The Huaqiao Warriors: Chinese Resistance in the Philippines, 1942-45

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Thc Huaqiao Ularriols Chlnrr

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fiqb ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY PRESS Bellarmine Hall, Katipunan Avenue Loyola Heights, Quezon City P.O. Box 154, 1099 Manila, Philippines Philippine Copyright 1996 by Ateneo de Manila Cover design by Fidel Rillo

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Copublished with the Hong Kong University Press, 139 Pokfulam Road, Hong Kong. @ Hong Kong University Press 1995. Distributed exclusively in the Philippines by the Ateneo de Manila Universiry Press.

The National Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Recommended entry:

Yung Li Yuk-wai. The Huaqiao warriors : Chinese

in the Philippines 194245 / Yung Li Yuk-wai. - Quezon City : ADMU Press, c1996

resistance movement

242 p

l. Philippines - History 2. World War, 1939-1945 movements 1939-1945 -

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1942-1945. Underground Philippines. 3. World War, Underground movements, Chinese.

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DS6864 t996 959.9042 P961000061 rsBN 971-550-i89-3

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Contents

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iii

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List of Tables

ix

Foreword

xiii

Preface

xv

Acknowledgements

I

The Chinese Community in the Philippines at the Outbreak of the Pacific War

1

Size

3

Sex distribution

I

Age structure

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Contents

First generation of immigrants Geographical distribution

Occupational distribution Hometown origin Origin of resistance spirit Filipino-Chinese relationship in historical perspective Chinese behaviour during British and American invasion Rise of Chinese narionalism Anti-Japanese movements Nationalism or parochial loyalty? Notes

2

Foundations of the Resistance Movement The Prewar Organizations and Leadership -of the Philippine Chinese Community Social organizations "Salvation" trrganizati. rns The Philippine Chinese Chamber of Commerce The Chinese Consulare The Chinese Nationalisr Parry (Guomindang)

The leftists Failure of joint-leadership

3

8 9 11

14

t5 L5

t7 20 ZZ ?.6

31

37 38 42 44 5Z

55

60

Notes

66 69

The Leftist Chinese Guerrilla Forces The Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla

l5

Force

The Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps

81

94

The Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese and Anti-Puppers League Chinese leftist resistance movement outside Luzon

101

Notes

109

99

vil

Contents

4

The Rightist Chinese Guerrilla Forces The Chinese Overseas l7artime Hsuehkan Militia The Pekek Squadr.x'r The Philippine Ohinese Youth \Tartime Special Services ()trrps

5

115

rt7 tz6 129

The Chinese Voluntccrs in the Philippines

134

Notes

r46

The Impact of the Resistance Movement on the Philippine Chinese Community

153

Resistance versus collaboration Traditionalists versus nationalists Guomindang versus leftist elements Postwar Filipino-Chinese relationship

154 158

t59

Notes

168 184

Appendix

169

Abbreviations

t93

Glossary

197

Bibliography

207

Index

2t9

T tist of Tables Table I

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

Table

2

3 4 5

6

7

8

Distribution of Chinese in Southeast Asia before the outbreak of the Pacific War.

5

Distribution of ethnic Chinese in Southeasr Asia in 1947.

6

Sex and age distribution of the Chinese citizens in the Philippines in 1939.

7

Distribution of Chinese cirizens in ren provinces of the Philippines in 1939.

10

Occupational distribution of the Chinese citizens in the Philippines in 1939.

t7

Average contribution of the Southeast Asian Chinese communiries to the Chinese war

chest, 1937-40.

?.3

Number of Chinese Salvation Associations in Southeast Asian countries.

43

Major skirmishes of the Hua Zhi (May l94Z

Table

Table

9 10 11

1943).

Major skirmishes of the Hua Zhi (May 1943 Sept. 1944).

_

84

85

Major skirmishes of the Hua Zhi (Sept. 1944

Table

Mry

Feb. 1945).

88

Battles of rhe Hua Zhi during the Mopping-up Campaigns.

89

I I

J

I

Foreword

ver the course of time, Filipinos have tended to stereotype and denigrate the Chinese in their midst, depicting them just not as grasping and disloyal, but as essentially cowardly: "they don't care who owns the cow as long as they get to milk it." In writing Philippine history, the Chinese immigrants and their descendantsl are acknowledged in discussions of economic development, but they tend to disappear when it comes to political history, especially those great crucibles in which the nation's identity was forged, the Revolution and the Second World War. Thus by imflication the Philippine Chinese are denied a role in the formative martial events of Philippine history, and, indirectly, the political rights arising from these nationalist struggles.2

x

lir

Foreword

In response, some Philippine Chinese have tended ro asserr their community's achievements in hagiographic terms. Those Chinese who fought alongside Filipinos are depicted simply as unflawed patriots, heroic contributors to narional greatness. Within the Chinese community, however, thcre have been divisions along ideological lines, with the pro-Nationalist (Guomindang) loyalists asserring the virtues of "rhe ir" resistance groups over those with more leftist tendencies, and vice versa. Like their Filipino counrerparrs they are, in effecr, sraking claims as to the meaning of Philippine history; in rhis debate, nor surprisingly, historical objectivity often gets lost. The author of this book stands outside these debates over ideology and identity; instead she tries ro assess dispassionately the sources, strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese resistance m()vement during the Japanese occupation of the Philippines. Building on rhe pioneering work of the late Antonio Tan, she has profited from the opportunity to exploit additional sources in the United States and China, as well as in the Philippines. Both the documents she found in the United States National Archives and the rare publications she tumed up in various Chinese libraries have considerably fleshed our rhe rarher sketchy account of these various resistance groups, some previously known only by name. The result is a much more detailed and nuanced

acc()unt of a many.faceted mrtvement, neither inconsequential

nor totally heroic. As is usual when sources multiply, contradictions have emerged, and it is to the aurhor's credit that she faces up squarely to these contradictions, as we[ as to the evidentiary gaps that remain, and has done her best to resolve them. She would be the

first to acknowledge thar more research remains to be done there are further possibilities for oral history and the Japanese sources for the occupation are still largely unexploreds but for the moment, this study represents the "state of the -art" with regard to the Chinese resistance movements in the wartime Philippines.

The writer of a foreword should not, I believe, "give away"

I

oreword

il xi

the author's findings before the readers huvc t'ven reached the text, but I do not believe it will spoil it firr anyone if I mention that the book shows that the organization and the actions of the Chinese resistance movement were more complex than either its celebrators or its detractors have generally acknowledge. Some Chinese fought much, some little, some hardly at all, and their motives were as mixed, as human, as anyone's, anywhere, any time. By putting flesh on these historical bones, by confronting the gaps and paradoxes offered by the available evidence, the author has written a story that should be of interest to all Filipinos, whether of Chinese ancestry or not, and also to those interested in the history of the "Cverseas Chinese,"4 wherever they may be found.

