The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space: Views from the Younger Generation Leaders Network 3031246721, 9783031246722

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The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space Views from the Younger Generation Leaders Network Edited by Julia Berghofer · Andrew Futter · Clemens Häusler · Maximilian Hoell · Juraj Nosál

The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space

Julia Berghofer · Andrew Futter · Clemens Häusler · Maximilian Hoell · Juraj Nosál Editors

The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space Views from the Younger Generation Leaders Network

Editors Julia Berghofer Berlin, Germany

Andrew Futter Leicester, UK

Clemens Häusler Munich, Germany

Maximilian Hoell London, UK

Juraj Nosál Vienna, Austria

ISBN 978-3-031-24672-2 ISBN 978-3-031-24673-9 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Alex Linch shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For Bob Berls

Introduction

This book is a joint project by members of the Younger Generation Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic Security (YGLN), a network of emerging leaders which draws its membership from the Euro-Atlantic space. Rather than just presenting a compilation of different viewpoints on emerging technologies and their immediate and longer-term implications for societies, security and economies in the region, the book presents a broad range of perspectives. It includes a collection of ideas, analyses and perspectives from a geographically diverse group of next generation thinkers from Europe, Russia and North America, who have collaboratively worked on their chapters. 24 February 2022 marked a sharp break in the relationship between Russia and the West, and an even sharper break in the relationship between Russians and Ukrainians—be it in the cultural, civil society, or academic sphere. The work on this book, however, continued with a remarkable spirit of collaboration between the contributors from east and west. Even in the present circumstances, the YGLN brings together experts from all sides. The YGLN is a place where Russians and Belarusians talk to Ukrainians, Armenians talk to Azeris and where North Americans talk to their European colleagues on security matters, economic, political and technological trends as well as threats to humanity like climate change and nuclear war. The Network started thinking about this book in late 2020, at a time when relations between east and west were already strained but did not

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INTRODUCTION

yet appear as bleak as today. Following the publication of a first book coauthored by YGLN members in 2020—Threats to Euro-Atlantic Security: Views from the Younger Generation Leaders Network—the participants in the Network shared a feeling that there would be value in joining forces once again for another academic, cross-regional project. The book we present here was also greatly motivated by the conviction that by collaborating on academic work, the YGLN creates and protects a safe space for scholars and professionals to meet and exchange ideas. At the same time, the book aims to spread fresh, next generation thinking across the academic, think tank and policy communities. We sense that the implications of emerging technologies for our collective future would be a timely and important topic for a Network as the YGLN to address. Henceforth, the collection that we brought together mirrors different trends in the wide field of emerging and disruptive technologies and puts them in the context of various social, political and economic settings, from military applications, export controls, the struggle between liberal and illiberal forces on the Internet, to new trends that can help to tackle climate change—to name but a few. The YGLN as a next-generation project is a natural hub for nourishing new ideas and for offering its members platforms to share them with a wider public. Since 2014, when the Network was launched in the wake of the emerging Ukraine crisis, it has provided a forum for exchange for the younger voices of emerging leaders across Europe, Russia and North America. Leaders come from a broad variety of professional and cultural backgrounds. While the YGLN has doubled its membership since the establishment of the Network to more than 100, the tradition of strong interpersonal links, formal and informal meetings between members, intimate discussions in-person and online, as well as frank and open exchange, has persisted. Those members who have risen to influential positions and consider themselves alumni of the YGLN—working for instance at NATO, the U.S. State Department, as advisors for the United Nations or pursuing political careers—are role models for existing members and remain part of the YGLN family to support their peers. Against this background, the book is to be understood as a project realised by colleagues who are closely collaborating with each other and who assist each other in developing their thinking—across cultural and political barriers.

INTRODUCTION

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Finally, the YGLN would not be as powerful as it is today without the tremendous support of senior leaders and experts from across North America, Russia and Europe. The Network continues to be extremely grateful for their help and advice. Amongst them, the co-editors would like to particularly thank Lord Des Browne, Ambassador (ret.) Jim Collins and Sir Adam Thomson for their passion for the network and their continued steadfast commitment to support the next generation of leaders. Above all, Robert E. Berls Jr. who was, until his passing in 2021, the staunchest supporter of the YGLN and a good friend and colleague to its members, deserves our highest gratitude.

Contents

Part I Politics and Geopolitics 1

2

Digital Illiberalism and the Erosion of the Liberal International Order Pavel Kanevskiy The Emergence of E-participation Tools: Strengthening Democracy Through Inclusive Debates Julia Berghofer

3

23 43

3

The US–China 5G Race in Europe’s Western Balkans Gent Salihu

4

The Role of Export Controls in Managing Emerging Technology Maria Shagina

57

The Geopolitics of Energy Transition: New Resources and Technologies Marco Siddi

73

5

Part II Strategic Stability and Military Affairs 6

Technological Uncertainty and Strategic Stability Igor Istomin

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Emerging Technologies and “Green-Friendly” Military Conflict? Lucia Gavenˇciaková

8

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: Implications for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Maximilian Hoell and Sylvia Mishra

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Contemporary Cybersecurity Challenges Pavel Sharikov

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Autonomous Weapons Systems in Armed Conflicts: New Challenges for International Law Verena Jackson

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123 143

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Part II Economy and Society 177

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Crime in the Digital Age: A New Frontier Juraj Nosál

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Emerging Technologies as an Opportunity for a Sustainable and Carbon-Neutral Future Ivana Vuchkova

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Cyber Sovereignty: Should Cyber Borders Replicate Territorial Borders? Tinatin Japaridze

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Tracing Accountability: Product Sourcing Technology and Implications for Conservation and Human Rights Initiatives Carolyn Forstein

Index

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Notes on Contributors

Julia Berghofer is a Policy Fellow with the European Leadership Network where she focuses on nuclear arms control and deterrence in the Euro-Atlantic space. Her position also includes coordinating the activities of the Younger Generation Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic Security (YGLN). Prior to joining the ELN, Julia was a Research Assistant with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) in Berlin and a Project Assistant in the organisational team of the Munich Security Conference (M.SC.). Julia holds a Bachelor in Political and Communication Sciences from the Ludwig-Maximilians-University in Munich and the University of Vienna, and completed her Master in Political Science at the University of Hamburg. Carolyn Forstein is an Attorney practising trial and appellate litigation at a U.S. law firm. She previously clerked for U.S. District Court Judge Timothy Burgess and Justice Edwin Cameron of the Constitutional Court of South Africa. Carolyn has worked on a range of international law and rule of law issues, including projects based in Ukraine, Bangladesh and Peru. Before law school, Carolyn researched rule of law development as a Fulbright fellow in Ukraine and studied in Russia on an academic scholarship. Carolyn holds a J.D. from Columbia Law School and a B.A. in International Relations from Stanford University.

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Lucia Gavenˇciaková is a Policy Assistant at Globsec, and a Master’s degree student in Security and Strategic Studies in the Czech Republic. She became interested in the field of climate security as a high school student and developed her passion for the topic into the main focus of her studies. She was an active contributor to Czecho-Slovak security portal, where she has published several analyses on climate security and military decarbonisation. She currently focuses on the challenge of climate security among the leaders and citizens of the Slovak Republic. Maximilian Hoell is a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Leadership Network in London, where he works on issues pertaining to nuclear arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation as well as transatlantic security. He earned a Ph.D. in International Relations from University College London. He also studied at the Universities of Oxford, Yale and Montpellier, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology (KAIST) as well as the London School of Economics and Political Science. Max has held academic appointments at Université Paris Dauphine—PSL, London campus as well as Northeastern University—London. Igor Istomin is an Acting Chair at the Department of Applied International Political Analysis and a Leading Research Fellow at the Center for Advanced American Studies, at Moscow State Institute of International Relations. He holds Ph.D. and M.A. degrees from MGIMO as well as undergraduate degree from St. Petersburg State University. In 2020–2021, Igor was a Senior Fellow at the Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. Verena Jackson is a Researcher and Lecturer at the Center for Intelligence and Security Studies (CSIS) at the University of the Armed Forces of Germany in Munich (UniBW). Prior to that, she worked for international law firms and the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, Garmisch-Partenkirchen Germany. She is a fully qualified lawyer in Germany holding a degree with specialisation in International Law. Her research focuses on Humanitarian Law, Human Rights and National Security Law. In particular, on the challenges that emerging technologies pose to the law. She also focuses on the transatlantic comparison of law. Tinatin Japaridze is the Vice President of Business Development at The Critical Mass and Special Advisor on Eurasian security at Eurasia Group. She previously worked for the City of New York and the United Nations as Bureau Chief for Eastern European media. In 2019, she became a

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Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs Ambassador on Cyber Ethics and Digital Leadership. Tinatin served as a “Go Big” Officer at ELN focusing on the New START Treaty extension, and later became a member of the YGLN. Her book Stalin’s Millennials was published to critical acclaim by Rowman & Littlefield in 2022. Pavel Kanevskiy is an Associate Professor of political science and international relations at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Since 2014 he has been a member of the Younger Generation Leaders Network on Euro-Atlantic Security (YGLN), being chair of the YGLN in 2018–2022. In 2015–2016 he was an EASI Hurford Next Generation Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. He is an expert at the Russian International Affairs Council, focusing on Russia–West relations. He regularly writes for academic journals and think tanks on Russian and American politics, international relations and comparative politics. Juraj Nosál works at the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) in Vienna where he is currently an Associate Project Officer for combating cybercrime in the Transnational Threats Department. Prior to that, he served in the OSCE Secretariat’s Conflict Prevention Centre (2020–2022), Transnational Threats Department (2017– 2020) and the Office of the Secretary General (2014–2017) where he supported various projects on the topics such as security sector governance and reform, intelligence-led policing, cybercrime and panEuropean security dialogue. He holds a Master’s degree in Terrorism and Political Violence from University of St Andrews and in International Relations from Masaryk University. Gent Salihu is a J.D. Candidate and Allen and Erika Lo Endowed Technology Law Scholar at Georgetown Law. Previously, Salihu worked on justice reforms through USAID Kosovo programming, including utilising technology to improve access to justice and streamline services. Gent taught public policy at the Rochester Institute of Technology in Kosovo, and served as an Advisor to the President of Kosovo and Minister of Justice. Salihu graduated A.B., magna cum laude, in Philosophy and Government from Dartmouth College, and as a recipient of Weidenfeld and Chevening scholarships, he holds a Master of Public Policy from the University of Oxford. Dr. Maria Shagina is a Diamond-Brown Research Fellow for Economic Sanctions, Standards and Strategy at the International Institute for

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Strategic Studies (IISS). Her research interests cover economic statecraft, international sanctions and energy politics, with a particular focus on the post-Soviet states. Pavel Sharikov is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, and Associate professor at Lomonosov Moscow State University. In 2019–2020 Pavel worked at the Center for International and Security Studies at the University of Maryland. In 2015 he authored the book Information security in a multipolar world. Pavel has published over 100 articles in Russian and English, and regularly appears in Russian media with commentaries on American politics and Russian-West relations. Marco Siddi is a Montalcini Assistant Professor at the University of Cagliari (Italy) and a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs. He focuses primarily on EU–Russia relations, European energy and climate policy and European identity and memory politics. He has published in some of the most renowned peer-reviewed journals in his research field. Previously, he was a Marie Curie fellow at the University of Edinburgh and a DAAD fellow at the Institute of European Politics (IEP) in Berlin. He has a Ph.D. in Politics from the Universities of Edinburgh and Cologne. Ivana Vuchkova is a Program Coordinator at the Friedrich-EbertStiftung Office in Skopje, where she leads the portfolio of activities in the field of economy, energy and sustainable development. Ivana holds a Master’s degree in Economic Governance and Development from the OSCE Academy, and is an author and co-author of number of papers and publications in the mentioned fields, including the first Manual of Arguments for a Fair and Ecological Society. As part of her professional and personal development, she is committed to promoting just economic and energy policies that are in harmony with the planetary boundaries and social needs.

PART I

Politics and Geopolitics

CHAPTER 1

Digital Illiberalism and the Erosion of the Liberal International Order Pavel Kanevskiy

Introduction The Internet was one of the most important technological innovations of the twentieth century, originating at the core of liberal international order (LIO). Three decades ago, the Internet was presumed to become a technology that would strengthen global liberalism because open information flows were seen as a natural continuation of freedom, supporting basic liberal and democratic principles. The creation of the Internet should be seen as a logical continuation of technological progress that is deeply interconnected with the spread of liberalism. But the liberalising promise of the Internet was put at risk by political authorities inside both authoritarian and democratic countries, as well as by “Big Tech” and populist, illiberal groups of different kinds. This chapter provides an overview of the underlying reasons that have led to the emergence of both digital liberalism and digital illiberalism, what implications these

P. Kanevskiy (B) Lomonosov Moscow State University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_1

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processes have on the liberal international order, and proposes policy recommendations for how to reverse illiberal tendencies in the digital sphere.

Technological Progress and the Emergence of Liberal Internationalism Technological progress and the evolution of liberalism can be seen as naturally interdependent. Liberties and liberal institutions deriving from the era of the Enlightenment established conditions for human creativity, social and political progress. Liberalism created the premises for innovation and inventions that provided people with new means to do things, increased benefits and lowered costs. Innovation became the driving force of the industrial revolution in the West and laid the foundations of modern economies. The strong link between liberalism and technological progress was the key factor behind the evolution of liberal democracies and the liberal international order. From the liberal colonial empires of the nineteenth century to the post-Cold War order, the technological superiority of the Western countries was the foundation of their central role in global politics and the global economy. Technological progress had steadily increased monetary and political returns for industrialised and liberal states and created preconditions for stronger connectivity inside the liberal core. Globalisation, the internationalisation of the chains of production, and improved links between capitalist hubs across the world technologically drove the liberal order in the second half of the twentieth century. Hence, technologies were shaping and strengthening liberalism both domestically and globally. The interconnection between globalisation and technological progress also explains the remarkable stability of the postWWII Western order and its ultimate technological superiority by the end of the millennium. It facilitated economic growth, encouraged the flow of knowledge and technology and drew states together.1 The spread of liberalism resulted in the emergence of the truly integrated global system

1 G. John Ikenberry, “The End of Liberal International Order?”, International Affairs, 94:1 (2018), p. 17.

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in the nineteenth century even though not all members of this system were fully open and democratic societies.2 At the same time, members of the liberal order had to adjust to a growing technological complexity. A grand debate on who controls technologies and, in whose interest, dates back to the early stages of industrial capitalism, although it was not until the twentieth century that widely accepted regulatory frameworks were created by states.3 Had the modern regulatory state not developed, the negative effects of industrialism would likely have overshadowed its positive ones. However, the exact balance between regulation and freedom has changed over time. Technological progress has had both benefits and drawbacks for liberal societies because of its strong impact on labour markets, distribution of resources and social inequality. Waves of industrial progress strengthened the link between liberalism, technological progress and capitalism. One of the key reasons why technological development became highly interconnected with liberalism was the adoption of experimental methods within liberal communities. But whereas in most parts of the world science and innovation existed without much practical application, in early liberal societies, primarily in Great Britain, it became an element of industrial production when business people understood the benefits of relying on experiments and scientific research. As Jack Goldstone argues, England in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was the first country in which a combination of “educated workforce, freedom of ideas, technological innovation, and the application of scientific engineering to industry” created a new model of economic growth and set an example for other nations to follow.4 States that managed to build strong institutional and cultural ties between liberty, creativity, innovations, inventions and the market economy benefitted the most. They became more developed economically and technologically which in turn amplified their power and capabilities

2 Ronald Findlay & Kevin H. O’Rourke, Power and Plenty: Trade, War, and the World Economy in the Second Millennium, (Princeton University Press: 2007) pp. 395–414. 3 Larry Neal & Jeffrey G. Williamson (eds.), The Cambridge History of Capitalism (Cambridge University Press: 2014), pp. 82–126. 4 Jack Goldstone, Why Europe? The Rise of the West in the World History, 1500–1850 (George Mason University: 2009), p. 172.

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globally. These processes also fostered the emergence and strengthening of more inclusive institutions that made societies more open and promoted the culture of innovation.5 The deep interconnection between liberalism, technological progress and the economy was one of the centrepieces of Modernisation Theory of the twentieth century.6 This theory was criticised multiple times, mainly from a Marxist and Dependence Theory viewpoint.7 Doubts have also been raised about whether capitalism and technological innovation can survive without liberalism.8 The major weakness of such criticism is that although it poses many deep questions on the nature of capitalism, democracy and societal development, it doesn’t really break the logical tie between liberalism and technological progress. For example, Germany was economically and technologically backward at the beginning of the nineteenth century, but had managed to reach high levels of scientific and industrial development in the second half of the nineteenth century while remaining a predominantly authoritarian state. As noted by Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson, Germany’s economic institutions in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries became more inclusive even as its polity remained largely authoritarian.9 To understand the German phenomena, it is worth remembering that although not being a part of the liberal order in the strict sense of the word, Germany was not completely illiberal. Centres of economic and technological progress in the Western parts of Germany had longstanding traditions of decentralised governance, trade and science. Civil codes like Prussia’s Allgemeines Landrecht had protected private property since at least the late eighteenth century, and in the early nineteenth century the Code Napoleon with its ideas of constitutionalism and the rule of law were becoming particularly visible in places like Rhineland 5 Trygve R. Tholfsen, “The Transition to Democracy in Victorian England”, International Review of Social History, 6:2 (1961), pp. 226–248. 6 Walt W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth, (Cambridge University Press: 1960). 7 Herbert Marcuse, One-dimensional man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial

Society, (Beacon Press: 1991), p. 260; Andre Gunder Frank, Barry K. Gills, The World System: Five Hundred Years or Five Thousand? (Routledge: 1996), p. 344. 8 Branko Milanovic, Capitalism, Alone: The Future of the System That Rules the World (Harvard University Press: 2019), p. 304. 9 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty, (Crown Business: 2012), p. 546.

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and Westphalia.10 Furthermore, the pre-WWI autocratic regimes with their growing middle classes and fast urbanisation had to integrate and accept elements of freedom and plurality without which it would’ve been impossible to sustain the necessary levels of scientific knowledge and entrepreneurship. The same logic is applicable to a certain degree to Japan or Russia in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Centralised illiberal states of the twentieth century like Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union made a new series of attempts to build competitive technological infrastructures in the twentieth century. They were successful in the military domain and in using technologies for mass mobilisation and total state control. For totalitarian regimes, technologies were used largely for the coercive needs of the state and became multipliers of their power at home and abroad. Innovations were allowed to the extent that they contributed to regime survival. This level of technological progress was enough to compete with the Euro-Atlantic liberal powers on the global stage but had limited potential for societal and economic development at home. The Communist system was the longest-standing illiberal and undemocratic alternative to the liberal order. Soviet science was able to produce ground-breaking success in space technologies, nuclear physics and chemistry. However, despite high levels of education, scientific breakthroughs and a stable if modest quality of life, innovation and technology never became drivers of societal and economic change under Communism. As Chi Ling Chan rightfully argues, that was mainly because of the “extensive military-industrial black hole exhausting the Soviets of key resources” as well as “the ideological capture of science… and structural disincentives against innovation.”11 The domination of a top-down approach and the absence of markets never allowed for the creation of a proper link between science, innovation and the economy. Loren Graham suggests that this is because the Soviet Union (as well as contemporary Russia to a certain degree) never “fully adopted the modern view that making money from technological innovation is an honorable, decent, and admirable thing to do.”12 The Soviet Union was able to compete with the West 10 Ewald Grothe, “Model or Myth? The Constitution of Westphalia of 1807 and Early German Constitutionalism”, German Studies Review, 28:1 (2005), pp. 1–19. 11 Chi Ling Chan, “Fallen Behind: Science, Technology, and Soviet Statism”, Intersect, 8:3 (2015), p. 1. 12 Loren Graham, Lonely Ideas: Can Russia Compete? (The MIT Press: 2013), p. 103.

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primarily because it created modern weaponry, but it never became a true competitor in the global economy. Gaps in key areas such as microchips and mechanical engineering only accelerated Soviet technological and economic decay. The Soviet example demonstrates that while innovations and technologies may serve the narrow purposes of the autocracy, the inability to link innovations and technologies with societal and economic progress inevitably weakens illiberal regimes from the inside. Contemporary China represents the latest example of the predominantly authoritarian system that managed to build a strong economy and to be able to compete with the West in many technological areas. According to Global Innovation Index, in 2021 China ranked 12th among the 132 economies, up 22 positions from ten years earlier.13 China heavily invests in critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, semiconductors and the space industry, although it is still far from being a leader in any of these areas.14 China is just another example of when modernisation, economic and technological progress become possible after a series of semi-liberal reforms. The new thinking of Deng Xiaoping as well as favourable geopolitical, trade and demographic conditions of the 1980s, 1990s and 2000s resulted in significant economic growth and boosted China’s technological potential. However, just like the Soviet Union before China faces serious challenges in building a truly competitive technological economy in a situation when Xi Jinping and the ruling elite appear unwilling to reform the system further.15

The Rise of Digital Liberalism With the rise of the Internet and digital technologies championed by the West, the structural leadership of liberal democracies in the global system became ever more evident. The Internet surfaced as the game-changing

13 Global Innovation Index 2021. China, https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/ wipo_pub_gii_2021/cn.pdf (Accessed 10 August 2022). 14 Dennis Normile, “A Beijing Think Tank Offered a Frank Review of China’s Technological Weaknesses. Then the Report Disappeared”, Science (8 February 2022), https://www.science.org/content/article/beijing-think-tank-offered-frank-reviewchina-s-technological-weaknesses-then-report (Accessed 10 August 2022). 15 Hal Brands, “The Dangers of China’s Decline”, Foreign Policy (14 April 2022), https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/04/14/china-decline-dangers/ (Accessed 10 August 2022).

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technology at the turn of the millennium. When Tim Berners-Lee invented the World Wide Web in 1989 for the purpose of information exchange between scientists and institutions, few could have imagined the revolutionary impact it would soon have on communication and the global economy. The Internet played a crucial role in the expansion of the liberal international order not only through increased returns, but it also created a new communication infrastructure that allowed the LIO to strengthen and expand in the post-Cold War era. According to Daniel Deudney and John Ikenberry, the post-1945 international liberal order was comprised of several key elements: security and economic co-binding; the consensual, cooperative and integrative nature of the American hegemony; the availability of mutual gains through the expansion of capitalism and free trade; the role of the Western liberal civic identity; the presence of semi-sovereign powers like Germany and Japan that reinforced the liberal order rather than the balance of power.16 It is through these elements that the liberal international order became the foundation for solidarity, cohesion and cooperation between states. The Internet successfully supported these elements in a number of ways, especially during the “golden era” of globalisation and liberalisation of the 1990s and the early 2000s. Foremost, it became a crucial tool for democratisation, and the expansion of liberal views and ideas. For the United States an open and free Internet was crucial for ensuring peace and prosperity at home and abroad as it helped to sustain American economic and political hegemony. The Internet was part of the “end of history” zeitgeist because it was considered as a natural continuation of the Western ideological, economic and technological superiority. Henry Farrell and Abraham Newman point out that the United States had managed to restructure the LIO with the use of the Internet, believing that “open communication would become self-reinforcing over time, strengthening democracy within liberal states and spreading democracy and liberal values to autocratic regimes.”17

16 Daniel Deudney & G. John Ikenberry, “The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order”, Review of International Studies, 25 (1999), pp. 179–196. 17 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “The Janus Face of the Liberal International Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining?”, International Organization, 75 (2021), p. 337.

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According to Larry Diamond, the Internet had great advantages compared to earlier technologies. Its decentralised character and ability to reach large segments of the population were well-suited to grassroots movements. The Internet’s capability to empower citizens in their desire to play a bigger role in politics and combat authoritarian regimes made it a perfect “liberation technology.”18 Indeed, this new communication infrastructure became one of the pillars of the Euro-Atlantic security model based on a combination of military force, economic and technological power and attractiveness of the Western model of development. The principles of open access and the unrestricted flow of information were crucial in supporting the growth of interconnected global liberal networks. It created a platform for improved communication within the global civic and capitalist communities. It was the driving force behind the strengthening of what Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye called “complex interdependence:”19 that the unwinding informational revolution fundamentally changes the world in which force matters less and countries are increasingly interconnected.20 The neoliberal approach towards global networks was based on the assumption that their existence resulted in reciprocal dependence that made coercive behaviour less effective, while stimulating mutually beneficial cooperation between states, corporations and civic groups. A network-based liberal order led to the creation of multiple information and communication hubs which made it harder for separate states to control them.21 This, in turn, fostered decentralisation, more freedom in international agenda-setting and hence strengthened the key principles of the LIO. Liberal networks existed long before the Internet, but digital liberalism reinforced their strength and efficacy while creating new communication channels for them. This is especially relevant in regard to international businesses and non-governmental organisations that received a new tool for communicating and advocating their agendas in the transnational and supranational space. 18 Larry Diamond, “Liberation technology”, Journal of Democracy, 21:3 (2010), pp. 69–83. 19 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., Power and Interdependence (Longman: 2001). 20 Robert O. Keohane & Joseph S. Nye Jr., “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age”, Foreign Affairs, 77:5 (1998), p. 83. 21 Ibid.

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The deep connection between online technologies and networks of interdependence challenges the opinions of some authors claiming that digital liberalism did not fulfil its main objective—that of increased international liberalisation.22 New communication spaces allowed major civic and capitalist forces around the world to better coordinate their activities, strengthened business ties and played a huge role in the development of international civil society. That of course didn’t mean that the Internet was able to change the structure of world politics. After all, as Keohane and Nye rightfully observed, “information does not flow in a vacuum but in political space that is already occupied.”23 Hence, the Internet was just an additional layer of the complex interdependence that made communication and transnational flows easier but didn’t become fully independent of politics. This also posed a dilemma—largely unsolved to this day—of whether the Internet is a technology of freedom or it is a technology of control.24 Consequently, one of the biggest challenges for many Western and especially American experts and policymakers since the 1990s was to make sure that the Internet and its underlying communication system stayed within the liberal agenda. This challenge shaped the American approach towards Internet governance. At the core of that thinking was the idea that the Internet—with all the benefits it creates for the liberal order— must not include any barriers or strict norms. In other words, it should be left as a largely unregulated technology because that was the only way for it to support the LIO naturally; to remain as a tool of the invisible hand of democratisation and liberalisation; and on top of that to let the United States strengthen its role as the key stakeholder in LIO. This goal was meant to be reached under two main conditions: the open and unregulated nature of the Internet, and American “smart supervision” designed to guarantee that no other state had the capacity to shape the virtual space according to their views and national interests. Greater multilateralism in governance of the Internet was traditionally perceived by American decision-makers as a threat to its democratic and liberal nature. 22 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “The Janus Face of the Liberal International Information Order: When Global Institutions Are Self-Undermining?”, International Organization, 75 (2021), p. 342. 23 Keohane & Nye, “Power and Interdependence in the Information Age”, p. 84. 24 Ronald Deibert & Rafal Rohozinski, “Liberation vs. Control: The Future of

Cyberspace”, Journal of Democracy, 21:4 (2010), p. 44.

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These ideas were behind the logic of US President Bill Clinton’s decision in 1998 to shift governance of the Internet from multilateral bodies such as the UN-affiliated International Telecommunication Union (ITU) to the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a California-based private company.25 As the American domain name market was the largest in the world, and the United States controlled the root server system that sits on top of the Domain Name System (DNS). This decision allowed the United States to shape Internet governance to their political and economic advantage as well as to multiply American hegemony within the liberal order. ICANN is not a formal regulatory institution, it is a private supervising body whose main function is to maintain the unregulated, open and interconnected character of the Internet. This approach coincided perfectly with the dynamic of the American-led liberal order because it restricted possibilities for states to shape the norms and rules of the virtual space and left it within the self-regulatory framework. The Internet was, hence, a double-edged technology that rested on principles of deregulation but was never meant to be fully neutral, because its main purpose was seen in supporting a certain set of ideas and multiplying American political and business influence globally. This situation created a paradox when a key new technology deriving from within the liberal system with tremendous potential to influence economies, civil societies and security was left outside of the normative and institutional structure. Such a paradox predetermined the anarchic nature of the Internet, which soon became a double-edged sword for digital liberalism and the liberal order it was supposed to support.

Virtual Anarchy and Digital Illiberalism The liberalising function of the Internet focussed attention away from its darker illiberal side. But how and why, in a matter of just two decades, did this alternate world become so powerful that it began to contest the original image? There is no single answer: power misbalances created by the unipolar system, the impact of democratic interventions, the economic crisis of 2008 and its aftershocks, accelerating migration flows, cultural clashes, rising populism, nativism and anti-globalisation 25 David Bach, “Varieties of Cooperation: The Domestic Institutional Roots of Global Governance”, Review of International Studies, 36:3 (2010), pp. 578–579.

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sentiments provoked a perfect storm for liberal internationalism in the twenty-first century. The political, economic, value and communicative foundations upon which the LIO was grounded were put into doubt by many non-Western polities as well as different groups at the heart of the liberal community. Together with structural problems, such as the unequal distribution of resources and the disproportional role of the corporate sector, these factors created new challenges for the liberal order. The Internet, which was a major communication platform within the liberal order, became crucial in the rise of illiberalism. There were several fundamental shifts in world politics that strengthened the illiberal side of the Internet. The terrorist attacks of September 2001 led to an era of surveillance systems penetrating all aspects of life. Together with the growing power of big technological corporations this resulted in an invasion of personal privacy and the evolution of surveillance capitalism based on micro-targeting of the audience and marketing and advertising business.26 Another important reason behind the rise of digital illiberalism was the gradual rise of autocratic regimes and autocratic tendencies both outside and inside the Euro-Atlantic community. It took time for these actors to accommodate to the new information technologies used by pro-democratic forces, but mobilisation against it accelerated during the second decade of the twenty-first century. Finally, the culture of political activism itself started to change with growing anti-elitist and populist sentiments gaining ground globally. Hence, digital liberalism was facing rising pressure from three different but deeply interconnected sides: the state (from both liberal and illiberal camps), “Big Tech,” and a new type of grassroots political activism. The combination of these pressures led to a number of disruptions in the relationship between the Internet and the liberal order. One thing that could have hardly been predicted in the early days of digital liberalisation was that online technologies would reinforce rather than undermine the domestic and global influence of the illiberal regimes. The role of illiberal states in controlling the virtual agenda had indeed long been relatively low. In the 1990s and early 2000s, they lacked the motivation and means to influence the evolution of the Internet and to compete with the United States as well as global networks that promoted digital liberalism. Tectonic shifts in political cultures and new waves of 26 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power (Profile Books: 2019), p. 704.

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civic activism at the beginning of the twenty-first century resulted in a political tremor, legitimacy crises and colour revolutions in developing regions, from the post-Soviet space to the Islamic world and the Asia– Pacific. The Internet played a crucial role in this wave of democratisation. As Philip Howard argued in 2010, the Internet played a key role in nearly all democratic transitions of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.27 The World Web became a basis for civic coordination and was able to successfully compete with the state media in agenda-setting. However, new protests and legitimacy crises pushed many ruling elites into defensive positions. Liberalism and extensive freedoms were quickly blamed as universal causes of all misfortunes by illiberal politicians and autocrats. The Internet was at the centre of the new battleground for human minds. Its open nature and strong connection to the liberal world were perceived as a threat to national interests in the eyes of many illiberal political elites. Hence some states started pushing harder to contest and ideally control the virtual agenda. The example of Belarus vividly demonstrates how the regime’s response to pro-democratic Internet activism evolved in the first decade of the twenty-first century.28 Attacks on digital liberalism by authoritarian regimes became more solidified and concentrated in the 2010s as a response to such events as the Arab Spring and new civil unrest in the post-Soviet space. Moreover, as authoritarian regimes started to view digital liberalism as a threat to their legitimacy and survival, they decided to shift those tactics used against dissent at home to fighting digital liberalism globally by mobilising illiberal forces of all kinds and undermining democratic institutions. Those tactics that worked at home turned out to be applicable in the global anarchic and unregulated virtual space. Fake news and the creation of illiberal networks based on social media had become unexpectedly strong tools that were able to compete with liberal agendas and discourses, influence public opinion and sow social and political mistrust. Digital illiberalism became a compensatory strategy for those political forces who saw the US-led LIO as the source of all troubles, from an unfair distribution of power to the existential threat to the illiberal regimes themselves. A 27 Philip N. Howard, The Digital Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Information Technology and Political Islam (Oxford University Press: 2010), pp. 3–4. 28 Volodymyr V. Lysenko & Kevin C. Desouza, “The Use of Information and Communication Technologies by Protesters and the Authorities in the Attempts at Colour Revolutions in Belarus 2001–2010”, Europe-Asia Studies, 67:4 (2015), p. 639.

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new kind of illiberal counter-propaganda produced plentiful outputs at a minimum cost, and allowed for illiberal sentiments to be spread both at home and abroad. Illiberal states also introduced an array of methods to put the Internet under stricter governmental control. Simple solutions to this day include blocking or slowing down of the Internet supported by legislative actions best seen in China, Russia and Iran. Longer-ranging visions suggest it is possible to disconnect from the global network and create a separate state-controlled root system. Russia and China have made the first steps in this direction in 2018 and 2019, respectively. Russia went ahead by enacting a law that would someday allow it to create a “sovereign Internet,”29 whereas China started experimenting with independent DNS root servers.30 Today it is possible to imagine a world where the Internet is divided into different regulatory segments.31 The spread of contentfiltering from both illiberal and liberal states violates the very philosophy of the Internet as an open space. But it is not only illiberal states that are witnessing the erosion of digital liberalism. Democratic states, either through governmental agencies or private entities, are collecting enormous amounts of metadata to be used for national security reasons. Political parties and politicians of different kinds use private companies to collect and analyse private data without a strict judicial oversight. This raises a question about the moral limits of personal data management and the purposes it can be used for. The notorious example of Cambridge Analytica, a firm that was involved in multiple political campaigns in the United Kingdom and the United States, including the support of Donald Trump and pro-Brexit

29 Roman Goncharenko, “Russia Moves Toward Creation of an Independent Internet”, DW (17 January 2018), https://www.dw.com/en/russia-moves-toward-creationof-an-independent-internet/a-42172902 (Accessed 25 January 2022). 30 “China Greenlights Establishment of Root Server”, Xinhua (8 December 2019), http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-12/08/c_138613999.htm (Accessed 25 January 2022). 31 Ronald J. Deibert, “The Geopolitics of Internet Control: Censorship, Sovereignty, and Cyberspace”, in: Andrew Chadwick/Philip N. Howard (eds.), Routledge Handbook of Internet Politics (Routledge: 2009), p. 334.

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organisations. But this is just a drop in the ocean of unregulated data gathering.32 Illiberal civic activism is another dilemma for digital liberalism. The anarchic nature of the Internet created natural premises for a wide variety of opinions that were not necessarily liberal. The liberalising effect of the Internet was most evident among globalised elites, well-educated, rational, cosmopolite citizens, and those aspiring to liberal values in the developing world. However, as a mass technology available to every citizen in the world with access to a computer or a smartphone, the virtual world can also be shaped by very different actors. As Larry Diamond noted a decade ago, “even in the freest environments, the new digital means of information and communication have important limits and costs… The proliferation of online media has not uniformly improved the quality of public deliberation, but rather has given rise to an “echo chamber” of the ideologically like-minded egging each other on.”33 Radical, populist, illiberal voices on both sides of the political spectrum, with little chance of setting agendas through traditional representation, have found the Internet a perfect ideological tool. While mainstream politicians and political parties were slow in exploring the possibilities of online communication, illiberal movements were early adopters. The emergence of illiberal movements has rational explanations but it is doubtful whether they would have had such an impact on the wider public without the Internet. Examples of both Trump and proBrexit campaigners demonstrate the malicious side of online media and its potential to empower illiberal movements. Major tech corporations have often been blamed for the rise of digital illiberalism. After all, they created the infrastructure through which states gather data and illiberal regimes and movements spread hatred and fake news. Considering the Internet is largely unregulated, Big Tech was free to set the rules and norms to their advantage with minimal public control. The evolution of regulatory regimes across the world, with the noticeable example of the EU and its General Data Protection Regulations (GDRP) implemented in 2018, have made some difference but haven’t stopped illiberal forces from exploiting the open nature of the Internet. 32 Billy Perigo, “The Capabilities Are Still There. Why Cambridge Analytica Whistleblower Christopher Wylie Is Still Worried”, Time (8 October 2019), https://time.com/ 5695252/christopher-wylie-cambridge-analytica-book/ (Accessed 10 August 2022). 33 Diamond, “Liberation Technology”, p. 80.

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Big Tech didn’t have all these political dilemmas in mind when it evolved into the digital universe. The main goal of these companies was and remains profit. Facebook and Twitter were not created for propaganda and the spread of fake news. As David Runciman argues; “The architects of the system are stumbling across the pitfalls with the rest of us… It is just a side effect of being in the advertising business.”34 In the end, the corporations were handmaids in shaping both digital liberalism and digital illiberalism. According to Francis Fukuyama “network economies guarantee that the power to distribute or supress information becomes concentrated in the hands of just two or three gigantic internet platforms.”35 This shows once again that institutions designed to enhance market efficiency and reduce transaction costs can be used for coercive needs.36 All this leads to the broader question of why the Internet and social media have made liberal democracies more vulnerable rather than strengthening them. Traditional media in liberal societies has to a certain degree been subject to the public interest, regulations and ethical codes. By contrast, the anarchic virtual world is a perfect breeding ground for a cacophony of voices, competing narratives and partisanship. As Anne Applebaum notes, “the social media algorithms themselves encourage false perceptions of the world.”37 Algorithms have the ability to radicalise those who use them and favour primitive emotions like anger and fear because emotions keep people online. Recent revelations by Facebook whistle blower Frances Haugan show that the corporation knew its algorithms were fuelling polarisation, hate speech and misinformation.38 Still, the underlying problem of digital illiberalism is not Big Tech, populist politicians or illiberal movements per se. Rather it is the changing nature of democracy and the way that politics is made in the digital era. 34 David Runciman, How Democracy Ends (Profile Books: 2019), p. 158. 35 Francis Fukuayama, Liberalism and Its Discontents (Profile Books: 2022), p. 104. 36 Henry Farrell & Abraham L. Newman, “Weaponized Interdependence: How Global

Networks Shape State Coercion”, International Security, 44:1 (2019), pp. 46–47. 37 Anne Applebaum, Twilight of Democracy. The Failure of Politics and the Parting of Friends (Allen Lane: 2020), p. 113. 38 Loveday Morris, Elizabeth Dwoskin & Hamza Shaban, “Whistleblower Testimony and Facebook Papers Trigger Lawmaker Calls for Regulation”, The Washington Post (25 October 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2021/10/25/facebookpapers-live-updates/ (Accessed 25 January 2022).

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Whereas traditional representative democracy was meant to work through discussion and compromise, democracy in the digital era is built on the short-term desires, fears and biases of the electorate. The Internet with its data-harvesting machines, online advertising and social media algorithms, is a perfect environment for quick decisions and what people see as quick solutions. Brexit was based on the idea of a quick solution to a range of complicated challenges, just like the election of Donald Trump. Populists and illiberal politicians build their agendas on short-lived occasions rather than long-term visions. This tendency is also spreading to mainstream centrists. Digital democracy is not necessarily equal to digital liberalism, because participation and political perceptions work differently in the virtual universe, not always in the name of reason, respect of norms and basic liberal values.

What Is to Be Done? There is no simple solution to the problem of digital illiberalism. It will require a lot of work from political elites as well as a politically conscious public. The core task is to harness digital technologies again for democratisation. One example is a wave of deliberative democracy, a form of democracy that is based on public consultation with citizens, that continues to gain momentum across the globe. One of the leading researchers in this area, Hélène Landemore, argues that citizens’ assemblies and juries have become vivid examples of how the direct participation of citizens can make policies more informed, efficient and legitimate.39 Today’s political deliberation extensively relies on online technologies with the trend becoming particularly evident in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic.40 Citizens’ assemblies have great potential to channel public activity into meaningful decision-making and connect it to representative democracy. Apart from that, online voting spreading from Canada to Estonia is used to help politicians decide on key issues of local communities. Big data and machine learning can also be used to scan social problems and improve feedback loops rather than be exploited solely for the sake of successful political campaigns. 39 Hélène Landemore, Open Democracy: Reinventing Popular Rule for the Twenty-First Century (Princeton University Press: 2020), p. 272. 40 Claudia Chwalisz, “The Pandemic Has Pushed Citizen Panels Online”, Nature, 589 (2021), p. 171.

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Changing the nature of social media requires more sophisticated responses. Combating fake news and fact checking are good starting points that are already high on the agenda. The problem is that they haven’t prevented polarisation and cognitive biases. The example of the United States shows that citizens tend to interpret political issues through a partisan perspective and use the term “fake news” when “referring to information uncongenial to one’s own beliefs.”41 As Francis Fukuyama argued “the Internet has allowed people to mistake speech acts for acts that affect outcomes in the real world… This is not to say that social media cannot lead to meliorative outcomes in the real world. Most people, however, are satisfied with the simulacrum of reality that they get through their online interactions.”42 To change such attitudes would mean changing the way people see the Internet as a tool of responsible political actions based on norms of civil society, verification of information as well as respect for private opinions and zones of privacy. Recalibrating corporate algorithms is another vector but that would require a lot of work from lawmakers on both sides of the Atlantic as well as public discussion on forms and limits of regulation. GDPR is a great example of data protection, however, it is necessary to watch carefully that GDPR’s safeguards do not compromise freedom of speech that is already endangered in such EU countries as Hungary or Poland.43 In illiberal countries the situation is more one-dimensional. Digital illiberalism is rooted in the nature of such political regimes. Bureaucracies and special services tend to interfere much deeper into the digital space seeing it as a potential threat to the stability of the state. In countries like China and Russia governments control what their citizens can and cannot see online and shrink and destroy the space for independent thought on the Internet.44 “Sovereign Internet” approaches won’t reverse to a more 41 Chau Tong, Hyungjin Gill, Jianing Li, Sebastián Valenzuela & Hernando Rojas, “Fake News Is Anything They Say!”—Conceptualization and Weaponization of Fake News Among the American Public”, Mass Communication and Society, 23:5 (2020), p. 760. 42 Fukuayama, Liberalism and Its Discontents, pp. 112–113. 43 Nani Jansen Reventlow, “Can the GDPR and Freedom of Expression Coexist?”,

AJIL Unbound, 114 (2020), p. 34. 44 Yaqiu Wang, “In China, the ‘Great Firewall’ Is Changing a Generation”, Politico.com (9 January 2020), https://www.politico.com/news/magazine/2020/09/01/china-greatfirewall-generation-405385 (Accessed 10 August 2022); John Thornhill, “Russia’s Digital Iron Curtain Will Fail”, Financial Times (10 March 2022), https://www.ft.com/con tent/26e88a2b-c7ba-46c7-8191-490188f4757b (Accessed 10 August 2022).

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open digital political culture unless pushed by political transformations from the inside. The underlying issue is how the Internet could be governed to remain part of the liberal order and to reduce the risks of descending into greater illiberalism. The biggest dilemma is that Internet governance has two faces; one of a democratic nature and another of a coercive and manipulative one. Both digital liberalism and illiberalism are rooted in the global web’s open nature. The absence of clear rules and norms has created a vacuum that was filled by radical populists of all kinds, private corporate interests and illiberal regimes, and it allowed governments and political parties to exploit unregulated flows of big data. That leads to the next question: Who should be responsible for creating a more structured, understandable and legitimate set of rules? Illiberal states would obviously want a more multilateral approach like the revival of the ITU mandate, but that would most likely legalise and legitimise the partition of the Internet along geopolitical and ideological lines. One possible answer is that the current deregulated regime with ICANN at its core should be reformed. Internet governance should be a multi-stakeholder process with international civil society having more of a voice within the regulatory mechanism. That also requires a more robust action from politicians, lawmakers and civil societies across the world who should acknowledge the risks of the Internet remaining an informal and therefore highly politicised space. That requires a lot of balancing because giving too much regulative power to national governments will only further depreciate its original liberal nature. Whether through the comprehensive reform of ICANN or the creation of new institutions, we need to make sure that any new attempt to regulate the Internet and the way information is spread online doesn’t undermine basic freedoms and is used for the benefit of liberal democracy.

Conclusion The connection between digital liberalism and illiberalism is ambiguous because the Internet itself is both a liberation technology and technology of control. Realistically it is hard to disconnect one from another. The biggest challenge in dealing with digital illiberalism is the open and deregulated nature of the Internet. The Internet is different from information technologies of the past because it potentially gives every citizen and social group the power to shape public opinion and influence political

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actions. Platforms of digital communication allow the spread of any kind of information and disinformation, but their strengths are easily turned into weaknesses; they are vulnerable to excessive control and manipulation. Reversing digital illiberalism will require a new approach to Internet governance, to the ways social media algorithms are organised, and to the Internet’s function in a modern democracy. At the same time digital illiberalism is not the cause but the effect of the larger illiberal wave in the Euro-Atlantic community and beyond that has deep roots in economic, demographic, political and cultural shifts across the globe. If and when the liberal international liberal order is fixed and the next global wave of liberalisation arrives digital illiberalism will not fade away completely but it can at least lose its current impact. The power of the Internet lies in its ability to open the way to critical thinking, to accelerate economic and social development, to build cultural, economic and political ties among groups and nations, to break stereotypes, and to foster the spread of democratic ideas. This is why any attempt to introduce more regulation in the digital sphere requires careful treatment. An overregulated Internet will not solve the problems of the liberal order but likely make things worse.

CHAPTER 2

The Emergence of E-participation Tools: Strengthening Democracy Through Inclusive Debates Julia Berghofer

Introduction Direct democracy is not part of the political process in most countries, which is one reason why participation in the public political discourse for citizens who are not part of the political establishment is traditionally limited. This can lead to discontent with citizens who do not have access to these debates. Likewise, the bureaucratic process around some available tools is complex and may lead to lesser engagement. However, leaders in countries like Germany have started to understand that broader and more inclusive participation by citizens can contribute to strengthen democratic structures and the legitimacy of the decision-making processes. E-participation, whose “tools and approaches are constantly evolving

J. Berghofer (B) European Leadership Network (ELN), London, UK e-mail: [email protected] Younger Generation Leaders Network (YGLN), Berlin, Germany

23 © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_2

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parallel to new technologies and the digitalization of various services”1 is an effective way to increase the inclusivity of participation. Thanks to the availability and widespread reach of digital technologies—the use of social media platforms, videoconferencing, etc.—in most parts of the world it offers an opportunity for engaging a larger part of the citizenship in policy processes. Given the limitations of this contribution it is not possible to provide a holistic assessment of e-participation tools. Therefore, an assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of three specific initiatives—the Dialog Endlagersicherheit, the Bürgerrat—Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt, and the Bundestag’s (public) e-petition platform—is used to exemplify the opportunities and challenges linked to e-participation tools from the viewpoint of their reach, their contribution to the decision-making process and user-friendliness. These initiatives have been selected because of their popularity and relevance. They have certain aspects in common and other aspects in which they differ. Their commonality is the timeliness of their respective focal area; the concreteness of their output; a combination of online and offline activities. The aspects where they partly differ are the scope of participation and inclusiveness; the level of provision of information; the ability of participants to take part in consultations; possibilities for active participation; the accessibility of the tools provided by the conveners; their timeline; and concrete outcomes. The chapter begins by providing information on the concept of eparticipation as a tool to support e-government and enhance digital democracy. Subsequently, it will look at Germany’s overall performance in e-participation and e-government, before examining the three initiatives mentioned above and their respective approach. In the final section, the chapter will provide some thoughts on the effectiveness of these approaches based on principles laid down by the research services of the United Nations (UN) and the European Parliament (EP).

1 Lita Akmentina, “E-participation and Engagement in Urban Planning: Experiences from the Baltic Cities”, Urban Research & Practice (2022). https://doi.org/10.1080/ 17535069.2022.2068965.

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E-participation: Definition and the Situation in Germany The 2020 E-Government Survey, published by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA),2 defines eparticipation as both a subfield of participation and part of e-government, the latter being one component of the broader framework of digital democracy. More precisely, the UN study, describing itself as the “only global report that assesses the e-government development status of all United Nations Member States”,3 refers to e-participation as a concept that “revolves around the use of information and communications technology (ICT) to engage people in public decision-making, administration and service delivery”. Alongside pointing out the “intrinsic and instrumental value” of this specific form of participation, the publication also highlights the importance of e-participation for the implementation of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). In particular, target 16.74 of the UN SDGs calls for ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative decision-making at all levels.5 The intrinsic value, the report further explains, “is based on the idea that participation (…) is a desirable goal because it contributes to inclusive societies”, while the instrumental value lies in “the role it can play in increasing government accountability, making public services more responsive to people’s needs, and improving the quality of policies and

2 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey 2020”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Docume nts/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 3 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey 2020”, see section “About this Survey”.https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Por tals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey% 20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 4 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey 2020”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Docume nts/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 5 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Sustainable Development Goals, SDG Indicators, https://unstats.un.org/sdgs/metadata/?Text=&Goal=16& Target=16.7 (accessed 27 July 2022).

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legislation”.6 According to the concept laid out by the E-Government Survey, the core elements of e-participation as an intersection of participation and e-government are: provision of information, consultation, and decision-making.7 This approach cannot be seen as a general definition. In a 2016 study on the “Potential and Challenges of E-Participation in the European Union”, the European Parliament states that the term e-participation “suffers from a lack of an all-inclusive definition, as it comprises a wide range of initiatives”.8 According to this paper, there is nevertheless a “general consensus” that it comprises the following interactions between governments and citizens: e-information, e-consultation, and edecision-making.9 Macintosh/Whyte (2008) are using a similar “working definition” when describing e-participation along the lines of provision of information, the engagement of citizens through government-led initiatives (“top-down”), as well as efforts to empower citizens and civil society to reach out to their elected representatives (“ground-up”).10 For the purpose of this chapter—which is not aimed at finding a new definition—the working definitions provided by the EP and the UN, which also align with the Macintosh/Whyte definition, will be used. In this sense, eparticipation can be broadly defined as a combination of three aspects: (i) the provision of information, (ii) consultation of citizens, and (iii) engagement of citizens in the decision-making process through digital means (which does not exclude a combination of digital and offline tools as will be shown later in this chapter).

6 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey 2020”, see Chapter 5 “E-Participation”, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/ Portals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20S urvey%20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 7 Ibid. 8 European Parliament Directorate-General for Internal Policies, “Potential and Chal-

lenges of E-Participation in the European Union”, (2016), https://www.europarl.europa. eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2016/556949/IPOL_STU(2016)556949_EN.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 9 Ibid. 10 Ann Macintosh and Whyte, Angus, “Towards an Evaluation Framework for ePar-

ticipation.” Transforming Government People Process and Policy, 2:1 (2008). https://doi. org/10.1108/17506160810862928.

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Besides the lack of clear definition of the term “e-participation”, there are also no clear benchmarks as to what defines “successful” eparticipation tools. Taking the UN and EP publications as a basis, responsiveness of governments to the needs of their citizens, accountability, inclusiveness/accessibility, and effectiveness appear to be dominant aspects when it comes to assessing the success of e-participation initiatives. The UN Survey ranks countries according to an E-Participation Index (EPI) based on the features of national e-government portals. A summary of these features provided by the study includes 14 points, starting with the “[a]vailability of online information (on policies and budgets) in the areas of education, health, social protection, employment, environment and justice” and ending with “[e]vidence of Government’s publication of outcomes of policy consultations online”.11 The countries assessed in the UN publication have been allocated to four distinct EPI levels since 2016, ranging from “low” to “middle”, “high”, and “very high” EPI values. In 2020, Germany ranks among the countries with a very high EPI level according to the study,12 which indicates that most of the e-participation features identified by the UN are present in Germany. Compared by its E-Government Development Index (EGDI)—a measurement that includes the Online Service Index (OSI), Telecommunications Infrastructure Index (TII), and Human Capital Index (HCI)—Germany is ranked 25, thus falling behind, inter alia, the Nordic countries, Estonia, the UK, France, and the Netherlands. Compared to 42 other countries in Europe that were assessed by the authors of the study, Germany’s performance is therefore only moderately satisfactory. Although Germany still holds a very high EDGI value (rating class V3—which equals 15 out of 16 possible ranks), the survey states that “focusing on improvements in online services provision could greatly accelerate progress in overall e-government development”. With regard to citizens’ preparedness to engage politically via online tools, there have been only a few German-speaking studies published in 11 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey 2020”, see p. 118, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/egovkb/Doc uments/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full%20Repo rt).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 12 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey 2020”, see p. 119, Table 5.1, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Portals/ego vkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey%20(Full% 20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).

