The Ideas and Practices of the European Union's Structural Antidiplomacy : An Unstable Equilibrium [1 ed.] 9789004372924, 9789004372894

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The Ideas and Practices of the European Union’s Structural Antidiplomacy

Diplomatic Studies Series Editor Jan Melissen (Leiden University, Clingendael Institute and University of Antwerp)

volume 14

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/dist

The Ideas and Practices of the European Union’s Structural Antidiplomacy An Unstable Equilibrium By

Steffen Bay Rasmussen

leiden | boston

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Bay Rasmussen, Steffen, author. Title: The ideas and practices of the European Union’s structural antidiplomacy : an unstable equilibrium / by / Steffen Bay Rasmussen. Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, 2018. | Series: Diplomatic studies, ISSN 1872-8863 ; Volume 14 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2018035202 (print) | LCCN 2018037719 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004372924 (eBook) | ISBN 9789004372894 (hardback : alk. paper) Subjects: LCSH: European Union. | European External Action Service. | Diplomatic and consular service--European Union countries. | European Union countries--Foreign relations administration. Classification: LCC JZ1570 (ebook) | LCC JZ1570 .B383 2018 (print) | DDC 341.242/2--dc23 LC record available at http://lccn.loc.gov/2018035202

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. ISSN 1872-8863 ISBN 978-90-04-37289-4 (hardback) ISBN 978-90-04-37292-4 (e-book) Copyright 2018 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents 1 Introduction: The European Union and the Contemporary Transformation of Diplomacy  1 1.1 The European Union as a Case of Special Interest  5 1.2 Research Design  6 1.3 The Organisation of the Book  10 2 Conceptual Framework: Diplomacy, Alienation and Ideal Types  11 2.1 Towards a Contingent Notion of Diplomacy  12 2.1.1 The English School  14 2.1.2 The Limitations of Doctrinal Approaches  16 2.1.3 Alienation and Diplomacy  18 2.1.4 A Contingent Definition of Diplomacy  19 2.2 A Social Constructivist Ontology of Diplomacy  20 2.2.1 Social Structures  20 2.2.2 The Role of Diplomacy in the International System  23 2.2.3 Conceptualising the Diplomacy of Individual Actors  24 2.2.4 Diplomacy as a Structured Discursive Totality  25 2.2.5 Layers of Diplomacy  28 2.3 Westphalian Diplomacy: An Ideal Type  32 2.3.1 Westphalian Diplomatic Identities, Ideas and Meta-practices  33 2.3.2 Westphalian Diplomatic Practice  38 2.4 Antidiplomacy: An Ideal Type  43 2.4.1 Antidiplomatic Identities, Ideas and Meta-practices  44 2.4.2 Antidiplomatic Practices  48 2.5 Ideal Types and the Analysis of the Social Structure, Practices and Meta-practices of EU Diplomacy  51 3 The Organisation of the EU as a Diplomatic Actor  53 3.1 The Historical Evolution of the EU as a Diplomatic Actor  53 3.2 The Internal Setup of the EU as a Diplomatic Actor after Lisbon  62 3.2.1 The European Council and Its Permanent President  64 3.2.2 The Council of the European Union  66 3.2.3 The Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission  67

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3.2.4 The European External Action Service  68 3.3 Division of Labour in Brussels and the Challenge of Coherence  71 3.4 Conclusion: A Complex Network Organisation  77 4 The EU in Bilateral Diplomatic Relations  79 4.1 The EU as a Receiver of Diplomatic Missions  79 4.2 The Permanent Representation of the EU in Third States  81 4.2.1 The EU Delegations  82 4.2.2 The Role of the Diplomatic Missions of the Member States  93 4.3 EU Special Representatives  99 4.4 Coordination in the Network of EU Diplomatic Representations  101 4.5 Conclusion  107 5 The Participation of the EU in International Organisations  109 5.1 The Participation of the EU in International Organisations: General Aspects  111 5.2 The United Nations  116 5.2.1 Status of the EU  118 5.2.2 Forms of Representation  119 5.2.3 Coordination Practices  120 5.2.4 The UN Security Council  122 5.2.5 The FAO  123 5.3 The World Trade Organization  126 5.3.1 Status of the EU  126 5.3.2 Forms of Representation  128 5.3.3 Coordination Practices  129 5.4 The International Monetary Fund  131 5.4.1 Status of the EU  131 5.4.2 Forms of Representation  131 5.4.3 Coordination Practices  133 5.5 The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce)  134 5.5.1 Status of the EU  135 5.5.2 Forms of Representation  135 5.5.3 Coordination Practices  136

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5.6 Conclusion  137 6 EU Diplomatic Meta-practices: Institutionalisation, Legalisation and Regionalisation  140 6.1 Evolution of the EU’s International Legal Personality and Its Competences to Conclude International Agreements  143 6.2 EU Agreements: General Aspects  148 6.2.1 Cooperation Agreements  152 6.2.2 Association Agreements  154 6.2.3 Technical and Partial Agreements  156 6.3 Regionalisation: The Structure of the EU’s Relationships with Other Regions  157 6.3.1 Africa and the acp States  158 6.3.2 Asia  163 6.3.3 Latin America  166 6.3.4 The European Economic Area  172 6.3.5 The European Neighbourhood Policy  174 6.4 Conclusion: EU Diplomatic Meta-practices between Transformative Effects and Isomorphic Pressures on the EU to Adapt  187 7 Social Structures of EU Diplomacy  191 7.1 The International Identity of the European Union as a Diplomatic Actor  192 7.1.1 The Dominant Antidiplomatic EU Identity  193 7.1.2 The Minority Construction of EU Diplomatic Identity Based on the Westphalian Ideal Type  199 7.2 The Causal Ideas in EU Diplomacy  202 7.3 Strategic Objectives of EU Diplomacy  209 7.4 Conclusion  213 8 Conclusions and Perspectives  215 8.1 Main Characteristics of European Union Diplomacy  215 8.1.1 EU Diplomatic Practices  215 8.1.2 EU Diplomatic Meta-practices: Institutionalisation, Legalisation and Regionalisation  217 8.1.3 The Antidiplomatic Social Structures of EU Diplomacy  219 8.2 What Diplomatic Theory Reveals about the EU: The Structural Antidiplomacy of the European Union as an Inherently Unstable

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Equilibrium between the Ideal Types of Westphalia and Utopian Antidiplomacy  221 8.3 What the EU Case Reveals about Diplomacy: Ideal Types and the Pluralisation of Diplomacy  230 8.3.1 The Case of EU Diplomacy and the Construction of a Typology of Diplomacies  230 8.3.2 The Systemic Impact of the EU’s Structural Antidiplomacy  233 Annex 1: Ideal Type Social Structures of Diplomacy  238 Annex 2: Ideal Type Diplomatic Meta-practices  239 Annex 3: Ideal Type Diplomatic Practices  240 Bibliography  241 Index  263

Chapter 1

Introduction: The European Union and the Contemporary Transformation of Diplomacy Diplomacy has a long history that can be traced back to when the first human collectives were formed and began to interact with each other.1 Since then, diplomacy has evolved along with the forms of political organisation of human collectives and the technological means available for their communication and interaction. Thus, the modern form of diplomacy that we know from the 19th and 20th centuries has evolved alongside the Westphalian system and the sovereign state itself as a form of political organisation since the 15th century,2 culminating with the regularisation and codification of existing diplomatic practices and functions in the Vienna Convention of 1961.3 Modern diplomacy is characterised by taking place among sovereign states in an anarchic international system. The lack of an overall authority in the system means that states recognise each other as equals, with no right to interfere in the internal affairs of others. Nevertheless, it is now clear that because of globalisation, the international system has evolved far beyond the world in which Westphalian diplomacy originally arose. As such, the main characteristics of the Westphalian diplomatic model are under pressure from contemporary processes of globalisation. In broad terms, globalisation implies a diminishing of geopolitical space and increased interdependence on a global level. Distance loses importance, and events in one country have a potentially very large impact on life in other countries. Both the issue area of international politics and the volume of diplomatic interaction have increased, since few issues are now an exclusively domestic concern. Whether the issue is safety standards of industrial products or the regulation of economic activity within a state, these have a clear international * Part of the research presented in this book has been financed by a scholarship from the Basque Government. 1 Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The practice of diplomacy: Its evolution, theory and administration (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 7. The long history preceding modern diplomacy is also stressed by G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005); James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 2 Matthew Smith Anderson, The rise of modern diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993). 3 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004372924_002

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relevance. Also issues fundamental to democracy, such as legislation about discrimination and freedom of speech are no longer the exclusive prerogative of the state, but a matter of international concern.4 The resulting quantitative increase of diplomacy has a profound impact, both with respect to the specific practices of international interaction and the internal organisation of states.5 It is reflected in the growth of global regulation, particularly with respect to economic and financial affairs, and in the establishment of a wide range of semi-independent international organisations and agencies. ­Diplomacy is therefore also increasingly multilateral, since many political issues concern more than just two countries. The quantitative increase of diplomacy has also led to the foreign ministry losing its monopoly on international action. It now shares this function with sectoral ministries and sub-state governments who participate in international politics in their own right. Another important aspect of the contemporary transformation of diplomacy is that civil society organisations play an increased role, notably large businesses seeking to further their particular interests and non-governmental organisations that work for normative goals. It has even been argued that the foreign ministry is no longer needed, and other bodies of the central administration can handle diplomacy within their field,6 though other observers stress the centrality of the foreign ministry within a national diplomatic system.7 Also, foreign ministries, with their “long-established procedures and routines are increasingly unable to handle the sheer volume, speed and proliferating formats of foreign-policyrelevant information coming from and exchanged between non-state actors irrespective of state borders.”8 State diplomacy is no longer the main facilitator of contacts and communication across state boundaries9 and, as observes 4 A good example of this is the so-called “Cartoon Crisis” of 2006, which began as a discussion in Denmark about the trade-off between respect for the religious beliefs of different groups in society and the freedom of speech used to criticise religion. As part of the debate, cartoons were printed in a Danish newspaper depicting the Prophet Mohammad in offensive ways. Soon, however, it evolved into a major international crisis, since Muslims all over the world reacted angrily and turned the issue into a major international conflict with several casualties. See Uffe Andreasen, “Reflections on Public Diplomacy after the Danish Cartoon Crises: From Crisis Management to Normal Public Diplomacy Work,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 3, no. 2, 2008, pp. 201–207. 5 Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in diplomatic practice (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 1999), pp. xiv–xvi. 6 Moses and Knutsen, quoted in Jozef Bátora, Foreign ministries and the information revolution. Going virtual? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 5. 7 Brian Hocking et al., Futures for diplomacy: Integrative diplomacy for the 21st Century (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2012). 8 Jozef Bátora, Foreign ministries and the information revolution. Going virtual? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 2. 9 Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 92.

Introduction

3

Ulrich Beck,10 globalisation means that the state is now forced into continuous negotiation and legitimisation of its position in relations to non-state actors. The erosion of the sovereignty of the state that globalisation brings with it thus gives rise to more international actors that put more hitherto domestic issues on the agenda of international politics, and this also means that the patterns of interaction in the international system is changing. Diplomacy is no longer exclusively a question of the representatives of two sovereigns negotiating about war and peace, but is also about a wide range of actors with different sources of legitimacy discussing narrow topics of direct interest to them. Thus, the Westphalian system based on the sovereignty of unitary state actors is under pressure. This breaking down of the Westphalian international system and changed patterns of interaction can be interpreted as a crisis in diplomacy. Brzezinski provocatively stated already in the 1970s that if foreign ministries and embassies “did not already exist, they surely would not have to be invented.”11 One can indeed question the aptness of traditional Westphalian diplomatic practices in the context of globalised relations, but it seems that neither international organisation nor advances in communications technology making governments able to communicate instantly make diplomacy technologically redundant.12 Rather, in the words of Hamilton and Langhorne, the context, content and form of diplomacy may be changing, but in the absence of the establishment of a world government or a global revolution, the only possible international order is based on the mediation by diplomats among the various political actors.13 The contemporary transformation of diplomacy therefore does not mean that it is losing its relevance, but rather the contrary, that there is an intense need for managing complexity and differences in this changing international system.14 Cornago argues that the contemporary processes of change should be understood as a pluralisation of diplomacy in terms

10 11 12

13 14

As quoted by Jozef Bátora, Foreign ministries and the information revolution. Going virtual? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 3. As frequently quoted in the literature on contemporary diplomacy, for instance in Brian Hocking, “Catalytic diplomacy: Beyond ‘newness’ and ‘decline,’” in Jan Melissen (ed.), ­Innovation in diplomatic practice (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 1999), p. 23. The same line of reasoning is put forth by Small, who states that “when the cost of communication approaches zero, geography doesn’t matter anymore.” Quoted by ­ Ronald ­Peter Barston, Modern Diplomacy, 3rd edition (Harlow: Pearson Education, 2006), p. 5. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The practice of diplomacy: Its evolution, theory and administration (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 245. Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker, “Introduction,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 3.

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Chapter 1

of practices and actors,15 and the central question in the present enquiry therefore becomes how we can understand the nature of EU diplomacy within this broader process of pluralisation. The increased interdependence brought about by processes of globalisation means that a much more fundamental accommodation of interests is necessary. Isolation and separation is with globalisation no longer an option, so the central challenge that confronts us now is how to live in increased proximity with others.16 So, just as the answer to the problem, formulated by Sharp as that of “living separately and wanting to do so, while having to conduct ­relations with others”17 has historically been diplomacy, the current challenge seems to be to adapt the form of international interaction to fit the globalised world. The central goal is to allow different political entities not only to coexist peacefully, but also to prosper in the long term, an adaptation which has been termed “sustainable diplomacy,”18 and which entails not only an analytical challenge, but also a normative challenge for researchers,19 in that our ­concepts should permit common ground to be found and by exploring new practices we should work to identify those practices that not only seek to defend a p ­ articular interest but also those that seek to defend the systemic interest of finding common ground allowing for different groups to coexist peacefully. As observed by Melissen, the management of change in international relations is a key feature of diplomacy,20 and therefore innovations in practices have always characterised diplomacy. Nevertheless, the current process of transformation not only involves specific practices, but also the fragmentation of the rules and norms that underpin international interaction.21 Still, and even though the diplomatic interaction in the international system is clearly undergoing process of pluralisation, is not yet clear whether the changes 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013). James Der Derian, Virtuous war. Mapping the military-industrial-media-entertainment network (Boulder: Westview Press, 2001), p. 203. Paul Sharp, “For diplomacy: representation and the study of international relations,” International Studies Review, vol. 1, 1999, p. 51. Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian, “Sustaining global hope: Sovereignty, power and the transformation of diplomacy,” in Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian (eds.), Sustainable diplomacies (New York: Palgrave, 2010), p. 2. Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), pp. 71–75. Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in diplomatic practice (Houndsmills: MacMillan, 1999), p. xix. Brian Hocking et al., Futures for diplomacy: Integrative diplomacy for the 21st Century (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2012).

Introduction

5

are merely modifications of the Westphalian diplomacy that leave its basic features intact, or if diplomacy is changing profoundly, in a process comparable to the changes produced by the transition from the suzerain medieval order to the Westphalian system of states.22 1.1

The European Union as a Case of Special Interest

With respect to the contemporary transformation of diplomacy and the elements of continuity and change within it, Jönsson and Hall conclude that “the evolution of the European Union as a diplomatic persona, in particular, is an intriguing and evolving case that warrants further study.”23 Spence formulates the central question in this regard as being if “EU diplomacy is something qualitatively new in diplomatic terms.”24 It follows logically that an investigation of the parallel changes in diplomacy, the structure of the international system and the nature of the units of this system is more interesting when it takes the form of studying a case in which the changes are more advanced.25 Without a doubt, this case is the European Union. As a sui generis post-modern political form26 characterised by flexibility and uncertainty,27 22

23 24 25

26 27

A fundamental question, according Coolsaet. See: Rik Coolsaet, “The transformation of diplomacy at the threshold of the new millennium,” in Christer Jönsson and Richard Langhorne (eds.), Diplomacy vol. iii (London: Sage, 2004), p. 2. Cooper answers this question affirmatively: The transformation of the international system with the end of the Cold War is of the magnitude similar to the transformation that created the Westphalian states system, see: Robert Cooper, The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twentyfirst century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 3. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 167. David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 36–84, p. 65. In contrast to a recent study by Bátora, who investigates the changes in diplomacy by comparing the impact of the revolution in information technology in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of Canada, Norway and Slovakia. Jozef Bátora, Foreign ministries and the information revolution. Going virtual? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008). Also Hocking ­defends this alternative analytical approach, connecting changes in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs with wider changes in the international system. Brian Hocking, “What is the foreign ministry?” in Kishan S. Rana and Jovan Kurbalija (eds.), Foreign Ministries: Managing diplomatic networks and optimizing value (Geneva: DiploFoundation, 2007), pp. 3–19. Expression of Ruggie analysed in more detail by Ben Rosamond, Theories of European integration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 111. According to Heartfield, the EU can therefore be characterised as a process without a subject. James Heartfield, “European Union: A process without subject,” in Christopher J.

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it is a non-state and non-sovereign international actor, radically different from the Westphalian state. This fact raises interesting questions about the very nature of the international system and the forms of interaction within it, as EU diplomacy indeed represents an “existential challenge” to established forms of diplomacy.28 First of all, if existing diplomatic practices have arisen as a cause and a product of the sovereign state, the question that begs itself is how an actor which is not a state and is not sovereign engages in diplomatic relations with other actors in the international system and to which extent it is qualitatively different? Second, how does it affect the EU as a non-state actor that it must exist in an international system (still) based on the sovereignty of unitary states? These are the two principal questions that the present study sets out to answer. 1.2

Research Design

In order to answer these questions about the transformation of diplomatic interaction in the current context of globalisation, the conceptual point of departure is the studies of diplomacy of the English School, particularly the thinking of James Der Derian, who can be regarded as pertaining to the third generation of the English School.29 He develops the notions of diplomacy of the earlier generations, particularly those of Hedley Bull30 and Adam Watson.31 In his On diplomacy from 1987,32 Der Derian develops a conception of diplomacy based on theories of alienation, which corresponds well with subsequent theoretical work in the tradition of social constructivism where particularly the work of Alexander Wendt will be drawn on in this study.33

28

29 30 31 32 33

Bickerton, Philip Cuncliffe, and Alexander Gourevitch (eds.), Politics without sovereignty: A critique of contemporary international relations (New York: ucl Press, 2007), p. 131. Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, “The diplomatic system of the EU: Concepts and analysis,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 12. Iver B. Neumann, The English School on diplomacy, Discussion papers in diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2002). Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 1977). Adam Watson, Diplomacy. The dialogue between states (London: Eyre Methuen, 1982). James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). Alexander Wendt, Social theory of international politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

Introduction

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As such, a broad constructivist approach is a natural theoretical companion of the concept of diplomacy of Der Derian. It provides a theoretical basis for the concept of diplomacy with the theory of the social construction of meaning, complementary to the alienation theory used by Der Derian. It also facilitates the use of Der Derian’s ideas about diplomacy in an empirical analysis, which is a necessary operationalisation, since although his work is widely recognised in the academic community, very little research actually applies his ideas. The main reason for adopting this theoretical focus is that Wendt’s constructivism and Der Derian’s approach to diplomacy are not so much a theory in themselves with axiomatic assumptions and hypotheses of causality. Rather, they are series of ontological and meta-theoretical claims that allow for great flexibility in the definition of concepts when investigating specific cases. This flexibility is important for the investigation of a potentially new form of ­diplomacy. Here, the theoretical starting point cannot include specific assumptions about the entity under scrutiny, nor about the practices by which the entity interacts with others. The basic logic of the argument is simple: You cannot use concepts developed to describe the Westphalian system and its diplomatic practices to analyse how these phenomena may be changing. A constructivist approach allows for conceptualising fundamental differences, in this case b­ etween EU diplomacy and other forms of diplomacy. The concept of diplomacy itself is obviously the most central in this study, and its definition is subject to treatment throughout the following chapter. Here it can be briefly defined in abstract terms as the structured totality of practices, diplomatic meta-practices and social structures of meaning through which alienated political entities interact.34 Diplomacy can thus be thought of as necessarily consisting of three “layers,” which are inextricably linked: social structures of meaning, diplomatic meta-practices (structuring principles) and different specific practices. The approach to diplomacy adopted here distinguishes between the ­concept of foreign policy (the political content) and diplomacy (the execution of a given foreign policy).35 The distinction is particularly important due to the fact that the two concepts are often confused in both public debates and in ­academic analysis. Diplomacy is about how political entities interact, while ­foreign ­policy concerns the specific content of the relations between these political 34 35

The concept of alienation refers here to political entities with negatively defined relational identities, i.e., that amongst them the feelings range from indifference to hostility. This distinction is vital to define the concept of diplomacy according to both Vilariño Pintos and Watson, see: Eduardo Vilariño Pintos, Curso de derecho diplomático y consular, 2nd edition (Madrid: Tecnos, 2003), pp. 68–70; Adam Watson, Diplomacy. The dialogue between states (London: Eyre Methuen, 1982), p. 11.

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Chapter 1

entities, including the strategies employed to achieve them. Furthermore, the concept of diplomacy is not here associated neither with specific practices, such as maintaining an embassy abroad, nor with specific elements of social structures, such as ideas of inviolability or non-interference in the internal affairs of others. Diplomacy is considered the interaction among alienated political entities, which at different times and in different places can be based on different social structures of meaning, according to different structuring principles and take the form of different practices. Apart from this flexible notion of diplomacy, to investigate changes in diplomacy and how different the EU is in this regard as a diplomatic actor, it is necessary to have a fixed point against which EU diplomacy can be compared. This fixed point is here two ideal types of diplomacy: Westphalian diplomacy and antidiplomacy. In his 1987 book, Der Derian draws a theoretical distinction between what can be considered ideal-type Westphalian diplomacy and utopian antidiplomacy, which are based on opposite understandings of international relations and therefrom resulting different practices for interaction with other units in the international system.36 The Westphalian ideal type describes the traditional functioning of the international system of sovereign states by means of modern diplomacy, i.e. diplomacy “as we know it.” Antidiplomacy, by contrast, has only existed briefly in specific historical periods, such as during the French and Russian Revolutions. It is based on the refusal to accept that humanity is divided in alienated states and the refusal to adhere to established modern practices of international interaction. These two ideal types will be used as benchmarks to understand the position of the EU as a non-state actor in an anarchical international system of sovereign states, by considering to which extent the EU diplomacy shares elements on the three layers with the Westphalian and antidiplomatic ideal types. The main argument of the book is in this regard that EU diplomacy shares key elements of the social ­structures of meaning with the antidiplomatic ideal type, uses sui generis meta-­practices and essentially Westphalian diplomatic practices, making EU diplomacy paradigmatically different from hitherto existing forms of international i­nteraction, and giving rise to the theoretical formulation of a new ideal-type form of international interaction, structural antidiplomacy. The book thus aims to add to the existing literature by conceptualising the essential nature of EU diplomacy and its relevance within the wider transformation of the international system and the nature of interaction herein. Whereas the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the European External Action Service have given rise to abundant work on different aspects of EU diplomacy, 36

These ideal types are described in detail in Chapter 2.

Introduction

9

this literature tend to focus on specific empirical aspects, with some notable exceptions.37 This body of literature on specific legal, political, ideological and organizational aspects of EU diplomacy will be used to support the general argument constructed in the book, and the aim of the empirical chapters are then to contribute to the overall understanding of EU diplomacy generated by the interpretation of specific manifestations EU diplomacy in the context of the two ideal types, rather than providing new detailed empirical data about of EU diplomacy. Apart from a broad understanding of EU diplomacy in theoretical terms, another main contribution that the book aims to make is conceptual. Diplomatic meta-practices are conceptualised as an intermediate category between the structure and agency that are traditionally defined as a dichotomy. This intermediate category functions in the diplomacy of the EU as a transmission belt that allows an international actor to combine specific micro-­practices from the still dominant Westphalian paradigm of international interaction, necessary to interact with others in a meaningful way, with the utopian social structures of actor identity and causal ideas from the antagonistic paradigm of antidiplomacy. The book therefore establishes the new ideal type of international interaction of a structural antidiplomacy that maintains a utopian basis of overcoming conditions of anarchy but without reverting to violent antidiplomatic practice, made possible by the structural meta-practices of diplomacy. Apart from not seeking to present new empirical data about the EU’s diplomatic representation, the book thus does not intend to evaluate EU diplomacy, which before the creation of the European External Action Service (eeas) was described as “the world’s principal under-performing asset.”38 The objective here is not to assess EU diplomacy in the sense of participating in the discussion about whether the EU “punches below its weight” in international relations, or whether EU taxpayers receive value for the money the EU spends on diplomatic activities. There is therefore also no aim of providing policyrelevant recommendation by entering into the discussion of how the design 37

38

For example Jozef Bátora, “Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 44–66; Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, “Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the European Union,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 143–165; David Spence, “Taking stock: 50 years of European diplomacy,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 235–259. Peter Marshall, UK ambassador to the UN, quoted by Geoffrey Edwards and David ­Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), ­Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 21.

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of EU diplomatic representation could be improved. Also beyond the scope of this book is the issue of legitimacy and democratic accountability, although these issues may seem pressing to discuss particularly in the context of the staff of the European External Action Service. 1.3

The Organisation of the Book

The following Chapter 2 provides the conceptual and theoretical context of the study. After considering different approaches to the study of diplomacy, constructivist theory is used to complement Der Derian’s conceptualisation of diplomacy in terms of alienation. Arguments drawn from the discourse theoryinspired foreign policy theory of Wæver is then used to construct a framework for analysing three layers of diplomacy: social structures of meaning, metapractices and practices. The chapter also contains the description of the two ideal types of diplomacy against which EU diplomacy will be compared in the analysis: Westphalian diplomacy and utopian antidiplomacy. Chapter 3 introduces the internal organisation of the EU as an international actor, with a special focus on the changes introduced by the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the eeas. Chapters 4 and 5 contain the analysis of EU diplomatic practices, considering EU diplomatic representation in bilateral ­relations and international organisations, respectively. Chapter 6 turns the focus to the structuring of EU diplomacy through the diplomatic meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation, evident in the EU’s international agreements and relationships with other world regions. Chapter 7 focuses specially on the social structures of meaning upon which EU diplomatic practices and meta-practices are based. The argument draws on the insights of the previous analysis of practices and meta-practices as well as documental analysis to establish the main actor identities, causal ideas and strategic objectives of EU diplomacy. Chapter 8 is a concluding chapter, which brings together the partial insights from the different chapters and provides a general characteristic of EU diplomacy. In terms of the contribution of applying diplomatic theory to the study of the EU, it concludes that EU diplomacy is paradigmatically different from other types of international interaction. In terms of the contribution of the EU case to understanding the broader process of transformation of diplomacy, it concludes that the EU case represents a break with the Westphalian ideal type and a typology of contemporary diplomacies is constructed as a humble proposal for a possible first step to grasp the wider transformation of ­diplomacy in the globalising world.

Chapter 2

Conceptual Framework: Diplomacy, Alienation and Ideal Types The central concept in the present study is that of diplomacy. A necessary first step is thus one of finding a workable definition of the slippery and essentially contested concept of diplomacy. Diplomacy and its derived adjectives are part of our every-day language and is as such a terminology with which we are familiar, for instance when we say that somebody conveyed a message diplomatically. It does not mean via an ambassador, but with tact, respect for the other’s feelings and very subtly. But this familiarity with the concept that induces a sense of security in us that we know perfectly well what diplomacy is about, is precisely what makes a rigorous definition necessary, heeding Hegel’s warning: “The commonest way in which we deceive ourselves and others, about understanding is by assuming something is familiar, and accepting it on that account; with all its pros and cons, such knowing never gets anywhere and it knows not why…”1 Leaving aside our common perception of a concept is thus the only way to advance in a scientific enquiry. As for the present research into EU diplomacy, Hegel’s wisdom means that we cannot analyse what is commonly known as EU diplomacy as something we are familiar with due to the long academic tradition of analysing diplomacy, and accepting what the EU does as diplomacy as such. Hegel warns us that such an approach is a dead end, and this is why a central question dealt with in this book is to which extent EU diplomacy is actually diplomacy as we commonly perceive it. While Hegel’s warning should be heeded as for any analysis of diplomacy, since the EU is in many aspects an actor very different from the classic state actor normally associated with diplomacy, the warning is ever more relevant when analysing EU diplomacy. The central line of thinking about diplomacy in this investigation has to do with the close relationship between diplomacy, the units and the nature of the international system. Diplomacy is a consequence of the units doing it, and of the international system within which they interact. At the same time, however, the international system owes its central characteristics to diplomacy, in that the international system is constituted through diplomatic 1 James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: B ­ lackwell, 1987), p. 119.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004372924_003

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practice. The function of this chapter is to situate the present investigation within the body of existing work on diplomacy, and to develop two ideal types of diplomacy which can be used as benchmarks for analysing EU diplomacy. These are summarised in annexes 1 through 3. The aim is thus to conceive of diplomacy in a way that is not linked to the specific characteristics of the system that is undergoing transformation, while at the same time not falling into the opposite fallacy of arguing that every instance of international exchange is unique. 2.1

Towards a Contingent Notion of Diplomacy

As for the specific definition of diplomacy, the academic literature does not at first glance help much in clarifying the essence of the concept of diplomacy, since it is used to describe very different phenomena (from the marketing strategies of multinational companies to the cold war logic of nuclear deterrence). Furthermore, new composite concepts are created because of the lack of precision of the concept of diplomacy, such as “the new diplomacy,” “celebrity diplomacy” and “gunboat diplomacy” to mention but a few. The fact that it is difficult to attribute a clear meaning to the concept of diplomacy is reflected in the numerous definitions and perceptions in the academic literature of what diplomacy really is all about. Despite the definitional diversity, and although diplomacy predates the sovereign state, diplomacy is normally defined as a prerogative of sovereign state in the mainstream academic literature. Apart from the insights revealed by the few-lines definitions of the concept of diplomacy, the different focuses in the literature on diplomacy is noteworthy. For the current purpose of this chapter, developing a notion of diplomacy capable of capturing the significance of EU diplomacy, there is a “voluminous but treacherous literature on diplomacy.”2 The greatest part of the literature on diplomacy is thus focused on the empirical manifestations in a given historical era. Part of this literature consists of practitioners’ accounts and another of the works of diplomatic historians, but both parts tends to be of a descriptive nature, or even prescriptive, giving advice about how to be a good diplomat, and rarely go beyond the empirical focus to consider diplomacy as a wider phenomenon. Examples hereof include Satow’s classic,3 but also explicitly 2 Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 12. 3 Ernest Satow, Satow’s Guide to Diplomatic Practice (London: Longman, 1917).

Conceptual Framework

13

historical studies such as those of Anderson,4 Cohen,5 Campbell6 and Gilbert,7 to name but a few. Such an empiricist approach to diplomacy also tends to define diplomacy simply in terms of what diplomats do for a living, based on a study of their various duties and ways of working. This is the case also in more recent studies, for instance those of Berridge, who further states that “diplomacy consists in communication between officials with the intention of promoting the foreign policy by formal agreement or tacit adaptation,” with the primary purpose being “allowing the states to reach the objectives of their foreign policies without recurring to the use of force, propaganda or law.”8 Another example is Hamilton and Langhorne, who define diplomacy as “the pacific conduct of relations between political entities, their chiefs and accredited agents (…).”9 Thereby, they do not define diplomacy in terms of the state, but retain for the most part of the study a focus on the empirical manifestations of diplomacy in specific historical periods. In the context of the contemporary transformation of diplomacy, recent studies have tended to continue the empiricist tradition and to focus on specific “new” modalities of diplomacy that are currently gaining ground, such as paradiplomacy (of non-central governments, i.e. the diplomacy of sub-state regions)10 and public diplomacy.11 In contrast to the large body of empiricallyoriented literature on diplomacy, only a few recent studies of more direct utility for this investigation deals with diplomacy as a larger concept that transcends 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

11

Matthew Smith Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993). Raymond Cohen, “The Great Tradition: The Spread of Diplomacy in the Ancient World,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 1 (2001), pp. 23–38. Brian Campbell, “Diplomacy in the Roman World (C. 500 bc-ad 235),” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 12, no. 1 (2001), pp. 1–22. Felix Gilbert, “The ‘New Diplomacy’ of the Eighteenth Century,” World Politics, vol. 4 , no. 1 (1951), pp. 1–38. G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), p. 1. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The Practice of Diplomacy: Its Evolution, Theory and Administration (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 1. See for instance Noé Cornago Prieto, “Perforated Sovereignties, Agonistic Pluralism and the Durability of (Para)Diplomacy,” in Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian (eds.), Sustainable diplomacies (New York: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 89–108; Noé Cornago Prieto, “On the Normalization of Sub-State Diplomacy,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 5, no. 1 (2010), pp. 11–36. See for instance Jan Melissen (ed.), The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Mai’a K. Davis Cross and Jan Melissen (eds.), European public diplomacy: Soft power at work (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013).

14

Chapter 2

specific diplomatic practices and instead focus on its timeless features.12 Of more interest for the present purposes is therefore the approach of Jönsson and Hall, who see diplomacy as “a perennial international institution that ‘expresses a human condition that precedes and transcends the experience of living in the sovereign, territorial states of the past few hundred years.’”13 Hereby, the notion of diplomacy is explicitly decoupled from specific actors and specific practices, allowing for analysing diplomacy in abstract terms as “the mediation of the material and ideational propensities of universalism and particularism.”14 This latter approach to diplomacy, most evident in the different generations of the English School, is well-suited for the purposes of this investigation, related to understanding a potential break with Westphalian diplomacy. 2.1.1 The English School In contrast to the Realists, the English School,15 from the first-generation scholars Martin Wight and Herbert Butterfield onwards,16 saw diplomacy as an important phenomenon in its own right, although both generally aimed at developing a philosophy of history, rather than focusing on diplomacy itself.17 As for the scholars of the second generation, Hedley Bull explicitly opens up his definition of diplomacy to include non-state actors by defining it as “the conduct of relations between states and other entities with prestige in global 12

13 14 15

16 17

Most prominently among the examples is Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), and James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), but also the approaches of Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013) and Jozef Bátora, “Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 44–66, who like Jönsson and Hall see diplomacy as a persistent institution that changes over time, takes this point of departure. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 3. Ibidem, p. 33. I follow here Neumannn’s distinction among English School scholars of the first, second and third generation, see Iver B. Neumann, The English School on diplomacy, Discussion papers in diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2002). Their work is mainly outlined as essays in Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wight, Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966). Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 20.

Conceptual Framework

15

politics by official agents and pacific means.”18 The formulation “other entities with prestige in global politics” does leave room for interpretation, but a reading of his book makes clear that the entities in question are political communities not organised in recognised states, but with a clear actorness in international relations, such as the Palestine Liberation Organisation (plo), or international organisations constituted by states. In the light of this investigation, however, the most important element of Bull’s thinking about diplomacy is his concept of diplomatic culture, which he defines as “the common stock of ideas and values possessed by the official agents of states.”19 Elements of the diplomatic culture include a common language, a common philosophical point of view and a common moral code. Bull principally uses the concept of diplomatic culture to support his argument of the existence of an international society, and does not investigate in detail the relationship between the ideas and values of the diplomats and the diplomatic practices in which they engage.20 Still, he considers the shared diplomatic culture as a factor facilitating the interaction of diplomats. A drawback is that the concept is limited to the diplomatic corps, and does not take into account the ideas and values possessed by the political entities themselves. This way, Bull’s concept of a diplomatic culture is centred on the existence of an epistemic community of diplomats and not in the social process of the construction of meaning among and within political entities. Bull uses for this phenomenon the term international political culture,21 and thus operates with different notions of culture. The point of departure in the present study is that although analytically separate, the two different elements constitute an overall construction of identities and ideas that may be specific to a given actor or shared more or less widely in the international system. Although using the terms in a slightly different way, the theoretical argument sustaining this study is based on Bull’s argument that there is more to diplomacy than the observable practices and on the attention he pays to the importance of the social aspects of diplomacy, such as the identities and ideas of the different actors, and analytically distinguishing these from the practices undertaken. 18 19 20 21

Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 156. Ibidem, p. 304. A weakness also highlighted by Iver B. Neumann, The English School on diplomacy, Discussion papers in diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2002), p. 8. Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 303–335.

16

Chapter 2

The work of Der Derian will be dealt with in more detail below, since, although not explicitly constructivist, it is an excellent starting point for developing a social constructivist notion of diplomacy useful for analysing EU diplomacy. Another third generation scholar identified by Neumann, Christian Reus-Smit,22 is explicitly constructivist, although not focusing primarily on diplomacy. Still, a major contribution of relevance for this investigation is his linking of the social identity of the units of the international system to the diplomatic practices they undertake. Thereby, the social elements relevant to the study of diplomacy are not only the ideas and values that are shared in the international system, which is Bull’s focus, but also the social identity of the political entity itself. 2.1.2 The Limitations of Doctrinal Approaches The above definitions of diplomacy and the identification of the most important aspects and functions of diplomacy are as most social science based upon the observation of the contemporary and historical social reality. As such, the definitions reflect the functioning of the international system up to the time of writing, which explains the state-centrism in most of the definitions, since the international system was until very recently more or less adequately described as the Westphalian international system of states. The above definitions and their main characteristics as identified subsequently therefore largely correspond to the Westphalian ideal type diplomacy outlined below, which will serve as a benchmark for analysing EU diplomacy. However, in the context of the purposes of this study, the existing approaches to diplomacy are inadequate in at least two important respects. First, when enquiring into the possibility of paradigmatic change, the exclusive focus on historically contingent practices of diplomacy that the empiricist approaches to diplomacy give rise to, would constitute a serious limitation in the scope of the study. To only look at changes in the practice of diplomacy would provide little clue to why these changes occur and to their significance in a broader historical context and their likely implications for the future. In the words of Cohen, we need to be able to “distinguish the permanent from the transitory, the peripheral from the irreplaceable.”23 To this end, the explicit 22 23

Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Raymond Cohen, “Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 bc to 2000 ad,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice (Houndsmils: MacMillan, 1999), p. 2.

Conceptual Framework

17

mission of Jönsson and Hall is, in the aptly title book “Essence of diplomacy,” to identify the “essential dimensions, or timeless features, of diplomacy (…) or, more accurately, (…) uncover those timeless parameters, within which change occurs in a long term perspective.”24 Second, the state-centrism and unitary actor perception of the majority of the approaches reviewed above would lead to consider the EU as a unitary actor and not focus on the interplay between Member States and Union-level activities. A wider conception of diplomacy that goes beyond the assumption of diplomatic actors being unitary is therefore necessary for the present study. Here, the present study will adopt the view of Jönsson and Hall, who stress the historical contingency of the link between the sovereign state and diplomacy and define diplomacy not in terms of the state, but of the polity. This is then defined as a political authority with a degree of institutionalization and hierarchy, in the form of appointed leaders, with a distinct identity and capability to mobilise resources.25 Diplomatic actors are thus not necessarily sovereign, nor territorially organised. Drawing on Der Derian, as outlined below, it is possible to identify the absence of an overarching authority and alienated conditions as defining features of the system within which diplomacy takes place. Excluded from being diplomatic are thus relations between the central government and the regional governments in a state, since there is a system of overarching authority (be it a constitution upheld by an independent court, or the central government itself). In the same category of non-diplomatic political relationships are thus those between the EU and a Member State. Similarly, the relations between a state and civil society actors such as private businesses or normative ngo’s cannot in this conception be considered diplomatic relations, since the state is formally the political authority regulating the existence and behaviour of civil society organisations. Although the work of Jönsson and Hall and Der Derian thus go some way in overcoming the problem of state-centrism and unitary-actor assumptions, they do not explicitly consider diplomatic actors that are not unitary. Nevertheless, their approaches are a good point of departure, since they explicitly do not restrict diplomacy to be a matter only for states, and going beyond the unitary actor assumption would be in line with their abstract definitions of diplomacy and quest for identifying key features of diplomacy across time and space.

24 25

Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), pp. 2–3. Ibidem, p. 31.

18

Chapter 2

2.1.3 Alienation and Diplomacy To the values and ideas of Bull in terms of diplomatic culture, James Der Derian adds an identity dimension to the social aspects of diplomacy to be taken into account in what he calls a post-classical approach.26 To Der Derian, identity is a question of alienation, which is the concept most central to his thinking about diplomacy. As such, in his principal work on diplomacy, Der Derian defines diplomacy in terms of alienation as “the mediation among estranged peoples organized into states that interact in a system.”27 Alienation thus is the central concept in Der Derian’s thinking about diplomacy. The part of Der Derian’s work dedicated to outlining his concept of alienation is based on a reading of various classical authors, from Hobbes and Rousseau to Hegel and Marx. Noting how the concept of alienation changes with the relationship of the thinkers to the reality they wish to describe or explain, two main meanings of the term alienation are identified. The first meaning is in the sense of a relinquishment or transfer, for example of understanding and power to an Other. Der Derian uses the term in this sense, primarily in the chapter on mytho-diplomacy to describe how the humans alienated (=transferred) their understanding and power to God. The second meaning, which is all the more relevant for diplomacy, denotes an estrangement. Disregarding the less relevant usage of the term, alienation can thus be understood as “a separation which is accompanied by sentiments ranging from indifference to hostility.”28 The concept thus has both objective and subjective elements. To speak of alienation it is necessary to have at least two political entities that are separable in objective terms, and whose subjective views of one another range from indifference to hostility. Alienation can thus be thought of as a condition, in the sense of two individuals or political entities being alienated from one another, which is a basic condition for diplomacy. It can also be thought of as a theory, where the concept of alienation serves to understand social life and historical developments. In outlining a theory of alienation, Der Derian relies on a 1977 translation to English of Hegel’s Phänomenologie des Geistes from 1807. The idea is that the condition

26

James Der Derian, “Hedley Bull and the case for a post-classical approach,” in James Der Derian (ed.), Critical practices in international theory (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 296–297. 27 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 43. 28 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 28.

Conceptual Framework

19

of alienation is rooted in the way in which the individual acquires a perception of Self. It is through the alienation from other individuals that each acquires an existence, and through the same process that each attributes existence to the individuals from which each is alienated. Mutually recognising each other as alien, individuals establish their fundamental equality and each establishes its identity of Self. Alienation is thus to Der Derian and Hegel the inevitable companion of human existence, since it is the fundamental process by which individuals acquire that most basic sentiment of human existence; the perception of a Self clearly demarcated and differentiated from other humans. 2.1.4 A Contingent Definition of Diplomacy Although he includes a reference to the sovereign state in the definition, this is to Der Derian a contingent historical fact that arose with the establishment of the Westphalian states system during the Renaissance. His thinking on diplomacy can be taken beyond the state, since what is important is not the statehood that the political entities in the system might have, but the fact that they are alienated from one another. What characterises the political entities among which diplomacy occurs is thus not their internal characteristics, but the relationship between them as being alienated. As such, the state can be viewed as the political entity that in the era of the Westphalian system was the most extended, but which is just one organisational option. Diplomacy is possible among any alienated political entities and not just states. Building on the thinking of Der Derian, a more universal definition of diplomacy that does not restrict the concept to the Westphalian system is therefore possible: the interaction among alienated political entities. Such a more abstract definition is a necessary starting point for the analysis of contemporary phenomena, since it allows for investigating phenomena beyond the Westphalian international system and its corresponding diplomacy practices. An abstract definition that is unrelated to a specific organisational form or specific practices is flexible and universal in the sense that it can be used in different places and in different times, “filling” the abstract concept with the contingent meaning and details that are specific to different places and eras. This basic view of diplomacy as being the relation among polities, rather than the concrete manifestation in space and time of given practices and ideas, such as opening of embassies and extraterritoriality, is vital to adopt in order to proceed in the investigation of the current transformation of diplomacy and the specific case of the European Union, since it cannot be assumed that it adjusts to the contingent practices and culture of the Westphalian system. Rather, being a different kind of polity, it can be expected to have different identities and ideas and undertake different practices. Therefore, as remarked by Jönsson and Hall, in natural processes

20

Chapter 2

of change, such as which contemporary diplomacy finds itself, continuity and similarity is as interesting to identify as is difference and change,29 directing attention to aspects of continuity and similarity between EU diplomacy and the Westphalian ideal type. 2.2

A Social Constructivist Ontology of Diplomacy

The term social constructivism is used very broadly to encompass many different approaches and is essentially a second-order theoretical construct.30 To understand the ontological position of constructivist theory, it is vital to draw a distinction between the natural world and the social world. Both the natural world and the social world exist independently of the perception of the observer. The ontological stance of this book is thus only moderately reflectivist, in that it assumes that there is a social world “out there” regardless of our perception of it. Other approaches, often labelled “post-modern,” even refutes the existence of a reality outside human cognition. With such an assumption, it is difficult to establish any kind of truth, since one human can never be sure of what another perceives, and thereby is talking about. Such a stance has a tendency to degenerate into philosophical solipsism, excluding ex ante the possibility of science. The constructivism espoused here shares with rationalist theories the belief in the existence of a reality external to the cognition of the individual human being, a reality that can be investigated by scientific methods. Nevertheless, social reality differs from material reality in that humans construct their social reality whereas the material reality is a given. 2.2.1 Social Structures In a constructivist theoretical perspective, international relations are guided by intersubjectively shared ideas and values held by actors. These ideas and values constitute social structures that shape the behaviour of the actors and these structures are themselves a product of human interaction. They are constructed when individuals and groups interact and together form common meaning and common knowledge. As such, there is a dialectic relationship between structure and agency.

29 30

Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 32. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 4–7.

Conceptual Framework

21

Any actor, be it an individual or a group, constructs its identities and ideas by articulating sameness and difference through parallel processes of p ­ ositive and negative identification. An individual will identify positively with other actors and ideas with which it sympathises, and articulate a sameness of itself in relation to this other actor or idea. In articulating sameness, an individual will develop an identity containing perceptions of what the individual is an instance of, i.e. what social characteristics it shares with a group. Oppositely, an actor will identify negatively with an actor or idea that it despises, and define itself in opposition to this actor or idea. Through these processes, an actor will place itself in relation to another actor, something that can be likened to that of positioning oneself on a social map.31 Thus, the identity and ideas of an actor at a given point in time is socially constructed and contingent, and susceptible to change. Therefore, a primary concern in Chapter 7 is to establish the present identity and ideas of the EU as an international actor in relation to the diplomatic practices which these social structures give rise to, and through which they are in turn reconstructed. An important point in the search for a solution to the problem of unreflected anthropomorphism inherent in the works of Hegel and Der Derian, is that these structures are not reducible to the individuals that construct them. Alexander Wendt attributes an equal ontological importance to agents and social structures, although neither is reducible to the other,32 a point further developed and clarified in several articles.33 Particularly Wendt’s 1999 in-depth study34 is interesting for the present purposes, since it explicitly addresses the problem of anthropomorphism in applying the reasoning of classical sociological theories, such as Berger and Luckmann’s,35 to the study of international relations, a form of reasoning perfectly compatible with Hegel’s concept of alienation that Der Derian builds upon to develop his diplomacy notion. That social structures are not reducible to the individuals constructing them 31 32 33

34 35

Peter L. Berger, Invitation to Sociology: A Humanistic Perspective (New York: Doubleday, 1963), p. 81. Alexander Wendt, “The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations,” International Organization, vol. 41 , no. 3, 1987, p. 339. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics,” International Organization, vol. 46, no. 2, 1992, pp. 77–94; Alexander Wendt, “Bridging the Theory-Meta-Theory Gap in International Relations,” Review of International Studies, vol. 17, no. 4, 1991, pp. 383–392; Alexander Wendt, “Levels of Analysis v. Agents and Structures: Part iii,” Review of International Studies, vol. 18, no. 2, 1992, pp. 181–185. Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1967).

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Chapter 2

b­ ecomes clear when one makes a distinction between common and collective knowledge, of which social structures consist.36 Common knowledge is intersubjective understandings constructed through the interaction of individuals. Collective knowledge is also constructed through interaction, but not necessarily held by any individual. To illustrate this, consider the employees of a car factory. Probably, they will have very little common knowledge about car building, since each of them is a specialist in different aspects of the process of building a car. Collectively, however, they possess all the detailed knowledge necessary to build a car. The non-reducibility of collective knowledge to individuals is what makes possible to speak of the EU having an identity and ideas that no Member States or individuals have. Furthermore, the nonreducibility of collective knowledge explains why social structures are reified, to appear just as real to the individual as material structures. Therefore, these social structures, once constructed, through a process of reification become just as real as material structure, in that the actors perceive them as an externally given reality.37 Drawing on institutionalist theory, Bátora observes in this regard about diplomats that “they structure their actions according to a particular logic of appropriateness anchored in diplomatic rules, norms and principles.”38 The actor identities and causal ideas prevailing in diplomatic culture is this way a powerful constraint on actors to behave as other actors. The interesting question in the context of this study is therefore the extent to which the EU, as a qualitatively different actor than the state, is capable of being different, and doing diplomacy differently. In the ensuing analysis of EU diplomacy, the systemic isomorphic pressures upon the EU in its processes of developing its sui generis diplomacy will therefore be given special attention. 36 37

38

Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 157–165. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (New York: Doubleday, 1967), p. 89. Reification is not here meant in a strictly structuralist sense where agency is a simle product of structure, but rather that structures seem to agents to be external realities, a point also argued by Wendt, particularly in his 1994 article: Alexander Wendt, “Collective Identity Formation and the International State,” American Political Science Review, vol. 88, no. 2, 1994, pp. 384–397. Jozef Bátora, Foreign ministries and the information revolution. Going virtual? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 42. The concept of a logic of appropriateness refers to the fact that each actor adapts its behaviour to make sense within existing social structures. On the concept of a logic of appropriateness, see James G. March and Johan P. Olsen, “The logic of appropriateness,” in Robert E. Goodin, Michael Moran, and Martin Rein (eds.), Oxford handbook of public policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 689–708.

Conceptual Framework

23

2.2.2 The Role of Diplomacy in the International System In a constructivist perspective, diplomacy is not a matter of pre-established states with given identities and interests that interact in a system. Rather, the social structures of the system, created through interaction, are what constitute a diplomatic actor as, for instance, a sovereign unitary state rather than an illegitimate rebel group. This is reflected in the importance of diplomatic recognition, where actors attribute to each other the identity of a legitimate diplomatic actor, and in the Westphalian version, one of sovereign equal. In a constructivist approach, diplomacy is therefore much more central to international relations generally than in mainstream approaches to international relations. Wendt’s constructivism opens up for an albeit limited role for diplomacy, and his theoretical arguments can indeed be seen as the social underpinning of the interwar Idealist idea that diplomacy can change the way states think about themselves and each other.39 In contrast, in the Realism of Morgenthau,40 diplomacy is a mere tool, and in the Neorealism of Waltz,41 diplomacy is barely a factor worthy of analysis.42 In the constructivist perspective adopted here, in contrast, diplomacy defines the actors of the international system, and through diplomacy, the actors construct their identities and interests, as well as structures of common knowledge among the actors, i.e. the diplomatic culture, often expressed in international law. Diplomacy is therefore central both to the social structure of the international system and the self-identification of the actors in it that this social structure shapes, since the social structure “exists, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their practices,”43 i.e. because of diplomacy. By considering diplomacy in constructivist terms, it becomes apparent that studying EU diplomacy is not only for the insights hereinto, but also as a first step to better understand the wider transformation of the common ground in the international system, i.e. diplomatic culture more generally. 39 40 41 42

43

Dale C. Copeland, “The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (eds.), Constructivism and International Relations. Alexander Wendt and His Critics (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 6–8. Hans J. Morgenthau, Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, 6th edition (New York: Knopf, 1985). Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading,: Addison-Wesley, 1979). For a thorough analysis of the Realist research programme, see Leire Moure Peñín, El Programa De Investigación Realista Ante Los Nuevos Retos Internacionales Del Siglo xxi (Leioa: Servicio Editorial de la Universidad del País Vasco / Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, 2010). Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 185.

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2.2.3 Conceptualising the Diplomacy of Individual Actors Wendt’s social constructivism has been the subject of substantive criticism from various theoretical standpoints.44 Given the limited scope of the present book however, in the following the focus will only be on the issues of relevance for an enquiry into EU diplomacy. The conception of social structures outlined above has implications that Wendt does not deal with because of his systemic focus. Wendt has thus been criticised of downplaying the role of diplomacy by leaning towards a structural determinism.45 Also, his Social Theory of International Politics deals with state identity from the point of view of the international system, and not as an issue of the individual state. To Wendt, states exist prior to their interaction with other states, and politics begin only when interaction with other states begin.46 But since social structures are conceived of as intersubjective understandings constructed through interaction, social structures will differ among groups and societies, since individuals in a society primarily interact with themselves, creating their own culture. In this sense, structure and agency are not ontologically separate, but mutually constitutive. To understand how individuals and groups act, it is necessary to understand the specific internal context, because this influences their specific way of giving meaning to external phenomena. In essence, Wendt deals with the social processes of the state visà-vis other states, but does not take into account the social within states. As pointed out by Ringmar, Wendt’s approach therefore cannot account for how the structure of international politics is interpreted within a state,47 i.e. how each actor in the international system creates its own identities and ideas, giving rise to actor-specific meanings and rationalities. In this book, the primary actor in question, the EU, is opened up to analysis, acknowledging the importance of understanding also the domestic social structures of ­meaning of the 44 45

46

47

For a collection of different criticisms and Wendt’s reply hereto, see the edited volume: Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (eds.), Constructivism and International Relations. Alexander Wendt and His Critics (New York: Routledge, 2006). Sárvárys criticism focuses specifically on this point. See Katalin Sárváry, “No Place for Politics? Truth, Progress and the Neglected Role of Diplomacy in Wendt’s Theory of History,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (eds.), Constructivism and International Relations. Alexander Wendt and His Critics (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 160–180. A criticism developed by Andreas Behnke, “Grand Theory in the Age of its Impossibility: Contemplations on Alexander Wendt,” in Stefano Guzzini and Anna Leander (eds.), Constructivism and International Relations. Alexander Wendt and His Critics (New York: Routledge, 2006), pp. 48–56. Erik Ringmar, “Alexander Wendt: A social scientist struggling with history,” in Iver B. Neumann and Ole Wæver (eds.), The future of international relations: Masters in the making? (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 283.

Conceptual Framework

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EU for understanding its diplomacy, in an approach thus sharing features with that of Reus-Smit linking the culture and sense of moral purpose of an actor to its international behaviour.48 The social structures of EU diplomacy are thus not only considered a function of the EU’s international practice but also internal dynamics. This entails that the social structures of EU diplomacy cannot be deduced only from the EU’s diplomatic practice, but must take internal social and political processes into account, which is why the analysis of the social structures of EU diplomacy in Chapter 7 not only infers from diplomatic practices and meta-practices, but is also based on other sources. 2.2.4 Diplomacy as a Structured Discursive Totality The speech-act theory of John Austin affirms that language does not merely describe a reality, but creates it.49 This way, language constitutes the social world, and at the same time, it is a system that is not determined by the social reality to which it refers. The discursive structure of language then again defines the possibilities for agency. “People are both masters and slaves of language.”50 This way, language should be seen as an instance of the social structures dealt with above, that are non-reducible to the actors constructing them. A discourse is thus the result of social practice that establishes relations among concepts and thereby their meaning and identity, whether a spoken word, or an observable action. Not only the specific content of a diplomatic message, but also how it is conveyed thus communicates. And in the same vein, all the behaviour of an actor is interpreted for its communicate content, whether this was originally intended or not. Consequently, “in diplomatic communication, saying is doing, and doing is saying.”51 In the same way, not saying or doing something also communicates different messages, depending on the specific circumstance. By adopting a discourse theoretical perspective, it is thus possible to enhance the approach of the English School authors Bull and Watson to analysing the social dimension of diplomacy. Whereas they restricted themselves to ­analyse ­specific diplomatic practices and consider these expressions of diplomatic 48 49 50 51

Christian Reus-Smit, The Moral Purpose of the State: Culture, Social Identity, and Institutional Rationality in International Relations (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999). Lupicinio Íñiguez Rueda, “El Lenguaje En Las Ciencias Sociales: Fundamentos, Conceptos Y Modelos,” in Lupicinio Íñiguez Rueda, Análisis Del Discurso (Barcelona: Editorial uoc, 2006), pp. 47–87, pp. 53–56. Roland Barthes quoted in Louise Phillips and Marianne W. Jørgensen, Discourse Analysis as Theory and Method (London: Sage Publications Ltd, 2002), p. 17. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 86.

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culture,52 discourse theory directs attention to the analysis also of spoken and written statements to gain knowledge about social structures, in the case of the present study, primarily the identities and ideas constituting the social structures of EU diplomacy. All such social practices of speech, behaviour or inactivity are termed articulations.53 In this respect, all social practices are articulations, since they all reproduce or change meaning, i.e. social structures. This way, a discourse can be defined as the structured totality resulting from articulatory practice. A discourse is thus not just a way of speaking about an issue, but a way of seeing the world, a structural totality that is created by speeches and by observable material action. This way, discourse theory can be seen as a complement to Wendt social constructivism, in that it not only focuses on identity and the relations among political entities, but directs the attention to how the social structures of meaning and the practices of a given actor constitutes a totality, which is the reason why the analysis of EU diplomacy cannot be restricted to the relationship between the EU and other actors, but must take into account the social structures of identities, ideas and basic world-views upon which EU diplomatic practices are based and together constitutes a discursive totality, hence the holistic approach of the present study. The structured reality created through action, however, is never closed or fixed.54 This is because of overdetermination, a concept that refers to a surplus of meaning, arising from the plurality of meanings attributed to one single concept, such as sovereignty, which means something different to different international actors. In one construction, the sovereignty of the state is an ultimate goal and a key to the well-being of the population, whereas in another, the sovereignty of the state is a primary problem leading to nationalism and war. This overdetermination leads to the emergence of floating signifiers within the discourse. These are the elements that are unable to couple permanently to any one idea or meaning. These floating signifiers penetrate all discourses and prevent their closure. Another type of signifier is nodal points. These are privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of a chain of moments within the

52 53 54

Iver B. Neumann, The English School on diplomacy, Discussion papers in diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2002), p. 13. Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), p. 105. As claimed by structuralist scholar Louis Althusser, “Ideology and State Apparatuses,” in Louis Althusser (ed.), Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays (London: New Left Books, 1971). This way the theoretical approach developed here from a conglomerate of theoretical building blocks could be termed post-structural.

Conceptual Framework

27

discourse. Therefore meaning is relatively structured around a number of n ­ odal points within a discourse,55 leading to relative objectivity within the social. So, because of the floating signifiers, no discursive structure or social entity can ever be a self-contained totality where meaning is permanently fixed. In a discursive perspective, a phenomenon such as EU diplomacy is an open totality of contingent social relations that is continuously problematised, i.e. it is a field of several discourses that via contradictory articulatory practices is continuously fixed in temporary and ambiguous forms. This also means that the construction of meaning is always an intersubjective understanding among actors, in that all articulations are only able to establish a meaning if the audience is persuaded by the articulation. A discourse is delimited by the construction of social antagonisms, a process which has a clear parallel to the process of identity formation. In order for a discourse to keep together its different nodal points and construct a relation among them in the face of overdetermination, a range of meanings are excluded from the discourse. These meanings have only one common characteristic, namely that they are threatening to the discourse. This way the excluded meaning is constructed as a radical and threatening other. These excluded meanings may, of course, be part of other discourses within the same social space (such as the EU’s international actor identity). Then an antagonistic relationship is said to exist between the social constructions. An effect of such antagonism is the construction of subject positions in a mutually exclusive way. Indeed, conflicting discourses with respect to the identity of the EU as a diplomatic actor can be identified, as will be argued in Chapter 7. In the antagonistic discourses, the key signifiers have different meanings, constructing opposite causal ideas. This means that as there are two antagonistic constructions of EU identity, this gives rise to different causal ideas and potentially antagonistic practices, pointing to a fundamental instability of EU diplomacy, being torn between antagonistic identity constructions. Considering the EU’s interaction with other international actors, there is also a limit to the possibility of coexistence of antagonistic discourses on international relations if the actors adhering to them are to be able to interact. The problems of the French and Russian revolutionaries to live out their antidiplomatic discourse while the rest of the actors in the international system with whom they had to engage maintained the Westphalian diplomatic discourses illustrates the point.56 When analysing the extent to which EU diplomacy is 55 56

Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, Hegemony and Socialist Strategy. Towards a Radical Democratic Politics (London: Verso, 1985), p. 112. See Chapter 2.

