The Ground, Method, and Goal of Amandus Polanus’ (1561–1610) Doctrine of God: A Historical and Contextual Analysis [1 ed.] 9783666501876, 9783525501870

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Stephen B. Tipton

The Ground, Method, and Goal of Amandus Polanus’ (1561–1610) Doctrine of God A Historical and Contextual Analysis

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Reformed Historical Theology Edited by Herman J. Selderhuis In co-operation with Emidio Campi, Irene Dingel, Benyamin F. Intan, Elsie Anne McKee, Richard A. Muller, and Risto Saarinen

Volume 73

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Stephen B. Tipton

The Ground, Method, and Goal of Amandus Polanus’ (1561–1610) Doctrine of God A Historical and Contextual Analysis

Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht

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Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek: The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data available online: https://dnb.de. © 2022 by Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Theaterstraße 13, 37073 Göttingen, Germany, an imprint of the Brill-Group (Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands; Brill USA Inc., Boston MA, USA; Brill Asia Pte Ltd, Singapore; Brill Deutschland GmbH, Paderborn, Germany, Brill Österreich GmbH, Vienna, Austria) Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress.

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Contents

List of Figures....................................................................................... 11 Abbreviations ....................................................................................... 13 Preface ................................................................................................ 15 Chapter One: Introduction ..................................................................... 1.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 1.2 Secondary Literature ................................................................. 1.2.1 Scholarship of Post-Reformation Reformed Orthodoxy ....... 1.2.2 Scholarly Research and Amandus Polanus ......................... 1.3 The Main Research Question...................................................... 1.4 Methodological Considerations .................................................. 1.5 Organization and Structure ........................................................

19 19 20 20 26 30 36 39

Chapter Two: Polanus’ Historical Context ............................................... 2.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 2.2 The Life of Amandus Polanus ..................................................... 2.2.1 Early Years and Education ............................................... 2.2.2 Geneva and Travels ......................................................... 2.2.3 Professor of Old Testament .............................................. 2.2.4 Academic Disputations at the University of Basel................ 2.2.5 The Works of Amandus Polanus ....................................... 2.3 Polanus in the Context of the Post-Reformation Period ................. 2.4 Philosophical and Methodological Influence: Aristotelianism and Ramism ...................................................... 2.4.1 Aristotelianism............................................................... 2.4.2 The Ramist Alternative to Aristotelianism.......................... 2.4.3 Aristotelian and Ramist Influence in Polanus ..................... 2.5 Early Reformed Orthodox Contemporaries of Polanus .................. 2.5.1 Zacharias Ursinus ........................................................... 2.5.2 Girolamo Zanchi ............................................................ 2.5.3 Lambert Daneau ............................................................ 2.5.4 William Perkins.............................................................. 2.5.5 Lucas Trelcatius Jr. .......................................................... 2.5.6 Gulielmus Bucanus .........................................................

41 41 41 42 44 45 47 49 52 57 59 63 65 68 69 70 72 72 73 74

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Contents

2.5.7 Bartholomäus Keckermann.............................................. 75 2.6 Summary................................................................................. 76 Chapter Three: Theological Foundations of Polanus’ Doctrine of God ....... 3.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 3.2 Overview of Book One of the Syntagma....................................... 3.3 The Definition of Theology ........................................................ 3.4 The Archetypal/Ectypal Distinction ............................................ 3.5 The Authority of Scripture ......................................................... 3.6 Summary.................................................................................

77 77 77 80 85 93 97

Chapter Four: The Divine Essence and Names ....................................... 4.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 4.2 The State of these Doctrines in Early Reformed Orthodoxy ............ 4.3 Polanus’ Introductory Orientation .............................................. 4.4 The Description and Distribution of the Doctrine of God .............. 4.5 The Existence of God ................................................................ 4.6 The Essence of God ................................................................... 4.6.1 The Distribution of the Doctrine of the Divine Essence ....... 4.6.2 Excursus on the Holy Trinity ............................................ 4.6.3 The Names of God .......................................................... 4.6.4 The Essential Properties of God ........................................ 4.6.5 The Distinction Between First and Second Order Essential Properties......................................................... 4.7 Summary.................................................................................

99 99 100 104 109 111 116 119 124 129 131

Chapter Five: The First Order Essential Properties of God ........................ 5.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 5.2 The State of First Order Essential Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy ................................................................ 5.3 The Structure of Polanus’ Discussion ........................................... 5.4 The Simplicity of God................................................................ 5.5 The Perfection of God ............................................................... 5.6 The Infinity of God ................................................................... 5.6.1 The Eternity of God ........................................................ 5.6.2 The Immensity of God .................................................... 5.7 The Immutability of God ........................................................... 5.8 Summary.................................................................................

141 141

136 140

141 144 149 160 164 166 167 172 174

Chapter Six: The Second Order Essential Properties of God ..................... 177 6.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 177

Contents

6.2 The State of Second Order Essential Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy ................................................................ 6.3 The Structure of Polanus’ Discussion ........................................... 6.4 The Life of God ........................................................................ 6.5 The Immortality of God............................................................. 6.6 The Blessedness of God ............................................................. 6.7 The Glory of God...................................................................... 6.8 Summary................................................................................. Chapter Seven: The Divine Wisdom ....................................................... 7.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 7.2 The State of the Doctrine of the Divine Wisdom in Early Reformed Orthodoxy ................................................................ 7.3 Polanus’ Discussion of Divine Wisdom ........................................ 7.4 The Various Distinctions within the Divine Wisdom ..................... 7.4.1 The Categories of the Divine Wisdom ............................... 7.4.2 The Knowledge of God .................................................... 7.4.3 The General and Special Knowledge of God ....................... 7.4.4 Divine Foreknowledge..................................................... 7.4.5 Distinctions within Divine Foreknowledge ........................ 7.4.6 The Knowledge of Simple Intelligence and the Knowledge of Vision ....................................................... 7.5 Summary................................................................................. Chapter Eight: The Divine Will ................................................................ 8.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 8.2 The State of the Doctrine of the Divine Will in Early Reformed Orthodoxy ................................................................ 8.3 Polanus’ Discussion of the Divine Will......................................... 8.4 Scholastic Questions Regarding the Will ...................................... 8.5 Distinctions within the Divine Will ............................................. 8.5.1 The Essential and Personal Will ........................................ 8.5.2 The Efficient and Permitting Will...................................... 8.5.3 The Absolute and Conditional Will ................................... 8.5.4 The Revealed and Hidden Will ......................................... 8.5.5 The Necessary and Free Will ............................................ 8.5.6 The Distinctions Concerning the Objects of the Divine Will .................................................................... 8.6 Summary.................................................................................

178 180 181 183 184 188 190 193 193 193 195 202 202 204 205 207 207 211 217 219 219 219 221 223 225 226 229 231 235 239 240 244

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Contents

Chapter Nine: Essential Properties of God Termed ‘Types’ Within the Divine Will ............................................................................ 9.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 9.2 The State of These Various Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy ............................................................................... 9.3 ‘Types’ within the Divine Will .................................................... 9.4 The Goodness of God ................................................................ 9.5 The Grace of God ..................................................................... 9.6 The Love of God ....................................................................... 9.7 The Mercy of God ..................................................................... 9.8 The Patience of God .................................................................. 9.9 The Kindness of God ................................................................. 9.10 The Justice of God..................................................................... 9.11 The Truth of God ...................................................................... 9.12 The Holiness of God.................................................................. 9.13 Summary.................................................................................

247 247 248 252 253 256 262 265 268 270 272 276 278 280

Chapter Ten: The Divine Power and Freedom ......................................... 10.1 Introduction ............................................................................ 10.2 The State of Divine Power and Freedom in Early Reformed Orthodoxy ................................................................ 10.3 The Power of God ..................................................................... 10.3.1 Divine Omnipotence....................................................... 10.3.2 Impossibilia ................................................................... 10.4 The Freedom of God ................................................................. 10.5 Excursus on the Divine Decree and Human Freedom .................... 10.5.1 The Divine Decree .......................................................... 10.5.2 Divine Creation and Providence ....................................... 10.5.3 Human Freedom ............................................................ 10.5.4 Excursus Summary ......................................................... 10.6 Summary.................................................................................

283 283

Chapter Eleven: Conclusion ................................................................... 11.1 This Work in Summary.............................................................. 11.2 Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God ......................................... 11.2.1 Review of the Main Research Question.............................. 11.2.2 Polanus and the Divine Decree ......................................... 11.2.3 Polanus and the Interaction Between Reason and Scripture .. 11.2.4 Polanus and the Trinity ................................................... 11.3 Polanus Put Positively ...............................................................

311 311 314 314 317 321 327 331

283 285 288 290 293 299 299 303 306 307 308

Contents

Bibliography ......................................................................................... 335 Primary Sources ............................................................................... 335 Secondary Literature......................................................................... 339 Index of Names .................................................................................... 349

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List of Figures

Figure 1 Tabulae Perpetuae (Polanus, Partitiones (1599), tabulae 1–2) ...................... Figure 2 Distinctions in Polanus’ organizational method among the ‘types’ of the divine will............................................................................................ Figure 3 Distribution of the ‘Types’ of the Divine Will............................................ Figure 4 The Organizational Structure of Divine Goodness.....................................

66 222 253 255

Abbreviations

CD

Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, G. W. Bromily and T. F. Torrance, eds., H. Knight et. al., trans. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956–1975). PG Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Graeca, 161 vols. (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1857–1866). PL Patrologiae Curcus Completus, Series Latina, 221 vols. (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1844–1863). PRRD Richard A. Muller, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 4 vols. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003). S.Th. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 5 vols. (Christian Classics, 1981). Translations of the Summa Theologiae are from The Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas Aquinas, Latin-English Edition, vol 1. Prima Pars, Q. 1–64 (Scotts Valley, CA: NovAntiqua, 2008).

Preface

The question I have most often been asked with regard to my doctoral studies is, “Who is Amandus Polanus?” Once the introductions have been made, however, the second most frequent question (and, perhaps, the more important of the two) is, “Why study his doctrine of God?” In beginning to answer that, I must state from the outset that I have been fortunate to study a theologian whose view of God is very similar to my own. Indeed, as an ordained minister in the Presbyterian Church in America, I am encouraged by how often echoes of Polanus’ thought can be heard in the chapters and questions of my own doctrinal standards, the Westminster Confession of Faith and Catechisms. While I do not agree with every jot and tittle of Polanus’ theology, I have found in him a kindred spirit and companion with whom to dialogue and from whom to learn. I have also, from time to time, had the opportunity to find myself organizing my thoughts in neat pairs of twos. This, however, does not answer the question: “Why study Polanus’ doctrine of God?” There is, on the one hand, a scholarly and historical interest – a desire to better understand the Reformed tradition generally and the early Reformed orthodox particularly. On the other hand, as a Christian, I have been reminded of the fundamental importance of God to all of theology. Whenever I think about God, a whole host of questions instantly spring to mind: Who is this God? What is he like? How can I be sure he exists? How can I know him? And once I do know him, how can I be sure he will remain as he has revealed himself to be? These very questions are at the center of Polanus’ doctrine of God. Furthermore, these answers to these questions radiate out into the whole of his theological project as, once we know this God, we come also to know ourselves in relation to him. Thus, the doctrine of God also forms the foundation of Polanus’ soteriology and ethics. While the entirety of his theology is not the focus of this work, it is my desire that this study of Polanus’ doctrine of God would bear much academic fruit as this important figure of Reformed orthodoxy and scholasticism is better understood in his own historical and theological context. With regard to Polanus himself, I came across him in a rather serendipitous way. As part of my preparatory studies for pursuing a Ph.D., I needed to learn Latin. In addition to looking at a variety of works that have been translated, I wanted to work through a text that was not yet available in English. Couple this desire with my recent reading of Reformed Thought on Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2010), and it only took a quick search through the Post-Reformation Digital Library to find a work on liberum arbitrium. What I found was a disputation presided over by Amandus Polanus. The more I read and translated, the more I realized that

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Preface

Polanus was a figure who had been too long neglected. While he figures repeatedly in Richard A. Muller’s four-volume study, Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2004), Muller himself acknowledges that his work is only a prelude to the many, in-depth, studies of individual theologians that would need to be accomplished in order to sharpen our understanding of Reformed orthodoxy. This work would never have been possible without the help of many individuals – too many, in fact, to name. I would like to express my gratitude to my promotors Prof. Dr. Andreas J. Beck and Dr. Dolf te Velde for their many hours of reviewing and commenting upon my work and for their encouragement and exhortation to complete this beginning stage of my scholarly career. I am also grateful for the interactions with the members of the Institute of Post-Reformation Studies (IPRS) at ETF Leuven. I look forward to seeing the fruit of the research that is being incubated at this institution. I would also like to acknowledge my great appreciation for the various members of the research group Classic Reformed Theology (“Werkgezelschap Oude Gereformeerde Theologie”). While I have not had the opportunity to speak to all of them directly, I have greatly benefited from their work. In particular, I wish to acknowledge the tremendous help and encouragement that I received from the late Prof. Dr. Willem van Asselt and continue to receive from Prof. Dr. Antoon Vos during their time at ETF Leuven. I would also like to thank Ryan Hurd for his efforts to review my Latin translations and for the helpful suggestions he offered. Any errors in translation, of course, remain my own. I am greatly indebted to those individuals who have read and made comments on this dissertation in part or in whole. I am particularly thankful to Prof. Dr. R. H. Reeling Brouwer, Dr. Stefan Lindholm, Prof. Dr. Aza Goudriaan, and Prof. Dr. Koert van Bekkum for their service as readers and for their helpful and insightful comments. As well, I thank the Doctoral Committee of ETF, Leuven, for their kind permission to publish my 2020 Doctoral Dissertation. This volume is a slightly edited version of that previous work. I would also like to express my deepest appreciation and admiration for Dr. Derek Thomas and Dr. Duncan Rankin. Both of these men have been an enormous blessing to me in my ministry and have modeled for me what it means to be a ‘pastortheologian’. I would also like to thank the elders, deacons, and members of Hillcrest Presbyterian Church in Volant, Pennsylvania, for their love, encouragement, patience, and grace as I have continued to both study and write and pastor in their midst. Lastly, I would like to thank my family for their constant care, prayers, and support: my parents, Rhonda Matthews and David Tipton and step-parents, Creig Matthews and Brenda Tipton; my siblings, Allen Tipton and Katherine Blair; my daughters, Alicia Tipton and Meaghan Tipton; and most of all, Catherine, my lovely

Preface

wife who has stood by me through all things and who truly is the helper God has specifically fashioned for me. “Since we have the same spirit of faith according to what has been written, “I believed, and so I spoke,” we also believe, and so we also speak, knowing that he who raised the Lord Jesus will raise us also with Jesus and bring us with you into his presence. For it is all for your sake, so that as grace extends to more and more people it may increase thanksgiving, to the glory of God.” (2 Corinthians 4:13–15).

Stephen Tipton, April, 2022

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1

Introduction

This work provides a contextual and analytic exposition of the doctrine of God in the theology of Amandus Polanus (1561–1610) as he sets these doctrines forth in the Syntagma theologiae christianae. I intend to show that Polanus’ theology is intentionally rooted in God’s own self-revelation in Scripture and is aimed at the goal of doxology and worship of the Triune God. Further, I intend to show that the Trinity of divine persons is integral to Polanus’ discussion of God’s single and simple divine essence. Lastly, I intend to show that Polanus’ use of logic and reason results organically from his understanding of man as he is made in the image of God and therefore does not function as the foundation of his theology. The purpose of this work is twofold. First, it will present a summary and analysis of Polanus’ doctrine of God by examining the structure of the Syntagma, the interactions Polanus has with various sources, the definitions and distinctions he employs, as well as the arguments he makes. My goal in this first purpose is to seek to understand Polanus’ exposition of the doctrine of God as he expresses it in the Syntagma. Second, this work will present a critical engagement with the secondary literature by which I will consider the insights offered by a range of scholarly assessments of Polanus’ theology and seek to evaluate various misunderstandings of his thought and work. My goal in this second purpose is both to incorporate insights into Polanus’ doctrine of God that elucidate his theology and to correct or dispute views that obfuscate his theology. This chapter provides four introductory sections. First, I present a survey of the secondary literature that is relevant to this work. This includes literature that deals with Reformed orthodoxy and scholasticism more broadly, literature that deals with the doctrine of God in the era of Reformed orthodoxy (especially the early phase of that period), and literature that is specific to Polanus. Second, I present the main research question and break this question down into its constituent parts. This portion includes a more detailed look at the main arguments from the secondary literature that are integral to my overall discussion of Polanus’ theology. Third, I discuss the methodology I employ to analyze Polanus in this context. This includes a discussion of the primary sources from Polanus’ work that are used throughout this work. Finally, I provide an overview of the organizational structure of my work.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.2

Secondary Literature

1.2.1

Scholarship of Post-Reformation Reformed Orthodoxy

In order to approach the vast amount of secondary literature regarding PostReformation Reformed Orthodoxy, a certain level of simplification and categorization is necessary. While this work seeks to situate itself within the milieu of what is described below as ‘newer’ scholarship, a detailed discussion of the history of Post-Reformation scholarship is outside the scope of this work and has, at any rate, been accomplished by others. Therefore, this section will contain a broad sketch of the state of scholarship from the perspective of the ‘newer’ scholarship that seeks to orient the reader (and direct the reader to other studies) rather than exhaustively evaluate the ‘older’ scholarship. Furthermore, this section is designed particularly to orient the reader in preparation for the more detailed discussion of the secondary literature on Amandus Polanus in section 1.2.2, below. Much of the scholarship of the post-Reformation Reformed orthodox period has been focused upon various lines of continuity and discontinuity between the theologians of this period and their Reformation, medieval, and patristic predecessors. The primary thesis of what can be described as the ‘older’ scholarship seeks to draw clear lines of discontinuity between the Reformed orthodox and the Reformers. Typically, this ‘older’ scholarship has seen this discontinuity in terms of two observations: 1) Reformed scholasticism is a predestinarian system, and 2) Reformed scholasticism is overly rationalistic. The primary thesis of what can be called the ‘newer’ scholarship seeks to demonstrate the presence of various lines of continuity and discontinuity between the Reformed orthodox and their various predecessors. Generally speaking, the Reformed orthodox were in continuity with the Reformed with regard to their overall theology but were more in continuity with medieval scholastics with regard to their overall methodology. Furthermore, this ‘newer’ scholarship argues that predestination does not serve as a ‘central dogma’ for the Reformed orthodox and that, while there is clear evidence of the usage of logic and reason among the Reformed orthodox, their theology should not be characterized as rationalistic. The remainder of this section is a chronological survey of the relevant secondary literature that traces out the origination and assessment of these theses.1

1 This survey is relatively brief and only touches upon the major figures and positions. It is largely based upon Willem J. van Asselt, and Eef Dekker, “Introduction,” in Reformation and Scholasticism, An Ecumenical Enterprise, Willem J. van Asselt and Eef Dekker, eds., Texts and Studies in Reformation and Post-Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2001); Richard A. Muller, Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725, 4 vols., 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003); Andreas J. Beck, Gisbertus Voetius

Secondary Literature

The first major period of the ‘older’ scholarship includes Ferdinand Christian Baur (1792–1860), Alexander Schweizer (1808–1888), and Wilhelm Gass (1813–1889).2 Baur argued that the centrality of predestination to Protestant theology was a logical development in the history of Christian dogma. Schweizer argued that Protestant theology was both a predestinarian and a rationalistic system. He saw predestination (which he linked to the ‘feeling of absolute dependence’ as promulgated by his mentor, Friedrich Schleiermacher) as the central dogma (Centraldogma) of Protestant thought. Gass concurred, arguing that Reformed theology took its shape as a whole from this internal principle of predestination. It should be noted that these three scholars did not merely describe predestination as a ‘central dogma.’ Rather, this notion was for them in fact a normative element of theology. In the second period of scholarship into post-Reformation Reformed dogmatics, this thesis would be challenged, yet in two different ways. Herman Bavinck (1854–1921) rejected the assumption of the previous period of scholarship that regarded predestination as a central dogma, “and applied a historical-critical method to his own description of Reformed theology.”3 In this way, Bavinck’s approach to Reformed dogmatics anticipates some of the aspects of the ‘newer’ scholarship described below. Heinrich Heppe (1820–1879), accepted the central dogma theory. Unlike the scholars of the previous period, however, he saw the central role of predestination in Reformed theology as a negative insertion into Christian theol-

(1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, Church History and Religious Culture 84 (Leiden: Brill, 2022); J. Martin Bac, Perfect Will Theology, Divine Agency in Reformed Scholasticism as against Suárez, Episcopius, Descartes, and Spinoza, Brill’s Series in Church History, Vol. 42 (Leiden: Brill, 2010); Willem J. van Asselt and Pieter L. Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship: From Discontinuity to Continuity” in Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, trans. Albert Gootjes, Reformed HistoricalTheological Studies (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011); and Dolf te Velde, The Doctrine of God in Reformed Orthodoxy, Karl Barth, and the Utrecht School: A Study in Method and Content, Studies in Reformed Theology, Vol. 25 (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 2 See, Alexander Schweizer, Die protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwicklung innerhalb der reformierten Kirche, 2 vols. (Zurich: Orell, Fuessli & Co., 1846–1856); Ferdinand C. Baur, Lehrbuch der christlichen Dogmengeschichte (Tübingen: L. Fues, 1847); Wilhelm Gass, Geschichte der protestantischen Dogmatik in ihrem Zusammenhänge mit der Theologie überhaupt, 2 vols. (Berlin: G. Reimer, 1854); van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 10; and van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction,” 15. 3 Van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 12. See also See Herman Bavinck, Reformed Dogmatics, 4 vols., ed. John Bolt, trans. John Vriend (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003–2008); Heinrich Heppe, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche: Dargestelt und aus den Quellen belegt (Elberfield: R. L. Friedrichs, 1861); Heinrich Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources, ed. Ernst Bizer, trans. G. I. Thompson (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1978); and van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction,” 17.

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Chapter One: Introduction

ogy.4 According to Heppe, predestination did not arise as a central dogma because of a logical historical progression of theology (i.e., a logical development within theology), but because of external factors, particularly through Theodore Beza (1519–1605) and his Tabula predestinationis.5 Thus, the more pristine theology of Calvin, which was not focused upon or logically deduced from predestination as a central dogma, was overtaken by the ‘Calvinist’ theologians. The turn of the twentieth century sees the next period of scholarship characterized by Hans Emil Weber (1882–1959) and Paul Althaus (1898–1966).6 Weber adopted the central dogma theory as mediated through Baur, claiming that predestination was used by Reformed orthodox theologians to introduce the rationalistic and rigid deductive system of the medieval scholastic method. Althaus, who was a student of Weber and well known for his Lutheran studies, argued that Reformed theology was a “rigid system” which, with the doctrine of predestination, “acquired a rationalistic and speculative character far removed from the biblical witness.”7 Thus, these scholars gave affirmative answers to the questions posed above, but appraised the inclusion of these elements within Reformed scholasticism negatively. The fourth period of scholarship is characterized by the dialectical theology of Karl Barth (1886–1968), who provided a new perspective on Reformed orthodoxy in his Church Dogmatics.8 According to Bac, Barth viewed Reformed orthodoxy as “a mature expression of the theology of the church, because it combines the Reformed intent to study the biblical witness of revelation with the best medieval fruits of academic theology.”9 Furthermore, Barth rejected the notion that predestination was the central dogma of Reformed orthodoxy. Barth, however, expressed several criticisms of Reformed orthodoxy: its use of and the importance given to natural

4 See van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 13; van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction,” 17; and Bac, Perfect Will Theology, 9. 5 See Richard A. Muller, “The Use and Abuse of a Document: Beza’ Tabula Praedestinationis, The Bolsec Controversy, and the Origins of Reformed Orthodoxy,” in Protestant Scholasticism, Essays in Reassessment, ed. Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark, Studies in Christian History and Thought (Colorado Springs: Paternoster, 2005), 33–61; Richard A Muller, Christ and the Decree, Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008), 3–4; and Muller, PRRD, 1:86. 6 See Hans Emil Weber, Reformation, Orthodoxie und Rationalismus (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1937); Paul Althaus, Die Prinzipen der deutschen reformierten Dogmatik in Zeitalter der aristotelischen Scholastik (Leipzig: Deichert, 1914); van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 14; and Bac, Perfect Will Theology, 9. 7 Van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 15. 8 Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, eds. (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1956–1975) (hereafter, CD); van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 15; van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction,” 20; and Bac, Perfect Will Theology, 9. 9 Bac, Perfect Will Theology, 9.

Secondary Literature

theology; the way Reformed orthodox theologians treated the doctrine of God by first considering the essence and attributes and only afterwards turning to the Trinity; and the way that the theology of the Reformed orthodox turned Scripture into a static and objective body of knowledge that could be studied by reason.10 Thus, Barth denied that predestination served as a central dogma in Reformed theology, but did appraise it as being overly rationalistic. In the middle of the twentieth century, a number of scholars began to synthesize this older scholarship. Basil Hall sought to demonstrate a division between the theology of Calvin and what he saw was the degradation of theology that began with Theodore Beza, thereby introducing the phrase “Calvin against the Calvinists.”11 Brian Armstrong continued the negative appraisal of predestination as a central dogma. He sought to demonstrate that scholastic theology did not come into Reformed theology with Beza, but was instead present from the beginning of the Reformation.12 John S. Bray affirmed this notion, and summarized Reformed scholasticism according to six characteristics: first, it was a theology characterized as having been built upon rational principles and syllogistic argumentation; second, it was dependent upon the philosophy of Bellarmine; third, reason was given the same weight as Scripture in determining theology; fourth, Reformed theology was marked by the use of metaphysics in order to speculate about God’s essence and his will; fifth, Scripture was seen as a revealed collection of logical propositions; and sixth, there was a new understanding of faith that entered with the shift from the Reformers to Reformed scholasticism.13 It is important to note that for both Armstrong and Bray, scholasticism was not just a method used by scholastics, but had a particular content associated with it.14 The second half of the twentieth century has also seen what has been called ‘newer’ scholarship which has challenged much of the previous, ‘older,’ view of Reformed orthodoxy and scholasticism. An early wave is characterized by Heiko Oberman and David Steinmetz, who posited a significant level of continuity between

10 Bac, Perfect Will Theology, 10. 11 Basil Hall, “Calvin against the Calvinists,” in John Calvin, ed. G. E. Duffield (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966). See also Thomas F. Torrance, Scottish Theology: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1996). 12 Brian G. Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy: Protestant Scholasticism in SeventeenthCentury France (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1969); van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 17; and van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction,” 22. 13 John S. Bray, Theodore Beza’s Doctrine of Predestination, Bibliotheca Humanistica & Reformatorica, vol. 12 (Leiden: Brill, 1975); van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 17; and van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction,” 23. 14 Van Asselt and Rouwendal, “The State of Scholarship,” 18.

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medieval scholasticism and the theology of the Protestant Reformers.15 Significant criticism of the ‘older’ scholarship, as well as much positive appraisal of Reformed orthodoxy and Reformed scholasticism generally, is seen in the work of Richard A. Muller, Willem J. van Asselt, Antonie Vos, Eef Dekker, Andreas J. Beck, Dolf te Velde, J. Martin Bac, Carl Trueman, and others.16 This ‘newer’ scholarship of Reformed Orthodoxy is broadly characterized by a number of common conclusions: • First, the Reformed orthodox theologians worked to codify and confessionalize the teachings of the Reformers. There is therefore a great deal of continuity between the first and second generation of Reformers and the various periods of Reformed orthodoxy. • Second, Reformed orthodox theologians also show broad continuity with medieval scholastic theology. • Third, this broad continuity with medieval scholasticism is partially due to the shared Christian (i.e., catholic) tradition and partly because scholasticism, whether medieval or Reformed, is first and foremost a methodology. Therefore, while the application of similar methods to same broad body of evidence is likely to produce similar results, methodology should be distinguished from content. • Fourth, rather than functioning as a central dogma, the doctrine of predestination has a soteriological importance for Reformed orthodox theology. • Fifth, the doctrine of God has been found to be foundational for both medieval and Reformed orthodox theology. This should not be taken to mean that their particular understanding of God is what stands as the center of their theology, but rather that God himself is the center and the foundational subject matter of theology. • Sixth, Reformed scholasticism should be understood in its context as a theology of the schools and universities. In particular, an awareness of this institutional

15 Heiko A. Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism (Harvard University Press, 1963); Heiko A. Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986); David C. Steinmetz, Luther in Context (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1995); David C. Steinmetz, Calvin in Context (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); and Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark, “Introduction,” in Protestant Scholasticism, Essays in Reassessment, Studies in Christian History and Thought, Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark, eds. (Colorado Springs: Paternoster, 2005), xiii. 16 For representative works, see above, note 1. See also Willem van Asselt, J. Martin Bac, and Roelf T. te Velde, eds. Reformed Thought on Freedom: The Concept of Free Choice in Early Modern Reformed Theology, Texts and Studies in Reformation & Post-Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010); and Carl R. Trueman, The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998).

Secondary Literature

and supra-individual framework is essential to correctly understanding the character, genres, and methodology of the theology of Reformed scholasticism. • Finally, one of the main methodological continuities that characterizes the whole of theology from Augustine to Anselm, from Thomas to Zwingli, from Calvin to de Moor is captured in the phrase fides quaerens intellectum: that is, that theology begins with faith and then proceeds to seek understanding. In addition, a number of methodological insights characterize the ‘newer’ scholarship: • First, it seeks to understand the object of their study within its own historical and theological context. This is contrary to much of the older scholarship which tended to read Reformation and Reformed scholastic theologians in light of the scholar’s own context, issues, and theological formulations. • Second, it seeks to understand their subjects in terms of continuity and discontinuity with contemporary and medieval sources. The primary axis of continuity is in terms of method: while Reformation and post-Reformation theologians may reach different conclusions than did their medieval scholastic predecessors, the majority of scholastic theologians of all eras were broadly united in terms of their methodology. • Third, these ‘newer’ scholars see whatever discontinuity may arise between the Reformed orthodox and Calvin – or other Magisterial Reformers – as part of the ongoing development of Reformed orthodoxy. Thus, Calvin ought not be considered the standard or ‘high water mark’ of Reformed theology. Further, this means that Reformed orthodoxy should be evaluated on its own terms, and not in terms of its fidelity to what Calvin wrote. • Fourth, several of these authors seek to understand particular issues of divine sovereignty and human freedom in light of Vos’ insights into the doctrinal formulations of John Duns Scotus, particularly the concept of synchronic contingency.17 This ‘newer’ wave of scholarship also includes research specifically focused upon the Reformed orthodox doctrine of God. Muller focuses upon the doctrine of God

17 See Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2006); Antonie Vos, Henri Veldhuis, A. H. Looman-Graaskamp, Eef Dekker, and Nico W. den Bok, eds., John Duns Scotus: Contingency and Freedom: Lectura I 39, The New Synthese Historical Library 42 (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1994); Antonie Vos, Henri Veldhuis, Eef Dekker, Nico W. den Bok, and Andreas J. Beck, eds., Duns Scotus on Divine Love: Texts and Commentary on Goodness and Freedom, God and Humans (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003).

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in volume three of Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics.18 Dolf te Velde looks at the doctrine of God among various Reformed orthodox theologians and compares that to the theology of Karl Barth and the Utrecht School.19 John Platt looks at the arguments for the existence of God as found in Dutch theologians during the early Reformed orthodox period.20 Andreas J. Beck looks at the doctrine of God in Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676).21 Harm Goris considers the influence of Thomism on the doctrine of God of Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590).22 These works are in broad continuity with the general thesis of the ‘newer’ scholarship regarding Reformed orthodoxy and its continuity and discontinuity with both medieval scholasticism and the theology of the Reformers. 1.2.2

Scholarly Research and Amandus Polanus

Although he is widely considered a significant figure in Reformed Scholasticism, Amandus Polanus has been the subject of relatively little detailed interaction in the secondary literature. He receives only cursory treatment in the works of Althaus. Heppe does not focus upon Polanus per se, but Polanus does feature often in Reformed Dogmatics as an example of the various doctrinal points Heppe seeks to elucidate. The works of Ernst Staehelin regarding Polanus are primarily biographical in nature.23 The scholarship that does focuses upon Polanus’ doctrine and thought can be considered in three categories. The first category is represented by the work of Karl Barth, Heinrich Faulenbach, and Max Eugene Deal.24 This category consists of a broadly Barthian or Neo-Orthodox critique of Polanus that sees in his work an

18 Muller, PRRD, Vol. 3: The Divine Essence and Attributes, 2nd Printing (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2006). Muller also focuses upon specific theologians. See, for example, Richard A. Muller, “Unity and Distinction: The Nature of God in Theology of Lucas Trelcatius, Jr,” in Reformation & Renaissance Review, 10.3 (2008), 315–341. 19 Te Velde, Doctrine of God. 20 John Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575–1650, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, Vol. 29 (Leiden: Brill, 1982). 21 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency; and Andreas J. Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676): Basic Features of His Doctrine of God,” in Reformation and Scholasticism, 205–226. 22 Harm Goris, “Thomism in Zanchi’s Doctrine of God,” in Reformation and Scholasticism, 121–139. 23 Ernst Staehelin, Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf (Basel: Verlag von Helbring & Lichtenhahn, 1956); Ernst Staelhelin, “Die Lehr- und Wanderjahre des Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf,” Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde 44 (1945): 37–77. 24 Barth, CD; Heinrich Faulenbach, Die Struktur der Theologie des Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf (Zurich: EVZ-Verlag, 1967); and Max Eugene Deal, “The Meaning and Method of Systematic Theology in Amandus Polanus” (Ph.D. Thesis, University of Edinburgh, 1980).

Secondary Literature

example of the discontinuity between the Magisterial Reformers and the Reformed Orthodox due to the imposition of an overly rationalistic and dualistic methodology. Karl Barth is perhaps the first scholar to significantly interact with Polanus’ theology. When Barth arrived at the University of Basel, he set a portion of his time to studying those theologians who preceded him at the university. Chief among these was Amandus Polanus. Even a causal reader of Church Dogmatics is familiar with Polanus’ name as Barth references him in almost every volume of his work. In many instances, Barth quotes Polanus positively: even, at times, going so far as to mark Polanus out as the single good example on a particular point from among all the Protestant scholastics. While Barth offers much praise for Polanus throughout his Church Dogmatics, he also provides considerable criticism. Barth detects the influence of Stoicism, Neo-Platonism, and rationalism in Polanus’ theology, and sees Polanus’ use of Ramist dichotomies as an intrusion of dualistic thinking.25 In 1976, Faulenbach expanded upon Barth’s assessment of Polanus in the first monograph devoted to the Polanus’ theology.26 Faulenbach provides in his work a selective but representative overview of the whole of the Syntagma – a feat not elsewhere represented in the secondary literature. Faulenbach includes a section on Polanus’ methodological foundations for theology as well as a lengthy discussion of his doctrine of Scripture. Faulenbach focuses his criticism on Polanus’ use of Aristotelian categories and Medieval Scholastic methodology, and thus seeks to demonstrate the influence of reason and fatalism in Polanus’ thought. Faulenbach also criticizes the central place that he sees predestination and the decree have in Polanus’ theology. In 1980, Deal wrote his doctoral dissertation at the University of Edinburgh in which he investigates the connection between method and content in Polanus’ theology. Unlike Faulenbach, Deal confines his discussion to the first four books of the Syntagma: the portion that can be termed ‘prolegomena’, the doctrine of God, the doctrine of the Trinity, and the works of God (specifically, the decree and predestination). In his analysis, Deal asserts that Polanus was governed by the analytic and dualistic character of his logic in the service of a fundamentally Augustinian metaphysical scheme. While Deal does not use the language of ‘central dogma,’ he does criticize Polanus for allowing the doctrine of predestination to

25 On Barth’s appraisal of Polanus, see Rinse H. Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy (Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing Company, 2015), 35–74 and Ryan Glomsrud, “Karl Barth Between Pietism and Orthodoxy: A Post-Enlightenment Resourcement of Classical Protestantism” (DPhil Thesis, University of Oxford, 2009). 26 See Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy, 38, note 12 who indicates that when Faulenbach brought a copy of his work to Barth, Barth was not well pleased with it. The classification, therefore, of Faulenbach as ‘broadly Barthian or Neo-Orthodox’ should be understood in this light.

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obscure God’s revelation of himself in Christ. Further, both Deal and Faulenbach criticize Polanus for not starting his doctrine of God, and indeed the whole of his theology, with the Trinity. These two works are marked by the imposition of Barthian concepts onto the words and categories that Polanus employed without a contextual and historical analysis of the distinctions used by Polanus.27 The second category of scholarship is represented by Muller, Letham, Reeling Brouwer, and E. P. Meijering.28 These scholars present the relationship between the Reformers and the Reformed scholastics in terms of broad continuity and seek to correct the assertion that Reformed scholasticism was essentially rationalistic, or anything other than a methodology. While Polanus features in their work, none of the scholars represented in this second category provide more than a general overview of or introduction to Polanus’ thought, nor do they provide a focused or in-depth study of Polanus’ methodology or doctrine. Muller deals with the issue of the discontinuity thesis that sought to separate Calvin from the “Calvinists” in Christ and the Decree.29 In particular, Muller interacts with Polanus and William Perkins as representatives of the early Reformed scholastic period, demonstrating that the doctrine of predestination was not a “central dogma” for either theologian and therefore did not control or dominate their doctrinal formulations. Muller also repeatedly refers to Polanus in Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics, a work seeking to provide further evidence of the continuity of thought between medieval scholasticism, the Reformation, and post-Reformation Reformed scholasticism.30 Robert Letham opines in 1990 that, despite the significance of his theology and work, Polanus remains a “neglected theologian.” Letham provides a brief biography, a survey of extant scholarship, and an overview of the two major theological works by Polanus: the Partitiones theologiae and the Syntagma theologiae Christianae.31 In 2015, Rinse H. Reeling Brouwer investigates the connection between Karl Barth and Polanus, asserting that Barth misunderstood Polanus’ theology on its own terms by reading Polanus through the lens of modernity. Therefore, according to

27 On Faulenbach and Deal’s view of Polanus, see also Robert Letham, “Amandus Polanus: A Neglected Theologian?” Sixteenth Century Journal XXI, no. 3 (1990): 467; Byung Soo Han, Symphonia Catholica: The Merger of Patristic and Contemporary Sources in the Theological Method of Amandus Polanus (1561–1610), Reformed Historical Theology, Vol. 30 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecth, 2015), 32; and te Velde, Doctrine of God, 30. 28 Specific works include: Muller, PRDL; Muller, Christ and the Decree; Letham, “Amandus Polanus”; Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy; and E. P. Meijering, “The Fathers and Calvinist Orthodoxy: Systematic Theology – A. Polanus, J. Wolleb and F. Turrettini,” in The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists, Vol 1 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 867–888. 29 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 129–173. 30 Muller, PRRD, passim. 31 Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 463–476.

Secondary Literature

Reeling Brouwer, Barth tends to interpret Polanus as though their contexts were identical and also sees dualism in Polanus’ consistent use of Ramist dichotomies instead of simply seeing duality.32 E. P. Meijering discusses the use of church Fathers in Polanus’ systematic theology. He includes references found throughout the Syntagma. Meijering concludes that Polanus’ usage of the church Fathers was, like that of Wolleb and Turrettini, according to the phenomenon of testes Veritatis in that these Reformed orthodox authors used the fathers as authorities only to the extent that they reflected Scripture.33 The third category of scholarship, represented by Han and my own work, uses the broad historiographical methodology of the newer scholarship to study Polanus’ methodology and theology in his own context.34 This category is differentiated from the previous one in that it focuses specifically upon Polanus and his work. In this way, the scholars in this category seek to ensure that Polanus does not remain a ‘neglected theologian,’ and to contribute to the expanding of scholarship into Reformed orthodoxy more generally, as prompted by Muller in his own work.35 In his work of 2015, Han focuses upon Polanus’ use of Patristic sources and analyzes the impact of this source material upon Polanus’ theological method, focusing upon various loci set forth in the Partitiones and Syntagma. Thus, Han’s work provides insight into one particular aspect of Reformed Orthodox methodology in general through the lens of Polanus’ particular methodology. It seeks to correct at least one aspect of the older scholarship’s claim that usage of an Augustinian and/or Aristotelian method resulted in a rationalistic theology departing from Calvin and the Reformation. As his focus is upon the sources for Polanus’ theology, however, Han provides only a cursory and selective treatment of the actual doctrines that are found in Polanus’ work. In this third category of research, I have written an article that places Polanus’ archetypal/ectypal distinction in the context of what could be termed his ‘prolegomena’ in book one of the Syntagma theologicae christianae.36 This work builds upon the analysis of this distinction in Franciscus Junius by Willem van Asselt and shows the ways in which Polanus adopts and adapts Junius’ use of a distinction that is rooted in the in se/in nobis distinction of John Duns Scotus.37

32 33 34 35

Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy, 35–74. Meijering, “The Fathers and Calvinist Orthodoxy,” 868. Han, Symphonia Catholica. Muller, PRRD, 2:18, “Despite the length of the study, I have been continually aware that it barely scratches the surface of the subject.” Indeed, Muller specifically encourages works such as this one. 36 Stephen Tipton, “Defining ‘Our Theology,’ Amandus Polanus on the Fundamental Task of the Theologian,” Journal of Reformed Theology 10, no. 4 (2016): 291–313. 37 See Willem J. van Asselt, “The Fundamental Meaning of Theology: Archetypal and Ectypal Theology in Seventeenth-Century Reformed Thought,” Westminster Theological Journal 64 (2002): 319–336.

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This brief overview of extant scholarship into Polanus demonstrates that there are significant gaps in research. While Faulenbach seeks to analyze the structure of Polanus’ theology generally, and while Deal seeks to analyze Polanus’ doctrine of God more specifically, neither scholar seeks to analyze Polanus in a contextual and historical way. Further, in focusing upon Polanus’ reception of Patristic sources, Han deals with only one small portion of the whole of Polanus’ theological method. Much more work remains to be done on this significant, if heretofore largely neglected, theologian.

1.3

The Main Research Question

At its core, this study seeks to provide a contextual and analytic exposition of specific portions of Polanus’ doctrine of God as they are set forth in the Syntagma theologia christinae. The main research question this work seeks to answer is focused upon two aspects of Polanus’ doctrine of God: first, what is his doctrine of God, and second, what is the ground, method, and goal of his doctrine of God. While I am interested in providing a summary and analysis of Polanus’ doctrine of God, and in discussing the various opinions of Polanus’ theology and methodology more broadly, I also desire to seek to understand what Polanus is ‘doing’ in his theology. In particular, I wish to discuss the place of Scripture and reason in Polanus’ doctrine of God as well as the doxological and Trinitarian aim of that doctrine. This work will therefore provide a discussion and evaluation of Polanus’ doctrine of God as well as a critical engagement with the secondary literature (both on Reformed orthodoxy broadly, and on Polanus more specifically). While this study will place Polanus within the context of early Reformed orthodox theology, my primary focus is upon the theology of Amandus Polanus. Polanus has been chosen for a variety of reasons. First, Polanus is often regarded as an important representative of early Reformed orthodox theology. Muller, for instance, does this implicitly as he often uses Polanus to provide an orientation to the various doctrines Muller discusses in Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics.38 In his introduction to Heppe’s Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche, Bizer describes Polanus as “a conserving epigone, to a large extent also a compiler.”39 Letham describes Polanus in this way:

38 E.g., Muller, PRRD, 3:159, 227, 255. See also below, Chapter 9.2. 39 Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy, 61, fn. 98. Reeling Brouwer translates a quote from Ernst Bizer, “Einführung,” in Heppe, Die Dogmatik, xlvii, “wesentlich bewahrender Epigone, weithin auch Kompilator.”

The Main Research Question

Polanus stands, in chronological terms, at the mid-point of this period [i.e., between the works of Beza and Zanchi and the Synod of Dordt]; moreover, he is essentially a synthesizer. His is not the contribution of creative genius, and no daring new departures are seen in his works. Rather, as a consolidator, a preserver of the tradition, he brings the whole field of theology together into a systematic unity. He may be highly representative of what was actually being taught in the Reformed Church of his day and in the years following. Indeed, Faulenbach can call him one of the fathers of Reformed orthodoxy.40

Given the cooperative and institutional nature of Reformed scholastic theology, however, “creative genius” and “daring new departures” are hardly to be anticipated. Therefore, in consulting a consolidator and a compiler, one may expect to find in Polanus a theology that is in broad continuity not only with the Reformation and Reformed orthodox theologians who proceed him, but also with the periods of Reformed orthodoxy that comes after him. At the same time, while he may be “highly representative” of Reformed orthodox thought, I will demonstrate Polanus’ own particular perspective on Reformed theology. As one of the earlier ‘systematizers’ of theology during the Reformed orthodox period who was “one of the most significant framers of early orthodox Reformed theology, the author of a system, the Syntagma theologiae, that provided the Reformed tradition with one of the more cohesive and fully-developed theologies of the era,” I will demonstrate how Polanus draws from earlier formulations and makes them his own.41 Second, much of the work that has been accomplished on Polanus is either: a) of the ‘older’ scholarship that sees Polanus as either developing this theology from the foundation of predestination (a ‘central dogma’ by another name) or as being overly rationalistic (or both); or b) of the ‘newer’ scholarship but is either not focused specifically upon Polanus, or is focused upon a different aspect of Polanus’ work and thought. Thus, I contend that the scholarly view of Polanus is incomplete. While my focus is upon Amandus Polanus, it is specifically upon one particular aspect of his theology: indeed, I focus upon a particular aspect of his doctrine 40 Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 464. Letham refers to Faulenbach, Die Struktur, vii. Compare, however, the above quote with Robert Letham, “Polanus, Amandus (1561–1610)” in Donald K. McKim, ed., Encyclopedia of the Reformed Faith (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1992), 280–281, “Polanus is a bridge between the pristine Reformed theology and orthodoxy, scholastic in constructing theology with academic precision and logical rigor but, with a strong doctrine of God, oriented to Christological, soteriological, and practical concerns.” Note, in particular, the language that suggests a divergence between Reformed theology (i.e., as that which is “pristine”) and later Reformed scholasticism. Such discontinuity language is missing from the earlier Sixteenth Century Journal article. 41 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 15. See also Amy Burnett, Teaching the Reformation: Ministers and Their Message in Basel, 1529–1629 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 142.

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of God. According to te Velde, Reformed orthodox discussions of God generally revolved around five issues: God’s names, his being, his attributes, his works, and his persons.42 This list includes the oneness of God’s essential nature, the three divine persons, as well as the works of God in creation and providence. While all five of these issues deal with God, the first three (names, being, and attributes) can be said to “constitute the doctrine of God in a strict sense.”43 Thus, following te Velde, my focus is upon Polanus’ doctrine of God in this ‘strict sense’: with the terminological substitution of ‘essential properties’ for ‘attributes.’ I have chosen to focus upon the doctrine of God because of its foundational place within Polanus’ theology. Letham observes that “Polanus’s most powerful single theme is the doctrine of God.”44 Furthermore, the doctrine of God is where Polanus begins to put into practice the principles that he lays out in book one of the Syntagma (and are discussed in chapter three, below). The doctrine of God is also where the majority of the ‘older’ secondary literature interacts with Polanus. By focusing attention here, I will therefore not only be able to evaluate that ‘older’ scholarship but also, where appropriate, to correct it. In considering this portion of Polanus’ theology, I will seek to pay particular attention to his organization and to the relative depth with which he considers each topic.45 Thus, I discuss the essence, existence, names, and initial distinctions of properties in one chapter, but develop Polanus’ doctrine of the divine wisdom and will each in their own chapter. As will be demonstrated, however, for Polanus the doctrines of the Trinity and the divine operations are very much part of the doctrine of God – a phrase which is, after all, not native to the Syntagma. Therefore, while a fully detailed discussion of these important aspects of Polanus’ doctrine of God as a whole is beyond the scope of this dissertation, two excursus are included in order to provide a basis upon which to evaluate some of the claims of the secondary literature.

42 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 111. 43 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 111. 44 Letham, “Polanus,” in Encyclopedia of the Reformed Faith, 281. See also Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism, 240, “The ‘De Deo’ locus... was the realm of traditional scholastic philosophical theology.” 45 In this, I seek to take seriously the comment from Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy, 38, who, speaking of Faulenbach, says “Although he analyses the structure of Polanus’ theology and has a chapter on logic, his presentation in fact completely disregards the Ramist shape Polanus gives to his Syntagma. As such, Faulenbach’s presentation of the doctrinal materials is dissociated from Polanus’ table of contents. One wonders whether an author is really taken seriously, if treated in this way.” I digress from Polanus’ organization at two points, however. First, I include a brief excursus on the Trinity well before Polanus discusses that locus. See below, Chapter 4.6.2. Additionally, I consider Polanus’ treatment of the gloria Dei as an essential property in connection with the other properties that Polanus groups it with (i.e., life, immortality, and blessedness).

The Main Research Question

In addition, I will focus upon the negative appraisal of Polanus’ theology by Faulenbach and Deal. While this is not the central focus of this work (i.e., my intention is not to merely offer a rebuttal to particular positions), I intend to show that much of their criticism (and certainly their main thesis) is a distortion of Polanus’ theology.46 Specifically, while Faulenbach and Deal are more characteristic of the broadly Barthian or Neo-orthodox school than that of Schweitzer, Baur, Gass, Weber, Althaus, or Heppe, their answers to the basic questions of rationality and central dogma are broadly in line with the answers given by these other scholars. From Faulenbach and Deal three distinct criticisms of Polanus’ doctrine can be synthesized. The first major criticism is the supposed imposition of rationalism upon his doctrinal formulations. This is a criticism that both Faulenbach and Deal have with Polanus. In this regard, Faulenbach states: Polanus offers a sum of theology as knowledge about God and his will. It is a new scholasticism, which has in him a first great representative among the Reformed. He follows a trait of his time to expand the doctrinal system. Theology as science follows ‘empirically’ verifiable laws of logic. The question of cause and effect determines Polanus’ thinking. This rational empiricism marks the contemporary historical tie of theology to the methodology of a prevailing Aristotelianism, which shapes all sciences.47

Elsewhere, Faulenbach is struck by Polanus’ “conscious use of reason… [that is] an element which penetrates orthodox theology through the inclusion of the Aristotelian method of science.”48 Likewise, Deal’s primary criticism of Polanus’ doctrine of God is that his theological thinking, “seems governed by the analytic and deductive character of his logic in the service of a fundamentally Augustinian metaphysical scheme.”49 Thus, according to these scholars, Polanus’ theological

46 Note that Barth’s critical engagement with Polanus is ably covered by Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy. Specific criticisms that Barth raises will be handled individually below, in the various chapters which deal with Polanus’ doctrinal discussions. 47 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 321, “Polan bietet eine Summe der Theologie als Erkenntnis über Gott und seinen Willen. Es ist eine neue Scholastik, die in ihm einen ersten großen Vertreter unter den Reformierten hat. Er folgt einem Zug seiner Zeit, die Lehrsysteme auszubauen. Die Theologie als Wissenschaft folgt ‚empirisch‘ nachprüfbaren Gesetzen der Logik. Die Frage nach Ursache und Wirkung bestimmt das Denken Polans. Dieser rationale Empirismus kennzeichnet die zeitgeschichtliche Gebundenheit der Theologie an die Methodik des vorherrschenden Aristotelismus, der alle Wissenschaften formt.” 48 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 138, “Auffallend ist das bewußte Verwenden der Vernunft. Dies ist ein Element, das in die orthodoxe Theologie eindringt durch die Aufnahme der aristotelisch bestimmten Wissenschaftsmethode.” 49 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 124–25.

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inquiry is dominated by a particular methodology – one that relegates the teaching of Scripture behind logic and reason. The second major criticism is the place that the doctrine of God’s decrees has in the Syntagma. Faulenbach, in particular, sees the decree as central to Polanus’ theology and states that: “The doctrine of God and his decrees cannot be the starting point of Christian doctrine.”50 For Faulenbach, Polanus’ doctrine of God is grounded upon, guided by, and pointed towards the doctrine of an immutable decree. Similarly, Deal states that “the doctrine of the decrees threatens the older orthodox systematicians with the restrictions of the formal requirement of metaphysics, rather than the more suggestive but multi-relational model of the Holy Trinity.”51 For Deal, the fact that the whole of Polanus’ theology is burdened with metaphysical restrictions is evidenced by the fact that Polanus chose to discuss the divine decree as part of his exposition of God’s will.52 This last statement of Deal also points to the third major criticism. Deal claims that “unless the Triune nature of God’s revelation is explored from the very outset, one has sought for axioms and principles at the periphery of the Christian revelation.”53 Thus, because Polanus begins with such ‘axioms and principles,’ the whole of his doctrine of God (not to mention his doctrine of theology as archetypal and ectypal, or his doctrine of Scripture) is focused upon what is merely peripheral, rather than what is central, to the teaching of Scripture. Deal believes that by focusing on this periphery, Polanus has compounded his error because this “analytic process leaves the Trinity as a ‘problem’ for the doctrine of God and his perfect attributes.”54 Therefore, by not starting at what Deal considers central to revelation, Polanus must ‘explain away’ whatever axioms and principles he has found concerning God’s one, simple, essence when he arrives at the doctrine of the divine persons. From these various criticisms, a broad picture of the ‘older’ appraisal of Polanus emerges. Faulenbach and Deal’s combined critical engagement with Polanus can be summarized as follows: first, the doctrine of the divine decrees plays a foundation

50 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 322, “Die Gottes- und Dekretenlehre kann nicht Ausgangspunkt der christlichen Lehre sein.” 51 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 115. 52 See below, Chapter 8.5.4. 53 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 125. 54 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 125 In this criticism, Deal is echoing closely the general statement about Reformed orthodoxy made by Barth, CD, I/1, 300–301, “It is … hard to see how what is distinctive for this God can be made clear if, as has constantly happened in Roman Catholic and Protestant dogmatics both old and new, the question of who God is, which is the business of the doctrine of the Trinity to answer, is held in reserve, and the first question to be treated is that of the That and the What of God, as though these could be defined otherwise than on the presupposition of Who.” This quote is reproduced in Thomas F. Torrance, “The Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition,” Reformed Review 54, no. 1 (2000): 5–6.

The Main Research Question

role in this theology; second, the doctrine of the Trinity (which should play a foundational role) is therefore obscured or neglected; and third, that primary reason for the first two criticisms is the influence of rationalism upon Polanus’ thought. The criticism of Faulenbach and Deal, however, also provides a rough scaffolding within which to consider Polanus’ doctrine of God as a whole. In other words, they appear to be asking good questions, however much I may eventually come to disagree with their answers. I will therefore seek to ascertain the role that the divine decree, logic and reason, and the Trinity have in Polanus’ doctrine of God. Further, I will use these discussions to answer three derivative questions of my own: 1. First, what is the foundation upon which Polanus’ doctrine of God is built? 2. Second, what is the goal or end for which Polanus expends so much effort to write the Syntagma in the first place? 3. Third, what methodology does he uses to get from a foundation to that final goal?55 The answer that I will seek to demonstrate in this work is that the foundation of Polanus’ theology is Scripture (and not reason); the goal of Polanus’ theology is doxology and the worship of the Triune God; and the method that Polanus employs to move from a foundation of Scripture to the end goal of doxology is a rational (but not rationalistic) exposition of Scripture. I will show that, when understood in its own context, Polanus’ theology is Word based and Word centered, that he seeks to develop in his readers a sense of awe in God and a desire to worship God, and that he has before him from the very beginning not a peripheral abstraction of God, but none other than the Triune God of Scripture: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Along the way, I will have opportunity to consider a number of auxiliary questions that arise organically from the text of the Syntagma. This will include continuity and discontinuity between Polanus and his medieval and Reformed predecessors and his Reformed orthodox contemporaries. I will also consider several specific criticisms of Polanus’ work from a wide variety of theological and methodological backgrounds (not all of which appraise Polanus negatively). A complete and synthetic discussion of these issues, however, will remain in the background as I consider Polanus’ doctrine of God as he sets it forth. Thus, I will return to the answers Polanus’ doctrine of God’s essence, names, and essential properties provides to these questions and issues in the final chapter.

55 Note that Faulenbach and Deal primarily concern themselves with the first and last question, to which they would give the same answer: Polanus’ doctrine is founded upon rationalism and is methodologically rationalistic.

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The current study, however, will not be able to answer all questions about Polanus’ doctrine of God or cover every aspect of that doctrine with the same detail. This work will therefore not seek to attempt to bring Polanus into conversation with later theologians, theological movements, or theological controversies. My primary focus is to understand Polanus within his own context. That does not mean, however, that such conversations are unfruitful or outside the scope of Historical Theology – only that I have had to be selective in the questions I have chosen to take up.

1.4

Methodological Considerations

This work will emphasize an interpretation of Polanus’ doctrine of God utilizing original sources, examined in their original context. The methodology proposed is broadly based upon the “Cambridge school” of intellectual history and is in line with the methodological presuppositions promulgated by Willem van Asselt and Eef Dekker in Reformation and Scholasticism.56 Those presuppositions are given by van Asselt and Dekker as follows: 1. “Scholasticism is a scientific method of research and teaching, and does as such not have a doctrinal content, neither does it have reason as its foundation. 2. There is a continuity between the Medieval, Reformation and Post-Reformation Era (which is of course, not to deny that there are many differences). 3. ‘Aristotelianism’ is exceedingly problematic when applied with a broad brush, and should rather be avoided if used unspecified. 4. Syllogisms are used by any person in a reasoning process (but not always consciously and explicitly), and are therefore, in themselves, not a sign of anything beyond that reasoning process, let alone of Aristotelianism. 5. The scornful way in which Luther and Calvin treated scholasticism is not to be taken as an overall hermeneutical principle to read scholasticism. 6. Let the scholastics themselves define scholasticism. 7. Protestant scholasticism does not proceed by abstracting proof texts out of Scripture, nor does Medieval scholasticism avoid or neglect Scripture and scriptural language. 8. Christian faith, and therefore, Christian theology, has its own view of life, its own frame of thought and is not to be identified with any philosophical system.

56 See Quentin Skinner, “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas,” History and Theory, vol. 8, no. 1 (1969): 3–53; Mark Bevir, The Logic of the History of Ideas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Elizabeth Clark, History, Theory, Text: Historians and the Linguistic Turn (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 2004); Carl R. Trueman, Histories and Fallacies: Problems Faced in the Writing of History (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010).

Methodological Considerations

9. Parts of that unique Christian frame of thought are the concepts of will and contingency. 10. The relative placement of a locus in a system of doctrine does not as such change its content.”57 These methodological presuppositions provide this study with the advantage of being able to evaluate Polanus’ doctrine of God in his own context. I am therefore freed from a desire either to compare Polanus against a measuring stick of, for example, Calvin or to view his doctrine through the lens of later theologians or systems of doctrine. In specific terms, the methodology I will employ consists in five components.58 First, I will examine Polanus’ doctrine of God in light of his historical and theological context. This means that before I turn to a discussion of Polanus’ doctrine, I will first consider his life, work, and theological foundations. Second, it is important to recognize that Polanus is writing in an academic context: in particular at a university that is training ground for pastors preparing for ministry. Polanus’ context is therefore the precise definition of scholastic: that of the academy or school. At the same time, Polanus’ theology is focused upon the practical needs of training ministers as much as it seeks to engage in polemics with certain Roman Catholic theologians.59 Third, I will proceed with both a structural and a conceptual analysis of Polanus’ doctrine of God. My analysis will be structural in that I will take cognizance of his organization in order to see how that structure elucidates (and sometimes obscures) whatever doctrinal point he is seeking to make. My analysis will also be conceptual since the concepts that Polanus employs are more important than the specific words or phrases he uses. As Beck points out in his own discussion of methodology: “The terms and sentences which one author uses may in another author express different concepts and propositions.”60 Therefore I will pay particular attention to both the way Polanus uses specific terms and to the way these terms signify concepts other theologians may use by other names.

57 Van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction,” 39. 58 These methodological components are dependent upon and modified from those components indicated by Beck., Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679), 8–11. 59 Which, at any rate, would not be outside the skillset required by a Reformed pastor in the early Reformed orthodox period. 60 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 8–9. “Bei verschiedenen Autoren gleich lautende Termini und Sätze können jeweils andere Begriffe und Propositionen ausdrücken.” See also Ulrich Leinsle, Introduction to Scholastic Theology, trans. Michael Miller (Washington: CUA Press, 2010), 55–59.

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Fourth, my conceptual analysis will consider the way in which medieval and Reformed scholastics referred to other texts. At issue here is the manner in which an author makes appeals on the basis of ‘authority.’ According to Willemien Otten: Prior to the scholastic age, when the notion of authority was invoked, it referred mostly to the living testimony of a noted Christian predecessor with whom the author saw himself linked in a continuous tradition. When transplanted to a scholastic context, however, auctoritas soon came to point to a bracketed text, one to used be rather than confirmed or denied.61

This means that an author can quote from another author without signifying that they agree with all of the theological positions held by the quoted author (or even all of the arguments that are part of that theological position). Thus, Polanus can quote from Thomas Aquinas without being himself a Thomist, Duns Scotus without being a Scotist, and Aristotle without being Aristotelian. With respect to this last ‘authority,’ Beck points out that university culture was, for the centuries up to, including, and proceeding past the period of Reformed Orthodoxy is broadly able to be categorized as ‘Aristotelian.’62 This also means that, among both medieval and Reformed scholastics, there existed nothing like the modern understanding of history. One must, therefore, resist the temptation to assume that authors like Polanus are using the same historiographical methodology in their own examination of prior theological figures and positions.63 Finally, Polanus’ work will be analyzed from the perspective of a methodological continuity within the university tradition – one that existed from the medieval scholastic period through, and beyond, Polanus’ own day. Specifically, I consider the impact of (broadly speaking) Thomism, Scotism, and Nominalism as it was transmitted through time of the Reformation period and into Reformed scholasticism.64 Beck here mentions that while such a methodology had previously been

61 Willemien Otten, “Medieval Scholasticism: Past, Present and Future,” Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis, 81 no. 3 (2001): 288. Emphasis original. 62 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 16. 63 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 17. 64 See below, Chapter 2.4, and Richard A. Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy,” Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis, 81 no. 3 (2001): 306–325.

Organization and Structure

applied to Reformation scholarship,65 it has only recently been applied to the study of Reformed orthodoxy and scholasticism.66 In terms of texts, this study will focus primarily upon the Syntagma theologiae Christianae as it contains the most detailed and developed system of his theology.67 The various editions of the Partitiones theologiae and several disputations will be used to cross-reference and expand upon Polanus’ theology. While both of the 1590 and 1599 editions of Polanus’ Partitiones will be consulted, I take as my primary text the 1610 edition of the Syntagma.68 Not only was this edition completed in Polanus’ own lifetime, there are additions to at least the 1617 edition that are of uncertain provenance.69 With regard to Latin quotations in the footnotes, I have sought to expand upon all abbreviations and standardize the spelling without carrying over printer embellishments, ligatures, or accents. While punctuation is maintained in the footnotes, Polanus’ use of italic printing is not. Scripture references are from the English Standard Version unless the portion quoted by Polanus is so textually different as to change the meaning.70 In such cases, the translation provided is my own. Unless otherwise noted, all other translations are my own.

1.5

Organization and Structure

This dissertation is organized into eleven chapters: two of which deal with the broad context within which Polanus lived and worked (Chapters Two through Three); the remainder of which look specifically at Polanus’ doctrine of God (Chapters Four through Ten). Chapter Two considers Polanus in his historical context. This includes

65 See Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology; idem., The Dawn of the Reformation; Steinmetz, Calvin in Context; Steinmetz, Luther in Context; and Richard A. Muller, The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition, Oxford Studies in Historical Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 66 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 17. See also Willem J. van Asselt, The Federal Theology of Johannes Cocceius: (1603–1669), Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, Vol. 100 (Leiden: Brill, 2001); Muller, Christ and the Decree; Muller, PRRD, 4 vols.; Trueman and Clark, Protestant Scholasticism; Van Asselt and Dekker, Reformation and Scholasticism; te Velde, Doctrine of God; Bac, Perfect Will Theology. 67 See below, 2.2 for a discussion of the various works of Polanus. 68 Note that references to the 1590 and 1599 editions of the Partitiones will be designated in the footnotes (i.e., Partitiones (1590)). References to the Syntagma will be to the 1610 edition unless otherwise noted. References to the 1610 edition indicate the column number followed by a letter Polanus uses to indicate relative vertical location on the page. 69 Note that these additions also appear in the 1624 edition. One such addition is discussed in Chapter 8.5.4, below. 70 The Holy Bible, English Standard Version (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001).

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a discussion of his life and work, as well as placing him within the nexus of various aspects of the post-Reformation period: Reformed orthodoxy and scholasticism; and Aristotelianism and Ramism. Finally, I consider those early Reformed orthodox theologians with whom I compare Polanus in the remaining chapters. Chapter Three focuses on three aspects of Polanus’ ‘prolegomena’ in book one of the Syntagma: the definition of theology in terms of wisdom (sapientia); the distinction of true theology into archetypal and ectypal; and Polanus’ discussion of the authority of Scripture. Chapter Four begins with an introductory overview of the second book of the Syntagma, followed by Polanus’ basic description of God and the primary level of distribution into essence and persons. Following this, I discuss various distinctions Polanus makes within the attributes of God before taking up the distinction between names and essential properties. At this point, I also discuss Polanus’ use of distinctions within the one, simple essence of God as well as the distinction he makes between essential properties of the first and second order. In addition, this chapter includes a brief excursus on the Trinity. Chapter Five focuses upon the essential properties of God of the first order: simplicity, perfection, infinity, and immutability. Chapter Six considers the four main properties that come under the essential properties of the second order: life, immortality, blessedness, and glory. Chapter Seven begins a more detailed look at the essential properties that Polanus breaks out beneath the blessedness of God: in this case, God’s essential wisdom. Chapter Eight takes up the divine will as the next property. Chapter Nine considers a number of essential properties that Polanus designates ‘types’ of the divine will: goodness, grace, love, mercy, patience, kindness, justice, truth, and holiness. Chapter Ten focuses upon the final two subtypes of God’s blessedness: his power and his freedom. Chapter Ten also includes an excursus on the divine decree, creation and providence, and human freedom. The Conclusion is more than just a summary of the previous chapters. Rather, the conclusion pulls together the data from chapters four through ten and evaluates them in light of the main thesis of Faulenbach and Deal (given above) as well as the three main questions I have posed: what is the foundation, goal, and primary methodology of Polanus’ theology.

Chapter Two: Polanus’ Historical Context

2.1

Introduction

The primary goal of this work is to understand Polanus’ doctrine of the essence, names, and essential properties of God. No small part of coming to understand the work of any individual is seeking to place them within the matrix of their own personal history: where they were born; where they lived, studied, worked, and raised a family; and the various people with whom they did these things. In a word, an individual’s context must be discerned. To that end, I begin this chapter with a discussion of the relevant historical data concerning Polanus’ life and work. Next, I will seek to place Polanus within the context of the larger setting of early Reformed orthodoxy and scholasticism. In this section, I will give particular attention to Christian Aristotelianism and Ramism, as both are adopted and utilized by Polanus in his doctrinal formulation and organization. From there, I will discuss the seven contemporary early Reformed orthodox theologians who will provide additional historical and theological context for Polanus’ doctrinal formulations in the Syntagma as I turn to the discussion of that work in later chapters.

2.2

The Life of Amandus Polanus

The life of Polanus is described with varying levels of detail in the secondary literature. Staehelin’s book, Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf, is the only biography solely dedicated to the life of Polanus.1 Of the many early modern works detailing ‘the lives of saints,’ several include biographical information on Polanus.2 In addition, much of the secondary literature reproduces a broad outline of Polanus’ life.3 Han, 1 Staehelin, Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf. 2 See Melchior Adams, Vitae Germanorum theologorum, qui superiori seculo Ecclesiam Christi voce scriptisque propagarunt et propugnarunt, congestae et ad annum usque MDCXVIII deductae (Heidelberg: Jonae Rosae, 1620), 805–808; Samuel Clarke, The Marrow of Ecclastical Historie, conteined in the Lives of the Fathers, and other Learned Men and Famous Divines (London: W. Dugard, 1650), 450; and Edward Leigh, A Treatise of Religion & Learning, and of Religious and Learned Men (London: Charles Adams, 1646). Polanus himself provides a brief sketch of his theological education in Partitiones (1590), Praefatio 5–9. 3 This includes those works specifically on Polanus, such as Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 1–4; Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 1–17; Han, Symphonia Catholica, 33–54; and Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 463. Further, several works that touch upon Polanus provide biographical detail, including: James Isaac Good, History of the Swiss Church since the Reformation (Publication and Sunday School Board of

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Chapter Two: Polanus’ Historical Context

in particular, provides considerable new research concerning the academic history, theological background, and administrative turmoil surrounding the St. Elizabeth Gymnasium in Breslau.4 What follows is a brief survey of the extant material drawn mainly from the secondary literature that focuses upon Polanus’ educational and professional life in order to sketch out the major influences upon his thought and the primary focus of his own work.5 2.2.1

Early Years and Education

Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf was born on December 16, 1561, in Troppau, Silesia.6 He was one of nine children born to Heinrich and Martha Polan, about whom little else is known.7 He entered the Gymnasium of St. Elizabeth in Breslau under the rectorship of Petrus Vincentius.8 It was here that Polanus was instructed in “the summary of the faith” (summa fide) over a period of six years.9 St. Elizabeth was also where he was introduced to Greek grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic through the textbooks of Philip Melanchthon.10 Han describes the St. Elizabeth Gymnasium as having been “established on a blend of mild Lutheranism and the humanistic ideal.”11 Despite this (or perhaps because its Lutheranism was only ‘mild’), Polanus came into contact with Reformed theology in some form and he appears to have already been in basic agreement with the tenets of the Reformed faith before he departed from Breslau.12

4 5

6 7 8

9 10 11 12

the Reformed Church in the United States, 1913), 66–68; Hans R. Guggisberg, Basel in the Sixteenth Century: Aspects of the City Republic before, during, and after the Reformation (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982), 48; Muller, Christ and the Decree, 130; Amy Nelson Burnett, Teaching the Reformation: Ministers and Their Message in Basel, 1529–1629 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 139–142; Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy, 36; and McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 141–143. Han, Symphonia Catholica, 33–39. Polanus does refer to his own life in several of the prefaces to his works. These are included below. The majority of the knowledge his life and times, however, is the product of many scholars piecing together the information available. This section is merely seeks to summarize these data. Han, Symphonia Catholica, 33. Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 1. See also Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 139. On Vincentius’ rectorship, see Han, Symphonia Catholica, 36–37. Han, Symphonia Catholica, 33 fn. 8, notes that Gustav Bauch, Geschichte des Breslauer Schulwesens in der Zeit der Reformation (Breslau, 1911) provides the general history of Breslau in the time of the Reformation. Polanus, Partitiones (1590), praefatio, 5, “in quo sex annos summa fide institutis sum.” Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 139. Han, Symphonia Catholica, 38. Han, Symphonia Catholica, 40. Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 1, claims that it was during this time in Breslau that Polanus was “introduced to the works of Calvin and Beza and became a strong supporter of their teaching on predestination.”

The Life of Amandus Polanus

In April of 1583, Polanus began his formal academic training at the University of Tübingen.13 There he was introduced to the teaching of Jacob Schegk (1511–1587), professor of medicine and philosophy. It is likely that Polanus received further instruction in the particulars of Aristotelian philosophy from Schegk.14 It was also while Polanus was in Tübingen that he was exposed to an important intra-Protestant debate which took place between the Lutheran Jacob Andreas (1525–1590) and Lambert Daneau (1535–1590) on election, grace, and the proper interpretation of Romans 9:11ff.15 Polanus supported Daneau in that debate and, because of this support, was encouraged by Schegk to leave Tübingen and enroll at the University of Basel.16 Polanus did so, arriving at Basel in July of 1583.17 It was during this time in Basel that Polanus first encountered Johan Jakob Grynaeus (1540–1617), who was Professor of Old Testament at that time at the University of Basel.18 Polanus lived with Grynaeus for a time and was heavily influenced by him both personally and theologically.19 According to Han, the “prevailing evangelical tradition” in Basel at this time was a mixture of an older Lutheranism, sustained by Jacob Sulzer, and a newer Reformed orthodoxy brought in by Grynaeus.20 Grynaeus had studied in Basel from 1551 to 1558 and had matriculated at Tübingen in 1563, where he, like his later protégé, heard the lectures of Jacob Schegk. Grynaeus received his doctorate from Tübingen in 1565 and almost a decade later was appointed Professor of Old Testament at the University of Basel.21 With this appointment, Grynaeus instituted a number of changes to theological education in Basel. Through these changes, Grynaeus was able to “introduce a heretofore unaccustomed degree of institutional structure, methodological rigor, theological thoroughness, and broad publicity [for the university]”.22 Polanus learned Grynaeus’ particular dialectic method, which included the use of definitions and divisions, the foundational importance of Scripture, and the need

13 See Han, Symphonia Catholica, 40; Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 1; and Adams, Vitae Germanorum, 805–806. 14 See Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 1, who points out that Emil Weber had called Shegk the “Vater und Bahnbrecher der neuen Scholastik.” 15 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 1. Han, Symphonia Catholica, 40, points to several places in Polanus, Logicae, in which Polanus demonstrates his support of Daneau over against Andrea. See also Adams, Vitae Germanorum, 805–806. 16 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 40. 17 Clarke, Marrow, 450. 18 For biographical information on Grynaeus, see Adams, Vitae Germanorum, 868–880; Clarke, Marrow, 900; Han, Symphonia Catholica, 54–64; and Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 134–139. 19 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 24. 20 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 46. 21 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 134. 22 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 135.

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to apply doctrine.23 While this general methodology is broadly compatible with Ramism (on which, see below, section 2.4.2), Grynaeus was not himself a Ramist. At the same time, he was neither opposed to Ramism itself nor to his students and colleagues using Ramist methodology.24 Thus, while Polanus would encounter the dialectical methodology of Peter Ramus later on in his academic career, this initial introduction to a form of theology that is structurally similar no doubt laid a foundation onto which Ramist principles would fit nicely. Polanus was so grateful for his tutelage that he later named Grynaeus both father-in-law and his academic father (socer et pater meus).25 In a relatively short period of time, Polanus’ exegetical and theological methodology was profoundly impacted by Grynaeus’ efforts to establish Reformed orthodoxy in Basel.26 2.2.2

Geneva and Travels

In 1584, Grynaeus was called by Johann Casimir (1543–1592), regent to his nephew the Palatine Elector Count Frederick IV (1574–1610), to reintroduce Reformed theology at the University of Heidelberg.27 Polanus first accompanied Grynaeus to Heidelberg, but later that same year travelled to Geneva, where Polanus professed to have “[enjoyed] a great privilege of experiencing the lectures and disputations of the most accurate and sharpened theologian, Theodore Beza.”28 While Polanus did not stay long in Geneva, he indicated that it was from this time that he did not cease collecting and refining his set of theological definitions and distinctions,

23 See also Polanus, Partitiones (1590), Praefatio 6, “Ac tum, ne studium meum incertum ac vagum esset, cepi illud beneficio artis Logicae certis limitibus et finibus circumscribere, et tum in praelectionibus et disputationibus, tum praecipue in privata Scipturae sacrae meditatione definitiones et distributiones, in quibus maximum solidae eruditionis et scientiae momentum situm est, observare, excerpere, colligere et ex praescripto legum Methodi in ordinem redigere.” 24 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 137–138. Burnett says, “The Aristotelian structure of Grynaeus’s analysis makes his use of a dichotomized table rather surprising, and indeed, this was one of the few times Grynaeus used the dichotomies so characteristic of Ramist method.” 25 Polanus, Partitiones (1590), Praefatio. See also Han, Symphonia Catholica, 41. 26 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 48. See also Polanus, Partitiones (1590), praefatio 6, “Post Tubingam me contuli inde singulari providentia misericordis Dei Basileam sum delatus, ubi sincerissimum et fidissimum studii Theologici ducem Reverendum et excellentissimum virum D. Iohannem Iacobum Grynaeum mihi dedit.” 27 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 135. See also Polanus, Partitiones (1590), Praefatio 7; Jill Raitt, “The Elector John Casimir, Queen Elizabeth and the Protestant League,” in Controversy and Conciliation, eds., Derk J. Visser and Dikran Y. Hadidian (Alison Park: Pickwick, 1986), 117–145; and Geoffrey Parker, ed., The Thirty Years War, 2nd edition (New York: Rutledge, 1997). 28 Polanus, Partitiones (1590), Praefatio 6. See also Clarke, Marrow, 450; Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 464; and Han, Symphonia Catholica, 49.

The Life of Amandus Polanus

which would eventually appear in the form of the Partitiones theologicae, the first edition of which was published in 1589.29 Polanus’ previous mentor, Grynaeus, was called back to Basel in 1585 and was installed as both Professor of New Testament at the University and Cathedral Pastor.30 Polanus returned to Basel that same year to continue his theological studies. It was at this point that he was more formally introduced to the works of Peter Ramus.31 According to Han, “at the turn of the sixteenth century, the methodological influence of Ramism increased at the University of Basel and culminated in Polanus’ passionate appreciation of it in his theological work.”32 For the next five years, Polanus travelled frequently between Geneva, Heidelberg, Namiest and Basel.33 He was for a time tutor of Dionysius von Zierotin (1564–1615), a young Bohemian noble, and was at one point the theological superintendent to a Bohemian-Marienschen Brethren fellowship in Namiest. On October 29, 1590, Polanus received his doctoral degree from the University of Basel after an oral defense presided over by Johannes Brandmüller (1533–1596), who was at that time the professor of Old Testament.34 Polanus continued to study and prepare in hopes of obtaining a position at the University of Basel with his mentor Grynaeus – even to the point of improving this Hebrew with a Jewish rabbi to bolster his credentials for the position of Professor of Old Testament.35 He returned to Basel in 1596, a few months before Brandmüller died. 2.2.3

Professor of Old Testament

That same year, Polanus’ desire was fulfilled, and his preparation was rewarded when he was appointed to fill Brandmüller’s position as professor of Old Testament. Also that same year, Polanus was married to Maria, a daughter of his mentor Grynaeus.36 For the next fourteen years, Polanus and Grynaeus would continue to shape the university and city of Basel according to the Reformed faith.37 Basel

29 Polanus, Enchiridii Locorum Communium Theologicorum, Rerum, Exemplorum, atque Phrasium sacrarum (Basel: Konrad von Waldkirch, 1589), epistola. See also Han, Symphonia Catholica, 50. 30 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 135. 31 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 19; Howard Hotson, Commonplace Learning: Ramism and Its German Ramifications 1543–1630 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007); and Han, Symphonia Catholica, 50. 32 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 50–51. 33 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 51. 34 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 140. See also Adams, Vitae Germanorum, 806; and Staehelin, Amandus Polanus, 20. 35 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 51. 36 Staehelin, Amandus Polanus, 30. 37 Muller, Christ and the Decree, 130.

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had long been a foundational city in the establishment of the Reformed church.38 It was rather unique among the cities that embraced the Reformation in that it had an established system for training, installing, and supervising pastors. Indeed, Burnett states, “Basel was the only Protestant city outside of Wittenberg that had a university available to train its pastors as early as the 1520’s.”39 While the middle of the sixteenth century was marked by sympathies to Lutheranism in the teachings of Kock and Sulzer, by the time Grynaeus was called back to the city, both men had died. Grynaeus and the Reformed faith became very popular in Basel – both with the city residents and the students at the university. Polanus’ appointment as Professor of Old Testament in 1596 provided additional reinforcement to Grynaeus.40 In particular, Polanus continued in the tradition he had learned under Grynaeus – the emphasis on the teaching of Scripture and the practical application of theology.41 Grynaeus’ and Polanus’ reforms in the University of Basel also proved popular to students from outside that city. Given Basel’s location on the border between the Swiss cities to the south and the German cities to the north, the city had long been an economic, political, and ideological trading post between these two regions.42 With the allegiances of such universities as Heidelberg and Tübingen changing back and forth with the religious leanings of particular Elector Counts, many German, Bohemian, and Moravian students came to the University to study. Polanus was especially popular with students from Bohemia and Moravia, almost certainly stemming from his travels and teaching in that region prior to his appointment as Professor of Old Testament.43 Further, the influx of students from Bohemia and Moravia meant that there were more potential pastors in Basel than there were posts for graduates. This led to the decision, around the time of Polanus’ installation as Professor of Old Testament, that only those who had attained a Master’s degree could hold pastoral posts in Basel.44 This meant that Polanus and Grynaeus had even more time to inculcate Reformed orthodoxy into their students as they prepared themselves for the pastorate.

38 See Amy Nelson Burnett, “Generational Conflict in the Late Reformation: The Basel Paroxysm,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History XXXII:2 (Autumn, 2001): 222. 39 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 11. 40 See Adams, Vitae Germanorum, 806; Staehelin, Amandus Polanus, 26–29; and Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 34. 41 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 52. 42 For Basel’s particular relationship with the cities and nations surrounding her, see Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 29–33. 43 Guggisberg, Basel in the Sixteenth Century, 48. 44 Amy Nelson Burnett, “The Educational Roots of Reformed Scholasticism: Dialectic and Scriptural Exegesis in the Sixteenth Century,” Dutch Review of Church History 84 (2004): 315.

The Life of Amandus Polanus

Amandus Polanus died on July 8, 1610, at the relatively young age of 48. He was the victim of an outbreak of plague in the city of Basel.45 He was survived by his wife and three daughters: Susane, Salome, and Irene.46 2.2.4

Academic Disputations at the University of Basel

One feature of academic life that Grynaeus and Polanus emphasized was the scholastic practice of disputations. Originating in universities during the medieval scholastic period, disputations were a continuing feature at the University of Basel, as well as being introduced into the various Reformed institutions in the period of Reformed orthodoxy.47 In a disputation, a presiding professor would present a general theological topic upon which a respondent would develop a number of theses and defend them against a number of objections posed by either fellow students or other professors.48 According to te Velde, disputations “[were] intended to exercise the student’s thinking power and skill in debate and discussion, and to help them digest what they learned.”49 While these disputations preceded the tenure of Grynaeus and Polanus in the scholastic life of the University of Basel, the number of these disputations did increase under them. Furthermore, Grynaeus and Polanus were eager to have these disputations published and distributed abroad – both to increase the dissemination of Reformed theology and to “publicize the type of theology that was being taught there.”50 Thus the publishing of these disputations served to increase the stature of the University of Basel more broadly in the Reformed world and also served as advertisements for prospective students. Burnett catalogs several important data points in her review of the printed disputations in the period between 1576 and 1625. She categorizes these disputations under five broad headings based upon what she detects is the disputation’s primary

45 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 4. On the plague in Switzerland in that era, see Edward A. Eckhert, “Boundary Formation and Diffusion of Plague: Swiss Epidemics from 1562 to 1669,” Annales de Démographie Historique (1978): 49–80. 46 Han, Symphonia Catholica, 53. 47 See Pieter Rouwendal, “The Method of the Schools: Medieval Scholasticism,” in van Asselt, et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 59–61; Andreas J. Beck and Dolf te Velde, “The Synopsis of a Purer Theology in Its Historical and Theological Context,” in Synopsis Purioris Theologiae / Synopsis of a Purer Theology, Latin Text and English Translations: Volume 3, Disputations 43–52, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Traditions, Volume 222/9 (Leiden: Brill, 2020): 29–32; and McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 129. 48 Beck and te Velde, “The Synopsis of a Purer Theology in Its Historical and Theological Context,” 29. 49 Dolf te Velde, “Introduction,” in Synopsis Purioris Theologiae / Synopsis of a Purer Theology, Latin Text and English Translation: Volume 1, Disputations 1–23, R. T. te Velde and Riemer Faber, eds. (Leiden: Brill, 2014), 5. 50 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 139.

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emphasis: those dealing with general protestant doctrine (i.e., doctrine in common with Lutherans); those dealing with distinctly Reformed doctrine; polemics of a general nature (i.e., with Lutherans, Anabaptists, or anti-Trinitarians); polemics specifically dealing with Roman Catholic theologians; those dealing with pastoral issues; and those dealing with exegetical issues.51 Between 1576 and 1595, Grynaeus supervised 252 disputations. Starting in 1596, Polanus supervised 241. Thus, in fifteen years Polanus only supervised eleven fewer disputations than Grynaeus supervised in a twenty-year period. Along with a general increase in overall disputations per year, Burnett notes a number of changes to the overall distribution of disputations. 42.9% of the disputations supervised by Grynaeus were under the category of general protestant doctrine. This percentage drops to 32.2% under Polanus. The percentage of disputations focused upon pastoral and exegetical issues also drop slightly under Polanus, but neither were large percentages under Grynaeus. The percentage of disputations which focused upon specifically Reformed doctrines, however, increases under Polanus from 23.8% to 33.6%.52 While the percentage of generally polemic disputations increases from 2.4% to 3.7%, the percentage of anti-Roman Catholic disputations more than doubles: from 15.9% under Grynaeus to 34.6% under Polanus.53 Thus, under Polanus, there were more disputations focused on specifically Reformed doctrine and more disputations that engaged in polemics with Roman Catholic theologians and doctrines. Furthermore, in terms of the content of these disputations, Burnett notes that many of those supervised by Grynaeus were “virtually interchangeable with portions of his theology lectures printed as biblical commentaries.”54 She finds a similar phenomenon with those disputations supervised by Polanus. With Polanus, however, Burnett notes that the disputations he supervised “followed roughly the same organizational scheme as his theology textbooks.”55 It therefore may very well be the practice of disputations that accounts for the maturation of Polanus’ own theology between the earliest version of the

51 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 147–151, and tables 6.1 and 6.2 on p. 282. 52 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 150. Burnett describes this increase as a “clear bias toward Reformed doctrine.” 53 Burnett notes that many of the disputations contained more than one emphasis and, at any rate, what she notes is the emphasis may not be the actual subject matter of the disputation (e.g., she may detect a preponderance of ‘anti-Roman Catholic polemic’ in a disputation that is on the Holy Scripture). For the sake of her research, however, she categorizes them according to which emphasis is greatest in any one disputation. Further research into these disputations would no doubt provide greater insight, particularly if the percentages within each disputation were taken into account (i.e., rather than a disputation being all one category or another). 54 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 148. 55 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 151. Burnett is not specific if this pattern is found in the disputations overall, or in the disputations within a given academic year.

The Life of Amandus Polanus

Partitiones in 1590 and the publication of the Syntagma in 1610. The organizational structure of the two works is practically identical. What changes, however, is the inclusion of polemical interaction and an increased focus upon fine distinctions and definitions in the Syntagma. Given the general academic purpose of these disputations, it would seem that they are a window into the development of Polanus’ own increasingly sophisticated doctrinal formulations. 2.2.5

The Works of Amandus Polanus

Besides teaching and supervising disputations, Polanus also produced a wide variety of published works. His exegetical works include several biblical commentaries (on Ezekiel, Daniel, Malachi, and Hosea56 ) and an examination of the incarnation in the Old Testament.57 Polanus also wrote two books on logic.58 He is perhaps best known, however, for his theological writings. He wrote one stand-alone book on a separate head of doctrine: De aeterna Dei predestinatione (concerning God’s eternal predestination).59 Later in his career, Polanus published the Symphonia catholica seu consensus catholicus.60 This work combines together both patristic and medieval voices on the major heads of doctrine. Symphonia catholica demonstrates Polanus’ desire to show forth the catholicity of the Reformed church and also demonstrates his own “profound knowledge of patristic literature.”61 In addition, Polanus’ name appears in a great number of printed disputations from his time as Professor of Old Testament at the University of Basel. These disputations include such topics as: the Word of God;62 free choice in human

56 Amandus Polanus, Analysis libelli prophetae Malachiae, aliquot praelectionibus Genenae proposita (Basel: Waldkirch, 1597); Amandus Polanus, In Danielem Prophetam visionum amplitudine difficillimum (Basel: Waldkirch, 1599); Amandus Polanus, Analysis libri Hoseae prophetae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1601); and Amandus Polanus, In librum prophetiarum Ezechielis commentarii (Basel: Waldkirch, 1608). 57 Amandus Polanus, Exegesis analytica illustrium aliquot vaticiniorum Veteris Testamenti de Incarnatione, Passione, Morte et Resurrectione Domini nostri Iesu Christi (Basel, 1608). 58 Amandus Polanus, Logicae libri duo, juxta naturalis methodi leges conformati (Herborn, 1590, 1593; Basel, 1598, 1599); and Amandus Polanus, Syntagma logicum Aristotelico-Ramaeum, ad usum imprimis theologicum accommodatum (Basel: Waldkirch, 1605). 59 Amandus Polanus, De aeterna Dei predestinatione (Basel: Waldkirch, 1598). 60 Amandus Polanus, Symphonia catholica seu consensus catholicus (Basel: Waldkirch, 1607). 61 Aza Goudriaan, “Athanasius in Reformed Protestantism: Some Aspects of Reception History (1527–1607),” Church History and Religious Culture 90:2–3 (2010): 269. See also Han, Symphonia Catholica, 169. 62 Amandus Polanus, De Canone Scripturarum Divinarum, Theses Theologicae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1597).

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beings;63 the Lord’s Supper;64 the union of two natures in the one person of Christ;65 the church;66 saving faith;67 the grace of God;68 the legitimacy of the vocation of ministry;69 the death of Christ;70 and original sin.71 Some of these were also gathered together into topical volumes.72 Note that some of these disputations were published prior to Polanus being installed as professor of Old Testament, showing that he was active in the academic life of the University of Basel even as far back as 1590.73 The best known among Polanus’ theological writings were his more systematic works. The earliest of these is the Partitiones theologicae, which underwent at least three Latin editions (and at least one English edition) in Polanus’ lifetime.74 The first edition, published in 1590, includes all of the major heads of doctrine that Polanus continued to use. It does lack the depth of detail and clarity that the later works exhibit. In the second edition, published in 1599, Polanus expanded the work from 238 pages to 434 pages – almost doubling its size. Interestingly, book one (given to the doctrine of what man is to believe concerning God) more than doubles in size: from 156 pages in the 1590 edition to 344 pages in 1599. This increase is the result of the additional detail that Polanus provides in the various loci under book one – and can be seen, for example, in the discussion of first and second order attributes below (4.6.5). Book two (given to the doctrine of the good works that man is to do in response to God’s grace) only increased from 81 pages to 89. It is therefore a

63 Amandus Polanus, De Arbitrio Hominis, Theses Theologicae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1597); and Amandus Polanus, De libero hominis arbitrio theses theologicae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1601). 64 Amandus Polanus, De coenae Domini partibus theses theologicae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1596). 65 Amandus Polanus, De unione personali duarum naturarum in Christo theses theologicae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1609). 66 Amandus Polanus, De Ecclesia capita quaedam (Basel: Waldkirch, 1592). 67 Amandus Polanus, De fide salvifica theses theologicae in partes quinque (Basel: Waldkirch, 1608). 68 Amandus Polanus, De Gratia Dei, Theses Theologicae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1597). 69 Amandus Polanus, De Legitima Ministrorum Vocatione (Basel: Waldkirch, 1600). 70 Amandus Polanus, De Morte Christi Theses Theologicae (Basel: Ostenius, 1592). 71 Amandus Polanus, De Peccato Originis Capita aliquot (Basel: Waldkirch, 1597). 72 For example, Amandus Polanus, De verbo Dei didascalia, in sex disputationes (Basel: Waldkirch, 1593); Amandus Polanus, Theses theologicae controversae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1599); and Amandus Polanus, Collegium anti-Bellarminianum: tribus disputationum (Basel: Ludovici Kônig, 1613). 73 Ernst Staehlin, “Die Lehr-und Wanderjahre des Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf,” 52. 74 Amandus Polanus, Partitiones theologicae (Basel: Waldkirch, 1590, 1599, 1610); and Amandus Polanus, The Substance of Christian Religion Soundly Set Forth in Two Bookes, By Definitions and Partition, Framed According to the Rules of a Natural Method, trans. Elijahu Wilcocks (London: Oxenbridge, 1595).

The Life of Amandus Polanus

significantly smaller percentage of the whole, but practically identical in length to what came before.75 Building upon this expansion of the Partitiones in 1599, Polanus published the Syntagma theologiae christianae in two volumes between 1609 and 1610.76 The Syntagma retains the overall organizational pattern of the earlier Partitiones, but it includes even greater technical sophistication in terms of the definitions Polanus uses, the distinctions he employs within the various heading and subheadings, the polemical interaction with Lutheran, anti-Trinitarian, and Roman Catholic interlocutors, and the inclusion of specific application (or usus) in various loci (particularly in Book Two). Polanus replaces the tables of bifurcations that preceded the text of both editions of the Partitiones with the Synopsis Totius Syntagmatis. In this Synopsis, Polanus provides shortened definitions and distinctions of the various loci in the Syntagma.77 Another major change between the Partitiones and the Syntagma is the inclusion of the material that makes up book one of the Syntagma, which covers the definition and meaning of theology, as well as Polanus’ doctrine of Scripture. This addition is almost double the size of the whole of the 1599 edition of the Partitiones and makes up 18% of the total of the Syntagma.78 What Polanus covered in book one of the two editions of the Partitiones is found in books two through seven of the Syntagma. This portion is 2,555 columns in length and is roughly 57% of the whole. The portion that remains, books eight through ten, deal with the doctrine of good works (the subject matter of book two in the 1590 and 1599 editions of the Partitiones). These books are 1,134 columns in length, and approximately 25% of the whole. If just books two through ten are taken into account, however (i.e., that part which directly corresponds to books one and two in the Partitiones), the distribution of the material falls midway between the two editions at 70% for that material previously found in book one and 30% for that material previously found in book two.79 A third edition of the Partitiones was published in 1610. It is an extreme synopsis of the previous editions at only 24 pages long. Although no explanation for the

75 Pace Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 464 n. 9, who indicates that “the second book, on good works, was not added until the 1596 Basel edition.” The 1590 edition, however, includes a liber secundus, entitled De Bonis Operibus. 76 Amandus Polanus, Syntagma theologicae christianae, 2 vols. (Hanau: Wechel, 1610, 1624 and Geneva, 1617). 77 Richard Muller often uses the Synopsis Totius Syntagmatis as a general orienting outline in his discussions of the various loci throughout Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics. 78 Note that the portion on the doctrine of Scripture is approximately 88% of book one, meaning that Polanus gives over 16% of the whole of the Syntagma to this one topic. 79 See Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 471–473 for more detail on space given to various doctrines in the Partitiones and the Syntagma. Note that Letham consults a 1602, Basel, edition to which I do not have access.

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major reduction in detail that was necessary to reduce 434 pages to 24 is given, it is possible that Polanus felt that the Syntagma provided the more detailed work and that the Partitiones could be reduced to a summary of the doctrines of faith and good works.