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recent times. One insightful study on e-democracy has been conducted by Germany’s digital association Bitkom.13 It was presented in September 2021, ahead of the general elections. The study investigates to what extent citizens consume information about political topics online, whether they appreciate online dialogue opportunities with politicians, and whether there is appetite for more e-participation tools. According to the study, while the younger generation is most likely to gather political information online, there is a huge interest among almost half of the respondents across all age groups to engage in an online dialogue with politicians, thus implying a greater desire for active involvement. Also, more than a third of the respondents have already tried out eparticipation tools, be it in a regional, federal, or European context. More than half of the respondents would like to do so in the future. The study also flags divergencies regarding the approval for e-participation in different contexts: while 33% of the respondents have already engaged in e-participation on a federal level, and 31% indicated an interest to do so in the future, actual participation and interest is considerably lower regarding the EU level (9% and 22%, respectively). The authors of the study add that the higher engagement rate and interest with regard to the federal level might be due to the availability of several existing tools, for instance e-petitions.

Dialog Endlagersicherheit The topic of Endlagersicherheit (repository safety) is one of the most controversial themes in post-War Germany, as it is linked to another contentious issue, nuclear energy. While there was some optimism in the early days of nuclear energy, huge demonstrations in the 1970s and the Chernobyl incident in 1986 have stirred more criticism among the population.14 The Christian Democrats and Liberal Democrats continued to reassure the German public of the safety of nuclear power plants, while in sharp contrast, the Green Party established itself as a key opponent of

13 Bitkom, “Bitkom stellt Studie zu E-Democracy vor”, (9 September 2021), https:// www.bitkom.org/Presse/Presseinformation/Bitkom-stellt-Studie-zu-E-Democracy-vor (accessed 27 July 2022). 14 BUND, “AKW in Deutschland”, https://www.bund.net/themen/atomkraft/akw-indeutschland/ (accessed 27 July 2022).

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atomic energy, and the Social Democrats slowly embarked on a similar route.15 After more than a decade of hard struggle among opposing political forces about a possible nuclear phase-out, the tragic reactor incident in Fukushima in 2011 led to a rethinking among nuclear energy proponents. The German government eventually decided to gradually eradicate atomic energy. Chancellor Merkel, once known as “enthusiastic supporter of nuclear energy”,16 made a remarkable “180-degree turn”17 when she announced only four days after the incident plans for Germany to phase out until 2022, adding in a public statement that “the world has changed through Fukushima”.18 Her decision was backed by a broad majority in the Bundestag. The incident also strengthened public mistrust against the continued reliance on nuclear energy.19 However, identifying a final repository for spent nuclear fuel proved a difficult issue to solve. Indeed, Germany has been struggling with the problem of finding a final storage since the late 1970s. While the small municipality of Gorleben in Lower Saxony has been treated as possible long-term storage site, public resistance and protest marches have led to a growing awareness among politicians that a top-down approach would not be feasible and that an involvement of citizens might lead to increased

15 SWR2, “Bundestagsdebatte zu Tschernobyl und Atomkraft” (25 April 2022), https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/archivradio-geschichte-in-originaltoenen/bundes tagsdebatte-zu-tschernobyl-und-atomkraft/swr2/88310820/ (accessed 27 July 2022). 16 “Out of Control: Merkel Credibility with Nuclear U-Turn”, Der Spiegel (21 March 2011), https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/out-of-control-merkel-gam bles-credibility-with-nuclear-u-turn-a-752163.html (accessed 27 July 2022). 17 NTV, “Merkel verteidigt 180-Grad-Wende in Atompolitik Schwarz-Gelb wirbt um rot-grüne Zustimmung”, (15 March 2011), https://www.n-tv.de/politik/Schwarz-Gelbwirbt-um-rot-gruene-Zustimmung-article2850061.html (accessed 27 July 2022). 18 WDR, “15. März 2011 - Merkel verkündet Abkehr von Atomenergie”, (15 March 2021), https://www1.wdr.de/stichtag/stichtag-fukushima-merkel-abschaltungakw-atommoratorium-100.html (accessed 27 July 2022). 19 Deutschlandfunk, Endstation Fukushima, (25 November 2011), https://www.deu tschlandfunk.de/endstation-fukushima-100.html (accessed 27 July 2022); for a more detailed assessment of the loss of trust in atomic energy in Germany against the background of media framing, see Wolling, Jens (Ed.); Arlt, Dorothee (Ed.), “Fukushima und die Folgen - Medienberichterstattung, Öffentliche Meinung, Politische Konsequenzen”, (2014), https://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/49390/ 49390_1.pdf?sequence=1 (accessed 27 July 2022).

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acceptance among the population.20 Gorleben today is no longer an option, and the government is now planning to identify an alternative by 2031. Against this background, the Federal Ministry for Environment, Nature Conservation, Nuclear Safety, and Consumer Protection (BMUV) ran the Dialog Endlagersicherheit from July to November 2019. The aim was to comprehensively involve citizens as laid down in the Repository Site Selection Act (Standortauswahlgesetz—StandAG)21 which entered into force in 2017.22 The StandAG regulates the search for a suitable repository site for highly radioactive waste in Germany. The first step in the process consisted of further strengthening the security requirements of the StandAG through a new regulation.23 The BMUV involved experts, relevant stakeholders as well as interested citizens without expert knowledge in the in-person and virtual discussions about the new regulation. The website of the BMUV further explains the various steps of the dialogue, starting in July 2019. The steps include, inter alia, an online dialogue in August 2019 which preceded a public symposium in September and the amendment of the StandAG in May 2020.24 In sum, the entire dialogue process can be described as a combination of three elements: (i) provision of information on the website (www.dialog-end lagersicherheit.de): explanatory videos, information about relevant legislation and other publications, and a specific youth module; (ii) virtual consultation and active participation online: opportunity to comment the regulation, virtual dialogue, submission of written statements, and; 20 DW, “Der lange Weg zum Atommüll-Endlager”, (28 September 2020), https:// www.dw.com/de/der-lange-weg-zum-atommüll-endlager/a-55080914 (accessed 27 July 2022). 21 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbraucherschutz, “Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, https://www.bmuv.de/themen/bildung-beteil igung/beteiligung/dialog-endlagersicherheit (accessed 27 July 2022). 22 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbraucherschutz “Endlagersicherheit: Der Weg zum sicheren Einschluss”, (August 2019), https:// www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_PDF/Endlagerprojekte/endlagersich erheit_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 23 Ibid. 24 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbrauch-

erschutz, “Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, https://www.bmuv.de/themen/bildung-beteil igung/beteiligung/dialog-endlagersicherheit (accessed 27 July 2022).

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(iii) in-person consultation: symposium over two days in Berlin. The final report25 of the BMUV published in the aftermath revealed some interesting data: The website counts 5,530 visitors and 116 comments to Articles 1 and 2 of the draft regulation that were under consideration. Furthermore, the ministry reports almost 19,000 page views for the online platform, alongside more than 1,600 downloaded materials, which appears to be a high number. From a technical perspective, the online platform seems to have been easily accessible as the final report shows. The participants were able to insert their comments directly into a text box next to the draft regulation on the website. In addition, they were able to submit more comprehensive written reactions via email, which happened in 24 cases. The process was open to everyone and is described on the BMUV’s website as “lowthreshold”. However, the final report reveals that only 40 persons made use of the opportunity to comment the regulation. The numbers are even lower for the online dialogue which counted only four contributions. After the Dialog ended, the BMUV collated the comments and reactions submitted by the participants providing them for evaluation by experts. Based on these evaluations, there have been some changes to the draft regulation (Verordnung über Sicherheitsanforderungen und vorläufige Sicherheitsuntersuchungen für die Endlagerung hochradioaktiver Abfälle).26

¨ Burgerrat Demokratie Unlike the Dialog Endlagersicherheit, which was designed to combine inperson elements with e-participation tools, the second round of the Bürgerrat —Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt (Citizens’ Assembly—Germany’s

25 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbraucherschutz, “Schlussbericht: Dialog Endlagersicherheit”, (July 2020), https://www.bmuv. de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Pools/Forschungsdatenbank/fkz_4718E03290_schlussber icht_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 26 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbraucherschutz, “Verordnung des Bundesministeriums für Umwelt, Naturschutz und nukleare Sicherheit”, (6 April 2020), https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_ PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/19._Lp/endlsianf_verordnung/Entwurf/endlsianf_vo_refe_vero rdnung_bf.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).

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Role in the World)27 was moved into the virtual space as a response to the pandemic. Initially, it was designed as a format in which participants meet and discuss physically. Hence, the first round of the Bürgerrat took place in the form of in-person gatherings. The project has been realised by the initiative Mehr Demokratie e.V., which describes itself on its website as the largest NGO for direct democracy globally, as well as “non-partisan and charitable”, comprising 10,000 members and “informing 200,000”.28 Moving into the virtual space, the conveners of the discussion platform brought together a group of 160 randomly selected citizens from different socioeconomic and professional backgrounds via an online platform. Over the course of ten meetings, the organisers provided participants with detailed information on topics such as trade and EU, with inputs by renowned experts like Timothy Garton Ash and Nicole Deitelhoff. Likewise, participants had the opportunity to actively engage and debate during the video sessions. The Bürgerrat started with a first “preparation” phase in the Autumn of 2020. This phase was dedicated to drafting a working programme, including a selection of topics, implementing institutes, parliamentary groups of the Bundestag, and civil society organisations.29 This initial process was accompanied by online discussion rounds with randomly selected participants. The initiative came up with five focal areas: sustainable development, economy and trade, peace and security, democracy and the rule of law, and the European Union. During the second of the process,30 ten virtual meetings took place between January and February 2021, both in the form of plenary as well as working group sessions. The discussions were supported by professional moderators and experts who provided their insights as “living libraries”. During these meetings, of which some have been live streamed, the participants worked on concrete proposals in the five fields.

27 Bürgerrat, “Deutschlands Rolle in der Welt”, https://deutschlands-rolle.buergerra t.de (accessed 27 July 2022). 28 Mehr Demokratie, “Profil von Mehr Demokratie e.V”, https://www.mehr-demokr atie.de/ueber-uns/profil (accessed 27 July 2022). 29 Bürgerrat, “Phase 1: Preparation”, (Autumn 2020), https://deutschlands-rolle.bue rgerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/preparation/ (accessed 27 July 2022). 30 Bürgerrat, “Phase 2: Meetings”, (January/February 2021), https://deutschlandsrolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/meetings/ (accessed 27 July 2022).

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The third phase31 in March 2021 involved presenting the proposals which were then published in a “Citizens’ Report”. The report has been handed over to the President of the Bundestag and to parliamentary groups. The final phase32 began in March 2021 and was dedicated to “civil society monitoring” by which the organisers mean the process of evaluating the implementation of the report’s recommendations through continued discussions with parliamentarians. The list of the meetings is long and reveals a high level of ambition: In April, the Bürgerrat has presented its report to then-foreign minister Heiko Maas; in July, there has been a discussion with the Bundestag Committee on Economic Cooperation and Development; in August, the group convened for workshops at the Federal Academy for Security Policy and the Chancellor’s Office, to name but a few. The Bürgerrat initiative is characterised by a high level of professionalism, a creative website, and a coherent agenda. The access, however, was restricted since the project was only open to 160 selected participants. Since the agenda of the Bürgerrat was much broader than the Dialog Endlagersicherheit, it offered a wider scope for deliberation, consultation, and exchange of ideas between participants in an online format. While the aim of the Dialog was to work on a very specific regulation with a narrow focus, the Bürgerrat was more about developing visions and a larger set of recommendations on Germany’s future role in the world. At the same time, both processes can be described as result oriented.

(Public) E-Petitions The UN E-Government Survey 2020 notes that while the use of eparticipation tools continues to spread over more countries, there is also “a trend towards multi-function participation platforms”,33 which 31 Bürgerrat, “Phase 3: Handover to the Bundestag”, (March 2021), https://deu tschlands-rolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/handover-to-the-bundestag/ (accessed 27 July 2022). 32 Bürgerrat, “Phase 4: Implementation Phase”, from March 2021 on, https://deutsc hlands-rolle.buergerrat.de/en/citizens-assembly/implementation-phase/ (accessed 27 July 2022). 33 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey 2020”, see Executive summary, p. xxx, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Por tals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey% 20(Full%20Report).pdf, (accessed 27 July 2022).

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include, among other tools, consultations, opinion surveys, and epetitions. E-petitions can be submitted to the Bundestag since 2015. A key requirement for the submission of an e-petition as opposed to a regular petition was simply that citizens had to use an online form provided on the website of the Bundestag. Another novelty introduced by the Bundestag is the possibility for citizens to submit a public petition—that includes petitions, requests, and complaints of public interest that are being published on the website of the Petitions Committee. If the petition of any initiator who wants to gather public support for their matter fulfils the respective requirements as laid out in the directive of the Petition Committee (Richtlinie für die Behandlung von öffentlichen Petitionen—öP ),34 they can start collecting signatories for their petition online. The process is very straightforward: once a public petition has been uploaded to the Bundestag’s website, anyone can sign it. In addition, people can discuss the subject in a dedicated online forum over a period of four weeks. If the required quorum of 50,000 signatures is reached within a month, the petitioner is eligible to participate in a public hearing during a session of the Petition Committee.35 A study published by the Scientific Service of the Bundestag in 2015 states that two million citizens have registered on the online petition website of the Committee since 2005 (https://epetitionen.bundes tag.de). The authors note that while most public petitions attracted less than 1,000 signatories, a small portion was able to reach the quorum of 50,000 supporters.36 Today, the Bundestag website reveals an impressive number of public petitions submitted online: 6,637 concluded petitions since June 2011, alongside 1,342 petitions that are under assessment, and 61 petitions which are currently open for signature (as of 23 January 2022). The large number of petitions submitted with the online platform indicates a high interest among the population for using this tool to engage politically and 34 Deutscher Bundestag, “Richtlinie öffentliche Petitionen”, https://epetitionen.bundes

tag.de/epet/service.$$$.rubrik.richtlinie.html (accessed 27 July 2022). 35 Wissenschaftliche Dienste des Bundestags, “Aktueller Begriff: 10 Jahre E-Petitionen und öffentliche Petitionen”, https://www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/386458/0154f9 e2e29137c25943bb323acd2ef0/10-jahre-e-petitionen-und-oeffentliche-petitionen-data. pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 36 Ibid.

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to exchange opinions with other citizens. This data strongly supports the above-mentioned findings in the 2020 Bitkom study.

Assessment of the Three Initiatives The UN E-Government Survey characterised the instrumental value of e-participation as a possible contribution for increasing government accountability, making public services more responsive to citizens’ needs, and improving the quality of policies and legislation. The report adds that more broadly, this can also include a “strengthening of the legitimacy of Governments and people’s trust in public institutions”.37 In the following section, the three initiatives will be compared against their level of provision of information, citizens’ possibility to take part in consultative processes, as well as the chance to engage in active participation and decision-making. Within these three distinct categories, the author will focus on the aspects of accessibility/participatory elements, inclusiveness, responsiveness, their representative nature, and possible outputs, thus referring to the requirements laid down in SDG 16.7. Provision of information. The Bürgerrat and the Dialog Endlagersicherheit have provided participants with ample information about the subject matter on their respective online platforms and offline. Large parts of the material can still be accessed on the respective websites, including for instance the public portion of the Bürgerrat ’s video conferences, or written background material about repository safety on the BMVU’s website. The availability of information beyond the actual timeline adds to the transparency and sustainability of these efforts. The e-petition platform, by nature, does not offer information on substance, only on process. While the e-petition platform and the Dialog Endlagersicherheit are inclusive initiatives by design, for they were/are open to the public, there were some obstacles in terms of accessibility. Notably the lack of translation of the website into other languages raises the stakes for non-native speakers to equally participate. The BMUV provides general information about the work of the ministry in English, easy language, and sign 37 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, “E-Government Survey 2020”, see Chapter 5: E-Participation, https://publicadministration.un.org/egovkb/Por tals/egovkb/Documents/un/2020-Survey/2020%20UN%20E-Government%20Survey% 20(Full%20Report).pdf (accessed 27 July 2022).

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language, but the ministry’s information on the Dialog Endlagersicherheit is only available in German. The picture is similar to the e-petition website. The Bundestag provides information about the parliament and the work of its committees in 19 languages, easy and sign language, but apart from an explanatory video on e-petitions in sign language,38 the e-petition webpage is not translated into any other language. This exclusive access to relevant information on tabling an e-petition in a certain sense contradicts the provisions laid down in Article 17 of the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany which lays out the right of petition: “Every person shall have the right individually or jointly with others to address written requests or complaints to competent authorities and to the legislature”.39 To which the Bundestag website adds: “Article 17 guarantees the right for everyone to table a petition – independent of whether they are of age or not, whether they are foreigners or living abroad”.40 The herein envisioned inclusiveness stands in contrast to the lack of translation into relevant languages (English and Turkish41 ) on the e-petition webpages. Meanwhile, the Bürgerrat as a non-governmental initiative and selective in terms of its participants, provides information in German, English, French, and Spanish language. Engagement in consultative processes. The Dialog Endlagersicherheit and the Bürgerrat are initiatives designed to engage citizens in consultative processes. They were gathering participants’ ideas and opinions through different channels, including by videoconferencing or through written

38 Deutscher Bundestag, “Petitionen: Bitten und Beschwerden an den Deutschen Bundestag” (1 January 2022), https://www.bundestag.de/mediathek?videoid=7135476& url=L21lZGlhdGhla292ZXJsYXk=&mod=mediathek#url=L21lZGlhdGhla292ZXJsYXk/ dmlkZW9pZD03MTM1NDc2JnVybD1MMjFsWkdsaGRHaGxhMjkyWlhKc1lYaz0mbW9 kPW1lZGlhdGhlaw==&mod=mediathek (accessed 27 July 2022). 39 Federal Ministry of Justice, “Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany”, https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/englisch_gg.html#p0098. 40 Deutscher Bundestag, “Petition Einreichen”, https://epetitionen.bundestag.de/ epet/peteinreichen.html (accessed 27 July 2022). 41 According to a study by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees in

2015, 2,9 Mio. Citizens with Turkish background were living in Germany, see Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, “Türkeistämmige Personen in Deutschland”, (2018), https://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Forschung/WorkingPa pers/wp81-tuerkeistaemmige-in-deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=12 (accessed 27 July 2022).

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feedback/comments online. Both platforms implemented the consultation process between conveners and participants in a responsive way. This level of responsiveness was further strengthened through additional offline meetings where participants were able to meet with experts, stakeholders, and politicians. However, the hurdles for active participation were higher for the Dialog. The numbers in the final report suggest that, while many people downloaded background material, a comparably small number obviously felt competent enough to comment on the draft regulation. There is also a consultative mechanism for e-petitions. The website offers a possibility for the petitioner to exchange opinions with an interested audience in the online discussion forum, insofar as public petitions are concerned. Unless a public e-petition reaches a quorum of 50,000 signatures there will be no opportunity to extend the consultation to a higher body. However, if the quorum is reached, the consultation process is levelled up to an offline discussion in the petition committee of the parliament. Varying in scope and accessibility, all three initiatives consist of a combination of (possible) online and offline consultation processes including with experts and decision-makers. They can therefore be seen as a means to successfully strengthen the democratic process through exchange with citizens. Active participation in decision-making. The Bürgerrat is an initiative that is not directly linked to decision-making but rather aims at inserting ideas bottom-up into the political discourse. Setting an ambitious and broad agenda, the initiative has engaged many politicians (including the foreign minister), committees, and parliamentary groups in discussing the Citizens’ Report. Chances are therefore high that some of the ideas are being heard by decision-makers. Even more so, as this project has been implemented shortly before the Bundestag elections, at a time when opposition parties like the Greens and the Liberal Democrats were rethinking their strategic direction and might have been more open to listening to citizens’ ideas. However, the initiative developed ideas and communicated “best case scenarios”, but it did not set a concrete goal. This might be due to the fact that the selected fields addressed in the Citizens’ Report were not pre-defined but developed throughout the process by participants with the support of experts. The Dialog Endlagersicherheit on the other hand confronted its participants with a pre-defined and narrow subject matter and set a clear goal for

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the initiative. The final report of the Dialog describes the evaluation of the ideas that were collected during the process. The fact that there was little room for the development of very creative ideas was offset by the existence of relative transparency with regard to the ministry’s expectations and more certainty about the outcome. Following a very clear structure, the ministry has prepared a report accompanying the publication of the draft legislation,42 containing a detailed and comprehensive assessment of participants’ comments and suggestions on Article 1 and 2 of the draft legislation. The 126-pages long report43 contains summaries of the comments and complements them with the ministry’s answers to each suggestion. Also, a colour scheme indicates whether suggested changes have been partially or fully accepted in the draft legislation, whether they have been rejected or whether a suggestion was not exactly dealing with the subject matter. Despite the large amount of data, the colour scheme makes the report easily accessible. The 116 comments that have been submitted by participants were split into 309 suggestions on Article 1 and 65 on Article 2, of which the ministry (fully or partially) accepted more than 90.44 Among these, suggestions were ranging from changes to certain terminologies (for instance, “barriers” instead of “closures”) to highly specific requests for the inclusion of more detailed information on model calculations in an attachment to the draft legislation. However, while the number of submitted comments seems to be high given a very specific subject matter, the fact that the number of active commentators on the online platform was rather low indicates that several participants might have commented multiple times. Also, the subject matter expertise displayed in many comments reveals that the general knowledge of active participants is well above a non-expert audience. This critical point has also been addressed in the final report which reflects that a majority of 42 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbraucherschutz, “Verordnung über Sicherheitsanforderungen und vorläufige Sicherheitsuntersuchungen für die Endlagerung hochradioaktiver Abfälle”, https://www.bmuv. de/gesetz/verordnung-ueber-sicherheitsanforderungen-und-vorlaeufige-sicherheitsuntersu chungen-fuer-die-endlagerung-hochradioaktiver-abfaelle (accessed 27 July 2022). 43 Bundesministerium für Umwelt, Naturschutz, nukleare Sicherheit und Verbraucherschutz, “Übersicht über eingereichte Stellungnahmen zum Referentenentwurf, mit Bemerkungen des BMU”, https://www.bmuv.de/fileadmin/Daten_BMU/Download_ PDF/Glaeserne_Gesetze/19._Lp/endlsianf_verordnung/Stellungnahmen/endlsianf_vo_ stn_tabelle_bf.pdf. 44 This number does not include possible multiple responses.

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attendees of the in-person symposium were in fact representatives of state agencies or scientific experts. Compared with this example with very concrete outcomes, the chances to influence decision-making through tabling a (public) e-petition can be considered rather low for the quorum is high. Notwithstanding, epetitions are a popular tool which an increasing number of citizens are ready to use. In 2019, the petitions committee registered more than one million electronic signatures and 926 public e-petitions (compared to 886 public petitions and 685,000 electronic signatures in 2018).45 Whether or not a public petition leads to policy change depends on the subject matter and the willingness of decision-makers to grapple with it. Yet, successful public petitions are likely to receive media attention and they can generate public pressure beyond the hearing of the petitioner in the petitions committee. For example, in 2019, a public petition by the Protestant Church in Central Germany (EKMD), on a speed limit of 130 km/h on German freeways received more than 66,000 signatures and got ample media attention.46 So far, there is no speed limit in Germany, but the public pressure is rising,47 to which initiatives like the e-petition have certainly contributed.

Conclusion All three e-participation initiatives examined in this chapter have their strengths and weaknesses in terms of accessibility, inclusiveness, transparency, and level of ability to influence the decision-making process. As for some aspects, like participatory elements and inclusiveness, transparency, provision of information, and engagement of citizens in consultation processes, an assessment with regard to their effectiveness is easier made than for less obvious aspects like impact on the decision-making 45 Deutscher Bundestag, “Der Jahresbericht des Petitionsausschusses”, (2020), https:// www.bundestag.de/resource/blob/809388/07846b72b014a33bff0320760aab5bb8/Aus gabe_2020-data.pdf (accessed 27 July 2022). 46 Welt, “Petition für Tempolimit hat genug Zeichner”, (3 April 2019), https://www. welt.de/print/welt_kompakt/print_wirtschaft/article191274715/Petition-fuer-Tempol imit-hat-genug-Zeichner.html (accessed 27 July 2022). 47 According to an October 2021 poll, 60% of the German population are in favour of a speed limit. See: NDR, “Umfrage: Mehrheit in Deutschland für Tempolimit”, (29 October 2021), https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/mecklenburg-vorpommern/Umfrage-Mehrheitin-Deutschland-fuer-Tempolimit,tempolimit316.html (accessed 27 July 2022).

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process. The latter one would require more in-depth research as to what degree e-participation tools have a measurable influence on the political process. Nevertheless, all three initiatives can be seen as useful steps towards broadening citizens’ involvement in political processes and could guide the way for even more effective and inclusive e-participation projects.48 It is not possible on the basis of a limited set of examples to fully demonstrate that e-participation tools are suitable means when it comes to the improvement of quality and transparency of legislation and enhancing the transparency of selected decision-making processes as well as their responsiveness to the needs of citizen. But this chapter demonstrated that some of the e-participation tools that already exist can lead the way forward and are worthwhile efforts to build upon. Going forward, the design of similar initiatives can be improved, which would make e-participation an even more powerful tool. While, as Akmentina (2022) notes, e-participation tools develop in parallel with new technologies within the ICT sphere, this is not a straightforward evolution. Government agencies and non-governmental initiatives need to invest in being ahead of the curve by combining more traditional e-participation tools (like discussion platforms, videoconferencing) with more advanced tools, for instance AI-enabled collective intelligence as used by Bluenove.49 The French firm is regularly convening “citizen debates” with the aim to identify convergent and divergent arguments in digital discussions with large numbers of participants. Using more advanced technologies might also be an incentive for more citizens to actively engage in consultative processes. However, technology alone will not solve it all. It is also important for the initiators of future initiatives to take into account that the results and envisaged outcomes of the respective processes need to be communicated in a sufficiently comprehensive and accessible way. This is even more true in technically complex areas where a lack of expert knowledge might raise the hurdles for citizens to actively participate. Finally, a more widespread application of new and creative e-participation tools could also have a positive spill-over effect for 48 The BMUV for instance has already launched another hybrid dialogue format on water resources and will continue with a next dialogue on climate protection. The website of the water dialogue can be accessed here: https://dialog.bmuv.de/bmu/de/process/ 54586 (accessed 31 August 2022). 49 Bluenove, https://bluenove.com/en/ (accessed 27 July 2022).

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citizens to actively engage in consultative processes on an EU level. As the Bitkom study has shown, there is already some appetite among German citizens to engage on the federal level, but more incentives would be needed to foster e-participation in a European context.

CHAPTER 3

The US–China 5G Race in Europe’s Western Balkans Gent Salihu

The emergence of fifth-generation wireless technology (5G) is likely to change great power dynamics in the Western Balkans, as the US seeks to offset China’s growing presence in a battleground that was historically fought with Russia, not China. The Western Balkans region, which is geographically surrounded by the European Union (EU), is comprised of six countries: Albania, Bosnia, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia (WB6). All of these countries are in the process of joining the EU. The EU’s 5G Clean Toolbox for mitigating risks pertinent to 5G does not prevent the deployment of Chinese technology either in the EU or in countries that aspire to join the EU.1 The positioning of the Western Balkans on the doorstep of the EU, without a retributive European position towards Chinese-backed 5G technology, incentivizes 1 “Cybersecurity of 5G networks—EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures”, European Commission, (29 January 2020), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybers ecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-measures (Accessed 14 December 2021).

G. Salihu (B) Georgetown Law, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 43 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_3

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China to enter the Western Balkans market quickly and at scale, and act as a norm setter. This chapter examines the prospects of China’s rollout of 5G technology in WB6 either on its own, by leveraging the regional influence of Russia, or through other foreign vendors, such as Turkey, whose 5G services could depend on Chinese chipsets. The chapter then argues that to restrict China’s domination in Europe’s neighbourhood, especially in states that aspire to join the EU, the US cannot rely on a standalone European response. The US will need to proactively engage with Europe and other allies, including Turkey as a core NATO regional player, provide a practical alternative to China’s 5G technology, and position itself as a global leader in scaffolding a trustworthy rulebook for emerging technologies.

China’s Rising Appetite in the Western Balkans When US President Trump brought Kosovo and Serbia together to sign a treaty to normalize their economic relations, the US–China 5G race became an integral part of the treaty. Both Serbia and Kosovo agreed— with the US, rather than with each other—that they would prohibit the use of 5G equipment by “untrusted vendors,” which meant Chinese vendors.2 The 5G commitment by Serbia and Kosovo gave context to US involvement in solving a lingering conflict in the Western Balkans: the US would serve as a guarantor to a settlement between two countries on the outskirts of Europe provided that its geopolitical interests were preserved. The US made it clear that choices over available 5G technologies depended not only on the superiority of a given technology but also on its producer’s values of democratic governance pertaining to information security and data privacy. The US concern is that Beijing can use its 5G technology to covertly gather intelligence that nurtures its own authoritarian regime or support similar ones in countries where its technology is deployed. Geographically, the Western Balkans is entirely surrounded by the EU, and all WB6 countries are potential contenders for joining the EU. Any 5G investment in the region therefore falls under the attention of the 2 “The ‘Washington Agreement’ between Kosovo and Serbia”, American Society of International Law, (12 March 2021), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/25/issue/ 4/washington-agreement-between-kosovo-and-serbia (Accessed 14 December 2021).

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EU. The EU’s 5G Clean Toolbox for mitigating risks pertinent to 5G, however, does not have the power of law for EU countries and, as such, the WB6 is not mandated to follow it.3 The 5G Clean Toolbox is an attempt by the EU to coordinate its approach towards secured 5G networks; however, the toolbox does not consider Chinese 5G investments as inherently unsafe. Chinese-backed 5G technology is already present across the EU. In some countries, such as Cyprus, China already dominates the telecommunications industry, suggesting that the EU does not maintain a tough stance against the deployment of Chinese-back 5G technology in EU territory. Expanding 5G presence in the Western Balkans as a future EU territory would help China fortify its influence inside the EU. The concerns over China’s deployment of 5G infrastructure in the Western Balkans are twofold: market domination over Western-backed 5G technologies, on the one hand, and the weakening of democratic governance of countries that host Chinese-backed technologies, on the other. From an economic perspective, given the physical demand to install numerous new base stations for 5G coverage, sprawled across the territory, the first investors tend to have a market advantage. The rollout of 5G technology requires dense instalment of base stations as transmitter hubs for localized coverage of wireless internet over a relatively short distance.4 Over time, it becomes a matter of convenience and cost effectiveness to maintain base stations already installed by first providers rather than replacing providers who would then install a new set of stations. The advantage of the first investor in 5G infrastructure, therefore, heightens the 5G race between the US and China, including in the Western Balkans. China’s Huawei Technologies Co. is already building 5G base stations on its own, without reliance on US company parts.5 The concern is 3 “Cybersecurity of 5G networks—EU Toolbox of risk mitigating measures”, European Commission, (29 January 2020), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/cybers ecurity-5g-networks-eu-toolbox-risk-mitigating-measures (Accessed 14 December 2021). 4 Colin Blackman & Simon Forge, “5G Deployment: State of Play in Europe, USA and Asia”, European Parliament ITRE Committee, (April 2019), https://www.europarl. europa.eu/RegData/etudes/IDAN/2019/631060/IPOL_IDA(2019)631060_EN.pdf (Accessed 7 January 2022). 5 Doug Brake & Alexandra Bruer, “The Great 5G Race: Is China Really Beating the United States?”, Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, (30 November 2020), https://itif.org/publications/2020/11/30/great-5g-race-china-really-beating-uni ted-states (Accessed 7 January 2022).

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that China can achieve a first mover advantage compared to Westernbacked 5G developers, such as Ericsson and Nokia, especially given that Huawei’s dominance is about its technological capabilities rather than cost advantages (for example, base stations with smaller and lighter antennas and with integrated Tiangang communication chips that have greater computing capability than other chips in the market).6 5G investments become even more critical given the foundational role of reliable 5G internet for follow-on advancements in the “Internet of Things,” from interconnection of devices to the deployment of automated cars at scale, and Smart City technology.7 WB6 has primarily been a territory in which the US and Europe were wary of Russian rather than Chinese influence. China’s political and economic influence in the region is currently limited. China has neither a large economic presence that could be leveraged for political influence, nor political influence that could be used for significant economic gains. China, instead, is likely to leverage Russia’s political and economic influence in the region in capturing a sizeable portion of the 5G market. Russia’s relationship with Serbia, the biggest economy in the Western Balkans, is founded on their common Christian Orthodox heritage. Russia is also a staunch supporter of Serbia’s diplomatic efforts in maintaining its territorial claims over Kosovo, which seceded from Serbia without its consent in 2008, but with the backing of the US and Europe. Russia supports Serbia’s EU membership provided that it does not join NATO. Russia also aims at maintaining its influence over Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina, which have sizeable ethnic Serb populations. In Montenegro, a court found two Russian military intelligence officers guilty of attempting to plot a coup in 2016, a year before Montenegro joined NATO, to violently replace a pro-Western government with an anti-NATO and pro-Russian government.8 Bosnia and Herzegovina has

6 Si Hyung Joo, Chul Oh & Keun Lee, “Catch-up strategy of an emerging firm in an emerging country: analysing the case of Huawei vs. Ericsson with patent data”, International Journal of Technology Management, 72:1–3, (2016), pp. 19–42. 7 Carolyn Bartholomew, “China and 5G”, Issues in Science and Technology, 36:2, (2020), pp. 50–57. 8 “Russian GRU Agents Found Guilty of Attempted Montenegro Coup”, Warsaw Institute, (9 May 2019), https://warsawinstitute.org/russian-gru-agents-found-guilty-attemp ted-montenegro-coup/ (Accessed 8 January 2022).

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been another geopolitical playground for Russia by providing direct political backing to the separatist leader of Republika Srpska who intends to dismantle the Dayton Peace Accords that guarantee the existence of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a single, cohesive state.9 The ambitions of Russia and China to synchronize their security, political, and economic agendas have been made explicit through the issuance of a joint statement tailored to a Western audience during the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing.10 The statement suggests an alliance of two states founded on complementary opportunism rather than a common agenda. The statement suggests that Russia and China are willing to support each other’s individual agendas on a quid pro quo basis, rallying around their common adversary, the West, to win ground on their individual areas of interest. The vision outlined in the statement opens the way for China to rely on Russia for its ICT deployments, including 5G, in the Western Balkans, while Russia relies on China in areas that Russia needs its support, such as opposing NATO’s enlargement. In support of China’s ambitions to dominate the ICT industry, Russia has expressed commitment to an “open” and “accessible” ICT environment, sympathizing with China’s ambition to deploy its 5G technologies in the midst of US diplomatic efforts to prevent Beijing’s dominance in this field. The statement also calls for the creation of “non-discriminatory conditions for scientific and technological development,” as well as a commitment to “step up practical implementation of scientific and technological advances.”11 The statement suggests that China is not concerned about competing with the US, but rather that the US is

9 Unlike Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia, the other remaining WB6 countries—Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia—have been less susceptible to Russian influence. Albania and Albanian-majority Kosovo and North Macedonia, which has a sizeable Albanian minority, set their foreign policy on the basis of US foreign policy. However, China could still make an entry by leveraging on the influence of other players in the region, as this chapter later makes a case. 10 “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”, President of Russia, (4 February 2022), http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 (Accessed 5 February 2022). 11 “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”, President of Russia, (4 February 2022), http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 (Accessed 5 February 2022).

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creating barriers to buy time for catching up in the 5G race in which China believes has the upper edge and Russia is willing to help China maintain it. China’s approach towards the EU has generally been characterized as a “norm taker.” Leading the market early, however, is an opportunity to set standards that the rest will then need to follow. The Russia–China joint statement raises concerns in the West’s about China’s heightened interest in evolving towards becoming a “norm setter,” and, subsequently, over the impact of Chinese-backed technology on democratic governance. In return, China and Russia see the attempts by the West to “impose their own ‘democratic standards’ on other countries and to monopolize the right to assess the level of compliance with democratic criteria” as threats to their own national interests.12 In addition to leveraging Russia’s influence in the region, China could use its direct engagement through its multilateral aid initiatives. China launched a regional cooperation platform with Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) that includes 11 EU member states and the Western Balkans, except Kosovo, due to China’s lack of recognition of Kosovo’s statehood. The forum’s latest meeting in 2021 issued a list of joint activities on a wide array of areas, including technology.13 China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is more explicit in how it creates, through its “Digital Silk Road” component, a fertile ground for Chinese tech companies, including Huawei, to utilize government advocacy in enabling foreign market access. The BRI is already present in Montenegro, Serbia, and Bosnia and Herzegovina. Montenegro has struggled to fulfil the conditions of an unfavourable loan contract that it entered, amounting to one-fifth of the country’s GDP, to finance and build a highway between Podgorica and Belgrade. The loan contract foresees that in the event that Montenegro is unable to pay instalments on time, China’s state-owned Export–Import Bank can seize land.14 As Montenegro struggles to get out of a loan trap,

12 Ibid. 13 “2021 Cooperation between China and Central and Eastern European Countries

Beijing List of Activities”, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the United States of America, (18 February 2021), https://www.mfa.gov.cn/ce/ceus//eng/zgyw/t1854675. htm (Accessed 5 January 2022). 14 Rob Schmitz, “How a Chinese-Built Highway Drove Montenegro Deep Into Debt”, National Public Radio, (29 June 2021), https://www.npr.org/2021/06/28/ 1010832606/road-deal-with-china-is-blamed-for-catapulting-montenegro-into-historicdebt (Accessed 29 December 2021).

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it finds itself in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis China to potentially submit to other Chinese investments, including 5G deployment, in return for restructuring its highway debt if needed. China’s digital technology, besides 5G, has already been deployed at scale in Serbia. Prior to committing to the US through an economic normalization agreement with Kosovo that would prohibit the use of 5G equipment by “untrusted vendors,” Serbia had already signed a Safe City Strategic Cooperation Agreement with China that led to the rollout of 8,000 Huawei cameras with biometric facial recognition across the capital city.15 Members of the European Delegation to the EU–Serbia Stabilization and Association Parliamentary Committee reacted over such “invasive” technology, raising concerns over democratic governance, personal data protection, and human rights. European Parliamentarians also noted that the rollout was conducted without a prior public debate.16 Bosnia and Herzegovina followed Serbia’s path by hosting a ChinaCEEC innovation cooperation meeting during which Bosnia signed a safe city agreement with Huawei. Huawei already cooperates with Bosnia’s two major carriers, HT Eronet and M:Tel, except with the BH Telekom. BH Telekom, however, did not rule out the opportunity of cooperating with Huawei on rolling out 5G in the future. Huawei has also launched a development programme for Bosnian IT professionals—Seeds for the Future—that aims to share its knowledge on 5G and artificial intelligence.17 The same programme was also extended to the IT professionals from Serbia and North Macedonia. Deploying 5G infrastructure in the Western Balkans—a future EU territory in which EU rules currently do not apply—could help China’s positioning in the EU evolve from a “norm taker” to that of a “norm setter.” The EU provides democratic benchmarks that must be met for the WB6 to join the Union, which is troublesome from Russia’s and 15 Alessandra Briganti, “Serbia’s smart city has become a political flashpoint”, WIRED, (10 August 2021), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/belgrade-huawei-cameras (Accessed 30 December 2021). 16 Viola von Cramon-Taubadel et al., “Use of mass surveillance in Belgrade”, Viola von Cramon, (29 September 2021), https://violavoncramon.eu/en/news/content/useof-mass-surveillance-in-belgrade/ (Accessed 11 January 2022). 17 Stefan Vladisavljev, “China’s ‘Digital Silk Road’ Enters the Western Balkans”, Association for International Affairs – China Observers in Central and Eastern Europe, (June 2021), https://chinaobservers.eu/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/CHO ICE_policy-paper_digital-silk-road_A4_web_04.pdf (Accessed 26 January 2022).

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China’s standpoint. Due to the EU’s lack of a unified stance towards the deployment of Chinese-backed 5G technology, the EU has not imposed conditions that would prevent the WB6 from adopting Chinese technologies. The eventual membership of the WB6 in the EU is an incentive for China to take root in the Western Balkans on the basis of its own norms with the expectation that through the Western Balkans, one day it could flood the EU market. China’s perceived strategy would fit with what seems to be Russia’s strategy of endorsing the membership of its ally Serbia with the expectation that in the future it could use it as its Trojan horse for influencing the EU’s internal policies.

Countering China’s 5G Ascendancy Through Resistance The US launched a series of diplomatic initiatives against the rollout of Chinese-backed technology as a means of safeguarding privacy and sensitive information on 5G networks. The Trump Administration launched the Clean Network Initiative as a strategy to slow down China’s 5G domination while enabling US-backed companies to playing catch up. Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia joined the Clean Network Initiative, making a commitment that they would prevent any Chinese-backed 5G deployment on their territory. Serbia did not join the network despite its commitment through the Washington Agreement for keeping Chinese-backed 5G outside its networks. Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro followed Serbia’s lead. The Clean Network Initiative brought together over 50 countries and 180 telecommunications companies that were committed to banning Huawei’s 5G rollout or phasing out existing Huawei equipment from their networks.18 In addition to endorsing the network’s principles, the governments of Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia also signed follow-on bilateral memoranda of understanding with the US. The Prime Minister of Albania stated that his country would have a “proactive role” in the Western Balkans to keep a “5G Clean Path.”19 The Prime Minister of Kosovo stated that Kosovo “proudly stands side by side” with its

18 “The Clean Network”, U.S. Department of State, (2017–2021), https://2017-2021. state.gov/the-clean-network/index.html (Accessed 2 February 2022). 19 Ibid.

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strategic partners, whereas the Prime Minister of North Macedonia stated that the 5G memorandum is “vital for the prosperity, national security, and economic development” of North Macedonia.20 The Biden Administration recently launched the “Declaration for the Future of the Internet” to “support a future for the Internet that is an open, free, global, interoperable, reliable, and secure.”21 Biden’s approach seems to focus more on international governance, intending to align regulatory approaches on the internet across like-minded countries, rather than on creating an alliance that would prevent China’s rapid and irreversible domination in the 5G sphere. Unlike the Clean Network Initiative, Serbia joined Biden’s Declaration for the Future of the Internet.22 The Declaration, however, is not legally binding and it remains unclear how the aspirational declaration would be translated into actions that would prevent US allies from acquiring Chinese 5G equipment. The signing of bilateral anti-China memoranda by Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia during the Trump Administration should prove more effective in slowing down China’s 5G rollout in the short run than Biden’s Declaration. The strategic positioning of Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia with the US, however, does not make the penetration of Chinese-backed 5G technology in the Western Balkans inevitable. Similar to Bosnia, Serbia, and Montenegro where China can leverage Russia’s political influence, China can leverage Turkey’s influence in Albania, Kosovo, and North Macedonia. Turkey is the largest foreign investor in the three countries, and China has used Turkey in the past in deploying its products. For example, Albania purchased Chinese COVID19 vaccines through a Turkish intermediary, characterizing it as Beijing’s route to Albania via Istanbul.23 For its digital transformation, Turkey’s

20 Ibid. 21 “A Declaration for the Future of the Internet”, The White House, https://www.whi

tehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/04/Declaration-for-the-Future-for-the-Internet_ Launch-Event-Signing-Version_FINAL.pdf (Accessed 20 July 2022). 22 “FACT SHEET: United States and 60 Global Partners Launch Declaration for the Future of the Internet”, (28 April 2022), The White House, (Accessed 20 July 2022). 23 Marsela Musabellio, “Albania External Relations Briefing: Beijing to Tirana via Istanbul”, China-CEE Institute, (April 2021), https://china-cee.eu/wp-content/uploads/ 2021/05/2021er04_Albania.pdf (Accessed 26 January 2022).

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political leadership intends to rely on China for developing its technological capabilities.24 Turkey has already embraced Chinese military technology and the Chinese ZTE Corporation is the main shareholder of Netas, Turkey’s largest telecommunications equipment manufacturer.25 While Turkey intends to build its own 5G technology, Turkcell, the biggest telecom company in Turkey with the Turkish government as its largest shareholder, became the first provider outside of China to use Huawei’s mobile services and it is relying on Huawei to build its 5G enabling environment.26 Even if China were not to access the Western Balkans market through a direct rollout of its 5G technology, its chipsets will be present through Turkish or other foreign vendors that depend on Chinese manufacturers.

The Way Forward: Countering China’s 5G Through Innovation and Renewed Alliances The presence of China’s technologies on the doorstep of Europe will become inevitable unless the US and Europe rethink their current strategy of confrontation through resistance. To maintain an upper hand in the race, the US and Europe will need to provide a practical alternative to China’s 5G options; resistance helps create a supply void in a market with continuous demand, which will then require to be filled by Western-backed technology suppliers. While the strategy of resistance could prove effective in slowing down Huawei’s market dominance, it could also hurt the US chipmaking industry and, in turn, undermine the intended goal of helping them to catch up. Preventing the use of US technology, such as semiconductors, for Huawei equipment hurts US companies. In turn, it gives non-US

24 Richard Kraemer, “Courting danger, Erdogan ramps up reliance on China”, Middle East Institute, (21 September 2021), https://www.mei.edu/publications/courting-dan ger-erdogan-ramps-reliance-china (Accessed 26 January 2022). 25 “Netas and ZTE will raise the stakes strengthening the localisation synergy further for Turkey’s 5G transformation”, Netas, (3 March 2021), https://netas.com.tr/netasand-zte-will-raise-the-stakes-strengthening-the-localisation-synergy-further-for-turkeys-5gtransformation?lang=en (Accessed 26 January 2022). 26 “Turkcell Joins Hands with Huawei to Build a 5G-oriented All-Cloud Core Network”, Huawei, (15 February 2019), https://www.huawei.com/en/news/2019/2/ turkcell-5g-oriented-all-cloud-core-network (Accessed 26 January 2022).

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competitors access to a multi-billion-dollar market void. It does not prevent other US-friendly companies, such as South Korea’s Samsung, from doing business with China, hurting US companies’ market positioning. It ultimately incentivizes China to accelerate its own research and development efforts. Huawei is already looking inward, stepping up its investments in building China’s semiconductor supply chain.27 There are historical precedents of technological gaps between the US and its adversaries, pushing the US to step up its innovation efforts. The Soviet Union’s launch of Sputnik 1, the first artificial satellite, is a case in point. The response of the US was to look inward and innovate, because the option of restricting the Soviet Union’s technology deployment was not possible. It proved, however, beneficial for the US. The follow-on investments and establishment of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) secured a dominant role for the US in outer space. Instead of focusing on restrictions that slow down its adversaries, the US needs to look inwards and towards its allies in accelerating research and investments in new technologies.28 As it shifts from restrictions to deployment, the US can also look into providing credit and political risk mitigation to US companies to incentivize them to invest in volatile markets. Turkish companies are the largest investor in the Western Balkans because they are willing to invest in markets that are underpinned by poor governance structures and volatile electoral cycles. The US could rely on the International Development Finance Corporation (DFC) to support US companies in winning market ground in the 5G sphere.29

27 Dan Strumpf, “Huawei Pours Money Into China’s Chipmaking Ambitions”, (10 January 2022), https://www.wsj.com/articles/hungry-for-chips-huawei-invests-in-chi nese-companies-that-make-them-11641819638 (Accessed 19 January 2022). 28 A Brookings Institution analysis makes a similar point, stating that the US “must shift the conversation away from catching up with the Chinese government to being more proactive in the planning around 5G to allow for expedient network deployments and a pathway for the quick accrual of the benefits that will arise from their use.” Nicole Turner Lee, “Navigating the U.S.-China 5G Competition”, (April 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/FP_202 00427_5g_competition_turner_lee_v2.pdf (Accessed 28 July 2022). 29 The DFC’s mission is narrower in scope compared to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). While USAID’s work focuses on international developmental assistance to advance US foreign policy at-large, DFC’s work focuses on providing development assistance through direct US private sector engagement.

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Europe is also in need of greater US political focus, supporting the Europeans in building a cohesive foreign and security policy, in general, and towards Europe’s neighbourhood and the Western Balkans, in particular. The frozen conflict between Kosovo and Serbia has created space for Russia and China to give political support to Serbia against Kosovo and, in return, tap into its market. Bosnia and Herzegovina is on the brink of a political collapse as the President of Republika Srpska attempts to dismantle the Dayton Peace Accords, while showing a willingness to replace relations with the EU and the US with Russia and China.30 Europe’s handling of the Western Balkans has highlighted a weak Europe that is unable to build a cohesive foreign and security policy towards its neighbourhood without US involvement. A more engaged US in Europe’s neighbourhood also necessitates coordinating its Western Balkans agenda with Turkey. Turkey is a NATO member that feels neglected by the EU and the US in the strategic direction of the Western Balkans. Yet, Turkey is already politically and economically invested in the Western Balkans, including in countries in which Russia has political leverage. Engaging Turkey in the Western Balkans could weaken the prospects of any joint China–Russia–Turkey engagement in the Western Balkans in return for yielding Turkey with greater leeway to engage in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Engaging with Turkey in the Western Balkans could create a common US–Turkey ground for building 5G infrastructure. US and Turkish companies—Bechtel and ENKA, respectively—have a demonstrated record of implementing joint large-scale infrastructure projects, which includes the Albania–Kosovo and Kosovo–North Macedonia motorways. The consortium is currently building a 5G-ready motorway in Serbia that will include a corridor for the future installation of 5G fibre.31 A closer US-Turkish partnership in the Western Balkans could prevent a Chinese competitor from installing 5G fibre in the corridors that the US-Turkish consortium is building.

30 Daniel Boffey, “Bosnian Serb leader: Putin and China will help if west imposes sanctions”, (29 November 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/29/bos nian-serb-leader-putin-and-china-will-help-if-west-imposes-sanctions (Accessed 2 February 2022). 31 “Bechtel ENKA to Build Serbia’s First 5G-Ready Digital Motorway and Key Flood Defense System”, (5 December 2019), https://www.bechtel.com/newsroom/releases/ 2019/12/bechtel-enka-build-serbia-5g-ready-motorway/ (Accessed 12 January 2022).

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Finally, the US needs to bring its allies together in setting a regulatory framework within the confines of a unified global governance regime. 5G technology is malleable vis-à-vis national governments and their corresponding values. The direction of 5G technology and its impact in our societies depend on the values that underpin them. The fragmentation of global governance institutions could also lead to a bifurcation of 5G technology development, with the US and China sitting on two opposite sides. Disregarding the United Nations and the corresponding global governance architecture will provide greater space for China and Russia to instil its values in them. China has already launched the Global Initiative on Data Security that it intends to use with Russia’s backing as a basis for scoping the work of the UN Open-ended Working Group on ICT security.32 President Biden’s Declaration for the Future of the Internet recognizes the importance of shaping rules through the UN system and other multilateral fora; however, it remains unclear how the Declaration is to be translated into actionable measures among alliance members that would create a better fighting chance for 5G technologies from vendors that subscribe to democratic values. The Western Balkans could also have a role in the UN. The US can rely on Albania’s 2022–2023 nonpermanent membership in the Security Council to create a single Western Balkans front as Russia and China strive to influence more countries for endorsing their way of developing a rulebook.

32 “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the International Relations Entering a New Era and the Global Sustainable Development”, President of Russia, (4 February 2022), http://en.kremlin.ru/supplement/5770 (Accessed 5 February 2022).

CHAPTER 4

The Role of Export Controls in Managing Emerging Technology Maria Shagina

The world’s leading powers are racing to develop and deploy emerging technologies with potentially far-reaching consequences for the economic and military balance. Yet these technologies often remain ungoverned, as the existing four multilateral regimes—the Nuclear Suppliers Group, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, and the Wassenaar Arrangement—only cover conventional military items and dual-use technology. The rapid development of emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI), quantum computing, robotics, and cyber surveillance technologies has created the need to amend export control restrictions designed for the Cold War period. With the profound shifts in the global technology landscape, including stronger civilian-military fusion and the misuse of technology with human rights implications, new guardrails, and international coordination are

M. Shagina (B) International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, UK e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 57 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_4

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required. Unlike in the Cold War era, the US no longer enjoys overwhelming technological dominance and today’s supply chains of cuttingedge technologies are more diffused. China is rapidly catching up with the US in its quest to achieve a global innovation advantage in emerging technologies. With the locus of production firmly placed in middle powers such as Taiwan and South Korea, fostering cooperation and building technological coalitions of like-minded countries has become essential. This chapter examines how export control regimes shape emerging technologies—unilaterally in the US and EU, and multilaterally through the US–EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC). How the nationallevel export control regimes are designed, enforced, and implemented will have a profound impact on the development of emerging technologies, technology transfer, and the security of global supply chains in the long run. Imposing new guardrails on emerging technologies will require a balancing act between avoiding protectionism and compromising national security interests. Both the US and EU have updated their export control mechanisms and modernized regulations. Concerned by Chinese technology acquisition practices, the US passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) of 2018 to maintain its technological leadership and address the risks of technology transfer via industrial espionage. The EU updated its Recast Dual-Use Regulation to introduce greater safeguards for cybersurveillance technology and minimize the risk of human rights violations. New unilateral regulations diverge in their scope and policy goals, by creating a mismatch with the multilateral export control regimes. China has adopted a whole-of-government approach to attaining leadership in the development and standard-setting of emerging technologies, seeking to localize entire supply chains and to bolster its self-sufficiency and strategic advantage. China’s ambitions to harness technological supremacy in cutting-edge technologies will have far-reaching implications for the West’s resilience, competitiveness, and security. Having missed the opportunity to define standards for previous technologies such as the Internet, China’s intrinsic ambition is to seize the opportunity to become a rule-setter going forward. With its “Made in China 2025” and “China Standards 2035” policies, Beijing is making huge strides in dominating the development of emerging and critical technologies such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, the Internet of Things,

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5G/6G, and cyber surveillance technologies. By imposing its own technological standards, Beijing aims to create new dependencies, ready to be exploited in the future.

