The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Union 9780847673780

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The Im pact o f World War II on the Soviet Union

THE IMPACT OF WORLD WAR II ON THE SOVIET UNION

Edited by

Susan J. Linz University of California Irvine

ROWMAN & ALLANHELD PUBLISHERS

To Sarah Elisabeth and Hilary Nicole

ROWMAN Si ALLANHELD Published in the United States o f America in 1985 by Rowman & Allanheld, Publishers (A division o f Littlefield, Adams & Company) 81 Adams Drive, Totowa, New Jersey 07512 Copyright © 1985 by Rowman & Allanheld, Publishers All rights reserved. No part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without prior permission o f the publisher. L ib ra ry o f C o n g r e ss C a ta lo g in g in P u b lica tio n D a ta

Main entry under title: The Impact o f World War II on the Soviet Union. Includes index. 1. Reconstruction (1939-1951)— Soviet Union— Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. World War, 1939-1945— Influence— Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Soviet Union — History— 1925-1953— Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Linz, Susan J. II. Title: Impact o f World War 2 on the Soviet Union. III. Title: Impact o f World War Two on the Soviet Union. D829.S65146 1985 947.084*2 IS B N 0-8476-7378-2 IS B N 0-8476-7379-0 (pbk.)

84-17804

Printed in the United States o f America 84 85 86 / 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

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Table of Contents \j

Tables and Figures Acknowledgments

1 Introduction: War and Progress in the USSR, Susan J. Linz PART I

1

WORLD WAR II AND ITS AFTERMATH 2 World War II and Soviet Economic Growth, 1940- 1953, Susan J. Linz Appendix: Capital Reconstruction and Postwar Development o f Income and Consumption, Wassily Leontief 3 Successful Spatial Management, Holland Hunter 4 Crisis Management in the USSR: The Wartime System o f Administration and Control, Sanford R. Lieberman 5 Soviet Peasantry in World War II, Alec Nove 6 The Soviet Bible Belt: World War IPs Effects on Religion, William C. Fletcher 7 Soviet Policy and the Division o f Germany, 1941- 1945, Robert M. Slusser

PART II

vii xi

11 38 47 59 77 91 107

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONSEQUENCES OF WORLD WAR II 8 Postwar Soviet Society: The “Return to Normalcy”, 1945-1953, Sheila Fitzpatrick 9 The Impact o f World War II on the Party, Cynthia S. Kaplan 10 The Impact o f World War II on Leningrad, Edward Bubis and Blair A. Ruble

129 157 189

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Table of Contents

11 Demographic Consequences o f World War II on the Non-Russian Nationalities o f the USSR, Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver 12 World War II in Soviet Literature, Deming Brown 13 Debates About the Postwar World, Jerry F. Hough 14 Conclusion: Impact and Aftermath o f World War II, James R. Millar

283

Index Contributors

293 299

207 243 253

Tables and Figures

Tables 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.1A 2.2A 2.3A 2.4A 2.5A 3.1 3.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 5.6 5.7 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5

Soviet State Budget, 1940-1946 Actual and Planned Soviet National Income: 1940, 1944, 1945, 1950 Soviet Employment and Wage Data, 1940-1953 Actual and Potential Aid Estimates, 1945-1953 Calculated National Income Produced, Distributed by Source, USSR, 1937-1940 and 1945-1952, Case 1 Calculated National Income, Distributed by Use, USSR, 1937-1940 and 1945-1952, Case 1 Per Capita Consumption, USSR, 1937-1940 and 1945-1952 Calculated National Income Produced, Distributed by Source, USSR, 1937-1940 and 1945-1952, Case 2 Calculated National Income, Distributed by Use, USSR, 1937-1940 and 1945-1952, Case 2 Railroad Management Personnel, by Administrative Level and Length o f Time in Current Assignment, as o f 13 November 1938 Annual Railroad Passenger Traffic, USSR, 1937-1951 Agricultural Employment, 1941-1945 Average Annual Trudodni, 1940-1943 Agricultural Machinery in Sovkhozy, 1940-1944 Nominal Value o f Average Trudoden, 1940-1945 Real and Biological Yields, Kazakhstan, 1940-1943 Grain Yields in Sovkhozy and Kolkhozy, 1940, 1943-1945 Kolkhozy Livestock in Rear Areas, 1940-1943 Wage and Salary Earners in the Soviet National Economy in Millions Labor Recruitment Sources for Heavy MachineBuilding Enterprises o f the USSR, 1946-1949 Composition o f Labor Force o f Kuzbass Coal Combine Breakdown o f the Industrial Workforce o f the USSR, 1945 and 1948 Livestock and Sown Area o f Kolkhozy, 1941-1950

14 16 18 27 40 41 43 44 45 52 56 79 80 82 85 86 86 87 139 140 141 145 145

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Tables and Figures

8.6 8.7 8.8a 8.8b 8.8c 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 9.7 10.1 10.2 10.3 10.4 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.8 10.9 10.10 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4

Size and Breakdown o f the Kolkhoz Population o f the USSR (boundaries o f 1939) Money Income o f Kolkhoz Households by Region, 1945-1950 Kolkhoz Population o f the USSR, in Millions, 1945-1950 Kolkhoz Population o f the RSFSR, in Millions, 1940-1950 Population o f the USSR, Rural and Urban, 1940-1954 Local Party Membership Distribution o f Political Generations in Party Organi­ zations Social Composition o f Local Party Membership Kolkhozy with Primary Party Organizations by Oblast and Republic Education o f Obkom, Raikom, and Republic Central Committee Secretaries The Political Generation o f Raion Party Committee and Revkom Members The Education o f Okruzhkom, Gorkom, and Raikom Party Secretaries Membership o f Leningrad City Party Organization, 1939-1954 Leningrad Party Membership as a Percentage o f National Party Membership, 1917-1971 (Selected Years) Composition o f Leningrad City and District Soviets, 1939 and 1947 Production o f Selected Industrial Products, USSR and Leningrad, 1940, 1950, and 1955 Relative Increase in Productivity o f Selected Branches, 1940, 1950, and 1960 Structure o f Leningrad in Industry in 1960 Output o f Selected Leningrad Industries, 1956 Investment in the National Economy, 1918-1960 Numbers o f Specialists with Higher and Technical Edu­ cation in National Economy, 1913, 1940, and 1955 Research Assignments Made by RSFSR People’ s Com ­ missariat o f the Enlightenment, by Discipline and Lo­ cation, 1935 Groupings o f Thirty-four Non-Russian Nationalities in the Analysis Sex Ratios in 1959, by Age and Grouping Number o f Women Married per Thousand Women, by Age in 1959 Pearson Correlations between Sex Ratio and Proportion o f Females Married by Age for Thirty-four Non-Russian Nationalities, 1959

145 147 148 148 149 162 164 165 166 169 172 173 192 193 194 196 197 198 198 199 201 202 213 214 215 218

Tables and Figures

Pearson Correlations between Sex Ratio and Estimated Proportion o f Females Ethnically Intermarried by Age for Thirty-four Non-Russian Nationalities, 1959 11.6 Estimated Number per Thousand Ethnically Russifying, 1959-1970, Among People Age 0-8 and 9-18 Years in 1959 11.7 Pearson Correlations Among Background and Ethnic Pro­ cess Variables Used in Multivariate Analysis 11.IB Multiple Regression Equation for War Bride Cohort 11.2B Multiple Regression Equation for War Widow Cohort

ix

11.5

220 225 226 241 242

Figures 2.1 3.1 3.2 3.3 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6

Impact o f Reparations and Economic Aid on Soviet Ag­ gregate Output Railroad Freight Traffic, Russia and USSR, 1913-1928, and USSR, 1937-1952 Gross Industrial Output, USSR, 1940-1944 Annual Railroad Passenger Traffic, USSR, 1937-1951 Number o f Males in the Soviet Union by Single Year o f Age, 0-48, in 1959 Number o f Females in the Soviet Union by Single Year o f Age, 0-48, in 1959 Sex Ratio in the Soviet Union by Single Year o f Age, 0-48, in 1959 Number o f Ukrainians per Thousand with Russian as Native Language in 1959 by Age, Sex, and Urban-Rural Residence Number o f Chuvash per Thousand with Russian as Native Language in 1959 by Age,Sex, and Urban-Rural Residence Results o f Multiple Regression Analysis o f Ethnic Process Variables

29 49 54 56 209 209 211 217 217 229

Acknowledgments

I am particularly indebted to James R. Millar and James Richardson for their support, encouragement, and assistance in the early stages o f this project. I thank Paul Gregory, Ted Uldricks, and members o f the Russian Area Studies Program at Louisiana State University for their help. My sincere appreciation also goes to each o f the contributors for submitting and revising their papers in a timely manner. Working with them has been an enlightening and altogether pleasurable activity. Above all, I thank my husband and two daughters for their patience and understanding during my preoccupation with this book. Financial assistance for this project was provided by the Research Council at Louisiana State University, the Ford Foundation, and the American Association for the Advancement o f Slavic Studies.

1 Introduction: War and Progress in the USSR SUSAN J. LINZ

World War II represents an important watershed for the Soviet Union. Economically, it was the first real test o f the Soviet system o f central planning. Politically, it thrust the USSR into the world arena as a major world power. Socially, it provided a cohesive force previously lacking in Soviet society. One need only visit the Soviet Union to get a sense o f the profound impact o f World War II on the people. Indeed, over fifteen thousand Russian volumes have been written about the Great Patriotic War. In spite o f the recognized magnitude o f the impact o f World War II, little research has been done in the West to understand the ways in which World War II affected Soviet economic, political, or social systems. For­ tunately, this situation is reversing as more scholars are beginning serious analyses o f the war period. The difficulty lies, however, in the extreme lack o f statistical information pertaining to the war effort despite recent access to archival material. A number o f the essays that compose this volume were presented as original research studies to a symposium held at Louisiana State University (LSU) in April 1983. The symposium was made possible by grants from the Research Council at LSU, the Ford Foundation, and the American Association for the Advancement o f Slavic Studies. The principal aim o f the two-day symposium was to bring together prominent scholars from the United States and abroad in numerous disciplines including economics, political science, history, sociology, literature, and religion, to investigate the ways in which World War II affected Soviet life. In addition, several other essays were generously made available by scholars unable to attend. The essays cover the entire war and postwar period (through Stalin’ s death in 1953). Comprehensive coverage was not, however, a primary goal.

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Emphasis was instead placed upon identifying the impact o f the war in the author’ s area o f expertise, with encouragement also given to identifying World War II’ s continuing impact in the USSR. As such, this volume offers a useful starting point for what promises to be a rich and extended area o f study in future years. Indeed, much work still needs to be done on the impact o f the war on the Soviet military. The salient and unifying theme that emerges from this collection is the overwhelming success o f the Soviet system in fighting back the German onslaught in the face o f almost impervious odds initially and in spite o f tremendous losses o f men and materiel. This volume is divided into two parts. Part I examines the impact o f World War II and its aftermath; Part II, the social and political consequences o f the war. The essays are arranged in each section from general to more specific themes. In Part I, the first essay examines the impact o f World War II on Soviet economic growth, using available Soviet and Western data. In addition to identifying the war’ s impact on aggregate economic indices, disaggregated data on the industrial sector, labor force, and household consumption are analyzed. More importantly, Chapter 2 puts the impact o f World War II on the Soviet economy into perspective by developing a measure o f the burden that the economic cost o f the war imposed upon the postwar population. Calculations by various methods yield estimates o f the postwar replacement cost o f total material war losses ranging from approximately 8 to 10 years’earnings o f the 1945 labor force, supporting the claim that World War II cost two Five-Year Plans. The potential for a reduction in the postwar burden o f World War II, had additional aid [Lend-Lease, United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) funds, the U.S. loan, Marshall Plan aid] become available, is also examined by Linz in Chapter 2. A comparison is then made between the impact o f the aid actually received in the form o f reparations, “pipeline” Lend-Lease, and UNRRA assistance on postwar recovery efforts and eco­ nomic growth potential with that o f the potential additional foreign assistance programs. Two similar scenarios are also examined in the Appendix to Chapter 2. This essay is an edited version o f a paper written in 1944 by Wassily Leontief (1973 Nobel laureate) for the Research and Analysis Division o f the U.S. Office o f Strategic Services. Leontief’ s findings were made available exclusively for inclusion in this book for comparison purposes since both the methodology and results are strikingly similar to those o f Chapter 2 despite a span o f nearly four decades. The primary focus o f his paper was to describe capital reconstruction and postwar development o f Soviet national income and consumption. The two scenarios depicted in his counterfactual analysis include one in which postwar military expenditures return to the 1938 level and reconstruction proceeds without the help o f foreign credits, although domestic gold stocks are depleted for 3 years to finance recon­ struction. In the second scenario, foreign credits are available to the extent o f $1.5 billion per year for 3 years. Leontief calculated in 1944 that the rate o f reconstruction would not be greatly increased should foreign aid

Introduction: War and Progress in the USSR

3

become available, making only a few months’difference in terms o f restoring investment levels. Both Leontief and Linz conclude, on the basis o f completely separate analyses, that, although the cumulative indirect effect on Soviet national income would have been appreciable had additional foreign aid been forthcoming, reparations had a more direct and important impact on reconstruction efforts. An important component o f the successful war effort involved the massive evacuation o f industry from frontline areas to locations deep in the Soviet interior. Railroads were essential during World War II both in Soviet evacuation operations and troop movement. Holland Hunter, by providing a geography o f World War II in the USSR in Chapter 3, puts into relief the transport operations that were carried out to insure Soviet success in World War II. As Hunter indicates, World War II provided a test for the Soviet transportation and comm unication sector— mainly the railroads— and this sector like m ost others passed the test successfully. Instead o f contributing to a collapse o f the regime, as the Russian railroads had done in World War I, Soviet railroads in World War II provided sturdy links which held the whole country together. They weathered the massive invasion which excised their m ost developed portions, and through flexible adaptation and energetic responses, carried the men and materiel which enabled Soviet armed forces to eject and defeat the Nazis.

Sanford Lieberman pursues the evacuation theme in Chapter 4 by describing the special wartime system o f administration and control adopted to undertake the massive effort. The primary focus o f his essay involves an analysis o f the operation and effectiveness o f the State Defense Committee (GKO) that was superimposed upon the Soviet system during World War II in order to circumvent the traditionally rigid and time-consuming aspects o f the bureaucratic procedure. The GKO provided the administrative flex­ ibility and centralization o f control that the war effort required. Special committees and commissions were set up under GKO to deal with specific aspects o f the war effort: military, political, security, economic. In addition, city committees for defense and a Council for Evacuation were established during the war to deal with general crises. Yet, as Lieberman points out, in spite o f the variety o f extraordinary organs established, no special administrative mechanism was adopted to implement the decisions o f the GKO and other extraordinary organs. Hence, GKO business was executed through regular state administration and Party channels. Lieberman contends that, given this situation, Stalin’ s personalized style o f leadership was therefore an important factor in the successful war effort. The impact o f World War II on Soviet agriculture is analyzed by Alec Nove in Chapter 5. His essay brings to this volume both the breadth and depth o f a longtime scholar o f the Soviet economy. Nove’ s analysis o f the war’ s impact on physical output and political controls in the agricultural sector, and on peasant incomes and welfare during the war and early postwar period, attests to his reputation in the field. Beyond simply analyzing the

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data, Nove brings to life the appalling situation, the desperate shortages, the errors o f policy, and the hardships suffered in the rural sector during World War II. Moreover, he documents the antipeasant policies that impeded recovery after the war. William Fletcher examines the pervasive impact o f World War II on religion in the USSR in Chapter 6. He argues that World War II changed church-state relations for an entire generation after the war because it affected the nature o f the church and, religiously at least, altered the nature o f society in ways that were profound and probably permanent. What emerged from World War II, Fletcher contends, was a bargain between church and state. In return for political services, the state granted the church the right to exist as an institution in Soviet society. The key to understanding the effect o f World War II, however, is found in the resulting religious demography. World War II created a Soviet “Bible Belt,”and those areas under German occupation during the war still show the legacy o f the occupation in terms o f a transformation o f their religious profile. More importantly, however, World War II won for the Russian church a legal, as opposed to an underground, existence in society at the cost o f narrowing its mission to the purely spiritual. Fletcher concludes that World War II established a bargaining pattern o f church-state relations that, modified and weakened, remains to this day. An interesting account o f the impact o f World War II on Soviet policy and the division o f Germany is provided by Robert Slusser in Chapter 7. He argues that The establishment o f an East Germ an state was not the outcom e o f a deliberate and conscious policy on the part o f Stalin and his advisors, but rather the unforeseen and in part unwanted culmination o f Soviet actions and policies toward Germany in interaction with those o f the three Western Allies.

Indeed, Slusser contends that the basic lines along which Germany was dismembered were drawn up by British planners in 1943-44, with the Soviets accepting the plan because it gave them more than they could have hoped to achieve by any other means. The British plan assured the Soviets o f controlling 40 percent o f Germany’ s prewar territory, and a third o f her postwar population and resources. The plan also gave them a commanding position in Berlin. According to Slusser, Soviet wartime policy toward Germany pursued a number o f goals, some o f them predicated on its unity, others on its dismemberment: In effect, Stalin wanted to have it both ways— an assured portion o f Germ an territory under Soviet control and at the same time a strong position in the postwar struggle for a united Germany. What Stalin did not want was a Sovietcontrolled East German successor state com peting with a larger, richer, m ore populous West Germ an state enjoying the support o f the Western Allies. Yet this is what he got.

Introduction: War and Progress in the USSR

5

Part II examines social and political consequences o f World War II in the USSR. In spite o f data difficulties, Sheila Fitzpatrick puts together a remarkably in-depth account o f World War II’ s impact on Soviet society in Chapter 8. World War II’ s most devastating impact was upon the population, both in terms o f actual losses and population transfers during the war and immediate postwar period. In addition to an enlightening and thorough analysis o f the war’ s impact on urban life and labor recruitment, Fitzpatrick provides a seminal analysis o f Soviet convict and conscript labor during this period. Moreover, her description o f rural life and migration from the kolkhoz offers an interesting and complementary overlap with Nove’ s discussion o f Soviet peasantry (Chapter 5). Fitzpatrick also examines the concept o f a “return to normalcy”in the postwar period, which implies a release from wartime obligations and constraints, relaxation o f tension, going home, and settling down. Yet, as she points out, these qualities, however desired by Soviet citizens, were not characteristic o f the Soviet Union in the immediate postwar period. Instead, obligations and constraints were scarcely diminished. Many survivors uprooted by World War II could not or did not return home. In response to a query, as to why there was no return to normalcy, Fitzpatrick offers a concise analysis o f the abnormal prewar period, a period o f social revolution and structural transformation. She also speculates about the Soviet regime’ s attitude about normalcy under Stalin’ s reign, concluding that only after Stalin’ s death did things relax. In Chapter 9, Cynthia Kaplan analyzes the impact o f World War II on the Party by distinguishing between the Party as a political organization and an administrative organ responsible for the performance o f other organizations in the USSR. Kaplan then compares behavioral tendencies associated with the direct effects o f World War II with prewar and postwar party behavior. Having examined the war’ s impact in light o f prewar and postwar trends, she concludes that the direct and indirect effects o f World War II had long-term consequences for the Party—wartime enrollments increased the Party’ s size—while the prewar trend toward greater party saturation among white-collar workers continued. The essay by Edward Bubis (formerly a Leningrad city planner) and Blair Ruble (Chapter 10) is an in-depth analysis o f the impact o f World War II on Leningrad, a city in which more than ten times the population died between August 1941 and January 1944 than died in Hiroshima following the atomic blast in August 1945. In addition to the loss o f human life, German bombardment obliterated over 25 percent o f Leningrad’ s capital stock (housing, streets, water and sewer lines) and caused the destruction o f countless architectural and artistic treasures. Bubis and Ruble contend that more important than the physical destruction and loss o f life was the war-related change in Leningrad’ s status in Soviet society. They perceive the war’ s impact as both negative and permanent, concluding that during the decade o f the 1940s, the once majestic city o f Leningrad became simply a second city to the larger, more dynamic, and increasingly more cosmopolitan Moscow. Their conclusions are derived from an examination o f several

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economic and political indices that indicate a transformation o f the city’ s work force; industrial, economic, and scientific base; and political elite: Despite the loss o f many important functions to M oscow during the 1920s and 1930s, Leningrad had remained a direct com petitor to the Soviet capital in many spheres. The War physically and psychologically destroyed much o f the city. Perhaps even more important in the long run, the W ar’ s destruction provided an excuse for anti-Leningrad leaders in M oscow (who, after all, emerged as predominant in the wake o f the Leningrad Affair) to justify the diminution o f Leningrad econom ic and academic capacity--- By not rebuilding secondary econom ic sectors, . . . central econom ic planners insured that Leningrad would lack the kind o f econom ic diversity so necessary for the maintenance o f urban distinction. The end result has been that, to a considerable degree, Leningrad never recovered from the impact o f World War II.

Barbara Anderson and Brian Silver focus their essay (Chapter 11) on the immediate impact and on the long-term, indirect consequences o f World War II on a set o f demographic factors involving non-Russian nationalities o f the USSR. Their essay is especially topical, given the growing interest in the Soviet nationality question over the last decade. The authors review the impact o f World War II on the Soviet population as a whole as background to their examination o f the war’ s differential impact among non-Russian nationalities. The main thesis o f their essay is that the differential impact o f World War II on non-Russian nationalities is reflected in the differential ratios o f males to females, and that these differentials contributed to varying rates o f ethnic intermarriage and also to subsequent linguistic and ethnic russification o f the nationalities. Anderson and Silver suggest that quite apart from the direct and immediate losses o f population during the war, the normal balance between the number o f males and females became so skewed for some nationalities that if unmarried women were to find spouses at all (and many would not) many had to marry men o f other nationalities. Their paper clearly demonstrates the powerful effect World War II had on linguistic and ethnic russification o f non-Russian nationalities. They conclude that World War II was a turning point in demographic history for most o f the autonomous republic nationalities (ARN), arguing that for the ARN as a whole, the immediate losses during the war, however large they appear to be, were less significant than the ensuing accelerated russification that was induced by World War II. The social and political consequences o f World War II are evident in Soviet literature, as Deming Brown illustrates in Chapter 12. Because literature in the USSR usually represents a direct reaction to public events, the impact o f World War II on Soviet literature was enormous. Indeed, between 1941 and 1945 the efforts o f the Soviet writing community were almost completely devoted to the war. Writers became journalists, and poets read verses to enthusiastic audiences at the front. As Brown indicates, although wartime writing was strongly hortatory, urging Russians to endure and inciting them to smash the enemy, it was at the same time less

Introduction: War and Progress in the USSR

7

programmed and more candid, emphasizing the strengths o f simple Russians. As the war progressed and victory became more evident, however, official manipulation o f literature increased. In the postwar years, the literary community was encouraged to continue to write about the war, and as Brown states, the “function o f war fiction became one o f demonstrating the role o f the Communist Party leadership and ideology in mobilizing for victory, o f showing the indispensability o f Stalin’ s leadership, and o f proving that the heroic exploits that won the war could only have been accomplished by the especially endowed New Soviet Man.”O f special interest in Brown’ s essay is his analysis o f the manner in which Stalin was portrayed in postwar war-related literature. In the final chapter o f Part II, Jerry Hough explores some o f the crucial debates about the West that took place in the last years o f World War II and the early postwar period. Understanding these debates is vital. In and o f themselves, they remind us that much conflict was hidden behind the Soviet totalitarian facade, even in the postpurge period. More importantly, however, Hough points out that it is possible that the debates reflected divisions at the leadership level and that the origins o f the Cold War are more complex than usually assumed. Moreover, even if the debates were totally irrelevant so far as policy outcome was concerned, they provide an excellent example o f the types o f expressions o f views that were able to emerge in the press in the Stalin period and, therefore, contribute to a more sophisticated understanding o f the policies o f that period. James Millar puts into perspective the combined efforts o f the numerous authors who have contributed to this collection by providing an innovative overview o f the war period in the concluding chapter. Like each o f the authors, he brings to this volume a sense o f the profound impact o f World War II on the Soviet people.

Part One

World War II and Its Aftermath

2 World War II and Soviet Economic Growth, 1940-1953 SUSAN J. LINZ

The impact o f World War II on the Soviet economy has received little scholarly attention in the West, not because the economic impact was considered unimportant, but because the period from 1940 to 1953 more than any other in Soviet history is characterized by a paucity o f economic data. For over a decade, Nove’ s Economic History o f the USSR (1969) remained the primary Western source regarding the contours o f the Soviet war effort. Beyond this, little attention has been devoted to the structural changes brought about by World War II. No one, for example, has examined in any detail the quantitative impact on planning, production, or distribution patterns that resulted from (1) the long-term increase in female labor force participation rates, (2) the movement o f industry to the East, (3) technology transfer in the form o f Lend-Lease aid or reparations, or (4) new territories annexed during World War II. Even less attention has been focused on the impact o f World War II on Soviet national policy. Zaleski (1980) and Dunmore (1980) stand alone in their respective examinations o f the impact o f World War II on planning practices and regional policy. Textbooks on the Soviet economy devote at most only a paragraph or two to transition from the late 1930s to early 1950s. Fortunately, this situation is reversing as more scholars are beginning serious analyses o f the war period. This paper examines the impact o f World War II on Soviet economic growth. The first section documents World War II’ s impact on the Soviet economy between 1940 and 1953, using available Soviet and Western statistics. In addition to identifying the war’ s impact on aggregate economic indices, it also analyzes disaggregated data on the industrial sector, labor force, and household consumption. The next section puts the impact o f World War II into perspective by examining a measure o f the burden that

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the economic cost o f the war imposed upon the postwar population. Calculations by various methods yield estimates o f the postwar replacement cost o f total material (nonhuman) war losses ranging from approximately 8 to 10 years’earnings o f the 1945 labor force, supporting the Soviet claim that World War II cost two Five-Year Plans (Tamarchenko 1967, 135). The war cost estimates initially presented include the reduction in the postwar burden resulting from foreign aid and reparation payments received between 1945 and 1953. As such, they do not represent the true cost o f World War II to the Soviet people. It is possible, however, to estimate roughly the impact o f reparations and other foreign aid [“pipeline” Lend-Lease1 and the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA) funds] on postwar recovery efforts. The estimates derived in this section indicate an initial contribution o f some 4 months to 1 year’ s earnings o f the 1945 labor force. That is, had reparations and aid not been received, the immediate postwar burden on the Soviet people would have been substantially higher. This section also examines the potential for a reduction in the postwar burden had additional foreign assistance (the proposed U.S. loan and Marshall Plan aid) become available. The impact on postwar recovery efforts and Soviet economic growth potential o f additional aid with that o f reparations and aid actually received from 1945 to 1953 are compared. The results indicate that within the framework employed in this paper, Stalin was perfectly rational in declining Marshall Plan assistance. The final section offers some speculations on the cost to the Soviets o f winning World War II. The Appendix following this essay is an edited version o f a paper written in 1944 for the U.S. Office o f Strategic Services by Wassily Leontief (1973 Nobel laureate). The primary focus o f his paper was on describing capital reconstruction and postwar development o f Soviet national income and consumption. Two scenarios are depicted in his counterfactual analysis: In the first, postwar military expenditures return to the 1938 level and re­ construction proceeds without the help o f foreign credits, but domestic gold stocks are depleted for 3 years to finance reconstruction. In the second scenario, foreign credits are available to the extent o f $1.5 billion per year for 3 years. Leontief calculated in 1944 that the rate o f reconstruction would not be greatly increased should foreign aid become available, making only a few months’difference in terms o f restoring investment levels.

The Impact of World War II on the Soviet Economy The Soviet effort in World War II began in June 1941 with the German invasion, Operation Barbarossa, and found itself at a disadvantage early on, both militarily and economically. In spite o f vast natural resource reserves, the high quotas o f the initial Five-Year Plans required extensive exploitation o f European Russia. As a result, the resource base in eastern regions o f the USSR remained largely untapped. Correspondingly, no real efforts had been made prior to 1941 to urbanize or develop transportation

World War II and Soviet Economic Growth

13

facilities in the East. Moreover, the purges in 1936-1937 o f top political, economic, and military leaders caused a substantial prewar decline in industrial output (Katz 1975). Within 6 months o f the invasion, German forces occupied or isolated territory that prior to World War II accounted for over 60 percent o f the total coal, pig iron, and aluminum production; nearly 40 percent o f total grain production, and 60 percent o f total livestock. Moreover, this area contained 40 percent o f the prewar Soviet population, 32 percent o f the state enterprise labor force, and one-third o f the fixed capital assets o f the state enterprise sector (Nove 1982, 271). The speed o f the German advance impinged upon Soviet evacuation efforts, but official Soviet sources report that from July to November 1941, over 6 million people and 1523 industrial enterprises were removed to eastern regions (Urals, West Siberia, Central Asia, Kazakhstan), o f which 1360 were large-scale enterprises (employing more than 100-500 people) (Istoriya 1963, 1:148; Chadayev 1965, 65; Kravchenko 1970, 123-25). An additional 150 enterprises were evacuated from behind the Leningrad and Stalingrad fronts in 1942-1943 (Eshelony 1960, 108, 140). Excellent analyses o f the magnitude o f the evacuation effort are provided by Hunter (Chapter 3), Lieberman (Chapter 4), and Nove (Chapter 5). Evacuation, occupation, and conversion to military production caused a severe decline in aggregate output. Not until March 1942 did industrial output regain its 1940 level. Indeed, 1942 marks the turning point o f the Soviet war effort. By the end o f that year, the Soviets had regained occupied areas, and industrial output in eastern regions had increased over twofold its 1940 level. These gains were not sufficient, however, to offset the detrimental impact o f the “scorched earth”2 campaigns and wartime losses on aggregate output. National income at the end o f the war was still some 20 percent below its prewar level. Agricultural production did not regain its prewar level until after World War II ended as Nove (Chapter 5) and Fitzpatrick (Chapter 8) indicate in their detailed analyses o f World War II’ s impact on the agricultural sector. Millar (1980) offers a seminal analysis o f the financial aspects o f the Soviet effort in World War II. Indeed, using the sources and uses o f State Budget funds for the war years, he traces the impact o f war costs and warrelated structural changes in the Soviet economy. Because the State Budget is so comprehensive in the USSR, including all investment flows in the economy as well as military and nondefense categories o f expenditure, Millar is able to provide a relatively detailed sketch o f the magnitude o f the Soviet war effort by analyzing budgetary data. His war budget table is reproduced in part here (see Table 2.1) to facilitate explanation o f the impact o f World War II on aggregate economic indices (lines A, B, J, P). Most striking is the increase in defense outlays (line A), which rose from 33 percent o f all budget nonfinancial uses o f funds in 1940 to nearly 60 percent in 1942, averaging over 50 percent for the war period. A comparison o f the share o f wartime defense outlays with the 1940 level is somewhat

Table 2.1 Soviet State Budget, 1940-1946

A. B. C. D. E. F. G. H. I. J. K. L. M. N. O. P. Q. R. S. T.

Uses of funds, non-financial Defence outlays Outlays on the national economy of which: All industry Heavy and machine tool industry only Agriculture (excludes procurement) MTS only Transport and communications Housing and communal services Trade and agricultural procurement Social-cultural outlays of which: Education & enlightenment Health and physical culture Grants to families Social insurance Social maintenance Administration Total non-financial uses above Other, unidentified uses of funds* Total expenditures chargeable against ordinary receipts of which: Republic and local budget non-financial outlays

1940

1941

5.7 5.8

8.3 5.2

1943 1944 1945 (billions of 1960 rubles) 10.8 12.5 13.8 12.8 3.2 7.4 3.3 5.4

2.9 2.6 1.3 0.8 0.7 0.3 0.2

3.0 2.8 0.9 0.6 0.6 0.1 n.a.

1.8 1.7 0.5 0.3 0.4 0.1 n.a.

1.8 1.6 0.5 0.3 0.6 0.1 0.1

3.1 2.8 0.7 0.4 0.9 0.2 0.1

4.1

3.1

3.0

3.8

2.2 0.9 0.1 0.5 0.4

1.5 0.7 0.1 0.3 0.6

1.0 0.7 0.1 0.2 1.1

0.7 16.3 0.8

0.5 17.1 1.7

17.1 4.2

1942

1941-45

1946

58.2 24.4

7.4 10.6

4.4 3.9 0.9 0.5 1.1 0.3 0.2

14.0 12.8 3.6 2.1 3.6 0.8 n.a.

7.0 n.a. 1.3 n.a. 1.2 0.4 0.3

5.1

6.3

21.3

8.0

1.3 0.8 0.1 0.3 1.3

2.1 1.0 0.1 0.4 1.7

2.6 1.1 0.2 0.5 2.0

8.5 4.3 0.7 1.7 6.6

3.8 1.4 0.4 n.a. 2.1

0.4 17.4 0.7

0.5 20.1 0.7

0.7 25.0 1.1

0.9 27.4 2.1

3.1 107.0 6.3

1.2 27.4 4.9

18.8

18.1

20.8

26.1

29.5

113.3

32.1

3.1

2.2

2.6

3.8

4.8

16.5

6.6

u. V. w. X. Y. z. AA. BB. CC. DD. EE. FF. GG. HH. JJ. KK. LL. MM. NN. 00. PP. QQ.

Sources of funds Enterprise profit withdrawals Turnover tax receipts Total above (U + V) Income tax from cooperatives, kolkhozy, etc. Income of the MTS Transfer of cash balances of socialized sector Direct taxes and fees from population of which: Agricultural tax Income tax Housing and cultural tax Taxes on bachelors, one-person and childless families War tax War lottery receipts Money gifts to Red Army & Defense Funds Total above (AA -I- GG + HH) Local taxes and collections Other republic and local non-financial income Social insurance contributions Total non-financial sources of funds above Other unidentified sources of funds5 Total non-financial sources of funds of which: Republic and local budgets

■Residual: (S-Q)

2.2 10.6 12.8 0.3 0.2 —

2.4 9.3 11.7 0.3 0.1 2.0

1.5 6.6 8.1 0.2 0.1 —

2.0 7.1 9.1 0.3 0.1 —

2.1 9.5 11.6 0.3 0.1 —

1.7 12.3 14.0 0.3 0.1 —

9.7 44.9 54.6 1.7 0.4 2.0

1.7 19.1 20.8 0.3 n.a. —

0.9

1.1

2.2

2.9

3.7

4.0

13.8

2.3

0.2 0.4 0.4 —

0.2 0.5 0.4

0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1

0.4 0.6

0.5 0.9

0.6 1.1

—

—

—

0.1

0.2

0.3

1.8 3.4 0.6 0.8

n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

2.0

0 .0

_

— — 0.9 0.2 0.4 0.9 15.7 1.2 16.9

0.1 0.2 1.4 0.1 0.5 0.7 16.8 -0 .5 16.3

1.4 0.2 0.5 2.9 0.2 0.3 0.6 12.4 2.6 15.0

1.7 0.3 0.5 3.7 0.3 0.4 0.7 14.6 3.3 17.9

2.1 0.5 0.5 4.7 0.6 0.5 0.9 18.7 4.9 23.6

3.9

3.1

2.2

2.6

3.5

—

_

0.1 4.1 0.6 0.6 1.0 20.7 6.3 27.0

7.2 1.2 1.8 16.8 2.0 2.3 3.9 83.7 16.7 100.4

2.3 n.a. n.a. 1.2 24.6 5.4 30.0

4.1

15.5

6.2

—

bResidual: (PP-NN)

Source: James R. Millar, "Financing the Soviet Effort in World War II" Soviet Studies, 32, no. 1 (January 1980), 109-11.

— —

16

Susan J. Linz

Table 2.2 Actual and Planned Soviet National Income: 1940,1944,1945,1950 (billion rubles, 1940 prices)

%

1950 (Plan)

%

1940 (Actual)

%

1944 (Actual)

%

1945 (Actual)

National Income

377.4

100.0

303.1

100.0

331.1

1. Consumption a. Households b. Military Personnel

279.3 264.3 15.0

74.0 70.0 4.0

188.3 150.0 33.3

60.5 49.5 11.0

217.7 188.5 29.2

2. Investment a. Fixed Capital b. Livestock c. Inventories Industrial Agricultural

66.1 40.5 0.1 25.5 18.5 7.0

17.5 10.7

13.4 7.5

6.8 4.9 1.9

40.6 22.7 0.1 17.8 14.6 3.2

5.9 4.8 1.1

48.8 27.9 1.5 19.4 15.0 4.4

14.7 103.5 8.4 56.6 5.0 0.5 5.8 38.0 4.5 30.0 8.0 1.3

20.5 11.2 1.0 7.5 5.9 1.6

3. Defense

27.0

8.5

76.9

26.1

62.3

19.5

29.0

6.9

5.0

1.3

2.3

0.8

2.3

0.7

6.0

1.2

4. Other

0.0

0.0

100.0 504.5 100.0 65.8 366.0 72.5 56.9 351.0 69.6 3.0 8.8 15.0

Source: E. Zaleski, Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933-1952 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 352.

misleading, however, because the share o f defense outlays had already begun to rise sharply by 1940 in anticipation o f war. Defense outlays in 1937, for example, represented only 17 percent o f all budget nonfinancial uses o f funds. Yet by 1940 this category had reached some 34 percent. In addition, as Millar points out, the defense category o f the State Budget understates total war-related expenditures because o f the exclusion o f outlays connected with the conversion o f plant, equipment, and manpower to war production, and the additional civilian administrative cost occasioned by World War II. These administrative costs are examined in more detail by Leiberman (Chapter 4). Perhaps more than anything else, Table 2.1 indicates the relative and absolute decline in nondefense outlays during World War II, in addition to documenting the impact on the economy o f the loss o f some 20 to 50 million people3 and 30 percent loss o f the capital stock. The adverse effect upon household consumption was particularly severe, falling from 74 percent o f national income in 1940 to 66 percent o f a lower national income in 1945. This occurred at a time when grain stocks were reduced to augment consumption (see Table 2.2, and Nove’ s discussion in Chapter 5), and social security payments (which include payments to families o f those killed or disabled in World War II) were rising (Table 2.1: lines M, N, O). Official Soviet sources report that capital formation also declined drastically during World War II, from 19 percent in 1940 to 4 percent in 1942. Indeed, the prewar rate o f capital formation was not regained at any time during the war (Tamarchenko 1967, 50-51). Hence, expenditures on the war effort rose at the expense o f consumption and investment, from 11 percent o f national

World War II and Soviet Economic Growth

17

income in 1940 to a high o f 44 percent in 1943. Yet, as Millar indicates, citing the official Soviet history o f World War II, even this share understates the fraction o f real national income that was absorbed by the war effort by some 15 percent in 1942. IMPACT ON INDUSTRY World War II caused both short- and long-term changes in Soviet industrial sectors in terms o f level o f production, composition o f output, and regional emphasis. In total, some 31,850 large-scale industrial enterprises were “put out o f production” (although not all were completely destroyed) during World War II (Voznesenskii 1948, 95), representing more than 80 percent o f the prewar number o f industrial enterprises located in the Ukraine, Belorussia, and occupied areas o f the Russian Socialist Federated Republic (RSFSR). From 1941 to 1945, the composition o f industrial output adjusted to meet the needs o f the war effort. Indeed, the proportion o f industrial output devoted to defense during the war exceeded that o f heavy industry and light industry combined (Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1972, 168). Reconstruc­ tion priorities dictated the emphasis on heavy industry in the postwar period as is evident in the distribution o f industrial investment (Kapital'noe stroitel’ stvo 1961, 66-67) and the reduced share o f light industry (as a percentage o f gross industrial output) in the postwar period (Kravchenko 1970, 351). In spite o f this, light industry experienced more rapid gains in the immediate postwar period (Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1972, 195). More long-term in nature was the impact o f World War II on the location o f industry. New construction in eastern regions was exceedingly rapid in the first two years o f World War II. Capital investment in heavy industry directed to the Urals and Western Siberia rose from 13 percent in 1940 to nearly 40 percent in 1942 (Sokolov 1946, 20). Evacuation and recruitment policies generated a 65 percent increase in the industrial work force in the Ural and Volga regions between 1940 and 1943 (Voznesenskii 1948, 65). The combined result o f these policies was an expansion o f industrial output in the eastern regions from 3.94 billion (new)4 rubles in 1940, to 9.12 billion in 1944 (Voznesenskii 1948, 46). Dunmore suggests, however, that the long-term nature o f the locational shift should not be overestimated. First, growth o f industrial production in the eastern regions was concentrated in the defense sector, possibly exag­ gerating the extent o f wartime industrial growth. Second, although defense production expanded in the East, output o f foodstuffs, timber, and con­ struction materials in this region fell substantially during World War II. “To claim that the war gave the eastern areas a greatly expanded base for postwar industrial growth is to ignore the disproportionalities between sectors within that base”(Dunmore 1980, 36). Third, the quality o f wartime construction in the East was significantly lower than peacetime norms because o f the urgency with which these industrial enterprises were built, thereby shortening the life o f both the buildings and equipment. Fourth,

18

Susan J. Linz

Table 2.3 Soviet Employment and W age Data, 1940-1953

1940 1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953

Average annual employment* (millions)

Average annual wage (new rubles)5

Average annual industrial work force (millions)

31.2 27.4 18.4 19.4 23.6 23.7 30.6 32.1 34.3 36.1 38.9 40.7 42.2 43.7

397 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 521 570 683 723 745 767 791 807 815

8.3 7.8 5.5 n.a. n.a. 7.2 10.2 11.0 12.1 12.9 14.1 14.9 15.5 n.a.

■Workers and salaried officials in national economy; excludes collective farm workers and military personnel. bPost-1961 rubles. Source: Trud v SSSR (1968) 22; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR (1956), 189; G. Kravchenko, Voennaia ekonomika SSSR, 1941-1945 (1963), 98, 218; Promyshlennost SSSR (1964), 84.

reconstruction in western regions took priority over industrial expansion in the East. In part this was because reconstruction efforts focused on civilian (heavy) industry as opposed to armament production, which pre­ dominated in the East. “Liberated areas”received a greater share o f capital investment in 1944 than in 1940 (Kravchenko 1970, 221). Lastly, recon­ struction efforts in the western regions employed the latest technology, whereas “new” plants in the East utilized old technology and evacuated equipment.

IMPACT ON POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE The most pervasive impact o f World War II in the USSR is found is the devastating human loss incurred by the war. The 1939 census reports 170.6 million people living in the 1939 territory, and approximately 20 million living in newly acquired regions,5 putting the 1939 population in present boundaries at some 190.7 million. A rough estimate, based on a 2.5 percent annual increase in population, indicates a 1959 population o f 240 million; however, the 1959 census shows only 208.8 million, implying a loss o f some 30 million people. The correspondingly adverse affect o f World War II on the work force is shown in Table 2.3. Not shown is the increased work

World War II and Soviet Economic Growth

19

effort occasioned by World War II, nor the change in the composition o f the work force to include more women, youths, and elderly. A detailed analysis o f the composition o f wartime population loss is provided by Fitzpatrick (Chapter 8). Most striking is the war-related change in the number o f women relative to men. In 1939, the number o f women in the USSR exceeded that o f men by some 7 million. By 1959, there were 20 million more women than men, with almost all o f this surplus concentrated among women 32 years old and older. Anderson and Silver (Chapter 11) examine the demographic consequences o f these wartime population losses, with particular emphasis on the impact on non-Russian nationalities. An indirect consequence o f World War II on the Soviet population and work force stems from the postwar industrialization drive, which was influenced not only by reconstruction efforts, but also by the USSR’ s emergence from World War II as a major world power. The impact o f these conditions is evident on postwar rural-urban distribution patterns. Histor­ ically, the majority o f Russians lived in rural areas: in 1913, only 18 percent o f the population lived in urban centers; in 1939, less than one-third. Yet by 1959, almost half lived in urban areas. Indeed, the urban population rose from 60 to 100 million people from 1939 to 1959, while over this same 20-year span, the rural population fell from 130 to 109 million (Schwartz 1958, 109). The impact o f the rapid postwar growth in urban areas is documented and analyzed by Fitzpatrick in Chapter 8. Bubis and Ruble (Chapter 10) examine postwar rural-urban distribution patterns in detail for Leningrad, and their implications for Party membership and leadership. Another consequence o f World War II is found in the shift in population to the East. Some 47 million people were located in eastern regions o f the USSR in 1939. By 1959, this figure reached 63 million. During the same period, Kazakhstan experienced a 50 percent increase in population (6.1 to 9.3 million), while the population west o f the Urals only rose from 144 to 146 million (Schwartz 1958, 109). Nove (Chapter 5) provides a vivid description o f the movement east by the peasantry. Mobilizing sufficient labor resources for the war effort involved strength­ ening labor discipline codes and imposing restrictions on labor mobility and individual employment choice. An October 1940 decree authorized compulsory transfer o f engineers, technicians, and skilled workers from one enterprise to another. In July 1941, this right was granted to a number o f regional and provincial committees, allowing for forced assignment o f certain military personnel and workers to jobs in agriculture, industry, and con­ struction. A decree in December 1941 forbade workers in war industries to leave jobs for the duration o f the war, and in September 1942, another decree extended this to transport personnel and all workers in areas near the front. Additional restrictive decrees were issued in April and May 1943 (Shigalin 1960, 240-41). The impact o f these policies on the distribution o f the industrial labor force is illustrated in part by Dunmore (1980, 73, 128) and described in more detail by Fitzpatrick (Chapter 8). The most

20

Susan J. Linz

pronounced impact on labor recruitment and mobilization for the war effort resulted from the February 1942 decree that required the labor services o f all men between the ages o f 16 and 55 and all women 16 to 45 years old. Over 730,000 civilians were mobilized: 565,900 from urban areas, 168,000 from rural areas. O f these, 191,000 were sent to war industries (Shigalin 1960, 242). In addition to direct controls over labor to offset manpower shortages resulting from wartime losses and increased military service, other policies adopted during World War II to combat declines in industrial production included lengthening the working day 1 to 3 hours, suspending vacations, emphasizing the replacement o f male with female labor, and additional training. From June to December 1941, nearly 1 million housewives and schoolgirls (grades 8 to 10) were brought into the production process. The proportion o f women in the total labor force rose from 38 percent in 1940, to 53 percent in 1942, reaching 55 percent by 1945. In industry, women represented 41 percent o f the work force in 1940, 52 percent in 1942 (59 percent in the electric industry in 1942) (Zhenshchina 1960, 35; Kravchenko 1970, 99). Kravchenko (1970, 97-98) also reports actions taken to train skilled workers, declaring that in 1942, for example, 80 percent o f all industrial workers took training courses. A parallel effort was made to train tractor drivers and agricultural mechanics. A final consequence o f World War II on the Soviet population and labor force entails the war’ s impact on forced labor. One U.S. estimate puts the number o f persons in concentration camps in 1948 at 13 million (Schwartz 1949, 116). Other estimates range from 2-3 million to 20 million people (Jasny 1951, 405-7). Forced labor personnel included German prisoners, other enemy soldiers, and “politically dangerous”Soviet citizens (returning military personnel, former kulaks, religious officials, and political or minority group dissidents). Fitzpatrick provides an excellent discussion o f conscript and convict labor in Chapter 8. IMPACT ON HOUSEHOLD CONSUMPTION A comparison o f money incomes and expenditures o f Soviet households in 1940 and 1945 yields some insight into the impact o f World War II on civilian consumption patterns. Zaleski (1980, 442-47) reports that wages, salaries, and other payments (including military pay) in 1945 exceeded the 1940 level by some 2.3 billion rubles, in spite o f restrictive wartime policies over wages. Income from the sale o f products in collective farm markets rose fourfold (by 9.4 billion rubles) from 1940 to 1945 as a result o f wartime food shortages. Similar wartime increases are found in the pensions and allowances category o f household income which rose from 73 million rubles in 1940, to 2.37 billion in 1945. In spite o f these increases, however, the share o f total consumption in national income was much lower in 1945 than in 1940 (see Table 2.2) despite a lower level o f national income in 1945 as compared to 1940.

World War II and Soviet Economic Growth

21

A dditional insight regarding the im pact o f W orld W ar II on civilian household co n su m p tio n is found in w ar-related ratio n in g practices ad o p ted to m obilize resources for the w ar effort. T he first rationing decree (July 1941) affected Moscow, L eningrad, a n d th e su rro u n d in g provinces (21 u rb an areas, 17 districts) an d encom passed such p ro d u cts as bread, m acaroni, sugar, butter, fat, groats, m eat a n d m eat products, a n d fish. In ad d itio n , a n um ber o f m anufactured pro d u cts were rationed: cotton, linen, rayon fabrics, ready-m ade clothes, leather a n d ru b b er shoes, a n d soap. R ationing was extended to different p rodu cts an d to different cities a n d provinces as the w ar w ore on. T he m agnitude o f w ar-related ratio n in g is best illustrated by the n um ber o f in d iv id u als actually involved in the rationing process. T he C o m m issariat o f Trade (w hich included the A d m in istratio n for R ationed Supplies) su­ p ervised the centralized allocation o f co nsum er goods. Zaleski (1980, 351) concludes that, adm inistratively, th is occupied 14,000 persons in 3,100 offices at the en d o f the war, w ith som e 13,000 persons w orking in 1,900 control offices to supervise the d istrib u tio n o f ration cards, w hich in tu rn em ployed 400,000 in d iv id u als (although only 20 percent were full-tim e employees) to d istrib u te ratio n cards in in d u strial enterprises a n d ap a rtm en t organizations. N early 61 m illion people in u rb an areas were affected by ratio n in g in 1941. By 1944, th is figure had risen to 76.8 m illion. In D ecem ber 1945, 80.6 m illion Soviet people were supplied w ith bread u n d er the rationing system (o f w hich som e 26.8 m illion lived in rural areas). N eedless to say, the results o f the vast ap p aratu s o f d istrib u tio n an d control were not always satisfactory eith er to the state or the Soviet people.

IMPACT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH W orld W ar II caused a severe setback in the growth o f o u tp u t in the USSR. T he ground lost in term s o f the grow th rate w as not recovered by 1953, nor even by 1961. In large p a rt th is stem s from the reduction in Soviet p o pulation an d labor force, not only o f the losses im m ediately attrib u tab le to W orld W ar II, b u t also from the reduction o f the Soviet leadership’s capacity to expand the labor force. Also con trib u tin g to the d etrim en tal im pact o f W orld W ar II on the aggregate grow th rate o f the econom y was the long-term character o f the 30 percent loss o f capital stock. T he n atu re o f th is loss includes direct destruction, cu rtailed investm ent, a n d hence, a reduction in productive capacity not only d uring W orld W ar II, b u t also for an indefinitely long p eriod after the war. A vailable d ata (M oorsteen a n d Powell 1966, 386) suggest th a t had it been possible to m ain tain the investm ent growth rate indicated by prew ar trends, the absolute volum e o f investm ent realized in each o f the post-1950 years w ould have been achieved 6 to 7 years earlier, o r alternatively, w ould have exceeded actual investm ent in each year by som e 80 percent. F rom th is it follows th a t it was not the case th a t the value o f fixed capital stock, having regained its prew ar level som etim e in

22

Susan J. Linz

1949 (M oorsteen an d Powell 1966, 322), was th ereafter unaffected by th e im pact o f W orld W ar II. A conventional m ethod for analyzing the im pact o f W orld W ar II on Soviet econom ic grow th exam ines th e w ar’s im pact on th e stock o f capital, the quantity o f labor an d o th er in p u ts available for p roduction, a n d changes in their productivity. M oorsteen a n d Powell (1966, 314-379) com piled sufficient d ata on Soviet em ploym ent, capital stock, capital-labor a n d capitalo u tp u t ratios, an d in p u t p ro d u ctiv ity m easures to p u t together a rough sketch o f W orld W ar II’s im pact on S oviet econom ic grow th p o ten tial in the im m ediate postw ar period. An im p o rtan t consequence o f W orld W ar II on Soviet econom ic grow th potential involved the acquisition o f new territo ry . N ew te rrito ry bro u g h t u nder Soviet dom ain not only add itio n al lan d a n d capital stock b u t also additional labor. T he im pact on em ploym ent o f acquiring new te rrito ry w as m ore pronounced in the ind u strial sector th a n in agriculture, although b o th sectors exhibited significant if only tem p o rary labor force increases. A com parison o f 1940 an d 1945-1946 em ploym ent figures (M oorsteen a n d Powell 1966, 365) shows a w ar-related reduction in agricultural em ploym ent, caused not only by w artim e losses from G erm a n occupation a n d destruction, b u t also from substantial num bers o f agricultural w orkers w ho jo in e d th e R ed A rm y and, w hen dem obilized, found (or were assigned) em ploym ent in urban industrial centers. Included in these agricultural em ploym ent figures is the increase in the labor force th a t resulted from higher w artim e an d postw ar fem ale labor force particip atio n . F or the nonagricultural sector, W orld W ar II’s im pact was sim ilar w ith respect to higher fem ale labor force participation. Indeed, m easured in 1937 m an-years a n d ad ju sted for changes in hours, total em ploym ent in th is sector in 1945 exceeded th a t o f 1940. T rem endous w ar-related popu latio n losses had an adverse effect u p o n S oviet labor force growth potential, however. P rew ar increases in to tal em ploym ent (approxim ately 3 percent from 1928 to 1940) w ere m ore th a n halved as a result o f W orld W ar II (1 percent increase in total em ploym ent 1945-1961). T he w ar-related annexation o f new te rrito ry also allow ed for an expansion o f sown area, from 137.7 m illion hectares in 1939 to 150.4 m illion in 1940 (M oorsteen and Powell 1966, 366). Yet, the d evastating im p act o f W orld W ar II is clearly seen in the reduction o f sown lan d by 1945, in co m p ariso n w ith th at o f 1928. As N ove (C h ap ter 5) p o in ts out, not u n til 1948 w as the prew ar figure o f sown land attain ed (not u n til 1951, using c u rren t boundaries). T his holds in spite o f the expansion o f agricultural p ro d u ctio n in the East. Johnson (1963) suggests th a t as far as grain yields w ere concerned, the expansion o f territo ry did not greatly alter average q u ality o f sow n land. The im pact o f W orld W ar II on Soviet ca p ital-o u tp u t a n d cap ital-lab o r ratios was pronounced. T he average ca p ital-o u tp u t ratio (co m p u ted as the ratio o f net capital stock to G N P in 1937 prices) rose irregularly in th e prew ar period (from 1.68 in 1928 to 1.93 in 1940). A t w ar’s end, it h ad reached 2.01, rising to 2.10 in 1946, before falling a n d rem ain in g below 2.0 until after 1953 (M oorsteen a n d Powell 1966, 367-68). W artim e dev-

World War II and Soviet Economic Growth

23

astation o f capital stock an d slow assim ilation o f foreign technology would account for these changes, as w ould reconstruction p rio rities favoring heavy industry. T he cap ital-o u tp u t ratio in nonagricultural sectors behaved broadly like th a t o f the total, although the increase over the 25-year p eriod from 1928 to 1953 w as less. T he extrem ely high ratio for housing reflects, in ad d itio n to the usual factors m aking for a high capital intensity in this sector, the low level o f official rents in the Soviet U nion. A com parison o f pre- an d postw ar capital-labor ratios reflects, perhaps m ore th a n anything else, the differential im pact o f W orld W ar II on the grow th rates o f capital a n d labor. P rod u ctiv ity is cited as a m ajor factor in explaining growth in any in dustrialized econom y. T he d isru p tiv e effects o f w ar on p ro d u ctiv ity are no d o ubt pervasive. Low p ro d u ctiv ity durin g w ar a n d th e in itial postw ar p eriod is expected, perhaps unavoidable, because o f the conversion to a n d from m ilitary production. It is not clear, however, th a t th e overall im pact o f w ar on p ro d u ctiv ity will necessarily be unfavorable. W ar m ay im pede technological developm ents in som e areas w hile stim ulating it in others. M oreover, even though w ar d isru p ts the functioning o f existing ad m in istrativ e agencies, it does provide an o p p o rtu n ity for elim inating bureaucratic rig­ idities. T he pervasive, yet som ew hat obscure, n atu re o f W orld W ar II’s im pact on several pro d u ctiv ity m easures is w ell-docum ented by M oorsteen a n d Powell (1966, 370, 378-79). T h eir p ro d u ctiv ity estim ates are problem atic, however, because they are sensitive to interest rate estim ates, the m ethod o f aggregating inputs, a n d the ad ju stm en t o f labor in p u ts for hours worked. T he delayed reaction o f W orld W ar II in term s o f growth rates, the “ econom ic m iracle” o f the 1950s in w hich W est G erm any an d Jap an each recovered rapidly from a substantial degree o f w artim e devastation, d id not o ccur in the Soviet U nion. Extensive controls over the econom y, a com ­ m itm en t to rap id growth, the lack o f an occupying power, a n d a firm ly established political regim e w ith no dom estic opposition w ould ap p ear to be conducive conditions for econom ic growth. Yet, the Soviets experienced a relatively long period o f rem arkably low p ro d u ctiv ity growth after W orld W ar II. C ertainly such factors as conversion to a n d from m ilitary production, the state o f rep air o f the capital stock, bottlenecks a n d shortages in the supply o f agricultural m aterials to nonagricultural areas, hours adjustm ents o f labor inputs, unm easured changes in the q uality o f labor, a n d the overall disorganizing effects o f war, b o th d u rin g the h o stilities a n d after the conflict ended, affected in p u t productivity, a n d hence, S oviet econom ic growth, at least un til 1953. A lthough it is ab u n d an tly clear th a t W orld W ar II altered factor p ro ­ po rtions, thereby influencing productivity, it is m ore difficult sim ply by exam ining the d ata to identify the im pact o f the w ar on the level o f technology, on econom ies o f scale, or on efficiency, all o f w hich are d eterm in an ts o f productivity. T hese d ata m u st be exam ined in an analytical fram ew ork th a t identifies the m agnitude o f the w ar effort. T he m ethodology em ployed in the next section in generating w ar cost estim ates provides one

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Susan J. Linz

possible analytical fram ew ork a n d yields ad d itio n al insight in to the im p act o f W orld W ar II on Soviet econom ic growth.

War Cost, Postwar Burden, and Econom ic Growth M easuring the econom ic cost o f w ar necessarily em ploys an o p p o rtu n ity cost approach in which the o p p o rtu n ity cost, by com paring p o ten tial a n d actual o u tp u t levels, captures foregone civ ilian p ro d u ctio n a n d /o r capacity expansion, or alternatively, reduced civilian consum ption, o r ad d itio n al work effort required by the war. C alculating p o ten tial o u tp u t by projecting a prew ar o u tp u t trend into the postw ar period can n o t accurately represent an estim ate o f w hat the course o f o u tp u t w ould have been in th e absence o f W orld W ar II, b u t it does m ake clear th e n atu re o f the loss in o u tp u t w hich the war, in all its consequences, entailed. For exam ple, Soviet d ata indicate that had it been possible to m ain tain the o u tp u t grow th rate indicated by the prew ar tren d (6.1 percent annually 1928-1937, o r 5.9 percent 1936-1939, in 1937 prices), the absolute volum e o f o u tp u t realized in each postw ar year w ould have been attain ed 6 to 7 years earlier. A lternatively, the absolute value o f o u tp u t based on the prew ar grow th tren d would have exceeded actual o u tp u t from 1945 to 1950 by som e 50 percent. Analyzing the im pact o f W orld W ar II on the S oviet econom y by using an o p p o rtunity cost approach is ap p ro p riate w hether w ar cost is m easu red in term s o f costs absorbed durin g the conflict (M illar a n d L inz 1978, 1980) or costs absorbed in the postw ar period (Linz 1983) because these are not separate costs analytically, only tem porally. W artim e costs include, for example, direct governm ent expenditures on the w ar effort, w artim e loss o f national incom e because o f dam aged or destroyed factors o f p ro duction, loss o f personal consum ption resulting bo th from lower w artim e n ational incom e an d the increased share o f governm ent ex p en d itu res in n atio n al incom e, reduced leisure tim e, an d extra effort a n d resources req u ired to convert to w artim e production. W ar costs not absorbed d u rin g th e conflict carry over into the postw ar p eriod a n d include such com ponents as th e cost o f continued lower national incom e because o f th e net loss o f factors o f production, depleted capital stock, reduced b irth ra te s a n d lab o r force growth rates, an d additional m edical costs for the w ounded a n d disabled who dem and special care after the w ar ends. C arry o v er w ar cost does not represent any additional w ar cost, however. R ather, the term is used to represent the extent to w hich u nabsorbed w ar cost is allocated to the p o stw ar period, thereby affecting econom ic grow th potential. Linz (1983) provides three estim ates o f carryover w ar cost for th e S oviet experience in W orld W ar II. T he first estim ate uses Soviet claim s a n d sources to establish a rough estim ate o f the w ar cost ab sorbed betw een 1945 and 1953. To check w hether th is is a reasonable in te rp re tatio n o f the m agnitude o f the postw ar im pact, the second estim ate em ploys S oviet national incom e data, an d the th ird , aggregate o u tp u t d ata in a p ro d u ctio n

World War II and Soviet Economic Growth

25

function fram ew ork. A n idea o f the p o stw ar b u rd en im posed u pon the S oviet people is o btained by calculating each estim ate in term s o f years’ earnings, or w ork effort o f the 1945 labor force. T he estim ates range from 8 to 10 years’ earnings w hen considering only the material losses generated by W orld W ar II, su p portin g the claim th a t W orld W ar II cost two FiveYear Plans. I f w ar-related pop u latio n losses are tak en in to account, as they necessarily are in the pro d u ctio n function analysis, carryover w ar cost estim ates rise to 18 to 25 years’ earnings. By any m easure, the postw ar im p act o f W orld W ar II im posed a trem endous b u rd en on the leadership’s econom ic grow th efforts a n d upon the postw ar p o p u latio n as a whole. Indeed, the m agnitude o f these carryover w ar cost estim ates p u t into perspective S oviet rep aratio n d em an d s after W orld W ar II a n d yield fu rth er insight in to th e econom ic relationships established after the w ar betw een the U SSR a n d E astern Europe. In the context o f the debate regarding the origins o f the C old W ar,6 u n d erstan d in g the postw ar im pact o f W orld W ar II an d the extent to w hich it was reduced by actual foreign assistance p rogram s (“ pipeline” Lend-Lease, U N R R A funds, an d reparations) paves the way for an exam in atio n o f the extent to w hich additional foreign aid (the proposed U.S. loan, a n d M arshall P lan aid) w ould have reduced the postw ar bu rd en o f W orld W ar II to the Soviet people. T he following section develops several m easures o f the im pact o f actual aid a n d rep aratio n s on Soviet postw ar recovery efforts. S im ilar analysis is conducted for the p o tential aid program s. To facilitate com parison betw een th e v arious aid im pact estim ates derived here (and the w ar cost estim ates described previously) each is expressed in term s o f years’ earnings, or work effort req u ired by the 1945 lab o r force to generate an equivalent im pact dom estically.

IMPACT OF ACTUAL AID T he im pact o f actual reparatio n paym ents an d o th er form s o f econom ic assistance on the Soviet econom y has not previously been calculated, p rim arily because o f m easu rem en t problem s. A ttem pts have been m ade, however, to estim ate total econom ic aid a n d rep aratio n s received by the U SS R betw een 1945 a n d 1953. T he m ost com prehensive effort, found in N u tte r (1962, 351-54), gives an estim ated range o f $9.1 to $21.2 billion. T he sm aller figure values aid an d rep aratio n s in “ 1938 dollars,” the higher estim ate is in term s o f “ cu rre n t” o r 1945 dollars. T h is range represents a low er b o u n d estim ate o f rep aratio n s an d aid actually received because it does not take in to account proceeds from jo in t stock com panies established in E ast E uropean countries, tra n sit privileges, d iscrim in ato ry trad in g prices (except for Polish coal), levies for su p p o rt o f occupation tro o p s a n d ad ­ m in istratio n , forced labor o f w ar prisoners a n d interns, o r th e value o f m achinery an d eq u ip m en t in occupied te rrito rie s d ism an tled a n d rem oved to R ussia by Soviet occupation forces before the en d o f the war. M oreover, N u tte r (1962, 353) concludes th a t these figures un d erstate th e tru e value

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Susan J. Linz

o f reparations received, w hether valu ed in 1938 or 1945 prices, because prices o f goods and services received as rep aratio n s were disco u n ted su b ­ stantially in favor o f the U SSR. To determ ine the im pact on Soviet po stw ar recovery efforts o f th is low er bound estim ate o f reparations a n d aid received betw een 1945 a n d 1953 requires a conversion o f the estim ates from d ollar to ruble values. Pick (1959, 343) reports the official exchange rate d u rin g the w ar a n d im m ed iate postw ar period at 5.3 rubles to $1.00. U sing the official exchange rate, however, fails to provide a m eaningful m easure o f eith er the tru e value o r significance o f reparation paym ents or o th er form s o f econom ic aid to th e U SSR. As H olzm an (1968, 814) p o in ts out, the official exchange rate “ has served as little m ore th an an accounting device for converting foreign currency prices o f Soviet exports a n d im p o rts in to rubles for th e p urposes o f constructing foreign trad e accounts in local currency.” D u rin g th e 1930s and 1940s, exchange rates betw een the ruble a n d o th er foreign currencies were set arbitrarily by the Soviet governm ent. T he ruble w as grossly u ndervalued as judged by any com parison o f its purchasing pow er w ith the purchasing pow er o f nom inally equal am o u n ts o f dollars, pou n d s, a n d so on. D uring W orld W ar II, official exchange rates rem ain ed unchanged, despite the great inflation o f n onrationed consum er goods prices. H olzm an (1968) therefore offers an alternative exchange rate range, based o n co m ­ parisons o f dom estic an d foreign price trends, o f 2.5 to 3.5 rubles to $1 for the postw ar period. A lthough his exchange rate range p rovides a m ore accurate picture th an one based on the official rate, it is not q u ite ap p ro p riate for m y purposes because it deals alm ost exclusively w ith ex p o rt prices, w ithout considering the differences in degrees o f u n d erv a lu atio n o f exports an d im ports. M oreover, because dom estic prices in the im m ed iate po stw ar period did not accurately reflect costs o f p roduction, the ratio betw een w orld m arket prices an d dom estic prices is u n derstated. H olzm an’s exchange rates do serve as a useful basis for com parison, however. A m ore m eaningful m eth o d o f converting d ollar values in to ruble values to determ ine the m agnitudes these rep aratio n a n d aid estim ates rep resen t in the postw ar Soviet econom y is derived using Lend-L ease inform ation. First, Lend-Lease aid was sim ilar to po stw ar aid a n d rep a ra tio n s in th a t it was constrained by available supplies. Second, b o th ruble a n d d o llar estim ates o f Lend-Lease aid are readily available although b o th the U SS R an d U.S. w ould have a tendency to m isrepresent the actual v alue o f L endLease aid. T he Soviets claim th a t Lend-Lease aid am o u n ted to 5 billion rubles, also stating th at Lend-Lease aid cam e to ab o u t 4 percent o f th e ir w artim e national incom e (T am archenko 1967, 57; C herniavski 1964, 19-20). U.S. records show Lend-Lease aid o t the U SSR to taled som e $11 billion by the end o f 1945 (Jones 1969). T he first claim , 5 billion rubles to $11 billion, results in a ruble-dollar exchange rate o f 0.5R to $1. C alculating an exchange rate based on the second claim req u ires an estim ate o f Soviet national incom e d u rin g th e war, Yw. A vailable Soviet sources do not contain estim ates o f w artim e n atio n al incom e b u t do provide

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Table 2.4 Actual and Potential Aid Estimates, 1945-1953

Dollar values (billions) Official 5.3R to 1 a. Actual Aid b. 1938 prices c. % Ypw d. A Q ,« e. A Q 2> f. 1945 prices % Ypw 9h. A O, i. A Q2 jk. 1.

Potential Aid loan + ERP1 % Ypw

m. n.

A 0, A Q2

.

loan + ERP2 % Ypw

0

Pq-

r.

A 0, A 02

Ruble values (billions) Holzman 3.5R 2.5R

Lend-Lease 0.7R 0.5R

31.8 5.5 28.3 2.1 73.8 12.8 59.4 2.3

22.8 3.9 21.2 2.0 52.8 9.1 48.2 2.2

6.4 1.1 6.9 1.7 14.8 2.6 14.5 1.9

4.6 0.8 5.1 1.6 10.5 1.8 10.7 1.8

6.0 1.0 6.5 1.7 10.5 1.8

1.7 0.3

1.2 0.2 1.4 1.3 2.1 0.4

9.1

48.2 8.3

21.2

111.8 19.4

2.4

12.7 2.1

8.4 1.4

4.2

22.3 3.9

14.7 2.5 14.6 1.9

2.9 0.5 3.6 1.5

“Change in aggregate output when all aid goes to capital formation. Change in aggregate output when all aid goes to labor or wage goods.

national incom e indices (1940 = 100) for the w ar period: 92 in 1941, 66 in 1942, 77 in 1943, 88 in 1944, a n d 83 in 1945 (K ravchenko 1970, 351). Bergson an d H eym ann (1954, 24) estim ate the 1940 level o f national incom e at 45.8 billion rubles (1940 prices). Hence, Yw equals 184 billion rubles, an d L end-L ease aid (at 4 percent o f Yw) totaled som e 7.4 billion rubles, yielding a second exchange-rate estim ate o f 0.7R to $1. F or com parison purposes, results using each exchange rate described above are provided in T able 2.4. U sing Lend-L ease exchange rates, the im pact o f rep aratio n s a n d econom ic aid on Soviet postw ar recovery is exam ined first by calculating the ruble value o f reparations an d aid as a percent o f cum ulative postw ar national incom e, Ypw. O nce again, available Soviet sources do not provide estim ates o f n ational incom e betw een 1945 a n d 1953, b u t do contain national incom e indices (1940 = 100) for th is period: 85 in 1945 (K ravchenko 1970, 351); 78 in 1946 ( Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1970, 533); 93 an d 116 in 1947-48 (Ekonomicheskaia zhizn 1967, 1: 411); 136 a n d 164 in 1949-50 (V ikentev 1957, 140); 184 an d 204 in 1951-52 ( Narodnoe khoziaistvo 1956, 36); 204 in 1953.7 H ence, Ypw totaled 577.7 billion rubles (1940 prices) betw een 1945 an d 1953. L end-L ease exchange rates yield rep aratio n s a n d aid estim ates ranging from 4.6 to 14.8 billion rubles betw een 1945 a n d 1953 (Table 2.4: lines b, f), im plying a 1 to 3 percent co n trib u tio n to postw ar national

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Susan J. Linz

incom e during this period (lines c, g). H olzm an’s exchange rates resu lt in an aid estim ate range o f 22.8 to 73.8 billion rubles, co n trib u tin g som e 4 to 13 percent o f cum ulative (1945-1953) national incom e. An idea o f the co n tributio n m ade by rep aratio n s an d aid is found in a com parison w ith the am oun t o f w ork effort req u ired to generate an eq u iv alen t am ount o f national incom e dom estically. T h at is, to generate a sim ila r to tal increase in national incom e w ould have taken the 1945 labor force o f 27.2 m illion w orkers an d salaried officials (Zaleski 1980, 607), earning a n average 521 rubles per year (Trud 1968, 138), betw een four m o n ths’ a n d 1 year’s earnings using Lend-Lease exchange rates. T his com pares w ith to ta l m aterial w ar cost estim ates o f betw een 3 a n d 7 years’ earnings o f th e 1940 lab o r force (M illar and Linz 1978, 1980; S aryadar 1980).8 H ad rep aratio n s a n d aid not been received, the b u rd en o f W orld W ar II u p o n th e S oviet people would have been appreciably higher. An alternative m ethod o f analyzing the im pact o f econom ic aid a n d reparation paym ents betw een 1945 a n d 1953 uses aggregate o u tp u t d ata w ithin a production function fram ew ork to relate o u tp u t to available supplies o f capital and labor. A ctual levels o f aggregate o u tp u t cited in Soviet sources for 1945 to 1953 clearly include all rep aratio n paym ents a n d econom ic aid received during this period. W hat w ould the level o f o u tp u t have been w ithout reparation paym ents or econom ic aid? A graphical in te rp re tatio n is useful for illustrating a n um ber o f feasible decision rules regarding reparations an d aid th at Soviet planners w ould necessarily have faced in 1945. Figure 2.1 identifies aggregate o u tp u t levels before a n d after receiving reparations an d econom ic aid. G iven the Soviet system o f central p lan n in g and priorities, it m akes no sense to assum e th a t capital a n d labor receive their m arginal products; hence the price ratio s have been om itted . P rior to receiving aid, the econom y operates at p o in t A, given existing technology an d actual stocks o f capital a n d labor. W hen rep a ra tio n s a n d other econom ic assistance becam e available, one decision rule w ould have allowed for the entire am ou n t o f aid to go tow ard capital form ation. U n d er this decision rule, the original capital stock w ould be augm ented by the foreign resource inflow from K0 to Ku shifting the iso q u an t o u t from Q0, the nonreparations level o f o u tp u t, to ß ,. Because labor has been co n strain ed to its original level, L 0, by th is decision rule, p o in t B m arks th e relevant com bination o f capital an d labor used to produce Q x. A sim ilar analysis follows for a decision rule th a t allows all aid to go tow ard labor o r co n su m er goods. A lternatively, Soviet planners w ould necessarily have considered the im pact on aggregate o u tp u t o f using aid to augm ent b o th cap ital a n d labor. U nder this decision rule, in ad d itio n to acquiring capital goods, aid w ould also have been used to purchase foodstuffs o r o th er co n su m er goods for paym ents-in-kind to attract youths, w om en, a n d dem obilized soldiers to th e cities or industrial centers w here these goods w ere in sh o rt supply. As seen in Figure 2.1, this yields a greater im p act on o u tp u t th a n th a t resulting from using all aid in either capital o r labor form ation. O u tp u t reaches a m axim um , ß 2> u n d er the assu m p tio n o f perfect co nvertibility o f foreign

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Figure 2.1.

Impact of Reparations and Economic Aid on Soviet Aggregate Output

Labor

resource inflow (reparations an d o th er econom ic aid) to the o p tim al levels o f capital ( K2) an d labor (L 2). T he co n trib u tio n o f reparations a n d other econom ic aid m ust fall w ith in the range defined by Q0 a n d Q2. T ranslating this graphical in terp retatio n in to actual figures requires certain in form ation regarding the stru ctu ral p aram eters o f the Soviet econom y in the postw ar p eriod— elasticities o f o u tp u t w ith respect to capital an d labor, an d a technology m easure, for exam ple. E stim ating a p roduction function yields precisely these param eters. R esults ob tain ed by using a C obb-D ouglas specification an d the ord in ary least squares (OLS) estim atio n procedure indicate a m uch greater response in o u tp u t levels corresponding to a change in capital th a n to a change in labor.9 In large p a rt th is is explained by the changing stru ctu re o f the Soviet econom y, from p redom inantly agricultural to industrial, d u ring the 1930s a n d 1940s. C orrespondingly, the im pact o f aid on postw ar grow th poten tial differs m arkedly betw een the two decision rules. U nder the first decision rule w here all aid goes to capital form ation the co n trib u tio n o f reparations a n d aid to aggregate o u tp u t w ould have fallen

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Susan J. Linz

w ithin the range o f 5.1 to 14.5 billion rubles, using L end-L ease exchange rates (Table 2.4: lines d, h) a n d estim ated p ara m ete r values b ased on nonagricultural net national p ro d u ct (N N P ), capital services valued at 8 percent interest rate, an d em ploym ent d ata taken from M oorsteen an d Powell (1966, 352-65). To produce an eq u iv alen t increase in aggregate o u tp u t dom estically w ould have req u ired th e 1945 lab o r force to w ork betw een 3 m onths and 1 year. T his com pares w ith a sim ilar im p act estim ate o f 4 m onths’ to 1 year’s earnings based on national incom e data. U sing th e aid estim ate derived from H olzm an’s exchange rates, th is decision rule im plies a contribution o f som e 21.1 to 59.4 billion rubles (Table 2.4: lines d, h), requiring additional work effort o f 1.5 to 4.2 years, w hich again is very sim ilar to estim ates based on national incom e d a ta o f 1.6 to 5 years’ earnings. H ad all aid gone to augm ent labor (Table 2.4: lines e, i), th e co rresp o n d in g im pact on ou tp u t w ould have been m uch less, betw een 1.7 a n d 2.3 billion rubles, requiring som e 1.5 to 2 m onths’ ad d itio n al w ork effort to generate an equivalent im pact dom estically. T hese figures allude in p a rt to the severe capital shortage created by W orld W ar II, a n d in p a rt to th e trad itio n al differential em phasis on consum er goods versus p ro d u cer goods in the USSR. N one o f these estim ates, however, represents the m a x im u m im pact reparations and aid would have had u p o n o u tp u t for at least tw o im p o rta n t reasons. Looking only at the im pact on o u tp u t o f augm enting eith er cap ital or labor ignores the long-run effects o f net ad d itio n s to capital stock o r labor. T his aspect m ight be exam ined w ith in the context o f a H a rro d D om ar type growth model. In addition, because it m akes no sense to assum e perfect com petition w here capital a n d labor receive th e ir m arginal p ro d u cts given the Soviet system o f central p lanning an d priorities, only th e b o u n d ary solutions can be determ ined (that is, all aid going to eith er cap ital form ation or labor). A llocating reparations an d o th er econom ic aid op tim ally betw een capital and labor w ould necessarily have h ad a greater im pact on aggregate o u tp u t th an any o f the estim ates ob tain ed previously. M oreover, as stated, the reparation an d aid estim ate itself is a lower b o u n d estim ate. These results indicate that, w hether m easured w ith respect to n ational incom e or aggregate outpu t, the im pact o f rep aratio n s a n d econom ic aid was substantial. Roughly m easured, to generate an eq u iv alen t increase in incom e or o u tp u t w ould have req u ired add itio n al w ork effort by the p o stw ar labor force o f som e 3 m onths’ to 1 year’s earnings (1.5 to 5 years’ earnings using H olzm an’s exchange rates). H ad the Soviets not received any p ostw ar assistance, the carryover cost o f W orld W ar II to the S oviet people w ould have been m arkedly greater th an cu rren t estim ates indicate.

IMPACT OF POTENTIAL AID Soviet reconstruction efforts w ere aided significantly by rep aratio n s, “ p ip e­ line” Lend-Lease, an d U N R R A assistance. Each o f these, however, rep re­ sented a source o f conflict betw een the U n ited States, B ritain, F rance, a n d

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the U SSR. T he earliest a n d m ost pervasive source o f conflict arose over Soviet reparations claim s, especially w ith respect to G erm any. D iscord over P oland, R om ania, H ungary, a n d Czechoslovakia after the P o tsd am Agree­ m ent fu rth er inflam ed the rep aratio n s issue, a n d th e tenuous relationship betw een the Allies began deterio ratin g rapidly. Lend-Lease posed an o th er source o f postw ar confrontatio n specifically betw een the U nited States an d U SSR. T he U n ited States d id not like the sporadic w artim e releases o f the S oviet press th a t never really inform ed the Soviet people o f the im p o rtan ce o f Lend-L ease to th eir w ar effort, nor d id the Soviets like T ru m an ’s a b ru p t te rm in atio n o f L end-L ease once G erm an y surrendered. Soviet-A m erican confrontation also arose over U N R R A aid. A lthough U N R R A h ad been organized a n d funded (prim arily by the U nited States) to provide food, m edical care, a n d o th er assistance to w ar-devastated areas, protests intensified in the im m ediate postw ar p erio d th a t U N R R A funds (U.S. dollars) were being used to fund C o m m u n ist expansion. As a result, U N R R A assistance w as cancelled in 1946, despite existing econom ic conditions in the U SSR a n d E astern E urope.10 In place o f the increasingly u n p o p u la r L end-Lease an d U N R R A aid, the U nited States p roposed a loan o f $1 billion in 1945 to aid Soviet reconstruction efforts. D iscussions o f a loan to the U SSR had been in itiated m uch earlier, however. U.S. A m bassador A. W. H a rrim a n w ent to M oscow in O ctober 1943 to m eet w ith A. I. M ikoyan (Soviet C o m m issar for Foreign Trade) to ta lk ab o u t U.S. assistance in th e ir reconstruction efforts. Indeed, the loan w as perceived by business an d governm ent leaders alike as a way to help avoid the an ticip ated postw ar depression in the U.S. In Jan u ary 1945, V. M . M olotov (Soviet Foreign M inister) m et w ith H a rrim a n w ith the Soviet’s first form al request for a postw ar loan o f $6 billion. By th is tim e, conflicting interests w ith respect to the Soviet U nion’s reconstruction efforts were evident, an d the loan had becom e m ore o f a diplom atic tool th a n an econom ic opportunity. In spite o f cooling relations betw een the U nited S tates a n d U SSR , however, H a rrim a n inform ed the Soviets in A ugust 1945 th at the E xp o rt-Im p o rt B ank w as w illing to consider Soviet proposals for p ostw ar aid, an d at T rum an ’s request, $1 billion was earm arked by the B ank for possible loan to the U SSR. N egotiations were stalled a n d the loan “ lost” for the first 6 m onths o f 1946 w hile the U.S. State D ep a rtm en t w aited, hoping th a t Soviet recon­ struction needs w ould require th em to m ake concessions regarding reparations a n d o th er issues, an d M oscow w aited, believing the U nited States needed to finance exports to the U SS R to head off a depression. By the en d o f 1946, the loan w as no longer a cu rren t issue a n d the general question o f U.S. assistance in Soviet reconstruction efforts was not m entioned again u n til June 1947 w hen Secretary o f State M arshall gave his fam ous com ­ m encem ent speech at H arv ard , offering a general plan for E uropean recovery. W hen the U nited States offered the Soviet U nion econom ic assistance u n d er the M arshall P lan in 1947, th e S oviet leadership declined participation. A n um ber o f W estern scholars co n ten d th a t the aid was offered in such a

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way as to preclude any possibility o f p articip atio n by th e U S S R .11 N onetheless, had they agreed to jo in in w hat becam e know n as the E u ro p ean R ecovery P rogram (ERP), w hat am o u n t o f aid could the Soviets have expected? Between A pril 1948 an d Ju n e 1952, the E uropean Recovery P rogram gave over $13 billion in aid (Ferrell 1978, 86). O v er h a lf o f th is sum w as d istributed am ong B ritain, France, a n d Italy. G erm an y received ap p ro x i­ m ately $1.4 billion. A ssum ing th a t an o th er p articip a n t in the E R P w ould have changed the relative shares rath er th a n the to tal funds ap p ro p riated by Congress, an u pper boun d estim ate o f p o ten tial aid to th e U SSR equaling the share actually granted to B ritain o f $3.2 billion can be derived. P olitical conditions at the tim e, however, suggest th a t th is sum m ig h t be high. A lternatively, one m ight assum e th a t th e S oviet U nion w ould have received only as m uch as G erm any. T he traditional story im plies th a t the im pact o f these tw o p o ten tial aid program s would have been substantial, allow ing the Soviets to recover th e ir prew ar econom ic capacity m uch m ore rapidly a n d /o r easily th a n they did. It is useful, therefore, to com pare these poten tial program s w ith those actually received because it is q u ite clear th a t th e loan a n d E R P aid w ere offered as substitutes for continued rep aratio n paym ents an d o th er existing (or term inated) aid program s. As indicated, th e loan a n d E R P assistance at best w ould have am ounted to som e $2.4 to $4.2 billion from 1945 to 1953 (Table 2.4: lines k, o). T h is represents 1 to 3 billion rubles using Lend-Lease exchange rates (6 to 15 billion rubles, using H o lzm an ’s exchange rates). As such, these tw o potential aid program s w ould have am o u n ted roughly to som e 0.2 to 2.5 percent o f cum ulative p o stw ar natio n al incom e (lines 1, p), representing approxim ately 1 to 3 m o n th s’ earnings o f th e 1945 work force (5 m onths’ to 1 year’s earnings, using H olzm an’s exchange rates). Employing the aggregate p ro duction function analysis described above, u nder the first decision rule w here all aid goes to capital fo rm atio n (Table 2.4: lines m , q), o u tp u t w ould have increased by 1.4 to 3.6 billion rubles at Lend-Lease exchange rates (6.5 to 14.6 billion rubles, using H o lzm an ’s exchange rates). To generate a sim ilar increase dom estically w ould have required additional w ork effort by th e 1945 w ork force o f 1 to 4 m o n th s’ earnings. U nder the second decision rule, w here all aid goes to augm ent labor (lines n, r), o u tp u t w ould have increased by 1.3 to 1.5 billion rubles (1.7 to 1.9 billion rubles, using H olzm an’s exchange rates), req u irin g som e 1 to 2 m onths’ additional w ork effort to generate an eq u iv alen t increase domestically. T hese last figures indicate th a t although p o ten tial aid w as absolutely sm aller in value term s th a n actual aid received, th e relative im pact on o u tp u t given the second decision rule w ould have been sim ilar. Indeed, this again suggests a capital shortage prevalent in the po stw ar S oviet economy. C alculated in th is rough m anner, a n d co m p ared to the cost o f W orld W ar II to the Soviet people, the p otential im p act o f receiving th e loan a n d E R P assistance w as relatively m odest. T h is is especially striking in co m ­ parison w ith the im pact o f actual rep aratio n s a n d aid. It does not necessarily

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follow, however, th a t the loan or E R P aid w ould have been insignificant. It is possible to conceive o f a situ atio n w here it w ould have been significant a t the m argin. T h at is, the loan a n d E R P aid w ould necessarily have been used to elim inate bottlenecks in the econom y (generating electricity or im proving tra n sp o rt facilities, for exam ple) by acquiring the m ost effective technology o r facilities. R eparations, on th e o th er hand, d id not represent state-of-the-art technology o r equipm ent. As such, E R P funds m ight have allow ed for an earlier recovery o f the prew ar level o f o u tp u t, or, for exam ple, legislation th a t com pelled w om en a n d youths to rem ain in the w ork force after the w ar m ight not have been necessary. T here is no a p rio ri reason to th in k , however, th a t a m arginal rath er th an an average cap ital-o u tp u t ratio is relevant for analyzing th e im pact o f these potential aid program s u pon Soviet reconstruction efforts since a large section o f E uropean R ussia w as fought over w ith a scorched ea rth policy twice. To check the reasonableness o f th e estim ates derived above, a sim ple four-equation m odel m ay be em ployed to sim ulate the im pact o f additional aid on the size or productiv e capacity o f the postw ar economy. A ssum ing p otential aid enters the Soviet econom y as ad d itio n al investm ent, it is possible to estim ate the relatio n sh ip betw een changes in investm ent, capital stock, labor, a n d o utput. T he m odel can then be used for sim ulation purposes to predict o u tp u t levels for various levels o f additional investm ent. A com plete specification o f th e m odel a n d estim atio n results are given in Linz (1980). T he results indicate th a t for an exogenous change in investm ent o f 1 billion rubles in tim e t, for exam ple, aggregate o u tp u t will initially rise by som e 430 m illion rubles in the period t + 2. T he total effect o f such a change in investm ent on aggregate o u tp u t w as found to be an increase o f 9.35 billion rubles. T he m agnitudes o f b o th the im pact a n d long-run m ultipliers generated by th e m odel are intuitively appealing for several reasons. T he relatively sm all im p act m ultiplier reflects the chronic difficulties o f carrying out investm ent plans cited in S oviet sources. T he long-run effects indicate both the fact th a t investm ent plans are used to elim inate bottlenecks in the econom y, especially after W orld W ar II, a n d the rath e r low efficiency o f investm ent resulting from the wide dispersion o f investm ent projects an d delays arising from unfinished con stru ctio n (L okshin 1937, 1952). To de­ te rm in e the responsiveness o f aggregate o u tp u t to changes in the level o f investm ent, the investm ent elasticity w as calculated a n d found to be ap­ proxim ately .10 for the postw ar period, 1945-1953. C alculation o f these m ultipliers a n d the elasticity o f investm ent allows for determ in atio n o f the effect o f p o ten tial foreign assistance on postw ar aggregate o utput. H ad the $1 billion loan been granted in 1946 a n d used to purchase in d u strial m achinery a n d equipm ent, for exam ple, aggregate investm ent w ould have been 2 to 4 percent higher in 1946-47. T he im pact o f such an exogenous increase in investm ent w ould not be ev id en t in the econom y im m ediately. G iven an elasticity o f .10, a substantial change in aggregate o u tp u t is not expected to occur in the short-run. Indeed, the

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m odel described above indicates a 2-year lag before aggregate o u tp u t w ould rise. Hence, an additional .5 to .7 billion rubles o f investm ent in 1946 would result in an increase in aggregate o u tp u t o f .21 to .30 billion rubles by 1948, generating a total increase o f som e 4.7 to 6.5 billion rubles. Similarly, had the Soviets received $1.4 to $3.2 billion o f E R P funds in 1948 (the best scenario possible), aggregate investm ent w ould have increased by som e .7 to 2.2 billion rubles (3.5 to 11 billion, using H o lzm an ’s exchange rates). T he im pact o f such an exogenous increase in investm ent w ould have driven aggregate o u tp u t u p by som e .3 to .9 billion rubles by 1950. T he total increase in aggregate o u tp u t o f such an increase in investm ent is estim ated at 6.5 to 20.5 billion rubles. T he com bined effect o f these potential aid p rogram s is clearly m uch less than th at o f reparation paym ents durin g the sam e period. T h is is ev id en t in a com parison not only o f the absolute am o u n ts o f aid u n d er consideration, b u t also o f the additional w ork effort req u ired to generate a sim ilar im p act domestically. P otential aid estim ates represent a t m ost only a th ird o f the value o f aid an d reparations actually received, m aking a difference o f only a few m onths in term s o f earlier recovery. R esults p ro v id ed by L eo n tief (see A ppendix) coincide very closely w ith those derived above using L endLease aid estim ates. Viewed in isolation, these figures are substantial. R elative to the m agnitude o f the postw ar burden, or carryover cost o f W orld W ar II to the Soviet people, however, these estim ates ap p e ar m odest.

Speculations on the C ost of Winning World War II Although the total real cost o f W orld W ar II to the Soviet U nion has yet to be fully m easured, there is no d o u b t th a t th e econom ic cost o f the w ar im posed a trem endous burd en upo n the Soviet people, b o th in absolute term s and relative to o ther p articip an ts. A significant p o rtio n o f to tal m aterial w ar cost carried over in to the postw ar period, adversely affecting econom ic growth efforts. In large p art, certain costs were m ade unavoidable for the U SSR by the onset o f the C old War. T here is, however, no a p rio ri reason to believe th at the net effect o f W orld W ar II w as negative w hen taking into account political a n d social factors. A cquisition o f new te rrito ry a n d new technology, in ad d itio n to the political a n d social cohesion resulting from sustaining a successful w ar effort, are benefits th a t have been o m itted from the econom ic analysis presented here. F u rtherm ore, little em phasis was placed on the significance o f actual aid a n d rep aratio n paym ents in Soviet postw ar recovery efforts. C onsidering the m ag n itu d e o f actual aid an d reparation paym ents relative to p o ten tial aid p rogram s im plies th a t Stalin was perfectly rational in refusing to m ake political concessions in retu rn for U.S. econom ic assistance after W orld W ar II. M oreover, considering only the absolute am ount o f aid in eith er scenario ignores th e significance o f the m arginal contributio n , w hich m ight well have been su b stan tial for E R P assistance, as it w as in G erm an y in the postw ar period. U nfortunately,

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insight in to th is aspect benefits m ore from h indsight th a n from counterfactual analysis. T here are also o th er costs o f w inning, w hich have not been explicitly discussed, th a t q u ite possibly im posed an additional b u rd en upo n the Soviet population. C osts o f occupation a n d costs o f em erging from W orld W ar II as a m ajor m ilitary pow er have necessitated disp ro p o rtio n ately large annual expenditures for defense. In co n trast to the U.S. econom y, w here continued defense spending in the postw ar p erio d created jobs, generating additional n ational incom e, the b urden o f a continued high level o f defense expenditures in the Soviet econom y (where the level o f national incom e is fixed for a given plan period) is found in a “ crow ding o u t” o f the provision o f consum er goods. In this sense, the econom ic consequences o f W orld W ar II an d the relationships th a t arose d u rin g the postw ar perio d stem m ing from the C old W ar are still evident today.

Notes 1. “Pipeline”Lend-Lease involved the goods allocated but not delivered to the USSR when Lend-Lease terminated in 1945. There is no question that Lend-Lease food shipments alleviated serious Soviet shortages during the war. Shattered Red Army communication systems were rebuilt by using Lend-Lease equipment. Lend-Lease supplied specialized steels and alloys, allowing Soviet efforts to concentrate on the production o f basic types o f steel. Moreover, Lend-Lease aid was not entirely consumed by the war effort. Electric power machinery, a complete rubber tire factory, equipment for drilling and refining petroleum, and technical knowledge were all valuable in Soviet reconstruction efforts. It is clear, then, why the abrupt termination o f Lend-Lease caused the Soviets so much concern. For an excellent discussion o f Lend-Lease aid see Martel (1979). 2. Prior to, and concurrent with the German invasion in June 1941, the Soviets transferred to the East all movable capital stock, and deliberately sought to destroy everything that could not be removed. The Germans also succeeded in destroying a large portion o f the remaining capital stock during their retreat in 1943. For descriptions o f the military campaigns and general history o f World War II see Clark (1966), Hart (1971), and Seaton (1971). 3. The population o f the Soviet Union was reduced by 7 million during the course o f World War II, from 198 to 191 million. Taking into account the prewar population growth rate o f 2.5 percent per annum implies a total loss in population o f some 20 million. A total “loss” o f over 50 million people by 1959 (compared to the expected population at that time) is given in V. V. Pokshinshevskii, Geographiia naseleniia SSSR: ekonomiko-geograficheskie orcherki (Moscow: 1971), 34. Further discussion o f population losses is found in Fitzpatrick (Chapter 8) and Anderson and Silver (Chapter 11). 4. On 1 January 1961, the Soviet government revalued the ruble, making ten rubles equal to one new ruble. Unless otherwise noted, ruble figures given in the remainder o f this paper are in new rubles. 5. Lorimer (1946, 148) reports 20.1 million people in the newly acquired territory. Bergson and Heymann (1954, 6) put this figure at 23.6 million. 6. The origins o f the Cold War have been the subject o f controversy for over two decades. The traditional view assigns initiation o f the Cold War to the Soviet Union, interpreting U.S. actions as responses to Soviet policies in Poland and Eastern Europe. The literature abounds with the traditional viewpoint. See, for example, Mosely (1949), Schlesinger (1967), Feis (1970). Revisionists do not see U.S. foreign policy after World War II as merely responding to Soviet initiatives. Rather, they see U.S. leaders using diplomatic policy and economic sanctions to try to shape the postwar world in accordance

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with US. needs, standards, and conceptions. See especially Alperovitz (1965), Gardner (1970), Kuklick (1972). For a representative discussion o f differences and attempts to classify writers into schools, see Maier (1970), Graebner (1969), and Morganthau (1967). 7. For lack o f a published estimate or index, the 1953 level o f national income was assumed to be at least equal to the 1952 level. 8. Calculations in terms o f the 1945 work force are higher than those based on 1940 figures because o f the reduced size o f the postwar work force. For a complete discussion, see Linz (1983). 9. This result holds regardless o f whether considering total GNP, capital services and employment; or nonagricultural, nonresidential GNP, capital services and employment. It also holds regardless o f whether capital is valued at an 8 or 20 percent interest rate. For a complete discussion o f specification, data, and parameter values, see Linz (1983). 10. The State Department argued that the food crisis was over (apparently disregarding the 1946 Soviet harvest) and that UNRRA aid was no longer necessary to war-ravaged countries since they were capable o f importing necessary goods. In early 1947, however, the United Nations’Food and Agricultural Organization estimated a world grain shortage in that year o f about 8 million tons. Furthermore, evidence indicates that Poland needed $200 million for imports for 1947 to maintain a minimum individual daily subsistence o f 1800 calories, and relief deficits for Austria, Greece, Hungary, Italy, and China totaled $596 million for 1947 (Paterson 1978, 88). Perhaps a better explanation for UNRRA termination was the increasing awareness in Washington o f the value o f economic assistance as a diplomatic tool. The apolitical nature o f UNRRA policy was not well liked— U.S. officials wanted influence over the final distribution o f UNRRA funds. This position is exemplified by U.S. response to the Soviet request in 1945 for $700 million for reconstruction in the Ukraine and Belorussia, a request that required the appropriation o f more funds to the UNRRA general fund. The United States, however, was unwilling to make the appropriation, supplying instead only a fraction o f the amount requested. To make up the difference, the United States suggested that the Soviets apply for a loan, then failed to grant it. 11. Although Marshall invited European nations to undertake a joint economic re­ construction plan with U.S. assistance, the Marshall Plan, in a manner similar to the Truman Doctrine, equated economic recovery with political stability, anticommunism, and security against Soviet expansion. In addition, the French and British feared that the inclusion o f the USSR would foreclose congressional support for a European recovery program and therefore took a decidedly cool attitude toward the Soviets at the Paris conference o f the three foreign ministers. For the distribution o f Marshall Plan aid and further discussion, see Patterson and Polk (1947), Paterson (1978).

References Alperovitz, Gar. Atomic Diplomacy. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1965. Bergson, Abram, and Hans Heymann. Soviet National Income and Product 1940-1948. New York: Macmillan, 1954. Chadayev, Ya. Ekonomika SSSR v period velikoi otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945. Moscow: 1965. Chemiavski, Y:u. Voina i prodovol'stvie: snabzhenie gorodskogo naseleniya v Velikuyu Otechestvennuyu voinu 1941-1945. Moscow: 1964, 19-20. Clark, Alan. Barbarossa, The Russian-German Conflict 1941-1945. London: Penguin Books, 1966. Dunmore, Timothy. The Stalinist Command Economy. New York: St. Martin’ s, 1980. Ekonomicheskaia zhizn Book I, Moscow: 1967, 411. Eshelony idut na vostok: iz istorii perebazirovaniya proitvodstvennykh sil SSSR v 1941-42. Moscow: Nauka, 1968. Feis, Harold. From Trust to Terror: Onset o f the Cold War. New York: Norton, 1970.

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Ferrell, Robert. “The Magnanimity o f the Marshall Plan and the Obstructionism o f Russia.”In Origins o f the Cold War, edited by T. Paterson. Lexington, Mass.: Heath, 1970. Gardner, Lloyd. Architects o f Illusion. Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1970. Graebner, Norman. “Cold War Origins and the Continuing Debate,”Journal o f Conflict Resolution 13 (March 1969): 123-32. Hart, B. H. Liddle. A History o f World War II. New York: Macmillan, 1971. Holzman, Franklyn. “The Ruble Exchange Rate and Soviet Foreign Trade Pricing Policies, 1929-1961,”American Econom ic Review 58, no. 4 (September 1968):803-25. Istoriiya Velikoi otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soyuza 1941-1945. Tom 2. Moscow: Voenizdat, 1963. Jasny, Naum. “Labor and Output in Soviet Concentration Camps,”Journal o f Political Economy (October 1951):405-19. Johnson, D. Gale. “Agricultural Production.” In Bergson and Kuznets (eds) Economic Trends in the Soviet Union, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Jones, Robert. Roads to Russia: US Lend Lease to the Soviet Union. Norman: University o f Oklahoma Press, 1969. KapitaTnoe stroiteTstvo. Moscow: 1961. Katz, Barbara. “Purges and Production: Soviet Economic Growth 1928-1940.” Journal o f Econom ic History 35 no. 3 (March 1975):567-90. Kravchenko, G. Ekonomika SSSR v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow: Ekonomika, 1970. Kuklick, Bruce. American Policy and the Division o f Germany. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1972. Linz, Susan J. “Measuring the Carryover Cost o f World War II to the Soviet People: 1945-1953,”Explorations in Economic History 20 (1983):375-86. __________ Economic Consequences o f Cold War Origins? An Examination o f the Carryover Cost o f World War II to the Soviet People, Unpublished PhD dissertation. University o f Illinois, 1980. Lokshin, E. “Tizahelaia industriia i teknicheskaia rekonstrucktsia narodnogo khoziaistva,” Problemy ekonomiki, nos 5-6 (1937), 52-7. __________ Planirovanie materialnotekhnicheskogo snabzheniia narodnogo khoziaistva SSSR (Moscow 1952). __________ Promylennost ' SSSR 1949-1963. Moscow: Mysl\ 1964. Lorimer, Frank. The Population o f the Soviet Union. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1946. Maier, Charles. “Revisionism and the Interpretation o f Cold War Origins,”Perspectives in American History 4 (May 1970):313-47. Martel, Leon. Lend-Lease, Loans, and the Coming o f the Cold War. Boulder: Westview Press, 1979. Millar, James R. “Financing the Soviet Effort in World War II,”Soviet Studies 32 (January 1980): 106-23. Millar, James R., and S. J. Linz. “The Cost o f World War II to the Soviet People,” Journal o f Econom ic History 38 no. 4 (December 1978):959-62 and “Reply”40 no. 4 (December 1980):849. Moorsteen, Richard, and Raymond Powell. The Soviet Capital Stock, 1928-1961. Homewood, IL: Irwin, 1966. Morganthau, Hans. “Arguing About the Cold War,”Encounter 26 (May 1967):37-41. Mosely, Philip. “Soviet-American Relations Since the War,” Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science (May 1949):202-11. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR various years (Moscow). Nove, Alec. An Econom ic History o f the USSR. Rev. Middlesex: Penguin, 1982. Nutter, G. Warren. The Growth o f Industrial Production in the Soviet Union. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962. Paterson, Thomas, ed. Soviet American Confrontation: Postwar Reconstruction and the Origins o f the Cold War. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978.

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Patterson, Gardiner, and Judd Polk. “The Emerging Pattem o f Bilateralism,” Quarterly Journal o f Economics 62 (1947): 118-42. Saryadar, Edward. “The Cost o f World War II to the Soviet People: Two Five-Year Plans?”Journal o f Economic History 40 no. 4, (December 1980):842-48. Schwartz, Harry. “Soviet Labor Policy 1940-1945,”Annals o f the American Academy o f Political and Social Science (May 1949). __________ Russia's Soviet Economy. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1958. Seaton, Albert. The Russo-German War, 1941-1945. London: Penguin, 1971. Schlesinger, Arthur, Jr. “Origins o f the Cold War,”Foreign Affairs 46 (June 1967):22-52. Shigalin, G. Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow: Izd-vo Sotsial’ no-ekonomicheskoi Literatury, 1960. Sokolov, B. Promyshelennoe stroitel'stvo v gody Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow: Gosplanizdat, 1946. Tamarchenko, M. L. Sovetskie finansy v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow: 1967, 130-36. Trud v SSSR. Moscow: 1968, 138. Vikentev, C. Natsdionalnyi dokhod SSSR v poslevoennoi period. Moscow: Politizdat, 1957, 140. Voznesenskii, N. The Economy o f the USSR During World War II. Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1948. Zaleski, Eugene. Stalinist Planning for Economic Growth, 1933-1952. Chapel Hill: Uni­ versity o f North Carolina Press, 1980. Zhenshchina v SSSR. Moscow: 1960.

Editor’ s Note The following essay is a p o rtio n o f a p ap er entitled “ T he F u tu re D evelopm ent o f the N ational Incom e o f the Soviet U nion” w ritten by W assily L eo n tief (1973 Nobel laureate) in 1944 for the U.S. Office o f Strategic Services. T he m ost striking aspect o f his p ap er is that, although o u r knowledge o f Soviet national incom e accounting an d p ro d u ctio n function analysis has b roadened beyond that presented in L eo n tief’s original p ap er in 1944, little ad d itio n al analysis regarding the w ar an d the im m ed iate postw ar perio d has been forthcom ing. L eontief’s essay represents an im p o rta n t co n trib u tio n to u n ­ derstanding this period o f Soviet econom ic developm ent: first, because it was w ritten at the tim e w hen significant policy decisions were being form ulated in the U nited States an d , second, because it was w ritten by som eone intim ately fam iliar w ith the Soviet econom ic a n d political system .

Appendix to Chapter 2: Capital Reconstruction and Postwar Development of Income and Consumption WASSILY LEONTIEF

Case I: M ilitary expenditures retu rn to the 1938 level; reconstruction proceeds w ithout the help o f foreign credits, b u t gold is ex p o rted from

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39

stocks to the am ount o f $500 m illion a year for three years. (At the en d o f the war, R ussia’s total gold stocks will be in excess o f $2 billion.)