2.3

Polanus in the Context of the Post-Reformation Period

As important as the particular details of Polanus’ life are for establishing a context to understand his doctrine of God, so too is the broader theological and academic context in which he lived and worked. In order to evaluate this broader context, I will examine Polanus in light of the methodology of the ‘newer’ scholarship described and referenced in Chapter 1.2, above. In what follows, I will look at Polanus in reference to two interrelated terms: Reformed orthodoxy and Reformed scholasticism.80 In terms of periodization, both Reformed orthodoxy and Reformed scholasticism belong to a time period following the Protestant Reformation.81 Reformers such as Oecolampadius, Zwingli, Vermigli, Bucer, Farel, and Calvin did not envision a break with the universal church. Instead, they sought a “reformation,” not a completely new church.82 Following the initial stages of the Protestant Reformation, 80 On Reformed orthodoxy and scholasticism, see Bac, Perfect Will Theology, 8–15; Andreas J. Beck, “God, Creation, and Providence in Post-Reformation Reformed Theology,” The Oxford Handbook of Early Modern Theology, Richard A. Muller and A. G. Roeber, eds. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016): 195–212; Andreas Beck, “Reformed Confessions and Scholasticism. Diversity and Harmony,” Perichoresis 14.3 (2016): 17–43; James E. Dolezal, “A Practical Scholasticism? Edward Leigh’s Theological Method,” Westminster Theological Journal, 71:2 (Fall 2009): 337–354; McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 95–163; te Velde, Doctrine of God, 44–76; Dolf te Velde, “Eloquent Silence: The Doctrine of God in the Synopsis of Purer Theology,” Church History and Religious Culture, 92 (2012): 581–608; Trueman and Clark, “Introduction,” xi-xix; Willem J. van Asselt, “Protestant Scholasticism: Some Methodological Considerations in the Study of Its Development,” Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis, 81.3 (2001): 265–274; van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction” in Reformation and Scholasticism, 11–43; and van Asselt and Rouwendal, “Introduction” Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 1–9. 81 Muller, PRRD, 1:28; and van Asselt, et. al., “Introduction,” Reformed Thought on Freedom, 20–21. See also, among many others: Will Durant The Reformation: A History of European Civilization from Wyclif to Calvin: 1300–1564, The Story of Civilization, Vol. 6 (New York: MJF Books, 1957); Paul O. Kristeller, Renaissance Thought: The Classic, Scholastic, and Humanist Strains (New York: Harper and Row, 1961); Diarmaid MacCulloch, The Reformation: A History (New York: Viking Press, 2003); Alister E. McGrath, Reformation Thought: An Introduction, 3rd ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 1999); Heiko Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986). 82 See Han, Symphonia Catholica, 26–27, “Polanus was eager to demonstrate that the Reformed churches of his age, not the Roman Catholic Church, were truly apostolic and catholic in faith and doctrine because of their theological consanguinity with the apostles of Christ under the guidance of the

Polanus in the Context of the Post-Reformation Period

the various Reformed churches sought to continue in their theological forefathers’ footsteps but also to extend and defend their work. Such a continuation required ecclesiastical structures as well as the means to train leaders at every level of the church.83 Ecclesiastical structure was primarily a function of the various Reformed confessions written in the post-Reformation era.84 Adherence to these confessions is the best way of understanding ‘orthodoxy.’85 The training of church leaders was primarily a function of the various Reformed academies and universities. The academic context in which such training was done is the best way of understanding ‘scholasticism.’86 Therefore, for my purposes, Reformed orthodoxy will refer to the broader context involving Reformed churches in the wake of the Protestant Reformation and Reformed scholasticism will refer to the narrower context involving academic work in the various universities and schools of that broader Reformed church.87 The post-Reformation Reformed orthodox period runs from approximately 1560 to 1790 and is typically broken up into three eras: an Early Orthodoxy (1560–1620), a High Orthodoxy (1620–1700), and a Late Orthodoxy (1700–1790).88 The stage of Early Orthodoxy is marked mainly by the “initial codification of Reformed theology,” as well as “polemics against Lutheran and Roman Catholic theology.”89 Representatives of this era include Girolamo Zanchi, Zacharius Ursinus, Franciscus Junius, Johannes Wollebius, as well as Amandus Polanus. The era of High Orthodoxy is characterized by additional elaboration upon the doctrinal formulations of the Early Orthodoxy period as well as defense and polemics against Arminius and the Remonstrants and the philosophies of Descartes and Spinoza.90 Representatives

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same Spirit, and thus that the Reformed churches stood in catholic-orthodox consensus of doctrine in the line of the ancient apostolic church or tradition.” See also Richard A. Muller, “Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism,” in Trinity Journal, 19.1 (Spring, 1999): 93; and Muller, PRRD, 1:48. See Willem J. van Asselt, “Scholasticism in the Time of Early Orthodoxy (ca. 1560–1620)” in van Asselt, et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011), 108. See, for example, James T. Dennison, Jr., ed., Reformed Confessions of the 16th and 17th Centuries in English Translation, 4 volumes (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2008–2014). See van Asselt, “Scholasticism in the Time of Early Orthodoxy,” 103–104. McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 115. McGraw quotes Leinsle, Scholastic Theology, 7, “Scholasticism refers to the method employed for teaching theology in the schools.” See Beck, “Reformed Confessions and Scholasticism,” 19, “The term ‘orthodoxy’ is mainly used as an epochal term, ‘scholasticism’ refers primarily to a scientific practice or method.” This periodization reflects van Asselt, et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, passim. Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 22 – 23. See also van Asselt, “Scholasticism in the Time of Early Orthodoxy,” 103–131. Willem J. van Asselt, “Scholasticism in the Time of High Orthodoxy (ca. 1620–1700)” in van Asselt, et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 132–166. See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 23.

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of this period include Heinrich Heidegger, Johannes à Marck, and Francis Turretin. The era of Late Orthodoxy sees a general decline in doctrinal elaboration as the formulations of the Early and High periods gives way to the changing philosophical spirit of this later time. Te Velde, in particular, notes the downgrade of theology among “the so-called Swiss Triumvirate, Jean-Alphonse Turrettini, Samuel Werenfels, and Jean François Osterwald.”91 Yet a stream of theology in line with the earlier periods remained – specifically in the Continuous Commentary of Bernardinius de Moor. My particular focus is on the so-called early period of Reformed orthodoxy. This early period is often thought to begin in 1560 and extend through 1620.92 According to van Asselt, this early period “can best be characterized as confessionalization and codification.”93 ‘Confessionalization’ refers to the process in which these various confessions, catechisms, and statements of faith are promulgated and adopted into the life of the church. This period begins with the decade in which many foundational confessions and catechisms were written and adopted by various Reformed churches: such as the Scots Confession (1560); the Belgic Confession (1561); the Heidelberg Catechism (1563); and the Second Helvetic Confession (1566).94 This early period extends up through the Synod of Dort (1618–1619) and therefore incorporates both another important confessional document and what McGraw describes as “the closest thing to an ecumenical Reformed synod in postReformation theology.”95 The purpose of these confessional documents was, on the one hand, to solidify the church that promulgated and/or adopted the confession, and, on the other, to draw important boundary lines between those ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ the Reformed church through definitive statements of orthodoxy.96 In this sense, ‘orthodoxy’ not only carries the general meaning of ‘right teaching,’ but also means specifically the right teaching as defined by these Reformed confessions.97 In this way, the Reformed confessions provide the ‘guard rails’ within

91 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 24. See also Willem J. van Asselt, “Scholasticism in the Time of Late Orthodoxy (ca. 1700–1790)” in van Asselt, et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 167–193. 92 I note again the difficulty of choosing an exact set of dates. Muller, PRRD, 1:31, specifies the years 1565 to 1640 for early orthodoxy, with two halves to that epoch divided by the Synod of Dort and the Thirty Years War. Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 73, places this early period from 1565 to 1635. 93 Van Asselt, “Scholasticism in the Time of Early Orthodoxy (ca. 1560–1620),” 107 (emphasis original). See also McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 96, who states, “The primary characteristic of this first stage of Reformed orthodoxy is confessionalization;” and Beck and te Velde, “The Synopsis of a Purer Theology in Its Historical and Theological Context,” 10–11. 94 All are found in Philip Schaff, The Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical Notes, 6th ed., 3 vols. (New York, 1931; repr. Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1983), III. 95 McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 97. 96 McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 114. 97 Muller, PRRD, 1:33.

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which Reformed orthodox theologians taught and wrote. While the confessions do provide a more specific definition as to what is or is not ‘orthodox,’ the actual writings of the theologians who worked within these confessions should also be considered ‘orthodox.’ That is, ‘orthodoxy’ is not merely to be defined by the various Reformed confessions: these confessions draw boundary markers, but they do not provide a whole and fully articulated system of doctrine (either by intention or effect). The works of the Reformed orthodox theologians (e.g., Polanus and the Syntagma) provide that increasingly whole and articulated system of doctrine. This ‘filling in the lines’ is the product of the ‘codification’ of this early period. Codification incorporates the process of confessionalization, but also includes the various works of individual theologians. Generally, the detail with which these theologians write goes well beyond that of the confessions.98 This work of codification is also not the work merely of a synod itself or even of an individual church. Rather, much of this work in the early Reformed orthodox period took place in universities and other schools. Therefore, this codification reflects both the continuation (in some cases) or gradual re-introduction (in other cases) of medieval scholastic methodology into the universities of the post-Reformation period.99 Many of the schools that were taken over by the Reformers and the Reformed orthodox had been medieval universities – such as Oxford, Basel, Wittenberg, and Heidelberg. These universities had usually begun as cathedral schools as far back as the eighth century, and had grown to become full-fledged universities starting in the thirteenth century.100 Even by the time of early Reformed orthodoxy, many of these universities that were located in Protestant cities only became Protestant gradually.101 Furthermore, even among staunchly Protestant universities, battles between Lutheran and Reformed, and later between Arminian and Reformed, professors were a common feature. Arguments between the Lutheran and the Reformed positions was particularly seen in Basel in the middle of the sixteenth century. Given both the gradual nature of the transition and the need for tried-andtrue methods for the organization of academics and the instruction of students, it is of little surprise that many of these universities borrowed liberally from their ancient and medieval forefathers – adopting and adapting to fit their needs. No small part of this process involved the inclusion of medieval scholastic methodology into the theological curriculum.102

98 Compare, for instance, the Heidelberg Catechism with Ursinus’ Commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism. 99 McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 97. 100 See Rouwendal, “The Method of the Schools,” 57–58. 101 See McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 125, who includes Wittenberg among such universities. 102 McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 129.

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The term “scholasticism’ refers specifically to a methodology.103 Through this methodology, the Reformed orthodox sought to develop a set of highly technical means to investigate Scripture and to systematize the teaching of Scripture in their doctrinal formulations. This methodology included the careful identification and distinction of topics; definitions of and divisions within these topics; logical and Scriptural arguments demonstrating these definitions and divisions; and polemical interaction with opposing views and objections.104 This scholastic methodology is therefore focused upon definition and on division by way of distinction.105 Rouwendal notes four aspects of this medieval scholastic methodology: lectio, meditatio, quaestio, and disputationes.106 The first three comprise: 1), a pattern of lecture upon some authoritative text (e.g., Lombard’s Sentences or, later, Aquinas’ Summa Theologica); 2), reflection by the students upon what they have heard; and 3), a series of questions designed to ensure understanding.107 In particular, the quaestio method was used extensively by the Reformed scholastics: both in the more formal An, Quid, Qualis method; and in the less formal definition and distinction method.108 Disputations (disputationes) were discussions around a specific topic in which a student prepared theses and was to be ready to respond to various objections posed to his position.109 Throughout the early Reformed orthodox period, these four aspects of medieval scholasticism made their way into the Reformed universities. While Reformed scholastics incorporated these broad categories, they also adapted and changed them to suit their needs and

103 Muller, PRRD, 1:34. Muller states, “[scholasticism] well describes the technical and academic side of this process of the institutionalization and professionalization of Protestant doctrine in the universities of the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.” He further notes that this definition of scholasticism contradicts those who would see scholasticism as denoting a particular content, including Armstrong, Calvinism and the Amyraut Heresy, 31–40; Jack B. Rogers and Donald K. McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach (San Francisco: Harper and Row: 1979), 36–37, 43–47, 150–165, 185–188. 104 See van Asselt, “Protestant Scholasticism,” 266, who states, “In fact, ‘scholasticism’ is a collective noun denoting all scholarly research and instruction carried out according to a certain method, which involves the use of a recurring system of concepts, distinctions, proposition analyses, argumentative strategies and methods of disputations.” Van Asselt points his readers to L.M. de Rijk, Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing, 2nd ed. (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1988), 25. 105 See Willem J. Van Asselt, “The Theologian’s Tool Kit: Johannes Maccovius (1588–1644) And The Development Of Reformed Theological Distinctives,” Westminster Theological Journal 68.1 (Spring 2006): 29, “making clear distinctions (distinguere) was the heart of the scholastic tradition.” 106 Rouwendal, “The Method of the Schools,” 59. 107 See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 46–47. 108 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 47. See also Beck, “God, Creation, and Providence in Post-Reformation Reformed Theology,” 204. 109 See above, 2.2, for additional information regarding disputations, both generally and in the context of Polanus and the University of Basel during this early period.

Philosophical and Methodological Influence: Aristotelianism and Ramism

presuppositions. As Muller rightly points out, Reformed scholasticism was modeled after, but not identical to, medieval scholasticism.110 He indicates a number of specific changes: an ad fontes use of Greek and Hebrew in their discussions; the use of the locus method; and a tendency toward rhetorical rather than demonstrative arguments.111 These changes particularly demonstrate the influence of Renaissance and Humanism upon Reformed scholasticism.112 Scholasticism per se, whether of the medieval or Reformed orthodox variety, is therefore an exercise in fides quaerens intellectum – “faith seeking understanding.”113 While scholasticism is a methodology and is therefore not tied to any one particular stream of doctrinal content, it was greatly influenced by philosophy: ancient, medieval, and contemporary. Thus, the influences of Aristotelianism, Christian Aristotelianism, and Ramism is important to discern – to which I turn in the next section. A general note of caution must be given, however: the utilization of a particular philosophical methodology does not imply the importation of the whole of that philosophy into a given theological work. Quoting Aristotle, for example, does not mean that the whole of Aristotle’s work and thought is to be imputed to whatever author is quoting him.114

2.4

Philosophical and Methodological Influence: Aristotelianism and Ramism

Distinct from, but closely related to the concepts of orthodoxy and scholasticism are two very important additional aspects of the post-Reformation period: the

110 Muller, PRRD, 1:35. 111 See Muller, PRRD, 1.36. 112 For these influences, see Kristeller, Renaissance Thought and Its Sources, 21–31; Pieter L. Rouwendal, “‘Open Hand and Fist’: Humanism and Scholasticism,” in van Asselt, et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 73–85; and van Asselt, et. al., “Introduction,” in Reformed Thought on Freedom, 21. 113 See also van Asselt, et. al., “Introduction,” in Reformed Thought on Freedom, 23, who states, “The theological quest of seeking understanding meant a search for arguments for the truth of faith. Whereas faith trusts in God for the truth of its belief, understanding can argue for the veracity of its belief. Therefore, this scholastic kind of theology decidedly utilized philosophical disciplines like semantics, logics and metaphysics to articulate the Christian faith with the help of philosophical analysis in order to stimulate faith and make it understandable.” 114 In this regard, see te Velde, “Eloquent Silence,” 596, who states, “More generally, we should realize that theology in the scholastic era was hardly interested in specific, personal influences or reliance. Instead, it understood itself as a collective enterprise embedded in the age-old structures of the universities and other institutions of learning, and, in the final analysis, as a common quest for truth on the basis of God’s own revelation in Scripture and in service of the church.”

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continuing importance of Aristotelianism and the introduction of Ramist methodology into some of the universities. Both of these concepts will be discussed in further detail below. First, however, it is important to note that each is – broadly speaking – a rational or logical influence upon the method for doing theology. One of the questions this work is seeking to answer is whether or not a rationalistic tendency or an incipient rationalism controls and directs the theology of Polanus (both individually and as a representative of Reformed scholasticism generally). One answer that can be anticipated at this point is the notion that the inclusion of logical or rational methodology is not in itself evidence of rationalism. The important question is not ‘Does this author use logic and reason?’ but ‘What role does logic and reason play in their overall theological formulation?’ Does logic and reason play a foundational role, or is the author seeking to use logic and reason to explain, organize, and analyze some other foundational material? Specifically, in the case of Reformed orthodox and scholastic theology, is logic and reason the source of doctrine (i.e., with Scripture being used merely to prop up or lend credence to whatever doctrine is being considered), or does Scripture function as the ultimate source of doctrine (i.e., with logic and reason used as an instrument to aid in understanding)? While the overall evaluation of this phenomenon in Polanus is no small part of this thesis, this question has been repeatedly answered in the more recent secondary literature: for the Reformed scholastics, Scripture, not reason, is the fundamental source of doctrine.115 The foundational conviction is that Scripture is authoritative. The logical and rational tools that these Reformed scholastics develop (and adapt – both from each other and from the ancient and medieval periods) are used in service to Scripture, not instead of it.116 Thus, I will argue that the mere presence of logical and rational instruments does not constitute evidence of rationalism unless those instruments are themselves the source and foundation upon which a doctrine (or system of doctrine) is based.117

115 See, for example, Dolezal, “Practical Scholasticism,” 350. Speaking of a figure a generation after Polanus, Dolezal remarks that “Leigh’s use of reason and philosophy is instrumental, not principial.” 116 On this notion, see Dolf te Velde, “‘Soberly and Skillfully’: John Calvin and Jerome Zanchi (1516–1590) as Proponents of Reformed Doctrine,” Church History and Religious Culture 91:1–2 (2011): 61, who states, “Over the course of the decades leading into the seventeenth century, Reformed theology managed to shape its own tradition of logic and metaphysics designed to fit with the theological convictions based on God’s revelation in Scripture.” 117 See also Richard A. Muller, After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press: 2003): 79, “The presentation of logical or rational arguments in the context of faith and the typically scholastic recognition of a series of authorities are not supportive of rationalism unless reason is established as the primary authority and used as the foundation and source of the content of thought rather than as an instrument in argumentation.”

Philosophical and Methodological Influence: Aristotelianism and Ramism

2.4.1

Aristotelianism

Returning to the question of the major influences upon both medieval and Reformed scholasticism, I begin with Aristotle.118 Universally referred to as ‘the Philosopher,’ the logical tools that Aristotle provided were ubiquitous among most scholastic theologians. This is evidenced by the use of Aristotle (or, more properly, Aristotelian concepts) in the universities from at least the twelfth through the seventeenth century.119 The appropriation of Aristotelian concepts and categories during the medieval period was not along clear, or even singular, lines. That is, the major schools of thought (tied to the various monastic traditions through which the universities first flourished) modified, adapted, and applied the logic and metaphysics of Aristotle in different ways. On the whole, medieval scholastics found Aristotle’s philosophy to be “a stimulating and generally convincing body of thought.”120 This is not to say that these medieval scholastics adopted the whole of Aristotle’s philosophy or that what they adopted was unmodified according to Christian teaching. Rather, Aristotle’s categories and logical methodologies – through evaluation, debate, and adaptation – became part of the underlying structure of academic life in the Middle Ages.

118 See Diogenes Allen and Eric O. Springsted, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 2nd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 65–102; Frederick C. Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 1, Greece and Rome (London: Search Press, 1966); David Knowles, The Evolution of Medieval Thought, 2nd ed. (London: Longman Group, 1988), 11–14; John Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy: an historical and philosophical introduction (New York: Routledge, 2007), 21–22. See also T. Theo J. Pleizier and Maarten Wisse, “‘As the Philosopher Says’: Aristotle” in Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, van Asselt, et. al., eds., 26–44; and te Velde, Doctrine of God, 47–53. 119 On the issue of Christian Aristotelianism, along with the intramural debate over the use of the term ‘eclectic’ to describe Reformed scholastic appropriation of various strands of ancient, patristic, and medieval thought, see Muller, “Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy,” passim; Antonie Vos, “Scholasticism and Reformation,” in Reformation and Scholasticism; Richard A. Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’” 223–41; Aza Goudriaan, Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen, Brill’s Series in Church History Vol. 49 (Leiden: Brill 2006), 54; Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 10–11; van Asselt, et. al., “Introduction,” in Reformed Thought on Freedom (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 26; Aza Goudrian, “Theology and Philosophy,” in A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy, Herman J. Selderhuis, ed., Companions to the Christian Tradition Vol. 40 (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 35–36; te Velde, Doctrine of God, 43; Darren M. Pollack, Early Stuart Polemical Hermeneutics: Andrew Willet’s 1611 Haxapla on Romans, Reformed Historical Theology Vol. 50 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017), 150; and Richard A. Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 77–78. 120 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 48.

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To some extent, this phenomenon did not radically alter even during the time of the Reformation. As Oberman and Steinmetz have sought to make clear, any notion of a clean break between medieval scholasticism and the Reformation is overstated at best – and, at any rate, tends to take sporadic, general, and/or polemic statements of Luther and Calvin as emblematic of the whole of Reformation thought. Not only did Aristotle continue to be taught in the universities, but broad categories of Aristotle continue to provide the background to many of Calvin’s thoughts – particularly, with regard to four-fold causality. This phenomenon continues (and, indeed, increases) during the time of Reformed scholasticism. The success of the Protestant Reformation (at least in the regions in which it was successful) necessitated the ongoing training of theologians and pastors. This, in turn, resulted in Reformed universities retaining Aristotle as part of their curriculum. Burchill notes that no small part of this retention was due to Melanchthon’s insistence that Aristotle be taught in (and before) the university. This ensured that Aristotelian methodology would remain foundational for those training for pastoral ministry.121 As with the medieval scholastics, however, Aristotle’s thought was neither wholly nor uncritically incorporated into Reformed scholastic thought. This phenomenon has often been termed ‘Christian Aristotelianism’ and reflects the fact that these Christians adopted and adapted some of Aristotle’s thought.122 In particular, his textbooks on logic and metaphysics remained important for theological discussions throughout the period of Reformed orthodoxy.123 Aristotelean logic provided a more or less fixed set of standard mechanisms by which to investigate and discuss a given subject matter. Broadly speaking, this includes such notions as the law of non-contradiction; the distinction between subject and predicate; the notion of essence and accident; using definitions to distinguish one concept from another; and the use of logical syllogisms.124 This first notion of the principle of non-contradiction was foundational for theological arguments

121 Christopher J. Burchill, “Girolamo Zanchi: Portrait of A Reformed Theologian and His Work,” Sixteenth Century Journal XV.2 (1984): 187. See also Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’” 307; and Richard A. Muller, “Vera Philosophia cum sacra Theologia nusquam pugnat: Keckermann on Philosophy, Theology, and the Problem of Double Truth,” Sixteenth Century Journal 15.1 (1984): 342, who states, “Melanchthon himself manifests the gradual rapprochement of revelation and reason in the theology of the Reformation.” 122 I.e., it is not an ‘Aristotelian Christianity,’ but a Christian Aristotelianism. 123 In particular, see Aristotle, The Complete Works: the Revised Oxford Translation, trans., Jonathan Barnes (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984): “Categories,” 3–24; “Prior Analytics,” 39–113; “Posterior Analytics,” 114–166; and “Metaphysics,” 1152–1728. See also van Asselt and Rouwendal, “‘As the Philosopher Says’: Aristotle” in Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 26 for a discussion of the selective and critical adoption of Aristotelian thought. 124 Pleizier and Wisse, “Aristotle,” 30–35.

Philosophical and Methodological Influence: Aristotelianism and Ramism

among the Reformed scholastics.125 According to this principle, something cannot both be true and not true at the same time and in the same respect. Further, an argument that both asserts and denies the same position is incoherent and falsifies itself. Given the level of polemical involvement with Roman Catholic, Socinian, Arminian, and Lutheran opponents, ensuring one’s arguments were internally consistent and sound was of extreme importance to Reformed scholastics. Furthermore, the concepts of subject and predicate (or subject and attribute) provided basic tools to evaluate statements about virtually anything.126 The subject is the entity about which a particular notion or concept is expressed: thus, in the statement: ‘the chair is green,’ the chair is the subject and the predicate or attribute is green. There is, therefore, a difference between the notion of ‘a chair’ and ‘being green.’ The predicate or attribute says (lit., ‘predicates’) something about the subject. A subject, however, can have two main kinds of attributes: either accidental or essential. An essential attribute predicates something that is inseparable from the subject: if the subject were to cease having that particular predicate, it would either no longer be that specific entity or it would cease to exist. Alternatively, an accidental attribute predicates something that is in some sense separable from the subject: it remains what it is even if the accidental attribute changes or is removed. Thus ‘chair-ness’ (however defined) cannot be removed and the chair still remain a chair. A chair, however, remains a chair whether or not it is green. ‘Greenness’ is an accidental attribute of a chair. The final logical notion that was a major influence upon medieval and Reformed scholastic theology was that of the syllogism.127 The purpose of a syllogism is to combine various inferences to make an argument. The argument is formed from two premises that are resolved into a conclusion. Typically, the first premise is a general statement, such as “All dogs are animals.” The second premise provides a more specific statement, such as “Spot is a dog.” The conclusion unites these two ideas: in this case, “Spot is an animal.” In this case, a syllogism might look like this: • All dogs are animals • Spot is a dog. • Therefore (or consequently), Spot is an animal. On one level, the logical syllogism is not very informative or interesting. Its rhetorical force, however, is precisely in its simplicity. The assumption is that if the major and minor premises are true, then the conclusion must logically follow. In other words, a properly formed syllogism is logically valid even if it is not actually true.

125 Pleizier and Wisse, “Aristotle,” 30. 126 Pleizier and Wisse, “Aristotle,” 31. 127 Pleizier and Wisse, “Aristotle,” 35–36.

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Therefore, much of the polemics in this early period (and particularly as Polanus engages in polemics) takes the form of discussing the premises employed in such logical syllogisms. Sometimes the major premise is shown to be false (e.g., as something not universally true). Other times, the minor premise is shown to be false (e.g., a mistaken category or identification: i.e., perhaps Spot is in fact a cat). In still other times, the middle term is shown to be ‘ambiguous,’ (e.g., that the word ‘dog’ in the major premise has a different meaning than it does in the minor term). Either way, an otherwise valid argument can be shown to be untrue, and therefore the doctrines that depend upon that argument can be shown also to be false. Besides these basic issues of logic, medieval and Reformed scholastic theology was also greatly informed by Aristotle’s metaphysics. Metaphysics deals primarily with the origin of things and consists in such notions as the distinction between potency and act and the four-fold causes of material, formal, efficient, and final.128 A ‘material cause’ refers to the matter out of which a thing is composed: thus, the material cause of the previously considered green chair is the wood from which it is made. A ‘formal cause’ is what gives the material its form: in the case of the chair, it would be the quality of “chair-ness”. An ‘efficient cause’ is that which produces the effect: in the case of the chair, it is the carpenter who makes it. A ‘final cause’ is the end or goal associated with something; in the case of the chair, it has been made for the purpose of sitting.129 Ultimately, the study of such causality is the study of how change occurs in an entity. While there was much debate over what constituted a particular cause (i.e., what was the actual material cause of something), the notion of these four-fold causes remained a staple of Reformed orthodoxy. To this list of four basic causes, however, a fifth is added by medieval scholastics: the instrumental cause.130 Pleizier and Wisse describe this instrumental cause as, “the subordinate efficient cause.”131 This was introduced particularly to speak of the relationship between God’s providence as active and efficient and the responsibility of human beings to be more than merely passive in the salvation that God sovereignly accomplishes in them. For example, faith is an ‘instrumental cause’ in justification: faith does not effect salvation as an efficient cause, but faith is an instrument through which God brings about salvation in his elect. The distinction between potency and act is also important in medieval and Reformed scholasticism. Whereas the four-fold causes are Aristotle’s description of change, the distinction between potency and act is, in many ways, Aristotle’s definition of change. According to Aristotle, whatever has potency moves towards

128 129 130 131

McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 108. Pleizier and Wisse, “Aristotle,” 39–40. Pleizier and Wisse, “Aristotle,” 40. Pleizier and Wisse, “Aristotle,” 40.

Philosophical and Methodological Influence: Aristotelianism and Ramism

the realization or actualization of that potency. The realization of this ‘potency in act’ is how Aristotle defines change. While the general notion of potency and act was retained by medieval and Reformed scholastic theologians, this notion of all potency having to be actualized was abandoned. Not only does such a concept entails absolute necessity of being, it also leads ultimately to a necessary creation. But the Reformed orthodox insist that there is more potency in the world than is actualized (see, for example, the discussion of the distinction between God’s knowledge of simple intelligence and his knowledge of vision, 7.4.6 below.) This, in particular, provides the basic rubric through which the medieval and Reformed scholastic theologians sought to evaluate Aristotle: does it comply with the teaching of Scripture? Thus, the notion that Reformed scholasticism was ‘Aristotelian’ must be nuanced: many of the basic logical and metaphysical notions put forth by Aristotle were used by scholastics of every era, but only in so far as these notions helped to explain, rather than contradict, the teaching of Scripture.132 2.4.2

The Ramist Alternative to Aristotelianism

Besides Aristotle, Pierre de la Ramée (Latin: Petrus Ramus, 1515–1572) was another major influence both upon Reformed scholasticism generally and upon Polanus specifically.133 Ramus was born in the Picardy region of France in 1515.134 He received his Master of Arts from the University of Paris in 1536 and continued on there as a teacher of philosophy. It was during this early teaching career that he criticized the works of Aristotle – so much so that his colleagues charged him with “seeking to destroy the foundation of religion and philosophy.”135 After a brief 132 See also Muller, PRRD, 1:372, “If, for example, Aristotelian philosophy is identified as a metaphysical model in which a finite unmoved mover acts primarily as the final cause of the actualization of all things out of an infinite and eternally existing material substratum, it would be a very difficult task to find any Aristotelian theologians at any point in the development of Western or Latin Christianity... If, on the other hand, Aristotelianism is defined as a view of the universe that affirms both a primary and a secondary causality, that assumes the working of first and final causality through the means of instrumental, formal, and material causes, and that, using this paradigm, can explain various levels of necessary and contingent existence, then a large number of Aristotelians appear on the horizon.” Muller includes in this horizon “Thomas Aquinas, Cardinal Cajetan, Francis Suarez, and all of the Reformed scholastics.” 133 Donald K, McKim, “Ramus, Peter (1515–1572)” in Encyclopedia of the Reformed Faith, Donald K. McKim, ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1992), 314. See also Donald K. McKim, Ramism in William Perkins’ Theology (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 1987); Walter J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue (Harvard College, 1958; Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2004), citations refer to the University of Chicago edition; and te Velde, Doctrine of God, 77–85. 134 For biographical data on Ramus, see McKim, Ramism, 15–17; Ong, Ramus, 17–35. 135 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 79.

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trial, his works were, by order of King Francis I, prohibited from being published or sold, and he was ordered not to teach philosophy.136 He did teach mathematics and classics for a time, and he converted to Protestantism in 1562. For the rest of his life, Ramus would go back and forth between Paris and various Reformed cities in Switzerland and Germany: out of France when tensions against Protestants were high, back to Paris when tensions were low. He was a source of almost constant friction wherever he went, stirring up Beza and others against his teachings. He returned to Paris for good in 1570 but was the victim of mob violence against the Protestants in that city in 1572.137 The source of so much of the disquiet with his fellow academics was the system of logic that Ramus developed. He intended this system of logic to provide an alternative to the predominate use of Aristotelian methodology within the universities.138 At its core, “Ramism aims at a practical piety and at a purification of theological language, reducing it to biblical simplicity without scholastic intricacies.”139 In practice, however, Ramism could be just as complicated as Aristotelian scholasticism. Ramism can be summed up as involving two primary ideas: invention and judgement.140 The act of ‘invention’ is the creation of a middle term that is used to answer a particular question. Walter J. Ong provides a helpful example to navigate this concept in the following question: Is man dialectical?141 In order to answer the question, Ramus proposes to ‘invent’ a middle term. Thus, he would invent the term: “Whatever is rational is dialectical.” Since every man is rational, it follows that every man is dialectical. This middle term, then, provides a way to describe the relationship between the two terms ‘man’ and ‘dialectical.’142 A middle term can be used to answer a given question positively or negatively; its function is to answer the question. The act of ‘judgment’ is the collocation or assembly of that which invention has demonstrated.143 Through this assembly, the subject matter contained in or described by the invented middle terms could easily be taught and communicated.144 136 McKim, Ramism, 15. 137 McKim, Ramism, 17. 138 Willem J. van Asselt and Pieter L. Rouwendal, “Distinguishing and Teaching: Constructing a Theological Argument in Reformed Scholasticism,” in van Asselt, et al., Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism, 93. 139 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 78. 140 Ong, Ramus, 182–183. 141 Ong, Ramus, 182. 142 See also van Asselt and Rouwendal, “Distinguishing and Teaching,” 93. 143 Ong, Ramus, 183–184. 144 Keith L. Sprunger, “Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology,” Harvard Theological Review, 59.2 (1966): 134.

Philosophical and Methodological Influence: Aristotelianism and Ramism

The central feature of Ramus’ method was the use of definition and bifurcated distinctions: in other words, one begins with a basic definition derived from the middle term and then proceeds to divide that defined topic or concept into its two constituent parts.145 These ‘lower level’ bifurcations are in turn subject to bifurcation, and so on, until the whole of a subject has been discussed. To this, a chart depicting the various bifurcations is usually appended, which serves as a sort of table of contents (or index, if placed at the end) and as a way to see the whole of the subject in its interrelationships (or, at least, as much of that interrelationship as can fit on one page). Not every level in the dichotomies is given the same focus, and Ramists often use what appear to be arbitrary or forced divisions in order to retain a strictly bifurcated structure. Not many of the early Reformed orthodox theologians extensively used Ramist methodology. William Perkins, William Ames, Bartholomäus Keckermann, and Polanus are perhaps the most well-known adherents from this period – although each adopt Ramism in their own way and to different degrees. 2.4.3

Aristotelian and Ramist Influence in Polanus

With this broad description of both the form of Aristotelianism that was brought forward into the Reformed orthodox period for wide-spread use in the schools and Ramism as it was adopted in various places as an alternative to Aristotle, the question remains: to what degree did either methodology influence Polanus? The influence of Ramism is, perhaps, more immediately obvious. The 1590 and 1599 edition of the Partitiones begin with Tabulae Perpetuae: charts in which the whole of the Partitiones is diagramed according to the bifurcations Polanus will make throughout that work.146 The following image provides an example of this sort of chart in the Partitiones:

145 Sprunger, “Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology,” 135, “The essential work of method, once invention and judgment have taken place, is to define carefully the terms, arrange the material into dichotomies, each carefully defined again, and finally to follow a natural organization moving from universal principles to specifics.” See also Ong, Ramus, 30–31. 146 The 1590 edition contains 30 pages of charts, the 1599 edition contains 56 pages of charts.

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Figure 1 Tabulae Perpetuae (Polanus, Partitiones (1599), tabulae 1–2)

While the Syntagma does not include such a chart, it begins with the Synopsis Totius Syntagmatis. This synopsis serves much the same function as the visual charts in the Partitiones, but with columns of text rather than with charts. For example, the synopsis of book two begins: Synopsis of Book Two Christian theology has two parts: first, concerning faith; second, concerning good works. The Doctrine of Faith has two parts: first, concerning God; second, concerning the Church. The Doctrine of God has two parts: first, concerning God’s essence; second, concerning his works.147

This synopsis does not include any of the larger definitions Polanus later uses: it mainly just lists the various distinctions and divisions that Polanus will make later

147 Polanus, Syntagma, Synopsis Totius Syntagmatis, 2–3, “Synopsis Libri II. Theologicae Christianae sunt partes duae: prima de fide: altera de bonis operibus. Doctrinae fidei partes sunt duae: prima de Deo, secunda de Ecclesia. Fidei de Deo duae sunt partes: prima de essentia Dei, secunda de operibus ipsius.”

Philosophical and Methodological Influence: Aristotelianism and Ramism

on in the Syntagma. These bifurcations are seen throughout, evoking some level of criticism in the secondary literature.148 The influence of Ramism upon Polanus’ theological methodology goes well beyond structure, however. In the opening chapter of the Syntagma Logicum Aristeclico-Ramaeum, Polanus defines logic as the “art of using reason well.”149 This logic has an internal and an external use. The internal use of logic is for the direction of reason and the forming of methods, rules, and instruments such that truth is discovered and arranged into knowledge. Thus, logic has a function in the investigation of all that can be known by human beings. Logic also has an external use – that of arguing for that truth which has been (internally) discovered and arranged. Furthermore, Polanus indicates that logic is composed of two aspects: proposition (propositum) and judgment (iudicium). Proposition refers to creating the particular argument to demonstrate truth.150 Thus, this aspect of logic corresponds to ‘invention’ in Ramist’ logic. Judgment, on the other hand, refers to organizing those arguments into axiomata and syllogisms. While Polanus demonstrates a dedication to Ramist logic and organization, he also includes a number of broadly Aristotelian concepts. In the Syntagma Logicum Aristotelico-Ramaeum, Polanus discusses a number of terms that correspond to Aristotle: the use of the four causes, discussions of singulars and universals, distinctions between substance and accident, a discussion of the various types of habiti, and the distinction between act and potency. Many of these same concepts are also seen in the Syntagma theologica christianae: the discussion of the four-fold causality of Scripture (3.5); the discussion of the various kinds of distinctions he is making and is not making (4.2.8); the distinction between a priori and a posteriori essential properties (4.3.4); the use of the seven modes of composition that are denied in God’s simplicity (5.4);151 his discussion of species intelligibiles (7.3); his distribution of God’s knowledge into intelligentia, scientia, ars, and prudentia (7.4.1); his discussion of God’s knowledge of universals and singulars (7.4.3); his discussion of the forma of sin (8.5.6); and his discussion of the various causes of divine love (9.6).152 As well, Polanus’ definition of theology as wisdom reflects older medieval ‘wisdom’ traditions, which were revived with Ramus’ discussion of the practical rele-

148 See Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 141, “This devotion to Ramist division was unfortunate, because it often made [Polanus’] discussion confusing and hard to follow as he jumped from one level of division to another.” Note that Burnett’s comment seems to be a matter of her own subjective taste. See also Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 465 and 472. 149 Polanus, Syntagma Logicum Aristelico-Ramaeum, 1, “Logica est ars ratione bene utendi.” 150 Polanus, Syntagma Logicum Aristelico-Ramaeum, 3. 151 This instance of Aristotelianism is also noticed by McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 110. 152 Parenthetical references are to the various sections below discussing these features.

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vance of Christian doctrine.153 While Polanus refrains from defining theology as “the art of living well,” he certainly discusses the many ways in which the student of theology can put into practice what has been learned. Thus, Polanus’ inclusion of a section of usus (practical application) in many of the chapters in the second book on God’s essence, names, and essential properties also reflects broadly Ramist principles.154 On the whole, Polanus’ adoption of Aristotelianism and Ramism appears to be a rather fluid thing.155 Polanus draws from both Aristotle and Ramus, even though the latter intentionally set out to provide an alternative for the former.156 Thus, I concur with Deal’s assessment, that “one cannot help but surmise that Polanus in his mature thinking probably used more of Aristotle than Ramus would have approved and more of the Ramist method than Schegk [his teacher in Aristotelian logic] would have approved.”157 Polanus shows himself to be far more interested in drawing from both logical toolkits in a rather holistic way, all for the purpose of clearly explaining and applying doctrine.158

2.5

Early Reformed Orthodox Contemporaries of Polanus

In addition to Polanus’ own historical background, and a general overview of Reformed orthodoxy and scholasticism, I also desire to include a brief and necessarily narrow comparison with other Reformed orthodox theologians working and writing in this Early Period. In the chapters that follow on Polanus’ doctrine of God’s

153 Ong, Ramus, 32. See also below 3.3. 154 Sprunger, “Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology,” 137, “the end of doctrine is not knowledge of things relating to itself, but practice and exercise.” Note that the mere use of usus does not designate one Ramist. Zanchi utilizes the convention more thoroughly than does Polanus, see Patrick J. O’Banion, “Jerome Zanchi, the Application of Theology, and the Rise of the English Practical Divinity Tradition,” Renaissance and Reformation, XXIX.2–3 (2005): 97–120. 155 McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 112. 156 Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 140. See also Muller, “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’” 310, “Nor, indeed, ought Ramus’ own impact be understood as entirely antiAristotelian: by his own admission, Ramus’ logic sought to offer a simpler model of the discipline for the students, but it did not undermine the logical rules established in the older Aristotelian model – and it is clear that many of the ‘Ramists,’ so-called did not give up basic assumptions taken from Aristotelian physics and metaphysics.” 157 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 2. 158 McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 144. See also van Asselt and Rouwendal, “Distinguishing and Teaching,” 98, who draw this important observation: “in the period of Reformed orthodoxy, scholastic method is an eclectic whole of various elements taken from the history of philosophy and theology.”

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essence, names, and essential properties, seven theologians will provide such a comparison: Zacharias Ursinus (1534–1583), Girolamo Zanchi (1516–1590), Lambert Daneau (1535–1590), William Perkins (1558–1602), Gulielmus Bucanus (d. 1603), Lucas Trelcatius Jr. (1573–1607), and Bartholomäus Keckermann (1572–1608).159 While there are undoubtedly other individuals from this period who could be compared with Polanus, these individuals have been chosen in that they are Reformed theologians who wrote comparable treatises on doctrine in the period of early Reformed orthodoxy up to the death of Polanus and the publication of Syntagma.160 They therefore provide a base line against which to analyze the structure and content of the Syntagma. These theologians also indicate potential influences upon Polanus’ doctrine of God. Further, by considering Polanus alongside these other early Reformed orthodox theologians, I can emphasize the joint effort of academic (i.e., scholastic) theology in Europe. Thus, Polanus and his contemporaries saw themselves as part of a larger, united, tradition in search of truth. As well, the comparison will not be with these theologians simpliciter, but with specific works that are most comparable with the Syntagma. In what remains of this chapter, I will briefly consider the biography and works of each of these seven theologians, with particular emphasis upon the work that will be compared with the Syntagma. 2.5.1

Zacharias Ursinus

The first early Reformed orthodox theologian with whom I will compare Polanus is Zacharias Ursinus.161 Ursinus was born in 1534 in Breslau, Silesia – the same city as Polanus. He studied at Wittenberg from 1550 to 1557, and at Zurich from 1560 to 1561. Between these two periods of study, he was a teacher at the St. Elizabeth Gymnasium in Breslau. While studying at Wittenberg, Ursinus became something of a protege to Phillip Melanchthon, from whom he rented a room.162 While in Zurich, he befriended the Italian Reformer Peter Martyr Vermigli. In 1561, Ursinus was called by the Elector Count Frederick III to assist in the reformation of the Palatinate. Ursinus served as the Loci professor at the University of Heidelberg from 1561 to 1568, as well as rector of the Collegium Sapientiae (the seminary attached to the university) from 1561 to 1576. It was during this period that Ursinus was

159 These theologians are ordered according to the date of their death. 160 For instance, Franciscus Junius, Summa aliquot locorum, in Opera Theologia, vol. 2 (Geneva: Chouet, 1613). Note, however, that the publication of Junius’ Summa is after the death of Polanus. 161 For literature concerning Ursinus’ life and work, see Derek Visser, Zacharias Ursinus: The Reluctant Reformer (New York: United Church Press, 1983); and Christopher J. Burchill, “On the Consolation of a Christian Scholar: Zacharias Ursinus (1583–83) and the Reformation in Heidelberg,” Journal of Ecclesiastical History Vo. 37, No. 4, October (1986), 565–583. 162 Burchill, “On the Consolation of a Christian Scholar,” 556.

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the primary author of the Heidelberg Catechism, which was adopted in 1563. He lectured on the Catechism during his time at the university, and these lectures were collated and published by David Pareus.163 With the death of Frederick III in 1576, Ludwig VI (1539–1583) became Elector Palatine and restored Lutheranism. With this restoration, Reformed scholars like Ursinus were ejected from their posts as Heidelberg University. After Ursinus was removed from his position he became a professor at the Casimirianum, which was founded by John Casimir (the brother of Ludwig, who was himself Reformed) as the Heidelberg school of theology in exile in Neustadt an der Haardt. Ursinus held this position until his death in 1583. Ursinus is perhaps best known for the aforementioned commentary on the Heidelberg Catechism.164 For my comparison with Polanus, however, I will be looking at a more systematic and scholastic work, Ursinus’ Loci Theologici.165 Not only is the organization of the Loci Theologici closer to that of Polanus’ Syntagma, Ursinus presents in that work a fuller explanation of his doctrine of God. 2.5.2

Girolamo Zanchi

The second early Reformed orthodox theologian with whom I compare Polanus is Girolamo Zanchi.166 Zanchi was born in 1516 in Alzano in northern Italy. In 1531, he entered the Augustinian monastery at Bergamo, where he would study for the next ten years. In 1541, he travelled to Lucca, where he came under the tutelage of Peter Martyr Vermigli. It was during this time that Zanchi embraced the Reformed faith.167 Ten years after that, in 1551, Zanchi fled the Inquisition and travelled to Geneva. While in that city, he attended Calvin’s lectures and sermons 163 Zacharias Ursinus, Explicationum Catecheticarum, in Opera Theologica Vol. 1 (Heidelberg: Lancelot, 1612): 46–413. 164 Translated into English as Zacharias Ursinus, The Commentary of Dr. Zacharius Ursinus on the Heidelberg Catechism, trans., G. W. Williard (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Company, 1985). 165 Zacharias Ursinus, Loci Theologici, in Opera Theologica, vol. 1 (Heidelberg: Lancelot, 1612): 426–909. 166 For literature concerning Zanchi’s life and work, see Otto Gründler Olivier, Die Gotteslehre Girolami Zanchis und ihre Bedeutung für seine Lehre von der Prädestination (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1965); Burchill, “Girolamo Zanchi,” 185–207; Harm Goris, “Thomism in Zanchi’s Doctrine of God,” 121–139; Patrick J. O’Banion, “Jerome Zanchi, the Application of Theology, and the Rise of the English Practical Divinity Tradition,” 97–120; Dolf te Velde, “‘Soberly and Skillfully’: John Calvin and Jerome Zanchi (1516–1590) as Proponents of Reformed Doctrine,” Church History and Religious Culture 91.1–2 (2011), 59–71; Stefan Lindholm, Jerome Zanchi (1516–90) and the Analysis of Reformed Scholastic Christology, Reformed Historical Theology, vol. 37 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2016); and Stefan Lindholm, “Jerome Zanchi’s Use of Thomas Aquinas,” in Aquinas Among the Protestants, ed., Manfred Svensson and David VanDrunen (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley Blackwell, 2018), 75–90. 167 Burchill, “Girolamo Zanchi,” 187.

Early Reformed Orthodox Contemporaries of Polanus

over an eight-month period. He then taught at the Strasbourg Academy until 1563 – a time beset by controversy with Johannes Marbach, a Lutheran, over the Lord’s Supper.168 After this, Zanchi was for four years the pastor of a congregation of Italian refugees in Chiavenna, which was then allied with the Swiss Confederacy. In 1568, he was called to succeed Zacharias Ursinus as the Loci professor of theology at the University of Heidelberg.169 He held this position until 1576, when the Lutheran Ludwig IV became elector of the Palatinate and all of the Reformed professors were expelled from their university positions. Zanchi accepted a call as professor of biblical theology at the above mentioned Casimiranum.170 Although he was asked to return to Heidelberg in 1583, he declined and remained at Neustadt until his death in 1590. Zanchi was a prolific writer – his Omnia Opera Theologica consists of three volumes in eight parts.171 He is perhaps most well-known for his two-volume work on the doctrine of God: De Tribus Elohim and De Natura Dei.172 He also wrote a shorter summary of theology: De religione christiana fides.173 The work with which I will compare Polanus and the Syntagma is De Natura Dei. De Natura Dei is a one-volume length discussion of God’s existence (An sit Deus?), God’s essence (Quid sit Deus?) and God’s attributes or properties (Qualis sit Deus?). Zanchi’s work in this volume is exceptionally thorough. Furthermore, the organization and content compares closely with the portion of the Syntagma that I will be examining, and it is considered one of his major works.174 While it is an important work in the study of Zanchi, De Natura Dei is of a slightly different genre than the Syntagma in that it is both much more narrowly focused and deals with its subject matter in greater detail. Therefore, my comparison between the Syntagma and De Natura Dei will be more in terms of broad categories: the organizational structure, definitions and distinctions each theologian uses.

168 169 170 171

Burchill, “Girolamo Zanchi,” 194. Burchill, “Girolamo Zanchi,” 199. Burchill, “Girolamo Zanchi,” 204. Girolamo Zanchi, Operam theologicam, 8 vols. (Heidelberg: Stephanus Gamonentus (v. 1–4, 7–8), Matthaeus Berjon (v. 5–6), 1605). 172 Girolamo Zanchi, De tribus Elohim, aeterno Patre, Filio, et Spiritus Sancto (Neustadt: Harnisius, 1589); and Girolamo Zanchi, De Natura Dei seu de divinis attributis (Heidelberg: Jacob Mylius, 1577). 173 Girolamo Zanchi, De religione christiana fides (Neustadt: Matthaeus Harnisch, 1585). See also Luca Baschera and Christian Moser, Girolamo Zanchi, De religione Christiana fides – Confession of Christian Religion, 2 vols., Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, Volume 135 (Leiden: Brill, 2007). 174 See, Lindholm, “Jerome Zanchi’s Use of Thomas Aquinas,” 77.

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2.5.3

Lambert Daneau

The French Reformed theologian, Lambert Daneau, was born in Beaugency-surLoire in 1530.175 He studied law at the University of Orleans from 1553 to 1559 but became convinced of the Protestant religion and soon fled to Geneva. While in Geneva, he was a student under John Calvin from 1560 to 1561, from whom he became convinced of the Reformed faith. In 1562 he was sent by the Compagnie des Pasteurs of Geneva to pastor in Gien, in north-central France. In 1572, after the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, Daneau returned to Geneva, where he taught at the Academy with Beza until 1581. He would later teach as professor of theology at the University of Leiden from 1581 to 1582, and he was both pastor and teacher in Ghent from 1582 to 1583. He then moved to the Academy at Orthez which was supported by Henry of Navarre (later to become Henry IV of France). He remained there until 1591, when he and the academy moved to Lescar. In 1591 he took up a pastorate in Castres, near Toulouse, where he remained until he died in 1595. Daneau was the author of many works, including works on theology, philosophy, and ethics. He wrote as an introduction to the Christian faith the Christianae Isagoges ad christianorum theologorum locos communes in 1583.176 Christianae Isagoges covers the primary portions of dogmatic theology: the doctrine of God, the Trinity, creation and providence, salvation and the church. It is this introduction to the Christian faith that I will compare with Polanus’ Syntagma. 2.5.4

William Perkins

The Elizabethan Puritan William Perkins was born in 1558, in Warwickshire, England.177 He matriculated at Christ College, Cambridge, in 1577, and received his Master of Arts in 1584. He was a lecturer at Great St. Andrews Church in Cambridge

175 For literature concerning Daneau’s life and work, see Olivier Fatio, Methode et Théologie: Lambert Daneau et les Débuts de la Scholastique Réformée (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1976); Fatio, “Lambert Daneau,” in Jill Raitt, ed., Shapers of Religious Traditions in Germany, Switzerland, and Poland, 1560–1600 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), pp. 105–19; Donald Sinnema, “The Discipline of Ethics in Early Reformed Orthodoxy,” Calvin Theological Journal 28 (1993), 10–44; and Christoph Strohm, Ethik im frühen Calvinismus. Humanistische Einflüsse, philosophische, juristische und theologische Argumentationem sowie mentalitätsgeschichtliche Aspekte am Beispiel des Calvin-Schülers Lambertus Danaeus, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, vol. 65 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996). 176 Lambert Daneau, Christianae Isagoges ad christianorum theologorum locos communes, libri II (Geneva: Eustachus Vignon, 1583). 177 For literature concerning Perkin’s life and work, see W. B. Patterson, William Perkins and the Making of Protestant England (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); McKim, Ramism, 5–14; Richard A. Muller, Christ and the Decree, 131–132; Mark Shaw, “William Perkins and the New Pelagians:

Early Reformed Orthodox Contemporaries of Polanus

and became a fellow at Christ’s College in 1584. He held this post until 1595. Perkins is known for his prolific writing, for his works on practical theology, and for his Ramism.178 Through his work at Christ College, he was able to influence a great number of Puritan theologians, such as fellow Ramist William Ames (1576–1633), James Ussher (1581–1656), and Richard Sibbes (1577–1635). He died in 1602, one year before the death of Queen Elizabeth, under whose reign he lived the whole of his life. Perkins’ many works include The Whole Treatise of Cases of Conscience, the Foundation of Christian Religion, and Prophetica (published in English as The Art of Prophesying).179 In my comparison with Polanus’ Syntagma, I will use Perkins’ Armilla aurea, translated into English as the Golden Chaine.180 Although this work is much briefer than Polanus’ Syntagma, Perkins shared Ramism creates interesting comparisons, as does the way in which they each divide the attributes of God. 2.5.5

Lucas Trelcatius Jr.

Trelcatius Jr., was born in London in 1573 to Lucas Trelcatius Sr. (1542–1602), who was himself a pastor in the Reformed church and was later a teacher at the University of Leiden.181 His parents lived in Paris until the St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre in

178

179

180

181

Another Look at the Cambridge Predestination Controversy of the 1590’s,” Westminster Theological Journal 58 (1996), 267–301. For his practical theology, see Sinclair Ferguson, foreword to The Art of Prophesying, by William Perkins (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth Trust, 1996); for his Ramism see Donald K. McKim, Ramism in William Perkins. William Perkins, A case of conscience the greatest taht euer was, how a man may know, whether he be the son of God or no. Resolued by the vvord of God. Whereunto is added a briefe discourse, taken out of Hier. Zanchius (Edinburgh: Robert Walde-grave, 1592); William Perkins, The foundation of Christian religion gathered into sixe principles. And it is to bee learned of ignorant people, that they may be fit to hear sermons with profit, and to receiue the Lords Supper with comfort (London: Thomas Orwin, 1591); William Perkins, Prophetica, sive, De sacra et vnica ratione concionandi tractatus (Cambridge: Johannis Legatt, 1592). William Perkins, Armilla aurea, id est, Miranda series causarum et salutis & damnationis iuxta verbum Dei Eius synopsin continet annexa tabula (Cambridge: Iohannis Legatt, 1590); William Perkins, A Golden Chaine, Or the Description of Theologie, Containing the Order of the Causes of Salvation and Damnation, According to Gods Word (Edinburgh: Robert Walde-grave, 1592). For literature concerning Trelcatious Jr.’s life and work, see Muller, “Unity and Distinction,” 315–341. Muller notes that there is scant biographical material on Trelcatius, Jr., with much of that being found in works regarding Arminius. Muller cites Keith Stranglin, Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation: The Context, Roots, and Shape fo teh Leiden Debate, 1603–1609 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), as well as ‘Trelcat (Luc),’ s.v. in Eugene and Emile Haag, La France Protestante ou vies des Protestants français qui sont fait un nom dans l’histoire, 9 vols (Paris: J. Cherbuliez, 1846–1858). See also Richard A. Muller, “‘Duplex cognitio Dei’ in the Theology of Early Reformed Orthodoxy,” Sixteenth Century Journal 10.2 (1979): 51–62.

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1572, at which point they fled to England. Trelcatius, Jr., later travelled to Rijssel, Ghent, and Brussels as his father moved from pastorate to pastorate among various Walloon congregations. Trelcatius, Sr., then became pastor of a Walloon church in Leiden in 1585. He was made Professor of Theology at the University of Leiden two years later in 1587. Trelcatius, Jr., studied in Basel, Zürich, Heidelberg, and Geneva, and took the pastorate of the Walloon church in Leiden in 1595. When his father and his father’s colleague, Franciscus Junius, died of the plague in 1602, Trelcatius, Jr., took over the post of Professor of Theology at the University of Leiden in his stead. Muller notes that he was appointed as “extraordinarius, namely, the junior professor, subordinate in rank to Kuchlinus, Gomarus, and Arminius.”182 The majority of the younger Trelcatius’ time at Leiden was taken up with disputes with Arminius. Trelcatius, Jr., was somewhat unique among his Leiden faculty contemporaries in that he was the only one to produce a sort of loci communes on the whole range of Reformed doctrine. Muller notes that his aim was to produce a “theological manual of middle range in technical detail – less in detail but broader in compass than the major treatises of the era, and more technically developed than the extant brief compendia of doctrine.”183 It is this middle range textbook, the Scholastica institutio, that I will compare with Polanus’ Syntagma.184 2.5.6

Gulielmus Bucanus

Bucanus is one of the theologians with whom I will compare Polanus that relatively little is known about.185 He was a deacon from 1568 to 1571 and then pastor from 1571 to 1591 in Yverdon-les-Bains. He then became the Professor of Theology at the Academy of Lausanne from 1591 to 1603. He was called to teach at the Saumur but died before he could take up the position. His primary work was the Institutiones

182 Muller, “Unity and Distinction,” 318. 183 Muller, “Unity and Distinction,” 319. Note that Muller includes Polanus in the comparison. He probably intends the Partitiones, as the Syntagma would not be published until three years after Trelcatius’ death. 184 Lucas Trelcatius, Jr., Scholastica et methodica locorum communium institutio (Hanau: Guilielmum Antonium, 1610). 185 For literature concerning Bucanus’ life and work, see Irena Backus, “Bucanus,” at Dictionnaire Historique de la Suisse, https://hls-dhs-dss.ch/fr/articles/011062/2004–10–25/, last accessed 12/01/2020; Muller, PRRD, 1:42; Roland S. Ward, God and Adam: Reformed Theology and the Creation Covenant, (Larnsvale, NSW: Tulip Publishing, 2003), 60; and Sung-Jai Cho, “Trinitarische Theologie bij Guilielmus Bucanus († 1603),” Ph.D. Diss., Theologische Universiteit Apeldoorn, 2013.

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theologicae.186 Backus describes it as “one of the very first Reformed textbooks of dogmatic theology.”187 In the Institutiones theologicae, Bucanus covers the primary loci of Christian theology in a succinct and clear fashion. 2.5.7

Bartholomäus Keckermann

The exact date of Keckermann’s birth is not known, but it can be fixed to somewhere between 1571 and 1573.188 He was educated at the Gdansk Academic Gymnasium, matriculating there in 1586. He studied at the University of Wittenberg in 1592 but completed his studies at the University of Heidelberg in 1595. He was a dormitory supervisor at Heidelberg before taking a teaching position at the Collegium Sapientiae in 1597. In 1600, he took a position as Professor of Hebrew at the University of Heidelberg but left two years later to become Professor of Philosophy at the Gdansk Academic Gymnasium. He remained at that position until his death in 1609. Keckermann is perhaps most well-known for his philosophical works, which Freedman describes as “encyclopedic in breadth.”189 He wrote Praecognitorum Logicorum, a Systema logicae, and a Systema ethicae.190 For my purposes, I will compare Keckermann’s Systema S. S. Theologiae.191 This work is among the relatively

186 Gulielmus Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae seu locurum communium christianae relgionis (Geneva: 1602). The edition referenced throughout is the 1605 edition, published by Johannes & Isaias le Preux in Bern. 187 Backus, “Bucanus,” “l’un des tout premiers manuels réformés de théologie dogmatique.” 188 For literature concerning Keckermann’s life and work, see Muller, “Vera Philosophia,” 341–365; Joseph S. Freedman, “The Career and Writings of Bartholomew Keckermann (d. 1609),” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society 141.3 (Sept. 1997), 307–364; and Hotson, Commonplace Learning. 189 Freedman, “Bartholomew Keckermann,” 309. On Keckermann’s influence upon Alsted and his own ‘encyclopedic’ efforts, see Hotson, Commonplace Learning, 114–126; Kocku Von Stockrad, Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Esoteric Discourse and Western Identities, Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, ed., A. J. Vanderjagt (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 180; and Andreas J. Beck, “Rationalität und Scholastik in der reformierten Orthodoxie, insbesondere bei Keckermann, Voetius und Coccejus,” in Reformation und Rationalität, ed. by Ernst-Joachim Waschke and Herman Selderhuis, Refo500 Academic Studies, Vol. 17 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 263–288. 190 Bartholomäus Keckermann, Praecognitorum Logicorum Tractatus tres (Leipzig 1598); Bartholomäus Keckermann, Systema logicae, tribus libris adornatum, pleniore praeceptorum methodo, et commentariis scriptis ad praeceptorum illustrationem (Hanau: Antonius 1600); and Bartholomäus Keckermann, Systema Ethicæ. Tribus libris adornatum et publicis prælectionibus traditum in Gymnasio Dantiscano (London, Nortoniana, 1607). 191 Bartholomäus Keckermann, Systema S. S. Theologiæ, Tribvs Libris adornatum. Methodum ac Dispositionem operis Tabula præfixa adumbrat. Cum indice rerum & verborum locupletissimo (Hanau: Guilielmum Antonium, 1602).

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few from the Reformed orthodox period to consider the doctrine of the Trinity before the divine attributes. These seven theologians provide seven works with which to compare and contrast the doctrinal formulations that Polanus sets forth in the Syntagma. They are all of various lengths and genres, yet they provide a rough sketch of the doctrine of the essence, names, and essential attributes/properties of God in the Early Reformed Orthodox period. In these works can be seen the general trajectory of the doctrine of God in this period: the major issues raised as well as the basic structure their discussion takes. While the focus of my work is not to simply compare and contrast Polanus with these theologians, they do provide a contextual starting point to establish the basic state of the question regarding the particular doctrines I wish to examine in the early Reformed orthodox period.

2.6

Summary

This chapter has provided a basic overview of a variety of historical details that serve to situate Polanus within his own context. This has included details of his own personal history and the various places in which he studied and worked, as well as the major figures from whom he learned and with whom he labored. Additionally, I saw the broader backdrop of Reformed orthodoxy and Reformed scholasticism, situating Polanus both in terms of timeframe (orthodoxy) and the methodology he employed (scholasticism). I also investigated the two philosophical strands that influence Polanus’ methodology: a Christian form of Aristotelianism and Ramism. Finally, I introduced those early Reformed orthodox theologians with whom I will compare Polanus and his doctrinal formulations in the Syntagma. From this sketch of Polanus’ life and historical context, I have a framework within which to better understand his doctrine of God as it arises from the Syntagma. What remains, however, is the theological context that comes out of the first book of the Syntagma. It is to that theological context that I proceed in the next chapter.

Chapter Three: Theological Foundations of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

3.1

Introduction

While the primary focus of this work is upon Polanus’ doctrine of the essence and essential properties of God; i.e., the Triune God as seen in his essential unity. In order to better understand these doctrines, it is also important to consider more broadly the foundations of Polanus’ theology as these foundations arise in the first book of the Syntagma – a portion of the work that can rightly be considered ‘prolegomena’.1 In order to do this, I will consider three inter-related concepts in this chapter: Polanus’ definition of theology in terms of wisdom (sapientia); the distinction of ‘true theology’ into archetypal and ectypal theology; and, finally, the authoritative role of Scripture in the development of doctrine. In looking at just these three concepts, I will not be able to do justice to the whole of book one of the Syntagma. Rather, my intention is to evaluate the way in which Polanus begins his work so as to better understand what comes in the book two (and, though it is outside of the scope of this work, what comes in the books that follow book two). Together, these three aspects of Polanus’ ‘prolegomena’ demonstrate the principial starting point for his theology. Ultimately, they show the theocentric nature of the whole of the Syntagma in that Polanus begins with the revelation from God that is of God. Context, however, remains important even for this discussion. Whereas in later chapters I will compare Polanus’ doctrine of God with the seven early Reformed Orthodox theologians introduced in Chapter One, the comparisons below are more generalized. This reflects the slightly different goal of this (and the previous) chapter – that of seeking to discern the overall contextual foundations for Polanus’ work. I therefore begin with a general overview of book one of the Syntagma before taking up the three items I will be considering in detail.

3.2

Overview of Book One of the Syntagma

Although Polanus does not use this word to describe what he is doing in book one, it can rightly be described as the place where he sets forth his theological prolegomena. ‘Prolegomena’ refers to the ‘words that come before:’ in this case, the foundational starting point for what follows. Polanus was not alone in his quest to discern these 1 Much of the context of this chapter is adapted from Tipton, “Defining ‘Our Theology’.”

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starting points. As the time of the Reformation gave way to the period of early Reformed orthodoxy, the gathering and codifying of doctrinal theology was added to the ongoing task of polemic debate.2 Discussions between the various newly formed (or newly Reformed) universities and disputes with their established Roman Catholic counterparts were typical of this period. As well, the continued pace of confession writing resulted in the production of many important statements of faith and practice. These features together provided a conceptual and methodological background for what the Reformed orthodox saw as the primary work of the church: preaching and teaching in the context of the church.3 It was a period wherein the newness of the Reformation gave way to the systematic exposition of the whole of Post-Reformation thought, stressing as appropriate both points of continuity and discontinuity with the past.4 Several of the theologians of this early Reformed scholastic period took up the task of seeking to define the limit and scope of, as well as the basis for, theology. That is, it is during this early Reformed scholastic period that we begin to see the development of a distinctly Reformed prolegomena. Through their efforts, the theologians of this period developed what Muller calls, “arguably, the most exhaustive and finely tooled prolegomena in the history of theology.”5 While the theologians of later Reformed scholastic periods would not always go into the same level of detail on these questions, it is important to remember that before these later writers could assume and paraphrase these ideas they first had to be delicately worked through by thinkers of previous generations.6 Two initial questions arose from this early doctrinal codification: what is the fundamental meaning of theology, and what is the foundational basis upon which the church does theology? The first question seeks to understand the subject matter into which theologians inquire: what is theology? While it may seem at first to be a largely academic question, the circumstances both within and without Reformed orthodoxy demanded it. For one: how was one to account for the differences between Roman Catholic and Protestant theologies? For another: how were the Reformed to account for the growing diversity of thought among their own theologians? Every theologian claimed to have true theology (theologia vera). Was theology, then, just a matter of opinion? The second question seeks to understand the foundation upon which true theology is built: the principium cognoscendi, as well as the place theology held among other academic disciplines, particularly philosophy. Reformed scholastic theologians self-consciously sought to base their dogmatics upon the 2 3 4 5 6

Van Asselt, “Scholasticism in the Time of Early Orthodoxy,” 103–04. See Burnett, Teaching the Reformation, 171–86. See, for example, van Asselt and Dekker, “Introduction,” 38–39. Muller, PRRD, 1:109. See Muller, PRRD, 1.149.

Overview of Book One of the Syntagma

revelation of God in Scripture. The Word of God is therefore both normative for and authoritative within the development of their theology. As such, a thorough understanding of the nature and authority of Scripture is a doctrinal and practical priority. Polanus begins book one with the question of theology itself: what is the precise meaning and scope of theology? What are its parts and what are the relationships between those parts, how does the whole fit together and how can one navigate through the whole? Before answering, Polanus provides a brief etymological discussion of theologia, and differentiates theologia vera from theologia falsa.7 These preliminaries aside, Polanus discusses true theology according a number of typically scholastic questions: whether true theology exists (an sit theologia vera),what is it (quid sit), and what is its subject (quod subjectum est).8 In response to the first question (an sit theologia vera), Polanus declares that, Scripture, human authorities, and human reason all testify to the existence of true theology.9 In response to the second question, Polanus declares that true theology is the wisdom of divine things (see below, 3.3). This, too, is demonstrated by Scripture and human testimony. This wisdom of divine things is twofold: it is either archetypal or ectypal (see below, 3.4). Polanus’ discussion of archetypal theology leads him, first, to consider God as our summum bonum10 and, second, to consider knowing God as the ultimate blessedness that a rational creature can attain.11 Polanus’ discussion of ectypal theology is divided, first, into that which is in Christ in his incarnation and that which is in those who are saved in Christ. In those who are saved, this ectypal theology either belongs to those blessed in heaven (i.e., those who have died in Christ) or to those who are pilgrims along the way (i.e., those who are living by faith in Christ). The final portion of book one, which is by far the largest, deals with Scripture. Polanus discusses the authority of Scripture first and at great length (see below, 3.5). He then takes up a number of other issues in relatively less detail: the necessity of Scripture,12 the various authentic versions of Scripture,13 the issue

7 Etymological discussions about the meaning of a particular word or phrase under discussion is common in Polanus’ theological methodology, as will be seen throughout the discussion of his doctrine of God. Less common are higher level divisions that sit above the primary definition Polanus gives. Another example of this is found in Polanus’ discussion between the Personal and Essential Wisdom of God (see Chapter 7.3 below). 8 Polanus, Syntagma, 5E. 9 Polanus, Syntagma, 5D–7C. 10 Polanus, Syntagma, 15A–52B. 11 Polanus, Syntagma, 52B–62D. 12 Polanus, Syntagma, 447C–475E. 13 Polanus, Syntagma, 476A–525E.

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of translation,14 the perspicuity of Scripture,15 issues related to the interpretation of Scripture,16 and the perfection of Scripture.17

3.3

The Definition of Theology

One of the questions that Polanus takes up in book one of the Syntagma is that of the genus of theology. He does not ask this question directly, however, and the answer he provides is divided up in his discussion of the two distinctions within the one concept of theologia vera: i.e., the archetypal/ectypal distinction detailed in section 3.4 below. Because Polanus’ answer to this question is dependent upon this distinction in terms of its distribution, but not in terms of the overall answer, and because he deals with the issue before he makes the distinction (even if he provides more information to the overall answer in the second half of the distinction) I will take up this issue first. In order to place Polanus’ answer in its proper context, it must be recognized that by defining theology, Polanus has entered into a scholastic discussion that goes back at least to the Middle Ages.18 The range of possible answers to this question is connected with Aristotle’s discussion in the Nicomachean Ethics regarding the categorization of the various academic disciplines according to five basic ways of knowing: intelligentia, scientia, sapientia, ars, and prudentia.19 According to Aristotle, intelligence (intelligentia) indicates knowledge of principles apart from their demonstration; knowledge (scientia) indicates knowledge of conclusions based upon the demonstration from self-evident principles; wisdom (sapientia) indicates knowledge of both principles and conclusions that points towards an ultimate goal; art (ars) is a knowledge of techniques that bring about some desired result; prudence (prudentia) is the knowledge of practical judgment. The question then becomes: in which of these academic disciplines do we find theology? Theologians of all eras have answered this question in a variety of ways: either a hard determination into scientia or sapientia, or an acknowledgement that theology is a mixed discipline admitting all or many of these ways of knowing.20 Augustine places theology in the category of scientia.21 Thomas Aquinas also declares

14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

Polanus, Syntagma, 526A–599C. Polanus, Syntagma, 599C–632E. Polanus, Syntagma, 633A–749B. Polanus, Syntagma, 749C–790E. Muller, PRRD, 1:326–327; van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 326. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, VI.3–8:1139b–1142a. For a discussion of the history of the answers to this question, see Muller, PRRD, 1:326–327. Augustine, De Trinitate, CCL 50, 424. See also van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 327.

The Definition of Theology

that theology is scientia, and includes Augustine as testimony.22 For Duns Scotus (and Ockham after him), however, theologia lacks a crucial feature of scientia – that of demonstrations made on the basis of self-evident reasons.23 According to Muller, this question did not arise during the time of the Reformation. As the codification of Reformed teaching continued in the post-Reformation Reformed orthodox period, however, several answers were given. Perkins declared that “theology is the science of living blessedly forever.”24 Junius states that theology is wisdom.25 For Keckermann, theology should be understood through the rubric of prudence.26 Polanus’ own answer to the question of the genus of theology is found in his response to a broader question: ‘What is true theology?’ (quid est theologia vera). He answers by declaring that “true theology is the wisdom of divine things.”27 Polanus demonstrates that true theology is wisdom through Scripture (Ephesians 3:10, 1 Corinthians 2:6) and the testimony of a variety of ancient authors. Here, Polanus cites Clement of Alexandria who states, “with reason, therefore, the apostle has called the wisdom of God ‘manifold,’ and which has manifested its power ‘in many departments and in many modes’ – by art, by knowledge, by faith, by prophecy – for our benefit.”28 Polanus also refers to Thomas Aquinas, who affirms that “sacred theology is especially called wisdom.”29 Furthermore, Polanus demonstrates considerable reliance upon the thought of John Duns Scotus, “it is most proper to say that theology, according to itself, is wisdom.”30 Like Turretin after him, Polanus indicates a later statement by Thomas that describes sacred doctrine (sacra doctrina) as wisdom.31 Polanus does not interact with Thomas’ earlier statement that theology is scientia, but rather focuses on the notion that, for Thomas, the designation of theology as a science does not exclude the notion of wisdom.32

22 Aquinas, S.Th., 1, q. 1, a. 2. 23 Duns Scotus, Op. Oxon., prol., q. 3, art. 2 an. 4. 24 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11. Voetius also defines theology in terms of scientia. See Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 186. 25 Junius, De vera theologia, in Opuscula theologiae selecta (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1882), 48. 26 Keckermann, Systema, 1. 27 Polanus, Syntagma, 7C, “Theologia vera est sapientia rerum divinarum.” Note that this statement is identical that given by Junius, and comes in answer to the same basic issue, i.e., the broader definition of theologia. See Han, Symphonia Catholica, 75. 28 Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, book I, chap. IV, in PG 9, col. 587–590. 29 Aquinas, S.Th., 1, q. 1, a. 6, res., “Unde sacra doctrina maxime dicitur sapientia.” 30 Polanus, Syntagma, 8B, “Magis tamen proprie dici potest, quod Theologia secundum se est sapientia.” The reference is from Duns Scotus, Ordinatio (Citta del Vaticano: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1950), 214. 31 François Turrettini, Institutio theologiae elencticae (Leiden: Fredericum Haring, 1696), 21–22 (I. vi. 4, 6, 7). 32 See Muller, PRRD, 1:327.

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In his initial discussion regarding the definition of theology, Polanus does not go into specific detail about Aristotle’s categories of knowing. In chapter thirteen of the Syntagma, however, Polanus discusses the category (genus) of theology as wisdom (sapientia) in greater detail. This sets his fuller discussion of genus particularly within the category of ectypal theology.33 Thus, Polanus provides the basic designation that theology is wisdom in the definition of theology itself but discusses the various categories of knowing under the rubric of ectypal theology – i.e., ‘our theology.’34 This reflects Polanus’ commitment to God’s simplicity (see below, Chapter 5.4) and his exposition of God’s wisdom (see below, Chapter 7). As God knows according to one simple act of understanding, these ‘ways of knowing’ do not strictly speaking apply to him. In this later discussion, Polanus asks whether ectypal theology ought to be considered intelligence (intelligentia), science (scientia), art (ars), prudence (prudentia), or wisdom (sapientia).35 He states that our theology is not intelligence, as this is narrower than theology.36 Here he indicates that intelligence is the knowledge of first principles apart from their demonstration. Polanus, however, is seeking to demonstrate throughout the first book of the Syntagma that divine revelation is absolutely necessary for theology. As such, theology cannot be known without revelation. Polanus states that theology is not science, strictly and properly speaking, as science deals with conclusions that are deduced by demonstration from principles or premises that we find evident.37 He indicates that ectypal theology does not proceed from such self-evident principle but rather from revelation.38 Furthermore, scientia pertains to necessary and universal truths. Given that ectypal theology rests upon the revelation of God, it includes contingent and particular events, such as creation, the incarnation, and the resurrection. Polanus determines that theology is

33 Polanus, Syntagma, 75B. 34 This adumbrates a discussion that Polanus will have regarding the wisdom of God (sapientia Dei) in chapter eighteen of the Syntagma. See below Chapter 7.3 and 7.4. 35 Polanus, Syntagma, 75E. 36 Polanus, Syntagma, 76A. 37 Polanus, Syntagma, 76B. 38 See Muller, PRRD, 1:327, who states, “Scotus – followed by Ockham and others – had argued that theology, despite is principles drawn from a higher science and its use of reason to draw conclusions from those principles, lacked one crucial characteristic of scientia: demonstration made on the basis of evidence or evident reasons. In order for such demonstrations to occur, theology must contain ‘necessary reasons’ (rationes necessariae) that are evident in themselves (per se notis) either immediately or mediately. However, revealed knowledge accepted by faith does not belong to the category of self-evident necessary reason. Theology does not rest on natural light and therefore has no evidence of its object comparable to the evidence that scientia has concerning the contingent order of things. Therefore, theology cannot strictly be called a science.” Muller references Duns Scotus, Op. Oxon., prol., q. 3, art. 2 an 4.

The Definition of Theology

also not prudence as it, too, is narrower than theology.39 Prudence is a practical or active habit in which true reason conjoins with ability for right activity. Theology is not art, which is also narrower than theology.40 Art is the directed activity of reason, intelligence, and wisdom. Each of these Aristotelian categories is, itself, narrower than the definition of theology that Polanus is seeking to put forth. Although Polanus’ understanding of theology does not fit precisely into any of the previous categories, he acknowledges that theology embraces all of these concepts. Polanus indicates that a wide range of Scripture demonstrates this phenomenon: Psalm 119:27, 34, 66, 73, 99; Proverbs 1:2, 3; and Ephesians 3:4, among others.41 Polanus anticipates this conclusion with the description that each method of knowing is ‘narrower’ than theology: each is certainly contained in theology but does not exhaust it as a concept. This is particularly true in its ‘ectypal’ form, i.e., as we do theology according to our own mode of understanding. Polanus therefore concludes that theology is not merely wisdom, but as wisdom our theology “is a composite disposition [embracing] the other mental dispositions: assenting to principles by intelligentia; conclusions and deductions from principles by scientia; employing Christian works by ars; rightly directing and governing all things toward piety and life by prudentia.”42 In this way, Polanus does not merely include in wisdom the knowledge of things about God, but includes reverence for God, trust in God’s promises and obedience to God’s commands: theology, for Polanus, embraces not only the knowledge of God as it is revealed by God, but also the proper response to that revelation. Thus, theology for Polanus is not merely speculative, but also eminently practical.43 He supports this statement with the notion that theology proceeds under the illumination of the divine gift of faith and the application of logical discourse upon the revealed principles of the faith. Further, Polanus’ point of view on this matter is

39 40 41 42

Polanus, Syntagma, 80C. Polanus, Syntagma, 80B. Polanus, Syntagma, 80D. Polanus, Syntagma, 81D, “Relinquitur ergo ut verum Theologiae nostrae genus sit sapientia, quae est habitus compositus, alios habitus mentis in se comprehendens, per intelligentiam principiis assentiens, per scientiam conclusiones et determinationes ex principiis deducens, per artem in operibus Christianis occupata, per prudentiam recte res omnes ad pietatem et vitam pertinentes dirigens et gerens.” 43 On the ‘practicality’ of theology in Polanus, see Han, Symphonia Catholica, 81. On the ‘practicality’ of early Reformed orthodox theology generally, as well as the differences between early modern and more current uses of the word, see Aza Goudriaan, “Theologia practica: The Diverse Meaning of a Subject of Early Modern Academic Writing,” in Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism, Studies in the History of Christian Traditions, vol. 120 (Leiden: Brill: 2013), 443–455; O’Banion, “Jerome Zanchi, the Application of Theology, and the Rise of the English Practical Divinity Tradition,” 97–120; and Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 187.

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evident in his distribution of theology into faith concerning God and good works (see below, Chapter 4.3). Such a distinction shows his particular emphasis on both theoretical knowledge of God and practical living toward God. Indeed, in giving “wisdom” as the answer to the question of the genus of theology, Polanus has already included both a speculative (or theoretical) and a practical aspect in theology.44 Polanus, however, provides three explicit reasons why he declares that theology is both theoretical and practical.45 First, theology is demonstrated to be practical according to its end or goal. He first shows this with reference to Scripture, such as 1 Timothy 1:3–5 and 4:7, 1 John 4:21, and James 1:21. Polanus also refers to the testimony of the church, particularly to John Duns Scotus. Polanus quotes from question four from Duns Scotus’ commentary on Lombard’s Sentences: In that the first object of theology is an ultimate end or principle in accordance with a created intelligence, these things which have been obtained from an ultimate end are practical principles. As a consequence, the principles of theology are practical. Therefore, the conclusions are also practical.46

Here Duns Scotus ties the source of the principles to the ultimate end to which those principles point. Such a ‘pointing towards a goal’ is the very definition of practical.47 The second reason that theology is practical as well as theoretical is that theology contains that doctrine that is found in the Law of God.48 As such, it contains God’s rules and commands for living – obedience to which is found not merely in knowing, but also in doing. Thirdly, Polanus states that “a practical understanding concerning a goal is more noble than any speculation.”49 It should be noted, however, that these demonstrations do more to show that theology is practical. That is, the theoretical or speculative aspect of theology appears to be a given for Polanus and is therefore not made explicit.50

44 See van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 327. 45 Polanus, Syntagma, 89E. Polanus uses theoretica and speculativa as synonyms. 46 Duns Scotus, Quaestiones in Librum Primum Sententiarum, in Opera Omnia, vol. 8 (Paris, 1893), “cum primum objectum Theologiae sit ultimus finis et principia in intellectu creato sumta a fine ultimo sint principia practica: igitur principia Theologiae sunt practica: ergo et conclusiones sunt practica.” 47 See Muller, PRRD, 1:343. 48 Polanus, Syntagma, 90C. 49 Polanus, Syntagma, 90C, “tertio, quia cognitio practica circa finem est nobilior omni speculatione.” 50 See also below, Section 4.3 on the implementation of this practical element in Polanus’ doctrine of God more broadly through the use of application, or usus, sections in book two of the Syntagma.

The Archetypal/Ectypal Distinction

3.4

The Archetypal/Ectypal Distinction

From his definition of true theology, Polanus proceeds to a discussion of the archetypal/ectypal distinction. If true theology is the wisdom of divine things, then it refers both to the understanding that God has of himself and to the understanding that we have of God. In both cases, God is the object of knowledge (i.e., the thing being known). The manner or mode of that knowledge, however, is not the same. God understands himself in accordance with his own nature and human beings created in the image of God understand God in accordance with their own nature. The issue, then, becomes the relationship between these two ‘types’ of theology. In order to explain this phenomenon, Polanus distinguishes true theology into archetypal (archetypa) or ectypal (ectypa) theology.51 Such a distinction has roots in medieval scholastic discussions, particularly in Duns Scotus’ response to Aquinas’ conception of an analogia entis.52 Whereas Aquinas taught that we gain knowledge of God through a ‘chain of being,’ Duns Scotus asserted that our knowledge of God rests upon authoritative testimony. In this way, the distinction arose in the broad context of epistemology.53 Duns Scotus discerns a difference between God’s own knowledge of himself and human knowledge of God. God’s knowledge of himself is theology secundum se: he depends upon no other for knowledge of himself and his knowledge of himself is perfect and complete.54 Human knowledge of God, on the other hand, is theology secundum quid: it relies upon something outside itself. This human knowledge is therefore necessarily imperfect and incomplete due to our particular mode of knowing. That is, human beings rely upon revelation for their knowledge of God. In this sense, God’s own knowledge of himself is theology ‘proper,’ while human knowledge is accommodated to their particular way of knowing. While the epistemological issue remains in Reformed scholasticism, an especially soteriological aspect arises due to their understanding of the noetic effects of sin.55 Thus, our inability to know God has a two-fold source: we are ontologically different than God and our understanding even of the revelation that God shows forth is tainted by sin. This soteriological aspect broadens the distinction of ectypal theology to take in the incarnation and salvation through the incarnate Christ (see below). Because of these considerations, many Reformed orthodox theologians followed

51 See also the discussion of this distinction in Han, Symphonia Catholica, 75. 52 On the medieval roots generally, see Muller PRRD, 1:227–228; van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 323; and Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 156–157. 53 Van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 320. 54 See Muller, PRRD, 1:227, “At the heart of his own theological enterprise, Duns Scotus recognized the vast and unbridgeable gulf between the divine self-knowledge and all human knowledge of God.” 55 See also Muller, PRRD, 1:225.

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their medieval predecessors in acknowledging a distinction between an ‘archetypal’ and an ‘ectypal’ theology. According to van Asselt, this distinction is found in use by a wide variety of Reformed orthodox theologians, including Johannes Polyander, Johannes Alsted, Melchior Leydecker, Petrus van Mastrict, Franciscus Turrettinus, Johannes Cocceius, Franciscus Burman, Johann Heinrich Heidegger, Abraham Heidanus, and Johannes Braun.56 Polanus includes in the Syntagma his exposition of the distinction between a wisdom of God that is archetypal and a wisdom of God that is ectypal. In support of the overall archetypal/ectypal distinction, Polanus references generally – without quoting – Thomas Aquinas in pars prima of the Summa Theologia and in Aquinas’ exposition of Boethius’ de Trinitate.57 Polanus does, however, rely more specifically upon the formulations of Duns Scotus.58 In the prologue to his commentary on Lombard’s Sentences, Duns Scotus distinguishes, “between theology in itself and theology in us.”59 For Duns Scotus, God’s knowledge of himself is essential and is therefore necessary: it would be impossible for God not to know himself perfectly, essentially, and naturally. This sort of natural, essential, knowledge is not predicated of rational creatures because their essence is not like that of God.60 It is from this in se/in nobis distinction that Polanus develops this particular formulation. This doctrine is also very similar to what Franciscus Junius (1545–1602) sets forth in De theologia vera.61 In that work, published some fifteen years prior to the Syntagma, Junius develops the in se/in nobis distinction in his definition and defense of ‘true theology.’ Junius provides much of the definitions that Polanus adopts and the distinctions he adapts. In fact, Polanus’ exposition of this distinction in the Syntagma is wholly comparable to that which Junius articulates. There are some structural differences, but these are more related to Polanus’ penchant for

56 See van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 323. 57 See Han, Symphonia Catholica, 77, “This definition, however, is not an invention of the Reformed orthodox, but, as Junius and Quenstedt testified, is grounded in some biblical testimonies and is very traditional.” 58 Polanus, Syntagma, 9E–10A. 59 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, prol. 3:1–3, n. 141, “primo distinguo de theologia in se et de theologia in nobis.” 60 See also Muller, PRRD, 1:227–228. 61 Franciscus Junius, De theologia vera (1594) in Opuscula theologica selecta, ed. Abraham Kuyper (Amsterdam: F. Müller, 1882).

The Archetypal/Ectypal Distinction

strict bifurcation, whereas Junius is comfortable with divisions into three or more parts.62 Junius does not, however, quote from or refer to Duns Scotus.63 In his discussion of this distinction, Polanus defines archetypal theology as “the wisdom of divine things that is residing in God, essential to himself, and uncreated.”64 Polanus is here describing that perfect knowledge which God has of himself and his works by one simple act of intelligence. In knowing himself and his works, God knows every aspect of himself. Thus, nothing about God is unknown to God. Further, this knowledge takes on the very character of God: his knowledge is eternal, simple, and perfect. As will be shown in the section below regarding God’s essential properties of the first order, describing God’s knowledge of himself with one of these attributes practically demands the others. Thus, God’s knowledge is not composed of potency and act; neither does it move from potency to act. As God’s archetypal knowledge of himself is eternal, Polanus allows that it can also be called prototypical. In the same way, as this archetypal knowledge is perfect and absolute, it can also be called exemplary.65 Polanus indicates that God’s archetypal wisdom participates in all his other attributes. Thus, God’s self-knowledge is absolute, infinite, simultaneous, and incommunicable.66 He declares that this archetypal theology is essential, “for God alone is naturally known only to himself.”67 Thus, God’s own knowledge of himself is identical with his very essence.68 Polanus states that this knowledge that God alone has is also perfect in that it encompasses all things: both within the Godhead and among his creation. Given these attributes of archetypal theology, Polanus declares that it only resides in the divine mind and cannot be communicated to his creatures. For Polanus, archetypal theology is not something to be investigated into and is therefore not the subject of the Syntagma. Archetypal theology is proper to

62 Pace Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 47, who asserts that behind Polanus’ doctrine there is a “hidden Thomistic epistemology, determined by philosophical influences, according to which all human knowledge is only an emanation of divine wisdom.” Faulenbach also attaches to Junius this dependence upon Thomas. Faulenbach therefore misses Duns Scotus’ influence upon both Polanus’ and Junius’ use of the in se/in nobis distinction. See also Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 12–14, and 16, who attributes the source of this distinction to Duns Scotus. 63 van Asselt, “The Fundamental Meaning,” 322. 64 Polanus, Syntagma, 10C, “Theologia archetypa est sapientia rerum divinarum, in Deo residens, essentialis ipsi et increata.” Pace Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 16, who translates sapientia rerum divinarum as “the wisdom of the divine essence.” i.e., in a subjective, rather than objective sense. 65 Polanus, Syntagma, 11B. 66 Polanus, Syntagma, 12C. 67 Polanus, Syntagma, 12C, “Solus enim Deus est sibi soli naturaliter notus.” Polanus is quoting from Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, prol. 3:3, n. 152. 68 See van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 231.

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God and to God alone. As a consequence, our only response to the revelation of the existence of God’s essential wisdom is adoration.69 Whereas God’s archetypal theology is incommunicable and proper to himself, ectypal theology is both communicable and communicated to rational creatures. Polanus defines ectypal theology as “the wisdom of divine things, expressed and formed by God from his own archetype by a gracious communication unto his own glory.”70 From God’s perfect, essential, and archetypal wisdom concerning himself, his actions, and his will, he graciously and willingly communicates wisdom to his rational creatures. Ectypal theology is not, however, a reproduction of the whole of God’s archetypal understanding of divine things. There are aspects of God’s essential wisdom that will never be revealed. God’s wisdom is infinite; that which is finite cannot contain that which is infinite.71 At the same time, what is communicated is substantially the same as the archetype.72 Polanus is therefore not postulating two different understandings of God. The ectype is formed (formata) from the archetype: “the archetype is the original and the ectype is the copy, which ought to agree with, correspond to, and be the image of the original.”73 Polanus indicates that this division into archetypal and ectypal theology is analogical, “because archetypal theology is the primary and is called the principal mode of theology, whereas ectypal theology is secondary and is called a likeness of the archetype.”74 Polanus demonstrates this with reference to the various perfections that God demonstrates himself to possess: wisdom, goodness, justice, and power (to name but a few). While these things are expressed in rational creatures in various ways (and to various extents), their source is in God. The perfection of each and

69 Polanus, Syntagma, 10D. 70 Polanus, Syntagma, 12D, “Theologia ectypa est sapientia rerum divinarum, a Deo ex archetypo ipsius expressa atque informata per communicationem gratiosam ad gloriam ipsius.” 71 Cf., Muller, PRRD, 1:109, “the ontological and epistemological premise [upon which Reformed prolegomena would rest] would be finitum non capax infiniti.” 72 Per Muller, PRRD, 1:230: “Although true theology is diverse or ‘multiplex’ considered according to its modes of communication and the ‘subjects’ or knowers in which it is found, true theology is one according to substance, whether it is found in God himself or in his creatures.... This substantially singular theology, as known infinitely and absolutely by the divine subject, God, is archetypal; as known finitely and relatively by the creaturely subject, ectypal.” 73 Polanus, Syntagma, 13D, “Theologia archetypa est exemplar: ectypa est exemplum quod exemplari convenire, respondere et simile esse debet.” 74 Polanus, Syntagma, 9C, “Haec divisio est analogica; quia Theologia archetypa primo et principaliter Theologia est et dicitur: Theologia ectypa secundario et ad similitudinem archetypa.” See also Muller, PRRD, 1:231; Beck, “God, Creation, and Providence,” 198; and van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 328, who, speaking of Junius, says that he “shows no hesitancy in using the term ‘theology’ univocally for the knowledge of God himself and human knowledge of God.”

The Archetypal/Ectypal Distinction

every virtue is found in God alone and yet a likeness or similitude of these virtues can be found in human beings.75 While theology is singular according to substance, there are distinctions to be made in the terms of the subject who understands and respective mode of their understanding. Thus, this singular theology can be distinguished into archetypal and ectypal, and ectypal theology can be distinguished in a variety of ways. The primary distinction that Polanus makes is between an ectypal theology considered in itself (in se), and ectypal theology as it occurs in rational creatures.76 Considered in itself, ectypal theology is the whole of that divine wisdom which is communicable by God to rational creatures, whether in this life and in the life to come.77 It is a concept within the mind of God concerning himself, his will, and his works that is communicable. This communicable knowledge is accommodated to their created (i.e., finite) nature. In this way, in se ectypal theology is the inexhaustible storehouse (thesauri) from which flows whatever God graciously desires to communicate to his rational creatures. This storehouse cannot be accessed by mere human effort, however: it must be revealed (i.e., actually communicated).78 The use of the term ‘communicable’ provides a portion of the distinctions with that ectypal theology that occurs in rational creatures. Considered as it occurs in rational creatures, ectypal theology is the wisdom of divine things that is actually communicated to these creatures according to their measure and capacity.79 Here Polanus speaks of the knowledge of God that creatures were created to receive. In terms of its substance, that ectypal theology which occurs in rational creatures differs from ectypal theology considered in itself only by quantity – that is, it is that portion of the storehouse of God’s revelation that is actually communicated. It is therefore actual knowledge (communicated) as opposed to merely potential knowledge (communicable). This “actual” ectypal theology is distinguished into two categories: that of Christ as the head of the church of God according to his human nature and that which is found in believers as the members of Christ.80 According to Polanus, the ectypal theology of Christ as head of the church is the whole divine wisdom communicated to Christ according to his human nature (i.e., on account of the hypostatic union of the divine and human nature into one person) and the extraordinary presence of the Holy Spirit in and with Christ throughout his earthly ministry.81 Polanus

75 76 77 78 79 80 81

Polanus, Syntagma, 9D. Polanus, Syntagma, 13E. Polanus, Syntagma, 14A. Van Asselt, “Fundamental Meaning,” 338. Polanus, Syntagma, 14C. Polanus, Syntagma, 62E. Polanus, Syntagma, 63A.

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affirms the ectypal theology that was in Christ as the head of the church is also sometimes called the theology of union.82 The ectypal theology that resided in Christ according to his human nature is not identical with the ectypal theology that is found in the church as the body of Christ. One primary distinction that Polanus wants to maintain is that while Christ is the mediator of ‘our theology,’ his own wisdom of divine things in the context of his incarnate, earthly, ministry is not mediated through himself.83 While in both cases the transfer of knowledge occurs through the agency of the Holy Spirit, it differs in nature and content from that which is found in the body of Christ – either in this life or in the life to come. Not all that was revealed to Christ was or will be revealed to us. The theology of the body of Christ (theologia membrorum Christi) is “the wisdom of divine things that Christ communicates with his church to the glory of God and their eternal salvation.”84 Polanus further distributes this half of the distinction into either the theology of the blessed (theologia beatorum) or the theology of those upon the way (theologia viatorum).85 This theology of those upon the way, which can also be translated “pilgrim theology,” can also be called “our theology” (theologia nostra). The theology of the blessed is “the wisdom of divine things that Christ communicates by his Holy Spirit to those who are in heaven.”86 It is the clear vision or intuitive understanding of God that the blessed receive through the Holy Spirit in the presence of Christ. This theology of the blessed is the highest understanding of God for which man has been created.

82 Pace Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 17, who characterizes the distinction between ectypal theology as it exists in Christ and as it exists in believers as being “between God’s word, Jesus Christ, and man’s rationality.” Polanus does not, however, distinguish “man’s rationality” from Christ as the Word of God, but man as a rational creature being distinguished from the humanity of Christ in the hypostatic union. Deal further declares that “just as Jesus is the image of the archetype, so is man’s rationality ectypal to God’s revelation of his archetypal reality, expressed in Jesus Christ.” I note that Polanus does not use the language of Jesus being the image of the archetype. Jesus is more than merely the revelation of God’s wisdom concerning himself (the only way that “archetypal” is used in this section). Further, Deal implies that our rationality is itself ectypal, rather than that our theology is ectypal. This is a fundamental confusion of the categories that Polanus has been utilizing. Deal therefore divides Polanus’ categories along an axis that Polanus didn’t intend. 83 Polanus, Syntagma, 63A. 84 Polanus, Syntagma, 63E, “Theologia membrorum Christi, est sapientia rerum divinarum a Christo cum membris suis communicata ad gloriam Dei et membrorum Christi salutem sempiternam.” 85 This language of ‘blessed’ and ‘one on the way’ can be found throughout Augustine, Civitate Dei in Opera Omnia, vol. 7, PL 41 (Paris: Guame Fratres, 1838). 86 Polanus, Syntagma, 64A, “Theologia beatorum, est sapientia rerum divinarum a Christo per Spiritum Sanctum cum beatis communicata in caelo per claram visionem seu intuitivam notitiam Dei ad gloriam ipsius.”