Norman G. Owen The University of Hong Kong August 1994

Notes

I

I refer here to those who have rerained "Chinese" identity. Those mestizos who are idenrified as "Filipino," such as Jose Rizal, Sergio Osmefla, and Corazon Cojuangco Aquino, are generally given full credit for their accomplishments, sometimes at the expense of their Chinese ancestry.

2

One exception is the revolutionary Chinese general Jos6 Ignacio Paua (Hou Yabao). See Edgar lTickberg, The Chinese in Philippine Life, 1850-1898 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965), pp.201-

).

I

xil

Foreword

3

See Newsbtter of The Forum for the Survey of Records ConcemJapanese Occupation of the Philippines, No. I (August 1991), which summarizes the firsr five installments of this news-

ing the

4

I

,l

letter in Japanese. In considering this field as a whole, scholars are increasingly using the term "Chinese overseas" (huaren) rather than "Overseas Chinese" (hua4iao), which implies conrinued (Chinese) narionaliry, an implication not accepted by all rhose of Chinese ethnicity now dispersed around the world. For certain times and places, however ('C)verseas including the wartime Philippines Chinese" re-mains both accurate and convenient. -

=

Preface

f

I

o trace the development of a guerrilla resistance move-

ment, scarcity of source materials is the primary problem involved, as it was highly difficult if not impossible for any irregular resistance force to keep complete records of its members and activities. Moreover, for primary materials written after the war, either by members of the resistance teams or by their leaders, their reliability was in question. Two main sources of information were consulted in this study. For the Chinese language materials, two monographs had been published on two of the Chinese resistance forces respectively (The Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force and the Philippine Chinese Youth Wartime Special Services Corps). A

xtv

Preface

number of articles could be found in the souvenir issues of the Chinese veterans organizations in Manila, such as the Wha Chi Veterans Metropolitan Manila Post, COWHM Veterans Association (National Headquarters), and the Confederation of Filipino Chinese Veterans. In addition, articlcs on the leftist resistance movement can be found in academic jorrrrrrrls and other literature

published in mainland China in the l9E0s.

The Philippine Archives Collection of rhe U.S. National Archives and Records Administration is thc other main source of information. Several files on the major Chinese guerrilla groups were kept, as most of them sought American recognition when the war was over. Many of the records were reports by leaders of the resistance teams on their wartime activitics. It is hardly possible to verifu these materials as they were seldom corroborated in other sources. Presumably part of the information provided by these sources might be fake or exaggerated. On the other hand, in view

of the attempt of the American authorities to cut down the amount c'rf back payment and the jealousy and rivalries among the guerrilla teams, the reports of American investigation and recount by other Filipino resistance leaders might be equally biased. However, research value exists in the study of materials of these types. It is believed that a critical analysis of these source materials throws light on the true picture of the resistance forces, and the distinctive features of the Chinese resistance movement reflected the situation of the Philippine Chinese community before the war. It is upon this rationale that this research was carried out.

As for romanization, standardization is difficult as the Hokkien (Fukienese) and Cantonese ways and the Wade-Giles system were all found in the English language sources. The pinyin system is adopted in this work wherever rhe Chinese versions of the names of persons, organizations and places are known to the author, and they are listed in the glossary. When the Chinese versions of these names are not known, they are cited in the text in the original form of the sources consulted. Therefore, the way that the names were romanized in the text does not necessarily reflect the hometown origin of the people mentioned.

I

t; I

Acknowledgements

N f ever had I realized how a scholar was indebted to so many I\ p"opl. and organizations until I started this research. My to Dr. Norman G. Owen of the University of Hong Kong, who dealt with all the questions that arose during the course of the research with keen insight and enduring patience. This book would not have been published without his deepest gratitude goes

encouragement and support. The following people gave me various directions in my search for materials in the Philippines in August 1988: Professor Theresa Chong Carino of China Studies Program, De La Salle University; Mrs. Teresita Ang See and Mr. Go Bon Juan of Kaisa Para Sa Kaunlaran, Inc.; Mr. G. Chen of the Manila Chinese Press

XVI

Acknowledgements

CIub; Mr. V. Tan of the Federation of Fil-Chinese Chambers of Commerce & Industry; and Dr. Serafin D. Quiason of the National Historical Institute. The following organizations gave me hearty receptions and generously offered me their publications: Headquarters Wha Chi Veterans MM Post; COWHM Veterans Association (National Headquarters); and the Confederation of Filipino Chinese Veterans. I have ro express my grarirude especially to Mr. and Mrs. R. Leong, Mr. and Mrs. B. Lao, Miss J. Sze and Mr. Y. Ng for their hospitality during my sray in Manila. I visited Guangzhou twice during my research, in December 1988 and January 1989. There I was given access to the libraries of the following institutes: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies and Institute of Overseas Chinese Studies, Jinan University; and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies of Zhongshan University. I was much enlightened by the suggestions of Professor Huang Zisheng of Jinan University. I would also like to thank the members of the Friendly Association of Retumed Philippine Chinese for their friendliness and cooperarion. In May and June 1990, I stayed in Washington D.C. to collect infcrrmation from the American military records on the Philippines during the war period. I am grateful to Mr. John Taylor and Mr. Wilbert B. Mahoney of the Military Reference Branch, National Archives and Records Administration, and the staff of the Washington National Records Cenrer for all their assistance. Dr. Alfred McCoy of University of \i7isconsin, Madison, gave me much guidance and encouragement through our telephone conversations. I am also greatly indebted to Mr. and Mrs. Paul Ho and their family for their warmrh and kindness during my stay. This research was financed by a postgraduate studentship and a postgraduate research granr from 1988 to 1990, and a Swire Scholarship from 1989 to 1990. I am also grateful ro rhe Committee on Swire Scholarship for the award of rhe Swire Travel Grant in 1990, without which my trip to rhe U.S. would have been impossible. Last but not leasr, I would like to express my eamesr ac-