THE WORKING HYPOTHESIS Briefly, the hypothesis th a t is tested is that, u n d er con d itio n s stated above, the fixed capital in each o f the v arious sectors o f the R ussian econom y can be restored to the June 1941 level w ith in 2.5 to 3.5 years after V-Day; th at is, in 1947 or in 1948. In detail the hypothesis is as follows: 1. In d u strial an d tran sp o rt capital are each restored to the June 1941 level in 1948; this requires an average an n u al investm ent at ab o u t the im m ediate prew ar level. 2. In agriculture, the im m ed iate policy objective is taken to be the reattain m en t o f prew ar per cap ita o u tp u t by 1949 w ith a labor force som ew hat below prew ar; this requires the restoration o f capital by the en d o f 1947, a n d som e ad d itional increase u p to 1949. 3. Because o f the extrem e housing shortage, w hich already existed before the war, housing investm ent is taken to be at the peak prew ar level in the first p a rt o f the reconstruction p erio d a n d to rise gradually thereafter; the value o f housing is restored to the prew ar level by the en d o f 1948. 4. O n the basis o f the im m ediate prew ar experience, an n u al investm ent in oth er categories o f fixed cap ital is assum ed to proceed at the sam e rate as investm ent in in d u stry a n d housing. W hile at first sight, it m ight seem im plausible to assum e th a t the volum e o f investm ent in the reconstruction period could be generally com parable to th a t o f the im m ediate prew ar years, it should be recalled th a t the burden o f m ilitary expenditures will be greatly reduced as com pared w ith prew ar years. In order to project the calculations beyond the reconstruction period, fu rth er assum ptions are introduced. T hese assum ptions are based prim arily on a consideration o f prew ar experience a n d also o f the tren d s prevailing in the reconstruction perio d a n d are o f necessity som ew hat arbitrary. For exam ple, in the case o f industry, the an n u al investm ent after 1948 is assum ed to be a gradually increasing percentage o f national incom e startin g at the percentage reached at the en d o f the reconstruction p e rio d .1

METHOD OF CALCULATING ALLOCATION O n the basis o f the above hypothesis an d plausible assum ptions regarding the allocation o f the labor force in different sectors, it is possible to com pute the new incom e produced year-by-year in the different sectors a n d hence the total corresponding annual national incom e produced. In the case o f industry, for exam ple, the relation betw een o u tp u t on the one h an d a n d capital an d labor on the other, fixed by prew ar tren d s is projected to the p ostw ar period to d eterm in e the incom e produced by this sector in each p ostw ar year.

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Wassily Leontief

Table 2.1A Calculated National Incom e Produced, Distributed by Source, USSR, 1937-1940, 1945-1952

Case 1 Agriculture

Year

Total

Industry

1937 1938 1939 1940

23.9 25.3 26.9 28.4

11.0 11.5 12.0 12.3

3.8 3.0 3.4 3.5

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952

20.7 26.0 27.1 29.0 31.3 33.5 35.9 37.9

10.7 13.2 13.7 14.5 15.4 16.2 17.1 17.9

2.4 2.8 3.2 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9

1937 1938 1939 1940

307 325 345 365

367 383 400 410

138 109 123 127

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952

266 334 348 372 402 430 461 487

357 440 457 483 513 540 570 597

87 101 116 123 130 134 138 141

Trade

Construction

Other

1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7

3.9 4.3 4.7 5.1

3.0 4.3 4.4 5.1

0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7

1.6 1.8 1.9 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

3.8 5.0 5.3 5.9 6.3 6.8 7.4 7.8

1.6 2.3 2.2 2.5 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.8

0.6 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.1 1.1

390 415 415 415

429 473 516 560

732 1,049 1,073 1,244

172 172 241 241

390 439 463 463 512 537 561 586

418 549 582 648 692 747 813 857

390 561 537 610 732 878 1,024 1,171

207 310 276 276 310 345 379 379

Transport

Billions of 1937 dollars

1928 = 100 percent

Source: W. Leontief, “The Future Development of the National Income of the Soviet Union,” OSS Paper, (1944): Appendix C.

Total disposable national incom e as d istin ct from national incom e p ro ­ duced com prises incom e produced plus the value o f gold exports from previously accum ulated stocks. T he allocation o f the to tal disposable incom e is determ ined as follows: an n u al investm ent in fixed capital each year is established at once from the assu m p tio n s used, w orking capital req u irem en ts are calculated as a fixed percentage o f in d u strial o u tp u t. U n d er th e assu m p tio n already stated as to the level o f m ilitary expenditures, co n su m p tio n is determ ined as a residual. RESU LTS The results o f the calculations are show n in T ables 2.1 A a n d 2.2A. T he 1940 national incom e is reattain ed by 1948. A fter that, a rap id rise occurs

Table 2.2A Calculated National Income, Distributed by Use, USSR, 1937-1940, 1945-1952 (billions of 1937 dollars) Case 1

Year

National income produced

1937 1938 1939 1940 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952

Disposable income®

Net fixed capital investment

Net increase in working capital

Military expenditures

Total non­ consumption

Consumption

23.9 25.3 26.9 28.4

23.9 25.3 26.9 28.4

5.2 4.8 4.8 4.7

0.8 1.1 1.2 1.4

3.6 4.8 8.4 11.8

9.6 10.7 14.4 17.9

14.3 14.6 12.5 10.5

20.7 26.0 27.1 29.0 31.3 33.5 35.9 37.9

21.2 26.5 27.6 29.0 31.3 33.5 35.9 37.9

4.4 5.3 6.0 6.2 6.6 7.3 8.1 9.0

_ 2.1 0.4 0.7 0.8 0.7 0.9 0.9

4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8

9.2 12.2 11.1 11.7 12.2 12.8 13.8 14.7

12.0 14.3 16.4 17.3 19.1 20.7 22.1 23.3

aThis differs from national income produced by the net export of gold reserves, which is assumed to amount to $500 million a year in the years 1945-1947. No account is taken of the reverse effect of gold accumulation before the war. Source: W. Leontief, "The Future Development of the National Income of the Soviet Union," OSS Paper (1944): Appendix C.

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Wassily Leontief

a n d by 1942 national incom e o f $38 billion is attain ed w hich is 40 p ercent higher than th at o f 1940. A level o f incom e corresponding to th a t projected for 1942 under the T h ird Five-Y ear P lan, w hich w as in te rru p te d by th e war, is reattained in 1950-1951. T hus in term s o f the expansion o f to tal output, the w ar will have cost the R u ssian s nine years. T he sharp increase in o u tp u t from 1945 to 1946, it should be noted, is due to the fact th at in estim ating the 1946 figure a m ore o r less a rb itra ry allowance was m ade for the in itial difficulties o f reconversion. A t th e sam e tim e, the increase from 1946 to 1947 is relatively sm all because o f th e assum ption th at the R ussians restore th e ir 40-hour w orking w eek after tw o years o f reconstruction. T he dates at w hich the o u tp u t o f different sectors reaches th e 1940 level are as follows: in dustry an d tran sp o rt, by the beginning o f 1948; agriculture, 1948; trade, beginning o f 1949. W hile investm ent in housing co n stru ctio n is calculated to exceed the prew ar level already in 1945, the recovery o f construction income lags b eh in d th a t in o th er sectors.2 T he m ost significant result is th a t the envisaged investm ent p rogram could be carried out, an d yet enough o u tp u t w ould rem ain, after m ilitary an d investm ent requirem ents are m et, to enable the R u ssian s to raise th e ir cu rrent consum ption to the im m ediate prew ar level in the very first year after the conclusion o f hostilities. However, because o f th e w artim e d e­ struction o f consum ers’ stocks o f clothing a n d household goods, th e resulting living standard w ould still be sh o rt o f the prewar. It has to be kept in m ind, furtherm ore, th a t because o f th e high m ilita ry expenditures, co n ­ sum ption in the im m ediate prew ar years (1939 a n d 1940) w as reduced to a low level. In contrast w ith the incom parably w orst w artim e living stan d ard s, however, the calculated postw ar con su m p tio n w ould seem to be high enough to p erm it the R ussians to ca rry out the envisaged investm ent program . The peak consum ption level o f 1937-1938 is calculated to be rea ttain ed by the beginning o f 1947. In the subsequent years co n su m p tio n rises at th e im pressive rate o f about 8 percent a year. A com parison betw een prew ar an d postw ar co n su m p tio n , in p er cap ita term s, substantiates these general conclusions (see Table 2.3A, C ase 1).

Case 2: International political situ atio n sam e as in C ase 1: foreign credits are available to the extent o f $1.5 billion a year for th ree years. For the purposes o f the present calculation it is assum ed th a t the loans are am ortized over a fifteen-year period, beginning at the tim e the loans are contracted; an d th at interest is at the rate o f 2 percent p er an n u m . T he net am ount o f credit received in the first three years th u s am o u n ts in to tal to $3.8 billion, and annual service charges in the fo u rth year am o u n t to $378 m illion. If credits o f this m agnitude are available, it is im probable th a t R ussia w ould be w illing to export gold at a rate exceeding c u rre n t o u tp u t. In view o f the uncertainties o f w orld m ark et conditions, a large gold reserve w ould be especially desirable if large deb t co m m itm en ts w ere contracted. T h u s

Capital Reconstruction and Postwar Development

43

Table 2.3A Per Capita Consumption, USSR, 1937-1940, 1945-1952

Year 1937 1938 1939 1940 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952

Consumption in dollars Case 1 Case 2 86.9 86.9

88.2

88.2

73.1 61.0

73.1 61.0

69.2 81.0 91.8 95.0 103.3

70.2 85.0 95.6 94.1 104.4 111.5 119.0 128.0

110.6 116.0 120.5

While bringing up their capital investment to the prewar level, the Russians will obviously create a new industrial plant different in physical composition and location from that which was ravaged by the Germans. The new industrial plant will certainly be more efficient that the old. On the other hand, however, without technological progress the replacement of the destroyed net capital values would not necessarily mean reattainment of the prewar production capacity, particularly in the instances where the destroyed plants were old and their capital values largely written off. Since most of the Russian prewar industrial investment was quite new, the foregoing consideration is mainly relevant in the case of housing. The reconstruction of the destroyed living space will require more than a replacement of the lost net capital value.

disposable incom e in C ase 2 is increased, as com pared w ith Case 1, not by the full am o u n t o f the loan proceeds, b u t by the am o u n t o f these proceeds less the difference in gold exports. T h e to tal loan proceeds less the difference in gold exports am ount to $2.3 billion for the three years. C om pared w ith the estim ated to tal loss o f fixed capital due to the war, $16 billion, this is a relatively sm all am ount. Accordingly, it is not surprising th a t the calculated rate o f reconstruction is not greatly increased, in com ­ p arison w ith C ase 1 (in w hich foreign loans are not available). If, as is likely, the entire am o u n t o f credits is used directly to increase investm ent, the p eriod o f reconstructio n in different sectors is reduced by only a few m onths, as com pared w ith C ase 1. T he corresponding developm ent o f incom e in the postw ar years is shown in Tables 2.4A an d 2.5A. W hile the effect o f the credits in increasing the rate o f reconstruction is not very m arked, the cum ulative indirect effect on to tal national incom e is appreciable. In 1952, national incom e reaches the level o f $39.8 billion, as com pared w ith $37.9 billion in the sam e year in C ase 1. T he difference, $1.9 billion, is considerably in excess o f the annual service charges on the loan in th a t year. T he investm ent o p p o rtu n ities in R ussia are so great th a t the repaym ent o f loans will im pose no net additional b u rd en on the econom y. T h e m agnitude o f the net gains from loans realized

44

Wassily Leontief

Table 2.4A Calculated National Incom e Produced, Distributed by Source, USSR, 1937-1940, 1945-1952

Year

Total

Industry

Agriculture

Case 2 Transport

Trade

Construction

Other

Billions of 1937 dollars 1937 1938 1939 1940

23.9 25.3 26.9 28.4

11.0 11.5 12.0 12.3

3.8 3.0 3.4 3.5

1.6 1.7 1.7 1.7

3.9 4.3 4.7 5.1

3.0 4.3 4.4 5.1

0.5 0.5 0.7 0.7

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952

20.9 26.8 27.7 29.5 31.8 34.1 36.8 39.8

10.7 13.4 13.8 14.6 15.6 16.4 17.4 18.5

2.5 2.9 3.4 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9 3.9

1.6 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4 2.6

3.9 5.1 5.4 5.8 6.4 7.1 7.9 8.6

1.6 2.9 2.4 2.4 3.0 3.6 4.2 4.8

0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.4

1937 1938 1939 1940

307 325 345 365

367 383 400 410

138 109 123 127

399 415 415 415

429 473 516 560

732 1,049 1,073 1,244

172 172 241 241

1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952

268 344 356 376 408 438 472 511

357 447 460 487 520 547 580 617

91 105 123 130 134 138 141 141

390 439 463 488 512 537 585 634

429 560 593 637 703 780 868 945

390 707 585 585 732 878 1,024 1,171

207 241 276 310 345 345 345 483

1928 = 100 percent

Source: W. Leontief, “The Future Development of the National Income of the Soviet Union," OSS Paper, (1944): Appendix C.

by the R ussians will depend, o f course, on th e ir ability to o b ta in on reasonable term s an export surplus necessary to m eet service charges. C onsum ption in the reconstruction years as well as later is som ew hat greater in Case 2 th an Case 1. W hile it is assum ed in C ase 2 th a t all the loan proceeds are used to increase investm ent, the in d ire ct effect o f the increased investm ent on incom e p erm its an increase in con su m p tio n . The R ussians have indicated th a t they expect rep aratio n s to m ake a substantial contribution to th eir reconstruction effort.3 It is rep o rted th a t in the case o f the reparations bill included in the rejected arm istice term s to F inland, the am ount was fixed at o n e-h alf the m aterial dam age the F in n s caused.4 If the sam e principle were followed in fixing th e bill to the G erm an s, the am ount m ight com e to $10 billion (1937 dollars). Since they are p rep ared to take paym ent-in-kind, an d possibly in labor services, the R u ssian s expect

Table 2.5A Calculated National Income, Distributed by Use, USSR, 1937-1940, 1945-1952 (billions of 1937 dollars) Case 2

Year

National income produced

1937 1938 1939 1940 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952

Disposable income*

Net fixed capital investment

Net increase in working capital

Military expenditures

Total non­ consumption

Consumption

23.9 25.3 26.9 28.4

23.9 25.3 26.9 28.4

5.2 4.8 4.8 4.7

0.8 1.1 1.2 1.4

3.6 4.8 8.4 11.8

9.6 10.7 14.4 17.9

14.3 14.6 12.5 10.5

20.9 26.8 27.7 29.3 31.8 34.1 36.8 39.8

22.3 28.1 28.8 28.9 31.4 33.7 36.4 39.4

5.3 6.1 6.6 6.2 6.6 7.3 8.1 9.0

_ 2.2 0.4 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.8 0.8

4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8 4.8

10.1 13.1 11.7 11.8 12.1 12.8 13.8 14.7

12.2 15.0 17.1 17.1 19.3 20.9 22.6 24.7

■Differs from income produced by the net proceeds from foreign credits or, alternatively, the net payments on foreign loan account. Source: W. Leontief, "The Future Development of the National Income of the Soviet Union," OSS Paper (1944): Appendix C.

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Wassily Leontief

no transfer problem to th w a rt th eir efforts to o b tain co m p en satio n for the dam age done them . If any such am ount as th a t ju s t referred to w ere collected from th e G erm ans, R ussian reconstruction could be greatly facilitated a n d the R u ssian interest in loans w ould be reduced. However, it is doubtful th a t th e sum o f $10 billion could be collected in to to w ith in a p erio d o f th ree o r four years. Possibly an appreciable tim e will elapse before an y sizeable am o u n ts can be collected, except in readily available form s such as, say, lab o r services and livestock.5

Notes 1. Assumptions and calculations are stated in detail in W. Leontief, “The Future Development o f the National Income o f the Soviet Union,“U.S. Office o f Strategic Services (OSS) paper (1944) Appendix C. 2. This lag is to be explained partly by the fact that housing investment in the reconstruction period is larger in relation to industrial investment than it was before the war, while the construction income generated by housing investment is less, per ruble o f investment, than by industrial investment. 3. “Russian War Damage and Possible Reparations Claims,“ Research and Analysis No. 1899, U.S. OSS (26 May 1944). 4. “Finland’ s Capacity to Pay the Russian Reparations Demand,”Research and Analysis No. 2127, 24 June 1944. 5. In view o f the lengthy period required to restore depleted livestock herds, payments in this form would be o f great value to the Russians.

3 Successful Spatial Management HOLLAND HUNTER

A Quick Sketch of the Geography of World War II in the USSR M uch o f the hu m an d ram a o f W orld W ar II in the U SSR is associated w ith the sw eeping m ovem ents o f arm ies a n d peoples as the w ar drove them , first eastw ard an d then w estw ard, for thousands o f m iles across E urope a n d Asia. T his essay on tran sp o rta tio n aspects o f the story therefore requires at least a b rie f sketch o f its ch ief geographic developm ents.1 It will thus p u t in relief the tra n sp o rt op eratio n s th at had to be carried o u t to insure S oviet success in the war. It will also throw light on som e postw ar consequences th a t took several years to unfold. T he U SSR w as invaded by the N azis on 22 Ju n e 1941. D uring the sum m er an d fall, N azi forces drove rapidly an d deeply into the E uropean p a rt o f the U SSR, surro u n d in g Leningrad, reaching the gates o f Moscow, a n d crossing the U kraine to R ostov on the D on River. In 1942, during the spring an d sum m er, they drove southeastw ard into the n o rth C aucasus and, m ore im portantly, m ounted a m assive attack against Stalingrad on the lower Volga. A t Stalingrad, betw een N ovem ber 1942 an d Jan u ary 1943, Soviet forces tu rn ed the tide and, after an o th er m ajor battle aro u n d K ursk in the spring, the U SSR began a steady d riv e to expel the invaders. By February 1944, the siege o f L eningrad had been lifted a n d the Soviet arm y was entering eastern Europe. By M ay 1945, the Soviet arm y had reached Berlin. Substantial S oviet forces were then shifted to the F ar East, w here they took control o f Japanese forces in M anchu ria in August 1945. Large-scale tran sp o rt op eratio n s were çentrally involved in all these m assive m ovem ents. In the su m m er a n d fall o f 1941, while N azi forces drove rapidly forw ard, there w as hasty evacuation o f people a n d p roperty

48

Holland Hunter

from the U kraine, Belorussia, a n d the Baltic states. T h e railro ad s w ere th e principal carrier, b u t all m eans o f tra n sp o rt were utilized: trucks, carts, a n d tractors; ships an d boats; m otorcycles a n d bicycles. As N ove indicates (C hapter 5) hundreds o f thousands o f persons w alked, d riv in g th e ir livestock before them . E quipm ent in h u n d red s o f factories w as d ism an tled for rail shipm ent to new locations farth er east. E verything useful a n d m ovable was evacuated if possible. I f the eq u ip m en t escaped th e invader a n d su rv iv ed the trip, it was throw n into a great m ass o f supplies available for th e w ar effort. Even before the tran sp o rt operations connected w ith evacuation w ere finished, the railroads w ere called on to assem ble tro o p s a n d m ateriel to defend Moscow. Special efforts were m ade for rap id m ovem ent o f tro o p s and supply train s from the in terio r to the front, b u rd en in g low -capacity interregional lines far beyond norm al levels. In ad d itio n , bom bing a n d strafing by N azi aircraft d isru p ted rail operations. N evertheless, th e supplies brought to defend the capital in late 1941 enabled it to survive. All during 1942, far larger flows o f tro o p s an d m ateriel converged on the region aro u n d Stalingrad, w here an even m ore decisive battle raged for seven m onths. Soldiers and civilians hastily com pleted several new rail lines to bring troops an d m unitio n s for a giant pincers m ovem ent th a t enveloped a large G erm an arm y (600,000 su rv iv ers su rren d ered in Ja n u ary 1943). A dditional flows supported the battle at K ursk. Soviet railroad personnel played a key role in su p p o rtin g th e S oviet arm y’s drive to expel the N azis. It was necessary to restore at least singletrack operation on key lines across occupied territo ry . T he retreatin g N azis were experts at dem olition b u t Soviet railroad personnel quickly becam e experts at pro m p t restoration. T h is tra n sp o rt su p p o rt co n tin u ed across eastern Europe, all the way to Berlin, w hile the distance betw een fro n t a n d rear steadily lengthened. Even after VE-Day in Europe, a large-scale tra n sp o rt o p eratio n w as required to m ove troops an d supplies for u p to eleven th o u sa n d kilom eters betw een G erm any an d M anchuria. T h e m ove w as accom plished in less th a n four m onths. Four decades later it m ay ap p e ar to have been a m in o r appendage o f the war, b u t it strain ed a w ar-w eary railro ad system to a significant extent.

Contrasts Between World Wars I and II T he volum e o f railroad freight traffic is one useful in d icato r o f a n econom y’s overall activity, so it is instru ctiv e to com pare th e im p act o f W orld W ars I an d II on R ussia an d U SSR w ith respect to it. T he tw o curves in F igure 3.1 trace, against a logarithm ic vertical scale, the an n u a l level o f railro a d freight ton-kilom eters from 1913 through 1928 a n d from 1937 th ro u g h 1952. The years 1916 and 1940 are ju x ta p o se d as the p rew ar peaks; 1918 a n d 1942 appear as the w artim e troughs. Several significant differences betw een

Figure 3.1.

109 Ton-Kilometers

Railroad Freight Traffic, Russia and USSR, 1913-1928, and USSR, 1937-1952, in Billions of Metric Ton-Kilometers

Source: H. Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy. (1957), 112, 331.

50

Holland Hunter

the two periods are im m ediately apparent. T he recovery o f S oviet railro ad freight traffic from 1922 to 1926 w as extraordinarily rapid; th e grow th rates o f the 1940s cam e now here near m atching the earlier experience. A t th e sam e tim e, it is obvious that, relatively speaking, th e fall in railro ad freight traffic during the F irst W orld W ar w ent far deeper th a n d u rin g the Second. T he contrast reflects not narrow aspects o f railro ad o p eratio n s b u t large basic differences in the whole su rro u n d in g political a n d econom ic situation. A fter the F irst W orld War, it req u ired ten years to reach th e 1916 level o f railroad freight traffic in the U SSR. R egaining the 1940 level after th e Second W orld W ar required only six years. T he horizontal lines connecting 1940 w ith 1948 and 1916 w ith 1928 enclose areas th a t suggest th e relative differences in ground lost as a result o f the tw o conflicts. It is clear that, through checking the initial d ro p in railro ad freight traffic a n d m ain ta in in g steady growth after 1942, the Soviet governm ent w as able to av e rt a recurrence o f the calam itous deficiencies th a t had to be m ade u p d u rin g the 1920s. T his contrast in railroad perform ance reflects fu n d am en tal political d if ­ ferences between the two periods. T he tsarist regim e collapsed gradually over two an d one-half years; in m id -1941 the K rem lin w as paralyzed for only two an d one-half weeks. T he N azi invasion, though n o t unexpected, disrupted adm inistrative controls rad iatin g ou t from M oscow, b u t n o t for long. In spite o f strains a n d tension, effective a d m in istra tiv e au th o rity quickly reached out even to the te rrito ry being o verrun. In particu lar, d u rin g the m ost difficult m onths o f 1941 a n d 1942, th e Soviet tra n sp o rt a n d com m unications system held together, su p p o rtin g the P arty a n d the arm e d forces.

The Period of Transport Compression, 1941-1942 How did the railroads do it? T he answ er lay p artly in a long p erio d o f p reparation.2 W hen rapid forced in d u strializatio n began at th e en d o f the 1920s, the railroads were asked to handle enlarged flows o f heavy freight traffic w ithout m uch expansion o f th eir facilities; they quickly becam e a bottleneck. A tran sp o rt crisis existed for three years. Its serious im plications were review ed in several m ajor speeches at th e S eventeenth P arty Congress in January 1934. U rging p ro m p t solution to the crisis, the C o m m issa r o f War, K. E. Voroshilov, referred to tra n sp o rt as the “ tw in b ro th e r o f the Red Army.” Soon thereafter, m ore resources were p u t in to im proved railro ad facilities, a new set o f adm in istra to rs succeeded in galvanizing railro ad operations, an d the tran sp o rt crisis was surm ounted. A key factor here was a new k in d o f discipline. D iscipline is req u ired in the operation o f all railro ad system s to ensure safety o f tra in m ovem ent; it has been sym bolized on m any E uropean railroads, including those o f R ussia an d the U SSR, by p u ttin g personnel in uniform . B ut an em phasis on strict observance o f operating rules, on “ going by th e book,” can lead to stodgy perform ance, an d in the U SSR from 1934 on, a new generation o f railroad personnel was encouraged to be m ore dynam ic. B oth a t th e

Successful Spatial Management

51

railroad com m issariat in M oscow (N K PS) a n d o u t in the field, h ard -d riv in g youngsters replaced cautious senior officials. T he purges o f 1936-1938 rem oved th ree-q u arters o f the officials operating S oviet railroads, thus ending the substantial progress o f 1935 an d 1936. T able 3.1 gives the details. T he replacem ents for the purged officials gained useful experience as the railroads ca rrie d supplies for m ilitary clashes w ith th e Japanese in 1939 near V ladivostok a n d in M anchuria, as well as in su p p o rt operations w hen th e U SS R to o k over the Baltic nations a n d fought against F in lan d in 1939-1940. T hus the Soviet railroad system h ad developed a strong a n d tested organizational fram ew ork by the tim e W orld W ar II began. In ad d itio n to the central C om m issariat in Moscow, it included 26 regional railroads, each o f w hich m anaged all com m o n -carrier trackage on its territory. In July an d A ugust 1941, flexible arrang em en ts were quickly im provised, thus facilitating th e regrouping o f railroad ad m in istra tio n s in su p p o rt o f specific m ilitary cam paigns. T he organ o f control w as the A d m in istratio n for W ar C o m ­ m unications (U PV O SO ), a long-standing organization established on 5 M arch 1918, u n d er the Suprem e W ar Council, w hich w as reorganized a n d restaffed to m eet em ergency conditions. T h is ad m in istra tio n p rovided an effective link betw een the K rem lin a n d the railroads in dealing w ith ensuing em er­ gencies.3 T he altered balance betw een th e d em an d s faced by the railroads an d resources available for m eeting th em em erged as a second factor accounting for railroad success. T he w estern regions occupied by the N azis had generated som e 40 p ercent o f Soviet rail freight traffic, a n d th is dem an d was erased. M ost o f the locom otives an d freight cars used to m eet th is d em an d were evacuated a n d were thus available for use on unoccupied territory. Difficulties arose, not because o f shortages in m otive pow er a n d rolling stock, b u t rather from a lack o f trackage a n d space for storing or tran sferrin g cars an d locom otives on the rem aining p a rts o f the railroad system . As new dem an d s for rail freight service arose from reestablished evacuated plants, hasty an d energetic efforts began to m eet them . Sidings a n d spur lines were added, yards w ere enlarged, connecting links p u t in, a n d h undreds o f m iles o f new line were built, adding increm ents o f rail capacity tailored to the altered dem an d s o f the w artim e economy. In a large geographic sense, it m ight be said th a t after an unin ten d ed retreat by Soviet forces, very stu b b o rn defense o f unoccupied te rrito ry ensued. T he railroads illustrate th is policy. D u rin g the 1920s a n d 1930s, no effort had been m ade to bu ild lateral no rth -so u th lines near the w estern frontier across the radial lines leading eastw ard, though R ussia had suffered from th eir absence d uring W orld W ar I. In th e fall o f 1941, however, co nstruction w ork began hastily on a no rth -so u th rail line parallel to the Volga R iver from near K azan through S aratov w est o f the riv er to a p o in t above Stalingrad. T h is rokadnaia (an adjective deriv ed from the chess term “ ro o k ” ) served as a “ second strategic line along the Volga,“4 w hich, together w ith tw o sh o rter lines from the south, brought huge supplies for the battle o f Stalingrad.

Table 3.1

Railroad Management Personnel, by Administrative Level and Length of Time in Current Assignment, a s of 13 November 1938

Appointed before 1 November 1937 % Number Heads of NKPS administrations Deputy heads, NKPS administrations NKPS section heads Subtotal, Commissariat Heads of individual railroads Deputy heads, railroads Heads of basic services Heads of fifteen sections Subtotal, railroad central adm. Heads Heads Heads Heads Heads

of of of of of

traffic divisions railroad stations locomotive divisions locomotive depots line sections

Appointed from Nov. to 1 April 1938 % Number

Number Enumerated

3.7 20.3 33.1

17 31 57

63.0 52.7 48.4

27 59 148

62

26.7

105

44.8

234

9 53 84 80

22.5 71.6 43.5 14.8

17 14 59 293

42.5 18.9 25.4 54.0

40 74 193 543

29.5

226

26.8

373

43.7

850

17.2 16.2 35.4 20.2 21.6

163 141 85 93 205

66.5 34.4 34.6 25.0 33.5

40 199 75 202 276

16.3 49.4 30.0 54.8 44.9

245 406 247 370 616

33.3 27.0 28.5

1 12 49

67

28.5

14 7 60 170

35.0 9.5 31.1 31.2

251 42 66 87 75 135

9 16 42

Appointed since 1 April 1938 % Number

Subtotal, railroad field adm.

405

21.5

687

36.4

792

42.1

1884

Total, all management levels

723

24.3

975

33.0

1270

42.7

2968

Source: B. P. Beshchev, chief editor, Zheleznodorozhnyi transport v gody industrializatsii SSSR (1926-1941), A. G. Naporko, chief compiler (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Transport, 1970), 309.

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53

In checking the N azi attack a n d organizing to d riv e th e invaders back, S oviet auth o rities could draw on very su b stan tial in d u strial capacity, initially fully equal to G erm an y ’s. T he invasion req u ired im aginative a n d wellorganized readjustm ents, however, th a t m ade use o f an effective tran sp o rt a n d com m unications sector. In spite o f occasional setbacks a n d errors, this sector o f the econom y m anaged to m eet the d em an d s placed on it. Severe w inters h am pered tra n sp o rt o p erations durin g W orld W ar II, b u t the U SSR w as b etter able to deal w ith th em th a n were N azi occupying forces. In the first w inter o f th e war, S oviet tro o p s were b etter clad than the invaders. A truck ro ad across frozen Lake Ladoga prov id ed a lifeline for L eningrad. T he civilian p o p u latio n w as resourceful in finding firewood for stoking steam locom otives w hen D o n b as coal w as not available. In front o f Stalingrad, the invaders’ tra n sp o rt difficulties in the fall an d w inter o f 1942-1943 co n trib u ted to th eir defeat. D uring the w ar an d ever since, the U SSR has stressed the im portance o f an eastern ind u strial base, b u ilt u p before 1940 “ b eh in d the U rals,” 5 as a key factor in Soviet victory. T he tra n sp o rt im plication is th at very long distances w ere involved betw een front a n d rear, especially as the front m oved w estw ard. Long hauls were indeed involved, a n d the average length o f haul for railroad freight rose substantially. A nother factor, however, served to hold the hauls dow n. As show n in Figure 3.2, h a lf the in d u strial o u tp u t o f the w ar years cam e from Soviet te rrito ry w est o f the usual b o u n d ary o f the eastern regions. Even w hen this m iddle b an d o f te rrito ry (p rim arily the Volga valley) was im m ediately b eh in d the front an d subject to N azi bom bing, it co n trib u ted h a lf the co u n try ’s output. In the later stages o f the war, additional o u tp u t was m ore readily o b tained here a n d in tem p o rarily occupied regions th an in the east. As the need for b o th m ilitary a n d reconstruction supplies shifted steadily w estw ard, the long distances involved in shipm ents from Siberia becam e an ever-increasing disadvantage. W hile the U rals, the U ral-K uznetsk K om binat, the K azakh republic, a n d Soviet C entral A sia all played vital roles in W orld W ar II, the unoccupied p arts o f the E uropean U SSR played an equally fundam ental role.

The Emergency Restoration Period, 1943-1945 T hough N azi dem olition was thorough, S oviet railro ad personnel developed great skill in repairing bridges a n d o th er key in stallations quickly. Even d u ring the early m onths o f the evacuation, im provised arrangem ents for loading an d unloading becam e an art. In su p p o rt o f m assive m ilitary operations, Soviet railroad personnel invented novel ways o f handling train m ovem ents, bringing supplies to a front an d retriev in g em pty cars, using only a skeletal single-track netw ork. In rebuilding bridges an d im provising freight handling m ethods, the U SSR dem o n strated w hat becam e evident from analysis o f W orld W ar II experience in E urope an d later experience

54

Holland Hunter Figure 3.2.

Gross Industrial Output, USSR, 1940-1944

in K orea an d V ietnam : determ in ed defenders can th w a rt efforts to in terd ict tran sp o rt lines perm anently. As Soviet forces drove w estw ard across occupied territo ry , service w as restored initially on only a few key lines. T he local econom y w as in ru in s an d supplies for the front were crucial. T h en gradually the connections necessary to su p p o rt the rebuilding o f the general econom y w ere restored. The rebuilding o f passenger statio n s cam e som e years later. R esto ratio n o f coal supplies p erm itted the railro ad s to ab a n d o n th e use o f w ood, th u s raising the efficiency o f locom otives.

Successful Spatial Management

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A m ong the supplies received by the U SSR u n d er Lend-Lease an d M utual A id w ere alm ost 2000 steam locom otives a n d 475,000 trucks, a substantial am ount o f signaling an d com m unications equipm ent, steel rails, a n d 11 m illion pairs o f boots, all o f w hich bolstered Soviet w artim e tran sp o rt perform ance. T he supplies arriv ed m ainly after the battle o f Stalingrad, thus contrib u tin g to the w estw ard d riv e durin g the second stage o f the war.

Postwar C on sequ en ces of Wartime Transportation Developments As already indicated, officials at the N K PS (since 1946, the MPS), along w ith the m aritim e an d river ad m in istratio n s, had shown them selves to be seasoned, com petent m anagers o f tran sp o rtatio n . T here had been crises, controversies, an d som e ad m in istra tiv e reorganization; however, the crises w ere surm ounted an d a strong group o f tran sp o rta tio n leaders em erged from the war. T he two m ost p ro m in en t were Iv an V ladim irovich Kovalev, a key m em ber o f the W ar C o m m u n icatio n s A dm in istratio n u n d er the S uprem e W ar C ouncil from July 1941 to D ecem ber 1944, who w ent on to be m in ister o f railroads (from 1944 to the 1960s), a n d Boris Pavlovich Beshchev, the head o f a m ajor railroad (the K uibyshev) durin g W orld W ar II, who served as m in ister for a decade thereafter. D uring the F ourth Five-Year P lan (FY P) period (1946-1950), the railroads evidently held the confidence o f the P arty leadership. A m ple resources flowed to the railroads as they helped the econom y regain an d surpass the prew ar level. T he policy o f stringency tow ard tra n sp o rt investm ent th a t had prevailed in the late th irtie s gave way tem porarily to relative generosity. However, the railroads’ success in handling m ore traffic gave the authorities an excuse to cut back the railro ad s’ share o f investm ent in the Sixth FYP. O ne im m ediate consequence o f the w ar was an unexpected surge in railroad passenger traffic, as shown in Table 3.2 a n d Figure 3.3. T he volum e o f passenger-kilom eters had fallen from 98 billion in 1940 to a level o f 3 8 -39 billion in 1942 and 1943. It rose to 57 billion in 1944 an d 66 billion in 1945, still far below the p rew ar level. B ut in 1946 it ju m p e d alm ost 50 percent to equal the 1940 level o f 98 billion passenger-kilom eters, an d in 1947 it reached 95 billion. In 1948, however, the total fell back to 75 billion. Both the surge from 1945 to 1946 a n d the fall from 1947 to 1948 were unexpected by railroad traffic planners. Clearly, the retu rn to th eir hom es o f people dislocated by the w ar exceeded the expectations o f railroad authorities. All these figures, incidentally, are for paying passengers; those who may have crow ded into passenger cars w ithout tickets an d all who rode in freight cars are om itted. In the early postw ar years, Soviet railroads were rebuilt an d expanded w ith unchanged technology. T he Lend-Lease locom otives a n d a sim ilar dom estic design, the L series, were q u ite ap p ro p riate for po o r track con­ d itio n s.6 T hough L. M. K aganovich had been displaced durin g the w ar by

Table 3.2 Annual Railroad P a ssen ger Traffic, USSR, 1937-1951, in Millions o f P as­ senger-Kilometers

Year

Traffic

Year

Traffic

1937 1938 1939 1940 1941 1942 1943

90,942 91,661 93,726 97,972 n.a. 38,000 39,300

1944 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951

58,100 66,200 97,800 95,100 85,200 81,300 87,600 98,500

Sources: 1937-1940 and 1945-1951 from H. Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy (1957), 357.1942 from G. S. Kravchenko, Ekonomlka SSSR v gody VOV (Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny) (1970), 274. 1943 and 1944 from I. V. Kovalev, Transport v VOV (1981), 332.

Figure 3.3.

Annual Railroad Passenger Traffic, USSR, 1937-1951

1946

1951

Successful Spatial Management

57

o th e r railroad officials, he regained his influence in th e early 1950s an d becam e a focus for oppositio n to technological change. It w as only after S talin died an d K aganovich lost influence th a t the steam locom otive gave way to electrics an d diesels. T he slow eastw ard m ovem ent o f p o p u latio n a n d in d u stry in the U SSR, w hile tem porarily sp u rred by W orld W ar II, was, in fact, checked as a result o f postw ar restoratio n in occupied territo ry . T he restoration o f this very large area u n d er the F o u rth F Y P d rain e d m assive resources away from eastern developm ent. In d u strial centers in the U rals a n d west Siberia fell back from th eir w artim e levels. H ad it not been necessary to m ake up for N azi d estruction on occupied territo ry , the prew ar tre n d tow ard expansion in the east w ould have continued, a n d eastern regions w ould have received m ost o f the plants, equipm en t, a n d labor th a t w ent instead in to rebuilding occupied territory. T hough the F o u rth F Y P called for a co n tin u ed shift o f in d u stry tow ard the east, m inisterial officials preferred expansion in the E uropean p a rt o f the U SS R .7 O u tp u t increm ents could be ob tain ed m ore quickly a n d cheaply by adding to existing facilities in th e E uropean p a rt o f the U SSR th a n at new locations in the east. L abor was easier to o b tain a n d retain. W orking co nditions were generally m ore attractive. H ence, bran ch level decisions th w arted policies em bedded in the F o u rth Five-Y ear Plan. H ad it not been for W orld W ar II, the m o m en tu m o f the eastw ard m ovem ent m ight have been b etter m aintained.

Two Summary Judgments In his F ebruary 1946 lecture to th e Soviet people, S talin spoke o f W orld W ar II as a test o f the S oviet system .8 T he S oviet tran sp o rta tio n an d co m m unications sector— m ainly the railro ad s— like m ost others, passed the test successfully. Instead o f co n trib u tin g to a collapse o f th e regime, as R ussian railroads had done in W orld W ar I, Soviet railroads in W orld W ar II provided sturdy links th a t held the w hole co untry together. They w eathered a m assive invasion th a t excised th e ir m ost developed portions, and, through flexible adap tatio n s a n d energetic responses, ca rrie d the tro o p s a n d m ateriel responsible for the Soviet ejection a n d defeat o f the N azis. M ore broadly, bo th the P arty a n d governm ent as a whole provided a fram ew ork o f au thority an d pow er th a t succeeded in utilizing the tran s­ p o rtatio n an d com m unicatio n s system to m ain ta in control on a continental scale. D u rin g W orld W ar I outlying p o rtio n s o f the R u ssian em pire slipped out from u n d er effective sup erv isio n as St. P etersburg’s com petence declined. In W orld W ar II, by contrast, after approxim ately 15 days o f tem porary paralysis, Stalin m anaged to exert effective coo rd in atio n through p ro m p t com m unication reaching to every p a rt o f the U SSR, an exam ple, indeed, o f successful spatial m anagem ent.

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Notes 1. The most thorough official source is the six-volume Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza, 1941-1945, commissioned by a Central Committee decree o f 12 September 1957, and published in the 1960s. For an evaluation, in English, o f military developments, see John Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1975) and The Road to Berlin (Boulder Westview, 1983). The history o f wartime Soviet transportation is recounted in detail by Ivan Vladimirovich Kovalev, who draws on archival sources and his own inner-circle experience, in his Transport v Velikoi Ote­ chestvennoi voine (1941-1945 gg.), issued by the Institute o f History o f the USSR Academy o f Sciences (Moscow, 1981). Another thorough study from the same institute, using archival sources, is Georgii Aleksandrovich Kumanev’ s Sovetskie zhelenodorozhniki v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo Akedemii Nauk SSSR, 1963), which has a substantial bibliography. 2. Holland Hunter, Soviet Transportation Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1957), esp. chapters 3 and 4. 3. Kovalev, op. cit., 44-79, esp. 54 and 73-75. 4. Kovalev, loc. cit., 75. 5. This was the title o f John Scott’ s influential 1942 book describing his experiences as a young welder building the steel works at Magnitogorsk. 6. J. N. Westwood, Soviet Locomotive Technology During Industrialization, 1928-1952 (London: Macmillan, 1982), 189. 7. Timothy Dunmore, The Stalinist Command Economy (New York: St. Martin’ s Press, 1980), passim, esp. chaps. 4 and 6. 8. J. V. Stalin, Speech Delivered by J. V Stalin at a Meeting o f Voters o f the Stalin Electoral District, Moscow, February 9, 1946 (Moscow: Foreign Language Publishing House, 1946).

4 Crisis Management in the USSR: The Wartime System of Administration and Control SANFORD R. LIEBERMAN

In m any ways, the m agnitude o f m any o f the recu rren t crises o f the tw entieth century has been so great as to m ake these events q ualitatively different from alm ost all crises o f the p a s t.1 Accordingly, crisis situations have com pelled m any contem p o rary regim es to respond w ith rapid, all-out, effective action. In ad m in istra tiv e term s, such a response has required these regim es to circum vent the rigidities o f form al bureaucratic in stitu tio n s an d procedures an d rely to a large extent b o th on specially created organs an d in stitu tio n s an d on specifically em pow ered in d iv id u als for the execution o f particularly im p o rta n t assignm ents.2 T he use o f such extraordinary form s o f ad m in istratio n an d control in the Soviet U nion during W orld W ar II provides a m ajor case in point. C aught off guard by the G erm an invasion o f 22 June 1941, the Soviet U nion was confronted w ith the increasingly grim prospect o f defeat. S urvival necessitated th a t the Soviet regim e rapidly a n d fully m obilize the co u n try ’s h u m an an d m aterial resources. T his, however, req u ired the creation o f a special w artim e system o f a d m in istra tio n a n d control— one th at would facilitate operative decision-m aking an d policy im plem entation, while, at the sam e tim e, perm ittin g Stalin a n d his to p associates to retain a fair m easure o f centralized control over the w ar effort. In so doing, as would be the case in m any o th er aspects o f the w ar effort, the Soviet regim e was to draw heavily upon its past experience in dealing w ith crisis situations, above all, those d ating from the p eriod o f the C ivil W ar and Intervention. T h at significant use was to be m ade o f form s an d techniques, especially those o f an ex traordinary n atu re th at had w orked successfully in earlier

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Sanford R. Lieberman

crises, was owing to the d ictato r’s personal preferences a n d to th e regim e’s correct perception th a t th is w as not th e tim e for ex p erim en tatio n a n d innovation. O f p articu lar im portance w ould be the estab lish m en t on 30 Ju n e 1941, o f the State D efense C o m m ittee (G K O ), w hich, in ce rtain respects, w as m odeled after the C ouncil o f W orkers’ a n d P easants’ D efense th a t h ad functioned during the years o f the C ivil W ar a n d In terv en tio n .3 T h is extraordinary organ— a kin d o f in n e r P o litb u ro w ith S talin as ch a irm an and M olotov, M alenkov, Beria, an d Voroshilov as its other original m em bers— was accorded “ the entire plenitude o f pow er in th e country.” 4 As such, th e State D efense C om m ittee issued resolutions which had the force o f law in war time. All citizens, all Party, soviet, K om osom ol and military organizations were obliged uncondi­ tionally to fulfill the decisions and orders o f the GKO. It exercised leadership o f the national econom y in the interests o f war production, led the construction o f the armed forces and their administration, took measures for the guaranteeing o f social order and security, and created, in necessary instances, special com m ittees and administrations on matters pertaining to military-economic and defense construction.5

M ore specifically, the G K O was concerned w ith the appointment and replacement o f the higher-ranking military comm anders; the preparation o f reserves for the army in the field; the solution o f important military-strategic questions; the adjustment o f the work o f industry, transport, and agriculture to the conditions o f wartime; the supply o f the population and the army with produce; the procurement o f fuel, the preparation o f labor reserves and the allocation o f labor am ong the various industrial objects; and the battle against enemy spies.6

T he establishm ent o f the G K O also had an im p o rta n t effect on th e S oviet U nion’s regular system o f political an d ad m in istra tiv e controls. A ccording to L eonard Schapiro, w ith th e establishm ent o f th e State D efense C o m m ittee, the whole system o f balance between the Party organizations on the one hand, and the soviet and econom ic organizations, on the other, which it had been found necessary to maintain, however imperfectly, even in the gravest em er­ gencies in the past, was thus swept aside. . . .7

T his is not to say th at the G K O su p p lan ted the regular system o f controls. Rather, as indicated earlier, it w as su p erim p o sed u p o n the en tire system in order to circum vent the traditionally rigid a n d tim e-consum ing aspects o f bureaucratic procedure a n d thus to provide the S oviet regim e w ith b o th the ad m inistrative flexibility an d th e centralization o f control th a t th e w ar effort required. “ T he keynote o f w artim e a d m in istra tio n . . . [according to S chapiro] was rationalization.” 8 T h at th is was, in fact, the case is in d icated by the

Wartime System of Administration and Control

61

ra th e r inchoate natu re o f th e G K O ’s m odus o perandi. O f p articu la r sig­ nificance, in th is respect, is the following description o f the operational aspects o f the State D efense C o m m ittee pro v id ed by the th e n head o f the rear o f the R ed A rm y, G eneral A. K hrulev: The apparat o f the G K O was essentially that o f the Central Com m ittee o f the Party, the Council o f People’ s Com m issars and the people’ s commissariats. . . . M em bers o f the G K O making reports, prepared drafts each according to his sphere o f activity, and always entered freely into the office o f the Chairman o f the GKO. Hither uninterruptedly cam e military leaders, people’ s com m issars and other responsible individuals not only at [Stalin’ s] request . . . but also on their own initiative if som e important, unexpected problem had com e up. Meetings o f the G K O in the usual sense o f the term— that is, with definite agendas, secretaries and protocols— did not exist. The procedure o f reaching agreement with Gosplan, the people’ s com m issariats and departments, on questions o f supply o f the army, was reduced to a minimum. This enabled . . . the leaders o f each sector o f the econom y . . . to d o everything that was necessary for the front, for the defeat o f the enem y m ore rapidly. Conscious initiative o f central and local workers was the key.9

Sketchy though it is, K h ru lev ’s account is th e single m ost com plete account o f the G K O ’s m odus o peran d i available. T h is d escription may, however, be expanded som ew hat by piecing together a n u m b er o f com m ents from v arious o th er Soviet an d non-Soviet sources. F irst, it is evident th a t not all business w as conducted by the full com m ittee. Indeed, one Soviet source states th a t “ questions frequently were exam ined solely by its [the com m ittee’s] ch airm an, assistants or in d iv id u al m em bers.” 10 T h is sam e source cites such actions as an exam ple o f S talin’s failure to observe dem ocratic procedure o r free d iscussion.11 W hile not denying th is fact, it should also be poin ted o u t th a t the preoccupation o f co m m ittee m em bers w ith a v ariety o f im p o rta n t assignm ents— som e o f w hich to o k th em away from M oscow— necessitated th eir absence from com m ittee m eetings. As for the actual dynam ics o f decision-m aking, the following description is presented as an approxim atio n o f the co m m ittee’s m odus operandi. Each co m m ittee m em ber w as personally responsible for ce rtain aspects o f the w ar effort— political, m ilitary, security, a n d /o r econom ic.12 As such, they not only oversaw th eir respective areas o f endeavor, b u t also m aintained p rim e responsibility for solving the v ario u s problem s th a t confronted th eir p articu la r sectors. B rainstorm in g sessions seem to have been an extrem ely im p o rta n t problem -solving technique. Such w ork w as done in p a rt through a nu m b er o f special com m ittees a n d com m issions set u p u n d er the G K O , the C ouncil o f P eople’s C om m issars, or o th e r im p o rta n t central organs. For exam ple, a tran sp o rta tio n co m m ittee o f the G K O was established in F ebruary 1942 u n d er S talin’s ch airm an sh ip (w ith A. A. A ndreev as assistan t chairm an). The C om m ittee planned and regulated the freightage o f railroad, sea and river transport, coordinated shipping, and worked out measures for im proving the material base . . . o f the country’ s entire transport system ----13

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M ore frequently, however, w hen confronted w ith som e problem , the in dividual G K O m em bers sim ply called a m eeting a n d bro u g h t people together who had the necessary degree o f expertise a n d pow er to solve problem s th at had arisen in th e ir p articu la r spheres o f activity. In a d d itio n to the regular participants o f such m eetings, in d iv id u al experts a n d ad v iso rs were often called in on a m o m en t’s notice to help resolve a p articu la r q uestion.14 Such face-to-face attem p ts at problem solving fit in well w ith the dem ands o f w artim e. T im e w as o f the essence— w ritin g m em os or holding a series o f individual m eetings w as to o tim e-consum ing. E m el’ianov describes a num ber o f such sessions in his m em oirs: I [Emel’ ianov] received an invitation to the Kremlin, to a meeting called by Voznesenskii. In his reception room, I met Tevosian, Malyshev, Lomako, and several more people . . . [Voznesenskii] reported how serious the situation with respect to nickel was— “We, in essence, will allocate nickel only for the production o f armor, gun steel and the aviation industry— for the production o f crankshafts”— he said. “In order to fulfill the program we must have”— and he named a quantity o f nickel. “We have, however, . . . and he again named a figure”— “you are specialists and Com m unists too. I cannot take the entire responsibility for the defense . . . [effort] . . . on m yself—tell me what needs to be done? Where can we get the m issing nickel? H ow shall we get out o f this situation . . . ?” The participants o f the meeting expressed their opinions on how the arsenal o f science should be utilized in order to get out o f the difficult situation with nickel. In the process o f discussion, the idea o f a steel-substitute was b o m and polished. A way out was found. The difficult task was decided.15

If the subject u n d er consideration could not be resolved a t th is level o r was o f sufficient im portance, it m ight be b rought to the atten tio n o f several G K O m em bers, the full com m ittee, o r perhaps S talin him self. T he sam e consultative process w ould be followed again w ith th e responsible G K O m em ber acting as the principal reporter. M oreover, it m ust be stressed th a t even in Stalin’s presence th is process frequently involved a considerable am ount o f genuine discussion a n d debate. D espite b o th th e obv io u s adverse effects o f one-m an tyrannical rule on bureaucratic in itia tiv e 16 a n d statem en ts to the effect th a t Stalin him self often m ade decisions according to his m o o d rather th an according to his u n d erstan d in g o f a p a rtic u la r q u estio n ,17 evidence exists which suggests th a t the Soviet leader frequently w as w illing to listen an d accept advice from his civ ilian a n d m ilitary ad v iso rs a n d associates. Indeed, he seem s to have done so w ith increasing frequency as th e w ar progressed. In this respect, his actions were directly c o n tra ry to those o f H itler.18 The inform ation an d advice Stalin received cam e in th e first instance from his im m ediate associates. M uch o f th is w as done in an inform al setting such as late night d inners at S talin’s dacha. M ilovan D jilas, w ho h ad occasion to atten d several o f these dinners, notes th a t

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at these dinners, the Soviet leaders were at their closest, m ost intimate with each other. Everyone would tell the news from his bailiwick, whom he met that day, and what plans he was making.19

A nd again, Stalin was o f a lively, almost restless temperament. He always questioned h im self and others; and he argued with h im self and others.20

In som e instances, such questio n in g w as an attem p t on the p a rt o f the d ictato r to find o u t w here o th er m em bers o f the State D efense C o m m ittee stood on a given issue. Such ap p aren tly was the case w ith the G K O m eeting held on 19 O ctober 1941, at the height o f the Battle o f Moscow. A ccording to one o f the p articip an ts in th is m eeting, we were gathered together in the evening in Stalin’ s office in the Kremlin— “W ill we fight for M oscow ?”— asked Stalin. As usual, he paced around the room, stuffing cigarette tobacco in his pipe. All were silent, then Stalin decided to ask all those who were present personally. G oin g first up to Molotov, he repeated his question— “We will fight” . . . [Molotov] . . . answered. So answered, one after the other, all those who were present. Then, right there, with Stalin [himself] . . . dictating, the G K O resolution which began with those m emorable words, “It hereby is declared . . .” was written.21

K uznetsov also notes th a t Stalin relied on experts to check on the work o f v arious people’s com m issars saying, “ Now I will check u p on you. Now we will hear w hat the practical w orkers have to say.” 22 Indeed, not only does it ap p ear th a t Stalin frequently sought ou t the opinions o f his advisors a n d associates, b u t also it w as som etim es possible for people w ho had w orthw hile suggestions an d the courage o f th eir convictions to argue th eir p oints o f view an d eventually w in th e day. M arshal B agram ian, for exam ple, notes th a t at a Stavka (G eneral H ead q u arters o f the S uprem e C o m m and) m eeting, a rep o rt w as given w ith w hich he h im self d id not agree. H e kept silent, however, an d the m a tte r w as apparently resolved to the satisfaction o f everyone present, including Stalin. “ S uddenly S talin asked— ‘b u t perhaps you [B agram ian] have an o th er o p in io n on th is [m atter]?’” 23 T hus given an o p p o rtu n ity to reopen the subject, B agram ian presented his views, w hich subsequently w ere approved .24 In p o in t o f fact, it seem s th a t S talin placed great em phasis on achieving a clash o f ideas as a way o f o btaining the correct solution o r best answ er to a given problem . M arshals Z hukov an d K onev, for exam ple, having been recalled to M oscow from the E astern F ro n t in A pril 1945 for a top-level conference on the taking o f Berlin, were asked by the Soviet d ictato r w ho should be given the task o f cap tu rin g the G erm an capital. W hen each m an argued in favor o f the use o f his own forces, Stalin ordered bo th o f th em to p rep are separate detailed plans a n d to rep o rt back w ithin forty-eight hours. Two days later, the two m arshals presented th eir proposals to S talin .25 In th is instance, “ having listened to

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the two proposals, Stalin now approved th em both. B ut to Z hukov w ent the responsibility o f capturin g Berlin.” 26 T he p articipants in such m eetings (as well as in lower-level m eetings) were expected not only to have the necessary degree o f expertise in o rd er to discuss a specific issue b u t also to be p rep ared to do so. P o o r perform ance in such conferences was penalized rath e r severely.27 F u rth erm o re, the p a r­ ticipants9 aw areness o f Stalin’s rep u tatio n a n d personality m ade it co n sid ­ erably m ore difficult for them to deliver a p ro p er presentation. H igh-ranking officials could be reduced to stam m erin g incoherence u n d e r the pressure o f Stalin’s sharp questioning.28 M ilitary officials, however, seem to have fared som ew hat b etter th an civilian au th o rities in such sessions— p erhaps because, at a tim e w hen so m uch depended on the m ilitary, they h ad to be treated m ore circum spectly th a n th e ir civilian co u n terp arts. In the last analysis, as w as in d icated by the Z hukov-K onev episode, decision-m aking authority rested squarely in S talin’s ow n hands. O nce th is stage had been reached, the ap p ro p riate G K O m em ber a n d /o r expert(s) would be given the task o f d raftin g the actual resolution. It w ould th e n be presented to Stalin once again for final approval. Such, for exam ple, w as the case w ith the decision to form the rear o f the R ed Arm y. M ikoyan thus inform ed G eneral K hrulev by phone th at the Supreme Com m ander [entrusts]. . . you with the task o f preparing a draft o f a G K O resolution on the organization o f the rear o f the R ed Army in wartime. Representatives o f Stavka were immediately drawn into this work. ... At the end o f July, the draft o f the resolution G K O was prepared. Leading workers o f the G K O were gathered in Stalin’ s office. Having read the document, the Supreme Com m ander silently passed it to the head o f the General Staff, G. K. Zhukov. Zhukov quickly acquainted h im self with the draft and cate­ gorically declared— “I don’ t agree. The authors o f this docum ent want organs o f the rear to replace the General Staff.” Having cast an expressive glance at G. K. Zhukov, the Supreme Com m ander took back the draft and imm ediately signed it.29

Although other extraordinary organs, including the C ouncil for E vacuation30 a n d city com m ittees o f defense ( gor/cos) in a n u m b er o f frontline areas,31 were established during the war, no special ad m in istra tiv e m ach in ery existed for im plem enting the decisions o f the G K O .32 T h is m ean t th a t th e greater p art o f the State D efense C o m m ittee’s business h ad to be executed thro u g h the regular channels o f P arty a n d state ad m in istratio n . T hus, according to Sinitsyn, resolutions o f the State Defense C om m ittee were addressed directly to the organs o f state power and administration, to C ouncils o f People’ s Com m issars o f union and autonomous republics, executive com m ittees o f oblast and krai soviets o f workers’deputies, to various governmental institutions and adm in­ istrations, to people’ s com m issariats and committees, departments and enter­ prises. In these resolutions, concrete assignments were given . . . [and] it was stated who and in what length o f time these assignments had to be fulfilled.33

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T he sup erim p o sitio n o f the State D efense C o m m ittee— even w ith the ad d itio n o f o th er extrao rd in ary organs— upon the regim e’s regular system o f ad m in istratio n an d control, however, w as by itself an inadequate orga­ nizational response to the crisis o f all-out war. Som ething m ore w as needed, som ething th a t not only w ould k n it the regim e’s regular a n d extraordinary organizations an d in stitu tio n s into one w orkable whole, b u t w ould also com pensate for the failure o f the Soviet leadership to w ork o u t a detailed set o f protocols on ad m in istra tiv e op eratio n s a n d ju risd ictio n al boundaries in tim e o f war. T his som ething extra was pro v id ed by the personalization o f pow er th a t w as a hallm ark o f the S talin era. A lthough th is phenom enon d id not either originate or en d w ith Stalin, th e regim e’s reliance on per­ sonalization o f pow er durin g the Stalin era clearly owed m uch to the personality o f the dictator. In fact, the Soviets them selves, recognizing the extent to w hich one m an, Stalin, d o m in ated the entire era, aptly refer to th is p eriod as “ the era o f the cult o f the personality.” W hat we know ab o u t Stalin’s personality, in p articu la r his m egalom ania a n d ap p aren t paranoia, suggests a n atu re th a t w ould seek to im p rin t itself firm ly a n d fully upon the regim e’s system o f ad m in istra tio n a n d control— th at is, to personalize (or Stalinize) it. A nd, indeed, durin g the years o f his rule, Stalin proceeded to do precisely this. H is nocturnal work schedule becam e the schedule for m uch o f the co u n try ’s bureaucracy. H is ruthlessness a n d arb itrarin ess p rovided subordinates a t all levels w ith a stan d ard o f b ehavior to em ulate. H is personalized style o f leadership was reflected in the sim ilar style o f responsible low er-ranking officials. T he system had not only its Stalin, b u t also its countless “ little Stalins.” In ad d itio n to the considerable au th o rity som etim es exercised inform ally by Soviet officials, personalization o f pow er also existed— even before the w ar— in a n um ber o f in stitu tio n alized form s, the m ost im p o rta n t o f w hich w as the plenip o ten tiary system . Basically, w hat the system involved was the delegation by som e governm ental or P arty organ (ranging in im portance d u ring the w ar from the G K O itself, the C entral C o m m ittee o f the AllU nion P arty, the C ouncil o f People’s C om m issars, an d ind iv id u al com ­ m issariats, to the various local organizations) o f considerable a n d indeed, at tim es, alm ost carte blanche authority, to a p articu la r individual, usually for the execution o f a specific assignm ent. In the case o f the State D efense C om m ittee, the co m m ittee had plenipotentiaries in all military-industrial com m issariats and departments, territories... [and regions],... [and] in important enterprises and construction projects. They did what had to be done to implement the decisions o f the G K O . . . and to m obilize forces and resources for the war effort.34

In som e instances, top-ran k in g leaders like M alenkov, A ndreev, an d V oznesenskii w ere pressed in to service as plenipotentiaries. In o th er cases, the in d iv id u al involved m ight, for exam ple, be a people’s com m issar, a p lan t m anager, or a local official.35 It w as hoped that, by com bining powerful m an d ates w ith personal expertise (fam iliarity w ith a p articu la r problem or

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geographical area) a n d /o r personal authority, these ex trao rd in ary officials would be able to accom plish th e ir assignm ents.36 T he plenipotentiary system h ad som ething in p articu la r to reco m m en d its use by Stalin— it offered h im a m echanism for th e closest possible approxim ation o f a one-m an exercise o f total power. F or Stalin, the ideal system w ould have been one th a t p erm itted h im to be everyw here a t once an d to do everything single-handedly. Lacking th is possibility, th e next best thing was to grant considerable o r even near-total m an d ates o f au th o rity to select individuals to deal w ith p articu la r problem s. By doing this, S talin was able to bring great am ounts o f pow er to b ear on p a rtic u la r situ atio n s while still keeping responsibility focused on specific ind iv id u als. In a sense, he was not giving up any pow er a t all because such in d iv id u als w ere acting as his eyes, ears, an d fists in th e field. T h is system w as forceful, arb itrary , and even ruthless in its operation. T his, however, w as not only w hat S talin desired, an d in fact dem anded, b u t w as also w hat th e S oviet U n io n itself w ould need, especially in the crisis o f all-out war. An interesting and im p o rta n t case study o f th e actual o p eratio n o f th is extraordinary system o f ad m in istra tio n a n d control is p ro v id ed by the evacuation o f in dustry durin g the w ar.37 As noted earlier, in th e su m m er an d fall o f 1941 the Soviet regim e w as confronted w ith th e increasingly grim prospect o f defeat. T he situ atio n in the field w as critical enough. However, the ever-m ounting te rrito ria l losses p resented an ad d itio n al deadly th reat to the U SSR ’s ability to continue to wage war. T he areas already lost or in danger o f being lost were rich in m ineral, agricultural, an d h u m a n resources an d form ed the hea rtlan d o f th e Soviet in d u strial com plex.38 T he loss o f natural an d hu m an resources, w hile a very serious m atter, could, however, be survived since the Soviet U nion had at least m in im ally sufficient qu antities o f those resources req u ired to continue its w artim e struggle. B ut the loss o f a m ajor portio n o f its in d u strial strength w ould be a different m atter. Thus, for the Soviet regim e to survive, it h ad to m ove quickly to evacuate as m uch as possible o f its in d u strial resources from actual an d potential w ar zones to the deep rear. Initially, however, the evacuation project w as m arked by chaos, p articu larly in the w estern border regions th a t lay in the im m ed iate p ath o f th e rapidly advancing enem y forces. Because the regim e’s evacuation m ach in ery w as not yet functioning, P arty an d governm ental organs in these areas h ad to deal w ith the problem s o f evacuation them selves.39 Indeed, at the sta rt o f hostilities, contingency plans for the evacuation o f in d u stry d id not even exist! T he absence o f such plans, the speed o f the enem y advance, the im m ensity o f the task at han d , a n d the lack o f pow er a n d com petence on the p art o f the local officials in bo rd er areas to cope w ith th e larger issues an d problem s o f evacuation all com bined, in m ost instances, to d o o m the efforts o f the local organs to failure.40 I f the evacuation was to succeed, an d , indeed, if th e S oviet U n io n w as to survive the crisis o f war, an all-out m obilization effort w ould have to be made. T his, however, necessitated the creation o f a special w artim e

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system o f ad m in istratio n an d control, a t th e apex o f w hich, as previously noted, w ould be the State D efense C o m m ittee (G K O ). Accordingly, the G K O assum ed overall leadership o f the evacuation process. T he co m m ittee itself, m oreover, w ould issue m any o f the m ost im p o rta n t decrees relating to the w ork o f evacuation.41 T he w ork o f the evacuation, especially overall plan n in g an d coordination, w as to o enorm ous an d com plex, however, to be ca rrie d o u t w ithout som e so rt o f organizational expression o f its own. Accordingly, o n 24 Ju n e 1941, tw o days after the sta rt o f the war, the regim e form ed a C ouncil for E vacuation u n d er the C ouncil o f People’s C om m issars o f th e U SS R 42 an d charged it w ith leading the work o f re-basing enterprises, collective farms, tractor stations (MTS), population, produce . . . [and] material objects, and with placing all evacuated [objects and individuals] . . . in new locales.43

M ore specifically, the m an d ate given th e C ouncil for E vacuation included the following: the establishm ent o f evacuation prio rities a n d tim etables; the d eterm in atio n o f areas o f relocation; the allocation o f m eans o f tran sp o rtatio n ; a n d the preservation o f goods a n d the care o f th e evacuees en route to th e ir d estination in the Soviet rear.44 In keeping w ith the critical im p o rtan ce o f the council’s assignm ent, great em phasis w as placed upon its m a in tain in g effective, efficient leadership o f th e entire evacuation an d relocation process. T he nature o f b o th the m em bership a n d the organizational stru ctu re o f the council reflects this concern for operative leadership. H eaded at first by L azar K aganovich, a long-tim e m em ber o f the P olitburo w ith a rep u tatio n as a tough a n d able econom ic troubleshooter,45 the council, a t one tim e or another, nu m b ered am ong its m em bers M ikoyan, Kosygin, S hvem ik, P erv u k h in , Saburov, Shaposhnikov, a n d a “ representative from the People’s C o m m issariat o f Internal Affairs (N K V D ).” 46 Being thus com ­ posed o f a sm all n um ber o f im p o rta n t officials, som e o f w hom served as representatives o f organizations directly engaged in o r having a significant in terest in the w ork o f evacuation,47 a n d possessing a w ide-sw eeping a n d pow erful m andate, the C ouncil for E vacuation w as in a position to tran sact m uch o f its business quickly a n d w ith a m in im u m o f red tape. T h at its apparat num bered only 80 to 85 people fu rth e r enhanced the council’s ability to m ain tain effective leadership o f the evacuation process.48 W ith a staff th a t sm all, m uch o f th e w ork o f form ulating a n d im plem enting the details o f the council’s evacuation-relocation plans h ad to be perform ed by the regim e’s regular instru m e n ts o f ad m in istra tio n a n d control, thereby allow ing the council’s staff a n d m em bers to concentrate on m ajor or p articularly urgent question s an d problem s. A t the center, such assistance w as provided, in the first instance, by the com m issariats, w hich d id m uch o f the actual planning for the evacuation o f p articu la r in d u strial un its.49 In the field, the various aspects a n d stages o f the evacuation process were controlled by a num b er o f plen ip o ten tiaries an d o th er specially ap-

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pointed officials. T he m ost im p o rta n t o f these officials were those w ho held m andates from the State D efense C om m ittee. In som e cases, high-ranking or technically expert officials were sent o u t from M oscow to oversee a p articular aspect o f the evacuation process. T hus, for exam ple, A. G. Sherem et’ev, an A ssistant People’s C o m m issar for F errous M etallurgy, w as dispatched in August 1941 to Z aporozh’e as the G K O ’s p len ip o te n tia ry to oversee the evacuation o f th e huge Z aporozhstal M etallurgical W orks.50 In other instances, the in divid u al given such a m a n d ate w as a local P arty, governm ental, or econom ic official.51 T he utilizatio n o f such local officials in the capacity o f plenipotentiaries h ad a n obvious advantage since they had firsthand knowledge o f b o th the enterprises a n d locales m ark ed for evacuation. O n the o ther hand, although the pow er attach ed to a G K O m andate w as considerable, som e aspects o f the w ork o f evacuation w ere considered so im p o rtan t th a t they req u ired th e leadership o f very highranking P arty an d governm ental officials from Moscow, officials w ho could ad d their own personal power, prestige, a n d influence to th e ir already highpow ered m andates. Thus, for exam ple, on 25 O cto b er 1941, the . . . [Council o f People’ s C om m issars and the Central C om m ittee o f the All-Union Com m unist Party] instructed the vice-chairman o f the Council o f People’ s Commissars, N. A. Voznesenskii, “to represent . . . [the Council] in Kuibyshev,”“to direct the work o f the people’ s com m issariats that were being evacuated to the East . . . ” and to strive to get the factories that had been evacuated to the Volga [region], the Urals, and Siberia into operation at the earliest possible date. . . [That same day] . . . the Politburo authorized Secretary o f the Party . . . Central Committee, A. A. Andreev, who was . . . then in Kuibyshev with a part o f the Central Com m ittee’ s app a ra t. . . , to issue orders and instructions in the name o f the Central Com m ittee for the obkom s [regional Party co m ­ mittees] o f the Volga region, the Urals, Central Asia and Siberia “on questions . concerning the organization o f industry . . . [in connection with the evacuation o f enterprises to these oblasts [regions]... ,52

Although som e sem blance o f control over the ac tiv ities o f these tw o high-ranking officials was m ain tain ed — V oznesenskii, for exam ple, w as re­ q u ired to send progress rep o rts back to M oscow every five o r six days53— the breadth an d force o f th e ir m an d ates m ade it clear th a t th e regim e had, in effect, given them full discretionary pow er to do w hatever th e situ atio n required. In addition to the State D efense C o m m ittee plen ip o ten tiaries, a con­ siderable num ber o f o ther special officials holding m an d ates from v ario u s o f the regim e’s regular an d ex traordinary central organs a n d organizations, including the C ouncil for E vacuation, in d iv id u al co m m issariats, the State P lanning C om m ittee (G osplan), the A ll-U nion C ouncil o f T rade U nions, a n d the central com m ittees o f in d iv id u al trad e unions, also w ere involved in the various on-the-scene aspects o f the w ork o f evacuation, relocation, an d reconstruction.

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O th er th a n the p len ipoten tiaries o f th e State D efense C om m ittee, the m ost im p o rta n t o f the ex trao rd in ary officials to p articip ate in the evacuation process w ere the inspectors for th e C ouncil for E vacuation a n d the council’s p lenipotentiaries for p articu la r com m issariats. T he group o f inspectors, headed by the then deputy ch a irm an o f the C ouncil o f People’s C om m issars o f the U SSR , A. N . K osygin, consisted o f a relatively sm all n um ber o f “ leading w orkers” w ho were charged w ith m ain tain in g control over the evacuation process,54 w hereas th e plen ip o ten tiaries for com m issariats, as th eir title suggests, exercised su pervision over the evacuation, relocation, a n d reconstruction activities o f p articu la r co m m issariats.55 M uch o f the credit for the success th a t th e evacuation-relocation-reconstruction effort ultim ately achieved m ust be given to th em a n d to the o th er specially m a n d ated officials w ho acted in th e nam e o f th e regim e or ex traordinary organizations a n d in stru m en ts o f control. Ju st as w as the case at the center, the w ork o f evacuation a n d relocation req u ired som e so rt o f organizational expression o f its own at the local level. Accordingly, a large n um ber o f local organs o f the C ouncil for E vacuation were established in areas w here evacuation-relocation work w as going on. Included am ong such organs were: city, regional, a n d republic com m issions for evacuation; evacuation ad m in istra tio n s for regions, te rrito rie s (krais), a n d republics; evacuation p o in ts (evacopoints) a t factories an d stations; bases for tran ssh ip p in g ( evacobases) at large railro ad a n d p o rt centers; an d regional, city (gorod) an d d istrict (raion) com m issions for the reception an d placem ent o f evacuated enterprises a n d th e ir personnel.56 Com posed, as a rule, o f a relatively sm all n u m b er o f leading officials draw n from the various local organizations taking p a rt in th e w ork o f evacuation, relocation, or reconstruction, these bodies apparently were subordinated b oth to the C ouncil for E vacuation a n d to the regular soviet organs in the areas in qu estio n .57 T h is system o f dual su b o rd in atio n seem s to have been based, in p art, on the view th a t the C ouncil for E vacuation’s ow n operative leadership o f the w ork o f evacuation could best be m a in tain ed if the council were not bu rdened w ith ru n n in g a highly developed ad m in istra tiv e system o f its own. A t the sam e tim e, view ed from a som ew hat different perspective, the su b o rdination o f the local evacuation organs to the te rrito ria l soviet or­ ganizations undoubtedly w as aim ed at im proving effective leadership over such w ork in the locales them selves. M any o f the questions a n d problem s th a t fell w ithin the purview o f th e local evacuation organs— m obilization o f m anpow er a n d evacuations in to the im m ed iate rear, to nam e b u t tw o— h ad to be dealt w ith on a purely local basis, a n d therefore, som e form o f local co ordination an d control w as required. T his, th e regim e m ay have felt, could best be provided by the regular soviet organs th a t (along w ith th eir local P arty counterparts) had fulfilled such functions in the prew ar period. R egular local organizations, in p articu la r P arty organizations, also played a key role in o th er aspects o f the evacuation-relocation process such as the provision o f needed inform ation to higher bodies an d plenipotentiaries58

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a n d the m obilization o f local resources, especially m an p o w er resources.59 In general, however, these organizations occupied a po sitio n auxiliary to th at o f the higher, in particu la r th e extraordinary, organs a n d th e ir plen i­ potentiaries in all stages o f the evacuation process.60 M oreover, in assisting in this work, the local organs them selves m ade considerable use o f extraor­ d inary form s an d m ethods o f ad m in istra tio n a n d control. T h u s they not only appointed th eir ow n plen ip o ten tiaries for specific geographical areas a n d for p articu lar projects,61 b u t also form ed num erous special co m m ittees an d operative groups to assist in the w ork o f evacuation, relocation, an d reconstruction.62 As was the case at the center, such ex trao rd in ary efforts would prove to be vital to the success o f the evacuation-relocation process. In theory, at least, the on-the-scene activ ity o f th e vario u s p len ip o ten tiaries a n d special organs an d com m issions, especially w hen tak en together w ith the work perform ed by bo th th e regular local organizations a n d th e m ilitary authorities, should have provided strong a n d effective leadership to the evacuation process. G iven b o th the supposed strength o f th e ir special m andates or regular pow ers a n d th e ir com m on involvem ent in m any evacuation projects, they conceivably could have resolved m an y pressing issues and problem s on th eir own. In m an y cases, such on-the-scene coordination was, in fact, effected a n d the desired results achieved. In o th e r instances, however, the on-the-scene efforts o f vario u s plenip o ten tiaries, regular an d special organs, an d com m issions clearly proved to be a source o f conflict an d confusion. In p art, th is w as the result o f the sheer n u m b er o f officials, organs, an d organizations taking p a rt in th e evacuation process.63 In addition, m any officials engaged in such w ork (except p erh ap s those charged w ith overall leadership) ten d ed to view problem s in term s o f the interests o f th eir own organs an d organizations ra th e r th a n in term s o f those o f the regim e as a whole. For exam ple, in M u rm an sk in Ju n e 1941, the representatives o f several people’s com m issariats, no t considering the interests o f the oblast, attem p ted to take as m uch eq u ip m en t from th e ir factories as possible. T he obkom a n d the M ilitary C ouncil o f the F o u rteen th Army, however, inform ed the in d u strial officials th a t they were categorically forbidden to take equipment and to transfer cadres beyond the boundaries o f the oblast without the perm ission o f the military council.64

C om pounding this organizational conflict a n d confusion was, as no ted earlier, the failure o f the regim e to draw up even general ev acuation plans prior to the start o f the war. O nce the w ar began, such p lan s h ad to be form ulated quickly an d u n d er great pressure. As a result, th e Soviet leadership was in no position to pay m ore th a n cursory atten tio n to such o rganizational niceties o f the evacuation process as the establishm ent o f exact ju risd ic tio n a l boundaries betw een the various regular a n d ex trao rd in ary organizations a n d agencies involved in such work. To be sure, there w as no d o u b tin g the overriding authority attached to a G K O m andate, especially in the h an d s o f an A ndreev or a Voznesenskii. B ut w hat w as one to say ab o u t th e relative

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scope (and power) o f the m an d ate o f a p len ip o ten tiary for the C o m m issariat for F errous M etallurgy versus th a t o f his co u n terp art for the C o m m issariat for the C hem ical In d u stry o r o f th eir m an d ates vis-à-vis th a t o f a special representative o f th e C o m m issa riat for R ailroads o r o f G osplan? A nsw ers to such question s could be pro v id ed only by the central leadership o f the evacuation process— the C ouncil for E vacuation o r in som e instances, the G K O itself. N ot surprisingly, given the im p o rtan ce accorded the principle o f personalization o f pow er in th e S talinist system o f rule, the answ er to th e question o f w ho w on o u t in such ju risd ictio n al disputes, as well as in com petitions for scarce (and usually centrally allocated) resources seem s to have depended not only on the relative im p o rtan ce o f the various projects b u t also on the personal qu alities a n d personal influence o f the plenipo­ te ntiaries an d o th er officials in charge o f on-the-scene evacuation operations. A t the sam e tim e, it is also q u ite clear th a t no m atter w hat the outcom e o f p articu lar incidents o f interorganizational riv alry was, such d em an d s for centralization o f control as those noted previously had to place certain lim its on the regim e’s quest for operative leadership in the field. D espite these an d m any o th er problem s a n d shortcom ings, betw een July a n d N ovem ber 1941, a total o f 1523 in d u strial enterprises, including m ore th an 1360 large plants were evacuated to th e rear.65 M oreover, by m id -1942, m ore th a n 1200 o f these evacuated enterprises had been restored to p ro ­ d u ctio n .66 T he struggle for survival, at least on the in d u strial front, had been won.

Conclusion In view ing the first phase o f th e war, especially the su m m er an d fall o f 1941, h isto rian s an d oth er students o f th e Soviet U nion’s involvem ent in the Second W orld W ar have ten d ed to focus th eir atten tio n on the num erous serious m istakes m ade a n d setbacks suffered by the Soviet regime. A nd the facts are there to ju stify such a focus. Yet, at the sam e tim e, all to o often analysts overlook the fact that, despite the precarious position in w hich it found itself d uring th is period, th e S oviet regim e still possessed sufficient strength, a n d sufficient physical, m oral, a n d ad m in istrativ e resources to m ake the evacuation o f in d u stry the great success it was. T he S talinist system , even at the height o f the crisis o f war, still appears to have been viable. Indeed, despite all o f the negative aspects o f Stalinism , including its basic responsibility for th e co u n try ’s being u n p rep a re d for w ar in June 1941, it can be argued that, given th e S oviet U nion’s overall position at the sta rt o f the war, it is doubtful w hether the co untry w ould have been able to survive h ad a different system been in effect. In a way, the Stalinist system — a garrison state th a t m ade considerable use o f ex traordinary form s o f ad m in istratio n an d control even in the prew ar p erio d — was itself a vital factor bo th in the evacuation process a n d in the Soviet U nion’s ability to survive in a tim e o f all-out war.

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Notes 1. The very magnitude o f twentieth-century crises has been, at least partially, the result o f the revolution in technology that the century has witnessed. At the same time, rather paradoxically, this revolution, especially in the spheres o f transportation and communications, has provided the technical means by which regimes have been able to make an effective administrative response to crisis situations. 2. See, for example, War Industries Board (Bernard M. Baruch, chairman), American Industry in the War, rev. ed. (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941), and Merle Fainsod, Lincoln Gordon, and Joseph C. Palamountain, Jr., Government and the American Economy, 3rd ed. (New York, 1959), 824-869, for discussions o f the use o f such forms o f administration and control in the economic sphere in the United States during World War I and World War II respectively. 3. For a description o f both the organization and the functions o f the Council o f Workers* and Peasants* Defense, see Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo Soiuza (IVOvSS), vol. 4:104. 4. Ibid., 6:103. Kaganovich, Mikoyan, and Voznesenskii would be added to the membership o f the GKO in February 1942 and Bulganin would replace Voroshilov as a member o f the State Defense Committee in 1944. 5. Ibid. 6. V. A. Tskulin, Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii SSSR 1936-1965 (Moscow, 1966) , 35-36, and A. M. Sinitsyn, “Chrezvychainye organy Sovetskogo gosudarstva v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,’ * Voprosy istorii, no. 2 (February 1955):34. 7. Leonard Schapiro, The Communist Party o f the Soviet Union (New York, 1959), 493. 8. Ibid. 9. Khrulev, A. V. “Stanovlenie strategicheskogo tyla v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine.” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1961), 66. 10. IVOvSS, 6:103. 11. Ibid. 12. For example, in addition to their other duties, Molotov exercised oversight over tank production, Malenkov over aircraft and engine production (30 September 1943), and Beria over the production o f armaments and munitions. Pravda. 13. IVOvSS, 2:526. 14. The following statement is typical: “Molotov called me at the start o f 1943. ‘ We are just beginning a meeting at my place. Can you come quickly to the Kremlin?* ’ ’ [Emel’ ianov, “O vremeni, o tovarishchakh, o sebe. Zapiski inzhenera.’ ’Novy mir, no. 2 (February 1967): 132]. 15. Ibid., 129. 16. That this had been the case in the prewar period was to have a serious efTect both on the administrative system’ s ability to cope with a wartime situation and on the nature o f the emergency changes that had to be introduced into the system in time o f war. See, for example, N. Kuznetsov, “Before the War,’ ’International Affairs, no. 1 (January 1967) : 102-103 and no. 3 (March 1967):94, and Il’ ya Ehrenburg, The War: 1941-1945 (New York, 1964), 14. 17. N. N. Voronov, Na sluzhbe voennoi (Moscow, 1963), 229. 18. To be sure, Stalin’ s interests in and concern for certain aspects o f the war effort, especially military affairs, led him on occasion to disregard the counsel o f his advisors and to superimpose his own views on a given question. This was particularly true in the early stages o f the war. 19. Milovan Djilas, Conversations with Stalin (New York, 1962), 77. 20. Ibid., 69. 21. N. G. Kuznetsov, “Gody voiny,’ ’O k t ia b r no. 8 (August 1968): 175. 22. Ibid., 153.

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23. L. Sandalov, “Put’Sovetskogo polkovodtsa,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 11 (November 1967):42. 24. Ibid. 25. Cornelius Ryan, The Last Battle (London, 1966), 248-256. 26. Ibid., 255. 27. Thus, for example, according to N. A. Antipenko, Mikoyan called the heads o f the rears o f fronts to a meeting in the Kremlin to discuss the preparation o f food supplies for winter. The head o f the rear o f the Volkhov Front was the first to speak. Having gotten up, he began to leaf through his little notebook in search for information, but the temperamental Mikoyan switched from one question to another, and the reporter did not succeed in finding the required page, and had not committed anything to memory. Extremely upset by the head of the rear’s lack of information, A. I. Mikoyan then and there ordered that he be dismissed from his post.

(N. A. Antipenko, Na glavnom napravlenii [Moscow, 1967], 88). 28. See, for example, V. Emel’ ianov, Novy mir, no. 2 (February 1967):88-89. 29. A. Khrulev, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1961):68-69. 30. For a further discussion o f the work o f the Council for Evacuation, see 66-71. 31. Such committees o f defense were formed in, among other places, Stalingrad, Sevastopol, Tula, Rostov, Murmansk, Voronezh, Kalinin, Astrakhan and Kamyshinsk. (A. M. Sinitsyn, “Chrezvychainye organy Sovetskogo gosudarstva v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” Voprosy istorii, no. 2 (February 1955):35, and IVOvSS, vol. 6:104). The Astrakhan and Kamyshinsk committees o f defense, moreover, were subordinated to the Stalingrad committee o f defense (Sinitsyn, p. 36). The defense o f Moscow and Leningrad, generally speaking, was handled by the State Defense Committee itself (ibid., p. 35). Furthermore, in a number o f other combat areas, paramount civilian authority was vested in so-called “constricted” local ispolkoms. These bodies, in many respects, were quite similar to the city committees o f defense. 32. However, according to Kravchenko, “the executive and control organ for the allpowerful State Defense Committee . . . [was the Council o f People’ s Commissars o f the RSFSR],”Victor Kravchenko, I Chose Freedom (New York, 1946), 400. 33. Sinitsyn, Voprosy istorii, no. 2 (February 1955):34—35. 34. IVOvSS, 6:103-104. J. Armstrong, in The Politics o f Totalitarianism notes that the authority o f such G K O plenipotentiaries superseded that o f all local officials (p. 134). That this was the case is pointed up by the following extremely interesting incident. In the fall o f 1941, Voronov was sent to Leningrad as plenipotentiary o f the GKO to, among other things, supervise the production o f munitions in that beleagured city. He quickly ran up against Zhdanov, the all-powerful Party boss o f Leningrad. Zhdanov wished that more munitions be brought into Leningrad from the outside, while Voronov, holding his own ground, asserted that the city’ s industrial concerns could handle this task by themselves. Voronov won the argument— and one must surmise that at least in this instance, his having a specific mandate from the GK O outweighed Zhdanov’ s formal power and personal influence (N. Voronov, “V trudnye vremena,”Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 9 (September 1961):71-72. 35. See, for example, Emel’ ianov, Novy mir, no. 2 (February 1967), N. V. Adfel’ dt, Istoriia Moskovskogo Avtozavoda imeni I. A. Likhacheva (Moscow 1966), 298, and G. A. Kumanev, “Podvig zheleznodorozhnikov,”Ya. A. Poliakov et al., editors, Eshelony idut na vostok (Moscow, 1966): 130. 36. The importance o f having a personal knowledge o f a given area and its officialdom is pointed up by the following statement: The selection o f I. K. Smirnov to the post o f head o f the rear o f the Southern Front had special sense. Prior to the war . . . [he had] worked for a long time in the Ukraine. He was a member o f the Military Council o f the Kiev military okrug, and commanded the troops of the Khar’kov military okrug. Being a member o f the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR, I. K. Smirnov had great authority in republic and oblast organizations, knew all secretaries o f obkoms and . . . leaders of soviet organs, many directors of enterprises.

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Khrulev, Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1961):70. See also ibid., 72. 37. For a fuller examination o f evacuation o f industry, see Sanford R. Lieberman, “The Evacuation o f Industry in the Soviet Union During World War II.“Soviet Studies, 35, no. 1 (January 1983):90-102. 38. For a description o f what the Soviet losses entailed, see N. Voznesenskii, The Economy o f the U.S.S.R. During World War II (Moscow, 1948), 42 and Poliakov et al.,

6. 88.

39. See, for example, G. I. Olekhanovich, “Ot Pripiati za Volgu,” in Poliakov et al.,

40. See, for example, I. I. Belonosov, “Evakuatsiia naseleniia iz prifrontovoi polosy v 1941-1942 gg.”in Poliakov et al., 15, and A. V. Mitrofanova, 84. 41. Prior to the formation o f the GKO, most important resolutions and decisions, including those pertaining to the formulation o f general plans and instructions for the evacuation process were made by (or issued in the name of) the Council o f People’ s Commissars (Sovnarkom) and/or the Central Committee o f the All-Union Communist Party. 42. For details, see L. I. Pogrebnoi, “O deiatel’ nosti Soveta po Evakuatsii,”in Poliakov et al., 201-207 and M. G. Pervukhin, “Perebazirovanie promyshlennosti,”in P. P. Pospelov et al., Sovetskii tyl v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine, 2 (Moscow, 1974), 13-30. The Council for Evacuation actually was only one o f several extraordinary organs that the regime instituted at one time or another during the war. It remained in existence until 25 December 1941, at which time it was replaced by a Committee for the Unloading o f Transit G oods and Other Cargo (Iu. A. Vasil’ ev, Sibirskii arsenal 1941-1945 [Sverdlovsk, 1965], 131). Moreover, in the intervening period, the regime formed a Committee for the Evacuation o f Population under the Council for Evacuation (26 September 1941-31 January 1942) and a committee for the evacuation from frontline districts o f reserves o f foodstuffs and industrial goods as well as plant equipment o f light industries (25 October 1941-19 December 1941). Finally, in July 1942, in response to the new German offensive, the GKO placed control o f the second major evacuation process in the hands o f a newly created Commission for Evacuation (Poliakov et al., 10-11). O f all these extraordinary organs, only the original Council for Evacuation is considered in this essay. 43. Pogrebnoi, in Poliakov, et al., 202. 44. See ibid., 204-5, and Likhomanov, 84. 45. Poliakov et al., 10. Most earlier Soviet discussions o f the evacuation process list Shvemik rather than Kaganovich as the original chairman o f the Council for Evacuation. (See, for example, IVOvSS, 2:143). In addition, many o f the same sources err in putting the creation o f the Council at the start o f July 1941 (Poliakov et al., 9-10). 46. Pogrebnoi, in Poliakov et al., 201-2. The role o f the NKVD in the evacuation process was not limited to security matters. It was also to play a key role in the supply o f manpower, especially for construction projects in the areas o f relocation. 47. See ibid., and N. F. Dubrovin, “Eshelon za eshelonom,’ ’in Poliakov et al., 208. 48. Pogrebnoi, in Poliakov et al., 202. The Council’ s apparat was divided into three groups: one for the evacuation and relocation o f industrial enterprises, institutes, orga­ nizations, and foundations and their personnel, one for the evacuation o f the general population, and one for the provision o f transportation. 49. The commissariats themselves frequently made use o f brainstorming sessions that not only drew on the knowledge and abilities o f officials in the given commissariat but also in some cases elicited assistance from leading cadres in other commissariats and organizations. For example, see Mitrofanova, 91. A fair amount o f vertical consultation also seems to have taken place. An example o f such consultation is provided in A. G. Sheremet’ ev, “45 dnei, 45 nochei,’ ’Gvardiia tyla, (Moscow, 1962): 19. 50. A. G. Sheremet’ ev, in Gvardiia tyla, 19. For a good description o f the dynamics o f the on-the-scene work, see ibid., 14-30, Mitrofanova, 90-117 and A. M. Belikov, “Tiazheluiu promyshlennost’v glubokii tyl,’ ’in Poliakov et al., 36-47.

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51. The director o f the Stalin Auto Works (ZIS) in Moscow, I. A. Likhachev, for example, was appointed as the G K O ’ s plenipotentiary in charge o f the evacuation o f the ZIS facilities. N. V. Adfel’ dt et al., Istoriia Moskovskogo Avtozavoda imeni I. A. Likhacheva (Moscow, 1966), 298. 52. IVOvSS, 2:148-149. 53. Ibid., 149. 54. Pogrebnoi, in Poliakov et al., 203. 55. Ibid. These plenipotentiaries were assisted by small groups (usually three to five individuals) specially chosen from the apparat o f the particular commissariats. Moreover, the collegia o f the commissariats and leaders o f institutions, in order to aid the pleni­ potentiaries o f the Council for Evacuation, “formed special commissions . . . [composed] o f highly qualified specialists who worked out concrete plans for the evacuation o f sectors o f the economy as a whole and for individual enterprises, scientific, cultural-educational. Party, and state institution . . .”(ibid.). At the same time, the commissariats and other organizations involved in the work o f evacuation frequently formed special operative groups and commissions to further their own evacuation activities. See, for example, Dubrovin, in Poliakov et al., 210. 56. Pogrebnoi, in Poliakov et al., 204. 57. The lines o f authority that lead down to these organs were somewhat unclear. For example, according to L. I. Pogrebnoi, who worked in the apparat o f the Council for Evacuation, the evacopoints were subordinate organs o f the Council (Pogrebnoi, in Poliakov et al., 204). Another Soviet source, however, maintains that the evacopoints for the evacuation o f the civilian population were organized and controlled by departments created under the Council o f People’ s Commissars o f union republics, oblispolkoms and kraiispolkoms (Belonosov, in Poliakov et al., 210). The answer to this seemingly contradictory state o f affairs most likely is that while these organs were under the overall jurisdiction o f the Council for Evacuation, they also were subordinate to the regular soviet oigans in the areas in question. 58. See, for example, Sheremet’ ev, in Gvardiia tyla, 21. 59. See Mitrofanova, 96-97, 99. 60. Important as the work o f industrial evacuation was, it could not be allowed to interfere with the actual conduct o f military operations, especially in matters o f logistics. Military priorities had to be maintained. Accordingly, the work o f preparing industrial plants and personnel for evacuation frequently was coordinated with, or even on occasion controlled by, the Military Councils o f the particular war zones. The military’ s general competence to act in such matters was based, first, upon the Statute on Martial Law that had been decreed at the very start o f the war. (See IVOvSS, 2:21). Subsequently, the military’ s jurisdictional authority over specific aspects o f evacuation was made more explicit. By a government decision o f 5 July 1941, “the evacuation o f the . . . [civilian] population from [frontline areas] . . . was to be conducted by order o f the local military commander.”(Belonosov, in Poliakov et al., 16.). The evacuation o f human and material resources into the deep rear, however, required a degree o f coordination and control beyond the competence o f the military commanders and councils (in terms o f both their limited territorial mandates and their abilities). Their sphere o f absolute authority tended, therefore, to be confined to evacuations o f a more limited nature, such as the removal o f the civilian population to the immediate rear. (Ibid., 16, 18). This is not to say that military commanders and councils did not play a prominent role in the larger, more important aspects o f evacuation work. The planning and execution o f this work was in fact frequently conducted with the participation o f the appropriate military authorities. (For an example o f the participation o f Military Councils and military authorities in the work o f evacuation, see Sheremet’ ev, 19 and Khrulev, 71). 61. Mitrofanova, 109. 62. For example, the Cheliabinsk obkom formed a special group composed o f two secretaries o f the Magnitogorsk gorkom, the director o f the Magnitogorsk Combine, the head o f the department o f capital construction, the director o f the Magnitostroi trust and directors o f seven evacuated factories and charged them with checking on the progress

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o f the (ibid., 63. 64. 65. 66. period

restoration o f each o f the enterprises 132). Vasirev, 130. Mitrofanova, 118-119. IVOvSS, 1:148. See also Mitrofanova, M. I. Likhomanov, Organizatorskaia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941-42

that had been evacuated to Magnitogosk

116 and Poliakov et al., 13. rabota partit v promyshlennosti v pervyi gg.), (Leningrad, 1969), 108.

R eferences Adfel’ dt, N. V. et al., Istoriia Moskovskogo Avtozavoda imeni. I. A. Likhacheva. Moscow, 1966. Antipenko, N. A., Na glavnom napravlenii. Moscow, 1967. Armstrong, J., The Politics o f Totalitarianism. New York: Random House, 1961. Djilas, Milovan, Conversations with Stalin. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1962. Ehrenburg, Il’ ya, The War: 1941-1945. New York: The World Publishing Company, 1964. Emel’ ianov, V., “O vremeni, o tovarishchakh, o sebe. Zapiski inzhenera.”Novy mir, no. 2 (February 1967), 61-141. Fainsod, Merle et al., Government and the American Economy, 3rd ed. New York: Norton, 1959. Khrulev, A., “Stanovlenie stategicheskogo tyla v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine.” Voennoistoricheskii zhurnal, no. 6 (June 1961), 64-86. Kravchenko, Victor, I Chose Freedom. New York: C. Scribner’ s Sons, 1946. Kuznetsov, N., “Before the War.”International Affairs, no. 1 (January 1967), 99-104. ______, “Gody voiny.’ ’Oktiabr’ , no. 8 (August 1968), 135-182. Lieberman, Sanford R., “The Evacuation o f Industry in the Soviet Union during World War II.”Soviet Studies, 35 (January 1983), 90-102. Likhomanov, M. I., Organizatorskaia rabota partii v promyshlennosti v pervyi period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-42 gg. Leningrad, 1969. Mitrofanova, A. V, Rabochii klass Sovetskogo soiuza v pervyi period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow, 1960. Poliakov, la. A. et al. editors., Eshelony idut na vostok. Moscow, 1966. Pospelov, P. P. et al., Istoriia Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo soiuza, 6 volumes. Moscow, 1961-1965. _______Sovetskii tyl v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine, vol. 2. Moscow, 1974. Ryan, Cornelius, The Last Battle. London: Collins, 1966. Sandalov, L., “Put* sovetskogo polkovodtsa,” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 11. (No­ vember 1967), 39-47. Schapiro, Leonard, The Communist Party o f the Soviet Union. New York: Random House, 1960. Sheremet’ ev, A. G., “45 dnei, 45 nochei,” Gvardiia tyla. Moscow, 1962. Sinitsyn, A. M., “Chrezhvychainye organy Sovetskogo godsudarstva v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny.” Voprosy istorii, no. 2 (February 1955), 32-43. Tskulin, V. A., Istoriia gosudarstvennykh uchrezhdenii SSSR 1936-1965. Moscow, 1966. Vasil’ ev, Iu. A., Sibirskii arsenal 1941-1945. Sverdlovsk, 1965. Voronov, N., “V trudnye vremena.” Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, no. 9. (September 1961), 62-76. Voronov, N. N., Na sluzhbe voennoi. Moscow, 1963. Voznesenskii, N., The Economy o f the USSR during World War II. Moscow, 1948. War Industry Board, American Industry in the War, rev. ed. New York: Prentice-Hall, 1941.

5 Soviet Peasantry in World War II ALEC NOVE

N um erous books an d articles on th e p easan try d u rin g W orld W ar II have been published in the Soviet U nion. Indeed, it is now possible for a Soviet author, V. T. A niskov (1979), to publish a volum e devoted to analyzing the historiography o f the subject. In his book, w ar-related disasters an d o th er negative aspects o f W orld W ar II are played down. H e regards the m ore critical w orks used extensively in th is essay (e.g., A ru tiu n ian 1969) as too critical, though he does say th a t som e earlier publications h ad been insufficiently so. T he very title o f A niskov’s book reflects the offhcial line: in the face o f im m ense obstacles a n d occasional policy erro rs an d w ith m uch self-sacrifice an d hard sh ip , the Soviet peasantry did its patrio tic duty, “ though only ten to twelve years previously, through collectivization, this class jo in ed w ith ( priobshchilsia) the socialist order.” Indeed, this fact is said to prove the d u rability an d sound foundation o f the kolkhoz system a n d peasant loyalty to it (Ansikov 1979, 3-4). In the period stretching roughly from 1961-1971, however, the view o f the role o f the peasantry d u rin g W orld W ar II was rath e r different. O ne sees this also in the m uch franker a n d m ore critical approach th at has been taken in recent years tow ard o th er sensitive historical questions, including such issues as collectivization. M ore research on the role o f the Soviet p easantry in the Second W orld W ar w ould clearly be both desirable an d possible. Som e picture o f w hat h appened to the Soviet peasantry in the areas u n d er G erm an occupation w ould also be helpful. I f any such statistics exist, n either I nor a G erm an colleague have been able to find them . U nfortunately, the head o f the G erm an A gricultural A d m in istratio n o f O ccupied T erritories, O tto Schiller, seem s to have left no account o f his experiences. T he only book he w rote after W orld W ar II was a sh o rt history o f Soviet collective farm ing, published at T ubingen in 1954. In S tu ttg art in the 1950s I had a

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long talk w ith Schiller, durin g w hich he related experiences o f spontaneous decollectivization in areas free o f S oviet and G erm a n control, how he welcom ed this, an d how his advice was overruled by th e N azi au th o rities who w ished to preserve kolkhozy so as to m axim ize p ro cu rem en ts for G erm any. Beyond a b rief account in A ru tiu n ia n (1969, 220-224), no S oviet published work on this aspect o f the subject seem s to exist. D allin ’s German Rule in Russia (1957) naturally concentrates on o th er m atters. F or those able to use G erm an archival m aterial, investigating th e im p act o f G erm a n occupation on Soviet agriculture represents a trem en d o u s area for original research. A p artial analysis m ay be done, using S oviet statistics on w artim e agricultural production th at relate only to te rrito rie s u n d er S oviet control. Indeed, for several years m illions o f th e m ost fertile hectares, m illions o f peasants, and m illions o f u rb an consum ers were b eh in d G erm a n lines, adversely affecting w artim e agricultural production. It m ust be em phasized that, given such losses o f v itally im p o rta n t agricultural areas, com bined w ith the m obilization o f m an p o w er for the arm ed forces an d shortages o f haulage power, eq u ip m en t a n d fuel, the perform ance o f agriculture durin g W orld W ar II has to be regarded as im pressive. In the first im p o rta n t postw ar w ork on th e econom y, N . Voznesenskii (1948) contrasts th is state o f events w ith the critical food situation in 1916-1917. T his is no t altogether fair, however. R u ral a n d u rb an shortages an d hardships betw een 1941 an d 1945 were in fact far g reater th an those th a t contributed to the collapse o f the tsa rist regim e. T h is stem s in p art from territo rial losses a n d the scale o f defeats in 1941-1942, w hich far exceeded those o f 1915-1917. Yet w hen all is said, th e Soviet arm y a n d the population were fed durin g W orld W ar II, w ith only a m arginal (though not insignificant) contributio n from ab ro ad through Lend-Lease. N o t only ruthlessness an d coercion, b u t also genuine p atrio tic co m m itm en t, are responsible for the very im pressive achievem ents o f th e Soviet w ar ecnom y.

The Agricultural Labor Force T he village lost m en not only to th e arm ed forces— over 60 p ercent o f arm ed forces were rural residents according to A nsikov (1979, 4)— b u t also to the industrial w ork force. In ad d itio n , the m obilization o f m an y tracto rs an d horses for the arm y a n d the v irtu a l cessation o f deliveries o f new tractors placed additional bu rd en s on th e rem ain in g agricultural lab o r force. As a result, w om en, juveniles, a n d old people w ere u tilized o n a large scale.1 Table 5.1 shows, however, a decline in agricultural em ploym ent d u rin g W orld W ar II. T he figures in T able 5.1 relate to rear areas, i.e., those b ehind the front. It is not clear, however, w hether these v ary w ith m ilita ry retreats and advances. T he im plication seem s to be th a t they refer to the same areas. T his follows from d ata for the w hole co u n try cited by A ru tiu n ia n (1969, 398), which explicitly refers to unoccupied territo ry . T h e fall betw een the end o f 1940 an d the en d o f 1943, a n d the rise to 1945, are all m uch greater than th a t shown in Table 5.1. A fu rth e r difficulty w ith an y consistent

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Table 5.1 Agricultural Employment, 1941-1945 (thousands, a s of January 1)

1941 1942 1943 1944 1945

Working Age Men Women

Total

Juveniles (12-16)

Aged and Sick

Total

Percentage of 1941

8657 5890 3605 2341 2770

18169 15423 13196 11432 11440

3848 3779 4035 3821 3424

2360 2369 2379 2388 2390

24368 21572 19600* 17644 17346

100.0 88.5 80.5 72.4 71.2

9532 9533 9591 9094 8661

•The printed tables gives 12609, which is evidently an error. Source: Arutiunian, Sovetskoe krest’ianstvo, p. 75, quoting Istoricheskii arkhiv.

in terp retatio n o f the d ata w as th a t it w as precisely to those areas in w hich in d u stry w as concentrated an d food needs rose sharply th a t a large p ro p o rtio n o f the p easantry m igrated to w ork in w ar industry. T hus, in m any areas o f the U rals an d W est Siberia, the agricultural labor force fell by 45 percent (A rutiunian, p. 75). A ccording to A ru tiu n ian , in 1942 no less th a n 96 percent o f the “ aged an d sick” an d 95 percent o f the juv en iles (12-16 year olds) to o k p a rt in kolkhoz production. T hese num bers were q u ite insufficient to cope w ith seasonal peaks, however. As a result, m illions o f u rb an citizens, students, an d school children w ere also m obilized. In 1943 they earned 12 percent o f all trudodni in kolkhozy as against only 4 percent in 1940. W orld W ar II affected not only the com position a n d size o f the agricultural labor force, b u t also the w ork effort in the agricultural sector. T he com pulsory m in im u m o f trudodni (w ork days) worked by ad u lt kolkhozniki (kolkhoz w orkers) w as raised to 150 in 1942 in cotton-grow ing areas, a n d to 100-120 in others. Juveniles h ad a fifty -trudodni m in im u m (Chadayev 1963, 359). M in im a w ithin this to tal were established for the p erio d o f sowing, cultivation, a n d harvesting. T hese were substantially overfulfilled on average, b u t little d o u b t exists th a t w artim e coercive m easures could be taken to enforce extra w ork or longer hours if it w as thought necessary. In som e areas the m in im a proved to o high— there w as not enough collective work. In oth er areas they w ere easily overfulfilled— in areas where, for exam ple, a great deal o f laborintensive tasks (livestock an d vegetable production) needed to be done. Law enforcem ent agencies ignored this, however, taking in to account neither the im posed m in im u m nor the objective possibilities o f fulfilling it (A rutiunian 1969, 91). A ccording to A ru tiu n ia n , the law was, not in fact, im posed w ith its füll severity; nevertheless, th e law w as severe. For the first offense, “ com pulsory labor” in kolkhoz o r M achine T ractor S tation (M TS) for up to six m onths, w ith a 25 percent d eduction from th e value o f trudodni earned; or, if no w ork w as available, offenders were assigned a period o f forced labor by the local N K V D . A nother indication o f the severity o f the law was th a t those failing to c a rry o u t the m in im u m nu m b er o f trudodni could be deprived o f th eir p riv ate plots (though th is seem s not to have been a m uch-used penalty).

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Table 5.2 Average Annual Trudodni, 1940-1943

Men of working age Women of working age Older adults Juveniles

1940

1943

312 193 132 74

338 244 135 100

Source: Arutiunian, Sovetskoe krest’ianstvo, p. 339.