The Archetypal/Ectypal Distinction

Pilgrim theology, on the other hand, is “the wisdom of divine things which has been communicated by a gracious inspiration from Christ, by the Holy Spirit, with human beings who are living in this earth.”87 This is the theology that is relative to this life and is aimed at both the contemplation of God and the right worship of God. In that this form of ectypal theology comes through the apostles and prophets by inspiration of the Holy Spirit, it can also be called ‘revealed theology.’ This pilgrim theology can be considered two ways. First, it can be considered absolutely (absolute). As such, it is the wisdom of divine things according to the divine truth that God inspires and enunciates in the Old and New Testaments as attested by the prophets, apostles, and evangelists.88 Considered absolutely, it is essentially one, eternal and immutable for it is necessarily true, holy, and perfect according to God, its author. Pilgrim theology can also be considered as it is found in those who are themselves on the way (quatenus est in ipsis viatoribus), that is, those who are pilgrims. As such, it is the wisdom of divine things that is meditated upon in this life by men, communicated from God by the Word, and measured (modificata) according to man’s reason.89 It is measured in the sense that it is regulated, accommodated, and adapted to the individual. Polanus supports this with numerous references to Scripture (Job 3:34; Romans 12:4; 1 Corinthians 12:4, 11; Ephesians 4:7; 2 Peter 3:15; etc.). This accommodation is necessitated by creation, not as a result of the fall.90 Again, what Polanus seeks to convey is in line with the notion that finite human understanding cannot contain that which is infinite. This, of course, is not a denial of the effects of the fall upon human understanding, but simply stating that even before the fall, God accommodated his understanding such that Adam could apprehend it. Polanus’ use of the language of archetypal and ectypal theology demonstrates the distinction’s overall importance within the development of a Reformed “system” of theology. First, it demonstrates that, “the Reformed conception of Christian theology is fundamentally a relational enterprise, determined by and determinative of the divine-human relationship.”91 In this way, it underlines two important concepts. First, Polanus is emphasizing the basic distinction between the creator and the creature, between the infinite and the finite. As Polanus will make clear in later portions of the Syntagma, particularly seen below in Chapter Seven on

87 Polanus, Syntagma, 67C, “Theologia viatorum, est sapientia rerum divinarum a Christo per Spiritum Sanctum cum hominibus hic in terra degentibus per gratiosam inspirationem communicata...” 88 Polanus, Syntagma, 73E. 89 Polanus, Syntagma, 75B. 90 Cf., Muller, PRRD, 3:262, “God does not accommodate his truth to human sin - rather he accommodates his truth to human ways of knowing.” 91 Van Asselt, “The Fundamental Meaning,” 325.

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the Divine Wisdom, the mode of understanding between God and rational creatures is utterly incomparable. Whereas God understands all things by one simple act of understanding, rational creatures move from ignorance to various stages of understanding via rational inquiry and logical discourse.92 . Ectypal theology is, at its most basic level, revealed theology. It shows humanity that God alone is Summum Bonum, and it directs human beings toward God as their highest blessing and reward. Even so-called natural theology is an apprehension of the glory of God revealed in creation. The relationship between God and the believer is more than one of mere revelation. Because of the archetypal/ectypal distinction, however, this relationship can never be less than one in which God reveals himself. Second, Polanus’ usage of the distinction demonstrates the importance of Christology – and by extension the doctrine of the Trinity – to any discussion of theology.93 At this stage in the Syntagma, a number of the concepts that Polanus has used have not yet been defined, such as: God is simple, eternal, and understands according to one simple act of intelligence. The distinction, however, is important for him to unfold even before he defines these other doctrines. Due to a Reformed understanding of the communication of properties specific to each nature (communicatio idiomatum), the archetypal theology that Christ has according to his divine nature is not communicated to his human nature. A truly human mind must be finite, and as such cannot comprehend archetypal theology. By virtue of the nature of his humanity, Christ only had ectypal theology. With this understanding, the distinction between the two natures of Christ is maintained. Without a strong Trinitarian and Christological foundation, we are bound to confuse and misunderstand God’s gracious communication of himself to us. While these concepts can be discerned from Polanus’ use of this particular distinction, our discussion also underlines one of the weaknesses in the Syntagma. Polanus rarely states, much less demonstrates, the importance of the doctrines he discusses. Even in those places where Polanus includes specific application he does not draw larger connections. In this way, comparisons between doctrines are easily lost.94 Whatever connections are to be made between doctrines that are not obvious in Polanus’ organizational structure must be discerned by the reader. Thus, one can argue for the relational or Christological aspects of Polanus’ discussion of this distinction, but we can ultimately only speculate as Polanus himself does not make these elements any more than implicit.

92 See below, Sections 7.3 and 7.4.2. 93 See also van Asselt, “The Fundamental Meaning,” 334. 94 See also Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 465.

The Authority of Scripture

3.5

The Authority of Scripture

It is God’s gracious communication of himself to rational creatures to which Polanus now turns. As was noted above, Polanus’ discussion of the doctrine of Scripture comprises the majority of book one: chapters fifteen through forty-eight. Polanus begins his discussion of Sacred Scripture with the foundational statement that “the first principle according to which all theological doctrine is resolved is ‘the Lord says,’ or ‘God says.”95 Accordingly, Scripture is set forth under the concept, if not the term, of a principium cognoscendi.96 Further, he declares a number of assertions to be the principia theologiae et fidei, among which are that Scripture is truly divine, that Scripture is the certain and infallible rule of faith and good works, and that the Scriptures are now necessary for us. Indeed, these principles can be seen to be worked out in what Polanus is going to present in the remainder of the Syntagma.97 The authority of Scripture is foundational to the whole of Polanus’ argument: in terms of the priority it enjoys in the overall discussion, the space that Polanus dedicates to it, and the overall doctrinal importance that authority has – both in this chapter and throughout the whole of the Syntagma. Thus, given the emphasis that Polanus gives to the testimony of Scripture in his doctrinal formulations, this section focuses upon the authority of Scripture. Polanus begins his discussion of the authority of Scripture by presenting the following definition: The authority of Sacred Scripture is the dignity and excellence that is applicable only to Sacred Scripture, before all other writings, whereby it is and is held to be authentic (i.e., infallibly certain), and so by absolute necessity it must be believed and obeyed by all because God is its author.98

Thus, Scripture stands above and beyond all other writings as the authentic Word of God (i.e., the aforementioned Deus dixit). Polanus indicates that the ‘absolute necessity’ of which he speaks is, in fact, a hypothetical necessity (necessitate ex

95 Polanus, Syntagma, 96B, “Primum siquidem principium in quod omnia dogmata theologica resoluntur est, Dominis Dixit, seu Deus Dixit.” 96 See Muller, PRRD, 2:155. 97 Polanus, Syntagma, 102D. Han, Symphonia Catholica, 243, concludes that Polanus’ list “reveals a comprehensive approach to the issues that Reformed writers of the era were formulating, debating, and incorporating into their theologies.” See also Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 24; and Muller, PRRD, 2:262. 98 Polanus, Syntagma, 1031, “Authoritas Sacrae Scripturae est dignitas et excellentia soli Sacrae Sripturae prae omnibus aliis scriptis competens, qua est et habetur authentica, id est, infallibiliter certa, sic et necessitate absoluta ab omnibus ei sit credendum atque obtemperandum, propter autorem Deum.”

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hypothesi).99 That is, it is a necessity of the consequence of God having spoken, not something that is in and of itself absolutely necessary. God did not have to speak to his creation; given, however, that he has spoken, that word must be received, believed, and obeyed because God is its author.100 According to Polanus, Scripture has a two-fold authority: it is either divine or it is canonical.101 The divine authority of Scripture flows from the fact that God himself is the author of Scripture. Polanus indicates that there is an in se and a quoad nos dimension to the divine authority of Scripture. The absolute and in se dimension is seen in that there is an authority that exists in Scripture as the very word of God apart from any and all human acknowledgement.102 Thus, the word of God would be the word of God even if there were no one to receive and read it. At the same time, God communicates that word to human beings. Scripture is therefore authoritative as it concerns us (quoad nos, i.e., to us).103 Polanus indicates that there is both a divine and a human testimony to the divine authority of Scripture. The divine testimony is likewise two-fold: an external and an internal testimony. In this, Polanus is indicating an internal or external testimony with respect to us, rather than with respect to God. The external divine testimony is that which is found in Scripture itself. Thus, Scripture testifies to its own authority in that it is the very word of God. Here, Polanus references 2 Corinthians 13:3, 1 Timothy 4:12, and 2 Timothy 3:16.104 The internal testimony is the effective persuasion of the Holy Spirit breathed out upon the heart such that human beings believe that Scripture is divine.105 Here, Polanus references 1 Corinthians 2:10–13, 2 Corinthians 1:21–22, and 1 John 2:20.106 This divine and human testimony work hand in hand – so that God speaks through his Word and by his Holy Spirit.107 This is contrary to Faulenbach, who argues that Polanus has so subordinated the foundational Reformation doctrine of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit to the external testimony of Scripture itself as to undermine its importance. Faulenbach argues that Polanus’ position is a deviation from the thought of Calvin, for whom “the testimony of the Spirit and the authority of Scripture require and confirm each

99 100 101 102 103 104

Polanus, Syntagma, 103C. See also below, Section 10.4. See Muller, PRRD, 2:175. Polanus, Syntagma, 103D. Polanus, Syntagma, 104E. Polanus, Syntagma, 105A. Polanus, Syntagma, 107D–108C. Though at first glance the 1 Timothy 4:12 reference might seem somewhat odd, it is probably included because Paul is indicating that the authority of Timothy’s teaching does not derive from his age, but from the author: Christ speaking in his Word. 105 See also Muller, PRRD, 2:156 and 265. 106 Polanus, Syntagma, 117C. 107 See Muller, PRRD, 2:266.

The Authority of Scripture

other.”108 Polanus, however, does not deny that the internal testimony of the Spirit is necessary, and the inclusion of multiple other testimonies does not contradict this. Polanus’ doctrine of Scripture may be more detailed and specific than Calvin’s, but that does not mean that Polanus denies Calvin’s claim of the necessity of the internal testimony of the Holy Spirit. In addition to this divine testimony to the authority of Scripture, Polanus also includes human testimony. This human testimony is also duplex: that testimony that arises from within the church, and that which arises from outside the church.109 Polanus, however, subordinates the testimony that arises from within the church beneath the divine testimony. In other words, Polanus denies that the divine authority of Scripture is based solely upon the testimony of the church (i.e., that apart from the testimony of the church no one would be convinced of the authority of Scripture).110 In fact, the divine authority of Scripture is merely testified to by the church; that authority does not depend upon the church’s testimony. Polanus ends the section on human testimony with a brief consideration of the testimony of those outside the church: the testimony of Jews, heretics, and the Gentiles.111 Besides this two-fold testimony to the divine authority of Scripture, Polanus considers six rational arguments. The first, longest, and most developed argument involves the causes of Scripture.112 Polanus considers five causes: divine, efficient, material, formal and final.113 The divine cause is also the efficient cause, namely, that Scripture comes forth from God (by divine calling and sending) and is inspired by God.114 As God is its author, Scripture has divine authority. The material cause of the authority of Scripture is the doctrines transmitted in it and the word it brings forth, both of which are truly divine.115 The formal cause of Scripture’s authority is its immutable holiness and the perfection of the truth it contains. To this word nothing profane, unjust, or imperfect may be added.116 Polanus argues that Scripture, considered in itself, is complete and pure. The final cause of the divine authority of Scripture is twofold: the illumination of the glory of God and the firm and eternal consolation and salvation of our souls.117

108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117

Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 313. Polanus, Syntagma, 179E. Polanus, Syntagma, 182C. Polanus, Syntagma, 245C–252B. On the issue of the causality of Scripture, see Muller, PRRD, 2:225. Polanus, Syntagma, 128E. Polanus, Syntagma, 129A. On this issue of the efficient cause of Scripture, see Muller, PRRD, 2:226. Polanus, Syntagma, 150C. On this issue of the material cause of Scripture, see Muller, PRRD, 2:227. Polanus, Syntagma, 154A. Polanus, Syntagma, 155D. On the issue of the final cause of Scripture, see Muller, PRRD, 2:227.

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In the second rational argument, Polanus considers the effects of Scripture. Specifically, he infers from Scripture’s ability to effect divine virtue that it must be divine.118 In order to bring about divine effects, the cause must itself be divine. The third reason Polanus provides is grounded in the subject matter of Scripture.119 As Scripture demonstrates the things of God without any error or defect, Polanus affirms that it must therefore be divine in origin.120 The fourth rational argument Polanus presents concerns things often applied to Scripture, such as its antiquity, its majesty, its universal reception, its providential protection, the agreement of all its parts, etc.121 All of these provide reason to believe that Scripture is the very word of God. The fifth argument considers the lack of errors to be found in Scripture.122 As we are prone to error, the perfection of Scripture demonstrates its divine origin. The sixth and final argument Polanus puts forth concerns the accuracy of prophecy in Scripture.123 Since there is accurate prophesy in Scripture, he who is Scripture’s ultimate author must be divine. That is, there must be behind the authorship of Scripture someone capable of knowing the future beforehand. Note that in these reasons, Polanus is not seeking to present an absolute demonstration of the divine authority of Scripture based upon reason alone. First, it follows the testimony of Scripture and the Holy Spirit. Second, these rationes are presented in line with fides quaerens intellectum. That is, Polanus begins from the standpoint of faith and presents and proceeds to the good reasons for his faith in the testimony to the divine authority of God. Third, Polanus presents these reasons directly after the divine testimony (i.e., before he considers the human testimony). They are therefore presented as reasons to trust and believe the foundational testimony of Scripture, to which reasons one could reasonably add the testimony of the church (and even the testimony of those outside the church).124 The issue of the divine authority of Scripture having been demonstrated, Polanus returns to the concept of the canonical authority of Scripture in the thirtieth chapter of the Syntagma.125 The basic definition, however, comes from the initial discussion of the duplex nature of the authority of Scripture: The canonical authority of Sacred Scripture is that by which Sacred Scripture alone in itself is and behaves to us as a rule or canon, that is, the certain, steadfast, perfect, only,

118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125

Polanus, Syntagma, 158A. Polanus, Syntagma, 160C. Polanus, Syntagma, 160C. Polanus, Syntagma, 161C. See also Muller, PRRD, 2:273. Polanus, Syntagma, 176B. Polanus, Syntagma, 177D. See Muller, PRRD, 2:278. Polanus, Syntagma, 252C.

Summary

and incontrovertible rule of the whole of the wisdom of divine things, of the whole of religion, faith and divine worship and of the Christian life.126

It is important to note that this is not a discussion of the canon itself (what books make up the canon) or canonicity (what it takes to be part of the canon) but concerning what it means that Scripture is canon. As canon, Scripture is the believer’s only rule for faith and good works.127 This is true not just of parts of Scripture, but Scripture in its entirety.128 This canonical authority is derived from God, not from any other source.129 When these two broad ideas are combined – the divine authority of Scripture and the canonical or regulative rule of Scripture – what arises is a Word of God that both carries the full authority of God but also exercises that authority in the regulation of all of faith and practice; that is, all that concerns faith in God and that concerns the good works that rational creatures owe to him. In other words, the foundational authority and regulative rule of Scripture undergird the whole of the Syntagma. Polanus will therefore continue to issue forth rational arguments and engage in polemical debate. At the same time, the substance of his arguments and the basis upon which he refutes opponents will be his understanding of what Scripture authoritatively teaches.

3.6

Summary

In the opening book of the Syntagma, Polanus lays out the primary principles that stand behind the remainder of his discussion of sacred doctrine: the definition of Scripture as the wisdom concerning divine things; the fundamental distinction between archetypal and ectypal theology, and Scripture as the principium cognoscendi. It is important, however, to see these three ideas as not three separate notions but, rather, three interconnected concepts upon which the whole of the Syntagma stands. Thus, theology is seen as wisdom because it does not rest upon self-evident principles but upon God’s own gracious self-revelation in nature and Scripture. Further, this wisdom of divine things is ectypal. It is not identical that wisdom of

126 Polanus, Syntagma, 103E–104A, “Canonica authoritas Sacrae Scripturae est qua Sacra Scriptura in se est et a nobis habetur Canonica seu Canon, hoc est, certa, stabilis, perfecta, unica et irrefragabilis Regula totius sapientiae rerum divinarum, totius religionis, fidei et cultae divini, vitaque Christianae.” 127 Polanus, Syntagma, 252E. See also Muller, PRRD, 2:340–341. 128 Polanus, 263D. 129 Polanus, Syntagma, 279C.

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divine things that God himself has. This is true not only because God’s mode of understanding is different than ours, it is also true because God chooses to reveal himself through the ministry of Christ. And yet, according to substance, this ectypal theology is one with God’s archetypal theology in that the ectypal is expressed and copied from the indubitable original. Further, it is not merely communicable but actually communicated: God is therefore shown from the very beginning to be gracious, good, powerful, and absolute. Indeed, this God who communicates is shown to be Triune – for the Father communicates through the Son, by means of the Holy Spirit. Finally, as the very word of God, Scripture carries the full authority of its author. Scripture is therefore foundational to all of theology. And, since this theology is a practical exercise, Scripture is foundational to all of the Christian life. These are notions that carry forward throughout the whole of the Syntagma. They are found in the fundamental distribution of the subject matter (i.e., faith and good works). They are seen in the definitions and distinctions that Polanus makes. In every doctrine, throughout the whole of the work, Polanus builds his theology upon the authoritative foundation of God’s communicated revelation of the wisdom he has concerning himself.

Chapter Four: The Divine Essence and Names

4.1

Introduction

In this chapter, I begin the discussion of Polanus’ doctrine of God as he sets it forth in the first seven chapters of book two of the Syntagma.1 These chapters are not only the start of the larger discussion of God’s essential properties that take up the remainder of book two; they are the foundation upon which the whole rest of the Syntagma is built. Polanus answers basic scholastic questions that drive the structure of book two: Who is God? Can God’s existence be demonstrated? How can we know what God is like?2 Polanus’ answers come in the form of basic definitions that are then distributed into various distinctions (usually, but not always, into two distinctions). Accordingly, book two of the Syntagma includes: a description of what God is; a demonstration of Gods’ existence; the basic distinction between God’s essence and his operations; the distribution of God’s essence into attributes and Persons (although the divine Persons are discussed fully in book three of the Syntagma); the distribution of divine attributes into names and essential properties; and the distribution of the essential properties of God into a first and a second order. My focus in this chapter is the initial discussion of these topics as it arises in the first seven chapters of book two of the Syntagma. This chapter begins with a survey of the early Reformed orthodox discussions of the major questions and issues addressed in the doctrine of God. Next, I proceed to a discussion of Polanus’ doctrine of God’s essence and the divine names as he discusses them in the Syntagma. In this, I seek to understand the Syntagma in its own context and on its own terms. I also consider objections to Polanus’ doctrine as it arises in secondary literature. Note that this will include a rather cursory discussion of Polanus’ orientation to the remainder of the Syntagma found in the first two chapters of book two, as well as an orientation to the discussion of the two orders of essential properties.

1 These chapters cover: (1) the partition of theology; (2) the doctrine of the faith; (3) a description of God; (4) the demonstration of God’s esse; (5) the essence of God; (6) the names of God; (7) and an orientating discussion of the properties of God in general. 2 Polanus specifically asks the scholastic question: Quid sit Deus? He provides an answer to the question An sit Deus? in chapter 4 on the demonstration of God’s existence. He answers the question of Qualis sit Deus? in the chapters on the divine names and essential properties. In these last two cases, he does not explicitly ask the scholastic question, either in marginal notes or in the text of the Syntagma.

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4.2

The State of these Doctrines in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

As was discussed in the Introduction (1.3), my primary focus is upon the doctrine of God in a strict sense: the being, names, and essential properties of God. Among these three, I would further distinguish between issues related to the existence of God (An sit Deus?) and the essence of God (Quid sit Deus?), and between issues related to making distinctions about God and the categorization of God’s attributes. This expansion provides the five distinct items I consider in this chapter: the divine names; questions related to God’s existence; questions related to God’s essence; discussion of the nature of the distinctions to be made in the attributes; and the categorization of the attributes. None of the early Reformed orthodox theologians with whom I compare Polanus include a discussion of all five categories. From the conglomerate picture these seven other theologians provide, however, a comparison with Polanus is both possible and profitable. The first category of comparison is the names of God. Of the early Reformed orthodox theologians I compare with Polanus, only Zanchi, Trelcatius, Jr., and Perkins include discussions of the divine names. Zanchi has an extensive discussion, covering the final six chapters of book one of De Natura Dei.3 Zanchi discusses ‫( יהוה‬Jehovah), ‫( אלחים‬Elohim), ‫( אדני‬Adodai), Θεος (Theos), and Κυριος (Kurios). Trelcatius, Jr. focuses upon Jehova Elohim as a description of both God’s one essence and three persons.4 Perkins notes the divine name ‘Jehova Elohim’ and references several Scriptural texts which demonstrate this.5 He does not, however, elaborate on the meaning or significance of the name. Ursinus, Bucanus, Daneau, and Keckermann do not include discussions of the divine names. In the second category of comparison, several of these early Reformed orthodox theologians include a discussion of the proofs for God’s existence.6 Ursinus discusses eleven such proofs in answer to the question: “Which testimonies demonstrate that God exists?”7 Bucanus offers seven reasons (rationes) under the category Unde probas esse Deum: from motion, from a first cause, from the movement toward ends, from the necessity of a need for goodness and wisdom, the conscience, and the surety of punishment.8 Daneau provides eight reasons under the heading An Sit Deus: the creation of the world, the sustenance and governance of the world, miracles, the universal testimony of humanity, a sense of God’s goodness, the

3 4 5 6 7

Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 33–59. This depth is characteristic of Zanchi’s work as a whole. Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 41. Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11a. On this issue, see Platt, Reformed Thought and Scholasticism, 49–50. Ursinus, Loci theologici, 458, “Qua testimonia ostendant, esse Deum?” See below for the discussion of these eleven in comparison to Polanus’ demonstrations. 8 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 2.

The State of these Doctrines in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

conscience, Scripture, and philosophy.9 Under the last category, Daneau refers to Anselm’s Monologion and Thomas Aquinas’ five ways.10 Perkins lists eight reasons by which it is shown that God exists: 1. by the course of nature: 2. by the nature of the soule of man: 3. by the distinction of things honest and dishonest: 4. by the terror of conscience: 5. by the regiment of civill societies: 6. by the order of all causes having ever recourse to some former beginning: 7. the determination of all things to their several ends: 8. the consent of all men well in their wits.11 In each of the former three cases, these theologians mix what could broadly be described as “Thomistic” arguments according to the five ways with more rhetorical arguments. When the more Thomistic arguments are found, such as arguing from a first cause, they are often presented in a more ‘rhetorical’ form, rather than being set forth in the form of a logical syllogism (i.e., major premise, minor premise, conclusion).12 It should not be surprising that all seven early Reformed orthodox theologians discuss the essence of God. They do so, however, marked by various differences. Ursinus provides a lengthy description of God in response to the question: Quis et qualis sit verus Deus? 13 His description includes various attributes of God (e.g., spiritual, eternal, immutable, just, etc.), that God is three persons (including the personal distinctions), and who God is demonstrated to be by his works (e.g., the works of creation, providence, and salvation). Bucanus describes God in much the same way, though with different terms. He describes God in terms of attributes, persons (and personal relations), and operations.14 Daneau describes God in terms of his attributes and operations (at least, in terms of his rule over all things).15 Keckermann describes God only in accordance with his attributes.16 Perkins describes God in terms of two of the three attributes he will later enumerate: “The nature of God, is his most lively and most perfect essence.”17 Trelcatius Jr. has one of the

9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 3a–5a. Anselm, Monologium, PL 156; Aquinas, S.Th., Ia, q. 2, a.3, co. 1. Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11a. See also Muller, PRRD, 3:171. Ursinus, Loci theologici, 468. Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 3. Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 1a–2b. Keckermann, Systema, 6. Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11a.

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more robust definitions among these early Reformed orthodox theologians: “God’s essence is that whereby God is and exists by and of himself absolutely: for he alone is what he is and who he is—i.e., his being does not rely upon another.”18 Furthermore, Keckermann and Trelcatius, Jr. include items comparable to the axiomata that Polanus introduces in his discussion of God’s essence. Keckermann lists six: that God is actus purus, that essence and being are the same thing in God, that God is without composition (i.e., simple), that God is the universal cause of being, that God is perfect (and, therefore, self-sufficient), and that in God there is an absolute unity of essence.19 Trelcatius, Jr. indicates that the unity of God does not obtain by aggregation, consensus, or by being under a genus or in a species.20 Of these early Reformed orthodox theologians, only Zanchi and Daneau discuss the nature of the distinctions made by the enumeration of attributes. Zanchi refers to the distinctions as ‘by reason, or conception’ (ratione), and denies any real (realiter) distinctions between the attributes.21 Daneau, as his fifth rule regarding the discussion of God’s essence, says, “there is no real distinction between God’s attributes, but only a notional or rational one.”22 Note that although Daneau does not say explicitly, the use of notio suggests that he believes the distinction of attributes has some basis in God himself, and the attributes are therefore distinguished in virtue of the ratio ratiocinatae, and not the ratio ratiocinans.23 In terms of the categorization of attributes, a wide variety is seen in these early Reformed orthodox theologians. Ursinus does not provide any categories, and his listing of the attributes mixes what Polanus later describes as first order and second order properties. Bucanus refers to the attributes as either incommunicable or communicable.24 Daneau discusses a variety of categories: proper and metaphorical, relative and temporal.25 The categories he eventually utilizes, however, are absolute and relative.26 Keckermann also uses the categories of absolute and relative.27 For both, the absolute attributes generally correspond to incommunicable, and the relative attributes generally correspond to communicable. Perkins distinguishes between those attributes regarding the nature of God and those regarding the life 18 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 41, “Essentia est qua per se et ex se abolute Deus est, et existit: Est enim id solus quod est et qui est, id est οὐσια alteri non innitens.” 19 Keckermann, Systema, 8–11. 20 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 41. 21 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 83. See also Goris, “Thomism in Zanchi’s Doctrine of God,” 137. 22 Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 12A, “Quarta regula est, Inter attributa Dei non esse distinctionem realem, sed tantum notionis et rationis.” 23 See below, Section 4.2.8, for the discussion of these terms. 24 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 6. 25 Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 8b. 26 Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 12a. 27 Keckermann, Systema, 90.

The State of these Doctrines in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

of God, as well as an additional third category of those regarding God’s glory and blessedness.28 Trelcatius, Jr. is alone among these early Reformed orthodox theologians in that he uses one of the same major categories as Polanus, that of a priori and a posteriori.29 Trelcatius, Jr. also includes within these categories the distinctions between negative and affirmative attributes within the a priori attributes (viz., infinity and simplicity, respectively) and between proper and improper attributes within the a posteriori attributes (viz., potentia, scientia, and voluntas as proper and amor, ira, etc. as improper). Polanus’ exposition of God’s essence demonstrates broad continuity with these other early Reformed orthodox theologians. While none of them are perfectly identical – whether in the topics they choose to address, the way they address them, or the length of the discussion addressing them – they do show a remarkably similar focus upon a core of major issues. Polanus also shows remarkable thoroughness, in that he is the only one of these particular early Reformed orthodox theologians (excluding Zanchi) who addresses each of the five categories I articulated at the beginning of this section. Polanus is therefore found to be both broadly representative of the early Reformed orthodox period, and as moving the discussion toward a more complete and robust discussion of the doctrine of God. There are at least two factors that may contribute to the fact that Polanus has what could arguably be called a ‘more robust’ presentation of the doctrine of God – at least in comparison to other early Reformed orthodox theologians who were writing more or less complete dogmatic theologies (i.e., all but Zanchi). First, Polanus shows a penchant for more specific polemical interaction with various interlocutors than with most of these other early Reformed orthodox theologians – again, at least in the works with which I am comparing the Syntagma.30 To be sure, that level of interaction does not surface in every chapter of the Syntagma. This should not be surprising: the Reformed orthodox share an enormous commonality with Roman Catholic theologians and even more with Lutheran theologians. This polemical interaction, however, will become evident later, such as in the sections on immensity (with regard to the ubiquity of Christ’s human nature) and in the

28 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11a, 12a, 13b. 29 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 47. See also Muller, “Unity and Distinction,” 325. As will be shown below, one of the ways that Polanus describes the distinction between first order and second order essential properties is with the difference between a priori and a posteriori properties. See below, Section 4.3.4. 30 It should be noted, however, that the different genres in which these Reformed orthodox theologians wrote suggests that not all of them would include the same sort (or length) of polemics as Polanus does. Those works of a more catechetical or introductory level, for example, would not include much, if any, polemical interaction.

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discussion of divine grace.31 This does not even take into account Socinians and other anti-Trinitarian sects with whom Polanus interacts. As these discussions increased between the Reformed orthodox and Roman Catholics or Lutherans, the need to continue developing a robust theology became clearer. This development not only continued in the decades after Polanus, the inclusion of other doctrinal interlocutors (particularly, the Remonstrants) served as a catalyst to develop even more detailed definitions and even finer distinctions. Second, the inclusion of God’s names in the doctrine of God could be seen as evidence of the importance of biblical exegesis in the later decades of the early Reformed orthodox period. This is not to deny that Ursinus, Daneau, Bucanus, and Keckermann were either not interested in or were devoid of biblical exegesis. Rather, it is simply to point out that Polanus, at least, was first and foremost a biblical scholar.32 In this, it is important to remember that these early Reformed orthodox theologians are not a monolith: either in what they write regarding theology generally or the doctrine of God specifically, or in their backgrounds and training. Polanus’ inclusion of the names of God (particularly his emphasis on the name Jehovah) demonstrates in part his commitment to bring Scripture to bear upon the whole of his theological system.

4.3

Polanus’ Introductory Orientation

Polanus begins book two with a section that provides orientation to the remainder of the Syntagma. Having set forth the basic idea of theology along with its definition, nature and principles in book one, Polanus continues with the distribution of theology into its various parts. According to his Ramist organizational principle, each

31 See below, Sections 5.6.2 and 9.5. 32 See above, Section 3.5 for Polanus’ focus on Scriptural authority. See also McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 143, who notes that in the Reformed orthodox period, systematicians routinely served first as professors of Hebrew, citing Han, Symphonia Catholica, 51. While the general point is correct, too much can be made of Polanus’ title. First, the system at the University of Basel was that the junior of the two in the theology faculty was titled ‘Professor of Old Testament.” This is the position that Grynaeus held prior to his promotion of Professor of New Testament. This procedure suggests several things. First, that whoever was assigned to teach theology at the University of Basel was expected to know sufficient Hebrew and Greek to teach the Bible as a whole. Otherwise, one would not expect the junior theologians to bear a fairly specific title. Second, that the University of Basel was, in fact, very interested in teaching the Bible. Otherwise, different titles might be expected for their theology faculty. Finally, Polanus does demonstrate himself to be a capable Hebraist (at least by early Modern standards) and a frequent commentator of Old Testament books. Thus, it appears that Polanus took his title seriously, and sought to provide tools to the church to better understand the Hebrew portions of Scripture.

Polanus’ Introductory Orientation

part of the distribution will then be defined, distributed into various distinctions, expanded with axiomata, and defended against various objections. Polanus states that the true theology of the pilgrim has two parts: faith and good works.33 The things of faith are that which is to be believed (de rebus credendis); those of good works are that which is to be done (de rebus faciendis).34 In addition, Polanus distinguishes between the act or habitus of faith and the content of faith. His focus will be on the content of faith; the discussion below will therefore be framed in the form of ‘the doctrine of the faith’ – taking faith in an objective sense. Polanus begins with faith because it is necessary first to know God before one can worship him rightly. Just as good works issue forth from faith, so too will the doctrine of good works follow the doctrine of faith in the order of the Syntagma. With this division of theology into faith and good works (or belief and practice), Polanus includes within theology as a whole a discussion of ethics.35 Such a structure, according to Letham, “had the effect of giving ethics independent significance for the first time in Reformed dogmatics.”36 This focus upon belief and practice is evident in the meta-structure of the Syntagma as a whole, but it is also evident within the portion dedicated to theology.37 Almost every chapter or section ends with a number of usus or application based loosely upon the grid provided in 2 Timothy 3:16, “All Scripture is breathed out by God and profitable for teaching,

33 Polanus, Syntagma, 833B. 34 Polanus, Syntagma, 833B. 35 Though not dependent upon Polanus in any direct sense, notice that this division between faith and good works is captured in the third question of the Westminster Shorter Catechism: “Q. 3. What do the Scriptures principally teach? A. The Scriptures principally teach, what man is to believe concerning God, and what duty God requires of man” (“Westminster Shorter Catechism,” in The Westminster Confession of Faith (Glasgow: Free Presbyterian Publications, 2003, reprint), 287). This is made even more patent in the Westminster Larger Catechism, whose question five is identical to the WSC. Further, the heading for questions six through ninety reads, “What Man Ought to Believe Concerning God,” covering generally the doctrines of God, of creation, of redemption, of Christology, of ecclesiology, of soteriology and of eschatology. Questions ninety-one and following fall under the heading, “Having Seen What the Scriptures Principally Teach Us To Believe Concerning God, It Follows To Consider What They Require As The Duty of Man.” What follows is an exposition of the Ten Commandments, the reading of God’s Word, the sacraments and prayer. The Shorter Catechism follows the very same structure, though without the section headings corresponding to the answer to the third question. 36 Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 466. Given that the ground of such a division (or, perhaps better, for the inclusion of ethics within the sphere of theology) is found in Scripture itself, Letham also admits that, “Polanus does not give to ethics an independence from theology as such....” Therefore, while ethics or praxis is included within a “system of doctrine” for the first time, it was not separated from the larger discussion of theology or right belief. 37 See above, Section 3.3, for Polanus’ discussion of theology as practical.

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for reproof, for correction, and for training in righteousness.” The marginal headings indicate which particular usus correspond to teaching (διδασκαλια), reproof (ἐλεγχος), correction (ἐπανερθωσις), and trining (παιδεια), to which Polanus adds a fifth, comfort (παρακλησις).38 In terms of Polanus’ use of these usus, three things can be said. First, the categories themselves tend to be rather consistent across the various essential properties. ‘Teaching’ refers to those things just taught within the essential property that demonstrate that God is, in fact, God (i.e., God is shown to be the true God because he truly and properly lives).39 Other statements among these didactic usus connect one essential property with another (i.e., God is shown to be perfect because he is simple).40 ‘Reproof ’ refers to that which corrects the errors of heretics. While Polanus does not always name the specific heresies (or heretics) he is reproving, he does occasionally mention Antropomorphites, Marcionites, and Manichees.41 In another example, Polanus states that the love of God refutes the notion that God is the author of sin: God loves that which is good such that he cannot himself be the author of that which is evil.42 The third category, that of ‘correction,’ is also pointed at error. Rather than be directed at what might be considered heresies, these errors are those that might arise from a believer due to ignorance or misunderstanding. For example, Polanus indicates that God’s ubiquity demonstrates that no one place is to be preferred for the worship of God than another.43 Another example is the patience of God – this is given not that believers might presume upon God, but to lead them to repentance (quoting Romans 2:4).44 ‘Training’ refers to that application that demonstrates to believers what their duty is before God given a particular essential property. Thus, God’s graciousness shows the believer that he or she is to repent (quoting from Joel 2:13).45 The fifth and final category of usus is that of ‘comfort.’ Here, Polanus presents those aspects of God’s essential properties that serve to sustain us as viatores – pilgrims along the way. Therefore, several of these usus point the believer to that which God has promised in the life to come. For instance, the God who is himself blessed has promised to pour himself out as blessing in eternal life.46 These ‘comfort’ usus, however, also provide sustaining truth for the

38 Cf. McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 144 who only indicates the four in connection with 2 Timothy 3:16. 39 Polanus, Syntagma, 987B. 40 Polanus, Syntagma, 913B. 41 Polanus, Syntagma, 913D and 1036C. 42 Polanus, Syntagma, 1111D. 43 Polanus, Syntagma, 963C. 44 Polanus, Syntagma, 1150D. 45 Polanus, Syntagma, 981D. 46 Polanus, Syntagma, 998B.

Polanus’ Introductory Orientation

believer in this life as, for instance, “God is most free, there we call upon him with confidence.”47 This last example highlights the second aspect of these usus: while some are more developed with either logic or Scripture, many simply take the form of what might be called ‘pithy sayings’ without any additional support or development. Thus, the connection between God’s absolute freedom and our ability to call him with confidence is not something Polanus makes patent – either in his overall discussion of God’s freedom or in the usus section itself. The overall effect of these usus is a disconnected list of seemingly random bits of wisdom. They demonstrate an overall desire on the part of Polanus to show the practical nature of the doctrine of God, but they also demonstrate a weakness in his ability to connect these doctrines to the life of the believer in a consistent way. Perhaps part of the difficulty is the applicatory grid that Polanus seeks to impose upon each of the essential properties. What if there is no specific heresy (or, for that matter, no significant error among believers) that is attached to a particular essential property? This is all the more interesting when we consider that the practice only shows up in the chapter on the description of God and among most of the essential properties of the first and second order.48 Why do these portions of his doctrine of the essence and attributes of God include application but the portion on the names of God does not? Unfortunately, Polanus neither provides the reason for including usus where he does have them nor for excluding usus where he does not have them. Third, the specific inclusion of these usus in the portion of the Syntama concerning the essential properties of God shows another area in which Polanus is adopting and adapting the theological tradition he has inherited. Here again, Polanus is shown to be taking up the convention used by Zanchi in De Natura Dei. In that work, Zanchi provides usus for the attributes of God that he expounds in the middle three books of De Natura Dei. Like Polanus, Zanchi does not discuss usus in the portion of De Natura Dei devoted to the essence and names of God (book one). Unlike Polanus, Zanchi discusses usus in the final portion of De Natura Dei on providence and predestination. Also, unlike Polanus, Zanchi does not provide a rubric for the usus he gives. Polanus tends to include more individual usus, but he develops each less than Zanchi did. While Polanus’ usage of the convention of usus is adapted from Zanchi, the application Polanus provides is not identical to Zanchi

47 Polanus, Syntagma, 1209D, “Deus est liberrimus: Ergo invocandus cum fiducia.” 48 For the usus connected with the description of God, see Polanus, Syntagma, 860B. Note that Polanus does not provide usus for either infinity or will. Both of these essential properties, however, are distributed into various essential properties beneath them. See sections 5.6 and 9.3, below.

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and, at any rate, includes the application of essential properties that Zanchi does not discuss (i.e., patience, kindness, and holiness).49 The inclusion of these usus in this portion of the Syntagma also underlines Polanus’ attempts to provide for the practical needs of the church.50 Polanus has written his Syntagma as instruction for future pastors and theologians and, in part, teaches them to be sensitive to the issues of application. This is seen in Polanus’ determination that theology as a whole is not merely a speculative or theoretical endeavor but is also supremely practical. This is true generally, in the sense that the whole of theology is practical. It is also true of individual aspects of theology, in the sense that particular doctrines are specifically practical – even (perhaps especially) those portions of theology, such as the divine attributes, that might not normally be considered to be all that practical. Polanus describes the doctrine of the faith as “what teaches us what a Christian individual must believe for eternal life.”51 He demonstrates this description by reference to John 20:31, in which the author states the purpose behind his writing this gospel account: that the reader might “believe that Jesus is the Christ, the son of God, and that by believing you may have life in his name.” Polanus distributes this doctrine of the faith into two parts: first God, and then the church. According to this distribution, God will be first considered according to his essence and his operations and then the product of God’s redeeming grace will be considered in his ordering of the Church. Polanus points to the creeds of the church as evidence of this division. He specifically points to the Apostles’ Creed, the Niceno-Constantinopolitan Creed, the Athanasian Creed, the Synod of Ephesus, and the Chalcedonian Creed as each

49 See also O’Banion, “Jerome Zanchi, the Application of Theology, and the Rise of the English Practical Divinity Tradition,” Renaissance and Reformation, XXIX, 2–3 (2005), 98, where O’Banion notes, “One of the most important clues for understanding what Zanchi was doing in De natura Dei, a clue that has been almost entirely ignored, is the convention designated the usus doctrinae, the use of the doctrine. By means of that convention Zanchi sought to drive his systematic theological conclusions toward practical theological application. That is to say, when weight is given to the structural and methodological role played by the usus doctrinae in De natura Dei it becomes clear that a major thrust of the book pushes toward the spiritual health of believers... Ultimately, Zanchi’s approach to theology proper is at least as important for its influence on the development of Protestant practical theology as it is for any special emphasis on predestination or its use of an Aristotelian scholastic method.” While a comparative analysis of Zanchi’s and Polanus’ use of the usus convention is outside the parameters of this present study, it would shed light on both what Polanus was seeking to do in his own doctrine of God and the impact of Zanchi’s inclusion of these usus on later Protestant practical theology. 50 See Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 475. 51 Polanus, Syntagma, 844D, “Prima pars Theologiae est de fide, docens quid sit homini Christiano credendum ad salutem aeternam.”

The Description and Distribution of the Doctrine of God

demonstrates this two-part division between God and the Church.52 This division is most clearly seen, however, in the four “credo” statements of the Apostles’ Creed. The first three statements cover belief in God (Father, Son and Holy Spirit). The final statement deals with faith in the holy catholic church.53 Polanus’ argument is that these creeds give ample evidence that the basic statement of the orthodox Christian faith is comprised of two parts: what man is to believe concerning both God and his Church. In terms of the structure of the Syntagma, Polanus first proceeds to discuss the doctrine of God from the remainder of book two through book seven. Book two deals more properly with the doctrine of God in his essence, existence, and attributes (both names and essential properties). Book three covers the doctrine of the Trinity. Books four through six deal with God’s works. Polanus returns to the discussion of the doctrine of the Church in book seven.

4.4

The Description and Distribution of the Doctrine of God

Polanus begins his discussion of God with a question posed in the margin of the text: Deus quid sit?54 In answer, he provides the following description of God: “God is an uncreated spirit, existing from himself, one in essence, and three in the persons of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit.”55 Polanus supports this definition with reference to John 4:24, Exodus 3:14, Deuteronomy 6:4, and 1 John 5:7. In brief, God is “Jehovah Elohim—i.e., one eternal essence of three persons.”56 Polanus concedes that such a description is not an attempt by man to completely explain or comprehend God – it merely seeks to understand what God has revealed about himself. Thus, for Polanus, God is not able to be defined perfectly.57 It is possible, however, to describe God accurately, so long as one follows the discourse of Scripture

52 Polanus, Syntagma, 846A–855D. For each, Polanus provides the full text of the creed in Greek (where applicable) and Latin. 53 The four-fold division holds with the Niceno-Constantinopolitan creed, but the lack of “in” appearing in the final clause (et unam catholicam atque apostolicam Ecclesiam) may detract slightly from his argument. 54 At various places, these marginal notes reflect words or phrases used in the main body of the column of text the note is placed adjacent to. In this case, however, the words “Deus quid sit?” do not appear in the main body – Polanus simply proceeds to a definition. 55 Polanus, Syntagma, 857A, “Deus, est Spiritus increatus, existens a seipso, unus essentia, at trinus personis Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus.” 56 Polanus, Syntagma, 857B, “Breviter: Deus, est Jehova Elohim, id est, una essentia aeterna Trium Personarum.” 57 Consider the title of Chapter Three of Book Two: “In quo descriptio Dei traditur et declaratur.”

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and reason.58 Furthermore, Polanus indicates that this name “Deus” is not merely properly attributed to the Father, but also to the Son and the Holy Spirit.59 Therefore, the God whom the whole of the Syntagma is about is principally Triune. Polanus indicates that Deus describes neither a genus nor a species in that God is numerically one, and he is therefore the only individual of his kind.60 To support this, Polanus presents several reasons why genus and species are not attributable to God. In each case, he asserts a notion that, broadly speaking, is demonstrated elsewhere in the Syntagma.61 First, nothing is above God, as if there were some genus to which God belongs. Further, there is no sense in which God participates in anything the way a species participates in a genus.62 Second, God is neither under a genus or part of a species because he is individually one according to his essence. That he is three persons does not mitigate the unity and individuality of his essence. Polanus’ third reason that God is not under any genus is because God does not have a cause.63 Since God does not have a cause, he is preeminent. Fourth, Polanus states that God is not composite – a notion that he will return to in his exposition of divine simplicity as one of the first order essential properties of God. As God is non composite, so there is neither a genus that is higher than him nor is he himself distributed into various species.64 At the end of his chapter in which he describes God, Polanus returns to the basic definition of God given above – that the God who is one in essence exists as three persons. While he will return to the doctrine of the Trinity later in the Syntagma, Polanus indicates at this point that there is nothing in God that is not in the divine persons, “for the divine essence does not subsist except as in the individual or divine persons.”65 In light of this, all that follows with regard to God’s essence, existence, names, and properties are to be understood as speaking of the one essence that subsists (indeed, only subsists) in the three divine persons. Polanus is not, therefore, describing a divine essence abstracted from the Triune God, but the divine essence that is common to each of the divine persons.

58 59 60 61

62 63 64 65

Polanus, Syntagma, 857C. Polanus, Syntagma, 858D. Polanus, Syntagma, 858D. For instance, that God is one is demonstrated below, in the section on God’s essence. That God is non-composite and without cause is taken up in the discussion of divine simplicity in Section 5.4 below. Polanus, Syntagma, 859B. Polanus, Syntagma, 859D. Polanus, Syntagma, 859E. Polanus, Syntagma, 861D, “Essentia namque divina non subsistit nisi in individuis seu personsis divinis.”

The Existence of God

4.5

The Existence of God

Polanus next proceeds to the issue of demonstrating the existence of God. The statement ‘God exists’ is, according to Polanus, demonstrable tou hoti – by reasoning from effects seen in the world back to a cause.66 Polanus indicates that these sorts of demonstrations, “are the cause of our knowledge of God that we call ‘acquired,’ and we must distinguish it from the knowledge that is innate or infused.”67 Here Polanus distinguishes between two broad categories for our knowledge of God: innate and acquired knowledge. Although Polanus does not here define what he means by these terms, Beck states that innate knowledge is that by which “the human mind can understand that the proposition ‘God exists’ is self-evidently true, given that God is an infinitely perfect being.”68 Polanus references Romans 1:19–20 in support of the notion that there is sufficient proof of God’s existence such that even those ignorant of God’s Word are without excuse.69 These demonstrations also involve what is called ‘acquired knowledge.’ Beck describes this as that knowledge which is “based on the sense experience of God’s creation.”70 Beck includes in this type of understanding both proofs of a more Thomistic nature (i.e., patterned after the five ways) and rhetorical arguments (i.e., a posteriori arguments or του ὁτι arguments). Polanus presents sixteen arguments for God’s existence in what appears to be a mixture of both innate and acquired knowledge.71 According to Polanus, God is demonstrated to exist by: I. A consideration of the world: its grandness, craftsmanship, and form; its continued endurance; its so wise government; its countless variety; the order of its bodies; its divers

66 For the distinction between του ὁτι and του διοτι, see Aristotle, Posterior Analytics (Harvard University Press, 1930), 88 (Book I, Part 13). See also Jack MacIntosh, “Theological and Scientific Application,” in Logical Modalities from Aristotle to Carnap: The Story of Necessity, Max Cresswell, Edwin Mares, and Adriane Rini, eds., (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2016), 168–169. 67 Polanus, Syntagma, 862C, “Est vero haec demonstratio causa notitiae Dei quam acquisitam dicimus, quae ab insita et ab infusa discerni debet.” 68 Beck, “God, Creation, and Providence,” 197. 69 See also Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius,” 213, who notes that the notion that the believer does not need any proof of God’s existence, “does not take away the fact that the non-believer who denies – or hyperbolically doubts – the truth of the proposition Deus est violates his own epistemological capacity which is a gift of God (cognitio Dei insita).” 70 Beck, “God, Creation, and Providence,” 197. 71 Note that Polanus references Scripture in several places, not so much to circumvent a demonstration from effect back to cause, but rather to demonstrate that even Scripture testifies to humanities ability to reason in this way.

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movements; and its extraordinary power, [all of which] teach that an intelligent nature exists from whom all things proceed.72 II. The innate principles in us, which are the sources of the teachings which by necessity have been impressed on man’s mind by an intelligent nature.73 III. The special knowledge naturally innate in us that God exists.74 IV. Our conscience’s own testimony, that it shrinks from thunder and other unfamiliar storms, and earthquakes, and fears God the judge due to committing wickedness—indeed, it shudders and trembles.75 V. Punishments for crimes which are inflicted on the wicked even in this life.76 VI. The organization and preservation of political order.77 VII. The virtues and remarkable emotions in heroic souls.78 VIII. Signs of things to come.79 IX. The end of all natural things. This is because, since it is absolutely certain there is an end in all things, but hardly any foresee or perceive what they continually incline and proceed toward, thus it is entirely necessary for there to be some mind who understands everything, controls them individually, and directs them to their ends.80 X. There is a sequence of causes which does not proceed infinitely; it thus leads us by the hand to a particular Prime Mover, upon whom all movements, acts and effects depend.81

72 Polanus, Syntagma, 862, “I. Considaratio mundi; cuius moles, fabrica, forma, continua sustentatio, tam sapiens gubernatio, innumera varietas, ordo corporum, diversus motus, vires admirandae docent esse naturam aliquam intelligentem a qua sint haec omnia.” Polanus indicates that Scripture concurs in Psalm 8 and 19, and Romans 1:19–20. Further, this notion is repeated in philosophy, such that nihil est suiipsius causa. Since nothing can be its own cause, God is both uncaused and the cause of all that exists. 73 Polanus, Syntagma, 863C, “II. Principia nobis innata, quae sunt doctrinarum exordia, quae necesse est a natura intelligente mentibus hominum impressa esse....” 74 Polanus, Syntagma, 863D, “III. Specialis notitis naturaliter nobis insita quod sit Deus.” 75 Polanus, Syntagma, 863D, “IV. Proprium nostrae conscientiae testimonium, ad tonitrua et alias insolitas tempestates, terraemotus, expavescentis et ob commissa scelera Deum judicem metuentis, imo cum trepidatione quadam exhorrescentis....” 76 Polanus, Syntagma, 863E, “V. Poenae scelerum, etiam in hac vita improbis inflictae....” 77 Polanus, Syntagma, 863E, “VI. Ordinis politici constitutio et conservatio.” 78 Polanus, Syntagma, 864A, “VII. Virtutes et motus singulares in animis heroicis.” 79 Polanus, Syntagma, 864A, “IIX. Significationes futurorum.” 80 Polanus, Syntagma, 864A, “IX. Finis rerum omnium naturalium. Nam cum in omnibus sit certissimus, paucissimae vero eum, ad quem constanter vergunt perguntque, prospiciant aut percipiant; omnino opertet mentem esse quandam, omnia intelligentem, singula gubernantem et ad fines suos dirigentem.” 81 Polanus, Syntagma, 864B, “X. Series causarum non progrediens in infinitum, quasi manu ducens ad primum aliquem motorem, a quo motus, actionesque et effecta omnia pendeant.”

The Existence of God

XI. Worship itself, whether it is religious or superstitious, being introduced by fear of the divine will (Numinis).82 XII. The common confession and consensus of all peoples, even the most savage.83 XIII. The sense of God’s goodness—i.e., of his immeasurable spiritual and physical benefits.84 XIV. The excellence of our mind. For the fact that we reason, think in our mind, and come up with and deploy various arts is due to God’s kindness.85 XV. The immortality of our soul.86 XVI. The admirable, outstanding, unexpected events, with which the theater of human life is filled, which cannot happen except by an absolutely powerful nature.87

On the basis of these many arguments, Polanus deems it is clearly evident that God exists – even to those who are ignorant of what Scripture contains. “Indeed,” says Polanus, “all individuals know in every way that God exists, due to the feeling of divinity they have before any use of their reason.”88 This knowledge of God is not complete – that is, the “wholly” refers to the “that which can be known” from Romans 1. It is sufficient only to render humanity without excuse, it is not the whole revelation of God as it is found in Scripture. Furthermore, these demonstrations are an admixture of both innate and acquired knowledge of God. This is contrary to what Heppe says regarding Polanus’ demonstrations of God’s existence. Heppe states: “The proofs of the existence of God have nothing to do with ‘innate knowledge of God,’ but with ‘acquired knowledge of God.’”89 Yet according to Polanus there is a sensus divinitatis or a “feeling of divinity” 82 Polanus, Syntagma, 846B, “XI. Cultus ipse sive religiousus, sive superstitiosus timore Numinis introductus.” 83 Polanus, Syntagma, 846C, “XII. Communis omnium gentium etiam efferatissimarum confessio et consensus.” 84 Polanus, Syntagma, 846D, “XIII. Sensus bonitatis Dei, id est, immensorum beneficiorum Dei spiritualium et corporalium.” 85 Polanus, Syntagma, 846D, “XIV. Mentis nostrae praestantia. Nam quod ratiocinamur, mente disputamus, varias artes excogitamus et exercemus, Dei beneficio sit.” 86 Polanus, Syntagma, 845A, “Animae nostrae immortalitas.” 87 Polanus, Syntagma, 845B, “Admirabiles et insignes insperatique eventus, qui non nisi a potentissima natura fieri possunt, quibus plenum est vitae humanae Theatrum.” 88 Polanus, Syntagma, 865C, “Imo Deum esse ex tactu divinitatis, ante omnem rationis usum, omnes omnino homines sciunt.” Polanus notes that those scholastics –particularly Thomas Aquinas – who deny that the knowledge of God’s existence is self-evident do so in vain, (Itaque, Deum esse per se notum, frustra negant Thomas Aquinas et alii Scholastici.). See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 127 n.54. 89 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 49. See also Heppe, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche, 38, “Die Beweise für das Dasein Gottes beziehen sich nicht auf die notitia Dei insita, sondern auf die not[itia] Dei acquisita.”

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that all persons have. This is reflected in the second and third demonstration above: innate principles and special knowledge naturally innate in us that God exists. It is true that the majority of these demonstrations are a posteriori arguments and του ὁτι arguments. Yet it cannot be said that Polanus’ demonstration of God’s existence has “nothing to do” with the innate knowledge of God’s existence. While the use of so-called proofs for the existence of God were an integral part of medieval Scholastic theology, their usage was not universal in the Reformation and early post-Reformation Reformed orthodox discussions of the doctrine of God. Muller notes that the question of the existence of God did not appear in all of the Reformed scholastic works on the Doctrine of God, but when it does appear it “has an apologetic and polemical function rather than a substantive or formative one in the course of the theological system.”90 The existence of this discussion in Polanus has received various considerations from scholars. Muller first describes Polanus’ inclusion of the proofs of God’s existence in the Syntagma as “a rather cursory treatment,” and then goes on to place him with Ames, Maccovius, and Wollebius as early Reformed orthodox theologians who “either neglect or specifically exclude the proofs from Christian theology.”91 To be sure, Polanus does not expand upon many of the sixteen proofs he provides for God’s existence. Yet the description of having either neglected, excluded, or only treated cursorily appears misplaced. Faulenbach, referencing Heppe, mentions these proofs of God’s existence, indicating that they appear “according to the model of Melanchthon, very probably depending upon Ursinus.”92 A comparison, therefore, between Ursinus and Polanus is important. In the first demonstration, Ursinus claims that there is an order and a government that is “by nature understandable” (a natura sapiente) which is proof of God’s existence. In the second proof, he points to human rationality and the evidence this provides for a rational creator. Third, Ursinus refers to the innate ideas of morality present in human beings. As these could not come by accident, they must have a cause, which Ursinus claims is God. Fourth, Ursinus demonstrates that “even without teaching, all men perceive with their natural judgment that God exists.”93 Fifth, Ursinus points to the pangs of conscience experienced after sinning, and sixth to the general belief that such sins will be punished by a righteous judge. In the seventh demonstration, Ursinus refers to the presence of order in political society as proof that such an order was designed by some higher intellect. Eighth, Ursinus refers to the motus heroici which point outside of humanity to a higher cause. Ninth, he refers to prophecy of future events which demonstrate an intellect 90 Muller, PRRD, 3:170, speaking generally of Reformed orthodox, not of Polanus in particular. 91 Muller, PRRD, 3:171, 178. 92 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 136, “Nach dem Vorbild Melanchthons, sehr wahrscheinlich in Abhängigkeit von Ursinus, gibt Polan Gründe an, daß es Gott gibt.” 93 Ursinus, Loci theologici, 460, “etiam sine doctrina naturali iudicio sentiant esse Deum.”

The Existence of God

outside of time. Tenth, he points to the teleological order that exists in the world – again positing a wise and intelligent nature outside of the world order. Lastly, he points to the absurdity of an infinite series of causes as proof of a first cause. A comparison of these eleven proofs from Ursinus with the sixteen proofs Polanus offers in the Syntagma demonstrates a considerable amount of overlap. Polanus’ first ten are identical in content to and in order of Ursinus’ list – with the one exception of Ursinus’ second proof on the cause of our rationality. Polanus’ fourteenth proof takes up the substance of Ursinus’ second. In this, Polanus replicates Ursinus’ arguments concept for concept in what is practically the same order. Polanus, however, adds five additional proofs to what Ursinus provides. Proofs eleven and twelve demonstrate the existence of God from the worship that men give due to fear of divine power and the universal confession of the existence of, at least, a god by all men. Proof thirteen points to the sensus bonitatis Dei. Proof fifteen points to the immortality of the human soul. Finally, proof sixteen considers the unique blessing of providence in human life. As with the archetypal/ectypal distinction that Polanus developed from Junius, the method of appropriation demonstrates more than mere dependence.94 As with Junius, Polanus takes the broader concepts and makes them his own. Therefore, Faulenbach’s comment that Polanus depends upon Ursinus for these proofs seems to be quite right. What Faulenbach misses, however, are the additions which Polanus makes to the list that Ursinus provides. Perhaps more important than the source of Polanus’ proofs is the overall purpose they serve within the Syntagma. The inclusion of a demonstration of the existence of God is prompted by the reality that there have been and continue to be atheists (ἀθεοι) who deny the existence of God. Polanus sets forth his various considerations in light of Romans 1:19–20, that there is enough evidence to leave such atheists without excuse. Seen in this light, the proofs for God’s existence serve three purposes. First, they serve as a demonstration of the truth of what Scripture teaches concerning men – namely, that they know that God exists and are without excuse. In expanding upon Romans, Polanus seeks to vindicate Paul’s claim. Thus, these proofs and considerations provide very real evidence that a person can acquire regarding the existence of God. They serve a polemical and apologetic function within the broader scope of the Syntagma. Second, the proofs provide a practical demonstration of a large part of Polanus’ theological project: logical argumentation built upon the foundational truths set forth in Scripture. Much of the criticism of the Reformed orthodox generally, and Polanus specifically, regarding the imposition of logic and reason into theology ignores the fact that Scripture must be examined as to its meaning. The tools and

94 See Section 3.4, above.

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methods used in that examination include logic and reason, but these tools and methods are subject to and subordinate to the very Scriptures they are used to examine. Further, building upon the ectypal theology as it is communicated to us in this life (both in terms of the partial nature of that revelation in earlier biblical times and in terms of our individual abilities to understand it in our own time), our logical and reasoned examination of Scripture is always tentative and subject to correction. This does not, however, leave Polanus without the ability to investigate with the tools he has available to him how God’s existence might be demonstrated through logical consideration.95 Third, the inclusion of the proofs, particularly in the form in which Polanus presents them, further demonstrates the character of the Syntagma as the gathered, and improved upon, wisdom of the early Reformed Scholastic period. Polanus deviates significantly from Junius, who, according to Muller, “consciously adopted Aquinas’ five ways – without modification, either by way of philosophical nuances reflecting non-Thomistic trajectories of earlier thought or by way of adding the rhetorical arguments found in Calvin, Melanchthon, Ursinus, or Daneau.”96 Yet neither did Polanus simply replicate Ursinus’ proofs. Polanus recasts the more extensive content found in Ursinus in his own words. Thus, while not speaking directly to the kind of conversations within early Reformed scholasticism, Polanus gives evidence to the ongoing interaction and eclectic borrowing that took place in this early period.

4.6

The Essence of God

Having set forth the basic definition of God (quid sit), and having demonstrated that God exists (an sit), Polanus proceeds to consider the doctrine of “the Faith in God” according to its distribution: the first part concerns the essence of God and the second concerns his operations.97 By this division, Polanus considers what the Triune God is in himself before he considers the acts of God in history – however much the first are demonstrated and confirmed by the second. The essence of God

95 In this regard, see also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 125, “We should realize that the ‘proofs’ do not pretend to yield a fully rational understanding and demonstration of God, but merely provide some rational indicators to make the point that there are good reasons to believe that the living God does exist.” 96 Muller, PRRD, 3:178, citing Junius, Theses theologicae Heydelbergensis, De Deo: seu, Deum esse, 20–37. 97 Polanus, Syntagma, 865D. This corresponds broadly to what Beck, “Gisbertus Voetius,” 218, describes in Voetius as “the distinction between theologia necessaria (the divine essence) and theologia contingens (the divine acts).”

The Essence of God

is thus expounded in the remainder of book two of the Syntagma (essence, names and essential properties) and book three (Trinity), with the operations of God in book Four through book seven. Polanus provides the following definition: “God’s essence is Deity proper, whereby God is and exists as absolutely by and through himself.”98 He supports this definition with reference to Galatians 4:8, Colossians 2:9, Psalms 90:2, Revelation 1:8 and Exodus 3:14. Polanus’ argument is that God alone is eternal and has no beginning – he simply is. God alone is “quod est et qui est.”99 Therefore God’s existence does not depend upon anything apart from God himself. In this discussion, Polanus notes a number of differences between God and his creatures. First, he notes that while essence and ‘being’ (ὁ ὠν) differ in creatures, “God alone is what he is and is who he is—i.e., his own οὐσια not dependent on another.”100 There is therefore no difference between God’s essence and what or who God is. In other words, for Polanus, God is his essence – these are not separable. Second, Polanus states that “although essence and existence differ in creatures, nevertheless they do not [differ] in God.”101 That is, in the case of that which God has made, what something is does not necessitate that it exists – the definition of an apple does not require the existence of any particular apple. The very nature of God’s essence, however, requires that he exists. Third, Polanus indicates that “in a similar way, essence and substance differ in creatures, because essence is contained in substance and all that inheres within essence by its nature. But concerning divine things, these are taken to be the same thing.”102 Therefore creaturely essence is contained in substance, but with respect to divinity they refer to the same concept. At this point, Polanus considers two issues regarding the number and modes of the divine essence.103 According to his essence, “God is one, not as an aggregate, consensus, genus, or species, but only one in number—or actually prior to number.”104 Therefore the divine persons are not merely gathered together in a group. As God is one in essence, so too is he one numerically. For, as Polanus goes on to

98 Polanus, Syntagma, 865E, “Essentia Dei, est ipsa Deitas, qua Deus a se et per se absolute est et existit.” 99 Polanus, Syntagma, 867C. 100 Polanus, Syntagma, 867C, “Essentia et ὁ ὠν, qui est, in creaturis differunt: at Deus est id solus quod est et qui est; id est οὐσια alteri non innitens.” 101 Polanus, Syntagma, 867C, “Essentia item et existentia, quamvis in creaturis differant, tamen non in Deo.” 102 Polanus, Syntagma, 867C, “Essentia et substantia similiter differunt in creaturis, quia in substantia essentia continetur et praeter essentiam ipsam quaecunque naturaliter inhaerent essentiae: at in divinis pro eodem usurpantur.” 103 Polanus, Syntagma, 868A. 104 Polanus, Syntagma, 868B, “Proinde etiam Deus est unus, non aggregatione, non consensu, non genere nec specie; sed tantum numero, aut potius ante numerum.”

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explain, “even if there are three persons in number– Father, Son, and Holy Spirit – nevertheless these are one in number absolutely, the only God under the concept of essence.”105 With this statement, Polanus continues to link the singular essence of God to the three persons or modes of subsistence. It therefore depends upon the way in which one speaks of God. In terms of his essence, God is one. In terms of persons, there are three. Yet there are not three gods, but one God in three persons. In terms of the modes of speaking about the unity of the divine essence, Polanus considers whether such unity is absolute or only relative.106 Relative unity can be understood by the example of a common humanity: the common human essence in which all humans share and participate. Similarly, a rock is a rock because it shares in and participates in the essence of ‘rock’ (i.e., that universal ‘rock-ness’ that is shared by all actual rocks). Polanus indicates that it is not, however, proper to speak of God in this way. God is absolutely one in essence, rather than only or merely relatively one in essence.107 There is therefore nothing else that shares in God’s essence. Polanus demonstrates this first by the testimony of Scripture. He references Deuteronomy 4:35 (“To you it was shown, that you might know that the Lord is God; there is no other besides him.”), 39 (“Know therefore today, and lay it to your heart, that the Lord is God in heaven above and on the earth beneath; there is no other.”), 6:4 (“Hear, O Israel: The Lord our God, the Lord is one”), 32:39 (“See now that I, even I, am he, and there is no god beside me; I kill and I make alive; I wound and I heal; and there is none that can deliver out of my hand.”); and 1 Corinthians 8:4 (“Therefore, as to the eating of food offered to idols, we know that “an idol has no real existence,” and that “there is no God but one.”).108 Polanus also includes a number of logical arguments to prove the absolute unity of God.109 Three arguments revolve around the nature of God’s being: he is being itself (ens a se), the first being (primum ens), and the foundation of being (summum ens). In each case, Polanus states that such a being cannot be more than one. Similarly, Polanus remarks that he who is supremely perfect, omnipotent, most sufficient, and ubiquitous cannot admit more than one being. It is absurd to argue that there is more than one being who is ‘all powerful,’ etc. Similarly, in his third argument, Polanus states that God is one “because the governance of the world does not allow

105 Polanus, Syntagma, 868D, “Etsi enim tres sunt numero personae Deitatis Pater, Filius et Spiritus Sanctus: illae tamen sunt unus numero absolute seu unicus Deus ratione essentiae. 106 Polanus, Syntagma, 871B. 107 Polanus, Syntagma, 871E. 108 Polanus, Syntagma, 872B. 109 Polanus, Syntagma, 872C–875D, provides ten such logical arguments. The order herein is topical, rather than the order in which Polanus presents them.

The Essence of God

for many gods.”110 Finally, Polanus states: “If God is not one, then he is not God at all.”111 By this he indicates that the unity of the divine essence is established over against the Gentiles, Tritheists, Tetratheists and other proponents of Trinitarian heresies.112 Polanus also indicates that the essence of God can be understood either communiter or singulariter.113 Considered communally, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit share equally in the divine essence.114 In other words, no one divine person is more “divine” than the other two. Considered singularly, each member of the Trinity may be distinguished, but only according to their mode of subsistence.115 Accordingly, the Father is non per generationem, the Son is per generationem, and the Holy Spirit is per processionem.116 These modes of subsistence are the singular differentiation between the persons as they are considered ontologically. Given that this concept more precisely falls under the doctrine of the Trinity, Polanus will take it up in more detail in book three.117 With this, Polanus indicates that the divine essence can be considered singularly either in itself or in a particular person of the Trinity or it can be considered communally in all three persons at once. Polanus is quick to clarify that he does not wish to say that the divine essence itself is unbegotten in the Father, begotten in the Son and proceeding in the Holy Spirit. Such a schema would establish three divine essences. Rather, the “per” phrases are used adverbially (adverbiis) to describe the mode of subsistence and not adjectivally to describe the divine essence each has.118 4.6.1

The Distribution of the Doctrine of the Divine Essence

Having defined the divine essence and set forth its basic distinctions, Polanus next proceeds to distribute the doctrine according to its parts: that which concerns the attributes of God and that which concerns the person of God. As with the major distributions made previously, Polanus will take up the attributes of God in detail (chapters six through thirty-seven, the remainder of book three) before returning to the subject of the persons of the Trinity.

110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118

Polanus, Syntagma, 872D, “III. Quia gubernatio Mundi plures deos non admittit.” Polanus, Syntagma, 875B, “Quia si Deus non est unus, omnino non est.” Polanus, Syntagma, 878B. Polanus, Syntagma, 878B. Polanus, Syntagma, 878C. Polanus, Syntagma, 878C. Polanus, Syntagma, 878E. Polanus, Syntagma, 1265A–1512D. Polanus, Syntagma, 878E.

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Polanus defines the attributes of God as “what is ascribed to God in Sacred Scripture, not so much to explain God’s essence and nature as to declare to us in some way according to our capacity what can be known of him by us.”119 Polanus includes three axiomata in support of this definition. First, “whatever is said concerning God is not God, because he is ineffable.”120 Polanus herein asserts an ectypal relationship between God’s essential essence in himself and God’s self-revelation of his attributes to his creatures. In this notion, Polanus distinguishes between what is said concerning God and God himself. In the second axioma, Polanus states, “No attribute of the divine essence and nature is sufficient to explain God: because God is infinite.”121 As God is infinite, he is beyond the expression of mere words. This notion is in keeping with one of the basic axioms of orthodox theology: finitum non capax infiniti. In the third axioma, Polanus states, “The attributes of God given in Scripture support and perfect our understanding of God, whether that understanding is innate or acquired.”122 With this, Polanus indicates that there are not two different understandings of God – a natural and a Scriptural – but merely two distinct modes of understanding. Therefore, the knowledge of God that is innate in humanity is supported by Scripture just as it is completed (or brought to its proper conclusion) by Scripture. The knowledge of God that is acquired (e.g., through the use of the proofs that Polanus has just enumerated) is likewise supported by and completed by Scripture. Next, Polanus discusses two basic modes of description or attribution in Scripture: first affirmativa and negativa, and second propria and figurativa.123 The first distinction is between those statements that either affirm or deny something about God. Affirmative attributes indicate that some statements affirm a perfection of God. Here Polanus provides Jehovah, wisdom, goodness, and power as examples of affirmative attributes. These affirmative attributes not only indicate a perfection in God, but also demonstrate God to be the author of all the perfections that exist in that which he has created. Negative attributes deny some creaturely imperfection to God. Here, Polanus provides infinity, incomprehensibility, and immortality as examples.

119 Polanus, Syntagma, 879C, “Attributa Dei, sunt qua Deo adscribuntur in Scripturis Sancts, non tam ad essential naturamque Dei explicandum, quam ad declaradum nobis aliquo modo pro nostro captu illud quod de Ipso a nobis cognosci potest.” 120 Polanus, Syntagma, 879D, “I. Quicquid de Deo dicitur, non est Deus, quia est ineffabilis.” 121 Polanus, Syntagma, 879D, “II. Nulla attributa divina essentiam naturamque Dei sufficienter explicant: quia illa est infinita....” 122 Polanus, Syntagma, 879D, “III. Attributa Dei in Scriptura tradita nostram notitiam de Deo, tum insitam tum acquistiam, iuvant et perficiunt.” 123 Polanus, Syntagma, 880A.

The Essence of God

Two items of note arise from this distinction. First, even though Polanus provides only a few examples of affirmative and negative attributes, he connects positive attribution and one of the names of God (Jehovah). This is in keeping with the overall structure of the Syntagma – i.e., that the names and essential properties of God are distinctions within the category of divine attributes. On the one hand, I could simply say that Polanus is merely being consistent. On the other hand, a discussion of God’s names under the rubric of affirmative or negative attributes is quite significant. While few of the theologians of the early Reformed orthodox period discuss the names of God as a separate locus, none of them include any of the names of God in their discussion of the distinctions between the various attributes or properties of God. The second item of note is that the usage of this distinction corresponds to the via affirmativa and via negativa used by other contemporary theologians.124 See the discussion in section 4.2 above for the broad divisions of the patterns of classification used by early Reformed orthodox theologians. The second division Polanus makes is between proper attribution and figurative attribution.125 Figurative attributes refer to descriptions of God by signs, such as by metonymy, irony, metaphors, or by some conjunction of two or more of these figures and signs.126 Polanus includes these ‘figurative’ attributes because of the principle of the authority of Scripture that he has established in book one of the Syntagma.127 These figurative attributes reflect a sort of secondary way that Scripture speaks of God: they stand beneath the names of God in terms of describing who and what God is, but they do reveal a great deal about God – particularly in his works. Proper attributes, then, speak more concretely, if imperfectly, about God. Polanus points out, however, that even describing some attributes (in fact, the majority of the attributes he will be considering) as “proper” is potentially misleading. Whatever words God uses to communicate himself to us are, according to the nature of human language, finite and are accommodated to us as creatures. Every essential property of God is infinite, and therefore surpasses all human understanding.128 It is for this reason that Polanus finds it necessary to distinguish between the words used and the God they seek to explain. Here Barth takes particular issue with Polanus, and with the Reformed orthodox more generally, in the presentation of the divine attributes. He declares, “We must reject out of hand the semi-nominalistic reservation that in the last resort we can speak of the proprietates Dei only improprie…”129 Barth, however, misunderstands

124 125 126 127 128 129

See Muller, PRRD, 3:166; and te Velde, Doctrine of God, 135. Polanus, Syntagma, 880B. See Polanus, Syntagma, 1228B and 1263B. See above, Section 3.5. Polanus, Syntagma, 880C. Barth, CD II/1, 333.

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Polanus’ usage of language of proprie.130 It must be noted that Polanus does not say that we speak of the proprietates Dei only improprie. Improprie is used in chapter seven to describe that which has yet to be shown regarding God (i.e., that which has not yet been revealed) as well as back in book one to describe pagan (i.e., false) theology. In the discussion of the distribution of the attributes, proprie is not paired with improprie, but with figurata. Thus, figurata is not improper (i.e., inappropriate), but a manner of speaking that is distinguishable from proprie. Further, while Polanus does indicate that our language concerning God does not attain an understanding of “God as he is in himself,” it isn’t Polanus’ seminominalism that presses him to make this statement, but the archetypal/ectypal distinction presented in book one. Polanus is not denying the existence of universals – considering he believes these properties very much exist in God – but rather our ability to fully and adequately express in human language the character of the ineffable God. Barth further rejects the notion that “Proprie loquendo there is only one proprietas Dei, namely His essentia.”131 Barth asserts that God’s being “transcends the contrast of simplicitas and multiplicitas, including and reconciling both.”132 Barth continues the quotation from Polanus, such that, respecting ourselves, we speak of multiple properties. Barth attributes this “fiction” to the “dazzling effect of the platonicaristotelian idea of being… [which ascribed] a much higher dignity to the idea of the one as against that of the many…”133 For Barth, the result is that Polanus (and other Reformed orthodox theologians) fail to adequately do as much justice to the multiplicity of God as he has done with God’s unity. More will be said below when Polanus begins to discuss the simplicity of God. Yet it must be raised here at least preliminarily because it appears that Barth did not keep what Polanus says with respect to the Divine essence in mind as he surveyed the particular attributes. The properties Polanus will examine are properties of the divine essence. They are never discussed as “parts” of the divine essence, but as descriptions of the one, unified, essence of God. There is, according to Polanus, no multiplicity within the divine essence to do justice to, as God’s essence is one and only one. That there are three persons does not, for Polanus, introduce any multiplicity of essence. Thus, while Barth clearly disagrees with Polanus’ conclusions, Polanus did not fail to do what he did not set out to do in the first place.

130 See also Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Orthodoxy, 57ff. 131 Barth, CD II/1, 334. See also below, Chapter 5.4, for the discussion of Barth’s view of Polanus’ doctrine of simplicity. 132 Barth, CD II/1, 333. 133 Barth, CD II/1, 334.

The Essence of God

This discussion also draws forward two specific aspects of the discussion of book one that took place above in chapter three.134 Despite both statements that appear to be to the contrary and criticisms that state the contrary, Polanus believes that we can indeed predicate properties appropriately to God. The first reason is because of the archetypal/ectypal distinction. God’s knowledge of himself, as he is in himself, is archetypal. His knowledge is therefore perfect, infinite and comprehensive. To admit that our knowledge of God cannot attain to such perfection is not to suggest that what knowledge we do have is contrary to or different than God’s knowledge of himself. Ectypal theology is that which is pressed out from the original, archetypal knowledge of God. It differs from the archetypal knowledge that God has concerning himself in its extent, degree, and mode, but not in the truth of its content. It is upon this basis that Polanus makes predications concerning the character and nature of God knowing that what he says is true, even if it is not comprehensively true of what God is in himself and archetypally. Even more, because God does not contain within himself contradictory knowledge concerning himself, whatever knowledge God has concerning himself that has not been expressed (i.e., that remains archetypal) does not and cannot contradict what has in fact been expressed. Thus, ectypal knowledge concerning God is provisional only in its completion not in its revelation of truth. The archetypal/ectypal distinction enables Polanus’ ectypal discussion of the attributes of God, even though they will necessarily fail to attain the perfection of God’s archetypal understanding of himself. The second insight from book one that provides the basis for Polanus’ discussion of God’s essential properties is the character of revelation. Because God has chosen to reveal himself both at specific times to various individuals and for all time within the pages of Scripture, a record exists of the nature and character of God. Further, for Polanus, the authority of Scripture is none other than God who speaks in and through its pages. Thus, the appropriateness of Polanus’ predication of various essential properties to God is based not upon logic or reason, but upon the revelation of these properties in, by, and through God in Scripture. At this point, Polanus shifts from a definition of the attributes of God to take up the discussion of the attributes themselves according to those that are proper and those that are figurative. The proper attributes are divided into the Divine names and the essential properties of God. The divine names are taken up in the remainder of chapter six of book two, while the essential properties of God are considered in chapters seven through thirty-one.135 In chapters thirty-three through thirty-seven, Polanus will return to the notion of figurative attributes.

134 See above, Section 3.4. 135 Chapter thirty-two contains a discussion of a secondary distribution of the proper attributes of God – the absolute and the relative. See Polanus, Syntagma, 1226–1227.

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4.6.2

Excursus on the Holy Trinity

Before I move on to discuss Polanus’ doctrine of the divine names, I will first jump ahead to the portion of the Syntagma in which he covers the doctrine of the Trinity.136 I do this here for three reasons. First, Polanus has already shown in the definition of God which he provides that the Trinity is a vital and integral part of who God is. Thus, for Polanus, Trinity is not something to be abstracted from his discussion of God’s essence. Second, I consider the doctrine of the Trinity here, in an excursus, and not in its fullness later in this work because Polanus’ doctrine of the Trinity is both comprehensive in its detail and massive in its exposition.137 Muller, reflecting upon Polanus’ work in book three, rightly describes Polanus as having a “patristic depth exceeding the Reformers,” and, compared with the other full-scale systematic works of his time, as containing “the most extensive presentation of the doctrine of the Trinity.”138 A discussion commensurate with either Polanus’ depth or length is beyond the scope of this work.139 Third, by including a survey of Polanus’ main points will enable us to evaluate both Polanus’ basic description of God (i.e., does he truly present a God that is at once one in essence and three in persons) and the criticism against his methodology (i.e., that by waiting until after dealing with the single essence, Polanus treats the Trinity as a fringe doctrine rather than as central to all theology).140 Polanus sets forth the doctrine of the Trinity in book three of the Syntagma.141 The first three chapters deal with the concept of ‘person.’ The next three chapters (4–6) are dedicated to the divine persons individually (Father, Son, and Holy Spirit). The next two chapters (7–8) focus upon the Trinity as a whole. Chapter 8 is where Polanus provides an extensive list of axiomata on the Trinity in which he draws his understanding of the Trinity into a more cohesive whole. Finally, in the last three chapters (9–11), Polanus refutes various antitrinitarian objections to the term homoousion and to the distinctions between the three persons. From the broad

136 137 138 139

Polanus, Syntagma, 1265A. Polanus’ doctrine of the Trinity continues through column 1512D. Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 180. Muller, PRRD, 4:61 and 4:88. For a more detailed discussion of Polanus’ doctrine of the Trinity, see Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 150–159; and Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 125–182. Polanus also features in volume four of Muller, PRRD. Polanus, however, appears less frequently than he does in Muller’s three prior volumes. See also Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 105–139. 140 See also Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 245–251. Beck’s synopsis of Voetius’ doctrine of the Trinity serves much the same purpose. Beck places his discussion after the divine names. Given Polanus’ bifurcation between person and attribute (and since the attributes of God are both the divine names and the essential properties), I have placed my survey here. 141 Muller, PRRD, 4:148.

The Essence of God

structure of the book as a whole, the more general form of the argument Polanus makes emerges: he defines ‘person,’ describes the individual persons, and unifies the whole doctrine with testimony and reason. Polanus begins with a discussion of the term ‘persona.’ He defines the divine person as, “a subsistence in the divine essence which has in itself by nature that whole divine essence but is distinguished by its incommunicable property from other persons to which it is referred.”142 In order to expand upon this more basic definition, Polanus presents a number of conclusions (consectaria). Among these, he states that the divine persons are not part of the divine essence, but each person is the whole divine essence and the whole divine essence is in each person.143 Similarly, Polanus declares that the divine persons are not abstracted from, separated from, divided out of, species of, or qualities of the divine essence.144 Instead, the persons are understood to subsist and reside in the divine essence. Further, whatever is said of the divine essence is also said of the divine persons.145 Polanus also indicates a number of ways in which the divine persons differ from human persons: the divine persons are eternal, infinite, not essentially different from each other, in one another, and each has the whole divine essence.146 Finally, Polanus states, “the essence of the one person is the essence of the other divine person; as the essence of the Father is the essence of the Son: they differ only by relation.”147 From this definition and these conclusions, Polanus presents the divine persons as individual subsistence in the divine essence, that subsist by the divine nature, and are identical with one another according to essence, but are distinguishable according to their personal relations. Since the divine persons are to be distinguished by their personal relations, it is not surprising that Polanus’ description of each person focuses upon that specific issue:

142 Polanus, Syntagma, 1274A, “Persona deitatis, est subsistentia in divina essentia totam illam divinam essentiam natura in se habens, sed proprietate sua incommunicabili ab aliis personis ad quas refertur distinca.” For Polanus’ understanding of ‘person,’ see also Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 151; and Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 131. 143 Polanus, Syntagma, 1275C. 144 Polanus, Syntagma, 1275E–1276B. 145 Polanus, Syntagma, 1276E. 146 Polanus, Syntagma, 1276C. 147 Polanus, Syntagma, 1277A, “Essentia unius personae divinae est essentia alterius personae; ut essentia Patris est essentia Filii: differunt tantum relatione.”

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“God the Father is the first divine person, having origin from no one but himself, not existing from another, and from eternity begetting the Son, his essential image, and breathing out the Holy Spirit with the same Son.”148 “The Son of God is the second divine person, having been always begotten by the Father, certainly not according to essence, but according to personal existence, and with the Father breathing out the Holy Spirit.”149 “The Holy Spirit is the third divine person, proceeding by an eternal and singular spiration from the Father and the Son.”150

In each chapter, Polanus demonstrates both the divinity and the ‘personhood’ of each of the divine persons on the basis of Scripture and the testimony of the church. Further, for each person Polanus expands upon the description of their unique personal property. Thus, the Father is neither begotten nor proceeds, but both begets and spirates. The Son is begotten but does not proceed; he spirates but does not beget. The Spirit neither begets nor spirates; is not begotten but proceeds. Polanus then focuses upon the Trinity as a whole, showing how this doctrine is also demonstrable from Scripture and testimony.151 Next, Polanus presents a number of axiomata that draw together the whole of Trinitarian discussion.152 Thus, Polanus states, “the Holy Trinity is God, and is indeed the one and only God.”153 There are not therefore, multiple gods (either inside or outside the Trinity). Further, Trinity is said in reference to the persons and to their personal distinctions, not with reference to the divine essence.154 Polanus then discusses the proper comparison of the essence of the persons: they are not 148 Polanus, Syntagma, 1286B, “Deus Pater, est persona Deitatis prima, a nullo originem habens, a se, non ab alio exsistens, et ex se ab aeterno Filium, imaginem suam essentialem gigens, et cum eodem Filio Spiritum Sanctum spirans.” For Polanus’ discussion of God the Father, see also Muller, PRRD, 4:257ff; Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 118ff; and Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 136–140. 149 Polanus, Syntagma, 1308E, “Filius Dei, est persona Deitatis secunda, a Patre semper generata, non quidem secundum essentiale, sed sedundum personale esse, et cum Patre Spiritum Sanctum spirans.” For Polanus’ discussion of God the Son, see also Muller, PRRD, 4:326; Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 120ff; and Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 140–155. 150 Polanus, Syntagma, 1321E, “Spiritus Sanctus, est persona Deitatis tertia, a Patre et Filio per aeternam atque unicam spiratione procedens.” For Polanus’ discussion of God the Holy Spirit, see also Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 128ff; and Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 156–161. 151 Polanus, Syntagma, 1405D–1436D. 152 My order of presenting these axiomata differs from that which Polanus uses. In this presentation, I have grouped them together thematically. 153 Polanus, Syntagma., 1436E, “Sacrosancta Trinitas est Deus, et quidem unicus et solus Deus.” 154 Polanus, Syntagma, 1438B, “Trinitas non in essentia, quae unica est, sed in numero personarum et in earum distinctione est.” Polanus cites Tertullian, Adversus Praxeus/Gegen Praxeas, Fontes Christiani series, vol. 34 (Freiburg: Hurder, 2001), 102–104; and Aquinas, S.Th., 1., q. 31, art. 1, ad. 4.

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unlike (ἀνομιοι), merely similar (ὁμοιουσιος), or completely different (ἑτεροουσιος.). Instead, the divine persons are ὁμοουσιος (i.e., of the same essence) and as such have a single common essence (communem essentiam singularem).155 The differences between the divine persons are therefore not according to their essence because “according to their essence, the divine persons are one.”156 They have among themselves one, equal, eternal, common, and perfect essence. While the divine persons are not to be distinguished according to essence, “they are nevertheless to be really distinguished” in that one person is brought forth from the other (una persona ab alia producitur).157 Polanus provides a three-fold manner of distinguishing between the divine persons: according to origin (origo), order (ordo), and work (opera).158 According to origin, the persons proceed one from another: the Father is without procession, but from him proceeds the Son; the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Son receives personhood from the Father but does not receive his being or essence from the Father. Thus, according to his essence (per essentiam) the Son is of himself (a se), but according to his person (per personam), the Son is not a se, but is of the Father (ex Patre). According to order, one person is before another: the Father first, the Son second, and the Holy Spirit third. In terms of their works, the persons can be distinguished according to mode (with respect to external operations) and action (with respect to personal operations). In their external operations, “the Father acts by the Son, in the Holy Spirit.”159 In their personal operations, the activity of each is different in a two-fold way. First, according to internal personal activity, the Father begets the Son, the Son is begotten and breathes out the Spirit, the Spirit is breathed out by the Father and the Son. Second, there is an external personal operation of the persons: the Father sends the Son, the Spirit drives the Son into the wilderness, etc. Thus, Polanus states, “All distinctions in God originate from the relations.”160 There is therefore in God nothing but essence and relation. Although Polanus describes the distinction as real (i.e., reale), the distinction he is making is closer to a formal or modal distinction. Indeed, Polanus states as much: “Considered among themselves, the relations in God are real, for by mode and form they differ from the essence; however, they do not differ really from the

155 Polanus, Syntagma, 1438D. 156 Polanus, Syntagma, 1440B, “Personae Deitatis secundum essentiam unum sunt.” 157 Polanus, Syntagma, 1440C, “Personae Deitatis inter se non essentialiter, non secundum esse, quod commune est, quia una est earum essentia; sed tamen realiter distinguuntur.” 158 Polanus, Syntagma, 1451A. See also Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 156. 159 Polanus, Syntagma, 1452A, “Pater agit per Filium in Spiritu Sancto.” 160 Polanus, Syntagma, 1442C, “Omnis autem distinctio in Deo nascitur ex relationibus.”

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essence.”161 In support of this, Polanus cites from Gabriel Biel’s prologue to the Sentences.162 Thus, the relations are real, and really to be distinguished from one another. With regard to the distinction between persona and essentia, however, the distinction is a modal one. The persons therefore neither compose or make up the divine essence, nor are they separated from each other. Rather, the persons are only distinguished by these properties.163 The divine persons are therefore not aliud et aliud, but they are alius et alius. Finally, I note the manner in which Polanus begins the next book following his discussion of the Trinity in book three. At the beginning of his discussion of God’s works, he inserts this transitional sentence: “Thus far [the discussion] has been on the essence of God; what follows is on his works.”164 Note that from this, Polanus is indicating that the whole of the doctrine of the Trinity comes under the rubric of the divine essence. That is, Polanus keeps the very definition and distribution he set out at the beginning of Chapter six of the Syntagma: that faith concerning God’s essence has two parts: the attributes of God (which Polanus distributes into names and essential properties) and the divine persons.165 Now that the doctrine of the divine persons is completed, Polanus has come full circle on his doctrine of the essence of God. While this survey of Polanus’ doctrine of the Trinity does not do justice to the depth of argument that Polanus presents in the Syntagma, it does show the broad lines of his thought. God is not composed of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; rather, the three divine persons subsist in the one divine essence. According to his essence, God is a non-composite unity. This one God eternally and immutably subsists in three distinct persons – distinct according to their own particular personal properties. Furthermore, while the aseity of the Son and the Holy Spirit is affirmed according to essence, according to person, the Son is from the Father and the Holy Spirit is from both the Father and the Son. Thus, just as the divine essence can be thought of either communiter, or singulariter, so too can the divine persons.

161 Polanus, Syntagma, 1443B, “Relationes personarum realiter inter se; modo et formaliter tantum ab essentia differunt: realiter vero ab essentia non differunt.” 162 Gabriel Biel, Collectorum circa quattor librus Sententiarum, vol. 1 (Tübingen: Mohr Seibeck, 1973), quest. 2, art. 3, p. 35. 163 Polanus, Syntagma, 1443B. As Polanus states in another axiomata, there are three persons, but not three gods since the divine essence is undivided and non-composite. 164 Polanus, Syntagma, 1513A, “Hactenus fuit de essentia Dei: sequitur de operibus ipsius.” 165 Polanus, Syntagma, 879B.

The Essence of God

4.6.3

The Names of God

According to Polanus, the divine names speak to the question of who God is: his essence, his properties and even his persons.166 They are those names that are revealed by God - either immediately or through the agency of the prophets and apostles - and properly signify what man is to discern concerning God.167 These names put forth the power and glory of God as that which is to be accepted by faith. By these names God is believed upon, called upon, worshipped and professed. These names are therefore an important link between God and man as made in his image. Polanus discusses ten principle divine names: eight found in the Old Testament and two in the New Testament.168 Polanus primarily distinguishes between those divine names that signify something about God’s essence and those that signify something about God’s essential properties.169 Three Hebrew and one Greek name speak to the essence of God: ‫( יהוה‬Jehovah), ‫( יה‬Jah), ‫( אהיה‬Eheje), and κυριος (Kurios).170 The divine name Jehovah is the primary and principle Old Testament designation for God, with Kurios being the equivalent in the New Testament. The other two Hebrew names - Jah and Eheje – are derivatives of Jehovah and speak particularly of his being.171 According to Polanus, Jehovah “signifies the individual, singular divine essence which is incommunicable to creatures, and existing beyond other things that are and making it be the case that all things exist.”172 This divine name – and by extension, those names which are versions or translations of it – sometimes refers to the three divine persons jointly or communally.173 This phenomenon is demonstrated by a quotation from Isaiah 6:3 and 5. Polanus declares that the text in Isaiah itself refers

166 On the doctrine of the divine names more broadly in Reformed orthodox theology, see: Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 241–245; Muller, PRRD, 3:246270; and te Velde, Doctrine of God, 114–129. 167 Polanus, Syntagma, 881C. 168 Polanus first presents the divine names from the Old Testament and then from the New. In my discussion, I have grouped those divine names from each portion of Scripture that Polanus designates as either referring to God’s being or his essential properties. 169 See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 122. 170 Polanus typically gives the Hebrew or Greek name first, and then uses the Latin equivalent. Sometimes he includes both. For simplicity sake, I have given the Greek and Hebrew names once and use the Latinized form if it needs to be repeated. 171 Polanus, Syntagma, 893D and 894C. 172 Polanus, Syntagma, 884A, “Divinam significat essentiam, individuam et singularem, creaturis incommunicabilem, et prae ceteris quaecunque sunt exsistentem, et facientem ut alia omnia exsistant.” 173 Polanus, Syntagma, 888B.

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“indubitably” to the Father.174 John 12:41, however, declares that Isaiah spoke of the Son in that passage, and Acts 28:25 declares that it was the Holy Spirit who gave Isaiah the details of his mission.175 Other passages specifically refer to a singular person, such as Psalm 2:2 (of the Father); Zachariah 1:10, Genesis 18:1, Isaiah 25:9, etc. (of the Son). Likewise, the divine name θεος (Theos) can either refer to the Trinity as a whole or to a particular person.176 Polanus indicates three things which the name Jehovah signifies.177 First, it signifies that God’s essence subsists of himself (ex se) and absolutely (per se). God is therefore not dependent upon any other being to exist. Polanus quotes from Revelation 1:4 (“Grace to you and peace from him who is and who was and who is to come”) and 16:5 (“Just are you, O Holy One, who is and who was, for you brought these judgments.”). Second, it signifies that the existence of all creatures is from God. Here, Polanus quotes from Acts 17:28 (“In him we live and move and have our being”) and Romans 11:36 (“For from him and through him and to him are all things.”). Third, Polanus states that the name Jehovah signifies how the promises and threats of God become real to his people. In support of this, Polanus quotes Exodus 6:2–3 (“I am the Lord. I appeared to Abraham, to Isaac, and to Jacob, as God Almighty, but by my name the Lord I did not make myself known to them.”), Exodus 20:2 (“I am the Lord your God, who brought you out of the land of Egypt.”), and Jeremiah 16:20–21 (“Can man make for himself gods? Such are not gods! Therefore, behold, I will make them know, this once I will make them know my power and my might, and they shall know that my name is the Lord.”). It is significant that Polanus would seek to demonstrate the meaning of Jehovah in the first two instances only with passages from the New Testament. Thus, while these are Hebrew names, found principally in the Old Testament, the full disclosure of Scripture is applicable to assist in discerning what is meant by this name. The fundamental aspect of Jehovah is God’s being. These texts of the New Testament therefore also speak of both the nature of God’s being and the communication of being to his creatures. The other category of the divine names given in Scripture speak of God’s essential properties. The names ‫( אל‬El) and ‫( אלחים‬Elohim) speak particularly of God’s power and might.178 Polanus notes two features of the name Elohim. The first is that while this name can be attributed in an analogical way to creatures and an improper way to false gods, it properly signifies God.179 Second, Polanus indicates

174 175 176 177 178 179

Polanus, Syntagma, 888C. Polanus, Syntagma, 888C. Polanus, Syntagma, 899A. Polanus, Syntagma, 891A–C. Polanus, Syntagma, 894E. Polanus, Syntagma, 895D. See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 123.