The New Challenges Posed by Emerging Technologies Emerging technologies pose a unique combination of challenges to the effectiveness of traditional export controls. First, there is no agreement on what constitutes an emerging technology. Academic scholars have tried to define the main attributes of emerging technology and set technical standards that would distinguish this technology: radical novelty, rapid development, coherence, prominent impact and uncertainty and ambiguity.1 Following this definition, a broad range of enabling and disruptive technologies falls under the category of emerging technology: additive manufacturing, robotics, quantum computing, synthetic biology, lethal autonomous weapons systems, hypersonic weapons, and machine learning, including artificial intelligence, among others. Yet, there is no consensus on the national or international levels on why a certain technology should be controlled and whether there is a direct link to proliferation threats. In the context of export controls, the absence of the agreed definition makes it difficult to identify items subject to control.2 Second, emerging technologies are hard to capture with a control-listbased approach because in many cases the technology is still developing and changing swiftly. Control lists, if they can be compiled at all, are often obsolete shortly after their introduction.3 Applying catch-all provisions (non-listed goods) is possible, but this approach has traditionally been difficult for the private sector to implement, as it increases the burden

1 Daniele Rotolo, Diana Hicks and Ben R. Martin, “What is an Emerging Tech-

nology?,” Research Policy, 44:10 (December 2015), p. 1831. 2 Kolja Brockmann, “Drafting, Implementing, and Complying with Export Controls: The Challenge Presented by Emerging Technologies,” Strategic Trade Review, Spring/Summer 2018, Issue 06, pp. 5–28. 3 Scott Jones, “Trading Emerging Technologies: Export Controls Meet Reality,” Security and Human Rights 31 (2020), pp. 56–57.

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of compliance on companies.4 The focus on why, rather than which, particular technology should be controlled is crucial for designing export control regimes, but understandably more difficult to achieve. Third, in contrast to traditional proliferation threats, emerging technologies are often value neutral. Their dual-use nature makes it difficult for authorities to draw a clear line between legitimate and illegitimate uses. As a result, evaluating their national security impact is inherently hard. For instance, “drones” or 3D printing is neither inherently good nor bad, but depending on their application the technology can constitute a national security risk.5 Fourth, emerging technologies pose a unique proliferation threat because they often involve the intangible transfer of data rather than the transfer of physical goods. This makes them more challenging to track: for example, additive manufacturing or 3D printing could make it easier for states to build certain weapons systems from scratch, thus making it hard for the international community to detect them.6 Finally, the emerging technology sector is dominated by a large number of stakeholders, including non-state actors, smaller market players, and academic institutions. Such organizations do not always have the means to fund professional compliance departments and thus might be less aware of their exposure to proliferation risks.7 In addition, the interagency process at the government level is complicated by the involvement of many authorities in the decision-making process, making it hard to create a cohesive regime.

4 Public Comments of Kevin Wolf, Emily Kilcrease, and Jasper Helder. Regarding Areas and Priorities for US and EU Export Control Cooperation under the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, p. 23; https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/pub lic-commentskilcreaseus-and-eu-export-control-cooperation-under-the-us-eu-trade-and-tec hnology-council. 5 Natasha E. Bajema, “WMD in the Digital Age: Understanding the Impact of Emerging Technologies,” Emergence & Convergence, Research Paper No. 4, October 2018. 6 Matthew Kroenig and Tristan Volpe, “3D Printing the Bomb?: The Nuclear Proliferation Challenge,” The Washington Quarterly, 38:3 (Fall 2015). 7 Brockmann, p. 13.

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US Export Controls US export controls originated in the Cold War era. In 1949, the Export Control Act came into force. The key objectives were to protect US national security interests, to advance the country’s foreign policy goals, and to prohibit or curtail the export of sensitive technology to adversaries. The Act was designed to prohibit anything military, strategic, and economically significant to be exported to communist states. In 1969, Washington passed the Export Administration Act, which established the regulatory framework for the export of dual-use technology, administered by the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS). During the 1960s and 1980s, the US sought to prevent all technology transfer of military, strategic, or economic importance that would benefit the Soviet Union in military terms through the Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), the successor of the Wassenaar Agreement.8 Later the COCOM embargo was extended to China. Since the mid-2000s, what might be described as Beijing’s “technonationalism” prompted Washington to use “defensive” restrictive measures to protect sensitive technology transfers. The US has been actively using a plethora of technology restrictions, ranging from export controls, outbound and inbound investment screening mechanisms to sanctions and tariffs.9 As part of the National Defence Authorization Act Fiscal Year 2019, the Trump administration passed the Export Control Reform Act (ECRA) to update it for dual-use technology not captured by the existing multilateral export control regimes. The main objective was to counter China’s ambitions of gaining technological leadership through industrial policies. Through Made in China by 2025, Beijing often used joint ventures and government-funded acquisitions to obtain control over technology transfer and intellectual property. Prior to the ECRA reform, the US waived license requirements for China’s civilian end-use

8 Michael Mastanduno, Economic containment: CoCom and the politics of East–West trade (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1992). 9 Jon Bateman, “U.S.-China technological ‘decoupling’: A Strategy and Policy Framework,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2022, p. 2.

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sectors such as aerospace, semiconductors, and microelectronics.10 ECRA gave BIS substantial authority to unilaterally impose export controls on almost any type of commodity, software, or technology; specific enduser or specific end-use.11 Since 2018, BIS has expanded its Entity List, End-User Control List, with Chinese technology leaders in such areas as telecommunications, semiconductors, cybersecurity, and supercomputers. China’s Huawei, Hikvision, and Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation (SMIC) ended up on the Entity List. ECRA’s particular focus is on the control of emerging and foundational technology items currently not captured by the scope of traditional control mechanisms. As per Sect. 1758, ECRA seeks to establish “a regular, ongoing interagency process to identify emerging and foundational technologies” that are essential to the national security of the US and critical for maintaining or increasing the country’s technological advantage.12 For strategic reasons, ECRA does not define what “national security” means and does not offer a concrete definition of the “emerging technologies.” In line with this strategic ambiguity, the scope of national security is up to the interpretation and may change over time. However, in the current context, it is clear that the update of the legislation was primarily driven by China-specific threats. Due to the increasing civilmilitary fusion in China, the existing Commerce Control List and Military End-User List were no longer able to effectively capture critical and emerging technology.13 Concerned about forced technology transfers, Congress tightened the export control regime, which prohibits US firms to sell or engage key technology on the BIS control list through a transfer or joint venture. As a result of public consultations (in the form of an advanced notice of proposed rulemaking “ANPRM”), the following technologies were listed pursuant to ECRA: (1) biotechnology; (2) artificial intelligence (AI) and

10 Ian F. Fergusson and Karren M. Sutter, “U.S. Export Control Reform and China: Issues for Congress,” Congressional Research Service, 14 January 2021, https://crsrep orts.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11627/3. 11 Public Comments of Kevin Wolf, Emily Kilcrease, and Jasper Helder. Regarding Areas and Priorities for US and EU Export Control Cooperation under the US-EU Trade and Technology Council, p. 17. 12 Text - H.R.5040—115th Congress (2017–2018): Export Control Reform Act of 2018 | Congress.gov | Library of Congress. 13 Jones, Trading Emerging Technologies, p. 55.

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machine learning; (3) position, navigation, and timing technology; (4) microprocessor technology; (5) advanced computing technology; (6) data analytics technology; (7) quantum information and sensing technology; (8) logistics technology; (9) additive manufacturing (e.g., 3D printing); (10) robotics; (11) brain-computer interfaces; (12) hypersonics; (13) advanced materials; (14) advanced surveillance technologies. In February 2022, the National Science and Technology Council updated the list of critical and emerging technologies.14 BIS opted for a broad definition of technology that includes goods, software, and technological know-how.15 . Despite its broad remit for unilateral action, ECRA emphasizes the importance of multilateral coordination for the effectiveness of export controls: “Export controls should be coordinated with the multilateral export control regimes. […] Application of unilateral export controls should be limited for purposes of protecting specific United States national security and foreign policy interests.”16 Due to increasingly diffused supply chains, unilateral US controls on emerging technologies may lead to regulatory fragmentation and backfill from non-US companies. If not aligned on the multilateral level, US restrictive measures could significantly impede the competitiveness of US advanced technology industries and jeopardize their ability to innovate.17 ECRA’s Sect. 4817 stipulates conditions to avoid such unintended consequences of unilateral actions. The following should be taken into account: (i) the development of emerging and foundational technologies in foreign countries; (ii) the effect export controls imposed pursuant to this section may have on the development of such technologies in the United

14 National Science and Technology Council, Critical and Emerging Technologies List Update, February 2022, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/ 02-2022-Critical-and-Emerging-Technologies-List-Update.pdf. 15 “New Controls on Emerging Technologies Released, While U.S. Commerce Department Comes Under Fire for Delay,” Gibson Dunn, 27 October 2020, https:// www.gibsondunn.com/new-controls-on-emerging-technologies-released-while-us-com merce-department-comes-under-fire-for-delay/ 16 Export Control Reform Act 2018, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title: 50%20section:4811%20edition:prelim. 17 Stephen Ezell and Caleb Foote (2019): “How Stringent Export Controls on Emerging Technologies Would Harm the U.S. Economy,” Information Technology & Innovation Foundation, (May 2019), p. 3.

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States; and (iii) the effectiveness of export controls imposed pursuant to this section on limiting the proliferation of emerging and foundational technologies to foreign countries.18

The direct implication of these provisions is BIS’ preference toward a targeted, measured approach: if a particular technology exists outside the US, there is little rationale to place it on the export control list unilaterally.19 However, as concerns over emerging technologies mount and agreements on the multilateral level take time, the US recently adopted a “control-now-cooperate-later” approach. For example, BIS imposed blanket export restrictions on geospatial imagery AI.20 In addition to the revision of export controls, in 2018 the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) passed the Foreign Investment Risk Review Modernization Act (FIRRMA), which issued final regulations on how to address national security threats arising from foreign investments.21 The updated provisions call for closer scrutiny of foreign investments in emerging and foundational technologies. FIRRMA expands CFIUS’ jurisdiction to non-controlling investments such as venture capital investments. FIRRMA also sets mandatory declaration requirements on any transaction involving a US business or critical technology. The identified technology pursuant to ECRA will be automatically controlled by FIRRMA, making the enforcement of foreign investment screening contingent on the progress of export controls. As a result, the lack of definitional clarity on what emerging technology is from BIS impedes CFIUS to fulfil its responsibilities. With no agreement on what technologies to control, CFIUS cannot exercise its power to regulate risk-laden foreign investments.22 The implications of this regulatory uncertainty may lead to fewer inbound investments in the long run.

18 Export Control Reform Act 2018, https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?path=/pre lim@title50/chapter58&edition=prelim. 19 Public Comments of Kevin Wolf et al., p. 21. 20 “New Controls on Emerging Technologies Released, While U.S. Commerce Depart-

ment Comes Under Fire for Delay”. 21 U.S. Department of the Treasury, The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, https://home.treasury.gov/policy-issues/international/the-committee-onforeign-investment-in-the-united-states-cfius. 22 Fergusson and Sutter, “U.S. Export Control Reform and China: Issues for Congress.”

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EU Export Controls Unlike the US, the EU’s approach to export control is less comprehensive and agile. Brussels does not have an equivalent of BIS to regulate the export of sensitive items. The competency on export controls is anchored at the national level and member states are responsible for licensing exports. As a result, EU export controls are “a patchwork of EU-wide rules set out to pursuant to EU legislation and local rules applied by individual member states.”23 The EU export control framework is comprised of dual-use export controls and military export controls. In addition, EU member states may set out their own lists of controlled dual-use items. In 2011, the EU launched a review of its regulation on dual-use goods. After the Arab Spring, EU member states sought to update the bloc’s export control mechanism to catch up with rapid technological developments, but to no avail. Irreconcilable positions over different interpretations of emerging technologies and divergent national interests impeded the revision. The opposition to include digital surveillance technologies was primarily driven by commercial interests, for instance.24 After a change in Germany’s position, the Commission adopted a proposal to modernize the export controls of dual-use goods, “including the prevention of the misuse of digital surveillance and intrusion systems that results in human rights violations.”25 The regulation was recast as Regulation (EU) 2021/821, which was adopted by the European Parliament in May 2021 and entered into force on 9 September 2021. Known as Recast Dual-Use Regulation, the updated export control regime aims to respond to rapidly evolving security risks and disruptive technologies. In comparison with ECRA, the Recast Dual-Use Regulation has a narrow scope focused on controlling the exports of cyber-surveillance items with human rights implications 23 Anahita Thoms, “Export Controls in the European Union”, The Guide to Sanctions, Third Edition, 2022, p. 187. 24 Samuel Stolton, “EU Nears Conclusion on Cyber Surveillance Export Controls”, EURACTIV, (21 September 2020), https://www.euractiv.com/section/digital/news/eunears-conclusion-on-cyber-surveillance-export-controls/. 25 “Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council setting up a Union Regime for the Control of Exports, Transfer, Brokering, Technical Assistance and Transit of Dual-Use Items (recast), European Commission, (28 September 2016), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/resource.html?uri=cellar:1b8f930e8648-11e6-b076-01aa75ed71a1.0013.02/DOC_1&format=PDF.

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and on regulating emerging technologies. Unlike ECRA, the EU’s regulation does not mention the need to maintain technological leadership or defend its national security interests, but it refers to the need to maintain the competitiveness of economic operators. The EU’s regulation implemented catch-all, end-use controls on cyber surveillance items with human rights implications. The regulation is directed “to ensure that the international commitments and responsibilities of the Member States and of the Union–in particular regarding non-proliferation, regional peace, security and stability, and respect for human rights and international humanitarian law–are complied with.”26 With the update, the EU’s dual-use goods list would go beyond the internationally agreed scope and include items such as facial recognition and spyware. The Regulation introduces a new end-use control on cyber-surveillance equipment, where the exporter is aware or has been informed that the exported items are or may be intended for use in connection with internal repression or the commission of serious violations of human rights and international humanitarian law. This applies to items (whether listed or not) that are specially designed to enable the covert surveillance of natural persons by monitoring, extracting, collecting, or analyzing data from information and telecommunication systems. To strengthen the effective application of export controls of nonlisted items, harmonization on the member state level is essential. To that end, member states are committed to information-sharing among themselves and with the Commission, in particular regarding cyber-surveillance items, e.g., via the EU electronic licensing platform. In addition, the EU set up an “Emerging Technology Expert Group” to address risks associated with trade and technology transfer.27 Compared to the US CFIUS, the EU’s investment screening has a different objective and is much narrower in scope. The EU’s main 26 “Regulation (EU) 2021/821 of the European Parliament and the Council of 20 May 2021 setting up a Union regime for the control of exports, transfer, brokering, technical assistance and transit of dual-use items (recast), Official Journal of the European Union, (11 June 2021), https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri= CELEX:32021R0821. 27 “Commission’s actions to implement new EU Export Control Regulation,” News archive, European Commission (europa.eu), (9 September 2021), https://policy.trade. ec.europa.eu/news/commissions-actions-implement-new-eu-export-control-regulationmemo-2021-09-09_en.

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aim is to coordinate national foreign investment screening mechanisms, as opposed to crafting a pan-European regulatory framework. Yet the implementation of investment screening mechanisms is patchy, as the competency on this belongs to EU member states, with some countries having no such a policy at all.28 The combination of uneven export controls and uneven investment screening mechanisms will likely create discrepancies, weakening the control of emerging technologies.

US–EU Trade and Technology Council Given China’s military-civil fusion policies, the urgency to control emerging technologies is becoming even greater. Several multilateral efforts to coordinate export controls among techno-democracies are underway. The US–EU Trade and Technology Council (TTC) is the most significant attempt since the end of the Cold War to impose export controls outside the traditional scope. Other groupings such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative address the issue of export controls too. In June 2021, Washington and Brussels agreed to establish the TTC to align their approaches to emerging trade and technology issues. Putting existing disagreements aside, the allies showed a readiness to tackle new issues emanating from autocratic states and non-market economies. In September 2021, the US and EU released a Joint Statement outlining the transatlantic agenda on policy areas, including export controls, investment screening, and global supply chains. The statement avoided mentioning Beijing directly, but the China threat was noticeable between the lines. The statement declared the need for enhanced mutual collaboration to promote “democratic and sustainable models of digital and economic governance.” The TTC consists of 10 working groups, including on technology standards, export controls, investment screening, climate and

28 Vera Z. Eichenauer, Michael Dorsch & Feicheng Wang, “Investment Screening Mechanism: The Trend to Control Inward Foreign Investments,” EconPol Policy Report, (December 2021), https://www.econpol.eu/sites/default/files/2021-12/EconPol_Poli cyReport34.pdf.

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green tech, and data governance. A particular focus is placed on the development of “trustworthy AI” with a “human rights-centered approach” and resilient supply chains in the semiconductor industry.29 The second TTC meeting held in May 2022 was shaped by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The US and EU created a Strategic Standardization Information mechanism to enable better information-sharing on the development of international standards for emerging technologies and developed a joint roadmap on evaluation and measurement tools for trustworthy AI and risk management.30 The third TTC meeting held in Autumn 2022 focused on how to avoid a subsidy race between the allies and build supply chain resilience. As part of the TTC, the Export Control Working Group seeks to increase regulatory alignment on the control of dual-use items and emerging technologies. A multilateral approach is recognized as crucial because export controls are most effective when applied by a broad coalition of countries. The Joint Statement of the TTC not only seeks to modernize the multilateral export control regimes beyond their traditional non-proliferation risks, but also aims to support a global-level playing field. The latter departs from the principle of national discretion currently practiced.31 The Statement incorporates concerns raised both in the US and EU export control regulations, increasing civil-military fusion, coercive technology acquisition strategies, cyber-surveillance technologies, and human rights abuses. In December 2021, the Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative was launched to develop guidance regarding “the application of human rights criteria to export licensing policy and practice.”32 Given uneven enforcement capacities, the TTC is devoted 29 U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Inaugural Joint Statement, (29 September

2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/29/ u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-inaugural-joint-statement/. 30 FACT SHEET: “US-EU trade and technology council establishes economic and technology policies & initiatives” (16 May 2022), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingroom/statements-releases/2022/05/16/fact-sheet-u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-councilestablishes-economic-and-technology-policies-initiatives/#:~:text=The%20U.S.%2DEU% 20Trade%20and,Secretary%20of%20State%20Antony%20J. 31 Public Comments of Kevin Wolf et al., p. 25. 32 Fact Sheet: Export Controls and Human Rights Initiative Launched at the Summit

for Democracy, The White House, (10 December 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/ briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/12/10/fact-sheet-export-controls-and-humanrights-initiative-launched-at-the-summit-for-democracy/.

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to developing appropriate capability, building assistance to third countries, and applying transparent guidelines for American and European exporters.33 Coordinating the US and EU’s export controls on the bilateral level, let alone on the multilateral level, will not be an easy feat. Unlike the Cold War’s COCOM, the TTC doesn’t aim to formally align the decisionmaking of licensing practices, but to establish a platform for consultations, coordination, and information-sharing.34 Differences in established practices, regulatory traditions, and legal authorities will inevitably put limitations on export control coordination. The Joint Statement recognizes it, by pointing that “the cooperation and exchanges of the TTC […] should respect the different legal systems in both jurisdictions.”35 There are regulatory and structural limitations to the US’ and EU’s coordination. While the US usually favors market instruments for shaping the emerging technologies, the EU prefers to use regulatory tools, rules, and standard-setting. The EU’s legal authority on the enforcement of listed items and end-use controls does not match the US’. Even EU member states with the strictest application of export controls have narrower authority than the US. Unlike the US, the EU does not have an end-user control list either. A ban on the export of listed items to specific users would need to be enacted through sanctions and not export control measures.36 To harmonize export control coordination, the EU would be required to make significant changes in its regulations. Currently, the existing regimes allow EU member states to control items that are outside the scope of multilateral export control regimes focused on non-proliferation or conventional weapons-related items. The EU does not have any direct authority to instruct its member states to regulate items that are not on a multilateral export control list. The enforcement of controls on items not related to conventional weapons is an unchartered territory for the EU. To expand controls for items beyond the multilateral scope, a unanimous agreement by all EU member states would be required to 33 U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council Inaugural Joint Statement, (29 September 2021), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/09/29/ u-s-eu-trade-and-technology-council-inaugural-joint-statement/. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. 36 Public Comments of Kevin Wolf et al., p. 27.

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adopt the changes. In the past, the revision of the EU export control regime was a painstaking process. Without EU-wide revisions, member states could apply Article 9, which gives them the authority to impose unilateral controls for public security and human rights considerations. However, the application of this provision on additional controls has been rare. Until September 2021, when the Recast Dual-Use Regulation was adopted, but this has never been coordinated at the EU level. To successfully trigger this Article, EU member states would have to agree on the term “public security.”37 Another avenue would be to exercise the EU’s catch-all authority in the control of non-listed items. The assessment of whether the export of items is related to military end-use and whether a license should be denied belongs to the competency of EU member states.38 As export controls do not fall in the remit of the European Commission, each member state is responsible for its own assessment and interpretation. As a result, the discretion among member states often leads to the uneven application of catch-all authorities.

Conclusion The US, EU, and China are locked in great-power competition for global leadership in emerging technologies. AI, machine learning, 5G, and other technologies have a more transformative potential than the previous generation of technologies, so shaping their control and defining their standards will have far-reaching implications for national security, warfare, economic competitiveness, and technological advantage. Beijing is making huge strides in dominating the development of emerging and critical technologies and setting their own standards. Described as technonationalism, China has leveraged its state capitalism toward the creation of national champions and generously funded R&D. A primary example is China’s global leading role in 5G equipment. By imposing its own technological standards, Beijing can create new dependencies, ready to be exploited in the future. In the field of AI, while the US currently leads

37 Ibid., p. 6. 38 Ibid., p. 26.

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on it, China is rapidly catching up, and the EU is lagging behind it.39 US sweeping export controls introduced in October 2022 aimed to stymie China’s advance in emerging technology. The uncertainty and ambiguity around emerging technologies makes it hard to apply conventional control mechanisms. The upgrade of export controls on emerging technologies will be inherently contingent on the definition of national security and foreign policy objectives. Any export control mechanism will be predicated on how threats are defined, how technologies can be controlled, and how best to avoid endangering commercial interests. The core problem of export controls faced during the Cold War period remains relevant, namely how to balance controls with national security and economic interests and how to improve the efficiency of the licensing process. But while the focus on end-use and end-users will remain of primary importance, due to the often nonphysical nature of emerging technologies focusing on a list of specific items has become an outdated way to control technology. As a result, any meaningful multilateralization of export controls would require a shared definition and mutual understanding of national security threats as well as the synchronization of foreign investment screening. The West’s unprecedented response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has broken the mould and represents a unique opportunity to create a plurilateral export control regime beyond traditional non-proliferation objectives. As part of highly coordinated actions, the US and 37 allied and partner countries joined novel and expansive export controls against Russia. Prior to the invasion, any attempts to multilateralize export control laws were aspirational, with the US leading with unilateral policies. Export controls against Russia have put the TTC in a new light: the council can capitalize on the formation of “a core group of technodemocracies” to push for controls outside the scope of the traditional regimes.40 This will help to avoid regulatory fragmentation and uneven enforcement, and strengthen supply chain resilience.

39 Daniel Castro, Michael McLaughlin & Eline Chivot, “Who Is Winning the AI Race: China, the EU or the United States?”, Center for Data Innovation, (August 2019), https://www2.datainnovation.org/2019-china-eu-us-ai.pdf. 40 Kevon Wolf & Emily S. Weinstein “COCOM’s Daughter?” WorldECR, (May 2022), https://cset.georgetown.edu/wp-content/uploads/WorldECR-109-pp24-28-Art icle1-Wolf-Weinstein.pdf.

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Export controls can be a powerful tool in limiting rivals’ access to emerging technology and in delaying, rather than halting, their technological advance. Finding the right balance between legitimate national security concerns, strategic economic objectives, and foreign policy goals is quintessential. Without a clear vision, imposing export controls on emerging technologies can create uncertainty detrimental to innovations and investments.

CHAPTER 5

The Geopolitics of Energy Transition: New Resources and Technologies Marco Siddi

Introduction1 Increasing evidence of the climate crisis2 and the international agreements that aim to tackle it, notably the Paris Climate Agreement, are leading most of the Global North to embark on an energy transition. The transition can be defined as the shift by the energy sector away from fossil fuel-based systems of energy production and consumption to fossil-free 1 This chapter is based on Marco Siddi, “The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition”, FIIA Briefing Paper 326 (2021), https://www.fiia.fi/wp-content/uploads/2021/ 12/bp326_marco-siddi_the-geopolitics-of-the-energy-transition.pdf (Accessed 25 January 2022). 2 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2021—The Physical Science Basis: Summary for Policymakers (2021), https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar6/wg1/ downloads/report/IPCC_AR6_WGI_SPM_final.pdf (Accessed 25 January 2022).

M. Siddi (B) University of Cagliari, Cagliari, Italy e-mail: [email protected] Finnish Institute of International Affairs, Helsinki, Finland

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 73 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_5

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sources, such as wind, solar and—depending on national policy choices— nuclear energy, and storage systems based on lithium-ion batteries and hydrogen. The energy transition will be characterized by the growing penetration of renewables into the energy supply mix, electrification, and improvements in energy storage thanks to emerging technologies, such as mega-batteries and more efficient electrolysers for the production of green hydrogen. Thanks to renewables, energy production will become more decentralized. Smart grids using digital technologies will have to be built to react quickly to local changes in renewable energy production and usage. As governments pursue the transition, new regulatory frameworks will be formulated to govern the sector and considerable investments are expected. Economic systems based on renewable energy will be far less impactful on the climate than those based on fossil fuels (i.e., coal, oil, and gas). In the coming decades, the transition will take place at different paces in different regions of the world. The richer economies of the Global North will lead the way, whereas several countries of the Global South may still increase their fossil fuel consumption in the coming decade, particularly if they do not receive sufficient economic aid and transfers of emerging green technologies from the Global North. Importantly, Chinese emissions are estimated to peak in the latter half of the 2020s.3 Nonetheless, an increasing number of countries are pledging to achieve carbon neutrality (zero net emissions) in the next few decades. The EU, US, and Canada aim to be carbon neutral by 2050 (some EU countries have earlier targets—Finland in 2035, Germany and Sweden in 2045, while Poland has not yet made a formal national pledge); China and Russia have stated 2060 as their target year, whereas India has put forward the latest date among major polluters, 2070. Under these circumstances, major fossil fuel producers will have to adapt or face considerable economic losses. Meanwhile, countries which control the raw materials that are necessary for the energy transition (rare earth and other critical elements, cobalt, and lithium), as well as the related supply chains and technological know-how, will acquire economic and geopolitical importance.

3 CarbonBrief, “China’s Emissions on Track to Peak by mid-2020s”, (30 September 2021), https://www.carbonbrief.org/daily-brief/chinas-emissions-on-track-topeak-by-mid-2020s-iea/ (Accessed 11 July 2022).

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As a result of the decentralization of energy production, the geopolitics of renewable energy will be less conflictual than the geopolitics of fossil fuels. However, new dependencies will develop—for instance, on countries that control the supply chain of rare earth elements. Different kinds of environmental issues will emerge, albeit less acute than the prospects of destruction caused by carbon emissions. Knowhow and patents in relevant emerging technologies—for instance, advanced renewable energy installations, electrolysers for the production of green hydrogen, battery technology, and carbon capture and storage technologies—will become essential. This chapter investigates some of the main developments, resources, and emerging technologies related to the energy transition. It starts with a brief assessment of the main winners and losers of the transition, followed by a discussion on the new geopolitics of renewable energy, with a focus on critical minerals. The role of hydrogen as a carbon-free energy carrier is also discussed. Due to their impact on supply chains for green technology, China and its Belt and Road Initiative deserve special attention. The chapter concludes by briefly reviewing the main EU policies concerning the geopolitics of renewables, including the EU’s current initiatives.

Leaving Behind the Fossil Fuel Era: The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition The energy transition will cause serious economic losses for fossil fuel producers such as Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Algeria, Nigeria, Russia, and Norway, and will also weaken their geopolitical influence. The extent of the losses will depend on the speed of the transition and the capability of these countries to adapt and diversify their economies. The list of potential losers is in fact longer. For instance, it also includes the large hydrocarbon sector in the United States—following the “shale revolution”, the US has become a major exporter of fossil fuels. Countries that currently benefit economically and geopolitically from the transit of fossil fuels on their territory, such as Ukraine and Georgia, can also be counted among the losers.4 4 Indra Overland, Morgan Bazilian, Talgat Ilimbek Uulu, Roman Vakulchuk & Kirsten Westphal, “The GeGaLo index: Geopolitical Gains and Losses After Energy Transition”, Energy Strategy Reviews, 26 (2019), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/ S2211467X19300999 (Accessed 25 January 2022).

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Differences exist between fossil fuel producers concerning the size and timing of the losses that they will incur due to the energy transition. Those with lower production costs and lower break-even prices for oil, such as Saudi Arabia and Russia respectively, will be more resilient and competitive in the shrinking markets. Major producers such as Russia and Saudi Arabia, and potentially the US, may also cooperate in the OPEC + format (including OPEC members and ten other oil-producing countries, such as Russia) in order to reduce price volatility, as we have seen several times since 2016. Moreover, oil and gas producers that are better positioned for exports to the Asian market—where demand is expected to grow during the next decade—can still make large profits.5 For instance, Qatar’s outlook is positive thanks to its relative proximity to East Asian markets and the fact that it delivers its gas by tankers, as liquefied natural gas (LNG), and can easily reorient its exports. Conversely, Algeria’s gas exports rely mostly on pipelines, which cannot easily be reoriented, and they supply the European market, which is expected to decarbonize earlier. Due to the expected rise in carbon prices and the introduction of carbon border taxes in the future, carbon intensity in the production process (namely the greenhouse gas emissions per unit of energy produced) will also play a role. For instance, Saudi Arabia has managed to reduce its carbon intensity by decreasing gas flaring and integrating solar energy into oil and gas processing. Conversely, oil producers such as Iraq and Algeria have a higher carbon intensity.6 On the other hand, large importers of fossil fuels—such as China, the European Union, and Japan—will benefit from the energy transition, particularly if they continue to acquire the necessary emerging technology and resources. When China reduces its dependence on oil, it will also decrease its vulnerability to disruptions at maritime choke points such as the Strait of Malacca. Countries where the world’s leading clean-energy

5 See for example International Energy Agency, Southeast Asia Energy Outlook 2022, https://iea.blob.core.windows.net/assets/e5d9b7ff-559b-4dc3-8faa-42381f80ce2e/Sou theastAsiaEnergyOutlook2022.pdf (Accessed 11 July 2022). 6 Indra Overland et al., “The Geopolitics of Energy: Out with the Old, In with the New?” Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Forum, 126 (2021), pp. 41– 55, https://www.oxfordenergy.org/publications/oxford-energy-forum-the-geopolitics-ofenergy-out-with-the-old-and-in-with-the-new-issue-126/ (Accessed 25 January 2022).

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companies are located—China, Western Europe, Japan, and the United States—are likely to profit considerably from the transition. Even states that currently rely on oil and gas export revenues, such as Russia and Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) states, can reduce losses and potentially gain from the transition if they adapt their economies. Both Russia and MENA countries have great potential for renewable energy production. Russia also controls large reserves of minerals that are critical for the transition.7 For these actors, a key challenge lies in overcoming the ‘hydrocarbon culture’ and the related vested interests that have shaped their economies and societies for decades, or even centuries. In the case of Russia, Western sanctions following its attack on Ukraine in February 2022 could slow down the transition due to limited access to emerging green technologies. Furthermore, any discussion concerning expected losses from the energy transition should also consider the losses from inaction, namely the catastrophic effects that climate change is having and will have on economies and societies if the energy transition does not occur, or if it occurs partially or too slowly. Projections vary; a recent study has shown that around 10% of the global economic output could be lost if temperature increases stay on the current trajectory.8 If these figures are taken into account, the costs of the energy transition appear rather as inevitable investments to prevent even worse crises. While the gains from implementing the energy transition in terms of fighting climate change are evident, a debate exists regarding security and supply issues. The geopolitics of renewable energy will feature a new type of competition concerning sources and technologies. Access to critical minerals and rare earth elements for the production of high-tech and renewable energy applications (wind turbines, solar panels, efficiency lighting) will be essential. Rare earths include 17 elements in the periodic table (i.e., neodymium, dysprosium, and scandium, among others), most

7 Marco Siddi, “The Geopolitics of the Energy Transition: Essential Issues and Implications for the EU and Russia”, Valdai Club Expert Opinions (18 October 2021), https://valdaiclub.com/a/highlights/the-geopolitics-of-the-energy-transition/ (Accessed 25 January 2022). 8 Swiss Re Institute, “The Economics of Climate Change: No Action not an Option” (2021), https://www.swissre.com/institute/research/topics-and-risk-dialogues/climateand-natural-catastrophe-risk/expertise-publication-economics-of-climate-change.html (Accessed 25 January 2022).

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of which are found in high geographic concentration. China is in a dominant position in both the production and processing of rare earths and controls a substantial share of relevant global supply chains. China is also prominent in renewable technology and battery manufacturing. It now produces more than 70% of the world’s solar modules and hosts nearly half of the world’s wind turbine manufacturing capacity.9 While rare earths are also found outside China’s territory (for instance, in Australia and Russia), the economic viability and toxicity of extraction and processing make it difficult to develop alternative supply chains. The most significant rare earth mining corporation outside China, Lynas, is based in Australia; Beijing’s attempt to buy a 51% stake in it was blocked by the Australian government in 2009 for strategic reasons. The US lags behind in this field. Its main rare earth mining corporation, Molycorp, filed for bankruptcy in 2015, and later underwent restructuring. It takes at least a decade to bring new rare earth mines into operation because it is a capital-intensive endeavour. Meanwhile, China has consolidated the position of its six state-owned companies dealing with critical minerals and continues to have lower material costs, as well as greater “tolerance” for the high environmental impact of mining. China’s boycott of rare earth exports to Japan between 2010 and 2015, the previous US President Donald Trump’s attempts to impose tariffs on rare earths, and the disruptions in the supply chains caused by the Covid-19 pandemic highlight that these supply chains are exposed to international crises and 10 tensions. China’s boycott against Japan began after an incident near the contested Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea. It led to a price spike on several elements, and it only ended in 2015 after Japan, the EU, and the US filed complaints with the World Trade Organization (WTO). As of 2021, it seems unlikely that the WTO would now manage to defuse a similar dispute, as trade wars between the US and China have undermined its centrality.

9 Michal Meidan, “China’s Emergence as a Powerful Player in the Old and New Geopolitics of Energy”, The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies Forum, 126 (2021), pp. 12–15; Sophia Kalantzakos, “The Race for Critical Minerals in an Era of Geopolitical Realignments”, The International Spectator, 55:3 (2020), pp. 1–16. 10 Andreas Goldthau & Llewelyn Hughes, “Protect Global Supply Chains for LowCarbon Technologies” (2 September 2020), https://www.nature.com/articles/d41586020-02499-8 (Accessed 25 January 2022).

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The US stance under Donald Trump contributed to the politicization of supply chains. In the summer of 2018, Trump included rare earths in a list of Chinese products that were to be subject to tariffs. As the US imported 78% of its rare-earth compounds from China, the tariffs would have harmed the US tech industry. Hence, they were removed from the final list of goods subject to tariffs in September 2018.

Storing Energy: Lithium, Cobalt, and Hydrogen In addition to rare earths, lithium and cobalt are chemical elements of essential importance for the energy transition, notably for producing devices that store energy. Hydrogen is a carbon-free energy carrier that can be used to store energy and facilitate the decarbonization of hard-toabate sectors, such as heavy industry and long-haul transportation. Lithium is used in lithium-ion batteries in electric cars, as well as in portable electronic devices and grid storage appliances. It is found in high concentrations particularly in the “lithium triangle” of Argentina, Bolivia, and Chile, as well as in Australia (now the main producer) and in China, which plays a key role in processing and supply. It is widely accepted that global lithium reserves are adequate to sustain growing demand from the electric vehicle industry. However, temporary supply shortages might occur due to potential spikes in lithium demand in the short term.11 In Europe, some deposits of ore lithium are located in Germany, the Czech Republic, and Serbia. Lithium extraction is problematic as it causes environmental degradation and water stress, and requires high energy use. It may also exacerbate inequalities and undermine the livelihood of local communities, as highlighted by recent protests near the Atacama mine in Chile, and in Serbia.12 Cobalt is used in batteries, smartphones, laptops, and electric cars. Around 70% of current cobalt extraction and the largest reserves are 11 Daniele Stampatori, Pier Paolo Raimondi & Michel Noussan, “Li-Ion Batteries: A Review of a Key Technology for Transport Decarbonization”, Energies, 13 (2020), pp. 8– 10 and 17–18, https://www.mdpi.com/1996-1073/13/10/2638 (Accessed 25 January 2022). 12 Dave Sherwood, “Chile protesters block access to lithium operations: local leader”, Reuters (25 October 2019), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-chile-protests-lithiumidUSKBN1X42B9 (Accessed 11 July 2022); “Serbia revokes Rio Tinto lithium mine permits following protests”, BBC (21 January 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/worldeurope-60081853 (Accessed 11 July 2022).

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located in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). Chinese companies control nearly half of the global production of refined cobalt. In the DRC, Beijing has secured a central position in cobalt mining. China is also the main consumer of cobalt and the main supplier to the US. Europe hosts around one-fourth of the global cobalt refining capacity, mainly in Finland. Cobalt extraction is concentrated in the hands of a few companies and is highly controversial. In 2016, Amnesty International reported that over 100,000 artisanal miners, including numerous children, dug out cobalt without any safety precautions in the DRC. As a consequence, cobalt enters the supply chain of multinational companies through a highly exploitative process and gross human rights abuses.13 Due to the rise in sales of electric cars, competition in the development and production of lithium-ion batteries has occurred between China, the US, and Europe. Currently, China is ahead of competitors in the construction of new battery gigafactories. Meanwhile, the US and the EU have published lists of critical minerals, including lithium and cobalt, which they consider essential for battery production and the energy transition. Japan maintains a stockpile of minerals that it qualifies as critical. Hydrogen is a highly promising energy carrier in the context of the energy transition. On Earth, it is nearly always combined with other elements, as in water molecules, H2 0. However, if it is freed from its compound (for example, by splitting water molecules through electrolysis), it can be converted into electricity through fuel cells, combusted to produce heat or power, or used as feedstock. If it is burned in an engine or combined with oxygen in a fuel cell, hydrogen produces heat or electricity, and only water vapour as a by-product, with no carbon emissions. Hydrogen is not an energy source and needs to be produced using energy sources such as gas, coal, nuclear power, or renewables. Various colours are used to describe the different production pathways: “grey” hydrogen from natural gas and coal; “green” hydrogen from renewable energy, produced through electrolysis; “purple” hydrogen from nuclear electricity; and “blue hydrogen” from gas and coal but with carbon

13 Amnesty International, “This is What We Die for: Human Rights Abuses in the Democratic Republic of Congo Power the Global Trade in Cobalt” (2016), https:// www.amnesty.org/en/wp-content/uploads/2021/05/AFR6231832016ENGLISH.pdf (Accessed 25 January 2022).

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capture and storage (CCS) technologies—which allow carbon dioxide to be captured before it enters the atmosphere. While today most hydrogen is produced from fossil fuels (without CCS), it is especially green and potentially blue and purple hydrogen that hold promise for the energy transition. Green hydrogen allows renewable energy produced from intermittent sources such as solar and wind to be stored and dispatched. It can store such energy much longer than batteries. Hydrogen can be particularly useful for decarbonizing sectors such as heavy industry and long-haul transport. Currently, producing green hydrogen is more costly than other types of hydrogen. However, costs are coming down and several countries are allocating more and more investments to hydrogen technologies. China has already managed to lower the production costs of electrolysers considerably. Transportation costs and infrastructure will play an important role in hydrogen trade, making it somewhat similar to gas trade today. For transportation, pure hydrogen can be liquefied, but this involves cooling it to -252 C and using a lot of energy. It is more practical to convert it into a compound, such as ammonia, but such conversions are expensive. Pipeline transport could make more sense, especially if existing pipelines can be repurposed for hydrogen transport. For example, when the demand for gas in Europe decreases, some of the existing thick networks of pipelines could be adapted to transport green or blue hydrogen. Hydrogen can be produced almost anywhere in the world, and many countries will be prosumers, both producers and consumers. However, some countries have better resources, access to technologies, and can become larger and cheaper producers. Countries such as Australia, Chile, and Morocco aim to become exporters of hydrogen, whereas Japan, Korea, and Germany are preparing to become large-scale importers. Several countries in the Middle East and Russia have large-scale potential for hydrogen production and see blue and green hydrogen as an opportunity to preserve their role as key energy suppliers. To an extent, hydrogen trade can lead to new dependencies. China’s lower production costs of electrolysers can stir fears in the West that Beijing will dominate yet another new energy technology. However, the hydrogen trade will be less asymmetric than gas or oil trade. As hydrogen can be produced almost anywhere in the world and many countries will be prosumers, it will be nearly impossible for exporters to weaponize

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hydrogen trade. If anything, hydrogen trade will provide a back-up for the electricity system and strengthen energy security.14

Driving the Energy Transition: The Cases of China and the EU As argued, China is in a favourable position in the geopolitics of renewables and of the energy transition. It has access to vast raw material resources, largely controls supply chains, and occupies a strong position in the processing of critical minerals and the development of photovoltaic and wind turbine technology. In addition, it is promoting its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), a project with considerable investments that are meant to unite Eurasia and Africa (and arguably Latin America) into a common space of trade, infrastructure, and digital connectivity. To do this, the BRI requires large quantities of critical minerals. Moreover, Chinese technologies will be implemented—most notably in the digital sector, such as 5G networks—as part of the BRI’s global outreach. Traditional industrial powers, particularly the US, have taken a critical stance vis-à-vis the BRI, not least because it poses a serious geopolitical challenge. Having China as the main investor, the BRI is helping Beijing to forge a global network of partnerships. There are widespread concerns that, while Chinese authorities talk of the BRI as a “win–win initiative”, China’s partners tend to be pushed into debt and dependence on Beijing. On the other hand, Western economic prescriptions have sometimes led countries in the Global South to accumulate debt and develop economic dependencies. Arguably, China offers an alternative to poorer nations that do not want to rely solely on Western finance and institutions. As it strives to be a leader and role model in the energy transition, the EU has been trying to secure access to the necessary raw materials. The EU’s focus on supply chains of critical minerals can be seen as part of the “geopolitical approach” advocated by European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen. Building on its 2008 Raw Materials Initiative, the European Commission has published a list of critical raw materials and identified challenges to their secure and sustainable supply. The EU 14 Thijs van de Graaf, Indra Overland, Daniel Scholten & Kirsten Westphal, “The New Oil? The Geopolitics and International Governance of Hydrogen”, Energy Research and Social Science 70 (2020), https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S22146296 20302425 (Accessed 25 January 2022).

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has launched a European Raw Materials Alliance, which aims to build resilience and strategic autonomy for Europe’s rare earth value chains.15 In 2020, the Commission adopted a Critical Raw Materials Action Plan and subsequently developed a strategic partnership with Canada in this field. In September 2021, the EU-US Trade and Technology Council stated that Brussels and Washington would expand cooperation on critical and emerging technologies and on securing supply chains, with a particular focus on climate and clean technology. Furthermore, in October 2017, the European Commission launched the European Battery Alliance, a platform for cooperation between industry, member states, and the European Investment Bank. A central goal is to secure access to raw materials for batteries from countries outside the EU and boost primary and secondary production within the Union. France and Germany took the lead in this 16 endeavour. The European Commission further strengthened its focus on digital and green supply chains by launching the Global Gateway in December 2021, a roadmap to advance EU-endorsed connectivity infrastructure that is functional to the energy transition. While the Commission announced that it will mobilize e300 billion in 2021–27 for investments in five macro-areas (digital, climate and energy, transport, health, education, and research), it remains unclear whether the EU can compete with China’s BRI in both financial and organizational terms.17 The EU has also taken significant steps in the field of hydrogen. Developing hydrogen capacity is seen as an important part of the European Green Deal. In July 2020, the European Commission published the EU Hydrogen Strategy. The strategy announces investments and envisages a phased increase in green hydrogen production, so that it is deployed

15 For EU policies concerning critical raw materials and relevant documents, see https://ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/areas-specific-interest/cri tical-raw-materials_en (Accessed 11 July 2022). 16 Stampatori et al. (2020). For official sources on EU policies, see: https:// ec.europa.eu/growth/sectors/raw-materials/policy-and-strategy-raw-materials_en; on EUUS cooperation, see: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/STATEM ENT_21_4951 (Accessed 25 January 2022). 17 European Commission, “The Global Gateway” (1 December 2021), https://ec. europa.eu/info/sites/default/files/joint_communication_global_gateway.pdf (Accessed 25 January 2022); for an analysis, see Tyyne Karjalainen, “EU Global Gateway: Building Connectivity as a Policy”, FIIA Working Paper 127 (2022), forthcoming.

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on a large scale across hard-to-decarbonize sectors after 2030.18 In their post-Covid-19 recovery plans, several member states have announced considerable investments in hydrogen capacity. However, the availability of sufficient water and enough space for the large-scale expansion of solar and wind energy generation are important limiting factors for hydrogen production. Due to high population density and high consumption, the EU as a whole will quite possibly become an importer of hydrogen.

Conclusion The energy transition will lead to new configurations in energy trade and geopolitics. Countries will strive to secure access to resources that are essential for renewable energy production and storage, such as critical minerals and rare earth elements. Knowhow and patent ownership for emerging green technologies such as advanced renewable energy installations, electrolysers, and battery gigafactories will be important indicators of leadership in the energy transition. As resources are limited and developing green technologies requires considerable investments, the main global actors—notably China and the US—are already competing for the control of supply chains and technology development. Especially if international relations continue to be shaped by tensions and protectionist trends, competition will continue and possibly limit the transformative potential that could be unleashed by global cooperation in the energy transition. Nonetheless, while demand for critical minerals and emerging technologies may lead to new dependencies and tensions, the geopolitics of renewable energy will be less conflictual than that of hydrocarbons. Energy production will become more decentralized, and more states will become prosumers. However, countries will decarbonize at different speeds, and hydrocarbon consumption and geopolitics will persist in

18 European Commission, “A hydrogen strategy for a climate-neutral Europe” (8 July 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/hydrogen_strategy.pdf. For an analysis of the EU Hydrogen Strategy, see Frank Umbach, “The EU’s Hydrogen Strategy and its Geopolitical Challenges”, ISPI Commentary (21 May 2021), https://www.ispion line.it/it/pubblicazione/eus-hydrogen-strategy-and-its-geopolitical-challenges-30521. For an analysis of the European Green Deal, see Marco Siddi, “The European Green Deal: Assessing its current state and future implementation”, FIIA Working Paper 114 (2020), https://www.fiia.fi/en/publication/the-european-green-deal (Accessed 25 January 2022).

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many parts of the world. Large fossil fuel exporters will have to progressively adapt to the energy transition; if they persevere with their current economic model, their prospects will be bleak. The worsening climate crisis leaves no room for further delays in the energy transition. Countries of the Global North, which together with China are responsible for the vast majority of historical emissions, should proceed swiftly and share the necessary emerging technologies with poorer countries. International cooperation will accelerate the transition and give the world a chance to avoid catastrophic climate change. Unfortunately, at the time of writing, the prospect of a cooperative global energy transition appears to be seriously at risk due to growing geopolitical tensions and competition. The war in Ukraine and the ensuing confrontation between the West and Russia—while China and other key actors such as India have continued to do business or even increased ties with Moscow—could have serious repercussions on the energy transition too. In this context, a “muddling on” scenario becomes an increasingly likely prospect, with different growth models for energy technologies, an increasingly heterogeneous world of “clubs” led by regional powers, and limited global cooperation on emerging green technologies, as well as on tackling climate change more broadly. In such a scenario, even major technological breakthroughs in the green sector may fail to prevent catastrophic climate change, as conflicting groups of states will compete for leadership and be reluctant to share their best technologies with the opposing side or poorer countries of the global South.19

19 Morgan Bazilian, Michael Bradshaw, Johannes Gabriel, Andreas Goldthau & Kirsten Westphal, “Four Scenarios of the Energy Transition: Drivers, Consequences, and Implications for Geopolitics”, WIREs Climate Change 11:2 (2020), https://doi.org/10.1002/ wcc.625.

PART II

Strategic Stability and Military Affairs

CHAPTER 6

Technological Uncertainty and Strategic Stability Igor Istomin

Introduction In 2017, Russian President Vladimir Putin proclaimed that the state that attains leadership in Artificial Intelligence “will become the master of the

A previous version of the argument presented here appeared in research published in Russian: Igor Istomin, “Innovation Mirage: The Role of Technological Uncertainty in Military Instability”, Vestnik MGIMO Universiteta, 6, (2020), pp.7-52. The author expresses appreciation to Alexander Chekov, Anne Crowley-Vigneau, Ivan Danilin, Mikhail Mironyuk, Elena Nechaeva and William C. Wohlforth for their suggestions on the study. He is grateful to Andrew Futter, Clemens Haeusler and Maximilian Hoell for their feedback on the draft. I. Istomin (B) MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 89 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_6

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world”.1 This statement revealed a deep-seated belief in the power of emerging technologies. The Russian leader was not alone in his fascination. Several years earlier, the US Department of Defense had announced the “Third Offset Strategy” to preserve its edge through technical innovation. During a speech to unveil the new strategy, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel acknowledged that Washington was unable to outspend competitors on legacy systems. Instead, it counted on a breakthrough in emerging weapons systems.2 The reliance on technology reflects a desire for prompt solutions to complex challenges. As futurologist Arthur C. Clarke famously put it, “Any sufficiently advanced technology is indistinguishable from magic”.3 Whereas the belief in the supranatural promises an escape from the constraints of reality, technological optimism becomes its substitute under the veneer of rationalism. However, next to attraction lies fear. If emerging technologies resemble magic—is it perhaps of the dark kind? Concerns are especially strong in the security domain. After all, someone’s superiority is inevitably someone else’s vulnerability. No wonder the recent rapid developments in long-range precision weapons, hypersonic vehicles, more credible hit-to-kill missile defence systems, Artificial Intelligence, and offensive cyber capabilities have triggered not only hopes but also controversies. While each of these emerging technologies threatens detrimental consequences for international security, their potential overlapping multiplies anxieties.4 Critics even suspect that these innovative capabilities have undermined the pillars of the “Long

1 “Putin: leader in the sphere of artificial intelligence will become the master of the

world”, RIS Novosti (1 September 2017), https://ria.ru/20170901/1501566046.html (Accessed 3 February 2022). 2 Chuck Hagel, “Reagan National Defense Forum Keynote Address”, US Department of Defense (15 November 2014) https://www.defense.gov/News/Speeches/Speech/Art icle/606635/ (Accessed 3 February 2022). 3 Arthur C. Clarke “Clarke’s Third Law on UFO’s”, Science, 159:3812, (1968), p. 255. 4 See, for example, Richard H. Speier, et al. Hypersonic missile nonproliferation:

hindering the spread of a new class of weapons, (Rand Corporation: 2017); Michael T. Klare, “The Challenges of Emerging Technologies”, Arms Control Today, 48:10, (2018), pp. 10– 16; Christopher F. Chyba, “New technologies & strategic stability”, Dædalus, 149:2, (2020), pp. 150–170; James Johnson, “Delegating strategic decision-making to machines: Dr. Strangelove Redux?”, Journal of Strategic Studies 45:3 (2022), pp. 439–477.

