The Ideal Chinese Political Leader: A Historical and Cultural Perspective 0274674084, 9780275972592, 0275972593

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The Ideal Chinese Political Leader A Historical and Cultural Perspective Xue^hi Guo

MEGER

Westport, Connecticut London

General Library System University of Wisconsin - Madison 728 State Street Madison, Wl 53706-1494 U.S.A.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Guo, Xuezhi, 1956— The ideal Chinese political leader : a historical and cultural perspective / Xuezhi Guo. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-275-97259-3 (alk. paper) 1. Political leadership—China. 2. Political science—China. 1. Title. JC33O.3.G86 2002 303.3'4'0951—dc21 2001021183 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data is available.

Copyright © 2002 by Xuezhi Guo All rights reserved. No portion of this book may be reproduced, by any process or technique, without the express written consent of the publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 2001021183 ISBN: 0-275-97259-3 First published in 2002

Praegcr Publishers, 88 Post Road West, Westport, CT 06881 An imprint of Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc. www.praeger.com

Printed in the United States of America

The paper used in this book complies with the Permanent Paper Standard issued by the National Information Standards Organization (Z39.48-I984).

10 987654321

To Liao Zibi 1934-1980

Contents

Preface

ix

Acknowledgments

xv

Part I: Personality of the Confucian Nobleman (Junzi) 1 Humaneness: Foundation of Confucian Political Ideology

3

2 Ritualism: Autonomous Moral Personality versus Politicization

23

3 Moralism: Ethics, Society, and Politics

39

4 Political Pursuit of the Jmzizi

55

Part II: Personality of the Daoist Sage {Shengren) and Authentic Person (Zhenren) 5 Daoist Political Thought: From the Daodejing to Huang-lao Daoism

71

6 Naturalism: Personal Spirituality against Artificiality

89

7 The Principle of Self-Protection in Political Pursuit

103

Part Hl: Personality of the Enlightened Leader {Mingjun) 8 Political Strategist

125

9 Behaviorism and Bureaucratic Rationality

141

10 The Art of Rulership

157

11 Enlightened Despotism behind Realpolitik

175

Contents

12 Political Strategy Practiced by Contemporary Political Leaders

201

Conclusion

231

Chronological Highlights

241

Glossary

243

Bibliography

251

Index

261

Preface

This study offers an historical perspective and conceptual framework to the inves­ tigation of Chinese political theory by identifying the personalities of ideal Chi­ nese political leaders. In Chinese culture, personality is a significant factor that regulates the pursuits of political figures and powerfully influences their moral be­ havior. For Chinese political leaders, personality is a combination of the values and ethics of Confucian, Daoist, and Legalist traditions that derive from the ideal pursuit of the Confucian “nobleman” (junzi), the Daoist “sage” {shengren) and “authentic person” (zhenren), and the Legalist “enlightened leader” (mingjun). Al­ though Mohism, as a major school of thought before the pre-Qin period, was influential in modeling the personality of political leaders, it gradually lost its prominence during and after the Qin-Han era and no longer played a central role in the development of Chinese philosophy and thought; therefore, this study does not focus on Mohism in investigating the ideal personalities of political leaders. Confucianism can be classified as three comprising traditions—the “great tradi­ tion,” the “politicized tradition,” and the “little tradition.” Although there are close links among those three traditions and each contains a few sharp departures from the others, they represent different influences on the personalities of the Chinese political leaders. For political leaders who received a systematic orthodox educa­ tion, the values of the great tradition were likely their primary source of moral in­ doctrination and virtuous training. For those who had little exposure to orthodox education, such as military leaders who helped rising political officials overthrow established rulers, the little tradition provided the major source of the values that guided their social and political practice. The little tradition, as disseminated through folk culture—^traditional stories, folk songs, and operas—was more influ­ ential than the great tradition. Considering that the classics of Chinese tradition were unpopular and traditional thought was heavily attacked by radical intellectu-

X

Preface

als in the early twentieth century, many radical intellectuals had also been less in­ fluenced by the great tradition than by the little tradition. Despite its origin in pre-Qin Confucian philosophy, politicized Confucianism had bom less of a relation to the teachings of Confucius and Mencius since Han Confucians made Confucianism the predominant philosophy and gradually trans­ muted classic Confucianism into the study of scripture (Jingxue). Politicized Con­ fucianism was a fusion of Confucian ritualism with Legalist political thought, Yin-Yang cosmological categories, and Daoist cunning. When Confucian moral values were politicized to serve an authoritarian regime, they were used as the powerful weapon to strengthen the ruler’s power and legitimate authoritarian po­ litical institutions. With the assistance of politicized Confucians, powerful leaders became political heads of state as well as symbolic, moral, economic, and ideolog­ ical authorities. This explains why emperors consistently asserted themselves as Confucians in ruling the state, as in the cases of the Qing rulers (e.g., Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong). The mechanism and dynamics of political hierarchy were shaped by the complex interplay between the Confucianization of Legalist bureaucracy and the politicization of Confucian moral values. With the develop­ ment of the monarchical system, Confucian moralization of politics and the politicization of Confucian morality became dominant traditions in Chinese history. In both theory and practice, the three Confucian traditions—“great,” “politized,” and “little”—are interpreted and exercised differently, even though they use the same terms. My theoretical analysis of the nature of an ideal personality in Chinese culture begins by describing how these values are represented in Chinese philosophy and thought, particularly with regard to Confucianism, Daoism, and Legalism. I com­ pare the evolution of the notions of ideal personalities with developments in Chi­ nese philosophical traditions to show how the currents of these different schools have fused with one another and thus affected the ideal personalities of Chinese political leaders. By investigating the value systems demonstrated by Chinese po­ litical leaders as they have pursued idealized politics and exercised real politics, I further examine how the central values in Chinese philosophy, and thought influ­ ence the personalities of Chinese political leaders and how Chinese culture shapes their behavior and forms their personalities. Part I examines the ideal personality of the Confucianjunzi (nobleman), and the social concept and expectations defined by the pursuit of humaneness, ritualism, and moralism. Humaneness (ren) is defined by Confucianism as the source of ba­ sic human feelings of empathy and sympathy; it carries a strong altruistic motive. In politics, ren urges toward a benevolent government and people-centered politi­ cal ends. Although ren is important in referring to human relations and this-worldly efforts, it also carries cosmic concerns and a strong ethico-religious impulse. Rituals (Zr) in the Confucian value system function as important vehicles to so­ cialize, individuals and achieve political and social order. Li requires a political leader to comply with established social norms and to set himself as a model for

Preface

xi

the populace. Given that rituals cultivate religious sentiment and influence the moral personality of political leaders, Confucianism rejies on rituals rather than law to achieve political rule; however, a highly politicized ritualization, when linked to political power, enforces established hierarchical relations and supports an autocratic polity. In Confucianism, morality not only constrains but also conveys religious func­ tion. A political leader is expected to serve as an exemplar and is entrusted with the obligation and right to establish moral order. Political rule relies primarily on a combination of moral persuasion and coercion. A remarkable feature of traditional Chinese political systems is the politicization of Confucian moral persuasion. This legacy continued even after the Qing empire was overthrown and a monarchical polity no longer played a role in the Chinese political arena. An enduring tradition in Chinese politics is the inseparability of morality and politics. Part II analyzes the ideal personality of the Daoist shengren (sage), which cen­ ters on Laozi’s ontology concerning the human realm, and the ideal personality of the zhenren (authentic person), which emphasizes Daoist naturalism. Laozi pays great attention to investigating how political order and social harmony can be achieved and maintained by following Nature. He is deeply concerned about hu­ man competition and desires fueled with pursuit of honor and social achievement, which he believes violate natural law and cause human strife and conflict. In both social and political realms, Laozi encourages the doctrine of nonaction (wuwei)—to govern without active interference—to establish and maintain social order and achieve political rule. Although Laozi believes fliat the evolution of and changes in the universe are governed by rules that are beyond human control, the naturalistic approach in Laozi’s philosophy is founded on the assumption that hu­ man existence and social evolution must submit to the dialectic nature of the uni­ verse. This means applying wisdom in social relations and political pursuits in order to achieve harmony between Nature and human beings. Despite the fact that Laozi’s philosophy provided a profound theory and contributed greatly to a model of human life, Laozi’s emphasis on the application of wisdom in guiding social in­ teractions was used by Huang-lao Daoism and Legalism as the basis for develop­ ing theories of political manipulation and trickery. The Daoist “authentic person” (zhenren) in the Zhuangzi is a transcendent crea­ ture who turns away from fame and wealth and keeps his spirit free from concern for possessions and glory. An ideal zhenren rejects any kind of political authority and opposes any doctrine that promotes political pursuit and social participation. The Zhuangzi idealizes the unfettered personality and simultaneously opposes any attempt toward political pursuit; hence, the Zhuangzi pursues absolute spiritual freedom, which enables man to overcome the distorting influences of society (civ­ ilization and conventions) and the ego-self (desire, honor, knowledge). As frie zhenren strives for complete liberty from society, he seems to transcend time, space, reality, and the distinction between self and others. He also strives to sub­ merge his life into the universe and reach an ideal realm in which he is free of de­ sires, attachments, and moral judgments (e.g., life and death, right and wrong.

xii

Preface

good and bad). Zhuangzi’s political theory is established on the absolute noninterference of government toward its people and opposes social rituals, penal law, and even political responsibility. Zhuangzi’s transcendent attitude toward in­ dividual life and political pursuit deeply influences Chinese intellectuals; his natu­ ralist point of view serves as a powerful relief for those who become political failures or retreat from the political arena. Part in investigates the strategic behavior of Chinese political leaders as repre­ sentations of the philosophy of self-protection as defined by Laozi, Huang-lao Daoists, and Legalist behavioral scientists. These ideals, it is illustrated, have had a deep and dynamic influence upon Chinese political leaders over time. Although wisdom pervades almost all Chinese philosophical schools of thought—such as Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, and Legalism—Daoism and Legalism place greater emphasis on the application of wisdom and cunning in social interactions and political pursuits. Unlike Confucianism and Mohism, which clearly distin­ guish between “wisdom” and “cunning,” Laozi makes no distinction between the two and deems all knowledge and wisdom as cunning and cleverness. Laozi holds a naturalist point of view in which everything in the universe submits to the natural law, and human existence and social evolution follow the dialectic nature of the universe. Laozi believes that the application of wisdom and strategy is the embodi­ ment of how human beings follow natural rule. There are, of course, different posi­ tions held by Laozi and the Legalists in interpreting wisdom and cunning. While wisdom and cunning in the Daodejing are considered as types of conventional knowledge, in the Legalist literature they are intentionally associated with each other. Laozi’s rejection of the distinction between wisdom and cunning was ma­ nipulated by Legalist theorists to justify Legalist political theory that insists that cunning and deception must be used in human relations. Like Daoism, in which wisdom is emphasized to ensure a better human existence, and Legalism, in which political manipulation is stressed to safeguard a ruler-centered political system, Chinese strategists prefer using manipulative tactics to resorting to force and vio­ lence to achieve military advantage. Ancient Chinese military classics and short treatises such as the Sunzi, the Simafa, and the Wiai deem warfee an intellectual endeavor based on the wise application ofphilosophical principles and knowledge associated with strategy, tactics, and calculation. In addition, social and political stratagems have penetrated popular culture and formed a highly ingenious, wide­ spread, and enduring tradition through the dissemination of idioms, traditional primers, novels, dramas, and stories. The behavioral science of Legalism is founded on the assumption that human nature is evil and human relationships are based on the calculation of exchange benefits. An enlightened ruler or political leader must use his power to control his subordinates by using secret tactics and trickery, manipulating political power, and implementing reward and punishment; therefore. Legalist political theory is based on the successful employment of three themes—political technique (shu}, political authority (shi}, and penal law {fa}—which ensure, maintain, and enhance control over subordinates. Political “method” or “technique” is employed by the

Preface

xiii

ruler or the political leader to prevent his power from falling into others’ hands and to effectively control his officialdom. Political authority (sht) provides a structural and a substantive domination of others through the use of physical power to com­ mand human resources. The Legalist system ensures that the entire state rests on the authority of the rulers; acceptance of authority is the central factor in the coer­ cion ofpower. Penal law (fa) is deemed by Legalists as an effective tool to achieve social order and political rule. When political authority is viewed as the locus of political power and central­ ized political power is the determinant for political and social order, the ruler’s role becomes crucial to securing peace and prosperity. Chinese political thought does not favor an institutionalized political system to control bureaucracy, but rather re­ lies on a ruler’s personal qualities to master officialdom; hence, the art of rulership is deemed essential to achieving a successful political reign. The art of rulership depends not only on skillful utilization of political strategy and cunning to safe­ guard the ruler’s power and control his officialdom, but also on the implementa­ tion of morality and ritual to promote harmony and social cohesion. With the increasing influence of Confucianism after the Han unification of China, the art of rulership required the monarch’s virtue to inspire the people and promote righ­ teousness and humaneness. Although penal law was imposed to achieve social or­ der, benevolence and morality played an increasingly important role in political rule, and gradually overpowered the emphasis on punishment. Hence, the Chinese political system has a long tradition of interactions between Confucianism and Le­ galism. The triumph of Confucianism over the official ideology was ultimately at the price of tolerating Legalist practices.

Acknowledgments

This book has benefited immensely from the critical commentary on earlier drafts by Brantly Womack, Shao-Chuan Leng, Kenneth W. Thompson, Ronald G. Dimberg, and Gilbert Roy. I sincerely thank each of them for their intellectual in­ terest and their scholarly efforts to strengthen this publication. I am deeply in­ debted to Julia Ching, who kindly read the entire manuscript, and her remarks on the text proved significantly valuable. I am especially grateful to Chen Jian for critiquing the manuscript and sharing with me his vast experience in the historical perspective of Chinese political thought. My students at the University ofVirginia have given me extensive comments on the manuscript, which greatly helped me to refine some of the analytical ideas in the book. Financial support from various institutions was also integral to the conclusion of this work, and thus 1 express my deepest appreciation to: the Institute for the Study of World Politics, the Sun Yat-Sen Scholarship Foundation (Lee Yuh Jie Dissertation Scholarship), and the Department of Government and Foreign Affairs at the University of Virginia. I also owe special gratitude to the following individu­ als who have cared for this project and assisted materially in its development: Dr. James T. Sabin, Catherine A. Lyons, Mildred G. Vasan, Marcia Goldstein, Nicole Coumoyer, Deborah Whitford, Leslie Billings, and Henry Lazarek. Special thanks are due to Ming Lung, librarian of Asian Languages and Cultures at the University of Virginia, who was unstinting with her time and technical expertise. My grati­ tude extends to Jolie A. Sheffer and Ron Riekki, both of whom provided editorial assistance and good conversation. My most profound debt is to my wife, Yanqing Sun. Without her unwavering, unconditional support and encouragement, this book could never have been under­ taken or completed.

Part I

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

___________________ 1____________________

Humaneness: Foundation of Confucian Political Ideology

Pre-Qin Confucian thinkers such as Confucius (551-479 B.C.), Mencius (372-289 B.C.), andXunzi (d. 238 B.C.) clearly distinguish individual worth from social status. While viewing ruler (Jun) and minister (chen) as different social di­ visions of labor, Confucianism deems the nobleman (Junzi) a special class whose members have distinctive individual worth, share commitment, and uphold a civilized tradition. The “nobleman” in Confucianism refers to those who have high-minded honor and integrity, largeness of heart and moral stature, refined cul­ tivation, and uncompromising adherence to the principles of the True Way. The junzi carries with him a strong sense of honor and a demanding code of conduct to safeguard justice and correct rulers against the abuse of political power. Although a nobleman is not necessarily a king, Confucianism encourages the nobleman to take high responsibility for government service and to fulfill his moral mission to transform the world. Hence, Confucianism does not discourage its noblemen from becoming powerful and even from taking positions as kings. To be sure, Confu­ cianism urges political leaders to follow the standard of the noblemen and gradu­ ally cultivate themselves into sage-kings (shengwang). Despite the fact that the sage-king exists only as a political ideal and never as a political reality, examining the personality of a nobleman is significant to under­ stand the personality of a Conftician sage-king. Critical examination of the frag­ mented materials of the early texts has identified that the sage-kings in ancient China were related to god-figures.' Deity figures such as the wise, learned, strong, and benevolent Yao and Shun are established as paragons of Confucian virtue for rulers to follow. In the%Mnzj, a great sage is defined as a deity figure “who has an awareness that extends to the Great Way, who is limitlessly responsive to every transformation, and who discriminates between the essential and inborn natures of each of myriad things.”^ According to the Xunzi, there is no way for human beings

4

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

to become or even follow a great sage because a great sage behaves like a god who can dominate myriad things in the universe? Although Mencius does not catego­ rize the sage beyond the human realm, he defines the sage as “the culmination of humanity.”^ Because the criteria for becoming a sage-king are nearly humanly im­ possible, no one in Chinese history except the deity figures Yao, Yu, and Shun has been crowned a sage-king. Even Confucius never aimed for the omnicompetence of the sage-king. His goal was to become a nobleman rather than a sage, although he has been honored as embodying the quintessence of sagely wisdom. The noble­ man is the embodiment of the Confucian personality and the carrier of the Confu­ cian moral mission and humanistic tradition. Although Confucius viewed the personality of the nobleman (junzi) as a combi­ nation of human virtues, the value of humaneness (ren) is the central component for a nobleman to achieve moral perfection and safeguard the Way. For Confu­ cianism, the criteria to be a junzi are to follow the Way, to cultivate humaneness {ren} and righteousness (yz), abide by propriety (/z), and perform brave and heroic deeds to realize justice. THE DAO IN CONFUCIANISM

The Way in Mencius’ philosophy is imderstood as a metaphor that signifies a process, a movement, and a dynamic unfolding of the self as a vital force for per­ sonal, social, and cosmic transformation.^ As the ultimate pursuit for Confucians is to devote themselves to the prevalence of the Way in the world, the junzi, who most perfectly has given up self, ego, obstinacy, and personal pride, follows not profit but the Way.® The Confucian Way, according to Tu Wei-ming, “addresses the question of the ultimate meaning of human existence.”’ It is not "a norm to be conformed to” but rather “a standard of inspiration that must be reenacted by ceaseless effort.”’ The goal of ceaseless human effort is established by Mencius as resting on the inherent goodness of human nature. Mencius stresses incessant self-cultivation to manifest the moral ability inherent in human nature. For Mencius, the ultimate goal for htxman beings is to cultivate themselves morally and spiritually to follow the Way in order to achieve sagehood, “the highest and the most profound mani­ festation of humaneness.” In this respect,ywnzi personality in Mencius’ perspec­ tive is a high moral character formed by ceaseless pursuit of the Way; hence, the Confucianjunzi is one who is willing to make ceaseless effort and never balks at any personal sacrifice in following the Way. In the Lunyu, the Analects, Confu­ cius deems following the Way to be the loftiest life goal of ajunzi, valued higher than human life itself: “In the morning, hear the Way; in the evening, die con­ tent’”’ To pursue an ideal humane society, Confucius changed ren, which origi­ nally meant the virtue of superior man, into a universal virtue. When ren is applied as a universal virtue, it retains a sense of kindness to inferiors in benevo­ lent government (renzheng). In practice, the attainment of the Way for an

Humaneness

5

individual requires incessant self-cultivation through dynamic interpersonal conduct and the manifestation of moral virtues in the social and political order. Although Xunzi’s emphasis on psychological development is quite different from the Mencian perspective, Xunzi (d. 238 B.c.) accentuates the vital impor­ tance of the Way to regulate political order. In contrast to the Mencian view about the inherent goodness of human nature, Xtmzi argues that “the nature of man is evil; his goodness is the result of activity.”’^ That is to say, human virtue is not in­ born but is to be “accumulated” by “the civilizing influence of teachers and laws.”" Because virtues come from education and learning from civilized society, according to Xunzi, the Way is “not the way of Heaven, nor the way of Earth, but the way followed by man, the way followed by the superior man.”*’ Despite differ­ ent interpretions of the origin of the Way, Xunzi, like Confucius and Mencius, stresses the importance of the Way in promoting the junzi personality and achiev­ ing sagehood. To pre-Qin Confucians, the promotion of the Way increases individual auton­ omy and encourages self-cultivation against the possible counterinfluence of po­ litical authority. In the Confucian perspective, if one is a superior one must be humble to listen to the advice from one’s subordinates and if one is a subordinate one must be brave to air one’s concern. What concerns Confucian thinkers is how a junzi, in facing the dominant political power, can preserve the principles of the Way and become a real “great man.” “He cannot be led into excesses when wealthy and honored or deflected from his purpose when poor and obscure, nor can he be made to bow before superior force.”*’ Pre-Qin Confucians believe that self-cultivation and self-completion provide the guarantee of the establishment of the Way. This explains why Confucianism emphasizes individual self-cultivation and depends on the extension of inner virtues into the external world; however, be­ cause the Way is embodied in the form of inner virtues, it lacks an objective and concrete form. The manifestation of the Way does not depend on a personal god or religious organization but rather on the individual’s high moral virtue. The prereq­ uisite to being a ConfucianJunzi is self-cultivation.

POLITICAL CONNOTATION OF REN There are various translations of ren in English. Never defined by Confucius,*'* ren is often translated as benevolence, love, altruism, human-heartedness, and man-to-manness.” While A. C. Graham views ren as “an unselfish concern for the welfare of others,”*^ Wing-tsit Chan views it as the most crucial value ofJunzi personality, around which the whole Confucian movement developed.*’ Tu Wei-ming also suggests that ren is subtly linked to virtually all other basic Confu­ cian concepts.*® As the most important value in achieving a humane world, ren or­ ders all other cardinal virtues.*’ Probably because of its vague definition, various explanations of ren are offered by different Confucian thinkers. Whereas pre-Qin Confucians deem ren the cen­ tral value from which all human virtues derive, the Neo-Confucians view ren as

I I

1

6

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

unselfishness fused with sympathy. In practice, according to Fung Yu-lan, ren is a talent for considering others.^® That is, one considers other people’s desires based upon one’s own desire. Ren is “the highest attainment of moral cultivation” and can only be achieved after rigorous effort.^’ Confucianism regards humaneness as the source of basic human feelings of em­ pathy and sympathy. In the Analects, Confucius lays humaneness in a supreme po­ sition among all the virtues: “If the will is set on ren, there will be no practice of wickedness.”’^ Whereas Mencius defines ren as “man’s mind,”” Xunzi views ren as love.” In fact, the notion of ren is held as love by almost all Chinese philosophy, including Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, and Legalism.’^ Tang Junyi, one of the leading modem Confucians, explains ren as the essence of our good nature, “be­ ginning with filial piety and flowing out as universal love, to all under Heaven and to all natural things.”’® Tang deems ren as the foundation of filial piety and altru­ ism. The moral consciousness of ren, for Tang Junyi, “is all-embracing love, which pervades, penneates, and fills Heaven and Earth as a whole.”” Because ren is the center of Confucian doctrine and a supreme value of human goodness, it must be safeguarded: “One will not seek to live at the expense of injuring ren and will even sacrifice one’s life to preserve ren.”” In discussing how ren links with other Confucian values, Fung Yu-lan argues that Confucian ren is embodied by the virtues ofzhong (loyalty) and shu (reciproc­ ity). That is, *'zhong and shu are the starting points of ren.”” In the Analects, Con­ fucius defines shu as a moral virtue—“never do to others what you would not like them to do to you.”’’’ Loyalty in Confucianism refers to a desire to consider others. Y. P. Mei even argues that all virtues such as love, reciprocity, loyalty, courage, and trustworthiness can be regarded as expressions of ren^ The ideal moral per­ sonality is “to hold oneself true to ren under all circumstances”;” that may help to explain why Confucius puts so much weight on ren to achieve the ideal personalty of the nobleman. In the Analects, ren is discussed a total of 105 times in 58 chap­ ters.” In explaining the relation between ren and the Way, Mencius defines ren as man. When ren and man are conjoined, the result is the Way.’** In explaining how to define a man who has achieved ren, Confucius states: “A man who has realized ren, wishing to establish himself, also seeks to establish oth­ ers; and wishing to fully manifest himself, also helps others to fully manifest them­ selves.”” In other words, in order to realize ren, one needs to start from individual self-cultivation and then extend one’s virtues toward others. In Confucianism, there must be an altruistic motive underlying one’s efforts from which a logical definition is drawn: to be a man of humaneness is to “love all men” as one loves oneself.’® In other words, Confucian humaneness means to do one’s utmost to de­ velop sympathy and manifest ardent love for others and to demonstrate one’s self­ less devotion to society. Even Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.), the leading theorist of Legalism, defines ren as requiring one “to love men joyously and from the inmost of one’s heart.”” Confucian pursuit of humaneness centers on transforming the world by promot­ ing man’s creative role. The divine (Heavenly) order in Confucianism is embodied

Humaneness

7

in human order itself. In Tu Wei-ming observation, Confucian humanism is nei­ ther secular nor transcendent, and does not aim exclusively to satisfy either human concerns or cosmic ones. Rather, “it is ‘anthropocosmic* in that it embraces a con­ cern for both the secular world here and now and the world beyond Taking care of the people (min) is one ofthe most important missions of Confucian political leaders. Thus, Confucian humaneness involves having a strong concern for both the people’s welfare and their suffering. In practice, the wealth of the peo­ ple depends on creating and safeguarding a harmonious world in which the rulers care for the people, who in turn have confidence in their rulers and support their rule. Whereas the role of the ruler is to protect, educate, and nurture the people, the role of the nobleman is to safeguard the common people by helping and advising the ruler. In Mencius’ perspective, upon taking a position as minister and official, a no­ bleman serves as an independent counsel to the ruler. For Confucianism, a govern­ ment must serve to achieve benevolence and justice for the common good; it is understood not in terms of power but in terms of moral ethics. This explains in part why open political contention is not a part of the Chinese culture. China has a long history of denying the public a place in politics, and it refuses to analyze openly or systematically its political process. There is a close relation between ren and yi (righteousness). Ren is attainable when the unconditional obligation (the action ofyf) is impregnated with an honest love and sense of fellow-feeling (also called sympathy) with others.’’ Confucius sees righteousness as “the substance of everything.’’ It is also a significant founda­ tion of thejunzi personality.^’ The virtue of righteousness is evident in any transac­ tion that is done unconditionally as a benefit to society or other people.*” Whereas relations between father and son in Confucian ethics originate from ren, as Tang Junyi explains, the relations between brothers are derived from yi.*^ Good relationships between fnends, as Tang further deduces, are based on cher­ ishing the same virtue of righteousness and following the same Way. Friendships are built on mutual respect for others’ spiritual personalities in horizontal relation­ ships. The relationship between a monarch and his minister should be of this sort, with consensus regarding the Way and a shared upholding of the virtue of righ­ teousness. The monarch’s benevolence and the minister’s loyalty should form a framework of mutual aspiration, which then extends down to the people.*” The virtue of righteousness is one of the most important features of ajunzi. The difference betweenJunzi and xiaoren (mean man) is righteousness: “The mind of Junzi is conversant with righteousness; the mind of the mean man is conversant with gain.”** AlthoughJunzi never deny their natural predisposition toward self­ interest, the pursuit of self-interest cannot undermine the moral virtue of righ­ teousness. In other words,7wziri must take righteousness into account when pursu­ ing self-interest. According to Confucius, "Wealth and rank are what every man desires; but if they can only be retained to the detriment of the Way, he must relin­ quish them. Poverty and obscurity are what every man detests; but if they can only be avoided to the detriment of the Way, he must accept them.”*’

8

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

BENEVOLENT GOVERNMENT

In ancient Chinese culture and philosophy, the concept of “unity of Heaven and man” {tianren heyi) is the foundation of all Chinese religions and all systems of in­ tellectual thought, such as Confucianism, Daoism, Buddhism, Legalism, and the Yin-Yang School. In the Shijing^ the Book ofPoetry, and in the Shujing, the Book ofDocuments, Heaven is described as the central source of moral order and the es­ sential force in maintaining human political and social orders. As Heaven is viewed as a supreme personal deity with superior moral force, its concept in die Analects remains the central religious connotation undergirding Confucian hu­ manism. The close relationship between human and natural phenomena leads to the conception that human conduct is reflected in acts of Heaven. Since human be­ ings are part of the natural order, any improper conduct on their part will cause dis­ order in the whole of nature. In early China, kings in kinship groups were regarded as semidivine figures and were deemed descendants of the demigods. These beings are the ultimate media­ tors between the divine and human beings, and were privileged to hear the voice of the gods, maintaining communication with the divine. Although the kinship sys­ tem restrained a king’s arbitrary exercise of authority, kings were deemed as de­ scendants from ancestors with shamanic and ecstatic powers and were granted ultimate control over state power. After China was united and Confucianism was established as the official ideology, the ruler was theorized as the Son of Heaven and was believed to act on behalf of Heaven to maintain order in society. Hence, he is perceived as a moral creature whose right conduct harmonizes with the unseen forces of nature. As the Son of Heaven maintains the universal harmony of man and nature on behalf of Heaven, it is logical to assume that the ruler would take re­ sponsibility for all that happens in nature and society. As a ruler’s moral conduct is linked directly with the principal causal force ofhistory, the ruler is regarded as the sage-king responsible for the collective obligations of the nation who, with the as­ sistance of a ruling vanguard, thereby deserves indisputable power and authority. Unlike the philosopher-king of the Platonic theory, who is the embodiment of wis­ dom, the Confucian sage-king is the perfection of moral personality. Although not all sages were kings, sageliness in early China definitely was regarded as the quali­ fication for rulership.’'® The exclusive connection between sagehood and kingship was significantly undermined with the gradual secularization of kinship as an in­ stitution, but it did not entirely erase the perceived need to maintain a shamanic character for kingship.*’ For Confucianism, Heaven is viewed as a symbol of a transcendent moral force from which the Mandate comes. When Han Confucians established Confucianism as the official ideology, Dong Zhongshu (197-104 B.C.) set up a perfect theoretical system which, on the one hand, established the sovereign’s authority by means of Heaven’s Mandate, and on the other hand, stipulated that a ruler must rule by fol­ lowing the example of Heaven (fatian erzhi). Although Xunzi’s social and politi­ cal ideas question the direct reference of Heaven to human society and in Xunzi’s

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definition (compared to Confucius and Mencius) the ideal noblemen rely less on the mysterious and utterly inscrutable ways of Heaven in history, Xunzi shares with both Confucius and Mencius the idea that good political and social orders regulated by humaneness {ren) and rituals (Zz) must be on some level embodied in the order of Heaven?’ The Mandate of Heaven has been regarded by Chinese culture as the philosoph­ ical foundation for a legitimate government. An ideal ruler, as defined by the Book ofDocuments, is one who “reveres Heaven, puts the interest of the people as a pri­ ority, rules the nation with morality, and fulfills his duty wisely and with sincer­ ity.”^’ The legitimacy of political rule relies on the good conduct or virtue of the ruler, which is the ethical sanction for preserving his rule. The sanction put on the ruler is powerful—bad conduct on his part will certainly cause Heaven to with­ draw its Mandate. A tyrannical ruler would be forcibly overthrown and the Man­ date would be transferred to a wise and deserving person who safeguards the principle of benevolence in governance; hence, the sanctions behind the Mandate of Heaven were more religious than moral or philosophical. It was said that the last ruler of Xia, a tyrant, was replaced by the ruler of Shang; six hundred years later, the last ruler of Shang, another tyrant, was replaced by the ruler of Zhou. In both cases. Heaven gave Mandates to the rulers of Shang and Zhou, respectively, to destroy the tyrants, even though the Xia and Shang people themselves had failed to overthrow their own rulers. The Mandate of Heaven justi­ fies the “right of rebellion” as the last resort of the people against tyrannical gov­ ernment. Under this theory, governments are censured by the people; Heaven’s Mandate is embodied in the people’s decision and is linked with the people’s con­ tentment. As the Zuozhuan indicates, “what the people desire will certainly be granted by Heaven.”^’ The Lushi chunqiu records a story about how a ruler needs to behave when the people suffer. Shortly after the ruler of Shang replaced the last ruler of Xia as the Son of Heaven, drought caused poor harvests for several years. The ruler of Shang begged Heaven for mercy and was willing to accept punish­ ment himself as long as the drought would disappear and the people would no lon­ ger suffer. As a sacrifice to Heaven, he shut himself in and pondered over his mistakes, cut his hair as a substitute for cutting off his head, and hurt his hand as a substitute for hurting his body. As his sincerity moved Heaven, Heaven dropped rain and bestowed the bumper harvest. ” The heroic deeds of the Shang ruler, who was willing to sacrifice himselffor the benefit of the people, have long been estab­ lished as a model for later rulers to follow. For a ruler, according to the Book of Documents, “it is the achievement of the people if a king rules the nation well; it is his fault alone ifthe king does not rule the nation well.”” Rebellions are justifiable when a government foils to preserve the virtue of benevolence against tyranny. An enduring tradition in Chinese culture is to blame the ruler whenever severe natural or manmade calamities occur. In any case, the people should not be blamed for their difficulties because they are merely objects needing care, protection, and sympathy. If the people suffer and the Way does not prevail, the blame lies with the ruler and his ministers. That is why Confucianism puts the responsibility for

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

transforming the world entirely on the ruler and his ministers. When Confucius de­ fined the Mandate of Heaven {tianming) as the philosophical foundation for kingship, he established a moral constraint on the rulers to protect the people. If a ruler fails to do so or if he persecutes the people, the Mandate theory implies the loss of this Mandate for the ruler and justifies a rebellion against him. This explains why the rulers in traditional China were always compelled to blame themselves pub­ licly when social crises occurred and popular discontent prevailed. For example, when facing severe political and economic crises caused by constant foreign ex­ pansion and natural disasters, in 69 B.C. Wudi of the Han issued an edict of blame against himself and asked for forgiveness by the populace. Gaozong (Zhao Gou, 1107-1187) in the Song dynasty issued an edict to put similar blame on himself when the empire failed to resist invading armies in 1128 A.D. When the peasant re­ bellion led by Li Zicheng (1606-1645) seized Anhui in 1628 and surrounded Beijing in 1644, Emperor Chongzhen (Zhu Youjian, 1610-1644), the last ruler of the Ming dynasty, issued the imperial edicts to denounce himself. The emperor blamed himself for imposing heavy taxes on the people and making the unforgiv­ able mistake of employing degenerate government officials.^’ “The nation gradu­ ally suffers because corrupt officials plunder the people and exhaust our national treasury; I live in the isolated palace and ignore their crime. It is my fault.” He emotionally condemns himself: I am the parent of the people, but I fail to protect them. The people are my children, but they cannot enjoy a peaceful life, watching the nation's lands fall into enemy hands. Who else should be blamed, if not me?

The central motive for a ruler’s self-blame is to regain the support of the people so that the empire can survive when the monarchy faces severe social and political crises. In Confucianism, one of the central political pursuits for the noblemen and the political elite is to carry out “benevolent government.” In practice, this means lov­ ing the people and benefiting the public. Upon taking a position in government, a junzi must be an “official similar to a parent” with a duty to “plan and worry ahead of the people and enjoy the fruits after the people.” Mencius defines ajunzi as one who shares both his pain and joy with the people—“the people will delight in the joy of he who delights in their joy, and will worry over the troubles of he who wor­ ries over their troubles.”^’ For a Confucian ideal government, the legitimacy of political authority depends on the people’s trust and faith; political and social orders are achieved by promot­ ing the autonomous moral sense of the people rather than by relying on punish­ ments and coercion. The Mandate of Heaven is embodied by the people’s will and “only those rulers who follow the will of the people can move Heaven.”^® Con­ sidering the fact that Confucian ideology is both sociopolitical and ethicoritual, a society regulated by Confucianism enjoys harmony and welfare and is transfig­ ured By a life of sacred and beautiful ritual in which all classes participate.^’

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Confucianism deems family the first school of virtue as well as the source of the values that make government benevolent. Familial relationships are established upon the following principle—“the father is benevolent, the mother is kind, the el­ der brother cares for his younger brother, the younger brother respects his elder brother, children have filial piety toward their parents” (Juyi, mud, xiongyou, digong, zixiao), the “Five Rules” (yvudian} defined by the Book ofDocuments.^^ There are fundamental differences between Confucius and Western classical thinkers such as Plato and Aristotle about the role of family. Plato questions the role of family in developing “public virtues,” the central source for an ideal polis. He is convinced that family, as a particular “private” group within the polis, is pri­ marily concerned with economic interests and therefore lacks the environment to promote intellectual development. Although Aristotle favors family more than Plato and credits the family with developing certain virtues, affections, and the im­ portant elements to maintain social order, he holds that the family practices control but not politics. According to Aristotle, as the head of the family dominates, other members are not allowed to participate in the political process equally. In contrast to both Plato and Aristotle, Confucius believes that love among members of a family and relatives is a natural step toward developing the moral character of good men for future government conduct. In this respect, “loving one’s relatives” and “loving the people” in Confucianism is transferable without contradiction. The familial affection channeled through harmonizing rituals and customs becomes the foundation for a Confucian benevolent government. The concept of benevolent government connotes two central aspects: ensiuing political and social order and promoting the natural affection of the people. Order in Confu­ cian benevolent government comes from the same hierarchy found in Western po­ litical institutions, but Confucian hierarchy fundamentally rejects the oppression of the populace and takes popular support as the condition for the legitimacy of po­ litical institutions. Confucianism believes that a good society depends wholly on the inherently moral intentions of good men, and the creation and sustenance of a benevolent government relies on the social and political leadership of morally superior men. The horrible experience of the Qin Empire (221-206 B.C.) proves the importance of how the values of benevolence must prevail in guiding the practice of a political authority. Although the state of Qin unified China in 221 B.C. and established a strong and efficient government, it lasted only fifteen years because of its ruthless penal laws and failure to follow Confucian benevolence. Confucius believes that the roots of goodness within the human heart are the foundation for creating a be­ nevolent government devoted to the wealth and prosperity of the people. Mencius is convinced that men are perfectible because they are by nature good and have an innate moral sense. Everyone is capable of becoming a sage through self­ cultivation and the emulation of models. Here, moral action is deemed an intrinsic worth and the moral agent is viewed as an end for pursuing a peaceful and harmo­ nious society. In an ideal Confucian society, the degree of one’s moral achieve­ ment determines his political and social status required by Confucian hierarchical

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

society based on rituals and humaneness. Confucius relied heavily on the ruling vanguard—an elite of moral “good men” who belong to a kind of transcendent, creative minority—to make good societies. The ruling vanguard in a Confucian benevolent government is never a “political class,” even in the administrative sense, but a kind of priesthood which shoulders moral responsibility to promote the spirit of humaneness. The ruling vanguard is viewed by Confucius as a group of moral beings who up­ hold virtue against human enor, especially against evil rulers. They provide the ruler with a rational and ethical sanction for the exercise of his authority, at a time when the ruler relies mainly upon the sanctions of Heaven’s Mandate. Confucian political theory deals mainly with a vanguard elite, but not an abstract “sover­ eignty.” Unlike Hobbes who relies more on the strength of the Sovereign Power rather than a ruler’s virtue derived from moral self-cultivation to achieve social and political order, Confucian thinkers are concerned mainly with how political figures behave as the models of benevolence and morality and help the common people to manifest their moral virtues. Given that the nature of benevolent government is to serve the general good and the central goal for a political authority is to protect the people, the populace is supposed to keep their trust and faith in their government. Even if they might be mistreated, they are compelled to keep their loyalty and conform unconditionally to authority. Despite the fact that an individual might complain about governmen­ tal unfairness, he accepts his fate without questioning the ways of authority. For most Chinese, frustration often results from their expectation that authority should be benevolent and fair and ought to take care of everything for the populace. Lucian Pye has observed that in Chinese culture there exists a profound contradic­ tion between an acceptance of the legitimacy of venting emotions over any form of mistreatment by authority and a sense of the propriety and wisdom of controlling feelings and accepting one’s situation fatalistically. Whereas it is acceptable, on some occasions and in some situations, for Chinese to rage in public, to cry out in anguish at having been mistreated, “it is deemed equally honorable to endure one’s sufferings stoically, to hold in one’s anger, and to accept the sovereignty of fate.”’’ The tendency to accept one’s situation is further reinforced when the duty of an in­ dividual is more important than his rights; Chinese culture always encourages an individual to “sacrifice the smaller self in order to fulfill the greater self’—the na­ tion. In fact, the idea of “benevolent government” is fundamentally established on the denial of the legitimacy of individualism and on the promotion of conformity. Anne Thurston also has observed that Chinese patriotism is always linked with a required blind adherence to political authority; patriotism is held by Chinese intel­ lectuals as the supreme value, so much so that they often become uncritical de­ fenders of the regime.^ Although political rule based on benevolence is the foundation of Confucian political thought, Confucian thinkers differ in terms of how to promote it. Compared with Confucius and Mencius, who rely heavily on individuals’ inner moral consciousness to comply with li (rituals) to promote a benevolent govern­

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ment, Xunzi emphasizes an externally imposed system such as penal regulations and institutions which rely on physical coercion to reinforce the regulations based on Zi?’ Although Xunzi shares with Confucius and Mencius the idea that the goal of political rule is to achieve the general welfare of society as a whole, Xunzi in­ sists that power, the crasser goal of the state, also needs to be taken into account whenever political authority strives for a harmonious society. According to Xunzi, anyone in society, even men of the highest moral attainment, desires rank, wealth, and power. As long as individuals behave correctly within the bounds of the sys­ tem defined by rituals, they have every right to expect generous rewards. In this re­ spect, as Benjamin Schwartz indicates, Xunzi’s ethics seem to be essentially utilitarian.^ Confucius and Mencius believe that the source of moral behavior is within individuals and deem the ruling vanguard a group of moral beings who pur­ sue the common good with pure motives. Disagreeing with both Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi questions the pure motives of the ruling vanguard in pursuing po­ litical careers by emphasizing a necessary consideration of the power and wealth of states. Despite his ethical utilitarianism, Xunzi shares with Confucius and Mencius the idea that the central concern for successful rule is achieving the self-cultivation and self-education of the people and manifesting moral virtue to encourage good government. MODERN PRACTICE OF POLITICIZED REN Confucian humaneness, rooted in a strong inner transcendence, features a pow­ erful idealism that is manifested as an impulse to change the world. This impulse comes from a sense of historical mission, socially intuitive knowledge, and a de­ sire to uphold the Way. It is certainly not conceived of as a pursuit for political power. What Chinese humaneness strives for is a society founded on trust and har­ mony among the people. Christianity relies on transcendent belief to relieve the pressures of the harsh realities ofnatural human existence; Indian Buddhism relies on meditation to reach an eternal ideal realm; fundamental Chinese culture, on the other hand, sees the world as a harmonious and intimate environment in which hu­ man beings and nature care for and help each other. The Chinese are willing to adapt themselves to the society in which they live in order to enjoy their lives, however limited. The concept of Chinese humaneness is based on harmony and in­ timate affinitive relationships among human beings and between human beings and Nature. Ifwe agree wiUi Leon Vandermeersch’s argument that Confucius’ hu­ maneness can be imderstood as graded love in a system of social stratification, then Chinese humaneness is based on a strong sense of affinity. The concept of ren combines altruism with nationalism and patriotism. Ren in modem China posits that individuals have a moral obligation toward their nation and that individual unselfishness and self-sacrifice are required for the general good. The modem notion of ren, however, is not viewed as universally applicable. Rather, it emphasizes differentiated affinity among members of its social groups. The application of ren in modem China has been limited to those who belong to

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

the identified groups such as “fellow countrymen” {tongbao}. The concept of ren among modem thinkers such as Liang Qichao and Yan Fu, for example, is related to self-assertion, self-restraint, and self-sacrifice for the qun (group, literally, flock or herd). In explaining why ren was applied only to tongbao, Liang Qichao, re­ vealing Darwinian influence, believed that it was the Chinese struggle to survive in the face of immoral imperialism. The notion oiren in Chinese Communist ideology has been interpreted differ­ ently. The “benevolent government,” the central concept of the Chinese ideal pol­ ity, had been identified by the Chinese Communists as a nation pursuing a proletarian dictatorship to “serve the people,” with the people being defined by Mao as “all classes, strata, and social groups that support and take part in Socialist construction.” All others who are not categorized as “the people,” of course, are the “enemies of the people” and must lose their right to be protected by a benevo­ lent government.®’ Armed by the Marxist-Leninist theory of class struggle, Mao claimed that enemies included foreign imperialism and the Chinese “exploiting class.” In making this assertion, Mao xmdermined Confucian love based on hu­ maneness and limited the spread of the feelings of reciprocity and empathy only to “comrades” (tongzhi} or “those with the same convictions.”®* This contrasts with Confucian hmnaneness, which advocates love of all people “within the Four Seas,” albeit to different degrees. Because the state apparatus, including the army, the police, and the courts, is “the instrument by which one class oppresses an­ other,” according to the Chairman, there is a requirement that no benevolence be accorded to reactionaries.®’ High degrees of group identification for purposes of categorizing the “comrades” (“sociocentricism,” as defined by Richard W. Wil­ son) act to block full recognition of others who are not members of the identified groups.®® Most political campaigns in the Mao era, such as patriotic indoctrination, rectification, “recalling suffering and remembering happiness” (yiku sitian), aroused the hatred of the enemies of the people and developed feelings of reciproc­ ity and empathy among the comrades. In fact, some political campaigns, in partic­ ular recalling suffering and remembering happiness, functioned as moralizing mass movements, perhaps even religious movements. Besides the cultural roots for differentiating benevolence and hatred toward dif­ ferent social groups, the creation of class conflict by the Chinese Communist Party was certainly strategically important. By creating antagonism between the rich and the poor and then helping the poor against the rich, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) won over the support of the poor, who constituted the maj ority of the population. Zhang Guotao admits that the CCP policy of confiscating lands from the rich and then distributing them to the poor at the end of the 1920s and in the early 1930s had nothing to do with socialism, the claimed goal of the Communist Party, for socialism means the nationalization of land and the socialization of pro­ duction rather than peasant uprising. Proceeding from this strategic consideration, the Communist Party was convinced that this policy could satisfy the poor’s desire for land, thereby rousing them to join the Communist army to fight for power against the Nationalists.®’ Although the artificial creation of classes was important

