The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73 9789814376518

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The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies

Established as an autonomous corporation in May, 1968, the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies is a regional research centre for scholars and other specialists concerned with modern Southeast Asia. The Institute's research interests are focussed on the many-faceted problems of Modernization and Development and Political and Social Change in Southeast Asia. The Institute is governed by a 24~member Board of Trustees on which are represented the University of Singapore and Nanyang University, appointees from the Government, a~ well as representatives {(om a broad range of professional and civic organizations and groups. A ten-man Executive Committee oversees day-to-day operations; it is ex officio chaired by the Director. the Institute's chief academic and administrative officer.

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Singapore Copyright Act (Cap. 187). No person shall reproduce a copy of this publication, or extracts therefrom. without the written permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore."

The Growth of the Malayaian Armed Fo rces, 196 3- 7 3 Some Foreign Press React i o ns

by

Chandran Jeahurun

Occasional Paper No. 35 Inat itute o f SoutheASt Aslan Studies Price:

S$ •• 00

Dr. Chandran Jeshurun's "The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces, 1963-73: Some Foreign Press React.1ons" is the th1rty-fifth publication in the Inst1tute's Occas1onal Papers series. This series was inaugurated in 1970 and for the most part consists of d1scussion and other papers presented at the Institute's Occasional and In-House seminars. Grow1ng out of a larger research proJect currently in progress, Dr. Chandran ' s survey of foreign , especially British, press reactions to the growth of Malaysia's armed forces should be of cons1derable 1nterest to students of Malaysian m1l1tary affairs. Perhaps even more 1mportant, let's hope it will stimulate further work along these l1nes, and also on such other 1ssues as the role of armed forces in national pol1tical , economic , and social development , in In Malays1a as well as th e other countries of the region. the meant1me, wh1le wishing Dr. Chandran and h1s study all the best , 1t 1s clearly understood that respons1b1lity for facts and op1n1ons expressed 1n the work that follows rests exclus1ve ly with Dr. Chandran and his interpretat1ons do not necessarily reflect the views or policy of the Institute or its supporters.

18 September 1975

D1rector Institute of Southeast As1an Studies

Acknowledgements The research for this paper was done in London in 1974 wh1le I was Corr~onwealth Visiting Academic Fellow at the Department of War Studies , King's College , University of London . I should like to express my gratitude to the Association of Commonwealth Univers1ties for the award of the Fellowship. I am grateful for facilities made available at the Press Library, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, and at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London. I should also like to acknowledge the comments made on an earlier version of this paper by Dr. Peter Lvon, Senior Lecturer in Commonwealth Studies, Institute of Commonwealth Stud1es, London, although I take full responsibility for the contents of this paper.

The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces , 1963-73: Some Fore~gn Press React~ons

The role of the armed forces in the political evolution of the emerging nations of Southeast Asia is a subject of grow~ng pronanence ~n the study 9f the recent history of the reg ion. Few generalizations about 'that role, however , have been possible due to the different ways in which the m il ~tary has actually participated in the political processes of particular count r ies , Nevertheless, it is eminently clear from some o f the most able accounts of the r ise of the m~litarv in Southeast Asia that the personal role of ~nd~vidual leaders was a vital element in the political predominance of the armed forces as a whole.l There are, of course , those countries in wh~ch the military has remained 1nconspicuously in the background of political change, however much ind~v~dua l members of the armed fo r ces might have been pol~ticized dur~ng the struggle for independe nce. Of these, the armed forces in Malaysia certainly occupy an un~que posit~on ~ n that not. even the embryonic elements of the early Malay r egiments appear to have played a n active role in the pre- Independence nationalist movements. Consequently , ~t has been very much an axiom of the recent pol~t~cal history of Malaysia that, just as its governmental

1

For a general

introduct~on

to the subje ct , see J . J. Johnson, ed.,

The Role of the Military in Under-deve loped Countries , Pr i nceton, 1962; H. Daalder, The Role of the Military in 'the Emerging Countries , ' s - Gravenhage , 1969; Jacques van Doorn, ed . , Military ~ofesa~on and ~litary Regimes: Commitments and Conflicts , The Hague, 1969 ; Lucten W- Pye, "Armies in the Proces s of Pol i uc.a l Modermzation," European Journal of Socia. logy (Paris) , Vol. II , No . 1, 1961, pp . 89-92 . Among more detailed case studie s, see Daniel S . Lev , " The Political Role of the Army in IndoneHa , " Paeific Affairs (Vancouver ) , VoL XXXVI, Winter 1963 /6 4, pp. 349- 364 ; John P. Lovell and C. I. Eugene Kim, "The Military and Po lit ic.al Change in As i a," Pacific Affairs, VoL XL, SpringSummer 1967 , pp . 113-123; Roger Paget. , "The Mihtary in Indonesian Poli t1es: The: Burden oi Power," Pacnf1-C Affai rs, Vol . XL, Fall - Winter, l967t68, pp . 294-314; J. Stephen Hoad ley 1

