The Greek-Turkish War 1919–23: An Australian Press Perspective 9781463215316

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The Greek-Turkish War 1918–23 An Australian Press Perspective

Conflict and Trade in the Middle East 1  

The Greek-Turkish War 1918–23 An Australian Press Perspective

Stavros T. Stavridis

Gorgias Press 2008

First Gorgias Press Edition, 2008 Copyright © 2008 by Gorgias Press LLC All rights reserved under International and Pan-American Copyright Conventions. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, scanning or otherwise without the prior written permission of Gorgias Press LLC. Published in the United States of America by Gorgias Press LLC, New Jersey ISBN 978-1-59333-967-8 ISSN 1941-6199

Gorgias Press

180 Centennial Ave., Suite A, Piscataway, NJ 08854 USA www.gorgiaspress.com Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Stavridis, Stavros T., 1949The Greek-Turkish War, 1918-23 / Stavros T. Stavridis. -- 1st Gorgias Press ed. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Greco-Turkish War, 1921-1922--Press coverage--Australia. 2. Age (Melbourne, Vic.)--History--20th century. 3. Argus (Melbourne, Vic.)--History-20th century. 4. Greco-Turkish War, 1921-1922--Diplomatic history. 5. Australia--Foreign relations--1900-1945. I. Title. DF845.53.P74S73 2008 949.507’2--dc22 2008009619 The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standards. Printed in the United States of America

TABLE OF CONTENTS Table of Contents................................................................................... v Preface ...................................................................................................ix Acknowledgments ...............................................................................xiii Abbreviations .....................................................................................xvii Introduction ........................................................................................... 1 1 A Theoretical Study of the Press: A Historical Perspective......... 15 1a) Definition of the press ............................................................ 16 1b) Functions of the press............................................................. 17 2. The newspaper as a source of historical information ............... 23 2a) Traditional method of writing history ................................... 24 2b) The critics of this approach .................................................... 25 2c) Use of the newspaper as a historical document ...................... 28 2d) The use of the press in historical writing in Australia ........... 31 3. The operations of the Press under different political systems. 33 3a) Autocracy................................................................................ 34 3b) Absolutism.............................................................................. 36 3c) Totalitarianism........................................................................ 38 3d) Liberal Democracy ................................................................. 42 4. Australian Colonial Press ......................................................... 43 4a) Some press restrictions in Australia ........................................ 44 4b) Australian Nationalism........................................................... 50 5. The role of the News Agencies................................................. 57 6. The role of foreign correspondents reporting the news........... 63 6a) The emergence of the modern war correspondent................. 63 6b) The importance of London as a news centre in the period under investigation................................................................ 65 6c) The appearance of the Australian foreign correspondent....... 66 6d) The operation of the press at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 and other meetings pertaining to settlement of the Greek-Turkish War............................................................... 69 v

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23 Australian Press Reports .............................................................. 85 1a) The Greek Territorial Claims at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: a pro-Greek position ............................................... 86 1b) The Greek Territorial Committee 1919................................. 99 1c) The Italian manoeuvres and Greek-Italian rivalry in Asia Minor: March–May 1919 .................................................... 108 1d) The Greek landing at Smyrna and its reports in the Melbourne press.................................................................. 115 1e) Italian Cabinet crisis of June 1919 and Greek-Italian Rapprochement in Asia Minor ........................................... 122 2a) The Turkish Treaty: the anti-Turkish stance ....................... 128 2b) The rise of Mustapha Kemal Pasha (Ataturk) and his Nationalist Movement ........................................................ 133 Comparing the Sources .............................................................. 149 1. The San Remo Conference April 18–26, 1920 ....................... 151 1a) The issue of Official Press Communiqués............................ 151 1b) Allied response to President Wilson’s note of March 24 over the future Turkish treaty............................................ 157 1c) Coverage of some items relating to the Turkish peace treaty160 The Straits question ....................................................... 161 Enforcing the Turkish treaty: troop numbers required 164 Smyrna: Italian opposition to Greek claims .................. 168 1d) Newspaper editorials on the Turkish peace treaty .............. 174 2. The Greek attempt to occupy Constantinople in July 1922.. 176 2a) The Greek advance on Constantinople ................................ 176 The rumours and the internal situation in Greece ........ 176 The two Greek notes and Allied refusal ........................ 183 Allied countermeasures and Greek disappointment...... 190 2b) The autonomy of Smyrna .................................................... 197 A Greek “Mikrasiatic” State........................................... 198 The proclamation of autonomy and Allied and Turkish reactions.................................................................. 208 2c) Lloyd George speech of August 4, 1922 and reactions to it . 222 Australian Foreign Policy in Asia Minor 1919–23..................... 235 1.1 The Turkish Peace Settlement 1918–21................................ 238 1.1a) Turkish peace initiatives .................................................... 238 1.1b) Turkey’s capitulation ........................................................ 241

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1.1c) Australian reactions to the Turkish armistice.................... 244 1.1d) Demobilisation and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 .. 246 1.2 The internal situation in Turkey .......................................... 252 1.2a) Cabinet crises and internal Disorders March–April 1919.. 252 1.2b) Turkish reactions: Greek occupation of Smyrna MayJune 1919 ............................................................................. 258 1.2c) The Treaty of Sevres and its modifications........................ 261 1.3 Trade links with the Near East............................................. 273 2. The Imperial Conference 1921 ............................................... 276 3. The Chanak crisis and the Lausanne Conference................... 281 3a) Australian political reactions and parliamentary debates ..... 281 3b) Reaction of ordinary Australians and institutions to the Chanak crisis ....................................................................... 294 3c) Australian and League of Nations involvement in the Near East ...................................................................................... 300 3d) Australian participation at Lausanne Peace Conference 1922–23................................................................................ 306 4. The Imperial Conference of October 1923 and the Post Lausanne period. ................................................................. 316 Summary and Conclusion .................................................................. 323 Bibliography ....................................................................................... 329 Primary Sources.......................................................................... 329 Unpublished Documents............................................................ 329 (a) Australian Archives, Canberra , ACT ...................... 329 (b) Australian Archives Melbourne................................ 331 (c) Australian Archives Perth ......................................... 331 Great Britain ................................................... 332_Toc191270115 Index ................................................................................................... 345

PREFACE The Greek-Turkish war of 1919–23 will be examined by using the press reports of The Age and Argus newspapers and relevant Australian, British, American, Greek and Turkish archival sources. The Melbourne press covered the Greek-Turkish conflict for three important reasons. Firstly, Australian forces had played a major part in the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in the Middle East in the 1914–18 War. Secondly, the Greek-Turkish War involved the clash of two opposing armies: the Greek army of occupation at Smyrna (Izmir) and the Turkish Nationalist movement led by Mustapha Kemal Pasha (later known as Ataturk). The Great Powers—Great Britain, France and the United States had initially sanctioned the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna in May 1919. The Italians opposed the Greek presence in Asia Minor from the outset. The electoral defeat of Eleftherios Venizelos in November 1920 paved the way for the return of the former, King Constantine, to the Greek throne. After this the Allied Powers—Britain, France and Italy—adopted a neutral position in the Greek-Turkish conflict and considered King Constantine persona non grata. Finally, the Suez Canal, the Dardanelles and the Persian Gulf were waterways of strategic and economic importance for Great Britain in the Middle and Near East which allowed it unhindered communication with the Indian Empire. The Suez Canal was important for Australia in terms of its trade and strategic links with Great Britain. Australia had no direct involvement in the actual conflict but the Colonial Office did provide the Australian Government through the Governor General’s office, with some information on the events unfolding in Asia Minor. Throughout the period 1919–23, Australia was trying to chart an ‘independent’ foreign policy within the framework of the British Empire. The Imperial Conferences was the only forum ix

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where the Dominions could question Britain on foreign and Imperial policy issues. The Australian Prime Minister W. M. Hughes wanted the Dominions to have some input into the foreign policy formulation of the British Empire. The Chanak crisis of September 1922 nearly brought Australia into direct conflict with the Kemalists following the defeat of the Greek army. In the end, no Australian contingents were dispatched to Chanak.The images of Anzac graves in the Dardanelles were still fresh in the minds of the post 1918 generation. During and after the Chanak episode and the Lausanne Conference of 1922–23, the Australian Government was provided with detailed and confidential information on Allied negotiations with the Kemalists. This study utilises newspapers as a primary source in discussing the Greek-Turkish conflict from the perspective of the Australian press. It will show that the Australian press depended largely on British news sources for its information on international affairs, even though, the Australian newspapers had tried to lessen their dependence by establishing the Australian Press Association in London in the early 1870s. In the course of the 1914–18 war, the Argus signed news contracts with a number of major British newspapers and with the New York Times in America in order to reduce its dependence on Reuter’s news agency. The press can be best understood within the context of the political system in operation. Under a Totalitarian system the press is strictly controlled and censored by the state. In the Liberal/Democratic model, the press operates independently of the State and can freely comment and criticise a government’s domestic and foreign policies. During the 1914–18 War the Australian Government applied strict press censorship for national security reasons. In the period 1919–22, the Allied Powers concluded their deliberations on the Turkish question “in camera” and issued daily communiques to the press. These press bulletins did not reveal the details of Allied differences on the Turkish peace settlement. It was through news leaks of Allied Governments (particularly the French) and intimate contacts with foreign ministry operatives and political leaders that journalists were able to write about and explain Allied differences to their readerships. While press censorship was imposed in Constantinople (Istanbul) and

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Smyrna, the news accounts of the Greek-Turkish conflict published in The Age and Argus newspapers were not subject to further censorship in Australia. Schutz’s first and second-order constructs will be used to analyse and interpret the press accounts (i.e., first-order constructs) of the Greek-Turkish conflict (written by war correspondents and news editors) and other information collected by news agencies. The appropriate technical language (i.e., second-order constructs) will be devised using hermeneutics to ascertain hidden meanings in the press accounts. This will allow a comparison to be made between newspaper articles and archival sources. This method of analysis will show that newspaper stories can be verified and substantiated, in most cases, from official sources. It is hoped that this study, which uses the press as a primary source, will serve as an ‘ideal’ type for investigating international and political conflicts from an Australian perspective. Stavros Terry Stavridis February 2008

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This book is dedicated to the memory of my late father George Stavridis who encouraged me to undertake research in Modern Greek History and to the continuing support of my mother Helen. The research and writing of this book would not have been possible without the patience, support, and encouragement of my wife Rebecca and our two daughters Eleni and Daniella. A special thanks is also due to my supervisors, Dr. Abraham Sophocleous and Mr. George Papadopoulos, who read my drafts and encouraged me along each step of the way to complete my study. There are a number of people who greatly assisted my research and whose time and efforts cannot go unrecognised. Dr. Benno Engels from the Department of Social Sciences at R.M.I.T. drew my attention to Christopher Lloyd’s The Structures of History (1993), and Michael Stanford’s The Nature of Historical Knowledge (1986), books which assisted in the theoretical aspects of this study. Messrs. Darren Watson and Andrew Griffin and Ms Irene Sullivan respectively, of the Melbourne and Canberra offices of the Australian Archives, were helpful in assisting me to identify relevant archival materials for my research. Ms Daniele Lerable, of the French Embassy in Canberra, Mr. Michael Wood, The Age Archivist, Mr. Frank Prain, Library Manager of The Age and Ms Vicki Ritchie, Libraries Manager of The Herald & Weekly Times responded promptly to my written enquiries. I would also like to thank Dr. Victoria Solomonidis, the Greek Cultural Attaché at the Greek Embassy in London, who provided me with a photocopy of Chapter 2 of her Ph.D. dissertation, titled “The Asia Minor Defence Movement”, which greatly assisted my understanding of the Mikrasiatic Amyna movement. I would like to thank the following for granting me copyright permission to quote from official documents and relevant secondary sources. The names are listed below: xiii

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1. Australian Government Departments of Defence, Foreign Affairs, and Trade to use their documents found in the National Archives of Australia collection. 2. Australian War Memorial to use The First World War Official Histories series Vol.5 and 7. 3. British High Commission, Canberra, ACT to use official British documents found in the National Archives of Australia collection. 4. Ms Linda Nicol, Permissions Controller, Cambridge University Press—to quote from Shmuel Galai, The Liberation Movement in Russia, 1900–1905, 1973. Reprinted with the permission of Cambridge University Press. 5. Ms Rachel Hill, Public Affairs Assistant, Canadian High Commission, Canberra, ACT to quote Australian Documents A981/1 Turkey 19 Prime Minister of Canada to PM Hughes March 12, 1922. 6. Mr. Martin Sibson, Permissions Dept, Harcourt Education, United Kingdom—The Critical Historian by G. Kitson-Clark. Reprinted by permission of Harcourt Education. 7. Ms Laura Scott, Permissions Dept, HarperCollins Publishers, United Kingdom—The Practice of History by G. R. Elton (1967) and The Russian Revolution by Richard Pipes (1992). 8. Paul C. Helmreich, Emeritus Professor of History, to use material from his book From Paris to Sevres: The Partition of the Ottoman Empire at the Peace Conference of 1919–1920, Ohio State University Press, 1974. 9. Ms Mari Takayanagi, Archivist, House of Lords Record Office, to quote from the David Lloyd George papers. 10. Ms Wendy Fisher-Hudson to quote from her late husband’s work W. J. Hudson & M. P. Sharp, Australian Independence, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988. 11. Mr. Will Underwood, Director, Kent State University Press— Louis P. Cassimatis, American Influence in Greece 1917–1929. Ohio, 1988. With permission of The Kent State University Press. 12. Ms Deborah Carter, Permissions Assistant, Louisiana State University Press—Reprinted by permission of Louisiana State University Press from The History Makers by Kenneth E. Olsen. Copyright 1966 by Louisiana State University Press.