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Peace”, which prevented clashes between major powers amidst the intense rivalries of the latter part of the twentieth century.5 Throughout their confrontation, the Soviet Union and the United States reached an understanding of strategic stability as a situation in which neither side had the incentive to initiate an attack against the other. This understanding emphasized avoiding a catastrophic direct clash between the superpowers, given the unreliability to control escalation.6 The guarantees against nuclear Armageddon resided in force composition, ensuring an inevitable and devastating response to a potential assailant. The paradox of strategic stability arose from a reliance of peace on mutual vulnerability. Anxious specialists suspect that forthcoming technical advancements will reverse past achievements.7 They are expected to reduce the survivability of forces and undermine their ability to punish adversaries. In this regard, Andrew Futter argued that the emerging technologies “reopened questions about counterforce strikes and deterrence by denial, imperilled mutual vulnerability as a central ordering mechanism in strategic affairs, presented more complex pathways towards escalation, blurred the nuclear–conventional distinction, and cultivated a more suspicious and

5 See, for example, Andrew Futter, and Benjamin Zala, “Emerging non-nuclear technology and the future of the global nuclear order”, Nuclear disarmament, (Routledge: 2019), pp. 207–224. 6 For the definitions of strategic stability, see Elbridge Colby, “Defining strategic stability: Reconciling stability and deterrence”, Strategic stability: Contending interpretations, (Army War College Press: 2013), pp. 47–84. 7 See, the survey of expert opinions on implications from selected emerging technologies (AI, cyber capabilities and hypersonic missiles), Michal Onderco, and Madeline Zutt, “Emerging technology and nuclear security: What does the wisdom of the crowd tell us?”, Contemporary Security Policy, 42:3, (2021), pp. 286–311. For tracing of risks to strategic stability, see also Andrey A. Kokoshin, “Strategic Stability in a deteriorating international environment”, Polis. Political Studies, 2018, 4, pp. 7–21, in Russ.; Dmitri Trenin, “Strategic stability in the changing world”, Carnegie Moscow Center (March 2019) https://carnegieendowment.org/files/3-15_Trenin_StrategicStability.pdf (Accessed 13 August 2022); Christopher F. Chyba, “New technologies & strategic stability”, Dædalus, 149:2, (2020), pp. 150–170; James Johnson, “‘Catalytic nuclear war’ in the age of artificial intelligence & autonomy: Emerging military technology and escalation risk between nuclear-armed states”, Journal of Strategic Studies (2021), pp. 1–41; Johnson, “Delegating strategic decision-making to machines.”.

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fearful nuclear environment”.8 Such concerns are not uniform, but they received loud acknowledgement in the strategic community.9 The current chapter demonstrates that the debate on the destabilizing effects of emerging weapons stays hostage to technological determinism. This debate rests heavily upon the theory of offence–defence balance despite its evident flaws. The following analysis highlights the risks produced by the uncertainty that technological change infuses in calculations rather than by the intrinsic characteristics of emerging weapons. Drawing upon Science and Technology Studies, it argues that the new technological means and capabilities are open to various applications, with actors requiring time to learn their true meanings. The exaggerated speculations over their potential uses promote misperceptions and overreactions. This argument follows an established tradition attributing escalation to miscalculations rather than hostility.10 Its implication for strategic stability lies in attributing the dangers to the pace of technological change rather than its content. The chapter does not claim that technological uncertainty necessarily leads to war initiation. The historical analysis points to the role of structural conditions, political considerations, strategic expectations, and leadership choices as other important variables in this regard. However, it identifies the contribution of emerging technologies in amplifying tensions and fostering brinkmanship. The analysis starts by exploring the drawbacks of assigning destabilization to specific arms. It suggests an alternative explanation of the effects of technological change by examining its capacity to generate uncertainty by looking at the record of the Cold War. This period constitutes a hard case for the argument as it witnessed rapid military innovations without direct clashes between the superpowers. Nevertheless, the analysis will disclose connections between the qualitative advancement of capabilities and the initiation of crises. The chapter will wrap up by examining the potential

8 Andrew Futter, “Disruptive Technologies and Nuclear Risks: What’s New and What

Matters”, Survival, 64:1, (2022) p. 99. 9 For a more sanguine view, see Todd S. Sechser, Neil Narang, & Caitlin Talmadge, “Emerging Technologies and Strategic Stability in Peacetime, Crisis, and War”, Journal of strategic studies, 42:6, (2019), pp. 727–735. 10 John H. Herz, “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma”, World Politics, 2:2, (1950), pp. 157–180.

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effects of technological uncertainty on current geopolitical rivalries and Euro-Atlantic security.

Perils of Technological Determinism Martin van Creveld opened his study on the evolution of military technology with a pronouncement: “war is completely permeated by technology and governed by it”.11 This claim falls within a tradition of technological determinism, rallying such diverse thinkers as Karl Marx, Walter Rostow, and Alvin Toffler. They all viewed changes in the material circumstances as a crucial precondition for social, economic, and political transformations. As prominent critic Andrew Feenberg explained, technological determinism envisages that “technology is destiny”.12 In Security Studies, this reasoning found expression in the theory of offence–defence balance (hereafter, offence–defence theory).13 It attributes the frequency and pace of armed struggle to the changes in prevailing technologies (along with a few additional characteristics, such as geography). Offence–defence theory distinguishes capabilities favouring the assailant and the defender, claiming that their relative efficacy varies through history. Major shifts follow technical innovations affecting the lethality, mobility, or survivability of military forces. Thus, the invention of gunpowder or mechanized armour skewed the balance towards the offence, while the introduction of castles or rapid-firing arms (such as the machine gun) empowered resistance to an attack. According to such scholars as Stephen van Evera, Charles Glaser, and Robert Jervis, the dominance of the offence makes wars common, short, and decisive due to the increased premium of the first strike. It may incentivize even a status-quo-oriented power to launch an attack pre-empting potential aggressors. The prevalence of the defence transforms militarized disputes into prolonged and inconclusive conflicts of attrition. It enables

11 Martin Van Creveld, Technology and war: From 2000 BC to the present, (Free Press: 1989), p. 1. 12 Andrew Feenberg, Transforming technology: A critical theory revisited, (Oxford University Press: 2002), p. 8. 13 See, for example, Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World politics, 30:2, (1978), pp. 167–214; Charles L. Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-Help”, International Security, 19:3, (1994), pp. 50–90; Stephen Van Evera, Causes of war: Power and the roots of conflict, (Cornell University Press: 1999).

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states to recover from surprise onslaughts making offensive gains problematic. These conditions leave even a committed revisionist uneasy with military options. The offence–defence theory is an obvious example of technological determinism, as it treats military hardware as a key variable for international security. Although lacking comprehensive criteria for separating destabilizing arms from more benevolent ones, its proponents linked prominent cases of military confrontation to the emergence of major weapon systems. In this regard, the German Blitzkrieg during the Second World War served as a model of offence-dominated warfare. Meanwhile, the trench stalemate of the First World War illustrated the futility of armed struggle when the defence was dominant. Given the heightened belligerence across Europe in 1914, the latter case poses questions regarding the capacity of governments to assess technologies on the offence–defence scale properly.14 Jervis confessed that, at times, offensive arms are indistinguishable from the defensive, which leads to miscalculations. However, he believed that this challenge was not insurmountable. Other offence–defence theorists assigned to Jervis’s claim that “when defensive weapons differ from offensive ones, it is possible for a state to make itself more secure without making others less secure”.15 For proponents of the offence–defene argument, an absence of major wars in the latter part of the twentieth century followed a shift towards defence dominance with the invention of nuclear weapons. Their destructive capacity made such struggles prohibitively costly, imposing restraint on the potential assailants. As even a small number of such arms incurs unacceptable damage on its target, the chances to prevent devastating retaliation by taking a defender by surprise became unrealistic.16 Thus, proponents of the offence–defence theory claimed that the inescapable fear caused by nuclear weapons served as the main guarantor of global peace.

14 Stephen Van Evera, “The Cult of the Offensive and the Origins of the First World War”, International Security, 9:1, (1984), pp. 58–107. 15 Robert Jervis, “Cooperation under the Security Dilemma”, World politics, 30:2, (1978), p. 187. 16 Robert Jervis, The meaning of the nuclear revolution: Statecraft and the prospect of Armageddon, (Cornell University Press: 1989).

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Despite the intuitive appeal of claims that “war is more likely when conquest is easy”,17 their theoretical soundness and empirical validity face strong pushback. The flaws extend beyond the indistinguishability of capabilities already noted. John Mearsheimer, Colin Gray, and Kier Lieber demonstrate that the offence–defence theory underestimates the ability of states to adjust available means to their goals.18 As a result, its inferences poorly fit the historical record. Even offence–defence theorist van Evera confessed that technical advancements of the mid-nineteenth century (such as rapid-firing rifles) amplified the ability of the defending side to annihilate the advancing force.19 Nevertheless, this period witnessed a spike in armed struggles including the Crimean War and the wars of Italian and German unification. They often led to swift and decisive victories (the American Civil War was an evident outlier).20 The offence–defence theorists address this anomaly through references to quantitative arms races, diplomatic conditions, or misperceptions. However, relying on such ad hoc patches undermines their basic argument. Similarly, offence–defence theory struggles to address the reluctance of Britain or France to use force despite their presumptive offence dominance in the 1930s. Such restraint contradicts claims that satisfied powers would launch preventive wars for the sake of the status quo. Neither Western power followed this logic. Even Moscow used every opportunity to delay or avoid the clash with Hitler despite the offensive military doctrine pursued by the Red Army. The subsequent war also contradicted theoretical expectations. After the swift campaigns in Poland and France,

17 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of war: Power and the roots of conflict, (Cornell University Press: 1999), p. 117. 18 John J. Mearsheimer, Conventional Deterrence, (Cornell University Press: 1988), pp. 20–21; John J. Mearsheimer, “The false promise of international institutions”, International Organization, 19:3, (1994), p. 23; Colin S. Gray, Weapons don’t make war: Policy, Strategy and military technology, (University Press of Kansas: 1993); Keir A. Lieber, War and the engineers, (Cornell University Press: 2018). For the detailed account of the debate between offence–defence theory proponents and opponents, see Sean M. Lynn-Jones, “Offense-Defense Theory and its Critics”, Security Studies 4:4 (1995), pp. 660–691. 19 Stephen Van Evera, Causes of war: Power and the roots of conflict, (Cornell University Press: 1999), p. 170. 20 On the role of technological innovations in these wars, see Geoffrey L. Herrera, “Inventing the Railroad and Rifle Revolution: Information, Military Innovation and the Rise of Germany”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 27:2, (2004), pp. 243–271.

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it evolved into a battle of attrition. In the great battles on the Eastern front, armour commonly praised as the tool of the offence contributed no less to the defence. Finally, an examination of the Cold War era reveals that the two superpowers did not rely on the pacifying force of nuclear terror alone. Instead, they exhibited relentless anxiety over the potential deterioration of their deterrent and sought a decisive edge for themselves.21 Nuclear deterrence also proved incapable of preventing clashes between smaller powers. For example, it did not dissuade Egypt from attacking Israel over Sinai in 1973 nor Argentina from challenging the UK over the Falkland Islands in 1982. Moreover, it failed to forestall the worsening of Sino-Soviet tensions into armed skirmishes over the islands in the Ussuri River in 1969.22 The rising anxieties regarding the advancement in long-range precision weapons, hypersonic vehicles, anti-missile systems, and offensive cyber operations largely mirror alarmed anticipations in the heyday of the Cold War. Concerns regarding these capabilities proceed from expectations that they will empower the offence, encourage aggressive revisionists, and compel satisfied powers to seek military pre-emption. Such expectations follow the logic of the offence–defence theory. However, historical realities challenge both beliefs in the calming effect of nuclear weapons and concerns over inherently destabilizing arms. The preceding analysis illuminated the deficiencies of the underlining differentiation between dangerous and benevolent capabilities. Despite its attractiveness, offence–defence theory provides underspecified and misguided inferences regarding the implications of emerging weapons for international security. It proceeds from uncritical allegiance to technological determinism, presuming that certain capabilities create straightforward military and political consequences. However, the futility of this argument does not leave technological change irrelevant to the risks of war. Thus, the following section will re-examine its role in fostering uncertainties. 21 Brendan R. Green, and Austin Long, “The MAD Who Wasn’t There: Soviet Reactions to the Late Cold War Nuclear Balance”, Security Studies, 26:4, (2017), pp. 606–641. 22 For more detailed account of nuclear deterrence failures throughout the Cold War, see Richard K. Betts, “Nuclear Peace and Conventional War”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 11:1, (1988), pp. 79–95.

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Uncertainty in Socio-Technical Systems The dissatisfaction with deterministic explanations fuelled the search for alternatives in the field of Science and Technology Studies (STS). STS seeks to explore social and technical systems in terms of mutual construction,23 rather than taking technology as something a priori given. STS explores the impact of social expectations on the design and application of tools and crafts. These expectations produce trade-offs given the multitude of stakeholders imposing competing requirements on evolving technologies. Moreover, STS accepts the limits of social control over material conditions, which also influence technological change. Thus, STS scholars attribute advancements in tools and crafts to continuous negotiations between social groups and non-social constraints. Technologies rarely possess straightforward and definite meaning at the inception. They stay open to alternative interpretations as their promises and limitations reveal through time and trial. In the meantime, the effects of technology remain highly contested and prone to misinterpretation.24 Thus, the acceleration of technological change infuses uncertainty over material circumstances, complicating strategic calculations. Moreover, it invites divergences in perceptions.25 The lack of definite knowledge allows proponents of technology to advertise it as a game-changer. This advocacy complements a natural tendency of novelty to draw human imagination, contributing to technological hype.26 The resulting excitement attracts crucial resources for the advancement of technology at its early stages. However, it also creates unrealistic expectations hard to disprove so long as new tools and crafts remain underdeveloped.27 Only the subsequent maturation of the technology enables a more realistic appraisal.

23 Mary Manjikian, “Social construction of technology: How objects acquire meaning in society”, Technology and world politics, (Routledge: 2018), pp. 25–41. 24 For example, Williamson R. Murray & Allan R. Millett, eds. Military innovation in the interwar period, (Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 6–49. 25 Ibid, pp. 193–194. 26 Ozgur Dedehayir & Martin Steinert. “The Hype Cycle Model: A Review and Future

Directions”, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 108, (2016), pp. 28–41. 27 British military theorist B.H. Liddell Hart argued long ago: “War experience teaches us that no new weapon proves so deadly in practice as in theory”. See, Basil H. Liddell Hart, Revolution in warfare, (Faber and Faber: 1946), p. 33.

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STS have implications for explaining the impact of technological change on war initiation.28 This theoretical framework reveals the contribution of emerging weapons to the uncertainty over the military balance. Such capabilities increase risks of destabilization as their effects on armed conflict are underspecified and contested.29 Moreover, they attract exaggerated hopes leading to the overestimation of shifts in capabilities. For the prospects of war, the actual contribution of emerging weapons to armed strength is secondary to their psychological impact. The dynamic nature of technological change infuses additional urgency in security calculations. The uneven acquisition of emerging weapons fosters anxiety over perceived windows of vulnerability by states that might be “lagging behind”. The prospects of others mastering new capabilities incite them to engage in pre-emptive escalation. Meanwhile, a proliferation of technologies through competitive emulation increases concerns among early movers regarding their vanishing edge.30 They obtain incentives to exploit their perceive advantage before their windows

28 For the account of previous efforts to apply STS findings in security studies, see Rocco Bellanova, Katja Lindskov Jacobsen, and Linda Monsees, “Taking the Trouble: Science, Technology and Security Studies”, Critical Studies on Security, 8:2, (2020), pp. 87–100. 29 Meanwhile, Geoffrey Blainey suggested that wars occur when states disagree on their relative power Geoffrey Blainey, Causes of war, (Simon and Schuster: 1988). 30 The timelines for such concerns vary, given the unequal diffusion of the technologies in question. Preceding studies conditioned the speed of proliferation on the variability in organizational and financial requirements for their adoption. See, Michael C. Horowitz, The diffusion of military power, (Princeton University Press: 2010). Some specialists argue that technical sophistication of modern weapons perplexes attempts to catch up. Others refute such conclusions (see, Michael C. Horowitz, Sarah E. Kreps, and Matthew Fuhrmann, “Separating Fact from Fiction in the Debate over Drone Proliferation”, International Security, 41:2, (2016), pp. 7–42; Matthew Fuhrmann, and Michael C. Horowitz, “Droning on: Explaining the Proliferation of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles”, International Organization, 71:2, (2017), pp. 397–418; Andrea Gilli, and Mauro Gilli, “Why China has not Caught up Yet: Military-Technological Superiority and the Limits of Imitation, Reverse Engineering, and Cyber Espionage”, International Security, 43:3, (2018), pp. 141–189; Michael C. Horowitz, et al., “Correspondence: Military-Technological Imitation and Rising Powers”, International Security, 44:2, (2019), pp. 185–192. As these debates do not call into question the overall capacity of technological uncertainty to produce destabilizing consequences, the following analyses refrains from exploring them in detail.

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of opportunity close.31 In both instances, a sense of urgency encourages acting rather than waiting for emerging weapons to reveal their characteristics. Unlike offence–defence theory, assigning risks of escalation to technological uncertainty does not presume differentiation between specific capabilities. It also does not provide inferences in the subsequent course of armed struggle or its outcomes. Thus, it is consistent with the literature questioning the impact of technology on military fortunes.32 Nevertheless, it entails greater repercussions of qualitative arms races relative to other alterations in capabilities. Technological change cultivates higher uncertainty than increases in troop numbers, which are easy to measure, and produces a larger imprint on threat perceptions than doctrinal adjustments, which do not intimidate as much as sophisticated weapons. History has repeatedly shown the tendency of technological changes to generate exaggerated estimates. For example, the introduction of aviation in the early twentieth century instigated prophesies about the forthcoming obsolesce of other capabilities. Throughout the interwar period, the writings of the Italian theorist Giulio Douhet popularized images of massive intimidation campaigns obliterating whole cities from the air.33 However, subsequent attempts to “bomb adversaries out of wars” remained largely futile despite a lot of trying.34 Similarly, the arrival of nuclear weapons inaugurated speculations of revolutionary consequences. Even otherwise sceptical of technological determinism B.H. Liddell Hart argued: “Warfare as we known it for the last thirty years is not compatible with the atomic age”.35 Bernard Brodie anticipated that with the use of nuclear bombs “on the grand scale that existing forces make possible, other kinds of military operations are likely to prove both unfeasible and superfluous”.36 Nevertheless, the Soviet 31 On the origins of the window metaphor, see Richard Ned Lebow, “Windows of Opportunity: Do States Jump through them?”, International Security, 9:1, (1984), pp. 147–186. 32 Stephen Biddle, Military power, (Princeton University Press: 2004). 33 See, Giulio Douhet, The command of the air, (Coward-McCann, 1942). 34 See, Robert A. Pape, Bombing to win: Air power and coercion in war, (Cornell University Press: 1996). 35 Basil H. Liddell Hart, Revolution in warfare, (Faber and Faber: 1946), p. 84. 36 Bernard Brodie, Strategy in the missile age, (Princeton University Press, 1959),

p. 166.

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Union and the US spent the bulk of their military budgets on conventional rather than nuclear forces. With the progression of the Cold War, their attention increasingly turned to supposedly obsolete capabilities, demonstrating the limitations of the “nuclear revolution”.37 War-prone periods closely correlate with acute technological change. For example, the arrival of rapid-firing rifles, steel artillery, and railways in the 1850s–1860s triggered a sequence of clashes between the great powers. The outbreak of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-Prussian wars illustrates concerns over the passing edge acquired through technological lead. Likewise, the creation of recoilless artillery, the machine gun, and aviation confounded military calculations in the early twentieth century. Pre-empting a potential catch-up, early mover Germany fostered escalation leading to the First World War.38 Two decades later, short-term handicap in land and air power incentivized Nazi assaults on neighbours with numerically superior militaries, paving the way for another global confrontation.39 The second half of the twentieth century diverges from these examples, witnessing intense technological change without a single instance of a major great power war. It provides the last stand for offence–defence theorists, trusting in pacifying effect of nuclear weapons. However, alternative explanations assign the Long Peace to bipolarity or the status-quo orientation of the two leading contenders rather than to prevailing technology.40 In this regard, the absence of major wars since 1945 appears overdetermined. A deeper assessment of this period in the following section will reveal the linkage between technological changes and spikes in confrontation.

37 For example, NATO strategic concept adopted in 1968 required that the Alliance should engage in nuclear war “only after the possibilities of preserving or restoring the integrity of the NATO area through political, economic and conventional military actions had been tried and found insufficient”. See, “Final decision on MC 14/3. A report by the Military Committee to the Defence Planning Committee on overall strategic concept for the defense of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization area”, (January 16, 1968). 38 David G. Herrmann, The arming of Europe and the making of the First World War, (Princeton University Press: 1997). 39 Barry R. Posen, The sources of military doctrine, (Cornell University Press: 1984). 40 See, for example, Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of international politics, (Waveland Press,

1979).

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Technological Revolutions Amidst Soviet-American Rivalry Intense international competition incentivizes states to invest heavily in emerging weapons, which in turn increases the risk of confrontation due to rising uncertainty. However, technological change does not proceed in a linear manner. It comes in waves, which constitute the periods of gravest concern. The Soviet-American confrontation witnessed four such waves, which arrived at the turn of each of the decades of the Cold War. Three of them coincided with intense crises, with only one on the verge of the 1970s mitigated by arms control efforts. The first wave of technological change started at the end of the Second World War with the acquisition of nuclear weapons by the US. The use of nuclear weapons against Japan in August 1945 served not only direct military purposes but also as a signal to Moscow. Washington sought to tame Soviet ambitions by demonstrating the destructive power of their newly acquired arms. The uncertainty over the potential effects of the emerging weapon enabled derogatory remarks from Soviet leadership.41 Nevertheless, the embarrassing retreat in the Berlin crisis of 1948 revealed Moscow’s respect for the US nuclear threat.42 The Soviet atomic explosion in 1949 shook prior calculations. Washington revised assessments that Moscow would refrain from overt offensives for the foreseeable future.43 The political competition morphed into military brinkmanship. The Korean War reflected increased Soviet confidence. It also testified elevated US eagerness to forcibly counter Moscow across Eurasia rather than serve as an offshore “arsenal for democracy”.

41 For example, Joseph Stalin in a Sunday Times interview on 17 September 1946, noticed: “I do not consider atomic bomb such a serious force, as some political figures tend to assume. Atomic bombs are designed to frighten faint-hearted, but they cannot decide the fate of a war, as there are certainly not enough bombs for such purpose” (Joseph V. Stalin, Works in 18 volumes, Vol. 16, (Pisatel: 1997), pp. 37–38, in Russ.). 42 Victor Gobarev, “Soviet Military Plans and Actions during the First Berlin Crisis, 1948–49”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 10:3, (1997), pp. 1–24. For a detailed account of the Soviet efforts to catch up with the US in the nuclear field, see David Holloway, Stalin and the bomb: The Soviet Union and atomic energy, 1939–1956, (Yale University Press: 1994). 43 The increased sense of urgency can be traced in the subsequent US National Strategy Report, see NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security (April 14, 1950).

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The Korean War evolved into a large-scale struggle, threatening escalation beyond the local theatre and conventional means.44 The rudimentary nature of the Soviet atomic arsenal incentivized Washington to consider pre-emptive strikes on Moscow until 1955.45 Therefore, the emergence of new capabilities did not calm the SovietAmerican rivalry. Nor nuclear weapons played a stabilizing role attributed to it by offence-defence theory. The window of vulnerability for Moscow opened at the end of the devastating Second World War, which prevented it from considering pre-emption. After 1949, the US realized that its technological edge had decreased, which fostered greater brinkmanship. Eventually, Washington chose not to exploit its closing window of opportunity, due to the shortage of atomic bombs rather than their defensive characteristics. By the mid-1950s, the stockpiles of nuclear weapons increased, but the superpowers got more accustomed to them. As the military balance clarified, they sought rapprochement with the Geneva summit of 1956.46 The second wave of technological change undermined these attempts. Advancements in long-range missiles, rather than promoting trust in reliable deterrence, amplified concerns over a potential sneak attack. By the late 1950s, Soviet advances in rocket science aggravated speculations regarding the “missile gap” in the US.47 The reliance on the new capabilities by the Soviet leader Nikita Khrushchev amplified these concerns. They prompted brinkmanship despite drastic troop reductions that had

44 The Korean War represented a proxy conflict rather than a direct brinkmanship between the superpowers. Nevertheless, the US came close to the use of nuclear weapons in a limited war against Soviet allies. It refrained from such use largely due to the hesitation over proper targets (see, Daniel Calingaert, “Nuclear Weapons and the Korean War”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 11:2, (1988), pp. 177–202; Roger Dingman, “Atomic Diplomacy during the Korean War”, International Security, 13:3, (1988), pp. 50–91; Conrad C. Crane, “To Avert Impending Disaster: American Military Plans to use Atomic Weapons during the Korean War”, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 23:2, (2000), pp. 72– 88. 45 Russell D. Buhite & Wm Christopher Hamel, “War for Peace: The Question of an American Preventive War against the Soviet Union, 1945–1955”, Diplomatic History, 14:3, (1990), pp. 367–384. 46 Günter Bischof & Saki Dockrill (eds), Cold War respite: The Geneva summit of 1955, (LSU Press: 2000). 47 Peter Roman, Eisenhower and the missile gap, (Cornell University Press: 1995).

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taken place since the mid-1950s. Uncertainty over Moscow’s capabilities urged Washington to intensify its intelligence-gathering efforts. The downing of the surveillance aircraft over Soviet territory in 1960 elevated the confrontation, derailing the expected diplomatic breakthroughs at the Paris summit.48 The deployment of US missiles in Turkey raised Soviet anxieties, prompting Moscow to position similar capabilities in Latin America. The Cuban Missile Crisis signified a peak in the SovietAmerican confrontation, bringing it to the verge of a shooting war. It subsided through the combination of hectic diplomacy and sheer luck.49 Throughout this period, the uncertainty generated by new arms increased the sense of vulnerability on both sides. In numerical terms, the US retained pre-eminence, but Soviet secrecy and bravado confused public perceptions.50 Anxieties over presumed technological inferiority on both sides fostered intense brinkmanship. Nevertheless, the faith in a long-term preponderance of their respective models encouraged the Soviet and American leaders to avoid war, even if at the last moment. The subsequent growth in missile arsenals counterintuitively produced a relaxation of tensions. This relief proceeded well into the 1970s, despite a new wave of technological change. By the late 1960s, the superpowers explored missile defence systems and multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles. Their arrival confused the military balance, fostering the type of risks discussed in the previous section. However, outstanding concerns, such as the growing Sino-Soviet enmity and US exhaustion in Vietnam, incentivized the superpowers to mitigate uncertainty through negotiated limitations rather than to engage in brinkmanship.51 They tamed anxiety over emerging weapons before it became acute.

48 E. Bruce Geelhoed, Diplomacy Shot Down: The U-2 Crisis and Eisenhower’s aborted mission to Moscow, 1959–1960, (University of Oklahoma Press: 2020). 49 The literature on the Cuban missile crisis is enormous. For the detailed account, see Mark White, the Cuban missile crisis, (Springer: 1995). 50 In 1959, Nikita Khrushchev famously claimed that the Soviet Union was “turning out missiles like sausages”, meaning that it had enormous capacity to produce such new weapons. At the time of this pronouncement Moscow had only four deployed ICBMs available. 51 Raymond L. Garthoff, Détente and confrontation: American-Soviet relations from Nixon to Reagan, (The Brookings Institution: 1985).

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Moreover, technological and organizational difficulties plagued the development of missile defence systems. The latter posed as the most potentially revolutionary and therefore threatening due to the concerns over reliable nuclear retaliation in case of a surprise attack. The US even aborted its plans in this domain, while the Soviet Union satisfied with deploying a limited protection over its capital. Therefore, the third technological wave remained half-accomplished. The last wave of technological transformation in the Soviet-American rivalry started in the late 1970s. It emerged from the US efforts to compensate for the Soviet numerical build-up through innovative capabilities (often referred to as the second offset strategy). The introduction of cruise missiles, precision-guided munitions, stealth bombers, and advanced sensors caused a reassessment of the conventional arms. As Moscow lagged behind in these capabilities, it felt increasingly insecure.52 In parallel, the Soviet modernization of intermediate forces prompted the positioning of advanced US missiles in Europe. Lastly, the commencement of the Strategic Defense Initiative resurfaced anxiety regarding nuclear parity. The SDI envisaged deployment of ground and space-based interceptors (including non-kinetic ones) reopening concerns regarding the destabilizating effects of anti-ballistic missile systems. The increasing uncertainty generated by emerging weapons resulted in another period of brinkmanship centred in Europe. Political leaders in Moscow and Washington expressed acute concerns over the rising possibility of a war. The confrontation reached its peak in 1983 with the downing of the Korean Air flight 007 by a Soviet fighter and the controversy over the NATO Able Archer exercise.53 As the superpowers put their nuclear forces on a high alert the chances of miscalculation or inadvertent escalation multiplied. Compared to the previous instances, the early 1980s witnessed a wider range of emerging weapons aggravating risks of destabilization. US technological advancements led to a greater sense of vulnerability on the Soviet side. As a result, Moscow was more prone to overreact, as evident from the downing of the civilian aeroplane. Eventually, the Soviet 52 Dima P. Adamsky, “Through the Looking Glass: The Soviet Military-Technical Revolution and the American Revolution in Military Affairs”, Journal of Strategic Studies, 31:2, (2008), pp. 257–294. 53 Stephen J. Cimbala, “Year of Maximum Danger? The 1983 ‘war scare’ and US-Soviet Deterrence”, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 13:2, (2000), pp. 1–24.

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Union sought rapprochement, with Washington recognizing its diminishing ability to compete.54 Subsequently, the fascination with the late Cold War technical innovations incentivized the US to pursue military solutions for ensuing local crises throughout the 1990s.55 The preceding analysis demonstrates that technological change is not the only variable affecting the prospects of war initiation. Political considerations sometimes encourage states to seek cautious restraint and precautionary arms control rather than military pre-emption to address uncertainty. Such retrenchment primarily follows exhaustion over preceding engagement in major wars or prolonged local conflicts (as witnessed by the Soviet Union after the Second World War or by the US amidst Vietnam quagmire). Nevertheless, the record of the Soviet-American rivalry corroborates the connection between new capabilities and risks of armed struggle. It reveals the contribution of presumed windows of vulnerability and closing windows of opportunity to brinkmanship. Henceforth, it validates theorizing on the destabilizing consequences of emerging weapons.

Conclusion Technological change has consequences for international security (including in the Euro-Atlantic space) that have not been sufficiently appreciated. While strategic debates often revolve around the intrinsic characteristics of emerging weapons, the gravest risks derive from the uncertainty and the exaggerated expectations they infuse in assessing the military balance. The historical record validates the detrimental effect of new capabilities on threat perceptions and their contribution to brinkmanship, if not war initiation. Their arrival often triggers anxiety over windows of vulnerability. Proliferation of emerging technologies, in turn, fosters concern regarding closing windows of opportunity. The rising wave of emerging technologies causes contestations over the relative consequences for the offence and defence throughout the 2020s. For example, Russia as an early mover in hypersonic vehicles 54 William C. Wohlforth, “Realism and the End of the Cold War”, International Security, 19:3, (1994), pp. 91–129. 55 Keith L. Shimko, “The United States and the RMA: Revolutions Do Not Revolutionize Everything”, chapter in Jeffrey Collins and Andrew Futter (eds.), Reassessing the Revolution in Military Affairs, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2015), pp. 16–32.

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positions them as a contribution to deterrence, while Western observers treat them as destabilizing. The views on missile defence are the reverse, which corresponds to the relative accomplishments in developing these capabilities. The preceding analysis demonstrates that both sides are somewhat misguided in their anxieties. Any emerging weapons have a detrimental impact on threat perception and thus undermine strategic stability. Their specific characteristics are less consequential than the uncertainty associated with their adoption. The military-technological developments of the twentieth century challenge the faith placed in nuclear arms as a guarantee against a major war. Contemporary reactions to the development and deployment of long-range precision weapons, hypersonic vehicles, missile defence or offensive cyber capabilities in fact mirror preceding cycles of brinkmanship. To a certain degree, the early 2020s resemble the last wave of the Soviet-American rivalry given the anticipation of technological advances across several loosely related domains. However, unlike in the 1980s, when the US prevailed across most capabilities, different powers claim primacy in various emerging weapons today. Such an uneven landscape creates especially fertile ground for miscalculation. In this regard, the current controversies echo the turn of the 1960s when uncertainty over relative capabilities spiked, generating an acute sense of vulnerability. The Euro-Atlantic faces especially high risks from the recent wave of emerging technologies due to several circumstances. First, technological uncertainty in this region intertwines with intense political tensions caused by the collapse of the Russian–Western relations. Moreover, military posturing has acquired an increasing conspicuous role in mutual hostility between the sides. Second, both Russian and NATO leaders place substantial reliance on emerging technologies in their defence strategies.56 As the beginning of this chapter demonstrated, they are easily seduced by the promises of technology. This combination creates a breeding ground for anxiety over the perceived windows of vulnerability and/or closing windows of opportunities. One should not assume that states will stall attempts to acquire an edge through technological advancement given the associated risks. However, 56 See, “National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation” (2 July 2021), http://www.kremlin.ru/acts/bank/47046 (Accessed 14 August 2022); “NATO 2022 Strategic Concept”, (29 June 2022), https://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/ (Accessed 14 August 2022).

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history also shows that certain danger limitation is achievable through precautionary arms control and strategic risk reduction. Although such measures cannot foster a defence advantage by conveniently restricting offensive capabilities (as the preceding analysis argues), arms control increases predictability and tames anxieties generated by technological change. Even when negotiated agreements remain out of reach, professional engagements between the militaries serve to debunk dangerous myths. Unfortunately, the risks from emerging technologies seem to fall low in their talks, which tend to focus on more immediate aspects of deconfliction amidst mutual hostility. Finally, rather than aggravating fears over emerging weapons, proponents of strategic stability need to challenge more the excitement they entail. So far, the expert community has contributed to the hype over the new weapons rather than dislodged beliefs in acquiring security through technical solutions. Its representatives often fail to recognize how the warnings that they voice, factor into the desire of decision makers to obtain competitive advantage. Both for the good of their own native homelands and for the preservation of international peace they should challenge louder the deficiencies and uncertainties of the emerging capabilities, resisting the fall into the fascination with the novel.

CHAPTER 7

Emerging Technologies and “Green-Friendly” Military Conflict? Lucia Gavenˇciaková

Introduction The global security environment has dramatically transformed in recent years and conventional military models no longer guarantee success. A duality of dynamic elements that includes emerging technologies as well as climate change and its various security implications have become core elements of strategic thinking and military planning. Their implications are far-reaching and complex, and include, among others, changing the future physical battlespace, rethinking of military doctrines and procurements, and new pressures for warfighting emerging from the changing climate. In July 2022, when the world was facing extensive heatwaves, the United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned policymakers

L. Gavenˇciaková (B) GLOBSEC, Bratislava, Slovakia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 109 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_7

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that humanity was facing “collective suicide”.1 Glaciers collapsing in Italy and Kyrgyzstan, extensive devastating and deadly wildfires across Europe, temperature extremes breaking records in various locations, including London, roofs melting and roads cracking in China, or droughts in America. What was long considered a still distant future, in spite of warning signals and reports of the Intergovernmental Panel for Climate Change (IPCC), has already become a reality for many people around the world. The events induced by the changing climate are not happening in a vacuum. It has been scientifically proven that the ongoing climate change is anthropogenic, i.e., caused by human actions, and human action is needed to reverse its negative consequences.2 Furthermore, even the slightest deviation in the ecological balance can trigger a butterfly effect. With the changing climate patterns, it is obvious that many ecosystems are already being disrupted, which will negatively affect the functioning of societies and communities across the world. Apart from the new challenges, however, climate change also acts as a “threat multiplier”, exacerbating already existing dangers.3 It is not surprising that climate change has been repeatedly linked to armed conflicts, for instance, in Darfur and Syria.4 ,5 ,6

1 Fiona Harvey, “Humanity Faces ‘Collective Suicide’ Over Climate Crisis, Warns UN Chief”, The Guardian (18 July 2022), https://www.theguardian.com/enviro nment/2022/jul/18/humanity-faces-collective-suicide-over-climate-crisis-warns-un-chief (Accessed 20 July 2022). 2 Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al., Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press: 2021). 3 The CNA Corporation, National Security and the Threat of Climate Change (2007), https://www.cna.org/archive/CNA_Files/pdf/national%20security%20and%20the%20t hreat%20of%20climate%20change.pdf (Accessed 20 July 2022). 4 Katherine J. Mach et al., Climate as a Risk Factor for Armed Conflict (Stan-

ford Digital Repository: 2018), https://purl.stanford.edu/sy632nx6578 (Accessed 18 February 2022). 5 Jeffrey Mazo, “Chapter Three: Darfur: The First Modern Climate-Change Conflict”, The Adelphi Papers, 49:409 (2009), pp. 73–89. 6 Peter H. Gleick, “Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria”, Weather, Climate, and Society, 6:3 (2014), pp. 331–340.

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The Climate-Security Nexus A lot of time has passed between the first concerns raised being about climate change in the nineteenth century and the publication of the IPCC’s Sixth Assessment Report in 2021, which has explicitly attributed the ongoing changes to the human activity.7 Many analyses have been published in that period, warning policymakers about the security implications of the changing climate for societies. In 1971, Richard Falk predicted the inverse relationship between the period to adapt and potential of social unrest8 ; this was elaborated even further by the end of the century by analysts who came after him, such as Thomas Homer-Dixon.9 In 2007, the Military Advisory Board of the research and analysis organization CNA, published a report in which climate change was declared a military matter. Unlike today, at the time of its publication, the report was not seriously recognized beyond the publishing organization due to its leftist notion and challenging views of established military doctrine.10 However, more recently, in the second decade of the twenty-first century, the nexus between climate change and security has started to be emphasized by an increasing number of expert groups, all of which build on the 2007 report. The Centre for Climate Security (CCS) and the International Military Council on Climate Security (IMCCS) are just two of the groups that are significantly contributing to the understanding of the ongoing situation by translating the findings of the scientific establishment to the security and military communities, thus connecting climate security with the national security. Just as climate change is causing unprecedented weather conditions, it is also creating unprecedented security challenges that must be adequately addressed at the political level, including when it comes to formulating

7 Valérie Masson-Delmotte et al., Climate Change 2021: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Sixth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press: 2021). 8 Richard V. Falk, This Endangered Planet: Prospects and Proposals for Human Survival

(Random House: 1971). 9 Thomas Homer-Dixon, “On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict”, International Security, 16:2 (1991), pp. 76–116. 10 Chad M. Briggs & Miriam Matejova, Disaster Security: Using Intelligence and Military Planning for Energy and Environmental Risks (Cambridge University Press: 2019).

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a military doctrine. There are four main challenges that need to be considered in this regard. First, climate change transforms the nature of military operations. In 2005, when hurricane Katrina hit the east coast of the United States, the response was slow and unsystematic partly because of the deployment of military personnel and equipment overseas, in Iraq and Afghanistan. With more than 1800 casualties and damage exceeding $125 billion, this catastrophe has taught American policymakers a costly lesson. The increasing amount of less predictable and more severe weather events that require military action may not diminish or replace traditional military activities, but they will require improved planning with regard to the changing environment and multi-domain operations, increased versatility of the armed forces, and more personnel to be able to operate at home and abroad.11 Second, natural hazards and extreme weather events expose the vulnerability of the armed forces, military estates, and the existing infrastructure. Just as states need to build the societal and infrastructural resilience towards the climate change, so do national militaries. Third, on the top of climate change multiplying threats and amplifying instabilities resulting in new conflicts, melting icebergs and thawing permafrost create new theatres and areas of competition, requiring strategical attention.12 Last but not least, the armed forces are one of the largest contributors to climate change. The United States Department of Defense alone is the single largest consumer of energy in the US and the world’s largest institutional user of petroleum.13 The excessive consumption of petrochemicals results in a corresponding carbon footprint. Therefore, the

11 Lynn E. Davis, Jill Rough, Gary Cecchine, Agnes Gereben Schaefer & Laurinda L. Zeman, Hurricane Katrina: Lessons for Army Planning and Operations (RAND Corporation: 2007). 12 Siemon T. Wezeman, “Military Capabilities in the Arctic: A New Cold War in the High North?”, SIPRI Background Papers (2016). 13 Neta C. Crawford, “The Defense Department Is Worried About Climate Change— And also a Huge Carbon Emitter”, The Conversation (12 June 2019), https://the conversation.com/the-defense-department-is-worried-about-climate-change-and-also-ahuge-carbon-emitter-118017 (Accessed 18 July 2022) and Linsey Cottrell & Eoghan Darbyshire, “The Military’s Contribution to Climate Change”, Conflict and Environment Observatory (16 June 2021), https://ceobs.org/the-militarys-contribution-to-climate-cha nge/ (Accessed 20 July 2022).

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fourth main challenge that the military sector faces is the decarbonization of the processes and operations in order to mitigate climate change. A 3 °C hotter world has no safe places.14 No country and no person will be immune to the changing climate. Therefore, it is the duty of the public sector, including the military, to mitigate climate risks as much as possible. Decarbonization or greening of the military is a comprehensive task requiring close cooperation between the public and the private sector to harness the technological advancement and reach the ambitious goals of reducing greenhouse gas emissions. NATO has already recognized climate change as a threat that transforms the operational environment and has put itself into a position of the leader in the military and institutional decarbonization. Having firm plans to become greener materialized in the new Strategic Concept, in which the Alliance has introduced a commitment to reduce its carbon footprint by 45% by 2030 and to net zero by 2050.15

Decarbonization of Militaries Through Emerging Technologies Against the backdrop of the rapidly changing climate, the security landscape is concurrently being transformed by emerging technologies. Just as with the impacts of climate change, the technological advancements of the past years have been unprecedented. The leaps in digital transformation, ultra-connectivity, novel materials, and increasing autonomy are transforming how states assess and address security threats. In the military domain, these emerging technologies are usually perceived through a lens of gaining strategic competitive advantage in a world of great power politics. But the battlefield of the future will not only be influenced by innovations in the fields such as robotics or unmanned aerial vehicles but also by the environmental impact of the changing climate. Therefore, while asking how to harness technological innovations in great 14 The Economist, “A 3 °C World Has No Safe Place”, (24 July 2021), https://www. economist.com/leaders/2021/07/24/a-3degc-world-has-no-safe-place (Accessed 28 July 2022). 15 NATO, “NATO Releases Its Climate Change and Security Impact Assessment”, (28 June 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_197241.htm (Accessed 28 July 2022).

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power competition, we should also ask how to utilize these emerging technologies to lower the carbon footprint of global militaries. The combination of new policy thinking and technological innovation offers potentially transformative means to effectively decrease the greenhouse gas emissions in both the private and public sectors. Probably the most noticeable emerging technology is artificial intelligence16 and the related process of digitalization and data analytics. In light of rapid technological development over the past decade, data have replaced oil as the most valuable resource, and being dubbed the “new oil”.17 Today, big data and advanced analytics (BDAA), are important for understanding EDTs as a foundation for their implementation. BDAA both allows and requires ubiquitous sensing and computing, the growth of 5G networks, and the internet of things. The ubiquitous deployment of sensors is especially critical for creating better possibilities of real-time evaluations and necessary adjustments to the ongoing developments in the environment. For instance, by harnessing the digital possibilities available from the planning of smart cities, some technological companies have already created a concept of a smart multi-domain base adapted for roles of militaries in the twenty-first century. By harnessing the power of data through machine learning, artificial intelligence, sensors, and the internet of things, the bases would be self-facilitating many processes, including resupplying, repairing critical components before they fail or identifying energy leaks and other problems. At the same time, the interlinked devices would help to coordinating manpower and equipment during hazardous situations, which are constantly being multiplied by climate change.18 Such optimization of the processes, mobility and transport flows not only make the bases more efficient but also intensifies climate mitigation efforts while alleviating financial expenses and reducing operational logistics. For instance, the United Kingdom has already turned to the power of data 16 In this chapter, the term artificial intelligence encompasses all the processes that display forms of intelligent behaviour with at least some degree of automation, including machine learning, deep learning, and other. 17 The Economist, “The World’s Most Valuable Resource Is No Longer Oil, But Data”, (6 May 2017), https://www.economist.com/leaders/2017/05/06/the-worlds-most-val uable-resource-is-no-longer-oil-but-data (Accessed 25 July 2022). 18 Joe Mariani, Isaac Jenkins, Michael Stehn & Dan Quasney, “The Smart Base: Digital Backbone of Power Projection”, Deloitte (8 October 2018), https://www2. deloitte.com/us/en/insights/multimedia/interactives/smart-military-bases-potential-ben efits.html (Accessed 18 July 2022).

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and algorithms to organize more sustainable virtual military exercises to decrease both, emissions and costs.19 Artificial intelligence can be also utilized in energy grids, creating smart microgrids controlled by a computer that measures energy demand and supply and prioritizes its distribution. NATO has begun testing smart energy technologies, from solar to hybrid grids, to decrease the carbon footprint. Hybrid generators can already power command tents with lighting and computing capabilities, without the need for a thermal generator. Alongside solar-powered tents, they also account for increased mobility and improved energy security in the regions where energy supplies are erratic or non-existent.20 Integrating a smart component with renewable resources can lead to an improved generation of energy, distribution, and security. Better energy management allowed by the smart grids can eventually also allow more extensive deployment of hybrid combat and non-combat vehicles that could use both, petroleum fuels and electricity where possible. Apart from better logistical and energy management, the advancement in digitalization and BDAA also accounts for progress in development of EDTs. There are a number of novel materials that are related to this development, such as smart textiles that would support the data collection for following analysis, assessment, and decision-making. Other technologies include for instance quantum sensing, computational imagining, or microwave photonics.21 However, the reduction of traditional fossil fuels and greater use of alternative energy sources is only a partial solution to the emissions of the military sector. Energy and fuel use may be one of the major sources of greenhouse gases but definitely not the only one. According to the Conflict and Environment Observatory, procurement and supply account for the largest share of emissions. The process encompasses the arms and other equipment production from the extraction of raw materials through the fabrication and supplying until their final disposal. One of NATO’s aims introduced in the Climate Change & Security Impact Assessment is to procure more sustainable military equipment. This goal will require the 19 IMCCS, The World and Climate Security Report 2020 (February 2020). 20 NATO, “NATO Tests Smart Energy Technologies at Exercise Capable Logistician

2019”, (14 May 2021), https://www.natomultimedia.tv/app/asset/650590 (Accessed 28 July 2022). 21 NATO, Science and Technology Trends 2020–2040: Exploring the S&T Edge (2020).

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application of modern technologies into a number of complex processes, including the optimization of the manufacturing process, development of novel materials to protect scarce resources or to add greening abilities to equipment, and waste management.22 The power of BDAA has already been demonstrated in overcoming the challenges of the inefficient procurement and supply processes, by optimizing the logistics at smart bases. This includes, for instance, truck platooning or integration of artificial intelligence in the calculations of the optimal routes of vehicle or aircraft to reduce the emissions. Though not the main contributor to the military emissions and related climate change, contemporary militaries are dominated by aviation.23 Greening of the sector does not only include low-emission technologies but also reduction in the noise pollution while maintaining the efficiency of the aircraft fleet. Similar to ground forces, electrification and hybrid engines are the main avenues of decarbonization being explored in military aviation. Due to the density of energy, electrification is at this point a reality only for some types of unmanned aerial vehicles or for flying short distances, but not an option for long haul flights. The future thus lies mainly in alternative fuels. In aviation, there are several alternative low-emission options to kerosene-based fuels, such as sustainable aviation fuels (SAF), e-fuels, or hydrogen. For instance, the United Kingdom has already turned to the SAF, which do not require any additional modification of the aircraft.24 E-fuels or synthetic fuels also bypass the need for reengineering the engines. On the other hand, interest in hydrogen, despite having been studied for a couple of decades, is now rising again due to the introduction of electric vertical take-off and landing aircrafts. Hydrogen is technically perhaps the most challenging to

22 NATO, The Secretary General’s Report : Climate Change & Security Impact Assessment (2022). 23 Linsey Cottrell & Eoghan Darbyshire, “The Military’s Contribution to Climate Change”, Conflict and Environment Observatory (16 June 2021), https://ceobs.org/ the-militarys-contribution-to-climate-change/ (Accessed 20 July 2022). 24 Jane Hupe, “Transport and the Environment: Sustainable Aviation Fuels”, Open Access Government (5 March 2020), https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/transportand-the-environment-sustainable-aviation-fuels/83471/ (Accessed 28 July 2022).

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integrate since it requires the modification to jet combustion engines and a new infrastructure for the process of its production and storage.25 Hydrogen fuel cells and hybrid engines also hold a big promise for the naval fleet. The US Navy has been installing hybrid electric drivers on its vessels, a combination of the usage of ship’s electronic grid and gas turbines.26 The United Kingdom’s Royal Navy is already attempting to create the world’s greenest naval fleet, aiming to achieve net zero. In addition to using alternative energy sources in its logistics centres and warehouses, the Navy is re-designing its vessels such as a new Type 26 frigate, which combines gas turbines and diesel generation technologies to achieve greater speed without enlarging engines. Other patrol ships have been equipped with catalytic reduction systems that decrease the emissions of nitrous oxide. More electrification and hybrid engines are planned to be introduced by 2030. Moreover, the Royal Navy aims to procure more multipurpose modular ships that could be easily transformed for various types of operations and activities, and also seeks ways how to prevent oil spills in an event of a hull breach or water leaks, and reduce the marine growth on the hull by anti-fouling paint to improve the vessels’ durability.27 A list of potential green solutions to decarbonizing the military is not limited only to the previously mentioned examples. Data mining, BDAA, artificial intelligence, digitalization for the optimization of processes; alternative sources of energy for the logistics centres and other estates, and alternative low-emission fuels for vehicles, vessels, or aircraft offer the most promising prospects in this regard. Some of these are already in use or being testing, while other projects are still in the process of research and development to deliver the most desirable results. The bottom line is that emerging technologies and related processes of digitalization present vast opportunities to reduce the carbon footprint of militaries. At the same time, we should not be blinded by optimism and must acknowledge that

25 Ibid and Open Access Government, “How can sustainable fuels support the future

of military aircraft?”, (3 August 2021), https://www.openaccessgovernment.org/how-cansustainable-fuels-support-the-future-of-military-aircraft/116708/ (Accessed 28 July 2022). 26 Gareth Evans, “Green at Sea: Can the US Navy Cut Its Vast Energy Footprint?”, Naval Technology (18 January 2018), https://www.naval-technology.com/analysis/goinggreen-sea-can-us-navy-cut-vast-energy-footprint/ (Accessed 28 July 2022). 27 Ibid.

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the integration of these technologies in the military sector may not be as smooth as it seems on a paper.

Challenges to the Integration of Emerging Technologies However promising the integration of emerging technologies designed to decarbonize military operations may appear, a number of tactical or strategic challenges cannot be overlooked. Such transformations also raise a number of ethical and practical questions. Various reports on the benefits of integrating emerging technologies have already been published, but only a few of them address the potential challenges that will need to be overcome to make this integration successful. The first and of utmost concern in the Euro-Atlantic region is the innovation and procurement gap between Allied nations. Historically, innovation usually originated in the public sector and the process was topdown oriented. Whether it was technology or biology, many inventions from the World Wars made it into everyday lives. It was not until the early 1940s that the US begun to attempt to replace women who performed complex calculations by machines that could calculate even quicker and more precisely, which has set a base for a machine we today know as a computer. Radars, flu vaccines, plastic surgery, walkie-talkies, and nuclear energy are some of the other examples. In the twenty-first century, innovation is mostly dominated by private enterprises and start-ups, which for various reasons lack the connection to the public sector. The US organisation DARPA has hardly any counterparts in Europe, though the European Defence Fund (EDF) has been attempting to promote cooperation between national armed forces and the private research and development sectors since 2017. As of today, many European countries lack close cooperation between the public and private sector, which complicates the innovation and procurement of technologies that can affect operability. Even today some joint exercises suffer from differences in infrastructure in the EuroAtlantic region, such as the network setup, which causes an ongoing issue of safe cooperation of integrated networks and data systems. If NATO’s goals are to be met, securing effective interoperability between nations is essential. Although the establishment of the Defence Innovation Accelerator and Innovation Fund, which aims to sharpen the Alliance’s technological edge, can contribute to overcoming some of the challenges,

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the process of closing the interoperability gaps is still going to take some time. These institutions are created with the aim of overcoming procurement and effectiveness challenges to equally prepare all the members of the Alliance for the battlefield of the future, but closing the gaps must come first. Earlier in this chapter, the beneficial applications of data, artificial intelligence, and autonomy in the military domain were mentioned, but the availability of the necessary 5G network is still lacking in many regions. This reflects the thinking of policymakers from individual countries. While some are, and can afford to be proactive, other countries with limited financial resources are prioritising improvement for procurement and innovation to catch up with their counterparts. To ensure both greening and interoperability within the Alliance, it is necessary to consider the individual needs of member states and whether they can afford to integrate emerging technologies into their individual defence sectors in order to reach unified standards in the Euro-Atlantic space. Second, the increased smartness, digitalization and electrification of military vehicles implies increased requirements for electricity. Charging up the emerging technologies and storing the data and communications can be at the same time a part of the problem that has been defined at the beginning of this chapter. It is estimated that the information and communications sector consumes between 5 to 7% of world electricity use and is responsible for approximately 2% of global greenhouse gas emissions; by 2040 this could reach 40%.28 Although emerging technologies can contribute to decarbonizing the military as introduced in the previous part, they still need sources of electricity. For instance, if artificial intelligence and data are to be used to optimize processes, we must always consider that these data are stored in data centres which require significant energy sources to operate. Hence, the more sustainable use we can make of one resource, the more of the resource will be needed. It is an effect known as the Jevons paradox, and it means that a policy can increase the efficiency with which a resource is used, but at the same time will require more resources to implement the policy.29 It is similar to the

28 Lotfi Belkhir & Ahmed Elmeligi, “Assessing ICT Global Emissions Footprint: Trends to 2040 & Recommendations”, Journal of Cleaner Production, 117 (2018), pp. 448–463. 29 Lucia Mendelová, Realita virtuálna (Kalligram: 2019).