The Future of Portuguese Timor : Oc.cas~onal

Paper No , 27, Singap ore, i. 9 7 5

Dilemmas and Opportunities,

Inst~t.ute

of Southeast. Asian

Stud~es ,

- 2 -

system drew its inspirati on from a Westminster model, too, the place of the armed forces with i n that system adapted according to Bri tish precedents . The factors have contributed to this singular character of the Malaysian armed forces could v ery well form the basis a separate study.

so, was that of

Malays i a i s possibly one of the few examples of an independent nation in post-war Southeast Asia which laid a somewhat l i mited emphasis on nat i onal defence planning during its format i ve years. Apart from the fact that its independence was a relatively recen t event (the independent Federation of Malaya carne ~nto being in 1957 and Malaysia only in 1963 ) , the country's external defence was assured by the Anglo-Malayan (Malaysian after 1963) Defence Agreement (AMDA).2 Internally, however, during the early years of its independence, the country continued to face the threat posed by the Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) although the remnants of the CPM's guerilla forces had been dr~ven out ~nto the relatively inaccessible regions of the Thai-Malaysian border by 1960. This prevailing securi ty situation, therefore, ensured that the strength of the armed forces was ma i ntained, albeit at a more nominal level compared to the peak of the communist insurrection, known as the Emergency (1948-60). The major element of the armed forces, however, continued to be made up of the Army and the para-military units of the Police and neither the Navy nor the Ai r Force was appreciably developed in the i mmediate post-Independenc3 period. The imminent formation of the new Federation of Malaysia in 1963 and the international . crisis that it provoked in the form of Indonesia's Confrontation policy inevitably resulted in greater attention being paid to the question of Malaysia's defence needs. Although Confrontation itself was the kind of hypothetical scenario for which the Angl o -Malayan Defence Agreement had been designed, the vastly extended national boundaries, particularly in the Borneo states, and the increased dangers of internal subversion necessitated an immediate physical expansion of the country's armed forces. The very process of the formation of Malays i a had generated sufficient political differences between the Malayan Government and the new member states that p oi nted to the 2

For a comprehensive account of the Anglo-Malayan (Malaysian) Defence Agreement see D. Hawkins, The Defenoe of Malaysi a and Si ngapor e : From AMDA to ANZUK, London, 197 2 .

-

3 -

likelihood o f new dangers to the internal security s ituation. This coupled with th e firm intention of the central government to bear the brunt of the country 's immediate defence needs independently of the Commonwealth defence umbrella meant that there would have t o be adequate forces properly equipped to deal with any emergency . The separation of Singapore from the Federation in 1965 and the end of Confrontation in the following year do not appear to have altered the basic premises on which the Malaysian armed forces were built up i n the post-1963 period. Whereas the concept of maintaining i nternal security and coping with what was then described by the then Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defen ce , Tun Abdul Razak , as the "close defence"3 of the country was a viable o ne s o long as the AMDA deterrent remained, the situation was drastically changed by the British Labour Government's decision 1n 19 68 to withdraw . militarily from east of Suez by the mid- 1970 s with a much firmer date being eventually fixed as 1971. 4 The politics of the actual withdrawal, which had begun in the Borneo states as early as in 1966, together with the ambiguous nature of the alternative defence arrangements that were supposed to replace AMDA,S seem t o have been largely responsible for the Malaysian Government adopting a more independent approach towards the devel o pment of the armed forc e s . It is , needless to say, impo ssible to determine precisely how much of the new think ing ab o ut the country ' s defence needs was due to

3

Par Ziamen~ary Deba~ s ,

Dewan Ra 'ayat , Vol. v, No . 4 , 29 May

1963, col s . 494-495. 4

See Ph ili p Darby , British Def enoe PoLioy East of SUea, 1947- 1968, London, 1973; N. Brown , Briti s h Arms and Stra tegy, 197D-80, London, 1969 , Chapter 2 ; L W. Martin , British De fence PoZ icy: The Long RecessionaL, Adelphl Paper no. 61 , Lond on, 1969; Hawkins , De fence of MaLays ~a and Singapore , Chapter III. For a somewhat spirited a ccount of a poasible earlier Malaysian reac tion to continued military dependence on Britain, see Dav id C. Hawkins, "Britain and Malays i a - An other View: Was the De c ision t o Withdraw Entirely Voluntary or Was Britai n Pushed a Little~" Asi an Survey (Be rk eley) , Vol. IX, No . 7 , July 1969, pp. 546-562.

5

Chin Kin Wah , The Five Power Defeno6 Arrangements and AMDA: Some Observati ons on the NatMre of an EvoLving Partnership, Oc c asi onal Paper No. 23 , Ins titute of Southeast Asian Studies , Singap ore , 19 74.