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13. Ms Jack Sarkies, Administrative Assistant, Melbourne University Press: Douglas Pike (Ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol.5, Melbourne, 1974; Bede Nairn (Ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol.6, Melbourne 1976; Bede Nairn & Geoffrey Searle (Ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vols.8 and 10, Melbourne 1981 and 1986; Geoffrey Searle (Ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol.11, Melbourne 1988; John Ritchie (Ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol.12, Melbourne 1990; CMH Clark, History of Australia Vol.5, Melbourne, 1987. 14. Mr. Nick Coney of the National Archives of United Kingdom, London to quote from British Foreign Office and Cabinet papers. 15. Ms Nina Crisp, Publishing Assistant, Oxford University Press—Reproduced by permission of Oxford University Press from The Australian Legend by Russell Ward © Oxford University Press, www.oup.com.au. 16. Ms Angela Crocombe, Rights Co-Ordinator-Adult Books, Penguin Books Australia Ltd.—for permission to quote from The Archibald Paradox by S. Lawson (1983) and Waiting for the Revolution by N. McLachlan (1989). 17. Mr. Gavin Souter for permission to quote from his book Company of Heralds (1981). 18. Ms Janet Smith, Copyright and Permissions Department of The Age newspaper—The Age. 19. Ms Christine Campbell, Picture Library Reproduction Rights, The British Library—for reproduction permission: India Office Private Papers: Curzon Collection: Mss Eur F112/183 ff.123–124 and Bonar Law Papers: 111/12/36 “I am grateful to the Board of the British Library for allowing me to consult materials in its custody in particular the official files of the India Office Records and in the India Office Private Papers” for my Masters Dissertation.

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20. Wyn Diong, Office Assistant, The Macquarie Library—for permission to quote from page 235 of The Penguin Macquarie Dictionary of Australian Politics (ISBN 014051211X). 21. Mrs. Sheila Thompson for granting me permission to quote from her husband’s book, Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988. 22. Professor Dr. Yusuf Halaçoğlu, President of the Turkish Historical Society, for permission to use B. N. Şimşir, British Documents on Atatűrk, Vol.1 and S. Sonyel, Atatűrk: The Founder of Modern Turkey. 23. Ms Rhonda Wetjen of University of Iowa Press, to use excerpts from Windows on the World by Robert Desmond.

ABBREVIATIONS Ataturk Vols.1 and 4.: Bilal Simsir, British Documents on Ataturk Vol.1 and 4. B.D.F.A.: British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Confidential Print Series F Europe 1919– 39. C.P.D.: Commonwealth of Australia, Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates. D.B.F.P.: Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series 1919–39. FRUS PPC: US Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States Paris Peace Conference 1919 13 Vols. FRUS PPC 1918 Supp.1:WW Vol.1: US Dept of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States: Supplement 1: The World War Vol.1. Greece Internal: National Archives and Records Administration, Records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Greece 1910–29. H.C. Debs: House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates. Turkey Internal: National Archives, Records of the Department of State Relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910–29. Turkey Political: National Archives, Records of the Department of State relating to Political relations between Turkey and other 1910–29. PPW: Arthur. S Link (Ed), The Papers of Woodrow Wilson.

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INTRODUCTION In the first two decades of the twentieth century, newspapers assumed a very important role in terms of helping to shape and influence public opinion and also in reporting and commenting on the government’s domestic programs and foreign policy positions. During the 1914–18 war newspapers played a very important role in helping to maintain national unity, at the same time as they were also subject to government censorship. Newspapers provided the ordinary citizen with all the information concerning domestic and overseas news, at a time when other forms of communication such as radio, television, and the motion picture were either in their infancy or simply did not exist. The Australian press reported on issues that concerned the British Empire and the vast majority of the news came from British sources. The geographic focus of this study will be Asia Minor, also known as Anatolia, which formed part of the territory of the Ottoman Empire. Anatolia was a region which contained a Turkish Moslem majority and also minority groups such as Greeks, Armenians, Kurds, and Arabs. 1 For Britain, the emergence of a strong and powerful Greece in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Seas in the post 1918 period was seen as a means of protecting vital British interests in the Suez Canal and of retaining unhindered communication with the Indian Empire. There are two main objectives to this study. Firstly, it examines the Greek-Turkish war as it was reported in the two Melbourne papers, The Age and Argus, and also draws on Australian archival sources 1

For a discussion on the use of the terms “Near East” and “Middle East” see, M. E. Yapp ,The Making of the Modern Near East 1792–1923, Longman and New York, 1987, pp.1–2 ; Arnold. J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, Howard Fertig, New York, 1970, pp.5&9.

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and other relevant material. Secondly, it discusses the development of an Australian foreign policy on this war. The Melbourne press reported the events in Asia Minor because Australian troops had fought against the Ottoman Empire in the First World War. Turkey had sided with the Central Powers—Germany, Austro-Hungary, and Bulgaria— during this war and so had been Australia’s enemy. At the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, the victorious allies gathered to impose their peace terms on the vanquished. Australia participated in the ensuing peace discussions both as a member of the British Empire delegation and also as an individual nation which allowed her to sign the Treaty of Versailles in June 1919. There are five major research questions as well as a number of subsidiary ones, which will form the basis of the four chapters of this study. The questions are: 1. How does a newspaper shape social attitudes in recording an historical event such as an inter-ethnic war? How can a newspaper be used as an historical source? (Ch.1) 2. Was Australia in the period 1919–23, dependent on Britain for forming its views of international events that were relevant to various communities in Australia? (Ch.2) a) Was the Australian press dependent on British sources for its information? (Ch.2) b) How did this information impact upon Australian attitudes? (Ch.3) 3. Are there identifiable periods in the conflict in which the papers adopted either a pro-Greek and anti-Turkish stance, or an antiGreek and pro-Turkish position? (Ch.2) a) Did the Melbourne papers report the conflict in a particular manner? (Chs.2/3) b) Were the Melbourne papers simply reporting “verbatim” the overseas news accounts of the war? (Ch.3) 4. Is it possible to identify an Australian foreign policy position towards the Greek-Turkish conflict as a whole? (Ch.4) a) Did Australia establish a more ‘independent’ foreign policy in the areas which were of immediate interest to Britain?

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b) Did the Paris peace conference of 1919 and the Imperial discussions of 1921 and 1923 assist in developing an Australian foreign policy? c) To what extent did the crisis of Chanak bring about a more independent Australian foreign policy at the Imperial Conferences? 5. What was the function of the British Colonial Office in providing the Governor-General’s office through to the Prime Minister’s department with details relating to British foreign policy and Imperial issues? (Ch.4) a) Did The Age and Argus support, attack, query, or question British foreign policy in Anatolia? b) Were these papers supportive or critical of Prime Minister W. M. Hughes’ call to defend the Empire in Chanak in September 1922? c) After the Chanak incident abated did the Australian Government demand more information on British foreign policy? The chapter numbers which apply to the major research and subsidiary questions are shown in brackets above. This dissertation is beneficial for Australian studies in that it increases our understanding of the Asia Minor crisis from an Australian perspective and also sheds light on an otherwise obscure aspect of Australian history. From early 1919 till early September 1922, Australia had no direct involvement in the Asia Minor campaign but the British Colonial Office informed the Australian Government of some of the events unfolding in Anatolia. Andrew Fisher, the Australian High Commissioner in London, signed the Treaty of Sevres on August 10, 1920 on behalf of the Australian Government. This was the beginning of an evolutionary change in the relationship between Britain and its Dominions in foreign affairs. The Treaty of Sevres permitted the Allies to impose their peace terms on a defeated Turkey. Two years later Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the Turkish Nationalist leader, overturned this peace treaty by driving the Greek army out of Anatolia. The Allied and Associated Powers— Britain, France, and the United States—had sanctioned the dispatch of Greek troops to Smyrna (Izmir) in May 1919 to administer the city. In September 1922, W. M. Hughes, along with other Dominion leaders,

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were approached by the British Government to dispatch troops to Chanak to defend Imperial interests in the Turkish Straits. The Kemalists wanted to pursue the defeated remnants of the Greek army into Europe. Britain and its allied partners France and Italy sent troops to Chanak as a precautionary measure to stop a Kemalist advance into Europe. France and Italy decided to evacuate their troops from Chanak, thus leaving Britain to face the Kemalists alone. The significance of the Chanak crisis was that it exposed the conflict that existed between Imperial and Australian national interests. It was during the Chanak crisis that Australia faced the prospect of becoming directly involved in a war with Turkey, and many Australian ex-servicemen offered their services to defend the Empire. The Australian Labor Party and Trade Unions questioned seriously the idea of sending Australian troops to Asia Minor to defend what it considered to be British interests. The Federal Labor Opposition leader, Mr. Charlton, had even proposed a referendum be held to allow the Australian people to vote on such an important issue. As it happened, no Australian troops were sent to Chanak in the end. Apart from the importance of this study to Greek-Australian and Turkish-Australian history, it will also offer the opportunity of opening up historical research by utilising newspapers as a primary source of information. The traditional method of writing history is based on using archival sources such as unpublished and published documents. It was the German historian Leopold Von Ranke in the 19th Century who pioneered the traditional method of using archival sources and concentrated in writing about important individuals. Since then, many historians have followed his lead by delving into archival repositories. 2 In this case, the press reports will serve as the primary source of information and the gaps appearing in the news articles will be supplemented by archival sources. This approach is novel in two respects: 1) An account of the The Greek-Turkish War has never been written before from an Australian perspective by using press reports as a primary source; 2) The accuracy, distortion, and bias of newspaper ac2

This will be further elaborated in Chapter One, Part 2 (a) traditional method of writing history.

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counts can be ascertained by comparing the accounts to archival sources mainly from within Australia, but also from the U.K., U.S.A., Greece, and Turkey. The novel aspect is that it uses the methods of “new history,” where the emphasis is not on important people but on newspaper accounts written by journalists for ordinary people. However, the intentions and actions of the major political leaders and nations involved in Asia Minor cannot be ignored either. One question that needs to be clarified from the outset is Question 2 (b) regarding the effect of the Greek-Turkish conflict, as it was reported in the Australian press, on Australian attitudes. The author was unable to obtain access to the working files of The Age and Argus, and therefore, can only speculate on public reaction to the Greek-Turkish war. 3 There is a lack of material written from an Australian point of view in the existing literature on the Asia Minor conflict. All the previous works, such as those listed below, are based largely on archival and manuscript sources. In most cases, newspapers are only used to illustrate a particular view, or to describe some scene; usually they are simply underutilised as a source. Otherwise, the Asia Minor issue has been researched from other perspectives but not from an Australian one. The Greek view is presented in M. L. Smith The Ionian Vision (1973), N. Petsalis-Diomidis Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 (1978) and A. Karagiannis Greece’s Quest for Empire at the Paris Peace Conference 1919–1920 (PhD thesis 1981). 4 Smith has not used many newspaper sources in his book. However a couple of examples were used to illustrate the journalistic impressions of the period 1918–22. Ward Price’s Daily Mail account is used to describe the destruction of Smyrna in September 1922, and Ernest Hemingway’s report in the Toronto Daily Star highlights the plight of refugees in October 1922. 5 3

See Chapter One, Part 2 (b) for the attacks on this approach. Michael Llewellyn Smith, The Ionian Vision, Allen Lane, London, 1973; N. Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919, Institute for Balkan Studies Thessaloniki, 1978; Alexander Karagiannis, Greece’s Quest for Empire at the Paris Peace Conference 1919–20, PhD, Indiana University, 1981 [available through University Microfilms International.] 5 Smith, op. cit., pp.310fn.21, 319–21fns.9&10. 4

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Karagiannis mentions that the liberal press in England was antiTurkish. Karagiannis uses Professor Kitsikis book Propagande et pressions en politique international (Paris 1963) to explain that Greek agencies and press bureaux were set up by the Greek Government in October 1918 to spread Greek propaganda. 6 Karagiannis does not mention the names of any British and Greek newspapers. However, Smith and Karagiannis do indicate that Rudyard Kipling translated the Greek national anthem into English and it appeared in the Daily Telegraph. 7 Petsalis-Diomidis cites Greek newspapers, Nea Hellas, Embros, Eleftheron Vima, the Italian paper, Giornale d’Italia, and the British journal, Morning Post, as his only newspaper sources. Otherwise, he has underestimated the value of newspapers as a source of information. 8 B. C. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne [1976] and A. E. Montgomery, “Lloyd George and the Greek question 1918–1922” in A. J. P. Taylor (Ed), Lloyd George: Twelve Essays [1971] covers Britains involvement in the Near East. Busch makes some reference to newspapers in his narrative, mainly concentrating on three newspapers, The Times (London), Daily Telegraph, and Chicago Tribune, and the reports in them mention the Chanak crisis of September 1922. 9 In particular, reference is made to a newspaper clipping from Moniteur Oriental, which was sent by Admiral Webb to Lord Curzon on May 21, 1919 and which reported on the appointment of Mustapha Kemal Pasha to the post of Inspector-

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Karagiannis, op. cit., p.150fns.2&4. Smith, op. cit., p.64; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.150fn.3. 8 Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.69, 76,79 and113. 9 B. C. Busch, From Mudros to Lausanne 1918–23, State University of New York Press, Albany, New York, 1976,pp.199fn.60, 330fn.35 (a letter published in London Times), 332fn.28, 351–52fns.75&78 (Chanak episode) and 386fn.46 (second phase of Lausanne Conference 1923). Busch uses a lot of contemporary journals of the period such as Edinburgh Review, Current History, New Europe, Foreign Affairs, Contemporary Review and Nineteenth Century and After in his footnotes. Current History and Foreign Affairs are still published in 1996. The Times (London) hereafter will be cited as London Times. 7