Moreover, kolkhozy chairm en a n d brigade leaders w ho failed to rep o rt breaches o f the rules were them selves subject to crim in al penalties. A ru tiu n ia n cites som e instances w here the law w as not ap p lied a n d o thers w hen it w as applied too rigorously by kolkhoz chairm en a n d o th er officials w ho feared accusations o f leniency. C iting archives, he states th a t in K azak h stan , for example, 78,500 kolkhozniki did not w ork the m in im u m n u m b er o f irudodni (m any w ith extenuating circum stances) in 1943. Yet only 5180 cases w ere brought before the courts, w ith 4100 o f th em found guilty a n d condem ned. D uring 1944, in the entire rear areas o f the U SSR , 11 percent o f kolkhozniki did not w ork the prescribed m in im u m (A ru tiu n ian 1969, 92). Yet, in 1944, only 3 percent o f all those w ho d id not w ork the obligatory m in im u m w ere condem ned by the courts. C o u rt cases w ere usually b rought against only the m ost barefaced w ork avoiders. Fear o f being p u n ish ed w as real, however, because any repetition o f the offense w as q u ite severely p u n ish ed by a sentence o f forced labor in a cam p ru n by th e N K V D (A ru tiu n ian 1969, 90). T he actual average num ber o f trudodni w orked as calculated by A ru tiu n ia n , using archive m aterials is presented in Table 5.2. T hese figues rep resen t workday units, not days worked. Scattered evidence suggests th a t on the average each trudoden represented roughly 1.5 actual days in peacetim e. It seem s likely th at trudodni valuation, in term s o f tim e a n d effort required, altered in w artim e. In any case, one m ust agree w ith A ru tiu n ia n th a t the highest num ber o f trudodni te n d ed to be w orked in areas w here the com pulsory m inim um was lowest, im plying th a t th is form o f com pulsion was not the decisive factor in explaining ad d itio n al w ork effort d u rin g W orld W ar II. Rather, m ost peasants doubtlessly felt it w as th e ir d u ty to w ork hard. Indeed, A ru tiu n ian criticizes these regulations as “ one o f th e stu p id (nelepyi) products o f the bureaucratic system o f control over agriculture” (1969, 96). Sovkhozy were able to m ain ta in p rew ar em ploym ent levels despite th e loss o f m en to the arm y by m obilizing all persons living on th e ir te rrito ry a n d by hiring seasonal w orkers (m ostly w om en a n d juveniles). A ccording to archive d ata used by Z elenin (1969, 35) relating to “ co m p arab le” (i.e., nonoccupied) territory, the to tal sovkhoz labor force increased d u rin g W orld W ar II from 712,000 people in 1940 (falling to 639,000 in 1943) to 836,000 in 1944. Zelenin also rep o rts w ar-related changes in area sow n by sovkhozy.

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It should be stressed th a t in 1940 sovkhozy were responsible for only 6.9 percent o f the area sow n to grain, 4.5 percent o f cattle, a n d so forth. Hence, the m ain b u rd en fell on kolkhozy throughout th e war. Bare statistics do not begin to show how h ard life w as for S oviet peasantry. M echanical aids o f all kin d s becam e scarce or nonexistent. H orses were m obilized, m anual labor pred o m in ated . In areas over w hich w ar had raged, m any villages w ere destroyed. P eople lived in holes in the ground, used cows for ploughing, even p u t them selves into harness a n d pulled a plough or harrow . A ru tiu n ia n (1969, 156) cites m em oirs: “ We had to haul the plough. Eight to ten w om en harnessed them selves a n d hauled; we used a w ider harness th a n the horses. We hauled a big stock to w hich the plough w as attached. B ehind the plough we had an o th er w om an or young lad.” R em arkable stories are to ld o f the evacuation o f people a n d anim als as the G erm a n s advanced. A literary d escrip tio n can be found in M aksim ov’s novel Sem ’dnei tvoreniya, an d also in co n tem p o rary publications. T his, for instance, is a b rie f extract from Novy mir (1941:9-10): Vast flocks o f sheep, cows, and goats make their way through our little town, exhausted hardly able to m ove their legs; som e o f them loaded onto carts and m oved further. By the river, wherever you look it is like nomadic tribes: shepherds resting under carts, milkmaids, sick sheep, freshly-slaughtered flesh, hides. A m ilkm aid says: “We have been on the way for a month and four days. . . . We have to deliver the livestock to its destination, but our animals are not used to long walks, they move slowly, and then what about being machine-gunned from the air? Frightened sheep gather in a tight circle, so the bullets get them. . . . We lie in ditches, the cow s scatter in the forest, almost all the sheep were killed. We had go o d sheep!”

A ru tiu n ian cites harrow ing stories in w hich m any tho u san d s o f peasants, livestock, an d tractors m ake th e ir way to the D n iep er in July 1941. T he few bridges across the D n iep er w ere overw helm ed. P ontoon bridges a n d b oats partially relieved the pressure, allow ing som e 600,000 head o f livestock a n d 4500 tracto rs to be m oved to the eastern bank. “ M any were killed, an d m uch m achinery an d livestock were lost. . . . T he G erm an s reached the riv er before the m ove w as com pleted” (1969, 50). We m ust im agine the scenes at the bridges an d ferries th a t were being used concurrently by retreating troops, those evacuating in d u stria l eq uipm ent, a n d civilian ref­ ugees. In the entire evacuation procedure, it w as established th a t the extrem ely scarce tra n sp o rt w as reserved for ind u stry ; peasants a n d anim als had to w alk. C iting the research w ork o f M . Pogrebinski, A ru tiu n ia n claim s th at 59.3 percent o f all cattle, 82 percent o f all sheep, 26.7 percent o f the pigs a n d 14 percent o f the horses th a t were in the U k rain e at the outbreak o f w ar in Ju n e 1941 w ere evacuated as w ere m ost tractors not requisitioned by the arm y. M any tractors w ere abandoned, however, for lack o f fuel an d spare p arts. Z elenin (1969, 110) cites d a ta on th e evacuation o f sovkhozy: “ W hile the larger p a rt o f th e livestock w as evacuated, m any never arriv ed .

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Table 5.3 Agricultural Machinery in Sovkhozy, 1940-1944 (in thouaanda)

Tractors Combine-harvesters

1940

Total USSR 1943

1944

74,278 27,397

37,901 18,819

40,257 19,526

Comparable territories 1940 1943 1944 42,474 15,668

26,994 13,112

23,993 12,553

Note: These figures do not indicate that 18 percent of the tractors and 30 percent of combine-harvesters were unable to function at all, presumably because of lack of fuel and spare parts. Source: Zelenin, Sovkhozy SSSR, p. 24.

[Thus] from the U kraine, Belorussia, a n d the W estern regions o f th e R SFSR , the m ajor p roportion o f livestock was evacuated: 83.4 percent o f cattle, 97.7 percent o f sheep an d goats, 66.2 percent o f pigs. However, few reached th eir destination: about 30 percent o f cattle, 20 percent o f sheep. . . . Between 17 and 23 percent o f evacuated livestock w ere delivered to u n its o f the R ed A rm y for m eat.” A ccording to A ru tiu n ia n (1969, 53), lack o f fodder an d shelter led to the slaughter o f the b ulk o f th e “ evacuees” : by 1 January 1942, very few o f th em could be left alive. M any o f those th a t did reach th eir destination (e.g., the N o rth Caucasus) w ere o v erru n by the G erm ans in the 1942 sum m er offensive. A m ass o f h u m a n a n d an im al m isery is contained in such stories an d statistics.

Machinery and Equipment All sources agree th at m ost horses a n d tracto rs w ere m obilized for the R ed A rm y or destroyed by G erm an forces a n d th a t u n til 1944 hard ly an y tracto rs or spare p arts for o ther m achines w ere supplied to agriculture. Even the favored sovkhozy got nothing p rio r to 1943 as T able 5.3 illustrates. T he C om m issar o f Sovkhozy, R Labanov, stated to his colleagues in 1941: “ It is clear th a t we will get no new tractors th is year o r next.” A n o rd er from the C om m issariat o f Sovkhozy envisaged even th e use o f cows (though not pedigreed cows) for ploughing (Z elenin 1969, 26-27). As a result, bottlenecks im m ediately arose in the supply o f bridles, harnesses, an d ropes, all o f w hich were to be m ade on the farm s. Spare p a rts for the rem ain in g tracto rs were either im provised also o r m ade in local in d u stria l w orkshops. O nly in the second h alf o f 1943 were supplies o f tracto rs resum ed, a n d m an y were sent to the newly liberated w ar-devastated areas. T he M achine T ractor Stations (M TS) w ere in worse shape th a n th e sovkhozy. As a result, in 1942 as m uch as 79 percent o f all kolkhoz grain had to be harvested by horse or by h an d (A ru tiu n ian 1969, 164). M uch o f the sowing was also done by hand. G iven the lack o f m achines, it w as not surprising th at harvest yields fell. T he average h arv est o f grain in kolkhozy was 7 -8 centners per hectare in 1938-1942 b u t only 4.6 centners in 1942

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despite favorable w eather. As a result, there w as not enough left for seed, w hich fu rth er com plicated the food supply situ atio n in 1943. W artim e grain procurem en ts fu rth e r co m pounded th e grave situation in ru ral areas. P aym ent-in-kind by kolkhozy for the w ork done by the M TS rem ained a m ajor source o f state grain p rocurem ents a n d a m ajor bu rd en for kolkhozy, especially as these paym ents were based on the greatly exaggerated “ biological” yield, a n d not the m uch lower real harvest. The biological [vidovoi] harvest was roughly estimated. . . . Som e directors o f M TS and regional officials increased it without even bothering to visit the fields. . . . At the end o f 1942, when food shortages were particularly grave, the collection o f any information about the harvest other than the biological yield was altogether forbidden. Even the drafting o f a food and fodder balance using data o f the actual threshed harvest was seen as a breach o f this rule.

K olkhoz chairm en tried to avoid excessive procurem ents by fair m eans o r foul. Som e w ere sentenced to long prison term s for “ sabotaging grain procurem ents.” P arty officials were th reaten ed w ith p u n ish m en t too a n d th en had to be w arned: “ do not overdo things, do not rem ove seed grain a n d b eat up (kolkhoz) officials.” T here w ere “ arrests a n d searches by N K V D ” in the course o f grain procurem ents, w ith all sorts o f excesses, so th at “ m any kolkhozy in alm ost every area w ere left w ithout enough seed” (A rutiunian 1969, 200-204).

Political Control In the early stages o f W orld W ar II (N ovem ber 1941), “ political d ep a rtm en ts” in the M T S were reconstitu ted , acting as a species o f P arty w atchdog over kolkhoz agriculture. T h eir task included b o th encouragem ent and, w here necessary, coercion. T hus, it w as th e ir task to oversee the enforcem ent o f the m in im u m nu m b er o f trudodni a n d o f agricultural delivery plans. O nly h arsh controls could extract so great an o u tp u t from the village. Voznesenskii (1948, 90) contrasts the total procurem ents o f grain in 1918-1921 (920 m illion poods) w ith the 1941-1944 figure (4264 m illion poods) “ despite the G erm an occupation o f the richest farm ing areas o f the U SSR .” He could as well have added, “ despite the food shortages th is created in the villages.” R eoccupied areas posed great difficulties in term s o f enforcem ent. In B elorussia an d the U kraine, for exam ple, “ there were anti-kolkhoz, private property, an d anti-state attitu d es,” an d som e peasants jo in ed the U k rain ian n ationalist arm ed bands. In the K u rsk oblast it was alleged th a t form er kulacks had retu rn ed to th e ir villages. Som e (formerly) collective horses h ad been taken away an d h idden by peasants, an d altogether there was m uch to do “ to restore collective land utilization” (A rutiunian 1969, 250-252). In fact, we m ust suppose th a t in m any places it was necessary to re­ collectivize.

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A m tiu n ian (1969, 399) cites statistical d ata ab o u t th e political officers o f the M TS an d sovkhozy. It is notew orthy th a t 96.2 percent o f th em w ere male, nearly all o f m ilitary age. T he political d ep a rtm en ts w ere abolished in M ay 1943 as unnecessary, b u t inasm uch as 1943 w as a p articu larly unsuccessful year, A niskov (1969, 107) w onders if th is ab o litio n w as not prem ature.

Peasant Incom es and Welfare Official Soviet sources agree th a t peasant life w as exceedingly h ard b o th in term s o f physical conditions o f w ork a n d in levels o f con su m p tio n . Sovkhoz workers and perm anent staff o f the M TS, as well as ru ral officials, w ere p aid predom inantly in money, a n d fairly well p aid by Soviet sta n d ard s o f the tim e. Engineer-technicians in sovkhozy received 700 (old) rubles p er m onth, tractor drivers 200-700, tru ck d riv ers 320-330, a n d “ M T S pay w as sim ilar” (A rutiunian 1969, 83). K olkhoz m em bers w ere p aid very little in com parison. In spite o f these adequate salaries, however, m an u factu red goods were practically unobtainable, a n d free-m arket food prices w ere astronom ical. Thus, in the R SFSR in 1942, the average price o f a kilogram o f grain was 53.80 rubles (com pared to 1.88 rubles in 1940). A liter o f m ilk was priced at 38 rubles, a n d a kilogram o f pork fetched 261 rubles (A m tiunian 1969, 352). M any peasants refused to sell for money, p referring barter. Paym ents-in-kind were therefore w idespread, including bonuses-inkind. In one region, for exam ple, a trac to r d riv er w ho overfulfilled his ploughing norm received a piglet o r a beehive. R egular issues o f g rain a n d potatoes as p artial paym ent a n d /o r the right to purchase at th e official (ration) price becam e the m le. Paym ent-in-kind was always the m le for kolkhoz m em bers. A long w ith the produce o f their private plots, these paym ents w ere decisive in th e ir survival. B ut low w artim e pro d u ctio n a n d high state p ro cu rem en ts left them very little. T he price paid by the state for com pulsory deliveries during W orld W ar II was q u ite negligible. Indeed, A m tiu n ia n calls it “ symbolic,” for exam ple, three kopeks for a kilogram o f potatoes. “ In 1942-1943 the am ounts issued per trudoden w ere only ab o u t 800 g ram s o f grain and 200-400 gram s o f potatoes, o r ab o u t h a lf o f the am o u n t issued in 1940” (A m tiunian 1969, 79). G iv en the acute shortage a n d th e huge free-m arket prices, however, these sm aller am o u n ts w ere greatly valued. According to a speech by p arty leader A. S. Shcherbakov, som e “ sold” trudodni they earned for large sum s. T he am o u n ts p aid to kolkhoz m em bers, even on the average, represented starv a tio n rations. T able 5.4 illustrates the nom inal “ value” o f the average trudoden. The figures given in Table 5.4 actually overstate the am o u n t o f pro d u ce available because (according to A m tiu n ian ) they represent only th e q u an titie s “ allocated.” In fact, however, p a rt o f the am o u n t form ally “ allocated” as paym ent to the peasants w as taken away as com pulsory deliveries. T hus,

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Table 5.4 Nominal Value of Average Trudodan, 1540-1945

Grain (kg) Potatoes (kg) Money (old rubles)

1940

1941

1942

1943

1944

1945

1.60 0.98 0.98

1.40 0.33 1.07

0.80 0.22 1.03

0.65 0.40 1.24

n.a. n.a. 1.12

0.70 0.26 0.85

Source: Arutiunian, Sovetskoe krest'ianstvo, p. 339.

4.4 m illion to n s w ere supposed to be allocated in 1942, b u t only 2.9 m illion w ere issued. A ru tiu n ian estim ates th a t on a per cap ita basis th is was less th an 200 gram s o f grain a n d one p o tato p er day. Yet, th is had to feed a fam ily w hose head w as probably away in th e arm y. S urvival thus depended on the p riv ate plot. B ut private plot p ro duction w as also subject to com pulsory state deliveries, for exam ple, 456 liters o f m ilk p er cow. As if th is were not enough, there w as a fivefold increase in the agricultural tax on notional incom e from p riv ate plots a n d livestock. O th er b u rd en s on p rivate anim als included m obilization o f su rv iv in g p riv ate cows to haul carts filled w ith grain to the procurem ent centers. In 1944, for exam ple, there were 60,000 cows engaged in such w ork in K u b an ’ alone! (A ru tiu n ian 1969, 263). Taxes, delivery quotas, an d shortage o f fodder led to a steep decline in the num ber o f p riv ate livestock in the rear areas. It m ight be thought th a t the peasant household could m ake a great deal o f m oney given the very high free-m arket prices. O nly a few could benefit from this, however, because o f tra n sp o rt problem s a n d lack o f tim e. In any case, there w as little th a t could be bought for money. Som e peasants were able to engage in b arte r trade w ith u rb an residents who cam e to nearby villages. N ear Barnaul (Altai), for exam ple, a m etal bucket was exchanged for six kilogram s o f flour. K olkhoz m arkets, even in such tow ns as Moscow, sold little in 1942-1943 despite huge prices (the prices were huge because so few peasants were selling). True, som e m ade a sm all fortune in paper rubles, b u t m ost peasants lived in d ire poverty. It m ust be stressed th a t there w ere great variations. In one U zbek region, 30 percent o f kolkhozy issued no m oney o r grain w hatever in paym ent for trudodni (A rutiunian 1969, 29). In the U SSR as a whole, 5.4 percent o f kolkhozy paid no grain, 37.5 percent paid less th a n 300 gram s p er trudoden, a n d 75 percent issued no po tato es in 1945 (A ru tiu n ian 1969, 351).

Output D uring the w ar an d first postw ar years, false “ biological” h arv est statistics w ere the basis o f claim s that, despite all the difficulties, w artim e harvests co m pared well w ith those o f the prew ar period. Such a b rig h t picture is

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Table 5.5 Real and Biological Yields, Kazakhstan, 1940-1943

Biological yield Real yield

1940

1941

1942

1943

6.4 4.8

10.9 7.2

9.1 3.9

5.6 2.6

d .

§

CM

Source: Arutiunian, Sovetskoe krest’ianstvo,

citing archives.

found, for instance, in the th ird volum e o f L yashchenko’s econom ic history, published as late as 1956. Yet h arv est losses w ere im m en se d u rin g W orld W ar II (about a third), owing to orders to increase sown area u n d er co n d itio n s in w hich labor and eq u ipm en t were desperately lacking, b o th for sowing an d harvesting. These conditio n s were co m p ounded by all th e o th er problem s referred to previously. T he difference betw een real a n d official biological yields are illustrated for K azak h stan in Table 5.5. N ote the increase in official overestim ates, on w hich paym ents for M T S services w ere based. T he areas u n d er Soviet control in 1942 produced 24.9 m illion to n s o f grain on 58 m illion hectares o f sown area, resulting in the low yield o f only 5 centners per hectare. By all accounts, 1943 w as clim atically a m uch less favorable year, an d it w as also one in w hich all th e disasters o f the w ar bore particularly heavily. T hus, although several m ajor liberated areas (for exam ple, K arsnodar, Rostov, Stavropo) w ere in th e 1943 area b u t not in the 1942 area, only 56.6 m illion hectares could be sown w ith 52.5 m illion hectares harvested. Total grain h arvested in 1943 w as only 20.6 m illion tons. N o w onder both Z elenin a n d A ru tiu n ia n conclude th a t 1943 w as an appalling agricultural year, representing the low est p o in t o f all th e w artim e m iseries. D ata found in Z elenin provides am ple evidence o f th is fact (see Table 5.6). By 1944, it w as possible to deliver m ore eq u ip m en t, tractors, an d fuel to the agricultural sector. As a result, recovery com m enced in reconquered regions, generating a notable im provem ent over the dreadful year o f 1943. In his survey o f Soviet historiography o f th e period, A niskov takes A rutiunian to task for being overcritical w ith regard to the policy o f increasing sowings in rear areas. H e insists th a t it w as a necessary consequence o f the heavy losses o f territo ry to the invaders. B ut the p o in t o f the criticism Table 5.6 Grain Yields in Sovkhozy and Kolkhozy, 1940, 1943-1945 (centners per hectare)

Sovkhozy Kolkhozy

1940

1943

1944

1945

8.9 8.5

3.8 3.9

7.0 5.7

6.7 2.1

Source: Zelenin, Sovkhozy SSSR, p. 83.

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Table 5.7 Kolkhozy Livestock in Rear Areas, 1940-1943 (year end, millions)

Cattle Sheep & Goats Pigs Horses

1940

1941

1942

1943

22.7 56.4 6.1 14.8

21.6 59.7 6.5 12.2

22.5 61.2 5.6 10.7

22.9 63.7 3.6 9.8

Source: Arutiunian, Sovetskoe krest’ianstvo, p. 188.

is th a t the extra areas could n o t be properly sown, cultivated, or harvested, a n d as such, w ere thus wasteful. As m ight be expected, d ata on livestock show very heavy losses o f horses a n d pigs; however, a surprisingly high p ro p o rtio n o f cattle an d sheep in the rear areas survived. M eat an d m ilk pro d u ctio n fell steeply (after an in itial upsurge in slaughtering) because o f critical shortages o f fodder. Table 5.7 tells the basic tale. By 1 Jan u ary 1945, w hen alm ost the w hole p rew ar te rrito ry was back u n d er Soviet rule, C hadayev (1963, 359) rep o rts total livestock num bers, as a percentage o f 1941 levels, as: cattle 81 percent (cows 77 percent), pigs 32 percent, sheep an d goats 47 percent (all categories o f owners). Extrem ely heavy losses occurred in occupied areas due to attem p ted Evacuation during the Soviet retreat, the G erm a n practice o f requisitioning, a n d destruction d uring th eir retreat. It to o k m any years to rep air the dam age a n d to rebuild villages, cow sheds, etc. In kolkhozy, yields per cow fell from 949 kilogram s in 1940 to 751 in 1943, the w orst year (C hadayev 1965, 443). In sovkhozy, the fall w as from 1803 to 1138 kilogram s in the sam e period (Z elenin 1969, 96).

The First Postwar Years T he Soviet peasantry had borne im m en se bu rd en s durin g W orld W ar II. O n to p o f all the hard sh ip s they experienced durin g the war, there were appalling problem s after it: a shortage o f haulage power, a heavy loss o f m anpow er (m illions o f peasants had been killed in the war), a n d the destruction o f thousands o f villages in the fighting. A t first survivors had to live in im provised holes in th e ground. O n to p o f all this, 1946 was a year o f drought. T he harv est w as very poor. O nly 39.6 m illion tons o f grain w ere harvested in 1946, even less th an in 1945. As a result, m any w ent hungry, som e actually starving. A ccording to K hrushchev, Stalin nonetheless ordered th at som e food be ex p o rted (Pravda 10 D ecem ber 1963). A t first there w as hope o f reform o f the kolkhoz system . M any peasants m ust have felt th a t th eir w artim e efforts deserved this. Som e evidence exists to the effect th a t such o p tim ism was actually encouraged by the political officers. Be th is as it may, th e sam e b itte r year saw these hopes dashed by

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a decree “ on m easures to liquidate breaches o f th e kolkhoz sta tu te” (19 S eptem ber 1946). Breaches in policy had been allow ed in w artim e. For example, m anagem ent p erm itted som e collective lan d to be cu ltiv ated by peasant families, and state plans were perforce m odified on the spot to fit in w ith w hat was possible in the extrem ely harsh w artim e circum stances. In the postw ar period, the previous tight controls over p ro d u ctio n a n d procurem ents were reasserted a n d the size o f p riv ate plots restricted. In m any instances, land th a t was being cu ltiv ated by peasant fam ilies h ad to be abandoned even if the kolkhoz had no possibility o f growing an y crops on it. A C ouncil for K olkhoz Affairs was set u p u n d er A ndreyev to exercise general supervision an d to com bat breaches o f the kolkhoz statute. M oreover, the M inistry o f A griculture was d iv id ed into th ree p arts (food crops, in d u strial crops, an d livestock). Evidently, th is was not a success, a n d in 1947, it w as reunited, w hile the C ouncil for K olkhoz Affairs w as quietly w ound up. T ighter control over farm s was reasserted in th e resolution o f th e F ebruary 1947 Plenum o f the C entral C o m m ittee o f the Party. Sowing plans w ere im posed on farm s in great detail a n d delivery obligations w ere m ade m ore specific an d onerous an d could be arb itrarily v aried by local officials (who notoriously abused their pow er to squeeze ever m ore o u t o f agriculture), while procurem ent prices rem ained at the low, p rew ar levels. Political supervision over kolkhozy w as to be based on the M TS, a n d these w ere each to have a political deputy-director for th is purpose. T h is w as the period during which Lysenko w as achieving suprem acy in the “biological sciences,” an d his charlatan -n o stru m s were im posed by o rder on the farm s through the party-state m achine, regardless o f local circum stances.2 As if this w as not bad enough, financial b u rd en s w ere increased on kolkhozy a n d on peasant households. T he later were dealt w ith p articu larly harshly. C ash paym ents per w orkday u n it rem ained low. In to d ay ’s rubles, it was 14 kopeks even as late as 1952, probably only ab o u t 10 kopeks in 1947-1948, or the sam e tin y sum as before the war, though retail prices had risen sharply in the interval. To buy one bottle o f vo d k a req u ired 20 days’ work at least; a p air o f trousers w as hardly thought of. P aym ents-inkind, m ainly grain, were m ore im p o rta n t th a n money, an d o f course, the p rivate plot an d private livestock continued to be the p rim a ry source o f the fam ily’s food (other th an bread) a n d cash incom e (v ia free-m arket sales). Free-m arket prices fell as the acute w artim e shortages w ere overcom e, an d the u nfortunate kolkhoz households found them selves paying tw o k in d s o f tax: one w as a high-rates tax on the n otional incom e received from specific crops or anim als3 an d the o ther to o k the form o f high com pulsoryprocurem ent quotas on the o u tp u t o f the p riv ate plot, p aid for a t nom inal, extrem ely low prices. T he peasants were caught eith er way. I f they h ad a cow, then they had to pay tax in cash on the incom e th a t w as d eem ed to have derived from it, and to deliver m ilk to the state. I f there w as no cow, then they avoided the tax but still had to deliver m ilk to the state, since the delivery obligation w as ind ep en d en t o f the possession o f a cow. If necessary, the peasant had to buy m ilk (at a free a n d therefore high price) to deliver to the state (at a very low price).

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K olkhozy w ere poor, could invest little, a n d were starv ed o f m aterials because prio rity in m aterial allocation w ent to u rb an industry. O ne exam ple o f the low prio rity o f agriculture w as th a t for several postw ar years, kolkhozy w ere not even allow ed to o b ta in electricity from the national electricity netw ork, in oth er w ords, they had to generate th eir ow n or go w ithout. T h is did not prevent socialist-realist p ainters from producing m any oil p aintings show ing Stalin against a background o f electric tracto rs th a t seem ed to be getting th e ir own cu rren t from w ires attached to long-distance tran s­ m ission lines (I saw such p aintings as late as 1955. N eedless to say, there were an d are no electric tracto rs in real life!). W hen kolkhozy were able to purchase in d ustial inputs, they had to pay high retail prices, thus still fu rth er reducing th eir ability to pay th e ir m em bers. T he year 1947 also m arked the beginning o f the painful process o f im posing collectivization on the peasants o f the areas annexed in 1939-1940, notably the three Baltic republics. As a result, o u tp u t showed a sharp, though tem porary, decline, p articularly in L ithuania. T he one relatively b right spot w as the revival o f tracto r production, w hich eased the haulage problem . In all these circum stances, agricultural recovery w as slow. G ra in harvests, according to official statistics, surpassed the 1940 level by 1949, b u t these statistics w ere in term s o f the grossly inflated biological yield. R evised figures show th a t the 1940 levels were not reached w hen S talin died in 1953, while livestock num bers stagnated a n d rem ain ed below the levels o f 1940, 1928, an d even 1916, as K h rushchev p o in ted o u t in his speech to th e S eptem ber 1953 P lenum , w hich ushered in the first o f a large num ber o f m easures designed to restore health to Soviet agriculture.

Conclusion O ne m ust agree w ith A ru tiu n ia n ’s jud g m en t, a realistic picture o f the appalling situation, th at the d esperate shortages, the erro rs o f policy (on sown areas), a n d the hardsh ip s suffered, do no t detract from , b u t on the contrary, m agnify the achievem ent o f the Soviet p easantry durin g W orld W ar II. H e rightly points o u t th a t the prodrazverstka (requisitionings) o f W ar C o m m u n ism to o k a far sm aller share o f the h arv est th a n d id the p rocurem ent agencies in 1941-1945. T he peasants in 1918-1920 rebelled, those in th e “ G reat P atriotic W ar” d id not. H e asserts th at th is shows their co m m itm en t to the system a n d th eir sense o f p atrio tism . We m ay reasonably p o in t o u t th a t th eir patrio tism overrode th eir hatred o f the system , an d th a t the organs o f Soviet pow er w ere m uch m ore strong in the villages in 1941-1945 th an in 1918-1920. Yet we should, in m y view, accept the fact th a t there w as m uch th a t w as genuinely heroic in th e co n d u ct o f the m illions o f overw orked an d underfed peasants, m ostly w om en, who som ehow kept the tow ns an d the soldiers fed u n d e r co n d itio n s th a t we have difficulty even im agining. Recovery after the w ar was im peded by an ti-p easan t policies (as evidenced in the decrees o f 1946), the co n tin u atio n o f heavy taxes on p riv ate plots, the ever-increasing com pulsory delivery quotas, a n d the

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extrem ely low procurem ent prices. K hrushchev h ad m uch to say a b o u t this after Stalin's death. I will end by draw ing atten tio n again to the very extensive S oviet literatu re on the w ar years, m uch o f w hich is conveniently listed in A niskov’s b o o k on historiography. O nly a few sources have been utilized in th is paper, a n d even these could have provided d ata for a p ap er th ree tim es th e present length. Anyone looking for a research topic need look no further.

Notes 1. Many women not only drove tractors and combine-harvesters during World War II, but also tried to repair them in cold, ill-equipped workshops, or out in the fields. Soviet tractors were (and indeed many still are) very difficult for women to handle. 2. For an excellent discussion o f Lysenko’ s impact on the biological sciences, see R. Medvedev, The Rise and Fall o f T D. Lysenko. 3. For details o f this iniquitous tax, which discouraged production and caused some peasants to cut down fruit trees to save tax, see A. Nove, “Rural taxation in the USSR,” Soviet Studies, (October 1953).

R eferences Aniskov, V. T., Podvig sovetskogo krest 'ianstvo v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine. Moscow, 1979. Arutiunian, Yu. V., Sovetskoe krest ‘ ianstvo v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny. Moscow, 1969. Ya. Chadayev, Ekonomika SSSR v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny 1941-1945. Moscow, 1965. Voznesenskii, N. A., Voyenneya ekonomika SSSR (Moscow, 1948). Zelenin, T. E., Sovkhozy SSSR, 1941-1945 (Moscow, 1969).

6 The Soviet Bible Belt: World War II’s Effects on Religion WILLIAM C. FLETCHER

W orld W ar II was the m ost im p o rta n t event in the m odern history o f religion in the U SSR. In the m agnitude o f the changes it w rought, the W ar eclipsed even the cataclysm o f the R ussian R evolution. T his essay contends th at the w ar changed church-state relations for the next generation, determ ined the form o f the church, altered its function and, religiously at least, altered th e nature o f society profoundly an d probably perm anently. T here really is no way to describe how the G erm an invasion shocked the Soviet regime. Even the u n restrain ed hyperbole o f the M oscow P atria r­ chate’s w artim e propagand a does not, for a change, overstate the case. Like thunder on the Russian land was the horrifying news o f Hitler’ s hordes falling upon us. His Holiness learned o f it on Sunday, 22 June 1941, when after service he returned from the Cathedral. This news disturbed him so deeply that after som e meditation, assured by prayer and confident o f heavenly help, he [made his first wartime proclamation]. . . J

Official Moscow, however, panicked. For a fortnight Stalin u ttered not a word. H e w as now here to be seen. O nly a single voice— an d not an official one at th a t— m ade any public response to the N azi invasion. Im m ediately after the invasion began, on June 22, M etropolitan Sergii, the M oscow P atriarch ate’s leader, m ade a ringing proclam ation: Fascism, knowing no law but naked force and accustom ed to ridiculing the highest postulates o f honour and morality, has once more shown itself true to its nature. The Fascist brigands have fallen upon our native lan d.. .. Our Orthodox Church has always shared the destiny o f the people, bearing their trials, rejoicing in their successes, and this time too it is not going to

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William C. Fletcher forsake its people, bestowing, as it does, the blessing o f Heaven upon the forthcom ing heroic exploit o f the whole people. For us, above all, it is right to recall Christ’ s commandment, ‘ Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends.’ 2

T he die was cast. T he battle com m enced, a n d religion in th e U SS R began its profound, irreversible change.

Church-State Relations W orld W ar II m arked the close o f the prew ar ch ap ter in the relations between church an d state in the U SSR. A new p attern em erged. It w as not perm anent, for w hat prevails today, forty years later, is only a p a rt o f the relationship established durin g the war. However, the inform al concordat o f 1943 would rem ain in place, unchanged for a decade a n d a half, a n d even though m uch o f it eroded away thereafter, it has not yet disap p eared entirely.3 W hat em erged from W orld W ar II w as a bargain betw een church an d state. In retu rn for political services, the state granted th e church the right to exist as an institu tio n in Soviet society. T his was no new position for th e M oscow P atriarchate. As early as in 1927, w ith his church organization at the p o in t o f collapse, M e tro p o litan Sergii had no alternative b u t to seek an accom m odation w ith the regim e. In place o f the earlier hostility, or even the n eu tral po sitio n w hich h ad followed it, he declared th a t in political m atters, at least, th e church is com pletely subservient to th e governm ent: We must show, not in words but in deeds, that not only people indifferent to Orthodoxy, or those who reject it, can be faithful citizens o f the Soviet Union, loyal to the Soviet government, but also the m ost fervent adherents o f Orthodoxy, to whom it is as dear with all its canonical and liturgical treasures as truth and life. We wish to be Orthodox and at the same time to claim the Soviet Union as our civil motherland, the joys and successes o f which are our joys and successes, the misfortunes o f which are our misfortunes. . . . Rem aining Orthodox, we remember our duty to be citizens o f the Union “not from fear, but from conscience,’ ’as the Apostle has taught us (Rom. 13:5).4

It was the church’s only hope: perhaps the governm ent, in retu rn for political services, w ould w ithdraw its attack. It did not work. A year later the regim e descended u p o n w hat rem ain ed o f the R ussian O rthodox church, along w ith all o th e r religions in th e country, w ith unrestrained ferocity. T he church w as decim ated. W ith in ten years it was brought to the b rin k o f extinction. It was only the advent o f W orld W ar II th a t reversed th is d ism al situ atio n for the church. T he invasion o f eastern P oland, a n d th en the occupation, created a situation in w hich, for the first tim e, th e regim e needed all the help it could get. Sergii seized every o p p o rtu n ity to ren d er service to the

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state. A long w ith others w ho h ad done likewise, he co ndem ned his nam esake a n d subordinate, M etropolitan Sergii (V oskresenskii), for defecting. W ithout w aiting for the governm ent’s perm ission he began the d istrib u tio n o f highly effective, m im eographed encyclicals against the G erm ans. By the first a n ­ niversary o f the invasion, R ussian O rthodox p ro paganda leaflets w ere being flown b eh in d G erm an lines. A ppeals were m ade to R o m anian, Yugoslav, Czech, an d G reek soldiers in the G erm a n forces. D espite the fact th a t it w as illegal to do so, the church began organizing collections for the w ar effort, an d late in 1942 Sergii asked for an d then received perm ission from S talin h im self to collect co n trib u tio n s for a co lu m n o f tanks. T he church form ed a special organization to care for w ar orphans. In addition, it added its voice to agitation am ong th e W estern Allies for th e opening o f a second front a n d su p p o rted the state’s ongoing pro p ag an d a against the V atican.5 Sergii’s strategy succeeded. T he state could ill afford to refuse his offered services. In stantly it began to change its policies tow ard religion. T he antireligious cam paign was cancelled forthw ith. R estrictions against church activity, if not rescinded, w ere forgotten. By 1943, w hen the tide o f battle began to tu rn , an inform al concordat betw een church a n d state had been w orked out, w hich continu ed in effect unchanged for the rest o f Stalin’s rule an d on into the future. T he state accepted the bargaining situation proposed by Sergii in 1927. T he state conceded to the church th e right to exist as an in stitu tio n in society. Its freedom o f o p eratio n w as severely lim ited, b u t it was given sufficient concessions to p erm it its con tin u ed survival. T he central ad m in ­ istration w as allow ed to rebuild, a n d M etro p o litan Sergii, after sixteen years, w as finally allow ed to be elected P atriarch. T he nu m b er o f bishops was allow ed to increase to a spare a n d thinly staffed corps, m arginally sufficient for ad m in isterin g the church, a n d finally stabilizing at sixty-nine or seventy bishops. A tightly lim ited educational netw ork w as established to supply a t least som e p a rt o f the church’s critical need for priests. C losed churches were reopened; by the en d o f the w ar som e 15,000 O rthodox churches were operating, an d th at nu m b er w as allow ed to continue unchanged.6 For its p art, the church w as diligent in continuing to serve the state in political m atters. As the w ar m oved w estw ard the p a tte m o f services changed, w ith the direct w ar effort a n d pro p ag an d a activ ities giving way to assisting th e state in establishing political control. A fter th e w ar the church continued to serve the state: in the peace cam paign in the fifties, in the ecum enical m ovem ent u n d er K hrushchev, an d once again in the anti-W estern p ro p a­ ganda, as the sterner foreign policy o f B rezhnev was continued by his successors.7 B ut the state rem ain ed faithful to its p a rt o f the bargain only as long as Stalin lived. U n d er K hrushchev the church was reduced to p erhaps h a lf o f its form er strength, a n d th is situ atio n has continued u n ­ changed. In su m m ary then, the w ar’s effect on church-state relations was profound. It inaugurated a new ch ap te r in the h isto ry o f religion in the U SSR, a bargaining situation in w hich each side m ade concessions. T he church

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rendered to the state unquestioning, obedient service in political m atters. In return, the state perm itted the church to su rv iv e as a n in stitu tio n in society. T his approach to church-state relations rem ain s in force, b u t it has been m uch changed, m uch m odified, a n d not a t all to th e church’s advantage.

The Form of the Church As far as the R ussian O rthodox church is concerned, the m ost im p o rta n t effect o f W orld W ar II is to be found in the n atu re o f the church. C hurchstate relations were affected by the war, a n d the new p attern resisted erosion for decades; indeed, it is still visible in som e o f its aspects. T h e change in the nature o f the church, however, was m uch m ore p ro fo u n d a n d p ro m ised to be perm anent. T h at the R ussian O rthodox church exists today in the U SSR as a recognizable O rthodox, p atriarch al in stitu tio n , able to w orship openly in society, is the direct result o f the war. In 1939, w ith Sergii’s church organization on the p o in t o f collapse, there was a m ighty rival for the affections o f the R u ssian O rth o d o x believers: underground O rthodoxy. It is curious th at the existence a n d im p o rtan ce o f u n d erg rou n d O rthodoxy seldom appears in W estern scholarship. I have review ed elsew here in som e detail its history an d developm ent, the evidence for w hich (increasingly, from Soviet sources) is m assive an d convincing.8 H ere I shall outline m erely the history o f this phenom enon in order to indicate how decisive w as th e w ar’s preservation o f the official church, th e M oscow P atriarchate. Sergii’s change o f policy in 1927 resulted in a storm o f protest. It w as com pletely unacceptable to large sectors o f the church. F or exam ple, the M oscow P atriarchate sent five th o u san d copies o f the p ro clam atio n to the various dioceses an d parishes; over 90 percent o f th e recipients refused to dissem inate the proclam ation, retu rn in g it to the sender, a n d th e state h ad to intervene by publishing it shortly thereafter in Izvestiia in o rder to en su re th at the change in policy becam e know n.9 G reat num bers o f O rth o d o x clerics an d believers broke relations w ith the M oscow P atriarch ate over th is issue. A t least in term s o f th e n u m b er o f bishops w ho w ent in to schism rather th an accepting the new policy, Sergii’s 1927 pro clam atio n resu lted in the greatest schism in all o f R ussian history. (In the G re at Schism , o r Raskol, o f the seventeenth century, not a single bishop jo in e d th e dissenters.) T he schism atics quickly becam e know n as T ik h o n ites (from P atria rc h T ikhon, whose policy tow ards th e Soviet governm ent w as o p p o sitio n at first, an d then neutrality, b u t never unco n d itio n al p olitical loyalty). T h is was a generic term , however, an d w as used to describe a large n u m b er o f local, regional, an d national organizations w hich w ere form ed in o p p o sitio n to Sergii’s new policy. T he largest an d m ost im p o rta n t o f these w as th e Josephite schism , u n d er the nom inal leadership o f M etro p o litan Iosif. Shortly after m aking his proclam ation, M etropolitan Sergii ordered Io sif tran sferred from R ostov

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(Iaroslavl province) to L eningrad. T h e state, however, refused h im a residence p erm it for L eningrad, an d so Sergii subsequently ordered h im tran sferred to O dessa. Io sif broke relations w ith Sergii rath e r th a n accept th is second transfer. T he p ro test spread like wildfire. Beginning in L eningrad, it quickly reached neighboring dioceses a n d then expanded all over th e country, an d a large nu m b er o f bishops, priests, a n d parishes proclaim ed Io sif as th eir ecclesiastical leader rath e r th a n su b m it to th e M oscow P atriarchate. N o r w as th is the only schism . N um erous others sprang u p independently aro u n d the country. P erhap s the m ost notable w as the Iaroslav C hurch O blast, led by the m ost senior prelate in the church, M etro p o litan Agafangel. A t least tw enty bishops su p p o rted this m ovem ent, w hich was sym pathetic to b u t not affiliated w ith the Josephites. A host o f o th er regional a n d local schism s sprang up: the V ik to rian sk ii schism , th e V arlaam ovtsy, the Buevtsy, th e D anilo vskii m ovem ent, the M echevtsy— m ore th a n forty nam es o f such groups ap p ear in th e data, w hich are far from com plete. M any o f these groups affiliated w ith the Josephites, an d m ost o f th em looked to M etropolitan Petr, w hom Sergii succeeded w hen P etr was exiled by the regime, for canonical validity. Such m atters as loyalties a n d affiliations, however, soon becam e academ ic. As has been noted, the state em barked on an u n restrain ed antireligious cam paign in 1929, an d its w rath fell especially heavily on these schism atic groups. M ost o f the know n leaders w ere ro u n d ed u p during the w inter o f 1929, a n d the m ovem ent w as forced to go u n d erground com pletely. T he churches th a t h ad rem ained loyal to the M oscow P atriarchate, however, were not spared, an d very quickly the vast m ajority o f the O rthodox believers were forced to illegal, clandestine practices to continue any sem blance o f th eir religious life. T he difference betw een loyalty a n d schism becam e m oot, a n d confusion sw ept over the R ussian O rthodox church throughout the country. Regular, strict adherence to O rthodox practice soon becam e im possible. T here w as no way o f ensurin g th a t clergy w ere properly ordained, th at they ca rried o u t th e ir services in strict accordance w ith the canons o f the church, o r th at heresies d id not creep in. Believers were forced to accept a broad range o f expedients: existence o f w andering priests who avoided the au ­ th o rities an d w ent from group to group; services conducted by m in o r clergy, or even laym en; ad hoc celebrations at a local shrine (a spring, a holy apple tree); prayer m eetings conducted from m em ory w hen nothing else was available; sacram ents d istrib u ted a n d d iv in e rites ad m in istered by corre­ spondence; an d a host o f o th er innovations. N ew organizations sprang up, som e o f them O rthodox b u t m any o f them w ith m ore an d m ore tenuous claim s to th a t title: the Im iaslavtsy, who struggled against collectivization an d all o th er contact w ith the sinful Soviet order; the Io an n ity (followers o f St. Jo h n o f K ronstadt) who advocated celibacy in expectation o f th e en d o f the world; the Apokalypsisty, who p reached w hat their nam e suggests; the Fedorovtsy, a w idespread m ovem ent

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expecting the im m in en t Second C om ing o f C hrist; an d in th e background were stranger m ovem ents such as th e C herdashniki, the Shashkovtsy, a n d the other Sects o f the R ed D ragon (an allusion to th e biblical prophecy in R evelation 13) m elting into th e w ilder extrem es o f P entecostalism a n d the ancient R ussian m adness o f th e Khlysty. It w as inevitable. O nce the lines o f ecclesiology, church discipline, a n d church doctrine were broken, even the best ordered o f parishes, w hen it was forced underground, risked a cascading process o f d etach m en t from O rthodoxy. A fter a few years, w hat su rv iv ed m ight have been called O rthodoxy, b u t it was a long way from any th in g recognizable in te rm s o f the thousand-year trad itio n o f the R ussian O rth o d o x church. N evertheless, these m ovem ents were congenial to the R u ssian people, a n d in the absence o f openly functioning O rthodox churches, they w ere m ightily attractive. H ad the official R ussian O rthodox church been forced to th a t last, sm all step over the brin k o f com plete collapse, these underg ro u n d O rthodox m ovem ents w ould have taken its place. They very nearly did so anyhow. D u rin g W orld W ar II, as will becom e ap parent later, the underground O rthodox surfaced im m ed iately in the occupied areas, created their local a n d even d istrict church organizations, and began vigorous activity. In th e areas w hich w ere n o t occupied a sim ilar phenom enon took place. Even after the w ar w as over, u n derground O rthodoxy w as able to offer serious com petition to the P atriarch al churches for som e years. T he w ar years an d the preceeding decade o f pressure h ad effected th e am alg am atio n o f underground O rthodoxy. W hat h ad been a congeries o f local an d regional groupings, m ore or less (or not at all) affiliated nom inally to som e prelate, now coalesced into tw o identifiable m ovem ents: th e T rue O rth o d o x C hurch an d the True O rthodox C hristians. T he form er was the m ore highly organized. It attem p ted to reproduce in clandestine circum stances as m uch o f trad itio n al O rthodoxy as possible. Its w orship and activities were prem ised on the services o f a functioning priesthood. A t least for the decade o f th e 1940s th e T rue O rth o d o x C hurch was able to provide itself w ith priests. To be sure, given the necessities o f the illegal, underground position, the True O rth o d o x C hurch w as not able to ensure th at all priests had received a canonical ord in atio n . P robably they had, for the secret ordaining o f young m en into the p riesth o o d has been a tradition in all branches o f O rthodoxy, legal as well as illegal, thro u g h o u t the Soviet period. N or could the canonical services o f th e episcopacy often be provided. A lthough from tim e to tim e there were ad m in istra tiv e leaders on a district or regional basis, there is no evidence th a t the True O rth o d o x C hurch possessed (or even p retended to possess) any su b stan tial corps o f secret bishops. D espite these lim itations, the T rue O rthodox C hurch w as able to provide a structured approach to O rthodoxy w hich, on the local level, differed little from the traditional services the R u ssian people h ad enjoyed from th eir church in happier tim es. C ertain ly the differences betw een such services

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a n d those o f the legalized, p atriarch al church w ere negligible to m ost o f the people, an d great num bers o f the O rthodox R ussians actually preferred th e T rue O rthodox C hurch services w hen they h ad th e choice. W hile there w ere real advantages to th e highly stru ctu red approach o f th is clandestine m ovem ent, there also w ere disadvantages w hich led to the m ovem ent’s disappearance. G iven the necessity o f the services o f a priest, all the state needed to do w as discover an d rem ove th e priests, an d the m ovem ent could no longer function. T h is the state d id in the early fifties, a n d the T rue O rthodox C hurch ceased to exist except in rem ote, scattered groups here a n d there across the vast country. T he oth er postw ar m ovem ent, the T rue O rthodox C hristians, w as m uch less highly organized. Indeed, no stru ctu re at all was required, m erely the desire to give expression together to the O rthodox faith. I f a p riest was available (a w andering priest d ro p p in g by, for exam ple, o r som eone w ho claim ed to be a priest [even if not very credibly], o r even som eone who rem em bered the liturgy) his services were gratefully accepted. I f not, then T rue O rthodox C h ristian s w ould perform w hatever w orship services were possible: o bserving the vesper service, o r p a rts o f it, u n d er the leadership o f a laym an or (m ore often) an old w om an; singing the akafisti from m em ory; listening to an extem poraneous ex hortation o r serm on; or m erely reciting from m em ory the O rth o d o x prayers learned at the g ran d m o th er’s knee. M ost o f the tim e, an d in m o st places, the T rue O rthodox C h ristian s could provide only the palest shadow o f the rich liturgical life o f O rthodoxy. W here a p atriarchal church w as open, how ever ta in ted its leaders m ay have seem ed, the T rue O rthodox C h ristian s generally d id not exist or, if they did, w ere confined to the m ost ad a m a n t o f the M oscow P atriarch ate’s foes. T he problem , however, w as th a t there were so few open churches in the po stw ar period. As will becom e ap p aren t below, the geographic d istrib u tio n o f the lim ited n um ber o f churches th a t the regim e p erm itted to function was far from uniform , an d vast reaches o f the R ussian land had no church w hatsoever available. H ere the T rue O rthodox C h ristian s sprang up in village after village, tow n after tow n, a n d even in the cities. They co n stitu ted a form idable co m p etito r to the M oscow P atriarch ate for the affections o f the R ussian believers sim ply because they could function in places w here the state w ould not p erm it p atriarch al churches to exist. T h eir inform al stru ctu re m ade th em alm ost im p erv io u s to state pressure. T im e an d again the au thorities w ould attem p t to d isru p t a functioning u n it o f the T rue O rthodox C h ristian s by arrestin g all its know n adherents, b u t they w ould m iss one or two, a n d w ith in weeks th e group w ould be functioning as vigorously as before. T he T rue O rthodox C h ristian s handily survived the concerted attem p t in the early fifties to suppress underground O rthodoxy; indeed, they grew significantly, for the cam paign against the m ore highly stru ctu red T rue O rthodox C hurch, once it had succeeded in rem oving a group’s priest, inevitably caused th a t group to evolve in to yet an o th er p arish o f the T rue O rthodox C hristians.

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T he state m ade a m uch m ore serious attem p t to eradicate th is group in the antireligious cam paign o f th e sixties. T he severity o f th a t cam paign certainly reduced the num bers o f the T rue O rthodox C h ristian s. B ut strangely enough, it also had the effect o f giving b irth to m ore highly stru ctu red form s o f the m ovem ent. W hen the increasing pressure forced the T rue O rthodox C hristians to go deep, deep in to the underground, th en it becam e m ore feasible for them to organize on a regional a n d even on a national basis. Leaders o f the m ovem ent could no longer ap p e ar openly in society; thus they w ent com pletely underg ro u n d a n d were able to organize th e ir life into networks w hich reached from Siberia to the w estern borderlands. O ver the years, however, th e M oscow P atriarch ate w as generally able to w in out over the underground m ovem ents. T he True O rthodox C h ristian s still exist, b u t they are not, num erically, a very im p o rta n t challenge to th e legalized churches. T he advantages o f being able to w ork openly in society are overw helm ing; the concessions gained d u rin g W orld W ar II were sufficient to allow the R ussian O rthodox church to revive an d to continue to the present as a Patriarchal church. H ad the w ar not effected th is change, O rthodoxy in the U SSR w ould n o t today be a P atriarch al church functioning openly in society.

The Function of the Church B ut World W ar II had an even m ore p rofound effect th a n this. It d eterm in ed the structure o f the m odern R ussian O rthodox church, to be sure, b u t it also ratified profound changes in th e m ission and, indeed, the very n atu re o f the church itself. T he concessions th a t the state gave to the church from th e w ar onw ards were very tightly proscribed a n d lim ited. In particular, b o th th e co n stitu tio n o f the U SSR an d the legislation on religion lim ited th e church’s function to w orship services only. All o th er form s o f religious activ ity are pro h ib ited . It was im plicit, o f course, in th e church’s offer o f political su p p o rt a n d in its endeavor to gain perm ission to function as an in stitu tio n in society th a t the church w ould agree to abide by the laws o f th a t society. Perforce, then, the church had to accept the lim itatio n s in h eren t in th e society’s laws. T his m eant th at the church’s m ission was purely spiritual. T h e church “ considers politics from the p o in t o f view o f th eir c o n trib u tio n to her cause— the cause o f the sp iritu al salvation o f m an.” 10 T h e new situ atio n m eant “ a retu rn to [the church’s] ow n sphere o f activ ity — th a t o f concern for the salvation o f the souls en tru sted to its leadership.” 11 Or, as a W estern observer, for exam ple, rep o rted on a conversation w ith a n archbishop: “ In answ er to m y question, ‘W hat is the m ain task o f the church?’ his answ er was im m ediate, ‘It prepares people for the next life.’” 12 All social ac tiv ities were p ro h ib ited — Sunday schools, young people’s associations, charitable activities, anything at all o th er th a n w orship services. T h e ch u rch h ad to accept the b itter realization th a t in exchange for the rig h t to exist legally, its m ission was reduced exclusively to the spiritual. All social concern, an y

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m ission to society, all responsibility for m oral im p ro v em en t in the public realm w ere prohibited. T he church’s m ission w as vertical only, a n d there w as no horizontal dim ensio n to it at all. T his w as a profound, w renching change for the R u ssian O rthodox church to absorb. F or R ussian O rthodoxy trad itio n ally w as deeply involved in the social concerns o f C h ristian ity as well as the spiritual. T h a t facile W estern m isu n d erstan d in g th at presum es O rthodoxy to be an otherw orldly, purely m ystical, ethereal approach to the faith is, q u ite sim ply, wrong. O rthodoxy, especially R ussian O rthodoxy, has trad itio n ally been deeply rooted in the soil o f the land, an d its p rim e concern— often to the d esp air o f its m ystics— has been w ith this world, w ith today's society, w ith C hristianizing the cu lture in this w orld too. T he p rerevolutionary church is a case in point. In the R ussian Em pire, R ussian O rthodoxy w as profoundly involved in the social affairs o f w hat w ould now be called the secular society. It spent a great deal— m ost?— o f its efforts in providing for the civil cerem onies o f society: b irth registration (baptism s), m arriage (weddings), a n d death (funerals). It ran the school system for the entire country. It w as vigorously involved in m issions, b oth w ithin the E m pire as the borders were p ushed eastw ard, an d ab ro ad in A laska, N o rth A m erica, an d elsewhere. A nd these m issions, w hile they may well have h ad a spiritual dim ension, certainly had a full m easure o f social concern: spreading the R u ssian culture. T he R ussian people were m uch involved in cerem onies, in th e polysyllabic titles d eriving from religious precedents, an d in the quasi-superstitious reverences o f O rthodoxy, b u t not m any o f th em seem ed profoundly spiritual. T he church was a p a rt o f th eir society, a p a rt o f th eir h u m d ru m lives. N o t so today. Today the church has a purely religious, purely supernatural function in society. It can have no in terest in, a n d it can m ake no efforts for, the im provem ent o f society in any way. A lthough it is deeply concerned w ith ethics (all C h ristian ity is), it can only deal w ith the personal ethics o f in d iv id u al believers; the ethics o f society at large is legally beyond its purview . T his acceptance o f a purely sp iritu al role in society, th is renunciation o f any social m ission, is really w hat is at the h e a rt o f the controversy w ith the schism atics. It is a peculiarity o f o u r tim es th a t b o th the Soviet sources a n d m ilitantly antico m m u n ist observers in the W est claim th a t underground O rthodoxy is a purely political phenom enon, th a t these people refuse the M oscow P atriarch ate because o f th eir political hostility to the atheistic, co m m u n ist regim e.13 T his is not the case. T he p o in t a t issue was, in fact, the interference o f the state in the internal life o f the church, its m ission, a n d its procedures for carry in g o u t th a t m ission. M etropolitan Sergii’s acceptance o f the Soviet regim e in 1927 was distasteful to a large sector o f the church, probably the m ajority. T he L eningrad diocese, for exam ple, h ad acquiesced to the declaration, b u t w hen the fruits th a t it bore proved to be S oviet interference in the internal life o f the church— in the critical m a tte r o f deploym ent o f bishops— then the

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diocese w ent into schism . T he in itial an n o u n cem en t o f th e form ation o f the independent Iaroslav C hurch O blast led by M e tro p o litan Agafangel m akes this point explicitly. We welcom e this [1927] requirement and testify that we have always been, are, and will be loyal and obedient to the civil government; always have been, are, and will be honorable and conscientious citizens o f our mother country; but this, we consider, has nothing in com m on with the policy called for by you and does not invite and require the children o f the church to voluntary renunciation o f those rights o f freely organizing the inner religious life o f the society o f the church which that policy itself grants to the civil government (allowing congregations o f believers to elect their own clerical leaders).14

T his was the critical issue: interference in th e life an d m ission o f the church, not politics. To be sure, it is difficult to separate the one from the other, an d w hen the pressure o f the antireligious cam paign becam e severe, then quite naturally a great m any o f those who had been forced u n d erg ro u n d reacted w ith hostility tow ard the state, ân d apocalyptic den u n ciatio n s p ro ­ liferated. B ut m ost o f those who w ent underg ro u n d w ere w illing to accept the Soviet regime, grudgingly, perhaps, b u t in good conscience. W h at they could not accept was the regim e’s insistence th a t the only function o f the church was w orship services w hile every o th er facet o f life m u st be u n d e r the regim e’s exclusive control. T his attitu d e persisted. U nder the G erm a n occupation, for exam ple, w hen O rthodox believers cam e o u t into the open from the underg ro u n d , th e m assive religious resurgence w as by no m eans confined to w orship services. N ikita Struve, in his description o f the Pskov m ission o f th e O rth o d o x church u n d er the occupation, points th is o u t vividly. Particular attention was paid to the young who had been affected by Marxism. Priests were authorized to teach the catechism in the primary schools; special courses on religion were organized for adolescents, and requests for adm ission exceeded the limits o f space and staff available. In Pskov, study circles met five times a week. Neither were social activities neglected by the mission, so far as the occupying power allowed them. In 1943 each parish adopted a prison cam p and entrusted the young with the task o f collecting food, and clothing, etc., for it.15

In the sixties one underg ro u n d O rthodox m ovem ent, th e T rue O rthodox C hristians W anderers, w as discovered to m a in ta in a system o f theological schools on the elem entary, secondary, a n d ad v an ced levels; facilities for production an d distrib u tio n o f literature; a netw ork o f “ safe houses” a n d supply personnel; a nationw ide postal service; a n d th e like.16 Indeed, it m ay be a general rule o f o u r tim es: people w ho reject th e legalized churches in the U SSR do so not p rim arily because o f political hostility to the Soviet regime; rather, they choose an u n d erg ro u n d existence, w ith all its dangers an d discom forts, because they do not agree th a t th e

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faith can be restricted to th e purely spiritual, purely w orship functions as the Soviet laws dem and. T he R u ssian O rthodox church has accepted these laws. T h an k s to the in terv en tio n o f W orld W ar II it w as able to preserve its trad itio n al, p atriarchal stru ctu re in the M oscow P atriarchate. T he price it paid w as acceptance o f a m ission confined exclusively to the spiritual, w ith no social dim ension a t all. T h is is a new phenom enon in O rthodoxy, a n d is certainly the m ost profound change th a t the w ar brought to the R u ssian church.

The Nature of Society P erhaps the m ost im p o rtan t, a n d certainly the m ost w idespread effect o f W orld W ar II on religion is to be found in the religious character o f the society w hich has em erged. D isap p o in tin g the fond hopes o f the professional atheists, religion has not disap p eared from S oviet society, b u t the profile o f religion w as profoundly altered by the war. T he key to und erstan d in g th is effect o f W orld W ar II is to be found in the co u n try ’s resulting religious dem ography. T he w ar created a so rt o f Soviet “ Bible Belt.” All o f those areas w hich were u n d er G erm an occupation d u ring the war, in m ore or less o f a crescent from Volgograd to the gates o f L eningrad, still show the legacy o f th e occupation. P erhaps they always will. D uring the occupation, the G erm a n au th o rities eith er ignored religion entirely or, in som e cases, actually encouraged a n d facilitated its rev iv a l.17 T h is religious revival gave a m arked character to the entire belt o f lands u n d er G erm an occupation. T h e character persists to this day. T he evidence is unanim o u s th a t all o f the various indices o f religiousness increase as one goes w estw ard into these form erly occupied areas o f the S oviet Bible B elt.18 T he n um b er o f believers rises from a m inority in p arts o f E uropean R ussia tow ard a m ajority o f the popu latio n in these regions, an d som etim es an overw helm ing m ajority. T his high incidence o f religious belief is bo th the cause an d the consequence o f the d istrib u tio n o f churches in the U SSR. In m ost deno m in atio n s h a lf o f the legally operating churches are to be found in the Bible B elt.19 All o f the o th er identifiable indices o f religiousness in society repeat th is p attern o f increase in the Bible Belt as com pared to the R ussian areas w hich were not u n d er occupation. N o r is th is all: there are p rofound changes in the religious com position w ithin the Bible Belt, m any o f w hich are the direct result o f W orld W ar II. Perhaps the m ost im p o rta n t o f these is an increase in the non-O rthodox sector o f the po p u latio n .20 Even in Slavic populations, w hich traditionally have been O rth o d o x — e.g., p a rts o f the U k rain e— the growth o f sectarian m ovem ents such as B aptist, Pentecostal, Jehovah’s W itness, a n d the various indigenous sects, has been one o f the m ost rem arkable features o f the society’s postw ar developm ent. W hen the flourishing u n derground O rthodox

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a n d especially (in the form erly U niate areas) th e u n d erg ro u n d C atholic m ovem ents are added to the P ro testan t sects, th e religious profile o f the society is profoundly different from th a t o f o th er p a rts o f E u ro p ean R ussia. Although this phenom enon has yet to be stu d ied extensively, several possible reasons for this tran sfo rm atio n o f the religious profile o f Bible Belt areas can be suggested. First, d u rin g W orld W ar II, a n d especially in th e early m onths o f the war, these areas were bitterly anti-Soviet, a n d th e population w ent over to the G erm an s en m asse. T he W ehrm acht w as w elcomed as a liberating arm y, a n d the awful h istory o f the preceding tw o decades o f Soviet rule was rep u d iated w ith all th a t w ent w ith it. T he Moscow Patriarchate, o f course, w hich h ad steadfastly proclaim ed its loyalty to the Soviet governm ent despite the w orst o f th e regim e’s atrocities against the people, could scarcely hope to escape at least som e o f th e tain t. A nd especially w hen the P atriarchate entered in to the w ar effort w ith en th u siasm an d outspoken support o f the Soviet forces (along w ith co n d em n atio n o f all who forsook the regime), alienation from the M oscow P atria rc h ate becam e m ore and m ore pronounced in the occupied areas. N ot only d id th e believers there shun the P atriarchate by conviction, they also found it expedient to do so to avoid giving occasion to the growing w rath o f the N azi rulers against the populations o f the occupied areas. W hen the R ed A rm y retu rn ed to these areas, these anti-S oviet sentim ents continued and, indeed, grew. M uch o f the region was em broiled in a v irtu a l civil w ar w ith the retu rn in g Soviet authorities. T his sorry ch ap ter in the h isto ry o f these regions is v irtually ignored in the West, b u t the resistance to th e reim p o sitio n o f Soviet control was w idespread and, in a great m any tim es a n d places, bloody. B andera’s arm y ranged through the w estern U k ra in e a n d w as not overcom e for a decade. T he resistance in L ith u an ia w as w idespread a n d vicious, an d there is som e evidence th a t churchm en w ere not entirely uninvolved.21 T his b itter struggle w hich raged through these lands in the m onths an d years following W orld W ar II only intensified the endem ic hatred o f Soviet rule throughout the Bible Belt. A nd the corollary o f this dissatisfaction w ith the social controls w hich had been im posed from the east w as a rise o f nationalism . T hro u g h o u t th e Bible Belt, the nationalistic sentim ents o f the p o p u latio n were intensified a n d grew as a result o f the w artim e events. M ore a n d m ore th e people began to insist on th eir own identity as contrasted w ith th e R ussian s w ho came, first to reoccupy their lands an d then in a co ntinuing a n d increasing stream o f im m igration. N ot surprisingly, religious elem ents w ere enlisted in the burgeoning nationalism o f the population. N o t to be O rthodox, or in som e regions to be O rthodox b u t to reject th e M oscow P atriarch ate, becam e one o f the touchstones o f nationalism . T he increased incidence o f religion throughout the Bible Belt w ent h a n d in h a n d w ith the increase o f nationalism . T here is a further difference in th e religious com p o sitio n o f th e Bible Belt societies. T he ultim ate effects o f these religious differences are difficult

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to foresee; however, they m ay be profound. In m ost o f R ussia, overt religiousness seem s to be co ncentrated in a certain sector o f the population. In far greater p ro p o rtio n s th a n th e ir incidence in the general pop u latio n w ould suggest, the elderly a n d w om en p red o m in ate am ong those who ad m it to being religious. N o t so in the Bible Belt. H ere a significantly higher percentage o f the religious believers are m iddle aged a n d younger, an d the n u m b er o f m en an d w om en te n d to be represented m ore equally. Indeed, in m uch o f the region the age d istrib u tio n a n d the p ro p o rtio n o f m en to w om en replicate the p attern s o f the general p o p u latio n .22 To date no observer has been able to suggest reasons for th is p attern. Is it because there are fewer social sanctions against religiousness in these regions, an d th a t it is less risky to declare one’s beliefs openly? Is it because th e religious organizations are less com prom ised in the eyes o f the citizenry th an the M oscow P atriarchate w ith its close association w ith th e authorities? Is it because religion is identified w ith nationality? T he result o f these changes is th a t by an d large the non-R ussian n a­ tionalities o f the Soviet U nion have becom e m arkedly m ore religious th an th e R ussians. In the w estern bo rd erlan d s m uch o f th is change can be directly linked to the war. In the U kraine, studies o f the nu m b er o f people who believe in G o d consistently yield aggregate totals o f 45 percent o f the p o p ulation o r even m ore, as com pared w ith 2 5 -35 percent, a n d som etim es less, in the R ussian areas. T he sam e p attern persists in Belorussia. In the Baltic states neither L atv ia nor E stonia, w ith th e ir E uropean cultures, display the ram p an t secularization o f W estern E urope, b u t instead, h a lf or m ore o f the p o pulation rem ains religious. A nd in L ithuania, w ith the exception o f 20 percent o f the p o pulatio n w ho are R ussian im m igrants, the p attern o f religiousness m uch m ore closely em ulates postw ar P oland th a n Russia, w ith the vast m ajority o f th e pop u latio n overtly religious.23 T hese w estern borderlands, then, have com e to display the sam e high incidence o f religion th a t has long been the case am ong o th er m inority nationalities. Religion is m uch m ore pervasive— far m ore com m on th a n am ong the R ussians— in the m in o rity n ationalities o f M uslim extraction in central A sia.24 Sim ilarly, the A rm enians a n d the G eorgians ten d to em brace religion as a natural p a rt o f th eir culture. N one o f these, o f course, nor any o f the dozens o f oth er nationalities like them , can trace th eir religiousness even in p a rt to the w artim e experience; th a t is a peculiarity o f the Bible Belt nationalities. T he Bible Belt has thus jo in e d the o th e r m inority n ationalities in the U SSR in the v irtu a l identity o f religion w ith nationality. To be a m em ber o f one o f these nationalities alm ost autom atically m eans also to be religious. Conversely, to be R ussian in these areas not only m eans to be a foreigner b u t also, by an d large, to be irreligious. A nd it is a very short step from view ing outsiders as atheists to view ing th em as uncivilized barbarians. T he strange result, then, is th a t at least insofar as religion is concerned, the R ussians have becom e b arb a ria n s w ithin th eir own dom ain. In earlier tim es the R ussians could claim — indeed, they took great pride in doing

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so— th at their expansion was a d iv in e m ission bringing the blessings o f C hristian civilization to the heathen, irreligious b arb arian s. T h is is no longer so. O ne illustration m ay bear this out: m orality. T he connection betw een religion an d ethics is universally perceived in th e U SSR. Religious people are expected to behave m ore ethically th a n o thers to such a n extent th a t w hen they do not, even atheistic researchers express in d ig n atio n .25 W ith the spread o f atheism , or, m ore properly, irréligion (for c o m m itted atheists are as rare as C hristian s in the R ussian lan d s— rarer, in fact) th is connection w ith ethics has been broken, an d the leaders o f ath eism in the U SSR have enjoyed scant success in attem p tin g to provide a fo u n d atio n for ethics in the absence o f religion.26 W hen upw ardly m obile R ussians, then, move in to live am ong or do m in ate m in o rity nationalities, they are view ed (and generally correctly) as irreligious; th e corollary w ould be th a t they are not expected to abide by C h ristian ethics. T he problem is vastly com pounded, o f course, by the econom ic a n d political system th at the R ussians represent. T h is is largely because the Soviet U nion insists upon a peculiar approach to in d u strialized life that, to date at least, has proven unw orkable w ithout increasing reliance on theft, fraud, bribery, an d all m an n er o f extralegal expedients. Especially in the countryside, life in the U SSR is v irtu a lly im possible w ithout recourse to influence, cheating, and illegality in p roviding for one’s needs. A t least in the eyes o f the m in o rity n ationalities, then, the R u ssian s have becom e the religious barb aria n s o f the tw entieth century. A ccording to som e reports, at least, the “ R ussian soul,” the fascination w ith m etaphysics, th e search for m eaning has by a n d large succum bed to a crass, o p p o rtu n istic p ursuit o f m aterial gain.27 T his is especially visible am ong the educated elite, large sectors o f w hich seem obsessed w ith the p u rsu it o f a b etter ap a rtm en t, a choice w ork assignm ent or, above all, the right to live in M oscow o r L eningrad. T he high com m itm ent o f the n ineteenth-century Narodniki, w ho idealistically abandoned all to “ go to the people” in service, the soul-searching agonies o f the “ useless sons” questing for som e high calling in life, a n d even the salon posturing searchers for high m etaphysical tru th are not very visible today, apparently, having been swallowed in the endless gray o f m a terialism am ong the elite. Am ong the rank an d file, the com m on citizens, m atters are doubtless worse in the R ussian hinterlands. T he d ata are sparse, for we really know surprisingly little o f life outside the u rb an ized centers. B ut certain ly it is ap parent th at there is little or nothing left o f at least the o u tw ard p arap h ern alia o f religion th at used to be so visible am ong the R u ssian p easants— the daily ritual, the incessant crossing o f oneself, the appeals to the saints, th e reliance on im precations (which today exists only in the rem arkably inventive cadences o f R ussian profanity). T he net result, then, is a reversal o f w hat w as at least claim ed u n d er the old em pire. W ithin the S oviet d o m ain , the R u ssian s are no longer

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bringing C h ristian ity an d civilization to the benighted peoples o f the nonO rthodox world. A t least from the p o in t o f view o f the m inority n ationalities a n d the Bible Belt, the R ussians represent the new invasion o f irréligion, im m orality, a n d barb arian ism . T h is is the en d u rin g legacy o f W orld W ar II. It transform ed the religious profile o f the societies o f the occupied areas, form ing them into a new Bible Belt. It narrow ed the church’s m ission to the purely spiritual, w ith no social dim ension at all. It w on for the R u ssian church a legal, as opposed to an underground, existence in society. A nd it established a bargaining p attern o f church-state relations w hich, m odified an d w eakened, rem ains to th is day. In all these respects, W orld W ar II w as the single m ost im p o rta n t event in the tw entieth cen tu ry for the histo ry o f religion in the USSR.

Notes 1. Russian Orthodox Eastern Church, Patriarkh Sergii i ego dukhovnoe nasledstvo (Moscow: Moscow Patriarchate, 1947), 234. 2. Russian Orthodox Eastern Church, The Truth about Religion in Russia (Moscow: Moscow Patriarchate, 1942), 8-9. 3. For a more detailed examination o f the evolution o f this approach to church-state relations, see William C. Fletcher, A Study in Survival: The Church in Russia, 1927-1943 (New York: Macmillan, and London: SPCK, 1965), and also Richard H. Marshall, Jr., “Fifteen Years o f Change: A Review o f the Post-Stalin Era,”in Max Hayward and William C. Fletcher, eds.. Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma o f Power (New York: Praeger, 1969): 1-18. 4. Izvestiia, 18 August 1927. 5. Russian Orthodox Church, The Truth about Religion. 6. William C. Fletcher, “USSR,”in Western Religion: A Country by Country Socio­ logical Inquiry, ed. Hans (J. J.] Mol (The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1972): 565-86. 7. William C. Fletcher, Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy (London: The Royal Institute o f International Affairs [Oxford University Press], 1973). 8. William C. Fletcher, The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917-1970 (London: Oxford University Press, 1971). 9. Archimandrite Ioann (Snychev), “Tserkovnye raskoly v russkoi tserkvi 20-kh i 30-kh godov X X stoletiia— grigorianskii, iaroslavskii, iosiflianskii, viktorianskii i drugie. Ikh osobennost’i istoriia” (Magister’ s diss.: Moscow Theological Academy, 1965), 189, 196. 10. Russian Orthodox Eastern Church, The Russian Orthodox Church, Organization, Situation, Activity (Moscow: Moscow Patriarchate, 1959), 230. 11. Ibid., 7. 12. Marcus Bach, God and the Soviets (New York: Crowell, 1958), 158. 13. Fletcher, The Russian . . . Church Underground, 13. 14. Delo Mitropolita Sergiia (unpublished typescript, n.p. [1930?]), 66: 170. Cf. Ioann (Snychev), Tserkovnye raskoly, 165. 15. Nikita Struve, Christians in Contemporary Russia (London: Harvill Press, 1967), 71-72. 16. Fletcher, The Russian . . . Church Underground, 235-49. 17. Wassilij Alexeev, “The Drama o f Exarch Sergii Voskresenskii,” Irenikon, no. 2 (1957): 189-201. 18. William C. Fletcher, Soviet Believers: The Religious Sector o f the Population (Lawrence, Kans.: Regents Press o f Kansas, 1981), 68, 70-71. 19. Ibid., 178.

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20. Iibd., 71-72. 21. V. Stanley Vardys, The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania (New York: East European Quarterly [Columbia University Press], 1978), 69-72. 22. Fletcher, Soviet Believers, 81-82. 23. lu. B. Pishchik, “Sovremennyi protestantizm: problemy teorii i praktiki,” in A. F. Okulov, ed., Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma 13 (1972): 410. 24. Fletcher, Soviet Believers, 70. 25. Ibid., 165-167. 26. Ibid., 167. 27. For example, see Andrea Lee, Russian Journal (New York: Random House, 1982).

R eferences Alexeev, Wallilij. “The Drama o f Exarch Sergii Voskresenskii.” Irenikon, no. 2 (1957): 189-201. Bach, Marcus. God and the Soviets. New York: Crowell, 1958. Delo Metropolita Sergiia. Unpublished typescript, n.p. (1930?). Fletcher, William C. Religion and Soviet Foreign Policy. London: The Royal Institute o f International Affairs (Oxford University Press), 1973. _______The Russian Orthodox Church Underground, 1917-1970. London: Oxford Uni­ versity Press, 1971. _______Soviet Believers: The Religious Sector o f the Population. Lawrence, Kansas: Regents Press o f Kansas, 1981. _______A Study in Survival: The Church in Russia, 1927-1943. New York: Macmillan, and London: SPCK, 1965. _______“USSR,”in Western Religion: A Country by Country Sociological Inquiry, ed. Hans [J. J.] Mol. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1972. Hayward, Max and William C. Fletcher, eds. Religion and the Soviet State: A Dilemma o f Power. New York: Praeger, 1969. Ioann (Snychev), Archimandrite. “Tserkovnye raskoly v russkoi tserkve 20-kh i 30-kh godov X X stoletiia—grigorianskii, iaroslavskii, iosiflianskii, viktorianskii i drugie. Ikh osobennost’i istoriia.”Magister’ s diss., Moscow Theological Academy, 1965. Lee, Andrea. Russian Journal. New York: Random House, 1982. Marshall, Richard H., Jr. “Fifteen Years o f Change: A Review o f the Post-Stalin Era,” in Hayward & Fletcher, Religion, 1-18. Okulov, A. F., ed. Voprosy nauchnogo ateizma. Moscow: “Mysl’ ,”biennially. Pishchik, lu. B. “Sovremennyi protestantizm: problemy teorii i praktiki," in Okulov, Voprosy, 13 (1972): 410. Russian Orthodox Eastern Church, Patriarkh Sergii i ego dukhovnoe nasledstvo. Moscow: Moscow Patriarchate, 1947. _______The Russian Orthodox Church, Organization, Situation, Activity. Moscow: Moscow Patriarchate, 1959. -------The Truth about Religion in Russia. Moscow: Moscow Patriarchate, 1942. Struve, Nikita. Christians in Contemporary Russia. London: Harvill Press, 1967. Vardys, V. Stanley. The Catholic Church, Dissent and Nationality in Soviet Lithuania. New York: East European Quarterly (Columbia University Press), 1978.

7 Soviet Policy and the Division of Germany, 1941-1945 ROBERT M. SLUSSER

In O ctober 1949 the Soviets sponsored the establishm ent, in th eir zone o f occupation in G erm any, o f the com m unist-controlled G erm an D em ocratic R epublic. A pproxim ately one m onth earlier a West G erm an state, the Federal R epublic o f G erm any, had been form ed in the three W estern zones o f occupation— B ritish, U.S., a n d French. T he establishm ent o f an East G erm an state was not the outcom e o f a deliberate and conscious policy on the p a rt o f Stalin a n d his advisers, b u t rath er the unforeseen and, in p art, u nw anted cu lm ination o f Soviet actions a n d policies tow ard G erm an y in interaction w ith those o f the three W estern Allies. Each o f the four occupying pow ers co n trib u ted to the final outcom e, b u t only two, G reat B ritain a n d France, deliberately fram ed th eir policies w ith th at goal in view.

Initial Soviet War Aims: The Eden-Stalin Talks For Stalin during the first six m onths o f the war, the single overriding w ar aim was survival. It was only w hen the m in im u m co nditions for achieving th at goal had been ensured by the Soviet victory in the Battle o f Moscow th at Stalin was able to form ulate other, broader, w ar aim s looking to the eventual defeat o f N azi G erm an y an d her allies. T he occasion for Stalin’s initial form ulation o f long-range Soviet w ar aim s w as the visit to M oscow o f B ritish Foreign Secretary A nthony Eden

The research on which this chapter is based was made possible in part by a grant from the American Council o f Learned Societies.

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on 16-20 D ecem ber 1941. In the course o f th e ir conversations, Eden an d Stalin ranged widely over the problem s facing the Soviet U nion a n d B ritain as w artim e allies, am ong them the future o f G erm any. As rep o rted by Eden, Stalin p u t forw ard a num ber o f specific proposals for w eakening G erm any, both by transferring p ortion s o f her te rrito ry to o th e r states, including the U SSR, and by splitting G erm any itself in to a n u m b er o f in d e p en d e n t states. T he R hineland, and possibly Bavaria, were to becom e autonom ous; A ustria was to regain her independence; P o lan d w ould receive E ast P russia; the S udetenland w ould be restored to C zechoslovakia; a n d for th e U SS R Stalin dem anded a strip o f territo ry n o rth o f the N em en River, including the Baltic po rt o f K önigsberg.1 Strictly lim ited in his negotiating pow ers by his directives from th e W ar C abinet, Eden was unable to m ake any form al co m m itm en ts on b e h a lf o f B ritain, b u t he received a v iv id perception th a t Stalin w as d eterm in ed to see G erm any dism em bered after the war, a n d th is im pression, conveyed to C hurchill an d the W ar C abinet, played a m ajor role in shaping B ritish concepts o f the probable direction o f Soviet policy to w ard G erm an y a n d thereby, indirectly, in shaping B ritish policy itself. Am ong the topics discussed d u rin g the E den-Stalin talks w as th a t o f the postw ar occupation o f G erm any. Eden to ld Stalin: There was no doubt that som e kind o f military control over Germ any would be necessary and . . . Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, if they would help, would have to undertake it.2

T here is no indication, however, th a t Stalin responded to th is suggestion or recognized in it the germ o f an idea w hich w ould eventually d eterm in e the future o f G erm any. Stalin’s overriding concern, according to Eden, was for Soviet security. It w as th is concern th a t underlay his insistence on B ritish recognition o f the Soviet frontiers w ith P o lan d o f S eptem ber 1939, a recognition th a t Eden refused to give. Sharply contrasting w ith the plans for G erm a n y ’s d ism em b erm en t, w hich Stalin outlined in his talks w ith Eden, were his public utterances. In an order o f the day to the R ed A rm y on 23 F ebruary 1942, Stalin said, “ T he experience o f history teaches us th at H itlers com e a n d go b u t the G erm a n people, the G erm an state rem ain.” 3 Stalin elaborated the idea in a speech on R ed Square on 6 N ovem ber 1942: Such a goal as the destruction o f Germany we d o not have, since it is im possible to destroy Germany, just as it is im possible to destroy Russia. But we can and must destroy the Hitler state. O ur task is to destroy the Hitler state and those who have inspired it.

But even here Stalin sounded a m oderate note: It is not our aim to destroy all military force in Germany, for every literate person will understand that it is not only im possible in regard to Germany

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as it is in regard to Russia, but it is also inexpedient from the point o f view o f the future. But Hitler’ s army can and should be destroyed.4

T he B ritish, m eanw hile, were contem plating th e bleak p rospect o f a w eakened postw ar B ritain unable to secure the cooperation o f h er w artim e allies, R ussia an d the U n ite d States. In th a t u n p ro m isin g eventuality, Eden rep o rted to th e cabinet on 5 O ctober 1942, we should eventually have to accept the collaboration o f Germany, with the feeble hope that the Germ ans would undergo a change o f heart and turn away from aggression.’

It w as early in 1943 th a t th e B ritish began seriously to form ulate plans for the zonal occupation o f G erm any. In a p ap er su b m itted to the cabinet on 16 Jan u ary 1943, Eden advocated not only “ the jo in t occupation o f G erm any by the three m ajo r Allies” after the w ar b u t also the exercise by the occupying pow ers o f “ a very close control over its econom ic life.” 6 The greatest danger, as Eden reported on March 8, 1943, was that o f ... an orientation o f Germ an policy toward the U SSR and the conclusion o f a Russian-German alliance directed against the West.

“ T he u ltim ate aim o f the com m unists,” Eden w arned, . . . w ould be not regional autonomy but the seizure o f power in a united Germany.7

It w as w ith these thoughts in m in d th a t Eden traveled to W ashington in M arch 1943 for talks w ith P resident R oosevelt a n d his advisers. Aware th a t the future o f G erm an y w as likely to take a p ro m in en t place in these A nglo-A m erican talks, the Soviets called in to play th eir d iplom atic repre­ sentatives to register Soviet view s on th is v ital topic. In L ondon Soviet A m bassador Ivan M aisky to ld Eden th at the Soviet Government, which wishes to see Germ any broken up, would countenance som e kind o f federal union between the parts.8

A t approxim ately the sam e tim e the sam e p o in t w as being m ade by the S oviet am bassador to the U n ited States, M axim Litvinov, in a conversation w ith R oosevelt’s close associate, H a rry H o p k in s.9 W ith his m em ories o f the D ecem ber 1941 talks w ith Stalin th u s refreshed, E den to ld R oosevelt th at “ S talin was likely to insist on breaking u p G erm an y in to a nu m b er o f states.” As to S talin’s views on the future o f G erm any, E den expressed his “ p riv ate o p inion,” that, far from w ishing to d o m inate a defeated postw ar G erm any, S talin w as anxious to have U.S. a n d B ritish forces fully co m m itted in E urope at the tim e o f G erm a n y ’s collapse, in

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order that R ussia w ould not have to “ take full responsibility for w hat w ould happen in G erm any or the rest o f Europe.” 10 D uring the E den-R oosevelt talks H a rry H opkins suggested th a t th e B ritish an d A m ericans should jo in tly w ork o u t plans for the future o f G erm an y an d then present them to the R u ssian s.11 R oosevelt ap proved th e suggestion a n d the A m ericans assum ed it h ad B ritish acceptance as well. Instead, th e B ritish, shortly after Eden’s retu rn to L ondon, began form ulating th e ir ow n plans for G erm any’s postw ar treatm ent. It w as these plans, discussed n eith er w ith the A m ericans nor the R ussians, w hich d eterm in ed G erm a n y ’s fate. T he process began w ith a m e m o ran d u m to the cab in et by E den on 25 M ay 1943, in w hich he outlined the div isio n o f G erm an y after h er defeat into three zones o f occupatio n .12 U nable to reach a conclusion on the m a tte r because o f disagreem ent over the question o f to ta l m ilita ry occupation, the cabinet referred the problem to th e A rm istice a n d P ostw ar C o m m ittee (APW ), one o f a n um ber o f agencies established w ith in th e B ritish governm ent to work out policy on questions concerning the co n d u ct o f the w ar a n d planning for the postw ar period. A m ong these the A PW w as one o f th e m ost im portant, by reason o f the urgency o f th e tasks w ith w hich it w as charged, an im portance recognized by the designation o f D ep u ty P rem ier C lem ent A ttlee as its chairm an, whence its com m on designation as th e Attlee C om m ittee.13 O n 31 July, th e A PW w as reorganized a n d ren am ed the C om m ittee on A rm istice T erm s an d C ivil A d m in istratio n (ACA), w ith Attlee continuing as ch a irm an .14 It was in the Attlee C o m m ittee th a t detailed plans for th e occupation o f G erm any were draw n up. By the late su m m er o f 1943 th e co m m ittee had prepared its final report, including a plan for th e d iv isio n o f G erm a n y into three zones o f occupation, w ith the Soviets in the east, th e B ritish in the northw est an d the A m ericans in th e southw est. Berlin w ould be deep inside the Soviet zone b u t not p a rt o f it; instead, B erlin w ould be subject to three-pow er occupation. T he plan m ade no p rovision for access to B erlin by the W estern pow ers.15 M eanw hile, Soviet planning w as proceeding on th e assu m p tio n th a t G erm any w ould retain her u n ity after defeat. T he problem , therefore, as the Soviets saw it, w as how to o b tain a d o m in a n t po sitio n in po stw ar G erm any. In a step tow ard th is goal the Soviets on 12 July 1943, an n o u n ced the form ation o f a N ational C o m m ittee for a F ree G erm any, headed by the veteran G erm an C om m u n ist leader W alter U lbricht. A w eek later th e first issue o f the com m ittee’s new spaper, Freies Deutschland, appeared, a n d on the following day the co m m ittee began rad io b ro ad casts to G erm an y from a tran sm itte r in the Soviet U n io n .16 T he Soviets were aware, however, th a t C o m m u n ist appeals w ould need reinforcem ent from other opinion-m aking circles in G erm an y if th eir ob­ jectives were to be reached. T hey w ere also aw are o f the p o ten tial leverage th eir control over vast num bers o f G erm a n p risoners o f w ar gave them . It was in response to considerations o f th is k in d th a t th e S oviets in S eptem ber 1943 announced the form ation o f a League o f G erm a n O fficers.17

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T he A m ericans, m eanw hile, w ere also draw ing u p plans for G erm an y ’s p ostw ar future. A D ep a rtm e n t o f State rep o rt en titled “ T he Political R e­ organization o f G erm any,’’ issued on 23 S eptem ber 1943, to o k a forth rig h t stan d against the forcible d ism em b erm en t o f G erm any, seeing it as “ a grave danger to future w orld order.” Instead, the p ap er favored a unified b u t decentralized G erm any, organized on the federal principle, w ith in w hich a d em ocratic n ation could emerge. Failure to p u rsu e wise a n d enlightened policies in G erm any, the p ap er w arned, entailed the risk th a t R ussia m ight achieve dom inance o f postw ar G erm an y .18 T h is p ap e r form ed p a rt o f the p rep arato ry m aterial w hich U.S. S ecretary o f State Cordell H ull to o k w ith h im to the C onference o f Foreign M inisters (C F M ) which m et in M oscow from 18 O ctober to 1 N ovem ber 1943. H ull h im self rem ain ed undecided on the subject o f G erm an y ’s future, b u t his ch ief h ad no such hesitations. In a m eeting w ith H ull on O ctober 5 th e president “ stated ‘categorically’ th a t he w as in favor o f the p a rtitio n o f G erm an y into three or m ore sovereign states. T hese states m u st be held together only in a custom s union.” 19 N eith er the A m ericans n or the R ussians, however, cam e to the M oscow C F M w ith a fully w orked-out p lan for G erm an y ’s future. H ull, despite R oosevelt’s urging, stuck by his experts’ preference for a u n ited b u t de­ centralized G erm any. As to the R ussians, M olotov, in response to a query from Eden, said the Soviet governm ent was “ som ew hat backw ard” in its study o f the question o f dism em bering G erm any, because o f its leaders’ p reoccupation w ith the m ilitary aspects o f the war. M olotov added that, “ H e w as sure, however, th a t [the S oviet leaders] w ould give w eight to any o pinion in favor o f dism em b erm en t [o f G erm any] by force.” 20 Two m easures to w eaken G erm an y were agreed on by the conference: the transfer o f East P russia to P o lan d a n d the reestablishm ent o f A ustrian independence. For the rest, the conference decided to set u p a three-pow er E uropean A dvisory C om m ission (EAC), based in L ondon w ith a m andate w hich included p reparing reco m m en d atio n s to the three governm ents on p roblem s concerned w ith the en d o f the war. T he EAC’s first task, it was agreed, w as to prepare detailed recom m endations on the term s o f su rren d er by G erm any an d her allies a n d the m ethods o f controlling th em after the w ar.21 D espite its origins as a three-pow er body, the EAC d id n o t enjoy equal su p p o rt from each o f the Allies. B oth the R ussians a n d the A m ericans feared it m ight take on attrib u tes o f policy m aking rath er th a n restricting itself to recom m ending policies on w hich the heads o f state could th en say the final w ord. T he B ritish, however, quickly recognized in the EAC an in stru m en tality w hich could be used to tran slate in to three-pow er decisions p lans w hich had been thus far B ritish alone. B ritish officials operating w ith in a com bined A nglo-A m erican staff had m eanw hile draw n up plans for the m ilitary occupation o f G erm any im ­ m ediately after her defeat. Like the A ttlee C o m m ittee’s plan for zonal occupation, the m ilitary plan (designated by the cover nam e R A N K IN ) called for Soviet occupation in the east, B ritain in the northw est, a n d U.S.

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in the southw est. Shown a d raft o f R A N K IN en ro u te to th e T eheran Conference, Roosevelt expressed strong objections to it, not w ith regard to the proposed Soviet zone b u t w ith regard to the two w estern zones. T he U nited States, he felt, should have the northw est zone, leaving the southw est to the B ritish.22 Roosevelt’s objections to R A N K IN m ark ed th e sta rt o f a p ro tracted a n d acrim onious dispute betw een the B ritish a n d A m ericans th a t w as finally resolved by a com prom ise at the Second Q uebec C onference in S eptem ber 1944, under w hich the tw o w estern zones rem ain ed as designated in th e original R A N K IN plan, b u t w ith the U n ited States receiving special rights in po rt enclaves at Brem en an d B rem erhaven in the B ritish zone.23 T he squabble over zones served to deflect the A m ericans’ atten tio n from the long-range im plications o f th e B ritish plan for po stw ar G erm any, including its anom alous provisions for Berlin. It w as not th e m ilita ry planners, however, who determ ined G erm any’s future; R A N K IN , for all th e controversy it generated, was m erely a tem p o rary plan for th e sh o rt-term m ilita ry o ccupation o f G erm any. The crucial planning for G erm a n y ’s future w as th a t pioneered by the Attlee C om m ittee in the su m m er o f 1943 a n d c a rrie d through, on B ritish initiative, in the E uropean A dvisory C om m ission in 1944.

Germany’ s Future at the Teheran Conference The question o f G erm any’s future occupied a p ro m in e n t place am ong th e topics discussed at the Big T hree conference in T eheran (28 N o v e m b e r-1 D ecem ber 1943). By this tim e the outcom e o f th e w ar in E urope could be regarded as decided— G erm an y ’s u ltim ate defeat w as inevitable, given the forces arrayed against her, a n d the Allies, for the first tim e, w ere in a position to draw up m eaningful strategic plans for the com ing year. It was C hurchill w ho in troduced the subject o f G erm a n y ’s future, on the first day o f the conference. G erm any, he said, should be subjected to “ far-reaching territo rial changes” ; its place in the center o f E urope m ight be taken by a federation o f A ustria, B avaria, a n d H ungary.24 S talin rejected this proposal as “ insufficient,” b u t avoided co m m ittin g h im se lf to an y th in g more definite. A t din n er on N ovem ber 29 Stalin spoke o f th e need for “ really effective m eans to control G erm any . . . otherw ise G erm an y w ould rise again w ith in 15 to 20 years to plunge the w orld into an o th er war.” As to th e m easures he had in m ind, they included the liq u id atio n o f “ a t least 50,000 a n d perhaps 100,000 o f the G erm an co m m an d in g staff” a n d the reten tio n by the Allies o f the important strategic positions in the world so that if Germ any m oved a muscle she could be rapidly stopped.

As to the territo rial settlem ent, S talin’s ideas h ad changed little since his talks w ith Eden in D ecem ber 1941. All G erm a n te rrito ry east o f the

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O der-N eisse line should go to P oland; R ussia w ould d em an d Königsberg, b u t P oland should have the rest o f E ast Prussia. R ussia, said Stalin, w anted term s w hich “ will leave R u ssia on the neck o f G erm any.” T he possibility th a t these m ight tu rn o u t to be Stalin’s m in im u m dem an d s was raised w hen he to ld C hurchill, “ T here is no need to speak at the present tim e ab o u t any Soviet desires [w ith regard to G erm any], b u t w hen the tim e com es, we will speak.” 25 T he problem o f G erm an y ’s future w as taken u p again a t the last plenary session o f the conference, on th e evening o f D ecem ber 1. S talin introduced th e subject an d indicated briefly his preference for dism em b erm en t b u t then sat back a n d let the W estern leaders set forth th eir views. C hurchill lim ited h im self to advocating the separation o f Prussia, “ the evil core o f G erm an m ilitarism ,” from the rest o f G erm any. R oosevelt set forth a plan for the d iv ision o f G erm an y into five self-governing states, together w ith U nited N ations “ or som e form o f in tern atio n al co n tro l” over the K iel C anal a n d the R u h r a n d S aar in d u strial areas.26 It w as R oosevelt’s im pro v ised plan th a t earned S talin’s approval; he preferred it, he said, to th a t o f C hurchill. If G erm an y w as to be dism em bered, “ it should really be dism em bered.” B ut there w ould always be the danger o f G erm an reunification, “ . . . no m a tte r w hat m easures were taken, there would always be a strong urge on the p a rt o f the G erm an s to reunite.” 27 N o final decision w as taken on dism em berm ent; instead the three heads o f state agreed to refer the qu estio n to th e E uropean A dvisory C om m ission. S talin closed the discussion by restating S oviet desire for the acquisition o f K önigsberg. He said that the acquisition o f that part o f Eastern Prussia would not only afford the Soviet Union an ice-free port but would also give to Russia a small piece o f Germ an territory which he felt was deserved.28

T he W estern leaders m ade no co m m itm en t on th is d em an d , b u t the Soviets co nstrued th eir silence as assent, claim ing a t the P o tsd am C onference th a t they h ad agreed to Stalin’s request.

Strang Presents the British Plan T he discussions a t the T eheran C onference left th e future o f G erm any unsettled. It w as not the Big T h ree’s ideas on dism em b erm en t w hich d eterm in ed G erm an y ’s fate b u t th e ir decision to tu rn the problem over to the E uropean A dvisory C om m ission, for it w as in th a t body th a t th e decisive steps w ere taken. T he first m eeting o f th e EAC, w hich to o k place in L ondon on 15 D ecem ber 1943, saw the establishm ent o f a secretariat, the ad o p tio n o f w orking procedures, an d th e designation o f a date in m id -Jan u ary for the com m ission’s first substantiv e m eeting. In p rep aratio n for th a t event the B ritish m ilitary an d civil b ureaucracy sw ung in to action. O n D ecem ber 12

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the B ritish Chiefs o f Staff C o m m ittee (COS) sent th e C o m m ittee on A rm istice T erm s an d C ivil A dm inistratio n (ACA) a rep o rt en titled T he M ilitary O ccupation o f G erm any in w hich th e latte r’s d iv isio n o f G erm an y in to three zones o f occupation w as adopted, placing B erlin inside th e S oviet zone b u t u n d er three-pow er ad m in istratio n . A pproval by th e ACA w as prom pt, b u t on D ecem ber 30 Sir W illiam Strang, a senior foreign service officer who had been designated B ritish representative on th e EAC, w rote to Eden, requesting perm ission to delay presen tatio n o f th e B ritish plan. Strang’s argum ent was th a t he needed m ore tim e to discuss the p lan w ith the R ussians an d A m ericans.29 Instead S trang w as in stru cted to present th e plan at the first suitable opportunity. T he reason for haste appeared to be twofold: first, th e R ed A rm y, in its drive w estward, w as rapidly approaching the eastern b o u n d a ry o f G erm any, a n d Eden was anxious to get A llied agreem ent on occupation zones before the Soviets entered G erm any; second, G eneral Eisenhower, w ho w as know n to favor the interm ingling o f Allied occupation tro o p s th ro u g h o u t G erm any, was scheduled to arrive in L ondon on Jan u ary 14 to take u p his d u ties as C om m ander in C hief o f the S uprem e H ead q u arters, A llied E xp ed itio n ary Forces (SHAEF). B ritish initiative w as facilitated by th e fact th a t n eith er th e R ussian s nor the A m ericans cam e to the EAC w ith definite proposals for G erm a n y ’s future. T hus the B ritish plan had no com petitors w hen Strang laid it o n the table at the EAC’s m eeting on 15 Jan u ary 1944. Strang’s p resen tatio n com prised three drafts: “ T erm s o f S u rren d er for G erm an y ” ; “ M ilitary O ccupation o f G erm any,” including a m ap show ing th e th ree zones o f occupation an d G reater Berlin; a n d “ A llied C ontrol M achinery in G erm a n y during the Period o f O ccupation.” 30 The Soviets at this po in t were still th in k in g in term s o f a unified G erm an y after defeat, to judge by an event w hich to o k place a few days before Strang’s presentation. T he head o f th e G erm a n C o m m u n ist P a rty (K P D ) in Russia, W ilhelm Pieck, acting in response to a briefing by ex-C om intern leader Georgi D im itrov, ap p o in ted a team o f tw enty K P D m em bers to work out a com prehensive program for “ T he S olution o f P olitical Tasks in G erm any A fter the War.” 31 It took the Soviets exactly one m onth to decide on th eir response to the B ritish proposal. A t a m eeting o f th e EAC on 15 F eb ru ary 1944, F edor G usev, Soviet am bassador to G re at B ritain a n d S oviet rep resen tativ e on the EAC, subm itted a draft for su rre n d er term s by G erm an y including a m ap showing occupation zones to be allocated to each o f th e th ree allies. T he zonal boundaries in the Soviet d raft were v irtu a lly identical w ith those in the docum ents laid before the EAC by Strang on Ja n u ary 15.32 The A m ericans, m eanw hile, locked in interagency d isp u tes a n d h am p ered by high-level d istru st o f the EAC, h ad nothing concrete to propose. T h u s the tacit agreem ent betw een the Soviets a n d the B ritish effectively settled the question o f G erm an y ’s occupation. W hy had the Soviets accepted the B ritish plan? E ssentially because it gave them m ore th an they could have hoped to achieve by an y o th e r m eans.

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It not only assured them o f controlling 40 percent o f G erm an y ’s te rrito ry a n d a th ird o f her populatio n a n d resources, b u t it also gave them a co m m anding position in Berlin, from which Soviet influence over all o f G erm any could be extended. U ntil the B ritish plan was presented, Stalin h ad no idea o f the concrete term s w hich the W estern Allies m ight offer the Soviets for postw ar controls in G erm any. Soviet acceptance o f the B ritish plan indicates th a t the B ritish had done th eir work well: the prize offered the Soviets w as glittering enough to ensure th eir acceptance o f an arrangem ent which allocated to the B ritish control o f G erm a n y ’s in d u strial h eartland, the R h in e-R u h r region. T he Soviets, m eanw hile, w ere still u n certain as to the best course to follow in regard to G erm a n y ’s dism em berm ent. At a m eeting o f the EAC on 25 January 1944, Strang, acting in response to a directive o f the Teheran Conference, proposed the setting up o f a C o m m ittee on D ism em berm ent. G usev said th at the Soviet delegation “ has not had sufficient m aterial or experts” to study the qu estio n .33 It was not un til M arch 1945, in fact, th at the Soviets were ready to state th eir official position on dism em berm ent.

British Rationale for the Planned Occupation of Germany T he prolonged w rangling betw een the B ritish an d A m ericans over th eir zones in w estern G erm any preoccupied b o th sides throughout m uch o f 1944 a n d was not resolved until the Second Q uebec C onference in S eptem ber 1944 by a com prom ise th a t in effect gave the B ritish w hat they w anted, control o f northw est G erm any. O n th a t basis the EAC was able to sign the three-pow er protocol w hich p u t the stam p o f Allied approval on w hat had originally been a purely B ritish plan. D uring the m onths which intervened betw een S trang’s initial presentation o f the plan an d its final validation, the B ritish conducted a vigorous internal debate over the m erits an d draw backs o f the plan, a debate w hich casts a revealing light on the real B ritish m otives. T he debate got u n d er way early in June 1944 w hen a Foreign Office spokesm an sent letters to the Econom ic a n d In d u strial P lanning Staff (EIPS) an d the Chiefs o f Staff (COS) requesting th em to consider the question o f d ism em berm ent in its econom ic a n d m ilitary aspects respectively.34 Also active in the debate were the A rm istice an d P ostw ar P lanning C o m m ittee (APW ) an d its successor, the P ost-H ostilities P lanning C o m m ittee (PH P). D uring the second h a lf o f 1944 these agencies produced a steady stream o f rep o rts an d com m ents in w hich they took sharply divergent views on the value to B ritain o f a policy aim ed at the d ism em berm ent o f G erm any. It w as the strongly held view o f the Chiefs o f Staff, for exam ple, th at a Germ any with single centralized control as regards politics, industry, and science will be potentially a greater threat to the peace o f Europe than she

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will be if she is dismembered. This argument is all the stronger if there is taken into account the possibility o f Germ any falling under the dom ination o f a hostile power.35

M ilitary advocacy o f dism em b erm en t was given pow erful civ ilian backing by the A ttlee C om m ittee. A t a session o f the co m m ittee on 20 July 1944, Attlee spoke in favor o f destroying the “ central m achine” o f governm ent in G erm any an d condem ned as an illusion the idea th a t there w as a “ n orm al G erm any” which could be revived, as d istin ct from the “ centralized a n d m ilitaristic m achine” that, in his view, had ruled G erm an y for th e p ast fifty years.36 In a P H P rep o rt dated 10 A ugust 1944, the conclusion w as reached th a t “ the dism em berm ent o f G erm any would, on balance, be to o u r [i.e., B ritish] strategic advantage.” R ejecting a Foreign Office spokesm an’s ch aracterizatio n o f the rep o rt as “ hopelessly unsound,” 37 the P H P in a rep o rt d ated 25 August 1944, spelled o u t the rationale b eh in d its conclusions. (a) The dismemberment o f Germany into three or m ore independent States, without any central government or federal organization, would be to our strategic advantage, both in relation to an aggressive Germ any and a hostile USSR.

In the existing though no t yet form ally ad o p ted EAC d raft pro to co l for the zonal occupation o f G erm any, the P H P found a convenient basis for dism em berm ent: If dismemberment took the form o f a devolution into three States, the areas o f those States would correspond broadly, though not necessarily exactly, with the zones o f occupation at present contemplated.

Am ong the advantages o f dism em berm ent, in P H P ’s view, w as th a t o f “ Insurance A gainst a P otentially H ostile U SS R ” : If the U SSR were eventually to develop hostile intentions toward us, a situation would arise, not only in Europe but in the M iddle Eastern and Far Eastern areas, which would require a com plete reorientation o f our present policy. In that event, we should require all the help we can get from any source open to us, including Germany. We must above all prevent Germ any com bining with the Soviet Union against us. It is open to argument whether a united Germany would be m ore likely to side with the USSR than with ourselves. In any event it is m ost unlikely that the U SSR would ever permit the rearmament o f a united Germ any unless she were satisfied that she could dom inate a Germ any so rearmed. Thus, we are unlikely to secure help from the whole o f Germany against the USSR. O ur interests are therefore likely to be better served in this event by the acceptance o f dismemberment, for we might hope eventually to bring north­ western, and possibly southern Germ any also, within the orbit o f a Western European Group. This would give increased depth to the defenses o f the United Kingdom and increase the war potential o f that group.

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We conclude that dism em berm ent would at least reduce the likelihood o f the whole o f Germ any com bining with the U SSR against us, and that as an insurance against a hostile USSR, it would be to our long-term strategic advantage.