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for the survival and development of the Chinese Communist Party, dividing soci­ ety into classes was difficult for the CCP. In the E-Yu-Wan base area, as .Zhang Guotao indicates, the division of classes in the countryside was not apparent be­ cause the big landlords were only a handful of the population and the middle and small landlords, though numerous, were not rich.“ The notion of ren as the privilege of certain classes and social groups had a long history in Chinese culture, as an enduring tradition ofpoliticized Confucianism. Be­ cause the enemy was not deemed human, inhumane treatment of antagonistic classes and social groups has been a characteristic of Chinese monarchical culture. In traditional China, ruthless punishment under the politicized tradition was widely employed against the heterodoxy, often extending to the family and relatives of the punished. Both the Communists and the Nationalists in the twentieth century re­ fused to apply the virtue of humaneness to those who were defined as enemies. The Nationalists’ massacre of the Communists in the 1920s was justified as a necessity in “safeguarding the purity of the party.” Similarly, the Communists in the land re­ form movement in the late 1940s and early 1950s cruelly suppressed the so-called exploitative classes, and the Red Guards in the Cultural Revolution maltreated and persecuted the so-called five types of black elements. The doctrine of class struggle imported from Western Marxism-Leninism helped the Chinese Communists to clearly divide friends and enemies into camps and to create large numbers of class enemies who must be deprived of the treatment of humaneness. In this respect, the Communist benevolent government fundamentally contradicted the pre-Qin Confu­ cian humane political pursuits that mediated class conflict and applied the virtue of humaneness to the entire population. In other words, in Confucian political thought, the ultimate political end is to alleviate the conflict between friends and enemies and achieve social harmony. In Mao’s Communist ideology, the political end was to re­ alize an absolute egalitarianism in which there would no longer exist “three great differentiations.” This tendency to define the concept of humaneness according to classes during the Mao era is reflected in the words of the radical hero, Lei Feng: “Be merciless to your class enemies and be warm as spring toward your comrades.” In the 1960s, Communist social morality was directly linked to a requirement to hate the enemies of the people, as the political slogan propagated, “mercy toward the ene­ mies of the people is merciless to the people.” In the Cultural Revolution, the range of enemies was expanded throughout society, even within the party, the military, and the government. This explains why humaneness in the period of the Cultural Revolution was considerably distorted and undermined. Ba Jin, one of the most well-known wnters in modem China, expresses the evil side of human nature in the Cultural Revolution. He wonders why suddenly so many wolves and tigers appeared around him. In the period of the Cultural Revolution, when the distortion of the hu­ mane spirit reached its extreme, ren became a privilege limited to those who came from the same political camps. When an increasing number of people were vulnera­ ble to being declared “class enemies” in the Cultural Revolution, they lost their trust in the regime and society, a situation in which, to borrow Liu Zaifu’s words, the “wolf pack was everywhere.”^

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

BENEVOLENT GOVERNMENT IN MODERN REFLECTION

As Chinese political tradition puts human beings at the center of the universe, the value of populism is die foundation of Confucian political theory. The Chinese political thinkers believe that common aspirations of the people is the base of po­ litical stability and successful political rule; therefore the ruler must attach impor­ tance to the people. In Confucian thought, the dominant attitude towards the people is overwhelmingly benevolent and the criterion as a legitimate ruler is his moral obligation to take care of his populace. The ruling elite, especially the monarch, were vested by the Mandate of Heaven with full authority and unlimited power to rule the nation. The central component in the Mandate of Heaven referred to their responsibility to bring peace and pros­ perity to the people. The thought of attaching importance to the people means “protecting and favoring the masses.” Although various conditions and reasons, such as economic structures, international relations, and social conflicts, played a certain role in causing the development of their personalities and ideological ori­ entations, the residue of the traditional Chinese political tradition remained a pow­ erful influence on modem leaders. Despite great evolution, its central concept has not changed. Almost all modem political thinkers or leaders including Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao, Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, and Deng Xiaoping claimed the well-being of the masses as their central political pursuit and strove to establish a strong centralized government that protected the masses and provided wealth to the people. Benevolent government was viewed as the repre­ sentative of the collective interests of the people and as a cohesive organization that held the people together. Ideally, the government should take care of all its members, so no one should need to assert individual rights for the sake of individ­ ual interests. Chinese political thinkers believe that successful rulers rely on popular support derived from the people’s faith in the essential goodness and virtue of their rulers. They believe that a thriving and prosperous “holy world” with one heart and one mind could be achieved only when the principle “common aspiration of the peo­ ple” is treated as a central value by the nation’s rulers. The “people” was in the center of Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the People. In Maoist literature, “peo­ ple” and “mass” appeared frequently, forming the core of Mao’s political theory. Mao was convinced that any problem could be solved if he mobilized the strength of the masses. Along with Mao, Deng Xiaoping believed that the strength and soli­ darity of a party depended on its good relations with the population. Mao’s legacy in the Long March and the revolutionary era was his belief in the efficacy ofmass action. He was convinced that the masses remained a source of in­ finite moral energy. If this energy could be tapped, mobilized, and directed by the party, the masses would become a decisive force for achieving the communist rev­ olution and the nation’s industrialization and modernization. As a central principle in Yanan, party personnel were required to operate in close quarters with the masses. After 1949, a remarkable characteristic of the communist system in the

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Mao era was combining dictatorial leadership with mass participation via the party’s “mass line.” Implementing the tasks of attaching importance to the people relies on the self-consciousness of the ruling party; it never means to let the masses take the rights of political participation in their own hands. Despite claiming “democratic dictatorship of people” and that “people run their own house,” Mao carried out the way of “protecting and favoring the mass,” which carried on the heritage. The difference between Mao’s totalitarian regime and the traditional au­ thoritarian government lies in their approaches toward the populace. While “the traditional system was characterized by the domination of the elite over a passive population,” the Maoist totalitarian regime was characterized “by total mobiliza­ tion and active participation of the populace directed toward rapid social change, and by total political control which penetrate[d] to the grass roots.”’® Because the conflicts between the bureaucracy and the masses relied on the protection and fa­ vor of the govenunent, Mao believed it should be the ethics of the party to main­ tain contact with the masses. As Mao stressed, the policies of attaching importance to the masses could consistently be carried out only if the government “officers” could maintain purity of thoughts against the corruption of bourgeoisie on the souls of people. As for the “people-centered value,” Chinese political theory does not mean that the citizenry have voice or independent means of participation and the emphasis on popular support does not mean their trust of the inherent wisdom of popular be­ liefs. Rather, popular support is the foundation of political rule that, as a traditional proverb explains, functions like water, “supporting and overturning a boat (the ruler).” The term “masses” was related to a collective interest, not the interest of an individual among the general population. The human value in Chinese culture ac­ tually means the moral value of human beings; thus the imperatives of political stability and of orderly social life require a denial of self-interest and an individual is required to fulfill his moral obligation to devote himself to the collective inter­ ests and public good. Although “people-centered value” for both Marxism and Confucianism stresses the “people-people” relations, there were vital differences between them: the theoretical core of Marxism stresses the “inner relations of the individ­ ual,” which is viewed as the prerequisite of people-people relations, while China’s “people-centered value” heavily ignores “individual value” but empha­ sizes “people-people relations.” Although the Soviet Union in the Stalininist era also depreciated individuals, Stalin gave priority to material over people while Mao gave priority to collective people over individuals. The Soviet Union over­ stated the “material-centered value” and changed the Marxist theory of economic basis into “economy-centered theory.” China not only criticized “economy-centered theory”, but also depreciated the significant function of eco­ nomic basis. Considering the irreconcilable conflicts between Soviet “mate­ rial-centered value” and China’s “people-centered value,” after the founding of the PRC Mao sought to weaken the influence of the Stalinist economy-centered theory on China’s economic policy by advocating the mass line and later “the

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

class struggle,” which stressed the decisive factor of the human being on eco­ nomic construction. An enduring tradition of the CCP is its emphasis on popular support, which has been viewed as a central principle of legitimacy for the Chinese Communist Party. The success of mass mobilization directed by the party’s mass line ensured a close link between the party’s interests in pursuing ruling power and the wealth of the rural poor peasants, the majority of China’s population. The mass line, one of the three “magic weapons” (fabao} defined by Mao for the CCP’s triumph over the Nationalists, was deeply rooted in Confucian people-centered value. In the Cul­ tural Revolution, mass movement was pushed toward an extreme by Mao in order to defend utopian socialism against the bureaucracy. Mao’s abuse of mass move­ ment in the Cultural Revolution caused a national disaster and lost support both in­ side and outside of the party. Shortly before he died, Mao admitted that the Cultural Revolution had cost the popular support of the party.” The primary task for Deng Xiaoping in the post-Mao period was to regain popular support. His po­ litical and social programs included the party’s reaffirmation of the principle of seeking truth from facts, the efforts to improve the life of the population, and the party’s commitment to allow the citizen to have more political freedom. To gain support from the population, Deng expanded the categories of the “people” by re­ classifying the overwhelming majority of members of the former “exploiting class,” such as “former landlords” and “former capitalists,” as ordinary members of their local communities. The intellectuals, who were distrusted by Mao, were defined as an important part of the proletariat and were praised as “precious wealth” of the socialist construction. In modem Chinese political thought, the notion of benevolent government is re­ lated to at least three central components: social equality, wealth ofthe people, and national greatness. Social equality refers to the equal distribution of social sources and equal opportunity for political participation and it is the basis for a “Great Har­ mony” that has been a central pursuit for several generations of modem Chinese thinkers from Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao to Sun Yat-sen. Equality within the ranks of the people is often set forth as an ideal; popular resentment and rebellions are often treated as a symptom and result of injustice and the enormous gap be­ tween rich and poor. This explains why egalitarianism is always one of the central goals for an ideal Chinese government. The speedy consolidation of the People’s Republic after 1949 was, of course, based on the universalization of the Yanan legacy. The virtue of egalitarianism was one of the most endiuing traditions of Mao’s political programs. In his later years, Mao even put egalitarianism toward an extreme as he viewed backwardness as a positive condition for a reservoir of revolutionary energy and a source of moral purity. Mao strove for a society with minimum status differences among oc­ cupations, with minimum income differences, and with professionals capable of rising above their occupational norms to attain a broad view of societal needs. Mao’s version of egalitarianism was derived from the foundation of traditional be­ nevolent government combined with the Marxist image of communism—people

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would work for pleasure and eat without paying, they do not need wages because goods would no longer be produced for exchange but would be allocated on the ba­ sis ofneed; the community would replace the patriarchal family system for provid­ ing security and education to its members. It should be acknowledged that Mao’s success after 1949 in maintaining a general equity of distribution, combined with attaining social peace and order and restoring China’s national dignity, helped the Chinese Communist Party achieve overwhelming popular support. In addition, the modem Chinese thinkers view benevolent government as a po­ litical organ to fill basic economic needs and provide education for the population so that the people can enjoy peaceful life and pursue self-development. Deng Xiaoping particularly emphasized the importance of the party’s task in promoting the wealth of the people. In order to ensure the CCP’s leadership of society it was necessary to demonstrate the material advantages. “To build socialism, it is neces­ sary to develop the productive forces. Poverty is not socialism.”’’ In the later 1970s and the 1980s, Deng Xiaoping’s economic reform ensured the increasing wealth of the population, thereby enjoying overwhelming support from both the party and the general public. A nation’s greatness comes with its ability to protect its population, resist for­ eign aggression, and safeguard national dignity. For modem Chinese political leaders—Chiang Kai-shek, Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping—nationalism and pa­ triotism link up their concern with the fate of the nation—a concern which they shared with the cultural heritage of the past. Modem Chinese nationalism arose under China’s wealth and power against foreign imperialism. A central concept of benevolent government in modem China was establishing a strong and power­ ful nation against imperialism. Both Sun Yat-sen’s Three Principles of the Peo­ ple and Mao Zedong’s utopian socialism reflect this idea. The KMT and the CCP were bom in a nationalist milieu in which national independence and unity were a priority. The central concern for Chiang Kai-shek was how a united China could be achieved to restore China’s greatness and dignity. His efforts to pursue national unity vastly overshadowed all other problems. When Chiang targeted the unequal treaties as the roots that caused China’s humiliation and other mod­ em ills, such as the spread of famine, the breakup of the family, selfishness, the use of narcotics, and profit-seeking materialism, Chiang successfully won popu­ lar support and consolidated his leadership. Chiang’s version of “benevolent government” referred to the state control of economic life, land, and labor (but not capital) as factors of production, and the masses as farmer-soldiers, which matched with Mao’s socialist version exercised during the Great Leap and the Cultural Revolution. In particular, Chiang was convinced that the government should plan the people’s livelihood and control and restrict their wants, thus, combining “benevolence” with “justice.” Chiang Kai-shek put China’s unity as priority and strove for its solidarity, which undoubtedly consolidated the legiti­ macy of Chiang’s political rule. The three components for a benevolent government must maintain a certain bal­ ance and not one should develop toward the extreme. Resistance of the system

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

20

would arise if balance is lost. To eliminate the communists and achieve national unity, Chiang connived the rich to exploit the poor and ignored die severe social in­ equalities in the mid-1940s, which directly contributed to die collapse of the nation­ alist government. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Mao took a radical approach to developing egalitarianism, which plunged the Chinese into poverty and brought China’s economy into disaster. Because of dwindling support, Mao was forced to withdraw and had to allow his associates to restore economic order. When Deng Xiaoping abandoned Mao’s egalitarianism and promoted a socialist free market for increasing the wealth, social cohesion suffered because of enormous gaps between the rich and the poor, massive proletarianization, and greater social alienation. Deng has to make the initiatives to provide certain protection for the disadvantaged citi­ zens. The mechanism of Chinese political rule influenced by the ideas of traditional benevolence functions as an alarm against extreme policies that might cause na­ tional crisis or disaster. NOTES 1. See Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 60. 2. Xunzi, 31:355. ZZJC ed.; John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, Vol. 3. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 261. 3. Xunzi, 31:356. 4. Mencius, 7:288. ZZJC ed. 5. Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University ofNew York Press, 1985), p. 94. 6. Herbert Fingarette, Confucius—The Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers. 1972), p. 79. 7. Tu Wei-ming, Way, Learning, and Politics Essays on the Confucian Intellectual (New York: State University ofNew York Press, 1993), p. I. 8. Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought, p. 94. 9. £unyu,4:78, ZZJC ed.; Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (London: G. Allen and Unwi Waley, 1945), p. 103. 10. Aunrj, 23:289. ZZJC ed. 11. Ibid.

\1. Xunzi,Z-.ll. 13. Mencius, 6:246. ZZJC ed.; D. C. Lau, Mencius, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984), p. 117. 14. Wing-tsit Chan, “Chinese and Western Interpretations of Jen (Humanity),” in Jour­ nal of Chinese Philosophy 2 (1995), p. 109. 15. Wing-tsit Chan, “K’ang Yu-wei and the Confucian Doctrine of Humaneness {Jen}," in Neo-Confucianism, Etc.: Essays by Wing-tsit Chan, ed. Charles K. H. Chen (Hanover, N.H.: Oriental Society, 1969), p. 249. 16. A. C. Graham, Disputers of the Tao (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), p. 19. 17. Wing-tsit Chan, “The Story of Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind: Essen­ tials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Cen­ ter Press, 1967), p. 33. 18. Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought, p. 87. 19. Ibid., p. 81.

Humaneness

21

20. Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit ofChinese Philosophy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1947), p. 17. 21. Ambrose Y. C. King, “The Individual and Group in Confucianism: A Relational Per­ spective,” in Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values, ed. Don­ ald J. Munro (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1985), p.57. 22. Lunyu, 4:75. 23. Mencius, 11:464.

24. Xunzi, 21-324. 25. Wing-tsit Chan, “Chinese and Western Interpretations,” p. 108. 26. Tang Junyi, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials ofChinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 197. 27. Ibid., p. 197. 23. Lunyu, 15:337. 29. Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, p. 17. SO.Lwnyu, 15:343. 31. Y. P. Mei, “The Basis of Social, Ethical, and Spiritual Values,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 153. 32. Ibid., p. 153. 33. Wing-tsit Chan, “Chinese and Western Interpretations,” p. 107. 34. Mencius, 14:575. 35. Lunyu, 6:134. 36. Ibid., 12:278. 37. Han Feizi, 20:96. ZZJC ed. 38. Tu Wei-ming, The Confucian World Observed (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1992), p. 18. 39. Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, p. 16. 40. Lunyu, 15:342. 41. Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, p. 16. 42. Tang Junyi, Tang Junyiji [The selected collections of Tang Junyi] (Beijing: Qunyan chubanshe, 1993), p. 330. 43. Ibid., p. 330. 44. Lunyu, 4:82. 45. Lunyu, 4:76; Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 102. 46. Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China (Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cam­ bridge University Press, 1997), p. 35. 47. Ibid., pp. 101, 171,174. 48. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 315-316. 49. Shangshu jinguwen zhushu, 16:3b. SBBY ed. 50. Chunqiu zuozhuan zhengyi, 40:7b. SBBY ed. 51. Liishi chunqiu, 9:86-87. ZZJC ed. 52. ShangshuJinguwen zhushu, 6:6a. 53. Fan Shuzhi, Chongzhen zhuan [Biography of Chongzhen] (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1997), p. 546. 54. Ibid., p. 547. 55. Mencitis, 2:70. 56. Maoshi zhengjian, 18:8b. SBBY ed.

22

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

57. Schwartz, The World oflhoughl in Ancient China, p. 117.

SZ.Shangshujinguwenzhushu, 59. Lucian W. Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre: China's Political Culture (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1988), p. 54. 60. Anne F. Thurston, Enemies of the People (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1987), pp. 294-301. 61. Xunzi, 8:151. 62. Schwartz, TTje World of Thought in Ancient China, pp. 299-300. 63. Mao Zedong “On the Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People,” in Se­ lected Works ofMao Zedong, Vol. 5 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1977), p. 385. 64. Cihai [Sea of words]. Vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 1979), p. 449. 65. Mao Zedong “On the People’s Democratic Dictatorship,” in Selected Works ofMao Zedong Vol. 4 (Peking: Foreign Languages Press, 1961), p. 418. 66. Richard W. Wilson, “Moral Behavior in Chinese Society: A Theoretical Perspec­ tive,” in Moral Behavior in Chinese Society, ed. Wilson and Greenblatt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 12. 67. Zhang Guotao, Wode huiyi [My recollections], Vol. 3 (Hong Kong: Mingbao yuekan, 1974), p. 975. 68. Ibid., pp. 975-976. 69. Li Zehou and Liu Zaifti, Gaobie geming [Saying goodbye to the revolution] (Hong Kong: Cosmos Books Ltd., 1995), p. 111. 70. Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: The Univer­ sity of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 13. 71. When Mao’s health condition dramatically deteriorated in the early summer of 1976, he told several members of the Politburo that he was worried about the possible leadership crisis after his death. He said that he had done two [important] things in his life: his achieve­ ment in building the People’s Republic and his efforts in launching the Cultural Revolution. The former, according to Mao, won an overwhelming public support. For the latter, how­ ever, “there were not many supporters but a lot of opponents.” See Li Yau, Zaisheng zhongguo: zhonggong shiyijie sanzhong quanhuide qianqian houhou [Reviving China: be­ fore and after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Congress], Vol. 1 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1998), p. 91. 72. Deng Xiaoping, Deng ^^aopingwenxuan [Selected works of Deng Xiaoping] Vol. 3 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1993), p. 223.

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Ritualism: Autonomous Moral Personality versus Politicization

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATION OF RITUAL Instead of relying on fear and punishment to achieve social order, Confucianism depends heavily on social ritual (/f). In an ideal Confucian society, li is deemed as a basis for the law and penal law is established to enforce li. Li, as a determinate fac­ tor in Chinese culture, defines the sociopolitical order and functions as the lan­ guage through which the culture is expressed. It is an important vehicle to mold and change people’s attitudes or habits based on the social order. Confucianism views society as a system of roles that form a ritual structure. When one plays or fills a societal role, one follows the ritual of that role and conforms to its //.' Li prominently and pervasively orders society and dominates formal legal institu­ tions. The notion of li “is very broad, embracing everything from manners to me­ dia of communication to social and political institutions.’’^ Julia Ching describes li as “customary, uncodified law internalized by individuals and governing gentle­ men in their personal and social lives in their behavior toward the spirits as well as the rest of the world.’’’ As li serves to socialize individuals and cultivate the Confu­ cian personality, ren can be attained by ceaseless self-cultivation manifested through ritual {li}. Therefore, li is valued not for role performance but for being “the raw stuff of humaneness.” Herbert Fingarette views li as “holy ritual” or “sacred ceremony.” The defining characteristic of Confucius’ teaching, according to Fingarette, “is the use of the language and imagery of li as a medium within which to talk about the entire body of the mores, or more precisely, of the authentic tradition and reasonable conven­ tions of society.”* Fingarette further observes: Rite brings out forcefully not only the harmony and beauty of social forms, the inherent and ultimate dignity of human intercourse; it brings out also the moral perfection implicit in

24

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

achieving one’s ends by dealing with others as beings of equal dignity, as free coparticipants in //?

The prevalence of li, in Fingarette’s view, helps to promote the moral socialization of individuals, thereby achieving social harmony. Like law, li also models individ­ uals by providing sanctions to guard against evil and to encourage individual moral conduct guided by social criteria. Xunzi’s perspective that human nature is evil particularly values die role of ethical and political li to restrain and control hu­ man desires. Although Xunzi shares with Mencius the transferability and perfect­ ibility of human nature, Xunzi questions one’s ability for self-developing moral virtues, a central assumption made by Mencius. According to Xunzi, men cannot rely on their inner moral consciousness to adjust and restrict their passions and de­ sires. To control human passion and desire, human beings must follow an exter­ nally imposed system and internalize social rituals. Social order in Chinese society, as Hall and Ames observe, is a harmony achieved through personal participation in a ritually constituted community rather than through laws or customs. There is a considerable difference between the Western socie^ oflaws and the Chinese ritual community, which emphasizes social harmony achieved through personal ritualized roles and relationships.^ In Xunzi’s perspec­ tive, the reinforcement of external penal rules hardly achieves the voluntary compli­ ance of the populace. But if a society is regulated by the rules of li, which is internalized by education and moral suasion, the people will conscientiously ob­ serve discipline and view the safeguarding of social order as their moral obligation. As Conftician rituals (li) are closely related to the socialization of individuals’ be­ havior, Confucian philosophy was founded on a rejection of hemiiticism and moral theories that emphasize other-worldliness. Moral personality must be concretely manifested through moral conduct in society and concern for real human life. Li in Confucian ethics serves to distinguish different moral behaviors and demonstrate humaneness. Rituals function to cultivate humaneness and humaneness is embodied within rituals. In Confucius’ perspective, the original ideal of “subduing one’s self and returning to rituals” serves to realize humaneness in society.’ The pursuit of hu­ maneness perfects an individual’s moral personality by following established social rituals. In fact, the concept of li in the Analects is primarily related to individual vir­ tue based on behavioral propriety. Confucius views ren as one’s inner moral virtue derived from self-cultivation to follow propriety. A complete overcoming of selfish­ ness becomes an external manifestation of one’s cultivated humaneness. When asked to explain the meaning of humaneness (ren), Confucius states: To completely overcome selfishness and keep to propriety is ren. If one day everyone [in the world] overcomes selfishness and keeps to propriety, the entire world will return to ren. Does ren come from oneself, or from others? ’

The realization of individual humaneness relies on self-cultivation and learning for oneself, to borrow Confucius’ own words, “thejunzi seeks within himself.”’ Of course, this self is not an isolated individual. Rather, he exists in a complex rela­

Ritualism

25

tionship with other selves, and the accomplishment of his self-cultivation can be achieved only through dynamic interactions with others and active participation in transforming society. To a certain extent, li is also related to the idea of concession, which serves to promote a harmonious society and avoid human conflicts. In fact, propriety and concession in Confucian ethics are regarded as the duties of the individual toward others."’ Because li is deemed a duty, in Fung Yu-lan’s observation, “the content of li also is the benefit of others.”" Confucianism values ritual as an important mechanism for maintaining social and political order. Ifsocial norms are regulated by rituals, individuals will follow them. The abidance of rituals is the duty of the populace and the ruling class, including the ruler of the nation. Humane order in society can be maintained as long as everyone respects and follows the established rituals. In particular, the ruling class must comply with established social norms and also set themselves as models for the populace to emulate. In the Analects Confucius states, “If a ruler loves li, file people will not dare to be irreverent.”*^ “When a ruler loves to observe the rules of li, the people will be easily managed.”" £/’s function lies in establishing humane social and political order and in culti­ vating the moral personality of individuals. The fundamental purpose of li is not political, social, religious, or aesthetic accomplishment, but the perfection of the autonomous moral personality of individuals. Confucius believes that the moral personality can b^ attained through the gradual influence of rituals, because rituals can cultivate religious sentiment; hence, li is “a virtue combining outward form and inner spirit.”’^ This explains why Confucius refused to depend on law for po­ litical rule and social order. Unlike law, which deals only with crime, li influences all aspects of human life. Under an imposed law, individuals feel constrained to abide by social regula­ tions in order to avoid being punished. In a society governed by li, individuals would not be motivated to abide by social order because of a fear of punishment. Rather, they would be willing to comply with the established social norms and to safeguard social solidarity, thereby achieving a harmonious secular order in the man-centered society. In fact, in the ideal Confucian society, everyone can achieve moral self-perfection and everyone is constrained by shame and moral integrity. Everyone voluntarily conforms to the established social norms to protect their in­ tegrity and avoid losing face. Through li, Confucianism cultivates inner con­ sciousness, and through society, a sense of shame. Confucius views the sense of shame as a deep inner sense of self-respect instead of simply the “shame ethic” im­ posed by society to constrain individuals. Li here means to “constitute a certain form for embodying true sentiment.”" Confucius’ central motive in promoting rit­ ual is to create quality people who refine and order themselves and stand in rela­ tionships defined by “creativity” rather than “power.”** Li helps to achieve a social order generated by individual moral volition. In other words, under the influence of li, individuals’ compliance with social order is not the result of imposed external pressure, but is a natural extension of inner virtue and a desire to pursue the “just” order of human society.

26

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

POLITICIZED RITUAL

In practice, ritual promotes the establishment of one’s moral personality based on inculcating social norms such as social harmony, which is one of the central po­ litical pursuits of Confucianism. In the Analects, the requirements of li are laid out as a series of proper behaviors that instruct men to “look at nothing in defiance of ritual, to listen to nothing in defiance of ritual, to speak of nothing in defiance of ritual, never to stir hand or foot in defiance ofritual.”*’ The realm of humaneness is reached by internalizing the established social rituals. In other words, one’s inner goodness and humaneness are manifested if this internalization becomes one’s conscientious outward action. When one melds outside social rituals into one’s in­ ner desires and one’s conduct coincides with outside social order, then one’s moral self-cultivation has reached the realm of humaneness and achieved the “unity of Heaven and man” (tianren heyi). Li functions as a driving force for harmonizing social norms with one’s inner desires and promotes the manifestation of human virtues in society. In explaining li as a vehicle for socializing and indoctrinating in­ dividuals and promoting their virtues, Hall and Ames point out: Although ritual practices initially lure the performer into social relationships with the stability and acceptability of their authorized forms, they are not simply given standards of appropriateness sedimented within a cultural tradition that serve to shape its participants in predictable ways. Ritual practices also have a creative dimension. In this sense, they are more exhortative than prohibitive. Rituals inform the participant of what is proper only to the degree that they are performed by him. Beyond any formal social patterning is an open texture of ritual that is personalized and reformulated to accommodate the uniqueness and the quality of each participant. From this perspective, ritual is a pliant body of practices for registering, developing, and displaying one’s own sense of cultural importances. It is a vehicle for reifying the insights of the cultivating person, enabling one to reform the community from one’s own unique perspective, and ultimately, to leave one’s own mark on the tradition.”

The Confucian tradition of moral self-cultivation achieved by following rituals has powerfully influenced the personality of Chinese intellectuals throughout history. Politicized Confucians, however, pushed socialized ritual to the extreme in an ef­ fort to support autocratic monarchical power. When self-cultivation and self­ completion are linked with ritual socialization, individual autonomy has to submit to social norms such as the interests of the monarch and collectivism. Even during the period of Communist rule, the virtue of self-cultivation was paralleled by the Chinese Communist practice of self-criticism.*’ In order to achieve the internal­ ization of these virtues, one must constrain oneself, repress one’s desire and sacri­ fice self-interest—virtues that the politicized Confucians have emphasized heavily. For the politicized Confucians, the central purpose of constraining oneself through rituals is to achieve political order, which is realized by gradually cultivat­ ing one’s inner values in the socially preferred direction. The pursuit to repress one’s desire and sacrifice self-interest promotes uncon­ ditional adaptation to the outside world. In order to follow established social ritu­

Ritualism

27

als, one has to constrain oneself or hide one’s true feelings. This pattern is strengthened if the ruling class enforces social order and manipulates the inter­ pretation of the dominant Confucian doctrine in order to achieve compliance among the elite and the populace. In traditional authoritarian China, the monarch usually had powerful influence over the establishment of rituals and the interpre­ tation of their content. The primary emphases of rituals were related to achieving absolute loyalty of the populace to the monarch and to maintaining the empire’s social stability. Once rituals are linked to political power, they inevitably serve the needs of po­ litical rulers and lose their original essence as defined by pre-Qin Confucians. As a standard to define individual role based on social status, die notion of li in the early Han dynasty greatly emphasized achieving political and social order rather than promoting the moral self-cultivation of individuals. Jia Yi (200-168 B.C.) defines li as the foundation for stabilizing the nation and establishing the political system and also as a criterion to distinguish “an honorable from a humble person” and “a stronger from a weaker person.Confucius does not use li to distinguish the peo­ ple strictly based upon their social status and government positions; he is also con­ cerned that political power uses li to establish the unquestionable authority of the rulers. Mencius relates li to the source of human morality rather than a standard to de­ fine political order based on hierarchy. Mencius tends to promote an equal relation between a political leader and his followers: “If a prince treats his subjects as his hands and feet, they will treat him as their belly and heart.... If he treats them as mud and weeds, they will treat him as an enemy.”^’ The Confucian dominance of the official ideology in the Han dynasty made the politicization of Confucian li in­ evitable. In order to strengthen the authority of the ruler, for example, Zhangdi (56-88 A.D.) in the Later Han imposed the Three Cardinal Bonds proposed by Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.) as the official ideology (the absolute obedience of a minister to­ ward his ruler, a son toward his father, a wife toward her husband). Li imposed by political needs had become a tool for fettering an individual’s thought and stran­ gling the individual’s self-autonomy. This explains why the May Fourth Move­ ment in the early twentieth century, which appealed for a total abandonment of Confucianism and mainly targeted Confucian li, influenced Chinese society so profoundly. It is also understandable why Max Weber confuses the original Con­ fucian doctrine (the “great tradition” of Confucianism) established by pre-Qin Confucians with the official ideology (the “politicized tradition” of Confucianism) manipulated by monarchs and politicized Confucians. According to Weber, the function of the Confucian ethic is to force “adjustment to the world,” while “the in­ dividual necessarily lacked an autonomous counterweight in confronting this world.What Weber had seen was a politicized li that served to support the auto­ cratic monarch and constrained individuals’ creativity and self-autonomy. With the development of an autocratic polity, rituals in traditional China be­ came highly politicized in almost all human relations. Enforced rituals established hierarchical relations in all social settings, such as the relationships between an in-

28

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

dividual and his clan, family, or the social group to which he belonged. Because compliance with rituals was directly linked to the moral virtues of individuals, sac­ rificing oneself to follow rituals became an important virtue in attaining a moral personality; thus, it is understandable that the Chinese are often seen as the antithe­ ses of the “autonomous individual” {duli renge)?^ Instead, individual responsibil­ ity, individuality, love, freedom, equality, and self-expression are melded into the collective needs of life that “render it indispensable for the individual to blend har­ moniously with a group.”^'’ Rituals were imposed on individuals and were stipu­ lated as behavioral standards. One must behave according to one’s role in the established system of the ritual society and comply with the social groups estab­ lished by ritual order (e.g., clan). In fact, ritual society creates situations in which one might be both a master and a servant.One could behave unrestrictedly to­ ward one’s children as a father, while complying unconditionally with the leader ofhis clan as a member of the "great family.” Without a doubt, politicized li played a role in stifling individuality. Politicized li contrasts fimdamentally with the pre-Qin Confucian U based on promoting self-autonomy and the perfection of in­ dividual moral personality. Although autocracy in traditional China stemming from politicized li interfered with the Confucian goal of developing independent individual personalities, Con­ fucian humaneness still remained the fundamental aspect of the Confucian tradi­ tion. Throughout history, Chinese intellectuals have striven for an independent moral personality through self-cultivation of Confucian humaneness. Peter Bol has observed that the history of Chinese thought is a history of criticism, and the intellectual culture of the last 1,000 years has been marked by self-conscious thought about values.^^ The spiritual tradition of Confucianjunzi has long centered on the dignity and internal autonomy of the individual. Influenced by this tradi­ tion, Chinese intellectuals have demonstrated a strong sense of historical mission, obligation to society, and concern for the fate of their nation. Considering that politicized li undermines the spirit of Confucian humaneness, Chinese intellectuals have striven to put ren over li in an effort to safeguard the Confucian humane tradition. Their fearless criticisms of the autocratic polities and preservation of the Way in Chinese history is a true manifestation of Confucian humane spirit. However, despite the great efforts made by Chinese intellectuals to devote themselves to their mission, the conflict between ren and li has been a di­ lemma for Chinese intellectuals throughout history. Considering that Confucian­ ism, theoretically, is unable to establish an objective and effective system to guide and constrain li, and that ren and li are always intertwined, li under the cover of ren is often manipulated by the ruling class. Moreover, Confucianism, especially Neo-Confucianism, has relied heavily on self-purification of the human soul and has put significant weight on the idealization of moral self-cultivation and self­ fulfillment while putting little emphasis on monitoring the manipulated social rit­ ual. The moral criterion is not based on objective and consistent social norms but on one’s subjective judgment influenced by current social rituals. This undoubt­

Ritualism

29

edly predisposes a tortuous process for the development of Confucian humane tra­ dition in Chinese history.

RITUAL AND SELF-FORBEARANCE Confucianism emphasizes that the etiquette of ritual is the external manifesta­ tion of internal morality. Although a junzi is required to demonstrate courteous behavior in human affairs, he is not allowed to compromise principles simply for the sake of courtesy. Confucius sees thejunzi as a model for both inward quali­ ties and outward appearances. These outward appearances include “high stan­ dards of deportment and dress, and a meticulousness in one’s use of things, not only for their moral and aesthetic value, but especially for their social implica­ tions.”” From the angle of aesthetics, Confucius believes that an individual’s in­ tention and his exercise of internalized moral and aesthetic values can promote the socialization of rituals and the prevalence of propriety, thereby achieving so­ cial and political order. In the Analects, Confucius establishes a set of behavioral standards and suggests that the junzi sincerely practice these outward appear­ ances to cultivate internal consciousness to follow social rituals. For example, a junzi should dress according to the situation.^® He must speak and behave differ­ ently when speaking with the prince and officers of the lower and the higher grades.” A junzi also follows strict rules in daily life: “When eating, he does not converse. A^en in bed, he does not speak.”’® “He does not eat meat which was not cut properly nor that is served without its proper sauce.”” “If his mat is not straight, he does not sit on it.”” “When he is about to mount his carriage, he will stand straight, holding the cord. When he is in the carriage, he does not turn his head quite round, he does not talk hastily; he does not point with his hands.”” More than Confucius, the later Confucians emphasized the expression of out­ ward appearances to achieve individual moral personality and linked these kinds of expressions of solemn manner to the rigid formalism of rituals. This restric­ tion of behavior became the primary target for the May Fourth Movement. In fact, one of the major evils that modem Chinese intellectuals have condemned is the rigid formalism of rituals in politicized Confucianism. A junzi must enable himself to be accepted by those around him. To do so, he must try his best to maintain harmony and avoid conflict with others. Self­ forbearance maintains harmony and creates moral advantage over others. Chinese society admires those uninterested in confronting and taking advantage of others. Ajunzi, according to Confucius, “has nothing to compete for.”” For those who do not contend, in Laozi’s philosophy, “no one under heaven can contend with them.”” The Chinese are compelled to maintain harmony and avoid contention (at least open contention) with others. Confucianism resorts to the doctrine of the Mean to avoid a radical emphasis on harmony that is stimulated by the formalism of rituals. Requiring a simple and genuine attitude toward the reverence of ritual, the Zhongyong, the Doctrine ofthe Mean, deems the virtue of sincerity {cheng} the basis for the prevalence of har-

30

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

mony promoted by social ritual?^ For a Confucian nobleman, the pursuit of harmony comes from the sincerity of his moral personality but not from the moti­ vation to adapt to the formalism of rituals. As Confucius indicates, a Junzi “is in harmony but does not follow the crowd.”” In Confucianism, therefore, the empha­ sis on harmony is not for the sake of ritual formalism but rather is a sincere em­ bodiment of Confucian humane society. In fact, when harmony is radically emphasized to satisfy the social ritual, it tends to develop toward its opposite—dis­ order (luan). As Sun Longji (Sun Lung-kee) observes, one who meekly submits to oppression will ultimately lose control when his patience ends. Discontent will be­ come unrestrainable if one is unable to air his grievances through legitimate chan­ nels. Westerners tend to openly express their love and hate; whereas, Chinese tend to seek hannony at the price of self-forbearance. As a result, their aggression, once exposed, becomes extreme and “usually gets out of hand.”” This partially explains why mass movements and political campaigns in China such as the May Fourth Movement in 1919 and the student demonstration in 1989 spun out of control. When mass movements and political campaigns provide the only channel to vent, grievances are finally expressed very aggressively. RECTIFICATION OF NAMES

Rectification of names (zhengming) is the requirement of value toward those who take certain government positions and is one of the central political-ethical doctrines in Confucianism. Confucius believes that society would properly be ordered only if everyone acts according to the “names” required by social obliga­ tion. Confucius sees this rectification as a precondition for an ideal government and well-defined political and social order. When Zi Lu, one of Confucius’ stu­ dents, asked Confucius what the first step should be in government administra­ tion, Confucius replied: “What is necessary is to rectify names.” Rituals define an individual’s responsibility based on his role (mingfen); thus, these rituals are standards forjudging whether a person’s behavior is in accordance with his role and name. Confucius sees government as an institution with well-defined relationships be­ tween all individual roles. Rectification of names serves as a guideline for one’s behavior according to die different roles in society. A good government, in Confu­ cius’ definition, is that 'junjun, chenchen.Jufii, and zizi" that is, “The king ought to behave like a king, the minister like a minister, the father like a father, and the son like a son.”” Rectification of names defines an individual’s social relationship and responsibilities. For example, the title of king means being a paramount leader with unchallenged authority; it also means being a mediator between human soci­ ety and Heaven, who is benevolent, wise, and capable of achieving social order and maintaining social prosperity. Rectification of names also implies the promo­ tion and development of an elaborately differentiated system of status based on so­ cial obligations.

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Mencius stresses the rectification of names in terms of social responsibility. For Mencius, a king would not be called “king” if he failed to fulfill his social respon­ sibilities. Mencius explains his position as follows: King Xuan of Qi asked, “Was it a fact that Tang banished King Jie and that King Wu marched against King Zhou?” Mencius replied, "According to the records, yes.” The King said, “Is regicide permissible?” Mencius said, “He who mutilates benevolence is a mutilator; he who cripples rightness is a crippier; and a man who is both a mutilator and a crippier is an ‘outcast.’ I have indeed heard of the punishment of the ‘outcast Zhou,’ but I have not heard of any regicide.”"*®

Mencius does not justify a rebellion against a legitimate qualified king. Rather, he supports a revolution to overthrow an unqualified ruler, such as a despot who loses the Mandate of Heaven and fails to fulfill his social responsibilities. Rectification of names, in Xunzi’s perspective, enables a society to identify a person’s values based upon his conduct and abilities. Xunzi explains why rectifi­ cation of names is important for achieving political order: Because fixed names keep objects distinguished and because when his Way is practiced his goals are universally understood, he takes pains to produce uniformity [in regard to names and his Way] among the people. Because hair-splitting with propositions and creating names on one’s own authority brings confusion to the correct use of names and causes the people to be suspicious, multiplying argument and litigation among them, the True King labels these “Great Evils,” to be punished as severely as the crimes of forging credentials or tampering with weights and measures. Hence, none of his people dare avail themselves of odd propositions in order to create confusion in the correct use of names. Thus they are guileless. Being guileless, they are easy to control. Being easy to control, there is meritorious accomplishment. Since none dare avail themselves of odd propositions to bring confusion to the correct use of names, his people are thus united in adhering to his laws and meticulously following orders.*'

For Xunzi, to be a member of the ruling class one should have appropriate conduct and the abilities to match that class. Hence, the rectification of names encourages a moral self-persuasion process through which the junzi could coordinate his inner moral convictions with the outer requirements of family, society, and status group obligations.^^ By introducing the rectification of names, Xunzi proposes a politick order that would replace the existing hereditary aristocracy with a meritocracy. RITUAL ROLE OF A RULER How does the age-old vision of Mandate of Heaven influence contemporary Chinese political thought and the perceptions of both the ruler and the ruled? In Confucianism, file Mandate of Heaven justifies a sage-ruler’s authority in ruling the nation and making the Way prevail in society. As the Mandate of Heaven pro­ vides the ruler with a central ritual role, the ruler activates the entire ritual structure and establishes the chain of behavior modeling from the top of the hierarchy. Con-

32

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

fucian political philosophy is concerned about social-political structures from the point of view of individual interaction with society instead of egoistic individuals. As the nation is modeled by a familial structure, the ruler is seen as the father, hav­ ing responsibility for the protection, education, and development of those in his care. In Mencius’ theory, ifthe ruler is truly virtuous and talented he could become a sage-ruler. Therefore, virtuosity is the vital criterion for being a sage-ruler. From a pragmatic perspective, Xunzi justifies the vital role of sage-ruler in creating ide­ ology, establishing rituals, and giving orders to society because only a sage-ruler “knows Heaven’’—“Heaven and the earth are understood thoroughly by him and all things on earth submit themselves to him.”^’ Xunzi discourages a theoretical or metaphysical investigation about why Heaven bestows its Mandate to the ruler, and how the Mandate comes about, and what its contents should be. His primary concern is the outcome—how a society is able to achieve harmony by following a unified command. Xunzi might be worried that “any speculation will focus on Heaven’s desires or willing and draw attention away from the sages’ conscious creation of convention.”** A sage-ruler is not obligated to be involved in the specific duty of the govern­ ment; the Mandate of Heaven gives him unquestionable power to order the system and a pivotal ritual role in modeling society. The Mandate of Heaven also autho­ rizes the ruler as the ultimate arbiter of culture including the media, literature and the arts, educational affairs, programs in science and technology, policies towards the intellectuals, and public health and sports. The sage-ruler generates the entire ritual structure and sets society on the ritual path. As a political, moral, and ideo­ logical authority, the sage-ruler sets himself as a model for the people to emulate and brings natural order into human society for achieving harmony between hu­ mans and Nature. The Confucian notion of power refers to a moral obligation of the ruler to use his own exemplary conduct as a means for influencing the behavior of the ruled. In this regard, power in Confucianism carries a strong ritualistic func­ tion. Because Chinese political thought views ideology as a highly moralistic com­ mitment, ideology is often treated as a type of ritual. The Mandate of Heaven authorizes the sage-ruler as the determinant of the stan­ dard of right and wrong in human society, and his intuitive knowledge is accepted by the population as the truth and standard for maintaining social order. In Confu­ cianism, the sage-ruler’s intuitive knowledge of the world relies on past experi­ ence to inform his intuitive decision-making. For Daoism, the sage-ruler’s inner knowledge of the world “derives not from ‘empirical investigations’ but from his intuitive grasp of the whole.”*’ Unlike Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who believe that experience offers little guidance in the search for universal principles of ethi­ cal and political order, Confucius emphasizes the importance of past experience and the model of ancient sages. The sage-ruler was expected to be a model and guardian. As a patriarchal sage-ruler, his innate concern for other humans manifests as benevolent concern for all members in the community. The obligations of rulers toward the people are

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one of the central themes of traditional Chinese thought in which the dominant at­ titude towards the people is overwhelmingly benevolent. The revolution and pop­ ular rebellions are signified as a symptom and result of the corruption, greed, and malfeasance of rulers. Because rulership links to virtuosity, revolution is justified when another political figure is more virtuous than the current ruler. The current example is Hua Guofeng. When Deng Xiaoping pursued his control of the party leadership, the primary charge for Hua Guofeng’s dismissal was lack of the “polit­ ical and organizational ability to be the chairman of the party.’**^ For the population, the virtue of conformity comes from their respect for and deference to their sage-ruler, whom they tend to mystify as a godlike image. The unconditional confidence and trust in the sage-ruler creates the soil for the ruler’s personality cult. Mao’s personality cult was established on the confi­ dence and respect of the elite and the populace because of his great prestige and achievement in saving the Red Army in the Long March, in defeating the Nation­ alist Army in the 1940s, in challenging the world’s greatest power to a stalemate in Korea, in founding the People’s Republic, in enhancing China’s national pride and international prestige, and in making an impressive rate of economic growth and noticeably improving living standards of its people in the early 1950s. With the great enhancement of his prestige and authority, Mao was put above the party by his associates and Mao’s words became the unquestionable Bible of the party and the criteria in determining right and wrong. While the post-Mao party leader­ ship believed that Mao’s personality cult was partially influenced by the Stalinist model of leadership, it mostly blamed traditional “feudal autocracy.” After es­ tablishing his dominance in the party leadership, Deng took Mao’s lessons to remedy collective leadership and restore Leninist norms of inner-party democ­ racy. The new party constitution adopted by the Twelfth Congress in 1982 pro­ hibited “all forms of personality cult.” Although the principle of collective leadership was ever more loudly pro­ claimed and Deng denied himself to avoid appearing to covet a Mao-like role, the personal power and prestige of Deng Xiaoping grew dramatically. Deng success­ fully restored a new political order to replace that of the Cultural Revolution, pro­ moted rapid economic growth and transformation, opened China to the world, and carved out a healthy, though difficult, middle course between Left and Right. De­ spite his intention to eschew the highest titles of formal power and urge the party to continually reserve the Thought of Mao Zedong, he had been viewed by the elite and the populace as a paramount leader with virtuosity and talents and his “thoughts” in general were praised over the years as “a great development of Marxism in China,” a similar position as the Thought of Mao Zedong in the Mao era. As Roderick MacFarquhar observes: Deng ... personally would attempt to leam the negative lessons of Mao’s leadership. Yet his rejection of Mao’s titles and cult failed to deal with tendencies deep in the “feudal” political culture.... Now he himself had to come to terms with the corollary: Power and authority could not be wished away simply by refusing titles; the imperial tradition could

34

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

not be exorcised by Party resolution. No matter how loudly he protested that he participated in only one or two key decisions a year, he was regarded by both supporters and opponents as the court of last resort?’