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General. 10 Montgomery in his work cites the press only twice as a source. 11 Some of the works above, which neglect or underestimate the value of newspapers as a source of information, are largely written in the Rankean tradition—that is, they are based on archival sources. 12 Sonyel outlines the Turkish position in his two books titled Turkish Diplomacy 1918–1923 (1975) and a biography of Ataturk: the Founder of Modern Turkey (1989). 13 The author makes extensive use of Turkish, French, British, American, and Greek newspapers to capture the journalistic impressions of the times. Some of the newspapers used in the latter publication include: Ikdam, Peyam-i-Sabah, Vakit and Tanin (Turkish); L’Asie Francaise, L’Echo de Paris, Le Matin, Le Temps, and Petite Parisienne (French); Daily Mail, Daily Telegraph, Glasgow Herald and London Times (British); Christian Science Monitor, New York Times, New York World, and New York Tribune (American); and Kathimerini, Estia, Embros, Astrapi and Athinaiki (Greek). 14 The American view is well presented in L. Cassimatis, American influence

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ibid., p.168fn.11. Mustapha Kemal Pasha was appointed by the Sultan in May 1919 as Inspector General to oversee the demobilisation of the Turkish army in accordance with the armistice signed at Mudros on October 30, 1918. However, the landing of the Greek army at Smyrna on May 15,1919 along with the the subsequent troubles that occurred in that city, led Mustapha Kemal to eventually resign from his position as Inspector-General and to establish a nationalist movement. This movement would ultimately drive out the Greeks from Anatolia in early September 1922. See Chapters 2 and 4. 11 A. E. Montgomery, “Lloyd George and the Greek question 1918–22” in A. J. P. Taylor (ed), Lloyd George Twelve Essays, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1971, pp.258fn.1 and 267fn.4. 12 See footnotes 2 and 3. 13 Salahi R. Sonyel, Ataturk—the Founder of Modern Turkey, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1989, pp.19–20. Hereafter cited as Sonyel. Salahi. R. Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy 1918–23, Sage Publications, London, 1975, pp.15– 16. Hereafter cited as Turkish Diplomacy. 14 Sonyel, pp.3fn.12, 5fn.18, 13fns.29–31, 27fn.28, 44fn.33 and bibliography pp.215–23; Turkish Diplomacy, pp.107fn.2, 109fn.31, 154fn.20, 155fn.36, 183fn.21 and 228fn.43.

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in Greece 1917–1929 [1988], and, like Sonyel, he too makes ample use of newspapers. 15 Another excellent book, Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres [1974], deals with the negotiations between the European Powers and the United States over the future of the Ottoman Empire. Helmreich cited important and influential papers, such as the New York Times, Le Temps, and London Times, in his footnotes and bibliography. Helmreich refers to press reactions in England, Paris, Italy, and Turkey over the peace terms imposed on the Ottoman Empire in May 1920. 16 Sonyel, Cassimatis, and Helmreich have combined archival and newspaper accounts to achieve a well-balanced and in-depth account of their subject matter. 17 The Abductive research strategy which derives its ideas from hermeneutics and interpretivism will be used to apply first and second order constructs to explain Australian press reaction to the GreekTurkish war. It will be noted that Abductive research involves locating and describing an event (i.e. the Greek-Turkish War as portrayed in the pages of the Melbourne press) from an “insider’s view” and not from an “outsider’s” perspective. This research strategy can be adopted by the historian as a way of understanding the language used by journalists and of unlocking the hidden meanings of newspaper accounts. 18 The term “hermeneutics” literally means “to interpret” and it is used to unearth “what texts mean.” Martin Heidegger, the German Philosopher (1889–1976), believed that history should be viewed “as it were from the inside” and this phrase will be explained below. Interpretivism has its intellectual roots in hermeneutics, Schutz being

15

Louis P. Cassimatis, American Influence in Greece 1917–29, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 1988, pp.239fn.25, 243fn.5, 244fns.8,17,&20, 245fn.34, 246fn.48, 250fn.20, 251fns.27 and 29, 252fns.52–3 and bibliography p.292. 16 Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1974, pp.367–68 (bibliography) and 314–15. 17 See Chapter 1, Part 2 (c). 18 Norman Blaikie, Approaches to Social Enquiry, Polity Press, Oxford, 1993, pp.176–77.

INTRODUCTION

9

among its main contributors. 19 Schutz, the German Philosopher (1899– 1959), developed the idea of using first and second order constructs to interpret and explain social reality. First order constructs involve examining the everyday language that journalists and war correspondents employed by foreign newspapers, news agencies, Australian newspaper owners and news editors, used in reporting the Greek-Turkish conflict to the Melbourne public. One problem with the term “public” is to distinguish what it meant in the minds of Melbourne journalists. Perhaps the Melbourne papers viewed the “imagined” public as the entire community as opposed to the “ordinary” individual reading about the conflict. 20 When a researcher uses second order constructs, he devises technical language to interpret and explain the actual events, participants, newspaper accounts, official documents, and statements that make up the conflict. 21 The historian can combine first and second-order constructs by devising a technical language that allows him to probe deeper into the actual newspaper accounts and thus show the interplay of diplomatic, political, economic, commercial, and individual factors. 22 The application of the method of first and second order constructs can produce an “ideal type” for how newspapers might be used as a primary source in interpreting and explaining conflict. 23 The author will also test the ideas of political science theory which have been borrowed from deductivism, in order to explain the operations of the press under various political systems such as Totalitarianism, Autocracy and Liberal/Democracy. 24 The idea of testing 19

ibid., pp.28, 34–5 and 36–7; Christopher Lloyd, The Structures of History, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993, p.78. For background information on the theories of Heidegger and Schutz see Gordon Marshall [Ed.], The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1994, pp.213, 256 and 390. 20 ibid., pp.179–80. The issue of an “imagined” public will be further developed under the heading of Australian nationalism in Ch.1, Part 4(b). 21 ibid., p.180. 22 Some of these factors will be detailed in Chapters 2–4. 23 For a discussion of Ideal types see Blaikie, op. cit., pp.178–81. 24 For a discussion on Deductivism see ibid., pp.143–55.

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

political science theory has been borrowed from Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm Four Theories of the Press. Another text, which will be used to explain the operations of the Australian press, is Henry Mayer Press in Australia (1968). The works of Siebert et al. and Mayer are important in that they place the operation of the press in a contextual framework. Events need to be understood and placed in their own time and space. The Australian press operated within a Liberal/Democratic political system and British Imperial framework in the period 1919–23 which allowed it to publish freely, without restriction or the imposition of censorship. Under Totalitarianism and Autocracy, the press is censored and controlled by the political party or monarch in power in order to prevent political opposition and criticism from developing. The state uses the press for propaganda purposes. However, the only time the Australian Government imposed political and military censorship was in the 1914–18 war and only then for national security purposes. From 1919 onwards, these press restrictions were lifted. 25 Censorship was a major problem for journalists in Paris in 1919 and at other conferences set up to resolve the Greek-Turkish war. The Allied Powers informed journalists of their deliberations through brief communiques that resulted in press leaks. Furthermore, censorship operated at Constantinople, Athens, Smyrna, and Angora, which made it difficult for journalists to obtain accurate information on the progress of the conflict. 26 Historians use memoirs, diaries, published and unpublished documents, newspapers, pamphlets, oral testimony, and parliamentary debates to reconstruct the past. The historian should comprehend the past “in its own terms” and not by the standards of the present. This means that the knowledge of the past can only be judged by the evidence of the past. An event that happened in the past cannot be replayed. The historian can only reconstruct the past in his own mind 25

See Chapter 1, Part 3, Operations of the press under different political systems. 26 See Chapter 1, Part 5 (d). The operation of the press at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 and other meetings pertaining to settling the Greek-Turkish War.

INTRODUCTION

11

from the surviving evidence. 27 In this study, the Greek-Turkish war will be explained through reports written by journalists for ordinary people. Other sources will be used to fill in the gaps in the newspaper narratives. The historian should ask questions such as: How did this information come into existence? Who produced it? Was the report altered or modified before taking its final form? How reliable is it? and Can the evidence be corroborated from other sources? Since press reports will be compared in this study to archival and other sources, the historian needs to bear in mind that the latter have their own problems. 28 Two examples will be used to illustrate the problem of other sources such as diaries and memoirs. Firstly, Harold Nicolson, a Foreign Office official and a member of the British Peace delegation to Paris in 1919, kept a diary recording his impressions of the conference and its participants. He published his diary in 1933 under the title Peacemaking 1919. The historian should pose the following questions: How reliable and accurate is the information in the diary? Can the diary entries be verified or substantiated by the official conference minutes and diplomatic documents? and Have the diary entries been altered? Secondly, authors who publish their memoirs may have particular motives for doing it. As participants in some past event, the authors may be seeking not only to tell their version of events, but also to justify their involvement and decision over some issue, and possibly discredit former colleagues. For example, David Lloyd George’s memoirs which were published under the title The Truth about the Peace Treaties Vol.2, describe the 1919–23 period. Some questions regarding this book that can be raised are: Is the author recounting the whole story or omitting important information? Can the memoir be regarded as a reliable source? Can the author’s memory play tricks and confuse dates, places, and events? and What is the real or underlying motive for publishing the 27

G. R. Elton, The Practice of History, Fontana, London, pp.33, 51 and 78. G. Kitson-Clark, The Critical Historian, Heinemann, London, 1970, p.67; Elton, op. cit., p.77. 28

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

memoir? 29 In addition, archival sources can be tampered with, destroyed, or edited. This raises the further possibility of official documents being forged. From the historian’s perspective, “all [documentary] evidence can be divide[d] into two [types]: that produced specifically for [the historians] attention and that produced for other purpose[s].” 30 It is obvious “that no one ever forged evidence to deceive historians; the intention nearly always is to deceive contemporaries.” 31 Newspapers record events as they unfold and discontinue coverage after an event has been resolved or ceases to be of news value. Newspaper accounts should be subject to the same standards of historical scholarship as archival and other sources. The following questions can be asked when examining journalistic accounts of the GreekTurkish conflict: Is the war correspondent reporting the conflict from the front line? Are journalists subject to wartime censorship? Do they devise ways to circumvent press censorship in order to send their stories to their home office? Is the information sanitised to hide troop losses from civilians? Could journalists become engaged in propaganda activities for their governments? and What is the bias of the reporter? 32 The historian’s task is to probe the truth, that is, to interpret and select materials and to determine which questions to ask and which to exclude, and what evidence to include. The historian has to undertake a thorough review of everything, which is pertinent to the research, and use his imagination to recreate the past. This can only be achieved by asking the right questions which in turn will allow the historian to reconstruct and interpret the past from the fragmentary evidence. After all, it is from the surviving evidence that the historian can write a plausible account and speculate at to how the past looked to those being studied. 33 This is like examining an event from an “insider’s” perspective. 29

Nicolson and Lloyd George’s book will appear in the chapters below. Kitson-Clark, op. cit., pp.72–4, 76 and 79; Elton, op. cit., p.100–1. 31 Elton, op. cit., p.98; Michael Stanford, The Nature of Historical Knowledge, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986, p.66. Forgeries will be discussed in Chapter 1. 32 Kitson-Clark, op. cit., pp.198–9. 33 Elton, op. cit., pp.88,109 and 112–13. 30

INTRODUCTION

13

The historical data for this study was generated by the accounts of the Greek-Turkish war from The Age and Argus and foreign newspapers such as the New York Times and London Times that expressed certain perspectives and described particular episodes. The newspaper stories will be probed in the manner indicated above. This study has four chapters. Chapter one outlines the theoretical framework for using the press as a historical source and looks at how newspapers shape social attitudes in recording an historical event such as an inter-ethnic war: the Greek-Turkish conflict in this case. The second chapter focuses on 1919, when the press largely supported Greek territorial claims and adopted a pro-Greek stance, while the Italians and Turks on the other hand, received unfavourable press treatment. In particular, Italy was trying to advance its own territorial ambitions without due regard to the feelings of its allied partners. Turkey pleaded for its empire to remain intact, and the Turkish Nationalist movement under Mustapha Kemal’s leadership was determined to drive the Greeks out from Anatolia. The next chapter compares Australian press reports of the conflict with leading American (New York Times) and British (London Times) newspapers. The overseas press gave greater coverage to the Greek-Turkish conflict than the Melbourne press. Moreover, Britain, France, the United States, and Italy had major economic, financial, and commercial interests in Anatolia. The Melbourne press only reported on events that concerned the British Empire. This study examines the San Remo Conference in April 1920 and the subsequent Turkish peace settlement which almost allowed Greece to fulfil its territorial ambitions. The second example deals with the Greek threat to occupy Constantinople and the strong anti-Greek press campaign during the period of King Constantine’s reign. In the last phase of the conflict, in late July 1922, the Greeks threatened to occupy Constantinople. However, the Allied powers took precautionary measures to forestall a Greek military move on the Turkish capital. The press seemed sympathetic to the Turkish position over the proposed Greek move. Finally, the last chapter seeks to uncover an Australian foreign policy position on the Greek-Turkish war as a whole. The press was considered an important medium in reporting the foreign policy of the Australian and Imperial Governments. Australia was trying to develop

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

a more “independent” position in world affairs, as was demonstrated at the Paris Peace Conference. Australia’s immediate foreign concerns in the Pacific are briefly mentioned. However, Australia depended on the British Colonial Office for information on the events unfolding in Asia Minor. It was during the Chanak crisis of September 1922 that Australian and Imperial interests clashed and the Melbourne press queried whether Australia should send troops to the Turkish Straits. The events themselves had shades of Gallipoli, which was still fresh in the minds of the post 1918 generation.