W ith a frankness th a t w as often lacking in m ore widely d istrib u ted state papers, the P H P rep o rt asserted that, “ I f we are to secure the positive benefits o f d ism em b erm en t it is v ital th a t the northw estern area o f G erm an y should be a B ritish zone o f occupation.” 38 T he U .S.-B ritish conflict over th e w estern zones, as we have seen, was finally resolved by a com prom ise at the Second Q uebec Conference. W ith the question o f the w estern zones settled, the way was open for three-pow er agreem ent, an d on 12 S eptem ber 1944, the EAC ad o p ted a d raft “ Protocol on Z ones o f O ccupation in G erm an y an d A d m in istratio n o f the ‘G reater Berlin’ A rea” w hich, w ith m in o r ad ju stm en ts on N ovem ber 14, was forw arded to the heads o f state for th eir approval. T h u s the p lan originally m apped o ut by the A ttlee C om m ittee in 1943 w as acquiring the b inding force o f an A llied agreem ent on G erm a n y ’s future. In O cto ber 1944 C hurchill an d E den m et w ith S talin in Moscow. Stalin once again cham pioned the idea o f dism em bering G erm any. As rep o rted to R oosevelt by C hurchill, Stalin advocated th a t the R u h r a n d the S aar be detached and put out o f action and probably under international control and a separate state form ed in the Rhineland. He would also like the internation­ alization o f the Kiel Canal.39

Eden, though it w as he w ho h ad in itiated the process o f planning for G erm an y ’s dism em berm ent, still hesitated form ally to endorse it. In a m em o ran d u m w ritten tow ard th e en d o f 1944 he said th a t dism em berm ent w ould raise “grave political as well as practical issues to w hich an answ er w ould have to be found before we could su p p o rt such a policy.”40 In a deeply troubled m ood as the w ar’s en d approached, C hurchill w rote a long m em orandum to E den su m m in g u p his views on the position o f G erm an y in a restructured Europe. “ It is m uch too soon,” C hurchill said, for us to decide these enorm ous questions. . . . We have yet to settle the practical questions o f the partition o f Germany, the treatment o f the Ruhr and Saar industries, etc. These may be touched upon at our forthcom ing conference, but I doubt whether any final decision will be reached then. . . .4I

W hat bo th C hurchill an d R oosevelt lost sight o f w as the fact that, in th e absence o f enlightened, consistent, an d forceful leadership, policy for­ m ulation on m ajor issues w ould not sim ply m ark tim e, b u t w ould be shaped at the level o f w orking com m ittees, ex p ert consultation, an d the like. T his w as w hat happened to U.S. an d B ritish policy w ith regard to the d ism em ­ b erm en t o f G erm any. W hile R oosevelt w as draw ing u p or endorsing plans

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for postw ar G erm any, w hich a State D ep a rtm en t h isto ria n later castigated as “ technically am ateurish an d m orally indefensible,” 42 a n d w hile C hurchill an d Eden were agonizing over the m oral a n d m aterial problem s raised by dism em berm ent, B ritish officials at a lower level were m aking detailed plans on the assum ption th at postw ar G erm an y w ould be split in to th ree p arts, w ith the clear recognition th a t th is div isio n w ould very likely lead to the absorption o f eastern an d w estern zones in to riv al spheres o f influence.

Dismemberment at the Yalta Conference A t the Y alta Conference (4-11 F ebruary 1945) it w as the Soviets w ho appeared to be keenest for the dism em b erm en t o f G erm any. M olotov, on F ebruary 5, urged the W estern Allies to c o m m it them selves in favor o f dism em berm ent, an d later on the sam e day, Stalin insisted on inclusion o f the w ord “ dism em berm ent” in th e su rren d er in stru m e n t for G erm any, w ithout, however, specifying its exact im plications.43 Vojtech M a stn y ’s sug­ gestion th a t Stalin w anted inclusion o f th e w ord to discourage any G erm a n thought o f trying to negotiate a separate su rre n d er to the W estern Allies has m erit.44 W hatever Stalin’s m otives, th is was the last discussion o f the topic by the Big T hree; by m utual agreem ent th e subject w as referred to the foreign m inisters, an d they in tu rn passed it on to the C o m m ittee on D ism em berm ent w hich had been stalled for m ost o f the p ast year. O n February 6 Stalin gave form al approval to the EAC pro to co l (already ratified by the B ritish an d A m ericans) on occupation zones in G erm an y an d ad m inistration o f the G reater Berlin area.45 O n th e sam e day he ordered Zhukov to halt the R ed A rm y’s d riv e tow ard Berlin a n d shift th e w eight o f his offensive to the north, in P om erania.46 T he tw o decisions w ere logically connected: by accepting the EAC protocol Stalin en su red th e approval by his allies for Soviet control o f 40 percent o f G erm a n y ’s te rrito ry w ithout the need to push the R ed A rm y to the lim it. A slowdown in the S oviet w estw ard advance w ould p erm it a m ore orderly, less hectic pace a n d w ould give Stalin the op p o rtu n ity to gauge Soviet actions in response to his perception o f W estern plans. W hile the discussion o f the su rre n d er in stru m e n t a n d ap p ro v al o f the EAC protocol appeared to be the m ost salient aspects o f the Y alta discussions bearing on the future o f G erm any, tw o o th er agreem ents reached at th e conference played an im p o rta n t role in shaping th a t future. T h e first concerned reparations, w ith the Soviets calling for a total o f $20 billion, h a lf to go to the Soviet U nion. C hurchill refused to accept th e S oviet figures, b u t th e A m ericans, in the interests o f com prom ise, agreed to do so, “ as the basis for discussion.” 47 T his gesture gave the Soviets th e opening they needed to present the $20 billion figure later, at the P o tsd am Conference, as th e one on w hich they an d the A m ericans h ad “ agreed.” T h e co m prom ise o n reparations w orked o u t at P o tsd am in tu rn helped lay the fo u n d atio n for actions in the postw ar years w hich co n trib u ted directly to th e splittin g o f G erm any.

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O f equal significance w as th e decision to include F rance as an occupying pow er in postw ar G erm any, w ith a seat on the A llied C ontrol C ouncil for G erm any. Stalin agreed to these proposals only on the final day o f the conference, an d only on co n d itio n th a t the te rrito rie s to be assigned to F rance should be draw n from the B ritish a n d A m erican zones. H e may have felt th a t he w as thereby protecting Soviet interests, b u t the consequences o f his action w ere far from favorable for Soviet goals in G erm any. As a m em ber o f the C ontrol C ouncil for G erm an y after the war, France system ­ atically blocked any action d irected tow ard the m aintenance o f G erm an unity. Later, w hen the econom ic policies im posed in the Soviet zone deepened the split betw een E ast a n d W est G erm any, the French su p p o rted the AngloA m erican policy o f strengthening th e W est G erm a n econom y, w ith the result th a t in the postw ar struggle for G erm an y th e Soviets found them selves confronting not ju s t a w eakened B ritain a n d a reluctant A m erica b u t a firm ly u n ite d W estern alliance enjoying the su p p o rt o f a revived a n d vigorous W est G erm an population.

Soviet Policy in the Final S ta ges of the War T he Soviet decision to cham p io n G erm a n u n ity can be dated to shortly after the Y alta Conference. T he first concrete evidence the W estern Allies obtained o f this decision w as G u sev ’s ann o u n cem en t at the second m eeting o f the C o m m ittee on D ism em b erm en t on 26 M arch 1945.48 G u sev ’s statem ent cam e ju s t tw elve days after the Soviets in itiated th eir own plan for the dism em berm ent o f G erm an y by tu rn in g over to the Polish P rovisional G overnm ent G erm an territo rie s lying east o f the O der-N eisse line.49 T ransfer to P oland o f the East G erm a n territo ries, w hich included the rich Silesian coal fields an d in d u strial com plex, provides in d irect b u t cogent evidence th a t at this stage Stalin w as thin k in g in term s o f a u n ited (though truncated) G erm any, in w hich the Soviets could w ork tow ard an eventual C om m unist takeover, rath er th an the establishm ent o f a C om m u n ist-d o m in ated state in the reduced Soviet zone. T he Polish transfer significantly weakened the prospects for a viable Soviet-zone state. W hen the Soviets, after G erm an y ’s defeat, carried out a m assive program o f stripping in d u strial equipm ent from th eir zone u n d er the guise o f reparations, they fu rth er weakened the econom ic base o f a potential successor state in East G erm any. T hus by pursuing incom patible goals in G erm any, Stalin was planting the seeds for the postw ar setbacks an d reversals w hich S oviet policy encountered in G erm any. A lthough the EAC agreem ents p rovided for four-pow er ad m in istratio n o f Berlin, the Soviets were d eterm in ed to establish th eir control over the G erm an capital well before the W estern Allies could reach the city. O n A pril 21 E isenhow er inform ed Stalin o f his plan to halt the W estern Allies’ d rive at the Elbe River, inform ation w hich evidently convinced the suspicious Stalin th at th e ir rea l goal m ust be Berlin. R ecognizing th a t the w ar was

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now entering its final phase, a n d d eterm in ed to acquire th e m ost favorable strategic position in a collapsing G erm any, S talin ordered Z hukov from th e n orth and K onev from the south to capture B erlin a t th e earliest possible m om ent.50 Even before the Soviets entered the city, th e ir planes flew tw o team s o f Soviet-trained G erm an C o m m u n ists in to S oviet-held te rrito ry near the G erm an capital, an d on M ay 1 the group led by W alter U lb rich t began its operations.51 It was the Soviets w ho first disclosed the plans for zonal o ccupation o f G erm any, in a press rep o rt on 7 Ju n e 1945.52 W ith a speed th a t to o k th e W estern Allies com pletely by surprise, the S oviet m ilita ry a d m in istra tio n in East G erm any then adop ted a n u m b er o f m easures aim ed at seizing th e initiative in the new G erm an y th a t could be expected to em erge from defeat. O n June 10 Z hukov authorized the form ation o f political p arties in the Soviet Zone, an action w hich M astny describes as “ an incipient S oviet b id for a d o m inant role in the whole o f G erm any.” 53 In o rd er to give the revived G erm an C om m unist P arty (K PD ) a co m m an d in g lead in th e p olitical race, the Soviets on June 12 sponsored a conference in th eir zone to m a rk the reorganization o f the party.54 Pleading the need to reestablish o rder after the G erm a n surrender, the Soviets im posed a m onth’s delay before the W estern arm ies w ere auth o rized to enter Berlin. By this tim e the EAC w as approaching th e en d o f its official activities, w ith only a few last-m inute details to iron out, am ong th em th e exact delineation o f the French sector o f occupied Berlin. A pro to co l o f July 12 took care o f th at problem , an d the occupying forces o f th e W estern Allies were at last able to settle into th e ir new qu arters.

Soviet Policy at the Potsdam Conference T he final Big T hree conference o f the w ar w as held at P o tsd am , ju s t outside Berlin, in the Soviet zone, from 17 July to 2 A ugust 1945. In regard to the treatm ent o f G erm any the conference p ro duced few surprises b u t rath er m arked the form al adoption o f decisions reached earlier. T hus, th e W estern Allies in effect sanctioned the tran sfer to P o lan d o f the G erm a n te rrito rie s east o f the O der-N eisse line, retain in g only the legal fiction th a t th e tran sfer was provisional pending the conclusion o f a peace treaty w ith G erm any. Transfer o f K önigsberg to th e U SS R also received ap p ro v al in principle pending a peace settlem ent. T he problem th at caused the greatest conflict at th e conference w as th a t o f reparations. T he Soviets now strongly p u t th eir case for a to tal o f $20 billion, h alf to go to the USSR. W ithout form ally endorsing these figures, the W estern Allies agreed th a t the Soviets should be free to take rep aratio n s in kind from their own zone o f occupation, as well as from “ ap p ro p riate G erm an external assets.” 55 T his elastic form ula gave th e Soviets extensive leverage in form erly G erm an-occupied E astern E urope, a n d helped th em lay the foundations for econom ic d o m in a tio n o f th a t region.

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Since even these m easures failed to satisfy th e Soviet d em an d for reparations, U.S. Secretary o f State, Jim m y Byrnes, offered a form ula u n d er w hich the Soviets, in ad d itio n to taking rep aratio n s from th e ir own zone, were to receive 25 percent o f such in d u strial capital eq u ip m en t from the W estern zones as w as unnecessary for the G erm an peacetim e econom y, 15 p ercent to be com pensated by shipm ents o f foodstuffs a n d in d u strial goods, 10 percent w ithout com pensation. W ith in less th a n a year th is com plicated arran g em en t had broken dow n, an d G eneral Lucius D. Clay, co m m an d an t in the U.S. zone, h alted sh ip m en ts to the Soviets. France, w hich w as not represented at th e conference a n d thus not bou n d by its decisions, w as given a seat on the A llied C o n tro l C ouncil for G erm any, an illogical arran g em en t w hich contained th e germ s o f future dissension.

The Balance Sheet S talin’s high regard for the w ork o f th e EAC w as show n indirectly by his request to T rum an, on 15 A ugust 1945, for a zone o f occupation in Ja p a n .56 E vidently Stalin hoped to repeat in the F ar E ast the dual policy which he found so congenial in E urope: control o f a n occupation zone in the defeated n atio n as a springboard to influencing a n d eventually controlling the ex­ enem y state as a whole. T rum an ’s sobering experience w ith the zonal division o f G erm any, however, led h im to reject S talin’s request. T he absence o f a F ar E astern co u n terp art to th e EAC— the result o f A m erica’s prio rity in d eterm in in g Allied strategy in th a t th eater— was an essential prerequisite to T ru m an ’s decision, w hich spared Ja p an the trau m a o f dism em berm ent to w hich G erm an y w as subjected. (T he div isio n o f K orea into Soviet an d U.S. zones o f occupation resulted from entirely different processes, however sim ilar the results m ay appear.)57 Soviet w artim e policy tow ard G erm an y p u rsu ed a nu m b er o f goals, som e o f th em predicated on its unity, others on its dism em berm ent. In effect, S talin w anted to have it b o th ways— an assured p o rtio n o f G erm an te rrito ry u n d er Soviet control an d at the sam e tim e a strong p osition in the postw ar struggle for a un ited G erm any. W hat S talin d id n ot w ant w as a Sovietcontrolled E ast G erm an successor state com peting w ith a larger, richer, m ore populous W est G erm a n state enjoying th e su p p o rt o f the W estern Allies. Yet th a t is w hat he got. T he basic lines along w hich G erm an y w as dism em bered were draw n up by B ritish planners in 1943-1944. By accepting th eir b lu e p rin t a n d attem p tin g to com bine it w ith o ther S oviet goals in G erm any, S talin helped m ake d ism em berm ent a reality.

Notes 1. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, B ritish Foreign P o lic y in th e S eco n d W orld War, (London: Her Majesty’ s Stationery Office, 1971), 2:551. (Hereafter cited as Woodward 2.) For a

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Soviet view o f the Eden-Stalin talks, see V. G. Tmkhanovsky, B ritish Foreign P o lic y D u rin g W orld W ar II 1939-1945 (Moscow: Progress Publisher, 1970), 213-23. In Tru-

khanovsky’ s presentation Stalin’ s paramount concern is with Soviet security. Trukhanovsky omits any reference to Stalin’ s proposals for the dismemberment o f Germany. (Hereafter cited as Tmkhanovsky, B ritish Foreign P olicy.) 2. Sir Anthony Eden, The R eckon in g: The M e m o irs o f A n th o n y E den, E a rl o f Avon (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 335. (Hereafter cited as Eden, R eckon in g.) 3. Joseph Stalin, The G reat P a trio tic W ar o f th e S o v ie t U nion (New York: International Publishers, 1945), 44. 4. Ibid., 69. 5. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, B ritish Foreign P o licy in the S eco n d W orld W ar (London: Her Majesty’ s Stationery Office, 1962), 435. (Hereafter cited as Woodward 1962.) 6. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, B ritish Foreign P o lic y in th e S eco n d W orld War, Vol. 5 (London: Her Majesty’ s Stationery Office, 1976), 16. (Hereafter cited as Woodward 5.) 7. Ibid., 25, 29. 8. Eden, R eckoning, 429. 9. John L. Snell, W a rtim e O rigins o f th e E ast-W est D ile m m a over G erm a n y (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1959), 38. (Hereafter cited as Snell, W a rtim e O rigins.) 10. Robert E. Sherwood, R oosevelt a n d H opkins: A n I n tim a te H istory, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 711-12. 11. Ibid. 12. Woodward 1962, 443-45; Woodward 5-, 46-48. 13. Tony Sharp, The W a rtim e A llia n ce a n d th e Z o n a l D ivisio n o f G erm a n y (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 35, note 4. (Hereafter cited as Sharp, W a rtim e Alliance.) Woodward 1962, 445. 14. Sharp, W a rtim e Alliance, 35. 15. Woodward 1962, 445-48, 465-70. Winston S. Churchill, The S econ d W orld W ar (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953) Vol. 6, Trium ph a n d Tragedy, 507-8. 16. Vojtech Mastny, R u s sia ’s R o a d to th e C o ld War. D ip lo m a cy, W arfare, a n d the P olitics o f C om m u n ism , 1941-1945 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 80. (Hereafter cited as Mastny, R u s sia ’s R o a d .) Snell, W a rtim e O rigins, 36. 17. Ibid., 36. For the view that these moves were related to Moscow’ s disappointment with the Western Allies’failure to open a Second Front and its consideration o f a possible separate peace with Germany, see William O. McCagg, Jr., S ta lin E m b a ttle d 1 9 4 3-1948 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), 38. 18. H. A. Notter, P o stw a r Foreign P o licy P reparation, 1 9 39-1945 (Washington, D.C.: Department o f State, 1949), 558-60. 19. Cordell Hull, The M em o irs o f C o rd ell H u ll (N ew York: Macmillan, 1948), 2:1265-66. 20. Woodward 5:77. 21. Woodward 2:588-89. Philip E. Mosely, “The Occupation o f Germany: New Light on How the Zones were Drawn,”in T he K rem lin a n d W orld P o litics (New York: Vintage Books, 1960): 158. (Hereafter cited as Mosely, “Occupation.”) In the Soviet view the establishment o f the EAC was the result o f a Soviet initiative. Tmkhanovsky, B ritish Foreign P olicy, 373. For a West German analysis o f the work o f the EAC see HansGunter Kowalski, “Die ‘ European Advisory Commission’ als Instrument alliierten Deutsch­ landplanung 1943-1945,” Vierteljahrshefte f ü r Z eitgesch ich te 19 (July 1971) 3:261-93. 22. U.S. Department o f State. Foreign R e la tio n s o f th e U n ited States. T he Conferences a t C airo a n d Tehran, 1943 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961), 254-56. (Hereafter cited as FR U S, C airo a n d Tehran.) Sharp, W a rtim e A lliance, 42. Donald J. Nelson, W artim e O rigins o f the B erlin D ile m m a (University, Alabama: University o f Alabama, 1978), 30-32. William M. Franklin, “Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin,” W orld P olitics 6 (October 1963): 10-11. (Hereafter cited as Franklin, “ Zonal Boundaries.”) 23. Mosely, “Occupation,” 178-79. Franklin, “Zonal Boundaries,” 21. 24. Woodward 5:78. 25. Ibid., 553-54. Snell, W a rtim e O rigins, 46-47. 26. F R U S, C airo a n d Tehran, 600. In the Soviet-bloc version it was only the Western Allies who favored the dismemberment o f Germany at Teheran. See for example the

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Polish historian Stefan Boratyski (S. Boratynskii), D ip lo m a tiia p erio d a Vtoroi M irovoi w in y . M e zh d u n a ro d n ye kon feren tsii 1941-1945 god o v (Moscow: Izd-vo inostrannoi literatury, 1959), 222. This has become the standard Soviet treatment o f the subject. For a recent example, see V. Nekrasov, “Istoricheskie uroki Tegerana,”K o m m u n ist 17 (November 1983): 110-21, 119. In Soviet documentary publications this interpretation is supported by the deletion o f statements by Stalin favoring the dismemberment o f Germany. See for example S o vetsk ii S o iu z na m ezhdu n arodnykh konferentsiiakh p e rio d a Velikoi Otechestvennoi w in y 1941-1945 gg. Vol. 2. Tegeranskaia konferenstsiia ru k o w d ite le i trekh soiuznykh d e rzh a v — SS S R , SShA, V elikobritanii (28 n o ia b ria -1 dek a b ria 1943 g.) S born ik doku m en tov (Moscow: Izd-vo politicheskoi literatury, 1975), 165. For commentary, see Robert Beitzell, ed., Teheran Yalta P otsdam : T he S o viet P rotocols (Hattiesburg, Miss.: Academic International, 1970), 4. Beitzell lists Stalin’ s statements on Germany as one o f four deletions “[which are] o f such importance as to seriously distort the record o f the proceedings at Teheran.” 27. FR U S, C a iro a n d Tehran, 602. 28. Ibid., 604. 29. (a) “The Military Ocupation o f Germany. Report by Chiefs o f Staff Committee.” London: Public Record Office (PRO), PREM 3.1014/11, 21-37. (b) Strang to Secretary o f State on Procedure in the European Advisory Commission, PRO. F.O. 371.40580, 22. 30. U.S. Department o f State. Foreign R e la tio n s o f the U n ited States. 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966), 1:112-59. (Hereafter cited as F R U S 1 9 4 4 - 1.) Nelson, W a rtim e O rigins, 38. Sir William Strang, H o m e a n d A b ro a d (London: Andre Deutsch, 1956), 213-14. (Hereafter cited as Strang, H om e.) Sharp, W artim e Alliance, 56. Woodward 5, 198-200. 31. Mastny, R u ssia 's R oad, 146. 32. “Iz materialov Evropeiskoi Konsul’ tativnoi Komissii,”M ezh du n arodn aia z h iz n ', 5 (1968): 158-60. Nelson, W a rtim e O rigins, 40. Sharp, W a rtim e Alliance, 57. F R U S 1944-1, 177-78. Franklin, “Boundaries,” 13. In the view o f a Soviet historian, the Soviet Union accepted a zone o f occupation smaller than its contribution to Allied victory would have entitled it to in order “to give further proof o f its desire and readiness to co-operate with its Western Allies in peace as in war.”Trukhanovsky, B ritish Foreign P olicy, 431. See also Alexander Fischer, S o w jetisch e D eu tschlan dpolitik im Z w eiten W eltkrieg 1941-1945 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1975), 79-80. 33. Minutes o f the Third Meeting o f the EAC. PRO. F.O. 371.40580, 186. P ravda o p o litik e zapa d n yk h d erzh a v v g e rm a n sk o m voprose (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatefstvo politicheskoi literatury 1959), p. 12. (Hereafter cited as P ravda o p o litik e.) 34. Letter from Oliver Harvey, 7 June 1944, Foreign Office. PRO. F.O. 371.39079, 233-36, 237-39. 35. PRO. F.O. 371.39080, 170. 36. Woodward 5, 214-15. 37. PRO. F.O. 371.39080, 393-401. 38. Ibid., 15-17. 39. Churchill, T rium ph a n d Tragedy, 240-41. Snell, W a rtim e O rigins, 102-3. 40. Woodward 5, 243. 41. Churchill, Trium ph a n d Tragedy, 350-51. 42. Ernest F. Penrose, E co n o m ic P lanning f o r th e P eace (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 258. 43. Woodward 1962, 488. Woodward 5, 272-74. Trukhanovsky omits any reference to Soviet insistence on the dismemberment o f Germany at Yalta and asserts that it was the British and Americans who favored that policy. Trukhanovsky, B ritish Foreign Policy, 432. This has become the standard Soviet interpretation. See, for example, A. Iu. Borisov, “Sovetskaia diplomatiia na mezhsoiuznicheskikh konferentsiiakh v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” Voprosy istorii, 6 (1980):21-38, 32. 44. Mastny, R u ssia's R oad, 242. 45. Nelson, W a rtim e O rigins, 73. 46. Sharp, W a rtim e A lliance, 26.

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47. Snell, W a rtim e O rigins, 150. U.S. Department o f State. Foreign R e la tio n s o f th e U nited States. T he Conferences a t M a lta a n d Yalta (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955), 921-22, 937, 978-79. 48. According to the Statement by Gusev, the Soviet government understood the decision o f the Yalta conference regarding the dismemberment o f Germany “not as an obligatory plan, but as a possibility for exerting pressure on Germany with the object o f rendering her harmless in the event o f other means proving inadequate.” Mosely, “Dismemberment,”144. P ravda o p o litik e za p a d n yk h derzhav, 13, citing M ezh du n arodn aia zh iz n ' 5 (1955):44. Woodward 1962, 527. In the Soviet view it was thanks to Soviet policy, as enunicated in part by Gusev, that Germany escaped dismemberment at the end o f the war. Trukhanovsky, B ritish Foreign P olicy, 432. 49. Hans W. Schoenberg, “The Partition o f Germany and the Neutralization o f Austria” in Thomas T. Hammond, ed., T he A n a to m y o f C o m m u n ist Take-overs (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975), 373. (Hereafter cited as Schoenberg, “Partition.”) 50. Peter Calvocoressi and Guy Wint, T otal War. C auses a n d C ourse o f th e S econ d W orld W ar (London: Allen Lane, the Penguin Press, 1972), 536. 51. Schoenberg, “Partition,” 375. 52. Sharp, W a rtim e Alliance, 157. 53. Mastny, R u ssia ’s R oad, 290. 54. Schoenberg, “Partition,” 376. 55. Herbert Feis, B etw een W ar a n d Peace: The P o tsd a m C onference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 253-58. 56. Herbert Feis, The A to m ic B om b a n d th e E n d o f W orld W ar II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966), 152-53. 57. The origins o f the United States-Soviet agreement which led to the division o f Korea are analyzed in my article, “Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-50: Stalin’ s goals in Korea”in Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., T he O rigin s o f th e C o ld W ar in A sia (Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1977), 123-46.

References Beitzell, Robert, ed. Teheran Yalta P otsdam : The S o viet Protocols. Hattiesburg, Miss.: Academic International, 1970. Boratynskii, S. D ip lo m a tiia p e rio d a Vtoroi M iro vo i voiny. M e zh d u n a rodn ye kon feren tsii 1941-1945 godov. Moscow: Izd-vo inostrannoi literatury, 1959. Borisov, A. Iu. “Sovetskaia diplomatiia na mezhsoiuznicheskikh konferentsiiakh v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny.” Voprosy isto rii 6. 1980:21-38. Calvocoressi, Peter, and Wint, Guy. T otal War. C auses a n d C ou rse o f th e S econ d W orld W ar London: Allen Lane (the Penguin Press) 1972. Churchill, Winston S. The Seco n d W orld War. Vol. 6. Trium ph a n d Tragedy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1953. Eden, Anthony. The R eckon in g: The M e m o irs o f A n th on y Eden, E a rl o f Avon. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965. Feis, Herbert. The A to m ic B o m b a n d th e E n d o f W orld W ar II. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966. ------- B etw een W ar a n d Peace: The P o tsd a m Conference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960. Fischer, Alexander. S ow jetisch e D eu tschlan dpolitik im Z w eiten W eltkrieg 1941-1945. Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1975. Franklin, William M. “Zonal Boundaries and Access to Berlin.”W orld P olitics 16. October 1963:1-31. Hull, Cordell. The M em o irs o f C o rd ell Hull. New York: Macmillan, 1948. “Iz materialov Evropeiskoi Konsul’ tativnoi Komissii”M e zh d u n a ro d n a ia z h iz n ’. 5 1968 158-60.

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Kowalski, Hans-Gunter. “Die ‘ European Advisory Commission1 als Instrument alliierten Deutschlandplanung 1943-1945,”V ierteljahrsheftefilr Z eitgesch ich te 19. 1971, 3:261-93. London. Public Record Office. Files PREM 3.1014/11; F.O. 371.39079, 39080, 40580. McCagg, William O., Jr. S ta lin E m b a ttle d 1943-1948. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978. Mastny, Vojtech. R u ssia's R o a d to th e C o ld War: D ip lo m a cy, W arfare, a n d th e P olitics o f C om m u n ism . 1941-1945. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979. Mosely, Philip E. “The Occupation o f Germany: New Light on How the Zones Were Drawn.”In T he K rem lin a n d W orld P olitics. New York: Vintage Books, 1960, 155-88. Nekrasov, V. “Istoricheskie uroki Tegerana.”K o m m u n ist 17, November 1983, 110-21. Nelson, Donald J. W a rtim e O rigin s o f th e B erlin D ilem m a . University, Alabama: University o f Alabama Press, 1978. Notter, H. A. P o stw a r Foreign P o licy P reparation, 1939-1945. Washington, D.C.: De­ partment o f State, 1949. Penrose, Ernest F. E co n o m ic P lan n in g f o r th e Peace. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953. P ravda o p o litik e za p a d n yk h d erzh a v v g erm a n sk o m voprose. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’ stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1959. Schoenberg, Hans W. “The Partition o f Germany and the Neutralization o f Austria.”In Thomas T. Hammond, ed.. T he A n a to m y o f C o m m u n ist Take-overs. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1975, 366-84. Sharp, Tony. T he W a rtim e A llia n ce a n d the Z o n a l D ivisio n o f G erm any. New York: Oxford University Press, 1975. Sherwood, Robert, E. R oosevelt a n d H opkins: An In tim a te H istory, rev. ed. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950. Slusser, Robert M. “Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-50: Stalin's Goals in Korea.” In Yonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds., The O rigins o f th e C o ld W ar in Asia. Tokyo: University o f Tokyo Press, 1977, 123-46. ______ , ed. S o v ie t E co n o m ic P o lic y in P o stw a r G erm any: A C ollection o f P apers b y F o rm er S o viet Officials. New York: Research Program on the USSR, 1953. Snell, John L. W a rtim e O rigin s o f th e E ast-W est D ile m m a over G erm any. New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1959. S o vetsk ii S o iu z na m ezhd u n a ro dnyk h konferentsiiakh p e rio d a Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny 1941-1945 gg. Vol. 2. T egeranskaia konferentsiia ru kovoditelei trekh soiu zn ykh der­ zh av— S SSR , SShA, V elikobritanii (28 noiabria-1 dekabria 1943 g.) S born ik doku m en tov

Moscow: Izd-vo politicheskoi literatury, 1975. Stalin, Joseph. T he G reat P a trio tic W ar o f th e S o viet Union. New York: International Publishers, 1945. Strang, Sir William. H o m e a n d A broad. London: Andre Deutsch, 1956. Trukhanovsky, V. G. B ritish Foreign P o licy D u rin g W orld W ar I I 1939-1945. Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1970. U.S. Department o f State. Foreign R ela tio n s o f the U n ited States: The Conferences at C airo a n d Tehran, 1943. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1961. ________ T he Conferences a t M a lta a n d Yalta. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1955. _______ 1944, 1. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1966. Woodward, Sir Llewellyn. B ritish Foreign P o licy in th e S eco n d W orld War. London: Her Majesty’ s Stationery Office, 1962. ________ B ritish Foreign P o lic y in th e S eco n d W orld War, 2. London: Her Majesty’ s Stationery Office, 1971. ________ B ritish Foreign P o licy in th e Seco n d W orld War, 5. London: Her Majesty’ s Stationery Office, 1976.

Part Two

Social and Political C o n se q u en ces of World War II

8 Postwar Soviet Society: The “Return to Normalcy” , 1945-1953 SHEILA FITZPATRICK

T he tw o great w ars o f the tw entieth cen tu ry were fought by societies, not sim ply by th eir arm ies. In the belligerent countries, civilians as well as m ilitary conscripts found th eir way o f life, occupation, a n d often place o f residence changed for the d u ratio n o f the war. T he d isru p tio n was greatest w hen there w as enem y occupation o f te rrito ry (as in m uch o f the Soviet U nion in W orld W ar II), m ass evacuation, an d flight o f population. But even in the direst w artim e circum stances, as long as hope o f victory rem ained, civilians an d soldiers thought o f th is d isru p tio n as tem porary. They expected th a t w hen the w ar ended norm al life w ould be resum ed. For the Soviet population, however, norm alcy an d stability rem ained elusive goals in the postw ar years from 1945 until S talin’s death in 1953. In the first place, the process o f ending the w ar produced social dislocations alm ost com parable w ith those associated w ith fighting it since tens o f m illions o f people had to be dem obilized, repatriated, retu rn ed from evac­ uation, an d released from w artim e jo b s th at th eir holders regarded as tem p o rary or to w hich they had been drafted. M any chose not to return to their prew ar hom es an d occupations. M any others found them selves unable to do so. In the second place, the regim e’s coercive policies precluded the kind o f relaxation an d peacetim e read ju stm en t th at the Soviet population hoped for after the war. Som e types o f postw ar Soviet repression had prew ar analogues, others were m odeled on w artim e experience. Some coercive policies were particularly associated w ith the incorporation o f new territo ries into the Soviet U nion an d others w ith the perceived im peratives o f postw ar

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econom ic reconstruction, b u t it w ould be difficult to find a sphere o f p ostw ar Soviet life in w hich coercive policies were entirely absent. In the afterm ath o f war, the regim e w anted to tighten controls on the society, n o t loosen them . A fter the Second W orld War, as after the F irst W orld W ar a n d C ivil W ar in Russia, m illions o f people w ere in m ovem ent from one geographical or social location to another, a n d a substantial p a rt o f the m ovem ent w as spontaneous an d uncontrolled. B ut in the second h a lf o f th e 1940s, unlike the early tw enties, there existed a strongly entrenched regim e w ith coercive capacities and intentions; a n d the regim e’s ow n policies (resettlem ent, deportation, and labor conscription) added significantly to the dem ographic and social upheaval. T he regim e quickly dem obilized m uch o f th e R ed A rm y after the Second W orld War, b u t it w as not ready to dem obilize society in 1945. For the long-suffering Soviet population, m ore years o f privation, storm , and stress lay ahead.

The War and Its Immediate Impact on the Soviet Population D uring the Second W orld War, G erm an a n d Axis tro o p s occupied the U kraine, Belorussia, the Baltic R epublics, the C rim ea, the N o rth ern C aucasus and large areas o f E uropean R ussia— in all, te rrito ry w ith a prew ar popu latio n o f 85 m illion, or 45 percent o f the to tal Soviet p o p u la tio n .1 Som e 12 to 15 m illion Soviet citizens w ere evacuated o r fled eastw ard away from the G erm ans.2 M oscow alm ost fell in O ctober 1941, L eningrad w as u n d er siege from Septem ber 1941 to Jan u ary 1944, an d G erm a n tro o p s pen etrated as far east as the Volga before being tu rn ed back at the Battle o f Stalingrad. According to official Soviet claim s, the occupying forces destroyed a n d plundered 1710 tow ns an d m ore th an 70,000 villages. In a d d itio n 32,000 industrial enterprises an d 65,000 kilom etres o f railro ad track w ere com pletely or partially destroyed.3 As they retreated, the G erm a n s drove off livestock, seized or destroyed agricultural m achinery, set fire to buildings, a n d blew up bridges. In addition to this devastation, b an d itry a n d anti-S oviet resistance m ovem ents were rife at the en d o f the w ar in reclaim ed areas like the U kraine and the newly acquired W estern territories. In the course o f the war, over 5 m illion S oviet soldiers a n d officers w ere captured by the G erm ans, although only one m illion o f these w ere alive in prisoner-of-w ar (PO W ) cam ps at the en d o f th e w ar.4 To provide labor for the Reich, several m illion Soviet citizens were tra n sp o rte d to G erm an y and, like the su rviving prisoners o f war, req u ired rep atriatio n at the en d o f the w ar.5 O u t o f 3 m illion Jews in the Soviet p o p u latio n o f 1939, it is estim ated th at 800,000 were cap tu red in G erm an-occupied te rrito rie s a n d perished in N azi concentration cam ps, an d an ad d itio n al 909,000 Jews w ere captured in eastern P oland— the area occupied by the S oviet U nion in 1939, taken by the G erm ans in 1941, a n d reoccupied a n d in co rp o rated in to the

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S oviet U nion in 1944-1945— a n d m et the sam e fate.6 F or the Soviet p o p u latio n as a whole, the official S oviet estim ate o f w artim e p o pulation losses— usually expressed as casualties, b u t probably also covering Soviet citizens w ho rem ained in or fled to the W est at the en d o f the w ar— is a staggering 20 m illion,7 o u t o f a to tal p o p u latio n o f som ething over 190 m illion at the outbreak o f w ar.8 O f th e 20 m illion, ab o u t h a lf are a ttrib u te d to m ilitary casualites an d h a lf to civ ilian losses. T he m ale p o pulation suffered m uch heavier losses, particu larly in the fighting age-groups, th a n the female. O n the hom e front, w ar b rought d rastic changes in the com position o f th e w ork force. Perhaps 20 m illion m en w ere conscripted into the arm ed forces d uring the war, an d th is m ean t th a t agriculture an d in d u stry — p articularly agriculture— w ere d rain ed o f m ale w orkers.9 O n the collective farm s, the nu m b er o f w orking-age m en (1 6 -5 9 years old) d ro p p ed by 12.4 m illion betw een 1940 an d 1944, leaving a sexual im balance o f four w om en o f w orking age for every m a n .10 In B elorussian kolkhozy in 1945, there w ere alm ost six w om en o f w orking age for every m a n .11 A m ong civilian wage earners in industry, agriculture, a n d o th er sectors o f the national econom y, the nu m b er o f m en d ro p p ed by 8 m illion betw een 1940 an d 1945, a n d the p ro p o rtio n al share from 61 to 44 p ercen t.12 Previously unem ployed w om en, adolescents, invalids, a n d the elderly were draw n in to em ploym ent to replace the m en. S trict labor discipline w as characteristic o f th e w artim e period, as was labor conscription (tru d o va ia m o b iliza tsiia ). By a law o f 26 June 1940, all w orkers w ere p ro h ib ited from leaving th e ir jo b s w ithout the perm ission o f th eir em ployers, violations being punishable by im p riso n m en t o f two to four m onths. A fter the outb reak o f war, the defense in d u stry a n d tran sp o rt w orkers w ere p u t u n d er m ilitary discipline, w ith p u n ish m en t o f five to eight y e a r s im p riso n m en t for un au th o rized d ep a rtu re from the jo b .13 Boys a n d girls in the 14-17 age group were liable to com pulsory d raft in to labor reserve schools, after w hich they were supposed to w ork at assigned jo b s for a period o f four years.14 U rb a n adults becam e liable for labor conscription to ind u stry a n d constructio n projects in 1942, a n d a decree o f the sam e year authorized tem p o rary conscription o f u rb an adults a n d schoolchildren to help w ith agricultural w ork.15 B ut the rural p o pulation w as also subject to labor conscription: in the years 1942-1944, 1.4 m illion rural dw ellers were drafted, m ainly for in d u strial w ork in the sam e region.16 Altogether, 7.6 m illion persons were conscripted for w ork in industry, construction, forestry, an d agriculture in 1943.17 Ju st before the war, as a result o f the N azi-Soviet pact o f 1939, the Soviet U nion acquired new te rrito ry in the w est by occupying a n d incor­ porating eastern P oland (divided betw een the U k ra in ia n an d Belorussian Republics); p a rt o f R o m an ia (M oldavia); a n d the th ree Baltic states, L ith ­ uania, L atvia a n d E stonia. A bout 20 m illion people were thereby ad ded to the Soviet p o p u latio n ;18 an d in the sh o rt p erio d before G erm a n occupation o f the w hole area in 1941, th e S oviet au th o rities to o k the first steps tow ards

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S ovietization— land reform , nationalization o f in d u stry a n d trade, a n d the arrest and deportation to d istan t p arts o f the Soviet U nion o f m any local bourgeois nationalists. Poland suffered m ost from the repression: an estim ated 880,000 o f its form er citizens were d ep o rted to special settlem ents an d labor cam ps in 1940-1941 (though it w as also m ore fo rtu n ate th a n th e o th er countries in that, by special agreem ent w ith the P olish governm ent in exile, h alf the Poles were released before the end o f the w ar).19

Population Transfers, Resettlement and Sovietization Policies Transfers o f large ethnic populations, by decision o f the Soviet governm ent or as a result o f agreem ents betw een the Soviet U nion a n d foreign states, were characteristic o f the 1940s (before, durin g a n d after th e war). T hey deserve particular attention in any study o f the im pact o f the Second W orld W ar on Soviet society an d the Soviet regim e because th is w as a form o f social engineering th at the regim e had not practised on any significant scale before 1939. Its introduction was associated w ith bro ad er changes in S oviet policy tow ards the non-R ussian Soviet popu latio n in the late Stalin p erio d the significance o f w hich has yet to be adequately assessed by histo rian s. T his was a period o f unprecedented suspicion, repression, a n d arb itra ry handling o f non-R ussian n ationalities by the Soviet regime. The first ethnic population transfers took place in the perio d from 1939 to 1941, probably not on Soviet initiative. By the term s o f the N azi-Soviet pact, tens o f thousands o f Baltic G erm an s were rep atriated to G erm any, and m ore than 100,000 G erm an s living in Soviet-controlled Polish te rrito ry were m oved into the areas o f P oland occupied by the G erm ans. In retu rn , the Soviet U nion acquired about 50,000 U k rain ian s, R ussians, Belorussians, and L ithuanians who were tran sferred from G erm an-controlled te rrito ry in 1940-1941.20 By a sim ilar p o pulation exchange w ith F in lan d in 1940, after the W inter War, 415,000 in h ab itan ts o f the K arelian provinces ca p tu red by the Soviet U nion were tran sferred to F in n ish te rrito ry .21 A lthough these transactions were not S oviet-inspired, a n d in the case o f the G erm an exchange were clearly related to the N azi d riv e to reu n ite the G erm an Volk, they provided the Soviet regim e w ith a precedent for u p ro o tin g whole ethnic groups. T he idea evidently to o k hold since after the o u tb reak o f w ar the Soviet regim e carried o u t op eratio n s o f a sim ilar k in d involving Soviet ethnic m inorities. T he first such operation, form ally prophylactic b u t actually punitive in nature, was the rem oval o f the entire G erm a n p o p u latio n o f the Volga region (about 400,000 people, according to th e 1939 census) and its resettlem ent in Siberia a n d C entral A sia in th e fall o f 1941.22 T h is was followed in 1943-1944 by the forcible d ep o rta tio n o f the C rim ean T atars and five sm all nationalities from the N o rth ern C aucasus (C hechens, Ingushi, K arachai, Balkars an d K alm yks), a total o f ab o u t a m illion people w ho were resettled in K azakhstan a n d C entral A sia.23 T hese peoples had lived

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in areas th a t cam e u n d er G erm a n occupation, an d th e stated reason for th eir d ep o rtatio n w as th a t they were collectively guilty o f collaboration w ith th e G erm ans. T he postw ar settlem ent in E urope involved large-scale p o p u latio n transfers in w hich the Soviet U nion p articipated. T hese were necessitated by the existence o f m illions o f displaced persons an d by the reco n stitu tio n o f n ations w ith new borders. In th is settlem ent, the Allies were guided by the principle th a t ethnic hom ogeneity w ith in a given area was desirable, because heterogeneity h ad been the cause o f so m uch recent conflict. As in the im m ediate prew ar period, the Soviet U nion w as a p articip a n t rath e r th a n a n in itiato r o f the postw ar policies o f p o p u latio n transfer. B ut its p articip atio n cannot be dissociated from th e em ergence o f coercive russification tendencies, especially in the w estern te rrito rie s o f the Soviet U nion in the late Stalin period. T he m ajor postw ar popu latio n exchange involving the Soviet U nion was w ith Poland, a co untry th at w as newly reco n stitu ted u n d er Soviet auspices, w ith the loss o f its form er eastern provinces to the S oviet U nion an d com pensatory gains in the w est a t the expense o f G erm any. By SovietP olish agreem ents o f 1944 a n d 1945, ethnic Poles a n d Jews (but not other nationalities) w ho had been P olish citizens before 17 Septem ber 1939 an d w ho resided in the eastern provinces th a t were now incorporated in to the S oviet U nion, had the optio n o f m oving from the Soviet U nion to P oland. Conversely, U k rain ian s, R ussians, B elorussians a n d L ith u an ian s (but not Jews) living in P oland h ad the op tio n o f m oving to the Soviet U nion.24 M ore th a n h a lf a m illion U krain ian s, R ussians, Belorussians, an d L ithuanians actually m oved from P olan d to the Soviet U nion u n d er this agreem ent— probably involuntarily in m any cases, since they evidently co n stitu ted the great m ajo rity o f the p o pulatio n eligible for transfer. Two m illion Poles, or a b o u t h a lf those eligible for transfer, m ade the jo urney in the opposite d irectio n .25 In addition, a su b stan tial group o f Jews got out o f the Soviet U nion v ia the Polish-Soviet exchange though a high p ro p o rtio n o f them subsequently left P oland for Palestine a n d o th e r destin atio n s.26 In resettling the transferees, Soviet au th o rities show ed m ore anxiety ab o u t the security o f b order areas th a n a b o u t ethnic homogeneity. T he incom ing U k rain ian s an d B elorussians were not settled in the border districts o f the w estern U k rain e an d w estern Belorussia from w hich the Poles had been repatriated. Instead, m ost o f th em w ere settled in the southern U kraine, while R ussians an d U k rain ia n s w ho h ad form erly resided in S iberia an d K azakhstan w ere brought in to rebuild the p o p u latio n o f the b o rd er d istricts.27 W estern U k rain ian tow ns like Borisov, denuded o f skilled w orkers an d specialists by w ar an d popu latio n exchanges, were sent cadres from R ussia a n d A zerbaidzhan, an d th is k in d o f organized m ixing a n d reshuffling o f n ationalities seem ed to be typical o f p ostw ar policy.28 D espite Belorussia’s heavy w artim e population losses a n d labor shortage, m any Belorussian p easants were sent to work in in d u stry a n d co nstruction in K arelia, Altai, Siberia, an d the F ar E ast.29 According to H arriso n Salisbury, Jews d eported

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from central an d w estern regions o f th e S oviet U n io n d u rin g the “ anticos­ m opolitan” cam paign o f the late 1940s were not sent to B irobidzhan, the Jewish autonom ous region in the F ar East, b u t to Y akutia. B ut w hen Salisbury visited B irobidzhan in 1954, he found a large contingent o f C rim ean T atars who had been resettled there after th e ir w artim e d ep o rta tio n and who were still not p erm itted to retu rn to th eir h o m elan d .30 T he Baltic states an d o th er newly acquired te rrito rie s w ere subjected to heavy R ussification in the postw ar period. Estonia, w ith a p rew ar p o p u latio n o f not m uch over a m illion, lost m any o f h er ow n nationals through deportation and received in retu rn an influx o f 180,000 non-E stonians, m ainly R ussians, in the years from 1945 to 1949.31 T he sam e hap p en ed in L atvia, where R ussians rose from 12 percent o f th e p o p u latio n in 1935 to 27 percent in 1959.32 In an allegedly v o lu n tary program o f “ organized resettlem ent” , h alf a m illion peasants from overcrow ded regions o f E u ro p ean R ussia were m oved to the bo rd er areas o f K alin in g rad (form erly K önigsberg an d recently acquired from G erm any), S akhalin (the so u th ern h a lf o f w hich had ju st been acquired from Japan), Eastern Siberia, th e F ar East, a n d elsewhere.33 T he russification elem ent in the program w as som etim es overt: “ Slavs are again settling on this ancestral Slavic soil,” w rote Iz v e siiia in D ecem ber 1946, describing the trek o f R ussian a n d B elorussian kolkhozniks w ith “ their livestock, poultry, farm im plem ents, a n d seeds” to K alin in g rad .34 The newly acquired territo rie s— the Baltic states, w estern U kraine, w estern Belorussia, an d p a rt o f M oldavia— h ad to be “ S ovietized” as well as “ Russified” after the war, continuing the process begun in 1940-1941 an d in terru p ted by G erm an occupation. “ S ovietization” m e an t n ationalizing industry an d trade, expropriating the old bourgeoisie, in tim id a tin g th e local intelligentsia, creating new ad m in istra tiv e cadres an d , finally, collectivizing peasant agriculture. Reaching back to the experience o f the S oviet R u ssian past, the authorities deported large num bers o f “ class enem ies” a n d created tem porary “ Sovietizing” in stitu tio n s like rabfaks, w hose p u rp o se w as to bring workers an d peasants into higher education a n d th u s tran sfo rm the old elites35 who were no longer to be found in the old te rrito rie s o f th e Soviet U nion. In the spring o f 1949, an all-out collectivization d riv e w as launched in the newly acquired te rrito rie s.36 T h is closely followed the m odel o f its R ussian precursor (the collectivization d riv e o f th e w in ter o f 1929-1930) an d included expropriation o f kulaks a n d th eir d ep o rta tio n to S iberia a n d other distan t parts. As in the earlier R u ssian case, collectivization w as a m ajor social upheaval, accom panied by large-scale m igration o f peasants from countryside to tow n. In Estonia, the ru ral share o f to ta l p o p u latio n d ropped from 53 percent at the beginning o f 1950 to 46 p ercen t only four years later, representing an out-m igration from the countryside o f over 50,000 peasants.37

Repatriation and Demobilization By January 1953, 5.5 m illion Soviet citizens were rep a triate d to th e Soviet U nion, the m ajority o f them retu rn in g w ith in a year o f th e e n d o f the

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w ar.38 M ost o f the repatriates w ere form er S oviet PO W s39 a n d civilians from occupied Soviet territo rie s who h ad been tran sp o rte d to th e Reich as foreign laborers during the w ar40 although som e had probably left the Soviet U nion voluntarily d u ring the G erm a n arm y ’s retreat. R ep atriatio n w as a tricky qu estio n from everybody’s p o in t o f view. As far as the Soviet au thorities were concerned, Soviet soldiers a n d officers w ho had allow ed them selves to be cap tu red were a suspect group: on th e one hand, they should have preferred d eath to th e dishonor o f falling into enem y hands;41 on the o th er hand, there w as th e possibility th a t they h ad been collaborators (like the m illion o r m ore S oviet POW s who h ad served w ith th e W ehrm acht’s O sttru ppen o r jo in e d th e Vlasov A rm y)42 o r been recruited as spies d u ring th eir p erio d o f in tern m en t. T he sam e suspicion attached to the O sta rb e ite r group (som e o f w hom had volunteered to go a n d w ork in G erm any), an d indeed to all Soviet citizens o th er th an those on active service w ith the R ed A rm y w ho found them selves in E urope at the en d o f the war. A t Y alta the Allies had obliged them selves to rep atriate all Soviet soldiers a n d civilians from E urope, an d betw een M ay a n d Septem ber 1945 they d id so conscientiously, despite growing uneasiness as it becam e clear to the A llied personnel directly involved th a t m an y o f th e ir charges d id not w ant to be repatriated. T he effort slackened after Septem ber, and, in the end, a n estim ated h a lf m illion Soviet displaced persons rem ained in the W est.43 However, over 2 m illion Soviet citizens w ere rep atriated from W estern occupation zones to the Soviet U nion in 1945.44 T here were m any accounts o f the strange reception the repatriates received as they crossed the b order in to the Soviet U nion— “ first w elcom ed at the dock w ith a brass band,” as an A m erican d ip lo m at rep o rted in M urm ansk, “ a n d then m arched off u n d er heavy arm ed guard to an unknow n desti­ nation.” 45 T he repatriates w ere interrogated on a rriv al by the N K G B ’s V etting an d Screening C om m issions, w hich sought to establish who were the collaborators an d w ho m ight have been recruited for espionage. P a rt o f the group— how large a p ro p o rtio n is not clear46— received labor cam p sentences, thus passing from one form o f confinem ent to another; a n d the rest either retu rn ed hom e, w ere d rafted back in to the Arm y, o r d rafted for civilian labor.47 D em obilization o f R ed A rm y servicem en w as a sim ilarly m assive o p ­ eration, though less fraught w ith political a n d internal security tensions. T here w ere 11.4 m illion m en in the arm y in M ay 1945.48 Large-scale dem obilization began in July o f th a t year, a n d by S eptem ber alm ost 3.5 m illion soldiers an d officers w ere retu rn in g to civilian life.49 By 1948, the to tal num ber o f dem obilized Soviet soldiers h ad reached 8.5 m illion50— an enorm ous influx for the civ ilian econom y to absorb. In co n trast to the rep atriatio n operation, dem obilization was a fairly loosely organized process. Initially, those discharged w ere given th eir papers on th e spot an d allowed to go w here they pleased. T he practice w as reportedly changed later so th at soldiers had to pick u p th eir p ap ers— necessary d ocum ents for reentry into civilian life— at the place w here they had been in ducted into the service.51

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T he purpose o f this policy was to ensure th a t peasan t soldiers retu rn ed to the kolkhoz after dem obilization. B ut there were still m any ways o f evading th is requirem ent. Since lab o r shortages were endem ic im m ediately after th e war, local au th o rities a n d enterprises did everything possible to encourage soldiers statio n ed in the area to rem ain after dem obilization, regardless o f th eir place o f induction. In A zerbaidzhan, for exam ple, soldiers stationed th ere at the en d o f th e w ar were w ooed w ith concerts, m ovies, a n d m eetings w ith w orkers from local plants and oilfields, an d lectures “ o n the econom y o f th e republic a n d its prospects for developm ent” ; a n d as a result, 50,000 settled in Baku after dem obilization.52 Soviet histo rian s estim ate— there are not exact statistics, underlining the spontaneous aspect o f the process— th a t a b o u t h a lf o f all dem obilized soldiers found w ork in the tow ns after the war, w hile h a lf w ent to the countryside.53 B ut this indicates a significant dem ographic shift: before the war, not h alf b u t tw o-thirds o f the S oviet p o p u latio n w as rural, a n d presum ably the sam e applied to the co h o rt conscripted for m ilita ry service. Clearly, large num bers o f peasant soldiers chose not to retu rn to th e ir form er hom es and occupations after the war, a n d th e controls w ere not strict enough to force them back. W hile it is clear th at veterans had m an y inform al privileges in th e poverty-stricken society o f the im m ediate p ostw ar period, th e ir trea tm e n t in the Soviet U nion was not generous by com parison w ith o th er A llied countries. O n dem obilization, veterans were en titled to the cost o f th e ir tran sp o rt home; food for the journey; a set o f clothes; a p air o f shoes; a n d a lum p sum calculated on the basis o f arm y pay a n d length o f service (not, however, a significant am ou n t except for officers).54 T here w as no S oviet equivalent o f the G .I. Bill in the U n ited States, encouraging ex-soldiers to continue their education.55 Soviet adm issions b o ard s d id favor veteran s in practice, b u t those who w ent to college after th e w ar h ad to live on th e sam e low stipends as o ther students. E m ploym ent w as su p posed to be arranged by the veterans’ local soviets, “ taking in to co n sid eratio n th e ir experience an d specialties acquired in the R ed Arm y, b u t no t in p o sitio n s lower th an those they held before they jo in e d the A rm y” .56 For m any soldiers, however, arm y service in W orld W ar II tu rn e d ou t to be a channel o f upw ard mobility. T h is w as tru e o f peasants w ho en tered the urban labor force after dem obilization. It w as also tru e o f soldiers w ho rose to be noncom m issioned officers (N C O s) a n d officers d u rin g the war, jo in ed the C om m unist party, a n d m oved in to ad m in istra tiv e a n d m anagerial positions after the war. ^ft should be rem em bered th a t at th e en d o f the w ar h a lf the~ C om m unist' p arty w as in th e arm e d forces. A q u a rte r o f all soldiers (m ore th an 3 m illion) belonged to the P arty ,57 m ost h aving jo in e d during the war. T he d o m in a n t prew ar p attern o f elite rec ru itm en t— largescale adm ission o f w orkers into the P arty a n d system atic p ro m o tio n o f lower-class C om m unists into ad m in istra tiv e jo b s— h ad begun to lose favor w ith the political leadership before the w ar a n d w as d ro p p ed altogether in the 1940s.58 W hat took its place in th e im m ed iate p ostw ar p erio d w as th e

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ap p o in tm en t o f veterans w ho had jo in e d the P arty d u rin g the w ar to positions o f civilian leadership.59 Aggregate figures on th is process are not available, b u t a good deal o f fragm entary d ata is p rovid ed by Soviet historians. By the en d o f 1946, alm ost 30,000 dem obilized C o m m u n ists h ad been ap p o in ted to leading w ork in the U k rain ian oblasts o f K harkov, O dessa, Stalino, a n d P oltava.60 O f 22,000 dem obilized soldiers sta rtin g work in enterprises o f the M in istry o f F errous M etallurgy in 1946, alm ost 7,000 w ent in to m anagerial-technical jobs, w here they co n stitu ted 15 percent o f the whole m anagerial-technical co h o rt.61 Very large num bers o f veterans from peasant backgrounds becam e kolkhoz chairm en after the war. In the K rasn o d ar oblast alone, 1720 dem obilized soldiers were elected chairpersons o f kolkhozy in 1946.62

Urban Life and Labor Recruitment after the War Life in the tow ns w as even h ard er in the postw ar years th a n it had been in the 1930s. T he overw helm ing problem was th e shortage a n d low quality o f housing. O vercrow ding, including m ultiple-fam ily occupancy o f com m unal (apartm ents not designed for the purpose, had been characteristic o f R ussian jurban housing since the great p easant m igration to the tow ns in the F irst Five-Year Plan. B ut d uring the war, m ore th a n 50 percent o f u rb an living espace in the te rrito ry occupied by the G erm an s w as dam aged or destroyed;63 ijand housing in oth er p arts o f the Soviet U nion d eteriorated because o f lack b f upkeep an d the pressures o f accom m odating large num bers o f evacuees. In M oscow at the en d o f th e war, for exam ple, 90 percent o f central heating a n d 48 percent o f w ater an d sewage system s were o u t o f com m ission, an d urgent repairs were needed on 80 percent o f roofs, 60 percent o f electrical E quipm ent, a n d 54 percent o f gas eq u ip m en t.64 U rb a n population grew rapidly after the w ar (by 1950 the num ber o f u rb an dw ellers was m ore th a n 6 m illion above the 1940 level),65 an d housing construction an d rep air d id n o t keep pace w ith it. P er capita u rb an living space d ro p p ed from 4.09 square m eters in 1940— already below any ac­ ceptable m in im u m — to 3.98 square m eters in 1950.66 In K em erovo (Siberia), the o b k o m rep o rted in 1946 th a t a substantial p ro p o rtio n o f w orkers “ still lived in hostels w ith tw o tiers o f bunks, an d the real average norm o f living space for one in h a b ita n t does not exceed tw o square m eters” .67 In Moscow, too, hun d red s o f thousands o f w orkers lived in hostels, the great m ajority o f w hich were actually barrack s o r im provised accom m odations in basem ents, factory prem ises, an d unfinished buildings.68 M inistries a n d enterprises in Belorussia, w here w artim e dam age to tow ns had been particularly severe, b u ilt barrack-type housing for th eir w orkers in the first postw ar years, an d it w as not until 1949 th at th is form o f housing construction becam e less co m m on.69 R ationing o f food an d m anufactured goods was introduced in the su m m er o f 1941 an d rem ained in force u n til 1947. O f course it was no novelty for the Soviet u rb an populatio n since the rationing im posed durin g the F irst

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Five-Year Plan had been lifted only in 1935. In 1942-1943, b read w as often the only rationed com m odity d istrib u ted , a n d the b read ratio n in M oscow at the end o f 1943 w as 300-650 gram s p er day according to th e ratio n in g category.70 However, as in earlier periods o f stringency, m ost wage earners could get a hot m eal, albeit o f low quality, at th eir place o f w ork. In 1944, “ com m ercial stores,” selling food a n d o th er goods a t very high prices, w ere revived, b u t those were far beyond the m eans o f the average wage earner. Real wages were at a very low level in the first po stw ar years. Because o f the drought an d harvest failure o f 1946, ratio n in g w as not lifted on schedule and food shortages becam e m ore severe. Prices on ratio n ed goods were approxim ately tripled in Septem ber 1946.71 C onsequently, the fact th a t com m ercial prices were sim ultaneously low ered d id not benefit th e average wage earner. T he lifting o f rationing in 1947 w as accom panied by a currency reform designed to take excess cash o u t o f circulation.72 T h is w as p rim arily aim ed at urban speculators a n d peasants w ho h ad am assed savings d u rin g the w ar by selling produce at high prices on th e free m arket, b u t it w as also intended to encourage the largest possible n u m b er o f u rb an dw ellers to rem ain or becom e wage earners. O nly in 1949, w ith the first o f th ree successive rounds o f price cuts, d id the econom ic situ atio n o f the u rb an population begin to im prove. D uring the war, the work force w as bo o sted by the presence o f “ te m p o rary ” workers— w om en who had not previously w orked, pensioners, invalids, a n d adolescents. It was feared th a t w hen the w ar ended, large num bers o f these workers w ould w ithdraw from the labor force despite the co n tin u ed critical need for labor. A lthough adolescents did, in fact, w ithdraw ,73 p rim a rily to continue their education, it seem s th a t m any o f the o th e r te m p o rary w orkers rem ained in the work force after the war. T h is w as probably because food prices were so high th at fam ilies could not afford nonw orking m em bers. T here m ay have been some w ithdraw al from the w ork force by u rb an w om en in 1945-1946, b u t as Table 8.1 suggests, th is w as no t significant over the longer term (even allowing for the increase associated w ith p easan t wom en com ing into the labor force). In Moscow, for exam ple, the p ro p o rtio n o f wom en am ong blue- an d w hite-collar w orkers d ro p p ed betw een Ja n u ary 1945 and M arch 1947, b u t th e actual n u m b er increased slightly.74 T h e num ber o f pensioners em ployed in the national econom y also increased— from 400,000 in 1945 to 484,000 in 194675— reflecting n o t only th e high price o f food b u t also the inadequacy o f pensions. T he tw elve-m illion person increase in the size o f the em ployed lab o r force between 1945 an d 1950 (Table 8.1) w as u n m atch ed in Soviet h isto ry except in the F irst Five-Year Plan period. D em obilized v eteran s m u st have provided the largest single recru itm en t source, b u t th e contingent o f new w orkers included repatriates, peasants com ing from th e kolkhozy, graduates o f the labor reserve schools, young u rb an dw ellers en tering em ploym ent, an d labor conscripts. (C onscript an d convict labor will be dealt w ith separately in the next section.) Q uite a large p ro p o rtio n o f the new w orkers, including all the veterans an d m ost o f the u rb an en tran ts to the lab o r force, w ere

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Table 8.1 W age and Salary Earners in the Soviet National Econom y in Millions, with Breakdown by Sex

1940 1945 1950

Average No. for Year

No. of Men

as percent

No. of Women

as percent

33.9 28.6 40.4

20.7 12.7 21.2

61 44 53

13.2 15.9 19.2

39 56 47

Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922-1972 g. lubileinyi statlsticheskii ezhegodnik, 345, 348.

h ired individually by the given enterprises from the labor m arket. B ut there were also m echanism s o f organized recru itm en t— orgnabor, the labor reserve system , an d labor conscriptio n — all o f w hich to o k recruits from the kolkhozy (for the m ost p art) a n d tra n sp o rte d th em to assigned em ploym ent, often in d istan t regions o f the country. O rgn abor (organized recruitm ent) was a term from the 1930s th at was usually (that is, in the usage th a t w as prevalent during the 1930s an d the postw ar Stalin period) applied to recru itm en t o f labor from the kolkhozy for w ork u n d er contract w ith specific enterprises. T he organizing agent in the postw ar period w as the M in istry o f L abor Reserves (created in 1947); a n d o rg n a b o r w as used m ainly to provide unskilled labor for high priority sectors o f heavy in d u stry in areas o f the country w here labor was scarce. T hus, as T ables 8.2 an d 8.3 suggest, o rgn abor recruits were m uch m ore likely to be sent to Siberian coal m ines th an to the m ore sophisticated an d accessibly located enterprises o f th e heavy m achine-building industry. In 1948, 73.6 percent o f o rgn abor recruits w ent to the north, the U rals, an d S iberia.76 K olkhozniki signed 71 percent o f orgn abor contracts in 1950.77 T he org n a b o r share in to tal labor recru itm en t durin g the F o u rth FiveYear P lan (1946-1950) can n o t be d eterm in ed w ith precision. O ne set o f figures puts the nu m b er o f org n a b o r recruits for th is p eriod at 3.8 m illion,78 an other at 2.4 m illion.79 T h is w ould m ean th at orgn abor provided a fifth to a th ird o f all labor recru ited d u rin g the F o u rth Five-Year plan (a total o f 11.6 m illion80), b u t the u p p er estim ate— a n d perhaps even th e lower one— is too high, judging from th e breakdow ns for p articu la r industries a n d regions o f w hich Tables 8.2 a n d 8.3 provide a sam ple. If in the late 1940s, as in the 1950s,81 it w as not u ncom m on for one in d iv id u al to sign a succession o f o rgn abor contracts, th is w ould explain why the figures are exaggerated. T he system o f labor reserve schools, created in 1940 (see p. 131) an d generally regarded as a w artim e expedient, rem ained in active operation after the war. 1948 w as the peak year;82 b u t w hile the schools’ o u tp u t d ro p p ed rapidly in the early 1950s, it was not until 1959 th a t the system w as abolished an d the schools becam e o rd in ary technical schools.83 In the p ostw ar period students w ere still being d rafted into labor reserve schools

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Table 8.2 Labor Recruitment S ou rces for Heavy Machine-Building Enterprises of the USSR, 1946-1949

Number of new workers Percentage recruited from Individual hiring Labor Reserve Schools Orgnabor Transfer from other enterprises Other sources

1946

1947

1949

22,344

26,631

27,803

66.1 3.5

49.5 27.4 0.6 1.2 21.3

55.5 23.3 1.6 7.8 7.8

_

1.8 28.4

Source: A. V. Smirnov, “Changes in the Number and Composition of Workers of the Heavy Machine-Building Industry in the USSR in the Years of the Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950),“ in Izmeneniia v chislennosti i sostave sovetskogo rabochego klassa. Sbornik statei, 235.

rather than volunteering. In co n trast to the o rg n a b o r draft, w hich one m em oir o f the period describes as often w elcom ed by the kolkhozniki (though not by the kolkhoz ad m in istratio n ), the labor reserve d raft w as evidently unpopular: “ T he boys disliked the schools because living co n d itio n s there were bad and because they had to do very h ard work; to avoid being drafted into the schools, boys w ould ru n away from the villages to hide in the cities, where they frequently becam e delinquents.” 84 B ut the labor reserve schools were conduits to m ore skilled em ploym ent th a n orgnabor, as well as supplying different branches o f in d u stry (see T able 8.2 a n d 8.3). D u rin g the F ourth Five-Year Plan period, 3.6 m illion stu d en ts are said to have passed through the schools,85 thereby am ounting to over 30 percent o f all labor recruitm ent. T he share o f free hiring in labor recru itm en t obviously v aried enorm ously according to circum stances. L ooking at Table 8.2, for exam ple, we can see th at the heavy m achine-building in d u stry w as doing a lot o f in d iv id u al hiring in 1946 as the veterans retu rn ed from the war, b u t less in 1947 a n d 1949 w hen there were fewer veterans a n d m ore labor reserve graduates. However, K uzbass Coal, w ith its rem ote location a n d heavy dependence on conscript and other involuntary labor, d id relatively little in d iv id u al hiring. All in all, assum ing th a t 5 o r 6 m illion new w orkers cam e in to the work force v ia orgn abor an d the labor reserve schools d u rin g th e F o u rth Five-Year Plan an d th at there w as not a high rate o f renew al w ith in th e conscript labor contingent, it seem s likely th a t a b it less th a n h a lf o f th e total labor recruitm ent in th is p erio d w as done by in d iv id u al h irin g on the labor m arket. T he “ o th er” category in Table 8.2 is likely to cover th e labor o f convicts or deportees. However, a m uch higher figure, 79 percent, is q u o te d for th e p ro p o rtio n o f all jo b openings in 1950 th a t were filled by in d iv id u al h irin g .86 T h is reflected an increase in in d iv id u al h iring a t th e en d o f the F o u rth FiveYear Plan period. B ut it w as also a p roduct o f th a t old Soviet b ê te noire.

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Table 8.3 Com position of Labor Force of K uzbass Coal Combine (Siberia), with Breakdown by S ou rces of Recruitment (percentage)

Cadre (prewar) workers Hired by enterprises Labor reserve schools Orgnabor Evacuees Conscripts (mobilizovannye) Other

1 Dec. 1945

1 May 1946

1 Oct. 1947

21.4 6.1 5.3

19.0 9.0 5.5 9.7 2.3 18.3 36.2

17.2 23.1 7.8 11.9 1.1 7.8 31.1

—

2.8 23.2 41.2

Source: Q. A. Dokuchaev, Rabochii klass Sibiri i Dal'nego Vostoka v poslevoennye gody (1946-1950), 66.

high labor turnover, for we m ust assum e th a t am ong the alm ost 3 m illion people who found them selves new jo b s in 1950, a p ro p o rtio n h ad earlier been assigned o th er jo b s (that they had subsequently quit) as labor reserve school graduates or org n a b o r recruits. D espite the law o f 26 June 1940, b in d in g w orkers to th eir jo b s— w hich stayed on the books, along w ith o ther d isciplinary m easures o f th e im m ediate prew ar a n d early w artim e period, u n til 1956 (although the penal stip u latio n s were quietly d ro p p ed in 195187)— people who to o k new jo b s were not necessarily new workers. In 1951, it w as estim ated th a t m ore th a n 40 percent o f newly recruited w orkers were either transferring from o th er jo b s o r retu rn in g to th eir original w ork place after an absence.88 T he m ain causes o f labor turnover in the postw ar period were poor living an d housing conditions. F rom Jan u ary to M ay 1946, according to d ata o f the M in istry o f F errous M etallurgy, 32,000-33,000 w orkers were taken on an d 62,700 left, 10,000 o f them w ithout perm ission from the authorities. In the year from S eptem ber 1947 to Septem ber 1948, 289,300 w orkers left the m ines o f the D onetsk a n d M oscow basins, a q u a rte r o f th em w ithout perm ission.89 A t the G lukhovo C o tto n C om bine in N oginsk alm ost h a lf the w orkers hired in 1946 left in the sam e year.90 O u t o f 13,650 graduates o f labor reserve schools sent to B elorussian in d u strial enterprises in 1947 only 7459 were still a t th e ir jo b s on 1 Jan u ary 1948, a n d 6191 had d ep arted for unknow n d estin atio n s because o f bad housing an d problem s o f food supply.91

Convict and Conscript Labor A t the end o f the w ar the Soviet U nion had tw o different types o f convict labor at its disposal: its own indigenous convicts (together w ith foreigners arrested in the Soviet U nion a n d sent to labor cam ps) an d G erm an , Japanese, a n d o th er prisoners o f w ar cap tu red d u rin g W orld W ar II. In both cases the question o f num bers seem s intractable. E stim ates o f the pop u latio n o f

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Soviet labor cam ps in the postw ar p erio d range from 3 -5 m illion to 12-15 m illion92 (the higher estim ates evidently including Axis PO W s, th e low er ones not), b u t they are all qu ite speculative. T he estim ates d ep e n d heavily on extrapolations from d ata on the im m ed iate prew ar p eriod, alm o st ignoring the specific postw ar situation. Inform ation on the num ber o f enem y PO W s in Soviet h a n d s after the w ar is also highly unsatisfactory. Soviet w artim e co m m u n iq u és claim ed th at 3.7 m illion G erm an m ilitary prisoners had been tak en ,93 b u t M olotov stated in 1947 th at after the retu rn o f a m illion G erm a n PO W s only 890,532 rem ained in Soviet hands.94 T he first figure is probably exaggerated, w hereas the second is likely to be an u n d erestim ate since M olotov w as resp o n d in g to criticism o f the Soviet U nion for not releasing its p risoners o f war. In addition to the G erm ans, som e h u n d red s o f th o u san d s o f Japanese, H u n ­ garian, R om anian, an d oth er POW s were in Soviet h an d s after the war. Although the order o f m agnitude m ay be disp u ted , som e statem ents ab o u t the convict population in the p ostw ar S oviet U nion can be m ade w ith reasonable confidence. First, the n um ber o f S oviet convicts (excluding enem y POW s) m ust surely have been greater in 1945-1946 th a n it h ad been in 1939. It had been swollen by waves o f arrests associated p articu larly w ith te rrito rial changes an d war: the occupation a n d in itial Sovietization o f eastern Poland an d the Baltic states in 1939-1941, the liberation o f Soviet territories from G erm an occupation a n d th e p u n ish m en t o f collaborators, anti-Soviet partisans, an d b an d its in the U kraine, Belorussia, a n d elsew here; renewed Sovietization in the Baltic states, M oldavia, w estern B elorussia a n d the w estern U kraine; a n d the retu rn o f m illions o f S oviet PO W s a n d repatriates whose loyalty w as regarded as suspect. Second, convict an d PO W labor in the im m ed iate p ostw ar p erio d w as useful to the Soviet U nion— m uch m ore useful a n d central to th e econom y th an it had been in the prew ar period. It w as th e m ost extrem e form o f drafting labor to areas o f acute need as for exam ple, in th e rebuilding o f cities an d the repair o f roads, bridges, a n d railro ad s in te rrito rie s heavily dam aged u nder the G erm an occupation, not to m en tio n the “ tra d itio n a l” forced-labor sphere o f m ining an d lum bering in rem ote p a rts o f th e S oviet U nion. T he political leaders m ay have perceived forced lab o r as essential to postw ar econom ic reconstruction— w hatever th e m erits o f th is ju d g m e n t— in view o f w artim e population losses a n d th e difficulties o f m obilizing free labor an d keeping it on the jo b w hen living co n d itio n s were bad. By the beginning o f the 1950s, however, the econom ic arg u m en t in favor o f m aintaining such a large convict p o pulation h ad becom e m uch less plausible. T he daunting econom ic situ atio n o f the early po stw ar years h ad im proved, an d the m ost urgent a n d basic tasks o f po stw ar econom ic reconstruction were done. In the sphere o f nonconvict labor, co n scrip tio n o f various kinds w as giving way to unorganized recruitm ent. N evertheless, the prisoners an d POW s w ere not released, a n d som e o f the projects on w hich they were used in the early 1950s— the V olga-D on C anal a n d the construction o f the new M oscow U niversity b u ild in g on L enin H ills95— had a grandiose rath er than strictly practical quality.

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F rom the swift dism antlin g o f th e convict labor em pire following Stalin’s death, it m ust be surm ised th a t Stalin h im self was the roadblock, either because he w as generally blocking policy change o r because he h ad developed a n attach m en t to the idea o f forced labor. Release o f political p risoners— those arrested in the prew ar purges, as well as w artim e a n d postw ar internees— began on a sm all scale in 1953. Soviet citizens accused o f collaboration w ith G erm an occupation forces w ere am n estied in 1955, an d th e Soviet PO W s an d repatriates w ho h ad been arrested on th e ir retu rn to the Soviet U nion w ere released not long afterw ards. A n unofficial Soviet estim ate, w hich u n fortunately can n o t be confirm ed o r docum ented in any way, p u ts the n um ber o f prisoners released in 1956-1957 at 7 -8 m illion, o u t o f an estim ated to tal labor-cam p p o p u latio n o f 12-13 m illion.96 G erm an POW s, w hom the S oviet au th o rities h ad refused to repatriate earlier on the grounds they were w ar crim inals, were also released after Stalin’s death: ab o u t 10,000 retu rn ed to W est a n d E ast G erm an y in 1953-1954, a n d an o th er 10,000 w ere rep a triate d following the B ulganin-A denauer talks in 1955.97 T his, o f course, w as only a sm all fraction o f the num ber o f G erm an soldiers believed to have been taken priso n er by the Soviet U nion. If, as seem s to be generally thought, the Soviets really d id retu rn alm ost all o f the su rv iv in g G erm a n PO W s in 1955, the im plied m ortality rate is staggering. C onscript labor in the postw ar p eriod is a less fam iliar a n d less d ram atic topic th a n convict labor. B ut the two are linked— functionally, if not in stitu tio n ally — an d the m ore accessible d ata on conscript lab o r should throw light on the b roader phenom enon. L abor conscription (tru dovaia m o b iliza tsiia ) o f the civilian p o p u latio n was introduced durin g the w ar (see above, p. 131), an d in 1943-1944, 2.4 m illion labor conscripts were w orking in in d u stry an d constructio n .98 L abor co nscription w as not a pun ish m en t b u t an obligation com parable to m ilitary service, an d histo rian s have generally treated it as purely a w artim e expedient. It co n tin u ed into the postw ar period, however; and, although m any conscripts were probably ju s t serving o ut term s begun d uring the war, others m ust actually have been conscripted for labor after the w ar ended.99 C o n scrip t labor w as used all over the Soviet U nion in the p eriod betw een 1945 a n d 1948, b u t its share vis-à-vis nondrafted labor w as highest in eastern Siberia a n d the F ar East, rem ote b u t developing areas; in the N o rth ern C aucasus a n d C rim ea, presum ably because o f the d ep o rtatio n s o f nationalities (see above, p. 134); a n d also in M oldavia (m uch o f w hich w as newly acquired territo ry ) w here over h a lf o f all w orkers in 1945 w ere labor conscripts. Betw een 1945 a n d 1948 q u ite large num bers o f labor conscripts were sent to the W estern bo rd erlan d regions: Belorussia, the U kraine, the K arelo-F in n ish R epublic, L atvia, a n d E sto n ia.100 A ccording to the Soviet h isto rian B. I. G vozdev, postw ar labor shortages m ade it necessary to use co n scrip t labor on a surprisingly large scale throughout the Soviet U n io n .101 In his breakdow n o f the in d u strial w ork force (see T able 8.4), conscrip t labor evidently accounts for m ost o f the category “ others” ,102 w hich is notable not only for its size b u t also for the

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fact th at it actually grows in absolute term s betw een 1945 an d 1948. (O th er fragm entary data, such as those cited in T able 8.3, d o not confirm this, b u t G vozdev’s figures are certainly the m ost com prehensive available.) It may be inferred from G vozdev’s d ata th a t labor co n scrip tio n h ad been com pletely phased out by the spring o f 1950.103 B ut th is is only an inference, an d the actual term inal date o f labor co nscription (not counting sh o rt-term drafting o f kolkhozniki for lum bering, road building, etc.) h as still to be established.

Rural Life and Migration from the Kolkhoz T he w ar greatly weakened the m aterial base o f th e kolkhozy (see Table 8.5) . H orses an d m anpow er were taken for m ilitary purposes, a n d th e sow n area contracted. As they retreated from the occupied territo ries, the G erm a n s plundered the kolkhozy o f anim als an d m achinery a n d destroyed buildings. M oreover, a good deal o f kolkhoz p ro p erty found its way in to p riv ate h an d s during the w ar as external supervision slackened. In occupied B elorussia and the U kraine, expropriated kulaks cam e back an d repossessed th e ir old houses, blacksm ith shops, an d m ills.104 Elsewhere, peasants expanded th e ir p rivate plots at the expense o f the kolkhoz, a n d there w ere concealed sales a n d leasing o f lan d .105 P rocurem ent levels were high throughout the war, a n d the average daily paym ent to the individual kolkhoznik for his w orkdays d ro p p ed from 350 gram s o f cereal an d 330 gram s o f potatoes in 1940 to 190 gram s o f cereal a n d 70 gram s o f potatoes in 1945.106 O n the o th er h an d , prices on the kolkhoz m arket were very high, an d m any peasants acq u ired large savings in cash by selling produce from th e ir p riv ate plots. T h e m ost vexing problem for the kolkhozy was the shortage o f m anpow er resulting from w artim e m ilitary conscription. T he w orking-age m en w ere gone, a n d even som e o f the working-age w om en had been conscripted to w ork in in d u stry (see Table 8.6) . T he old and the young h ad to becom e full-tim e w orkers on th e kolkhoz, an d w om en who had norm ally spent m ost o f th e ir tim e on the p riv ate plots had to take the m en’s place cultiv atin g the kolkhoz fields. T he w ar’s end brought m en back to the countryside, b u t in far sm aller num bers th an had departed. T h is w as not only because o f casualties b u t also because m any o f the su rv iv in g peasant soldiers chose not to go hom e after dem obilization, or at least chose not to stay. O f those th a t d id retu rn , m any were invalids and unable to work. A year after th e w ar ended, the ratio o f working-age w om en to m en in all S oviet kolkhozy w as tw o to one (Table 8.6) w hereas on R ussian kolkhozy it w as th ree to o n e.107 T h is m u st surely have been the cause o f m uch bitterness a n d d isap p o in tm en t. In te rrito ry th at had been occupied by the G erm an s, w ar dam age w as still visible on every side, an d agriculture w as often reduced to a p rim itiv e level. M any kolkhozy in R ussia, th e U kraine, a n d B elorussia w ere still using cows as d raft anim als in 1946, a n d others were digging w ith spades in stead

Table 8.4 Breakdown of the Industrial Work Force of the USSR, 1945 and 1948 1 April 1945 Number Percentage Total Workers Employees ITR* Others

9,505,300 6,525,900 487,500 746,200 1,745,700

1 April 1948 Number Percentage

100 69 5 8 18

100 71 5 8 16

11,607,600 8,251,200 559,800 926,700 1,869,900

Engineers and technical personnel Source: B. I. Gvozdev, "Size of the Working Class," 114-16.

Table 8.5 Livestock and Sown Area of Kolkhozy, 1941-1950

1941 1945 1946 1947 1948 1949 1950

Cattle (millions)

Horses (millions)

Sown area (million hectares)

20.1 15.4 15.9 15.8 17.0 20.9 25.4

14.5 6.2 6.5 6.6 6.9 7.9 9.7

117.7« 83.9 84.0 89.2 101.8 111.1 121.0

•1940 figure. Source: Sovetskaia derevnia v pervye poslevoennye gody 1946-1950, 212, 255.

Table 8.8 S ize and Breakdown of the Kolkhoz Population of the USSR (boundaries of 1939), in Millions

Working-age* Men Women Adolescents Outside working-age not fit to work, etc. Total number

1940

1944

1945

1946

35.4 16.9 18.6 7.1

22.0 4.5 17.6 6.4

23.9 6.5 17.4 6.1

25.0 8.2 16.8 5.4

33.3 75.8

34.0 62.4

34.5 64.5

33.1 63.5

•Excluding invalids Source: lu. V. Arutiunian, Sovetskoe krest'ianstvo, 318.

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o f ploughing an d sowing by hand. T here w ere no horses a t all in 120 kolkhozy in the N ovgorod o b last.108 B ut 1946 was also a year o f natu ral disaster. A severe d ro u g h t h it large p arts o f the Soviet U nion— M oldavia, m ost o f the U kraine, p a rts o f the central black-earth region, the lower Volga, an d th e M a ritim e P rovince in the F ar E ast— causing harv est failures in these regions. D espite this, p ro ­ curem ents quotas rem ained high; a n d by d in t o f enorm ous pressure on th e peasants, grain deliveries were actually not m uch low er in 1946 th a n they had been in 1945 (17.5 m illion to n s as against 20 m illio n ).109 B ut th is reduced m uch o f the rural p o pulation to a d esperate co n d itio n because so little was left for the peasants’ own consum ption. As T able 8.6 shows, departures o f working-age peasant w om en an d adolescents w ent up— probably a com bined result o f drafting for in d u stry a n d hunger— a n d the to tal n u m b er o f very old and very young persons in the kolkhoz p o p u latio n fell, suggesting increased m ortality associated w ith fam ine. In the postw ar years, Alec N ove has w ritten, it w as “ as if S talin w as determ ined to m ake the peasants pay for the necessary po stw ar reco n stru c­ tion” .110 C om pulsory state deliveries an d paym ents to th e M achine-T ractor Stations (M TS) am ounted to h a lf o f all kolkhoz grain p ro d u ctio n in 1947 a n d 1948 an d to m ore th an h a lf the kolkhoz p ro d u ctio n o f m ilk a n d m e a t.111 M oreover, prices paid by the state for deliveries w ere n o t only far below m arket prices, they were also way below pro d u ctio n costs, leading som e Soviet scholars to refer to postw ar procurem ents as a tax -in -k in d rath e r th an an equivalent exchange.112 Prices for grain h ad scarcely been raised since the beginning o f the 1930s; in 1950 they covered a b o u t one-seventh o f production costs. M oreover, prices v aried by region, to th e disadvantage o f some o f the regions m ost severely affected by the war. In Belorussia, for example, the state bought pigs at one-tw entieth th e cost o f raising th e m .113 However, there were exceptions to the general p a tte m o f low p ro cu rem en ts prices. C otton, citrus products, a n d tea were the m ain item s for w hich th e state was paying high prices after the war, an d th e resu lt w as a great disparity o f incom e betw een kolkhozy in favored areas like U zb ek istan an d the Caucasus on the one hand, a n d Belorussia on th e o th er (see T able 8.7). Paym ent for work on the kolkhoz w as in k in d (m ainly grain a n d potatoes) as well as in money, b u t the paym ents were well below th e prew ar level, and kolkhozniki were very m uch d ependent on th eir p riv ate plots for subsistence an d money incom e. However, the p riv ate plots were a source o f revenue to the state as well as th e in d iv id u al households in the postw ar years. First, individual households had to m ake com pulsory deliveries o f vegetables, eggs, m ilk, an d so on at below -m arket prices. If a household could not m ake deliveries o u t o f its p riv ate p lo t— for exam ple, if it h ad no cow to produce m ilk— the specified am o u n t o f m ilk h ad to be b orrow ed or bought on the m arket a n d delivered to the state regardless. Second, individual households had to pay th e agricultural tax in ad d itio n to taxes levied on the kolkhoz as a whole. T he agricultural tax w as calculated by assigning a ruble value for each priv ate-p lo t asset— anim als, vegetable garden, fruit trees— and taking a percentage.

Table 8.7 Money Income of Kolkhoz Households by Region, 1945-1950 (In rubles of the given year)

USSR Uzbekistan Caucasus Central black earth region Ukraine Belorussia Source: Sovetskaia derevnia, 288.

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

1,144 4,627 2,308 1,237 619 236

1,112 4,260 2,212 1,056 618 335

1,319 4,405 2,584 1,267 830 503

1,196 4,345 2,264 1,000 834 458

1,387 7,165 2,777 1,070 925 485

1,684 11,861 3,323 986 1,103 463

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Table 8.8a

Kolkhoz Population o f the USSR (excluding newly acquired territories), in Millions, 1945-1950

Total Working-age

1945

1948

1949

1950

64.4 23.9

65.4* no data

63.8 26.7

62.3 25.9

■I. M. Volkov, "The Kolkhoz Peasantry in the First Postwar Years (1946-1950),” Voprosy istorii, 1970, no. 6: 7. Source: Sovetskaia derevnia, 109.

A dd to this the fact th at the D ecem ber 1947 currency reform w iped o u t peasant savings and th at corvée obligations laid on the kolkhoz w ere a constant source o f resentm ent, a n d it is not h ard to find explanations for peasant dissatisfaction, expressed in the high rate o f o ut-m igration from the kolkhozy (only tem porarily balanced in 1945-1947 by the re tu rn o f the dem obilized soldiers) in the postw ar years. K olkhoz p o p u latio n in R ussia had far from reached the prew ar level w hen the tide tu rn ed in 1947-1948 an d num bers started to d ro p again (see Table 8.8b). In 1948 an d 1949, m ore than a m illion working-age peasants left R u ssian kolkhozy. M any o f those departing, though by no m eans all, were o rgn abor rec ru its.114 B ut th e m igration cannot be satisfactorily explained as a governm ent-sponsored effort to attract peasant workers to industry. T here was actually an excess o f w orkers in industry after the 1947 currency reform encouraged non w orking u rban residents to find jobs: in 1948, in d u stry had 147,000 w orkers m ore than its planned contingent, a n d th e situation had not changed by 1951.115 From the governm ent poin t o f view, the utility o f peasants staying in the countryside was greater th a n the utility o f th eir m igrating to tow ns a n d becom ing urban wage earners at th is tim e. Yet the agricultural policies o f the latter p a rt o f th e S talin p erio d were not calculated to enhance the quality o f ru ral peasant life. In m any p a rts o f the Soviet U nion, notably in R ussia, the old U kraine, a n d Belorussia, fiscal an d econom ic pressure on the kolkhozy becam e alm o st intolerably severe at the end o f the 1940s. T he tax on kolkhoz incom e w as raised in Table 8.8b

Total Workingage

Kolkhoz Population of the RSFSR in Millions, 1940-1950

1940

1944

1945

1946

1947

1948

1949

1950

44.8

35.7

36.6

36.1

37.6

37.1

35.7

34.5

20.8

12.5

13.5

14.2

15.7

15.9

15.4

14.7

Source: Verbitskaia, "Changes in the Size and Composition of the Kolkhoz Peasantry," 126, 131.

Postwar Soviet Society Table 8.8c

1940 1950 1954

149

Population of the USSR, Rural and Urban, 1940-1954 (in millions, data for the beginning of each year)

Of Which

Population Total

Urban

Rural

194.1 178.5 191.0

63.1 69.4 83.6

131.0 109.1 107.4

As Percentage of Total Population Urban Rural 33 39 44

67 61 56

Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR 1922-1972, 9.

A ugust 1948, an d the bu rd en o f th is w as felt m ost in areas like the C entral black-earth region an d B elorussia116 w here kolkhoz incom es were low a n d falling (see T able 8.7). Q uo tas for kolkhoz delivery o f m eat an d m ilk also w ent u p at the end o f the 1940s,117 m eaning th a t less w as available for co nsum ption a n d sale on the m arket. As for the in d ividual households an d th eir p riv ate plots, an average o f 16.6 percent o f eggs, 12.9 percent o f grain a n d 5 -6 percent o f potatoes a n d m ilk products produced on p riv ate plots w ent to the state in the form o f com pulsory deliveries in 1950.118 T he agricultural tax becam e a very heavy burden since the value assigned to p easant assets d id not reflect falling freem arket prices an d since the percentage taken for tax was increased: according to a Soviet calculation, the average agricultural tax on a kolkhoz household in 1950 w as 93.6 rubles, as against 59.5 rubles in 1945.119 In fact, the b u rd en w as so great th at in 1949-1950 peasants sta rted to dispose o f th eir assets— chopping dow n orchards (in the exam ple m ade fam ous by K hrushchev),120 selling off anim als, a n d reducing th e acreage u n d er cultivation in th eir p riv ate plots. T he percentage o f peasant households owning a cow, w hich in the first postw ar years had held fairly steady at a level com parable w ith th a t o f 1940, fell from 74 in 1948 to 64 in 1950.121 In the period from 1950 to 1953, the area u nder cu ltiv atio n in p riv ate plots declined from 7.5 m illion hectares to 6.9 m illio n .122 It w as in these years, 1950-1953, th a t m igration from countryside to tow n becam e a flood. In the p erio d 1950-1954, 9 m illion persons are said to have m igrated perm anently to the tow ns, o u t o f a total ru ral-urban m igration o f 24.6 m illion over th e tw enty-year period 1939-1959,123 an d the ru ral share o f total pop u latio n d ro p p ed from 61 percent to 56 percent (see T able 8.8c). T he rate o f d ep a rtu re w as greatest in areas w here the econom ic plight o f the kolkhozy was m ost acute, which in R ussia m eant the Moscow, Sm olensk, R yazan, K aluga, Penza, T am bov, a n d O rlov oblasts, w here in 1950 from 60 to 90 percent o f kolkhozy were paying out no m ore th an one kologram o f grain p er w orkday.124 In a raion o f M oscow oblast said to be fairly typical, the n u m b er o f working-age kolkhozniki, expressed as a percentage o f the num b er in 1946, w ent u p to 108.5 percent in 1949 only to d ro p to 80 percent in 1952.125

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In response to this crisis, the basis o f o rgn abor recru itm en t w as changed to draw proportionately m ore heavily on the u rb an p o p u latio n th a n on the ru ra l,126 an d one w ould suppose th a t ru ra l soviets were in stru c ted to place strict lim itations on the n u m b er o f p assp o rts issued to kolkhozniki. B ut these m easures were obviously not effective in stem m in g the flow. A fter Stalin’s death, the leadership decided th a t “ m istakes” in policy tow ards the kolkhoz peasantry w ere to blam e, an d later Soviet h isto rian s have held to th is opinion. T he outflow from the countryside slowed dow n in th e m id1950s only after a series o f policy changes h ad m ade th e econom ic situ atio n o f the peasantry m ore viable. The concept o f a “ retu rn to norm alcy” is often ap p lied to postw ar societies. It im plies release from w artim e obligations a n d constraints, re­ laxation o f tension, going hom e, a n d settling dow n. B ut these qualities, however desired by Soviet citizens, were not characteristic o f th e Soviet U nion in the im m ediate postw ar period. O bligations an d co n strain ts w ere scarcely dim inished. M any su rv iv o rs u p ro o ted by th e w ar could not o r d id not return home. T he kolkhoz had to côpe w ith abnorm ally great governm ent dem ands despite its depleted population a n d pred o m in an ce o f w om en. Peace brought ««settlem ent to all those who w ere involved in p o p u latio n exchanges an d resettlem ent program s, as well as the p o p u latio n o f th e newly acq u ired territories subject to Sovietization m easures. I f the anticipated retu rn to norm alcy d id n o t occur in th e im m ed iate postw ar years, how is this to be explained? T he first p o in t to b ea r in m in d is th at the prew ar Soviet U nion d id not provide a very satisfactory o r com plete m odel o f norm alcy to w hich the society could re tu rn after th e war. Though the turm oil o f social revolution had subsided by th e m id1930s, the spirit o f struggle a n d conflict— kept alive by the growing th re a t o f w ar in the latter p art o f th e decade— w as deeply ro o ted in th e P a rty ’s political culture. T he kolkhoz still seem ed an alien in stitu tio n to m ost peasants, w hose idea o f a retu rn to norm alcy w as a retu rn to th e o ld precollectivization village. T he N ew Econom ic Policy o f the tw enties, w ith its private businesses, sm all traders, a n d generally m ore relaxed an d g em ü tlich atm osphere, was probably still th e m odel o f norm al life for m ost tow n dwellers. W ithin the elite, the purges o f th e late 1930s h ad left a trau m atic legacy o f fear an d insecurity. As a result o f collectivization, th e liq u id atio n o f NEP, and the purges, the Soviet U nion had acq u ired a large convict population in prisons an d labor cam ps. A lthough forced lab o r w as to som e extent integrated into the national econom y, th e cam ps w ere trea ted as a sham eful secret, and it is very doubtful th a t the S oviet leadership— let alone the population— saw them as norm al o r system ic in th e prew ar decade. A fter the war, the perpetu atio n o f a n essentially w artim e atm osphere can partially be explained in term s o f the urgent p roblem s o f econom ic reconstruction an d m anpow er shortages. However, th is rationale faded as the econom y becam e stronger at the en d o f the 1940s. A co n trast m u st surely be draw n, for exam ple, betw een the pressures on th e kolkhoz in the first postw ar years, and the even greater pressures im p o sed a t the beginning

Postwar Soviet Society

151

o f the 1950s. T he form er w ere harsh, b u t acceptable w ithin a context o f w ar-associated sacrifice. T h e la tter seem ed alm ost gratuitous, reviving old suspicions th a t the regim e w as basically antagonistic to the peasantry, an d leading m illions o f peasants to ab a n d o n th e kolkhoz a n d seek a new life in the tow ns. T he regim e itself w as a m ajo r b a rrie r to a retu rn to norm alcy in the im m ediate postw ar years. In the first place, it w as taking a stance o f repressive vigilance in all areas, indicating to th e p o p u lation th a t the tim e o f crisis, em ergency, extrao rd in ary m easures, a n d sacrifice w as not yet past. Soviet leaders w ere undou b ted ly aw are o f differences betw een th eir own definition o f norm alcy an d th a t o f the population, or large segm ents o f it: they knew th a t d u ring the w ar peasants had talked o f a postw ar abolition o f the kolkhoz, intellectuals o f a postw ar easing o f cultural controls, an d so on. Before any retu rn to norm alcy occurred, from the regim e’s standpoint, it w as necessary to establish th a t the relevant norm s were “ Soviet” , not “ co u n terrevolutionary” . In the second place, the regim e’s policies tow ards non-R ussians were an im pedim ent to norm alization. It was trying to Sovietize the newly acquired te rrito ries in the w est w ith extrem ely d isru p tiv e social consequences, w hile a t the sam e tim e prom otin g R ussification o f the popu latio n o f these an d o th er b order regions. T he an tisem itic aspects o f the “ anticosm opolitan” cam paign reinforced the im pression th a t non-R ussians were in deep disfavor as a group a n d fu rth e r destabilizing innovations in official nationalities policy m ight be expected. I f the regim e h ad not q u ite replaced the old “ class enem ies” w ith ethnic enem ies in S talin’s last years, it certainly seem ed to be m oving in th a t direction. However, in talking o f regim e attitu d e s in S talin’s last years, we should possibly m ake a distin ctio n betw een the attitu d es o f S talin him self, an d those o f his colleagues an d p o ten tial successors. To ju d g e by the speed an d thoroughness o f change after Stalin’s death, there m ust have been som ething like a silent consensus o f dissatisfaction, o r a t least uneasiness, w ith Stalin’s p osition on m any question s em erging w ith in the P arty leadership at the en d o f his life. P a rt o f the consensus m ight be expressed as a desire to lift w artim e obligations an d co n strain ts th a t h ad su rv iv ed in to the postw ar period, low er the level o f repression a n d social tension, a n d p u t the society on a m ore norm al peacetim e footing. W ith in a few years o f S talin’s death, th ere w ere to be basic changes o f policy tow ards the kolkhoz peasantry, relaxation o f labor discipline m easures, a b an d o n m en t o f the labor reserves system , an d a p artial dism antling o f the w hole em pire o f convict labor. O v ert russification policies w ere dropped, an d som e ethnic groups d ep o rte d d u rin g th e w ar (though not the C rim ean T atars or Volga G erm ans) were allow ed to retu rn to th e ir hom elands. Soviet “ collaborators” , together w ith the S oviet PO W s an d O starbeiteren im prisoned on th e ir retu rn from E urope after the w ar w ere released. G erm a n POW s were finally— ten years after the w ar’s en d — repatriated. T h is w as essentially the long-aw aited po stw ar relaxation, the retu rn to norm alcy th a t had never really o ccurred in th e years 1945 to 1953. T h at

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harsh an d stringent period, seen by m any co n tem p o rary W estern observers as the quintessence o f Stalinism , perhaps deserves a less grandiose label like Jerry H ough’s “ petrification” .127 T he system , clum sily attem p tin g a transition from w ar to peace, seem ed to have stuck halfw ay a n d be floundering. It was only w hen Stalin died th a t the balance eventually tip p ed , allowing Soviet society to lurch fow ard in to the p ostw ar era.

Notes 1. Michael K. R oof and Frederick A. Leedy, “Population Redistribution in the Soviet Union, 1939— 1956,” G eographical R e v ie w (April 1979):210. 2. Ibid. 3. Istoriia K om m u n istich eskoi P a rtii S o vetskogo S o iu za 2d ed. (Moscow: Politizdat, 1962), 605. 4. Alexander Dallin, G erm an R u le in R u ssia 1941-1945 (London: Macmillan, 1957), 427. 5. 1.7 million Soviet citizens were working in Germany in 1943, according to data cited in Edward L. Homze, Foreign L a b o r in N a zi G e rm a n y (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), 195. Malcolm J. Proudfoot, a repatriation official in Europe in the immediate postwar years, puts the numbers at something over two million, citing ILO and OSS estimates o f 1944, in his E uropean Refugees: 1 939-52. A S tu d y in F orced P opulation M ovem ent (Evanston, 111.: Northwestern University Press, 1956), 80. However, a recent Soviet estimate is much higher, almost six million— see G. A. Kumanev’ s article in P. A. Zhilin, ed., Vtoraia m irovaia voina i so v rem en n o st’ (Moscow, 1972), 262, cited in Mark R. Elliott, Paw ns o f Yalta, S o viet R efugees a n d A m e r ic a ’s R o le in th eir R e p a tria tio n (Urbana, 111.; University o f Illinois Press, 1982), 23, 29 (note 3). 6. Proudfoot, E uropean Refugees, 322-23. 7. Istoriia Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny S ovetskogo S o iu za 1941-1945, vol. 6 (Moscow; Viennoe izdatel’ stvo, 1965), 30. 8. The estimate o f Soviet population is 190.7 million, including newly acquired territories (W. Ukraine, W. Belorussia, Moldavia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia) at the end o f 1939. N arodnoe k h o zia istvo S S S R v 1960 g. S ta tistich esk ii ezh egodn ik (Moscow; Statistika, 1961), 7. 9. This estimate is obtained by adding the alleged 10 million military casualties to the 11.4 million in the Soviet armed forces in May 1945 {Isto riia Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny, 6: 123). Obviously this is only a rough approximation. 10. lu. V. Arutiunian, S o vetsk o e k re st’ianstvo v g o d y velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (Moscow; Izdatel’ stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1963), 318. 11. A. A. Levskii, “Restoration o f the villages o f Belorussia in the postwar period,” Voprosy istorii, no. 4 (1975):50. 12. N arodnoe k h oziaistvo S S S R 1 9 2 2 -1972 gg. Iu b ilein yi sta tistic h e sk ii ezh egodn ik (Moscow: Statistika, 1972), 345, 348. 13. Harry Schwartz, R u s sia ’s S o viet E conom y, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., PrenticeHall, 1958), 525, 528. 14. The Labor Reserves system was created shortly before the war by a decree o f 2 October 1940. Although the 1940 quota was essentially filled by volunteers, real conscription was practised from the summer o f 1941. E. S. Kotliar, G osudarstvenn ye tru dovye re zervy S S S R v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voin y (Moscow, 1975), 14, 27. 15. Harry Schwartz, op. cit., 528. 16. Arutiunian, S o vetsk o e k re st’ianstvo, 322. 17. Harry Schwartz, op. cit., 528. 18. N arodnoe k h o zia istvo S S S R v 1960 g., 7. 19. S. Swianiewicz, F orced L abour a n d E co n o m ic D evelopm ent, An E n qu iry in to th e E xperien ce o f S o viet In d u stria liza tio n (London: Oxford University Press, 1965), 41-42.