- 4 -

purely m1l1tary influence or the result of a fresh assessment of foreign pol1cy goals and the potent1al~t1es of the domest1c s1tuat1on . Suffice to add that there had always been a certain lack of enthusiasm for AMDA among Malayan/Malaysian political c1rcles which was expressed in an extremely truculent form by sections of the United Malays National Organ1zation CUMNO) component of the ruling All1ance Party when the Br1t1sh announced their decision to withdraw mil1tarily from the region . Admi~tedly , these pressures by themselves are unlikely to have accounted for the continued expansion of the Malays1an armed forces and it 1s quite conceivable that much more significant was the growing uncertainty in the international relations of the region which was signalled by the Sino- American rapprochement and the gradual disengagement of the Un1ted Staces from the V1etnarn War. These trends severely limited the defence and foreign policy options o~en to small nations in Southeast Asia such as It is also very likely that , just as the Malaysia ~ Malaysian proposal in 1970 for the neutralization of Southeast Asia was typical of the response to the new s1tuation, the creat1on of a credible defence force was its irres1stible corollary. However, Malaysia ' s efforts to beef up her armed forces in anticipation of the onerous burden of self - reliance in defence matters has attracted a certain amount of adverse publicity outside the country . A n umber of domestic issues and changes in multilateral defence arrangements have , to some extent, clouded most interpretations of the growth of the Malaysian armed forces over the ten- year period , 1963 - 73. Of these, undoubtedly the afte rmath o f the May 1969 post- election racial disturbances i n Kuala Lumpur and various parts of Peninsular Malaysia has t ended to colour many opin1ons as to the desir ability fo r a small country such as Malaysia to concentrate her r esources in bu1lding up her mili~ary strength.?

6

Milton E. Osborne, "Post Vietnam: The End of an Era in Southeast As~a?" , Internar;iona~ Affairs (London), Vol . 45, No. 2, April 1969, pp. 223-233 ; W.A.C. Adie , "Possibilit i es for Reg~onal Defence in the Post- Vietnam Era ," Revue du Sud-Est Asia·tique et de Z 'Extreme- Orient (Brussels), 1970/7 2, pp. 139-150; i-'e t e r Lyon , "Reorientations ~n Southeast Asia , ANZUK and After," Round Table (London>, No. 246 , April 19 72, pp . 231-239 .

7

Expenditure on defence and internal se curity formed 21.8% of the budget in 1973 . See Malaysia, The Expenditure Budget of the Federal, Government~ 1913 ~ Kuala Lumpur, 1973, p . vii .

- 5 -

In the~r most extreme form , ·~hese c..omments have bluntly predicted that the rapid and massive expansion o~ the Army in pa~t~cular would lead ultimately to a m1litary and, by lmplication, Malay pol1t~cal hegemony. 8 Not unexpectedly , too, the Malays1an response to the gradual phasing out of the Commonwealth defence role in Malays1a and S~ngapore provoked a somewhat qu e stioning react1on from those quarters wh1ch had traditlonally been accustomed to the v~ew tha~ ne~ther Malaysia nor s~ngapore would ever be ab l e t o ma1ntain the~r own 1ndependent forces . Far from surveying t h e ent~re range of op i n~ons expressed about the growth o f the Malaysian armed forces, it i s the aim of this paper to focus largely on the reaction of the Brit~sh press ~n part1cular and the apparent response of Malays1an off1c1a l c 1rcles as a possible backdrop for the overt steps taken by the Malaysian Government to expand the armed for c es . As th~s paper ~s ~ntended to be an exam~nation of the react1on of the Brit~sh press ~o the evolution of Malaysian defenc e pol~cy dur~ng the ten- year period 1963-73 , it is necessary at the very outset to establish that the strength of the armed forces has, ~n fact , increased during those years , H~therto, most references to Malays~a ' s defence capabil~ty have merely alluded to the apparent increase ~n numbers , particularly of the Army, w~thout spe cif~ca l l y ~nd~cating the areas ~n which growth has taken place or attempt~ng to trace the stages of expansion . 9 There ~s no doubt that ~n sheer numbers alone the strength of the armed forces has ~ncreased enormously from about 22,000 men 1n 1963 to probably more than 60,000 by 1973.10 8

See espe cially, Peter Simms, "A Quiet Coup 1.n Kuala Lumpur," Life Mbgasine, Asia Ed . (Tokyo), 21 July 1969; Felix V. Gagliano, CommunaL VioLen oe i n MaLaysia 1969: The Po hti oa L Afterma. c ~, Papers in lnternat1.onal Studies, Southeast As1a Series no . l3, Athens, Ohio, 1971, Repnnt, pp . 34-35 .

9

Hawkins, De f enoe of MaLaysia and Si"'gapo.re , Chapter IV: Communa L Vi o L6noe ~n Ma Laysi a, pp. 34-3S -

10

Gagliano,

See Table I. The latter figure, 1.t ~ust be stressed, is widely quoteci among non-Malaysian sources though offi c1.al Malaysian fig urer. fall far short of the alleged 60 ,000. In April 1971 9 for example, t he Malayr.ian Ch i ef of the Genera l Staff l.S reported to have stated that the total strength of the regul ar f or ces would be 38 , 000 wh,e n devel opment p l ans were finally cotrplered. Bawk~ns, Defenoe o f Ma Lausi a and S~ngapore, p . 61, als o ~ au t1.on s aga1.nst treating any of the est i mates as reliab l e .