The Essence of God

that the name Elohim properly speaks to the mystery of the Trinity – particularly the plurality of divine persons.180 Polanus is one of several Reformed scholastic theologians who believes that Jehovah signifies the Trinity (whether singularly or communally).181 ‫( שדי‬Schaddai) communicates God’s omnipotence, by which God does as he pleases.182 Polanus states that God is the only one this name is appropriately ascribed to in Scripture. The name ‫( אדני‬Adonai) tells of God’s rule and reign (dominus) over all his creation.183 Whereas this word is used analogically of various creatures, it belongs properly only to God. ‫( עליון‬Helion) speaks of his excellency over all things.184 Finally, θεος (Theos), when speaking particularly of the one true God, communicates the eternal divine essence of God.185 While these divine names do not exhaust the biblical witness to God’s essence, they give particular and concrete testimony to these aspects of his being. Polanus therefore gives their treatment specific priority within the attributes of God. 4.6.4

The Essential Properties of God

Having thus discussed the divine names, Polanus proceeds to his treatment of the essential properties of God. By way of definition, “the essential properties of God are the divine attributes whereby both the truth of the divine essence itself becomes known and is distinguished from all other essences.”186 Thus, apart from what the divine names convey, God communicates and reveals his essence through the demonstration of his essential properties. As will be seen in the discussion of the particular attributes, God also underlines the difference between himself as creator and all his creation. Before distributing the essential properties of God into their various parts, Polanus provides eleven axiomata relative to the essential properties as a whole.187

180 Polanus, Syntagma, 896A. 181 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 123 lists Zanchi, Polanus, Alsted, Scharpius, Waleaus, Alting, Bucanus, Maresius, and Heidegger among those who accept that Elohim is evidence for the Trinity. Among those who do not, he lists Mastricht, Gomarus, the Synopsis purioris theologiae, and De Moor. See also Stefan T. Lindblad, “Of The Nature Of God: The Inter-Relation of Essence and Trinity in Edward Leigh’s ‘A Systeme or Body of Divinity’ (1662),” Journal of the Institute of Reformed Baptist Studies (2013), 119, “Leigh’s doctrine of the nature of God turns, first, on the divine names, names which teach something of God’s essential unity and trinitarian subsistence.” 182 Polanus, Syntagma, 897C. 183 Polanus, Syntagma, 897E. 184 Polanus, Syntagma, 898B. 185 Polanus, Syntagma, 898E. 186 Polanus, Syntagma, 901D, “Proprieta Dei essentiales, sunt attributa divina, quibus et essentiae divinae veritas in se innotescit et ab omnibus aliis essentiis discernitur.” 187 These eleven axiomata can be found in Polanus, Syntagma, 901D–904E.

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In the first axioma Polanus states: “God’s essential properties are really God’s very essence itself, and they do not differ from God’s essence or each other.”188 The essential properties are therefore not some different thing from God himself, as “in God there is nothing that is not either essence or person.”189 In light of this, Polanus connects various essential properties to the essence of God. These essential properties are inseparable (axioma five), and are themselves eternal (axioma seven), and essential (axioma eleven). The essential properties do not exist as accidents in God (axioma nine) or as parts of the divine essence (axioma four). Therefore, the essential properties do not come after God’s essence (axioma eight). God does all that he does and is all that he is by one and the same act (axioma six). Further, in axioma ten, Polanus states, “God’s essential attributes are acts, just as God is himself absolutely pure and simple act.”190 Most of these axiomata are given without expansion and therefore appear to rely upon Polanus’ later discussions of God’s various essential properties. Two of these axiomata refer to ways that essential properties are not distinguished in God. In the second axioma, Polanus says, “nothing in God is distinguished essentially, since all the things in God are one indivisible and absolutely simple essence.”191 Thus, the essential properties are not divisions within the divine essence – such as to suggest that God is the composition of various parts. From this, Polanus goes on the third axioma to state: As God’s essential properties are not really (realiter) distinguished, so too they are not distinguished by the nature of the thing (ex natura rei) but rather by reason (ratione) or more preferably by mode (modo); that is, by our conception and comprehension, or by our mode of understanding.192

Several things of note come to the fore in this axioma. First, the notion that God’s essential properties are not distinguished realiter is based upon the prior axioma – that there are no essential distinctions within God. Second, Polanus states that 188 Polanus, Syntagma, 901D, “I. Proprietates Dei essentiales sunt realiter ipsamet Dei essentia, et nec ab essentia Dei, nec inter se reipsa differunt....” 189 Polanus, Syntagma, 901E, “II, In Deo nihil est, quod non sit aut essentia aut persona.” 190 Polanus, Syntagma, 904B, “X. Proprietates Dei essentiales sunt actus, prout Deus actus purissimus est et simplicissimus.” 191 Polanus, Syntagma, 901E, “III, Nulla in Deo distinguuntur essentialiter: quia omnia quae sunt in Deo sunt una et indivisibilis et simplicissima essentia.” 192 Polanus, Syntagma, 902A, “IV. Proprietates Dei essentialis ut non realiter, ita nec ex natura rei sed ratione distinguuntur aut modo potius, id est, nostra conceptione et comprehensione, seu nostro intelligendi modo.” See also te Velde, “Eloquent Silence,” 584, “A note of caution is added to make it clear that the attributes should not be understood as entities apart from the divine essence, but as relationally or rationally distinct from God’s essence in view of our concepts.”

The Essence of God

the mode of distinction is in accordance with human understanding. That is, the distinctions he makes do not refer to actual divisions within the divine essence (i.e., distinctions according to the nature of God), but are discerned by reason (ratione).193 In describing the distinctions to be made between the various attributes as ratione versus realiter, Polanus brings an important concept into his discussion. In regard to this particularly complex concept, Muller notes three broad types of distinctions: distinctions between things (distinctio realis), distinctions within a thing (distinctio formalis or modalis), and distinctions concerning a thing (broadly speaking, distinctio ratione).194 Real (realiter) distinctions have to do with distinctions between two things: res and res. Thus, there is a real distinction between a chair and a horse, as well as between two horses. It is also possible to make a real distinction within a composite thing: as between the body and spirit of a human being. Polanus indicates two reasons it is not possible to attribute a real distinction to God’s essence. First, there is only one God (i.e., one res). God is therefore not subject to the real distinction between res et res. Second, God is not composed of multiple separate “things”. This is something Polanus will demonstrate later on in the first of the first order essential properties of God. Thus, God’s essence is not made up of multiple things (aliud et aliud). Therefore, real distinctions (distinctio realis) cannot be attributed to God’s essence. It is possible, however, to attribute the other types of distinctions to God: either formalis, modalis, or rationis.195 A formal or a modal distinction is a distinction that is made within a thing. Muller defines distictio formalis as one in which “two or more formal aspects of a thing” are distinguished.196 Muller indicates that a distinctio modalis is “between various modes of subsistence of a thing or various ways in which a thing exists.”197

193 Polanus makes similar statements at various places in the Syntagma in his discussion of the essential properties of God: 911E and 912A (in relation to divine simplicity); 1009C (divine wisdom); 1158D (divine justice); and 1192A (divine power). 194 Muller, PRRD, 3:286. 195 See Beck, “God, Creation, and Providence,” 200, who states, “While the Reformed doctrine of simplicity excluded all composition from the divine essence, it did not exclude all distinctions.”; and Muller, PRRD, 3:278, who states, “Indeed, the entire force of the Reformed scholastic argument is to deny in God only those distinctions that imply composition, namely, real distinctions and, therefore, to point toward the proper distinctions that do subsist among the attributes and between the attributes and the divine essence.” (emphasis original). See also Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 258. 196 Richard A. Muller, “distinctio,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology, 2nd ed (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017), 93–94. 197 Muller, “distinctio,” 94. Muller continues: “The distinctio modalis belongs not so much to the logical spectrum of distinction between the real and the purely rational as to the vocabulary of trinitarian

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A distinctio ratione is a distinction that arises on the basis of reason. It is through such a distinction that Polanus (and others) distinguish between God’s essence and his attributes, between the names of God and his essential properties, between God’s essential properties of the first order and those of the second order, and between the various essential properties themselves. A question, however, arises from this notion: “whether the attributes differ purely by our conceptions, or whether there is a foundation of the difference in the reality of God’s being?”198 As Polanus himself says, “to distinguish or differ by reason is said ambiguously.”199 He notes that there are distinctions according to reason that have no basis in the thing itself, but rather “have only objective or imaginary and fictitious being.”200 Polanus attributes this notion to Gabriel Biel and William of Ockham and rejects it as incorrect.201 This notion is comparable with a distinction used by other Reformed and medieval scholastics, a distinctio rationis ratiocinans. This distinction is one that “[rests] only on the operation of the reason and not on the thing.”202 Therefore, the basis of the distinction is solely in the mind of the one making it and has no foundation or basis in the thing being examined. Instead, Polanus holds to a notion of distinctio rationis that does have some foundation in the thing examined. He attributes this, without reference, to both

198 199 200

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202

theology, according to which a person can be described as a mode of subsistence.... Logically, there is little difference between the distinctio formalis and the distinctio modalis. Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 132. Te Velde speaks of this concept broadly, not with specific reference to Polanus. Polanus, Syntagma, 902A, “Ratione distingui seu differre dicitur ambigue.” Polanus, Syntagma, 902B, “quae habent esse tantum obiectivum seu imaginarium et fictum, non autem esse reale.” See also Duby, Divine Simplicity, 22, and Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and PostReformation Orthodoxy, 56. Duby, in note 54 states, “Strictly speaking, this rejection of Ockham and Biel opposes only their formal presentation of the nature of the distinctio realis. However, this rejection is designed to take the reader beyond the notion of a mere nominal diversity among the divine attributes and to legitimize the Thomistic approach.” Polanus refers to Gabriel Biel, Prologo super primum Sententiarum, quest. secunda. He does not refer to any particular work by Ockham. For a discussion of the view in question, see Duby, Divine Simplicity, 17, “The medieval era thus yields several distinct ways of construing God’s simplicity with respect to the divine attributes. The Thomistic route insists that the distinctions among the attributes are discerned by analysis of the essence itself (ratio ratiocinata) and have an objective foundation in God or at least in God’s works (fundamentum in re). Duns Scotus goes further and attempts to locate the fundamentum in formal distinctions among the attributes in God himself. Ockham rejects both the Thomistic and the Scotistic views as betrayals of divine simplicity, repudiating the distinction arising ex ratione ratiocinata and the Scotist formal distinction and positing a purely conceptual and subjective distinction.” Muller, “distinctio,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 94. See also “ratio ratiocinata/ ratio ratiocinans”, 257. Muller describes ratio ratiocinans as “mere reasoning” or “reason reasoning.”

The Essence of God

Aristotle and Aquinas.203 Here we encounter a distinctio rationis ratiocinatae, in which a distinction is made “by reason of analysis” that has some basis or foundation in the thing itself (fundamentum in re).204 While Polanus rejects a distinction on the basis of God’s nature (ex natura rei), he does find basis for rational distinctions in God himself.205 Thus, God’s intelligence and his mercy are distinct from each other, and also from his justice.206 This is particularly so with regard to the second order essential properties of God, in which an ad extra dimension of God’s properties are demonstrated. It is with regard to this notion that Polanus makes distinctions between the various essential properties. These distinctions are not realiter, in that they do not distinguish between two or more separate things. Rather, they are ratione. More specifically, although Polanus doesn’t use this precise language, they are distinctio rationis ratiocinata – distinctions on the basis of a consideration or analysis of the thing itself. They do not merely arise from reasoning (i.e., they are not distinctio rationis ratiocinans), but have their source in the thing itself. Having set forth these axioms as a baseline for the discussion of the essential properties themselves, Polanus next proceeds to distribute the essential properties according to two orders: primus and secundus. Polanus is quick to point out, however, that properly speaking there are not many properties in God, but only one.207 There is nothing else in God than the divine essence itself. Polanus’ discussion of multiple properties is therefore, contra Barth, not improprie but rather with respect to our way of understanding. For Polanus, improper speech concerning God consists in pagan or heretical notions. We may speak of many attributes because God has so accommodated himself to our way of understanding. Thus, for Polanus, the complement to proprie is respectu nostri, not improprie.

203 Polanus, Syntagma, 902C. Polanus there states, “Aristoteli vero, Thomae Aquinati et aliis ratione distingui, idem est quod definitione et modo concipiendi in intellectu nostro distingui: diversam enim rem concipit intellectus noster ex nomine misericordae, quam ex nomine iustitiae.” 204 Muller, “distinctio,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 93–94. See also “ratio ratiocinata/ratio ratiocinans”, 257. 205 Duby, Divine Simplicity, 22. Duby links the phrase “ex natura rei” in Polanus’ third axioma to Duns Scotus (presumably, his formal distinction). This is contrary to te Velde, Doctrine of God, 133, who demonstrates that Polanus uses the language of forma, if not distinctio formalis, in the discussion of the second order essential properties of God: Polanus, Syntagma, 983E, “Nam homo per aliam formam intelligit, per aliam iustus est. Idem sentiendum de aliis attributis secundi ordinis.” 206 Polanus, Syntagma, 902C. See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 133, who, speaking of Reformed orthodoxy more broadly, indicates that these distinctions can also be seen in an eminent sense (eminenter) and/or by virtue of God’s power (virtualiter). 207 Polanus, Syntagma, 904C.

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4.6.5

The Distinction Between First and Second Order Essential Properties

At the end of the seventh chapter of book two of the Syntagma, Polanus begins the larger discussion of the essential properties of God according to their distribution into essential properties of the first and second order.208 The essential properties of God that are of the first order are those that belong to God absolutely and in himself alone – and are therefore simply incommunicable.209 These first order properties are divided into simplicity (simplicitas) and perfection (perfectio), and infinity (infinitas) and immutability (immutabilitas) and are detailed in chapters nine through thirteen in the Syntagma.210 The second order attributes are spoken of God a posteriori. These second order attributes are incommunicable as they are found in God, but are, by analogy, referred to “as communicable, because a certain similarity of them is found in creatures.”211 Polanus distributes this second order of essential properties into life (vita) and immortality (immortalitas), and blessedness (beatitudo) and glory (gloria).212 To this description, Polanus adds eight reasons describing the differences in the way the property is found in God and the human beings. Most of the reasons simply reiterate the correspondences that Polanus has demonstrated in the first order essential properties: the second order properties are in God in an infinite, perfect, unified, absolute, proper, and immutable way; they are in human beings in a finite, imperfect, diverse, secondary, analogical, and mutable way.213 Polanus also affirms notions he has previously stated in his discussion of the divine essence: these second order properties are in God by his nature, while they are in us by participation.214 Finally, Polanus affirms a notion going back to the first book of the Syntagma: “In God [these properties] are archetypal, in creatures [they are] ectypal.”215 In his discussion, Polanus references at least three of the several ways that Reformed orthodox theologians followed in categorizing God’s attributes or properties. A variety of patterns are indicated in the secondary literature.216 These patterns

208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216

Polanus, Syntagma, 904C. Polanus, Syntagma, 905A. For a discussion of these first order essential properties of God, see Chapter Five, below. Polanus, Syntagma, 983B, “Et hae sunt incommunicabiles, ut sunt in Deo: communicabiles tamen dicuntur (κατ’ αναλογιαν), quia earum similitudo quaedam in creaturis reperitur.” For the discussion of these second order essential properties, see Chapters Six through Ten, below. Polanus, Syntagma, 983D–984A. These are the third, fourth, fifth, seventh, and eighth reasons Polanus gives. Polanus, Syntagma, 983C. Polanus, Syntagma, 984A, “VI. In Deo sunt ἀρχετυποι, in creaturis ἐκτυποι.” See Muller, PRRD, 3:216–217; te Velde, Doctrine of God, 134–135.

The Essence of God

include: incommunicable and communicable; first order and second order; a priori and a posteriori – these classifications are largely synonymous. Other categories can be found within and across these prior classifications: negative and positive; absolute and relative; proper and improper. Thus, Trelcatius Jr. can speak of negative a priori attributes (infinitas) and proper a posteriori attributes (potentia, scientia, and voluntas).217 Although the usage of the categories of a priori and a posteriori are found in a variety of Reformed orthodox theologians, the precise meaning behind them is not so apparent.218 What is clear is that the terms are practically identical to the incommunicable/communicable distinction or the first order/second order. What is not clear is how these two phrases ought to be understood given their historical usage. For instance, Aristotle distinguishes between two ways of knowing a particular fact: the knowledge of the fact itself is distinguishable from the knowledge of the reason for that fact.219 He uses the example of twinkling and non-twinkling planets to demonstrate this. First, is the demonstration of fact which argues from known effects to an unknown cause: • Planets do not twinkle; • Things that do not twinkle are near in proximity; • Therefore, planets are near. In this example, the effect is known (the planet doesn’t twinkle), but the cause is what is being reasoned toward. Second, Aristotle provides a demonstration of reasoned fact, which argues from a known cause to its effect: • Planets are near; • Things that are near do not twinkle; • Therefore, planets do not twinkle. In these two demonstrations, there is a significant difference between the two middle terms: “things that do not twinkle are close in proximity” is different from “things that are close do not twinkle.” The first demonstrates a fact, but the second demonstrates the reason for that fact. In other words, planets are not close because they do not twinkle, but rather, do not twinkle because they are close.

217 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 47. 218 Muller, PRRD, 3:221, includes Johann Heinrich Hottinger, Cursus theologicus, methodo Altingiana: ejusdem accessit Urim, id est, oratio, theologi ideam nobis exhibens theoretici, seu characteres, quibus se doctor publicus commendare debet (Tiguri: Schaufelbergeri, 1660), among those who use the a priori/a posteriori categories. 219 Aristotle, Posterior Analytics, I.13.

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Thomas Aquinas took up this notion under the name of a demonstratio propter quid and a demonstratio propter quia.220 A demonstration propter quid is one that argues from the cause of something to its effect. A demonstration propter quia is one that argues from an effect back to its cause: i.e., that which is prior (at least with respect to the one inquiring). Thus, when an effect is better known than its cause, we proceed from the effect to knowledge of the cause. Likewise, when a cause is better known than its effects, we can proceed from the cause to knowledge of the effect. Ockham links Thomas’ demonstration propter quid to the notion of a demonstration a priori.221 In these sorts of demonstrations, “the premises explain the reason why the thing is as it is affirmed in the conclusion.”222 Ockham also links Thomas’ demonstration propter quia to a demonstration a posteriori. In these demonstrations, “[we know] that it is so (quia ita est), not why (propter quia ita est).”223 In this way, ‘we know because’ (i.e., a posteriori) is different from ‘we know why because’ (i.e., a priori). Planets are close – we know why because they do not twinkle. We know why they do not twinkle – because they are close. In this way, a demonstration a priori moves from known causes to knowable effects and a demonstration a posteriori moves from known effects to a knowable cause. Polanus’ usage of these terms to describe the two classes of God’s essential properties demonstrates an important point about each class. First order, incommunicable properties are a priori because of what precedes them – not temporally, but structurally in our apprehension of God.224 Given that Polanus has begun with the one essence of God, and has defined it as he has, the first order essential properties are known propter quid: ‘why because.’ The priority is not temporal, but logical and structural. We know that God is simple because we know that he is one absolutely

220 Aquinas, ST, 1, q.2, a.2, co. See also M. Pickave, “La notion d’a priori chez Descartes et les philosophes médiévaux,” Les Études Philosophiques 75 (2005):434, “les auteurs médiévaux distinguent plusieurs manières selon lesquelles quelque chose peut être antérieur ou postérieur – prior vel posterior – ; ce faisant, ils s’inspirent des textes décisifs d’Aristote: ainsi du chapitre XII des Catégories, du chapitre XI du livre V de la Métaphysique et du début des Analytiques postérieurs et de la Physique avec la célèbre distinction entre l’antérieur selon la nature et l’antérieur pour nous ; mais, comme expression consacrée, a priori est, cependant, toujours appliquée à la démonstration.” 221 Ockham, Summa logicae, pars III–2, cap. XVII in Opera philosophica, I, ed. Ph. Boehner et al. (New York: The Franciscan Institute, 1974). 222 Pickave, “La notion d’a priori chez Descartes et les philosophes médiévaux.” 436 “puisque les prémisses expliquent la raison pour laquelle la chose est comme il est affirmé dans la conclusion.” 223 Pickave, “La notion,” 436, “Elle sait seulement que c’est ainsi (quia ita est), et non pas pourquoi (propter quid ita est).” 224 In arguing that the first order essential properties are known a priori is not to suggest that Polanus believes they have any cause outside of God himself. Polanus has argues that God’s essential properties are identical with his essence. See, particularly, Polanus, Syntagma, 903D, “Essentiales proprietates Dei non sunt posteriores essentiam Dei: quia reipsa sunt idem.”

The Essence of God

and of himself. Similarly, we know that God is perfect, infinite, and immutable because we know both his absolute and of himself unity and his simplicity. In other words: • We know that a being that is one absolutely and of himself must be simple, perfect, infinite, and immutable. • God is one absolutely and of himself. • Consequently, God is simple, perfect, infinite, and immutable. Thus, the cause of God’s first order attributes is God’s own essence; the first order attributes do not cause the essence of God.225 Second order, communicable properties are a posteriori because we see their effects in the world that God has created. Here, we argue from the previously known effects back to a previously unknown cause. We know ‘that’ God is living, immortal, blessed, and glorious. On the basis of these properties, we argue back to the character of the essence of God. While it is certainly true that a contemplation of God’s first order essential properties would result in the a priori demonstration that God is as he is according to his second order essential properties (i.e., that he is living, wise, just, etc.), it is also true that knowledge of at least some of God’s second order essential properties would precede that contemplation (i.e., that which can be known about God from the things that he has made). Further, a study of Scripture would impart knowledge of the rest of the effects of God’s second order essential properties upon the created order just as the experience of salvation would impart an experiential knowledge of God’s saving activity. The knowledge of these effects would (in all likelihood) precede the knowledge of the character of the essence of God because God demonstrates the character of his essence to his creation through his works. If we take the works of God as the known effects (insofar as they are or can be known), we can argue from these effects back to the cause. This is precisely what Polanus does in some of his arguments for the existence of God: there is a conscience, there must be a creator of that conscience; there is an universal expectation of judgment for sins, there must be one who will judge sins. Therefore, when we see the effects of God’s works in the world, we argue from those effects back to God as the cause. We know that there is the government and sustenance of the created order, therefore we know that God is a loving and just God. We know that there is forgiveness for sins, therefore we know that God is merciful. God is not merciful because he forgives sins; rather, he forgives sins because he is merciful. The known effect (forgiven sins) points back to the (previously) unknown cause.

225 I.e., God is simple, perfect, infinite, and immutable because he is one absolutely and of himself. He is not one absolutely and of himself because he is simple, perfect, infinite, and immutable.

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Rather than discuss these divisions in any detail, however, Polanus simply states them and moves to the discussion of the first order essential properties of God. I will take up the first of these in the next chapter.

4.7

Summary

In this first part of book two of the Syntagma, Polanus has sought to set forth the foundation of his doctrine of God. Yet even this rests upon its own foundation: the distribution of theologia vera – specifically, ectypal theology of the pilgrim along the way. Polanus begins with Christian theology in two parts: what we are to believe concerning God and what works God requires of us. What we are to believe (‘the faith’) is also distributed into two parts: faith concerning God and his church. Faith concerning God is distributed into God’s essence and his operations. God’s essence is comprised of both his attributes and his Persons. God’s attributes are his names and his essential properties. Therefore, Polanus focuses in this portion of the Syntagma upon only half of many of these divisions: God, but not yet his church; God’s essence, but not yet his operations; God’s attributes, but not yet his Persons; but both God’s names and his essential properties, and both the essential properties of the first order and those of the second order. A number of items of particular significance arise in this discussion. First, Polanus describes God in terms of his essential unity and Personal Trinity. While the fullness of Polanus’ discussion of the Trinity is not found until book three of the Syntagma, he will continue to discuss the divine Persons as his discussion of the various essential properties demand it. Thus, from the very outset and throughout the discussion of God’s attributes, Polanus presents a God who is Triune: one according to essence, three according to Person. Second, Polanus is found to be committed to the demonstration of God a posteriori from what is both innate in rational creatures made in the image of God and what is acquired by an examination of the world God has made. In this, Polanus goes beyond Thomas’ five ways, and is almost identical to the formulation of Ursinus. The third item of significance is Polanus’ brief but important discussion of the sort of distinctions he will be making throughout his discussion of the essential properties of God. Rather than by distinctio realis (which would posit more than one ‘thing’ in God), he distinguishes between essential properties by a distinctio ratione, that is, distinctions made on the basis of our mode of understanding. Specifically, Polanus appears to be using in fact the distinctio rationis ratiocinatae – distinctions made by reason of analysis that have their foundation in the thing being examined.

Chapter Five: The First Order Essential Properties of God

5.1

Introduction

The previous chapter discussed the broad foundation of Polanus’ doctrine of God – his understanding of the essence and attributes of God. With the discussion of God’s essence, Polanus has sought to answer the question: what is God (quid sit Deus)? With his account of God’s attributes, he shifts in order to answer the question: what is God like (qualis sit Deus)? One aspect of his answer to that question was set forth in the divine names. The other aspect is found in his doctrine of the essential properties of God which are either of the first and the second order – a distinction introduced in the last chapter. This chapter is focused upon God’s essential properties of the first order. These first order essential properties can be described as those which are incommunicable and understood a priori (i.e., for Polanus, once you acknowledge that God exists, he must have these first order properties). Polanus considers six essential properties: simplicitas and perfectio; infinitas and immutabilitas; and aeternitas and immensitas (as subcategories of God’s infinitas). I begin with a survey of the early Reformed orthodox discussion of the properties that Polanus designates ‘first order.’ This will include both the major concepts used and issues raised with these properties and a discussion of the structure and organization of these properties. Next, I consider Polanus’ account of these first order essential properties as he discusses them in the Syntagma. Finally, I consider the whole of Polanus’ discussion in light of the major questions this thesis seeks to answer.

5.2

The State of First Order Essential Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

My consideration of the various discussions relative to the first order essential properties of God in the period of early Reformed orthodoxy involves two primary aspects: the enumeration and organization of the various properties of the first order and the specific issues or concerns that are commonly associated with these properties. My goal is not to be exhaustive, but rather to provide an orientating description of early Reformed orthodoxy up to and including Polanus. In terms of enumeration, the early Reformed orthodox theologians with whom I am comparing Polanus demonstrate broad commonality and continuity. Ursinus discusses God as being spiritual, intelligent, eternal, essentially other, incompre-

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hensible, perfect, and immutable.1 Further, he places God’s omnipotence after his immutability – serving as a kind of ‘bridge attribute’ to the communicable attributes which follow.2 Similarly, Zanchi covers simplicity, eternity, immutability, life, immensity, perfection, and blessedness in chapters two through eight of book two of De Natura Dei.3 Bucanus defines God in terms of a variety of properties, the first among them indicative of a distinction between communicable and incommunicable attributes: God is spiritual, intelligent, simple, incomprehensible, immutable, and omnipotent.4 In his discussion of the two modes of categorizing God’s essential attributes, Bucanus lists simplicity, immutability, eternality, and immensity as those attributes paradigmatic of the incommunicable attributes.5 Similarly, Daneau describes God in terms of a variety of first order attributes: simplicity, perfection, infinity, ubiquity, immutability, eternality, and unity.6 While Daneau does indicate the existence of a division of properties between absolute and relative attributes, his actual discussion of the various properties does not reflect this division: he discusses eternality, immortality, and immutability as the first three properties; invisibility, incomparability, and infinity as the last three (i.e., properties thirteen through fifteen); and God’s incomprehensibility in the middle of the whole discussion as the eighth property.7 Daneau therefore intersperses these incommunicable and absolute attributes in and around the communicable and relative attributes. Keckermann speaks of the division between absolute and relative attributes, placing immutability and infinity among the former.8 Similarly, Trelcatius, Jr., differentiates between essential and relative attributes, but also describes the division in terms Polanus also uses: a priori and a posteriori.9 He includes in his discussion of the a priori attributes the positive attribute of simplicity and the negative attributes of infinity and immutability.10 Finally, Perkins distinguishes between attributes that relate to God’s nature and those that relate to the life of God.11 Those that relate to his nature are categorized broadly as divine perfection, which is in turn divided

1 Ursinus, Loci theologici, 469–478. 2 As noted in the previous chapter’s discussion, Ursinus does not indicate a division between first order and second order attributes (by that or any other designation). 3 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 76–195. 4 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 3. 5 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 6. 6 Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 14a. Daneau adds goodness after perfection, a property that is perhaps more appropriately part of the second order. 7 Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 14b–19a. 8 Keckermann, Systema, 89. 9 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 40 and 49. 10 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 48, 49. Trelcatius, Jr., includes eternity in his discussion of God’s immutability. 11 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 7.

The State of First Order Essential Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

into simplicity and infinity. Perkins further distributes simplicity into immutability and spirituality and infinity into eternity and greatness. Thus, while these early Reformed orthodox theologians do not use the same division of properties – indeed, some do not use any divisions – they generally include the same attributes that Polanus discusses under the essential properties of the first order. Further, even when a theologian does not include an attribute widely discussed by the others he tends to include comparable attributes that would suggest a unity of concepts, if not of names. Thus, Ursinus does not list simplicity as a separate attribute of God, but he does speak of God’s spirituality (i.e., incorporeality) and immutability.12 While these two attributes are distinguishable from God’s simplicity, they are part of the general argument that God is without composition or movement from potential to act. Apart from the enumeration of attributes, these early Reformed orthodox theologians also demonstrate commonality in the issues they sought to address by these attributes. Three commonalities emerge from a consultation of their respective works. First, a relative paucity of discussion of these attributes is, in most cases, seen. Apart from Zanchi, none of these early Reformed orthodox theologians go into as much depth on any of these first order essential properties of God as does Polanus. Second, the discussions that they do have are marked by seeking to understand the logical implications of Scripture. As such, the issues they discuss can be seen to derive from their exegesis of the text of Scripture. For instance, how are we to understand the texts which declare that God does not change in light of the texts which describe God’s repentance from some particular act or decision? Is God immutable or can he, in fact, change? At least a part of their discussions involves seeking to understand which texts are to be understood as speaking properly and literally and which are to be understood as speaking improperly and metaphorically. Even with regard to divine simplicity, Perkins, for example, seeks to demonstrate the doctrine with respect to the interaction between John 5:26, John 14:6, and 1 John 1:7.13 Third, these authors also demonstrate the various ways these properties are connected to one another – and, indeed, are often derived from one another.14 In this way, the notion of immutability in shown to be intricately involved with simplicity,

12 Ursinus, Loci theologici, 469 and 479. 13 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11b. 14 See Muller, PRRD, 3:271, “Simplicity, spirituality, and invisibility, moreover, stand together in many of the Reformed orthodox systems as a triad of related attributes – so related, indeed, that they imply each other, and at times, demand virtually the same definition.” Although Muller is referring specifically to those three attributes (simplicity, spirituality, and invisibility), the notion holds more generally to the properties of the first order.

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infinity, eternity, and perfection.15 In the same way, simplicity can be seen as a conclusion drawn from God’s independence, unity, and perfection.16 Furthermore, the notion that infinity relates to quantity (magnitude), space (immensity or omnipresence), and time (eternality) is very common.17 Rather than demonstrate confusion as to the propriety of any of these properties, these observations indicate a more basic reality about the nature of God’s essential properties (something Polanus himself notes): God is his attributes.

5.3

The Structure of Polanus’ Discussion

In the Syntagma, Polanus presents these first order essential properties of God in two pairs of two properties: simplicitas and perfectio, infinitas and immutabilitas. Although they are paired in this way, Polanus does not make explicit the connection or relation between simplicity and perfection in a way that is distinct from infinity and immutability. That is, there is no mention in the text as to why these four and not some other grouping, or why they are grouped and ordered as they are. It may be that Polanus pairs these four more according to his Ramist organizational structure (i.e., seeking to place things in pairs of two) rather than any specific relation or connection. As I will seek to demonstrate below, it seems most likely that the connection between the attributes of the first order is not found in this initial pairing, but in how the later three are implied by and flow from God’s simplicity. This initial pair-of-two-pairs structure exhibits various shifts from the presentation Polanus provides in the 1590 and 1599 editions of the Partitiones. With regard to the 1590 edition, several differences are noted. First, Polanus has no discussion of the divine names and offers no distinction between ‘essential properties’ and ‘attributes.’ Second, Polanus divides the attributes into two categories: those that have a likeness or similitude in what God has created and those that do not.18 The first category of attributes Polanus discusses roughly corresponds to the second order essential properties: “beatitudo, immortalitas, intelligentia, praescientia, memoria, voluntas, bonitas, sanctitas, iustitia, clementia, longanimitas, patientia, constantia, fortitudo, veracitas, fidelitas, etc”.19 The second category of attributes are aeternitas, infinitas, ubiquitas, omnipotentia, and omniscientia.20 While this list demonstrates substantial crossover between this edition of the Partitiones and the Syntagma, there

15 16 17 18 19 20

See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 168. Polanus remarks that immutability can be discerned from all four. See Muller, PRRD, 3:277. See Muller, PRRD, 3:331–362. Polanus, Partitiones (1590), 2. Polanus, Partitiones (1590), 2–3. Polanus, Partitiones (1590), 5–6.

The Structure of Polanus’ Discussion

are two important differences. First, this 1590 edition of the Partitiones does not contain a discussion of divine simplicity or perfection. Second, in the Syntagma, Polanus discusses omnipotentia as a distinction within the category of potentia Dei in chapter 29, and omniscientia as a distinction within the category of sapientia Dei in chapter 18.21 The 1599 edition of the Partitiones demonstrates more similarity with the Syntagma. In that edition, Polanus includes the distinction between the divine names (which he lists) and essential properties (which he divides into essential properties of a first and a second order) within the concept of divine attributes.22 The essential properties of the first order are paired differently (simplicity with infinity and perfection with immutability).23 Thus, a discussion of simplicity and perfection is included in the 1599 edition, divine ubiquity is included in the discussion of immensity as one part of God’s infinity, and God’s omnipotence and omniscience are no longer designated as first order essential properties.24 Overall, the 1599 edition of the Partitiones and the Syntagma are practically identical in structure. The primary difference is in the amount of detail added to the various loci in the Syntagma. It is possible to at least partly account for the shift from the 1590 edition of the Partitiones to the 1599 edition and then to the Syntagma in terms of a shift from the more specific designation of attributes that are either communicable or incommunicable (in the 1590 Partitiones) to essential properties in two orders, as was discussed above in Chapter Four.25 Although Polanus does utilize the terms communicable and incommunicable in the Syntagma, he also introduces a priori and a posteriori as important differences between the two classes of God’s essential properties. This shift also demonstrates a maturation in his understanding of communicable attributes. To be sure, omnipotentia is not communicable, but potentia is (likewise, omniscientia and scientia). Furthermore, very little of the subject matter under discussion in this chapter can be found in the earlier edition of the Partitiones. Of the four essential properties of God of the first order, only infinity and its two subdivisions of eternity and immensity find correspondence in the earlier work. Further, as will be shown below, the whole of the first order essential properties relies upon and flows from the simplicity of God – an attribute/essential property that did not even appear in that earliest doctrinal work. Therefore, Polanus demonstrates

21 Also note the change from the language of intelligentia/scientia to sapientia in the Partitiones and Syntagma, respectively. This difference will be discussed further below in Chapter 7. 22 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 3. 23 Polanus, Partitiones (1590), 3. 24 See Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 7 (for divine omniscience as part of the discussion of divine wisdom) and 19 (for divine omnipotence as part of the discussion of divine power). 25 See Chapter 4.3.4 above.

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an overall increase in the sophistication of his structure of the attributes/essential properties of God from the 1590 edition of the Partitiones to the 1599 edition and then to the Syntagma. Another consideration beyond the source of the change between the Partitiones and the Syntagma is the question of the broader provenance of Polanus’ discussion of simplicity. This doctrine was neither a new discovery of Polanus nor of the Reformed Scholastics. Indeed, Muller states that “from Irenaeus to the era of Protestant orthodoxy, the fundamental assumption was merely that God, as ultimate Spirit is not a compounded or composite being.”26 Thus, Irenaeus states in his treatise, Against Heresies: [God] is simple, uncompounded Being, without diverse members, and altogether like, and equal to Himself, since He is wholly understanding, and wholly Spirit, and wholly thought, and wholly intelligence, and wholly reason, and wholly hearing, and wholly seeing, and wholly light, and the whole source of all that is good – even as the religious and the pious are wont to speak concerning God.27

In this, Irenaeus shows the correspondence between ‘simple’ and ‘uncompounded’ such that there is no compositeness or diversity within God. Second, Irenaeus connects the identity of various attributes with one another. God is “wholly thought” but is also ‘wholly intelligence,’ that is, the thought which is identical with his whole being is also identical to his intelligence which is also identical with his whole being. Similarly, Augustine writes: For to him it is not one thing to be, and another to live, as though he could be not living; nor is it to Him one thing to live, and another thing to understand, as though He could live, not understanding; nor is it to Him one thing to understand, another thing to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed.28

26 Muller, PRRD, 3:276. 27 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, Book 2, in Ante-Nicene Fathers, Vol. 1: The Apostolic Fathers with Justin Martyr and Irenaeus, (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1885), 374. See also Irenaeus, Adversus haereticos in PL 2, (Paris: Migne, 1844). 28 Saint Augustine, The City of God, trans. Marcus Dods (New York: Random House, 1950), 251. See also Aurelius Augustinus, De Civitate Dei, libri XXII, 291, “quia non aliud illi est esse, aliud vivere, quasi possit esse non vivens; nec aliud illi est vivere, aliud intellegere, quasi possit vivere non intellegens; nec aliud illi est intellegere, aliud beatum esse, quasi possit intellegere non beatus; sed quod est illi vivere, intellegere, beatum esse, hoc est illi esse.”

The Structure of Polanus’ Discussion

There is in this declaration an emphasis on the identity of the attributes of God with God himself. He is not the compound assimilation of various attributes – living, understanding, blessed – but is these things in and of himself. The doctrine of divine simplicity continues to be of great importance during the medieval Scholastic period. This continues in the Monologion, where Anselm states, “the supreme nature is simple: thus all the things which can be said of its essence are simply one and the same thing in it.”29 The doctrine is even further refined and given increased depth in the work of Thomas Aquinas. In question three of pars prima of the Summa Theologica, Thomas considers the question of the simplicity of God under eight broad articles.30 These articles declare divine simplicity by denying the following: 1. God is not composed of corporeal parts; 2. God is not composed of matter and form; 3. God’s essence is not different from God; 4. God’s essence is not different from his existence; 5. God is not contained in a genus; 6. There are no accidental qualities in God; 7. That God creates man in his image (who are by nature composite beings) does not imply that God is also complex; 8. That God creates does not mean that his being commingles with what he has made. Throughout the discussion of these articles, Thomas repeatedly refers to the distinction between act and potency – to be composed of parts suggests a prior potentiality to be so composed, matter is by nature potentiality, existence is to essence as actuality is to potentiality, subjects are to accidents as potentiality is to actuality, etc. Because there is no potentiality in God – as he is actus purus – compositeness cannot be attributed to God. Similarly, Thomas asserts that God does not have any of his attributes because he participates in them: as though he merely participated in existence, or as matter participates in form. For, as Thomas says, “he is therefore of his essence a form; and not composed of matter and form.”31 Nor can his essence be different from himself, “because God is not composed of matter and form, as is

29 Anselm, “Monologion,” in Anselm of Canterbury: The Major Works, trans. by Simon Harrison, eds. Briand Davies and G. R. Evans (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 31. See also Anselm, Monologium, 31, “Quod ita sit simplex, ut omnia quae de eius essentia dici possum, unum idemque in illa sint...” 30 Aquinas, S.Th., Ia, q. 3. 31 Aquinas, S.Th., Ia, q. 3, a. 2, co, “Est igitur per essentiam suam forma; et non compositus ex materia et forma.”

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exhibited, it is necessary that God be his own Godhead, his own life, and whatever else is likewise predicated of him.”32 Muller echoes this tracing out of the lineage of the doctrine of divine simplicity and adds that the Reformers demonstrate little difference from their patristic and medieval forerunners.33 Even Calvin, though he is said to have broken with the overly rationalistic medieval Scholastics, retains the language of simplicity – even if he does not expand upon it to any great detail.34 Muller also points out the importance for the Reformed Scholastics of the doctrine of divine simplicity in defending the doctrine of the Trinity, particularly against opponents of simplicity, such as Vorstius, the Socinians, and certain Remonstrants.35 By way of example of these early Reformed orthodox theologians, Zanchi places simplicity at the head of the attributes of God that he details in De Natura Dei.36 Likewise, Perkins defines simplicity as “that by which hee is voide of all Logicall relation in arguments.”37 Thus, God does not have in himself adjunct or subject. Perkins goes on to state: Hence, it is manifest that to have Life and to be Life: to be in Light and to be Light, in God are all one. Neither is God subject to generality, or specialty: whole, or parts; matter, or that which is made of matter; for so there should bee in God divers things, and one more perfect than another.”38

Any such subjection would be anathema to the most simple being. Keckermann provides an example of one who does not break simplicity out as a separate attribute but includes the notion both implicitly and explicitly throughout his discussion of God’s attributes. First, Keckermann defines the essence of God as being purus actus without any admixture of potentiality.39 As has been shown both in the medieval Scholastics and in Polanus, the pure actuality of God is integral to his simplicity. Second, Keckermann later describes God as “simplicissima et mera

32 Aquinas, S.Th., Ia, q. 3, a. 3, co, “Et sic, cum Deus non sit compositus ex materia et forma, ut ostensum est, opertet quod Deus sit sua deitas, sua vita, et quidquid aliud sic de Deo praedicatur.” 33 Muller, PRRD, 3:273. 34 John Calvin, Institutio christianae religionis, in Calvini Opera quae supersunt omnia, Vol. 2, Corpus Reformatorum XXX, G. Baum, E. Cunitz, and E. Reuss. Brunswick, eds. (Braunschweig: C. A. Schwetschke, 1864), I.xiii.20. 35 Muller, PRRD, 3:275. 36 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 76. 37 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11b. See also Perkins Armilla Aurea, 6. 38 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11b. See also Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 6. 39 Keckermann, Systema, 8.

The Simplicity of God

essentia.”40 While this is not as clear as what is found in Zanchi or Perkins, the description of God as actus purus demonstrates the fundamental importance of this concept to a broader understanding of God’s essential properties. This brings us to the doctrine of divine simplicity as expounded by Polanus. It should be noted, even before turning to that portion of the Syntagma, that simplicity as an essential property of God has already been adumbrated by Polanus’ discussion of essential properties in general. In the expansion of his definition of the essence of God, Polanus affirmed that God’s existence and essence are identical; that God is not one by aggregation, consensus, or genus; and that God is one in number even as he is three in persons.41 Further, Polanus asserts the simplicity of God in the axioms related to the essential properties in general: axioma 2 – that God is simple; axioma 4 – the identity of the essential properties with one another; axioma 5 – the inseparability of the essential properties from one another; axioma 6 – that God is most simple act; axioma 9 – that God has no accidental qualities; axioma 10 – that God is most pure and most simple act.42 Simplicity is therefore shown to be a central defining feature of his theology of the Doctrine of God.

5.4

The Simplicity of God

Polanus organizes his chapter on simplicity according to the following portions: a definition of the essential property; four logical considerations based upon the definition; eleven demonstrations that God is simple; and a consideration of three objections to the doctrine. Polanus defines simplicity as “the essential property of God whereby the divine essence is signified as being utterly individual and absolute, lacking composition, division, multiplication, or accidents, and hence incorporeal, spiritual, and invisible.”43 As will be the case with many of the definitions of the various essential properties of God that follow, the definition that Polanus gives here is rather complex and dense. Polanus therefore appends four inferences (consectaria) that flow (fluunt) from this definition.44

40 41 42 43

Keckermann, Systema, 91. See above, Chapter 4.2.3. See above, Chapter 4.2.8. Polanus, Syntagma, 905C, “Simplicitas Dei, est essentialis Dei proprietas, per quam essentia illa divina prorsus individua et absoluta, expers compositionis, divisionis, multiplicationis et accidentium, atque adeo incoporea, spiritualis, invisibilis esse significatur.” 44 These consectaria are similar in effect and in form to the axiomata that are encountered in Polanus’ discussion of the divine essence and names, as well as in many of the essential properties of God of both the first and second order.

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The first inference that Polanus draws forth from his definition is that there is nothing in God that is not essential.45 As his essence is whole and complete, God has no essential accidents, passions, or parts. By denying that God has any accidents, Polanus is stating that there is nothing in God that can change and God still be God (i.e., whether a desk is made from wood or metal, it remains a desk; the material from which it is made is said to be ‘accidental’). In denying passions, Polanus is not saying that God does not feel strongly about the sins of his people, but rather that the affections God has and the actions God does are never elicited from outside his essence. That is, they extend outwardly in his actions but the source of all his acts and affections are in himself alone. In denying parts, Polanus is indicating that the various attributes or properties that he is going to be discussing are not things that ‘make up’ God. That is, God is not composed of wisdom and will as if these were two parts of a whole. While we by our own mode of understanding distinguish between God’s wisdom and his will, they are not isolated portions of the essence of God. Second, Polanus indicates that there is nothing potential or contingent in God: all that is in God is eternal and infinite act.46 In speaking of potential, Polanus is referring to something that is not but could be (i.e., a man who is sitting has the potential to stand up). Contingent refers to something that is but could be otherwise (i.e., a man who sits could also be standing). In particular, contingent is contrasted with necessity. Something that is necessary is and cannot be otherwise. On this basis, Polanus declares that everything in the divine essence is necessary. In other words, God necessarily is what he is. In the third inference, Polanus indicates that those things that are predicated of God should be understood essentially, rather than referring to accidents of the divine nature.47 Thus, ‘good’ and ‘just’ are not accidents of his essential nature but are identical with God’s essence itself. By this inference, if God were neither good nor just he would cease to be God. The final inference is that some things are predicated of God both abstractly and concretely: “God is called goodness, life, wisdom, justice; he is also said to be good, living, wise and just.”48 Those things that are said abstractly flow from God’s indivisible and essential perfection. Therefore, Polanus indicates that God is not Being (Ens) because he participates in the quality of being, but because he is per se and most perfectly Being. In speaking of ‘participation’ Polanus is indicating that existence is not something that is outside of, prior to, or greater than God himself. Similarly, God is spoken of in concrete terms so that we may know the truth of his existence: that he “is in fact good, living, 45 46 47 48

Polanus, Syntagma, 905D. Polanus, Syntagma, 905D. Polanus, Syntagma, 905E. Polanus, Syntagma, 906A, “… Deus vocatur bonitas, vita, sapientia, iustitia; dicitur etiam bonus, vivus, sapiens, iustus.”

The Simplicity of God

wise, and just, and he works good things, things that are in accordance to his living and wise essence, and things that are just.”49 For Polanus, this would not be possible unless these things were suitable to an essence which subsists of itself. After these four inferences, Polanus discusses eleven demonstrations that give greater clarity to his definition, by which it is proven (liquet) that God’s essence is simple.50 These demonstrations can be analyzed according to three broad categories: demonstrations drawn from the testimony of Scripture, demonstrations that show the connection between divine simplicity and other essential properties, and various logical demonstrations. In the first category, Polanus argues that Scripture testifies to God’s simplicity. In the first demonstration, he points to the divine name Jehova.51 By this self-revelation, God signifies that he is a se and per se. Thus, God has his various essential properties (such as wisdom, goodness, and justice) from himself.52 In this, Polanus is linking this discussion of God’s simplicity not only to his prior discussion of the names of God (and in that way, encouraging the reader to refer to that prior section of the Syntagma), but is also grounding the simplicity of God in revelation itself. Second, God is demonstrated to be simple “because he is not only living, enlightened, and filled with love, but he is also life, light and love itself.”53 God is not composed (constat) of life, light, and love. Rather, God is these things in and of himself. Third, John 4:24 demonstrates that God is simple in that his essence is wholly spirit and is therefore noncorporeal.54 It should be noted that while I have placed these first three demonstrations under the category of ‘Scriptural,’ Deal in particular argues that the whole of Polanus’ argument is based upon Aristotelian thought rather than Scripture.55 As Deal states, “these attributes in philosophical garb may develop from contemplation about the Divine Name (Chapter vi), yet supporting evidence for a discussion of simplicity… is very limited.”56 According to Deal, the only biblical basis Polanus presents for his doctrine of simplicity is John 4:24. While it is true that this is the only explicit reference to a particular text of Scripture, Deal passes over the notion that these first three demonstrations are the result of a broad reading of Scripture (i.e., they are 49 Polanus, Syntagma, 906B, “… reipsa bonum, viventem, sapientem, justum esse, et operari bona, essentiae viventi et sapienti consentanea, justa…” 50 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 141–143, for another discussion of these arguments. 51 Note that Polanus does not here specifically reference Exodus 3 and the discussion there of the divine name. 52 Polanus, Syntagma, 906C. 53 Polanus, Syntagma, 906C, “Quia non tantum vivens, lucididus, plenus charitate est, sed etiam vita, lux et charitas ipsa....” 54 Polanus, Syntagma, 906D. 55 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 89, “The simplicity of God is supported by Aristotelian philosophy rather than Scripture.” 56 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 89.

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not pulled from philosophical discourse, but from Scripture). That God is ‘Jehovah’ is not derived from Aristotelian logic, but from Scripture. Furthermore, Polanus’ discussion of this name of God earlier in the Syntagma shows that the simplicity of God is demonstrated from Scripture.57 Likewise, the language of vivens and vita, lucidus and lux, and plenus charitate and charitas is chosen because it reflects Scripture, not philosophy. It is therefore at least possible that Polanus considered direct (and potentially voluminous) references to Scripture to be unnecessary to demonstrate these truths.58 When considered through the lens of Polanus’ own context, the lack of explicit references to Scripture is not necessarily a weakness in the demonstrations of God’s simplicity but is rather emblematic of Polanus’ assumptions about the role of Scripture as a whole for his theology. Thus, these first two more or less implicit references, together with the third explicit reference to John 4:24, provide ample evidence that Polanus is in fact seeking to demonstrate this doctrine upon the basis of the teaching of Scripture, rather than upon reason and logic. Therefore, for Polanus, the ‘garb’ of simplicity is indeed the rich tapestry of God’s word. In the next category of demonstrations, Polanus links God’s simplicity to the other first order essential properties. These can be termed the ‘interconnectedness’ of these various essential properties. First, God is demonstrated to be simple in that the more perfect a being is, the further they are from division or non-being. Polanus states that division is the path to non-being. As God is most perfect, he must therefore also be most simple.59 Second, Polanus indicates that God is demonstrated to be simple in that he is immutable and eternal. If God were composite, he would be mutable in that the parts make up the whole could be separated.60 If God were composite, he could not be eternal because the parts of him would exist prior to their coming together to form him.61 It is important to note that Polanus’ arguments that God’s simplicity is demonstrated by his immutability and eternity appear to be backward. Purely from the structure of his discussion, Polanus argues that God’s eternity and immutability is

57 See below, Chapter 4.2.7. 58 I.e., it would not be more true that God is light by referencing any or all of the passages that indicate that he is. 59 Polanus, Syntagma, 907A. 60 Polanus, Syntagma, 907A. Polanus cites Tertullian, but the quote is actually from Novatian, De Trinitate, VI.9, “Quod enim immortale est, quicquid est, illud ipsum unum et simplex et semper est.” See Smith, The Oneness and Simplicity of God, 83. Per E. Dekkers, Clavis Patrum Latinorum, Corpus Christianorum Clavis Patrum Latinorum (Turnhout, BE: Brepols Publishing, 1995), 73, what Polanus quotes as being from Tertullian is actually from Novatian but was included in early editions of the works of Tertullian. 61 Polanus, Syntagma, 907B.

The Simplicity of God

grounded in his simplicity, not that immutability and eternity demonstrate God’s simplicity. Notice the structure: (1) God is proven (liquet) to be simple “because he is immutable.”62 (2) “But if God were composite, then he would be mutable.”63 Note that Polanus does not say, “if God is immutable, he must be simple,” but in fact concludes the opposite: “if God is not-simple, he is not-immutable.” Polanus therefore argues that it is the non-composite nature of God (i.e., his simplicity) that grounds his immutability, rather than showing how God’s immutability (or eternality) demonstrates his simplicity. The third and final category of demonstrations are those in which Polanus primarily relies upon logical arguments.64 The first of these is that the simplicity of God is demonstrated “because he is pure act.”65 In himself, God is only pure act or pure actuality.66 As Muller defines it, “actus or actuality designates that which exists or that which is actualized, as distinct from potential, that which can exist or has potential for existence.”67 By describing God as actus purus or actus purissimus, God is said to be the most fully actualized being, the only being with no potential or incomplete actualization. This aspect of God’s simplicity is tied to his perfection: as he is not composed of act and potency, but is instead pure act, God is the most perfect being. In particular, this means that God is not susceptible to further or additional actualization. If he were subject to further actualization, there would have to be something his essence is yet to be or become. Note that this is different than speaking of the Incarnation, in which Christ takes a human nature: the divine nature of Christ is not altered or changed in that event. Thus, even with the Incarnation, God remains fully actualized in his essence. Were God able to be further actualized, some passive potentiality would be the root of that susceptibility for change in his being. He is therefore not only simple and perfect but also immutable. This does not mean that God is without any capacity to interact with his creation ad extra, as Dolezal states, “[God] unchangingly wills change in his ad extra dealings with creatures without 62 Polanus, Syntagma, 907A, “Quia est immutablilis.” 63 Polanus, Syntagma, 907A, “At si esset compositus, mutabilis esset.” 64 These are demonstrations four through six, ten, and eleven. I have reordered them for this discussion, and the ordinals are mine rather than Polanus’. Using his ordinals, my list is 4, 6, 5, 11, and 10. 65 Polanus, Syntagma, 906D, “Quia est actus purissimus,” Only demonstration ten, below, is accompanied by any extensive discussion. This demonstration stands alone, however, as the only one to not have any further elaboration such as “hoc est,” or “id est.” 66 See also Polanus, Syntagma, 904B. In the tenth axioma Polanus gives regarding the Essential Properties of God generally, he states, “God is most pure and simple act” (Deus actus purissimus est et simplicissimus). See above, Chapter 3.2.8. 67 Muller, “actus,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 20.

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willing or experiencing a corresponding change of agency in His own intrinsic actuality.”68 God therefore has the capacity to interact with his creatures – even the contingent actions of his creatures – without a necessary change within himself, he has ordained whatever changes are to occur in how he manifests himself to his creation without any actual change of being. In the second logical argument, Polanus indicates that God is simple because he is one complete entity and is therefore without any parts.69 In support of this, Polanus provides a quote from Novatian’s De Trinitate: “He is himself ‘all eyes’ because he sees all, and ‘all ears’ because he hears all, and ‘all hands’ because he works all things, and ‘all feet’ because he is totally everywhere. For what is simple does not have in itself difference from itself.”70 If God were made up of parts they would at some prior point have had to ‘come together’ into the one whole that is God. In the third demonstration, Polanus states that God is simple because he is the first being.71 According to Polanus, the greater a being is, the more simple he must be as there would be no one greater to create or compose him. Fourth, God is demonstrated to be simple because “he does not possess diversity or undergo composition in himself, in his persons, or in his works.”72 There is no composition in God in himself, for his esse is identical with his essentia.73 Further, there is no composition in the divine persons, for the essentia is precisely the same in each person.74 Finally, there is no composition in the divine operations because his will and his acts are identical (i.e., whatever God wills, that he also does).75 I have reserved the most elaborate of these logical demonstrations for last. Polanus states that God is demonstrated to be simple, “because no mode of composition occurs in God, whether you consider him absolutely, or as he is with other things.”76 68 James Dolezal, All That is in God: Evangelical Theology and the Challenge of Classical Christian Theism (Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2017), 21. Dolezal’s general statement about God’s simplicity applies to Polanus’ discussion. 69 Polanus, Syntagma, 906E. 70 Polanus, Syntagma, 906E, “Ipse totus oculus: quia totus videt: et totus auris, quia totus audit: et totus manus, quia totus operatur: et totus pes, quia totum ubique est. Non enim habet in se diversitatem sui quod est simplex.” The quote is from Novatian, De Trinitate, VI.8 (the first sentence) and 9 (the second sentence). 71 Polanus, Syntagma, 906E. Note the discussion below, Section 5.5, for a discussion of God as first and perfect being. 72 Polanus, Syntagma, 910C, “Quia non habet nec admittit diversitatem aut compositionem nec in se, nec in personis, nec in operationibus.” 73 Polanus, Syntagma, 910C. 74 Polanus, Syntagma, 910D. 75 Polanus, Syntagma, 910D. 76 Polanus, Syntagma, 907C, “Quia nullus compositionis modus in Deum cadit, sive ipsum in se spectes, sive cum rebus aliis.” te Velde, Doctrine of God, 139, lists three possible forms of composition: physical, logical, and metaphysical.

The Simplicity of God

Polanus cites seven modes of composition that can be observed.77 First, something may be composite by being made up of parts limited by quantity. Polanus states that God is not made up of parts at all, for he is without a body and there is nothing corporeal in him at all.78 Second, something may be composite by the union of matter and form, as with a person. Here Polanus states that God is pure form and is therefore without any material.79 Polanus also points out that everything composed of matter and form is perfect or good by participation, as matter participates in form. In contrast, God is perfect and good according to his essence, and not by participation.80 Further, everything composed of matter and form has some degree of passive potential. As God has no passive potential, Polanus concludes that he is therefore one substance.81 Third, something may be composite by being under a genus. Polanus indicates that this cannot apply to God since God is not under any type or genus in that he is the first and supreme being.82 Fourth, something may be composed of subject and accident.83 Here Polanus reaffirms that because God is himself not composite, no accidents occur in God and there is nothing in God that is not of himself. Fifth, something may be composite with both act and potential. But as Polanus will go on to demonstrate in a later chapter of the Syntagma, God is immutable and so is therefore not composed of act and potential.84 God is pure act or actuality and has no potential or capacity for, as Polanus states, “potential being is imperfect being.”85 Sixth, something is composite if anything is added to its nature. Again, Polanus states that God is not composed in this way for there is nothing that is added to his nature.86 Thus, God is not only “living” but also “life itself.” Finally, something is composite by a difference in esse and essentia. Polanus again refers to what he has already demonstrated: God is his own nature or essence. Not only this, but he is also his own being and existence. From all of this, it is demonstrated that: “the existence of God is the very essence of God.”87 At this point, Polanus turns to consider three objections to the simplicity of God. The first objection is: “God is threefold; consequently, he is not entirely simple.”88 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 140; and McGraw, Reformed Scholasticism, 110. Polanus, Syntagma, 907E. Polanus, Syntagma, 907E. Polanus, Syntagma, 908B. Polanus, Syntagma, 908B. Polanus, Syntagma, 908B. See also Chapter 4.2.3, above. Polanus, Syntagma, 908C. Polanus, Syntagma, 908C. Polanus, Syntagma, 908D, “... nam ens potentia est imperfectum ens.” Polanus, Syntagma, 909B. Polanus, Syntagma, 909C, “Esse Dei est ipsa Essentia Dei.” Polanus, Syntagma, 911A, “Deus est trinus: Ergo non est simplicissimus.”

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Polanus responds that it is not universally true that whatever is trinus is not simple. To be sure, that which is threefold by a composition of parts is not simple. God, however, is threefold by the coexistence of the divine Persons as distinct modes of subsistence. These three modes of subsistence are not added together to make up the one God but are themselves personal distinctions within the one God. Thus, per te Velde, “according to the Reformed orthodox, the doctrine of simplicity is perfectly consistent with a correct doctrine of the Trinity. Indeed, it is precisely the incorrect version of the trinitarian dogma that conflicts with the proper concept of divine simplicity.”89 The second objection is: “Something which consists of subject and attributes is not simple; God consists of subject and attributes; for we say about him that he is omnipotent, wise and just, and likewise that he has life in himself (John 5:26). Consequently, God is not simple.”90 In other words, according to this objection, when Scripture says that God is wise, there is a distinction between God as subject and wise as an attribute. Polanus marshals three responses to this objection. The first is that the major proposition is only true if subject and attribute are aliud et aliud and therefore different from each other.91 Subject and attribute are the same thing in God. Second, these properties attributed to God are not different form his essence but are the same with them. Third, such attributes as omnipotence and wisdom are not accidents of God, or adjuncts beyond his essence, but are the same as his essence.92 Although Polanus does not indicate the source of these objections, the specific language that he uses (aliud et aliud) appears in the doctrinal formulations of the Remonstrant Conrad Vorstius (1569–1622).93 Vorstius was one of several of Polanus’ contemporaries who denied the full simplicity of God: according to te Velde, the charges against Vorstius were, “quite generally that his teachings run against not only some particular points but against the main articles of the Christian Religion.”94 In 1606 Vorstius published a collection of his disputations on the doc-

89 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 149. 90 Polanus, Syntagma, 911D, “Qui subjecto et attributis constat, is non est simplex: Deus subjecto et attributis constat: Nam dicitur de eo, quod sit omnipotens, sapiens, iustus: item quod vitam habeat in semet ipso, Joh. 5.26. Ergo Deus non est simplex.” 91 Polanus, Syntagma, 911D. 92 Polanus, Syntagma, 912B. 93 On Vorstius, see Dolf te Velde, “Eloquent Silence”; and “Collateral Damage? The Condemnation of Conrad Vorstius by the Synod of Dordrecht (1619)” in More Than Luther: The Reformation and the Rise of Pluralism in Europe, Karla Boersma and Herman J. Selderhuis, eds. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019), 321–338. 94 Te Velde, “Collateral Damage?” 3. See also Muller, PRRD, 3:275 and 283.

The Simplicity of God

trine of God.95 Four years later, in 1610, Vorstius added notes to those disputations. In one of the notes, attached to disputation III (De Natura Dei in Genere), Vorstius wrote that Scripture indicates “that one thing and another thing (aliud et aliud) are in God, namely, subject and accident, or the agent and the action.”96 Given the date of the publication of this second edition with the additional notes (i.e. within a year after the publication of the first book of the Syntagama), Polanus is not specifically interacting with Vorstius. The idea that Vorstius brings to further light, however, was certainly a live issue prior to the publication of the additional notes. The third and final objection is: “Something visible is not simple. God is visible because he often appeared to the Fathers. Consequently, God is not simple.”97 Polanus responds that God’s essence has not been seen, neither has he been seen by a physical eye, but rather is seen mentally – that is, in the visio Dei.98 In other words, this objection results from equivocating with the word ‘appear.’ It therefore remains true that God is simple in his being. With this objection, Polanus finishes his discussion of divine simplicity. It is at this point important, however, to consider both a criticism that Barth has with Polanus’ doctrine of divine simplicity and Reeling Brouwer’s extended discussion of Barth’s interaction with Polanus on this point. According to Barth, theological methodologies like the one that Polanus uses tend toward a presentation of God’s essence that is abstracted from (and therefore separable from) the three persons of the Trinity: The fact that the life of God was identified with the notion of pure being, the fact that the idea of God was not determined by the doctrine of the Trinity, but that the latter was shaped by a general conception of God (that of ancient Stoicism and Neo-Platonism), was now avenged at the most sensitive spot. Starting from the generalised notion of God, the idea of divine simplicity was necessarily exalted to the all-controlling principle, the idol, which, devouring everything concrete, stands behind all these formulae. As a result it was impossible to make proper use of what Augustine had so happily indicated with his phrase multiplex simplicitas or simplex multiplicitas: the triumphant unity in God of the Lord with glory and of glory with the Lord. From this starting point we can speak

95 Vorstius, Tractatus theologicus de Deo, sive de natura et attributis Dei (Steinfurt: Theophilus Caesar, 1606). 96 Vorstius, Tractatus theologicus de Deo, sive de natura et attributis Dei (Steinfurt: Theophilus Caesar, 1610), 210, “Accedunt varia Scripturae testimonia, quibus asseritur aliud et aliud in Deo esse, videlicet subjectum et accidens, sive agens et actionem.” 97 Polanus, Syntagma, 912E, “Qui est visibilis, is non est simplex: Deus visibilis, quia saepe apparuit Patribus: Ergo non est simplex.” 98 Polanus, Syntagma, 913A. See also Polanus, Syntagma, 52Bff on the Visio Dei as the blessedness of rational creatures.

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only hesitantly about the reality of the divine perfections. On this basis, when we speak of God, we must mean essentially only the simplicity and not the richness, at best the simplicity of the richness, but at bottom only the simplicity. We may try to specify, but in the last resort we can intend and demonstrate only the barrenness of nuda essentia.99

From this it is clear that Barth sees simplicity as an idol (i.e., something that competes with the true God for faith and worship) and a ‘devourer’ of that which is ‘concrete.’ By this comment, however, it is also clear that Barth did not understand simplicity as Polanus (and Reformed scholastics generally) presents it. The point of God’s simplicity is not to deny that there is a ‘richness’ of being in God, but to deny that the richness of being in God are actually distinct things that can be separated from God.100 Thus the simplicity of God comes before these other first order essential properties (and, therefore, before all second order essential properties) not because Polanus intends to render null all that will come after it (i.e., to place at the head of his exposition of the richness of God’s essence something that will only devour all that comes after), but precisely because simplicity acts like guard rails to everything that follows: these are distinctions, but they are not real distinctions (i.e., something that would render God composite, and therefore also mutable and finite and imperfect). Reeling Brouwer sees Barth’s primary point of contention with Polanus (here and elsewhere) is that Barth sees dualism where he should see duality.101 Polanus (and others) present the essence of God alongside the persons of God – rather than setting one reality as prior ontologically than the other. This is seen most clearly with Polanus, who includes God’s triune reality in his answer to the question quid sit Deus? Polanus only turns to the distribution of that definition into attributes (names and essential properties) and persons after he has so defined God in terms of trinity. Reeling Brouwer also sees a failure in Barth to consider and reflect upon the structure of the Syntagma as a whole rather than use it as a storehouse of separable theological positions with which to dialogue.102 If, for instance, Barth had reflected upon Polanus’ use of bifurcation to demonstrate parallel ideas (Faith and Good Works; God and the Church; the Divine Essence and Works; the Divine Attributes and the Trinity; etc.), he might have greater appreciation for the connected nature

99 Barth, CD II/1, 329. 100 See above, Chapter 3.2.8, and Muller, PRRD, 3:278, “Indeed, the entire force of the Reformed scholastic argument is to deny in God only those distinctions that imply composition, namely, real distinctions and, therefore, to point toward the proper distinctions that do subsist among the attributes and between the attributes and the divine essence.” (emphasis original). 101 Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Theology, 41. 102 Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Theology, 37.

The Simplicity of God

of each part of the pair. That is, faith is distinguishable from good works, but not separable, just as God’s attributes are distinguishable from the persons, but not separable, etc. He may also have seen a principle of intensification in the structure of lower order pairs: ... it is questionable whether Barth is correct when he assumes that the more general point of view [i.e., the attributes] must be seen as a framework that arises from sources other than Scripture, which further dictates the more particular point of view [i.e., the Trinity] which follows afterwards. It is quite possible that Barth is speaking too much here on the basis of the presuppositions of later modernity. In scholastic times the method which proceeds from the general to the particular point of view was conceived rather as a way of intensification within one, simple reality.103

By this method, Polanus moves from general to increasingly more specific as he transitions from essence generally to attributes to names and essential properties of the first and second order. These intensifications, however, do not mitigate the fact that the divine persons are conceptually on the same basic level as the attributes. That is, the divine essence consists in the attributes and the persons. Thus, both the attributes and the persons (i.e., the majority of Libri Secundi and all of Libri Tertii) provide the fullness of what God truly is. Finally, it is interesting that the doctrine of simplicity suggests to some a counter to the notion that God is Triune. To suggest, as Barth does, that the notion of simplicity is little more than “speculation about the nature of His being,” is to miss the foundation that the doctrine of simplicity provides for the very doctrine it is set against.104 Muller speaks to this notion when he says, “from the time of the fathers onward, divine simplicity was understood as a support of the doctrine of the Trinity and as necessarily defined in such a manner as to argue the ‘manifold’ as well as the non-composite character of God.”105 It is, therefore, the doctrine of divine simplicity that prevents theology from presenting a merely triplex God rather than a Triune one.

103 Reeling Brouwer, Karl Barth and Post-Reformation Theology, 46. The emphasis is original, the bracketed statements are added for clarity. 104 Barth, CD II/1, p. 261. 105 Muller, PRRD, 2:276.

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5.5

The Perfection of God

Following the discussion of God’s simplicity, Polanus next discusses God’s perfection.106 The structure of his chapter on divine perfection is similar in some regards to what has preceded it: he begins with a definition, provides arguments from Scripture and reason and deals with several objections. Whereas Polanus introduces a number of inferences (consectaria) right after the definition of divine simplicity, he includes axiomata at the end of his discussion of divine perfection. Polanus begins with the following definition: God’s perfection is the essential property of God whereby we understand that the divine essence lacks nothing absolutely, but that God has all things in himself in a most complete way from everlasting to everlasting and even the perfections of all things, and thus that he is the exemplar of all things and the cause of every perfection whether it is of nature or of grace.107

Polanus indicates that this property is also called God’s self-sufficiency in that God is called perfect because he lacks nothing.108 Polanus demonstrates God’s perfection with reference to the testimony of Scripture and through logical arguments. With regard to the testimony of Scripture, Polanus cites Job 37:16 (“Do you know the balancing of the clouds, the wondrous works of him who is perfect in knowledge,”) and Matthew 5:48 (“You therefore must be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect.”)109 Polanus presents these demonstrations in the form of syllogisms without additional comment. His first logical argument is: • Whatever necessarily is maximally being in actuality is maximally perfect. • But God necessarily is maximally being in actuality. • Consequently, God is maximally perfect.110

106 Polanus, Syntagma, 914B. 107 Polanus, Syntagma, 914C, “Perfectio Dei, est essentialis Dei proprietas, per quam intelligitur, essentiae divinae nihil plane deesse, sed omnia ipsam integerrimo modo ab aeterno in aeterum atque etiam perfectiones omnium rerum in se habere, atque aliis esse exemplar ac causam omnis perfectionis, Naturae et Gratiae.” 108 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 151, speaking of Reformed orthodoxy broadly, refers to this property as ‘Independence.’ 109 Polanus, Syntagma, 915A. 110 Polanus, Syntagma, 915B, “Quicquid necesse est maxime in actu esse, id maxime est perfectum: At Deum necesse est maxime in actu esse: Ergo Deus est maxime perfectus.”

The Perfection of God

In the first argument, Polanus indicates that God is perfect because he has no passive potentiality (i.e., that he is pure actuality). Potentiality is seen as imperfection because what is potential is not actualized.111 If God were to have any potentiality, he would either be perfect without the actualization, or would become imperfect once the potential was actualized. Either way, the possibility of God either being imperfect or able to become imperfect is introduced. Instead, Polanus asserts that there is no potentiality at all in God – he is perfect because he is pure actuality. The second logical argument is: • That which that lacks no good thing is perfect. • God lacks no good thing. • Consequently, God is perfect.112 Here Polanus adumbrates a later discussion about God’s essential property of beatitudo Dei, particularly, that God possesses all good and is free from all evil.113 The third and final logical argument is: • Whatever is absolutely and simply one is certainly perfect. For the more something is one and simple, the more it is perfect. • But God is one and absolutely simple. • Consequently, God is perfect.114 Here Polanus demonstrates the ascending nature of his overall argument by basing the perfection of God upon the previously demonstrated simplicity of God. Having set forth these syllogisms as stand-alone demonstrations of God’s perfection, Polanus proceeds to discuss seven objections to this doctrine.115 Several of these objections refer to things said to be added to God by his rational creatures: worship, obedience, honor, etc. If God requires these of rational creatures, then he is not perfect without these additives. Polanus responds that these things are not additives that God lacks apart from the giving of them to him by his creation. Rather these things are what rational creatures owe God by way of response. They are said figuratively to “give” something to God, yet he is neither increased by worship nor decreased by the lack of worship. Another objection suggests that God utilizes the works and activity of what he has made. According to this objection, someone who

111 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 150. 112 Polanus, Syntagma, 915C, “Cui nullum deest bonum, is est perfectus. Deo nullum deest bonum. Ergo Deus est perfectus.” 113 See Polanus, Syntagma, 995B. 114 Polanus, Syntagma, 915C, “Quicquid unum est simplicissimum, id certe est perfectum. Nam quo quid est magis unum et simplicius, eo est perfectius: At Deus unus et simplicissimum: Ergo est perfectus.” 115 Polanus, Syntagma, 915D–919E.

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utilizes the works of others is not perfect.116 Polanus responds that this is only the case when one is compelled to employ another’s works by necessity or inability. God, however, utilizes the acts of his creatures according to his own free will and goodness.117 Polanus indicates, therefore, that God demonstrates himself to be without either necessity or inability, but rather to be able to do whatever he desires. Polanus next covers five axiomata related to God’s perfection.118 First, Polanus indicates that God is in himself absolutely and totally perfect, from everlasting to everlasting and without any defect or increase. In support of this, he references Romans 11:35, itself a reference to Job 41:11, “Or who has given a gift to him that he might be repaid?” Polanus concludes from this that God is not in need of anything from his creation and is not indebted by what he has made in any way. Polanus’ second axioma is that God is not able to lack any perfection, whether privatively (privative), by stating that God lacks something, or negatively (negative), by denying some perfection to inhere in God. In his third axioma, Polanus states that all perfections meet in God according to his one simple essence. God is not a conglomerate of many ‘perfections,’ but remains a most simple being. The fourth of Polanus’ axiomata is that God is the cause of all perfections in all things. In support of this, he quotes from Romans 11:36. The same God who is perfect in himself is also the source “from whom, through whom, and to whom are all things.” In the fifth and final axioma, Polanus states that every perfection which is discovered in the things which God has made are found first and most perfectly in God himself. This is because God is the chief and first cause of all perfections that exist in humanity as rational creatures made in God’s own image. This last axioma, however, raises a number of questions. If God is the cause of all perfections that exist in rational creatures, and he himself lacks no perfection, does that mean God has those same perfections in himself which also exist in rational creatures? In other words, if there are things which tend towards the perfection of human beings, are these perfections also found in God? In the first of these questions, Polanus asks if reasoning (ratiocinatio) exist in God?119 This he denies: “properly speaking, there is no reasoning or syllogistic discourse within God, and neither is there deliberation.”120 He provides four reasons to demonstrate this.121 In the first place, reasoning has to do with things that are unknown to the one reasoning: human beings reason from not-knowing to knowing. With God,

116 117 118 119 120

Polanus, Syntagma, 916A. Polanus, Syntagma, 916A. Polanus, Syntagma, 920A–B. Polanus, Syntagma, 920E. Polanus, Syntagma, 920E, “In Deo non est ratiocinatio seu discursus Syllogisticus proprie loquendo, ut nec consultatio.” By ‘discursus,’ Polanus indicates a logical argument, not mere conversation. 121 Polanus, Syntagma, 921A–B.

The Perfection of God

however, all things are clearly and certainly known. Second, Polanus indicates that God cannot reason by syllogism, discourse, or consultation because these indicate the existence of an imperfection which is not possible for one with a simple intelligence. Here, Polanus adumbrates issues he will take up later in his chapter on divine wisdom.122 In that portion of the Syntagma, he demonstrates that God understands all things all at once. God does move from known premises to a previously unknown conclusion: God knows the major premise, minor premise, and conclusion at the same time – indeed, he knows them from all eternity. Third, division, discourse, and composition do not exist in God; rather, he knows by simple intuition, “whereby composite things are seen in a simple mode, changeable things in an unchanging mode, and necessary things in a simultaneous mode.”123 The fourth and final reason Polanus gives is that since God is not more familiar with some things more than others, but instead understands all things by his one simple act of understanding, God does not reason by logical discourse. The second question is whether God has the capacity or potential for understanding.124 Polanus again responds that such a potential or capacity does not exist within God. One reason for this is that the potential for understanding properly speaks of a power or faculty which is elicited or received by the intellect. In God, however, understanding is not elicited or received but is necessary of itself and subsists from itself.125 Another reason is that the capacity for understanding does not speak of a simple perfection but instead includes a concomitant imperfection.126 Wherever a capacity for understanding exists, so too must ignorance. As ignorance is not a perfection and is not itself found in God, neither is there any capacity for understanding in God. The third question is whether ‘faith in God’ (insofar as God could be said to believe something) is resides in or is to be found in God.127 Again, this question is raised because the presence of faith can be considered a perfection in human beings – does this perfection also exist in God? This Polanus denies because faith requires an object that cannot be seen. Therefore, as with the capacity for understanding, faith is seen as a perfection that is concomitant with an imperfection, as befits humanity. As all obscurity is repugnant (repugnat) to the infinite clarity of God’s

122 See below, Chapter 7.3. 123 Polanus, Syntagma, 921B, “3. quia in Deo nulla est compositio et divisio: ac proinde nec discursus, sed simplex intuitus, quo simpliciter videntur quae composita sunt, et invariabiliter quae variabilia sunt, et simul quae necessaria.” 124 Polanus, Syntagma, 921C. 125 Polanus, Syntagma, 921C. 126 Polanus, Syntagma, 921D. 127 Polanus, Syntagma, 921D.

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understanding, he cannot have faith.128 Further, there is no higher authority upon which God is able to believe. For these reasons, God does not have the capacity to believe. 129 While Polanus is careful to deny these qualities in God, he is also careful to affirm these qualities as that which tends toward the perfection of human beings. The important distinction to be made, however, is that the capacity to reason, understand, and believe are creaturely perfections that inhere in a way that is appropriate to humanity as creation. These aspects are part of imago Dei, and Polanus will pick them up again when he speaks about human beings under the category of that which God has made.130

5.6

The Infinity of God

Polanus’ treatment of God’s infinity is more complex than was the case with the prior properties of simplicity and perfection.131 In this discussion, Polanus makes the first ‘property level distinction’ – that is, a distinction within one property that results in two separate properties divided out from it.132 Polanus’ discussion of infinity is comprised of three separate chapters in the Syntagma: infinity proper, followed by eternity and immensity as the two distinctions of infinity. Polanus dedicates forty-one columns to this property – more than the other three first order essential properties combined. Further, in his discussion of divine immensity, Polanus takes up the most extensive set of objections to any of the first order essential properties of God. Polanus defines God’s infinity as, “the essential property of God whereby he is signified to be neither limited nor measured by time, place, or anything else, but rather by his essence and nature to be act, simple, and absolutely infinite, immense, and incomprehensible”133 Polanus notes that the notions of ‘lacks’ and ‘does not have’ can be seen in two ways: either privatively, as if there was something God could have but does not, or negatively, as a thing for which it is not possible for God to have. Polanus only ascribes infinity to God in the second, negative, sense.

128 129 130 131 132 133

Polanus, Syntagma, 921E. Polanus, Syntagma, 921E. See Polanus, Syntagma, 1984D. See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 152, who generally describes infinity “as a kind of ‘meta-attribute.’” The other example, the divine will, is even more complex. See below, Chapter 8.3. Polanus, Syntagma, 924D, “Infinitas Dei, est essentialis proprietas Dei, per quam nec tempore, nec loco, nec ulla alia re finiri et mensurari: sed suam essentiam et naturam, actu, simpliciter, et per se infinitus, immensus et incomprehensibilis esse significatur.”

The Infinity of God

Polanus defends the notion that infinity is indeed an essential property of God of the first order with eight reasons. In a way, these reasons function as almost ‘negative axiomata’ in the structure of Polanus’ argument. In the first of these, Polanus states that there is no likeness or analog to this property to be found in that which God has made.134 This first reason may illuminate why Polanus felt he would need to defend placing infinity among the essential properties of the first order since second order properties do find some level of correspondence or analogy in human beings. He does not, however, discuss why someone might consider infinity something that has analogy in the created order, only the denial of this by these various means. Thus, the human soul is eternal as God has created it, but it is not infinite. In the remaining reasons, Polanus provides expansions from the definition. Thus, in the second reason God is understood to be eternal in that he is not limited or measured by time.135 Third, God is not limited by place but rather is omnipresent.136 Fourth, God is not limited in any of his actions or knowledge but is omnipotent and omniscient.137 In the fifth reason, Polanus states that God is infinite in his essence.138 Polanus considers three ways or genera under which philosophers have understood infinity: according to substance, quantity, and quality.139 Polanus affirms that God is infinite secundum substantiam because he is simple and without composition.140 He demurs, however with regard to infinity according to quantity or quality. God is not infinite secundum quantitatem because his being is of such magnitude that nothing can be added to it, neither can it be increased by anything.141 Further, God is also not infinite secundum qualitatem because as a most simple being, no qualities are added to him.142 Sixth, God is infinite in act. Rather than being infinite in potential (that is, to have the capacity to receive an infinite number of forms), God is most pure act.143 Seventh, God is infinite in his simplicity, as there is no material whatsoever in God.144 Finally, God does not receive infinity from another, but is per se infinitus.145 Following this discussion, Polanus declares that God’s infinity is duplex: it is both 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145

Polanus, Syntagma, 925C. Polanus, Syntagma, 925D. Polanus, Syntagma, 925D. Polanus, Syntagma, 925D. Polanus, Syntagma, 925E. See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 153. Polanus, Syntagma, 926A. Polanus, Syntagma, 926B. Polanus, Syntagma, 926C. Polanus, Syntagma, 927A. Polanus, Syntagma, 927A. Polanus, Syntagma, 927C.

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eternal and immense. He picks up each of these distributions of God’s infinity in his next two chapters in the Syntagma covering eternity and immensity. 5.6.1

The Eternity of God

Polanus begins his discussion of God’s eternity with the following definition: God’s eternity is the essential property of God whereby God is signified to be limited by nothing temporal and as having neither principle according to time nor end of his existence, but rather to be more ancient than every time, more beyond than every end, and absolutely, simultaneously, and always whole without succession.146

Polanus therefore focuses this aspect of God’s infinity upon the immensity of time. Accordingly, God is not subject to temporal succession and is without any beginning or end. To this discussion, Polanus adds the following Scripture references to this definition: Psalm 90:2, 92:8–9, 102:27–28, Jeremiah 43:17, and Daniel 7:13. It should be noted that the middle portion of this definition is somewhat novel. Polanus includes Boethius’ notion of “tota simul” but expands upon that to include the ‘ancient-ness’ and ‘beyond-ness’ of God.147 There is therefore both a life that is total and simultaneous and a life that extends beyond the categories of time and space. Polanus continues his discussion by indicating that there is both a proper and an improper way that eternity may be predicated of something. Properly, eternity means that something has neither beginning nor end.148 Eternity is improperly said of things that merely do not have an end, such as angels and the souls of human beings.149 In this discussion, Polanus adds a note regarding the eternal generation of the Son. That the Son is eternally generated speaks not to his origin in time (i.e., as a principium temporis) but as a principle of order (principium ordinis).150 With respect to this, te Velde remarks that, for Polanus, “the doctrine of eternity fits perfectly well with the doctrine of the Trinity.”151

146 Polanus, Syntagma, 928A, “Aeternitas Dei, est essentialis proprietas Dei, per quam Deus nullo tempore finiri, et nec principium secundum tempus nec finem exsistendi habere ullum, sed omni tempore antiquior et omni fine posterior et absolute citra successionem semper totus simul esse significatur.” 147 See also Brian Leftow, Time and Eternity, Cornell Studies in the Philosophy of Religion (New York: Cornell University Press, 2009), 157 and van Asselt, Federal Theology, 162. 148 Polanus, Syntagma, 928D. 149 Polanus, Syntagma, 928E. 150 Polanus, Syntagma, 929C. 151 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 160.

The Infinity of God

Polanus further demonstrates that God is eternal by reference to Scripture, reason and human testimony.152 First, he indicates that Psalm 90:2 and Isaiah 57:15 demonstrate the eternity of God.153 In these verses, God is said to be “from everlasting to everlasting,” and to be the one who “inhabits eternity.” Second, as God is the prime mover, he himself moves all things and is himself moved by nothing. Further, as nothing exists before God so as to be his cause, God is himself shown to be the prime cause of all things.154 The third demonstration is, “because God is absolutely simple he always remains the same.”155 As with the demonstration of God’s perfection, this third demonstration appears more to speak to God’s simplicity than to his eternity. Fourth, God is immutable and is therefore without any motion, change or succession.156 The church fathers testify to this eternity in God, such as Athenagoras and Cyprian.157 5.6.2

The Immensity of God

Following this discussion of God’s eternity, Polanus turns to a rather extensive discussion of the immensity of God. As with the previous properties, he begins with a definition: God’s immensity is the essential property of God whereby the divine essence is signified to be limited, circumscribed, and terminated by nothing locative, but rather to be everywhere penetrating and filling all places as well as individual places both in the world and beyond it, and is present to all things.158

By this definition, Polanus indicates that immensity is infinity with regard to space by which God fills all things yet is himself bounded by nothing. At the end of this definition, Polanus references Psalm 139:7, Isaiah 66:1, Jeremiah 23:23, and Acts 7:49 and 17:27. 152 I note the similarity of structure with his argument for God’s simplicity and perfection. 153 Polanus, Syntagma, 930E. 154 Polanus, Syntagma, 930E. Polanus adds Hebrews 1:2 and 1 Timothy 1:17 as demonstrations of this principle. 155 Polanus, Syntagma, 931A, “Tertio, quia est simplicissimus, idem semper manens.” 156 Polanus, Syntagma, 931A. 157 Polanus, Syntagma, 931D. The first reference is to Athenagoras, Atheniesnsis philosophi christiani supplicatis pro christianis (Venetia: Paulo Manuzio, 1556). The second reference is to Cyprian, “To Cornelius on his Refusal to receive Novatian’s ordination,” in Cyprian, Vol. 1, Ante-Nicene Christian Library (ANCL) Vol. 8 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1880)105. 158 Polanus, Syntagma, 933E, “Immensitas Dei, est essentialis Dei proprietas, per quam divina essentia nullo loco finiri, circumscribi et terminari, sed ubique omnia et singula loca in mundo et extra mundum penetrare et replere omnibusque rebus praesens esse significatur.”

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Polanus sets forth four axiomata of the immensity of God. The first of these axiomata is that “the sole, single reason for his omnipresence and ubiquity is the immensity and infinity of his essence.”159 In this, Polanus asserts that God’s ubiquity is essential, and therefore is not only part of God’s divine essence, but incommunicable, even to the human nature of Christ. Polanus indicates that this is contrary to the Ubiquitarians who contend that the body of Christ itself is ubiquitous. The second axioma is that no created thing is or can be everywhere, but only the divine essence.160 Here, Polanus again refers to the human nature of Christ. Polanus marshals eight reasons why this second axiom is true: from Scripture, in Jeremiah 23:24 (“‘Can a man hide himself in secret places so that I cannot see him?’ declares the Lord. ‘Do I not fill heaven and earth?’ declares the Lord.”); from the fact that the divine essence is alone immense and infinite; from the impossibility of there being multiple infinite beings; from God being distinguished from his creatures by his attributes; from the demonstration of Christ’s full deity; from the orthodox father’s discussion of Christ’s two natures; and that only God is capable of this ubiquity.161 The third axioma is that by virtue of his immensity, God is everywhere by his whole and undivided essence.162 Polanus demonstrates several ways this axiom is not to be understood. It is not the case that God is ubiquitous by multiplication, stretching, extension, division, or partition. Rather, God is whole and united in everything and in every single place and in everything “such that [his essence] is whole within all things and whole beyond all things, never closed up or closed off by anything, containing all things while contained by none, and hence not interspersed among things nor corrupted by their squalor.”163 Polanus therefore contends that God is everywhere by his own essence – not as an accident in various subjects, but as the principle and universal efficient and preserving cause of all things.164 The fourth axioma is that God is everywhere not by being localized, circumscribed or bounded, but rather by filling all things with the manner of his being.165 Therefore,

159 Polanus, Syntagma, 934E, “I. Causa ubique praesentiae et ubiquitatis sola atque unica est essentiae immensitas et infinitas.” 160 Polanus, Syntagma, 935A. 161 Polanus, Syntagma, 935B–937B. In particular, the quotes from orthodox fathers include: Augustine, “Tractate 78 on the Gospel of John,” in Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, First Series, Vol. 7, 340; Augustine, “Tractate 91,” 7.361; and Novatian (incorrectly cited as Tertullian), De Trinitate, XIV.7. 162 Polanus, Syntagma, 937B. 163 Polanus, Syntagma, 937C, “… atque adeo ut sit tota intra omnia et tota extra omnia: nusquam inclusa aut exclusa: omnia continens a nullo contenta: nec proptera immista est rebus aut a rerum sordibus inquinata.” 164 Polanus, Syntagma, 937D. 165 Polanus, Syntagma, 938B. See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 163, who says that God’s ubiquity is “repletive”: “God fills every place without being bound to one particular place.” Te Velde speaks generally of Reformed orthodoxy, but his comment applies specifically to Polanus. See also Muller,

The Infinity of God

as Polanus quotes Aristotle (“ille Philosophus”) as saying, “God is likened to a sphere whose center is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere”.166 Note that while the quotation was often attributed to Aristotle in both the Middle Ages and Early Modern period, it comes from Liber XXIV philosophorum, which purports to be a gathering of twenty four philosophers seeking to answer the question, “What is God?”167 Having given these four axiomata, Polanus next deals with three objections to the ubiquity that is entailed in God’s immensity, each of which is drawn from Scripture. The first objection is based upon Psalm 103:19, 115:3, and Matthew 6:9: “If God is and lives in heaven, then he is not everywhere.”168 Polanus declares this a fallacy as these texts speak with respect to his greater glory and majesty, rather than his whole being.169 The second objection is based upon Numbers 14:42: “If God is not with the impious, then he is not everywhere.”170 Polanus points out, however, that this refers to God’s grace, propitious favor, efficacious salvation, and the granting of his good works. As the people of Israel have rebelled against God, he declares that he will not be with them for their victory. At the same time, Polanus indicates that God is “with” Israel when he makes this declaration. Thus, he cannot be said in an absolute way to be “not with the impious.” The third objection is based upon Psalm 10:1, and 6:5: “If God departs from a people, and then returns to them, he is not everywhere.”171 Polanus declares that God does not leave and return according to his essence but is rather speaking with reference to his mercy or justice. At this point, Polanus considers a second category of concerns about God’s ubiquity, particularly as it relates to broadly Lutheran arguments.172 Polanus states again that only the divine essence is properly said to be ubiquitous. Therefore, the body of Christ itself cannot be ubiquitous as ubiquity is only attributed to the divine

166 167

168 169 170 171 172

PRRD, 3:344, “God, according to the orthodox, is ubiquitous in a repletive sense rather than in a circumspective manner for the latter reflects a sense of corporeal and spatial presence not applicable to God: God is not to be viewed as present in loco et spatio in the way that a thing is commensurate with the partibus spatii.” Polanus, Syntagma, 938D, “Recte ille Philosophus dixit: Deum esse sphaeram, cuius centrum sit ubique, περιφερεια seu circumferentia nusquam.” See Paolo Lucentini, “Il Liber viginti quattvor philosophorum nei poemi medievali”, in John Marenbon, ed., Poetry and Philosophy in the Middle Ages: A Festschrift for Peter Dronke (Leiden: Brill, 2001): 131–154. Polanus, Syntagma, 939A, “Si Deus est et habitat in caelis: non est igitur ubique.” Polanus, Syntagma, 939B. Polanus, Syntagma, 941A, “Si Deus non est cum impiis, non est igitur ubique.” Polanus, Syntagma, 942A, “Si Deus ab hominibus discedit, et ad eos redit, non est igitur ubique.” Polanus, Syntagma, 943A–961D. I say ‘broadly’ in that Polanus does not specifically identify the source of the objections.

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essence.173 Polanus then considers several arguments in favor of the ubiquity of Christ’s body.174 These arguments take the form of logical syllogisms each leading to the conclusion: ergo corpus Christi est ubique. Polanus does not attribute any of the arguments to a specific person or group – indeed, he only names two groups in Locus IV to demonstrate an ambiguity within the argument itself. The first four arguments are labeled “Loci” and are based upon specific passages from Scripture. The first three of these are Matthew 18:20, “For where two or three are gathered in my name, there am175 I among them;”176 Matthew 28:20, “And behold, I am with you always, to the end of the age;”177 and Ephesians 4:10, “He who descended is the one who also ascended far above all the heavens, that he might fill all things.”178 In each case, Polanus concludes that Scripture was not speaking with reference to the body of Christ in order to declare that his body is itself ubiquitous. Thus, in the passages from Matthew, Jesus is not promising to be among or with them in a bodily way, but rather to remain with his people by his deity, Spirit, character, power and majesty.179 Likewise, Paul is declaring that Jesus fills all things according to his grace and the gift of the Holy Spirit.180 Polanus also marshals the concurrence of orthodox church fathers to this notion, including Origin, Cyril, and Augustine.181 In Locus IV, Polanus considers the conclusion that because Jesus stated, “this is my body” (hoc est corpus meum), we can declare that his body is therefore ubiquitous.182 He provides four brief responses to this syllogism. First, Christ did not say, “my body is ubiquitous” (corpus suum esse ubique) nor does his language imply this.183 Thus, the words of Christ do not state that his body is ubiquitous, but rather indicate that he is intending to symbolize his body by the bread. Second, even those who declare Christ’s body to be ubiquitous according to this passage understand it differently. Polanus states that, for Luther, “hoc” refers to the bread, yet for the Concordistae

173 Polanus, Syntagma, 942E. 174 These arguments of Polanus are also discussed in te Velde, Doctrine of God, 165–167. 175 See Muller, PRRD, 3:341. Muller includes the Reformed orthodox polemics with Lutherans in the same section as those with Vorstius, Socinians, and various Cartesians. 176 Polanus, Syntagma, 943A. 177 Polanus, Syntagma, 944B. 178 Polanus, Syntagma, 945B. 179 Polanus, Syntagma, 944C. 180 Polanus, Syntagma, 945E. 181 Polanus, Syntagma, 943E–945B. Quotations include: Origen, Tractus 33, Matt 25, in Origenis Adamantii operum (Basel: Frobenius, 1557), 186; Cyril of Alexandria, Commentarius in Ioannis evangelium, Opera, vol. 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1872), I.vii, 81; and Augustine, Tract 50 in John, 7.279. 182 Polanus, Syntagma, 947A. 183 Polanus, Syntagma, 947A.

The Infinity of God

(i.e., those who were advocates of the Formula of Concord), it refers to the invisible body of Christ hidden within the bread.184 Third, Polanus indicates that the body that Christ gives for us is not found in the bread (i.e., remaining in the upper room after Jesus and disciples depart), but in the garden, in the house of the High Priest, in the palace of Pilate, and in the palace of Herod. It was Christ’s own body that was crucified, buried and rose from the grave.185 Fourth, the body of Christ does not by the mere utterance of these words become ubiquitous, for when Jesus first uttered them he remained in their midst.186 That is, Jesus did not transform into the bread, but continued to hold it forth and speak with his disciples. Consequently, Polanus declares that these words do not demonstrate that the body of Christ is ubiquitous. From this point, Polanus shifts from arguments based on Scripture to consider eight additional arguments he labels “ratiunculas,” – arguments of no great account or petty syllogisms.187 These arguments include the transfiguration, Christ is the right hand of God, that Christ is simultaneously in heaven and on earth, the hypostatic union, and Christ’s omnipotence. With each, he demonstrates the misunderstanding contained in the argument and concludes that these do not prove the ubiquity of the body of Christ. Thus, from all these objections and arguments Polanus again states that only the divine essence is ubiquitous. At least two potential data points may suggest why Polanus takes such great care to discuss and argue against various Lutheran positions on consubstantiation but leaves any discussion of the Roman Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. It should also be remembered that Polanus was first educated in Lutheranism in the St. Elizabethan gymnasium in Breslau. It should be recalled that Polanus left the University at Tubingen after a disputation of Lambert Daneau, presided over by the Lutheran Jacobus Andreas, in which Daneau took the Reformed position.188 When he arrived in Basel, Grynaeus was embroiled in his own dispute with Lutheranism in that city. Indeed, Grynaeus and Polanus labored together to institute a major shift away from Lutheranism in theological education at the University of Basel. By the time of the Syntagma, these issues may no longer have been “live” in the sense that debates still were ongoing. At the same time, the importance of these arguments in Polanus’ own background cannot be dismissed. Further, te Velde notes that Polanus’ interaction with these arguments demonstrates something of the practical application of his theological methodology.189 In particular, Polanus shows that he is not basing his doctrine upon reason alone,

184 185 186 187 188 189

Polanus, Syntagma, 947B. Polanus, Syntagma, 947B. Polanus, Syntagma, 947C. Polanus, Syntagma, 947E–961D. See Han, Symphonia Catholica, 40ff; and Chapter 2.2, above. Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 167.