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20. Joseph B. Schechtman, E uropean P opulation Transfers 1 9 3 9 -1945 (New York, 1946), 135, 150. 21. Ibid., 389. 22. Ibid., 383-84. 23. Aleksandr M. Nekrich, T he P unished P eoples (New York: Norton, 1978), 115; Robert Conquest, T he N ation K illers: T he S o viet D ep o rta tio n o f N a tio n alities (New York: Macmillan 1970), 64-65. 24. Joseph B. Schechtman, P o stw a r P opulation Transfers in E urope 1945-1955 (Phil­ adelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1962), 157-65. 25. Ibid., 161-162, 167, 172. 26. Most o f the Jewish transferees on this exchange had been among the estimated 600,000 Jews who were either deported from Soviet-occupied Poland just before the war or fled from that area and other parts o f the western Soviet Union as the Germans advanced in 1941. The total number o f Jewish transferees is unknown, but 140,000 moved from the Soviet Union to Poland in 1946. Proudfoot, E uropean R efugees, pp. 322-23 and 340-59. 27. Schechtman, P o stw a r P opulation Transfers, p. 168; V. I. Naulko, “Contemporary ethnic composition o f the population o f the Ukrainian SSR”, S o vetsk aia etnografiia, no. 5 (1962); 50. 28. Naulko, op. cit., 50. 29. I. E. Marchenko, R a b o ch ii k lass B S S R v poslevoen n ye g o d y (1945-1950) (Minsk, 1962), 128. 30. Harrison E. Salisbury, A m e ric a n in R u ssia (New York; Harper, 1955), 284. 31. Tonu Panning, “Population Changes in Estonia, 1935-1970,”P opulation S tu dies 36 (March 1972):58; R. N. Pullat, ed., P ro b lem y so ts ia l’noi stru k tu ry respublik S ovetskoi P rib a ltik i (Tallin: Eesti raanat 1978), 96. 32. Janis Sapiets, “The Baltic Republics,”in The S o viet U nion a n d E astern Europe. A H a n dbook , edited by George Schoplin, (New York; Praeger, 1970), 222. 33. O. M. Verbitskaia, “Changes in the Size and Composition o f the Kolkhoz Peasantry o f RSFSR in the First Postwar Years (1946-1950),”Isto riia SSSR , no. 5 (1980): 127. 34. Quoted in Eugene M. Kulischer, E urope on th e M ove. W ar a n d P opulation Changes 1917-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1948), 300. 35. Pullat, ed., P roblem y, 80-82. 36. S o vetsk a ia d erevn ia v p e r v y e poslevo en n ye g o d y (Moscow: Nauka 1978), 383-84. 37. Pullat, ed., P roblem y, 94. 38. Isto riia Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny, 6: 107; Verbitskaia, op. cit., 125. 39. Over five million Soviet soldiers were taken prisoner by the Germans, and almost two million had died in POW camps by 1944. On the status o f the rest at the end o f the war, see Proudfoot, E uropean Refugees, 80. 40. As o f May 1944, over two million Soviet citizens were in Germany as foreign laborers. Dallin, G erm an R ule, 427. 41. See Dallin, op. cit., 142 (note); Alexander Werth, R u ssia a t W ar 1941-1945 (New York: Dutton, 1964), 380-89. 42. Elliott, P aw n s o f Yalta, 19 and 27-28 (note 55). 43. Ibid., 122. The estimate must be only approximate, given the incentive for wouldbe nonreturners to conceal their Soviet citizenship: see Alexandra Tolstoy, “The Russian DPs,”R u ssian R e v ie w 9 (January 1950):54. 44. Elliott, op. cit., 82. 45. Quoted ibid., 194. 46. Swianiewicz (F orced Labour, 44) suggests that about half— 2.5 million— were sent to labor camps. Alexander Werth, R ussia: The P ost-W ar Years (New York: Taplinger, 1971), 28, suggests the much lower figure o f 500,000 for POWs, without mentioning other categories o f repatriates. Both estimates are guesses, based on rumors circulating after the war in Munich and Moscow respectively. 47. Just over a million were drafted into the Red Army, according to a Soviet source (M. I. Semiriaga, S o vetsk ie liu d i v evro p eisk o m soprotivlen ii (Moscow, 1970], 327; quoted in Elliott, P aw n s o f Yalta, 202). At the end o f 1945, half a million repatriates were

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working, probably as labor conscripts, in territories liberated from German occupation (Iu. A. Prikhodko, “Steps in the Restoration o f Industry in the Regions o f the USSR Liberated from German-Fascist Occupation,” Voprosy istorii, no. 5 [1969]:29). 48. Istoriia Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny, 6:123. 49. V. N. Donchenko, “Demobilization o f the Soviet Army and Resolution o f the Problem o f Cadres in the First Postwar Years,”Isto riia S SSR , no. 3 (1970):98. 50. M. I. Khlusov, R a z v itie so vetsk o i in d u strii 194 6 -1 9 5 8 (Moscow; Nauka, 1977), 90. 51. Peter Pirogov, W hy I E sca p ed (New York, 1950), 233. 52. A. M. Eldarov, R o st rabochego klassa A zerb a id zh a n a v g o d y poslevoennogo sotsialisticheskogo stro ite l’stva (Baku; Maarif, 1971), 29. 53. Verbitskaia, “Changes,” 125. 54. Carol Jacobson, “The Soviet G. I.’ s Bill o f Rights,” A m erica n R e v ie w on th e S oviet Union 7 (November 1945):57-8. 55. This question is discussed in Sheila Fitzpatrick, “Social Mobility in the Late Stalin Period: Recruitment into the Intelligentsia and Access to Higher Education, 1945-1953” (unpublished paper). 56. Jacobson, op. cit., 57. 57. A. V. Krasnov, ed., B o r’ba p a r tii i rabochego klassa z a vosstanovlenie i ra z v itie narodnogo k h oziaistva S S S R (1 9 4 3 -1 9 5 0 gg.J (Moscow; Mysl’ , 1978), 53. 58. For an indignant and detailed account o f postwar party recruitment in Moscow, stressing failure to recruit workers, see V. E. Poletaev, R a b o ch ie M o sk vy na zavershaiushchem etape stroiteVstva so tsia lizm a 1 9 45-1958 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1967), 188-90. After Stalin’ s death, recruitment o f workers into the party increased, but this was not so closely linked with promotion to administrative jobs as it had been in the 1920s and 1930s. 59. Donchenko, “Demobilization,” 102. 60. Krasnov, ed., B o r’ba p a rtii, 56. 61. B. I. Gvozdev, “Size o f the working class o f the USSR in the first postwar years (1945-1948),”Isto riia SSSR , no. 4 (1971):113. 62. Krasnov, ed., B o r’ba p a rtii, 56. 63. Harry Schwartz, R u ssia ’s S o viet E conom y, 456. 64. Poletaev, R abochie M oskvy, 252. 65. See Table 8.8c, p. 149. 66. Timothy Sosnovy, T he H ousing P roblem in th e S o v ie t Union (New York: Research Program on the U.S.S.R., 1954), 106. 67. A. F. Khavin, “A new might upsurge o f heavy industry o f the USSR in 1946-50,” Istoriia SSSR , no. 1 (1963):28. 68. Poletaev, R abochie M oskvy, 256. 69. Marchenko, R a b o ch ii klass BSSR , 201. 70. Solomon Schwarz, L a b o r in the S o viet Union (New York: Praeger, 1951), 215-6 (note 38). 71. Ibid., 220. 72. Harry Schwartz, op. cit., 478-80. 73. In 1945, 10.5 percent o f those working in industry were adolescents (16 years and under), but this dropped to 4.9 percent by mid-1948 (Khlusov, R a z v itie sov etskoi industrii, 147). 74. Poletaev, R abochie M oskvy, 71. 75. Khlusov, op. cit., 149. 76. M. Ia. Sonin, Vosproizvodstvo rabochei sily v S S S R i balan s tru da (Moscow; Gosplanizdat, 1959), 196. 77. Ibid., 207. 78. Ibid., 186. 79. Krasnov, ed., B o r’ba p a rtii, 121. 80. Khavin, “A New Mighty Upsurve,” 27. 81. Sonin’ s Table 62 (op. cit., 215), “Composition o f orgn abor recruits in terms o f previous occupation”(RSFSR, July-August 1953) has 17.7 percent in the category “Released from enterprises and construction sites at the end o f a labor contract”.

Postwar Soviet Society

155

82. Harry Schwartz, op. cit., 527. 83. Kotliar, G osudarstvenn ye tru d o vye rezervy, 236. 84. Fedor Belov, The H isto ry o f a S o v ie t C o llective F arm (New York: Praeger, 1955), 55-56, 104 and 108. 85. Khlusov, op. cit., 95. 86. Krasnov, ed., op. cit., 127. 87. R. Fakiolas, “Problems o f Labour Mobility in the USSR,”S o viet S tu dies 14 (July 1962): 17. 88. Khlusov, op. cit., 103. 89. Khavin, op. cit., 27-28. 90. M. I. Khlusov, “Worker cadres o f the Glukhovo ‘ V. I. Lenin* Cotton Combine in 1946-1950,“Isto riia S SSR , no. 4 (1958):94. 91. Marchenko, R a b o ch ii klass B SSR , 141. 92. For a survey o f the estimates, see S. G. Wheatcroft, “On Assessing the Size o f Forced Concentration Camp Labour in the Soviet Union 1929-1956,“S o viet S tu dies 33 (April 1981):267-8. The lower estimates come from Timasheff (1948) and Bergson (1961), the higher from Dallin and Nicolaevsky (1947) and Rosehelde (1981). 93. Swianiewicz, F orced Labor, 42. 94. Cited in David J. Dallin and Boris Nicolaevsky, F orced L a b o r in th e S oviet Union (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1947), 277. 95. For a list o f construction projects using convict labor, see Aleksandr I. Solzhenitsyn, T he G ulag A rchipelago 1918-1956, 3-4 (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), 591-3. 96. Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: T he Years in P ow er (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 19-20. 97. Keesing*s Research Report, G e rm a n y a n d E astern E urope sin ce 1945 (New York: Scribner, 1973), 127-8. 98. Krasnov, ed., B or'ba p a rtii, 118. 99. See Table 8.4, p. 145. 100. Gvozdev, “Size o f the Working Class,” 114-7. 101. Ibid., 120. 102. In one o f Gvozdev’ s tables (op. cit., 119), the “others”category is broken down into “ junior service personnel and guards”(5.5 percent o f industrial personnel in 1940, 5.6 percent in 1945) and “not distributed by category” (zero in 1940, 12.8 percent in 1945). The latter is evidently the main conscript labor group, but Gvozdev states that the former also included conscript labor (op. cit., 118-9). 103. See ibid., 119 (Table 5). 104. Arutiunian, S o vetsk o e k re st’ianstvo, 243-4; Belov, H istory, 20. 105. Arutiunian, op. cit., 329-30. 106. lu. V. Arutiunian, S o vetsk o e k re st’ianstvo v g o d y velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, 2nd ed., (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 340. 107. Verbitskaia, “Changes,” 130. 108. S o vetsk a ia derevnia, 204-5. 109. Ibid., 276. 110. Alec Nove, A n E co n o m ic H isto ry o f th e U .S.S.R. (London; Penguin, 1972), 298. 111. I. M. Volkov, “The Kolkhoz Peasantry in the First Postwar Years (1946-1950),” Voprosy istorii, no. 6 (1970): 13. 112. G. Ia. Kuznetsov, T ovarnye otnosheniia i eko n o m ich esk ie stim u ly v kolkh ozn om p ro izvodstve (Moscow, 1971), 136, quoted in S o vetsk a ia derevnia, 269. 113. S ovetsk a ia derevnia, 272. 114. In 1949, 768,600 Russian kolkhozniki departed for permanent work in industry: o f these, 621,900 were sent on orgnabor and 146,700 left “in a nonorganized manner” (Verbitskaia, op. cit., 128). 115. Khlusov, R a z v itie so v etsk o i industrii, 104. 116. S o vetsk a ia derevnia, 294-5. 117. Ibid., 280. 118. Ibid., 462. 119. Ibid., 464.

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120. Quoted from K o m m u n ist, no. 12 (1957), in Robert Conquest, P o w er a n d P o lic y in th e U SSR (New York; St. Martin's Press, 1961), 122. 121. S ovetsk a ia derevnia, 461. 122. Sonin, Vosproizvodstvo, 92.

123. Ibid., 144 and 148. 124. Verbitskaia, op. cit., 128. 125. lu. V. Arutiunian, “Formation o f Mechanizer Cadres o f Kolkhoz Production in the Postwar Period (1946-1957),”Isto riia S SSR , no. 5 (1958):6. 126. Sonin, op. cit., 206-7. 127. Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, H ow th e S o viet Union is G overn ed (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), 178-84.

9 The Impact of World War II on the Party CYNTHIA S. KAPLAN

T he Second W orld W ar found th e S oviet U nion a n d the P arty on the verge o f tran sitio n . T he S talinist revolution a n d the purges had transform ed the S oviet society, econom y, an d political institutions. By the late 1930s, the policies w hich produced th is new reality were replaced by policies seeking to ad m in ister it. As new econom ic an d social conditions began to influence inform al P arty behavior, official policies sought to transform the role o f the P arty ap p aratu s in Soviet society.1 For the m ost p art, these policies had yet to be realized w hen w ar engulfed the U SSR. F rom this perspective, the w ar intervened in an ongoing process o f political change. Thus, in ad dition to the im m ediate im pact o f the war, tw o central questions m ust be exam ined in order to assess the w ar’s consequences for the Party. First, how did the w ar affect tendencies present in prew ar P arty behavior an d the form al policies w hich sought to reshape the P arty ’s role? Second, to w hat extent did the w ar’s consequences for beh av io r correspond to prew ar trends? In analyzing the w ar’s im pact on the Party, I will distinguish between the P arty as a political organization a n d as an ad m in istrativ e organ re­ sponsible for the perform ance o f o th er organizations. As a political orga­ nization, the w ar’s direct im pact on the P arty was im m ense; as a bureaucracy, its influence was m ore com plex. T he w ar’s im pact on P arty com position, the professional experiences o f the ap p aratu s, an d the form al policies redefining the P arty ’s role all co n trib u ted to p arty behavior, as did a wide range o f o th er factors that affect organizational behavior. These include the econom ic an d political environm ent, the difficulty o f the tasks set by postw ar recovery plans, an d the relative experience an d expertise o f econom ic leaders. W hile I consider these factors crucial to p arty b ehavior an d w orthy o f

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detailed study, the present article’s focus rem ain s m ore lim ited. T he p rew ar and postw ar P arty behavior will be com pared w ith the behavioral tendencies associated w ith the direct effects o f the w ar on th e P a rty ’s com position, organizational p enetration o f society, a n d w artim e experiences. I f it is assum ed th at the w ar m ain tain ed or intensified the factors affecting orga­ nizational behavior, while retain in g th eir relative relatio n sh ip to each other, then it becom es possible to assess the w ar’s influence on P arty b ehavior.2

The Prewar Context The Soviet regim e began to shift its focus from stru ctu ral change to a m ore conservative perspective in th e 1930s. T he P a rty ’s in stru m en tal role in the socioeconom ic revolution had w aned by th e mid-1930s. D u rin g the im m ed iate prew ar period (1938-1941), the P arty began to reestablish itself as an organization, while sim ultaneously redefining its a d m in istra tiv e role. T hese efforts were reflected in the P a rty ’s recru itm en t o f increasing num bers o f the new Soviet intelligentsia (as opposed to workers) a n d in th e reshaping o f its role in econom ic ad m in istra tio n .3 Such policies w ere consistent w ith the growth o f the new Soviet technical elite, w ho enjoyed an increasing degree o f professional autonom y.4 A lthough the P arty sought to centralize its au th o rity over cadre qu estio n s an d to becom e m ore involved in local m atters, th is w as not inconsistent w ith the aforem entioned trends. T he P arty w as n o t to replicate the functions o f Soviet an d econom ic organizations. Indeed, th e latter organizations w ere also to be strengthened.5 T he central policy o f th e prew ar perio d evidenced a growing desire to rem ove the P arty from direct, daily involvem ent in local econom ic activities. These efforts, although not w ith o u t som e co u n ­ tervailing tendencies, foreshadow ed the p ostw ar p erio d ’s em phasis on the P arty ’s supervisory activities a n d the principle o f ed in o n a c h a lie (one m a n m anagem ent), am ong industrial m anagers.6 The agrarian sphere rem ained d istin ct from the prew ar tre n d s found in the urban industrial context. Soviet policy’s strong urb an , in d u stria l pref­ erence contributed to the P arty ’s distinctive role in agriculture. T he m ax­ im ization o f overt political au th o rity over expertise or rem u n erativ e in ­ ducem ent was further enhanced by the w eakness o f local ru ral P arty organizations, the P arty ’s reliance on m achine trac to r statio n personnel, the heavy reliance on plenipotentiaries, agricultural policies th a t sought to com plete the structural change begun durin g collectivization, ra th e r th a n sim ply adjust adm inistrativ e p attern s to the presence o f established in sti­ tutions, an d the absence o f a specialized an d politically reliable agricultural elite.7 These factors co ntrib u ted to form al policies th a t encouraged local P arty organizations to becom e m ore directly involved in agricultural p ro ­ duction.8 D ue to the rural sector’s low level o f political reliability, the P a rty ’s own organizational w eakness in the countryside, in terv en tio n ist policies, and the absence o f alternative leaders, the P arty co n fro n ted a different set o f conditions an d problem s in agriculture th a n in industry.

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A lthough m any prew ar co n d itio n s an d policies were suggestive o f future trends, form al policies aim ed a t tran sfo rm in g the P a rty ’s role rem ained substantially unrealized before prew ar m obilization m odified th em .9 A m ong the m ost im p o rta n t prew ar tendencies affecting the P arty were th e increase in P arty m em bership am ong th e new intelligentsia, form al policies th at sought to rem ove the P arty from d irect involvem ent in econom ic m atters, especially in industry, a n d to prom ote its supervisory role, a n d attem p ts to strengthen the local P a rty ’s role in agriculture.

The Effects of the War PARTY COMPOSITION T he P arty ’s com position reflects its relation to society. As Soviet social a n d econom ic policies have changed, so has P arty recruitm ent. Such trends, o f course, are influenced by the reigning political preferences o f th e era in w hich they occur. T hus, in d u strializatio n w itnessed an influx o f workers in to the Party, w hereas collectivization d id not produce an analogous phenom enon am ong peasants. As econom ic a n d social policies began to change in the 1930s, the P arty chose to incorporate greater num bers o f the Soviet technical elite. P arty recru itm en t d u rin g the p eriod betw een 1937 a n d 1941 clearly concentrated on the w hite-collar stra tu m .10 E nrollm ents increased rapidly due to th e ir long abeyance durin g the purges. T his was facilitated by the new P arty program presented at the E ighteenth P arty Congress in 1939, w hich eased adm ission req u irem en ts.11 Thus, the w ar in tervened as the P arty pu rsu ed a recru itm en t policy aim ed a t transform ing it from a w orker-dom inated organization to one com posed increasingly o f w hite-collar em ployees. To w hat extent did the w ar affect the P a rty ’s com position? Specifically, how d id w artim e recruitm en t change the d istrib u tio n o f political generations, social origins, an d education levels found am ong P arty m em bers? W hat regional variatio n s existed am ong local P arty organizations? D id the w ar affect u rb an an d rural P ary organizations differently? How extensive were changes w ithin the P arty ap p aratu s? T he answ ers to these questions provide a t least a p artial q u an titativ e basis for u n d erstan d in g the w ar’s im pact on the Party.

THE MASS PARTY T he w ar affected P arty organizations throughout the Soviet U nion. Provincial an d R epublican parties sent from 36 to 74 percent o f th eir en tire m em berships to the arm y d u ring the course o f the w ar.12 W artim e m obilization w as rapid. In 1941, only 16.5 percent o f the P arty w ere in the arm ed services, while 83.5 percent w ere m em bers o f te rrito ria l P arty organizations. By 1942, the respective figures were 42.4 an d 57.6 p ercen t.13 Sm aller P arty organizations sent a high percentage o f th e ir m em berships to the fro n t.14

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H igh losses necessitated a m assive P arty -recru itm en t cam paign am ong the arm ed forces an d the civilian population. Indeed, from 1941 to 1945 the party recruited 8,400,000 m em bers a n d candidates, o f these 6,381,000 or 79.6 percent were from the arm ed forces.15 T he ex trao rd in ary n atu re o f the w artim e recruitm ent is clear w hen it is com pared to recru itm en t d u rin g the period from 1936 to 1940, w hen 3,276,318 m em bers a n d can d id ates were adm itted, an d to the 1946-1951 period w hen 3,237,012 were a d m itte d .16 The w ar’s im m ense im pact on P arty m em bership is show n not only by the m agnitude o f newly recruited m em bers b u t also by w artim e losses. P rew ar P arty m em bership stood at 3,872,456 in 1941, while the po stw ar m em b ersh ip was 5,760,360 in 1945.17 Clearly, w artim e en ro llm en t a n d losses deeply affected the P arty m em bership. T w o-thirds o f all postw ar P arty m em bers had jo in e d d u rin g the w ar.18 A lthough the N azi occupation, the effect o f evacuees, a n d the p rew ar size o f P arty organizations all helped to d eterm in e the extent to w hich w artim e losses and new inductees changed local P arties, alm o st all organizations were deeply affected (see Table 9.1). O ccupied areas w ere m o st significantly affected, those far from the front to a lesser degree.19 T hus, a su b stan tial proportion o f local P arty m em bers were new to th e ir organizations, m any recently recruited. Table 9.1 shows the percentage o f new P arty m em bers and those who were dem obilized in local P arty organizations. G iv en the high m ortality rate am ong those P arty m em bers serving in th e arm e d forces, there is a substantial overlap betw een the tw o categories. The d istribution o f political generations also reflects th e influx o f new P arty m em bers.20 D ata presented in Table 9.2 show the m ag n itu d e o f the political generation recruited durin g the w ar a n d how it com pares to the postpurge inductees. Taken together, these tw o political generations clearly d om inated the postw ar Party. How did the m assive influx o f new p arty m em bers affect th e social com position o f the P arty? P rew ar P arty recru itm en t focused on th e new Soviet intelligentsia. A lthough the percentage o f w orkers a n d p easants d u rin g w artim e recruitm ent increased in co m parison w ith th e 1939-1941 p erio d (when they represented 20 a n d 10 percent respectively), the tre n d tow ards an increasingly w hite-collar P arty m em bership co n tin u ed d u rin g the war. W artim e enrollm ents am ong civilians a n d m em bers o f th e arm ed forces included 32.1 percent w ith w orking class backgrounds, 25.3 percent peasants, and 42.6 percent w hite-collar em ployees. W hite-collar rep resen tatio n is even greater w hen m easured by occupation, rath e r th a n by social origin.21 W artim e recruitm ent an d losses produced a shift in th e d istrib u tio n o f social origins found w ithin the Party. N ational d ata on P arty m em bers show an increase from 34.1 percent w ith w hite-collar backgrounds in 1941 to 48.3 percent in 1947. (These d ata include the effect o f dem obilized P arty m em bers.) T he percentage o f w orkers d ro p p ed from 43.7 percent in 1941 to 33.7 percent in 1947, w hereas peasants declined from 22.2 to 18 p ercen t.22 A lthough only p artial d ata on the social com position o f local P arty m e m ­ bership are available, w ith th e exception o f Siberia, C en tral Asia, a n d th e

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newly incorporated areas, provincial P arties ap p e ar to have increased rep­ resentation o f those w ith w hite-collar backgrounds. T he d istrib u tio n o f P arty m em bers w ith peasant an d w orker origins reflects the p red o m in an t econom ic activities o f the regions in w hich the local P arties are located. These effects are evident in Table 9.3. Econom ic changes induced by the w ar also affected the d istrib u tio n o f social origins am ong P arty m em bers. T he w artim e in d u strializatio n o f the U rals, the evacuation o f P arty m em bers from w estern regions, an d the transfer o f u rb an cadre to the countryside in W estern Siberia changed the social com position o f m any local P arty organizations. P arty organizations in W estern Siberia an d C entral A sia clearly show the effect o f the evacuees.23 T he relative dem ocratization o f P arty enrollm ents durin g the w ar d id not alter the tren d tow ards increasing w hite-collar representation.24 T he sexual com position o f P arty m em b ersh ip also changed because o f the war. T he n um ber o f w om en in the P arty increased due to th eir w artim e recruitm ent a n d m ale losses. T he percentage o f fem ale P arty m em bers rose from 14.5 percent before the w ar to 18.3 percent a t its conclusion.25 W artim e recruitm ent led to a younger, b etter educated P arty m em bership. T hose u n d er twenty-five years old co n stitu ted only 8.9 percent o f total P arty m em bership before the war, w hereas after it they com posed 18.3 percent o f the Party. Indeed, tw o-thirds o f the entire P arty was younger th a n thirtyfive years old in 1946.26 T hus, as a result o f w artim e losses a n d the P arty ’s recru itm en t practices, the “ nu m b er o f C o m m u n ists w ith higher, secondary, an d incom plete secondary education grew from 39.8 percent to 57.4 per­ cent.” 27 “ N o t less th an one-third o f all persons who had com pleted in stitu tio n s o f higher education w ere P arty m em bers.” 28 A vailable d ata from local P arty organizations show the increase in educational levels to be a universal tre n d .29 T hose organizations whose m em bers w ith higher an d incom plete higher education surpassed the national average for the U SSR in 1947 w ere located in areas whose popu latio n was generally b etter educated o r th a t received large num bers o f C om m unists from o th er regions.30 T hus, P arty m em bers in previously occupied areas a n d in newly industrialized regions h ad educational backgrounds surpassing national averages. W hile P arty m em bership clearly grew d u rin g the war, w hat effect d id the w ar have on the P arty ’s organizational presence in society? How did the w ar affect the d istrib u tio n o f C o m m u n ists in Soviet society? Was there a difference betw een u rb an in d u strial organizations a n d rural P arty orga­ nizations? A m ong the w ar’s m ost im m ed iate consequences was a d ram atic decline in the n um ber o f P rim ary P arty O rganizations (PPOs). D u rin g the first six m onths o f the war, P PO s declined by 987,000 organizations (m ore th a n 50 percent). E conom ic P PO s declined from 98,000 to 63,000.31 A lthough the d issolution o f P PO s located in occupied areas accounts for m ost o f this decline, the num ber o f kolkhoz P PO s also fell in areas b eh in d the lines. D ue to the low level o f P arty m em bership in rural areas, som e P PO s

Table 9.1 Local Party Memberehip

New Members (Percentage) Bashkir* Belorussiab Eastern Western Briansk® Cheliabinskd Chernigov* Chkalov* Gorki* Kalininf Kaluga^ Khabarovsk*1 Kherson* Kiev* Kirgiz* Kirov* Kostroma* Krasnodar* Kuibyshev! Kursk*

Demobilized Members (Percentage) 60 (1948)

72 (1946) 55.3 158 68.7 (1946) 41.8 (1946) 41 (1947) 36.6 (1947) 28.7 (1946) 50 (1947) 75 (1946) 75 (1946) 54 (1947) 64.2 (1946) 34 (1947) 67 (1948) 46.6 (1947) 63 (1950) 75 (1946)

New Members (Percentage) Leningrad* Moldavia* Moscow" Odessa* Orlovsk* Perm (Molotov)* Rostov" Saratov® Smolensk* Stanislav* Stavropol* Tadzhikistan* TiumenP Tula«» Udmurt* Ukraine' Vladimir* Voronezh* Voroshilovgrad*

70 (1946) 40 (1946) 34.4 (1946)

55.2 (1946) 92.8 (1946)

Demobilized Members (Percentage) 52.9 (1947) 50.3 (1947) 63.6 (1947) 39 (1947) 39.6 (1947) 37.6 (1947) 25.8 (1947) 45.3 (1947) 51 (1948)

82 (1946) 75.9 (1950) 22.4 (1947) 60 (1946) 62.8 (1946) 41.8 (1947) 74 (1947)

38.7 (1948)

•V. N. Donchenko, “Perestroika riadov VKP(b) v period perekhoda SSSR ot voiny k miru (1945-1948 gody)” (Candidate Dissertation, Moscow State University, 1972), 276. bN. N. Akimov et al., eds., Ocherkl istorii kommunisticheskol parti! Belorussii. Chast’ II (1921-1966) (Minsk: Izdatei’stvo Belarus’, 1967), 408-9.

CV. A. Smirnov, edM Ocherki istorli Brianskoi organizatsii KPSS (Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1968), 335. dZ. V. Shestakov et al., eds., V bœvykh riadakh leninskoi partiI: Chliabinskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tslfrakh 1917-1977 (Cheliabinsk: luzhno-ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1978), 33, 44. •V. N. Donchenko, “Demobilizatsiia sovetskoi armii i reshenie problemy kadrov v pervye poslevoennye gody,” tstoriia SSSR, no. 3 (May 1970):102. fV. I. Smirnov, ed., Ocherki istorii Kaiininskoi organizatsii KPSS (Moscow: Moskovskoi rabochii, 1971), 545. flA. F. Sladkov, ed., Ocherki istorii Kaluzhskoi organizatsii KPSS (Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1967), 306. hA. K. Chernyi, ed., Ocherk istorii Khabarovskoi kraevoi organizatsii KPSS 1900-1978 gody (Khabarovsk: Khabarovskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1979):263. 'I. I. Alekseenko et al., eds., Ocherki istorii Krasnodarskoi organizatsii KPSS, 2nd ed. (Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1976) , 409. IF. P. Zakharov et al.t eds., Kuibyshevskaia oblastnaia partiinaia organizatsiia v dokumentakh i tsifrakh (1902-1977 gg.) (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1978), 111. kS. S. Dmitriev et al., eds., Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974), 46 and V. A. Kutuzov, "Nekotorye voprosy partiinogo stroitel'stv v leningradskoi organizatsii v pervye poslevoennye gody (1946-1948 gg.),” Uchenye zapiski Institut istorii partii leningradskogo obkom KPSS I (1970):221. •E. S. Postovoi, ed., Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskoi partii Moldavii (Kishinev: Partiinoe izdatel’stvo TsK KP Moldavii, 1964), 309. mG. I. Shitarev et al., eds., Moskovskaia gorodskala i moskovskaia oblastnaia organizatsii KPSS v tsifrakh (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1972), 27, 47. "Calculations by the author. V. N. Donchenko, "Perestroika,” 252 and P. V. Barchugov, ed., Ocherki istorii partiinykh organizatsii Dona (1921-1971) ChasV II (Rostov-on-the-Don: Rostovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1973), 426. °V. A. Rodionov et al., eds., Saratovskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1975 (Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1977) , 25, 42. pD. A. Smorodinskov, ed., Ocherki istorii partlinoi organizatsii Tiumenskoi oblastI (Sverdlovsk: Sredne-Ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatel'stvo, 1965), 254. qN. I. Shmarakov, ed., Ocherki istorii Tul'skoi organizatsii KPSS (Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo Tula, 1967), 504. rV. I. lurchuk, ed., Ocherki istorii kommunisticheskoi partii Ukrainy, 4th ed. (Kiev: Izdatel'stvo politicheskoi literatury ukrainy, 1977), 370. 8S. I. Surnichenko, ed., Ocherki istorii Vladimirskoi organizatsii KPSS (Yaroslavl’: Verkhne-Volzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1972), 370. *L. G. Sharaev, ed., Ocherki Voroshiiovgradskoi oblastnoi partiinoi organizatsii (Kiev: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury ukrainy, 1979), 33.

Table 9.2 Distribution of Political Generations in Party Organizations (percentage of Party membership)

Party Organization Belorussia (1946) Cheliabinsk Oblast (1946) Kalinin Oblast (1945) (1950) Leningrad Oblast (1945) (1946) (1947) Moscow Oblast (1947) Perm Oblast (Molotov) Saratov Oblast (1947) Ukraine (1946) Uzbekistan (1948) (1950) Volgograd Oblast (1945) (1947

1937-1940 (Percentage)

1941-1946* (Percentage)

28.2«

35.8b

11.7«

67«

25.6d 12*

47.2* 61.3d

12.4*

10. 6*

9.4«

50.2e 58e 58.2e

13.2r

56.4f

168

58.58

9.7Q

60.18

15.2h

65.8h 60*>

17.6' 13.6'

65.2* 49.2'

27.91 16.61

35.11 62.81

el. M. Ignatenko and S. S. Mokhovikov, eds., Kommunisticheskaia partiia Belorussii v tsifrakh 1918-1978 (Minsk: Belarus’, 1978), 115. bT. I. Baradulina, “Povyshenie ideino teoreticheskogo urovnia kommunistov v raionakh osvobozhdennykh ot fasnistskoi okkupatsii," in L. V. Shivikov, ed., Deiatei'nosV KPSS vpervye gody posle Velikoi Otechestvennoi volny (Moscow: Akademiia obshchestvennykh nauk pri TsK KPSS, 1978), 2. «Z. V. Shestakov et al., eds., V bœvykh raidakh leninskoi partir. Cheliabinskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1977 (Cheliabinsk: luzhno-ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, 1978), 114. dA. V. Egorov, ed., Kalininskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1977 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1979), 63. •S. S. Dmitriev et al., eds., Leningradskaia organizatsia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974), 89-90. fG.Î. Shitarev et al., eds., Moskovskaia gorodskaia i moskovskaia oblastnaia organizatsii KPSS v tsifrakh (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1972), 110. 8G. G. Chazov et al., eds., Permskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973 (Perm: Permskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1974), 92. hV. A. Rodionov et al., eds., Saratovskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1975 (Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel stvo, 1977), 95. 'N. T. Bezrukov, ed., Kommunisticheskaia partiia Uzbekistana v tsifrakh (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1979), 141, 159. IA. P. Nevstuev et al., eds., Volgogradskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1978 (Volgograd: Nizhne-Volzhskoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, 1978), 38-39. ‘ Unless noted otherwise, data are for the 1941-1946 generation. Kalininskaia Oblast and Volgogradskaia Oblast Party data in 1945 are for the 1941-1944 generation. Data for the Leningradskaia Oblast Party in 1945 are for the 1941-1945 generation. Uzbek Party data in 1950 are for the 1941-1945 generation.

Table 9.3 Social Composition of Local Party Membership (by percentage)

1941

Worker 1945 1946

1947

1941

Peasant 1946 1945

1947

1941

White Collar 1946 1945

1947

Northwest 46.7 47.5 45.3 4.1 61.7 49.2 4.5 29.0 Leningrad* 51.1 48.1 9.3 3.6 Central Chernozem 44.0 43.4 16.4 43.1 39.4 12.7 31.9 Kuibyshev6 40.7 28.7 16.2 39.6 44.0 44.3 44.0 43.8 Saratov* 42.7* 35.2 34.7 20.8 21.0 31.6* 37.2 25.7* 19.0 Central 50.7 46.3 44.9 Kalinind 31.2 19.2 26.5 22.5 39.1 37.6 30.1 28.6 23.3 Urals 42.6 43.0 8.7 43.5 47.4 47.1 47.1 10.3 Chelyabinsk* 13.3 9.9 39.1 47.8 48.2 37.7 49.0 48.8 Molotov1 36.4 11.1 15.4 14.3 39.9 36.9 17.0 45.3 Western Siberia N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 42.0 N.A. 30.5 Altaio N.A. 3.5 27.3 30.9 30.6 43.7 44.3 Kazakhstan6 36.4 30.7 29.5 35.6 42.8 25.0 26.2 31.3 28.0 26.5 45.7 43.2 44.0 30.7 39.7 23.7 31.7 Uzbekistan1 28.2 32.1 32.3 25.1 23.6 N.A. N.A. N.A. 34.1 48.3 33.7 22.2 N.A. 18 43.7 N.A. N.A. VKP(b)i aS. S. Dmitriev et al., eds., Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974), 72-74. bF. P. Zakharov et al., eds., Kuibyshevskaia oblastnaia partiinaia organizatsiia v dokumentakh i tsifrakh (1902-1977 gg.) (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1978), 142. *V. A. Rodionov et al., eds., Saratovskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1975 (Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1977), 64. dA. V. Egorov, ed., Kalininskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1977 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1979), 39. «Z. V. Shestakov et al., eds., V boevykh riadakh leninskoi partii: Chelianbinskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1977 (Cheliabinsk: luzhno-ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1978), 76. fG. G. Chazov et al., eds., Permskaia oblastnaia organizatsiia KPSS v tsifrakh 1917-1973 (Perm: Permskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1974), 64. oN. la. Grishchin et al., Obshchestvenno-politicheskaia zhizn’ sovetskoi sibirskoi derevni (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1974), 111. hS. B. Beisembaev and P. M. Pakhmurnyi, eds., Kommunisticheskaia partiia Kazakhstana v dokumentakh i tsifrakh (Alma Ata: Kazakhskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1960), 250, 281, 303. ‘N. T. Bezrukov, ed., Kommunisticheskaia partiia Uzbekistana v tsifrakh 1924-1977 gg. (Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1979), 123, 129, 140. tData for 1941 are from, V. Beliakov and N. Zolotarev, Partiia ukrepliaet svoi riady (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970), 143. Data for 1947 are from “KPSS v tsifrakh,” Partiinaia zhizn', no. 21 (November 1977):28. ‘ Data are for 1940.

166

Cynthia S. Kaplan

Table 9.4 Kolkhozy with Primary Party Organizations by Oblast and Republic

Percentage Chernigov Chkalov Chuvash Gorki Kaluga Kherson Kirgiz Kirov Kostroma Krim Kurgan Odessa Perm (Molotov) Tadzhikistàn Turkmen Tiumen Udmurt Uzbekistan

1946

1947

2.0 37.0 15.1 11.8 1.0 4.3 57.1 1.8 8.0 8.0 3.0 1.2 3.0 20.6 41.5 5.5 3.6 46.2

21.0 60.0 41.7 23.6 4.4 22.1 67.4 5.2 12.4 20.2 22.0 9.6 8.1 26.1 54.3 14.6 8.0 56.0

Source: V. N. Donchenko, "Perestroika riadov VKP(b)," 158.

collapsed as a result o f m ilitary m obilization o f C om m unists, while o th er organizations were transform ed into can d id ate a n d kom som ol groups.32 In 1940, 12.6 percent o f kolkhozy had PPO s; in 1945, 15.5 percen t.33 T hese figures, however, are som ew hat m isleading. F rom th e beginning o f th e w ar until 1943, the num ber o f kolkhoz P rim ary P arty O rganizations declined, w ith the exception o f those in W estern Siberia a n d C entral A sia as seen in Table 9.4.34 T he disprop o rtio n ately high percentage o f kolkhozy w ith PPO s in C entral Asia stem s from the larger size o f kolkhozy there. In Siberia, the expansion o f the P arty netw ork reflects the influx o f evacuees an d urban cadres as well as agriculture’s heightened p rio rity due to the N azi occupation o f the cou n try ’s m ost fertile land. P rim ary P arty O rganizations located at kolkhozy te n d ed to be sm aller th an those at industrial enterprises.35 D u rin g the war, m any kolkhoz P P O s had only three to five C o m m u n ists.36 T h is can be a ttrib u te d to th e low levels o f rural P arty m em bership before the w ar as well as the direct effect o f m ilitary m obilization. D u rin g the first year an d a h a lf o f the war, the num ber o f rural C om m unists declined by 56 percent. By 1945, the n u m b er o f C om m unists w orking in agriculture reached 67.6 percent o f th eir Jan u ary 1941 com plem ent.37 W ith postw ar dem obilization, ru ral co m m u n ists ex­ ceeded their prew ar num bers by 11.6 percent (1946) na sele a n d th eir p rim ary party m em bership by 22.8 p ercent.38 R ural P arty personnel policies from 1946 u n til th e am algam ation o f kolkhozy in 1950 transferred C o m m u n ists from T errito rial P arty O rgani-

The Impact of World War II on the Party

167

zations to sm all kolkhoz P arty organizations. T hese policies also focused recruitm ent efforts on m em bers o f the ru ral intelligentsia.39 T hus, th e w ar increased the nu m b er o f ru ral C om m unists, strengthened prew ar tren d s th at sought to establish kolkhoz P PO s, a n d decreased the scope o f T errito rial P arty O rganizations. N evertheless, the degree o f the P a rty ’s p en etratio n a n d sa turation in the countryside rem ain ed low. O verall, the w ar transfo rm ed the n atu re o f the P arty through a m assive influx o f new m em bers. Local P arty organizations in occupied areas an d those w ith sm all prew ar m em berships w ere m ost extensively affected by th e war, those in C entral A sia the least. T he w ar’s direct effects on local P arty m em bership were m odified by the evacuation o f P arty m em bers from occupied regions, civilian recruitm ent, a n d the tran sfer o f experienced P arty m em bers to newly incorpo rated areas.40 T he im m ensity o f w artim e P arty enrollm ents resulted in the d o m in a tio n o f P arty organizations throughout the country by the 1941-1946 political generation. As a whole, postw ar P arty m em bers w ere b etter educated a n d younger th a n th e ir predecessors, b u t they lacked political education a n d professional experience. T his was due to an easing o f adm ission requirem ents durin g the w ar.41 T he m assive w artim e recru itm en t broadened b u t d id not reverse the p rew ar tren d tow ard enrolling increasing num bers o f w hite-collar em ployees. T he n um ber o f P arty m em bers w ith w hite-collar social origins rose in P arty organizations throughout the Soviet U nion. T he d istrib u tio n o f w orkers an d peasants in local P arties reflected regional econom ic characteristics. O ften, however, d ata o n social com position h id the actual occupational d istrib u tio n o f P arty m em bership since w hite-collar em ployees w ith w orker a n d peasant backgrounds were classified in the latte r categories rath e r th a n the former. D espite w artim e changes, the m ajor prew ar characteristics o f ru ral P arty organizations rem ained— the sm all n u m b er a n d size o f kolkhoz PPO s, the transfer o f te rrito ria l P arty m em bers to new kolkhoz PPO s, a n d the recruitm ent o f the rural intelligentsia. T he im pact o f peasant recruitm ent d uring the w ar w as m oderated by u rb an m igration a n d frequent ap p o in tm en ts o f ru ral P arty m em bers to p ositions o f au th o rity (usually w hite-collar) in the countryside.42 W ar-induced changes in the m ass P arty co n trib u ted to the developm ent o f a n um ber o f postw ar policies. T he m assive influx o f young P arty m em bers w ith little political education co n trib u ted to the intensification o f political in do ctrin atio n during the 1940s. Political education was expanded by es­ tablishing local, regional, an d national P arty schools as well as by heightening em phasis on propaganda an d agitation.43 C oncern over the political reliability o f new P arty m em bers, an d in particular, the lower levels o f the apparatus, led to a p eriod o f P arty consolidation d u rin g the late 1940s. R ecruitm ent du ring the postw ar period becam e increasingly selective, em phasizing in ­ d ividual qualifications.44 W artim e P arty recruits were frequently chosen for im p o rta n t local eco­ nom ic an d political positions. T he ap p o in tees’ lack o f political experience a n d specialized train in g co n trib u ted to th e high tu rn o v er rates found am ong

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Cynthia S. Kaplan

local P arty secretaries (ra ik o m a n d P P O secretaries) a n d agricultural leaders, p articularly kolkhoz chairm en.45 In d u strial m anagers w ere to som e extent exem pted from these tren d s due to selection criteria req u irin g greater technical educational qualifications. M ost o f all, the w ar delayed postpurge cadres from gaining professional experience. A fter the war, these inexpe­ rienced leaders were jo in ed by the P a rty ’s raw recruits from the w artim e generation.

THE PARTY APPARATUS T he Second W orld W ar’s prim a ry im pact on th e Soviet political elite rests in the nature o f the elite’s experience rath e r th a n changes in its com position. A lthough P arty leaders m ade frequent shifts am ong positions, the w ar d id not produce a change in the political generation a t the u p p er a n d in term ed iate levels o f the P arty apparatu s.46 T hus, the im pact o f the w artim e experience was determ ined at least in p a rt by the ch aracteristics o f w artim e P a rty leaders. T hese leaders were to d o m inate Soviet politics for decades to com e.47 M ost postw ar P arty leaders assum ed th e ir first leadership roles d u rin g the years from 1939 to 1941 as a result o f the purges. T he absence o f older political generations allowed postpurge leaders to establish th e ir ow n p attern s o f inform al behavior.48 Such behavior was subject to form al policies, personnel characteristics, an d conditions affecting inform al activities. P rew ar m obi­ lization prevented the evolution o f postpurge P arty b eh av io r from developing into stable adm inistrative patterns. T he w ar not only destroyed th is process b u t itself proved a source o f professional socialization. T hus, th e q u estio n is not so m uch one o f how the w ar affected the com position o f th e P arty apparatus, b u t rather how sensitive a n d open the postpurge generation w as to the w artim e experience. A lthough Stalin a n d his direct subordinates d o m in ated th e political process in the USSR, an exclusive focus upo n th em m isses the inform al aspects o f political life. T he P arty ap p aratu s, view ed as an organization, w as capable o f affecting policy through im plem entation. P arty beh av ior evolved as a product not only o f form al directives b u t also o f those factors th a t affect local P arty a p p a ra tc h ik i in carry in g o u t th e ir functions. A m ong th e m ost im p o rtan t participants in th is process are m em bers o f th e ob la st (provincial), g o ro d (city), an d raion (district) P arty com m ittees, th e ir b u reau s a n d secretaries. W ho were these m em bers o f the p ostw ar P arty ap p aratu s? F irst o b k o m secretaries in 1941 h ad entered the P arty d u rin g the 1920s, often com pleting their education after som e w ork experience. They w ere educated during a period w hen academ ic sta n d ard s w ere lax a n d p olitical subjects co nstituted a large percentage o f the cu rricu lu m . O ften such leaders served in political capacities while they p u rsu ed th e ir educations.49 O b k o m secretaries serving in agricultural oblasts te n d ed to be som ew hat o ld er a n d m ore poorly educated th an those in in d u strial o b lasts.50 D uring the postw ar period, the im m ed iate beneficiaries o f the purges began to give way to a slightly younger a n d b etter educated c o h o rt w ho

The Impact of World War II on the Party

169

Table 9.5 Education of Obkom, Raikom, and Republic Central Committee Secretaries (percentages)

1946 1952

Higher and Incomplete Higher

Secondary

Incomplete Secondary

50.2 77.8

27.9 17.0

11.1 3.7

Primary

10.8 .7

Source: Data for 1946 are from V. N. Donchenko, “Perestroika riadov VKP(b),“ 213. Data for 1952 are from “KPSS v tsifrakh,” Partiinaia zhizn’ 14 (July 1973), 25.

entered the P arty during in d u strializatio n a n d collectivization. T his was p articularly tru e in in d u strial oblasts. T he political tenure o f o b k o m first secretaries in 1955 reflects these postw ar elite personnel changes. A pprox­ im ately one-fifth o f the o b k o m first secretaries in industrial oblasts an d R SFSR oblasts had pre-1950 tenure.51 Such changes resulted in an increase in the educational levels found am ong obkom , k ra ik o m , a n d republican central-com m ittee P arty secretaries as shown in Table 9.5. A lthough P arty leaders’ educations rem ained p rim arily political, industrial specializations did increase. A relatively sm all percentage o f first ob k o m secretaries prio r to 1953 pu rsu ed agricultural specializations.52 Thus, the tren d tow ard increased expertise was m uch stronger am ong secretaries in in d u strial areas th an am ong those in agricultural regions.53 T hese educational differences co n trib u ted to different styles o f P arty leadership. B etter educated P arty leaders in in d u strial regions were m ore likely to com prehend the com plex problem s confronted by in d u strial m a n ­ agers an d less likely to attem p t to im pose political solutions. O b k o m secretaries increasingly shared a com m on background w ith industrial m a n ­ agers. T his fostered a cooperative relationship betw een political a n d industrial leaders. P arty secretaries relied u pon in d u strial m anagers’ greater expertise a n d experience, w hereas the m anagers looked to the secretaries for assistance in circum venting production p ro b lem s.54 P arty secretaries’ relations w ith agricultural leaders differed significantly from those o f th eir co u n terp arts in the u rb an in d u strial sphere. R ural political leaders d uring the 1940s a n d 1950s functioned w ithin a relatively u n sophisticated, politicized environm ent. O b k o m secretaries had to depend upon lower-level political leaders to insure agricultural policy im plem entation because o f the n ature o f agricultural production. O b k o m P arty m em bers increasingly becam e m onito rs o f results an d issuers o f directives, the latter subject to fu rth er specification by ra ik o m secretaries. T he central econom ic figure in policy im plem entation in agriculture was the kolkhoz chairm an. T he potential for P arty leaders to develop an interdependent relationship w ith kolkhoz chairm en was low, since the m ajority o f kolkhoz chairm en were inexperienced, lacked specialized education a n d training, an d frequently, were not even P arty m em b ers.55 Political solutions a n d the supplanting o f

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kolkhoz chairm en by raion-level cadres o r th e ir representatives w as a freq u en t response to o b k o m pressure, especially w hen p lan targets failed to be m e t.56 F rom an agricultural perspective, political leaders from g o rk o m s, u rb an raikom s, an d especially rural ra ik o m s influenced P arty b eh av io r through their roles in policy im plem entation. T h eir qualifications reflected the preferences o f central policy m akers an d the u n in te n d ed consequences o f the war. To w hat extent was th is in term ed iate level o f the P arty a p p a ratu s affected by the war? How do the background characteristics o f th is group com pare to those at the oblast level? Like their o b k o m counterparts, m any o f the prew ar a p p a ra tc h ik i a t city an d district levels assum ed th e ir positions in th e im m ed iate postpurge p eriod.57 T his group was subject to w ide-scale m obilization a t the beginning o f the w ar.58 M any o f those m obilized or w ho jo in e d p artisa n m ovem ents did not survive.59 Local P arty apparatus included large num bers o f new, inexperienced cadres after the war. In R ostov O blasf, for exam ple, only 17 o u t o f 155 oblast com m ittee w orkers had p rew ar P arty experience.60 In L eningrad, 88.5 percent o f the g o rk o m an d ra ik o m m em bers h ad d ep a rted d u rin g the first m onths o f the war.61 A t the en d o f the war, 82.6 percent o f the L eningrad P arty apparatus was new.62 In Belorussia in 1946, 28 percent o f th e r a ik o m an d g o rk o m secretaries were elected for the first tim e, 45 percent o f th e ra ik o m an d g o rk o m bureau m em bers, a n d 64 percent o f the to ta l ra ik o m a n d g o rk o m m em bership.63 In Sm olensk, o u t o f 1037 m em bers o f ra ik o m s a n d g o rk o m s before the war, only 178 rem ain ed at its conclusion.64 P a rty organizations located away from the front w ere also affected. In Saratov, g o rk o m an d ra ik o m m em bership sharply declined d u rin g the w ar.65 Even in Siberia, g o rk o m an d ra ik o m secretaries u nderw ent a su b stan tial renew al.66 D ata from K alinin O blast provide a som ew hat m ore detailed p icture o f cadre changes caused by the war. A ccording to th e F irst Secretary o f th e K alinin O bkom , I. Boitsov, K alin in ’s experience w as typical. O f the ra ik o m an d g o rk o m m em bers as o f 1 Jan u ary 1945, a to tal o f 28.9 percent h ad less th an one year o f jo b tenure, 57.6 percent h ad one to th ree years, w hile only 13.5 percent had three or m ore years. A m ong the to ta l m em b ersh ip o f 396 individuals in the K alin in P arty ap p aratu s, 86 percent (319) had em barked upon leading P arty w ork d u rin g the war. A ccording to Boitsov, there was a tendency to retain first ra ik o m secretaries m ore frequently th a n other m em bers o f the apparatu s, b u t nonetheless, “ th e m ajority o f cadres were young an d th eir leadership experience— w as th e experience o f th e w artim e period.’’67 The K alinin findings are su p p o rted by d ata from o th e r P arty organizations. T he num ber o f a p p a ra tc h ik i w ithout full-tim e P arty w ork experience grew even after the,in itial m ilitary m obilization. C adre tu rn o v er rates reflect this. For exam ple, M oscow urban ra ik o m s a n d g o rk o m s had a tu rn o v er rate o f 32.5 percent in 1943; from 1944 to the beginning o f 1945, o n e-h alf o f the u rban ra ik o m an d g o rk o m m em bers w ere replaced, as w ere 68 p ercent o f those in the oblast.68 In K uibyshev d u rin g the p erio d from 1945 to 1946,

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m ore th a n 75 percent o f g o rk o m an d ra ik o m secretaries were replaced.69 In W estern S iberia after the p ostw ar elections, one-fourth to on e-th ird o f all P arty secretaries w ere new to th e ir po sitio n s.70 In Belorussia, 494 ra ik o m secretaries w ere rem oved (1945-1946), in K aluga O blast, 36.2 percent o f P arty w orkers w ere replaced, including 23 ra ik o m secretaries (1946), in V ologodskaga O blast 40 percent o f ra ik o m secretaries (1946), in K irov O blast 46 percent o f ra ik o m secretaries (1947) were replaced.71 T hus, by the conclusion o f the postw ar P arty electoral m eetings, local P arty ap p aratu s h ad undergone a substantial renew al throughout the country. A m ong ra ik o m secretaries, 39.9 percent were newly elected, including 27.5 percent for the first tim e. Sim ilarly, 52.2 percent o f raio n bureau m em bers were newly elected, 35.3 percent for th e first tim e.72 As a result o f w artim e an d im m ed iate postw ar cadre changes, the 1931 to 1940 political generation d o m in ated the ap p aratu s. Som e a p p a ra tc h ik i a t the interm ediate level w ere even w artim e recruits. T hus, political leaders at the district an d city level cam e from a m ore recent political generation th a n th e ir superiors at the oblast level. T hus, m iddle-level P arty leaders h ad less practical political experience a n d education th a n those oblast P arty cadres w ho had assum ed th e ir first full-tim e P arty positions at the en d o f the purges (Table 9.6). In term ediate level a p p a ra tc h ik i after th e w ar h ad relatively low levels o f education. T h eir education levels rose d u rin g recovery as a result o f b oth personnel changes an d the fu rth e r education o f incum bents. T h is tren d is reflected in d ata dealing w ith areas th roughout the U SSR (Table 9.7).73 N ational d ata conceal im p o rta n t educational d isp arities am ong P arty organizations th a t correspo n d to an u rb an -ru ral cleavage. In som e oblasts, the percentage o f leading Party workers with only primary education was much higher, especially am ong secretaries o f rural rà ik o m s , significantly higher than the average. Thus, in the G or’ kovskoi oblast Party organization the percentage o f r a ik o m secretaries with only primary education was 27.5 percent, in Nizhnego Povolzh’ ia— 38 percent, in Kurganskoi— 40 percent, in Kaluzhskoi— 43.2 percent, and in Stalingradskoi— 61 percent.74

T he L eningrad P arty organization exem plifies these differences. In 1946, 58 percent o f city r a ik o m secretaries had higher educations, w hile only 8.5 percent o f the ra ik o m an d g o rk o m secretaries in the oblast organization h ad attain ed a com parable level o f education. D u rin g 1947, the P arty m ade a concerted effort to increase educational levels w ithin the apparatus. By 1948, 77.4 percent o f L eningrad’s u rb an ra ik o m a n d g o rk o m secretaries h ad a com parable level.75 In M oscow O blast, 45 percent o f ra ik o m secretaries h ad a t least an incom plete higher education as com pared to 70 percent o f those in the capital.76 A lthough ru ral ra ik o m secretaries’ educations im proved, th is increase d id not alleviate sectoral differences. T he d istrib u tio n o f specialized education w ith in the ap p a ratu s also conform ed to sectoral differences. In 1947, 9.8 percent o f the total P arty h ad higher a n d incom plete higher educations, a n d 47.1 percent secondary

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Table 9.6 The Political Generation of Raion Party Committee and Revkom M embers (1948)

Pre-1930 1931-1940 1941-1948

Secretaries (Percentage)

Bureau Members (Percentage)

Committee Members (Percentage)

31 54 15

28.3 49.4 22.3

39.2 59.4

20.2

Source: ‘‘Povyshat’ rol* raikomov kak organov,” 27.

a n d incom plete secondary. O f those w ith higher education 40.1 percent were in the field o f engineering a n d 6.3 percent agronom y, v eterin ary science, an d other agricultural specialities. T he strong preference for in d u stria l fields was also found am ong those w ith secondary level ed u catio n — 25.8 percent had technical training and 5.1 percent train in g in agronom y, v eterin ary science, and other agricultural fields.77 T he d isp arity in educational levels an d fields o f specialization suggests a m ore technically com p eten t u rb an P arty leadership, particularly at the d istrict level, th a n in the ru ral Party. However, the influence o f education on b eh av io r should be ev alu ated in light o f the relative qualifications o f state a n d econom ic cadres as it affected their inform al authority relations a n d th eir ability to perform th e ir jobs. The postw ar local P arty ap p a ratu s was com posed o f politically inex­ perienced leaders draw n prim arily from the postpurge a n d w artim e gen­ erations. W hile their educational levels rose d u rin g the po stw ar period, urban-rural differences rem ained. O verall, the inexperience o f local P arty leaders in full-tim e P arty positions suggests th a t the w artim e experience was likely to strongly influence th e ir future behavior.78

The Wartime Experience and Party Behavior The w ar represented a crucial experience in the professional socialization o f postw ar P arty appa ra tch ik i. Its im pact was heightened by the inexperience o f postw ar P arty leaders an d by the fact th at the P a rty ’s prew ar role w as in transition. W hile w artim e experiences undou b ted ly influenced in d iv id u al P arty m em bers, how d id the w ar affect th e P a rty ’s organizational behavior? The w ar encouraged the centralization o f pow er a n d au th o rity thro u g h o u t the Soviet system .79 T his centralization had different consequences for the P arty in the m ilitary an d civilian sectors. In the arm y, P arty professionals were rem oved from direct m ilitary co m m an d . Political w orkers in th e arm ed forces could not officially intervene in m ilitary decision m aking.80 T h is strengthened the principle o f e d in o n a ch a lie (one m an m anagem ent), am ong m ilitary leaders. In ad d itio n to its agitational activities, th e P arty recru ited large num bers not only o f enlisted personnel b u t also o f m ilita ry co m m an d ers. W hile three-fourths o f those recruited were from th e ran k s o f th e arm e d

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Table 9.7 The Education ot Okruzhkom, Qorkom, and Raikom Party Secretaries

1946 1952

Higher and Incomplete Higher (Percentage)

Secondary (Percentage)

18.7 62.3

3.2 25.5

Incomplete Secondary (Percentage) 23.9 9.2

Primary (Percentage) 25.4 3.0

Source: Data for 1946 are from V. N. Donchenko, "Perestroika riadov VKP(b)," 213. Data for 1952 are from "KPSS v tsifrakh," Partiinaia zhizn’ no. 14 (July 1973):25.

forces, P arty satu ratio n am ong co m m an d ers was high. Eighty percent o f co m m anding officers w ere either P arty o r k o m s o m o l m em bers.81 D u rin g th e postw ar period, dem obilized P arty m em bers w ith som e co m m an d experience w ere frequently chosen for positions o f authority. T his fostered a direct style o f P arty leadership. T he question o f centralization w ithin the civilian sector was m ore com plex th an in the m ilitary. Indeed, centralization w hen applied to the civilian sector is som ew hat o f a m isnom er. A uthority was concentrated in the h ands o f the party, b u t central control by M oscow o f local p arty organs varied. T h is concentration o f au th o rity also called into qu estio n p arty econom ic a n d political duties. W ere p arty m em bers to becom e involved in directing the econom y, or were they to lim it th e ir activities to the supervision an d verification o f econom ic activ ities in o rder to concentrate on political m atters? D uring the prew ar m obilization, the p arty becam e increasingly involved in econom ic m atters, especially in industry. T he E ighteenth P arty C onference held in 1941 established enlarged local d ep a rtm en ts w ithin p arty com m ittees based on ind u strial branches, thus reversing the functional organization established in 1939.82 D efense a n d heavy-industry d ep artm en ts sought to redirect production to w artim e needs. A t the sam e tim e, p arty bureaus a n d cells in in d u stry w ere granted the rights o f P P O s.83 All o f this led to the p a rty ’s direct particip atio n in local decision m aking du rin g the w ar.84 M any o f the p a rty ’s activities, however, involved regional coordination in the ind u strial sector.85 A lthough “ a countryw ide p ro duction netw ork was established by central plann in g organizations, in practice, a system existed based upo n local p arty organizations.” 86 W hat d id th is m ean for the role o f P arty m em bers vis-à-vis in d u strial m anagers? P arty m em bers’ in d u strial activ ities increased. As a rep o rt by the K irov F actory P arty co m m ittee noted, econom ic a n d political leadership was u nited. Yet, at the factory level th is frequently m ean t th a t the P arty enforced the directives o f the factory director.87 A t the o b k o m level, the P arty assum ed co ordination o f responsibilities associated w ith areal ad m in istratio n . Thus, P arty leaders becam e econom ic a d m in istra to rs w ithout displacing in d u strial m anagers. N. S. Patolichev’s account o f his w artim e experience in C heliabinsk as first o b k o m secretary provides a d escription o f the P arty leader’s rela-

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tionship w ith industrial leaders. Patolichev states th a t in spite o f close, direct relations w ith the M in istry o f F errous M etallurgy, he nonetheless relied upon experienced factory directors in decisions affecting th e ir en ter­ prises. Indeed, the absence o f specific directives from M oscow forced P atolichev an d local in dustrial m anagers to act as a decision-m aking te a m .88 Thus, an interdependent relationship ap pears to have arisen betw een P a­ tolichev as first o b k o m P arty secretary a n d the directors o f m a jo r in d u stria l enterprises. Patolichev recognized a n d relied u p o n directors’ expertise, w hile they turned to him for expediting an d coo rd in atin g functions. D uring the war, obkom s, g o rk o m s, a n d r a ik o m s w ere involved in coor­ dinating econom ic activities throughout the S oviet U nion. T h is type o f behavior occurred in areas w hich redirected existing in d u strial p ro d u ctio n to w artim e needs as well as in those w hich received evacuated en terp rises.89 A t tim es, the P arty ’s increased w artim e involvem ent d id lead to d irect intervention, especially in areas located closest to the front.90 Yet, co o rd in atio n rem ained the dom in an t p attem . M any local P arty organizations, p articu larly u rban raikom s, expanded th eir co o rdinating role at th e expense o f raio n soviets. In part, this resulted from the form ation o f troikas, w hich u n ite d Party, soviet, an d econom ic leaders, b u t w hich w ere inevitably headed by the raion P arty secretaries.91 O verall, th e P a rty ’s responsibility for a n d involvem ent in industry an d econom ic ad m in istra tio n increased, b u t a t least in the case o f heavy industry, th is d id n o t include the P a rty ’s displacem ent o f industrial m anagers. T he P arty confronted a different set o f problem s in agriculture th a n in industry. A lthough the P arty had yet to develop an extensive involvem ent in this sector before the war, the C entral C o m m ittee’s decision to m ake ra ik o m m em bers an d p o lito td e l w orkers at M achine T ractor S tations a n d sovkhozy personally responsible for agricultural production, forced local P arties to respond to the w artim e crisis.92 T he P a rty ’s d irect in te rv en tio n was encouraged by its low penetration o f the countryside, the absence o f P arty m em bers in positions o f au th o rity in agriculture, a n d th e generally low level o f qualifications a n d lack o f experience found am ong agricultural leaders— all factors intensified by the w ar.93 T he weakened state o f agricultural pro d u ctio n along w ith the P a rty ’s low rural profile fostered its reliance on ex trao rd in ary m easures. A lthough ra ik o m s an d ra iisp o lk o m s (executive co m m ittees o f d istric t soviets) decided the m ajor econom ic an d political q uestions o f the countryside d u rin g the war, crisis m anagem ent fell to the p u rv iew o f special P a rty representatives such as the heads o f political sections at M achine T ractor S tations a n d sovkhozy a n d ra ik o m plenip o ten tiaries.94 T hese leaders frequently su p p lan ted local econom ic cadres, especially kolkhoz ch airm en .95 A ccording to p ublished reports o f the period, they showed m in im al in terest in political activ itie s.96 T he ra ik o m itself often functioned as a d istric t agricultural a d m in istra tio n w ith relatively little direct involvem ent in p ro d u ctio n activ ities.97 W ith th e abolition o f p o lito td e ly in 1943, the m ajo r responsibility for agricultural perform ance fell to the ra ik o m . R u ral ra ik o m s co n tin u ed to rely on pleni-

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p o ten tiaries who, in fact, co n stitu ted the m ajor link betw een kolkhozy an d the d istrict center. T hus, th e ru ral P arty developed a style o f crisis m a n ­ agem ent th a t depended on special representatives w ho ultim ately un d erm in ed the auth o rity o f agricultural leaders. In general, the w ar increased the econom ic activ ities o f local P arty cadres, w hile dow ngrading th eir political role. T h eir expanded econom ic role varied betw een in d u stry an d agriculture. In industry, the P a rty ’s w artim e role em phasized coordinating activ ities and, less frequently, econom ic ad m in ­ istration. A cooperative relatio n sh ip betw een o b k o m s an d the leaders o f heavy in d u stry developed du rin g the war, a relationship th a t reinforced the growing autonom y found am ong in d u strial m anagers during the 1930s. To the extent th a t r a ik o m an d o b k o m P arty a p p a ra tc h ik i assum ed econom ic tasks, d u ring the war, the postw ar regim e’s desire to focus P arty efforts on p ropaganda an d agitation activ ities a n d supervision an d verification in in d u stry w as inhibited. Efforts begun at th e en d o f the 1930s to strengthen ru ral ra ik o m s were th w arted by the war, p articu larly through the reestablishm ent o f political sections at M achine T ractor S tations a n d sovkhozy.98 T he increased form al responsibility o f ru ral ra ik o m s fostered th eir fu rth e r reliance on plenipo­ tentiaries, w ho often supplanted agricultural leaders. T h is response, reinforced by the w artim e crisis atm osphere, becam e a com m on m odus op eran d i during the postw ar years. O verall, the w ar reinforced rural P arty leaders’ tendency to resort to ex traordinary m eans, usually political, in order to insure agricultural production. T he displacem ent o f agricultural leaders by P arty representatives lim ited th eir professional autonom y. T h is p attern o f behavior h in d ered postw ar efforts th a t sought to encourage a less direct style o f leadership.

The C on sequ en ces of the War T he w ar intervened as the P arty was relinquishing its in stru m en tal role in econom ic an d social developm ent a n d assum ing a m ore conservative ad ­ m in istrativ e role over Soviet in stitu tio n s. Postw ar P arty policy sought to create a P arty th a t w ould realign its political a n d econom ic functions. R ather th an acting as state ad m in istra to rs or line personnel, the postw ar P arty was to develop an indirect style o f leadership, em phasizing the supervision an d verification o f policy im plem entation. T hese changes were consistent w ith those begun during the late 1930s. T hey should not, however, be confused w ith the increased centralization o f internal P arty control th a t arose in response to the postw ar ap p a ratu s’ lack o f political experience a n d training. T he P arty ’s increased particip a tio n in econom ic decision m aking a n d the close relationship th at arose betw een som e P arty leaders a n d in d u strial m anagers com plicated the realization o f its new, officially prescribed role.99 T he postw ar m odel o f P arty beh av io r included tasks th at were in som e tension w ith each other. As L azar Slepov, a leading P arty theoretician, noted, P arty com m ittees are

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organs o f political leadership. Their tasks are to unite and direct the activities o f all state and public organizations. Party com m ittees are responsible for the economy. The Party judges the work o f one or another Party organization according to tangible results in the field o f econom y and culture, the standard o f living, and the serving o f workers’needs. However, Party organizations have the possibility o f rendering necessary leadership in the course o f econ om ic construction on the activities o f econom ic organizations: not supplanting econom ic enterprises and administrations, and not taking upon themselves the direct decision o f all econom ic questions.100

Thus, P arty leadership involved not only the in d irect influence o f o th er organizations through personnel decisions, b u t the “ su p erv isio n ( ko n tro V ) o f cadre work an d the rendering o f assistance in the actual im p lem en tatio n o f p arty an d governm ent decisions. A n im p o rta n t aspect o f political leadership rests in the P arty organizations’ supervision o f the w ork o f econom ic organs.” 101 The desire to have P arty organs follow th e details o f policy im plem entation an d assum e responsibility for econom ic results, although restrained from econom ic decisionm aking, m ade the realization o f th e P a rty ’s new role difficult. Slepov was clearly aw are o f th is tension w hen he w rote th at “ P arty organs are called upon to unite, direct, an d supervise, b u t not to supplant nor to elim inate the personal responsibility o f soviet an d econom ic organs.” 102 T his style o f postw ar P arty leadership req u ired econom ic leaders w hose expertise could help insure satisfactory plan fulfillm ent a n d necessitated the existence o f PPO s th at could m onitor w ork-place ac tiv ities a n d c a rry o u t propaganda an d agitation. These prerequisites were b etter m et in in d u stry than in agriculture. T he econom ic a n d h u m an consequences o f the w ar— the decline in the labor force, w ide-scale econom ic destruction, a n d investm ent preferences— also favored industry. P arty recru itm en t am ong w hite-collar em ployees who often held in d u strial positions fu rth e r assisted the p a rty ’s transition to an indirect role in industry. Indeed, even econom ic targets were m ore reasonable in in d u stry th a n in ag ricu ltu re.103 All th is m ean t th a t the better educated in dustrial m anagers were m ore likely to succeed w ith in a sector that relied increasingly on expertise. T hus, b o th in d u stria l m anagers and P arty leaders benefited from an in terd ep en d en t relatio n sh ip in w hich the form er enjoyed increasing autonom y an d th e la tte r assisted through obtaining and coordinating su p p o rt for in d u strial p roduction. T he w artim e experience o f P arty leaders encouraged th is evolving relationship. O f course, not all factors favored the P a rty ’s ad o p tio n o f a new role in industry th at focused on “ p rincipled questions,” policy issues, a n d critical supervision. For exam ple, o b k o m secretaries w ere accused o f developing a narrow approach to industrial q u estio n s.104 Indeed, they m ay have favored the interests o f industrial leaders on w hom they dep en d ed to fulfill the plan, rather than those o f Moscow. A nother p o ten tial problem w as the transform ation o f urban ra ik o m activ ity from a n econom ic focus to a political one. R a ik o m s often lim ited th eir activ ities to collecting d ata for reports to the obkom , v irtu ally ignoring th e ir duty to lead plant-level P arty

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organizations. W hile the less direct, m ore explicitly political postw ar P arty role in in d u stry w as not fully realized durin g recovery, the increasing qualifications o f o b k o m secretaries a n d the inexperience a n d youth o f the P arty cadres, nonetheless, facilitated behavorial change. T he w artim e experience a n d p o o r qualifications o f ru ral P arty leaders, the difficult conditions o f agricultural production, the superficial nature o f P arty p enetration in the countryside, Lysenkoism , a n d the poor qualifications o f agricultural leaders all m ade the ab an d o n m en t o f d irect political inter­ vention in agricultural pro d u ctio n unlikely. P ostw ar policies, such as the reestablishm ent o f p o lito td e ly at M achine T ractor Stations in 1947, the transfer o f P arty m em bers from rural T errito rial P arty O rganizations to kolkhoz PPO s, an d the ap p o in tm e n t o f P arty m em bers w ith organizational skills as kolkhoz chairm en, sought to m odify the factors w hich hindered the realization o f the postw ar P arty model. In spite o f the efforts inherent in central policies to redirect ra ik o m activ ities tow ards personnel issues a n d political in doctrination, ra ik o m plenipotentiaries continued to supplant kolkhoz chairm en, especially in po o rer agricultural areas. T his behavior resulted in th e r a ik o m ’s co n d em n atio n a n d rem oval o f kolkhoz chairm en. Such practices w ere officially co n d em n ed .105 N onetheless, the persistence o f high turno ver rates am ong agricultural personnel suggests th a t poor agri­ cu ltural results norm ally led to political intervention. B oth the d irect an d indirect effects o f the w ar had long-term consequences for the Party. W artim e enrollm ents increased the P a rty ’s size, w hile at the sam e tim e, they continued the prew ar tre n d tow ard greater P arty saturation am ong w hite-collar workers. T h is w as alm ost a precondition for a less in terv en tio n ist P arty role in in d u stry an d the increased professional autonom y o f econom ic m anagers. A t the elite level, the break w ith the prepurge political ap p aratu s w as deepened through th e ap p o in tm e n t o f young, inexperienced cadres to th eir first positions eith er durin g the w ar o r the im m ediate postw ar years. T hese new cadres’ postw ar b ehavior was influenced by th eir w artim e experience. T his b ehavior w as reinforced by th e econom ic an d social effects o f the war. T he distinctive p attern s o f P arty beh av io r evident in industrial an d agricultural activities co n tin u ed to exist decades later.106 T hus, the w ar’s political, econom ic, an d social effects helped to shape a generation o f Soviet P arty leaders w hose d o m in a tio n is only now draw ing to a close.

Notes 1. This is my own interpretation. See X V III s" ezd vsesoiuznyi k om m u n istich eskoi p a r tii (b) 10 -12 m a rta 1939 g. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’ stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1939) and R esheniia p a r tii i p ra v ite l’stva p o khoziaistvennym voprosam , vol. 2: 1 9 2 9 -1 9 4 0 g o d y (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1967). 2. See Cynthia S. Kaplan, “The Role o f the Communist Party o f the Soviet Union in the Implementation o f Industrial and Agrarian Policy: Leningrad, 1946-53” (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1981).

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3. T. H. Rigby, C o m m u n ist P a rty M em b ersh ip in th e U .S.S.R. 1 9 17-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 221-31. The VKP (b) during 1939-1941 recruited less than 20 percent workers, 10 percent peasants, and over 70 percent intellectuals and whitecollar employees based on social origin. Ibid., 225. “Izmeneniia v ustave VKP (b) dokladchik T. Zhdanov,”X V III sf'ezd, 516. 4. Kendall E. Bailes, Technology a n d S o ciety under L en in a n d S talin (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 297-336. 5. “Rech’ t. Andreeva,”X V III s"ezd, 104-21. 6. “Otchetnyi doklad t. Stalinana XVIII s"ezde partii o rabote TsK VKP(b),”X V III s"ezd, 37. 7. See M. A. Vyltsan, S o vetsk a ia derevn ia nakan u ne Velikoi O techestvennoi voin y (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), idem., Z aversh aiush ch ii e ta p so zd a n iia kolkh ozn ogo stroia (1 9 3 6 -3 7 gg.) (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo Nauka, 1978), idem., U kreplenie m ateriaV no-tekhnicheskoi b a zy kolkhoznogo stroia vo vtoroi p ia tile tk e (1933-1937): (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959), lu. S. Borisov, P odgotovka proizvodstven nykh kadrov seVskogo khoziastva S S S R v rekonstruktivnyi p e r io d (Moscow: IzdateFstvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960), N. A. Lysenko, P odgotovka kadrov d lia sotsialistich eskogo seVskogo k h oziaistva 1929-1958 gg. (Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1975), Robert Miller, O ne H u n dred T hou san d Tractors (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970), Roberta T. Manning, “The Col­ lective Farm Peasantry and the Local Administration: Peasant Letters o f Complaint in Belyi R aion in 1937,”paper presented at the National Seminar for the Study o f Russian Society in the Twentieth Century, 1983, Merle Fainsod, S m o len sk U nder S o v ie t R u le (New York: Vintage Books, 1958), and Rigby, M em bership, 231-35. 8. “Andreeva,”X V III s"ezd, pp. 109, 120. R esheniia, vol. 2, 646-49, 661-62, 707-13, 719-59. 9. An example o f this was the party’ s abolition o f special departments in the Secretariat as a means o f increasing the authority o f industrial managers. (Agriculture was exempted from this policy.) This policy was reversed at the Eighteenth Party Conference in February 1941. Leonard Schapiro, C o m m u n ist P a rty o f th e S o v ie t Union (New York: Random House, 1959), 450-51 and Rezoliutsiia XVIII Konferentsii VKP (b) 18 February 1941, “O zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii v oblasti promyshlennosti i transporta,”R esheniia, vol. 3: 1941-1952 gody (Moscow: IzdateFstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1968): 14-24. 10. I. N. Iudin, SotsiaV naia b a za rosta K P S S (Moskow: IzdateFstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1973), 186-87 and Rigby, M em bership, 221-31. 11. “Zhdanov,”X V III s"ezd, 516. 12. lu. P. Petrov, P a rtiin o e stroiteVstvo v so vetsk o i a rm ii i flo te (1918-1961 gg.) (Moscow: Voennoe izdateFstvo Ministerstva oborony SSSR, 1964), 351. 13. Ibid., 352. 14. L. N. UFianov, Trudovoi p o d v ig rabochego klassa i k re st’ianstva S ib iri 1945-1953 gg. (Tomsk: IzdateFstvo Tomskogo Universiteta, 1979), 34. 15. “KPSS v tsifrakh,”K o m m u n ist, no. 15 (October 1967): 93, and Petrov, P a rtiin o e stroiteVstvo v a rm ii, 397. 16. “KPSS,”K o m m u n ist (1967), 91. 17. “KPSS v tsifrakh,”P a rtiin a ia z h iz n ' (21 November 1977): 24. 18. P artiin a ia z h iz n 1, no. 1 (1956), 24 cited by V. Beliakov and N. Zolotarev, P a rtiia ukrepliaet svoi ria d y (Moscow: IzdateFstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970), 162. 19. Rigby, M em bership, 261-67. 20. Ibid., 200-35, 259-72. Only about 500,000 o f the demobilized soldiers had been party members before the war. Ibid., 272. 21. Rigby, M em bership, 224, 225, 239, and 268. In addition to party recruitment data for Kirov Oblast cited by Rigby (M em b ersh ip , 269-71), data for Leningrad and Rostovon-the-Don are available. Leningrad party recruits classified according to occupation during 1941-45 included 48.8 percent white collar, 31.2 percent industrial and transport, and 4.27 peasant. The comparable data for Rostov-on-the-Don were 55.4 percent, 19.7 percent, and 20.4 percent. S. S. Dmitriev et al., eds., L en in g ra d sk a ia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1973 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974), 114-5 and I. M. Kriulenko et al., eds., R ostovskaia

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oblastn aia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1975 (Rostov-on-the-Don: Rostovskoe

knizhnoe izdatel’ stvo, 1976), 94. 22. Beliakov and Zolotarev, P a rtiia ukrepliaet, 143 and “KPSS”, P Z h (1977), 28. 23. On Siberia, see Iu. A. Vasil’ ev, S ib irsk ii arsen a l 1941-1945 (Sverdlovsk: SredneUral’ skoe knizhnoe izdatel’ stvo, 1965), 75, M. R. Akulov, et al., P o d vig z e m li bogatyrskoi (Moscow: IzdateKstvo MysP, 1970), 115, and Ul’ ianov, Trudovoi podvig, 34. 24. For example, 65.9 percent o f the new party members in Omsk had white-collar social origins during 1941-1943. N. la. Grishchin et al., O bshchestvenno-politicheskaia z h iz n ‘ sov etsk o i sib irsk o i d erevn i (Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1974), 110. 25. Beliakov and Zolotarev, P a rtiia ukrepliaet, 158. 26. Ibid. 27. V. A. Vasilenko et al., Isto riia Velikoi O techestvennoi voin y S ovetskogo S oiu za 1941-1945, vol. 6: Ito g i Velikoi O techestvennoi voin y (Moscow: Voennoe izdatel’ stvo Ministerstva oborony soiuza SSR, 1965), 367. 28. Beliakov and Zolotarev, P a rtiia ukrepliaet, 158. 29. Data showing an increase in Party members’educational levels according to local Party oiganizations between 1941 and 1946 were found for Volgograd, Leningrad, Kuibyshev, Cheliabinsk, Perm, Rostov-on-the-Don, Georgia, Kalinin (1945), Saratov, Moscow, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, and Moldavia. The data are available in the party statistical handbooks published for the respective oiganizations. Exact citations and a table summarizing the information are available from the author. 30. For example, Leningrad, Georgia, Belorussia, and Moldavia. 31. L e k tsii p o isto rii KPSS, vyp. 3, 2d ed. (Moscow: Mysl’ , 1974), 59 cited by V. K. Beliakov and N. A. Zolotarev, O rg a n iza tsiia u d esia teria et sily (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1975), 98. 32. I. E. Zelenin, O bshchestvenno-politicheskaia z h iz n ’ 1 9 4 6 -1958 gg. so vetskoi derevn i (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo nauka, 1978), 12 and lu. V. Arutiunian, S o vetskoe krest'ianstvo v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny, 2d ed. (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo Nauka, 1970), 67, 68. Although the Eighteenth Party Congress had encouraged the establishment o f kolkhoz PPOs, most rural communists remained in territorial party organizations. In 1939, only 4.9 percent o f all kolkhozy had PPOs. N. N. Shushkin, Vo im ia p o b ed y (Petrozavodsk: Izdatel’Kareliia, 1970), 87. In 1941, there were 623,400 rural communists among whom only 62,300 were in PPOs. V. N. Donchenko, “Perestroika riadov VKP(b) v period perekhoda SSSR ot voiny k mini (1945-1948 gody),” (Candidate dissertation, Moscow State University, 1972), 170. 33. Zelenin, O bshchestvenno-politicheskaia zhizn', 36. 34. See “O partiinykh organizatsiiakh v derevne,”P a rtiin o e stroitePstvo, no. 12 (June 1942): 44-45, Beliakov and Zolotarev, P a rtiia ukrepliaet, 155, and Grishchin et al., O bshchestvenno-politicheskaia zhizn', 110. Complete data necessary to document the exact nature o f the decline in kolkhoz PPOs are unavailable. 35. For example, Dmitriev, L en in g ra d sk a ia o rg a n iza tsiia KPSS, 134-35. 36. “O partiinykh,”PS, 45. 37. Zelenin, O bshchestvennoe-politicheskaia z h iz n \ 11. 38. Donchenko, “Perestroika riadov,” 170. 39. Rigby, M em bership, 292-93. 40. Ibid., 266-67. 41. Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b), 19 August 1941, “O poriadke priema v partiiu osovo otlichivshikhsia v boiakh krasnoarmeitsev i nachal’ stvuiushchego sostova krasnoi armii,” in V. S. Vasilenko and E. P. Orekhov, eds., K o m m u n istich esk a ia p a rtiia v p e r io d Velikoi O techestvennoi voinu (iiu n ' 1941 g o d a -1 9 4 5 god) (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961), 95, 96, and Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b), “O prieme v chleny VKP(b) kandidatov, otlichivshikhsia v boiakh s nemetskimi zakhvatchikami,” in V. B. Kalinin, V. I. Nechipurenko, and V. M. Savel’ ev, eds., K o m m u n istich esk a ia p a r tiia v Velikoi O techestvennoi voine (iiun' 1941 g -1 9 4 5 g.) (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970), 61, 62. 42. Rigby, M em bership, 266-67 and Cynthia S. Kaplan, “The CPSU and Agriculture: The Emergence o f Postwar Party Behavior,”Chapter. 3, “Postwar Agricultural Policies,” 19. (Typewritten manuscript.)

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43. Postanovlenie TsK VKP(b), “O podgotovke i perepodgotovke rukovodiashchikh partiinykh i sovetskikh rabotnikov,”2 August 1946, K P S S v rezo liu tsiiakh i resheniiakh s"ezdov, konferentsii i plen u m ov TsK, vol. 6 : 1941-1954 (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1971), 162-72, G. D. Komkov, Ideino-politich eskaia ra b o ta K P S S v 1941-1945 gg. (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo Nauka, 1965), 370-83, and A. V. Krasnov, B o r ’ba p a r tii i rabochego klassa za vosstanovlenie i ra z v itie narodnogo k h o zia istva S S S R (1 9 43-1950 gg.) (Moscow: Mysl’ , 1978), 56-57. 44. Rigby, M em bership, 278-79. Jerry Hough notes that given the small size o f the

potential candidate pool, it is surprising that the party recruited so many new members, rather than so few. Jerry F. Hough and Merle Fainsod, H o w th e S o viet U nion Is G overned, rev. and enl. ed. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979), 331-34. 45. Krasnov, B o r’ba p a rtii, 56, 67, Shushkin, Vo im ia , 277, Arutiunian, S ovetsk o e k re st’ianstvo, 401-3, and 170-71. 46. This observation is based on an analysis o f o b k o m and republican party secretaries who attended the Eighteenth Party Congress in 1939 and the Nineteenth Party Congress in 1952. 47. See Jerry Hough, “The Soviet Elite II: In Whose Hands the Future?,“P roblem s o f C om m u n ism 16 (March-April 1967): 18-25 and Robert E. Blackwell, Jr., “Elite Recruitment and Functional Change: An Analysis o f the Soviet Obkom Elite 1950-1968,” Journal o f P olitics 37, no. 1 (February 1972): 124-52. 48. Seweryn Bialer, S ta lin ’s Successors (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980), 101 and Arthur L. Stinchcombe, C onstructing S o cia l T heories (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968), 107-17. 49. Bialer, S ta lin ’s Successors, 114, Jerry F. Hough, T he S o v ie t P refects (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969), 40-44, and Borys Lewytzkyj, “Generations in Conflict,” P roblem s o f C o m m u n ism 16 (January 1967): 39. 50. The average birth date for RSFSR obkom secretaries in agriculture in 1941 was 1900, age at party entry— twenty-two, and one out o f the eight were engineers. The comparable data for those in industry are: birth date 1904, age at party entry twentyone, and eight out o f fourteen were engineers. Hough, Prefects, 39. 51. Ibid., 50, 52, 65, and 71. 52. Blackwell, “Elite Recruitment,” 136. 53. Educational differences associated with service in industrial and agricultural oblasts have persisted. Hough, Prefects, 37. 54. For example, for behavior during the late 1930’ s see Bailes, Technology a n d S o c ie ty . 326-28, and Hough, Prefects, 80-100. 55. In 1946, 90.7 percent o f kolkhoz chairmen had primary education and 5.5 percent were illiterate. I. M. Volkov, ed., S o vetsk a ia derevn iia v p e r v y e p o s le lv o e n n y e g o d y 1 9 46-1950 (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo Nauka, 1978), 132. Forty-one percent o f kolkhoz chairmen in the USSR had held their jobs for less than one year. Idem., “Kolkhoznaia derevniia v pervyi poslevoennyi god,” Voprosy istorii, no. 1 (1966): 19. In 1948, only 40 percent o f kolkhoz chairmen were party members. Rigby, M em bership, 434. Also see, lu. P. Denisov, “Kadry predsedatelei kolkhozov v 1950-1968 gg.,”Isto riia SSSR , no. 1 (1971): 38-57 and Jerry F. Hough, “The Changing Nature o f the Kolkhoz Chairmen,”in James Millar, ed., T he S oviet R u ra l C o m m u n ity (Urbana: University o f Illinois Press, 1971), 110. 56. See Kaplan, “CPSU,”Chapter 6, “The Party in Action: Agriculture,”and Cynthia S. Kaplan, “The Communist Party o f the Soviet Union and Local Policy Implementation,” Journal o f P olitics 45 (February 1983), 14-16. 57. Beliakov and Zolotarev, O rg a n iza tsiia u d esia teria et sily, 85. 58. Within the first two years o f the war, Leningrad sent 1786 o f its leading party members, Belorussia 19 out o f 69 obkom secretaries and 285 out o f 600 gorkom and raikom secretaries, Ivanov 600 responsible workers and 2400 PPO secretaries, Kirov 32.5 percent (first 2.5 months) o f the heads o f raikom otdels, Volgograd 519 out o f 1509 o f the obkom nomenklatura, Uzbekistan 25 percent o f obkom, gorkom, and raikom secretaries, Kirgiz 1300 o f its central committee nomenklatura and Tadzhik 1079. N. A. Krasnov, P a rtiin ye m o b iliza tsii na fro n t v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voinu (Moscow: Izdatel’ stvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1978), 17-25. In Kazakhstan by the end o f 1942, 15.7 percent

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of gorkom and raikom secretaries, 65.4 percent of heads of sections, and 42.2 percent of PPO secretaries had left for the front. S. B. Beisembaev and P. M. Pakhmumyi, K om m u n istich esk a ia p a rtiia K a za k h sta n a v do k u m en ta k h i tsifrakh (Alma Ata: Kazakhskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1960), 256. In Siberia, the Irkutsk party had 71.7 percent of its secretaries mobilized. Vasil’ev, S ib irsk ii arsenal, 233. 59. Rigby, M em bership, 272. 60. P. I. Dubonosov, “Organizatorskaia i politicheskaia rabota kommunisticheskoi partii po vosstanovlenniiu i razvitiiu narodnogo khoziaistva v poslevoennyi period (1946-1950 gg.)” (Doctoral dissertation, Rostov State Pedagogical Institute, 1972), 133. 61. N. M. Kiryaev and I. V. Stavitskii, “Rost i ukreplenie riadov KPSS v period Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny,” Voprosy istorii, no. 9 (September 1959): 11 cited by Sanford R. Liberman, “The Party Under Stress: The Experience of World War II,“ in Karl W. Ryavec, ed., S o v ie t S o ciety a n d th e C o m m u n ist P a rty (Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978), 120. 62. P. P. Danilov, “Bor’ba kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza za vypolnenie chetvertogo piatiletnego plana v oblasti tiazheloi promyshlennosti” (Candidate dissertation, Leningrad State University, 1964), 53. 63. T. I. Baradulina, “Povyshenie ideino teoreticheskogo urovnia kommunistov v raionakh o svobozhdennykh ot fashistskoi okkupatsii,” in L. V. Shivikov, ed., D eiateV nost’ K P S S v p e r v y e g o d y p o sle Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny (Moscow: Akademiia obshchestvennykh nauk pri TsK KPSS, 1978), 2. 64. P. I. Kurbatova, S m o len sk a ia p a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voin y (Smolensk: Smolenskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1958), 113. 65. D. F. Frolov, E din stvo tyla i fro n ta (Saratov: Saratovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1961), 114. 66. Vasil’ev, S ib irsk ii arsenal, 75, 233, 234. For example, 48 percent of the raikom and aikom secretaries in the Buriat party organization were new during the war, as were 80 percent of sections heads. 67. I. Boitsov, “Vydvizhenie i rost kadrov v gody voiny,” P a rtiin o e str o ite l’stvo, no. 11 (June 1945): 36. 68. F. L. Aleksandrov et al., eds., O cherki isto rii M oskovskoi organ izatsii K P S S (1883-1965 gg.) (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1966), 601, 603. 69. N. S. Chernykh, I. B. Kogan, and V. P. Chistiakov, eds., O cherki istorii K iu bysh evskoi o rg a n iza tsii K P S S (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1967), 492. 70. Urianov, Trudovoi podvig, 28. 71. Donchenko, “Perestroika riadov,” 214-15. 72. “Povyshat’ roi’ raikomov kak organov politicheskogo rukovodstva (S raionnykh partiinykh konferentsii),” P a rtiin a ia z h iz n \ no. 5 (March 1948): 27. 73. Information on the educational backgrounds of gorkom and raikom secretaries for the late 1940s and early 1950s is selective. In Yaroslav Oblast 34.5 percent of gorkom and raikom secretaries had higher to incomplete secondary education in 1947, 67 percent in 1949; Cheliabinsk Oblast 32.8 percent had higher and incomplete higher in 1946, 53.8 percent in 1949; Kalinin Oblast 13.5 percent higher and incomplete higher in 1945, 51.3 percent secondary and incomplete secondary and 36.2 percent primary, in 1950 the respective figures were 42.6 percent, 51.5 percent, and 6.8 percent; Kostromsk Oblast 51 percent in 1947 (1st gorkom and raikom secretaries), 86 percent for second secretaries; Krasnodar Krai 21 percent higher and incomplete higher in 1948, 54 percent in 1950. P. M. Volkov, ed., O cherki isto rii la ro sla vsk o i o rg a n iza tsii K P S S (Yaroslavl’: VerkhneVolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1967), 442, E. M. Tiazhel’nikov, ed., O cherki istorii C h eliabin skoi o b lastn oi p a rtiin o i o rg a n iza tsii (Cheliabinsk: Iuzhno-ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1967), 369, A. V. Egrov, ed., K a lin in sk a ia o blastn aia o rg an izatsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1977 gg. (Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1979), 112, M. L. Siniazhnikov, ed., O cherki isto rii K o stro m sk o i o rg a n iza tsii K P S S (Yaroslavl’: Verkhne-Volzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1967), 305, and 1.1. Alekseenko, ed., O cherki isto rii K ra sn o d arskoi o rgan izatsii K P S S 2d engl. ed. (Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1976), 407. 74. Donchenko, “ Perestroika riadov,” 214.

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75. L en in g ra d sk a ia pravda, 23 December 1948, and V. A. Kutuzov, “Nekotorye voprosy partiinogo stroitel’stva v Leningradskoi organizatsii v pervye poslevoennye gody (1946-1948 gg.)” U chenye za p isk i Institut istorii partii Leningradskogo Obkoma KPSS, 1 (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1970), 231. 76. A. la. Utenkov, B o r’ba K P S S za vosstanovlenie n arodnogo k h o ziaistva i d a l’neishee ra zv itie sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva 1 9 4 6 -1955 gg. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo vysshaia shkola, 1974), 58. 77. “KPSS,” P Z h (1977), 29, 30. 78. Primary party secretaries have not been included due to their high turnover rates, lack of experience, and the fact that most only joined the party during the war. Their behavior was more clearly a product of the postwar period. Krasnov, B o r ’ba p a rtii, 67. 79. Beliakov and Zolotarev, O rg a n iza tsiia u d esia teria et sily, 93-98. 80. Ukaz presidiuma Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR 9 October 1942, “Ob ustanovlenii polnogo edinonachaliia i uprazdnenii instituta voennykh komissarov v krasnoi armii,” Vasilenko and Orekhov, eds., K o m m u n istich esk a ia p a rtiia , 127-28. 81. A. G. Ershov, “Partiinye i komsomol’skie organizatsii armii i flota v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945),” Voprosy isto rii KPSS, no. 6 (1975): 64. 82. Rezoliutsiia XVIII konferentsii VKP(b), 18 February 1941, “O zadachakh partiinykh organizatsii v oblasti promyshlennosti i transporta,” in R esheniia, vol. 3: 14-24. 83. Beliakov and Zolotarev, O rg a n iza tsiia u d esia teria et sily, 96, 99. 84. M. L. Gutin, “Sozdanie otraslevykh promyshlennykh otdelov partiinykh organov i ikh deiatel’nost’ v gody Velikoi Otechestvenoi voiny,” Voprosy isto rii KP SS, no. 9 (1978): 103-4. 85. Ibid. 86. P. R. Sheverdalkin, I. Z. Zakharov, and M. I. Likhomanov, K P S S — vd o kh n ovitel’ i organ izator p o b ed y sovetskogo naroda v Velikoi O techestvennoi voine (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1973), 182. 87. “Vse dlia frontal Vse sily na razgrom vraga!” Voprosy isto rii K PSS, no. 12 (1975): 89. 88. N. S. Patolichev, Isp yta n ie na zre lo st’ (Moscow: Politizdat, 1977), especially 200, 281-2. 89. For example, see the Leningrad and Tomsk party organizations. V. S. Flerov et al., eds., T om skaia g o rodskaia p a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny (Tomsk: Tomskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1962), 250-51 and S. P. Kniazev et al., eds., O cherki isto rii L en in g ra d sk o i o rg a n iza tsii K PSS, chast’ 2: n o ia b r’ 1917-1945 (Len­ ingrad: Lenizdat, 1968), 587. 90. Kniazev et al., eds., O cherki isto rii L en in g ra d sk o i org a n iza tsii, 586, 626 and Gutin, “Sozdanie otraslevykh,” 104 (Iaroslavl’). 91. This practice was noted in Leningrad, Perm, the Northwest Region, Rostov-onthe-Don, and Penzensk. V. V. Stemilov, “ Leningradskaia partiinaia organizatsiia v period blokady goroda (1941-1943 gg.),” Voprosy isto rii KPSS, no. 5 (1959): 118; A. G. Naumova, P erm skaia p a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi vo in y (1941-1945 gg.)

(Perm: Permskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1960), 20; V. V. Iarobkov, “ Partiino-politicheskaia rabota v zheleznodorozhnykh voiskakh v iiune-avguste 1944 g.” in N. N. Shushkin et al., eds., I z isto rii p a rtiin yk h o rg a n iza tsii se vero -za p a d a R S F S R (1941-1945 gg.) (Petro­ zavodsk: Petrozavodsk» Gos. Universitet, 1976), 83; D. I. Dubonosov, “Osveshchenie v istoriko-partiinoi literature deiatel’nosti KPSS po vosstanovleniiu i razvitiiu narodnogo khoziaistva (1945-1950 gg.) in V. I. Ivanov et al., eds., N ek o to rye voprosy p a rtiin o g o i sovetskogo str o ite l’stva (Rostov-on-the-Don: Rostovskii na Donu Gos. Ped. Institut, 1969), 200; and N. V. Khristoforov, ed., P en zen skaia p a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg.) (Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1964), 153-54. 92. Shushkin, Vo im ia, 237 and “O merkakh uvelicheniia podgolov’ia skota v kolkhozakh i sovkhozakh i povysheniia ego produktivnosti,” 13 April 1943, R esh en iia, vol. 3: 121-30. 93. The number of communists in the countryside declined from 623,400 in 1941 to 277,700 in 1943. Zelenin, O bshcheslvenno-politicheskaia z h iz n ’, 11. During the first years

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of the war up to 70 percent of leading kolkhoz cadres left for the front. Shushkin, Vo im ia, 267. The leaders replacing them were “young, inexperienced, needing study and practical help.” Ibid., 277. In 1943, 44 percent of all kolkhoz chairmen held their positions less than one year; in 1945 37.8 percent. Arutiunian, S o vetsk o e krest'ianstvo, 401-3. 94. Political sections were reestablished at machine tractor stations and sovkhozy during the war. Arutiunian, S o vetsk o e kresVianstvo, 63. Postanovlenie politbiuro TsK VKP(b) “Ob organizatsii politotdelov v MTS i sovkhozakh,” 17 November 1941, K P S S v rezoliutsiiakh: 36-38. 95. A. Grigor’ev, “Neskol’ko vyvodov iz opyta raboty politotdelov MTS,” P artiin oe stroiteVstvo, no. 17-18 (September 1942): 21, S. Tarasov, “Umelo podkhodit’ k liudiam,” P a rtiin o e stroiteVstvo, no. 22 (November 1942): 29, and A. Larionov, “Sekretär’ sel’skogo raikoma,” P a rtiin o e stroiteVstvo, no. 8 (April 1943): 27. 96. “Sel’skii raikom partii,” P a rtiin o e stroiteVstvo, no. 5-6 (March 1943): 7. 97. See F. A. Karevskii, K o lk h o zn o e kresVianstvo K u ib ysh evsk o i oblasti v otechestvennuiu voinu (Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1970), 37. 98. See Miller, Tractors, especially, 249-89. 99. L. Slepov, M e stn ye p a rtiin y e o rgan y (Moscow: VPSh pri TsK KPSS, 1954), 8, 25. 100. L. Slepov, “ Stalinskaia programma pod’ema partiino-politicheskoi raboty,” BoV shevik, no. 3 (February 1952): 26. For a discussion of these issues, see Jerry F. Hough, “The Soviet Concept of the Relationship Between the Lower Party Organs and the State Administration,” S la vic R eview , no. 2 (June 1965): 215-40. 101. Slepov, “Stalinskaia programma,” 27. 102. L. Slepov, “Zadachi i soderzhanie kursa ‘Partiinoe stroitel’stvo’,” L ek tsiia Vysshaia p a rtiin a ia sh k o la p r i T sK K P S S (Moscow: n.p., 1953): 22. 103. Eugene Zaleski, S ta lin ist P lan n in g fo r E c o n o m ic Growth, 1933-1952, trans. and ed. Marie-Christine MacAndrew and John H. Moore (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980). 104. Slepov, M estn ye, 25. 105. A. Kolosev and U. Zhukovin, eds., O p yt T selinskogo ra ik o m a p a r tii (P is’m a o seV skom ra ik o m e) (Astrakhan’: Izdatel’stvo gazeta Volga, 1948). This book reprints the major articles on rural raikoms which appeared in P ravda. N. Sudarikov, “Berezhno otnosit’sia i kadram presedatelei,” S o tsia listich esk a ia zakonnosV, no. 12 (December 1947):

6. 106. See Kaplan, “The CPSU and Local Policy Implementation,” 16-23.

R eferences Akimov, N. N. et al., eds. O cherki isto rii k o m m u n istich esk o i p a r tii Belorussii. Chast’ 2 (1921-1966). Minsk: Izdatel’stvo Belarus’, 1967. Akulov, M. R. et al. P o d vig ze m li bogatyrskoi. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Mysl’, 1970. Aleksandrov, F. L. et al., eds. O cherki isto rii M o sk o vsk o i o rg a n iza tsii K P S S (1893-1965 gg.). Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1966. Alekseenko, I. I. et al., eds. O cherki isto rii K ra sn o d a rsk o i o rg a n iza tsii KPSS. 2d ed. Krasnodar: Krasnodarskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1976. Arutiunian, lu. V. S o vetsk o e kresV ianstvo v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny. 2d ed. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Nauka, 1970. Bailes, Kendall E. Technology a n d S o c ie ty under L en in a n d S talin. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978. Barchugov, P. V., ed. O ch erki isto rii p a rtiin yk h o rg a n iza tsii D on a (1921-1971). Chast’ 2 Rostov-on-the-Don: Rostovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1973. Beisembaev, S. B. and Pakhmumyi, P. M., eds. K o m m u n istich esk a ia p a rtiia K azakh stan a v doku m en ta k h i tsifrakh. Alma Ata: Kazakhskoe gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo, 1960. Beliakov, V. and Zolotarev, N. P a rtiia u krepliaet svo i riady. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970.

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Bezrukov, N. T., eds. K o m m u n istich esk a ia p a rtiia U zbekistan a v tsifrakh. Tashkent: Uzbekistan, 1979. Bialer, Seweryn. S ta lin ’s Successors. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1980. Blackwell, Robert E., Jr. “ Elite Recruitment and Functional Change: An Analysis o f the Soviet Obkom Elite 1950-1968.” Journal o f Politics, 37 (February 1972): 124-53. B o l’shevik.

Borisov, lu. S. P odgotovka p roizvodstven nykh s e l’sk o g o k h o zia istva S S S R v rekonstru ktivn yi period. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1960. Chazovet, G. G. et al., eds. P erm sk a ia o blastn aia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1973. Perm: Permskoe khnizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1974. Chemyi, A. K., ed. O cherki isto rii K h abrovskoi kra evo i o rg a n iza tsii K P S S 1 9 00-1978 gody. Khabarovsk: Khabarovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1979. Chernykh, N. S., Kogan, I. B., and Chistiakov, V. P, eds. O cherki isto rii K iu bysh evskoi organ izatsii KPSS. Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1967. Danilov, P. P. “Bor’ba kommunisticheskoi partii sovetskogo soiuza za vypolnenie chetvertogo piatiletnego plana v oblasti tiazheloi promyshlennosti.” Candidate dissertation, Leningrad State University, 1964. Denisov, lu. P. “ Kadry predsedateli kolkhozov v 1950-1968 gg.” Isto rii S SSR , no. 1 (1971): 38-57. Dmitriev, S. S. et al., eds. L en in g ra d sk a ia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1973. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974. Donchenko, V. N. “Demobilizatsiia sovetskoi armii i reshenie problemy kadrov v pervye poslevoennye gody.” Isto riia SSSR , no. 3 (May 1970): 96-102. ______ “Perestroika riadov VKP(b) v period perekhoda SSSR ot voiny k m ini (1945-1948 gody).” Candidate dissertation, Moscow State University, 1972. Dubonosov, P. I. “Organizatorskaia i politicheskaia rabota kommunisticheskoi partii po vosstanovleniiu i razvitiiu narodnogo khoziaistva v poslevoennyi period (1946-1950 gg.).” Doctoral dissertation, Rostov State Pedagogical Institute, 1972. Egorov, A. B., ed. K a lin in sk a ia o blastn aia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1977 gg. Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1979. X V III s"ezd vsesoiuznyi ko m m u n istich esk o i p a rtii (b) 10 -1 2 m a rta 1939 g. Stenograftcheskii otchet. Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1939.

Ershov, A. G. “Partiinye i komsomol’skie organizatsii armii i flota v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945).” Voprosy isto rii K PSS, no. 6 (1975): 57-67. Fainsod, Merle, S m o len sk U nder S o viet Rule. New York: Vintage Books, 1958. Flerov, V. S. et al., eds. T om skaia g o ro d sk a ia p a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia v g o d y Velikoi Otechestvenno voiny. Tomsk: Tomskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1962. Frolov, D. F. E dinstvo tyla i fron ta. Saratov: Saratovskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1961. Grishchin, N. la. et al. O bshchestvenno-politicheskaia z h iz n ’ so vetsk o i sibirsk o i derevni. Novosibirsk: Nauka, 1974. Gutin, M. L. “Sozdanie otraslevykh promyshlennykh otdelov partiinykh organov i ikh deiatel’nost’ v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi voiny.” Voprosy isto rii K PSS, no. 9 (1978): 98-106. Hough, Jerry F. “The Soviet Concept of the Relationship Between the Lower Party Organs and the State Administration.” S la vic R eview , no. 2 (June 1965): 215-40. ----------“The Soviet Elite II: In Whose Hands the Future?” P roblem s o f C om m u n ism , 16 (March-April 1967): 18-25. ----------The S o viet Prefects. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969. ----------“The Changing Nature of the Kolkhoz Chairman.” T he S o viet R u ra l C om m u n ity. Edited by James Millar. Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1971. Hough, Jerry F. and Fainsod, Merle. H ow th e S o viet Union Is G overned, rev. and enl. ed. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1979. Ignatenko, I. M. and Mokhovikov, S. S., eds. K o m m u n istich esk a ia p a r tiia B eloru sii v tsifrakh 1918-1978. Minsk: Belarus’, 1978. Iudin, I. N. S o tsia l’n aia b a za rosta K PSS. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1973.

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Iurchuk, V. I., ed. O cherki isto rii k o m m u n istich esk o i p a r tii U krainy. 4ed. Kiev: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury ukrainy, 1977. Ivanov, V. I. et al., eds. N ek o to rye voprosy p a rtiin o g o i sovetskogo stroiteVstva. Rostovon-the-Don: Rostovskii-na-Donu Gos. Ped. Institut, 1969. Kalinin, V. B., Nechipurenko, V. I., and Savel’ev, V. M., eds. K o m m u n istich skaia p a rtiia v Velikoi O techestvennoi v o in e fiiu r i 1941 g .-1 9 4 5 g.). Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1970. Kaplan, Cynthia S. “The Role of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in the Implementation of Industrial and Agrarian Policy: Leningrad, 1946-1953.” Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University, 1981. ----------“The Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Local Policy Implementation.” Journal o f Politics, 45 (February 1983): 2-27. Karevskii, F. A. K o lk h o zn o e k re st’ianstvo K u ib ysh evsk o i oblasti v otechestvennuiu voinu. Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knzihnoe izdatel’stvo, 1970. Khristoforov, N. V., ed. P en zen sk a ia p a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia v g o d y Velikoi O techestvenoi voin y (1941-1945 gg.). Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatefstvo, 1964. Kniazev, S. P. et al., eds. O cherki isto rii L en in g ra d sk o i o rg a n iza tsii K P S S Chast’ 2: N o ia b r’ 1917-1945. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968. Kolosev, A. and Zhukovin, U., eds. O pyt T selinskogo ra ik o m a p a r tii (P is’m a o s e l’sk o m raikom e). Astrakhan’: Izdastel’stvo gazeta Volga, 1948. Komkov, G. D. Id e ino-politich eskaia rabota K P S S v 1941-1945 gg. Moscow: Izdatefstvo Nauka, 1965. K P S S v rezoliu tsiia k h i resheniiakh s"ezdov, kon feren tsii i p len u m o v TsK. vol. 6 : 1941-1954. Moscow: Izdatefstvo politicheskoi literatury, 1971. “KPSS v tsifrakh.” K o m m u n ist, no. 15 (October 1967): 89-103. “ KPSS v tsifrakh.” P a rtiin a ia z h iz n \ no. 14 (July 1973): 9-26. “KPSS v tsifrakh.” P a rtiin a ia z h iz n \ no. 21 (November 1977): 20-43. Krasnov, A. V. B o r b a p a r tii i rabochego klassa z a vosstanovlenie i narodnogo kh oziaistva S S S R (19 4 3 -1 9 5 0 gg.). Moscow: Mysf, 1978. Krasnov, N. A. P a rtiin y e m o b iliza tsii na fro n t v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voinu. Moscow: Izdatefstvo Moskovskogo Universiteta, 1978. Kriulenko, I. M. et al., eds. R o stovsk a ia o b lastn aia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1975. Rostov-on-the-Don: Rostovskoe knizhnoe izdatefstvo, 1976. Kurbatova, P. I. S m o len sk a ia p a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny. Smolensk: Smolenskoe knizhnoe izdatefstvo, 1958. Kutuzov, V. A. “ Nekotorye voprosy partiinogo stroitel’stva v Leningradskoi organizatsii v pervye poslevoennye gody 1946-1948 gg.).” U chenye za p isk i Institut istorii partii Leningradskogo Obkoma KPSS, 1 Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974. L en in gradska ia pravda.