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air conditioning paradox, whereby air conditioners are used to cool interiors spaces, while actually contributing to the warming of the planet by using energy from currently non-renewable resources and creating heat that contributes to higher temperatures when concentrated. It is predicted that by 2100, the Earth’s temperature will increase by 0.5 °C only by the use of air conditioners, which is continuously increasing due to warmer weather.30 It is also worth mentioning that data storage, except for using energy to store the data, requires energy for cooling, which constitutes almost half of the total consumption of energy.31 Therefore, the success of electrification lies not only in the integration of emerging technologies into various processes but also in the clean energy transition and the ability to harness renewable resources for charging up these new technologies. Clean energy needs to be applied in the military sector and one of the most popular solutions for this is photovoltaics. Photovoltaics have been tested to power the operation of tents on the ground but could be integrated into solar-collecting fabric that could turn pieces of clothing and uniforms into mobile energy supplies, or carbon fibre able to store lithium ions for vehicles. However, if we continue to power emerging technologies by using fossil fuels such as coal or gas, the overall outcome will be negative and will not lead towards the decarbonization of the military. Third, waste management contributes significantly to military emissions. The larger the digitalization and related advancement in and integration of emerging technologies, the larger the e-waste, or electronic waste, created as a by-product of the innovation. The global consumption of electronic devices, including some of the emerging technologies, could by the year 2050 result in more than 120 tonnes of e-waste every year.32 The used devices and technologies don’t constitute the main waste of the process. The majority is manufacturing waste. It is estimated that the process of getting 12 kg of useful material for manufacturing a computer, results in almost 500 kg of waste (plus the environmental load).33 Dealing 30 Ian Campbell, Ankit Kalanki & Sneha Sachar, Solving the Global Cooling Challenge How to Counter the Climate Threat from Room Air Conditioners (Rocky Mountain Institute: 2018). 31 Digital Future Society, Risks and Opportunities of Emerging Tech in the Climate Decade (2020). 32 Ibid. 33 Ibid.

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with the e-waste, when there is not even normal waste management ensured, is an issue that, if a lower carbon footprint of the military is desired, needs to have a solution before the further production of new devices starts. Fourth, the exponential growth of electronic and network-connected devices also creates more possibilities for cyberattacks, data leaks, disruptions or spoofing, and, generally, a more unpredictable situations. The more sophisticated the system, the higher the complexity of its functioning and the existence of possible vulnerabilities that can be exploited by the enemies. The increasing level of complexity and hidden vulnerabilities makes it much more difficult to mitigate possible threats and exploitation. Furthermore, the more interconnected these devices become, the larger the damage when one is attacked. Even without a direct attack by an aggressor, the devices can present a threat to processes simply by the functions they have and the individual level of digital literacy. For instance, not so long ago several secret US bases were publicly uncovered by individuals sharing their location in a fitness application when jogging.34 A couple of months later, another group of soldiers exposed secrets about nuclear weapons by using flashcard learning app.35 The integration of more electronic devices will expose higher requirements for preventing cyberattacks or individual failures that could endanger strategic interests, whether on the level of the Alliance or individual states. Finally, even if the previously mentioned challenges could prove to be effectively overcome, development and procurement it is not something that will happen overnight. Creating a notion that emerging technologies can be a silver bullet against climate change can divert attention from the already existing options.36 Indeed, while innovation presents a lot of beneficial solutions, some of which were outlined in this chapter, many of the emerging technologies are only in their early stages of development. Delaying the reduction of carbon emissions because of technological promises can be as dangerous as not undertaking any action at all. Hence, 34 BBC, “Fitness App Strava Lights Up Staff at Military Bases”, BBC News (29 January

2018), https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-42853072 (Accessed 29 July 2022). 35 Foeke Postma, “US Soldiers Expose Nuclear Weapons Secrets Via Flashcard Apps”, Bellingcat (28 May 2021), https://www.bellingcat.com/news/2021/05/28/us-soldiersexpose-nuclear-weapons-secrets-via-flashcard-apps/ (Accessed 29 July 2022). 36 Duncan McLaren & Nils Markusson, “The Co-evolution of Technological Promises, Modelling, Policies and Climate Change Targets”, Nature Climate Change, 2022.

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while the desired emerging technologies are in the process of development, the focus should be on what can be done with the equipment that is already available.

Conclusion Emerging technologies can and will be leveraged to green many processes, and militaries should not be an exemption from this modernization. Together with climate change, both of these dynamic elements will continue to actively transform the security environment, which implies the necessity of rethinking of the military doctrines for the twenty-first century. The twenty-first century military should not only be prepared for the battlefield but must also be versatile enough to address a wide range of threats, some of which are unprecedented, and, at the same time, must actively aim to contribute to the mitigation of such threats. Actors across the Euro-Atlantic space appear determined and ready to pursue both the goal of net zero and to boost innovation processes with the newly established accelerator and innovation fund, and such dedication is a step towards achieving this goal.

CHAPTER 8

Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications: Implications for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Maximilian Hoell and Sylvia Mishra

Introduction In the fourth industrial age, there is a chorus of scholars suggesting that artificial intelligence (AI) could become a general-purpose technology “like electricity, the internal combustion engine, or the microprocessor … [with] the potential to transform the economy, society, and the military.”1 Although the advancement of AI and its military applications and integration in weapons systems and on the battlefield have significant implications for national security and warfighting, the extent to which

M. Hoell (B) · S. Mishra European Leadership Network, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] S. Mishra e-mail: [email protected] 1 Allan Dafoe and Journal of International Affairs, “Global Politics and the Governance of Artificial Intelligence”, Journal of International Affairs, 72:1 (2019), p. 121.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 123 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_8

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AI will transform warfare remains an issue of contention. Several scholars suggest that in the long run, AI could have a sweeping impact on how militaries fight: the “seventh [military] revolution”,2 or so the argument goes, “will merge the changes generated by the Industrial Revolution and the Information Age with potentially significant alternations in how war is conducted.”3 AI could give militaries greater precision, speed, coordination, and lethality, “while making it easier for foreign governments to manipulate their adversary’s populations” (due to AI-shaped media and disinformation).4 Although the net effect of AI across military operations could vary in scale, more than one-third of AI researchers around the world agree that AI applications could be catastrophic and lead to an all-out nuclear war.5 The ongoing modernisation of nuclear arsenals (refurbishing existing strategic and tactical delivery systems and warheads to last beyond their originally planned service life and replacing many of these ageing systems with new systems) by nuclear-weapon states also includes the integration of more sophisticated AI in nuclear command, control, and communications (NC3). NC3 systems vary by state but consist of “warning, communication, and weapon systems—as well as human analysts, decisionmakers, and operators—involved in ordering and executing nuclear strikes, as well as preventing [an] unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.”6 The increasing integration of AI with NC3 could have implications for strategic stability and the implementation of States parties’ Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty (NPT) obligations, such as the article VI commitment to disarmament.7 For example, if AI improvements render nuclear 2 Frank G. Hoffman, “Will War’s Nature Change in the Seventh Military Revolution?”, Parameters, 47:4 (2017), p. 20. 3 Ibid., p. 30. 4 Ibid. 5 Jeremy Hsu, “A Third of Scientists Working on AI Say It Could Cause Global Disaster”, New Scientist (20 September 2022), https://www.newscientist.com/article/ 2338644-a-third-of-scientists-working-on-ai-say-it-could-cause-global-disaster/. 6 Matthijs M. Maas, Kayla Matteucci, & Di Cooke, “Military Artificial Intelligence as Contributor to Global Catastrophic Risk”, Cambridge Conference on Catastrophic Risk 2020 (22 May 2022), pp. 19–20, https://ssrn.com/abstract=4115010. 7 Jill Hruby & M. Nina Miller, “Assessing and Managing the Benefits and Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear-Weapon Systems”, NTI Paper (August 2021), https:// www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/NTI_Paper_AI_r4.pdf; Heather Williams, “Remaining Relevant: Why the NPT Must Address Emerging Technologies”, Kings

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forces more vulnerable to attack, the nuclear-armed states may choose to expand their arsenals in a bid to strengthen deterrence.8 This chapter argues that advances in AI and their integration with nuclear operations could have a significant impact on strategic stability. But despite these developments, AI remains largely unaddressed by key nuclear forums such as the NPT and the P5 process. Not discussing the impact of AI on nuclear stability and the NPT means that States parties miss an opportunity to shape norms on the integration of AI with NC3 that could help mitigate the risks and seize the opportunities of more AI-reliant nuclear systems. The remainder of this chapter is divided into three sections. The first section reviews past and present developments surrounding AI and its integration with military and NC3 systems. Section two outlines some of the risks and benefits of AI-supported NC3 systems. The third section develops the argument that AI, and its potential implications for strategic stability, need to be addressed within the NPT. The chapter concludes with policy recommendations on pursuing greater transparency and norms shaping efforts on AI and its integration with NC3.

Integrating AI with Military and NC3 Systems: Past and Present Developments In recent years, AI and its military applications have received no shortage of attention. Researchers have broadly defined AI as “machines that respond to stimulation consistent with traditional responses from humans, given the human capacity for contemplation, judgment, and intention.”9 AI is often associated with machines performing like humans in all intellectual tasks—a scenario which is known as “artificial general intelligence”

College London (August 2020), p. 7, evant-new-technologies.pdf.

https://www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/assets/remaining-rel

8 Rose Gottemoeller, “The Standstill Conundrum: The Advent of SecondStrike Vulnerability and Options to Address It”, Texas National Security Review, 4:4 (2021), https://tnsr.org/2021/10/the-standstill-conundrum-the-advent-of-secondstrike-vulnerability-and-options-to-address-it/. 9 Darrell M. West, “What Is Artificial Intelligence?”, Brookings (4 October 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-is-artificial-intelligence/.

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(AGI).10 Its potential military applications have prompted some observers to sound alarm bells: as Phil Torres has put it, the first state to obtain AGI wins “a decisive advantage that not even nuclear weapons can provide.”11 Unless controlled, the advent of AGI could by “default…[cause] total human annihilation.”12 Rather than fuelling speculations about these doom and gloom scenarios—human-level AI is likely still decades away—this chapter employs a definition of AI in line with current applications. Known as “artificial narrow intelligence” (ANI), this set of computational tools can be incorporated into various technologies, including weapon systems, to perform a specific function such as automating tasks according to an “if– then” logic, analysing complex or big datasets to identify patterns, flag anomalies, and make predictions.13 Although ANI appears to pale in comparison with AGI, major powers—including the P5 states (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States)—attach great importance to its rapid development in the contemporary world, resulting in a veritable race for technological superiority. As Russian president Vladimir Putin stated on 1 September 2017, “the one who becomes the leader in this sphere [AI] will be the ruler of the world.”14 Three months later, in December 2017, the Russian government announced the creation of a new Center

10 Phil Torres, “The Possibility and Risks of Artificial General Intelligence”, Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 75:3 (2019), p. 105. 11 Ibid., p. 106. 12 Ibid., p. 105. 13 Lawrence Lewis, “AI and Autonomy in War: Understanding and Mitigating Risks”,

CNA Analysis and Solutions (August 2018), p. 6, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/ PDF/DOP-2018-U-018296-Final.Pdf; see also Andrew Futter, “Explaining the Nuclear Challenges Posed by Emerging and Disruptive Technology: A Primer for European Policymakers and Professionals”, EUNPDC Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Papers, no. 73 (Brussels: EU Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Consortium, March 2021), pp. 7–8, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2021-03/eunpdc_no_73_0.pdf. 14 “Putin: Leader in Artificial Intelligence Will Rule World”, Associated Press (1 September 2017), https://apnews.com/article/technology-russia-business-artificial-intell igence-international-news-bb5628f2a7424a10b3e38b07f4eb90d4.

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for Artificial Intelligence at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technologies.15 Similarly, in August 2015, the United States Department of Defense (DoD) launched the Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx) in Silicon Valley, a public–private partnership, to ensure “America’s strategic dominance in technology.”16 In 2018, the DoD established the Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (JAIC) to harness the “transformative potential of AI”, enhance the performance of AI across diverse applications, and maintain its competitive edge.17 In 2022, the United Kingdom launched the Defence Centre for AI Research to advance AI capabilities in an “ambitious, safe, and responsible way”,18 while France’s national AI strategy sets out the vision to develop a civilian AI ecosystem that would facilitate military innovations.19 China, too, has been investing in AI massively. Noting the fierce competition “between the major developed countries in the world” for AI innovation, China’s State Council’s “new generation artificial intelligence development plan” of 8 July 2017 defines the objective for China to be “the world’s leading artificial intelligence innovation centre by 2030,”20 and for the Chinese AI industry to be worth one trillion yuan by 2030.21 15 Samuel Bendett, “Russia’s National AI Center Is Taking Shape”, Defense One (27 September 2019), https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2019/09/russias-nationalai-center-taking-shape/160219/. 16 Fred Kaplan, “The Pentagon’s Innovation Experiment”, MIT Technology Review (19 December 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/2016/12/19/155246/the-pentag ons-innovation-experiment/. 17 “The JAIC Story”, Chief Digital and Artificial Intelligence Office (2019), https://

www.ai.mil/about.html. 18 “Launching the AI Research Centre for Defence”, Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (14 July 2022), https://www.gov.uk/government/news/launching-the-def ence-centre-for-ai-research. 19 Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), p. 59, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_str ategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf. 20 “State Council Notice on the Issuance of the New Generation Artificial Intelligence Development Plan”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (20 July 2017), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2017-07/20/content_5211996. htm; see also Christina Larson, “China’s Massive Investment in Artificial Intelligence Has an Insidious Downside”, Science (8 February 2018), https://www.science.org/con tent/article/china-s-massive-investment-artificial-intelligence-has-insidious-downside. 21 Ibid.

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There are often exuberant expectations of what the technology can achieve. For example, several experts have noted that AI will “transform the character of warfare” and will have implications for “the battlefield, from under sea to cyberspace and outer space, and all points in between.”22 There are also expectations in the literature that AI leads to “‘Hyperwar’—a type of conflict and competition so automated that it would collapse the decision action loop, eventually minimising human control over most decisions”23 and that Western nations might have to prepare for the “need to defend against [artificially intelligent autonomous lethal] systems…operating at hyperwar speeds.”24 Other scholars have struck a more cautious chord, noting that while at present, military AI tools are utilised for intelligence analysis, predictive maintenance, image and pattern recognition, and language translation, AI has yet to transform warfare.25 Contrary to the recent hype, developing AI technology is not a new trend but has been researched for decades. For example, in 1950, Alan Turing explored the question of whether machines can think26 ; Shakey the Robot, developed by SRI International from 1966 to 1972, had basic cognitive abilities, and was thus “the first

22 David Vergun, “Experts Predict Artificial Intelligence Will Transform Warfare”, U.S. Department of Defense News (5 June 2020), https://www.defense.gov/News/NewsStories/Article/Article/2209480/experts-predict-artificial-intelligence-will-transform-war fare/. 23 General John Allen & Amir Hussein, “AI Will Change War”, Institute for National Strategic Studies (19 October 2021), https://inss.ndu.edu/Media/News/Article/287 0040/ai-will-change-war/. 24 Darrell M. West & John R. Allen, “How Artificial Intelligence Is Transforming the World?”, Brookings (24 April 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/how-artificialintelligence-is-transforming-the-world/. 25 Paul Scharre, “AI and the Future of War”, ChinaTalk podcast, Center for a New American Security (4 September 2022), https://www.cnas.org/publications/podcast/aiand-the-future-of-war. 26 Alan M. Turing, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Mind, 59: 236 (October 1950), p. 433.

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to embody artificial intelligence”27 ; and in the 1970s, military AI applications such as automatic target recognition software and active protection systems emerged.28 During the early 1990s, the Dynamic Analysis and Replanning Tool (DART) solved, with AI, logistical challenges for the U.S. military like “schedul[ing] the transportation of supplies or personnel.”29 DART increased efficiency noticeably, saving the U.S. military millions.30 In the recent past, the U.S. DoD deployed automated video analysis tools—an aspect of machine learning and deep learning that can distinguish moving objects of interest from still imagery.31 AI tools have also been used in NC3 since the Cold War, when both the United States and the Soviet Union automated detection and early warning systems.32 Moscow further appears to have contemplated a proposal for an autonomous nuclear retaliation system. According to a 1985 central committee note by Oleg Belyakov, the head of the central committee’s military industry department, “No [adequate] attention has been paid to a proposal, extremely important from the military and political point of view, to create a fully automated retaliatory strike system that would be activated from the top command levels in a moment

27 “Artificial Intelligence Timeline”, Military Embedded Systems (24 January 2019), https://militaryembedded.com/ai/machine-learning/artificial-intelligence-timeline. 28 Vincent Boulanin & Maaike Verbruggen, “Mapping the Development of Autonomy

in Weapon Systems”, SIPRI (November 2017), ch. 3, https://www.sipri.org/sites/def ault/files/2017-11/siprireport_mapping_the_development_of_autonomy_in_weapon_sys tems_1117_1.pdf. 29 “Artificial Intelligence Timeline”, Military Embedded Systems (24 January 2019), https://militaryembedded.com/ai/machine-learning/artificial-intelligence-timeline; Sara Reese Hedberg, “DART: Revolutionizing Logistics Planning”, IEEE Intelligent Systems, 17 (2002), pp. 81–83. 30 Ibid. 31 Cheryl Pellerin, “Project Maven to Deploy Computer Algorithms to War Zone by

Year’s End”, DoD News (21 July 2017), https://www.defense.gov/News/News-Stories/ Article/Article/1254719/project-maven-to-deploy-computer-algorithms-to-war-zone-byyears-end/. 32 Philip Reiner & Alexa Wehsener “The Real Value of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear Command and Control”, War on the Rocks (4 November 2019), https://warontherocks. com/2019/11/the-real-value-of-artificial-intelligence-in-nuclear-command-and-control/.

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of crisis.”33 Although the Soviet Union did not build this “fully automated retaliatory strike system,” Moscow developed a semi-automated “dead hand” mechanism to ensure its retaliatory capability in the event of a decapitating first strike against the Soviet Union: once activated (i.e., following a preliminary command from the command authority, the Soviet military general staff), the dead hand system relied on light, pressure, radiation, and seismic sensors to detect a nuclear attack on Soviet territory.34 If the system detected a nuclear explosion, it would test the communication links to the Soviet military general staff, and if the communication was interrupted, the dead hand “would immediately transfer launch authority to whoever was manning the system at that moment deep inside a protected bunker—bypassing many layers of normal command authority.”35 Thus, a human would have remained involved in any launch decision.36 Some sources suggest that the dead hand has been modernised since the end of the Cold War and that the system remains deployed at the time of writing.37 Apart from the dead hand, Russia uses AI tools to support its early warning and intelligence activities (e.g., to gather and process information at the National Defence Operations Centre and to find enemy military

33 “Dr. Strangelove Meets Reality”, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (14 April 2006), https://russianforces.org/blog/2006/04/dr_strangelove_meets_reality.shtml. 34 Nicholas Thompson, “Inside the Apocalyptic Soviet Doomsday Machine”, WIRED (1 September 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/09/mf-deadhand/; John Borrie, “Cold War Lessons for Automation in Nuclear Weapon Systems”, in: Vincent Boulanin (ed.), The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, volume I (Stockholm: SIPRI, May 2019), p. 47. 35 John Borrie, “Cold War Lessons for Automation in Nuclear Weapon Systems’, in: Vincent Boulanin (ed.), The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, volume I (Stockholm: SIPRI, May 2019), p. 47. 36 Ibid., see also “No Gaps in Early-Warning Coverage as Three Radars to Begin Combat Duty in 2017”, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (23 December 2016), https://russianforces.org/blog/2016/12/no_gaps_in_early-warning_cover.shtml; Nicholas Thompson, “Inside the Apocalyptic Soviet Doomsday Machine”, WIRED (1 September 2009), https://www.wired.com/2009/09/mf-deadhand/. 37 Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), pp. 22, 50, 113, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_strate gic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf.

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assets using the Kasatka avionics system) and precision-strike capabilities (e.g., AI-controlled hypersonic cruise missiles).38 President Putin’s identification of “artificial intelligence, robotization and unmanned systems”39 as a priority for Russia’s military modernisation on 18 December 2018 underpins these developments.40 While open-source information on Russia’s investment in military applications of AI is scare, further known examples of new AI-enabled systems include the Tupolev Tu-22M3M strategic dual-capable bomber, the Poseidon nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable unmanned underwater vehicle, and the Burevestnik nuclear-powered, nuclear-capable cruise missile.41 The United States, too, attaches great importance to the development of AI-supported early warning, intelligence, and precision-strike capabilities. Prominent examples include AI applications for data analytics (Project Maven), remote sensing (the Perdix unmanned aerial vehicle swarm, the X-47B unmanned aerial vehicle, and the Orca extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle), decision support (Deep Green), stockpile management, and precision strike and delivery (the Aegis ballistic missile defence systems).42 These developments come in the context of modernisation efforts to ensure the survivability and effectiveness of the U.S. NC3 system in light of ageing components and vulnerabilities that could be exploited by hostile actors. According to the Congressional Research Service, The Department of Defense (DOD) has identified a number of expanding threats that might challenge current NC3 systems and thus create a need to procure new systems. The [2018] NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] states

38 Ibid., p. 50. 39 Dmitry Stefanovich, “Artificial Intelligence Advances in Russian Strategic Weapons”,

in: Petr Topychkanov (ed.), The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, volume III (Stockholm: SIPRI, 2020), p. 25. 40 Ibid., see also Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), pp. 44-45, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_inte lligence_strategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf. 41 Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), pp. 50– 51, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_strategic_sta bility_and_nuclear_risk.pdf. 42 Ibid., pp. 42–43.

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that China and Russia have developed capabilities that could potentially threaten space-based systems; in addition, the introduction of modern information technologies poses potential cyber vulnerability, which ‘has created new challenges and potential vulnerabilities for the NC3 system.’43

There are indications that China equally increases its reliance on more sophisticated AI technology in NC3. The Chinese military is pursuing AI opportunities to offset U.S. advantages and has a strategy to outpace the United States through “intelligentised” warfare.44 The concept of “intelligentised” warfare focuses on human cognition to control the adversary’s will.45 In this regard, Chinese analysts have suggested that AI could help gain “control [of] the will of the highest decision-makers [of the adversary], including the president, members of Congress, and combatant commanders, as well as its citizens.”46 China is also adopting AI-supported tools in its early warning and intelligence capabilities (e.g., the over-the-horizon OTH-B long-range 24/7 radar), command and control (e.g., the Joint Operations Command and Control Advanced Concepts Demonstration System), and precisionstrike capabilities (e.g., the DF-ZF hypersonic glide vehicle, the extralarge unmanned underwater vehicle HSU-001).47 Like the other NPT nuclear-weapon states discussed so far, France has been investing in the research and development of military applications of AI. With a dedicated budget of e100 million a year between 2019 and 2025 for AI alone, France seeks “to have some strategic

43 John R. Hoehn, “Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3) Modernization”, Congressional Research Service in Focus IF11697 (8 December 2020), https://sgp.fas.org/crs/nuke/IF11697.pdf. 44 Koichiro Takagi, “New Tech, New Concepts: China’s Plans for AI and Cognitive Warfare”, War on the Rocks (13 April 2022), https://warontherocks.com/2022/04/newtech-new-concepts-chinas-plans-for-ai-and-cognitive-warfare/; see also “Chinese National Defense in the New Era”, State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China (24 July 2019), http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-07/24/content_5414325. htm. 45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), pp. 77– 78, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_strategic_sta bility_and_nuclear_risk.pdf.

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autonomy in AI.”48 At the time of writing, France has integrated AI with the Artemis infrared search and track system and is developing the AI-supported nEUROn unmanned combat aerial vehicle.49 Apart from precision-strike capabilities, France is also researching potential AI applications to “enable command and control of autonomous unmanned wingman for manned aircraft,” to gather and process information for early warning and intelligence, and to support remote sensing.50 The United Kingdom has also embraced an ambitious AI agenda, setting out its intention to raise the country’s AI “research and development (R&D) spending to 2.4% [of GDP] by 2027, and 3% over the longer term,” and to turn the country into an international AI R&D hub.51 As for integrating AI with British NC3, the UK is developing AIenabled remote sensing as part of the extra-large unmanned underwater vehicle programme and AI-driven intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (e.g., sensing for asset protection using integrated electronic network technology [SAPIENT]).52 The UK has further deployed, and is manufacturing, AI-supported systems to enhance its precision-strike capabilities. Examples include the sea ceptor air defence system as well as the Brimstone fire-and-forget missile “that can autonomously find a predefined target in a predefined way.”53

Risks and Opportunities of Military Applications of Artificial Intelligence Military applications of AI, especially in NC3, introduce both risks and opportunities for the global nuclear order. But despite several notable 48 Ibid., p. 64. 49 Ibid., p. 66. 50 Ibid. 51 HM Government, Industrial Strategy: Artificial Intelligence Sector Deal (London: Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, 2018), pp. 9, 11, https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attach ment_data/file/702810/180425_BEIS_AI_Sector_Deal__4_.pdf. 52 Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), p. 58, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_str ategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf. 53 Ibid.

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benefits of AI applications for nuclear stability, Western scholarship, on balance, tends to raise alarmist voices about the risks that military applications of AI pose for strategic stability and the global nuclear order. For example, Michael Horowitz argues that, in conventional conflicts, AI applications are likely to enhance the precision and velocity of military systems and operations to such an extent that they could exacerbate concerns, in some nuclear-weapon states, about the survivability of their retaliatory-strike capability.54 These countries may thus feel compelled to adopt a launch-on-warning posture, whereby a retaliatory nuclear strike would be launched upon warning of an incoming enemy nuclear attack.55 Rather than enhancing deterrence, critics allege that launch on warning fuels the risk of an inadvertent nuclear strike because of the possibility of false warnings and misperception: an adversary may misperceive a launch-on-warning posture as persistently preparing for a first strike.56 Furthermore, some analysts point to the potential “situation where a nuclear-armed state would trigger destabilising measures (e.g., adopting new and untested technology or changing its nuclear doctrine) based only on the belief that its retaliatory capacity could be defeated by another state’s AI capabilities.”57 Ambassador Rose Gottemoeller, a former NATO deputy secretary-general, has struck a similar chord, arguing that technological advances, such as AI-driven big data analysis and ubiquitous sensors, could create a “standstill conundrum” by rendering second-strike capabilities vulnerable to decapitation and nuclear deterrence fragile as a result.58

54 Michael Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Stability”, in: Vincent Boulanin (ed.), The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, volume I (Stockholm: SIPRI, May 2019), p. 83, https://www.sipri.org/publicati ons/2019/other-publications/impact-artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclearrisk-volume-i-euro-atlantic. 55 Ibid. 56 Frank N. von Hippel, “Biden Should End the Launch-on-Warning Option”, Bulletin

of the Atomic Scientists (22 June 2021), https://thebulletin.org/2021/06/biden-shouldend-the-launch-on-warning-option/. 57 Vincent Boulanin, “Exceutive Summary”, in: Vincent Boulanin (ed.), The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, volume I (Stockholm: SIPRI, May 2019), p. xii, https://www.sipri.org/publications/2019/other-publications/ impact-artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclear-risk-volume-i-euro-atlantic. 58 Rose Gottemoeller, “The Standstill Conundrum: The Advent of Strike Vulnerability and Options to Address It”, Texas National

SecondSecurity

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Other observers highlight the dangers that arise from AI in specific applications, such as “an autonomous platform with nuclear weapons, which would eliminate positive human control over nuclear weapon use…[Furthermore,] Hacking or spoofing could make a system vulnerable to capture or malfunction even before factoring in the chance that the brittle character of an algorithm leads to a malfunction.”59 To be sure, those risks exist, and the expressed concerns are not ungrounded. But by overemphasising the potentially destabilising impact of AI on strategic stability, Western pundits downplay two important considerations. First, AI could also strengthen nuclear deterrence and strategic stability, inter alia by increasingly automating tasks that are simple but subject to human shortcomings and emotions (e.g., anger, biases, boredom, distraction, fatigue, fear, hunger).60 Employing more sophisticated AI in early warning and decisionmaking systems could also produce quicker and more robust data analysis, and, as a result, buy valuable “time for de-escalation and tension reduction between sides” in a crisis.61 Indeed, AI tools could deliver better and faster differentiation between nuclear and conventional warheads and other dual-use objects, enhancing the accuracy of attack characterisations.62 Thus, while AI-enhanced conventional capabilities and early warning and intelligence systems may well prompt fears of decapitation and the adoption of launch-on-warning postures as a result, they may just Review, 4:4 (2021), https://tnsr.org/2021/10/the-standstill-conundrum-the-advent-ofsecond-strike-vulnerability-and-options-to-address-it/. 59 Michael C. Horowitz, “Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Stability”, in: Vincent Boulanin (ed.), The Impact of Artificial Intelligence on Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk, volume I (Stockholm: SIPRI, May 2019), p. 81, https://www.sipri.org/publicati ons/2019/other-publications/impact-artificial-intelligence-strategic-stability-and-nuclearrisk-volume-i-euro-atlantic. 60 Ibid., p. 83; Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), p. 17, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_str ategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf. 61 Jessica Cox & Heather Williams, “The Unavoidable Technology: How Artificial Intelligence Can Strengthen Nuclear Stability”, The Washington Quarterly, 44:1 (2021), p. 73. 62 Jill Hruby and M. Nina Miller, “Assessing and managing the benefits and risks of artificial intelligence in nuclear-weapon systems”, NTI paper, August 2021, p. 18, https:// www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/NTI_Paper_AI_r4.pdf.

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as well lessen ambiguity in a crisis. In any case, the 2022 U.S. China Military Power Report suggests that China (the only P5 state with a no-first-use pledge) has adopted a launch-on-warning posture, too.63 Similarly, AI applications in decision-support systems could provide greater situational awareness and response options, and support command decision-making. AI appears to perform particularly well in situational awareness enhancement by collecting and combining information, and identifying trends, patterns, and anomalies at speeds far greater than achievable by humans alone.64 The ability to process all available information in real-time could significantly reduce ambiguity and provide the context for the best possible decisions so long as the decision-maker does not blindly trust the system (automation bias) or inherently mistrust the system (trust gap).65 Training decision-makers to deal with the complexities of the human–machine relationship (e.g., through iterative wargaming using digital twins of nuclear-weapon decision-making and protocols that encourage rather than impede critical thinking) could help mitigate the risks while maximising the benefits of AI decision-support applications.66

63 Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, D.C.: Department of Defense, 2022), p. 99, https://media.defense.gov/ 2022/Nov/29/2003122279/-1/-1/1/2022-MILITARY-AND-SECURITY-DEVELO PMENTS-INVOLVING-THE-PEOPLES-REPUBLIC-OF-CHINA.PDF. 64 Jill Hruby & M. Nina Miller, “Assessing and Managing the Benefits and Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear-Weapon Systems”, NTI Paper (August 2021), pp. 21–22, https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/NTI_Paper_AI_r4.pdf. 65 On automation bias and lack of trust, see Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), p. 114, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/ files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_strategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf. 66 On the development of fail-safe protocols, see Jill Hruby & M. Nina Miller, “Assessing and Managing the Benefits and Risks of Artificial Intelligence in NuclearWeapon System”, NTI Paper (2021), p. 33, https://www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/ 2021/09/NTI_Paper_AI_r4.pdf; on the importance of critical thinking, see Beyza Unal with Julia Cournoyer, Calum Inverarity & Yasmin Afina, “Uncertainty and Complexity in Nuclear Decision-Making: Balancing Reason, Logic, Cognition and Intuition at Strategic and Operational Levels”, Research Paper (London: Chatham House, the Royal Institute of International Affairs March 2022), pp. 18–19, 49, https://www.chathamhouse.org/ sites/default/files/2022-03/2022-03-07-nuclear-decision-making-unal-et-al_1.pdf.

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Second, the West’s main competitors, China, and Russia, are increasingly embracing military applications of AI.67 Whether Western electorates and politicians like it or not, power politics and the race for technological supremacy in military applications have returned to the fore of international politics. Not enhancing the NC3 capabilities of Western states, for fear of AI doomsday scenarios, could increase confidence in Beijing and Moscow that they have a military advantage and, as a result, exacerbate rather than mitigate nuclear risks. Instead of fearing technological progress, the international community should embrace its benefits and mitigate the risks. Insights from other industries, such as aviation, suggest that it is possible to exploit the benefits of automation while harnessing the challenges. For the global nuclear order, one means of reducing the risk of arms races is arms control. Despite a period of arms control erosion, the current competition may eventually incentivise arms control among the P5 states. As Hal Brands has argued, “Contrary to most predictions, aggressive arms-racing actually enabled historic arms control: Reagan’s strategic build-up gave Moscow an incentive to make deep, disproportionate cuts in its arsenal of intermediate-range ballistic missiles and heavy ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles].”68

The Way Forward: Considering AI in NC3 (and Other EDTs) in the NPT No military technology is inherently good or bad, stabilising or destabilising. But the transformative character of AI applications vis-à-vis the limitations of the current technology is such that, if used in military

67 Dan Sabbagh, “MI6 Needs Tech Sector’s Help to Win AI Race with China and Russia—spy chief”, The Guardian (30 November 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/ uk-news/2021/nov/30/mi6-will-need-to-be-more-open-to-stay-secret-spy-chief-to-say. See also Nicholas D. Wright (ed.) “Artificial Intelligence, China, Russia, and the Global Order”, Fairchild Series (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 2019), https://www.air university.af.edu/Portals/10/AUPress/Books/B_0161_WRIGHT_ARTIFICIAL_INTE LLIGENCE_CHINA_RUSSIA_AND_THE_GLOBAL_ORDER.PDF; Tate Nurkin & Margarita Konaev, “Eye to Eye in AI: Developing Artificial Intelligence for National Security and Defense”, Atlantic Council (25 May 2022), https://www.atlanticcouncil. org/in-depth-research-reports/report/eye-to-eye-in-ai/. 68 Hal Brands, “The Art of the Arms Race: To Avoid Disaster, the United States Must Relearn Crucial Cold War Lessons”, Foreign Policy (1 July 2022), https://foreig npolicy.com/2022/07/01/arms-control-race-cold-war-geopolitical-rivalry/.

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and nuclear-weapon systems, it could impact strategic stability and the fulfilment of States parties’ obligations under the NPT in a plethora of ways. Despite the increasing integration of AI and other emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) with nuclear-weapon systems, their ramifications for nuclear policies and the NPT hardly receive any attention in the NPT review process. Indeed, the 25 August 2022 draft final document of the tenth NPT review conference only mentioned EDTs once. And during the four-week-long tenth NPT review conference in August 2022, only a handful of statements and working papers discussed EDTs: for example, in its opening statement, Bangladesh expressed concerns that AI and EDTs would make nuclear war “even more dangerous” and more likely.69 The Stockholm Initiative called upon the nuclear-armed states “to minimise potential vulnerabilities emerging from disruptive technologies and cyber threats, e.g., on command and control”,70 and asked all States parties to consider “The implications of emerging technologies on nuclear risks.”71 The Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative further appealed to the nuclear-armed states to mitigate EDTs vulnerabilities.72 69 “Statement by H.E. Dr. A. K. Abdul Momen, MP, Honourable Foreign Minister of Bangladesh at the General Debate of the 10th Review Conference of the Nuclear NonProliferation Treaty”, New York (1 August 2022), https://reachingcriticalwill.org/ima ges/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/1Aug_Bangladesh.pdf. 70 “Stepping Stones for Advancing Nuclear Disarmament”, working paper submitted by

Argentina, Canada, Finland, Germany, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, the Republic of Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, NPT/CONF.2020/WP.6 (12 March 2020), https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/doc uments/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/documents/WP6.pdf. 71 “A Nuclear Risk Reduction Package”, working paper submitted by the Stockholm Initiative, supported by Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ethiopia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South Korea, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland, NPT/CONF.2020/WP.9 (14 May 2021), https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/doc uments/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/documents/WP9.pdf. 72 “Recommendations for Consideration by the Tenth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons”, joint working paper submitted by the members of the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative (Australia, Canada, Chile, Germany, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Nigeria, Philippines, Poland, Turkey and United Arab Emirates), NPT/CONF.2020/WP.10 (10 September 2021), https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmamentfora/npt/revcon2022/documents/WP10.pdf.

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The scarce attention the NPT pays to EDTs may seem little surprising. Some States parties prefer dealing with EDTs in other forums to avoid overburdening the NPT.73 The NPT review process, or so the argument goes, struggles to address the issues at hand so far; therefore, adding another contentious topic—especially in the context of a fractured P5 process and a polarised NPT membership–might pose additional strains on the NPT review proceedings. AI and other EDTs also have several conventional military applications and are not specific to nuclear weapons, prompting questions if AI deliberations really fall under the scope of the treaty. However, given the immense frustrations of many NPT States parties at the perceived lack of progress on disarmament, the integration of nuclear weapons with EDTs should be a concerning development as they could impede progress on article VI. As Heather Williams has argued, “Hypersonic technology is poised to increase reliance on nuclear weapons, because increasingly fast means of nuclear delivery could put existing nuclear systems at increased risk.”74 Similarly, AI-enhanced remote sensing and reconnaissance capabilities could render second-strike capabilities vulnerable in future, prompting increases in nuclear arsenals in an effort to boost the survivability of second-strike forces.75 And AI-automated retaliatory launch systems could lead to accidental war.76 There is thus the need to study the impact of EDTs in general and AI in particular on the global nuclear order and the NPT. Since the NPT review process enables States parties to consult on their treaty obligations, including developments that may affect their implementation of treaty commitments, it would appear to be a suitable venue to foster

73 Heather Williams, “Remaining Relevant: Why the NPT Must Address Emerging Technologies”, Kings College London (August 2020), p. 7, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/ assets/remaining-relevant-new-technologies.pdf. 74 Ibid., p. 10. 75 Rose Gottemoeller,

“The Standstill Conundrum: The Advent of SecondStrike Vulnerability and Options to Address It”, Texas National Security Review, 4:4 (2021), https://tnsr.org/2021/10/the-standstill-conundrum-the-advent-of-secondstrike-vulnerability-and-options-to-address-it/. 76 Jill Hruby & M. Nina Miller, “Assessing and Managing the Benefits and Risks of Artificial Intelligence in Nuclear-Weapon System”, NTI Paper, 2021, pp. 23–24, https:// www.nti.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/09/NTI_Paper_AI_r4.pdf.

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some degree of shared understanding of the challenges and opportunities that EDTs pose for the implementation of States parties’ NPT commitments.77 At the very least, EDTs—and especially AI—should feature as an integral part of risk reduction conversations within the NPT. To foster a common understanding of how AI applications in particular impact the NPT, the P5 states should pursue confidence-and transparency-building measures related to AI and its integration with NC3. These measures could initially take the form of unilateral, bilateral or multilateral communications on how the integration of AI tools with NC3 impacts nuclear postures, doctrines, readiness levels, and strategic stability. Next, the P5 states should develop a common normative framework of acceptable and unacceptable AI use in NC3 as well as an AI risk reduction agenda. A good starting point is the P3 working paper on responsible nuclear-weapon state behaviour of 29 July 2022, which confirms that France, the United Kingdom, and the United States “will maintain human control and involvement for all actions critical to informing and executing sovereign decisions concerning nuclear weapons employment.”78 In the absence of a “formal bilateral or multilateral agreement that prevents any nuclear-armed state from fully automating its command and control”,79 the P5 states should strive for a common understanding of the associated risks of AI-enhanced NC3 systems and confirm in a joint statement that they will always ensure human control over nuclear-weapon systems and

77 Heather Williams, “Remaining Relevant: Why the NPT Must Address Emerging Technologies”, Kings College London (August 2020), p. 12, https://www.kcl.ac.uk/csss/ assets/remaining-relevant-new-technologies.pdf. 78 “Principles and Responsible Practices for Nuclear Weapon States”, working paper submitted by France, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the United States of America, NPT/CONF.2020/WP.70 (29 July 2022), https://reachingcriticalwill.org/images/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/ revcon2022/documents/WP70.pdf. 79 Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, & Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), p. 113, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_ strategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf.

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launch decisions.80 Another key element of such a P5 framework agreement on AI should be a strong norm of non-interference in each other’s NC2(3) systems.81 Given that on 2 August 2022 Ambassador Fu Cong expressed China’s readiness to address EDTs, such as AI, and given the desire of many NPT States parties to see concrete measures on risk reduction, the P5 states should develop and present a normative framework of acceptable and unacceptable AI use in NC3, including specific steps to mitigate AI challenges, in the eleventh NPT review cycle.82 Any effort reviewing the impact of EDTs on States parties’ NPT obligations should not be limited to the P5 process, however. Instead, these deliberations should involve a broad set of stakeholders, including at least interested non-nuclear-weapon States parties, as well as representatives from academia, civil society, and industry to build bridges between the policy and technical communities. Industry should be engaged to address the added complication of AI development in the private/commercial sector, which makes it difficult to control innovations with implications for nuclear stability. Such a multi-stakeholder approach would help States parties better understand the developmental trajectory of AI and its associated risks and benefits, and therefore help formulate adequate risk mitigation and benefit maximisation measures. Beyond the P5 process, and in the absence of a dedicated EDTs or risk reduction working group within the NPT, conversations should begin among like-minded stakeholders either bilaterally or multilaterally through existing risk reduction discussion tracks.

80 Ibid., p. 135; Lauren Kahn, “Mending the ‘broken arrow’: confidencebuilding measures at the AI-nuclear nexus”, War on the Rocks (4 November 2022), https://warontherocks.com/2022/11/mending-the-broken-arrow-confidence-bui lding-measures-at-the-ai-nuclear-nexus/. 81 Vincent Boulanin, Lora Saalman, Petr Topychkanov, Fei Su, and Moa Peldán Carlsson, “Artificial Intelligence, Strategic Stability and Nuclear Risk”, SIPRI (June 2020), p. 135, https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2020-06/artificial_intelligence_ strategic_stability_and_nuclear_risk.pdf. 82 “Upholding the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons for world peace and development”, remarks by H.E. Ambassador Fu Cong at the 10th review conference of the parties to the NPT, New York, 2 August 2022,https://reachingcriticalwill.org/ima ges/documents/Disarmament-fora/npt/revcon2022/statements/2Aug_China.pdf.

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Conclusion As more sophisticated AI tools become integrated with NC3, many opportunities and risks for nuclear stability arise. Consequently, the NPT membership should consider and address the implications of AI-supported NC3 for the implementation of NPT obligations and the global nuclear order. While the P5 states need to begin the conversation on establishing norms of acceptable and unacceptable AI use in NC3, all interested NPT States parties and stakeholders from academia, civil society, and industry should be involved in evaluating and addressing the risks and opportunities of AI applications for the global nuclear order, including the NPT.

CHAPTER 9

Contemporary Cybersecurity Challenges Pavel Sharikov

The problem of cybersecurity has been an important aspect of international relations and international security for some time. If we consider the 1990s, when widespread use of the Internet began, as the jumping-off point, we can now state that over three decades, government and private interests in cybersecurity have grown, the demand for experts working in this field has increased, and the number of recorded incidents has multiplied. Hardly any experts (either government or commercial) have claimed that cyberspace has become safer. The reason is not necessarily ineffective policy; the threats themselves are becoming more complex, and the actual field of cybersecurity is evolving extremely dynamically and in general the nature of the threats and the forms of cyber aggression are changing. Given the dynamically evolving reality, methods of government regulation and response to cyber threats are also changing. In the 1990s, governments prioritized the development of information technologies for

P. Sharikov (B) Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 143 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_9

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economic purposes, therefore national, business and private cybersecurity risks seemed much less important as compared to the benefits from the spread of consumer electronics. The evolution lay in that the United States, European countries, and later the EU initially worked to counter computer crime, and later to create centralized organizations such as ENISA (European Network and Information Security Agency) to protect critical infrastructure. In the latter half of the 2010s, it became a priority to develop a defensive, and later offensive military cyber capability. Probably the only exception is Estonia, where the cyber capabilities started to develop around the military forces in late 2000 due to alleged cyberattacks from Russia. Estonia also promoted the creation of NATO cybersecurity center in 2008. At present, we are at the point of institutionalization of the military use of information technologies. Today, the international community observes, for the first time in history, a large-scale armed conflict supported by offensive information operations. Russia and Ukraine have both used a wide range of offensive and defensive cyber-capabilities. However, the countries supporting Ukraine are also contributing to the Russo–Ukrainian standoff in cyberspace. Moreover, since there is no international consensus on dealing with cyber aggression in the context of military law, other countries’ engagement is quite impressive. Ukraine’s closest allies are NATO and EU member countries, their support in cyberspace has been much more notable in individual capacities rather than organizational. Russia has always been an active advocate of the adoption of cyber security norms in international law. Russia’s ultimate goal consisted of preventing conflict in cyberspace. The tragic development of the Russia– Ukraine conflict demonstrates that even though cyber offence is an important part of military action, its intensity is quite low compared to the actions on the ground. Despite the fact that cyber conflict hasn’t escalated to military action between Russia and NATO countries, efforts aimed at the prevention of a cyberconflict did not prevent the military actions on the ground. Cybersecurity will remain as one of the key elements of international security. Future cybersecurity agreements should be based on thorough research of cyber activities implemented during the Russo–Ukrainian conflict.

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Defining Military Cyber Capabilities Cybersecurity is one of the North Atlantic alliance’s (NATO) priorities. The leaders of the NATO member states agreed for the first time at the Wales Summit of 2014 that a cyberattack could constitute grounds for application of Article 5 of the NATO Treaty. The NATO declaration stated that “cyber defence is part of NATO’s core task of collective defence. A decision as to when a cyberattack would lead to the invocation of Article 5 would be taken by the North Atlantic Council on a case-bycase basis.”1 In 2016, NATO adopted a decision to equate cyberspace to the physical domains of warfare—air, land, and sea. In the same year, the Warsaw Summit adopted a cyber defence commitment (the NATO cyber pledge),2 under which the countries agreed to take similar steps in the development of their national cyber potentials. Given that various countries have different cyberwarfare capacities, certain disagreements have arisen over the applicability of international law, especially the law of war, to cyberattacks and conflicts in cyberspace. This issue has been worked up first and foremost by the Cybersecurity Defense Center of Excellence in Estonia. One of its most noteworthy accomplishments is the so-called Tallinn Manual,3 first published in 2012. The first edition presented the most general arguments explaining the legal side of cyberspace conflicts. The second edition, which appeared in 2017,4 was devoted to a study of the daily challenges which nations face in cyberspace and the legal framework of their response to them. The third edition is now in preparation. In 2018, NATO announced that it planned to open a Cyber Operations Centre (CYOC) similar to the national military cyber commands

1 NATO Wales Summit Declaration. (5 September 2014), https://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natohq/official_texts_112964.htm (Accessed 9 August 2022). 2 Warsaw Summit Communiqué, issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw (8–9 July 2016), https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.?selectedLocale=en (Accessed 4 July 2022). 3 M. N. Schmitt. (General editor). Tallinn Manual on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Warfare, (Cambridge University Press, 2013). 4 Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International Law Applicable to Cyber Operations. 2nd Edition. (February 2017), https://www.cambridge.org/ru/academic/subjects/law/hum anitarian-law/tallinn-manual-20-international-law-applicable-cyber-operations-2nd-edition? format=PB.

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instituted in the armed forces of each of its member states. The press, citing highly placed NATO military leaders, reported that the new center would be fully operational in 2023.5 In 2020, the British Ministry of Defence published the first edition of the NATO Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations.6 The central concept around which the NATO cybersecurity doctrine is built is sovereignty in the information space. The Doctrine asserts that offensive cyber operations will be carried out through the mechanism of voluntary determination of the results of cyber effects on sovereignty (Sovereign Cyber Effects Provided Voluntarily by Allies, SCEPVA). To all appearances, NATO does not currently have a consensus regarding planning for defensive and offensive cyber operations. This raises a series of questions about how to regulate the military use of information technologies in international relations. Russia’s official position has been explained in many different documents, for example in a UN resolution “Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security”7 adopted on 5 December 2018. Russian diplomats have adopted the term “International Information Security (IIS),” which describes measures aimed at preventing conflict in cyberspace. A proposed solution has been an international legal ban on the very idea of using information technologies for military purposes in order to deprive the state of the right of self-defence with tools of cyber aggression. Russian officials have never agreed to discuss the details of offensive cyber capabilities. Russia’s position doesn’t differentiate the government (military) and civilian responsibility for cyberattacks. According to the Russian position, all forms of cyber aggression must be treated as cybercrime, therefore international agreement on definition of offensive cyber capabilities would put certain forms of cyberaggression out of cooperative counter-cybercrime agenda. Russia’s IIS 5 R. Emmott, “NATO cyber command to be fully operational in 2023,” (16 October 2018), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-cyber-idUSKCN1MQ1Z9 (Accessed 4 July 2022). 6 NATO Standard AJP-3.20, Allied Joint Doctrine for Cyberspace Operations. Edition A Version (1 January 2020), https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/upl oads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/899678/doctrine_nato_cyberspace_operat ions_ajp_3_20_1_.pdf (Accessed 4 July 2022). 7 Developments in the field of information and telecommunications in the context of international security https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/ 418/04/PDF/N1841804.pdf?OpenElement.

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position goes in line with domestic information security policies, which include excessive government control over cyberspace. Accordingly, a ban has been proposed on standards of humanitarian or military law in cyber conflicts, since this law applies to military conflict. According to the Russian position, the very idea of cyberweapon contradicts the IIS concept, hence it has never been a subject of negotiations, even those devoted to arms control. For 30 years, the United States and European countries have had various priorities in the area of cybersecurity. In recent years, a certain convergence of positions has begun, and attention should be paid especially to regional processes—the consolidation of national information resources under the EU, as well as a striving to create a unified cyber command under NATO. It is notable that there is no consensus over cyber offensive capabilities among European states. For example, in Germany, the idea of using offensive cyber capabilities in retaliation against cyberattacks is forbidden by the German government’s coalition agreement.8 The Western approach to the problem of cybersecurity can be summarized as deterrence, i.e., the improvement of defences, and in recent years the development of offensive potential. In terms of doctrine, NATO’s cybersecurity policy is very similar to the US’. Like American policy documents, such as the Department of Defense Cyber Strategy of 20189 and the Command vision for US Cyber Command,10 NATO believes that aggression in cyberspace is a threat requiring constant attention and defensive measures, but it does not consider it a full-fledged military threat since it does not “cross the threshold of military action” and accordingly does not require a counterstrike by armed forces. Similarly, NATO countries perceive Russian cyber hostilities as a low-intensity conflict, described as “persistent engagement.”

8 Mehr fortschritt wagen bündnis für fbrüenihdeniits, gfüerechtigkeit ufnredihneaicth, ghearlteicghkteiigtkeit und nachhaltigkeit. https://www.spd.de/fileadmin/Dokumente/ Koalitionsvertrag/Koalitionsvertrag_2021-2025.pdf (Accessed 9 August 2022). 9 Department of Defense Cyber Strategy of 2018. https://media.defense.gov/ 2018/Sep/18/2002041658/-1/-1/1/CYBER_STRATEGY_SUMMARY_FINAL.PDF (Accessed 9 August 2022). 10 Achieve and Maintain Cyberspace Superiority, Command Vision for US Cyber Command. https://www.cybercom.mil/Portals/56/Documents/USCYBERCOM%20V ision%20April%202018.pdf (Accessed 9 August 2022).