Similar to Mao’s personality cult of the 1950s, Deng had been, perhaps unwill­ ingly, put above the party. Deng’s personal power increased considerably and his books were made mandatory reading for party members. In the 1987 Thirteenth Congress, Deng’s personality cult along with his celebrated thought and policies were pushed toward a new height. Although Deng did not take the official position as the head of the CCP, he was the real paramount leader who was trusted to take charge of the CCP. When the student demonstrations of December 1986 triggered social unrest in urban China, rebounding conservatives took the opportunity to press the party leadership for the removal of Hu Yaobang. The conservatives did not pursue a formal procedure (i.e., party conference) to dismiss Hu. Rather, they organized a delegation of seven conservative leaders to visit Deng and request Hu Yaobang’s dismissal. When the party leadership split during the Tiananmen crisis of April-June 1989, both conservatives and reformers hoped for Deng’s support and placed faith in his vital role to solve the crisis. China specialists have observed that Chinese leaders are granted great fiexibility to shift their positions as circumstances change. Many experts were puzzled that the Chinese could easily produce opposite forms of public life without causing trauma or tension by switching from Mao’s passionate politics of ideology to Deng’s pragmatism. The key to understanding this contradiction is the cultural perception of the ruler’s role. In traditional Chinese political thought, the ruler is appointed by Heaven to take care of the population, bring peace and prosperity to the people, and provide political and economic security to the ruled. To achieve this goal, the ruler is privileged (in the form of the Mandate of Heaven) to monopo­ lize the power and make any necessary policy adjustments based on changing cir­ cumstances. When a political leader is viewed as a benevolent sage-ruler, he is granted use of his intuitive knowledge to rule the nation and impose political and social programs, which might not be understood by the populace. When the popu­ lace believes that their ruler will do anything possible to embody or safeguard their interests, they allow government policy changes and tolerate setbacks caused by the ruler’s initiative to carry out his programs. Psychologically, the tolerance of setbacks relies on the prestige of the ruler. If the ruler has been viewed as a virtuous, talented, highly moral political leader, sim­ ilar to a sage-ruler, the elite and the population tend to exhibit a higher tolerance frian they do to a general ruler. It might partially contribute to the perception held by Mencius and Xunzi that a sage-ruler’s intuitive knowledge is the truth itself, and the charisma of the sage-ruler inspires a powerful confidence from the ruled. As Mao was respected in the 1950s by the population and the elite as a preeminent leader with extraordinary wisdom and talents, similar to a traditional sage-ruler, most of the elite believed that Mao “is always right and will not make mistakes.”^® Whenever the elite’s views contrasted with that of the chairman, according to Bo Yibo, they tended to convince themselves that they were wrong, and the chairman

Ritualism

35

was right. Bo Yibo describes personality cult of Mao in the party leadership in the 1950s: One of my long-term superiors and comrade-in-arms told me several times: “What Chairman Mao said, if you think it incorrect, [you] don’t point out. After you go home to think it through, you will gradually find that Chairman Mao is right.” A long period of time, there was indeed a frame in our minds: ifChairman said it correct, it was correct; ifhe said it wrong, it was wrong. Everyone took Chairman Mao’s standard as their own in judging right or wrong. 49

It explains partially why the elite and the population cooperated so much when Mao launched his Great Leap for a radical socialism and some of them still kept faith in Mao even after he had put the nation into the disasters. Similarly, when the paramount leader Deng Xiaoping launched his economic reform and abandoned Mao’s ideological radicalism, most of the elite and a major­ ity of the population had faith in Deng’s intuitive knowledge to bring the nation toward modernization and improved living standards. They also gave Deng tre­ mendous flexibility to implement his programs and make any necessary adjust­ ments to achieve economic reform. Although not all Chinese felt comfortable with Deng’s policy zigs and zags, they were prepared to face the possible difficulties, including the up-and-down motions of centralizing and decentralizing, tightening and relaxing, controlling and loosening.

NOTES 1. Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York; Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 62. 2. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinkingfrom the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcen­ dence in Chinese and Western Culture (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 269-270. 3. Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China (London: Cambridge University Press. 1997), pp. 239-240. 4. Herbert Fingarette, Confucius—the Secular as Sacred (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1972), p. 6. 5. Ibid., p. 16. 6. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, The Democrat^ of the Dead: Dewey. Confucius, and the Hope for Democracy in China (Chicago: Open Court, 1999), p. 214. l.Lunyu, 12:262. ZZJCed. 8. Ibid., 12:262. 9. Ibid., 15:342. 10. Hsieh Yu-wei, “The Status of the Individual in Chinese Ethics,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 316. 11. Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy (Westport: Greenwood Press Pub­ lishers. 1947), p. 18. 12. Lunyu, 13:284. 13. Ibid., 14:329.

36

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

14. Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Har­ vard University Press, 1991), p. 34. 15. Huainanzi, 11:176. ZZJC ed. 16. Hall and Ames, Thinkingfrom the Han, p. 273. 17. Lunyu, 12:262. 18. Hall and Ames, Thinkingfrom the Han, p. 271. 19. Tang Tsou, The Cultural Revolution and Post-Mao Reforms (Chicago: The Univer­ sity of Chicago Press, 1986), p. 13. 2(i.Xinshu, 6:1b. SBBY ed. 21. Mencius, 8:322. ZZJC ed.; D. C. Lau, Mencius, Vol. 1 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984), p. 159. 22. Max Weber, The Religion of China, trans. Hans H. Gerth (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1951), p. 235. 23. Pang Pu, Zhongguo wenhua de renwen jingshen [The liberal spirit of Chinese cul­ ture), quoted from Guangming Daily, June 1,1986, p. 3. 24. Ibid., p. 3. 25. Liu Zaifu and Lin Gang, Chuantong yu Zhongguoren [Tradition and the Chinese) (Beijing: Sanlian shudian, 1988), p. 175. 26. Tu Wei-ming, The Confucian World Observed (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. 1992), p. 19. 27. de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism, p. 29. 28. Lunyu, 10:208-217. 29. Ibid., 10:197-198. 30. Ibid., 10:224. 31. Ibid., 10:221. 32. Ibid., 10:225. 33. Ibid., 10:233-234. 34. Ibid., 3:47. 35. Daodejing, 22:12. ZZJC ed. 36. Zhongyong, H'A9\3,25:17b-18a. SBBY ed. 37. Lunyu, 13:296. 38. Sun Longji (Sun Lung-kee), Zhongguo wenhua de "shencengjiegou" [The “deep structure” of Chinese culture) (Hong Kong: Ji xian she, 1985), p. 146. 39. Lunyu, 12:271. 40. Mencius, 2:86; Lau, Mencixts, Vol. 1, p. 39. 41. Xunzi, 22:275-276. ZZJC ed.; John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study ofthe Complete Works, Vol. 3 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), p. 128. 42. Klaus-Georg Riegel, “Transplaning the Political Religion of Marxism-Leninism to China: the Case of the Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow (1925-1930),” in Chinese Thought in A Global Context, ed. Karl-Heinz Pohl (Leiden, the Netherlands: Koninklijke Brill NV, 1999), p. 350. 43. Xunzi, M'.lii'l. ZZJC ed. 44. Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p. 313. 45. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 250. 46. Li Yan, Zaisheng zhongguo: zhonggong shiyijie sanzhong guanhuide giangian kouhou [Reviving China: before and after the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Con­ gress], Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong dangshi chubanshe, 1998), pp. 601-602.

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47. Roderick MacFarquhar, “The Succession to Mao and the End of Maoism, 1969-82,” in The Politics of China: J949-1989, ed. Roderick MacFarquhar (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 331. 48. Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Reflections on certain major decisions and events]. Vol. 2 (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao chubanshe, 1991), p. 881. 49. Ibid., p. 881.

3

Moralism: Ethics, Society, and Politics

THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF MORALISM The moral sense, according to Mencius, originates from the sensibility of xin (mind-and-heart), which involves both a cognitive and an affective ability. The hu­ man mind consists inherently of four basic human feelings: commiseration (ce yin), shame and dislike {xiu e), deference and compliance {ci rang), and right and wrong {shi fei)} These form the foundation of spiritual self-development and moral virtues such as humaneness, righteousness, propriety, and wisdom. Here Mencius’ view of moral mechanics has apparent incompatibilities with Immanuel Kant’s view. For Kant, morality must not be sought in the nature of man or in the circumstances he is placed, but a priori, that is, through pure reason.^ In contrast to Confucian moral philosophy, which defines morality as being inherent in human nature and legitimates the individual’s ability to “manifest” moral virtue, Kant in­ sists that a pure moral philosophy “is completely freed from the empirical and thus belongs to anthropology.”’ Despite the differentiation of men’s role relations de­ fined by Chinese society, the dignity of man in the Confucian conception is univer­ sal; everyone can achieve moral excellence, equal inner worth, and possess an inherent ability to attain moral perfection by pursuing self-respect, autonomy, and self-development. Hence, Confucianism clearly distinguishes true nobility, identi­ fied with moral and intellectual worth, from social status, such as the ranks and titles given by the rulers. Disagreeing with the idea that some kinds of communica­ tion with human beings can be morally neutral and thus irrelevant, Confucians maintain that “all forms of social interaction are laden with moral implications and self-cultivation is required to harmonize each one of them.”* Neo-Confucianism started in A.D. 1000 and is characterized as a progressively stronger revival of Mencian moral philosophy.^ Compared with pre-Qin Confu­ cians, the Neo-Confucians have put much greater emphasis on cultivating moral

40

Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

personality. This stress on morality might be attributed to Buddhist and Daoist in­ fluences. After Dong Zhongshu (197-104 B.c.) transformed Confucius’ thought from an ethical treatise into the basis of a state religion in the Han dynasty, Confu­ cianism had maintained a dominant position in forming the social and political en­ vironment and influenced the behavior of Chinese intellectuals. Despite the great success of Confucianism in achieving social control, harmonizing human rela­ tions, and cultivating individuals’ moral virtue, it included a vital weakness—it was not good at encouraging logical analysis and metaphysical thinking.^ After the Han dynasty, Confucian orthodoxy was further strengthened by its as­ sociation with powerful unified empires. Hence, the Confucian weakness in pro­ moting the development of individuals’ thinking became more severe with the increasing strength and influence of the politicized ideology of the unified empire. Its wisdom, together with the best available official commentaries and sub­ commentaries, was systematically compiled and published. Confucian doctrine was the sole official ideology required, and its official examination system con­ trolled the nation’s intellectuals. In feet, the examination system safeguarded Con­ fucian orthodoxy and excluded “heretical thoughts,” deviations from the given official interpretation. As a result, Confucianism systematically failed to promote the development ofthinking and inner wisdom differing from standard Confucian doctrine; this inhibited the healthy evolution of pre-Qin Confucianism. If one in­ tended to cultivate one’s metaphysical thinking and develop inner wisdom, one might have to turn to Daoist or Buddhist philosophy. For example, the school of Zen Buddhism, well known as the Learning of Mind, is an advanced philosophy for mind development; it posits the mind as the sole determinant—^whether one behaves rightly or wrongly, a thing is good or bad, one affirms or denies, or the world is considered a void or a reality.’ This explains why Buddhism could survive in China and gain popularity. The spread of Daoist and Buddhist intellectual thought created insecurity in Confucians. This stimulated a Confucian reformation and revival. Since Confu­ cianism was established as official ideology, Confucians had striven for uncompro­ mising resistance to other philosophies and religions in an efforLto safeguard their orthodox position. Yet, they tried to reform and supplement traditional Confu­ cianism by absorbing other schools of thought. The most influential revival move­ ments include the appeal from Han Yu (768-824) to reinterpret Mencius’ ideas, the quest of Li Ao (d. 844) to define human nature and human emotions, and the birth of Neo-Confucianism. Neo-Confucianism, which played the most signifi­ cant role in reforming Confucianism, included the Learning of Principle (lixue) founded by Cheng Yi (1033-1107) and developed by Zhu Xi (1130-1200) and the Learning of Mind {xinxue) established by Lu Jiuyuan (1139-1193) and developed by Wang Yangming (1472-1528). Whereas the Learning of Principle represents the rationalist wing of NeoConfucianism, the Learning of Mind represents the idealistic wing of NeoConfucianism.® Both schools were influenced by Daoism and especially Bud­ dhism. As Carsun Chang argues, “Neo-Confucianism, as a revival movement,

Moralism

41

would not have begun without the stimulus of Buddhism.”’ The central idea of the Learning of Mind, that “my mind is the cosmos,” comes from Zen Buddhism.’® The rise of the Learning of Mind was one of the reviving movements that Song and Ming Confucians launched in response to the challenge from Buddhism.’ ’ Daoism also greatly influenced the philosophy of the Great Ultimate, the central system of the Learning of Principle and the cosmic principles defined by the Neo-Confucian thinkers and textually based on the commentary on the Book of Changes. To de­ velop the metaphysical thinking of pre-Qin Confucianism, the Great Ultimate of­ fers “a metaphysical interpretation of the cosmos, of its origin, its cyclical process of movement, and of return to rest, in terms of the interaction of the cosmic force of yin and yang and the Five Agents—fire, water, wood, metal, and earth—of change and transformation.”'^ Neo-Confucianism’s heavy emphasis on moralism in the Song and Ming dynas­ ties led Tang Junyi to argue that Confucians in this period had not only a moral, but a supermoral sense of life. Neo-Confudans paid more attention to the purifi­ cation of spiritual life and to metaphysical and religious thinking than did earlier Confucians.” Drawing upon Buddhist and Daoist self-reflective or quietistic ways of spiritual cultivation, Neo-Confucians highly esteemed the value of “quiescence, serenity, reverence, self-reflection, and self-examination."” Whereas the Learning of Principle was influenced “in many ways by Daoist religion,” the Learning of Mind “was influenced by Buddhist religion of the Inner-light form.”” Neo­ Confucianism developed metaphysics and emphasized the “inner sageliness” ideal more than previous Confucians had. Zhu Xi, after synthesizing the philosophical thought of Zhou Dunyi (10171073), Zhang Zai (1020-1077), Cheng Hao (1032-1085), and Cheng Yi (10331107), fused the metaphysical worldview of Buddhism with morality-centered Confucian philosophy, and thus successfully legitimized Neo-Confucianism. By reemphasizing Mencius’s theory that all men are innately good, he affirmed that every person can achieve virtue and goodness and is capable of attaining sage­ hood.’® Zhu Xi highly regards man’s xin (mind-and-heart) and the capability of self-perfection to achieve sagehood. With his stress on independent will, Zhu Xi deemed integrity to be a crucial criterion in the pursuit of sagehood. After Zhu Xi’s death, Wang Yangming further developed Neo-Confucianism toward an interior sense of mind-and-heart. Wang’s ideals especially influenced intellectuals in the century following his death.” Tang Junyi argues that Wang’s view is a combination of moral thought and ultramoral ideals and Wang’s philosophy is a combination of the early Confucian moral ideal and the ultramoralism of Buddhism and Daoism.” Both the Learning of Mind and the Learning of Principle deem xin (mindand-heart) as self-knowledge. Before Wang Yangming, Lu Jiuyuan had argued that “the universe is my xin, and my xin is the universe”—which presages the Learning of Mind.” Disagreeing with the position of the Learning of Principle, which holds that xing (human nature) is reason, Lu Jiuyuan further insists that "mind-andheart is reason.He was dissatisfied with the viewpoint of the Learning of Princi-

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

pie, which divided mind-and-heart into two levels: the upper level contains reason (human nature), and the lower level contains awareness and consciousness (mindand-heart). In other words, the human mind is inferior to and subordinate to hu­ man nature; hence, the Learning of Mind believes in a sole mind-and-heart through which reason is found and expressed. In particular, Lu Jiuyuan and Wang Yangming emphasize the expression of reason “through the thinking process of the mind.”^‘ According to Wang Yangming, mind-and-heart generates the power and capacity of humaneness (ren) and is the source of goodness in man. Wang Yangming’s concept of xin (mind-and-heart) refers to a life-giving power that un­ dergirds all conscious and moral activity. Wang Yangming further developed his theory by introducing the concept of liangzhi (innate moral intuition). The roots of Jiangzhi can be traced back to Mencius’ theory that the heart of compassion is the germ ofbenevolence; the heart of shame, of dutifulness; the heart of courtesy and modesty, of observance of the rites; the heart of right and wrong, of wisdom.^^ According to Wang Yangming, in­ nate moral intuition refers to an innate faculty of knowing, which has the same meaning as moral consciousness. He believes that everyone has liangzhi, that is, “ liangzhi exists in human mind-and-heart—^whether a sage or a fool.”^ The philo­ sophical logic of Wang Yangming is based on the correlation of three aspects of conscious life: emotion, knowledge, and will. Whenever emotion is aroused, ac­ cording to Wang, the will.is inspired and knowledge is prompted because innate moral knowledge is inherent in mind-and-heart. Innate moral knowledge controls and directs the will, because it rectifies and prompts the corrected will. This implies a powerful synthesis of knowing and doing. As Wang Yangming notes, “The unity of knowing and doing that I mention here is that doing executes when a prompting of will takes place.”’* As for the nature of xin (mind-and-heart), Wang Yangming holds that “xin is innate goodness” and is the source of all knowing and feeling. According to Wang, “It [mind-and-heart] becomes contaminated after the will arises.” In other words, “will is responsible for the fate ofthe human mind, whether good or contaminated. If one wants to rectify one’s [contaminated] mind-and-heart, one must amend one’s will when the will prompts.”’^ How can one change one’s will and purify a contaminated mind without external help? Wang Yangming argues that one must resort to one’s innate moral knowledge to achieve this purpose. Wang believes there is a crucial connection between willing and knowing, and innate knowledge is the decisive factor for a good will. The will can become good only when one acts on moral knowledge derived from mind-and-heart. If one relies on innate moral knowledge to distinguish right and wrong, one follows goodness instead of evil. Because the human mind is inherently good, one needs only to follow one’s innate moral knowledge rather than depend on external sanctions for the perfection of personality. The notion of innate moral knowledge establishes a strong base to de­ velop autonomy, integrity, and self-cultivation. Additionally, Wang argues that in­ nate moral knowledge does not enrich and widen the content of the moral knowledge but rather extends inherent goodness to the utmost. Knowledge fuses

Moralism

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with action and the logical extension of innate moral knowledge is the precondi­ tion that true moral knowledge lies only in action?® Wang’s epistemology is founded on the position that things are objects of consciousness: knowledge can be realized from both the external world and inner moral values because it first “exists as consciousness in the mind and passes through the thought process to become knowledge.”^’ In Neo-Confucianism, the difference between the Learning of Principle and the Learning of Mind lies in men’s capacity to distinguish between right and wrong. In the Learning of Principle, knowledge is a prerequisite to achieving reason. This leads Zhu Xi to stress the acquisition of knowledge from the external world. The Learning of Mind, on the other hand, holds that inborn human moral knowledge itself is capable of distinguishing right and wrong. Wang Yangming holds that “reason is inborn with the mind and is the foundation of all. When the mind is clear and unselfish, there is reason.”^® Once innate moral knowledge acts on the will, a person can know right and wrong. In contrast to Zhu Xi, who separates mind-and-heart from the physical world in space, Wang Yangming deems human knowledge of the world a construct of human minds, “a formation brought into being by our process of thinking.” Wang Yangming insists that "the unity of mind and the principles of things” ensures the individual’s capacity to judge right and wrong. Whether constituted by our conceptual beliefthat things must come to the mind as objects of consciousness, it follows that so-called principles exist in our minds, not in the external world.^’ Without a doubt, Neo-Confucianism takes individual spiritual autonomy to new heights and Neo-Confucian junzi personality is developed toward an ideal of moral perfection. This fundamentally changes the interpretation of pre-Qin Confucianism and profoundly influences later Chinese intellectuals. Unlike pre­ Qin Confucians, who stressed following the Way of the ancient sage, Neo­ Confucians trust their inherent moral ability to achieve sagehood. This leads them to establish criteria of truth and principle on their own and to hold that the human mind has limitless capacity for moral virtue and godlike creativity. When Wang Yangming mentions that the “streets are full of sages,” he actually means that everyone in the world is capable of becoming and is potentially already a sage. A strong desire for moral self-perfection inevitably promotes an ideal personal­ ity of ultramoral life, which in turn arouses a high spirit of self-respect, integrity, uprightness, and self-sacrifice. Neo-Confucians are concerned about inner ob­ structions to spiritual life development and they believe that only deep inner medi­ tation or self-reflection can eradicate the roots of these obstructions.’® The pursuit of self-perfectionbrings about the moral obligation of an individual toward society and the nation. This extension of perfectibility from the self to the external world encourages altruism, selfless sacrifice, and strong moral obligation. The impulse to fulfill moral obligations inevitably promotes a critique of political power, espe­ cially when benevolence and righteousness fail to prevail in political rule. One such example was Huang Zongxi (1610-1695), a follower of the Learning of Mind, who

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presented his brave critiques of rulers who regarded their domains as private prop­ erty and treated their subjects as servants and slaves. Neo-Confucian thought has profoundly influenced Chinese intellectuals. In response to the influence of Western materialism, there was a “renewal of favor” for the philosophy of Wang Yangming at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century.’* In modern China, the trend of reviving Wang’s moralism becomes evident when the Modern New Confucians pursue another “renaissance” of Confucianism. Among the eight modern Confucian camps, five of them (Liang Shuming, Xiong Shili, Tang Junyi, Mou Zongsan, and Xu Fuguan), closely identify themselves with the Learning of Mind of the Lu-Wang philosophy, while showing sympathy for the Learning of Principle of the Cheng-Zhu school?^ Without a doubt, Song-Ming Confucianism stimulated metaphysical thinking and developed moral consciousness. Although both the Learning of Principle and the Learning of Mind, two very different currents of Neo-Confucian thought, pushed Confucian metaphysics to deeper levels, they ignored the development of Confucian social practice. In other words, the Song-Ming Confucians heavily stressed metaphysical spiritual self-cultivation to pursue sagehood and in the pro­ cess departed fer from social practice. After the Ming dynasty, the intellectual mainstream switched its emphasis gradually from inner reflection to external un­ derstanding and firom spiritual and moral life to nature and social life. The empha­ sis of Chinese political thought shifted from stressing man’s spiritual side to accentuating the significance of human society, pragmatism, technology, and na­ ture. Like the thinkers of the Han dynasty, Confucians in the Qing era (1644-1911) took no interest in abstract thinking. Beginning from the middle of the Qing dy­ nasty, Confucians focused their attention on the satisfaction of man’s natural sen­ timents and desires. As Tang Junyi observes, the trend of thought since the end of the Ming dynasty “ha[s] moved from depth of thought to the extent of thought, from inward reflection to comprehensive understanding, from meditation on the spiritual and moral life to a consideration of natural and social life, and from the gaining of material for thought to historical documents and relics.”” In the Qing dynasty, a newly established social norm combined socially practical, moral, and natural human qualities. This led to a general trend among the Qing Confucians toward practical learning and evidential inquiry. Although practical learning, also called “Han learning,” was interpreted by modem thinkers such as Liang Qichao (1873-1929) and Hu Shi (1891-1962) as a revolt against Neo­ Confucianism, “the roots of Han learning in Neo-Confucianism are now widely rec­ ognized.”’^ Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu (1613-1682), and Wang Fuzhi (1619— 1692)—the three greatest scholars of the late Ming and the early Qing eras— stressed practical learning that focused on the issues important to the political system. For example, Huang Zongxi proposed economic and social reforms—such as land equalization, currency and military reform—that legitimated the concept of politi­ cal evolution and influenced later Chinese to adopt economic reforms and West­ ern-oriented modernization. As Liang Qichao acknowledges, Liang’s own political

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activities had been influenced by Huang’s ideas?’ In commending Huang’s political aspects, Liang credits Huang as a pioneer of the Chinese democratic movement. Liang Qichao esteems Huang Zongxi as “a native authority from whom reformers could obtain sanction for the democratic ideas and institutions they wished to im­ port from the West.”’’ Economic development, ignored in previous Conhician thought, was now linked with the traditional political pursuits ofbenevolent govern­ ment. In the later Qing dynasty, the influential Gongy’ang school stressed the correlation between evolution and economic development.’^ This linkage further stimulated the incorporation of Western ideas, culminating finally in Kang Youwei’s thought. Confucian evolution in the early part ofthe twentieth century encouraged a more radical political mood than at any other period in Chinese history. Confucian orthodoxy was challenged, and gradually Confucianism was criticized directly. For instance, the New Cultural Movement launched by the radical intellectuals in the early twentieth century initiated an attack against orthodox Confucianism and ap­ pealed for “democracy and science,” which were deemed lofty social values and sources of truth for China’s modernization. A significant development of junzi personality during the end of the Ming dy­ nasty and the early years of the Qing dynasty was its emphasis on political partici­ pation and the socialization of the moral personality. Mainstream intellectuals headed by Wang Fuzhi, Huang Zongxi, and Gu Yanwu urged turning away from an overemphasis on inner moral perfection. In other words, they criticized both the Learning of Principle and the Learning of Mind for ignoring social obliga­ tions and putting too much weight on the perfection of the sage within. This ear­ lier tradition oriented the Confucian junzi personality toward the development of deep metaphysical wisdom and moral consciousness, leading to the formation of a so-called strong sage within but weak outward kingliness. What late Ming and early Qing Confucians such as Wang, Huang, and Gu encouraged was the ex­ tension of man’s inner virtue into society. Their philosophy focuses on social and political responsibilities toward the nation and society. In other words, the pur­ suit of ideal personality becomes closely related to “outward kingliness,” or a strong sense of moral mission toward the nation and society. The junzi personal­ ity defined by Wang Fuzhi, for instance, refers to moral responsibility for the world; “one must take responsibility for all events in the world.” The junzi per­ sonality of Huang Zongxi appeals for a holy obligation for everyone to “safe­ guard the world” (bao tianxiaj. The current consensus is that these thinkers were the pioneers of modern thought on enlightenment, which profoundly influenced later Chinese intellectuals. In summation, during the end of the Ming dynasty and the early Qing dynasty, the intellectual mainstream gradually switched its emphasis from inner self­ questioning to external understanding, and from contemplation about spiritual and moral life to a concern with nature and social life. The emphasis of Neo­ Confucianism on the “sage within” began to extend toward “outward kingliness” manifested through a moral mission toward one’s society and nation. This evolu­ tion of Confucian thought was the harbinger of the later Chinese enlightenment

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

movement, especially at the end of the Qing dynasty and the early part of the twen­ tieth century. THE INSEPARABILITY OF MORALITY AND POLITICS

Ideal personality in Confucianism, to some extent, is related to a high degree of moral obligation toward the social group to which one belongs. In the Daxue, the Great Learning, Confucianism links politics with morality: “From the Son of Heaven down to the common people, all must regard cultivation of the personal life as the foundation.”’® In fact, all Chinese philosophers throughout history have been highly concerned with ethical, social, and political issues. Basic metaphysical problems, such as God, universals, space and time, and matter and spirit, were rarely discussed and, if they were discussed, were always linked to ethics.” The universalist claim that all must regard self-cultivation as the root, as Tu Wei-ming ob­ serves, “led to the obvious conclusion that politics were inseparable from morality and that morality must take precedence over politics.”^'’ Moral socialization pro­ motes a society in which the legitimacy of political authority must rely on its claim to serve public good. Rather than pursue personal interests such as political power and material gains, the Chinese political elite should aspire to being models of so­ cial norms to serve the public good. Hence, Confucian political theory is founded on the idea of benevolent government, the belief in the inseparability of morality and politics, and in the correlation between the self-cultivation of the ruler and the governance of the people. As moral order in Confucianism means social order, Confucianism does not conceive of politics as a mechanism of control independ­ ent of personal ethics.^’ Given that political order has primacy and the central authority is the locus of power, the establishment and maintenance of moral order rely on the mechanism of the state; however, the state is expected to serve as an example and its control of society relies on its moral virtues inspiring the populace. In Chinese hierarchi­ cal structure, morality always fuses with politics, and politics as a mechanism of control is always related to personal morality. The state exerts its social control through moral persuasion combined with coercive force, and'through a monop­ oly of access to media and education it prohibits any social group from develop­ ing an ideology different from the established orthodoxy. For a political leader, moral persuasion must be his primary objective in political ruling, and his ethical quality is the most powerful base of his authority. It has become a tradition for Chinese political leaders to be deemed not only political authorities but also ideological and moral authorities. In fact, few political leaders in Chinese history have ignored the importance of using morality for a political end and of monopo­ lizing ideology and moral control to safeguard the legitimacy of their political rule.

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MORALITY AS SPIRITUAL FORCE IN MODERN POLITICS

Because human nature in Confucianism is based on the autonomy necessary for moral reasoning, Chinese political thought believes that political power is basi­ cally spiritual, and spiritual force plays the decisive role in the nation’s political life. For modem Chinese political thinkers, the ideal society means that the na­ tion’s rulers could direct politics based upon morality, and that people are willing to follow and abide by their rulers. Confucianism established a long and well es­ tablished tradition that government and politics should be thought of only in terms of moralistic ideology.'*’ The political order in China was envisioned as closely correlated with social order, and everything depended upon moral conduct. Two cardinal characteristics of Chinese thought and philosophy is its neglect of meta­ physics and its ethical focus on epistemology.^’ Chinese political thought focuses the socialization of ethical order on the cre­ ation of an elaborate intellectual structure for all enlightened people to commit to established values. By virtue of incessant efforts on the cultivation of moral char­ acter, as Confucianism claims, becoming a sage is the ultimate pursuit for an indi­ vidual. Because power results from exemplary moral and ethical behavior, Chinese political thought believes diat most virtuous people should become lead­ ers. 'The socialization of morality actually implies its significant meaning in reality. Once morality introduced by the rulers into society becomes the code regu­ lating the relations among people, according to Confucianism, loyalty and reciprocity could be established between the rulers and the populace, and the pop­ ulace’s obedience could become possible. Moreover, once a kind of morality is ac­ cepted by the populace and becomes their moral faith, social cohesion would appear and the populace would voluntarily follow the models of morality; there­ fore, a ruler must rule morally. Even if his task is not to be moral, it must be cloaked in morality.^ Modem political leaders, such as Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, and'Mao Zedong, view morality as a powerful spiritual force in achieving social order. They believe that social moralization could eradicate selfishness and replace pri­ vate interest with the public good. For example, the New Life Movement launched by Chiang Kai-shek in 1934, served to cleanse and purify the popula­ tion through a revival of the ancient moral virtues. This campaign attempted to resurrect Confucianism as a basis for China’s unity and particularly promoted four Confucian virtues and moral foundations—li (courtesy), yi (right conduct), Han (honesty), and chi (integrity)—to achieve social moralization. To popular­ ize the ancient moral virtues, Chiang Kai-shek applied ninety-six specific rules to stipulate individual conduct and life style related to food, clothing, shelter, and action, such as not eating noisily, correcting posture, stopping smoking, keeping one’s gown buttoned, not spiting, killing rats and flies, being prompt, using na­ tive products."*’ In fact, in 1928 Chiang had successfully organized a mass cam­ paign—the anti-opium campaign—for eradicating vice. In the late 1930s, several other campaigns were launched to instill a new social consciousness.

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

Compared with Chiang, Mao paid more attention to social moralization and deemed political campaign an effective and powerful approach for changing so­ ciety and maintaining political order. For Mao, the ends of self-cultivation were more strictly subordinated to the political and public good, and unselfishness cultivated by moral consciousness was the foundation for an ideal government. In the period 1949-1966, Mao launched a number of political campaigns to pro­ mote social moralization; it is impossible during this period to distinguish be­ tween morality and politics.**® Traditional Chinese political thought aimed at a centralized government by a well-educated vanguard elite, which was headed by the Son of Heaven and served to establish and maintain a harmonious and peaceful society with modest eco­ nomic comfort. As Benjamin Schwartz notes, “The basic thrust of Confucianism was toward the maintenance of peace, harmony, and an economic welfare by no means defined in terms of unlimited economic growth or military power.”*” The successful reign of the ruling class depended mainly on how the government rein­ forced the nation’s identification with morality and orthodox ideology. Any form of ideology not associated with the ruler appeared to be scheming, devious, and subversive and was viewed as an extreme danger to the coxmtry. In the Mao era, the government imposed nationwide ideological control in an effort to direct the outlook of the population. The government authority penetrated deeply into every level of society and individual life including employment and marriage. The politicization of individual life and social moralization helped the government to effectively dictate its ideology. One of Mao’s key sources of power was his mo­ nopoly on determining the ideologies of China.^’ A central pursuit in Chinese political thought is the whole-hearted submission of the populace, including the political enemies of the ruling class. The ultimate objective for a ruler, according to Mencius’ Mandate of Heaven, is to win over the support of the people, rather than to resort to force for the submission of the peo­ ple. “The people were more like a natural force influenced by and influencing in turn the behavior of the ruler.”*’ To the extent that social cohesion based on a uni­ fied belief and criterion of morality decides the political success and failure of a ruler, Chinese politics is viewed as a politics centered on xinzhi (governing based on winning over the heart-mind of the ruled). By achieving the legitimacy of mo­ rality and ideology, Chinese communists even accomplished a political persuasion to convert acknowledged enemies. The use of moral persuasion instead of force contrasted with that of the Russian communists, who accepted the necessity of eliminating certain political enemies and seldom hesitated to use terror.®® Mao gave enormous emphasis to matters of ideology and to the importance of ideological education of the populace after founding the PRC, simply because he believed that right thinking was integral to right conduct, which reflected Confu­ cian moralism.®’ Despite Mao’s self-identification as a materialist after 1949, his political career was focused basically on ideology, the key tool for ensuring com­ pliance among the populace and achieving his ideal society. His political activities were based on die conviction that morality and spiritual faith could play a vital role

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in motivating people to accomplish the nation’s ambitious goals. Mao dazzlingly launched political campaigns for molding die will of people and bringing that will to bear in support of his goals. These approaches included the mass line, political campaigns, class struggle, and egalitarianism/plain living.^^ Mao actually played the role of spiritual as well as political leader. “If the ideal emperor was the voice of heaven,” according to Benjamin Schwartz, “Mao was the voice of the proletariaf’—“the resonance with Confucian tradition seems very striking.”’’ Carrying on Chinese political tradition, Mao Zedong extended social moralization into the entire country so that social cohesion driving toward the unity of will could be established and motivational force toward socialism could be promoted. The basic objective of Mao’s ideal socialism, after the founding of the PRC, was to implement moral force as ruling strength by emphasizing ideals such as “letting politics take command” and “class struggle.” Mao’s advocacy toward socialist morality in slogans such as “serve whole-heartedly for die people,” “seek no fame nor gain, fear neither hardship nor death” was the reformulation of traditional mor­ alism in the cultural psychology of the Chinese. Even though the Great Leap Forward launched by Mao was a great step toward economic development in 1958, Mao overemphasized the human factor and en­ thusiasm and viewed “politics as command” as the decisive precondition for achieving economic success. Although acknowledging the need for a technically trained elite, Mao emphasized the importance of human and moral factors and of mobilizing the political zeal of the masses.’** Since the Tenth Plenum in August 1962, Mao further inserted “class struggle” as the primary agenda for social moralization and politicization. It is not difficult to understand why Mao agreed with and supported Lin Biao’s radical political campaign in moralizing and politicizing the army and later extending it into the entire country in the early 1960s. There were no real economics in Mao’s thought apart from morality. Despite the fact that Mao never refused the significant function of obj ective economic rules such as market, cost, and profit, he insisted that economic success could be achieved only if human beings possessed lofty ideals. He kept the faith in die unlimited ability of human beings to change social reality in accordance with the dictates of their con­ sciousness regardless of the material circumstances. Believing that morality was the decisive factor in the creation of an economic miracle, Mao privileged the spiritual over material incentives for arousing the fervor of the population for economic re­ construction. Mao actually saw economic mechanisms as an accessory to moral so­ cialization and the political movement. At the time of the Great Leap, Mao was stimulated by Leninist and Stalinist the­ ory in which the communist millennium was not far distant and by the urgency for China’s survival in an intense international situation (e.g., the isolation from Western coimtries and Khrushchev’s pressure on the PRC). Influenced by Neo­ Confucian unlimited power of mind-heart and the dreams from the late nine­ teenth-century Chinese reformers for industrialization, Mao promoted his utopian socialism. Mao’s poetic inspiration, or “nativistic revolutionary romanticism” de­ fined by Tu Wei-ming, was the catalyst for putting his radical programs into prac-

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Personality of the Confucian Nobleman

tice. Relying partially on his poetic revolutionary romanticism, Mao had enjoyed triumphs over landlord oppression, the Nationalists’ defeat, and foreign domina­ tion with the help of the masses. He was nostalgic for the free supply system exer­ cised by the CCP during the war years. He believed diat the spirits of Yanan were applicable to the new democratic revolution of the past and to the present tasks of modernization as well. This led him to further impose radical social moralization against the “bourgeois elements,” such as abolishing the wage system because it “promotes the development of individualism.” Mao’s views inevitably contrasted with the elite in charge of economic work. It was difficult for them to organize socialized production without considering eco­ nomic efficiency and implementing levers such as price, cost, and profit. The so­ cial division of labor required by giant state-owned industries and the promotion of exchange of commodities due to rareness of materials became inevitable. These measures used to promote economic development were incompatible with Mao’s social moralization and ideal socialism, which centered on social equality and the gradual elimination of commodities and division of labor. Mao saw the policy con­ tradiction as resistance from the top leadership, even though these high-level lead­ ers had no intention of challenging his political and economic programs. After Mao’s campaigns—the Great Leap and the Three Banner Flags—destroyed the country’s economy during the period of 1959-1962, in order to promote economic recovery, more members of the Central Committee favored implementing eco­ nomic rules as a means of guidance in instituting economic policy, which undoubt­ edly left Mao’s “politics in command” out in the cold. After 1962, Mao gradually felt that his socialist line had been abandoned and his power had fallen into the hands of others. He decided to take action to defend his political and economic programs and maintain his absolute dominance. His distrust became evident and the conflicts between Mao and his ranking associates became acute. The overemphasis on social morality will cause behavioral hypocrisy for politi­ cal figures because of the gap between words and actions and between doctrinal theory and practice. Theoretically, morality and ideology are the guides and tools for achieving peaceful social conformity. In reality, however, ideology and moral­ ity are often manipulated to accomplish individuals’ and particular groups’ self­ interest as long as they claim their uncompromising adherence toward the ideol­ ogy. It does not matter whether they have interpreted the doctrine correctly or dis­ torted arbitrarily the content of ideological discourse. No study could overlook the paradox that “[t]he Chinese have great need for ideology, but in practice they seem to ignore the content of ideology.”^^ As discussed in Chapter 2, ideology in Chi­ nese culture is often treated as a type of ritual; thus, its form sometimes is more im­ portant than its content. Mao did not use ideology as window dressing to brighten his practical actions with theoretical gloss. Rather, he saw the development and propagation of ideology as central to the success of his strategies.^® High emphasis of morality compels political leaders to constrain their rhetoric with lofty senti­ ments of patriotism and mute their voice to particular interests. As a result, “there can be no open process of politics in which interests compete to attract attention

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and tradeoffs can be reasonably discussed.”^’ It is quite clear that Chinese political theory provides leeway for a ruler to interpret the content of morality and ideology to exert social control and establish and maintain political order. The existence of personalized rule, rather than institutionalized procedures, makes it commonplace for ideology to be whatever the supreme ruler says it should be.^®

NOTES Mencius, 3:138-139. ZZJC ed. 2. Immanuel Kant, Foundations of the Metaphysics ofMoral, trans. Lewis White Beck O'lew York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1969), p. 6. 3. Ibid., p. 5. 4. Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 56. 5. David S. Nivison, The fFays ofConfucianism: Investigations in Chinese philosophy, edited with an Introduction by Btyan W. Van Norden (Chicago and La Salle, Ill.: Open Court Publishing Company, 1996), p. 50. 6. Wu Y annan, Xinxueyu zhongguo shehui [The learning of mind and Chinese society] (Beijing: Zhongyang minzu xueyuan chubanshe, 1994), p. 2. 7. Carsun Chang, Wang Yang-ming: Idealist Philosopher of Sixteenth-Century China (New York: St. John’s University Press, 1962), p. 54. 8. Wing-tsit Chan, “Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Human­ ism,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 12. 9. Carsun Chang, Wang Yang-ming, p. 53. 10. Hou Wailu et al., Zhongguo sixiang tongshi [A comprehensive history of Chinese thought], Vol. 4 (Beijing: Renmin chubanshe, 1957-1960), p. 884. 11. Wu 'Yaimai\,Xi7ixueyu zhongguo shehui, pp. 2-3. 12. Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 108. 13. Tang Junyi, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials ofChinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 207. 14. Ibid., p. 206. 15. FungYu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1947), p. 202. 16. Mengzijizhu, 2:1 la-12a, 3:la-b; 6:4b-5b; 7: la-2a. SBBY ed. 17. 0. Briere, Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy /5P5-/P45 (New York: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965), p. 14. 18. Tang Junyi, Tang Junyiji [The selected collections of Tang Junyi] (Beijing: Qunyan chubanshe, 1993), p. 543. 19. Xiangshan guanji, 36:3b. SBBY ed. 20. Wang Yangming guanji [The collected works of Wang Yangming], Vol. 1 (Shang­ hai: Shanghai guji shubanshe, 1992), p. 42. 21. Carsun Chang, Wang Yang-ming, p. 24. 'll. Mencius, 3:138-139. 23. Wang Yangmingguanji. Vol. 1, p. 79. 24. Ibid.,p. 96. 25. Wang Yangmingguanji,No\. 2, p. 971.

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26. Julia Ching, To Acquire Wisdom: The Way of Wang Yang-ming (fiew York'. Colum­ bia University Press, 1976), p. 47. 27. Carsun Chang, Wang Yang-ming, p. 30. 28. Ibid., p. 35. 29. Ibid., p. 33. 30. Tang Junyi, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind, p. 207. 31.0. Briere, S.J., Fifty Years of Chinese Philosophy, p. 14. 32. Tang Junyi, Tang Junyiji, p. 7. 33. Tang Junyi, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind, p. 208. 34. Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977). p. 162. 35. Liang Ch’i-ch’ao (Liang Qichao), Intellectual Trends in the Ching Period, trans, with Introduction and notes by Immanuel Hsu (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), pp. 36-38. 36. Wm. Theodore de Bary, “Chinese Despotism and the Confucian Ideal: A Seven­ teenth-Century View,” in Chinese Thought and Institutions, ed. John K. Fairbank (Chicago: The University ofChicago Press, 1957), p. 198. 37. Tang Junyi, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind, p. 209. 38. Daxue, 1:2a. SBBY ed. 39. Wing-tsit Chan, “Syntheses in Chinese Metaphysics,” in The Chinese Mind: Essen­ tials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Cen­ ter Press, 1967), p. 132. 40. Tu Wei-ming, Way, Learning, and Politics Essays on the Confucian Intellectual (New York: Slate University ofNew York Press, 1993), p. 26. 41. Ibid., p. 6. 42. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 186. 43. Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 81. 44. Michel Oksenberg, “The Political Leader,” in Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales ofHistory, ed. Dick Wilson (Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 84. 45. John King Fairbank, The United States and China, fourth edition (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 251-252. 46. Xiao Yanzhong, Juren de dansheng [The birth of a great man] (Beijing: International Cultural Publisher Inc., 1988), p.211. 47. Benjamin Schwartz, China's Cultural Values (Tempe, Ariz.: Center for Asian Studies, Arizona State University, 1985), p. 31. 48. Kenneth Lievberthal, Governing China (New York: W.W. Norton & Company Inc., 1995), p.62. 49. Brantly Womack, “In Search of Democracy: Public Authority and Popular Power in China,” in Contemporary Chinese Politics In Historical Perspective, ed. Brantly Womack (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 58. 50. Lucian W. Pye, The Dynamics of Chinese Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, Publishers, Inc., 1981), p. 205. 51. Kenneth Lievberthal, Governing China, p. 62. 52. Ibid.,p. 64. 53. Benjamin Schwartz, China's Cultural Values, p. 30.

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54. Stuart R. Schram, “The Marxist,” in Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales ofHistory, ed. Dick Wilson (Cambridge, London; Cambridge University Press, 1977), p. 56. 55. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics, p. 206. 56. Kenneth Lievberthal, Governing China, p. 62. 57. Lucian W. Pye, The Spirit of Chinese Politics. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univer­ sity Press, 1992, p. 201. 58. Lucian W. Pye, Asian Power and Politics, p. 205.

4

Political Pursuit of the Jun^

THE JVNZI AS MORAL MODEL

Junzi, among the most central subjects of Confucius’ writings, is discussed even more frequently in the Analects than are central concepts of Confucianism such as the Way (dao), virtue (de), the sage (shengren), or the king (wang)} Junzi in the literature prior to Confucius had a strictly political reference that meant “son of the king.” One sense ofjunzi corresponds closely to “the nobleman” and “gentleman” in Western culture. Junzi in this sense is defined in the Analects as a class of well-bred persons with gentle ways, impeccable manners, and a developed moral sense. Another meaning ofJunzi, however, is “cast in the very lofty and selfsacrificing role demanded of the nobleman as a leader of others.”^ Julia Ching thus describes Confucianjunzi as prophets who “would speak in the name of the Clas­ sics, the sages, and of Heaven” and who “represented a kind of lay priesthood [whose] dignity and mission flowed more from their education and merit than from any personal charisma.”’ Hall and Ames argue that personal cultivation and communal responsibility for Confucian Junzi are mutually implicative and that junzi is “a qualitative term denoting someone who has an ongoing commitment to personal growth as it is cultivated and expressed through political leadership.”^ In Chinese political thought, the junzi have become a special class, representing a commitment to the service of state and society in the name of the common good.’ In fact, Confucius changed this sociological term into a moral term, expecting moral behavior of those who called themselvesjunzi. Junzi, as a special class in so­ ciety, have become the backbone of both political and social evolution and the preservation of the values of Chinese culture and civilization. To a certain extent, thejunzi personality combines the most important Confu­ cian virtues. Whereas ajunzi is defined as an individual who embodies nonconfor­ mity, autonomy, independence, firmness of point of view, and courage,® thejunzi

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personality refers to the inner virtue attained by cultivation and development of the self, and is founded on virtues such as humaneness {ren), righteousness (yi}, pro­ priety (//), wisdom {xhi), and bravery (yong), which are the central components of the Confucian value system. Thejunzi personality features a high degree of moral accomplishment and a unification of virtue and spirituality. In general, the ideal junzi personality demonstrates the following features: 1. A deep inner sympathy towards other human beings. The junzi personality demonstrates consideration for others. 2. A strong sense ofhonor. Thejunzi personality implies a strong motivation for polit­ ical success. 3. Fearlessness. Theyunz/ personality is founded on strength, courage, and determina­ tion. It also demonstrates strength of purpose, willpower, and endurance.