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different from Westphalian diplomacy, it is therefore helpful to estimate the degree to which the identities and ideas constituting the social structures of EU diplomacy are antagonistic to those of the Westphalian ideal type and how different the diplomatic practices are. To systematise and facilitate the comparison between potentially antagonistic constructions, ideal types of Westphalian diplomacy and utopian antidiplomacy are developed below as benchmarks for understanding the nature of EU diplomacy. 2.2.5 Layers of Diplomacy Wæver’s foreign policy theory57 is an attempt to theorise the policies towards the EU of EU Member States. It starts from the fact that discourses enable and constrain other discourses, and has a clear structural focus, in that he conceptualises discourses as being layered. The theory of layers arises because all specific constructions of meaning must necessarily have a basis in more abstract constructs, which Diez denominate meta-narratives.58 For example, the construction of the meaning of a particular diplomatic practice is made with reference to more fundamental discourses about diplomatic interchange, the identity and causal ideas and foreign policy strategies of the actors involved. This also allows for a diplomatic actor to attribute different meanings to similar behaviours by referring to different meta-narratives when constructing their social meaning. More fundamental discourses are thus resources upon which actors can draw when determining the meaning of a specific practice. Through this process, however, the actor also reinterprets these meta-narratives and thereby potentially transforms them.59 By fixing meaning by reference to more basic discourses, this also means that these meta-narratives not only enable certain constructions of meaning attributed to specific practices, but also constrain the space of possibility, since an actor must necessarily have a certain degree of consistency within its construction of meaning for it to make sense. 57

58 59

This section draws upon Ole Wæver, “Europæisk Sikkerhed Og Integration: En Analyse Af Franske Og Tyske Diskurser Om Stat, Nation Og Europa,” in Torben Beck Dyrberg, Allan Dreyer Hansen and Jacob Torfing (eds.), Diskursteorien På Arbejde (Roskilde: Roskilde Universitetsforlag, 2000), pp. 279–318; Ole Wæver, “Explaining Europe by Decoding Discourses,” in Anders Wivel (ed.) Explaining European Integration (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1998), pp. 100–146; Ole Wæver, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy,” in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 20–49. Thomas Diez, “Europe as a Discursive Battleground: Discourse Analysis and European Integration Studies,” Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 36, no. 1, 2001, pp. 15–19. Here Diez is closer to Foucault’s emphasis on practice than to Wendt’s focus on the effect of structures. Thomas Diez, “Speaking ‘Europe’: The Politics of Integration Discourse,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 4 (1999), pp. 603–604.

Conceptual Framework

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Deepest down, where depth signifies the degree to which the meaning is sedimented,60 are discourses on state and nation that contain the most fundamental “we”-concepts. These discourses articulate the relationship between the nation and the state and how membership of the nation is defined.61 Other nodal points are which internal character the state has, e.g. a welfare state or a liberal state, and the external dimension constructed for the state in the international system. The constructions at this deepest level of discourse constitute a specific set of constraints and possibilities for articulations on the upper levels. The second level identified is the relation vis-à-vis Europe of the first level construction.62 This level also contains the fixation of the meaning of the term “Europe,” whether Europe is for instance a federal state in its early stages or merely a common market. The third level identified by Wæver is the concrete manifestation of Europe, where actors argue their positions by drawing on the constructions on level 1 and 2. Articulations on level 3 thus creates certain structural routes taken from level 1 via level 2, and thereby reconstructing also level 1 and 2 constructions drawn upon. Wæver’s model has the distinct advantage that it is able to conceptualise difference systematically. Several level 3 constructions are possible on the basis of the same level 2 and level 1 constructions, and it is possible that different deeper notions of identity and ideas on level 1 actually give rise to the same political practices on level 3. Each structural route is one discourse on a topic, and by viewing discourses as being layered, it becomes apparent that antagonisms are not necessarily a question of either/or, but that different discourses can be similar on one level, but differ on another. It is thus possible to talk of partially antagonistic discourses, and degrees of antagonism, a considerable methodological advance when comparing EU diplomacy to theoretically constructed ideal types. Wæver’s theories of layered discourses are a highly useful theoretical step for the purposes of the present study. By drawing on the distinction between social structures of identities and ideas on one hand, and diplomatic practices on another, of which all discourses are made up, it is possible to adapt Wæver’s model of discursive layers to the study of the diplomacy of a specific actor, as illustrated in Figure 1. 60

61 62

Ole Wæver, “Europæisk Sikkerhed Og Integration: En Analyse Af Franske Og Tyske Diskurser Om Stat, Nation Og Europa,” in Torben Beck Dyrberg, Allan Dreyer Hansen and Jacob Torfing (eds.), Diskursteorien På Arbejde (Roskilde: Roskilde Universitetsforlag, 2000), p. 286. Ole Wæver, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy,” in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 33–37. Ibidem, p. 37.

30

Chapter 2 Specif ic diplomatic practice 1

Specif ic diplomatic practice 2

Meta-practice of diplomacy 1

Specif ic diplomatic practice 3

Meta-practice of diplomacy 2

Social structure of identities and ideas 1

Figure 1

Specif ic diplomatic practice 4

Specif ic diplomatic practice 5

Meta-practice of diplomacy 3

Social structure of identities and ideas 2

Conceptualising differences in diplomacy. Source: The author, adapted from Wæver’s works Note: Ole Wæver, “Europæisk Sikkerhed Og Integration: En Analyse Af Franske Og Tyske Diskurser Om Stat, Nation Og Europa,” in Torben Beck Dyrberg, Allan Dreyer Hansen and Jacob Torfing (eds.), Diskursteorien På Arbejde (Roskilde: Roskilde Universitetsforlag, 2000), pp. 279–318; Ole Wæver, “Explaining Europe by Decoding Discourses,” in Anders Wivel (ed.) Explaining European Integration, (Copenhagen: Copenhagen Political Studies Press, 1998), pp. 100–146; Ole Wæver, “Identity, Communities and Foreign Policy,” in Lene Hansen and Ole Wæver (eds.), European Integration and National Identity. The Challenge of the Nordic States (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 20–49.

Again, the deepest layer of the model is constituted by the identities and ideas about the international system of the actor. It thus includes the EUs perception of self in terms of identity, i.e. the nature of the European Union as a political entity and as an international actor as well as its main ideas about international interaction. The second layer of diplomacy consists of what can be termed diplomatic meta-practices, i.e. the principles structuring the specific practices diplomatic as well as the strategic approach to international interaction that makes an actor engage in different practices with different levels of intensity. These meta-practices reflect EU perceptions of the nature of the international system and the EU’s causal ideas about how peace and p ­ rosperity are created internationally. In the EU case, this turns the focus to the EU’s

Conceptual Framework

31

ambition and efforts to institutionalise and legalise international interaction, as well as to the regionalist approach of the EU to its management of relations with other actors. The third layer is then the observable manifestation of the specific diplomatic activities of the EU, such as the opening of EU Delegations, the accreditation of the EU’s representation in specific international organisations or a speech given by the High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission, Federica Mogherini. EU diplomacy is then the structured totality of the constructions on the three levels, and must be analysed as such. Figure 1 illustrates how different identities and ideas in a discourse are likely to give rise to different diplomatic meta-practices and specific manifestations of EU diplomacy. The figure illustrates the fact that different specific manifestations of EU diplomacy do not necessarily mean that the identities and ideas upon which they are based are different. Similarly, because the specific manifestations of the diplomacy of two actors are largely similar, one cannot conclude that the social structure of identities and ideas upon which they are based are also similar. To establish differences between the diplomacy of one specific actor, in this case the EU, and another, in this case ideal type constructions of Westphalian diplomacy and antidiplomacy, one must inevitably analyse the specific empirical manifestations in EU diplomatic practice, bilateral and multilateral (Chapters 4–5), the diplomatic meta-practices practices of the EU (Chapter 6) as well as the (social) nature of the diplomatic Self (Chapters 3 and 7). Der Derian’s distinction between essential elements of diplomacy and the contingency of its abstract definition are what this model of layers of diplomacy seeks to develop and operationalise for empirical analysis. The layer model of diplomacy does not reduce diplomacy to any specific idea, organisational form or specific practice, and thereby allows for cross-time and cross-actor comparison, including a capacity to conceptualise not only changes in diplomacy, but also paradigmatic changes of diplomacy.63 The model allows for conceptualising in which sense EU diplomacy is different from other forms of diplomacy, but it also permits assessing the significance of these differences, in the present case between EU diplomacy and theoretically constructed idealtype diplomacies. If differences are found in specific diplomatic practices, we 63

The notion of paradigm is here used as a heuristic instrument to characterise the degree of difference between two different diplomacies. As such, the concept is not used here in the sense of Kuhn’s scientific paradigm. Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962).

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are dealing with a change and difference within the ideal-type paradigm and these difference are less important and contain fewer implications for the future evolution of diplomacy as such in the international system, than if differences are found in the diplomatic meta-practices or even the social structures of EU diplomacy. In such a case, we are faced with not only a difference in diplomacy, but also a paradigmatic difference of diplomacy, likely to have farreaching consequences for the states system or the actor in question. A truly antagonistic relationship between two forms of diplomacy will be identified if the differences are found in all three layers, since the two will then constitute two antagonistic and mutually excluding paradigms of diplomacy. This was the case of the differences of the antidiplomacy of the French and Russian revolutionaries as compared with the prevalent Westphalian diplomacy, as will be argued below. Indeed, these two forms of diplomacy constitute the two ideal-type forms of diplomacy used as fix points to assess the nature of EU diplomacy.64 2.3

Westphalian Diplomacy: An Ideal Type

What characterises diplomacy in the mainstream definitions is the existence of generally accepted mechanisms for communication and negotiation and the existence of shared ideas that regulate practices and protect diplomats.65 That the definitions thus largely refer to Westphalian diplomacy should be obvious, and this section therefore also serves to illustrate why they were deemed insufficient for investigating changes to the paradigm they assume exist. Contemporary diplomacy is undergoing change and looks with the passing of time less and less like the Westphalian state diplomacy as outlined in the following. Nevertheless, since the objective is to investigate precisely these changes, to create an ideal type Westphalian diplomacy to have as a fixed point is not only methodologically sound, but indeed the only way forward. 64

65

The concept of ideal types is used here in the Weberian sense, where the diplomacy and antidiplomacy become heuristic tools for scientific enquiry but are not taken to be reflections of empirical reality. The comparison of EU diplomacy to two theoretically constructed ideal types with respect to the three layers of diplomacy identified above is the general analytical strategy of the present enquiry. The bibliographical basis is a translation of Weber’s 1922 Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft: Max Weber, Ekonomi Och Samhälle: Förståelsessociologins Grunder (Lund: Argos, 1983). Raymond Cohen, “Reflections on the New Global Diplomacy: Statecraft 2500 bc to 2000 ad,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in Diplomatic Practice (Houndsmils: MacMillan, 1999), p. 13.

Conceptual Framework

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Thus, in a recent investigation into the current transformation of diplomacy with a different perspective, Bátora argues for the same need to establish an “archetype” of modern diplomacy in order to assess whether an IT-driven revolution is taking place.66 2.3.1 Westphalian Diplomatic Identities, Ideas and Meta-practices In his genealogy of diplomacy, Der Derian situates the beginning of Westphalian diplomacy in the disintegration of the Holy Roman Empire that occurred when the estrangement among the European political entities became more important than their common alienation from Islam,67 an alienation that had hitherto generated the necessary cohesion among European political entities,68 making unity of Christianity the organising principle of the international system until 1648.69 As a result of the increasing interaction among the political entities, there was a growing problem of coexistence, which gradually generated a need to manage and settle conflicts. Due to the partition of the Italian peninsula into small states in the 15th century, the struggle of each state for its sovereignty and survival as a state produced the anarchic features of the Westphalian states system, and also the organised, professional diplomacy.70 The alienation among the states and their struggle for survival led them to recognise each other as sovereign equals, since in the absence of an overarching religious authority as was the case in the Holy Roman Empire, a workable sovereignty could only be granted each state through the recognising of the other states in the system. The creation of the sovereign state as a form of political

66 67 68

69 70

Jozef Bátora, Foreign ministries and the information revolution. Going virtual? (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 16. James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 108. Der Derian uses the concepts of estrangement and alienation to describe the history and nature of the international system and its diplomacy. Due to the constructivist theoretical approach in this book, it is adequate to rely on Der Derian’s terminology and lines of reasoning in characterising the Westphalian system. The constructivist definition of diplomacy used in this investigation is a development of Der Derian’s essentially constructivist notion, and as such to use his concepts also to describe the Westphalian system makes easier a coherent comparison later, since the ontological basis and epistemological stance of this investigation is compatible with Der Derian’s account to a greater extent than an alternative description of the Westphalian system in objectivist-historical terms. Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London : Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 4. Matthew Smith Anderson, The Rise of Modern Diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993), p. 3.

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organisation of a given community and the Westphalian international system and the diplomacy to which it gives rise are thus inextricably linked.71 The mutual recognition of sovereign equality is the basis of Westphalian diplomatic relations. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations was a codification of already existing diplomatic practices and customary rules. The Convention is a clear example of the Westphalian ideal type, seeing international relations as taking states as authentic expressions of popular sovereignty and cultural identity.72 In the preamble, the sovereign equality of states is established as a basic principle.73 In diplomatic relations, there is thus a formal equality among the parties, which defines the relationship and has brought with it a system of reciprocal orientations as the basis of diplomacy. This way, the ideas and norms of reciprocity and non-discrimination flowing from the mutual recognition of sovereignty, establish the states as formally equal and strengthen thereby the shared collective identity of being a state. In other words, what matters most in the Westphalian system is being a state, and to a less extent which state. The existence of these shared ideas means that the international society of states, created through their interaction, is a social structure that regulates the interaction of states. As argued specifically for the case of the Vienna Convention above, it is possible to consider international law in general, and diplomatic law in particular, as expressions of the shared ideas of the international system. The idea of the formal equality of states manifests itself also in diplomatic protocol, the classic example being the precedence of the diplomats of different states in a diplomatic function. The concept of precedence refers basically to seating arrangements and to who gets to speak first. Although it seems an exclusively ceremonial issue, due to the highly symbolic nature of precedence, it complicated international relations during 200 years or more,74 until the equality of all states was universally recognised as a principle, facilitated by the 71

72 73 74

This observation is what leads to a basic question underlying the present investigation as outlined in the introduction; that when a post-sovereign political entity arises in the international system, this can be expected to undertake a different form of diplomacy that does not necessarily obey the norms and practices of the Westphalian system, of which it is not a constituent unit. When one of the three elements, in this case the form of political organisation, can be observed to be changing, it becomes an imperative to investigate the impact this new form of political organisation has for diplomacy and the nature of the international system Paul Sharp, “For diplomacy: representation and the study of international relations,” International Studies Review, vol. 1, 1999, p. 51. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. Matthew Smith Anderson, The rise of modern diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993), p. 17.

Conceptual Framework

35

increasing functional similarity of the states in the international system. The solution found by the states was to regulate the issue of precedence by seniority of function (meaning the ambassador in a given receiving state that has longest been the ambassador), by alphabetic order of the names of the states represented at a given diplomatic function, or by rotation.75 For instance, in the UN, the states are seated alphabetically according to the names of the states in English, whereas in the EU Council of Ministers, the Member States are seated alphabetically according to the name of each state in its own language.76 All the above-mentioned ideas held by the states can also be considered an expression of the shared identity of being a state. When constructing its identity, each state does so be defining itself in opposition to the rest of the states, leading to the definition of other states as being equal, albeit different, and the idea of reciprocity, since the mutual recognition of sovereignty is integral to this construction. Simultaneously, a shared identity of being a state is also constructed, since a state only has the other states to mirror when defining which kind of entity it is. This similarity is reinforced by the similarity in the hiring and training of the diplomats, and their ways of working.77 ­Regardless of ideological or geopolitical differences between states, their diplomacy is organised in a functionally similar manner. The diplomats all share the same d­ iplomatic culture and thereby constitute an epistemic community with shared norms and values, the only difference being the name of the state they represent. There is thus an inherent identity conflict in Westphalian diplomacy, between the essential shared identity of being a state, and the relational identities each state has that define it as a specific state vis-à-vis the rest of the states in the international system. The rise of diplomacy during the Renaissance thus saw the states increasingly mutually estranged from each other giving rise to the future of modern diplomacy. At the same time, however, they were stuck in past traditions of universal solidarity, seen in the agreement to keep the diplomatic system constrained to Europe and not consider hostilities in overseas colonies as part of the relations between the states. Thereby they alienated their internal estrangement to the boundaries of the shared Christian world. In this sense, the rise of Westphalian diplomacy was characterised by the states 75 76 77

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Manual De Derecho Diplomático (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), p. 187. Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 57. Jozef Bátora, Foreign Ministries and the Information Revolution. Going Virtual? (Leiden : Martinus Nijhoff, 2008), p. 15.

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having one foot in the past while being eager to plant the other in an uncertain future.78 Different dynamics of alienation are fundamental to the Westphalian system. A first dynamic of alienation is the common alienation from the preceding imperial international system and the corresponding religious unity, meaning that a central authority exists in the system. A second dynamic is the alienation from the extreme conditions of pure hegemony and pure anarchy, and third, the mutual alienation among states due to the conflict of interests among them. In other words, in the Westphalian system there is a tension between the fragmenting force created by the alienation among states leading them to pursue individual interests in conflict, and the integrating force created by the common alienation from the conditions of hegemony and anarchy, which would be in the interest of no state. Westphalian diplomacy is the answer to mediate the tension, by establishing sets of generally accepted ideas and practices, enabling states to avoid the conditions of hegemony and anarchy and it operates in an international system of states which are at the same time united and divided by their common and mutual alienation giving rise to a balance of power logic.79 This is related to the Westphalian idea that no central authority exists in the international system, be it religious or not, that can judge and neutrally mediate among the contradictory particular interests of the states. This idea arose with the erosion of the authority of the Pope and the Christian unity towards Islam which occurred in tandem with increasing alienation among the European political entities. To maintain a degree of order and not end in an undesirable state of anarchy, the causal idea of a balance of power being a cause of international stability arose on the Italian peninsula in the first half of the 15th century.80 The international system that arose with the sovereign state is thus characterised by sets of reciprocal orientations among alienated states, which by means of the mutual recognition of sovereignty obtain their objectives of power and self-preservation. The objective of power creates a dynamic of hegemony, in that each state seeks to maximise its power. This dynamic is opposed to the logic of anarchy, in which each state struggles for its sovereignty. A balance of power among sovereign 78

79 80

James Der Derian, On Diplomacy: A Genealogy of Western Estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 130. I will argue that the same is characteristic of the diplomatic activities of the EU, being anchored in the diplomatic practices of the past while at the same time reaching out to the uncertain future of post-sovereign antidiplomacy. Ibidem, p. 133. Matthew Smith Anderson, The rise of modern diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 150–151.

Conceptual Framework

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equals emerged as the main organising principle of the international system81 and is manifested in diplomatic meta-practices such as the construction of alliances, institutionalised or not, against a particularly powerful state and the development of own capabilities to avoid the dominance of others. Diplomatic meta-practices thus serves thus to balance the opposing logics of hegemony and anarchy inherent in the international system due to the states pursuing their fundamental interests of self-preservation and power, which in their pure form as a totally anarchic system and a totally hegemonic system are contrary to the interests of all states, hence Watson’s notion of the nature of the international system swinging as a pendulum between the two extremes of anarchy and hierarchy, with the precise position of the pendulum changing over time, whilst the international system is always structured according to a compromise between the two extremes.82 The Westphalian system is therefore characterised by the tension between the imperatives for the recognition of difference and for rapprochement. The recognition of sovereign equality is at the same time a recognition of the differences between the states. Since the mutual recognition of sovereign equality is the basis of diplomacy, this can be seen as an institutionalisation of the difference and its continuous expression in practice. Diplomatic practice this way sustains the fundamental differences between states. At the same time, however, diplomacy arose because of a perceived need to communicate with other states and to pursue a foreign policy towards these. The content of diplomacy, dictated by foreign policy priorities of political approximation to other states, is this way at odds with the form of diplomacy which institutionalises difference and draws firm borders between states. These conflicting imperatives have their roots in the basic tension in diplomacy between universalism and particularism and is reflected in the potentially conflicting imperatives of individual diplomats, which are to further the particular interests of the state they represent, while at the same time further the universal interest of resolving all differences peacefully83 and maintaining a structural status quo. 81 82 83

Robert Cooper, The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twenty-first century, (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), pp. 4–5. Adam Watson, The Evolution of International Society (London: Routledge, 1992); Adam Watson, The Limits of Independence. Relations between States in the Modern World (London: Routledge, 1997). Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 82, argue that this tension in diplomacy is universal, and not restricted to the Westphalian states system.

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2.3.2 Westphalian Diplomatic Practice Diplomatic practices are understood here loosely as those practices by which states conduct their foreign policy and relate to other actors in the international system. Part of the problem is here that some authors include under the rubric of what diplomacy is simply all official tasks of diplomats, which would make the practices define what diplomacy is, rather than the contrary approach adopted in this study, namely that of letting an essentialist definition of diplomacy determine which are diplomatic practices and which are not. As such, practices regarding gathering information and informing the home government of current developments in the receiving state are not considered diplomatic practices, except very indirectly insofar as they can be considered part of the decision-making process of how to manage relations with the particular state. Another set of practices excluded are those relevant to promoting specific economic interests of firms from the accrediting state in the receiving state. A central source in the description of Westphalian diplomacy is the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.84 This is the universal international agreement that regulates the functioning of diplomacy, but its value stems not only from the universal applicability of the agreement, but from the fact that it puts explicitly on paper the ideas and practices of Westphalian diplomacy that has developed over centuries, making explicit the regulation of diplomatic practice. As such, it is a codification of the general and specific ideas, norms and practices that have developed over centuries. This makes the investigation into Westphalian diplomacy that much easier, since the Vienna Convention contains the generally accepted ideas and practices of Westphalian diplomacy, so that extensive investigations into diplomatic discourses and practices, or reliance on previous studies of such a nature becomes unnecessary. An important element regulating Westphalian diplomatic practice is the immunity of representatives and the prohibition to inspect their belongings. The idea of the immunity of the representative did not arise as a concept with the Westphalian system, but is probably the oldest norm of diplomatic culture,85 without which no negotiation is possible. The purpose is exclusively the smooth functioning of diplomatic relations, seen in that it is the diplomatic practice that is protected, since the protection is extended to the exercise of the diplomatic function and not to other activities. An often-mentioned 84 85

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Manual De Derecho Diplomático (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), p. 73.

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example is economic activities in the receiving state, with respect to which the diplomat does not enjoy immunity from civil jurisdiction and is not exempt from paying taxes.86 The smooth functioning of diplomacy is also sought ensured by the idea of the inviolability of communication and premises, which makes evident that it is the function and not the persons that are protected. The communication referred to here is that between a state and its missions in the exterior, which the receiving state cannot interfere with. The Vienna Convention defines all types of communication as being inviolable,87 which means not only the emblematic practice of the diplomatic pouch and diplomatic mail, which are the forms specifically mentioned in the convention. Also verbal communication by telephone or video conference is included, as is electronic forms of communication, such as for instance emailing. The inviolability of premises refers principally to the premises of the diplomatic missions, i.e. the embassy, but is extended also to the residence of the diplomats and their belongings. Also shared norms that regulate specific practices in detail exist. For instance, these norms define how to write diplomatic correspondence depending on the topic of the communication, detailed to the point of defining the structure of the communication in paragraphs. Also stylistic norms exist defining the appropriate vocabulary and phrases as well as fixed expressions and which language is used.88 A useful distinction to make as for the diplomatic practices is a functional one between those that serves a purpose of negotiation, which the Vienna Convention explicitly establishes as one of the principal practices of diplomacy, on one hand, and on the other hand those that serves what Bull calls reduction of friction89 and Cuéllar diplomatic management.90 The practices in this latter category are characterised by not having the purpose of achieving a specific objective, but instead seek to maintain good relations in general with other states, so that future negotiations will be easier, i.e. giving the machinery of inter-state relations a bit of oil, so that it will run more smoothly when

86 87 88 89 90

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 31. Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, art. 27. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Manual De Derecho Diplomático (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), pp. 149–151. Hedley Bull, The anarchical society: A study of order in world politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 165. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Manual De Derecho Diplomático (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), p. 139.

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­ ecessary. Examples are congratulations to elected politicians, greetings on the n occasion of national celebrations of the constitution or independence or other practices of courtesy. Other practices are more difficult to group, since they may serve both functions of courtesy and specific negotiation depending on the specific circumstance. A telephone call between head of states for instance, can serve to persuade, negotiate, clarify positions or cultivating personal relations, or more probable, a mix of these elements. The most emblematic of diplomatic practices is arguably the sending of a diplomatic mission. The classic symbol of bilateral diplomacy is the opening of an embassy in another state, i.e. accrediting a permanent diplomatic representation to the receiving state. This practice arose among the city-states in Northern Italy in the 15th century,91 and has been a rather uniform practice since the 16th century.92 The Vienna Convention defines the staff categories of the embassy and makes explicit their rights and duties, foremost of which are the immunity and inviolability. Nevertheless, diplomatic law makes clear that the diplomatic mission is an institution different from its manifestation in the buildings of the embassy and staff homes and the persons themselves.93 Therefore, ad-hoc representations are also considered diplomatic missions, although they do not have buildings. These enjoy roughly the same rights and privileges as any diplomatic mission. The ad-hoc diplomatic practice is the most ancient of diplomatic practices, used also when relations among political entities were not so intense as to necessitate a permanent representation. Instead, a messenger was sent by one political entity to convey a message to another or to negotiate a specific issue,94 which remains the general function of ad-hoc diplomacy. It is characterised by its limitation in time and the specific objective which the mission serves, for instance when sending a group of experts to negotiate issues of a technical nature. Another function is the reduction of friction, when a minister or other high ranking official is sent to a function in the receiving state to show more respect than would sending an embassy official. As such, when a head of state, or any other representative visits a another state, they are considered a diplomatic mission, although diplomatic law makes a formal distinction between those diplomatic missions

91 92 93 94

Matthew Smith Anderson, The rise of modern diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993), p. 7. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Manual De Derecho Diplomático (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), p. 77. Ibidem, p. 55. Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The practice of diplomacy: Its evolution, theory and administration (London: Routledge, 1995), pp. 7–8.

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constituted by heads of state, or similar high ranking officials, and other specialised diplomatic missions.95 The primary form of communicating officially, however, is in writing,96 in the form of a note taken by the ambassador, or another diplomat from the accrediting state, to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the receiving state.97 Various types of written communication exist, the usage and writing of which is regulated by norms. The diplomatic note is the most used form of communicating officially between an embassy and the receiving state, and it can take different forms, with stamp or not, being signed or not.98 The signed note is the most used form.99 It is used for important questions and in negotiations. Another type of written communication is the memorandum, which is used to communicate points of view or interpretation of previous communication. The unilateral declaration is used to communicate a standpoint on a given issue or voicing and opinion or interpretation of a specific event.100 All the types of written communication, as well as oral communication, adhere to a certain structure, and makes extensive use of standard phrases and forms of understatement,101 which facilitates communication and expresses the due amount of courtesy. Another prominent feature is the use of constructive ambiguities,102 used to express opinion while remaining flexible and avoiding closing any doors to potential future interpretations and agreements, but also to allow for the fact that much communication cannot be restricted exclusively to one audience, but is heard by many, such as for instance a public speech by a state leader on a given subject. Emailing is also used to communicate, although it suffers from security problems, like the fax, the telephone and the videoconference, which have always been accompanied by important security 95

Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Manual De Derecho Diplomático (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), pp. 135–137. 96 Neumann characterises diplomacy as the art of negotiation in writing. Iver B. Neumann, The English School on diplomacy, Discussion papers in diplomacy (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2002), p. 24. 97 All official communication between the representation of the accrediting state and the receptor state must be via the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receptor state, as made explicit in the 1928 agreement between various American states: Convención Sobre Funcionarios Diplomáticos, art. 13. 98 Eduardo Vilariño Pintos, Curso de derecho diplomático y consular, 2nd edition (Madrid: Tecnos, 2003), p. 197. 99 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Manual De Derecho Diplomático (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), p. 146. 100 Ibidem, p. 80. 101 Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 46. 102 Ibidem, p. 72.

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measures and generally there is hesitation in the use of new communication technologies.103 In the case of the communication between the accrediting state and its embassy abroad, also the regular mail can be intercepted by the receiving state, although explicitly prohibited by the Vienna Convention. The encryption of communication is therefore a diplomatic practice that goes back more than 400 years.104 Apart from the various types of written communication, the personal meeting between the ambassador, or another diplomat, with officials from the receiving state is an important practice. The meeting as a diplomatic practice has certain advantages over written communication when it comes to negotiate subtleties, and for the reduction of friction by generating confidence and understanding it is indispensable. Also, to persuade the receiving state or the ambassador of a point of view, the personal meeting is more effective than written communication. As a communicative practice complementary to written communication, the personal meeting is indispensable for diplomacy to function smoothly.105 In contrast to Neumann’s stressing of the importance of written communication, Pérez de Cuéllar considers the verbal negotiation the classical and most usual of diplomatic practices.106 A different communicative practice is the telephone call, which permits rapid communication advantageous is certain situations, such as during crisis. Other advantages are that it is possible to correct misunderstandings instantaneously and adjust positions during the conversation. Another advantage shared with the personal meeting is that it can be assured that the other part has received and understood the transmitted message. Also, not only members of the diplomatic mission can telephone, but also high-ranking officials based in state capitals and heads of state can talk directly with one another, thereby creating personal sympathy (or antipathy) at the highest levels of the state hierarchy. The disadvantages of the telephone explaining why high-ranking officials do not just telephone each other, are the linguistic barrier that might separate two states, but also the time difference between two capitals which makes written communication more apt. Also, in many situations it is convenient to have time to think and analyse the situation, something which the telephone does not permit. As such, the telephone call is supplementary to the other communicative practices. 103 G.R. Berridge, Diplomacy: Theory and Practice (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005), p. 93. 104 Matthew Smith Anderson, The rise of modern diplomacy, 1450–1919 (London: Longman, 1993), pp. 22–23. 105 Eduardo Vilariño Pintos, Curso de derecho diplomático y consular, 2nd edition (Madrid: Tecnos, 2003), p. 71. 106 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Manual De Derecho Diplomático (Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1997), p. 145.

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Two modalities of diplomacy are normally distinguished, since they give rise to different practices. The above-mentioned practices are primarily related to the bilateral relations between two states, but multilateral diplomacy gives rise to certain different diplomatic practices that can be divided into two primary categories: Conferences and international organisation. The international conference is an ad-hoc international meeting of representatives of a range of states, often ministers or heads of state. It is used as a diplomatic practice to mediate among many states when a specific issue concerns them all, and is characterised by the limited extension in time and the specific objectives. With respect to international organisation, it is distinguished by its long-term existence and the high degree of institutionalisation of the cooperation. It surged particularly after World War i, when the League of Nations was very important for the gradual institutionalisation of multilateral diplomacy, facilitating the interaction when issues required continuous interaction of several states. To summarise as for the Westphalian diplomatic practices, the permanent representation is the most classical and perhaps still the most important of bilateral diplomatic practices. New communication technologies permit rapid communication among states, which is particularly useful in times of crises and for courtesy calls. In a period of globalisation where problems require global governance rather than bilateral settlements, multilateral diplomacy becomes increasingly important. 2.4

Antidiplomacy: An Ideal Type

Antidiplomacy is the anti-thesis of diplomacy, and it will here be used basically in the sense of James Der Derian,107 who considers the phenomenon in two chapters in his 1987 book, namely those on Anti-diplomacy and Neo-diplomacy,108 as well as in his later book on antidiplomacy.109 Although antidiplomacy can rightly be considered diplomacy’s “ultimate other” and a “conceptual monster,”110 the approach is not here to consider the relationship 107 For a broader analysis of different analytical approaches to antidiplomacy, see Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), pp. 189–256. 108 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987). 109 James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1992). 110 Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), pp. 192–193.

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between antidiplomacy and diplomacy, but to consider antidiplomacy as an ideal type of international interaction that is antagonistic to the Westphalian ideal type and is used to complement this as a benchmark for assessing the nature of EU diplomacy within the context of the current global process of pluralisation. EU diplomacy can subsequently be analysed not only in terms of what it shares and does not share with Westphalian diplomacy, but also the traits that it may share with antidiplomacy,. 2.4.1 Antidiplomatic Identities, Ideas and Meta-practices The downfall of the suzerain state system that gave rise to the Westphalian paradigm of diplomacy was brought about by the conflict between a religious universalism and a political particularism that the suzerain system could not incorporate. The resulting Westphalian diplomacy effectively mediated the alienation among states, but as a result also organised the international system on the basis of the particularism of the states111 and ignored the unity of humankind alienated from nature and God. Antidiplomacy arose to counter the particularism and the system of mediation among states and replace it with the mediation of the alienation of a universal humankind.112 Antidiplomacy is difficult to identity empirically in the international system, due to its incompatibility with the hegemonic Westphalian ideal type. It exists primarily as a philosophical aspiration to how the world should be organised and not as an empirically observable phenomenon or concept structuring the international system.113 The concept of antidiplomacy is thus linked to utopian dreams of how the perfect international society is and can be brought about and thereby how to ensure a perpetual global peace. It has as its basis a longing for a lost unity and has as a central tenet the objective of overcoming the alienation of the peoples organised in states. The philosophical roots go back, at least, to the Enlightenment thinkers that confided in that an increase in the use of Reason would and should lead to the “moral and political unification of the entire human race.”114 Another version of antidiplomacy could also be identified in Nazi Germany and Hitler’s “antidiplomatic brutality,”115 which 111 Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 36. 112 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 136. 113 Ibidem, p. 142. 114 Linklater, quoted in Christer Jönsson and Martin Hall, Essence of Diplomacy (Houndsmills: Palgrave, 2005), p. 36. 115 Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), p. 211.

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was also based on a negative identification with the Westphalian system of sovereign – and thereby equal – states as expressions of the peoples. Whereas Westphalian diplomacy is defined in terms of the sovereign state, antidiplomacy is defined against the state and against the notion of sovereignty, in a process of de-territorialisation.116 A central idea is that the organisation of peoples into geographically defined territorial states is neither inevitable nor desirable. It is the segregation of humankind into alienated states that is the source of human misery. Emphasis is thus on the universal human nature and the shared interests of all peoples, and the state becomes not an embodiment or a servant of the people, but a bureaucratic monster that is the master of the people, serving its own interests at the expense of the interests of the people. The central actor is thus the revolutionary movement that acts internationally in representation of the people to bring an end to the existing Westphalian system. In terms of the identity of antidiplomatic actors, it is one of being enlightened and morally superior, acting in the interests of the people as an organic entity and not merely the interests of a ruling class. The sovereign state is the main problem in the international system and therefore also the main enemy that should be fought. Antidiplomatic revolutionaries therefore do not share the identity of states as actors in the international system. In the case of the France, the revolutionaries identified the New France negatively with the surrounding monarchic states, and in the Russian case, the Soviet Union identified negatively with the capitalist states. An important point is here that the negative identification was not only in terms of relational state identities, meaning in the sense of being a different kind of state. The negative identification was with all other existing states as a category, something which represents a more profound difference. As a consequence hereof, the revolutionary states were also unable to recognise the sovereignty of other states. The objectives of the revolutions were universal, aiming to liberate not only a specific people from a repressive government, but to liberate all peoples from the tyranny of the states generally. The objective was to overthrow foreign governments and overcome the condition of alienation between the peoples. The antidiplomatic actor identity is thus strongly conditioned by the perception of the international system and is indeed defined in opposition to the state and the international states system with its established Westphalian forms of diplomatic interaction. The identity does not revolve around a specific actor with defined interests to be defended peacefully in the interaction with 116 Ibidem, particularly p. 231.

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other entities, but has a clear systemic aspiration in that the main objective is systemic and the main actor therefore a revolutionary movement that acts on behalf of all peoples, a universal humankind. The systemic focus and universalist self-perception of antidiplomats are defining features of antidiplomacy that gives rise to certain causal ideas and meta-practices. A central element of antidiplomacy is thus to refuse to recognise the alienation among states as an inevitable condition leading to a causal idea of the segregation of the peoples into states as being the root cause of war and human misery. Therefore, the central objective of antidiplomacy is systemic transformation towards a universal human society, beyond the Westphalian segregation of peoples. This leads logically to the causal idea is that the eradication of the alienation of states and the (re)unification of humankind is the only way to ensure the security and welfare of the peoples. Westphalian diplomacy is both a product and cause of the segregation of humankind into alienated states and in this sense, it is part of the problem and can never be considered a method for bringing about the desired systemic change. Therefore, antidiplomatic thinkers identify the end of (Westphalian) diplomacy as a central strategic objective.117 The term antidiplomacy is therefore adequate not only because it is defined in opposition to (Westphalian) diplomacy but also because it seeks to abolish it and achieve a global transformation. This antagonistic relationship is not limited to philosophical debates, but can also be found in in the practice of antidiplomats, who were afraid that their newly constructed ideal societies would be contaminated by the ideas held by other states through the diplomatic interaction. Thomas Jefferson considered existing diplomacy the plague of world peace118 and the French Revolution thought of (Westphalian) diplomacy as a system of tyranny and evil that should be destroyed, leading the contemporary Burke to write that “the Treaty of Westphalia is, with France, an antiquated story.”119 This quote also reflects the other side of the story, namely the fear that existing states had of the revolutionaries and the instability that their ideas and practices could bring to the international system. For instance, the fear that Western European capitalist states had of the revolutionaries of the Soviet Union during its first years of existence can be seen as a good part of

117 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), pp. 166–167. 118 David Armstrong, “The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in diplomatic practice (Houndsmills, MacMillan, 1999), 43–59, p. 44. 119 Quoted in James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 171.

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the explanation of why the rise of fascist states in Europe was seen as a minor threat compared to the Soviets far into the 1930s.120 As for the distrust and even hate of French and Soviet antidiplomats of Westphalian diplomacy, a good part of the explanation, apart from the opposing causal ideas, is probably to be found in the fact that in contrast to what happens in democratic states, the diplomatic service was at the service not of the people generally, but rather at the service of the monarch and a small elite. Antidiplomacy, in contrast, serves the people and not the state or a determined elite within society.121 Not recognising the sovereignty of other states and having as a professed aim the end of (Westphalian) diplomacy, it is logical that antidiplomatic practice should not be guided by principles such as reciprocity, respect for diplomatic immunities and other behavioural norms related to protocol and courtesy aimed at reducing friction in the international system. The central causal idea of antidiplomacy is to overcome the condition of alienation among peoples organised in states as the way to peace and welfare for all. At least two distinct branches of antidiplomatic meta-practices drawing on this causal idea can be distinguished, in turn giving rise to very different practices. First, classical Idealist theory surrounding the systemic reordering after World War i contained the idea that as democracy spread, state governments would be increasingly true representatives of the interests of the peoples and that it was possible to rationally design an international system guaranteeing peace and prosperity for all.122 This was to be through a new form of interaction, where states would realise that they had shared interests that allowed them to create a central authority in the international system, thus dramatically reducing the importance of the alienated nature of relations of states, if not totally overcoming this. The solution was creating a new legalised and institutionalised international system through open covenants openly arrived at, associated with US President Wilson’s fourteen points.123 The best empirical example is probable the League of Nations, which was to be established as a central authority capable of imposing the collective rational interests of the peoples on any transgressor state. The organisation ultimately failed, amongst other factors due to its insufficient level of competences and 120 David Armstrong, “The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in diplomatic practice (Houndsmills, MacMillan, 1999), 43–59, p. 45. 121 Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian, “Sustaining global hope: Sovereignty, power and the transformation of diplomacy,” in Costas M. Constantinou and James Der Derian (eds.), Sustainable diplomacies (New York: Palgrave, 2010), pp. 1–22, p. 6. 122 Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), p. 217. 123 Ibidem, pp. 229–230.

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material capabilities to enforce an international peace in the face of aggressive policies of powerful states. With global history as it unfolded during the 1930’s, the notion of a grand institutional design to resolve international problems of peaceful coexistence was thus effectively side-lined.124 In this sense, the efforts towards an institutionalisation of international interaction with the aim of establishing a central authority can be considered one important antidiplomatic meta-practice. A second branch of antidiplomatic meta-practices were not based on causal ideas of a reformed diplomacy being able to lead to the overcoming of alienation, but on the immediate breaking down of the power structures of oppressor states impeding the unity of mankind. The refusal to recognise any universal basis for international interaction was in part due to the idea of not recognising existing states as legitimate actors, but also because it would slow down the realisation of the utopia.125 The causal ideas defining the existing state structures and the Westphalian system of diplomacy as sources of war and human misery rapidly led the philosophical universalist utopia to degenerate into meta-practices associated with espionage, sabotage, terrorism and subversion of foreign political systems, giving rise to violence as a main antidiplomatic practice.126 2.4.2 Antidiplomatic Practices The universalist ambitions of the antidiplomatic revolutions of France and Russia made war justified with reference to the need for liberating the peoples of other tyrannical states, an idea of just war that Der Derian traces back to Thomas More’s 1516 Utopia.127 In the case of the French Revolution, aggressive war was justified by the need to liberate other European peoples from the tyranny of the monarchic states. To extend the principles of the Revolution was thus key to overcoming alienation in the international system. For this reason, and for the common aversion of other European states to the French Revolution, revolutionary France soon found itself at war. It is noteworthy that the objective of the revolutionaries was never to conquer territory with the aim 124 This interpretation of Idealism and its failure as a political doctrine is largely based on: Edward Hallett Carr, The Twenty Year’s Crisis 1919–1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations (London: MacMillan, 1951). 125 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 153. 126 The specific focus of Der Derian’s book in a broader context. James Der Derian, Antidiplomacy: Spies, Terror, Speed, and War (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Blackwell, 1992). 127 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 145.

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of annexation and direct control, since this was seen as limiting the freedom of other peoples, but only to extend the principles of the Revolution.128 Incapable of being simply another entity in the existing international system and interact through Westphalian diplomatic practice, France had no other option than to promote the Revolution through war and other subversive means, for example, sending representatives to North America to instigate anti-monarchic rebellions against the parts of the continent controlled by England and Spain.129 However, these very practices lead to an increased alienation of the French people from other European peoples due to the fear of invasion, thus questioning the very purpose of these practices. This was further reinforced by the shift from a professional to a popular army, which again required the construction of enemy images and French nationalism for recruitment to the army. Also, engaging in war against other powerful states made alliances and military support from other states necessary. To obtain this, it was necessary to recognise these states as legitimate and negotiate with them, thereby undermining the antidiplomatic ideals of the Revolution.130 The final French defeat in the Napoleonic Wars had the effect of obliging France to recognise its adversaries as legitimate actors and negotiate with them based on Westphalian ideas of sovereignty and reciprocity.131 The result was a normalisation of France as a state and as an international actor, although the universality of the ideals of the French Revolution continues to be an important element of French political identity which gives France a clear international mission.132 The Russian Revolution is another good example of empirical ­antidiplomacy that shares its basic features with the French revolutionary antidiplomacy. The goal of the Russian revolution was also clearly universal in that it sought not only to overcome the alienation of states on a global scale but to eradicate the states system through the installation of a global communist society.133 The initial peaceful antidiplomacy under the leadership of Trotsky soon failed. One of its elements was to publish the content of diplomatic negotiations and s­ ecret 128 Ibidem, p. 174. 129 David Armstrong, “The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in diplomatic practice (Houndsmills, MacMillan, 1999), 43–59, pp. 48–49. 130 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 171. 131 Ibidem, p. 177. 132 Henrik Larsen, Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis. France, Britain and Europe (London: Routledge, 1997). 133 James Der Derian, On diplomacy: A genealogy of Western estrangement (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987), p. 183.

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treaties and since Westphalian diplomacy only served the interests of the capitalist class and not the people as such, it was necessary to stop participating in it, close the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and find ways to communicate directly with foreign publics.134 Perhaps most notably, the refusal to continue to fight in World War i had as an immediate consequence that the German army was able to make huge territorial gains, an experience which illustrates very clearly the futility of unilateral antidiplomatic practice in a Westphalian world. It soon became necessary to defend Russia not only against continuous German advances eastwards, but also against the Western-backed “white guerrillas,” leading to the creation of the powerful Red Army, thus passing from the peaceful utopian practices to violent antidiplomacy. Furthermore, since the Revolution did not spread as wished and the Red Army was unable to impose its ideals on foreign powers, it soon became necessary for the Revolution to establish some kind of modus vivendi with the capitalist states. This could only be achieved with a basis in the ideas and practices of existing Westphalian diplomacy, in which the Soviet Union participated as a normal actor henceforth. It is noteworthy the speed with which the reversion to the Westphalian mode of diplomacy occurred. The foreign diplomats arrested in January 1918 in disrespect of the inviolability and immunity of diplomats were released already the following day as a result of the outcry of the accrediting states that protested the violation of century-old customs.135 On a more symbolic level, in 1922 the Soviet Union restored all the traditional diplomatic ranks abolished during the Revolution,136 thus also accepting an internal organisation along Westphalian lines. Still, the Soviet Union continued throughout its existence to act on the initial causal ideals related to the universality of its ideas, seen in the global support for Communist parties and movements. Apart from these two examples of the antidiplomacy of the French and Russian Revolutions, further antidiplomatic practices are those of espionage and terrorism. Espionage is characterised by being an essentially antidiplomatic practice that Westphalian states also engage in, up to the point that there seems to be an intersubjective understanding that it is done and what should happen in case of being discovered. Terrorism, in contrast, is generally a practice recurred to as part of as a substitute for or complement to classical warfare, and has always existed as both a domestic and international practice. War is an antidiplomatic practice that nevertheless forms part of the 134 Ibidem, p. 197. 135 David Armstrong, “The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in diplomatic practice (Houndsmills, MacMillan, 1999), p. 55. 136 Ibidem, p. 53.

Conceptual Framework

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i­ ntersubjective understandings of Westphalian states also, as manifested in the Humanitarian Law regulating the conduct of war. In contrast, terrorism is a form of dealing with alienation in the international system that is completely beyond the shared social structures of Westphalian diplomacy. It is recurred to as a practice precisely by those actors who are not recognised diplomatically or politically as legitimate, be it Al-Qaeda or isis. Without going into an analysis of the ideologies of these actors, it seems straightforward to interpret them as classical antidiplomacies, although their universalism could be seen as limited to Muslims. They would share fundamental antidiplomatic self-perceptions and causal ideas that makes it the objective to liberate the Muslim peoples from the tyranny of the existing states, overcome the condition of alienation by the destruction of the state structures and forms of interaction and achieve the moral, religious and political unification of all believers by recurring to any effective practice, including warfare and terror. As for the antidiplomatic ideal type, it can be concluded that its antagonistic relationship with Westphalian diplomacy makes it unable to exist empirically in a stable form. Furthermore, the experiences of the French and Russian revolutions make evident that the actual functioning of the international system exercise a great isomorphic pressure upon all actors in the system.137 It was not possible for the antidiplomats to not engage in international interaction as sovereign states,138 even in the symbolic aspects of diplomacy, such as protocol and diplomatic rank. The lack of viable alternatives to Westphalian practices in turn influenced the meta-practices and identity of the antidiplomats so that their international action also came to resemble the Westphalian ideal types on these deeper layers of diplomacy. 2.5

Ideal Types and the Analysis of the Social Structure, Practices and Meta-practices of EU Diplomacy

The purpose of the present study is to assess the uniqueness of EU diplomacy in the context of the contemporary transformation of diplomacy so as to understand the nature of EU diplomacy and its likely future development as well as gain a better understanding of the broader phenomenon of the changes in 137 With the notion of isomorphic pressure I refer to the how the structures and day-to-day practices of the international system pressure international actors to become similar to the Westphalian state in terms of organisation and adapt their behaviour along the lines of Westphalian diplomatic practice. 138 David Armstrong, “The Diplomacy of Revolutionary States,” in Jan Melissen (ed.), Innovation in diplomatic practice (Houndsmills, MacMillan, 1999), 43–59, p. 56.

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diplomacy brought about by globalisation. To define an approach to the study of diplomacy that is capable of incorporating not only changes to diplomatic practice that leaves the essence of diplomacy as a social and political phenomenon intact, but also to conceptualise possible paradigmatic changes of diplomacy, this chapter has considered the ontological features of diplomacy and developed a layer model of diplomacy as a structured totality. This layer model allows for analysing not only diplomatic relationships but also to compare the diplomacy of a specific actor to that of another, by focusing on three distinguishable interconnected dimensions of diplomacy: (1) Actor identity and causal ideas, (2) meta-practices and (3) diplomatic practices. The significance of the difference found is then dependent on how deep a layer they are located at and whether differences are found in more than one layer. Due to the initial purposes, the analyticial strategy becomes to compare EU diplomacy to a fixed point and not the diplomacies of other actors that are themselves immersed in a process of transformation. Therefore, two ideal types of diplomacy were constructed that contain antagonistic elements on all three levels: Westphalian diplomacy and antidiplomacy. These ideal types are summarised in Annexes 1 through 3. The strategy for the empirical analysis that flows from this model is to analyse the three layers of EU diplomacy and to compare the findings to the ideal types. The empirical enquiry begins with the legal aspects of the EU’s identity in Chapter 3 (first-layer question), since the legal nature of the EU as a diplomatic actor is a logical first analytical step. Apart from this analytical parenthesis, the analysis will proceed according to the layer model beginning with the third-layer specific practices of EU diplomacy in its bilateral (Chapter 4) and multilateral relations (Chapter 5). The focus next turns to the second-layer question of the EU’s diplomatic meta-practices, where the institutionalisation and legalisation of EU diplomacy is analysed along with regionalisation (Chapter 6). The causal ideas of the EU that these metapractices reflect are then identified before these are interpreted in the context of the EU’s identity (first-layer question) in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 concludes as for EU diplomacy in relation to the ideal-types and the usefulness of the layer model for understanding EU diplomacy and its viability. Secondarily the discussion turns to what the study of EU diplomacy as defined here can help reveal about the broader phenomenon of the contemporary transformation of diplomacy in the context of globalisation.

Chapter 3

The Organisation of the EU as a Diplomatic Actor 3.1

The Historical Evolution of the EU as a Diplomatic Actor

To understand the present configuration and functioning of the European Union as a diplomatic actor it is important to note that this phenomenon of EU diplomacy is by no means new but can be understood as the result of a political process that has developed over several decades along with a gradual change in the attitudes of the Member States towards the global actorness of the EU1 and the gradual adaptation of the structures of EU diplomacy to accommodate the expansion of areas of Union competence. It is not the purpose here to provide an exhaustive description of the history of EU external action, but merely to situate the current configuration of the EU in its historical context by highlighting some key moments in the ongoing construction of the EU as a diplomatic actor. Already the European Coal and Steel Community (ecsc) established in 1951 by the Paris Treaty had diplomatic competences in that it could receive diplomatic missions from non-Member States, which were formally accredited to the High Authority (predecessor of the European Commission), and this same institution also opened permanent representations abroad, the first being in London in 1955.2 Although they could be characterised as mere information offices without any traditional diplomatic functions of representation and negotiation of international agreements,3 institutionally these Delegations of the High Authority were to be the predecessors of the current EU Delegations and have seen their functions develop in parallel with the broader process of European integration giving rise to both deeper and wider cooperation. Probably the most important event prior to the formal establishment of the eeas occurred when the project to create a European Defence Community 1 Stephan Keukeleire, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker convincingly argue the necessity of understanding EU diplomacy in this context, see: Stephan Keukeleire, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, The emerging EU system of diplomacy: how fit for the purpose?, Policy paper no. 1, Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Network on “The Diplomatic System of the European Union,” 2010, p. 1. 2 Hazel Smith, European Union foreign policy: What it is and what it does (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 51. 3 Michael Bruter, “Diplomacy without a State? the External Delegations of the European Commission,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 2, 1999, p. 183.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004372924_004

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was finally abandoned in 1954 when the French Parliament refused to ratify the agreement.4 This nodal point in the history of European integration effectively excluded security and defence matters from the agenda of European integration until the end of the Cold War and meant a bifurcation of the foreign policy of the EU and its institutional predecessors, where economic matters fell under community competence characterised by a supranational model of cooperation, whereas “political” matters and those with defence implications were excluded from community action. The bifurcation was institutionalised as the first and second pillars of the EU, respectively, with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993 and has historically meant that the EU institutions and Member States have different roles and make decisions by different procedures depending on the policy area, with the Common Foreign and Security Policy continuing to be based on consensus. Although the pillar structure of the Union was formally abolished by the Treaty of Lisbon, the differentiation of the policy areas continue to exist with respect to decision-making processes so this bifurcation is still a central characteristic of the EU as a diplomatic actor, as is the nature of EU foreign policy as complementary the nature of EU foreign policy as complementary to that of the Member States. The process of European integration continued after 1954 within primarily economic spheres, which has been important both as a background condition for the development of EU diplomacy and also given rise to certain specific developments. As a background condition, the functional cooperation characterised by logics of spill-over has contributed to a gradual creation of trust and mutual identification among Member States that has served both to consolidate the supranational model of integration in the EU and the emergence of a security community in the Deutschian sense in Western Europe.5 This creation of a sense of a common destiny and trust is undoubtedly an essential permissive condition for the gradual increase of EU diplomatic actorness. More directly, the increased economic integration had an important impact also on the EU’s international role. The European Economic Community (eec) established by the Rome Treaty in 1957 gave the Community exclusive competence and international legal personality in the area of the Common Commercial Policy, with the Commission being responsible for the relations with the UN and the gatt in these areas. The common external tariff that 4 Ben Soetendorp, Foreign policy in the European Union. Theory, history and practice ­(London: Longman, 1999), p. 133. 5 Deutsch sees a direct link between the functional cooperation in terms of transactions among the states and the emergence of the security community. Karl W. Deutsch, Political community and the North Atlantic area. International organisation in the light of historical experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

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was achieved in July 1968 also meant that the eec gained the competence to negotiate and conclude international agreements and as such has been a diplomatic actor capable of speaking with one voice in international relations for roughly fifty years, albeit within a limited policy area.6 These circumstances are what led to the formulation of the externalisation hypothesis by Schmitter.7 This basically describes developments in the EUs capacity for international agency as a function of the internal necessities of the EU, in this case the creation of a common market. A common external tariff inevitably brings with it a common commercial policy. Similar functional arguments can be found in neofunctionalist theory in the form of functional, political and cultivated spillover effects.8 In parallel, also the policy area of development cooperation saw a need for external action, with offices being established from 1965 onwards in developing countries to manage development aid, although initially without diplomatic status.9 Another important milestone for the EU’s development was the establishment of the European Political Cooperation (epc) on non-economic foreign policy matters, created at the margins of the Treaties and based on the ­Davignon report, in which the Member States established their intentions to share information, consult with other Member States on important matters of foreign policy and take joint action so as to be able to assume their responsibilities in the world.10 This was also affirmed as an objective in the 1970 Document on the European Identity, that explicitly sought to establish a separate international identity for “Europe” based on the values of representative democracy, rule of law, economic development and human rights.11 The setup of the epc included consulting with the Commission when relevant in an a­ ttempt 6 7 8

9 10 11

A fact stressed by Hazel Smith, European Union foreign policy: What it is and what it does (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 34, but ignored by many observers. As analysed by Ben Rosamond, Theories of European integration (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 93. It is beyond the scope of the present chapter to enter into a discussion of integration theories that seek to identify causes of European integration. For a good analysis of the spill-over arguments, see Jeppe Tranholm-Mikkelsen, “Neo-functionalism: obstinate or obsolete? A reappraisal of the new dynamism of the EC,” Millenium, vol. 20, no 1, 1991. Dieter Mahncke, “European Union diplomacy: Changes and challenges,” in Dieter Mahncke and Sieglinde Gstöhl (eds.), European Union Diplomacy: Coherence, unity and effectiveness (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2012), pp. 22–25. Report by the Foreign Ministers of the Member States on the problems of political unification (Davignon / Luxemburg Report), Luxemburg: Bulletin of the European Communities, 1970. Council of the European Communities, Document on the European Identity. Published by the Nine Foreign Ministers, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973, available at http://aei.pitt .edu/4545/01/epc_identity_doc.pdf (last accessed: September 2016).

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to coordinate policy areas, and it was institutionalised with the Single Act in 1987, up until when it existed merely as a political agreement among sovereign states.12 M.E. Smith has collected the first use of several foreign policy instruments by the EU, among which are particularly notable the first Declarations in 1970, coordination in the UN system (1971) and in the csce (1975) and the use of Community economic instruments for epc purposes (1975).13 The pillar structure of the European Union created by the Maastricht Treaty maintained the separation of economic integration in the first and supranational pillar from that of the new Common Foreign and Security Policy in the second intergovernmental pillar. This perpetuated and sedimented a complex model of EU diplomacy based on different competences in different policy areas, and with the same actors interacting differently according to the topic being the object of deliberation. The European Community continued to exist within the larger European Union with competence to act externally in policy areas where it had internal competences. In terms of decision-making, it was the Commission that would take initiative to negotiate international agreements in terms of trade and development cooperation, and the Commission that would represent the EC/EU in these policy areas. The Council would ­authorise the start of negotiations and formally conclude the resulting international agreement by qualified majority, consulting with the European Parliament.14 This meant that in practice the EC had substituted the Member States in trade negotiations.15 In areas of shared competences, such as education, health and culture, both the Commission and all Member States must consent to the agreement.16 The cfsp pillar was institutionalised as an intergovernmental area of ­cooperation of the Member States, a fact which should be understood in the absence of clear shared political goals in terms of general foreign and security policy, in contrast to the large degree of consensus on the first-pillar goals of global free trade through the reduction of tariffs and the removal of other barriers to trade. In the absence of shared goals, Member States had been ­reluctant 12 13 14 15

16

Michael E. Smith, “Diplomacy by decree: The legalization of EU foreign policy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 39, no. 1, 2001, p. 82. Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 54. EC Treaty (Nice), art. 300. Romualdo Bermejo García and Eugenia López-Jacoiste, “La pcc de la UE y la omc: su evolución y perspectivas de futuro tras el Tratado de Lisboa,” in Carlos R. Fernández Liesa and Castor M. Díaz Barrado (eds.), El Tratado de Lisboa: análisis y perspectivas (Madrid: Dykinson, 2008), p. 256. EC Treaty (Nice), art. 133.

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to transfer competences to the Commission and a system of majority voting in the Council and Parliament.17 As such, it was the European Council that established the general principles and common strategies of the cfsp, whereas the Council determined the common positions and common actions, always on the basis of consensus. The Treaty imposed on the Member States the obligation to make their foreign policies compatible with the common positions18 which were implemented through both Member State and Commission Delegation positions in bilateral relations and international organisations, with both having an obligation to coordinate and make their actions compatible.19 The obligation was therefore mainly to not hinder or act against EU agency, but not to actively cooperate, further established in the notion of constructive abstention, first introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty, by which Member States can abstain and thereby not veto joint action, but also not contribute to its implementation. In terms of the representation of the EU, this was a shared responsibility mainly of the Commission (first pillar) and the Presidency of the Council, which rotated to a new Member State every six months. A further complicating factor was therefore that the Commission Delegations to third states would either represent the Commission or the entire EU as a political entity, depending on the policy area in question. This basic institutional design gave rise to serious problems of horizontal coherence in EU foreign policy at the level of EU institutions (between the activities of different institutions and between different policy areas), and ­rivalry between especially the Commission and the Council Secretariat was the ­result.20 Furthermore, this lack of coherence was not helped by the lack of definition in the EU treaties on the precise competences of each institution regarding foreign policy and diplomatic representation, even if it is clear from the treaty text that coherence, as a function of the degree of compatibility and synergy between different external policies, was a general concern in the Treaty on European Union (teu) and mentioned in the common provisions.21 A classic example of incoherence is the tension between the export subsidies in EU agricultural policy, the objectives of trade liberalisation and the development 17 18 19 20

21

Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 6. teu (Nice), art. 15. Ibidem, arts. 11, 19 and 20. Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 30. teu (Nice), art. 3.

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cooperation objectives of strengthening agricultural production in developing countries. Different EU actors each defined policy objectives that were potentially contradictory in their external dimension, and coupled with the lack of hierarchy among these actors, the coordination problems were widely seen to reflect an inadequate functioning of the network of actors engaged in EU diplomacy. This inadequacy could also be seen as a lack of adaptation of the structures of the EU network to the international political reality. Whereas the complex institutional setup may have been an elegant expression of a political compromise among many Member States and EU institutions, the content of relations with third states most often transcended the pillar structure of the EU, so that having a different decision-making and diplomatic configuration according to policy areas was simply a bad fit when concrete conversations and negotiations covered several policy areas. This led to a gradual increase in the links between the pillars, where political initiatives were often the results of a combination of instruments with legal basis in both the first and second pillars.22 Apart from the problems of horizontal coherence that have always plagued the EU to the point of constituting a serious impediment to the impact of its foreign policy, another principal obstacle to achieving global influence is undoubtedly the combination of a lack of wide-spread agreement on foreign policy issues coupled with a decision-making procedure in the area of the second-pillar issue areas of the cfsp based on consensus. As the individual EU Member States retain full competences in traditional foreign policy and security matters, this means that any EU foreign policy coexists with the 28 individual foreign policies of the Member States, and the scene has thus been set not only for problems of horizontal coherence, but also for serious problems of vertical coherence, i.e. between EU-level policies and those of i­ ndividual Member States. Furthermore, when consensus is the decision-making ­procedure in cfsp matters, the EU can only formulate and implement a foreign policy if there is agreement among all Member States, which has resulted in many instances of EU inaction on the ground and the emission of vague political statements with which it is nearly impossible not to agree, particularly on some of the most controversial international topics. Before Lisbon, apart from problems of continuity due to the rotating Presidency and lack of coherent action due to the pillared structure and 22

Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 29.