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Much has been written about persistent engagement and US cyber deterrence policy (e.g., by Jason Healey,11 Martin Libicki,12 Ben Buchanan,13 and others). The contrasts between the Russian and Western positions impede the development of common definitions of the terms “cyberweapons,” “cyberattack,” “cyberwarfare,” etc. The policy of deterrence in the cybersecurity context assumes that nations disclose (at least in part) their doctrines on the use of cyberweapons, and some information on national military cyber capabilities. US doctrine, and following that, NATO doctrine, operates with the term “threshold of an armed conflict,” a red line whose crossing marks the onset of hostilities. To all appearances, a fairly high threshold of armed conflict with respect to cyberattacks corresponds to a policy of containment. The key question for international relations in the context of cyberconflict is how to categorize a cyberattack as a use of military force requiring a nation to enter into war (especially considering that the tools of aggression and the goals and dimensions of damage may be at least equal to nonmilitary ones). The Russian position in fact declares zero tolerance for cyberattacks, which leads to more unpredictability for the United States. In tandem with the positions set out in numerous documents on the Russian approach to IIS, Russian officials assert that any cyber aggression will be met with decisive responses. The development of events in the UN Open-Ended Working Group last year14 offered some hope for a compromise, but it is now more and more obvious that the parties’ positions are irreconcilable. It is noteworthy that in recent years, numerous studies have appeared whose authors attempt to compare the capabilities of various countries. This is not easy, given that there is no nomenclature and there are no 11 Jason Healey, “The Implications of Persistent (and Permanent) Engagement in Cyberspace”, Journal of Cybersecurity, 5:1 (2019), https://doi.org/10.1093/cybsec/ tyz008. 12 Martin Libicki, “Cyberdeterrence and Cyberwar”, (RAND Corporation 2009), https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/2009/RAND_MG877. pdf. 13 Ben Buchanan, The Cybersecurity Dilemma: Hacking, Trust and Fear Between Nations (Oxford University: Press, 2017). 14 David Ignatius, “The Ice Between the U.S. and Russia May Be Thawing—For Now”, Washington Post (19 October 2021), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/ 10/19/ice-between-us-russia-may-be-thawing-now/ (Accessed 9 August 2022).

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internationally recognized unified standards. In most of these studies, an important aspect of national cyber power is its doctrine. Naturally, there is extremely meagre official information on national cybersecurity strategies. Information on Russia’s capability must be drawn from foreign sources, raising questions of its objectivity. Very unfortunately, the military armed conflict in Ukraine is shedding a little light on how military cyber capabilities are used during a large-scale armed conflict.

Cyber in the Context of the War in Ukraine NATO and the EU In practice, the cyber deterrence doctrine debate has been partly confirmed by the development of events around the 2022 conflict between Russia and Ukraine. Back in December 2021, when Western leaders were already expressing concern over the increase in Russian forces on the Ukrainian border, American and British cybersecurity specialists were sent to Kyiv to advise the Ukrainian authorities as to how to repel potential Russian cyber aggression.15 At that time Dmitry Alperovich, a noted American cybersecurity specialist of Russian ancestry, supposed that Russia’s actions in cyberspace were applied in preparation for a ground military operation.16 In early February 2022, Anne Neuberger, US Presidential Cybersecurity Adviser, was sent to visit Europe. She met with leaders of NATO, the European Union, Bulgaria, Czechia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia, as well as Germany and France.17 The goal of Neuberger’s visit was to develop collective tools for responding to a Russian cyberattack and to provide possible support to Ukraine in case of potential cyber aggression. American officials have stated that Russia has already committed a cyberattack

15 D. Sanger, & J. E. Barnes, “U.S. and Britain Help Ukraine Prepare for Potential Russian Cyberassault”, New York Times (20 December 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2021/12/20/us/politics/russia-ukraine-cyberattacks.html (Accessed 4 July 2022). 16 “Before Russia’s Land Invasion of Ukraine Came the Cyberattacks”, https://www. marketplace.org/shows/marketplace-tech/before-russias-land-invasion-of-ukraine-camethe-cyberattacks/ (Accessed 31 October 2022). 17 M. Chalfant, “Top White House Cyber Official to Meet with Europeans amid Russia Tensions”, The Hill (1 February 2022), https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/ 592198-top-white-house-cyber-official-to-meet-with-europeans-amid-russia (Accessed 4 July 2022).

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against power facilities on Ukrainian territory and warned that such attacks could be repeated. Private-sector teams have also reported such attacks. In particular, Microsoft18 claimed that it has information that Russia was conducting “not only full-scale kinetic, but also digital military actions.” Moreover, the president of Microsoft said that he is cooperating with authorities in Ukraine, the United States, European countries, and NATO to develop cyber defences. At the official level, there are no signs that a military response to such actions is being developed. To the contrary, the US and its European allies are more concerned that Russia, not wishing to expand the military conflict to a full-scale war against NATO, will use cyberweapons. On 24 February 2022, on the first day of the Russo–Ukrainian conflict, the Cyber Rapid Response Team and mutual assistance in cybersecurity (CRRT) were first activated in the framework of the Permanent Structural Cooperation on security and defence (PESCO). At Ukraine’s request,19 a team of experts from Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, and Romania was sent to Kyiv for consultations and assistance against cyberthreats. Three weeks after the beginning of the military action in the Russo–Ukrainian conflict, Russia encountered unprecedented pressure in cyberspace. The hacker group Anonymous attacked Russian government sites for several weeks—actions that more resembled hooliganism than state-sponsored cyber aggression, but nevertheless inflicted noticeable reputation damage. No cases of cyberattacks by other nations against Russia have been reported. We have no open-source information on the execution or preparation of any offensive digital operations; to the

18 B. Smith, “Digital Technology and the War in Ukraine”, (28 February 2022), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/02/28/ukraine-russia-digital-war-cyb erattacks/ (Accessed 4 July 2022). 19 Ukraine is not an EU member, but on April 15, 2021, cooperation was established with EU countries under PESCO. “Ukraine-EU Cooperation in the Military-Political, Military and Military-Technical Spheres”, (15 April 2021), https://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov. ua/en/2633-relations/spivpracya-ukrayina-yes-u-sferi-zovnishnoyi-politiki-i-bezpeki/spi vpracya-ukrayina-yes-u-ramkah-spilnoyi-politiki-bezpeki-i-oboroni (Accessed 4 July 2022).

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contrary, steps are being discussed to provide cybersecurity in the light of future cyberattacks by Russia.20 According to official statements by the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,21 “in addition to Ukrainian special digital information attack units trained by the United States and other NATO countries, anonymous hackers and provocateurs are being engaged more and more in this cyberwar against us.” They note that the NATO countries are involved in training Ukrainian specialists, but if they are involved in cyber aggression against Russia, it was anonymously, without giving cause to accuse the countries’ leaders of waging war. During the 7 April 2022 meeting of NATO foreign ministers, General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg noted that “Ukraine is being provided largescale assistance in cybersecurity.”22 To all appearances, the United States is providing the bulk of the support. The aid was provided initially along the lines of the European Union23 beginning in June 2021, PESCO beginning in April 2021,24 and NATO CCDCOE25 beginning in May 2022; individual nations also provided aid. Obviously, the details are known and understood only within a narrow circle of experts, but even based on open-source data it is obvious that Western leaders’ continuing statements on Russian cyber aggression have not drawn either NATO or any NATO or EU member countries into the war. Moreover, there are certain analogies as to how support for Ukraine is being provided. NATO is giving

20 J. Blessing, “Get Ready for Russia’s Cyber Retaliation”, The Hill (3 March 2022), https://thehill.com//cybersecurity/596623-get-ready-for-russias-cyber-retaliation (Accessed 4 July 2022). 21 Russian MFA Statement in Connection with Ongoing Cyberaggression by the “Collective West”, (29 March 2022), https://mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/1806906/ (Accessed 4 July 2022). 22 Press conference by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg following the meetings of NATO Ministers of Foreign Affairs, (7 April 2022), https://www.nato.int/cps/ en/natohq/opinions_194330.htm (Accessed 4 August 2022). 23 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2022/733549/EPRS_B RI(2022)733549_EN.pdf. 24 https://ukraine-eu.mfa.gov.ua/en/2633-relations/spivpracya-ukrayina-yes-U-sferizovnishnoyi-politiki-I-bezpeki/spivpracya-ukrayina-yes-u-ramkah-spilnoyi-politiki-bezpekii-oboroni. 25 Ukraine to be Accepted as a Contributing Participant to NATO CCDCOE. https:// ccdcoe.org/news/2022/ukraine-to-be-accepted-as-a-contributing-participant-to-nato-ccd coe/ (Accessed 9 August 2022).

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visible support, while avoiding direct involvement and continuing to declare that it does not plan to enter into an armed conflict against Russia. The same is happening in the cybersecurity arena. This is also confirmed by statements made during the recent NATO summit in Madrid. Western specialists are holding consultations, Ukrainian specialists are involved in exercises, but with rare exceptions, we have no information on military cyber operations by Western countries against Russia. The United States US assistance has been very notable within cooperative NATO efforts, however, there were also unilateral actions. In late April 2022, Paul Nakasone, the Commander of Cyber Command, stated that the United States was conducting hunt-forward operations against Russia.26 The US conducted similar operations with allies. Hunt forward is a form of active defence: US CyberCom along with allies’ experts hunt for malicious activities inside the critical infrastructures and key national defence systems. In early June 2022, he admitted that the Cyber Command was also conducting offensive operations against Russia.27 Given that the NATO countries are trying to avoid a direct confrontation with Russia, such statements look very strange. While the hunt-forward operations are provocative enough to trigger retaliation, statements as such are clearly the acknowledgment of US cyber aggression against Russia. Russia’s reaction to this statement could have been unpredictable, since Russia’s retaliation could have resulted in a situation when the two countries became war parties. However, Moscow chose not to escalate this particular statement. These statements have not gone unnoticed in Russia; after them Nakasone was added to the sanctions list28 and he was banned from entering Russia. 26 Posture Statement of Gen. Paul M. Nakasone, Commander, U.S. Cyber Command before the 117th Congress (5 April 2022), https://www.cybercom.mil/Media/News/ Article/2989087/posture-statement-of-gen-paul-m-nakasone-commander-us-cyber-com mand-before-the/ (Accessed 9 August 2022). 27 Alexander Martin, “US Military Hackers Conducting Offensive Operations in Support of Ukraine, Says Head of Cyber Command”, (1 June 2022), https://news.sky.com/story/us-military-hackers-conducting-offensive-operationsin-support-of-ukraine-says-head-of-cyber-command-12625139 (Accessed 9 August 2022). 28 GpaℋdAnE CXA, naxodᴙwiecᴙ pod pepconalbnymi cankciᴙmi, vklᴔqaᴙ zappet na vbezd v PocciNckyᴔ Fedepaciᴔ (List of US citizens under personal sanctions,

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The Ukrainian Armed Forces do not officially have any entities responsible for cybersecurity. Specialists at Switzerland’s Higher Technical School Zürich (ETHZ) have analyzed the activities of the so-called “IT Army of Ukraine.”29 They say that in the absence of a national cyber command, Kyiv has built a national cyber power on the crowd-sourcing principle, and on a global scale including civilian and military specialists. The IT Army consists of two components: a continuous global call to all cybersecurity specialists in the world to conduct various attacks (mainly DDOS) against Russian targets, and secondly a team of Ukrainian specialists involved in more aggressive actions against Russia. The absence of a Ukrainian military cyber command likely also pushed Kyiv to think creatively about how to combine its nascent military and intelligence cyber capabilities with a massive, willing, and global civilian IT community in the defence of the nation. The IT Army consists of two parts: (1) a continuous global call to action that mobilizes anyone willing to participate in coordinated DDoS attacks against designated— primarily civilian—Russian infrastructure targets; and (2) an in-house team likely consisting of Ukrainian defensive and intelligence personnel that have been experimenting with and conducting ever-more complex cyber operations against specific Russian targets. The ETHZ researchers demonstrate the unique nature of the IT Army of Ukraine’s work. The Kyiv command (if the term “command” is appropriate in the context of this example) issues simple orders on cyberattack targets, accompanying them with very detailed information on the targets. The details are distributed through various channels, and the specific order is not released until the destruction of a specific target becomes a political priority. 1. The first example is on “simple tasking.” Here, the exact same targeting information the IT Army channel publishes is circulated in numerous other channels and chats. 2. The second example is on what is best described as “target enrichment.” Here, the targeting information posted by the IT Army including visiting Russian Federation) https://mid.ru/ru/detail-material-page/1814243/ (Accessed 9 August 2022). 29 Stefan Soesanto, “CYBERDEFENSE REPORT: The IT Army of Ukraine. Structure, Tasking, and Ecosystem”, Zürich, (June 2022), https://css.ethz.ch/en/center/CSSnews/2022/06/the-it-army-of-ukraine.html (Accessed 9 August 2022).

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channel is only circulated when it is further enriched with more IPs and ports. 3. The third example is “external clustering,” which is when the targeting information fails to circulate widely and only survives in a small cluster of channels and chats. 4. The fourth example is on what might be adequately termed “ad hoc prioritization.” Here, bits and pieces of targeting information pop up now and then in various channels and chats but are only consolidated at a much later point in time when the target is designated high priority by the IT Army. It’s interesting that the report also speaks of other similar hacker groups that operate in support of the IT Army, for example, the famous Anonymous, Belarussian Cyber Partisans, and IPStress. Thus, Ukraine has a very impressive cyber power at its disposal, and not only defensive but also offensive capability, to all appearance, outsourcing. The IT Army of Ukraine is a unique precedent both in the context of armed conflict and in international law. Experts at NATO’s Tallinn Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence have already begun studying its international legal status.30 They admit that participants in the organization are unlikely to be deemed combatants. The authors of the CCDCOE report mention that “hacktivist operations of potentially uncontrollable or indiscriminate effects such as open-source supply chain attacks or anything targeting critical infrastructure are never worth the risks—military, humanitarian, or criminal—that they pose.” In other words, such activities may be worthy during the hot phase of the conflict, but as soon as the military activities stop, further activities of such hacktivist groups will be subject to a criminal prosecution. Neither CCDCOE nor ETHZ experts don’t elaborate on what will happen with the IT army after the military actions are over. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs does not believe the IT Army of Ukraine is operating on a crowd-sourcing principle, and claims that it was created by the United States.31 “The mobilization occurred with 30 Ann Väljataga, “Cyber Vigilantism in Support of Ukraine: A Legal Analysis”, (March 2022), https://ccdcoe.org/uploads/2022/04/Cyber-vigilantism-in-support-ofUkraine-a-legal-analysis.pdf (Accessed 9 August 2022). 31 UkpainA mobilizovala IT-apmiᴔ dlᴙ bopbby ppotiv Poccii. Ukraine mobilized IT army to fight against Russia. Rossijskaya Gazeta, https://rg.ru/2022/05/26/ ukraina-mobilizovala-it-armiiu-dlia-borby-protiv-rossii.html (Accessed 9 August 2022).

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United States support,” said Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Oleg Syromolotov. “The Ukrainian IT Army was mobilized with Pentagon and U.S. intelligence service assistance for the mission of damaging the infrastructure of Russia and its allies,” he added. Russia None of the Western information about Russia’s cyber activities in Ukraine has been confirmed by official Russian sources. The official position is to generally deny all accusations. Furthermore, Russia is adopting strict laws under which any public assessment of the Russian Armed Forces’ actions based on any sources other than official ones can constitute grounds for criminal prosecution. Nevertheless, it is useful to draw attention to Microsoft’s reports,32 since many researchers cite these as primary sources. Microsoft experts and top management are involved officially and unofficially in the decision-making process. There is no doubt that the response of the United States, NATO, and other conflict participants is based on their conclusions on Russian cyber aggression (on the global scale). And the Russian entities that Microsoft believes are participating in cyber aggression are not being mentioned for the first time.33 Actors such as Strontium, Nobelium (also known as “Fancy Bear,” “Cozy Bear,” “APT 28,” and “APT 29”), in particular, have been reported by American companies providing cybersecurity services such as Mandiant,34 CrowdStrike, and FireEye in the context of election interference and the SolarWinds break-in. In the opinion of Microsoft specialists, the cyberattacks that are currently happening coincide geographically and chronologically with the Russian army’s strikes on targets in Ukraine. They have concluded that Russian cyber operations are part of an overall strategy and are carried out 32 Special Report: Ukraine an Overview of Russia’s Cyberattack Activity in Ukraine. Digital Security Unit, (27 April 2022), https://query.prod.cms.rt.microsoft.com/cms/ api/am/binary/RE4Vwwd (Accessed 9 August 2022). 33 Defending Ukraine: Early Lessons from the Cyber War. June 22, 2022. Brad Smith – Microsoft President & Vice Chair. https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-issues/2022/06/ 22/defending-ukraine-early-lessons-from-the-cyber-war/ (Accessed 9 August 2022). 34 Luke Jenkins, Sarah Hawley, Parnian Najafi, & Doug Bienstock, “Suspected Russian Activity Targeting Government and Business Entities Around the Globe”, (6 December 2021), https://www.mandiant.com/resources/russian-targeting-gov-business (Accessed 9 August 2022).

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in support of Armed Forces actions. Moreover, Microsoft (as confirmed by European sources) claim that various forms of Russian cyber aggression began long before 24 February 2022. We should also note that none of these facts have been confirmed in official Russian documents. The ministry of foreign affairs, incidentally, believes that “countries that claim ‘Russian hacker’ attacks but do not want to work with Moscow through official channels are acting ‘for political purposes,’” said Vladimir Shin, Deputy Director of the ministry’s Department of International Information Security. “We conclude that the countries that are accusing Russia of all kinds of mortal sins but do not want to work through official channels are actually not interested in real cooperation, but only using the imaginary threat of ‘Russian hackers’ for political purposes.”35

Conclusions Cyber conflict cannot be treated separately from the overall context. We cannot prevent cyber conflict without avoiding international conflict; there can be no separate defeat or separate victory. Cyberspace and the tools of cyber aggression are used to support of a variety of military, diplomatic, economic, and other tools during a conflict. In the context of the Ukrainian conflict, cyber aggression will most likely remain in the “low-intensity conflict” format. These missions include reconnaissance, destruction of both military and civilian targets, diversion, and a wide range of other applications. It is extremely unlikely that a cyberattack will elevate to a large-scale conflict and will cause death or large-scale damage. James Lewis from the Washington-based Center for Strategic and International Studies, in particular, believes36 that “cyberattacks can be used to produce or amplify political effect.” He also asserts that powerful Kremlin cyber aggression against the United

35 B MID nazvali politiqeckim icpolbzovanie «mnimoN ygpozy pycckix xakepov». Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Calls the Use of “Alleged Threat of Russian Hackers” a Political Statement. https://www.rbc.ru/politics/30/03/2022/6244b7d89 a79478d32f82755 (Accessed 9 August 2022). 36 James A. Lewis, “Cyber War and Ukraine”, (June 2022), https://www.csis.org/ana lysis/cyber-war-and-ukraine.

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States is unlikely because it obviously would not alter the American position on Ukraine but would provoke large-scale response undesirable for Moscow. There may be the highest level of mutual distrust in the cybersecurity arena, so we probably cannot speak of any unilateral steps aimed at reducing tensions. We can discuss only political declarations. A voluntary disclosure of details on cyber capability or cyberweapon use doctrine would be logical, within reasonable limits. Declarations of investigative assistance and the disclosure of materials relating to information on specific attacks would be valuable. Especially the information that would help find the source of the attack. Russia does not admit to the accusations leveled by Microsoft, and neither does it try to refute them in detail. The United States never comments about the activities of the IT Army of Ukraine, although under other circumstances their activities might be treated as those of a criminal group. Ukraine receives aid in cyberspace, not only from nations but from commercial companies as well. Unlike conventional weapons (there is information on Russian ones on the Internet and in intelligence), there can be no symmetry here by definition. It is obvious that with respect to cyber aggression, the parties hold different positions and pursue different goals. The cyber dimension of arms racing and arms control agreements, as well as general issues of using offensive and defensive cyber capabilities will be inherent part of the international relations. At a time when the foundations of the international system are being revised, it is clear that the practical experience of the Russo–Ukrainian conflict must be considered in future international agreements on cybersecurity.

CHAPTER 10

Autonomous Weapons Systems in Armed Conflicts: New Challenges for International Law Verena Jackson

A decade ago, Human Rights Watch (HRW) published the book Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots.1 This book linked an emerging technology in warfare—so-called Autonomous Weapon Systems (AWS)— with the term “Killer Robots”, and shaped the discussion about the future of warfare for many years to come. Autonomous Weapons Systems can locate and/or aim at targets without human intervention, (solely) based on algorithms and Artificial Intelligence (AI). The absence of a human element in decision-making 1 Human Rights Watch, “Losing Humanity: The Case against Killer Robots”, (19 November 2012), https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/11/19/losing-humanity/case-aga inst-killer-robots (Accessed 31 July 2022).

V. Jackson (B) Center for Intelligence & Security Studies, University of the Armed Forces of Germany (Universitaet der Bundeswehr), Munich, Germany e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 159 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_10

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over life and death has time and again alarmed civil society and scholars from many disciplines, giving rise to calls for meaningful human control.2 In these debates, the term Killer Robot has become synonymous with a Terminator3 -like humanoid machine, killing callously on the battlefields of the future. Emotions and sweeping conclusions have often trumped careful analysis. The real and complex challenges that AWS pose to international law, however, have received less attention though–perhaps because they are less spectacular, but all the more consequential, than Hollywood-infused phantasies. During the last decade, the academic and political discussion about AWS has expanded exponentially,4 notably in the Group of Governmental Experts (GGE) on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) meetings in Geneva since 2014.5 On the one hand, critics see (unsolvable) problems: they doubt whether AWS will ever be able to comply with the basics of international humanitarian law (IHL) and the core values of international human rights law (IHRL). Legal, ethical, and philosophical concerns go hand in hand in these views, as the fundamental question, if “machines” should be allowed to decide about a human’s life, challenges the (international) legal system.6 On the other hand, proponents suggest that AWS can help minimize atrocities by the absence of human emotions and flaws.7 Moreover, they may perform tasks more efficiently than humans8 and therefore might save soldiers’ lives and bring strategic advantages to the deploying armed force. 2 This term has been brought into discussion during the Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapons (GGE on LAWS) meetings under the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) in Geneva. See in detail further below. 3 As seen in the “Terminator” movies with Arnold Schwarzenegger. 4 See an overview in Daniele Amoroso, “Autonomous Weapons Systems and Interna-

tional Law – A Study on Human- Machine Interactions in Ethical and Legally Sensitive Domains ”, (Nomos 2020), pp. 25. 5 See more details at https://www.un.org/disarmament/the-convention-on-certain-con ventional-weapons/background-on-laws-in-the-ccw/ (Accessed 31 July 2022). 6 See supra. 1; for ethical considerations in detail see Armin Krishnan, Killer Robots— Legal and Ethicality of autonomous Weapons, (Ashgate: 2009), pp. 117. 7 See Ronald Arkin, Governing Lethal Behavior in Autonomous Robots, (Taylor & Francis: 2009), pp. 35. 8 Especially in DDD scenarios (Dull, Dangerous, Dirty), where human soldiers might experience exhaustion or fear which can lead to malperformance or (deadly) errors.

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This chapter first illustrates the technological concept of AWS and associated definitions of “autonomy”. Second, the chapter analyzes some core aspects of whether AWS can be compatible with IHL.

What Are Autonomous Weapons? Although there is no legally binding or universal acknowledged definition of AWS (yet), the US Department of Defense’s (DoD) understanding of AWS is very commonly9 used in the current academic discourse. According to the DoD an AWS is: A weapon system that, once activated, can select and engage targets without further intervention by a human operator. This includes humansupervised autonomous weapon systems that are designed to allow human operators to override operation of the weapon system, but can select and engage targets without further human input after activation.10

More broadly, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) defines AWS as: “…weapons that can independently select and attack targets”.11 These prevalent definitions have some key elements: AWS are selfgoverned weapons systems. They are able to function without human

9 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns, A/HRC/23/47 (9 April 2013), para. 38. 10 US Department of Defense, Directive 3000.9—Autonomy in Weapon Systems, (21 November 2012), p. 13. The directive will be updated in the course of 2022, see Valerie Insinna & Aaron Mehta, “Updated autonomous weapons rules coming for the Pentagon: Exclusive details”, Breaking Defense, (26 May 2022), https://breakingdefense.com/2022/05/updated-autonomous-weapons-rules-com ing-for-the-pentagon-exclusive-details/ (Accessed 31 July 2022). 11 International Committee of the Red Cross, “Autonomous Weapon Systems: Technical, Military, Legal and Humanitarian Aspects—Expert Meeting Report”, (March 2014).

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intervention12 and typically are a composite entity.13 The capacity for self-governed actions is based on algorithms and AI. The latter makes the weapon system referred to as autonomous. Autonomy in technology is per se a multifaceted and context-oriented concept, therefore posing a challenge to the legal analysis of “autonomous” AI systems. In addition, autonomy in the debate about AWS is often used inconsistently,14 i.e., automation and remote controled are sometimes wrongly used as synonyms for autonomy. From an etymological understanding, the term “autonomy” derives from the Greek words auto, meaning self, and nomos, meaning law. Going back to ancient Greece: A community governing itself was considered “autonomous”. This is distinct from the common modern understanding of autonomy as the ability of a (human) individual to self-govern.15 In a (Kantian) philosophical context, autonomy is much more than the mere human free will to choose between different options in terms of selfgovernance.16 Kant’s concept of autonomy revolves around the ability to think and choose. It centers on the individual duty to assess and to do the morally “right” thing.17

12 See more to “weapon”, Steven Haines, The Developing Law of Weapons: Humanity, Distinction, and Precautions in Attack, in: Andrew Clapham/ Paola Gaeta (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of International Law in Armed Conflict, (Oxford University Press: 2014), p. 3. 13 Andrew Williams, “Defining Autonomy in Systems: Challenges and Solutions”, in: Andrew Williams/Paul Scharre (ed.), Autonomous Systems—Issues for Defence Policymakers, NATO Allied Commander Transformation (2014), p. 35. Sometimes a simultaneously with AWS discussed emerging technology is autonomous (military) cyber operations see more Michael Schmitt, “Autonomous Cyber Capabilities and the International Law of Sovereignty and Intervention”, International Law Studies Vol. 96, (2020), pp. 549–576. 14 Supra 14, pp. 27. 15 See for more details Lucas Swaine, “The Origins of Autonomy”, History of Political

Thought, Vol. 37, No. 2 (Summer 2016), pp. 216–237. 16 See in detail Charles Larmore, “Kant and the Meanings of Autonomy”, in: Jürgen Stolzenberg and Fred Rush (ed.), 9/2011 Freiheit/Freedom, (De Gruyter: 2013). 17 See Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysics of Things, (German original version published in 1797).

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AI as the Fundament for Autonomy in AWS When applying different concepts of autonomy to AI, the specifics of AI must also be considered. One commonly used method on defining how “intelligent” or subsequently “autonomous” an artificial entity is, is the Turing-Test.18 In the original version of this test, a human has to determine whether an answer to a question has been given by another human or a computer. If the human is unable to tell the computer-generated answers, the computer has passed the test. Although some systems came close already, there has been no artificial entity so far with the capability to successfully pass it.19 The entity would have to possess certain abilities such as, inter alia, machine learning or automated reasoning. An important prerequisite for AI is human-like thinking and reasoning.20 Combining this with a variety of different abilities in an artificial entity, it is denominated artificial general intelligence (AGI), the “advanced stage” of an intelligent artificial entity. This entity’s abilities would come very close to a human brain and mind.21 To make AWS work properly on the battlefield, constant situational adaption is very important. This can be achieved with reinforced machine learning or even deep learning with neural networks (the ability of the system to teach itself and learn “on the go”).22 Aside from that, for being able to respond properly to human combatants/civilians, the system needs to be able to recognize human emotions and expressions correctly.

18 Stuart Russel & Peter Novig, Artificial Intelligence—A Modern Approach, (Pearson:

2021), p. 20. 19 Charu Aggarwal, “Artificial Intelligence”, (Springer: 2021), p. 13. See for an overview of the state-of-the-art in AI: Daniel Zhang, Nestor Maslej, Erik Brynjolfsson, John Etchemendy, Terah Lyons, James, Manyika, Helen Ngo, Juan Carlos Niebles, Michael Sellitto, Ellie Sakhaee, Yoav Shoham, Jack Clark and Raymond Perrault, The AI Index 2022 Annual Report, AI Index Steering. Committee, Stanford Institute for Human-Centered AI, Stanford University, (March 2022). 20 Supra. 21, p. 20. 21 Skeptical if this will ever be possible Ragnar Fjelland, “Why General Artificial Intel-

ligence will Not Be Realized”, Humanities and Social Science Communications, 7:10 (2020). 22 See in detail Ben Buchanan and Taylor Miller, Machine Learning for Policymakers What It Is and Why It Matters, The Cyber Security Project, (June 2017), pp. 11 & 14.

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As briefly showen, there is a multitude of necessary elements for an artificial entity being considered as intelligent. To put it simply, an AI entity is a “machine[s] that can compute how to act effectively and safely in a wide variety of novel situations”.23 But what is understood as AI in today’s technological meaning, is still quite different from complex biological/human intelligence. Hence, autonomy in AWS cannot (yet) be seen as fully congruent with human/philosophical autonomy due to the complexity of human thinking and reasoning. AWS are “granted” autonomy because of their increasing level of artificial intelligence,24 human autonomy however is inherent. Autonomy in AWS is the system’s “choice”25 on when and how to act, i.e., whether or not to engage the target. Within this decision lies a necessary assessment, whether the decision is right or wrong.26 The more intelligent or complex the AI in an AWS is, the more autonomously the AWS would be able to operate. The autonomous abilities of AWS vary. In respect to the degree of human intervention needed/possible in an AWS, it can be classified as a semi or fully autonomous weapons system. Fully autonomous systems are able to perform tasks without any human supervision or intervention needed. A highly sophisticated A(G)I (strong AI),27 would be needed to achieve this level of autonomy. AWS may also vary depending on the level of autonomy (LOA). For the determination and definition of the LOA, several approaches exist.28 A common approach is the Sheridan Autonomy Scale: The LOA goes from level 1 (no actual support by a computer, human performs every task) up to level 10 (computer is in charge of everything, human is completely out of the loop).29 At a median LOA (level 5), a computer 23 Supra. 21, p. 19. 24 UNIDIR, “The Weaponization of Increasingly Autonomous Technologies: Artificial

Intelligence”, UNIDIR Resources No. 8, (2018), p. 5. 25 Supra 10, para. 38. 26 See more supra. 7, p. 93. 27 For a brief explanation of the difference between weak AI and strong AI, see Jeff

Kerns, “What’s the Difference Between Weak and Strong AI?”, (16 February 2017), https://www.machinedesign.com/markets/robotics/article/21835139/whats-the-dif ference-between-weak-and-strong-ai, (Accessed 31 July 2022). 28 See supra. 14, pp. 39. 29 Andrew Renault, “A Model for Assessing UAV System Architectures”, Procedia

Computer Science, 61 (2015), p. 162.

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executes suggested actions after human approval.30 Only AWS with a high LOA, i.e., 10 (or slightly under), would be considered as a fully autonomous system, whereas, e.g., level 5 AWSs would be categorized as semi-autonomous. To render it more precisely, each level has to be assessed in the OODA-Loop (Observe, Orient, Decide, Act Loop) of an AWS individually.31 Therefore different autonomous capabilities within one AWS may exist. Another approach is to differentiate between AWS as human in, on, and out of the loop systems.32 These AI-enhanced abilities of AWS make them different from “traditional” weapons. In particular, autonomy is what distinguishes AWS from automatic weapon systems (i.e., anti-personnel mines or sentry guns), where the system’s reaction (i.e., explosion or firing) once triggered, is predestined and usually inevitable. In those kinds of weapons no complex algorithms are needed for them to function proberly, as they are operating by a rather simple (visual or tactile) trigger, without the ability/need to make choices. Furthermore, AWS must be distinguished from drones, although the two categories can overlap: some AWS can be classified as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and some drones might already have autonomous features (such as target selection).33 The fundamental difference is however that drones (still) are remote-controlled34 systems. As autonomous features can be implemented in various types of weapons, AWS can be divided into categories such as autonomous UAVs, subsurface water vehicles, or ground vehicles. And with rapid progress in

30 Supra. 32. 31 OODA- Loop of the system, see Ryan Proud/Jeremy Hart/Richard Mrozinski,

Methods for Determining the Level of Autonomy to Design into a Human Spaceflight vehicle: A Function Specific Approach, NASA Johnson Space Center, (2003), p. 3, available at https://ntrs.nasa.gov/citations/20100017272 (Accessed 31 July 2022). 32 See more Marco Sassóli, “Autonomous Weapons and International Humani-

tarian Law: Advantages, Open Technical Questions and Legal Issues to be Clarified”, International Law Studies, 90 (2014), p. 309. 33 See more Nils Melzer, “Human Rights Implications of the Usage of Drones and Unmanned Robots in Warfare”, European Parliament, Directorate-General for External Policies, (2013), p. 9. 34 Supra. 14, p.30.

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emerging weapons technology, autonomous swarms are another (future) category of AWS.35 AI in the case of AWS needs to be a very complex A(G)I with the same or at least very close to capabilities as biological/human intelligence. At this moment, there is no AI technology available that would meet all needs to categorize a weapons system as (fully) autonomous.36

AWS Under International Humanitarian Law International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is the law applicable in armed conflicts,37 also known as jus in bello.38 The aim of IHL is to strike a balance between enabling states to fight an effective war, while at the same time minimizing the negative effects on actively involved persons and civilians.39 Today’s main body of law governing the jus in bello, is the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their Additional Protocols (AP I & AP II) of 1977 (Geneva Law).40 In the aftermath of World War II, and even in the 1970s, the intellectual fathers and mothers of the modern law of war couldn’t have foreseen 35 See more Merel Ekelhof and Giacomo Persi Paoli, Robotic Swarms- Research Brief , UNIDIR, available at https://unidir.org/publication/swarm-robotics-technical-and-ope rational-overview-next-generation-autonomous-systems, (Accessed 31 July 2022). 36 Current systems only possess “partial” intelligence, see in detail Vincent Boulain & Maaike Verbruggen, “Mapping the Development of Autonomy in Weapon systems”, SIPRI (2017), p. 20. For an overview of existing and future AWS and further references see, supra. 4, p. 18. 37 Although IHL is supposed to be applicable in international armed conflicts, common article 3 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions also applies in internal armed conflicts, when the certain conditions are met, see in detail ICRC, Commentary on the First Geneva Convention, 2016. para. 384. The International Court of Justice found in its Nicaragua Case that the provisions in common article 3 are “elementary considerations of humanity”, Military and Paramilitary Activities in und against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America). Merits, Judgment. I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 14, para 218. 38 To be distinguished from jus ad bellum, the right to use force as an exception to the general prohibition against the use of force as encoded in Article 2 United Nations Charter. 39 Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out if the Loop”: Autonomous Weapons Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict”, Harvard National Security Journal, 4:2 (2013), pp. 231–281, (232). 40 See more Malcolm Shaw, International Law, (Cambridge University Press: 2021), pp. 892.

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how quickly military technology would evolve. The “digital battlefield”41 of today has emerged rapidly. The rules codified in the Geneva Law need to develop and adapt to new realities in order to ensure legal certainty for states and commanders in the field, as well as to protect combatants and civilians in novel situations. The challenges IHL faces in regard to AI in weapon systems, have mainly technological reasons: i.e., can AWS, by technology, comply with the Principle of Distinction; can AWS differentiate military targets and combatants from civilians? How can accountability for malfunctions or individual criminal responsibility and state responsibility be ensured (accountability gap)? There are also fundamental ethical questions about the dehumanization of warfare and the ethicality of AI deciding over human life. This raises the question of compatibility with the core concepts of Human Rights and Human Dignity.42 While these questions remain highly relevant, the considerations of this chapter will be limited to selected issues of AWS’s compatibility with international law. With regard to IHL, the first main point of argument (between experts and scholars) is whether AWS are legitimate weapons per se. The starting point is Article 36 of the AP I to the Geneva Conventions, which imposes the duty on states to ensure that new weapons comply with the Geneva Law or any other applicable international law.43 Although this is mandatory for all member states to the AP I, only a few states in fact have established review processes.44 In addition, emerging technologies pose

41 For a “Military Robotic Timeline” see, supra. 6, p. 168. 42 See Jürgen Habermas, “The Concept of Human Dignity and the Realistic Utopia of

Human Rights”, Metaphilosophy, Vol. 41 (July 2010), pp. 464–480. 43 “In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party.”, Art. 36 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, 1977, (AP I). 44 Vincent Boulanin, “Implementing Article 36—Weapon Reviews in the Light of increasing Autonomy in Weapon Systems”, SIPRI Insights on Peace and Security No. 2015/1 (November 2015), p. 17. The U.S. are not party to AP I but have implemented similar review standards, see in detail US Department of Defense, Law of War Manual, (2016), para. 6.2. Germany and the UK, in contrast, are both parties to AP I and have established a review process, see for details supra. 47, pp. 19 & 22.

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new challenges to the review process,45 as they first must be adjusted to the major role that AI plays in modern (future) weapons. This mirrors the difficulty of legally assessing AWS: the current discussion has to focus on a future technology which does not yet exist but most probably, if not certainly, will exist in the near future46 : The law, however, prefers to regulate what it can grasp. A special point of contention is the relationship between AWS and the Principle of Distinction, as enshrined in Article 48 AP I. The Principle holds that on the battlefield, civilians and civilian objects must always be distinguished from military ones or combatants. Only the latter two are legitimate targets,47 and indiscriminate attacks are prohibited (Article 51 (4) AP I). The Principle of Distinction can be seen as bipartite: the used weapon per se (as a means of combat) has to be able to discriminate in a technical sense, in order to enable legal employment in the concrete scenario of usage (of an AWS).48 Critics of AWS argue, that AWS are not currently able, or will likely never be, to comply with the Principle of Distinction. They consequently call for a pre-emptive ban of AWS.49 Given the current state of technology, doubts about sufficient situational awareness of AWS, an additional prerequisite to comply with the Principle of Distinction, are reasonable. However, trying to (legally) assess the capabilities of AI in the future would come close to making oracular prophecies. Technological progress will ultimately determine whether AWS can be used in a way, that is in compliance with the Principle of Distinction. A second point of contention is the relationship between AWS and the Principle of Humanity, which is another fundamental principle50 of IHL. It derives from the Martens Clause and has been enshrined—slightly 45 Ibid., p. 8. 46 See more about the current state-of the art, https://futureoflife.org/2021/11/

22/real-life-technologies-that-prove-autonomous-weapons-are-already-here/, (Accessed 31 July 2022). 47 See in detail Gary Solis, The Law of Armed Conflict, (Cambridge University Press: 2016), pp. 269. 48 See also supra. 42, p. 246. 49 See the campaign to stop

Killer Robots, https://www.stopkillerrobots.org/,

(Accessed 31 July 2022). 50 For an overview on the discussion about the “status” of the Principle of Humanity in IHL, see supra. 50, pp. 305.

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modified—in the Geneva Conventions and its APs.51 AP I Article 1(2) reads: In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity and from dictates of public conscience.

Based on the Principle of Humanity and the dictate of public conscience, the United Nations General Assembly remarked, “[…] A third source would in the future have to be added to them, namely, respect for the fundamental worth of the human person, which was the basis for the protection of human rights”.52 The Principle of Humanity is rooted in the concept of human dignity.53 Although Human Dignity is commonly discussed in the context of IHRL (see below), it is also a guiding concept for IHL.54 It can be understood as a “general interpretative guideline”55 to ensure that every aspect of IHL (and international law in general) is interpreted in accordance with Human Dignity. With the rise of AI in weapons systems, there has been a growing concern for a “dehumanization” of warfare. On the battlefield, humans would no longer decide over life or death of another human being. These decisions would now be up to algorithms, and this could lead to a violation of Human Dignity. Therefore, the concept of Meaningful Human Control (MHC) has been introduced during the GGE on LAWS meetings in Geneva.

51 The Martens Clause first was introduced in the Hague Conventions in the late nineteenth century. These Conventions, also known as “The Hague Law”, were the antecessor of the “Geneva Law”, see in detail Theodor Meron, “The Martens Clause, Principles of Humanity, and Dictates of Public Conscience”, The American Journal of International Law, 94:1 (January 2000), pp. 78–89. 52 UN GAOR, 6th Comm., 28th Sess., 1452d mtg., at 306, para. 46, UN Doc. A/C.6/SR.1452 (1973). 53 See Ginevra Le Moli, Human Dignity in International Law, (Cambridge University Press: 2021), p. 182. 54 Niels Petersen, “Human Dignity, International Protection”, Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law, (May 2020), para. 35. 55 Supra. 56, p. 184.

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Although the exact scope of it remains a topic of discussion,56 the concept is intended to ensure the human as the (ultimate) decision maker.57 Despite the different approaches to MHC, all have in common, that the usage of AWS without any human intervention (full autonomy) is not desired.58 AWS should be designed to allow (or even need) human agency and they will have to be employed with a human (ultimately) controlling the deployment/decision-making progress. MHC can be a feasible59 concept, to ensure compliance of AWS with IHL (in general) and with the concept of Human Dignity and the Principle of Humanity in particular. The absence of human decision-making and the shift of the decisional process onto algorithms, can also cause problems with individual criminal responsibility60 (of commanders and soldiers) on the battlefield or accountability for malfunctions. This “Accountability Gap”61 cannot be solved by holding the machine accountable due to the lack of consciousness.62 A sufficient MHC could help to overcome this legal pitfall by ensuring that a human is closely tied to the machine’s actions and consequently can be held accountable, legally and morally.63 Nevertheless, it is to note that due to the complexity of AI in AWS, a human operator will likely not be able to predict the course of action in every scenario.64 The level of MHC and the human necessity of involvement, therefore, would have to be very high. Ultimately this would rule fully autonomous

56 Amanda Musco Eklund, “Meaningful Human Control of Autonomous Weapon Systems- Definitions and Key Elements in the Light of International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law”, FOI, (February 2020), p. 10. See the different approaches in detail, p. 13. 57 Schmitt and Thurnher are skeptical of the concept of the “human in the loop” in the future due to “operational realties”, supra. 42, p. 237. In their view, it would foil the nature of (fully) autonomous weapons. 58 Supra. 59, pp. 28 et sp.; p. 49. 59 With a look at the ongoing GGE meetings in Geneva, it remains doubtful if states

will reach common ground on the exact scope of MHC and agree on a binding—and above all unambiguous—legal framework in the near future. 60 Must be distinguished from state responsibility, see supra. 43, pp. 589. 61 HRW, “Mind the Gap—The Lack of Accountability for Killer Robots”, (2015). 62 Ibid. p. 2. 63 ICRC, “Ethics and Autonomous Weapon Systems: An Ethical Basis for Human Control?”, (2018), pp. 13–14. 64 See supra. 4, pp.123.

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weapons as unable to comply with the requirements of responsibility and leave very narrow space for actual AI decisions. Another issue that MHC cannot solve is the problem of tracing the action back to its roots (the “many hands problem”65 ). AWS rely on complex technology and algorithms. In cases of malfunctions, it will be difficult to trace back to the actual cause. It might be an error in the software, hardware, concrete application, or a chain of events involving various of those components. In cases of war crimes, providing sufficient evidence for (malicious) intent can be difficult. In the past decade, emphasis has grown on the compatibility of AWS and IHL. Nevertheless, it is necessary to briefly highlight the selected impacts of AWS on human rights.66 While it is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss this in-depth, it can be stated that modern IHL is vastly influenced by fundamental ideas of IHRL.67 The relationship between IHL and IHRL has been debated by a wide range of experts and scholars. In general, Human Rights continue to be applicable during armed conflicts, even though some rights might be derogated.68 Most evidently,69 AWS can potentially violate a person’s Right to Life as well as the Right to Remedy and Human Dignity (see above).70 The Right to Life, as enshrined in Article 6 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), is not guaranteed absolute in times of war but is violated in cases of arbitrary killings.71 Due to technological shortcomings, it is feared that AWS won’t have the ability to assess situations 65 Ibid. p. 127. 66 See for an historical overview, Peter Kolbe, Human Rights and Humanitarian Law,

Max Planck Encyclopedias of International Law, (2012); for a compressed overview see, Daniel Ivo Odon, Armed Conflicts and Human Rights Law, (Routledge: 2021). 67 Vera Gowlland-Debbas & Gloria Gaggioli, The Relationship Between International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law: An Overview, in: Robert Kolb and Gloria Gaggioli (eds.), Research Handbook on Human Rights and Humanitarian Law, (Edward Elgar Publishing: 2013), p. 78. 68 Supra. 64, pp. 79. 69 With regard to the growing digitalization of warfare, data protection and privacy are

another growing concern. See more Arthur Holland Michel, “Known Unknowns, Data Issues and Military Autonomous Systems”, (UNIDIR 2021). 70 Paving the way for—not only—a human rights discussion on AWS was HRW, “Shaking the Foundations—The Human Rights Implications of Killer Robots”, (2014). 71 UN Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 36: The Right to Life, (3 September 2019) UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/36, para.10.

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thoroughly to comply with IHL (see above). As a result, an unlawful killing under IHL can violate Article 6 ICCPR.72 Due to the above illustrated “Accountability Gap”, the right to an effective remedy as Article 2 (3) ICCPR and other regional human rights treaties can be affected.

Conclusion The main reason for concerns about the compatibility of AWS with international law is the absence of the human decision maker. The human in charge is partially or entirely replaced by algorithms, making life and death decisions in future combat situations. This leads to fears of a dehumanization of warfare and raises doubts about the compatibility of AWS with IHL and IHRL. But an international agreement on a preemptive, complete ban of AWS is very unlikely. The political views of states and their concepts of military strategy are just too diverse. In addition to diplomatic difficulties, a pre-emptive ban (solely) based on the supposed incompatibility of AWS with international law would not be fully sustainable. As discussed in this chapter, however, AWS are not per se incompatible with international law. The crucial question in the future is how technology will advance and whether it will make compliance feasible. In today’s state of technology, it is unlikely that AWS can distinguish sufficiently between legitimate and illegitimate targets or recognize human emotions and actions correctly in the fog of war. Hence, there is a need to establish robust accountability and responsibility regimes for AWS. While individual criminal responsibility seems to be less problematic, establishing accountability (in case of malefactions) nevertheless is. However, this challenge is not specific to AWS only, but common to all complex modern, AI-based technology. Either way, the ethical question whether humans are willing to lay the decision-making over life and death in the hands of machines will remain. The development of AWS, though, would not necessarily interfere with Human Dignity when AWS’s technology is able to satisfy IHL and other IHRL requirements. MHC, for example, can serve as an additional safeguard for Human Dignity.

72 See more Andrea Spagnolo, “Human Rights Implications of Autonomous Weapon Systems in Domestic Law Enforcement: Sci-Fi Reflections on a Lo-Fi Reality”, QIL, 43 (2017), pp. 33–58, 45.

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Finally, the overall discussion on AWS and AI tends to put higher standards on (future) technology than those imposed on humans. Undoubtedly with more efficiency on the battlefield comes the obligation to meet higher safeguards. The debate about the legality of AWS, however, gives the impression that not just the level of safeguards must rise but also AWS are only legal when being the “perfect machine”. Every decision made by the AI in AWS would have to be flawlessly correct, with no room for error. While human soldiers are granted a certain margin of fallibility. A high level of safeguards in AWS doesn’t correlate with perfection, though. The law of war doesn’t call for perfection for compliance, but for a reasonable standard of safeguards.73 If those safeguards (e.g., failsafe mode, ability to distinguish targets or recognize actions of surrender) can be met in the future, will depend on the advancement of technology.

73 See also supra, 39, p. 257.

PART II

Economy and Society

CHAPTER 11

Crime in the Digital Age: A New Frontier Juraj Nosál

Introduction Digital technologies play an increasingly important role in our everyday lives. There is hardly any area of human activity that has not been affected by the digital revolution in one way or another and we now live in what is generally called a “digital age”. Digital technologies have brought numerous exciting opportunities that were unimaginable only a few years ago; however, these developments have also created unprecedented new risks and vulnerabilities. Continuous rapid development of these still emerging technologies and our growing dependency on them bring manifold security implications that concern all, from individuals through communities to entire states.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this text are those of the author and do not represent an official position of any organization. J. Nosál (B) Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 177 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_11

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One of the areas where digital transformation has played a significantly negative role is crime. Crime is a fluid concept that changes with time. What was considered a crime in the past may be legal today and what is legal today may be a criminal behaviour in the future. The dawn of the digital age has consequently brought a new form of criminality as well– cybercrime. In general, cybercrime is understood as an act that violates the law, which is perpetrated using information and communication technology to either target networks, systems, data, websites or technology or to facilitate a crime.1 In short, it is an umbrella term that includes offences both against and/or by means of computer systems. As the EU’s Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation, Europol, underlines in its annual 2021 Internet Organized Crime Threat Assessment, cybercrime represents “an evolution rather than a revolution”.2 This evolution can be seen from two perspectives. On the one hand, digital technologies have become useful aids and amplifiers of traditional crimes–what is generally called cyber-enabled crime (e.g., sexual exploitation of children online or trade in illegal substances on the Darknet). On the other hand, they have also created entirely new avenues for criminal activities–so-called cyber-dependent crime (e.g., ransomware or other types of malware, hacking, and distributed denial-of-service attacks). While cybercrime has been steadily growing in recent years, the Covid19 pandemic has significantly accelerated this trend.3 Furthermore, with the development of new digital technologies such as the Internet of Things, Web 3.0, machine learning/artificial intelligence and quantum computing, prospects of cybercrime are even more worrisome as its scope,

1 Marc Goodman & Susan Brenner, “The Emerging Consensus on Criminal Conduct in Cyberspace”, International Journal of Law and Information Technology, 10:2 (2002), pp. 139–223. 2 Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021 (Publications Office of the European Union: 2021), p. 13, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/ documents/internet_organised_crime_threat_assessment_iocta_2021.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 3 See e.g., Iulian Coman & Ioan-Casmin Mihai, “The Impact of Covid-19 on

Cybercrime and Cyberthreats” European Law Enforcement Research Bulletin—Special Conference Edition Nr. 5 (2022), pp. 61–67; Prem Mahadevan, Cybercrime: Threats During the Covid-19 Pandemic (The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime: 2020), https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Cyberc rime-Threats-during-the-Covid-19-pandemic.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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frequency and sophistication are likely to continue expanding exponentially, especially in technologically advanced countries of Euro-Atlantic area. All of this raises serious concerns about how well societies across the world are prepared to face the growing security threat. For example, according to some estimates, the rate of detection and prosecution of cybercrime in the United States is estimated to be as low as 0.05%.4 This chapter outlines the main risks posed by cybercrime and key trends in its evolution, analyzes challenges in combating cybercrime, and discusses what responses could be considered in the future to mitigate the negative impact of cybercrime on our societies.