4. A sense of a strong moral mission. Thejunzi personality implies a strong personal moral mission in pursuing the Way, regardless of possible negative consequences for oneself. Thejunzi personality demonstrates a strong sense of social justice.

5. A pursuit of altruism based on the virtue of shu (reciprocity). 6. A capacity for self-restraint. 7. A sense of self-respect.

8. A desire for individual autonomy and self-development. This feature also implies a liberality of mind. 9. A sense of dignity and integrity. Trustworthiness toward other human beings is cen­ tral to thejunzi personality.

Indeed, if we define a junzi according to the criterion of the Analects, his virtues can be summarized as “reverence and respect, filial piety, generosity of heart, and liberality of mind, consideration for others, trustworthiness, strength of purpose, courage, determination, and endurance, and in all of these a sense of priority and sequence, especially of the growth process by which certain primary virtues ma­ ture into others if properly cultivated.”’ Hence, ajunzi is the ideal model and agent of Confucianism to achieve political order and social harmony. The ideal personality of ajunzi, “the crucial element in Confucius ’ thought,”® is also related to the Confucian notion of moral personality, which stresses individ­ ual moral accomplishment. Compared with Legalism and Mohism, which care less about the ideal personality, both Confucianism and Daoism put heavy emphasis on the pursuit of the ideal personality, which in turn serves as the em­ bodiment of cultural spirit and values. Legalism deeply distrusts humanity, whereas Mohism is mainly utilitarian in political and social pursuits. Although Buddhism values the notion of the ideal personality and emphasizes the cultivation ofpersonality, it rarely involves political ethics and social morality. The ideal personality in Buddhism is rarely related to the realization of human moral value and the practice of social life. In contrast, both Confucianism and Daoism search for meaning in human life, truth, and the rule of the universe. The

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difference between them mainly lies in the fact that the Daoist ideal personality fo­ cuses on the achievement of “divine personality,” whereas Confucianism centers on the accomplishment of “human personality.”’ The junzi personality of Confucian ethics attains moral obligation through self­ cultivation, in order to achieve “sageness within and kingliness widiout”—culti­ vating oneself toward sagehood and devoting oneself to fulfill social responsibil­ ity. According to Confucianism, the central pursuit of aJunzi is to become a moral creature with a sagely disposition, manifested through the virtues of humaneness, altruism, sympathy, responsibility, bravery, and integrity. Confucianism deems moral and spiritual perfection of individuals the ultimate goal of human beings, which in turn serves to realize a harmonious society and reach the “unity of Heaven and man.” Although the cultural assumptions of Confucianism have their limitations, the Confucian junzi personality indeed molds Chinese behavior and forms a unique feature of Chinese social interaction. Moreover, thejunzi personality, in manifesting the cultural spirit and values of Confucianism, is esteemed as the moral model of Chinese intellectuals for politi­ cal pursuit and social interaction. It should be noted that the ideal personality in Chinese culture refers to an individual’s integrity and moral character rather than his social achievement. That is, the dignity and value of individuals in Confucian philosophy are not necessarily related to their roles in the established social sys­ tem and social norms. The ideal personality of Confucianism incorporates a strong and transcendent understanding of autonomy, a deep moral conscious­ ness, and a feeling of strong moral mission. In Confucian classics, the highest goal in life for ajunzi is to become a sage who possesses a transcendent personal­ ity, who achieves a great career and honor, and who is the most respected moral figure in society. Confucianism’s general method, in fact, is to set up ideal hu­ man models—sages—and then encourage everyone to strive toward those mod­ els through self-cultivation and self-fulfillment in a cosmic or social' setting. From a philosophical angle, Fung Yu-lan argues that the ideal life for a junzi is “both this-worldly and other-worldly,” and those who possess this life are sages. Fung notes: The life of the sage is a transcendent one, and the spiritual achievement of the Chinese sages corresponds to the saint’s achievement in Buddhism and the West. They all come under the same head. But to transcend the world does not mean to be divorced from the world, and therefore the Chinese sage is not the kind of sage who is so sublime that he is not concerned about the business of the world. His character is described as one of sageness in its essence and kingliness in its manifestation. That is to say that in his inner sageness he accomplishes spiritual cultivation, in his outward kingliness he functions in society. It is not necessary that a sage should be the actual head of the government in his society. With regard to practical politics, for the most part the sage certainly has no opportunity to be such; and when the statement is made “sage within and king without” it only means that he who has the noblest spirit should theoretically be king. As to whether he actually had or had not the opportunity to be king, that is immaterial.’®

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In fact, all Chinese philosophy holds that the ultimate goal for an individual is to become a sage who accomplishes spiritual transcendence in his inner life and em­ bodies kingliness in society." To be a sage, one must be a moral figure who em­ bodies human virtues and who has made great contributions to society and the nation, without necessarily being a king. Most importantly, the sage must become a superlative moral figure with both a transcendental spirit and a this-worldly em­ bodiment of truth, justice, strength, and integrity. The standard for becoming a sage is so high that few in Chinese history are honored aS sages. Confucianism is less concerned with the possibilities for everyone in society to become sages, like legends such as Yao, Yu, or Shun, than with inspiring everyone to emulate the moral conduct of sages. Arguably, the central pursuit of a Chinese intellectual, for Confucius, is not how to enter into the rank of sages but rather how to cultivate oneself to become a junzi who is accessible to everyone, and who is a social, though not necessarily perfect, moral being. Even Confucius himself never assumed the title of sage given to him by others; rather, he preferred to be seen as the very model of the junzi. As de Bary indicates, “While the fullness of human perfection was a hallmark of the sage, those who, like himself, would aspire to be noblemen, need not, and would best not, think of themselves as aiming at the omnicompetence of the sage.”'^ In fact, the Analects has given us a model of the Junzi and “almost everything said by or reported about him in the Analects be­ comes paradigmatic of the junzi."^^ In the Analects, no less than 106 passages in­ volve the junzi. That is why the junzi is also called the “central model of the Analects."^"' If the ultimate pursuit of Confucianism is social harmony and social justice, as the Doctrine ofthe Mean proposes, then thejunzi personality is the basis of the Confucian ideal world. Tang Junyi has argued that the virtues of Confucian ethics should be considered “essentially spiritual values.”*’ In this respect, thejunzi personality can be under­ stood as consisting of virtuous values in a spiritual sense. As Tang observes, the mainstream of Confucianism “considerfs] the virtues as the inner essence of one’s personality, and their values as intrinsic to one’s moral consciousness and tinged with a certain religious meaning, and thus as definitely spiritual values.”*’ The ulti­ mate goal of Confucianism is to cultivate a “moral man” who “realizes his good nature, develops his moral life to the fullest extent, attains unity of the irmer world and the outer world, and achieves the grandeur and beauty of personality.”*’ A junzi, according to Fung Yu-lan, “should unconditionally do those things which he feels to be obligatory.” He “cannot do those things as the means to achieve his per­ sonal ends, for then they would not be unconditioned.”*® Thejunzi personality re­ fers to fulfilling one’s strong personal moral mission even in political adversity and preserving the Way regardless of possible negative consequences for oneself. As ajunzi, he must “subordinate the outward status (the political or social standing of thejunzi) to the inner nobility and peace of mind of the nobleman.”*’ Confucian­ ism indeed has high hopes for the junzi to achieve social justice and political suc­ cess. Even under powerful pressure from the feudal and autocratic polity, as Xu Fuguan observes, the moral personality of the Confucian scholar-official still was

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crucial in detennining what he could accomplish politically. Thisjunzi personality was deemed by Confucianism as the basic criterion for determining whether a Confucian scholar-official was capable of serving his nation.’® Given that thejunzi personality is directly related to moral virtue, all the behav­ iors of the junzi must link to their moral obligation. For Confucianism, one’s self-cultivation, self-fulfillment, and natural life per se are directly related to moral obligation. In order to fulfill one’s moral obligation towards one’s nation, social group, or family, according to Confucianism, one must cherish one’s natural life. How does one devote filial piety toward parents if one loses one’s life? How does one dedicate selfless love to the nation ifhe does not exist in the world? Cherishing natural life is a moral precondition for fulfilling filial duty to parents and political responsibility for the nation. As the Book ofFilial Piety describes, because “the body, the hair and skin [of man] are received from his parents, he is not allowed to injure them.” Confucianism views the protection of natural life as one’s social ob­ ligation and rejects the notion that one may give up one’s life at will. As Mencius states, “A man loves all parts of his person without discrimination; as he loves them all without discrimination, he nurtures them all without discrimination.”’* The natural life is the basis from which one actualizes one’s moral ideals in soci­ ety. Otherwise, moral virtue would only be an empty ideal and one would be un­ able to embody moral virtue and values in society. In any case, one’s natural life in Confucian ethics is viewed as the means to real­ ize the Way. Since the pursuit of moral obligation in Confucian thought is the ulti­ mate goal ofhuman life, one must cherish one’s natural life to create the conditions necessary for fulfilling moral duty. But when one has to make a choice between natural life and moral principle, Confucianism would suggest that one give up one’s natural life to preserve the moral principle. As Mencius indicates, “Life is what I want; dutifulness is also what I want. If I cannot have both, I would rather take dutifulness than life.”” Throughout history, thejunzi personality plays a crucial role in influencing the social and political behavior of the Chinese political elite. Traditional China highly esteemed the junzi personality and believed it essential if individuals were to achieve social respect and political success. In fact, the missionary’s attitude is internalized in the junzi's mind and “this internalized sense of moral autonomy and transcendent power was connected to the political charisma traditionally claimed by scholars in their role as junzi."^^ In traditional Chinese society, despite various interpretations, both the rulers and the ruled highly regarded thejunzi per­ sonality.

“SAGENESS WITHIN” AND MORAL AUTONOMY Thejunzi feels a strong sense of moral mission to speak out against injustice and misrule whenever the Way does not prevail. For ajunzi, both his right and his duty are moral in nature.’* Unlike the Western philosophical tradition, which focuses on explaining the world, Confucian thought centers on pursuing changes in the world.

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Whereas mainstream Western philosophy stresses logic and epistemology, the Chinese tradition emphasizes social responsibility and moral mission to realize the Way. Humaneness (ren), which is the highest moral sense and cosmic dimension of the human mind and exists inherently in man’s mind, provides the base for man’s capac­ ity to self-transcend. In Mencius’ view, by taking a position as a minister or an offi­ cial, ajunzi serves as an independent coimsel to the ruler. Neo-Confucianism further takes individual spiritual autonomy to a new height. As Tu Wei-ming observes, “All root precepts in Neo-Confucian thought, in both the Ch’eng-Chu (Cheng-Zhu) and the Lu-Wang traditions, take self-realization as a background assumption.Neo­ Confucian philosophical anthropology assumes that the human mind has unlimited potential for moral virtue and godlike creativity. Compared with pre-Qin Confu­ cians, Neo-Confucians “do not simply follow the way of the ancient sage; they try to embody it so that they can manifest it in their own ways of life.”^^ Hence, ajunzi is required to fulfill his personal moral mission even in the face of political adversity and, in any case, he must preserve his own self-respect and remain true to his interior sense of principle. Confucius defines the junzi as individuals who “are not utensils” but rather those whose dignity comes from a higher purpose to “devote their minds to attaining the Way.”^’ The ultimate goal for a junzi is to dedicate himself to the True Way, no matter what ignominious fate he may suffer. Neo-Confucian thinkers not only put much more emphasis than pre-Qin Confu­ cians on individual ability to achieve sagehood, but also suggest a realizable method to practice it. Despite debates about the way in which one realizes spiritual cultivation (e.g., whether one must have no desire in order to achieve self­ realization), all Neo-Confucians insist that sagehood can be attained through an in­ dividual’s own effort. Because Neo-Confucianism stresses issues directly relevant to the cultivation of one’s personal life, it inevitably leads from the perfectibility of the self to the family, Uie state, and the world—even though Neo-Confucians cen­ tered mainly on self-cultivation rather than social practice. For Neo-Confucians, “[cjultivation of the self as the ‘root’ {ben} conveys not only personal but also so­ cial, political, and religious import.”^® It should be acknowledged that Neo-Confucianism has demonstrated both the advantages and disadvantages of changing Confucian thought. The most striking flaw of Neo-Confucianism is its overemphasis on moral personality; that is, Neo-Confucian self-cultivation, as the “heart of its educational doctrine ... puts such heavy emphasis on the power of the individual moral will to master any situation.”^^ This may help to explain why Neo-Confucianism draws strong opposition from many modem intellectuals who pursue Western democracy and freedom. Modem intellectuals mainly condemn the severe consequences of overemphasiz­ ing morality, such as “impractical idealism, naive optimism, and a simple moralis­ tic approach to politics that is altogether incapable of coping with the economic complications and Byzantine complexities of imperial politics.”®” Arguably, a high regard for moralism and self-cultivation undergirded both the Chinese nationalists and the Chinese communists as they strove for their own co­

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hesive political organizations. The party members in both groups were encouraged to develop self-cultivation in an effort to arouse revolutionary fervor. The commu­ nists, especially Mao Zedong, added a missionary flavor through constant indoc­ trination and always tried to establish a theoretical basis for their revolutionary fervor. An example of this attitude is the successful effort made by the Chinese communists to achieve the “conversion” and spiritual transformation of non­ communist generals and soldiers during the Chinese civil war. The Chinese Communist Party put much more emphasis on promoting the psychological trans­ formation of its members than did the Soviet Communist Party. Indoctrination ac­ tivities in the party and army organizations, as Alexander George indicates, “were seldom pursued in the mechanical fashion attributed to many political leaders in the Soviet Army simply in order to fulfill formal requirements.” The Soviet com­ munists had never developed systematic methods of “thought reform” like their Chinese counterparts, who deemed indoctrination the most vital and dynamic ap­ proach to psychologically transform individuals.’’

“KINGLINESS WITHOUT” AND POLITICAL RESPONSIBILITY

The junzi, if serving as members of the ruling elite, were from the very begin­ ning encouraged by Confucius to pursue governance, leadership, and public ser­ vice by manifesting their moral virtues to benefit the people. According to the Confucian ideal, ajunzi must personally assume responsibility for the nation and must devote himselfto political participation as he strives to change the world. The role that the nation plays here is not just that of an organ embodying political, eco­ nomic, and military functions. Rather, the nation implies a cultural value by which a junzi can realize his moral ideal and achieve his 'personality. The junzi, as Thomas Metzger points out, “were claiming a morally ultimate responsibility for the fate of the empire, a claim expressed particularly in the traditional ambition to occupy the tsai-hsiang (prime office) and use it as the fulcrum of moral-political transformation.”’’ Certainly, a successful junzi should also receive some recogni­ tion from the ruler; however, for ajunzi, the outward status gained through politi­ cal or social standing must be subordinate to his inner nobility and peace of mind. A junzi might choose to abandon his efforts to reform a ruler if the ruler has been incorrigible; but a great junzi never gives up his efforts to reform a ruler even though doing so might jeopardize his career or even his life. When ajunzi chooses to serve the government as bureaucrat or functionary, he is not bought by the ruler. Rather, he feels obligated to fulfill his mission and protest injustice in the nation’s decisions, often at the risk of his own life. Chinese intellectuals’ enthusiasm for taking political responsibility was strength­ ened after China suffered humiliation at the hands of Western powers. In a way, the antitraditionalism of Chinese intellectuals since the May Fourth Movement reflects a deep desire to take political responsibility. The May Fourth Movement, of course, emerged not only from the spirit of antitraditionalism, but also from the self­ consciousness of intellectual criticism. In fact, Chinese society in the twentieth cen-

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tury always reflects a trend toward radicalism tinged with a strong sense of humilia­ tion, grief, and indignation felt by Chinese intellectuals. This radicalism is ultimately encouraged by sentinients of nationalism and patriotism. For a junzi, fulfillment of political responsibility leads to an inevitable di­ lemma. On the one hand, a junzi must dedicate himself to the True Way and ad­ here to principle no matter what negative consequences might be suffered. In this respect, a junzi never compromises his principles and directs all his efforts to­ ward safeguarding the True Way. On the other hand, ajunzi is expected to fulfill his political responsibility flexibly as long as the True Way can be finally achieved. Once a junzi enters the political arena, he must be good at protecting himself while preserving the True Way. He should only attempt to achieve what can become reality through his own efforts and admonish those who are capable of accepting advice. The emphasis on moralism encourages a deferential stance toward obligation and commitment to social and political pursuits. Chinese culture emphasizes the importance of individual moral behavior in achieving social harmony and promot­ ing social cohesion. Few societies, as Richard Wilson argues, “have been as self-consciously moral as the Chinese.”’’ Even the Confucian concept of auton­ omy and self-cultivation is related more to an ethic of virtue rather than rights. In Chinese culture, there has been a strong tendency to link political practicalities with absolute moral standards. Metzger has argued that both orthodox (Confucian) and heterodox (Legalist, Daoist, Mohist) philosophies hold “the peculiar convic­ tion that political morality [depends] on the absence of ‘selfish’ feeling.” Despite the fact that the Confucian virtue of empathy and compassion did allow harmoni­ ous cooperation with people perceived as moderately selfish, “the classical philo­ sophic framework precluded the explicit legitimation of selfish impulse as a natural aspect of political forms.” In Confucian theory, as Metzger concludes, “morality tended to be the only legitimate basis for political authority.”’^ Indeed, political pursuers in Chinese society are never allowed to publicly mention “self­ ish interests.” Political authority would likely lose legitimacy if it failed to claim that its mission is to serve the public good. In fact, social moralization, if empha­ sized heavily, would promote a deep individual concern for society and nation. This may help partially to explain why intellectuals in both traditional and modem China were commonly concerned with society and actively threw themselves into poEtical participation. The termjunzi properly refers to an agent of the cosmos or a moral agent of the Way, whose purpose is to realize the will and transmit the truths of Heaven and Earth, and to transform the entire social and political order. Unlike their Western counterparts, traditional Chinese intellectuals never deemed the pursuit of knowl­ edge as their ultimate goal. The pursuit of knowledge was a means to take social responsibility and serve the government; therefore, a junzi has a strong feeling of historical mission “to establish a mind for heaven and earth; to plead on behalf of thepeople; to continue the tradition of learning, which the sages established, but which subsequently was not transmitted; to open a lastingly peaceful era for the

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next ten thousand generations.”^’ Chinese intellectuals’ feeling of historical mis­ sion would certainly be impossible without a strong social morality. Since Confucianism was officially established as the dominant ideology, the political influence of Confucian orthodoxy has been exerted not only through political power but also through the promotion of morality. As mentioned be­ fore, Confucianism has been gradually politicized since it was established as or­ thodox ideology by Han Confucians. What politicized Confucianism pursues is complete control over individuals’ behavior, beliefs, and attitudes. This model of politicized Confucianism was also inherited by the Chinese communists, who pushed socialized morality to the extreme. As Richard Wilson points out, the ba­ sis of moral authority in Chinese society is founded on the assumption that “moral knowledge is based in reason and that proper behavior is associated with proper thinking.” The measurement of moral behavior is closely linked with the dominant moral authority. In this respect, “appropriate conduct and thought are in no sense relative but have absolute features by which the social and moral worth of individuals can be measured.”’’ Although the social behavior of the po­ litical elite was fundamentally influenced by the Chinese tradition that empha­ sizes autonomy and self-cultivation, overemphasis on morality inevitably led to so-called sociocentricism, which is characterized by a high degree of group iden­ tification. Moralism in Chinese culture, once fused with traditional authoritarianism, es­ pecially patriarchal authoritarianism, would severely undermine the spirit of in­ tellectual criticism as a means to safeguard the Way. In this moralized society, the ruler was usually regarded by the populace and himself as representative of the people in his role as mediator between Heaven and human society. The rulers in traditional China strove not only to monopolize the highest authority in soci­ ety but also to determine the Way and “reason,” the embodiment of truth and principles. Since the Way in Chinese culture is “formless and unorganized,” as Ying-shih Yu has argued, and was often monopolized by the rulers,” Chinese in­ tellectuals viewed compliance with political authority as their moral obligation. Unlike Christian and Islamic cultures, in which religions can contend with politi­ cal authority through the church and other religious organizations, Chinese cul­ ture never allowed any systematic organization or religious belief to compete with or challenge political authority. Historically, the “transmission of the Way” {daotong) of Chinese intellectuals often confronted the “transmission of govern­ ment” (zhengtong) of the rulers. But daotong was rarely able to contend with zhengtong because of its lack of organized authority, such as that achieved by the Catholic Church in medieval Europe. Political leaders in traditional China, as Julia Ching has argued, were often esteemed as “shamanic figures, the original, spontaneous, and charismatic religious individuals,” even though most of them did not qualify as competent leaders. Although Confucian scholars “were some­ times powerful enough to gain the ear of a ruler, to participate in the office of kingship by serving as mediators on behalf of the people,” they were not priests

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like their rulers. Unlike churches, they were never powerful enough to oppose the state.^’ Though many Chinese intellectuals demonstrated their dauntless heroism and never balked at personal sacrifice when they devoted themselves to revolutionary movements, they lost their courageous devotion to principle as well as their auton­ omy when facing their own revolutionary leaders and the new political authority supported by them. The moralism of Chinese culture strongly encourages individ­ uals to assume a duty orientation when they morally connect with others. Individ­ uals see their unconditional submission to their own leaders, and even self­ sacrifice, as a moral obligation that must be safeguarded unconditionally. Under the powerful influence of authoritarianism, Chinese intellectuals always hoped for the appearance of an omnipotent sage-ruler who combined the qualities of a politi­ cal leader with those of a spiritual mentor. This expectation of authoritarianism was not limited to the ruler of the nation; rather, it appeared regarding all types of hierarchical relationships—from the local level to the central government. When knowledge and truth became reliant on realpolitik and ceased to exist independ­ ently and objectively, morality came to serve as a tool of political authority. Modem China has been in a state of constant turmoil as the Chinese struggle with their commitment to traditional moral ethics in the face of new modernist eth­ ical challenges. In the beginning of the twentieth century, an intellectual mood against tradition became overwhelming. Despite a strong sentiment against tradi­ tion, modem China always lands in a predicament of moralism. Most great revolu­ tionary advocates of reform in modem China have depended heavily on social moralization to achieve social order and national modernization. The New Moral­ ity, for Liang Qichao, is self-assertion, self-restraint, and self-sacrifice of the “Little I’s” {xiaowo} for the “Great I’s” (dawo)—the nation. The so-called revolu­ tionary morality imposed by Mao Zedong further pushed Chinese moralism to the extreme. In the People’s Republic in the Mao era, political moralization dominated al­ most every aspect of political and economic life. One of the most popular politi­ cal slogans in the PRC was that “politics is the command, soul, and lifeline of any work.” Not only was morality politicized, but so too was the daily life of the pop­ ulation. Even birth, death, and marriage were influenced by moral politicization. For example, research about the criteria for choosing husbands used by young unmarried females in Shanghai during the Cultural Revolution indicates that the primary consideration of female youth was the “political condition” of their fu­ ture husbands.^’ Chinese society during the Mao era strongly promoted selfabnegation for the sake of “others”—to take care of elders, to work in remote and backward regions, to marry convalescents, and the like. There has been a power­ ful taboo in both traditional and communist cultures against asserting any particularistic or private interests As James Pusey indicates, Mao “tried most forcefully to revolutionize his people’s morality, more forcefully, perhaps, than anyone else in history.”^* The function of government in Mao’s perspective was to nurture and promote the moral behavior of the populace, a legacy from

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Neo-Confucianism in which knowledge comes only with internalizing concepts, and understanding true moral rule means accepting it?^ Metzger views this radi­ cal moralization as the “Maoist vision of heroic moral action.” In examining this Maoist vision, Metzger argues: [T]his vision emphasized a cult of “sincerity” stressing uninterrupted self-abnegation for the sake of the total moral community (“the people”); the realization of this self-abnegation through disciplined work and what Pusey calls the “gladiatorial virtues”; the simultaneously egalitarian and elitist, collectivistic and individuating aspects of this cult, which aimed for equality while identifying a moral vanguard as well as an absolute moral leader, and which aimed for collective action while emphasizing the moral autonomy needed to oppose immoral authority; a special emphasis on youth as a likely attribute of the morally responsive person, though not of the absolute moral leader; the definition of the moral community in terms of both this universalistic cult of sincerity and Chinese nationalism; the voluntaristic belief, contradicting Marx, that economic backwardness cannot prevent this community from realizing the highest moral ideals and even serves as the best medium for the moral struggle; and a Manichaean definition of this struggle.'*^

In Mao’s moralism, the value of one’s existence was determined by the degree to which one devoted oneself to the "general good” and whether one would sacrifice oneself for the sake of another’s welfare. Most political thinkers in modem China have paid great attention to social moral­ ization. Their efforts, such as "mind washing” (Liang Qichao), “psychological re­ construction” (Sun Yat-sen), and “brainwashing” (Mao Zedong) served to promote social moralization. Since the beginning ofthe communist movement in China, Chi­ nese communists highly regarded social moralization in achieving high combat ef­ fectiveness and strong social cohesion. In the slogans "to serve the people” and "to liberate the people who live in misery,” the communists “propagated an ethos based on the values of hard work, courage, struggle, and self-sacrifice.”^'* In order to find a way that was completely different from the Soviet experience, Mao relied heavily on incessant class struggles, ideological struggles, and die revolution to create a com­ munist “new man,” who was unselfish and devoted himself voluntarily to commu­ nist revolution and socialism. Richard Madsen has argued that moral life for the Chinese communists was “based uncompromisingly on principle” and was "the ex­ pression of an individual’s personal integrity,” an ethic that represents what Max Weber has called a kind of “inner-worldly asceticism.”^’ Considering the powerful role that morality played in achieving cohesion in the party and in society, in pro­ moting high morale in the communist armies, and in ensuring the support of the masses, the promotion of morality was high on the agenda of the party’s political work throughout the CCP’s history. Even in rural communities with partial auton­ omy, as one field study identified, “the Maoist moral ideology does under certain circumstances become fused with the internal passions and the sense of moral duty of certain groups of people on the rural scene.”** It is difficult to link key Western values with the moral values of modem Chi­ nese society (such as Mao’s vision of heroic action) because moralism in modem

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China has its roots in tradition. Popular political slogans such as “spiritual atom-bomb” and “spirit can develop into material” that appeared during the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution were the declaration of a social moralization that mythicized the power of the human spirit. Arguably, the high emphasis placed on morality in modem China was influenced in part by Neo-Confucian moralism, especially the Learning of the Mind developed by Wang Yangming. In questioning the argument that “theNeo-Confiician emphasis on autonomy and the moral transformation of society was an ideal less connected to overt social behav­ ior than Mao’s ‘ascetocos’ and mostly reserved for an elite minority,” Metzger holds that “the Maoist ethos could have arisen more as an effort to implement, externalize, and popularize rather than to reject this Neo-Confucian ideal.”*’ Although political manipulation certainly played a role in arousing popular enthu­ siasm, the social and political moralization embedded in Chinese culture proved the decisive factor in helping the communists to transform Chinese society. In summation, Confucian philosophy and thought creates the junzi personality of Chinese intellectuals; the junzi personality in turn promotes the evolution of Confucian philosophy and thought. In fact, a junzi has been conceived as the means by which the ideal world of Confucianism can be achieved, and the junzi personality in Chinese tradition is closely linked with individual moral obligation toward the public and the group to which one belongs. In the Analects, for exam­ ple, Confucius’ political message and social ideal are communicated when he ex­ horts his disciples to cultivate theirjunzi personality as the moral foundation from which they can pursue their political and social ambitions. In Wang Yangming’s philosophy, thejunzi personality is closely linked to the piuification of man’s soul and the moralization of man’s behavior. In the evolution of the Confucian humane and moralistic tradition, unfortunately, politicized Confucians played an impor­ tant role in gradually distorting the pre-Qin Confucian versions of humaneness and moralism by employing them to serve political power while supporting the au­ tocratic monarchical polity.

NOTES 1. Wm. Theodore deBary, The Trouble with Confucianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 27. 2. Ibid., p. 28. 3. Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity (Tokyo; Kodansha, 1977), p. 102. 4. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, The Thinking From the Han: Self Truth, and Tran­ scendence in Chinese and Western Culture (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), pp. 157,160. 5. Julia Ching, Confucianism and Christianity, p. 102. 6. Irene Eber, “Scholarship and Autobiography; A Review of Vitaly Rubin’s Work on Confucianism,” in Confucianism: The Dynamics of Tradition, ed. Irene Eber (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1986), p. 142. 7. de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism, p. 29.

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8. Irene Eber, “Scholarship and Autobiography: A Review of Vitaly Rubin’s Work on Confucianism,” in Confucianism: The Dynamics of Tradition, p. 142. 9. Cai Mingtian, “Dehe tiandi, daoji tianxia” [Virtues harmonize with Heaven and the earth, the Way prevails in the world], in Zhongguo wenhua xinlun: Tiandao yu rendao [New perspectives of Chinese culture: the Way of heaven and humanity] ed. Liu Dai (Tai­ pei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1982), p. 77. 10. Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit ofChinese Philosophy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1947), p.4. 11.Ibid. 12. de Bary, The Trouble -with Confucianism, p. 6. 13. Ibid., p. 27. 14. Ibid., p. 6. 15. Tang Junyi, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967),p. 192. 16. Ibid., p. 192. 17. Ibid., p. 196. 18. Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, p. 12. 19. de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism, p. 7. 20. Xu Fuguan, Zhongguo sixiangshi lunji xubian [The sequel to a collection of the his­ tory of Chinese thought] (Taipei: Shibao wenhua, 1982), p. 496. 21. Mencius, 11:465, ZZJC ed.; D. C. Lau, Mencius, Vol. 2 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984), p. 237. 22. Mencius, 11:461; Lau, Mencius, Vol. 2, pp. 233-234. 23. Thomas A. Metzger, Escape from Predicament (New York: Columbia University Press, 1977), p. 177. 24. Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought: Selfhood as Creative Transformation (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1985), p. 30. 25. Ibid., p. 131. 26. Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought, p. 150. 27. Lunyu, 15:346. ZZJC ed. 28. Tu Wei-ming, Confucian Thought, p. 135. 29. de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism, p. 54. 30. Ibid., p. 54. 31. Alexander L. George, The Chinese Communist Army in Action: The Korean War and Its Aftermath (New York: Columbia University Press, 1967), p. 34. 32. Thomas A. Metzger, Escapefrom Predicament, p. 177. 33. Richard W. Wilson, “Moral Behavior in Chinese Society: A Theoretical Perspec­ tive,” in Moral Behavior in Chinese Society, ed. Wilson and Greenblatt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 1. 34. Thomas A. Metzger, “Foreword,” in Moral Behavior in Chinese Society, ed. Wilson and Greenblatt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. xvii. 35. Zhang Zai, trans. Thomas A. Metzger, Escapefrom Predicament, p. 77. 36. Richard W. Wilson, “Moral Behavior in Chinese Society,” in Moral Behavior in Chi­ nese Society, p. 11. 37. Yu Ying-shih, Wenhau pinglun yu zhongguo qinghuai [Cultural comments and Chi­ nese sentiment] (Taipei: Yuncheng wenhau shiye gufen youxian gongsi, 1988), p. 107. 38. Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. xiv.

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39. Yu Jianmeng, “Shanghai qingnian zeouguan de lishi yanbian” [The historical evolu­ tion of the concept of young Shanghai females choosing their spouses], in Xiandai jiating [The modem family] No. 11,1987. 40. Lucian W. Pye, “Factions and the Politics of Guanxi: Paradoxes in Chinese Adminis­ trative and Political Behavior,” China Journal 34 (July 1995), p. 41. 41. James R. Pusey, “On Liang Qichao’s Darwinian ‘Morality Revolution,’ Mao Zedong’s 'Revolutionary Morality,’ and China’s ‘Moral Development,’ ” in Moral Behav­ ior in Chinese Society, ed. Wilson and Greenblatt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 73. 42. Donald Munro, The Concept ofMan in Contemporary China (Ann Arbor: The Uni­ versity of Michigan Press, 1977), p. 33. 43. Metzger, “Foreword,” in Moral Behavior in Chinese Society, pp. xi—xii. 44. Richard P. Madsen, “The Maoist Ethic and the Moral Basis of Political Activism in Rural China,” in Moral Behavior in Chinese Society, ed. Wilson and Greenblatt (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1981), p. 152. 45. Ibid., p. 153. 46. Ibid., p. 170. 47. Metzger, ‘Toreword,” in Moral Behavior in Chinese Society, p. xv.

Part II

Personality of the Daoist Sage {Shengren} and Authentic Person {Zhenren}

5

Daoist Political Thought: From the Daodejing to Huang-lao Daoism

Unlike Confucian ethics, which focus primarily on the virtues of humaneness and morality in promoting ajunzi personality, Daoist ontology is based on the Way of naturalism, which serves to mold the personality of the Daoist shengren (sage) or zhenren (authentic person). Compared with the Confucian who “aspires to be one with Heaven” and the Buddhist who “hopes to enter nirvana where all individual characteristics and differences disappear,” the Daoist “aims at identification with Nature without differentiation.”’ Whereas thd Analects puts its emphasis on hu­ man society and strives to search for the real meaning of life, the Daodejing is con­ cerned with how human beings achieve social harmony and seek a better existence by unifying themselves with Nature. Although Confucian ideas in traditional China were unchallenged in directing official political practice and maintaining social cohesion, the doctrine of Daoism was often used as a means to help achieve the realization of the Confucian ideal society and functioned as an important buffer in avoiding the extremes of the aggressive Confucians. In fact, whenever a Chinese leader interacts with society and pursues political power, he is compelled to fuse Confucian ideas with Daoist thought.^ Hence, Daoism plays a significant complementary role in promoting the development of Confucianism and achiev­ ing the evolution of Chinese civilization. Although Confucianism has had a domi­ nant influence on orthodox ideology since the Han dynasty, Daoism has deeply penetrated Chinese society and powerfully influenced the establishment, mainte­ nance, and development of the Chinese political system. THE DAO OF THE DAODEJING

Daoism differs from other schools of thought by taking as its central idea, the dao, as the way to follow Nature. For Mencius, the concept of dao (the Way)

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emerges from situational intuitive guidance related to man’s innate standard in judging shi andfei (right and wrong) and in Mohism refers to the discourse of ac­ tion applied to behavior—“the course of events that comes about when everyone acts according to the utilitarian criterion.”^ In Laozi’s philosophy the Way means the origin and ultimate end of Heaven, Earth, human beings, and myriad things in the universe. The Lushi chunqiu, an eclectic text favoring Daoism, defines the Way as the highest principle in the universe and says that “no one knows its origin, form, beginning, or end, but everything originates from it.”^ Although the Way is ranked by Laozi as the highest principle in the universe, the ways of the dao are conditioned by the Self so as to follow Naturalness {ziran} unconditionally, a rule beyond the conscious efforts of human beings. As the Daodejing notes, “Within the realm there are four things that are great, and man is one of them. Man models himself on earth, earth on heaven, heaven on the Way, and the Way on that which is naturally so.”^ The Way is the general origin and Nature is the general principle. The guiding principle of Laozi’s doctrine, whether it involves human life, the uni­ verse, or political rule, is always to follow naturalness or spontaneity. In Laozi’s point of view, the naturalist Way is the principle in determining hu­ man fate and in guiding the social practice of human beings. Laozi is deeply doubt­ ful of the existence of an omnipotent God who created and controls the universe. He opposes any attempt at imposing force or power for controlling the universe. Laozi believes that the evolution of the universe has its own rule and everything in the universe must follow Nature; hence, Laozi attempts to replace the God of reli­ gion with the Way, a spontaneous spiritual power, which safeguards and liberates the spiritual freedom of humankind. Unlike Confucians who define dao as an en­ tity that denotes the Way or method of right conduct for the individual and for the state, Daoists view dao as a substance that means the sense of a method, and of a course of conduct.^ The ideal Confucian leader depends on his moral character to serve the general good; his Daoist counterpart follows the natural Way and imple­ ments the principle of nonaction {yntwei)—rule based on noninterference with the people and reliance on the employment of dialectic rule, such as the use of wisdom and intelligence in directing both social and political interactions.’ In this regard, Laozi’s social ideals and ruling strategy are fimdamentally different from those of Confucians. Unlike Confucianism, the notion of Heaven in the Daodejing refers to an omnipotent power that presents neither benevolence and love nor hatred of hu­ man beings. Heaven never imposes its will on mankind; it acts only by following the Way. Daoism also rejects the Mohist belief in an undisputed Heaven bringing order to society. Whereas Mozi views God as the absolute standard and the final reality, Laozi views Heaven as an unsympathetic force that treats creation like the straw dogs used at sacrifices.® The Daoist sage holds that things are changing but that the Way does not change. Laozi believes that any conscious effort against the Way is doomed to fail­ ure, because it contradicts the fundamental principle of the universe, a principle described by the Daodejing—“a complete reversing is the movement of the Way.”’ The quality of a thing, if developed to its extreme, will surely become its

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opposite. The Daoist sage must use this general law of opposition to govern all changes. For example, in order to preserve the whole, one must be twisted;’® in or­ der to become unyielding, one must yield; in order to become masculine, one must maintain the feminine. The central concern of the Daodejing is how an individual can achieve a better existence and how harmony can be achieved among human beings and between human beings and Nature. The Way, for the Daodejing, is not only the primeval origin of life but also an irrefutable truth that regulates the universe. This may ex­ plain why Laozi defines the Way as the Mother of the Universe, and believes that complete fulfillment of human life and happiness depends on devotion to Mother Nature. The Daodejing holds that the most dangerous enemies of harmony are selfishness and pettiness, both of which are stimulated by desires and passions and are the origin of human strife and tragedy. In order to overcome selfishness and pettiness, Laozi insists that human beings must be ruled by the Way—the principle that forever exhibits itself in the confluence of universal life. According to Daoists, human nature can be a stumbling block, because it changes elusively. In the Zhuangzi, Laozi’s standpoint about human nature is described: Cui Qu asks Laozi: “How can men’s minds be made toward goodness if no one administrates the world?” Laozi replies: “Men’s minds can be forced down or boosted up, but this downing and upping imprisons and brings death to the mind. Gentle and shy, the mind can bend the hard and strong; it can chisel and cut away, carve and polish. Its heat is that of burning fire, its coldness that of solid ice, its swiftness such that, in the time it takes to lift and lower the head, it has twice swept over the four seas and beyond. At rest, it is deep-fathomed and still; in movement, it is far-flung as the heavens, racing and galloping out of reach of all bonds. This indeed is the mind of man!”’ ’

To undermine selfishness and elusive human nature, Laozi dreams of a world where men return to the realm of simplicity and plainness. The ruler conducts him­ self to become a sage who does not interfere with his populace and instead treats them with exuberant love and heartfelt benevolence. He makes himself a model to others by manifesting his unselfish virtue. “The sage has no mind of his own. He takes as his own the mind of the people.”'^ The sage of Daodejing says: “Those who are good I treat as good. Those who are not good, I also treat as gooi In so do­ ing, I gain in goodness. Those who are of good faith, I have faith in. Those who are lacking in good faith I also have faith in. In so doing, I gain in good faith. Because the Daoist Way is viewed by Laozi as the highest principle in ruling the universe, the Daodejing strives to reveal the true meaning of the existence of man­ kind, which includes every aspect of human life. When Benjamin Schwartz holds that the essential orientation for the Daodejing is its mystical dimension, he also argues that the thought of the Daodejing emerges as multifaceted and endlessly adaptable to many-layered interpretations. The Daodejing is “a handbook of pru­ dent mundane life philosophy, a treatise on political strategy, an esoteric treatise on military strategy, a utopian tract, or a text that advocates ‘a scientific naturalis­ tic’ attitude toward the cosmos.”’* In its high regard for the development of human

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personality, the Daodejing pays primary attention to what Michael LaFargue calls “organic harmony.” LaFargue argues: [Let me] begin with aphorisms dealing with the Laoist equivalent of Mencian “virtue”— those that attack certain models of what it means to be a great human being and propose other models instead. If my thesis is correct, Laoist diought on this subject is based on the fact that any given human personality has a tendency to develop in such a way that the various qualities making up the personality form a spontaneously integrated and harmonious whole. Laoists are particularly sensitive to certain other human tendencies that damage this organic integration. One important negative tendency here is the tendency of separated consciousness to take impressing others as a primary goal. Thus it will give special emphasis to fostering those individual qualities that are socially impressive, and to repressing those qualities that appear negligible or negative in a given social environment. Another negative tendency is the tendency of separated consciousness to develop conceptually formulated ideals, and to think of “becoming good” as a matter of shaping one’s being and conduct according to these conceptual ideals. Both these tendencies will typically lead to a development ofpersonality that is “unbalanced” from the point of view of one who takes as her norm an organic balance and integration of qualities rising from within.'^

The naturalistic perspective held by the Daodejing is shared by Chinese classic lit­ erature. For example, the Book of Changes (Yijing) defines the Way as “the consti­ tution of the rhythmic movement of Yin and Yang.” Dai Zhen (1723-1777) states that “the operations of Yin and Yang designate the continuous process of change in the universe, forever manifesting the dao (the Way).”’^ Because myriad things in the universe follow the rule of the rhythmic operations of Yin and Yang, Laozi insists that human existence and social evolution must submit to the “dialectic” na­ ture of the universe, a theoretical foundation for the interpretation of nature’s rules and the application of wisdom. Thus, Daoist thought has been viewed as a wise and effective philosophy of life that “teaches the wisdom of appearing foolish, the success of appearing to fail, the strength of weakness and the advantage of lying low, the benefit of yielding to your adversary and the futility of contention for power.”” Although Chinese philosophy has been understood basically as the search for wisdom (zhi),^^ Daoism pays particular attention to its application and development. Laozi’s emphasis on the application of wisdom in guiding human existence would develop inevitably toward the theory of strategic behavior for Chinese social interaction. Laozi probably never expected that his wisdom would also be transformed by Legalists, such as Han Fei and Shen Buhai, into political stratagems to support power politics. This explains why the Daodejing is often viewed as a political manual that represents the political contrivances of the rulers and expoimds on the doctrine of kingship.