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independent Member State actions, the EU has also been plagued by a lack of leadership23 to upgrade the common interest. All the actors involved in the formulation of EU foreign policy and its execution through diplomatic activities, both EU institutions and Member States, generally sought to cooperate, consult and coordinate their activities. Still, this was not enough to avoid that, taken as a whole, EU diplomacy was characterised by both horizontal and vertical incoherence with the effect of generating internal power struggles and confusion on the part of third states. According to the Commission, this complex organisation of EU diplomacy meant a significant loss of visibility of EU action as well as of direct political influence,24 and good personal relations between the High Representative (representing the Council in matters of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp)) and the Relex Commissioner (representing the Commission and the foreign policy areas of its competence) were central in avoiding even greater problems of incoherence.25 Apart from these general problems of political coherence, the sui generis network setup of the EU as a diplomatic actor also had a negative impact on the representation of the EU in third states and in international organisations. First, there was a general the lack of clarity on whether the Commission or the Presidency could legitimately represent the EU in a third state or an international organisation in which political issue area. Of course, a third state could not and cannot be expected to understand the intricacies of the internal distribution of competences between EU institutions and Member States. Another problem was caused by the rotating nature of the Presidency of the Council. This meant that every six months, a different EU Member State would represent the EU in areas of the cfsp, whereas the Commission Delegation would represent the EU in other areas, a problem identified both by the EU and third states.26 A partial solution to the problem of continuity was found with the troika formula of the previous, present and future presidencies. Nevertheless, this did not solve the related problem of the EU ­position

23

24 25 26

Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, “EU diplomacy post-Lisbon. The legacy of the Ashton era,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 49–63, pp. 50–51. European Commission, Europe in the World – some Practical Proposals for Greater Coherence, Effectiveness and Visibility, COM(2006) 278 final, 2006). Natividad Fernández Sola, El Servicio de Acción Exterior de la Unión Europea, Working paper no. 46/2008 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2008), p. 3. Ibidem, p. 2.

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when represented sometimes by Member States with very little political weight. An important aspect of diplomatic communication has to do with the rank of the representative sent, and for some third states it was perceived as a lack of interest or a negative message that the EU would send small Member States to represent the Union, as occurred during the crisis in Yugoslavia in 1991, where the EU presidency troika was constituted by the Netherlands, ­Luxemburg and Portugal.27 This is probably one of the clearest example of where EU external action suffered not by a lack of political agreement and complex internal organisation, but because of its diplomacy. The deception and anger cause by the diplomatic mission of the EU was not caused by the content of its proposals, but by the perceived lack of respect shown by the EU by sending persons considered to be low-level and without political weight. To offset the negative effects of the rotating Presidency, the post of High Representative was created and occupied by former Spanish Foreign Minister and nato Secretary-General Javier Solana. This only solved the problem partially, since in many cases, representatives of third states would still prefer to speak directly to the ambassadors of the United Kingdom, Germany or France. The reality remains that any EU representative can only represent a common EU position when this exists, and that while it is being negotiated, or if the Member States can only agree vague political statements, the relevant interlocutors for third states will continue to be the representatives of the EU Member States with the political determination and economic, military and diplomatic capabilities to act decisively and forcefully. Another formula was the updated troika format established after the Treaty of Amsterdam as the current and future Presidency of the Council, the High Representative and a Commission representative, normally the DG Relex Commissioner,28 which was generally representing the EU.29 In sum, due to the nature of the EU as a non-state actor and its complex organisation in a network of actors characterised by diffuse structures of authority and a lack of clarity, EU diplomacy was plagued by a number of problems, to which only partial solutions had been created. So with respect to the diplomatic representation of the EU, an ever stronger perception gradually arose among academic analysts and EU officials that the system had functioned poorly for years and that to continue along the same path was ever 27 Ibidem. 28 Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 229. 29 Hazel Smith, European Union foreign policy: What it is and what it does (London: Pluto Press, 2002), p. 108.

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less feasible.30 The phrase that came to dominate the discourses of the Council and the Commission31 was the “need to speak with a one voice” in the world, a concern that was also reflected in the academic doctrine. The confusion of third states due to the multiple representation32 seemed to suggest that the requirements to coordinate and cooperate established in the Treaties were not enough to ensure coherence and that it was necessary to reduce the complexity in terms of the number of different actors involved in EU diplomacy. Furthermore, due to more general processes of economic, political and social globalisation, ever more issue areas are the topic of diplomatic interchange and these are ever more interlinked, a fact which in itself had made the complex network organisation of EU diplomacy less adequate and thus created an isomorphic pressure upon the EU to adapt more conventional forms of diplomatic ­representation in an international system that, although undergoing transformation, at its core remains based on the Westphalian state as a form of political organisation. Also, the internal development of the EU as a polity has constituted a source of the isomorphic pressure to create a diplomacy that resembles the classical Westphalian state diplomacy to a greater extent. The EU has competences in ever more issue areas, and decisions are increasingly made with intervention of the European Parliament and majority voting in the Council. With more competences and more decision-making capacity, a more efficient form of diplomatic representation also seemed in order. These isomorphic pressures can also be conceptualised in terms of a gap between the expectations placed upon EU external action and its ability to deliver results, a phenomenon that is widespread among EU officials, third states and academic analysts.33 30 31 32 33

Simon Duke, “Providing for European-Level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the ­ uropean External Action Service,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4 , no. 2, 2009, p. 213. E Clara Portela, “El Servicio Europeo De Acción Exterior: Un Instrumento Para Reforzar La Política Exterior,” in Alicia Sorroza Blanco (ed.), Presidencia Española: Retos En Una Nueva Europa (Madrid: Elcano, 2010), p. 122. Simon Duke, “Providing for European-Level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the European External Action Service,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 212. Belén Becerril, “Un Paso Más Hacia Una Diplomacia Común Europea,” in Presidencia ­Española: Retos En Una Nueva Europa, in Alicia Sorroza Blanco (ed.), Presidencia Española: Retos En Una Nueva Europa (Madrid: Elcano, 2010), pp. 149–153, p. 149. The concept of a gap between the capabilities and expectation was first introduced by Christopher Hill, see Christopher Hill, “The Capabilities-Expectations Gap, Or Conceptualising Europe’s International Role,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 31, no. 3 (1993), pp. ­305–328; Christopher Hill, “Closing the Capabilities-Expectations Gap?” in John Peterson and ­Helene Sjursen (eds.), A Common Foreign Policy for Europe: Competing Visions of the cfsp (London: Routledge, 1998).

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The institutional reforms of the Lisbon treaty in the area of foreign policy and diplomacy are therefore the result of a decade-long political process ending up in a complex political compromise between Member States, the Parliament and the Commission,34 and should therefore be understood in these terms rather than as a blueprint designed from scratch by a rational unitary actor. 3.2

The Internal Setup of the EU as a Diplomatic Actor after Lisbon

An important motivation behind the Lisbon Treaty was to offset the problems of horizontal and vertical coherence in EU diplomacy and thereby strengthen the EU as an international actor. In this vein, the Treaty sought to eliminate the pillar structure, an important source of the EU’s coherence problems, but although the pillars formally disappear, the exercise was not entirely successful.35 The Lisbon Treaty creates a single institutional framework for EU external action, with important consequences for its diplomacy, but with respect to the decision making in the cfsp area, the former second pillar of the Union remains differentiated from the rest. It also modifies the general equilibrium between the EU institutions, generally expanding the influence of the European Parliament through the extension of the ordinary legislative procedure, where the Parliament is now equal to the Council when approving the proposals of the Commission. Another important factor representing another advance in the integration process is the extension of Council majority voting to more issue areas, fundamentally leaving consensus-based decision making to foreign and security policy. Whereas these general changes should not be disregarded, a principal conclusion is that the bifurcation of EU external action continues to exist as for the decision making, although it has been substantially modified with respect to its administration and the diplomatic representation of the EU in the exterior. Also, the Lisbon Treaty formulates the values and objectives of EU foreign policy generally and without prejudice to specific policy areas,36 which should

34 35 36

Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 65. Wolfgang Wessels and Franziska Bopp, The institutional architecture of cfsp after the Lisbon Treaty – Constitutional breakthrough or challenges ahead?, Challenge Research Papers no. 10 (Brussels: ceps, 2008), pp. 2–3 and p. 10. teu (Lisbon), art. 21.

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help the coherence of EU diplomacy, at least in principle, and the legal basis becomes clearer. Nevertheless, this increased coherence is of course with respects to goals that are compatible, in the sense that the same EU policies towards a specific third state will further them all, something which cannot be simply assumed is the case, e.g. with respect to the liberalisation of world trade, eradication of poverty in the world and the sustainable development of developing countries.37 With respect to the legal nature of the EU as an international actor, the Lisbon Treaty affirms that the EU is a political entity with legal personality.38 This considerably reduces the legal complexity of entering into international agreements, since it is now clear that the international agreements to which the EU is party create obligations for both the EU institutions and its Member States.39 Whereas such a unilateral declaration does not itself change the nature of the agreements that the EU has with third states and international organisations, the disappearance of the European Communities as a legal subject differentiated from the EU and its Member States undoubtedly also increases the political visibility of the EU. The practical implications of the changes should not be overestimated, however, since the principal limitation on the EU’s ability to conclude international agreements, before and after the Lisbon Treaty, derives from the need for internal political agreement among EU institutions, including approval by the European Parliament, and consensus among Member States, all depending on the nature of the agreement and the political issue area.40 Still, the subject status of the EU in the international system is consolidated and on the symbolic level this further contributes to strengthening the identity of the EU as an influential international actor. The fact that the European Atomic Energy Community (euratom) continues to exist as a separate legal subject means that also with the Lisbon Treaty the EU has two distinct international legal personalities, which reduces clarity as for the precise definition of the EU as an international actor. As such, it is the­ euratom that is an observer to the International Atomic Energy Agency and not the EU,41 although it is the EU Delegation that is tasked with informal

37 38 39 40 41

Some of the objectives defined in article 21. teu (Lisbon), art. 47. tfeu (Lisbon), art. 216. Ibidem, art. 218. Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt and Thomas Ramopoulos, “The EU in the world of international organisations: Diplomatic aspirations, legal hurdles and political realities,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 106.

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representation and coordination among EU Member States.42 Nevertheless, due to the low visibility and level of international activity of euratom, the conclusion remains that the Lisbon Treaty significantly simplifies the existence of the EU as an actor in the international system from a formal point of view, with the practical political implications being more difficult to estimate. Another important aspect of the EU’s legal personality is the transformation of the Delegations of the Commission in the exterior into European Union Delegations, representing the EU across all policy areas, with a European External Action Service being not only responsibly for the representation of the EU through the Delegations, but also the hub of EU foreign policy decisionmaking in Brussels. Rather than the change in the legal status of the Union, the impact of this institutional revolution will probably be much greater, since it streamlines not only the diplomatic representation of the Union but also creates new structures of interaction among diplomats and policy-makers that ­allow for an intensification of socialisation processes, thereby helping the gradual emergence of greater convergence among EU officials and Member State diplomats and policy-makers with respect not only to the specific political content of EU diplomacy in narrowly defined issue areas, but also more generally with respect to the identity of the EU and the causal ideas upon which its international agency is based. In the following sub-sections, the focus will be on the changes in the individual EU institutions that are most relevant for assessing the changes in EU diplomacy. 3.2.1 The European Council and Its Permanent President The Lisbon Treaty contains a number of innovations with respect to the European Council. It is formally made an Institution of the EU, but more importantly, the Vice-President of the Commission/High Representative of the Union for Foreign and Security Policy (HR/VP) participates in its meetings. This creates a direct link between the institutions where the Member States are represented at the highest level with the head of the eeas. As such, the strategic direction that the European Council is to provide counts with the input both of the HR/VP and the President of the European Commission, although neither votes, and there is an opportunity for a formal exchange of ideas between Member States and the Commission and the eeas. More importantly for EU diplomatic representation, the Lisbon Treaty creates the post of a 42

Johanne Grøndahl Glavind, “Effective multilateralism in the iaea: Changing best practice,” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 103.

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permanent President of the European Council, with a mandate of two and a half year. Although an important effect of the permanent President is undoubtedly internal with respect to the management of the functioning of the European Council,43 there is also an impact on EU diplomacy in terms of being the “ultimate decision-maker” on foreign policy issues, although its effectiveness in terms of providing strategic direction and leadership has been questioned.44 With a permanent President setting the agenda and drafting policy statements, the European Council is less likely to be biased towards the foreign policy interests of the Member State holding the rotating presidency, and as such the institutional innovation should provide greater continuity. This effect is of course relative, since the European Council makes decisions by consensus. Of more importance is probably the visibility effect of having a permanent President. The EU now has a continuous representation of the cfsp policy area at the highest political level in the form of the President of the European Council. Here, the Lisbon Treaty falls short of establishing a precise division of labour between the President of the European Council and the High Representative, since both of them have functions of representing the Union in the cfsp policy area.45 This creates ample scope for conflict and differences of opinion and diplomatic style,46 which makes good personal relations vital for a smooth functioning of EU diplomatic representation at the highest level. In practice, the first President van Rompuy centred his activity on representing the Union at the highest level of Heads of State or Government in ­bilateral relations, as well as participating in multilateral summits at the same level. This indicates an informal division of labour also identified by Duke,47 where the President of the European Council does not enter into the detailed foreign policy content or specific negotiations with third states, but leaves this to the High Representative and her eeas. The parallel to the division of labour between a Head of State or Government and the foreign minister of any given 43 44

45 46 47

Carlos Closa, Institutional innovation in the EU: The Presidency of the European Council, ari no. 47/2010 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2010), p. 4. Puetter quoted in Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, “EU diplomacy postLisbon. The legacy of the Ashton era,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 57. teu (Lisbon), art. 15. Brian Crowe, The European External Action Service. Roadmap for success, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Chatham House, 2008), p. 19. Simon Duke, “Providing for European-Level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the European External Action Service,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 216.

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state is rather straightforward, which makes the division of labour beneficial not only for the coherence of EU diplomacy, but also for reducing confusion on the part of third states, in the sense that the EU diplomatic set-up in this case resembles a well-known model. 3.2.2 The Council of the European Union With respect to the organisation of the Council, the General Affairs Council is separated from the Foreign Affairs Council. The General Affairs Council is responsible for coordinating the work of the other Council formations and preparing the meetings of the European Council, thus making it a kind of ­Super-Council. In this respect, the Council must cooperate with the President of the European Council as well as the Commission, but since it continues to be presided by a new Member State every six months as the rest of the formations of the Council (with the exception of the Foreign Affairs Council),48 there are also obstacles to continuity and coordination present in the construction. Particularly since the Council Working Groups such as trade, climate change and development are also still presided by the rotating Presidency,49 this indicates a degree of continuity at the level of working groups, although the eeas largely replaces the rotating presidency in other aspects of EU diplomacy, notably the representative function, as discussed in the following chapters. The Foreign Affairs Council is presided by the High Representative, which provides for greater continuity and coherence and by means of the agendasetting power of a presidency changes the equilibrium between Member States and Union. For EU diplomacy, the fact of now having both the E ­ uropean Council and the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU presided by permanent presidencies held by EU officials is of paramount importance. By reducing the number of representatives involved in EU diplomacy, for third states it is now much easier to put a face on the EU, and due to the division of labour established between President van Rompuy and HR/VP Ashton, the role of each representative became relatively clear. A remaining complicating factor is the representative role of the President of the European Commission, which considerably muddies the picture, since he continues to be the highest representative for the Commission, formally the institution tasked with representing the 48 49

tue (Lisbon), art. 16. Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 80.

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EU externally in matters other than the cfsp.50 Importantly, the Commission President operates at the level of the Council President in terms of highest-­ level representation, but leaves the daily management and representation to the HR/VP and the eeas structures along with Commission DGs and the Foreign Affairs Council within their respective fields of competences.51 The Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice-President of the Commission The Lisbon treaty centres the coordination of EU external action in the post of High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-president of the European Commission (HR/VP). Thereby, three previous posts are merged into one: The President of the Foreign Affairs Council ­(rotating every six months), the High Representative of the cfsp (occupied by Javier Solana since its creation) and the European Commissioner responsible for External Relations. This construction was initially opposed by Javier Solana52 as well as Member States such as the United Kingdom, Sweden and Belgium,53 and obviously falls short of the supranational (and for the purposes of coordination ideal) option of simply integrating foreign policy issue areas into the first-pillar working method of the Union (the ordinary decision-making procedure) and making the eeas a Directorate General of the ­European Commission. Still, it is a notable advance with respect to coordination between the cfsp and other foreign policy issue areas, since the same person now heads the most relevant bureaucratic structures. One of the specific objectives of the Lisbon Treaty was to generate more coherence and continuity in the foreign policy and diplomatic representation of the EU, and largely accomplishes this by making the HR/VP responsible for the totality of EU foreign policy and diplomacy. Of particular relevance is here the leadership and political direction that the HR/VP can give to EU diplomacy now that she can present global initiatives and policy proposals by having this privilege both in the Council, as for the cfsp, and in the Commission, as for other policy areas. This 3.2.3

50 51

52 53

teu (Lisbon), art. 17. Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, “EU diplomacy post-Lisbon. The legacy of the Ashton era,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 51. Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 230. Natividad Fernández Sola, El Servicio de Acción Exterior de la Unión Europea, Working paper no. 46/2008 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2008), p. 8.

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way, the HR/VP coordinates not only the initiatives of the various DGs of the Commission with external implications to their work, but also r­ elations with the ­Council, the Commission and the Parliament, with central focus on coordination with the Commission DG’s with external implications in their work.54 However, the role of the HR/VP is not restricted to coordination, but also involves agenda-setting and leadership, which is vital for the ultimate ­viability of the EU’s diplomatic model. Here, Helwig concludes that the HR/VP has historically been able to undertake ideational leadership in the day-to-day practices, but has been reduced to a tool for large Member States during crisis.55 In sum, the scope for horizontal coherence of the EU foreign policy that its diplomatic structures execute is thus greatly increased with the institutional innovation that the new HR/VP represents. Furthermore, this innovation also has a more direct impact on the diplomatic representation of the Union. The HR/VP heads the eeas,56 including both its central administration and ­policy-formulating bureaucracy in Brussels and the diplomatic corps of the EU, centred on the Union Delegations in third states and international organisations that are responsible for EU representation across policy areas.57 This more unified representation of the EU,58 has arguably ­contributed to EU visibility, as has the fact of having a single HR/VP representing the Union ­continuously and across policy areas. 3.2.4 The European External Action Service The Lisbon Treaty establishes the European External Action Service as the main institutional innovation, although apart from its role as an organ to service the High Representative, the Treaty text does not provide any specific ­indications of its functioning or objectives.59 The internal organisation and precise role

54 55 56 57 58

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European External Action Service, “eeas Review,” 2013, unnumbered document available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf (last ­accessed: September 2016), pp. 7–10. Niklas Helwig, “The high representative of the Union: The quest for leadership in EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 100. tue (Lisbon), art. 27. tfeu (Lisbon), art. 221. Exceptions remain, in that the Presidency or another Member State represents the EU in third states without an EU Delegation, and the Member State holding the Presidency hosts multilateral summits held in the EU (whereas bilateral summits are hosted by the EU in Brussels): Niklas Helwig, Paul Ivan and Hrant Kostanyan, The new EU foreign policy architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the eeas (Brussels: ceps, 2013), p. 28. tue (Lisbon), art. 27.

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was left to a future Council decision that came about in July 201060 on the bases of a proposal made by the High Representative the previous March.61 In general, and contrary to what could be deduced from the impasse in the process of European integration after the failure of the Constitutional Treaty and the fact that some Member States fought to limit the innovations of the Lisbon Treaty,62 the Decision of the Council establishes a configuration that is close to what has been denominated by Duke the “maximalist” version of the eeas, among the variety of proposals for its competences and size in the previous debate.63 Even so, according to the Decision, and contrary to the wishes of the European Parliament,64 the eeas is established as an autonomous organ of the EU65 and not incorporated into the Commission, a model that was ­initially defended by both the Parliament and the Commission itself,66 and which would seem to make the most sense if analysed from a strictly functional point of view, where the Commission exercises the executive function in the European polity. This would have been the EU equivalent of establishing a Foreign Ministry within the supranational governmental structure. Due to Member State reluctance, the compromise was that of a large eeas with ­extensive competences, but separated from the Commission, so as to reflect the double role of the eeas as the diplomatic representation of the cfsp 60 61

62 63

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Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1. Catherine Ashton, Proposal for a Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, unnumbered document, available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/docs/eeas_draft_decision_250310_en.pdf (last accessed: September 2016). David Spence, “The eeas and its epistemic communities: The challenges of diplomatic hybridism,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 44. Simon Duke, “Providing for European-Level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the European External Action Service,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. ­218–221; Simon Duke, “The Lisbon Treaty and external relations,” Eipascope, vol. 2008, no. 1, 2008, pp. 15–16. On the EU European Parliament, see: Susana Medel Gálvez, “La posición del Parlamento Europeo en torno a la diplomacia común, con especial referencia al Informe Brok,” in José Manuel Sobrino Heredia (ed.), Innovación y conocimiento. iv Jornadas Iberoamericanas de Estudios Internacionales (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2010); Ramón Jáuregui Atondo, El Parlamento Europeo: un actor decisivo en las negociaciones sobre la creación del Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior ari no. 147 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2010). Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1, art. 1. Simon Duke, “Providing for European-Level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the ­European External Action Service,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 217.

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as well as of the policy areas under the Commission’s authority. The eeas must t­herefore ­continuously bridge the imperative of respecting the collegial ­decision-making of the Commission, with respect to decisions within its competences with foreign policy implications, and the need for consensusbuilding among Member States, which has led to a range of both formal and informal coordination practices to arrive at joint proposals acceptable to both the Commission and the Member States.67 The eeas is actively engaged in policy formulation, launching policy proposals that often cover both the cfsp and areas of Commission competence, with the HR/VP responsible for having them adopted not only by the eeas but also by the ­College of Commissioners before passing them on to the Parliament and Council.68 This way, it is important to note that the eeas is not only an ­organisation for the diplomatic representation of the EU, but also a forum for the analysis, planning and formulation of EU foreign policy, drafting Council Conclusions, policy papers and negotiating mandates to be decided upon.69 The central administration of the eeas is largely modelled on the French administration of its diplomacy. In fact, the Corporate Board of the eeas consists of a powerful Executive Secretary General and a Chief Operating Officer, who in turn have two deputies to help coordinate the Directorate Generals, the EU delegations and represent the eeas.70 Below this administrative level, the eeas is organised into a number of Managing Directorates, which contain both geographically defined desks, as well as multilateral and thematic units. Each of the Directorates must coordinate its activities with the “relevant services” of the Commission. Apart from these structures, specialised departments are responsible for public diplomacy, human resources, finance, legal counselling and parliamentary affairs. The eeas 2013 review recognises the practical drawbacks of concentrating the bridging function in the HR/VP, but also that this is something that is not a fundamental design flaw.71 The eeas consists of two main functional areas, the Delegations to third states and international organisations, analysed in the following chapters, and

67

Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 66. 68 Ibidem, p. 78. 69 European External Action Service, “eeas Review,” 2013, unnumbered document available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf (last ­accessed: September 2016), p. 9. 70 Ibidem, p. 6. 71 Ibidem, p. 13.

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a central administration in Brussels. As for the diplomatic representation of the EU, the eeas is central to the EU’s efforts to increase its coherence on the international scene, since one single service represents the EU’s point of view across practically all policy areas, with the most notable exception being trade negotiations, where the Commission represents the EU due to the EU’s exclusive competences in the Common Commercial Policy. Also, there is the case of areas without political agreement among Member States, in which case the EU will not have a common position, but 28 different opinions represented by 28 diplomatic services. With the creation of the eeas, a good structure for reducing the problems of horizontal coherence in EU diplomacy that stemmed from the multitude of actors previously involved in representing the EU was therefore established. The Lisbon Treaty does not change the nature of EU diplomacy as coexisting with Member State diplomacy, so the problem of vertical coherence does not change directly as a function of the institutional innovation, although a denser institutional environment with the eeas will probably enhance the “coordination reflex” of the Member States broadly speaking, in the sense that the EU dimension of Member State foreign policy is present at all stages of the policy process and coordination in the EU framework is not simply an option at the last phase of implementing the specific foreign policy initiative. 3.3

Division of Labour in Brussels and the Challenge of Coherence

The eeas is not simply the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the EU, nor its diplomatic service. It is sui generis and can be characterised as an interstitial ­organisation, emerging in the interstices between different organisational field and draws upon the legitimacy, physical, informational, financial and l­egal resources of these other fields, here Member States and EU institutions and ­bureaucratic structures.72 The main tasks of the eeas is to function as support to the High Representative in her mandate to implement the cfsp, preside the Foreign Affairs Council and coordinate and implement the external relations of the Commission, in her capacity of Vice-president of the Commission. In this sense, the eeas is in one sense the secretariat of the High Representative, although it also 72

Jozef Bátora, “The ‘Mitrailleuse Effect’: The eeas as an Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics of Innovation in Diplomacy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 51, no. 4, 2013, p. 601.

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assists the President of the Commission and the President of the ­European Council in their functions as representatives of the EU,73 and provides all the support necessary in this regard, reflective of close relations with these two Presidents.74 This way, the secretariat function of the eeas transcends the division of representative competences among the three mains persons, which should provide greater continuity and coherence to the representation. With respect to policy making, the eeas has taken over from the Council Secretariat the tasks of preparing the meetings of the Foreign Affairs Council presided by the High Representative, as well as preparing the activities and presiding the meetings of the foreign affairs-relevant working groups and committees, including the Political and Security Committee (psc), central to EU policymaking in the cfsp area.75 Although the eeas is a new organ of the European Union, it is based on the transfer of functions and staff from the Commission and the Council Secretariat that took place for the launch of the eeas in January 2011. From the Council Secretariat the units transferred were basically those working in the area of the cfsp in the DG External and Politico-Military Affairs, but also including the intelligence centre and the EU military staff. From the Commission was transferred primarily the DG Relex, entrusted with the external relations of the Commission, both the Brussels staff and that of the Delegations, together constituting two thirds of the staff initially transferred. With respect to development cooperation, a 2012 inter-service agreement further developed the 2010 Council Decision regarding the division of labour between the eeas and the new DG devco of the Commission. Although the Commission thus continues to work within the area of development cooperation, the eeas “contributes” to the programming and management of the ­instruments with which development policy is executed, such as the European Development Fund and the Development Cooperation instrument. To this end, the country-related and region-related officials and departments in 73

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Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1, art. 2. In fact, in 2012, the briefings for the HR/VP constituted less than a third of the total amount elaborated by the eeas. European External Action Service, “eeas Review,” 2013, unnumbered document available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf (last accessed: September 2016), p. 8. Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 81. Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1, art. 4.

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the former DG Development were transferred to the eeas.76 That the eeas is ­responsible for preparing the decisions of the Commission in this respect means, basically, that the eeas is responsible for the strategic planning and multiannual programming and geographically determined work, including the regional and national indicative programmes. In contrast, other instruments are jointly prepared and one as central as the European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (eidhr) remains under the responsibility of Commission, although the HR/VP as a Commissioner is involved in the decisions. The division of labour remains very complex internally,77 but a main conclusion is that the eeas is involved in the programming of the most relevant foreign policy financial instruments, with humanitarian aid being the only exception,78 and that a smooth cooperation between the eeas and DG devco is essential to achieve policy coherence and impact, and hence to the coherence of the diplomatic representation of the EU. Nevertheless, turf wars between the two bureaucracies have not been avoided.79 In its strive for increased horizontal coherence, the EU has effectively fused development cooperation with the cfsp in political terms. This has of course been criticised by numerous ngo’s that fear that the assistance of the EU to developing countries would be increasingly subordinated to the geopolitical concerns of the cfsp, instead of being based on politically neutral criteria aiming to help societies develop and alleviate human suffering. But the inverse could also be argued, with cfsp initiatives being obliged to pursue the article 21 objectives of poverty reduction and sustainable development.80 Whatever is the case, coherence means thinking development and geopolitics together, 76

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Isabelle Tannous, “The eeas, EU external assistance and development aid: Institutional dissonance or inter-service harmony?” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 128. For a good overview, see Isabelle Tannous, “The eeas, EU external assistance and development aid: Institutional dissonance or inter-service harmony?” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), Table 6.1, p. 131. Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015) p. 79. Isabelle Tannous, “The eeas, EU external assistance and development aid: Institutional dissonance or inter-service harmony?” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 136. teu (Lisbon), art. 21.

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and the central argument here is that the discussion should be understood with reference to the general evolution of the EU towards more a more assertive international strategy based on the defence of interests and giving lower priority to objectives of democracy promotion, dissemination of human rights values and exporting the EU model of peaceful coexistence among states.81 With respect to the areas of the European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement, these are also divided between the Commission and the eeas, ­although still under the supervision of the High Representative.82 The enlargement Commissioner still has international roles, although with the new structures of coordination clearly subordinate to the High Representative. Also other Directorate Generals of the European Commission inevitably has an international dimension in their work, most notably DG Trade, which continues to be responsible for trade-related diplomatic action given the exclusive competence of the EU in the common commercial policy, although Member States continue to be very active in trade-promotion. In the area of trade, the Commission, the Delegations and the Member States therefore continue to coexist as diplomatic actors. In terms of working areas, Duke also notes that many horizontal issues have remained largely in the hand of the Commission, such as energy security, climate change and global economic governance.83 Here it should be noted that this complexity is by no means unique for the EU. The eeas identifies the close cooperation with the Commission as vital,84 but it should also be noted that this problem of coordination repeats itself also with respect to any foreign ministry, whose role is changing from that of a gatekeeper to a boundary spanner,85 in the sense that in a globalised world, 81

82 83 84 85

In this sense, studies indicate that the EU prioritises political stability over democracy and human rights for geopolitical reasons, imposing few, if any sanctions in the framework of the conditionality included in the EU’s international agreements with third states. See Richard Youngs, The end of democratic conditionality: good riddance? (Madrid, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (fride), 2010). Also, sanctions imposed generally reflect the relationship of the EU with the state and the interests of that specific Member States may have, see Clara Portela, European Union sanctions and foreign policy (London, Routledge, 2010), p. 163. Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1, art. 9. Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 69. European External Action Service, “eeas Review,” 2013, unnumbered document available at: http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_review_en.pdf (last accessed: September 2016), pp. 6–9. Brian Hocking, “Introduction: gatekeepers and boundary-spanners – Thinking about ­foreign ministries in the European Union,” in Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.), Foreign ministries in the European Union: Integrating diplomats (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002).

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most sectoral ministries will have an international dimension in their work that should be coordinated through the foreign ministry. The EU is in this sense mimicking the state, abovementioned institutional differences aside, with respect to the organisation of its diplomacy, since the states are also moving away from a centralised model to one based on the horizontal and vertical coordination of the external activities of the different branches of the central, regional and local administrations of the state. With respect to the vertical coherence and coordination, the Lisbon ­Treaty86 imposes clear obligations on the diplomatic services of the Member States to coordinate and cooperate with the eeas, although it falls short of establishing procedures for how to implement this cooperation with respect to the role of the eeas, only mentioning the eeas very briefly in this regard.87 Still, the Council Decision reiterates the obligation of consulting and cooperating of the eeas, the Commission the Council Secretariat and the diplomatic services of the Member States,88 so that in practice there is little doubt that the intention is not to establish a strict division of labour among the different actors, but rather to seek a maximum coordination in the network of a­ ctors i­nvolved in EU diplomacy. In the absence of established procedures, the vertical coherence of EU diplomacy ultimately falls back on the political will of the EU actors and Member States to coordinate their foreign policies generally, and also on the enthusiasm of the individual ambassadors in a given third state. With respect to the horizontal coordination, the Commission previously coordinated the interaction of the DGs of the RELEX family (those with external activities) through frequent meetings in a specialised coordination committee. The Lisbon Treaty builds on this method for horizontal coordination but substantially changes it, since it creates a hierarchy within the College of Commissioners, giving the Vice-president (and High Representative) the authority to coordinate the activities of the other Commissioners. The Vice-President is thus responsible for the overall coordination of the external activities, not only of the Commission, but by virtue of her competences as High Representative, of the entire European Union. This greatly improves the formal basis for coordinating EU foreign policy across policy areas. With respect to the Brussels-based diplomatic representation, in contrast, the picture is less clear-cut. The President of the European Commission ­remains the maximum representative of the Commission, also in the exterior. 86 87 88

teu (Lisbon), art. 4 (general obligation of sincere cooperation), art. 24 (general foreign policy) art. 32, art. 34 (in multilateral diplomatic settings) and art. 35 (diplomatic missions). Ibidem, art. 27. Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the organisation and ­functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1, art. 3.

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So apart from the relatively simple division of labour between the President of the European Council and the HR/VP in terms of diplomatic representation, the presence of the Commission President complicates the picture, since his role is much less clear with respect to the President of the European Council and the HR/VP. The delimitation of the representative function of the President and Vice-President of the Commission is not clear, and the scene is thus set for potential conflict between the two,89 and may create unnecessary ­confusion in third states as to the roles and competences of each EU representative. In this regard, it is questionable if the current diplomatic troika of the President of the European Council, the President of the Commission and the HR/VP significantly reduces the complexity and possible confusion in the diplomatic representation of the EU when compared to the previous troika of the rotating Presidency, the Commission President and the High Representative. Although the creation of the eeas undoubtedly increases the scope for political coordination, the actual reduction of complexity in its diplomatic representation is not to be found so much in the high-level representation of the EU by its top political personalities in Brussels, but in the diplomatic missions of the eeas, topic of the next chapter. Also, even if the new structures significantly increase the scope for a more efficient horizontal coordination, there are also elements that seem to suggest certain continuity with respect to possible competitive dynamics among the actors involved in EU diplomacy. Some analysts stress that uniting the staff of different units of the Commission, the Council and diplomats delegated from Member States diplomatic services in the same eeas bureaucracy does not necessarily mean that the political infighting and competition among these factions should not continue within the new structures of the eeas,90 and evidence from the first years suggest that the eeas remains fragmented due to the different origins of its staff.91 The leadership abilities of the HR/VP and the general support that the new structures will have among Member States will to 89

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Belén Sánchez Ramos, “La representación exterior de la Unión Europea tras el Tratado de Lisboa: en busca de la unidad, eficacia y coherencia,” in José Manuel Sobrino Heredia (ed.), Innovación y conocimiento. iv Jornadas Iberoamericanas de Estudios Internacionales (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2010), p. 486. Brian Crowe, The European External Action Service. Roadmap for success, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Chatham House, 2008), p. 14; Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), pp. 73–75. David Spence, “The eeas and its epistemic communities: The challenges of diplomatic hybridism,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 52.

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a large extent determine whether a corporate identity will emerge within the eeas, with the staff and units gradually losing their previous identity linked to their institutional origin. This corporate identity and general support of the Member State will depend on the ability of the eeas to gain legitimacy and credibility as an institution,92 which in turns depends on the eeas’s ability to carry out its mandate and manage the EUs international relations. It should be noted that the Member States have with the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the eeas not renounced any competence in foreign policy and diplomacy. The long-term scope for the eeas to represent the EU in its entirety of course depends on whether the Member States will increasingly let themselves be represented by the eeas instead of their national diplomatic services, which again boils down to the main source of incoherence in EU foreign policy and diplomacy: the degree of convergence among Member States’ interests and foreign policy goals. Another crucial factor is how other actors in the global diplomatic system deal with the eeas and accept its special hybrid nature.93 3.4

Conclusion: A Complex Network Organisation

In general, the EU is constituted as a diplomatic actor as a network94 of actors with a complex and diffuse structure of authority and different sources of legitimacy. In the present study, only the EU institutions and Member States are taken into account, but the impression of the network structure is only strengthened if also considering the activities of sub-state regional and local governments and civil-society organisations. The Lisbon Treaty and the 92 93

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Natividad Fernández Sola, El Servicio de Acción Exterior de la Unión Europea, Working paper no. 46/2008 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2008), p. 12. An aspect stressed by Geert De Baere and Ramses A. Wessel, “EU law and the eeas: Of complex competences and constitutional consequences,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 189. The concept of network is here used simply as an image to describe the complex interaction of actors involved in EU diplomacy without a formal hierarchy and not as an analytical concept, which would entail a different kind of research. The use of the concept is thus similar to other authors in the field of EU foreign policy studies, see for instance Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman, “The ‘difference engine’: constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, no. 3, 2003, pp. 380–404. For an example of the network as an analytical concept, see for instance: Emilie Marie Hafner-Burton et al., “Network analysis for international relations,” International Organization, vol. 63, 2009, pp. 559–592.

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c­ reation of the eeas has contributed to simplifying the representation of the EU somewhat, but the basic features of having different decision-making procedures for different policy areas and different competences of EU institutions in each policy area remains a complicating factor. Also, whereas the institutional changes introduced by Lisbon Treaty have improved the scope for coordination in the network and the increase of horizontal coherence, the consensus-based decision-making in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy coupled with the continued diplomatic presence and agency of individual Member States still constitutes a serious obstacle to improving the vertical coherence within the EU. With respect to the organisation of the EU as a diplomatic actor, the primary conclusion is therefore that the EU does not share the most basic characteristic of the Westphalian diplomatic Self, which is the sovereign state acting through a unitary diplomatic service hierarchically superior to officials of sectoral ministries with an international dimension and sub-state governments. It is also clear that the EU shares even less with antidiplomatic organizational forms that are focused on peoples rather than states and revolutionary elites as true representatives of the peoples. The European Union itself is a product of Westphalian diplomacy and has evolved to its current form from being merely an international organization of sovereign states, although in terms of foreign affairs it still displays some traits hereof, most notably the unanimity in decision-making and the stressing of the sovereignty of the Member States to execute each their foreign policy in the treaties. A second conclusion is that the Lisbon Treaty and the eeas have moved the EU further along the path towards the Westphalian ideal model of the unitary international actor, but also that the significance of the changes should not be exaggerated. Rather than being a decisive move towards a supranational Westphalian model, the basic impression of the organisation of the EU as a diplomatic actor remains that of a complex network that is truly singular in striking the equilibrium mid-way between state and international organisation as forms of political organisation as well as between supranational and intergovernmental modes of cooperation. In the following chapters, how this complex network organisation functions through particular diplomatic practices in bilateral and multilateral relations will be analysed.

Chapter 4

The EU in Bilateral Diplomatic Relations As time goes by I do whatever I want. I know what people think. I pursue my own agenda. I don’t have to check everything with everyone. I would rather have forgiveness than permission. If you ask permission, you never do anything. javier solana, High Representative for the cfsp1

4.1 The EU as a Receiver of Diplomatic Missions Although most attention is traditionally given to the active dimension of EU diplomacy in terms of its practices in third states and in international organisations, the EU is also the receiver of diplomatic missions from practically all existing third states as well as several non-state actors, such as international organisations and sub-state authorities. For Brussels-based actors in the EU network, to speak directly to an ambassador of a third state accredited to the EU is a channel that EU actors find easier to use and have traditionally recurred to frequently as an alternative to send instructions through the Delegations to third states and act through these.2 The practice of receiving diplomatic missions of third states began with the accreditation of a Delegation of the United Kingdom to the ecsc in 1952,3 and in 1956 the United States became the first third state to accredit a representative with rank of ambassador to the then ecsc. The legal status and the process for the accreditation of the missions to the EU, which are also accredited to the separately existing European Atomic Energy Community, are generally similar to missions accredited to other states and international o­ rganisations,4 and as such fulfil the functions and enjoy the privileges set forth in the Vienna 1 Javier Solana, quoted in Brian Crowe, Foreign Minister of Europe (London: Foreign Policy ­Centre, 2005), pp. 14–15. 2 Brian Crowe, The European External Action Service. Roadmap for success, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Chatham House, 2008), p. 21. 3 Carmela Pérez Bernárdez, “Hacia el complejo establecimiento de un Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior: las futuras embajadas de la Unión Europea,” in Francisco Aldecoa Luzárraga et al. (eds.), Los Tratados de Roma en su cincuenta aniversario (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008), p. 1341. 4 Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 67–68. © koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004372924_005

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Convention on Diplomatic Relations.5 Frequently, the Head of Mission is simultaneously accredited also to one or more Member States, most often Belgium and Luxembourg, or to nato. The general impression is that the EU essentially copies the Westphalian model of receiving foreign missions, since these missions of third states function like missions to a state and not as a non-member state to an international organisation, where an observer status is frequently granted, which allows for the third state to participate in the life of the international organisation to a certain extent. It is the Commission’s protocol service, along with that of the Belgian foreign ministry that handles the formalities, including questions of precedence, and the accreditation is subject to approval not only by the Commission, but also the Council, the eeas and the Member States,6 and accreditation letters must be signed by the Head of State and presented both to the President of the Commission and to the President of the European Council. Unanimity is thus the rule in terms of accreditation of diplomatic missions and although the Commission has underlined the possibility of using a traditional diplomatic tool such as the declaration of a foreign representative persona non grata, unanimity means that it is difficult in practice. It is also the protocol office that coordinates with Belgium as a host state, where a special protocol to the Treaties obliges Belgium to confer the customary immunities and other privileges on diplomats accredited to the EU.7 Today, apart from internationally recognised states, a series of international organisations, such as the Arab League, the Gulf Cooperation Council, the African Union and UN agencies are also accredited to the EU, as are political entities such as Hong Kong and Palestine as well as sub-state entities such as Québec and Republika Srpska.8 In parallel with the missions of third states to the EU, these also have missions to the EU Member States, just as EU diplomacy consists in its active dimension both of EU Delegations and Member State embassies. The diplomatic relationships between the EU and third states are therefore very complex. Also, the representatives of the EU, such as the HR/VP and special r­ epresentatives

5 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961. 6 European Commission webpage: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/corps/ index.cfm?go=vademecum.vademecum (last accessed: September 2016). 7 Lisbon Treaty protocol 7, art. 16. 8 These are listed on the EU web pages, see: http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/ corps/view/cdSearch/act_showPDF.cfm?RepID=10002&DocType=1 (States) (last accessed: September 2016) and http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/corps/view/cdSearch/ act_showPDF.cfm?RepID=10001&DocType=0 (non-state entities) (last accessed: September 2016).

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that are mainly analysed in terms of their active dimension in third states, also receive visits in Brussels by the accredited representatives of third states. In sum, with respect to the EU as a receiver of diplomatic missions, the model sought followed is clearly that of the Westphalian ideal type, both in legal and practical terms, although subject to the unanimity rule when deciding on accreditations. The added complexity here consists not so much in the delegation of competences across policy areas, but in the simultaneous diplomatic relationships of both the EU and its Member States. 4.2

The Permanent Representation of the EU in Third States

Without a doubt, the practice of sending diplomatic missions abroad to negotiate with other actors is the most ancient of all diplomatic practices, dating back thousands of years to the early cultures of the Eufrat and the Tigris. The exact date of when the practice of sending envoys became an essentially diplomatic practice, one author has defined as when the messenger carrying bad news was no longer killed, but accepted not as the cause or the opposition itself, but as its neutral representative, the respect for whom would facilitate communication and thereby potentially avoid conflict. The EU is thus engaging in an ancient practice when it sends diplomatic missions abroad to represent it and one that is traditionally considered a prerogative of the sovereign state.9 Rather than attempting a general description of the specific daily practices of the staff of EU Delegations, the overall objective of the study being a holistic understanding of the EU as a diplomatic actor, the analytical attention is on the basic nature of the Delegations, their representative function and how they coordinate with other actors in the EU diplomatic network, particularly the Member State embassies. It should also be kept in mind that the diplomatic missions not only work via the formal and official channels at the negotiating table and as invitees at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the receiving state, but do an important part in the corridors and via telephone outside of the formal agenda. This is not least the case for the missions representing the EU at international organisations, where a large diplomatic corps is seconded from a very wide range of states and who are accustomed to striking the important deals directly with other representatives, rather than in the official forum, such as the UN General Assembly. The EU thus largely participates in the informal 9 Sauvignon quoted in Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 78.

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diplomacy on par with state actors, although its networked setup means that internal coordination and consensus-seeking also becomes a primary goal, apart from interaction with third state representatives. 4.2.1 The EU Delegations If the sending of diplomatic missions abroad is the most ancient of all diplomatic practices, the establishment of permanent representations in other states is probably the most emblematic, since it provides the physical evidence of diplomacy in the building of the embassy, and is therefore also the most visible of diplomatic practices. EU diplomacy on the ground in third states is executed by a network of actors, where overall efficiency and impact depends to a large degree on coordination and cooperation. The inevitable context of the diplomatic practices of the EU Delegations is therefore that they coexist with those of each EU Member States that continue engaging in diplomatic relationships alongside the Delegations as independent sovereign states, so when no political agreement has been reached in Brussels or on the ground, each maintain its individual position. For the purposes of representation, the EU maintains an extensive, organised and coherent network of permanent diplomatic missions in the world,10 with missions accredited to more than 160 states.11 The first permanent representation in a third state was an information office opened in Washington, in 1954,12 although it had no diplomatic functions.13 In 1955, the first Delegation of the High Authority of the ecsc opened in London,14 and was officially

10 11

12

13 14

As characterised by Michael Bruter, “Diplomacy without a State? The External Delegations of the European Commission,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 6, no. 2, 1999 p. 183. Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet, “Unus inter plures? The eeas, the Vienna Convention and international diplomatic practice,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 159. Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 53. Clara Portela, “El Servicio Europeo De Acción Exterior: Un Instrumento Para Reforzar La Política Exterior,” in Alicia Sorroza Blanco (ed.), Presidencia Española: Retos En Una Nueva Europa (Madrid: Elcano, 2010), pp. 119–146, p. 122. For the details of the procedures, see: José Manuel Sobrino Heredia, “La actividad diplomática de las Delegaciones de la Comisión en el exterior de la Comunidad Europea,” Revista de Instituciones Europeas, vol. 20, 1993, p. 491.

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awarded diplomatic status the following year.15 Since then, the number of Commission Delegations increased to around 50 in the 1970s to approximately 100 in the 1980s,16 until being represented in almost all states today. With respect to the status of the Delegations as diplomatic missions, this recognition happened in many instances several years after the Delegations was opened17 and it is significant that the upgrade was negotiated in each instance directly by the Commission and the third state, without the Member States being involved in the symbolically important decision.18 As is the case of the diplomatic practice of many states, some of the Commission Delegations were established as regional with accreditation to more than one third state, although being located physically in one of them. An example is the EU Delegation in Saudi Arabia, accredited also to the other Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) members Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman and Qatar, whereas a separate Delegation to the United Arab Emirates was opened in 2013,19 although the EU continues to stress the bi-regional relationship with the gcc region. 4.2.1.1 Legal and Symbolic Aspects of the Delegations The EU Delegations play an important role as the “embassies” of the EU in third states that give the EU a permanent presence, and it clearly shows that the nature of the EU is far from the typical international organisation, which does not open representations in non-member states.20 Although it is not a state actor either, the EU enjoys universal diplomatic recognition in that its bilateral relations are based on the same norms of reciprocity and inviolability 15

16 17

18 19 20

Carmela Pérez Bernárdez, “Hacia el complejo establecimiento de un Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior: las futuras embajadas de la Unión Europea,” in Francisco Aldecoa Luzárraga et al. (eds.), Los Tratados de Roma en su cincuenta aniversario (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008), p. 1341. Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 159. Carmela Pérez Bernárdez, “Hacia el complejo establecimiento de un Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior: las futuras embajadas de la Unión Europea,” in Francisco Aldecoa Luzárraga et al. (eds.), Los Tratados de Roma en su cincuenta aniversario (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008), p. 1342. Véronique Dimier and Mike McGeever, “Diplomats without a flag: the institutionalization of the Delegations of the Commission in African, Caribbean and Pacific countries,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 44, no. 3, 2006, pp. 496. Official webpages of the respective EU Delegations: http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/ gulf_countries/index_en.htm (last accessed: September 2016); http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/uae/eu_uae/political_relations/index_en.htm (last accessed: September 2016). Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 118–119.

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as traditional state diplomacy and follows the regulation of the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, even if only states can formally be party to this treaty.21 This is achieved through bilateral agreements between the EU and the receiving state effectively extending the application of the content of the Vienna Convention to the EU’s diplomatic mission.22 Also, the EU representation is generally treated indistinctly from a state with respect to diplomatic protocol and the formal and symbolic acts surrounding the opening of Delegations and the accreditation of the Head of Mission,23 although possibly with the exception of the question of precedence, depending on the third state in question. Also, the non-state nature of the EU means that it cannot issue diplomatic passports, so its representatives rely on laisser-passer diplomatic documents.24 Legally, the Delegations are thus full diplomatic missions in the sense of the Vienna Convention with all the rights and privileges derived therefrom in terms of personal inviolability and immunity as well as the inviolability of communication, premises etc. The staffs of the Delegations also enjoy the rights and privileges that the Vienna Convention gives them, and the similarity to state diplomats is underlined by the fact that they have the same titles. The Head of Mission has thus formally been an “Ambassador” since 1994,25 although internal documents of the Commission advised the heads of mission to not flash about their title, to avoid creating confusion or possible resentment among other ambassadors. It also seems inadequate that the Head of Mission was considered an EU ambassador when, until the Lisbon Treaty abolished the pillar structure of the EU, she was merely a representative of the European Commission. It is noteworthy that the Delegations already before the creation of the eeas generally figured in the list of the representations of sovereign states, and not international organisations, of third states, although with respect 21 22

23 24 25

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, arts. 48 and 50. Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet, “Unus inter plures? The eeas, the Vienna Convention and international diplomatic practice,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 163–164. Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 136–145. Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), “Introduction, the eeas as a catalyst of diplomatic innovation,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 10. Antonio Missiroli, “Introduction: A tale of two pillars – and an arch,” in Graham Avery et al., The EU foreign service: How to build a more effective common policy (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007), p. 10.

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to ­precedence, the Head of Delegation generally comes last after all state ambassadors.26 It thus seems that third states attempt to categorise the EU symbolically as a sui generis political entity between states and international ­organisations, and this is a position that the EU has traditionally requested to have. Only in recent years has the eeas has changed previous practice and now does no longer request to be put at the end of the Heads of Mission, but does not insist on its appropriate position according to seniority either.27 On a symbolic level, the EU Delegations have therefore taken a large step towards becoming equal to a state diplomatic mission. The EU has also developed a parallel symbolic practice by standardising the denominations of its representations, reserving Delegation for representations to recognised states and international organisations, whereas representations in non-universally recognised entities such as Palestine,28 Taiwan and Hong Kong and Macao are labelled Offices. Of further symbolic importance, the EU diplomatic missions adopt traditional state practice regarding the use of the EU flag and its anthem.29 4.2.1.2 Diplomatic Functions Even though the Delegations were only representing the Commission prior to the Lisbon Treaty and therefore tasked mainly with trade and development, with the upgrading to EU Delegations they took over the function of representing the EU in the cfsp area from the diplomatic mission of the Member State holding the rotating Presidency of the Council. The diplomatic functions of the Delegations are thus largely the standard embassy functions as defined in the Vienna Convention, in that they consist in informing and clarifying matter to the receiving state and negotiate with its representatives within a given mandate, although of course the situation is complicated by the simultaneous presence of the Member State embassies, who also interact with the receiving state and coordinate with the EU Delegation, a fact which has given 26 27

28 29

Conclusion based on a reading of the webpages of third state foreign ministries. Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet, “Unus inter plures? The eeas, the Vienna Convention and international diplomatic practice,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 169. According to its website it is formally an Office to the West Bank and Gaza Strip and mentions the Palestinian Authority and the Palestinian People, but not “Palestine.” Jan Wouters and Sanderijn Duquet, “Unus inter plures? The eeas, the Vienna Convention and international diplomatic practice,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 166–168.

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rise to considerable delays in the issuing of declarations.30 Still, the delivery of démarches by the Heads of Delegation has greatly increased the status of the EU and scope for interaction with the third states.31 It has also been debated whether the EU Delegations should assume consular functions,32 but the role established for the Delegations in the 2015 Directive33 is minimal and complementary and subordinate to that of Member States.34 The Delegations are in principle representing the EU in all policy areas, and the staff generally represent the EU’s point of view also outside of official communication with the host state, for instance in conferences, local media etc.35 However, with respect to the internal organisation of the Delegations, a complicating factor is the general division of labour between the eeas and the Commission regarding development cooperation, which translates into the Delegations working both for the central eeas bureaucracy and for the 30

31 32

33 34

35

Bruno Hanses and David Spence, “The eeas and bilateral relations: The case of the EU Delegation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 316. Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 65–86, p. 74. See for instance: Ana Mar Fernández, “Consular affairs in an integrated Europe,” in Jan Melissen and Ana Mar Fernández (eds.), Consular affairs and diplomacy (Leiden, Martinus Nijhoff, 2011); Ana Mar Fernández, “Towards an EU consular policy?” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 356–369; Ander Gutiérrez-Solana Journoud, “Artículo 46: la protección diplomática y consular. Una mínima extensión internacional de los derechos ciudadanos de la UE” in La Carta de los Derechos Fundamentales de la Unión Europea y su reflejo en el Ordenamiento Jurídico Español, ed. Ixusko Ordeñana ­Gezuraga, Pamplona, Aranzadi, 2014; Steffen Bay Rasmussen, “Constructing the European demos through external action? The case of consular assistance to EU citizens,” in Beatriz Pérez de las Heras (ed.), Building a European Demos: Democratic legitimacy in the postLisbon European Union and its impact on global governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). Council Directive (EU) 2015/637 of 20 April 2015 on the coordination and cooperation measures to facilitate consular protection for unrepresented citizens of the Union in third countries and repealing Decision 95/553/EC, published in OJ L 106/1 of 20 April 2015. See: Steffen Bay Rasmussen, “Constructing the European demos through external action? The case of consular assistance to EU citizens,” in Beatriz Pérez de las Heras (ed.), Building a European Demos: Democratic legitimacy in the post-Lisbon European Union and its impact on global governance (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016). A function highlighted by Bruno Hanses and David Spence, “The eeas and bilateral relations: The case of the EU Delegation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 316.

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European Commission, with Delegation staff coming from both organs. Also, the Commission can issue instructions to the Delegations within its area of competence, which at times has led to these diverging from eeas priorities.36 The Head of Mission is responsible for the overall coordination of the work of the Delegation, although she may remit questions to the head office in Brussels when, for instance, the eeas and the Commission issue contradictory instructions to Delegation staff.37 To ensure the horizontal coherence of the work of the Delegations, in 2012 a cooperation mechanism was establish to clarify lines of reporting and authority and also established a joint steering committee “eudel,” chaired by the eeas, to enhance cooperation and which, despite its denomination, formally remains an advisory body making decisions by consensus.38 Due to the exclusive competence of the EU in the area of the Common Commercial Policy, the Commission’s DG Trade generally handles trade negotiations, with the Delegations relegated to a subordinate role,39 but due to the limited extension of exclusive EU competences, this remains an anomaly within the general picture of the EU Delegations being the main responsible for EU external representation. The political content of the diplomatic interchange, though, obviously changes from one third state to another, depending on the nature of relations with the third state. In industrialised Western countries, the work of the Delegations will be primarily related to trade and economy, whereas the work of Delegations in acp countries will primarily be about the management of development funds and political dialogues. Historically, the Delegations have had a bigger role in candidate states and those having an association agreement, 36

37

38

39

Geert De Baere and Ramses A. Wessel, “EU law and the eeas: Of complex competences and constitutional consequences,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 180. Isabelle Tannous, “The eeas, EU external assistance and development aid: Institutional dissonance or inter-service harmony?” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The ­European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: ­Palgrave, 2015), p. 129. European Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint decision of the Commission and High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy of 28.03.2012 on Cooperation Mechanisms concerning the management of Delegations of the European Union, JOIN (2012) 8 final, art 2–3. Geert De Baere and Ramses A. Wessel, “EU law and the eeas: Of complex competences and constitutional consequences,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 182.

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since it was the Commission that was the responsible for conducting negotiations with these states and supervise the adaptation and implementation of the acquis communitaire and other measures agreed upon during negotiations. The concrete activities of the Delegations also depend on the political mandates of the Delegation in different policy areas. For instance, the room of manoeuvre of the Delegation with respect to the implementation of the cfsp is determined by the text of the mandate agreed in the Council. Another more symbolic function is performed by the Delegations’ staffs when they participate in the ordinary diplomatic life as it is lived in the capitals of the world observing diplomatic protocol and engaging in practices of courtesy that the behavioural norms of the diplomatic culture prescribe. E ­ xamples include sending representatives of the correct rank to official functions and assume the place in the line of precedence that protocol dictates. Also, since the Delegations have the role of representing the common EU points of view, they are also instrumental in organising cultural and other events with the ­participation of Member States that have a primarily communicative and symbolic diplomatic value, not least as public diplomacy initiatives directed at the foreign populations, rather than state authorities.40 4.2.1.3

Staff and Socialisation: Towards an EU Epistemic Community of Diplomats? With respect to the staff of the EU Delegations, the parallel to Member State embassies is clear. Two distinct groups can be identified, since they are either professionals working for the EU or local employees with specialist knowledge about the primary working areas of the Delegations or support staff. A legacy of the Delegations as Commission representations, in many cases primarily responsible for trade or administration of development aid, is that the gradual transformation to assume more traditionally diplomatic functions has been plagued by the lack of diplomatic training of the staff, which has been reflected in the quality of the political reporting.41 The issue of the staff of the Delegations was not clarified by the Lisbon Treaty, but left the question to be decided by the posterior Council Decision.42 The 40

41 42

See: María Luisa Azpíroz Manero, “Diplomacia mediática de la Unión Europea y visibilidad de la prensa de sus socios estratégicos latinoamericanos: Brasil y México,” in María Luisa Azpíroz Manero (ed.), Public diplomacy: European and Latin American Perspectives (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2015), pp. 35–56. Antonio Missiroli, “Introduction: A tale of two pillars – and an arch,” in Graham Avery et al., The EU foreign service: How to build a more effective common policy (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007), p. 13. teu (Lisbon), art. 27.

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general formula is that a Delegation staff comes from the eeas, and from specific Commission DGs when relevant. Another segment is delegated national diplomats that must constitute at least 30% of the eeas staff.43 As for the size of the Delegations, there is a great variety depending on the relations between the EU and the specific third state. Diplomats have long worked in cycles, alternating between occupying posts in Brussels and in the Delegations,44 in a clear parallel to the typical state o­ rganisation of the working patterns of diplomats, where they typically alter between working in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representations in third states or international organisations. A notable difference has historically been the extended use of local staff in the Delegations rather than only relying on employees seconded from Brussels.45 With the expansion of foreign policy competences of the EU generally this situation was increasingly perceived as untenable. Even if the Commission has maintained training programmes for Delegation staff since 1994, the issue of diplomatic training ­remained a salient issue throughout the debates on the creation of the eeas. The European Parliament, which generally preferred a very state-like diplomatic service, a­ rgued for a full-fledged European Diplomatic Academy to train EU diplomats,46 a suggestion that was nevertheless not accepted by the Member States, which preferred assuring the adequate level of diplomatic expertise through the s­ econdment of state diplomats to the eeas. The incorporation of the ­national diplomats on secondment has not been fully resolved, since they in principle return to their national diplomatic services after the end of their four-year term, thus creating doubts both about their career paths and loyalties, although Onestini argues that a diplomat pursuing national objectives would quickly be side-lined within the eeas.47 The staff of the specific EU 43 44 45 46

47

Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 82. European Commission, Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European Commission’s External Service, Luxemburg, Office for Official publication of the European Communities, 2004, p. 46. European Commission, Taking Europe to the world: 50 years of the European Commission’s External Service, Luxemburg, Office for Official publication of the European Communities, 2004, p. 47. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affaris, Human Rights and Common Security and Defence Policy, Report on a common Community diplomacy, 2009, A5-0210/2000; European Parliament, Committee on Institutional Affairs, Report on the institutional aspects of creating the European External Action Service, 2009, P7_TA(2009)0057. Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 83.

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­ elegation largely depends on the third state in question, for instance there D will be a predominance of Commission staff working with the implementation of specific projects when the host state is a developing country, whereas there will be more eeas staff when the host state is one with which the EU maintains more “political” relations, such as Russia. A general problem with respect to the staff of the Delegations that has only been partially resolved with the creation of the eeas is the fact that the persons are in most cases not career diplomats and that they therefore in many cases have not felt adequately prepared for representing the EU in diplomatic relationships.48 Former Commission or Council officials need traditional diplomatic training and the Member State diplomats seconded to the eeas need training in the intricacies of the functioning of the EU, particularly its external relations.49 In this last respect, it has also been proposed that in the absence of an EU diplomatic academy, the Member States should agree to adapt the training of their diplomats so these also become prepared to work in an eeas Delegation,50 a difficult step in practice since some Member States favour onthe-job training rather than formal training.51 The training courses organised by the eeas itself remain focused to a large extent on management, particularly financial management, although courses also cover broader diplomatic topics.52 To overcome these problems, Duke proposes to develop joint training initiatives for all staff involved in EU diplomacy.53 Even without a full-fledged diplomatic academy for the training of Member State diplomats as well as Commission and Council officials, it is vital that the eeas training programmes facilitate the socialisation of the participants, so that the persons working both in the eeas central administration and in 48 49 50 51 52 53

Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 150–151. Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 73. José Antonio Martínez de Villarreal Baena, “El Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior y la formación de las funcionarios diplomáticos,” in Alicia Sorroza Blanco (ed.), Presidencia Española: Retos En Una Nueva Europa (Madrid: Elcano, 2010), p. 148. Simon Duke, “Diplomatic training in the European Union,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 413. Ibidem, pp. 408–411. Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 74.