- 6 -

Wh1le the Army itself accounts for almost four-fifths of this total, the rate of expans1on of both the Navy and the Air Force has been even more impressive . The latter Services have evolved dramatically from their original roles as m1nor support w1ngs i n the armed forces into independent and v1able units performing certain essential functions within the overall defence strategy. The question has thus been ra1sed as to the strategic rationale behind the growth of the Malaysian armed forces and it is hoped to gain some 1dea of the motives in defence planning by tracing the various stages of growth. In order to keep a study such as this in its proper perspect1ve it would be also useful to begin with a brief survey o f the background of political and diplomat1c change since 1963 . Undoubtedly, as has been pointed out , the format1on of Malaysia 1n that year and Indonesia ' s Confrontat1on policy were events wh1ch necessitated the formulation of a more comprehensive policy towards national security. Although this resulted immediately in muchpublicized steps to increase the strength of various elements of the armed forces, fundamental changes were, however, precluded by the fact of continued dependence on Brit1sh defence assistance ~ It was not until the British announcement of a military withdrawal from east of Suez in 1968 that more pos1tive steps appear to have been taken by the Ma~ysian Government to rev1ew its own defence policy . There is , however, something of a lacunae in the available information about specific off1cial dec1sions with regard to the nature of the expansion of the armed forces that was being contemplated between 1968 and the ostensible decline of the concept of five-power Commonwealth defence cooperat1on by 1970. Wh1le this is entirely understandable from the Malaysian Government's security point of view , it 1s , nevertheless, a pity for one is forced to rely mostly on the data compiled by 1nterested 1nternational bodies such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies in analyzing the thinking of Malaysian defence planners , especially in the post- 1969 era. In d1scussing the evolution of Malaysian defence planning it needs to be stressed that throughout the per iod from 1963 until late 1969 the dominating influence in external questions, which only too often involved defence, was that of the then Prime Minister, Tunku Abdul Rahman. Although Tun Ra zak , his deputy, held the defence portfol io since 1957 iv would seem on the basis of the official record itself that his power was more nominal than

- 7 -

real and that the major decis1ons about defence emanated as much from t h e Prime Min1s ter's Department as from the Mini stry of Defence. To some extent this was due to the fact that Razak ' s position was, for most of the period , an inv1dious one 1n that , not only was defence regarded as an adjunct to external relat1ons (or vice versa), a ministry wh1ch was also under the Prime M1nister, but he was also burdened w1th other polit1cally difficult responsib il1ties such as rural development. At the level of the C1v 1l Service h1erarchy , too, the Permanent Secretary of the Min1stry of Defence does not appear to have enJoyed the sen1or1ty and 1nfluence of his colleague in External Affa1rs , for example , who was often directly in touch with the Pr1me Min1ster on matters affect i ng defence policy. It is n ot ent1rely clear what role, 1f any , the high command of the armed forces 1tself played 1n the various phases of defence plann1ng from 1963 to 1973. Confrontatio n undoubtedly provided an unique opportunity for a certain amount of direct m1l1tary influence on defence planning but most probably it was the British military withdrawal which opened up the higher echelons of the command structure to younger members of the sen1or personnel . For obvious reasons, however , 1t 1s impossible to characterize the prec1se nature of the role of this new blood in the plans that were drawn up for the expansion of the armed forces after 1968. The Malays1an Phase As has been e xplained earlier , the imminent formation of the new Federation of Malaysia persuaded even the most pac1fic m1nds in Government of the need to consider some increase in the strength of the armed forces . As Razak stated in Parl1arnent on 29 May 1963: " .•. we have now, as a result of Malays1a, a much bigger area to cover and a much longer coastline to protect; and we have , therefore, to expand our defence forces to look after this area ...• Whatever policy we adopt externally , we must still have enough defence forces, firstly , t o maintain law and order in our country, and seco ndly, to look after the close defence of our country."ll Muc~ earlier 1n the year, Razak