1 A THEORETICAL STUDY OF THE PRESS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE This chapter will set out the theoretical framework for studying the press as a historical source. A comparison will be made between the use of official documents and newspapers in historical writing. The press offers opportunities to investigate and analyse important events as reported by journalists and news agencies. Newspapers see their role as being able to report, collect, and disseminate information for public consumption. It must be emphasised that the press operates within a given political system. The two Melbourne publications to be investigated are The Age and Argus. These two newspapers were chosen for their pre-eminence and political influence, at a time when the Federal Parliament, the Prime Minister’s department, and the Governor General’s residence were all located in Melbourne. 34 The press was considered a primary source of information for ordinary citizens in the first two decades of this century. From this perspective newspapers have served as important vehicles for developing and shaping nationalism in many nations. 35 This chapter will cover the following aspects: defining the press and outlining its functions; highlighting the importance of the press as a source of information in historical scholarship; examining different political systems in which the press operates; assessing the role of the press in developing and fashioning an Australian national consciousness; and investigating the roles of news agencies and foreign correspondents in reporting the news. 34

C. J. Lloyd, Parliament and the Press, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, p.42. 35 For a discussion of Australian nationalism see Chapter 1, Part 4(b) .

15

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

1a) Definition of the press This section will provide a definition of the press and also state some of its functions. Richard Weiner defines the press as “a publication issued weekly, or at frequent intervals containing views and advertising.” 36 It is legitimate to claim that The Age and Argus fit the criteria of a publication issued on a daily basis containing news and views, and carrying advertising. Newspapers buy and sell news like any commodity in the marketplace. However, news or potential news is subject to four principles that set the parameters within which the “value” of a potential news item is determined. Bonney and Wilson quoting the Galtung and Ruge article, “Structuring and selecting news,” outline these four factors. They include: 1) The more the event concerns elite nations, the more probable that it will become a news item. 2) The more the event concerns elite people, the more probable it will become a news item. 3) The more the event can be seen in personal terms, as due to the action of specific individuals, the more probable that it will become a news item. 4) The more negative the event in its consequences, the more probable that it will become a news item. 37

It is necessary to expand briefly on the points above. In the first two decades of the 20th century, Britain was an elite nation because of her dominance in world affairs. She possessed a great empire which included Australia. Britain fought the Ottoman Empire in World War One and imposed its peace terms with its Allied partners France and Italy, on a vanquished Turkey. Australia contributed troops in assisting the British Empire in fighting and defeating the Central Powers— Germany, Austro-Hungary, the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. It was

36

Richard Weiner, Webster’s New Dictionary of Media and Communication, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1990, p.315. 37 Bill Bonney and Helen Wilson, Australia’s Commercial Media, Macmillan & Co, South Melbourne, 1983, p.301.

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17

at Gallipoli in April 1915 and Palestine in 1917–18 that Australian troops distinguished themselves for their bravery against the Turks. The Greek-Turkish war of 1919–22 is a news-value event because great powers like Britain and France had material interests in the Near East. Britain, France, and the United States approved the Greek landing at Smyrna (Izmir) in May 1919, which Mustapha Kemal Pasha, the Turkish Nationalist leader, vowed to overturn in liberating Turkey from foreign occupation. For a time British policy makers regarded Kemal Pasha as a bandit and considered his nationalist movement to pose a serious threat to British interests in the Near East. It would be at Chanak, on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles, in September 1922 that the memory of Gallipoli would be rekindled in Australia. It is against this background, that the Melbourne press for the purpose of this study is considered an important medium for reporting the GreekTurkish conflict to the public and politicians. Having defined the press the question to be asked is, What purpose does the press serve anyway? 1b) Functions of the press When the 1949 British Commission on the press, asked newspaper owners to indicate what they considered to be the proper functions of the press, they indicated five main groups: information, instruction, entertainment, reflection of public opinion, and advocacy. 38 The Age and Argus are newspapers that meet these criteria without much difficulty. Of the five functions the three most relevant ones to this study are information, reflection of public opinion, and advocacy. The two Melbourne papers under review were simply recording information about the Greek-Turkish war derived largely from British sources. It could be argued that the editors of both newspapers expressed opinions at moments of importance to Australia, but they otherwise remained silent. The times when these two publications reflected public opinion or took a position were during periods of important developments,

38

p.49.

Henry Mayer, Press in Australia, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1968,

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

such as the Turkish peace terms of May 1920 and the Chanak crisis in September 1922. 39 While newspapers function as profit-making enterprises, it is essential to examine the individuals who make their journals so successful and prominent. K. S. Inglis, an Australian historian, underlined that men like Sir Keith Murdoch and Sir Frank Packer, and the American, William Randolph Hearst, though wealthy, were more interested in shaping human destiny. 40 He failed to mention David Syme (1860– 1908) who owned and operated The Age. C. E. Sayers, the official biographer of David Syme, explains that Syme achieved political domination unparalleled in Australian journalism whereby politicians were made and humbled, and shaped to his policies and guided to carry out those policies. One of David Syme’s political candidates was Alfred Deakin who later became Australian Prime Minister. 41 G. Hutton and L. Tanner reveal that David Syme used the columns of his paper to sway decisions and to bring about change. 42 The Age was also regarded as a political force that could bring economic and political questions out into the open. The most noted cause espoused by The Age was that of tariff protection of the Victorian manufacturing industry. 43 On the death of his father David in 1908, Geoffrey Syme was given editorial control of the newspaper. He was resolute in carrying out his father’s protectionist stance and upholding the ideal of a dependable, reliable,

39

On the Turkish Peace Treaty terms see editorials of The Age, May 13, p.7 1920 and Argus , May 17, p.6, 1920; On the Chanak crisis see editorials of the Argus, September 18, 22, 26, 1922, pp.6,8,18 and The Age, September 19, 20, 1922 pp.8&10. 40 Mayer, op. cit., p.51. 41 C. E. Sayers, David Syme: A Life, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965, pp.vii and 243. Some of the issues which The Age supported were land reform, the creation of wages boards and anti-sweating legislation. 42 G. Hutton and Les Tanner (ed), The Age 125 Years the Age, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1979, p.v. Geoffrey Blainey wrote the introduction. 43 C. E. Sayers, op. cit., pp.vii and viii; G. Hutton and Les Tanner, op. cit., p. ix. Sayers mentions that the Argus and Sydney Morning Herald recognised Smye’s leadership over the protection issue. See Sayers, op. cit., pp.73–4.

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and well-written journal that was not simply aimed at making money. 44 The Argus, on the other hand, had a variety of owners in William Kerr 1846–48, Edward Wilson 1848–78, Lachlan Mackinnon 1852–88, Alan Spowers 1857–76, Gavin Edwards Evans 1867–97, William George Lucas Spowers 1879–1921, and Sir Lachlan Charles Mackinnon 1888–1919, all of whom played their part in developing the journal as a preeminent and influential publication. 45 For example, Wilson attacked the pastoralists’ monopoly on land and exposed government inefficiency and corruption. Both Lachlan Mackinnon and his cousin Lachlan Charles Mackinnon played a very important part in developing and maintaining the financial success of their newspaper. 46 It must be stressed that The Age and Argus were fierce rivals, with the latter supporting free trade and the former being a staunch protectionist. In fact, Wilson had depicted David Syme as an “arch-enemy ... that wretched beast and imposter.” Lachlan Mackinnon, in contrast, had a different opinion. He was sanguine about the newspapers future and believed in its “impregnable strength,” even though The Age had a larger circulation. 47 This, however, was one area in which common ground existed. During the 1871 election David Syme advocated compulsory and secular education and, as a consequence, the Education Act 1872 estab44

John Ritchie (ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography: Vol.12 1891–1939, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1990, p.154; C. E. Sayers, op. cit., p.253. 45 Argus and Australasian Ltd, Men who made “The Argus” and “The Australasian” 1846–1923 Vol.1, Melbourne, (1923?). In this publication the names of the owners can be found under the heading “Proprietors and their Representatives.” No page numbers are listed which makes it difficult for citing relevant details. Hereafter cited as Men who made The Argus. 46 Bede Nairn (ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol.6 1851–1890, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1976, pp.413–4; Douglas Pike (ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol.5 1851–1890, Melbourne, 1974, p.178; Bede Nairn and Geoffrey Serle (ed), Australian Dictionary of Biography Vol.10, Melbourne, 1986, p.316. Hereafter cited as Australian Dictionary with relevant volume number. 47 Australian Dictionary Vol.6, p.45; Australian Dictionary Vol.5, p.178.

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lished a department of education under a responsible minister. Lachlan Mackinnon had a deep commitment to education and was also a member of the original Council of the University of Melbourne. 48 Both newspaper proprietors were intelligent enough to see the value of educating Victorian youngsters as a means of developing potential future readers. The main purpose of a newspaper is to maintain and increase its circulation and advertising revenue. Mayer mentions that both prominent and popular journals are dependent on advertising for their survival. The advertising appeal of a newspaper can be seen as dependent on three conditions. These include: 1) the number and kind of readers it attracts; 2) the degree of concentration of readers from particular socio-economic backgrounds; and 3) the demand and supply for advertising space in all existing outlets: press, television, and radio. 49 In the period under review, television had not been invented and radio was in its infancy. Therefore, the newspaper was a very important vehicle for advertising and reporting the news. 50 The Argus and The Age attracted different advertising clientele. The latter, considered a “working man’s paper,” had a secure grip on the small mass advertising in the “wanted to sell,” “situations vacant,” and “small property” classifications. The former was a conservative journal that based its advertising on its display advertising and small-classified advertising. 51

48

Sayers, op. cit., p.108; Australian Dictionary Vol.5, p .178. Mayer, op.cit., pp.57–8. 50 There were only 1400 radio licences held in Australia in 1924 and by 1929 this had grown to some 300,000. The licence system established two classes of radio stations. The Australian Broadcasting Commission (ABC) founded in 1932 took over the Class A stations. Its revenue came from listeners licence fees whereas Class B stations operated by private companies did not receive this source of income. In the 1930s, the radio challenged the press in the dissemination of news. See H. Radi, “1920–29,” & J. R. Robertson, “1930– 39,” in Frank Crowley [ed], A New History of Australia, William Heinemann, Melbourne, 1977, pp.388, 444 and 46. 51 Desmond Zwar, In Search of Keith Murdoch, Macmillan and Co, South Melbourne, 1980, p.66. 49

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Mayer quotes circulation and population figures for The Age and Melbourne Herald, but curiously omits details for the Argus, which was an important paper in Melbourne from 1846 until its final demise in 1957. The Age was only second in circulation to the Argus. It is worth considering that from 1912–22, the Argus experienced a major increase in circulation, though in 1920 it dropped by some 2400 copies, then again showed an upward increase in 1921–22. 52 In short, both The Age and Argus can be viewed as quality newspapers. They were bold, independent, news-views oriented journals published in an open democratic society. 53 As prestigious newspapers they achieved their preeminence in a number of ways. Firstly, they were journals that had attained a reputation for reliability and for presenting the views of government to the public. Both publications were renowned for their dependable recording of parliamentary debates and proceedings in colonial and early Federation years. 54 Secondly, they sought to avoid popularising and sensationalising the news and to give their readers a serious and heavy slice of news and views. They were read by the powerful members of society such as public servants, scholars, politicians, religious, and business leaders. 55 Another reason for their prominence is that they had their head offices near Federal Parliament in Melbourne and had access to ministers and party leaders. This gave them a competitive edge over their interstate rivals until 1927. 56 Finally, a quality journal should be reliable and trustworthy in presenting all the available or known facts of a story to its readers. This allows the reader to reach an informed opinion on a particular issue. 57 52

Mayer, op. cit., p.11; Zwar, op. cit., p.66; Historical Records of “the Argus” and “Australasian,” no page number, held in the special collection at V.U.T. Footscray Campus library. 53 Merrill and Fisher, The World’s Great Dailies, Hastings House, New York, 1980, p.13. 54 Merrill and Fisher, op. cit., p.10; C. J. Lloyd, op. cit., pp .29–30, 50 and 53. 55 Merrill and Fisher, op. cit., pp.10 and 19; Mayer, op. cit., p.4. 56 Lloyd, op. cit., p.41. 57 Merrill and Fisher, op. cit., pp.19–20.