I

) At krrowledg,ements

n

XVI

I

knowledgment to all my informants in the Philippines and Guangzhou, who I believe may prefer not to have their nalnes mentioned, and all members of staff of the History Department, University of Hong Kong, the friends of Robert Black College and my family for thetr c()nstant c()nccrn and support. Of course, I am solely responsible frs, m()stly regardecl their stay in the c()untry as transient, and were largely separated from the native people except in brrsiness .iealings. Lcgally they rvere barred fiom the acquisition ol Filipino citizenship, but it was highly doubtful if most of tl-re rn wt,uld hzrve applied had this been avaiiahle to them. Culturally, real assimilation did not take place. ln Manila and other cities like Cebu anil Iloilo, the Chinese formed separate entities, living in their own neighhorhoods. Their children were sent to Chinese schools. They rnaintained their own newspapers and sociai organizations.ln'Was it normal for such a srnall alien group to fight side by side with the host people and the ruling regimc against the external invadersl A11 these features

:': L-

Filipino-Chinese relationship in historical perspective Frorn the historical perspective, this rvas a r:rther ahnormal reaction of the Philippine Clhinese. judging fr,rm the Filipino-Chinese relations frrr centurics, it r.vas highly unlikely for the Philippine Chinese to fight on behalf of the native pcople, although the early rel:rtions hctwccn tlic twtl pcoples canrlot he said to be entirely hostile. Alfonso Felix said that "the history of the relationship between the Filipinos and the Chinese is a history of massacre

re/g?/'(

C'7.' I T'f'

16

The Huaqiao Warriors

and discrimination."l0 Thcrc wcre six major revolts and massain the Philippi.es, .r.srly in the seventeenth and early eighteenth centurics, hrrt rnosr of these were caused by the suspicion of the Spanish rulcrs r()wrrrtls the increasing number of Chinese, and the Filipinos were involverl "only to the extent of being Spanish-led troops and len.ri.rg f r.* thc Spaniards certain cultural attitudes towards the Chinesc."]r It has even been said that the rnuruul lrspirations ftrr independence created a bond of sympathy bcrwccn flrc rwo peoples.r2 The Filipino revolurionary leaders enjoyed thc symparheric supcres of Chinese

p.rt

of some chinese revolurirnary leaders duri.g thc philippine

war of independence againsr the Spanish and Americans at the turn crf the century. Then in l9Z? some Filipino leaders also shared the enjoymenr of the chinese in the successf,l unifica-

tion of China.rr It was also said that the Filipinos were

to the Chinese during the Sino-Japanese conflict. According to one Toky. source, during the Manchurian crisis of 1911 and 1932, several hundred Filipinos visited the chinese cr>nsuiate-General and sh.wed their will of ioining the chinese army r() flght the Japanese.ra However, sympathy and support for the Chinese nationalist calrse werer limited to a small Broup of Filipino leaders and people only, and they never became the mainstream of Filipino sentimenr. Inste^d, with the grearer political awakening of the Filipinos in rhe twentieth cenrury, this economicaily powerfur but politically and culturally unassimilated minority gio,rp became more and more intolerable. The Sinophobia of the F'ilipinos in the twentieth cenrury was well reflected in the anti-chinese rir.rts in Manila in October 1924 arrd in San Pablo in 1931,r5 and the introductio.r of a series of bills in the commonwealth period to curtail the economic power of the Philippine chinese. George lTeightman made the following commenr on Filipino-chinese relations: syrnpathetic

Historically, the Philippines has been rhe scene of the grearest antipathy and open conflicr in Southeast Asia bet*,een the

Ihe

Chinese Community in the Phililtltirrt''

li

Chinese and the host group. Fearful and resentful of the doml' nant economic role of the Chinese, the Filipinos have long sought through legislative actions and iudicial interpretatltlnc to restrict the economic activity of the migrant community.

The implementation of such legislation and court decislone has but served as another complicating factor in a situation already characterized by cultural conflicts, social exclusiveness and the modern political problems of dual loyalties.r6

So judging from the history of Filipino-Chinese rt:latiotts

tt1,

to the outbreak of the Second World War in the islantls, it is hard to imagine that the Chinese resistance to the Japanese wrrs motivated by any empathy towards the native peopie.

Chinese behaviour during British and American invasion In the history of the Chinese community in the Philippines, it is also hard to find precedent for the Chinese siding with rhe colonial government and the native people against an externai invader. The attitude of the Philippine Chinese in two previc'rus cases of foreign invasions into the islands was very different from that towards the Japanese invaders in the 1940s. The first case took place in the mid-eighteenth century, during the Seven Years' \War between Britain and France. ln 1762, Britain declared war on Spain for her support of France in the war, and the Spanish colony of the Philippines hecame the target of British invasion in September 1767. Manila was held by the British between 1762 and 1764.37 During the British invasion of the islands, the Chinese collaborated with the British and provided them with guides. They also organized a volunteer team of about 5,000, planning an uprising against the Spaniards, but it was suppressed by the Spanish army. This led to the death of about 6,000 Chinese in December 1762 and the expulsion of surviving Chinese after Manila was resrored to the Spanish in 7764.)8 The Chinese

i

B

The Huaqiao Warriors

behavior in this case can be explained by rhe ir hostility t.warcls the spanish rulers because .f the age-l.nr1 tliscrimination ancl persecution they suffered under the Spanislr rrrlc. More than a century later, there was rhe outbreak of the Philippi.e revoluri.n against the Spanisli g()vc.r.enr in i896, wliich iater coincided with the Spanish-A'rcric.r.r war of lggg and led to rhe end .f Spanish regime i. thc I'hilippines. phirippine independence was proclaimed ar Kawit, Ca,,,ire on June 12, 1898, with Emilio Aguinaldo as rhe presitle.t .l rhe rcvolutionar! govemment. Later, when the Amcric..s t..k .vcr the rule .[ the islands and ign.red the newiy crcrrrcrl Filipi.. republic, fighting br.ke .ur berween Agtrinald.'s reptrblic.n army and the Arnerican tr()()ps. It to.k the Arnericans ah.ut thrcc-and-ahalf years ro suppress rhe Filipino rehcllion. During the course of these events, there were exarnplcs of chinese participati.n on rhe side of the Filipino rev,lutionaries against the Spaniards and later the Americans. The most weilknown case was that of General Jose lgnacio par.ra (Hou yabao, or Hao Who-pau). Paua was a native of Fujian. He had been active in secret society activities in his homet.wn, and became a leader of the local branch of the Triacl Socie ty (T'ianti hui) after he came ro Manila in 1872. when the philippine Rev.rution broke .ur, he joined the forc-es of Aguinaldo, and foiloweci him and other revolutionary leaders in their exile to Hong Kong in 1897. Larer Faua also participated in rhe resistance of the America. troops until his surrender in March 1900. The grearer achievement of Paua was in collecting money for the Revolution. It was said that in the Bicol region alc-ne, he collected 386,000 pesos.ie