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but that reason functions on top of and working with Scripture. Furthermore, perhaps in a way that is not immediately evident in other places where Polanus simply refers to Scripture, Polanus’ interaction with Lutheran ‘proof texts’ shows the depth and intricacy of which Polanus is capable in his biblical exegesis. In other words, Polanus is not merely looking for verses that, stripped of their context, might suggest a particular doctrine he holds on the basis of a previous attachment to philosophical concepts, but that he is prepared to seek to determine what a given text means and to build his doctrine upon that meaning.

5.7

The Immutability of God

The final first order essential property of God that Polanus presents is that of divine immutability. He defines immutability as: his essential property whereby God’s essence, together with all his properties, without coaction by his own nature, and absolutely, is understood as being incapable of being generated, corrupted, or entirely defined, increased or augmented in any way, changed, or changing place, but rather as being always the same.190

Polanus adds James 1:17, Psalm 102:27–28, and Malachi 3:6 as Scriptural support for this definition. He further indicates that this immutability refers in turn to God’s essence, to God’s nature or essential properties, and then to God’s decrees and promises.191 With regard to his essence, God is not susceptible to any conversion, passions, corruption, decrease, increase, alteration or change of place.192 With regard to his essential properties, these are all immutable and remain unchanged for eternity. Thus, the simplicity of God is immutable, the infinity of God is immutable, etc.193 Further, the decrees and promises of God, by which he decreed from eternity whatever he promises, are immutable.194 Polanus shows from the testimony of

190 Polanus, Syntagma, 965B, “Immutabilitas Dei, est essentialis proprietas eius, per quam essentia Dei una cum proprietatibus suis omnibus citra coactionem suapte natura et per se nec generari, nec corrumpi aut prorsus desinere, nec ulla ratione imminui vel augeri, nec alterari, nec locum mutare posse, sed semper eadem esse intelligitur.” 191 Polanus, Syntagma, 965D. See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 168 and also 151, in which these three notions are connected, via De Moor, to the property of divine independence (or, for Polanus, perfection). 192 Polanus, Syntagma, 965D. 193 Polanus, Syntagma, 965E. 194 Polanus, Syntagma, 965E.

The Immutability of God

Scripture that the decrees and promises of God are immutable from Isaiah 4:6, Romans 11, and Hebrews 6:17–18. Polanus then considers six arguments that demonstrate God is immutable. It should be noted that he follows a familiar pattern of demonstration: arguments from Scripture, arguments based upon other first order essential properties of God, and finally logical arguments. First, God is immutable because he is Jehovah. He is therefore being or essence itself and his existence is from himself and is not received from anyone. God is therefore not dependent upon any other being for existence than himself.195 With this, Polanus once again connects his discussion of a first order essential property of God back to his prior exposition of the divine names.196 Second, he is immutable because he is most simple act (actus simplicissimus).197 As he is most simple act, there is nothing in God to which a change from passive potential to actuality can be applied. Third, God’s immutability is required by his infinity and immensity.198 That which is infinite is not able to be moved or changed according to any exterior and interior qualities. Fourth, God is immutable because he is truly and properly eternal.199 The fifth reason that God is immutable is that he is most perfect. He has the fullness of perfection in and from himself and is therefore opposed to all change.200 Sixth, God is immutable because he is the first principle and first immovable mover. God has no external cause and no internal principle of motion or change.201 As an ‘unmoved’ being, God does not ‘become’ or ‘cease to be.”202 After these demonstrations, Polanus considers two objections to the immutability of God. The first objection declares: • Whatever is immutable is other than that which is created; • God is not other than that which is created; • Consequently, God is not immutable.203 Polanus indicates that Manicheans and Priscillianists attempt to demonstrate this objection by reference to the divine spirit that is blown into Adam upon his creation 195 196 197 198 199

200 201 202 203

Polanus, Syntagma, 966B. See above, Chapter 5.4, for Polanus’ discussion of divine simplicity. Polanus, Syntagma, 966B. Polanus, Syntagma, 966C. Polanus, Syntagma, 966C. See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 167, “God’s immutability is an attribute that can be derived from other properties in several ways.” He notes simplicity, infinity, eternity, and perfection. Polanus, Syntagma, 966E. Polanus, Syntagma, 967A. See Muller, PRRD, 3:309. Polanus, Syntagma, 967C, “Qui est immutabilis, is est alius a creaturis: Deus non est alius a creaturis: Ergo Deus non est immutabilis.”

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in Genesis 2, that all created things are from or out of his essence (ex Dei essentia), that we are called “his offspring” in Acts 17:28, etc.204 For Polanus, these arguments demonstrate a misunderstanding of the difference between God’s essence and his creative power. God’s creative power exists by virtue of his essence, and God creates in such a way so as to demonstrate the fundamental difference between Adam and the rest of creation (i.e., only Adam is made in God’s image). Polanus, however, contends that these facts do not in any way demonstrate an identity between God and what he has made. The second objection deals with the perception given in Scripture that God changes and must therefore not be immutable.205 For those who hold to this objection, this mutability appears to be demonstrated when God repents (e.g., Genesis 6:6, 1 Samuel 15:11, Psalm 105:45, Jeremiah 1:8, 10, 26:3, 13, 19). Polanus declares that these instances do not describe a change from the eternal decree of God, but to changes in the external operations of God that are contained within the decree itself.206 In other words, these changes are not essential and internal with respect to God himself but are changes with respect to God’s creatures that are part of God’s unchangeable eternal decree. According to this objection, it also appears in Scripture that God promises to do certain things that he then does not go on to do (Genesis 1:28, Psalm 131:14, Matthew 19:28, Exodus 32:10, Judges 10:13, 2 Kings 20:1). Polanus states that these promises are not unconditional and absolute, but do not come to pass because of the weakness of the constancy of those to whom God has promised. God has ordained that these promises would not be fulfilled, and thus they are not. With these objections concluded, Polanus ends his discussion of the first order essential properties of God.

5.8

Summary

This chapter has examined Polanus’ doctrine of the first order essential properties of God, taking into account the broader patristic, medieval, Reformed, and Reformed orthodox context, as well as more modern criticisms of Polanus in the secondary literature. In this portion of the Syntagma, Polanus asserts God’s essential simplicity: he is absolute; lacking any and all composition, division, multiplication, or accident. Polanus does not make this assertion merely upon the basis of reason, but grounds God’s essential simplicity in Scripture. Furthermore, God is demonstrated to be absolutely perfect and therefore as lacking nothing but having all things in himself.

204 Polanus, Syntagma, 967D. 205 Polanus, Syntagma, 970C. 206 Polanus, Syntagma, 971A.

Summary

God is therefore the cause of any relative perfection in that which he has made. Additionally, Polanus has shown how God is infinite in that he is without limit or measure. From this, Polanus concludes that God is eternal in that he is without limit or measure of time, and immense in that he is without limit or measure of space. Here, Polanus takes particular issue with Lutheran theologians who argue that Christ’s human nature shares in the ubiquity of his divine nature. Finally, Polanus has shown how God is immutable and therefore utterly without change in his essential being. A number of key features of Polanus’ doctrine of the first order essential properties have become evident in this discussion. First, there is the emphasis on the notion that God is himself necessary in his being. While not denying that God wills his immutability (for instance), it is necessary to clarify that God is not immutable because he wills it. God is necessarily immutable because he would not be God if he were not immutable (or simple, perfect, eternal and immense). Thus, the discussion that Polanus unfolds regarding these properties demonstrates their underlying interconnectedness. One aspect of this reality, however, is that it leaves Polanus open to the criticism that his arguments are ultimately circular: i.e., that simplicity is argued on the basis of perfection, infinity, and immutability, but perfection is itself argued on the basis of simplicity, infinity, and immutability, etc. There are also a few instances in which Polanus argued backwards: rather than perfection being grounded in simplicity, perfection argues for simplicity. In addition to the interconnectedness of these properties, Polanus demonstrates a marked structural shift from the 1590 Partitiones to the 1599 Partitiones and the Syntagma in both the presence and the importance of the doctrine of divine simplicity. As Polanus’ theology matures, he grounds the whole of God’s first order essential properties upon the foundation of a most simple God. This also demonstrates the importance Polanus places upon ‘getting God right,’ both in terms of his overall theological project, but also in his polemical interaction with Lutheran theology. Unless these first order essential properties are understood from the outset, our understanding of who and what God is (both essentially, Personally, and in the hypostatic union) will inevitably go awry.

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6.1

Introduction

In the fourteenth chapter of the Syntagma, Polanus shifts from his prior discussion of the first order essential properties and begins his exposition of God’s second order essential properties. These are the properties Polanus terms a posteriori and are distinguished from the a priori properties he previously discussed.1 His coverage of these properties will extend for eighteen chapters and over two hundred columns of text – making this the largest total portion of Polanus’ doctrine of God as he sets it forth in the book two of the Syntagma. In order to cover the material in more manageable portions, this chapter will cover only the four “heading” properties: life and immortality, blessedness and glory. The next chapters will look at the sub-categories of essential properties beneath God’s blessedness: wisdom, will, the various species Polanus designates beneath the divine will, power, and freedom. It is important to note that this present chapter introduces a digression from the overall structure of Polanus’ work. Although he introduces the four-fold division in chapter fourteen, Polanus’ order of exposition expands the four properties beneath the blessedness of God, and the several properties denoted species of the divine will, before he comes to the final property of the initial four – that of God’s essential glory. No doubt, Polanus would expect his readers to consider the various essential properties of God in the order in which he discusses them. However, in order to allow for more expanded discussion of the four essential properties that Polanus places beneath the divine blessedness, and to avoid having a rather small chapter at the end (for Polanus’ exposition of the glory of God is rather brief in comparison to many of the other properties), I have chosen to group the glory of God with those properties it is conceptually linked with and with whom it shares a level of distinction, rather than follow Polanus’ specific order in the Syntagma. That is, Polanus presents these four essential properties as being the main sub-distinctions of second order essential properties of God – it is for this reason that I have grouped them together. In this present chapter, therefore, I will endeavor to set forth Polanus’ doctrine of four second order essential properties of life, immortality, blessedness, and glory. In doing so, I will survey the general state of these properties among the various early

1 See section 4.3.4 above for a discussion of Polanus’ various descriptions of the division between essential properties: first and second order, a priori and a posteriori, and incommunicable and communicable.

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Reformed orthodox theologians with whom I am comparing Polanus: Ursinus, Zanchi, Daneau, Bucanus, Keckermann, Trelcatius, Jr., and Perkins. Further, I will look at the four properties as Polanus sets them forth in the Syntagma, taking care also to consider the discussion of these properties in the secondary literature on Polanus.

6.2

The State of Second Order Essential Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

As with the essential properties of God of the first order, my discussion of the state of these particular essential properties begins with a look at how the various theologians of the early Reformed orthodox period organize their list of divine attributes or properties. Muller describes the transition from attributes or properties of the first to the second order as a shift from a discussion of the essence of God to a discussion of the life of God.2 Similarly, te Velde notes that these attributes denoted second order include the three basic faculties found in humanity (understanding, will, and power) as “subdivisions of the divine life.”3 In some ways, however, the organization of the various attributes within this second order defy easy classification. In the list of attributes that Ursinus works through, the tenth through the eighteenth are roughly analogous to Polanus’ second order. Ursinus does not, however, use the language of first or second order – in fact, he provides no direct manner in which to differentiate the first group from the latter. In these nine subsections, Ursinus covers sapientia, bonitas, iustitia, veritatem, castitatis, misericordia, beneficus, liberrimus, and irascens peccatis as separate attributes.4 He also covers the glory of God as part of an earlier (arguably ‘first order’) attribute, that of divine perfection.5 Zanchi does make the distinction between communicable and noncommunicable attributes, but the order he follows in books two through four do not exactly match this division.6 For instance, and important for this present discussion, he includes life and blessedness among the incommunicable attributes.7 Further, he includes omnipotence among those attributes that might be seen as communicable. Largely, however, it appears that those attributes in book three are related to the intellectual/ volitional life of God, while book four focuses on those attributes that are related to

2 3 4 5 6 7

Muller, PRRD, 3:365. Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 175. Ursinus, Loci theologici, 480–488. Ursinus, Loci theologici, 473. Zanchi, De natura Dei, 61. Zanchi, De natura Dei, ordo librorum et capitum.

The State of Second Order Essential Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

the egress of the divine will. As has already been seen in my comparison of Polanus and Zanchi, the latter’s exposition is much deeper and more lengthy, in keeping with the somewhat different focus of each theologian’s work. Although Daneau discusses the distinction between those attributes God has absolutely and those he has relatively, he presents his attributes of God without any particular division. Of these four, he only has immortal, which he places between the attributes of eternal and immutable.8 Bucanus offers a descriptive definition of God, which includes his immortality and goodness (bonitas).9 He does not provide individual explanations of these various descriptors, but he does designate two modes of attribution: either communicable or incommunicable.10 As was discussed above (Chapter 4.3.4), Trelcatius, Jr., uses the a priori/a posteriori, distinction to describe the two categories of essential attributes.11 In this category, however, he only discusses God’s potentia, sapientia, and voluntas.12 Thus, while Trelcatius, Jr., is the only one of these theologians to use the a priori/a posteriori language, his actual division within that second, a posteriori, section does not take into account what are in Polanus the ‘higher level properties’ of life, immortality, blessedness, or glory. Among these early Reformed orthodox theologians, Perkins and Keckermann perhaps come closest to Polanus’ usage of these four ‘upper level’ second order attributes. Both theologians include a division between those attributes related to the nature of God (analogous to Polanus’ first order essential properties: perfection, simplicity, immutability, and spirituality) and those related to the life of God.13 Note that both theologians have the same list and in the same order: the only difference is that Perkins breaks up the attributes into various dichotomies. Unlike Polanus, Perkins and Keckermann discuss God’s will, wisdom, and omnipotence under the category of the life of God – which exists for them as a general label for ‘second order’ attributes.14 Additionally, Keckermann discusses God’s glory and blessedness as attributes that are derived from the former attributes of nature and life.15 This survey shows a wide variety of division and organization of the second order essential properties or attributes of God among these early Reformed orthodox theologians. None are identical to the manner and organization set forth by Polanus,

8 Daneau, Christianae isogoges, 16a. Daneau also includes invisible, incorporeality, and infinity at the end of the attributes he discusses. 9 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 4. 10 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 6. 11 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 50. 12 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 50, 52, 53. 13 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 7; Keckermann, Systema, 9. 14 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 10; Keckermann, Systema, 10. 15 Keckermann, Systema, 16.

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and even among themselves they demonstrate no fixed organizational structure (although Keckermann and Perkin are rather close to each other).

6.3

The Structure of Polanus’ Discussion

Before beginning to look at each property in turn, it is important to reflect upon the grouping of these properties together. First, as Polanus did with the first order essential properties of God, he sets these forth in two groups of two: life and immortality, blessedness and glory. The question is, does Polanus do this merely for Ramist influenced penchant for bifurcatorial organizational structure or is there something else behind this pattern. Polanus indicates in his introductory remarks that as he progresses through these second order essential properties his focus will narrow. Thus, Polanus indicates that “Life extends wider than blessedness and glory, as existence is wider than living.”16 In this sense, the transition from one second order essential property to the next is a shift to what is more specific than what came before. It is also possible to see these attributes as expanding or escalating from what came before: from life, to life-immortal, to the blessedness of that immortal life, to the glory inherent in that blessedly immortal life.17 Indeed, Polanus explicitly links life and immortality, and also explicitly links glory to all of the other second order properties that he distinguishes. As was seen in the previous section, however, life is rather rare as a separate essential property among Polanus’ early Reformed orthodox contemporaries.18 Perkins and Trelcatius, Jr., do utilize the term ‘life’, but as an overarching category of attributes, not as a separate one. Zanchi has a chapter on God’s life in book two of De natura Dei. In that chapter, he discusses the eternality of God as part of his answer to the question: quid sit vita Dei.19 Therefore, Zanchi’s exposition of Vita Dei is closely linked with his earlier discussion of eternity as a separate attribute (and, particularly, one collocated with simplicity, immutability, immensity and perfection). Similarly, Bucanus and Daneau include immortality but not life. Ursinus only discusses the eternality of God.

16 Polanus, Syntagma, 984B, “Vita latius patet, quam beatudo et Gloria: sicut esse latius patet, quam vivere.” 17 This is, at least in part, the answer provided by Muller, PRRD, 3:365, “This model is implied in the ascending order that moves from all being, to living being, to living being that knows and wills…” Muller explicitly ties this notion to that presented by Polanus in the synopsis to the Syntagma. 18 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 276, “These faculties [of understanding, will, and power] are mostly taken as subdivisions of the divine life.” 19 Zanchi, De natura Dei, 104. The chapter on Vita Dei is relatively brief in comparison to Zanchi’s other chapters.

The Life of God

Second, Polanus’ grouping of essential properties under the blessedness of God is even more striking than his distinction between life and immortality. These other theologians either provide little to no organization for their attributes, link them broadly under the categories of communicable and incommunicable, or place all (or the majority) of these second order essential properties under the category “life of God.” Nowhere but with Polanus is blessedness seen as the overarching category beneath which to find God’s wisdom, will, power, and freedom, or the various expressions of the divine will. Here, however, Polanus does provide insight into the organizational structure he has decided to use. Just as God is perfect, so he is free from all defects. While the essential properties that are found beneath God’s blessedness are denoted positively (i.e., via eminentiae), they address a number of potential defects with which fallen human beings are very familiar. Thus, the discussion of God’s supreme and superlative wisdom, grace, love, mercy, and justice (to just name a few of the essential properties that Polanus enumerates and discusses) is closely tied to and found beneath the notion that God is free from all misery and abounding in all good. While Polanus continues to clearly demonstrate a commitment to a Ramist organizational structure, that alone does not seem to adequately explain the particular pairings and underlying structure that Polanus utilizes among these second order essential properties. It is therefore important to see an escalation among these four attributes as Polanus presents them before his reader – one that is grounded in the essential life and immortality of God, that swells with God’s blessedness, to finally crescendo in praise and adoration of the glory of God. While the life-immortality distinction may be the weakest among the many attribute level distinctions that Polanus makes, it is in line with the overall escalation that this section endeavors to illuminate.

6.4

The Life of God

In the fifteenth chapter of the second book of the Syntagma, Polanus puts forth the life of God (vita Dei) as the first of the second order essential properties. Polanus begins with a brief discussion regarding the word ‘life’ and then distinguishes life ‘in us’ from ‘life in God’ – or, rather, ‘he who is life itself.’ The life that God has in himself is “not like an accident in a subject, but as the effect in an efficient cause.”20 Thus, according to Polanus, this life is not something added to God but is instead essential to his essence. He defines the life of God as “God’s essential property or

20 Polanus, Syntagma, 985C, “Habet autem eam in seipso non ut accidens in subjecto, sed ut effectum in causa efficiente.”

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the very living divine essence whereby God is signified as vigorously living and as rendering all things by his very self as well as being possessed of the power for stirring and moving [all things], and hence as instilling life in others also.”21 For this definition, Polanus quotes from John 1:4, Deuteronomy 32:40, Ezekiel 33:11, Daniel 4:34, and Acts 17:28. Polanus links this first of the second order essential properties of God back to those of the first order, declaring that God has this life in himself simplicissime, perfectissime, infinite, and immutabiliter.22 With this definition, Polanus presents the life in God as an active and essential rather than a passive or accidental quality. Further, because he moves all things and has power over all things moved he is “the origin of life that is distributed among his creatures.”23 Seen here is the first of many ad intra/ad extra distinctions that Polanus will make within God’s second order essential properties.24 God is life in himself – the ad intra dimension – and is the source of that life that exists outside himself – the ad extra dimension. Therefore, these second order essential properties will demonstrate an important connection between God as he is in himself and God as he acts outside of himself – and therefore also an important connection between the being (esse) and works (opera) of God. Polanus provides several axiomata for the life of God. First, “life (vita) and living (vivere) are not different in God, but are the same.”25 While this is generally in keeping with the overall tenor of Polanus’ exposition of the essential properties of God (i.e., that God is his attributes), this particular axioma underscores the notion that the fullness of life resides in God, who is that life himself. In the second and third axiomata, Polanus connects the life of God to his essential being and states that this life of God does not have its own cause. This latter is especially important, for if God’s life had a cause outside of himself, whatever that cause might be would be itself divine – and thus there would be more than one god. In the last axioma, Polanus states, “one can most properly say that only God lives.”26 Here, the notion seems to be that there is qualitative difference in the life that is in God. From this Polanus presents God living in and of himself, and the author of all life in his creation. In all, Polanus sets forth a relatively brief sketch of the doctrine of the divine life. He does not elaborate on this property in terms of its relationship to the whole of

21 Polanus, Syntagma, 985E, “Vita Dei, est essentialis Dei proprietas seu ipsa divina essentia vivens, per quam Deus actuose vivere et seipso omnia agere et vi agitandi movendique praeditus esse, ac proinde aliis quoque vitam indere significatur.” 22 Polanus, Syntagma, 986B–C. 23 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 177. 24 See Muller, PRRD, 3:373. 25 Polanus, Syntagma, 985D, “Vita et vivere in Deo non differunt, sed idem sunt.” 26 Polanus, Syntagma, 985E, “Tam certa est, ut propriissime solus Deus vivere dici possit.”

The Immortality of God

the second order essential properties, nor does he connect the faculties of intellect, will, and/or power to the divine life.

6.5

The Immortality of God

The second of the four primary categories of second order essential properties of God which Polanus considers is the immortality of God. This he defines as “God’s essential property whereby one understands that life cannot be separated from him, that he never ceases to live, and cannot die.”27 Because God is both living and life himself, it must therefore be impossible for him to be God and be able to die. Such a notion was “unimaginable” to the Reformed Orthodox.28 To this definition, Polanus sets forth three axioms. The first is that “God is immortal by his essence, not by a quality of immortality.”29 As with the life of God, this immortality is essential rather than accidental. Therefore, this life that God has is not able to be lost or removed from him. Second, God is “immortal from himself.”30 God is not immortal by participation in immortality or by the communication of immortality from something else. Rather, God is immortal by nature and essence. Third, only God is “truly, properly, absolutely immortal, because he alone is immutable in every way.”31 Here again Polanus interacts with the reality that all of the essential properties of God are one and are therefore both reliant upon one another and supportive of one another in their definition and discussion. Furthermore, with this axioma Polanus applies the immutability of God to his life: as he immutably lives, so he is immortal. At this point in his exposition, Polanus considers an anonymous objection: “Angels and human souls are also immortal. Therefore, God alone is not immortal.”32 Polanus responds that the kind of immortality that angels and human spirits have is different than that which he discusses here. First, angels and human spirits are called immortal only improperly, because their immortality has a source or principium.33 Second, these are not immortal from their own life and power, but their immortality 27 Polanus, Syntagma, 991B, “Immortalitas Dei, est essentialis Dei proprietas, per quam intelligitur, non posse ab ipso separari vitam, ipsum non desinere unquam vivere et mori non posse.” 28 Te Velde, 177, “Any separation of God and life is unimaginable: God cannot die.” 29 Polanus, Syntagma, 991C, “Deus est immortalis per essentiam suam, non per immortalitatis qualitatem.” 30 Polanus, Syntagma, 991D, “Est immortalis a se.” 31 Polanus, Syntagma, 991D, “Est solus vere, proprie et simpliciter immortalis; quia solus est omnino immutabilis.” 32 Polanus, Syntagma, 992C, “Angeli et anima hominum sunt quoque immortales: Ergo non solus Deus.” 33 Polanus, Syntagma, 992C.

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comes as a blessing from outside themselves and is indeed sustained in their nature by God.34 Polanus therefore maintains that only God is properly and of himself immortal. It should be noted that Polanus has provided little internal support for the essential property level distinction he has made between life and immortality. Indeed, his overall definition of immortality is given in terms of the life of God. While Polanus himself indicates that life and immortality are different (in that all who are immortal are living, but not all who are living are immortal),35 the connection between them is so tight that immortality might better be considered an aspect of God’s life, not a distinguishable essential property in its own right.36 This is all the more relevant in that Polanus defines God’s immortality in light of the life of God that he has just discussed.37 Thus, the content that Polanus provides regarding the immortality of God does not appear to justify regarding it as a distinguishable essential property.

6.6

The Blessedness of God

The third of the four major categories of second order essential properties is the blessedness of God. Muller remarks that Divine blessedness “is typically not detailed in the more doctrinal works of the Reformers,” and “is not universally present in the systems of the Reformed orthodox.”38 Muller further contrasts this with the “central position” this doctrine held in the works of medieval Scholastics such as Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.39 As will be seen, the blessedness of God holds an important place in Polanus’ exposition of the divine properties, even if ‘central’ is a debatable adjective. Polanus subsumes the intellectual and volitional activity of God under the category of his blessedness. He further incorporates God’s justice, holiness, goodness, grace, and mercy within this overarching category under the types of species of the divine will. Finally, Polanus includes the discussion of God’s power and freedom as part of divine blessedness. This last facet demonstrates

34 Polanus, Syntagma, 992C. 35 Polanus, Syntagma, 984C. 36 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 176–177, who combines life and immortality in one section, and states, “Immediately connected with God’s life is his immortality,” suggesting a distinguishable difference, but not on the level of separate essential properties or attributes. 37 This is not uncommon with Polanus, who regularly defines one essential properties with reference to other essential properties. See also Chapter 11.2.3, below. 38 Muller, PRRD, 3:371. 39 Muller, PRRD, 3.373. Muller references Thomas Aquinas, S.Th., Ia. Q. 26, art. 1–4; and Duns Scotus, Opus Oxonionse, I. d. 8, q. 4; d. 13, q. 1; IV, d. 13, q. 1.

The Blessedness of God

some discontinuity with other Reformed Scholastic teachers. Cocceius, for example, declares that “the life of God is understanding and willing.”40 For Polanus, however, to know and to will flows from the blessedness of God. Polanus defines beatitudo Dei as: his essential property whereby he is signified as being, by himself and his nature, free from all things evil and abounding in all things good, knowing such good things in an absolutely perfect way as well as being sufficient in himself, satisfied with himself, and not lacking any good things nor desiring such [for himself].”41

In support of this, Polanus quotes from 1 Timothy 1:11, 1 John 1:6, Psalm 16:2, 50:7, 14, and Haggai 2:8. Polanus therefore demonstrates two particular aspects of God’s blessedness: he is perfect in himself (good and free from all evil) and is utterly self-sufficient and happy in and of himself. Without further discussion, Polanus proceeds to present four axiomata. First, Polanus states, “God alone is truly blessed.”42 After a discussion of the meaning of the word beatus in various other languages (Latin, Greek, Hebrew), Polanus declares that true blessedness only corresponds to God himself. He alone is of himself free from all evil and abounding in all good. Here Polanus includes an etymological discussion among the axiomata, something he usually places at the opening of the chapter or section. Polanus’ second axioma is that “blessedness belongs only to the nature of one who understands, for one who does not know the good that he has is not blessed.”43 God not only possesses all good and is free from all evil, he is also fully aware of the good that he genuinely possesses and fully aware of the evil he completely lacks. Note that God’s freedom from evil does not consist in ignorance! Polanus therefore here links God’s blessedness to his essential knowledge of himself. Third, Polanus states that “blessedness consists in act, not in habit.”44 Since his blessedness is not a habit, God is not merely predisposed towards blessedness but is blessedness fully actualized (i.e., blessedness itself). Here Polanus quotes a portion of Aristotle’s Nicomachean

40 Johannes Cocceius, Summa theologiae ex Scripturis (Amsterdam: J. Ravenstein, 1665), 144, “Vita enim Dei est intelligere et velle.” See also Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 69, “In its essence God’s life is knowledge and will.” 41 Polanus, Syntagma, 995B, “Beatitudo Dei, est essentialis eius proprietas, per quam per se suamque naturam semper ab omnibus malis liber, omnibus bonis affluens, ea perfectissime cognoscens, sibique sufficiens et seipso contentus esse et nostris bonis non egere neque ea appetere significatur.” 42 Polanus, Syntagma, 996A, “Deus solus est vere beatus.” 43 Polanus, Syntagma, 996D, “Beatitudo est solius intelligentis naturae. Nam qui bona quae habet non novit, beatus non est” 44 Polanus, Syntagma, 996D, “Beatitudo in actu consistit, non in habitu.”

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Ethics to conclude that blessedness is absolutely and completely congruent with virtue.45 The fourth and final axiom is: “God is his blessedness as himself.”46 He therefore needs nothing outside of himself in order to be blessed or happy. This is in keeping with God’s essential perfection, but also his eternity. If God needed something outside himself to be blessed, then he would only become perfect after creation and would therefore not be perfect in eternity. Thus, the interconnectedness of the essential properties continues to be shown in Polanus’ doctrine of God. Muller points out that by including blessedness among the essential attributes of God, Reformed orthodox theologians were guaranteeing God’s essential freedom.47 If God is the source of goodness and being – his own as well as all that he creates – then his goodness and being are necessary. Thus, blessedness is closely linked to God’s self-sufficiency and aseity. God is therefore completely without any need of that which he has made: either for his being or his happiness. Polanus distinguishes four sub-categories within the blessedness of God: wisdom and will, and power and freedom.48 Before he defines and describes each of these in turn (indeed, several with their own subdivisions) Polanus first discusses them in their connection with each other. Once again, Polanus states that this division is for the benefit of the viator: it is undertaken in order to better and more easily understand what constitutes the blessedness of God. In terms of their connection to each other, Polanus states that wisdom (sapientia) is the principium agendi dirigens, will (voluntas) the principium imperans, power (potentia) and freedom (libertas) the principium exsequens, et in effectum exteriorem procedens.49 This reflects te Velde’s general observation regarding Reformed orthodoxy:

45 Polanus, Syntagma, 996D, “Ideo etiam Aristoles beatitudinem actione definit libro primo Ethicorum Nicom. capite duodecimo: ait enim beatitudinem esse ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν, animae actionem secundum virtutem perfectam, hoc est, virtuti undique absolute congruentem.” The full quote from Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1.13, “Ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἡ εὐδαιμονία ψυχῆς ἐνέργειά τις κατ᾽ ἀρετὴν τελείαν, περὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπισκεπτέον ἂν εἴη· τάχα γὰρ οὕτως ἂν βέλτιον καὶ περὶ τῆς

46 47

48 49

εὐδαιμονίας θεωρήσαιμεν. (Since blessedness is an activity of soul in accordance with perfect virtue, we must consider the nature of virtue; for perhaps we shall see the nature of happiness better).” Polanus, Syntagma, 996E, “Deus est ipse sua beatitudo.” See Muller, PRRD, 3:383, “Inasmuch as God is the ultimate source and goal of all good and as both necessary and sufficient in his being, God is in no need of his creatures or of particular acts on the part of his creatures to ensure his happiness. God is therefore utterly free in his dealings with the creation.” Polanus, Syntagma, 998D. Note that these distinctions are made in the opening paragraph of Chapter 18, In quo de Sapientia Dei, rather than within the previous chapter. Polanus, Syntagma, 998E.

The Blessedness of God

Knowledge directs the actor towards the possible options of action; the will decides which of the possible actions should be performed; the power is responsible for the actual execution of the preceding decision of the will.50

In this ordering, “wisdom directs will, power, and freedom.”51 Polanus demonstrates this by stating: “the one who directs is prior to what is directed, and the ruler is prior to the ruled.”52 By this, Polanus suggests more than just a didactic ordering (i.e., an order chosen for the purposes of teaching Christian doctrine) but also a logical ordering. It remains important to note, however, that Polanus makes these statements with the simplicity and immutability of God in mind. That is, Polanus is not now seeking to introduce an ontological or temporal ordering within the essence of God. Rather, the whole of his presentation of the doctrine of God is as an exercise in ectypal theology – an understanding of God that is by/from God and is based upon our capacity to understand. By proceeding in this way, Polanus continues to demonstrate both the consistency of his theological method and the importance of the order of the Syntagma – apart from book one, a reading of this chapter might lead one to conclude that Polanus’ doctrine of God is at odds with itself. In addition to the distinction applicable to these four attributes on the basis of principia, Polanus also pairs them: it is wisdom and will, power and freedom. This pairing raises a question, however: are there two pairs because of a Ramist penchant for dichotomy in division, or is there some other connection between the pairs that requires this two-fold division? By way of comparison, Muller places the first two in what he calls “Intellectual Attributes,” and the second two in what he terms “Attributes Relating to the Manifestation and Exercise of the Divine Will.”53 While such a division may better reflect the broader Reformed Scholastic distribution, it does not exactly coincide with Polanus’ exposition of the divine blessedness.54 In particular, Muller places justice, holiness, goodness and truth alongside power and glory as manifestations of the divine will. Polanus, however, sees justice, holiness, goodness and truth as distinctions within the divine will and he places power (along with freedom) beside the divine will. Polanus does not see the exercise of

50 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 175. Note that te Velde sees this trifold pattern in a number of Reformed orthodox theologians, including Turretin, Walaeus, Picet, and Alting. 51 Polanus, Syntagma, 999A, “Sapientiae dirigit voluntatem potentiam et liberatem.” 52 Polanus, Syntagma, 999A, “Dirigens autem prius est directo: regula prior est regulato.” 53 Muller, PRRD, 3:385 and 476. 54 It must be noted that while Muller uses the Synopsis Libri at the beginning of the Syntagma to provide an outline at the opening of many of his discussions of the various loci in PRRD, he is not seeking to pattern the whole of his discussion merely upon the example set forth by Polanus.

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divine power as a manifestation of the divine will per se, but an aspect of the divine blessedness. At the same time, at least part of Muller’s division seems appropriate - the divine wisdom and will could be seen in Polanus as “intellectual” properties. In comparison, then, divine power and freedom could be described as “effectual” properties. It is important to note, however, that the distinction between the pairs is not one of ad intra and ad extra properties. All four of these aspects of divine blessedness have both an ad intra and an ad extra dimension, as will be seen below in the chapters dealing with these properties.

6.7

The Glory of God

Polanus begins his discussion of this final major category of the essential properties of God of the second order with a lengthy treatment of the various ways the word gloria is used. It can signify the majesty of the divine essence, the acknowledgement and celebration of God (Luke 2:14, John 7:18, 2 Corinthians 4:15, etc.), the ark of the covenant (1 Samuel 4:21, Psalm 26:8, Jeremiah 14:3, etc.), the visible sign of the presence of God in light and splendor (Exodus 16:8, 1 Kings 8:10, Acts 7:55, etc.), the glorious ministry of the gospel of Christ (Isaiah 60:1–2, 2 Corinthians 4:4), the public worship of God (Psalm 63:2–3), the image of God as it is restored in us through justification and sanctification (Romans 3:23), the regeneration and sanctification by which the image of God is renewed in us (Isaiah 58:8), and the representation of the divine majesty and dominion (1 Corinthians 11:7).55 Having given these extensive Scriptural references, Polanus provides the following definition for God’s glory: God’s glory is his essential majesty whereby one understands that God truly is – that is to say: by his very essence truly is - what he is said to be: absolutely simple, absolutely perfect, infinite, eternal, immense, immutable, living, immortal, blessed, wise, understanding, omniscient, prudent, willing, good, gracious, loving, good, merciful, truthful, holy, pure, powerful, and indeed omnipotent – and that he declares himself to be such in all his works.56

55 Polanus, Syntagma, 1210A–1213A. For each of the various ways gloria is used, Polanus provides numerous citations (many of which are removed above by “etc.”), most of which precede a brief quotation. 56 Polanus, Syntagma, 1213D, “Gloria Dei est essentialis eius majestas, per quam intelligitur Deum revera esse, eundem essentia sua esse revera id quod esse dicitur, simplicissimum, perfectissimum, infinitum, aeternum, immensum, immutabilem, viventem, immortalem, beatum, sapientem, intelligentem, omniscium, prudentem, volentem, bonum, gratiosum, amantem boni, misericordem,

The Glory of God

With this definition, he links this final essential property of God with all those which precede it, explicitly naming each in the order in which he has discussed them. Thus, glory stands as the summation and capstone of all of God’s own self-revelation of his essence. Polanus provides several axiomata in support of this definition, two of which deal with the trinitarian nature of God’s glory. In these, Polanus first differentiates between an essential and a personal glory of God.57 He defines the essential glory of God as, “the glory common to the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in the unity of the divine essence.”58 Polanus defines God’s personal glory as, “what belongs properly to each person of the Deity.”59 He therefore declares that glory is proper to the Father as he is from no one; to the Son as he is begotten from eternity, all honor is due to him, and he is ὁμοουσιον with the Father; and to the Holy Spirit because he is ὁμοουσιον with the Father and the son.60 Furthermore, comparing among themselves, the glory of the persons is equal.61 With these notions, Polanus is presenting an important link between his discussion of the nature of God and the Trinity of persons in the Godhead. In the unity of his essence, God shares this glory equally and in common. What distinguishes the persons is not some relative share of this or any other attribute; all that differentiates them is their personal properties.62 In the fourth axioma, Polanus states that the pure divine glory differs from Christ’s human and mediatorial glory.63 With the distinctions described in this axioma, Polanus differentiates between the essential glory described in the previous paragraph and that which is bestowed upon Christ in the incarnation. He describes the gloria pure divina as that essential glory that eternally belongs to God alone is not communicable to any creature. On the other hand, gloria Christi humana is that which the person of Christ had by virtue of the incarnation and is the glory of humility. Gloria Christi Mediatoria is that glory which was proper to the person of Christ by virtue of his work as mediator. This glory is not the same as the essential glory that is proper to the divine nature of the second person of the Trinity. Not only, therefore, is God’s glory important as an essential property of God, it also

57 58 59 60 61 62 63

iustum, veracem, sanctum, castum, potentem imo omnipotentem, et talem se in omnibus operibus suis declarare.” Polanus, Syntagma, 1214C. Polanus, Syntagma, 1214C, “Essentialis gloria Dei, est gloria communis Patri, Filio et Spiritui Sancto, in unitate essentiae divinae...” Polanus, Syntagma, 1214D, “Personalis gloria Dei, est quae cuiusque personae Deitatis propria est.” Polanus, Syntagma, 1214D. Polanus, Syntagma, 1214E. See below, Chapter 9.3 below. Polanus, Syntagma, 1215B.

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provides an important link to both Trinitarian theology broadly and to the doctrine of the incarnation and mediation of Christ. In the fifth axioma, Polanus demonstrates the essential necessity of God’s glory. He states: “God wills his glory, not because he has been brought to do so by something, not according to the good pleasure of his will, and not toward or for the sake of some end; he does so by the necessity of his nature.”64 Thus, the notion ‘God is glorious’ is not a part of the egress of his will – that is, it is not something that only comes to be because God wills and decrees it. With this, Polanus is not denying that God desires that his name be glorified. Rather, he points out that the reason God is essentially glorious is because of his essence. Polanus discusses this issue in another axioma: namely, there is a difference between God’s essential glory, which he receives from no one, and the acknowledgement and admiration of his glory that God desires from what he has created.65 The point here, however, is to underline that God is what he is (his essence) and cannot be otherwise than what he is. It is fitting, therefore, that he finishes this section of the Syntagma with an axioma encouraging doxology. The final, sixth, axioma is that “God’s glory cannot be recognized or praised without acknowledgement of the mediator.”66 With this, Polanus again connects the essential nature and character of God with the mediation that is found in Jesus Christ. That is, the Christian truths of the gospel never appear to be far from Polanus’ mind as he writes his theology. Therefore, even in this - the last of the proper essential properties of God as he sets them out – Polanus points his reader to the fullness of the revelation of what God is truly like in the person and work of Christ.

6.8

Summary

In these ‘upper level’ second order essential properties, Polanus has presented the broad categories of the relational (and therefore, in an analogical way, communicable) attributes of God. Polanus has shown a God who is both alive and who is the source of all life – a life that is immutable, and therefore also immortal. God is most blessed: free from all evil and abounding in all good – indeed, lacking no good thing. Beneath the rubric of God’s blessedness, Polanus will go on to present the fullness of God’s operative attributes: his wisdom, will, power, and freedom. Finally, Polanus has sought to place the fulness of God’s glory before his readers. This essential glory undergirds the whole of who God is and reminds us that God 64 Polanus, Syntagma, 1216A, “Gloriam suam vult Deus a nulla re permotus, neque secundum beneplacitum voluntatis suae, neque in aut propter finem aliquem: sed necessitate naturae.” 65 Polanus, Syntagma, 1214E. 66 Polanus, Syntagma, 1216D, “Gloria Dei non potest agnosci et celebrari sine agnitione Mediatoris.”

Summary

is our summum bonum and that knowing him as he reveals himself is our own blessedness. God’s glory both encompasses all of who God is and directs all of God’s creatures to worship and adore him. It must be said that this relatively brief chapter belies the complex nexus of essential properties that is represented both by these four attributes and by the nested groupings of attributes that lie structurally beneath God’s blessedness. Indeed, part of the brevity reflects Polanus’ own exposition – he does not expand greatly upon these four properties (blessedness aside, which, at any rate, Polanus expands in a very different way). Internal distinctions within the proper discussion of these second order essential properties are very rare – in fact, most of the distinctions are introduced before the definition as ways of understanding the various words that are eventually excluded from the property as Polanus will be examining it. In one sense, then, the importance of this chapter lies in how it both connects with the essential properties of the first order and in the way it sets up God’s blessedness as a structural framework within which to examine the life of God in terms of his essential wisdom, will, power, and freedom. Further, that blessedness of God continues to provide structure for the discussion of God’s goodness and justice (and, therefore, for the several properties that are treated within them).

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Chapter Seven: The Divine Wisdom

7.1

Introduction

In the eighteenth chapter of the Syntagma, Polanus sets forth the Sapientia Dei as the first of the four broad distinctions within the blessedness of God. Here Polanus discusses the manner, object, and extent of God’s essential understanding. First, he looks at sapientia as an overarching category with a rather extensive definition (and expansions upon the definition). Next, Polanus distinguishes between various categories within the sapientia Dei – intelligence, knowledge, art, and prudence. Taking scientia as the more important aspect of these, Polanus continues to distribute this aspect of God’s wisdom in his discussion of a general and special knowledge, God’s divine foreknowledge, and the distinction between a knowledge of simple understanding (scientia simplicis intelligentiae) and a knowledge of vision (scientia visionis). This chapter will continue to set forth Polanus’ doctrine of divine wisdom in its historical and theological context. I begin with a survey of this doctrine in the early Reformed orthodox period, continuing to set Polanus’ doctrine within the framework of his near predecessors. Next, I examine Polanus’ doctrine as he sets it forth in the Syntagma. This will include a detailed discussion of the various distinctions that Polanus uses within this doctrine. Throughout, I will consider various objections and criticisms to Polanus’ doctrine as they arise.

7.2

The State of the Doctrine of the Divine Wisdom in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

By the time of the publishing of the Syntagma, the Reformed Orthodox formulation of God’s understanding dealt with several interrelated issues. Indeed, one important issue was the question of the proper terminology to be used for the attribute or property itself: should it be sapientia, scientia, or intelligentia? Bucanus refers to the sapientia Dei.1 Zanchi uses the terms scientia and sapientia more or less interchangeably.2 Perkins’ discussion is quite brief, yet he uses both sapientia

1 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 6. 2 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 239.

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and scientia to introduce the topic.3 Keckermann only refers to God’s intellectus or intelligens.4 Daneau and Trelcatius, Jr., use the term scientia.5 Ursinus speaks of God as “intelligens [and] immensae... sapientiae” within his overall definition of who or what God is.6 In the 1590 edition of the Partitiones, Polanus uses the term intelligentia, though he does note that the term is otherwise known as sapientia.7 By the 1599 edition, Polanus replaces intelligentia with sapientia as the overarching category.8 This feature continues in the Syntagma. Muller, reflecting on the variety of terms used over the course of Reformed orthodox theology, notes: the differences in theology caused by these formal divergences are minimal – but they do represent ways of addressing the problem of divine knowledge, inasmuch as intellectus identifies a faculty whereas scientia and sapientia do not... [furthermore] scientia is typically defined as a knowledge of first principles and the conclusions that can be drawn from them, sapientia is a knowledge of principles and of the ends or goals they imply.9

At least in this early period of Reformed orthodoxy, however, there does not appear to be much reflection upon the various terms available. Indeed, of those mentioned above, Polanus is the only theologian to order the various terms explicitly, noting that intelligentia and scientia (along with ars and prudentia) are included in the scope (complectitur) of sapientia.10 Beyond the basic category of the doctrine, there are several similar points of exposition. Most of these Reformed Orthodox theologians – even if briefly and only within a definition – discuss the mode of God’s knowledge, the objects of God’s knowledge, and the relationship between God’s knowledge and his will. As has been seen with other sections, Zanchi considers these topics in greater detail, while Ursinus, Daneau, Bucanus, Keckermann, Trelcatius, Jr., and Perkins offer more

3 Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 8; see also Perkins, Golden Chaine, 12a. Perkins suggests through his definition that he sees these terms as functionally equivalent: “The wisdome or knowledge of God, is that by which God doth, not by certaine notions abstracted from the things themselves, but by his owne essence; nor successively and by discourse of reason, but by one eternall and immutable act of understanding, distinctly and perfectly know himselfe, and all other things, whether they have bin or not.” 4 Keckermann, Systema, 97. 5 Daneau, Christianae isogoges, 15; Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 52. 6 Ursinus, Dontrinae christianae compenium, 183. The 1598 edition, edited by Pareus, gives more particular information regarding these aspects of God’s essence, Ursinus, Explicationum, 166. 7 Polanus, Partitiones (1590), 3. Polanus does speak of praescientia in this edition of the Partitiones. 8 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 6–9. 9 Muller, PRRD, 3:384–5. 10 Polanus, Syntagma, 158.1F.

Polanus’ Discussion of Divine Wisdom

concise discussions. Zanchi’s exposition of de scientia consists of sixteen quaestiones covering the propriety (an) of attributing understanding or wisdom to God, and the various modes of God’s knowledge (per seipsum, certo, perfectisimme, infinite, by one simple act of intelligence).11 He further discusses the proper objects of God’s understanding: all things, past, present, and future (questio II, III, VIII, XIV, XV), both universals and singulars (questio V).12 Perhaps more important is the general lack of in-depth discussion of the various distinctions within God’s understanding. Among these early Reformed Orthodox theologians, only Polanus utilizes the variety of distinctions that become much more commonplace in the 17th century. Zanchi uses the term scientia visionis (which, he notes, is “a Scholasticis vocatur”), but does not refer to the scientia simplicis intelligentiae, the corresponding term in the distinction as it is usually found.13 Trelcatius, Jr., refers to a distinction between the scientia indefinita et simplicis intelligentia and notitia visionis et praescientia definita in his Syntagma disputationum theologicarum, but neither expands upon them nor distinguishes between the pairs.14 Ursinus, Daneau, Bucanus, Keckermann, and Perkins do not refer to any distinctions related to God’s knowing or understanding. At the same time, Zanchi does have several discussions in his exposition concerning the relationship between foreknowledge and future contingents. Connections between Zanchi’s and Polanus’ exposition will occur below in the appropriate section. Polanus’ Syntagma will be shown once again to stand between the extensive quaestio focused discussion found in Zanchi and the terse definition-oriented discussion found in Ursinus, Daneau, Bucanus, Keckermann, Trelcatius, Jr., and Perkins. Polanus not only takes a middle ground in terms of length, but also distinguishes himself from these other works in the use of particular distinctions within the divine wisdom and knowledge. He therefore provides a less detailed discussion than Zanchi, but a more robust picture of the doctrine as a whole.

7.3

Polanus’ Discussion of Divine Wisdom

In his exposition of this essential property, Polanus follows his previous pattern of discussion: first the word itself, then its definition, and, finally, its distribution. After briefly distinguishing between created and uncreated wisdom, Polanus similarly distinguishes between essential and personal wisdom. Personal wisdom is “the 11 12 13 14

Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 241ff. Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 244 (q. II); 246 (q. III); 253 (q. VIII); 265 (q. XIV); 271 (q. XV); 249 (q. V). Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 261. Lucas Trelcatius, Jr., Syntagma disputationum theologicarum (Rotterdam: Joannis Leonardi á Berewout, 1615), 51. Trelcatius, Jr., does not refer to any distinctions in the Institutio.

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eternal Son of God in whom all the storehouse of wisdom and understanding have been hidden, and through whom the rivers of wisdom are diffused unto rational creatures, both angels and men.”15 With this notion, Polanus includes a Trinitarian aspect (indeed, a particularly Christological aspect) in God’s knowledge from the very beginning of his discussion. This section, however, is focused upon God’s essential wisdom – that wisdom that is an essential property of God. Any attempt to understand God’s essential wisdom, however, is bound to be rather complex.16 Polanus’ definition of God’s wisdom is no exception. He defines the wisdom of God as: his essential property by which he truly and properly knows all things at once in every way by one eternal immutable act of understanding, and he does so in an absolutely perfect, certain, and manifest way, as well as distinctly and necessarily or immutably—all while not ever being ignorant of anything, not learning or knowing successively, and forgetting nothing.17

As if he recognizes the length and complexity of this definition, Polanus proceeds to consider its various parts in greater detail. Most of the expansions on the definition are little more than reiteration: God knows all things truly, properly, perfectly, certainly, clearly, and distinctly by one immutable and eternal act.18 In four other expansions, however, Polanus either provides particular insight into what might otherwise be an obscure aspect of the definition or the expansion is significant in itself. These four expansions are related to God’s simplicity, to the manner in which he knows (i.e., not by species intelligibiles), to the extent of God’s knowledge (i.e., even to singularia), and to the connection between God’s knowledge and necessity. The first of these four particular expansions deals with the interrelation between God’s wisdom and the doctrine of divine simplicity set forth before as an essential property of God of the first order. Polanus states that “no aspect of the wisdom of

15 Polanus, Syntagma, 1000A, “Personalis sapientia Dei, est aeternus Fillius Dei, in quo reconditi sunt omnes thesauri sapientiae et intelligentiae, et per quem sapientiae rivi in creaturs rationales, Angelos et homines diffunduntur.” 16 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 177, “The divine knowledge is one of the most complicated parts of the Reformed orthodox doctrine of God.” 17 Polanus, Syntagma,1000C, “Sapientia Dei, est essentialis proprietas eius, per quam vere et proprie, uno, aeterno et immutabili intelligendi actu, simul, omnino omnia perfectissime, certo, evidenterque, distincte et necessario seu immutabiliter novit: nihil unquam ignorans, nihil successive discens et cognoscens, nihil obliviscens.” The definition has at its root the truth that God knows (novit). This act of knowledge, however, is modified by an extensive list of adverbial modifiers and phrases. Reducing it to a single sentence is therefore particularly difficult. The above definition is meant to capture the meaning of Polanus’ definition, rather than be a direct quotation. 18 See also Zanchi, De Natura Dei, Quaestio II (244), XII (261), XIII (264), and XIX (265).

Polanus’ Discussion of Divine Wisdom

God can be assigned to a genus, under which it would then be contained as one of the genus’s species.”19 God’s wisdom is therefore identical with his own essence. This is demonstrated by the simplicity of God – in that his wisdom is not different from his essence, and in the eternality of God – in that nothing is from eternity apart from God’s essence.20 “Wherefore,” Polanus states, “the wisdom of God is the very essence of God.”21 This first notion is fundamental to the internal consistency of Polanus’ theology by maintaining the simplicity of God. Although Polanus will utilize various distinctions within the wisdom of God (and also distinctions within the distinctions, as will be shown below), God’s simplicity means that these distinctions do not alter the essential unity of God. Rather, the distinctions utilized are by reason of our capacity for understanding.22 The second expansion considers the manner of God’s wisdom. Here, Polanus seeks to demonstrate that God knows all things by means of himself, that is, by means of his own essence. He describes this as “the similitude of all things which are or are possible to be.”23 God does not know things by means of vision or sight or perception, or by means of the impression of forms upon his mind. Thus, God’s knowledge is intuitive. Whereas Polanus uses the notion of forms later on, these forms are present in the divine essence itself, and not impressed upon the divine essence from without. Polanus proceeds to demonstrate this expansion to his definition with eight reasons (statements preceded by quia). As with the overall expansion on the definition of divine wisdom, many of these reasons are reiterations of previously discussed material: God’s wisdom is simple, eternal, of pure actuality, and without cause or passive potential.24 Two items are of particular importance in that they relate to causality: first, God’s knowledge is not caused by things outside himself; second, the degree to which God’s knowledge is itself causal. The question of the sapientia Dei having an external cause arises in several of the expansions upon Polanus’ definition. In the very first reason Polanus gives, he states: “the wisdom, intelligence, or knowledge of God has no principle nor cause; it is not 19 Polanus, Syntagma, 1000D, “Primo sapientiae Dei nullum potest dari genus, sub quo illa tanquam species contineatur.” 20 See also Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 241. 21 Polanus, Syntagma, 1001C, “Quapropter sapientia Dei est ipsa Dei essentia.” 22 See above, 4.6.4 for the discussion on Polanus’ use of distinctio ratione. 23 Polanus, Syntagma, 1001E, “Tertio, novit Deus omnia per seipsum, per suam essentiam, quae est similitudo rerum omnium que sunt, aut esse possunt: non quemadmodum nos facimus per visa seu species rerum objectas et intelligibiles, id est per φαντασίασ seu imagines a rebus sensu perceptis abstractas et animo impressas: seu per similitudines, quas mens concipit et conceptas retinet, tanquam sigilla cerae impresse.” This is the second of those aspects herein being discussed, but the third of the expansions overall. 24 These reasons are located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1002A–1003A.

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generated from elsewhere, but it is essential to the eternal and immutable divine nature.”25 Polanus goes on to discuss the possibility of God gaining knowledge from anything outside of himself as either a principium or causa. Were God to gain knowledge from something outside himself, these things external to God would have to exist for God to know them. That is, they would have to be eternal. This would either deny that God is the creator of all that exists or that God is himself at least in part composed of these created things. Either notion is contrary to the God of Scripture that Polanus has been seeking to describe. Polanus also states that if God gained knowledge by the sight of created things, his pure actuality would be compromised because his ability to understand would be prior to the act by which he understands. That is, there would be introduced into God a potential for understanding that contradicts both his pure actuality and his simplicity. Furthermore, knowledge that comes by the sight of visible things must necessarily be comprised of multiple distinct acts (i.e., rational discourse), whereas God knows by a single act or actus.26 Polanus additionally excludes species intelligibiles as the source of God’s knowledge or understanding. He states, “species intelligibiles [are] the impressed similitude of the thing understood in the intellect itself.”27 This notion arises from a discussion in Aristotle about the manner in which the human mind comes to understand things – particularly, by grasping the truth of a form from the matter in which that form is found. These species intelligibiles can be thought of as impressions elaborated from the data provided by the senses by a special act of the intellect.28 As God has no passive potential, nothing is able to be impressed upon God – he is before all things and is in no way changed by anything he creates. Were God to understand anything in this way, these species intelligibiles “should be before the divine knowledge.”29 Further, he would only have the passive potential for some of his knowledge – it would only be potential until the act occurs and he sees it. Therefore, God’s knowledge is not caused by anything outside of himself. In the fifth demonstration of this axioma, Polanus considers the issue from the other side. He declares that God’s wisdom is essential, “because God’s wisdom is the 25 Polanus, Syntagma, 1002A “1. quia Dei sapientia, scientia, notitia nullum principium, nullam causam habet, non gignitur aliunde, sed essentialis est naturae divinae illius aeternae et immutabilis.” 26 See Keckermann, Systema, 97, “Intellectus Dei est simplicissimus actus, id circo Deus non intelligit discurrendo ab noto ad ignotum; sed rem simpliciter et per se ipsam apprehendendo.” 27 Polanus, Syntagma, 1002D, “Quia species intellilgibiles, est similitudo rei intellectae in ipso intellectu impressa: At tales similitudines non sunt in ipso intellectu divino.” 28 See Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge, Brills Studies in Intellectual History Vol. 48, A. J. Vangerjagt ed. (Leiden: Brill, 1994); and Muller, PRRD, 3:398. 29 Muller, PRRD, 3:398. Muller appears to be using ‘should’ as a rough synonym for ‘would,’ in the sense that species intelligibiles are therefore obliged to be before, rather than suggest they ought to be before.

Polanus’ Discussion of Divine Wisdom

universal cause of all things.”30 Without God’s causal activity to bring something into being, nothing has, does, or will exist. Therefore, these things cannot be the cause of God’s wisdom. In so stating the wisdom of God to be the universal cause of all things, Polanus is not contradicting what he will state later about the will of God being the cause of all things that exist. God’s understanding of all-that-can-be logically precedes the act of his will by which all things have, do, or will come into being. As Polanus has already stated, it is the wisdom of God that directs the will. There is therefore a causal relationship between God’s wisdom and will that Polanus unfolds further along in his discussion.31 The third expansion Polanus provides for his definition concerns the object of God’s wisdom. Here, Polanus states, “God knows and understands all things in every way.”32 Polanus provides multiple examples of this comprehensive knowledge of things outside of God: angels and humans; things heavenly and earthly; good and evil; the greatest and the smallest; things hidden and things manifest; universals and singulars; things necessary and things that are contingent; that which is noble and that which is common; that which is and that which is not but is possible to be; and things future, past and present. Thus, God knows himself in himself (seipsum in seipso) and whatsoever is outside of himself. Polanus further states that God does not merely know all things in a universal sense, but his knowledge also extends even to singularia.33 Thus God knows ‘humanity’ as well as each individual human, just as he knows ‘trees’ as well as this particular tree. These he knows proprie et distincte. Here Polanus quotes Hebrews 4:13, Psalm 56:9, 139:1, and Matthew 10:26–30. At this point, Polanus considers two objections to the notion that God knows even singularia: one as set forth by Averroes (1126–1198) in several arguments and another from an unnamed source. The man that Western philosophers and theologians refer to as Averroes was a twelfth-century Islamic philosopher by the name of Abû-l-Walîd Muhammad Ibn Ahmad Ibn Rushd. Marenbon notes that while Averroes lacked widespread readership or notoriety in Islamic circles, he was well known in the Latin West, and “was known simply as the ‘Commentator,’” just as Aristotle, “the author of the texts he explained so devotedly was called the ‘Philosopher.’”34 In discussing this particular objection, however, Polanus neither indicates any reference to Averroes’ work nor any particular reasoning behind his discussion of the objections themselves. It is quite possible that Polanus is building upon a discussion in De Natura Dei, where Zanchi brings forth seven arguments under the category “Rationes Averrois, contra cognitionem Dei, de singularibus: mihi 30 31 32 33 34

Polanus, Syntagma, 1002C, “Quia sapientia Dei est causa universalis rerum omnium...” See Muller, PRRD, 3:403, “Knowledge is related to causality by means of the will.” Polanus, Syntagma, 1003D, “Quinto, novit et intelligit Deus omnino omnia.” Polanus, Syntagma, 1004D. Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy, 182.

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nunc refutandae sunt.”35 Polanus is not, however, merely copying Zanchi. While there is considerable crossover (the second argument in both deals with the same issue), the items are not discussed in the same order or with the same words. As well, Zanchi discussed seven rationes, while Polanus discusses eight argumenta. Furthermore, Polanus puts the arguments into logical syllogisms, something Zanchi does for only a few of the rationes he discusses.36 Polanus states this first objection as: “God does not know singular things: therefore, he does not know infinite things.”37 Eight reasons are given in support of the premise that God does not know singularia. Included in these are that God’s intellect is free from all material, that scientia is not about infinite things (as are singularia), and that what does not exist cannot be known. Here Polanus echoes many of the notions he has previously stated, particularly that God knows according to his essence and that many of the notions Averroes employs are true of our (limited, finite, discursive, successive, and rational) understanding, they do not transfer to the one simple act of intelligence by which God knows both universals and particulars. Ultimately, attempts to deny the knowledge of particulars to God is a failure to distinguish between creator and the created. The second, unattributed, objection that Polanus presents is: “If God does not know things that are absolutely impossible, then he does not know infinite things.”38 Here again Polanus reiterates that God’s lack of knowledge of impossible things is not because of any defect in his knowledge or essence. Rather, God does not know impossible things because he does not will them to be. Furthermore, he does not will them to be precisely because they are impossible. Thus, ‘the ability to do impossible things’ is itself self-contradictory. The fourth expansion deals with the relationship between God’s wisdom and necessity. Polanus declares that God “knows all things necessarily and immutably.”39 This is true, says Polanus, because God’s wisdom is always the same – it never wavers, it never grows or shrinks. Further, God knows all thing past, present, and future. He knows that which is necessary as well as that which is contingent. Because of these things, God knows his own infinite knowledge as well as the infallible necessity of those things that occur by his absolute power. Polanus states:

35 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 256–259. 36 If anything, Zanchi’s discussion appears more in line with Aquinas, as these rationes relatively correspond to Aquinas’ objectiones – arguments given in a more narrative form – to which Zanchi ‘responds’ with the abbreviation: “R.” 37 Polanus, Syntagma, 1005B, “Deus non novit singularia: Ergo non novit infinita.” 38 Polanus, Syntagma, 1008A, “Si Deus non novit simpliciter impossibilia, tum non novit infinita.” 39 Polanus, Syntagma, 1009A, “Nono, novit omnia necessario et immutabiliter.”

Polanus’ Discussion of Divine Wisdom

Therefore, even though God knows even contingent things—i.e., things that are contingent with respect to themselves and for us—he still does not know them in a contingent way, but necessarily and infallibly, inasmuch as they are subject to the divine sight according to the mode of their presence to such.40

That is, any particular thing known by God may in and of itself be necessary or it may be contingent. God’s knowledge of it, however, is itself necessary according to the immutability and eternality of his essence.41 Polanus also appends several brief axiomata to his discussion of the wisdom of God.42 First, “the wisdom of God is infinite and inscrutable.”43 Here, Polanus quotes Job 11:7–9 (“Can you find out the deep things of God? Can you find out the limit of the Almighty? It is higher than heaven – what can you do? Deeper than Sheol – what can you know? Its measure is longer than the earth and broader than the sea.”), Psalm 147:5 (“Great is our Lord, and abundant in power; his understanding is beyond measure.”), and Romans 11:33–34 (“Oh, the depth of the riches and wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable are his judgments and how inscrutable his ways! For who has known the mind of the Lord...”).44 Second, “God does all things wisely.”45 Again, Polanus quotes from Scripture: Psalm 104:24, Proverbs 3:19–20, and Jeremiah 10:12. Third, quoting from Romans 16:27, Polanus states that only God is wise, only God is all knowing, and only he knows all that are in heaven and earth.46 Finally, God is “wise from himself.”47 This is demonstrated in Isaiah 40:13–14 and Romans 11:34. Most notable about these axiomata is their brevity and their reliance upon Scriptural citations.

40 Polanus, Syntagma, 1009B, “Etsi igitur Deus etiam novit contingentia, hoc est, quae in se et nobis talis sunt, tamen non novit ea contingenter, sed necessario et infallibiliter, quaetenus subduntur divino adspectu secundum modum praesentiae illius.” 41 Polanus will return to the notion of contingent acts further on in this chapter, as well as in the subsequent chapter on the divine will. See below, Chapters 7.4.6 and 8.5.5. 42 Although these axiomata come near the end of Polanus’ discussion of sapientia Dei, as they relate to God’s wisdom generally, rather than to the distribution of the doctrine that follows below, they are included here. 43 Polanus, Syntagma, 1019D, “Sapientia Dei est infinita ac imperscrutabilis.” 44 Polanus adds Isaiah 40:12 and 28. 45 Polanus, Syntagma, 1020A, “Deus omnia sapienter facit.” 46 Polanus, Syntagma, 1020B, “Solus Deus est sapiens. Solus Deus est omniscius, solus novit omnia in caelo et in terra.” 47 Polanus, Syntagma, 1020C, “Deus et αὐτοσοφος, a seipso sapiens.”

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7.4

The Various Distinctions within the Divine Wisdom

With these expansions upon the basic definition of God’s wisdom completed, Polanus next begins the distribution of divine wisdom into its various distinctions. First, Polanus discusses the various categories of wisdom: intelligence, knowledge, art, and prudence. Of these, Polanus focuses primarily upon God’s knowledge (scientia). Therefore, he first presents a definition of scientia and then distributes that doctrine into three primary distinctions. The first primary distinction is between the general knowledge of God and the special knowledge of God. Polanus also provides several axiomata relating to God’s general knowledge. The second distinction is between God’s knowledge of things past or present and God’s knowledge of things future. This second aspect (praescientia) is distributed into two secondary distinctions: either universal or particular, and either theoretical or practical. In the third and final primary distinction, Polanus discusses scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia visionis. It is important to recognize that Polanus will be using the term scientia in the remainder of the distinctions that he will make. This does not, however, contradict Polanus’ categorization of theology as “wisdom of divine things.”48 As he will demonstrate below, scientia is a sub-category of sapientia. Thus, these distinctions remain within our “wisdom of divine things.” Therefore, for Polanus, scientia is neither interchangeable with sapientia nor separated from it. 7.4.1

The Categories of the Divine Wisdom

Polanus’ first distinguishes various categories within the concept of wisdom: intelligence (intellegentia), knowledge (scientia), art (ars), and prudence (prudentia).49 Prior to discussing each in turn, Polanus remarks that though these categories are distinct in humans, in God they are one and the same (unum et idem). These categories of wisdom can therefore be distinguished according to our understanding, but they do not imply any alteration to or denial of divine simplicity – something that continues to be of fundamental importance to the whole of his work. Of the four, Polanus focuses primarily upon the nature of divine knowledge (scientia), providing little more than a bare definition of the remaining three. The divine intelligence, Polanus states, “is the most manifest knowledge of all things in infinite modes, knowledge more manifest, excellent, and perfect than there is in any

48 See above, Chapter 3.3. 49 Polanus, Syntagma, 1009C.

The Various Distinctions within the Divine Wisdom

angel or human in their knowledge of principles.”50 With a quotation from Psalm 139:15, he defines the art of God as “God’s absolute knowledge whereby he skillfully effects his works.”51 Polanus continues that, “thus, the world or universe has been skillfully made by a certain art of a supreme archetype and pertains to divine art.”52 Polanus defines prudence as “God’s absolute knowledge whereby he decrees and does all things by the most wise counsel of his will.”53 This he demonstrates with quotations from Isaiah 40:28 and Jeremiah 10:12. Polanus’ discussion of these terms bears resemblance to various categories of knowledge that Aquinas enumerates: Now man has different kinds of knowledge, according to the different objects of his knowledge. He has “intelligence” as regards the knowledge of principles; he has “science” as regards knowledge of conclusions; he has “wisdom” according as he knows the highest cause; he has “counsel” or “prudence,” according as he knows what is to be done.54

Furthermore, Polanus’ usage of these categories is characteristic of early Reformed Scholasticism, which, according to te Velde, “reflects at once the Aristotelian theory of science and the width of biblical witness.”55 Although Polanus acknowledges these various aspects of God’s essential wisdom, his primary focus in what remains of this chapter in the Syntagma concerns God’s knowledge.

50 Polanus, Syntagma, 1009D, “Intellegentia Dei, est cognitio evidentissima rerum omnium, infinitis modis evidentior, excellentior, perfectior, quam in ullo est Angelo aut homine intelligentia principiorum.” 51 Polanus, Syntagma, 1018C, “Ars Dei, est notitia Dei absolutissima per quam artificiose opera sua efficit.” Note that Polanus discusses the various distinctions within scientia Dei before returning to ars and prudentia. 52 Polanus, Syntagma, 1018C, “Sic Mundus seu Universum est artefactum quoddam supremi Archetypi, divinaeque artis.” 53 Polanus, Syntagma, 1018D, “Prudentia Dei est notitia Dei absolutissima, per quam omnia decernit et facit ex sapientissimo consilio voluntatis suae.” 54 Aquinas, S.Th., Ia, q. 14, a. 1, ad 2, “Homo autem, secundum diversa cognita, habet diversas cognitiones, nam secundum quod cognoscit principia, dicitur habere intelligentiam; scientiam vero, secundum quod cognoscit conclusiones; sapientiam, secundum quod cognoscit causam altissimam; consilium vel prudentiam, secundum quod cognoscit agibilia.” Although Thomas is descibing man’s knowledge, he goes on to state, “Sed haec omnia Deus una et simplici cognitione cognoscit, ut infra patebit.” Thus, these categories hold when speaking about the knowledge of God, even if the manner in which they obtain are different. 55 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 177.

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7.4.2

The Knowledge of God

Polanus’ exposition of scientia Dei contains an overall definition followed by three primary distinctions – several of which also contain secondary distinctions and/or various axiomata. Polanus begins with the following definition: “God’s knowledge is absolutely simple knowledge of all those things that rational creatures know by reasoning; God, however, knows all these things without the discursus of reasoning.”56 In this definition, Polanus highlights two aspects of God’s knowing: it is universal (comprehending all things) and it is unlike human knowing. That God knows all things looks back to Polanus’ prior discussion of God’s essential wisdom. The characteristics of God’s wisdom transfer to God’s knowledge. Polanus gives more space to the discussion of the differences between God’s way or mode of knowing and human knowing. Unlike human knowing, God’s way of knowing does not contain discreet moments of moving from ‘ignorance’ to ‘understanding.’ Rather, God understands according to a most simple act: he does not reason syllogistically or reach conclusions. Ratiocinatio, Polanus states, “concerns the things that are uncertain, but nothing is uncertain in God.”57 Furthermore, conclusions are drawn from one thing that is more well-known than another – but to God all things are equally evident and clear. Finally, conclusions are made by those who know imperfectly and therefore acquire knowledge from something else – but God knows everything most perfectly. Polanus refers to a question posed in Zanchi’s De Natura Dei concerning God’s omnipotence: “An scientia, cognitio, et sapientia, Deo proprie attribuantur.”58 In that section, speaking of the difference between cognition in God and in created beings, Zanchi states that “God understands most perfectly and all things by one act simultaneously.”59 At the end of the section, Polanus encourages his readers to refer to a section from Francisco Suarez’s Metaphysicarum disputationum, in which Suarez notes that in God’s understanding and knowledge “there is no sequence, division, or discourse.”60

56 Polanus, Syntagma, 1009D, “Scientia Dei est notitia simplicissima omnium eorum quae creaturae rationales ratiocinando cognoscunt; Deus autem absque discursu ratiocinationis omnia (Psalm. 139:6).” 57 Polanus, Syntagma, 1010A, “Ratiocinatio enim, est de rebus dubiis, at Deo nihil est dubium (Heb 4:13).” 58 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 241. 59 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 242, “At Deus perfectissime, omniaque simul uno actu intelligit…” 60 Francisco Suarez, Metaphysicarum disputationum, 2 vols (Baptisan colosinum, 1605), XXX.XV.xxxiv (p. 129), “nulla est compositio, divisio, aut discursus…” Polanus does not quote Suarez directly but does refer specifically to this section and paragraph of this disputation, suggesting that he may have had it open before him as he referenced it.

The Various Distinctions within the Divine Wisdom

7.4.3

The General and Special Knowledge of God

Having defined divine knowledge and expanded upon that definition, Polanus distinguishes various aspects of the divine knowledge. The first distinction is between the general and special knowledge of God. God’s general knowledge is “that whereby he simply and absolutely knows all, both according to their factuality and according to their causality.”61 God knows the ‘what’ or ‘thatness’ of all things (κατα το ὁτι) as well as the ‘why’ or ‘therefore’ of all things (κατα το διοτι). This knowledge of all things extends even to sin and to the reprobate. God knows that which is good by means of himself (per seipsum). God knows evil, however, “reductively by way of opposing it to the good.”62 Polanus notes that this comprehensive knowledge is also termed “omniscience,” although this is a term that he does not use extensively. Polanus next provides seven axiomata for the general knowledge of God. Five of these reiterate material or ideas that have previously been discussed: the knowledge of God is actual, not habitual; nothing is hidden or obscured from God; and his knowledge is infallible, eternal, immutable, infinite, and universal. The third and seventh axiomata deserve special attention. The third axioma states: “all things in God’s knowledge are necessary—even if they are contingent in themselves with respect to their [created] causes.”63 Although Polanus does not expand upon this axioma, it demonstrates an important point. According to his essence, God knows all things necessarily. The object known by God, however, may in itself be either necessary or contingent. That is, something may be contingent with respect to its secondary cause, yet God still knows it necessarily. This knowledge does not impact the contingent nature of the cause or the effect, it merely reflects the absolute knowledge of God, as will be discussed more fully below.64 In the seventh axioma, Polanus relates God’s general knowledge to both universals and particulars. With respect to universal forms (formas universales), God “immutably possesses in himself from eternity these as the universal source (principium universale).”65 Similarly, God has singular forms (formas singulares), “as the exemplar or idea of each and every singular thing in the eternality of his infinite intellect, according to which all things and individual things are absolutely present

61 Polanus, Syntagma, 1010C, “Generalis scientia Dei, est qua simpliciter et absolute omnia et κατα το ὁτι et κατα το διοτι cognoscit.” 62 Polanus, Syntagma, 1010C, “Malum vero reductive per oppositum Bonum.” 63 Polanus, Syntagma, 1011A, “Omnia in scientia Dei sunt necessaria, etiamsi in se essent contingentia respectu causarum suarum.” 64 See below, section 7.4.6. 65 Polanus, Syntagma, 1011B, “Deus tum formas universales, ut principium universale, habet in sese ab aeterno immutabiliter…”

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as such in him (in se) and by him (a se) eternally.”66 In this axioma, Polanus both utilizes Aristotelian categories and distances himself (and by extension, Christian theology) from Aristotelian philosophy. In Aristotelian philosophy, particular things (singulars) require matter for individualization.67 Because of this, singular things cannot precede actuality: only universals are eternal. There cannot be, therefore, any likeness of singular things for God to know – at least not prior to their existence in time. This notion the Reformed orthodox saw “not only as philosophically unacceptable but also as the source of a series of errors both in and beyond the doctrine of God.”68 Polanus adopts a view that “resembles the Platonist-Augustinian view of the Ideas as having eternal existence in the mind of God.”69 This allows Polanus to both affirm God’s knowledge of singular things and to deny that these singular things have existence outside of God. Polanus adopts a broadly Aristotelian concept but transforms it according to his understanding of the dictates of Scripture. Polanus next provides a definition of the other half of the distinction, that of the special knowledge of God. He states: The special knowledge of God is that whereby he knows his elect ones, not only as he knows all the [non-elect] remaining, but graciously acknowledges [them] as his own, and whereby he distinguishes them from the others, regards them beyond the others, and approves them and loves them even to the point of considering them his sons in the beloved.70

In support of this definition, Polanus cites Psalm 1:6, Exodus 33:12, and Matthew 7:23. Polanus further declares that this is the knowledge of divine predestination and is also called scientia approbationis.71 Thus, Polanus points out an important difference between the general and special knowledge of God. On the one hand, the means of God’s knowledge is different. God knows generally according to his 66 Polanus, Syntagma, 1011B, “… tum formas singulares ut exemplar sive ideam rei cuiusque singularis infinitate aeterna intellectus sui, secundum quam omnia et singula sunt ipsi in se et a se aeternum praesentissima.” 67 See Muller, PRRD, 3:409, where Muller states, “Much of this problem derived from the assumption held by Aristotelian philosophy that the senses know singular things inasmuch as singulars are individuated by matter and the senses perceive the material order, while reason in and of itself knows only universals…” 68 Muller, PRRD, 3:409. 69 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 180. 70 Polanus, Syntagma, 1011D, “Specialis scientia Dei, est qua suos electos non solum ut reliqua omnia cognoscit, verum etiam gratiose agnoscit pro suis, ab aliis discernit, prae aliis curat, eosque approbat, et tantum filios in illo dilecto amat.” 71 Polanus, Syntagma, 1011E.

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essence, but the special knowledge of God is a result of the operation of his will. It is therefore also true that the objects of God’s knowledge are different. By his general knowledge, God knows all created things. His special knowledge, however, comprehends only the elect. 7.4.4

Divine Foreknowledge

The second set of distinctions in God’s knowledge that Polanus utilizes distinguishes between a knowledge of things past or present and a knowledge (or foreknowledge) of things future.72 Polanus indicates he does not mean to introduce a distinction in God’s knowledge per se, but only in our way of understanding: “for God knows simultaneously in one act of his understanding all things that are for us past, present, and future.”73 Those things which to us are past or present are, however, things future with respect to God’s knowledge.74 That is, God does not have knowledge of these past and present things by virtue of having seen them (much less having learned of them in some other way). Rather, all things that have, do, or will come to pass are contained in the foreknowledge of God. Polanus focuses his attention upon foreknowledge (praescientia), for which he provides the following definition: “The foreknowledge of God signifies God as having foreseen and foreknown from eternity all things that are said to be future with respect to us.”75 To further explain divine foreknowledge, Polanus introduces two sets of distinctions: foreknowledge is either universal or particular and either theoretical or practical. 7.4.5

Distinctions within Divine Foreknowledge

The first distinction Polanus introduces into God’s foreknowledge is that of the universal (universalis) and particular (particularis) foreknowledge of God.76 To be more specific, he discusses the first aspect of this distinction in greater detail. Polanus defines the universal foreknowledge of God as “that whereby God knows from eternity all things future temporally—both things that he himself was going to do (in the elect, reprobate, or in other creatures), and things that others were

72 Polanus, Syntagma, 1012A. 73 Polanus, Syntagma, 1012A, “Nam Deus simul uno intelligendi actu ab aeterno novit omnia, quae nobis sunt praeterita, praesentia et futura.” 74 See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 180, “God is eternal, and to him the succession of first and last, before and after, does not apply.” 75 Polanus, Syntagma, 1013C, “Praescientia Dei, est quam Deus significatur praevidisse et praecognovisse ab aeterno omnia, quae nostri respectu futura dicuntur...” 76 Polanus, Syntagma, 1013D.

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going to do because they were so permitted to do so.”77 Here Polanus distinguishes between God’s own activity and that which God merely permits, yet he includes these realms of activity within the universal foreknowledge of God. In support of this definition, Polanus provides another set of axiomata. The first three axiomata deal with the relationship between God’s foreknowledge and sin. The universal foreknowledge of God encompasses the whole of creation. This universal foreknowledge therefore also comprehends even that which God himself does not do – such as sin.78 Yet the relationship is not causal: “God’s foreknowledge is not the cause of those things that God decreed not to do but only to permit, as of sin.”79 Here Polanus anticipates the objection that such absolute foreknowledge would make God the author of sin. While this foreknowledge is not the cause of sin, it is “the cause of those things that God decreed either to do through himself or through others.”80 God is therefore not the author of all that he foreknows, but only the author of that which he decrees to do. God knows all that will be done, but he is not the efficient cause of all that he foreknows. Polanus therefore roots the foreknowledge of God in the decree. God foreknows for no other reason than because he decrees that which comes about in the future.81 Thus, divine willing precedes foreknowing – which is something that anticipates a later distinction between the knowledge of simple understanding and the knowledge of vision. In the fourth axioma, Polanus states, “neither divine foreknowledge or foreseeing impose upon future events necessity in themselves.”82 God knows contingent things necessario et infallibiliter, both because all things and events are present to his divine knowledge and because he knows all things conjoined with their attending causes. With respect to the sins of those whom God has decreed to create, divine foreknowledge does not convey a forced necessity to sin. “Neither,” adds Polanus, “do we sin because God foreknows it, but he knows rather that we are those going to sin.”83 In

77 Polanus, Syntagma, 1013D, “Universalis praescientia Dei, est qua Deus ab aeterno novit omnia, in tempore futura, tum quae ipse facturus erat, sive in electis, sive in reprobis, sive in aliis creaturis, tum quae alii facturi ad admissuri erant.” 78 Polanus, Syntagma, 1013D. 79 Polanus, Syntagma, 1014A, “Praescentia Dei non est causa eorum quae Deus decrevit non facere, sed solumodo permittere, ut peccati.” 80 Polanus, Syntagma, 1014A, “Eadem vero praescientia, est causa earum rerum, quas decrevit Deus facere vel per se vel per alios.” 81 Polanus, Syntagma, 1014C. As Polanus puts it: “Nec alia ratione Deus quae sunt praevidit, quam quia ita ut fierent decrevit.” 82 Polanus, Syntagma, 1014C, “Nec praescientia seu praevisio divina affert rebus et eventibus futuris necessitatem in ipsis.” 83 Polanus, Syntagma, 1014E, “Nec ideo peccamus, quia praescit Deus, sed praescit potius, quia peccaturi sumus...”

The Various Distinctions within the Divine Wisdom

this axioma, Polanus distinguishes between God’s knowledge of things themselves and the knowledge he has of these things in himself. God knows contingent things as contingent, even if the knowledge he has of them is necessary according to his own essence. Moreover, God’s necessary knowledge of future things does not convey an absolute necessity upon the object known. While it cannot be denied that God’s immutable, infinite, and perfect foreknowledge means that God knows how all things will occur, this connection is not strictly causal.84 This axioma adumbrates later Reformed scholastic usage of a medieval distinction between the necessity of the consequence (necessitas consequentiae) and the necessity of the consequent thing (necessitas consequentis).85 In the latter sort of necessity, the thing itself is necessary – such as the existence of God or the finite nature of all created things. In the former, necessity is only conveyed by consequence of the decree. The thing itself may be necessary, free, or contingent. As Muller states, Foreknowledge itself is not causal: knowledge is related to causality by means of the will. God knows things that he wills directly and immediately, and he also knows things that he wills only indirectly, that rise out of the interrelationship of secondary causality and free choice. God can therefore be said to know with certainty all future contingents and conditionals, whether they eventuate freely as choices of will or as necessities of consequence, inasmuch as his will actuates all things and from the perspective of the first cause they happen “immutably and infallibly” – but the manner of his willing of possibles is such that “according to the nature of second causes” they occur “necessarily, freely, or contingently,” in the course of time.86

Although Polanus does not use this more technical language in his discussion of this axioma here, the meaning of his explanation is essentially the same.87 Furthermore, Polanus is aware of the distinction in that he uses the language of hypothetical necessity in his discussion of divine freedom.88

84 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 182, “It is clear that Reformed Orthodoxy does not draw a straight line of necessity from God’s knowledge to the actual state of affairs.” 85 For more on the distinction between a necessity of consequence and of the consequent, see chapter 10.4, below. See also van Asselt, et al., “Introduction,” in Reformed Thought on Freedom, 35–38. 86 Muller, PRRD, 3:403–404. Muller quotes from Westminster Confession of Faith, V.ii. 87 See also Muller, Divine Will and Human Choice, 206, “This necessity, however, is consistently identified as a ‘necessity of infallibility’ or a ‘necessity of certainty’ in relation to the contingent order and the actuality of the order defined typically as a necessity of the consequence rather than as a necessity of the consequent thing.” Muller references Bucanus’ Institutiones theologicae, which was published in 1605, and the distinction was present also in Vermigli some fifty years prior, per van Asselt, et al., “Introduction,” in Reformed Thought on Freedom, 35. 88 See below, Chapter 10.4, for a discussion of the relationship between the concepts of hypothetical necessity and the necessity of the consequence.

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Fifth, Polanus distinguishes between foreknowledge and predestination. Predestination refers particularly to God’s election of those he chooses to save and reprobation of those he does not. “Foreknowledge” explains Polanus, “is broader than predestination.”89 Foreknowledge does not, however, extend further than the decree, “for God has foreknown nothing other than what he decreed either to do or to allow to happen.”90 In the sixth axioma, Polanus distinguishes between foreknowledge and permission. “Foreknowledge” he says, “is an act of intelligence, [whereas] permission is an act of the will.”91 Furthermore, the act of foreknowledge remains (immantentis) within God, just as the object of his foreknowledge is in himself (in se). Permission, on the other hand, crosses outside (transeuntis) of himself, just as its object is outside himself (extra se). In the seventh and final axioma, Polanus states that “all that God has foreknown, he has willed to happen.”92 This is so because nothing either is or may be except that which God either wills to do himself or wills to permit others to do. Even that which God permits (such as sin) comes about by the will of God. Having set forth these axiomata, Polanus returns to the other half of the distinction. Here, he defines the particular foreknowledge of God as “that whereby he specially pre-knows with a gracious affection of love certain individuals (i.e., the elect ones) as his own.”93 Polanus references both Romans 8:29 and 1 Peter 1:2 in support of this distinction. He furthermore parallels the prior distinction between general and special knowledge noted above. There is an important difference, however: the general knowledge of God takes into account all that is or could be, while the special knowledge of God is particularly conjoined with his will in election. Both the universal and particular foreknowledge of God, because it is ‘foreknowledge’, is conjoined with God’s eternal and immutable will. The second of the two distinctions is between the theoretical (theorica) and practical (practica) foreknowledge of God. Polanus describes the first sort of foreknowledge as nuda, “and is therefore called theoretical, speculative and contemplative.”94 This is the foreknowledge of God understood as a pure and simple act of God’s wisdom and understanding distinct from his will. This is not to suggest that

89 Polanus, Syntagma, 1015A, “Eadem praescientia patet latius quam praedestinatio, sed non patet latius quam decretum…” 90 Polanus, Syntagma, 1015A, “Nam nulla alia praescivit Deus, nisi quae decrevit, vel facere vel permittere fieri.” 91 Polanus, Syntagma, 1015B, “Nam praescientia est actus intelligentiae: permissio est actus voluntatis.” 92 Polanus, Syntagma, 1015B, “Omnia quae Deus praescivit, etiam voluit fieri…” 93 Polanus, Syntagma, 1015C, “Praescientia Dei particularis, est qua speciatim quosdam, nimirum electos, cum gratioso amoris affectu, ut suos praecognovit.” 94 Polanus, Syntagma, 1015E, “Prior est praescientia nuda, ac proinde theorica, speculativa, contemplativa dicitur.”

The Various Distinctions within the Divine Wisdom

foreknowledge is in any way separable from the divine will (for that which God ‘foresees’ is foreknown only because of the divine will), but rather to indicate that the foreknowledge of God can be understood theoretically in distinction from the will. The second sort of foreknowledge is active and practical. It is the foreknowledge that God has by virtue of the decree – and thus, by virtue of the will of God.95 This foreknowledge, Polanus states, “the Scholastics call praescientiam beneplaciti, and is the cause of things.”96 Muller explains the causal nature of practical foreknowledge in that “it is directed toward the goal of creation.”97 Polanus’ discussion of this distinction is brief, and is in many ways comparable to the distinction that follows. 7.4.6

The Knowledge of Simple Intelligence and the Knowledge of Vision

The third major distinction in the knowledge of God which Polanus discusses is between scientia visionis and scientia simplicis intelligentiae. Polanus defines the knowledge of vision as “that whereby God knows and sees as present [to himself] those things that exist and are yet future in every way.”98 God therefore has a comprehensive knowledge of all things that is not dependent upon the actual unfolding of time. While these things have not yet occurred when God ‘knows’ them (in that they are ‘future in every way’), yet God sees them ‘as present’. This is the knowledge of actuals (whether past, present, or future) – which Polanus notes is also called “intuitive knowledge” (notitia intuitiva).99 God knows these things in himself according to three manners. First, “He knows such things in himself not only as they are in his power, i.e., the things that he can do, but even as they are by his willing as those things that happen at some point.”100 In this, Polanus combines not only God’s knowledge and his will (as he knows because he wills), but also God’s knowledge and his power (in that he knows what he is capable of bringing about – i.e., all that is not impossible). Second, God “knows such things also in their secondary and proximate causes, whereby at some point such things will proceed and will be brought to light.”101 While these secondary and 95 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 289, notes that this category of God’s foreknowledge is found in Thomas, but not in Duns Scotus. 96 Polanus, Syntagma, 1016D, “Hanc Scolastici praescientiam beneplaciti vocant: Et haec est causa rerum.” 97 Muller, PRRD, 3:408. 98 Polanus, Syntagma, 1016D, “Scientia visionis in Deo, est qua Deus ea quae sunt et omnino futura sunt novit et videt, tanquam praesentia.” 99 Polanus, Syntagma, 1017B. 100 Polanus, Syntagma, 1016E, “Eaque novit primo in seipso non solum tanquam potente, hoc est, qui ea possit facere, sed etiam tanquam ea tandem fieri volente.” 101 Polanus, Syntagma, 1016E, “Secundo, novit ea in suis quoque causis secundis et proximis, a quibus omnino tandem proficiscentur et in lucem prodibunt.”

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proximate causes are outside himself, Polanus indicates that God not only knows causes and effects independently of each other, he also knows them as causes and effects. Third, “God knows such things in their very selves—i.e., that all things are going to exist.”102 From this is shown that while Polanus can distinguish between praescientia and scientia visionis, he nevertheless demonstrates the unity of God’s knowledge. God is therefore demonstrated to know that which occurs in three ways: first, he knows them through his own causality – i.e., he knows himself as the first cause of all things; second, he knows all things through the agency of secondary causes; third, he knows all things in themselves, abstracted from causality – i.e., he knows them as more than just effects of his own (and secondary) causality. In contrast to the knowledge of vision, Polanus also considers the scientia simplicis intelligentiae. He provides the following definition: The knowledge of simple intelligence in God is that whereby God knows the things that can actually happen or exist but never will happen nor exist—knowing such merely in his omnipotent essence but not in his will (because he does not will them to happen), not in their secondary causes (because these things have none), and not in themselves (because they will never exist).103

Here Polanus presents a knowledge in God that encompasses that which could be but is not. While Polanus combines knowledge, will, and power in his formulation of God’s knowledge of vision, in his discussion of the knowledge of simple intelligence he posits a knowledge that flows only from God’s power. Polanus notes that it can also be termed “abstract knowledge” (notitia abstractiva).104 Polanus affirms that this knowledge is in God by an act of his faculty of wisdom rather than by the faculty of his will. That they do not come to be is according to God’s will, but the knowledge of them in themselves comes from the faculty of wisdom. He terms this intelligence ‘simple’ (simplex) because it refers to that which does not itself exist but is only known as being rationally consistent or possible. Thus, by this aspect of God’s knowledge, he knows infinite substances and natures – even if they never actually come to be. “For,” Polanus states, “God’s power extends to infinity—i.e., he is able to create infinite things.”105 Again, the source of this

102 Polanus, Syntagma, 1017A, “Tertio novit ea Deus in semetipsis, quia scilicet omnia futura sunt.” 103 Polanus, Syntagma, 1017B, “Scientia simplicis intelligentiae in Deo, est qua Deus ea quae possunt quidem fieri et esse, sed nunquam fient, nunquam erunt, novit, in sua duntaxat omnipotente essentia, non autem in volente, quia ea non vult fieri, neque in causis eorum secundis, quia nulla habent; neque in seipsis, quia nunquam futura sunt.” 104 Polanus, Syntagma, 1017E. 105 Polanus, Syntagma, 1017D, “Potentia enim Dei in infinitum extenditur, hoc est, potest infinita creare.”

The Various Distinctions within the Divine Wisdom

knowledge is not God’s will choosing that which will be, but God’s power as that which he is able to bring about. Polanus appends two axiomata to the scientia simplicis intelligentiae. The first is that God knows “even those things that do not exist, and yes even those things that will never actually exist, provided they are not impossible things absolutely speaking.”106 Here Polanus denies to God the ability to know that which is impossible because “God does not will and is not able to do what is impossible absolutely speaking.”107 It is important that this axioma comes under the scientia simplicis intelligentiae, as Polanus only specifically denies a knowledge of that which is simply impossible with this particular distinction in the divine wisdom. As the scientia visionis comprehends all that is, it cannot by definition contain anything that is impossible. The second axioma is “those things that will never exist, possess existence in God’s omnipotence (provided they are not impossible absolutely speaking). For this reason, there is truth for all such things.”108 If this were not so, God could not know these things that are not, as he only knows that which is true. Polanus’ use of the distinction between scientia visionis and scientia simplicis intelligentiae closely corresponds to the treatment of Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae. Thomas defines the knowledge of vision as that which reaches to all that exists (past, present, or future): Since God’s understanding, which is his existence, is measured by eternity, which comprehends all time seeing as it it exists without succession, thus God’s present intuit reaches to all time and to all things that exist at any time as objects that are in a present mode for him.109

By this, God has seen (intuitus) all things that exist – that are or will be at any time – because they are present before him. There are other things, Thomas goes on to say, “which nevertheless are not, nor will be, nor have been.”110 These cannot be known

106 Polanus, Syntagma, 1017E, “Deus novit etiam ea quae non sunt: et vero etiam quae nunquam actu futura sunt, dummodo non sint simpliciter impossibilia.” 107 Polanus, Syntagma, 1018A, “Ut enim Deus non vult et non potest impossibilia simpliciter: ita etiam ea non novit.” 108 Polanus, Syntagma, 1018A, “Ea quae nunquam sunt futura, dummodo non sint simpliciter impossibilia, habent esse in omnipotentia Dei: idcirco omnium eorum est veritas.” 109 Aquinas, S.Th., Ia, q. 14, a. 9, “Quia, cum intelligere Dei, quod est eius esse, aeternitate mensuretur, quae sine successione existens totum tempus comprehendit, praesens intuitus Dei fertur in totum tempus, et in omnia quae sunt in quocumque tempore, sicut in subiecta sibi praesentialiter.” 110 Aquinas, S.Th., Ia, q. 14, a. 9, “Quaedam vero sunt, quae sunt in potentia Dei vel creaturae, quae tamen nec sunt nect erunt neque fuerunt.”

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by a knowledge of vision but remain known by God according to his knowledge of simple intelligence. While Polanus’ treatment of the distinction between the scientia visionis and the scientia simplicis intelligentiae demonstrates continuity with Thomas Aquinas, it shows some degree of discontinuity with other Reformed scholastic theologians. One level of discontinuity is with his near contemporaries. As has already been noted, Ursinus, Daneau, Bucanus and Trelcatius, Jr., do not utilize any scholastic distinctions in their discussion of divine knowledge, foreknowledge, or understanding. Keckermann, by way of example, presents a rather short exposition of the intellectus Dei, noting only four basic theorems: that God knows by a mere act of understanding; that God knows from himself; that God knows without temporal distinctions of past, present, or future; and that God knows necessarily.111 Polanus’ use of this distinction (as well as others) serves to distinguish him from these contemporary theologians. Polanus’ relationship to Zanchi is more nuanced. While Zanchi’s examination of the doctrine of the scientia Dei is quite extensive, he does not employ the distinction between scientia visionis and scientia simplicis intelligentiae.112 Zanchi presents Deus videns: one who sees all things perfectly and infinitely. Specifically, this God knows things which are future and things which are to us contingent.113 Zanchi defends this knowledge of God with many of the same reasons and Scripture references as are employed by other Reformed scholastics in discussing the scientia visionis. Further, Zanchi demonstrates that this God sees even things which neither exist now, nor have existed, nor will exist in the future.114 Though he does not use the language of scientia simplicis intelligentia, Zanchi once again captures the general idea of the distinction. Thus, Polanus and Zanchi are quite close on the concept and substance of this distinction, even if they diverge in the terms that they use. Regarding those Reformed Scholastics writing after Polanus, another level of discontinuity emerges. While the use of the distinction is present in several theologians, their particular use of the notion of scientia simplicis intelligentiae is slightly different than what is presented by Polanus. Voetius uses scientia simplicis intelligentiae to refer to possible things (possibilia) and scientia visionis to refer to actual things (existentia).115 Cocceius uses cognitio simplicis intelligentiae to refer to God’s

111 Keckermann, Systema, 97–99. 112 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 230–277. This is also a divergence from Zanchi’s usually Thomistic presentation of theology. The lack of this distinction is not noted among the differences between Zanchi and Thomas in Goris, “Thomism in Zanchi’s Doctrine of God,” 136ff. 113 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 249. 114 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 254. 115 Gisbertus Voetius, Selectarum disputationum theologicarum, 5 vols. (Utrecht, Joannem a Waesberge, 1648), I.248. See also Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 291.