Lewytzkyj, Borys. “Generations in Conflict.” P roblem s o f C o m m u n ism , 16 (January 1967): 36-40. Lieberman, Sanford R. “The Party Under Stress: The Experience of World War II.” S oviet S o c ie ty a n d the C o m m u n ist P arty. Edited by Karl W. Ryavec. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1978. Lysenko, N. A. P od g o to vk a kad ro v d lia so tsialistich eskogo s e l’sko g o k h o ziaistva 1929-1958 gg. Moscow: Vysshaia shkola, 1975. Miller, Robert. O n e H u n d red T hou san d Tractors. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970. Naumova, A. G. P erm sk a ia p a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg.). Perm: Permskoe knizhnoe izdatefstvo, 1960. P a rtiin o e stroiteVstvo. P a rtiin a ia zh izn Patolichev, N. S. Isp yta n ie na zrelosV. Moscow: Politizdat, 1977. Petrov, lu. P. P a rtiin o e stroiteV stvo v so vetsk o i a rm ii i flo te (1918-1961 gg.) Moscow:

Voennoe izdatefstvo Ministerstva obomy SSSR, 1964. Postovoi, E. S., ed. O cherki isto rii K o m m u n istich esk o i p a r tii M o ld a vii. Kishinev: Partiinoe izdatefstvo TsK KP Moldavii, 1964.

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R esheniia p a rtit i praviteT stva p o k h o zia istven n ym voprosam . Moscow: IzdatePstvo pol-

iticheskoi literatury, 1967. Rigby, T. H. Communist P a rty M em b ersh ip in the U .S.S.R. 1917-1967. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968. Rodionov, V. A. et al., eds. S a ra to vsk a ia o b lastn aia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1975. Saratov: Privolzhskoe knizhoe izdatePstvo, 1977. Schapiro, Leonard. C o m m u n ist P a rty o f th e S o viet Union. New York: Random House, 1959. Sharaev, L. G., ed. O cherki V oroshilovgradskoi oblastn oi p a rtiin o i o rgan izatsii. Kiev: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury ukrainy, 1979. Shestakov, Z. V. et al., eds. V boevykh riadakh len in skoi p a rtii: C h elia b in skaia oblastn aia organ izatsiia K P S S v tsifrakh 1917-1977. Cheliabinsk: Iuzhno-ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1978. Sheverdalkin, P. R., Zakharov, 1. Z., and Likhomanov, M. I. K P S S — vdokhnoviteT i organ izato r p o b ed y sovetskogo n a ro d v Velikoi O techestvennoi voine. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo politicheskoi literatury, 1973. Shitarev, G. I. et al., eds. M o skovskaia g o ro d sk a ia i m o sk o vsk a ia ob la stn aia org a n iza tsii K P S S v tsifrakh. Moscow: Moskovskii rabochii, 1972. Shivikov, L. V., ed. D e ia te l’n ost' K P S S v p e r v y e g o d y p o sle Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny. Moscow: Akademiia obshchestvennykh naiik pri TsK KPSS, 1978. Shmarakov, N. I., ed. O cherki isto rii TuTskoi o rg a n iza tsii K P SS. Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatePstvo Tula, 1967. Shushkin, N. N. Vo im ia pobedy. Petrozavodsk: IzdateP Kareliia, 1970. Shushkin, N. N. et al., eds. I z isto rii p a rtiin yk h o rg a n iza tsii se vero-zapada R S F S R (1941-1945 gg.J. Petrozavodsk: Petrozavodsk Gos. Universitet, 1976. Siniazhnikov, M. L., ed. O cherki isto rii K o stro m sk o i o rg a n iza tsii K P SS. Yaroslavl’: VerkhneVolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1967. Sladkov, A. F., ed. O cherki isto rii K a lu zh sk o i o rg a n iza tsii K PSS. Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1967. Slepov, L. “Zadachi i soderzhanie kursa ‘Partiinoe stroitel’stvo’.” Lektsiia Vysshaia partiinaia shkola pri TsK KPRSS. Moscow: n.p., 1953. ______ M estn ye p a rtiin y e organy. Moscow: VPSh pri TsK KPSS, 1954. Smirnov, V. A., ed. O cherki isto rii B rian skoi o rg a n iza tsii K P SS. Tula: Priokskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1968. Smirnov, V. I., ed. O cherki isto rii K a lin in sk o i o rg a n iza tsii KP SS. Moscow: Moskovskoi rabochii, 1971. Smorodinskov, D. A., ed. O cherki isto rii p a rtiin o i o rg a n iza tsii T iu m en skoi oblasti. Sver­ dlovsk: Sredne-Ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatePstvo, 1965. Stremilov, V. V. “Leningradskaia partiinaia orgaizatsiia v period blokady goroda (1941-1943 gg.).” Voprosy isto rii KPSS, no. 5 (1959): 101-21. Stinchcombe, Arthur L. C onstructing S o cia l T heories: New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1968. Sudarikov, N. “Berezhno otnosit’sia i kadram presedatelei.” S o tsia listich eskaia za kon n ost \ no. 12 (December 1947): 4-6. Sumichenko, S. I., ed. O cherki isto rii V la d im irsk o i o rg a n iza tsii K PSS. Yaroslavl’: VerkhneVolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatePstvo, 1972. Tiazhel’nikov, E. M., ed. O cherki isto rii C h eliabin skoi ob la stn o i p a rtiin o i organ izatsii. Cheliabinsk: Iuzhno-ural’skoe knizhnoe izdatePstvo, 1967. Ul’ianov, L. N. Trudovoi p o d vig rabochego klassa i k re st’ian stvo S ib iri 1945-1953 gg. Tomsk: IzdatePstvo Tomskogo Universiteta, 1979. Utenkov, A. la. Bor'ba K P S S za vosstanovlenie narodnogo k h o zia istva i daT neishee ra z v itie sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva 1946-1955 gg. Moscow: IzdatePstvo vysshaia shkola, 1974. Vasilenko, V. S. and Orekhov, E. P, eds. K o m m u n istich esk a ia p a r tiia v p e r io d Velikoi O techestvennoi voinu (iiu n ‘ 1941 g o d a - 1945 god). Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1961. Vasilenko, V. A. et al. Isto riia Velikoi O techestvennoi voin y S o vetskogo S o iu za 1941-1945. Moscow: Voennoe izdatePstvo Ministerstva oborony soiuza SSSR, 1965.

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Vasil’ev, Iu. A. S ib irsk ii a rsen a l 1941-1945. Sverdlovsk: Sredne-UraTskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1965. Volkov, I. M. “ Kolkhoznaia derevniia v pervyi poslevoennyi god.” Voprosy istorii, no. 1 (1966): 15-32. _____ , ed. S o vetsk a ia d erevn iia v p e r v y e poslevo en n ye g o d y 1946-1950. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Nauka, 1978. Volkov, P. M., ed. O cherki isto rii Iaroslavskoi o rg a n iza tsii KPSS. Yaroslavl’: VerkhneVolzhskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1967. “Vse dlia fronta! Vse sily na razgrom vraga!” Voprosy isto rii KPSS, no. 12 (1975): 82-98. Vyltsan, M. A. U kreplenie m a terial'n o-tekhn ich eskoi b a zy kolkh ozn ogo stroia vo vtoroi p ia tile tk e (1933-1937). Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Akademii Nauk SSSR, 1959. ______ S ovetsk a ia d erevn ia nakan u ne Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny. Moscow: Politizdat, 1970. ______ Z aversh aiush ch ii eta p so zd a n iia kolk h o zn o g o stroia (1 9 3 6 -1 9 37 gg.). Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Nauka, 1978. Zakharov, F. R, et al., eds. K u ib ysh evsk a ia o b lastn aia p a rtiin a ia o rgan izatsiia v dokum en takh i tsifrakh (1 9 0 2 -1 9 7 7 gg.). Kuibyshev: Kuibyshevskoe knizhnoe izdatelstvo, 1978. Zaleski, Eugene. S ta lin ist P la n n in g fo r E co n o m ic Growth, 1933-1952. Translated and edited by Marie-Christine MacAndrew and John H. Moore. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 1980. Zelenin, I. E. O bshchestvenno-politicheskaia z h iz n ’ 194 6 -1 9 5 8 gg. so vetskoi derevni. Moscow: Izdatel’stvo nauka, 1978.

10 The Impact of World War II on Leningrad EDWARD BUBIS BLAIR A. RUBLE

T he b ru tality an d destructio n unleashed by the Second W orld W ar were p erhaps now here m ore intensely revealed th a n in Leningrad, the scene o f the longest an d m ost devastating siege o f a m ajor u rb an center in the h istory o f m o d em w arfare. To place the L eningrad Blockade in com parative perspective, m ore th an ten tim es the nu m b er o f people died in Leningrad betw een A ugust 1941, an d Jan u ary 1944, th a n died in H iro sh im a following the atom ic blast o f A ugust 1945. By M arch 1943, the once v ib ran t city o f 3.2 m illion souls had been reduced to a m ilitarized en cam pm ent o f ju st 639,000 in h a b ita n ts.1 M oreover, G erm an b o m b ard m en t o bliterated m uch o f the city’s physical plant. In ad d itio n to the loss o f countless architectural a n d a rtistic treasures, the G erm an s destroyed 25 percent o f L eningrad’s capital stock, 16 percent o f the city’s housing stock, plus scores o f m iles o f streets, sewer lines, an d w ater lines.2 B eyond physical destruction a n d loss o f life, L eningrad sustained far less tangible b u t perhaps ultim ately m ore significant losses. A nthropologist Clifford G eertz, has w ritten o f the im p o rtan ce o f charism atic active centers in the social order: the points at w hich a society’s leading actors, ideas, an d in stitu tio n s com e together.3 P rerev o lu tio n ary St. Petersburg was such a center. However, as early as the 1890s, a national rail system , focused on M oscow a n d central R ussia, began to d im in ish St. P etersburg’s im portance as a p o rt o f entry for Im p erial R ussia. M oreover, the city’s peripheral location an d lack o f a large, wealthy, an d populous h in terlan d fu rth er eroded the city’s im portance as an in d u strial center, at least in relation to Moscow. P ostrevolutionary L eningrad continued to function as an active center in Soviet society despite a ruin io u s series o f corrosive events: the transfer o f

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the Soviet capital from the city to M oscow in 1918; the e n d o f m assive im portation o f industrial raw m aterials to be processed a t p o rts o f entry; the dispatch o f the A cadem y o f Sciences from L eningrad to M oscow in 1934; an d the decim ation in 1934 o f the local political elite d u rin g the purges following the assassination o f L eningrad P arty F irst Secretary Sergei Kirov. A fter the Second W orld War, M oscow em erged as the sole ch arism atic active center rem aining in the Soviet U nion. M eanw hile, L eningrad reb u ilt after the w ar so that, by the 1950s, p rew ar p o p u latio n levels h ad been achieved an d econom ic production levels surpassed. N onetheless, the city ’s once preem inent (and, after 1918, coequal) status in co m p ariso n to th a t o f Moscow was lost, seem ingly forever. In th is final sense, then, th e w ar’s im pact on L eningrad has probably been p erm an en t a n d m ost certain ly has been negative. To b etter u n d ersta n d how th is situ atio n developed, it is necessary to look beyond aggregate grow th rates to exam ine the evolving com position o f the L eningrad w ork force, political life, a n d econom ic a n d scientific bases.

The Transformation of the City’ s Work Force U nfortunately, the available d ata are n o t sufficient to identify th e social com position o f the city’s postw ar popu latio n w ith any certainty. All one can do is try to m ake a reasonable a n d reasoned a ttem p t to reco n stru ct w hat occurred on the basis o f very scattered a n d incom plete data. In m aking such an assessm ent, it appears th a t the high level o f p o p u latio n tu rn o v er th at took place in L eningrad durin g the first h a lf o f the 1940s resu lted in the replacem ent o f one o f the m ost educated a n d skilled u rb an p o p u latio n s in the Soviet U nion by one th a t w as relatively unskilled a n d undisciplined. Such characteristics were shared by the p o p u latio n s o f o th er u rb a n centers across the Soviet U nion so th a t L eningrad cam e to resem ble o th er typical Soviet provincial centers m ore th a n it resem bled th e co u n try ’s m ajo r charism atic center, Moscow. O f L eningrad’s prew ar m etro p o litan p o p u latio n o f 3.2 m illion, nearly 1.4 m illion are not accounted for by official statistics o n w artim e p o p u latio n losses.4 Such statistical lacunae probably result from the scores o f m ore pressing concerns burdening the local w artim e leadership ra th e r th a n the problem o f d ata collection. In addition, p o p u latio n shifts th ro u g h o u t the w ar were probably taking place too quickly to be recorded accurately. We know, for exam ple, th a t betw een M arch 1943 a n d S eptem ber 1945 the city’s population doubled from 639,000 to over 1.2 m illion.5 It ap p ears unlikely th at Leningraders, spread halfway to V ladivostok, w ould have been able to m ake the necessary hundred- an d thousand-m ile treks across a w ar-to m Soviet U nion back to th eir native city in sufficient num bers to account for this increase. T he characteristics o f the new p o p u latio n suggest th a t m uch o f the city’s postw ar popu latio n m ay have been draw n from ru ra l areas rather than from am ong retu rn in g w artim e evacuees.6 I f th is is th e case, Leningrad experienced a q u alitativ e decline in its p o p u la tio n in the sense

The Impact of World War II on Leningrad

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th a t the new L eningraders w ere n o t well suited to the needs o f the specialized in d u strial an d scientific enterprises th a t had d o m in ated the city’s econom y p rio r to the war. T h is q u alitativ e decline o ccurred despite the q u an titativ e recovery o f prew ar personnel a n d p o p u latio n reserves. L eningrad w as a traditio n ally m ale city, yet by A pril 1945, 76 percent o f all L eningraders em ployed in in d u stry were now female, a figure suggesting th a t w om en w ere the p red o m in an t sex in the city’s popu latio n as a w hole.7 P ostw ar in-m igration increased the city’s m ale population, as m ight be expected in a p eriod o f dem obilization. Still, the city rem ained predom inately fem ale throughout the postw ar p eriod at a rate slightly higher th a n those o f the U SSR an d R SFSR general a n d u rb an p o pulations as a whole.8 T h is fem inization o f L eningrad can be attrib u te d to several factors, not the least o f w hich is th e high p articip a tio n levels an d losses o f L eningrad m ales at the front or in su p p o rt positions b o th durin g the W in ter W ar w ith F in lan d a n d the blockade. T he process m ay also have been augm ented by a significant in-m igration from already fem ale-dom inated rural areas. Local officials criticized th e relatively undisciplined n atu re o f the postw ar L eningrad p o pulation d urin g the first m onths o f postblockade reconstruction.9 T h is general social indiscipline, w hich apparently w as pronounced in the city’s ind u strial establishm ents, m ight be an o th er sym ptom o f extensive ru ral flight an d in-m igration to Leningrad. In D ecem ber 1946, P etr Sergeevich Popkov, the w artim e chairm an o f the L eningrad C ity Soviet, who had recently becom e first secretary o f the L eningrad C ity a n d Regional P arty C om m ittees, reported to th e L eningrad C ity P arty C o m m ittee th a t labor tu rnover had soared to 58.6 percent in the city’s factories, a situation th a t necessitated inordinately high levels o f o v ertim e w ork.10 O nce again, the d ata are far from com plete a n d one m ust infer m ore from the available sources th a n is perhaps advisable. Still, co m m entaries by local L eningrad political a n d econom ic elites p o in t to b ehavior th at could be expected o f large n um bers o f dem obilized soldiers, o f rural in ­ m igrants to the city’s ind u stria l plants, or b o th .11 A t a m in im u m , the im age offered o f the L eningrad pro letariat durin g the p eriod is not th a t o f a highly skilled, long-em ployed labor elite. Rather, it suggests a work force consisting o f fairly substantial num bers o f low-skilled peasant workers, be they form er soldiers or new m igrants directly from th e collective farm . T he im m ediate postw ar period, then, was one o f considerable instability a n d change in the city’s p o p u latio n a n d w ork force. By the tim e o f the 1959 census, the city’s m etro p o litan po p u latio n barely surpassed its prew ar level o f 3.2 m illion residents. Yet, these 3.2 m illion plus in h ab itan ts were qualitatively different from the 3.2 m illion w ho had in h ab ited the city p rio r to the Second W orld War. L eningrad’s p o p u latio n w as now m ore rural an d less skilled th a n before. A lthough o th er Soviet cities experienced sim ilar postw ar trends, the consequences for L eningrad proved far greater th an elsewhere. T he highly disciplined a n d technologically ad vanced w orkers o f w hom L eningrad politicians had been so p ro u d in the p ast had been sw am ped by yet an o th er wave o f m igrants from th e countryside. These

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Table 10.1

Membership in Leningrad City Party Organization, 1939-1954 (on January 1)

Date

Full Members

Candidate Members

Total Membership

1939 1940 1941

100,610 114,591 117,745

29,972 36,737 34,048

130,582 151,328 151,793

1942 1943 1944 1945

61,842 30,305 35,363 56,982

12,386 13,588 14,280 14,269

74,228 43,893 49,643 71,251

1946 1947 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954

95,217 156,047 176,741 189,511 196,664 200,213 204,071 207,545 219,965

16,452 23,100 22,677 17,318 13,915 14,935 16,658 15,967 8,696

111,669 179,147 199,418 206,829 210,579 215,148 220,729 223,512 228,661

Source: S. S. Dmitriev, et al.( Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS, 70. See also B. Ruble, The Russian Review, 42, no. 3, (July 1983), 309.

changes were sufficiently large th at they can n o t be explained solely by the 632,253 civilian deaths cited in official Soviet publications. M ore people undoubtedly died during the blockade th a n S oviet statistical h an d b o o k s acknowledge. M oreover, a large percentage o f th e half-m illion evacuees probably never returned to live in Leningrad. T he city m ay have su rv iv ed the war, b u t not necessarily w ith its prew ar p o p u latio n intact.

The Transformation of the C ity’ s Political Elite Changes w ithin the city’s governing elite were, if anything, even m ore dram atic than those th at were taking place w ith in the p o p u latio n a t large. D uring the first two years o f the war, the m em b ersh ip o f the L eningrad P arty organization d ropped by nearly 75 percent (See T able 10.1). T h is decline occurred at a tim e w hen the national P arty m em b ersh ip increased, so that, by the end o f W orld W ar II, only 2 percent o f the A ll-U nion C om m unist P arty (Bolshevik) m em bership hailed from L eningrad, as o p ­ posed to som e 10 percent w hen K irov was assassinated in 1934 (See T able 10.2). Such developm ents eroded L eningrad’s prew ar political pow er base, a base th at had helped to sustain the city as a n active cen ter in S oviet society throughout the 1920s a n d 1930s. W hile the relative w eight o f L eningrad P arty m em b ersh ip w ith in th e

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Table 10.2 Leningrad Party Membership a s a Percentage of National Party Membership, 1917-1971 (selected years)

Year 1917 [On October 1] 1927 1934 1939 1941 1946 1952 1956 1966 1971

(On January 1) Percentage 16.6 8.1 10.3 5.7 3.9 2.0 3.3 3.8 3.3 3.1

Source: S. S. Dmitriev et al., Leningradskaia organizatsiia KPSS, v tsifrakh, 1917-1973 gg. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974), 70; N. A. Petrovich, et al., Partiinoe stroitel’stvo, 62. See also B. Ruble, The Russian Review, 42, no 3 (July 1983), 310.

national C o m m u n ist P arty organization declined, the com position o f the L eningrad P arty itself also u nderw ent considerable change. For example, 54,000 o f the 153,531 L eningrad P arty m em bers on 1 July 1941, left for th e front alm ost im m ediately following the ou tb reak o f hostilities.12 By Ja n u ary 1943, death rolls contained the nam es o f 13,000 P arty m em bers, a n d P arty m em bership plu m m ete d to 43,893.13 Between 1943 a n d 1945, 21,608 new m em bers jo in e d th e city’s C o m m u n ist P arty .14 M oreover, m any o f the 368,416 recruits, w ho jo in e d the P arty on the L eningrad front during the war, rem ained in the city,15 so th a t tw o-thirds o f all the m em bers o f the L eningrad city P arty organization in 1947 had not been in th e P arty w hen fighting broke o u t.16 T he m akeup o f P arty leadership councils w as altered even m ore th an th a t o f P arty m em bership at large. In S eptem ber 1952, 663 o f 759 delegates elected to the E leventh Regional P arty C onference had been elected to such a gathering for the first tim e, as h ad 91 o f 99 alternate delegates.17 Regional P arty F irst Secretary V. M. A ndrianov, w ho had been brought in from Sverdlovsk in 1949 to superv ise a m assive purge o f the L eningrad Party, rep o rted to th a t gathering th a t m ore th a n 2,000 P arty leaders (in ad d itio n to an o th er 1,500 state, trad e u n ion, a n d K o m s o m o l officials) had advanced in ran k d u ring his b rie f tenure in office.18 In O ctober 1952, A ndrianov told th e N ineteenth P arty Congress in M oscow th a t such advancem ent proved necessary as a result o f the previous d isto rtio n o f ideological w ork in L eningrad th a t had led to “ toadyism an d serv ility ” in personnel p ractices.19 O ne can assum e, then, th a t the new in cu m b en ts h ad benefited from the in voluntary d ep artu re o f th e ir predecessors.

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Table 10.3 Composition of Leningrad City and District Soviets, 1939 and 1947 (percentage)

Category

1939

1947

Educational Background Higher education Secondary education Primary education

41.0 30.0 29.0

54.5 25.2 20.3

Age 29 or younger 30-39 40-49 50 or older

23.2 48.7 19.9 8.2

4.6 30.0 47.2 18.2

Source: Z. V. Stepanov, ed., Ocherki istorii Leningrads, 38-39. See also B. Ruble, The Russian Review, 42, no. 3 (July 1983), 313.

M unicipal governm ent in stitu tio n s proved no m ore stable th a n those o f the Party. In M ay 1944, the L eningrad C ity Soviet convened for th e first tim e since the w ar began. Less th an one-third o f the soviet’s dep u ties attended as 708 o f 1037 council m em bers were eith er dead o r still at the front.20 W hen, in 1947, a new city soviet as well as fourteen new d istric t soviets m et for the first tim e, th e ir deputies were, as a group, o lder a n d b etter educated th an their prew ar co u n terp arts (See Table 10.3). U ncertainty w ithin local political in stitu tio n s accelerated following the death o f form er L eningrad P arty F irst Secretary, A ndrei Z hdanov, in A ugust 1948, as his m ajor rivals, G iorgii M alenkov a n d L avrenti Beria, set in m otion a large scale purge o f Z h d an o v ’s associates a n d protégés in L eningrad and beyond. Before the end o f M arch 1949, nearly every senior L eningrad P arty official had been rem oved from his post, never to be seen again. By Septem ber 1952, m ore than on e-q u arter o f all p rim a ry C o m m u n ist p arty com m ittees in L eningrad changed secretaries w ith perhaps as m an y as 2,000 other officials losing their jo b s as well.21 T his purge o f local p olitical elites consum ed a leadership cohort th a t had sustained the city’s political pow er base throughout m uch o f the 1920s an d 1930s. Subsequent L eningrad leaders may have been present in the city d u rin g the late 1940s; for the m ost p art, however, the Leningrad political elite o f the 1960s a n d 1970s d id not en ter active political life until after these purges, know n as th e L eningrad Affair, had run their course. The Leningrad Affair m akes a sharp d em arcatio n in th e city’s political history, one w hich com pleted a process o f political decline begun w ith the transfer o f the national capital to M oscow in 1918. T he d isco n tin u ities in the Leningrad population a n d in the city’s political life u n d erm in ed th e rem aining vestiges o f the city’s heritage as an active center in R u ssian a n d Soviet cultural an d political developm ent. T h roughout th e 1940s a n d in large p art because o f the destru ctio n o f the war, L eningrad was com ing to resem ble other Soviet provincial centers m ore th a n it resem bled Moscow.

The Impact of World War II on Leningrad

195

T h is break w ith the prew ar past becom es ever m ore evident as one exam ines changes in the L eningrad econom y brought ab o u t by the w ar’s destruction.

The Transformation of the C ity’ s Econom ic Base If, in 1913, 12 percent o f the co u n try ’s gross in d u strial o u tp u t w as produced in L eningrad, only 10 percent w as produced in the city in 1940 a n d m erely 7 percent in I960.22 T h is relative decline o ccurred despite a steady and, at tim es, rap id absolute increase in the city’s productive capacity (See Table 10.4). By 1969, for exam ple, L eningrad in d u stry w ould produce as m uch in one w eek as local in d u stry had p roduced in th e entire year o f 1928.23 T h is dim in ish in g relative im p o rtan ce o f the L eningrad econom y on the national scene w as accom panied by perhaps m ore pernicious phenom ena as the once diverse L eningrad in d u strial com plex becam e ever m ore spe­ cialized. Such specialization co n strain ed o p p o rtu n ities for the spontaneous interaction o f diverse social an d econom ic forces, w hich m any urbanists suggest m ake great cities great.24 As a result, L eningrad ceased to function as an econom ic charism atic center a n d cam e increasingly to resem ble other specialized Soviet provincial econom ic centers. In 1945, then Regional P arty F irst Secretary, Aleksei K uznetsov, rep o rted to the U SS R Suprem e Soviet th a t 75 percent o f the city’s in d u strial equipm ent h ad been evacuated or destroyed d u rin g the w ar.25 A t the sam e tim e, the city’s gross in d u strial o u tp u t in 1945 fell to ju s t 32 percent o f the 1940 levels.26 M eanw hile, as discussed previously, the qualifications o f local in d u strial w orkers declined sharply.27 In certain key sectors, the reduction o f productive capacity w as enorm ous. In 1945, for exam ple, Lenergo (the organization responsible for the city’s pow er supply) was able to generate only 22.9 percent o f its 1940 kilow att capacity.28 R em arkably, the city’s overall in d u strial o u tp u t m anaged to surpass prew ar levels as early as 1950.29 F rom the available d ata it now ap pears th a t th is achievem ent was accom ­ plished through the ab an d o n m e n t o f the previous productive capacity in a v ariety o f ind u strial sectors w ith an accom panying specialization in a m ore lim ited range o f econom ic activity. T he policy o f local econom ic specialization em erged durin g the F ourth Five-Y ear P lan period (1946-1950) as econom ic p lanners em phasized the city’s shipbuilding an d m odern m achine-building sectors at the expense o f o ther form erly im p o rta n t local industries. O n the positive side, Leningrad in d u stry cam e to specialize in such technologically intensive industries as radio-electronics, radio-technics, optics, precision m achine tools, a n d the like. Indeed, m any o f the city’s oldest, largest, a n d m ost im p o rta n t in d u strial establishm ents such as the fam ous K irov, Elektrosil an d M etal factories underw ent extensive m odern izatio n .30 A t the sam e tim e, som e trad itio n al L eningrad industries developed a t a slower rate th a n they had previously in L eningrad an d expanded a t a slower rate th a n the sam e in d u stry was then growing nationally (See T able 10.5). G ross o u tp u t in light a n d food in dustries in L eningrad in 1940, for exam ple, had been 9 tim es an d 6.8

Table 10.4 Production of Selected Industrial Products, USSR and Leningrad, 1940, 1950, and 1955

USSR

1940 Leningrad

1950 USSR

mingrad

USSR

1955 Leningrad

Leningrad % of USSR 1940 1950 1955

Product Hydroturbines, thousands of kwt Generators for hydroturbines, thousands of kwt Spinning frames for cotton, units Passenger cars, units Cotton cloth, billions of meters Woolen cloth, billions of meters Hosiery, millions of pairs Knitted goods, millions of units Leather footwear, millions of pairs Rubber footwear, millions of pairs Paper, thousands of tons Confectionery goods, thousands of tons Soap (40 percent equivalent)

207.7

200.2

314.9

159.0

1491.9

839.0

96.4

50.5

56.2

154.6

154.6

258.0

196.9

1413.0

889.0

100.0

76.3

62.9

1109.0 1051.0 3954.0 119.7 485.4 183.0

520.0 315.0 129.0 5.3 79.8 24.0

1958.0 912.0 3899.0 155.2 472.9 197.5

676.0 221.0 156.0 7.3 47.0 20.8

1990.0 1751.0 5904.0 251.0 771.5 430.1

506.0 311.0 234.0 11.6 62.4 36.7

46.9 30.0 3.3 4.4 16.4 13.1

34.5 24.2 4.0 4.7 9.9 10.5

25.4 17.8 4.0 4.6 8.1 8.5

211.0

34.6

203.4

27.2

274.5

30.4

16.4

13.4

11.1

69.7 812.0

39.9 57.3

110.4 1193.0

50.1 73.0

131.1 1862.0

64.1 81.2

57.2 7.1

45.4 6.1

48.9 4.4

790.0 700.0

91.3 97.9

993.0 816.0

85.1 95.0

1382.0 1075.0

102.0 108.6

11.6 10.0

8.6 11.6

7.4 10.1

Sources: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR (1956), 55-59; Narodnoe khoziaistvo goroda Leningrada (1957), 22-27.

Table 10.5 Relative Increase in Productivity of Selected Branches, 1940, 1950, and 1960

Economic Branch Gross output of industry Chemical and petrochemical industry Machine-construction industry Light industry Food industry

1940 (1913=1) USSR Leningrad 7.7 17.5 29.6 4.7 3.8

12.0 7.4 22.0 9.0 6.8

1950 (1913=1) USSR Leningrad 1.7 2.0 2.1 1.1 1.0

1.3 0.9 1.5 1.0 0.9

1960 (1913=1) USSR" Leningrad 5.2 7.7 9.0 2.8 2.3

3.6 3.1 5.6 2.2 1.7

Sources: Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR, lubileinii statisticheskii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Statistika, 1972),132-133; Leningrad i Leningradskaia oblast’ v tsifrakh. Statisticheskii sbornik (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1971), 23.

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Table 10.6 Structure of Leningrad Industry in 1960 (percentage of total)

Output

Quantity of Workers

Capital Funds

2.6 1.2 0.5 35.1 8.1 3.1 1.6 24.2 18.4

2.5 0.6 0.5 49.8 6.2 4.0 2.0 21.5 5.5

6.0 0.8 8.4 56.3 6.0 2.7 3.5 6.9 5.5

Branch Iron and steel industry Non-ferrous metallurgy Power plants Metal-fabricating industries Chemical industry Wood-working and paper industry Building-materials industry Light industry Food industry

Source: la. A. Lavrikov, E. V. Mazalov, Leningradskaia promyshlennost' i ee rezervi (1960), 15.

tim es above their 1913 levels while the analagous indices for th e n ational light an d food industries were only 4.7 tim es a n d 3.8 tim es respectively. In the postw ar period the correlation betw een th e rates in L eningrad light an d food industries and in the national branches w ere reversed, so th a t by 1960 both L eningrad industries were at or below the national average rate o f production increase. In the final analysis, the significance o f b o th sectors w ithin the econom ic structu re o f L eningrad d im in ish ed substantially (See Tables 10.6 an d 10.7).31 T he process o f specialization occu rred no t only am ong in d u stries b u t w ithin individual econom ic sectors as well. In the crucial m etalw orking industry, L eningrad’s production o f electric-pow er equipm ent, m etalw orking, m achine tools, an d com m unication eq u ip m en t expanded th ro u g h o u t th e Table 10.7 Output of Selected Leningrad Industries, 1956

Industry

1956 as Percentage of 1940 1950

All branches Machine-construction industry Power plants and supply Chemical industry Rubber industry Wood-working and paper industry Building-materials industry Tailoring industry Textile industry Leather, footwear and fur industries Food industry

259 353 103 231 195 194 575 164 191 142 141

Source: Narodnoe khoziaistvo goroda Leningrada (1957), 18.

203 241 166 240 206 180 257 180 184 167 160

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199

Table 10.8 Investment in the National Economy, 1918-1960

Plan Period

USSR (billions of rubles)

Leningrad (billions of rubles)

Leningrad as Percentage of USSR

1918-August, 1928

4.4

0.1

2.3

First Five-Year Plan (September 1928-1932)

8.8

0.4

4.5

Second Five-Year Plan (1933-1937)

19.7

0.9

4.6

Third Five Year-Plan (1938-June, 1941)

20.4

0.6

2.9

War period (July 1941-1945)

20.5

0.4

2.0

Fourth Five-Year Plan (1946-1950)

47.4

1.2

2.5

Fifth Five-Year Plan (1951-1955)

89.8

1.8

2.0

Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960)

168.0

3.2

1.9

Sources: Narodnœ khoziaistvo SSSR za 60 let (1972), 432; Leningrad i Leningradskaia oblast' v tsifrakh (1971), 63.

first 15 years after the w ar at a rate nearly tw o tim es faster th a n d id the city’s p ro d uction o f tran sp o rta tio n m achinery, hoisting a n d conveying m a­ chinery, an d eq u ip m en t for light in d u stry .32 Intersector a n d intrasector specialization com bined to sim plify th e city’s econom ic base and, in so doing, restricted its role in the national economy. T his reduction in the scope o f local econom ic activ ity ap p ears to have been the result o f a conscious policy decision, one w hich m ay have been beneficial in the short ru n im m ediately following the w ar as it facilitated th e retu rn to prew ar aggregate p roduction levels. O ver th e long run, however, the im pact was profoundly negative for the overall health an d v itality o f the city. D u rin g the F irst an d Second Five-Y ear P lans (1928-1937), L eningrad h ad received approxim ately 5 percent o f all investm ent in th e Soviet economy. D u rin g the postw ar F o u rth Five-Y ear P lan (1946-1950), the city’s share o f national econom ic investm ent w as reduced to 2.5 percent despite obvious a n d critical needs for postw ar reconstruction funds. Even the 2.5 percent investm ent level w as n o t sustained durin g the 1950s as L eningrad’s share o f national eocnom ic investm ent fell to 1.9 percent d u rin g th e Sixth Five-Year Plan (1956-1960) (See Table 10.8). Such policies in su red th at L eningrad w ould no longer rival M oscow as an econom ic center, m uch as the evolving ch aracter o f the L eningrad political elite discussed previously guaranteed th at the n o rth ern capital w ould no longer challenge M oscow politically.

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L eningrad— socially, politically, a n d econom ically— w as com ing to increas­ ingly resem ble other Soviet provincial centers w hile M oscow em erged as the single charism atic center in Soviet life.

The Transformation of the C ity’ s Scientific B ase Any discussion o f L eningrad’s loss o f statu re d u rin g th e first h a lf o f th e tw entieth century w ould rem ain incom plete w ithout m en tio n o f its lost p rim acy in science an d education. O n th e eve o f th e F irst W orld W ar, St. Petersburg rem ained the unchallenged national academ ic center. O v er th e course o f the next h alf century or so, the city’s general academ ic statu re eroded as Leningrad becam e an im p o rta n t, yet profoundly provincial, scientific axis. T his relative decline occurred despite signs o f aggregate growth. T he num ber o f scientific research organizations in L eningrad in ­ creased from 23 in 1914 to 141 in 1937.*3 M eanw hile, th e n ational scientific an d educational capacity w as expanding at an even faster rate, so th at, for example, L eningrad’s educated p o pulation cam e to represent a sh rin k in g percentage o f the educated p o p u latio n o f the Soviet U nion as a w hole (See Table 10.9). T hese trends, already ap p aren t p rio r to the o u tb reak o f W orld W ar Two, were accelerated durin g the postw ar period. T he underlying causes o f L eningrad’s academ ic d em ise ex ten d far beyond the im pact o f the w ar upo n the city’s scientific com m unity. T he m ost im p o rtan t single event in an extended process o f d eterio ratio n m o st certain ly rem ains the transfer o f the U SSR A cadem y o f Sciences’ h ea d q u arte rs to Moscow in 1934.34 Even after th a t transfer, however, L eningrad rem ain ed the Soviet U nion’s m ost p ro m in en t educational a n d university research center (See Table 10.10). M oreover, L eningrad’s loss o f statu re is attrib u tab le in p art to the em ergence o f a genuinely national scientific a n d educational infrastructure for the first tim e in R ussian (and Soviet) h isto ry .35 In the final analysis, then, L eningrad’s academ ic decline has been as m uch relative as absolute. Such developm ents do not m ake the im pact o f the Second W orld W ar upon the city’s scientific base negligible. T he evacuation o f educational a n d scientific research institu tio n s during the blockade w as m ore to tal th a n th a t o f industry. O nce the blockade was lifted, m ost academ ic establishm ents were reconstituted in Leningrad, although there is scattered evidence th a t the new in stitu tio n s were not necessarily staffed by retu rn in g L eningrad scholars.36 Indeed, it appears th a t once hostilities had ceased, m an y p ro m in e n t and productive researchers either rem ained at th e ir new in stitu tio n s in th e east or chose to m ove to the now d o m in a n t M oscow academ ic co m m u n ity (a process w hich has continued). H ad the dim in u tio n o f L eningrad’s scientific a n d educational capacity occurred in isolation, its im pact upo n the city’s general w ell-being need not have been devastating. However, occu rrin g as it d id in co n cert w ith the other areas o f decline discussed above, th e reduction o f th e city’s statu re as an academ ic center only co n trib u ted to a larger process o f disintegration. In this m anner, the transfo rm atio n o f the city’s scientific base resulting

Table 10.9 Numbers of Specialists with Higher and Technical Education in National Economy, 1913,1940, and 1955 (without servicemen)

Years

USSR (000s)

1913 1940 1955

136 908 2184

Higher Education Lenin­ Leningrad as Percentage grad of USSR (000s) 22 75 114

16.2 8.3 5.2

USSR (000s) 54 1492 2949

Technical Education Lenin­ Leningrad as Percentage grad of USSR (000s) 8 47 85

Sources: Leningrad za 50 let (1967), 77; Narodnoe khoziaistvo SSSR (1956), 193.

14.8 3.2 2.9

USSR (000s) 190 2400 5133

Total Lenin­ grad (000s) 39 122 199

Leningrad as Percentage of USSR 15.8 5.1 3.9

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Table 10.10 Research Assignm ents Made by RSFSR People’ s Comm issariat of the Enlightenment, by Discipline and Location, 1935

Moscow

Percentage Leningrad

Other

Number of Assignments

Discipline Mathematics Mechanics Physics Astronomy Chemistry Geography Geology Paleontology Petrography Mineralogy Chrystography Mineral sciences Microbiology Botany Genetics Zoology Histology Physiology Anthropology History Linguistics Psychology Party history Total

35 35 26 42 29 36 0 0 0 0 0 41 80 19 36 38 43 26 100 25 0 62 0

38 53 37 43 37 46 20 65 47 63 100 23 15 14 16 32 43 70 0 75 100 38 100

27 12 37 15 34 18 80 35 53 37 0 36 5 67 48 30 14 4 0 0 0 0 0

244 98 308 209 326 80 54 23 19 16 5 70 97 184 25 241 37 186 18 99 90 64 46

31

42

27

2539

Sources: Upravlenie universitetov i nauchno-issledovatel’skikh uchrezhdenii NKP RSFSR; Svodnyi plan nauchnogo-issledovaterskii rabot institutov i kafedr universitetov NKP RSFSR na 1935 g., in Blair A. Ruble, "The Expansion of Soviet Science," 542.

from the war, w hile far less d ram atic th a n the o th er spheres o f u rb an life exam ined here, nonetheless proved to be profoundly dam aging to L eningrad’s status am ong Soviet urban centers.

Conclusion By the late 1950s, L eningrad appeared to have m ore th a n recovered from the im pact o f the Second W orld War. T he city’s p o p u latio n h ad finally surpassed its prew ar level a n d the econom ic o u tp u t rose far in excess o f previous perform ance records. Yet, L eningrad’s visible health obscured deeper, long-term , destructive p attern s o f u rb an developm ent w hich had been either initiated or exacerbated by the city’s harrow ing experience d u rin g the war. L eningrad’s vaun ted work force had lost m uch o f its historic com petitive edge, created by form erly high skill levels in relation to oth er

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Soviet ind u strial centers. Its previously pow erful political m achine h ad been crushed, only to be replaced by a far less p o ten t local P arty elite. T he city’s econom ic base had lost ground in relation to the rest o f the Soviet econom y w hile in d iv id u al in d u strial sectors began to experience absolute decline in a d d itio n to the general p attern o f com parative decrescendo. Finally, L en­ in grad’s academ ic com m unity relenquished national prom inence to M oscow a n d now found itself in co m p etitio n in specific disciplines w ith new er scientific centers developing in N ovosibirsk a n d som e o f the larger republican capitals. In short, beh in d the restored neoclassical facades along the N evskii, th e M oika, a n d the F ontan k a em erged an increasingly provincial urb an center. T he city h ad little b u t pretense to com pete w ith against Moscow, w hich had, by then, em erged as the Soviet U nion’s sole charism atic center. L eningrad, for its part, becam e, m ore sim ply, second city. T he w ar a n d the im m ed iate postw ar period proved to be decisive for th e p attern o f decline ju s t described. D espite the loss o f m any im p o rta n t functions to M oscow durin g the 1920s a n d 1930s, L eningrad had rem ained a d irect co m p etito r to the S oviet capital in num erous oth er spheres. Both physically an d psychologically, the w ar destroyed m uch o f the city. P erhaps even m ore im p o rta n t in the long run, the w ar’s d estruction provided an excuse for anti-L eningrad leaders in M oscow (who, after all, em erged as p red o m in an t in the w ake o f the L eningrad Affair) to ju stify the d im in u tio n o f L eningrad econom ic a n d academ ic capacity. L eningrad’s form er preem ­ inence could now be destroyed through sim ple inaction as opposed to requiring direct force. By not rebuilding secondary econom ic sectors, for exam ple, central econom ic planners in su red th a t L eningrad’s econom ic base w ould d im in ish in national statu re a n d significance. T he e n d result has been that, to a considerable degree, L eningrad has never recovered from the im pact o f W orld W ar II.

Notes 1. Leon Goure, T he S ieg e o f L eningrad: August, 1941-J a nu a ry, 1944 (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 239. 2. V. A. Kamenskii, A. I. Naumov, Leningrad. G radostroiteT nyi p ro b le m y ra zvitiia (Leningrad: Stroiizdat, 1977), 144; N. S. Aleshin et al., Leningrad. E ntsiklopedicheskii spravoch n ik (Moscow: Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1957), 134; and E. Bubis, G. Popov, K. Sharligina, O p tim a ln o e p ersp ek tivn o e p lan irovan ie k a p ita l’nogo rem onta i rekonstru ktsii zh ilishn ogo fo n d a (Leningrad: Stroiizdat, 1980), 42. 3. Clifford Geertz, “Centers, Kings, Charisma: Reflections on the Symbolics of Power,” in Joseph Ben-David, Terry Nichols Clark (eds.). C ulture a n d Its C reators (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), 150-71, 309-14. 4. Official data identify a low population of 639,000 in March, 1943 as well as 554,000 evacuees and 632,253 civilian deaths. These figures account for approximately 1.8 million persons in a prewar population of 3.2 million. L. Goure, The S ieg e o f L eningrad, 239; Harrison E. Salisbury, The 90 0 D ays: T he S ieg e o f L en in g ra d (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), 513-18. 5. L. Goure, S ieg e o f L eningrad, 239; “ lz letopisi s o b y t i i L en in gradskaia pan oram a, 1982, No. 6:7.

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6. V. A. Ezhov, “ Izmeneniia v chislennosti i sostave rabochikh Leningrada v poslevoennyi period (1945-1950gg.),” Vestnik L en in gradskogo universiteta, se riia istorii, ia zy k a i literatury, No. 2 (1966): 15-21. 7. Ibid., 19. 8. G. M. Romanenkova, “Sotsial’no-ekonomicheskie posledstviia demograficheskogo razvitiia,” in N. A. Tolokontsev, G. M. Romanenkova (eds.), D em o grafiia i ekologiia krupnogo goroda (Leningrad: Nauka, 1980), 54-55; TsSU SSSR, Ito g i vsesoiuznogo p e rep isi naseleniia 1970 g oda (Moscow: Statistika, 1972), Vol. 2:5-11, Tables 1-2. 9. See, for example, N. Shiktorov, “ Ukrepim obshchestvennyi poriadok i bezopasnost’ v Leningrade,” L en in gradskaia p ra vd a (23 October 1945):2-3. 10. P. S. Popkovo “Rech’ na plenume Leningradskogo gorkoma VKP (b). 28 dekabriia 1946 goda,” L en in gradskaia pravda, (1 January 1947):2-3. 11. V. A. Ezhov, “Izmeneniia v chislennosti i sostave rabochikh” Vestnik L en in grad­ skogo U niversiteta se riia istorii, ia zy k a i litera tu ry no. 2 (1966), 15-21. 12. S. S. Dmitriev et al., L en in g ra d sk a ia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh, 1917-1973 gg. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974), 39-45. 13. Ibid. 14. Ibid., 74-75. 15. S. P. Kniazev, “Kurs na vosstanovlenie posle sniatiia blokady (1944-1945 gg.),” in Institut istorii partii Leningradskogo obkoma KPSS— Filial Instituta MarksizmaLeninizma pri TsK KPSS, O cherki isto rii L en in g ra d sk o i o rg a n iza tsii K P SS, C hasV 11: n oiabr‘ 1917-1945gg. (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968), 649. 16. S. S. Dmitriev, et al., L en in g ra d sk a ia o rg a n iza tsiia KP SS, 45-51. 17. N. A. Romanov, “Doklad predsedatelia mandatnoi komissii” L en in gradskaia p ra v d a (25 September 1952):3. 18. V. M. Andrianov, “Doklad sekretariia Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b)” L en in gradskaia pravda, (28 September 1952) 2-4. Frol’ Kozlov repeated the twothousand person figure in his report to the Nineteenth Party Congress the following month (F. R. Kozlov, “Rech’ ” L en in g ra d sk a ia p ra v d a (16 October 1952]:3). 19. V. M Andrianova, “Rech’” L en in g ra d sk a ia p ra v d a (9 October 1952):3-4. 20. A. R. Dzeniskevich, V. M. Koval’chuk, G. L. Sobolev, A. N. Tsamutali, V. A. Shishkin, N epokrennyi L eningrad, 2nd ed. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1974), 455. 21. In September, 1952, City Party Committee Secretary A. I. Alekseev indicated to a city party conference that 1213 officials had been appointed in recent months to primary party posts. Later, Alekseev noted that there were 4230 such primary party organizations (A. I. Alekseev, “Doklad sekretariia Leningradskogo gorodskogo komiteta VKP (b)” L eningradskaia p ra vd a (23 September 1952), 2-3). At the subsequent regional party conference, Regional Party First Secretary V. M. Andrianov refered to 2000 new officers having been appointed during his brief tenure in Leningrad, a figure repeated by Regional Party Second Secretary Frol’ Kozlov at the Nineteenth Party Congress a month later (“Doklad tov. Andrianova, [28 September 1952] “Rech’ tov. Kozlova,” 16 October 1952). 22. Planovaia komissiia ispolkoma Lengorsoveta and Statisticheskoe upravlenie goroda Leningrada. L en in gradskia p ro m y sh len n o st’ za 5 0 let (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967), 6; and other estimates calculated on the basis of Soviet data by Edward Bubis. Unfortunately, totally reliable economic data for Leningrad during and following the war is not available. Therefore, one must compare the relatively more reliable data for the 1930s and 1950s to determine how the Leningrad economy might have performed and developed throughout the decade of the 1940s. 23. N. B. Lebedeva et al., P a rtiin a ia o rg a n iza tsiia i rabochie L en in grada (Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974), 44. 24. See, for example, Jane Jacobs, T he E co n o m y o f C ities (New York: Vintage Books, 1970). 25. A. A. Kuznetsov, “XI sessiia Verkhovnogo soveta soizuza, 1-ogo sozyva, premia po dokladu o Gosudarstvennom biudzhete SSSR na 1945 god. Rech*” L en in gradskaia p ravda (28 June 1945), 2. 26. la. A. Lavrikov, E. Mazalov, L en in g ra d sk a ia p ro m y sh le n n o st ' / ee reservy (Len­ ingrad: Lenizdat, 1960), 9.

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27. L eningrad. E n tsik lo p ed ich esk ii spravochnik, 134; L en in g ra d sk a ia prom ysh len n o st’ z a 5 0 let, 27. 28. L en in g ra d sk a ia p ro m y sh len n o st’ za 5 0 let, 29. 29. L eningrad, E n tsiklopedicheskii spravochnik, 135. 30. L en in g ra d sk a ia p rom ysh len n ost ’ za 5 0 let, 29. 31. For a discussion of subsequent changes in the Leningrad economic structure, see Blair A. Ruble, “Romanov’s Leningrad,” P roblem s o f C o m m u n ism (November-December 1983), 36-48. 32. Statisticheskoe upravlenie goroda Leningrada N arodnoe k h o ziaistvo goroda Leningrada. S ta tistich esk ii sborn ik (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1957), 20. 33. I. Osipov. L en in g ra d i L en in g ra d sk a ia o b la st’ z a X X let S o vetsk o i vlasti (Leningrad: Lenoblizdat, 1937), 37. 34. L eningrad. E n tsiklopedicheskii spravochnik, 411-412. 35. Blair A. Ruble, “The Expansion of Soviet Science,” K now ledge: Creation, Diffusion, U tilization , Vol. 2, No. 4 (June 1981):529-553. 36. Several regional educatonal and research institutions east of the Urals, for example, trace their origins to the evacuated academic institutions of the War period; Ibid.

R eferences Aleshin, N. S. et al. L eningrad. E n tsiklopedicheskii spravochnik. Moscow: Bol’shaia Sovetskaia Entsiklopediia, 1957. Alekseev, A. I. “ Doklad sekretariia Leningradskogo gorodskogo komiteta VKP (b).” in L en in gra d sk a ia p ravda, September 23, 1952, 2-3. Andrianov, V. M. “Doklad sekretariia Leningradskogo oblastnogo komiteta VKP (b).” In L en in gra d sk a ia p ravda, September 28, 1952a, 2-4. ______ “Rech\” In L en in g ra d sk a ia p ravda, October 9, 1952b, 3-4. Ben-David, Joseph and Terry Nichols Clark (eds.) C ulture a n d Its Creators. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977). Bubis, E., G. Popov and K. Sharligina. O p tim a l’n oe p ersp ek tivn o e p lan irovan ie k a p ita l’nogo rem onta i rekonstru ktsii zh ilishn ogo fo n d a . Leningrad: Stroiizdat, 1980. Dmitriev et al. L en in g ra d sk a ia o rg a n iza tsiia K P S S v tsifrakh, 1917-1973 gg. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974. Dzeniskevich, A. R., V. M. Koval’chuk, G. L. Sobolev, A. N. Tsamutali and V. A. Shishkin N epokren n yi L en in g ra d (second edition). Leningrad: Nauka, 1974. Ezhov, V. A. “ Izmeneniia v chislennosti i sostave rabochikh Leningrada v poslevoennyi period (1945-1950 gg.).” No. 2. In Vestnik L enin g ra d sk o g o universiteta, se riia istorii, ia zy k a i literatu ry, 1966, 15-21. Goure, Leon. T he S ieg e o f L eningrad: August 1941-January, 1944. New York: McGrawHill Book Co., 1964. Institut istorii partii Leningradskogo obkoma KPSS—Filian Instituta Marksizma-Leninizma pri TsK KPSS. O cherki isto rii L en in g ra d sk o i o rg ra n iza tsii KPSS, C h a st’ II: n o ia b r’ 1917-1945 gg. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1968. “ Iz letopisi sobytii.” In L en in g ra d sk a ia p a n o ra m a . No. 6. 1982, 7. Jacobs, Jane. T he E c o n o m y o f Cities. New York: Vintage Books, 1970. Kamenskii, V. A. and A. I. Naumov. L eningrad. G radostroiteT n yi p ro b le m y razvitiia. Leningrad: Stroiizdat, 1977. Kozlov, F. R. “ Rech\” In L en in g ra d sk a ia pravda, 16 October 1952, 3. Kuznetsov, A. A. “XI sessiia Verkhovnogo soveta soiuza, 1-ogo sozyva, premia po dokladu o Gosudarstvennom biudzhete SSSR na 1945 god. Rech.” In L en in gradskaia pravda, 28 June 1945, 2. Lavrikov, la. A. and E. V. Mazalov. L en in g ra d sk a ia p ro m y sh len n o st’i ee rezervi. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1960. Lebedva, N. B. et al. p a rtiin ia o rg a n iza tsiia i rabochie L eningrada. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1974.

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Petrovich, N. A. et al. P a rtiin o e stroiteTstvo. Moscow: Politizdat, 1976. Planovaia komissiia ispolkoma Lengorsoveta and Statisticheskoe upravlenie goroda Leningrada. L en in gradskaia p ro m y slen n o st’ za 5 0 let. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1967. Popkov, P. S. “Rech\” In L en in g ra d sk a ia pravda, 1 January 1947, 2-3. Romanov, N. A. “Doklad predsedatelia mandatnoi komissii.” In L en in gradskaia pravda, 25 September 1952, 3. Ruble, Blair A. “The Expansion of Soviet Science,” In Know ledge: C reation, D iffusion, U tilization. Vol. 2, No. 4. 1981, 529-553. ______ “Romanov’s Leningrad.” In P roblem s o f C o m m u n ism , November-December 1983, 36-48. Salisbury, Harrison E. T he 900 D ays: T he S ieg e o f L eningrad. New York: Harper & Row, 1969. Shiktorov, N. “ Ukrepim obshchestvennyi poriadok i bezopasnost' v Leningrade.” In L eningradskaia pravda, 23 October, 1945, 2-3. Statisticheskoe upravlenie goroda Leningrada. N arodnoe k h o zia istvo g oroda L en in grada. Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1957. ______ L en in grad i L en in gradskaia oblast *v tsifrakh. S ta tistich esk ii sbornik. Leningrad: Lenizdat, 1971. Stepanov, Z. V., ed. O cherki isto rii L eningrada. Leningrad: Nauka, 1970. Tolokontsev, N. A. and G. M. Romanenkova, eds. D em o g ra fiia i ekologiia krupnogo goroda. Leningrad: Nauka, 1980. Tsentral’nœ statisticheskoe upravleniia SSSR. N arodnoe k h o zia istvo S SSR . S ta tistich esk ii sbornik. Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1956. ______ Itogi vsesoiuznogo p erep isi n aseleniia 1970 goda. Moscow: Statistika, 1972a. ----------N arodnoe k h o zia istvo S S S R z a 6 0 let. lu b ile in ii sta tistic h e sk ii sbornik. Moscow: Statistika, 1972b. Upravlenie universitetov i nauchno-issledovatel’skikh uchrezhdenii NKP RSFSR S vo d n yi plan nauchnogo-issledovateTskii rabot in stitu to v i kafedr universitetov. Moscow: Narkompros RSFSR OGIZ UchPEDIGIZ, 1935.

11 Demographie Consequences of World War II on the Non-Russian Nationalities of the USSR BARBARA A. ANDERSON BRIAN D. SILVER

W orld W ar II is a spectacular event in Soviet dem ographic history. In the course o f the war, over 20 m illion people are rep o rted to have died. M ore th an 25 m illion people were evacuated to the east an d south. M ore than 22 m illion people found th eir territo rie s annexed to the Soviet U nion in the period ju s t preceding, du rin g o r ju s t after the war. A t least 10 m illion children w ere not born durin g th a t tim e who otherw ise w ould have been. T hree m illion people em igrated or rem ained am ong those perm anently displaced from the Soviet U nion after the war. M ore th an a m illion nonR ussians were u prooted from th eir hom elands a n d dep o rted to Siberia an d C entral A sia because o f th eir alleged collaboration w ith the G erm an occupying arm y. D em ographers seldom focus atten tio n on singular historical events such as w ars, b u t tend rath er to focus on long-term tren d s an d p attern s o f behavior. T he effects o f fam ine, war, a n d natural disasters are viewed as m ajor p ertu rb atio n s in otherw ise “ no rm al” p attern s o f fertility, m ortality, a n d m ig ratio n .1 For exam ple, after noting the deep troughs in the course o f m arital fertility in R ussia resulting from the F irst W orld War, collec­ tiv ization, an d W orld W ar II, Coale, A nderson, an d H arm w rite that: [The troughs] occurred during years for which prim ary demographic data are nonexistent or inaccessible and for which information on social and economic

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conditions is also unsatisfactory. Moreover, even if a detailed analysis were possible, it would be a study o f pathological instances o f reduced fertility rather than o f the normal conditions under which fertility falls.2

The authors then add the following, however: There is the possibility, which we can only m ention without judging its probability, that these prolonged traum ata strongly influenced subsequent trends.

T his chapter exam ines both the im m ed iate im pact an d th e long-term indirect consequences o f W orld W ar II on a set o f dem ographic changes an d patterns am ong the non-R ussian nationalities o f the U SSR. Effects on the Soviet population as a whole are review ed as a background for ex­ am ination o f differential p attern s a n d tren d s am ong n on-R ussian n atio n ­ alities. In 1941, the total population o f the Soviet U nion w as 200 m illion. T h is num ber was not achieved again un til 1956.3 It is com m onplace to note th a t some Soviet nationalities suffered such serious w ar-related losses th a t recovery o f their pre-w ar population size took a long tim e; however, no q u an tita tiv e estim ates o f the absolute or relative differences in po p u latio n losses o f S oviet nationalities due to W orld W ar II have been published.4 We do not estim ate the direct losses to in d iv id u al n ationalities due to the war. Rather, we are interested in assessing som e o f the im plications o f the d ifferen tia l im pact o f the w ar on the n on-R ussian nationalities. O u r m ain thesis is th at the differential im pact o f the w ar is reflected in differential ratios o f m ales to females, an d th a t these differentials co n trib u te to v arying rates o f interethnic m arriage a n d to subsequent linguistic a n d eth n ic ru s­ sification. We do not regard the w ar as the sole cause o f the linguistic o r ethnic russification o f non-R ussian nationalities. M any o th er factors have been shown to affect th a t process.5 B ut the severe im pact o f the w ar on th e sex ratios o f m any non-R ussian nationalities ap pears to have accentuated a n d accelerated the process o f russification.6

Overview of the Demographic Impact of the War on the Soviet Population It is well know n th at the Soviet U nion’s tu rb u le n t h isto ry o f fam ines, w ars, an d revolution has had a m ajor im pact on the age d istrib u tio n o f the population. Figures 11.1 an d 11.2 show the age d istrib u tio n o f th e Soviet population as a whole by sex by single year o f age in 1959.7 In a p o p u latio n w ith a tranquil history, the n um ber o f people by age typically declines monotonically. T he Soviet age d istrib u tio n exhibits th ree large troughs. The trough for those in th eir teens in 1959 results from increased m o rtality

F ig ure 11.1

Number of Males in the Soviet Union by Single Year of Age, 0-48 in 1959, as Estimated by Baldwin

Figure 11.2

Number in Thousands

Number of Females in the Soviet Union by Single Year of Age, 0-48 in 1959, as Estimated by Baldwin

Age in 1959

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o f the young an d from b irth s th a t d id n o t occur d u rin g W orld W ar II. T he num ber o f b irth s during the w ar was reduced due b o th to p o stp o n em en t o f m arriage an d to reduced fertility am ong the m a rrie d .8 The trough for those in th eir m id-tw enties in 1959 results from reduced b irth s an d increased m ortality o f the young d u rin g the p erio d o f the collectivization o f agriculture a n d the fam ine o f 1932-1933. T he very large trough th a t reaches a low p o in t for those age 40 in 1959 has two sources. T his th ird trough includes th e co h o rt b o m d u rin g W orld W ar I, the 1917 R evolution, a n d th e C ivil War. As in W orld W ar II, tro u b led tim es led to a tem porary reduction in b irth s a n d increased m o rtality o f the very young. T his resulted in a sm all b irth co h o rt from th a t period. T he th ird m ale trough is m uch larger th a n the th ird fem ale trough because m ales in th at cohort were young adults d u rin g W orld W ar II an d , thus, w ere am ong the m ain w ar com bat fatalities. T he m ale deficit was not caused solely by war. In norm al p o pulations, the m ale deficit increases m onotonicaliy w ith age, since m ales typically have som ew hat worse m ortality rates th a n females. Fem ales usually becom e the m ajority after about age 20. However, singular events such as w ars, w hich have a strong differential m ortality effect on m ales a n d fem ales, can lead to a sharp increase in the m ale deficit. Figure 11.3 shows the increasing m ale deficit w ith age in th e Soviet population in 1959. It shows th e sex ratio by year o f age for 1959— th e num ber o f m ales at a given age p er 1,000 fem ales a t th a t age. It is a p p a ren t in Figure 11.3 th at during W orld W ar II m ales h ad substantially higher m ortality th an females. Since the tw o m ore recent troughs resu lted from the reduction o f b irth s an d from m o rtality o f the very young, it is reasonable th at the occurrence o f the first tw o troughs should not be linked to large differences in the num ber o f people by sex. T he th ird trough, however, is linked to a precipitous decline in the ratio o f m ales to females. T he deficit o f m ales w ho were young adults d u rin g W orld W ar II has had a serious effect on the m arital status o f w om en. For every age group between 20 and 69, the pro p o rtio n o f fem ales cu rren tly m a rrie d w as low er in 1959 th an in either 1939 or 1970.9 T h is suggests th a t th e large m ale losses from W orld W ar II had substantial effects on the m a rital statu s o f w om en throughout a w ide age range. The prop o rtio n o f w om en m a rrie d at any given tim e is a co m b in atio n o f the pro p o rtio n who have never m arried , the p ro p o rtio n widow ed, an d the p roportion divorced. In the m ain, w om en age 40-49 in 1959 w ould have reached m arriageable age d u rin g the 1930s a n d probably w ould have m arried an d begun bearing children before W orld W ar II. Since th e m ean childbearing age is approxim ately 30, th e children o f these w om en, on average, w ould have been age 10-19 in 1959.10 A substantial portio n o f these w om en w ould have becom e w ar widows. T hose who bore children before the w ar often w ould have becom e heads o f single-parent households, since th e ir chances o f rem a rry in g w ere lim ited

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211

Figure 11.3

Sex Ratio (Males per 1,000 Females) in the Soviet Union by Single Year of Age, 0-48 in 1959, Based on Baldwin’s Estimates

if they becam e widowed. We shall refer to th is group as the W ar W idow cohort.

For the Soviet po p u latio n as a whole, 58.3 percent o f w om en age 40-49 in 1959 (the W ar W idow cohort) were m arried . H ad the p ro p o rtio n o f 4049 year-olds w ho were m a rrie d in 1959 approxim ated a m ore typical figure (based on the p ro p o rtio n s for 1939 a n d 1970), betw een 70 a n d 75 percent w ould have been currently m arried. W om en age 30-39 in 1959 reached the m ean age o f m arriage during or ju s t after W orld W ar II. T h eir p o ten tial husbands w ould be those m en in th e co h o rt m ost depleted by the d irect effects o f W orld W ar II. We shall refer to this cohort o f w om en as th e W ar B rid e cohort. T he children o f th is cohort on average w ould have been age 0-9 in 1959.11 For the W ar Bride cohort, the m ain effect o f the m ale deficit w ould be th at m any never m arried. In 1959, 75.5 percent o f 30-39 year-old Soviet w om en were m arried. H ad the p ro p o rtio n o f 30-39 year-old w om en who were m arried as o f 1959 m ore closely approxim ated the p ro p o rtio n o f w om en w ho were m arried as o f 1939 a n d 1970, betw een 80 a n d 85 percent w ould have been currently m arried .

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Overview of Differences in the Demographic Impact of the War among Soviet Nationalities In order to assess the relative im pact o f th e w ar on different cohorts, data by age are needed. D ata by age from the 1939 census (or as ad ju sted to 1940 by N otestein)12 are available for the Soviet p o p u latio n as a w hole as well as for m any regions. B ut age d ata for 1939 b y n a tio n a lity are not available, and hence estim atio n o f w ar losses based on d irect co m parisons o f 1939 and 1959 age data for specific nationalities ca n n o t be m ade. We therefore rely on 1959 Soviet census d ata to exam ine retrospectively the effects o f the w ar by age cohort, w ith p rim a ry em phasis on d eterm in in g the relative w ar losses by nationality an d on assessing som e o f the long­ term consequences o f the differences in w ar losses. We exam ine the differential im pact o f the w ar on the 34 non-R ussian nationalities for w hich age d ata are available in the 1959 Soviet cen su s.13 To facilitate com parisons in the first p a rt o f the d ata presen tatio n , we aggregate the 34 non-R ussian nationalities into 10 groupings, based on m ajor differences in w ar experiences a n d in cultural a n d o th e r background ch ar­ acteristics. T he groupings are given in T able 11.1. L ater in the analysis, the nationalities will be treated as separate cases rath e r th a n in groupings.

SEX RATIOS We gauge the relative losses by nationality directly attrib u tab le to W orld War II by exam ining age-specific sex ratios (the nu m b er o f m ales p er 1,000 females in the age group). Sex ratios are a b etter in d icato r o f the d irect effect o f World W ar II on a nationality th a n is the size in 1959 o f the cohort who were young adults during W orld W ar II since th is is the sm all cohort born during the R evolution, W orld W ar I, a n d th e C ivil War. Sex ratios are presented for the ten groupings a n d for the R u ssian s in Table

11.2. It is often noted that the R ussians, U k rain ian s, a n d B elorussians suffered especially severely in W orld W ar II.14 Large m ale deficits (low sex ratios) w ithin these Slavic nationalities am ong those b o m in 1909-1913 (age 3034 in 1943) are therefore not surprising. A m ong the co h o rt o f R ussian s age 20-24 in 1943, for exam ple, there were only 605 m ales for every 1,000 females alive in 1959. In the sam e co h o rt o f U k rain ian s, there w ere 645 m ales for every 1,000 females; a n d am ong Belorussians, 678 m ales p er 1,000 females. It is m ore surprising th a t in th is co h o rt the m ale deficit for the T atarB ashkir grouping is even greater th a n the deficit for the U k ra in ia n s a n d Belorussians and that the deficit for the trad itio n ally non-M oslem ASSRlevel nationalities is greater th an th a t o f any o f the th ree Slavic n ationalities.

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Table 11.1

Groupings of Thirty-Four Non-Russian Nationalities in the Analysis

Grouping (or Nationality)

Nationalities within Grouping

Balts

Estonians Latvians Lithuanians Ukrainians Belorussians Moldavians Armenians Georgians

Ukrainians Belorussians Moldavians ArmenianGeorgian Non-Moslem ASSR

Tatar-Bashkir Moslem SSR

Dagestanis

Deported

213

Buryats Chuvash Karelians Komi Mari Mordvinians Ossetians Udmurts Tatars Bashkirs Azerbaidzhanis Kazakhs Kirgiz Tadzhiks Turkmenians Uzbeks Avars Dargins Kabards* Kumyks Lezghians Balkars Chechen Ingush Kalmyks

1959 Population (in Thousands) 988.6 1,399.5 2,326.1 37,252.9 7,913.5 2,214.1 2,786.9 2,692.0 253.0 1,469.8 167.3 287.0 504.2 1,285.1 412.6 624.8 4,967.7 989.0 2,939.7 3.621.6 968.7 1,380.3 1,001.6 6,015.4 270.4 158.1 203.6 135.0 233.1 42.4 418.8 106.0 106.1

Predominant Traditional Religion Lutheran Lutheran Roman Catholic Orthodox/Uniate Orthodox/Uniate Orthodox Gregorian Chris. Geo. Autoceph. (Orthodox) Orthodox/Buddhism Orthodox Orthodox Orthodox Orthodox Orthodox Orthodox/lslam Orthodox Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Islam Buddhism

■Kabards are not generally considered a Dagestani ethnic group but are included with the Dagestanis because, except for the Dagestanis they are the only North Caucasus nationality in the analysis who were not deported during World War II.

A m ong the T atars-B ashkirs, in the co h o rt age 20-24 in 1943, 618 m ales w ere still alive in 1959 for every 1,000 females. A m ong the non-M oslem ASSR-level nationalities, 572 m ales per 1000 fem ales in th e co h o rt age 2024 in 1943 w ere alive in 1959. In the next older co h o rt (those who were age 25-29 in 1943), b o th the T atars-B ashkirs an d the non-M oslem ASSRlevel nationalities had a larger m ale deficit in 1959 th a n d id any o f the th ree Slavic nationalities.

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Table 11.2 Sex Ratios in 1959, by A ge and Grouping (number of m ales per 1000 females)

Year of Birth:

19091913

19141918

19191923

19241928

19291933

19341938

Age in 1943:

30-34

25-29

20-24

15-19

10-14

5-9

Balts Ukrainians Belorussians Moldavians ArmeniansGeorgians Non-Moslem ASSR TatarsBashkirs Moslem SSR Dagestanis Deported

698 629 647 852 803

702 611 650 803 703

720 645 678 853 747

781 797 792 892 996

948 933 976 914 996

928 982 965 850 891

565

558

572

811

927

915

544

577

618

844

971

944

873 760 982

755 632 799

784 745 779

1093 1064 1034

1022 988 1052

943 926 864

589 734

606 665

605 699

807 936

955 977

973 919

Russians 34 Non-Russian Groups

Even though m ost o f the ASSR’s were beyond the front d u rin g the war, an extrem ely high prop o rtio n o f the m ales old enough for m ilita ry service m ust have been drafted an d died durin g the w ar.15 V. I. K ozlov has no ted the serious m ale deficit am ong the ASSR-level n atio n alities.16 H e a ttrib u te s this deficit to the large w ar losses o f these groups resulting from the fact th at the groups were predom inantly rural. Few m en from the ASSR-level nationalities w ould have been deferred as a result o f holding strategic civ ilian jobs. Although m any industrial plants were evacuated to cities in th e nonR ussian areas o f the Volga-Viatka region, these p lants generally b ro u g h t w ith them a nonindigenous skilled work force. T hese new in d u stries pro v id ed som e jo b op p o rtu n ities in the lower-skilled occupations for the local p o p ­ ulations, p rim arily for w om en a n d youths, b u t p ro v id ed few jo b s carry in g deferm ents for adult m ales o f the local n atio n alities.17 A high p roportion o f M oslem SSR-level group m em bers also w ere rural, b u t the m ale w ar losses am ong these nationalities w ere ap p aren tly a m uch lower prop o rtio n o f the young ad u lt m ale p o pulation. It could be th a t the location o f the ASSR’s in E uropean R ussia led to m en from th e ASSRlevel nationalities being sent to fight on the E uropean front, w hereas co n scrip ts from the traditionally M oslem SSR-level natio n alities generally served in less hazardous locations.

PROPORTIONS MARRIED The differential dem ographic im pact o f the w ar by natio n ality is depicted also in Table 11.3, w hich shows the num b er o f w om en m a rrie d p er 1000

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215

Table 11.3 Number of Women Married per Thousand Women, by A ge in 1959

Year of Birth:

19091913

19141918

19191923

19241928

19291933

19341938

Year Age 20:

19291933

19341938

19391943

19441948

19491953

19541958

638 552 545 681 638

674 608 605 737 678

722 705 712 795 763

725 760 760 807 817

657 737 724 768 765

366 481 448 569 509

463

539

643

690

664

395

474

561

669

725

716

492

704 604 609

774 681 674

859 765 782

903 826 828

913 608 821

824 637 630

532 581

614 648

720 739

776 784

761 763

482 553

Balts Ukrainians Belorussians Moldavians ArmeniansGeorgians Non-Moslem ASSR TatarsBashkirs Moslem SSR Dagestanis Deported Russians 34 Non-Russian Groups

w om en by age in 1959 for the ten nationality groupings. T here is great v ariability in the p ro p o rtio n o f w om en m arried , bo th am ong groupings an d across the age categories. T h ere is very little intergroup v ariability in the p ro p o rtio n s o f m en m arrie d at any age. A lthough there are substantial differences am ong Soviet nationalities in fem ale age a t first m arriag e,18 the fem ale m ean age o f m arriage has been in the early 20s for m ost S oviet nationalities throughout the p eriod con­ sidered.19 T hus, those m ost susceptible to w idow hood from W orld W ar II w ould be w om en b o m in 1909-1918 (the W ar W idow cohort), w hile those m ost likely to be affected by the w ar by having to defer m arriage or never being able to m a rry w ould be those b o m in 1919-1928 (the W ar Bride cohort). T he p ro p o rtio n s m a rrie d am ong w om en b o m before 1929 are low for U k rain ian s, B elorussians, R u ssian s an d , for m ost ages, Balts. However, the T atars-B ashkirs, an d even m ore so the non-M oslem ASSR-level nationalities, have especially low p ro p o rtio n s m a rrie d am ong the cohorts m ost severely affected by the war, reflecting the severe shortage o f m en belonging to those nationalities.

NATIVE LANGUAGE A nother co ncom itant o f the w ar is a change in p attern s o f language preference. For successive cohorts o f U k rain ian s, Belorussians, an d M oldavians b o m

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before the 1917 R evolution, for exam ple, larger a n d larger p ro p o rtio n s claim ed R ussian as th eir native language in 1959. In o th e r w ords, th e 1959 census data suggest progressively higher levels o f linguistic russification am ong those who reached school age before th e 1917 R evolution. T his trend was reversed im m ediately after th e R evolution. T h e first few cohorts o f U krainians, B elorussians, an d M o ld av ian s b o m after th e R ev ­ olution had successively sm aller p ro p o rtio n s w ho claim ed R u ssian as th e ir native language. T his app a ren t decline in linguistic russification m ay be related to the establishm ent o f native-language schools in the po strev o lu ­ tionary period in those p arts o f the U kraine, Belorussia, a n d M o ld av ia th a t were inside the U SSR in the interw ar period. For U krainian, Belorussian, a n d M oldavian ch ild ren reaching school age during W orld W ar II (age 5-9 in 1943), however, there w as a slight increase in the p ro portion w ho claim ed R ussian as th e ir native language in 1959, followed by som ew hat lower levels o f linguistic russification am ong th e postw ar cohorts. T hus, for these w estern SSR-level n ationalities, th e increase in the p roportion claim ing R u ssian as n ative language associated w ith W orld W ar II was short term , affecting only those o f p rim a ry school age at th e height o f the war. A sim ilar p attem o f changing p ro p o rtio n s for the co h o rts reaching school age before the 1917 R evolution a n d claim ing R ussian as n ative language can be found am ong m any o th e r non-R ussian nationalities. Like th e U k ra in ­ ians, Belorussians, an d M oldavians, th e p ro p o rtio n linguistically russified am ong those b o m in 1934-1938 (age 5-9 in 1943) w as higher in 1959 th a n am ong those b o m som ew hat earlier, for th e ASSR-level n atio n alities in the RSFSR. However, for these ASSR-level nationalities, unlike for th e U k ra in ­ ians, Belorussians, an d M oldavians, the increased linguistic russification o f those aged 5-9 in 1943 m arked only the beginning o f a sh arp u p tu rn in linguistic russification for successive cohorts. Figures 11.4 an d 11.5 illustrate th e p attern s o f change. They show th e num ber per thousand popu latio n by age, sex, a n d ru ra l-u rb a n residence claim ing R ussian as th eir native language in 1959 for U k ra in ia n s a n d C huvash, respectively. T he C huvash case is representative o f the experiences o f other non-M oslem ASSR-level nationalities in the R SFSR . For both U krain ian s an d C huvash, the co h o rt b o m in 1934-1938 shows a slightly higher pro p o rtio n claim ing R u ssian as th e ir nativ e language th a n the next older (preceding) cohort. For b o th the U k ra in ia n s a n d the C huvash, the m ain source o f this increase w as the linguistic russification o f those living in rural areas in 1959, especially rural m ales. T he fu rth e r rise in linguistic russification for the later co h o rts am ong th e C huvash, however, was due to the linguistic russification o f C huvash w ho lived in u rb an places in 1959. We believe the w ar is also a w atershed in ethnic russification for ASSRlevel groups, such as the C huvash. A lthough there is evidence th a t assim ilatio n o f these groups by R ussians has o ccurred over a p eriod o f several cen tu ries,20 especially rapid rates o f linguistic an d eth n ic assim ilatio n have ap p e ared am ong these nationalities in the postw ar p e rio d .21

F ig ure 11.4

Number of Ukrainians per Thousand with Russian as Native Language in 1959 by Age, Sex, and Urban-Rural Residence

Figure 11.5

Number of Chuvash per Thousand with Russian as Native Language in 1959 by Age, Sex, and Urban-Rural Residence

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Table 11.4 Pearson Correlations between Sex Ratio and Proportion of Fem ales Married by A ge for 34 Non-Russian Nationalities, 1959

Proportion Females Married for Cohort Born in:

19091913

19141918

19191923

19241928

.796 .819 .885 .693

.754 .767 .840 .721

.713 .710 .779 .752

.683 .617 .731 .824

Sex Ratio for Cohort Born in: 1909-1913 1914-1918 1919-1923 1924-1928

Sex Ratios, Proportions of Women Married, and Interethnic Marriage MALE DEFICITS AND THE PROPORTION OF WOMEN MARRIED The differential effect o f the w ar on the sex ratio s am ong Soviet nationalities, as shown in Table 11.2, may be related to the chances o f w om en to m arry. Table 11.4 shows Pearson correlations betw een the sex ratio by age a n d th e proportion o f w om en reported as m a rrie d in 1959 for several age groups for the 34 non-R ussian nationalities. T he strong positive co rrelatio n s suggest a close link betw een the severity o f the m ale shortage a n d the chances o f w om en from different nationalities to m arry. T he correlations are strongest for the two 5-year age cohorts th a t were m ost directly affected by m ale participation in the war, those b o m betw een 1914 a n d 1918 a n d betw een 1919 an d 1923. Statistical analysis (not show n here) o f the im pact o f the shortage o f m en on the pro p o rtio n o f w om en m a rrie d reveals th a t w om en who were in the age groups th at suffered the heaviest m ale w ar losses also experienced greater difficulty in m arry in g (or m arry in g again) re la tiv e to th e su p p ly o f m en in th eir a g e grou p th a n d id som ew hat older o r som ew hat younger women.

MALE DEFICITS AND THE PROPORTION OF WOMEN IN INTERETHNIC MARRIAGES A short supply o f m en o f a given nationality depresses the p ro p o rtio n o f females in the sam e nationality who m arry. However, if fem ales in the nationality are not totally unw illing to m a rry m en from o th e r n ationalities, entering an interethnic m arriage is an o th er way to becom e m arried . A lthough all Soviet nationalities suffered som e m ale deficit due to the war, we m ight expect to find that the m ore severe the deficit o f m ales for a nationality,

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219

th e greater the tendency o f fem ale m em bers o f th a t nationality who d id m a rry to m a rry m en o f o th er nationalities. U nfortunately, system atic d ata on intereth n ic m arriage by age are not available for m ost Soviet nationalities. To develop an in d icato r o f the relative extent o f interethnic m arriag e am ong th e non-R ussian nationalities, we used 1959 census d ata on the size o f the m ale an d fem ale age cohorts a n d on th e p ro p o rtio n s o f m ales a n d fem ales m a rrie d by age to estim ate th e num ber o f m a rrie d m en a n d w om en by age a n d by nationality. C om parison o f the estim ated num bers o f w om en a n d m en who rep o rted them selves in 1959 as m arrie d reveals th a t larger n u m b ers o f w om en th a n o f m en are m a rrie d at all ages. A lthough p a rt o f th is difference m ay be due to problem s o f m isrep o rtin g o f m arriage inform ation, am ong the nonR u ssian nationalities m uch o f the surplus o f m a rrie d w om en is probably due to in terethnic m arriage.22 T he rela tiv e differences am ong nationalities in the rep o rted num bers o f m a rrie d w om en a n d m a rrie d m en can be used to estim ate the rela tive tendency o f w om en o f different n ationalities to m a rry m en o f o th er nationalities. A n ind icato r o f in terethn ic m arriage should link fem ales to m ales o f the m ost ap p ro p riate age cohorts for m arriage. Because o f th e problem s o f d eterm in in g the m ost likely ages o f potential spouses an d because there is probably greater v ariability in age m atch-ups o f spouses for those cohorts affected directly by the war, we use a cum ulative m easure o f the extent o f in terethnic m arriage. We estim ate th e relative extent o f interethnic m arriage am ong fem ale nationality m em bers w ho are a ce rtain age o r older, specifically, those w ho w ere age 30 or older a n d those who w ere age 40 o r older in 1959. T he co nstruction o f the in tereth n ic m arriage in d icato r is described in A ppendix A at the en d o f th is chapter. T he in tereth n ic m arriage indicator is based on tw o assum ptions. F irst, it assum es th a t the tendency for m a rrie d w om en in a nationality to be in in tereth n ic m arriages is strongly related to the tendency for bo th m ale a n d fem ale group m em bers to be in interethnic m arriages. Second, it assum es th a t the tendency for m a rrie d w om en in a nationality to be m a rrie d to a m an from any o th er nationality is strongly related to the tendency for m a rrie d w om en in a n ationality to be m arried to a R ussian. Table 11.5 shows the P earson correlations betw een th is interm arriage in d icato r a n d the sex ratios. T hese are generally strong an d negative; w hen there is a severe m ale deficit, w om en te n d to m a rry m en from oth er nationalities. Sim ultaneously, based on d ata analyses not shown here, w hen there is a shortage o f m en o f th eir nationality, w om en ten d to m a rry less, b u t the p ro p o rtio n o f w om en from nationalities w ith a severe m ale deficit w ho do m a rry is greater th a n it w ould have been if w om en were strictly ethnically endogam ous. In o th er w ords, h ad w om en in nationalities w ith a severe m ale deficit been unw illing to en ter intereth n ic m arriages, the p ro p o rtio n o f fem ales m arrie d w ould be even lower.

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Table 11.5 Pearson Correlations between Sex Ratio and Estimated Proportion of Fem ales Ethnically Intermarried by A ge for 34 Non-Russian Nationalities, 1959

Estimated Proportion Females Intermarried for Cohort Born in:

19091913

19141918

19191923

19241928

-.792 -.765 -.711 -.743

-.825 -.808 -.733 -.724

-.868 -.842 -.801 -.744

-.848 -.761 -.778 -.823

Sex Ratio for Cohort Born in: 1909-1913 1914-1918 1919-1923 1924-1928

Hypothesized Factors Affecting Linguistic and Ethnic Russification INTERETHNIC MARRIAGE The m ost obvious way in w hich the large im balance in th e n u m b er o f m ales and fem ales in the p o pulation could have affected russification is through the effects o f intereth n ic m arriage on linguistic a n d eth n ic ru ssi­ fication o f the non-R ussian spouse a n d the linguistic a n d eth n ic russification o f the children o f interethnic m arriages. Interethnic m arriage sets the stage for the linguistic russification o f the next generation. Linguistic russification w ould probably be m ore com m on am ong children o f interethnic m arriages th a n am ong ch ild ren w hose p aren ts were both m em bers o f the sam e non-R ussian nationality. In m arriages between R ussians an d non-R ussians, children typically becom e bilingual. Also, the children o f interethnic m arriages w ould be m ore likely to com e to claim R ussian as their native language th a n w ould the n o n -R u ssian spouses them selves. M oreover, a high incidence o f intereth n ic m arriag e could co n trib u te to a decrease in the availability o f schooling in the n o n -R u ssian n atio n ality ’s traditional language. We know th at in the p ostw ar years, the decision to reduce the am ount o f native-language schooling for a given n ationality has been partially based on the prevailing degree o f bilingualism am ong nonR ussian children.23 To the extent th at th is is true, in term arriag e w ould lead to a decreasing necessity for schooling in the group’s non -R u ssian language, which, in turn, could lead to loss o f facility in th a t language. Interethnic m arriage could be especially im p o rta n t in th e process o f ethnic assim ilation in the U SSR because o f the w orkings o f th e in tern al passport system. C hildren whose parents are b o th o f th e sam e n ationality are legally required to claim th e ir p aren ts’ n ationality as th e ir ow n natio n ality

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221

on th eir internal passport. A child w hose parents are o f different nationalities can legally claim the natio n ality o f eith er p aren t.24 T h is legal control on ethnic affiliations also could regulate the shift o f subjective ethnic identifications. E ven the supposedly com pletely subjective choice o f nationality in the S oviet censuses could be strongly affected by the existence o f an “ official” nationality on the p assp o rt (and oth er official docum ents such as w ork records). T he leading Soviet ethnic dem ographer, V. I. K ozlov, 25 claim s th a t the choice o f the passp o rt nationality involves a crystallization or fixing o f eth n ic affiliation th a t m akes subsequent change in ethnic self-identification highly im probable.26 Therefore, interethnic m arriage is probably an im p o rta n t route through w hich changes in subjective eth n ic attac h m e n t occur in the U SSR. However, we do not expect th a t it is the only route, nor do we believe th a t if change in ethnic self-identification occurs at all, it always occurs through passp o rt identification or even durin g adolescence. A lthough ethnic russification is m ost likely to occur d urin g adolescence, a substantial am o u n t o f ethnic russification occurs after adolescence am ong groups, such as the K arelians a n d M ordvinians, th a t have high overall rates o f ethnic russification27.

MOBILITY ASPIRATIONS IN THE PRESENCE OF A MALE DEFICIT As in o th er in d u strial societies, m ost jo b s in the S oviet U nion are highly sex-stratified.28 I f there were a shortage o f m ales o f the indigenous nationality, th e positions in the group’s titu la r area th a t w ere trad itio n ally held by m ales could have been filled by m ale R ussians m ore often th an w ould have been tru e otherw ise. T h is could have pro v id ed an incentive for young persons o f the indigenous nationality w ith m obility asp iratio n s to russify linguistically a n d ethnically. F urtherm ore, if m any o f these traditionally m ale jo b s were filled by w om en o f the indigenous nationality, the large p ro p o rtio n o f R ussians in these jo b s also could have provided an incentive for w om en aspiring to these jo b s to russify linguistically a n d ethnically. M ore generally, as the u rb an izatio n a n d educational attain m en ts o f the non-R ussian p o p u lations accelerated in the postw ar period, the R ussian num erical predom inance in th e u rb an pop u latio n s o f the autonom ous republics could have com bined w ith increased m obility asp iratio n s o f nonR ussian youths to accelerate th eir linguistic a n d ethnic russification. A lthough we lack d ata bearing directly on the question o f aspirations a n d perceptions— the subjective d im en sio n — we can establish enough central facts ab o u t the ethnic m akeup o f the labor force in the autonom ous republics to m ake a plausible case for why th e losses in W orld W ar II could have increased the incentives for non-R ussians to assim ilate. In 1959, a large m ajority o f the u rb an pop u latio n s o f all o f the autonom ous republics w ere R ussians. In K arelia, for exam ple, K arelians co n stitu ted only 6.5 percent o f the u rb an pop u latio n o f the republic, w hereas R ussians were 72.5 percent. In the K om i ASSR, K om i com prised 26.4 percent o f the

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urbanites, w hereas R ussians com prised 59.2 percent. In th e T atar ASSR, T atars m ade up 29.4 percent o f the u rb an ites, a n d R u ssian s 61.1 percent. In the C huvash A utonom ous R epublic, C huvash m ade u p 35.9 p ercen t o f the population, R ussians 56.9 percent. D uring the ensuing eleven years until th e 1970 census, th e titu la r nationalities generally increased th eir share o f th e u rb an p o p u latio n w hile the R ussians decreased th eir share, b u t R ussians co n tin u ed to d o m in ate the m ost highly skilled job s in m ost sectors o f th e econom y. In 1959 in the K arelian ASSR, for exam ple, R ussians co n stitu ted 75.4 p ercen t o f the engineers, whereas K arelians were only 2.8 percent. S eventy-three percent o f the m edical doctors were R ussians, while only 1.0 p ercen t w ere K arelian s— only 11 o f the 1,064 m edical doctors in the republic w ere K arelian s.29 In the K om i ASSR in 1960,24.5 percent o f th e specialists w ith higher educational degrees were K om i, w hereas R ussians co m prised 59.3 p ercen t o f such specialists.30 In the T atar ASSR in 1966, T atars co n stitu ted 33.2 percent o f all specialists w ith higher degrees w orking in th e econom y, w hile R u ssian s co n stitu ted 57.1 percent.31 In 1950 and 1953, T atars am o u n ted to ab o u t 40 p ercen t o f all “ workers” and w hite-collar “ em ployees” (slu zh ashchie) in co nstruction, about 30 percent o f w orkers an d em ployees in industry, a n d ab o u t 20 percent in tran sp o rtatio n .32 T he T atar p ro p o rtio n o f w orkers a n d em ployees in construction, industry, an d tran sp o rta tio n increased substantially by 1963, b u t T atars still represented m uch less th a n a m ajority o f the w orkers a n d em ployees in those sectors o f the econom y.33 O f the ASSR-level nationalities, in th e 1950s a n d 1960s, only the C huvash com prised a m ajority o f the specialists w ith higher ed ucation w orking in their titu lar republic. In the late 1950s, betw een 56 a n d 60 p ercen t o f such specialists were C huvash, w hereas betw een 35 a n d 39 percent w ere R u ssian s.34 The plausibility o f the argum ent th a t the im balance betw een th e n u m b er o f m ales and fem ales resulting from W orld W ar II accelerated the linguistic an d ethnic russification o f non-R ussians does not d ep e n d o n establishing precisely when the num erical d om inance o f R u ssian s in the u rb an p o p u latio n s an d the skilled labor force cam e about. Judging from available d a ta in th e 1926 Soviet census, this dom inance has pro v id ed a context over an extended period o f tim e w ithin w hich adolescents com pleting secondary school, especially those living in or m oving to u rb an areas, w ould find it desirable to reidentify as R ussian linguistically a n d ethnically. However the severe im balance in the relative n u m b er o f fem ales a n d m ales am ong m any o f the ASSR-level nationalities, resulting from th e war, could have further reduced the co m petitiveness o f w orkers from th e local nationalities and thereby fu rth er increased th e incentives for youths o f the local nationalities to assim ilate. I f the indigenous labor supply is sharply reduced in certain cohorts because o f losses d u rin g W orld W ar II, m anagers would ten d to recruit new w orkers from outside the republic, w ho typically would have a different ethn ic a n d linguistic background th a n th a t o f the local nationality.

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T he incentives for m em bers o f indigenous non-R ussian nationalities to becom e russified an d the focus on nonlocal labor recru itm en t also w ould have been reinforced by the decision in the late 1950s to shift the language o f governm ent ad m in istratio n in the autonom ous republics (as well as in the autonom ous provinces a n d n ational okru gi) from the local languages to R u ssian .35 As a co n com itan t o f th is sw itch in language use, em ploym ent in state in stitu tio n s, in w hich the m em bers o f the local n ationalities had been m uch m ore heavily represented th a n in th e skilled labor force o f the in d u strial sectors o f the u rb an econom y, w ould becom e m ore attractiv e to R ussians. A t the sam e tim e, co m m an d o f the R ussian language w ould becom e a m ore im p o rta n t qualification for non-R ussians w ho sought jo b s in state in stitutions. We use as an ind icato r o f R u ssia n d o m in a n c e o f high-level jo b s in a group’s titu la r area the n u m b er o f specialists w ith higher education who w ere R ussians d iv id ed by the n u m b er o f specialists w ith higher education w ho w ere R ussians o r m em bers o f th e titu la r nationality. Thus, the m easure indicates the relative balance betw een R ussians a n d th e titu la r n ationality am ong specialists w ith higher education. T h is m easure is strongly related to th e p ro p o rtio n o f the u rb an p o p u latio n w ho are R ussians. It is a reasonable in dicator o f the extent to w hich R ussians do m in ate high-level jo b s and, thus, w hether non-R ussian young people in a given region w ould be likely to perceive russification as im p o rta n t for social m obility.36 T he overall presence o f R ussians also w ould m ake the relevance o f russification to social m obility clearer. We use as the in d icato r o f con tact w ith R u ssia n s the relative m ix o f group m em bers a n d R ussians w ithin the n on-R ussian group’s titu la r area. Specifically, the indicator is the num ber o f R ussians in the group’s titu la r area d iv id e d by the sum o f the num ber o f R ussians an d the n um b er o f group m em bers in the titu la r area.37

OTHER FACTORS We also expect the g e n e ra l social a n d dem ographic context w ith in w hich non-R ussians find them selves to be im p o rta n t for linguistic a n d ethnic russification. Earlier em pirical w ork has show n trad itio n al religion to be related to interethnic m arria g e38 a n d linguistic russification,39 a n d u rb an ­ ization to be related to linguistic an d eth n ic russification.40

U rb a n R e s id e n c e . Because u rb an p o p u latio n s o f the non-R ussian territo ries have m uch larger p ro p o rtio n s o f R ussian s in th em th a n do rural populations, the m ore u rb an the non-R u ssian population, the m ore likely th a t nonR ussians will m a rry R ussians. Also, especially for the ASSR-level n atio n ­ alities, native-language schooling is less available in u rb an th an in rural areas. F urtherm ore, because desirable jo b s th a t m ight often be held by R ussians w ould typically be in u rb a n areas, non-R ussians in u rb an areas are likely to be in com petitio n w ith R u ssian s a n d to see the benefits o f

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fluency in R ussian an d perhaps o f redefining th e ir linguistic a n d eth n ic identities as R ussian. Even though urban residence is likely to affect in tereth n ic m arriage, linguistic russification, an d ethnic russification, in th e analysis we will not explicitly exam ine the effect o f u rb an residence on ethnic processes. T here was a great deal o f ru ral-u rb an m igration since W orld W ar II, a n d th e characteristics o f residents o f u rb an areas in 1959 do not necessarily accurately reflect the characteristics o f the u rb an pop u latio n d u rin g W orld W ar II a n d in the im m ediate postw ar period. T ra d itio n a l R e lig io n . T raditional religion w ould be expected to affect the extent o f interethnic m arriage a n d linguistic a n d eth n ic russification p rim arily because nationalities th a t are m ore akin to R ussians in religion, in p a rtic u la r the traditionally O rthodox nationalities, will already have h ad considerable exposure to R ussian culture a n d w ould not have a religious b a rrie r to close contact and to assim ilation. O n the o th er h an d , o th e r factors being equal, M oslem nationalities w ould have a religious b a rrie r to assim ilatio n th a t m ight retard, though not com pletely prevent, in tereth n ic m arriag e w ith R ussians as well as linguistic a n d ethnic russification. A t the sam e tim e, we w ould no t expect trad itio n al religion to be equally im p o rtan t for interm arriage, linguistic russification, a n d eth n ic russification. We expect traditional religion to affect intereth n ic m arriag e41 a n d th e shift to R ussian as the native language am ong non-R ussians, b u t once nonR ussians have adopted R ussian as th eir native language, fu rth e r religious b arriers to change in eth n ic self-identification to R u ssian are unlikely to be im p o rtan t.42 In this analysis, traditional religion is indicated by a v ariable th a t assum es the value o f one if the group is not trad itio n ally M oslem a n d th e value o f zero if the group is traditionally M oslem . E a r lie r L in g u is tic R u s s ific a tio n . Even in 1926, n a ro d n o sti differed greatly

in the p ro portion claim ing R ussian as th e ir native language. E arlier levels o f group linguistic russification could affect w illingness to en ter in tereth n ic m arriages as well as susceptibility to russification am ong those w ho becam e adults during an d shortly after the war. To take into account the possible effects o f p rio r levels o f lingustic russification on w artim e an d postw ar rates o f linguistic a n d eth n ic ru ssi­ fication, we use data from the 1959 census on the p ro p o rtio n linguistically russified am ong those who were age 60 o r older— persons b o m before 1899. In general, we expect th a t the greater th e extent o f linguistic russification am ong those age 60 or older in 1959, the greater th e extent o f linguistic russification am ong those who w ere young adults d u rin g the war.

ADDITIONAL NOTE ON INDICATORS T he tw o youngest age groups for w hich d ata are rep o rted from th e 1959 census are those age 0-9 an d those age 10-19. T h e m others o f m o st o f those

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225

Table 11.6 Estimated Number per Thousand Ethnically Russifying, 1959-1970, Among People A ge 0-8 and 9-18 Years in 1959

Age In 1959: Grouping: Balts Ukrainians Belorussians Moldavians Armenians-Georgians Non-Moslem ASSR Tatars-Bashkirs Moslem SSR

0-8 Years

9-18 Years

26 19 8 3 0 72 18 0

13 20 22 56 57 207 154 86

Note: Assuming expectation of life at birth of 67.6 years for Balts, Ukrainians, Belo­ russians, Armenians, and Georgians; and of 62.8 years for other groups. Negative estimated reidentification represented as 0.

age 0-9 in 1959 w ould be those age 30-39 in 1959. T he m others o f m ost o f those age 10-19 in 1959 w ould be those age 40-49. Therefore, we will relate the characteristics o f those age 30-39 in 1959 to the characteristics o f those age 0-9 in 1959; we will relate the characteristics o f those age 4049 in 1959 to the characteristics o f those age 10-19 in 1959.

L in g u is tic R u s s ific a tio n . T he linguistic russification o f the generations who w ere young adults d uring the w ar will be indicated by the p ro p o rtio n claim ing R ussian as th eir native language in 1959 am ong those age 30-39 a n d those age 40-49 in 1959. T he m easures o f linguistic russification are m easures o f the native language as o f 1959. They are not direct m easures o f ch an ge in the native language. T he m easure o f e th n ic ru ssification is different. T here is no census question asking people w ho claim to be m em bers o f a given nationality w hether at som e earlier tim e they claim ed to be m em bers o f a different nationality. O u r m easure o f eth n ic russification is based on the estim ated loss o f m em bers o f a nationality in a p articu la r co h o rt betw een the 1959 a n d 1970 censuses above a n d beyond w hat could be accounted for by m ortality or em igration o u t o f the area o f en u m eratio n .43 T hus, the m easure o f ethnic russification is a m easure o f ch an ge in ethnic self-identification from non-R ussian to R ussian nationality betw een 1959 a n d 1970. It is not a m easure o f the p ro p o rtio n o f those b o m into a nationality who still claim ed th at nationality in 1959 or 1970. Table 11.6 shows the n um b er p er th o u san d persons age 0-8 in 1959 (age 11-19 in 1970) an d the n um b er p er tho u san d age 9-18 in 1959 (age 20-29 in 1970) estim ated to have changed th eir ethnic self-identification betw een 1959 an d 1970. In m ost cases, the target natio n ality o f the ethnic reidentifiers

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Table 11.7a Pearson Correlations Among Background and Ethnic P r o ce ss Variables Used in Multivariate Analysis

A. War Bride Cohort Ethnic Linguistic Linguistic Inter­ Russification Russification Russification married Sex Ratio 0-8 0-9 30-39 30 or older 30-39 Non-Moslem

-.518

.406

.338

.375

.446

Contact with Russians

-.100

.053

.024

.224

.616

Linguistic Russification 60 or older

-.524

.505

.972

.810

.674

Sex Ratio 30-39

1.000

-.857

-.660

-.761

-.767

Intermarried 30 or older

-.857

1.000

.606

.713

.751

Linguistic Russification 30-39

-.660

.606

1.000

.898

.793

Russian specialists

-.103

-.034

.059

.218

.604

Linguistic Russification 0-9

-.761

.713

.898

1.000

.906

Ethnic Russification 0-8

-.767

.751

.793

.906

1.000

was the R ussians although this is not always true. For exam ple, B ashkirs tend to reidentify as Tatars. For this reason, in estim ating the extent o f linguistic a n d o f ethnic russification, we create a c o m b in e d T atar-B ashkir case. T h e net n u m bers o f T atars an d B ashkirs together w ho reidentify ethnically (as som ething other than Bashkirs or Tatars) are treated as p a rt o f a single case, a n d all the variables an d indicators used to explain the extent o f russification o f the Tatars-B ashkirs are also based on a com b in atio n o f T atar a n d B ashkir data. Table 11.6 shows very high estim ated p ro p o rtio n s ethnically russifying am ong the traditionally non-M oslem ASSR-level groups. Such high rates could not have been in place for long, o r there w ould be no m em bers o f these nationalities left. We suspect th a t the heavily un b alan ced sex ratio and the high p roportions in term arry in g resulting from W orld W ar II could well have triggered a high level o f ethnic russification am ong these n atio n ­ alities.

Demographie Consequences on the Non-Russian Nationalities Table 11.7b

227

Pearson Correlations continued:

B. War Widow Cohort Inter­ Linguistic Ethnic Linguistic Sex Ratio Russification Russification Russification married 40-49 40 or older 10-19 40-49 9-18 Non-Moslem

-.319

.399

.335

.340

.161

Contact with Russians

-.230

.126

-.014

.269

.667

Linguistic Russification 60 or older

-.457

.446

.987

.804

.350

Sex Ratio 40-49

1.000

-.834

-.527

-.681

-.689

Intermarried 40 or older

-.823

1.000

.485

.548

.390

Linguistic Russification 40-49

-.527

.485

1.000

.853

.410

Russian specialists

-.152

.013

.023

.257

.720

Linguistic Russification 10-19

-.681

.548

.853

1.000

.689

Ethnic Russification 9-18

-.689

.390

.410

.689

1.000

Preliminary Correlational Analysis T able 11.7 shows the Pearson correlations betw een the variables o f interest for the W ar B ride cohort (those age 30-39 in 1959) a n d those age 0-9 in 1959. T able 11.7 also shows the analogous inform ation for the W ar W idow co hort (those age 40-49 in 1959) a n d those age 10-19 in 1959. All the correlations except those including an estim ate o f ethnic russification refer to the 34 non-R ussian nationalities.44 T he correlations including an estim ate o f ethnic russification refer to 24 non-R ussian groups.45 T he correlations are generally consistent w ith the p attern proposed. T he im balance in the n um ber o f m ales a n d fem ales brought on by W orld W ar II appears to be related to a variety o f changes in ethnic processes— in terethnic m arriage an d linguistic a n d ethnic russification.46 For the W ar Bride co h o rt (in Panel A an d Table 11.7), the severity o f the m ale deficit w as strongly related to the extent o f in tereth n ic m arriage. In ad d itio n , the sex ratio w as strongly negatively related to all the linguistic a n d ethnic russification variables. T he greater the p ro p o rtio n o f m en relative to w om en

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in a given cohort, the lower the level o f linguistic russification o f persons in either that cohort or the younger cohorts, an d the lower the rate o f ethnic russification o f the younger cohorts. T hat the sex ratio has at least as strong a correlation w ith all the linguistic an d ethnic russification variables as does the in tereth n ic m arriag e variable suggests th at the sex ratio affected russification through m ore p ath s th a n sim ply interethnic m arriage. T he strong relation o f th e sex ratio to b o th the russification variables an d the intereth n ic m arriage v ariab le m eans th a t distinguishing the separate effects o f in tereth n ic m arriag e from o th er effects o f the sex ratio will be difficult to detect. All o f the linguistic russification variables are strongly related to each other. G roups that had a high degree o f linguistic russification am ong the older generation tend to continue to have a high degree o f linguistic russification am ong later generations. All o f the linguistic russification variables are also strongly related to ethnic russification. The pattern o f correlations for the W ar W idow cohort, show n in Panel B, is generally sim ilar to that for the W ar Bride cohort. However, the relation between w hether the group is traditionally M oslem a n d ethnic russification is weaker for those age 9-18 in 1959 th an for those age 0-8 in 1959. T he relations between linguistic russification a n d ethnic russification are also som ew hat weaker for those in th e ir teens in 1959 th a n for those w ho w ere younger.

Multivariate Analysis of Ethnic Intermarriage, Linguistic Russification, and Ethnic Russification We now exam ine the results o f m u ltiv ariate analyses o f the roles o f the hypothesized factors in accounting for th ree ethnic processes: in tereth n ic m arriage, linguistic russification, a n d ethnic russification. T he analysis exam ines the sim ultaneous effects o f several variables as well as traces the direct and indirect effects o f those variables. Panel A o f Figure 11.6 schem atically presents the relations betw een the effects o f W orld W ar II and the ethnic processes. T he ethnic processes are. arranged from to p to b ottom in the assum ed tem p o ral o rder in w hich they occur. O n the right are contextual background variables. O n th e left is th e sex ratio variable.

EXPECTED LINKAGES A low sex ratio (i.e., a high m ale deficit) is expected to lead to greater interethnic m arriage. Interethnic m arriage in co m b in atio n w ith linguistic russification o f parents is expected to lead to linguistic russification o f children. Linguistic russification o f children is expected to lead to ethnic russification o f children.