In additicln to

Paua, there were otirer examples of Chinese support to the Filipino resistance against the Spanish and Arnerican rules, such as Francisco Osorio, Mariano Limlap, Telesforo Chuidian, and Roman Ongpin. C)soric-r was executed by the Span-

iards for his activities in Katipunan, a secret society aiming at the overthrow of Spanish rule. Limjap and Chuidian playe.llm-

portant roles in the governmenr of the I{epublic of the

the Chinese Community in the

Philipltinr',

l'l

Philippines, while Ongpin gave much {inrrtr,. r'rl ;rr.trl:ilr( ('l(} llt('

Filipinos in their strif-e for independencc.'r" M,)l('()\'('r, tlrr"rrlilr the connection Of Paua, some Chinese tnercltltttts rtlt,, ,l,rtt:tlt', money to support the Filipino resistance ot th.' Sl,rrrrr;rr,l. ,rrr,l I

Americans.al

However, Chinese participation in the cattsc ol I'ltilrl''1'rrrt' independence was limited to individual actic>ns and slr,'trl,l l',' regarded as an exception rather than the general resp()nse ol tlrt' majority. Mosr probahly the financial contribution of thc (lhinese merchants to the Philippine revolutionaries was mort: dttc to Paua's extortion than t. the Chinese desire to see the succcss of Philippine independence, and the secret stlciety connections of Paua helped to justify this. Actually there were also cases t() that the Chinese being sympathetic and the other extreme even giving help to the American troops. ln Albay, the Chinese shopkeepers "were eager to make themselves as indispensable tcl the Americans as they previously had been to the Spaniards and Filipinos."az It was also said that the Americans employed the Chinese "extensively to perform a gotld deal of work connected with supplying the troops at the front."4l

On the whole, the majority of the (lhinese in the Philip-

pines watched the development of these events with indifference, and accepted the change of ruler later with much tranquillity' In the words of Wickberg, "as a general rule, the Chinese seem to

have refrained from overt commitment to either side' Their method was simply to wait and be prepared to do business rvith whoever might be victoritlus."4a The Chinese Consulate in Manila was established immediately after the American takeover. This was welcomed by the majority of the Chinese residents there' which demonsrrared that rhere was little hostility towards the new govemment. These two cases show that the organization of the Philippine Chinese into resistance fcrrces against the extemal invaders during the Second \ilorld War was unprecedented. Things might have changed in the twentieth century. The Philippine Chinese enjoyed the freedom and security under the American rule th:rt

20

The Huaqiao Warriors

they had never experienced in the Spanish period. However, the American policies towards tlrese minority people were to remove many of the restrictions and cxtra taxes, to provide them with the opportunity ro pursue rheir rnarerial well-being, while

at the same time to discourage rlrcir immigration and prohibit their acquisition of Filipino citizenship.as Satisfied as rhey might be under the American rule, the policies of the American govemment were far from sufficient to rally tl-rc allegiance of the Philippine Chinese community in rime of crisis, especiirlly when not only material contributions but alst:, the lttsses of human lives would be involved.

Rise of Chinese nationalism With the absence of empathy towards the native people, a sense of belonging to rhe islands, or loyalty rowards rhe ruling regime, the other possible source of resisrance spirit of rhe Philippine Chinese against the Japanese can be sought outside the islands, in their senrimenral link with China and the growrh of nationalism in this overseas Chinese community. It is not easy to trace the exact course of the rise of nationalism of the Philippine Chinese. It is generally agreed that like the overseas Chinese in general, they lacked the consciousness of a "natic-rn" before the tum of the century. The link with China was senrimental and cultural rarher than political. Changes took place in rhe twentieth cenrury, when they were struck by three evenrs in China: the Chinese revolution and the formation of the Chinese Republic in 1911, the Northem Expedition and the unification of China by the Nationalist party in the 1920s, and the Japanese encroachment of China in the 1930s. Each of these had drastic impact on the rise of narionalism of the overseas Chinese. The spread of republican ideas among the overseas Chinese was slower in the Philippines than in other parrs of Southeast Asia, as the American Exclusion Law hindered the enrrance of I

Philil4ttrn'' 'llrt' lrr.t political activists into the islar-rds. lhe Chinese Community in the

21

l,t,tt,,

lr ,'f

ths

Tongmenghui (Ttrng'meng'hui, or Revoltrtl()lI;rry r\llr''r" ' )' Sun Yixian,S (Sun Yat-sen's) revolutionary pilrl y, wl\ n()l rrriltlgu-

rated in the Philippines until early 1911, wlrirlr rv,,. tlrc l,rtcst in ( Southeast Asia.a6 However, once the Philipprrr,' llrttrt:t' wete awakened ro the fact that the collapse of thc Mrttt,,lr,r l)ynastt

was inevitable, they were won over to the revttltrtt()r:rry Side easily, and in the early republican period, they wcrc r;tllr,'r ltlyal ( to Sun Yixian, probably because most of the Philippint' llrinese had their origins in Fujian and Guangdong, and wcl(' llr,'refore more inclined to support the govemment headed hy rr til:rtr from sourhem china. The fund raising campaign of sun Yixian's irgents in the Philippines in 1914 to 1915 met with enthusiastic sup-

port.4? ln the summer of 1919, the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Cantonese Association held a mass mceting, in which they made clear their support of the government in Canton. On May 5, l9?.1, Sun Yixian was inaugurated as the President of the Republic of China in Canton. The Philippine Chinese welcorned this news with great enthusiasm'48 Because of this inclination towards the "southern govemment," the success of Jiang Jieshi's (Chiang Kai'shek's) Northern Expedition against the warlord govemments in the north and the subsequent unificarion of china added further stimulation to the growth of patriotic feeling among the Philippine Chinese' On the first day of L927, the flags of the Chinese Nationalist government were much on display on Calle Rosario, Nueva, and other distric$ of Manila, showing the sympathy of the local Chinese to the Nationalist govemment. Groups of Chinese in Manila also left for china ro join the Nationalist forces in the expedition. By February 1927, 100 Chinese students had left Manila for training at Whampoa Military Academy.ae Then in the summer of 1977 , mass meetings were held in Manila and in the provinces by the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and some patriotic journalists to call for loyalty and support of the Nationalist Movement.to