The Various Distinctions within the Divine Wisdom

knowledge of possible things (rerum possibilium), and scientia visionis et scientia libera to refer to that which God wills to be (quae Deus vult esse).116 Pictet uses scientia simplicis intelligentiae to refer to God’s knowledge of that which can occur (quae fieri possunt) and scientia visionis to refer to God’s knowledge of those things future (res futuras).117 Rijssen uses scientia simplicis intelligentiae seu natrualem et indefinitam to refer to God’s knowledge of that which are merely possible (rerum mere possibilium), and scientia liberam, seu visionis, et definitam to refer to God’s knowledge of things future (rerum furturam).118 Note the consistency in terminology: God’s knowledge of simple intelligence is of things possible, things which are able to occur.119 Polanus, however, differs from these uses by stating that the things known according to scientia simplicis intelligentiae are mere possibilities which never are actualized: they are that which nunquam fient and nunquam errunt. In this, Polanus reflects Thomas Aquinas’ definition of scientia simplicis intelligentiae.120 Thus, Polanus envisions two distinct categories: one that is possible but not actual because it is not willed, and another that is actual because it is willed. It is important to note that Polanus is not differentiating between God’s knowledge of ‘possible’ and ‘actual’ – the differentiation made by the theologians in the previous paragraph. Rather, he is differentiating between ‘not actual’ and ‘actual’. In other words, rather than see the scientia visionis as a sort of subset of the scientia simplicis intelligentiae (the later encompassing all possibilities from which God ‘actualizes’ through the decree), Polanus sees them as two distinct categories of knowledge. While Polanus does not provide the reason for his particular understanding of scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia visionis, it may come about not so much 116 Cocceius, Summa theologiae, X.12 (p. 144) and X.16 (p. 144). See also van Asselt, The Federal Theology of Cocceius, 165–66. 117 Benedict Pictet, Theologia christiana ex puris SS. Literam fontibus hausta (Geneva: Cramer and Perachon, 1716), II.V.xvi (p. 155). 118 Leonhard Rijssen, Summa theologiae didactio-elenticae: ex celeberrimorum theologorum scriptis praecipue vero ex Francisci Turrettini Instituionibus theologicis aucta et illustrata (Bern, 1690), III.xxiv (p. 83). Given Rijssen’s usage of these two pairs of terms side by side, it suggests that for many in the Reformed orthodox, they were virtually identical. 119 See Muller, PRRD, 3:407, “a knowledge of things and events, some of which God wills into existence, the rest remaining nonexistent.”; Muller, “Scientia necessaria”, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 276, “[this is] the knowledge that God, according to his nature, must necessarily have: infinite and perfect knowledge of both the divine being itself... and of all possibilities.”; and te Velde, Doctrine of God, 180, “This knowledge is also called “knowledge of mere understanding,” because the object of the natural knowledge does not consist of the really existent entities, but only of the entities conceived in their essential structure as possibly existing. God does perfectly know and understand whatever could be possibly in existence, although some of these possibilities are never realized.” 120 See above, note 103.

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from a misunderstanding of these other theologians, nor from the ignorance of the difference. Rather, it can be explained somewhat by an understanding of the way in which Polanus usually uses distinctions. While in one sense the distinctions are never to be severed or separated, they allow Polanus to place things into two distinguishable categories. ‘What we are to believe concerning God’ cannot be separated from ‘what God requires of us,’ but they are both distinguishable and, to a large degree, mutually exclusive. What is in one category is not in the other – neither conceptually nor in the way in which Polanus presents them. When he comes to this particular distinction, it is at least possible that he intends for these two categories of God’s knowledge to be mutually exclusive. In one half of the distinction he places those things that are able to be but are not. In the other half he places those things that are able to be and are. While this particular pattern seems unique to Polanus, it is understandable in reference to his overall pattern of discussion. In terms of the secondary literature’s interaction with this distinction, Faulenbach states that scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia visionis refer to foreknowledge (praescientia), rather than to knowledge more generally.121 In this, Faulenbach passes immediately from a discussion of God’s immutability to God’s knowledge, leaving behind the distinction between these two in terms of the order of essential property (first vs. second) and that God’s foreknowledge is to be understood as a distinction, first, within God’s wisdom (sapientia), second, within God’s blessedness (beatitudino), which is itself one of four second order essential properties. In other words, Faulenbach ignores the structure of Polanus’ discourse in order to link immutability and foreknowledge. Thus, he misconstrues where Polanus places this distinction. Further, Faulenbach seeks to show how Polanus’ understanding of God’s knowledge is rooted in the doctrine of divine immutability. He states: All knowledge of God is founded in his immutabilitas; if there was ever something fundamentally new, this immutabilitas would no longer be sustained and, thus, at the same time the perfection of God would be denied. But since it exists, Polanus believes that all problems, like all events, must be traced back to this ultimate reason, without the inherent law of things being abolished.122

121 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 142, “Dem [i.e., the distinction between God’s knowledge of vision and God’s knowledge of simple intelligence] entspricht eine doppelte Aussage über Gottes Vorherwissen.”. 122 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 143, “Alles Wissen Gottes gründet in seiner immutabilitas; gäbe es einmal etwas grundsätzlich Neues, so wäre diese immutabilitas nicht mehr aufrechtzuerhalten und damit zugleich die Vollkommenheit Gottes bestritten. Da es sie aber gibt, müssen sich für Polan alle Probleme wie alles Geschehen auf diesen letzten Grund zurückführen lassen, ohne daß die Eigengesetzlichkeit in den Dingen aufgehoben wird.”

Summary

Faulenbach therefore confuses the ground which Polanus himself provides for God’s foreknowledge (wisdom, will, and power combined in a most free act) and instead relies upon a connection that Polanus would no doubt not deny, but does not make patent in the Syntagma. There is, however, an important difference between God’s foreknowledge having the characteristic of immutability and the notion that foreknowledge is grounded in immutability. As all of God’s essential properties are essentially one, Polanus would not deny that God’s foreknowledge is immutable. Yet this is not to suggest that Polanus traces back foreknowledge to immutability. Indeed, this is something that Polanus himself does not do. Perhaps of even greater interest is Polanus’ complete lack of reference to scientia media, even though the Syntagma is published well after the release of Luis Molina’s Concordia liberi arbitrii (1588) and Polanus himself demonstrates at least some level of familiarity with the work of Francesco Suarez. A detailed critique of scientia media, however, would come after Polanus, beginning with the works of Maccovius, Twisse, and Voetius.123

7.5

Summary

In this chapter on the divine wisdom, Polanus has set forth God as knowing all things by one immutable act of understanding. God is therefore neither ignorant, nor learning, nor forgetting. This wisdom is not separate or separable from God: it is his essential wisdom and is therefore identical with his own essence. This chapter also introduced several distinctions within the divine wisdom. Although Polanus has made distinctions before, this chapter shows the depth with which Polanus can analyze and discuss a topic. The first distinction dealt with the categories of wisdom: intelligence, knowing, art, and prudence. Taking knowledge (scientia) as the primary category, Polanus proceeds to drill down with more distinctions: between God’s general and special knowledge; between God’s knowledge of things past or present and things future (i.e., divine foreknowledge); between a universal and a particular foreknowledge; between a theoretical and a practical foreknowledge; and between a knowledge of simple intelligence and a knowledge of vision. This last distinction is in many ways foundational to what follows in the chapter on the divine will. God knows all things that could be according to his essential wisdom, but he knows that which will be according to the free choice of his own will.

123 For an overview discussion of the Reformed orthodox response to scientia media, see Muller, PRRD, 3:411–432; te Velde, Doctrine of God, 183–188; Bac, Perfect Will Theology, 71–156; and Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 300–351.

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Beyond the importance of these definitions and distinctions in themselves, Polanus’ discussion of divine wisdom also demonstrates the broader interconnectedness of the Syntagma. Polanus’ discussion of divine wisdom rests upon his earlier discussion in book one of the proper genus of theology: that it is the wisdom of divine things. Thus, wisdom (as opposed to science, art, or prudence) forms the basis for this chapter. Further, this nature of God’s way of understanding that is demonstrated in this chapter was more or less assumed in his earlier discussion of God’s archetypal theology: that is, God knows without discourse or logical reasoning.

Chapter Eight: The Divine Will

8.1

Introduction

This chapter discusses Polanus’ doctrine of the divine will as it is found in the nineteenth chapter of the Syntagma. Although there are some distinguishing features of the methodology Polanus uses (see below, 8.3), the overall result is generally typical of Polanus’ exposition of an essential property of God: a definition followed by several distinctions and sub-distinctions. As with the previous chapter on the divine wisdom, Polanus presents a somewhat complex group of distinctions. With these distinctions, Polanus shows himself to be similar to the medieval scholastics and the Reformed orthodox, while also willing to distinguish himself from them at need. This chapter begins with a survey of this doctrine among the various Reformed orthodox theologians with whom I have been comparing Polanus. Next, I consider the particular way in which Polanus organizes this doctrine to include a nesting of God’s essential properties beneath the distribution of God’s will into his goodness and his justice. In connection with this, I examine a significant shift in the structure of some of the chapters that follow. Finally, I consider Polanus’ doctrine of the divine will itself according to the definitions and distinctions he makes, taking special care to examine these doctrines in light of Polanus’ historical and theological context.

8.2

The State of the Doctrine of the Divine Will in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

The discussion and development of the doctrine of the divine will during the whole period of Reformed orthodoxy was marked by the convergence of two things: the Reformation era emphasis on sacred Scripture as its principium cognoscendi and the appreciation for and appropriation of medieval Scholastic terminology and methodology. Reformed orthodox theologians therefore sought to do justice to the breadth of biblical witness regarding the nature, modes, and objects of God’s will. While the same might be able to be said about every doctrine these theologians sought to demonstrate, the biblical witness regarding God’s will is tangled and difficult. Indeed, as Muller states, “the biblical references to divine voluntas were so varied that they could not be understood apart from a series of distinctions in the

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divine willing.”1 The elaboration of such distinctions, therefore, marks much of the theological discussion of the Reformed orthodox. With regard to the early Reformed orthodox theologians with whom I am comparing Polanus, however, the adoption of these distinctions is found in a more nascent state. For the majority, the discussion of the divine will is limited to a definition. Where more is added, it usually takes the form of a discussion of the modes and/or objects of the divine will. On one end of the spectrum, neither Ursinus nor Daneau include a separate discussion of the divine will, but connect it with other attributes: God’s will is immutable and is able to do whatever it wills.2 Bucanus simply lists voluntas among God’s general attributes without any additional elaboration.3 Keckermann has a more extensive discussion of the doctrine, primarily focusing upon the various objects of God’s will and the relation of God’s will to sin.4 Perkins defines the will of God as “that by which he both most freely, and justly, with one act willeth all things.”5 His discussion includes various objects of God’s will, but does not include distinctions within the divine will.6 Trelcatius, Jr., references several distinctions, but without much additional discussion or elaboration. He lists the following distinctions: absolute and conditional; consequent and antecedent; revealed and hidden; effectual and ineffectual; and consequentis et consequentia.7 By way of contrast, Zanchi’s overall discussion of the divine will is quite extensive and includes the use of several distinctions. This demonstrates a marked shift from the general lack of distinctions Zanchi used in his discussion of divine wisdom. Although he asserts that the divine will is one according to nature, Zanchi concedes that it is multiplex “on account of a diversity of things,” and “on account of diverse modes.”8 Among these diverse modes, Zanchi refers to several distinctions: an absolute and conditional will (voluntas absolutis et conditionalis), the will of God’s good pleasure and of his signified will (voluntas beneplacti et signi), a consequent and an antecedent will (voluntas consequens et antecedens), an effective and ineffective will (voluntas efficax et inefficax), and a hidden and revealed will (voluntas arcana et revelata).9 Zanchi discusses these distinctions with more elaboration than Trelcatius, Jr., but with less specific detail than Polanus presents. Of the two ways in which

1 2 3 4 5 6

Muller, PRRD, 3:432. Ursinus, Loci theologici, 476, 478; Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 16–17. Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 6. Keckermann, Systema, 99–103. Perkins, Golden Chaine, 12b. See also Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 8. Perkins does, however, introduce four “attribute level” distinctions within the divine will: love and hatred, grace and justice. 7 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 53. 8 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 309, “propter diversa rerum,” and 310, “propter diversos modos”. 9 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 310–311.

Polanus’ Discussion of the Divine Will

God’s will is multiplex, however, Zanchi spends more time discussing distinctions on account of a diversity of things (diversa rerum), which he divides broadly into either that which is good or that which is evil. Polanus presents a middle ground between the relatively terse discussion of this doctrine in the Reformed orthodox theologians that preceded him and the longer and more full discussion of the doctrine by those who came after. As with these contemporary theologians, Polanus includes a discussion of the modes and objects of God’s will. He is once again characterized by having a more robust discussion of these issues than most of his contemporaries. While Zanchi is more detailed overall, Polanus’ discussion of the essential/personal distinction, the legal/ evangelical distinction and the natural/free distinction are not found in Zanchi. At least one possible explanation for this general increase in sophistication as the Reformed orthodox period progresses is the increased polemical interaction with Roman Catholic theologians that marked the early period. Further, as the debate over middle knowledge begins to grow, as well as the growing debate with Arminius and then with the Remonstrants, a continuing increase in the sophistication with which the Reformed orthodox make distinctions and argue polemically begins to be seen.

8.3

Polanus’ Discussion of the Divine Will

As Polanus unfolds the doctrine of the divine will, two important differences with what has come before are immediately evident. First, the distinctions Polanus draws from this doctrine fall into two categories: one, those particular to the divine will (and will be discussed in this chapter), and two, the types (species) of the divine will that Polanus develops into multiple essential properties of God (which will be taken up below in Chapter 9). These species of the divine will fall into two groups: goodness (bonitas) and justice (iustitia). Note that these are not simply distinctions within the discussion of the divine will but emerge as essential properties in their own right. Further, each of these species has its own essential property level subdivisions. It is important to note that Polanus has made several distinctions within the preceding essential properties of God and has indeed divided one essential property into two.10 The scale of this distribution, however, has not previously been seen in the second book of the Syntagma. The second important difference with Polanus’ prior discussions of the various essential properties is the way in which he organizes or structures his argument. Polanus has, to this point, used a broadly consistent manner and order of discussion:

10 The infinity of God was divided into eternity and immensity, see Chapter 5.6 above.

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a discussion of the various ways that the property can be understood (usually, though not always, from Scripture), a basic definition of the property, various axiomata associated with the property, a distribution into various distinctions, and a five-fold consideration of the property’s application (usus). At any point among these elements, Polanus may deal with any number of objections or questions. With the discussion of the divine will and the several properties that he sees contained within it, Polanus shifts to a markedly different manner of argumentation. Unfortunately, Polanus gives no more reason for this shift than he did for the previous format of his discussions. He continues to begin many chapters with a discussion of the meaning of the word by which the property is called, but from here he asks a number of traditionally scholastic questions – ones that he has not previously undertaken within his discussion of the previous essential properties: an sit, quid sit, quot modis sit. From the question an sit, Polanus considers various reasons why the particular essential property might not be assumed to belong to God. Usually, though not in the present chapter on the divine will, Polanus presents an overall definition of the essential property in response to the question quid sit. From the question quot modis sit, Polanus sets out the distribution of the doctrine into various distinctions. Further, Polanus considers several of these essential properties according to their cause, effect, subject, adjuncts, and diversity. The manner of discussion, however, is not completely consistent. Polanus moves back and forth between the methodology he has used in previous examinations of essential properties and the newer methodology he takes up – as the figure below demonstrates:

Figure 2 Distinctions in Polanus’ organizational method among the ‘types’ of the divine will

Polanus’ discussion of the divine will itself, love, mercy (misericordia), patience, and truth follow the patterns used previously (i.e., with life, immortality, blessedness, and wisdom). This leaves divine grace, compassion (clementia), justice, and holiness (sanctitas) with the more scholastic organizational method.

Scholastic Questions Regarding the Will

While there is a difference in organization – indeed, one might even say in methodology, the overall result is not that different from what has come before. In particular, Polanus still includes definitions, distinctions, and axiomata. He still deals with objections and presents usus. What is perhaps most odd is the lack of consistency even within subcategories and that Polanus does not explain the difference in the text of the Syntagma. Beyond the fact of these differing methodologies, the reason for the differences is quite elusive. Polanus does not draw attention to the shifts he makes (e.g., something like: “here we will follow a different pattern of organization in our argument.”). The difference is not stemming from the switch from the Partitiones to the Syntagma. The 1599 edition of the Partitiones includes the exact same list of essential properties (in the same order) as the Syntagma. In fact, Polanus holds to both a much simpler and a more consistent methodology of presentation in the Partitiones (i.e., he provides a basic definition, followed by various distinctions within the property). The difference does not seem so much to be found in the development of his theology over time. That is, not only would he have had to develop all of the expanded discussions found in the Syntagma, he would have had to do so starting with the same basic level of discussion for each property: a definition and a list of several distinctions. While it is certainly an interesting feature, no obvious answer presents itself as to why Polanus shifts back and forth in this manner.

8.4

Scholastic Questions Regarding the Will

Polanus begins this chapter on the divine will by noting that, according to the word itself, voluntas may connote a number different concepts: the faculty of the will, the acts of that faculty, the object(s) of the will.11 This three-fold notion will become more commonplace in later Reformed orthodox discussions of the divine will, but among the contemporaries with whom I compare Polanus, only Zanchi so notes this etymological distinction.12 Polanus considers the first of these – the will as a faculty – to be the question at hand, although the second is worked out in the several properties which follow this chapter on the Divine Will, and the third does come up at the end of the chapter. Polanus next asks the question: An voluntas sit in Deo?13 Polanus first assumes two negative responses – though he does so without reference to any particular

11 Polanus, Syntagma, 1024D. 12 See Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 298. 13 Polanus, Syntagma, 1024D.

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individual or group.14 The first such negative response is that the will is a faculty of a rational nature that is distinct from its essence. But as there is nothing in God that is distinct from his essence, God must not have a will. Second, if God has a threefold will, he would be composite (almost certainly, Polanus refers to the three-fold etymological division he has just mentioned, rather than what might flow from the essentialis et personalis distinction he discusses next). Polanus responds that these arguments do not demonstrate anything.15 With regard to the first, Polanus asserts that as God’s will is an essential property, it is identical with his essence. With regard to the second, Polanus responds that the distinctions within the divine will that he will discuss are not due to any division within God himself, but rather are due to the nature of our capacity for understanding. Thus, while voluntas is diverse in us, “the distinctions are one and the same thing really and are only different by reason.”16 Having responded, however briefly, to these objections, Polanus concludes that voluntas is indeed in God. First, Scripture testifies to this in Psalm 115:3 (“Our God is in the heavens; he does all that he pleases.”) and Romans 9:19 (“You will say to me then, ‘Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will’”). Furthermore, Polanus affirms that reason also demonstrates that God has a will: • For every intelligent nature has a will; • God is an intelligent nature; • Consequently, he has a will.17 From there, Polanus proceeds to develop a number of distinctions within the essential will of God. It is curious that Polanus does not ask the question: quid sit voluntas Dei? He therefore does not begin with a basic definition for God’s will, as he has done for the divine wisdom and will do for both the other half of the pair of distinctions in God’s blessedness (potentia et libertas) as well as the various species within the divine will (bonitas et iustia, and their various distinctions). That is, he goes immediately from a discussion of the propriety of attributing will to God (An voluntas sit in Deo?) to the question of the modes of his will (Quot modis voluntas Dei dicatur?). Polanus

14 See above, section 5.4. It is possible that this, too, is in response to Vorstius. See te Velde, “Eloquent Silence,” and “Collateral Damage?” 15 Polanus, Syntagma, 1025A. 16 Polanus, Syntagma, 1025B, “Deinde distinctiones voluntatis Dei ipsius, in quo illa, quae in nobis diversa sunt, realiter sunt unum et idem et ratione tantum differunt.” See above, Chapter 4.6.4 for a discussion of Polanus’ use of distinctions. 17 Polanus, Syntagma, 1025C, “Esse autem volentatem in Deo testatur Scriptura Psal. 115.3. Rom. 9.19. et demonstrat ratio, nam omnia natura intelligens habet voluntatem: at Deus est natura intelligens: habet ergo voluntatem”

Distinctions within the Divine Will

does provide a general definition but he does so under the essentialis/personalis distinction described below.

8.5

Distinctions within the Divine Will

Polanus begins his discussion of the distinctions within the divine will with the question, ‘Quot modis voluntas Dei dicitur?’ Rather than answer by way of distinction, however, Polanus states: “God’s own will is singular in very fact, because it is the essence of God itself.”18 In other words, Polanus indicates that there is only one will in God, and he wills by one singular act of willing. At the same time, however, Polanus declares that because of noster infirmitas, the doctrine of the divine will ought to be rightly distributed into a number of distinctions. As Polanus has just stated however, these distinctions do not introduce composition within the divine essence as these distinctions differ only on account of our reason. As Polanus puts it: rationis tantum differunt.19 Polanus presents six major distinctions within the divine will: • God’s will is either essential (essentialis) or personal (personalis); • Either efficient (efficiens) or permissive (permittens); • Either absolute (aboluta) or conditional (conditionalis); • Either revealed (revelata) or hidden (occulta); • Either a willing by necessity of nature (ex necessitate naturae) or freely (libere); • And is distinguished according as the object of God’s will – either that which is good or that which is evil. In addition, the revealed will is further distinguished into antecedent (antecedens) and consequent (consequens) or legal (legalis) and evangelical (evangelica). Each of these distinctions are further discussed below.20

18 Polanus, Syntagma, 1025D, “Voluntas Dei reipsa est unica, quia est ipsamet essentia Dei.” 19 Polanus, Syntagma, 1025C. 20 Polanus also introduces an additional distinction just before the discussion of the objects of God’s will – “one is the will of God toward us and what he wills to do concerning us and other creatures; and another is what he wills to be done by us…” (Polanus, Syntagma, 1031C, “Sexto alia est voluntas Dei erga nos et quam vult facere de nobis et aliis creaturis: alia quam vult fieri a nobis…”). As this distinction is given without any further discussion in the Syntagma, it is simply noted here for a complete picture of Polanus’ various distinctions.

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8.5.1

The Essential and Personal Will

The first distinction Polanus discusses is that the will of God is either essential (essentialis) or personal (personalis).21 He defines the essential will of God as “his essential property whereby he wills from all eternity the good as an end and all things toward the good, by his very self as well as independently and by one continual act.”22 Note that while this is given as the definition of the essential will of God, it is given in terms of a general definition for the will of God (i.e., “his essential property”), and is very close to the definition Polanus provides in the 1599 edition of the Partitiones.23 By way of expanding upon this definition, Polanus presents ten axiomata regarding the essential will of God.24 Broadly speaking, they fall into three categories. First, several axiomata either reiterate or adumbrate connections between the various attributes: God’s will is free, just, immutable, and eternal. The second category touches upon issues related to causality. In this regard, Polanus presents three axiomata which are of particular interest. In the first of these axiomata, Polanus states: “God’s will is the cause of all things that exist.”25 Here Polanus echoes an idea that is broadly accepted in medieval and Reformed scholastic thought regarding the basic causal function of the will. For instance, Aquinas remarks: “it is necessary to say that God’s will is the cause of things.”26 Nothing comes about, and nothing can come about, apart from or contrary to the will of God. Further, in another of these axiomata related to causality, Polanus states that because God’s will is the cause of all that is, nothing can come about that is contrary to God’s will.27 Thus, whatever has been, is, or will be occurs only because God wills it to occur and nothing that does occur can be said to have occurred apart from God’s will. This is not the same thing as saying that God directly wills everything

21 Polanus, Syntagma, 1025D. It is important to note that Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 112, collapses this distinction into a merely personal willing so as to state that, “willing in God is an expression of His inter-personal relationship, that acting in which the Divine persons all may be said to ‘know’, or to ‘do’, or to ‘be’ substantive expressions of the Divine Will.” 22 Polanus, Syntagma, 1025D, “Essentialis voluntas Dei, est essentialis eius proprietas, per quam vult bonum ut finem et ad bonum omnia, ab omni aeternitate, a seipso et independenter, uno constantique actu.” 23 Cf., Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 9, “Voluntas Dei, est essentialis Dei proprietas, per quam omnia quaecunque vult, ab omni aeteritate, a seipso, uno constantique actu vult.” 24 All ten axiomata are found in Polanus, Syntagma, 1025E–1026D. 25 Polanus, Syntagma, 1026A, “Voluntas omnium quae sunt causa est.” 26 Aquinas, S.Th., I, q. 19, a. 4, res, “Respondeo dicendum quod necesse est dicere voluntatem Dei esse causam rerum, et Deum agere per voluntatem, non per necessitatem naturae, ut quidam existimaverunt.”. 27 Polanus, Syntagma, 1026C, “Praeter voluntatem Dei nihil sit, etiam quod sit contra Dei voluntatem.”

Distinctions within the Divine Will

that occurs in and of itself (i.e., in the case of sin). In the case of sin, God wills to permit the thing to be done. This axioma, however, also means that nothing can occur that is contrary to God’s will to permit it to occur. Polanus also indicates that just as the will of God is the cause of all that is, so also it does not itself have a cause. In the third of these axiomata, Polanus says that “God’s will has no efficient or moving cause for it; for if it did, there would be something before his will, which is sinful to believe.”28 From this, Polanus concludes that the will of God is not moved by a goal or end (movetur a fine), neither is it guided by some middle term towards an end (a mediis ad finem perducentibus). God does not will one thing because of or on account of something else: either logically or practically.29 In the third category of these axiomata, Polanus connects his exposition of the essential will of God to the doctrine of the Trinity. First, Polanus states that “God’s will does not precede his internal operations (e.g., generation, spiration, knowing, willing, loving), whereas it does from all eternity precede the external operations (e.g., creation, our redemption, and other such things).”30 Here Polanus sets forth the will of God according to an ad intra/ad extra distinction. The ad intra dimension refers to those acts of the divine will that are internal to the Godhead and are from eternity. In contrast, the ad extra dimension includes those things that are willed in eternity but come about in the unfolding of God’s will in time. There is therefore an a-temporal and internal act of knowing, willing, and loving by which God knows himself, wills himself, and loves himself. He is both the subject and object of this internal work. Polanus also includes in this eternal and internal work that by which the individual persons are distinguished: generation (and thus the un-generated Father, the generated Son) and spiration (the Holy Spirit). This notion clearly rules out any Arian view of God – that there was a time at which the Son did not exist. Second, Polanus states that “God’s essential will is equally common among all the three persons of the Holy Trinity.”31 There are not, therefore, three wills in the

28 Polanus, Syntagma, 1026A, “Voluntas Dei nullam habet sui causam efficientem et moventem: si enim haberet, esset aliquid quod antecederet eam, quod nefas est credere.” 29 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 201, “God wills something to happen because of some other thing (velle hoc propter hoc), but it is not so that God wills one thing because of another thing (propter hoc velle hoc).” Te Velde makes this statement with regard to Turrettini in particular, but the notion holds for Polanus generally. See also Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 360. 30 Polanus, Syntagma, 1026C, “Voluntas Dei non praecedit opera Dei interna, velut generationem, spirationem, cognoscere, velle, amare: at opera externa velut creationem, redemtionem nostram et alia, praecessit ab aeterno.” 31 Polanus, Syntagma, 1026D, “Essentialis voluntas Dei est aequaliter communis omnibus tribus personis Sacrosanctae Triados.”

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Godhead – each person of the Trinity having his own will. Rather, as the essence of God is one and is shared fully and equally by the persons, there is only one, unified and simple will in God. Regarding the second half of this first distinction, Polanus states that the personal will of God (personalis voluntas Dei) is “certainly one in number in the essence, but we consider it in two ways in the person – communally according to essence and singularly according to person and ad intra relation.”32 In support of this, Polanus references John 6:38–40 (“For I have come down from heaven, not to do my own will but the will of him who sent me. And this is the will of him who sent me, that I should lose nothing of all that he has given me, but raise it up on the last day. For this is the will of my Father, that everyone who looks on the Son and believes in him should have eternal life, and I will raise him up on the last day.”), Matthew 26:39 (“My Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as you will.”), and 26:42 (“My Father, if this cannot pass unless I drink it, your will be done.”). Furthermore, Polanus states, “as is the case in the divine essence, so the will is the same for Father and Son; but we are to consider it in the Father from himself and as he sends the Son, and in the Son relatively to the Father and as sent by the Father.”33 In this way, Polanus conceives of the singular divine will in two ways. First, the personal will of God is communal – that will that corresponds to the essential will noted previously. Second, however, it is proper to think of God’s personal will singularly, with respect to one person of the Trinity. That is, it is possible to speak of the “will of the Father,” the “will of the Son,” and the “will of the Holy Spirit.” In so doing, however, we do not speak of three different wills (as if the will of the Father disagreed with the will of the Holy Spirit), but the one essential will of God residing in, or active in, whatever particular person of the Trinity we discuss. With this distinction, two items are of particular note. First, as Muller remarks, the essential/personal distinction is quite rare among the Reformed orthodox.34 It should be noted, however, that Polanus does not formulate this distinction along the same lines as it is summarized by Muller, who states that the voluntas personalis “can only relate to the inward begetting and proceeding of the persons of the Trinity, understood as somehow belonging to the divine willing.”35 According to Polanus, however, a proper understanding of the personalis voluntas Dei is twofold. It is both a communal personal willing according to essence and an individual personal willing

32 Polanus, Syntagma, 1026D, “Personalis voluntas Dei est quidem numero una in essentia, sed duobus modis consideratur in persona, communiter secundum essentiam, singulariter secundum personam et relationem ad intra.” 33 Polanus, Syntagma, 1027A, “Ut essentia divina, ita etiam voluntas est eadem Patris et Filii: in Patre tamen a se et ut Filium mittente, in Filio vero relate ad Patrem et ut misso a Patre consideranda.” 34 Muller, PRRD, 3:453. 35 Muller, PRRD, 3:453.

Distinctions within the Divine Will

according to person. It therefore includes the “inward begetting and proceeding,” but it also connects the act of willing not to an essence but to the divine persons – both communally and individually (though not contrarily).36 The second item of note is the important connection between sections (indeed, books) of the Syntagma. This present distinction between the essential and personal will of God further demonstrates the importance of the overall structure of Polanus’ Doctrine of God. Polanus regularly connects the doctrines set forth in this particular book of the Syntagma with what will follow in the next book concerning the Holy Trinity. The God whose unified and simple essence is being demonstrated according to various essential properties is the God who has revealed himself in three persons: Father, Son and Holy Spirit. These various connections demonstrate that Polanus never has before his gaze Deus nudus or abstractus. 8.5.2

The Efficient and Permitting Will

The second distinction in the divine will that Polanus describes is between the efficient (efficiens) and permitting (permittens) will of God.37 He defines the efficient will of God as “that according to which God effects such as is good, whether through himself or through others.”38 From this, Polanus indicates that God’s efficient will is that which directly causes whatever good is brought about. It therefore excludes God’s willing of himself: although God wills himself necessarily, that will is not ‘efficient’ in this sense (i.e., God is not some good that ‘comes about’). Polanus supports this definition with reference to Ephesians 1:11 (“In him we have obtained an inheritance, having been predestined according to the purpose of him who works all things according to the counsel of his will.”). Additionally, he states that Tertullian refers to this aspect of God’s will as voluntas pura, maior, potior and that it may also be called voluntas bona et complacens.39

36 See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 202, “Polanus positively points out that there is a trinitarian and personal dimension in God’s willing,” and 192, footnote 61, “As a specification, Polanus, Syntagma 160, states that the will of God does not precede his internal operations, i.e., that the mutual relations of Father, Son and Spirit. In the context of the Trinity, we note in passing that several authors make an initial distinction between the essential (common) and the personal will by which each of the divine Persons wills the others. Cf. Muller, PRRD, 3:453, who briefly states that the personal will is always understood as a necessarily operating will.” 37 Polanus, Syntagma, 1027B. 38 Polanus, Syntagma, 1027C, “Voluntas efficiens, est secundum quam efficit Deus tantum bona, sive per se sive per alios.” 39 Although Polanus merely states Tertullian’s usage of this language without reference, the terms can be found in Tertullian, “An Exhortation to Chastity,” in Ante-Nicene Fathers, IV: The Fathers of the Third Century: Tertullian, Part Fourth; Minucius Felix; Commodian; Origen, Part First and Second, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson (New York: Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885), 85.

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By way of contrast, Polanus defines the permitting will as “that according to which God allows something to be done by creatures, whether it is good or indifferent, or an evil of error or of sin.”40 God does not impede or prevent these acts by his permitting will (although he very much could). In this way, the divine permission allows but does not directly cause these acts.41 Again, Polanus notes that Tertullian describes this as voluntas indulgentiae and minor, and that it is also called voluntas permissiva.42 Here, Polanus references 1 Corinthians 16:7 (“I hope to spend some time with you, if the Lord permits.”), Hebrews 6:3 (“And this we will do if God permits.”), and Acts 14:16 (“In past generations he allowed all the nations to walk in their own ways.”). In this second half of the distinction, Polanus differs slightly from the normal usage of divine permission in medieval scholasticism and Reformed orthodoxy.43 Usually, the divine permission is introduced to demonstrate how it is that, on the one hand, nothing happens apart from the will of God, and, on the other hand, it is evident from Scripture, reason, and experience that evil occurs. It would appear from these two premises that God must will evil. The standard medieval and Reformed orthodox position is that God permits sin, but does not will it per se. For instance, Thomas Aquinas quotes Augustine stating, “Nothing is done, unless the Almighty wills it to be done, either by permitting it, or by actually doing it.”44 Thomas goes on to note, “permission and operation refer to present time, permission being with respect to evil, operation with regard to good.”45 Duns Scotus also utilizes this notion in the forty-seventh discussion of the Ordinatio. There Duns Scotus posits two acts in us (in nobis): we either will or do not will something. He goes on to state that it is possible to posit this same distinction within God – he desires that

40 41 42 43

44 45

This is contra Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 113, who suggests that Tertullian refers to this as an ‘indulgence’. Polanus, Syntagma, 1027C, “Voluntas permittens, est secundum quam sinit Deus aliquid a creaturis fieri, sive bonum aut indifferens sit, sive malum culpae seu peccatum.” See Muller, PRRD, 3:471, “The permissive will is, thus, not directly causal, but no sin could occur without it.” See note 40, above. See Andreas J. Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency: An Early Modern Reformed Voice, Church History and Religious Culture 84 (Leiden: Brill, 2022), 368, “Since Voetius together with the majority of Reformed orthodox theologians understands God’s permission as a deliberate non-impeding of evil or sin, his doctrine of permission stands in clear continuity with the classical doctrine as first formulated by Augustine and Lombard, and developed by Aquinas, Bonaventure, and Duns Scotus.” Thomas Aquinas, S.Th., I. q. 19, a. 12, res, “Nihil sit, nisi omnipotens fieri velit, vel sinendo ut fiat, vel ipse faciendo.” Thomas is quoting from Augustine, Enchriridion, 95, where the Latin text is identical. Thomas Aquinas, S.Th., I. q. 19, a. 12, res, “Vel potest dici quod permissio et operatio refuruntur ad praesens permissio quidem ad malum, operatio vero ad bonum.”

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which is good (velle) and he permits what he does not will (nolle) by a reflex act (actum reflexum).46 At this point, Polanus concurs: God wills either by doing or by permitting. Further, God actively desires what is good, but only permits what is evil. In the case of what is good, God desires the thing itself. In the case of what is evil, God desires the action – particularly by way of determining to bring some specific good out of the evil he wills to permit. The point at which Polanus differs from this common usage is that he includes in the category of divine permission both things good (bonum) and indifferent (indifferens), along with the evil that makes someone guilty (malum culpae) and evil as a punishment (malum poenae). That is, Polanus does not restrict the divine permission merely to “sin” but includes things either good or indifferent in this category. This is not something that the Medieval scholastics such as Thomas or Duns Scotus do, nor is this formulation found in the contemporaries of Polanus (i.e., Zanchi, Ursinus, et. al.). Indeed, even with Polanus, this notion is found only in the Syntagma. While the 1590 edition of the Partitiones does not mention this distinction at all, the 1599 does. Further, the 1599 definition of divine permission, voluntas permittendi, as “that according to which God permits sin to occur.”47 A glance at the texts that Polanus appends to his definition of God’s permitting will, however, provides insight into the source of Polanus’ understanding. The references to 1 Corinthians 16 and Hebrews 6 show that in both cases the biblical author is referring to something that is not, in itself, sinful. From Paul’s perspective, travelling to Corinth is a good thing. He does not know if it will be in accordance with God’s plan. Thus, he will go, but only “if the Lord permits.” In this distinction, Polanus demonstrates the overall importance of the phenomenon of Scripture to how he organizes his doctrinal formulations. That is, he is not merely seeking to bend his previously learned theological and philosophical methodology in the general direction of Scripture, but to build his theology upon the foundation of Scripture. As Scripture says that God permits things that are not in themselves sinful (i.e., are indifferent), so Polanus will include that category in his understanding of God’s permissive will. 8.5.3

The Absolute and Conditional Will

The third distinction Polanus makes is between the absolute (absoluta) and conditional (conditionalis) will of God.48 Polanus notes that this designation is not 46 John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, I. d. 47. See Vos et.al., Duns Scotus on Divine Love, 178–192. 47 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 9, “Voluntas permittendi, est secundum qua permittit Deus peccatum fieri.” 48 Polanus, Syntagma, 1027E.

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intended to introduce a division within the divine will, but rather to signify the name of the will of God (significationem nominis voluntatis Dei).49 Polanus defines the absolute will of God as “what he simply and absolutely wills without regard to any condition in creatures that either is or will be.”50 This aspect of the divine will he also calls the beneplacitum voluntas divinae. Polanus refers to Romans 9:18–19 (“So then he has mercy on whomever he wills, and he hardens whomever he wills. You will say to me then, “Why does he still find fault? For who can resist his will?”) and the previously cited Ephesians 1:11. This absolute will of God extends forth comprehensively as either God wills (velle) or nills (nolle) – the latter understood as actively choosing that something not be, rather than a passive lack of will or decision concerning a matter. The absolute will of God is the first and supreme cause of all things– especially of our salvation. Apart from it, nothing can exist.51 According to Polanus, this will is known either by the word of God, in the works of God, or through the events of God’s providence as they unfold in time. In keeping with the simplicity of God and the notion that the properties of God and his essence are inseparable, Polanus notes that the absolute will of God is infinitely extended, immutable, and necessary.52 In contrast, Polanus defines the conditional will of God as “that whereby God wills something with a condition attached.”53 By this will, God “warns and forbids, permits, advises, and fulfills.”54 Here Polanus adapts a common Latin hexameter that was frequently used in Medieval Scholasticism.55 Polanus also calls this the voluntas signi, “because it signifies what is acceptable to God, what is our duty, what he wants to be done or omitted by us, etc.”56 Further, it is by this will that God “also wills the reprobate to be saved, if they were to believe in Christ.”57 It can therefore truly be said that God wills their salvation, but they will only be saved through the means of faith and repentance.58

49 Polanus, Syntagma, 1027E. 50 Polanus, Syntagma, 1028A, “Voluntas Dei absoluta, est quam quaedam vult simpliciter et absolute, citra ullam conditionem quae sit aut futura fuerit in creaturis.” 51 Polanus, Syntagma, 1028D. Polanus explicitly includes in this will the death of the reprobate. 52 Polanus, Syntagma, 1028C. 53 Polanus, Syntagma, 1028D, “Voluntas Dei conditionalis, est qua Deus quaedam vult cum adjuncta conditione.” 54 Polanus, Syntagma, 1028E, “Hac praecipit et prohibet, permittit, consulit, implet.” 55 See also Heppe, 85. 56 Polanus, Syntagma, 1028E, “Appellatur voluntas signi: quia significat quid Deus sit gratum, quid nostri sit officii, quid velit a nobis fieri vel omitti, et cetera.” 57 Polanus, Syntagma, 1029A, “Hac vult omnes etiam reprobos servari, si ipsi credant in Christum.” 58 See Muller, PRRD, 3:463, “It is incorrect to state that God will elect to salvation those who believe and repent, correct to argue that God elects some to salvation through belief and repentance.” It

Distinctions within the Divine Will

At this point, Polanus considers two questions. One, since God wills the salvation of the reprobate by condition, and does not will their salvation by his absolute will, are there in God contrary wills?59 He responds that there are not in God contrary wills, “for there is only one will of God’s essence, one will of God in himself, because there is only one God.”60 Rather than distinguish between two separate “wills” in God (i.e., absolute and conditional), Polanus is distinguishing between two modes (modi) in the one, unified will of God. The second question asks, “Whether God does not mock the reprobate, because he wills to save them by a conditional will, while at the same time he nills [nolens] to save them by an absolute will?”61 Polanus responds that God mocks no one. He wills seriously (serio) to save the reprobate if they come to Christ in faith. “He promised salvation,” Polanus says, “if only they were to believe.”62 But in the case of those who do not come to Christ in faith, who refuse to obey the call of the gospel, the fault lies not with God but with the disobedient unbeliever. Polanus demonstrates God’s earnest desire to save even the reprobate if they believe by reference to Matthew 22 and Luke 14. From Polanus’ discussion of this distinction, two important issues come to light. First, Polanus here deals with a distinction that is often considered to be problematic by subsequent Reformed orthodox theologians.63 The basic definition Polanus provides is in line with the broader Reformed orthodox usage. Thus, Muller states: According to [the absolute will], God wills and determines that something should occur ‘without any condition’ in the object of God’s willing – but the latter, the conditional will, rests upon the fulfillment of a condition in or by the object of the divine will, for example, the will of God to save men upon condition of faith.”64

A concern, however, was raised by later Reformed orthodox theologians as the Arminian controversy began to unfold. Thus, te Velde states: “The problem with the distinction is that it seems to allow pelagianizing or arminianizing abuse, if

59 60 61 62 63 64

is precisely unguarded statements like this that lead to the criticism of this distinction, as is noted below. Polanus, Syntagma, 1029A. Polanus, Syntagma, 1029B, “Non sunt in Deo contrariae voluntates: nam una est tantum voluntas Dei essentiae, una voluntas Dei in se, quia unus tantum est Deus.” Polanus, Syntagma, 1029C, “An non Deus illudit reprobis, volens eos servari voluntate conditionali, interim nolens eosdem servari voluntate absoluta?” Polanus, Syntagma, 1029D, “Salutem illis promittit, si modo credant.” Per te Velde, Doctrine of God, 198, who describes this as a distinction “evaluated very critically by the Reformed orthodox.” Muller, PRRD, 3:463.

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the conditional will is taken to be decisive of the actual course of events, and if the human free will is allowed to fulfill or not fulfill the posed conditions.”65 This, however, is not something Polanus explicitly allows. Furthermore, given his relative lack of discussion concerning the voluntas Dei conditionalis, this is not something Polanus implicitly includes. Rather, in light of the prior discussion on the will that Polanus has set forth, it seems best to interpret his use of the distinction as a twofold way (modus) in which the declared will of God is named. The absolute will of God is therefore not contrasted with the conditional, as if one is actually God’s will but the other is not. Rather, the difference can be understood in the following way: God’s absolute will is considered apart from what he wills, whereas the conditional will is considered in light of what he wills.66 The second important issue is Polanus’ rather laconic introduction of the distinction between the voluntas beneplaciti and the voluntas signi in conjunction with the previous distinction. In the first place, this distinction is not usually connected with the distinction between the absolute and conditional will of God. Muller, however, notes that the voluntas Dei conditionalis is best understood in terms of the voluntas signi – “granting that most of the divine precepts, promises, and condemnations are stated conditionally.”67 These conditional aspects of the divine will, however, are not mere signs, for they correspond to the genuine desire of God for his creation. Second, this distinction usually stands as a major and primary distinction within the will of God.68 Muller notes that the beneplaciti/signi distinction can be traced back to Hugh of St. Victor, Lombard, Alexander of Hales, and Bonaventure.69 Among the early Reformed Scholastics, it can be found in Zanchi (though not in Ursinus, Daneau, Bucanus, Keckermann, or Trelcatius, Jr.), and is found in later Reformed Scholastic theologians such as Rijssen, Voetius, Turretinni, Walaeus, Leigh, and Wendelin.70 In particular, Beck notes that this distinction has an important

65 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 198. 66 See Muller, PRRD, 3:464, “In other words, the conditional will remains an immutable will, willed eternally by God, but it is understood as being directed toward a contingent or conditional effect: the condition, strictly understood, obtains, not in the divine will, but in the temporal event.” 67 Muller, PRRD, 3.463. 68 Muller, PRRD, 3.457, “In most of the orthodox systems this stands as the initial or at least one of the basic distinctions – and it is certainly a distinction well established in the older theological traditions.” 69 Muller, PRRD, 3.457, note 471. 70 Zanchi, De natura Dei, III.iv, q. 3.2; Rijssen, Summa theologiae, III.xxxi, con. III; Voetius, SD V, 87; Turrettini, Institutio, 203; Edward Leigh, A systeme or Body of divinity: consisting of ten books. Wherein the fundamentals and main grounds of religion are opened: the contrary errours refuted: most of the controversies between us, the papists, Arminians, and Socinians discussed and handled. Several Scriptures explained and vindicated from corrupt glosses (London: Abraham Miller, 1654), II.vii, p. 199; Marcus Friedrich Wendelin, Christianae theologiae libri duo (Hanoviae: 1634), 72–73.

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place in Voetius’ doctrine of the divine will.71 In contrast, Polanus merely connects each with one half of the present distinction without any additional discussion. 8.5.4

The Revealed and Hidden Will

The fourth distinction Polanus makes in the divine will is that of a revealed (revelata) and hidden (occulta) will. He defines the revealed will of God as “what has been made known to man, either by God’s word or by a [natural] event.”72 God reveals his will in his word (i.e., by direct revelation), but also through events as they occur in time. That is, God may either reveal his will ahead of time or he may only reveal it as he brings about whatever he wills, either efficiently or by permission. Polanus introduces two distinctions in the revealed will of God: both brief and with very little additional discussion. First, this revealed will is either antecedent (antecedens) or consequent (consequens) – a distinction Polanus traces to John of Damascus in Ἐκδοσις ἀκριβης της Ὀρθοδοχου Πιστεως, which he quotes in Greek and Latin.73 Polanus defines the antecedent will of God as “that whereby God wills that all be saved and obtain the eternal kingdom.”74 The 1617 edition of the Syntagma indicates that this aspect of God’s will can be called voluntas theorica seu speculativa. The consequent will of God he defines as “that whereby God either bestows reward or inflicts punishment.”75 Likewise, in the 1617 edition, this aspect of God’s will can also be called voluntas practica. Note that in this distinction, Polanus is making a soteriological distinction. God wills that all would be saved, but also that there will be specific rewards bestowed and punishments inflicted (i.e., not all will be saved). One question is: in what sense is the absolute will of God ‘absolute?’ Does Polanus means that it is ‘absolutely’ effectual? Given what he says elsewhere regarding election and salvation, Polanus would not answer this positively. Similarly, what does he mean by ‘consequent?’ Does Polanus mean that the rewards and punishments are ultimately the result of some action on the part of the creature? Again, what Polanus says elsewhere

71 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 362. Beck goes on to state: “The importance which this distinction has for Voetius contrasts remarkably with Heppe’s rather problematic insistence that Reformed theology on the whole rejected the distinction between the voluntas signi and beneplaciti.” Beck refers to Heppe, Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert (Gotha, 1857), 88. 72 Polanus, Syntagma, 1029E, “Relevata, quae hominibus est patefacta sive verbo Dei sive eventu.” 73 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030A. The Latin can be found in John of Damascus, Expositio fidei orthodoxae, PG 94 (Paris: J. P. Migne, 1857), col. 1012. 74 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030A, “Antecedens voluntas Dei, est qua Deus vult omnes servari et regnum aeternum consequi.” 75 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030B, “Consequens voluntas Dei, est qua Deus vel praemium tribuit, vel poenam infligit.”

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suggests that this is not what he means. It is likely that the ‘alternate’ titles to this distinction are an aid to understanding what he means. God’s antecedent will is ‘theoretical’ in that Scripture says that God does not desire the death of anyone, not even the punishment of the wicked. There is therefore a general desire (if not on the level of an effectual will) in God that all should be saved. Yet Scripture also indicates that not all shall be saved. As with the distinction between God’s efficient and permissive will, this distinction appears to be an attempt by Polanus to steer as near to the text of Scripture as he is able. This distinction is included in a cursory and brief manner in the 1609 edition of the Syntagma. In the revisions made in the 1617 edition, the text includes an additional paragraph discussing the difficulty of this particular distinction.76 The paragraph is a direct quote from Armand de Belvezer’s (Armandus de Bellovisu) Declaratio difficilum terminorum theologiae, which presents four particular difficulties to this distinction.77 First, such a distinction suggests two separate wills in God. The distinction between an antecedent and consequent will, however, is a distinctio solum rationis.78 The second difficulty is that it suggests that God wills all to be saved by an antecedent will, but not by his consequent will unless they are good. Here Belvezer refers to what he had written previously in the same question – namely, that God’s consequent will regarding salvation is on the condition of faith. However, given that Polanus has previously spoken of this in the questions relating to the conditional will of God, it may be that Polanus assumes the reader will look above to that discussion, rather than to what Belvezer wrote. The third difficulty speaks of the fulfillment of these distinguished wills. The antecedent will is not always fulfilled – for not all mankind is saved. Taken as a whole, “[the antecedent will] sometimes fails as it does not occur.”79 It fails because it is not voluntas simpliciter, but secundum quid. In contrast, the consequent will semper et infallibiliter impletur. This is the desired and simpliciter will of God. In the fourth and final difficulty, Belvezer speaks of the antecedent will as voluntas speculativa. It therefore does not take into consideration actions or character. The consequent will is practica and does take into consideration character and actions. Again, this means that the antecedent will is not voluntas simpliciter, but secundum

76 The 1617 edition also includes the additional nomenclature for antecedens and consequens (theorica seu speculativa and practica, respectively). 77 Armandus de Bellovisu, Declaratio difficilum terminorum theolgoiae quam philosophia ac logica (Venetiis, 1586), 184. The quotation comes at the end of section 140. 78 Polanus, Syntagma (1617), 161.2A. 79 Polanus, Syntagma (1617), 161.2A, “Tertium, est quod voluntas Dei antecedens non semper implementur; nec semper illud quod ipse illam voluntate vult; sed aliquando deficit, ut non fiat…”

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quid and is therefore not always fulfilled. But, Belvezer continues, “what he wills by a practical will, he wills absolutely; hence, this will is always fulfilled by necessity.”80 These last two difficulties differ from the first two in that Belvezer corrects an improper understanding of the distinction in one and two but does not correct a misunderstanding in three and four. He therefore seems to suggest that there is a will in God (antecedens) that will ultimately fail. But as the will of God simpliciter cannot fail, does this mean that there is no proper and true distinction to be made here? If so, then why does Polanus include it as one of the proper distinctions that can be made concerning God’s one immutable will, which cannot fail, and to which nothing is contrary? This addition, however, may reflect a general move away from the distinction in Reformed Scholasticism in the period following Polanus. Beck, for instance, notes that Samuel Maresius (1599–1673) and Johann Heinrich Heidegger (1633–1698) do not welcome this particular distinction. Voetius, however, utilizes it, “insofar as the antecedent will is understood as a ‘declaration of the divine will and from the order posited by him between the condition and the conditional thing...’”81 The problem with the distinction arises from the tendency among some to equate the voluntas antecedens with the divine will in a true and proper sense. Thus, Muller states: According to this doctrine, God genuinely wills that which he knows will never happen! Such a doctrine makes God foolish and impotent, inasmuch as it claims that God antecedently intends something and antecedently desires it to happen when it neither will happen nor can be brought about by human ability – all the while that its non-occurrence is guaranteed because God himself, in another manner, does not will it. The voluntas antecedens, thus defined, is not a will at all but a wish, and incomplete exercise of the faculty, utterly unworthy of an omniscient and omnipotent being.82

For Polanus, however, the antecedent will of God is not conditional. That is, it does not depend upon the eventual belief of a person to be fulfilled. Rather, the distinction reflects the revelation of God that he desires no one’s death and therefore refers to the general principle that God wills salvation through faith in Christ. Polanus

80 Polanus, Syntagma (1617), 161.2A, “Quae autem vult voluntate practica, vult simpliciter: quare semper de necessitate implentur.” 81 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 363. Beck quotes from Voetius, SD V, 88: “Resp[ondetur]. Si per antecedentem intelligatur declaratio voluntatis divinae, et ordinis ab illo positi inter conditionem et rem conditionatam. Aff[irmatur].” 82 Muller, PRRD, 3:467.

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therefore places the distinction beneath the revealed side of the revealed/hidden distinction, rather than associate it with the absolute/conditional distinction.83 The second of the two sets of distinctions in the revealed will of God is that it is either legal (legalis) or evangelical (euangelica).84 Polanus defines the legal will of God as “that which is properly revealed in the law—i.e. what God wills to be done by us.”85 Although Polanus presents this aspect of God’s will simply and without further discussion, it seems likely that here he envisions the moral, civil, and ceremonial laws that were given to Israel in the Old Testament, as well as the commentary upon the Law set forth in the New Testament. Polanus defines the evangelical will of God as “what properly becomes known from the Gospel.”86 This refers both to the salvation which God has decreed from all eternity concerning the elect and to that which God requires of his elect “to repent and believe in Christ.”87 Here Polanus quotes John 6:38–40, Matthew 3:2 and 4:17, and Mark 1:15. In Deal’s discussion of this distinction, he states that it is here that one comes into contact with what he calls the “one of the least satisfying aspects of the older orthodox theology.”88 One might assume that this lack of satisfaction stemmed from the brevity of Polanus’ discussion of the distinction as a whole, or the relative space given to each half (although Polanus’ discussion of the evangelical will of God is longer than his discussion of the legal will of God – even discounting the quotes from Scripture.) Instead, Deal objects to the inclusion of the notion of a decree in Polanus’ discussion of God’s will: For the Scriptures reveal, says Polanus, what God has decreed from all eternity, and what he has required of us (cf. John 6:29, 40). One finds here a tendency to divide God’s saving activity from God’s redeeming grace, or to put it another way, a tendency to set a general scheme of activity by an absolute and perfect Being against the triune, revealed, gracious activity of the Father towards the Son through the Holy Spirit. The doctrine of the decrees threatens the older orthodox systematicians with the restrictions of the formal requirement of metaphysics, rather than the more suggestive but multi-relational model of the Holy Trinity.89

83 See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 199, “In the Reformed orthodox view this distinction is wrong if it assumes the possibility of intervention by the human will; it is acceptable inasmuch as it points to a temporal or logical order in the objects of God’s will.” 84 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030B. 85 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030B, “Legalis est quae proprie in Lege revelatur, nempe quid a nobis fieri velit Deus.” 86 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030C, “Euangelica, est quae proprie ex Euangelio innotescit...” 87 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030C, “...ut resipiscamus et credamus in Christum”. 88 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 115. 89 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 115.

Distinctions within the Divine Will

Deal’s statement, however, appears to go beyond what Polanus has stated. The decree – as a merely general scheme of activity – is not what controls or even dominates this statement. Rather, Polanus concludes that both God’s eternal saving activity – which is both gracious and triune – and what is required of those whom God saves is to be considered under the heading of the evangelical will of God. Further, Deal does not state how the decree – as a category of God’s works as revealed in Scripture – is included here as a nod to the “formal requirements of metaphysics.”90 Returning to the original distinction between the revealed and hidden will of God, Polanus defines the latter as “that which God conceals in the presence of men for as long as is fitting to him.”91 This particular half of the distinction is stated briefly with no additional discussion. 8.5.5

The Necessary and Free Will

The fifth distinction within the divine will is that “God wills certain things from the necessity of his nature and certain things freely.”92 Polanus provides the following definition for the former of these: [God] wills from the necessity of his nature what he wills concerning himself – not having been stirred up to that by anything either in himself or outside himself, and not according to the good pleasure of his will or for some end. He wills himself, his goodness, and his glory in this way. Yes indeed, he wills it by a necessity of his nature, not by the necessity of coercion.93

That which is ‘stirred up’ (permotus) refers to the activities of the divine will described below under the free willing of God. These God chooses to will. God, however, wills himself necessarily. He cannot but will that he exists, that he be good, just, and powerful. Polanus is careful to note that this necessity is by nature – God is not compelled from without to be as he is, but wills in accordance with his nature.

90 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 115. Given the relatively non-sequitur nature of his argument at this point, one wonders if Deal was simply awaiting the opportunity to make this statement at the first mention of the decree in connection with the divine will. 91 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030E, “Occulta voluntas Dei, est quam Deus coram hominibus abscondit quamdiu ipsi visum est.” 92 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030E, “Quinto, Deus vult quaedam ex necessitate naturae: quaedam libere.” 93 Polanus, Syntagma, 1030E, “Ex necessitate naturae vult: quae de seipso vult, nulla re sive intra se, sive extra se permotus, neque secundum beneplacitum voluntatis suae, neque propter aliquem finem: Hoc modo vult seipsum, suam bonitatem et gloriam: Haec, inquam, necessitate naturae vult, non coactionis.”

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By comparison, God wills freely “that which, according to the good pleasure of his will (beneplacitum voluntatis), he could both will and nill concerning creatures. Further, he wills these things without any necessity, unless a hypothetical necessity, which properly is the necessity of immutability.”94 Accordingly, God wills the means of salvation for his elect: i.e., saving faith, the remission of sins, eternal life, and salvation. Polanus declares that this is given to us not by reason of anything owed to his creation, sed ex mero suo beneplacito.95 In support of his thesis, Polanus quotes from Thomas Aquinas: “God does not will of necessity whatever he wills, but by having ordained something that he wills, it is necessary, because the will of God is immutable.”96 Here again, Polanus can be understood to comply with the distinction between the necessity of the consequence and the necessity of the consequent thing, albeit without this more technical language. God freely wills whatever he has ordained, yet it comes to pass immutably – not by conveying necessity in itself to the event decreed, but only by a ‘hypothetical’ consequence of the decree. 8.5.6

The Distinctions Concerning the Objects of the Divine Will

The sixth and final distinction concerns the object of the divine will. Polanus discusses this distinction by introducing two axiomata. The first is “the object of the divine will is both the good and the evil, but in different ways. This is because the object of the will properly and absolutely is only the good which is known, because it is desirable in its nature.”97 In this way, Polanus indicates that God does will both good and evil but does so in very different ways. The good that God wills is twofold. First, the good that God wills is “especially God himself as the summum bonum and end of all things – that is, his glory.”98 This, says Polanus, God properly (proprie) wills. God therefore properly and principally

94 Polanus, Syntagma, 1031A, “Libere Deus vult, quae de creaturis vult secundum beneplacitum voluntatis suae, quae poterat et velle et nolle: vult autem ea sine ulla necessitate, praeterquam hypotheseos, quae propria immutabilitatis est.” 95 Polanus, Syntagma, 1031B. 96 Polanus, Syntagma, 1031B. Polanus quotes from Aquinas, Summa contra gentiles, I.83: “Deus non necessario vult, quicquid vult; posito autem quod aliquid velit, est necessarium, quia voluntas Dei immutabilis.” 97 Polanus, Syntagma, 1031D, “Voluntatis divinae objectum est tum bonum tum malum; sed diverso modo, quum proprie et per se voluntatis objectum sit solummodo bonum cognitum, quia appetibile est suam naturam.” 98 Polanus, Syntagma, 1031D, “Bonum quod Deus vult est tum imprimis Deus ipse, tanquam summum bonum et omnium rerum finis, hoc est, gloria eius...”

Distinctions within the Divine Will

wills himself.99 Second, God wills his works and acts – these he loves and approves.100 This extends to every kind of good, whether natural (that which pertains to animal life), moral (that which pertains to human life), or divine (that which pertains to heavenly life). These things God truly (vere) and properly (proprie) wills.101 In support of this, Polanus quotes Psalm 115:3 and James 1:17. In contrast, Polanus states that God does not truly (vero) will evil “except under the concept of the good.”102 Thus, Polanus distinguishes between the evil as a punishment (malum poenae) and evil as guilt (malum culpae).103 Evil as a punishment, refers to the penalty that sin deserves. God wills such punishment, Polanus states, “because he himself is the judge of the world who punishes sins, and punishment itself is good absolutely speaking because the work of divine justice is opposed to sin.”104 For Polanus, this aspect of God’s will is the primary instigating cause (primaria instigens causa) of all punishment – even the ultimate penalty of death for sinners. This, Polanus affirms, is good because God wills it towards a greater good and because the punishment is justly inflicted. Polanus distinguishes the evil of punishment (which God actively and justly wills) from the evil that makes someone guilty (also called the evil of sin). He discusses malum culpae or malum peccatum according to three distinctions. First, it is considered “as sin is opposing the law of God.”105 In this sense, Polanus provides a general definition of what sin actually is. Second, this evil is considered “as it is the penalty for preceding sin.”106 Although Polanus does not expand upon this, it appears that he means that God permits more sin as a penalty for previous sin committed.107 Third, it is considered “as it is the cause of subsequent sin, as blindness among the Jews.”108 Polanus refers in this instance to the second chapter

99 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 192. Speaking of God’s necessity of willing himself, te Velde states: “given the fact that God is the summum bonum, and that the good is the proper object of God’s will, God necessarily wills Godself. Parallel to this statement, it is said that God wills the good as an end necessarily, but the means towards the end freely.” 100 Polanus, Syntagma, 1031D. 101 Polanus, Syntagma, 1032A. 102 Polanus, Syntagma, 1032A, “... nisi ratione boni.” 103 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 195–196, for a general summary of this discussion in the Reformed scholastic period. 104 Polanus, Syntagma, 1032B, “Malum poenae, hoc est, poenam peccati vult Deus et illius est autor: quia ipse iudex est mundi puniens peccata: et poena ipsa per se bona est; quia opus iustitiae divinae est adversus peccata.” 105 Polanus, Syntagma, 1032C, “Primium quidem uti est peccatum pugnans cum Lege Dei.” 106 Polanus, Syntagma, 1032C, “Deinde uti est poena praecedentis peccati.” 107 Cf. Romans 1:24, “God gave them over in the sinful desires of their hearts.” 108 Polanus, Syntagma, 1032C, “Tertio uti est causa subsequentis peccati: ut excaecatio in Judaeis, de qua Rom II.”

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of Romans, where Paul condemns Jew and Gentile alike in the breaking of God’s law. Polanus proceeds to consider the question: “Whether God wills malum culpae inasmuch as it is sin?”109 Polanus responds by making four distinctions he deems useful for this issue. First, there is the individual who sins (peccati subjectum), which is either the original sin of man’s nature (substantia hominis) or actual sin.110 He indicates that substance, as substance, is good, and action, as action, is good: “the subject of sin is good, for evil cannot exist unless it is in the good as in its subject.”111 Here Polanus appears to be following Augustine, who stated, “There is no nature that belongs to evil; but the loss of good has been given the name ‘evil.’”112 The subject who sins, however, is not seen as a neutral substrate, but as something good by nature of having been created by God, to which the moral quality of evil is added. Second, Polanus considers peccati forma, which he describes as ἀνομία: “the deformity of nature or action which deviates and strays from the Law of God.”113 Again, this deformity is for Polanus what sin most properly is. In relation to this, te Velde states, “[The] act, abstracted from its moral qualities, is good. The moral quality of an evil act (in Aristotelian terms its forma) is of course evil; rather than forma it should be called deformitas.”114 The third aspect is the peccati reatus, or, per te Velde, “the aspect that an evil act makes one guilty and gives a sense of guilt.”115 This peccati reatus, Polanus says, “is the obligation toward being punished on account of sin.”116 It is an entirely ‘good’ consequence of sin. Finally, peccati poena Polanus defines as “the work of divine justice that punishes sin.”117 These last two are metonymically called “sin” – the first because it is a peccato, and the second because it is instigated propter peccatum. Such distinctions, says te Velde, “[show] that there are aspects of a sinful, evil act that have the character of good and can be positively willed by God.”118 These distinctions having been made, Polanus proceeds to answer the previous question: is malum culpae something God wills? With regard to that evil which is the breaking and disregarding of his law, “God neither properly wills nor is able 109 Polanus, Syntagma, 1032E, “An Deus velit malum culpae quatenus est peccatum?” 110 Polanus, Syntagma, 1032E. 111 Polanus, Syntagma, 1033E, “Subjectum igitur peccati bonum est: malum enim esse nullum potest, nisi in bono tanquam subjecto.” 112 Augustine, De civitate Dei, 474, “Mali enim nulla natura est; sed amissio boni mali nomen accepit.” 113 Polanus, Syntagma, 1033B, “Peccati forma est ανομἰα est, deformitas naturae seu actionis declinantis et aberrantis a Lege Dei.” 114 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 195. 115 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 195. 116 Polanus, Syntagma, 1033B, “Peccati reatus est obligatio ad poenam propter peccatum.” 117 Polanus, Syntagma, 1033C, “Peccati poena, est opus iustitiae divinae peccatum punientis.” 118 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 195.

Distinctions within the Divine Will

to will [malum culpae], but he only permits it – and this not because he has been drawn to such, but [does so] willingly.”119 This permitting is a second order act of the will – a refraining from a positive act of will. Furthermore, God does not will the act itself, but does will to permit the act to be done insofar as he intends to draw forth some good from that act. He concludes with the following: “God truly wills all things that are good absolutely speaking. Yet to the extent malum culpae or peccatum is either an action, guilt, or penalty, it is a thing that is good absolutely speaking. Therefore, to the extent it is either an action, accusation, or penalty, God truly wills malum culpae or peccatum.”120

Furthermore, Polanus adds that nothing moves the will of God except his own most wise and holy good pleasure. The will of God is therefore not illogical (ἀλογος), “because it is not separate from his wisdom and cannot be separated.”121 Although it occurs here, almost at the end of the chapter, Polanus connects God’s voluntas with his sapientia. God wills as he wills: as he is the supremely wise God, he is able to direct all things towards the greatest good – even the evil of sin. The second axioma demonstrating the various objects of the divine will is “God does not will what he cannot will.”122 To this terse statement, Polanus adds a quotation from Bernard of Clairvaux, “Only for God is it better for him that he not will because he cannot.”123 In his discussion of the objects of the divine will, Polanus closely resembles the discussion in Zanchi. In the fourth quaestio, Zanchi asks: “An mala etiam, velit Deus?”124 Zanchi first considers the question from the perspective of the differences between malum culpae et poenae, as well as sin as an action, as lawlessness and as guilt.125 Ultimately, he answers the basic question with a number of theses. In the first thesis, Zanchi states: “God properly wills himself chiefly as the end of all

119 Polanus, Syntagma, 1033D, “… item quatenus est causa peccati, Deus proprie nec vult, nec velle potest... sed tantum permittit, idque non invitus, sed volens.” 120 Polanus, Syntagma, 1034A, “Proinde in hunc modum concludimus: Omnem rem per se bonam Deus vere vult: At malum culpae seu peccatum quatenus est vel actio, vel reatus, vel poena, est res per se bona: Ergo malum culpae seu peccatum quatenus est vel actio, vel reatus, vel poena, Deus vere vult.” 121 Polanus, Syntagma, 1034B, “Voluntas Dei non est ἀλογος, quia a sapientia eius non separatur, nec potest separari.” 122 Polanus, Syntagma, 1034B, “Deus non vult, quod non potest.” 123 Polanus, Syntagma, 1034C, “Solus Deus melior seipso esse idcirco non vult, quia non valet.” Bernard of Clairvaux, “Epistlola XCI”, Opera Omnia (Apud Gaume Fratres, 1839), sect. 2, 265. 124 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 317. 125 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 319.

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things—that is, he wills his glory and majesty.”126 This corresponds to Polanus’ first notion of God willing himself as the summum bonum. Second, Zanchi includes in God’s will that which God does. Polanus uses much of the same language: both refer to what God does (fecit) and acts (agit), and both remark that God approves (probat) and loves (amat) that which he wills.127 In the third through the sixth theses, Zanchi discusses the will of God relative to the evil of punishment (malum poenae), the evil that is the punishment for preceding sin (poena praecedentis peccati), sin as an act, and sin as an obligation unto death.128 This broadly corresponds to the discussion in Polanus relative to malum poenae et culpae and the fourfold distinctions relative to sin. In the seventh axiom, Zanchi states that sin, properly understood as the privation of all good (mera boni privatio), is something God neither properly wills nor can will (Deus proprie non vult, nec velle potest).129 This corresponds closely to Polanus’ discussion.130 This does not suggest that Polanus is merely copying Zanchi, or even that Polanus was directly dependent upon Zanchi. Rather, it demonstrates at the very least a common set of notions and a shared theological vocabulary among the Reformed scholastics. Further, it demonstrates the continuity of doctrine with medieval scholastics. Aquinas, for instance, refers to both malum culpae and malum poenae, coming to the same conclusion regarding God’s willing of evil as Zanchi and Polanus later do.131

8.6

Summary

In his exposition of the divine will, Polanus sets forth the will of God that is at once singular (according to essence) and multiform (according to both the modes of willing and the objects willed). According to God’s essence, his will is unified and one: indeed, Polanus presents God’s will as an independent and continual act whereby God chooses all things that occur according to a good end. And yet this singular will can, according to our manner of understanding, be distributed into a variety of distinctions. Among these, Polanus discusses God’s personal and essential

126 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 321, “Deus seipsum in primis, tanquam omnium rerum finem, proprie vult, hoc est, suam gloriam et majestatum.” 127 Compare Polanus, Syntagma, 1031D with Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 321. 128 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 323–327. 129 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 327, “Peccatum, proprie acceptum, quatenus scilicet nihil aliud est, quam mera boni privatio, eoque merum malum: ac proinde, quo actionis, per se alioquin bonae, inficiuntur, et peccati fiunt: Deus proprie non vult, nec felle potest.” 130 Indeed, the only difference is that Polanus lacks the adverb proprie. 131 Aquinas, S.Th., 1, q. 19, a. 9, resp.

Summary

will, thereby linking God’s will to both the essential unity of God and to the Persons of the Godhead. This essential will is itself distinguished into either an efficient or a permitting will, an absolute or a conditional will, a will of God’s good pleasure or a will of the sign, a revealed or a hidden will, and a necessary or a free will. God’s revealed will is further distributed into an antecedent or a consequent will and a legal or an evangelical will. Finally, Polanus considers the various objects of God’s will, particularly as it relates to both good things and evil things (i.e., sin). The divine will serves as a kind of pivot point for Polanus. First, this doctrine stands between his exposition of divine wisdom and power. Polanus does not merely place this doctrine between these two: God’s will is the link between God’s knowledge (i.e., his scientia simplicis intelligentiae) and his power – God acts because he chooses to act, and he chooses to act because he knows that which will bring about the best end (i.e., the ‘good’ that Polanus refers to in his definition of the divine will). In addition, the divine will serves as the opening to a whole variety of God’s essential properties that are termed species of the divine will. These, Polanus categorizes beneath the essential properties of divine goodness and justice. It is in these essential properties, particularly divine grace and mercy, where a specifically soteriological aspect of God’s essence is emphasized. The fullness of the divine will (i.e., God’s will and the various species within the divine will) underlines the contingent and free nature of God’s ad extra dealing with his creation.

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9.1

Introduction

In chapters twenty through twenty-eight of the Syntagma, Polanus expands upon a two-part idea he first broached in the 1599 edition of the Partitiones. The first is that the will of God can be thought of in terms of two types or species: the goodness of God and the justice or righteousness of God. The second is that the goodness of God is the fount of several additional essential properties of God: grace, love, mercy, patience, and kindness. These properties are not only related to God’s goodness, they are also related to each other in an ordered way.1 While the connections between these various essential properties are important to the overall structure of this portion of the Syntagma, Polanus gives each essential property its individual and particular attention. Most specifically, he distinguishes between an ad intra and ad extra dimension to the property, as well (with one important exception) of the differences between God’s will as it extends toward that which he has made generally and towards his elect in Christ. In this, a particularly soteriological horizon is seen in Polanus’ discussion of the divine properties. This present chapter will continue to seek to understand Polanus’ doctrine of God in its historical and theological context through both his exposition of these various essential properties within the overall structure of Polanus’ discussion of the second order essential properties of God. To that end, I discuss first the overall state of these essential properties of God in the early Reformed orthodox period up to and including Polanus. This discussion will primarily be limited to the structure and linkage that various theologians provide for these doctrines. The various sections below in which I discuss the different essential properties will include relevant comparisons regarding the content of a property. The majority of this chapter is a discussion of each essential property as Polanus presents it in the Syntagma. Given the breadth of topics included, the survey will be necessarily less detailed than was the case with the two previous essential properties. At the same time, by focusing upon the definitions and distinctions that Polanus provides I am able to draw together the main lines of his thought regarding these species of the divine will.

1 Polanus also links the truth and holiness of God to his justice, yet without designating justice the fount of these other two properties.

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9.2

The State of These Various Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

Unlike previous chapters, developing a picture of the early Reformed orthodox discussion of the essential properties that Polanus sets forth under the heading of “species of the divine will” is more difficult. Three issues complicate the matter: the actual attributes that various theologians list and/or describe; the connections between these various attributes and the divine will (if any); and the connections between the various attributes among themselves (again, if any). Each of these complicating issues are discussed further below. The first issue is that no two of the theologians with whom I have been comparing Polanus set forth the same list of attributes. This is true broadly (i.e., the total list of all attributes), but also with the particular properties that Polanus designates species of the divine will. Ursinus provides the closest list. He discusses God’s bonitas, iustitia, veritatem, castitia (similar to sanctitas), misericordiam, and beneficus..2 Daneau discusses the righteousness of God, and describes God as misericordissimus, but does not have a detailed discussion of these divine attributes.3 Bucanus lists a variety of the properties Polanus discusses (e.g., bonitas, iustitia, misericordia, gratia, and patientia), but without any expansion or explanation.4 Keckermann speaks briefly of two: benignitas (the goodness of God that flows from his love), and iustitia.5 The only inclusion of these attributes from Trelcatius, Jr., is a note that amor is something only improprie attributed to God.6 Zanchi and Perkins provide the closest comparison to Polanus. This is seen first in the list of attributes Zanchi examines: bonitas, gratia, amor, misericordia, iustitia, ira, odium, and dominatus.7 In this, Zanchi and Polanus include slightly different lists at the ‘essential property’ level attributes, but in both cases the same sorts of discussions occur (i.e., even though Zanchi does not include sanctitas as a separate attribute, he discusses it under iustitia, and even though Polanus does not list ira as a separate essential property, he also discusses it under the heading of iustitia). The second close comparison comes in the more comparable lengths of discussions each has on the various essential properties or attributes. Again, however, Zanchi is found to have both a longer discussion and a more consistent manner of discussing each attribute. For example, Polanus’ discussion of God’s patientia, clementia, or

2 Ursinus, Loci theologici, 481 (bonitas), 482 (iustitia), 483 (veritatem), 484 (castitatis), 485 (misericordiam), and 487 (beneficus). Note that beneficus is an adjectival noun, as is the next property, liberimus. 3 Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 18. 4 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 5. 5 Keckermann, Systema, 114. 6 Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 47. 7 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, Book Four, 401–521.

The State of These Various Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

sanctitas is very brief, while his discussion of gratia dominates the whole section of species of the divine will.8 Perkins groups two pairs of attributes beneath the will of God, which “by reason of divers objects, hath divers names, and is either called Love or Hatred, or Grace and Justice.”9 Perkins divides grace into either goodness or mercy and justice into word and deed. From this, a close parallel to what Polanus does is seen. Perkins, however, sets forth these attributes with only a basic definition and Scriptural demonstration. Therefore, Perkins does not examine any of the distinctions that Polanus utilizes in his discussion of these various essential properties. Furthermore, the difference in ordering is more than cosmetic: Polanus sees first goodness and justice as direct sub-types of God’s will, and a love that flows from grace, which in turn itself flows from God’s goodness. That is, Polanus demonstrates an almost nested relationship within the overall bonitas Dei, whereas Perkins demonstrates a more strictly Ramist organizational structure. The second issue complicating the development of a state of these attributes or properties in the early Reformed orthodox period is that none of the theologians with whom I compare Polanus discuss these various properties or attributes under the heading or notion of species of the divine will. This is not to suggest that there is no connection among these theologians between God’s voluntas and the various properties that Polanus designates species. Rather, I simply note that the closeness of the connection is something that is rather unique to Polanus – at least among these early Reformed orthodox theologians. Ursinus, Zanchi, and Daneau do not make an explicit connection, either in organization or definition, between these attributes and the divine will. Bucanus lists several attributes (gratia, iustitia, patientia, and misericordia) as effectus of God.10 While Bucanus does not make explicit in his discussion of these attributes that they flow from the divine will, the fact that they are effects of God imply the connection between God’s will and its effects. Similarly, Keckermann speaks of God’s benignitas et iustitia as the virtutes of God’s will.11 It is important to note, however, that both Keckermann and Bucanus write after the publication of the 1599 edition of the Partitiones theologicae, in which Polanus makes explicit the connection between these attributes: “The will of God is either the goodness or justice of God.”12 This organizes the more ‘list orientated’ treatment of the 1590

8 That discussion, however, is itself dominated by an extended discussion of arguments against a Reformed understanding of divine grace as set forth by Bellarmine. See below, section 8.5. 9 Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11. See also Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 9, “Voluntas Dei pro varietate obiecti varia fortitur nomina, et vel amor et odium, vel gratia et iustitia dicitur.” 10 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 5. 11 Keckermann, Systema, 114. 12 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 12, “Voluntas Dei est vel bonitas Dei vel iustitia.”

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edition of the Partitiones theologicae. Thus, while it is impossible to state that either Keckermann or Bucanus base their discussion on Polanus, it at least is clear that Polanus does not organize the Syntagma on the basis of either Keckermann or Bucanus. The third issue is Polanus’ particular organization of these various essential properties among themselves. This issue extends beyond his categorization of all of these properties as species of the divine will, as Polanus organizes them into two subtypes (bonitas and iustitia) and each of the subtypes further divided. This division and sub-division have been typical of the overall Ramist structure of definition-anddivision that Polanus uses throughout the Syntagma. This bifurcation, however, is found not just within the properties (i.e., as with the divine wisdom and the divine will in itself), but also in how larger groupings of properties are organized. None of the early Reformed orthodox theologians with whom I have been comparing Polanus include such an organization. While it may be noted that Polanus alone among them utilizes a Ramist structure, his organization is not simply to fulfill a bifurcatorial schema. These various properties are grouped as they are for a purpose – grace, mercy, love, patience, and kindness all flow from God’s essential goodness.13 Grace and love are therefore connected back to God’s will through the notion of God’s goodness. While none of the theologians with whom I compare Polanus either provide an identical list or organizational schema as set forth by Polanus, the model organized by Richard Muller in his Post Reformation Reformed Dogmatics provides an interesting attempt to synthesize Reformed orthodox discussions of these various essential properties or attributes. Muller includes many of the same essential properties as Polanus, and all under the heading of “Attributes Relating to the Manifestation and Exercise of the Divine Will.”14 From this overarching description, Muller breaks out three sub-categories: 1) righteousness, holiness, goodness, truth, and faithfulness; 2) power, dominion, majesty, and glory; 3) love, grace, mercy, anger, and hatred.15 Of these, only the middle section dealing with power, dominion, majesty, and glory differ significantly from the overall grouping of Polanus. There is much

13 See below, section 8.4. As with the prior issue, this is not something that merely comes about in the Syntagma. In the 1599 edition of the Partitiones theologicae, at the close of his discussion of the goodness of God, Polanus states, “Further, the goodness of God is the fount of the grace, love, mercy, patience, [and] kindness of God,” (Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 13, “Porro bonitas Dei, est fons gratiae, amoris, misericordiae, patientiae, clementiae Dei.”). 14 Muller, PRRD, 3:476. The quoted text is the name of the sixth and final chapter in book 3 on the Divine Essence and Attributes. Muller does not have a separate treatment of two properties that Polanus discusses: the patientia and clementia. 15 This is most easily seen in the table of contents in Muller, PRRD, 3:12–13.

The State of These Various Properties in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

less crossover, however, in the internal structure of how Muller and Polanus organize these properties. For instance, Muller and Polanus both place holiness and truth beneath God’s justice or righteousness, yet Muller also places God’s goodness beneath God’s justice – whereas Polanus has bonitas and iustitia as side-by-side sub-levels of the divine will. Finally, Muller describes love, grace, and mercy as ‘Divine Affections and Virtues,’ rather than ‘aspects’ of God’s essential goodness. It is certainly possible, however, that Muller would see ‘affections and virtues’ as ‘aspects’ of God’s essential goodness. Thus, the difference is probably primarily semantic. A difference of organization between Polanus and Muller would not be surprising or remarkable if not for the fact that Muller has repeatedly used Polanus as a model for how the Reformed orthodox organize their discussion of these doctrines. Taking the general outline from the Synopsis libri at the beginning of the Syntagma, Muller uses Polanus to orient the reader to his discussion of the overall division of theology,16 the divine essence itself,17 the names of God,18 the essential properties of the first order,19 and the general outline of the essential properties of the second order.20 Note that even the names ‘first and second order’ are explicit categories that Polanus uses. It is curious, therefore, that Muller does not use Polanus as a model for his discussion of the remaining attributes in Chapter 6.21 Given these issues, it is more difficult to present an early Reformed orthodox view of “types within the divine will” than it is to present such view of God’s wisdom and will, or of his power and freedom. There is markedly less crossover between what Polanus is doing with these properties and what the majority of the theologians with whom I compare him did in their own treatment of the doctrine of divine 16 17 18 19 20 21

Muller, PRRD, 3:159. Muller, PRRD, 3.227. Muller, PRRD, 3.255. Muller, PRRD, 3.271. Muller, PRRD, 3.366. Muller does refer to the organizational structure of Polanus’ Syntagma in the opening paragraph of section 6.3, “The Divine Affections and Virtues.” There Muller refers to the distinction that Polanus makes between affirmative and negative attributes and between proper or figurative. He then states, “The divine affections, given that they include such opposites as love and hate, mercy and anger, offer some reflection of the first part of Polanus’ division, even though the affirmative attributes are usually taken as members of the via eminentiae and the negative, of the via negativa. The second part of the division, however, that between “proper” and “figurative,” is the point of distinction between the affections and all of the attributes previously discussed.” (Muller, PRRD, 3:522). It should be noted that Mullers usage of the proper/figurative distinction is in direct contrast to the way that Polanus utilizes it. For Polanus, all of the attributes that Muller lists as affections (love, grace, mercy, wrath) are discussed in the section of “proper” attributes. That is, contrary to what Muller suggests, Polanus does not assert that God’s love, mercy, or grace are only figuratively attributed to God. They are very much part of the proper attributes as they appear in the Syntagma.

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attributes. Given this lack of crossover, there does not appear to be a set of common questions and issues that can be distilled from the early Reformed discussion of these attributes or properties. The following discussion of the various properties that Polanus terms ‘types of the divine will,’ when applicable, will seek to demonstrate the connections with the broader handling of these properties among the early Reformed orthodox.

9.3

‘Types’ within the Divine Will

Near the close of the chapter dealing with divine will, Polanus designates two subtypes (species) within that property: bonitas and iustitia.22 Polanus further distributes God’s essential goodness and justice into numerous additional distinctions providing such typical divine properties as grace, love, mercy, patience, kindness, truth, and holiness. While Polanus has already made a number of distinctions within the divine will (such as essential/personal, effective/permissive, absolute/conditional, etc.), each of these distinctions noted as “types” of the will are expounded both as separate essential properties and as separate chapters in the Syntagma. The distribution of these ‘types’ are shown on the following figure:

22 By the term ‘species,’ Polanus is generally refer to a “type” of the manifestation of God’s will. Thus, the notion of ‘type’ will be used to translate species with regard to God’s goodness and justice. Cf. “Species” in Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 285. Muller’s definition is more technical and precise than what Polanus appears to be using here. See also Lindblad, “Of the Nature Of God,” 120. Leigh describes the divine affections and virtues as “manifestations or egress of the divine will.”

The Goodness of God

Figure 3 Distribution of the ‘Types’ of the Divine Will

Each of the individual properties will be discussed further below, in the order in which Polanus presents them in the Syntagma.

9.4

The Goodness of God

The first subtype of the divine will that Polanus considers is bonitas Dei. Prior to Polanus, bonitas was attributed to God in the works of Ursinus, Zanchi, and Perkins.23 Ursinus and Zanchi use the language of fons with respect to God’s essential goodness, Ursinus stating that “God is the sole font of goodness, and the first cause of all good things.”24 Perkins, however, lists the goodness of God as a subset of his grace. Bonitas appears in the 1590 and 1599 editions of the Partitiones theologica, and also in Bucanus and Keckermann.25 While Keckermann uses the term benignitas, he defines the term as how God does good to his creation (either in a general or special way), and he corresponds it with God’s iustitia as the twofold virtutes of God’s will.

23 Ursinus, Loci theologici, 481; Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 401; Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 9. 24 Ursinus, Loci theologici, 481, “Deus est unicus fons bonitatis, et prima causa omnium bonorum.” 25 Polanus, Partitiones (1590), 4; Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 12; Bucanus, Institutiones theologici, 5; and Keckermann, Systema, 114.

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In the Syntagma, Polanus defines the goodness of God as: “His essential property whereby he is good in every way, both in himself and beyond himself as the actual author of every good thing.”26 In himself, God is good by his own essence rather than by participation in goodness or by an accidental quality of goodness.27 That is, God’s goodness flows from within himself rather than existing outside of God and flowing into him. Thus, the ‘direction of flow’ is from God to his creation, not the other way around. Further, Polanus indicates that goodness is God’s end because he alone is the highest good and is perfect goodness in whom there is nothing evil.28 Here again, Polanus demonstrates an ad extra/ad intra dimension in the second order essential properties of God. With reference to that which is outside himself, “God appears as the author of every good outside himself.”29 This authorship extends to the multitude of good that is to be done (facienda) by creatures, and to the good he himself has done (factus). This extra se bonitas is itself either general or specific. The general goodness of God “is that which extends itself generally unto all creatures, not only toward those who continue in the goodness with which they were created, but even toward those who fell away from original goodness (i.e., toward evil angels and men).”30 The special goodness of God “is that whereby God wills in a good way toward elect angels and men.”31 Polanus concludes his discussion by stating that the “goodness of God is the source (fons) of God’s grace, love, mercy, patience, and kindness.”32 A reference in the margin points the reader to Zanchi’s De Natura Dei as a general reference in that Zanchi places the goodness of God as the head of his discussion of the divine grace,

26 Polanus, Syntagma, 1034D, “Bonitas Dei, est proprietas eius essentialis, qua ipse omnibus modis bonum est, tum in se, tum extra se omnis boni autor existens.” See also Muller, PRRD, 3:503, who indicates that the doctrine of divine goodness “serves as the primary affection of the Divine will.” 27 Polanus, Syntagma, 1034E. 28 Polanus, Syntagma, 1034E. 29 Polanus, Syntagma, 1035A, “Extra se Deus boni omnis autor exsistit...” 30 Polanus, Syntagma, 1035B, “Generalitas bonitas Dei est quae ad omnes creaturas generatim se extendit, non tantum erga eas quae in bonitate, cum qua creatae erant, manserunt: sed etiam erga illas, quae a bonitate primigenia defecerunt; ut erga malos Angelos et homines” 31 Polanus, Syntagma, 1035C, “Specialis bonitas Dei, est qua Deus bene vult electis Angelis et hominibus” 32 Polanus, Syntagma, 1039D, “Bonitas Dei est fons gratiae, amoris, misericordiae, patientiae, clementiae Dei.” See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 207.

The Goodness of God

love, and mercy.33 Furthermore, Polanus orders these properties in this manner because “in the order of nature, God’s goodness is prior to his grace, love, mercy, patience, and kindness, because grace, with these remaining attributes, is generated from the goodness of the divine nature.”34 The order of the properties themselves is therefore particular: not only do they all flow from the goodness of God, but “love proceeds from grace, mercy from love, and kindness and patience from mercy.”35 This connected nature is demonstrated in the following figure:

Figure 4 The Organizational Structure of Divine Goodness

33 The marginal reference, which reads “Hieron. Zanchi, lib. quatro de natura Dei, cap. 6, sub initium,” is not a direct quotation (for Zanchi does not treat patientia or clementia as separate properties or attributes) and, at any rate, is pointing to the wrong chapter in book four of De Natura Dei. Chapter 1 in that librum refers to the divine goodness, while chapter 6 refers to God’s wrath (ira). Zanchi does refer to God as the fons... in Deo omnium aliarum, but not of specific attributes. 34 Polanus, Syntagma, 1039D, “Bonitas Dei est ordine naturae prior gratiae, amore, misericordiam, patientiam et clementiam Dei, propterae quod a bonitate naturae divinae nascatur gratia cum reliquis omnibus.” 35 Polanus, Syntagma, 1040A, “iii. Ex gratia prosiciscitur amor, ex amore misericordia, ex hac clementia et patientia.”

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That these essential properties are in this way connected is something Polanus returns to only once in what follows in the Syntagma – in his discussion of divine mercy (Section 8.7). It does, however, further underline Polanus’ commitment to demonstrating the interrelatedness of theological doctrines one to another as well as the overall structure whereby latter essential properties add to and expand upon prior essential properties.

9.5

The Grace of God

Polanus next turns to the various manifestations of God’s will that flow from his goodness, the first of which is God’s grace. While Polanus treats gratia in both editions of the Partitiones theologicae and the Syntagma, it is also found in early Reformed orthodox theological treatments in Zanchi, Perkins, and Bucanus. Whereas Bucanus simply lists gratia among the effecta of God, Zanchi devotes the second chapter of the fourth book in De Natura Dei to this topic.36 Perkins considers grace to be a larger sub-category beneath the will of God (alongside love, hatred, and justice) from which flows God’s goodness and mercy.37 Polanus begins his discussion of God’s grace in the Syntagma by first distinguishing between two meanings of the word gratia. In one sense, it can refer to the grace that resides within God – i.e., his essential grace. In the other sense, it can refer to the effects of that grace upon creatures. It is this first sense of the word that Polanus unfolds. He defines this grace as “his essential property, without doubt God’s kindest will and favor, through which he is truly, properly gracious, [and] whereby he favors and freely blesses his creatures.”38 With this definition, Polanus presents God as both gracious within himself, and as one who dispenses blessings by that grace. Further, this free and gracious blessing is an aspect or act of the divine will – indeed, divine grace falls under the larger heading of the divine will and continues Polanus’ discussion of the various ways in which God’s will is internally demonstrated – particularly via God’s essential goodness. This essential grace resident in God is twofold: Polanus distinguishes between a general and a special grace.39 The general grace of God is the common extension of his will to preserve all things. Polanus points out that since God extends this grace for the preservation of the whole of creation, no one can complain that God is

36 Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 5; Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 420. 37 Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 9. 38 Polanus, Syntagma, 1040D, “Gratia in Deo residens, est essentialis proprietas eius, nimirum benignissima voluntas Dei et favor, per quem vere et proprie est gratiosus, quo favet et gratis benefacit creaturae suae.” 39 See also te Velde, Doctrine of God, 207, who describes these as “degrees of goodness.”

The Grace of God

against him or her. The special grace of God is that gracious benevolence (gratuita benevolentia) that is grasped only in Christ, and only by the elect.40 Polanus allows that this aspect of grace can also be called gratia gratum faciens, gratia acceptans, gratia salvans, gratia iustificans, and gratia regenerans. The special grace of God is therefore that by which those saved are chosen, called, justified, and regenerated unto eternal salvation in Christ. Polanus therefore distinguishes between a ‘common’ and a ‘saving’ grace. Polanus presents eleven axioms in support of this definition.41 In these, he declares that it is by the very favor and benevolence of God that we are made favorable and acceptable to him. Further, the special grace of God towards us resides in God alone, is received in Christ alone, and is received to the glory of God alone. In this way, “the special grace of God is the beginning, middle and end of the whole of our salvation.”42 It is therefore the fount and cause and means of the whole of our salvation – not only as its initial source and the guarantee of its consummation, but also as the power by which it proceeds from start to finish. Although this essential grace resides only in God, Polanus asserts that we do have some understanding and sense of it. Even in this, however, he distinguishes between essential grace, which he also terms prima gratia, and that which is received by us – gratiae secundae, gratia dona, dona per gratiam. God’s essential or prima gratia exists prior to and is the basis of gratiae secundae. Polanus also accepts distinctions between the grace of election, of effectual calling and of regeneration. He likewise distinguishes between gratia praeparans (the grace by which our mind and will is prepared to yield to the Holy Spirit), gratia operans (the grace by which we are freed from the reign of sin and are renewed in our mind, will, and affections), and gratia cooperans (the grace by which God continues and completes the renewal he has begun in us, yet with which we cooperate by the Holy Spirit).43 In each of these cases, however, Polanus insists that the distinctions only arise in our understanding, as this essential grace is always one and the same in God. In addition to the broader discussion given above, two of the axiomata that Polanus presents are particularly important – not only for the specific information conveyed in them, but also in Polanus’ extended interaction with Bellarmine on the topics raised.44 In the first axioma Polanus presents, he states:

40 Polanus, Syntagma, 1040E. 41 Polanus, Syntagma, 1041B–1087E. 42 Polanus, Syntagma, 1086B, “Gratia Dei est principium, medium et consummatio totius salutis nostrae.” 43 Polanus, Syntagma, 1087E. 44 For additional information on Polanus’ refutation of Bellarmine’s argument, see te Velde, Doctrine of God, 209–213.

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The grace that renders [us] pleasing and acceptable to God is also the saving grace whereby we have been elected in Christ unto eternal salvation, effectively called, justified, regenerated, and finally whereby we are eternally saved. It is not an infused quality in us, nor something created or inhering to us, nor the love whereby we love God or any other virtue in us.45

Thus, this grace does not exist in us as a thing, but, as the second axioma describes, as something residing in God himself. Polanus continues: The grace of God whereby we are saved, whereby we have been elected and called, whereby we are justified and regenerated is in God alone, because it is God’s very favor and benevolence whereby he renders us favorable and acceptable to himself in Christ, Ephesians 1:6.46

Grace is therefore resident in God himself and is the essential property of God by which the fullness of salvation comes to the recipients of God’s special goodness. Following on from these rather brief axiomata, Polanus interacts with a number of arguments put forth by Bellarmine.47 Polanus presents seven texts from which Bellarmine deduces that gratia gratum faciens is an infused quality: Romans 5:19; John 4:14; Romans 5:5; Titus 3:5–6; 2 Corinthians 1:21–22, 5:5; 1 John 2:27; and 1 John 3:9. In each case, Polanus sets forth Bellarmine’s argument in the form of a syllogism, which he then refutes on the basis of a variety of counter-arguments. Most frequently, Polanus shows how Bellarmine misunderstands the consequences set forth in Scripture, how Bellarmine provides a false interpretation of important biblical and theological phrases, how Bellarmine rests on faulty assumptions, or how Bellarmine uses terms ambiguously or equivocally. Similarly, Polanus presents five arguments drawn from Romans 3:24 by Bellarmine affirming that the grace by which we are justified is infused and inherent in us.48 Again, Polanus replicates Bellarmine’s syllogism and responds with exegetical and logical arguments.