NONACTION OR NONINTERVENTION (WUWEIj IJie notion of wuwei (nonaction or nonintervention) is one of the central con­ cepts of Daoism. According to Schwartz, wuwei can be understood “as meaning

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nonaction or, more importantly, as the kind of unpremeditated, nondeliberative, noncalculating, nonpurposive action.”'’ LaFargue defines the notion of wuwei as “not-working” and views it as an internal, mental state of stillness. This internal state of mind ‘‘expresses itself in a certain style of leadership.”^® Laozi’s wuwei re­ fers to a political appeal against human competition and strife stimulated by civili­ zation. For Laozi, the desire for honor and social achievement that Confucians and Mohists strive for inevitably promotes competition, which is the origin of strife, conflict, and tragedy. Schwartz explains that in the Daodejing, “desire” (yu} does not mean only the simple satisfaction of instinctive biological needs for food, sex, and shelter, but also the kinds of desires and needs created by civilization.” Laozi strongly opposes effort that arises from competition among men and which stimu­ lates desires. The concept of wuwei in Confucius’ philosophy and political thought is re­ garded as nonassertiveness that requires the political rulers to “control themselves with great care and reign reverently facing the south.”” The ruler in Confucian po­ litical theory does not personally attend to administrative matters in the govern­ ment. Rather, he functions as a moral model to influence the populace and help them to achieve self-realization by manifesting his charismatic virtue. The notion of wMwei in Confucianism is related to the ruler’s role as the sage-king with the highest moral authority, which he encourages the people to emulate. Because mo­ rality in Confucianism is natural and intrinsic, everyone is capable of cultivating moral behavior based on an established standard. A successful Confucian ruler is one who serves as an example to realize this standard. As Zhu Xi (1130-1200) de­ fines it, the criterion for a Confucian “sage” is one who is able to fully realize his own nature and also the natures of others. A Confucian ruler does not rule the pop­ ulace arbitrarily and never imposes his will on his subordinates. His power and au­ thority come from his moral influence. In this way, he provides guidance for the moral transformation of his populace. In the doctrine of the Daodejing, however, nonaction (wuwei) is to govern with­ out active interference, because “through actionless activity all things are duly regulated.”^’ Laozi holds that there is a certain rule based on natural law that functions beyond any conscious effort of political actors. For Laozi, one can accomplish a certain purpose only if one practices the principle of nonaction to bring himself into conformity with the Way. In Laozi’s ruling doctrine, wuwei (nonaction) is the means, while (action) is the ultimate goal. In other words, wuwei (non­ action) in Laozi’s doctrine is only the appearance while wubuwei (action) is the purpose^^ Therefore, nonaction in Daoist theory is definitely linked to action ” Laozi’s wuwei, as Duyvendak observes, “is practiced with a conscious design.” In order to achieve a certain purpose, the Daoist saint practices wuwei with a con­ scious design but refrains from any conscious effort, because only in so doing will the “natural” development of things favor him.^® Laozi views arbitrary law and regulations imposed by the government as causes for social disturbance and firmly believes that “the more laws are promulgated, the more thieves and bandits there will be.”^’ In the Daodejing, the concept of wi/wei

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is deemed as not only a universal rule of individual life but also a guiding principle of political rule, including the “political technique” (shu) of the rulership?® Fifty percent of the time, when the term wuwei is mentioned in the Daodejing, it is used in reference to a technique of government and refers to the wisdom of political pur­ suit and rule?’ The concept of wuwei reveals a fundamental difference between the Daoist and Confucian cosmology. Whereas Confucianism insists on a connection between human moral achievement and cosmic harmony, Daoism is unwilling to interpret cosmic activity in terms of hiunan moral categories.®” Confucian wuwei depends on the moral character of the ruler rather than on institutional structures and political techniques. In contrast, Laozi’s wuwei advocates a realistically social or political pursuit that centers on the use of wisdom and ruling government based on the principle of nonaction. In addition, the concept of wuwei in Laozi’s philosophy is related to avoiding any action based on artificially induced or learned desires. Laozi’s wuwei creates a situation in which people are free to express their own untrammeled potentiality and develop naturally and fully without suffering the contaminations of exter­ nally-imposed “purpose.”®' This seems to make Laozi’s social and political phi­ losophy lean toward antiknowledge and anticivilization. The Daodejing argues, “exterminate the sage, discard the wise, and the people will benefit a hundredfold. Exterminate benevolence, discard rectitude, and the people will again be filial. Ex­ terminate ingenuity, discard profit, and there will be no more thieves and ban­ dits.”®® What disgusts Laozi is not the virtue of benevolence per se but any con­ scious efforts imposed by human society. Laozi also does not oppose knowledge, but he is concerned with fraud created by knowledge. Laozi believes that men are more likely to fall into evil ways if they use knowledge to achieve personal gain. For Laozi, all the values and virtues imposed by society to promote a peaceful world have opposite results: they inflame desires fomenting competition and strife. This is why Laozi proposes Yin characteristics, such as noncontention, tran­ quility, “dwelling below,” and simplicity as appropriate antidotes to an imbalance of Yang—the aggressiveness of the world caused by civilization. Daoism abandons guiding behavior with knowledge and opposes rule based on knowledge. In the Daodejing, Laozi describes his ideal society as “having little thought of self and as few desires as possible.”®® For Laozi, conventional knowl­ edge and all artificially established values impede the realization of the Daoist Way based on original nature. Laozi deeply distrusts efforts to improve the quality of human lives and create a peaceful world. In fact, a strong inclination toward “abandoning knowledge” is clearly presented in the texts of other pre-Qin thinkers such as Shen Dao. Shen Dao’s perspective, however, does not mean giving up sci­ entific beliefs about reality but rather giving up prescriptive doctrines. He discour­ ages rulers to “abide by prescriptions.” Instead, he encourages them to “let things take their course.”®'* There should be no deliberation, models, sages, or worthies. An ideal ruler for Laozi is one who is able to “empty the people’s minds but fill their bellies, weaken their wills but strengthen their bones.” In other words, the ruler needs to “keep the people innocent of knowledge and free from desire.”®® For

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Laozi, if everyone in society is free from desire and knowledge as a result of wuwei, there will be no cheating, robbery, and war; thus the ruler and the people will enjoy a peaceful world. In Laozi’s ideal society, the ruler does not interfere with the people and he is a model for his ministers and the populace. According to Laozi, the ideal ruler is a sage who is free from desire and contention,’^ stops put­ ting the worthy in power,” and highly values stillness and nonintervention.” The Daodejing’s ideal sage says: “I take no action and the people are transformed of themselves. I prefer stillness and the people are rectified of themselves. I am not meddlesome and the people prosper on their own. I am free from desire and the people become simple like the uncarved block.”” For Laozi, any conscious effort, including the promotion of the virtues of humanity, righteousness, ritual, or law, is not only useless but also harmful. Daoists are indeed concerned with the powerful influence society exerts in re­ molding individuals. For Laozi, the central goal for promoting wuwei is to under­ mine or terminate the influence of society on individuals and to follow the Way of Nature. Chad Hansen argues that, according to Laozi, getting rid of "wei (action) frees the individual from society’s purposes, socially induced desires, social dis­ tinctions, and social structures of meaning. Individuals should free themselves from social, artificial, and unnatural guidance, and guidance by a system of dis­ tinctions and name pairs. Freedom from these obstacles provides a condition to “act naturally.”^” Whereas one of the central concerns in the Analects is how to transmit the ancient culture that embodies and expresses moral achievement, the Daodejing idealizes antiquity not because of its culture but because of the lack of it.'*' The Daodejing distrusts any effort to impose law to achieve a universal stan­ dard of morality in society and rejects coercive and authoritarian government.

CHERISHING NATURAL LIFE Laozi urges men to free themselves from desires and passions caused by piusuing social honors, power, wealth, and even the fulfillment of social obligations. He believes that desires and passions are the primary source of harm for human health and the principal agents of the destruction of social order. For Daoists, a man’s spirit should not be puzzled by living and dying, fortune and misfortune, despite the fact that man has to fight to sustain the human body. In this respect, Daoism, Confuciansim, and Buddhism differ. Confucians strive to live for a holy ideal, namely, “In the morning hear the Way. In the evening die content!”*” Because the ultimate goal for Confucians is to achieve the perfection of their moral character and pursue an ideal world, they rarely hesitate to contribute everything, even their lives, to realize this goal. Con­ fucian junzi do not pursue .longevity like Daoists or dream paragate like Bud­ dhists. Buddhists believe that the human body is doomed to die and vanish; however, the human soul can be eternal, and life and death can always submit to the transmigration of the soul. According to Buddhism, in order to free oneself from the pain of death, one must insist on incessant cultivation and abstain from

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self-desire so that one’s soul can get out of the abyss of transmigration’s misery. Once one’s soul is freed from the cyclical karma, one no longer bodiers to be rein­ carnated in a new body but reaches eternal calm and peace in the beatific spiritual condition of nirvana. In other words, the ideal world that Buddhists pursue is the other shore where one’s soul no longer needs to be bothered by transmigration, for the root of man’s death is finally completely cut off. In contrast to both Confucians and Buddhists, Daoists highly cherish natural life and urge men to safeguard their natural existence. Laozi’s philosophy, to a certain extent, is the doctrine of guiding men to survival and pursuing better existence. The efforts made by Laozi to follow the Way and conform to Nature are not moti­ vated by a desire to reveal the rule of the universe, but rather reflect his strong con­ cern for the harmonious coexistence of all human beings. In other words, the ultimate concern for Laozi is how to realize a peaceful, quiet, and secure world where the people can be “transformed by themselves, rectified by themselves” and where “the people prosper for themselves” and “by themselves become simple like the uncarved block.’**^ This may explain why Schwartz believes that the individu­ alist motif held by Yang Zhu (a philosopher and thinker in the Warring State pe­ riod) is part of the vision of Laozi and Zhuangzi.** Daoist individualism is guided by a sense of strong naturalism, which, as the Huainanzi comments in the case of Yang Zhu, acts in “preserving life and keeping the body intact, and never injuring our material existence with things.”*^ According to the Liezi, the central theme of Yang Zhu’s individualist motif is to “let life run its course freely.”^ Of course, Yang Zhu and Laozi differ in terms of preserving life. Whereas Yang Zhu suggests that one should preserve life by dwelling in the mountains and countryside to es­ cape from the possible dangers of society, Laozi urges the individual to take the initiative to safeguard his interest by acting against unfavorable intrusions of soci­ ety into the natural sphere. EGALITARIANISM AND “SIMILARITY” The doctrines of wuwei in Daoism and “the Mean” in Confucianism are basically founded on an attention to mediation and compromise in conflicts. A remarkable feature of Confucianism is its emphasis on similarity rather than difference among human beings. Social harmony is a consistent tradition in Chinese culture. In order to avoid conflicts and maintain harmony, the Chinese are encouraged to constrain their emotions and internalize social rituals to inhibit impulsive actions. Although the doctrine of die Mean in Confucianism, theoretically, establishes a fundamental principle for the junzi to practice sincerity and create harmony between inner self and outer things, the political elite are concerned more with its emphasis on equilib­ rium and harmony in their actions and emotions. The Zhongyong, the Doctrine ofthe Mean, proposes an approach to prevent extreme emotions: “Where there is no stir­ ring of pleasure, anger, sorrow, or joy, the mind may be said to be in a state of equi­ librium. When those feelings have been stirred and they act in their due degree, there ensues what may be called a state of harmony.”^’ The ideal Confucian noble man or

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the Daoist sage is able to hide emotion under all circumstances—one feels resent­ ment but does not express anger, one suffers pain but does not expose sadness, and one feels happiness but does not demonstrate joy. With the doctrine of the Mean proposed by Confucianism, Daoism shares the value of human self-protection. In ih^Daodejing, one of the three treasures neces­ sary to qualify as a Daoist sage is the “refusal to be foremost of all things under heaven.”^® In order to protect oneself from danger, according to Laozi, one must avoid standing out among one’s fellows. In Zhuangzi’s view, a useful and out­ standing timber is always felled first.*” Chinese culture tends to make everyone keep in step with others. Unconventional behavior is discouraged. This emphasis on social harmony promotes egalitarianism. Laozi’s ideal pursuit of social harmony is built on an absolute egalitarianism where no one “dares to take the lead under heaven” {bugan yvei tianxia xian}.^^ The Chinese preference behind this philosophical foundation lies in the theory described in the Yilin: A tooth is harder than the tongue, but the tooth goes bad earlier. Those who are unyielding are doomed to death, but those who are soft and yielding can survive. Those who take the first move will drive themselves into an impasse, but those who act behind go toward a broad road.’*

Like the Yilin, the Huainanzi says that those who take the lead head toward a dead end, but those who take action behind will go toward a wide and free road.^^ Confucianism does not reject the social estate system. In fact, it discourages peo­ ple from stepping out of their social class. Chinese culture teaches individuals to learn their place and to be satisfied with things as they are. This tendency encourages a noncompetitive society and promotes human relationships without contention. Be­ cause egalitarianism and the value that “no one dares to take the lead under heaven” have become dominant national mentalities, the Chinese tend to keep pace with oth­ ers and avoid behaving differently. Without a doubt, this attitude of equalizing peo­ ple’s thought and behavior precludes heretical opinions and divergent behavior. Few Chinese do not know the adage that the “the bird who stretches its head will be shot by the gun” (qiangda chutouniad). According to the Yilin, “If a sage stays be-’ hind others, he is able to get ahead. If he makes himself aloof, he is able to stay im­ mune from troubles.”” No matter how capable and talented a person, his career would easily be destroyed if he begin to show off his abilities. For the Chinese, a successful entrepreneur must not show his wealth even ifhe has it. An ideal Chinese political figure is one who is circumspect and prudent; he is not fond of being in the limelight, showing off his ability and power, and seeing to everything himself. He always tends to avoid being viewed publicly as an aggressive politician, but builds an image as a disciplined and prudent political strategist. In particular, he needs to avoid establishing an image as a hero. Qian Mu researched the relationship between heroic images and political leaders in Chinese history. He argues that successful Chinese political leaders did not behave as heroes, even though they employed heroes. In the Chinese view, a hero is not fit to be a leader.’^

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Personality of the Daoist Sage and Authentic Person

Hence, under the doctrine of the Mean and noncontention, the Chinese are en­ couraged to maintain a “similarity” with others so that the individuals can feel se­ cure during their social interactions. Even if one is more outstanding than others, he avoids pushing himself forward because Chinese culture highly emphasizes self-effacement and discourages self-satisfaction. This does not mean that the Chi­ nese do not like to demonstrate their advantages and show their merits. In fact, they tend to resort to indirect ways of demonstrating their advantages, such as us­ ing a third party to extol their merits. The majority of the Chinese take society’s opinions seriously. Because everyone tries to behave similarly, many Chinese demonstrate their hostility to those who are “out of the ordinary.” This explains why many Chinese are hostile to those with high achievements, because others’ achievements will likely cause them to lose confidence in their own capabilities. In other words, it is likely that one’s achievements will be viewed by others as a threat.

RATIONALITY OF RULERSHIP; HUANG-LAO DAOISM Although Laozi’s philosophy demonstrates a strong inclination towards natu­ ralism, its central concern is how political order and social harmony can be achieved and maintained by following the Way of Nature. According to Laozi, be­ cause human strife is inevitable and the law of the jungle prevails, certain compro­ mises toward political power are necessary for achieving the ultimate goal of a harmonious world. Laozi advises rulers to ensure their dominance by maintaining social stability and decreasing the frequency of political races as long as possible. This lends to Daoist philosophy “a very pragmatic and manipulative side that is oriented toward realpolitik."^^ Mou Zongsan even defines Laozi’s learning as “die theory of emperor.”’^ Laozi’s manipulative strategy for successful rule has a prac­ tical importance in maintaining political order and social stability. This might be the primary reason why Laozi’s philosophy became a central part of the theoretical basis for Huang-lao Daoism. Daoist influence on many Chinese thinkers and philosophers in both the pre­ Qin and the early Han periods is evident. For example, th^Guanzi, an important political treatise, absorbed Daoist philosophy and successfully synthesized the thought of Huang-lao Daoism and Daoist classics such as the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi. After the Guanzi, the Liishi chunqiu designed a political blueprint for the Qin rulers by fusing various strands of Daoist thought. The Huainanzi further provided a systematic analysis of the Daoist theory of rule based upon the experi­ ences of early Han monarchs. From the texts unearthed in county of Ding, Hebei, the fragment of Wenzi, has been identified as an important text ofpre-Qin Huang-lao Daoism. Li Xueqin is con­ vinced that the Heguanzi is also an important Huang-lao Daoist text that was written during the later Warring State period.” Research conducted by Chen Guying further identifies many chapters in the Guanzi that were written by Jixia Huang-lao Daoists.” From some of the newly discovered texts at Mawangdui, there is much

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more information about the principles of Huang-lao thought than were known previ­ ously. The Four Classics ofthe Yellow Emperor discovered in Mawangdui are con­ sidered the earliest Huang-lao Daoist texts?^ In the early Han dynasty, when Confucianism had not yet been established as the orthodoxy, Huang-lao Daoism dominated official political ideology.^ After Confucianism was accepted as the offi­ cial ideology and esteemed the theoretical principle ofpolitical rule in Wudi ’s reign, Huang-lao Daoism continued to play a role as die practical guiding doctrine for the realization of a ruler-oriented monarchy.^’ The term “Huang-lao,” die linking of the Yellow Emperor to the figure of Laozi, was founded on Laozi’s philosophy and was responsible for the implementation of realpolitik in political rule. Huang-lao Daoism is defined by Herrlee Creel as “purposive Daoism” and termed by Benjamin Schwartz as “instrumental Daoism.” By preserving inner equa­ nimity and spiritual independence when facing outside interference, Huang-lao Daoists used inner tranquility and detachment as instruments in politics to promote their social ends. This equanimity and detachment never became obstacles to their activist role in society and “purposive” efforts in the outer world. The logic of Huang-lao Daoism lies in the theory that the ruler follows the Way of Heaven, while the ministers follow the Way in the human world by helping the ruler to administrate the nation. The Four Classics ofthe Yellow Emperor defines this logic as “ruler follows Heaven and the ministers follow the human world.”®’ Thus, a ruler must, follow nonaction, because the Way of Heaven is regulated by nonaction; ministers must follow action, because the Way in the human world is regulated by action. Huang-lao Daoists believe that any change in this order will cause political and social chaos. The concept of nonaction in the Guanzi also refers to one’s ability to resist one’s subjective bias caused by passion, and to take action based on objective rule. As the Guanzi states, “[the ruler’s] reaction is not based on his deliberation. His action is not based on his subjective choice.”®’ According to the Huang-lao Daoists, because the ideal wuwei world of Laozi cannot be realized by relying on the voluntary actions and consciousness of the population, an intermediary vehicle is needed for the realization of wuwei in soci­ ety. Huang-lao Daoists advocate active interference in the political process to cre­ ate a condition for realizing ultimate noninterference. These intermediary means include the promotion of social ethics, the implementation of reward and punish­ ment, and the prevalence of social ritual. These practical political approaches can be found in the so-called Four Adherences (ritual, righteousness, honesty, and feelings of shame or guilt) proposed by the Guanzi^ and the virtues of “morality, benevolence, righteousness, and ritual” suggested by the Wenzi. The Yin Wenzi also encourages the ruler to depend on ritual (/i) and music (yue). The most suc­ cessful sage-rulers, according to the Yin Wenzi, are those who “realize that human feelings fluctuate, thereby composing music to reconcile them and establishing rit­ ual to restrain them.”®’ Ritual and music establish standards to regulate social or­ der and internalize individual behavior, they also persist in influencing people and society regardless of what kind of ruler reigns. According to the Yin Wenzi, when political rule no longer relies on the ruler’s personal characteristics and abilities,

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the nation will be less susceptible to the possible immoral behavior of rulers, thereby maintaining the stability of the system; hence, both Huang-lao Daoists and Legalists intend to establish an institution in which political rule depends on stan­ dards and law rather dian on the individual characteristics of the rulers. Unlike Confucians and Daoists, Huang-lao Daoists and Legalists hope for but do not de­ pend on sage rulers. In Huang-lao Daoism, therefore, successful political rule based upon wuwei doctrine depends on active intervention (youwei}, an idea simi­ lar to the political doctrine of the Han Feizi, which relies on law (fa), political tech­ nique {shu), and authority (shi). Although both the Laozi and Huang-lao Daoists rely on the principle of nonintervention in political pursuits, they differ fundamentally on how to achieve a vntwei society. Research conducted by Chen Guying into the meaning of wuwei in the Four Canons ofthe Yellow Empire suggests a major difference between the Daodejing and Huang-lao Daoism. Whereas wuwei (nonaction) in the Daodejing refers to noninterference by government into people’s lives and is viewed as the means to achieve the goal oiyouwei (action), wuwei in Huang-lao Daoism is ac­ complished by initiating active political intervention and has been linked to secret political moves to ensure the ruler’s control.®* In the Daodejing, it is clear that Laozi does not advocate the application of yin-based techniques to achieve the yazig-inspired end of political control. Rather, as Hall and Ames indicate, the Daodejing “pursues both the personal and the political ideal that reconciles the tension of opposites in sustained equilibrium and harmony.”®’ This might lead Henlee Creel to define Huang-lao Daoism as a “purposive” as­ pect of Daoism, which “would appear to have arisen from the attempt to utilize an essentially mystical doctrine for the furthering of personal ambitions and political purposes.”®® The political “technique” and ruling principle of rulers have been sys­ tematically and vividly described by the literature of Huang-lao Daoism, such as the Four Canons of the Yellow Empire illustrated in silk scroll manuscripts exca­ vated in 1973 from the Mawangdui tomb in Hunan province. Despite its origins in Daoist philosophy, Huang-lao Daoism pays much more attention to the realistic concerns of political rule than the Daodejing does. Unlike the Daodejing, which aims to promote harmony between human beings and Nature and achieve a stable political system so that the nation can provide an environment congenial to self-realization of the people, the primary concern of Huang-lao Daoism is to help the ruler gain a realpolitik that will preserve his power. The use of law and political technique to realize a wuwei world was widely shared by Huang-lao Daoist theorists and political thinkers. The Guanzi, for in­ stance, advises the ruler to impose law and rituals to achieve political rule based on nonintervention. As the Guanzi states: “If names are rectified and laws are per­ fected, the sage-ruler will have nothing to do.”®’ The ideal society, according to the Yin Wenzi, is to establish law to “make able persons and villagers have the same behavior” and “to make the worthy and the fools think the same.”’’’ For Huang-lao Daoism, all methods of governance must achieve an ideal wuwei society in which the populace and ministers do not dare violate established rules and are gradually

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free from desire and knowledge. The ideal political rule based on wuwei doctrine aims at realizing a peaceful world in which, to borrow the Guanzi’s words, “laws stand unused, and penalties are never imposed on the people.”” A remarkable difference between the Daodejing and Huang-lao Daoism lies in their varying degrees of emphasis on realpolitik. In Huang-lao Daoism, the Way is inclined to explain how to ensure the dominance of political power rather than how to follow the rule of inviolable Nature and to use wisdom for peaceful and better individual social existence. Several modem scholars who compared the order of Laozi’s texts in Huang-lao Daoism with the original version of the Daodejing have argued that there is a different emphasis on realpolitik between Laozi and Huang-lao Daoists.” In Laozi’s original version, Daojing (the canon of the Way) is placed before Dejing (the canon of ethics). The order is reversed in the Huang-lao Daoist version of the Daodejing. This change indicates a strong incli­ nation in Huang-lao Daoism toward realpolitik. Huang-lao Daoism puts heavy emphasis on the application of xing (force and punishment) and de (reciprocal benefits) to achieve political rule. The concept of de in Huang-lao Daoism contrasts fundamentally with the Confucian notion of de that refers to the ruler’s moral power and virtue to transform (jiaohua} his minis­ ters and the population. The notion of de in the Huang-lao texts discovered re­ cently in the Mawangdui silk scrolls is related to mutual obligations between the ruler and the ruled—“[the ruler] is unselfish to give his love [to the people] in ex­ change for the people’s affinity and respect for him”’^ and “the ruler gives his kindness to his ministers in exchange fortheir loyalty.”” Hence, the notion of de in Huang-lao Daoism is essentially utilitarian. To rule the state successfully and con­ trol officialdom effectively, a Huang-lao ruler must use both xing and de?^ Whereas de promotes the voluntary compliance of the people toward the ruler, xing ensures social and political order and safeguards the sovereignty and security of the state when fighting for survival against foreign powers. There are two as­ pects included in resorting to xing: to enforce law for maintaining domestic order and to wage war for safeguarding international justice. In either case, the applica­ tion ofxing must be after de—the ruler “follows the order of Heaven if [he] resorts to xing [only] after pursuing Huang-lao Daoism pays considerable attention to status obligations, or the cor­ respondence between the actual performance of a functionary and the title or job description of the office, described by Huang-lao Daoism as xingming (name and form or status obligation). Status obligation, which clearly distinguishes the duties of the ruler and his ministers, is important in realizing an ideal political rule based on nonaction in which the ruler leaves the government duties to his officials and does not seek to care for every single thing personally.” Once status obligation is established, according to Huang-lao Daoism, order in the human realm can be brought into the Way of Heaven in “determining success and failure, life and death, survival and perishing, and vigor and decay.”” In the Guanzi’s perspective, the state can be successfully ruled only if the names are correctly given.” Accord­ ing to the Law of the Way in the Huang-lao texts discovered in the Mawangdui silk

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scrolls, “trouble in the world is caused always by xingming (status obligations) and titles; once xingming is established and titles are given, nobody can escape his re­ sponsibility and society can be in order.”®® For Huang-lao Daoists, the establish­ ment of status obligations reflects a natural inevitability derived from the Way. Once order is established and “names” are given, everyone is constrained under the given name to fulfill his obligations. As the Four Classics of the Yellow Em­ peror indicates, “order can be achieved if the title of the office corresponds to the actual performance of a functionary. Conflict can arise if the title of the office does not correspond to the actual performance of a functionary”;®' therefore, the estab­ lishment of names and the distinction of duties are an important means to achiev­ ing political rule based on nonaction. On the one hand, political authority and power relations are distinguished between the ruler and his ministers; on the other hand, duties and responsibilities among the ministers are clearly defined.®^ If the responsibilities of the officials are defined based on the given names, Huang-lao Daoism believes that all conflicts and contentions will automatically disappear. Huang-lao Daoists advise the ruler to monopolize the power to give names and ap­ point government positions—“the reason that the ruler is powerful is because he dominates the power to give names.”®’ The emphasis on status obligations, for Huang-lao Daoism, safeguards a political ethic in which the ruler maintains domi­ nance over his subjects.

NOTES 1. Wing-tsit Chan, “The Story of Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center

Press, 1967), p. 286. 2. Qian Mu, Cong zhongguo lishi laikan zhongguo minzuxing Ji zhongguo wenhua [Seeing Chinese nationality and culture from Chinese history] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiyegongsi, 1994), p. 134. 3. Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 205. 4. Lushi chunqiu, 3:32. ZZJC ed. 5. Daodejing, 25:14. ZZJC ed. 6. HerrleeG. Creel, What Is Taoism? (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), pp. 2-7. 7. Almost all schools of Chinese thought refer to the concept of wuwei. Confucius views the notion of wuwei as nonassertiveness that requires political leaders to have the internal virtue to guard against the lust ofpower and arbitrary will. The notion ofwuwei in Daoism is esteemed as a universal rule in guiding human life and wisdom in achieving political rule and social order. Whereas wuwei in Laozi Daoism is seen as a guiding principle for social and political pursuit and in Huang-lao Daoism refers to an active involvement in the politi­ cal process for maintaining social and political order, wuwei in the Zhuangzi is deemed as a nonstriving principle where one follows the cosmic order to free oneself completely from human society and conform unconditionally to Nature. The term wuwei in’Legalism refers to a political straUgem for the leaders to control the officialdom and safeguard their power.

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8. Y. P. Mei, “The Basis of Social, Ethical, and Spiritual Values in Chinese Philoso­ phy,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 159. 9. Daodejing, 40:25. 10. Ibid., 22:12. 11. Zhuangzi, 11:168-169; Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 116. 12. Daodejing, 49:30. 13. Ibid., 49:30. 14. Benjamin Schwartz, “The Thought of the Tao-te-ching,” in Lao-tzu and the Tao-te-ching, ed. Kohn and Lafargue (New York: State University of New York Press), p. 189. 15. Michael LaFargue, Tao and Method: A Reasoned Approach to the Tao Te Ching (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 164. 16. Dai Dongyuan Ji, 8:5b. SBBY ed. 17. Lin Yutang, The Wisdom of China and India (New York: Random House, 1942), p. 579. 18. Wing-tsit Chan, “Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Human­ ism,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 16. 19. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 188. 20. Michael LaFargue, Tao and Method, p. 216. 21. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 207. 22. Lunyu, 15:334. ZZJC ed. 23. Daodejing, 3:2. 24. Yu Ying-shih, “Fanzhilun yu zhongguo zhengzhi chuantong” [Antiintellectualism and Chinese Political Tradition], in Zhongguo zhexue sixiang lunji [Readings in Chinese philosophy and thought] Hu Shih, ed. (Taipei: Mutong chuban youxian gongsi, 1976), p. 116. 25. Mou Zongsan, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu Jiang [Nineteen lectures of Chinese philoso­ phy] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1997), p. 92. 26. Duyvendak, J. J. L. (Jan Julius Lodewijk), Tao Te Ching: The Book ofthe Way and Its Virtue (London, 1954), pp. 10-11. 27. Daodejing, 57:35. 28. The Chinese word^Aw is usually translated as “technique” or “method” and is related to the political skills and techniques of organizing and controlling bureaucracy. 29. Creel, What Is Taoism? p. 55. 30. Roger T. Ames, The Art of Rulership (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 29. 31. Ibid., p. 43. 32. Daodejing, 19:10. 33. Ibid., 19:10. 34. Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 209. 35. Daodejing, 3:2. 36. Ibid., 64:39. 37. Ibid., 3:2. 38. Ibid., 64:39. 39. Ibid., 57:35.

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40. Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, p. 214. 41. Ames, The Art ofRulership, p. 8. Al.Lunyu, 4:78. 43. Daodejing, 57:35. 44. Schwartz, 7%e World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 188. 45. Huainanzi, 13:218. ZZJC ed. 46.iiez/,7:82. ZZJC ed. 47. Zhongyong, 1:2a. SBBY ed. 48. Daodejing, 67:41. 49. Zhuangzi, 4:28. 50. Daodejing, 67:41. 51. Yilin, 1:14a. SBBYed. 52. Huainanzi, 1:9. 53. 1:10b. 54. Qian Mu, Cong zhongguo lishi laikan zhongguo minzuxing Ji zhongguo wenhua [Seeing Chinese nationality and culture from Chinese history] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1994), pp. 5C^-53. 55. ZhengyuanFu, China's Legalists (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1996), p. 24. 56. Mou Zongsan, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu Jiang, pp. 92,160. 57. Li Xueqin, “Heguanzi yu liangzhong boshu” [The Heguanxi and two types of silk manuscripts], in Daojia wenhuayanjiu [The analysis of Daoist culture], ed. Chen Guying, Vol. 1 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1992), pp. 333-343. 58. Chen Guying, “Xianqin daojia yanjiu de xinfangxiang” [The new direction for the analysis ofthe pre-Qin Daoism], in Daojia wenhuayanjiu [The analysis of Daoist culture], ed. Chen Guying, Vol. 6 (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1995), pp. 42-43. 59. Ibid., p. 24. 60. Zhang Qijun, Daojia zhihui yu xiandai wenming [Daoist wisdom and modem civili­ zation] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1984), p. 144. 61. Ibid., p. 147. 62. Guojia wenwuju guwenxian yanjiushi [Research office of national cultural relics and ancient documents], Mawangdui hanmu boshu [The silk scroll manuscripts from the Han tomb at Mawangdui], Vol. 1 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1980), p. 29. 63. Guanzi, 37:222. ZZJC ed. 64. Ibid., 1:1. 65. rm Wenzi, 1:5. ZZJC ed. 66. Chen Gxtying, “Xianqin daojia yanjiu de xinfangxiang,” p. 26. 67. DavidL. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinkingfrom the Han: Self. Truth, and Transcen­ dence in Chinese and Western Culture (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 93. 68. Creel, What Is Taoism? pp. 44—45. 69. Guanzi, 38:224. 70. Yin Wenzi, 1:4. 71. Guanzi, 53:290. 72. Chen Guying, “Xianqin daojia yanjiu de xinfangxiang,” p. 25. 73. Guojia wenwuju guwenxian yanjiushi, Mawangdui hanmu boshu, p. 47. 74. Ibid., p. 49. 75. Ibid., p. 69. 76. Ibid., p. 62. 77. Ibid., p. 29. 78. Ibid., p. 57.

Daoist Political Thought

79. Guanzi, 12:66, 38:224. 80. Guojia wenwuju guwenxian yanjiushi, Mawangdui hanmu boshu, p. 43. 81. Ibid., p. 54. 82. Ibid., p. 31. 83. Ibid., p. 29.

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6

Naturalism: Personal Spirituality against Artificiality

Whereas Huang-lao Daoism demonstrates a “purposive” aspect of Daoism and is fundamentally concerned with political order and successful reign, the Zhuangzi presents the romantic aspect of Daoism. Creel labels Zhuangzi’s ideology the “contemplative” aspect of Daoism, but Arthur Waley views it as the “quietism” of Daoism.’ The Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, as A. C. Graham observes, differ con­ siderably in thought: “Chuang-tzu (Zhuangzi) is the one ancient collection of writ­ ings of and for outsiders who prefer private life to office, while Lao-tzu (Laozi), although attractive to the same readership, presents itself as another guide to the art of rulership.”^ GENUINE NONINTERFERENCE

If Laozi’s philosophy is concerned with how one should respond to the world, Zhuangzi’s philosophy rises to a plane above human affairs. Tang Junyi argues that Zhuangzi “has a spiritual vision which is beyond the sense of self as an indi­ vidual and of the world as opposite to the self”’ Zhuangzi’s claims about “forget­ ting myself,” “loss of myself,” “forgetting the world under Heaven,” and being “out of the world under Heaven” reflect his spiritual pursuit of a transcendent world beyond the human realm. In the Daoist perspective, the human world is in­ terwoven with other worlds experienced from other perspectives, such as those of trees, animals, rocks, and so on. These worlds together add up to an ever­ expanding composite cosmos.* In comparing the Way of Laozi with that of Zhuangzi, Arthur Waley argues that the Way of Laozi “is a description of how the Sage, through the practice of Tao (dao) acquires the power of ruling without being known to rule.” However, the Way of Zhuangzi is related to the personal lives of individuals.’ The main theme in the long development of Daoism, as a philosophy

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and as a religion, has been the cultivation of a long life, an everlasting life if possi­ ble.^ The Zhuangzi particularly pays attention to the quest for immortality and re­ gards death as an evil. In this respect, Daoism shares with Buddhism the effort to seek immortality. The Buddhists pursue immortality in paradise, whereas the Daoists search for it on earth.’ Although both the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi center on how an individual can better survive during their limited lives, they differ in their approaches. The Daodejing encourages the individual to pursue harmonious coexistence with other human beings. The Zhuangzi urges the individual to completely liberate himself from society as a precondition for personal happiness. In this respect, religious Daoism {daojiao}, which focuses on the attainment of immortality by virtue of mystical practice, has deep roots in philosophical Daoism {daojia}. The Zhuangzi has little concern for social and political order. Rather, it focuses on how an individual can achieve self-realization and develop personal spiritual­ ity. From the Zhuangzi’s perspective, a genuine person (zhenren) must cut away any outward striving for reputation and fame to seek inward “congealing” or stasis, keeping his spirit free from concern for possessions, glory, and self­ justification, which is the common condition of men and women who live “within the four seas.”’ The ideal world for the Zhuangzi is a world relieved of the arbitrary interference of human society. Like Laozi, Zhuangzi views the prevalence of the dao as the purpose of human existence and bolds that the ultimate goal of human life is total identification with the dao by means of emulation. Zhuangzi fundamentally dislikes any kind of government or political institu­ tion—“I have heard of letting the world alone. I have not heard of governing the world.”’ He firmly insists on noninterference and naturalism and rejects political ethics. He has a disdain for social conventions. TheZ^uangz/ provides an anecdote to explain why human efforts are always counterproductive: Once a sea bird alighted in the subiu-bs of the Lu capital. The Marquis ofLu escorted it to the ancestral temple, where he entertained it, performing the Nine Shao music for it to listen to and presenting it with the meat of the Tailao sacrifice to feast on. But the bird only looked dazed and forlorn, refusing to eat a single slice of meat or drink a cup of wine, and in three days it was dead. This is to try to nourish a bird with what would nourish you instead ofwhat would nourish a bird.... A bird hates to hear even the sound of human voices, much less all that hubbub and to-do. Try performing the Xianchi and Nine Shao music in the wilds around Lake Dongting—when the birds hear it they will fly off, when the animals hear it they will run away, when the fish hear it they will dive to the bottom. Only the people who hear itwillgatheraround to listen.... Creatures differ because they have different likes and dislikes. Therefore the former sages never required the same ability from all creatures or made them all do the same thing. Names should stop when they have expressed reality, concepts of right should be founded on what is suitable.

The Marquis of Lu treated the bird as the most honored guest and tried his best to please the bird. The result, however, contrasted with his expectations. Similarly, a government might make an effort to serve its people. The law imposed and the so­

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cial norms promoted by the government in order to achieve this goal, however, will fail to benefit the people and will cause them suffering and pain. According to the Zhuangzi, the reason for this failure is that men try to use men to assist Heaven, but human effort cannot overpower Nature.” Zhuangzi’s social and political phi­ losophy, as Fung Yu-lan argues, is one of “complete liberty.”’^ Zhuangzi’s zhenren is a transcendent human creature who is indifferent, unat­ tached, and whose life is one of integration in which all conflicts and tensions find reconciliation. The notion of zhen means genuineness, purity, and integration ris­ ing as natural expressions not dictated by institutions and conventions.” An ideal zhenren dissolves the dichotomy of self and other to integrate himself or herself fully into the continuity of existence. Hall and Ames observe: This integration has the effect of making the genuine person different from others in the quality of his existence. The activity of the genuine person is characterized by flexibility, efficacy, and noncontention, collaborating with the social and natural environments in mutual disclosure, and serving as frictionless ground for their “self-so-ing,” and they for his own.... Existing beyond the plethora of disintegrative dualisms of self and other, creator and creature, reality and appearance, life and death, the genuine person achieves a kind of immortality—not by escaping to some purer realm, but by realizing himself in the concrete and persistent here and now.**

What a “genuine person’’ attempts to become is a transcendent creature who inte­ grates his or her self into the boundless universe and achieves eternal spiritual im­ mortality. An ideal Daoist zhenren follows the natural law. He strives to enter a sphere free from the interference of human conscious efforts where he forgets the self in “the sphere of undifferentiable oneness with all creation.’’*^ The zhenren appreciates divine will, expressed through Nature, and manifests it to the universe through the noble sentiments of compassion and love. The ultimate pursuit for zhenren is “to embrace in their own enterprise of living the concurrent universal life and, withal, to extend and to contribute their own vital impetus to the augmentation of life in the entire universe.’’*^ Zhenren are those who “in their oneness belong to the di­ vine, and in their not-oneness belong to the human, and for them there was no striving for victory between the two sides.’’” Indeed, Zhuangzi’s philosophy is basically naturalistic—it totally opposes any doctrine that promotes political pursuit and social participation. As Roger T. Ames observes, the Zhuangzi “is for the most part addressed to the project of individual enlightenment rather than the social and political consequences of this higher state of mind.’’*® Creel also argues that a number of passages from the Zhuangzi “em­ phasize the folly of placing any value on the individual as distinguished from the universe, and the ridiculous futility of regarding death as an evil and trying to fore­ stall it.’’*’ From Zhuangzi’s perspective, any attempt to govern the world goes against Nature, for the universe has its own rules for regulating the evolution of so­ ciety. Zhuangzi sees Nature as an automatic unfolding of the Way or cosmic rea­ son and advocates absolute nonaction and submission to Nature: “Let your mind

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Personality of the Daoist Sage and Authentic Person

wander in simplicity, blend your spirit with the vastness, follow along with things the way they are, and make no room for personal views, then the world will be gov­ erned. Zhuangzi disapproves of any human effort to interfere with society and sees all political institutions and regulations as instruments for oppressing the people. Be­ cause of this, Daoist intellectuals influenced by Zhuangzi’s naturalism as it pro­ vides criticism of reality, were more deeply radical than Confucian intellectuals. The ideal government for Zhuangzi is one that holds to the principle of lais­ sez-faire, does not interfere with the population, and advocates letting the people enjoy a pristine freedom. The goal for Zhuangzi is not arbitrary ruler-oriented au­ thority but radical anarchy based on natural instincts. Zhuangzi’s political theory is fundamentally established on philosophical anarchism. Even Confucian sages, who propose the practice of rituals, the love of music, and the values of benevo­ lence and righteousness in the pursuit of a harmonious society, are targeted by Zhuangzi as evil. According to the Zhuangzi'. The sage came along with the crouchings and bendings of rites and music, which were intended to reform the bodies of the world with the reaching-for-a-dangled-prize of benevolence and righteousness, which was intended to comfort the hearts of the world. Then for the first time people learned to stand on tiptoe and covet knowledge, to fight to the death over profit, and there was no stopping them.^'

Zhuangzi’s attitude toward the sage is similar to the position of Nietzsche toward Socrates, whom he viewed as the worst corrupter of European civilization. Cul­ ture, in Zhuangzi’s perspective, “is the embodiment of artificiality and the direct antithesis of natural simplicity Zhuangzi believes that human strength, no mat­ ter how powerful, is always insignificant when compared with Nature, and any ef­ fort made by human beings to resist or change Nature is doomed to failure. He believes that there are few possibilities to achieve success ifmen violate the rule of Nature. Even if success can be achieved, it would certainly cause more serious problems. Zhuangzi is convinced that human beings can reach their goal only if they follow Nature. Zhuangzi, as Hu Shih points out, is so-overwhelmed by his consciousness of the infinity and depth of the workings of nature that he looks upon all human efforts and endeavors as worthless, and upon all knowledge as hopelessly incomplete and inadequate. Because of this, he counsels men to surren­ der their hopeless quest for knowledge and to accelerate change.^’ The ideal goal for the Zhuangzi is the return of hxunan beings to Nature. Unlike Confucianism, which judges an individual’s value by how well he fuses with soci­ ety, Zhuangzi judges an individual’s value by how completely he frees himself from society. Zhuangzi emphasizes that natural consciousness is the true spirit of human beings, which transcends human reality. In the Zhuangzi, the authentic per­ son transcends time, space, and the universe. He “sleeps without dreaming and wakes without care,” “knows nothing of loving life, knows nothing of hating death,” “emerges without delight and goes back in without a fuss,” “does not for­ get where he began and tries to find out where he will end,” and “comes briskly

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and goes briskly.”^** Although an authentic person has to engage the human body in society and involve himself in worldly affairs, his spirit must be free from society. Throughout his life, Zhuangzi refused to pursue a political career and serve rul­ ers, despite repeated invitations from his ruler and his urgent financial needs.’^ The Historical Records describes how Zhuangzi turned down the invitation of King Wei to be the Prime Minister of Chu; King Wei of Chu (339-329), hearing good of Zhuangzi, sent messengers to him, bearing costly gifts, and inviting him to become Prime Minister. At this Zhuang Zhou (Zhuangzi) smiled and said to the messengers: “A thousand taels of gold is valuable indeed, and to be Prime Minister is an honorable position. But have you never seen the sacrificial ox used for the suburban sacrifice? When after being fattened up for several years, it is decked with embroidered trappings and led to the altar, would it not willingly then change place with some uncared-for pigling? Begone! Defile me not! I would rather disport myself to my own enjoyment in the mire than be slave to the ruler of a state. I will never take office. Thus I shall remain free to follow my own inclinations.”^

According to Fung Yu-lan, Zhuangzi holds that political and social institutions “serve only to impose suffering on man” for they “decide upon a single Good as a standard of conduct and force all men to follow this standard.” This violates the natural processes of the universe and the natural law described by the Zhuangzi— “Heaven and Earth have their constants.”’’ There is a certain consistency between the Daoist sage described by Laozi and the Daoist authentic person defined by Zhuangzi. In general, the Zhuangzi echoes and develops certain elements in \b&Daodejing, especially in its description of dao as obscure, hidden, and formless and in its affirmation of the natural, as opposed to the social, order.” The difference between the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi “tends to be one of emphasis rather than substance.”” Compared with the Zhuangzi, the Daodejing concerns the successful reign of the ruler and tends to view dao more as a method of control, of acquiring powerHowever, the employment of craft serves as a means for a ruler to create a society in which human strife can be reduced to a minimum and people do not compete with each other to pursue personal fame and gains. There is a significant difference between Zhuangzi’s wuwei (nonaction) and Laozi’s -wuwei with regard to the political realm. Whereas Laozi’s nonaction is heavily weighted toward political pursuit, Zhuangzi’s nonaction is totally indif­ ferent to political participation. Whereas Laozi gives a great deal of advice to kings, feudal lords, and ministers on how to gain and hold power, Zhuangzi is politically indifferent and even anarchistic.’’ The notion of wuwei in Zhuangzi’s philosophy refers to an attitude of genuine nonaction, motivated by a detestation of participation in the struggle of human affairs. Unlike Laozi who sees political pursuit as an important mechanism to maintain social order, Zhuangzi strives for absolute freedom and a total respite from social interference, thereby fundamen­ tally dismissing any political authority. Whereas Daoist thought related to politi-

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Personality of the Daoist Sage and Authentic Person

cal issues always comes from Laozi, Daoist thought related to personal life always comes from Zhuangzi?^ According to the Zhuangzi, an authentic person preserves his gentle nature and is content with his lot; he is never annoyed by the outside world or lured by fame and wealth. In order to preserve his life, he must avoid strife and drift from any en­ vironment with competition. For die Zhuangzi, only one who is unfettered by the affairs of life, who turns away from high social status and wealth, and adopts an in­ different attitude to right and wrong as well as good and evil, can become a free and authentic person. Zhuangzi dreams of a society in which everyone gives up their desires for political pursuit, fame, riches, and honors and sees through right and wrong, as well as good and evil. The Zhuangzi focuses on personal spirituality and insight, whereas the Daodejing is more concerned with the social and political consequences of this heightened state of awareness: The Daodejing is primarily a political treatise. As such, it is the portrait of the ruler who, emulating the regularity of nature, sets broad political and social conditions for die pursuit of personal realization. The sage-ruler is thus referred to as the “model of the world” under whose organization the people are at leisure to pursue their own realization.... Instead of focusing on the sage-ruler and the manifestation of his personal enlightenment in the appropriate government of the state, the Zhuangzi concerns itself more with the realization of the particular person, assuming perhaps that enlightened government is simply a natural extension of the enlightened person. The most salient features of this enlightened person— the Authentic Person—that can be abstracted from the Daoist texts are the following: First, the Authentic Person, through modeling human conduct on the rhythm and cadence of natural change, is able to realize an integration and continuity with the process of change as a whole. A recognition of the mutuality one shares with one’s environments leads to a reconciliation of opposites: a transcending of the self-other distinction and freedom from the desires, attachments, and dichotomous values that are generated from the notion of a discrete self (that is, a reconciliation of “this/that,” “good/bad,” “right/wrong,” “life/death,” and so on).’^

Because of its strong inclination toward naturalism, the extension of one’s de (vir­ tue) in the Daoist tradition is described in more pervasive terms than in the Confu­ cian literature. At times a virtuous person in the Confucian tradition becomes the embodiment and protector of the human order, a shaper of new culture, and a source of new meaning, whereas, the Daoists take a virtuous person beyond this and into the natural world.’*’

FREEDOM FROM BONDAGE The Zhuangzi emphasizes spiritual transcendence and an unfettered personality and opposes any attempt toward political pursuits. The central themes in the Zhuangzi are the pursuit of spiritual liberation and the safeguarding of the dignity of personality. Being indifferent toward moral judgment, Zhuangzi holds that there is no absolute shi (right) and fei (wrong) for anything, and therefore men

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should free themselves from this idea. Zhuangzi explains that “a right varies end­ lessly and a wrong also varies endlessly; therefore, one would rather realize no right and wrong than get involved in right and wrong.”” According to Zhuangzi’s philosophy, “right necessarily implies the existence of wrong, and vice versa, so that right and wrong are purely relative.”” Equipped with correlative traits of thought, the Zhuangzi views the world in terms of associations among interrelated, codependent opposites: big/small, beautiful/ugly, good/bad, this/that, being/nonbeing.” In contrast to the Mencian assertion that correctly cultivated heart-minds are sources of moral authority, the Zhuangzi denies any a priori existence to shi-fei moral judgments.” Because there exists no absolute standard for right and wrong, Zhuangzi holds that there is no need to clarify who is right and who is wrong when a dispute is involved: Suppose you and I have had an argument. If you have beaten me instead of me beating you, then are you necessarily right and am I necessarily wrong? If I have beaten you instead of your beating me, then am I necessarily right and are you necessarily wrong? Is one of us right and the other wrong? Are both of us right or are both of us wrong? If you and I don’t know the answer, then other people are bound to be even more in the dark. Whom shall we get to decide what is right? Shall we get someone who agrees with you to decide? But if he already agrees with you, how can he decide fairly? Shall we get someone who agrees with me? But if he already agrees with me, how can he decide? Shall we get someone who disagrees with both of us? But if he already disagrees with both of us, how can he decide? Shall we get someone who agrees with both of us? But if he already agrees with both of us, how can he decide? Obviously, then, neither you nor I nor anyone else can decide for each other. Shall we wait for still another person? ”

Zhuangzi believes that because nobody is able to judge right and wrong, there can be no definitive winner and loser in a dispute. Zhuangzi’s philosophy reflects a transcendent attitude toward moral judgments that has powerfully influenced the Chinese worldview. For most Chinese, it is rea­ sonable to conduct oneself according to what makes sense in particular circum­ stances and to quickly adjust one’s behavior in whatever situation one finds oneself. A case in point is that Chinese are known for tolerating leaders who routinely intro­ duce new policies that reverse previous commitments. As Lucian Pye observes, “the remarkable capacity of the Chinese political culture, more than other political cul­ tures, [is] to be flexible and adaptable, to allow leaders to proclaim policy reversals without apologies, and to ensure the equanimity of the public in accepting such re­ versals and new departures.”^'’ In the United States, where behavior is supposed to be guided by binding principles, there is usually little tolerance for political leaders who adjust their stated positions due to changing circumstances.'** For the Chinese, since there is no standard to judge purely relative right and wrong, it is reasonable for a Chinese leader to adjust his behavior and attitudes according to changes of circum­ stances. Scholars also observe that the Chinese can live easily with cognitive disso­ nance and that the “Chinese are relatively unperturbed at having to uphold positions that logic would indicate are mutually inconsistent and may not experience great in-

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ner tensions when belief and fact do not readily coincide.”^^ Zhuangzi’s thought pro­ motes tolerance for cognitive dissonance and supports the peaceful coexistence of simultaneously contradictory sentiments. Considering that the Zhuangzi lacks a clear moral preference and Zhuangzi’s theory fundamentally denies the absoluteness of truth and morality, Zhuangzi’s thought might easily be accused of moral relativism. The Zhuangzi, however, should not be understood as an exercise in relativism. Rather, relativism is used by the Zhuangzi as a strategy to attain complete spiritual freedom and to achieve a certain enlightened spiritual transformation. From Zhuangzi’s perspective, an au­ thentic person should be left far from this world, like birds that “beat the whirlwind and rise ninety thousand li (forty-five thousand kilometers).”^’ Zhuangzi’s thought “advocates complete liberty of action for the individual, and decries all govern­ mental restraints.” ** The pursuit of absolute freedom and liberty in the Zhuangzi leads Lin Yutang to argue that Daoism is “romantic throughout,” centering on nat­ uralism.^’ Indeed, Zhuangzi’s philosophy is related to a simple and romantic natu­ ralism that provides unlimited resources for human existence, artistic creation, and personal enjoyment. Moreover, the notion of nonaction in the Zhuangzi refers to the principle of fol­ lowing the Way to adapt to the cosmic order. The central goal of man’s extrication from the bondage of both the ego-self and society is to establish communication with the cosmic whole. When one overcomes the distorting influence of both soci­ ety (civilization and conventions) and the ego-self (desire, honor, knowledge), one rises to a realm of spiritual freedom. As the Zhuangzi states, I received life because the time had come. I will lose it because the order of things passes on. Be content with this time and dwell in this order and then neither sorrow nor joy can touch you. In ancient times this was called the “freedom from bondage.” There are those who cannot free themselves, because they are bound by things. But nothing can ever win against Heaven. That’s the way it’s always been.*^

Nonaction in Zhuangzi’s philosophy means freeing the self completely from soci­ ety and unconditionally conforming to Nature. An authentic person or enlightened man defined by Zhuangzi reaches an ideal realm of unconditioned freedom of spirit and transcends the distinction between self and other. The ultimate meaning Qixuanjie (freedom from bondage) is the fu­ sion of the individual life with the universe to reach an ideal realm in which “Heaven and earth were bom at the same time I was and the ten thousand things are one with me.”*’ Ames notes that Zhuangzi is not only indifferent to “worldly con­ ditions reflective of an understanding of the arbitrary nature of value judgments” but also strives to extricate men from “all of the desires, attachments, and dichoto­ mous values created by the notion of a discrete self,” such as life and death, right and wrong, and good and bad.*® Confucianism has been characterized in terms of masculinity, mundaneness, or­ der, and spontaneity, whereas Daoism has been frequently defined as feminine,

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mystical, chaotic, and spontaneous. Richard J. Smith describes Daoism and Con­ fucianism as yin-yang contrast, as ritual versus spontaneity, self-control versus naturalness, freedom versus social responsibility, hierarchy versus equality, and refinement versus primitivity.'*’ As a counterbalance to the Confucians who are trammeled by social responsibility, the Daoists who hold Zhuangzi’s philosophy stress individual liberation. In Zhuangzi’s basic themes, according to Vitaly Ru­ bin, a genuine person sets himself up against society and rejects it. Zhuangzi main­ tains that merging with nature means forgetting about men and that culture is the embodiment of artificiality and is the direct antithesis ofnatural simplicity.^® For the Daodejing and the Zhuangzi, Confucian ethics and Mohisl dialectics impose arbitrary human efforts that violate natural rule. Although Daoism and Confucianism are certainly different, their contrasts should not be seen as a radical opposition. It should be properly understood as a correlative distinction rather than as a dichotomizing principle. Examining the dy­ namics of the Chinese tradition. Hall and Ames view several factors that reinforce the exaggeration of this yin-yang contrast between Daoism and Confucianism. First, the earliest representatives of these two philosophies seem to have characterized each other in precisely such terms. Confucius himself criticizes some recluses as ignoring the demands of humanity that require their responsible participation in the social and political order.... And then there are the numerous passages in the Daoist classics that dismiss Confucian moralizing as an egregious assault on our natural human proclivities.... A second factor... is the actual way in which these two traditions have served the development of Chinese civilization. After all, Confucianism did become the official state doctrine during the Han dynasty, and Confucian classics were the curriculum that traditionally led to political office. By way of contrast. Buddhism was introduced into China largely through Daoist categories (geyi), and many popular uprisings were justified under the banners of rebellious Daoists.... One factor contributing to an exaggeration of this contrast between the Daoists and the Confucians is the failure to distinguish the teachings themselves from their historical interpretations.’'