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Throughout its history, The Age has been involved in contentious issues with forthright opinions. The Argus, for its part, played an important part in establishing the Australian Press Association in partnership with the Sydney Morning Herald and South Australian Register by supplying news to many papers in Australia and New Zealand. 58 The hard work of David Syme and the Argus owners allowed these two successful colonial papers to survive and become good newspapers in the 20th century. Newspapers must have good business people to run them to ensure their financial soundness, and must also have good editorial staff. The editors of both journals played a crucial role in keeping their newspapers in the forefront of Australian journalism. The Age had seventeen editors in its long history, and two who are of interest to this dissertation are A. L. Windsor 1872–1900 and G. F. H. Schuler 1900– 1926. According to The Age Archives document it lists the names of its editors, and mentions that they were radical, conservative, outspoken, or let the paper do the talking for them. 59 When David Syme decided on a course of action, the editor was responsible for carrying out the editorial, the comment, and news columns of the paper. It seems ironic that Syme promoted independence in the pen of his reporters and writers so long as they correctly interpreted the policy that Syme sanctioned and Windsor fashioned. Windsor was the editorial mouthpiece of Syme for 28 years. 60 G. F. H. Schuler espoused passionate protectionist views in line with The Age policy. He possessed very good political knowledge, boldness, and judgment that gave distinction to the paper. He kept a low public profile and did his editing from an office desk. Sayers describes Schuler as living in the shadow of David Syme where “his journalism was amiable, dedicated, but outmoded.” Lloyd says that Schuler “applied strict news criteria: space depended on news value and there 58

Merrill and Fisher, op. cit., pp. 20 and 47; Men who made The Argus; Australian Dictionary Vol.5, p.178. 59 The Age Archives, “editors of The Age” No page numbers shown. Mr. Michael Wood, the archivist of the Age, provided a copy of this document. 60 C. E. Sayers, op. cit., p.148.

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was no padding.” He was an aloof figure interested only in his work and his journalism was based on avoiding repetition by getting to the heart of an issue. 61 Some of the important editors of the Argus were Frederick William Haddon 1867–97 and Edward Sheldon Cunningham 1906–1928. The aim of the former was to place the Argus on the same rank with the great journals of England. As editor, he was given free reign in policy and he directed his energies towards making the paper an ultraconservative publication that would be read by the elite members of society. Haddon searched for the best writers available and encouraged new ones to write stories and articles displaying an air of authority. 62 According to the publication, Men who made “The Argus,” under the heading “Editors of the Argus,” Cunningham is described in the most laudable terms. He took passionate interest in all subjects with which a newspaper deals and kept in touch with individuals who were specialists both inside and outside journalism. This type of contact increased his interest in reading history and stimulated his personal recollections. 63 Under his administration news assumed a far greater importance and on his retirement in 1928 he was hailed “as one of the best known and most highly respected figures in Australian journalism” as someone who had “kept the Argus abreast of the times without sacrificing dignity or decency.” 64 Both Schuler and Cunningham edited their respective newspapers through the turbulent and chaotic period of conflict, revolution, and nationalism of the Balkan Wars 1912–13, the 1914–18 War, and the Greek-Turkish conflict 1919–23.

2. THE NEWSPAPER AS A SOURCE OF HISTORICAL INFORMATION In this section, four issues will be examined. First, the traditional approach of writing history pioneered by Von Ranke; second, the critics 61

Australian Dictionary Vol.11, p.539; Sayers, op. cit., p.152; Lloyd, op. cit., p.53. 62 Australian Dictionary Vols.4 and 6, pp.314 and 414–15; Men who made The Argus. 63 Men who made The Argus “Editors of the Argus.” 64 Australian Dictionary Vol.8, p.177.

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of this method; third, the newspaper used as a historical source; and finally, to highlight the Australian use of the press in historical writing. 2a) Traditional method of writing history The traditional method of writing history is to use archival sources: unpublished manuscripts and printed documentary collections and official government publications. It was the 19th century German historian Leopold Von Ranke who laid great emphasis on great individuals and his theory of historical knowledge rested on the factual reconstruction of events of the past. 65 He relied on written documents for writing his history that placed the main emphasis on the conscious deeds of political personalities. The portrayal of impersonal forces below the conscious level along with economic and sociological factors were largely excluded. Ranke emphasised the critical use of original sources and his approach influenced historians to follow his lead and look at archives with increasing rigour. 66 The modern British historian Geoffrey Elton followed the Rankean tradition of writing history when he wrote about 16th-century Tudor England with Thomas Cromwell as the central character. He used particular documents which had been calendered in the letters and papers of Henry VIII. 67 Elton outlined that the past has to be understood in its own terms not by our own standards. In other words, the historian has to investigate historical events through the eyes of those who took part and by understanding the use of language of that time. 68

65

Leopold von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History, (ed) Georg G. Iggers and Konrad von Moltke, The Bobbs-Merill Co, Indianopolis, 1973, pp. Ivi and Iiii. 66 ibid., p.Ixvii; Leopold Von Ranke, The Secret of World History, Fordham University Press, New York, 1981, p.3. 67 R .W. Fogel and G. R. Elton, Which road to the past?, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983, p.126; The following are a sample of Elton’s works on Tudor England: England Under the Tudors (1971); Policy and Police (1972) and Studies in Tudor and Stuart Politics and Government Vol.3 (1983). 68 G. R. Elton, The Practice of History, Fontana , London, p.33.

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2b) The critics of this approach This traditional view of writing history has been challenged by a number of historians. E. H. Carr attacked the 19th-century infatuation with using documents. He stated that documents do not reveal the entire story, as an author might include what he thought had happened or what he wanted others to believe. Peter Burke contrasted the new history with the old one. The latter deals with the achievements of major personalities such as statesmen and generals, whereas the former investigates the activities of the neglected majority of humanity. Burke criticises the Rankean tradition for relying on official records originating from government archives at the expense of other evidence. This means that the old history imposes the view from above, while the new history seeks to examine the view from below. 69 The “official” view of history is still subject to bias, omission, and even the creation of forgeries. The historian needs to examine his evidence in two important ways by establishing its genuineness and assessing its proper signifinance and detecting forgeries. 70 Kitson-Clark says that diary entries can be tampered with by recording or inserting information after the event. Leading soldiers and statesmen have written their memoirs and autobiographies justifying their roles in a certain event. The Middle Ages was a period where official documents were tampered with through deletions, additions, and miscopying, and documents can, also, be destroyed. Even Command Papers and Royal Commissions laid before the British parliament have been edited before they appeared. 71 One of the major problems facing historians is that of forgeries. Two examples will be used. The first example is the fictitious document “Protocols of the elders of Zion,” which was invented by the Czarist secret police at the end of the 19th century alleging an interna69

E. H. Carr, What is History? Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1970, pp.16 and19; Peter Burke, “Overture,” in Peter Burke (ed), New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992, pp.3–4. 70 Elton, The Practice of History, p.74. 71 G Kitson-Clark, The Critical Historian, Heinemann, London, 1970, pp.67, 72–4,76 and 79–80.

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tional Jewish conspiracy bent on world domination and also on the destruction of Christianity. Somehow this document fell into the hands of the Nazis who used it for their own diabolical ends. Here was a purported official document being used by different groups in power determined to pursue their anti-semitic ambitions. 72 The second example is a purported Arab-Turkish Treaty signed by Emir Faisal and Mustapha Kemal Pasha on June 16, 1919. The Armenian Delegation and a Dr. Topjian passed copies of this alleged treaty onto the British Peace Delegation in Paris and French authorities in Constantinople. The pact purportedly aimed at healing ArabTurkish differences and proclaimed a Jihad (Holy War) “on the day following the decision of the Peace Conference, which is said to be dividing Mohammedan territory between the foreign powers.” In late August 1919, Lord Curzon, the acting British Foreign Minister, sent copies of this agreement to British representatives in Constantinople and Cairo for their comment. They replied that the treaty appeared to be a forgery. There is no doubt that this bogus treaty was aimed at harming Anglo-French relations in the Near East. 73 Likewise, the Australian Archives refer to this alleged treaty in a secret cable of the Colonial Secretary to the Governor General on August 29, 1919. 74 Both examples show how forged documents can be used for sinister purposes and to potentially harm relations between nations. Therefore, the historian’s task is to uncover forgeries. As stated above, Peter Burke’s new history (showing “the view from below”) allows newspapers to be used as a primary tool of re72

Richard Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899–1919, Fontana Press, London, 1992, p.70; Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1978, p.82. 73 Bilal N. Simsir, British Documents on Ataturk Vol.1, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1992, pp.78–84, 92 & 112. . The author checked the indexes of the Argus, London Times from mid-1919 to March 1920 and The Age held on microfilm and could not find any newspaper reports of the Arab-Turkish Treaty. 74 National Archives of Australia, (NAA) series CP. 78/30/1 item no.Box 1, Secret Cablegram from Secretary of State for Colonies, London, 29 August 1919 to Governor-General, for your Prime Minister.

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search and allows comparisons to be made with documents (“the view from above approach”). This means that the everyday newspaper accounts of the Greek-Turkish conflict read by the general public (the view from below) can be substantiated to some extent from the documentary sources. 75 However, measuring the actual impact of the Greek-Turkish conflict on the Melbourne general public is a difficult exercise. The Age working files only go back to the early 1960s. The Herald & Weekly Times obtained “a lot of photographic material mainly from the 1930s from the Argus.” The historian faces the problem of reconstructing an imagined public reaction to the daily press reports of the Greek-Turkish war, which are available on microfilm. It was during the Chanak crisis of September 1922 that some public reaction could be seen in the newspaper columns. In the aftermath of the Greek-Turkish conflict, the British Government requested military assistance from its Dominions. Australia faced the distinct possibility of war with Nationalist Turkey. Many ex-diggers volunteered to fight and defend the British Empire at the Turkish Straits and the Melbourne press reported on these sentiments. 76 Another example showing public reaction was the announcement of the Turkish armistice of October 1918 in the columns of the Melbourne press in early November 1918. The newspaper accounts describe the joy of ordinary people who knew the 1914–18 war was close to finishing. 77 Newspapers can also shed a different perspective on historical writing, which will be discussed in the following section.

75

Peter Burke, “Overture” in Peter Burke (ed), op. cit., p.6. Letter of Mr. Frank Prain, Library Manager of The Age, to Terry Stavridis incorrectly dated May 17, 1995. This is in relation to the author’s inquiry of September 12, 1996 seeking permission to access the Library files of The Age; Letter of Vicki Ritchie, Libraries Manager of the HW, to Terry Stavridis dated November 25, 1996. There were no clippings or correspondence files accompanying the photographic material. (Letters in possession of Terry Stavridis). 77 This point will be discussed in Chapter 4. 76

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2c) Use of the newspaper as a historical document Kitson-Clark points out that “All journalism is an attempt to write history.” 78 He acknowledges the importance of the press as an historical resource: ...Clearly newspapers cannot be expected to supply all the knowledge which is necessary to enable the ordinary man or woman to understand the problems whose current phases they record. However, the newspaper has another lesson to teach. It should itself be regarded as a work of historical scholarship. In their reports, in their comments and most of all in their selection of what to put in the paper, the reporters, and editors are themselves as historians producing their own version of the past. Men and women should learn to recognise them for what they are and subject them to the same tests and the same criticism as ordinary historians are subjected to. 79

The citation above requires some comment. It is undeniable that newspapers cannot provide ordinary people with all their news requirements because Australian governments impose 30–year restrictions or exempt access to some official documents. 80 The editor can use his specialist and interpretive skills in editorials to explain to readers the geographical and historical background to a conflict, assess the personal motives of leaders and elucidate on the national policies of governments. 81 The journalist, on the other hand, faces the “tyranny of headlines” and writes his material under pressure from the scene of bat78

Kitson Clark, op. cit., p.4. ibid., p.197. 80 Department of Administrative Services, Australian Archives, Public access to Commonwealth records, (leaflet), March 1991. A small minority of materials is exempt from public access beyond 30 years, which relate to defence, security, and international matters. The records of the Commonwealth Government and its agencies are maintained under The Archives Act 1983. 81 Charles Merz “the influence of editorial comment four significant trends in editorials” in George L. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin (ed), The Press and Society, Westport, 1971, originally published in 1942 by Prentice-Hall, New York, pp.332–7; Roscoe Ellard “The writer and editorial quality” in Bird and Merwin (ed), p.342. 79

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tle without realising that he might be writing “for some still unborn historian.” 82 It is important for the historian to apply his skills in assessing the bias, accuracy or inaccuracy, and distortion in the journalistic accounts of the Greek-Turkish conflict. This will permit a comparison of newspaper accounts and official documents. The historian should subject journalistic accounts to the same rigours of historical enquiry by asking questions such as: “How do you know that this happened as you say it happened?” Did the journalist actually observe it? Did the journalist hear the story or account from someone else? and Was the news story invented or produced with some ulterior motive in mind? Elton informs us that the historian must pose the question to himself in assessing his evidence: “how and why did this come into existence?” From the historian’s perspective “all evidence [is] divided into two types: that produced specifically for his attention and that produced for some other purpose.” In weighing up historical evidence, the historian has to ascertain whether the newspaper stories are bold guesses based on incomplete or perhaps very dubious information. 83 There are historians who have found newspaper archives a precious source of information. Kenneth E. Olsen criticised older historians for regarding newspapers as a doubtful tool. He pointed out that all contemporary writers in social, economic, and political history have found newspaper files of New York Times and London Times an invaluable source. 84 Frederick Artz combined newspaper accounts with police and prefectoral records to reconstruct political conditions in France in the period 1814–30, thus shedding light on a neglected period of French history. Gilberto Freyre, a Brazilian sociologist, wrote a pioneering social history of Brazil in the 1930s using newspapers and

82

Harry Gordon, An Eyewitness History of Australia, Currey O’Neil Publishers, Melbourne, 1981, pp.8, 10–11 and 13. 83 The Practice of History, pp.99–101. 84 Kenneth E. Olsen, The History makers, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1965, pviii. The Times of London will hereafter be cited as London Times.