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the Delegations abroad come to share an EU identity and common EU outlook, with a primary professional loyalty towards the eeas and a “European attitude.”54 This socialisation is already helped by the daily functioning of the eeas, where persons with different institutional origins work side by side.55 Evidence from EU voting in the UN General Assembly shows that over the decades, there is increasing political coherence among EU Member States,56 a sign that socialisation and coordination dynamics might be functioning, although with respect to attitudes towards diplomacy or the eeas itself, Spence concludes that no homogeneity exists (yet),57 and that fragmentation rather than “melding” has characterised the staff process in the eeas so far.58 Nevertheless, Onestini concludes that overall, the integration of national diplomats into the eeas has been a success so far.59 For the eeas to function smoothly, regardless of how it is done, it is important to create an EU level epistemic community of foreign policy professionals that is compatible with, but distinct from, the epistemic communities existing in the foreign services of each EU Member State and the EU Commission.60 This is an on-going process of socialisation, which will determine whether the eeas ultimately becomes a battle ground and tool for other actors where each will struggle to impose its views on the eeas in its totality or whether it will evolve into an EU service based on an esprit de corps. An important ­factor is here that Member States have stopped sending ­problematic 54 55

56

57 58 59 60

Natividad Fernández Sola, “El Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior y la nueva gobernanza de los asuntos exteriores europeos,” in Alicia Sorroza Blanco (ed.), Presidencia Española: Retos En Una Nueva Europa (Madrid: Elcano, 2010), p. 156. Carmela Pérez Bernárdez, “Un órgano in statu nascendi: el Servicio Europeo de Acción Exterior (seae) post-Lisboa,” in José Manuel Sobrino Heredia (ed.), Innovación y conocimiento. iv Jornadas Iberoamericanas de Estudios Internacionales (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2010), p. 462. Caroline Bouchard and Edith Drieskens, “The European Union in UN politics,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, policy, power (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 119. David Spence, “The eeas and its epistemic communities: The challenges of diplomatic hybridism,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 50. Ibidem, p. 52. Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 82. David Spence, “Taking stock: 50 years of European diplomacy,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 235–259.

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or close-­to-retirement-age officials to EU posting, which was previously the norm,61 with the eeas being able to attract highly qualified and motivated staff from the Member States’ diplomatic services.62 However as an interstitial organisation, with staff drawn from a variety of organisational cultures63 and speaking many d­ ifferent languages, the challenges to the emergence of such an esprit de corps are numerous, involving not only practical issues and agreement on policy content, but the emergence of a common identity.64 Even within the Commission it was possible to detect notable cultural differences between different DGs.65 Interestingly, already in the first years of the eeas, staff generally felt more attached to the EU than their Member States, but identified less with the eeas than with the EU generally, evidencing that a sense of belonging and esprit de corps has not yet developed, a fact that in the opinion of the eeas staff is mainly due to internal organisational issues (lack of clear chain of ­command, institutional communication etc.)66 Whichever specific form it might take, the outcome of this socialisation process will then again feedback into the EU identity as an international actor,67 and its nature as a political entity in the international system; a collection of sovereign states that cooperate, or a polity and international actor that exists beyond state sovereignty and Westphalian diplomatic culture and structures.

61 62 63 64 65 66

67

Antonio Missiroli, “Introduction: A tale of two pillars – and an arch,” in Graham Avery et al., The EU foreign service: How to build a more effective common policy (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007), p. 15. Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, “National adaptation and survival in a changing European diplomacy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 269. Jozef Bátora, “The ‘Mitrailleuse Effect’: The eeas as an Interstitial Organization and the Dynamics of Innovation in Diplomacy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 51, no. 4, 2013, pp. 598–613. Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska, “Attitudes, identities and the emergence of an esprit de corps in the eeas,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 375. Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 65. Ana E. Juncos and Karolina Pomorska, “Attitudes, identities and the emergence of an esprit de corps in the eeas,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 383–388. A dimension stressed by Catherina Carta, see: Catherina Carta, “The EU’s diplomatic machinery,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, policy, power (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 45; and also Catherina Carta, The European Union Diplomatic Service: Ideas, Preferences and Identities (London, Routledge, 2011).

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4.2.2 The Role of the Diplomatic Missions of the Member States When analysing the diplomatic practices of the EU, there is a tendency in the literature to restrict the analysis to the activities of EU organs, such as the eeas. Nevertheless, the diplomacy of the 28 Member States continues to exist, although it is now embedded in the diplomacy of the EU. The Member States are formally sovereign, which means that any representation of them by other actors requires their consent. This is reflected in the structure of EU diplomacy, where each Member State has a veto in the Council in the cfsp area. But even though a single Member State cannot put a veto in some policy areas, the Member States in the Council still have a lot power over the political content of the diplomatic activities, including to determine that only a very vague EU position exists. One way of expressing the affairs is that the Member States have delegated representative competences to the eeas, the High Representative and Presidents of the European Council and the Commission, but that this delegation is mainly structural. They are representatives only, and not primarily policy-makers, in that the Member States in the Council decide the political positions that are later represented. This is so even in areas of exclusive EU competence, although the Member States decide by majority voting. In terms of executing foreign policy, analysts have concluded that Member States generally continue to see EU foreign policy and the eeas as complementary to their own foreign policy and diplomatic structures.68 This explains why there has not been a reduction of bilateral diplomatic action on the part of Member States with the creation of the eeas, but rather an institutionalisation and intensification of coordination practices.69 It is within this context that the role of the permanent diplomatic missions of the Member States in third states should be understood. In practice the picture is not one characterised by endless discussions of formal competences and turf wars. The general political culture of the EU to seek compromises that satisfy all parties contribute to make the common representation of the EU in the exterior more smooth. The representation thus ­reflects the political reality within the EU, where all the Member States are connected by mutual obligations and responsibilities. The representation of the EU Member States and the EU is thus done by a network of actors cooperating amongst them. In this sense, EU diplomacy consists of the diplomatic 68 69

Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, “National adaptation and survival in a changing European diplomacy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 260–261. Heidi Maurer, “An upgraded EU Delegation in a reinforced system of European diplomatic coordination: Insights from Washington,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 275.

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activities of the EU organs and of those of the Member States, when these ­represent their state as being part of the EU. Also, the individual Member States can greatly benefit from the existence of a Delegation in a third state where it is not itself present, not only in terms of political influence, but also in terms of information flows and logistical support when an ad-hoc mission from the Member State visits the receiving state.70 Particularly small Member States have welcomed the increased role of the Delegations, whereas particularly the UK has been reluctant.71 Some EU Delegations have actively tried to establish a role for the Delegation in this sense as a service-provider for EU Member States, also where these have embassies themselves.72 Diplomacy by EU actors on behalf of the EU coexists with Member State diplomacy, where each Member State represents itself. There are thus parallel diplomatic relations taking place, where the EU as a unit has relations with a third state in a policy area, and the Member States have relations with the third state in other policy areas, but there are also instances where diplomatic representation overlap rather than run in parallel.73 Sometimes, the EU Member States will also be representing the EU in their bilateral relations with the third state. This is so when the positions they represent are coordinated with the other Member States. In this case, they defend an EU position towards the receiving state rather than a specific state interest, and thus their activities are to be considered not only Member State diplomacy, but also EU diplomacy. A large part of EU diplomacy is thus ‘done’ by Member State diplomats and their permanent missions in third states, when common positions exist in an issue area. This is where the constitution of the EU as a network actor is particularly evident. The state diplomats may always receive their instructions from 70

71

72

73

Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: ­Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 58. Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, “EU diplomacy post-Lisbon. The legacy of the Ashton era,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 52. Heidi Maurer, “An upgraded EU Delegation in a reinforced system of European diplomatic coordination: Insights from Washington,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 280. Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: ­Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 23.

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their home Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but these instructions have often been negotiated in Brussels.74 As such, only the formal structure of Member State diplomacy remains intact and the meaning of the activities is in many cases different. Article 4 of the Treaty on European Union establishes the principle of sincere cooperation and creates a general obligation of Member States and EU Delegations to cooperate in the execution of the treaties, further specified in the Council Decision establishing the eeas.75 The information and coordination obligations are also specified in articles 24 and 34 of the teu. Still, it should be kept in mind that cooperation on the ground in third states is not a phenomenon that happens only because of formal treaty obligations. Already during the years of the epc, the EU Member States were found coordinating their policies in third countries with monthly meetings of the Member States ambassadors and the Head of the Commission Delegation, issuing common statements, sharing information, drafting joint reports and cooperating during crisis without much direction from their respective foreign ministries, but rather on own initiative.76 This, however, does not mean that the cooperation was always idyllic. On the contrary, there were “often” disputes on the ground in third states between Member State missions and Heads of Delegations and EU Special Representatives.77 On the other hand, in the face of financial restraints and lack of staff, the Member States representations have generally been keen to cooperate with the Delegations and ready to take any help that the Delegation staff could provide, be it logistical or information.78 Still, in terms of political reporting, the Member States have been reluctant to share their analysis with the EU Delegation, although one analyst expects the Member States to engage more actively with the EU Delegations in parallel with their gradual assertion of their increased role as providers of input to the Brussels-based decision making.79 If not, the contribution of the political reporting 74 75 76 77

78 79

Shaun Riordan, The new diplomacy (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2003), pp. 71–72. Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1. Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 102–103. Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 24. Ibidem, p. 59. David Spence, “The eeas and its epistemic communities: The challenges of diplomatic hybridism,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 73–74.

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becomes a very indirect form of contribution to the EU process, since it is passed through the capital-based foreign ministry before constituting an input to the decision-making process in Brussels.80 The important financial and practical incentives to cooperate effectively and pool resources, not only from the point of view of the general organisation of the diplomatic representation but also from the point of view of the individual diplomats working in third states, generally seeking EU cooperation, has led one observer to characterise the situation generally as a collaborative process,81 whereas another has stressed that state diplomats have historically mainly looked to their capitals for instructions, rather than to their EU colleagues for a common stance.82 Also, the financial motivation has not been enough to promote more symbolically charged practices, such as shared representations.83 Most of the important policy areas are included in a cooperative dynamic among the actors in the EU network, but some activities have nothing to do with the EU and therefore strictly remain Member State diplomacy. The obligations upon Member State diplomacy are relevant here, since they are negatively defined. They do not specify which activities to undertake as ­representing the EU or which issue areas should be coordinated with the other Member States and the Commission, but instead obliges the Member States to coordinate whenever necessary and to not undertake activities that go against EU positions. As such, when representing a Member State, the diplomats must keep in mind the EU dimension at all times. Not everything they do is EU ­diplomacy and not everything they do is Member State diplomacy. The border between the two is indeed fluid. When in a given issue area there is no specific EU common position, the Member State diplomat will nevertheless keep in mind the position and opinion of other EU Member States and the Commission, not only because of legal obligations to coordinate when necessary, but 80

81 82 83

Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 39. David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 68. Tim Bale, “Field-level cfsp: EU diplomatic cooperation in third countries,” Current Politics and Economics of Europe, vol. 10, no. 2, 2000, pp. 187–212. A good example is the failure of the project to establish an EU embassy complex when Nigeria changed its capital to Abuja. In the end only four Member States and the Delegation participated. David Rijks and Richard Whitman, “European diplomatic representation in third countries: trends and options,” in Graham Avery et al., The EU foreign service: How to build a more effective common policy (Brussels: European Policy Centre, 2007), p. 35.

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because as part of a network, taking into account the EU dimension becomes a general modus operandi. Also, whether it is Member State diplomacy or EU diplomacy is not decided primarily by the coordination and cooperation patterns on the ground in a third state or international organisation, but by the decision-making process leading to the specific political positions defended by the diplomatic activities.84 It is therefore difficult to think of a pure bilateral issue that is not somehow influence by the existence of the EU due to the fact that a Member State is embedded in the EU network and therefore has an EU dimension present to some extent in all policy areas, a phenomenon often analysed in terms of the Europeanisation of state foreign policy.85 Still the question remains of the extent to which the EU acts as a unit towards third states. As already mentioned, it depends on the issue and the receiving state, but interestingly the diplomatic practice of joint briefings of the Member States representatives by the receiving state has arisen.86 This can be interpreted as a two-sided diplomatic interchange between the EU on one side and the receiving state on the other. Nevertheless, this format allows only for one-way communication, in that the receiving state can communicate to the EU, but not with the EU, since the latter is not necessarily capable of replying immediately. A further indicator of the far from unitary agency of the EU is that of the patterns of coordination between EU Member States representations on the ground. As seems logical, it is not always all Member States present in the third state that participate in the coordination, but it depends on the interest in the specific topic, and also each Member States finds it more natural to coordinate with some Member States rather than others, hence the existence of regional sub-groupings within the EU that meet regularly. Also relevant third states of similar interests are included in these meetings, a fact 84

85

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Spence underlines the importance of this dimension for the understanding of the overall working of EU diplomacy. David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 65. See for instance: Ben Tonra, The europeanisation of national foreign policy: Dutch, Danish and Irish foreign policy in the European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); Reuben Wong and Christopher Hill (eds.), National and European foreign policies: Towards Europeanization (New York: Routledge, 2011); Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, “National adaptation and survival in a changing European diplomacy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 257–273. Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 42.

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which contributes to further erode the picture of the EU as a unitary diplomatic actor. But this is nevertheless a logical consequence of the political reality of the state of European integration. It simply might make as much sense for Danish and Swedish representatives in a given third state to coordinate and share views with their non-EU Norwegian counterpart than with, say, Romania, France or Portugal. Similarly, the larger EU Member States have been seen to form small exclusive clubs acting on their own, such as the EU3-format of France, Germany and the UK in the negotiations with Iran over nuclear issues,87 which nevertheless saw the HR involved and gradually becoming the main protagonist and chief negotiator, thus converting the initiative into a major EU diplomatic mission,88 and an informal arrangement that has generally worked well.89 Trying to do a general balance, Vanhoonacker and Pomorska conclude that the experience with respect to increased horizontal coherence of EU diplomacy is “mixed” and with respect to vertical coherence “weak,”90 although the examples drawn upon in the latter case are main crisis of a geopolitical nature and not the day-to-day functioning of the EU in areas of low political salience, a fact that might influence the conclusion. The impact on Member State diplomacy being little visible and indirect does not make it less important, but a reflection of the very nature of the EU, as also expressed in the social structures of its diplomacy. The formal sovereignty of other states is to be respected, and behavioural norms complied with, but the social significance of the political practices change, so that the EU interferes with the internal affairs of other states. The influence on Member State diplomacy is similar. The formal sovereignty of the Member States is respected, and the structures of Member State diplomacy are left intact, and the eeas has not provoked a down-sizing of Member State diplomacy that might have been logical.91 Nevertheless, the meaning of the practices u ­ ndertaken by the M ­ ember 87 88 89 90

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Sahar Arzafadeh Roudsari, Talking away the crisis? The E3/EU3-Iran negotiations on nuclear issues, EU diplomacy papers, no. 6/2007 (Bruges, College of Europe, 2007). Niklas Helwig, “The high representative of the Union: The quest for leadership in EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 92. Tom Sauer, “The EU as a coercive diplomatic actor? The EU-3 initiative towards Iran,” in Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj (eds.), The European Union as a diplomatic actor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 103–119. Sophie Vanhoonacker and Karolina Pomorska, “EU diplomacy post-Lisbon. The legacy of the Ashton era,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 56. Rosa Balfour and Kristi Raik, “National adaptation and survival in a changing European diplomacy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 257–273, p. 267.

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States diplomats has changed. The changed meaning of the diplomatic activities is more important than the formal persistence of the structures of representation and the argument here is therefore that Member State diplomacy is also EU diplomacy, and further, that the networked nature of the EU as a diplomatic actor makes it difficult to distinguish the two. This is particularly true for third states with which the EU and its Member States maintain diplomatic relations. For the representative of a receiving state it is also difficult to deal with a Member State without taking into account the EU context. This is not only due to lack of knowledge about the distribution of competences in the EU and therefore knowledge about who speaks for whom, but also because third actors are aware of the coordination among EU actors, that makes very few topics strictly bilateral issues. The result of the networked structure of permanent EU diplomatic representations has historically been uncertainty on the part of third states.92 4.3

EU Special Representatives

Among the ad-hoc practices the EU uses, the focus will here by on the EU’s Special Representatives (eusrs), although it should be noted that other actors in the EU network have general representative responsibilities both in terms of receiving foreign representatives and through their participation in EU adhoc diplomatic missions to international conferences and bilateral summits, aside from the diplomatic communication they emit from their Brussels headquarters. These are primarily the Presidents of the Commission and the European Council as well as the HR/VP, although spokespersons for the European Central Bank, European Parliament missions and statements by meps ­directed at foreign audiences could be included here as well. The EU Special Representatives represent a distinct and separate diplomatic practice from the network of Delegations and mentioned specifically in article 33 teu. The first Special Representatives were sent to the Great Lakes Region and the Middle East in 1996. They are given a general mandate by the Member States in the Political and Security Committee and undertake specific diplomatic missions at will, representing the EU both in third states and international organisations, when the issue is relevant to their mandates. Their mandates depend on the political context but are generally quite broad

92

Simon Duke, “Providing for European-Level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the European External Action Service,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 212.

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in the sense of allowing freedom of action,93 and are most often geographically d­ efined according to EU priorities and international engagements, with special representatives for Afghanistan, Kosovo, the Middle East peace process etc. The EU also has a thematic Special Representative for Human Rights.94 The Special Representatives are all under the authority of the HR/VP, although their non-integration in the eeas structures and the fact that their mandates are determined directly by the Member States gives them a special status with respect to the eeas, and the smooth cooperation with eeas structures remains a challenge in this regard.95 In fact, the first HR/VP tried to abolish or at least diminish the roles of the eusr and give their tasks to the eeas, but this was opposed by the Member States in the Council.96 Instead, and contributing to further institutional confusion, the HR/VP has begun to appoint Special Envoys for specific affairs, such as the peace process in Columbia and nonproliferation and disarmament, in the first case under the direct authority of the HR/VP and in the other integrated in eeas structures.97 This complicates the matter internally, although as a diplomatic practice, their functions as adhoc specialised representatives are similar. Historically, some Special Representatives have also been Heads of Commission/EU Delegations to ensure coherence between the Community policies (as Head of Delegation) and cfsp issues (as Special Representative), but with the Delegation now representing all policy areas, this construction is anachronistic, and the HR/VP suggested in 2016 to phase out the last three with finalisation of their mandates.98 Due to the large differences in the roles of the Special Representatives, they engage in different practices that they define themselves, although they 93

94 95 96 97 98

Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 50. eeas website on Special Representatives, at http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/3606/eu-special-representatives_en (last accessed: September 2016). Erwan Fouéré, The EU Special Representatives: A dwindling but resilient resource at the service of EU Foreign and Security Policy, ceps Policy Brief no. 348 (Brussels: ceps, 2016), p. 4. Dominik Tolksdorf, “Diplomacy at the individual level: The role of EU Special Representatives in European Foreign Policy,” in Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj (eds.), The European Union as a diplomatic actor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 71. Erwan Fouéré, The EU Special Representatives: A dwindling but resilient resource at the service of EU Foreign and Security Policy, ceps Policy Brief no. 348 (Brussels: ceps, 2016), pp. 7–8. Ibidem, pp. 5–6.

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generally fulfil the function of communicating the EU’s interest in a given geographical or issue area and they not only represent the EU’s position but also provide detailed information and strategic input to EU decision-making.99 Most base themselves in Brussels making journeys whenever necessary on specific diplomatic missions, whereas those accredited also as Head of Delegation of the EU are based in that state.100 The effectiveness of the eusrs has at times been lessened by the lack of clarity of competence between the Special Representative and the Head of the Delegation in the relevant third state, a relationship that is crucial due to the dependence of the Special Representatives on the logistical support of the Delegation,101 as well as on the smooth cooperation with the relevant eeas geographic and thematic desks. A potential obstacle in this respect could be the fact that the staff associated with the eusrs based in Brussels are financed from a different budget than the eeas, so the eusr staff cannot contribute directly to the work of the eeas.102 Having made this point about the problematic institutional integration of the eusrs and their difference from EU Special Envoys, the confusion that this gives rise to is mainly internal to the EU, since there is no doubt externally about what they represent. The symbolic aspect of having a designated EU diplomatic representative not only communicates EU foreign policy priorities, but also has a larger impact in the sense of contributing to the construction of the international identity of the EU, in that the practice mirrors the traditional Westphalian practice of sending special envoys. 4.4

Coordination in the Network of EU Diplomatic Representations

Due to its first pillar competences in key areas of international cooperation, such as trade, development assistance, agriculture and transport, the Commission was the leader of a process that transformed the economic relations with 99

Dominik Tolksdorf, “Diplomacy at the individual level: The role of EU Special Representatives in European Foreign Policy,” in Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj (eds.), The European Union as a diplomatic actor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 69–87, p. 72. 100 Ibidem, p. 70. 101 Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), p. 50. 102 Dominik Tolksdorf, “Diplomacy at the individual level: The role of EU Special Representatives in European Foreign Policy,” in Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj (eds.), The ­European Union as a diplomatic actor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 82.

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third states into a global policy based on a strategic approach to the world.103 This also means that as for first pillar issues, even prior to the Lisbon Treaty, the Commission Delegations were effectively EU embassies representing the EU as an entity. In second pillar issue areas, where the distribution of competences was different, the role of the Delegations was minor and Member State embassies assumed the principal role, with the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council being the centrepiece in the network. Nevertheless, in terms of coordination and promoting cooperation, the Delegations were overall the central players already before the Lisbon Treaty.104 A complicating factor when analysing the EU diplomatic presence in third states is that the Lisbon Treaty and subsequent Council Decision on the establishment of the eeas do not contain provisions to determine the scope of coordination activities by the Delegations and the functions of Member State diplomacy in this regard. The creation105 of the eeas does not affect the responsibility of each Member State to formulate and execute its foreign policy, nor does it affect the diplomatic representation of each Member State in third states and international organisations. There is thus no i­ ntention to substitute Member State diplomacy, and the creation of the eeas should therefore be understood not as a change of the networked nature of EU ­diplomacy, executed by Member States and eeas, but a change within the network that allow it to coordinate more efficiently and achieve a more ­unified representation in its diplomatic relationships. For the moment, the coordinative practices among the diplomatic missions of the various EU diplomatic actors in third states are based on the abstract and vague legal obligations of mutual coordination and cooperation found in the teu.106 In practice, there have been some conflicts between former ­Commission officials in the Delegations who sought to assume the general responsibility of the EU and Member State diplomats.107 The EU Delegations also cooperate with the ad-hoc missions of the HR/VP and other Brusselsbased actors such as the eusrs and Special Envoys to coordinate their a­ ctivities 103 Assessment by Stephan Keukeleire, “The European Union as a diplomatic actor: Internal, structural, and traditional diplomacy,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 14, no. 3, 2003, p. 50. 104 Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, “Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the European Union,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 154–155. 105 Simon Duke, “Providing for European-Level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the ­European External Action Service,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 224. 106 teu (Lisbon), arts. 4, 24, 32, 34 and 35. 107 David Spence, “The eeas and its epistemic communities: The challenges of diplomatic hybridism,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 54.

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and diplomatic messages, but also assist these in preparing the practical circumstances of their ad-hoc diplomatic missions, such as organising meetings, etc. The pattern of cooperation is thus rather similar to that between a state embassy and the special diplomatic missions that the accrediting state might send to the receiving state for special purpose; what has by practitioners been characterised as an inn-keeper function.108 In terms of the EU Delegations’ role as coordinators of the EU diplomatic network, it is clear that the upgrading of the Delegation with the creation of the eeas has enhanced their status within the network focused on providing and managing information flows,109 since they now deal with all policy areas, although the specific coordination is determined locally. With respect to the cooperation on the ground in third states, this takes place in the form of regular meetings generally chaired by the Delegation, both at the level of Head of Mission and at lower levels, although the chairmanship is adapted to the circumstances on the ground. In Congo, for instance, France takes the lead on security issues.110 The intensity of the coordination effort in the different coordination groups, reaching more than 10 in some third states, varies with the third state, from approximately 65 per year in Algeria to more than 100 in China and Russia.111 The example of the US shows how the upgraded role of the Delegation led to an increased institutionalisation and formalisation of the coordination.112 Delegations are also central in developing countries as focal points both for Member State missions and the host government,113 but also in other more strategically important third countries such as China, where the 108 Keith Hamilton and Richard Langhorne, The practice of diplomacy: Its evolution, theory and administration (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 226. 109 Heidi Maurer, “An upgraded EU Delegation in a reinforced system of European diplomatic coordination: Insights from Washington,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 280–281. 110 Bruno Hanses and David Spence, “The eeas and bilateral relations: The case of the EU Delegation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 316. 111 Calculated on the basis of data in Frauke Austermann, “Representing the EU in China: European bilateral diplomacy in a competitive diplomatic environment,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 297. 112 Heidi Maurer, “An upgraded EU Delegation in a reinforced system of European diplomatic coordination: Insights from Washington,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 282–283. 113 Isabelle Tannous, “The eeas, EU external assistance and development aid: Institutional dissonance or inter-service harmony?” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The

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Delegation has greatly increased the scope of policy coordination as well as its professionalism after the eeas was established.114 The functions of the meetings are information exchange, but also policy coordination and the drafting of joint assessments of the political situation in the receiving state. In terms of sharing reports and drafts, a certain reluctance of Member States to share national reports has been detected,115 but the fact of them having been drafted in different languages also reduces their usefulness. There are indications that the intensity of the diplomatic cooperation and reporting depends largely on EU foreign policy priorities in the third state in question,116 since those states of special interest to the EU and particularly those plagued by political instability require a continuous flow of up-to-date information. In these cases, the ­capacity of the EU Delegation to coordinate the output of the network is also greater.117 The political nature of the output of EU coordination, in terms of coherence, depends obviously on the third state and the distribution of interests and their intensity among Member States, but also on the amount of Member States present and the distribution of Member States interests across the ­categories of competences attributed to the EU. Where there are no EU ­competences or these are shared with Member States and there are strong contradictory interests on the part of Member States, these are pursued bilaterally by the individual representations, and the role of the Delegation is dramatically reduced.118 In contrast, when the EU has exclusive competence or exercises shared competences to a large extent, the role of the Delegation is great. Also, even in the absence of EU competences, when there are no strong Member States interests involved, or where these are compatible to a greater extent, the ability of the Delegations to promote cooperation and coherence

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European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 130. Frauke Austermann, “Representing the EU in China: European bilateral diplomacy in a competitive diplomatic environment,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 290. Heidi Maurer, “An upgraded EU Delegation in a reinforced system of European diplomatic coordination: Insights from Washington,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 274–287, p. 283. Argued by Geoffrey Edwards and David Rijks, “Boundary problems in EU external representation,” in Lisbeth Aggestam et al. (eds.), Institutional competences in the EU external action: Actors and boundaries in cfsp and esdp (Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 2008), pp. 40–41. Frauke Austermann, “The European External Action Service and its Delegations: a ­diplomatic service of different speeds,” Global Affairs, vol. 1, no. 1, 2015, p. 55. Ibidem, p. 61.

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among the EU diplomatic missions is greater. A recent study finds that the less developed a third country is, the greater the role for the EU Delegation, generally,119 and the same goes for the strategic importance of the third country to the EU. For the EU Delegation to have a large role, another relevant factor is leadership by the Delegation.120 In contrast, factors such as the number of diplomatic staff, the seniority of the Head of the EU Delegation and the degree of diplomatic professionalism have been found to not affect the role of the Delegation notably.121 Still, in a given third state where EU diplomacy thus consists of the activities of both the eeas and the Member States that cooperate and coordinate, the institutional centrepiece is clearly the European Union Delegations. The functions of the Delegations have changed in two ways: Firstly, they are now under the authority of the HR/VP, with the Head of Mission being from the eeas. Secondly, the competences of the eeas in cfsp matters mean that the EU Delegations assumes the functions that were previously exercised by the embassy of the Member State holding the Presidency of the Council. There is no longer a special role for the diplomatic mission of the Presidency, which comes to have a role in the EU network similar to that of other Member State missions. The Delegations now represent the EU across all policy areas and come to functionally resemble the classical Westphalian state embassies, although of course with respect to content they continue to be subject to the constraint of political consensus among Member States. In terms of the practical cooperation on the ground, a 2015 article concludes that administrative efficiency has improved, but that important challenges still remain with respect to the effectiveness of the diplomatic action, such as divergence of interests among Member States in a system where Member State diplomats still fundamentally execute instructions from the capitals and the personal relationships among EU diplomats is an important factor.122 119 Frauke Austermann, European Union Delegations in EU foreign policy: a diplomatic service of different speeds (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 176–177. 120 Frauke Austermann, “Representing the EU in China: European bilateral diplomacy in a competitive diplomatic environment,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 297. 121 Frauke Austermann, European Union Delegations in EU foreign policy: a diplomatic service of different speeds (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 178. 122 Dorina Baltag and Michael Smith, “EU and member state diplomacies in Moldova and Ukraine: Examining EU diplomatic performance post-Lisbon,” in Christine Neuhold and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds), Dynamics of institutional cooperation in the European Union: Dimensions and effects, European Integration online Papers (EIoP), vol. 19, special issue 1, Article 5, http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2015-005a.htm, pp. 1–25.

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The institutional innovations of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the eeas thus greatly reduce previously existing problems of continuity and complexity in terms of external representation. The problem of continuity in EU diplomacy was largely a function of being represented in cfsp areas by the r­otating Presidency. This meant a change in political priorities every six months, which in itself is a complicating factor. But the task of diplomats to create stable relations with host state interlocutors was also problematic, since the task fell to new persons every six months. To third states, diplomatic complexity is also reduced, since each state diplomat now represents only the accrediting state and not in some cases also the EU. This makes things simpler, and host state representatives tasked with EU relations do not have to deal with new people every six months. Complexity is also reduced with respect to policy areas. The host state now interacts with the EU Delegation irrespective of the issue area, whereas before the relevant EU representative was either the person working in the Commission Delegation or the one at the embassy of the Member State holding the Presidency. This is of course particularly relevant with issues that span the internal division of competences in the previous pillar structure of the EU. Whereas before the EU Delegations only worked for the Commission, they now work for different Brussels bureaucracies. First and foremost, they work for the eeas, which has the coordination role also in Brussels, with the Head of Mission being in all cases an eeas official. But as mentioned in the previous section, only the DG Relex of the Commission was incorporated into the new eeas structure. This also means that other DGs of the EU Commission with important external dimensions to their work, such as Enlargement, Development and Trade, continue to exist outside the structures of the eeas, as does echo. As such, the EU Delegations work with more issue areas than the central administration of the eeas in Brussels, and therefore the Delegations have staff not only from the eeas, but also from the relevant Commission DGs. This state of affairs is obviously the expression of the division of labour in Brussels, where the DGs of the Commission with external implications of their work continue to exist independently of the eeas. In Brussels, the HR/VP spans the institutions and coordinates the policy content, whereas in the Delegations this task is performed by the Head of Mission, responsible for the totality of Delegation activities and the coordination and coherence of these.123 Still, the fact that Delegations consist of staff situated in different administrative hierarchies, particularly in developing countries, of course has an impact on relative 123 Council of the European Union, Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service, 2010, 11665/1/10 REV 1, art. 5.

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role of the eeas and the Commission and the importance of coordination, reflected in HR/VP Ashton’s comments about the Commission development people not being “hers.”124 4.5 Conclusion With respect to the EU practices of bilateral diplomacy, a first conclusion is that is displays important characteristics of the Westphalian ideal type diplomacy but none of the violent and subversive practices of antidiplomacy. The EU clearly adopts the same practices of opening permanent representations and sending special envoys with the aim of negotiating on behalf of the EU. Also, its missions and representatives have the same status as state diplomats in terms of immunity, inviolability and diplomatic protocol, with the EU increasingly being treated as a state in terms of precedence and the EU not objecting to this. The impression of an EU generally adopting Westphalian practices in its bilateral relations is strengthened by the fact that the EU also engages in courtesy practices, for instance by congratulating winners of ­elections or expressing condolences in case of natural disasters. Of further Westphalian micro-practices, the EU also applies standard diplomatic communication in writing and organises personal meetings, uses telephone conversations and symbolically flies its flag and plays the anthem in manners similar to those of the states. In terms of receiving foreign missions, the EU also clearly follows the model of the Westphalian state and not that of an international organisation. A second conclusion is that the EU is still a special actor due to its network organisation where EU missions and Member State missions coexist in a network with a diffuse structure of authority. Due to this fact, the EU’s general efforts to be accepted as an equal in the diplomatic field by adopting Westphalian practices can be understood as an attempt to increase its symbolic power and thereby the effectiveness of its diplomatic action.125 However, there has been no great systemic problems to the EU developing as an international ­actor in its bilateral relationship, mainly due to the fact that Westphalian bilateral diplomacy is based on mutual consent and recognition, meaning that 124 David Spence, “The eeas and its epistemic communities: The challenges of diplomatic hybridism,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 54. 125 Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Symbolic power in European diplomacy: the struggle between national foreign services and the EU’s External Action Service,” Review of International Studies, vol. 40, no. 4, 2014.

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third states have generally not objected to the EU’s emergence in the diplomatic field. This stands in stark contrast to the difficulties experienced by the EU in international organisations, as will be analysed in Chapter 5. A third conclusion to be drawn with respect to EU representation in bilateral relationships is that the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the eeas greatly simplifies diplomatic interaction, increases the scope for vertical coherence, by moving the centrality in the network on the ground in third states towards the EU Head of Mission and the Delegation, as well as horizontal coherence, since the EU Delegation now speaks for the Union in all policy areas. ­However, these diplomatic advantages have come at the price of a greater internal complexity within the EU Delegations and the EU broadly, since the divide between supranational and intergovernmental policy areas has now simply been internalised within the eeas in Brussels and in the Delegations.126 126 As also concluded by: Eric Hayes, “EU Delegations: Europe’s link to the world,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, policy, power (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 36.

Chapter 5

The Participation of the EU in International Organisations This chapter considers EU diplomatic practices within international organisations. This multilateral aspect is important, firstly, because of the EU’s stated objective of contributing to an effective multilateralism in the international system.1 Secondly, given the objectives of reaching a general understanding of EU diplomacy, the very different challenges and complexity of the EU in terms of organising and representing its points of view through its diplomatic action in the institutionalised and legalised setting of treaty-based international organisations is a fundamental element. In fact, EU participation in international organisations is generally more problematic than its ­participation in bilateral diplomatic relations, due to the fact that international ­organisations are highly legalised and traditionally allow only states to be full participants. Just as the analysis of the EU bilateral relations should not be limited to the activities of the eeas and the EU Delegations, so the analysis of the EU’s participation in international organisations should focus on the functioning of the EU network in the different organisations and across policy areas. As ­opposed to bilateral relations that are determined basically by mutual consent, the forms of the EU’s interaction is to a large extent influenced by the international organisation in question, so the picture in terms of practices is extremely varied.2 With the aim of maximising the variance in the findings, the chapter will focus on the EU in the UN, including the General Assembly and Security Council, but also on different organisations where the role of the EU varies from being a Member alongside the EU Member States (the fao and the wto) to the osce, where the EU is an observer, to the imf where the distribution of the EU Member States in different voting groups makes concerted EU action extremely difficult. The aim is thus not to give an exhaustive account of how the EU acts within existing international organisations, but on the variety of practices in terms of the legal status of the EU, forms of representation and practices of coordination in the EU network. Therefore, other important 1 teu (Lisbon), art. 21. 2 Knud Erik Jørgensen, “The European Union in multilateral diplomacy,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 193–195.

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i­ nternational organisations are necessarily left out, such as the Council of Europe, as are those where the EU role is reduced, such as nato.3 The focus in this chapter is on the participation of the EU in permanent multilateral settings, since it constitutes the opposite institutionalised and legalised setting to the bilateral setting where few rules apply apart from mutual consent. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the EU also participates in international conferences, which, with respect to the degree of institutionalisation and legalisation, can be considered a setting half-way between the bilateral relations and the participation in international organisations. Particularly in the area of environmental and climate policy the EU is very active,4 although there is disagreement with respect the effectiveness and impact of the EU in this respect.5 A good specific example is in the negotiations of the 2015 Paris climate agreement, where the focus of the EU was on a legally binding agreement, in a continuation of the strategy of the previous Copenhagen summit that ultimately failed to reach an agreement and where the EU found that it was little realistic to simply lift up its way of doing things internally to the global level.6 Another area where the EU has been a main promoter of multilateral legal solutions is the area of international criminal justice, with its continuous support and advocacy for the International Criminal Court.7 3 On eu-nato relations, see Margriet Drent, From “effective” to “selective multilateralism”: The European Union’s relations with nato, in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 118–135. 4 For a discussion of the EU’s motivation in terms of ideas and interests in this respect, see Louise van Schaik and Simon Schunz, “Explaining EU activism and impact in global climate politics: Is the Union a norm- or interest-driven actor?” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 50, no. 1, 2012, pp. 169–186. 5 One observer concludes that the EU has gained considerable actorness and impact ­although mainly through informal mechanisms, see: Tom Delreux, “The EU and multilateralism in the environmental field: unep reform and external representation in environmental negotiations,” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 66–83. However, Schunz concludes that the EU has had little impact on substance, see: Simon Schunz, “The European Union’s climate change diplomacy,” in Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj (eds.), The European Union as a diplomatic actor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 178–201. 6 For details, see Ole Elgström, “Negotiating a new world order: The EU and multilateral ­diplomacy at times of change,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (­London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 82–83. 7 See: Martijn Groenleer and David Rijks, “The European Union and the international criminal court: the politics of international criminal justice,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 167–187; Laura Davis, “Discreet effectiveness. The EU and the icc,” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G.

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The evolution of the EU reflects its capacity to coordinate within the network across policy areas of different EU competences and a general tendency can be seen in a greater role for EU representatives when negotiations are not politically salient, whereas Member State leaders assume a greater role and visibility when there is a spotlight on the international conference. 5.1

The Participation of the EU in International Organisations: General Aspects

Whereas the EU practices in bilateral relations of sending diplomatic m ­ issions in accordance with the provisions of the Vienna Convention is a defining characteristic of the EU that clearly sets it apart from other international organisations8 and makes it much more similar to the ideal-type Westphalian ­state-centred diplomacy, to have Delegations accredited to another international organisation is a common practice of international organisations generally.9 Even so, the ambition of the EU is radically from that of regular international organisations in terms of the significance of its participation as a political entity and not merely as the secretariat of an international organisation of sovereign states participating for technical purposes only. The nature of the EU as a sui generis political entity creates a series of challenges for its participation in international organisations, which is determined not only by the complex distribution of competences across policy areas and resulting roles of different actors in terms of diplomacy, as was seen in the bilateral relations, but also by the fact that international organisations are rule-based organisations that in few cases foresee the participation of an actor that is neither a state nor a regular international organisation. International organisations are based on international treaties negotiated and ratified by each member state, which makes their reform to include the EU as a member difficult. Furthermore, they are also generally consensus-based, meaning that apart from the internal legal o­ rder of the organisation in question, the participation of the EU in the ­international organisation depends also on the good will of all the member states of the particular organisation.

van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 84–100. 8 José Manuel Sobrino Heredia, “La actividad diplomática de las Delegaciones de la Comisión en el exterior de la Comunidad Europea,” Revista de Instituciones Europeas, vol. 20, 1993, p. 485. 9 Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 236.

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Although their status has evolved over the years, in many cases from mere information offices to recognised diplomatic missions, it is noteworthy that the EU has sent Delegations to international organisations almost as early as to third states. As Delegations of the Commission, the EU has had Delegations to the oecd and unesco in Paris since 1960, to the UN and specialised ­agencies in Geneva and New York since 1964, to the osce in Vienna since 1979 and to the fao in Rome since 1993.10 There are some functions that are common to the Delegations, such as informing, negotiating and representing the EU formally, but the nature and content of the diplomatic activities of the Delegation vary very much with the legal status of the EU and its Member States within the organisation and the degree to which its working areas overlap with those of substantial EU competences. The cases where the EU Delegation represents the EU exclusively and in substitution of the Member States are extremely rare and limited to areas of exclusive EU competence, such as in the North Atlantic Fisheries Organization.11 Regional fisheries organisations are thus a good example of where a single EU diplomatic representation has effectively substituted the EU Member States as diplomatic actors, and this has generally occurred without great problems.12 In parallel, where the EU Member States retain their competences and the EU does not have great activity as an entity, such as in the area of defence, the EU Member States remain the sole members of the international organisation, such as in the case of nato. However, since very few policy areas are exclusive areas of competence of the EU or its Member States, international organisations generally work with areas that are of shared competence within the EU, or with areas that are a mixture of exclusive and shared competences. The most widespread formula is therefore a participation of the EU as a distinct entity as a member or observer, but alongside the EU Member States. This occurs in the cases of the wto and the fao where the EU is a member, and generally in the UN system where the EU has observer status. This ­international actorness of the EU as distinct from its Member States has had a great symbolic impact, since it implies a recognition of the EU not only as a subject of international law but also as a legitimate international actor 10 11 12

Ibidem, pp. 236–237. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, “International activities of the European Union and sovereignty of Member States,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in ­international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 330. Juan Santos Vara, La participación de la Unión Europea en las organizaciones internacionales (Madrid: Colex, 2002), p. 211.

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with an inherent right to engage in diplomatic relations and contribute to the management of relations between EU and non-EU peoples. The two main forms of participation of the EU in international organisations are thus as a member of the organisation or as an observer. In the latter case the participation is limited and the EU has no voting rights. Some hybrid forms of participation have also evolved, such as the enhanced observer status of the EU in the UN system where the EU participation is somewhere in between that of a member and an observer. Another formula is where the EU is a member of some subsidiary bodies of an organisation but not a member of the organisation as such.13 Aside from the legal status of the EU, a general characteristic of the EU as a participant in international organisations is the ­continuous efforts to overcome the formal limitations to its participation and act as a unit through the coordination and voting cohesion of its Member States. The representation of the EU in international organisations is complex, not least due to the lack of precision in the EU Treaties and the differing nature of its representation depending on the organisation in question. The pillar structure of the Union has historically been an important factor behind the difficulty in establishing the representation of the EU in international organisations, and the lack of precision led to power struggles between the Commission and Member States over the representative competences.14 Under the Nice Treaty, the issue was reasonably clear in respect of second-pillar issues, since it was the Presidency of the Council, with the assistance of the Commission and the High Representative, which had the primary role. Also, the defence of common positions by individual Member States was vital. In the first pillar, the issue was more complex depending on the distribution of competences between the EU and the Member States, although three basic models can be identified,15 in which the Commission played a central role: (1) The full delegation of the representative responsibility to the Commission (primarily in areas of exclusive competence); (2) the supervised delegation of ­representative ­powers to the Commission (areas of mixed competences); and (3) the coordination between

13 14 15

Rachel Frid, The relations between the EC and international organisations (The Hague: ­ luwer Law International, 1995), p. 169. K Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 250. See: Benoît Coeuré y Jean Pisani-Ferry, “The governance of the European Union’s international economic relations: how many voices?” in Andre Sapir (ed.), Fragmented power: Europe and the global economy (Brussels: Bruegel, 2007), pp. 29–31.

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Commission and Member State representatives (areas of mixed and supporting competences). An additional complexity is caused by the fact that very few topics on the agenda of an international organisation correspond neatly with the internal division of competences established in EU law. Therefore, in the immense majority of cases, both the Union and the Member States must necessarily be represented. This situation has historically given rise to considerable confusion on the part of third states,16 with both the Commission and the Presidency/EEAS representing the EU, and with each Member State representing also itself. Coordination in the network of actors involved in EU diplomacy is therefore vital for the performance of the EU as an entity in international organisations and frequent coordination meetings have historically been the norm. With respect to the legal status of permanent diplomatic mission of the EU to the international organisations, this depends in each case on the Host State agreement between the organisation and its host state. Generally, the EU mission has the same status as that of member states of the organisation, which are similar to that of bilateral missions, with the immunities and privileges that are customary in the Westphalian diplomatic paradigm. Whereas the establishment of the eeas did not cause great problems in the bilateral diplomatic relationships of the EU, but rather improved the coordination in the EU network, the situation is quite different with respect to the participation of the EU in international organisations, where the situation during the implementation of the changes has been characterised as “fundamentally contested.”17 Due to the internal distribution of competences, it was previously the Commission that generally represented the EU in first pillar issue areas; whereas the rotating Presidency of the Council represented the EU in cfsp matters. Therefore, in the many areas of mixed competences and pillar-crossing issue areas, the EU was represented jointly by the Commission and the Presidency. With the establishment of the eeas, the Delegations accredited to international organisations now became EU Delegations, as did the two offices that the Council maintained in Geneva and New York.18 From 16 17

18

Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 267. David Spence, “From the Convention to Lisbon: External competences and the uneasy transition for Geneva Delegations,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 221. Brian Crowe, The European External Action Service. Roadmap for success, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Chatham House, 2008), p. 13.

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the outset, it was not clear whether the Commission or the eeas should represent the EU and its Member States in international organisations and at which political level.19 After a struggle over who could and should represent the EU and its Member States outside of the area of specific EU competences, which lead to a crisis in the autumn of 2011 with blocked statements and démarches,20 the Council adopted a set of General Arrangements for EU Statements in multilateral organisations.21 This gives the right of the Member States to decide on a case-by-case basis whether and how to be jointly represented, by the rotating Presidency, EU Delegation, European Council President or the Commission. It should also be recalled that although the Delegations are formally part of the eeas, even when the EU is represented by the local EU Delegation, this might in fact mean receiving instructions from and reporting back to the Commission, as happens in the ilo22 and in the wto where the Commission is the main representative of the EU, due to its internal competences. Once there is an agreement on who should represent the EU position, there is the question of which entity is being represented. In this sense, three different kinds of statements of the EU network in international organisations exist, according to the division of competences between the EU and the Member States in the specific case: On behalf of the EU (EU competences, including specific actions in the framework of the cfsp when there is consensus in the Council), on behalf of the EU and its Member States (shared competences when there is agreement among Member States) and on behalf of the Member States (state competences when there is agreement among Member States).23 As such, the diplomatic representation of the EU varies depending on the international organisation and also the specific issue being discussed, with Member State deciding on a case-by-case basis how the EU should be represented. Continued confusion of third states’ representatives is the consequence, since 19 20 21 22

23

Michael Emerson and Pjotr Maciej Kaczynski, Looking afresh at the external representation of the EU in the international area, post-Lisbon, ceps Policy Brief, no. 212 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010), p. 3. Niklas Helwig, Paul Ivan and Hrant Kostanyan, The new EU foreign policy architecture: Reviewing the first two years of the eeas (Brussels: ceps, 2013), p. 64. Council of the European Union, “EU statements in multilateral organisations – general arrangements,” doc 15901/11, 24th October 2011 (last accessed: September 2016). David Spence, “From the Convention to Lisbon: External competences and the uneasy transition for Geneva Delegations,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 232. Council of the European Union, “EU statements in multilateral organisations – general arrangements,” doc 15901/11, 24th October 2011 (last accessed: September 2016).

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these are rarely experts on EU law and the division of competences among the actors in the network. 5.2

The United Nations

The EU has a complex relationship with the UN system in the form of bilateral cooperation between the two bureaucracies. Since 1958, the two organisations have interchanged information and documents and established consultation practices within an institutionalised framework.24 The relations are based on strategic agreements mainly in the areas of peacekeeping and development aid between the EU and specialised agencies and programmes of the UN, such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (fao), the United Nations Development Programme (undp) and the High Commissioner for Human Rights (unhchr), that have been established by the exchange of letters,25 with the overall EU goals of this cooperation being to strengthen the UN as a multilateral forum for solving international problems and to increase the synergies between the activities of the EU and the UN.26 As opposed to this bilateral relationship, a more relevant aspect for the purposes of the present argument is the question of the EU as a diplomatic actor within the UN system. In this regard it should be noted that the EU, in the form of its Member States, is the largest financial contributor to the UN, and that the EU has a special preference for participating in the EU system, given the EU’s multilateralist ideology.27 Still, the UN Charter reserves membership status to sovereign states,28 a fact that constitutes an important limitation to the role of the EU within the UN, where only its Member States have full rights. There nevertheless seems to be a widespread recognition that the EU is more than just another international organisation and that it needs to be treated ­differently in the UN system. The EU is thus accepted as a party to several 24 25 26 27

28

Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 264–265. David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 77. The initial objectives were outlined by the European Commission, The European Union and the United Nations: the choice of multilateralism, 2003. COM/2003/0526 final. Simon Duke, “Form and substance in the EU’s multilateral diplomacy,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, policy, power (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 16. UN Charter, art. 4.

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international framework treaties negotiated in the UN,29 and to support its presence the EU maintains Delegations at the UN headquarters in New York, Geneva, Rome, Vienna, Paris and Nairobi. The EU participates in almost all the main and subsidiary organs of the UN, as well as its specialised agencies, although with a different status in each. The fao is special since the EU is formally a member, albeit a special member, and the EU commonly has the status of observer, such as in the ecosoc, the ilo and the who. The absence of general rules regulating the participation of o­ bservers means that the EU participates in different ways in different ­organisms, for example with the right to speak in some but not in others. What generally characterises the EU as an observer is that it cannot vote and that it does not contribute financially. The EU is generally represented by the EU Delegations to the UN, although in a minority of cases, a Member State represents the EU viewpoint.30 Also, it should be kept in mind that EU diplomacy is not only a matter of the official EU representative acting as an observer, but of common policy positions being defended by the individual Member States through their ordinary diplomatic channels. In this sense, the Member States continue to fulfil a vital role in the EU network as a consequence of both formal and informal burden-sharing.31 The participation of the EU in the UN has evolved gradually to become ever more coherent, a fact no doubt further helped by the fact that the Delegations have now taken over the representative tasks previously held by the rotating Presidency of the Council, which also means, somewhat paradoxically, that the official EU representative was downgraded from a member to an observer.32 In spite of the difficulties generated by the legal status as an observer, the evolution towards greater coherence has been made possible by an intense coordination effort, both in the decision-making phase in Brussels and on the ground before sessions in the UN where more concrete issues are treated by the Delegation and Member State missions, with more than 1000 yearly coordination meeting in Geneva and more than 1300 in New York as early as 2006.33 29 30 31 32 33

David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 78. Katie Verlin Laatikainen, “The EU Delegation in New York: A debut of high political ­drama,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 199. Also stressed by Katie Verlin Laatikainen, ibidem, p. 196. Ibidem, p. 197. Mary Farrel, “EU representation and coordination within the United Nations,” in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting multilateralisms (New York: Palgrave, 2006), p. 33.

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5.2.1 Status of the EU All EU Member States are full members of the UN, whereas the EU has had an observer status since 1974.34 At the same time as the EU, both the comecon and the plo obtained this same status. As an observer, the EU could not express itself through its representatives, but had to rely on Member State delegations to express a common EU standpoint. In these cases, it was the Member State holding rotating Presidency of the Council that assumed the task, in parallel with its role in bilateral relations as for second pillar issues. The difference is here that also in areas where in principle it was the Commission that should express the EU´s position, it would still not be allowed to do so under UN rules. To speak and vote like a political entity in the General Assembly, it was therefore necessary to have numerous coordination meetings so as to establish a common position and speaking points. Of course, confusion would still arise when the Presidency alleged to speak for the EU, but other Member States then made independent statements. This situation, giving the Member States a greater role than the internal distribution of competence in the EU would suggest was unsatisfactory to all parties and it was clear that with the creation of the eeas the EU was evolving as a political entity far beyond the other regional organisations. After an intense effort by the EU, particularly HR/VP Catherine Ashton, the 2011 ­General Assembly resolution 65/276 gave the EU an enhanced observer status in the Assembly, with the right to speak, although not vote, to have access to all UN meetings, although with seating among the observers, and have its written proposals circulated through the official channels.35 This has solved the main problem that the EU previously had in the UN, namely the lack of formal ­access of its representatives.36 As of 2013, the eeas expressed the EU’s viewpoint in the immense majority of cases. Nevertheless, the General Assembly resolution also means that to vote, co-sponsor draft resolutions and propose candidates is strictly a matter for the UN member states, so in these cases, a Member State will continue to represent a common EU position, should it exist.

34 35 36

Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 277. UN General Assembly Resolution 65/276, of 10th of May 2011. Simon Duke, “Form and substance in the EU’s multilateral diplomacy,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, policy, power (New York: Routledge, 2013), p. 23.

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5.2.2 Forms of Representation The topics discussed in the UN General Assembly are often a mixture of issue areas where the different actors in the EU network have different competences and formally take decisions by different methods, such as a discussion touching upon development cooperation, security and trade. This creates a legal complexity for the EU, due to the internal distribution of competences, which entails that specific positions and declarations must be consensuated by all actors in the network and many statements and speeches therefore begin with the phrase “In the name of the European Union and its Member States.” A decision was taken in the coreper in 1975 regarding representation, which was established as dual by the Commission and the Presidency of the Council, with the Commission representative being the spokesperson in areas of Community competence and the representative of the Presidency in other areas.37 This general formula was applied in the UN system as well as in other international organisations,38 since it allowed overcoming the lack of voice for the EU by letting the Presidency using its speaking rights as a sovereign state to also speak in the name of the EU. In the General Assembly there has been a pattern where the amounts of declarations made in the name of the EU varied considerably with the Member State holding the Presidency, but generally the number increased over the years.39 Nevertheless, this formula was not sufficient to overcome confusion on the part of third states, whose representatives did not always comprehend the intricacies of the EU’s internal organisation and were not always clear on when a Member State representative spoke in the name of the EU or in the name of the Member State holding the Presidency only.40 This was finally resolved with the creation of the eeas and the representation by an EU representative, with the EU Delegation now delivering EU statements both in the plenary and commission meetings within the General Assembly and also towards other states.41 37 38 39 40 41

Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 282–283. Peter Bruckner, “The European Community and the United Nations,” European Journal of International Law, vol. 1, no. 2, 1990, p. 177. According to the data collected by Maximilian B. Rasch, The European Union at the United Nations: The functioning and coherence of EU external representations in a state-centric environment (Leiden: Martin Nijhoff, 2008), p. 141. Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 288. Edith Drieskens, Laura van Dievel and Yf Reykers, “The EU’s search for effective participation at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council,” in Edith Drieskens and

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5.2.3 Coordination Practices Before Lisbon, the Delegation of the Commission in New York and the mission of the Member State holding the Presidency were the key players in the coordination in the network, together with Council Offices established in New York and Geneva to help organise the numerous coordination meetings immediately prior to UN meetings. The Presidency also had a vital role during General Assembly sessions, since for internal coordination purposes all topics treated were considered as if they were cfsp topics,42 thereby making the mission of the Presidency responsible for coordination, although the High Representative also assumed the leadership of some important coordination meetings, a symbolically important aspect.43 The previous functions of the Commission Delegation and the Presidency now fall on the EU Delegation. This entails organising the information exchange with the Member States about the plenary sessions and to try to reach a common position, so whereas the main responsibility and chairmanship has passed to the EU Delegation, the coordination practices remain essentially the same.44 The Delegation must not only negotiate for the EU and speak on behalf of the Union, but also formulate the explanation of political positions. Nevertheless, the EU cannot, as an observer, vote or formulate explanations for the vote, so this task still falls on the rotating Presidency, which reflects a continued importance of the cooperation between EU Delegation and Presidency mission.45 Apart from this formalised burden-sharing with the Presidency, other Member States are also involved in ad-hoc burden sharing in the General Assembly committees and the Member State missions are particularly vital in informal negotiations with third states.46 Of course, it is not always possible to

42

43 44

45 46

L­ ouise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 23. Paul Luif and Mariyana Radeva, “EU co-ordination in international organisations: the case of the United Nations General Assembly and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,” in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds.), European foreign policy in an evolving international system: the road towards convergence (Basingstoke: ­Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 28. Maximilian B. Rasch, The European Union at the United Nations: The functioning and ­coherence of EU external representations in a state-centric environment (Leiden: Martin Nijhoff, 2008), p. 137. Edith Drieskens, Laura van Dievel and Yf Reykers, “The EU’s search for effective participation at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council,” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 23. Katie Verlin Laatikainen, “The EU Delegation in New York: A debut of high political drama,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: ­European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 205. Ibidem, p. 208.

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reach a common political position in the EU network, and then simply the EU has no position and each Member State defends its own point of view. In fact, the diplomats of the Member States and the EU Delegation have historically drawn on their experiences and only tried to reach a common position when there was a realistic opportunity for success.47 Apart from the internal coordination function, the EU also interacts and even coordinates with some third states of relevance, first and foremost candidates to EU membership, the eea states and those included in the Neighbourhood Policy, meeting on a weekly or bi-weekly basis.48 Sometimes, the EU representative will also speak in their name, a practice that has its parallel in the general political declarations of the cfsp produced in Brussels, with which third states frequently align themselves. The complex division of competences and multiple EU representatives make coordination vital for the EU to successfully pursue its international objectives in the General Assembly and other international fora. The political weight of an EU that agrees on a policy position is considerable also with respect to influencing the positions of third states, and there are also important expectations on the part of third states upon the EU’s capacity to act as an entity, expectations that by themselves create further social pressure on the EU Member State to contribute to making it so.49 One of the main functions of the EU Delegations in New York is therefore to strengthen the coordination among EU actors, by circulating draft declarations and draft common positions. Generally, the more central role of the EU Delegation within the EU network with the creation of the eeas has paradoxically given the Member States greater freedom to create national diplomatic profiles, since the EU delegation is now largely responsible for the EU position.50 Also, and particularly in the informal diplomatic processes, the Member State missions continue to have a vital role and also as negotiation facilitators in the UN system broadly.51

47 48 49 50 51

Maximilian B. Rasch, The European Union at the United Nations: The functioning and coherence of EU external representations in a state-centric environment (Leiden: Martin Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 152–153. Katie Verlin Laatikainen, “The EU Delegation in New York: A debut of high political drama,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), pp. 208–209. Jan Wouters, “The European Union as an actor within the United Nations General ­Assembly,” in Vincent Kronenberger (ed.), The EU and the international legal order: Discord or harmony? (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2001), p. 379. Katie Verlin Laatikainen, “The EU Delegation in New York: A debut of high political drama,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: ­European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 196. Ibidem, p. 212.

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5.2.4 The UN Security Council The European Union does not have any official status in the UN Security Council, although the EU Member States who are members of the Security Council have a general obligation of sincere cooperation52 and a specific obligation to inform the other Member States and the EU Delegation.53 A practice ­developed in the coordination meetings, where one of the Security Council members informs the other EU Member States.54 In spite of the weak legal obligations, the EU members of the Security Council normally vote together, and the High Representative or the eeas expresses the EU point of view in open debates.55 The EU High Representative has thus participated in the sessions of the Security Council in cases of general EU agreement on the policy issue since first being invited by France in 2000, but this remains a mainly symbolic aspect of EU actorness, that does not encroach upon the French and UK status as permanent members. There is thus no role for the EU in the previous negotiations that is the basis of the unsc’s work, and the EU as an organisation is largely on the receiving end of the unsc’s work.56 There is little proactive policy-making on the EU part and the coordination is not systematised to the same degree, a fact that can be traced back to the dynamics created by the different status of the EU Member States within the Security Council.57 France and the United Kingdom have traditionally considered the Security Council a key platform for the defence of their particular state interests and source of legitimacy for their global policies,58 so the EU dimension has entered only slowly in this UN organ. Still, even when there is no formal EU ­representative 52 53 54 55 56

57 58

teu (Lisbon), art. 4, also specified in arts 24 and 34. teu (Lisbon), art. 24. Mary Farrel, “EU representation and coordination within the United Nations,” in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting multilateralisms (New York: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 27–46, p. 34. Katie Verlin Laatikainen, “The EU Delegation in New York: A debut of high political drama,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 198. Caroline Bouchard and Edith Drieskens, “The European Union in UN politics,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen and Katie Verlin Laatikainen (eds.), Routledge Handbook on the European Union and International Institutions: Performance, policy, power (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 121–122. Maximilian B. Rasch, The European Union at the United Nations: The functioning and coherence of EU external representations in a state-centric environment (Leiden: Martin Nijhoff, 2008), pp. 172–173. Christopher Hill, “The European powers in the Security Council: differing interests, differing arenas,” in Katie Verlin Laatikainen and Karen E. Smith (eds.), The European Union at the United Nations: Intersecting multilateralisms (New York: Palgrave, 2006), pp. 54–55.

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expressing the EU position, it is possible to conclude that the concerted action of the EU states have made possible a general defence of EU political positions in the Security Council,59 and whereas the EU has not one seat, but several, the paradox is that the EU is seen as overrepresented in the Security Council.60 Even so, the presence of the EU in the Security Council is much less pronounced when compared to the General Assembly, both due to its lack of formal status and the interests at stake in Security Council, since security issues remains the area where the least movement towards greater agreement among EU Member States has happened.61 5.2.5 The fao 5.2.5.1 Status of the EU The then European Economic Community obtained the status as a privileged observer in the fao in 1962.62 The participation of the Community was a functional necessity due to its exclusive and shared competence in some of the working areas of the fao, such as trade, fisheries and agriculture. The special status was therefore a necessity of the internal law of the eec so that it could express itself in the name of the Community and its Member States,63 since the Member States did not have the competence to act in some areas. Nevertheless, only the Member States could participate in the treaties and agreements reached within the fao,64 giving rise to an incompatibility between the fao’s statutes that only foresaw sovereign states as members and the lack of competences of some of these members due to their participation in the process of European integration and the Community legal order they had established. 59 60

61 62 63 64

Johan Verbeke, “EU coordination on UN Security Council matters,” in Jan Wouters et al. (eds.), The United Nations and the European Union: an ever stronger partnership (The Hague: T.M.C. Asser Press, 2006), pp. 49–60. Edith Drieskens, Laura van Dievel and Yf Reykers, “The EU’s search for effective participation at the UN General Assembly and UN Security Council,” in Edith Drieskens and ­Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external r­ eform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 16. Ibidem, p. 23. Sergio Marchisio, “EU’s membership in International Organizations,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 238. Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 324. Sergio Marchisio, “EU’s membership in International Organizations,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 238.