11

Parl i amentary cols. 507-508

Debates ~

Dewan Ra 'ayat l Vol . 1 , No . 4, 29 May 1963 ,

- 8 -

had already spoken publicly of the "substantial expansion" 12 of the armed forces which was formally coufirmed on 23 May in the Royal Address to a joint session of Parliament.l3 In asking for a Supplementar y Vote of M$75 million , Razak outlined some of the details of the proposed expansion. It was intended to 1mmediately set up the 4th Infantry Brigade Headqua rters for the S1ngapore area for which an addit1onal battalion of the Royal Malay Reg1ffient , the 8th , would be formed and there would also be a new Reconnaissan ce Squadron as well as facil1ties for 1ncreased output of officer s and men from the ex1sti ng training establishmen ts. The Navy's strength was to be doubled with the acquisition of its f1rst fr1gate, a coastal minesweeper and 4 fast patrol craft while the Royal Malaysian Air Force (RMAF) was to be shortly suppl1ed with 4 Hand le y Page Da~t Re~ aLa mediumrange transports and 8 Sud-Av 1at1on .' ~oue t te 1 I I helicopters plus a number of other tra1ner a1rcraft. The main emphasis of the 1963 plans was on the sett1ng up of the 4th Infantry Br1gade for th e S1ngapore area , which was begun with the w1thdrawal of the Malays1an contingent from the U. N. Special Force in the Congo, and the provis1on for tactical troop movements to any part of Malaysia in case of e.m ergency . The Army in 1963 comprised 7 infantry battal1ons known as the Royal Malay Reg1ment, 1 regiment each of Reconna1ssan ce and Artillery, and a number of support elements none of which came up to battal1on strength. The m1d-1963 proposals envisaged the immediate raising of a 4th Infantry Brigade 1n the Singapore area by bringing together the cont1ngent sent to the Congo , 2 battalions of the Singapore Infantry Reg1ment and the 8th Battalion of the Royal Malay Reg1ment. By the end of the year , however, plans were set in motion for the establ1shmen t of 2 new Malaysian Ranger battalions with British mil1tary assistance and 1t was expected that the number of brigade formations would be 1ncreased to 5 by 1966.14 Plans tor the RM.AF primar1ly involved the need to ma1nta1n direct supply and trans port commun ications w1th the Bor n eo states and the first of the HP Da r t Rera ld transport planes arrived in

12

The Times (London) , 14

13

ParLiamentary DebateB 1 Dewan

Febr~ary

1963.

Ra 'a~at,

Vol. V, No. 1, 23 May 1963,

col& . 22 , 202 .

14

The Times , 30 December 1963; 1964.

Da~L y

TeLegraph (London ) , 12 February

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November 1963. In August 1963 the RMAF took possess1on of its 12 Sud-Aviation A Zo~ett b I i i helicopters thus giving In July 1964 an order was itself greater air mobility . placed with Vosper Thornycroft for 6 more high-speed patrol boatslS and the Navy ' s first fr1gate was commiss1oned on 2 October at Plymouth . l 6 Th1s was the KD Hang Tuah (KD stands for " Kapal D1raJa" or " His MaJesty 's Shlp ' ) which had see n service in the Second ~vorld War as the HMS Loch Ins h but had undergone an extensive refit. In short , the Razak proposals of 1963 - 64 did not envisage a part1cularly large 1ncrease in the s1ze of the Malaysian armed forces alth ough t:.hey did suggest that the government was aware of t .he urg ency of develop1ng selected areas where they were notab ly weak, espec1ally in the vastly d1fferent security cont:.ext of the new federat:.ion . However, 1n seek1ng the approval of Parliament for increased defence expend1ture in December 1964, Razak d1d expla1n that the government 's pol1cy was on~y to have sufficient armed for ces , fully tra1ned , equ1pped and moblle . l7 On the basis of actual plans 1n the p ~pel1ne at:. that t1me , it would seem that his comment:.s were intended largely to assuage the apprehensions of party supporters in the face Indeed, of several land1ngs by Indones1an infiltrators. no that mean to read be can Parliament 1n his statement anticipated was pol1cy spectacular change in defence although there was much talk of conscript1on of between 12 , 000 and 15, 000 men between the ages of 21 and 2918 and of setting up an ammun1t1ons factory in the country . Apparently , the government had every confidence in meeting an Indones1an mil1tary threat with the armed might of AMDA , the more so as Br1ta1n's huge task force began to assemb le 1n the Malays1an region.l9

15

The Times , 3 July 1964.

16

Ministry of D6fence rRoyaZ Navy) News ReZ.6ase , No. 146/64, London, 25 September 1964; see aiso FZ.i ght lnterna~i onaZ. (London), 15 October 1964 .

17

The Timee , 14 December 1964.

18

The Times , 5 June , 3 July 1964.

19

The

Times ~

1964 .

12 August 1964 ; Sunday Ti mes (London), 13 September-

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The centi:a .... government was not to be disappointed in the publicity value of 1 ts unusual activity over armed forces expansion in 1963 and 1964 for Lee Kuan Yew, the Singapore Prime Min1ster, was quick to warn of the dangers of having a large standing army and the possibility of a military takeover.20 In marked contrast to the qualms of people like Lee Kuan Yew, however, was the perspicacious comment of The Guardian that the Malaysian Government's attitude was "all sound and few deeds." It complained that even the modest budget for 1964 had been met with a howl of indignation from business quarters who seemed to care little about the nation's defence as demonstrated by the poor response to the National Defence Fund. Doubts were also raised as to the government's own seriousness on the grounds that the much-publicized recruiting campaign after the proclamation o f censer 1ption had been allegedly a The Guardian correspondent's sharp word d i smal failure. o f adv1ce was that there should be more sense of purpose in the government's defence plans which could begin by not observing fasting in the armed forces during the Muslim month of Ramadhan.21 The Tunku attempted to answer some of th1s crit1cism by announcing that training centres would be set up immediately in every state as a follow-up of conscr1ption. But the persistent attacks in the British press caused Razak to declare that Malaysia could not afford to have a large standing army which was why the g overnment i ntended to develop the Territorial Army as a reserve of fighting men.22 It became clear as the Razak plan of 1964 was implemented that the main emphasis of the proposed expans1on was on bu1lding up the Air Force and Navy. In July 1965, for example, Razak admitted that negotiat1ons were 1n progress for the purchase of a jet strike aircraft w1th a v1ew of establishing 1 or 2 squadrons at the earliest poss1ble date. He also stated that the current strength of 5 squadrons was to be expanded by 2 squadrons of De Havilland Canada Car i bou STOL transport planes and Atouette III

20

The Times,

21

The Guardian (London) , 7 January 1965 .