Figure 11.6

Results of Multiple Regression Analysis of Ethnic Process Variables E x p e c te d O rd e r o f R e la tio n s Ethnic « 4 ---- + Intermarriage

S e x Ratio

!+

Linguistic Russification of Grandparents

N

_ ^ L in g u istic Russification of Parents

NonM oslem

!+

Contact with R ussians

Linguistic Russification of Children

l+

Russian S p ecialists

Ethnic Russification of Children —

M ultiple R e g r e s s io n R e s u lts fo r W ar B ride C o h o rt Ethnic Intermarriage S ex Ratio

Age 30-39

■

Linguistic Russification

Age 30+ R2 = .734

+ ,

Linguistic Russification -

■Age 60+ -NonM oslem

Age 30-39 R2 = .983

1+

Linguistic Russification +_

Age 0-9

•Contact with R ussians

R2 = .888

Ethnic Russification

Age 0-8

~

Interaction of Russian S p ecia lists and Sex Ratio

R2 = .861

M u ltip le R e g r e s s io n R esu lts fo r W ar W id o w C o h o r t S ex Ratio ----

Ethnic Intermarriage » Age 40+ R2 = .677

Linguistic Russification

.Age 60+ Linguistic Russification

Age 40-49 R2 = .982

Linguistic Russification

Age 10-19 r2

^

= .848

!+

Ethnic R u ssification + >

Age 9-18 R2 = .675

Contact with * Russians

Interaction of Russian „ Specialists and S ex Ratio

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T he higher the prop o rtio n o f high-skilled jo b s in th e area th a t are held by R ussians the greater the expected linguistic a n d eth n ic russification o f children. In addition, the greater th e degree o f contact w ith R ussians, th e greater the expected intereth n ic m arriage, linguistic russification, a n d ethnic russification. Finally, non-M oslem s are expected to be m ore likely to in ­ te rm arry and to russify linguistically a n d ethnically th a n are M oslem s.

MAIN PROCEDURES Because the statistical testing o f all o f these hypothesized linkages is very complex, we will not describe it step-by-step b u t in stead only su m m arize the m ain statistical procedures a n d results. We initially tested the m odel depicted in Figure 11.6 thro u g h separate m ultiple regressions, w ith each ethnic process v ariable in tu rn tak en as th e dependent variable. For each ethnic process variable, we tested for th e effects o f the sex ratio, the background variable indicating w hether th e nationality had a non-M oslem trad itio n al religion, a n d the v ariab le in d icatin g the extent o f contact w ith R ussians. A n in teractio n te rm betw een nonM oslem traditional religion a n d contact w ith R u ssian s w as considered, based in p art on our previous research findings47 a n d in p a rt on th e expectation th at traditional religion w ould have a special jo in t effect w ith in tereth n ic contact. An interaction term betw een the sex ratio variable a n d th e R u ssian specialist variable also was considered.48 T he basic idea b eh in d th is in teractio n term is th at the effect o f the R ussian d om inance o f th e skilled jo b s in an area on the perception o f the im p o rtan ce o f russification for m obility by m em bers o f the indigenous nationality is greater w hen th e m ale deficit w ithin the indigenous nationality is greater. A t each stage we tested for the effects o f th e sex ratio variable, th e interethnic m arriage variable, a n d the im m ediately preceding linguistic russification variable. T hus, the sex ratio variable, in tereth n ic m arriage, a n d linguistic russification o f parents were considered in th e ex planation o f linguistic russification o f children; the sex ratio variable, in tereth n ic m arriage, an d linguistic russification o f children were all considered in the ex planation o f ethnic russification o f children. A larger set o f background variables was exam ined at an earlier stage in the analysis, including p o p u latio n size o f th e nationality, ed u catio n o f the parental generation, an d official status o f the nationality in th e federal hierarchy. N one o f these oth er variables proved to m ake a significant contribution to the explanation o f any o f th e ethnic process variables once the effects o f the m ain theoretical v ariables w ere considered. F or exam ple, the size o f the population o f the n ationality has no bearin g on in tereth n ic m arriage once the effects o f the sex ratio are considered; n or does it affect ethnic reidentification once the effects o f in tereth n ic contact an d prev io u s linguistic russification o f children a n d adolescents is taken in to account.

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STATISTICAL RESULTS Panels B a n d C o f Figure 11.6 show the relationships th a t were found th rough the m ultiple regression analysis to provide the best explanation. A ppendix B at the end o f th is ch ap ter gives the actual regression equations. In co ntrast to Figure 11.6A, arrow s betw een the variables are o m itted from F igures 11.6B an d 11.6C if the relationships betw een th e variables proved not to be statistically significant once the effects o f the o th er variables were taken in to account. All o f the relationships indicated by the arrow s are statistically significant at th e .05 level, w ith the sign ( + or —) on the arrow in dicating w hether the relation betw een the v ariables is positive or negative. T he 34 non-R ussian nationalities (33 cases) were included except for the analysis o f ethnic reidentification, for w hich 24 non-R ussian nationalities (23 cases) were included. G iven the high correlations show n in Table 11.7, as well as the sm all n um ber o f cases, several alternative p attern s o f relationships am ong the hypothesized variables w ould have been statistically significant. Hence, choice o f the “ best” m odel explaining eth n ic processes depends in p a rt on certain ju d g m en ts ab o u t the logical a n d theoretical p rio rity am ong the variables.49 In Figure 11.6, panels B a n d C, the p ro p o rtio n o f the total variance explained in the interethnic m arriage, linguistic russification o f children, a n d ethnic russification o f children (the R 2 value) is show n below each ethnic process variable. In every case, a substantial (and statistically sig­ nificant) p ro p o rtio n o f the v ariance w as accounted for. We shall review the m ain results w ith respect to each ethnic process variable in turn. I n te r e th n ic M a r r ia g e . For b o th the W ar Bride co h o rt a n d the W ar W idow cohort, the sex ratio w as the factor m ost strongly related to interethnic m arriage. T he low er the sex ratio (the greater th e m ale deficit), the larger th e p ro p o rtio n o f m arried w om en in the nationality w ith husbands from a different nationality. F urth erm o re, once the sex ratio w as taken into account, no o ther variable could account for an additional statistically significant p ro p o rtio n o f the varian ce in intereth n ic m arriage. T h is result ru n s counter to previous research a n d to a large body o f evidence from the Soviet experience indicating th a t trad itio n al religion strongly affects rates o f intereth n ic m arriage. It is likely th a t in m ore norm al tim es trad itio n al religion w ould have h ad a strong an d independent effect, b u t at least for the cohorts in w hich th e v ariatio n in the sex ratio across nationalities w as large, the influence o f th e sex ratio was d o m in a n t an d nullified the effects o f o th er factors, including trad itio n al religion, p opulation size, a n d the extent o f linguistic russification o f the earlier generation (those age 60 o r older in 1959). L in g u is tic R u s s ific a tio n o f T h o se W h o W ere Y ou n g A d u lts D u r in g W o rld W a r II. In accounting for the linguistic russification o f those age 30-39

a n d those age 40-49 in 1959, the p rio r level o f linguistic russification— the

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p roportion claim ing R ussian as th eir native language am ong those age 60 or older in 1959— is by far the m ost im p o rta n t variable. T h e greater the p roportion o f the older generation th a t was linguistically russified, the greater the p roportion o f those age 30-39 or 40-49 w ho w ere linguistically russified in 1959. Thus, there is an extrem ely strong intergenerational co n tin u ity in the relative levels o f linguistic russification o f th e n o n -R u ssian nationalities. As shown in Table 11.7, the correlation betw een th e p ro p o rtio n claim ing R ussian as their native language am ong those age 60 or older a n d those age 40-49 in 1959 is .987; the correlation am ong those age 60 or older an d those age 30-39 in 1959 is .972. D espite the strength o f these intergenerational links, the sex ratio is im p o rtan t in explaining the degree o f linguistic russification o f b o th the 30-39 an d 40-49 year-olds. T he greater the m ale deficit, the g reater the linguistic russification o f these adults, above a n d beyond w hat w ould be expected based on the linguistic russification o f th e oldest m em bers o f the sam e nationality. Thus, the unequal num bers o f m ales a n d fem ales d is ru p te d th e n o rm a l c o n tin u ity betw een th e linguistic russification o f one generation and the next. For the W ar Bride cohort, b u t not for the W ar W idow cohort, nonR ussians were also m ore russified linguistically th e higher th eir degree o f geographic interm ixing w ith R ussians. Also, for th e W ar B ride cohort, once linguistic russification o f those age 60 or older, th e sex ratio, a n d contact w ith R ussians are taken into account, trad itio n ally non-M oslem groups have som ew hat lower linguistic russification am ong those age 30-39 in 1959 th a n traditionally M oslem groups. T raditionally non-M oslem groups, however, had m uch greater contact w ith R ussians, greater prio r linguistic russification, a n d larger m ale deficits th an traditionally M oslem groups. T hus, th e negative coefficient for nonM oslem traditional religion does not im ply th a t trad itio n ally non-M oslem groups actually had lower levels o f linguistic russification am ong young adults. Table 11.7 shows th at th e P earson co rrelatio n betw een th e non-M oslem variable and linguistic russification o f those age 30-39 in 1959 w as positive an d statistically significant: .338. T he change o f sign in the m ultiple regression for the non-M oslem variable suggests th a t th e non-M oslem variab le is acting as a correction factor. The entire m ultiple regression analysis w as replicated on the 23 cases used in the analysis o f ethnic russification. W hen th a t w as done, th e results were substantially the sam e as those for the 33 cases. T h e only m ajo r exception was th a t the coefficient for the non-M oslem v ariable in th e analysis o f the linguistic russification o f those age 30-39 in 1959 w as not significantly different from zero. T he D ep o rted groups a n d the D agestani groups w ere the M oslem groups included in the 33 cases b u t excluded from th e 23 cases. Hence, the statistical significance o f the non-M oslem v ariab le for th e 33 cases appears to be related to peculiarities o f th e D e p o rte d groups a n d the D agestani groups.50

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o f C h ild re n . In accounting for th e linguistic russification o f the children o f th e W ar W idow a n d W ar Bride cohorts, the sam e factors are im p o rtan t. L inguistic russification o f the p aren tal generation is strongly positively related to linguistic russification o f the children’s generation. F or b o th cohorts o f children, the sex ratio an d th e degree o f geographic interm ixing w ith R ussians have statistically significant in d ep en ­ d en t effects on the extent o f th e ir linguistic russification. T he greater the m ale deficit a n d the greater th e contact w ith R ussians, the greater the degree o f linguistic russification o f children, above a n d beyond w hat w ould be expected from the degree o f linguistic russification in the parental generation. T hus, although the linguistic russification o f th e children reflects a high degree o f c o n tin u ity w ith th a t o f the p arental generations, th e linguistic russification o f children is also independently affected by the extent o f the im balance betw een the n u m b er o f m ales a n d fem ales in the parental generation. Surprisingly, the extent o f in tereth n ic m arriage am ong th e parental generation does not ap p ear to play a strong ind ep en d en t role in accounting for the linguistic russification o f the children. T h is is surprising because th e sim ple correlations betw een th e in tereth n ic m arriage in d icato r a n d the m easure o f linguistic russification o f the children are m oderate to strong: th e correlation betw een in term arriag e o f persons age 40-49 a n d linguistic russification o f persons age 10-19 in 1959 is .55; the correlation betw een the sam e variables for the 30-39 year-olds is .71. However, the results o f the m u ltiv ariate analysis m ay be explained by the fact th a t the sex ratio variable has a n even stronger relationship w ith the linguistic russification o f the children th a n does the interethnic m arriage indicator. T he correlations betw een the n atu ral logarithm o f the sex ratio o f the parental generations an d th e linguistic russification o f the children’s generations is - 0 .6 8 for th e children age 10-19 in 1959 a n d - 0 .7 1 for the children age 0-9. T he d o m in a n t effect o f the sex im balance on the linguistic russification o f the children’s generation overshadow s a n d statistically over­ w helm s the effect o f intereth n ic m arriage. W hile interethnic m arriage m a y play an interm ediate role in accounting for linguistic russification, the im pact o f the sex im balance in th e p aren tal generation is so great th a t it m asks an y effect o f interethnic m arriage. A t the sam e tim e, recall th a t the linguistic russification o f the parental generation is strongly related to the linguistic russification o f the children’s generation an d th a t the p are n t’s linguistic russification was also itself significantly affected by the sex im balance in th a t generation. Hence, the co ntinuity in the linguistic russification o f the W ar W idow a n d W ar Bride co horts an d th e ir children is itself p artly a pro d u ct o f the sex im balance resulting from the war. L in g u is tic R u s s ific a tio n

E th n ic R u s s ific a tio n . T he sam e factors th a t are m ost im p o rta n t for linguistic

russification are im p o rta n t for ethnic russification: previous linguistic rus­ sification, the sex ratio, a n d in tereth n ic m ixing. However, the form in w hich

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these factors operate for ethnic russification differs som ew hat from th eir form for linguistic russification. The m easure o f the extent to w hich R ussians d o m in a te d the jo b s held by specialists w ith higher education w orks b etter th a n th e m easure o f overall interethnic contact. T he relationship betw een eth n ic russification, th e sex ratio, and R ussian dom inance o f specialist jo b s is best expressed statistically as an interaction effect. T he greater the m ale deficit in th e p are n tal generation, the m ore strongly R ussian d o m in an ce o f specialist jo b s is related to eth n ic russification o f children. Thus, the im pact o f the w ar on th e sex ratios, com bined w ith the R u ssian dom inance o f the specialist jo b s in the n on-R ussian republics— especially in the ASSR’s— appears to have had a serious effect on su bsequent eth n ic russification o f non-R ussian youths. T he extent o f linguistic russification o f the parental generation an d the extent o f linguistic russification o f th e children’s generation both are due in p a rt to the sex im balance in th e parental generation. As a result, the am o u n t o f the ethnic russification o f the children th at m ay be attrib u ted directly a n d indirectly to th e sex im balance o f the parental generation is even m ore su b stan tial th a n th a t indicated in the direct effect o f the interaction te rm on eth nic russification.

Conclusion The severe sex im balance am ong som e nationalities as a resu lt o f W orld W ar II appears to have m arked the beginning o f a m ajor increase in russification. T he shortage o f m ales led to increased in tereth n ic m arriag e and also to substantially higher linguistic russification. L inguistic russification further facilitated the ethnic russification o f the next generation. C ontact betw een the non-R ussian nationalities a n d R ussian s w as im ­ p o rtan t in this process. For linguistic russification, th e extent o f geographic interm ixing in the non-R ussian n ationality’s titu la r area betw een nonR ussians an d R ussians w as im p o rtan t. For ethnic russification, the extent to w hich high-level jo b s in the group’s titu la r area were d o m in a te d by R ussians was m ore im p o rta n t th a n general in tereth n ic contact. The negligible role o f trad itio n al religion in accounting for linguistic russification runs counter to o u r earlier research findings. A lthough in those analyses, too, the m ajority o f the variance in linguistic russification could be attrib u ted to dem ographic factors such as in tereth n ic contact a n d u r­ banization, M oslem s were far less likely to shift th e ir native language to R ussian than were non-M oslem s in com parable dem ographic contexts. T h ere are several possible reasons for the differing results betw een th e present analysis and earlier ones. O ne reason could be th a t the earlier analyses included a larger n u m b er o f cases (54 versus 33). A second reason could be th a t som e o f th e factors taken into account in the cu rren t analysis m ay already indirectly reflect th e religious dim ension. For exam ple, previous levels o f linguistic russification

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p artly reflect the fact th a t th e titu la r nationalities o f the autonom ous republics th a t were m ost russified linguistically in the p rerevolutionary p erio d were those th a t h ad been converted to the R u ssian O rthodox religion. T h ird , at each step in th is analysis, we to o k linguistic russification o f a n earlier cohort into account. T raditional religion o f the group could explain general differen ces am ong groups in the tendency to russify linguistically yet not explain ch an ges in th e tendency to russify linguistically. T he finding th at trad itio n al religion does not play an ind ep en d en t role in e th n ic russification, on the o th er hand, is consistent w ith earlier research. O nce linguistic russification is taken in to account, trad itio n al religion does not play an in dependent role. O f the variables considered, tw o proved to be keys to every ethnic process: prio r linguistic russification a n d the sex ratio. T he high correlation o f linguistic russification across the generations rem in d s us th a t th is process is prolonged a n d has a high degree o f continuity over tim e.51 In co n trast to linguistic russification, sex ratios are volatile an d are susceptible to sudden distu rb an ces associated w ith calam itous historical events. M oreover, if the sh o rt-term d isturbances in the sex ratios are large enough, they can have b o th sh o rt-term a n d long-term effects. W orking in co m bination w ith oth er aspects o f the dem ographic context o f the autonom ous republics, the sex im balance brought on by the w ar appears to have accelerated russification o f m any o f the non-R ussian nationalities, particu larly the titu lar nationalities o f the autonom ous republics in the RSFSR. W hen one considers also the effects o f forced d ep o rta tio n a n d exile on the vitality o f several en tire nationalities52, W orld W ar II m ay be characterized as a tu rn in g point in the dem ographic history o f m ost o f th e autonom ous republic nationalities53. It m ay well be th a t for the autonom ous republic nationalities as a whole, the im m ediate losses d urin g the war, however large they were, w ere less significant for the groups’ long-term su rv iv al th a n the accelerated russification th a t followed a n d w as substantially induced by the war.

Notes 1. By some accounts, the USSR’s loss of military and civilian population during World War II, the birth deficit during the war, and the lower postwar birthrates resulting from the deficit of males, led to a total loss of over 50 million people by 1959 compared to the expected population at that time. See V. V. Pokshishevskii, G eografiia naseleniia S S S R : ekon om iko-geografich eskie ocherki (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1971), 34; and Robert A. Lewis and Richard H. Rowland, P opulation R ed istrib u tio n in th e USSR: Its Im pact on Society, 1 8 9 7 -1 9 7 7 (New York: Praeger, 1979), 103. 2. Ansley J. Coale, Barbara A. Anderson, Ema Harm, H u m an F e rtility in R ussia S in ce th e N in eteen th C entu ry (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), 17. 3. Lewis and Rowland, P opulation R edistribu tion , 104. 4. V. I. Kozlov, N a tsio n a l’n o sti S S S R (E tnodem ograficheskii obzor), Second Edition (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1982), 290. 5. For a discussion of some other factors related to linguistic and ethnic russification, see Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, “Changes in Linguistic Identification in the USSR, 1959-1979,” Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Population Association

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of America, San Diego, April 1982; Brian D. Silver, “Social Mobilization and the Russification of Soviet Nationalities,” A m erica n P o litic a l Scien ce R eview , Vol. 68 (March 1974): 45-66; and Barbara A. Anderson, “Some Factors Related to Ethnic Reidentification in the Russian Republic,” in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., S o v ie t N a tio n a lity P olicies a n d P ractices (New York: Praeger, 1978), 309-33. 6. We use the term russification to denote a change in subjective identification from non-Russian to Russian. We use the term lin gu istic russification to refer to change from non-Russian to Russian n a tive language as measured by responses to the census question on “native language” (rodn oi ia zyk ). We use the term eth n ic russification to refer to change from non-Russian to Russian self-identification as measured by responses to the census question on “nationality” (n a tsio n a l'n o st’). For discussion of the measurement of language and nationality in recent Soviet censuses, see Brian D. Silver, “The Language and Ethnic Dimensions in Russian and Soviet Censuses,” in Ralph S. Clem, ed.. R esearch G uide to the R ussian a n d S o viet Censuses, forthcoming. 7. Godfrey Baldwin, E stim a te s a n d P rojections o f th e P opulation o f th e U .S.S.R ., b y A ge a n d Sex: 1950 to 2000, U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis, International Population Reports, Series P-91, No. 23 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1973). 8. Coale, Anderson, Harm, H u m a n F e rtility in R ussia, 17. 9. G.A. Slesarev, Demograficheskie protsessy i sotsiaVnaia Struktura sotsialisticheskogo obshchestva (Moscow: Nauka, 1978), 60. 10. Some of the children of women age 40-49 in 1959 would be age 0-9 or age 2029. However, the vast majority of those age 0-9 would have had younger mothers, and most of those age 20-29 would have had older mothers. Thus, those age 10-19 in 1959 comprise the group the majority of whose mothers would be age 40-49 in 1959. 11. Some of their children also would have been age 10-19 in 1959. 12. Frank W. Notestein, et al.. T he F uture P opulation o f E u rope a n d th e S o v ie t Union: P opulation Projections, 1 9 40-1970 (Geneva: League of Nations, 1944). 13. The 1959 Soviet census presented age data by nationality only for the union republic-level nationalities within the Soviet Union as a whole and for the ASSR-level nationalities whose titular areas were within the RSFSR. The data for union republiclevel nationalities refer to the nationality’s population within the Soviet Union as a whole. The data for ASSR-level nationalities refer to the nationality’s population within the RSFSR. U.S.S.R., Ts.S.U., Ito g i vsesoiuznoi p erep isi naseleniia 1959 god a (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1962-1963). 14. See, for example, A. A. Isupov, N atsion aT n yi so sta v naseleniia S S S R (Po itogam perepisi 1959 g.) (Moscow: Statistika, 1964, 24; A. L. Perkovskii and S. I. Pirozhkov, “Ukrainskaia Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika,” in T. V. Riabushkin, ed., N aselen ie soiuznykh respublik (Moscow: Statistika, 1977), 66-81; A. A. Rakov, la. Z. Rubin, A. N. Peshkova, “Belorusskaia Sovetskaia Sotsialisticheskaia Respublika,” in Riabushkin, N a­ selenie soiuznykh respublik, 82-100. 15. Sex-selective ethnic assimilation could account for some of the male deficit for some nationalities. It seems implausible, however, that sex-selective assimilation could account for a high proportion of such a large male deficit. 16. V. I. Kozlov, N atsionaT nosti S S S R (E tnodem ograficheskii obzor). (Moscow: Sta­ tistika, 1975), 172-3. 17. I. S. Gurvich, “K voprosu o vliianii Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny 1941-1945 gg. na khod etnicheskikh protsessov v SSSR,” S o vetsk a ia etnografiia, 1976, no. 1:39-48; and Sh. M. Munchaev, “ Evakuatsiia naseleniia v gody Velikoi Otechestvennoi Voiny,” Isto riia SSSR , 1975, no. 3:133-141. 18. V I. Kozlov, D in a m ik a chislennosti n arodov (Moscow: Nauka, 1969), 122. 19. Coale, Anderson, Harm, H um an F e rtility in R ussia. 20. See, for example, T. I. Kozlova, E tn ografiia n a ro d o v p o v o lzh ’ia (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1964), 25-27. 21. Barbara A. Anderson and Brian D. Silver, “ Estimating Russification o f Ethnic Identity among Non-Russians in the USSR,” D em ography, Vol. 20 (November 1983V 461-489.

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22. Widows often report to census-takers that they are married. Men living apart from their wives often report that they are not married, while their wives report themselves as married. For details with respect to the 1959 Soviet census, see Barbara A. Anderson, “Family and Fertility in Russian and Soviet Censuses,“ in Ralph S. Clem, ed.. Research G u ide to th e R u ssian a n d S o v ie t Censuses, forthcoming. 23. Brian D. Silver, “The Status of National Minority Languages in Soviet Education: An Assessment of Recent Changes,” S o viet Studies, Vol. 26 (January, 1974): 28-40. 24. Victor Zaslavsky and Yuri Luryi, “The Passport System in the USSR and Changes in Soviet Society,” S o v ie t Union, Vol. 6 (1979): 137-53. 25. Kozlov, D in a m ik a chislennosti, 298, and Kozlov, N atsionaV nosti S S S R (1975) 230-231. 26. For a similar argument, see Victor Zaslavsky, T he N eo-Stalinist State: Class, E th n icity, a n d C onsensus in S o v ie t S o c ie ty (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1982), 92-94. 27. Anderson and Silver, “Estimating Russification.” 28. Michael Paul Sacks, W ork a n d E q u a lity in S o viet Society: The D ivision o f L abor b y Age, Gender, a n d N a tio n a lity (New York: Praeger, 1982). 29. Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Stat. upr. Karel’skoi ASSR, 4 0 let K areT skoi A SSR : sta tistich eskii sborn ik (Petrozavodsk: Gosstatizdat, 1960), 71. 30. la. N. Beznosikov, K uT turnaia revoliutsiia v K o m i A S S R (Moscow: Nauka, 1968),

212. 31. Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Stat. upr. Tatarskoi ASSR, D o stizh en iia T atarskoi A S S R k 50letiiu sov etsk o i vlasti: sta tistic h e sk ii sb o rn ik (Kazan*: Statistika, 1967), 90. 32. Ts.S.U. SSSR, Stat. upr. Tatarskoi ASSR: N arodnoe k h o zia istvo T atarskoi A SSR : sta tistic h e sk ii sborn ik (Kazan’:Tatknigoizdat, 1957), 162. 33. D o stizh en iia T a ta rsk o i A S S R k 50-letiiu, 87. 34. See, for example, Ts.S.U. RSFSR, St. upr. Chuvashskoi ASSR, C huvashiia za 40 let v tsifrakh (Cheboksary: Chuvashskoe gosizdat, 1960), 138; and Ts.S.U. RSFSR, St. upr. Chuvashskoi ASSR, S o vetsk a ia C huvashiia za 45 let: sta tistich eskii sbornik (Che­ boksary: Chuvashknigoizdat, 1966), 126. 35. lu. D. Desheriev and I. F. Protchenko, R a z v itie ia zy k o v n arodov S S S R v sovetskuiu epokhu (Moscow: Nauka, 1968), 122. 36. For the union republics, the data are for the year 1960 and are derived from Ts.S.U., Vysshee o b ra zo va n ie v SSS R : sta tistic h e sk ii sbornik (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1961), 70-71. The data for the autonomous republics come mainly from statistical yearbooks for those republics and refer either to 1960 or to the year nearest to 1960 for which information was published: Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Stat. upr. Bashkirskoi ASSR B ash kiria z a 50 let: sta tis­ tich eskii sborn ik (Ufa: Statistika, 1969), 89-90 (for the year 1960); Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Stat. upr. Buriatskoi ASSR, B u ria tsk a ia A S S R za 5 0 let (Ulan-Ude: 1967), 64 (for the year 1966); C huvashiia z a 40 let v tsifrakh 138 (for 1959); 4 0 let K areT skoi A SSR , 71 (for 1959); Beznosikov, K uT turnaia revoliutsiia v K o m i A SSR , 212 (for 1960); Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Stat. upr. Mariiskaia ASSR, M a riisk a ia A S S R za 50 let: sta tistic h e sk ii sborn ik (loshkarOla: Mariiskoe knizhnoe izdatel’stvo, 1970), 87 (for 1968); Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Stat. upr. Mordovskoi ASSR, M o rd o vsk a ia A S S R za g o d y S o vetsk o i vlasti (v tsifrakh): sta tistich eskii sborn ik (Saransk, 1967), 138 (for 1960); D o stizh en iia T a ta rsk o i A S S R k 50-letiiu, 90 (for 1966); Ts.S.U. RSFSR, Stat. upr. Yakutskoi ASSR, Y akutiia za 5 0 let v tsifrakh (Yakutsk: Statistika, 1967), 109 (for 1966). For the Bashkir ASSR, the numbers of Bashkir and Tatar specialists are combined before the measure is derived. For three autonomous republics (Dagestan, North Ossetia, and Udmurtia) no data on specialists by nationality have been published. To estimate the number of specialists of the titular nationality of those autonomous republics in 1960, we prorated the number of specialists with higher education among those nationalities working in th e R S F SR as a whole in 1960 according to the proportion of the urban p o p u lation of that nationality living in the RSFSR in 1959 that resided inside the nationality’s titular republic. The total number o f specialists by nationality in 1960 was taken from Vysshee obrazovanie, 70. The number of R u ssian specialists with higher education working in these ASSR’s in 1960 was estimated by first taking the total number of specialists working in the ASSR

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in 1960 (from Ts.S.U. RSFSR, N arodnoe k h o zia istvo R S F SR v 1960 godu: sta tistic h e sk ii ezhegodnik (Moscow: Gosstatizdat, 1961), 404-406), subtracting the estimated number of specialists who belonged to the titular nationality, and then multiplying the remainder by the proportion Russian among the part of the urban population of the ASSR in 1959 that was not of the titular nationality. 37. This variable gives similar results to the proportion of Russians in the titular area’s population or the proportion of group members in the titular area’s population, but the results are somewhat stronger than for the alternative indicators of contact. 38. Brian D. Silver, “Ethnic Intermarriage and Ethnic Consciousness Among Soviet Nationalities,” S o viet Studies, Vol. 30 (January, 1978), 107-16. 39. Silver, “Social Mobilization,” and Brian D. Silver, “ Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification of Soviet Nationalities,” in Jeremy R. Azrael, ed., S o viet N a tio n a lity Policies a n d Practices (New York: Praeger, 1978), 250-306. 40. Anderson, “Some Factors.” 41. Silver, “Ethnic Intermarriage and Ethnic Consciousness.” 42. Anderson, “Some Factors.” 43. Anderson and Silver, “Estimating Russification,” explains the estimation of ethnic russification in detail. 44. Tatars and Bashkirs are treated as a single nationality in this and subsequent tables. Thus, for the analysis of linguistic russification there are 34 groups, but 33 separate cases. 45. Again, since the Tatars and Bashkirs are combined into a single case, there are 24 groups in the analysis of ethnic reidentification but 23 cases. 46. The correlations with the natural logarithm of the sex ratio are shown. The natural logarithm is used because the difference between no male deficit and a small male deficit is less important than the difference between a moderate male deficit and a large male deficit. The correlations with the (unlogged) sex ratio were similar but generally weaker. 47. Anderson and Silver, “Changes in Linguistic Identification,” and Brian D. Silver, “Language Policy and the Linguistic Russification.” 48. This term was the product of the Russian specialists and the inverse of the sex ratio variable. Recall that the sex ratio variable is the natural logarithm of the sex ratio. 49. This is in keeping with standard procedure in multivariate analyses of this kind. See Ronald J. Wonnacott and Thomas H. Wonnacott, E co n o m etrics (New York: Wiley), 65-66. 50. Among the Deported groups and among the Dagestani groups, the boundaries are not always stable or clearly defined. See Anderson, “Some Factors,” and Ronald Wixman, Language Aspects o f E thnic P attern s a n d Processes in the N orth C au casu s (Chicago: University of Chicago, Department of Geography, Research Paper No. 191, 1980). 51. It is important to bear in mind that high intergenerational correlations in linguistic russification do not necessarily imply great stability in the actual levels of linguistic russification. 52. See Robert Conquest, The N ation K illers (London: Macmillan, 1970); and Aleksandr M. Nekrich, The P unished P eoples (New York: Norton, 1978). 53. Because the Deported nationalities had not completely returned from exile at the time of the 1959 census, we cannot make reliable estimates of their rates of ethnic russification between 1959 and 1970. 54. V. I. Perevedentsev, 27 0 M illio n o v (Moscow: Finansy i statistika, 1982), 21.

Appendix A Measurement of Interethnic Marriage It is not easy to obtain a good m easure o f the extent o f in term arriag e by nationality, if by “ m easure” one m eans an estim ate o f th e actual n u m b er o f w om en o f a given nationality w ith in a given age group w ho m a rry m en

Demographie Consequences on the Non-Russian Nationalities

239

from o th er nationalities. D eveloping a m easure is difficult because the exact target age group o f potential h u sbands for w om en o f a given age is not well defined an d varies across nationalities. D uring the postw ar period, for the S oviet p o p u latio n as a whole, on the average, husbands have been tw o to th ree years older th a n th eir w ives.54 However, th is average age difference varies across nationalities, w ith higher average age gaps for traditio n ally M oslem th a n for traditionally non-M oslem nationalities. Also, w hen m ales are in short supply, w om en ten d to m a rry m en from a greater age range th a n is norm ally true. Consequently, a precise estim ate o f the nu m b er o f wom en in in tereth n ic unions can n o t be obtained readily from a com parison o f the n u m b er o f m ales a n d the nu m b er o f fem ales in a nationality rep o rted as m a rrie d w ith in the sam e age range or w ithin any well-defined age range. Therefore, we do not attem p t to develop a m ea su re o f in tereth n ic m arriage b u t instead use an in d ic a to r o f the relative extent o f in tereth n ic m arriage am ong nationalities, a variable th a t reflects th e relative differences in in term arriage across groups. T he in term arriage indicato r is developed for w om en age 30 or older, as well as for w om en age 40 o r older in 1959. We have developed interm arriage indicators by com paring the n u m b er o f m a rrie d w om en a given age or older w ith the n um ber o f m en th a t age o r older, even though we know th at m any m en will be m arrie d to w om en younger th a n th e cutoff age. A cum ulated m easure is less sensitive to the problem o f m atching o f ages o f spouses th a n w ould be an in term arriag e in d icato r th a t defined the ages o f potential spouses m ore narrowly. T he in term arriage indicato r used for those age 30 a n d above, for example, is the n um ber o f fem ale nationality m em bers age 30 o r older m a rrie d m inus the n um ber o f m ale nationality m em bers age 30 or older m a rrie d in 1959 p er 1000 m a rrie d fem ale nationality m em bers age 30 or older. T he indicator registers the tendency o f those m a rrie d fem ale nationality m em bers to be m arried to m en from o th er nationalities. It is not affected by the sex ratio as such. People have com m only view ed the sex ratio (m ale deficit) as affecting the chances o f w om en to m arry. I f there were only 50 percent as m any m ales eligible for m arriage as fem ales am ong, say, the C huvash, then if the p ro p o rtio n m a rrie d o f C huvash w om en was only h a lf as large as the p ro p o rtio n m arried o f C huvash m en, the n u m b e r o f m a rrie d C huvash m en a n d o f m a rrie d C huvash w om en w ould be identical. Therefore, the in ter­ m arriage in d icato r is an in d icato r o f the n et tendency o f fem ale group m em bers to m a rry exogamously. Two ad ditional features o f th e m easures should be m entioned. F irst, the in term arriage indicator does not take in to account the p ro p o rtio n o f m en o f a given nationality w ho m a rry w om en o f an o th er nationality. It therefore does not reflect w hat p ro p o rtio n o f the total n u m b er o f group m em bers— m en as well as w om en— have spouses o f a different nationality th a n th e ir own. Second, the interm arriag e in d icato r reflects the differences in the

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proportions o f m arried w om en w ho are m a rrie d to m en o f an o th er n atio n ality b u t does not identify the nationality o f the m en in these in tereth n ic m arriages. M any ethnically m ixed m arriages do not involve R u ssian m en. Therefore, the indicator o f interethnic m arriage m ay not com pletely reflect the relative differences in the extent o f interm arriage betw een non -R u ssian w om en a n d R ussian men.

Appendix B Multiple R egression Equations Table 11.IB

Multiple R egression Equation for War Bride Cohort

Dependent Variable Inter­ married 30 plus

Linguistic Russi­ fication 30-39

Linguistic Russi­ fication 0-9

-.857 (.000)

-.229 (.000)

-.271 (.003)

Ethnic Russi­ fication 0-8

Independent Variables Sex Ratio 30-39 p value

.877 (.000)

Linguistic Russification 60 plus p value

-.068 (.028)

Non-Moslem p value

.065 (.016)

Contact with Russians p value

.179 (.008) .715 (.000)

Linguistic Russification 30-39 p value

.233

Sex Ratio-Russian Specialists Interaction p value

(.026)

Linguistic Russification 0-9 p value

.788 (.000)

R2 F ratio p value N of cases

.734

.983

.888

.861

85.569

397.468

77.015

61.789

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

33

33

33

23

Table 11.2B Multiple Regression Equation for War Widow Cohort Dependent Variable Inter­ married 40 plus

Linguistic Russi­ fication 40-49

Linguistic Russi­ fication 10-19

-.823 (.000)

-.097 (.001)

-.247 (.010)

Ethnic Russi­ fication 9-18

Independent Variables Sex Ratio 40-49 p value Linguistic Russification 60 plus p value

.943 (.000)

Contact with Russians p value

.222 (.006)

Linguistic Russification 40-49 p value

.727 (.000)

Sex Ratio-Russian Specialists Interaction p value

(.002)

Linguistic Russification 10-19 p value

.394 (.018)

R2 F ratio p value N of cases

.536

.677

.982

.848

.675

65.104

819.288

53.859

20.783

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

(.000)

33

33

33

23

Beta coefficients and p values are shown, as well as the R2 value for the overall equation, the F value for the overall equation, and the p value for the overall equation. All coefficients and all overall equations are significant at the .05 level.

12 World War II in Soviet Literature DEMING BROWN

W orld W ar II has been an obsessive them e o f Soviet literatu re for m ore th an four decades. A ny R ussian w ork th at p retends to deal w ith the essentials o f the tw entieth century m ust som ehow cope w ith it. For exam ple, although the n arrativ e o f P astern ak ’s D o c to r Z h iva g o ends w ith the year 1929, the book is nevertheless eq uipp ed w ith a p ostscript in w hich several im p o rta n t characters m eet at the front in W orld W ar II. A recent excellent novel L iv e a n d R e m e m b e r (Z h iv i i P o m n i)1 by V alentin R asp u tin , a m an from a m uch younger generation th an th a t o f P asternak, features a m ilitary d eserter from th a t sam e front. E very year dozens o f lesser w orks o f fiction ab o u t the war, as well as m em oirs an d films, continue to be produced for a Soviet audience th a t never seem s to tire o f such m aterial. F rom the m om ent w hen H itle r’s arm ies attacked the U SSR un til the defeat o f the G erm an s four years later, the efforts o f the Soviet w riting co m m unity were alm ost com pletely devoted to the war. A lthough m any w riters were exem pt from m ilitary service as such, a n d although som e older w riters were evacuated eastw ard at the w ar’s gravest stages, nearly a thousand o f them jo in ed the arm ed forces as co m batants or m ilitary correspondents, a n d 417 o f th em were killed.2 T he w riters’ full co m m itm en t to the w ar effort, although encouraged by S oviet authorities, was essentially v o lu n tary a n d spontaneous. In the first m onths after H itler’s attack, they becam e journalists, producing reportage, sketches, an d pam phlets. Poets read th eir verses to enthusiastic audiences at the front. W ithin a year, stories a n d plays were being w ritten. K o n stan tin S im onov’s novel o f Stalingrad, D a y s a n d N ig h ts (D n i i N o c h iy began ap pearing serially in 1943, a n d o th er w ar novels soon followed.4 A great am ount o f w artim e w riting was little m ore th an reportage, a n d m uch o f it tended to rely purely on sen tim en t an d p atrio tic fervor for its effects. U nder these circum stances, poetry fared som ew hat b etter th a n prose. G enerally

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speaking, the highest achievem ent o f w artim e w ritin g w as in the lyrics o f such poets as A nna A khm atova, M argarita Aliger, a n d Pavel A ntokolsky. A great am ount o f w artim e w riting was strongly hortatory, urging R u ssian s to endure an d inciting them to sm ash the enem y. T he m ost effective p am phleteer in this respect, am ong Soviet arm y personnel an d th e civ ilian population as well, was Ilya E hrenburg, w ho observed th a t “ o u r w riters have helped [the people] to see the enem y. H atre d is th e m oral ju stificatio n o f war. We hate the G erm an s not only because they kill defenseless people. We hate the G erm ans because we m ust kill them .” 5 Indeed, m an y w riters concentrated on inciting fellow R ussians to take th e m ost v io len t revenge on the G erm ans, as did Sim onov in a p oem en titled “ Kill H im !” ( “U bei E go!”), w hich closes w ith these lines: S o k ill a t le a st o n e o f th e m ! A s so o n a s y o u can , E a c h o n e y o u see, . K ill h im ! K ill h im ! K ill!6

W artim e censorship required th a t w riters largely avoid m en tio n in g sh o rt­ com ings in the Soviet m ilitary effort, as well as elem ents o f defeatism th a t were know n to exist in the early m onths o f the conflict. F or exam ple, a chapter o f Sim onov’s D a y s a n d N ights, depicting som e soldiers as indifferent about the cause a n d suspicious o f th e ir leaders, w as excised by the au th o rities.7 Nevertheless, w artim e w riting was less pro g ram m ed an d m ore candid, b o th in tone an d in substance, th a n th a t o f the im m ed iate p rew ar years. As it becam e less stereotyped, less pom pously P arty -m in d ed a n d official, Soviet w riting grew m ore in tim ate an d personal. Focusing on the ra n k a n d file— the peasant, the worker, the clerk— as they en d u red ordeals w ith courage an d dignity, literature em phasized the strengths o f sim ple R ussians. T he m ost m em orable o f these is probably Vasilii Tyorkin, th e soldier-protagonist o f A lexander T vardovsky’s long p o em .8 V asia T yorkin is a genuine folk hero, not larger th an life, yet endow ed w ith th e m ost engaging a n d ad m irab le qualities o f his people— ingenuity a n d staunchness in th e presence o f danger, good hum or, robust w it an d love o f fun, generosity, a n d a sense o f patrio tic duty. T vardovsky presents Vasia w ith sym pathy an d affectionate h u m o r and, w ithout sentim ental p roclam ations ab o u t his heroism , m anages to suggest that the w ar was won not by the co u n try ’s political ap p a ratu s a n d leadership b u t by the people. In featuring ordinary R ussians, w riters expressed p rid e in th e folk for th eir staunchness an d m oral toughness an d te n d ed to deem phasize the role o f the Soviet state. T he defense o f R ussia against th e N azis m eant, o f course, a defense o f h um an decency in general. B ut the N azi policy o f exterm inating R ussian culture also brought ab o u t a defiant d e term in a tio n to affirm the R ussian national character a n d to revive a n d preserve R u ssian cultural values an d tradition s. T h u s A nna A khm atova, w ho had every reason to loathe the Soviet governm ent a n d indeed d id so, could pu b lish th e following lines in P ra vd a in M arch 1942:

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245

It is y o u , R u s sia n to n g u e, w e m u st sa v e, a n d w e s w e a r W e w ill g iv e y o u u n sta in e d to th e so n s o f o u r son s: You s h a ll liv e o n o u r lips, a n d w e p r o m is e y o u — n e v e r A p ris o n s h a ll k n o w y o u , b u t y o u s h a ll b e f r e e F o r e v e r .9

W artim e literature w as also bu rd en ed w ith grief. Pavel A ntokolsky’s “ Son” (1943) is a long poem in m em ory o f his only son, w ho had been killed in action the year before. It describes th e boy, w ho will rem ain “ forever an eighteen-year-old,” tells how a n d why he died, com m em orates th e generation th a t perished in the war, a n d presents the personal tragedy o f a father as a sym bol o f th e tragedy o f an en tire n a tio n .10 T he m ost fam ous w artim e w ork by M arg arita Aliger is “ Zoya” (1942), a long n arrativ e poem ab o u t the schoolgirl, Zoya K osm odem yanskaya, w ho becam e a p artisan a n d w as captured, to rtu red , a n d hanged by the G erm a n s.11 B ut even sadder is A liger’s poem , “ M usic,” a requiem for h er husband, a young com poser killed at the front in the first m onths o f the w ar.12 P erhaps the m ost accurate reflection o f the em otional com plexity o f R ussian w artim e experience is O lga Berggolts’ “ F ebruary D iary ” (1942), a p o rtra it o f L eningrad u n d er blockade— m iserable, freezing, a n d starving, b u t p ro u d a n d defiant: In m ire , in g lo o m , in h unger, in so rrow , W h e re d ea th , lik e a sh a d e , d r a g g e d a lo n g a t o u r heels. W e w e re s o h a p p y. B r e a th e d such w ild fr e e d o m . T h a t o u r g ra n d c h ild r e n w o u ld h a v e e n v ie d u s .13

Years later, in 1956, Julia N eim an suggested the reason for th is seem ingly in ap p ro p riate w artim e elation: the w ar h ad p erm itted R ussians sim ply to be them selves. In a poem en titled “ 1941,” N eim an wrote: B rig h t a s a to rch it f la m e d , th a t s h in in g y e a r ! L ik e c r u m b lin g p la ste r, su b te r fu g e f la k e d off. A n d c a u se s w e re la id b a re, effects revea led : A n d th ro u g h th e b la c k o u t a n d th e c a m o u fla g e W e s a w o u r c o m r a d e s ' f a c e s — u n d isg u ised . T h e d u b io u s y a r d s tic k s th a t w e m e a s u r e d b y — F o rm s, q u estio n n a ire s, lo n g se rv ic e , ra n k a n d a g e — W ere c a s t a s id e a n d n o w w e m e a s u r e d true: O u r y a r d s tic k s in th a t y e a r w e re valor, f a i t h . 14

D u rin g the w ar itself, ideological considerations o f literatu re a n d indocrin atio n in correct attitu d e s tow ard service to the state were subordinated to com passionate, proud depiction o f suffering, courage, a n d endurance. In th is sense the w ar pro v id ed a tonic to the literary com m unity, w hich responded to its m odest taste o f creative freedom w ith enthusiasm . Political controls w ere always present, however, a n d th e P arty never ceased to regard literatu re as its ow n instrum en t. As the w ar progressed a n d victory becam e

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m ore evident, official m an ip u latio n o f literatu re increased. E h renburg’s vicious anti-G erm an satire, for exam ple, was now cu rtailed , since it w as no longer needed. Likewise, w riters were officially discouraged from dw elling on hum an loss an d grief; postw ar reconstruction w ould d em an d m ore optim istic literature, com posed in a m ajor key. In the postw ar years the Soviet governm ent encouraged the literary com m unity to continue to w rite ab o u t the war. Two o f th e best w ar novels— Vera Panova’s T he T ra in 15 an d V ictor N ekrasov’s F ro n t-L in e S ta lin g r a d 16— appeared w ithin a year o f its close. T he Train, a deceptively sim ple n arrativ e about the routine life o f a hospital train , is notable for the absence o f heroics, preaching, or obvious propaganda. A lternating betw een episodes on the train an d flashbacks to show the ch aracter’s prew ar, civ ilian existence, it portrays ordinary people as they love, relate to th e ir fam ilies, suffer, a n d show courage or cowardice. N ekrasov’s novel tells, in a calm , everyday firstperson m anner, o f the strengthening o f m orale th a t led to th e stiffening o f resistance against H itler’s forces. T he n arrativ e is so free o f large gener­ alizations and lofty rhetoric th a t the novel w as criticized for being insuf­ ficiently ideological. N evertheless, it w on a Stalin prize in 1947. Panova an d N ekrasov were exceptional, however, for shortly after the war, literature concerning it becam e, in response to official pressure, intensely political an d chauvinistic. T he function o f w ar fiction becam e one o f dem onstrating the role o f the C o m m u n ist p arty leadership a n d ideology in m obilizing for victory, o f showing th e indispensability o f Stalin’s leadership, an d o f proving th at the heroic exploits th a t w on the w ar could only have been accom plished by the especially endow ed N ew S oviet M an. M oreover, it was Soviet patriotism , com ing from C o m m u n ist belief, a n d not feelings o f R ussian national identity an d love o f R u ssian soil, th a t p ro v id ed the will to w in against the G erm ans. A notorious exam ple o f th e way in w hich w riting about the w ar w as subjected to political discipline is A lexander Fadeyev’s novel, T h e Young G uard. O riginally issued in 1945, it w as found to have neglected the P arty ’s p u rp o rte d ly leading role in organizing u n ­ derground resistance against the G erm an occupiers. T he novel w as w ithdraw n from circulation, Fadeyev rew rote it thoroughly, a n d the politically san itized version appeared in 1951.17 The w riting that began to ap p e ar after th e T w entieth P arty C ongress in 1956, however, reasserted, a n d even expanded upon, the hu m an e q u ality o f literature w ritten during the war. All o f th is w as especially tru e o f w riters and poets o f the “ w ar generation,” those w ho h ad been in th eir teens a n d early tw enties w hen they served as soldiers a n d ju n io r officers. E xperience at the front had largely shaped th eir personalities, a n d they all shared a m ixture o f bitter m em ories a n d nostalgia. By 1956 th ere h ad b een a n u m b er o f developm ents to give their w riting its ow n p articu la r characteristics. O ver a decade had passed since the w ar’s end, a n d th e distance enabled th em to understand b etter w hat they had experienced a n d w itnessed— no t only self-sacrifice and bravery b u t also cow ardice an d betrayal. T here was increased em phasis on the in d iv id u al h u m a n experience a n d its significance: the m oral problem s involved in co m m an d decisions; the

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247

effects on the h u m an psyche o f the fear a n d sight o f death a n d th e loss o f com rades; the n atu re o f a sense o f duty, o f loneliness, o f self-reliance, a n d o f bravery. T he P arty ’s role w as deem phasized in favor o f th a t o f the o rd in ary citizen-soldier as a person relying on h im self a n d his com rades, a n d not on political leadership. A lthough som e w riters con tin u ed to pain t broad, epic canvases o f the war, m any others w rote “ one-hero” books, exam ining closely the m entality a n d psychology o f a lone soldier o r p artisan . W riting becam e som ew hat less heroic th a n before, often dw elling on the sheer ghastliness o f w ar an d its senseless, n ig h tm arish qualities. T he tendency to concentrate o n the ugliness o f m ilitary action a n d its effects on the in d iv id u al has led conservative S oviet critics to argue th at in certain instances the read er’s atten tio n is directed away from the positive goals an d heroic n ature o f the S oviet w ar effort. M ost often cited in this respect is B ulat O kudzhava’s G o o d L u ck, S c h o o lb o y! {B u d ’ Zdorov, S h k o lia r ), w hose hero is a green recru it o f eighteen in his first com bat experience— alone, forlorn an d afraid, a n d willing to ad m it it. (T his short novel, which ap p eared in an obscure alm anac in 1961, has never been republished in the Soviet U nion.)18 O kudzhava, together w ith such gifted w riters as Baklanov a n d Bykov, has been accused o f “ R em arq u ism ” — painting w ar in such dism al colors th a t the w ork is an im plicit argum ent against the in stitu tio n o f w ar itself. A n a ttitu d e o f absolute pacifism , w hich finds no distin ctio n betw een ju s t an d u n ju st w ars, is o f course an tith etical to official Soviet ideology. C ritics have also speculated on the resem blance o f these w riters to o th er W estern w riters o f the “ lost generation” o f W orld W ar I. T hese Soviet w riters’ em phasis on the blood, filth, violence, cruelty o f the battlefield, a n d the gloom th a t em anates from th e ir works, does suggest at tim es the k in d o f despair expressed by such w riters as R em arq u e a n d Hemingway. In defending these w riters against such ideological accusations, sym pathetic critics p o in t o u t th a t th eir fiction does not present the w ar as som ething senseless; it is a ju s t w ar o f defense, show n to be m o tiv ated by legitim ate h atred o f the enem y.19 Perhaps the m ost interesting m easure o f controls over w ar literature is the changing im age o f Stalin in its pages. D u rin g the w ar itself, a n d especially after 1943, w hen Soviet forces w ent on the offensive, literatu re em phasized his role in R ussian m ilitary successes. In the K hrushchev years, however, through the novels o f Sim onov,20 G rigorii Baklanov,21 Vasilii Bykov,22 an d others, a different w artim e Stalin em erged— a bungler whose m ilitary u n ­ preparedness an d m ass purges o f arm y officers had paved the way for the in itial, rap id G erm an advances deep into R ussia. H is failure to heed advice, his cruelty, rigidity, suspicion, a n d his pen ch an t for o stentatious m ilitary successes were show n to have crippled the w ar effort by causing needless sacrifices o f hu m an life an d resources. B ut in the late 1960s an d 1970s a positive Stalin reappeared. B ondarev’s H o t S n o w {G orjach ii S n e g ),23 a novel o f the Battle o f Stalingrad, shows h im as a wise an d decisive leader, an d a chauvinistic novel by Ivan Stadnyuk, entitled W ar ( V oina ),24 portrays h im in reverential colors.

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In view o f the obvious im p o rtan ce o f ideological controls a n d ideological controversies over Soviet literatu re ab o u t th e war, one should at least speculate about the influence o f the C o m m u n ist P arty on such literature. Clearly a large pro p o rtio n o f those w ho w rote pro m in en tly ab o u t th e w ar were P arty m em bers. F rom a list o f 36 such w riters, I have been able to identify 23 as m em bers: 7 o f these had jo in e d th e p a rty before W orld W ar II, 14 jo in ed during the war, a n d 2 jo in e d after its close. (F ro m a larger list o f 114 w riters— w hich includes m an y w ho d id n o t feature the w ar in th eir w riting— I have been able to identify 41 as p arty m em bers. O f these, 11 had joined before the war, 21 jo in e d d u rin g th e war, a n d 9 jo in e d after its close.) As these figures illustrate, the large-scale recru itm en t in to the p arty during the w ar25 included a large p ro p o rtio n o f those in d iv id u als w ho were then, or subsequently becam e, professional w riters.26 A general com parison o f w ar literatu re w ritten by P arty m em bers, w ith literature on the sam e topic by n o n -P arty w riters, discloses, in m y opinion, no difference. T he sam e degree o f p atrio tism is p resen t in the w orks o f either group. A ttitudes tow ard Stalin an d his role in the w ar seem to have no relationship to an au th o r’s P arty affiliation. M ost im portantly, am ong the P arty m em bers them selves there is obviously a b ro ad sp ectru m o f attitudes tow ard the war. T hus, b o th Simonov, th e severe critic o f S talin’s w artim e behavior, an d Stadnyuk, w hose w orks laud Stalin’s role, w ere P arty m em bers. Bondarev, w ho stresses his R u ssian soldiers’ consciousness o f duty to the fatherland, w as a P arty m em ber, b u t so also w as O kudzhava, whose soldiers seem preoccupied w ith o th e r concerns. P arty discipline no doubt affected attitu d es an d them es in the w ar w ritin g o f P arty m em bers at various tim es in a loose an d general way. T h e fu n d am en tal fact, however, is that literature about w ar by b o th P arty a n d n o n -P arty w riters w as subject to the sam e overall controls. B oth groups w rote as m em bers o f th e sam e com m unity. M any stories an d novels w ritten by the w ar generation em ploy a tim e span th at enables them to em brace b o th the w ar a n d the ensuing p erio d up to the death o f Stalin (or thereabouts). Such w orks usually draw a contrast betw een front-line m orality, w here in d iv id u al honesty, loyalty, a n d cooperation am ong com rades are indispensable, a n d w here th e single p u rp o se o f destroying a m onolithic enem y brings ab o u t a pragm atic know ledge o f right an d wrong, an d a com plex a n d c o rru p t peacetim e scene, w here falsity an d m oral com prom ise are a p ro m in e n t feature o f life. B on d arev ’s S ile n c e (T ish in a )21 is one such novel. S im ilar in th is respect is N ek raso v ’s H o m e Town (V R o d n o m G orode ),28 w hose hero faces the psychological a n d m oral problem s o f learning how to live as a civilian, o f overcom ing th e trem en d o u s hold th at front-line values a n d associations have over h im , a n d o f en d u rin g his disillusionm ent in a postw ar w orld th a t still co n tain s m uch evil. O ften literary works th a t are ostensibly ab o u t the w ar exam ine ethical problem s th at transcend the w ar a n d are in fact tim eless. T h e w orks o f Bykov, Baklanov, N ekrasov, a n d B ondarev are frequently concerned w ith m oral explorations an d questions o f en d s a n d m eans o f the k in d th a t are

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n ot likely to be confronted directly in S oviet literatu re ab o u t contem porary society. T he w ar is thus a device for raising issues th a t m ight be considered ta boo in o th er contexts. In S olzhenitsyn’s story “ A n Incident at K rechetovka Station,” 29 for exam ple, L ieu ten an t Zotov, a young Soviet officer, tu rn s in to the au thorities a m an w ho m a y be a spy for th e G erm ans. W hether the m an is guilty or not, he is v irtu a lly ce rtain to be disposed o f as one. In perform ing a m ilitary duty, Z otov m ay have destroyed an innocent m an; the thought will to rm en t h im for life. N early all o f the w orks I have m entioned were published in the Soviet U n io n 30 an d thus give a censored representation o f the war. A co n trast to these is the novel o f Vasily G rossm an, L ife a n d F a te ( Z h iz n ' i s u d ’ba), published ab ro ad in 1980.31 A p ro m in en t w riter o f fiction a n d w artim e co rrespondent, G ro ssm an achieved great p o p u la r success w ith one o f his first w ar novels, T h e P eo p le a re I m m o r ta l (N a ro d b essm erten )n in 1942, an d w ith the first volum e o f a large, p anoram ic novel o f the war, F or th e Ju st C a u se (Z a p ra v o e d elo )n in 1952. L ife a n d F ate, the intended second volum e o f this novel, w as com pleted in 1960. T he m an u scrip t w as seized by the K G B in 1961. It is plain to see why L ife a n d F a te could not be published in the USSR. C entering on the Battle o f Stalingrad, it portrays not only the stubborn h eroism o f Soviet troops a n d officers b u t also the efforts o f political com m issars to extract political gain from the battlefield operations at the expense o f m ilitary efficiency an d through w aste o f h u m an lives. T he novel often digresses from the m ilitary front to depict civilian life, to show the lingering effects o f the te rro r o f 1937-1938 on w artim e m orale, a n d to argue th a t the patriotic fervor o f R ussians in defense o f th e ir m otherland w as closely linked to feelings o f G reat R ussian ch au v in ism a n d a concom itant scorn o f the non-R ussian S oviet populace. A nti-Sem itism , w ith in b o th the governm ental hierarchy an d the popu latio n at large, is prom inently displayed. In ad d ition, the novel depicts not only H itle r’s death cam ps a n d gas cham bers b u t also Stalin’s w artim e concentration cam ps. T here is a clear suggestion th a t in som e respects the situ atio n s o f Jews u n d er H itler a n d S talin were sim ilar. M oreover, the novel argues th at m uch o f the Soviet governm ental repression w hich is associated w ith th e postw ar years had actually begun d u ring the w ar itself. In a b rie f presentation such as th is one, there is not room to consider every im p o rta n t aspect o f the im pact o f W orld W ar II on Soviet literature. I have not m entioned, for exam ple, o th er treatm en ts o f the holocaust, m uch o f w hich to o k place on Soviet soil. I have only lightly touched upon the them e o f postw ar reconstruction a n d rehabilitation, which was extrem ely p ro m in en t in the im m ediate p ostw ar years. N or have I considered the concern o f Soviet w riters ab o u t the era o f nuclear arm a m en t w hich W orld W ar II inaugurated. T he official S oviet isolationism a n d anti-W estern cam ­ paign th at cam e as a kind o f perverse reaction against the w artim e coalition had a p rofound im pact on Soviet cu ltu re th a t has not been discussed here. T he w ar also produced a large n u m b er o f less tangible results w hich are

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very im p o rtan t b u t difficult to m easure. A m ong these are lingering feelings o f pride th at com e from the knowledge th a t the R ussian s w ere victors in a w ar o f national defense against an external aggressor, a n d th e com plex, no doubt contradictory, m ix tu re o f attitu d es resulting from the S oviet U nion’s new status as one o f the two superpow ers a n d m aster o f E astern Europe. W riters, o f course, are acutely aw are o f these m atters, but, u n d er the conditions o f Soviet censorship, they express th eir aw areness in literatu re so subtly and unsystem atically th a t it is difficult to define. Finally, one m ust say that, because literature in the Soviet U nion nearly always represents a direct reaction to public events, the im pact o f W orld W ar II on th a t literature was total. It is im possible to im agine w h at Soviet literatu re w ould have been like had th at w ar not taken place.34

Notes 1. Valentin Rasputin, L ive a n d R e m e m b e r (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1978). Prose works that have been translated will be cited in the English language edition only. 2. K ratka ia literatu rnaia entsiklopediia, 1972, 7:111. 3. Konstantin Simonov, D a ys a n d N igh ts (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945). 4. Even before this time, Stalin had personally promoted the creation of literature to propagandize his views of how to conduct the war. Accounts of the use of Alexander Korneichuk’s play, The Front, which was published in P ravda (August 24-27, 1942) for this purpose, can be found in Alexander Werth, R u ssia a t War: 1941-1945 (London: Barrie and Rockliff, 1964), pp. 423-26 and Vera S. Dunham, In S ta lin ’s T im e: M iddleclass Values in S o viet F iction (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1976), 5-7. 5. Quoted in Joshua Kunitz, R ussian L itera tu re sin ce th e R evo lu tio n (New York: Boni and Gaer, 1948), 783. 6. Constantine Mikhailovich Simonov, “ Kill Him,’’ Vladimir Markov and Merrill Sparks, eds., M odern R ussian P o e try (Indianapolis, Ind.: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1967), 761. 7. L. Lazarev, “ Eto stalo istoriei,’’ N ovy M ir, 1967, no. 6: 243. 8. Aleksandr Tvardovskii, “Vasili Terkin,’’ Stikhotvoreniia. P o e m y (Moskva: Khoduzhestvennaia Literature, 1971), 309-465. 9. Anna Akhmatova, “ Muzhestvo,” B eg vrem eni (Moskva-Leningrad: Sovetskii Pisatel’, 1965), 340. 10. Pavel Antokol’skii, “Syn,” A n tologiia russkoi so vetsk o i p o ezii: 1 917-1957 (Moskva: Gosizdat, 1957), 1:427. 11. Margarita Aliger, “Zoia,” S tikh otvoren iia i p o e m y v dvukh tom akh (Moskva: Khudozhestvennaia Literature, 1970), 1:148-93. 12. Aliger, “ Muzyka,” Ibid., 140-143. 13. Ol’ga Berggolts, “Fevral’skii dnevnik,” V ernost’ (Leningrad: Sovetskii Pisatel’, 1970) 78. 14. Juliia Neiman, “ 1941,“ L itera tu rn a ia M oskva, 1956. S b orn ik vtoroi (Moskva: Gosizdat, 1956), 296. Translated by Walter N. Vickery in Patricia Blake and Max Hayward, eds., D issonant Voices in S o viet L ite ra tu re (New York: Pantheon Books, 1962), 156. 15. Vera Panova, The Train (New York: A. A. Knopf, 1949). 16. Victor Nekrasov, F ront-L ine S ta lin g ra d (London: Harvill Press, 1962). 17. K ra tk a ia litera tu rna ia entsiklopediia, (1972), 7:878. 18. Bulat Okudzhava, “ Bud’ zdorov, shkoliar,” T arusskie S tra n itsy (Kaluga: Kaluzhskoe Knizhnoe Izdatel’stvo, 1961), 50-75. 19. L. Lazarev, “ Pamiat’,’’ Voprosy L itera tu ry, 1965, 5:75.

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20. Konstantin Simonov, T he L iv in g a n d th e D e a d (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1962); S o ld a ta m i ne ro zh d a iu tsia (Moskva: Sovetskii Pisatel’, 1964). 21. Grigorii Baklanov, Tri p o vesti (Moskva: Gosizdat, 1963); IiuT 41 G oda (Moskva: Sovetskii Pisatel*, 1965). 22. Vasily Bykov, T he T hird F lare (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, no date); Vasil Bykov, A lp in e B a lla d (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1966); Vasily Bykov, T he O rdeal (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co., 1972); Vasil’ Bykov, Voennye povesti (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1966); Vasil’ Bykov, F rontovye stra n itsy (Minsk: Belarus’, 1966). 23. Jurii Bondarev, G oriachii sn eg (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstav Oborony SSSR, 1974). 24. Ivan Stadniuk, Voina, (Moskva: Sovremennik, 1977); 1 and 2. (Moskva: Voennoe Izdatel’stvo Ministerstva Obomy SSSR, 1980), vol. 3. 25. See T. H. Rigby, C o m m u n ist P a rty M em b ersh ip in th e U SSR: 1917-1967 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1968), 271-72 and the essay by Cynthia Kaplan in chapter 9 of this book. 26. These figures are based on a perusal o f biographical entries in K ra tk a ia literatu rnaia en tsiklopediia, 8 vols., Moskva, 1962-1975. They do not pretend to be exhaustive. Nor can they be absolutely accurate: biographical entries in the encyclopedia indicate only the status o f the individual vis-à-vis the party a t th e tim e when th e en try w as printed. 27. Yuri Bondaryev, S ilen ce (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1966). 28. Viktor Nekrasov, “ V rodnom gorode,” lzb r a n n y e p ro izved en iia (Moskva: Gosizdat, 1962), 248-470. 29. Alexander Solzhenitsyn, “An Incident at Krechetovka Station,” S tories a n d Prose P oem s (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux), 167-240. 30. The exception is Pasternak’s D octor Z hivago. 31. Vasilii Grossman, Z h iz n ' i s u d ’ba (Lausanne, Suisse, 1980). 32. Vasilii Grossman, “Narod bessmerten,” Povesti. R asskazy. O cherki (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1958), 104-251. 33. Vasilii Grossman, Z a p ra v o e delo (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1955). 34. A portion of the material in the present article originally appeared in Deming Brown, S o v ie t R u ssian L ite ra tu re S in ce S ta lin (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978).

13 Debates About the Postwar World JERRY F. HOUGH

M ay an d June 1943 were tense m onths for Joseph Stalin. T he great battle o f K ursk was approaching, an d , w ith real nervousness, Stalin had accepted the advice o f his to p generals to w ait for a G erm an attack an d then to counterattack. T he G eneral Staff had w arned th a t the attack w ould com e in the M ay 10-12 period, then in the M ay 19-26 period, b u t nothing had h ap p en ed .1 (T he attack finally cam e on July 5 a n d was decisively repelled in the second h a lf o f the m onth.) A t the sam e tim e Roosevelt an d C hurchill held a m eeting on M ay 10 to w hich neither S talin nor any o f his representatives w as invited. Stalin is rep o rted to have been very suspicious; then on June 4 he w as inform ed th at there w ould be no second front in E urope in 1943. As a sign o f his extrem e irritatio n , he recalled his pro-W estern am bassadors, Iv an M aisky an d M axim L itvinov, from L ondon a n d W ashington, respec­ tively.2 W ith the Soviet victory in K ursk, Stalin’s m ood noticeably lightened. H e w as confident enough to begin celebrating victories w ith artillery salutes accom panied by firework bursts, a n d his thoughts clearly began turn in g to the nature o f the postw ar w orld.3 O n August 21 the C entral C o m m ittee an d C ouncil o f People’s C om m issars issued a decision on econom ic re­ construction; its receiving four pages in P ra vd a was m ore significant than its contents.4 O n S eptem ber 4 a com m ission on the arm istice was created w ith K lem ent V oroshilov as ch airm an, one on peace agreem ents un d er L itvinov, and an o th er u n d er M aisky on rep aratio n s.5 By the en d o f 1943 Stalin w as consulting his m in isters ab o u t postw ar currency reform an d the trade netw ork th a t should be established w ith the en d o f rationing.6 W ithin five years, m uch h ad changed. T he G ra n d A lliance had given

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way to intense cold war, a n d th e E ast E uropean co u n tries w ere being subjected to full C om m unizatio n on th e Soviet model. T he tig h test control had been clam ped on intellectual life a n d p articu larly on an y d irec t o r indirect contact w ith W estern intellectual life. T he tre n d to w ard greater p rivatization in agriculture had ended, a n d the kolkhozy for th e first tim e in a decade were p u t u n d er the leadership o f outsiders w ho w ere selected for their ability to im pose discipline.7 T h e prim acy o f heavy in d u stry h ad been reaffirmed. Yet, this process was a relatively slow one. H in ts o f th e new developm ents can be found, especially in retrospect, from 1943 onw ard, b u t in m an y respects the situation still h ad elem ents o f am biguity for several years after the war. O ne A m erican specialist on the Soviet U nion has recently described the period 1945-1947 as one o f détente, in co m parison w ith th e entente o f W orld W ar II a n d the C old W ar o f 1948-1953.8 A nother believes th a t the death o f Z hdanov in 1948 (or really his defeat several m o n th s before his death) was necessary to usher in full repression a t hom e.9 W esterners have h ad m any explanations for the rath e r gradual a n d som etim es am bivalent m ovem ent tow ard cold w ar a n d th e re in stitu tio n o f rigid controls. T he interpretatio n th a t cam e to be d o m in a n t in the U n ited States in the 1950s was th at S talin w as in control, th a t he knew th e d irectio n in w hich he w anted to move, b u t th a t he d id so slowly in o rd er to m in im ize potential opposition at hom e a n d abroad. In recent years, a n u m b er o f A m erican historians have im plied th a t S talin w as genuinely undecided o r a t least com m itted to an in term ed iate position, a n d th a t A m erican policy pushed him tow ard a policy o f cold war. A n earlier view w as th a t S talin hoped for a continuation o f the G ra n d Alliance, b u t th a t he faced serious opposition from w ithin the Politburo, perhaps from M alenkov a n d B eria,10 perhaps from T ito an d Z hd an o v ,11 p erhaps from unspecified h ard -lin ers.12 We probably will never be certain ab o u t Stalin’s p a tte m o f thinking. T he m em oirs th at V iacheslav M olotov, S talin’s closest confidant in these years, is said to have w ritten may be illum inating. G eorgii M alenkov a n d L azar K aganovich, key figures in these days, are ap p aren tly still alive a n d m ay have w ritten som ething, an d there m ay even be a h id d en m an u scrip t by the late A nastas M ikoyan, who w rote excellent m em oirs on the 1920s. N evertheless, Stalin was an extrem ely devious m an, a n d it is far from clear th at he revealed his tru e thoughts to anyone. To an extent th at is often not appreciated, however, th e am bivalence in public posture in the early years gave m iddle-level officials a n d scholars the possibility o f advancing different view s a b o u t the co n tem p o rary situ atio n an d about the policy th at should be followed in th e p ostw ar period. T hese debates are fascinating to follow, b o th because they in d icate o u r need to avoid a sim plistic view o f the Soviet political process, even in S talin’s to talitarian system , an d because they illu m in ate th e com plexity o f the issues th at Stalin w as facing.

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The Two Programs It is not difficult to d ocum en t th a t m any people in the Soviet U nion hoped for, spoke o u t for, an d even expected a very different postw ar w orld th an actually em erged. M any o f the sharpest ideological them es had been m uted d uring the war. (Even in his first speech after the G erm a n attack, Stalin had included the old R ussian greeting “ B rothers a n d Sisters” in his opening salutation, rath er th an “ C om rades” alone.)13 T he U nited States an d G reat B ritain w ere described as peaceloving rath er th a n im perialist, a n d contacts w ith foreigners w ere som ew hat relaxed. T he fact th a t th e co u n try held together in the face o f the m ilitary disasters in the sum m ers o f 1941 a n d 1942 indicated a high level o f su p p o rt for the regim e a n d suggested a possibility o f lower levels o f repression. T he fact th a t the in dustrialization program o f the 1930s had created enough o f an econom ic base to defeat H itler suggested th at resources could now be d iv erted from heavy in d u stry to consum er-related reconstruction. M any thought th at these developm ents presaged a perm an en t change in the postw ar period. T he w riter Ilya E hrenburg has testified not only to his feelings, b u t to those o f others, as well: I firmly believed that after victory everything would suddenly change.. . . W hen I recall conversations at the front and at the rear, when I re-read letters, it is clear that everybody expected that once victory had been won, people would know real happiness. We realized, o f course, that the country had been devastated, impoverished, that we would have to work hard, and we did not have fantasies about m ountains o f gold. But we believed that victory would bring justice, that hum an dignity would trium ph.14

It w as one thing to hope th a t the postw ar p eriod w ould be better. It w as another to define w hat the postw ar p eriod should be. T hose who had benefitted from som e policy ad o p ted in the 1930s were naturally loathe to ab an d o n it. T hose w ho w anted a postw ar w orld th a t w as different from th at o f the prew ar tried to find ways to advocate o r legitim ate it— or to argue against the hard-line tren d s th a t were em erging. Both in the 1940s an d at the present tim e, the m ost severe censorship is im posed on the presentation o f a com prehensive a n d integrated program . Lawyers then an d now can argue a b o u t the legal code; specialists on the W est could an d can use v arious techniques to suggest a foreign policy posture; econom ists can talk ab o u t the econom y, an d philosophers can advance different in terpretatio n s o f M arxism -L eninism in a policy-relevant m anner. W hat is difficult is for som eone to com bine these argum ents. W hat is difficult is to argue, for exam ple, th a t a p articu la r econom ic reform is needed an d th at this in tu rn requires a change in the relationship to W estern governm ents, to W estern ideas, o r to C o m m u n ist d eviation in W estern an d E astern Europe.

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In the mid-1940s, probably the clearest expression o f tw o m ajor co m ­ prehensive policies (probably th e tw o m ajor com peting program s) ap pears in a p air o f tw o-part articles published alm ost sim ultaneously in P ra v d a in A pril 1945. O ne w as w ritten by A ndrei V yshinsky, the first dep u ty com m issar o f foreign affairs, a n d the o th er by P etr Pospelov, the c h ie f ed ito r o f P ravda. For an A m erican accustom ed to thin k in g o f V yshinsky as the p ro secu to r in the show trials o f the 1930s, as the agent for th e im p o sitio n o f C o m m u n ist rule in R u m an ia in F ebruary 1945, a n d as th e m an w ho co n d em n ed th e U nited States in the vilest term s in th e U n ited N atio n s in th e p o stw ar period, it will com e as a surprise th a t it w as V yshinsky w ho appealed for a m ajor m oderation in policy.15 It w as Pospelov, the m a n to be chosen in 1955 to exam ine the m aterials on S talin’s crim es,16 w ho p resented th e h a rd ­ line position. V yshinsky’s article w as en titled “ L enin— the G re at O rganizer o f the Soviet State,” 17 an d in it he repeatedly em phasized the stability o f th e S oviet state and system , the degree o f p o p u lar su p p o rt for it.

In the decisive days o f the second world war, the Soviet state rose to the occasion, again and again confirming the invincibility o f the Soviet system, its vitality and its great creative capabilities. The Soviet system . . . showed a level o f stability and unshakeability that is explainable only by the fact that the powerful roots o f its historical being have sunk deep into the soil o f the Soviet land. . . . Now when the war is coming to an end, when all the tests o f the first months and years are far in the past . . . it is not difficult to be convinced by the real strength o f the Soviet state.

T he point o f such statem ents— a n d they w ere repeated thro u g h o u t th e article— seem ed to be th at political change was possible in th e postw ar period. V yshinsky insisted on the need for one-party rule (b u t only briefly), an d he acknowledged th a t th e state, including “ the organs o f repression,” would not w ither away in the tran sitio n from socialism to co m m u n ism so long as there was capitalist encirclem ent. N evertheless, he d id repeatedly m ention the transition from socialism to co m m u n ism as a possibility, a n d any reader knew th at com m u n ism w as to be less repressive th a n socialism . He em phasized “ the Stalinist teaching . . . ab o u t the in ev itab ility o f changes in the p rim ary functions o f the p ro letariat state, dep en d in g on changing historical conditions,” an d he asserted th a t “ in th e process o f grow th a n d developm ent o f the socialist state, its form s, its m eth o d s o f activity, a n d its functions change.” Indeed, in com plaining ab o u t “ th e u n d erev alu atio n o f th e S oviet state a n d its role,” V yshinsky seem ed to im ply th a t it could have a bigger role vis-à-vis the party, and, as shall be discussed, th is im plication seem ed confirm ed when Pospelov’s answ ering article p u t enorm ous em phasis on the party. V yshinsky seem ed to m ake the sam e p o in t in em phasizing the “ abundance o f rem arkable people” in the Soviet U nion a n d th e im p o rta n ce

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o f initiative, innovation, an d “ the use o f the m an y form s o f people’s creativity in the interests o f socialism .” T here w ere tw o specific areas in w hich V yshinsky em phasized the need for a responsive policy. F irst, he called the question o f the peasantry “ one o f the m ost im p o rta n t o f any revolution, particu larly the p ro letarian rev­ olution.” H e called the un io n w ith the peasants th e basis o f Soviet power. H e qu o ted L enin on the danger o f exploiting the m iddle p easantry a n d the need “ to take in to account the peculiar co n d itio n s o f life o f th e peasantry, to learn from the peasants th e m ethods o f tran sitio n to the best system , a n d n ot to d a re to c o m m a n d th em (n e sm e V k o m a n d o v a t).” 1* V yshinsky em phasized the im p o rtan ce o f doing “ everything possible to help the peasants to live b etter” an d cited a L enin statem en t th a t “ the m iddle peasantry will be on o u r side in the C o m m u n ist society only w hen we secure th e best econom ic conditions for its life.” Second, V yshinsky gave great atten tio n to th e n ationality question. He strongly dam n ed nationalism an d ch au v in ism , th e la tter w ord in the Soviet U nion always referring to G re at R ussian nationalism . H e d em anded full equality for all nationalities a n d q u o te d Stalin on the need to m ain tain contact w ith the m asses in th e outlying d istricts (okrain a). Specifically, he insisted th a t “ all Soviet organs in the outlying d istricts— the courts, the a d m in istrativ e system , the econom ic organs, etc.— be staffed as m uch as possible o u t o f local people.” A lthough V yshinsky im plied th a t the stability o f the system p erm itted rule w ith a lighter h and, he suggested even m ore strongly th a t stability rested on p o p u lar support. Com rade Stalin said that soviet power ‘is not power which is isolated from the people. On the contrary, it is a unique kind o f power which came out o f the Russian masses and is near and dear for them .' . . . Com rade Stalin indicated that this explains the great, unprecedented force and resiliency which Soviet power usually m anifests in the critical m inutes o f its life. It is necessary to evaluate this peculiarity o f Soviet power exceptionally highly, since it is precisely in this indisputable quality o f it that the key to explaining its force and vitality lies.

V yshinsky w as the n um b er tw o official in the foreign m inistry, b u t he d id not discuss foreign policy directly. However, his assertions ab o u t the need for one-party rule, for m o deration in the policy tow ard the peasants, a n d for th e reliance up o n local personnel in the outlying districts alm ost surely em bodied his program for E astern E urope as well as the Soviet U nion. H e qu o ted a L enin statem en t ab o u t th e tran sitio n to socialism th at “ the concrete conditions a n d form s o f this tran sitio n inevitably are an d should be different depending on th e co n d itio n s u n d er w hich the m ovem ent directed at the creation o f socialism begins,” a n d th is surely m eant th a t the Soviet m odel should not be im posed on E astern E urope exactly. V yshinsky said m uch less th a t seem ed relevant to relations w ith the West, b u t one sentence in his discussion o f th e form ation o f the Soviet

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federation had a very contem porary ring: “ C o m rad e S talin w arned against the danger o f an attack on us from the outside, against th e dan g er o f econom ic isolation for o u r federation, a n d also against th e dan g er o f an organized diplom atic boycott.” In the context o f th e rest o f his program , V yshinsky certainly seem ed to be saying th a t a m oderate policy in E astern E urope was necessary to avoid these foreign policy dangers as well. T he opposing program w as presented by P etr Pospelov in tw o articles in P ravda, the first o f w hich ran in the issue th a t ca rrie d V yshinsky’s second article.19 If V yshinsky w rote ab o u t the state, th e n P ospelov w rote about the Party, an d his P arty w as n o t one th a t m ade co m prom ises o r concessions. It w as a “ heroic party,” w hich w as characterized by its “ ideo­ logical im placability its organized nature, a n d its iron discipline.” It w as a p arty o f “advanced ideas,” w hich “ becam e a great m obilizing a n d organizing force in the struggle against the forces o f society w hich are becom ing obsolete.” T he w ords m o b ilize , o rg a n ize , an d tra n sfo rm in g o ccu rred again an d again. Like Vyshinsky, Pospelov w rote at length ab o u t th e strength o f w orker an d peasant support for the regim e durin g th e war. For him , however, th e source o f this support w as not th e ties o f the P arty to the m asses, b u t its ability to inspire them . T he P arty won its au th o rity w ith the aforem entioned ideological im placability; it gained su p p o rt in th e C ivil W ar by its struggle against “ foreign invaders” a n d “ the bourgeois-landlord co u n terrev o lu tio n ” ; it inspired “ m illions” w ith “ Stalin’s theory o f th e possibility o f v icto ry o f socialism in one country.” A lthough V yshinsky had referred to new form s o f rule, to greater in itiativ e for the masses, and apparently even for a relaxation o f the collective farm system, Pospelov left no do u b t ab o u t his attitu d e s to w ard such ideas. H e again and again attacked “ socialist-dem ocratic p arties o f th e W est” th a t “ sunk into the bog o f o p p o rtu n ism ” an d represented “ M arxism in w ords” alone. Pospelov’s article d id not use any w ords such as m e d iu m p e a sa n try b u t talked about the “ collective farm p easan try ” a n d its “ fervent p atrio tism .” He did m ention the equality o f the peoples o f th e S oviet U nion, b u t he alluded to the “ draw ing together” (sblizh en ie) o f peoples ra th e r th a n th e danger o f chauvinism . He em phasized “ the noble S oviet p atrio tism , in w hich the national trad itio n s o f people are connected in a h arm o n io u s m anner w ith the general vita l interests o f all the toilers o f th e S oviet U nion.” V yshinsky had spoken o f socialist co m p etitio n in a context th a t suggested reliance on voluntary cooperation in the econom y a n d p erh ap s even greater use o f m arket m echanism s, b u t Pospelov dragged in a q u o ta tio n from S talin about socialist com petition w ith a very different thrust: “ It w ould be foolish to think th at our w orking class, which m ade th ree revolutions, will go for labor enthusiasm an d a shock w ork m ovem ent in o rd er to m an u re the soil for capitalism . . . . Take away from it confidence in the possibility o f building socialism an d you destroy any basis for co m p etitio n .” Pospelov’s em phasis was upo n “ the p ara m o u n t advantages o f a planned, socialist system o f econom y.” “ N o o th er state w ould have been able in such

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a sh o rt period o f tim e to reco n stru ct the whole econom y on a m ilitary basis, achieve a ‘great resettlem ent’ o f factories to the East from regions tem porarily occupied by the enem y, an d quickly provide its arm y w ith such a q u an tity o f excellent-quality arm am ents, w hich were necessary to the decisive victories over H itle r’s G erm any.” Sim ilarly, in talking ab o u t the past, Pospelov asserted th a t there was ‘‘no o th er path o f quick econom ic restoration o f the country besides the pow er o f the Soviets a n d socialist transform ation,” an d it w as clear th a t he was also talking ab o u t the future. Pospelov too said little ab o u t foreign policy directly, b u t the th ru st o f his argum ent w as obviously th a t Eastern E urope should follow the Soviet m odel. H is rath er ugly attacks on socialist dem ocratic p arties certainly suggested th a t there w as no th ird path betw een classical Soviet socialism a n d classical capitalism nor any m ore m oderate p ath to socialism , a position, as shall be seen, co ntrary to th a t being advanced by m en such as Eugen Varga. T he sharp criticism o f th e socialist dem ocratic p arties m ay also have been a way o f suggesting th a t there were no m oderate forces in the West w ho m ight reduce governm ental hostility to the Soviet U nion. A t a m in im u m , Pospelov’s fervent su p p o rt for S talin’s theory o f socialism in one country conveyed precisely the opposite message o f V yshinsky’s w arning about econom ic isolation or diplom atic boycott. He ended his article w ith a Stalin statem ent about Soviet w ar aim s th at left little d o u b t ab o u t his own priorities: ‘‘T he enslaved peoples who fell u n d er the yoke o f the G erm an aggressors look upon us as th eir liberators. A great liberating m ission fell to o ur lot. Be w orthy o f th is m ission. T he w ar which you are fighting is a liberation war, a ju s t war.” Pospelov’s last sentence ended w ith the prediction th at ‘‘the ideas o f L enin an d S talin . . . show the p ath . . . to the happiness a n d friendship o f the liberated peoples.” H e surely w as talking ab o u t liberation from capitalism as well as the G erm ans.

Intellectual Freedom T he packages o f view s represented by the V yshinsky an d Pospelov articles were, in a sense, the m ost norm al ‘‘liberal” a n d ‘‘conservative” ones. However, a n um ber o f the issues in the packages were, in fact, divisible from each other, a n d som etim es they were com bined in different ways. T he controversies ab o u t the role o f A ndrei Z h d an o v reflect, I suspect, this divisibility. He seem s to have been a relative m oderate on q uestions o f intellectual freedom , b u t a hard-liner on questions o f co m m unization o f E urope an d the diversity o f roads to socialism .20 N ik ita K hrushchev seem s to have favored increased paym ents to the peasants b u t to have opposed any m ovem ent tow ard p riv atizatio n in agriculture, even tow ard sm all work links.21 O ne o f the leading ideologists, P etr Fedoseev, com bined strong su p p o rt for a m aintenance o f good relations w ith the U nited States (this will be discussed later) an d a denunciation o f chauvinism w ith an equally strong su p p o rt for a centralized p lanning system (‘‘p rivate p ro p erty div id es society,” he said).22 In addition,

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o f course, politics is seldom a m a tte r o f black-and-w hite views, b u t a spectrum o f confused an d im precise ideas, w ith m an y people inclined to th in k th at “ the tru th lies som ew here in betw een.” O f the specific issues th a t were involved in the com peting p ro g ram s for the postw ar period, the one th a t was d earest to the h earts o f the S oviet intelligentsia was the degree o f in d iv id u al freedom to be p e rm itte d after the war. I f the interpretation o f the origin o f the C old W ar p resented by George K ennan an d A dam U lam (that Stalin feared good relations w ith the West lest they undercu t the rationale for te rro r a n d o pen the S oviet U nion to dangerous ideas)23 is correct, th en th is q u estio n w as also the crucial one for Stalin. The argum ent th a t the postw ar p eriod should feature greater freedom a n d toleration could be m ade in a variety o f sim ple o r com plex ways. A few o f the m ore daring intellectuals even trie d to advocate a relaxation o f te rro r in a fairly direct m anner. T he head o f the In stitu te o f Law (and a subordinate o f Stalin’s in the People’s C o m m issariat o f N atio n alities in the 1920s) w rote a rather favorable assessm ent o f F ran k lin R oosevelt, especially praising him for m aking an advance in the definition o f freedom , including, naturally, “ freedom from fear.” 24 In a fam ous case, a leading h isto ria n described the reasons for the abolition o f the o p rich in a , Iv an the T errible’s equivalent to the secret police, in term s th a t all leading intellectuals knew were supposed to have contem porary m eaning: When the tsar despaired o f the dedication o f the m ost prom inent o p ric h in a leaders to him and understood that the parallel existence o f two courts— the old state and the o p ric h in a — served no purpose, then their further existence became an unproductive expenditure o f funds. Two events ended the tsar’s doubts on this question: on August 16th he received news o f the brilliant victory o f the Zemstvo com m anders over the khan, Devlet, and then the news of the death o f his chief enemy, the Polish king, Zygmunt.25

In literature, an A lexander T vardovsky could also be extrem ely direct: “ M any o f us, believing in the organizational principle, w an t to try ‘to organize a m iracle’ in the realm o f art. In m y opinion, th is is a hopeless attack. T he chief thing is not to plan any obligatory o u tlo o k for us, b u t . . . to create an atm osphere favorable for the m anufacture o f m iracles.” 26 A t other tim es the point could be m ade m ore indirectly. T he film -m aker Sergei Eisenstadt utilized Stalin’s w ell-know n ad m iratio n for Iv an th e T errible to m ake a m ovie about th a t tsa r th a t showed the o p rich n ik i as a “ gang o f degenerates, like the A m erican K u-K lux-K lan,” to q u o te a later C entral C om m ittee criticism o f it.27 A long discussion ab o u t the validity o f the views o f a prerevolutionary scholar, A lexander Veselovsky, on literary influences and literary criticism had b o th d irect a n d in d irect im plications about literary freedom .28 In the legal realm , the crim inologists co n tin u ed a discussion o f legal code th at had begun in the late 1930s a n d h ad been in te rru p te d by the war. A num ber o f proposals were m ade, including the ren u n ciatio n o f the principle

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o f analogy, w hich w ould provide the citizen w ith greater legal pro tectio n .29 T he head o f the theory o f state an d law d ep a rtm en t o f the C entral C o m m ittee’s A cadem y o f Social Sciences, M ikhail Strogovich, w rote a textbook on crim inal procedure th a t w ent so far as to assert th a t R ussia h ad ad o p ted (and, no d oubt, should continue to adopt) the m ost progressive experience o f the W est.30 In history an d philosophy, a scholar could easily advocate freer criticism a n d self-criticism , b u t those specific w ords were as m uch a tool o f the w itch-hunters as the liberals. N evertheless, in the early postw ar years, som e progressive scholars w ere very fo rth rig h t in expressing th is view, even in sessions called to denounce orthodox views. A t one such session held in Ju ne 1947, M . D. K am m a ri asserted, “ C om rade S talin teaches us th a t it is w rong eith er to im prove h istory or to m ake it worse, eith er to em bellish it or blacken it. It is necessary to describe it as it is, w ith all its contradictions, w ith its progressive an d reactionary sides a n d th e struggle betw een them .” 31 A t the sam e tim e, M. M . R o zen tal’ declared, “ [Philosophical] science can n o t be cowardly. Its task is not to repeat tru th , b u t to develop it in accordance w ith new conditions. . . . O ne factor w hich retard s o u r w ork . . . [is] a fear o f discussion.” 32 T he subtle way to speak ou t for freer expression o f unorthodox ideas w as to suggest the legitim acy o f m oderate ideas in the past, eith er because radical figures o f the past h ad been to leran t o f th em o r because radical view s had evolved from m ore m oderate ideas. T his technique had already been used in the 1920s an d w as the im m ed iate cause for Stalin’s suppression o f the histo rian s in 1931. T he debate th a t angered S talin m ost was one ab o u t the n ature o f the G erm a n Social D em ocrats before W orld W ar I an d L enin’s relationship to th e m .33 In one article in particular, A. G. Slutsky argued th a t L enin had often h ad a m ixed view o f G erm an Social D em ocratic leaders such as Bebel a n d K autsky u n til they spoke out against th e creation o f the B olsheviks in 1912. In Slutsky’s words, “ Lenin believed th a t argum ents am ong the so-called ‘left’ w ere not o f p rim a ry im p o rtan ce since he in essence considered th a t the d isputin g sides b o th cam e out o f M arxism .” 34 Slutsky also qu o ted L uxem burg an d Bebel on the value o f bourgeois dem ocracy because it increased the freedom o f revolutionaries to w ork against the capitalist system .35 Stalin undoubtedly saw th is line o f argum ent as an attack on his refusal to cooperate w ith the G erm a n Social D em ocrats against H itler (and was right in so seeing it), an d in 1931 he severely condem ned Slutsky as a “ slanderer” a n d a “ falsifier” w ho w as accusing L enin o f “ centrism ” an d “ o p p o rtu n ism .” 36 In 1934, however, w hen S talin was m oving tow ard a P opular F ront policy him self, he co-authored a directive ab o u t history textbooks th a t p artially reversed his 1931 letter. T he directive criticized h isto rian s who neglected “ the role a n d influence o f W estern E uropean bourgeois-revolutionary an d proletarian-socialist m ovem ents in R ussia” an d who forgot th at “ the R ussian revolutionaries considered them selves pupils a n d successors o f the w ell-known figures o f bourgeois-revolutionary an d M arxist thought in the West.” 37

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In the postw ar period those w ho trie d to prom ote a m ore to le ran t a ttitu d e tow ard unorthodox ideas continued to em phasize th e them es th a t S talin had raised in 1934. T he head o f th e P ro p ag an d a A d m in istratio n o f th e C entral C om m ittee wrote, o r at least signed, a h isto ry o f W estern E u ro p ean philosophy that, although critical, treated th e W estern philosophical tra d itio n w ith respect an d described M arxism as em erging o u t o f it.38 Indeed, a critic charged th at “ C om rade A leksandrov finds only the positive, only th e progressive aspects in each philosophical tendency a n d in each in d iv id u al question developed by this or th a t philosopher.” 39 Stalin’s 1931 letter m ade it difficult to discuss L enin’s co o p eratio n w ith m ore m oderate figures, b u t th e sam e p o in t could be m ade in discussions o f the nineteenth-century revolutionary m ovem ent. C hem yshevsky a n d D obroliubov, the m ost radical o f the p re-M arxist revolutionaries, received the highest praise, b u t if a scholar em phasized th a t they som etim es co operated w ith less radical figures, th a t im plied the legitim acy o f such co o p eratio n in general. Sim ilarly, a scholar could w rite ab o u t these rev o lu tio n aries in a way th at em phasized th eir attacks on th e xenophobic n atio n alism o f th e conservative Slavophils.40 O bviously these views in favor o f greater intellectual freedom a n d greater tolerance o f unorthodox ideas were not th e only ones to ap p e ar in the press. For every T vardovsky who w arned against attem p ts “ to organize a m iracle,” there were others w ho asserted th a t “ the com ing generation w ants to be real fighters for the fatherland [and] seeks a b o o k w hich w ould show it th e path,” 41 who “ w arned w riters against spiritual, ideological, a n d literary dem obilization, given the co ntem porary intern atio n al situation.” 42 A lthough everyone in the 1947 discussion o f the A leksandrov book h ad to criticize it (Stalin had already done so), there were those w ho d e e p ly m e an t it: “ M arxist philosophy by its very essence is rev o lu tio n ary a n d critical. . . . In the book o f C om rade A leksandrov, we do no t feel th is sp irit o f m ilita n t Bolshevik dedication in science; the book “ does not adhere to L enin’s principle o f partyness in philosophy [and is] a d isto rtio n o f the w hole history o f philosophy” ; the book does not use “ the language o f a M arxist. . . . T he decisive peculiarity o f the philosophy o f M arx ism -L en in ism is th at it is a revolutionary w eapon.” 43 Just as there were subtle ways to advocate to leratio n o f alien ideas, so the sam e techniques could be used to advocate th e opposite. W ith the reaffirm ation o f the W estern roots o f M arxism -L eninism suggesting a m ore open attitu d e to W estern ideas, so the denial o f these ro o ts h ad a very different im plication.44 O ne could em phasize th a t L eninism cam e p rim a rily out o f the R ussian revolutionary m ovem ent, th a t m en such as C hem yshevsky developed the m aterialistic base o f L en in ism m ore th a n m en such as Feuerbach. A nd, o f course, if assertio n s th a t C hem yshevsky co o p erated w ith m oderates m eant th at co operation w ith nonradicals w as possible in the contem porary world, then an em phasis on C hem yshevsky’s “ p rin cip led ” rebuff o f the m oderates had the o pposite m eaning. It should not be assum ed th a t disagreem ent w ith th e ideas o f m en such as A leksandrov necessarily im plied a d eterm in a tio n to suppress them . To

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a considerable extent, even the hard-liners in th e M oscow intellectual co m m unity w ere reluctant to take th is step. W hen S talin dem an d ed th a t the In stitu te o f Philosophy hold a m eeting to discuss A leksandrov’s book in early 1947, the session w as not critical enough, a n d a second one was convened, w ith provincial scholars invited. T he latter w ere generally less restrained. Even a m an such a M itin w as accused o f being to o protective o f those w ith the “ w rong” ideas.45 N evertheless, an insistence on “ partyness” a n d on “ M arxism -L eninism as a revolutionary w eapon,” at a m in im u m , gave an excuse for others to repress. In 1947, the m ost radical o f the philosophers, Vonifatii K edrov, could still be ap p o in ted ch ief ed ito r o f the new philosophy jo u rn al,46 and, as will be discussed shortly, Eugen Varga could still express his ideas on the peaceful roads to socialism . A t the en d o f 1947 a n d increasingly in 1948, however, the situatio n becam e increasingly grim for those w ith u northodox ideas.

The Economy A nother subject th at provoked intense debate at the en d o f the w ar was the econom y. Or, rather, one should say th a t the econom y p rovided the fram ew ork for a w ide variety o f conflicts. Each region pushed for higher p riority in the funding o f postw ar reconstruction a n d econom ic develop­ m ent,47 an d a b roader debate raged on th e p rio rity to give the reconstruction o f E uropean R ussia in co m parison w ith the continued expansion o f the m ore eastern regions;48 each m in istry pushed for m ore m oney for the sphere o f activ ity th a t it supervised;49 m in istries fought over b ureaucratic tu r f (for exam ple, officials o f the M in istry o f Trade a n d the C onsum ers’ C oops becam e involved in a d isp u te over w hether the latter should develop com m ission stores in the cities);50 crackpots (or innovators, depending upon one’s p o in t o f view) followed Lysenko’s exam ple in fighting for ideas th a t had significant investm ent consequences.51 A question such as w hether the U kraine should plant w inter or spring w heat a n d w hat system o f crop ro tation it should use involved not only agronom ists b u t even P olitburo m em bers.52 T he severe com petition for funds am ong regions a n d am ong m inistries obviously created headaches for the planners, b u t the m ajor difficulties centered on the broader prio rity questions. T hose who w anted an em phasis on co n su m p tio n an d social ju stice often w rote o f agriculture. V yshinsky’s fervent appeal for a b etter life for th e peasants has already been noted, an d th is them e was expressed in a nu m b er o f articles published in these years. T he light in d u stry an d trad e ad m in istrato rs, a n d also the M in istry o f F inances, were pushing the pro d u ctio n o f consum er goods.53 T he position th a t proved to be the w inning one em phasized th e need to m ain tain the p riority o f heavy industry. Because o f these regional a n d b u reaucratic disputes, the various econom ic issues could not coalesce into neat packages. For exam ple, as will be discussed

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shortly, the trade officials naturally seem ed to be p a rt o f th e group push in g for m ore resources for the consum er sector, b u t they h ad little in terest in the expansion o f priv ate trade. W hen th e m in iste r o f trad e o f the tim e later w rote th at only a centralized trad e netw ork could have saved th e co u n try in the fam ine o f 1946,54 it is extrem ely likely th a t he w as taking a p o sitio n th at he also m ade at the tim e. Sim ilarly, th e M in istry o f A griculture h ad every reason to appeal for m ore funds for agriculture, b u t also for th e preservation o f the collective farm system . Sufficient work has not been done on the m ajor econom ic d ebates to p erm it them to be described confidently a n d fully, a n d th is is a subject on w hich fruitful work is clearly possible. D u rin g the early p a rt o f th e war, G osplan was “ the w orking ap p a ratu s” o f N ikolai V oznesenskii, th e ch ief econom ic decision m aker o f th e tim e, a n d it w as com pletely ab so rb ed in m onth-to-m onth planning a n d even day-to-day checking on p ro d u ctio n o u tp u t.55 O nly in mid-1943 d id it begin to prep are a long-range p lan for the first tim e and to face the qu estio n s th a t it raised .56 C learly m ajor problem s em erged, for little has been reported, a n d a d raft p rep ared in August 1944 m ust have been rejected.57 The m ost interesting— an d to a considerable extent the m o st u nclear— position focused on the dangers o f inflation. R u ssia a n d G erm an y h ad b o th had runaw ay inflation after W orld W ar I, a n d th e problem o f excess p urchasing pow er was clearly going to be a serious one after the war, especially w hen rationing was abolished.58 O ne way to soak u p excess purchasing pow er was to increase the production o f co n su m er goods, a n d th is so lu tio n w as pushed not only by the light in d u stry ad m in istra to rs a n d trad e officials, b u t also by the M inistry o f F inances, w hich w as m o st directly concerned w ith the m onetary problem .59 A second obvious solution to a problem o f excess purchasing pow er is to raise prices, an d th is question w as fought o u t on th e issue o f so-called com m ercial stores, in w hich goods could be pu rch ased w itho u t a ratio n in g card, b u t at prices well above those in the norm al stores. (C erta in types o f shoes and w oolen cloth were, for exam ple, sold at 12 a n d 14V2 tim es the norm al price.)60 T he establishm ent o f com m ercial stores w as discussed at a conference in Jan u ary 1944, a n d the first tw enty food stores w ere opened in April. By the beginning o f 1946 there w ere com m ercial food stores in 130 cities an d com m ercial in d u stria l goods stores in forty. In 1946 they provided 24 percent o f th e to tal trad e tu rn o v er by m oney indicators, although o f course, not by volum e o f physical goods.61 These stores aroused controversy from the beginning. T he M in ister o f Finance, A. Zverev, proposed opening th em in all cities im m ediately, w hereas the food an d light industry m in isters thought th a t it w as necessary to go more slowly.62 T he central issue cam e to a head in 1946: As ratio n in g w as to be abolished an d a single price level w as to be established in all stores, should it be essentially at a m arket eq u ilib riu m level (that is, very high, as in the com m ission stores) or a t th e subsidized rates o f th e state stores? O n 16 Septem ber it w as decided to set prices a t an in term ed iate level, b u t

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this, o f course, m eant th a t those fighting for m ark et prices h ad lost.63 In 1949, a leading co nstruction m in iste r retu rn ed to the fray w ith an analogous proposal to b u ild cooperative housing at high prices, b u t his idea was ap parently rejected in a su m m ary fashion.64 T he question o f prices a n d inflation m eans th a t the postw ar econom ic debates m ay have been m uch m ore com plex th a n is som etim es assum ed in the W estern literature. T he p articip a n ts in th e discussions ab o u t the law o f cost an d ab o u t the n atu re o f m oney th a t w ere a p ro m in en t feature o f the literatu re beginning in 194365 m u st have included people w ho were suggesting th a t the m arket have a bigger role in determ in in g prices. Some were, no doubt, pushing for a w idening o f the p riv ate netw ork as well as state com m ercial stores. In agriculture, th e system o f sm all lin k w ork team s, w hich had becom e very w idespread durin g th e w ar,66 received continued strong su p p o rt (including th a t o f the C entral C o m m ittee secretary for agriculture, A ndrei A ndreev). Som e o f these su p p o rters m ust have had in m in d a de facto retu rn to fam ily farm ing w ith in a form al collective farm fram ew ork. N evertheless, u n til the h isto ry o f these econom ic debates is w ritten, caution is advised. A n appeal for m ore rational prices could sim ply refer to the need for som e change in th e prices set by th e p lanning organs for the state enterprises an d have nothing to do w ith any thoroughgoing d ecentralization on the basis o f m ark et m echanism s. T hus, the position o f the to p S oviet planner, N ikolai V oznesenskii, may well have been m isu n d ersto o d in the W estern literature. In 1930 at the Sixteenth P arty congress, S talin h ad said th a t incom e always grows faster th an p roduction u n d er socialism .67 V oznesenskii was th e first Soviet econ­ o m ist w ho directly expressed his disagreem ent w ith th is in print. In his m ajor book, T h e W ar E c o n o m y o f th e U SSR in th e P e rio d o f th e F a th erla n d War, he w arned against the dangers o f inflation if incom e were greater an d asserted th a t “ the price o f a com m o d ity in the socialist society o f the U SSR is based on its cost or the expenses o f p roduction.” 68 He insisted th a t there w ere econom ic laws o f socialism , specifically “ laws o f p roduction an d d istrib u tio n ,” th a t m ust be taken in to account, a n d he said th a t the plan m ust use the “ law o f cost” w hich is “ the m ost elem entary o f these laws.” 69 As a result, there has been som e tendency to see V oznesenskii as the leader o f the progressive forces against unspecified conservatives, as a m an who w as trying to introduce “ cap italist devices” a n d was probably killed in a 1950 purge because o f these view s.70 It is, in fact, highly unlikely th at V oznesenskii favored decentralization o r m ark et m echanism s. In the literature he com es across as a m an o f “ unusually strong will,” who repeatedly pushed for long-range planning an d w ho w as attracted to grandoise plans dem anding central direction, such as the red irectio n o f rivers from the A rctic to the so uth.71 Indeed, despite his calls for m ore scientific planning, th e criticism s o f h im a n d G osplan in this p eriod are for “ volu n tarism .” 72 In the debates ab o u t governm ental in terven tio n in th e econom y in the W est (to be discussed in the next section), V oznesenskii h im self to o k a very conservative position, essentially ridiculing the idea th a t th is had an y th in g to do w ith p lanning.73

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A lthough V oznesenskii w as clearly concerned w ith th e p roblem s o f inflation an d o f price rationalization (including th e subsidized prices in heavy industry), it is possible th a t the really controversial aspect o f his position related to agriculture. T he leading Soviet h isto rian on price form ation was later to estim ate th a t requisition prices in the 1930s w ere set a t only 10 to 15 percent o f the costs o f production. O f course, th is estim ate dep en d ed on the price assigned peasant labor, b u t the h isto ria n w as surely right in his general point: “ R ecognition o f the action o f th e law o f cost . . . w ould have required the conclusion th a t req u isitio n prices should be raised. . . . For the readers o f this w ork [o f V oznesenskii’s] th e q u estio n arose a t once ab out the need to change req u isitio n prices.” T he h isto ria n w as also rig h t th at “ in conditions o f a sharp d eviation o f req u isitio n prices for agriculture from their cost an d an excessively low level o f prices on heavy in d u stry products,” V oznesenskii’s w ords “ w ere a fairly d arin g statem ent.” 74 T his is not the place for an elaborate discussion o f P o litb u ro alignm ents. R ather the analysis o f V oznesenskii has m erely been a ten tativ e effort to rem ind the reader o f the likely com plexity o f the econom ic debates o f th e tim e an d the need for caution in o u r conclusions. T he struggle for price reform s an d the com m ercial stores w as not always a struggle for th e m ark et an d the consum er. In m any cases, the su p p o rters o f the form er were sim ply seeking to rationalize an d strengthen central planning. In m an y cases, they were trying to end shortages an d excessive purchasing pow er by setting high prices, rather th an by a m ass increase in the p ro d u ctio n o f goods for the consum er. For this reason, the econom ic debates w ere also debates on social policy. K hrushchev, as Stalin correctly chided h im ,75 really w as a n a ro d n ik (populist) who was pushing for a change in incom e d istrib u tio n in favor o f the peasant, b u t opposing the private sector. M any o f those favoring ratio n alizatio n a n d price increases were, in practice, su p p o rtin g the interests o f the m anagerial an d professional u rban pop u latio n against those o f low er incom e, w ho in im m ediate term s at least w ere favored by a policy o f subsidization o f consum er prices. These debates, no doubt, were also related to those on w hether to em phasize class origins in adm ission to college a n d the P arty see F itzpatrick (chapter 8) an d K ap lan (chapter 9), b u t such speculation goes well beyond the level o f o u r present knowledge.