The dynamic interaction between Confucianism and Daoism certainly is an impor­ tant feature in the evolution of Chinese culture and civilization throughout history.

“STAYING IN ONE PIECE AND KEEPING ALIVE” Laozi and Zhuangzi highly regard the value of life and yearn for a peaceful co­ existence of human beings. The ideal realm in Daoist philosophy is “to push far enough toward the void,”^’ “to hold fast enough to quietness,”” “to cleave to what is female,”” and “to return to a state of infancy.”” Zhuangzi’s authentic person is free from desire, the affairs of life, and the lure of fame and status, and his “Great Man” sees through fame, riches, and honors: The Great Man in his actions will not harm others, but he makes no show of benevolence or charity. He will not move for the sake of profit, but he does not despise the porter at the gate.

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He will not wrangle for goods or wealth, but he makes no show of refusing or relinquishing them. He will not enlist the help of others in his work, but he makes no show of being self-supporting. He does not despise the greedy and base. His actions differ from those of the mob, but he makes no show of uniqueness or eccentricity. He is content to stay behind with the crowd, but he does not despise those who run forward to flatter and fawn. All the titles and stipends of the age are not enough to stir him to exertion. All its penalties and censures are not enough to make him feel shame. He knows that no line can be drawn between right and wrong, and no border can be fixed between great and small. I have heard it said, “The Man of the Way wins no fame, the highest virtue wins no gain, the Great Man has no self.” To the most perfect degree, he goes along with what has been allotted to him.’^

Zhuangzi craves an absolute freedom of individual spirit. His ultimate goal for hu­ man life is to unite men and nature in an organic whole. In order to achieve “free and easy wandering,” one must kick over the traces of the filthy world and aban­ don the attempt for worldly wisdom. This is why Zhuangzi views the Daoist Way in a political context as the application of noninterference {wuyvei}. In other words, the model political institution, for Zhuangzi, is an anarchic government that pro­ tects the natural and social environment by preventing human interference. Zhuangzi strongly disapproves of the application of Legalist penal law and is deeply disgusted with the Confucians and Mohists for their encouragement of so­ cial rituals and political responsibility that cause suffering. In the world today, the victims of the death penalty lie heaped together, the bearers of cangues tread on each other’s heels, the sufferers of punishment are never out of each other’s sight. And now come the Confucians and the Mohists, waving their arms, striding into the very midst of the fettered and manacled men.... Who can convince me that sagely wisdom is not in fact the wedge that fastens the cangue, that benevolence and righteousness are not in fact the loop and lock of these fetters and manacles?

Zhuangzi searches for an ideal world in which no ritual is promoted and no penal law is imposed. In Chinese culture, Daoism is always related to “the recluse, the retirement to the mountains, the worship of the rural life, the cultivation of the spirit and the pro­ longation of man’s life, the banishment of all worldly cares and worries.”^® Even the concept of the sage in Daoist thought refers to one who “can succeed when the world has the Way and also can survive when the world is without the Way.”^’ This explains why many intellectuals throughout Chinese history went and lived in seclusion, where they could escape from elaborate formalities and the trickery of life. Zhuangzi’s philosophy is a powerful relief for those who are reduced to be­ coming failures in political contention. Compared with Americans, who are prone to resent failure, most Chinese are likely to find failure tolerable. A typical Chi­ nese man tends to “be content even though he himself is not a success and has failed to reach the high goals he set himself.” As Francis Hsu explains in the case of traditional China, “most well-to-do Chinese fathers retired early and enjoyed leisure, their families, and their scholarship. Other Chinese found their chi luo

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(spiritual refuge) in nature appreciation, calligraphy, poetry, or gardening. The Chinese male does not have to defend his personal failure by continuous acts of conquest.”® The yinshi (hermit) is part of the ideal personality of traditional Chinese intel­ lectuals. In fact, the intellectual forerunners of the Daoists, as Chad Hansen ar­ gues, were closely related to hermits.^’ Even Laozi was described by Sima Qian (ca. 145-ca. 86 B.C.) as a “reclusivejunzi.”^^ Early Daoists, such as Yang Zhu, dis­ approved of involvement in politics and advocated withdrawal from society for such egotistical motivations as self-preservation and survival. Although with­ drawal from society in the Zhuangzi is linked with the achievement of a transcen­ dent spiritual freedom rather than with egotistical motivations, the central pursuit of keeping oneself alive is still evident. The Zhuangzi defines yinshi as those who did not conceal their bodies and refuse to let them be seen; they did not shut in their words and refuse to let them out; they did not stow away their knowledge and re­ fuse to share it. But the fate of the times was too much awry. If the fate of the times had been with them and they could have done great deeds in the world, then they would have returned to Unity and left no trace behind. But the fate of the times was against them and brought them only great hardship in the world, and therefore they deepened their roots, rested in perfection, and waited. This was the way they kept themselves alive.® Lin Yutang describes three important reasons that Daoists prefer a reclusive life: “Firstly, [a reclusive life] stands for the return to nature and the romantic es­ cape from the world and revolt against the artificiality and responsibilities of Con­ fucian culture. Secondly, it stands for the rural ideal of life, art and literature, and the worship of primitive simplicity. And thirdly, it stands for the world of fancy and wonder, coupled with a childishly naive cosmogony.”® Lin Yutang observes that the Daoist love of hermitage “accounts for the fact that every Chinese is a Confucian when he is successful and a Daoist when he is a failure. The naturalism of Daoism is the balm that soothes the wounded Chinese soul.”® Zhuangzi’s transcendent attitude toward political pursuit and individual life has a deep influence on Chinese intellectuals. Many intellectuals in traditional China refused to become involved in political contention and lived in seclusion. A large number of scholar-officials throughout Chinese history, after falling into disfavor with their rulers or retreating from the political arena, liked to live in places where one was far from political contentions and where one could attain peace for his wounded soul. Zhuangzi’s philosophy provides the theoretical foundation for Chi­ nese intellectuals to avoid political risk but pays attention to one’s moral improve­ ment without thought of others. Like Confucianism, Daoism has deeply influenced the Chinese mentality and profoundly penetrates the consciousness of the entire population. Most traditional Chinese intellectuals not only revered Confucius and Mencius but also idolized Laozi and Zhuangzi. In their political pursuits, they tended to fuse Daoist thought into Confucian principles and view Confucianism and Daoism as complementary. A Confucian nobleman never hesitates to devote his efforts and make sacrifices to

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strive for personal honor, integrity, and social respect. A Daoist sage or authentic person, however, is able to free himself from the insidious concerns of human strife and to forget the annoyances of the outside world when he becomes a politi­ cal failure or has to retreat from the political arena. Confucian political zeal and Daoist withdrawal establish a healthy balance for the Chinese to socially adjust themselves and pursue their careers. Daoism holds that it is Nature that dominates the universe and determines hu­ man destiny. One is unable to achieve any goals if one fails to comply with Nature. In the Daoist perspective, any effort is limited regardless of men’s subjective de­ sire and efforts, for a being with supreme powers—Nature—controls all the crea­ tures in the universe and determines men’s fates. Because human beings are xmable to determine their fates and are controlled by Nature, they should not at­ tempt to ask too much of themselves. Chinese are often discouraged from radical attitudes toward individual pursuits and are urged to give up if they have made cer­ tain efforts but still fail to reach expected goals. A popular idiom shows a common mentality of the Chinese: “Man proposes but Heaven disposes’’ (moushi zairen, chengshi zaitian'). This cultural inclination to tolerate failure functions as a buffer to avoid political pursuits developing toward any extremes.

NOTES 1. Arthur Waley, The Way and Its Power (New York: Grove Press, 1958), p. 93. 2. A. C. Graham, Disputers ofthe Tao (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1989), p. 170. 3. Tang Junyi, “The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Value in Chinese Philosophy,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials ofChinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 271. 4. William A. Callahan, "Cook Ding’s Life on the Whetstone,” in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames (New York: State University ofNew York Press, 1998), p. 180. 5. Waley, The Way and Its Power, p. 92. 6. Wing-tsit Chan, “Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Human­ ism,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 20. 7. Wing-tsit Chan, “The Individual in Chinese Religions,” in The Chinese Mind: Essen­ tials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Cen­ ter Press, 1967), p. 290. 8. Michael Saso, “The Chuang-tzu nei-pien: A Taoist Meditation,” in Experimental Es­ says on Chuang-tzu, ed. Victor H. Mair (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1983), p. 142. 9. Zhuangzi, 6:118. ZZJC ed. 10. Zhuangzi, 18:274—275; Burton Watston, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), pp. 194-195. 11. Zhuangzi, 6:118. 12. Fung Yu-lan, J History ofChinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 230. 13. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, The Thinkingfrom the Han (New York: State Uni­ versity ofNew York Press, 1998), pp. 164-165.

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14. Ibid., p. 167. 15. Fung Yu-Ian, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1947), pp. 79-80. 16. Thome H. Fang, The Chinese View ofLife: The Philosophy of Comprehensive Har­ mony (Hong Kong: The Union Press, 1957), pp. 151-152. 17. Fung Yu-lan, The Spirit of Chinese Philosophy, p. 80. 18. Roger T. Ames, The Art of Rulership (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), p. 43. 19. Herrlee G. Creel, What Is Taoism? (Chicago; The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 45. 20. Zhuangzi, 7:133; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 94. 21. Zhuangzi, 9:154; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 106. 22. Vitaly Rubin, Individual and State in Ancient China, trans. S. Levine (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), p. 103. 23. Hu Shih, The Development of the Logical Method in Ancient China (Shanghai: The Oriental Book Company, 1922), p. 147. 24. Zhuangzi, 6:103-104. 25. Ibid., 26:398. 26. Shiji. 63:4a-4b. SBBY ed.; see Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. l.p. 221. 27. Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1, pp. 227-228. 28. Lisa Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 86. 29. Roger T. Ames, “Introduction,” in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames (New York: StateUniversity of New York Press, 1998), p. 1. 30. Creel, What Is Taoism? p. 5. 31. Ibid., p. 6. 32. Xu Fuguan, Lianghan sixiang shi [The history of the Former and Later Han], Vol. 2 (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1976), p. 192. 33. Ames, “Introduction,” in Wandering at Ease, p. 3. 34. Roger T. Ames, “Knowing in the Zhuangzi," in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 225. 35. Zhuangzi, 2:33. 36. Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, p. 233. 37. James D. Sellmann, “Transformational Humor in the Zhuangzi,” in Wandering at Ease in the Zhuangzi, ed. Roger T. Ames (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 166. 38. Raphals, Knowing Words, p. 89. 39. Zhuangzi, 2:50-51; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu,p. 48. 40. Lucian Pye, The Mandarin and the Cadre Cadre: China‘s Political Cultures (Arm Arbor: The University of Michigan, 1988). p. 81. 41. Ibid., p. 85. 42. Ibid., p. 88. 43. Zhuangzi, 1:3. 44. Creel, What Is Taoism? p. 37. 45. Lin Yutang, My Country and My People (New York: Halcyon House, 1938), p. 117. 46. Zhuangzi, 6:118. 47. Zhuangzi, 2:39; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 43. 48. Ames, The Art ofRulership, p. 44.

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49. Richard J. Smith, China's Cultural Heritage: The Ch'ing Dynasty: 1644-1912 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), pp. 121-123. 50. Vitaly Rubin, Individual and State, pp. 94-96, 103. 51. Hall and Ames, The Thinking From the Han, pp. 153-154. 52. Daodejing, 16:9. ZZJCed. 53. Ibid., 16:9. 54. Ibid., 28:16. 55. Ibid., 28:16. 56. Zhuangzi, 17:102; Waston, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, pp. 178-179. 57. Zhuangzi, 11:171; Waston, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 118. 58. Lin Yutang, My Country and My People, p. 118. 59. Zhuangzi, 4:83. 60. Francis L. K. Hsu, Americans and Chinese (Honolulu: The University Press of Ha­ waii, 1981), p. 170. 61. Chad Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 204. 62. Shiji, 63:3a. 63. Zhuangzi, 16:245-246; Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, p. 173. 64. Lin Yutang, My Country and My People, p. 117. 65. Ibid., p. 117.

7

The Principle of Self-Protection in Political Pursuit

A Confucianjunzi has his own personal mission to safeguard a moral order identi­ fied with Heaven’s ordinance (tianming). Because of this strong spiritual prop, the Junzi is encouraged to be concerned with other-worldly pursuit rather than utilitar­ ian considerations. A consistent tradition in Confucianism is the emphasis on indi­ vidual dignity and independence, as well as an obligation to develop virtue and behave morally toward society. Neo-Confucians particularly emphasize the mind’s direct access to the Way, seeing themselves as authorized human agents of Heaven. Because ajunzi is obligated to preserve the Way, he is concerned with the people’s welfare and suffering, and is devoted to serving the state and society in the name of the common good. Indeed, the Confucian spirit contains a powerful impulse to urge ajunzi to pur­ sue the Way and truth at any price—even self-sacrifice. As a junzi, “he always thinks of the Way; he neither worries how he is going to make a living nor has anx­ iety concerning poverty.”' In Confucius’ perspective, "Neither the knight who has truly the heart of a knight nor the man of good stock who has the qualities that be­ long to good stock will ever seek life at the expense of Goodness; and it may be that he has to give his life in order to achieve Goodness.”’ Confucian doctrine tra­ ditionally maintains a regard for moral integrity and emphasizes obligations to­ ward society. Confucius and Mencius highly respect those who devote their lives to achieving the Way, but the most respected figures are those who shoulder heavy responsibili­ ties and bear the pressure of human existence, including mental and physical suffering and humiliation. By continuing self-cultivation and tempering their will­ power, they transfer their dauntless heroism to a moral duty to endure humiliation in order to carry out the most important historical mission—promoting the Way in the world. Once one no longer fears death, of course, one has the courage to endure

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the ordeals of life (e.g., political demotion and persecution). By upholding the Confucian tradition that “the commander of the forces of a large state may be car­ ried off, but the will of even a common man cannot be taken from him,” a junzi firmly preserves his beliefs and principles regardless of difficulties. Throughout history, theyunz/ has become a symbol for Chinese intellectuals in shouldering so­ cial responsibility and fulfilling moral obligation to achieve the Way. Sima Qian in the Han dynasty, after suffering the dehumanizing punishment of castration, con­ tinued to fulfill his duty by completing the great Historical Records. After falling from political contention, Liu Zongyuan (773—819) in the Tang dynasty did not choose to give up but rather continually upheld his moral obligation for a possible political return. In this respect, Confucianism and Daoism share common ground in stressing the importance of realizing the Way. The ideal Chinese scholar­ official upholds the principles of the doctrine of the Mean and “is worldly wise and plays it safe” (mingzhe baoshen} while pursuing a political career.

THE DOCTRINE OF THE MEAN Confucian-dominated Chinese political tradition appeals to individuals to shoulder social responsibility and views government service as the main channel of moral perfection and attainment of the Way. In traditional political thought, the Mean is viewed as the characteristic of an ideal personality and is a highly desir­ able goal for self-cultivation and moral accomplishment in the quest to reach equi­ librium and achieve harmony. Confucianism sees the Mean as crucial to realizing a harmonious society for “perfect is the virtue that is according to the Mean!”’ It is clear that Confucianism heavily emphasizes the Mean because it reconciles social conflicts and harmonizes human relations. The Mean facilitates the establishment of harmonious relations among differing social classes so that social stability can be maintained. Confucian political ideology is closely related to an individual’s obligation to participate in the political process and serve the government; how­ ever, after an individual takes office, his pursuits are limited to certain political sit­ uations and his behavior is necessarily molded by political reality. The question becomes how can one achieve moral self-cultivation and promote the prevalence of the Way while surviving politically and enhancing his career? Research conducted by Wang Bangxiong has identified that the Zhongyong, or Doctrine ofthe Mean, one of the most important Confucian classics, was consider­ ably influenced by Daoism. While cheng (sincerity) in the Doctrine ofthe Mean is deemed as essential for ajunzi to preserve his inner virtue and integrity in any cir­ cumstance and to avoid “drifting with the tide,” the notions of zhong (equilibrium) and he (harmony) imply adapting oneself to different circumstances. These ideas basically reflect the thought of Laozi.'* The Doctrine of the Mean provides a theo­ retical foundation for theJunzi to make the best choice in a complex political situa­ tion and seek self-protection while pursuing a political career. It supports a life philosophy that accepts the status quo and recognizes the imperatives of Heaven. This philosophy to a certain extent matches the Daoist sage (shengren) and genu­

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ine person (zhenren), who comply with Nature and accept the status quo. One of the central ideas of the principle of the Mean is that any proposition involving hu­ man life must be “in accord with human nature” rather than merely “logically cor­ rect.”^ According to Confucius, a junzi should stand in awe of three things: “the imperatives of Heaven, great men, and the words of the sages.”* Indeed, “thejunzi must recognize his own limitations, imposed by his leadership function.” “No one can do everything or be good in all things. Some lead, others follow.”’ The Mean is expressed in Chinese as zhong—“being without inclination to ei­ ther side”—and yong—“admitting of no change.”® According to the Doctrine of the Mean, “zhong denotes the correct course to be pursued by all under heaven, yong denotes the fixed principle regulating all under Heaven.”’ Fung Yu-Ian ar­ gues that the notion of zhong in the Doctrine ofthe Mean connotes flexibility and change according to different circumstances. Its purpose is to achieve a state of “just right.”” If we define going beyond and felling short as two extremes on a continuum, the Mean refers to a state midway between these two poles. In the words of Zhu Xi (1130-1200), zhong is “a state that is not one-sided and neither goes beyond nor falls short.” If extended to human action, the Mean denotes the best course of action as being neither active nor passive." The Doctrine of the Mean explains the reason why the Mean is difficult to practice: “The knowing go beyond it and the stupid do not come up to it.”” This notion means that it is diffi­ cult for an individual always to respond properly to an established social norm and adapt to an imposed social environment. The Mean is viewed by Confucianism as a basic principle of individual social interaction and a standard for measuring whether the conduct that an individual exercises in his social interactions is correct. For example, li (ritual) is established as a set of guidelines to govern social deportment and domestic relationships that are suitable among the members of a community. In the mechanism of regulating the relationships among the members of the community, the application df rituals runs through the principle of the Mean. In the Book ofRites, for example, when li (ritual) is related to funerals, it provides an expression of grief and establishes a so­ cial respect for the deceased and his family. According to the Book of Rites, if one’s father or mother passes away, one should not eat for three days, should not take off his clothes for three months, and should continue to grieve for three years. The Book of Rites requires every member in society to follow the doctrine of the Mean and practice this ritual “just right”—a filial son does not do it excessively and an unworthy descendant has to do enough." The Book ofRites tells a story to describe appropriate conduct that satisfies the doctrine of the Mean. Zengzi, one of Confucius’ disciples, told Zi Si that he refused to eat food for seven days when his father died. Zi Si immediately criticizes Zengzi for violating the doctrine of the Mean by refusing to eat for more than three days, which is not acceptable by Con­ fucian li, thereby violating the principle of the Mean. ” The Mean is also an impor­ tant virtue to qualify as a nobleman. The difference between a nobleman and an inferior man, according to the Doctrine of the Mean, is whether one can manage

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his conduct when his emotions arise. A nobleman should control his emotions and desires in order to behave in the best possible manner.’^ Confucius highly values the doctrine of the Mean. He believes that the realiza­ tion of an ideal world depends greatly on the prevalence of the values of equilib­ rium and harmony because equilibrium (zhon^ “is the great root from which grow all the human actions in the world,” and harmony {he) as embodied in human rela­ tions “is the universal path that they all would pursue.” Confucianism holds that if “the states of equilibrium and harmony exist in perfection,” “a happy order will prevail throughout heaven and earth and all things will be nourished and will flour­ ish.”’® According to Confucianism, the central purpose for promoting the principle of the Mean is to achieve the prevalence of equilibrium and harmony in the uni­ verse, as well as in society. To achieve equilibrium and harmony, ajunzi must “do what is proper according to his station. He should not desire to go beyond this.”” Confucius gives examples to explain how ajunzi should properly behave: “In a position of wealth and honor, he does what is proper to a position of wealth and honor. In a poor and low posi­ tion, he does what is proper to a poor and low position. Situated among barbarous tribes, he does what is proper to a situation among barbarous tribes. In a position of sorrow and difficulty, he does what is proper to a position of sorrow and diffi­ culty.”’® The ideal personality of ajunzi is defined by Mencius as “never going be­ yond reasonable limits.”” In the Analects, Confucius is introduced as the ideal model of zjunzi who exercises the Mean and cultivates in himself the integration of two extremes into a single whole. The Master’s manner is “affable yet firm, commanding but not harsh, polite but easyEach pair of contrary and usually in­ compatible terms is integrated into a single whole, encompassing both aspects in the personality of Confucius. From the Master’s personality, we can infer his standpoint as the middle that integrates the two extremes. In Kanaya Osamu’s ob­ servation, the middle between two extremes of the Mean “is not fixed at a single central point but is an approximate middle that moves while maintaining a balance between the two extremes.”” In reality, it implies that ajunzi following the Mean is required to avoid behavior “startlingly unusual or special but rather the moder­ ate middle of ordinary existence.”’^ As Confucius further explains, “To divulge se­ crets and behave strangely in order to be mentioned with honor in future ages— this is what 1 do not do.”^® In political reality, the Mean is perceived as a significant principle that will guide the actions of ajunzi when facing complex and often dangerous political sit­ uations. Much ofthis perception is based on the idea that an inappropriate response to a political reality (e.g., going too far or not going far enough,) might ruin the po­ litical career of a junzi. From the Master’s response to his disciple Zi Gong, we find that the Master disapproves of the actions of both Shi and Shang, because Shi goes too far and Shang does not go far enough.^* Moreover, Confucius suggests in­ ternal inhibitions against individual sentiment in order to reach equilibrium and achieve harmony.

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The Mean is supported by the Confucian perspective of the imperatives of Heaven. Ajunzi must receive the arrangement of Heavenly imperatives to do what is appropriate to his position. Although ajunzi should try his best to pursue career success, according to Confucianism, he should not complain if he fails to achieve his goal. “One accepts willingly only what is one’s proper Destiny” and “one waits for whatever is to befall him. With a perfected character, he stands firm on his proper Destiny.Confucius and Mencius were models in complying with the im­ peratives of Heaven. When they failed to convince their princes to accept their po­ litical propositions during their travels from state to state, they accepted the status quo, even though they never gave up their efforts to correct the political leaders. The principle that Confucius and Mencius hold is that “in obscurity a man makes perfect his own person, but in prominence he makes perfect the whole Empire as well.”" Compared with Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi pays more attention to the im­ portance of the Mean in its flexibility for pursuing political ambition and self­ protection. Retaining his autonomy and preserving the principles of Confucian­ ism, according to Xunzi, ajunzi must be “able to employ his sense of what is mor­ ally right, to bend or straighten, changing and responding to every occasion.” Xunzi states: That the junzi... bends and unbends as the occasion demands and that he is flexible and tractable like rushes ^nd reeds is not because of fear and cowardice. That he is unyieldingly strong and fiercely resolute and that there is nothing in him that has not been made straight are not because of pride or haughtiness. His use of his sense of what is morally right to change in response to every situation is because of knowledge that is precisely fitting for every occasion, whether curved or straight.^’

In Xunzi’s perspective, an ideal Confucianjunzi is one who can make the best po­ litical moves while preserving the Confucian principle of moral integrity and ful­ filling his social responsibility. The Confucian concept of the Mean and the Daoist notion of noncontention {'wuzheng) have profoundly influenced the social psyche of the Chinese. Luo Guang argues that, influenced by the doctrine of the Mean, the Chinese tend to abide by authority, rarely behave radically, love peace, always leave some lee­ way in handling human relationships, and regard renqing (human feelings) highly.^* Under the influence of the doctrines of the Mean and noncontention, one tends to behave carefully and is punctilious about not overstepping the bounds of established rule. The Mean and noncontention have become important values in guiding the behavior of political figures. In reality, they are culturally coercive beliefs, which modify the political elite’s behavior as they adapt to the established political system. Although the Mean and noncontention facilitate the harmonious nmning of the government and the stability of an established politi­ cal system, they also promote political participation in an overly cautious and in­ decisive fashion. Many political elites, in spite of high hopes and great ambition

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at the beginning of their careers in office, lose their vigor and become overly cau­ tious in their political pursuits.

FLEXIBILITY IN POLITICAL PURSUIT Qian Mu argues that Confucian thought includes two central elements in its worldly pursuit: first, when a junzi is employed by the ruler, he devotes himself to benefiting the people and promoting a benevolent government; second, when ajunzi is not employed by the ruler, he concentrates on the self-cultivation of his moral per­ sonality.” Confucius defines this principle as “when needed, acting; when not needed, concealing.”^® Mencius further interprets Confucius’ position: “If one can realize one’s wishes, one confers benefits on the people and helps the people to de­ velop their virtues. If not, one attends to one’s own virtue in solitude.”’* Confucius places great emphasis on the individual autonomy of a junzi be­ cause df his conviction that a junzi should possess greater virtue than his ruler if the ruler is not a sage-king. In his description of the attitude of Zi Si (492—431 B.C.) toward his ruler, Mencius firmly holds that individual dignity and auton­ omy must be preserved when a junzi serves his ruler. In response to Duke Mu of Lu, who frequently bragged of his powerful position, Zi Si refused to accept any favors despite the resulting humiliation. As he replied to Duke Mu of Lu, “In point of position, you are the prince and I am your subject. How dare I be friends with you? In point of virtue, it is you who ought to serve me. How can you pre­ sume to be friends with me?”” Mencius holds that a junzi only serves the rulers but never makes fiiends with them. This implies that a junzi must maintain his self-autonomy when serving his ruler and must not be an implement for anyone else to use.” The obligation of ajunzi is to live in accordance with the Way and to serve his ruler, not as the ruler’s tool but as an agent of the Way, acting to bring the ruler’s own actions into closer accord with the Way.’* Confucianism also in­ sists that moral virtue can be guarded and that dignity can be protected only ifthe individual maintains moral integrity; thus, autonomy becomes the prerequisite for a junzi to accomplish the moral mission of achieving a well-ordered world and to promote the prevalence of the Way. Despite his strong encouragement of government service, Mencius insists that pursuing the Way must be the junzVs primary objective. Mencius admires the position of those who deem the preva­ lence of the Way as the ultimate goal and strive for moral self-cultivation regard­ less of unfavorable political situations. In Chinese culture, the maxim "being worldly wise and playing it safe” is formded on the theory of the Mean and is one of the political outlets that provides leeway for ajunzi to survive in his political career and preserve his autonomy. It is not desirable to sacrifice oneself for principle and to drag out an ignoble existence. As the maxim suggests, one neither gives up beliefs nor compromises principles in exchange for personal gain. Although Confucianism, in reality, strongly encour­ ages a junzi to undertake social responsibility in the form of government service, the ultimate objectives for a junzi in Confucian doctrine are self-cultivation and

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striving for moral perfection and then manifesting his moral virtues to society. In addition, the junzi is required to follow the Way if he faces a choice between loy­ alty {zhong} toward a ruler and loyalty to the Way. If one cannot change reality, one must switch from active political participation to focusing on self-cultivation and self-perfection. This doctrine actually justifies the flexibility of the behavior of the political elite. Ajunzi is convinced that he is pursuing his own moral perfec­ tion as long as he behaves like a "gentleman,” uprightly and honestly. Of course, a junzi demands a great deal of himselfbut does not expect the same of others. When the political situation is unfavorable, the individual autonomy of a junzi plays a crucial protective role. From this point, the maxim has its practical significance. For ajunzi, it is understandable to concentrate on political survival when a ruler refuses to accept his admonitions and the political situation becomes unfavorable for upright officers. The implication of this maxim is straightforward: If one is un­ able to change the status quo, why should one make excessive demands on one­ self? The maxim seems to suggest that moral self-cultivation and self-autonomy have been enough for a junzi despite his silence toward evil. In other words, al­ though he keeps silent in adverse political situations, he is only required to main­ tain his moral autonomy when performing his official duties. This stand is justified by the Doctrine of the Mean'. When the kingdom is well-governed, he is sure by his words to rise; and when it is ill-governed, he is sure, by his silence, to command forbearance to himself. Is not this what we find in the Book of Poetry—“Intelligent is he and prudent and so preserves his person?”’’

From Mencius’ attitude toward Boli Qi, we see that Mencius advocates a realistic position toward political pursuit. When Boli Qi realized that the Prince of Yu would not accept criticism, Boli Qi gave up remonstrating the prince in an effort to rescue Boli Qi’s own country and instead helped the state of Qin, the enemy of the state of Yu. As Mencius describes in his dialogue with his disciple Wan Zhong: Wan Zhong asked, “Some say the Boli Qi sold himself to a keeper of cattle in Qin for five sheep skins, and tended cattle to attract the attention of Duke Mu of Qin, Is this true?” “No,” said Mencius, “It is not.... He knew that the ruler of Yu was beyond advice and left for Qin.... Yet can he be called unwise when he remained silent, knowing that advice would be futile? He certainly was not unwise when he left in advance, knowing the ruler of Yu to be heading for disaster.... To sell oneselfinto slavery in orderto help one’s prince towards achievement is what even a self-respecting villager would not do. Are you saying that it is the act of a good and wise man?””

The message which presumably lies behind this seemingly pedantic punctilio is how to cope carefully with the relations between the principle of pursuing the Way, the flexibility of political behavior, and the relations between serving the government and expanding limited individual effort when striving for a political career. On the one hand, serving in government for a junzi means pursuing the

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prevalence of the Way (xing dao}-, otherwise he will accomplish nothing. For Boli Qi, remonstrating the ruler of Yu was his moral mission in pursuing the Way. Boli Qi left his ruler because he believed that the possibility of pursuing the Way no longer existed. On the other hand, ajunzi in the process ofpursuing the Way is lim­ ited by his own ability to exert a decisive influence on his ruler. Boli Qi realized that his attempts to influence the king of Yu had failed and that the ruler had showed his impatience and disgust with his advice. In order to pursue a new Way, Boli Qi had to abandon his ruler and choose a new agent, Duke Mu of Qin, as his ruler. We are invited again to consider a controversial issue in political pursuit: what happens when a junzi confronts a conflict between pursuing the Way and maintaining loyalty toward his ruler? In the case of Boli Qi, he felt he had to aban­ don his ruler ifhe wanted to continue to strive for moral perfection in pursuit of the Way. According to Confucius, ajunzi “serves his prince while he can do so with­ out infringement of the Way.”’’ Confucius clearly values the principle of the Way over loyalty in political participation and government service. Mencius also dis­ agreed with blind loyalty toward a ruler. Indeed, ajunzi should remonstrate only if a ruler is willing to be corrected. As Mencius indicates, “When the prince has faults, they (the ministers) ought to remonstrate with him. If he does not listen to them after they have done this again and again, they ought to leave him.”’® After the unification of China, it became impossible for a junzi to choose his ruler as in Confucius and Mencius’ times. Under this new situation, the principle of “being wise and playing it safe” takes on different forms, centering on careful participation when political situations are unfavorable. Ajunzi must recognize his limited ability to change reality and the possible consequences if he ignores dan­ gerous political situations. In Confucius’ view, ajunzi should hold a realistic posi­ tion—keeping silent and waiting for an opportunity—while maintaining his moral integrity and uprightness as long as possible. As Confucius recommends the posi­ tion of Ning Wu, “So long as the Way prevailed, he showed his wisdom. But when the Way no longer prevailed, he showed his folly. To such wisdom as his we may all aspire, but not to such folly!”” Confucianism advocates a realistic attitude to­ ward a junzi's political pursuit. In fact, Confucius himself is typical of the Chinese intellectual who, on the one hand, is filled with soaring aspirations but is also an enterprising spirit determined to achieve an earthshaking undertaking. Confucius even held the position of Min­ ister of Crimes in the State of Lu until he left due to political differences with the ruler. He later traveled from state to state, seeking other rulers who would employ him and take his advice in following the Way. Finding no further political appoint­ ments, he conducted himself virtuously and enjoyed a peaceful life, teaching his disciples and appreciating music and art. In its attention to following its principles and protecting life, Daoism more than Confucianism values flexibility in political pursuit. As the Huainanzi indicates, the nobleman takes the initiative when opportunity arises. He lives in seclusion when the situation is not favorable.'”’ The Guanzi advises the nobleman to “main­ tain silence to dodge punishment if he lives in the turbulent days when the Way

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does not prevail.”*’ A person who gains the Way, according to the Huainanzi, is one who is capable of keeping inner moral integrity while changing his outward appearance, that is, “he keeps his moral integrity in his heart but is able to bend and stretch freely and adapt himself to unpredictable situations.”*^ Li Bai (701-762), one of the greatest Tang poets, is also a typical figure among Chinese intellectuals. Like most Chinese intellectuals, Li Bai had high aspirations to “develop the [political] theory established by Guanzhong and Yanzi, use political techniques, and contribute all his knowledge and ability” to “assist the ruler in achieving the.stability and unity of the nation.”^’ To pursue a political career, Li Bai expected to use his literary talent to gain a high social rep­ utation by which he could attract the notice of the ruler. Failure in this, combined with unintentional involvement with the revolt of Prince Li Lin, led to his being sent into exile. He finally had to give up political pursuit and resort to Daoism to soothe his wounded soul. His embrace of Daoism, of course, was compelled by circumstances: “I did not originally give up the world; but the people themselves in the world abandoned me.”^** Many Confucian scholar-officials, after being forced to withdraw from the po­ litical arena, resorted to Daoist thought to heal their spiritual wounds. After Confu­ cian scholar Jia Yi was banished by the Han court from Changan, the capital city, to the Kingdom of Changsha, his writings strongly embrace Daoist thought. Jia Yi sighs at how powerless one is in the face of an unpredictable fate. In his prose­ poem Roc, Jia Yi holds that “good fortune lies within bad, bad fortune lurks within good.” In particular, “one cannot predict the will of Heaven and the direction of the Way. No one knows when good or ill luck will come.”*^ Jia Yi seeks to free him­ self from the mood of pessimism and confusion by resorting to the philosophy of Zhuangzi. Influenced by the Zhuangzi, Jia Yi hopes to become a Daoist genuine person {zhenren) who complies with the arrangement of Heaven and is indifferent to fame or gain. Like Zhuangzi, he also views “heaven and earth as a great furnace and the Creator as a skilled smith” and believes that one always coexists with the Way. In Jia Yi’s perspective influenced by Zhuangzi, a genuine person “does not seek self-protection for the sake of living, cultivates a disposition of emptiness so that he may wander in the universe, molds himself to become a transcendent moral man, and submits himself to fate without worry.”*® Similarly, Wang Anshi (1021-1086), the famous prime minister of the Song dynasty, went into seclusion and converted to Buddhism after he was forced to withdraw from the political arena. Most scholar-officials in Chinese history did not destroy themselves after experiencing severe political adversity and failure. Rather, they went into seclu­ sion to protect themselves and continued to pursue self-cultivation for eventual political return. Daoism was not always esteemed as a spiritual consolation for a political fail­ ure. It also has been accepted as a tactic for political survival for scholar-officials striving for political pursuit. Many Confucian scholar-officials employed seclu­ sion as a means of seeking political advantage. For many ambitious politicians, Daoist doctrine could be used tactically to help them avoid political risks and to

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wait for an opportunity for a successful political return. In other words, living in seclusion was merely a stratagem for political leaders and scholar-officials to stage a future comeback. In the first part of the twentieth century, for example, both Yuan Shikai and Chiang Kai-shek successfully used this strategy to pursue politi­ cal advantage. In the early period of the 1960s, Mao also employed this strategy to escape responsibility for economic failure and eventually to create an opportunity for revenge against his political foes. On the eve of the Cultural Revolution, while still in seclusion, he created factions within the leadership and lured Liu Shaoqi and other high-ranking party and government officials into a trap, and then launched an unprecedented mass movement against the senior cadres. Historically, the Daoist tradition has deeply influenced scholar-officials who, although persisting in their moral obligation to pursue the Way, upheld the princi­ ple of self-protection and cherished human life. In this respect, one may hide one­ self when the Way does not prevail, even though one never stops self-cultivation. Bai Juyi (772-846), Minister of Justice and one of the greatest poets of the Tang dynasty, was an outstanding scholar-official who fused the Daoist philosophy of seclusion with the Confucian doctrine of the Mean: “In obscurity a man mices perfect his own person, but in prominence he makes perfect the whole Empire as well.”*’ Bai Juyi’s philosophy is what he calls the philosophy of the “middle-class recluse” (zhongyin), not only maintaining one’s principles and integrity but also keeping one’s official position. Bai Juyi writes: The high-class hermit is busy in government service and lives in the market-place, The low-class hermit dwells in the mountains. The mountains are too desolate. The court and the market-place are too tumultuous and disturbing. I would be rather a middle-class hermit, Who holds an obscure leisurely position. Staying between society and seclusion And working neither leisurely nor busily, I never weary my mind or use physical strength, And I never suffer hunger and cold. Although I enjoy free time throughout the year. My salary is never short a single cent....

Man lives just one generation. It is hard to make everything satisfactory. Poverty and humility result in suffering, cold, and hunger. Honor causes man to have a heart loaded with worry. Only a middle-class hermit Can enjoy a life with happiness, peace, prosperity, richness.*’

A study conducted by Richard J. Smith about the attitudes of the Qing elite also identifies the mutually complementary feature of Confucian social responsibility and Daoist escape into nature. Whereas Confucianism “provides an emotional and intellectual escape valve for world-weary Confucians trammeled by social respon­

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sibility,” “the Taoist impulse was to defy authority, question conventional wis­ dom, admire the weak, and accept the relativity of things.”^’ The ideal personality of the Chinese political elite is often related to a synthesis of the Confucian nobleman and the Daoist sage or genuine person. Joseph Needham identifies the relationship between Daoism and Confucianism as “a yin thought-system” and “ayazig one.”^'’ Thisyw-yang contrast of Daoism and Confu­ cianism functions as a mechanism of balance for the Chinese to maintain healthy development during social and political interactions. Daoism has been described as feminine, tolerant, yielding, permissive, withdrawn, mystical, and receptive. Confucianism, in contrast, has always been imagined as masculine, controlling, hard, dominating, aggressive, rational, and donative.^’ Indeed, Daoist naturalism serves as a restriction to prevent the development of Confucian political zealotry and to maintain a healthy balance for Chinese culture, which has a strong bias to­ ward “this-world” efforts.