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social surveys. 85 Robert W. Desmond says that “the Press not only reports the history of the world day by day but helps to make it. It is the press that keeps us informed and shapes the opinions of people.” 86 There is no doubt that The Age and Argus are an invaluable source of information for the period 1919–23. As Australian papers they recorded the day by day events of Australian history covering local and overseas news. Since overseas stories came largely from British news sources, readers were influenced by these British accounts in Australia. Another compelling argument for including the press as a source is that newspaper cuttings are filed in government records. Thompson tells us that “editorial cuttings were often filed with Australian government documents dealing with Pacific island [issues].” He continues that even if ordinary citizens ignored editorial comment then “Government policy makers of the day considered them important indicators of public opinion.” 87 Furthermore, American and British diplomats dispatched from Athens, Istanbul, Rome, and Paris summaries of newspaper articles and editorials to the Foreign office in London and the U.S. Department of State in Washington respectively, as to keep their home governments informed of the prevailing mood of public opinion in those cities. The policy makers in London and Washington were then in a position to assess a particular problem and see what appropriate measures or action could be taken to improve or rectify the situation. Foreign correspondents’ reports give a government an insight as to how a situation is perceived “from below.” 88 The understanding that newspapers provide a “view from below” will allow a 85

Frederick B. Artz, France under the Bourbon restoration 1814–1830, Russell & Russell, New York, 1963, p.vii preface; Peter Burke, History and Social theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1992, p.17. 86 Robert W. Desmond, The Press and World affairs, Arno Press, New York, 1972, p.1. Hereafter cited as The Press and World affairs. 87 Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, p.4. 88 For example see National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., Records of the Department of State the internal affairs of Turkey 1910–29. Reels 72 and 73. This microfilm is held at Melbourne University Library’s Middle Eastern collection. Hereafter cited as Turkey internal.

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reconstruction of the Greek-Turkish war using Melbourne newspapers and archival sources and an explanation of Greek and Australian history from another perspective. The gaps in the Melbourne press accounts and Australian archives will be supplemented by British and American archival sources. For example, the most authoritative work on the Paris Peace Conference is the one published by the U.S. Department of State, which contains all the conference minutes and decisions relating to the Turkish question in 1919. 89 In general, Australian historians have largely underestimated the press as an important source in their historical writings. 2d) The use of the press in historical writing in Australia Writing in 1967 Mayer said that: Australian historians have shown little interest in our press. I have been compelled to do my own spadework in a field in which I have no special competence. The historical chapter, while much fuller than anything yet published, does not aspire to be a balanced account ... I have tried to base it largely on contemporary magazine articles from all states. 90

Mayer’s book, Press in Australia could be considered the first serious attempt to write about “the history, structure and content of the Australian Press.” 91 Mayer alluded to the enormous amount of material located in articles and pamphlets on the Australian press. He cites some earlier publications, such as K. S. Inglis “The Daily Papers” in Peter Coleman’s (ed) Australian Civilization (1962), W. Sprague Holden Australia goes to Press (1962), and H. M. Green’s A History of Australian Literature (1961) providing the best general outlines of the press. 92 It could be suggested that Mayer was attempting to synthesise a diverse range of ideas and sources into his book. It may be inferred further that Mayer was issuing a challenge to Australian historians to 89

Some of these aspects will be covered in Ch.2 highlighting the GrecoItalian rivalry in Asia Minor in 1919. 90 Mayer, op. cit., p.xiii. 91 ibid., p.xiii. 92 ibid., p.276.

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write histories of the Australian press and to utilise the press as a valuable resource. Spasmodic though such research may be, some activity can be seen in this area. Some works appearing since Mayer’s book are R. B. Walker The Newspaper Press in New South Wales (1976) and Yesterday’s News: A History of the Newspaper in New South Wales from 1920 to 1945 (1980), P. Lord One hundred and twenty five years of the Advertiser (1983), G. Blaikie Remember Smith’s Weekly? (1975), G. Souter Company of Heralds (1981), and D. Cryle The Press in Colonial Queensland (1989). No academic histories have ever been written on The Age and Argus newspapers. G. Hutton and L. Tanner’s, and P. Cole-Adams’ respective publications, 125 Years of Age and The Best of The Age 1979–80, are nothing more than a compilation of newspaper articles with brief introductions. The authors offer no commentaries or explanations as to how the articles were actually written. Therefore, they cannot be regarded as strictly historical works. However, Men who made the Argus and Historical records of the Argus provide a newspaper history written by the newspaper owners themselves. As a historical resource the materials presented depict the newspaper in a favourable light and eulogise the newspaper owners. It must be noted that C. E. Sayers wrote the official biography of David Syme whereas no official biographies are to be found of the Argus owners. 93 The late Australian historian Manning Clark offers another explanation for why the press was ignored as a research tool. He said: “One of the reasons why Australian history once held the unenviable reputation of being the dullest subject in the class-room, and providing the dullest books in the library was that its historians only used dull official material.” 94 While reading official material may be tedious; this must be balanced by using a variety of other sources in order to render a fuller account of the subject matter under review. This does not in 93

It must be noted that the Australian Dictionary of Biography contains mini-biographies of some of the names listed in this dissertation. It is only a reference work containing background information on some of the personalities listed. 94 Harry Gordon, op. cit., foreword written by Manning Clark.

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any way diminish the value of the newspaper as a source. In fact, it may serve to enhance it as a source of information by confirming evidence contained in official sources. This can be observed in the works of three well-known Australian historians. F. K. Crowley’s Modern Australia in Documents, Vol.1 1901–1939 (1973) was written with the intention of capturing the “use of the written and spoken words of contemporaries, the major events, developments and controversies in the history of Australia since the establishment of federal government in 1901.” He selected documents from “contemporary newspapers and journals, pamphlets, books, parliamentary debates and other official sources;... and many [of these sources] helped to form public opinion and contributed to consensus or controversy.” 95 Even Manning Clark’s A History of Australia Vols 3,5–6 makes extensive use of manuscript collections (private letters and personal diaries) and newspapers. 96 L. L. Robson Australia and the Great War (1977) uses the Argus a good deal. He says “This is because the paper was comprehensive and because it was published in Melbourne, the seat of the Federal Government and the Defence Department. Much material published in the Argus was in the form of official statements which appeared in most dailies...” He also balances this documentary collection by including Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates and Parliamentary Papers. 97 The publication of a newspaper can only take place within a political (or sociopolitical) context.

3. THE OPERATIONS OF THE PRESS UNDER DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS

This section will use political science concepts to explain the operations of the press under different political systems. Siebert, Peterson, and Schramm stated that: 95

F. K. Crowley, Modern Australia in Documents 1901–1939, Vol.1, Wren Publishing, Melbourne, 1973, preface. 96 C. M. H. Clark, A History of Australia, Vols. 3,5,6, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1973, 1981 and 1987; Rob Pascoe, The Manufacture of Australian History, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1979, p.163. 97 L. L. Robson, Australia and the Great War, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1979, p.ix. Preface and acknowledgement.

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23 ...the press always takes on the form and coloration of the social and political structures within which it operates. Especially, it reflects the social system of social control whereby the relations of individuals and institutions are adjusted. We believe that an understanding of the aspects of society is basic to a systematic understanding of the press. 98

The quotation above captures the essence of explaining how the operations of the press are different under different political models such as Autocracy, Absolutism, Totalitarianism, and Liberal/Democracy. 3a) Autocracy In this type of political regime power is vested in the hands of one individual who ruled without due regard to legal or constitutional controls and whose authority is unchallenged. The embodiment of sovereignty and state power resides with the ruler. This kind of administration can survive through time only under certain types of social and economic conditions. There must exist a large uneducated population who has no notion of natural rights and lacks any concerted political ambition to ameliorate their condition. The autocrat has a personal interest in prolonging such conditions. 99 Czarist Russia was a classic illustration of an autocratic regime. In the years 1881–1904 Russian society was characterised by serious repressive measures exercised by the Emperor. Many citizens, other than the aristocracy, were refused basic human rights such as personal freedom, political rights and freedom of speech. The notion of freedom of the press was non-existent. 100 In 1893 a People’s Rights Party was established at Saratov which aimed at challenging the autocratic power of the Czar. They published a manifesto in February 1894 outlining their 98

Siebert et al., Four Theories of the Press, Books for Libraries, New York, 1956, reprinted in 1973 by arrangement with University of Illinois Press, pp.1–2. 99 Vernon Bogdanor, The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of political institutions, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987, pp.36–7. 100 Shmuel Galai, The Liberation movement in Russia 1900–1905, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973, p.1.

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party’s programme. In that document they were vociferous in demanding basic human rights. In response, on April 21, 1894, the Czarist secret police (the Ochkrana) arrested the members and supporters of this group. It is apparent that the establishment of such a party and its published manifesto constituted a threat to the Czarist order. The secret police were used as an instrument of state terror and also to censor, silence, and suffocate public criticism. 101 Even Leo Tolstoy, the distinguished Russian novelist and writer, warned Czar Nicholas 11 in 1902 from the Crimea that unless he reduced his autocratic powers, he faced the serious problem of the people rising up against him and sweeping him out of power. 102 In the early 1900s the “Liberal-Democratic movement” was becoming more active and daring in its campaign for basic civil rights. When Svyatopolk-Mirsky, Minister of the Interior, relaxed censorship controls, many new journals appeared. Even the official press was free to report and comment on these issues, and workers, too, were being informed of the latest events in Russian society. 103 There were two important events that severely challenged the authority of Czarism: one was the Japanese victory over the Russians at Port Arthur on 20 December 1904 and the other was “Bloody Sunday” in early January 1905. The latter episode resulted in a wave of industrial action by workers, with even industrialists demanding political freedoms. Demonstrations in Poland, Finland, in the Baltic region and the Caucasus took place. Czar Nicholas 11 was in a dilemma, so in order to preserve and maintain his regime further concessions had to be made to avoid revolution. 104 Later in that year Czar Nicholas 11 consented and approved a number of measures (also known as the October manifesto) which protected most of the prerogatives of the Russian monarchy. Some of 101

ibid., pp.64–5 and 138–9. Marc Ferro, Nicholas 11: Last of the Tsars, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993, trans. by Brian Pearce, pp.73–4. 103 Galai, op. cit., pp.157–58, 234 and 236–7. P. Struve, the editor of Osvobozhdeiye coined the term “Liberal-democratic movement,” a Russian newspaper published in Stuttgart, Germany. 104 ibid., pp.239–40. 102

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the provisions of the manifesto included: 1) On March 4, 1906 full press laws guaranteeing the right of assembly and association; 2) an indirect system of voting; 3) the possibility of bringing before the courts libellous or seditious materials appearing in papers and journals; and finally the granting by the Duma (the parliament) to its members of the right to free speech and parliamentary immunity. On April 26, 1906 these new fundamental laws became public with Article 4 leaving real power in the hands of the Emperor. 105 3b) Absolutism This type of government existed in the 18th century when the sovereign usually governed large bureaucracies and standing armies. The monarchs instituted major reform initiatives in the economic, social, and legal spheres, which were expressed in largely secular terms as advancing the public good. Absolutist regimes can be found in the reign of Frederick 11 of Prussia 1740–86, Katherine of Russia 1762–96, and Joseph 11 of Austria 1780–90. It is interesting that the absolutist form of government was revived in the period after the French revolution. 106 In Metternich’s Austria, government administration was carried out by the aristocracy, police, army, and bureaucracy controlled from Vienna. In September 1819, Metternich, the Austrian Foreign Minister, ensured the ratification of the Carlsbad decrees that granted him the authority to close down student associations at German universities and enforce a more rigid and general censorship of the press. 107 At the centre of Metternich’s system of control were the political police entrusted with the task of keeping the press, private associations, and suspected extremists under surveillance. 108 There is no doubt that Metternich had

105

Richard Pipes, op. cit., pp.43–4 and 157–59. Article 4 stated that “To the Emperor of All the Russias belongs the Supreme Autocratic power. God himself commands that he be obeyed, not only from fear of God’s wrath, but also for the sake of one’s conscience.” 106 Bogdanor, op. cit., p.1. 107 David Thomson, Europe since Napoleon, Penguin Books, London, 1990, pp.130–1. 108 Brian Chapman, Police State, Macmillan and Co, London, 1971, p.36.

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the full backing of the Austrian Emperor to enforce such draconian laws. After the Napoleonic wars the French Kings Louis XV111 1814– 24, Charles X 1824–30, Louis-Philippe 1830–48, and the Emperor Napoleon 111 1852–70 enacted laws from 1815–70 to stifle the operations of the liberal press. It should be noted that during this time of supposed constitutional monarchy (excepting the Second Republic 1848– 1852) the French legislature was powerless and merely implemented the wishes of the King. The reigns of King Louis XVIII and Emperor Napoleon III will be briefly examined. During the reign of the former monarch press laws were passed in 1819, 1820, and 1822 by the French legislature dominated by extremists to ensure that the liberal press was stifled. 109 It is interesting that the chief royalist papers Moniteur, Quotidiene, Drapeau Blanc 1819–30, and Journal des Debats (1817–20) had at various times been subsidised by the government. They attacked the pretensions of the middle class and all ideas and institutions connected with the revolution. The Liberal papers after 1824, such as Journal des Debats and Constitutional Courier Francais were all strongly anticlerical. The total circulation of papers was not great and they were not sold as single copies but only on an annual subscription basis. Another manner in which the government attempted to control the liberal press was by the imposition of a postage charge and a two-cent stamp tax which meant that only those who were wealthy could afford to establish a newspaper. 110 On February 11, 1852 Emperor Napoleon III issued a statutory decree regulating the press. Every potential publication was subjected to official authorisation with caution money and stamp duty being maintained. Editors and staff were placed under the authority of the common law courts, where magistrates had the power to impose very harsh punishments ranging from a simple warning, to a temporary suspension for two months and even total suppression. For Napoleon 109

David Thomson, op. cit., p.145; Frederick B. Artz, op. cit., pp.39 and 82–3; Sir Llewellyn Woodward, Prelude to Modern Europe 1815–1914, Methuen, London, 1972, pp.78–9. 110 Artz, op. cit., pp.85 and 88.