The Growing Threat of Cybercrime On 7 May 2021, the Colonial Pipeline, one of the largest pipelines in the US, announced that it had been hit with a ransomware attack. The company shut down its 5,500 miles of pipeline, which carries 45% of the US east coast’s fuel supplies and travels through 14 southern and eastern US states.5 The attack forced the US government to declare an emergency and mount a robust federal response to mitigate the impact of the six-day shut down on energy supplies across the country.6 Even though the crisis lasted only for a few days, this largest publicly disclosed cyberattack against critical infrastructure in the United States had huge economic consequences and uncovered significant vulnerabilities and gaps in the country’s cybersecurity.7

4 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2022 (World Economic Forum: 2022), p. 63, https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Risk_Report_2020.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 5 Erum Salam, “Cyber-Attack Forces Shutdown of One of the US’s Largest Pipelines”, The Guardian (8 May 2021), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2021/ may/08/colonial-pipeline-cyber-attack-shutdown (Accessed 31 July 2022). 6 “FACT SHEET: The Biden-Harris Administration Has Launched an All-ofGovernment Effort to Address Colonial Pipeline Incident”, The White House (11 May 2011), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/statements-releases/2021/05/11/ fact-sheet-the-biden-harris-administration-has-launched-an-all-of-government-effort-to-add ress-colonial-pipeline-incident/ (Accessed 31 July 2022). 7 David E. Sanger & Nicole Perlroth, “Pipeline Attack Yields Urgent Lessons About U.S. Cybersecurity”, The New York Times (8 June 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/ 2021/05/14/us/politics/pipeline-hack.html (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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The increasingly negative impact of cybercrime is obvious from any data available on the subject. For example: the expected worldwide costs of cybercrime damages for 2021 may be as high as $6 trillion and by 2025, the annual costs are expected to reach $10.5 trillion8 ; global damages from ransomware attacks in 2021 were estimated to reach e18 billion9 ; approximately $14.5 billion in cryptocurrencies has been stolen between January 2011 and July 202210 ; and 37 billion data records were leaked in 2020 alone.11 While one should always take such figures with a pinch of salt, it is undeniable that cybercrime has been expanding and almost certainly will continue to do so in the years to come. Besides considerable economic damage, cybercrime can also cause societal and political harm. The detrimental effect of criminality on the socio-economic development of communities is a well-researched and established fact. Crime has a negative impact on a number of areas such as personal safety, corruption, gun violence, social order or economic growth. Furthermore, the inability of state institutions to effectively deal with criminality can impact public trust in the rule of law and justice, undermining confidence in democracy and contributing to political radicalization. While cybercrime–at least in its narrow sense as cyber-dependent crime–may be perceived by many as perhaps a more sophisticated and “civilized” form of criminality, it would be naïve to think that only because its main tool is a computer, its socio-economic impact could be less dangerous. It would be equally naïve to expect that cyber-dependent crime would simply replace traditional crime. If anything, digital technologies serve as powerful aids and enablers of traditional criminality. As noted by Europol, digitalization affects all forms 8 Steve Morgan, “Cybercrime to Cost the World $10.5 Trillion Annually By 2025”,

Cybercrime Magazine (13 November 2020), https://cybersecurityventures.com/cyberc rime-will-cost-the-world-16-4-billion-a-day-in-2021/ (Accessed 31 July 2022). 9 “Cybersecurity: Main and Emerging Threats in 2021 (Infographic)”, European Parliament (27 January 2022), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/headlines/soc iety/20220120STO21428/cybersecurity-main-and-emerging-threats-in-2021-infographic (Accessed 31 July 2022). 10 Crystal Blockchain, Crypto & DeFi Hacks, Fraud & Scams Report (Crystal Blockchain B.V.: 2022), https://crystalblockchain.com/security-breaches-and-fraud-involv ing-crypto/ (Accessed 31 July 2022). 11 Risk Based Security, 2020 Year End Data Breach QuickView Report (Risk Based Security: 2021), https://pages.riskbasedsecurity.com/en/en/2020-yearend-data-breach-quickv iew-report (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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of crime and methods and tools used by cybercriminals are increasingly adopted in other crime areas. As a result, the digital criminal ecosystem continues to evolve at an alarming pace.12 Another reason why cybercrime represents an increasingly significant threat is its potentially destabilizing impact on national security. Despite its various negative socio-economic consequences, traditional organized crime usually does not pose a direct danger to governments or states. Cybercrime represents a qualitatively different threat, for its methods and tools can be easily (mis)used to target a state’s institutions, systems and critical infrastructure that are essential for national security. Cybercrimeas-service industry has been booming in recent years and as far back as 2014, Europol sounded alarm bells about this trend.13 We are witnessing growing collaboration, specialization and professionalization of cybercrime economy,14 which now includes many types of activities such as botnets, distributed denial of service attacks, credit card fraud, malware, spam and phishing attacks. The services are sold through hacker forums, direct web sales, and on the Darknet using cryptocurrencies, enabling anyone with sufficient resources to engage in cyberattacks.15 Some of the organized cybercrime groups even resemble a well-run corporation, with everything from CEOs to HR departments and time-off policies for their “employees”.16 While the main motivation of cybercriminals will always be a profit, the same cannot be said of various state or non-state actors that may take advantage of their services. With the growing dependency on digital technologies in almost all spheres of state’s services, ranging from defence 12 Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2021, p. 9. 13 Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2014 (European Police Office:

2014), pp. 19–22, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/ europol_iocta_web.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 14 For more about the evolution of cybercrime-as-service industry, see HP Development Company, The Evolution of Cybercrime: Why the Dark Web Is Supercharging the Threat Landscape and How to Fight Back (HP: 2022), https://threatresearch.ext.hp.com/wp-con tent/uploads/2022/07/HP-Wolf-Security-Evolution-of-Cybercrime-Report.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 15 Thomas S. Hyslip, “Cybercrime-as-a-Service Operations”, The Palgrave Handbook of International Cybercrime and Cyberdeviance (Palgrave Macmillan: 2020), pp. 815–846. 16 Jeff Burt, “Cyber-Mercenaries for Hire Represent Shifting Criminal Business Model”, The Register (25 July 2022), https://www.theregister.com/2022/07/25/aig-unique-cyb ercrime-business/ (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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to social benefits, the number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited is expanding. Due to interconnectedness and growing complexity of most information systems, even those that may not be directly relevant for national security can pose a considerable risk. Thanks to encryption and other methods, attribution of actions in cyberspace is difficult and cybercrime services can therefore be a very attractive option for actors with certain nefarious political goals and agendas. According to the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, the explosive growth of digital technologies around the world is opening new potential domains for conflict and the ability of both state and non-state actors to carry out attacks across international borders.17 Furthermore, some parts of a state’s critical infrastructure can be lucrative targets for criminals too, as demonstrated by the ransomware attacks on hospitals during the Covid-19 pandemic18 or the growing number of attacks on major seaports.19 The growth in cybercrime in recent years is most likely only the beginning of a more fundamental and systematic shift in how crime is going to be committed in the future. In fact, the term “cybercrime” itself may become obsolete in years to come, as virtually all criminality may be conducted entirely, or at least partially, through digital means. The Covid-19 pandemic offers a glimpse into what the future may hold for us in this regard. While technology has been at the forefront of countries’ response to the pandemic, the accelerated digital transformation has also highlighted some critical risks to individuals and societies.20 In April 2020, Europol warned that with a record number of people staying in

17 “‘Explosive’ Growth of Digital Technologies Creating New Potential for Conflict, Disarmament Chief Tells Security Council in First-Ever Debate on Cyberthreats”, United Nations (29 June 2021), https://press.un.org/en/2021/sc14563.doc.htm (Accessed 31 July 2022). 18 CyberPeace Institute, Compendium of Multistakeholder Perspectives: Protecting the Healthcare Sector from Cyber Harm (CyberPeace Institute: 2022), https://cyberpeac einstitute.org/wp-content/uploads/Compendium-of-Multistakeholder-Perspectives.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 19 Sam Fenwick, “Cyber-Attacks on Port of Los Angeles Have Doubled Since Pandemic”, BBC (22 July 2022), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-62260272 (Accessed 31 July 2022). 20 Joyce Hakmeh, Emily Taylor, Allison Peters and Sophia Ignatidou, The COVID-19 Pandemic and Trends in Technology (Chatham House: 2021), https://www.chathamho use.org/2021/02/covid-19-pandemic-and-trends-technology (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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their homes and relying even more on the Internet for daily activities including work, education and leisure, the ways for cybercriminals seeking to exploit emerging opportunities and vulnerabilities have multiplied.21 The global police organization, Interpol, issued a similar warning only a few months later, underlining that the higher dependency on connectivity and digital infrastructure due to global lockdowns has increased the opportunities for cyber intrusion, and that cybercriminals were developing and boosting their attacks at an alarming pace.22 For instance, during the first year of the pandemic, malware and ransomware attacks increased by 358% and 435%, respectively.23 The accelerating evolution of cybercrime during the pandemic was primarily driven by a steep increase in opportunities that came with much higher number of people being online for significantly longer periods of time than before. It was not the result of any particular technological innovation and has represented a quantitative rather than a qualitative change. But with further development of digital technologies, we can expect that cybercrime will also continue to evolve qualitatively, which will lead to continuous quantitative expansion as well. As noted by the World Economic Forum in its annual global risks assessment, in the context of widespread dependency on increasingly complex digital systems, growing cyber threats are outpacing societies’ ability to effectively prevent and manage them.24 There are several technological innovations that may have a significant impact on cybercrime in the near future, in particular the Internet of Things, Web 3.0, machine learning/artificial intelligence (AI) and quantum computing. For example, the application of AI to offensive cyber operations can be expected to increase the number, scale and diversity of attacks. Using AI to automate tasks involved in carrying out cyberattacks will alleviate the existing trade-off between the scale and

21 Europol, Catching the Virus: Cybercrime, Disinformation and the COVID-19 Pandemic (Europol: 2020), https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/doc uments/catching_the_virus_cybercrime_disinformation_and_the_covid-19_pandemic_0. pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 22 Interpol, Cybercrime: Covid-19 Impact (Interpol General Secretariat: 2020), https://www.interpol.int/content/download/15526/file/COVID-19%20Cybercrime% 20Analysis%20Report-%20August%202020.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 23 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2022, p. 47. 24 Ibid.

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efficacy of attacks, which may expand the threat associated with labourintensive cyberattacks (e.g., spear phishing) and lead to novel attacks that exploit human vulnerabilities (e.g., through the use of speech synthesis for impersonation) or existing software vulnerabilities (e.g., through automated hacking).25 The Internet of Things creates new opportunities to increase efficiency and productivity through the use of “smart” devices. However, with all the data that needs to be collected for this purpose, the risks are exponentially greater as not only is more data being shared among many more participants, but more sensitive data is being shared.26 The shift to a more decentralized version of the Internet, Web 3.0, is also expected to create a more complex cybercrime landscape and a growing number of critical failure points.27 Last but not least, quantum computing is expected to fundamentally transform cybersecurity as it could crack the encryption keys that are essential for the protection of personal as well as public data nowadays.28 Although the first quantum computers will be almost certainly run by large, possibly government, organizations and the commercial use of this technology is still some years away, there is a wide consensus that they will get into the hands of criminals eventually.29 At the same time, it needs to be noted that all these technological innovations also offer promising opportunities for strengthening cybersecurity and law enforcement capacities to combat criminality.30 Therefore, they should not be perceived in a purely negative way. As with all technologies,

25 The Malicious Use of Artificial Intelligence: Forecasting, Prevention, and Mitigation (February 2018), https://www.repository.cam.ac.uk/handle/1810/275332 (Accessed 31 July 2022). 26 “Cyber risk in an Internet of Things world”, Deloitte (no date), https://www2.del oitte.com/us/en/pages/technology-media-and-telecommunications/articles/cyber-riskin-an-internet-of-things-world-emerging-trends.html (Accessed 31 July 2022). 27 World Economic Forum, The Global Risks Report 2022, p. 46. 28 Paul Lipman, “How Quantum Computing Will Transform Cybersecurity”, Forbes

(4 June 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbestechcouncil/2021/01/04/howquantum-computing-will-transform-cybersecurity/?sh=7856ae847d3f (Accessed 31 July 2022). 29 Europol, Internet Organised Crime Threat Assessment 2016 (European Police Office: 2016), pp. 64–65, https://www.europol.europa.eu/cms/sites/default/files/documents/ europol_iocta_web_2016.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 30 See e.g., Interpol & UNICRI, Artificial Intelligence and Robotics for Law Enforcement (2019), https://unicri.it/artificial-intelligence-and-robotics-law-enforcement (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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their potential to bring benefits or cause harm will depend on the people using them. However, it is almost certain that the vulnerabilities inherent within these new technologies, especially in technologically advanced and wealthy countries of the Euro-Atlantic area, will be exploited for criminal purposes.

Challenges in Combating Cybercrime Due to the reasons outlined above, it is not surprising that combating cybercrime is gradually becoming a priority for most countries and their criminal justice systems across the world, including in Europe and North America. However, there are a number of challenges that hinder the fight against cybercrime and raise questions about the ability of states to effectively deal with this growing threat. The first, and perhaps most important challenge is related to territoriality. While cyberspace is global and has no physical borders, criminal justice actors can operate only within their national jurisdictions. This may pose a number of practical issues in terms of international cooperation in the investigation and prosecution of cybercrime. But perhaps the most important issue in this regard is access to the fundamental element in any criminal justice process–evidence. In the digital age, evidence is primarily represented by data. Today, most data are not stored physically on individual devices but are available online on the “cloud” from servers that are often located in a foreign country (i.e., a foreign jurisdiction), and usually belong to a private entity. Furthermore, the electronic evidence needed in a criminal case may be located on multiple servers in several countries, and sometimes may be available only for a limited period of time. While data can move freely and instantly through cyberspace, gaining access to data located outside their national jurisdiction can be a very cumbersome and timeconsuming process for criminal justice actors. As noted in a recent study, although cross-border collection and exchange of electronic evidence is a priority for most countries, there are many unsolved issues stemming from different regulatory frameworks in each country with regard to ethical, legal or even procedural matters. Moreover, judicial cooperation processes

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require weeks or even months to be fulfilled.31 It is quite telling that even within the EU, where there is a high degree of harmonization when it comes to criminal justice and the rule of law, access to electronic evidence remains one of the key problems in the development of cross-border law enforcement cooperation, despite efforts to improve the situation in recent years.32 In short, reliance on traditional means of international cooperation in criminal investigations is simply not suited to obtaining volatile electronic evidence. Secondly, there are legal challenges. Crimes conducted through or facilitated by digital technologies have unique features that require adaptation, and in many cases the significant modernization, of existing laws, in particular criminal and procedural legislation. However, according to the Council of Europe, only 66% of UN Member States seem to have had substantive criminal law provisions to criminalize offences against and by means of computers “largely in place” by January 2022. An additional one third of States had adopted at least some specific substantive criminal law provisions. When it comes to reform of procedural law, which is a more complex undertaking, only 48% of States had specific procedural powers to secure electronic evidence for use in criminal proceedings “largely in place” by January 2022.33 While these figures in themselves may not look so bad and, admittedly, there has been a lot of progress in recent years, given the rapid evolution of digital technologies and continuous growth of cybercrime, the current state of affairs is far from satisfactory. One should also take any such figures with a bit of scepticism, as having laws in place does not automatically guarantee their implementation in practice. As noted by the Council of Europe, reforms in many countries are initiated but not carried through, with draft laws sometimes pending for years or being abandoned. In some instances, governments are careful not to

31 Fran Casino, Claudia Pina, Pablo López-Aguilar, Edgar Batista, Agusti Solanas & Constantinos Patsakis, SoK: Cross-Border Criminal Investigations and Digital Evidence (25 May 2022), https://arxiv.org/pdf/2205.12911.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 32 Marcin Rojszczak, “e-Evidence Cooperation in Criminal Matters from an EU Perspective”, The Modern Law Review, 85:4 (2022), pp. 997–1028. 33 Cybercrime Programme Office of the Council of Europe, The Global State of Cybercrime Legislation 2013–2022: A Cursory Overview (Council of Europe: 2022), pp. 4–5, https://rm.coe.int/3148-1-3-4-cyberleg-global-state-jan2022-p/1680a5 64bb (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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adopt laws without the necessary capacities to apply them, so while laws have been adopted, their implementing regulations have not as further capacity-building support is required to move forward.34 One also needs to keep in mind that criminal justice legislation does not operate in a vacuum and its effectiveness is often dependent on regulations in other sectors, such as property law, business law, tax law, various financial regulations, etc. Since digital technologies have implications for a wide range of human activities, a more holistic and comprehensive approach to the modernization of legislative frameworks will be necessary to enable criminal justice actors to effectively address cybercrime in the future. For example, a lot of illegal trade is facilitated using cryptocurrencies, but a very few countries in the world have dedicated laws or regulations for these virtual assets. The continuous rapid evolution of digital technologies also poses significant technical challenges for investigating and prosecuting cybercrime. With new online applications emerging on a regular basis, and digital technologies being used in more aspects of our daily lives, the scope of potential vulnerabilities that can be exploited for criminal purposes is increasing. Just as cybercriminals constantly update their modus operandi, so should the police. But that puts a lot of pressure on existing resources and capacities. Furthermore, the fact that the police always need to react to developments only after they take place, while criminals can take advantage of new opportunities as soon as they arise, means that criminal justice will be always one step behind. For example, various encryption tools make attribution of cybercrimes to perpetrators very difficult. Even if the police crack one encryption tool, criminals can simply switch to another one that is based on a different code. Last but not least, there is a significant knowledge gap. Investigating and prosecuting cybercrime requires specific knowledge and skills on behalf of the whole criminal justice system. Just as police officers need certain knowledge to be able to investigate such crimes, prosecutors and judges also need to acquire an adequate level of understanding of the methods and technology behind them. While most states across the world have established specialized units or departments for dealing with cybercrime, the basic knowledge and understanding of digital technologies among regular police officers, investigators, prosecutors and judges is still

34 Ibid., p. 3.

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lacking. With the growing importance of electronic evidence in almost all criminal cases, this poses a serious challenge for effective justice and the rule of law. The problem with this knowledge gap extends also to public. The most effective way of fighting any crime is prevention. Prevention of cybercrime requires digital literacy and basic understanding of cybersecurity and cyber hygiene among regular users. While there is no comprehensive global research on this subject, surveys that are available indicate that digital knowledge and skills considerably vary among people. For example, according to a special Eurobarometer survey conducted in 28 EU Member States in late 2019, just over half of respondents (52%) think they are well informed about cybercrime, and only 11% say they felt very well informed. Over three quarters (76%) of respondents believe that the risk of becoming a victim of cybercrime is increasing. However, far fewer (52%) think they can protect themselves sufficiently against it.35 According to a report from 2022, only 54% of EU citizens possess at least basic digital skills.36

Adapting to a New Criminal Landscape The risks posed by cybercrime are multiple and so are the challenges in combating it. There are no simple or all-encompassing solutions available. As digital technologies continue to develop and shape our lives, we will need to adapt to the new threat landscape that comes with them. Nevertheless, there are some steps that could be taken to at least mitigate the risks that we are facing in the near future. At the international level, states urgently need to agree on a global legal instrument to harmonize national cybercrime legislation and significantly increase the effectiveness and efficiency of international cooperation, especially when it comes to preserving and obtaining electronic evidence. Currently, the key multilateral treaty in this area is the 2001 Council of

35 European Commission, Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, Europeans’ Attitudes Towards Cyber Security (European Commission: 2020), https://data.eur opa.eu/doi/10.2837/672023 (Accessed 31 July 2022). 36 European Commission, Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2022 (European Commission: 2022), https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/desi (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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Europe’s Convention on Cybercrime37 that has 68 States as Parties, two additional States as signatories and 13 States invited to accede. While the Convention’s reach has expanded well beyond the Council of Europe’s membership base and has become a blueprint for international norms in this area, it is still far from becoming a global instrument that is needed. A potentially promising development is a new UN process to elaborate a “comprehensive international convention on countering the use of information and communications technologies for criminal purposes” that was launched in early 2022 and shall conclude in 2024. However, it is too soon to say whether this process will lead to a positive outcome. While there seems to be a general agreement on the need for such a global legal instrument and on some of its key elements, there are serious disagreements about the scope of the convention. Some states argue that it should include only cyber-dependent crime while others also want it to include certain types of cyber-enabled crime such as illegal online content. It is also likely that safeguarding human rights and fundamental freedoms will become a divisive issue in negotiations and some civil society actors are already raising concerns.38 Although it is premature to predict how the negotiations will play out, there are at least two reasons that call for scepticism. First, the current international climate, especially since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, is not prone to multilateral cooperation. Distrust among key players seems too high for achieving a break-through agreement on a new and novel global legal instrument. Secondly, and perhaps more importantly, disagreements among states that have hampered progress on combating cybercrime internationally for years are inherently linked to differing perspectives on broader issues related to digital governance, namely who should regulate cyberspace, who should have access to data, and who should regulate online content.39 All these questions touch upon

37 Also known as the Budapest Convention. 38 Tomaso Falchetta, Deborah Brown &

Katitza Rodriguez, “Opening Stages in UN Cybercrime Treaty Talks Reflect Human Rights Risks”, Just Security (18 April 2022), https://www.justsecurity.org/81105/opening-stages-in-un-cybercrimetreaty-talks-reflect-human-rights-risks/ (Accessed 31 July 2022). 39 Summer Walker, Cyber-Insecurities? A Guide to the UN Cybercrime Debate (The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime: 2019), https://globalinitiative. net/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/TGIATOC-Report-Cybercrime-in-the-UN-01Mar1 510-Web.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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some of the basic principles of international relations, such as national sovereignty and human rights (in particular the right to privacy and freedom of expression) and reflect different values that dominate various political systems. How difficult it is to find an agreement in this area is evident from the work of the UN’s “Open-ended intergovernmental expert group to conduct a comprehensive study on the problem of cybercrime” established in 2011. A draft of the study40 was finalized in 2013, but due to disagreements, has never been formally adopted. While the expert group remained as a platform for exchanging views and debating key issues related to cybercrime among the UN Member States, it has not produced many other tangible outcomes.41 Even if the new convention was agreed upon by 2024, it would most likely provide only minimum global standards as the compromises necessary for achieving such a positive outcome would result in lowest common denominator acceptable to all parties. Albeit, this would be still an improvement compared to the current situation. At the same time, additional tools for strengthening international cooperation should be developed. The aforementioned UN expert group in its draft report from 2013 proposes, in addition to a comprehensive multilateral treaty, the development of a dedicated multilateral mechanism for timely cooperation to preserve and obtain electronic evidence, the development of international model provisions on various aspects of combating cybercrime, and provision of enhanced technical assistance to countries. Further strengthening of existing informal police-to-police cooperation mechanisms as well as existing formal international cooperation channels, including bilateral and multilateral agreements, could also increase the effectiveness of cybercrime investigations. Given the global nature of cyberspace, international cooperation is crucial, but it will not suffice without complementary steps at the national level. Governments across the world need to make strengthening their capacity to prevent and combat cybercrime a top priority and develop adequate national strategies and action plans for the coming years to 40 UNODC, Comprehensive Study on Cybercrime: Draft-February 2013 (UNODC: 2013), https://www.unodc.org/documents/organized-crime/UNODC_CCPCJ_EG.4_2 013/CYBERCRIME_STUDY_210213.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022). 41 “Open-Ended Intergovernmental Expert Group Meeting on Cybercrime”, UNODC (no date), https://www.unodc.org/unodc/cybercrime/egm-on-cybercrime. html (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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address the challenges lying ahead of them in a holistic and coordinated manner. These should focus on at least four key areas. First, updating relevant laws to create a modern and agile legislative framework that will enable an effective fight against cybercrime. This primarily concerns criminal and procedural laws that are necessary for detection, investigation and prosecution of crimes. But a comprehensive review and overhaul of other relevant legislation may also significantly contribute to reducing cybercrime, namely through prevention and resilience. Second, is the systematic build-up of the criminal justice system’s capacities to deal with cybercrime. This should include not only strengthening the technical capacities of specialized units and departments through systematic training and procurement of necessary equipment but also providing basic education on this subject to all criminal justice actors. Police and judicial academies need to include the topic of electronic evidence and cybercrime into their standard teaching curricula to ensure that all criminal justice practitioners have at least a basic understanding of these issues. Building on this basic education, the academies also need to develop further advanced programmes for specialists as demand for expertise in this area will only grow. At the same time, criminal justice institutions need to re-think how they attract and retain talent to ensure that they offer flexible and lucrative enough conditions for experts working in cyber-related fields to join the public security sector. Another priority should be supporting resilience of the business sector, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises (SME), through an appropriate combination of positive incentives and mandatory regulations. As noted in a report by the World Economic Forum, the low cyber resilience of SME’s is seen as a key concern by most security experts. The report also found that there are critical perception gaps between security-focused executives and business executives, especially when it comes to prioritizing cyber in business decisions, gaining leadership support for cybersecurity, and recruiting and retaining cybersecurity talent.42 Governments should motivate business actors to increase their own cyber resilience and set national cybersecurity standards. While these should be tailored to each sector (e.g., much higher standards for financial 42 World Economic Forum, Global Cybersecurity Outlook 2022 (World Economic Forum: 2022), https://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Global_Cybersecurity_Outlook_ 2022.pdf (Accessed 31 July 2022).

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and health-care sector than for retail) and dependent on size and scope of a business, some minimum standards should be met by each company. Last but not least, state institutions need to systematically raise public awareness about the risks posed by digital technologies and provide free and easily-accessible education about the basics of cybersecurity and cyber hygiene for all segments of society, tailored to different age and social groups. These topics should be also incorporated into national educational systems, from elementary schools to higher education and universities, as a part of the broader development of digital skills and competencies. The ultimate aim of all these efforts is a long-term and systematic prevention of cybercrime among the public.

Conclusion The gap between risks and vulnerabilities posed by digital technologies and our abilities to manage them is widening. This is particularly evident when it comes to crime where an increasing number of acts are either committed through or facilitated by digital means. Cybercrime has been expanding both quantitatively and qualitatively in recent years, with the Covid-19 pandemic significantly accelerating this trend. With further development of digital technologies, namely the Internet of Things, Web 3.0, machine learning/artificial intelligence and quantum computing, cybercrime will continue to flourish, especially in technologically advanced and wealthy countries of the Euro-Atlantic area. In addition to mounting economic damage, it could cause significant societal and political harm, and poses considerable risks for national security. Criminal justice actors across the world, including in Europe and North America, are currently poorly equipped to deal with this threat. They face an uphill battle as combating cybercrime poses a number of problems, including the global nature of data versus the limitations of national jurisdictions, myriad legal and technical challenges and the knowledge gap among both criminal justice practitioners and public. The international community urgently needs to take steps at both the international and national level to mitigate the growing risks posed by cybercrime. It needs to find innovative ways to significantly increase the effectiveness of international cooperation in criminal investigations among various national jurisdictions as well as with the private sector, especially when it comes to preserving and obtaining electronic evidence. Governments need to strategically buildup their national capacities to combat

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cybercrime through modernizing legislative frameworks, educating and equipping criminal justice actors, strengthening resilience of business community and raising public awareness. Given the increasingly important role that digital technologies play in our lives and economies, we need to adapt to the new threat landscape that comes with them. If we fail to act, we risk losing the benefits brought by digital transformation as they become overshadowed by criminality spinning out of control and causing considerable economic, societal and political damage. As this adaptation will be a long haul, decisions we make today will define our (digital) tomorrow.

CHAPTER 12

Emerging Technologies as an Opportunity for a Sustainable and Carbon-Neutral Future Ivana Vuchkova

Introduction From the discovery of the steam engine, through the age of science and mass production, to the recent advent of digital technology, every technological revolution has been interlinked and followed by a transformation in energy use. These transformations were dominated by different energy sources as coal, gas, nuclear, and today’s renewable energy. Taken together, these shifts in technology and energy use are known as industrial revolutions. While previous energy transformations have mainly been driven by technological developments and economic rationales, the ongoing transformation towards renewable energy sources (RES) is a result of rising political, scientific, and activist concerns over the impact of fossil fuels on

I. Vuchkova (B) Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Skopje, North Macedonia e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 195 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_12

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global warming and climate change.1 Scientists have warned for decades about the limits to growth given the interdependency between economic development and natural resources. Against the backdrop of climate concerns, calls for sustainable development have become even louder.2 Still, the global challenge of climate change and sustainability have only really been fully recognized in recent years.3 The United Nations Climate Conference in Paris in 2015 was the first time that the political leaders of 195 countries and the European Union agreed to act and limit the global temperature increase to no more than 1.5 °C. Seven years after the Paris Agreement (PA), scientists are still preoccupied with the same concerns. Many recent reports, including one by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), point towards a high likelihood that global warming will reach or exceed 1.5 °C in the near-term. Yet, the political will of many countries confirmed by mechanisms such as the European Green Deal (EGD) and the efforts of scientists and engineers to offer adequate technological solutions, still suggest that meeting the goal of 1.5 °C is possible. If governments and the private sector pledge enough resources to research and innovation in renewable energy, and the costs of renewable technologies are reduced further so as to make them accessible for every country and region, a carbon-neutral future within this century can be reached. However, the success of the transformation towards a carbon-neutral future depends on emerging technologies for clean energy production. Technical adjustments, changes at the policy and behavioural level, directing investments and finances, and collaboration between countries will determine the level of success. Fulfilling these conditions will also influence the trajectory of the transformation: whether we move towards a “lower-carbon” energy system that produces a lower amount of carbon dioxide emissions (CO2 ), or towards a “carbon-neutral” energy system with “net-zero carbon” emissions.4 1 Luceño-Sánchez, José Antonio et al., “Materials for Photovoltaics: State of Art and Recent Developments”, International Journal of Molecular Sciences, 20:4 (2019). 2 Donella H. Meadows et al., (ed.1) The Limits to Growth (Potomac Associates Universe Books: 1972). 3 Donella H. Meadows et al., (ed.2) The Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update (Chelsea Green Publishing: 2005). 4 Net-zero carbon emissions does not mean achieving zero carbon emissions but minimizing all human-caused emissions to as close to zero as possible. This means that all

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Renewable Energy Sources Can (Re)Shape Our Future Renewable energy often refers to clean energy produced from sources such as solar, wind, hydropower, geothermal, biomass, tidal, and wave energy, which constantly replenish. The early discussion on renewables was focused on hydropower, wood, and biomass. Today, the renewables discussion is mostly about solar and wind and green hydrogen as a product of renewable electricity gained through the process of an electrolysis that splits water and oxygen. A distinction within the field of renewables can be made by their level of renewal, or if today’s use will affect their availability in the future. For instance, hydroelectric dams can change and reduce the flow and volume of the rivers they occupy partially because of the reduction in the storage reservoirs at the head of the river.5 Despite the fact that hydroelectricity has been considered as the oldest and most important form of sustainable electricity, its environmental impact has initiated debates and division among scientists as to which extend it should be considered as clean renewable energy. Therefore, while analyzing other emerging technologies in renewables, this chapter will also shed light on the most promising advances in hydropower that allow for energy generation without impeding the river flow or habitats. If implemented in a just, inclusive, and transparent manner, the transformation towards a carbon-neutral future has the potential to achieve various social, economic, and environmental benefits. For example, renewable energy can become a source of revenue for citizens. In the context of small-scale energy production from renewables, citizens sell surplus renewable energy or acquire dividends as members of energy cooperatives. More benefits are created for citizens in rural areas, where with the help of storage and off-grid solutions, renewables can provide affordable and accessible energy despite the limited transmission infrastructure in many developing countries or regions. The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) suggests that energy from renewable sources can become a common feature for rural areas.

exceeding emissions should be neutralized and offset by carbon capture technologies or natural carbon removals (e.g., forests). 5 J. D. Hunt, G. Falchetta, B. Zakeri et al., “Hydropower Impact on the River Flow of a Humid Regional Climate”, Climatic Change, 163 (2020), pp. 379–393. https://doi. org/10.1007/s10584-020-02828-w.

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Producing their own energy instead of importing expensive and scarce conventional fuels can reduce energy poverty in these regions where this is a rising issue considering the unequal access to conventional resources.6 In contrast to the fear that the energy transformation towards renewables will cost jobs, it is very likely that the renewable energy sector will create more job opportunities than there are today in the conventional sector. A recently conducted survey in Australia showed that if the country complies with PA, employment levels in the renewable energy sector would grow to 45,000 by 2025 and on average around 35,000 jobs would be created each year to 2035.7 This assessment does not even take into consideration jobs that will be created to support the new energy system (e.g., (re)building electricity transmission networks). The highest job growth will materialize in rooftop solar and wind, which could be a perfect opportunity for coal miners transitioning to new employment. To enable a smooth transition, the energy transformation process should be coupled with programs for upskilling and reskilling workers. Businesses, too, recognize the opportunities in the renewable energy market and invest rapidly in emerging energy technologies. The benefits spread from reduced energy costs, energy independence, and selfsufficiency, extra profit, to stable investment returns. The shift to renewables offers an opportunity to rethink growth as a collective success that incorporates sustainability. This would mean that the economic growth of a country is not measured in terms of economic output only, as is the case with Gross Domestic Product (GDP), but also in terms of social and ecological benefits and human well-being as part of the metrics. Yet, resources are limited and fragile and only by adding sustainability to the metrics, modern economies can initiate a systematic approach towards poverty while minimizing the ecological footprint of humanity. This growth formula can be achieved with scaling-up renewables. Renewable energy also has the potential to create a more just society in general, considering that ecological and social issues are not mutually

6 OECD, “Linking Renewable Energy to Rural Development”, OECD Green Growth Studies, OECD Publishing (2012), https://doi.org/10.1787/9789264180444-en (Accessed 16 December 2021). 7 Chris Briggs et al., Renewable Energy Jobs in Australia—Stage One, Institute for Sustainable Futures, (University of Technology Sydney: 2020).

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conflicting, but they result of a long-established unjust economic model.8 The tradition of profit-driven economies disregards not only social disparities but the environment as well, and leads us to an inevitable climate crisis. Extractive industries based on conventional resources such as fossil fuels that shape the energy sector of many countries can have direct and indirect negative social impacts unless such effects are controlled for, and have sometimes contributed to the displacement of populations, economic, social and gender inequality, and even armed conflicts.9 This is a result of vague and non-defined “property rights” to many such resources, which allow profits that could never be reached in other sectors. To hold this position, conventional resources even build a culture of resource dependent regions that slows down innovation and investment in modern technologies.10 With renewables, the uneven and often also unfair distribution of energy resources, as is the case with conventional fuels, will be less of a concern. Compared to fossil fuels, renewables are, to a certain extent, available in every country.11 This will also reduce the dependency of many countries which are reliant on fossil fuel imports, and hence, increase their resilience to geopolitical shocks and crises. In addition, renewable energy can play a crucial role in mitigating the climate crisis and adapting to climate change and help humanity to sustain a future on Earth. According to the latest UN reports, over 75% of global greenhouse gas (GHGs) emissions and nearly 90% of all carbon dioxide emissions result from burning fossil fuels, which makes them the largest contributor to global climate change. As renewables are gaining ground and increasing their share in the global energy outlook, emissions will be significantly reduced, which will mitigate the devastating consequences of climate change, and improve air quality and health.

8 Sonja Schirmbeck et al., A Manual of Arguments for a Fair and Ecological Society: Climate Action. Socially. Just (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Berlin, Germany: 2020). 9 United Nations, Transforming Extractive Industries for Sustainable Development (United Nations: 2021). 10 Shamsul M. Haque, The Fate of Sustainable Development Under Neo-liberal Regimes in Developing Countries (International Political Science Review: 1999). 11 Sonja Schirmbeck et al., A Manual of Arguments for a Fair and Ecological Society: Climate Action. Socially. Just (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung Berlin, Germany: 2020).

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The Role of Emerging Technologies in the Climate and Energy Challenge It took the world almost 50 years after Einstein’s paper “Concerning the Production and Transformation of Light” to demonstrate the photovoltaic (PV) effect at Bell Labs in New Jersey, and then to start the modern solar industry in 1973, with the ventures of Exxon and the U.S. Space Program.12 Another 50 years later, it seems that we’re reaching the breakthrough moment for renewables. In 2019, more power generation capacity was added through photovoltaic installations than from installations using fossil or nuclear fuels (even though, of course, the actual added solar energy generation over the course of time may only be 20% of the installed capacity).13 Alongside the different types of photovoltaics that were developed long time ago, there are also relatively new ones that improve constantly the efficiency and durability levels, reduce environmental impact and other side effects. The oldest type of solar cells, known as monocrystalline silicon solar cells, last over 25 years, but their efficiency levels decrease gradually at about 0.5% per year which means that they need replacing on a fairly regular basis. Despite their durability and efficiency, initial costs for this technology are still high due to the complicated manufacturing process and limited geographical prevalence of silicon.14 In recent years, there has been a technological improvement through reducing the total thickness of silicon materials used in monocrystalline cells that have led towards minimizing costs. As smaller pieces of silicon are produced in a simpler and cheaper way, polycrystalline or multicrystalline cells represent another type of technology used for photovoltaics. They can have the same lifespan as monocrystalline cells but show a much lower level of efficiencies, and as a result, have driven further development of PV technologies. Thin-film 12 Daniel Yergin, The New Map: Energy, Climate and the Clash of Nations (Penguin Press, New York: 2020). 13 Renewable energy policy network for the twenty-first century, Renewables 2021 Global Status Report (REN21: 2021). 14 Measured by mass, silicon makes up 25.7% of the Earth’s crust and is the second

most abundant element on Earth, after oxygen. Pure silicon crystals are only occasionally found in nature; they can be found as inclusions with gold and in volcanic exhalations. Silicon is usually found in the form of silicon dioxide (also known as silica), and silicate. China dominates the world’s production of silicon, followed by Russia, India and the United States. See more: https://www.chemeurope.com/en/encyclopedia/Silicon.html.

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PV cells require even smaller amounts of silicon, but this technological process, which is otherwise cheaper and more efficient, comes at the expense of conversion efficiency. As an alternative to silicon-based PV cells, scientists have offered another thin-film technology known as Cadmium Telluride (CdTe) PV. This technology offers lower manufacturing costs, but there are environmental concerns over the limited supply of tellurium and the potential waste disposal.15 Following the patterns of constant improvement of PV technologies, the Copper Indium Gallium Selenide (CIGS) PV has been gaining popularity in recent years. With high efficiency levels and durability levels, and no risk of disposal, it promises to overcome many of the existing cons of its predecessors. Polymer and organic PV cells offer various advantages due to the lower-production costs, but still require advancement in terms of efficiency levels. In the last decade, PV cells efficiency levels have increased from 15 to 20%, and only during last year, these levels have achieved 23%. At the same time, new PV technologies limit the annual losses to 0.25% which is a double improvement from previous types. Further increases in efficiency are expected in coming years, which means PV technologies could be able to offset the embodied energy16 in less than a year and a half. In general, there has been a significant improvement in PV technologies that has also allowed for energy generation without affecting the food production, as it is the case with agro-photovoltaics. However, improvements are needed in terms of investments in adequate storage and collaboration technologies that will prevent losses from the generated amounts of solar energy. That slows down the transformation process because solar energy on its own is still an intermittent source that it is not always available without interruptions. Furthermore, recycling technologies will further reduce the current levels of environmental impact of solar panels, and allow a completely carbon-neutral energy production.

15 College of Earth and Mineral Science, “Photovoltaics: Utility Solar Power and Concentration” (2022). See more: https://www.e-education.psu.edu/eme812/nod e/608. 16 Embodied energy refers to the energy used to extract the raw materials (silicon, tellurium, etc.) and manufacture solar panels, which in recent years has represented a major concern among environmentalists and questioned the sustainable future promised by solar energy.

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Another aspect of the energy transformation that may help reduce the cost of renewable technology is the misconception that renewable energy is more expensive than fossil energy. In the past, water, wind, and solar energy as “ancient” RES were heavily replaced by coal, oil, and natural gas due to their lower prices and technical efficiencies. However, if all peripheral costs of fossil energy use are factored in, the reality is quite the opposite. For example, the pollution caused by the fossil fuel industries and their impact on global warming and climate change have resulted in increasing health, social, economic, and ecological costs that are not part of the accounting metrics that derive energy prices, nor calculated by energy operators. As a result, fossil fuels and their products cause allocative inefficiencies meaning that the price consumers pay differs from the efficient price and the real production costs, which prevents RES to compete on equal terms. The only advantage they have compared to RES is their level of technological efficiency due to the simpler technological solutions that they rely upon. Yet, the allocation inefficiencies indicate that society would benefit more if energy is produced from clean resources. If all subsidies, tax exemptions, and reliefs were included in the final energy price, this real price would no longer be “cheap”. In the US, this price is estimated using the social cost of carbon (SCC), the dollar value of the total climate damages incurred from emitting each other metric tonne of carbon dioxide.17 Alongside energy production technologies, to improve the availability of energy from renewable sources, the world will need advanced technological solutions as more reliable storage capacities, and mechanisms for demand-side responses and cross-border interconnections. Storage capacities combined with the flow and lithium-ion batteries lead to more secure, stable, and cleaner electricity supply. Their efficient integration into the system combined with effective forecasting methods and coordination mechanisms can limit peak demand levels and support system balancing. As explained previously, efficiency levels will be also optimized and thus, capital-intensive investments in under-utilized generation and network assets will be avoided. In that sense, emerging technologies in energy will not only enable the transformation to renewables but can also reverse the trend of asset utilization reduction and enable a more cost-effective transition to the low-carbon future. 17 Nicholas Stern et al., A Social Cost of Carbon Consistent with a Net-Zero Climate Goal (Roosevelt Institute: 2022).

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Hydropower, biomass, and geothermal energy are essential elements of the picture, but capacity additions are dominated by solar and wind energy. Complementary technologies to extend their efficiency are therefore very important. One example for this is the development of hybrid renewable plants that have not only extended storage capability, but also the possibility to compensate wind or sun deficit with biomass energy. They can achieve a 100% renewable energy supply that is stable and reliable regardless of the weather conditions. In a similar vein, modern bioenergy and hydrogen-based fuels will play a key role in the achievement of net-zero targets, especially in sectors where direct electrification is most challenging. Technological advancements in hydropower will reduce the impact of dams to river flows and allow for the modular generation of hydropower and other water sources as waves or tides. In such way, hydropower will not only continue to be one of the most important mechanisms of generating sustainable electricity but will also play a major role in mitigating the current energy crisis and complement other renewable sources. Modular hydropower, tidal, and wave energy can lead towards optimization of waterpower without affecting the water flows. Additionally, there is the Pumped-Storage Hydropower (PSH) that works like a big battery and supports the stability and resilience of the electric grid. With such technology, the intermittent nature of wind and solar energy will no longer be a concern. Research shows that these batteries that are used currently to stabilize America’s power grid, can be further optimized at a reduced cost.18 Along with emerging and complementary technologies in renewable energy, new technological developments in key sectors such as construction and building, agriculture and mobility will add to the opportunities for a carbon-neutral future. With the help of batteries and electrolysers, the energy can be stored and converted from electricity to heat or fuel, and back again. Such conversion processes are essential to enable electrification and ensure flexibility which is needed to match the supply of variable renewables and demand for electricity at the least cost. There are millions of behind-the-metre enablers of flexibility, in the form of smart metres, electric vehicles (EV), and charging infrastructure that no one could imagine twenty years ago. Hence, it is safe to say that a carbon-neutral future is feasible within this century. The increase of the 18 U.S. Department of Energy, “5 Promising Water Power Technologies”, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy (2017).

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utility-scale battery storage (from less than 20 GW in 2020 to over 3 000 GW by 2050)19 and carbon capture technologies and solutions offered by artificial intelligence (AI) and satellite observation, would help and speed-up the process.

Emerging Technology Is Only One Part of the Solution There is no doubt that emerging technologies in energy are paving the way towards a carbon-neutral future, primarily through transforming the power system towards renewables and then decarbonizing the entire economy through the electrification of key sectors. Yet, the trajectories and dynamics of renewables deployment and penetration into the energy system depend also on the price and accessibility of technologies, as well as on adequate policy, financial and technical support, and collaboration between countries. As a result, the energy mix of different countries changes at different pace reflecting the cost of new investments, political and technical barriers. To reduce the price of modern renewable technology and make it accessible to all countries, there is a need to apply, on a massive scale, the technologies and approaches that are mature today, using policies and measures that are tried and tested. Economies of scale will further drive down production costs, which are already significantly lower than few years ago. Further investment in research and innovation will improve current technologies in terms of efficiency, capacity, lifespan, and climate impact, but incentives and attractive financial schemes are needed to make them accessible for everyone. International support and solidarity in the process remain crucial for making clean and affordable energy also available in the developing world. Governments need to step in with adequate policy support in key priority areas, from research and innovation to adjusting the infrastructure and removing technical barriers on the way to renewable energy. This has to include the electrification of industries to a scale that is difficult to imagine today, for example of long-distance transport. Governments also need to collaborate on international policies that reduce the costs and ease

19 International Energy Agency, “Energy Security and the Risk of Disorderly Change”, World Energy Outlook (2021).

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the path of innovative technologies to the market, as well as to developing countries.20 The EGD represents a roadmap of policies that guide the path towards a climate-neutral European continent by 2050. When combined with financial support schemes and plans for infrastructural adjustments, such mechanisms can obligate countries to gradually reduce their emissions, either as member states or as trading partners. Member states are obligated to follow the regulations on emission quotas, technological requirements, and carbon taxes. Major trading partners will have to decarbonize in order to stay competitive on the European market: The announced Carbon Border Adjustment Mechanisms (CBAM) aims to prevent “carbon leakage” from economies that are still relying on fossil fuels. Parallel investment in energy efficiency is a crucial part of the energy transformation process. Too much energy is produced and used inefficiently. If different methods and techniques are applied, significant amounts of fossil resources could be saved with no loss on the final output. In electricity generation, efficiency can be estimated based on the ratio of energy translated into electricity after it is absorbed, as well as the environmental impact, and the initial investment and maintenance costs. Taking into account all factors, renewable energy technologies can be more efficient compared to conventional. If combined with investment in energy efficiency methods that reduce energy consumption, they can contribute towards a more balanced energy demand and hence better coordinated energy market. Further collaboration between countries can enable storing the excess of renewable energy production in neighbouring countries. This is possible through regional coordination centres that offer real-time data exchange, dispatching, and virtual storage plants. The prerequisites here would be an international regulatory framework, political will of countries, and an adequate infrastructure for shared use of variable renewable energy and storage units. Enhanced collaboration would support a costeffective transformation. Putting national storage capacities at regional disposal will increase the share of clean energy while reducing network operational costs and maximising economic benefits. A real-time data exchange will keep operators informed about energy demand and supply 20 International Energy Agency, “Keeping the Door to 1.5 °C Open”, World Energy Outlook (2021).

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and will help coordinate all market operations through a shared platform. This is already the case with Coreso in Western Europe that is planned to further evolve at European level.21

Renewables and Associated Technology Can Guarantee the Future of Energy Security As the International Energy Agency (IEA) has shown in the World Energy Outlook 2021, well managed transformations towards clean energy can help reduce energy market volatility and its impact on businesses and consumers. A cooperative ownership and regulated market participation through a minimum set of harmonized technical and data requirements can guarantee the stability of the system. With adequate information and communication technologies (ITS) architecture, software systems, blockchain technology, micro-services, and application programming interfaces (APIs) the system will be stable without affecting the flexibility of consumers, prosumers, distributed generators, and storage facilities22 In parallel to the implementation of emerging technologies that enable shared use of renewables, not only within, but between countries as well, the functionality and maintenance activities of energy supplies can be fully optimized. In parallel, risks and failures can be identified and resolved in due course. Although renewables can improve the stability and security of the energy system, present conspiracy theories are stoking fears of rising energy prices. Seemingly scientific language and arguments are used to portray ambitious climate and energy policies as a problem for the near future—by claiming, for example, that renewable technologies and carbon taxes will effectively make energy increasingly expensive. It is true that higher carbon prices have played a role in pushing up electricity prices. However, the real bottom-line cause of the energy crisis is the sharp spike in the price of natural gas and other fossil fuels resulting from Russia’s

21 https://www.coreso.eu/about-us/. 22 UNCTAD, The Role of Science, Technology and Innovation in Promoting Renew-

able Energy by 2030, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Geneva: 2019.

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invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. The effect of this spike is nearly eight times bigger than the effect of the increase in carbon prices.23 Considering the energy dependence levels of countries, businesses, and households, there is no immunity to energy market shocks and crises. That is especially visible in the current energy crisis that countries from the entire European continent and beyond are witnessing as a result of fossil fuel dependency. It is time to draw a lesson: Given that our societies are very energy dependent, governments have to respond with adequate policies and enable the transformation to more sustainable, secure, and affordable energy supplies from renewables. In fact, despite the unfavourable weather conditions, wind and solar PV have already provided valuable contributions to meeting European electricity demand in the fourth quarter of 2021, as the energy crisis reached another peak.

Conclusion The success of the transformation towards a carbon-neutral future depends on emerging technologies for clean energy production. Considering the role of energy in the global economy and our way of life, navigating the uncertainty on the way to the new energy future will not be easy. Technical adjustments, changes at the policy and behavioural levels, directing finances, and collaboration between countries will be crucial in determining when and whether we are moving towards a “lowercarbon” energy system that produces lower amount of CO2 emissions, or towards a “carbon-neutral” energy system that equalizes “net-zero carbon” emissions.24 According to current actions by governments and the private sector in applying and developing new technologies to extend technological efficiencies, energy storage, recycling of materials, distribution and coordination of the market and collaboration, a logical prediction is a lowercarbon world after 2050. To reach carbon-neutrality, decarbonization requirements and opportunities should be matched through appropriate 23 Fatih Birol, Europe and the World Need to Draw the Right Lessons from Today’s Natural Gas Crisis, Analysis International Energy Agency—IEA: 2022. 24 Net-zero carbon emissions does not mean achieving zero carbon emissions but minimizing all human-caused emissions to as close to zero as possible. This means that all exceeding emissions should be neutralized and offset by carbon capture technologies or natural carbon removals (e.g., forests).

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investment signals. The role of the state is crucial in combining smart politics with the right policies such as emission quotas and technological standards that will gradually reduce carbon emissions, both in the energy sector and in energy-intensive industries. To prevent “buying the way out”, an adequate carbon tax has to be introduced and followed by industrial policy that favours carbon-neutral sectors and offers incentives for technological advancement. The state with all energy market participants has a responsibility to enable the infrastructure for growing renewables and guarantee system stability while providing all market participants with certain flexibility. Finally, collaboration between countries in terms of financial and infrastructural support and technological transfer towards less-developed states is an imperative for a global success. The shared use and storage of renewable energy through interconnected infrastructure and joint coordination should be followed by coordinated fiscal and industrial policies as these are essential to redefine the role of the state and the private sector and enhance public–private cooperation that is critical for innovation and growth. Faster and further innovation of new, clean energy technologies could shape a new era of growth in which sustainability matters.

CHAPTER 13

Cyber Sovereignty: Should Cyber Borders Replicate Territorial Borders? Tinatin Japaridze

The primary hope of the early proponents of the Internet was to limit government control by maintaining open networks and the free flow of information through a democratic and an entirely stateless connection to the rest of the world. However, as a result of the mass adoption of the Internet and digital technologies into everyday life, the cyber domain became intrinsically linked to national security, and thus began to require government participation in the regulatory process. Today, as we continue to contemplate the future of Euro-Atlantic security, regulation of the Internet continues to lack a central managing organization and remains devoid of a single internationally accepted and operated jurisdiction, yet more and more countries are pursuing a policy of “Internet sovereignty”

T. Japaridze (B) The Critical Mass LLC, Alexandria, VA, USA e-mail: [email protected] Eurasia Group, New York, NY, USA

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 209 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_13

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in the name of protecting national security and its netizens.1 Thus, a growing debate of the Digital Age is how international law can regulate state actions in the cyber domain and whether the very principle of sovereignty should be taken into account in cyber operations. The increased “Cyber-balkanization,” or segregation of the Internet into smaller groups with similar interests (including matching national interests), is no longer limited to openly authoritarian regimes such as the Chinese “Great Firewall” and the Iranian “Halal Net,” as more countries, including Russia, Brazil, and India, are gradually moving towards data sovereignty and Internet fragmentation. Openly opposed to the U.S.dominated Internet, the Russian state actively promotes the concept of “cyber sovereignty” through growing online censorship of the networks on its territory. To this end, Russia has begun replicating the Chinese model of policing through hybrid tactics designed to minimize—if not entirely eliminate—undesirable online content by shutting off its Internet borders from outside influence. The result is that the question of ethics has largely been overshadowed by the desire to protect critical digital infrastructure. The drive to construct such “cyber walls” stems from the need, for better or worse, for state actors to exercise “Internet regulation.” This, in and of itself, can be probed from two contrasting and often irreconcilable perspectives—one rooted in the Western paradigm that condemns a clampdown on open access and the restriction of free flow of information, and another, employed by Russian, Chinese and other semi and fully authoritarian regimes, aimed at protecting national cyber borders and the privacy and safety of its netizens against violent, extremist content and disinformation. However, rarely does the public policy discourse attempt to reconcile these two opposing viewpoints. This is largely due to the fact that at its core, the discourse about the protection of national cyber borders at the expense of maintaining open access to information is less concerned with the public (and user) policy and more focused on the political responsibility of regulating cyber borders that undermines the positive factors of Net regulation. We can no longer ignore the issue of unethical Internet governance, and the implications of pursuing “cyber sovereignty” without taking into full account the ethical factors

1 Citizens in the cyberspace.

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that are vital to maintaining a democratic cyberspace that is simultaneously protective of its users and unrestrictive towards their access to information.

National Security as a Cyber Concept Sovereignty is the fundamental principle of international law and thus a “basic constitutional doctrine of the law of nations”2 rooted in two key elements: the physical space and territoriality. Since the inception of the modern nation-state, sovereignty has been comprised of two separate albeit related sides—internal and external. Through internal sovereignty, the state is able to exercise its independent right “to exercise therein, to the exclusion of any other state, the functions of a state,”3 and remain protected from external intervention. Through external sovereignty, however, a state is granted equality alongside other states in the international order.4 On a broader scale, the very concept of sovereignty is rooted in “the collection of rights held by a state, first in its capacity as the entity entitled to exercise control over its territory and second in its capacity to act on the international plane, representing that territory and its people.”5 Over time, perceptions about the role and the importance of the cyber domain by political actors has shifted, becoming increasingly linked to the national security of a given state, thus resulting in the cyberspace concept changing “from being a matter of low politics to high politics of national security.”6 Traditional legal doctrine continues to treat the cyber domain as a “mere transmission medium” that enables the exchange of messages from “one legally significant geographical location to another,”7 whereby 2 James Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (Oxford University

Press: 2012), p. 447. 3 Island of Palmas Case (Netherlands, USA), Reports of International Arbitral Awards, April 4, 1928, vol. 2, pp. 829–871. 4 U.N. Charter, Article 2(1), 1945, United Nations (“The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members”). 5 Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law, p. 448. 6 Nazli Choucri & David D. Clark, “Who Controls Cyberspace?”, Bulletin of the Atomic

Scientists, 69:5 (September 2013), p. 68. 7 David R. Johnson & David Post, “Law and Borders—The Rise of Law in Cyberspace”, Stanford Law Review, 48 (February 1997), p. 1378.