)2

Ihe Huaqiao Warriors

Anti-f apanese movements The upsurge of patri.ric feeling came ro a clirrrrrx i, the l9J0s, when rhe Japanese arnbiti.n rowards cl-rina ht,crrrrrt' rn.re obvi.us. Strrng anri-f apar,ese feeling was ar.useil t.lrrly rrr 1928 when the Jinan Incident br.ke .ut.5r rhis was furrht'r irrspirt.tl by the Mukden Incidcnt and tl're conseq'ent Jap..r'sr. .t t rrprrri.. .f Manchuria i. l9l 1.5l As a result, there wcrc rr s(..('s.r'mass carnpaigns and the firrmati.n .f the so-callcd "srrlv:rtir.r" s.cieties. A Federati.n of Philippine (lhinese Nrrrr,.rrl Srrlvari.n Assrrciati.n (Feilubin huaqiao jiuguo lianhehui) rvrrs lirrr,t.rl .. No-

vember 30, 91 1, c.nsisting of lOl ass.ci:rtirr.rs.',, J-lrt. N il)eteenth R.utc Army's resistance t. thc Japant-se i.r Shrr.ghlri in lglZ was met with much cnthusiasric applause in rlrc islrr.r.ls. These anti-Japanese activities came t() a pcak aftt'r tlrt: ,rrrhr.ak .f the Sino-Japanese War in 1917. The supp.rt of the Philippi.e c)hi.est, I.r r he cl-ri.e se effort in the war was marerial as we ll as spiritt*rl. Thc prrrlippine chinese were very generous in their m()netary crlntrihrrtion to the 1

chinese government. They d.nated m()ney, nraterials and rnanpower. By the beginning of 1932, they had raised a sum of $250,000 [sic] for "any pr.jecr irr connecri.. wirh nationar sarvation," and anorher $400,000 [sic] for General Ma Zhanshan (Ma Chan-shan), the defender of Manchuria. From l93l to l9jl, a sum .f m.re than $2,000,000 [sic] was collected for fl.od relief, for the Ninereenth R.ute Army in defending Shanghai, anlunreers fighting against the Japanese in Manchuria and Jehol.sa After the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese War in 19J2, about 500,000 pesos were senr ro China every monrh by the philippine Chinese. Fr.m then t. 1939, a rotal contribution tf 12,000,000 pesos was recorded.55 According to another source, a t.tal sum of 7,852,899.85 pesos was collecred by the philippine Chinese berween July 1937 and May 1939.56 Fund-raising campaigns of vari.rus kinds were held, the mosr rypical of which was the contriburion ro an air force fund for china's air defense. By

The Chinese Community in the Philippines

giving 100,000 pesos, which was the cost of a war plane, a dtlnor could designate the type of plane to be bought and have the donor's name inscribed on it. Leading Chinese businessmen and many commercial and social associations participated in the cam' paign enthusiastically.5T Donations also took the form of sending materials to China. The materials ranged from airplanes and vehicles to fooC, clothing and medicine. The Philippine Chi' nese ranked first among the Chinese communities in Southeast Asia in their average contribution to the Chinese war chest. Tabte 6 shows the average contribution of the Southeast Asian Chinese communities during the three years after 1937. The unit was in Chinese currency (yuan).58 Tabte

6

Average contribution of the Southeast Asian Chinese communities to the Chinese war chest, 193740.

Country

Number of

Averag,e monthly

Average per capita

Chinese

contribution

(yuan)

(yuan)

Philippines Malaya Burma

Netherlands lnd ies Annam

140,000 2,3s0,000

4s0,000 1,600,000 450,000

700,000 4,200,000 540,000 't,600,000 200,000

5.0 "t.75

1.2 1.0 0.5

In addition,

manpower was an important contrihution of the Philippine Chinese to the Chinese war effort. After the outbreak of Sino-Japanese conflict in Shanghai in 1932, a military drill team was organized by the Chinese community in Naga,

Camarines, training able-bodied Chinese to serve their motherland. Of the 152 overseas Chinese forming the Sixty-first Division of the Nineteenth Route Army, whlch resisted the Japanese in Shanghai, five came frorn the Philippines.5e After 1937, more Chinese went back to China to join either the Nationalist Arrny of the Guomindnng or the Eighth Route Army

24

The Huaqiao Warriors

and New Fourth Army under the Communisrs. Many also returned to China to serve in the medical units, or as aviators and truck drivers.6o The spiritual support of the Philippine Chinese ro the Chinese Nationalist governmenr was eqrrally noticeable. After 1937, in addition to the numerous mass rallics, rhere was an influx of memorials and petitions into the Chir-rese Nationalist government, calling for a united effort tcl resist the Japanese. Wang Jingwei's defection from the Nationalist g()vernmenr aroused much fury in the Philippine Chinese. Even befirre Wang's proJapanese government was established in Nanjing on March 30, 1940, a "Punish the Traitor \7ang Committee" was formed and messages were sent to China to denounce him. Moreover, goodwill missi.ns were sent to china from time to time to sLrow the support of the Philippine Chinese. A large scale movement to boycott Japanese goods was launched in the islands in early 1938, which was intensified in 1939, although there was much difficulty in the implementarion of the regulati.ns and some chinese merchants hesitated tcr boycott Japanese goods because of the detrimental effect on their commercial interests.6l

Despite its small size, rhe Philippine Chinese communiry contributed significantly to the overseas chinese anri-Japanese salvation movement. Several factors accounted for this. Firstly, they had grearer senrimenral link with China than their counterparts in other Sclutheast Asian countries due to geographical proximity, the frequent travel to and from China, and the fact that the majority of them belonged to the first generation clf immigrants. Secondly, on average they were relatively wealthier than their counrerparts in other southeast Asian countries, which enabled them to contribute more to the war chest. Finally, the sympathetic attiude of the American and Philippine authorities was alsc-r an important factor. After the exposure of Japanese ambition in the early 1930s, the Filipinos were more anti-]apanese than anti-Chinese, and the.. *r, growing Filipino concern over the Japanese threat ro the

Iht,Chinese ( ommunity in the

I'hilipl;int's

)';