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The solution was a modification of the constitutive treaty and regulations of the fao that permitted the eec as a member from 1991,65 with the reluctance of other fao members being the vital reason behind the delay, since they feared upsetting the equilibrium of interests present in the organisation.66 The solution was not to make an exception in the case of the EU, but to generally allow regional economic integration organisations to become members of the fao67 provided that they fulfil a series of conditions, among which the most important is a declaration regarding the distribution of competences between the regional organisation and its member states relative to fao working areas,68 so that the role of each becomes clear. The EU is thus a member of the fao alongside its Member States, which is nevertheless a special membership, both due to the obligation of maintaining the declaration of competences updated, but also because it does not contribute to the budget of the fao. Only the EU Member States contribute and it would therefore be a double contribution. When voting, the EU votes with the number of votes of its Member States and has not only a single vote. A main limitation of its status is its inability to participate in the organs of restricted membership in the fao,69 which among other things regulate the internal functioning of the organisation. The fao is thus a good example of the evolution of international law provoked by the presence of the EU as a special kind of diplomatic actor. Whereas it has been accepted as a member, it remains a special and limited membership, which is nevertheless far more substantial that an observer status, since it allows for voting with the combined votes of the EU Member States within its areas of competence. 5.2.5.2 Forms of Representation The European Union has had a Delegation accredited to the fao in Rome since 1993.70 In the daily work, the Member States or the EU participate and vote according to the declaration of distribution of competences drawn up 65

66 67 68 69 70

For a detailed analysis of this, see: Joni Heliskoski, “Internal struggle for international presence: The exercise of voting rights within the fao,” in Alan Dashwood and Cristophe Hillion (eds.), The general law of E.C. external relations (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2000), pp. 79–99. Juan Santos Vara, La participación de la Unión Europea en las organizaciones internacionales (Madrid: Colex, 2002), p. 240. fao Constitution, art. 2. fao Constitution, art. 2(5–7). fao Constitution, art. 2(9). Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 236–237.

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as a precondition for EU membership. Before each meeting in the fao, the EU must specify who is competent on which points of order and who will in consequence be voting,71 and in the case of it being the EU, it will be with the combined votes of its Member States that have the right to vote at the meeting. An agreement between the Council and the Commission from 1991 established that the Commission would represent the Community when the main part of issues under discussion was a Community competence and the Presidency when the main part of issues were outside of Community competence, in both cases supposing a prior agreement among the Member States on the policy position in areas of mixed competences. The Commission representative and the Member States would be able to support or add to the position expressed by the Presidency. In cases of no agreement among the Member States, these would express each their opinion and vote individually, although the Commission would still be able to intervene.72 The same happens in areas of Member State competence, although in these cases nothing impedes coordination and joint voting either. The Lisbon Treaty and the eeas has greatly simplified this internal division of labour, since the eeas now speaks in representation of the Union both in areas of exclusive and shared competences,73 although the Presidency sits together with the eeas in the meetings to speak on behalf of the Member States when these have the competence in the area under discussion.74 Still, the complexity has to a large extent been internalised, since the EU is now represented by one delegation and has only one nameplate at the meetings, although the Member States continue to be members in their own right. 5.2.5.3 Coordination Practices Coordination and political agreement within the EU network continues to be of paramount importance. The 1991 agreement between the Council and the Commission also established the procedure for coordination and how the EU should prepare the meeting, declarations and voting in the fao. In areas of mixed competence, only when coordination meetings resulted in a common position would the EU substitute the Member States when voting and otherwise each Member State would vote according to own preferences. In general, 71 72 73 74

Michael Emerson and Pjotr Maciej Kaczynski, Looking afresh at the external representation of the EU in the international area, post-Lisbon, ceps Policy Brief, no. 212 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010), p. 3. Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 335–336. Robert Kissack, “The role of the EU in the reform of the fao: Bridge builder or structural engineer?” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 50. Ibidem, p. 60.

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the coordination practices with the 1991 agreement as the basis were not sufficient to guarantee a coherent representation in the fao,75 and the situation has given rise to continued struggles over the division of competences.76 The EU Delegation has now taken over the coordination task and organises coordination meetings, at least twice per month.77 Nevertheless, Member States have vested interests in agricultural policy and therefore have been reluctant to grant the influence to the EU Delegation that could be expected when considering the EU membership of the fao.78 5.3

The World Trade Organization

5.3.1 Status of the EU The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) was established in 1947 basically as a forum for trade negotiations and with a procedure for dispute settlement. After the creation of the Common Commercial Policy with the Rome Treaty and the completion of the customs union in 1968, it was clear that the issue area treated in the gatt fell within Community competences, including partially under the exclusive competence of external trade relations. Due to the absence of Member State competences, it was thus inevitable that the eec be a diplomatic actor in the area of international trade. The eec was admitted in the gatt as a negotiator already in 1961, helped by the fact that it substituted the Member States in negotiations and did not act alongside them, and the fact that this was not seen as problematic by other gatt participants.79 75 76

77 78 79

Sergio Marchisio, “EU’s membership in International Organizations,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 254. Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt and Thomas Ramopoulos, “The EU in the world of international organisations: Diplomatic aspirations, legal hurdles and political realities,” in in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 99. Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 321. Robert Kissack, “The role of the EU in the reform of the fao: Bridge builder or structural engineer?” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 61–62. Romualdo Bermejo García and Eugenia López-Jacoiste, “La pcc de la UE y la omc: su evolución y perspectivas de futuro tras el Tratado de Lisboa,” in Carlos R. Fernández Liesa and Castor M. Díaz Barrado (eds.), El Tratado de Lisboa: análisis y perspectivas (Madrid: Dykinson, 2008), p. 256.

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The Commission thus became the sole representative of the entire political entity in substitution of the Member States within the area of exclusive community competence, although the eec was not formally a member of the gatt.80 When the World Trade Organization (wto) was founded to succeed the gatt, it was therefore logical that the eec should become a full member. The Commission participated in the negotiations of the international agreement creating the wto as the only EU representative, although both the EU and the Member States individually signed the treaty and became wto member states. Although it is a founding member of the wto, in contrast to the case of the fao, the EU is a special member that is specifically mentioned in the founding treaty, which establishes that the EU votes with a number of votes equal to that of its Member States.81 This would seem to constitute an enormous advantage for the EU and has been criticised particularly by the United States. Nevertheless, the absence of any serious conflict is probably due to the fact that decision-making in the wto organs is generally characterised by consensus.82 The advantage of the voting weight of the EU within its area of competence is therefore more formal than real. Within the wto, the EU has generally evolved from being a defensive actor to a proactive leader,83 and has now become “well established among the ‘big players’ on world trade.”84 Particularly in the dispute settlement system has the diplomatic activity of the EU been notable, both in defensive and offensive cases. The high profile of the EU reflects the efficiency of the cooperation between the Commission and the Member States in the wto, which has permitted that the Commission act as any other foreign policy actor in the wto.85 Another important factor has of course been the large degree of political

80 81 82 83 84 85

Sergio Marchisio, “EU’s membership in International Organizations,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 235. wto, Agreemment establishing the World Trade Organizationo, art. ix. Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, “World Trade Organization and the European Union,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 82. Ibidem, p. 80. Frank Hoffmeister, “The European Union as an international trade negotiator,” in Joachim A. Koops and Gjovalin Macaj (eds.), The European Union as a diplomatic actor (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), p. 150. Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, “World Trade Organization and the European Union,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 80.

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agreement on the policy stances among the actors in the EU network, which has permitted them to generally act as a unit towards other wto members. 5.3.2 Forms of Representation After the creation of the customs union in 1968, the eec substituted the Member States in the trade negotiations in the gatt. Although there was never a formal decision to that effect in the gatt, the other participants accepted as natural that the eec participated in the meetings and committees of the gatt and concluded international trade agreements.86 Due to its extensive competences in the area, the Commission established a Delegation in Geneva in 1964,87 although with no formal status in the gatt. In practice, the EU Delegation in Geneva represents the EU in the different international organisations with headquarters there, including the wto, but in the case of the wto it is done by Commission and not eeas staff and in this sense it is a setting where the Lisbon Treaty and the eeas has changed reality on the ground relatively little. Although the EU and its Member States formally participate as differentiated entities, there is generally a unitary presence of the EU in the wto. The Commission has historically been the sole representative of the EU and its Member States in the wto, speaking on ­behalf of the entire EU in “almost all”88 meetings, although always after a coordination meeting with the Member State missions,89 and it became customary that only the Commission representative would express an opinion in the name of the EU although Member State representatives might be present in a specific ­meeting.90 The Commission has been the main representative of the EU both in areas of exclusive and mixed competences in the dispute settlement system. 86

87 88 89

90

Romualdo Bermejo García and Laura San Martín Sánchez de Muniain, “Las relaciones de la Unión Europea con la Organización Mundial de Comercio,” in Fernando M. Mariño Méndez and Carlos J. Moreiro González (eds.), Derecho internacional y Tratado Constitucional Europeo (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006), p. 221. Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 340–341. w t o  website, https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/european_ communities_e.htm (last accessed: September 2016). Romualdo Bermejo García and Eugenia López-Jacoiste, “La pcc de la UE y la omc: su evolución y perspectivas de futuro tras el Tratado de Lisboa,” in Carlos R. Fernández Liesa and Castor M. Díaz Barrado (eds.), El Tratado de Lisboa: análisis y perspectivas (Madrid: Dykinson, 2008), p. 256. Bart Kerremans, “The European Commission and the EU Member States as actors in the wto negotiating process: decision making between Scylla and Charybdis,” in Bob Reinalda (ed.), Decision making within international organisations (London: Routledge, 2004), pp. 52–55.

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Also in specific negotiations the Commission has acted alone representing the entire EU in all policy areas, although it is the Council that authorises the negotiations and the general mandate. The role of Member States has been to assist the Commission in the negotiations and sign agreements jointly with the Commission and it is ­noteworthy that among the Member States, only Hungary has a specific mission to the wto.91 As far as the diplomatic interaction is concerned, there has been no great differences between areas of exclusive and mixed competences,92 so it can be concluded that the EU actors in the network has shared an ambition about the EU being a unitary actor to effectively defend common interests. 5.3.3 Coordination Practices The combination of the internal distribution of competences and the ways of working with different issue areas of the wto makes a strict division of labour between the different actors in the EU diplomatic network impossible. In practice, this has historically mean that the DG Trade of the Commission has met frequently with a committee of the respective Council working group,93 a fact that facilitates the exchange of information and adjustment of positions to make the posture of the EU more coherent and unified, although the challenge of the Commission to balance benefits and costs of wto agreements for the individual Member States, not speaking for themselves, is considerable.94 Although an attempt to codify the coordination norms in writing failed,95 the

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93 94

95

David Spence, “From the Convention to Lisbon: External competences and the uneasy transition for Geneva Delegations,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 238. Esther López Barrero, “La Unión Europea como miembro de la Organización Mundial del Comercio (omc) y la omc como ‘miembro’ de la Unión Europea,” in Carmela Pérez Bernárdez (ed.), La proyección exterior de la Unión Europea: desafíos y realidad (Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanch, 2007) p. 167. Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, “World Trade Organization and the European Union,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 83. Bart Kerremans, “The European Commission in the wto’s dda negotiations: A tale of and agent, a single undertaking, and twenty-seven nervous principals” in Spyros Blavoukos and Dimitris Bourantonis (eds.), The EU presence in international organisations (London, Routledge, 2011), p. 147. Sergio Marchisio, “EU’s membership in International Organizations,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 252–253.

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distribution of competences among the EU and Member States has not had great practical effects on the diplomatic performance of the EU as an ­entity in the wto,96 due to the general willingness of the Member States to let the EU take the lead in organisation.97 Also, the high degree of legalisation, particularly in the dispute settlement system, has granted a comparative advantage for the Commission due to its great technical expertise, thus creating an incentive for Member States to rely on Commission experts. This fact has also contributed to making the role of the Commission in the wto larger than what it might be, according to the formal distribution of competences in the network. Also after Lisbon, DG Trade continues to exist separately from the eeas, and it is the Trade Commissioner who represents the EU in the wto ministerial conference, the highest authority within the wto, whereas it is the EU Delegation under the eeas that manages the daily interaction with third states and is formally accredited as a diplomatic mission. Since the EU is a member of the wto, there are few legal obstacles to EU activities within the organisation, the challenge being mainly one of vertical coordination with the Member States and internal coordination between the eeas and DG Trade. The practice is that the Member States generally refrain from speaking in the trade negotiations and instead focus on supervising and controlling what the EU mission does.98 Therefore, the coordination meetings among EU actors are mainly chaired by the rotating Presidency and not the EU Delegation.99 The sheer volume of coordination meetings among the actors involved in EU representation indicates the intense effort of coordination, but also the fragmentation of the EU as an actor, with 1000 coordinating meetings taking place in Geneva every year.100

96

Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, “World Trade Organization and the European Union,” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 86. 97 Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt and Thomas Ramopoulos, “The EU in the world of international organisations: Diplomatic aspirations, legal hurdles and political realities,” in in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 99. 98 Catherina Carta, “The EU in Geneva: The diplomatic representation of a system of governance,” Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 9. no. 2, 2013, p. 417. 99 Ibidem. 100 Sieglinde Gstöhl, “EU diplomacy after Lisbon: More effective multilateralism,” Brown Journal of World Affairs, Spring/Summer 2011, no. 11, 2011.

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The International Monetary Fund

5.4.1 Status of the EU All the EU Member States are also members of the imf, but in contrast to the case of the wto the EU has no official status. The European Central Bank (ecb) is an observer,101 but due to its political independence, concerted political action of the EU must happen through the coordinated behaviour of its Member States. The situation can be characterised as anachronistic, since the EU Member States with the adoption of the Euro transferred competences over monetary policy to the EU.102 The lack of an official status for the EU is particularly problematic due to the incapacity of the EU to convert the more than 30% of combined voting weight of the Member States into political influence, due to the internal structures of the imf itself. The lack of an EU role and distribution of EU Member States on different voting groups means that the imf is probably the case where the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the eeas has had the least impact on EU diplomatic practices, since the EU continues to be represented exclusively by the individual missions of the Member States.103 5.4.2 Forms of Representation In the meetings of the imf Board of Governors, constituted by a representative of each member, the Presidency of the Council has historically made declarations in the name of the EU that have been previously approved in the Council in special meetings where also Member State central banks are present. The Board of Governors only meets once per year, so the EU is not faced with great coordination problems in this sense. When the discussion involves the Euro, the EU Member States using the Euro are represented by a spokesperson of the Washington-based eurimf coordination group, which also includes representatives of the ecb and the Commission. The Presidency of the Council also speaks in the name of 101 Michael Emerson and Pjotr Maciej Kaczynski, Looking afresh at the external representation of the EU in the international area, post-Lisbon, ceps Policy Brief, no. 212 (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2010), p. 4. 102 Manuel López Escudero, “Relaciones de la Unión Europea con el Fondo Monetario Internacional, el Banco Mundial y el Banco de Pagos Internacionales,” in Fernando M. Mariño Méndez and Carlos J. Moreiro González (eds.), Derecho internacional y Tratado Constitucional Europeo (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006), p. 281. 103 Reflected in the fact that as of September 2016, the eeas website contains no mention of the EU in the imf and the Commission´s website has not been updated since 2010.

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this group.104 In the multilateral consultations on the reform of the general ­governance of the monetary system initiated by the imf in 2006, the Euro area has been represented by a troika consisting of representatives of the Member States using the Euro, the Commission and the ecb, whose coordination has been so effective that the Euro-zone has had a unitary representation,105 nevertheless the negotiations have not led to reforms of the imf. The 24-Member imf Executive Board is responsible for most decisions and the general management of the imf and has a for the EU problematic composition. Of the EU Member States, Germany, France and the United Kingdom each have their individual representative on the Board, due to their quotas and voting weights in the imf. The rest of the Member States are included in different groups, in which also non-Member States are present. Each group has one representative on the Executive Board that expresses the views and votes for the entire group, which is then bound to reach a consensus on a common political position or abstain from voting. With respect to EU diplomatic action, the distribution of the EU Member States in different imf groups is a cause of great problems, particularly because some Member States, such as Spain or Ireland, are a minority in their group and therefore could be contributing to a contrary vote or abstention of their groups even when a consensus would exist within the EU with respect to a policy position. The fragmentation of the EU as an actor within the imf also constitutes a serious incentive to not coordinate within the EU. Particularly for the larger Member States it is easier to obtain influence by coordinating in a forum such as the G8, which itself is a disincentive to coordinate within the imf. Also, even if the EU or the Eurozone should get its own representation on the Board in substitution of the EU Member States, as the Commission has proposed, this would probably be filled by the ecb or the Commission,106 which is undoubtedly a further disincentive for Member States to accept change. Whereas it might also seem logical that the EU Member States should constitute their own group, this would nevertheless upset the internal balance in the imf since the group would have more than 30% of the votes, double those of the United States, and the EU Member States have 104 Jean-Victor Louis, “Les relations extérieures de l’Union économique et monétaire,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 94. 105 Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, “A single EU seat in the International Monetary Fund?” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 66. 106 Michael Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s role as global actor: Institutions, law and the restructuring of European diplomacy (Brussels: ceps, 2011), p. 71.

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therefore been under pressure to accept reduced voting weights,107 a further disincentive to accept a greater role for the EU. Another option would be that the EU would become a member of the imf with a corresponding quota and voting weight. According to the imf’s calculations of quotas and votes, the EU would have fewer votes than the Member States combined today, but still more than the United States. Also, the influence of the EU would increase, since it would per definition always vote jointly. Again it is not likely that other imf members would facilitate such an increase of EU influence, although some might have a general interest in updating imf structures to increase its legitimacy.108 An additional internal complication that functions to break reforms is the fact that not all EU Member States have introduced the Euro as their currency, so the representation of the EU in the imf would still need to take this into account, creating further internal organisational problems. 5.4.3 Coordination Practices The main coordination among the actors in the EU’s diplomatic network regarding the work of the imf is done in the scimf Brussels-based working group created in 2003 with representatives of the Member States’ ministries of finance, the Member States’ central banks, the Commission and the ecb. To ensure coordination with the representatives in Washington, the Council Presidency’s representative in the imf Board of Governors also normally ­participates in the meetings. Generally, the agreements reached in the scimf constitute the political basis for the coordination among the Washingtonbased representatives in the eurimf, and in practice there is an active collaboration between the two coordination groups.109 Furthermore, there is an added layer of coordination among the Member States using the Euro,110 and 107 Ibidem, pp. 71–72. 108 One analysit specifically mentions the United States, although its own relative power would diminish. For the detailed argument, see: Manuel López Escudero, “Relaciones de la Unión Europea con el Fondo Monetario Internacional, el Banco Mundial y el Banco de Pagos Internacionales,” in Fernando M. Mariño Méndez and Carlos J. Moreiro González (eds.), Derecho internacional y Tratado Constitucional Europeo (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006), p. 294. 109 Lorenzo Bini Smaghi, “A single EU seat in the International Monetary Fund?” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 66–67. 110 Manuel López Escudero, “Relaciones de la Unión Europea con el Fondo Monetario Internacional, el Banco Mundial y el Banco de Pagos Internacionales,” in Fernando M. Mariño Méndez and Carlos J. Moreiro González (eds.), Derecho internacional y Tratado Constitucional Europeo (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2006), p. 282.

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further problems when the Council Presidency is not held by a Member with a seat on the Board or if the eeas or Commission would take over the coordinating role from the rotating Presidency.111 Still, the main conclusion is that the principal obstacle to concerted EU action remains the imf structures and not coordination in the EU network. The situation of the EU in the imf has not evolved over time, so it is generally a very good example of the sharp contrast between the level of integration internally in the EU and the possibility for a diplomatic representation of this fact, for which the EU continues to rely on pragmatism in the absence of a fundamental reform of the international organization.112 5.5

The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce)

The EU and the osce maintain a bilateral cooperation at the level of working groups, which have had an exchange practice since 2003, and through direct c­ ontacts between the osce Secretariat and different EU institutions.113 Generally, the cooperation between the two organisations functions best when an EU Member State occupies the Presidency of the osce.114 There is also practical c­ ooperation in concrete missions, that are generally about election-­monitoring, inter-ethnic relations and policing.115 The operational approach of the two organisations are similar, basically because the osce approach to security linking human, military and economic aspects and its holistic approach to crises has been a model for the EU in its construction as an international actor.116 EU Member States generally prefer to participate in EU missions rather than osce missions, which has given rise to a debate over whether the EU’s evolution as an international actor is hollowing out the osce, and whether the two strategic objectives of EU foreign policy of strengthening its own role and multilateral organisations such as the 111 Michael Emerson et al., Upgrading the EU’s role as global actor: Institutions, law and the restructuring of European diplomacy (Brussels: ceps, 2011), p. 74. 112 Manuel Lopez Escudero, “New Perspectives on eu-imf Relations: A Step to Strengthen the emu External Governance,” European Papers, vol. 1, no. 2, 2016, pp. 469–499. 113 Giuseppe Nesi, “The relations between the European Union and the osce in crisis management,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), pp. 273–274. 114 Peter van Ham, “eu-osce relations: Partners or rivals in security?” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), p. 138. 115 Ibidem. 116 Ibidem.

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osce are practically compatible in all cases. The evolution has generally favoured EU (and nato and the Council of Europe) actorness over the osce,117 although it retains its relevance as a common forum for the countries of the two cold war blocs. 5.5.1 Status of the EU The European Union is not a Member of the osce, and although it through its Member States constitute almost half the membership and contributes almost two thirds of its budget,118 the EU has not used its massive presence to direct the activities of the osce.119 However, already at the negotiations preparing the 1975 Helsinki final act, the then 9 Community Member States announced that they would act a as a group. This was officially recognised and the delegation was denominated “Member States, Presidency/EC”.120 5.5.2 Forms of Representation Until the Lisbon Treaty, it was generally the rotating Presidency that represented the EU in the osce and there has been unanimity among the M ­ ember States in 95% of the cases, which has permitted the EU to present a position in the meetings.121 The osce has since derogated its rules of procedure to let an eeas representative speak for the EU.122 The lack of a formal status for the EU has meant that the mission of the Member State holding the Council Presidency still formally represents the EU, although the floor is then given to the eeas representative.123 It is common for candidate states to join the EU consensus, 117 Niels van Willigen, “Effective multilateralism between unequal partners” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 137. 118 Ibidem, p. 141. 119 Peter van Ham, “eu-osce relations: Partners or rivals in security?” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 135–136. 120 Ibidem, p. 134. 121 Paul Luif and Mariyana Radeva, “EU co-ordination in international organisations: the case of the United Nations General Assembly and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,” in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds.), European foreign ­policy in an evolving international system: the road towards convergence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 34. 122 Lars-Erik Lundin, “Effective multilateralism after Lisbon: The added value of the eeas and the EU Delegation in Vienna,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 251. 123 Niels van Willigen, “Effective multilateralism between unequal partners” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 146–147.

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so that the bloc acting with the common EU position is actually even larger. This has not been beneficial for the dialogue in the osce, since the EU positions are the result of a compromise, sometimes carefully crafted, that is not flexible when interacting in the osce. Russia has expressed the EU behaviour as “killing” the political dialogue in the osce124 and that the osce had become an instrument of a group of countries.125 With respect to the subject being represented, this varies from “the European Union” (exclusive competences) to “the EU and its Member States” (shared competences) to “the EU Member States” (Member State competences),126 although this remains a mainly technical issue since it is the EU as an entity that is being represented by one sole statement under the heading of EU Statement, and other osce members basically considers this an internal EU issue.127 5.5.3 Coordination Practices The basic political positions that the EU maintains in the osce are negotiated and expressed in the conclusion of the Council. At a lower hierarchical level, Member States officials coordinate in regular meetings of the osce working group in Brussels.128 Nevertheless, since this group only meets once per month and because the Member State delegations to the osce receive their instructions from their respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs, it is necessary that the Member State missions to the osce also coordinate and adjust their practice at the most concrete level, which is done through coordination meetings chaired by the EU Delegation,129 although lack of capacity has forced the eeas to hand over the chairmanship of some meetings 124 Paul Luif and Mariyana Radeva, “EU co-ordination in international organisations: the case of the United Nations General Assembly and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,” in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds.), European foreign policy in an evolving international system: the road towards convergence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 35. 125 Niels van Willigen, “Effective multilateralism between unequal partners” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), pp. 139–140. 126 Ibidem, p. 147. 127 Ibidem, p. 148. 128 Giuseppe Nesi, “The relations between the European Union and the osce in crisis management,” in Enzo Cannizzaro (ed.), The European Union as an actor in international relations (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002), p. 274. 129 Lars-Erik Lundin, “Effective multilateralism after Lisbon: The added value of the eeas and the EU Delegation in Vienna,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 251.

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to the Presidency mission.130 The position of the EU Delegation is further enhanced by the fact which it functions as the institutional memory of the EU in the osce.131 With respect to the political content, an interesting development is the “chef de file” system,132 which involves that Member States specialise in different issue areas, permitting the EU to establish a division of labour and gain more collective expertise, in parallel to the informal burden-sharing identified in the UN system. There is thus a type of lead state within each policy area that is the primary responsible for elaborating documents and proposals to be discussed at the coordination meetings.133 In any case, coordination is greatly helped by the fact that Member State positions on issues being discussed are largely compatible, with disagreements being mainly procedural.134 5.6 Conclusion A first conclusion from the study of the EU’s participation in international organisations is that there is a basic tension between the EU legal order, where certain competences are exclusive to the EU level or shared with the Member States, and the internal legal constitution of international organisations that were created as fora for sovereign states and that only with difficulty can incorporate a non-state political entity such as the European Union. Only in very few international organisations, such as fisheries, does the EU have all the competences to allow for a perfect substitution of Member States. This also means that when compared with the bilateral relations, the EU displays markedly less resemblance to the Westphalian ideal type of diplomatic practices 130 Niels van Willigen, “Effective multilateralism between unequal partners” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 147. 131 Peter van Ham, “eu-osce relations: Partners or rivals in security?” in Knud Erik Jørgensen (ed.), The European Union and international organisations (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 136–137. 132 Ibidem, p. 136. 133 Paul Luif and Mariyana Radeva, “EU co-ordination in international organisations: the case of the United Nations General Assembly and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe,” in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds.), European foreign policy in an evolving international system: the road towards convergence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 36. 134 Niels van Willigen, “Effective multilateralism between unequal partners” in Edith Drieskens and Louise G. van Schaik (eds.), The EU and effective multilateralism: Internal and external reform practices (New York: Routledge, 2014), p. 148.

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in international organizations. The EU does send diplomatic missions to international organizations, but these are most often not treated as state missions in the internal life of the organization. This also means that the EU cannot always adopt the communication channels and forms of Westphalian diplomacy. The fact that the law of the specific international organization is an important factor for determining the specific EU practices also leads to a second conclusion, regarding the lack of uniformity in the EU’s participation in international organisations. The status of the EU depends on the founding treaty of the international organisation and the competences of the EU in the political issue areas governed by the international organisation. Depending on the legal status that the EU has been awarded, the practices of representation and coordination change in the EU network. When the EU has been granted the status of a member, the Commission and the eeas typically express the EU position, when there is one, whereas the EU has recurred to creative solutions of letting a Member State speak on behalf of the Union after an intense coordination effort to hammer out common positions, when the EU has no legal status within the organisation. Due to the political weight and internal constitution of the EU, organisations such as the fao and the wto have admitted the EU as a member, whereas others, most notoriously the imf, have not. In all cases is the exchange of information and coordination of policy ­positions within the EU network vital. It happens both in working groups in ­Brussels and among the diplomatic missions accredited to the international organisation in question. Coordination practices are adapted to the each case, where we see the dynamic ranging from that of Member States seeking to control the Commission/EEAS where this has a great role due to its competences (wto) to a specialization among Member States to boost the collective expertise in the network (osce). The success of the network organisation is therefore also mixed. The internal constitution of the imf in voting groups makes a coherent EU diplomatic action practically impossible, whereas the experience of EU participation in the wto seems to suggest that the network structure has not been an impediment for the EU to have been able to act efficiently in the defence of EU interests when there is a basic political agreement among all actors on the policies to be pursued. The main challenge here is in terms of internal organisation and coordination in the network, thus creating an incentive, in this policy area and international organisation, to move the EU diplomatic organisation t­owards the Westphalian model of a diplomatic actor.

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The general impression is that the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the eeas do not clarify the matter of the diplomatic representation of the EU in international organisations, but leave the issue to loose informal arrangements and the flexibility of the actors involved,135 as was the case before the Lisbon Treaty. However, in terms of areas of political agreement, the formal abolishment of the pillar structure has facilitated cooperation, even if the role of the Presidency is retained in areas where the EU due to the internal law of international organisations cannot participate fully. Having this way concluded as to the relatively modest change that the creation of the eeas has supposed in terms of EU participation in international organisations, an aspect that should not be underestimated is the general strengthening of cooperative dynamics, in many cases lead by the EU Delegation, improving the prospects not only for practical coordination but also increased socialisation within the EU network, making coordination seem evermore natural and contributing to diluting the distinction between defining interests in the national and EU realms among Member State diplomats and policymakers. Also, evidence suggests a continued EU effort to gradually increase its status in international organisations generally and this should be seen as an indicator of a strategic thrust to strengthen multilateral governance and the institutionalisation and legalisation of this governance, beyond a mere necessity due an internal redistribution of competence.136 The enhanced observer status of the EU in the UN granted by a 2011 General Assembly resolution is a good example of the success of this continued effort. 135 Catherina Carta, “The EU in Geneva: The diplomatic representation of a system of ­governance,” Journal of Contemporary European Research, vol. 9. no. 2, 2013, p. 415. 136 See also: Jan Wouters, Jed Odermatt and Thomas Ramopoulos, “The EU in the world of international organisations: Diplomatic aspirations, legal hurdles and political realities,” in in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 101–106.

Chapter 6

EU Diplomatic Meta-practices: Institutionalisation, Legalisation and Regionalisation Whereas the previous three chapters have dealt with the organisation of the EU and its practices of participation in bilateral diplomacy and international organisations, this chapter focuses on the European Union’s diplomatic metapractices, i.e. its practices of structuring and organising its diplomatic interaction with other actors. Whereas the EU’s diplomatic practices are no doubt ­important for an overall understanding of EU diplomacy, an analysis based on the three-layered model of diplomacy outlined in Chapter 2 would nevertheless be incomplete without considered the diplomatic meta-practices of the UE, as an expression of the EU’s diplomatic presence at a higher level of abstraction. They are also key to understanding the EU’s diplomatic practice in the context of the EU’s international identity and causal ideas. The main argument here is that the logic and meaning of diplomacy in terms of managing the relations between alienated entities changes fundamentally when institutionalised and legalised in an international agreement or when this happens on a regional basis, since the two sides to the diplomatic relationship are drawn into a context where a legal basis exists for the relationship and more players are involved, in contrast to the structural anarchy of the Westphalian system. In the present chapter, a first focus is on the institutionalisation and ­legalisation of the EU’s international relationships in international agreements. Whereas the analysis here will primarily focus on the institutionalisation of the EU’s diplomatic relationships in international agreements, it should be noted that the institutionalisation and legalisation is an EU foreign policy objective formulated in the 2016 EU Global Strategy as support for a rulesbased international order.1 This is seen also in the content of the diplomatic exchange across different practices, as referred to also in Chapter 5, where climate change governance and international criminal law were highlighted as examples of the EU’s general support for legalised multilateral governance.

1 European Union, Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, available at the eeas website: http://eeas .europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (last access: September 2016), pp. 15–16.

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Admittedly, traditional Westphalian diplomacy also contains a certain legalisation of the international exchange, as seen in the continuous evolution and codification of international law. Many state actors also actively support multilateral fora such as the UN, the icc, etc. However, in the case of the EU this is of a qualitatively different magnitude, undoubtedly due to its specific international identity and its status as a foreign policy objective in itself, and not merely as a means to an end as it would be in the case of states. The quantitative significance of the diplomatic meta-practice of institutionalising the diplomatic interaction in the case of the EU is seen in the fact that via the different types of agreements with third states, the EU has an institutionalised and rule-based relationship with almost all states in the world, and it is a practice that has been continually increasing quantitatively. Whereas initially the international agreements covered mainly the Common Commercial Policy and the development cooperation activities of the EU, the use of agreements have generally extended to all policy areas as a way to pursue policy objectives more generally. The fact that formal international agreements now form the basis of the EU’s interaction with practically all third states and regional groupings shows the quantitative importance of the meta-practices irrespective of the political content of the exchange. A main tenet of the EU’s meta-practices is the complementarity of the ­bilateral and bi-regional agreements of the EU. Consider for instance the case of Argentina, which is included both in the eu-mercosur bi-regional relationship and in bi-regional projects between the EU and a wider group of L­ atin American countries. Apart from these structured relationships, Argentina has bilateral agreements with the EU on trade and scientific cooperation, but also cooperates with the EU in thematic areas of global reach, for instance EU ­initiatives to promote human rights, democracy and the environment. To promote regional cooperation and integration in other parts of the world has been an EU foreign policy objective for decades, expressed in the EU preference and insistence on grouping its relations with third states of a given region so as to maintain bi-regional relations with the group. This diplomatic meta-practice is at the same time a defining characteristic of the EU’s diplomacy and the EU as an international actor, since no other entity in the international system employs such a meta-practice. In this chapter, the focus will be on regionalisation as a diplomatic meta-practice rather than as a political objective, but in Chapter 7, the meta-practices will be discussed in the context of the EU’s identity, causal ideas and foreign policy strategies more generally. The basis of regionalisation as a diplomatic meta-practice is the idea that the EU experience with regional integration is applicable in other parts of the world, which has led to regionalisation being a key element of EU foreign

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policy generally.2 This is seen in the fact that the bilateral agreements that the EU has with third states are generally complemented by, and should be understood in the context of, a regional agreement with a group of states located in the specific world region. Furthermore, these bi-regional agreements contain explicit provisions about regional integration as a priority objective, linked to the provisions about financial, technical and institutional support that the EU will provide the regional organisation with as part of the agreement.3 Although the regionalisation is thus both a foreign policy objective and a diplomatic meta-practice, it should be noted that the bi-regional relationships have not always been created on EU initiative, but in many cases contacts have been initiated by regional groupings seeking to maintain bi-regional relations with the EU.4 In other cases, the existence of the EU has been largely ignored in diplomatic terms by other regional organisations, evident in the cases of the Commonwealth of Independent States (cis) constituted by most of the former Soviet Republics and the North American Free Trade Agreement (nafta) between Canada, the US and Mexico, suggesting that when a hegemonic state dominates the regional organisation, the interest is reduced in favour of the bilateral relations of this state with the EU. The main political and economic instruments used by the EU in its diplomatic relationships are written down in the agreement, so in this sense the agreement also reflects the internal political agreement among the EU actors about how the EU’s relationship with the third state or region in question should be in terms of content. The depth of an agreement also reflects the degree of political agreement within the Union, hence the absence of a global agreement with the United States and the limited agreements, in terms of content, with China and Russia. Whereas the agreements are generally structured in a similar way and the diplomatic interaction is organised in a similar manner, the specific political content of the agreement varies with the third state or grouping in question, although the headings of political dialogue, trade provisions and support for regional integration are common elements. Importantly, the agreements not only define the interaction in terms of policy content and instruments, but also the diplomatic relation, by institutionalising

2 Mary Farrel, “A triumph of realism over idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa,” Journal of European Integration, vol. 27, no. 3, 2005, p. 265. 3 Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith, “The EU and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 167–188. 4 Karen E. Smith, European Union foreign policy in a changing world (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), p. 80.

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the meetings in regular consultations and even creating joint bodies to oversee the implementation of the agreements. A related EU practice that could be mistaken for a diplomatic meta-practice is that of proclaiming certain third states strategic partners and considering relations with them as strategic partnerships, an EU practice that goes back decades.5 Apart from the fact that the EU has defined such a great number of strategic partners that it is close to losing any meaning, it is mainly a communicative practice that establishes an EU foreign policy priority, but does not affect the diplomatic interaction in terms of what has been institutionalised in agreements, apart from an intensification of the exchange. It cannot therefore be considered a diplomatic meta-practice as it is understood here, although some observers see the strategic partnerships as a result of the failure of the regionalisation meta-practice. For instance, the strategic partnership with Brazil has been seen as a direct consequence of the failure of the EU to advance in its bi-regional relationship with Mercosur6 and therefore indicative of a general weakening of the regionalisation meta-practice and a strengthening of bilateralism within EU diplomacy. The topic of the international agreements is of great legal complexity, but it is here the institutionalisation effects of the agreements that are the focus of the analysis. In the following, the legal debates concerning the EU’s international legal personality and the legal nature of the agreements will only be considered briefly. 6.1

Evolution of the EU’s International Legal Personality and Its Competences to Conclude International Agreements

The fact that the EU did not have a legal personality before the Lisbon Treaty generated problems for the EU in international relationships, and particularly so with respect to entering into formal agreements with third states as a diplomatic meta-practice. The European Communities, which constituted the first pillar, had an explicitly formulated legal personality within its spheres of competence ever since it was first established in 1971 that the competences transferred to the Communities with respect to its internal functioning also meant the competence to enter into international agreements in these same 5 Stephan Keukeleire, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, The emerging EU system of diplomacy: how fit for the purpose?, Policy paper no. 1, Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Network on “The Diplomatic System of the European Union,” 2010, p. 4. 6 Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith, “The EU and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 186.

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issue areas.7 This allowed it to act independently of the Member States as a subject of international law, and it is the extent of these legal competences as an international actor that sets the EU apart from other international organisations in legal terms,8 to the point where it can to be considered a sui generis entity. The EC could enter into agreements with third parties directly where it had exclusive or mixed competences, including not only commerce and ­development cooperation, but also with respect to the environment, technology, education, culture etc. Apart from these specified areas, article 308 of the EC Treaty opened up for EC competence, with unanimity in the Council, to conclude international agreements whenever it was necessary for the functioning of the Common Market. This opened the doors to conclude agreements in a very wide range of political issue areas, whenever the Commission and all Member States would agree, and therefore also to interpretations and pragmatic ­solutions to legal restrictions. It also gave rise to turf wars between the C ­ ommission and Member States, since the decision-making procedure would vary according to the policy area. An example of the flexibility and pragmatism permitted by article 308, is the fact that it constituted the legal basis of EU assistance to Kosovo, although it is arguably difficult to see how assisting Kosovo is necessary for the functioning of the internal market.9 As the case was in overcoming the problems of representation of the EU in international organisations, so the problems arising from the EU’s particular legal subjectivity have been gradually overcome by legal and procedural creativity. This is particularly so in the cfsp issue areas, where the EC could not be party to agreements due to the lack of internal competences. In implementing political decisions, representatives of the EU would negotiate agreements with third states, but they lacked the legal authority to make a final agreement on behalf of the EU.10 Agreements could only formally be agreements between the EU Member States and third states or international organisations as for the cfsp. One legal invention to overcome the problem was the use of memoranda 7 8 9 10

Cesáreo Gutiérrez Espada and María José Cervell Hortal, La adaptación al tratado de Lisboa (2007) del sistema institucional decisorio de la Unión, su acción exterior y personalidad jurídica (Granada: Comares, 2010), p. 98. Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), pp. 38–43. Cited by David Spence, “The Commission and the Common Foreign and Security Policy,” in David Spence y Geoffrey Edwards (eds.), The European Commission (London: John Harper, 2006), p. 362. Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 218.

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of understanding, which though not always legally binding under international law, for instance allowed the EU administration of Mostar.11 Another effort to overcome the problems of the lack of legal personality and the complex distribution of competences between the Community and the Member States was the use of mixed agreements, which are international agreements worded so as to define the EU side of the agreement as “the European Community and its Member States,” now “the European Union and its Member States.” The motivation for using mixed agreements is not solely legal, but has historically also been political, since it is a pragmatic solution to the complex setup of the EU as an actor that allows avoiding the battles over competences between Member States, Commission and Council.12 The mixed agreements leave no room for doubt about who is bound by the agreement, notwithstanding the legal competences of the EC and the Member States in the various issue areas covered by the specific agreement, since they bind the EU institutions and the individual Member States in their own right as actors.13 As such, since it was the Presidency of the Council, the High Representative and the Commission that acted on behalf of the Union and since the agreements concerned the whole territory of the EU, it can be considered, for the purposes of analysing EU diplomacy, that the EU as an entity also before Lisbon had a de facto capacity to enter into international legal agreements, notwithstanding the complex internal organisation of the EU as an actor. Apart from the international agreements within the Community area of competences, the teu as changed by the Amsterdam Treaty also allowed the EU to enter into international agreements outside of areas of Community competence.14 The main difference with respect to the conclusion of agreements was that the Presidency represented the EU in the negotiations instead of the Commission, taking the form of a bilateral agreement or an exchange of letters constituting an agreement. Three types of agreements can be distinguished within the areas of the csdp.15 First, the Status of Forces Agreements that regulate the status of the EU military personnel stationed abroad. Here, the EU has generally followed UN practice except for the insistence of the EU that its staff receive a treatment equivalent to that given to diplomats in the 11 12 13 14 15

Ibidem, p. 225. Belén Sánchez Ramos, La Unión Europea y las relaciones diplomáticas (Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, 2004), p. 52. Ibidem, p. 53. teu (Nice), art. 24. Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), pp. 470–478.

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Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.16 Second, the agreements regulating the participation of third states in eu missions, with the main aim being to make the third states align with the Joint Action of the Council that establishes the mission, including the framework participation agreements. Third states as diverse as Albania, Chile, Morocco, Russia, South Africa, Thailand and the United States have participated through such agreements. Third, agreements relative to the safe exchange of confidential information with third states and international organisations, with concrete examples being nato and the icc.17 The functioning of the EU in this area has developed gradually and is reflected in the treaty language. Whereas the 1992 Maastricht Treaty mentioned exercising the combined influence of the Member States in the most effective manner,18 the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty mentioned the influence of the Union,19 but it is not until the Lisbon Treaty once and for all established the international legal personality of the European Union generally20 that the evolution has reached its logical conclusion. The European Union became the successor to the international agreements of the European Community and it is thus the EU that now has the formal right to negotiate and conclude international agreements within the powers established for the Union in the founding treaties. This reduces considerably the legal complexity of entering into international agreements, since it is now clear that the international agreements to which the EU is party create obligations for both the EU institutions and its Member States. In terms of the procedure, the initiative to conclude international agreements resides with the High Representative when an agreement relates mainly to the cfsp and with the Commission in other cases,21 which illustrates the centrality of the HR/VP as a means for reducing conflict within the EU.22 Still, the distinction between what is a cfsp issue and what is not is considerably blurred since the EU’s holistic approach to security generally also makes trade and climate change relevant elements of the cfsp. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Aurel Sari, “The conclusion of international agreements by the European Union in the context of the esdp,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly, vol. 57, 2008, pp. 56–57. Ibidem, p. 59. Maastricht Treaty, 1993, art. J.2(1). Amsterdam Treaty, 1997, art. 16. teu (Lisbon), art. 47. tfeu (Lisbon), art. 218. Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), pp. 139–140.

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It is still the Council that formally authorises the start of negotiations and names the EU representatives. Due to the lack of clarity regarding the border between cfsp and non-CFSP issues, this has given rise to conflicts which again led to a 2013 agreement establishing that the Commission leads the negotiations in matters within its competences and the eeas in other cases.23 In practice, it is in consequence the eeas that generally negotiates agreements with third states, although with close coordination with the relevant Commission DGs and when necessary also with Commission experts being part of the negotiating team.24 The main exception is the “pure” trade agreements and those negotiated within the framework of the wto, where the Commission continues to play the main role. Still, there is the question of the division of competences between the EU and its Member States, which is dependent on the political issue area. Particularly due to the EU’s focus on global agreements with third states, this means that issue areas will cover not only cfsp and non-CFSP issues where the Union has competences, but also issue areas of Member State competences and areas of shared and parallel competences, such as development cooperation, cultural cooperation and education, to mention but a few. The phenomenon of mixed agreements, to which both the EU and the Member States are parties on the EU side, is therefore still highly relevant also after Lisbon. As such, mixed agreements are still seen as a legal formula that to a large extent makes possible to avoid the internal debate about the precise delimitation of competences.25 The fact that EU agreements with third states and regions normally include both trade provisions and a political dialogue falling under the cfsp means that the immense majority of these international agreements are of a mixed nature with the both the EU and the Member States being parties and the inclusion of the eeas in the negotiations alongside the Commission. A good example is the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with Kosovo, where the Commission negotiated the trade provisions and the HR/VP, assisted by the eeas, the cfsp and political dialogue provisions.26 A general conclusion is therefore that whereas the legal setup has been somewhat simplified with the Lisbon Treaty, political agreement and tight coordination between the Commission, Member States and the eeas is 23 24 25 26

Ibidem, p. 142. Cesar Onestini, “A hybrid service: Organising efficient EU foreign policy,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy postWestphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 81. Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 164. Ibidem, p. 165.

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­ ecessary to make the EU’s meta-practice of institutionalising and legalising n relations function in practice, a fact foreseen also in the fact that the Lisbon Treaty establishes that a negotiating team must represent the EU, rather than specifying which actor in which circumstances.27 6.2

EU Agreements: General Aspects

The European Union has three main types of agreements into which relations with most third states are institutionalised; trade agreements, cooperation agreements and association agreements. Trade agreements institutionalise cooperation only in terms of trade and historically lost importance gradually and were often sought complemented by cooperation or association agreement institutionalising cooperation in other areas. A new generation of free trade agreements, denominated “deep and comprehensive free trade agreements” have surged after 2010, particularly with industrialised states such as South Korea, Canada and the United States. What characterised these agreements generally is their institutionalisation of cooperation in common committees and working groups and that they go beyond mere removal of trade barriers and seek regulatory cooperation and harmonisation, particularly evident in the agreement with Canada. As part of a general strategy, the EU has sought to link trade and development assistance with political issues and involvement in the internal affairs of other states and regions. This means that two other types of agreements have become dominant in the relations with most third states; cooperation agreements and association agreements. In general, an association agreement is an indicator of a privileged relationship with the EU in comparison with other states. For the EU, the signing of one agreement or the other is thus a diplomatic instrument communicating clearly to the third state in question which kind of relationship the EU envisages with that state. Another communicative value is to other states, when they perceive which kind of behaviour with respect to democratic structures, liberalisation of the economy and r­espect for human rights is treated by the EU in a preferential way. With respect to the human rights clauses of the agreements, the European Parliament has on ­occasions used its position within the decision-making process to delay negotiations, and often focuses attention on human rights issues rather than on the material interests the EU may have in an agreement. Apart from the highly salient negotiations of Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements ­after 27

tfeu, art. 218.

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2010 with countries such as Ukraine, Canada and the United States, most new agreements are Association Agreements and the Ukraine Trade Agreement is also part of an Association Agreement. As such, new free trade agreements generally include normative provisions that have at least the potential to affect third state behaviour, in line with the Lisbon Treaty’s subordinating the Common Commercial Policy to general normative EU foreign policy objectives.28 The nature of the third state is largely determinant for the type of agreement and the specific policy content of the agreement, and although Duke observes that the agreements have historically tended to include standard clauses29 there are also some variations in the intensity of cooperation and the material scope depending on the country in question. In this regard, the 2016 EU Global Strategy thus formulates an objective of increasingly deepening tailor-made partnerships further.30 As such, the free trade agreement negotiated with Canada involves few non-trade and investment-related aspects, and they are mainly related to consumer protection and environmental protection.31 In contrast, the 2014 Association Agreement with Ukraine32 involves cooperation on a range of other areas, besides the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement that forms part of the Association Agreement, such as political dialogue, cfsp cooperation as well as cultural affairs. The same impression is the case with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements negotiated with North African states.33 With respect to developing countries, cooperation involves practically all aspects of the development of local society in political, economic and social terms and regulates the terms of EU financial assistance. 28 29 30 31 32 33

Sieglinde Gstöhl and Dominik Hanf, “The EU’s Post-Lisbon Free Trade Agreements: Commercial Interests in a Changing Constitutional Context,” European Law Journal, vol. 20, no. 6, 2014, pp. 733–748. Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 64. European Union, Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, available at the eeas website: http://eeas .europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (last accessed: September 2016), p. 25. European Commission, Comprehensive economic and trade agreement (ceta) between Canada, of the one part, and the European Union and its Member States (Brussels: EU, 2016), COM (2016) 444 final. European Union, “Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Ukraine, of the other part,” Official Journal of the European Union, L 161/3 (Luxembourg: EU, 2014). Guillaume Van der Loo, “Mapping out the Scope and Contents of the dcftas with Tunisia and Morocco,” Papers IEMed, no. 28, 2016.

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What is particularly relevant from a diplomatic point of view is that the agreements go way beyond a contract between two actors where they acquire reciprocal behavioural obligations, but restructure the internal organisation of the parties involved and makes this internal organisation object of international legalisation. Even in the cases of trade agreements, to stay with the recent examples of the Ukraine and Canada agreements, they both go beyond the elimination of barriers to trade and detail regulatory obligations to an extent that an integration of the economies is sought achieved not only in terms of trade, but also standards of production or public procurement. Particularly in the Ukraine case, the Agreement is therefore a means to an internal transformation of the Ukrainian economy along EU standards, making Ukrainian participation in the process of EU integration easier, even if for the moment membership is not on the agenda. In terms of the political instruments applied, the EU tends to use the same, such as institutionalised political dialogues on different levels, human rights clauses and conditioned financial and technical assistance in the case of developing countries and regions.34 The agreements regulate not only the trade-related or political content of the relationships, but also the diplomatic ­interaction, through the establishment of regular meetings at different hierarchical levels, from Heads of State or Government to technical officers, and in some cases also common institutions.35 The political dialogue generally included in the agreements concerns political issues broadly and often has to do with the EU’s political values of democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance. By being institutionalised in an agreement that also covers other areas, the EU links various issue areas into a unified stance towards the third state. The diplomatic significance of the political dialogue with third states and groups of these is that it institutionalises the debates on political organisation, societal values and political and civil rights that are normally considered a matter of internal state sovereignty. The dialogues contain the prospect for having a structural impact on other entities and the international system to the extent that they serve to diffuse EU political values of democracy, rule of law, human rights and good governance. This potential impact of the dialogue is to be measured only in the long term, whereas the main instrument to affect policies of third states in the short term 34 35

Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 69. Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, “Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the European Union,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 156–157.

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is primarily the conditionality clauses in the agreements concluded by the EU. The political dimension is particularly prominent in the Cotonou Agreement with the acp states and any violation of the principles may lead to the suspension of the agreement,36 meaning basically withholding economic benefits. The political dialogue is thus also specifically linked to the conditionality instrument in this case. The political dialogue is complemented by specific cooperation programmes that may or may not include EU financial assistance, depending on the third state and region in question. Apart from the political dialogue, trade and financial assistance, other typical areas are environmental protection, ­security and migration. This cooperation is executed according to national and regional strategies, with both annual and multiannual programming. The cooperation is thereby not only institutionalised but also stabilised in time, and being written down in documents approved by both parties constitutes an important legalisation of the interaction, not only in terms of form, but also in terms of content. Aside from the relations with industrialised countries such as Canada, a common element in the international agreements between the EU and third states, but also the bi-regional agreements between the EU and another grouping of states, is the increasing use of the conditionality instrument in the form of the democracy and human rights clauses, that were generally incorporated into EU agreements after the 1990s. However, after the 2007 and 2013 enlargements with Rumania, Bulgaria and Croatia and the changed general political climate against further enlargement, the conditionality instrument in its positive version promising membership has largely lost its value, save in a few specific cases, such as the Balkan states. Another conditionality instrument that is losing value is that of extending preferential terms of trade to specific third states, principally due to wto regulations. In this sense, the instrument of positive conditionality is left without its biggest carrot, that of EU membership, and relies mainly on the semi-inclusion of third states into the EU in the form of selective participation in some of the EU’s spheres of cooperation, a point that will be taken up when discussing the European ­Economic Area and the European Neighbourhood Policy below. Of course, before reaching an agreement the EU can also make continued assistance dependent on the signing of a new agreement. Particularly with respect to the Economic Partnership Agreements (epa) negotiated with the acp countries, the EU is criticised for blackmailing the acp countries into signing 36

Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 388.

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an agreement using the conditionality instrument not only to promote the EU values of democracy, human rights and good governance, but also to promote its material economic interests by establishing as an indispensable part of the agreements the privatisation and liberalisation of African economies, so that the epa’s are thereby not really about values but economic interests.37 Conditionality not only serves as an instrument in relations with the developing countries of the acp. Also in relations with other states, the importance to these of access to the internal market of the EU gives the EU a powerful instrument. In the case of the United States, for instance, the EU has traditionally made market access dependent upon respect for EU legislation concerning genetically modified foods and the fusion of corporations.38 Also, the insistence of the EU on democracy clauses in international agreement with third states that do not think that they have any problems in this regard are offended by the EU’s insistence on including them, for example in the case of the trade agreement with Australia.39 It is worth noting that via the formal bilateral and regional agreements virtually all of the development assistance given by the EU is conditioned by the respect for human rights and the democratic principles as defined by the EU. A criticism raised in this regard is that the diplomatic practices of the EU that interfere dramatically in the internal affairs of other states aim to transfer economic, social and political principles to other states and regions in the world without taking into consideration if in those places exist the preconditions for the principles to be adequate for the development of the state or region in question.40 6.2.1 Cooperation Agreements The cooperation agreements contain provisions regulating the cooperation in economic affairs and trade, but normally also a framework for political dialogue with the third states. The diplomatic practices by which the political dialogue is executed involve a common council of ministers and a committee of officials that meet regularly. Also between members of the European

37 38 39 40

Mary Farrel, “A triumph of realism over idealism? Cooperation between the European Union and Africa,” Journal of European Integration, vol. 27, no. 3, 2005, pp. 263–283. Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st century (London, Fourth Estate, 2005), p. 54. See: David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 72. Stephan Keukeleire, “The European Union as a diplomatic actor: Internal, structural, and traditional diplomacy,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 14, no. 3, 2003, p. 48.

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­ arliament and the parliament of the third state or region there is an instituP tionalised contact within the framework of the political dialogue. Cooperation agreements regulate the relations of the EU with the former Soviet Republics in the form of Partnership and Cooperation Agreements and Framework Cooperation Agreements and they could in some sense be considered a first step towards the more ambitious Association Agreements, which have been negotiated with Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia and Georgia. The c­ ooperation agreements were conceived as a way to institutionalise and legalise the bilateral relations with the newly independent states, without offering them membership, in substitution of the previous Cooperation Agreement with the Soviet Union.41 Although the EU’s diplomatic relationship with Russia is unique in many ways due to its strategic importance to the EU and its Member States, it is based on a Cooperation Agreement from 1997,42 since the EU suspended the negotiations to renew and possibly upgrade the Agreement in 2008 over the war in Georgia, resumed them and again froze the negotiations due to the Russian military intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea. A Cooperation Agreement determines the diplomatic interaction of the EU and the third state. To stay in the example of Russia, which is not special in terms of the regulation of diplomatic interaction, the parties should meet twice per year at the levels of Head of State and Governments in summits, although this is subject to political currents. Meetings take place at the level of ministers in the Cooperation Councils, at the levels of high-ranking staff in the Cooperation Committee as well as in sub-committees that function as working groups. Apart from this interaction of the executive organs, there is also a Committee for Parliamentary Cooperation, where members of the European Parliament and the Russian Parliament meet. The areas of cooperation and the relative intensity of the cooperation in each area depend on the specific political content of the relationship between the EU and the third state in question, although the objectives are broadly similar. Common elements are trade provisions and a political dialogue and, when relevant, clauses for the financial assistance provided by the EU. In contrast with Association Agreements, participation in specific EU cooperation is not an objective, and the relationship established is mainly based on EU-tothird state interaction and not the semi-inclusion practices generally seen in the European Neighbourhood Policy. 41 42

Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 390. European Commission, Partnership and Cooperation Agreement – Russia, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTrans Id=643 (last accessed: September 2016).

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In the case of Russia, the areas of cooperation that were established in the Agreement are the political dialogue and the establishment of four common spaces: Economic; liberty, security and justice; external security; and research and education, including culture. Of course, as the EU Member States continue to pursue their individual foreign policies towards third states and particularly in the case of such strategically important countries as Russia, the efforts of the EU to increase the coherence of its agency as an entity have been of mixed success. The Russian example also shows that the institutionalisation and legalisation of the relationships is not in and by itself a factor that guarantees foreign policy success in terms of the political content of the relations, and although the scope for a socialisation of diplomatic agents must be deemed higher in this case, the EU’s transformative ambition have in terms of content been downgraded in favour of a more strategic approach based on interests, mainly due to the resistance of Russia to what is seen as EU interference.43 The Russian annexation of Crimea seems to be compelling evidence of the little impact of EU diplomacy on Russia, or perhaps even that the EU approach has been counterproductive and been perceived as a geopolitical challenge. More generally, logic also suggests that the impact of the legalisation and institutionalisation is greater when there is a greater degree of convergence of interests, on one hand among EU Member States, but on the other between the EU and the third state in question in terms of general world view, and when the EU has something tangible to offer. 6.2.2 Association Agreements In contrast with the Cooperation Agreements, the Association Agreements are specifically mentioned in the tfeu art. 217 and are defined by establishing a set of reciprocal rights and obligations, although in practice this does not lead to a relationship of equality between the parties.44 The Association Agreements are qualitatively different from the Cooperation Agreements and establish a closer link between the EU and the third state, and are for prospective members the first step towards membership. The Agreements go beyond mere cooperation in trade and other areas and allows the third state to participate in the cooperation among Member States organised in the framework of the  EU. The Association Agreement with Turkey, for instance, extends the customs union to include this state, and the Association Agreement establishing the 43 44

Tom Casier, “The EU and Russia: A marriage of convenience,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 135. Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 382.

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European Economic Area (eea) with Iceland, Norway and Lichtenstein also extends the internal market to these states. These agreements in a certain way function to lessen the differentiation between the EU and the third states by a semi-inclusion of the latter in aspects of the EU. Particularly the structured relationship with Norway blurs the distinction between member and nonmember, and establishes another distinction between some non-members and other non-members, to the extent that it is doubtful whether EU-Norway relations can really be considered “diplomatic” in the same way as EU-Russia relations, for instance. The argument is that due to the intense institutionalisation of cooperation, the EU and the third state are not clearly differentiable entities in the international system, and the sovereignty of a closely connected third state such as Norway is as theoretical as that of a Member State, due to its dependence on the EU and the fact that many third states subscribe to the EU’s cfsp declarations, thereby being partially included in the EU self. In parallel, and contributing to the same blurring effect, some Member States are less than full members, not participating in the common currency or the csdp. There are thus opposite dynamics at work, some contributing to diluting the EU as an international subject, but others strengthening it; such as the upgrading of the EU Delegations. The partial inclusion of states can be interpreted as a repetition of the founding experience of the EU stressing the virtue of cooperation on technical matters to build trust and change patterns of mutual identification. In the cooperation programmes, these are between Member States and third states, with the EU itself not being so much part in the diplomatic relations, but more like an international organisation facilitating the transformation of relations between Member States and third states, and changing these third states through socialization processes in a way similar to how EU Member States are socialised through their structured interaction. The meta-practices of institutionalisation and legalisation, and particularly in the extreme version of partial inclusion in the EU areas of cooperation, can in fact be seen as a conscious antidiplomatic strategy in the pursuit of the strategic objectives of the EU globally more generally.45 Another example of an Association Agreement is the Cotonou Agreement, which groups bilateral agreements between the EU and the states which constitute the group of privileged former colonies in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, known by the initials as the acp countries. Also the Stabilisation and Association Agreements with the Western Balkan states are technically Association Agreements, and these have all been recognised as candidates for 45

See Chapter 7.