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111, the press was simply a political tool that had to be kept subservient to his will. 111 From 1863 onwards the liberal and republican opposition grew rapidly in France and lured outstanding lawyers such as Jules Favre and Jules Ferry to its ranks. Ironically, government prosecution of journalists and agitators provided republican lawyers, as counsels for the defence, with the opportunity to expound republican thinking within the protection of the courtroom. It was Leon Gambetta who defended a group of republican journalists in a famous press trial in 1869. 112 In March 1869, the French legislature enacted press legislation which freed newspapers from having to obtain a licence before issue and also terminated police orders such as warnings, suspensions, and suppression. Though the press law had been relaxed, stringent penalties were still in operation as well as caution money and stamp duty. After June 1869, the republican and revolutionary movements began to make their presence felt and enticed audiences to their meetings. New publications came into existence like the Tribune, Revue Politique, Electeur Libre and Lanterne. 113 3c) Totalitarianism In this section the dissertation will focus on the controversies surrounding this term. The Totalitarian model will be used to refer to the political ideologies of Fascism, National Socialism, and Socialism/Communism. These political doctrines found expression in the establishment of totalitarian regimes in Fascist Italy 1922–45, in Nazi Germany 1933–45, and the Soviet Union 1917–91 under the leaderships of Benito Mussolini, Adolf Hitler, Lenin, and Stalin respectively. 114 Since no clear definition of this term exists, the crucial charac111

Emile Bourgeois, History of Modern France, Vol.2 1852–1913, Octogan Books, New York, 1972, originally published in 1919, p.2. 112 Thomson, op. cit., p.268. 113 Emile Bourgeois, op. cit., pp.140–1. 114 David L. Sills (ed), International Encyclopedia of the Social sciences, Vol.15–17, Macmillan, The Free Press, New York, 1972, pp.106–8. Volumes 5 and 11 of this publication contain definitions on Fascism pp.334–50 and on National Socialism pp. 45–50. For an in-depth discussion on Fascism, Na-

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teristics will be listed. These include: “A) A single party dominated by one leader. B) A militant ideology that sought the transformation of society in accordance with certain higher “laws.” C) Police terror and repeated purges. D) The destruction of all-intermediate social groups or autonomous institutions in order to produce an atomised population. E) Central control of communications and mass propaganda.” 115 The most salient points are items are (D) and (E) and the discussion concerning them which follows will outline certain common features pertaining to the operations of the press in this model. In accordance with characteristic (D) the Fascists in Italy, the Nazis in Germany and the Bolsheviks in the Soviet Union destroyed their political opponents and press in one major blow. Mussolini (IL Duce) seized power by marching on Rome on October 28, 1922. The next three years of his regime were characterised by mild violence towards the press and political parties which otherwise seemed to function normally. In 1926, he silenced the press, abolished all political (Liberal and Socialist) parties and then proceeded to erect his Totalitarian state. The fascist party became the sole political force in Italy. 116

tional Socialism and Socialism/Communism see the following works: Ernst Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, Mentor, New York, 1969, parts 1, 3 and 5; Karl Dietrich Bracher, The German Dictatorship, Penguin Books, Harmonsworth, 1978; and Leonard Shapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Vintage Books, New York, 1971. 115 Mary McCauley, Politics and the Soviet Union, Penguin Books, Harmondworth, 1982, p.147. 116 James Joll, Europe since 1870, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1978, pp.260 and 268. The Melbourne press reports of November 1926 show Mussolini silencing all opposition political parties and the press. See The Age, “NEW FASCIST COURTS. Legislation for the Defence of the State.,” November 8, 1926, p.8; “THE IRONHAND IN ITALY. BOLSTERING FASCISM. ALL OPPOSITION OFFICES CLOSED.,” November 11, p.11; “THE MODERN CAESAR. Mussolini’s Inspiration.,” November 12, p.10; Argus, “PROTECTING ITALY. Stern Fascist Measures. Retrospective Bill announced.,” November 8, p.18; “LONG LIVE MUSSOLINI.!” Deputies Enthusiasm.’ & ‘Raid on Anti-Fascists.,’ November 11, p.11; “AUT. CAESAR AUT. NIHIL. Mussolini’s Ambition. His Contempt for Democracy.,” November 12, p.19.

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When Hitler became Chancellor of Germany on January 30, 1933 as head of a coalition ministry, he persuaded President Hindenburg to sign a set of decrees (also known as Enabling Acts) which dissolved the Reichstag (Parliament) and called for new elections. The Reichstag fire of February 1933 was allegedly started by the communists thus giving Hitler the pretext for establishing his totalitarian state. Hitler requested the President to sign another decree to suspend civil liberties under the Weimar constitution. Some of these important control measures included curtailing the freedom of the press, and violations of the privacy of postal, telegraph, and telephone communications also occurred. 117 The social democratic and communist press and Catholic dailies disappeared, while the liberal newspapers such as Frankfurter Zeitung and Berliner Tageblatt survived because they had severed all their Jewish affiliations. They were also permitted to use non-Nazi journalists. 118 When the Bolsheviks seized power in Petrograd (Leningrad) in October 1917, they issued a decree that newspapers which had opposed the October revolution would be censured. The Bolsheviks put their decree into operation by either closing down or confiscating newspaper property. In an interesting development, the Military Revolutionary Committee in Moscow overturned the press decree by declaring on November 21, 1917, that the emergency had passed and the press once again could enjoy freedom of expression. Though the Bolsheviks made some concessions to various newspapers, the initial decree remained in force. By August 1918, the Bolsheviks had closed down all newspapers and magazines. 119 Social revolutionaries were given some minor cabinet posts in the Bolshevik government but when the Constituent Assem-

117

Alan Bullock, op. cit., pp.258 and 263. For newspaper headlines showing President Hindenburg’s decree curtailing press freedom. See Argus and The Age, “NEW GERMAN DECREES ... Many Newspapers Suppressed.” & “HINDENBURG’S DECREE. BAN ON THE PRESS.,” February 8, 1933, pp. 7 and 9. 118 Richard Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich, Penguin Books, Harmondworth, 1974, p.496. 119 Pipes, op. cit., pp.521–2 and 524.

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bly met in January 1918, Lenin closed it down by instituting single party rule. 120 With this model the principal control of communication and mass propaganda rested with the state in which very strict censorship of the press operated (Point E). Lindeman and Miller described propaganda as “a device for conditioning [human] behaviour.” 121 This allowed Fascist Italy, Hitlerian Germany, and Stalinist Russia to use the media, such as newspapers, radio, motion pictures, magazines, and leaflets as tools controlling, manipulating , and directing public opinion in one particular direction. 122 All journalists writing in these totalitarian societies were employed in the ministries of propaganda, and they had to write according to the official party line. The general public in these societies were fed lies and distortions of the truth. Any deviation from the official party line could result in journalists facing severe retribution from governmental authorities. 123 120

Pipes, op. cit., p.521; Joll, op. cit., pp.231–2. For a discussion of the closure of the Constituent Assembly and newspapers opposed to the Bolsheviks in January 1918. See Argus, “RUSSIAN CHAOS. ASSEMBLY MEETS. DISORDER AND CIVIL WAR.,” January 21, p.7; “ASSEMBLY ENDS. DISSOLVED BY LENIN.,” January 22, p.5; “RUSSIAN CHAOS ... Bolshevik Tyranny. Socialism and Civil War.,” January 23, p.9; The Age, “THE BOLSHEVIKI ASSEMBLY OPENED. DISORDER AND BLOODSHED...,” Jan. 21, p.7; “RUSSIA’S ASSEMBLY SUMMARILY DISSOLVED...,” Jan.22, p.5; “GERMANY AND RUSSIA.... Terrorism in Petrograd.,” Jan.23, p.7. 121 Edward C. Lindeman and Clyde R. Miller, “The Age of Propaganda,” in George L. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin (ed), op. cit., p.29. 122 Leonard W. Doob, “Types of Propaganda,” in George L. Bird & Frederic E. Merwin (ed), op. cit., p.31. For a discussion of the setting up and operations of propaganda ministries in Fascist Italy, Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia, see David Mack Smith, op. cit., pp.85 and 213; Bracher, op. cit., pp.320–3; Leonard Shapiro, op. cit., pp.468–70. 123 David Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, Pengiun Books, Harmondsworth, 1979, p.213; Bracher, op. cit., pp.322–3; Shapiro, op. cit., pp.469– 70. Journalists in Italy could not work without a license which was issued by the propaganda minister. In Nazi Germany, Josef Goebbels combining his triple position of Propaganda Minister, President of the Cultural Chamber

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There is one fundamental difference in the situation regarding press ownership that existed in these three societies. Both the Italian and German newspapers were privately owned but endorsed the views of the government. For example, in Italy there was Francesco Coppola’s Politica, Franco Ciarlantini’s Augustea, Edmondo Rossoni’s La Stirpe, and Giuseppe Bottai’s magazine Critica Fascista. 124 In Germany, Jules Streicher’s Frankische Tages Zeitung and Der Sturmer were two such papers supporting National Socialism. 125 The press in the Soviet Union, on the other hand, was publicly owned and operated by the state. 126 However, each country had a newspaper that was regarded as the official mouthpiece for the government. These included Popolo d’Italia in Italy, Volkischer Beobachter in Germany, and Pravda and Izvestia in the Soviet Union. 127 3d) Liberal Democracy This political system is based on the ideas found in the works of John Milton’s Areopagitica, John Locke’s Two Treatises of Government, John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, and in the works of the French enlightenment philosophers Voltaire, Rousseau, and Montesquieu. 128 All these political theorists advocated the principles of individual liberty including free speech, right of assembly and association, and freedom of conscience. The origins of such principles were very influential in the establishment of a free press in the western world. Even the western and party propaganda chief established a Reich journalism school in 1935. The Culture and Propaganda department in Russia was divided into 12 sections. One of these was for the press. 124 David Mack Smith, op. cit., p.27. 125 Grunberger, op. cit., pp.502–3. 126 Siebert et al., op. cit., p.28. 127 David Mack Smith, op. cit., p.239; Bracher, op. cit., p.119; Roy A Medvedev, Let History Judge, Vintage Books, New York, 1971, pp.350–1 and 53. 128 George H. Sabine and Thomas L. Thorson, A History of Political Theory, Holt-Saunders international, 1973, pp.469–70 and chs. 28–29; John Locke, Two Treaties of Government, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1963, with introduction by Peter Laslett; John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, W. W. Norton, New York,1975, edited by David Spitz pp.17–8.

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press for a time had to wrestle with governmental authorities. For example, the British press from the 17th to mid-19th century had to grapple against prosecution for sedition and imposts such as excise and stamp duties. Throughout the 18th century, a judge was appointed by the Crown to decide whether published materials were dangerous or not. It was Fox’s Libel Act that fixed “the dispute in 1792 by giving the jury the right to determine the harmful tendency of the published material.” 129 Lord Ellenborough disclosed that the Newspaper Stamp Duties of 1819 “[are] not [directed], but against the pauper press.” 130 Raymond Williams reveals that to understand candidly the operations of the British press in the first half of the 19th century is to understand that the so-called respectable press was not so respectable. There was direct bribery of journalists by Ministers and authorised advertising was given to papers favourable to government opinion. 131 It was not until the abolition of duties on Advertising in 1853, on Stamp in 1855, on paper in 1861, and on securities in 1869 that the British press was freed from Government control and interference. 132 These reforms in Britain helped the Australian colonial press to escape the newspaper controls that had been imposed for a time on the British press.

4. AUSTRALIAN COLONIAL PRESS The Australian Colonial Press was not subject to the rigid censorship controls that existed in other countries. This section will illustrate two exceptions whereby government controls and censorship were imposed on the press during the Colonial period and the 1914–18 conflict. The importance of the press in helping to mould Australian nationalism should not be undervalued. 129

Siebert et al., op. cit., pp.47–8; George Boyce, “The Fourth Estate” in George Boyce, James Curran & Pauline Wingate (ed), Newspaper History: from the 17th century to the present day, Constable, London and Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1978, p.20. 130 Raymond Williams, “The Press and Popular Culture” in James Boyce et al. (ed), Newspaper History, op. cit., p.46. 131 ibid., p.46. 132 James Curran, “The Press as an Agency of Social Control” in G. Boyce et al. (ed), Newspaper History, op. cit., p.61.