Philippines.62Japanese-American relations wt'rt rtl.,, (l('l('rr()t:rlrlrt. The Japanese regarded the Philippines as "a pistol rrirrrt'tl rt lrrprttt's [reart," while the Americans were loading the pisto[."r As:t rt'srtlt,

the American authorities and later the (.lotrtttt,,rtlvt':rlllt governrnent were tolerant towards the Chincse ftrnrl-rrrisrrrg campaigns, boyccltt of Japanese goods and other anti-Jrpiu)('s(' activities in the islands. Compared with the restrictions in tlrt' amount of remittances to China in British Malaya, and the l,rrn on the Chinese fund-raising and boycott activities in Thailantl, the Philippine Chinese were rather free in their activities."a Anyhow, the actual contribution of the Philippine Chinesc to the Chinese war effort is not our main concem. Instead, its repercussion on the Philippine Chinese community is of greater relevance to this study. The anti-Japanese "salvation movement" in the decade before the outbreak of war in the Philippines pushed the patriotism of the Philippine Chinese to a new peak, and linked them more closely with the events in China. They were then well nurtured with hatred of the Japanese, and this sentiment formed the very foundation of the resistance spirit. During the occupation, the Chinese guerrilla members, Ieftist and rightist alike, regarded themselves as fighting for China, and they had the final target of fighting back to China to help the liberation of their motherland when the war in the Philippines was over. The following is found in an open letter of the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force (Hr.ra Zhi) to rhe "Americans and Filipino friends" on their third anniversary (May 19, 1945): Japanese have been practically wiped out of the Philippines, everybody knows that Japanese fascism is far from crushed and that the final battle will take place in China. Because China is our motherland where our people are still suffering under the Japanese yoke, we will not consider our task fulfilled yet after the liberation of the Philippines. We believe and feel that this is the only logical step for us to

Although the

take.65

26

The Huaqiao Warricrs

Similarly, in "A Message on July 7 to Our American Comin the Phiiippines (CVP) a rightist Chinese gtrerrilla force, made the following appeal: rades in Arms," the Chinese Vohrnteers

Befcre Japan's unconditional surrcndcr, our duty will not end yet. Our task still lies ahead. Under rhe leadership of General Douglas MacArthur, let us stand on (]hina or strike on ro Tokyo! There we still have millions of peoplc groaning under

the Japanese

heels.66

Nationalism or parochial loyalty? The Chinese resistance movement could not be purely motivated by an urge to fight for China. It is more appropriate to regard Fujian province rather than China as the "motherland" of the Phihppine Chinese. It had been nored that about 85 per cent of the Chinese in the Philippines were Fukienese, anC geographical proximity to Fujian enabled them ro be more sojouming than the other Southeast Asian Chinese communities. Throughout the years, close ties were maintained between the Philippine Chinese and their home province. Since the turn of the cenrury, the Philippine Chinese were gerring more and more involved in

Fujian provincial politics. After the death of Yuan Shikai in 1916, the collapse of authority resulted in social disorder and economic dislocation in many provinces, including Fujian, where the tea and lacquer industries suffered. In response to this, the Fukienese in the islands organized the Nanyang Overseas Chinese Fujian Salvation Association (Nanyang minqiao jiuxianghui) in 1924, and the Fookien Times was founded in 1926 as an organ for the promotion of the movemenr with the financial support from wealthy Chinese merchants in the Philippines.6T Then in 1933, when a group of generals of the Ninereenrh Route Army, which was famous for its resistance against the Japanese in Shanghai in 1932, organized a "people's govemment" and declared Fujian independent from the National governnrent at Nanjing,

lE-

The Chinese Community in the Philippines

27

the Philippine Chinese demonstrated their sympathy and pro' vided financial support. This can partly be explained by the fact that the Nineteenth Route Army had been waging an active bandit-suppression campaign and managed to restore order in southem Fujian since the army was transferred from Shanghai in the spring of 193i.68 The forceful suppression of the secessionist movement and the bombing of Quanzhou, the hometown of most Philippine Chinese, by the National government by the end of 19-13 was ill-received in the Philippine Chinese community.6e In view of the response of the Philippine Chinese towards these events in China, the nationalist spirit of the Philippine Chinese could probably be regarded as parochial loyalties. This was well demonstrated by the following quotation from an antiJapanese pronouncement by the Chinese in the Philippines in t937: Now is the tirne for national salvation. Now is equally the time for village saivation . . . N{anchuria, Tientsin, Shanghai will fall into the whirlpool of Japanese domination. Fukien is only a short distance from Taiwan . . . Japan's construction of Kaoshiung since 1919 as a naval base rvas designed for the occupation of Fukien . . . We must clevote our effort to the uational salvation movement but it is equally important that we assume the responsibiliry of saving Fukien.?o

One should not neglect the possibility that over the years rlrc Philippine Chinese community might have developed into ;r separate entity of its own, inclining neither towards assimilatron with the native community n.rr towards integration into ( llrrnese political structure. This coincides with Blaker's view tlr:rt "nationalism and assimilation are obviously two important ,lrnrensions in the life of the overseas community, but the cenlrirl lactor appears to be the view of the overseas residents that tlr,'y ure distinct from both the Chinese and Filipinos."Tl "fherefore, there emerge.J another possible source of resist,rrrt t'spirit that the Phiiippine Chirrese migl-rt be fighting frrr -*

t

28

lhe fluaqiao Warriors

themselves. Here three possible incentives cotrl.l be explored.

Politically, could the Philipplne Chinese parriciparion in the resistanCe movgmaa, he interprete.] as a m('lu)s to gtrin 1r'qlrgnition as citizens of the host country? Evidently rro rrttempt had

been made on the side of the Philippine govcnrrnt.rrr afrer rhe Second World War to assimilate this alien gr()up llrr,,rrgh legal

means until Marcos' presidency. A more intcrcst ing phenomenon was that there was little effrrrt.n rhc sitlc.l rhe (lhinese to seek modification clf citizenship l^ws u.tl p,racri.es .fter the

war.

It

trade

in

the

was

not until the enactment .f Filipiniz:rti.n of retail

1954, followed by a number.f nari..alizati.n hills under Magsaysay administration, that there was a noticeable in-

crease in application for naturalization.?l Even after Marcos proclaimed his policy of assimilation ar rhe beginning of the first elected term of the presidenr of rhe Republic of the philippines in 1966. there was only ltrkewarm response from the local Chinese population. In a survey conducted by Pacho in 1925, in which 580 ethnic Chinese were inrerviewed on their preferences if the acquisition of Philippine citizenship was made easier for them, 46.9 per cent favoured electing Philippine citizenship; 16.6 per cent did not; while 36.5 per cenr beLrnged to the ,,don,[ know" or "no response" category. Pacl-r,r concluded that uncertainty and ambivalence exisred among the ethnic Chinese in the Philippines, and what they really desireci was residency rarher than citizenship.Tl The hehaviour of the Phitippine Chinese in the citizenship issue in the postwar years indicated that their participation into the resistance movement could not have been motivated by the desire to seek recognition from the Philippine govemment as citizens of the Republic.