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membership or potential candidates, just as the Association Agreements with Greece and Croatia preceded their membership of the Union. 6.2.3 Technical and Partial Agreements An interesting exception to the pattern of having global agreements with third states regulating the diplomatic relationship in its entirety is the United States. With the US, the EU has only sectoral agreements that do not cover all political areas. As for the relations with the US, these began in 1974 when the Member States established the principle of periodic consultations with friendly and allied countries.46 It was an informal, but institutionalised procedure that permitted the EU and the US to coordinate policies in areas where their interests coincided. The New Transatlantic Agenda, a manifest of political characteristics from 1995,47 nevertheless established a structure of contacts with the US that is similar to that established by the global agreements. There are biannual summits and frequent ad-hoc meetings at the level of ministers, high-ranking staff as well as on the working group level. Also, there are interparliamentary sessions to maintain political dialogues outside of the executive’s reach. Due to the political importance of the United States, the relationship is also characterised by the intensity of relations that the Member States maintain with the US both bilaterally as well as in multilateral fora such as nato. Another characteristic of the EU’s relationship with the US is that a great part of it, in terms of trade, is institutionalised in international organisations such as the wto and the imf.48 To complement the interaction in these multilateral fora, the EU and the US have a series of technical agreements that are detailed and limited to a specific area of cooperation, for instance trade in one commodity, although a comprehensive free trade agreement is being negotiated at the time of writing, largely modelled on the agreement with Canada. Another noteworthy exception to the general rule of institutionalising diplomatic relationships in global agreements is Switzerland, which has chosen not to have a formal Association Agreement that would allow it to participate in the eea. The basis of the relationship continuous to be a Trade Agreement from 1972 that establishes a free trade zone, complemented with more than

46 47 48

Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 115. European Commission, The New Transatlantic Agenda, 1995, available at http://ec .europa.eu/external_relations/us/docs/new_transatlantic_agenda_en.pdf (last accessed: September 2016). Fraser Cameron, An introduction to European foreign policy (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 93.

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100 technical agreements49 that regulate other areas, notably transport and the free movement of persons related to the Schengen space. The example of Switzerland also shows that not having a global Cooperation or Association Agreement does not imply having a worse relationship with the EU in political terms or a less legalised relationship, and the intensity and depth of the agreements make them comparable to an Association Agreement, and on the EU side it is in this sense revealing that they were adopted under article 217 tfeu.50 6.3

Regionalisation: The Structure of the EU’s Relationships with Other Regions

As a structuring principle and political objective,51 regionalisation is a key diplomatic meta-practice of the European Union, and a dimension where EU ­diplomacy is truly unique.52 The regionalisation meta-practice of the EU ­implies that the relationship of the EU with the rest of world regions follow the same basic structure, institutionalised and legalised in internal EU documents and an Agreement with the region in question. The basis is a multiannual ­Regional Strategy Paper and a Regional Indicative Programme that ­corresponds to the same period. On the basis hereof, the EU also seeks to maintain a similar structure of bilateral relations with the states in the region, so in this sense the meta-practice is not only a question of the existence of a biregional agreement but also that the bilateral relations are grouped by region. Apart from the institutionalisation of the bi-regional relations in formal agreements, a main diplomatic practice that gives visibility and symbolic importance to the relationship is the high-level summits where a political dialogue 49 50 51

52

European Union, Treaties Office Database. List of treaties of the European Union, at http:// ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (last accesssed: September 2016). Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), 383. Apart from being a specific objective in the EU’s global strategy (European Union, Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, available at the eeas website: http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/ eugs_review_web.pdf (last accessed: September 2016), it is also reflected in the inclusion of a regional dimension in the agreements signed by the EU with third states and regional organisations. These are available online, see: European Union, Treaties Office ­Database. List of treaties of the European Union, at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default .home.do (last accesssed: September 2016). Cintia Díaz-Silveira Santos, La estrategia inter-regional de la Unión Europea con Latinoamérica: el camino a la asociación con el mercosur, la Comunidad Andina y Centroamérica (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2009), p. 76.

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is maintained, a practice that in itself serves to support the process of regional integration in another part of the world through the visibility and prestige it gives to Head of State and Governments. Given the purposes of the chapter to explore EU diplomatic meta-practices, the focus will here be on the structure of the EU relationship with other regions and not on the political content, except where necessary. Also, a sample of specific regions are considered here in order to provide a sense of the diversity of the EU regionalisation meta-practice and to identify common aspects and does not pretend to be an exhaustive overview of all world regions and sub-regions. In this sense, the sampling criteria are similar to those used to choose the international organisations analysed in Chapter 5. 6.3.1 Africa and the acp States 6.3.1.1 The acp Group of States Relations with the European Union was the primary objective of the creation of a group of 78 states in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific Ocean (acp states) in 1975, serving the EU initially as a way to manage its relations with the former colonies of its Member States,53 rather than as an expression of a regionalisation meta-practice. The origin of the relationships can be found in the 1963 and 1969 Yaoundé Conventions, which were later further developed in the different Lomé Conventions after 1975 and in the 2000 Cotonou Agreement.54 This is formally a mixed multilateral Association Agreement between the European Union and its Member States on one part and each acp state on the other part. It is a global agreement that regulates the relations with the acp states and is centred on three main areas: development cooperation, trade and political dialogue. With the Agreement, each acp state establishes a similar relationship with the EU. It can therefore be discussed whether the EU relationship with the acp states is an expression of the regionalisation metapractice, since it does not formally establish a bi-regional relationship with the ‘acp region,’ which does not exist in reality, although recently the acp states have begun an institutionalised cooperation going beyond their relationship with the EU. The acp group is considered here due to the clear intent of the EU to manage relations with these states as a group and the fact that the diplomatic interaction with the group is similar to the way the EU interacts with 53 54

Cintia Díaz-Silveira Santos, La estrategia inter-regional de la Unión Europea con Latinoamérica: el camino a la asociación con el mercosur, la Comunidad Andina y Centroamérica (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2009), p. 79. Cotonou Agreement, 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=818 (last accessed: September 2016).

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other regions. Also, to strengthen regional and sub-regional cooperation is an explicit objective of the agreement,55 making special reference to practical and limited cooperation in certain sectors. Furthermore, development assistance to the acp is programmed jointly with the acp states at this level, considering the region as one in terms of development strategy.56 There are thus three main layers in the relationships of the EU with the acp states. First, the acp level dealing with development cooperation and political dialogue broadly, then the relations with the seven acp regions, with which the Economic and Partnership Agreements are being negotiated, and finally with each acp state. In this latter case, the bilateral agreements are not global agreements as described in the previous chapter (with the 1994 Cooperation Agreement with South Africa being a notable exception), but agreements that regulate a specific issue between the third state and the EU not included in the acp agreement, such as for example fisheries agreements.57 Within the framework of the Association Agreement, organs for diplomatic interaction are created in the form of a Joint Parliamentary Assembly, a Committee of Ambassadors and a Council of Ministers,58 in order to implement the agreement and develop relations as foreseen. The Council of Ministers is the main organ and composed of representatives of the Commission, the EU Member States and each acp state, with the Presidency alternating between an acp and EU Member State. It meets annually and it is the main decisionmaking body (by unanimity) and the forum for the political dialogue. In parallel, the acp Council of Ministers is the main organ on the acp side working with the group’s internal decision-making and implementation, and in fact the cooperation has gone beyond the management of relations with the EU to also include coordination in the wto and UN system.59 The acp group also maintains a permanent Secretariat in Brussels. The Committee of Ambassadors is composed of a representative of each EU Member State, the Commission and the Heads of Mission of the missions of the acp states to the EU. It meets regularly to manage the cooperation and prepare the meetings of the Council of 55 56 57 58 59

Cotonou Agreement, 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=818 (last accessed: September 2016), art. 30. European Union, European Development Fund intra-ACP cooperation Strategy Paper and Regional Indicative Programme 2014–2020 (Brussels: EU, 2016). European Union, Treaties Office Database. List of treaties of the European Union, at http:// ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (last accesssed: September 2016). Cotonou Agreement, 2000, available at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=818 (last accessed: September 2016), arts. 15–17. acp  official  website  at  http://www.acp.int/content/secretariat-acp  (last  accessed: September 2016).

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Ministers. The Joint Parliamentary Assembly is composed of members of the European Parliament and the parliaments of the acp states and has a consultative and deliberative function, meeting twice per year. 6.3.1.2 The African Union The EU has maintained a political dialogue with the African Union since 1994 and the EU relations with Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific have been proclaimed strategic partnerships as separate regions. The Joint Strategic Agreement between the EU and Africa from 2007 was the result of a special summit, and although it is formally a multilateral agreement, it specifically mentions the African Union as a relevant actor.60 Within this framework the EU not only assists the AU generally as a regional organisation but also with practical and financial support to adapt its institutions, in a good illustration of the regionalisation as political objective and diplomatic meta-practice, including bilateral meetings of the Commission and its AU counterpart. Nevertheless, in comparison with other regions, the bi-regional relationship between the EU and the African Union is little developed and the strategic association has been characterised as mainly symbolic.61 This is partially due to the fact that the EU has grouped the North African members of the AU into the European Neighbourhood Policy and the Union for the Mediterranean, whereas it maintains separate relations with more substantial cooperation with subSaharan sub-continental regional economic integration organisations. The relations with the African Union and Africa as a continent therefore do not include economic and trade relations, but focus mainly on political issues, such as security and stability, good governance, democracy and human rights, and cooperation is largely focused on these areas. Continental integration, in terms of an African-wide free trade area, is also mentioned as a priority in the latest strategic document, but this should be understood in the context of the focus on the sub-continental regional epa agreements, which also means that the EU sees these sub-continental regions as key to continental integration, along with infrastructure investments programmed continentwide.62 60 European Union, The Africa-EU Strategic Partnership, 2007, http://www.consilium .europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf (last accessed: September 2016), p. 5. 61 Cintia Díaz-Silveira Santos, La estrategia inter-regional de la Unión Europea con Latinoamérica: el camino a la asociación con el mercosur, la Comunidad Andina y Centroamérica (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2009), p. 80. 62 European Union, EU-Africa Roadmap 2014–2017 (Brussels: EU, 2014), pp. 8–9.

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6.3.1.3 acp Regional Organizations There are specific EU regional relations with seven different groups of acp states, with which the EU is negotiating Economic Partnership Agreements to complement the Cotonou Agreement and for which the EU structures relations in Regional Strategy Papers and Indicative programmes. These regions are: The Southern African Development Community (sadc), Central Africa, West Africa, the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean, and also with the Pacific region and the Caribbean as organised in the forum of Caribbean acp states (cariforum). Within the framework of the overall eu-acp relations and institutionalised interaction defined in the Cotonou Agreement, the Regional Strategy Papers and Indicative Programmes for each region explicitly outline regional integration as a central objective and involves both an analysis of the current state of affairs as well as a strategy for increasing regional integration, both institutionally and by developing common policies and specifying the nature of EU assistance to achieve the objectives of development and regional integration. Apart from supporting their regional integration, the EU also maintains a regional political dialogue with each, negotiates the Economic and Partnership Agreements and programmes development aid on a regional basis to complement the bilateral agreements and assistance to each state. As an example, more than half of the financial assistance allotted to the Central African region in the period 2007–2013 was destined to promote economic regional integration and the epa negotiations, and less than 10% to political integration and sustainable management of ­natural resources.63 The Regional Strategy Papers are agreed with the region in question and signed by representatives of both. The sadc is the only case where the biregional relationship is based on an existing organisation. In the case of the ­Caribbean, although the EU has recognised that the Caribbean Community and Common Market (caricom) is the “main pillar of regional integration,”64 the EU has preferred not to base its bi-regional relationship with the ­Caribbean on this organisation, but on the cariforum, a grouping of the Caribbean acp states (including Cuba) that was created in 1992 with the aim of ­interacting with the EU. 63 64

eeas website on the legal frameworks and financial assistance to Africa, at http://eeas .europa.eu/diplomatic-network/africa/328/africa-and-the-eu_en#Legal+frameworks+an d+financial+instruments (last accessed: September 2016). European Commission, European Community – Caribbean Region. Regional strategy paper and regional indicative programme 2008–2013 (Brussels: EU, 2008), p. 18.

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The agreement with Central Africa stands out because it is an agreement with two Central African regional organisations, the Economic and Monetary Community of Central Africa (cemac)65 and the Economic Community of Central African States (ceeac).66 These two organisations have similar goals of economic integration and a partially overlapping membership, with the cemac being reserved for the states using the cfa franc as their currency. This way, the agreement is trilateral, due to the situation of the states participating in these partially competing projects of regional integration. Similarly, the agreement with West Africa includes two organisations: The Economic Community of West African States (ecowas) and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (uemoa).67 What distinguishes the two organisations is again that the uemoa states share a currency and thus form a separate monetary union within ecowas. The agreement between the EU and the Region of Eastern and Southern Africa and the Indian Ocean is a multilateral agreement signed by the European Commissioner for Development and Secretary Generals of the regional integration organisations: Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (comesa), East Africa Community (eac), the Indian Ocean Commission (ioc) and the Executive Secretary of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development (igad). In the case of the Pacific Region, the agreement is between the EU and the acp Region and signed by the Pacific Islands Forum (pif) General Secretary, even if this organisation also includes Australia and New Zealand, to which the strategy is not applicably, since the pif is implementing EU assistance to the Pacific acp states. Regional integration in Africa is generally characterised by having very ambitious goals but very little intra-African trade which, along with a predominance of Westphalian ideas of sovereignty and the overlapping memberships of regional integration organisations, constitutes the main limits to regional integration in Africa.68 The general level of economic and bureaucratic development of several African states also means that regional integration and statebuilding of modern liberal-democratic states take place simultaneously,69 ­indicating the long-scale time horizon of the EU promoting regional integration in Africa. Furthermore, the continuous association in Africa of EU 65 66 67 68

From the French: Communauté Économique et Monétaire de l’Afrique Centrale. From the French: Communauté Économique des États d’Afrique Centrale. From the French: Union Économique et Monétaire Ouest Africaine. Peter Draper and Morisho Mwana Biningo Nene, “Rethinking the (European) foundations of Sub-Saharan African regional economic integration,” in Søren Dosenrode (ed.), Limits to regional integration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 77–94. 69 Ibidem.

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d­ iplomacy with neo-colonial objectives means that specific EU initiatives and cooperation platforms must at the same time engage with African states and communities, but at the same time articulate a separateness of the two continents beyond neo-colonial interdependence discourses.70 6.3.2 Asia There is no overarching structure of cooperation with the Asian continent as is the case in Africa, so region-to-region relations are primarily carried out with asean, although the Central Asian region will also be considered here as an example of a different kind of regional interaction. 6.3.2.1 asean Bi-regional relations with South East Asia are mainly based on the 1980 Cooperation Agreement with asean,71 a free trade area, although the first meeting of ministers took place two years earlier.72 Apart from the summits of ministers of the EU Member States and the asean states, the Cooperation Agreement establishes a Joint Cooperation Committee to manage the relations between the two regions, which are fundamentally about trade but with an added political dialogue. The Cooperation Agreement also includes provisions on development cooperation, but both in this area and with respect to trade, the bilateral relations with the asean states have always had more weight than the bi-regional relations. This has to do with the founding ideology of asean, which never aspired to become a supranational institutional expression of an on-going process of regional integration73 loosely modelled on the EU, which is often the case in Africa and Latin America. The Westphalian ideology of state sovereignty and non-intervention is strong in asean, which therefore mainly deals with method to increase trade and investment flows,74 and the general very different approaches of the two regional actors towards economic and political issues remain a major obstacle 70 71 72 73 74

Ueli Staeger, “The European Union’s Regionalism Diplomacy in Africa: An English School approach,” Bruges Regional Integration & Global Governance Papers, no. 2, 2015. EEC-Asean Cooperation Agreement, available at the EU Treaties Office Database European Union, Treaties Office Database. List of treaties of the European Union, at http://ec.europa .eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (last accesssed: September 2016). Cintia Díaz-Silveira Santos, La estrategia inter-regional de la Unión Europea con Latinoamérica: el camino a la asociación con el mercosur, la Comunidad Andina y Centroamérica (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2009), p. 79. Lay Hwee Yeo, “Political cooperation between the EU and asean: searching for a longterm agenda and joint projects,” in Paul J.J. Welfens (ed.), eu-asean. Facing economic globalisation (Berlin: Springer, 2009), pp. 45–46. Ibidem, p. 53.

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to further interregional relations.75 A more specific problem was the membership of Myanmar in asean since 1997, which the EU refused to include in the Cooperation Agreement due to the lack of democracy and human rights in the country, in another example of the EU not taking existing regional organisations as basis for interaction. This also led to the suspension of the political dialogue, although the ministerial meetings were resumed two years later. The negotiations for the establishment of a free trade area between the EU and asean, historically a main objective, have still not been concluded. As a response to the lack of progress, the EU has turned to intensifying the bilateral trade relationships with the asean states individually, in an apparent clash of a regionalist ideology with the reality in another region. It must nevertheless be concluded that the interaction has been weakened as a meta-practice due to the general shift towards bilateral relations, although it still exists as a political objective, evident in the framing of the 2015 bilateral Trade Agreement with Vietnam to complement the Cooperation Agreement as a stepping stone toward an eu-asean agreement.76 Also, in the 2015 strategy document on asean relations, the EU reiterates in the very first paragraph the importance of aiding regional integration among asean countries, also for the EU’s own sake.77 Simultaneously with the turn to the negotiation of bilateral agreements after 2009, the EU has also turned to practical and technical cooperation on a range of different matters, such as border management and migration and training sessions on preventive diplomacy, but also organising business summits.78 6.3.2.2 Central Asia A good example of the ideological strength of the regionalisation meta-­practice is the region of Central Asia, where a regional group has arisen on EU initiative and mainly in order to have a relationship with the EU. The EU has m ­ aintained a bi-regional political dialogue with the group integrated by K ­ azakhstan, 75 76

77 78

Noel M. Morada, “Europe and Southeast Asia: asean-eu Interregionalism between Pluralist and Solidarist Societies,” Review of European Studies, vol. 4, no. 3, 2012, pp. 89–99. Press statement by the President of the Commission, President of the European Council and the Prime Minister of Vietnam on the 02/12/2015, available at http://www.consilium .europa.eu/da/press/press-releases/2015/12/02-joint-statement-with-prime-ministervietnam/ (last accessed: September 2016). European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint communication to the European Parliament and the Council: The EU and asean: a partnership with a strategic purpose, May 2015, JOIN(2015) 22 final. Website of the Mission of the European Union to asean, at http://eeas.europa.eu/ delegations/association-southeast-asian-nations-asean/906/asean-and-the-eu_en (last accessed: September 2016).

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­ irgizstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan since 2007,79 and although the EU has K explicitly declared the strengthening of regional cooperation an objective, it also speaks of bilateral cooperation as “essential”80 to achieve the other transformative objectives that the EU pursues in the region with respect to installing a liberal market economy and democratic political systems.81 Apart from these objectives explicitly mentioned in the agreement with the region in form of a Regional Strategy Paper, it is also clear that a primary EU objective has been to ensure political stability in the region and prevent the rise of terrorist organisations. In this sense, the objectives of the EU with the region are partially incompatible since the security imperative of stability stands at odds with the other objectives of democratising the societies and promoting regional integration, both of which implies shaking up the status quo and undermining the power of the governments. The clash between the need for regional integration to promote economy and security in the long term and the need for strong state institutions to implement an integration process is a problem field that the EU also faces in Africa, where local elites often see institutionalised and legalised regional integration as a threat to their position.82 Just as it has in North Africa, it is clear that in Central Asia, the EU has prioritised the short-term goals of stability and security from immediate threats (and refugee flows) over the long-term objectives of a structural transformation based on EU values and the EU experience, for instance in the form of the promotion of democracy or human rights. Apart from these objectives there are also other motives behind the EU’s choice,83 such as the material interests in terms of oil and gas, as well as the strategic position of the region regarding the on-going conflict in Afghanistan. Furthermore, the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (eaeu) based on a customs union including Kazakhstan and Kirgizstan also seems to be a defining point in the process of integration in the region. The EU is unwilling to establish bi-regional relations with the eaeu, mainly because it is not seen as an instance of rule-based ­integration but a loosely defined instrument

79 80 81 82 83

Council of the European Union, The European Union and Central Asia: The new partnership in action (Luxembourg: EU, 2009). Ibidem, p. 14. European Commission, Regional Strategy Paper for Asistance to Central Asia for the period 2007–2013 (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), p. 4. Peter Draper and Morisho Mwana Biningo Nene, “Rethinking the (European) foundations of Sub-Saharan African regional economic integration,” in Søren Dosenrode (ed.), Limits to regional integration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 77–94. Aurelia Mañé Estrada and Eva Soms i Bachs, Asia Central en el marco del semestre de la presidencia española de la UE: una visión del Observatorio de Asia Central, ari, no. 161 (­Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2010).

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of Russian foreign policy, but the fact is that it severely curtails the EU’s diplomatic and political options in the region.84 Nevertheless, and just as happens in North Africa, the EU also maintains several specific cooperation areas with the region that are probably of lower salience but nevertheless work to further objectives of a transformation of the societies, such as an education initiative, a rule of law initiative as well as cooperation on the environment and water, transport etc.85 Still, in 2009, 70% of EU assistance to the region was canalised through bilateral programmes on the basis of the bilateral Cooperation Agreements that the EU has with each state,86 which also shows that the regional dimension is not that strong in practice. 6.3.3 Latin America The relations with Latin America are, apart from the eea and the enp, the most advanced in terms of EU regionalisation meta-practices. There has been a Strategic Association between the EU and Latin America (including the Caribbean acp states) since 199987 that plays out on the highest of the three different geographical levels of EU-Latin American relations. First, there are the continental relations of the Strategic Association between the EU and the Latin America and the Caribbean Region (lac), that are mainly developed through a series of biannual eu-lac summits at the level of Head of State and Government, a form of interaction promoted by the EU.88 As part of the general EU meta-practice, Latin America has a regional strategy that defines the relations both in terms of political content and diplomatic interaction.89 There is an institutionalised political dialogue and in terms of content the focus is on diffusing EU values in terms of democracy, human rights, good governance and regionalisation, in essence to diffuse the EU model of regional governance. This level of bi-regional interaction serves thus mainly as a forum for p ­ olitical dialogue and as a complementary way that the EU can engage with states 84 85 86 87 88 89

For a fuller analysis, see Laura Delcour et al., “The Implications of Eurasian Integration for the EU’s Relations with the Countries in the post-Soviet space,” Studia Diplomatica, 2015. Website of the eeas on Central Asia. http://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquartershomepage/2068/central-asia_en (last accessed: September 2016). Council of the European Union, The European Union and Central Asia: The new partnership in action (Luxembourg: EU, 2009), p. 31. European Commission, La Unión Europea y América Latina: Una asociación de actores ­globales, 2009, COM (2009) 495/3. María Salvadora Ortiz, “Iberoamérica y la diplomacia de cumbres,” Política Exterior, vol. 24, no. 136, 2010, pp. 40–48, p. 43. European Commission, Amerique Latine: Document de programmation régionale 2007– 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/la/rsp/07_13_fr.pdf (last accessed: September 2016).

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that it does not have strong bilateral relations with or other links by virtue of the third state’s membership in a sub-continental integration organisation.90 Cooperation programmes also exist at the continental level in terms of research, education, drugs and migration,91 funded by 800 million euros in the period 2014–2020,92 a substantial increase from the previous period. The second geographical level of interaction consists of relations between the EU and regional organisations in Latin America that nevertheless do not include all states on the continent, mainly, mercosur, the Andean Community and the Central American Integration System (sica). The continental strategy includes as a specific objective to establish Association Agreements with these regional organisations.93 The third geographical level is then the bilateral relations with each state. There is a certain tension between the different levels, particularly between the bilateral level and that of relations with regional organisations. Although the EU has generally had as an objective to create in Latin America a mirror image of the EU experience of regional integration and structural peace, due to the reality of the lack of progress internally both in the continental-wide integration and in the different Latin American regions and the bi-regional relations with these, the EU has increasingly turned to negotiate individual bilateral Association Agreements with individual states, a fact that has been criticised in Latin America as harmful to regional integration on the continent.94 As such, the EU is generally losing attractiveness in the region due to a sensation that the bi-regional relationship is not able to keep advancing.95 As a countervailing force to the increasing bilateralism and consequent w ­ eakening of the regionalisation meta-practice, the eurolat inter-­ parliamentary assembly is important as part of the Strategic Association. 90 91 92 93 94 95

María Salvadora Ortiz, “Iberoamérica y la diplomacia de cumbres,” Política Exterior, vol. 24, no. 136, 2010, pp. 40–48, p. 47. eeas website on Latin America and the Carribean, at https://eeas.europa.eu/diplomatic -network/latin-america-and-caribbean/331/latin-america-and-the-caribbean_en (last accessed: September 2016). EU Regional Indicative Programme Latin America 2014–2020, at https://eeas.europa.eu/ sites/eeas/files/the_eu_allocates_eu_925_million_to_regional_cooperation_with_latin_ america_over_the_period_2014-2020.pdf (last accessed: September 2016). European Commission, La Unión Europea y América Latina: Una asociación de actores globales, 2009, COM (2009) 495/3. Carlos Malamud, La Cumbre alcue de Madrid y el estado de la relación birregional EuropaAmérica Latina, ari no. 98 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2010), pp. 4–5. Bruno Ayllón Pino, “La dimensión exterior de la Comunidad de Estados Latinoamericanos y Caribeños (celac). Avances en el diálogo y la cooperación extra-regional,” Revista Iberoamericana de Derecho Internacional y de la Integración, no. 3, 2015.

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It was ­created in 2006 at the initiative of the European Parliament and is a continuation of the biannual inter-parliamentary meetings between the two regions at continental level that began in 1974. As a joint institution, half of the members are from the European Parliament, whereas the other half comes from the Latin American regional parliaments: The Latin American Parliament (continental), the Andean Parliament, the Central American Parliament, the mercosur parliament and joint parliamentary committees EU/Mexico and EU/Chile.96 Although these Latin American parliaments are not generally seen as legitimate institutions in their respective regions,97 the inter-parliamentary assembly is nevertheless a clear expression of the EU’s regionalisation meta-practice, and the ambition to manage relations with other peoples on a regional level. 6.3.3.1 The Andean Community The Andean Community is a regional organisation constituted by Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru, characterised by its high degree of institutionalisation and relative success in terms of integration. The Commission has characterised the Andean Community as very ambitious,98 since it not only aims at a free trade area, but at extending integration into more politically charged issue areas. The bi-regional political dialogue has been held since 1996, and the Regional Strategy Paper outlines the EU actions to support regional integration. A major obstacle to the regionalisation meta-practice of the EU was the failure of the negotiations of an ambitious bi-regional Association Agreement in 2008, caused among other factors by the fragile institutions of the Andean states and US policy towards the region.99 The breakdown meant maintaining the bi-regional political dialogue and assistance, but pursuing trade relations on a bilateral basis, a factor that has been detrimental to the Andean 96 97

98 99

Parlamento Europeo, eurolat- Reglamento. (Referencia completa en la Bibliografía, Fuentes Directas). Natalia Ajenjo Fresno, “La asociación estratégica entre la Unión Europea y América Latina como bloques de integración regional: un análisis crítico de la nueva asamblea parlamentaria euro-lat,” in Juan José Martín Arribas (ed.), Las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y América Latina: ¿cooperación al desarrollo y/o asociación estratégica (Burgos: Servicio de Publicaciones e Imagen Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos, 2008), p. 121. European Commission, Comunidad Andina. Documento de estrategia regional 2007–2013 (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), p. 4. Alan Fairlie Reinoso, “La Comunidad Andina de Naciones y la Unión Europea,” in Cristian Freres and José Antonio Sanahuja (eds.), América Latina y la Unión Europea: estrategias para una asociación necesaria (Barcelona: Icaria, 2005), p. 169.

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­Community itself,100 and leading to a trade agreement with Peru and Colombia only, to which Ecuador has negotiated accession,101 leaving only Bolivia with a separate arrangement. Also, the trade agreement makes reference to relations with other Andean Community members,102 so it could simply be seen as a result of EU impatience with the negotiations of a bi-regional agreement leading it to make agreements with three of the states, with the aim of Bolivia joining eventually. Whereas the relations with the Andean region follows the “standard” division between region and states, it stands out that the EU now only deals with political dialogue, development and encouraging regional integration on the regional level, but leaving trade outside of the Andean Community framework. Regional diversity in the Andean region is what has made impossible for biregional relations to move forward,103 and the region thus seems to be another example of EU regionalist meta-practices meeting an adverse reality and the EU therefore recurring to bilateral trade agreements to the detriment not only of bi-regional relations, but to the regional integration organisation itself. 6.3.3.2 mercosur mercosur is constituted by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Paraguay and Venezuela as a regional integration organisation in the process of establishing a common market, although it also has a mechanism for dialogue on issues beyond trade and economy. Its integration process has generally been hampered by the asymmetry in the membership due to the relative size of Brazil and by a general failure to implement the agreements reached.104 The bi-­regional relationship with mercosur goes back to 1992 and is i­nstitutionalised in a 100 Cintia Díaz-Silveira Santos, La estrategia inter-regional de la Unión Europea con Latinoamérica: el camino a la asociación con el mercosur, la Comunidad Andina y Centroamérica (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2009), pp. 237–238. 101 European Commission website on the Andean Community at http://ec.europa.eu/trade/ policy/countries-and-regions/regions/andean-community/ (last accessed: September 2016). 102 European Union, Trade Agreement between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and Colombia and Peru, of the other part (Luxembourg: EU, 2012). 103 José Antonio Sanahuja, “La Unión Europea y celac: Balance, perspectivas y opciones de la relación birregional,” in Adrián Bonilla Soria and Isabel Álvarez Echandi (eds.), Desafíos estratégicos del regionalismo contemporáneo: celac e Iberoamérica (San José: Flacso, 2014), p. 172. 104 Andrés Malamud, “Interdependence, leadership and institutionalisation: The trible deficit and fading prospects of Mercosur,” in Søren Dosenrode (ed.), Limits to regional integration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 163–178.

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F­ ramework Cooperation Agreement that entered into force in 1999,105 an agreement that later served as inspiration in the relationships with the Andean Community and Central America.106 In terms of content, the main areas are the political dialogue that takes place in summits, development cooperation in terms of EU assistance to mercosur and the efforts to establish a free trade zone, particularly relevant for the mercosur since the EU is the primary trade partner. Nevertheless, the negotiations for a more detailed and ambitious Association Agreement stranded in 2004,107 partially due to internal problems in mercosur and partially due to the EU’s refusal to open its market further to agricultural products in the context of wto negotiations.108 In this sense, the bi-regional relationship has been closely linked to the free-trade negotiations within the wto.109 It is notable that 70% of EU funds of the Regional Indicative Programme for 2007–2013 were destined to implement an Association Agreement with mercosur110 and negotiations were reopened in 2010, but as of September 2016 still without agreement. The importance of the regionalisation meta-practice in this case is also seen in the EU’s aid to strengthen mercosur’s institutions, mainly the functioning of the Secretariat, Parliament and dispute settlement system111 as well as with technical assistance, for instance in the form of training customs officers to improve implementation in the mercosur legal order and manage the cooperation in practice. Simultaneously, however, the EU established a developing strategic partnership with Brazil in 2007, due to doubts about mercosur’s ability to progress internally so that it would have common legislation in the areas being negotiated with the EU.112 This shift has occurred also in other regions and means 105 European Union, Treaties Office Database. List of treaties of the European Union, at http:// ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (last accesssed: September 2016). 106 Cintia Díaz-Silveira Santos, La estrategia inter-regional de la Unión Europea con Latinoamérica: el camino a la asociación con el mercosur, la Comunidad Andina y Centroamérica (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés, 2009), p. 163. 107 European Commission, La Unión Europea y América Latina: Una asociación de actores globales, 2009, COM (2009) 495/3, p. 5. 108 Carlos Malamud, UE y Mercosur: Negociaciones sin futuro, ari 61/2012 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2012). 109 Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith, “The EU and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 185. 110 European Commission, Mercosur. Documento estratégico regional 2007–2013 (Brussels: European Commission, 2007), p. 5. 111 Ibidem, pp. 29–33. 112 Sebastian Santander, “The EU and Brazil in a changing world: Strategic partners of competitors?” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 185.

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that the EU’s regionalisation practice is losing credibility generally, being seen to be replaced by a “selective bilateralism” by other countries in the region.113 6.3.3.3 Central America The first bi-regional relations between the EU and Central America go back to the San José process in 1985, and consisted basically in an annual political dialogue about the pacification of the region, based on a Framework Cooperation Agreement. The dialogue was confirmed in 1996 and 2002, incorporating issues such as social and economic development and continues to be the primary channel of communication between the two regions.114 A new agreement from 2003 incorporated more elements, such as migration and terrorism,115 and the objective to work towards an Association Agreement including free trade was established.116 This Association Agreement was signed in 2012 as the first bi-regional Association Agreement of the EU, although not yet ratified by all Central American states. It further institutionalises relations and establishes a series of common bodies, from an Association Council of ministers to bi-regional working groups.117 As happens with other regions, a main objective in the Agreement is to strengthen regional integration and bi-regional cooperation. At the EU’s insistence, a series of political areas, such as environmental protection, gender equality and human rights were included in the Agreement along with support to the institutionalisation of regional integration.118 The Central American region maintaining relations with the EU consists of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, and it is noteworthy that it thereby does not coincide with the Central American 113 Ibidem, p. 194. 114 European Commission, América Central. Documento de estrategia regional 2007–2013 (Brussels: European Commission, 2007). 115 Juan José Martín Arribas, “Una visión global de las relaciones entre la UE y América Latina,” in Juan José Martín Arribas (ed.), Las relaciones entre la Unión Europea y América Latina: ¿cooperación al desarrollo y/o asociación estratégica (Burgos: Servicio de Publicaciones e Imagen Institucional de la Universidad de Burgos, 2008), pp. 52–53. 116 Hugo López y José Antonio Morales, “Centroamérica y la Unión Europea: en busca de un nuevo modelo de asociación” in Cristian Freres and José Antonio Sanahuja (eds.), América Latina y la Unión Europea: estrategias para una asociación necesaria (Barcelona: Icaria, 2005), p. 146. 117 EU-Central America Association Agreeement, art. 2, available at http://trade.ec.europa .eu/doclib/docs/2011/march/tradoc_147661.pdf (last accessed: September 2016). 118 Peter Abrahamson, “Central American integration: Prospects for a troubled region,” in Søren Dosenrode (ed.), Limits to regional integration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 109–131.

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Community, nor with the sica, which also includes Belize and the Dominican Republic,119 although the regional political dialogue includes Belize as a full Member of the sica.120 Still, Belize and the Dominican Republic are instead incorporated into the acp group, in this case clearly showing that it is the EU’s criteria determining the definition of region rather than existing realities on the ground. Still, in the Agreement specific mention is made of sica institutions and the Central American Parliament, so this seems to indicate that it is the sica that it is referred to when the EU outlines its objectives of strengthening regional integration, although it would undoubtedly have been more adequate for this purpose to conclude an Association Agreement directly with the sica. 6.3.4 The European Economic Area The European Economic Area (eea) was created in 1994 by an agreement121 between the EU the efta states (except Switzerland), of which only Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein remain as eea members due to the entry into the EU of Austria, Finland and Sweden. In its essence, the eea Agreement extends the internal market, including the free movement of persons to the three eea states, which makes the agreement qualitatively different from all other EU agreements. The basis of the agreement is that in return for access to the EU market, the eea states must adopt the acquis communautaire in the areas covered by the agreement and accept all new UE legislation in these areas.122 As non-EU Member States they do not participate in EU decision-making, although they can participate in some expert groups and comment on future legislation, which in reality amounts to very little influence.123 The issue areas of the agreement are basically those

119 sica website at http://www.sica.int/miembros/miembros.aspx (last accessed: September 2016). 120 European Union, Political dialogue and cooperation agreement between the European Community and its Member States, of the one part, and the republics of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama, of the other part, available at https:// eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/political_dialogue_and_cooperation_agreement.pdf (last ­accessed: September 2016). 121 Agreement on the European Economic Area, 1994, available through the EU Treaties Office Database, at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (last accesssed: September 2016). 122 Fraser Cameron, An introduction to European foreign policy (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 123. 123 Ibidem, p. 125.

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establishing the four fundamental freedoms, i.e. the free movement of persons, services, capital and goods, excluding agriculture and ­fisheries, with the related issues to ensure fair competition in terms of social policy, consumer protection, environmental protection etc. The Agreement also regulates the participation of the eea states in different agencies and programmes of the EU, such as those related to research, environment, tourism and civil protection, and when they do participate, they contribute to the financing and are part of the managing organs, but without the right to vote. The agreement is ­supplemented by other technical agreements allowing the states to participate in other EU areas of cooperation, such as police cooperation, csdp ­missions, etc. In terms of institutions, the cooperation is institutionalised into three main bodies.124 First of all, the eea Council, constituted by the foreign ministers of the eea and EU Member States, meets twice per year and provides political leadership of the work of the eea Joint Committee. This is constituted by the Ambassadors of the eea states to the EU and representatives of the Commission and the Member States, and is the main forum for managing the cooperation and where the decisions are made with respect to which EU legislation is relevant to the eea Agreement and therefore must be adopted by the eea states. Although decisions by the Committee formally requires agreement between the EU and all eea states,125 the legislative procedure has already begun in the EU with the eea states in a mere consultative role,126 so in reality there is little that the eea states can do to influence the process. A Joint Parliamentary Committee is constituted by parliamentarians of the eea states and the European Parliament with the aim of increasing dialogue and mutual understanding,127 and the efta Surveillance Authority and efta Court are responsible for monitoring compliance and interpreting the legislation.128 In sum, the eea effectively extends participation in the EU’s core area of cooperation to non-Member States, albeit without the right to participate in

124 Agreement on the European Economic Area, 1994, available through the EU Treaties O ­ ffice Database, at http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/default.home.do (last accesssed: September 2016), arts. 89–95. 125 Ibidem, art. 93. 126 Ibidem, art. 99. 127 Ibidem, art. 95. 128 Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 386.

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the institutions, and also in the international activities of the EU in the shape of csdp missions and cfsp communications. This partial inclusion of nonmembers into the EU Self contributes to undermining the image of the EU as a geographically-based diplomatic actor and dilutes the distinction between Self and Other in international system. As will be argued in the following section, the same basic model of managing relations with the regions bordering the EU based on intense legalisation, institutionalisation and partial inclusion in the EU Self, is repeated in the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy, although with less intensity. 6.3.5 The European Neighbourhood Policy The European Neighbourhood Policy (enp) has its basis in a Polish initiative and was first defined in detail in a 2003 Commission communication as a strategy for spreading security and stability beyond the EU’s borders and handling the relations with the new EU neighbours after the 2004 enlargement so they would not feel excluded,129 including also the Southern Neighbours. Notable exceptions are Belarus, Libya and Syria, which are not included due to EU dissatisfaction with these states in terms of EU values of democracy, human rights and good governance. The Lisbon Treaty (art. 8 teu) makes explicit mention of the EU neighbourhood and the objective of spreading EU values to the area. The enp is basically an EU initiative towards its neighbours, although the activities are formally agreed between the parties and depend on both for implementation, and can be seen as motivated by two different factors. On one hand ideology in terms of the value-diffusion objectives of the EU, and on the other hand a practical necessity to manage the relations with the new neighbours that were not seen as immediate candidates for membership. The Commission has explicitly recognised that the enp is basically an attempt to promote reforms and internal transformations in the neighbouring states ­according to EU values and ideas, but without offering them membership.130 In 2004 the enp was further defined in a strategy paper after discussions of the first Commission communication in the Parliament, Member States and neighbouring states.131 129 Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, “Much ado about nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in context” in Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.), The ­European Neighbourhood Policy in perspective: Context, implementation and impact (New York: ­Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 13. 130 European Commission, A strong European Neighbourhood Policy (Brussels, European Commission, 2007). 131 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy strategy paper (Brussels, European Commission, 2004).

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In terms of regionalisation, the enp is essentially a regional framework for managing structurally similar bilateral relations with the neighbouring states, as defined in Action Plans agreed with each neighbouring state. No regional organisation exists with which the EU can relate, and the diversity of the neighbouring states makes different political content and intensity of cooperation with each third state included in the enp necessary, as reflected in the different partial objectives. The EU has therefore chosen to use the same instruments and having the same overall objectives in terms of value diffusion and internal transformation, but applies the instruments differently and gradually according to the specific third state. Still, the status of the enp as a catch-all policy covering very diverse states has been characterised as one of its main flaws,132 a problem that has only been partially fixed with the creation of the Eastern Partnership and the Union for the Mediterranean, considered below. Although the enp is thus formally a series of bilateral relations, it can nevertheless be considered an expression of the EU’s regionalisation meta-­ practice, since the intention of the EU is clearly to deal with the neighbours as a group. Furthermore, the relations are structurally similar and extensively institutionalised. The bodies established in the framework of the enp are the Cooperation or Association Councils, Administrative Committees and corresponding sub-committees in which all EU Member States, the Commission and the third state participate.133 It is the specialised sub-committees that are the main fora for interaction with the enp states.134 The institutions work to implement the global Agreements, based on Action Plans without time limit negotiated between the EU and the enp state. As opposed to the bi-regional relations of the EU with other world regions, the EU does not have a regional political dialogue with the enp states, but a series of bilateral dialogues. In contrast, EU assistance is organised regionally in strategy documents for the Neighbourhood, with specific programmes for the Eastern and Mediterranean sub-regions, which strengthens the impression of the enp as an instance of regionalisation of diplomacy. According to the EU, the enp is based on the shared values of rule of law, good governance, respect for human rights and those of minorities, promotion 132 Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, “Much ado about nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in context” in Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.), The ­European Neighbourhood Policy in perspective: Context, implementation and impact (New York: ­Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 14. 133 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy strategy paper (Brussels, European Commission, 2004), p. 10. 134 European Commission, A strong European Neighbourhood Policy (Brussels, European Commission, 2007), p. 11.

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of good neighbour relations and the principles of market economy and sustainable development. It is debatable to which extent these values are actually shared among all enp states, considering for instance the neighbour relations between Israel and Palestine, but the list is at least a very clear expression of the normative diffusion ambition of the EU, aiming at transforming the enp states internally. The interpretation that the enp was designed to be more about the diffusion of EU values than an expression of already existing values is strengthened when considering the strategic objective formulated in the 2003 EU security strategy135 of creating a ring of friendly and well-governed states around the EU, an objective that the Commission explicitly refers to in the context of the enp.136 In this sense, the security dimension has also been present in the enp from the beginning, in that the state of affairs in the neighbouring states is seen as directly linked to EU security.137 The strategic objective of transforming the enp states so that they become ever more similar to EU states in terms of administrative organisation and political culture is thus also clear, reflected also in the fact that progress reports in these terms are elaborated annually for each enp state by joint sub-committees. These progress reports are then used by the EU to elaborate general reviews of the enp,138 although their nature was proposed changed with the 2015 enp review.139 The recent shift in the foreign policy priorities associated with the enp of which the change in reporting is indicative is discussed in more detail below. In the absence of a promise of membership, the enp uses different instruments that also include the semi-inclusion of third states in the EU Self, as identified in the case of the European Economic Area. The enp takes its point of departure in existing agreements and instruments, in the form of the bilateral Cooperation and Association Agreements that the EU has with each enp state. These agreements form the basis upon which the Action Plans of the 135 Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003). 136 European Commission, European Neighbourhood Policy strategy paper (Brussels, European Commission, 2004), pp. 4–5. 137 See: también Gwendolyn Sasse, “‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood ­Policy and the EU’s eastern neighbours,” in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds.), European foreign policy in an evolving international system: the road towards convergence (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), p. 167. 138 Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff, “Much ado about nothing? The European Neighbourhood Policy in context” in Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.), The ­European Neighbourhood Policy in perspective: Context, implementation and impact (New York: ­Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 9. 139 Steven Blockmans, The 2015 enp Review: A policy in suspended animation, ceps commentary (Brussels: ceps, 2015).

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enp are developed. The Action Plans are at the centre of the enp and are similar to those established through Strategy Papers and Indicative Programmes with other third states and regions, since they establish the working areas and EU technical and financial assistance. In the case of the enp the assistance is explicitly linked to an agenda of political and economic reform, with the ­approximation of the enp states’ legislation, standards and norms being general goals of the Action Plans. A particular feature of the enp is its broad scope in terms of political issues areas, which makes it a nearly global cooperation scheme, evident in the Action Plans.140 The Action Plans are similar in structure, but different with respect to specific content, although they all contain provisions on political dialogue, economic and social cooperation, trade, market reforms, cooperation in justice and home affairs as well as other policies such as transport, energy, environmental protection, education and public health. Promoting regional integration is also a common element in the enp action plans. Another important aspect of the enp is the emphasis on trans-border ­cooperation between local and regional actors and civil society actors on both sides of the EU’s external border, an aspect to which the EU destined more than a billion Euros in the period 2007–2013.141 The main objectives are here to instigate socio-economic development in the neighbouring states to reduce the differences between EU Member States and the neighbours and cooperate across the border in terms of environmental protection, public health, organised crime, border management as well as to facilitate interaction of civil society organisations.142 The programmes of trans-border cooperation can be considered a bottom-up counterweight to the top-down relations that the EU has with the central governments, a facet stressed by the Commission as key to their success.143 Since EU membership is not contemplated in the case of the enp states, and the EU thereby loses a primary instrument of positive conditionality, the basic strategy of the EU is to incentivise the internal transformation of these states by a gradual extension of the four freedoms of the internal market, making it dependent on the evolution of the third state in question. Instead of EU membership, the “end point” of the enp can therefore be considered closer 140 Consulted at the eeas website, http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhoodpolicy-enp/8398/-enp-action-plans_en (last accessed: September 2016). 141 European Commission, European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument. Cross-­ border cooperation strategy paper (2007–2013) and Indicative Programme (2007–2010) (Brussels, European Commission, 2007), p. 29. 142 Ibidem, p. 10. 143 Ibidem, p. 15.

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to the situation of the eea states. Another important instrument that the EU employs to achieve its transformative objectives is to let enp states participate in the concrete programmes and agencies of the EU alongside the Member States, in a dynamic similar to the eea states, and as contemplated in the enp Action Plans.144 The enp states participate in some EU agencies and technical cooperation programmes on an equal footing with the parallel institutions of the Member States as described in a 2006 Commission communication,145 although in certain specific cases the participation is further developed in agreements with the specific states.146 The participation is based on a kind of technical and administrative conditionality where enp states are allowed to participate when they have established an administrative and technical structure similar to those of the Member States. For instance, there is a cooperation programme between the laboratories of the EU Member States analysing the quality of drinking water in which the enp states’ laboratories can participate when they are organised along similar lines and function according to the same standards. It is therefore clear that the enp is based on the will of the enp states to reform along the lines of the EU Member States, as well as on the conditionality instrument of financial assistance. In parallel, the gradual integration into the EU internal market is another tool for the transformation of the enp states,147 since it involves the gradual adoption of the relevant ­acquis communautaire. Still, a general conclusion with respect to its impact is that without the carrot of membership, the conditionality instrument loses its main effect and the enp could therefore be seen more as an “open-ended socialisation process,”148 working through social mechanisms rather than due to material leverage. 144 Available at the eeas website, http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/european-neighbourhoodpolicy-enp/8398/-enp-action-plans_en (last accessed: September 2016). 145 A range of technical programmes and agencies are open to the participation of nonmember neighbouring states. The general approach and list og agencias and programmes upon to enp states is contained in the 2006 document: European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and to the European Parliament on the general approach to enable enp partner countries to participate in Community agencies and ­Community programmes, COM/2006/0724 final. 146 These are available through Eur-Lex, at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/SK/ ALL/?uri=URISERV:r15015 (last accessed: September 2016). 147 Fraser Cameron, An introduction to European foreign policy (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 109. 148 Ian Manners, “As you like it: European normative power in the European Neighbourhood Policy,” in Richard G. Whitman and Stefan Wolff (eds.), The European Neighbourhood Policy in perspective: Context, implementation and impact (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 44.

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Overall, the intention of the enp can be interpreted to be to diminish the importance of the institutional border between the EU and its neighbours and dilute the image of “Fortress Europe” partially created by the Schengen Agreement.149 The method can be characterised as establishing porous and multidimensional borders, for instance transactional borders, cultural borders and geopolitical borders.150 Only the institutional border remain rigid, whereas the other borders are permeable and allows the neighbouring states to participate in the process of European integration, albeit partially. The effect is, as in the case of the eea, to dilute the EU as a political entity by the partial inclusion of others into the diplomatic Self. Just as some EU Member States are less than full Members, most notably those not using the Euro as their currency, the eea and enp states can in a certain sense be considered partial “members” of the EU as well, at the very least important stakeholders in the process of E ­ uropean integration generally. Whereas the enp is essentially a regional grouping of bilateral relations, it is linked to multilateral regional processes with the Eastern and South Eastern neighbours in the Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy as well as with the Southern neighbours in the Union for the Mediterranean, both ­further e­ xpressions of the EU regionalisation diplomatic meta-practice, and considered in the following. 6.3.5.1 The Eastern Partnership and the Black Sea Synergy Just like the Union for the Mediterranean was a French initiative, the Eastern Partnership was initially promoted by Sweden and Poland.151 It does not pretend to substitute the enp as a framework for managing the relations with the neighbouring states, but to intensify the bilateral cooperation with the Eastern and South-Eastern neighbours (Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine) and to add a multilateral dimension to these relations.152 It shares the broad enp goals of bringing the neighbouring states economically 149 Gwendolyn Sasse, “‘Conditionality-lite’: The European Neighbourhood Policy and the EU’s eastern neighbours,” in Nicola Casarini and Costanza Musu (eds.), European foreign policy in an evolving international system: the road towards convergence (Basingstoke: ­Palgrave Macmillan, 2007), pp. 164–165. 150 Characterisation made by Esther Barbé Izuel, “Identidad y frontera en Europa: los veinticinco y sus vecinos,” in Francisco Aldecoa Luzárraga et al. (eds.), Los Tratados de Roma en su cincuenta aniversario: perspectivas desde la Asociación Española de Profesores de Derecho Internacional y Relaciones Internacionales (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2008), p. 1067. 151 Esther Barbé Izuel, “La Unión por el Mediterráneo: de la europeización de la política exterior a la descomunitarización de la política mediterránea,” Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo vol. 13, no. 32, 2009, p. 26. 152 European Commission, Eastern Partnership, 2008, COM (2008) 823 final, pp. 9–10.

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and politically closer to the EU and specifies four platforms for intensified cooperation: Strengthening institutions and good governance; people-to-people contacts and civil society; economic integration and financial cooperation; and energy security.153 Due to the rich energy resources of some of the neighbouring states and the role as transit countries of others, the general energy dependence of almost all EU Member States on imports from outside the Union adds an extra dimension to the relations with the Eastern Partnership where the EU’s value-diffusion objectives are complemented by Member State interests in terms of energy security. The EU’s regional approach in this field has been characterised as “meagre,”154 reflected also in the fact that the EU has negotiated further agreements with some states and not others, giving them a qualitatively different relationship with the EU, with Ukraine being the best example, and the EU also stresses in a recent communication the necessity of addressing the rift opened up within the Eastern Partnership as a consequence hereof.155 For its implementation, the Eastern Partnership had a 600 million Euro budget for the period 2010–2013, of which 350 million were new funds and the rest existing but reprogrammed funds.156 The regional framework that the Partnership adds to the relations makes it serve as a forum for exchanging experiences with the transitions and reforms in neighbouring states and for strengthening the relations among them. The thematic overlap with the enp means that it also serves to consolidate this broader initiative. Diplomatic interaction takes place on four levels: Biannual meetings of Head of State or Government; annual meetings at the margins of the Foreign Affairs Council of the EU at the level of Ministers of Foreign Affairs; meetings at least twice per year with the officials responsible for the platforms; and specialised working groups in the ­platforms. Also, a Joint Parliamentary Assembly, a civil society forum and a conference of local and regional authorities have been created.157 On the EU side, consequently also representatives of the European Parliament, the

153 eeas website on the Eastern Partnership, at http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eastern-partnership/419/eastern-partnership_en (last accessed: September 2016). 154 Servando de la Torre, “Iniciativas conjuntas en el Mar Negro y el Mediterráneo,” Política Exterior, vol. 24, no. 136, 2010, p. 38. Author’s translation from the Spanish “tímida.” 155 European Union, Multilateral cooperation. Eastern Partnership: Supporting reforms, ­promoting change, available at the eeas website, at http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/easternpartnership/8392/The-Eastern-Partnership---Flagship-Initiatives_en (last accessed: September 2016). 156 European Commission, Eastern Partnership, 2008, COM (2008) 823 final, pp. 14–15. 157 eeas website on the Eastern Partnership, at http://eeas.europa.eu/topics/eastern-part nership/419/eastern-partnership_en (last accessed: September 2016).

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­ ommittee of the Regions, the Economic and Social Council, as well as of the C European Investment Bank and the European for Reconstruction and Development have participated in meetings. Beyond the substance of cooperation, a function of the regional forum is to establish a dynamic of peer evaluation of the reforms undertaken, thereby increasing the pressure on the participating states. A stated long-term objective is more clearly regionalist in the sense of promoting regional integration, since the Commission foresees the creation of a free trade area or even an Economic Community between the Eastern Partnership states that would then be linked to the EU on the eea model.158 The Black Sea Synergy is an EU initiative from 2007 that has not been developed to a great extent. It aims to increase regional cooperation around the Black Sea, with representation of the states of the Eastern Partnership as well as Turkey, Russia and the EU Member States Greece, Bulgaria and Rumania individually.159 It does not pretend to establish a new cooperation structure, since structures are already very complex due to the singular relations of the EU with Russia as a Strategic Partner and Turkey as a candidate country, apart from the enp and Eastern Partnership relations with the other non-EU states. The purpose is instead to make cooperation more fluid within these frameworks and between them. In terms of issues, they are those of the enp with special relevance for the Black Sea, such as democracy, human rights, energy, transport, trade, environmental protection etc.,160 although given the ­region’s strategic importance for EU energy security, it is energy, transport and environmental protection that are prioritised, with energy security being the l­eitmotiv of the Black Sea Synergy.161 A 2015 assessment of the Black Sea ­Synergy ­initiative recognised that the impact had so far been limited, and although the EU still sees a great potential for the future, it recognises that it will depend on a more active attitude of the involved parties.162 The Black Sea Synergy initiative is not institutionalised in a formal agreement or in common bodies and regularised interaction, but it is noteworthy 158 European Commission, Eastern Partnership, 2008, COM (2008) 823 final, pp. 11–12. 159 European Commission, Black Sea Synergy. A new regional cooperation initiative, 2007, COM(2007) 160 final, p. 2. 160 Ibidem, pp. 3–8. 161 Energy security was the main motivation behind the initiative according to Rosa Riquelme, “Una dimensión regional: del Mar Negro al Mar Caspio,” in Antonio Remiro Brotóns (ed.), Los límites de Europa (Madrid: Academia Europea de Ciencias y Artes, 2008), pp. 415–456. 162 European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint Staff Working Document. Black Sea Synergy: review of a regional cooperation initiative, SWD(2015) 6 final, pp. 9–11.

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that it is largely conceived as an alternative to the regional initiative Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (bsec),163 a regional organisation established in 1992 and that apart from the Black Sea Synergy states also incorporates Albania and Serbia.164 The EU’s intention is that the Black Sea Synergy come to serve as a forum for political dialogue and that the contacts between the European Parliament and the parliamentary assembly of the bsec also come to promote the Black Sea Synergy.165 6.3.5.2 The Union for the Mediterranean As a parallel to the Eastern Partnership, the Union for the Mediterranean is a parallel multilateral cooperation around the Mediterranean Sea initiated in 2008,166 although it is a continuation of the Barcelona Process initiated in 1995 after having defined the South of the Mediterranean as a zone of strategic importance. The interaction is based on the bilateral Association Agreements between the Union and Southern Mediterranean states that are structurally similar. It is noteworthy that all the Association Agreements, as happens in other regions, have as an explicit objective to promote regional integration.167 Apart from the EU, its Member States and the enp states, also Mauritania, Monaco, Libya, Syria, Turkey, Albania, Bosnia and Montenegro are included and the Arab League is invited to the meetings.168 One of the purposes of the multilateralisation of relations was to increase the joint management of the relations and establish more concrete multilateral projects of cooperation in specific areas to complement the political dialogue and increase the visibility of the relations.169 The institutionalisation of the multilateral cooperation takes the shape of biannual summits at the level of Heads of State or Government that provide 163 Panagiota Manoli, “EU’s flexible regional multilateralism towards its Black Sea neighbourhood,” Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, vol. 2, no. 3, 2012, pp. 431–442, p. 440. 164 Black Sea Economic Cooperation website, available at http://www.bsec-organization.org/ member/Pages/member.aspx (last accessed: September 2016). 165 European Commission, Black Sea Synergy. A new regional cooperation initiative, 2007, COM(2007) 160 final, p. 9. 166 Union for the Mediterranean Secretariat, Final statement Marseille, November 2008, available at http://ufmsecretariat.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/09/dec-final-Marseille-UfM .pdf (last accessed: September 2016). 167 Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 399. 168 Antonio Blanc Altemir, “La Unión por el Mediterráneo: ¿una etapa más de la política mediterránea de la UE?” Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, vol. 60, no. 2, 2008, p. 703. 169 Union for the Mediterranean Secretariat, Joint declaration of the Paris summit for the ­Mediterranean, available at http://ufmsecretariat.org/joint-declaration-of-the-paris-summit-for-the-mediterranean-paris-13-july-2008/ (last accessed: September 2016), pp. 13–18.

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strategic direction whereas sectoral ministers meet ad-hoc to discuss cooperation in their areas. Meetings at these levels are prepared by bi-monthly meetings of high-ranking officials, who also prepare annual work programmes. A Brussels-based Permanent Joint Committee then prepares the meetings of the high-ranking officials. As opposed to other bi-regional constructions, where the Presidency alternates between the EU and the other region, the Presidency is in this case shared between the EU and a neighbouring state elected by unanimity among the neighbours for a period of two years. Nevertheless, already after two years, the role of the EU Member States had increased to the point where an observer concluded that the Union for the Mediterranean seemed less like an instance of EU regionalism than an intergovernmental forum of 43 states,170 although the modifications with the Lisbon Treaty now means that it is not an EU Member State that co-presides the Union for the Mediterranean, but the Commission (areas of EU exclusive competences) and the HR/VP (other matters), and the eeas at the level of officials.171 It should be noted that the structure also includes meetings of parliamentary, regional and local assemblies,172 which serve to provide input to the political dialogue. The Secretariat, located in Barcelona, is the key institution in the Union for the Mediterranean. It analyses the projects proposed by the participating states’ ministries, regional or local authorities or civil society, and supervises the implementation of the projects and sends reports on this to the Permanent Committee and the high-ranking officials.173 It has independent legal personality and is led by a General Secretary from a neighbouring state with 5 sub-­ Secretary Generals appointed by the high-ranking officials. In terms of working areas, the Union for the Mediterranean works in parallel to the other multilateral frameworks within the enp on political dialogue and security, transport, energy, water resources, the role of women, economic integration, business development etc.,174 and the transformative objectives of the EU in terms of promoting democracy and human rights are explicit on the EU side. Thus, although the Union for the Mediterranean is officially a relation .

170 Jesús A. Núñez Villaverde, “Mediterráneo: El viaje a ninguna parte de la UE,” Política Exterior, vol. 24, no. 136, 2010, pp. 8–9. 171 eeas website on the Union for the Mediterranean, at http://eeas.europa.eu/diplomaticnetwork/union-mediterranean-ufm/329/union-for-the-mediterranean-ufm_en (last accessed: September 2016). 172 Panos Koutrakos, EU international relations law, second edition (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2015), p. 400. 173 Antonio Blanc Altemir, “La Unión por el Mediterráneo: ¿una etapa más de la política mediterránea de la UE?” Revista Española de Derecho Internacional, vol. 60, no. 2, 2008, p. 705. 174 Union for the Mediterranean Secretariat website, at http://ufmsecretariat.org/priorityareas/ (last accessed: September 2016).

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between two equals, many observers see the relation as fundamentally asymmetric and it has been likened to that of a teacher and pupil,175 precisely due to the EU’s objectives of diffusing its values and ideas. Another criticism of the EU in this respect is formulated particularly strongly in the context of the relations with the North African states, where objectives of political stability and stemming the flux of migration has trumped the goal of promoting EU values, although the problem is more general.176 Particularly the Union for the Mediterranean seems a construction unable to instigate a transformation of the participating states, and the policy towards the area reveals a good deal of hypocrisy in EU foreign policy. When democracy has resulted in the election of governments sceptical of EU values and its international actorness, such as in Algeria and Palestine, the EU has chosen to support corrupt and antidemocratic governments instead of those democratically elected. Evidence suggests that the EU, when forced to make a choice, has prioritised trade and stability over value diffusion, and that the EU is not using the instruments embedded in the agreements to their full potential to provoke a change in the social structures of foreign states regarding their political values.177 A politically asymmetric relation between the EU and its neighbours to the South and East might be inevitable due to different levels of economic development and the fact that the EU provides assistance and the neighbours receive it. The lack of a membership perspective constitutes a serious limitation for the EU’s transformative objectives and already before the Arab Spring, the EU was being accused of not being true to its own ideas and prioritising s­ tability and maintaining the status quo above the transformation of the neighbours.178 In this case, the discrepancy between the official rhetoric of the EU and its reluctance to invoke the democracy and human rights clauses in the Association Agreements makes the EU lose legitimacy in its identity as a qualitatively

175 Fraser Cameron, An introduction to European foreign policy (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 111. 176 Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 70. 177 Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, “Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the European Union,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 157. 178 Wolfgang Mühlberger and Patrick Müller, “The EU’s comprehensive approach to security in the mena region: What lessons for csdp from Libya?” in Laura Chappel, Jocelyn Mawdsley and Petar Petrov, The EU, strategy and security policy: Regional and strategic challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 51–67.