22

T~

14 De cember 1964 .

Times, 18 January 1965; Straits Times (Kuala Lumpur) , 17 January 1965 . Unless ·otherwise i ndicated , all subsequent c1tati ons refer to the Malaysian edition of the Straits Times .

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helicopters respectively. 23 Meanwhile, the Navy 's increased patrolling duties were acknowledged by a further order, in addition to the 10 that had already been acquired, for 14 fast patrol boats from Vosper.24 There was nothing in these proposed measures that could be possibly construed as being at variance with the position that Razak had taken in stating Malaysia's defence plans . They were certainly consonant with Malaysia's continuing rel i ance o n AMDA , and, as such, were unaffected by the novel situation that was created by the separation of Singapore later in 1965. It was mainly this event and its inevitable repercussions on AMDA that were to lead to the next phase in the growth of the Malaysian armed forces. The Uncertain Phase As stated earlier, the emphasis in armed forces expansion since 1963 had been mainly in improving the transport and support operations of the Air Force and in assuming increased naval patrolling duties . However, it can be argued that the new squadron of jet strike aircraft that had been envisaged early in 1965 was probably intended to be the nucleus of an eventual fighter squadron as it was essential to have sufficient experience with a trainer jet before proceeding to the more s ophisticated supersonic fighters. The project was , no doubt, conceived in earnest for in March 1966 1t was announced that an order had been placed for the Canadair CL-41S, an armed version of the Tutor. standard pr1mary jet tra iner.25 The new squadron would be based at what was described as a 11 Strike base .. in Kuantan on the east coast of the peninsula.26 In these circumstances, the decision,27 in February 1966, to acquire

23

The Times, 23 July 1965; Straits Times, 5 June 1965; Ftight International., 29 July 1965 . STOL stands for "Short Take-Off and Landing. "

24

Financial. Times (London), 1 July 1965.

25

Straits Times, 26 February 1966; Fl.ight International., 17 March 1966.

26

Straits Times , 22, 23 December 1965 .

27

Financial. Times , 14 February 1966; Straits Times , 15 February 1966. This was the somewhat unfortunate KD Bang Jeba~ wh1ch was launched in December 1967 but was only delivered in Sept.ember 1972 after

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the latest Yarrow-design frigate equipped for anti-submarine warfare and armed with surface-to-air Seaaat missiles at a cost of M$30 million would seem to have been indicative of a more ambit·ious l ong-term defence strategy. It is no doubt possible that the evaluation of the vessel had already begun long before the separat ion of Singapore for Razak had, after all, spoken as early as in 1964 of the eventual acquisi tion of "f rigates " for the Navy. Nevertheless , the choice of this particular vessel for a small navy with highly special1zed tasks has not ceased to baffle many unless it is to be regarded as part and parcel of an overall external defence strategy designed to reduce the heavy dependence on AMDA. Singapore ' s separation, it seemed , o nl y served to strengthen the con viction of both governments, Malaysian and S1ngaporean , to affirm repeatedly 1n public pronouncements their unshakable fai th in the so-called concept of the "indivisible defence " of both countries. It seems only too obvious now, i n retrospect, that it was , in fact, no more than a ploy t o draw th e other Commonwealth partners into a new defen c e arrangement. Its obJeCt was v1rtually lost with the collapse of the Jo1nt Defence Council and the Combined Operatio ns Committee that had b een hastil y set up after separation , not t o speak of conti nuing strains in Malaysia - Si~~ap o re relations as the end of Con frontation appro ached. The whole quest ion of the Brit ish disengagement and its a ftermath in Southeast Asia i s t oe complicated to be dealt wi th i n any depth here but it can hardly be exaggerated that, a.part from the quest for a new pol1cy that it bro ugh t abo ut in Malaysia, it was t o leave a deep impressi o n on the Malaysian commanders who took over to the extent that they were often more cr1tical of the British than even the poli ticians in Kuala Lumpur.

a delay of almost t h ree year s due t o tnnumerabl e problems including labou r str ike s at t he shipyard and a mysterious fire dur ing construc t ion. It is s aid , not altogether i n je st , among RMN circles that i t was renamed the Jy, 1Q77

12

A.W. Stargar dt, Prqblems o f Neutral it y in South East As ia : The Relevanc e o f th e European Experien ce , 1972. 29pp . S$3.00.