THE PRINCIPLES OF SERVING A RULER When Chinese political elites pursue their political careers, they inevitably serve their rulers. Approaches differ when serving rulers, each according to the ruler’s ability, talent, and merit. Chinese history generally categorizes rulers as one of three types: enlightened, mediocre, or unsavory. When an enlightened ruler reigns, the elite usually have a strong desire for political participation and actively devote themselves to their duties. The voluntary compliance of the elite with their ruler contributes to the ruler’s vital role as a sage-king to achieve universal, all-embracing, ethicopolitical order, as defined in the Book ofPoetry. According to Schwartz’s observation about the common ground shared by the Book ofPoetry and Confucius, “Few men in the state of nature were capable of realizing their full potentialities. It was only when the sage-kings had actualized the patterns of the normative culture that it became possible for all hiunan beings to achieve their full humanity. Once a ruler was viewed as a sage-king, the Chinese believed that his knowledge was both intuitive and innate. The Book ofDocuments outlines three figures representing such an ideal and godlike sage-king: Yao, Shun, and Yu. The sage-king’s intuition becomes the real standard of right and wrong to bring order to the world. Sharing this view with Confucius, Mozi holds that the sage-king’s wisdom and ability are crucial in order to achieve a harmonious world through universal love. In Daoism, the role of the sage-king is largely mysticized. Zhuangzi de­ scribed the significant role of the sage-king in the Way of Heaven: “Emptiness, stillness, purity, silence, and wuwei are the substance of the Way and its power; therefore, the emperor, the king, and the sage rest in them.”” The rule of the sage-king depends essentially on his spiritual power, his inner knowledge of the world “derives not firom ‘empirical investigations’ but from his intuitive grasp of the whole.”” Mencius’ theory ofinnatism further justifies the godlike role of the sage-king. The sage-king has innate abilities to convey moral virtue and achieve

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the socialization of li (rituals) by implementing ren (humaneness). Confucian­ ism requires ren to be the virtue of the ruler and li to be for ordinary people who can be led only by li and their respect for authority. This disposition in traditional Chinese culture toward sage-kings establishes a basis for the practice of wor­ shipping charismatic leaders. The attitude of the elite toward political participation was conceived by the Chi­ nese political thinkers to be a vital factor in evaluating the success and failure of a ruler. Most successful rulers throughout Chinese history made great efforts to win over the support of the elite and intellectuals by encouraging their political partici­ pation. For example, Taizong (Li Shimin) of the Tang dynasty, after learning a les­ son from the Sui rulers, paid great attention to winning over the elite by playing the role of a “humble learner of the arts of government.” As the emperor explained, he wanted to fully understand his ministers’ sentiments.^’ Li Shimin’s most defining characteristic, as J. A. G. Roberts notes, was his ability to “surround himself with capable ministers, thus establishing a model of the appropriate relationship, which should exist between the emperor and those who serve him.”” For most rulers throughout Chinese history, dreams ofbeing worshipped as suc­ cessful rulers were hard to realize because of their relative lack of talent and abil­ ity. Some, perhaps, lacked opportunities. Rulers like Wudi in the Han dynasty, Taizong in the Tang dynasty, and Qianlong in the Qing dynasty were described as models of virtue for other emperors to emulate. For example, Taizong of the Tang dynasty has been described as “unsurpassed in brilliance and glory in die entire an­ nals of China.”” Under the reign of Qianlong, China entered a prolonged period of internal peace. As China’s borders expanded to their farthest point, great feats of scholarly and artistic achievement were recorded, and Qianlong’s reign is now viewed as the most glorious in Chinese history.” The political environment cre­ ated by the rulers plays a vital role in determining the outlook and attitude of Chi­ nese intellectuals and elites toward political participation. The second category of rulers is the mediocre. For those who prove to have a limited ability to achieve the nation’s goals, Confucian political culture promotes the power of the elite and the bureaucratic apparatus in an effort to control these rulers. In this situation, the elite have a powerful influence in decision-making and in compelling their rulers to follow them. The elite also strive to constrain those who are charismatic leaders but later show serious incompetence in bringing peace and order to the nation. The attachment of the elite to their rulers is greatly under­ mined if a highly admired supreme ruler makes serious mistakes that bring suffer­ ing to the nation. Such a ruler would by no means be respected as a sage ruler with powerful charisma, but rather as a mediocre one who needed assistance to main­ tain normal rule in his monarchy. For both types of rulers, it is not difficult to un­ derstand that the elite serve them because they share common ideals and pursue the same goals. But the question arises when a scholar-official faces an unpleasant ruler who lacks virtue—how then does a scholar-official maintain a commitment to serving the government?

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The third type of ruler is the unsavory leader. When an elite serves an unsavory ruler and faces a world where the Way does not prevail, the elite’s self­ consciousness and willingness to adjust play a vital role in judging what is right for the situation.^’ There is strong evidence to show that Confucius admired Qu Boyu’s integrity as a minister in the Wei Zixia government. Confucius referred to him as a superior man because he demonstrated an uncompromising moral princi­ ple in cooperating with a good ruler and repudiating a bad one. Despite his respect, Confucius has reservations about the position taken by Qu Boyu. Confucius’ unwillingness to set up a rigid standard response to complicated political situations indicated his flexibility toward a junzV&political choice during government service. On the one hand, the Master stressed individual self-develop­ ment and self-cultivation in an effort to become a moral being. On the other hand, he highly emphasized political participation and service in government as an indi­ vidual’s social duty. In contrast to Daoism, which centers its efforts on promoting the naturalization of human beings, Confucianism focuses its attention on achiev­ ing the socialization of individuals. We already discern that because the funda­ mental objective for Confucianism is to pursue a harmonious, peaceful, and well-ordered society, and the central concern for Confucianism is to highlight the function of individual moral obligation to undertake social responsibility and transform the world; thus, political participation and government service become the most important channels for an individual to achieve moral self-perfection and fulfillment. Certainly, Confucius placed his hopes for a well-ordered society heavily on junzi, whom he defined as those who “cultivate in themselves the capacity to be diligent in their tasks” and “cultivate in themselves the capacity to ease the lot of the whole populace.From Confucius’ point of view, the central pursuit for a no­ bleman is his moral duty to self-cultivation in order to manifest his virtues to soci­ ety and serve his country. Ambrose King argues that because ren in Confucian ethics can only be achieved by the efforts of the individual self (//), Confucius re­ gards the individual as an active selfwho is capable of reaching a state of moral au­ tonomy and of achieving sagehood.^’ In an ideal Confucian society, the ruling vanguard is not a “political class” but rather a kind of priesthood that holds society together by a “holy rite” and the spirit of ren. Additionally, in Confucian political thought the realization of self-cultivation toward moral perfection and political success is not merely limited to special figures in society but is a universal demand on all junzi. The Confucian heritage that is characterized by a sense of historical mission, an obligation to society, and a concern for the fate of their nation has deeply influenced Chinese intellectuals.^^ We are reminded again of the popular slogan, “Everyone takes responsibility for the nation’s fate” (tianxia xingwang, pijit youze), which justifies the Confucian political appeal of promoting political participation of individuals. Inspired by his political and historical mission, ajunzi envisions his role in gov­ ernment service as a duty to influence the ruler. This attitude might partly explain why Confucius’ position differs from that of those who accept office while “sur-

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rendering their wills” and those who leave office to escape suffering and humilia­ tion. Although the Master does not clarify his position on taking office when the Way does not prevail, he implies a flexible position that embodies both a will to­ ward vigorous political participation in an effort to influence the ruler and a will to maintain moral autonomy and individual integrity. This begs the question: how can one effectively influence an unsavory ruler and seize any opportunity to con­ vert him without first accepting office? The answer is revealed in the following parable described in iheAnalects. Gongshan Furao, who rebelled against the legit­ imate authority of the Duke of Lu and sought illegitimate means to seize power, invited the Master to visit him. Confucius wished to go. Responding to the displea­ sure of his disciple Zi Lu, the Master showed his strong wishes to exert influence on the notorious usurper. As he justified his initiative, “If anyone were to use me, I believe I could make a ‘Zhou (a well-ordered society) in the east!’ Similarly, probing the Master’s attitude toward the invitation of Bo Xi, another disreputable usurper, we can see Confucius’ confidence in his ability to achieve his goal with­ out losing his autonomy and moral integrity. Bo Xi summoned the Master. He would have liked to go, but Zi Lu said, “I remember you once saying, ‘into the house of one who is doing evil, the gentleman will not enter. ’ Bo Xi is holding Zhongmu in revolt. How can you think of going to him?” The Master said, “It is true that there is such a saying. But is it not also said that there are things ‘so hard that no grinding will ever wear them down,’ that there are things ‘so white that no steeping will ever make them black?’ Am I indeed to be forever like the bitter gourd that is only fit to hang up, but not to eat?”®*

One can safely assume that Confucius did not refuse to serve unsavory rulers, even upstarts and usurpers. It is probably the case that when the Way does not prevail, the need for junzi with a desire for self-sacrifice becomes urgent and overwhelm­ ing. Ajunzi, according to Confucius, cultivates himself to contribute to society and sacrifices himself to achieve a well-ordered world. As the Master ardently pro­ fessed, “If the Way prevailed under Heaven, I should not be trying to alter things.”®® Although Confucius was willing to serve in government despite suffering hu­ miliation, he held his premise that suffering and humiliation caused by govern­ ment service do not bring an exchange of individual gains, such as emoluments and fame; rather, they fulfill a holy mission to make some impact on the world of power. No doubt Confucius tried to find a way to maintain personal integrity even in highly adverse circumstances, while continually accepting office with humilia­ tion. Because of his hope of realizing an ideal world in which humaneness pre­ vailed, Confucius strongly emphasized political participation and government service as the holy mission of a Junzi. Unless a Junzi helps a ruler to achieve a re­ ceptivity to virtue, he has accomplished nothing. AJunzi, according to Confucius, must have a strong desire for government service and strong self-confidence to ac­ complish his mission. “If there were any princes who would employ me, in the

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course of twelve months, 1 should have done something considerable. In three years, the government would be perfected.”^^ Confucius’ position on government service also influenced Xunzi, who, more than any other Confiician thinker, emphasizes the social and political responsibili­ ties of a junzi’, however, Xunzi places great importance on the junzi's mission to serve the ruler. He even proposes a technique (shu) or method for a scholar-official to retain the ruler’s favor in order to stay in office: If the ruler bestows high rank on you and exalts you, be respectful, take strict care to fulfill your duties, and be restrained. If he trusts and loves you, be careful, circumspect, and humble. If he gives you sole authority, hold fast to maintaining your responsibilities and oversee them meticulously. If he is at ease and friendly with you, be cautious of this closeness and do not become corrupt. If the ruler is distant and remote, strive for complete oneness with him but do not oppose him. If he diminishes and degrades you, be fearful and apprehensive but do not harbor resentments.^’

Unlike Mencius, who proposes a reciprocal relationship between ruler and minister and who justifies a minister abandoning his ruler ifhe does not like the ruler, Xunzi emphasizes unconditional loyalty from a minister toward his ruler, and views serv­ ing the ruler as an important moral obligation that a minister should fulfill: Confucians model themselves after the Ancient Kings. They exalt ritual and righteousness. They do their duties as ministers and esteem their ruler to the highest degree. Should a ruler employ them, they fulfil their duty and do anything appropriate to their duty. Should a ruler not employ them, they return to their villages and live like careful and obedient common people.... When they occupy a position of power and influence over the people, they are the pillars of the state in assisting a ruler or duke in governing the state. When they occupy a position that is subordinate, they are capable ministers and the treasure of a ruler.^®

Xunzi believes that the success or failure of a scholar-official’s political career is linked to his service to his ruler. While retaining his autonomy and integrity, a scholar-official should do his best to fulfill his social responsibility and serve his ruler. In this respect, in Xunzi’s thought the position of a minister when interacting with his ruler was much lower than that espoused by Confucius and Mencius. Al­ though it is debatable whether Xunzi’s emphasis on unconditional loyalty from a minister toward his ruler directly contributed to the centralized bureaucratic model of government in the Qin-Han period, Xunzi’s influence in promoting the adapta­ tion of Confucianism to the centralized bureaucratic model of government is evi­ dent. Xunzi’s primary concern is how noblemen can win over the ruler’s trust and stay in office to fulfill their moral duty and contribute to their nation. The presence of noblemen is important because a good society is maintained only by a govern­ ment of noblemen and a harmonious community can be upheld only by the moral force of a ruling vanguard who play a transformative, educational role in society. Considering that theJunzi’s service is often not wholehearted during the reign of an unpleasant ruler, they frequently show a passive attitude in response to po-

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litical participation and government service. In reality, this attitude implies a cir­ cumspect position in political pursuit and a fear of involvement in a dangerous political situation, while maintaining a degree of autonomy and self-respect. The attitude of thejunzi toward political participation in Chinese history has been de­ scribed as a barometer measuring the political success or failure of a ruler. In general, when a capable and virtuous ruler takes office and rules with great talent and competence, surrounding himself with a capable elite, large numbers of junzi are willing to serve in government and actively participate politically. When an unsavory and self-indulgent ruler reigns, many junzi try to avoid politi­ cal involvement so that qualified personnel for government service are seriously lacking.^’ For example, in the Sui dynasty, emperor Yang Guang (605—618) dis­ liked criticism from his ministers regarding his increasing preoccupation with foreign expansion and large-scale domestic construction, causing overwhelming resentment by the populace. After the emperor killed his influential senior advi­ sor Gao Ai for his bold criticism of the emperor’s policy, Yang Guang failed to obtain crucial and valuable suggestions from his ministers and few remained loyal when the empire was at stake. Despite the fact that the Sui was a strong and prosperous empire, growing fast economically and militarily, the dynasty fell in 618, only twenty years after its establishment. To explain the empire’s quick de­ mise, Qing Zhihua blames the emperor’s failure to win the support of his minis­ ters, combined with popular resentment.’® To the extent that an incorrigible ruler is unwilling to be influenced, Confucius would very likely agree to retreat and give up the endeavor. Confucius suggests his favorite posture in which one seeks political survival without losing moral integ­ rity: “When the Way prevails under Heaven, then show yourself. When it does not prevail, then hide.’’” Confucianism makes it quite plain that individuals need to maintain their moral integrity with a certain flexibility that may well enhance their ability to seize opportunities. Mencius’ position toward the flexibility of political pursuit can be found from his comments on Bo Yi and Liu Xiahui, two ancient sages. As the Mencius describes: Bo Yi would serve only the right prince and befiiend only the right man. He would not take his place at the court of an evil man, nor would he converse with him. For him to do so would be like sitting in mud and pitch wearing a court cap and gown.... Even when a feudal lord made advances in the politest language, he would repel them. He repelled them simply because it was beneath him to go to the feudal lord. Liu Xiahui, on the other hand, was not ashamed of a prince with a tarnished reputation, neither did he disdain a modest post When in office, he did not conceal his own talent, and always acted in accordance with the Way. When he was passed over, he harbored no grudge, nor was he distressed even in straitened circumstances.... Consequently, he was in no hurry to take himself away, and looked perfectly at ease in the other man’s company, and would stay when pressed. He stayed when pressed, simply because it was beneath him to insist on leaving.... Bo Yi was too straight-laced; Liu Xiahui was not dignified enough. A junzi would follow neither extreme.”

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When viewed from the point of view of Mencius, the way of Bo Yi lacks flexibil­ ity. Bo Yi only served a ruler whom he esteemed and only took office in a good government. In contrast, Liu Xiahui took office regardless of good or bad rulers and whether or not the rulers were capable of being influenced. As Mencius ex­ plained, the Way that Confucius pursues shows great flexibility without losing principle: “Confticius was such that he would take office, or would remain in a state, would delay his departure or hasten it, all according to circumstances.”’^ Confucianism sets up a canon of political participation for thejunzi and the elite to follow so that politically ambitious Confucians could survive in a complicated and oftentimes dangerous political situation. From the angle of maintaining a ruler-centered political system, Huang-Iao Daoism also supports a flexible attitude toward political pursuits when ministers serve their ruler. This flexibility in taking political initiatives serves not only the individuals’ self-protection but also the need to safeguard the political authority of the ruler. The Guanzi believes that tolerance for political power is necessary and important. If a minister has made all his efforts and is still unable to admonish the ruler to follow the Way, he must back up for the sake of maintaining the ruler’s dignity and protect himself: [His withdrawal] does not mean that he is afraid to die or that he is not loyal to his ruler. If a minister insists on admonishing his ruler, he will suffer a fatal disaster. On the one hand, he harms the ruler’s dignity, for he violates the principle [of complying with his ruler]. On the other hand, his admonishment costs his personal life. The consequences are too severe; therefore, he does not give up his responsibility even though he withdraws from the political arena. He does not stop writing, even though he retires from the office. He will wait for another political opportunity and the prevalence of the Way.’**

In the Guanzi’s view, a successful political elite must survive in a complex politi­ cal situation and take the initiative when the opportunity arises. He neither makes a move if the move cannot bring a result that he desires, nor takes a risk if the risk cannot achieve the goals that he pursues.

NOTES 1. Lunyu, 15:346, ZZJCed. 2. Lunyu, 15:337; Arthur Waley, The Analects of Confucius (London: G. Allen and Unwi, 1945), p. 195. 3. Zhongyong, 3:3a. SBBY ed. 4. Wang Bangxiong, Rudao zhijian [Between Confucianism and Daoism] fTaipei: Hanguang wenhua shiye youxian gongsi, 1985), pp. 64-67. 5. Lin Yutang, My Country and My People (New York: Halcyon House, 1938), p. 109. 6. Lunyu, 16:359. 7. Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Trouble with Confucianism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991), p. 38. 8. Zhongyong, 1:1a. 9. Ibid., 1:1a.

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10. Fung Yu-lan, Zhenyuan liushu. Vol. 1 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1996), pp. 432,438. 11. Kanaya Osamu, “The Mean in Original Confucianism,” Chinese Language. Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics, ed. Philip J. Ivanhoe (Chicago and La Salle; Cams Publishing Company, 1996), p. 84. 12. Zhongyong, 4:3b. 13. Liji, 20:18b, 20:19a-19b. SBBY ed. 14. Ibid., 2:9a.. 15. Zhongyong, 2:2b~3a. 16. Ibid., 1:2a. 17. Ibid., 14:8a. 18. Ibid., 14:8a. 19. Mencius, 8:327. ZZJC ed. 20. Lunyu, 7:153. 21. Kanaya Osamu, “The Mean in Original Confucianism,” in Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture: Nivison and His Critics, p. 85. 22. Ibid., p. 85. 23. Zhongyong, 11:5b. 24. Lunyu, 11:245-246. 25. Mencius, 13:517-519. ZZJC ed. 26. Ibid., 13:525. 27. Xunzi, 3:25-26. ZZJC ed.; John Knoblock, Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, Vol.l (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 175-176. 28. Luo Guang, Zhongguo zhexue de jingshen [The spirit of Chinese philosophy] (Tai­ pei; Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1990), pp. 152-153. 29. Qian Mu, Zhongguo sixiang shi [The history of Chinese thought] (Taipei: Taiwan xuesheng shuju, 1983), p. 49. 30. Lunyu, 7:140. 31. Mencius, 13:525. 32. Mencius, 10:425; D. C. Lau, Mencius, Vol. 2 (Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press, 1984), p. 217. 33. Lunyu, 2:30. 34. Edward Shils, “Reflections on Civil Society and Civility in the Chinese Intellectual Tradition,” in Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity, ed. Tu Wei-ming (Cam­ bridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), p. 69. 35. Zhongyong, 27:20a. 36. Mencius, 9:392-394; Lau, Vol. 2, pp. 197-199. 37. Lunyu, 11:251. 38. Mencius, 11:430. 39. Lunyu, 5:106; Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 112. 40. Huainanzi, 10:162. ZZJC ed. 41. Guanzi, 11:60. ZZJC ed. 42. Huainanzi, 18:325. 43. Li Taibai quanji [The collected works of Li Bai], Vol. 3, noted by Wang Qi (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju chubanshe, 1977), p. 1225. 44. Li Taibai quanji. Vol. 2, p. 827. 45. Honshu, 48:4a. SBBY ed. 46. Ibid.,48:4b-5a. ^1. Mencius, 13:525.

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48. Bai Juyiji [The collected works of Bai Juyi], Vol. 2, collated by Gu Xuejie (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1979), p. 490. 49. Richard J. Smith, China's Cultural Heritage: The Ch'ing Dynasty. 1644-19S2 (Boulder: Westview Press, 1983), p. 121. 50. Joseph Needham, Science and Civilization in China, Vol. 2 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956), p. 61. 51. Ibid., Vol. 2, p. 59. 52. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), pp. 65-66. 53. Zhuangzi, 13:81. ZZJC ed.; Burton Watson, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968). p. 142. 54. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 250. 55. Arthur Wright, “T’ang T'ai-tsung: The Man and the Persona,” in Essays on T'ang Society: The Interplay of Social, Political and Economic Forces, ed. John C. Perry and Bardwell L. Smith (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1976), pp. 17-32. 56. J. A. G. Roberts, A History ofChina (Great Britain: Alan Sutton Publishing Limited, 1996), p. 88. 57. William Frederick Mayers, The Chinese Reader's Manual (Taipei: Literature House 1964), p. 122. 58. Roberts, A History of China, p. 218. 59. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 112. 60. Lunyu, 14:329. 61. Ambrose Y. C. King, “The Individual and Group in Confucianism: A Relational Per­ spective,” in Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values, ed, Don­ ald J. Munro (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, The University of Michigan, 1985), p. 57. 62. Tu Wei-ming, The Confucian World Observed (Honolulu, Hawaii: The East-West Center, 1992), p. 36. 63. Lunyu, 17:370. 64. Lunyu, 17:371-372; Waley, The Analects of Confucius, p. 211. 65. Lunyu, 18:393. 66. Ibid., 13:287. 67. Xunzi, 7:69.; Knoblock, Translation and Study ofthe Complete Works Vol 2, p. 59. 68. Xunzi, 8:75. 69. Qin Zhihua, Xinzhi yu zhengzhi—lun zhongguo dezhi zhuyi chuantong [Rule by heart-mind and rule by politics in the tradition of the Chinese rule based on morality] (Nanning: Guangxi renmin chubanshe 1996), p. 189. 70. Ibid., pp. 230-231. 71. Lunyu, 8:163. 72. Mencius, 3:144-148; Lau, Mencius, Vol. 1, pp. 69-71. 73. Mencius, 3:127; Lau, Mencius, Vol. I, p. 61. 74. Guanzi, 11:60.

Part III

Personality of the Enlightened Leader {Mingun}

8

Political Strategist

Whereas Confucianism shows a strong concern for how human efforts achieve po­ litical order and social harmony, Daoism centers on how human beings yield to Nature for the purpose of seeking a better existence. Although the philosophy of the Daodejing represents a considerable investigation of mystical nature, its basic concern is the human realm. It urges men to cherish their limited natural lives and to seek survival, especially while piursuing a political career. Laozi’s political phi­ losophy, to a certain extent, is a strategy for political pursuers to seek survival and maximize advantages. This helps to explain why the Daodejing is often viewed as “a political manual dealing with the proper guidance of society.”’ Considering the profound influence of Daoism on the Chinese mentality, Chinese culture is funda­ mentally founded on a belief in the efficacy of using wisdom and intelligence in social and political interactions for survival and advantage. Daoism asserts that there is a natural rule that functions as the underlying law regulating human life. The most important human effort, for the Daodejing, is to find the rule that directs men’s social interaction and social existence. For exam­ ple, Laozi believes that retreat is the best strategy in order to advance. That is, “in order to live in any specified manner, one must begin by living in a manner exactly the opposite.”^ Compared with Confucianism and Mohism, which clearly distin­ guish between wisdom and cunning, the Daodejing makes no distinction between the two and views all knowledge and wisdom as cunning and cleverness.’ This Daoist philosophical thought plays a significant role as the theoretical basis for the social and political strategies of Chinese leadership.

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THEORETICAL FOUNDATION OF STRATEGIC BEHAVIOR Daoist philosophy has had a profound influence on Chinese society at the levels of both elite and popular cultures, and Laozi’s thought has deep roots in Chinese intellectual history. Laozi’s strategic thought has become a theoretical basis for the enduring national character in which both the merits and the shortcomings of the Chinese coexist.^ Not only is the ideology of Laozi’s thought and doctrine thor­ ough and penetrating, but also its expression in philosophic theory is pragmatic. Laozi’s philosophy pays great attention to advising men on how to protect them­ selves from harm as well as the need to seek a better existence. The Daodejing states: Rather than fill it to the brim by keeping it upright Better to have stopped in time; Hammer it to a point And the sharpness cannot be preserved forever; There may be gold and jade to fill a hall But there is none who can keep them. To be overbearing when one has wealth and position Is to bring calamity upon oneself. To retire when the task is accomplished Is the way of heaven.’

Laozi asserts that everything in the universe submits to natural law, which is em­ bodied in the principles of the soft overcoming the hard, the weak overcoming the strong, and the feminine overcoming the masculine. The ideal Daoist sages in the Daodejing were those who could employ traits such as softness, darkness, recep­ tivity, tranquility, and weakness to protect themselves and pursue advantage. The Daodejing holds that human existence and social evolution submit to the “dialec­ tic” nature of the universe. In Laozi’s “dialectic” tenets, as Schwartz observes, “there is a particular preoccupation with the dyadic opposites of nature—the mas­ culine and feminine, dark and light, weak and strong, hard and soft, dynamic and passive—which reminds us of similar concerns in Anaximander and Heraclitus.”^ Human life, according to the Daodejing, is subordinated to the general principle of dyadic complementarity and opposition. To seek survival, for example, one must be soft, passive, and inaggressive; in order to become dominant, one must be sub­ missive. As the Daodejing suggests: “Bowed down then preserved; bent then straight; hollow then full; worn then new; a little then benefited; a lot then per­ plexed.”’ Laozi’s stratagems—“the soft overcomes the hard” and “the instruments of power must not be revealed to anyone”—are not only developed into political and military methods but are also esteemed as techniques for social interactions in Chi­ nese society. Compared with Zhuangzi, who is often recognized as the Chinese Nietzsche and who strove diligently for the romantic and naturalistic delights of life, Laozi is strongly concerned with how individuals could survive in a competi­ tive society, as well how individuals could protect themselves. That is why Lin

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Yutang believes that Laozi’s thought is “the most brilliantly wicked philosophy of self-protection in world literature.” Besides teaching laissezfaire and passive resistance, it [Laozi’s philosophy] taught also the wisdom of stupidity, the strength of weakness, the advantage of lying low, and the importance of camouflage. One of its maxims was, “Never be the first of the world,” for the simple reason that thus one could never be exposed to attack and consequently never fall. It was, so far as I know, the only known theory of ignorance and stupidity as the best camouflage in life’s battle, in spite of the fact that the theory itself was the result of the highest human intelligence.^

Laozi certainly believes, as Fung Yu-lan points out, that “the man who knows the Invariable and hence is enlightened must possess definite rules for living in the world and maintaining contact with things.”’ The Daodejing indeed urges men to strive for “methods” by pursuing strategic behavior to protect themselves. It is fair to speculate that Laozi might never intentionally urge men to take the initiative for personal advantage at the price of others or expect his philosophy to be used in the service of ruler-centered totalitarianism. Legalists give a Machiavel­ lian shift to Laozi’s rejection of distinction between wisdom and cunning and use its “instrumentalist” interpretation and intelligence to justify Legalist political the­ ory-cunning and deception must be used in human relations. Wisdom and cun­ ning in the Daodejing are viewed as conventional knowledge, but in Legalist literatures they are specifically associated with one another. Compared with Le­ galism, which cares only about a ruler-centered political system, Daoism focuses upon how rulers embody the will of the populace. According to the Daodejing, the sage “has no mind of his own.” He “takes as his mind the mind of the people.”” Al­ though Daoism was borrowed by Legalists as a political tactic, as Mou Zongsan defended it, the essence of Daoism is its wisdom, its profound theory, and its con­ tribution to the attitude of human life.'^ Julia Ching also argues Laozi’s philoso­ phy—how to survive and how to keep one’s integrity in a time of disorder—as the most important practical lesson of Daoist philosophy. It is a lesson that has had im­ mense importance in the development of Daoist religion.” Also, as Fung Yu-lan has indicated, the Laozi (Daodejing “is not a book to teach men how to exalt se­ cret plotting,” even though “it described what happens.”” The application of stratagems in social and political interaction is also empha­ sized by other classical thinkers. In the Wenzi, the quality of yielding is viewed as “the basis of survival,” whereas firmness is “the access to dearth.” According to the Wenzi, [a] man who wishes to pursue firmness must preserve his yieldingness; a man who wishes to be strong must safeguard his yieldingness. Softness, once accumulated, can become firmness, and yieldingness, once accumulated, can become strong. A strong man might defeat those who are weaker than him. But he fails to defeat those who are as strong as him. Softness, however, can bring about an inestimable power which can allow a man to defeat those whose strengths are more powerful than his.’*

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Strategy applied to social interactions is also emphasized in the Huainanzi, in which active initiative is disguised as “nonaction.” He who would have firmness must do so by yieldingness. He who would be strong must guard it by tenderness. A wealth of yieldingness gives an abundance of firmness; an accumulation of tenderness yields strength. Take note of the nature of the predominant events and you will have an indication of whether misfortune or happiness impends. Strength will overcome an unequal combatant, but two of equal strength will have an equal result. Yieldingness will overcome anything superior to itself; its strength is boundless.

In Daodejing, the proposition that “softness overcomes hardness” is ultimately a universal principle based upon natural law rather than merely a technique for so­ cial interaction. In the Huainanzi, however, “tenderness” and “yieldingness” have been established as premeditated techniques to achieve political and social advan­ tage. A political leader who follows the Way, according to the Huainanzi, is guided to rule based on “a yielding will and unwavering action.” “He is as still and soft as downy feathers and shrinks from action and appears incapable of doing [things]; being free from care and anxiety, he never loses opportunity. Moving and revolving with all things in the world [to follow Nature], he does not move ahead but reacts appropriately.” Only those who follow the strategy to act can “be equal to any sudden crisis during times of change, dispose of calamities, and ward off difficulties with invincible strength.”’^ As indicated by the Huang-lao texts dis­ covered recently in the Mawangdui silk scrolls, “one who keeps softness enjoys good luck; one who holds firmness goes toward death.”” For one who exercises the spirit of “yieldingness” or “tenderness,” “there is no enemy that is not over­ come and nothing can harm if one is capable of meeting every change and judging the times.”’® Daoism also holds that phenomenal changes in the universe follow certain general principles and anything that goes to one extreme must swing to its opposite.” In other words, two contradictory things in the universe are always both opposite and complementary to each other. Misfortune and fortune, as well as good and evil, are always mutually changeable. Although Laozi’s philosophy centers on defensive strategies for self-protection, arguably it can be used to develop offensive initiative for personal advantage. The Daodejing indicates: It is easy to maintain a situation while it is still secure; it is easy to deal with a situation before symptoms develop; it is easy to break a thing when it is yet brittle; it is easy to dissolve a thing when it is yet minute. Deal with a thing while it is still nothing; keep a thing in order before disorder sets in.^®

Laozi not only holds that taking initiative at the crucial moment is vitally impor­ tant but also urges men to act always with caution when initiating offensive ac­ tions. People “always ruin themselves on the verge of success” because they fail to remain cautious. Laozi holds that “there will be no ruined enterprises if the people keep being as careful at the end as at the beginning.”^’ In Laozi’s perspective, stratagems employed to accomplish a purpose are significantly important because

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they help to follow the natural rule. Despite its wisdom on seeking the “rule" and “techniques” for better survival, Laozi’s ideas about using strategy for self-protection and advantage could easily be used as stratagems to pursue per­ sonal advantage. In dealing with antagonistic human interactions, Laozi insists that one “cleaves to the Feminine,” even if one is equipped with the strength of “the Masculine.”^ Huang-lao Daoists further emphasize the principle of gaming mastery by striking only after the enemy has struck. According to Four Classics of the Yellow Em­ peror, when a general confi-onts an enemy, he should always hold a position such that his men “do not dare to take the initiatives and are not able to attack the en­ emy.”’’ At least two reasons are important behind this theory: first, to remain cau­ tious of the enemy and guard against pride caused by underestimating the enemy; second, to encourage the enemy to arrogance, which will lead to its defeat. When Laozi warns a political or military leader not to expose his advantage in order to avoid being manipulated, he suggests he follow the principle—“Great skills look like clumsiness and great eloquence looks like stammering.”’^ Shared with the Daodejing, Huang-lao Daoism holds that a resourceful person should look like an ignorant one.” Whereas the Daodejing views that nobility has humbleness and the High have the Low as their foundation,” Huang-lao Daoism is convinced that “wisdom has stupidity and firmness has softness as their roots.”” An enduring tradition in Chinese military thought is an emphasis on intelligence and strategy over force. Force is viewed in the Daodejing as “an inauspicious instru­ ment, which is hated by everyone."’® The Daodejing even insists that “one who fol­ lows the Way never resorts to force.”” The best generals, according to the.yz/m, are always those who are not bellicose.’® The Heguanzi, a Huang-lao Daoist text, argues that the winners of a war should be those who defeat their enemy without resorting to force (buzhan ersheng}. According to the Heguanzi, “a person who is proficient in wars is one who highly values non-confrontation; the best way to win a war is to use intelligence and strategy, the second-rate way is to bribe the personnel of the enemy state, the most inferior way is to resort to force,”” The Heguanzi further explains: Intelligence and strategy can confuse the ruler of an enemy state, making him become obsessed with extravagance and luxury and enticing him to be dissolute and haughty. When the ruler no longer rules as a sage, he trusts unduly those who are close to him. Although they do not perform meritorious services, he rewards them. When the ruler is joyful, a criminal can be treated as an innocent; when he is angry, an innocent can be treated as criminal.... The bribing of the personnel of the enemy state means to bribe those who are close to their ruler. Cheated by close ministers who accept bribes, the ruler is unable to distinguish truth from falsity and right from wrong. As a result, the relations between the ruler and his loyal ministers would sow discord and the views of loyal ministers would be ignored. The way to resort to force is to attack and defeat the enemy while the force of the enemy is waning.”

The Heguanzi challenges the view that the strong has more advantage than the weak to become the winner. As long as the weaker party uses intelligence and

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strategy proficiently and successfully, the weaker can become the winner, as the cases in which Tang defeated Xia and Zhou destroyed Yin?’ There are a large number of cases in which intelligence and strategy were fa­ vored before the utilization of force. Before Yingzheng (259-210 B.C.), the king of Qin (later the first emperor of United China) launched wars against other states to unify China, he sent Yao Jia and Dun Ruo, his advisors, to the states of Han, Wei, Yan, and Zhao, where they used the stratagem of sowing distrust among the minis­ ters and between the ministers and their rulers. This strategy was important for the state of Qin to annex other states. For example, the state of Zhao was a strong state among the seven states in the later Warring States period. The army of Zhao led by General Li Mu defeated the Qin army twice and became a large obstacle in the way of Qin’s expansion toward the east. Realizing the difficulty of defeating Zhao by military force, the king of Qin sent Dun Ruo to the state of Zhao, where he bribed Empress Wang and Guo Kai, a close minister of the king of Zhao, in exchange for their influence on the king of Zhao to dismiss General Li Mu. Believing the accu­ sation given by Guo Kai against Li Mu, the king of Zhao appointed Zhao Cong and Yan Ju, two mediocre generals, to replace Li Mu. The army of Qin seized the chance to invade the state of Zhao and defeated Zhao’s army. The stratagem to sow discord in the state of Zhao won the war, which the Qin ruler was unable to win by military force.’** If the use of force is inevitable, Chinese strategists tend to take the initiative only after opportunities arrive, such as if the strength of an enemy is weakened by inter­ nal conflicts or the occurrence of a natural or man-made disaster. According to the Guanzi, “ifthe enemy has not suffered disaster sent by Heaven, it is not the time to launch an offensive; if there has been no man-made disaster inflicted on the en­ emy, it is not the time to declare a war.’’” The use offeree is viewed by Chinese strategists as the last resort after all other options fail. The Chinese preference for using psychological strategy instead offeree and vi­ olence can be found in ancient military classics and short treatises such as the Sunzi, the Simafa, and the Wuzi. These military manuals (bingfa) see warfare as an intellectual endeavor based upon the wise application of philosophical principles and knowledge associated with strategy, tactics, and calculation. In particular, the Sunzi, a military strategy manual that is considered a fourth century B.C. Legalist text, discusses strategic methods for using military intelligence and was widely loved by most Chinese. Edward Boylan has argued that this preference for the Chi­ nese to use psychological stratagems presents a distinctive cultural style in war and continues to influence the Chinese.’® Alastair Johnston also believes that “within the China field there seems to be little controversy about the proposition that ‘deep’ history and culture are critical sources of strategic behavior.’’” In his comparison of the Soviet military, which “exhibited a preference for the preemp­ tive, offensive use of force that was deeply rooted in a Russian history of external insecurity and internal autocracy,’’ and the United States military, which “has ex­ hibited^ tendency towards a sporadic and reluctant though messianic and crusad­ ing use of force that is deeply rooted in a fundamental belief in the aberrance of

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warfare in human relations and the moralism of the early republic,” Johnston ar­ gues that China “has exhibited a tendency for the controlled, politically driven de­ fensive and minimalist use of force that is deeply rooted in the statecraft of ancient strategists and a worldview of relatively complacent superiority.”’® In other histor­ ical literatures related to warfare, there exists the same tendency to emphasize knowledge, wisdom, deception, and cuiming. For example, the Zhanguo ce, the Intrigues of the Warring States, is a compilation of selected historical anecdotes and speeches of the “international strategists” in the Warring States era, who pro­ posed strategies and even shamelessly cynical plots and schemes to the political leaders for pursuing dominance. The Intrigues ofthe Warring States regards deceit as crucial to warfare and views the application of deception in its proper sphere as both necessary and admirable. The Romance of the Three Kingdoms describes a number of efficacious political and military strategists who use stratagems based on foreknowledge and deception. Chinese tradition has historically favored nonvi­ olent methods in dealing with military confrontation. Nonviolent methods such as “mediation by third parties, negotiation, espionage, bribery and subversion, split­ ting followers from leaders, intimidation and cajolery, and all forms of decep­ tion”—w«c often used in successful military campaigns.” Chinese military theory cares more about “a psychological rather than a physical result” and strives for the enemy’s submission, not necessarily his destruction.'*® This cultural pattern also can be found on Mao’s attitude towards the use of coercion internally. Mao’s disapproval toward the Stalinist use of terror and murder indicated his inclination to avoiding physical excesses. For Mao, the best way to defeat an enemy is not to eliminate the enemy physically but rather the enemy’s psychological submission. To borrow his words: “To cure the disease to save the patient.” From the perspective of ancient Chinese strategists, the best way to defeat an en­ emy is to use psychological tactics. They view warfare philosophically as a vital means for survival that justifies the strategic use of deceit. Whereas utilizing diplo­ macy and resorting to force are ranked as secondary and tertiary options, respec­ tively, the use of strategy is viewed in the Sunzi as the primary consideration.*’ The Sunzi views war as “the way of deception” (guidao) and defines war as a behavior of craft or trickery in which stratagems must be used;**’ hence, the Sunzi holds that military strategy favors manipulation and even conspiracy. According to the Sunzi, if a general plans to launch an offensive, he needs to pretend that he is not going to attack; if he plans to attack from a place near the enemy, he needs to pre­ tend to attack from a faraway place; if he plans to attack an enemy from a distant place, he needs to pretend to attack from a place near the enemy; if an enemy han­ kers after gains, the general needs to use gain to lure the enemy; if an enemy is in disarray, the general should seize the opportunity to attack the enemy; if an enemy is very well equipped, the general needs to cautiously defend against the enemy; if an enemy is big and powerful, the general needs to think of a way to avoid the en­ emy; if an enemy is impetuous and irritable, the general needs to constantly harass the enemy; if an enemy is cautious, the general needs to use every conceivable stratagem to make the enemy overconfident; if an enemy is at rest, the general

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needs to tire the enemy; if enemies unite as one, he needs to sow dissension among them; he should launch an offensive before an enemy prepares and should take an action that the enemy is unable to anticipate.**^ According to the Sima fa, there are two best ways for the martial-specialist gen­ erals to defeat an enemy: to use morality and justice, and to use trickery. The em­ ployment of morality and justice refers to applying sincerity and trust to move and inspire the enemy; dignity and awe are demonstrated to deter an enemy; die use of trickery is related to employing stratagems to defeat an enemy, such as by encour­ aging an enemy’s arrogance and sense of imperviousness, undermining an enemy’s advantage, and secretly gathering military intelligence and sowing dis­ sension within the enemy’s personnel.** The notion oiquan was often used by an­ cient strategists for justifying military strategy. Whereas quan in the Sima fa is described as the skills to use strategy flexibly,**^ it is the Wuzi that refers to crafty manipulation to lure an enemy. According to the Wuzi, deception needs to be used upon those who easily trust others; a bribe needs to be used on those who desire gains; harassment needs to be used on those who lack strategy and easily change plans; the scheme of sowing dissension needs to be used on an enemy whose lead­ ers are rich and arrogant while its subordinates are poor and resent their leaders.**® Considering that the use of trickery is viewed as the most important means of defeating an enemy, throughout history the Chinese military has developed an en­ during tradition of politically and militarily strategic culture and behavior. In this respect, Chinese strategy indeed “stresses indirection and the manipulation of the enemy’s perceptions of the structure of the conflict.”^’ Lucian Pye has observed that the calculus of power in Chinese military thought was not limited to the rais­ ing of material force; stratagems, deception, and winning with minimum effort were also emphasized.**® Influenced by Daoism, Mao often expressed the view that in weakness there is strength and in strength, weakness. He believed that the weak are able to become strong, while the strong have the seeds for their own destruc­ tion. As long as the weak were good at seizing opportunities, they could defeat the strong and achieve dominance. Mao’s own experience had proved the Daoist wis­ dom that the weak could defeat the strong. Though the CCP was a minority, it de­ feated the KMT in the civil war during the 1940s. Despite inferior equipment, Mao dared to challenge the overwhelmingly superior forces of the United States in the Korean War. In the mid-1960s, Mao supported young and radical ideologues, such as Yao Wenyuan, Guan Feng, and Qi Benyii, against the bureaucracy. Michel Oksenberg argues that the Daoist intelligence provided Mao the fountainhead to view everything in constant motion and see power as a definite attribute of any in­ dividual, group, or nation. In particular, Mao “was attracted to the fluidity of any situation, and as a result he was less concerned witfi immediate power balances than with trends.”**’ Influenced by Chinese nonaction and passivity, Mao paid par­ ticular attention to the maintenance of initiative as a vital ingredient in political battle. For Mao, according to Oksenberg, “Key tasks were to move at the propitious^moment for purpose of surprise, to stage confrontations in the most favorable environment, and to project an image of one’s trend-in-power which counters the

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strategy of the adversary.”^® Daoist wisdom was also used by Chiang Kai-shek to split and disintegrate his political opponents and consolidate his power. Having faith that the weak were able to defeat the strong, Deng Xiaoping in 1977 manipu­ lated an ideological battle headed by his follower Hu Yaobang to attack the benefi­ ciaries of the Cultural Revolution, despite their dominance over the party leadership. Because little difference can be found between traditional Chinese strategic thought as embodied in seven military classics in five scriptures {yvujing qishu} and modem Chinese military thought, there seems to be little controversy about the continuity of the Chinese tradition of strategic culture.

SOCIAL STRATAGEMS IN POPULAR CULTURE In examining the fact that the Chinese resort to psychological strategies while dealing with their social relations, we can find a certain pattern by carefully inves­ tigating popular culture. Many social stratagems in modem China can be found in idioms, which are popular and influential in Chinese society. Qiao Jian has argued that Chinese culture forms a highly ingenious, widespread, and enduring tradition of social and political strategies. According to Qiao Jian, the strategies in Chinese culture are mainly based on deductive reasoning from various models established from the principle of metaphor. He enumerates the so-called “thirty-six strata­ gems,” a “conscious’’model related to strategies, as an example in identifying Chi­ nese strategic behavior during social interactions.^' Although a systematic theory of strategic behavior has not been officially es­ tablished and encouraged since Confucian doctrine dominated orthodox ideol­ ogy, the cultural influence of strategic behavior still penetrates every comer of Chinese society through the dissemination of popular culture such as traditional primers, novels, drama, and folk stories, which are spread via both open and un­ derground channels. Many Chinese also learn psychological and social strate­ gies by imitation. As Robert Ruhlmann has observed, “To teach by imitation has long been the practice in China, where, traditionally, education has relied on models and precedent more than on rules.”^^ Certain famous figures are synony­ mous with specific attributes or virtues for the people to imitate. For example, the legendary Gou Jian (d. 465 B.C.), the king of Yue at the end of the Spring and Autumn period, symbolizes a brave and wise king who endured humiliation in order to restore his defeated motherland. After the state of Yue lost the war against the state of Wu, Gou Jian hid his hatred and pretended to surrender to the king of Wu. To get the king of Wu to drop his guard, Gou Jian became his ser­ vant, offering the king of Wu his wife as a concubine, paying tribute to him every year, and serving as the vanguard when he waged wars with others. Ten years later, after the Yue became strong enough against the Wu, Gou Jian defeated the king of Wu and exterminated his state. Similarly, Guan Yu (d. 219) of the Three Kingdoms is the symbol of unwavering fidelity to his lord, and Qu Yuan (d. 278 B.C.) is the symbol of the loyal minister misunderstood by an unworthy prince.^’

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Zhang Fei (d. 221) and Li Kui in the Song dynasty are symbols of strength and courage with impulsive generosity. Moreover, through generations the Chinese have been profoundly influenced by various myths and legends and popular novels, such as Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Water Margin, Dream ofthe Red Chamber, Jin Ping Mei, and Journey to the West. From these readings, the Chinese learn not only how to handle human relationships, such as establishing, maintaining, and strengthening friendship, but also how to practice wisdom, including strategies to protect themselves and to ex­ ercise manipulation and even conspiracy. Mao Zedong regarded Romance of the Three Kingdoms, Water Margins, Dream of the Red Chamber, and Jin Ping Mei not only as literature but also as political novels.^^ Popular culture has always played a significant role in promoting the popularity of Chinese strategic behavior because it penetrates and influences every level within Chinese society. Tu Wei-ming has argued that Chinese philosophy and thoughts are fundamentally rooted in popular culture.^^ Philosophy in the Chinese perspective must be dedi­ cated to everyday life and ordinary action, and “the Chinese did not develop spe­ cial terminology for philosophy different from everyday language and beyond the understanding of the simple man.”’® In Chinese history, the best philosophers are those who are closely related to popular culture. The elite culture in Chinese soci­ ety actually is the “crystallization of popular culture.” The essence of Confucian philosophy, for example, is in the pithy statements of basic principles about the daily life of the common people.” Political strategies disseminated by popular cul­ ture powerfully influence both the populace and the ruling elite. From the Confucian point of view, the five cardinal relations (parent and child, ruler and subject, husband and wife, old and young, friends) comprise the central value system of a Confucian society and the basic norms of Chinese social order.” Strong particularism, which is regulated by the values of filial piety, loyalty, and love, dominates the social interaction of Chinese. But, because these values are carefully graduated according to the nature of the specific relationships, strangers are excluded from the group of people whose relationships are regulated by the five relations. Wolfram Eberhard has argued that, even in the era of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), family for the Chinese means security and warmth, and the outside world means insecurity and coldness. As the Chinese must suppress all aggression within the family, the outer world is the field in which aggression finds its outlet. While aggression can be shown indirectly toward familiar neighbors in the village or town, the Chinese might feel free to discharge their aggression di­ rectly when they interact with complete strangers, such as in encounters in a mod­ em big city or in a foreign country, where one is sure that the contact is casual and fleeting. In that case, “What counts in such contacts is aggressive intelligence, making the most of every chance as often as one can without risking too much.”” It is true that popular culture plays a vital role in promoting negative applica­ tions of strategy, such as cunning and deception, when the Chinese interact with outsiders and strangers. The Zengguang xianwen, for example, was a primer that had widespread influence on the ruling class and the populace in traditional China.