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different kind of actor.179 A 2011 communication by the Commission and the HR/VP180 assessing the enp in the context of the Arab Spring, identified democracy support, economic development and regional partnership as necessary key focus areas, suggesting that the EU had not lost sight of long-term transformative objectives. However, given the lack of regional integration in the Arab world in general, it should also be noted that even if the EU seeks to promote such regional integration as part of its regionalisation meta-practice, the Southern neighbours might find it more beneficial to pursue a bilateral integration with the EU in market terms, by gradually adopting EU regulatory standards as specified in bilateral agreements rather than pursue closer integration with other states in the region. In this case, the mere presence of the EU internal market and the incentives it creates for neighbouring states to adapt to its standards might actually hinder regional integration on the EU’s borders.181 The contrast to more recent declarations is also striking. At the presentation of the 2015 enp review, the Commission stressed an increased need for focusing on stability and shared interests rather than EU values,182 which seems to reflect a general impatience with the transformative objectives initially set out for the enp and confirmed by the Lisbon Treaty. However, it is doubtful whether it is realistic to expect a fundamental change of societies in the span of a few years or even decades, and the breakdown of the authoritarian regimes that at least in Tunisia has been the consequence of the Arab Spring, could be seen as a change that makes possible an increased impact of EU meta-practices.183 The EU policy in terms of its foreign aid to North Africa after the Arab Spring has been characterised by continuity, although according to one observer not so much due to a perception that its approach is working but due to a lack of vision.184 Still, the success of the transformative objectives 179 Esther Barbé Izuel, “La Unión por el Mediterráneo: de la europeización de la política exterior a la descomunitarización de la política mediterránea,” Revista de Derecho Comunitario Europeo vol. 13, no. 32, 2009, pp. 44–45. 180 European Union, A new response to a changing neighbourhood, 2011, COM(2011) 303 final. 181 Wolfgang Zank, “The trajectory of Arab non-integration: Historical reconstruction and theoretical explanation,” in Søren Dosenrode (ed.), Limits to regional integration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015), pp. 33–55. 182 Steven Blockmans, The 2015 enp Review: A policy in suspended animation, ceps commentary (Brussels: ceps, 2015). 183 Patrick Holden, “Testing EU structural diplomacy: The challenge of change in North ­Africa,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 258. 184 Federica Bicchi, “The politics of foreign aid and the European Neighbourhood Policy PostArab Spring: ‘More for More’ or Less of the Same?” Mediterranean Politics, vol. 19, no. 3, 2014, pp. 318–332.

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in the case of the 2004 enlargement shows that it is not utopia, but it does seems to suggest that without firm membership expectations, the motivation of third states, and possibly of the EU itself, may not be sufficient. Furthermore, the shift towards a more interest-based strategic approach downplaying the transformative objectives has also been noticed in other regions and in the bilateral relations with Russia.185 The problematique is undoubtedly linked to the value-based identity of the EU as diplomatic actor with universal political values and diplomatic principles. Their promotion is therefore not merely a means to augmenting the welfare in other states, but becomes an end in itself driven by EU identity dynamics, particularly in the case of the regionalisation meta-practice. The EU has expressed that the goal of regionalisation promoted in the agreements is not an end in itself,186 and that the EU model is not necessarily applicable in other states and regions, recognising the uniqueness of the European experience. Nevertheless, it is clear that the EU in this instance is referring only to the specific institutionalisation of regional integration and that the intrinsic value of regional integration in general is not questioned, nor are the fundamental EU political values of democracy, rule of law, good governance, human rights nor the diplomatic principles of regional integration, multilateralism, institutionalisation and legalisation upon which the EU itself is based. The conviction remains that basic features of the EU model is still exportable to other states and regions, it must merely be adapted in the concrete details to the specific circumstances. In consequence, the 2015 enp review maintains its support for regional integration among third states as an objective of the enp,187 and although it recognises that “not all partners aspire to EU rules and standards,”188 meaning having an evolution towards the EU model as their objective, the promotion of EU values is still an explicit objective, although there is clearly a change of focus towards promoting shared interests in economic and security terms. The general impression is that of a clash between the defence of shortterm EU interests in terms of economic gains, stability and security and the long-term interest of helping the neighbouring states develop towards the EU 185 Tom Casier, “The EU and Russia: A marriage of convenience,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 129–145. 186 European Commission, European Commission support for regional economic integration efforts among developing countries, 1995, COM(95) 219 final, p. ii. 187 European Commission and the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Joint communication to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Review of the European Neighbourhood Policy, 2015, pp. 18–19. 188 Ibidem, p. 2.

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model in political and diplomatic terms. A good example of this is the focus in recent bilateral trade agreements on making third states adopt the regulatory acquis associated with the EU market, thus maintaining the transformative ambition in economic terms mainly. 6.4 Conclusion: EU Diplomatic Meta-practices between Transformative Effects and Isomorphic Pressures on the EU to Adapt In this chapter, the focus has not so much been on the effectiveness of the instruments contained in the EU’s international agreements to obtain specific foreign policy goals but more on the potential impact of the EU’s meta-­ practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation. A primary conclusion is that the EU’s diplomatic meta-practices are radically different from Westphalian meta-practices of building alliances, maintaining the systemic status quo through the construction of shared understandings of acceptable behaviour or the construction of a balance of power. Secondly, the EU does not share the violent antidiplomacy’s meta-practices of supporting armed groups and terrorist organizations, although the EU does systematically support foreign civil society organizations that work to promote the EU’s political values. What EU diplomatic meta-practices resemble the most as for their transformative nature is the utopian antidiplomacy’s idealistic inspiration to overcome conflict and create prosperity by the grand design of creating an international authority. The EU’s meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation of relations do not seek transformation through grand design, but through the gradual change of patterns of interaction and the social structures of meaning that underpin these as for the political values of foreign societies and the diplomatic principles by which interaction takes place. For an overview of the meta-practices of EU diplomacy compared to the ideal types, see Annex 2. In line with the theoretical perspective adopted in this book, the transformation of the basic political values and diplomatic principles of foreign societies should be seen in a long-term perspective, since specific instruments such as conditionality are only destined to affect immediate government behaviour. Only in the longer term can values and principles “trickle down” and spread in society, thereby making the change more sustainable than a mere ­conditionality-induced change of practice. To assess EU diplomatic metapractices it is therefore necessary to turn away from specific events, such as the EU’s political positions towards the Arab Spring and consider long-term effects.

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The main impact of the legalisation and institutionalisation of the relationships in agreements is the socialisation effect on government decisionmakers, parliamentarians and civil servants, which takes place through the political dialogue and the mere institutionalisation itself, as a different model for conducting international relations. Also, most of the EU’s international agreements are based on an intervention in the internal affairs of others, be it through provisions on democracy and good governance or regulatory adaptation and harmonisation of standards in trade agreements. The legalisation thereby locks the parties into a relationship and places single issues into a wider framework, raising the stakes of political disagreement and facilitating agreements through the ability to link specific issues to cooperation in other political areas as well as past and future cooperation. The legalisation and ­institutionalisation can be seen not only as ways for two parties to agree to mutual intervention in internal affairs, within the limits stipulated in the agreement, but also provides a mechanism for protecting the relationships against the negative effects of single issues, for socialising perceptions of interdependence and shared responsibility and for building trust between the parties, potentially allowing them to change their perception of each other from potential adversaries to potential friends, in parallel to how it has occurred within Europe among the EU Member States. Nevertheless, it is clear that these are not automatic processes and of course depend also on the attitude of third parties, as the example of Russia has shown. Also, the EU has recently turned to trade-focused agreements with industrialised states, such as South Korea and Canada, indicating a reduced focus on global agreements that cover relations across issue areas. This can be seen as a matter of adapting to the demands of other states as well as in a change in priorities on the EU part, although even these trade agreements go far beyond addressing only international behaviour but reflect elements of economic integration, including regulatory harmonisation. Not only the practices related to the semi-inclusion of others in the EU Self and detailed and substantial global agreements with third states but also recent Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements consist of regulatory harmonisation far beyond the removal of trade barriers, so the institutionalisation meta-practice this way refers not only to the diplomatic interchange through joint institutions, but also the mode of production within the states concerned, in a logic that resembles the internal evolution of the EU market. However, more detailed empirical studies are needed to assess the potential t­ ransformative effect of institutionalisation and legalisation meta-practices in the long term in specific diplomatic relationships. A similar situation of a partial clash between the EU’s approach to conducting diplomacy as evidenced in its meta-practices and the contemporary reality

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in the international system can also be seen in terms of regionalisation as a diplomatic meta-practice. The EU has consistently sought relations with other regions of the world, where instigating regional integration has been a vital motivation for the EU,189 with agreements including both technical and financial assistance to further regional integration. This has led the EU to establish relations not only with other regional organisations, but also to create regional groupings with which to relate. In other cases, a regional organisation may exist that the EU nevertheless does not consider to be an expression of a region, such as is the case of the Organization of American States, with which the EU does not have a diplomatic relationship. Another example is the relatively low intensity relations that the EU has with its African counterpart, the A ­ frican Union, because the Mediterranean states in Northern Africa are included in the Union for the Mediterranean and the European Neighbourhood Policy as forms of regionalisation, whereas sub-Saharan states form part of the acp group and sub-continental regional organisations. As happens with the EU’s bilateral relations, the diplomatic relationships with other regions are institutionalised and legalised in formal agreements and developed through multiannual strategies and annual work programmes. In this sense, the diplomatic interaction is also in the case of regions regulated by agreements that determine the frequency of meetings, who participates and which content is on the agenda. Another characteristic is that the EU has used its own experience of sectoral integration to promote practical and technical cooperation that is politically non-controversial as first steps in a regional integration process, however this has made the EU lose credibility as a valuebased actor, since it relegates questions of democracy and human rights to a secondary plane. This has further been exacerbated by a recent shift of the EU towards a focus on stability to the detriment of values. Just as the institutionalisation and legalisation meta-practices were influenced by the priorities of third states, in the case of regionalisation, the r­ eality of the world outside the EU also seems to constitute a limit to the immediate usefulness of the regional approach. A recent volume of case studies of ­regional integration edited by Dosenrode,190 paints a general picture with respect to regional integration in other parts of the world that is generally characterised by ambitious rhetoric and plans and little real progress, particularly evident in Africa and Latin America. Whereas economic structures might 189 Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith, “The EU and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 170. Their conclusion is drawn from numerous interviews with Commission staff. 190 Søren Dosenrode (ed.), Limits to Regional Integration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2015).

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constitute an incentive against regional integration in some parts and implementation problems might exist due to the inefficient bureaucratic structures in some states, the lack of integration is generally influenced by strong ideas of sovereignty prevalent in these states. The lack of integration in other parts of the world thus constitutes a limit to the content of the relations the EU can maintain regionally. On one hand we see the EU seeking to allow for variances among third states within an overarching regional framework, such as is the case of the European Neighbourhood Policy, but we also see a lack of EU patience with regional integration projects that has made it turn to the negotiation of bilateral agreements with selected third states, particularly in Asia and Latin America, and a renewed focus on interest-based strategic partnerships. The is mirrored in the deadlocked Doha-round negotiations on global free trade, which is another factor that has contributed to the EU turning to bilateral agreements instead of multilateral global agreements, although it should be stressed that making bilateral agreements does not exclude the option of complementary regional or global agreements. Nevertheless, as is the case with respect to the institutionalisation and legalisation meta-practice, the level of transformative ambition of the EU also with respect to regionalisation means that its impact should be judged on a decades-long time scale. Still, just as the attitudes of third states constituted a pressure upon the EU to engage in purely commercial agreements with third state, so also the lack of progress of the processes of regional integration in other parts of the world can be interpreted as a pressure upon the EU to adapt towards an increased focus on bilateral relations. In this sense, the reality in the international system creates isomorphic pressures upon the EU to abandon or reduce the ambition of some of its meta-practices, just as was argued in Chapter 5 that the institutional-legal reality of international organizations constitute a limit to the possibilities for EU diplomacy to develop within them. A main conclusion is therefore of an EU diplomacy that exists uneasily in the international system due to the partially contradictory existence of EU transformative objectives as manifested in diplomatic meta-practices and the reality of an international system still based largely on the central elements of Westphalian diplomacy. This issue will be analysed in more detail in Chapter 7 analysing the social structures of EU diplomacy and the further theoretical and empirical perspectives it gives rise to will be discussed in the concluding Chapter 8.

Chapter 7

Social Structures of EU Diplomacy EU diplomacy consists not only of its practices and meta-practices, but contains at its most fundamental level a distinct EU diplomatic identity and ideas about the international system that in turn give rise to certain strategic objectives. The ideational basis of EU diplomacy is arguably the result of Member State and EU institutions interacting during decades that has allowed shared ideas about EU diplomatic action to arise. The current chapter focuses on these social structures constituting the basis of EU diplomacy and serves different purposes within the overall aim of understanding the nature of EU diplomacy. First of all, a study of the social structures of EU diplomacy is interesting and relevant in itself, since it will contribute to the analysis of to which extent the EU is a special diplomatic actor in the international system by establishing to which extent the EU as an actor is based upon the elements and constructed meanings of the traditional diplomatic culture of the Westphalian inter-states system or rather draws upon antidiplomatic ideas. Secondly, the constructivist starting point of the argument defines a mutually constitutive relationship between of agency and social structures which makes impossible understanding the observable diplomatic practice of the EU outside of the social context within which it takes place. The social structures of EU diplomacy thus constitute an indispensable complementary part to the diplomatic practices and meta-practices when the goal is a holistic understanding of EU diplomacy. When in this chapter the international identity of the EU as an actor is analysed, there is an obvious point to be made flowing from its non-state nature. In the Westphalian international system, the primary source of identity for the state actor is the mutual recognition of sovereignty among the states. With this mutual recognition the states define themselves as states with sets of causal ideas and strategic objectives flowing from this recognition, as outlined in Chapter 2. The fact that the EU is not a state is precisely what it makes it particularly interesting to study, since it cannot be expected to share the actor identity of being a sovereign state, and therefore not be assumed to share the corresponding causal ideas and strategic objectives either. Therefore, the diplomatic identity, causal ideas and strategic objectives of the EU are the object of the analysis in the present chapter.

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The International Identity of the European Union as a Diplomatic Actor

Given the non-state nature of the EU as an international actor it is impossible for the EU to construct a diplomatic identity1 based on mutual recognitions of sovereignty, which is the basis for the Westphalian state. A first question then becomes on the basis of what the EU constructs its identity. Although the EU does not share the state identity, this does not imply that the EU does not engage in identity dynamics vis-à-vis other actors in the international system. Even if no other entity exists in whose terms the EU can identify itself, it can still identify positively or negatively with other actors in the international system, be they states, international organisations or another type of actors. On a fundamental note, the EU identifies positively with other states that share the basic democratic norms of the EU, but also with other regional organisations such as the AU and the mercosur. With the same range of actors, the EU also identifies negatively, thereby creating a self-perception clearly differentiated from other actors. In fact, distancing itself from various US foreign and domestic policies has been a continuous incentive for the EU Member States to establish the EU as an international actor.2 An illustrative point here could be the EU stance against the death penalty. Identity construction happens continuously by a multitude of persons engaging in a multitude of practices, each with different motivations and interests. This results in different identities being constructed, and it will therefore always be a generalisation to talk about the identity of any collective actor in the singular. In fact, EU identity, as an expression of the basic nature of

1 Due to the purposes of understanding EU diplomacy, what is the focus here is on the EU selfperception as an international actor and how it interprets the world in order to construct this self-perception. This is what is meant by the expressions “international identity of the EU as a diplomatic actor” and “the EU’s diplomatic identity” employed in this text. This EU identity should not be confused with the “European” identity that individuals and Member States may have, in the sense of perceiving themselves as European. For an overview in this respect, see: Sonia Lucarelli, Furio Cerutti and Vivien A. Schmidt (eds.), Debating political identity and legitimacy in the European Union (London: Routledge, 2011). Admittedly, the existence of a widespread sentiment of belonging to Europe and positive identification with the EU among the peoples of Europe is not wholly without relevance for the EU’s international identity, however it is beyond the scope of the chapter to explore these links. For such an analysis, see: René Schwok, “Politique internationale de l’Union européenne et identité européenne: apports et limites des approaches constructivistes,” Relations Internationales, no. 139, 2009, pp. 73–88. 2 Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 4.

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the EU as a political entity and outcome of an integration process, is an area where multiple perceptions coexist and it could even be characterised as an essentially contested concept. However, it is also necessary to generalise and identify patterns to increase understanding. To this end, two main identity constructions for the EU as a diplomatic actor will be outlined in the following, a dominant antidiplomatic identity and a minority identity construction along the lines of the Westphalian ideal type. An identity construction or identity narrative is an analytical concept and it would therefore be possible to identify alternative constructions and narratives of EU identity The constructions analysed here are influenced by the purposes and concepts of the study in terms of assessing EU diplomacy’s similarities and differences with the two ideal-type diplomacies described in Chapter 2. However, other scholars have also found the dominant antidiplomatic identity and variants of an alternative Westphalian ideal-type identity, although formulated differently,3 which strengthens the conclusion of the analysis performed here. 7.1.1 The Dominant Antidiplomatic EU Identity The most important element in the construction of its identity is the EU’s interpretation of the fact that it is not a sovereign political entity, i.e. a Westphalian state. The most important construction is to be found in the narrative of a European past of near-continuous war among sovereign states. In the framework of the European Political Cooperation, the nine Member States emitted a Document on the European Identity in 1973.4 This document, which can be considered an ideological basis of the then future EU foreign policy, is a clear expression of this narrative. It established the European past of warfare as the basic motivation for the very existence of a process of European integration leading to the creation of the EU. This past of warfare among sovereign states has led to the creation of a wide-spread sentiment of a common destiny and interdependence, which complements the common European political culture of democracy, human rights and social justice.5 In this narrative, the historical 3 See for instance Cristian Nitoiu, “The narrative construction of the European Union in external relations,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 14, no. 2, 2013, pp. 240–255; Ian Manners and Philomena Murray, “The end of a noble narrative? European integration narratives after the Nobel Peace Price,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 54, no. 1, 2016, pp. 185–202. 4 Council of the European Communities, Document on the European Identity. Published by the Nine Foreign Ministers, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973, available at http://aei.pitt .edu/4545/01/epc_identity_doc.pdf (last accessed: September 2016). 5 Michael E. Smith, “Toward a theory of EU foreign policy-making: multi-level governance, domestic politics, and national adaptation to Europe’s common foreign and security policy,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 4, 2004, p. 742.

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problem of Europe has thus not primarily been the ideology and behaviour of certain states in specific historical moments, be it France under Napoleon or Hitler under Germany, but the very Westphalian system of sovereign states that define themselves as eternal rivals or potential enemies, a system that inexorably leads to conflict and war. A balance of power and mediation among alienated states through Westphalian diplomatic practices has not been sufficient to guarantee the peaceful coexistence of European peoples. Only with the initiation of the process of European integration and its institutionalisation in the European Union and organisational predecessors, have the European peoples become able to manage their relations in a satisfactory manner and secure a perpetual peace for the peoples of Europe.6 This fundamental identity construction is usually accepted as a main EU identity.7 The Document on the European Identity affirms that unity is a basic European necessity for guaranteeing the survival of the civilization that the (then) nine European states have in common. The success of the EU model of a structural peace is caused by its rupture with the basic principles of the Westphalian system, such as the norms of non-intervention and a reinterpretation of what sovereignty entails. The identity of the EU as a diplomatic actor is thus essentially anti-Westphalian, an identity that exists is opposition to the Westphalian norms of sovereignty and territoriality.8 One of the central characteristics of European integration as a model for inter-state relations is the mutual intense interference in the internal affairs of other Member States,9 and an unprecedented degree of common regulation of almost all political issue areas amounting to a functional disaggregation of the state. Therefore, relations among EU Member States are no longer diplomatic in the Westphalian sense and although the structures remain in place in the form of embassies etc., it has required a different meaning, reflective of the fact that the condition of alienation among the states has been overcome, leading Spence to conclude

6 Stephan Keukeleire, “The European Union as a diplomatic actor: Internal, structural, and traditional diplomacy,” Diplomacy and Statecraft, vol. 14, no. 3, 2003, p. 32. 7 For instance by Cristian Nitoiu, “The narrative construction of the European Union in external relations,” Perspectives on European Politics and Society, vol. 14, no. 2, 2013, pp. 240–255; Ian Manners and Philomena Murray, “The end of a noble narrative? European integration narratives after the Nobel Peace Price,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 54, no. 1, 2016, pp. 185–202. 8 Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman, “The ‘difference engine’: constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, no. 3, 2003, p. 382 and p. 399. 9 Robert Cooper, The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twenty-first century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 27.

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that the “Westphalian order, in Europe (…) is clearly moribund.”10 Overcoming the condition of alienation has been gradual and is both a cause and a consequence of the institutional integration, where the gradual creation and evolution of the epistemic community of Member State diplomats and foreign affairs official has had the effect of reaching similar problem perceptions and political positions more easily.11 This does not imply that the EU Member States are no longer formally sovereign, but that they are no longer alienated so that the meaning of sovereignty changes. This change is what has led to the characterisation of the relations among the Member States as a “late sovereign” diplomacy.12 In the construction of the EU’s diplomatic identity it is thus the European past of war and Westphalian diplomacy that constitutes the Other against which the EU identifies negatively. The key characteristic of the EU is that it has overcome the balance of power as an organising principle of inter-state relations13 and installed what Kagan has called a post-modern paradise,14 where one state does not construct other Member States as their alienated Other. Rather, with creation of the EU the Member States found a common Other, which is the past of the European continent. Based on this common Other, the EU identity is therefore fundamentally antidiplomatic, as a structural solution to the systemic problems of war among European states caused by the Westphalian system, a construction identifiable also as a central message in EU public diplomacy.15 In this sense, the EU identifies itself as existing in contrast with the Westphalian international system.16 This identity contains within it a radical solution to the problem of war, since the solution is not an effective mediation between alienated states 10 11 12 13 14 15 16

David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper y B. Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 66. On the influence of the epistemic community of diplomats, see: Mai’a K. Davis Cross, The European diplomatic corps: diplomats and international cooperation from Westfalia to Maastricht (New York: Palgrave, 2007). Rebecca Adler-Nissen, “Late sovereign diplomacy,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 121–141. Robert Cooper, The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twenty-first century (London: Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 6. Robert Kagan, Of paradise and power. America and Europe in the new world order (New York: Knopf, 2003). See: Steffen Bay Rasmussen, “The messages and practices of the European Union’s public diplomacy,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 5, no 3, 2010, pp. 263–287. Ian Manners and Richard G. Whitman, “The ‘difference engine’: constructing and representing the international identity of the European Union,” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 10, no. 3, 2003.

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through diplomacy, but to overcome the condition of alienation through integration. It is the process of European integration that has allowed the European states to overcome their alienation, with the EU being the institutional manifestation of the antidiplomatic solution to the problems of coexistence of in the previously Westphalian European international system. The fact that the EU identifies itself as an antidiplomatic solution to the problems of the Westphalian system creates a strong narrative link between the nature of the EU Self, its fundamental ideas about cause and effect in the international system (it is the sovereign Westphalian system that is the problem, not the behaviour of individual states) and the EU’s strategic objectives (peace and prosperity is achieved globally by reproducing the European experience). These links will be taken up in the following sections of the chapter. The sense of a common destiny is reflected in the notion of the EU being a security community, although not only in the functionalist original formulation of Karl Deutsch,17 but in a constructivist conception where it is the fundamental identities and ideas of the states that have gradually changed and allowed this security community to rise as a consequence of qualitatively different conceptions of security.18 Alexander Wendt’s notion of cultures of anarchy adequately describes the qualitative change that has occurred in Europe and that is the basis of the EU’s diplomatic identity. His argument it is that the international system, although always anarchic, can be characterised by three different cultures of anarchy. A first option is a Hobbesian culture of enmity and a second Lockean culture of rivalry among sovereign States, cultures that are socially constructed through interaction of states by warfare and diplomacy.19 The third possible culture is a Kantian culture of friendship that has been gradually constructed in Europe with the process of integration since the 1950s. The EU’s identity construction is therefore ambivalent towards the state as a form of political organisation. The EU itself is based on a formal respect for the sovereignty of states and the voluntary transfer of competences to a supranational authority, but it is also clear that the organisation of the peoples into sovereign and alienated states is partially the cause of the misery of the peoples. A related important characteristic of the EU’s identity as a diplomatic actor is thus that it is not derived from the sovereignty of a people that 17 18 19

Karl W. Deutsch, Political community and the North Atlantic area. International organization in the light of historical experience (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957). See: Emmanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett (eds.), Security communities (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1998). Alexander Wendt, Social theory of international politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 246–313.

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confers authority and legitimacy upon a government acting internationally in its name, but on a series of abstract and universal principles of democracy, human rights, good governance, as well as diplomatic principles of institutionalisation, legalisation and regional integration. The EU identity rests upon these values and principles and not on a territorially defined sovereignty. The contrast with the Westphalian state is here obvious, since it is a territorially defined entity based on a sovereign people, regardless of its constitutional nature and the political priorities of the government in office. Whereas a state’s diplomatic identity is therefore separable from the content of its foreign policy and fundamental values, this is not the case of the EU, which is defined in terms of its values and principles, creating a much stronger link between its identity and the specific content of its foreign policy. This close link is a construction that van Ham has called the “founding myth of the EU,”20 that of being a universally applicable model for managing relations among states, based on universal values. This also means that an EU international agency not aiming to further the values will amount to negating the EU’s own historical experience and thereby it’s very reason for being. It is in this context that the EU’s diplomatic meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation become particularly relevant as forms of promoting its own model, while at the same time formally respecting the sovereignty of third states in its diplomatic micro-practices, where the EU generally follows established Westphalian practices and behavioural norms, as argued in Chapters 4 and 5. However, the failures of the utopian antidiplomacies of the French and Russian revolution and their rapid evolution into Westphalian-style interaction suggests that an antidiplomatic actor cannot exist within a broader Westphalian system and this raises the question of the extent to which the EU’s antidiplomatic identity construction is stable. The international system exerts a great isomorphic pressure upon the actors within it to become similar to Westphalian states in order to be able to act and to exist in the long term, as also argued in the previous chapters. The basic logic is perhaps most clearly seen in the Common Commercial Policy, where the EU must inevitably defends its material interests even when they necessarily clash with those of third states. In order to do this, the EU must interact within establish fora, such as international organisations, and through established diplomatic practices. The general evolution of the EU as an actor in terms of gaining ever more foreign policy competences and being organised more effectively therefore contributes to 20

Peter van Ham, The power of war: Why Europe needs it, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, no 19 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2008), pp. 3–4.

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this systemic isomorphic pressure upon the EU to become functionally similar to a Westphalian state. The defence of interests in the Common Commercial Policy, and increasingly in other policy areas as well, is antagonistic to the EU’s dominant actor identity construction as being value-based and qualitatively different and contributes to weakening this identity construction. Historically the EU has been able to reduce the impact of this antagonism between its identity and some of its international practices by discursively disassociating itself from controversial Member State practices. For instance, the controversial use of force against Iraq in the 2003 invasion was done by certain Member States and not by the EU, which continued to undertake practices to promote democracy, human rights and regionalisation. However, as the EU increasingly attempts to act as a unit, this discursive separation between a value-based EU agency and discrepant Member State practice is ever less tenable. This has led to the rise of an alternative identity construction for the EU in terms of being an effective and coherent actor along Westphalian lines. Another factor contributing to the weakening of the dominant construction is the fact that it is simply “getting old” and that to younger generations it is not very useful to imagine the EU in the terms of structural peace, ironically partly due to the EU’s own success of ensuring peace on the continent.21 However, whereas particularly the participation of the EU in international organisations reveals that the non-state character of the EU creates pressures upon the EU to reform, at the same time it also limits the potential of an alternative construction of the EU as a coherent and strong international actor. The EU has been partially successful in acting coherent by its intense coordination practices and the legal evolution of the international organisations themselves, allowing for a greater role of the EU. On one hand, this state of affairs contributes to strengthen the EU’s identity as being qualitatively different from the state. On the other hand, the EU ambition to act coherently as an entity across policy areas tends to stress the shortcomings of the network model, where the unanimity rule in important policy areas is a fundamental limit to the degree of EU concerted action. The irony is perhaps that as the EU becomes ever more efficient and effective as an international actor, particularly with the creation of the eeas, it is ever more seen not as a sui generis actor, but is compared to state actors stressing the shortcomings and failures of the EU, for instance when compared to the United States. 21

Ian Manners and Philomena Murray, “The end of a noble narrative? European integration narratives after the Nobel Peace Price,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 54, no. 1, 2016, p. 189.

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The Minority Construction of EU Diplomatic Identity Based on the Westphalian Ideal Type Among the diplomatic practices of the EU there are several that contribute to strengthen its antidiplomatic identity, although mainly the meta-practices have that effect. Other practices, in contrast, and particularly the settings of EU diplomatic agency have the opposite effect of weakening the construction of this identity and strengthen an alternative identity of the EU as a functionally “normal” Westphalian actor. Particularly the creation of the eeas has been important, since the scope of action of the Delegations has been broadened and they are now representing the EU as an entity, and not merely the Commission. Also, third states treat the EU Delegations according to the provisions of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, a fact which reflects the ­expectations of third states towards the EU to behave as a state-like actor. Another source of isomorphic pressure upon the EU that helps construct an alternative diplomatic identity for the EU is the perceived lack of influence that the network organisation has caused, partially due to its difficulty in participating in some fora, and which was one of the main motivations behind the creation of the eeas and the general strengthening of the EU’s capacity for concerted action that is also given paramount importance in the 2016 Global Strategy.22 Related here is also the reluctance to further enlargements, particularly with Turkey, where arguments based on culture and religion has become part of the debate, in this sense ascribing a culturally essentialist identity to the EU in opposition to the dominant identity construction of the EU as based on universal political values and diplomatic principles. An alternative diplomatic identity constructed for the EU is thus one of being a strong and coherent actor that is capable of effectively defending the material and geopolitical interests of the EU, including if this means rivalling the United States. It is an essentially euro-nationalist23 construction that is based on the ideal-type Westphalian actor, and articulated also as complaints that the EU does not have the influence it should have as a result of the combined economic and geopolitical weight of the EU Member States. It is not a new identity that arose with the debates about the establishment of the External 7.1.2

22 23

European Union, Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, available at the eeas website: http://eeas .europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (last access: September 2016). Expression of Fraser Cameron, An introduction to European foreign policy (New York: Routledge, 2007), p. 216.

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Action Service towards the end of the 1990s,24 and was expressed also in the rhetoric surrounding the launching of the cfsp with the Maastricht Treaty at the beginning of the 1990s. It can be traced back at least to the 1981 London report that clearly made use of this construction, identifying as a main problem to be resolved that the Member States were “still far from playing a role in the world appropriate to their combined influence.”25 An earlier expression, though less explicit, can be seen in the 1973 Document on the European Identity that establishes as a basic necessity to “speak increasingly with one voice”26 since the Member States individually were no longer able to influence the international agenda significantly. In this sense, the decisive and coherent diplomatic action of the EU is constructed as a necessity for the Member States to gain influence in the world, with the diplomatic role of the EU being a power multiplier for the Member States. In its diplomatic practice, the best example is EU agency within its exclusive competences, meaning mainly fisheries and the Common Commercial Policy, where the EU acts coherently and decisively to defend its particular economic interests, for instance the protection of the EU agricultural sector in the wto. In this sense, although the EU’s international agency in some issue areas has a strong normative dimension and the EU’s meta-practices also function to change the nature of diplomatic interaction according to EU values, in other issue areas the EU’s diplomatic practice is largely of a unitary actor that defends its material interests in a way similar to that of other actors. The ideal of the EU being a strong and coherent actor is not only evident in official EU documents, Member State discourses and inferable from EU diplomatic practices, but is also prevalent in academic analysis of the topic. Particularly in the context of the boom of academic production on EU diplomacy and foreign policy in relation with the creation of the eeas, the ideal of the EU as a strong and coherent actor was generally not questioned by academic analysts. Of course, the construction of an ideal identity for the EU as a strong and coherent actor in its interaction with other actors is logical, since it seems to make little sense to establish the EU as an actor and not designing the institutional setup to make it as effective as possible. In extension hereof, it therefore also seems logical to categorise instances of incoherence or ineffective defence 24 25 26

For an overview of this debate, see: Simon Duke, “Preparing for European diplomacy,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no 5, 2002, pp. 849–870. Quoted in Michael E. Smith, Europe’s foreign and security policy: The institutionalization of cooperation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 126. Council of the European Communities, Document on the European Identity. Published by the Nine Foreign Ministers, Copenhagen, 14 December 1973, available at http://aei.pitt .edu/4545/01/epc_identity_doc.pdf (last accessed: September 2016).

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of material interests as the result of a flaw in the institutional setup of the EU as a diplomatic actor. As a complement to this euronationalist identity of the EU as a competent international actor, it is also possible to identify a culturally essentialist EU identity to give it substance, in parallel to the EU political values and diplomatic principles in the EU antidiplomatic identity. It is exemplified in the initiative to create a New Narrative for Europe,27 but the definition of the EU as a specific cultural essence renounces the universality of the EU experience and further contributes to strengthening the alternative euro-nationalist construction and its antagonistic relation to the (still) dominant antidiplomatic construction, thereby weakening it.28 For the time being, the unwillingness of the Member States to renounce their competences in foreign policy more generally and their formal autonomy in the decision-making process in favour of a federal EU construction has so far prevented the EU from becoming the ideal coherent actor speaking with a single voice through a single diplomatic corps. This means that the identity strengthened by EU diplomatic practice in areas where the EU is capable of concerted action through the eeas, or the eeas in combination with other actors of the network efficiently coordinated, is the euro-nationalist identity, whereas in other areas when there is not internal agreement among Member States and the EU therefore does not have a common political position, the different messages and policies of the individual actors in the EU network attributes an identity to the EU of a classical international organisation composed of sovereign states that, although it has an enormous impact internally among the Member States, is not able to act coherently towards other actors in the international system on substantial policy, but “disappears” as an actor and is substituted by the Member States, except for the abstract defence of its values. In sum, it is possible to identify two major diplomatic identities of the EU that are at least partially antagonistic. Whereas the identity of the EU being an antidiplomatic solution to Westphalian problems is still dominant, particularly evident in EU public diplomacy messages and as also evidenced by EU diplomatic meta-practices, the internal evolution of the EU to have ever more foreign policy competences and the constitution of the international system 27 28

European Commission, A new narrative for Europe: The mind and body of the Europe, 2014, available at http://ec.europa.eu/culture/policy/new-narrative/documents/ declaration_en.pdf (last accessed: September 2016). For an analysis of the identity-related aspects of the EU’s narrative turn to culture, see: Steffen Bay Rasmussen, “The New Narrative for Europe and the Culture-Identity Nexus in European Union Public Diplomacy,” in María Luisa Azpíroz (ed.), Public diplomacy: European and Latin American perspectives (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2015), pp. 57–81.

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generally that favours state-like actors are two factors that constitute an important isomorphic pressure upon the EU to become ever more similar to the Westphalian ideal-type actor and thereby they also strengthen the EU’s alternative euro-nationalist identity. 7.2

The Causal Ideas in EU Diplomacy

The causal ideas flowing from the EU’s identity constructions and diplomatic practices and meta-practices can be grouped into two main narratives: The dominant antidiplomatic narrative flowing from the EU’s antidiplomatic identity construction and elements of an alternative narrative linked to the euronationalist Westphalian identity of the EU also identified above. The EU’s dominant international identity was in the previous section characterised as being of a fundamental antidiplomatic nature. Nevertheless, the EU’s diplomatic practices are radically different from the utopian antidiplomatic practices of the French and Russian revolutions, which suggests that EU diplomacy contains very different ideas of cause and effect in the international system, and therefore of power. The revolutionaries based their antidiplomatic practices on a causal idea of direct influence (or hard power), which means that influence is achieved through direct control over events and foreign policy substance. A good example of this is using the military to force another state to adopt a certain international behaviour or even to force a change of constitutional principles internally in other states. EU diplomacy also bases itself on such a direct power notion, as seen in the use of the conditionality instrument or in trade negotiations where the EU defends its material interests. Nevertheless, the EU’s primary causal idea of power is of a structural nature. Although the conditionality instrument and the EU’s defence of economic interests thus seem easy to categorise within the Westphalian paradigm of diplomacy, it is clear that the EU does not share more fundamental ideas of political organisation and interaction contained in Westphalian diplomacy. On one hand, the EU formally respects the notion of territorial sovereignty in its diplomatic practices. With respect to the behavioural norms that determine the behaviour of EU diplomats in specific instances, the general impression is also that the EU shares the behavioural norms prevalent in the international system, which corresponds largely to the Westphalian ideal type. The EU being a new actor, it is entirely logical that it has no choice but to abide by the norms of the international system in order to have its practices recognised as diplomatic practices by the larger diplomatic community. The diplomatic practices of the EU thus follow standard diplomatic protocol. With respect to

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communication, EU diplomats follow the norms established by diplomatic custom concerning the various types of written and verbal communication. When sending representatives to a specific meeting or function, the EU also observes the norms of diplomatic hierarchy, sending representatives at the appropriate level of seniority. On the other hand, the analysis of the EU’s metapractices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation, as well as its use of the conditionality instrument, reveals that the EU seeks to change the internal organisation of third states as well as the way they interact diplomatically. The transformative ambition is also clearly seen in EU public diplomacy practices, where the EU finances local civil society groups in foreign communities working to promote EU values.29 This means a rejection of the idea of inherent fundamental differences between peoples and between different states, as a logical extension of the idea of the universality of EU political values and diplomatic principles. A causal idea flowing directly from the EU’s own experience of integration, as outlined above, is therefore that it is necessary to intervene in the internal affairs of other states and also to change the way of interstate diplomacy in order to achieve peace and prosperity. This reflects a related idea of the universal applicability of the European experience and the universality of EU political values (democracy, human rights, market economy and good governance) and diplomatic principles (multilateralism, regionalisation, institutionalisation and legalisation). This also means that the EU rejects the idea of an inevitable anarchy in the international system and the consequent alienation of states, the most basic ideas of Westphalian diplomacy, and substitutes this idea with one regarding the possibility of overcoming the condition of alienation among peoples, a clearly antidiplomatic idea. In the EU case this should happen through the institutionalisation and legalisation of diplomatic relations, regional integration and the global spread of universal political values, not through utopian violence. The idea of the universality of European political values and diplomatic principles means that these are more important than Westphalian ideas of territorial sovereignty and non-intervention, which are only respected formally, but not substantially by the EU in its diplomatic practices and meta-practices. It might seem that there is a clash between the ideas of the EU and the Westphalian values of the international community that it claims to want to support.30 Nevertheless, it seems clear that when the EU expresses its 29 30

Steffen Bay Rasmussen, “The messages and practices of the European Union’s public diplomacy,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 5, no 3, 2010, pp. 263–287. Karen E. Smith, European Union foreign policy in a changing world (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), pp. 97–98.

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support to existing multilateral organisations it is not necessarily supporting the same ideas of sovereignty and non-intervention upon which they are based, but does so in order to strengthen the institutionalisation and legalisation of the diplomatic exchange generally, just as its diplomatic meta-practices do, in order to promote the strategic objective of a rule-based international order.31 The EU does seek to create an international community, but one based on its own experience, political values and diplomatic principles. The redefinition of sovereignty that takes place in the case of the EU is one where there is no longer a strict barrier between the domestic and international spheres and where each state must justify its domestic policies before an international audience, as it happens within the EU. In terms of security, the antidiplomatic social structures of EU diplomacy are also clear. In the Westphalian system, there are two general causal ideas about how to achieve systemic peace, through hegemony or through a balance of power. In both cases, it is the separation of the state from other states that makes it secure, and its security therefore depends mainly on its capacity to defend itself and form alliances. The basic causal ideas is security not only as survival but also as the capacity to make decisions free from outside pressure or interference, i.e. to not become a satellite state that must obey the dictates of a powerful state to survive. Security is therefore about the creation of an impenetrable barrier between the domestic and the international. The basic EU causal idea of security is the opposite. Security is here about breaking down this barrier and turning domestic issues into international political issues, with a common legislation and extensive mechanisms for mutual surveillance.32 This is what makes it possible to establish a Kantian culture of anarchy among states, a culture that because of globalisation cannot be merely European, but must be global to function optimally. This way, EU diplomacy exists beyond the choice within the Westphalian paradigm of hegemony or a balance of power to achieve order and peace.33 Apart from a causal idea of direct power, which gives rise to diplomatic practices aimed at managing the relations between the EU and other actors 31

32 33

European Union, Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, available at the eeas website: http:// eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (last access: September 2016), pp. 15–16. Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st century (London, Fourth Estate, 2005), pp. 40–42. See also: Robert Cooper, The breaking of nations. Order and chaos in the twenty-first century, London, Atlantic Books, 2003.

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at specific moments, it is also possible to identify another causal idea of power in the social structures constituting the basis of EU diplomacy. It is of an indirect nature and has been termed civilian,34 soft,35 normative36 or structural.37 Although recognising that the same phenomenon could be interpreted differently and correctly labelled civilian, soft or normative, from the theoretical perspective adopted here, the structural power notion seems more adequate. The European Union clearly attempts to influence the norms and ideas of ­others, as sustained by Manners and his normative power concept. But this is not sought achieved only through conditionality and other instruments for exercising direct influence, but also through persuasion and attraction,38 a key concept of the soft power notion. However, this can also be considered a fundamentally structural ambition, to change the social structures of meaning within foreign communities so that these come close to EU political values and diplomatic principles. This is sought achieved, on one hand, through public diplomacy initiatives aimed at persuasion and conditionality clauses in terms of human rights, democracy or regional cooperation as an exercise of a direct form of power, but, on the other hand also through the socialisation process that happens during each diplomatic encounter and particularly through the EU’s diplomatic meta-practices of institutionalising and legalising diplomatic interaction in global agreements as well as through regionalising 34

35 36

37

38

Expresión coined by François Duchêne, “Europe’s role in world peace,” in Richard Mayne (ed.), Europe tomorrow: Sixteen Europeans look ahead (London: Fontana, 1972), pp. 32–47. See also: Mario Teló, Europe: A civilian power? European Union, global governance, world order (New York: Palgrave, 2006); Richard G. Whitman, “Muscles from Brussels. The demise of civilian power Europe?,” in Ole Elgström and Michael Smith (eds.), The European Union’s roles in international politics. Concept and analysis (London: Routledge, 2006), pp. 101–117. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft power: The means to success in world politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004). Ian Manners, “Normative power Europe: A contradiction in terms?,” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, 2002, pp. 235–258; Ian Manners, “The EU’s normative power in changing world politics,” in André Gerrits, Normative power Europe in a changing world: A discussion (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2009). Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, “Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the European Union,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 143–165; Stephan Keukeleire, Floor Keuleers and Kolja Rauba, “The EU, structural diplomacy and the challenge of learning,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 199–214. Joseph S. Nye Jr., Soft power: The means to success in world politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004), p. 6.

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the diplomatic interaction, thereby aiming at a structural transformation not only by means of the foreign policy, but also by means of its diplomacy.39 The structural power notion thus allows conceptualising also that the EU changes the structures of interaction and thereby seeks to achieve a change in social structures of foreign communities and, by extension, the international system more generally. The basis is the idea of the Westphalian paradigm inevitably producing instability and conflict, a key element of the EU’s diplomatic identity. In a certain sense, this also reveals that EU diplomacy (the form of interaction) is at least as important as EU foreign policy (specific content) in the pursuit of the EU’s objectives. The causal idea underpinning the meta-practices of EU diplomacy is thus that the EU’s political values and diplomatic principles are diffused through the form of international interaction itself and not only through the content of this interaction. The effect of the EU’s meta-practices is that interaction takes place in the context of written agreements between the parties that institutionalises the interaction and establishes reciprocal rights and obligations as well as shared goals for the interaction. The EU preference for legally binding agreements can therefore be considered one of the most notable characteristics of the EU as an international actor. Just as the process of European integration formally respects the sovereignty of the Member States but radically changes its meaning, so the EU diplomatic meta-practices formally maintain intact the Westphalian micro-practices that allow the EU to interact with ­others without problems, but changes the meaning of this interaction. That this causal idea of power that underpins EU diplomacy is of a structural nature also means that the EU’s influence is larger when international interaction is low-key and where no paramount state interests are at stake and that it loses influence when relations are characterised by a high level of conflict and a low level of trust and when competition and conflict among great powers dominate the international agenda.40 It is also a form of influence characterised by its low visibility and long-term time perspective. 39

40

A similar distinction between what they term structural foreign policy and structural diplomacy while stressing the mutually reinforing relationship of both is made by Stephan Keukeleire, Floor Keuleers and Kolja Rauba, “The EU, structural diplomacy and the challenge of learning,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 199–214. Álvaro de Vasconcelos, “‘Multilateralising’ multipolarity,” in Álvaro de Vasconcelos and Giovanni Grevi (eds.), Partnerships for effective multilateralism: EU relations with Brazil, China, India and Russia (Paris: euiss, 2008), p. 24.

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Keukeleire’s concept of structural diplomacy, developed in collaboration with several other scholars, relates mainly to the EU strategic objective of transforming the internal structures of other states in the international system, particularly the neighbouring states, so that they resemble the Member States of the EU in terms of political values,41 although particularly the 2016 work42 also considers the possibility of an international, even systemic, dimension, and this is what is stressed here. The European Union, in the dominant construction, depends on change at systemic level to be able to prosper, specifically established in the context of the 2003 European Security Strategy, as discussed in the following section. Given the objectives of the present study of understanding the distinct nature of EU diplomacy, this latter systemic aspect is important. Beyond mere structural changes in the internal organisation and the diplomatic interaction, what is important is the structural change with respect to EU political values and diplomatic principles in the political culture of other communities, i.e. the social basis for their international agency, as well as the collective knowledge in terms of diplomatic principles in the international system generally. From the point of view of diplomatic theory, it is thus very noteworthy that the EU’s ideas relate mainly to the system and the universal and not to the particular, leading to the conclusion that EU diplomacy is largely based on a raison de système rather than a collective EU-level raison d’état. When effective, the EU’s diplomatic meta-practices, along with other more direct instruments, socialise other actors to internalise and make it natural to act regionally and institutionalise and regionalise relations, gradually build trust and make it possible for states to redefine themselves in their relationships to others, thereby changing the relationship from that of potential adversaries to potential partners in a shared project.43 Of course, it is highly likely that the impact of the EU in this regard will be different in different third states, and although not guaranteed, the EU’s own experience suggests that at least it is not impossible. A related question is how other states perceive the EU’s diplomatic action. The reactions of Russia towards the diplomatic and political agency of the EU towards the Ukraine suggests that it is not necessarily 41 42

43

See: Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, “Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the European Union,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 143–165. Stephan Keukeleire, Floor Keuleers and Kolja Rauba, “The EU, structural diplomacy and the challenge of learning,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 199–214. Mark Leonard, Why Europe will run the 21st century (London, Fourth Estate, 2005), p. 44.

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interpreted as benign, but possibly in Westphalian terms as simply a different way of achieving influence abroad. It is still too early to tell if EU diplomatic meta-practices and other contentrelated instruments are sufficient to export its model for inter-state relations, and the point is not here to assess the degree to which the EU is having the desired impact, which is one of Keukeleire, Keuleers and Raube’s primary goals, leading them to develop a more detailed model for assessing effectiveness.44 Rather than discuss its empirical impact, a topic which will be taken up briefly at the end of the conclusion of the book along with recommendations for further studies, the argument pursued here, related to the EU’s causal ideas of a double structural transformation regarding political values and diplomatic principles, is regarding how this constitutes the EU as a fundamentally antidiplomatic actor in the international system with EU diplomacy being based on a coherent social construction of an antidiplomatic identity, causal ideas and strategic objectives. However, another consequence of EU diplomacy being based on a causal idea of power of a structural nature also means that the current development of the EU towards increasingly concerted action and effective defence of short-term material interests has the potential to undermine one of the main mechanisms for achieving international influence. As such, the alternative euro-nationalist identity construction outlined above is based on different ideas of international causality and influence. In extension of the analysis of the euro-nationalist identity construction different causal ideas arise in EU diplomacy. Whereas the network structure and lack of effective and concerted action of an EU speaking with one voice was no problem for the antidiplomatic identity and dominant causal ideas of EU diplomacy, but rather reinforcing these social constructions, the opposite is the case with respect to the euro-nationalist identity construction of the EU. Here, the most basic idea is that the EU needs to be a Westphalian-like actor in order to gain international influence and be able to defend its interests effectively, and the ineffective network organisation of the EU has therefore been the main problem of EU diplomacy, an idea espoused by both the Commission and the Council as well as academic analysts in the debate on the creation of the eeas.45 The institutional changes of the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the eeas has without a doubt contributed to improving the coordination 44

45

Stephan Keukeleire, Floor Keuleers and Kolja Rauba, “The EU, structural diplomacy and the challenge of learning,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 199–214. See: Brian Crowe, The European External Action Service. Roadmap for success, Royal Institute of International Affairs (London: Chatham House, 2008), p. 6; Simon Duke,

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and coherence between different the different actors planning and executing EU diplomacy, which shows a strengthening of the euro-nationalist discourse, but it is also clear that the fundamental network structure persists and that the EU is still far from a unitary actor. The Member States remain unwilling to relinquish their veto power in matters falling under the Common Foreign and Security Policy, which points to the lack of prospects for an EU diplomacy substituting that of the Member States. Also, Member States continue to consider that their national diplomatic services are worth the cost, indicating that also in terms of execution, the network structure will persist for the time being. The ideal of the coherent actor is therefore mainly a driver for increased coherence within the EU network and a general reorientation towards defending particular strategic interests to a greater extent rather than being primarily focused on structural transformation, as reflected in the efforts to establish strategic partnerships with individual third states.46 The latest developments in EU diplomacy instigated by the Lisbon Treaty and the creation of the eeas can this way be interpreted as a strengthening of the fundamental idea of euronationalism being the basis of EU diplomacy giving rise to the defence of interests as the overall strategic objective rather than the essentially antidiplomatic raison de système focused on overcoming the condition of alienation in the international system by exporting the key features of the EU model. The current nature of EU diplomacy can in this light be understood as a mix of two different identity constructions giving rise to different ideas about cause and effect in international relations – and leading to different strategic objectives. The EU has clearly not completed the transition to a Westphaliantype actor, but has nevertheless moved sufficiently in this direction so as to undermine the construction of antidiplomatic identities and ideas that are nevertheless still dominant in EU diplomacy. The overall result is an unstable equilibrium between at least partially antagonistic discourses that give rise to and are perpetuated by partially incoherent diplomatic practices. 7.3

Strategic Objectives of EU Diplomacy

When analysing the strategic objectives of EU diplomacy, understood as the management of relations among political entities, there is certainly a methodological case for analysing specific objectives in specific relationships.

46

“Providing for European-Level Diplomacy After Lisbon: The Case of the European External Action Service,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4 , no. 2, 2009, p. 213. See Michael Smith, “The EU, strategic diplomacy and the bric countries,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 115–128.

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Nevertheless, given the holistic ambition of the present study, an immersion in the details of specific relationships between the EU and other actors is not possible. Although recognising the great potential contribution of such ideographic studies, the focus here remains on overall understanding, with the argument based on the construction of identities and ideas outlined above as well as EU diplomatic behaviour generally, and particularly with respect to its diplomatic meta-practices. The strategic objectives flow directly from the identity and causal ideas inherent in EU diplomacy outlined above, and are constructed continuously through EU diplomatic practices and meta-practices, but are also expressed in strategy documents of the EU. The twin objectives of a double transformation of the international order and the internal social structures of other communities are clearly expressed in the 2003 European Security Strategy47 and the 2016 Global Strategy,48 although here formulated less sharply. In the 2016 Global Strategy generally, a reduced level of transformative ambition can be detected and a greater focus on pragmatism and the adaptability of the ambitions to specific settings in a blend of idealistic aspiration and realistic assessment.49 The objectives of norm diffusion and structural transformation are also contained in the Lisbon Treaty,50 but are most clearly expressed in the 2003 European Security Strategy. The first strategic objective contained in the 2003 European Security Strategy is related to the internal transformation in other states, being to create a ring of friends around the EU as a zone of security and trying to prevent weak states characterised by conflict and organised crime.51 This is expressed in the meta-practices associated with the European Neighbourhood Policy and complementary multilateral initiatives, based on the instruments of conditionality and partial inclusion in the process of European integration. The ENP is along with the European Economic Area the best example of how the EU uses its 47

48 49 50 51

Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003). Subsequently, the EU published a report on the implementation of the security strategy, but it does not substantially alter the arguments. Council of the European Union, Report on the implementation of the European Security Strategy – Providing Security in a Changing World, 2008, S407/08. European Union, Shared vision, common action: A stronger Europe. A global strategy for the European Union’s Foreign and Security Policy, available at the eeas website: http://eeas .europa.eu/top_stories/pdf/eugs_review_web.pdf (last access: September 2016). Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “The EU Global Strategy and diplomacy,” Contemporary Security Policy, 2016. teu (Lisbon), art. 21. Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003).

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diplomatic meta-practices to institutionalise and legalise the diplomatic relationship as well as to add a regional dimension to bilateral relations. The same meta-practices are also detectable in other geographical regions where the EU also promotes its political values of democracy, human rights and good governance through the content of the exchange as well as through its diplomatic meta-practices more generally. The ambition to achieve a transformation that goes beyond a mere adapting of state practices has been clearly expressed in the context of the EU’s relationships with developing countries, where HR/VP Ashton has characterised the objective of the transformation as “deep democracy,” in which the changes not only occur on paper or in state practice but become integral to the societies.52 The goal is clearly that the third states come to resemble the EU in terms of its political values and institutional organisation. Although most clearly seen in the ENP, the transformative strategic objectives of the EU are also seen in its relationships with other states and regions and can thus be considered a general strategic objective of EU international agency beyond the neighbourhood. A second strategic objective contained in the 2003 European Security Strategy is to strengthen the international order based on an effective multilateralism,53 which constitutes an transformative objective with respect to the forms of interaction in the international system. The objective is not to strengthen an order based on a balance of power or the hegemony of a ­superpower in a unipolar system, which might seem a conservative rather than transformative objective, but to further institutionalise and legalise international interaction and promote integration on a regional basis. The idea is to ­reintegrate isolated states into the international community built on existing organisations, and the UN Charter plays here a special role as a social basis of the international community and as a source of legitimacy. Also new institutions and global rules should be created to achieve a more fair international order, and the strategy mentions here trade policy and development cooperation as key policies. Apart from the foreign policy positions of the EU, its diplomatic metapractices undoubtedly also plays a role here as a main way of further institutionalising, legalising and regionalising diplomatic interaction. The diplomatic meta-practices are thus complementary to the content of EU foreign policy, such as the trade and development policies mentioned in the strategy, but also 52

53

Catherine Ashton, quoted by Bruno Hanses and David Spence, “The eeas and bilateral relations: The case of the EU Delegation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 319. Council of the European Union, A secure Europe in a better world: European security strategy (Brussels: Council of the European Union, 2003), p. 10.

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the general support for rule creation and rule application evident in EU foreign policy, from climate change negotiations to the evolution of international criminal law, as argued in Chapter 5. The 2003 European Security Strategy also mentions the need to react to and prevent specific threats in terms of terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction or allowing local conflicts to spill-over, however the main time perspective is the long term and the approach pro-active, where the EU sees the double transformation of the political values of foreign communities and the diplomatic principles and forms of interaction in the international system as security needs of the EU, hence the title: “A secure Europe in a better world.” The security strategy thus makes clear that the diffusion of EU political values and diplomatic principles is not only a matter of expressing EU identity and fundamental ideas through diplomatic meta-practices and the content of the diplomatic exchange, but a security need and a long-term interest of the EU. In this context, the EU’s cdsp missions’ comprehensive approach that goes beyond mere crisis management can be understood as further practices aimed at transforming both the societies internally as well as ensuring an internationalisation of conflicts, in the sense of foreign mediation and assistance to overcome security problems, and there is a general expectation that the eeas will in time be able to further enhance the capacity of the EU beyond responding to emerging crises.54 Although the 2016 Global Strategy reduces the level of ambition, the strategic objectives of transforming foreign communities and the international system are clearly still present and they break with the Westphalian paradigm and can be characterised as antidiplomatic in the sense that the ultimate goal is not finding ways of managing the relations between alienated communities so that these may coexist peacefully, but to overcome the condition of alienation globally. It is therefore easy to interpret the EU strategic objectives flowing from its identity as an antidiplomatic solution to Westphalian problems, based on ideas of the universality of the European experience and its political values and diplomatic principles, in the sense that the EU is basically trying to export its model to other regions, or even lifting it up to the global level, not in terms of the precise institutionalisation, but in terms of overcoming alienation. In this regard, the first High Representative, Javier Solana, expressed his view that a credible EU foreign policy must necessarily be a logical extension 54

Alison Weston and Frédéric Mérand, “The eeas and crisis management: The organisational challenges of a comprehensive approach,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 335.

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of the origins of the European project,55 and it was also determined in Chapter 6 that the EU’s meta-practices have the effect, to the extent of their impact, of re-creating the fundamental diplomatic principles of the EU model in its interaction with third states and regions.56 7.4 Conclusion The dominant EU diplomatic identity is that of being an antidiplomatic solution to the dilemmas and problems of the Westphalian states system. The basic features of the construction is that European historical experiences have demonstrated the limitations of Westphalian diplomatic solutions to the problems that the coexistence of sovereign states give rise to, and that instead of mediation among alienated states, which led to continuous warfare on the European continent for centuries, with the EU the alienation among the states has been overcome and perpetual peace ensured for the peoples of Europe, effectively installing among EU Member States a Kantian logic of anarchy. This identity, coupled with ideas of the universal validity of European experiences, is what makes the EU pursue its double transformative strategic objectives with respect to the simultaneous transformation of both the internal organisation and political values and diplomatic principles of third states as well as those prevalent as shared knowledge generally in the international system, i.e. systemic diplomatic culture. The end goal is to overcome the condition of alienation on a regional and ultimately global level and reinstalling universal values, a defining feature of the antidiplomacy ideal type. Overall, the EU’s diplomatic practices and meta-practices can be interpreted as the result of and at the same time contributing to the reconstruction of an EU strategic objective of promoting regional integration based on its model57 where these increasingly integrated regions are then a step towards a larger global transformation, permitting overcoming alienation not only regionally, but globally, and thereby finally moving beyond a Westphalian paradigm of 55 56 57

Javier Solana, Europe in the world: the next steps. Cyril Foster Lecture, Oxford, 2008, available at the Council website: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_Data/docs/ pressdata/en/discours/99116.pdf (last accessed : September 2016). Spence reaches a similar conclusion, see: David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 36–84. Hardacre and Smith reach a similar conclusion, see: Alan Hardacre and Michael Smith, “The EU and the diplomacy of complex interregionalism,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, pp. 167–188.

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diplomatic interaction. This makes the social structures of EU diplomacy fundamentally antidiplomatic, sharing with the Westphalian ideal type only the behavioural norms related to specific diplomatic practices of communication, courtesy and diplomatic protocol. For a summary overview, see annex 1. However, the EU’s diplomatic meta-practices are generally being weakened and the structural transformation objectives being downplayed both in multilateral and bilateral relations in favour of a more strategic approach aiming at defending interests, and the insistence of regionalising relations is weakened in favour of an increased focus on bilateral relations, as the EU has found its transformative ambitions difficult to pursue in practice. This is feeding into an alternative Westphalian identity construction for the EU giving rise to alternative causal ideas that can generally be characterised as a euronationalist alternative focusing on defending EU interests in a competitive international system characterised by the persistence of dominant Westphalian ideas. The result is a fundamental instability of EU diplomacy, since its social structure are based on an antidiplomatic ideal type that is antagonistic to the Westphalian ideal type diplomacy (still) hegemonic in the international system, a situation that will be further discussed in the following Chapter 8.