13

Wil liam R. Roff, Aut ob iogra phy & Biograph y in Ma l ay Histor ir?al Studies , 1972. 2lpp. S$2. 00 (out-of print)

The

14

Lau Teik Soon, Indonesia and Regional Security: Djakarta Conferenc e on Cambodia , 1972. 20pp. S$3.00

15

Syed Hussein Alatas, The Second Malaysia Plan 1971 1975: A Critique , 1972. 16pp. S$3.00

16

Harold E. Wilson, Education al Policy and Performan ce in Singapore , 1942 - 1945 , 1973. 28pp. S$3.00

17

Richard L . Schwenk, The Potential for Rural Developme nt i n the New Seventh Division of Sarawak: A Prelimina ry Backgroun d Report , 1973 . 39pp. S$4.00

18

Kunio Yoshihara , Japanese Direct Investmen ts in Southeast Asia , 1973. 18pp. S$4 . 00

19

Richard Stubbs, Counter - insurgenc y and the Economic Factor : The Impact of the Korean War Prices Boom on the Malayan Emergency , 1974. 54pp. S$5 . 00

20

John Wong , The Political Economy of Malaysia' s Trade ReLations with China , 1974. 31pp. S$3.00

21

Riaz Hassan, Interethn ic Marriage in Singapore : A Study of Interethn ic Relations , 1974. 85pp. S$6.00

22

Tatsumi Okabe , RevivaL of Japanese Militarism ? 1974. 26pp. S$3.00

23

Chin Kin Wah , The Five Power Defence Arrangeme nts and AMDA: Some Observati ons on the Nature of an Evolving Partnersh ip , 1974. 21pp. S$3 . 00

24

Peter Carey , The Cultural Ecology of Early Nineteent h Century Java : Pangeran Dipanagar a , a Case Study , 1974. 56 pp. S$4.00

25

Chandrase karan Pi 11ay , The 1974 General Elections in Malaysia: A Post - Mortem , 1974 . 20pp . S$3 . 00

26

I.W . Mabbett, Displaced Intellectu aLs in Twentieth Century China , 1975. 45pp. S$4.00

27

J. Stephen Hoadley, The Future of Portugues e Timor: Dilemmas and Opportun ities , 1975 . 28pp. S$4.00

28

M. Ladd Thomas, Political Violence in the Muslim Provinces of Sou~hern Thailand , 1975. 27pp. S$4 . 00

29

Joseph Camilleri , Southeast Asia in China's Foreign Policy , 1975. 37pp. S$5.00

30

Wellington K.K. Chan , Politics and Industrialization in Late Imperial China , 1975. 19pp. S$4.00

31

Leslie E. Bauzon, Philippine Agrarian Reform 1880 1965: The Revolution that Never Was, 1975. 2lpp. S$4.00

32

Paul H. Kratoska, The Chettiar and the Yeoman:

British Cultural Categories and Rural Indebtedness in Malaya,

1975.

29 pp .

S$4.00

33

Morris I. Berkowitz , The Tenacity of Chinese Folk Tradition -Two Studies of Hong Kong Chinese , 1975. 32pp. S$4.00

34

M. Rajaretnam, U.S. Energy - Security Interests in the Indian Ocean , 1975. 36pp. S$5.00

35

Chandran Jeshurun, The Growth of the Malaysian Armed Forces ~

1975.

1963-?3:

25pp.

Some Foreign Press Reactions ,

S$4.00

36

Peter Polomka , ABEAN and the Law of the Sea:

37

Sharon A. Carstens, Chinese Associations in Singapore

A Preliminary Look at the Prospects of Regional Co-operation , 1975. 16pp . S$4.00

Society:

1975.

An Examination of Function and Meaning, S$4.vJ

30pp .

Library Bulletins 1

Rosalind Quah, Library Resources in Singapore on Contemporary Mainland China, 1971. llpp. S$2.00

2

Quah Swee Lan, comp. , Oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia :

1971.

23pp.

A Preliminary Bibliography,

S$2.00

3

P. Lim Pui Huen , comp. , Directory of Microfilm Facilities in Southeast Asia , 1972. 24pp. S$2.00 (Out of print)

4

Checklist of Current Serials in the Library , 1972.

30pp. 5

S$3.00

Tan Sok Joo , Library Resources on Burma in Singapore, 1972. 42pp. S$3.00

6

Quah Swee Lan, camp . , Oil Discovery and Technical Change in Southeast Asia : A Bibliography , 1973. 32pp. S$3.00 (Out of Print)

7

P. Lim Pui Huen, camp. , Directory of Microfilm Facilities in Southeast Asia, 2d Edition , 1973. S$4.00

32pp.