45 Polanus, Syntagma, 1041B, “Gratia Deo gratum atque acceptum faciens atque ita et gratia salvans qua summus electi in Christo ad salutem aeternam, efficaciter vocati, iustificati, regenerati, qua denique aeternum servamur, non est qualitas nobis infusa, non aliquid in nobis creatum et inhaerens, non charitas qua nos Deum diligimus, aut ulla alia virtus in nobis.” 46 Polanus, Syntagma, 1071B, “Gratia Dei qua servamur, qua electi et vocati sumus, qua iustificamur et regeneramur, est in solo Deo: quia est ipse favor Dei et benevolentia qua ipse nos in Christo sibi gratos et acceptos facit, Ephesi 1.v.6.” 47 Polanus, Syntagma, 1041B. These objections from the four books titled De Gratia et libero arbitrio, which are found in Roberto Bellarminus, Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei, 4 volumes, Vol. 4 (Satorii, 1601), 4:516–929. 48 Polanus, Syntagma, 1071Bff. These objections are from the five books titled De Iustificatione, and can be found in Bellarminus, Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei, 4:930–1321.

The Grace of God

Two items of particular interest arise from Polanus’ lengthy polemic against Bellarmine. The first is that Polanus chooses to grapple with Bellarmine’s exegesis of biblical texts. By presenting Bellarmine’s arguments in the form of his own syllogisms, Polanus raises a shield against any counterargument that he is merely tearing down straw men. Further, if the very texts that Bellarmine marshals in defense of his position can be demonstrated to argue against Bellarmine’s position both logically and exegetically, then the Cardinal (and those who side with him) has no basis from which to attack the Reformed position. For example, one of the matters that Polanus takes up from Bellarmine is the notion that gratia gratum faciens is the same thing as habitus charitatis: “grace is not distinguished from love by any mode, but only by reason.”49 Polanus presents this syllogism as representative of that argument: • If the same things are applicable in every respect to [multiple] things, those things are the same thing. • The same things are applicable in every respect to the grace that makes us acceptable and the disposition of love. • Consequently, they are the same thing.50 This syllogism is demonstrated by the fact that by participation with the disposition of grace a person becomes a son of God. This is proven by 1 John 3:1(a) (“See what kind of love the Father has given to us, that we should be called children of God; and so we are.”) and 1 John 4:7(b) (“Whoever loves has been born of God and knows God.”). In Polanus’ response, he considers both the syllogism that Bellarmine advances as well as the biblical evidence Bellarmine cites. Indeed, the basis upon which the logic of the syllogism is incorrect is ultimately because of the testimony of Scripture. Thus, Polanus responds to this notion along three lines. First, he says that this ability to bestow that by which we become sons of God is not said properly of the disposition of grace, but of divine benevolence. Second, Polanus indicates that the same thing is not said of the disposition of love – i.e., the middle term of the syllogism given above is not applicable in the case of the dispositions of love and grace. Third, Polanus notes that the testimony of Scripture does not support this syllogism. 1 John 3:1 speaks of love (charitas), not of any disposition inhering in us. We are sons of God by the mere love of God; we love God by his grace to us. This love, Polanus states, is metonymous with ‘efficient cause.’ Further, 1 John 4:7 speaks

49 Polanus, Syntagma, 1054B, “Gratiam a charitate, aut nullo modo, aut sola ratione distingui.” 50 Polanus, Syntagma, 1054D, “Quibus eadem conveniunt per omnia, ea sunt idem; Gratia gratum facienti et habitui charitatis eadem conveniunt per omnia; Ergo, sunt idem.”

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not of the cause of God’s love but of its effects in those he loves – that is, love for God is a sign of regeneration. The second interesting item is the sources Polanus references in support of his counterarguments. He makes several non-specific references to Augustine, Peter Lombard, and Thomas Aquinas, as well as a particularly rare reference to John Calvin (at least within Book Two of the Syntagma).51 In addition to these general references, Polanus quotes (sometimes at length) from Ignatius’ Epistola ad Romanos, Augustine’s In Epistolam Ioannis, De Dono Perseverantiae, De Civitate Dei, and De Trinitate, from Bernard of Clairvaux’s Sermones super Cantica Canticorum, from Thomas Aquinas’ In Epistolam ad Ephesios and Ad Romanos.52 In each case, Polanus attempts to demonstrate how Bellarmine contradicts teachings of the church fathers, and how the doctrine he is setting forth in the Syntagma corresponds to the catholic teaching of the church.53 For example, with regard to Romans 3:24, Polanus takes up the following syllogism: • If the favor, benevolence, and generosity of God is signified by the expression ‘by grace,’ then the word ‘grace’ is not the same as ‘favor’, but the effect of favor, which truly signifies infused righteousness; • The first part is true [i.e., the favor, benevolence, and generosity of God is signified by the expression ‘by grace’];

51 Polanus references Augustine in Syntagma, 1043D, 1051C, 1075D; Peter Lombard in Syntagma, 1064C; Thomas Aquinas in Syntgma, 1077A; and John Calvin in Syntagma, 1051C. Of these, Polanus indicates a location only in Calvin, Institutio christianae religionis, 3.2.12. 52 Ignatius, Epistola ad Romanos, in PG 5 (Paris: Migne, 1857), 814 (located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1049C); Augustine, In Epistolam Ioannis, in PL 35 (Paris: Migne, 1864), 402 (located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1053B); Augustine, De Dono Perseverantiae, PL 45 (Paris: Migne, 1865), 1027 (located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1059C); Augustine, De Civitate Dei, in PL 41 (Paris: Migne, 1864), 650 (located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1064A); Augustine, De Trinitate, in PL 42 (Paris: Migne, 1865), 872 (located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1080C); Bernard of Clairvaux, “Sermone XXIII,” in Sermones Super Cantica Canticorum, Sanctorum Patrum Opuscula Selecta, Vol. 5 (Academica Wagneriana, 1888), 188 (located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1064B); Aquinas, In Epistolam ad Ephesios, in Opera Omnia, vol. 21 (Paris: 1876), 326 (located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1079A); Aquinas, Ad Romanos, in D. Pauli Apostoli Epistolas Commentaria, Vol. 1, 9th ed. (Leige: H. Dessain, 1857), 92 (located at Polanus, Syntagma, 1081E–1082E). 53 See also, te Velde, Doctrine of God, 211, “Besides the technical diagnosis of logical fallacies committed by Bellarmine, we find Polanus accuse Bellarmine of following Aristotle more than is suitable in theology, and of playing a sophist rather than a theologian. Polanus also attempts to show that Bellarmine’s position differs from normative fathers and doctors such as Augustine and Thomas Aquinas.”

The Grace of God

•

Consequently, what follows is true [i.e., the word ‘grace’ is not the same as ‘favor’, but the effect of favor, which truly signifies infused righteousness].54

Polanus indicates that the syllogism is only partly true. The expression ‘by grace’ does indicate the generosity of God, which is to say we are justified by a gracious gift. Here, Polanus cites Ambrosiaster as Ambrose: “They are freely justified because they do not work, nor do they give repayment, but are justified only through faith by the gift of God.”55 The rest of the syllogism (i.e., the rest of the major proposition) is false. Gratis signifies the favor and benevolence of God, as God’s benevolence is the cause of his generosity. Justification, then, is the gift of God; not something owed to us according to merit but given from God’s own benevolence. Important here is how Polanus uses an ancient church father against Bellarmine, demonstrating the Reformation understanding of justification by grace through faith is an inheritance of the ancient church. Taken as a whole, Polanus puts forth an argument that both rests upon the Reformed understanding of Scripture as the principium congnoscendi, and therefore that corresponds with what Polanus has stated about the authority of Scripture earlier in the Syntagma. His argument furthermore seeks to demonstrate the irrationality (i.e., the illogical-ness) of Bellarmine’s position – demonstrating particularly that the Reformed position is not based upon Scripture in isolation from logic and reason.56 In addition, where appropriate, Polanus includes the testimony of the catholic church, underlining the notion that it is the Reformed scholastics, such as Polanus, who are the true heirs of the catholic fathers. Finally, the debate reminds us that Polanus is not writing in a vacuum. While the debates with Lutherans over the Lord’s Supper have largely grown quiet, and Gomarus’ disputations with Arminius have only just begun, there remains an ongoing back and forth with various Roman Catholic contemporaries – particularly given the positions Polanus argues against were only published in the previous decade. Indeed, of the several theologians that

54 Polanus, Syntagma, 1071D, “Si voce gratis, favor, benevolentia ac liberalitas Dei significatur, tum nomen gratiae, not ipsum favorem, sed effectum favoris illius nempe iustitiam infusam significat; Verum est quod antecedit; Ergo et quod sequitur.” 55 Polanus, 1072A, “Justificati sunt gratis, quia nihil operantes, neque vicem reddentes, sola fide iustificati sunt dono Dei.” The quote can be found attributed to Ambrose in Commentarium in epistolam ad Romanum, book II (Paris, 1690), 46. See also Ambrosiaster, Commentaries on Romans and 1–2 Corinthians, Ancient Christian Texts, ed. and trans. Gerald Bray, series ed. Thomas C. Oden and Gerald Bray (Downers Grove: Intervarsity Press, 2009), 29. 56 Pace Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 147, who asserts “Logische Überlegungen beherrschen die Auseinandersetzung. (Logical considerations dominate the discussion).” According to Faulenbach, Polanus is not seeking to engage with Bellarmine in light of Bellarmine’s arguments. Rather, the use of syllogisms and the recourse to logically argumentation suggests that Polanus’ whole theological system is thoroughly rationalistic.

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te Velde lists as “significant works against Bellarmine,” all responded between 1590 and 1630.57 This debate is therefore all the more important, as in many ways Reformed and Roman Catholic theologians (such as Bellarmine) evidence enormous overlap in their doctrine of God. It is, however, where the doctrine of God overlaps with particularly soteriological issues (with gratia Dei being just such an issue) that the Reformed separate from Roman Catholics.

9.6

The Love of God

The next property that Polanus considers is the amor Dei. The early Reformed scholastic theologians with whom I have compared Polanus demonstrate a typical breadth of variety in how they discuss God’s love. As with many of the other essential properties that Polanus covers, Zanchi provides a chapter length discussion on the love of God.58 Perkins also includes amor as a sub-category of God’s will, paired with hatred and grouped with grace and justice.59 God’s love is not, however, discussed in any great detail by the other early Reformed scholastic theologians. Keckermann mentions it briefly alongside God’s bonitas, while Trelcatius, Jr., lists it (along with ira) as those attributes that are improprie attributed to God.60 Polanus includes God’s love in the 1599 edition of the Partiones theologicae, but not in the prior 1590 edition.61 He begins his discussion of divine love in the Syntagma with a variety of typically scholastic questions. First, he asks modo sit – for the love of God can either refer to ‘that which God loves’ or to ‘the love that has God as the object’. It will be this first notion that Polanus considers as an essential property of God. Second, he asks an sit – to which he responds that it seems that love does not exist in God, for love is suffering (passio). Yet Polanus responds that love is suffering in man, but in God resides a love without suffering. Furthermore, he adds that God does not love by emotion (affectus) but by action (effectus). Having considered these preliminary quaestiones, Polanus next asks what the love of God is (quid sit). He answers with the following definition:

57 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 209, note 129. There, te Velde states, “The most significant works against Bellarmine were written by David Pareus of Heidelberg, William Whitaker and William Ames in England (see the controversy between Ames and Bellarmine: Eef Dekker, “An Ecumenical Debate”), Daniel Chamier in France, Amandus Polanus in Switzerland, and Sibrandus Lubbertus in the Netherlands...” 58 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 439. 59 Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 9. 60 Keckermann, Systema, 114; Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 47. 61 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 13.

The Love of God

God’s love is his essential property or essence whereby, delighting himself in that which he approves, he wills what is good to it. For this is loving: delighting oneself with that which is pleasing, and willing and supplying what is good to it.62

In support of this, Polanus references 1 John 4:8. From this definition, Polanus provides several nested distinctions. Polanus first distinguishes between a natural and a voluntary love.63 The natural love of God (amor Dei naturalis) is “that by which he loves himself before all things: the Father the Son and the Holy Spirit, the Son the Father and the Holy Spirit, the Holy Spirit the Father and the Son.”64 Here, Polanus references Matthew 3:17, 12; John 3:35, 5:20, 17:24 and 14:31. Two items of note arise in connection with this natural love. First, this love is common to all three persons of the Trinity and is therefore properly considered among the attributes or essential properties of God.65 Because love is essential in this sense, it can also be considered a necessary love (particularly in contrast with the free or voluntary love in the second half of the distinction). Second, Polanus explicitly connects the notion of the essential properties of God to his internal and intra-personal relations. In the other half of the distinction, Polanus discusses God’s voluntary love (amor dei voluntarius): the love God has for that which he has made.66 Regarding this voluntary love, Polanus further distinguishes between a general and a special love of God. The general love of God embraces all things he has made and therefore maintains, sustains, and does good to them. In support of this, Polanus references Matthew 5:44–45. In contrast, the special love of God is his particular love of the elect.67 Within this special love, Polanus distinguishes between the love of God for Christ according to his human nature and the love of God for the elect in Christ. The first love – that love for Christ according to his human nature – “is that whereby the Father embraces Christ, not only as the λόγος, but also as man and the mediator constituted from eternity.”68 Here, Polanus quotes John 3:16. This love,

62 Polanus, Syntagma, 1094D, “Amor Dei, est essentialis proprietas seu essentia Dei, qua oblectans sese in eo quod approbat, ei bonum vult. Hoc enim est amare, oblectare se eo quod placet, eique bonum velle et praestare.” 63 See also Muller, PRRD, 3:565. 64 Polanus, Syntagma, 1094E, “Amor Dei naturalis, est quo seipsum ante omne amat: Pater Filium et Spiritum Sanctum: Filius Patrem et Spiritum Sanctum: Spiritum Sanctus Patrem et Filium” 65 See also Muller, PRRD, 3:566; and te Velde, Doctrine of God, 207, who states: “Polanus makes a basic distinction between the intra-trinitarian love and the outward love of creatures. The love within the Trinity is natural, eternal and necessary: there is no possibility of the three Persons in the Trinity not loving each other.” 66 Polanus, Syntagma, 1095B. 67 Polanus, Syntagma, 1095D. 68 Polanus, Syntagma, 1095D, “Amor Dei erga Christum, est quo Pater Christum complectitur, non tantum ut λόγος, sed etiam ut hominem et Mediatorem ab aeterno constitutum.”

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says Polanus, is the foundation of the love of God towards us, “for God has loved us in his beloved.”69 Polanus distinguishes God’s love toward his elect from his love towards Christ as man and mediator. While God’s love toward his elect is founded upon his love for Christ as man and mediator, it remains distinguishable from it. At the same time, that love God has for his elect cannot be separated from Christ – in whom they are both elected and loved. God is therefore said to love the elect in Christ. At this point, Polanus proceeds to discuss the cause, effect, subject, and characteristics of God’s love. He states that the causa efficiens amoris Dei erga nos “is the mere goodness of God.”70 In support of this, Polanus references John 4:10 and 4:19. The love of God therefore finds no ground in that which God has created – there is nothing within those whom God loves that would move him toward them as lovely or loveable. This, Polanus states is contrary to two quotations from Bellarmine. The first is taken from De gratia et libero arbitrio and states: “he shows that our love makes us beloved to God.”71 In the second, taken from the same work, Bellarmine writes, “because God loves us in two ways: in one way in order that we would be just and holy, and in another way because we are just and holy.”72 In response, Polanus states that Bellarmine has confused the efficient cause (the first way) with the final cause (the second way).73 With this, Polanus appears to be arguing that God first loves us in order that we would be just and holy, and then loves that which he has worked in us by his efficient love. These are therefore not two modes or manners of his love, but the same love from two different perspectives – that of active and effective working and that of acted and effected result. In terms of these effected results, Polanus states that the effecta of the divine love are the innumerable benefits which God bestows upon us.74 This love was the cause of the liberation of Israel from Egypt (Deuteronomy 4:37) and of Israel’s election (Deuteronomy 10:15). This love was the reason Balaam could not curse the people of Israel (Deuteronomy 23:5), as well as the reason that David was given a wise son (2 Chronicles 2:11). Finally, this love of God toward us is shown in that God gave up his only begotten son (John 3:16, John 14:21, Proverbs 3:12, Hebrews 12:6).

69 Polanus, Syntagma, 1095E, “quia Deus dilexit nos in illo dilecto.” 70 Polanus, Syntagma, 1099B, “Causa efficiens amoris Dei erga nos est mera bonitas Dei.” 71 Polanus, Syntagma, 1099D, “Docet quod nostra dilectio faciat nos Deo dilectos.” Here, Polanus references Bellarminus, Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei, 4.961. 72 Polanus, Syntagma, 1099D, “Quod Deus duobus modis nos diligat: uno modo, ut simus iusti et sancti. alio modo, quia sumus iusti et sancti.” Here, Polanus references Bellarminus, Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei, 4.968. 73 Polanus, Syntagma, 1099E–1100B. 74 Polanus, Syntagma, 1102E.

The Mercy of God

In terms of the subjects of God’s love, Polanus declared that these are only that which is good, “for God loves only what is good.”75 God therefore loves himself, as he is the greatest and infinite good. He also loves that which he himself has made, as everything he creates is good. In one way, therefore, God loves all things equally in that he loves by a single, pure and simple act of the divine will. This love is unequal, however, when considered from the perspective of the objects and effects of his love. God loves those who are better (meliores) more than he loves those who are less good (minus bonae), he loves Christ according to his human nature more than the rest of mankind, rational creatures more than animals, the elect more than the reprobate, etc. Polanus next considers the adjuncta or characteristics of God’s love.76 He states that God’s love is eternal, as he loves us in his Son from eternity. Second, God’s love to us is of immense magnitude, as demonstrated from John 3:16. Third, this love is immutable, constant and firm. Fourth, Polanus states that we ought always to be certainly persuaded by this love and should consider it when faced with temptation.

9.7

The Mercy of God

Following the love of God, Polanus discusses the misericordia Dei. In the early Reformed orthodox theological discussions on the attributes of God, mercy finds more widespread treatment than do many of the other properties that Polanus considers. It is found as a separate attribute or property in Ursinus, Zanchi, Daneau, Perkins, and Bucanus, but not in Keckermann or Trelcatius, Jr.77 As with God’s love, Polanus does not include God’s mercy in the 1590 edition of the Paritiones theologicae. He does, however, include it in the 1599 edition.78 Polanus begins the discussion of the mercy of God in the Syntagma with a familiar series of typically scholastic questions: In how many manners is this spoken? (Quot modis dicitur?); Is this truly attributed to God? (An Deo vere tribuatur?); Is this properly attributed to God? (An proprie Deo tribuatur?) What is it? (Quid sit?) What is its cause; what are its effects? (Quae eius causa, effecta).79 With regard to the number of ways the word can be used, Polanus indicates that God’s mercy can be taken actively or passively.80 In an active sense, mercy refers to God’s actual acts

75 Polanus, Syntagma, 1103E, “Nihil enim amat Deus, nisi quod bonum est.” 76 Polanus, Syntagma, 1106C. 77 Ursinus, Loci theolgoci, 485; Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 453; Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 18; Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 9; Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 5. 78 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 14. 79 Polanus, Syntagma, 1114E. 80 Polanus, Syntagma, “Misericordia Dei, vel active accipitur vel passive.”

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of mercy – understood in so far as God is purest act. In a passive sense, mercy refers to these acts of God as they are understood by those upon whom he shows mercy. Polanus will refer to the prior way, as this is that mercy that is essential to God. In the second question, Polanus considers whether mercy can be truly attributed to God. He responds that it is truly attributed to God, since all virtues and all that is good are found in him.81 As mercy is both a virtue and that which is good, mercy is in God. Similarly, in response to the third question, Polanus states that mercy is properly (proprie) attributed to God – that is, not by anthropomorphism or otherwise improperly. Polanus points to the mercy that God exhibited towards fallen man (Genesis 3), demonstrating that mercy was in God before it was in man. Further, the mercy of God is eternal, normative, and continual.82 In connection with this, Polanus references the objections of Stoics who deny that there is mercy in God because he does not suffer.83 According to this line of thought, misericordia is equivalent to grief of the soul (aegritudo animi). If God does not suffer in his soul, then he does not have mercy. Here, Polanus replies that while it may be true in human beings that mercy and misery are closely related, with God they are not. Just because Polanus denies passio in God does not mean that mercy is not really in God. Polanus then turns to the question: Quid sit misericordia Dei? He responds with a definition: “The mercy of God is his most eager will running to the aid of those who are miserable, from which every kindness comes forth.”84 In support of this, Polanus references Exodus 34:6 and Romans 9:18. Polanus also provides several axiomata. First, God’s mercy proceeds from free love toward us (gratuitus erga nos amor), and this love is the efficient cause of God’s mercy.85 Polanus therefore indicates that this mercy is fully of grace and not of works. Further, he reiterates the notion of the connectedness of these various essential properties that fall under the category of God’s essential goodness. Just as love is the source of mercy, so grace is the source of love and God’s goodness is the source of his grace. Second, God is merciful from his own essence and not from any other quality, disposition, or passion.86 Thus, not only does Polanus continue to contend that God is a most simple being, he also grounds mercy in the very essence or being of God. Here, Polanus quotes from Ephesians 2:4, Exodus 33:19, and Romans 9:15. Third, the effects of God’s mercy are either spiritual or physical benefits. For the spiritual

81 82 83 84

Polanus, Syntagma, 1115B. Polanus, Syntagma, 1115D. Polanus, Syntagma, 1115E. Polanus, Syntagma, 1117C, “Misericordia Dei, est propensissima eius voluntas miseris succurrendi, a qua beneficia omnia proveniunt.” 85 Polanus, Syntagma, 1118D. 86 Polanus, Syntagma, 1119A.

The Mercy of God

benefits, Polanus refers to Romans 9:16 (speaking of God’s sovereignty in election), Titus 3:5 (speaking of the mercy by which we have been saved), Luke 1:77 (speaking of the remission of sin), Ephesians 2:4 (speaking of God having made us alive with Christ), and 1 Peter 1:3 (speaking of God having begotten us again to a living hope).87 The physical benefits are likewise demonstrated by Isaiah 30:18, as God “delays, softens and removes punishments.”88 Further, Jeremiah 3:22 demonstrates that God “saves for himself some who are in the midst of their punishments, lest all be consumed.”89 Finally, Philippians 2:27 shows that God sometimes liberates us from desperate illnesses, as he did with Epaphroditus. Although Polanus does not further elucidate the distinction he makes between spiritual and physical, it would seem that the spiritual effects of God’s mercy bestow or accompany salvation, while the physical or corporeal effects of God’s mercy do not, in and of themselves, grant salvation. Thus, many have experienced the mercy of God in a merely physical or non-salvific way. In this way, Polanus could be anticipated to indicate that the spiritual effects of God’s mercy are only experienced by the elect, whereas all may experience the physical effects. Indeed, this is related to Polanus’ next discussion of the subjects of God’s mercy. He begins by stating: “The mercy of God is extended toward all who have been placed in some misery, yet differently toward the elect than toward the reprobate or other creatures.”90 Here, Polanus references Luke 6:34. Seen through the lens of its subjects, God’s mercy is therefore distinguished between general and special. The generalis misericordia Dei, “is that by which God, as God, is not only inclined to help all his creatures (and in particular, mankind, both unjust and just) placed in some misery; but even his actual helping them, yet not all unto eternal life, but all to some salvation, and that temporary.”91 Thus, Polanus places mercy in the context of a post-fall world. Prior to the fall, there was no need for mercy as there was no misery from sin and no distress. Further, the reference to “some sort of salvation” suggests not a salvation that can be gained and lost, but a salvation that is itself distinguishable from eternal salvation. Just as he wrestles with the wideness of the biblical usage of the word ‘mercy,’ Polanus is here also wrestling with the biblical 87 88 89 90

Polanus, Syntagma, 1119A. Polanus, Syntagma, 1119C, “Deus ex misericordia sua differt, mitigat ac tollit poenas.” Polanus, Syntagma, 1119C, “Servat sibi aliquos in mediis poenis, ne omnes consumantur.” Polanus, Syntagma, 1119E, “Misericordia Dei ad omnes, qui in miseria aliqua constituti sunt, extenditur, aliter tamen erga electos, quam erga reprobos aliasve creaturas.” 91 Polanus, Syntagma, 1120A, “Generalis misericordia Dei, est qua Deus, ut Deus, non solum propensus est ad succurrendum omnibus fuis creaturis, atque in primis hominibus, tam in iustis quam iustis, in aliqua miseria constitutis: verum etiam reipsa succerrit, non quidem omnibus ad vitam aeternam, sed tamen ad aliquam salutem, eamque temporariam.” A marginal notation refers to Zanchi’s De Natura Dei, book 4, chapter 4, question 3 and Jerome Zanchi, Miscellanea Theologica, vol. 3 (Oporinus & Crespin, 1566), 35.

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language that uses ‘salvation’ in a broader context than just the eternal salvation God grants to his elect. Polanus defines the specialis misericordia Dei as “that whereby God, as the most free Lord, has mercy unto eternal salvation upon whom he wills – truly upon them whom he calls, justifies, and glorifies.”92 Here Polanus quotes Romans 9:18, Exodus 20:6, and Psalm 103:13. According to Polanus, while God extends a general mercy to all the special mercy which grants eternal life and salvation is conferred only upon the elect. Polanus continues with six adjuncta or characteristics of the mercy of God: the mercy of God is free, perpetual, and abundant; God is always mindful of his mercy; in the case of the special mercy of God, is greatly demonstrated to us in this life; and is something to be desired from God.93 Polanus also considers two differentia or distinguishing characteristics of God’s mercy. First, the mercies of God “are opposed to human merits and likewise remove them. For if salvation occurs by mercy, then it is not from our merit.”94 Second, the mercy of God “has never been and will never be uncertain or fortuitous.”95 Polanus quotes from 2 Timothy 1:9, that the mercy by which God has secured salvation was in accordance with his own purpose and was given in Christ before the foundation of the world. Polanus concludes this section with a brief comparison between mercy and vengeance. With reference to Exodus 20:5–6, he states, “the mercy of God is wider than vengeance, for God extends mercy to the thousandth generation, while he only allots vengeance to the fourth generation.”96

9.8

The Patience of God

Chapter 24 contains a relatively brief account of the patience of God. With this property, Polanus diverges from the majority of Reformed and Reformed orthodox theologians in asserting patientia as a separate attribute or property of God. None of the early Reformed orthodox theologians that have herein been compared with Polanus refer to patience as an attribute. More typically, the notion of God’s patience is tied to his justice, wrath, or mercy. Like the two previous essential properties,

92 Polanus, Syntagma, 1121A, “Specialis misericordia Dei, est qua Deus ut liberrimus Dominus miseretur ad salutem aeternum quorum vult, nempe eorum, quos vocat, iustificat et glorificat.” 93 Polanus, Syntagma, 1123D–1129C. 94 Polanus, Syntagma, 1129D, “Misericordiae Dei repugnant merita humana et se mutuo tollunt. Nam si salus obtingit ex misericordia: non igitur ex notris meritis.” 95 Polanus, Syntagma, 1140D, “Misericordia dei nunquam fuit, neque unquam erit vaga et fortuita.” 96 Polanus, Syntagma, 1140E, “Misericordia Dei est amplior, quam vindicta: nam misericordiam Deus, in mille generationes extendit, vindictae duntaxat quatuor generationes assignat.”

The Patience of God

Polanus does not include patientia in the 1590 edition of the Partitiones theologicae but does include it the 1599 edition.97 Also like the previous several attributes, Polanus begins his discussion of the patience of God in the Syntagma with a series of scholastic questions98 In response to the question of whether or not there is patience in God, Polanus considers two anonymous objections to patience being an essential property of God.99 The first objection is that patience presumes a sort of suffering: as God does not suffer, he does not have patience. Polanus considers the middle term ‘God does not suffer’ to be ambiguous, as the word for suffering (pati) can refer to either pain, anguish, and affliction or it can refer to the moderation of wrath. The first mode of suffering is alien to God, but he does moderate his wrath.100 As God does indeed moderate his wrath, Polanus asserts that patience is an essential property of God. The second objection is that all of God’s essential properties are eternal. However, since patience involves those with whom God has patience, patience cannot be eternal. As a consequence, patience is not a property of God. In response, Polanus distinguishes between the external activity of God that occurs in time from the underlying and internal property of God from which that external activity flows. Thus, God’s patience flows from God’s essential character and God can therefore be said to be patient even without an object with which to be patient. The former relies upon the latter – which is what Polanus will describe in this chapter. He defines the patience of God as “his kindest will by which his anger is so far moderated that he either endures a long time his sinning creatures and defers their punishments, looking for their repentance, or he does not pour out his wrath all at once upon them lest they are reduced to nothing.”101 In support of this, Polanus references Romans 2:4, 3:26, 9:22, 1 Peter 3:20, 2 Peter 3:15, 2 Samuel 22:36, and Psalm 18:36. The efficient cause of God’s patience is not his acceptance of the individual (personarum acceptio), as God is not a respecter of persons. God is not moved by the wealth or dignity of anyone, as might an earthly magistrate, but is moved to patience “by the mere goodness of the divine nature: for that reason, he is indeed patient and longsuffering because he is good.”102 Thus, God is not patient and

97 98 99 100 101

Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 14. Polanus, Syntagma, 1144D. Polanus, Syntagma, 1144D. Polanus, Syntagma, 1145B. Polanus, Syntagma, 1146A, “Patientia Dei, est benignissima eius voluntas, per quam ita moderatur iram suam, ut vel diu sufferat peccantes creaturas et poenas differat, exspectans ipsorum resipiscentiam: vel iram non omnem uno momento in illos effundat, ne in nihilum redigantur.” 102 Polanus, Syntagma, 1147B, “mera bonitas divinae naturae: ideo enim patiens et longanimis est, quia bonus est.”

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longsuffering by an accidental quality but is so by his very essence and of himself. The effects of God’s patience are that he tolerates and, for a time, chooses to disregard sin. In this way, the subjects of God’s patience include all men, even the reprobate. This patience can always be sought after: even as God waited in the days of Noah (Genesis 6:13) and with Israel in the desert.

9.9

The Kindness of God

Like patience, the kindness or clementia of God is not commonly seen as a separate essential property or attribute of God in Reformed or Reformed orthodox theologians.103 Much more common is to see the clementia as a synonym for God’s mercy or misericordia. However, as the following discussion will show, Polanus has conceived of a very specific notion of clementia that is distinct from God’s misericordia. In his discussion of God’s kindness in the Syntagma, Polanus again alters the form of his discussion: from a series of ‘scholastic questions’ (i.e., an sit, quid sit, qualis sit, etc.), to the prior form he has utilized in the Syntagma. He therefore does as he has done previously and he begins with a definition: “The kindness of God is his most favorable will by which he even remembers his mercy in wrath, is inclined toward us and spares us, even though we have merited otherwise, because he prefers our repentance and conversion rather than our death.”104 This essential property of God is also called his quickness to forgive (placabilitas Dei). Polanus makes a conceptual (ratione) distinction between the kindness of God and his patience or longsuffering. Thus, whereas God’s patience suppresses his wrath, in his kindness he either lessens, regulates, or remits punishment. He provides numerous examples from John 3, 2 Kings 20, Daniel 4, 2 Samuel 12, Joel 2 and 3, and Ezekiel 36. Polanus presents four axiomata of the kindness of God. First, kindness is particularly attributed to God: “for if this characteristic is appropriate to kings, princes, and magistrates, in whose hands are the law of life and death, how much more appropriate is it to the king of kings and prince of princes, who has absolute law over all to either be saved or judged?”105 In support of this, Polanus references

103 Again, it is found in the 1599 edition of the Paritiones theologicae, p. 14, but not in the earlier 1590 edition. 104 Polanus, Syntagma, 1152A, “Clementia Dei, est benegnissima eius voluntas, per quam etiam in ira misericordiae suae recordans, nobis est propitius, parcitque nobis, etiamsi aliter meriti simus, malens resipiscentiam et conversionem nostram quam mortem.” 105 Polanus, Syntagma, 1153A, “Deo propriissime tribuitur clementia. Cum enim virtus sit conveniens Regibus et Principibus et Magistratibus penes quos est ius vitae necisque: cui magis conveniet quam Regi Regum, Principi Principum, qui ius absolutum habet omnes vel servandi vel perpendi?”

The Kindness of God

Joel 2:18. Second, Polanus states that without the kindness of God, no one will be saved. Third, the kindness of God is not equally set forth before everyone, both the impenitent and the repentant, but only to the repentant. Fourth, the kindness of God is not contrary to his justice, “because God only forgives those who repent, since Christ, their surety, has paid the penalty in their place.”106 From these axiomata, it is clear that Polanus does not intend to set forth a distinction between the general and special kindness of God – that is, to suggest that there is a kindness that God shows to all his creatures, and one which he shows to the elect. In the sense in which he uses the concept here, God’s kindness is intimately tied to a mercy that flows from propitiation. His kindness is therefore grounded upon the satisfaction of God’s wrath in the death of Jesus Christ. Therefore, even if his elect deserve wrath because of their sins, God wills to spare and forgive them. While it is conceivable to suggest that God is generally “kind” to all of his creatures, Polanus has carved out a very specific use of the term in his definition and axiomata and one can therefore not say (at least for Polanus) that God has a sort of clementia toward all his creatures. One issue, particularly given the general lack of early Reformed orthodox attention to clementia as a separate essential property from God’s misericordia, is how these two properties relate in Polanus’ theology. First, in his definition of God’s mercy, Polanus notes that from this mercy comes “every kindness.”107 The word Polanus uses there is beneficia, and not clementia, but the notion is important: every kindness which extends toward man is of God’s mercy. This corresponds to the overall connectedness of these attributes as Polanus has been setting them forth. It is important to remember that these essential properties are not simply a random list of various faculties or affections attributable to God. Rather, Polanus has been organizing and structuring them according to how they fit together and flow forth from God. Thus, grace is the source of God’s love, love is the source of God’s mercy, and mercy is the source of God’s patience and kindness. The “every kindness (beneficia)” that flows from God’s mercy is specified as either patientia or clementia. In particular, the special mercy of God – that mercy that saves – responds to God’s elect either in patience or in forgiveness. Note also that Polanus has connected clementia to repentance. In that sense, the connection between these three essential properties becomes clearer. God’s mercy is demonstrated towards sinners in two ways, depending upon their coming to him in repentance of particular sins. If they repent, God is merciful and forgives them – the particular manifestation of his clementia. If they do not repent, God shows forbearance and patience toward them,

106 Polanus, Syntagma, 1153C, “Clementia Dei non pugnat cum eiusdem iustitia, quia Deus solis resipiscentibus ignoscit, quum loco illorum sponsor ipsorum Christus poenas luerit.” 107 Polanus, Syntagma, 1117C.

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only for the sake of Christ, who has died for them – the particular manifestation of his patientia. In that sense, these essential properties are far from redundant – even if the connection requires synthesis on the part of the reader.

9.10

The Justice of God

In chapter 26, Polanus considers the justice of God as the second major category of types of essential properties within the will of God. In this way, justice sits alongside blessedness as the two major subcategories of the divine will. The iusitia Dei as an attribute or essential property of God finds widespread discussion among the early Reformed orthodox theologians. It is found in Ursinus, Zanchi, Daneau, Perkins, Bucanus, and Keckermann.108 Polanus does not discuss it as a separate essential property in the 1590 edition of the Partitiones theologicae but does include it in the 1599 edition.109 Polanus begins his discussion of the iustitia Dei in the Syntagma as he has several times before, with considering the ambiguity associated with the word ‘justice.’ One can understand the word in reference to many things: God’s essential attribute of justice, the operation of God’s justice, the righteousness of Christ imputed by faith, what God demands from his creatures, the restored state of spiritual life in the believer, or the wise and just government of either God himself or wise and just rulers.110 Although each of these uses of the word are appropriate in their own setting, Polanus considers justice as it is an essential property of God. Polanus provides the following definition: “The justice of God, when taken as an essential property of God, is his will by which he himself is just and the author of all justice in creatures.”111 He quotes from Psalm 48:11 and Deuteronomy 32:4 as scriptural evidence of this definition and indicates that this essential property of God can also be termed ‘rectitude’ or ‘equity.’ With this definition, Polanus indicates both an ad intra (i.e., his own justice within himself) and an ad extra (i.e., his authorship of justice in his creation) dimension within God’s justice. Polanus proceeds to provide five axioms related to God’s justice. Three of these demonstrate the relation of God’s justice to his being or essence. The other two, however, concern God’s relationship to the law. In these, two issues come to the fore. First, Polanus notes that God does what is contrary to his own law – i.e., that

108 Ursinus, Loci theologici, 482; Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 482; Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 18; Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 10; Bucanus, Insitutiones theologicae, 5; Keckermann, Systema, 114. 109 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 15. 110 Polanus, Syntagma, 1155E. 111 Polanus, Syntagma, 1157B, “Iustitia Dei, cum pro essentiali proprietate Dei accipitur, est voluntas eius, per quam ipse iustus est et omnis iustitiae in creaturis autor.”

The Justice of God

which he forbids us from doing. As an example, Polanus references the fact that God permits sin – this is contrary to his own law, yet God is not unjust when he allows it. The reason that God does this and remains righteous is “because the law has not been spoken to him but to us.”112 This reason is further expanded upon in the fourth axioma: “The highest, most perfect, and infallible rule of divine justice is his will. For God is a law unto himself. Whatever God desires to do, insofar as he from himself wills, is just.”113 With this axiom, Polanus is affirming that there exists outside of God no standard to which he must adhere or by which he might be judged, as God’s own will is the standard and rule of all justice. God is righteous in all that he does because it is of his essential nature to be righteous. God is not righteous in comparison to some external standard of righteousness but is righteous in and of himself.114 This discussion therefore has the effect of indicating a necessary aspect to God’s will (i.e., he is necessarily just because his justice is identical with his being) and a free aspect (i.e., God is free in his expression of justice toward his creation). Thus, this free aspect of God’s will also links back to God’s wisdom and will, and forward to God’s power and freedom. Next, Polanus considers a distinction within Divine justice: God’s justice is either universal or particular. He introduces this distinction with the caveat that just as the essence of God is one, so too is his justice. The distinction is one that is made conceptually (rationis); that is, that the distinction is one that is made by us in our understanding of God’s essential justice. Polanus defines the universal justice of God in the following manner: the order or nature of the divine mind and will whereby God immutably and ineffably wills and approves such things, does them, and brings them about in others as what he

112 Polanus, Syntagma, 1158A, “Deus facit quae Lege sua nobis prohibuit, quia non sibi, sed nobis Legem tulit.” 113 Polanus, Syntagma, 1158A, “. Iustitiae divinae regula summa, perfectissima et infallibilis, est voluntas eius. Nam Deus sibi ipsi lex est. Quicquid Deus fieri vult, eo ipso quod vult, iustum est.” 114 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 218, “Reformed orthodox authors who deal explicitly with this issue, deny that God is subject to any given order, and that God’s will itself is the fundamental rule of justice.” Te Velde refers specifically to Polanus in the footnote from this statement. See also, Muller, PRRD, 3:485–486, “God is ex lex, beyond the law in the sense that he is not bound by the specific precepts of a law that he has ordained as a standard for human conduct – nevertheless, he is not free from the substance of the law and cannot ‘enjoin himself or make himself its opposite, as for example, to believe that he is not God... in opposition... to the first precept of the Decalogue.’” Muller quotes from Voetius, SD, I.xix (p. 375). See also Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 392.

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has prescribed in his law, and all that opposes this order he neither wills, nor approves, nor works, nor brings about, nor aids, but rather terribly hates and detests.115

Polanus quotes from Psalm 11:7 (“the Lord is just, he loves justice”) and Psalm 5:5 (“for you are not a God who wills iniquity”), indicating that to say God is either able to sin or is the author of sin is great blasphemy.116 The particular justice of God, “is his immutable will by which he gives everyone his due.”117 This particular justice is either extended toward himself or toward his creatures. In no case, Polanus states, is this justice commutative: God is a debtor to no one, and he gives more from his goodness and kindness than we could offer back to him. The particular justice of God toward himself is that glory which God both grants to himself and desires others to assign to him.118 In this way, Polanus connects at least in some way the ideas of justice and worship. The particular justice of God toward his creatures is that by which God is unable to will or do anything unjust to that which he has made.119 This ‘inability’ is not in any way a defect of God but demonstrates the presence of a greater ability in God. Polanus further distinguishes this particular order of God’s justice into his disposing or distributing justice. God’s iustitia disponens is how we understand God’s justice in relation to how he regulates and governs (disponit et gubernat) the world as its Lord and Judge.120 God’s iustitia distribuens is how we understand God’s justice in relation to how he assigns good (bonum) to whom he has promised, and evil (malum) to those who deserve it.121 This distributive justice is either of grace or of wrath. The divine justice of grace is “the most eager and constant will of God by which he faithfully fulfills his promises.”122 This, Polanus states, is also called the justice of divine promises (iustitia promissionum divinarum). He continues by saying that God demonstrates this aspect of his justice “when he remits the sins to us who repent, when he protects our life, when he defends us against all unjust

115 Polanus, Syntagma, 1158E, “Universalis iustitia Dei, est ordo seu natura mentis et voluntatis divinae, qua Deus immutabiliter et ineffabiliter talia vult et approbat, facit ipse et efficit in aliis, qualia in lege sua praecepit, et omnia quae cum hoc ordine pugnant nec vult, nec probat, nec operatur, nec efficit, nec adiuvat, sed horribiliter odit atque detestatur.” 116 Polanus, Syntagma, 1159A. 117 Polanus, Syntagma, 1159B, “Particularis iustitia Dei, est immutabilis voluntas eius, qua suum cuique tribuit.” 118 Polanus, Syntagma, 1159C. 119 Polanus, Syntagma, 1159D. 120 Polanus, Syntagma, 1159D. 121 Polanus, Syntagma, 1159E. 122 Polanus, Syntagma, 1159E, “Iustitia gratiae divinae, est propensissima et constanissima voluntas Dei, qua promissa sua fidelissime praestat.”

The Justice of God

power, frees us from oppression, and preserves us unharmed.”123 God is therefore demonstrated to be just when he punishes sin, but also when he fulfills his promises of grace. Polanus sees this particular distinction as an easy answer to the question, “Is the justice of God opposed to his grace and mercy?”124 Polanus responds that since God forgives the sins of repentant believers, both the justice and the kindness of God are satisfied. His kindness is satisfied because God forgives apart from any merit in the creature. His justice is satisfied because he promises forgiveness on the basis of repentance and belief. For Polanus, therefore: “God is just both when sin is punished and when sin is forgiven.”125 This Polanus demonstrates from Romans 3:25–26, and then with a series of quotations from Psalm 5:9, 16, 7:18, 31:2, 71:1–2, 16, 116:5, Deuteronomy 32:3–4, Daniel 9:16, Nehemiah 9:7, and 1 Thessalonians 1:6. On the other side of the distinction, Polanus defines the justice of divine wrath as “that by which God surely and most equitably administers his judgments just as he has threatened.”126 In support of this, Polanus references Psalm 88:13, 89:15, and 97:2. This justice of wrath is either a chastening of the elect or a punishment of the reprobate.127 From this is demonstrated that God is just both when he keeps his promises and when he follows through on his threats. In the elect, the justice of God is either in themselves (in ipsismet) or in Christ on their behalf (in Christo pro ipsis).128 In themselves, God’s justice interacts with the elect in two ways: they are liable to eternal death and condemnation because of their sin, and they are likewise subjected to various temporal afflictions.129 As the elect are in Christ, the justice of God is demonstrated on their behalf through Paul’s words to the church in Rome (Romans 8:32): “For God did not spare his own son but gave him up for us all.”130 Polanus concludes his discussion of the justice of God by next looking at how that justice extends toward the reprobate: first reprobate men and then the Devil and his angels.131 In the reprobate men, the justice of God is demonstrated through their remaining beneath the wrath of God in this life and receiving the fullness of

123 Polanus, Syntagma, 1159E, “Hanc declarat Deus, cum resipiscentibus nobis peccata remittit, cum vitam nostram tuetur, cum nos contra omnem iniustam vim defendit, ab oppressione liberat et incolumes servat.” 124 Polanus, Syntagma, 1160C, “An iustitia Dei adversetur eiusdem gratia et misericordiae?” 125 Polanus, Syntagma, 1160D, “Iustus ergo Deus est et cum peccata punit, et cum peccata remittit.” 126 Polanus, Syntagma, 1164B, “Iustitia irae divinae, est qua Deus iudicia sua certo atque aequissime exercet, quemadmodum est comminatus.” 127 Polanus, Syntagma, 1164C. 128 Polanus, Syntagma, 1164E. 129 Polanus, Syntagma, 1165A. 130 Polanus, Syntagma, 1166A, “nam Deus proprio Filio suo non pepercit, sed pro nobis omnibus tradidit illum.” 131 Polanus, Syntagma, 1167D.

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his justice for all eternity. With respect to the Devil and his angels, by God’s justice they have been driven from heaven and forever deprived of God’s eternal glory and blessing.

9.11

The Truth of God

Polanus continues his discussion of divine justice by making two ‘property level’ distinctions: “The justice of God is in turn either truth or holiness.”132 The first of these, God’s truth, is found in a variety of places among the discussion of God’s attributes by the early Reformed orthodox. Ursinus treats it as a separate attribute, whereas Zanchi does not.133 Daneau speaks of the truth of God in connection with God’s immutability.134 Perkins deals briefly with this attribute under the heading of God’s justice.135 Keckermann discusses it as the lone attribute under those attributes that are a combination of both God’s will and his intellect.136 Polanus discusses God’s truth as a separate essential property in the 1599 edition of the Partitiones theologicae.137 In the Syntagma, Polanus defines veritas Dei as: his essential property whereby one understands that he is consummately true in himself, truthful in his words and deeds, sincere, and faithful, and the author of every truth in creatures, and averse to all deception and falsehood and from all pretense and forgetfulness.138

Polanus states that God is truth, as with his other essential properties, not by an inherent quality but by his own essence. That is, Polanus continues to assert the fundamental role simplicity plays in his doctrine of God. From this discussion, Polanus states that “God himself is his own truth.”139

132 Polanus, Syntagma, 1172B, “Iustitia Dei rursus tum veritas est, tum sanctitas.” 133 Ursinus, Loci theologici, 483. Note that this marks only the third divergence between Polanus and Zanchi – the first two being God’s patience and kindness. 134 Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 16. See also Muller, PRRD, 3:515. 135 Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 11. 136 Keckermann, Systema, 118. See also Muller, PRRD, 3:511, who discusses God’s truth in relation to the intellectual attributes, rather than God’s volitional ones. 137 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 17. 138 Polanus, Syntagma, 1172E, “Veritas Dei, est essentialis eius proprietas per quam in seipso summe verus in dictis factisque suis verax, sincerus et fidelis, et in creaturis omnis veritatis autor esse intelligitur, ab omni falso et mendacio et ab omni simulatione atque oblivione alienissimus.” 139 Polanus, Syntagma, 1173A, “Unde Deus ipse est sua veritas.”

The Truth of God

Polanus next distinguishes between the truth of God in himself and the truth of God outside himself towards his creatures.140 He discerns three modes by which God is understood to be truth in himself. First, God is truth in himself according to his essence, “by which he truly is and truly is the sort that he is said to be. For just as what seems to be but is not is false, so the what truly is, is thus true.”141 Here, Polanus refers to 2 Chronicles 15:3, Jeremiah 10:10, John 17:2, 1 Thessalonians 1:9 and 1 John 5:20–21. Second, God is truth himself, “since he himself is uncreated and is therefore most particularly the first, highest, and greatest truth and its immutable archetype, exemplar, and ideal of all true things which are outside himself.”142 Polanus therefore declares God to be the cause and measure of all truth. The third mode is his truth in his own internal personal works (in operibus internis personalibus) and in his own internal essential works (essentialibus).143 The truth of God is demonstrated in his internal personal works as “the Father truly begets the Son, the Son truly is begotten of the Father, the Holy Spirit truly proceeds and emanates by eternal spiration from the Father and the Son.”144 This truth is also demonstrated in his internal essential works since, “all his decrees are true.”145 That which God decrees from eternity he decrees truly, “thus God is truth in himself.”146 There is also the truth of God that extends outside of God towards his creatures. This is demonstrated either in God’s works or in God’s word.147 God is demonstrated to be true in all his external works, “since in these he is averse to all falsehood, deceit, and fiction.”148 In support of this, Polanus references Revelations 15:13 and 16:7 and 2 Thessalonians 2:9. Further, Polanus presents God as being immutably true and faithful in all his words.149 Here, Polanus references Deuteronomy 22:4 and Psalm 100:5. This aspect of the veritas Dei is also termed constantia Dei and

140 Polanus, Syntagma, 1173A. 141 Polanus, Syntagma, 1173A, “Uno modo essentiam suam, qua vere est et vere talis est, qualis esse dicitur: Sicut enim falsum est, quod videtur esse, sed non est: ita verum, est id quod vere est.” 142 Polanus, Syntagma, 1174B, “Secundo Deus in seipso est veritas, quatenus ipse increata, ac id circo propriissime prima, summa et maxima veritas, et archetypum immutabile, exemplar et idea est rerum verarum omnium quae sunt extra ipsum.” 143 Polanus, Syntagma, 1174D. 144 Polanus, Syntagma, 1174D, “In personalibus, quatenus Pater vere gignit Filium, quatenus Filius vere nascitur ex Patre, quatenus Spiritus Sanctus vere per aeternam spirationem procedit et emanat a Patre et Filio.” 145 Polanus, Syntagma, 1174E, “Sic veritas est in operibus Dei internis essentialibus, quaetenus omnia eius decreta vera sunt.” 146 Polanus, Syntagma, 1174E, “Sic Deus est veritas in seipso.” 147 Polanus, Syntagma, 1175A. 148 Polanus, Syntagma, 1175A, “Veritas est in omnibus operibus externis, quatenus in illis est alienus ab omni mendacio, simulatione et figmento. 149 Polanus, Syntagma, 1176B.

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also justitia dicti.150 In this, Polanus explicitly connects together the properties of immutability, wisdom, will, and justice: God is true in all that he is and does both by an immutability of essence and by his free exercise of the decree. Polanus next considers the effects (effecta) of the veritas Dei. He discerns a three-fold effect under the category of all created truth (omnis veritas creata): in that which God has made, in the created intellect of men and angels, and in the written or spoken word.151 Insofar as all things which God makes conform to the understanding which he has of them in the divine mind, so all created things conform to divine truth. Further, as the created intellect of men and angels reason and understand in conformity to God, so these conform to divine truth. Likewise, as the written and spoken word conforms to divine truth there is truth in these words. Polanus also details a number of adjuncta, dissentanea, and comparata. The characteristics of divine truth correspond to his divine essence. Thus, God’s truth is constant and stable, eternal and unchanging in the mind of God, conspicuous, pure, one, perfect, and good.152 Because of these characteristics, Polanus declares that divine truth is to be celebrated, desired, proclaimed by parents to children.153 Polanus also points out the differences between divine truth and the reception of that truth by men. God remains faithful and true even if men fail to understand. His promises are not made void by the untrustworthiness of men, just as his covenant is not made void when men break it. Further, his truth is not invalidated when men fail to believe him. In all these ways the objective truth of God is not affected by the subjective reception of that truth by men.

9.12

The Holiness of God

Polanus places another essential property beneath the category of God’s justice: the divine holiness. Muller notes that this attribute was not singled out by any systematic works among the second generation of Reformers, but it became far more prominent among the Reformed orthodox.154 While this may be true more broadly, in the early Reformed orthodox period, particularly among the theologians with whom I am comparing Polanus, this particular essential property is conspicuous by its absence. As has been seen several times, Polanus adds the holiness of God as an essential property in the transition from the 1590 to the 1599 editions of the Partitiones 150 151 152 153 154

Polanus, Syntagma, 1176C. Polanus, Syntagma, 1177A. Polanus, Syntagma, 1177E. Polanus, Syntagma, 1179B. Muller, PRRD, 3:497–498.

The Holiness of God

theologicae.155 It is also found in Perkins after a fashion in that he discusses God’s faithfulness in keeping his promises as part of his justice in word (i.e., truth) and deed.156 While Perkins does not use the language of sanctitas, it closely corresponds to the way Polanus uses the term in both the Partitiones and the Syntagma. In his discussion of this essential property in the Syntagma, Polanus provides the following definition: The holiness of God is his essential property whereby one understands that his nature is most perfectly just all throughout, to which belongs absolutely nothing of sin, iniquity, evil, or defect, and likewise that it is supremely spotless, pure, and loving, as well as the cause of purity and spotlessness in rational creatures, and contrariwise supremely abhorring all impurity and uncleanness, both internal and external, and this most severely detesting and punishing.157

God is therefore opposed to all iniquity, pollution, wantonness, or injustice and is in himself just, pure, and without sin or defect. To this definition, Polanus appends two axiomata. First, God is holy, “not only by his essence and from himself but also by what he brings about, in so far as he sanctifies and cleanses us from the uncleanness of sin and wills us to be as he himself is.”158 In support of this axioma, Polanus cites Isaiah 29:23, 40:25, and 41:20. The second axioma is that only God is truly and properly holy. Here, Polanus cites 1 Samuel 2:2. Polanus’ discussion of this final type of the divine will is extremely brief: indeed, it takes up less than one column, and is only about 2/3 the size of the usus which follow. Given his discussion of divine truth, there seems to be little room left for a discussion of his holiness. It might have been possible to closely associate God’s truth with his words and God’s holiness with his deeds: yet Polanus includes both words and deeds in his definition of God’s truth. On the other hand, surely Polanus intends to include the rectitude of God’s word and deed in his essential sinlessness. There therefore seems little room for truth given God’s holiness. Ultimately, it seems most likely that Polanus includes both of these essential properties (even

155 Polanus, Partitiones (1599), 17. 156 Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 11. 157 Polanus, Syntagma, 1185A, “Sanctitas Dei, est proprietas eius essentialis, per quam intelligitur naturam eius esse universe et perfectissime iustam, in qua prorsus nihil vitii, nihil iniqui, nihil mali, nihil labis inest, ac perinde esse etiam summe puram et castam, amantemque et causam puritatis et castitatis in creaturis rationalibus, contra autem summe abhorrentem ab omnia impuritate et immunditie sive interna sive externa, eamque servissime detestantem et punientem.” 158 Polanus, Syntagma, 1185C, “Deus est sanctus non tantum essentiam suam, et perse, sed etiam effectu, quod nos sanctificet et a peccatorum sordibus emendet, et tales esse velit, qualis ipse est.”

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though a line between them is very difficult to draw) because of the testimony of Scripture: God is said to be true and God is said to be holy. Further, the mode of demonstration of these notions in Scripture point towards their being proprie, rather than figurative, properties.

9.13

Summary

In this chapter, I have considered the rather extensive discussion that Polanus provides concerning the various essential properties of God that he terms species of the divine will. He groups these species beneath two ‘head’ properties: God’s goodness and his justice. First, Polanus presents God as he who is in himself good in every way. He iterates this out in the various essential properties which flow from God’s goodness as a fount: grace, love, mercy, patience, and kindness. These essential properties do not just flow from God’s grace, they flow from one another as part of God’s goodness to that which he has made. God’s grace is that by which God blesses his creatures. Polanus affirms both a general and a special (i.e., saving) grace in God. From God’s grace flows his love. According to his love, God delights to do good to what he has made. In this essential property, Polanus shows once again the detail Reformed scholasticism is capable of with regard to the various distinctions that can be made: God’s love has a natural and a voluntary dimension; and the voluntary love of God is both general and special; and the special love of God is both for Christ and for those who are in Christ. God’s love is also another place where Polanus shows a depth to his polemical interactions, particularly with Bellarmine, as Polanus shows God’s love for his elect to be only for what God has done in and for them. From this love flows God’s mercy – that by which God is ready and willing to come to the aid of those who are miserable. As with many of the essential properties under the goodness of God, Polanus presents both a general and a special mercy of God. Finally, with respect to those essential properties that are beneath God’s goodness, patience and kindness both flow from God’s mercy. God’s patience is his will by which he moderates his anger and suffers long. Polanus also indicates that God’s patience is designed to bring sinners to repentance. By his kindness, God remembers his mercy in his wrath and reflects God’s desire for repentance and faith (i.e., salvation) more than for the destruction of the wicked. Having completed his discussion of God’s goodness and the various types of God’s will that are categorized beneath God’s goodness, Polanus next turned to his discussion of divine justice. God’s justice is that by which he is both just in himself, but also the author of all justice in his creation. Thus, Polanus continues to demonstrate an ad intra and an ad extra dimension to God’s operative properties. There is a universal and a particular justice with God, and the particular justice is both a disposing and a distributing justice. By this distributing justice, God shows

Summary

forth both grace and wrath. Polanus also distributes beneath the justice of God two additional essential properties. First, God’s truth is how he is true (and also faithful) in himself and also in his words and deeds. Second, God’s holiness is how he is just all throughout, and is therefore wholly without sin. God is furthermore both pure in himself and also the source of all purity. While these various essential properties fill out Polanus’ overall discussion of the will of God, they also demonstrate a particular soteriological function within these species of the divine will. If we are able to pull back slightly from the intricate detail that Polanus provides, we see that God’s goodness has two broad aspects: how God is good toward all his creation and how he is good toward his elect. God’s goodness toward all of his creation shows forth God’s absolute worthiness to receive all of our worship and leaves all those who receive that goodness without excuse if they reject him. More specifically, God’s special or particular goodness is demonstrated towards his elect. This shows the source of our justification before God: by his grace alone and by what Christ has done for us alone. Indeed, the Christological aspect undergirds all of this as well: God is not just loving toward his elect, he is loving toward them on behalf of Christ and in Christ. This also allows us to see the function that the final three essential properties perform in the interconnectedness of these species of the divine will. That is, they show us that there is a duplex gratia: God is interested in both our justification and our sanctification. Thus, God is shown to be just and the author of all justice, but also righteous and the author of all righteousness. Therefore, while it is somewhat more subtle in how he presents it, these essential properties can be seen as the source of our sanctification, in a similar way to how God’s goodness is the source of our justification. To be sure, there is not envisioned here a sharp divide (as if God is not patient with us or kind to us in our sanctification), but rather to see a broad tendency in these two distinctions generally toward one of the two-fold graces.

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10.1

Introduction

Having set forth the divine wisdom and will as the first half of a four-fold division of God’s essential blessedness, in chapters twenty-three and twenty-four of the Syntagma, Polanus turns to the second half of the division: God’s power (potentia) and freedom (libertas). His discussion of these two essential properties of God seeks to answer the related questions of God’s ability to do that which he wills as well as to what degree and extent is God free in carrying out his own will and decree. In this, Polanus continues to demonstrate himself to be within the broad stream of Reformed scholastic thought and yet to have his own particular manner of organizing and disseminating that doctrine. This chapter begins with a survey of the early Reformed orthodox discussions of the major questions and issues concerning God’s essential power and freedom. Next, I proceed to a discussion of Polanus’ doctrine of God’s power and freedom as he discusses them in the Syntagma. In this, I seek to understand Polanus’ doctrine in his context and within the broader medieval background. Further, I also consider these doctrines in light of discussions in secondary literature (either about Polanus specifically, or the Reformed orthodox more generally). This chapter also includes a lengthy excursus that summarizes Polanus’ discussion of the divine decree, providence, and human freedom. This information will be valuable not only to contextualize Polanus’ comments regarding God’s essential freedom, but also as I turn at the end of this chapter to evaluate the question of necessity, contingency, and freedom as it pertains to Polanus’ doctrine of God more broadly.

10.2

The State of Divine Power and Freedom in Early Reformed Orthodoxy

As with the previous chapter on the types within the divine will, Polanus’ organization by which he combines these two essential properties is not a common feature among the various early Reformed Scholastic theologians with whom I have been comparing him. Zanchi, Daneau, Perkins, and Trelcatius, Jr., do group omnipotence with God’s wisdom and will.1 These theologians therefore place the power of God within the same broad category as Polanus does. Ursinus places omnipotentia in

1 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 197; Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 14; and Perkins, Armilla Aurea, 8.

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between God’s immutability and his wisdom.2 Keckermann places potentia at the head of those attributes in which there is found some relation in created beings, just before the divine intellect.3 From this, a pattern is demonstrated by these early Reformed scholastic theologians: Zanchi, Daneau, Perkins, and Trelcatius, Jr., show a correlation between God’s power and his wisdom and will; Ursinus and Keckermann imply a connection by placing power next to God’s intellectual attribute (either sapientia or intellectus).4 Apart from Polanus, Ursinus is the only one of these theologians to discuss God’s freedom as a separate essential attribute or property of God. Ursinus does not, however, discuss freedom in explicit connection with God’s power or, combined with power, in connection with God’s wisdom and will as distinct essential properties. Among these Reformed scholastic contemporaries and predecessors, Polanus’ own particular organizational principle appears to be unique. Not only does this structure enable Polanus to provide a more detailed discussion of these two important essential properties, it also demonstrates the escalating nature of the essential properties he has categorized as being aspects of the blessedness of God. In their various discussions of God’s power (potentia Dei), early Reformed scholastic theologians considered several common issues. The first issue is the various ways that these theologians define God’s power. Most common is a definition of God’s power that coincides with his will: i.e., that God by his power does all that he wills and is able by his power to do all that he is able to will.5 There is, therefore, a common notion of God being able specifically to do what which is possible (i.e., all that is not impossible according to nature).6 The second issue is the distinction that is often made between the absolute and ordained power of God. Broadly speaking, this distinction shows two ways that God’s power is to be understood. God’s absolute power is that by which he is able to do more than he does or than he wills to do. God’s actual or ordained power is that by which he causes all that is: ‘actual’ because it is, indeed, a reflection of what is actual; ‘ordained’ because it is a realization of God’s will in ordaining whatsoever comes to pass.7 This distinction is found in Zanchi, Perkins, and Trelcatius, Jr.8 Third, a number of related concerns are addressed by many of Polanus’ contemporaries and predecessors. These are, in no particular order: God’s power as

2 3 4 5 6

Ursinus, Loci theologici, 478. Keckermann, Systema, 104. See also Bucanus, Institutiones theologicae, 6, who lists several attributes in no discernable order. See Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 50–51; and Keckermann, Systema, 105. Polanus’ discussion of what is possible or impossible is characteristic of the early Reformed orthodox period. See section 10.3, below. 7 This definition follows Perkins, Golden Chaine, 8. 8 Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 202; Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11; and Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 50.

The Power of God

governing and directing,9 assertions that potentia Dei does not imply any passive potential in God,10 discussions about the multi-fold infinity of God’s power (usually into infinite in essence, objects, and effects),11 concerns about the extension of God’s power to so-called ‘impossible things’,12 and the communication of God’s power either to Christ in the incarnation or to humanity in general.13 Among the authors with whom I compare Polanus, the majority discuss the doctrine of God’s power in the space of a few brief pages. Zanchi is once again distinguished by the breadth of his discussion of the topic. In sharp contrast to discussions about God’s power, discussions about ‘freedom’ as a separate essential attribute or property of God are almost non-existent among these theologians. This does not, of course, mean that these theologians do not discuss God’s freedom, merely that they do not include ‘freedom’ among the essential properties or attributes of God. Ursinus alone has freedom as a separate attribute (he uses the term liberrimus) and demonstrates how his understanding of God’s freedom refutes the claim of those “who imagine the mind of God to be bound by the world and not to be able to act otherwise than they who act by secondary causes.”14 Neither Zanchi, Daneau, Bucanus, Trelcatius, Jr., nor Perkins discusses freedom as a separate attribute or property. Instead, for the majority of these theologians, freedom is discussed in conjunction with God’s will.15 This phenomenon matches much of the secondary literature, as neither te Velde nor Muller discuss God’s freedom as a separate essential property in their surveys of Reformed scholastic treatments of the divine attributes.16

10.3

The Power of God

Polanus begins his discussion of the power of God by noting the several manners in which the phrase is used in Scripture: specifically, to refer to Jesus Christ

9 10 11 12

13 14 15 16

See Ursinus, Loci Theologici, 478; and Daneau, Christianae Isogoges, 17. See Perkins, Golden Chaine, 11; and Keckermann, Systema, 104. See Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 204; and Keckermann, Systema, 104. See Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 225; and Keckermann, Systema, 107. See also Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 51, for a discussion of God’s power as extending to that which is “possible” – therefore, by implication, not extending to that which is not possible. See Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 206. Ursinus, Loci theologici, 487, speaking of ‘impious Stoics,’ “qui fingebant, Deum esse mentem alligatam mundo et aliter agere non posse quam agunt caussae secundae.” See, for example, Keckermann, Systema, 101. See also Muller, PRRD, 3:446–452, where he discusses the concept. Like Keckermann, however, Muller does so under the heading of the divine will. In fact, Muller titles section 5.4: “Will and Freedom.” and Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 375–384.

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(1 Corinthians 1:24), to the gospel itself (Romans 1:16), and even at one point to Simon Magus (Acts 8:9–10).17 His present discussion, however, is in reference to power as an essential property of God, held in common by the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit.18 Polanus defines this potentia Dei as, “the essential property of God whereby he can and does accomplish all in each and every thing.”19 From this, Polanus demonstrates God to be both omni-potent and omni-efficient. Following from this definition, Polanus declares God to be the principium agendi in all that he has created, as all things act by and through the potentia Dei. Note that this description differs from what Polanus stated in Chapter 18 on the Wisdom of God. There he declares wisdom to be the principium agendi dirigens, the will to be the principium imperans, and power and freedom together to be the principium exsequens.20 The difference appears to be that in the chapter on wisdom Polanus is referring to these properties as principia in an ad intra sense, whereas in the discussion of power he refers to that property as principia in an ad extra sense. That is, God’s wisdom, will, power, and freedom are coordinated internally and among themselves in the way described in chapter 18. In that sense, God’s will ‘directs what is to be done,’ his will ‘selects,’ and his power ‘follows.’ When God’s power is considered from the perspective of that which extends externally and in relation to that which God has created, however, his power can be seen as the foundation of activity. In this initial discussion, Polanus also distinguishes between the essential power of God and the personal power.21 The latter is that by which the Father can beget the Son, the Son can be begotten, the Father and the Son can send forth the Holy Spirit by spiration, and the Holy Spirit can proceed from the Father and the Son.22 In a way, Polanus’ discussion of this issue might be seen as an addendum to the issue with which he opened the chapter – that of the various ways in which the power of God can be properly understood. It is, however, a different issue in that it underscores Polanus’ awareness of the interrelations between the essential properties and trinitarian nature of the one God. On the one hand, the essential properties are held 17 Polanus, Syntagma, 1190D. 18 Note, in particular, the Trinitarian nature of the doctrine of God’s power emphasized from the start. 19 Polanus, Syntagma, 1191A, “Potentia Dei, est essentialis Dei proprietas, qua potest et efficit omnia in omnibus et singulis.” This definition is quoted by Voetius, SD I, 405. See Andreas J. Beck, “‘Expositio Reverentialis’: Gisbertus Voetius’s (1589–1676) Relationship with John Calvin,” Church History and Religious Culture 91 (1/2): 128, and 128 n. 36. 20 Polanus, Syntagma, 998E. See also Muller, PRRD, 3:526. 21 Between the discussion of the various ways the word ‘power’ can be used and the rest of the chapter – including the discussion of axiomata, objections and usus, Polanus presents the definition, principia, and essential/personal distinction in just three brief sentences – i.e., he states them without any additional information or data. 22 Polanus, Syntagma, 1191B.

The Power of God

in common by each person of the Trinity. On the other, the personal relations reflect a genuine power unique to each person of the Trinity. Furthermore, this capacity is not to be seen as a ‘potency for action,’ for in God there is not any potentiality, but only pure actuality. In this way, just as God is able to understand and to will, so the Persons in the Godhead are able to beget, be begotten, spirate, and be spirated. In one sense, we might say that what is revealed of God’s activity demonstrates something (though certainly not all) of God’s power – he is clearly able to do that which he actually does. Polanus continues his discussion with the presentation of ten axiomata in which he presents many of the issues found more broadly in the Reformed scholastic period.23 In general, they fall into two broad categories: those dealing with the nature of God’s essential power, and those dealing with the implications of God’s power being infinite (i.e., omnipotence).24 In the first category, Polanus states that the power of God is the cause of things.25 This is so because the power of God is always to be understood together with his will, and never apart from his will. This is confirmed by a later axioma in which Polanus indicates that “the omnipotence of God is not separated from his wisdom, will, and justice, for God cannot do what opposes his wisdom, will, and justice.”26 Therefore, while the power of God is infinite, “he nevertheless never acts unless it is measured by the wisdom and will of God.”27 Polanus affirms that just as nothing occurs apart from God’s will, so also is nothing done apart from God’s power. He goes on to declare that God’s power is essential, is not limited by our understanding, and is able to bring about whatever he so desires without any hindrance.28 Furthermore, this divine power is not merely a capacity or a disposition, for such a notion would be to merely define the divine power as agendum – that which is to be done – rather than the power to do.29 Neither does Polanus intend for the divine power to be understood as passive in any way. There is, according to Polanus, nothing in God that is not wholly actual: his power

23 See Muller, PRRD, 3:524–540. 24 Note that this organization is not organic to Polanus’ list of axiomata, as the first category comprises axiomata two through five, eight, and ten. 25 Polanus, Syntagma, 1191D. Cf. Muller, PRRD, 3:525, who describes Edward Leigh as not having “a Thomistic inclination to derive omnipotence from the identification of God as first efficient cause.” While Polanus does not define God’s power in terms of causality, he does not shy away from declaring God’s omni-causality as a demonstration of his potentia. 26 Polanus, Syntagma, 1196B, “Omnipotentia Dei non est a sapientia, voluntate et iustitia eius separanda: non enim potest illa Deus facere, quae sapientiae, voluntati et iustitiae eius repugnant.” 27 Polanus, Syntagma, 1196B, “Itaque potentia Dei licet infinita sit, nunquam tamen agit, nisi prout a sapientia et voluntate Dei modificata est.” 28 Polanus, Syntagma, 1192A, 1196A. 29 Polanus, Syntagma, 1191D.

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is therefore always and only active, it is never a passive potential.30 Through these various axiomata, Polanus continues to broadly connect this particular essential property of God with all of God’s other essential properties. 10.3.1 Divine Omnipotence The second category of axiomata relates to God’s omnipotence. Polanus begins with a fairly common discussion of the infinite nature of God’s power.31 Here he declares that God’s power is understood to be infinite with regard to various manners of discussion. For instance, God’s power is infinite according to his very own nature, as power is of the divine essence itself. This is in keeping with something that Polanus has consistently held: each of God’s essential properties take on the basic characteristics of all his other essential properties. Furthermore, this notion continues to underline the conceptual importance of the notion of God’s absolute simplicity. Regarding these other modes of discussion, God’s power is infinite with respect to the objects of divine power, the effects brought about by divine power, and the actions God does or is able to do by his divine power. When combined together, these various methods of discussing the infinite nature of God’s power serve to demonstrate that his power is infinite both in itself and in its various external extensions. Polanus relates this notion of the infinite nature of God’s power to a common term – that of omnipotence (omnipotentia).32 In the sixth axioma, he distinguishes between the absolute and actual omnipotence of God.33 This distinction has roots in the medieval scholastic discussion of God’s power. Thomas Aquinas raises this issue in the Summa Theologiae where he asserts that God is able to otherwise than what he actually does.34 In his discussion, Thomas includes the distinction between

30 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 239. 31 Polanus, Syntagma, 1191B. Similar discussions can be found in Zanchi, De Natura Dei, 204, and Keckermann, Systema, 105. 32 Polanus, Syntagma, 1192B. 33 Te Velde, Doctrine of God, 237, states, “The distinction became famous partly due to Calvin’s rejection in his Institutes.” As much of the more recent secondary literature points out, Calvin’s objection was less about the use of the distinction than it was about its abuse. See also Beck, “‘Expositio reverentialis’,” 128; and Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 428. 34 Aquinas, ST, I. q. 25, a. 5. On medieval background to this discussion more generally, see Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology, 30–54; Marenbon, Medieval Philosophy, 303–304; Muller, PRRD, 3:517–518; Henri Veldhuis, “Ordained and Absolute Power in Scotus’ Ordinatio I 44” in Vivarium 38.2 (2000), 222–230; Antonie Vos, The Theology of John Duns Scotus, Studies in Reformed Theology, Vol. 34 (Leiden: Brill, 2018), 67–68. On the Reformed orthodox usage of this distinction, see; Beck, “‘Expositio reverentialis,’” 129; Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 421–430, Muller, PRRD, 3:524–530; te Velde, Doctrine of God, 237–238.

The Power of God

an absolute and an ordained power in God.35 He does, however, link this distinction very closely to God’s wisdom, such that while God is able to do more than he does, he does as he does according to his wise judgment. Thus, God could act according to his actual power, but chooses not to: potentia absoluta remains hypothetical.36 Duns Scotus takes this in a more voluntaristic manner. According to Duns Scotus, God is not bound to the current order of nature according to his absolute power, yet God does follow (or binds himself to) the current order of nature according to his ordained power.37 For Duns Scotus, the reason for the distinction between an absolute and an ordained power is God’s active choice according to his will.38 In other words, God specifically chooses one actuality out of the whole realm of possible actualities. Polanus defines the absolute omnipotence of God as “that by which God can perfectly do whatever can exist.”39 He calls this omnipotence ‘absolute’ because God is not limited by the universal laws of nature. That is, there is nothing outside of God that curtails or lessens his power. This omnipotence is essential to God, and by it “he can absolutely and simply do everything that is possible absolutely and simply—i.e., anything that does not imply contradiction and is not opposed to God’s nature and will, even if it never will exist.”40 Polanus demonstrates this power by reference to Christ’s assertion that God is even able to raise up sons for Abraham from stones. With this half of the distinction, Polanus affirms that there are things God can do that he nevertheless does not do. In doing so, however, Polanus combines two important ideas in the limitation and/or regulation of the divine will. First, Polanus posits a power in God that is limited by possibility: if it is possible, then God can, according to his absolute power, accomplish it. This concept of being “absolutely and simply possible” is further defined as involving two components: it must not be contradictory (i.e., it must not contain a logical contradiction), and it must accord with the “nature and will of God.” I will take up in the next section this notion of contradiction (as this is something Polanus takes up in greater detail). It must 35 Aquinas, ST, I. q. 25, a. 5, ad 1, “Secundum hoc ergo, dicendum est quod Deus potest alia facere, de potentia absoluta, quam quae praescivit et praeordinavit se facturum, non tamen potest esse quod aliqua faciat, quae non praesciverit et praeordinaverit se facturum.” 36 See Veldhuis, “Ordained and Absolute Power,” 222. 37 Duns Scotus, Ordinatio. 1, d. 44. n. 10. See Antonie Vos, The Philosophy of John Duns Scotus, 241–245; and The Theology of John Duns Scotus, 67–68. 38 Beck, “‘Expositio reverentialis’,” 129. See also Velhuis, “Ordained and Absolute Power,” 226. 39 Polanus, Syntagma, 1192B, “Absoluta omnipotentia Dei, est qua quicquid esse potest, hoc etiam facere Deus perfecte potest.” 40 Polanus, Syntagma, 1192C, “Hac absolute et simpliciter potest omnia, quae absolute et simplicter sunt possibilia, hoc est, quae non implicant contradictionem, et naturae voluntatique Dei non repugnant, etiamsi ea dumquam futura sint.”

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not be missed, however, that God’s absolute power is here stated to be regulated by God’s essence. Polanus is not, therefore, positing some monstrous ability that resides in the deity that is capable of horrendous acts of unrighteousness – indeed, Polanus would call such ability a contradiction of God’s own righteous character. Instead, he puts before us a powerful, if subtle, reminder that God’s power cannot be separated from who he is. Power (and its constituent distinctions) remains an essential property of God. 10.3.2 Impossibilia Before considering the actual omnipotence of God, Polanus answers a question that might arise in response to his prior assertions: “Whether God is able to do that which is impossible according to his nature?”41 To answer this question, Polanus first distinguishes between that which is impossible of nature (impossibilia naturae) and that which is impossible by nature (impossibilia natura).42 That which is ‘impossible of nature’ he describes as “those things which are above the usual course and order of nature.”43 He gives several examples, such as the sun standing still, a fire that does not burn, an iron implement rising to the top of a body of water. Polanus indicates that such actions and effects are not beyond God’s omnipotence to bring about, as Scripture itself testifies. Thus, according to Polanus, God is not limited by the created order. That which is “impossible by nature” he describes as “those things which are repugnant to the definition of a thing and to being as much as it is being.”44 At this point, Polanus give such examples as something to both be and not be, for man to not be an animal, a triangle without three sides, two lines from the center of a circle to the diameter not being the same length. These are things which are impossible by nature and God cannot bring them about.45 Polanus continues: In the same way, he is neither able to will things that are contraries, e.g., good and evil; nor things that are contradictories, e.g., being and non-being. Hence, he is not able to actualize either contraries, which cannot [both] subsist in a nature maximally simple and

41 Polanus, Syntagma, 1193C, “An impossibilia natura Deus potest?” 42 See also Muller, PRRD, 3:535. 43 Polanus, Syntagma, 1193C, “Impossibilia naturae, sunt quae usitatum cursum et ordinem naturae superant.” 44 Polanus, Syntagma, 1193D, “Impossibilia natura, sunt quae rei definitioni repugnant, et enti, ut ens est.” 45 Polanus, Syntagma, 1194A.

The Power of God

immutable; nor can he actualize contradictories, which do not have place in the essence of God, which is free from all falsehood and in accordance with absolute and perfect truth.46

This inability, however, is not from any impotentiae, but rather flows directly from God’s potentia.47 God’s unchanging nature demonstrates him to be that which is most powerful, as he never departs from himself. With regard to the actual omnipotence of God, Polanus states that it is “that whereby he not only can do whatsoever he wills and decrees, but he himself does so without difficulty and with only a command, and he is not hindered or able to be hindered by any agreement from any cause.”48 This Polanus also calls the ‘ordained power of God’ (omnipotentia Dei ordinata), for by this power God does whatever he decrees and ordains to do.49 Polanus continues that, by this power, “[God] has created everything and either still preserves and governs it or destroys it; by this all things in all beings is worked and done according to the benevolent disposition of his will.”50 Furthermore, God could, by his ordained power do more than he chooses (i.e., decrees) to do according to this actual power. At the same time, “there are many things that cannot be done by God according to [their own] ordinary power that can be done according to absolute power.”51 Thus, divine power is not in any way limited by natural causes, as these flow from God by choice of will (arbitrio voluntatis) and not by any necessity of nature (necessitate naturae).52 This actual or ordained omnipotence represents the ability of God to do that which he has decreed. In this, the actual power of God connects with an important aspect of divine agency – the eternal decree of God. Furthermore, at least by implication, this decree is demonstrated to be both intricately connected to God’s will and not subject to anything outside of God (i.e., utterly free). This distinction between an actual and an absolute power is important in Polanus’ doctrine of God for several reasons. First, it provides a link between God’s power

46 Polanus, Syntagma, 1194A, “Sicut not potest velle nec contraria, ut bonum et malum; nec contradictoria, ut esse, non esse: Ita nec agere potet aut contraria, quae in natura maxime simplici ac immutabili subsistere nequeunt; aut contradictoria, quae in Essentia Dei falsitatis omnis experte, ac in veritate absolutissima et perfectissima locum non habent.” 47 Polanus, Syntagma, 1194B. 48 Polanus, Syntagma, 1195C, “Actualis omnipotentia Dei, est qua quaecunque vult et decrevit, non solum potest facere, sed etiam reipsam facit sine difficultate et solo nutu, nec ullo pacto ab causa aut impeditur aut impediri potest.” 49 Polanus, Syntagma, 1195C. 50 Polanus, Syntagma, 1195D, “Hac omnia creavit ac etiamnum aut conservat ac moderatur, aut destruit: hac operatur et efficit omnia in omnibus pro benevolo affectu voluntatis suae.” 51 Polanus, Syntagma, 1195E, “Multa nequeunt a Deo fieri secundum potentiam ordinariam, quae secundum absolutam possunt.” 52 Polanus, Syntagma, 1195E.

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and his wisdom and will. Thus, with God’s absolute power, Polanus includes a power in God that is linked to God’s wisdom – God knows all that he is able to do (i.e., all that is not impossible by nature). With God’s actual or ordained power, Polanus includes a power in God that is linked to God’s will – that which God is able to do is actualized according to God’s choice (indeed, his free choice, which links wisdom, will, and power to God’s essential freedom). While the will is the determining factor between what is merely possible and what is actual, God’s power is the factor behind God’s knowledge of simple intelligence (scientia simplicis intelligentiae).53 Second, this distinction underlines the radical contingency of the created order: creation is as it is because of God’s free choice. God alone remains that which is absolutely necessary; creation comes about only because he so chose to bring it into being. In his discussion of divine omnipotence, Polanus has drawn broadly from the Reformed and medieval Scholastic tradition. While the distinction between an absolute and an ordained (or actual) power can be found in the more intellectualist theology of Thomas Aquinas, Polanus’ own formulation is closer to the voluntarist tradition as seen in Duns Scotus in the medieval period, as well as throughout the Reformers and the Reformed Orthodox. That is, Polanus ties the actual or ordained power of God to his will rather than to his wisdom. While these essential properties cannot be separated (and can only be distinguished by means of our reasoning), the ‘root’ of God’s actual power is said by Polanus to be God’s will. As he nears the end of his discussion, Polanus considers several general and anonymous objections that might be made against the omnipotence of God. He responds to a number of texts that, from a human perspective, only appear to limit God’s power (e.g., Genesis 18:17) or that specifically refer only to the ordained power of God (e.g., Genesis 19:23). He responds in more detail to the objection that since God is unable to lie, deny himself, sin, deceive, or die that God is not omnipotent.54 Here Polanus quotes from Augustine’s de Civitate Dei, “For he is called omnipotent as he does what he wills, not as he suffers what he does not will.”55 Therefore, as Polanus understands Augustine to be saying, God is not able to do certain things because he is omnipotent. This argument carries forward to the objection that God is not able to change. Polanus responds that God’s inability to change demonstrates the perfection of his being and power, rather than an imperfection.56 Polanus therefore continues to demonstrate the cohesiveness of his doctrine of God: if God had the power to change, he would be neither immutable nor simple. Indeed, on the basis of what Polanus has already demonstrated regarding God in the first order 53 See above, Chapter 7.4.6 for Polanus doctrine of scientia simplicis intelligentiae. 54 Polanus, Syntagma, 1197B. 55 Polanus, Syntagma, 1197C, “Dicitur enim omnipotens faciendo quod vult, non patiendo quod non vult.” The quote is from book five, chapter ten of Augustine, Civitate Dei, 203. 56 Polanus, Syntagma, 1198B.

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essential properties of simplicity and immutability, were God to have a capacity for change in his essence he would not be God.

10.4

The Freedom of God

In his relatively brief chapter on libertas Dei, Polanus concludes the fourfold distinction he made within the blessedness of God. Without any sort of etymological discussion of libertas, Polanus begins the chapter with the following definition: God’s freedom is his essential property whereby he is understood to be most freely able to do all that he wills, and whereby he most freely does what he does and cannot be compelled by anyone, but is completely under his own right, placed under obligation by no one, a debtor to no one, and liable to no burden of either guilt or sin.57

In connection with this, Polanus links freedom to blessedness by reflecting on the sad and unhappy state of one who is not lord of his own operations and acts – something he finds repugnant to the very idea of God. Polanus expands this definition with five axiomata that further deepen his depiction of God’s freedom. In two of these axiomata, which Polanus does not expand upon, he declares that God alone is properly and truly free and is furthermore by all manner free.58 The remaining three axiomata are both more detailed and are important to an overall understanding of Polanus’ doctrine of freedom. In the first of these axiomata, Polanus sets forth the freedom of God as being threefold: “from coaction, from servitude, and from the burden of misery.”59 He defines liberty from coaction as: How God, apart from any necessity has from all eternity decreed all things according to the succession of creation, preservation, and government of all things, and [this] without any coaction or constraint following from secondary causes, so as to not depart from his own uprightness.60

57 Polanus, Syntagma, 1205E, “Libertas Dei, est proprietas eius essentialis, per quam omnia quae vult, liberrime posse, et quae facit liberrime facere et a nemine cogi posse, sed omnino sui iuris, nemini obstrictus, nemini obligatus, nemini debitor, nullique oneri sive culpae, sive poenae obnoxius esse intelligitur.” 58 Polanus, Syntagma, 1206A, 1208A. 59 Polanus, Syntagma, 1206A, “Libertas Dei triplex est, a coactione, a servitute, ab onere miseriae.” 60 Polanus, Syntagma, 1206B, “Libertas Dei a coactione, est qua Deus absque ulla necessitate ab aeterno decrevit universum ordinem creationis, conservationis et gubernationis rerum omnium, eumque sine ulla coactione aut alligatione ad causas secundas exsequitur, sic ut a rectitudine sua non discedat.”

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Several things are important in this definition. First, is the notion that God does not decree anything because he is forced to do so from without. On the one hand, this is rather obvious in that nothing exists prior to the decree. On the other hand, this underlines the radical freedom that exists within God to decree or not as he wills. This freedom from coaction and constraint coincides with God’s essential impassibility.61 The second important aspect of his definition is that God is not bound to decree any particular thing by reason of any coaction, coercion or the constraint of secondary causes. In what would be reflected decades later in the Westminster Standards, Polanus is declaring that God’s decree is what establishes secondary causality, rather than the other way around.62 God is therefore not forced to decree any specific thing by what he has made. Third, the definition links the decree of God with the manner in which he carries out his decree – via his works of creation, preservation, and government.63 Thus, God is seen to be active, not passive. Taken as a whole, God is free to be himself, and is not forced or coerced from without in anything that he decrees or in the performance of those decrees. Polanus defines God’s liberty from servitude as “how God is obligated to no one, a debtor to no one, and is not subject to or constrained by another government, command, or authority, [and] there is over him no other principle by which he is governed.”64 From this, Polanus declares that nothing which God has made has any sort of absolute or natural claim on him. Just as nothing can coerce him, so too is God not constrained by any imposition from that which he has made. The only principle by which God is regulated, constrained, or controlled is his very own essence. Thus, even God’s own covenant faithfulness derives from his character (i.e., his essential properties) rather than by coercion from without. Finally, Polanus defines God’s freedom from misery as “how only God is of such a nature that no misery, guilt, or punishment is able to fall upon him.”65 This is true in terms of God’s own essence, in that he is essentially righteous and without sin. Further, this is

61 On God’s impassibility as part of his divine simplicity, see above, Chapter 5.4. 62 See Westminster Confession of Faith, III.1, “God, from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of his own will, freely, and unchangeably ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of secondary causes taken away, but rather established,” (emphasis added). 63 Compare this with Westminster Shorter Catechism, Q. 8, “Q. How doth God execute his decrees? A. God executeth his decrees in the works of creation and providence.” 64 Polanus, Syntagma, 1206B, “Libertas Dei a servitute, est qua Deus nulli est obligatus, nulli debitor, neque gubernationi aut ductui aut imperio alterius subjectus aut alligatus, a nullo alio principio a quo gubernatur pendens.” 65 Polanus, Syntagma, 1206C, “Libertas Dei ab onere miseriae, est qua solus Deus naturam talis est, ut nulla miseria sive culpae sive poenae in eum possit cadere.”

The Freedom of God

true from the nature of misery, in that it flows from sin. God is therefore absolutely unable to be miserable. In this axioma, Polanus presents a picture of God’s freedom from a variety of necessities that commonly do inhere in human willing and freedom. God, however, is not simply a human being writ large; he is the principle and foundation of all being. These impediments, therefore, do not attach themselves to God. That said, it is clear from these definitions of the various necessities that God is free from that God is not free from all necessity. Note the language: there is “no other principle by which he is governed,” and he “does not depart from his own uprightness.” With these statements, Polanus reminds us that God’s freedom does not exist outside of himself – that is, freedom is an essential property of God, subject to God’s essential nature itself and, by extension, to all of the other essential properties. This truth, however, works both ways. By way of example: God’s immutability does not impede God’s freedom, and neither does God’s freedom deny God’s immutability. Rather, God is essentially and immutably free, just as he is essentially and freely immutable.66 In another axioma, Polanus relates two particular common aspects between the freedom that is in God and the freedom that is in rational creatures. In the first aspect, Polanus uses a phrase that could be translated in a number of ways: that both God and rational creatures “consilio agant.”67 This phrase could mean: they act by or in accordance with a plan; they act by counsel or advice; or they act by judgement or wisdom. The middle definition would no doubt be rejected by Polanus if the counsel or advice is supposed to come from some created thing outside of the Godhead. The initial definition is certainly true of God – who in all things acts in accordance with his decree. It falters somewhat, however, in reference to humans: while we certainly do, from time to time, act in accordance with previously laid plans, given our lack of omniscience we must also continually change our plans and even act without a prior plan as situations change (something God never does). Thus, ‘acting in accordance with a plan’ seems a relatively minor comparison to make. This leaves the final definition: the commonality between human and divine action is that both act by judgment or wisdom. In fact, taking what Polanus has said previously about God’s wisdom, it might be better to say that both act by the judgment of wisdom (i.e., by rational choice). Polanus is therefore declaring the relationship between acts (be they divine or human) and the prior activity of judgment by the faculty of wisdom.

66 See also Muller, PRRD, 3:446, “From one perspective, divine necessity and immutability limit the divine will; from another, these perfections of the divine being in no way impede the spontaneity of divine willing nor do they imply an absolute necessity or necessity of coaction on the divine will.” 67 Polanus, Syntagma, 1206D.

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This comparison is all the more important because Polanus has declared the manner of God’s act of understanding to be entirely different from man’s act of understanding. In that previous chapter on divine wisdom Polanus stated, “God knows all at once, by one eternal and immutable act and effort.”68 In this way, God does not discover things discursively (by argumentation), successively (knowing one thing after another), by reason (deducing some things by others), or by developing his knowledge (proceeding from that which is known to that which is unknown). Rather, Polanus states that God knows all things simultaneously and in stark contrast to the manner of knowing in human beings.69 In this present chapter on divine freedom, however, Polanus is arguing that whereas divine and human understanding is reached in entirely different ways, divine and human actio are similar in that each act on the basis of the judgement of wisdom. There is yet another manner in which God’s will is similar to that within rational creatures. Polanus declares this connection to obtain: Because they will without coaction the things they have intended, since their own will exists in a suitable nature for willing the opposite or what is different from what he does will, or for changing his action, by his own accord and power innate to himself, by inclining to another direction.70

Polanus demonstrates that this freedom is predicated of God in Psalm 104:24 and 115:3, and is predicated of man in Genesis 3:6, Matthew 23:37, 2 Samuel 24:12–13. Polanus gives three reasons why this liberty is characteristic of God: by reason of intellect, will and the conjunction of intellect and will.71 By his omniscience, God knows all things both perfectly and eternally. Here, Polanus is almost certainly speaking of God’s knowledge of simple intelligence, by which he knows all things that could be, even if they are not.72 By his will, God depends upon no other cause but himself. That is, God is able to freely choose according to his own nature, rather than be constrained by anything outside himself. By the intellect and will

68 Polanus, Syntagma, 1206D, “Quarto, novit omnia simul, uno aeterno et immutabilis actu atque uno momento.” 69 See te Velde, Doctrine of God, 157, “There is [in God] no transition from not knowing to knowing.” 70 Polanus, Syntagma, 1206D, “Alterum quod sine coactione volunt ea quae cogitarunt, quum voluntas sua natura idonea existat ad volendum oppositum aut diversum eius quod vult, aut ad differendum suam actionem, sua sponte ac vi sibi insita in partem alteram inclinante” 71 Polanus, Syntagma, 1207B, 1207D, 1207E. 72 See, however, Chapter 7.4.6 above for Polanus rather unique take on the scientia simplicis intelligentiae visionis simplicis intelligentiae.

The Freedom of God

combined, God demonstrates himself to be “unchangeably free by his nature.”73 Here, Polanus links closely these two essential properties of God – indeed, while they can be distinguished they cannot be separated. Thus, a proper understanding of God’s freedom requires that these two properties be understood both individually and in connection. This is all the more important as they are part of the four-fold distinction within God’s essential blessedness. Furthermore, here is additional evidence that Polanus intends God’s essential properties to be seen as not only connected but as escalating. Without wisdom, there can be no proper choosing; without wise choice, there can be no proper application of power, without the wise application of power in choice, there can be no freedom. In the last axioma that Polanus considers, he discusses what sort of necessity there may be in God. He states: Although God by nature is good, that is, by supreme, absolute necessity, and he begot the Son and spirated the Holy Spirit from eternity, nevertheless [these are so] not because they have been coacted, but [God] exists, lives, is blessed and good, has the Son and Holy Spirit, and wills that all his counsels and works are good and just as he wills them to exist by a most free will – even though it is impossible for him to will things which are contrary to these things.74

Therefore, although God is good by nature, he is also good and blessed according to his own will – which is a longer way of saying that God does not will anything contrary to his essence. That God is good – indeed, good by a necessity of nature – does not remove true liberty from God. Further, it is important to note that Polanus is here declaring that God is both good and triune in by a comparable mode – according to a necessity of his very own nature. This is particularly important with regard to the issues of human will. Immediately following the quote above, Polanus states: We must carefully observe this against those who accuse us of taking away all liberty from man when we say he is fallen necessarily, sins necessarily, wills and does necessarily what God decreed. For if the absolute necessity of willing in God does not remove the highest liberty in him, much less does the necessity from the hypothesis of the divine decree and

73 Polanus, Syntagma, 1207E, “Ratione tum intellectus tum voluntatis coniunctim, quod Deus immutabiliter sit liber naturam suam.” 74 Polanus, Syntagma, 1208A, “Etiamsi Deus natura, hoc est, summa et absoluta necessitate bonus est, et Filium genuit et Spirtum Sanctum spiravit ab aeterno: tamen non coacta, sed liberrima voluntate exsistit, vivit, est beatus et bonus, Filium et Spiritum Sanctum habet, et omnia sua consilia atque opera bona et iusta esse vult, quantumvis impossibile sit, eum his contraria velle.”