Chapter 8

Conclusions and Perspectives The continuous globalisation of international politics brings with it a growing necessity for reconciling the differences between political communities that coexist in conditions of proximity and interdependence. Nevertheless, it is highly doubtful that the forms of diplomatic interaction developed to manage the relations among states in the 19th and 20th centuries are also adequate for confronting the challenges of the 21st century globalised world. The idea inspiring the present inquiry into the resulting contemporary transformation of diplomacy is in this context the close relationship between diplomacy, the structure of the international system and the nature of the political entities interacting internationally. As a new type of actor, the European Union was deemed a particularly interesting case, since it is probable that we here see new ways not only of organising a political community, but also of acting through diplomacy. The analysis was based on a contingent notion of diplomacy inspired by Der Derian, who conceptualises diplomacy as the management of the relations among alienated political entities. To structure the analysis, a loosely constructivist analytical framework was developed, which conceptualised EU diplomacy as a structured totality with three layers: (1) the social structures of identities and ideas of the EU as a diplomatic actor; (2) the meta-practices of the EU that structures the diplomatic exchange; and (3) the specific diplomatic practices undertaken. To estimate the degree to which EU diplomacy is something qualitatively different, two ideal types of international interaction were created: Westphalian diplomacy and utopian antidiplomacy. The analysis thus consisted in determining which characteristics of each ideal type it is possible to identify in EU diplomacy. Annexes one through three contain tables that compare the EU’s structural antidiplomacy to the Westphalian and antidiplomacy ideal types for each of the three layers. 8.1

Main Characteristics of European Union Diplomacy

8.1.1 EU Diplomatic Practices Taken as a whole, the EU as a diplomatic actor consists of a network of actors with a diffuse structure of authority and different sources of legitimacy, as both sovereign states and intergovernmental forums and supranational political

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and administrative actors cooperate in the strategic planning and implementation of EU diplomacy in what has been described as a multi-stakeholder diplomacy.1 Furthermore, the interaction among the multitude of actors in the network varies depending on the particular case and policy issue. The political dynamics created by the institutionalisation of cooperation among Member States and EU institutions also reveal that authority in the EU is not simply a matter of intergovernmental or supranational. The EU’s international action coexists with, and is carried out through, the individual diplomacy of each Member States, upon which there are strong obligations to cooperate and coordinate. In this respect, and although conflicts do occur, the general impression of the functioning of the networked representation is that of a collaborative process. The main feature of the permanent diplomatic representation of the European Union in third states is after the Lisbon treaty the formal abolition of the previous tripartite structure. The EU Delegation and the individual Member States are the key players, although the Delegation of the Union under the auspices of the eeas has a privileged position in the network on the ground in third states, and is active in promoting coherence among the Member States present. Still, the Commission continues to have a role due to its competences particularly in trade and development policy, including the capacity to issue instructions to Delegation staff. There is a general lack of clarity regarding the roles and formal responsibilities of each of the actors, so the diplomatic presence of the EU varies considerably depending on the political issue and on the third state. The Lisbon Treaty has generally reduced complexity regarding the EU’s diplomatic representation, but instead of resolving the underlying organisational issues giving rise to the complexity, it has been achieved mainly by internalising this complexity within the Delegation structures and the Brussels-based institutions. With regard to the diplomatic representation of the EU in international organisations, a general problem field is the tension between the needs of the EU to act on one hand, which is a function of the internal distribution of competences, and the legal constitution of international organisations on the other. EU participation in international organisations is generally more problematic than its participation in bilateral diplomatic relations, due to the fact that international organisations are highly legalised and state-centric environments. 1 Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, “The diplomatic system of the EU: Concepts and analysis,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 16–21.

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The solution to the problem of the participation of a non-state entity in international organisations has been pragmatic and consisted in creative legal adaptation by the EU and the international organisations, for instance the special status in the wto which allows the EU to participate. In the UN system, the enhanced observer status has enabled the EU to have an official status, even if it is not formally a member. A second feature of the EU’s participation in international organisations is the lack of uniformity and its ad-hoc nature. The lack of uniformity is particularly evident in the official status of the Union in international organisations, spanning from Member (e.g. wto, fao), over observer (e.g. UN General Assembly) to non-participant (e.g. imf – although the European Central Bank has observer status), differences which are also reflected in the level of coherence of EU participation in the organisations. With respect to the international behaviour of the EU through specific diplomatic practices, the overall conclusion is that EU employs the well-known practices of Westphalian diplomacy. Arguably its network organisation is radically different from that of the Westphalian state, but in specific interactions, the EU employs standard diplomatic practices, such as the opening of permanent diplomatic missions, the ways of communicating and with respect to diplomatic rank and protocol, where the EU is increasingly treated as a state actor, both with respect to precedence and diplomatic titles as well as the full rights and privileges granted to EU diplomats and Delegation in terms of immunity and inviolability, as established in the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Also, representations to the EU have a legal status similar to that of representations to states, although the procedure for accreditation is slightly different. However, the fact that the behaviour of EU diplomats at a specific time strictly adheres to the behavioural norms of Westphalian diplomatic culture as it exists in the international system, helps to hide the fact that the social significance of its diplomatic practices are quite different from the social significance of Westphalian diplomatic practice. This different meaning of the EU’s Westphalian diplomatic practices is provided by EU’s diplomatic meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation. EU Diplomatic Meta-practices: Institutionalisation, Legalisation and Regionalisation Whereas EU diplomatic practices follow established diplomatic norms, this should not divert attention from the uniqueness of the EU as a diplomatic ­actor, which is primarily to be found in the structuration of its diplomatic practices, i.e. in its diplomatic meta-practices of regionalisation, institutionalisation and legalisation, as well as in its social structures. 8.1.2

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As a structuring principle and political objective, the regionalisation of international relations is a key diplomatic meta-practice of the European Union, and a dimension where EU diplomacy is truly unique. The EU maintains bi-­ regional diplomatic relationships with almost all regions and sub-regions in the world. In general, the regional relationship is complementary to the bilateral relations with third states. The relations of the EU with other states thus often involve several levels of interaction, from a bi-regional political dialogue or framework cooperation, over relations with sub-regions that have more content and seek to promote regional integration among third states, to ­detailed programs of bilateral cooperation with a third state The EU maintains relations with regional groups already existing, but it is noteworthy that we also see examples of a regionalism that does not take its point of departure in the existing economic and political realities of other world regions, but where it instead is the world vision of the EU that determines the boundaries of the regions with which it maintains diplomatic relations. As in the case of the bilateral diplomatic relations with third states, diplomatic relations between the EU and other world regions are institutionalised in formal agreements, multiyear strategies and annual work programmes. Thus, the diplomatic interaction is regulated by agreements that define the regularity of meetings, at what level they are held and which content is discussed. As such, other diplomatic meta-practices of the EU are the institutionalisation and legalisation of its bilateral and multilateral diplomatic relationships in formal agreements with almost all third states. The agreements regulate not only the political content of the relationships, but also the diplomatic interaction, through the establishment of regular meetings at different hierarchical levels, from Heads of State or Government to technical officers, and in some cases also common institutions. Many agreements are global in the sense that they regulate all policy areas, and in this sense they are an important diplomatic practice for overcoming the negative effects of the network organisation of the EU as an international actor with respect to the transformative impact of EU diplomacy.2 The institutionalisation of the diplomatic interaction is achieved through the Westphalian practices of negotiation based on mutual consent, but the effect is the structural transformation of diplomacy towards the EU model of interaction, based on the mutual interference in the internal affairs of 2 Keukeleire, Thiers and Justaert also note that the network organisation is not a serious obstacle for the EU’s transformative ambitions. Stephan Keukeleire, Robin Thiers, and Arnout Justaert, “Reappraising diplomacy: Structural diplomacy and the case of the European Union,” Hague Journal of Diplomacy, vol. 4, no. 2, 2009, p. 155.

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others and legally binding mutual obligations including common regulation. Of course, states and other international organisations also sign agreements, but in the EU case it is apparent that the institutionalisation and legalisation of interchange is an end in itself and not merely a means to an end, as would most likely be the case of other actors. In addition to the general legalisation of bilateral and multilateral relations, the extreme version of these meta-practices with an antidiplomatic effect are those that dilute the EU as a “black box”-style political entity through the semi-­ inclusion of third states in the European Union. In parallel with the less than full participation of certain Member States in the EU, the semi-inclusion practices are expressed in the constitution of the European Economic Area and the European Neighbourhood Policy, which establishes multidimensional and porous frontiers with the participant states. It functions by letting the neighbouring states participate in technical cooperation programmes on an equal footing with the EU Member States. This should be interpreted as a way of extending to its neighbours the EU model of cooperation among formally sovereign states in a dense and highly institutionalised network. The semi-inclusion reveals a key idea of the utopian antidiplomacy, which is the idea of denying the existence of insurmountable differences between Self and Other. The metapractices of the EU thus create dynamics of interaction very different from the dynamics of mutual alienation that characterises Westphalian diplomacy. Instead of serving to ensure peaceful coexistence between alienated political entities, which is the main objective of Westphalian diplomacy, the clear antidiplomatic effect of the institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation of diplomatic relations, is to reduce the differences between these and the EU Member States and overcome the condition of alienation among the political entities. Jointly, the EU’s practices and meta-practices are therefore indicative of a radical antidiplomatic EU international identity as well as antidiplomatic causal ideas and strategic objectives. 8.1.3 The Antidiplomatic Social Structures of EU Diplomacy The main identity of the EU as an international actor is that of being an antidiplomatic solution to the dilemmas and problems of the Westphalian interna­ tional system, in contrast to Westphalian ideas of territoriality and sovereignty. The basic construction is that the historical experiences of European countries have shown the limited capacity of Westphalian diplomacy to solve the problems caused by the competitive coexistence of sovereign states. The mediation among the alienated entities through diplomacy could not avoid centuries of war among European states and, according to the self-perception of the EU, only with the creation of the European Union have its Member

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States overcome their mutual alienation and secured a perpetual peace for the peoples of Europe. The EU identity is thus constructed on the basis of negative identification with the state and Westphalian diplomacy, the core feature of the antidiplomatic ideal type. An important idea in the diplomacy of the EU is the universality of the political values of the EU regarding the organisation and internal functioning of political entities in terms of democracy, human rights, rule of law and good governance and the universality of the EU’s diplomatic principles of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation. This universality is the basis of the causal ideas of security and welfare of the Union. These are about overcoming the alienation between states as the only possible source of peace and stability. With regard to the strategic objectives of the UE, the main conclusion is also that they are basically of an antidiplomatic nature. EU diplomacy has as strategic objectives firstly, to instigate an internal transformation in third countries with respect to their political values, partially through foreign policy tools of conditionality and partially through the diplomatic meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation. Secondly, the objective is to transform the anarchic Westphalian international system into an international community, not based on existing Westphalian diplomatic culture, but on the lifting up of the principal characteristics of the European model of integration to the global level, through meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation. It implies a rejection of the fundamental idea of the Westphalian diplomacy, namely the inevitability of the conditions of anarchy and alienation, and reveals a notion of limited sovereignty of states and a rejection of norms of non-intervention. In this interpretation, the EU aims to overcome the alienation among states through the spread of its political values and diplomatic principles in the international system. Not only do the diplomatic meta-practices reveal these fundamental ideas, the creation of an international order based on effective international institutions is an explicit objective of the 2003 European Security Strategy and constructed as the only possible source of EU peace and prosperity. The diplomatic meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation thus reveal that a main tenet of EU diplomacy is its structural nature. With respect to the objective of instigating a general transformation of the political values of other states, the EU clearly breaks with the Westphalian ideas of sovereignty and non-intervention. However, European Union diplomacy is based on a further causal idea of a structural nature: Not only the need for the transformation of the internal social structures of other states,

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but also the need for the transformation of the dominant social structures of diplomacy in the international system, i.e. systemic diplomatic culture, along with a modification of meta-practices towards the institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation of interaction. This way, major political changes are achieved through changing the basic structures of the international system, in stark contrast to the dominant idea in Westphalian diplomacy, which assumes the inevitable existence of the structural condition of anarchy and which considers a balance of power among sovereigns a source of peace and stability. In contrast, the logic of EU diplomacy points to both internal transformations in states and a systemic transformation being necessary in order to overcome the condition of alienation that characterises the Westphalian system. As such, the main impact of EU international agency is not necessarily to be found in the content of its interaction, but in its form, i.e. in its diplomacy, in that it works to recreate the EU model of peaceful coexistence in its relations with other states and regions. Apart from the dominant antidiplomatic EU construction, the analysis has also identified an antagonistic, essentially Westphalian euro-nationalist construction. It sees the EU in terms of the Westphalian ideal of a strong unitary actor that is capable of effectively defending EU short-term material interest. This alternative discourse is reinforced by the isomorphic pressures exerted by the Westphalian international system and the ways of interacting diplomatically within it upon the EU. It is an alternative construction that gains strength with the continuous evolution of the EU as an international actor reflected in the weakening of its regionalisation meta-practice in favour of bilateral strategic partnerships and a general turn towards prioritising common interest rather than political values in the relations with other states. 8.2

What Diplomatic Theory Reveals about the EU: The Structural Antidiplomacy of the European Union as an Inherently Unstable Equilibrium between the Ideal Types of Westphalia and Utopian Antidiplomacy

European Union diplomacy is organised into a network characterised by the continuing centrality of state actors and diffuse structures of legitimacy and political authority, but also by the increasingly common decision-making and implementation process. The network concept describes the diplomacy of the European Union in two different ways. The first concerns the organisation of the EU as a network of actors who act together towards the exterior. Thus, the international action of the European Union is diplomacy by a network.

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The second sense in which the network notion describes EU diplomacy concerns the fact that the European Union as an entity builds and participates in networks with third states, evident in its diplomatic meta-practices. Thus, the EU’s international action takes place partly as a diplomacy that works through networks. With respect to the three layers of diplomacy, the EU combines specific Westphalian practices with sui generis meta-practices aimed at transforming structures and antidiplomatic social structures of meaning. In this sense, the theoretical approach of this study allows for understanding the nature and significance of European Union diplomacy beyond a comparison of observable practices and directs attention to the fact that while the specific practices of the EU are predominantly Westphalian, the social meaning and effect of these practices are in many instances, though not all, antidiplomatic. The antidiplomatic structural effects of formally Westphalian practices allow the EU to exist, albeit somewhat uneasily, as an antidiplomatic entity in an international system still essentially Westphalian, in contrast to the failures of the antidiplomacies of the French and Russian Revolutions. EU diplomacy is based on antidiplomatic social structures, i.e. the deepest layer where theory indicates that differences have the greatest importance and effect. This makes it possible to conclude that EU diplomacy to a large extent is paradigmatically different from Westphalian diplomacy. The fact that the EU mimics specific Westphalian diplomatic practices helps to hide the fact to analysis not attentive to the social dimension of diplomacy. In line with the initial suspicion, stemming from the triangular relationship among diplomacy, the structure of the international system and the units constituting it, the European Union is a case where the contemporary transformation of diplomacy has advanced furthest, up to the point of showing strong elements of a new ideal type diplomacy, clearly distinguishable both from the Westphalian and the antidiplomatic ideal types. This leads to the characterisation of the EU’s international agency as a new ideal type structural antidiplomacy. The relation of the EU’s structural antidiplomacy to the ideal types of Westphalian diplomacy and utopian antidiplomacy is illustrated in Figure 2. The diplomatic practices of the EU are formally Westphalian, but the institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation of diplomatic relations have antidiplomatic structural effects, consistent with the antidiplomatic objectives, identities and ideas of its diplomacy. Although the EU bases its international agency on antidiplomatic social structures, the structural focus seen in the institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation of diplomatic practices allows the Union to pursue its antidiplomatic objectives without having to resort to the antidiplomatic practices of warfare and terrorism. In this sense it is important that the EU itself is a

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Conclusions and Perspectives MicroPractices

Metapractices/ Structuring principles

Social structures

Specif ic Westphalian practice 1

Specif ic Westphalian practice 2

Westphalian metapractices: Balance of power, alliances and capability development

Specif ic antidiplomatic practice 1

Sui generis meta-practices: Institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation

Westphalian social structure of identities and ideas

WESTPHALIAN DIPLOMACY

Figure 2

Specific Westphalian practice 3

Specif ic antidiplomatic practice 2

Antidiplomatic metapractices: War, terror and subversion

Antidiplomatic social structure of identities and ideas

EU STRUCTURAL ANTIDIPLOMACY

UTOPIAN ANTIDIPLOMACY

The three layers of the EU’s structural network diplomacy, compared to the ideal type Westphalian diplomacy and the ideal type utopian antidiplomacy Source: The author

powerful example of the possibility and viability of an antidiplomatic solution to the dilemmas and problems of coexistence in the international system. Also, the networked nature of the EU and its value-based foreign policy has actually helped it achieve its antidiplomatic objectives, since their structural aims are not easily interpreted as a mere reflection of economic or geopolitical self-interest. The network nature and lack of concerted action in many issue areas has helped the EU communicate its identity as a qualitatively different entity and diplomatic actor, thereby facilitating the generation of trust and the diffusion of its political values and diplomatic principles. This is also seen in that fact that the EU is actively seeking to communicate this antidiplomatic identity narrative through its public diplomacy. The organisation of the EU as a network actor and the internal distribution of competences between the various actors has historically not been a great obstacle in this respect, since the transformative objectives that were the basis of what the EU transmitted through its diplomatic practices and meta-practices were primarily universal values and principles aimed at transforming structures and only to a lesser extent the defence of specific interests. This was again the simple result of a lack of internal agreement about which interests to defend. This lack

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of strong material interests to be defended internationally in relations with third states has historically allowed the structural antidiplomacy to function, since it has allowed for the form of interaction to be more important than the specific content in relations with third states. The current attempts to reform EU diplomacy can therefore have important negative consequences for the antidiplomatic effect of the EU’s structural antidiplomacy, a point that will be discussed further below. As argued above, as a new kind of actor in the international system, it is very significant that the EU does not break with Westphalian diplomatic practices, but instead tries to copy them to the greatest extent possible and adapt its network organisation to function more efficiently within the frameworks of the existing international system. The 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and the related customary law associated with the classical Westphalian states system remain the legal basis for diplomatic interaction in the international system. This suggests that a fundamental condition in the international system for a political entity is the lack of alternatives to Westphalian diplomatic practices, at least if unwilling to use violence. Nevertheless, the theoretical approach adopted in this study allows for understanding the nature and significance of European Union diplomacy beyond a comparison of observable practices, which tends to lead to conclusions about the imperfect nature of EU diplomacy, as it is evaluated, implicitly or explicitly, with a Westphalian ideal type in mind. Instead, attention is here directed to the fact that because of its meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation, it has been possible for the EU to exist as an antidiplomatic entity in an international system still essentially Westphalian, and to pursue its antidiplomatic objectives without having to resort to the antidiplomatic practices of warfare and terrorism. As the EU this way to a large extent pursues antidiplomatic objectives using Westphalian practices, its existence as a an entity in the still predominantly Westphalian international system is inherently unstable, due to the conflict between the antidiplomatic social structures of EU diplomacy and the still essentially Westphalian international system. An important clue to the future evolution of EU diplomacy was found in the Lisbon Treaty and the establishment of the eeas, generally giving rise to pragmatism rather than vision in the EU’s approach to the world.3 In this sense, these two most recent innovations 3 Assessment of Michael Smith, “The EU, strategic diplomacy and the bric countries,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 125.

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can largely be placed within the alternative euro-nationalist Westphalian discourse on EU diplomacy, since they are designed to bring the EU closer to the Westphalian ideal type actor. The recent changes in EU diplomacy are therefore mainly significant as an indication of an ideational and identitarian shift. It is still too early to clearly estimate the impact of the establishment of the eeas in this respect, but it seems clear that it is motivated by a perception of the content (interests) being more important than the form (structural impact of diplomacy), meaning that the EU is in a process of downplaying the element of raison de système which has been a key characteristic of its diplomacy so far, to the benefit of an EU-level euronationalism. Although the movement remains limited, the intention to move EU diplomacy in the direction of Westphalia seems clear. In this respect, the principal question is whether the new organisation will contribute to creating a growing convergence between the policy positions of Member States, without which a common diplomatic representation will be impossible beyond the generic defence of human rights, democracy and the material interests that the States Members may have in common. The most prominent feature of recent developments is thus not their immediate impact on diplomatic practices, but that they are a reflection of a strengthened euro-nationalist discourse on EU diplomacy, which they in turn contribute to. As a consequence, the hitherto dominant antidiplomatic discourse ­weakens, so that the future development of diplomatic practices and ­meta-practices of the EU as an actor will be come to be legitimised to a greater extent with reference to the Westphalian discourse. Without a resurgence of the discourse containing the structural and long-term antidiplomatic objectives of the EU, the effect is that the most coherence choices for European policymakers in the future will increasingly be between a Westphalian euro-nationalist discourse, with its final solution in the creation of the European Federation, and the Westphalian state discourse, with its final solution in the continuing defence of narrow state interests and the dilution and marginalisation of EU diplomacy, which would remain as a curious normative add-on to Member State diplomacies. Although the innovations constituted by the Treaty of Lisbon and the establishment of the eeas undoubtedly help alleviate current problems of coherence and complex representation, they therefore also give rise to important questions. It has been argued that the existence of a unified diplomatic representation increases the normative power of the EU4 and that with the eeas, 4 Natividad Fernández Sola, El Servicio de Acción Exterior de la Unión Europea, Working paper no. 46/2008 (Madrid: Real Instituto Elcano, 2008), p. 20.

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the institutional logic of distinguishing between a representation of the interests of the Member States and a representation of the common EU interest will disappear. Instead a functional logic will be installed, since the new service will represent supranational and state interests indiscriminately.5 This interpretation seems to suppose that the eeas will be able to represent the potentially conflicting interests of Member States while ignoring the continued existence and importance of Member State diplomacy tasked with the defence of particular Member States interests. Rather than fusing the representation of the two sets of interests, the eeas actually simplifies matters, in that it clearly distinguishes between EU interests, defended by the eeas, and Member State interests, defended individually by each Member State. In any case, the vision of a vertical division of labour where the EU defends values and Member States each their particular interests is of course also a formula that will not allow the EU to develop as an actor6 towards the Westphalian ideal type, but rather maintain it as an unstable combination of two antagonistic paradigms of diplomacy. It could also be argued that the EU, with its movement towards Westphalia in terms of its organisation, visibility and capacity to defend material interests in the diplomatic interchange, would lose its hitherto principal source of influence; that of being an example of a qualitatively different international actor,7 namely an antidiplomatic solution to the problems of the Westphalian international system. One aspect of this problem field relates to the traditional perception of the EU in third states as a neutral international actor, which is clearly differentiated from the Member States. This is particularly relevant in Africa, where EU Member States are still seen to defend their neo-colonial interests in former colonies,8 but the EU has also benefitted in terms of structural impact from being differentiated by such dubious Member State practices as the aggressive warfare against third states in violation of international law and the political and military support to cruel dictatorships. 5 Natividad Fernández Sola, “El Servicio Europeo De Acción Exterior Y La Nueva Gobernanza De Los Asuntos Exteriores Europeos,” in Alicia Sorroza Blanco (ed.), Presidencia Española: Retos En Una Nueva Europa (Madrid: Elcano, 2010), p. 158. 6 Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 70–71. 7 Ian Manners, “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 40, no. 2, p. 252. 8 David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), p. 73.

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The potentially inverse relationship between the options of acting coherently, decisively and visibly, on one hand, and achieving the transformative strategic objectives, on the other, is apart from the fact that they are based on antagonistic social structures, caused by the EU being perceived as a Westphalian power defending its short-term interests and not as a new type of benign actor based on universal values and ideas. If this becomes the dominant perception of the EU abroad, the EU will only be able to coerce foreign governments to change their behaviour in specific instances through the use of diplomatic instruments such as conditionality. It will not be able to socialise its values so that they have a long-term impact through their inclusion in the domestic political discourses of third states. In this case, therefore, the EU will fail to reach its first strategic objective of the internal transformation of the social structures of third states, which is a necessary precondition for the achievement of the principal strategic objective: the structural transformation of the international system through the establishment of an international community with a radically new diplomatic culture, based on the meta-practices of the EU as well as its antidiplomatic ideas. The strengthening of the euro-nationalist Westphalian discourse in the diplomacy of the EU also reduces in a more direct way the possibilities for the EU to achieve the objective of the structural transformation of the international system. It reduces its possibilities to affect the social structures of the international system, i.e. the prevalent diplomatic culture, through the metapractices of institutionalisation, legalisation and legalisation, up till the point where the self-other dynamics of alienation among the actors in the international system has been overcome. When a strategic objective of the EU is the transformation of the international system into a an international community based on the antidiplomatic EU model for coexistence among states, for the EU to behave and promote itself as a Westphalian-type actor with state attributes, capable of defending its interests with diplomatic and military means is counterproductive, although logical in a short-term perspective focusing on the need to defend specific interests and against specific threats.9 The basic problem arises when the EU seeks to influence the world in two ways simultaneously, which are at least partially incompatible: as a model to follow and as a strong actor,10 based as they are on antagonistic ideas. The 9 10

See: Peter van Ham,, The power of war: Why Europe needs it, Clingendael Diplomacy Papers, no. 19 (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael”, 2008). Martin Ortega, Building the Future. the EU’s Contribution to Global Governance (Paris: euiss, 2007), pp. 91–94.

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a­ rgument is that the EU cannot hope to construct an international community on a global level characterised by a Kantian culture of friendship, if it behaves as if were a Lockean actor in a culture of competitive coexistence among sovereign entities. It will by its own diplomatic practices, dedicated to firmly defend EU interests, strengthen the alienation among the political entities in the international system and reaffirm Westphalian identity dynamics. Also, for the EU to continue its evolution as an actor towards Westphalia in terms of social structures, seems to go against the Zeitgeist of the contemporary transformation of diplomacy, which sees the power and control of central governments eroding and an increasing efficiency of networked forms of influence. This is an evolution that not only affects the EU as an actor, but all states in general and the EU Member States in particular.11 Their Ministries of Foreign Affairs are changing their roles from gatekeepers to boundaryspanners, i.e. from the ideal-typical Westphalian role of controlling the access to the institutions of the state, to a post-sovereign role working for overcoming the frontiers in a network of actors characterised by its poorly defined hierarchical structure.12 Consequently, although the formally Westphalian diplomatic practices still exist, they take place in a “radically different” context also beyond the EU.13 When influence in the international system is ever more a question of influencing through networks where central control is an illusion, it seems to make more sense for the EU to use the eeas to develop and improve its network approach to diplomacy and the efficiency of its metapractices, rather than to accelerate the movement towards Westphalia. Although it may seem premature in the light of the obvious difficulties of the EU Member States to agree on key policy areas of international relations, one observer has already warned of the danger that the EU develops its own hegemonic ambitions.14 This could occur as a result of the simple fact that, as 11

12

13 14

Brian Hocking and Michael Smith, “The diplomatic system of the EU: Concepts and analysis,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 15–16. Brian Hocking, “Introduction: gatekeepers and boundary-spanners – Thinking about foreign ministries in the European Union,” in Brian Hocking and David Spence (eds.), Foreign ministries in the European Union: Integrating diplomats (Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2002). Stephan Keukeleire, Michael Smith and Sophie Vanhoonacker, The emerging EU system of diplomacy: how fit for the purpose?, Policy paper no. 1, Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Network on “The Diplomatic System of the European Union”, 2010, p. 2. David Spence, “EU governance and global governance: new roles for EU diplomats,” in Andrew F. Cooper and Brian Hocking (eds.), Global governance and diplomacy: worlds apart (New York: Palgrave, 2008), pp. 36–84.

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a result of the evolution of the EU as an international actor that involves having ever more competences, the EU will increasingly find it necessary to take a political position on some of the more controversial global policy issues, where it earlier had no opinion. Given the general lack of political agreement about the EU’s nature, role in the world and the interests that its diplomacy should defend, it is doubtful if this transition towards the Westphalian model will occur rapidly, if at all. Cooper is pessimistic with respect to the achievement of the long-term transformative objectives of the EU that implies recreating the EU experience on a global level, which is what leads him to recommend the inter-mediate solution of maintaining the EU in its current form domestically, whilst equipping it to act externally in a Lockean world.15 He argues that EU should maintain its Kantian culture of structural peace internally, but accept that the international system is characterised by a Lockean culture, and therefore the EU must act accordingly externally: “Among ourselves, we keep the law but when we are operating in the jungle we must also use the laws of the jungle.”16 His vision, which undoubtedly is more practical and implementable in the short term, nevertheless hinders the fulfilment of the long-term strategic objectives of the Union, due to the strengthening of the Westphalian world view that his thinking entails, and ignores the fact that the strategy is based on two antagonistic paradigms of diplomacy. Although the unstable equilibrium of EU structural antidiplomacy seems to be moving slightly in the direction of the Westphalian ideal type, this is also problematic, even if it should succeed in its euro-nationalist version. Should the unstable equilibrium, as which the EU inevitably exist in the international system, continue its evolution toward the Westphalian ideal type, the tragedy will be that the EU might be able to act in coherently in a Lockean world, and thus win some battles in the short term, but at the same time will see its principal strategic objectives of the creation of an EU-style international community o­ bstructed, or even impeded, thus losing the “war” in the long term. With ­respect to the wider transformation of diplomacy, the EU will have failed to convince the world of the virtues of its own solution to problems among Member States. These will have been lifted up to the global level, where the EU as an actor will be part of an international system based on competitive co-existence in an increasingly interconnected world. This move seems to negate the European historical experiences, not only of the centuries of diplomatic failure to ­secure peace and prosperity, but in particular the last half-century of s­ uccessful 15 16

Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London : Atlantic Books, 2003). Robert Cooper, The Post-Modern State and the World Order (London: Demos, 2000), p. 38.

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i­ ntegration and the overcoming of alienation among states. If the Westphalian state was and is a problem, the recreation of the state at the European level cannot be a solution.17 A more positive interpretation from the point of view of Westphalian diplomacy would be that the EU is successfully adapting to the isomorphic pressures of the international system and is “maturing” as an international actor, finally leaving behind its antidiplomatic ideas. 8.3

What the EU Case Reveals about Diplomacy: Ideal Types and the Pluralisation of Diplomacy

The Case of EU Diplomacy and the Construction of a Typology of Diplomacies Inferring from the study of EU diplomacy, it becomes apparent that traditional concepts related to the Westphalian ideal type are not necessarily adequate for understanding the contemporary transformation of diplomacy. The case of the European Union has shown that new forms of diplomacy do not necessarily share the most basic ontological assumptions of the Westphalian ideal type about the international system or the entities that populate it. It is therefore probable that the contemporary transformation of diplomacy contains elements that represent a paradigmatic shift of diplomacy and not only a shift within the Westphalian ideal type. Consequently, I propose a typology of diplomacy, which includes other possible ideal type forms of acting in the international system, ideal types which are already detectable in contemporary international practice. As a result of the findings of the study relative to the case of European Union diplomacy, the typology is based on the distinction between Westphalian ­diplomacy and utopian antidiplomacy, on one hand, and between the diplomatic practices and the social structure of diplomacy, on the other, considering the meta-practices a transmission belt between ideas and practice. The typology is of ideal types of diplomacy, understood as structured totalities. It must be stressed that ideal types are not generalised forms of interaction in the international system with their characteristics being attributable to all actors and all relations between them. Rather, and accepting the inevitability of different form of interaction coexisting, the ideal types describe the main 8.3.1

17

Robert Cooper, The Breaking of Nations. Order and Chaos in the Twenty-First Century (London : Atlantic Books, 2003), p. 37.

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c­ haracteristics of the diplomacy of one concrete actor, or of one concrete ­diplomatic relationship. This way, it is an attempt to characterise the diplomacies of the different actors that populate the contemporary international system. The distinction between practices and social structures in one dimension and the distinction between Westphalia and antidiplomacy in another dimension give rise to four ideal types of diplomacy, as visualised in Table 1. The first of these ideal types (top left) is the combination of Westphalian practices and Westphalian social structures, which corresponds to the Westphalian ideal type outlined in Chapter 2. Actors carrying out diplomacy of this kind pursue the diplomatic objectives of managing their alienation from other actors in the international system so that they can coexist peacefully in a competitive environment. The means are the traditional Westphalian diplomatic practices, which are based on the recognition of the insurmountable condition of mutual alienation and related ideas of territorial sovereignty and norms of non-intervention. The second ideal type (bottom right) is the utopian antidiplomacy also outlined in Chapter 2. The basic idea is the refusal to recognise the fundamental differences among states and that the alienation among these is insurmountable, natural or desirable. Another important idea is that the organisation of the peoples in alienated states inevitably leads to wars and general misery. The failure to recognise the legitimacy of other states as actors and the value of the Westphalian diplomatic system leads such actors to engage in antidiplomatic practices that can be grouped in meta-practices of war, terrorism or supporting rebellions in other states. The classic examples of such actors are the French and Soviet revolutionaries, whereas a more contemporary example could be the utopian violence of the Al-Qaeda network or other antisystem violence. Table 1

A typology of diplomacies

Westphalian social structures

Antidiplomatic social structures

Westphalian practices

Westphalian diplomacy

Structural antidiplomacy

Antidiplomatic practices

Utopian-teleological diplomacy

Utopian antidiplomacy

Source: The author

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The third ideal type (bottom left) is the combination of pursuing diplomatic objectives using antidiplomatic practices. An actor of this type recognises the condition of alienation and inherent differences among political entities as inevitable and sees peaceful competitive coexistence as possible. At the same time, the actor uses antidiplomatic practices, such as warfare and terrorism. A good example of this type of diplomacy is thus separatist violence by sub-state entities, or terrorist groups acting on behalf of a non-recognised territoriality. The aim is, in this case, to establish a new state alienated from others. The rationale is the recognition of the insuperable alienation between formally equal states and the sovereignty of each, so the ultimate goal remains the management of the alienation among states. But first the new territorial state must be established by violent antidiplomatic means and the annexation of territories of existing states. This utopian-teleological ideal type of diplomacy is thus a combination of using antidiplomatic means to bring about a Westphalian future, but is perhaps not the most interesting type from a theoretical point of view, since it has no systemic consequences. Whereas its impact is potentially large in terms of the human casualties of the struggle for independence, the question is ultimately one of recognition as a sovereign, Westphalian state. The victory or failure of each movement will determine the outcome of a specific case and potentially have as a consequence a minor territorial reordering of the states system. Nevertheless, the result is in any case a strengthening of the Westphalian system and its diplomacy. In this sense, this type of diplomacy can be seen as transitional phenomenon between two periods of Westphalian diplomacy (before and after the armed struggle). Diametrically opposed to this ideal type diplomacy, the fourth ideal type (top right) combines antidiplomatic social structures of meaning as the basis for international action, including the pursuit of antidiplomatic objectives, with Westphalian diplomatic practices. As this study concludes is the case of the European Union, this kind of diplomacy consists of social structures that do not contain an acceptance of alienation among states as being a natural and eternal condition, but as something to be overcome so that the peoples of the world can live in peace and welfare. It contains universal political values and combines the rejection of a barrier between domestic politics and foreign ­policy with norms of peace and a structural power notion. Westphalian diplomatic practices are made to have the effect of promoting antidiplomatic ends through the meta-practices of institutionalisation, legalisation and regionalisation of relations among entities. Not only is the EU as an actor a good example of this ideal type, but so are the EU Member States as for the relations among them. These are not Westphalian-type diplomatic relations either, since they are not based on the negative mutual identification that c­ haracterises

Conclusions and Perspectives

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a­ lienation, but on positive identification that characterises a Kantian security community. Although at first sight the relations among EU Member States seem formally Westphalian diplomatic relations, due to the persistence of Westphalian practices, these are at the same time highly institutionalised and legalised up to the point that the sum of relations among Member States resembles a domestic political system based on positive identification instead of alienation; i.e. the antidiplomatic solution which the EU considers itself to be. Considering the different ideal types of diplomacy, it becomes obvious that the EU’s structural antidiplomacy is paradigmatically new and also that it holds a potentially large systemic impact. First of all, because it is a more “realistic” form of antidiplomacy that takes its point of departure in the current alienation among political entities and, secondly, because it is based on peaceful means and voluntarism rather that violence and imposition. Rather than coerce other actors to accept its worldview, the meta-practices can be thought of as constituting a middle ground between coercion and mere persuasion as a form of influence that nudges other actors into coming to organise themselves differently and adopt EU values of political organisation and principles of diplomatic interaction. Thirdly, because in an era where humanity balances on the brink not only of nuclear war but also irreversible climate changes and an ensuing ecological collapse, it becomes a normative imperative to devise new forms of interaction and global governance, not based merely on the peaceful existence among actors each with their individual raison d’état, but on forms of diplomacy that are based on a raison de système which allows for global problems being solved rationally on a global scale.18 EU diplomacy can be seen as one example in this regard, notwithstanding all its problems and flaws. 8.3.2 The Systemic Impact of the EU’s Structural Antidiplomacy On a systemic level, the case of the EU points to the fundamental lack of ­alternatives to Westphalian diplomacy in terms of practices, which explains the fact that the development of the eeas has basically consisted in “copying established standards and practices of the diplomatic field.”19 It should be recalled that the traditional diplomacy among states (and other actors) is not static, but immersed in a process of transformation with wide-ranging implications in terms of the involved actors, contexts and practices employed. 18 19

On diplomacy as raison de système and the normative implications of studying diplomacy, see Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013), particularly Chapter 1. Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), “Introduction, the eeas as a catalyst of diplomatic innovation,” in Jozef Bátora and David Spence (eds.), The European External Action Service: European diplomacy post-Westphalia (New York: Palgrave, 2015), p. 5.

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­ ethods for achieving influence obviously change with technological advancM es and geopolitical changes brought about by the rise of new actors and new powers and resulting new patterns of interactions and (inter)dependence. It has been argued that this fact creates a need for a new kind of integrative diplomacy that takes this new reality into account to avoid the fragmentation of diplomacy and losing the common ground for peaceful interaction.20 Still, from the conceptual starting point adopted here, in an increasingly competitive world, diplomacy generally maintains the tenets of the Westphalian ideal type in terms of the social structures, being a vehicle for the defence of interests while avoiding that alienation among entities spills over into warfare. ­Using the vocabulary of Alexander Wendt,21 diplomacy’s main function remains e­ nsuring the smooth functioning of a Lockean international society of competitive coexistence with the minimum possible transaction costs, while avoiding that competition degenerates into Hobbesian logics of enmity. So from the analytical perspective adopted in the present study and following Cornago’s work on the pluralisation of diplomacy,22 it can be hypothesised that the contemporary transformation is not so much about a change of diplomacy, but mainly a pluralisation within what remains essentially Westphalian idealtype diplomacy, although particularly the rise of new actors acting independently of territorially defined entities presents a challenge to whether we can still talk of a Westphalian diplomacy of non-state diplomatic actors. Further detailed empirical studies are needed to determine whether the pluralisationwithin-Westphalian-diplomacy hypothesis is correct. As such, the typology developed above is therefore mainly directly useful for understanding how different EU diplomacy is and how different kinds of violent actors differ from a diplomatic point of view. In contrast, it is not sufficiently detailed to capture the essence of the current pluralisation of practices and rise of new non-territorial actors within the Westphalian paradigm as defined here, although it suggest that these are of minor significance in a systemic diplomatic sense than is the structural antidiplomacy of the EU. The current challenge is that the EU must find a way to make its own particularism and existence within a broader diplomatic field, largely Westphalian in nature and exercising isomorphic pressures upon the EU, compatible with the antidiplomatic social structures of its diplomacy. As such, the challenge of 20 21 22

Brian Hocking et al., Futures for diplomacy: Integrative diplomacy for the 21st Century (The Hague: Netherlands Institute of International Relations “Clingendael,” 2012). Alexander Wendt, Social theory of international politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999). Noé Cornago, Plural diplomacies: Normative predicaments and functional imperatives (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 2013).

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the European Union is even greater than that of the states, which must also adapt to the pluralisation of diplomacy. The experiences with the antidiplomacies of the French and Russian revolutions underline the doubtful viability of the coexistence of competing paradigms of international interaction. In both cases, the strong isomorphic pressures of the existing diplomatic field upon the revolutions meant that these were quickly transformed into state actors generally acting within the Westphalian paradigm.23 Nevertheless, the typology identifies the EU’s diplomacy as paradigmatically different from these. The revolutions were both based on antidiplomatic practices and a direct notion of power as the central causal idea underpinning the practices. In contrast, the EU employs largely diplomatic practices based on the recognition of sovereignty and consent of third states and a structural power notion, seen in its diplomatic meta-practices.24 An important question is therefore whether the EU can maintain the unstable equilibrium of its structural antidiplomacy in a still essentially Westphalian diplomatic system long enough for it to have a transformative impact. This can indeed be seen as the main obstacle to the EU’s diplomacy having a large structural impact on the diplomatic field. On the other hand, the diplomatic field is immersed in a process of transformation where established practices and norms are being questioned, which in itself facilitates systemic change, although to the extent that diplomacy is undergoing a fragmentation and Westphalian ideal-typical ideas are further sedimented in some world regions, this could mean that it becomes even more difficult for the EU to sustain its structural antidiplomacy and have a systemic impact.25 The current study has identified two areas of further enquiry in order to better understand the current transformation of diplomacy and the possible role of EU diplomacy within this broader process. Firstly, the main purpose of the study being to understand EU diplomacy, the typology of diplomacies was not developed sufficiently to capture the current pluralisation of diplomacy. Further studies might help detail the ideal types and create different sub-categories by comparing different diplomatic actors in terms of the social structures, meta-practices and practices of their diplomacies. Thereby they would also be able to critically assess whether these new expressions of 23 24 25

See Chapter 2. See Chapter 6. Hocking et al. in this respect argue that generally it becomes more difficult to gain influence for actors seeking to base relations on shared values, international integration and common processes of problem-solving in the current environment of change, see: Brian Hocking et al., “Whither foreign ministries in a post-Western world?,” Clingendael Policy Brief, no. 20, 2013, p. 3.

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diplomacy are actually keeping within the Westphalian paradigm or whether they are substantially different also in terms of meta-practices and social structures so that they constitute another ideal type of diplomacy, just as the present study has argued that EU diplomacy does. Secondly, whether the EU will ultimately be successful in exporting its (anti-)diplomatic model is highly doubtful, although the increased interdependence and shared destiny of all states in an increasingly interconnected and ecologically fragile world seem to resemble ever more the intra-European conditions when the model was first created. An important area of enquiry would therefore look systematically at the diplomacy of other actors and seek to establish the impact that their interaction with the EU has had in terms of social structures, meta-practices and practices of diplomacy. Bátora has outlined different scenarios for the systemic transformation of diplomacy,26 but detailed empirical studies of the EU’s diplomatic relationships with other actors are necessary to identify the changes caused by the EU, taking into account also that the transformative impact of EU diplomacy may be very different in different policy fields and regions of the world. A 2016 book on the EU diplomatic system edited by Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker27 in part approaches the topic of EU diplomacy from a structural point of view. Here Duke argues that the transformative ambitions are most successful with respect to third states where the EU has something tangible to offer, be it membership or financial assistance. Evidence thus suggests that while the EU’s instruments are fundamentally the same, the content and impact of the human rights dialogue included in agreements are very different if the third state is China or a third state dependent on EU development funds.28 Furthermore, Elgström concludes that in terms of climate change and trade, EU idealism in terms of affecting global structures in line with its own principles has not worked and should be turned down in favour of a more realistic approach.29 In the case of North Africa, a central conclusion is that the 26 27 28 29

Jozef Bátora, “‘Does the European Union transform the institution of diplomacy?,’” Journal of European Public Policy, vol. 12, no. 1, 2005, pp. 44–66. Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016). Simon Duke, “The practices of post-Lisbon diplomacy,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 69–70. Ole Elgström, “Negotiating a new world order: The EU and multilateral diplomacy at times of change,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), p. 89.

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EU’s approach has been too top-down driven and the transformative aims too ambitious when there is no membership promise as a motivation.30 Also the case study on Kosovo concludes that the EU must to a greater extent adapt its approach to reach its full potential.31 Still, these studies are mainly focused on the political values of foreign states or specific reforms, and less on diplomatic practices and meta-practices. Particularly comparative studies of EU relations with different types of actors and groups of actors from different world regions focusing on the interplay between practices, meta-practices and identities and ideas would be useful to assess the impact of the EU’s structural antidiplomacy in specific cases and, in extension, provide clues as to the systemic impact and future evolution of the unstable equilibrium that is EU structural antidiplomacy. 30

31

Patrick Holden, “Testing EU structural diplomacy: The challenge of change in North Africa,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 260–263. Stephan Keukeire, Daan Fonck and Raphaël Métais, “The EU’s structural diplomacy towards Kosovo,” in Michael Smith, Stephan Keukeleire and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds.), The diplomatic system of the European Union: Evolution, change and challenges (London: Routledge, 2016), pp. 215–231.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004372924_010

Antidiplomacy ideal type

Identity Identity – the sovereign state as the only – the people is the fundamental reference, diplomatic actor, acting through its official not the sovereign state representatives – Humankind is universal and its moral – the mutual recognition of sovereignty and political unity is natural. The segregation of and formal equality of states as a shared peoples into sovereign states is not inevitable state identity – the revolutionary elite as the vanguard Systemic and causal ideas of a utopian transformation – absence of a central authority in the interna- Systemic and causal ideas tional system – the negation of accepting the alienated sovereign – the existence of a barrier between domestic states as the basis of international  interaction and international politics giving rise to strict – state diplomacy contributes to ­upholding non-intervention and non-interference norms the alienation of states with opposing – states are inevitably alienated from each other ­interests ­contrary to the common interests – diplomacy serves the strategic objective of of the peoples managing the relations of alienated states – the strategic objective is to eradicate alienation, – diplomats constitute a transnational so Westphalian diplomatic practices should stop epistemic community – peace and welfare of peoples are achieved – negotiation as way to resolve disputes peacefully through the eradication of alienation and the – balance of power as source of stability and (re)unification of humanity peace that avoids systemic extremes of pure Functional ideas and behavioural norms anarchy and hegemony – no space for recognition of others as basis of Functional ideas and behavioural norms reciprocity – recognition as basis of practices of reciprocity – no accept for behavioural norms of courtesy and – norms of courtesy and diplomatic protocol protocol of Westphalian diplomacy – immunity and inviolability of diplomats – no immunity or inviolability of diplomats

Westphalian ideal type

Annex 1: Ideal Type Social Structures of Diplomacy Identity – identity of being an antidiplomatic solution to the problems of the Westphalian states system – identity of being a post-sovereign diplomatic actor organised in a network with complex structures of authority and legitimacy Systemic and causal ideas – rejection of a barrier between domestic and international politics – Necessity of overcoming alienation among states as precondition for peace and welfare – necessity of mitigating the systemic anarchy by creating an international society based on shared norms, effective international institutions and international rule of law – the universality of European political values and diplomatic principles makes these the appropriate foundation of international society – the European solution to the problems of the Westphalian system should be exported to the global level, although not necessarily the specific institutional form Functional ideas and behavioural norms – respect for Westphalian behavioural norms and formal sovereignty

Ideal-type EU structural antidiplomacy

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004372924_011

Antidiplomacy ideal type – idealistic aspiration to create an international authority by a grand design to enforce peace and create prosperity, exemplified by the League of Nations – war, terrorism and subversion – support to non-state actors ­fighting against state structures of dominance though violent practices of guerrilla warfare or terrorism

Westphalian ideal type

– building alliances to achieve security and maintain systemic status quo – construction of a balance of power to avoid a state becoming hegemonic – construction of shared diplomatic  culture allowing peaceful inter­ action of diplomats so competition in zero-sum environment does not degenerate into a state of perpetual conflict – pursuing trade agreements of mutual benefit

Annex 2: Ideal Type Diplomatic Meta-practices – legalisation of international interac­ tion trough legally binding agreements covering multiple or all policy areas – incorporation of political values in international agreements – institutionalisation of interaction through the creation of joint institu­ tions at political and administrative levels and the regulation of the diplo­ matic interaction – regionalisation of the diplomatic inter­ action and support for regional integra­ tion on other continents – support to foreign civil society organisa­ tions working for EU political values

Ideal-type EU structural antidiplomacy

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, ���8 | doi:10.1163/9789004372924_012

Antidiplomacy ideal type – acts of war as main practices until the alienation between states has been overcome – peoples do not have conflicting interests that need mediation through Westphalian diplomatic practices – refusal to be represented through diplomats – detention and imprisonment of foreign diplomats – espionage against foreign governments – violent practices of murder, bombings, kidnapping, extortion to weaken state structures – specific subversive practices of espionage and terrorism to topple foreign governments

Westphalian ideal type

– unitary representation of the state – the representative embodies the state and is therefore inviolable and immune from host state jurisdiction – the permanent diplomatic mission to third states and international organization as vehicles for defending state interests – ad-hoc diplomatic missions to international summits and third states – negotiation as primary practice of the peaceful settlement of disputes – importance of symbolic and courtesy practices – verbal and written communication using universally accepted formats – diplomatic recognition of representatives of sovereigns

Annex 3: Ideal Type Diplomatic Practices

– permanent and ad-hoc bilateral and multilateral missions, copying the Westphalian practices to the extent possible – importance of symbolic and courtesy practices of Westphalian diplomacy – adherence to Westphalian practices of verbal and written communication – accreditation and recognition of diplomatic representatives as Westphalian diplomacy – negotiation as primary practice for interaction with foreign diplomats

Ideal-type EU structural antidiplomacy

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Index Ad-hoc diplomacy 40, 43, 94, 99, 102, 103, 240 Alienation 6, 7, 10–78, 194–196, 203, 209, 212, 213, 219–221, 227, 228, 230–234, 238, 240 Ambassador 11, 35, 41, 42, 60, 75, 79, 84, 85, 95, 159, 173 Anarchy 9, 36, 37, 140, 196, 203, 204, 213, 220, 221, 238 Anthropomorphism 21 Antidiplomacy 8–10, 28, 31, 32, 43–52, 107, 187, 197, 213, 215, 219, 221–231, 233–240 Ashton, Catherine 66, 107, 118, 211 Association agreement 87, 147–149, 153–159, 167, 168, 170–172, 176, 182, 184 Balance of power 36, 187, 194, 195, 204, 211, 221, 238, 239 Causal idea 9, 10, 22, 27, 28, 30, 36, 46–48, 50–52, 64, 140, 141, 191, 202–210, 214, 219, 220, 235, 238 Coherence horizontal 57, 58, 68, 71, 73, 75, 76, 78, 87, 98, 108 vertical 58, 62, 71, 75, 78, 98, 108 Common Commercial Policy 54, 55, 71, 74, 87, 126, 141, 149, 197, 198, 200 Common Foreign and Security Policy (cfsp) 54, 56–59, 62, 65, 67, 70–73, 78, 79, 85, 88, 93, 100, 105, 106, 114, 115, 120, 121, 144, 146, 147, 149, 155, 174, 200, 209 Common Security and Defence Policy (csdp) 145, 155, 173, 174 Communication 1–3, 13, 25, 32, 39, 41–43, 60, 81, 84, 86, 92, 97, 99, 107, 138, 171, 174, 178, 180, 185, 203, 214, 240 Consular affairs 86 Cooperation agreement 148, 152–154, 159, 163, 164, 166, 170, 171 Cooper, Robert 5, 229, 230 Coordination practice 70, 93, 120, 125–126, 129–130, 133–134, 136–138, 198 reflex 71

Cotonou agreement 151, 155, 158, 161 Council decision establishing the organisation and functioning of the European External Action Service 69, 72, 75, 88, 95, 102 Council of Europe 110, 135 Council of the European Union 35, 56, 57, 59–62, 66–72, 76, 80, 85, 88, 90, 93, 100, 102, 105, 113–115, 117–120, 125, 129, 131, 133–136, 144–147, 180–181, 208 Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade  ­Agreement 148, 149, 188 Delegation of the European Commission 57, 59, 83, 95, 102, 106, 120 of the European Union 31, 53, 63, 68, 70, 80–109, 112, 114, 115, 117, 119–122, 126, 128, 130, 136–137, 139, 155, 199, 216 of the High Authority 53, 82 Democracy 1, 47, 55, 73, 74, 141, 150–152, 160, 164–166, 174, 181, 183–186, 188, 189, 193, 197, 198, 203, 205, 211, 220, 225 Der Derian, James 6, 18, 43 Diplomacy bilateral 40, 43, 79–109, 114, 140, 216, 218 definition of 12, 14, 19–20, 38 modern 1, 8, 33, 35 multilateral 43, 75, 218 Diplomatic academy 89, 90 actor 8, 17, 23, 27, 28, 45, 52–78, 81, 98, 99, 102, 112, 116, 124, 126, 138, 174, 186, 191–202, 208, 215, 217, 223, 234, 235, 238 corps 15, 68, 201 culture 15, 18, 22, 23, 26, 38, 88, 92, 191, 213, 217, 220, 221, 227, 239 law 34, 40 meta-practice 7, 9, 10, 30–32, 37, 47, 48, 52, 140–190, 197, 201, 204–208, 210–212, 214, 217–220, 222, 235, 239

264 Diplomatic (cont.) mission 39–42, 53, 60, 76, 79–85, 93–99, 101–103, 105, 111, 112, 114, 130, 138, 217, 240 practice 1, 3, 6–10, 12, 14–16, 21, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 34, 37–43, 47–52, 81–83, 93, 97, 99, 100, 109, 131, 137, 150, 152, 157, 191, 194, 197, 199–204, 209, 210, 213–218, 222–225, 228, 230–232, 235, 237, 239, 240 principles 186, 187, 197, 199, 201, 203–208, 212, 213, 220, 223, 238 protocol 34, 84, 88, 107, 202, 214, 238 Discourse 10, 25–31, 38, 61, 163, 200, 221, 225, 227 Document on European Identity 55, 193, 194, 200 Duke, Simon 65, 69, 90, 149, 236 Economic Partnership Agreement (epa)  151, 160, 161 Embassy 8, 39–42, 82, 85, 103, 105, 106 Enlightenment 44 Epistemic community 15, 35, 88–92, 195, 238 Equilibrium 62, 66, 78, 124, 209, 229, 235, 237 Estrangement 18, 35 EU Global Strategy 140, 149, 157, 199, 212, 220 EU identity 27, 91, 92, 186, 192–198, 201, 212, 220 European Atomic Energy Community (euratom) 63, 64, 69 European Coal and Steel Community (ecsc) 53, 79, 82 European Commission 31, 53–57, 59–62, 64, 66–76, 80, 82–93, 95–96, 99–102, 106– 107, 112–120, 125, 127–134, 138, 144–147, 149, 153, 159–160, 162, 168, 173–178, 181, 183, 185, 199, 208, 216 European Council 57, 64–66, 72, 76, 80, 93, 99, 115 European Defence Community 53 European Economic Area (eea) 121, 151, 155, 156, 166, 172–174, 176, 178, 179, 181, 210, 219 European Economic Community (eec) 54, 55, 123, 124, 126–128

Index European External Action Service (eeas)  8–10, 53, 64–80, 84–87, 89–93, 95, 98, 100–109, 114–115, 118–119, 121–122, 125, 128, 130, 131, 134–136, 138–139, 147, 183, 198–201, 208–209, 212, 216, 224–226, 228, 233 European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (eidhr) 73 European Neighbourhood Policy (enp) 74, 151, 153, 160, 166, 174–187, 189, 190, 210, 211, 219 European Parliament 56–57, 61–63, 68–70, 89, 99, 148, 153, 160, 168, 170, 172–174, 180, 182 European Political Cooperation (epc) 55, 56, 95, 193 European Security Strategy 176, 207, 210–212, 220 Food and Agriculture Organization (fao) 109, 112, 116, 117, 123–127, 138, 217 Foreign Affairs Council 66, 67, 71, 72, 180 Foreign policy 2, 7, 10, 13, 28, 30, 37, 38, 54–59 , 62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70, 71, 73, 75, 77, 78, 89, 91, 93, 97, 101, 102, 104, 127, 134, 140–143, 149, 154, 166, 176, 184, 187, 192, 193, 197, 200–202, 206, 211, 212, 220, 223, 232 French Revolution 46, 48, 49 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (gatt) 54, 126–128 Good governance 150, 152, 160, 166, 174, 175, 180, 186, 188, 197, 203, 211, 220 Gulf Cooperation Council (gcc) 80, 83 Head of Mission 80, 84, 87, 103, 105, 106, 108 Hegemony 36, 37, 204, 211, 238 High Authority 53, 82 High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission (HR/VP) 64, 66, 70, 72–73, 76, 80, 99–102, 105–107, 118, 146–147, 183, 185, 211 Humanitarian Law 51 Human rights 55, 73, 74, 100, 116, 141, 148, 150–152, 160, 164–166, 171, 174, 175, 181,

Index 183, 184, 186, 189, 193, 197, 198, 203, 205, 211, 220, 225, 236 Ideal type 8–52, 81, 107, 111, 137, 187, 193, 199–202, 213–215, 220–240 Identity (of the EU) 27, 63, 64, 101, 186, 191–202, 219 Immunity 38–40, 50, 84, 107, 217, 238 Institutionalisation 10, 37, 43, 48, 52, 93, 103, 110, 139–190, 194, 197, 203, 204, 212, 216–224, 227, 232, 239 Intergovernmental 56, 78, 108, 183, 215, 216 International Monetary Fund 131–134 Inviolability 8, 39, 40, 50, 83, 84, 107, 217, 238 Isomorphic pressure 51, 61, 187–190, 197–199, 202, 221, 230, 234, 235 Keukeleire, Stephan 207–208, 218, 236 Language 11, 15, 25, 35, 39, 92, 104, 146 Layer (of diplomacy) 7–8, 10, 28–32, 51–52, 102, 140, 215, 222–223 League of Nations 43, 47, 239 Legalisation 10, 48, 52, 110, 130, 139–190, 197, 203, 204, 217–222, 224, 227, 232, 239 Legal personality 54, 63, 64, 143–148, 183 Legitimacy 3, 10, 71, 77, 122, 133, 184, 197, 211, 215, 221, 231, 238 Maastricht Treaty 54, 56, 146, 200 Manners, Ian  77, 205 Meta-practice 7–10, 25, 30–37, 44–48, 51–52, 140–191, 197, 199–208, 210, 211, 213–215, 217–225, 227, 230–233, 235–237, 239 Mogherini, Federica 31 Multilateralism  109, 186, 203, 211 Network organisation 61, 77–78, 107, 138, 199, 208, 217, 218, 224 New Narrative for Europe 201 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (nato) 60, 80, 110, 112, 135, 146, 156 Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (osce) 109, 112, 134–138 Particularism 14, 37, 44, 234

265 Pluralisation (of diplomacy) 3, 230–237 Political and Security Committee (psc)  72, 99 Political dialogue 87, 136, 142, 147, 149–154, 156–161, 163–172, 175, 177, 182, 183, 188, 218 President of the European Commission 64, 66, 67, 75–76 President of the European Council 65, 66, 72, 76, 80 Public diplomacy  13, 70, 88, 195, 201, 203, 205, 223 Raison de système 207, 209, 225, 233 Regionalisation 10, 140–190, 197, 198, 203, 217–222, 224, 232, 239 Representation  9, 10, 31, 40, 43, 45, 53, 57, 59–62, 64, 65, 67, 68, 70–73, 76, 78, 81–99, 101–109, 112, 113, 115, 119, 124–126, 128–136, 138, 139, 144, 181, 216, 217, 225, 226, 240 Rotating presidency of the Council 58–60, 65–67, 76, 85, 106, 114–115, 120, 130, 134–135 Rule of law 55, 150, 166, 175, 186, 220, 238 Russian Revolution 8, 27, 32, 49–51, 197, 202, 222, 235 Security community 54, 196, 233 Sincere cooperation 75, 95, 122 Social structures 7–10, 20–24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 34, 51–52, 98, 184, 187, 190–215, 217, 219–224, 227, 228, 230–232, 234–236, 238 Solana, Javier 60, 67, 79, 212 Sovereign equality 34, 37 Sovereignty 3, 26, 33–36, 45, 47, 49, 78, 92, 98, 150, 155, 162, 163, 190–192, 194–197, 202–204, 206, 219, 220, 231, 232, 235, 238 Special representative(s) of the EU 80, 95, 99–101 Speech act 25 Spill-over 54, 212 Strategy. See EU Global Strategy; European Security Strategy Structural antidiplomacy 8, 9, 215, 221–231, 233–240 Supranational 54, 56, 67, 69, 78, 108, 163, 196, 215, 216, 226

266 Sustainable diplomacy 4 Training 35, 88–90, 164, 170 Treaty of Amsterdam 60, 57, 145–146 on European Union 57, 95, 99, 102, 145, 174 on the Functioning of the European Union 154–157 of Lisbon 8, 10, 58, 62–65, 67–69, 71, 75, 77–78, 84–85, 88, 102, 106, 108, 120, 125, 128, 130–131, 135, 139, 143, 145–150, 174, 183, 185, 208–210, 216, 224–225 of Maastricht 54, 56, 146, 200 of Nice  113 of Paris 53 of Rome 54, 126 Troika 59, 60, 76, 132 Union for the Mediterranean 160, 175, 179, 182–187, 189 United Nations General Assembly 81, 91, 119, 217 Security Council  122–123 Universalism 14, 37, 44, 51

Index Utopian antidiplomacy 8, 10, 28, 187, 197, 215, 219, 221–223, 230, 231 Values (of the EU) 55, 62, 74, 150, 152, 165–166, 174–176, 184–187, 189, 197, 199–201, 203–208, 211–213, 220–221, 223, 226–227, 232–233 Vertical coherence 58, 62, 71, 75, 78, 98, 108 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations  1, 34, 38–40, 42, 80, 84–85, 111, 146, 199, 217, 224 Violence 48, 203, 224, 231–233 Visibility 59, 63–65, 68, 111, 157, 158, 182, 206, 226 Wæver, Ole 10, 28–30 Wendt, Alexander 6–7, 21, 23–24, 26, 196, 234 Westphalian diplomacy 1, 5, 8, 10, 14, 28, 31–47, 50–52, 78, 138, 141, 190, 195, 202, 203, 215, 217, 219–223, 230, 232–234, 238, 240 state system 44 World Trade Organization 109, 112, 115, 127–131, 138, 147, 151, 156, 159, 170, 200, 217