Economically, could the resistance spirit emerge from the fear of the Japanese challenge ro rhe posirion of the Chinese in the Philippinesl There is no doubt that Japanese economic penetratiorr iirto the islands in the 19J0s threatened the economic interest of the Cl-rinese there, especially after the detrimental effect of the boycott of the Japanese goods since 1931. In the decade of the 1930s, the Japanese population in the philippines

Ihe Chinese Community in the ['hililtltirtt':

29

almost doubled to about 30,000. By l()i(), 1,r1,r1111'1;g ilrrtrrigrants exceeded Chinese for the first time in I)lrili1,1,inc history.'r Chinese boycotts of Japanese goods in the errrly l9l0s l,,rct'd the Japanese to build up their own retail traclc organizatiotr. ln spite of the boycott, Japanese imports into the islancls increasctl hy 25 per cent from 1932 tct 1937, and a large portion t.lf thcse im' ported goods were handled by Japanese retailers.T5 At the height of their influence, the Chinese were said to control 80 to 90 per cebt of the retail trade of the islands, but in the mid-1930s, the Chinese share of the retail trade and the marketing of rice fell to about 65 per cent.76 Furthermore, the Japanese alst't maintained close relations with some Filipino officials such as Jose Laurel, Pedro Sabido, and even President Quezon.iT In spite of all these threats to the econ,.rmic prces were put in a file under ttre name of Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Corps (File 105, Box 12l).5 The reports on the activities of the leftist guerrilla teams were all the works of the guerrilla leaders. The most detailed accounts were Huang Jie's (Huang Chieh's) "General Summary of Wha Chi (Hua Zhi) Activities," Wang Xixiong's (Ong Se Siclng's) "History of the Three Years of Anti-Japanese Guerilla Warfare of the Vlah Chi (Wha-Chi, or HuaZhi)," and "A Bricf Report on the Activities of the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteers [sic] Corps," which was presumably written by the leader of the team itself. A11 these were reports to the American authorities when the war was over. Besides, a monograph abotrt

the Philippine Chinese AntiJapanese Guerrilla Forces was published in Hong Kong in 1980." There are also two souvenir issues published by the Wha Chi Veterans Metropolitan Manila Post on its fbrtieth and forty-fifth anniversaries in 1982 and 1987 respectively.i Articles about the Ieftist resistance movement are also found in the academic joumals published in mainland China in the 1980s and the four issues of Yanlnihong (Tricolor Amaranth), which is a publication

lL

L

The Leftist Chinese Guerrilla Forces

79

of the Guangzhou Feilubin gwiqiao Lionyihui (Guangzhou Friendly Association of Returned Philippine Chinese). The only non' Chinese literature which gives much positive confirmation of the leftist Chinese resistance movement is Luis Taruc's Bom of the People.s The following accor-rnt of the history of the leftist resistance forces is based on the information from these materials.

Several leftist Chinese resistance forces were engaged in military and non-military activities during the Japanese occupa' tion. There were two main guerrilla outfits engaging in military activities in the mountainous area. The dominant one was known the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force (Feilubin hua4iao langn zhidur), usually abbreviated as the Hua Zhi (!7ha Chi, or Wah Chi). The other one, which was closely linked with the Hu Zhi, was known as the Philippine Chinese AntiJapanese Volunteer Corps (Feilubin huaqiao kangri chujian yiyongdui), usually abbreviated as Kang Chu, or PCAJVC' At the same time, another leftist organization known as the Philippine Chinese Anti-japanese and Anti-Puppets League (Feilubin hw4iao kangrl fanjian dntongmeng), usually abbreviated as the KongFan, was responsible for the underground activities in rhe cities. All these emerged from the prewar Chinese leftist move' ments , in the islands centering around the Philippine Chinese as

United 'Workers' Union. Close cooperation was maintained among these bodies, and the Chinese leftist resistance move' ment was best noted for its unity and coordination.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Philippine Chinese United 'Workers' Union together with some other Chinese leftist anti-Japanese organizations formed the Anti-Japanese and Chinese-Protection Committee (Kangri huqiao weiyuanhui), with Xu Jingcheng as the chairman. Petitions were sent to President Quezon, rhe High Commissioner Sayre, and to General MacArthur, requesting to join the United States Army Forces in the Far East (USAFFE). A l7artime Service Corps was set up, ready to serve the Fil-American army.e Before they set ol{, Manila was declared an open city and the Fil'American troops were all withdrawn.lo

B0

the Huaqiao Warriors

A decision was made conceming the salt ry of the anti-Japanese activists in Manila. On Decernl,e r 25, 1941, the Anti-Japanese and Chinese-Protection Conrrrrir ree passed a resolution to evacuate them and their families, rorrrlling about 400 persons, from Manila. The evacuation took lrotli the southem

and northern routes. Wang Xixiong led .,nt' gr'()up, which was mainly composed of women, children and rh.' oltl, sorrth to Paete, Laguna. On the other hand, Xu Jingcheng :rrr,l ( )hcn Cunsheng led another group north to Bulacan. Huang it' rrntl Cai Jianhua also led the military rrainees of the \Tarrirnc Scrvicrc Corps into San Femando, Pampanga, where they corrrinrrctl their military training.lr All those who evacuated to centrrrl l-rrzon were young and able-bodied men. With the help of the KI,MI,,r2 they settled temporarily at Mandili, Candaba, Pampangrr.r' Ilere they encountered the Japanese rroops on March ), l94Z and fought .f

their first skirmish, killing and wounding sixry-rwo

Japanese,

capturing three. This stimulated Japanese re rlrli,rion. Later these Chinese evacuees in central Luzon had t,, rcrrear further into Mount Arayat, Pampanga, when the Japanesc started to mop up the guerrillas in Bulacan.ra Immediately after the evacuarion from Manila, the AntiJapanese and Chinese-Protection Committee was reconstituted as the Emergency Action Committee (Feichong shiqi xingdang weiyrnnhui). By the end of January 1942, a shorr-rerm political and military training course was held for the cadres selected. The training consisted of fcrur parts. The fir$r parr was on how to organize a team. The instructors were Luo Lishi and Guo Jian. The second parr was on the United Front policy. The instructor was Xu Jingcheng. The third part was on rhe political work of the army. The instructor was Guo Jian. All these were held at Mandili. The fourth parr was on guerrilla racrics, which was held on Mount Arayat. The instructor was Huang jie. The training course lasted for one month.l5 On February 15, 1942, Xu ]ingcheng called an emergency conference of the top leaders. An overall blueprint was laid down. Firstly, they were ro assist the Filipino iaborers and peas-

l-

-

The Leftist Chinese Guerrilla Forces

8t

ants to organize an anti-Japanese force. Secrll.lly, lltt'y rvt'tt' to organize underground activities in Manila, central rttrtl sotrlltt'ttt Luzon, the Bicol region, Iloilo, Cebu, Samar antl (lrt:tlrrrto.r'' Finally it was also determined that the majority ol thc (llrirrt'st' who had evacuated frorn Manila would return, as the silttlttiott

there had already stabilized. To implemenr the above pcllicies, the trainees of the (lrrtlrt' Training Course were divided into three groups. The first grotrp remained in central Luzon to assist the Filipino peasant association to organize armed resistance. The second group returned t() Manila to organize underground activities there. (As a result, the Philippine Chinese Anti-iapanese and Anti-Puppets Leagues were formed in Manila, southem and central Luzon in March.) The third group was sent to the southern islands, namely Cebu, Panay and Mindanao, to contact the local Chinese leftist antiJapanese organizations. From April to June, anti-Japanese and anti-collaboration activities were organized in Cebu, Iloilo and Cotahato.rT