8

Ng Shui Meng, camp., Demographic Materials on the Khmer Rep~blic , Laos and Vietnam , 1974. 54pp. S$5. 00

9

Saength ong M. Ismail, Library Resources on Thailand in Singapor e , 1974. 130pp. S$7.00

Trends in Southeas t Asia 1

Trends in Indo nes i a: Proceedings and Background Paper , 1971 . 58pp. S$3.00 (Out of print)

2

Trends in Ma laysia: Proceedings and Background Paper , Edited by Patrick Low , 1971. 120pp. S$5.00 (Out of pr1 nt)

3

Trends in the Philippine s . Edi ted by Lim Yoon Lin . (Singapore University Press) , 1972. 140pp. S$5.00

4

Trends in Indonesia . Edited by Yang Mun Cheong. (S1ngapore Un1versity Press) , 1972 . 140pp. S$5.00

5

Tren ds in Tha i land. Edited by M. RaJaretnam and Lim So Jean . (Singapore University Press) , 1973. 14 2 pp . s $ 7 • 00

6

Trends in Malaysia II. Edited by Yang Mun Cheong. (Singapore University Press) , 1974 . 154pp. S$7.00

7

Trends in Sin gapore. Edited by Seah Chee Meow. (Sing apore Univers ity Press) , 1975. 15lpp . S$10.00

Field Reeort Series 1

Yong Mun Cheong, Conflicts within the Prijaji World o f the Pavah yangan in West Java , 1914 - 1927, 19 7 3 • 4 2 pp • s $ 3 • 00

2

Patrick Low and Yeunq Yue-man , The Proposed Kra Canal: A Critical Evaluation and Its Impact on Singapore , 1973.

39pp .

S$3 .00 (Out of print).

3

Robert Fabr:ikant, Legal Aspects of Production Sharing Contrac~s in 2d ~d ition.

4

the Indonesian Petroleum Industry ,

1973.

235pp,

S$ 25 , 00

The Indonesian Petroleum Industry : Miscellaneous Source Materials. Collected by Robert Fabrikant.

1973.

516pp e

S$25 . 00 (Out of print)

5

C.V. Das and V.P . Pradhan, Some International Law Problems Regarding the Straits of Malacca , 1973. 95pp. S$10.00 (Out of print)

6

M. Rajaretnam , Politics of Oil in the Philippines , 19 73. 8lppc S$5.00

7

Ng Shui Heng , The Population of Indochina : Some Preliminary Observati ons, 1974. 126pp . S$7.00

8

Ng Shui Meng, The Oil System in Southeast Asia : A PreZ~minary Survey , 1974. 93pp . S$10.00

9

Wong Saik Chin, Public Reaction to the Oil Crisis : The Singapo~e Case , 197 5. 87pp. S$6.00

10

Kawin Wilairat , Singapore's Forei gn Policy: First Decade , 1975. lOSp~ . S$10,00

The

Current Issues Sem i nar Series 1

Multinational Corporat~ons and their Implications for Southeast Asia . Edited by Eileen Lim Poh Tin ,

19 73. 2

66pp .

S$6 . 00

Southeast Asia Today:

1973 . 4

S$12 . 00 (Out of print)

Economic and Political Trends in Southeast Asia ,

1973 . 3

1 40pp .

llOpp .

Problems and Prospects,

S$10, 00

Japan as an Economic Power and its. Implications for Southeast Asia , Edited by Kern ial S. Sandhu and

Eileen P.T. Tang (Singapore University Press) , 1974 . l47pp. S$15 . 00 5

The Future Pattern of Japanese Economic and Political Relations with Southeast Asia , 1975 . 82pp . S$6 . 00

Oral History Programme Series 1

Philip Hoalim , Senior , The Malayan Democ ra ti c Union: Singapore 's First Democratic Political Party ,

1973 .

S$3.00

26pp .

2

Andrew Gilmour, My Role in the Rehabilit ation of lOOpp . S$6 . 00 1946 - 1953 , 1973 . Singapore:

3

Marnoru Shinozaki , My Wartime Experiences ·in S$6 . 00 (Out of print) Singapo r e , 1973. 124pp .

Southeast Asian Perspectives 1

u.

2

HarsJa W. Bachtiar , The Indonesian Nation :

Khin Mg . Kyi and Daw Tin Tin , Administrative S$3.00 Patterns i n Historical Burma, 1973. 67pp. Some Problems of Integration and Disintegration , 1974.

62pp . 3

S$5.00

Political and Social Change in Singapor e .

Wu Teh- Yao.

200pp.

Edited by

S$10.00

Monographs 1

Sartono Kartodirdjo, Protest Movements in Rural Java (Oxford University Press) , 1973. 229pp . S$18 . 00

2

Modernization in Southeast Asia .

Edited by Hans Dieter Evers (Oxford University Press), 1973. 249pp. S$18.00

Annual Reviews 1

Southeast Asian A ffairs 1974.

1974.

350pp .

S$15 . 00

(Out of print) 2

Southeast Asian A ffa irs 19?5 .

1975.

256pp .

(FEP International Ltd.),

S$30.00

The above publications are available for sale at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies , House No. 8, University of Singapore Campus , Bukit Timah Road, Singapore 10 . Tel: 514211

THE AUTHOR Dr. Chandran Jeshurun, formerly of the Department of History, National University of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur, is currently a Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.