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This primer provides advice for the Chinese on how to protect themselves and pur­ sue personal advantage. Holding a negative view of human nature, this primer urges men to take any measure necessary to protect themselves as well as to use any means to achieve this goal. Because no one can be trusted, according to this primer, one should “show one’s heart only thirty percent*’ and “never devote one­ self to others wholeheartedly.” According to Mou Zongsan, the Chinese have tre­ mendous wisdom in using political manipulation, an enduring tradition in Chinese social interactions.^ The Houheixue, the Thick and Black Learning, written by Li Zongwu in 1917, “satirically exposes the artful and cynical techniques people em­ ployed to negotiate their way into and up the ranks of officialdom.”^’ The so-called “Truth of Six Characteristics for Questing for an Official Position” and the “Truth of Six Characteristics for Staying in Office” proposed by Li Zongwu are actually a set of social strategies used to pursue personal advantage. In the “Truth of Six Characters for Questing for an Official Position,” for instance, the Thick and Black Learning describes a set of methods on how to reach that goal successfully. Ac­ cording to the “Six Characteristics,” one must first have free time {kong} to devote oneself solely to this enterprise, and also have patience and perseverance. Second, one must be skillful in exploiting [gong) an advantage and seizing opportunities. Third, one must be gifted with a silver tongue and aptitude for writing to boast {chong). Fourth, one must be skillful in flattering {peng} superiors. Fifth, one must be good at scheming to tactically use threats (kong) if flattery does not work. Sixth, one must tactically give a present or money {song) to those needed for one’s per­ sonal advantage.” These cynical techniques employed for pxirsuing social advan­ tage often run rampant when political corruption and social instability undermine social cohesion and morality. In communist China under Mao’s rule, strategic behavior continued and was further encouraged by political campaigns. Political campaigns, as large-scale mass movements, were usually implemented in the form of a people’s war in which strategies were employed to fight against class enemies. The so-called bat­ tle of annihilation, positional warfare, war of attrition, and guerrilla war used for mass movements against the capitalist readers, for example, were very popular during the Cultural Revolution. Military strategies employed against the national­ ists in the civil war were popularly encouraged in the Cultural Revolution, such as “to crush our enemies one by one,” “to use an iron hand in a velvet glove,” “to meet an adversary with his own strategy,” “to launch surprise attacks,” “to remove the lid,” “to serve in a negative way to teach,” and "to make a feint to the East while at­ tacking in the West.” In Chinese culture, war always equates with hostile action so that any strategy, including cheating, trapping, luring, and murdering, is justified. In the Sunzi, a classic manual for military strategy, war is defined as “tricky behavior” in which one attains one’s end by “hook or by crook.”®’ In fact, once popularized through­ out society, political campaigns as strategic and ruthless wars would inevitably bring about a destructive psychological influence over the entire population and crumble the long-standing system of social trust based on Confucian humane-

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ness. During the Cultural Revolution when the entire society was saturated with class struggle, society’s system of trust was totally destroyed. A radical example was that children broke their relationships with their parents and the daily life of the entire population was politicized. Indeed, political campaigns caused an overwhelming mentality of social distrust among the population. The popular­ ization of instrumental relationships since the Cultural Revolution, which might be partially explained as the sequel to social distrust, became one of the most se­ vere obstructions to social cohesion in the post-Mao period.

STRATEGY IN POLITICAL PURSUIT From his concern for political stability and social harmony, Laozi defines an ideal Daoist sage as a combination of a virtuous patriarch and a political strategist. On one hand, the ideal Daoist sage in Laozi’s perspective refers to one who fol­ lows the Way'” and devotes his love unselfishly to the people and his nation.®’ On the other hand, he is a successful political leader who is able to use political strata­ gems skillfully to achieve political ends and to control his bureaucracy.®® Without a doubt, the Daodejing is a manual for successful political rule. Laozi’s doctrine regarding political rule powerfully influences Huang-lao Daoism, which is di­ rectly linked to the behavioral science of the Legalists. There has been a consensus thatfajia (Legalism) borrowed from the Daoist con­ cept of wuwei (nonaction) to establish the political theory of Legalism, which played a crucial role in the promotion of the autocratic tradition in the Chinese pol­ ity. Together with Confticianism, Legalism has played a significant role in form­ ing Chinese traditional political institutions and directing political practices. Considering the powerful influence of Legalism upon the political elite, some his­ torians have argued that the Chinese monarchical political tradition was actually imbedded in a model of Confucianism on the outside and Legalism on the inside (yvairu neifa).^^ Even in the observation of Liang Shuming, a well-known modem Confucian scholar, political rule in traditional China relied basically on the inter­ dependence {xiangji weiyong') of Confucianism and Legalism, while Daoism played a role as moderator between them.®® While Confucianism was employed to guide social organizations, spiritual and moral civilization, according to Fung Yu-lan, Legalism was used to direct the theory and techniques of realpolitik.®’ Al­ though Confucianism played the central role not only in directing political practice but also in political thought, imdiluted Confucianism per se exists only as a politi­ cal idea and never in political reality.’® Borrowing from Daoism, Legalism employs wuwei (nonaction) as a general term for political strategy. It seems unimportant to inquire how the paradoxical term of the wuwei links with aggressive political initiative. Rather, focus should be directed as to how Chinese philosophy offers a set of techniques or policies of ad­ ministration for political pursuit and social interaction. If we accept Sima Tan’s defimtipn of wuwei—that Daoist nonaction means that nothing is left undone—the

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content of nonaction is easy to put into practice, even though the term itselfis diffi­ cult to explain. If the concept of nonaction in the Daodejing is viewed as a means to realizing a peaceful world, nonaction in Legalism is developed as a political stratagem to en­ sure the ruler’s power and to maintain the stability of the monarchical polity. Herrlee Creel has argued that the policy of wuwei in Shen Buhai’s description has two principal advantages for the ruler. On the one hand, “it leaves him free, as an executive, to supervise the government without becoming so involved in its details that he cannot perform his proper function, and loses perspective.” On the other hand, “While the ruler maintains firm control of the administration, he plays no ac­ tive role in the carrying out of its functions.”’’ When a Legalist ruler leaves himself free, he not only is allowed to be an incompetent ruler, but he should not use his ability even if he has talent.’^ For both Shen Buhai and Han Fei, wuwei does not mean doing nothing or holding a laissez-faire attitude toward political pursuit. Rather, it means taking an active position in the political realm and creating a cloak of secrecy that is not penetrated by the ruler’s subordinates.

NOTES 1. David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, TTiinkingdrom the Han: Self, Truth, and Transcen­ dence in Chinese and Western Culture (New York: State University of New York Press, 1998), p. 46. 2. Fung Yu-lan, A History ofChinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 183. 3. Lisa Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 78. 4. Zhang Qijun, Daojia zhihui yu xiandai wenming [Daoist wisdom and modem civili­ zation] (Taipei: Taiwan shangwu yinshuguan, 1984), p. 152. 5. Daodejing, 9:5. ZZJC ed.; D. C. Lau, Tao Te Ching (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1963), p. 65. 6. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 203. 7. Daodejing, 22:12; Lau, Tao Te Ching, p. 79. 8. Lin Yutang, My Country and My People (New York; Halcyon House, 1938), pp. 118-119. 9. Fung Yu-lan, A History ofChinese Philosophy, trans. Derk Bodde, Vol. 1 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), p. 183. 10. Daodejing, 49:30. 11. Mou Zongsan, Zhongguo zhexue shijiu jiang [Nineteen lectures of Chinese philoso­ phy] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1997), p. 159. 12. Julia Ching, Mysticism and Kingship in China (London: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p.216. 13. Fung Yu-lan,..4 History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. l,p. 184. 14. Wenzi, 1:6. SBBYed. 15. Huainanzi, 1:8-9. ZZJC ed.; Evan Morgan, Tao: The Great Luminant; Essays from Huai nan tzu (New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., 1969), p. 14. 16. Huainanzi, 1:8.

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17. Guojia wenwuju guwenxian yanjiushi [Research office ofnational cultural relics and ancient documents], Mawangdui hanmu boshu [The silk scroll manuscripts from the Han tomb at Mawangdui], Vol. 1 (Beijing: Wenwu chubanshe, 1980), p. 58. 18. Huainanzi, 1:8. 19. Fung Yu-lan, A History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 1, pp. 180,184. 20. Daodejing, 64:39; Lau, Tao Te Ching, p. 125. 21. Ibid. 22. Daodejing, 28:16. 23. Guojia wenwuju guwenxian yanjiushi. Vol. 1, p. 79. 24. Daodejing, 45:28. 25. Chen Songchang, “Mawangdui boshu ‘miaohe,’ ‘zhaoli’ ” [The translation of “miaohe” and “zhaoli” of the silk scroll manuscripts from the Mawangdui tomb] in Daojia wenhuayanjiu [The analysis of Daoist culture], ed. Chen Guying, Vol. 6 (Shanghai: Shang­ hai guji chubanshe, 1995), p. 371. 26. Daodejing, 39:25. 27. ChenSongchang, “Mawangdui boshu ‘miaohe,’ ‘zhaoli,’ " '\nDaojia-wenhuayanjiu Vol. 6, p. 371. 28. Daodejing, 31:18. 29. Ibid., 31:18. 30. Yilin, 1:12b. SBBYed. 31. Heguanzi, 3:20b. SBBY ed. 32. Ibid.. 3:20b. 33. Ibid., 3:20b-21a. 34. SeeSAy/, 81:9a. SBBY ed. 35. Guanzi, 42:252. ZZJC ed. 36. Edward S. Boylan, “The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare,” Comparative Strategy 3:4(1982), p. 341. 37. Alastair I. Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chi­ nese History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995),p 22 38. Ibid., p. I. 39. John King Fairbank, The United States and China, 4th ed. (Cambridge, Mass.: Har­ vard University Press, 1979), p. 70. 40. Ibid.,p. 70. 41. Sunzi, 3:35-37. ZZJC ed. 42. Ibid., 1:13. 43. Ibid., 1:13-20. 44. Sima fa, 3:2b-3a. SBBY ed. 45. Ibid., 3:2a. 46. Wuzi, 4:7. ZZJC ed. 47. Johnston, Cultural Realism, p. 26. 48. Lucian Pye, Asian Power and Politics: The Cultural Dimensions ofAuthority (Cam­ bridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 46. 49. Michel Oksenberg, “The Political Leader,” in Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales ofHistory, ed. Dick Wilson (Cambridge, London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), pp 74-75 50. Ibid., p. 78. 51. Qiao Jian, “Zhongguo wenhua zhong de jice wenti chutan” [A preliminary investiga­ tion about stratagem in Chinese culture], in Zhongguoren de xinli [The psychology of the Chinese], ed. Guoshu Yang (Taipei: Guiguan Press, 1988), p, 419. 52. Robert Ruhlmann, “Traditional Heroes in Chinese Popular Fiction,” in Confucian­ ism and Chinese Civilization, ed. Arthur F. Wright (New York: Atheneum, 1965), p. 135.

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53. Ibid., p. 130. 54. Wang Dongxing, Wang Dongxing huiyi: Mao Zedong yu Lin Biao fangemingjituan de douzheng [The recollections of Wang Dongxing: The struggle between Mao Zedong and Lin Biao’s antirevolutionary clique] (Beijing: Dangdai zhongguo chubanshe, 1997), p. 126. 55. Tu Wei-ming, Xiandai jingshen yu rujia chuantong [Modem spirit and Confucian tradition] (Taipei: Lianjing chuban shiye gongsi, 1996), p. 391. 56. Wing-tsit Chan, “Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Human­ ism,” in The Chinese Mind: Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, ed. Charles A. Moore (Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967), p. 16. 57. Tu Wei-ming, XiandaiJingshen yu rujia chuantong, p. 391. 58. Ambrose Y. C. King, “The Individual and Group in Confucianism: A Relational Per­ spective,” in Individualism and Holism: Studies in Confucian and Taoist Values, ed. Don­ ald J. Munro (Ann Arbor: Center for Chinese Studies, University of Michigan, 1985), p. 58. 59. Wilfram Eberhard, Moral and Social Values ofthe Chinese: Collected Essays (Tai­ pei: Cheng-wen Publishing Company, 1971), pp. 11-12. 60. Mou Zongsan, Zhong^o xhexue shijiuJiang [Nineteen speeches of Chinese philoso­ phy] (Shanghai: Shanghai guji chubanshe, 1997), p. 160. 61. Mayfair Mei-hui Yang, Gifts, Favors, and Banquets: The Art ofSocial Relationships in China (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 109. 62. Li Zongwu, Houheixue daquan [A complete collection of thick and black learning] (Hong Kong: Xuewen chubanshe, 1960), pp. 21-22. 63.Sunzi, 1:13. 64. Daodejing, 51:31. 65. Ibid., 13:7, 66:40. 66. Ibid., 9:5, 22:12,36:20-21,45:28, 64:39. 67. ZhengyuanFu, China's Legalists (New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc, 1996), p. 8. 68. Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi [The essential features of Chinese culture] (Hong Kong: Sanlian shudian, 1987), p. 218. 69. Fung Yu-lan, Sansongtang quanji [The complete works of sansongtang], Vol. 6, (Zhengzhou: Henan renmin chubanshe, 1989), p. 192. 70. Liang Shuming, Zhongguo wenhua yaoyi, p. 218. 71. Henlee G. Creel, What Is Taoism? (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 65. 72. Fung Yu-lan, Zhenyuan liushu. Vol. 1 (Shanghai: Huadong shifan daxue chubanshe, 1996), p. 504.

9

Behaviorism and Bureaucratic Rationality

THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCE OF LEGALISM Legalism is popular for its persistence in a ruler-centered autocratic polity and views government as an apparatus to serve the interests of the ruler? Whereas Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.), Shen Buhai (d. 337 B.C.), and Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.) are generally assigned as the three pillars of Legalism, Shen Dao (d. 315 B.C.) and Tian Plan are considered the key figures who transformed Daoism into Legalism. Un­ like Mencius ’ truly virtuous ruler, Legalists intended to create a truly “enlightened ruler” {mingjun} who is able to effectively rule the masses and control his bureau­ cracy. In Chinese Ancient Thoughts, Benjamin 1. Schwartz describes the features of a truly Legalist “enlightened ruler”: He must be anything but an arbitrary despot, if one means by a despot a tyrant who follows all his impulses, whims, and passions. Once the systems which maintain the entire structure are in place, he must not interfere with their operation. He may use the entire system as a means to the achievement of his national and international ambitions, but to do so he must not disrupt its impersonal workings. He must at all times be able to maintain an iron wall between his private life and public role. Concubines, friends, flatterers, and charismatic saints must have no influence whatsoever on the course of policy, and he must never relax his suspicions of the motives of those who surround him?

An ideal enlightened ruler is a skillful manipulator and successful politician who uses means or “technique” in achieving self-protection and political control. The central pursuit of Legalism is to ensure, maintain, and enhance the ruler’s absolute power and authority. Legalists were convinced that three themes were critical for the successful reign of a ruler—political technique (shu), authority or power (shi), and law (fa). Legalism challenges Confucianism’s view that humane-

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ness and righteousness are the foundation of successful governance. In his de­ nouncement of Confucianism, Shang Yang (d. 338 B.C.) insists that “the humane person can be benevolent to men but cannot make men humane and the just person can love men but cannot make men compassionate.”’ The concept of the Way (dao) in the Han Feizi is interpreted as the basis of the absolute authority of the ruler and the notion of nonaction (wuwei) as the ruler’s mysterious and secret mo­ dus operand!.^

POLITICAL TECHNIQUE (SHU) Legalists view political method or technique as the most crucial ingredient in controlling a bureaucracy. In fact, before Legalism there had been a trend toward promoting political technique to manipulate bureaucracy in Chinese political thought. Herrlee Creel has provided evidence identifying the existence of the “the­ ory of bureaucracy” based on method long before the dominance of Legalists.’ In Shen Buhai’s fragments and the Han Feizi, the central concern is the problem of the ruler’s control of officialdom. According to Han Fei (d. 233 B.C.), because of the evil of human nature, men without kinship bonds compete with each other for the world’s limited resources. The ruler should not expect absolute loyalty from his ministers; as the Han Feizi warns, “Ministers have no bonds of flesh and blood to tie them to their ruler. It is only the force of circumstances that compels them to serve him. Those who act as ministers never for a moment cease trying to spy into their sovereign’s mind, and yet the ruler of men sits above them in indolence and pride.”’ Legalist rulers should not trust anyone, because society is an arena where political contention is inevitable and where the outcome can only be the survival of the winner and the extermination of the loser. Legalists are convinced that the ruler’s high-level entourage should never give up their sinister search for power. “Their desire to advance their own power and prestige by influencing the ruler or even overthrowing him was still an ever-present possibility.”’ Han Fei takes the ruler’s perspective toward competing with his ministers for power. The theoretical foundation of Legalism is based on the assumption that human nature is evil and that personal interests are calculated. Agreeing with Shen Dao (d. 315 B.C.) and Shang Yang, Han Fei holds that all human relationships, to differ­ ent degrees, involve the calculation of personal gain. Even when the physician sucks his patients’ cuts and holds their blood in his mouth in an effort to save their lives, he expects only profit, not love. Similarly, the carpenter wants people to die so that he can sell more coffins and the Cartwright wants his customers to be rich and noble so he can sell more carriages. In Han Fei’s explanation, “Not that the Cartwright is benevolent and the carpenter cruel, but unless people are rich, car­ riages will not sell, and unless people die, coffins will not be bought.”® The rela­ tionship between the ruler and his ministers is actually a naked relationship of exchanged benefits:

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There are different [calculating] minds between the ruler and his minister. The ruler keeps the minister in service with a calculating mind. So does the minister with a calculating mind serve the ruler. The minister never cares to injure his body and benefit the state, nor does the ruler want to injure the state and benefit the minister. The minister by nature would regard personal injury as unprofitable to himself, whereas, the ruler by nature would think the injury of the state as unforgivable to the minister. In short, ruler and minister cooperate, each with a calculating mind?

Han Fei concludes that the relationship between ruler and minister, which is not as intimate as the bond between father and son, “is an outcome of mutual calcula­ tions.” “Ministers exert their strength to the death in exchange for the rank of no­ bility and a handsome salary from the ruler while the ruler confers rank and emoluments in exchange for the ministers’ service.”*® A Legalist ruler realizes that his ministers are potential threats and, therefore, does not expect the ministers to be truly loyal. The ruler must also be vigilant against those close to him, such as his wife, concubines, royal uncles, and cousins, because they all will benefit from his early death. The Han Feizi insists that there is no exception between parents and children in terms of calculating their personal interests. The reason why parents congratulate each other when males are bom and kill female babies is that the par­ ents calculate their own future interest; only males can become the primary labor force, thereby, benefiting the parents.” The Han Feizi believes that the exchange of benefits between the ruler and his ministers is the prerequisite for their political cooperation. The concept ofshu (political technique) is introduced by Legalism to ensure the absolute power of the ruler. The Han Feizi states that, if the nation is the ruler’s carriage and authority is the ruler’s horse, political technique is the ruler’s skill for driving them.” In Legalism, political technique and authority are essential to en­ sure absolute power of the ruler. As the Han Feizi holds, “Nothing is more honor­ able than the body of the ruler, more dignified than the throne, more magnificent than the ruler’s awe, and more powerful than the ruler’s authority.”” Shen Buhai (d. 337 B.C.) views the ruler as a shout and the minister as an echo. “If the ruler plants the root, the minister manages the branch; if the ruler holds the controls, the minister performs detailed tasks.”” Shen Buhai is strongly convinced that it is im­ possible to make ministers loyal to their ruler without political techniques.” If the ruler uses political technique, according to the Han Feizi, “neither can the minis­ ters arrogate all power to themselves, nor will the courtiers dare to parade their in­ fluence.”” Shen Buhai, as the leading theorist of sku (political technique), was concerned more with the ruler’s control of officialdom than with deliberately formulated rule for regulating the ministers’ conduct. Liu Xiang (77-16 B.C.) comments that Shen Buhai’s book is a political treatise advising a ruler to use manipulation rather than punishment to supervise and hold responsible his ministers and subordinates.” Xunzi particularly criticizes Shen Buhai, who “does not understand talent and wis­ dom because he is hoodwinked by political power and authority.”” Whereas pre-Qin Confucians want the ministers to control their rulers, Shen Buhai advo-

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cates a tight centralized control of the ruler and is concerned with a division of power from the rulers. Shen Buhai recommends that the rulers adopt shu to prevent the usual drain of power to ministers. Legalists believe that ministers always have an unlimited desire to advance their own power and prestige by influencing or overthrowing the ruler. The ruler must pay great attention to any potential or overt threat. In explaining the overwhelming concern of the ruler over his bureaucracy, Schwartz observes: The rulers themselves are woefully vulnerable to flattery, to the irrational attraction of intellectual brilliance, outstanding valor, saintly virtue, or physical beauty. What is more, the average ruler’s own “private knowledge’’ is no more infallible than that of his officials, and when he makes the effort to control his officials by a pretense of personal omniscience and the unfailing brilliance of his own analyses, his nakedness will soon be revealed. What must be established are impersonal, objective mechanisms and rules for strictly limiting the powers of officials and subordinating them to the unchallenged control of the ruler. There must be mechanisms which are completely independent of the vagaries of interpersonal relations. Han Fei-tzu elaborates such methods at great length. Officials are systematically encouraged to spy on each other and to denounce each other. There are many devices for isolating functionaries from each other and preventing collusion against their ruler. In the end, however, one finds a congruence between some of the main mechanisms used to assure the ruler’s absolute control of his officials and the mechanisms designed to make bureaucratic government effective.”

Concerned that the power of the ruler might fall into the hands of his ministers, Han Fei is convinced that the ruler is a target for servants and even other members of his family because everyone is motivated by selfishness. Han Fei warns rulers to be careful of senior ministers and court attendants, as well as brothers, uncles, cousins, sons, concubines, and wives. No one is to be trusted. Legalists are also convinced that the origin of an unstable society comes from rulers’ ineffectiveness in controlling the statecraft. The ministers, according to the Han Feizi, always envy and try to drain their rulers’ power. In particular, when the ministers form powerful cliques, the rulers can hardly exert effective rule and fall victim to intracourt power struggles. Because Han Fei is'concemed with these threats, he encourages rulers to protect themselves via any political measure, in­ cluding espionage, denunciation, and trapping officials into acts that reveal suspi­ cious motives.^® According to the Shangjun shu, the Book ofLord Shang, the ruler should become an “enlightened” person who is capable of seeing everything so that the ministers do not dare to commit evil.’’ Compared with law {fa}, which “is codified in books, kept in governmental of­ fices, and promulgated among the populace,” political technique {shu} is “hidden in the ruler’s heart and serves to comprehensively test various situations and se­ cretly control the ministers.” Whereas “law should be as public as possible, politi­ cal techniques should be more concealed.”” According to Shen Buhai and Han Fei, the total and unswerving submission and loyalty of the ministers must be pro­ moted for the ruler to exert effective rule. In Legalist political techniques, the em­

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phasis on secrecy and the promotion of the rulers mysterious behavior enhances the employment of shi (situational authority). Shen Buhai says: If the superior’s cleverness is visible, people will guard against it. If his stupidity is visible, people will bewilder him. If his knowledge is visible, people will disguise themselves. If his ignorance is visible, people will hide their faults. If his freedom from avarice is visible, people will watch for unguarded moments. If his avarice is visible, people will entice him.^’

Legalists advise rulers to hide personal bias and preference in an effort to protect themselves from manipulation by their ministers and avoid personal control ex­ erted by flattering advisers. Legalism is also convinced that the ruler is always “a center of determining gains and losses so that he is targeted by others.”^ The Han Feizi further notes: If the ruler exposes his like and dislike, his subjects will find opportunities to cater to his pleasure so that the ruler falls into delusion. If the ruler leaks the words and opinions of his ministers, the ministers will hesitate to express their opinions so that the ruler will become unenlightened and ill-informed.^’

In Han Fei‘s view, the sentiments, attitudes, likes, and dislikes of the ruler might become the source for manipulation by others striving to pursue their own advantage and usurp power; therefore, the ruler must never reveal his true intentions, desires, and inner thoughts to others in an effort to eliminate any pos­ sibility of being manipulated. This explains why an ideal ruler, in Legalism, keeps a public distance and shields himself behind a veil of secrecy. Han Fei ad­ vises the ruler not to reveal his wants and his views, because his ministers “will polish their manners accordingly and display their hues differently.’’^® Shen Buhai also warns the ruler: The skillful ruler avails himself of [an appearance of] stupidity, establishes himself in insufficiency, places himself in (a posture of] timidity, and conceals himself in inaction. He hides his motives and conceals his tracks. He shows the world that he does not act. Those who are near feel affection for him, and the distant think longingly of him [i.e., desire to become his subjects]. One who shows men that he has a surplus has [his possessions] taken from him by force, but to him who shows others that he has not enough, [things] are given. The strong are cut down, those in danger are protected. The active are insecure; the quiet have poise.^’

The Han Feizi explains further: If the ruler can give full play to others’ abilities, he will need to do nothing. If the ruler tries to excel, then nothing will go right. If he strives to outshine others, he will invite deceit among his subordinates. If the ruler likes to show off his eloquence and wisdom, his subordinates will use them to bluff and deceive. If the roles between superior and inferior change, the state will never be ordered.^®

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In the Shenzi, the so-called rule for regulating relations between the ruler and his ministers (junchen zhidao) is related to a Legalist form of the ruler-minister rela­ tion: a ruler with wuwei (noninterference) and aminister with^oww: (action). The ruler leaves everything to his ministers to do, but secretly watches how his minis­ ters perform and judges whether they are qualified: The ministers do everything but the ruler does nothing. The ruler enjoys a comfortable and pleasant life while the ministers toil all year. The ministers spare no effort to contribute their talent and wisdom to accomplish their duties. The ruler does not interfere with their work; he only watches how they perform.... As a ruler, if he tries to do the governmental tasks personally and vies with his ministers in doing things, he is taking the place of his ministers and will suffer hardship and busyness. The ministers readily take the opportunity to enjoy comfortable lives. If the ruler likes to vie with his ministers to do things, the ministers are unwilling to accomplish their duties. As a result, the ministers tend to hide their talent and wisdom. Once the ruler makes a mistake during his performance, the ministers will blame the ruler. This is the origin of national disaster.^’

Shen Dao believes that it is dangerous for the nation if the ruler “reverses” his role with his ministers. If the roles of the ruler and his minister are not in order, the na­ tion is always beset by crisis.^® Legalist theorists believe that ministers give impartial and better advice if the ruler maintains an aura of mystery. In the Han Feizi, seven strategies are proposed to help the ruler ensure his control over the ministers: 1. Comparing different views—the ruler must always compare what he sees and hears.

2. Making punishments definite—to make prohibitions and decrees effective, penal­ ties must be definite.

3. Bestowing reward and honor—“If reward and honor are insufficient and faithless, the inferior will not obey. Ifreward and honor are great and faithful, the inferior will make light of death.” 4. Listening to all sides of every story—“If the ruler listens to one perspective only, he cannot distinguish between the stupid and the intelligent.”

5. Making pretentious appointments—“If someone has frequent audiences with his superior and is accorded a long reception but not appointed to any office, then vil­ lainous men will disperse in his presence like deer in all directions. If the ruler sends men out to find anything other than what is in question, the ministers would not dare to sell private favors.” 6. Manipulating different information—“If the ruler makes inquiries by manipulating different information, then even unknown details will come to the fore. If the ruler knows everything of something, then all of the hidden will be seen in a different light.” 7. Inverting words—“Invert words and reverse affairs and, thereby, cross-examine the suspect and then the ruler will get at the reality of culprits.”’’

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In order to control his bureaucracy effectively, the ruler must monopolize the power to mete out reward and punishment. As the Han Feizi suggests, the ruler punishes not only those who fail to accomplish their jobs but also those who do too much, including too much good, for both of them represent a threat to the strictly institutionalized system. Han Fei suggests that the ruler must remove any of his subordinates he does not sufficiently influence and, more importantly, must be alert to influence from the ministers, which might pose a potential threat to the rulerIn the chapter “Following” (yinxun) in the Shenzi, Shen Dao advises the ruler not to employ anyone who is not interested in salary and not to start discuss­ ing business with someone without providing him a handsome payment.^’ Those who cannot be encouraged after being rewarded and those who are not afraid after being punished and disgraced also must be removed.’^ An ideal Legalist ruler needs to have the ability to link the interests of his minis­ ters with their services. Not expecting their moral obligation and ethical loyalty, the ruler should make the ministers believe that they are working for themselves. An enlightened ruler, according to Shen Dao, utilizes his ministers naturally and cleverly. Everyone has his own desires and is motivated to pursue his personal interests. If the ruler forces the ministers only to benefit the ruler, he is unable to find a qualified person. ... Therefore, when constraining his ministers from pursuing only their own interests, an enlightened ruler can make his ministers benefit themselves while they are benefiting the ruler.2’

To make the ministers serve both the ruler and themselves, Legalism needs to rely on certain criteria and measurements. The X&nn xingming, meaning that the actual performance of a functionary corresponds to the title or job description of the of­ fice,’^ was introduced as the objective standard for serving Legalist political reality. The control of the ministers includes interbureaucratic spying. The Han Feizi advises the ruler to encourage his officials to spy on and derogate each other. Spying among ministers secures important information for the ruler and creates competitive relationships among the ministers. In fact, many Chinese emperors and political leaders have resorted to this strategy for political survival or career enhancement. The Ershisi shi, the Annals of the Twenty-Four Dynasties, and the Zizhi tongjian, the Comprehensive Mirror to Aid in Government, have recorded rich stories about the employment of interbureaucratic spying in traditional China. Even in the twentieth century, it was often utilized in Sun Yat-sen’s constitutional scheme.” In the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party, interbureaucratic spy­ ing was popularly used to ensure the party’s control over its members. The system of political commissars in the CCP army, for example, functioned to oversee the commanders of the CCP army units. In the Legalist view, any activity by which subjects can build up their own repu­ tation, establish their own authority, grant rewards in their own name, or enhance their own influence must absolutely be prohibited. The ruler must be wary of any

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attempt by the ministers to establish horizontal communications within the bu­ reaucratic hierarchy because horizontal communications serve to establish private cliques. Although political technique in Legalist theory mainly ensures the absolute power of the ruler, some theorists suggest instructing ministers on how to deal with rulers. For example, Shen Buhai advises ministers “never to overstep the duties of one’s post and speak about people’s business, even though aware of it.”’* In the “Difficulties in the Way of Persuasion” of the Han Feizi, Han Fei urges the ministers to move carefully when trying to persuade their ruler. When one attempts to persuade his ruler, according to the Han Feizi, one must know “the heart of the persuaded in order to fit oneself into the wording.” The Han Feizi believes that one would be doomed to failure if he were to persuade those who strive after high fame to pursue big profit or those who strive after big profit to pursue high fame. One would be accepted in name but kept distant in fact if one persuaded those who strive after big profit in secret but openly pursue fame. One’s persuasion would be accepted in secret but he would be kept distant openly if he persuaded them to pursue big profits.” Thus, Legalists suggest that a minister carefully deal with his ruler in order to ensure political survival and ad­ vantage. If a minister speaks of anything the ruler wants to conceal or ifhe knows the motives and true purpose of the ruler, Legalists believe that the minister will then be in danger. A minister will also be in danger if he challenges the ruler’s vices or forcibly attempts to persuade the ruler to do what he cannot do and not to do what he cannot stop doing.^° Legalists believe that a ruler-minister relationship based on the exchange of benefits is the most dangerous form of cooperation in human relationships. A min­ ister must do everything cautiously and carefully when serving his ruler, because, as a popular Chinese verse indicates, “one accompanying the ruler is just like one who accompanies a tiger” {banjun ru banhu). For Legalists, only the successful minister can “embellish the pride and obliterate the shame of the persuaded.” The Han Feizi lists the strategies in detail: If he has any private urgent need, you ought to encourage him "with the cause of public justice. If the persxxaded has a mean intention but cannot help it, you ought to praise his excellent points and minimize his hannfulness to the public. If he has a high ambition in mind but his real ability falls short of the mark, you ought to enumerate his mistakes, disclose his disadvantages, and esteem his suspension from realizing it. If he aspires to the pride of wisdom and talent, you ought to enumerate different species of the same genus with reference to every object of knowledge and thereby supply him with abundant information and let him derive ideas from you but pretend to ignorance of his derivation so as to elevate his wisdom.^’

In the Han Feizi's view, a minister must carefully observe the ruler’s feelings of love and hate before he makes any political move.^^

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POLITICAL POWER AND AUTHORITY (SHI) In the Legalists’ view, authority means both a structural and a substantive domi­ nation of others because of the physical power to command human resources and mobilize power. Roger T. Ames defines the term shi as “political purchase,” which is related to the ruler’s capacity to regulate the conduct of others and to use his po­ litical status and strategically advantageous position to amplify his influence over others.^’ In this respect, authority is a form of power that enables the ruler to com­ mand and dispense punishment and rewards. This power, as the Guanzi describes, refers to granting life, ending life, granting wealth, causing impoverishment, de­ moting status, and promoting status.** As the leading theorist of shi (authority), Shen Dao values shi highly in strengthening the absolute power of the ruler. In the Legalist interpretation, the notion of shi means to ensure that the entire system rests on the authority of the rulers; this acceptance of authority is the central factor in the coercion of power. Shen Dao holds fiiat “talent and wisdom are not enough to make the masses obedient, but the authority (shi) and the position are able to make even talented people compliant.”^’ In the Legalist perspective, the floating snake and the flying dragon are no better than the earthworms if they are not sup­ ported by the fog and the cloud. Shen Dao indicates, “the reason that many talented people condescend to comply with fools is because the fools take a high position, an advantage of controlling others by shi."^^ In fact, “once one takes power, he can make talented people comply regardless of whether he is talented or not.”^’ A ruler would get nowhere without political authority, because power is indistinguishable from authority. In examining certain assertions made by Shen Dao, Ames argues: First, since men of superior quality can be subjugated by inferior men and vice versa, it is not the degree of “superiority,” moral or intellectual, which affords the individual the capacity to govern others. Second, just as clouds are a necessary condition for the flying dragon to realize itself as flying dragon, so authority and position are necessary conditions for a man to realize rulership... even if a man has all the ability and wisdom of a capable ruler, it is only when he has access to the authority and position of the ruler—that is, when he has shih (shi)—that he actually has the opportunity to be a ruler.... Finally, whereas superior character may have some bearing on the success of government, it is the authority and position of the ruler which give him political purchase and hence political control.*®

According to Legalist political theory, political action and the exercise of power should not be constrained by morality, and the piu'suit of political power does not need moral justification. When a Legalist ruler remains the ultimate mystery of au­ thority, as Schwartz observes, “the system itself enhances the mantle of mystery and the sense of remoteness which sunounds the figure of the ruler, but finally it is the symbolic aura of authority sunounding the figure of the ruler which makes possible the implementation of the system.”*^ In explaining the powerful function of a ruler’s authority to control his ministers, the Guanzi notes:

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Personality of the Enlightened Leader

If there is an intelligent ruler above, who is the possessor of authority (shi) whereby he can rule with absolute certainty, his multitudes of subjects will not dare to do wrong. The reason why these multitudes of subjects do not dare to deceive their ruler is not because they love him, but because they fear his awe-inspiring power (shi). The people vie with one another in offering their services, not because they love their ruler, but because they fear his laws and commands. Therefore the intelligent ruler keeps the invincible measure in his own hand, with which to govern the people who must be at his service. He rests in an authority (shih) requiring obligatory respect, so as to keep in order the subjects who must obey him. Thus his orders are carried out, and his interdicts serve to forbid.^®

In the Guanzi's view, shi is important in promoting the compliance of subordinates toward their superiors, because it is actually an “awe-inspiring power.” In order to enhance the mysterious sense of political authority, Legalists advocate absolute respect for and submission to the ruler. Political authority promoted by Legalists include “sitting the ruler on a high throne, forbidding the use of his personal name, enforcing lots of bowing, kneeling, and kowtowing, punishing anyone who looks at the ruler’s face, and publicizing stories of his strength, accomplishments, and skill.”5’ The ruler also “does not let his power be seen so that he can achieve self-protection and nonaction,Han Fei advises the ruler to rely on authority (shi) rather than the faithfulness of the ministers and on political technique (shu) rather than the loyalty of his subordinates.” Unlike Confucianism, which relies on moral suasion and the ruler’s ability to transform and influence his ministers, Legalism favors the ruler’s total control of officialdom by manipulating political power and using intimidation. Without au­ thority, according to Legalism, even a talented leader could not effectively control his subordinates and establish political order. To effectively control the official­ dom, the ruler must be the sole source of authority; he must monopolize his power and never share it.

LAW (K4) Legalism holds that law is a code of conduct that regulates the members of a community and a system that promotes social justice and stability. According to Shen Dao, law provides the ruler a standard for unifying the thought of the com­ munity so that social harmony can be achieved: The wise cannot override the law to abstain from personal profit. Sophists cannot ignore the law to talk wildly. Scholars and warriors cannot despise the law to pursue individual honors. Ministers cannot place themselves above the law to claim merits for themselves.’*

Legalism insists that the dignity of the law must be absolutely safeguarded; that is, whoever violates the law must be punished.” Because humans naturally desire benefits and human relationships are the cal­ culation of exchanged benefits, the ruler must use his power to control his minis­ ters by manipulating rewards and punishments; Han Fei refers to this as rule by

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law or standards. The ruler should be skillful in employing punishment, because “punishment promotes force, force produces prosperity, prosperity brings about strength, and strength promotes virtue.”^*’ Because Legalists believe that men are inherently evil, men should be taken for what they are and dealt with on that basis. Legalists see only two sanctions for law—force and profit, that is, force to deter and profit to induce.” Both Legalists and Xunzi (d. 238 B.c.) see human nature as evil. Legalists hold that the evil human nature determines the calculation of per­ sonal interests. But Xunzi believes that men can transcend evil human nature and achieve greatness through moral education and self-cultivation. In ancient Chinese documents, _/h (law) was often related to the character xing (punishment), which embodied commands and penal punishments according to the will of the ruler. Challenging Confucians who rely on humaneness and righ­ teousness to establish and maintain social order. Legalist theorist Shang Yang was convinced that penal law is much more effective to achieve social and political or­ der. Shang Yang notes: If ruled by penal laws, the people will fear. Being fearful, they will commit no craft and evil. There being no craft and evil, they are able to enjoy what they like. If guided by righteousness, however, they will be unbridled. If they are unbridled, the nation will become chaotic.”

Unlike other civilizations such as Babylonian, Egyptian, Judaic, Islamic, Greek, and Roman, in which law connects closely with religious sanctions and invariably divine will, Legalist law deals only with penal punishment. Han Fei highly regards the law of Shang Yang, which treats minor offenses seriously. This leads Sima Tan (d. 110 B.C.) to criticizes Legalists who “were harsh and little inclined to compas­ sion.”^’According to Shang Yang, “If[the ruler] imposes heavy penalties on petty crime, petty crime will not occur and serious crime will never come. This is said to be getting rid of penalties by using penalties.”'^® In explaining the usefulness of the law of Shang Yang, Han Fei also holds that “major offenses are hard for men to commit while small faults are easy for men to remove.” The “right way of govern­ ment,” according to the Han Feizi, is “to make men get rid of minor and easilycommitted faults and to not commit more serious offenses.”^' When punishment is harsh and applied decisively, according to Shang Yang, “no one is willing to try [committing crime] and, therefore, there is no need for a state to impose penal law.”^2 Legalists believe that establishing harsh punishments eliminates crime and ultimately abolishes the use of punishment. In Legalist political theory, the notion offa refers to a ruler’s absolute domi­ nance of the state’s ideology and the populace’s thought. According to Li Si (d. 208 B.C.), a Legalist statesman, if the ruler does not prohibit various schools of thought that develop outside the official ideology, the ruler’s power will be under­ mined and secret factions will run wild.*’ A Legalist government is a totalitarian regime that must absolutely embody the will of the ruler and must be xmified by an indisputable ideology imposed by the ruler.

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For Legalists, the primary reason for implementing law is that the ruler should not trust anyone around him. In the political arena, no one can be trusted no matter the relationship. Only law can be trusted to direct social and political operations and to regulate human relationships. Legalist law (fa) is expected to provide an ob­ jective standard rather than intuitive guidance to control a bureaucracy. Han Fei believes that law is public and provides standards of conduct, which are universal and impartial; therefore, law is not the expression of the ruler’s personal desires or an exposition of personal qualities. If the ruler relies on his own likes or dislikes when giving his subjects reward or punishment, according to Shen Dao, the ruler will create trouble for his political rule: Even though the ruler’s reward is appropriate, a receiver of reward always wants more rewards because of his unlimited desire. Even though the punishment that the ruler gives is just right, a receiver of punishment wants less punishment because of his unlimited desire. If a ruler does not follow the law but relies only on his individual taste to give reward and punishment, people of equal merit will not be rewarded equally and people with similar crimes will not be punished similarly. If there is no distinction for rewards and penalties, resentments among the ruler’s subjects will arise.

Shen Dao is convinced that the ministers will not complain and harmony will pre­ vail if the receivers of rewards and punishments cannot expect the ruler to treat them differently .^5 Legalists are convinced that law is an effective tool to rule the populace, espe­ cially in times of human strife. The Han Feizi notes that in ancient times when peo­ ple were simple, the ruler could contain crime and rule successfully as long as he condemned infamy. When the people become clever and crafty, the ruler must re­ sort to penalties to maintain order.^ In explaining why law is important to achieve a peaceful world, the Han Feizi states: The law does not fawn on the noble; the string does not yield to the crooked. To whatever the law applies, the wise cannot reject it and can the brave defy it. Punishment for fault never skips ministers, reward for good never misses commoners. TQ_conect the faults of the high, to rebuke the vices of the low, to suppress disorders, to decide against making mistakes, to subdue the anxjgant, to straighten the crooked, and or to unify the folkways of the masses, nothing could match the law. To warn the officials and overawe the people, to rebuke obscenity and danger, and or to forbid falsehood and deceit, nothing could match penalty.®’

Legalists resort to law to achieve a stable and lasting political system that does not depend on the ruler’s personal characteristics. By implementing the law, even me­ diocre rulers could successfully rule the nation. Confticianism relies on the appear­ ance of the sage-ruler who possesses perfect moral virtues for political rule, whereas Legalism hopes to maintain a stable political system that does not depend on a ruler’s personal qualities. In this respect. Legalists share their views with Huang-lao Daoists, who rely heavily on a political system based on law and regu­

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lations. Not relying totally on a ruler, Huang-lao Daoists actively promote social norms and customs such as rituals, honesty, feelings of shame or guilt, morality, and music to achieve political control. According to the Yin Wenzi, if political rule relies only on the individual ability of a ruler instead of on a political system (e.g., ritual and music imposed by the ruler), the nation might suffer a crisis if this capable ruler dies, because the abilities and skills of a capable ruler are not necessarily inherited. The Yin Wenzi is convinced that this is the origin of instability for a nation.®’ The Han Feizi states that the people would not dare to challenge order if law were established, the ministers would not dare to venture conspiracy against the ruler if the ruler could skillfully use political skills and manipulation, and subor­ dinates would not dare to disobey their superiors if the authority of those superi­ ors is unchallenged. When no one dares to step beyond what one should be and overdo what one should do, the ruler can safely and calmly enjoy his wuwei rule. The ultimate goal for Han Fei’s ideal society is to “make both the ruler and the ruled return to pureness and simplicity”—a yvuwei world.®’ In this ideal world, as Han Fei describes. Carriages and horses are not worn out on the road. Flags and banners are never confused in the big swamps. Myriad people do not lose their lives because of bandits and weapons. Courageous warriors do not see their life spans determined by flags and streamers. Excellent men are not praised in pictures and books, nor are their merits recorded on plates and vases. And documents of annals are left empty.’”

The ideal world that Han Fei dreams of is a wuwei society where the Way prevails: “Following the Way to safeguard the law, the enlightened ruler enjoys peace and the extinction of evil. He is placid and serene, complies with the Mandate of Heaven, and only pays attention to the essence of things.”’* For Han Fei, the real­ ization of a peaceful and pastoral wuwei world depends on active interference through the establishment of rewards and punishments and the utilization Of politi­ cal technique. In sum, Legalism advocates an effective use of rewards and penal­ ties for the ruler to effectively control his ministers and the populace. Unlike Confucians who put the Way and the good of the nation ahead of rulers, Legalists center on the outcomes that primarily benefit political power. They have no inter­ est in distinguishing between what is good for the state and the people and what is good for the rulers. Shen Dao disavows any attempt to mingle individual morality to achieve social and political order. He also disapproves of ministers risking their lives to admonish the ruler. For Shen Dao, the ministers’ admonishments give no help to the ruler but rather serve to help the ministers to raise their own names. He believes that the rise and fall of a state never depend on loyal ministers. Shun was a great sage-king and a successful ruler, but he was not a filial son, since he sent his father, who lost sight in both eyes, into exile. Jie, the notoriously tyrannical ruler of Xia, had many loyal ministers, yet he was overthrown; thus, “a filial son is not bom in the house of a kind parent and loyal ministers do not emerge under a sage ruler.” Shen Dao advises the ruler to disallow ministers to exceed their authority to remonstrate him and exercise authority outside their organizations.’^ In Shen

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Dao’s political philosophy, morality never plays a role in influencing political power.

NOTES 1. The Chinese fajia (school offa) has been conventionally translated as the Western term “Legalism.” Despite its misleading translation, I shall continue to use it in my discus­ sion. 2. Benjamin I. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985), p. 345. 3. Shangjun shu, 18:33. ZZJC ed. 4. Lisa Raphals, Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions of China and Greece (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992), p. 83. 5. Herrlee Creel, “The Beginnings of Bureaucracy in China: The Origins of the Hsien,” Journal ofAsian Studies 23 (1964), pp. 155-184. 6. Han Feizt, 17:82-83. ZZJC, ed. 7. Schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, p. 337. 8. HanFeizi, 17:84; W. K. Liao, The Complete Works ofHan Fei Tzu,N