The Philippine Chinese Anti-fapanese Guerrilla Force The first group which remained in central Luzon formed the hackbone of the HruZhi later. On March 29,1947, the Philippine People's Anti-Japanese Army (Hukbo Ng Bayan Laban sa Ilapon, usually known as the Hukbalahap, or simply the Huk) was frrrmed under Luis Taruc. These Chinese members merged

it. The Hukbalahap was composed of six squadrons

and there were seven or eight Chinese members in each squadron.ls l{owever, as many of them did not know the local language, it was difficult ro communicate with the Filipino members. Therefirre, they decided to create a separate Chinese guerrilla team. intc'r

On May 19,1942, the Philippine Chinese Anti-Japanese Guerrilla Force (Hm Zhi) was established, which was designated as Squadron 48 of the Hukbalahap (this designation came from the

B2

The Huaqiao Warriors

abbreviation of the New Fourth Army and Eighth Roure Army in China).re Huang Jie was the Chief Commrrnder; Cai Jianhua was the political instructor, while Chen Ctrnsheng and Wang Xixiong were the Chiefs of Staff.2o The history of the Hua Zhi from May 1942 twn anriJapanese resistance movement.

A

The Huaqiao Warriors

172

Their advice was often rt.sistcd by Vicente Lava, who was then our general secretary, irnrl l,y rnyself. Ir seemed to us that this advice was always relatcrl to Ohinese mainland interests rarher than Philippine inrcresls. First, they advised us to lmlrck rlrc .fapanese relentlessly. Although we did so, we suspeo(,(l tlr:rr rheir morives were chauvinistic, that their main concerrr wls wirh the battle then going on in China. It seemed to us thul rl.rey viewed our struggle only as a diversionary acri()n. lUhen our fight resulted in a fierce Japancsc c()unter-attack and we suffered heavy casualties, they switchecl to a defensive strategy, urging us to hide our guns ancl retum to our barrios. They sent most of the members of their own organization home to China. They called this policy "rerrear for

in the field refused ro pur ir inro action. !7e had great respect for the Chinese comrades. But when we realized the extent of their chauvinism and selfinterest, our respecr quick-ly diminished.?7 defense." But the Filipinos

Similarly, on the Chinese side, the friendship and cooperation between the two peoples were seldom mentioned in postwar publications, especially in those of the Guominltng veteran associations. Instead, conflicts and hostilities were depicted from time to time. The following is an example of the conflict between the CVP and the Marking's guerrilla force mentioned in an article in one of the CVP souvenir issues: Once we put up our flag [of the Republic of China] on an old building. lX/hen the members of Marking's force saw it, they threatened us to take it down immediately. I thought that this was a matter of national honor, and we should nc,t make any concession. Finally we got our way.i8

Agairr it was only in the leftist publications that the warrime friendship between the Filipinos and Chincse was given grearer weight, probably because the Hun Zhi had cooperated closely

I

lmpact on tht' l'hilippine Chinese

Comnunity

with the Hrrklrulrrlrrrp, rrn.l lived on the hospitality of

17 ,

tl-re Phr[-

ippine pe,r1rlc. Art rclt's like "Zhon{ei renmin xiu'txue ningcheng di you1i" rf .ii: \l(iIr[illLi'i,i/,tll!r"r'L (The Sino-Filipino Friendship ccmented with bkrod) hy Ilrrang Jie , the Chief Commander of the ,kIAEA Hua Zhi, arrd "Yongyuztn huairLian zhou ni -'yineng"' (l Ye Eli]l iftfiL miss you, my Filipino rnother) by Jing were found in the souvenir issue of the 45th anniversary of thc Hua Zhi.7e However, the cowardice and inexperience of the Filipino guerrilla members were sometimes satirized in the leftist publications. In Liang Shangyuan and Cai Jianhua's monograph on the Chinese leftist resistance force in the Plrilippines, the following description about the first assault by the Hukbalahap is found: "The Filipino comrades were so inexperienced," a Cantonese guerrilla member recounted. "They were blowing a trumpet during marching, and all the villagers were awakened . . !0hen we were getting near to our target, the enemy shot and we exchanged fire. Two Filipino members could not find any shelter in a hurry, and they just hid behind the Chinese guerrilla members, using the bodies of the Chinese members as shelters

.

."80

So fighting on the same side against the common enemy fcrr three years did not create any sense of brotherhood between the Filipinos and Chinese. One explanation is the fact that with the exception of the leftist resistance activities, cooperation between the Chinese and Filipino guerrilla fcrrces was slender, as most of these Chinese guerrillas stayed in the city and worked urrderground. !7hile friendshii-r did develop among the Chinese and Filipinos fighting on the leftist side, it was too weak t..r influence the general attitude of the two peoples, especially in an antiClommunist atrnosphere in rhe Philippines in the postwar period. Another explanation is that the significance of the Chinese resistance movement was barely noticeahle in a hackgrorrnd of widespread resistancc agninst thc )rrprrnese' in the Philippirics, in which the Chinese only piayed a srnallpart. The Philippincs was

)L

174

Iltt Hu,tqiao

Warriors

known as the "problem child" in the vast firl)irn('sc Lirnpire during the Pacific War. Culturally more attaclrt'rl ro tlrt'West, and with a definite promise of independence h1, l().|(r rrtcording to the Tydings-McDuffie Act passed by the Lj.S. ( i,,rr1grt'ss in March 1934, the Filipinos were hostile to the Oricnt:rl ( (),)(lucr()rs frr)m the beginning. The Japanese cruelry to thc 1,,..;rl l,t',,p[e caused much humiliation and hatred. Theodore Frit'rr,l ,,,rrrnre nted that "thc Philippinc sccne, witlrin a ycar ol cflt', llvr',,r( ul)irti()n, was one of a steady level of espionage, sab