Eastern Europe and Different Roads to Socialism The question o f econom ic policy inside the S oviet U n io n w as also closely related to policy in Eastern Europe. I f the Soviet U nion w ere going to change its econom ic system , th en th a t change w ould have a n im p act on w hat to im pose on E astern Europe. M ore im p o rta n t in term s o f real political choices, if E astern E urope w ere to be p erm itted a significant degree o f autonom y an d variation in its developm ent, th is latitu d e w ould legitim ate pressure for change inside the Soviet U nion. If E astern E urope w ere to follow the objective “ laws o f socialism ” as m anifested in th e S oviet experience,

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then it w ould be h ard to argue th a t th e S oviet U nion should or could d eviate from these laws itself. By all indications, a w ide v ariety o f optio n s w as considered for E astern Europe. O ne m ay have been incorporation o f these countries into the Soviet U nion. T he Soviet m oney issued in 1937 depicted a state seal w ith eleven ears on the sheaves: one to represent each o f the u n io n republics. By the beginning o f the war, the nu m b er o f republics h ad increased to sixteen, b u t despite frequent suggestions, Stalin refused to change the m oney u n til 1948. D uring the war, M olotov “ said th a t there is no sense in doing so, for only after the w ar will it be finally clear how m any u n io n republics there will be.” 76 Since M olotov could scarcely ad m it in public th a t republics m ight be lost, an increase in th eir n u m b er through the incorporation o f E astern E uropean countries m ust have been a live option. By contrast, som e o f the leading figures in th e foreign policy establishm ent w ere pushing very h ard for a m oderate policy in Eastern Europe. A lthough it is still im possible to be absolutely certain , one seem ed to be the F innish co m m u n ist O tto K uusinen. W riting u n d er th e pseudonym N. Baltiisky, he w as speaking optim istically ab o u t the B ritish trade u nions as late as N ovem ber 1946,77 b u t in an article in Ju n e 1945 he seem ed to be m aking an even m ore radical p o in t w ith in th e fram ew ork o f a defense o f the p atrio tism o f foreign com m unists: In all history there has not been a single patriotic movement which had as its goal the encroachm ent on the equality and freedom o f other nations. All im portant patriotic movements o f the XVIII and X IX centuries were directed at liberating their own countries from alien dependence or at repelling an alien attack— for example, the N orth Am erican war for independence o f 1775 and 1783, the revolutionary wars o f the French people from 1792 to 1794, the national-liberation struggle o f the Greeks (1821-29), the Poles (1830, 1846, 1863), and a series o f other peoples. It is understandable that the readiness to struggle for the freedom o f one’s own nation is one thing, but the readiness to struggle for the suppression o f another nation is som ething completely different. The first is patriotism . The second is not. For example, dom inion over colonies, the preservation o f privileges which allows the m etropolis to oppress and exploit colonial nations can in no way honestly be m otivated by patriotic considerations. . . . The most im portant Russian democratic publicists o f the last century felt this particulary sharply and they strongly emphasized this im portant side o f patriotic ideology.78

T he assertions ab o u t the u n p atrio tic natu re o f th e d om inance o f others were supposedly directed a t E u ro p ean colonial pow ers an d at th e criticism o f foreign com m unists w ho su p p o rted th e liberation o f the colonies o f th eir countries. N evertheless, the rem arkable reference to the national-liberation struggle o f the Poles in 1830, 1846, an d 1863 against R u ssian dom inance m ust have rung an enorm ous bell w ith an audience accustom ed to A esopian discourse on sensitive subjects. A foreign audience w ould not find the reference to the R ussian publicists very m eaningful, b u t a R u ssian would,

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no doubt, know th at the tw o w hom K u usinen q u o te d (Belinsky a n d D o b ­ roliubov) had opposed the tsa rist repression o f th e P olish rebellions. T he question o f one-party d o m in a tio n o f m ost o f th e E astern E u ro p ean countries may have been decided fairly early, b u t th e ch aracter o f those regimes, especially in the sh o rt term , rem ained controversial. T h e new regim es were called “ people’s dem ocracies” to suggest th a t they w ere not identical w ith the Soviet U nion, b u t th e content o f th a t p h ra se w as th e subject o f intense dispute.79 In countries such as H ungary, an intense p olitical struggle raged over questions such as collectivization. T hose w ho w anted the E astern E uropean countries to follow th e Soviet m odel found it easy to talk about the universal character o f the laws o f socialism a n d th e glories o f the Soviet m odel as Pospelov h ad done. T h eir op p o n en ts could, like Vyshinsky, refer to historical peculiarities. The m ost im p o rtan t debate ab o u t E astern E urope w as th a t w hich em erged around the work o f Eugen Varga, the d irecto r o f th e In stitu te o f th e W orld Econom y an d W orld Politics an d a regular co n su ltan t to Stalin for tw o decades. In late 1946 he published a m ajor book, C h an ges in th e E c o n o m ic s o f C a p ita lism a s a R esu lt o f W orld W ar II, w hich su m m arize d his views, b u t the book was soon subjected to devastating criticism . A lthough he w as never arrested, his in stitu te w as abolished. H e w as forced to recant, a n d he virtually ceased to be published for th e rest o f Stalin’s life.80 Some W esterners have believed th a t Varga w as p u n ish ed for excessive optim ism about the econom ic future o f ca p italism — for p red ictin g a long­ term postponem ent o f a new depression— b u t th is perception is not accurate. Although Varga suggested th a t capitalism w ould not experience a full-scale depression for ten years, th is pred ictio n assum ed th a t E urope w as so devastated th at it w ould require a decade to reach prew ar levels o f pro d u ctio n . (In actuality, it was to take only th ree to five years.) T h a t is, Varga w as predicting a m ajor depression after ab o u t th e sam e in terv al as betw een 1917 and 1929, b u t w ithout the real bo o m o f th e 1920s.81 H e explicitly co m p ared the com ing postw ar cycle to th a t o f 1929-1937 (w hich included the ab o rtiv e boom o f 1933-1937), rath er th a n to th a t o f 1921-1929, a n d as a critic correctly pointed out, “ com rade Varga indicates by th is th a t there will be a repeat o f a depression o f a special kind.” 82 In ad d itio n , Varga pred icted an interim m oderate depression in the U n ited S tates in tw o o r th ree years. T his scenario m ight be an d som etim es was, criticized, b u t it scarcely was an unforgivable heresy. W hen Varga was forced to w rite an abject ten-page recantation in 1949, he did not even m ention th is q u estio n ,83 a n d a year earlier he had had to acknowledge th a t the in te rim A m erican depression had not occurred as soon as he h ad p redicted.84 T he heart o f Varga’s “ erro r” actually lay in his analysis o f th e W estern political system s. A dopting a p hrase first used by L enin, “ state-m onopoly catpialism ,” Varga argued th at the state had becom e an increasingly im p o rta n t actor in W estern econom ic life. It h ad a “ decisive role” in the w artim e econom y an d even afterw ard d id not re tu rn to prew ar levels.85 M oreover, Varga asserted th a t “ the qu estio n o f “ p lan n in g ” . . . will again becom e

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urgent in tw o or three years w hen the regular crisis o f overproduction occurs.” 86 T he real problem w ith Varga’s analysis cam e in his treatm en t o f the d eterm in an ts o f governm ent action. In the orthodox view, th e state was com pletely subordinate to the “ m onopolies” a n d to th em alone.87 By contrast, Varga asserted th a t the W estern governm ent, although ultim ately controlled by “ the financial oligarchy,” 88 som etim es defended the interests o f the capitalist class as a whole, instead o f the im m ediate, narrow interests o f the m onopolistic bosses. Since the basic interest o f the cap italist class as a whole w as preservation o f the cap italist system , a n d since this goal som etim es required policies (for instance, price control in w artim e) th a t were against the im m ed iate profit interests o f the “ m onopolies,” governm ental policy could not reflect the latter. In practice, Varga treated the governm ent a n d societal political forces as having a considerable independence in im m ed iate term s. For exam ple, he explained the en d o f price control in the U nited States by strictly political factors: the death o f P resident R oosevelt a n d the election o f a R epublican Congress in 1946.89 In response to criticism , he expressed scorn at the idea th a t “ now in 1947 the w orking class a n d the L abor P arty has no influence on the policy o f England, th a t the financial oligarchy m akes all the policy.” 90 H e asserted th at the w orker “ lays claim to a m uch m ore significant role in m aking decisions on all political q uestions an d will fight for the achieve­ m en t o f this role.91 M ore im p o rtan t, Varga w as suggesting th a t the influence o f the m asses on the bourgeois state could becom e so great th a t it could serve as a vehicle for the transform ation o f cap italism a n d the peaceful tran sitio n to socialism . To say th a t the bourgeois state w as subordinate to the m onopolies alone m eant th a t it could not be used to achieve any w orker goals, let alone evolution to solution. It im plied th a t there was no m ed iu m ground betw een a full bourgeois an d a full socialist system . Varga, however, treated the E astern E uropean countries as being p a rt o f the capitalist w orld b u t as having “ econom ies o f a new type,” as being “ dem ocracies o f a new type.” 92 This, to repeat, w as in S eptem ber 1946. In M arch 1947, in an article entitled “ D em ocracies o f N ew Type,” he acknow ledged th a t th e E astern E uropean countries w ere “ not cap italist states in the usual sense o f the w ord” b u t still asserted th a t they were “ som ething com pletely new in the history o f m an k in d .” 93 As a critic noted, th is still im plied th a t th eir p ath o f developm ent, being com pletely new, w ould not be identical to Soviet socialism .94 T h is analysis o f E astern E urope fu rth e r im plied th a t capitalism in W estern E urope could take on radically different, a n d m uch m ore progressive, form s th an it had in the past. Indeed, in his M arch 1947 article, Varga specifically asserted th a t “ bourgeois nationalization . . . m eans progress in the direction o f dem ocracy o f a new type.” 95 In the concluding predictions in his book, Varga had m ade m uch the sam e p o in t in m ore general term s: “ T he ch ief focus o f the political struggle betw een the two basic classes o f capitalist society, the bourgeoisie an d the proletariat, will be the question o f the greater o r lesser p articip atio n in the a d m in istra tio n o f the state.” 96

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T h is view o f the bourgeois state w as perilously close to th e arg u m en t o f the so-called revisionists o f the tu rn o f the cen tu ry w hom L enin h ad so vehem ently repudiated, identical to it, in th e view o f m any o f Varga’s critics. H is discussion o f Eastern E urope w as surely an A esopian way o f suggesting th at the com m unization o f th a t region not be c a rrie d th ro u g h to its conclusion, perhaps in order to strengthen the “ dem ocratic forces” in W estern foreign policy, perhaps to m ake a gradual tran sfo rm atio n o f W estern E urope m ore likely because less threatening, p erh ap s to save his native H ungary from the w orst aspects o f Stalinism . Even after the M arch 1947 conference th a t severely criticized his book, Varga stubbornly held to his view s for som e tim e. In O cto b er 1947, after the “ two cam p” doctrine was enunciated at the tim e o f th e fo rm atio n o f the C om inform , he expressed his o p inion w ith even greater sharpness: Bourgeois Europe . . . itself has now recognized that the capitalist social order needs basic reform, that it is impossible to get by without such m easures as nationalization o f the im portant branches o f production, state control over the economy, “ planning” o f the economy. . . . Today thirty years after the victory o f the G reat October Revolution, th e stru g g le in E u ro p e is b e c o m in g in its h is to r ic a l d e v e lo p m e n t m o r e a n d m o r e a stru g g le f o r th e te m p o s a n d f o r m s o f tra n s itio n f r o m c a p ita lis m to s o c ia lis m .

Although the Russian way, the Soviet system, is undoubtedly the best and the fastest m ethod for transition from capitalism to socialism, historical development, as Lenin had predicted, shows that other ways are also available for the achievement o f this goal.97

T his persistence, th is “ non-party relationship to criticism ,” th is p etitio n o f “ a clearly revisionist thesis,” as K o n stan tin O stroviianov, th e d irecto r o f the In stitu te o f Econom ics a n d a relative m oderate, expressed it,98 was the last straw. A n um ber o f o th er scholars o f his in stitu te h ad been publishing som ew hat sim ilar views,99 a n d at th e en d o f 1947 the en tire in stitu te w as abolished.

Foreign Policy T he debate on foreign policy in general was, o f course, closely associated w ith th at on Eastern E urope an d roads to socialism . As shall be discussed, the sam e argum ents about the bourgeois state th a t h ad im plications ab o u t the possibility o f a peaceful evolution to socialism also h ad im plications about the driv in g forces o f W estern foreign policy an d the th rea t th a t th e West posed. M ore basically, however, the central qu estio n in th e debates on Soviet relations w ith the W est w as w hether m oderation in S oviet policy in E astern E urope w ould produce sufficient benefits. For this reason, the debates on relations w ith th e W est h ad a n u m b er o f aspects. To som e extent, o f course, the issue could be th e d ep th o f the m oral obligation th at the Soviet U nion h ad to fulfill a “ lib eratin g ” role in

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E astern Europe, as Pospelov h ad em phasized. T he n atu ral co u n ter to this argum ent w as th at a heavy h an d in E astern E urope w ould frighten the W est an d un d ercu t a strong tre n d tow ard a n evolution to socialism in W estern Europe. T hus, it is at least a possibility th a t Varga w as exaggerating his o p tim ism ab o u t such evolution to su p p o rt his foreign policy argum ent. A second aspect to th e foreign policy debate centered on econom ic questions. C learly th e Soviet U nion h ad a m ajor need for aid an d trad e in its econom ic reconstruction, a n d the qu estio n w as w hether it could receive it from the W est at acceptable political cost. It w as easy enough to say th a t the Soviet econom y needed reconstruction, a n d som e linked th is question to foreign policy; V yshinsky’s in d ire ct w arning against econom ic boycott has already been m entioned. In 1944, an article in B o ls h e v ik linked cooperation w ith the W est w ith th e battle to prevent runaw ay inflation. T he au th o r su p p o rted Soviet en try into th e In tern atio n al M onetary F u n d , as well as efforts to achieve stability o f foreign currencies a n d norm al foreign trade after the war. “ T he U SSR is interested in such postw ar collaboration, for this collaboration will p erm it us to accelerate a n d facilitate the process o f the reconstruction o f o u r econom y.” 100 P ospelov’s previously cited fervent su p p o rt for socialism in one country represented not only a pro u d assertio n th a t th e Soviet U nion could go alone, b u t surely also the d em an d th a t it no t accept any foreign restrictions. M ikhail Iovchuk, a C entral C o m m ittee official w ho w as the m o st vigorous su p p o rter o f a R ussocentric view (m any years later an acquaintance called h im a “ Black H u n d red er” ), to o k the sam e po sitio n by praising R ussia for deciding “ not to dogm atically borrow the achievem ents o f W estern E uropean civilization, not to assim ilate th em ‘in th e m a n n er o f India,’ b u t to create a m ore advanced social stru ctu re w hich b etter answ ered th e interests o f the m asses th a n W estern E uropean civilization.” Iovchuk asserted th a t Chernyshevsky “ had spoken o u t against attem p ts o f aliens ( c h u zh e ze m tsy ) to tu rn R ussia com pletely into a colony o f som e E uropean state,” 101 a n d one suspects th a t the “ aliens” he currently h ad in m in d were Jews such as Varga. T he m ajor aspect o f the debate on foreign policy centered on th e q uestion o f w hether cooperation w ith the W est was possible on acceptable grounds. In private an d even several tim es in print, the form er foreign m inister, M axim L itvinov, now in the shadows, pro p o sed a m ore lim ited security policy th a t m ight p erm it a m ore durable relationship w ith the West:

The crux o f the m atter was not the desirability o f an em pire (that was now taken for granted) but rather the ways and m eans o f its possible integration into an international order com patible with the Western notions. To Litvinov, Anglo-American support o f any settlement his government would wish to enforce in east central Europe was indispensable for Russia’s true security. Keenly aware o f the depth o f Western sympathy for his country’s security needs, he was also convinced that such support could be obtained if only the lim its o f those needs were stated sensibly and clearly enough.” 102

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As L itvinov him self told A m ericans from 1943 on, th e tendency to w ard isolation, suspicion, an d parochialism w ith in th e S oviet leadership w as very strong.103 To a considerable extent, it w as a suspicion o f W estern ideas a n d th eir possible im pact upon Soviet society. It w as a suspicion th a t a colla­ borative relationship w ith the W est w ould p erm it the infusion o f W estern ideas and a w eakening o f the dictato rsh ip a n d o f natio n al u n ity (th at is, separatist m ovem ents in the republics). H ence the debates a b o u t W estern ideas that have already been discussed were, to a great extent, also d ebates about foreign policy. T he question o f the W estern th re a t also h ad a purely m ilita ry -fo re ig n policy side to it as well. T he debate a b o u t the n atu re o f the bourgeois state th at was analyzed in the previous section clearly referred to the W estern th reat in addition to the possiblity o f a peaceful tran sitio n to socialism . Those who were em phasizing the su b o rd in atio n o f the state to th e m onopolies scarcely had a benign view o f the “ m onopolies.” R a th e r such th eo rists accepted Lenin’s theory o f im perialism , in particular, his th eo ry th a t econom ic factors drove the capitalist countries to w ar w ith each other. D uring 1945 the conservatives were increasingly op en in suggesting th a t W orld W ar II was not the result o f an attack by th e “ fascists” against the “peace-loving” nations (the w artim e line), b u t o f the cap italist system itself. In May, for exam ple, a m ajor-general, B. A ntropov, launched a severe attack on Clausew itz’s dictum th at “ w ar is state policy co n tin u ed by o th e r m ean s” (a dictum th at L enin had repeated). According to Clausewitz, policy is built on the desires and opinions o f the sovereign. . . . [These propositions] are a clear expression o f an idealistic interpretation o f the concepts o f the state and politics. . . . Lenin em phasized that politics and economics are indistinguishable from each other, that politics is the concentrated economics. The roots o f politics m ust be sought, he emphasized, in the economic position o f the classes which head the state.104

T he fervent su p p o rt o f L enin’s analysis o f the econom ic ro o ts o f foreign policy was obviously m eant to rem in d th e readers o f the rest o f the analysis, an d “ the sovereign” whose desires a n d opinions d id not cause W orld W ar II was, o f course, Hitler. O thers tried to present a m ore nuanced picture. T he answ er to A ntropov, published in a long-delayed “ A ugust” issue o f B oV sh evik , w hich w as signed to press on O ctober 9, was w ritten by th e new ch ief ed ito r o f B oV shevik, P etr Fedoseev. Fedoseev criticized those who th ought th a t “ in tern atio n al relations develops com pletely ind ep en d en t o f classes,” b u t he p ointedly quoted L enin (Clausew itz was not m entioned) to the effect th a t w ar is a continuation o f policy by oth er m eans. However, Fedoseev d istin g u ish ed betw een W orld W ar I an d W orld W ar II: In W orld W ar I, th e w ar w as a continuation o f the capitalists’ policy o f plu n d erin g colonies, b u t in W orld W ar II, the issue o f colonies w as not involved, a n d G erm an y w as seeking world d o m in atio n .105

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Fedoseev began his article w ith a strong attack o n fascist ideologists who p repared the w orld for W orld W ar II by “ proposing th e theory th a t w ar is a n eternal an d unavoidable phenom enon.” H e en ded th e article w ith the contention th a t “ L eninism does not consider w ar inevitable, even in present conditions. W ar can be averted if the peace-loving natio n s act in concord.” H e w rote as if he thought th a t th is w as possible. H is assertio n th at the “ bourgeois use o f d ictatorsh ip a n d w ar led G erm an y in to a b lin d alley” suggested th a t the bourgeoisie o f o th er countries w ould n o t follow the sam e path; his assertion th a t “ th e goals p u rsu ed in the w ar d eterm in e the policy o f these states after the w ar” seem ed reassuring ab o u t A m erican aim s; his praise o f Soviet foreign policy for being “ flexible, far-seeing, a n d effective” was, if not a prediction, at least in ten d ed as ad vice.106 Yet an o th er technique used to deem phasize the W estern th rea t was to assert th a t there w ere div isio n s (“ contradictions” ) am ong th em th a t the Soviet U nion could exploit. Varga h im self often w rote ab o u t A m ericanB ritish riv alry ,107 b u t this them e w as stressed even m ore by his associate, I. L em in. Every o ther natio n is “ a po ten tial ally or a poten tial enem y,” L em in w rote, an d he reassured his audience th a t “ E ngland by no m eans in ten d s to su rren d er w ithou t a battle” in its struggle w ith the U n ited S tates.108 A nother way to try to suggest a less th reatening W est an d , sim ultaneously, to u n d ercu t the logic o f L enin’s analysis in Im p e ria lis m w as to present the im age o f the bourgeois state th a t has already been discussed in the last section. Varga h im self w as arguing th a t L enin’s analysis o f the inevitability o f w ar betw een capitalist countries h ad becom e o u tm oded by the rise o f the U nited States an d the Soviet U nion to super pow er statu s after W orld W ar I I,109 b u t he w as also m aking th e sam e p o in t w hen he argued th a t a m ultiplicity o f forces d eterm in ed the actions o f the W estern state. Indeed, in his book, w hich w as signed to press in late S eptem ber 1946, after the sta rt o f the Z hdanovschina, he explicitly stated th a t “ th e dem ocratic forces in all countries” were so strong a p o ten tial im p act on governm ental policy th a t “ the relationship o f th e cap italist countries to th e S oviet U nion will n o t be the sam e as it w as in the prew ar period.” 110 O f course, these p o ints in tu rn were subject to attack. T he previously discussed assertions th a t th e W estern governm ents were com pletely subor­ d in ated to the m onopolies had nearly as pessim istic an im plication for foreign policy as for peaceful evolution o f the W est to socialism . W hen the new governm ents such as In d ia w ere described as tools o f the m onopolistic bourgeoisie an d the landlords, as they were by those dubious o f collabo­ ra tio n ,111 this characterizatio n h ad the sam e im plications. In ad dition, those w ho w anted to say th a t th e Soviet U nion could not take advantage o f “ cap italist contradictions” spoke o f class solidarity am ong the bourgeoisie an d the do m in atio n o f the U n ited States over w hat cam e to be know n as the im perialist “ cam p,” a cam p th a t included countries such as In d ia th at called them selves neutral. T he argum ent ab o u t a W estern th rea t could be a two-edged sword. If th e W est w as really a m ajor m ilitary th rea t in the sh o rt ru n , then Soviet

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expansionism w as as dangerous as collaboration w ith th e W est w as im ­ possible. As a consequence, it is possible to read som e w arnings ab o u t th e danger o f w ar as a call for Soviet cau tio n in E astern E urope. It w as possible to read a w arning by G eorgii M alenkov th a t “ it is w rong to und erev alu ate one’s ow n forces” or one can “ fall in to panic a n d in tim id a te one’s se lf” as a call for an aggressive foreign policy,112 b u t such in te rp re tatio n s are highly doubtful. Surely Stalin did w orry ab o u t th e possible reaction o f th e W est to events in East Europe, an d the gradual natu re o f the S oviet takeover m ay well have reflected this caution. N evertheless, it is m ost u nclear th a t th is w as reflected in the public debate. T hose w ho w ere talking a b o u t a W estern th reat were saying th a t it was in h eren t to capitalism , a n d such an argum ent gave little support for a Soviet policy o f self-denial in E astern Europe. T he clear-cut hard-liner on the Politburo, L azar K aganovich, w ho w arned o f continuing capitalist encirclem ent, found it n atu ral to w arn against “ co m ­ placency and self-satisfaction,” to call for “ increased Bol’shevik vigilance,” an d to call upon the regim e “ to consolidate o u r victory,” the la tter alm o st surely a reference to E astern E urope.113 T he M alenkov-type assertion, especially w hen coupled w ith a n attack on those w ho base th e ir analysis on ideological citations, was alm ost surely m ean t to be a ju stificatio n for détente, rath er th an the opposite.

Conclusion For the average A m erican, it has probably been q u ite interesting to read th at the Soviet press, even u n d er Stalin, co ntained a far w ider range o f views o f key policy questions th a n is usually assum ed, b u t th e m ajo r q u estio n rem ains, do the debates m ean th a t the course o f h isto ry in th e second h a lf o f the 1940s m ight have been radically different th a n it was? M ight E astern Europe have been only “ F in lan d ized ” rath e r th a n have th e S oviet m odel im posed on it? M ight the C old W ar have been avoided? The first answ er to these qu estio n s is th a t we really c a n n o t be certain . T he second is th at the answ er is probably far m ore com plex th a n is usually assum ed. M ost o f the discussion o f th e C old W ar has been very vague in defining the term c o ld war. A ny inform ed speculation ab o u t how th e po stw ar p erio d m ight or m ight not have evolved differently m u st rest on a precise definition o f different optio n s at different tim es. It m u st focus n o t ju s t on A m erican and Soviet foreign policy acts, b u t also on o th e r events such as the unexpected fam ine o f 1946.114 C ertainly any thought ab o u t an E astern E urope th a t w as as in d ep en d en t as F inland was to be should not focus p rim a rily on possible m istakes by P resident T rum an in the spring a n d su m m er o f 1945. W hen m edals w ere aw arded to scholars o f the A cadem y o f Sciences on th e 220th an n iv ersary o f the A cadem y in June 1945, Eugen Varga w as not included am ong th e to p 131 m edal w inners as his statu s alm ost dictated, b u t in th e next group

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o f 375.115 Even at th a t early date his position in th e debates was not fully respectable. T he L itvinov w arnings from 1943 testify to the dep th s o f S talin’s suspicions. T he disinclinatio n o f the Polish governm ent in exile in L ondon to be “ F in lan d ized ” an d th e broken W estern prom ises ab o u t a Second F ro n t in 1942 an d 1943 w ere certain to raise the gravest dou b ts in a person such as Stalin. R oosevelt’s selection o f H a rry T rum an as his vice presidential ca n didate in 1944 w as even worse. W hen G erm an y h ad invaded the Soviet U nion in June 1941, T rum an h ad to ld T he N ew York T im e s th a t “ if we see th a t G erm any is w inning, we ought to help R ussia, an d if R ussia is w inning we ought to help G erm an y a n d th a t way let them kill as m any as possible.” 116 It m ay be th a t a Stalin w ould have found som ething to suspect, regardless o f w hat th e W est did. It is m ore problem atical w hether co m m u n ist rule in E astern E urope could have had a less severe ch aracter a n d w hether som e o f the harshness o f Soviet-A m erican relations, including the K orean War, could have been avoided. T here is not the slightest evidence to challenge th e conventional view o f the 1950s an d 1960s ab o u t “ S talin’s u n restricted autocratic co m m an d o f Soviet foreign policy in these years,” 117 not the slightest evidence th at critics o f the em erging policy w ere th in k in g o f the possibility o f defeating a n d rem oving Stalin. However, since Stalin sharply cu rtailed the debates in 1948-1949 as the policy line was firm ly established, it is possible th at his previous w illingness to have different lines presented m eant th a t he had not fully m ade up his m in d . I f I read it correctly (w hich I m ay well not have), Z h d an o v ’s position w as th a t the U nited States could im pose its system in W estern E urope an d the Soviet U nion could im pose its in Eastern Europe, b u t th at an effort should be m ade to m ain ta in reasonable S oviet-A m erican relatio n s.118 O n the day after the beginning o f the conference to denounce Varga’s book in 1947, Stalin had a m onth-old interview w ith H aro ld Stassen published in P ra v d a .119 In the interview he repeatedly em phasized the possibility o f Soviet-A m erican cooperatio n ( so tru d n ich estvo ), n o t ju s t coexistence. Since he stated th at “ if b o th sides begin to abuse each o th er w ith nam es such as m onopolists o r to ta lita r ia n , then there will not tu rn o u t to be cooperation,” a n d since Varga w as being denounced for not calling the U nited States a m onopolist-dom inated regim e, S talin m ay have been subtly w riting off the possibility o f cooperation. However, he m ay well have been w illing to exchange trade for a correct S oviet-A m erican relationship if the W est were willing. Yet, if Z hdanov a n d Stalin h ad such hopes, they were being naive. Q uiet W estern acceptance o f the com m u n izatio n o f E ast Europe, particularly o f Poland, w hose invasion had led to the declaration o f w ar against G erm any in 1939, w as an action th a t dem ocratically elected governm ents o f the U nited States an d G reat B ritain were scarcely going to be able to take. By the sam e token, it is difficult to im agine a dem ocratic U nited States in this tim e being able to prepare for decisive m ilitary action to m oderate Soviet

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behavior in E astern E urope, a policy th a t probably h ad a b etter chance o f success th a n an attem p t at reassurance.120 In 1945-1946, the U nited States a n d the Soviet U n io n w ere each new to the role o f super power, an d they had had no tim e to ad ju st to nuclear w eapons. President T rum an was q u ite inexperienced, a n d S talin w as a m a n w ith a m ost awful side to his personality. Today, forty years after th e en d o f W orld W ar II, m ilitary equality has been achieved, nuclear w eapons have becom e old-hat, an d Soviet ideology has mellowed. T h e sam e S oviet d ebates th at raged in 1944-1946 continue today, w ith the sam e in terconnections am ong foreign policy, relationship to W estern ideas, a n d econom ic policy. Yet, after forty years the Soviet U nion an d th e U n ited States still have n o t found a way to conduct their riv alry in a m easured way, an d those A m ericans who talk m ost about prom oting h u m an rights a n d liberty in the S oviet U nion an d E astern E urope follow a foreign policy th a t u n d ercu ts— one m ight alm ost say, destroys— those fighting for liberalization w ith in the S oviet Union. Instead o f criticizing o u r inexperienced predecessors, it w ould be m ore fruitful for us to survey the su bsequent experience a n d reflect m ore about the difficult tasks o f today.

Notes 1. S. M. Shtemenko, G en era l’n yi s h ta b v g o d y voiny, K n iga p e rva ia (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1981), 210-40, esp. 224-28. 2. I. M. Maisky, V ospom inaniia S ovetskogo d ip lo m a ta , 1 9 2 5 -4 5 gg. (Moscow: Nauka, 1971), 676-77. 3. See the discussion in Shtemenko, G en eral'nyi sh tab v g o d y voiny, 446-49. The salutes also had a significance for others. Ilya Ehrenburg recalls that “from that day in August when the stars of the first salvo rocketed into the Moscow sky, I began to look about me carefully and to reflect about the kind of world it would be after victory.” Ilya Ehrenburg, The W ar 1941-45 (London: MacGibbon & Kee, 1964), 119. 4. Pravda, 22 August 1943, 1-4. 5. Maisky, Vospom inaniia S o vetskogo d ip lo m a ta , 699. V. Kardashov, Voroshilov (Mos­ cow: Molodaia gvardiia, 1976), 331. Isto riia K o m m u n istich esk o i p a r tii S ovetskogo S o iu za (Moscow: Politizdat, 1970), vol. 5, book 1, 549, 674. 6. A. G. Zverev, Z a p isk i m in istra (Moscow: Politizdat, 1973), 231, and D. V. Pavlov, S to ik o st’ (Moscow: Politizdat, 1979), 194-95. 7. For the new kolkhoz chairmen, see Jerry F. Hough, “The Changing Nature o f the Kolkhoz Chairman,” in James R. Millar, ed., T he S o viet R u ra l C o m m u n ity (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1971), 103-120. 8. William Taubman, S ta lin ’s A m erica n P olicy: F rom E n ten te to D éten te to C o ld W ar (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1982), 5-6. 9. Werner G. Hahn, P o stw a r S o viet Politics: The F all o f Z h d a n o v a n d th e D efeat o f M oderation 1946-1953 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1982), 9-13. 10. George F. Kennan, “Excerpts from a Draft Letter Written at Some Time During the First Months of 1945,” S la vic R eview , XXVII, 3 (September, 1968), 481-984. 11. Franz Borkenau, European C o m m u n ism (New York: Harper, 1953). 12. See, for example, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., R oosevelt a n d th e R ussians: T he Yalta Conference (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1949), 309-11. This view is generally supported in William O. McCagg, Jr., S ta lin E m b a ttled , 194 3 -1 9 4 8 (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1978), esp. 94-95, 143-46, and 258-59.

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13. The speech is found in I. V. Stalin, S o ch in en iia , edited by Robert McNeal (Stanford: The Hoover Institution on War, Revolution, and Peace, 1967) vol II, 1. 14. Ehrenburg, T he W ar 1941-45, 124. 15. Robert Sharlet has recently noted, however, that behind the scenes Vyshinsky seemed to be a leading force for the regularization of the legal system. 16. Roy A. Medvedev and Zhores A. Medvedev, Khrushchev: The Years in P ow er (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), 67-68. 17. P ravda, 21 April 1945, 3, and 22 April 1945, 4. The quotations from Vyshinsky that follow are from these two issues. 18. This phrase was only one of two in dark print in Vyshinsky’s two-piece article, and it was also in dark print in the original Lenin text. 19. P ravda, 22 April 1945, 3, and 23 April 1945, 3. 20. Werner Hahn notes the difference between Zhdanov’s position on culture and science compared with economics, but does not draw the conclusion that the economics debate was really a foreign policy one. P o stw a r S o viet P olitics, 88. 21. Stalin, S ta lin E m b a ttled , 359-60, note 23. 22. P. Fedoseev, “ Marksizm-leninizm ob istokakh i kharaktere voin,” B o lsh e v ik , no. 16 (August 1945):39, 41-43. 23. X, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,’’ Foreign Affairs 25, no. 4 (July 1947):510. Kennan said that the Soviet stress on an outside menace is founded “in the necessity of explaining away the maintenance of dictatorial authority at home.” A similar interpretation is found in Adam Ulam, E xpan sion a n d C o ex isten ce (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1968), 400-03. 24. I. P. Trainin, “O demokratii,” S o vetsk o e g osu darstvo i pravo, no. 1 (1946): 19. 25. S. Veselovsky, “Uchrezhdenie Oprichnogo dvora v 1565 g. i otmena ego v 1572 g.,” Voprosy istorii, no. 1 (1946):99. 26. L itera tu rn a ia g a ze ta , 22 May 1945, 1. 27. B o ls h e v ik , no. 16 (August 1946):52. For a discussion of the general question, see Leo Yaresh, “Ivan the Terrible and the O prichnina ,” in Cyril Black, ed., R e w ritin g R ussian H istory: S o v ie t In terp reta tio n s o f R u s sia ’s Past, (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Publishers, 1956), 216-32. 28. Robert M. Hankin, “Postwar Soviet Ideology and Literary Scholarship,” in Ernest J. Simmons, ed., Through th e G lass o f S o viet L ite ra tu re (New York: Columbia University Press, 1953), 266-79. 29. Peter H. Solomon, Jr., S o viet C rim in o lo g ists a n d C rim in a l P o licy: Specialists in P olicy -M a k in g (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), 21-22 and 26-27. The discussion is scattered through the issues of the journal S o tsia listich eskaia za k o n n o st’ of 1946 and 1947. 30. M. S. Strogovich, U golovnyi p ro tsess (Moscow: Iuridicheskoe izdatel’stvo, 1946). For a selection of the most controversial statements in this book, see Sovetskoe gosu darstvo i pravo. no. 6, (1948):73-86, and no. 4 (1949):43-44. 31. Voprosy filosofii, no. 1 (1947): 16. 32. Ibid., 90. 33. For a short description o f the debate, see George M. Enteen, The S o viet ScholarBureaucrat: M . N. P okrovskii a n d th e S o c ie ty o f M a rx ist H isto ria n s (University Park, Penn.: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1978), 145-50. Also see V. A. Dunaevsky, “ Bol’sheviki i germanskie levye na mezhdunarodnoi arene (nekotorye aspekty temy v osveschenii sovetskoi istoriografii kontsa 20-kh-nachala 30-kh godov,” in S. D. Skazkin, ed., E vropa v n ovoe i noveishee vrem ia (Moscow: Nauka, 1966), 491-513. 34. A. Slutsky, “ Bol’sheviki o germanskoi s-d v period ee predvoennogo krizisa,” P roletarskaia revoliutsiia, no. 6 (June 1930):38-72. The quotation is from 60. 35. I b id , 42, 59-60. 36. I. V. Stalin, “O nekotorykh voprosakh istorii bol’shevizma,” in I. V. Stalin, Soch in en iia (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1951), XIII, 84-102. 37. I. Stalin, A. Zhdanov, and S. Kirov, “Zamechaniia po povodu konspekta uchebnika po istorii SSSR,” in K izucheniiu isto rii (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1938), 23. The directive was written on 8 August 1934.

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38. G. F. Aleksandrov, Isto riia za p a d n o evro p eisk o ifilosofii, 2d ed. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo AN SSSR, 1946). In the Soviet Union it is often more important who signs something— that is, takes responsibility for it—than writes it. Several of the exchanges in the stenographic report of the conference that criticized the book suggested that Aleksandrov had relied very heavily on the prominent scholars in the Institute of Philosophy. Voprosy filosofii, no. 1 (1947): 158, 163, 223-34, 269. 39. M. B. Mitin, in Voprosy filosofii, no. 1 (1947): 124. For a series o f quotations from the Aleksandrov book that outraged conservatives, see Ibid., 6-12, 32-33, 124-26, 281-84. See the discussion in Percy E. Corbett, “The Aleksandrov Story,*’ W orld P olitics , vol. 1, no. 2, 161-74. 40. Z. V. Smirnova, Ibid., 111. 41. O. Mishakova (a secretary of the Central Committee of the Komsomol), in L iteratu rn aia g a zeta , 22 May 1945, 1. 42. Vsevolod Vishnevsky, Ibid., 26 May 1945, 1. 43. M. V. Emdin, M. B. Mitin, and P. F. Iudin, in Voprosy filosofii, no. 1 (1947): 10, 124, 280. 44. The conflict over the relationship of the Soviet Union to Western ideas had many paradoxical elements. In particular, Marx and Engels were not Russians, and the greatest Western influence on Russia had been Marxism. To the extent that the opponents of Western influences were simply hostile to foreigners (including what they perceived to be an alien Jewish element in Russia), they had to be aware that, as one Soviet citizen later expressed it in a private conversation, Marx was “nobody but a German Jew.” The official movement toward a Russocentric view began with a March 1944 Central Committee decision that attacked a relatively favorable treatment of Hegel, for to deemphasize Hegel was to deemphasize the Western tradition out of which Marx came and to deemphasize Marx himself. Two of the most militant Marxists, Mark Mitin and Pavel Iudin, were demoted at this time, the latter after fighting particularly hard for an emphasis of the European Marxist origins of Marxism-Leninism. (See P. Iudin, “Georgii Valentinovich Plekhanov,” B o l’shevik, no. 10 (May 1943): 17, and the discussion in Voprosy filosofii, no. 1 (1947):456.) It would be fascinating to understand the politics of the evolution of this theme during the war. It is possible that many who began pushing a Russian-centered interpretation thought that they were fighting a radical, revolutionary policy in favor of a moderate one and then discovered that their line was coopted by the virulent xénophobes. 45. Voprosy filosofii, no. 1 (1947):362. 46. See the discussion in Hahn, P o stw a r S o viet P olitics, 70-78, esp. 74. 47. McCagg, S ta lin E m b a ttled , 1943-1948, 89-90, and Timothy Dunmore, T he S ta lin ist C o m m a n d E co no m y (New York: S t Martins Press, 1980), 89-90. The stenographic reports of Supreme Soviet sessions are a good source for specific requests. 48. Dunmore, The S ta lin ist C o m m a n d E conom y, 42-45, 54-57. 49. Ibid., 99-100, 109-14. For a discussion of the ministerial struggles over the spoils in occupied Germany, see Vladimir Rudolph in Robert Slusser, ed., S o v ie t E con om ic P olicy in P ostw ar G erm a n y (Ann A rbor Research Program on the USSR, 1953), 20-22, 31-35. 50. A. V. Liubimov, Torgovlia i sn abzh en ie v g o d y velikoi otechestvennoi voin y (Moscow: Ekonomiki, 1968), 209-210. 51. The Lysenko question was not simply one of ideological rigidity but had major implications for the amount of money that should be spent on agriculture. David Jorawsky is probably correct in suggesting that Stalin supported Lysenko in significant part because his theories implied that higher agricultural productivity could be achieved without expensive fertilizer. 52. Sidney I. Ploss, Conflict a n d D ecision -M aking in S o viet R u ssia (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), 34-36. 53. Zverev, Z a p isk i m in istra , 229. 54. Liubimov, Torgovlia i snabshenie v g o d y velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, 201. 55. A. Zelenovsky, “Iz opyta raboty Gosplana SSSR v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny,” P lannovoe kh oziaistvo, no. 5 (1975):61. 56. F. Kotov, “Velikie pobedy i progress ekonomiki,” Ibid., no. 5 (1980): 15.

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57. Eugene Zaleski, S ta lin ist P lan n in g f o r E co n o m ic G rowth (Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1980), 296-97. 58. In 1945, the amount of goods available for each ruble in circulation was three times less than in 1940. G. M. Sorokin, “ Ekonomiia i planirovanie v pervye gody tretei piatiletki i v gody velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (1938-1945),” in S h a g i pia tileto k : ra zv itie ek o n o m ik i S S S R (Moscow: Ekonomiki, 1968), 159. 59. Zverev, Z a p isk i m in istra, 227-30. 60. Pavlov, S to ik o s t’, 197. 61. This paragraph is based on Ibid., 194-201. 62. Pavlov, S to ik o s t1, 195. 63. Ibid., 201. 64. S. Z. Ginzburg, O p ro sh lo m — d la budushchego (Moscow: Politizdat, 1983), 299-300. 65. M. I. Sabluk, R a z v itie m a rk sistsk o i teo rii d en eg v so tsia listich eskom obshchestve (Kiev: Vishcha shkola, 1982), 127-32. 66. lu. V. Arutiunian, S o vetsk o e krest'ianstvo v g o d y velikoi otechestvennoi voiny, 2d ed. (Moscow: Nauka, 1970), 84-85. 67. See the discussion in D. K. Trifonov and L. D. Shirokopad, eds., Istoriia politich eskoi e k o n o m ii so tsia lizm a , 2d ed. (Leningrad: Izdatel’stvo Leningradskogo universiteta, 1983), 510. 68. N. A. Voznesenskii, Voennaia e k o n o m ii S S S R v p e r io d O techestvennoi voiny (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1948), 139,145-48. See the discussion in Trifonov and Shirokopad, Isto riia politich esk o i eco n o m ii so tsia lizm a , 279-85, 510-14. 69. Voznesenskii, Voennaia e k o n o m ii S SSR , 145. 70. Gerald Segal, “Automation, Cybernetics and Party Control,” P roblem s o f C o m ­ m u n ism , 15, no. 2 (March-April 1966):5. 71. V. Kolotov, “ Predsedatel’ Gosplana,” L itera tu rn a ia g a ze ta , 30 November 1963, 2; Kolotov, N ik o la i A lekseevich Voznesensky, 327-32. 72. la. E. Chadaev, E k o n o m ik a S S S R v p e r io d velikoi otechestvennoi voiny (1941-1945 gg.) (Moscow: MysF, 1965), 93. 73. Voznesenskii said that it was “sheer nonsense” to speak of a stronger governmental role in the West attributing the idea to “some theoreticians who consider themselves Marxists.” Voznesenskii, Voennaia ek o n o m ik a S SSR , 30-32 and 183-85. See the discussion in Hahn, P o stw a r S o v ie t Politics, 87-89. 74. A. N. Malafeev, P roshloe i n astoiashche te o rii tovarnogo p ro izvo d stva p ri so tsia lizm a (Moscow: Politizdat, 1975), 115-16. Peter Wiles discusses the differences between Voz­ nesensky and Stalin on the law of value and ridicules Stalin as an abstract ideologist. However, if the issue was agriculture, then the Stalin 1952 attack makes sense, for he was in the process of rejecting greater expenditures for agriculture at that time. P. J. D. Wiles, T he P o litica l E co n o m y o f C o m m u n ism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1962), 104-6. 75. N. Khrushchev, “Za tesnuiu sviazi literatury i iskusstva s zhizn’iu naroda,” K om m u n ist, no. 12 (August 1957): 13. 76. Zverev, Z a p isk i m in istra, 216. The question was also related to that of a Balkan federation. See Elliot R. Goodman, T he S o viet D esign f o r a W orld S ta te (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966), 326-38. 77. N. Baltiisky, “K itogam Braitonskogo kongressa britanskikh tred-unionov,” N ovoe vrem ia, no. 21 (November 1, 1946):7-9. 78. N. Baltiisky, “O patriotisme,” Ibid., no. 1 (June 1945):5. 79. See H. Gordon Skilling, “People’s Democracy in Soviet Theory,” S o viet S tu dies 3, no. 1 (July 1951): 16-33; no. 2 (October 1951): 131-49. Also see Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, The S o viet B loc (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1960), 25-32 and 45-58. 80. For a bibliography of Varga’s works (including the postwar years), see E. S. Vaiga, K a p ita lizm p o sle vtoroi m iro vo i voiny (Moscow: Nauka, 1974), 521-54. 81. E. Varga, Izm en en iia v ek o n o m ik e k a p ita lizm a v itoge vtoroi m irovoi voiny (Moscow: Gospolitizdat, 1946), 269.

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82. “Diskussiia po knige E. Varga ‘Izmeneniia v ekonomike kapitalizma v itoge vtoroi mirovoi voiny’, 7, 14, 21 maia 1947 g., Stenograficheskii otchet,” M iro vo e kh o zia istvo i m irovaia politika, no. 11 (November 1947 suppl.):19. 83. E. Varga, “Protiv reformistskogo napravleniia v rabotakh po imperializmu,” Voprosy ekonom iki, no. 3 (1949):79-88. 84. Ibid., no. 9 (1948):56. 85. Varga, Izm en en iia v e k o n o m ik e k a p ita lizm a , 32, 318. 86. Ibid., 68. 87. For a description o f the orthodox position, see Richard Nordahl, “Stalinist Ideology: The Case of the Stalinist Interpretation of Monopoly Capitalist Politics,” S o v ie t S tu d ies 26, no. 2 (April 1974):243-47. 88. “Diskussiia po knige E. Varga,” 50. 89. Ibid., 2. 90. Ibid., 61. 91. Varga, Izm en en iia v ek o n o m ik e k a p ita lizm a , 38. 92. Ibid., 303. 93. E. Varga, “Demokratiia novogo tipa,” M iro vo e k h o zia istvo i m irovaia po litik a , no. 3 (1947):3. 94. Comment of E. S. Lazutkin, Voprosy eko n o m ik i, no. 9 (1948): 104-5. 95. Varga, “Demokratiia novogo tipa,” 3. 96. Varga, Izm en en iia v e k o n o m ik e k a p ita lizm a , 318. 97. E. Varga, “Sotsializm i kapitalizm za tridtsat’ let,” M iro vo e k h o zia istvo i m irovaia politika, no. 10 (1947):4-5. 98. Voprosy ekon om iki, no. 1 (1948):88; no. 8 (1948):71, 98-99. 99. In the words of Ostroviianov, “the mistakes of Comrade Vaiga in significant degree are typical of many works of the former Institute of World Economy and World Politics.” Ibid., no. 1 (1948):87. For the best—if highly colored—description of the institute, see Ibid., no. 8 (1948):88-92. Other major scholars o f the institute who were severely criticized were—in the usual order of criticism, from worst to bad—I. Trakhtenberg, L. Eventsov, M. Bokshitsky, V. Lan, A. Shpirt, I. Lemin, and S. Vishnev. 100. Z. Atlas, “Mirovaia valiutnaia problema,” B ol'shevik, no. 15 (August 1944):40. 101. M. Iovchuk, “ Klassiki russkoi filosofii XIX veka,” B o l’sh evik, no. 12 (June 1944) :26. 102. Vojtech Mastny, R u ssia ’s R o a d to th e C o ld W ar (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979), 223-24. For Litvinov’s public advocacy under the pseudonym o f N. Malinin, see Ibid., 219, 231-32. 103. For a collection and analysis of these statements, see Vojtech Mastny, “The Cassandra in the Foreign Commissariat: Maxim Litvinov and the Cold War,” Foreign Affairs, 54, no. 2 (January 1976):366-76. 104. B. Antropov, “O Klauzetse i ego uchenii o voine,” B o l’sh evik, no. 10 (May 1945) :39. 105. Fedoseev, “Marksizm-leninizm ob istokakh i kharaktere voin,” 32, 52-54. 106. Ibid., 32, 45, 46, 51, 57. 107. Varga chose this theme for an article that he was invited to contribute to the American journal Foreign Affairs in 1947. E. Varga, “ Anglo-American Rivalry and Partnership,” 25, no. 4 (July 1947):583-92. While speaking of the alliance between the “reactionary” forces of Truman and Bevin, he pointed to the forces pushing in the other direction. Varga’s article was printed immediately after George Kennan’s famous “ X” article (556-82) and in retrospect gives a very paradoxical quality to Kennan’s article. Kennan was writing about “the” Soviet way of looking at the world, at least among members of the older generation, but the editors chose as a representative of Soviet thinking an older man who did not have such views and who, even in the Foreign A ffairs article, was implicitly criticizing them. 108. Quoted in Alfred J. Rieber, S ta lin a n d the French C o m m u n ist P arty, 1941-1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), 257-58. Reiber juxtaposes the positions of Lemin and Varga, but their differences on foreign policy were relatively minor. For a fuller discussion of Lemin and his position, see Franklyn J. C. Griffiths, Im ages, P olitics,

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a n d L earn in g in S o v ie t B ehaviou r T o w a rd th e U n ited S ta te s (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia

University, 1973), 374-78. 109. For a later retrospective discussion of the issues, see E. Varga, O cherki p o p ro b le m a m p o lite k o n o m ii k a p ita lizm a (Moscow: Politizdat, 1964), 78-88. For a discussion in 1948, see “O nedostakhakh i zadachakh nauchno-issledovatel’skoi raboty v oblasti ekonomiki,” Voprosy ek o n o m ik i, no. 9 (1948):55. Both for pro-détente and anti-détente forces there was a tension between the argument about the inevitability of war among capitalist states and the existence of contradictions among them. To say that war was inevitable created both a sense of threat and a sense that the contradictions were big enough to call for a flexible Soviet foreign policy. Most were “inconsistent” (the Stalinists said war was inevitable, but the United States dominated the capitalist world; the pro­ détente forces reversed the arguments), but Lemin spoke out, with qualifications, for Lenin's doctrine on war and criticized Varga on tactical grounds (“harmful from a political point of view”) for repudiating it. 110. Varga, Izm en en iia v e k o n o m ik e k a p ita lizm a , 319. 111. E. Zhukov, “Obostrenie krizisa kolonial’noi sistemy,” B o lsh e v ik , no. 23 (December 1947):54. 112. Pravda, 8 February 1946, 2. 113. Ibid., 8 February 1946, 4. 114. In early 1946 everything looked normal with the harvest. By May-June, the situation had become “alarming.” Pavlov, S to ik o s t’, 198. 115. P ravda, 11 June 1945, 1-2; 13 June 1945, 1. As an added offense to Varga, the list of the 375 medal holders was divided precisely at the point in the alphabet where his name appeared so that he appeared in the list on 13 June, rather than 11 June. 116. N ew York T im es, 24 June 1941, 7. 117. Robert C. Tucker, T he S o v ie t P o litic a l M in d (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1963), 158. 118. Pravda, 3 February 1946, 3. 119. Pravda, 8 May 1947, 1. 120. Vojtech Mastny is right to remind us that the wave of revisionist literature criticizing the United States for causing the cold war by being too hard-line was preceded by criticism of the United States for causing the problems by being too accommodating. McCagg reports the evidence that Stalin seemed afraid of the West ( S talin E m battled, 14), and one should not reject offhand the possibility that a credible hard-line stance might have caused some moderation in his policy.

14 Conclusion: Impact and Aftermath of World War II JAMES R. MILLAR

N o society in m odern tim es has absorbed a blow o f the severity o f O peration B arbarossa an d survived as a political, econom ic, a n d social entity. The Soviet experience in W orld W ar II a n d its im pact upon postw ar Soviet society have scarcely been ch arted by W estern students o f Soviet society. As a consequence, the w ar a n d the im m ediate postw ar p eriods are the least u n d ersto o d o f the years since 1917. T here are three critical q uestions ab o u t W orld W ar II a n d its im pact, w hich the essays contained in th is volum e go som e way tow ard answering. F irst, how large was the im pact o f W orld W ar II on the Soviet system ? Second, how d id the Soviet U nion survive the im pact? A nd th ird , w hat p erm anent changes d id the w ar im pose upon th e stru ctu re an d functioning o f the m ain in stitu tio n s o f Soviet society?

The Impact of the War Upon the Soviet Union T he econom ic cost o f W orld W ar II to the Soviet people has now been estim ated, using several different conceptual approaches. Susan L inz’s es­ tim ates (C hapter 2) o f m aterial losses range from four to ten years effort by the labor force available in 1940 o r 1945. I f the loss o f m anpow er is included, the econom ic cost o f W orld W ar II is m ore th a n doubled. P ut differently, the econom ic cost o f th e w ar was equal to, an d possibly even som ew hat greater than, the total w ealth created durin g the ind u strializatio n d rive o f the 1930s. It w ould be interesting to know how Soviet w ar costs stack u p against the costs o f the w ar to the o th er m ajor p articipants. T here can be little

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d oubt th at Soviet w ar costs were greater th a n the costs experienced by an y other country in the war, b o th in total an d on a p er ca p ita basis. U nlike the other m ajor participan ts in the war, the Soviet U nion lost territo ry , population and capital stock at the very beginning o f th e w ar a n d w as obliged to fight a prolonged w ar w ith d im in ish ed capacity. M oreover, the Soviet econom y was fully em ployed at th e o utset o f w ar a n d could n o t fall back upon excess capacity. Perhaps the various estim ates th a t Susan L inz a n d I have d ev elo p ed 1 will inspire others to attem p t to estim ate w ar costs for th e o th e r p articip an ts. The costs to B ritain an d to G erm an y w ould doubtless be the m ost in terestin g to estim ate for com parative purposes. Judging by th e length o f th e w ar effort and by the degree o f w ar m obilization, m y best guess is th a t G re at B ritain would com e out second to the U SSR in p er ca p ita w ar costs in any such com parison. O f course, econom ic cost represents only a p o rtio n o f the to ta l h u m a n costs o f war. T he hum an costs o f w ar .must, for exam ple, include ce rtain costs that are essentially infinite, such as the loss o f one’s ow n life o r death an d injury to loved ones. They also have to register costs im p o sed by in terrupted and broken careers, fam ily separation, incarceration, a n d m ental an d physical stress. Soviet official sources rep o rt a to ta l o f 20 m illion lives lost in the war, about h alf o f w hom were m ilitary personnel. Total casualties have never been quoted officially. I have estim ated th em elsew here at approxim ately 30 m illion— w hich is a b o u t 15 percent o f th e 1940 p o p u la tio n .2 Even this large num ber w ould not include w ar-related physical consequences, such as those caused by chronic m a ln u tritio n . All o f these co n sid eratio n s suggest th at the cost o f W orld W ar II w as exceptionally pervasive, as well as differentially heavy, for the Soviet population. Few fam ilies could have avoided loss o f a close fam ily m em ber. Few er still could have avoided severe physical or m ental distress. It is no surprise th a t th e m em ory o f W orld W ar II rem ains active for a large p ro p o rtio n o f th e co n tem p o rary Soviet population an d th at it is still a d o m in a n t literary them e.

How the Soviet Union Survived the War How did the Soviet U nion su rv iv e so costly an d ferocious a w ar? W here did the resources com e from to w in the w ar? A t th e aggregate level the answ er is straightforw ard. As the tables a n d analysis show in C h a p te r 2, the population as a whole b o th increased its w ork effort a n d red u ced its claim s on cu rren t ou tp u t du rin g the w ar years. A llocation p rio ritie s shifted sharply in favor o f m ilitary uses at th e expense o f investm ent, co n su m p tio n , an d nonm ilitary ad m in istrativ e expenses (in th a t order). T his radical reallocation o f resources was financed, in th e p ro p er sense o f the word, prim arily through new taxes (particularly th e “ w ar ta x ” on personal incomes) an d by m eans o f ex trao rd in ary deficit financing by the State budget. Special don atio n s from in d iv id u als a n d collective farm s provided a small b u t significant source o f funds. M oreover, b u d g etary funds

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were centralized to finance an increased share o f total spending by the central governm ent.3 W orld W ar II caused d rastic changes in resource allocation patterns. T he railw ay system played a key a n d largely successful role in effecting the physical reallocation o f resources. As H olland H u n ter p u t it in C h ap ter 3: “ Instead o f con trib u tin g to a collapse o f th e regim e, as R ussian railroads h ad done in W orld W ar I, S oviet railroads in W orld W ar II p rovided sturdy links w hich held the w hole co u n try together.” T he principal reason for success appears to have been th e organizational fram ew ork, discipline, an d experience th a t w ere developed in response to the tran sp o rta tio n crises generated by various phases o f the in d u strializatio n d rive o f the 1930s. Sanford L ieberm an suggests in C h ap ter 4 an even m ore general conclusion w ith respect to the system o f ad m in istra tio n th a t developed u n d er Stalin in prew ar years: “ T he Stalinist system , even at the height o f the crisis o f war, still appears to have been viable. Indeed, . . . it is doubtful w hether the cou n try w ould have been able to survive had a different system been in effect.” T he im plication is, then, th a t the experim entation an d in stitu tio n ­ b uilding o f the 1930s produced a system w ith features th at m ade it unusually adaptable to w artim e dem ands. T he State D efense C o m m ittee (G K O ) was su perim posed u p o n the existing ad m in istrativ e stru ctu re as a sm all, highlycentralized, decision-m aking unit. Together w ith th e “ plen ip o ten tiary sys­ tem ,” w hich facilitated quick a n d decisive changes in prio rities in specific sectors o f the w ar effort, th e G K O increased the degree o f central control in all areas. As L ieberm an p o in ts out, these changes w ere not inventions o f w artim e, b u t innovation s based u p o n historically successful responses to crises in th e B olshevik past. A n increased degree o f personalization o f power a n d o f accountability for its exercise du rin g th e w ar were consistent w ith the general ad m in istrativ e philosophy developed in the 1930s, a n d these principles rem ain the hallm ark o f Soviet ad m in istra tiv e practice today. The specific ad m in istrativ e structure, specifically the G K O , th at was created d u ring the war, however, w as dissolved subsequently. N o new p erm anent ad m in istrativ e structure em erged from the w ar experience. T he high degree o f central control w hich the G K O -p len ip o ten tiary system provided obviously facilitated resource reallocation as well as tro o p con­ centration a n d strategic planning. T he evacuation o f in d u stry represented ju s t a p a rt o f the general m obilization a n d concentration o f capital an d labor up o n w artim e tasks. It illustrates particularly well the way the system could be brought to bear upo n a specific b u t com plex task th a t had to be accom plished prom ptly. T he evacuation o f in d u stry from te rrito ry threatened by G erm an tro o p s was paralleled by the evacuation o f peasants a n d th eir anim als. I f this was less successful th a n the evacuation o f in d u stry it was because, as Alec N ove points ou t in C h ap ter 5, they were low on the priority list. T hey had to w alk, a n d they qu eu ed to pass through bottlenecks. A n even m ore m assive reallocation o f resources w as involved in the m ovem ent o f able-bodied m ales o u t o f rural areas a n d in the requisition o f trucks, tractors, d raft anim als, a n d eq u ip m en t belonging to collective

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farm s. T he rural agricultural sector w as literally p lu n d ered o f resources th a t m ight be o f use in the w ar effort. T hus, the p attern o f forced resource extraction w itnessed during b o th W ar C o m m u n ism a n d th e F irst Five-Y ear Plan w as repeated in su p p o rt o f the w ar effort. T h is tim e, however, it included depletion o f the agricultural capital stock. It w as successful according to Alec Nove (C hapter 5) because the peasants’ “ p atrio tism ov erro d e th e ir hatred o f the system . . . .” C entral planning an d enterprise m anagem ent d u rin g the w ar have not yet received m uch attention anyw here. S oviet sources suggest th a t th e prew ar system rem ained intact in general structure.4 T he m aterials balancing system , centralized allocation o f scarce m aterials, o v erco m m itm en t target setting, labor controls, an d “ m icrom anagem ent” by m in istries ap p aren tly co n tin u ed to characterize the process. W hat changed w ere th e p rio rities them selves and the degree o f neglect o f low p rio rity d em and. E nterprises producing low priority products an d services o perated fitfully, if at all, as m aterials becam e available. M any sim ply shut dow n. A lthough it seem s to be tru e th at the prew ar structure o f the Soviet econom y lent itself to rap id conversion to w ar econom y status, the changes in priorities, in d em an d p attern s, a n d in the extent o f labor m obilization indicate unam biguously th a t th e p rew ar econom y was not a “ w ar economy.” The State D efense C om m ittee succeeded in th e estab lish m en t a n d m a in ­ tenance o f the new priorities req u ired by a successful m ilita ry defense o f the Soviet U nion. F rom a strategic stan d p o in t, th e low p o in t in econom ic an d m ilitary capacity occurred som e tim e in m id -1942. By su m m er’s en d in 1942, the Soviet econom y h ad been p u t on a full w ar footing, a n d econom ic indices began to tu rn up. G ra in yields an d o u tp u t co n tin u ed to decline through 1943, however, m aking th a t year in all likelihood th e m o st m iserable for the population as a whole. It is clear th at the m ajority o f the Soviet popu latio n accepted th e sacrifices im posed upon it by W orld W ar II, an d th e m in o rity w as coerced to go along. Patriotism was a m ajor factor by all accounts. Stalin’s w illingness to strike a bargain w ith the church for su p p o rt d u rin g the w ar doubtless afforded another source o f p o p u lar su p p o rt. In an im p o rta n t sense, W orld W ar II validated both the econom ic a n d ad m in istra tiv e structu res th a t h ad been created by the Bolsheviks durin g the 1930s a n d th e p arty itself. T hey had been tested u nder the m ost extrem e co n d itio n s im aginable a n d proved out.

Short-Term C on sequ en ces of the War In the years after 1945 prew ar statistical p attern s began to reassert them selves in m any areas. T he high p rio rity accorded po stw ar reco n stru ctio n delayed a “ retu rn to norm alcy,” b u t som ething very m uch like “ H igh S talin ism ” had been reestablished by the tim e o f Stalin’s death early in 1953. F ro m

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th e vantage p o in t o f th irty years later, it is possible to separate o u t the tem p o rary an d the long-term consequences o f the war. Several potentially im p o rta n t changes induced by the w ar proved to be only tem porary. T he prim acy o f capital investm ent a n d growth was rees­ tablished. W artim e m ilitarizatio n o f the labor force faded slowly b u t surely. T he increased centralization o f all op eratio n s was relaxed gradually too, as m ay be seen, for exam ple, from budgetary d ata.5 T he sharp increase in the ratio o f direct to in d irect taxes as sources o f budgetary revenue (which o ccurred as a result o f the w ar tax on personal incom e a n d the decline in tu rnover tax revenue) w as reversed after the war, retu rn in g to the norm al shallow U -shaped curve th a t m ost developing countries exhibit. R esort to deficit financing w as sharply d im in ish ed in the postw ar period, as the M in istry o f F inance retu rn ed to th e practice o f extrem e financial conser­ vatism . D irect (coupon) ratio n in g was also phased o u t in favor o f a retu rn to queuing, to special d istrib u tio n s, a n d all the o th er m anifestations o f chronic com m odity deficits. M oney wages, prices, an d o th er pecu n iary a n d financial in stitu tio n s were bypassed or dim in ish ed durin g the height o f th e w ar effort. D irect physical allocation w as generally preferred because it p erm itted b etter control over p rio rities an d because it o p erated w ithout the lags money flows generally entail. T he sam e phenom enon had been observed b o th durin g W ar C o m ­ m unism an d the in d u strializatio n d riv e o f the early 1930s. D epecuniarization d uring W orld W ar II d id not, however, reflect an ideological preference, as had been the case in the earlier periods. O n the contrary, care was taken to m in im ize adverse effects u p o n the v arious incentive a n d accounting system s. Books were kept, saving w as encouraged, taxes were utilized rationally. Money, prices, m oney wages, the budget a n d the banking system regained significant in strum en tal roles after the war, a n d they have continued to grow m ore im p o rta n t as control a n d allocation m echanism s ever since. C ensorship o f statistical d ata a n d secretiveness ab o u t problem s, accidents a n d o th er m atters regarded as eith er strategic or potentially em barrassing h ad becom e qu ite extensive p rio r to th e war. T he outbreak o f w ar led to a policy o f total blackout, a policy th a t continued unab ated afterw ards until well after Stalin died. A lthough still extensive, censorship has been gradually m odified since th at tim e, b u t w ith typical policy zig-zags. T he inform ation base available today is b etter th a n at any tim e since the en d o f the 1920s.6 As Sheila F itzpatrick indicated in C h ap ter 8, a “ retu rn to norm alcy” w as delayed in the Soviet U nion u n til after Stalin’s death. T he im m ense cost o f W orld W ar II provided p a rt o f the reason for the delay. C ontinued sacrifice w as req u ired to reconstruct the dam age w rought by the w ar an d to lay an econom ic base th a t could su p p o rt the new postw ar m ilitary prom inence o f the U SSR in w orld affairs. Large segm ents o f the population had also been “ co n tam in ate d ” eith er through v o luntary or involuntary contact w ith th e outside world. T h u s the continued need for “ vigilance” a n d “ discipline.” Stalin’s death in M arch 1953 is probably the best date to m ark the close o f postw ar reconstruction o f the S talinist system .

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Long-Term C on sequ en ces of the War World W ar II accelerated ce rtain stru ctu ral changes th a t w ere already underw ay prior to its outbreak. T he evacuation o f in d u stry from th e w est an d w artim e construction in the east w as consistent w ith plan s to shift the center o f industrial gravity eastw ard. T he policy w as in fact in te rru p te d in the im m ediate postw ar years as the Soviet U nion absorbed rep aratio n s evacuated from occupied Axis countries an d concentrated o n reco n stru ctio n o f territo ry in E uropean R ussia th a t had been occupied a n d fought over during the hostilities. W artim e policy tow ard agriculture a n d ru ral life accelerated th e flow o f able-bodied, skilled w orkers to u rb an occupations. P o stw ar policy failed to rectify the dam age done to the sector durin g the war, a n d agriculture fell steadily farther b ehind the oth er sectors in m ost respects. By th e e n d o f postw ar recovery, Soviet agriculture had at best regained 1940 p er ca p ita production levels, b u t it had becom e relatively m ore backw ard b o th tech­ nically an d in the quality o f life. W orld W ar II a n d th e rigors o f p o stw ar reconstruction contributed to, b u t d id not originate th e sector’s problem s. The w ar did, however, m ake a solution m ore difficult because o f th e m ale deficit th at was caused by differential exposure o f p easan t m ales to com bat an d the reluctance o f surviv o rs to retu rn to the village. The postw ar relative decline o f L eningrad w as also prefigured in p rew ar policy. T he w ar only accelerated th e process by w hich M oscow gained econom ic and political ascendency. As R uble a n d Bubis have show n in C hapter 9, L eningrad has becom e one o f several im p o rta n t pro v in cial cities rather than the “ second city” o f prew ar years. T h is w ould seem to be a characteristic outcom e in highly centralized politico-econom ic system s a n d assignable only in p a rt to the im pact o f war. T he m ost d ram atic change th at the w ar brought ab o u t for S oviet leadership externally was in the U SSR ’s strategic p osition in w orld affairs. T he S oviet U nion had not been regarded as a m ilitary pow er o f th e first ran k p rio r to W orld W ar II. Insofar as it w as regarded as a threat, it w as an ideological threat. T he fear was th at workers, an d especially the unem ployed am ong them , w ould see in B olshevik R ussia a preferred altern ativ e to capitalism . A t the end o f the war, the Soviet U nion disposed o f th e m ost pow erful ground forces in the world, a n d it occupied by reason o f victo ry in battle the better p art o f w hat is called E astern E urope today. For W estern leaders, it was as though G hengis K h an h ad retu rn ed a n d w as once again poised in the east at the head o f hordes o f ideologically satu ra te d b arb arian s. As R obert Slusser has shown (C hapter 7), the very w eight a n d rap id ity o f Soviet troop m ovem ents in 1944 caused B ritish p o stw ar plan n ers to anticipate the division o f Europe. T here m ight very well have been noth in g left for the other Allies to claim . T he qu estio n at the close o f hostilities in Europe was not w hether the Soviet U nion a n d th e U n ited S tates w ould divide the w orld up betw een them selves, for th a t had already o ccu rred de

Conclusion: Impact and Aftermath of World War II

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facto. T h e qu estio n was w hether they w ould ever w ithdraw from the territo ries they occupied. T he answ er seem s to be in the negative. T hus, the S oviet U nion em erged from W orld W ar II as a m ajor international presence, b u t it w as a presence based u p o n a very slender econom ic base, especially by com parison w ith the U nited States. D espite the fact th a t it w as 20 percent sm aller th a n it had been in 1941, the S oviet econom y had becom e the second largest econom y in the world. G erm an y a n d Jap an were defeated an d occupied. T he econom y o f G reat B ritain had been badly dam aged by bo th the length a n d th e intensity o f h er share o f the w ar effort against the Axis powers. T h u s the S oviet U nion had becom e a superpow er essentially by default, an d there was a n o rder o f m agnitude difference betw een the tw o superpow ers. T he U n ited States econom y had m ore than doubled in size d u ring the war, a n d the S oviet econom y a t best w as a q u a rte r its size. T he “ tw o cam ps” outcom e o f the high-level Soviet debates ab o u t the postw ar w orld, th a t Je rry H ough has explored in C hapter 13, h ad significant im plications, therefore, for th e quality o f life o f the Soviet population. G iven conflict betw een the tw o superpow ers, the econom ic size differential betw een them p u t an extrem ely heavy b u rd en upon the Soviet econom y a n d the population. U nlike prew ar in dustrialization, postw ar reconstruction h ad to be conducted along w ith a relatively heavy burden o f defense spending. T h is is im p o rta n t in explaining why “ the retu rn to norm alcy” to o k so long. R eparations extracted from form er Axis pow ers were obviously im p o rta n t in reducing the cost o f the reconstruction effort. T he experience in evacuation o f in d u stry early in the w ar m ay have com e in han d y in planning a n d executing evacuation o f indu strial p la n t a n d eq u ip m en t as reparations. G iven th e long-term econom ic interdependency th a t has been enforced for m em bers o f the Soviet bloc in E astern E urope, however, th is was a form o f borrow ing from P eter to pay Paul. A lthough agricultural p ro d u ctio n had not yet regained the 1940 level, p ostw ar reconstruction w as pronounced com plete in 1950. International responsibilities an d the cost o f m a in tain in g a com petitive m ilitary estab­ lishm ent in th e chilly clim ate o f the 1950s m eant a slower recovery o f in d iv id u al living stan d ard s th a n w as the case in E urope or Japan. T he dem ographic im pact o f th e w ar w as probably the m ost d ram atic internal consequence o f the war. T here w ere two aspects o f th e dem ographic im pact. First, m ales were a t greater risk o f death d u rin g the w ar th an fem ales, a n d the im pact skewed the sex d istrib u tio n o f the p o pulation correspondingly. T ogether w ith the earlier differential dem ographic im pact o f the F irst W orld War, the revolutions o f 1917, the civil war, a n d the purges, there w as a 20 m illion deficit o f m ales at the en d o f the war. B arbara A nderson a n d B rian Silver have explored the rath er subtle link betw een the m ale deficit an d linguistic russification (C hapter 11), th an k s to the existence o f d ata on th is topic. T h is is truly the tip o f a fascinating iceberg, for the im pact o f th e m ale deficit upon a large range o f oth er

290

James R. Millar

sociological, dem ographic an d econom ic variables m u st have been large a n d significant for m any types o f beh av io r th a t we have no d a ta to test. We sim ply do not know, for exam ple, how a n d to w hat degree th e m ale deficit caused changes in attitudes tow ard m arriage, divorce, household resp o n ­ sibilities, and other fam ilial relations. The second dim ension o f the dem ographic im p act o f th e w ar was generational. The differential loss o f m ales o f d raft age d u rin g th e w ar created a gap in the leadership co h o rt w hose m em bers are approxim ately between the ages o f 57 an d 67 today. It has co n trib u ted , therefore, to th e geriatric character o f the highest governing bodies in the S oviet U nion today. Similarly, the baby boom following W orld W ar II created a bulge w ith th e sam e kinds o f adverse long-run im plications for econom ic grow th a n d incom e d istribution that are being observed in th e U n ited States today. It will be decades before the echoes o f these dem ographic anom olies fade away altogether. T he long-run im pact o f the w ar u pon th e p a rty ap p a ratu s has been explored carefully by C ynthia K ap lan (C h ap ter 9). As she shows, th e w ar in terru p ted a trend tow ard a m ore in d irect style o f p arty leadership, a tre n d th at was resum ed in the postw ar period. T h e w idespread use o f the plenipotentiary system o f central interv en tio n continued, however, to ch a r­ acterize m anagem ent o f agricultural p roduction, w hich reflected th e low level o f m em bership in rural areas a n d th e p o o r q u ality o f local agricultural m anagem ent. It m ay be ap t to note th at th is tendency tow ard differential p arty policy culm inated in an unsuccessful a ttem p t by K hru sh ch ev to bifurcate the party apparatu s com pletely along u rb an -ru ral lines. T h e m a in im pact o f the w ar upon the party, however, w as th e m assive influx o f new m em bers during the war. T he purges h ad already th in n e d p a rty ran k s o f long-term experienced m em bers. T hus the p arty w as alm o st com pletely renewed by the end o f the war, a n d it h ad presum ably acq u ired som e o f the luster th at surrounded retu rn in g w ar veterans. G enerally speaking, the w ar proved the w orkability a n d the reliability o f political an d econom ic in stitu tio n s. T he new generation o f p a rty m em bers th at had occupied positions in the various n o n m ilitary as well as m ilita ry in stitutions during the w ar w as doubtless persuaded by the headiness o f success in w ar o f the efficacy o f the Soviet system . I f th e 1930s w as the period during w hich Soviet in stitu tio n s were created, th e w ar w as th e tim e o f their testing. T he postw ar years were, by contrast, years o f co n serv atism , not experim entation. It was a p eriod d u rin g w hich the p rew ar system w as reestablished in m ost o f its particulars. O nly the death o f S talin in 1953 appears to have foreclosed reestablishm ent also o f th e periodic purge. The generation o f party m em bers th a t su rv iv ed W orld W ar II is still, for all practical purposes, in charge. It seem s reasonable to speculate th a t the conservatism o f contem porary Soviet dom estic policy reflects not m erely the conservatism that com es norm ally w ith ad v ancing age, b u t also th e conviction o f m en and w om en w ho su rv iv ed the m ost dev astatin g la n d invasion in m odern history th a t th e principal political a n d econom ic in-

Conclusion: Impact and Aftermath of World War II

291

stitu tio n s o f the Soviet U nion are still m ore w orkable a n d reliable in the long ru n th a n any available alternative. O ne persisting effect o f W orld W ar II has been, therefore, the gradual petrification o f th e system .

Notes 1. In addition to Susan Linz’s calculations in Chapter 1, see also James R. Millar and Susan J. Linz, “The Cost of World War II to the Soviet People,” Journal o f E conom ic H isto r y 38, no. 4 (December 1978):959-62. 2. T he A B C s o f S o viet S o cia lism (Urbana: The University of Illinois Press, 1981). 3. For an extended treatment see my “ Financing the Soviet Effort in World War II, S o viet S tu dies 32, no. 1 (January 1980), pp. 106-23. 4. See, for example, Isto riia Velikoi O techestvennoi voiny Sovetskogo S oiu za 1941-1945 gg. (Moscow, 1961), t.6, and G. S. Kravchenko, E k o n o m ik a S S S R v g o d y Velikoi O techestvennoi voin y (Moscow, 1970). 5. For supporting data see “Financing the Soviet Effort in World War II,” and James R. Millar and Donna Bahry, “ Financing Envelopment and Tax Structure Change in the USSR,” C an a d ia n S lavon ic P a p ers 21, no. 2 (June 1979): 165-74. 6. The current period is one of retrenchment with respect to economic and demographic data. The Khrushchev years may have been a “golden age.”

Index

Academy of Sciences, 190, 200 Administration for War Communication, 51 Administration system, 59-76, 285, 286; industrial evacuation and, 66-71; plenipotentiary system of, 65-66, 67-68, 70, 285; Stalin’s leadership style and, 65; State Defense Committee and, 66-67, 68, 70-71, 285 Administrative costs, 16 Agricultural machinery, wartime shortage of, 81, 82 Agricultural production: postwar, 87, 288; prewar, 13; territorial annexation and, 22; wartime, 85-87. S ee also Grain Agriculture: Communist Party and, 158, 159, 168, 169-70, 174-75, 176, 177; policy implementation in, 169-70; postwar policy, 288. S ee also Kolkhoz system; Labor force, agricultural; Peasantry Akhmatova, Anna, 244-45 Aleksandrov, G. F., 262 Aliger, Margarita, 244, 245 All-Union Party, Central Committee of, 65 Andreev, A. A., 61 Andrianov, V. M., 192 Aniskov, V. T., 77 Anti-Semitism, 249 Anti-Soviet resistance, 83, 130 Antokolsky, Pavel, 244, 245 Apokalypsisty, 95 Armed forces: Communist Party membership in, 136-37, 160, 173; composition of, 78; demobilization of, 135-37 Armenians, 103 Armistice and Postwar Committee, 110, 115 Atheism, 103, 104 Attlee, Clement, 110, 116 Attlee Committee, 110, 111, 112, 116

Autonomous republic nationalities (ARN). S ee Non-Russian nationalities Bagramian, Marshall, 63 Baklanov, Grigorii, 247, 248-49 Baltic states: German occupation of, 130; religiousness in, 103; russification of, 134; Soviet acquisition of, 131 Banditry, 130 Belorussia: German occupation of, 130; industrial enterprises in, 17; postwar housing conditions in, 137; religiousness in, 103 Belorussians: demographics of, 212, 213, 214, 215-16, 225; population transfers of, 131, 132 Berggolts, Olga, 245 Beria, Lavrenti, 60, 194 Berlin, Allied occupation of, 110, 119-20 Beschchev, Boris Pavlovich, 55 “ Bible Belt,” 101-4 Bondarev, Yuri, 247, 248-49 Britain, division of Germany and, 108, 109, 110, 111-12, 114-18 Budget. S ee State budget Bykov, Vasilii, 247, 248-49 Byrnes, Jimmy, 121 Capital formation, wartime decline in, 16 Capital investment, industrial, 17 Capital stock: agricultural, 285-86; wartime loss of, 21-22, 35n Capital-labor ratio, 22, 23 Capital-output ratio, 22-23 Censorship, 244, 245-46, 287 Chemyshevsky, N. G., 262 Churchill, Winston, 112, 113, 117, 118 Church-state relations, 4, 91-106; “ Bible Belt” and, 101-4; governmental concessions in, 93; postwar, 93, 98-105; prewar, 92; religiousness of society and, 101-5; wartime 91-92,

294

Index

93-94, 96. S ee also Russian Orthodox Church Chuvash, 216, 217, 222 Clay, Lucius D., 121 Cold W ar economic growth and, 34-35; origins of, 35-36«; Stalin and, 254 Collective farms. S ee Kolkhoz system Collectivization, 77; Communist Party enrollment and, 159; of newly acquired territories, 134. S ee also Kolkhoz system Commissariat of Trade, rationing and, 21 Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration, 110, 114 Communist Party, 157-87; admission requirements, easing of, 159, 167; agricultural sector and, 158, 159, 174-75, 176, 177; apparatus of, 168-72; economic role of, 175; German, 110, 114, 120; industrial sector and, 169, 173-74, 175, 176-77; leadership/ educational levels of, 168-69, 171-72/ inexperienced, 170-71, 172/ postwar, 290-91/; in Leningrad, 192-93, 194; literary influence of, 248; membership, in armed forces, 136-37, 160, 173/ educational levels of, 161/ female, 161/ local, 162-63, 165/ political generations, 160, 164/ postwar, 160, 162-63, 165/ prewar, 160/ rural, 160, 161, 165, 166-67, 168/ white-collar, 5, 159, 160, 161, 165/; organizational behavior of, 172-75; postwar, 162-63, 165, 175-77, 290-91; prewar, 5, 158-59, 160; Primary Party Organizations of, 161, 166, 167, 168; recruitment efforts by, 159, 160-61; social composition of, 159, 160-61, 165; Territorial Party Organizations of, 166-67; veterans in, 136-37; wartime mobilization of, 159, 160 Concentration camps, 20 Control system. S ee Administration system Convict labor, 141-43 Council for Evacuation, 67, 69-70 Council of People’s Commissars, 61, 65 Council of Workers’ and Peasants’ Defense, 60 Crimea, German occupation of, 130 D a ys a n d N ights (Simonov), 243, 244

Decollectivization, 78 Defense spending: postwar, 35; wartime, 13-14, 16 Demobilization, 135-37

Demographics, war-related, 207-41, 289-90; of non-Russian nationalities, 212-35; of Soviet population, 208-11 Djilas, Milovan, 62-63 D o cto r Z h iva g o (Pasternak), 243 Eastern Europe, postwar policy regarding, 266-70 Eastern U.S.S.R.: development of, 12-13; evacuation of, 13; industrial construction in, 17-18; population shifts in, 19; reconstruction and, 57 Economic growth, 11-46; capital stock loss and, 21-22; Cold War and, 34-35; postwar, 24-34; productivity and, 22-24; wartime curtailment of, 12-24 E conom ic H isto ry o f th e U .S.S.R. (Nove), 11 Economic investment, by Five-Year Plans, 199 Economy, postwar, 287, 289; policy debates regarding, 263-66 Eden, Anthony, 107-10, 117, 118 Educational infrastructure, 200 Ehrenburg, Ilya, 244, 246, 255 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 114, 119 Eisenstadt, Sergei, 260 Employment statistics, 18. S e e also Labor force Enterprise management, 286 Estonia, 131, 134 Ethnic groups. S e e Non-Russian nationalities European Advisory Commission (EAC), 111, 113-14, 115, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 European Recovery Program (ERP), 32-34 European U.S.S.R., German occupation of, 130 Evacuation: administrative control of, 66-71, 75«; Communist Party and, 161; of industry, 13, 66-71, 75«; local control of, 69-70; of peasantry, 81, 82; total population involved in, 130; transport operations for, 47-48 Fadeyev, Alexander, 246 Federal Republic of Germany, 107 Fedorovtsy, 95-96 Fedoseev, Petr, 259, 272-73 Financial policy, postwar, 287 Finland, population transfer with, 132 Five-Year Plan(s), economic investments of, 199 Food allocations. S e e Rationing Food prices, 84, 85, 144; free-market, 85,

88

Index Food shortages, 20, 36«. S ee also Agricultural production Forced labor, 20, 79, 130; conscription, 131, 143-44; convict, 131, 143-44 Foreign aid, postwar recovery and, 12, 25-34; actual, 25-30; potential, 30-34; total, 25-26 Foreign policy, postwar, 270-74 France, German postwar division and, 119, 121 F ront-L ine S ta lin g ra d (Nekrasov), 246 Georgians, 103 German Democratic Republic, 107 German invasion: official Soviet response to, 91; route of, 47 German occupation: areas occupied by, 13, 130; physical destruction of, 130; religious revival during, 101 German Social Democrats, 261 Germans, repatriation of, 132 Germany, postwar division of, 4; British policy for, 108, 109, 110, 111-12, 114-18; Eden-Roosevelt talks on, 109-10; Eden-Stalin talks on, 107-10; Soviet policy for, 107-10, 111, 112-13, 114-15, 117, 118-121; Teheran Conference and, 112-13; United States policy for, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117-18, 121; Yalta Conference and, 118-19 Gosplan, 264, 265 Grain: harvest yields of, 82-83, 86, 87; postwar prices, 146; stocks, reduction of, 16; wartime prices, 84, 85; wartime procurements of, 83 Gross industrial output, 54 Grossman, Vasily, 249 Gusev, Feodor, 114, 115, 119 Harriman, William Averell, 31 Hopkins, Harry, 109, 110 H ot S n ow (Bondarev), 247 Household consumption: postwar, 16, 42, 43, 44; wartime, 16, 20-21, 42, 43 Housing: capital-output ratio for, 23; postwar conditions of, 137; postwar investment in, 46« Hull, Cordell, 111 Imiaslavtsy, 95 Industrial production: military production and, 13; wartime increase in, 17 Industry: capital investment in, 17; Communist Party and, 169, 173-74, 175, 176-77; evacuation of, 13, 66-71, 75«; German destruction of, 130; heavy, 17, 18; light, 17; location of, 17-18; management of, 168 Inflation, postwar, 264-65, 266

295

Intellectual freedom, 259-63 Ioannity, 95 Iosif, Metropolitan, 94-95 Japan, proposed Soviet occupation of,

121 Jews: Polish, 130-31; in population transfers, 133-34; Soviet, 130, 133-34 Kaganovich, Lazar M., 55, 57, 67 Kaliningrad, 134 Karelians, 221, 222 Kazakhstan, 19 Kedrov, Vonifatii, 263 Khlysty, 96 Khrulev, A., 61 Khrushchev, Nikita: agricultural policy and, 87, 89, 259; church-state relations and, 93; income distribution and, 266 Kirov, Sergei, 190 Kolkhoz system, 77; household incomes in, 147; manpower shortage of, 144; migration from, 146, 148-50; population of, 145, 148, 149; postwar conditions of, 144-51; procurement prices and, 146; wartime food sales by, 20. S ee also Peasantry Komi, 221-22 Konev, Ivan Stepanovich, 63-64, 120 Königsberg, Soviet acquisition of, 108, 113, 120, 134 Kosygin, Aleksei Nikolaevich, 67, 69 Kovalev, Ivan Vladimirovich, 55 Kursk, Battle of, 47, 48, 253 Kuznetsov, Aleksei, 195 Labor camps, 141-43, 150. S ee also Forced labor Labor conscription, 131, 143-44 Labor discipline practices, 19, 78-79, 131 Labor force: agricultural, 78-82; composition of, 19-20; convict, 141-43; free hiring of, 140-41; industrial/ average annual employment, 18/ in eastern U.S.S.R., 17/ postwar, 18, 145/ wartime, 18, 131/; in Leningrad, 190-92; loss of earnings by, 12, 25; non-Russian, 221-23; postwar, 18, 145, 287/ recruitment of, 138-41/ Labor policies, wartime, 19-20, 78-79, 131 Labor reserve schools, 139-40, 141 Labor turnover, 141 Languages, of non-Russian nationalities, 215-17, 223 Latvia, 131, 134 League of German Officers, 110 Legal system, 260-61

296

Index

Lend-Lease, 12; “pipeline,” 12, 25, 30, 35«; postwar conflict regarding, 31; total amount of, 26-27; transport aid of, 55 Lenin, Vladimir Ilyich, 261 Leningrad: academic decline of, 200-202; Communist Party membership in, 192-93, 194; economic base of, 195-200; industrial output of, 195-99; in-migration, 191; labor force of, 190-92; municipal government of, 194; population, prewar, 190/ social composition of, 190—92/; population, wartime, 189, 190; postwar decline of, 189-206, 288; purges in, 190, 192, 194; as scientific research center, 190, 200-202; societal importance of, 5-6, 189-90 Leningrad Affair, 192, 194 Leningrad siege, 47, 130; death toll of, 5, 189, 192; physical destruction of, 5, 189; transport operations for, 53 L ife a n d F a te (Grossman), 249 Literature, 243-51; censorship of, 244, 245-46; Communist Party’s influence on, 248; intellectual freedom in, 260; postwar, 245, 246-50; Tvardovsky on, 260; wartime, 6-7, 243-46, 247 Lithuania, 89, 103, 131 Litvinov, Maxim, 109, 253, 271-72 L ive a n d R e m e m b e r (Rasputin), 243 Livestock: evacuation of, 81-82; postwar production of, 145, 146; privately owned, 85, 88; wartime losses, 82, 86, 145 Living standards, postwar, 289 Lysenko, T. D., 88 Machine Tractor Stations: equipment lack, 82-83; political control within, 83-84, 88, 175, 177 Maisky, Ivan, 253 Malenkov, Giorgii, 60, 194, 254 Marriage, interethnic, 218-21, 226, 227, 228-31, 233-34, 238-40 Marshall Plan, 12, 31-32, 36* Marxism-Leninism, 261, 262, 263 Materialism, 104 Mikoyan, Anastas Ivanovich, 31, 67, 254 Military production, industrial output and, 13 Minority nationalities. S ee Non-Russian nationalities Moldavians, 215-16, 225 Molotov, Viacheslav, 31, 60, 111, 254, 267 Moscow, transport operations for, 48 Moslems, war-related demographics of, 213, 214, 232, 234

Narodniki, 104 National income: foreign aid and, 26, 27, 28, 30; postwar, 13, 38-46; by source, 40, 44; by use, 41, 45; war costs and, 16-17 Nazi-Soviet pact o f 1939, 131 Neiman, Julia, 245 Nekrasov, Victor, 246, 248 New Economic Policy, 150 Nondefense spending, 14, 16 Non-Russian nationalities: war-related demographics of, 6, 207-41/ ethnic russification, 220-35/ interethnic marriages, 218-21, 226, 227, 228-31, 233-34/ language preferences, 215-17/ linguistic russification, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225-35/ occupational mobility, 221-23/ population transfers, 132-34/ proportions of married women, 214-15, 218/ sex ratios, 212-35/ urban populations, 221-22, 223-24/; deportation of, 207; religiousness of, 103-5 Northern Caucasus, 130, 132 Okudzhava, Bulat, 247 Operation Barbarossa. S ee German invasion Output: agricultural, 85-87; foreign aid and, 28-30, 33-34; industrial, 13, 54 Panova, Vera, 246 Pasternak, Boris Leonidovich, 243 Patolichev, N. S., 173-74 Peasantry, 77-90; Communist Party membership of, 160, 161, 165; compulsory state deliveries by, 146, 149; evacuation of, 81, 82; in German-occupied areas, 77-78; incomes of, 84, 85; political control of, 83-84; postwar, 87-89; welfare of, 84-85 Pieck, Wilhelm, 114 Plenipotentiary system, 65-66, 67-68, 70, 285 Poland: Jews in, 130-31; Soviet population transfers with, 133; Sovietization of, 132 Popkov, Petr Sergeevich, 191 Population: ethnic transfers of, 132-34; Kolkhoz, 145, 148, 149; prewar, 18; sex ratios of, by age, 208-14, 218, 226, 227, 232, 233/ male deficit in, 210, 211, 212-14, 215, 218-20, 221-23, 226-35/ of non-Russian nationalities, 212-35/; wartime loss of, 18-20, 35«, 131/ casualties, 284/ death toll, 16, 207, 284/ Pospelov, Petr, 256, 258-59, 271

Index Post-Hostilities Planning Committee (PHP), 115, 116-17 Postwar period: economic policies of, 287, 289; Kolkhoz migration, 146, 148-50/ labor recruitment, 138—41/ population transfers, 132-34/ repatriation, 134-35/ resettlement, 133-34/ rural life, 144-51/ Sovietization, 132-34/ urban life, 137-38/ war’s immediate impact and, 130-32; policy debates regarding, 253-81/ on Eastern Europe, 266-70/ economic, 263-66/ on foreign policy, 270-74/ on intellectual freedom, 259-63/ major, 255-59/ Stalin and, 253-55/ U.S.-Soviet relations and, 274-76/; Soviet society during, 129-56, conscript labor, 143-44, convict labor, 141-43, demobilization, 135-37 Potsdam Conference, 31, 118, 120-21 Price rationalization, 264-65, 266 Primary Party Organizations (PPO), 161, 166, 167, 168 Prisoners-of-war Axis, 141-42, 143; as forced labor, 141-43; Soviet, 130, 143/ repatriation of, 135, 143/ Private land: agricultural tax on, 85, 146, 149; decline in, 149; restrictions on,

88 Productivity, postwar economic growth and, 22-24 Purges: Communist Party leadership patterns and, 168; industrial output and, 13; of Leningrad Communist Party, 190, 192, 194 Railroads, 3, 285; commissariat, 51, 55; emergency restoration of, 53-55; freight traffic on, 48-50; management personnel of, 52; organizational framework of, 50-52; passenger traffic on, 55, 56; postwar, 55—57 RANKIN plan, 111-12 Rasputin, Valentin, 243 Rationing, 21, 84-85, 137-38, 144 Recollectivization, 83 Recovery: agricultural, 89; completion of, 289; foreign aid and, 12, 25-34/ actual, 25-30/ potential, 30-34/ total, 25-26/; heavy industry and, 17; national income and, 38-46 Religion: non-Orthodox sects, 101-2, 103-4; russification and, 224. S ee also Church-state relations; Russian Orthodox Church Reparation payments: economic growth and, 25-26, 27, 28-31, 33; Potsdam

297

Conference agreements regarding, 31, 118, 120-21; projected, 44, 46 Repatriation, 134-35, 143 Repression, postwar, 129-30 Resettlement policies, 133-34 Resistance movement, anti-Soviet, 83, 130 Resource allocation patterns, 284-86 Romania, 131 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 109-10, 113, 117-18 Ruble: postwar revaluation of, 35«; wartime exchange rate of, 26 Rural population: Communist Party membership of, 160, 161, 165, 166-67, 168; decrease of, 19; labor conscription of, 131; postwar, 19, 144-51. S ee also Kolkhoz system; Peasantry Russian Orthodox Church: acceptance of Soviet regime by, 92-93, 94, 99; form of, 94-98; function of, 98-101; postwar, 96-101; prerevolutionary, 99; prewar, 94-96; schisms within, 94-98, 99-100; True Orthodox Church and, 96-97; underground movements in, 95-98, 99-100 Russian Socialist Federalist Republic (RSFSR), 17 Russification, 151; of Baltic states, 134; ethnic, 220-35; factors affecting, 220-27; linguistic, 216, 220, 222, 223, 224, 225-35 St. Petersburg, 189 Sakhalin, 134 Salisbury, Harrison, 133-34 Schiller, Otto, 77-78 Scientific research, Leningrad as center of, 200-202 “Scorched earth” campaigns, 13 Sergei, Metropolitan, 91-92, 93, 94, 99 Siberia: agricultural labor force in, 79; heavy industry in, 17 Simonov, Konstantin, 243, 244, 247, 248 Slutsky, A. G., 261 Social dislocations, postwar, 129 Social security payments, wartime increase in, 16 Solzhenitsyn, Alexander, 249 Sovietization, 131-32, 134, 151 Spatial management. S ee Transport operations Stalin, Joseph: church-state relations and, 93; Germany’s postwar division and, 107-10, 112-13, 117, 118, 119-20, 121/ Eden’s conversations regarding, 107-10/; leadership style of, 65; literary depiction of, 247, 248, 249; postwar policies of, 151-52, 253-55;

298

Index

on Soviet-American cooperation, 275; State Defense Committee and, 60, 61, 62-64, 65, 66 Stalingrad, Battle of, 47, 48 State budget: components of, 13; defense spending, 13-14, 16; nondefense spending, 16 State Defense Committee (GKO), 60-69, 70-71, 285, 286; evacuation control by, 67-69, 70-71; operational structure of, 3, 61; problem-solving approach of, 61-64; purpose of, 60; Stalin's involvement with, 60, 61, 62-64, 65,

66 Strang, William, 114 Tartars, 132, 134 Tatar-Bashkir, 212-13, 214, 215, 225, 226 Taxation: agricultural, 85, 146, 149; wartime, 284 Technicians: population percentages of, 200, 201 Teheran Conference, 112-13 Territorial annexation, 207; agricultural production and, 22; Sovietization and, 131-32, 134 Territorial Party Organizations, 166-67 Tikhonites, 94 Trains, The (Panova), 246 Transport operations, 3, 47-58; evacuation efforts and, 47-48; foreign aid for, 55. S ee also Railroads True Orthodox Christians, 96, 97-98 True Orthodox Church, 96-97 Truman, Harry S., 121, 274, 275, 276 Tvardovsky, Alexander, 244, 260 Tyorkin, Vasilii, 244 Ukraine: anti-Soviet resistance in, 83, 130; German occupation of, 130; industry in, 17; religiousness in, 103 Ukrainians: demographics of, 212, 213, 214, 215-16, 217, 225; population transfers of, 131, 132 Ulbricht, Walter, 110, 120 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: policy on Germany’s postwar division, 107-10, 111, 112-13, 114-15, 117, 118-21; postwar U.S. relations of.

274-76; war goals of, 107-8. S e e also specific regions of the U.S.S.R. United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 12, 31, 36n United States: policy on Germany's postwar division, 110, 111, 113, 114, 117-18, 121; postwar Soviet relations, 274-76 Urals: agricultural labor force in, 79; heavy industry in, 17; industrial labor force in, 17; population increase in, 19 Urban population: increase of, 19; labor conscription of, 131; non-Russian, 221-22, 223-24; postwar, 137-38 Varga, Eugen, 263, 268-70, 273 Veterans, 136-37 Volga region, industrial labor force in, 17 Voroshilov, K. E., 50, 60, 253 Voznesenskii, Nikolai, 68, 264, 265-66 Vyshinsky, Andrei, 256-58, 259, 263, 271 Wages: agricultural, 88; average annual, 18; postwar, 18, 138; wartime, 18, 20 War costs, 12, 283-84; budgetary, 13-17; carryover, 24-25; industrial, 17-18; opportunity cost approach, 24-25; resource allocation and, 284-85 White-collar workers, in Communist Party, 5, 159, 160, 161, 165 Winter War, 132 Women: in Communist Party, 161; demographic impact of war on, 210-11, 214-15, 218-20, 226-28, 232, 233; in labor force, 19, 20, 131, 138, 139/ agricultural, 78, 79, 90n / in Leningrad, 191/; male ratio to, 19, 210, 211, 212-14, 218-20, 221-23, 226-35 Work days, compulsory, 79-80 Work force. S ee Labor force World War II: importance to Soviet Union of, 1-7; literary depiction of, 243-251; long-term effects of, 288-91; short-term effects of, 286-87 Yalta Conference, 118-19 Young G uard, T he (Fadeyev), 246 Zhdanov, Andrei, 194, 254, 259 Zhukov, Georgi Konstantinovich, 63-64,

120

Contributors

BA RBARA A. A N D E R SO N is a professor o f sociology a n d research scientist o f the P opulation Studies C enter at the U niversity o f M ichigan— A nn Arbor. She is a co-author o f H u m a n F e rtility in R u ssia S in c e th e N in eteen th C en tu ry, an d author o f In te rn a l M ig ra tio n D u rin g M o d e rn iza tio n in L a te N in eteen th C en tu ry R u ssia a n d o f num erous articles on population a n d on Soviet ethnic an d dem ographic processes. D E M IN G BR O W N , professor o f R ussian literatu re at the U niversity o f M ichigan, is the auth o r o f S o v ie t R u ssia n L ite ra tu r e S in ce S ta lin , S o v ie t A ttitu d e s T o w a rd A m e ric a n W riting, a n d num erous articles on R ussian literature o f the n ineteenth a n d tw entieth centuries. ED W A R D BUBIS is a visitin g scholar at the C enter for International Studies at the M assachusetts In stitu te o f Technology. P rio r to em igrating from the Soviet U nion in 1982, he served as an associate professor o f u rb an planning an d operations research o f th e L eningrad Engineering-Econom ics In stitu te a n d as a consultant o f the L eningrad C ity H ousing an d U rb an D evelopm ent A uthorities. H e is the auth o r o f several books, including E co n o m ics o f U rban P la n n in g an d O p tim a l P ro g ra m m in g in Urban P la n n in g a n d M u ­ n ic ip a l S e rv ic e s E con om ics.

SH EILA F IT Z P A T R IC K is a professor o f h istory at the U niversity o f Texas at A ustin. H er m ost recent books are E d u c a tio n a n d S o c ia l M o b ility in th e S o v ie t Union, 1 9 2 1 -1 9 3 4 a n d T h e R u ssia n R evolu tion . She is currently w orking on a book on the social h istory o f the S talin period. W IL L IA M C. F L E T C H E R , D irecto r o f Soviet a n d East E uropean studies a n d professor o f religious studies at the U niversity o f K ansas, is an authority on religion in the U SSR, w ith ten books a n d num erous m ajor articles to his credit. JE R R Y F. H O U G H , professor o f political science at D uke U niversity an d staff m em ber o f the B rookings In stitu tio n , is the au th o r o f T h e S o v ie t Prefects, T he S o v ie t U nion a n d S o c ia l S cien ce T heory, H o w th e S o v ie t U nion Is G overned, S o v ie t L ea d ersh ip in T ransition, T he P olish C risis: A m e ric a n P o lic y O ption s, a n d the forthcom ing T h e S tru ggle f o r th e T h ird W orld: S o v ie t D e b a te s a n d A m e ric a n O ptions.

300

Contributors

H O LL A N D H U N T E R , professor o f econom ics at H averford College, has tested prew ar Soviet planning w ith an econom yw ide m odel a n d surveyed cu rrent Soviet econom ic problem s. For his recent analysis o f S oviet tra n sp o rt developm ents, see the H unter-K aple p ap er in P a rt 1 o f U.S. Congress Jo in t Econom ic C om m ittee S o v ie t E c o n o m y in th e 1980s. C Y N T H IA S. K A PLA N , assistant professor o f political science a t the U niversity o f Chicago, has presented papers a n d published on the b eh av io r o f local p arty organizations in the U SSR. She is com pleting a b o o k on the C om m unist P arty o f the Soviet U nion a n d agriculture a n d is cu rren tly engaged in research on the tran sfo rm atio n o f the Soviet countryside. WASSILY LEO N TIEF, 1973 N obel laureate, is D irecto r o f th e In stitu te for Econom ic Analysis at N ew York U niversity a n d au th o r o f several books, including T h e S tru ctu re o f th e A m e ric a n E c o n o m y 1 9 1 9-1929, In p u t-O u tp u t E con om ics, an d T he F u tu re o f th e W orld E con om y. SA N FO R D R. LIEB ER M A N is an associate professor o f political science at the U niversity o f M assachusetts at Boston. H e is also an associate o f the R ussian Research C enter o f H a rv a rd U niversity a n d has been a v isitin g professor o f political science at H arv ard . H is research in terests cen ter on Soviet dom estic affairs durin g W orld W ar II. SUSAN J. L IN Z , visiting assistant professor o f econom ics a t th e U niversity o f California at Irvine, has authored a n d co-authored several w orks relating to the im pact o f W orld W ar II on the Soviet economy. H er cu rren t research focuses on m icroeconom ic decision-m aking in co n tem p o rary S oviet econom y. ALEC NOVE is a professor em eritu s o f econom ics a t the U niversity o f Glasgow. H is books include T he S o v ie t E c o n o m ic S y ste m , W as S ta lin R e a lly N ecessary? E co n o m ic H isto ry o f th e U SSR, P o litic a l E c o n o m y a n d S o v ie t S ocialism , an d m ost recently, T h e E co n o m ics o f F easible S o cia lism .

JAM ES R. M ILLA R , professor o f econom ics at the U niversity o f Illinois at U rb an a— C ham paign an d recently ed ito r o f the S la v ic R e v ie w , is the author o f A B C s o f S o v ie t S o c ia lism a n d num erous articles in Slavic a n d econom ic journals. BLAIR A. RU B LE, A ssistant D irecto r o f the N ational C ouncil for S oviet an d East E uropean R esearch, is the au th o r o f S o v ie t T rade U nions, T h eir D evelo p m en t in th e 1970s an d co-editor o f several works, including In d u s tria l L a b o r in th e U SSR. H e has published num erous articles a n d review s a n d is currently w orking on a m onograph exam ining local politics a n d p la n n in g in Leningrad. BR IA N D. SILVER is professor o f political science a t M ichigan State U niversity. He has published num erous articles o n Soviet n atio n ality affairs an d Soviet population and is co-editor o f S o v ie t A sia n E th n ic F ron tiers. R O B ER T M. SLUSSER, professor em eritu s o f h isto ry a t M ichigan State U niversity, is editor o f S o v ie t E c o n o m ic P o lic y in P o stw a r G e rm a n y a n d au thor o f T h e B erlin C risis o f 1961.