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each of the geographical locations is meant to abide by its own applicable laws and sovereignty. To this day, there is no clear consensus on whether the “law of cyberspace”8 can or should evolve into an independent field, or instead remain an extension of the criminal and international laws of the physical space of which the virtual space is a mere component. Yet, the emergence and rapid increase of cyber threats permeating the online sphere and converging with traditional border security threats and vulnerabilities is radically changing this viewpoint. A lack of clear lines separating public and private sectors, state from non-state actors, and the incompatibility of traditional concepts of geography with the notion of borders in cyberspace, are just a few of the reasons why it remains unclear how exactly international law can apply to this domain. Former Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department during the Obama administration, Harold Koh, believes that international law principles should extend to the cyber domain, as cyberspace is not a “law-free”9 zone and therefore the same set of rules and principles should apply both off-line and online. In his remarks delivered at the USCYBERCOM InterAgency Legal Conference in 2012, Koh noted that “at least one country” [hinting at China10 ] continues to question whether existing bodies of international law can apply to the Internet, instead urging for the creation of new treaties that “impose a unique set of rules on cyberspace.”11 This alternative view on new treaties applicable to and directly targeting cyberspace is now being adopted by an ally of the People’s Republic of China in the cyber domain—the Russian Federation. In contrast to the Western paradigm of Internet openness and free flow of information, for both Russia and China, promoting cyber sovereignty is designed to secure their cyber borders and control the information flow

8 Sandeep Mittal & Priyanka Sharma, “Enough Law of Horses and Elephants Debated… Let’s Discuss the Cyber Law Seriously”, International Journal of Advanced Research in Computer Science, 8:5 (May–June 2017), p. 1343. 9 Harold Hongju Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace. Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by Harold Hongju Koh to the USCYBERCOM Inter-Agency Legal Conference Ft. Meade, MD, Sept. 2012”, Harvard International Law Journal, 54 (December 2012), p. 3. 10 Adam Segal, “China, International Law, and Cyberspace”, Council on Foreign Relations (2 October 2012), https://www.cfr.org/blog/china-international-law-and-cyb erspace. 11 Koh, “International Law in Cyberspace”, p. 2.

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and content accessed through their networks.12 The liberal side of the argument, however, deems the very notion of cyber sovereignty to be a direct limitation of human rights and freedom of expression. The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) passed a resolution on 27 June 2016, that condemns measures to disrupt Internet access, equating denial of a citizen’s undisrupted access to online freedom to a direct violation of human rights. Both China and Russia, two of the Permanent Five members of the UN Security Council, put forth amendments regarding the language used in the UNGA’s draft resolution. The resolution stated: Stressing the importance of applying a comprehensive human rights-based approach when providing and expanding access to the Internet and for the Internet to be open, accessible and nurtured by multi-stakeholder participation. While the amendments read: Stressing the importance of applying a comprehensive and integrated approach in providing and expanding access to the Internet and for the Internet to be open, accessible and nurtured by multi-stakeholder participation.13

The “human-rights-based approach” to the cyberspace calls for “open, accessible” Internet that is “nurtured by multiple stakeholder participation.”14 However, this approach is in direct contradiction with both Russia’s and China’s views on sovereignty of the state and their “netizens” in the cyber domain.

Cyber vs. Information Space: Two Sides of the Same Coin? The U.S. Department of Defense defines “cyberspace” (a term that Russia considers “limiting” and “narrow”15 ) as the following: “a global space 12 Sean Watts & Theodore Richard, “Baseline Territorial Sovereignty and Cyberspace”, Lewis & Clark Law Review, Forthcoming (March 16, 2018), last revised on (31 July 2018), p. 775. 13 General Assembly, The Promotion, Protection and Enjoyment of Human Rights on the Internet, A/HRC/32/L.20 (27 June 2016), https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/ 845728?ln=en. 14 Ibid. 15 Ruslan Yusufov (Group-IB), interview with author, Skolkovo/Skoltech, Russia (20

November 2017).

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in the digital environment, consisting of interdependent networks of information and communication infrastructures, including the Internet, communication networks, computer networks and embedded processors and controllers.”16 Russia views cyberspace as an element of its broader “information sphere.”17 The Ministry of Defence of the Russian Federation specifically defines the “Information Sphere” as an area related to production, transformation, and use of information, including individual and public consciousness, information and telecommunications infrastructure, and information proper.18 Furthermore, based on the 2016 Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, the information sphere includes not only cyberspace, but also traditional media organizations and operations, social media platforms, telecommunications networks, and subjects whose activities are connected with the formation and processing of information, as well as a set of mechanisms for regulating relevant public relations.19 In the military realm, Russian military theorists and authorities refrain from using terms such as “cyberwarfare” or “cybersecurity,” instead relying on the concept of “information warfare” as an umbrella term that encompasses all cybersecurity-related activities and operations.20 Similar to the Russian understanding of the information space, within the framework of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization Agreement, the People’s Republic of China defines an “information war” as “a confrontation between two or more states in the information space aimed at damaging information systems, processes and resources, critical and other structures,

16 U.S. Department of Defense, “Strategy for Operations in the Information Environment” (June 2016). Web. https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/DoDStrategy-for-Operations-in-the-IE-Signed-20160613.pdf. 17 Russian Federation, Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation, Approved by Decree of the President of the Russian Federation, Articles 19 and 29, No. 646, Moscow, Russia, December 5, 2016. 18 Dictionary of Terms and Definitions in the Field of Information Security, 2nd

edition, extended and amended, Military Academy of the General Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (Moscow, Russia: Research Center for Information Security, 2008), p. 40. 19 Russian Federation, Doctrine of Information Security of the Russian Federation. 20 Michael Connell & Sarah Vogler, “Russia’s Approach to Cyber Warfare”, Center for

Naval Analyses Publication (March 2017), pp. 1–38.

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undermining political, economic and social systems, [and] mass psychologic[al] brainwashing to destabilize society and state, as well as to force the state to tak[e] decisions in the interests of the opposing party.”21 While for the Russian Federation cyber sovereignty is a relatively novel concept, in China it has already become one of the core aspects of policy in pursuit of a new digital world order. At the dawn of the digital age, the Chinese propaganda authorities originally underestimated the rapid emergence of social media outlets, and to embrace online media as a larger extension to “traditional propaganda tools.”22 Therefore, unlike China’s traditional media outlets, online content was not directly regulated by the government per se but instead managed by the state-controlled “private” Chinese companies. This would not last for long, as the Internet continued to evolve into a powerful platform posing an array of direct and growing challenges to the Chinese state power apparatus.23 First mentioned in a white paper entitled The Internet in China dated 2010, China’s move towards “cyber sovereignty” was further reinforced by President Xi Jinping at the BRICS summit in 2014. As noted earlier, according to the Chinese model of “Internet sovereignty,” cyberspace is a direct reflection of physical space, which, in turn, reflects a state’s sovereign territory. In promoting its proposed cyber policy, China has since been actively engaged in cultivating alliances and partnerships rooted if not in the same political and cultural ideologies, at least in comparable goals pertaining to the new digital world order.24 21 Agreement Between the Governments of the Member States of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization on Cooperation in the Field of International Information Security (16 June 2009), https://cis-legislation.com/document.fwx?rgn=28340. 22 Rogier Creemers, “Cyber China: Upgrading Propaganda, Public Opinion Work and Social Management for the Twenty-First Century”, Journal of Contemporary China, 26:103 (September 2016), p. 89. 23 The history of Internet censorship in China is outside of the scope of this paper, for more information, please see Rogier Creemers, “Cyber China: Upgrading Propaganda, Public Opinion Work and Social Management for the Twenty-First Century”; Eric Harwit, “The Rise and Influence of Weibo (Microblogs) in China”, Asian Survey, 54:6 (2014), pp. 1059–1087; and Neil Thomas, “China’s Two Greatest Internet Rumor Mongers and ‘Black PR’ Philanderers Arrested”, Danwei (22 August 2013), http://www.danwei.com/ chinas-two-greatest-internet-rumor-mongers-and-black-pr-philanderers-arrested/. 24 Yuxi Wei, “China-Russia Cybersecurity Cooperation: Working Towards CyberSovereignty”, Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, University of Washington (21 June 2016), https://jsis.washington.edu/news/china-russia-cybersecurity-coo peration-working-towards-cyber-sovereignty/.

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The conceptual strategy employed by Xi posits China as the next cyber superpower, and is viewed by Beijing as simultaneously a combination of the basic principles rooted in Marxism as well as in digital development of China under the new historical conditions in the technological sphere.25 The “Great Firewall” of China restricts online access to certain websites (i.e., Facebook and YouTube, to name but two)—and, furthermore threatens to crack down on Internet users within the sovereign borders of Chinese’s territory who “disguise” their IP addresses in order to circumvent the wall.26 At the World Internet Conference hosted by China in 2015, Xi proposed the “four principles,” including but not limited to “respect for cyber sovereignty”27 as an instrument towards promoting changes to the system of global Internet governance, cyber development, and management. Xi noted that the principle of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and overall sovereign equality of all states enshrined in the U.N. Charter is a “basic norm” in international relations that should also be extended to the cyberspace.28 In China’s pursuit of global cyber governance, Xi called upon the international community to insist on respecting every state’s Internet sovereignty by “respect[ing] the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development and model of cyber regulation,” and to this end “participate in international cyberspace

25 “Deepening the Implementation of General Secretary Xi Jinping’s “Strategic Thinking on Building China into a Cyber Superpower: Steadily Advancing Cybersecurity and Informatization Work”, Theoretical Studies Center Group, Cyberspace Administration of China, Qiushi (15 September 2017), http://www.qstheory.cn/dukan/qs/201709/15/c_1121647633.htm. 26 Rogier Creemers, Samm Sacks, Paul Triolo, & Graham Webster, “China’s Cybersecurity Law One Year On: An Evolving and Interlocking Framework”, New America (30 November 2017), https://digichina.stanford.edu/work/chinas-cybersecurity-law-one-yea r-on/. 27 Elsa Kania, Samm Sacks, Paul Triolo, & Graham Webster, “China’s Strategic Thinking on Building Power in Cyberspace”, New America (25 September 2017), https://www.newamerica.org/cybersecurity-initiative/blog/chinas-str ategic-thinking-building-power-cyberspace/. 28 Jinghan Zeng, Tim Stevens, & Yaru Chen, “China’s Solution to Global Cyber Governance: Unpacking the Domestic Discourse of ‘Internet Sovereignty”, Politics & Policy, 45:3 (2017), p. 433.

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governance on equal footing.”29 The “four principles” advocate domestic implementation of the model and, through the PRC’s open appeal to other state players to adopt its proposed policy, China actively calls for a joint, large-scale international consensus.30 Not surprisingly, Russia was one of the first players to eagerly embrace this model but not without certain key features of its own. Unlike Russia and China, the Western powers perceive the Internet as a “global commons” directly linked to a “a bottom-up, multi-stakeholder approach to […] governance” and “underpinned by principles of […] democratic governance and respect for human rights.”31 Whereas, Russia and China perceive the Internet as both a tool and a domain that is used within the borders of a given states and is therefore ought to be subject to national regulation through the implementation of cyber borders. This position calls upon a “a more top-down, territorial vision of how cyberspace should be governed” and “is underpinned by the principles of state sovereignty and non-interference.”32 Although outside the scope of this chapter, the Data Localization Law must be mentioned, as countries continue to adopt their own data protection standards, including the European Union’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which came into force on 25 May 2018. The EU’s GDPR is focused on individual protections of data, whereas the Russian and Chinese data localization laws encompass the top-down, state-controlled approach to the protection of data within the borders of each respective country. The European, Chinese, and Russian frameworks all reflect various facets of data localization and cyber governance that are, in turn, reflective of and inspired by the political cultures and realities of these countries. Multiple attempts have been made towards reaching a multi-national consensus on definitions or mutually acceptable norms over the past years,

29 Xi Jinping, except from his keynote address to the World Internet Conference in 2015, quoted in Zeng et al.’s “China’s Solution to Global Cyber Governance”, pp. 433– 434. 30 David Bandurski, “China’s Cyber-Diplomacy”, China Media Project (21 December 2015), https://chinamediaproject.org/author/david-bandurski/page/37/. 31 Camino Kavanagh, Tim Maurer, & Eneken Tikk-Ringas, “Baseline Review, ICTRelated Processes and Events: Implications for International and Regional Security (2011– 2013)”, International Cyber Security, ICT4Peace Foundation, Geneva, 2014, p. 34. 32 Ibid.

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but with only limited results. One such platform was the United Nations Group of Governmental Experts (UN GGE) on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security—a UN-mandated working group of experts from 25 countries, including the U.S., Russia, and China, focusing on emerging threats in information security. Six working groups have been established since 2004. However, in June 2017, the UN GGE failed to reach a consensus towards the creation of advance norms for responsible state behaviour in cyberspace.33 The two camps on either side of the spectrum expressed contrasting and seemingly irreconcilable understandings of international law pertaining to cyberspace, including: (1) the right to carry out countermeasures in the event of internationally wrongful acts, rooted in the contradiction between cyber sovereignty and the spirit of the unrestricted Internet, (2) the right to self-defence in cyberspace, and (3) international humanitarian law, which directly reflects the ongoing conflict between the online freedom of expression and state intervention in the name of national security.34 Unsurprisingly, both China and Russia called for the negotiation of a new and entirely separate treaty on information security on the basis that current international laws either do not adequately apply to the cyber domain or are otherwise not suited to the goal of regulating cyberspace. In contrast, the United Kingdom argued that the existing law of armed conflict, particularly the principles of necessity and proportionality, could also be reflected in cyberspace.35 In a similar vein, the United States

33 Tim Maurer & Kathryn Taylor, “Outlook on International Cyber Norms: Three Avenues for Future Progress”, Carnegie Endowment (2 March 2018), https://carnegiee ndowment.org/2018/03/02/outlook-on-international-cyber-norms-three-avenues-for-fut ure-progress-pub-75704. 34 The United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution on 27 June 2016 that condemns measures to disrupt Internet access, equating denial of a citizen’s undisrupted access to online freedom to a direct violation of one’s human right. 35 U.N. Secretary-General, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, supra note 171, at 11; id., Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, at 15, U.N. Doc. A/ 65/ 154 (20 July 2010), https://www.un. org/disarmament/ict-security/.

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claimed that “[t]he same laws that apply to the use of kinetic weapons should apply to state behaviour in cyberspace.”36 In October 2018, the UNGA’s First Committee adopted two separate and contradictory resolutions on cyber norms and regulations in the cyber domain. This was led by two of the Permanent Five Members of the UN Security Council—Russia and the United States. The first resolution sponsored by the Russian Federation called for reviewing the existing norms contained in the UN GGE reports, but at the same time, “introduc[ing] changes to them or elaborat[ing] additional rules of behavior,” and studying the possibility of “establishing regular institutional dialogue with broad participation under the auspices of the United Nations”37 in the form of an open-ended working group (OEWG) of the General Assembly. The resolution placed strong emphasis on state sovereignty in the cyber domain, as well as information and content control on the Internet. The second resolution submitted to the UNGA by the Western Europe and Other Group and sponsored by the U.S., calls for the continuation of the processes undertaken by the UN GGE on exploring how international law applies to the cyber domain and identifying ways to increase compliance with existing cyber norms by all member states of the world organization.38 Merely reviewing and comparing these two opposing proposals from two largely irreconcilable camps shows that, at least for the foreseeable future, the possibility of reaching a consensus in the international arena on cyber and information governance is bound to remain confined to a Utopian surrealism.

36 U.N. Secretary-General, Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/ 60/ 202 (August 5, 2005); Rep. of the Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security (2010), transmitted by Note from the U.N. Secretary-General titled Group of Governmental Experts on Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, U.N. Doc. A/ 65/ 201 (July 30, 2010). 37 General Assembly, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/C.1/73/L.27/Rev. 1 (29 October 2018), https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/gadis3619.doc.htm. 38 General Assembly, Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, A/C.1/73/L.37/Rev. 1 (18 October 2018), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/N18/327/70/ PDF/N1832770.pdf?OpenElement.

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One month later, in November 2018, the Third Committee of the UNGA approved two proposals submitted by the Russian Federation. The first proposal based on the Shanghai Cooperation’s “International Code of Conduct for Information Security” limits the use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) towards intervening in the domestic affairs of another state. The second document proposes a direct alternative to the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime (also known as the Budapest Convention39 ), of which Russia is not a signatory. The Budapest Convention, which was passed by the Council of Europe in November 2001, is aimed at regulating countries’ actions in the cyber domain in the fight against crimes committed on the Internet. According to the Director of the Russian Foreign Ministry’s Department for New Challenges and Threats, Ilya Rogachev, “It [the Budapest Convention] contains some provisions, that are unacceptable to us [the Russian Federation], specifically, Article 32 (b), on cross-border access to data.”40 Rogachev insisted that Article 32(b), which allows the owners of data to control its use, thus depriving the state of its due control of information, is, according to the Russian state “a breach of copyright, private property and interference in other states’ internal affairs.”41 In direct opposition to the Budapest Convention, under the auspices of the UNGA, the Russian Federation proposed a new international treaty—its very own convention—on “Countering the use of Information and Communication Technologies for Criminal Purposes.” Unlike the Budapest Convention, Ilya Rogachev argues that this alternative draft convention set forth by his government is rooted in “equal interaction based on legal cooperation between various countries, the existing mechanisms or creation of the new ones.”42 It must also be noted that although the document is in direct contradiction to the Western approach to data protection, the proposed resolution was, nevertheless, unanimously supported by 88 member states of the UNGA—not surprisingly, excluding most of the organisation’s Western members. The Russian authorities interpret this as a clear sign 39 “Convention on Cybercrime (Budapest Convention)”, Budapest (23 September 2001), https://rm.coe.int/1680081561. 40 “Russia to Propose Draft Cybersecurity Convention to UN General Assembly”, TASS (3 July 2018), https://tass.com/politics/1011749. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid.

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that being a signatory of the Budapest Convention (in order to discuss and actively debate the issues pertaining to cybercrime and cybersecurity more broadly) is no longer a precondition, thus serving as a competing alternative to the “hegemonic”43 U.S.-led model. Following two years of deliberations among 115 UN member states, government, and NGO organizations, and as a result of 200 written submissions and over 110 hours’ worth of on-the-record statements, the OEWG’s consensus report failed to establish greater state accountability over their actions in cyberspace. The consensus report is neither legally binding nor ground-breaking in its content. In June 2021, the 25-member GGE Working Group adopted a consensus final report, which, among other principles, cited Internet sovereignty on numerous occasions, including a demand to “respect for the sovereignty of other States.”44 However, the report failed to explicitly make the case for pursuing sovereignty in cyberspace as a binding national security rule. In December 2021, Iran’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN rejected “the use of force” in the cyber domain, noting that the Information and Communications Technology (ICTs) should be used solely for peaceful purposes. Among other principles, he highlighted his country’s assertion of the rights of state sovereignty in cyberspace. In obvious criticism of the UN GGE, Ambassador Majid Takht Ravanch identified the OEWG as “the UN’s first-ever inclusive, transparent, and multilateral intergovernmental process,”45 echoing similar positions held by both Russia and China advocating that placed cyber sovereignty on par with national security and secure borders, whereby a given state has the right to control its national segment of the Internet as it deems fit. Through the General Assembly’s resolution 74/247, the world body established an open-ended ad hoc intergovernmental committee of experts to elaborate on a potential comprehensive global convention focused on countering the use of information and communication technologies for criminal purposes. At the writing of this chapter, the second 43 Ibid. 44 Arindrajit Basu, Irene Poetranto, & Justin Lau, “The UN Struggles to Make

Progress on Securing Cyberspace”, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (19 May 2021), https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/05/19/un-struggles-to-makeprogress-on-securing-cyberspace-pub-84491. 45 “Iran Rejects Use of Force in Cyberspace”, ABNA (14 December 2021), https:// en.abna24.com/news/iran-rejects-use-of-force-in-cyberspace_1208356.html.

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meeting of the UN Ad-hoc Committee (AHC) took place between 30 May and 10 June 2022 and delved further into creating a potential global treaty on countering cybercrime.46 While the majority of governments participating in the Ad-hoc meeting differed on criminalization and the particular crimes that can/should be made illegal under the treaty, as well as the and the specific definitions of relevant terminology, the session steered participants away from politics, focusing instead on the technical issues—the primary aim of the committee.

Regulation vs. Sovereignty of Cyber Borders Regulatory responsibility is at times erroneously seen as the sole responsibility of one actor. Instead of appointing one governing body to control and police cyberspace, it should instead be a joint effort and a mutual responsibility shared among state and non-state actors, non-profit organizations, and those in the private sector that all ultimately operate under the umbrella of international law. Traditional legal doctrine continues to treat cyberspace as a mere transmission medium that enables the exchange of messages from one legally significant geographical place or location to another. To this day, there is no clear consensus on whether the “law of cyberspace” can or should evolve into an independent field or remain an extension of the criminal and international laws of the physical space. However, the emergence and rapid increase of cyber threats permeating the online sphere and converging with traditional security threats and vulnerabilities is radically changing this viewpoint. While the Internet is traditionally perceived as a borderless place, nation states, including Russia and China, view the domain in terms of defending their segment of the broader cyberspace. Lack of clear lines separating the responsibility of central regulation of cyberspace by state versus non-state actors and institutions, public versus private sectors, as well as the sheer incompatibility of traditional concepts of geography with the notion of borders in cyberspace, are just some of the reasons why it remains unclear as to how exactly both domestic and international law can apply to this domain.

46 “Under the Microscope: Delegates Get into the Details as UN Cybercrime Negotiations Move Forward”, Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (15 June 2022), https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/un-cybercrime-negotiations/.

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Today, the pursuit of cyber governance as a state policy is justified as a means for ensuring national security and thus maintaining safety and security of a given state and its netizens. However, it is important to separate the regulation of cyberspace as part of broader national security and sovereignty from a restriction or even a slight limitation of access to information and communication. In the increasingly unprotected cyberspace, nation states are susceptible to surveillance and malicious interference by a foreign state and non-state actors that directly impact the security and privacy of a sovereign state and its citizens. Without protecting the virtual borders of a country and its critical infrastructure from outside intrusion, a sovereign state is not only making itself vulnerable to illegal interference by malicious intentions, but is also endangering the safety and security of its population in an increasingly digitizing world. The UN and other international organizations continue to call for the creation and global adoption of universally acceptable cyber norms, attributing the lack of rules and regulations to the increasingly hostile conflicts and acts of lawlessness that continue to be exercised in the domain. And yet, from the outside looking in, it is becoming less likely that the universal adoption of cyber norms of behaviour can, in fact, secure and stabilize cyberspace. Even the most optimistic proponents of Internet openness and the democratic free flow of information are starting to question the practicalities of cyber norm adoption and implementation on a global scale. Due to its nature, the cyber domain is constantly evolving at “network speed,”47 and thus, abiding by a set of constructs and norms put into writing several years or even months earlier can be extremely challenging. However, at the same time, operating on the basis of complete openness in a “law-free” cyber zone is also tainted with numerous risks and threats pertaining to cyber hygiene and cybersecurity. Whether we treat cyberspace as a “libertarian fantasy” or a “true international space,”48 it is difficult to discount the fact that it is, after all, a cross-border concept

47 Jason Healey, interview with author, Columbia University, New York, September 28, 2018; Jason Healey, “Cyber Warfare in the 21st Century: Threats, Challenges, and Opportunities”, Testimony to US House Armed Services Committee (1 March 2017), https:// www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/CHRG-115hhrg24680/pdf/CHRG-115hhrg24680.pdf. 48 Jackson Adams & Mohamad Albakajai, “Cyberspace: A New Threat to the Sovereignty of the State”, Management Studies, 4:6 (November–December 2016), pp. 256–265.

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and traditional means are insufficient in protecting state sovereignty and territorial integrity in this domain. In this regard, Russia’s and China’s positions on this issue are no longer unique. Although at least designing, if not explicitly adopting, standards of Internet governance to mitigate the impact of a “semi-closed” national cyberspace on society is of vital importance, the likelihood of reaching a universal consensus on standards of cyber governance is further complicated by the irreconcilability of cultural and political sensibilities of different states and their national cyber environments. Both semi and fully authoritarian systems will, it seems, continue to veto the very notion of abiding by most global norms, especially if they continue to be crafted and proposed by Western policymakers.49

Conclusion The principles of sovereignty and non-interference in the cyber domain will likely persist as a vital defensive function and an indirect legitimization used by autocratic states, such as the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China, for limiting external intervention into their domestic affairs,50 and in the process, also restricting the free flow of information and tightening government control over the Internet as a way of “protect[ing] against political instability and civil unrest.”51 However, none of the above factors diminish the fact that pursuing cyber sovereignty by constructing “Great Firewalls” and “online Iron Curtains” and, thus, actively drawing cyber borders that further divide societies in the age of Internet globalization, will have detrimental effects on democracy and freedom of expression through censorship. The feasibility of unobstructed 49 A good example of this is the original Tallinn Manual that was drafted by U.S. and Western European academics and leading experts in the field. The Tallinn Manual is an academic, non-binding study of how international law applies to cyber conflicts and cyber warfare published by the NATO affiliated Cooperative Cyber Defense Centre of Excellence (CCDCOE). 50 Anthea Roberts, “Is International Law International?”, in Disruptions and Competitive World Order 2018 (Oxford University Press: 2017), p. 296. 51 U.N. Secretary-General, supra note 171, at 9–10; id., Developments in the Field of Information and Telecommunications in the Context of International Security, at 11, U.N. Doc. A/ 59/ 116 (23 June 2004); Christopher A. Ford, “The Trouble with Cyber Arms Control”, New Atlantis: Journal of Technology & Society, 29 (Fall 2010), pp. 52, 62.

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communication in the Digital Age continues to be challenged in the name of protecting the territorial and information sovereignty of states in cyberspace without taking into consideration the moral factors and an individual user’s self-determination. Whether limiting the free flow of information in the name of isolating and thus safeguarding national cyber borders from foreign interference is the answer for communications policy moving forward remains to be seen. For the time being, the “Balkanization” of the Internet—a policy that should, in theory, be part of a sovereign state’s national security policy, will continue to be used as a carte blanche for state authorities as sole Internet regulators who wish to exercise maximum control over their country’s information space and, as a result, further impinge upon the very notion of an open and unified global Internet.

CHAPTER 14

Tracing Accountability: Product Sourcing Technology and Implications for Conservation and Human Rights Initiatives Carolyn Forstein

The origin, production, and shipping pathways of goods are the subject of both national and international legal regimes across the Euro-Atlantic. The international community has long sought to protect environmental biodiversity by regulating the import and export of certain flora and fauna. States have also increasingly recognized the connection between business and human rights, and sought to craft protections aimed at holding corporations accountable for ensuring that their supply chains do not directly or indirectly facilitate human rights abuses. While legal regimes have developed around these issues, enforcement remains challenging in an era of unprecedented global commerce. New

C. Forstein (B) Robbins, Russell, Englert, Orseck & Untereiner LLP, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected]

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 227 Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9_14

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forensic technologies related to product sourcing, including molecular tagging, DNA and fibre analysis, and stable isotope analysis, can help promote supply chain integrity and, correspondingly, help identify products that contain illegally-exported resources or have ties to human rights abuses. This chapter seeks to highlight these technologies and textualize their potential uses in light of the current legal landscape and potential future initiatives.

Conservation The international movement to preserve and protect biodiversity by restricting wildlife trade spans decades. In the early 1970s, recognizing the need for a cross-border approach to protecting wildlife species, states drafted the Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES). CITES entered into force in 1975, and remains the preeminent international agreement on wildlife trade, with 184 current parties.1 State parties to CITES are required to implement permitting systems to regulate the trade of listed species. CITES lists over 38,700 protected species, divided into three groups: species threatened with extinction, species that may become threatened with extinction unless trade is subject to strict regulation, and species who do not fall into either of the above categories, but are protected at the national level by at least one state party. CITES imposes different permitting requirements for each protected group, with species in the first group subject to the most stringent protection. In order to determine whether to grant import or export permits, states are required to designate both national-level scientific authorities tasked with assessing whether a proposed export or import could be detrimental to the survival of the species, as well as national-level management authorities tasked with determining whether the specimen was obtained legally in the country of origin. In addition to implementing CITES, a number of states have implemented far-reaching legislation aimed at combating illegal trafficking in wildlife, fish, and plants that extends beyond the requirements of the Convention. In the United States, for instance, the Endangered Species Act directly incorporates CITES, making it “unlawful for any person 1 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, “What Is CITES?”, https://cites.org/eng/disc/what.php (Accessed 13 April 2002).

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subject to the jurisdiction of the United States to engage in any trade in any specimens contrary to the provisions of the Convention, or to possess any specimens traded contrary to the provisions of the Convention.”2 In addition, the Lacey Act prohibits trafficking in fish, wildlife, or plants taken in violation of either US or foreign law.3 While the Lacey Act explicitly captures the species protected under the Endangered Species Act and CITES, it also provides a basis for prosecuting violations of U.S. or other countries’ laws concerning species that are not listed under CITES. The European Union has taken a similar approach. The EU has implemented CITES through the EU Wildlife Trade Regulations, including Council Regulation (EC) No. 338/97, which incorporates the protected CITES species and broadly implements CITES’ legal framework, and Commission Regulation (EC) No. 865/2006, which provides detailed requirements for import and export permits. Going beyond CITES, the EU has also adopted broader prohibitions on trade in timber. The EU Timber Regulation prohibits the “placing on the market of illegally harvested timber or timber products derived from such timber,” and applies to all timber “harvested in contravention of the applicable legislation in the country of harvest.”4 As with the US Lacey Act, the EU Timber Regulation creates a mechanism for prosecution based on violations of other states’ timber harvesting laws, even if such trade would not run afoul of CITES. Several other countries have also adopted laws specifically aimed at curbing trade in illegally harvested timber. Like the EU Timber Regulation, the Australian Illegal Logging Prohibition prohibits the importation of anything “made from, or [that] includes, illegally logged timber,” and defines “illegally logged” as “harvested in contravention of laws in force in the place (whether or not in Australia) where the timber was harvested.”5 The Japan Clean Wood Act requires the government to “establish basic policies for promoting the use and distribution of Legally-harvested Wood

2 United States Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S. Code § 1538(c)(1). 3 United States Lacey Act, 16 U.S. Code § 3372. 4 European Union Timber Regulation, Regulation (EU) No 995/2010, (20 October

2010). 5 Australia Illegal Logging Prohibition Act 2012 No. 166, 2012.

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and Wood Products,”6 and the Korea Act on the Sustainable Use of Timbers requires the government to “formulate and implement necessary policies to ensure the distribution and use of timber or timber products produced... in compliance with the timber harvest-related statutes of the Republic of Korea or the country of origin.”7 The passage of these laws reflects the increased global focus on trade in illegally harvested wood products and growing interest in effective enforcement.

Human Rights The international community has also increasingly recognized the link between global trade and human rights, and the need to establish norms and procedures aimed at holding companies, states, and other commercial actors accountable for human rights violations committed in their supply chains. As a baseline, the prohibition on forced labour is well-established in international law. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that “[n]o one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour,”8 while the ILO Forced Labour Convention requires members to “undertake[s] to suppress the use of forced or compulsory labour in all its forms” and specifies that “[t]he illegal exaction of forced or compulsory labour shall be punishable as a penal offence.”9 More recently, the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, adopted in 2011, emphasized the need for businesses to affirmatively respect human rights, and for states to protect against human rights abuses occurring within their territory, including by businesses, and to provide access to remedies for victims of human rights abuses.10 States have codified these prohibitions in national laws in both broad and targeted ways. In the United States, the Tariff Act of 1930 prohibits 6 Japan The Act on Promotion of Use and Distribution of Legally-Harvested Wood and Wood Products (the Clean Wood Act), (20 May 2017). 7 South Korea Act on the Sustainable Use of Timbers, Act No. 14657, (21 March 2017). 8 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Art. 8(3)(a). 9 International Labour Organization Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (No. 29), Arts.

1, 25. 10 United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework (2011), https://www.ohchr. org/sites/default/files/documents/publications/guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.

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the importation of “[a]ll goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in any foreign country by convict labor or/and forced labor.”11 In addition to this general prohibition, in December 2021, the United States passed the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, which creates a rebuttable presumption that “any goods, wares, articles, and merchandise mined, produced, or manufactured wholly or in part in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region of the People’s Republic of China” were the product of forced labour and are prohibited from import under the Tariff Act of 1930.12 In the United Kingdom, the Modern Slavery Act of 2015 criminalizes forced labour and human trafficking, and additionally requires commercial companies over a certain size to prepare an annual “slavery and human trafficking statement” detailing the steps the company has taken to “ensure that slavery and human trafficking is not taking place” within its supply chain or business.13 As of July 2020, Canada prohibits the importation of “goods mined, manufactured, or produced wholly or in part by forced labour,”14 and is currently considering a law imposing annual supply chain reporting requirements for Canadian businesses.15 The European Union has discussed adopting an import ban similar to those in effect in the United States and Canada. In her September 2021 State of the Union Address, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen announced that the Commission would “propose a ban on products in our market that have been made by forced labour.”16 And politicians in the European Union, United Kingdom, and Canada have all expressed concern about forced labour in Xinjiang and the possibility of imposing targeted import bans or other measures aimed at rooting out human rights abuses in corporate supply chains.

11 19 U.S.C. § 1307. 12 U.S. Pub. L. No. 117–78 (Act of 23 Dec. 2021), sec. 3(a). 13 U.K. Modern Slavery Act 2015, sec. 54. 14 Canada Customs Tariff, Number 9897.00.00. 15 Canada Bill S-211, Canada’s Fighting Against Forced Labour and Child Labour in

Supply Chains Act. 16 Ursula von der Leyen, “European Commission State of the Union Address 2021” (15 September 2021), https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ SPEECH_21_4701.

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Emerging Sourcing Technologies Although these laws and frameworks exist for the protection of human rights and species conservation in international trade, enforcement remains a challenge. Countries largely rely on disclosure: while importers are obligated to certify compliance with environmental and/or human rights norms, it is difficult to test the veracity of these certifications, both due to the sheer volume of imports and the technical difficult of pinpointing the origin of various materials. On the environmental side, for instance, timber—including illegally harvested, protected timber— is utilized in a wide range of products, often in a highly-processed format, and may not be immediately recognizable as a protected species. This challenge is exacerbated with respect to human rights norms, which are focused on locations and practices rather than specific species. For example, while cotton is a primary focus of human rights-related trade legislation, including the recent legislation aimed at exports from Xinjiang, cotton is produced around the globe, and an imported cotton garment would not inherently trigger human rights concerns. Without clear documentation of the supply chain, it can be difficult to prove that the cotton was produced in an internationally unlawful manner. Several new sourcing technologies may help shift this balance. In recent years, new technologies have emerged that allow users to both trace and test timber and cotton specimens. These technologies, which involve both tagging products at the source to ensure traceability, and testing products after export to determine origin, have significant potential for both environmental and human rights initiatives. The following overview highlights three significant emerging forensic technologies related to sourcing. DNA Tagging: DNA tagging is a method for tracking a raw material or product throughout the supply chain. DNA tagging involves applying a molecular tag to a material, which then stays with that material throughout its lifespan. Once a product has been tagged, that product can be tested and traced by way of that tag. While tagging can be applied at any point in a product’s lifecycle, by tagging a material shortly after harvest—for instance, tagging raw cotton at cotton gins—producers can ensure that material is traceable even after it is processed and incorporated into other products. A U.S.-based biotechnology called Applied DNA Sciences has developed tagging technology and partnered with cotton producers in the United States, India, and Australia to tag millions of pounds of cotton

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over the last several years. After being harvested, the raw cotton is “misted” with Applied DNA Sciences’ tagging technology during the ginning process, before being processed into thread or fabric.17 Tagging allows downstream clothing manufacturers to verify that their products are entirely composed of cotton from a certain producer, and, conversely, to demonstrate that their products do not contain cotton connected to identified human rights abuses. After tagging “Australian cotton or Indian cotton or American cotton,” for instance, once “you know where it’s come from and can verify where it’s come from throughout the supply chain, then you also can verify where it has not originated from.”18 DNA/Fibre Analysis: DNA analysis, or fibre analysis, operates from the opposite perspective: rather than tracing a known product through the supply chain, DNA analysis is a means of testing a product of unknown origin and identifying it based on its DNA. In the timber context, “scientists use high powered microscopes to look at plant fibers and vessels in a snippet of paper to identify what types of trees were used to make it. Vessels are structures that transport nutrients and water in plants, and they have distinct anatomical features that allow for identification of its genus and, in some cases, species.”19 Fibre analysis can help identify the presence of protected species, even when repackaged and combined with non-protected materials, and thereby reveal illegal logging or harvesting practices. Stable Isotope Analysis: Stable isotopic analysis compares the ratios of chemical elements within a sample in order to verify its origin. These ratios naturally vary in different environments, and “are often correlated with various climatological, biological, and geological variables.”20 By examining these ratios within a specific sample and comparing it against reference samples from different parts of the world, forensic scientists can 17 Pimacott, “How Our Cotton Is Made”, https://www.pimacott.com/our-pure-pro cess/how-its-made (Accessed 24 August 2022). 18 BBC Business Daily, “Tracing Cotton’s DNA”, BBC (7 April 2021), https://www. bbc.co.uk/sounds/play/w3ct1jn9, at 12:34. 19 Ruth Nogueron & Craig Hanson, “Risk Free? Paper and the Lacey Act”, World Resources Institute (15 November 2020), http://pdf.wri.org/paper_and_the_lacey_act. pdf. 20 Jason Grant & Hin Keong Chen, “Using Forensic Science to Deter Corruption and Illegality in the Timber Trade”, World Wildlife Fund (March 2021), https://www. worldwildlife.org/pages/tnrc-topic-brief-using-wood-forensic-science-to-deter-corruptionand-illegality-in-the-timber-trade.

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narrow in on the provenance of the sample. While DNA analysis can help identify what species is in a fibre sample, stable isotopic analysis can help identify where the material in that sample originated. Stable isotopic analysis, particularly in combination with DNA analysis, has implications for import/export controls and provides a means of tracing products that are not universally prohibited, but whose harvest or export is prohibited or restricted from certain regions. These technologies carry significant potential for transnational law enforcement, as well as environmental and human rights advocacy campaigns.

Strategic Implications The illegal timber industry is “the world’s third largest criminal sector after drugs and counterfeit goods,” and is worth approximately $152 billion per year.21 Although the international community and individual states have developed a robust legal framework around illegal logging, the practice is both prevalent and lucrative. Fibre analysis and stable isotope analysis are potentially powerful tools for governments to use in identifying and prosecuting violations of environmental and export/import laws. Interpol has recognized both the threat posed by illegal timber harvesting and the potential for “timber forensics and high-tech tools to remotely monitor and identify logging concessions and illegal logging sites.”22 Timber forensics have already been discussed in a handful of cases. In 2013, the Environmental Investigation Agency, an international NGO, released a report documenting illegal logging of protected hardwoods in the Russian Far East. As the report described, the vast majority of illegally harvested Russian hardwoods were sent to China, where “the origins of illegally harvested timber are obscured as manufacturers mix it 21 Peter Yeung, “The ‘Timber Detectives’ on the Front Lines of Illegal Wood Trade”, National Geographic (9 March 2022), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/env ironment/article/the-timber-detectives-on-the-front-lines-of-illegal-wood-trade. 22 Interpol, “Forestry Crime: Targeting the Most Lucrative of Environmental Crimes”

(14 December 2020), https://www.interpol.int/en/News-and-Events/News/2020/For estry-crime-targeting-the-most-lucrative-of-environmental-crimes; see also United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Best Practice Guide for Forensic Timber Identification 2 (2016) (“Forensic analysis can significantly contribute to legal, sustainable and traceable trade in timber and non-timber forest products”).

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with legal sources,” and then distributed across the globe to “unwitting consumers, unaware of its illicit origins.”23 The United States Department of Justice subsequently charged Lumber Liquidators, a U.S.-based hardwood flooring retailer, with violating the Lacey Act by importing hardwood flooring manufactured in China from illegally logged Russian timber. Lumber Liquidators pled guilty in 2015 and agreed to pay more than $13 million in fines, leading to the “first felony conviction related to the import or use of illegal timber” in the United States and “the largest criminal fine ever under the Lacey Act.”24 A portion of this fine was directed to a project to develop “a wood identification device that if successful, could fill a critical gap in enforcement when it comes to identifying the species of timber at a border or in an enforcement scenario.” As the Department of Justice noted, “[i]f U.S. border officials would have had access to such a device in 2011, then perhaps Lumber Liquidators could have been flagged for violation years ago, thus averting the flow of money back to China and Far East Russia in support of illegal logging.” This prediction came to fruition in 2021, when the United States utilized tree DNA evidence for the first time in a federal criminal trial. The case did not involve imported timber, but instead centred on the defendant’s illegal logging operation in the Olympic National Forest, a nationally protected region in the state of Washington. The defendant, Justin Wilke, was charged with violations of the Lacey Act, as well as other crimes. At trial, the United States introduced testimony from a geneticist, who testified that the wood sold by the defendant was a genetic match to the remains of three poached trees that law enforcement discovered in the Olympic National Forest, and that “[t]he DNA analysis was so precise that it found the probability of the match being coincidental was approximately one in one undecillion (one followed by 36 zeroes).”25

23 Environmental Investigation Agency, “Liquidating the Forests” (9 October 2013), https://eia-global.org/reports/liquidating-the-forests-report. 24 U.S. Department of Justice, “Lumber Liquidators Inc. Sentenced for Illegal Importation of Hardwood and Related Environmental Crimes” (1 February 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/lumber-liquidators-inc-sentenced-illegal-import ation-hardwood-and-related-environmental. 25 U.S. Department of Justice, “Timber Thief Convicted Following 6-Day Trial” (9 July 2021), https://www.justice.gov/usao-wdwa/pr/timber-thief-convicted-following-6day-trial.

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In Europe, law enforcement officials have similarly recognized the potential utility of DNA and isotopic analysis. A recent report commissioned by the European Parliament’s Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs discussed the implementation and enforcement of the EU Timber Regulation, and noted that enforcing due diligence obligations remains challenging, as “cooperation with producer country enforcement authorities is weak or non-existent, which makes obtaining evidence of failures of due diligence difficult.” To improve enforcement, “competent authorities are increasingly using scientific analysis of products, for example through isotopic or DNA testing, to validate the information provided by companies on their products, since these tools can provide evidence that does not rely on cooperation with any agency in the countries of origin.”26 As indicated by these examples, DNA and stable isotope analysis create enormous possibilities for law enforcement to identify and produce evidence of illegal harvesting practices, even absent cooperation from other national authorities. While it has been predominantly deployed in connection with timber, these tools can also be used to identify other illegal activity, including poaching of protected wildlife and unregulated fishing. While sourcing technology is not infallible or allencompassing, and its application requires significant human expertise and time, continued development of streamlined technologies could significantly enhance countries’ abilities to enforce their own environmental commitments and legal regimes. In addition to identifying due diligence failures by importers, the ability to identify illegally harvested specimens could also potentially help authorities uncover and deter corruption and fraud throughout the supply chain. By increasing the likelihood that disguised or smuggled products will be exposed, forensic sourcing technologies increase the correspondent risk for individuals engaged in these practices. In addition to aiding law enforcement efforts, new tracing technologies may incentivize companies to take affirmative steps to ensure the legality and traceability of their supply chain. DNA tagging, for instance, provides cotton suppliers and purchasers with an affordable mechanism to prove 26 European Parliament Policy Department for Citizens’ Rights and Constitutional Affairs, “Internal and External Dimension of Illegal Logging: Legal Issues and Solutions” (3 November 2021), https://www.europarl.europa.eu/thinktank/en/document/IPOL_S TU(2021)700009.

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the origin of their products. If such technology becomes widely accessible, and if companies are alert to the possibility of enforcement, as well as increasing public demand for ethically and sustainably sourced products, commercial actors within the supply chain may conclude that it is within their own best interests to document their compliance with international norms. In a similar vein, forensic sourcing technology may be a helpful advocacy tool for environmental and human rights campaigns. On the environmental side, activists who suspect that certain products are being illegally harvested and transported may be able to use this technology to obtain supporting evidence and thereby initiate investigative or enforcement proceedings. From a human rights perspective, although identifying human rights violations across a supply chain is less straightforward than identifying a violation of a protected species law, sourcing technologies could be particularly useful where human rights abuses are tied to a particular industry or region. Cotton is a key example. For decades, the cotton industry in Uzbekistan was directly tied to forced labour, as the government conscripted citizens, including children, to work the annual cotton harvest. In 2007, a group of NGOs, trade unions, investors, and activists created the Cotton Campaign, an advocacy coalition focused on ending forced labour in cotton production. Among other tactics, the Cotton Campaign supported a global boycott of cotton from Uzbekistan, and launched the Uzbek Cotton Pledge. Over 330 brands and retailers, including major multinational companies, signed on, and committed to “not knowingly source Uzbek cotton for the manufacturing of any of our products until the Government of Uzbekistan ends the practice of forced labor in its cotton sector.”27 In March 2022, following policy changes by the Uzbekistan government, the Cotton Campaign ended its call for a boycott after monitors reported that there was “no central government-imposed forced labor in the 2021 harvest.”28 Although the Cotton Campaign did not specifically focus on forensic tracing, sourcing technology could have been a helpful tool in promoting 27 Cotton Campaign, “The Uzbek Cotton Pledge for Companies”, https://www.cot toncampaign.org/uzbek-cotton-pledge. 28 Cotton Campaign, “Cotton Campaign Ends Its Call for a Global Boycott of Cotton from Uzbekistan” (10 March 2022), https://www.cottoncampaign.org/news/cotton-cam paign-ends-its-call-for-a-global-boycott-of-cotton-from-uzbekistan.

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and encouraging implementation of the cotton boycott. For signatories to the boycott pledge, DNA tagging would provide a straightforward way to ensure that any cotton within their supply chain originated from outside Uzbekistan. At the same time, DNA/fibre analysis and stable isotope analysis could potentially allow advocates to identify the presence of Uzbek cotton in manufactured goods. These technologies could now prove useful in combating human rights abuses in Xinjiang, China. Human rights monitors have reported widespread state repression of Uyghurs and other ethnic and religious minorities in Xinjiang, including the use of compelled labour. Forensic tools could support governments, companies, and human rights activists in efforts to identify and deter imports originating from forced labour in Xinjiang. As human rights researchers have explained, identifying instances of forced labour in Xinjiang is especially challenging as the region is tightly controlled and heavily surveilled, so that “many of the traditional tools that companies use, such as labor audits, are not effective.”29 Accordingly, companies seeking to trace their supply chains could potentially utilize “new technologies such as identification of DNA traits that could indicate whether a cotton-containing product contains Xinjiang cotton and thus test the veracity of supplier sourcing claims.” In the United States, where the 2021 Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act established a presumption that any products harvested or manufactured in Xinjiang are the product of forced labour, forensic technologies could also help uncover and prove violations of this law. In June 2022, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security issued a report describing its strategy for preventing violations of the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act, and identified “DNA traceability or isotopic testing” as a potential form of evidence capable of showing that goods imported to the U.S. were completely sourced from outside Xinjiang.30

29 See, e.g., Amy K. Lehr & Mariefaye Bechrakis, “Connecting the Dots in Xinjiang, Forced Labor, Forced Assimilation and Western Supply Chains”, Center for Strategic and International Studies (October 2019), https://www.csis.org/analysis/connecting-dots-xin jiang-forced-labor-forced-assimilation-and-western-supply-chains. 30 United States Department of Homeland Security, Strategy to Prevent the Importation of Goods Mined, Produced, or Manufactured with Forced Labor in the People’s Republic of China, Report to Congress, 49 (June 2022).

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Conclusion In sum, emerging forensic technologies are a potentially potent tool for both governments and private actors seeking to implement and enforce international legal compacts, combat transnational crime, and ensure supply chain authenticity. As these technologies continue to develop, and as databases of references samples continue to grow, they may become increasingly accessible, accurate, and applicable to a wider range of products. In addition to the environmental and human rights applications described above, tracing technologies could be particularly helpful in enforcing political sanctions regimes targeting products originating in specific sanctioned countries. While these technologies have gained increasing attention from the international community over the last several years, there are a number of hurdles to more widespread implementation. DNA and stable isotope analysis, for instance, utilize reference samples, and “[t]he collection of more reference samples is considered one of the greatest obstacles to implementing genetic and chemical methods for species identification and determining the geographic region of origin.”31 The financial cost of forensic validation is also a significant obstacle to a broader roll-out. However, recent statements by the United States and the European Union about the potential efficacy of such technologies demonstrate the growing interest in these technologies, and a number of initiatives are working to build reference databases and consider how these scientific techniques can further policy aims.32 Legislation that expressly places the burden on importers to ensure supply chain authenticity and to be able to document the legality of their imports may also spur companies to invest in technology that will allow them to clearly document compliance. Governments across the Euro-Atlantic space should continue to support the development and utilization of these tools as mechanisms, and consider their implications for more effective enforcement when crafting new trade restrictions and rules. 31 Melita C. Low et al., “Tracing the World’s Timber: The Status of Scientific Verification Technologies for Species and Origin Identification”, IAWA Journal (29 July 2022). 32 See Low et al., “Tracing the World’s Timber” (describing initiatives “to bring together scientists, policy makers, and industry stakeholders who work on technologies and policies to reduce illegal logging”, including World Forest ID, which “aims at creating extensive global reference databases”).

Index

A Algorithms, 17–19, 21, 115, 135, 159, 162, 165, 169–172 Artificial intelligence (AI), 8, 40, 49, 57–59, 62, 64, 68, 70, 89, 90, 114–117, 119, 123–140, 142, 159, 162–173, 178, 183, 192, 204 Autonomous weapons systems (AWS), 59, 159–168, 170–173

B Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), 48, 75, 82, 83 Big data, 18, 20, 114, 134

C Canada, 18, 74, 83, 138, 231 China, 8, 15, 19, 43–55, 58, 61, 62, 67, 70, 71, 74–85, 110, 127, 132, 136, 137, 212, 213, 215–218, 221, 222, 224, 234, 235, 238

Climate change, vii, viii, 77, 85, 109–113, 116, 121, 122, 196, 199, 202 Cold War, 57, 58, 61, 67, 71, 92, 96, 100, 101, 105, 129, 130 COVID-19, 18, 51, 78, 178, 182, 192 Cyber, 57–59, 66, 68, 90, 96, 106, 132, 143–157, 180, 183, 188, 191, 192, 209–213, 215–225 attack, 145, 146, 181 threats, 138, 143, 183

D DNA, 228, 232–236, 238, 239 Drones. See UAVs Dual-use technology, 57, 61

E European Commission (EC), 70, 82, 83 European Union (EU), 16, 19, 28, 32, 41, 43–46, 48–50, 54, 58,

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 J. Berghofer et al. (eds.), The Implications of Emerging Technologies in the Euro-Atlantic Space, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-24673-9

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INDEX

65–71, 74–76, 78, 80, 82–84, 144, 147, 149, 151, 186, 188, 196, 217, 229, 231, 239

P Paris Agreement (PA), 196, 198 Poland, 19, 74, 95, 149, 150

F Facebook, 17, 216 Fake news, 14, 16, 17, 19

Q Quantum computing, 57–59, 178, 183, 184, 192

G General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 16, 19, 217 Germany, 6, 9, 23, 24, 27–30, 33, 39, 65, 74, 79, 81, 83, 100, 147, 149 Globalisation, 4, 9

R Renewable energy, 74, 75, 77, 80, 81, 84, 195–199, 202–205, 208 Russia, vii, 7, 15, 19, 43, 44, 46–51, 54, 55, 68, 71, 74–78, 81, 85, 105, 130–132, 137, 144, 146, 149–153, 155–157, 206, 210, 212–214, 217–222, 224

H Hypersonic missiles, 91

I International law, 144, 145, 154, 160, 167, 169, 172, 210–212, 218, 219, 222, 230 Internet, viii, 3, 8–21, 45, 46, 51, 58, 114, 143, 157, 183, 184, 209, 210, 212–225 Iran, 15

L Liberal international order (LIO), 3, 4, 9–11, 13, 14

N NATO, viii, 44, 46, 47, 54, 106, 113, 115, 118, 134, 144–152, 155 Nuclear weapons, 94, 96, 99–102, 121, 124, 126, 135, 138–140

S Science and Technology Studies (STS), 97, 98 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 25, 35

T Turkey, 44, 51, 52, 54, 103

U UAVs, 165 Ukraine, viii, 68, 71, 75, 77, 85, 144, 149–151, 153–155, 157, 189, 207 Ukraine War (2022), 207 United Kingdom (UK), 15, 27, 96, 114, 116, 127, 133, 140, 218, 231 United Nations (UN), viii, 12, 24–27, 55, 146, 189, 190, 199, 218, 219, 221, 223

INDEX

United States (US), 9, 11–15, 19, 43–47, 49–55, 58, 61–65, 67–71, 74–80, 82, 84, 91, 100–106, 112, 118, 121, 129,

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131, 132, 136, 140, 147, 148, 150–152, 154, 155, 157, 179, 202, 210, 218, 219, 221, 228–232, 235, 238, 239