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governance remove that freedom which coincides with creatures – namely, judgment and spontaneous choice.75

For Polanus, God cannot be declared the author of sin since God is necessarily and unchangeably (even if freely) good. The decree does not remove from man either the freedom to do according to his will nor the genuine repercussions that follow from those spontaneous choices. This is so because the decree does not impose upon the actions of mankind an absolute necessity. That is, the necessity that is implied is one that does not remove the principle of liberty. Rather, the necessity that adheres is one of hypothesis; on the basis of the decree, the event occurs. However, while the decree itself is immutable and unchangeable, even though it could be different than it actually is, that does not mean that it conveys an absolute necessity to the event. The event itself remains contingent. In this axioma, Polanus is indicating a distinction that is conceptually very similar to the distinction between the necessity of consequence and the necessity of the consequent thing.76 It is therefore important to consider this distinction between the necessity of the consequent (necessitas consequentis) and the necessity of the consequence (necessitas consequentiae).77 This distinction rests upon an analysis of the implication between an ‘antecedent’ and a ‘consequent’. By way of example, we could say, “If I marry Catherine, she is my wife.” In this case, ‘if I marry Catherine’ is the antecedent, and ‘she is my wife’ is the consequent. The implication between these two phrases can be thought of in two ways. First, the implicative relationship itself can be necessary. In that case, the whole could read: “It is necessary that: if I marry Catherine, she is my wife.” In other words, necessarily, if the antecedent obtains, the consequent obtains as well. This kind of necessity is called the necessity of the consequence. What is necessary is not either state of affairs in themselves, but the implication between them. It is neither necessary that I marry Catherine (I could marry someone else) or that she be my wife (she could marry someone else). If, however, I marry her, she

75 Polanus, Syntagma, 1208B, “Hoc diligentissime observandum adversus eos, qui criminantur nos omnem libertatem adimere homini, quum dicimus eum necessario lapsum, necessario peccare, necessario id velle et facere, quod Deus decrevit. Nam si absoluta necessitas volendi in Deo, non tollit summam libertatem in eo: multo minus necessitas ex hypothesi decreti et gubernationis divinae tollit libertatem eam quae creaturis competit, hoc est, iudicium et electionem spontaneam.” 76 See van Asselt, “The Theologian’s Tool Kit,” 35, where van Asselt notes the connection between absolute and hypothetical necessity on the one hand, and necessitas consequentis and necesitas consequentiae on the other in the work of Johannes Maccovius. 77 See van Asselt, et. al., “Introduction” in van Asselt, et. al., ed., Reformed Thought on Freedom, 35–38. See also Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 335–336, 369–370, and 387–388.

Excursus on the Divine Decree and Human Freedom

is therefore my wife.78 Polanus calls this kind of implication between the antecedent and the consequent a ‘hypothetical necessity’. This sort of necessity is contrasted with the necessity of the consequent. In this type of necessity, the consequent is itself necessary. That is, the consequent is not necessary by virtue of the implication implied by its relationship to the antecedent – the consequent is necessary quite apart from the antecedent.79 Thus, this type of necessity is called ‘absolute necessity’ by Polanus. How Polanus works this out in greater detail in later portions of the Syntagma, however, is seen in the following excursus.

10.5

Excursus on the Divine Decree and Human Freedom

In order to more fully understand the nature of Polanus’ understanding of the concepts of necessity, contingency, and freedom, it will first be necessary to look at the broader context of these notions as they are found in Polanus’ doctrine of God as a whole. To do this, I will consider data that lies outside of the portion of the Syntagma that is the primary consideration of this work: his doctrine of the divine decree, providence, and human freedom as found under the broader heading of God’s works.80 As with the previous excursus on the Trinity, my intention is not to be exhaustive in discussing Polanus’ doctrine of the works of God as a whole or in discussing those particular issues covered herein. Indeed, Polanus’ doctrine of the works of God are expansive and rather detailed. Thus, I seek to survey and summarize that doctrine in order to provide an orientation to Polanus’ thought as well as a framework within which to evaluate the information Polanus has already provided regarding necessity, contingency, and freedom.81 10.5.1 The Divine Decree Polanus’ discussion of the divine decree is located within a distinction he made concerning the works of God. The works of God are either internal or external.82 The internal works of God are either personal (i.e., that by which the Father begets

78 See, van Asselt, “Introduction,” 36, “if the implicative connection between two propositions or events is necessary, this does not mean that either or both is necessary in itself.” 79 If, however, the antecedent is necessary in itself, the necessary relationship between the antecedent and the consequent would, by implication, ‘transfer’ the necessity of the antecedent to the consequent. 80 These issues are found at the beginning of the whole portion given over to the works of God: Polanus, Syntagma, 1513A–3342B. 81 For Polanus’ doctrine of the works of God, see also Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 159–174, and Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 183–202. 82 Polanus, Syntagma, 1524B. The doctrines of creation and providence comprise the external decree.

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the son, etc.) or essential.83 Thus, Polanus indicates that the divine decree is an act of the whole Trinity according to essence, rather than of one individual person according to personal property. He describes the essential internal works of God as, “the internal acts of divine wisdom and free will, namely, the eternal counsel and decree of God.”84 Polanus defines the eternal counsel of God as, “the essential internal work of God, the judgment, so to speak, of the divine reason and wisdom concerning all things, the activity of which he willed to a good end.”85 Therefore, according to Polanus, this eternal counsel is a communal work of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit together, rather than merely by any one particular person.86 Polanus understands the decree itself to be: the essential internal work of God (without doubt an act of the divine will), by which God, as one who is most wise and to whom belongs the highest and most free authority, both [a] appoints unto himself from eternity to bring to pass whatsoever is to occur, that which has occurred, and whatever is yet to occur, and [b] ordains individual things to a good end, as also the very means by which that end is reached, together with all circumstances.87

Thus, the decree is an act of the divine will (and, thus, also of the divine wisdom), which establishes all things past, present and future and ordains all things to a single good end. These two together (i.e, the counsel and decree of God) comprise both the judgment to act (counsel) and the effecting of that decision (decree). Polanus discusses the divine decree according to two distinctions: between a general and a special decree, and between the decree of God’s good pleasure (decretum beneplaciti Dei) and the decree of the sign (decretum signi).88 He describes the decree of God’s good pleasure as that which God has decreed according to the will of his good pleasure (voluntate beneplaciti).89 This decretum beneplaciti Dei

83 Polanus, Syntagma, 1526B. 84 Polanus, Syntagma, 1528A, “Interna essentialia opera Dei dicuntur actus interni sapientiae et liberrimae voluntatis divinae; nempe aeternum counsilium et decretum Dei.” 85 Polanus, Syntagma, 1528B, “Aeternum Consilium Dei, est opus Dei essentiale internum, judicium quasi mentis et sapientiae divinae de rebus omnibus quas voluit fieri ad finem bonum.” 86 See Muller, Christ and the Decree, 151, 87 Polanus, Syntagma, 1530B, “Aeternum Decretum Dei, est opus Dei essentiale internum, actus nimirum diviniae voluntatis, quo Deus tanquam is qui est sapientissimus et penes quem est summa ac liberrima autoritas, tum constituit apud se ab aeterno ut fierent quaecunque facta sunt, quaecunque fiunt, et adhuc fient: tum singula ordinavit in bonum finem, ut et media ipsi, per quae ad eum finem pervenitur, una cum omnibus circumstantiis.” 88 According to Polanus, the general decree pertains to all created things without exception, while the special decree involve issues of predestination, election and reprobation. In a way, the special decree also extends to all angels and all humanity, just in a different and diverse ways. 89 Polanus, Syntagma, 1539A.

Excursus on the Divine Decree and Human Freedom

does not merely confirm what God will bring about; it actually executes that which God has determined shall occur at some particular point in time (whether through himself or through the agency of others) and also regulates and directs all things to a good end. Therefore, this ‘decree of God’s good pleasure’ extends even to the acts of sin. Here, however, Polanus makes the important distinction that God does not, by his decree, personally cause any particular sin to be done. Instead, the decree works to govern and regulate sin, and to direct that sin toward some good end. Polanus describes the decree of the sign as that which God has decreed according to the will of the sign (voluntas signi).90 He distributes this decretum signi into either an “ordering decree” (decretum praecipiens) or a “permissive decree” (decretum permittens).91 The first is that by which God establishes what he approves or disapproves to be done. The second is that by which God resolves to permit whatever he chooses to permit. This aspect of the decree covers both good and evil. Thus, while God does decree to permit sin, the existence of sin is not directly attributable to any decree of God. Polanus presents eighteen important axiomata near the end of the chapter.92 Many of these axiomata reiterate notions that have come forth in previous discussions, that is, they echo many of the statements made with regard to essential properties. For instance, Polanus states that the divine decree is absolute, eternal, immutable, and comprehensive.93 The divine decree, however, does not have these ‘attributes’ of itself, but because the decree comes forth by God’s will. It is eternal in that it God decrees even time itself (and, thus, according to another axiomata, the decree exists before anything is created).94 The decree is comprehensive in the sense that nothing exists outside of God that is not decreed – or, to put it positively, all that is outside of God is ‘covered’ by the decree. Polanus also describes the decree in terms of the essential properties of God that are involved in its promulgation and execution. As the decree is brought forth by the wisdom of God (sapientia Dei), it is itself also most wise.95 As the decree is brought forth by the will of God (voluntas Dei), it is most free and most just.96 At the same time, Polanus distinguishes the divine decree from God’s will and wisdom. He 90 Polanus, Syntagma, 1540C. 91 Polanus, Syntagma, 1540C. 92 Polanus, Syntagma, 1541A–1559D. These axiomata are grouped together conceptually and are not presented in the order in which they are found in the Syntagma. 93 Polanus, Syntagma, 1541B, 1544C, 1545E, 1547A. 94 Polanus, Syntagma, 1456A. 95 Polanus, Syntagma, 1541B. 96 Polanus, Syntagma, 1541B and 1546E. Here, Polanus presents just one aspect of the types or species that he has placed structurally under the divine will. It is not a random decision, however: out of all the species Polanus has enumerated, God’s justice most appropriately should be associated with the divine decree.

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states that the divine will is wider than the decree, as God wills himself (including his personal properties) but does not decree them.97 Polanus also distinguishes between the divine decree and God’s foreknowledge.98 Indeed, the foreknowledge of God is the proper and necessary effect (effectus proprius et necessarius) of the decree.99 In other words, the decree is that by which the distinction between the scientia simplicis intelligentiae and the scientia visionis is made. Thus, God does not decree because he foreknows, but foreknows because he has decreed in accordance with his will. Perhaps the most interesting of these axiomata is the seventeenth, in which Polanus states, “The eternal decree of God does not remove the contingency of effects and events.”100 He indicates that an absolute, or coercive, necessity destroys contingency. The eternal decree of God, however, does not impose such necessity, as secondary causes work according to their own nature to move or to bring things about. Polanus indicates that effects or events which happen according to secondary causes are contingent, even if they are necessary according to the divine decree.101 Polanus declares that the decree is necessary, “not by an absolute necessity, nor the necessity of coaction or coercion, but only by a necessity of immutability or a necessity from hypothesis and of the consequence.”102 God therefore brings about what he has decreed in such a way that the contingency of secondary causes is not removed. The event is necessary, but only in a hypothetical sense: that is, only when the decree is taken into consideration. On the basis of this axioma, Polanus is seen to affirm that while God brings things about by his decree, he does not change the nature of the thing he brings about. Contingent events continue to be contingent: they do not become necessary events merely because God has decreed them. They certainly come about necessarily (i.e, by a necessity of the consequence or by a hypothetical necessity), but they do not become in their nature necessary events.103

97 98 99 100 101 102

Polanus, Syntagma, 1556A. Polanus, Syntagma, 1556C. Polanus, Syntagma, 1542D. Polanus, Syntagma, 1558C, “Aeternum decretum Dei non tollit contingentiam effectum et eventum.” Polanus, Syntagma, 1559A. Polanus, Syntagma, 1559A, “respectu decreti divini sunt necessarii, non necessitate absoluta, nec necessitate coactiva seu coactionis, sed tantum necessitate immutabilitatis seu necessitate ex hypothesi et consequentiae.” 103 See Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 453–454.

Excursus on the Divine Decree and Human Freedom

10.5.2 Divine Creation and Providence Polanus discusses creation in book five of the Syntagma as the first of God’s eternal works by which God has brought forth (produxit) all that is.104 In that discussion, Polanus considers various aspects of this creation: its cause, form, material, and end; heaven and earth; and angels and humanity. In terms of the causa efficiente of creation, Polanus states in his second thesis that “because he has willed, God wisely and powerfully, from his own mere goodness, has made all things.”105 In this, Polanus links God’s work of creation back to his essential properties of the second order – namely his will (voluntas), goodness (bonitas), wisdom (sapientia), and power (potentia). God’s work is related to his will because God creates in according to the highest freedom (summe liberate) and not by a necessity of nature. God’s works are related to goodness because God desires to communicate that which is good. That God’s works are related to wisdom is seen in the testimony of Scripture: Psalm 104:24, 136:5; Proverbs 3:19. Finally, God’s works are related to his power since “creation can in no way come to be apart from infinite power.”106 Each of these four essential properties is said to be the causa creationis – not because creation has four separate essential causes, but because God creates as part of the execution of his eternal decree, which decree is a function of these essential properties working together as each does what is proper to its own manner of operation. All four essential properties work together as the essential cause of creation. Polanus sets forth his doctrine of divine providence in book six of the Syntagma in which he defines the providence of God as, “the transient act of God, by which he attends and manages the world created by him and all as are in it and come to be, according to his own will, to his own glory and the salvation of the elect.”107 By defining God’s providence as a transient act (actio transiens) Polanus is differentiating providence from those immanent acts which have God as both subject and object.108 By this providence, God governs both the good (bonum) and evil (malum) of all his creatures.109

104 Polanus, Syntagma, 1648B. 105 Polanus, Syntagma, 1692C, “Ergo Deus, quia voluit, ex mera bonitate sua sapienter et potenter omnia condidit.” 106 Polanus, Syntagma, 1692B, “Potentia Dei est causa creationis: nam creatio nulla unquam fieri potuit sine virtute infinita.” 107 Polanus, Syntagma, 2163E, “Providentia Dei actualis, est actio Dei transiens qua mundum a se creatum et omnia quae in eo sunt ac fiunt, secundum suam voluntatem curat ac dispensat ad suam gloriam et electorum salutem.” 108 See “Actio” in Muller, Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 6. 109 As noted above, Polanus spends considerable space discussing bonum et malum before returning to the subject of the “parts” of God’s providence in chapter seven.

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Polanus distinguishes between two parts to this providence: action (actio) and permission (permissio).110 God’s actions are those things which God brings about: that which is good, but also the evil of penalty (malum poenae).111 According to Polanus, God brings his actions about in either a mediate or immediate way.112 God acts mediately by the employment of secondary causes which he uses to bring about his works.113 Through the utilization of secondary causes, God does not bring such things about by necessity, but by the contingency of these secondary causes.114 By his immediate acts, God brings about whatsoever he wills apart from any mediation or the instrumentality of secondary causes.115 Polanus describes divine permission as that by which God does not inhibit the actions of his rational creatures, even though he clearly has the power to do so.116 This permission does not imply any imperfection or lack of power (i.e., impotentia) in God – rather, it is an active permitting by which God chooses not to restrict the actions of others. While the act/permission distinction deals with the manner of God’s providence, Polanus also makes a distinction with respect to the object of God’s providence: it is either general or special. The special providence of God is that which is particular to God’s revealed acts toward rational creatures and includes the blessings and judgments of God.117 Thus, the greater part of the remainder of the middle part of the Syntagma (i.e., what we are to believe concerning God and his church) is focused upon the special acts of God’s providence. By his general providence, God acts to preserve (conservatio), destroy (destructio), or govern (gubernatio) that which he has created.118 God allows what he has created to continue to exist by his preservation and he denies a continuation of existence by his destruction. For God’s governance, Polanus provides the following definition: The governance of all things is that whereby God entirely controls all things according to his good, free, and just will. [By this governance, he] justly orders all things (even when secondary causes act unjustly), as nothing occurs except what is pleasing to God himself,

110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118

Polanus, Syntagma, 2228A. See above, Chapter 8.5.6 for Polanus’ discussion of malum poenae. Polanus, Syntagma, 2228D. Polanus, Syntagma, 2228E. Polanus, Syntagma, 2228E. Polanus discusses several of these instruments: bona and mala, ordinaria and extraordinaria, animata and inanimata, and rationalia and rationis expertia. Polanus, Syntagma, 2234C. Polanus, Syntagma, 2235A. Polanus, Syntagma, 2247D. Polanus, Syntagma, 2240D.

Excursus on the Divine Decree and Human Freedom

according to this own eternal counsel; nothing else occurs, either by place or time, or by manner or result.119

Thus, not only does God decree all that comes to pass, but he also works that decree out in all things such that nothing but what he decrees comes to pass. This work of God is in accordance with his eternal counsel and is thus an act of his wisdom, will, power, and freedom. God governs all things either by movement (motio) or by restriction (cohibitio). God works by movement in two ways: an effecting or directing movement. By an effecting movement (effectio motus), God either bends or turns the will of his creatures.120 By a directing movement (directio motus), God either guides or directs the will of his creatures.121 Finally, by restriction (cohibitio), God impedes the actions of his creatures.122 Thus, God not only acts in the beginning of movement, but also the continuation and the termination of such movement. In this discussion, Polanus uses language similar to that which is used to discuss the divine concursus or praemotio physica.123 There is an effective working of God in which he works his will in us. He bends us where our will is normally inclined to go and turns us where our will is normally not inclined to go. Yet God also works by directing our will. Here, God leads us to that action that he wills for us to do (or from that action he wills for us not to do). Polanus, however, does not use the terms concursus or praemotio physica in his discussion of God’s works. In his discussion of divine providence as it is found among the Reformers and Reformed scholastics, Heppe indicates that a threefold model of discussing God’s general providence was common and included preservation, concurrence, and governance.124 He demonstrates this phenomenon with a reference to Braun (1628–1708).125 Likewise, Beck notes the language of concurrence in Gisbertus Voetius.126 Heppe also indicates that other theologians use a twofold model – one

119 Polanus, Syntagma, 2243E, “Gubernatio omnium, est qua Deus omnino pro bona, libera ac iusta sua voluntate moderatur, etiamtum quum iniuste agunt causae secundae, omnia iuste ordinans, sicut nihil nisi iuxta eius aeternum consilium, nec alio loco vel tempore vel modo vel eventu fiat quam Deo ipsi placuit.” 120 Polanus, Syntagma, 2244B. 121 Polanus, Syntagma, 2244C. 122 Polanus, Syntagma, 2245B. 123 See Muller, “Concursus,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 73; and Muller, “praemotio physica,” in Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms, 279. See also Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 458. 124 Heppe, Reformed Dogmatics, 256. 125 Johannes Braunius, Doctrina Foederum sive Systema Theologiae didacticae et elencticae (Amsterdam: Abraham van Someren, 1691), 189. 126 Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 458.

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that either omits concurrence altogether or subsumes it (either conceptually or literally) beneath some notion of direction or governance. Pictet (1655–1724) subsumes divine concurrence under the heading of God’s government, Keckermann uses the language of preservation (conservatio) and direction (rectio), and Trelcatius, Jr., uses only preservation.127 Therefore, while a three-fold distinction that includes specific discussion of divine concurrence may develop later in the period of Reformed scholasticism, with Polanus and at least two of his near contemporaries, the language of concurrence may not be present, but the concept of divine direction is present. 10.5.3 Human Freedom Polanus’ discussion of human will is divided in the Syntagma between a discussion of human nature according to its state of innocence in creation (in the section of the Syntagma dealing with creation) and a discussion of human nature in its state of sin, redemption, and glory (in the section of the Syntagma dealing with God’s special acts of providence). Thus, while Polanus includes a discussion that broadly corresponds to each of the traditional Augustinian four-fold states of human nature, he does not use that rubric to organize his discussion of human nature or of human will.128 In his discussion of human beings as an act of God’s creation and as an object of God’s providence, Polanus considers man as made in the image of God and the freedom of choice that man has according to his nature. Polanus states that rational creatures are made in the image of God, and therefore have both an intellect and a will. By their intellect, rational creatures know, understand, and judge.129 These actions are, of course, subject to the distinctions Polanus has already made in his discussion of divine wisdom: human beings know, understand, and judge in accordance with their own creaturely capacity and method.130 By their will, rational creatures act freely either to will (volle) or not will (nolle), and either to stop willing (suspendere) or will differently (differre).131 Although with different language, Polanus here broadly indicates the concepts of a freedom of contrariety

127 Pictet, Theologia Christiana, 408; Keckermann, Systema, 145; Trelcatius, Jr., Institutio, 119. Heppe refers to Pictet and Keckermann, but not to Trelcatius, Jr. 128 See Augustine, De Correptione et Gratia, in PL 44 (Paris: Migne, 1863), cols 914–46. On the history of the use of Augustine’s four-fold state, see also Philip Graham Ryken, Thomas Boston as Preacher of the Fourfold State, Rutherford Studies in Historical Theology, David F. Wright and Donald Macleod, eds. (Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999), 67–68. 129 Polanus, Syntagma, 2012A. 130 See above, Chapter 3.4 and Chapter 7.3. 131 Polanus, Syntagma, 2106A.

Excursus on the Divine Decree and Human Freedom

and a freedom of contradiction. According to this distinction, the will is able to choose this or that object (the freedom of contrariety) and is able to choose or to not choose a particular object (the freedom of contradiction).132 For Polanus, the ability of the rational creature to will or not will is conceptually similar to a freedom of contradiction. Likewise, the ability of a rational creature to will something different is conceptually similar to a freedom of contrariety. Although Polanus does not here use the language that would become more common in later periods of Reformed Orthodoxy, he shows that the concepts are prevalent in the discussion of free choice.133 The will therefore chooses that which the intellect had designated to be good and rejects that which is designated to be bad. In this action, Polanus declares the human will to have a freedom from coaction (libertas a coactione).134 Further on in the chapter on man made in the image of God, Polanus describes natural liberty as the immunity from coercion or violence to the will. The will chooses voluntarily, and by its own movement either selects or rejects that which the intellect has previously selected or rejected.135 Thus, human choice is not free with respect to the object – that is, to choose either good or bad. Rather, the will is considered free by looking at its efficient cause: the will is free because it chooses without coercion and chooses voluntarily.136 10.5.4 Excursus Summary Polanus presents the divine decree and the execution of that divine decree in creation and providence as an egress of God’s essential blessedness: that is, in the coordinated activity of the divine wisdom, will, power, and freedom. Because the divine decree comes forth on the basis of God’s counsel, it is wise. Because God selects that which will come to pass in the decree, it is in accordance with his will. Because God is able to bring about that which he decrees, it is powerful. Because God decrees apart from the necessity of coercion or coaction, it is free. Furthermore, the execution of the divine decree in providence demonstrates that God’s governance and direction is necessary for all things to come to pass. Yet the necessity that is imparted to all things is not such that alters the essence or nature of things: contingent things remain contingent and are only necessary according to a hypothetical necessity.

132 See van Asselt, “Introduction,” 45–46; and Beck, Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1679) on God, Freedom, and Contingency, 448. 133 See van Asselt, et. al., eds., Reformed Thought on Freedom, passim, for the Reformed scholastic use and evaluative discussion of technical language regarding free choice. 134 Polanus, Syntagma, 2106D. 135 Polanus, Syntagma, 2123B. 136 Polanus, Syntagma, 2124A.

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Finally, because God has created human beings in his own image, they have an ectypal form of his own blessedness: the ability to freely choose on the basis of their wisdom selecting what is good. While the ability of man to choose the good is affected by the fall, the root ability to choose is not removed from him. From this excursus, a picture emerges in which the broad contours of Polanus’ thought correspond with the extant research into the Reformed orthodox understanding of the divine decree and human freedom. Polanus clearly distances himself from a form of determinism that is more in line with Stoic fate than any notion coming from biblical Christianity, while drawing deeply upon the medieval scholastic heritage in both the distinctions he utilizes and the development of a voluntaristic tradition in the meaning he gives to the terms found within the distinctions. Polanus includes important concepts of the distinctions between a necessity of the consequence and consequent, freedom of contrariety and contradiction, the spontaneous nature of free choice, and the freedom of the will from coercion in its free choosing. As with many other features of his theology, Polanus is less specific than other Reformed orthodox theologians would be. Thus, he does not have some of the technical specificity that characterize Junius, Gomarus, Voetius, or Turretin.137

10.6

Summary

In these two chapters from the Syntagma, Polanus has sought to complete the second half of the four-fold distribution of God’s essential blessedness by unfolding the power and the freedom of God. These are not merely to be understood in the sense of adjectival descriptors (i.e., that God is powerful or free), but as essential properties of God: distinct properties within the nexus of concepts abstracted by our rational capacity, yet not constituting separate aspects or accidents in God. That is, these essential properties are integral to who God is. According to his essential power, God can do that which he wills, and indeed he does that which he wills. In keeping with inseparability of God’s essential properties, God’s power is infinite, wise, just, good, and holy. As infinite, it is appropriately termed ‘omnipotence.’ By his knowledge of simple intelligence (scientia simplicis intelligentiae), God knows all that he is able to bring into existence: this is God’s

137 See B.J.D. van Wreeswijk, “An Image of Its Maker: Theses on Freedom in Franciscus Junius (1545–1602),” in Reformed Thought on Freedom, 95–125; Eef Dekker and Marinus A. Schouten, “Undisputed Freedom: A Disputation of Franciscus Gomarus (1563–1641),” 127–144, Andreas J. Beck, “The Will as Master of Its Own Act: A Disputation Rediscovered of Gisbertus Voetius (1589–1676),” in Reformed Thought on Freedom, 145–170; and Eef Dekker, Andreas J. Beck, and T. Theo J. Pleizier, “Beyond Indifference: An Elenctic Locus on Free Choice by Francesco Turrettini (1623–1687), in Reformed Thought on Freedom, 171–200.

Summary

absolute power (omnipotentia absoluta). By his will, God chooses to bring to pass the particular state of affairs that obtains in creation: this is God’s ordained or actual power (omnipotentia ordinata seu actualis). At the same time, God is utterly free in all that he does and in all that he chooses. According to his essential freedom, God is not bound by any external necessity to either be what he is or do what he does. God acts in all things according to his nature (i.e., in accordance with his wisdom, will, power, etc.), yet he acts without coercion or on account of any debt to what he has made. God is therefore shown to be wise, willing (and therefore good and just), powerful, and free in all that he is and in all that he does. This wisdom, will, power, and freedom extends to the particular manifestation of his essential ad extra work in the eternal counsel and decree. These essential properties of God (indeed, all essential properties of God) are also manifested in the way in which God carries out his decree: in his work of creation and providence. Creation is radically contingent because God freely chooses to create – nothing outside of him coerces that decision. Further, God is both good and just in the working out of the decree through his providence. Thus, while the creation itself is contingent, the individual acts of God’s creation (whether good or evil) depend upon his governance of all things. These individual acts are therefore necessary from the point of view of the decree and from the point of view of God’s governance, direction, and control. Yet this necessity is a hypothetical necessity or a necessity of the consequence. Likewise, and in an analogous way, human beings made in the image of God have a creaturely freedom – their choices are free in that they are not coerced and in that they arise spontaneously from within them.

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11.1

This Work in Summary

This work has been organized into two main parts: a first part that focused on the background and context for the doctrines that were examined in more detail in the second part. Beginning in the introduction, I surveyed the secondary literature relative to ‘older’ and ‘newer’ scholarship of Reformed orthodoxy, set forth the main research question of this work, and considered the methodology that I would employ. In chapter two, I considered Polanus in his historical context, including his life, work, and various Reformed orthodox contemporaries. As well, this chapter served as an introduction to some of the various terms used throughout: orthodoxy, scholasticism, Aristotelianism, and Ramism. In the third chapter, I focused upon three aspects of Polanus’ theology as they are put forth in book one of the Syntagma: the definition of theology as wisdom; the archetypal/ectypal distinction in theology; and the authority of Scripture and its place within theological discussion as a whole. From this evaluation, Polanus was shown to be a representative figure of early Reformed orthodoxy and of Reformed scholasticism – with the former referring more to the ‘content’ of his theology and the latter to the ‘method’ by which he analyzes and organizes his theology. Further, Polanus’ own foundational principles were set forth in such a way as to allow us to analyze and evaluate the manner in which he continues his discussion of doctrine. In chapter four, I began my analysis of Polanus’ doctrine of God by discussing his definition of God in terms of one essence and three persons, as well as his presentation of sixteen demonstrations of the existence of God. Polanus first distributes the doctrine of God into essence and operations, and then the essence of God is distributed into attributes and persons. The attributes of God are either names or essential properties. Further, while the focus of this work as a whole was on Polanus’ exposition of the divine essence and attributes, I included here a discussion of Polanus’ doctrine of the Trinity. As will be shown below, however, the whole of Polanus’ discussion of God is rooted in the definition given above: God is one in essence and three in persons. This chapter also included a discussion of the various ways in which the divine essence can be distributed: either according to affirmative or negative attributes; according to proper or figurative attributes; or according to names and essential properties. Although Polanus uses the first distinction in terms of the titles given to the various essential properties (e.g., God is not finite; but is perfect), his discussion of the divine names and essential properties comes within the middle distinction between proper and figurative attributes. Thus, names and

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essential properties are proper (rather than figurative) ways of speaking about the Triune God. The names of God themselves speak both to the essential unity of God and to his various properties. The larger discussion of God’s essential properties, however, occurs according to its own distribution: essential properties of the first or second order. In chapter five, I considered Polanus’ doctrine of the essential properties of the first order: God’s simplicity, perfection, infinity, and immutability. God’s simplicity was presented as the ground for the rest of Polanus’ discussion of God’s essential properties (as well as the foundation of a Triune, rather than a three-fold, God). As God is simple, he is utterly and absolutely without any composition of parts, division into parts, or accidental qualities inhering in his essence. God’s perfection shows that he lacks nothing and is in himself perfect and the source of all perfection in all that he has made. This property in particular begins a common feature of discussing an ad intra/ad extra dimension in God: how God necessarily is in himself, and how God contingently interacts with his creation. God’s infinity is how he is not limited by either space (and is therefore immense) or time (and is therefore eternal). Finally, this chapter considered God’s divine immutability: that God does not increase or decrease in any way and does not change but always remains the same. According to Polanus, these first order essential properties are understood a priori in the sense that the nature of the divine essence is the ‘cause’ of these properties in our understanding. In chapter six, I discussed the upper level distinctions within the essential properties of the second order: God’s life, immortality, blessedness, and glory. By his life, God is demonstrated to be both living and the source of all life. By his immortality, God is shown to have an immutable, unchangeable, and perfect life. For God’s blessedness, Polanus states that God is free of all evil and abounding in all good – thereby being utterly self-sufficient and happy in himself. This particular essential property is then distributed into four additional properties (one of which, the divine will, is further distributed into numerous types), which are discussed in chapters seven through ten. Lastly in this chapter I discussed God’s essential glory. Although I discussed this in chapter six in conjunction with these other properties that are of the same level of distinction, Polanus includes it at the end of his discussion of the proper attributes of God where it serves as a sort of ‘cap-stone’ to all of the other essential properties. Indeed, Polanus takes up all of the other properties in his definition of God’s essential glory and directs his readers to God alone as the object of true worship. According to Polanus, these second order essential properties of God are understood a posteriori in that we see the effects of these properties in general and special revelation. In contrast to the previous chapters, chapter seven is the first of several chapters in which I focus upon a single divine property: in this case, God’s essential wisdom. Polanus shows how God knows all things by one immutable act of understanding.

This Work in Summary

This knowledge is distinct, immutable, perfect, and necessary. Polanus’ discussion of God’s wisdom is where I begin to encounter more sophisticated sets of distinctions within a single essential property (i.e., a distinction that does not result in another essential property, as was the case with infinity). First, Polanus discusses the various Aristotelian categories of knowledge: intelligentia, scientia, ars, and prudentia. Polanus asserts that God’s wisdom is shown, in some sense, to be comprised of all of these concepts. The remainder of his discussion, however, is focused on the scientia Dei. This he distributes according to three primary distinctions: a general knowledge and a special knowledge; a knowledge of past and present and a knowledge of all things future; and a knowledge of simple intelligence and a knowledge of vision. In his discussion, Polanus presents God as knowing all things according to his essence: things past, present, and future, things that occur and things that do not occur. At the same time, a key portion of God’s knowledge is dependent, in a structural way, upon his will – the distinction between God’s knowledge of simple intelligence and his knowledge of vision results from the free choice of his will. In chapter eight, I discussed God’s will. Polanus defines the essential will of God as how God by himself and by one single, simple, act wills all things toward some good. Though this will is singular and simple in God, Polanus presents a number of rational distinctions that arise according to our manner of understanding: this will is either effective or permitting; absolute or conditional; revealed or hidden; or necessary or free. Further, the divine will can be distinguished according to its object. God wills that which is good directly and personally. He wills that which is evil differently according to whether it is an evil of penalty or an evil of guilt. In all of this, Polanus seeks to defend God against any claim that he is the author of sin or evil. Further, Polanus demonstrates the place the divine will in the overall progression of his doctrine. While God knows all that is possible according to his knowledge of simple intelligence, God has a knowledge of vision because of the choice of his will. Thus, Polanus demonstrates a commitment to voluntarism and a voluntarist tradition in his exposition of the divine will. Although Polanus has made several distinctions within the divine will, he also makes several other ‘property level’ distinctions which he describes as ‘types’ (species) of the divine will. These distinctions result in essential properties of God in their own right. As with before, each of these essential properties is shown to have both an ad intra (and therefore necessary and essential) and an ad extra (and therefore contingent and flowing out of the essential) aspect. First, Polanus distinguishes between God’s essential goodness and his justice (or righteousness). He defines the goodness of God in terms of God’s essential and personal goodness (having all good in himself) and in terms of him being the author of all goodness in his creation. Polanus also describes God’s goodness as the fount of a number of other essential properties. The first of these is God’s grace: that by which God is kind (in himself) and shows kindness, blessing, and favor to his creation. Second, God’s love

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is that by which he delights in what he approves of, and wills to do good to it. Third, God’s mercy is his eagerness to run to the aid of those who are in need. Fourth, his patience is that by which he endures the sins of his creatures and moderates his anger – all of which is designed to bring them to repentance. Fifth, God’s kindness is that by which he remembers his mercy in wrath and spares those whom he has elected unto salvation. Polanus defines God’s essential justice or righteousness as how God is both just in himself and the author of all righteousness in his creation. From this, he distinguishes between God’s truth (that by which God is both true in himself, and the author of truth) and God’s holiness (again, that by which God is both himself holy and the author of all holiness). These various essential properties all encompass an ad intra dimension whereby God is essentially good, patience, true, etc. Further, they all have an ad extra dimension as an egress of the divine will into creation more broadly through the acts of divine providence. Furthermore, in each property is seen the beginning of a soteriological aspect of Polanus’ doctrine of God as God loves the elect in a particular way, is patient with the elect in a particular way, etc. In chapter ten, I discussed the final two properties that Polanus distinguished beneath God’s will: his power and his freedom. He defines God’s power as that by which God is able to do, and actually does, according to his will in each and every thing. As before, Polanus distinguishes between a personal and an essential power, and (within one of the axiomata he discusses) between an actual and an ordained power. He defines God’s freedom as that by which God does all that he does without coercion by or debt to anyone. My discussion of these last two essential properties matched the relative brevity with which Polanus himself discusses them. At the same time, I considered how these essential properties both reach back to finalize the discussion begun under the headings of God’s wisdom and will, and how it reaches forward to the discussion of the divine decree. Thus, under a lengthy excursus, I summarized Polanus’ doctrine of the decree, creation and providence, and human freedom.

11.2

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

11.2.1 Review of the Main Research Question The purpose of this work has neither been merely to summarize Polanus’ doctrine of God, nor only to analyze specific aspects of that doctrine. That is, I have sought to do more than just consider what Polanus said in these chapters of the Syntagma. Rather, my overarching intent has been to use this analysis to ascertain more generally the larger framework of his doctrine of God. Specifically, I seek to understand Polanus’ doctrine of God in light of the three issues I raised in the introduction: the ground or

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

foundation of Polanus’ doctrine of God; the goal or end of Polanus’ doctrine of God; and the methodology he uses to proceed from foundation to goal (Chapter 1.8). Thus, my primary research question is not simply to ask what Polanus’ doctrine of God ‘is’ but has been instead to ultimately consider what Polanus ‘does’ in this exposition of the doctrine of God. In order to answer this question, I first placed Polanus’ doctrine of God in its historical and theological context and then evaluated its various constituent parts. One key feature of this contextual analysis has been the opportunity to compare Polanus with the various early Reformed orthodox contemporaries: Ursinus, Zanchi, Daneau, Perkins, Bucanus, Trelcatius, Jr., and Keckermann. From this discussion, it was shown that Polanus is a fairly representative figure in early Reformed orthodoxy – while his particular mix of Ramist and Aristotelian methodology is not common in his period, and his organization and the structure of his arguments are therefore specific to himself, his doctrinal content is within the broad outlines of Reformed confessional orthodoxy. Furthermore, I have shown through my analysis that Polanus is in continuity with the broad outlines of catholic orthodox. Indeed, in his polemics, one of Polanus’ regular tactics is to show how his contemporary Roman Catholic or Lutheran interlocutors have strayed from their medieval scholastic moorings. This is an appropriate point also to consider the characterization of Bizer and Letham regarding Polanus being a compiler, a consolidator, or a preserver.1 On the one hand, I have already commented above that the cooperative and institutional nature of Reformed scholastic theology should not be expected to produce what Letham says Polanus lacks: “creating genius” or “daring new departures.”2 On the other hand, at least two features of Polanus’ work mitigate the characterization. First, while Polanus does indeed synthesize the broader medieval scholastic tradition in with the theology of the Reformers, he is hardly unique in that effort.3 The general continuity thesis of Muller, van Asselt, and many others would suggest that the whole of Reformed orthodoxy was concerned with synthesizing the best of the catholic tradition that came before them (including their near Reformed orthodox predecessors and contemporaries). Indeed, “daring new departures” tended to come from those elements within Reformed orthodoxy that would soon be declared error and schismatic. The point here is not so much that Letham is wrong in his characterizations, but that such characteristics as ‘consolidator,’ ‘preserver,’ and ‘synthesizer’ are not specific to Polanus – these could largely characterize the whole of Reformed orthodoxy.

1 See above, Section 1.3. 2 Letham, “Amandus Polanus,” 464. 3 Indeed, were he unique in such an effort, that itself might be characterized as a daring new departure.

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Second, with regard to the specific characterizations of Bizer, I must demur. In calling Polanus an ‘epigone’, Bizer is suggesting that Polanus is an inferior imitator without actually indicating who he is supposed to be imitating or in what manner he is inferior. While it is true that my analysis of Polanus above shows him following Zanchi, Ursinus, and Junius in a variety of doctrines, in each case Polanus was shown both to adopt the general structure and definition found in the works of his contemporaries and predecessors but also to adapt them to his own use. In these instances, it is at least arguable that Polanus’ use of Zanchi’s usus, Ursinus’ proofs for the existence of God, or Junius’ archetypal/ectypal distinction improves upon and enlarges the scope of these aspects of Christian doctrine.4 Furthermore, I note the relative lack of attribution throughout the Syntagma.5 If Polanus is largely compiling the thoughts of others, such a lack of attribution renders the dependencies highly subjective. At any rate, to prove that Polanus is “to a large extent… a compiler,” one would have to do more than simply make an assertion. This characterization by Bizer also ignores several doctrinal formulations that do appear to be unique to Polanus. I noted above Polanus’ nuances to several distinctions: the knowledge of simple intelligence and knowledge of vision distinction (Section 7.4.6), the efficient and permitting will distinction (Section 8.5.2), and the antecedent and consequent will distinction (8.5.4). Polanus also includes the kindness of God as a separate attribute (Section 9.9). Finally, I note the particular structure and arrangement of the essential properties of God that according to my research is entirely unique to Polanus. While it may be true that none of these features would be described as ‘daring,’ they do represent independent thought. I would therefore contend that the characterizations of Bizer and Letham are either misleading or so non-specific as to be appendable to the majority of Polanus’ fellow Reformed orthodox. I now turn to an analysis of Polanus’ doctrine of God according to three criticisms raised in the secondary literature by Faulenbach and Deal: the role of the decree, reason, and the Trinity in Polanus’ theology. I have chosen to proceed in this manner for two reasons. First, the criticisms of Polanus that are found in Faulenbach and Deal have yet to be answered in a manner comparable to how the criticisms arise. That is, while various representatives of the ‘newer’ scholarship refute the claims of Faulenbach and Deal, they do so in works that are not primarily about Polanus’ doctrine of God. Muller and te Velde present Polanus as one among many early Reformed orthodox theologians. Han’s focus is more on the patristic background to Polanus. Han therefore only presents one chapter on the theology of the Syntagma 4 See above, Section 3.4 (for Polanus’ use of Junius’ archetypal/ectypal distinction), Section 4.3 (for Polanus’ use of Zanchi’s usus), and Section 4.5 (for Polanus’ use of Ursinus’ proofs for the existence of God). 5 Compare, for instance, the Syntagma with a corresponding section in the Symphonia catholica.

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

and is necessarily selective and brief. Indeed, these two words could be used to describe the whole of the ‘newer’ scholarship relative to Polanus’ doctrine of God. This is not to criticize these works, simply to reiterate the lacuna that remains in scholarly research to evaluate the claims of Faulenbach and Deal in light of a contextual analysis of Polanus’ doctrine of God. Second, I proceed with an evaluation of the issues raised by Faulenbach and Deal because they are indeed important issues. The roles of the decree, of reason, and of the Trinity in Polanus’ doctrine of God are not peripheral issues. My contention is not that Faulenbach and Deal have asked bad questions (i.e., what is the role of the decree, etc.), but rather that they have provided answers to good questions that do not take into account the historical and theological context in which Polanus writes. Furthermore, by pursuing my own answers to these important questions, I am also answering the primary research question: what is the ground, the goal, and the method of Polanus’ doctrine of God. As I consider the role of the decree, I find that Scripture, not the doctrine of the decree, is the ground or foundation of Polanus’ doctrine of God. As I consider the role of reason, I find that reason and logic are methodological tools used by Polanus, rather than the starting point for his theology. As I consider the role of the Trinity, I find that the glory of the Triune God is not a peripheral or problematic doctrine for Polanus but is the central focus of the whole of his exposition of the doctrine of God. 11.2.2 Polanus and the Divine Decree The first issue is that of the role of the doctrine of the divine decree in Polanus’ doctrine of God. While the place wherein Polanus explicitly discusses the divine decree is outside the main portion of the Syntagma that I have examined (and was only covered in an excursus), Polanus has been shown to interact with this doctrine in various places throughout his doctrine of God. From this, three facets of Polanus’ understanding of the divine decree emerge: first, he links the decree more generally with the essential properties of God; second, he draws explicit connections between the properties distinguished within God’s essential blessedness; and third, he underlines the soteriological aspects of the divine decree. As the second excursus (Chapter 10.5.1, above) showed, the proper category within which to consider the decree is that of God’s operations. The decree is an internal work of God that results in the external works of creation and providence. There is not, for Polanus, any distinction between the God whom he describes in book two of the Syntagma and the God whose operations he describes in books four through seven of the Syntagma. Thus, the essential properties of God do not merely apply to God’s essence but also, in a derivative way, to his works. This is seen in his discussion of God’s immutability (Chapter 5.7, above). There, Polanus notes that the essential immutability of God’s nature extends also to his eternal

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operations. By extension, Polanus indicates that the decrees of God are also immutable. He does something similar in his discussion of prudence as a ‘genre’ of God’s wisdom (Chapter 7.4.1, above). There Polanus discusses prudentia in terms of the character of the acts of God. This ‘character’ of God’s essential wisdom is also therefore a ‘character’ of this eternal decrees. In both places Polanus links the essential properties of God to the ad extra operations of God – all of which fall under heading of the divine decree. Polanus also indicates several connections between God’s wisdom, will, power, and freedom and the divine decree. Note that these are the four essential properties that fall underneath the property of God’s essential blessedness. In his discussion of divine foreknowledge (Chapter 7.4.5, above), Polanus indicates that while God knows more than he decrees, he foreknows only that which he actually decrees. Because only that which God decrees comes to pass, foreknowledge is dependent upon the decree. In a separate distinction, Polanus presents the divine decree as a sort of ‘pivot point’ between the scientia simplicis intelligentiae and the scientia visionis (Chapter 7.4.6, above). With regard to the divine will, Polanus states in the distinction between God’s necessary and free will that God freely wills that which he decrees (Chapter 8.5.5, above). Next, in the discussion of God’s power (Chapter 10.3, above), Polanus states that the power to be able to do all that he decrees is his actual omnipotence. Finally, in his discussion of divine freedom (Chapter 10.4, above), Polanus declares that God decrees all things without any necessity of coaction or coercion. Thus, the decree plays an important role in the movement from a knowledge of all possible things to foreknowledge of all actual things – the possible becomes the actual through the divine decree as a function of God’s most free and powerful will. In addition to these places where Polanus explicitly refers to the divine decree, there are many other instances in which he refers implicitly to this doctrine. In particular, I refer to the many places that Polanus distinguishes between a ‘general’ and a ‘special’ aspect of God’s knowledge or of the types of God’s will. Thus, God knows all things he has decreed, but knows his own elect in a particular way through his predestination of them (Chapter 7.4.3, above). Further, there is a general love, a general mercy, and a general patience of God toward all he has created, but there is a special love, mercy, and patience of God toward his elect. As with the distinction between scientia simplicis intelligentiae and scientia visionis, the ‘decisive’ factor is God’s will that results in the decree to elect. In this way, the decree does introduce important distinctions into Polanus’ discussion along soteriological lines. God’s ad extra operations are focused and limited according to the decree of election. This brief survey shows that Polanus does indeed make many references to God’s decree in his discussion of the doctrine of God. In each case, however, Polanus links together one of two things with his inclusion of the decree. First, he reiterates the simplicity and unity of God’s essence. If God is immutable, then that immutability

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

extends not only to his being ad intra, but also to his ad extra operations. Second, Polanus places the decree within the context of the various properties of the divine blessedness by way of their interaction with one another according to our manner of understanding. The doctrine of the divine decree operates as the category within which Polanus places the ‘outworking” of God’s wisdom, will, power, and freedom. In other words, God works out his wise, free, and powerful will through his decree – specifically in his works of creation and providence. This assertion is contrary to some of the secondary literature, which contends that the divine decree functions as a sort of ‘central dogma’ from which all his other theology is deduced. Recall that Faulenbach criticized Polanus for beginning with the doctrine of God and his decrees.6 It is important to see two aspects of Faulenbach’s critique. First, he is not seeing two things here as the ‘starting point’ of Polanus’ theology. Rather, Faulenbach sees the decree itself as the starting point for the doctrine of God that then becomes the starting point for all of theology. Second, Faulenbach’s criticism is not merely one of order of topics but of structure and principle. Thus, according to Faulenbach, the doctrine of the divine decree stands beneath Polanus’ doctrine of God, and that these two doctrines together form a principial ‘starting point’ for his theology. Deal echoes this concern, seeing in Polanus’ discussion of God’s decree evidence of “the formal requirement of metaphysics” that “threatened the older orthodox systematicians.”7 Note that neither Deal nor Faulenbach provide much evidence for these claims. It therefore appears almost axiomatic for them that the doctrine of the divine decrees is foundational to Reformed scholasticism. To be fair, however, the criticism is briefer and more anecdotal in Deal. In response to this particular criticism, I note that the research presented herein provides no basis upon which to argue that the doctrine of the divine decree functions for Polanus as a sort of ‘central dogma’ from which his doctrine of God particularly, or his whole theology more generally, is logically deduced. But if the divine decree were in fact central to Polanus’ theology, one would expect to see it exert a controlling or regulatory effect over Polanus’ theology more broadly. This is not, however, a phenomenon that is observed in his theology. Predestination exists and is discussed – not because it is ‘central’ but because it is a Scriptural concept and category that must be accounted for. At the same time, Polanus frequently introduces ‘qualifiers’ into this discussion of the divine decree. He consistently draws a careful distinction between a necessary ad intra dimension and a contingent and free ad extra dimension to God’s essence. Thus, the decree is immutable, but not 6 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 332, “Die Gottes- und Dekretenlehre kann nicht Ausgangspunkt der christlichen Lehre sein,” (“The doctrine of God and his decrees cannot be the starting point of Christian Doctrine”). 7 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 115.

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according to what Polanus refers to as an ‘absolute necessity’ – or a necessity of the consequent thing. Rather, the decree is immutable ex hypothesi, or on account of God’s having willed it. Again, it is necessary that God decrees, but what he decrees is not itself absolutely necessary. Along the same line, Polanus indicates that the decree does not take away the contingency of secondary causes. Rather, God works through secondary causes in such a way that they remain what they are (i.e., he does not change contingent causes into necessary ones). I should also note that Polanus links the divine decree to the divine counsel, thereby showing that there is in God both a wise, powerful, and free decision and a wise, powerful, and free act by which he brings about what he has decided. Thus, while there remains in God a necessary and ad intra act of ‘counsel,’ the egress of God’s will is itself radically contingent and only brings about whatever it does bring about according to a necessity of the consequence. Thus, the things that God decrees do not occur according to an absolute necessity or a necessity of the consequent, but by a hypothetical necessity. Further, the means whereby God brings his decree into reality are the transient acts of creation and providence. The manner in which God’s providence interacts with the free and contingent decisions of his rational creatures is via God’s governance. Here, God ‘bends’ and ‘directs’ the will of his creature without offering violence to that will by coercion. In this, Polanus comes remarkably close to the concept of divine concursus without using the specific term. In his overall discussion of the interrelationship between the divine decree and human freedom, Polanus employs terms and specific language in his distinctions that are not as sophisticated as what will be used by later Reformed orthodox theologians. The concepts that are conveyed in Polanus’ exposition are, however, both clear and significant: clear to the reader that Polanus intends to protect an historic view of divine and human freedom, as well as the relationship between the two; and significant in that these concepts argue strongly against any notion of the decree as ‘central’ to Polanus’ theology. The decree does not take away the freedom of choice that rational creatures receive by virtue of having been made in God’s image. If the decree was central, one would expect this line of argument to disappear – or at least to be minimized behind the absolute unchangeableness of the decree. Polanus, however, does exactly the opposite: he indicates at length that God’s decree does not remove the freedom of the creature but rather provides the very conditions in which this freedom can be exercised. It is therefore more accurate to see the divine decree as part of the superstructure of Polanus’ doctrine of who God is and what God had done and continues to do. Note that the divine decree stands for Polanus as a broad heading beneath which to consider its distinguishable ‘parts’ of the works of creation and providence. Thus, the decree is not something from which Polanus ‘logically deduces’ the whole of his theology but is rather part of the overall movement of his discussion. It may very well be that the decree stands between the discussion of who God is and what

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

God has done. Standing in this place, the decree functions as either another step on the way to understanding God as he has revealed himself, or as a stumbling block. The difference is not so much due to the manner in which Polanus presents these doctrines (although, to be fair, the Ramist style does not appeal to everyone), but in the way in which the reader holds these doctrines to begin with. The point to be made is that, in this case, the conclusion of Faulenbach and Deal appear to derive more from their own theological positions and presuppositions than from an objective and contextual analysis of Polanus and his doctrine of God. 11.2.3 Polanus and the Interaction Between Reason and Scripture The second issue involves the role of reason and logic in Polanus’ doctrine of God. This issue touches upon the overarching criticism of Polanus’ theological method: that his methodology is ultimately a form of rationalism. I have defined rationalism in terms of logic and reason being a principial and methodological starting point – that which provides the foundation upon which the whole of Polanus’ theology is built. I contend that Polanus’ use of logic and reason is instrumental rather than foundational – that is, he uses logic and reason as a tool to better understand Scripture, but that he endeavors to place his reading of Scripture as the foundation and source for all of his theology. In order to demonstrate this from the material I have examined, I will look at two examples of Polanus’ use of reason and Scripture: the demonstration of God’s existence and Polanus’ discussion of divine simplicity. First, Polanus’ use of logic and reason can be examined by his discussion of the demonstration of God’s existence (Chapter 4.5, above). At first glance, it might appear rather obvious that these demonstrations are a rationalistic attempt to ‘prove God’s existence’ by the use of autonomous human reason. In each case Polanus presents things that are ‘seen’ outside of Scripture. For example, Polanus points to the government and craftsmanship of the world, political and judicial order, the absurdity of an infinite regress of causes, and the common consensus of all people. Once these logical demonstrations are examined, however, the arguments that Polanus provides can just as easily be seen as evidence that what Paul says in Romans 1:19–20 is clearly demonstrable – there is a knowledge of God that be acquired by looking at that which God has made – rather than an attempt to prove God’s existence apart from Scripture. If Paul states that God is known by all through observing creation, then there ought to be some evidence of that (even as there should be evidence of the revelation that human beings will suppress that truth in unrighteousness). These demonstrations therefore indicate the foundational role that Scripture plays in Polanus’ theology. He uses logic to organize and analyze his reading of Scripture. Thus, Polanus’ theological methodology is not rationalistic; logic and reason are tools useful for a thorough and structured understanding.

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Second, Polanus’ use of reason and logic (and the relative place that reason and logic have in his overall theological methodology) can be seen in the way in which he demonstrates that God a particular essential property. Here, I choose to look at divine simplicity because this stands as the first of the many essential properties considered by Polanus and utilizes a structure that is broadly common to the rest of his discussions. In my examination of Polanus’ exposition of divine simplicity (Chapter 5.4, above), I noted that he used three categories of demonstration: Scriptural, interconnectional, and logical. He provides three Scriptural demonstrations of God’s simplicity: the revelation of the divine name Jehovah; that God is ‘life, light, and love;’ and the testimony of John 4:24. Recall that I insisted, pace Deal, that all three are indeed Scriptural demonstrations. By referencing Jehovah, Polanus not only points back to his prior discussion (and thus this demonstration could also be numbered among those that are interconnectional), but also points to God’s own self-revelation in Scripture. Similarly, Polanus uses explicitly biblical language: ‘life,’ ‘light,’ and ‘love.” While it is true that he does not reference specific passages of Scripture, it is also true that these words are so generically Scriptural as not to require reference. Recall the conclusion above: the ‘garb’ of simplicity is indeed the rich tapestry of God’s word. At the same time, it should be noted that very often Polanus does not engage in any kind of exegesis of the texts the references or quotes. One should not, however, infer from this that Polanus is merely engaging in some kind of empty ‘proof texting.’ Rather, these references ought to be seen in the context of an exegetical history that is shared even among those with whom Polanus will vehemently disagree on other issues. Indeed, it is when Polanus is engaged in polemics that he is found to be most exegetical – whether he engages with Bellarmine or with various unnamed Lutheran proponents of the ubiquity of the physical body of Christ. In those instances, Polanus engages with the text to show how and why his opponents misunderstand Scripture. His technique of demonstration is highly ‘logical’ (i.e., he typically interacts with logical syllogisms), but his intent appears to be exegetical. In the section on divine simplicity, however, there is no great dispute with his primary interlocutors as to the correct understanding of these various texts. Indeed, this doctrine stands in continuity with the catholic understanding of the doctrine of God. Polanus therefore merely provides the references because the meaning of the texts (or biblical terms) is not in dispute. The relative lack of exegesis in one section in comparison with another does not mean that there is a lack of Scriptural support for the doctrine that has less exegesis. Instead, this should be seen as evidence of a general consensus of the catholic tradition of exegesis of that text and the implications of that exegesis for specific theological doctrines. Polanus also includes a number of interconnectional demonstrations – places in which he links simplicity to various other essential properties. I note two features of these interconnections: 1) they proceed from the common ground of the prior

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

(i.e., Scriptural) demonstration, but 2) these interconnections are not evidence of circular arguments. First, if Polanus’ demonstration of God’s simplicity is grounded in Scripture (i.e.: the divine name of Jehovah; the explicitly biblical categories of life, light, and love; and the testimony of John 2:24), then whatever interconnections he may make with other essential properties of the first order (or, for that matter, of the second order) should be understood in connection with that biblical evidence. Thus, even if it were true that Polanus merely demonstrates God’s perfection, infinity, and immutability on the basis of God’s simplicity, these ‘derived’ essential properties would still rest upon the foundation of Scripture’s evidence for God’s simplicity. This is, of course, something that Polanus was shown not to do: in each case, Polanus shows how his reading of Scripture testifies to God’s essential perfection, infinity, and immutability. Second, it is possible that these interconnectional demonstrations leave Polanus open to the criticism that his arguments are ultimately circular: i.e., that simplicity is argued on the basis of perfection, infinity, and immutability, but perfection is itself argued on the basis of simplicity, infinity, and immutability, etc. A comparison of the definitions that Polanus provides for each first order essential property, however, shoes that they are not explicitly defined in terms of one another. Consider the following definitions as they were given above in Chapter 5: • God’s simplicity is the essential property of God whereby the divine essence is signified as being utterly individual and absolute, lacking composition, division, multiplication, or accidents, and hence incorporeal, spiritual, and invisible. • God’s perfection is the essential property of God whereby we understand that the divine essence lacks nothing absolutely, but that God has all things in itself in a most complete way from everlasting to everlasting and even the perfections of all things, and thus that he is the exemplar of all things and the cause of every perfection whether it is of nature or of grace. • God’s infinity is the essential property of God whereby he is signified as being limited and measured by neither time, nor place, nor anything else, but rather that his essence and nature is infinite, immense, and incomprehensible, and he is such actually, absolutely, and by his own self. • God’s eternity is the essential property of God whereby God is signified as being limited by no time and as having neither principle according to time nor end for which he exists, but rather that he is more ancient than every time, more beyond than every end, and absolutely, simultaneously, and always whole without succession. • God’s immensity is the essential property of God whereby the divine essence is signified as being limited, circumscribed, and terminated by no place, but rather as everywhere penetrating and filling all places as well as individual places both in the world and beyond it, seeing as he is present to all things.

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God’s immutability is his essential property whereby God’s essence, together with all his properties, without coaction in his nature, and absolutely, is understood as being incapable of being generated, corrupted, or at all defined, increased or augmented by any concept, being changed, or changing place, but rather as being always the same.

Note that none of these essential properties are defined with reference to another essential property. He does reference God’s immensity (explicitly) and God’s eternality (implicitly) in his definition of infinity – yet these two essential properties are then given as two distinctions within the infinity of God. Thus, while Polanus does not define each first order essential property in direct terms of the others, he certainly does describe the various first order essential property in terms of the others. He does so, however, not by circular reasoning but according to a formerly established principle. God’s essential properties are ultimately one. They can be distinguished – indeed, they must be distinguished according to our manner of reasoning and understanding. Nevertheless, though they can be distinguished, they cannot be separated. Further, the distinctions are only made in a way that does not introduce any essential composition into God’s essential being. While these essential properties of God are therefore intertwined, Polanus is not defining each essential property in terms of the other but is demonstrating them with reference to one another. They are therefore not ‘circular definitions’ but rather ‘cohesive demonstrations.’ Each essential property is defined in isolation from the others by what makes them particularly distinct. The description that follows from each definition, however, demonstrates further the fact that though they are distinct they are not separable. The last category of demonstrations that Polanus uses in his discussion of divine simplicity are the logical demonstrations. I noted three axiomata which I labeled ‘logical’: that God is pure act, that God is without parts, and the God is without composition. In each case Polanus logically deduces from the fundamental concept of ‘simplicity’ what must be true about God. Note the following syllogisms: • That which is simple is purest act; • God is simple; • Therefore, God is purest act.

• • •

That which is simple is without parts or composition; God is simple; Therefore, God is without parts or composition.

The notion that God is purest act and without parts or composition is logically implied by the previous categories of demonstration. Scripture and the intercon-

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

nectivity of essential properties indicates that God is simple, therefore he must have these categories of simplicity. Indeed, by demonstrating that God has the characteristics of simplicity, Polanus is implicitly refuting the notion that God is not simple because he does not have these characteristics. Thus, even before Polanus turns to consider explicit objections to divine simplicity, he is laying the foundation for this discussion through these logical demonstrations. The relationship between Scripture and logic or reason in Polanus’ doctrine of God is further demonstrated by two additional examples. First, in his discussion of the divine names, Polanus shows that the whole of his understanding of who God is and what God is like is founded upon Scripture (Chapter 4.6.3, above). In other words, the names that God has revealed in Scripture confirm God’s being and give instruction into the nature of that being, as well as the first glimpse of the divine persons and some of the essential properties of God. It should also be noted that Polanus discusses the divine names after he has considered his logical demonstrations that God exists. Thus, while the demonstrations occur as part of God’s general revelation of himself to all his creation (something which Scripture attests to, but is not itself part of), the divine names stand at the beginning of Polanus’ discussion of God’s special revelation of himself in Scripture. In other words, whereas Scripture testifies to a broad and general knowability of God through that creation and providence, the sort of knowledge of God that Polanus considers starting with the divine names is found only in Scripture. Second, my discussion of the origin of Polanus’ distinction between an effective and a permissive will demonstrates how Polanus sees relationship between Scripture and logic (see Chapter 8.5.4, above). Recall that Polanus includes in his understanding of divine permission things that are not in themselves sinful: God permits good things and indifferent things, as well as evil things. While this particular distinction was not found in either medieval scholastic predecessors or Reformed scholastic contemporaries, the texts that Polanus cites indicate the probable origin for his formulation of divine permission.8 There is a divine permission even of good and indifferent things because 1 Corinthians 16 and Hebrews 6 speaks of God ‘permitting’ things that are, at least according to God’s revealed will, good – the strengthening of the church by the Apostles. I contend that Polanus’ own particular nuance to the divine permission is more than just an anomaly. Rather, Polanus defines permission as he does (and, I must add, contrary to normal usage of the distinction) for the same reason he has defined every other distinction as he does: because he is convinced that these definitions and distinctions reflect true ectypal

8 It must be said, however, that it is certainly possible that this feature is not entirely unique with Polanus. It very well could be the case that he adapts this from an unnamed and uncited source. In my research, however, I was not able to find a comparable formulation of divine permission.

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theology of the pilgrim along the way. That is, he is convinced these definitions and distinctions are drawn from the true teaching of Scripture. My claims regarding the fundamental role of Scripture and the instrumental role of logic and reason are contrary to some of the secondary literature on Polanus. Faulenbach and Deal, in particular, assert that logic and reason serve as a foundational methodology in the theology of Polanus – thus, he is accused of ‘rationalism.’ According to Faulenbach, “the question of cause and effect determines Polanus’ thinking.”9 Similarly, Deal states that Polanus’ doctrine “seems governed by the analytic and deductive character of his logic in the service of a fundamentally Augustinian metaphysical scheme.”10 As I begin my response, I note that my discussion of Polanus’ doctrine of God has included many instances of Polanus’ use of logic and Aristotelian categories. He has detailed numerous axiomata and consectaria, he has placed theological inquiry in the form of many syllogisms, and he has many times considered various formal, material, final, and efficient causes. How, then, should one evaluate the criticism that Polanus’ theology is overly rationalistic? First, it is important to note that much of the criticism that Deal and Faulenbach levy against Polanus typically comes either in isolation and as part of a specific instance of numerous (or seemingly innumerable) axioms and principles, or it comes as part of their overall criticism of Polanus’ methodology. It will therefore be helpful to pull back and consider Polanus’ broader pattern of using logic and reason to work out his doctrine. Here I readily acknowledge that Polanus does indeed use a plethora of logical and rational devices to demonstrate his theological positions (as well as to show the weakness in the theological positions of others). He uses a Ramist methodology of first defining a topic and then distributing it into its various parts. What is crucial to recognize here, however, is that Polanus’ Ramism does not determine ‘how’ these doctrines will be defined or distributed, only ‘that’ they will be defined and distributed. Similarly, Polanus uses the logical tools of a broadly ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ such as syllogisms, discussions of various types of causes, and the distinction between essence and accidents (see above, Chapter 2.4.1). Yet even here I must note two things. First, in order for Polanus’ usage of such notions to be evidence of ‘rationalism’ it would have to be shown that these notions constitute a foundation upon which Polanus builds his argument. Thus, there is a difference between the use of reason and rationalism. The former sees logic as a tool to better understand a subject. The latter begins with human reason as a principium in itself. Second, in arguing that Polanus begins with human reason as a principium in itself, one would have to ignore the very starting point that Polanus gives for his own theology. In other words, you would

9 Faulenbach, Die Struktur, 321. 10 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 124–25.

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

have to either skip over or seek to explain away the foundational nature of Polanus’ discussion of Scripture in book one of the Syntagma. Here again the example of Polanus’ demonstration of divine simplicity demonstrates that logic is being used in service to the larger goal of presenting a biblical doctrine (i.e., a doctrine that arises from the reading of Scripture). To be sure, Polanus’ use of the tools of logic adds a great deal to the Scriptural demonstrations he presented earlier. Yet it remains important to recognize that Polanus uses the tools of logic and reason to build upon a foundation that is laid in God’s own revelation of himself to his creatures. Scripture, not reason, is the foundation for Polanus’ theology. Reason is used in service to Scripture – not the other way around. 11.2.4 Polanus and the Trinity The final issue is that of the role of the Trinity in Polanus’ doctrine of God. Here I note in particular the more limited definition of ‘doctrine of God’ that I have been operating beneath. While the Trinity can be considered to be part of a broader understanding of the doctrine of God, my consideration of that doctrine has been in a narrower and more ‘strict’ sense of just God’s essence, names, and essential properties. Polanus himself distributes the doctrine of ‘faith concerning God’ into God’s essence and operations; and he further distributes the doctrine of God’s essence into attributes and persons. Thus, according to the structure of Polanus’ doctrine of God, the Trinity is integral to a proper understanding of God’s essence. While Polanus waits until book three of the Syntagma to present a fuller and more specific exposition of his doctrine of the Trinity, the three divine persons, both individually and communally, come up regularly in the doctrines that Polanus expounds in book two. This is not a unique feature of just this doctrine as Polanus repeatedly brings forward issues that are defined and discussed in later portions of the Syntagma. For instance, he speaks of God’s wisdom and simplicity in his definition of theology in book one and the doctrine of the divine decree is found in various places in Polanus’ discussion of God’s essential properties. Thus, in my examination of Polanus’ doctrine of God, I have indicated several places in which Polanus makes explicit reference to the Trinity: • The initial definition that Polanus provides for ‘faith concerning God’ explicitly indicates both God’s essential oneness and that God subsists in three persons (Chapter 4.4, above). • In discussing the divine essence, Polanus indicates that God’s essence can be discussed either communally or singularly (Chapter 4.6, above). Furthermore, a singular discussion can either refer to God’s one essence that is found equally in all three persons or it can refer to one individual person (i.e., distinctly but not separately).

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•

•

•

•

•

•

In his discussion of the divine names, Polanus states that Jehovah can refer to the persons of the Trinity jointly or singularly, and Elohim speaks to the mystery of the Trinity (Chapter 4.6.3, above). Thus, the names by which God reveals his essence and something of his essential properties includes the notion that the God who is one in essence subsists in the divine persons. In dealing with an objection to God’s simplicity (that if there are three persons, then God is not simple), Polanus demonstrates that it is precisely the doctrine of simplicity that secures the Triunity of God (Chapter 5.4, above). If God’s essence was not simple (i.e., non-composite), there would therefore be three gods rather than three persons in one God. It is, according to Polanus, the doctrine of divine simplicity that safeguards the Trinity. In speaking about the eternity of God, Polanus indicates that the eternal generation of the Son by the Father refers to a principle of order in their personal properties, not to his origin in time (Chapter 5.6.1, above). Thus, the Son and the Holy Spirit are eternal because they partake of the one, simple, and eternal essence. In his discussion of God’s essential glory, Polanus distinguishes between an essential glory shared by all three persons and a personal glory that can be attributed to each person individually (Chapter 6.6, above). Similarly, Polanus indicates an essential wisdom and a personal wisdom (Chapter 7.3), an essential and personal will (Chapter 8.5.1, above), and an essential and personal power (Chapter 10.3, above). In the excursus on the divine operations, Polanus also speaks of essential operations and personal operations (Chapter 10.5.1, above). In speaking about the divine love, Polanus shows that there is a necessary, ad intra, love by which the three persons of the Trinity love one another, and a voluntary, ad extra, love by which the Triune God loves his creation (Chapter 9.6, above). Finally, in his discussion of the freedom of God, Polanus notes that the personal operations unique to each person are not carried out by coaction (i.e., the Father freely begets the Son, the Father and the Son freely breathe out the Spirit, the Son is freely begotten, the Holy Spirit freely proceeds from the Father and the Son). These actions by which alone the three persons are distinguished are free, even if they are impossible to be otherwise according to nature (Chapter 10.4, above).

It should be noted that this is only a subset of the references to the Trinity that Polanus has made throughout his whole doctrine of God. It should be noted that by speaking of an ‘essential’ and a ‘common’ wisdom, will, or power, Polanus is not suggesting that there are three ‘wisdoms,’ ‘wills,’ or ‘powers’ in God. Just as the essence of God is one and simple and indivisible, so too the essential properties are one and simple and indivisible. Neither is Polanus indicating that the persons

Synthesis of Polanus’ Doctrine of God

can be separated (or that the essential properties of one divine person can be separated from the essential properties of another divine person). Rather, Polanus consistently seeks to distinguish what can be distinguished (and, more importantly, what is distinguished in Scripture), even if what can be distinguished cannot be separated. Each essential property is fully attributed to and indistinguishable in, each divine person. Thus, for example, the personal will of God is one and simple and indivisible, and there is no difference between the will of the Father, the Son, or the Holy Spirit. These distinction between a ‘personal’ and an ‘essential’ essential property is therefore one that is made according to our capacity (i.e., a rational distinction).11 While Polanus clearly discusses topics related to the Trinity in book two, he does delay the full discussion of the particulars of the personal distinctions between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit until after his discussion of the divine attributes (i.e., the names and essential properties).The suggestion of the secondary literature, however, that to place the doctrine of the Trinity after the doctrine of the divine essence and attributes is to begin with what is ‘marginal’ rather than what is ‘central’ in God (or in Scripture, or in theology) is to misunderstand what Polanus is doing. Here, I specifically interact with Deal’s assertion that “unless the Triune nature of God’s revelation is explored from the very outset, one has sought for axioms and principles at the periphery of the Christian revelation.”12 Thus, according to Deal, placing the doctrine of the divine essence, names, and essential properties before the doctrine of the Trinity is to deal with what is ‘peripheral’ before what is foundational. Further, Deal indicates that the doctrine of the Trinity becomes a ‘problem’ for Polanus’ prior discussion of God’s perfection of being. At least two factors, however, mitigate against this particular criticism. First, Polanus begins with that which is common and identical among all three persons: the names and essential properties of God. The names are common in that they are not God’s personal names (i.e., Father, Son, and Holy Spirit), but names that speak to the being and attributes of the Triune God, either specifically or generally. Thus, contrary to so much common parlance, Polanus does not by the generic word ‘God’ mean to speak of the Father apart from the Son and the Holy Spirit. That is, when Polanus speaks of the will of God, he is not speaking of the Father’s will in isolation from the will of the Son or the Spirit. Rather, just as ‘God’ refers to the three persons communally, so too do the divine names. As well, his

11 Note that this differs from the distinction between a ‘personal property’ and an ‘essential property.’ Polanus indicates that the personal properties are formally or modally distinct in each divine person (i.e., begetting, begotten, breathed out, etc.). Here, I refer to the notion that Polanus raises that an essential property (i.e., the divine will) can be spoken of either personally (or individually) or essentially (or communally). 12 Deal, “Meaning and Method,” 125.

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discussion of the essential properties, as was shown above, focus on what is equally present among all three persons. He does not speak of the ‘wisdom of the Father’ over against the “wisdom of the Son.’ In other words, to speak of the one ‘essential’ wisdom of God is equally to do justice to the ‘personal’ wisdom as it is found in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The divine wisdom can only be ‘abstracted’ because it is ‘essential,’ and therefore identical in all three divine persons. At least two factors can be discerned as being behind such a decision. First, this is the common structure of classic Christian theism during and before the time in which Polanus wrote. Of those near Reformed orthodox contemporaries with whom I have been comparing Polanus, only Keckermann discusses the personal distinctions between the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit before he discusses God’s essential attributes.13 Second, one of the primary theories of Ramism is that investigation proceeds properly from that which is most general to that which is more and more specific. In other words, Polanus has both methodological and traditional reasons for beginning as he does. The second mitigating factor is that Polanus proceeds as he does in order to both safeguard the Trinity and to provide a rational basis for asserting one God subsisting in three persons, rather than three gods. For Polanus, the doctrine of divine simplicity safeguards the doctrine of the Trinity. This is seen explicitly in the objections that Polanus answers in that chapter of the Syntagma. If God is not simple, he cannot be Triune – he must be threefold or triplex. Therefore, the one God is not ‘composed’ of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, nor is the one essence divided between them. Not only do these notions contradict Scripture, they also contradict sound reason. One could only suggest that the ‘perfect being’ of God as expounded by Polanus in book two of the Syntagma creates a ‘problem’ for Polanus in his doctrine of the Trinity if the specific arguments that Polanus makes are ignored. Rather than being ‘peripheral’ or ‘problematic,’ however, the Trinity stands as part of Polanus’ fundamental definition of God – we are to believe that God is one in essence and three in persons. The doctrine of the Trinity does not disappear from the discussion while Polanus unfold his understanding of the divine essence, names, and essential properties. Indeed, the Trinity (either communally or singly) comes up with some frequency in Polanus’ various discussions in book two of the Syntagma.

13 See Keckermann, Systema, 54.

Polanus Put Positively

11.3

Polanus Put Positively

In this section, I will attempt to answer my original research question in a positive way. By positive, I do not refer to an analysis of the quality of Polanus’ theology, but rather to say something about what Polanus’ theology is doing, rather than merely what it is not doing. As important as the previous discussion has been regarding several of the major criticisms that have been raised against Polanus and his theology, it is also valuable to seek my own answer to the question: “What is Polanus doing in his doctrine of God?” Put simply, Polanus is intentionally building his doctrine of God upon the ground of Scripture, by means of reason and logic in service to Scripture, all to the glory and worship of the Triune God. First, Polanus’ theology is built upon the ground of Scripture as the principium cognoscendi. This means that Polanus specifically intends to draw his definitions and distinctions from his reading of Scripture. Therefore, Scripture forms the basis and foundation from which his theology is intentionally built. This assertion directly flows from Polanus’ discussion of the authority of Scripture and the place that his doctrine of Scripture has in the overall structure of the Syntagma. At the same time, Polanus stands within a long tradition of exegesis. That his doctrine of God does not radically depart from other Reformed (or even medieval) scholastic theologians is not because he has based his theology upon rationalism or has merely slavishly followed those who have gone before. Rather, it indicates a shared exegetical understanding. Furthermore, it is important to recognize that Polanus begins the Syntagma with the God who reveals himself in Scripture. Thus, Polanus’ theology can be understood as being radically theocentric. Polanus begins with theology as both the wisdom of God (i.e., archetypal theology) and the wisdom from God (i.e., ectypal theology). Because, however, he seeks to bring his readers before the God who condescends to reveal himself to his creation, he first instructs us in what the revelation is (and is not). In addition, the very manner of Polanus’ discussion in the various chapters that I have considered demonstrate that, for Polanus, theology is to be built up from the Word of God. I should also note that my discussion of Polanus’ use of Scripture only scratches the surface: the most consistent source of testimony that Polanus invokes throughout the whole of his doctrine of God is in fact God himself speaking through the Scriptures. Second, the method by which Polanus builds his theology from Scripture is reason and logic used in service to Scripture. While the doctrines themselves arise from Scripture, their specific presentation, their precise definitions, and their painstaking distribution proceed with the assistance of a logical methodology. Wherever logic contradicts the clear teaching of Scripture, logic must give way to revelation. Thus, even the formally true arguments of those with whom Polanus engages in polemics must give way to the testimony of Scripture. Furthermore, Polanus proceeds as

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he does because of his conviction that human beings, as rational creatures, are made in God’s image. As such, human beings have an intellect and a will, they have power to carry out their will and freedom with which to do so. To be sure, there are deep distinctions between creator and creature: but the fundamental analogy remains by virtue of God’s creative fiat. Thus, whereas God knows all things by one simple act of intelligence, we who are finite and fallible must proceed on the basis of reasoning and logical discourse. Indeed, part of the manner in which God accommodates his own archetypal understanding of himself includes the necessity for those to whom his ectypal theology is communicated to use their God-given faculties to understand and put into practice God’s authoritative truth. Logic functions as a tool to analyze and organize the teaching of Scripture. Thus, Polanus is primarily influenced by a Ramist methodology on the macro scale of analysis and organization, but by a Christian Aristotelianism on the various aspects of analysis on a doctrine-by-doctrine scale. Third, I contend that Polanus seeks to use the means of logic and reason to build up his doctrine of God to the glory and worship of the Triune God. Here, I would refer to both the definition Polanus gives of God (that God is one in essence and three in persons, see Chapter 4.4) and the manner in which he begins his discussion of the divine works. Recall from the discussion at the end of the excursus on the Trinity (Chapter 4.6.2) that Polanus begins book four with the statement that thus far he has been considering the divine essence. That is, for Polanus, the divine persons are part of – indeed, integral to – his discussion of the divine essence. Thus, from the very beginning of his discussion of God, Polanus has before him the reality that the God he is describing is one in essence and three in persons. The Trinity is not a problem for Polanus by virtue of his exposition of the perfection of God’s essence. Quite the opposite: the goal of his whole doctrine of God is to consider the Triune God in all his revealed glory. It is therefore not just the reality of God’s Triunity, but the worship and glory of the Triune God that Polanus seeks. Recall that a major aspect of Polanus’ purpose in writing the Syntagma was to place God before the reader as the summum bonum and knowledge of God as the highest blessedness a human being can attain. Further, Polanus indicates that the purpose of the Syntagma is twofold: both theoretical (i.e., for understanding who God is) and practical (i.e., for understanding what our response to this God should be). Thus, the remainder of the Syntagma seeks to carry out this two-fold purpose. We are taught both what we should believe concerning God (books two through seven) and what obligation this God places upon us (books eight through ten). Finally, the manner in which Polanus begins his discussion of God’s names and way in which he ends the discussion of God’s essential properties should be noted. In describing the divine names, Polanus states that these names are that by which God is believed upon, called upon, worshipped and professed (see Chapter 4.6.3). From the very beginning of his discussion of the

Polanus Put Positively

divine attributes, Polanus indicates that God communicates his names to us that he might be worshipped. Then, at the end of the section in which he details the many essential properties of God, Polanus focuses upon the glory of God, which rises to a crescendo of praise, honor, and glory being given to the one true, and truly Triune, God. My investigation has therefore shown that in his doctrine of God as he sets if forth in the Syntagma, Polanus seeks to build his understanding upon the ground of God’s authoritative word, to erect that doctrine with the aid of logical arguments and reasoning, all to the worship and glory of the Triune God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

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Good, James Isaac. History of the Swiss Reformed Church Since the Reformation. Publication and Sunday School Board of the Reformed Church in the United States, 1913. Gordon, Bruce. The Swiss Reformation. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002. Goris, Harm. “Thomism in Zanchi’s Doctrine of God.” In Reformation and Scholasticism: An Ecumenical Enterprise, eds. Willem J. van Asselt and Eef Dekker, 121–140. Grand Rapids: Baker, 2001. Goudriaan, Aza. “Athanasius in Reformed Protestantism: Some Aspects of Reception History (1527–1607).” Church History and Religious Culture 90:2–3 (2010): 257–76. ______. Reformed Orthodoxy and Philosophy, 1625–1750: Gisbertus Voetius, Petrus van Mastricht, and Anthonius Driessen. Brill’s Series in Church History, Volume 49. Leiden: Brill 2006. ______. “Theologia practica: The Diverse Meaning of a Subject of Early Modern Academic Writing.” In Church and School in Early Modern Protestantism. Edited by Jordan Ballor, David Sytsma, and Jason Zuidema, Studies in the History of Christian Tradition, Volume 120. Leiden: Brill, 2013: 443–355. ______. “Theology and Philosophy.” In A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy. Edited by Herman J. Selderhuis. Companions to the Christian Tradition, Volume 40. Leiden: Brill, 2013: 35–36. Gründler Olivier, Otto. Die Gotteslehre Girolami Zanchis und ihre Bedeutung für seine Lehre von der Prädestination. Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener Verlag des Erziehungsvereins, 1965. Guggisberg, Hans R. Basel in the Sixteenth Century: Aspects of the City Republic before, during, and after the Reformation. St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982. Haag, Eugene and Emile Haag. “Trelcat (Luc),” La France Protestante ou vies des Protestants français qui sont fait un nom dans l’histoire. 9 Volumes. Paris: J. Cherbuliez, 1846–1858. Hall, Basil. “Calvin against the Calvinists.” In John Calvin: A Collection of Distinguished Essays, ed. G. E. Duffield, 19–37. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1966. Han, Byung Soo. Symphonia Catholica: The Merger of Patristic and Contemporary Sources in the Theological Method of Amandus Polanus (1561–1610). Reformed Historical Theology, Volume 30. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht Academic, 2015. Heppe, Heinrich. Dogmatik des deutschen Protestantismus im sechzehnten Jahrhundert. Gotha, 1857. ______. Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformierten Kirche dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt. Ed. Ernst Bizer. Elberfield: R. L. Friedrichs, 1861. ______. Reformed Dogmatics: Set Out and Illustrated from the Sources. Ed. Ernst Bizer. Trans. G. T. Thompson. Reprint. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1978. Holmes, Christopher R. J. “The Theological Function of the Doctrine of the Divine Attributes and the Divine Glory, With Special Reference to Karl Barth and His Reading of the Protestant Orthodox.” Scottish Journal of Theology 61, no. 02 (2008): 206–23. The Holy Bible, English Standard Version. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2001.

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Secondary Literature

Meijering, E. P. “The Fathers and Calvinist Orthodoxy: Systematic Theology, A. Polanus, J. Wolleb and F. Turrettini.” In The Reception of the Church Fathers in the West: From the Carolingians to the Maurists, vol 1, ed. Irena Dorota Backus, 867–888. Leiden: Brill, 1997. Muller, Richard A. After Calvin: Studies in the Development of a Theological Tradition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. ______. Christ and the Decree: Christology and Predestination in Reformed Theology from Calvin to Perkins. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2008. ______. Dictionary of Latin and Greek Theological Terms: Drawn Principally from Protestant Scholastic Theology. Second Edition. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017. ______. Divine Will and Human Choice: Freedom, Contingency, and Necessity in Early Modern Reformed Thought. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017. ______. “Duplex Cognitio Dei in the Theology of Early Reformed Orthodoxy.” Sixteenth Century Journal 2 (1979): 51–62. ______. “Not Scotist: Understandings of Being, Univocity, and Analogy in Early-Modern Reformed Thought.” Reformation & Renaissance Review 14:2 (2012): 127–50. ______. Post-Reformation Reformed Dogmatics: The Rise and Development of Reformed Orthodoxy, ca. 1520 to ca. 1725. 2nd  Revised Edition. 4 Volumes. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2003. ______. “Reformation, Orthodoxy, ‘Christian Aristotelianism,’ and the Eclecticism of Early Modern Philosophy.” Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis 81, no. 3 (2001): 306–25. ______. “Scholasticism, Reformation, Orthodoxy, and the Persistence of Christian Aristotelianism.” Trinity Journal 19.1 (Spring, 1999): 81–96. ______. The Unaccommodated Calvin: Studies in the Foundation of a Theological Tradition. Oxford Studies in Historical Theology. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001. ______. “Unity and Distinction: The Nature of God in Theology of Lucas Trelcatius, Jr.” Reformation & Renaissance Review 10.3 (2008): 315–41. ______. “The Use and Abuse of a Document: Beza’s Tabula praedestinationis, the Bolsec Controversy, and the Origins of Reformed Orthodoxy.” In Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment, Studies in Christian History and Thought, eds. Carl R. Trueman and R. Scott Clark, 33–61. Reprint. Milton Keyes: Paternoster, 2005. ______. “Vera Philosophia cum sacra Theologia nusquam pugnat: Keckermann on Philosophy, Theology, and the Problem of Double Truth.” Sixteenth Century Journal 15.1 (1984): 341–65. O’Banion, Patrick J. “Jerome Zanchi, the Application of Theology, and the Rise of the English Practical Divinity Tradition.” Renaissance and Reformation XXIX.2–3 (2005): 97–120. Oberman, Heiko A. The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1986. ______. The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963. Ong, Walter J. Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1958.

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Otten, Willemien “Medieval Scholasticism: Past, Present and Future.” Nederlands archief voor kerkgeschiedenis 81, no. 3 (2001): 275–89. Parker, Geoffrey. Editor. The Thirty Years War. Second Edition. New York: Rutledge, 1997. Patterson, W. B. William Perkins and the Making of Protestant England. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pickave, M. “La notion d’a priori chez Descartes et les philosophes médiévaux.” Les Études Philosophiques 75 (2005): 434–54. Platt, John. Reformed Thought and Scholasticism: The Arguments for the Existence of God in Dutch Theology, 1575–1650. Studies in the History of Christian Thought, Volume 29. Leiden: Brill, 1982. Pleizier, T. Theo J., and Maarten Wisse. “‘As the Philosopher Says’: Aristotle.” In Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism. Reformed Historical-Theological Studies, eds. Willem J. van Asselt, et. al., trans. Albert Gootjes, 26–44. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011. Pollack, Darren M. Early Stuart Polemical Hermeneutics: Andrew Willet’s 1611 Haxapla on Romans. Reformed Historical Theology, Volume 50. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2017. Poythress, Diane. Reformer of Basel: The Life, Thought, and Influence of Johannes Oecolampadius. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011. Raitt, Jill. “The Elector John Casimir, Queen Elizabeth and the Protestant League.” In Controversy and Conciliation, eds. Derek J. Visser and Dikran Y. Hadidian, 117–46. Alison Park: Pickwick, 1986. Rijk, L.M. de. Middeleeuwse wijsbegeerte. Traditie en vernieuwing. 2nd Edition. Assen: Van Gorcum, 1988. Rogers, Jack B. and Donald K. McKim. The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible: An Historical Approach. San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1979. Rouwendal, Pieter L. “The Method of the Schools: Medieval Scholasticism.” In Introduction to Reformed Scholasticism. Reformed Historical-Theological studies, eds. Willem J. van Asselt, et. al., trans. Albert Gootjes, 56–72. Grand Rapids: Reformation Heritage Books, 2011. Ryken, Philip Graham. Thomas Boston as Preacher of the Fourfld State. Rutherford Studies in Historical Theology, eds. David F. Wright and Donald Macleod. Carlisle: Paternoster, 1999. Shaw, Mark. “William Perkins and the New Pelagians: Another Look at the Cambridge Predestination Controversy of the 1590’s.” Westminster Theological Journal 58 (1996): 267–301. Schaff, Philip. The Creeds of Christendom, with a History and Critical Notes. Revised Edition. Three Volumes. Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1984. Selderhuis, Herman. A Companion to Reformed Orthodoxy. Brill’s Companions to the Christian Tradition. Leiden: Brill, 2013.

Secondary Literature

Sinnema, Donald. “The Discipline of Ethics in Early Reformed Orthodox.” Calvin Theological Journal 28 (1993): 10–44. Skinner, Quentin “Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas.” History and Theory 8, no. 1 (1969): 3–53. Spruit, Leen. Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge. Brills Studies in Intellectual History, Volume 48. Leiden: Brill, 1994. Sprunger, Keith L. “Ames, Ramus, and the Method of Puritan Theology.” Harvard Theological Review 59.2 (1966): 166–151. Staehelin, Ernst. Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf. Basel: Verlag von Helbing & Lichtenhahn, 1956. ______. “Die Lehr-und Wanderjahre des Amandus Polanus von Polansdorf.” Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde 44 (1945): 37–77. Steinmetz, David C. Calvin in Context. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. ______. Luther in Context. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 1995. Stranglin, Keith. Arminius on the Assurance of Salvation: The Context, Roots, and Shape of the Leiden Debate, 1603–1609. Leiden: Brill, 2007. Stockrad, Kocku Von. Locations of Knowledge in Medieval and Early Modern Europe: Esoteric Discourse and Western Identities. Brill’s Studies in Intellectual History, Volume 186. Leiden: Brill, 2010. Strohm, Christoph. Ethik im frühen Calvinismus. Humanistische Einflüsse, philosophische, juristische und theologische Argumentationen sowie mentalitätsgeschichtliche Aspekte am Beispiel des Calvin-Schülers Lambertus Danaeus. Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte, Volume 65. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996. Schweizer, Alexander. Die protestantischen Centraldogmen in ihrer Entwicklung innerhalb der reformierten Kirche. 2 volumes. Zurich: Orell, Fuessli & Co., 1846–1856. Tipton, Stephen. “Defining ‘Our Theology,’ Amandus Polanus on the Fundamental Task of the Theologian.” Journal of Reformed Theology 10, no. 4 (2016): 291–313. Torrance, Thomas F. “The Distinctive Character of the Reformed Tradition.” Reformed Review 54, no. 1 (2000): 5–16. ______. Scottish Theology: From John Knox to John McLeod Campbell. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1996. Trueman, Carl R. The Claims of Truth: John Owen’s Trinitarian Theology. Carlisle: Paternoster, 1998. ______. Histories and Fallacies: Problems Faced in the Writing of History. Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2010. ______, and R. Scott Clark, eds. Protestant Scholasticism: Essays in Reassessment. Studies in Christian History and Thought. Reprint. Milton Keyes: Paternoster, 2005. Velde, Dolf te. “Collateral Damage? The Condemnation of Conrad Vorstius by the Synod of Dordrecht (1619).” In More Than Luther: The Reformation and the Rise of Pluralism in Europe, Academic Studies, Volume 55, eds. Karla Boersma and Herman J. Selderhuis, 321–38. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2019.

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Index of Names

A Althaus, Paul 22, 26, 33 Ambrose 261 Anselm of Canterbury 25, 101, 147 Aquinas, Thomas 38, 56, 80, 81, 85–87, 101, 113, 116, 135, 138, 147, 184, 200, 203, 211, 213–215, 226, 230, 240, 244, 260, 288, 289, 292 Aristotle 38, 57, 59, 60, 62, 63, 65, 67, 68, 80, 82, 135, 137, 169, 185, 186, 198, 199 Armstrong, Brian 23 Asselt, Willem J. van 24, 29, 36, 54, 80, 86, 315 Athenagoras 167 Augustine 25, 80, 146, 157, 170, 230, 242, 260, 292 B Bac, J. Martin 22, 24 Backus, Irena 75 Barth, Karl 22, 23, 26–29, 33, 34, 121, 122, 135, 157–159 Baur, Ferdinand C. 21, 22, 33 Bavinck, Herman 21 Beck, Andreas J. 24, 26, 37, 38, 111, 124, 129, 214, 234, 237, 305 Bellarmine, Robert 23, 257–262, 264, 280, 322 Bellovisu, Armandus de 236 Bernard of Clairvaux 243, 260 Beza, Theodore 22, 23, 31, 42, 44, 64 Biel, Gabriel 128, 134 Bray, John S. 23 Brouwer, Rinse H. Reeling 28, 29, 157, 158 Bucanus, Gulielmus 69, 74, 75, 100–102, 104, 142, 178–180, 193–195, 214, 220,

234, 248–250, 253, 256, 265, 272, 285, 315 Burchill, Christopher J. 60 Burnett, Amy Nelson 44, 46–48, 67 C Calvin, John 22, 23, 25, 28, 29, 36, 37, 42, 52, 60, 70, 72, 94, 95, 116, 148, 260 Clement of Alexandria 81 Cocceius, Johannes 86, 185, 214 Cyprian 167, 337 Cyril of Alexandria 170 D Daneau, Lambert 43, 69, 72, 100–102, 104, 116, 142, 171, 178–180, 194, 195, 214, 220, 234, 248, 249, 265, 272, 276, 283–285, 315 Deal, Max Eugene 26–28, 30, 33–35, 40, 68, 90, 151, 226, 238, 239, 316, 317, 319, 321, 322, 326, 329 Dolezal, James E. 153, 154 Duby, Steven J. 135 Duns Scotus, Johannes 25, 29, 38, 81, 82, 84, 86, 87, 134, 135, 211, 230, 231, 289, 292 F Faulenbach, Heinrich 26–28, 30–35, 40, 87, 94, 114, 115, 216, 217, 261, 316, 317, 319, 321, 326 Freedman, Joseph S. 75 G Gass, Wilhelm 21, 33 Goris, Harm 26 Grynaeus, Jakob 43–48, 104

350

Index of Names

H Hall, Basil 23 Han, Byung Soo 29, 30, 41–43, 45, 316 Heppe, Heinrich 21, 22, 26, 30, 33, 113, 114, 305 I Ignatius 260 Irenaeus 146 J John of Damascus 235 Junius, Franciscus 29, 53, 74, 81, 86–88, 115, 116, 308, 316, 336 K Keckermann, Bartholomäus 65, 69, 75, 81, 100–102, 104, 142, 148, 178–180, 194, 195, 214, 220, 234, 248–250, 253, 262, 265, 272, 276, 284, 288, 306, 315, 330 L Leigh, Edward 234 Leinsle, Ulrich 53 Letham, Robert 28, 30–32, 51, 105, 108, 315, 316 M Marenbon, John 199 McGraw, Ryan M. 53, 54 Meijering, E. P. 28, 29 Muller, Richard A. 24, 25, 28–30, 39, 54, 56, 57, 63, 74, 78, 81, 82, 114, 116, 124, 133, 143, 146, 148, 153, 159, 178, 180, 184, 186–188, 194, 206, 209, 211, 219, 228, 233, 234, 237, 250, 251, 278, 285, 315, 316 N Novatian 154, 336 O Oberman, Heiko 23, 60 Ockham, William of 81, 82, 134, 138

Ong, Walter J. 64 Otten, Willemien 38 P Perkins, William 28, 65, 69, 72, 73, 81, 100–102, 142, 143, 148, 149, 178–180, 193–195, 220, 248, 249, 253, 256, 262, 265, 272, 276, 279, 283–285, 315 Pictet, Benedict 215, 306 Platt, John 26 Pleizier, T. Theo J. 62 R Ramus, Peter 44, 45, 63–65, 67, 68 Rijssen, Leonhardus 215, 234 Rouwendal, Pieter L. 56, 340 S Schweizer, Alexander 21 Staehelin, Ernst 26, 41 Steinmetz, David C. 23, 60 Suarez, Francisco 63, 204, 217 T Tertullian 152, 229, 230 Thomas Aquinas 63, 200 Trelcatius, Jr., Lucas 69, 73, 74, 100–103, 137, 142, 178–180, 194, 195, 214, 220, 234, 248, 262, 265, 283–285, 306, 315 Trueman, Carl R. 24 Turrettini, François 29 U Ursinus, Zacharias 53, 69–71, 100–102, 104, 114–116, 140–143, 178, 180, 194, 195, 214, 220, 231, 234, 248, 249, 253, 265, 272, 276, 283–285, 315, 316

Index of Names

V Velde, Dolf te 24, 26, 32, 47, 54, 129, 130, 156, 166, 168, 171, 178, 186, 203, 233, 241, 242, 262, 285, 316 Voetius, Gisbertus 26, 116, 124, 214, 217, 234, 235, 237, 305, 308 Vorstius, Conradus 148, 156, 157, 170, 224 Vos, Antonie 24, 25

W Weber, Hans Emil 22, 33, 348 Wendelin, Marcus Friedrich 234 Wisse, Maarten 62 Z Zanchi, Girolamo 26, 31, 53, 68–71, 100, 102, 103, 107, 108, 142, 143, 148, 149, 178–180, 193–195, 199, 200, 204, 214, 220, 221, 223, 231, 234, 243, 244, 248, 249, 253–256, 262, 265, 272, 276, 283–285, 315, 316

351