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4a) Some press restrictions in Australia The first exception was the Sydney Gazette 1803–42 published “By Authority.” The Colonial Authorities could resort to direct and indirect methods to overcome press opposition. The direct method involved demands for securities, actions of libel, and contempt of court or parliament. With the indirect approach, the government could punish or favour the press by the manipulation of press contracts. It could also withdraw or grant government advertising contracts. Government advertising, for example, had been withdrawn from The Age in 1862 and Melbourne’s Daily Telegraph in 1877–78, and given to the “patriotic press.” 133 In 1824 Governor Arthur of Van Diemans Land advocated that newspapers should be licensed and the Earl of Bathurst, Secretary of State, in July 1825 authorised Governor Darling of New South Wales to integrate the colony to English law on the issue of a stamp tax and registration of newspapers. There was no English authorisation allowing the Governor to introduce annual licences without the recommendation of the Executive Council. Darling refrained from implementing these instructions until he felt that the “licentiousness” of the press warranted restraint. Chief Justice Francis Forbes concluded that Darling’s actions were aimed at either reducing or destroying the circulation of newspapers. 134 The arrival of Governor Burke to the Colony of New South Wales on December 3, 1831 ushered in a new period of liberalisation with the introduction of trial by jury, representative government, and full civil rights for the emancipists. The 1830s were a period in which newspapers increased in number and competed vigorously, which resulted in lower prices. 135 Walker concluded that the Australian press was “unburdened by newspaper and advertisement taxes, colonial newspapers started off with advantages denied to their British counter-

133

Mayer, op. cit., pp.17– 8; Gordon, op. cit., pp.21–3. R .B. Walker, The Newspaper Press in New South Wales, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1976, pp.12–3; Gordon, op. cit., pp.24–5 and 33–4. 135 Walker, op. cit., p.20. 134

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parts.” 136 It is in the context of these conditions that the operations of The Age and Argus newspapers can be understood. The second exception was the restrictions applied to the Australian press during the First World War. The War Precautions Act 1914, modelled on the British Defence of the Realm Act, gave the Commonwealth Government wide-ranging powers for “preventing individuals from communicating with the enemy,” “securing the safety of communications,” “the deporting or interning of aliens,” and “inspecting, impounding or retention of books, documents and papers.” This empowered the Commonwealth to censor newspapers for the duration of the war. 137 From 1915 onwards, there was much working class discontent over soaring prices and rents, the attempts of the wage boards to freeze wages, and Prime Minister W. M. Hughes’ failure to support a referendum to control prices. Many working class individuals believed rightly or wrongly that they were carrying a disproportionate burden of the wartime sacrifices compared to the richer classes. These long standing grievances culminated in a series of strikes in key industries, such as metal, coal, wool, and ports which brought the trade unions into direct conflict with the Federal Labor Government. 138

136

ibid., p.257. Robson, op. cit., pp.36–7; Geoffrey Sawer, Australian Federal Politics and Law 1901–29, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne,1972, pp. 140–1. 138 Turner “1914–19” in F. Crowley (ed), op. cit., pp.318 and 327–9; Robson, op. cit., pp.45, 55–6 and 65–6. In August 1917, a general strike began in N.S.W when Railway and Tramway Commissioners tried to alter the working methods of its employees. Road Transport, mining and maritime workers joined the strike in support of their railway and tramway counterparts. Both Federal and State governments broke the strike by recruiting strikebreakers and preference of employment was given to those belonging to the newly established “loyalty” unions. Many striking unionists were not reemployed. In fact, the Governments victory came at the cost of alienating the working class. The Argus newspaper was, totally, opposed to the Unions. See Turner “1914–19” in F. Crowley (ed), op. cit., pp.341–2; Robson, op. cit., pp.86–8. 137

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Walker tells us that the press had no complaint over suppression of military intelligence but expressed uneasiness on the issue of political censorship. Journalists complained of mistakes and contradictions and “accused the Deputy Chief Censor of ignorance and indifference to the problems of newspaper production. The conscription issue was to bring the conflict to a head.” The newspapers insisted that political discussion of conscription be permitted, especially after the Adelaide censor had prohibited Barrier Daily Truth from reporting the Caucus meeting covering this subject. 139 Furthermore, the Labor Party split in November 1916 over the conscription issue that led to the resignation of Prime Minister W. M. Hughes and of 24 Labor Parliamentarians who then formed the National Labor party. The parliamentary future of the National Labor Party was dependent on the goodwill of the Liberals. Therefore, the two parties decided in January 1917 to amalgamate, thus forming the Nationalist Party. 140 The Argus headlines “Mr. Hughes parts company with Federal Labor Caucus” in November 1916 and “A New Federal Ministry” in February 1917 capture the Labor party split and the formation of a Nationalist administration. 141 As early as December 1914, the Argus questioned the value of entrust-

139

Walker, op. cit., p.251. Sawer, op. cit., p.130. The Federal election result of May 5, 1917 saw the Nationalists winning 53 seats to Labor’s 22 for the House of Representatives. In the Senate, the Nationalists won all the 18 seats. See Turner “1914– 19” in F. Crowley (ed), op. cit., and p.336. 141 Robson, op. cit., pp.77–80. It should be noted that the two referenda in October 1916 and December 1917 over compulsory conscription were defeated. The Labor party, trade union movement and Dr. Daniel Mannix, the Catholic Co-adjutor Archbishop of Melbourne, were instrumental in persuading the electorate to vote “No.” This, further, divided Australian society on sectarian lines. See Robson, op. cit., pp.71–6, 89–90 & 97–8; Turner “1914–19” in F. Crowley (ed), op. cit., pp.334–6 and 343–4. Sectarianism could be seen with the suppression of Irish nationalism due to the Easter uprising of 1916. “Loyal Orange” partisans accused all Irish Catholics as being traitors. See Robson, op. cit., pp.61–3 and 102fn.41; Turner “1914–19” in F. Crowley (ed), p.343. 140

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ing censorship to military and naval personnel who lacked the necessary training to undertake such work. 142 In order to break the hold of military and political censorship, a press censorship conference was convened in Melbourne from April 16–18, 1918 to try to settle this issue. The Government was represented by W. M. Hughes, the Prime Minister, George Pearce, the Minister of Defence, the Military and Naval officers General Legge, Captain Thring, and Colonel McColl, and the editors of the major Australian papers. It was suggested that a censorship advisory board be set up to improve communication between the censor and the newspapers. Hughes admitted there were problems with censorship and hoped a close rapport could be established between the government and press. The former had the responsibility of protecting the Commonwealth from the enemy, while the latter had that of informing the public on the progress of the war without contravening the rules of censorship. 143 Pearce proceeded to outline the government’s position regarding military and political censorship and expressed concern about the spread of German propaganda, which the government had to counteract. 144 On political censorship, he stated that “I have never intended that ... censorship [of Government administration] should be used ... to protect me against criticism.” He was critical of the press for having published biased reports regarding the Defence Department’s camp administration and defended the censor’s intervention to prevent the wrong impression being created in the mind of the public. 145 Schuler conceded the government’s right to impose military and naval censorship, but on local matters this was unacceptable to a free press which felt it was stifled by “outsiders” who lacked the knowledge and skills of journalism. 146 After much deliberation, the editors supported Schuler’s motion of an Advisory Board being created with a 142

Robson, op. cit., pp.38–9. NAA, Series MP 367/1 General Correspondence Files, Department of Defence, 01 Jan 1917–31 Dec 1929 item no.437/1/115 pt 2, Press Censorship Conference, April 16–18, 1918 pp.4–5. 144 ibid., pp.19–20. 145 ibid., pp.22–3. 146 ibid., pp.25–6. 143

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view to promoting a better understanding between the press and censor. This Board was to be instituted immediately to act and to advise the censor. 147 On April 30, 1918 Schuler and Cunningham notified T. Trumble, the Secretary of the Defence Department, that they accepted their appointment to this Board. 148 It must be noted that General Legge, the Chief of General Staff, suggested that the Censorship Board be disbanded officially in June 1919, and Trumble, in turn, notified the editors, thanking them for their valuable contribution. 149 Finally, on November 23, 1918 the Defence Minister George Pearce, on the recommendation of the deputy censor, approved the relaxing of press censorship for some issues. There were four items that could be reported without the approval of the censor. These included: “1) Matters which [were] formerly prejudicial to recruiting. 2) Matters relating to the sale of wheat... 3) Criticism of Government Departments. 4) Censorship [relating] to mercantile shipping [which had] already been released under instructions from the Chief Censor, London.” However, censorship still applied to matters of a purely military nature. This related to troop movements and forces still stationed on various war fronts, and the restrictions could only be relaxed by the Imperial authorities. The British Admiralty still suppressed information relating “to warships, transports and vessels carrying troops” which might harm the interests of the Empire or the Commonwealth. 150 147

ibid., p.154. The Censorship Advisory Board consisted of Dr. E. S. Cunningham, G. F. H. Schuler, J. H. Davidson and J. M. Mackay. 148 NAA, Series MP 367/1 General Correspondence Files, Department Of Defence, 01 Jan 1917–31 Dec 1929, item no. 430/2/1251, letters sent on April 30, 1918 by Schuler and Cunningham to T. Trumble, secretary of Department of Defence, Melbourne. 149 NAA, Series MP367/1 item no.430/2/1251, Department of Defence, Minute Paper, Legge, Chief of General Staff to Secretary, June 17, 1919 and Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence, letter Trumble to Schuler, July 11 1919. 150 NAA, Series PP 14/1 Commonwealth Of Australia Department of Defence, Melbourne, November 25th 1918, item no. 2/1/357, “Relaxation of Press Censorship.”

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Military censorship was still appropriate in view of the Allied discussions taking place in Paris to settle the future of the Ottoman Empire. The Greek landing in Smyrna in May 1919 was carried out in a veil of secrecy so that Turkish suspicions would not be aroused. Though Greece was given Allied approval to administer Smyrna, she was also protecting Allied interests in Anatolia until the Turkish peace settlement could be concluded. Any premature release of Allied intentions to the Turks might have harmed Imperial interests in the Near East. 151 It will be argued elsewhere in this study that the press reports of the Greek-Turkish conflict were subject to military censorship in Athens, Istanbul, and Angora (Ankara) by government authorities before they reached London for transmission to Melbourne. The degree of censorship depended on how the war was going for each of the parties. 152 Overall, the Australian press operated in an open and free democratic system, where it could publish and criticise the actions of politicians and the decisions of government without any interference. It also played an important part in developing and shaping Australian nationalism.

151

The Age and Argus newspapers did not publish any accounts of the Allied proceedings in approving the Greek landing at Smyrna on May 14, 1919. Both reported the landing briefly on May 19, 1919. See The Age May 19, 1919, p.7 and Argus May 19, 1919, p.7. The Smyrna landing will be explained in Ch.2. 152 For example David Lloyd George Papers contain Press Bulletins from Athens listing Military communiqués and Newspaper accounts originating from Anatolia on the Greek assault on Angora. See House of Lords, David Lloyd George papers, F55/2/25, Press Bulletin, Athens, 8 September 1921, folder 16, Box 91 and F55/2/19, Press Bulletin, Athens, August 31,1921, folder 16, Box 91. (These documents are in the custody of the House of Lords Records Office. It would be obvious that the Greek censor would play down the Greek failure to occupy the Angora in September 1921, before reaching the mainstream press in order to maintain the morale of the Greek troops and civilian population. Hereafter cited H.L.R.O, LG.

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4b) Australian Nationalism This section will focus on how newspapers played an important role in developing Australian nationalism and in assisting in the shaping of public opinion. Defining nationalism is not an easy task, when one considers that it has many meanings. 153 In this study, Nationalism is defined as: The complex sentiment or ideology of belonging to and identifying with a nation, usually based on an awareness of some common racial, territorial, cultural, linguistic, and historical experiences, and often developed against other cultures or nations... Australian nationalism has taken two main forms, in some ways contradictory. A pride in being British and part of the British Empire was a widely held sentiment among white Australians until the post world war II period. 154

The Australian colonies shared common racial, territorial, cultural, and linguistic experiences, but not the same historical background. New South Wales and Tasmania shared a convict past, unlike South Australia, which attracted free settlers. In the 1830s and 1840s anti-transportation leagues were established in New South Wales and Tasmania to petition the Imperial authorities to stop the transportation of convicts. They wanted to attract free settlers to their colonies. 153

The definition on nationalism, shown below, is the one that the author finds the most suitable for use in this study. 154 The Penguin Macquarie Dictionary of Australian Politics, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1988, p.235; The literature on Nationalism is a huge and evergrowing area of academic research. For a brief discussion on Nationalism, the reader should consult the following works: Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London and New York, 1990; Anthony D. Smith (ed), Nationalist Movements, Macmillan press, Basingstoke, 1976; and James G. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Macmillan Education, London, 1991. For a discussion on Australian nationalism the following books should be consulted: John Eddy and Deryck (ed), The rise of Colonial Nationalism, Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1988; Stephen Alomes, A Nation at Last? The Changing character of Australian Nationalism 1880–1988, Angus & Robertson, North Ryde, 1988; and Noel MacLachlan, Waiting for the Revolution: A History of Australian Nationalism, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1989.

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Victoria (Port Philip district) was separated from New South Wales by the Australian Colonies Government Act 1850 which gave the colonies some measure of local autonomy in enacting laws for local government, the judiciary, customs duties, the electoral system, and also gave them the authority to change their constitutions, which had previously been the responsibility of the British parliament. The discovery of gold in Victoria in the 1850s did not mark the beginning of Australian nationhood, but the Eureka incident of 1854 was important in highlighting the importance of political freedoms. For a generation or so, Victoria was the leading Australian colony in terms of population and wealth. 155 It was later in the 19th century that an Australian identity began to emerge, with some people espousing Republicanism and others such as Sir Henry Parkes and Alfred Deakin considering themselves Australian-Britons. Both Deakin and Parkes considered themselves Australian as well as having loyalty to the British Empire. 156 There are certain preconditions for nationalism to take root. For Benedict Anderson the cardinal requirement is print-capitalism—that is, the establishment of commercial printing (newspapers) on a large scale where “nations are ‘imagined’ by many people and linguistic nationalism takes root.” 157 MacLachlan, on the other hand, indicates that “...New World ‘democracy’ produced virtually universal literacy, served by a cheap predominantly liberal/radical press—crucible of nationalism everywhere.” 158 The ideas of Anderson and MacLachlan show very clearly that a combination of commercial printing and universal literacy was important in developing nationalism. Language becomes the main channel of communication between newspapers and

155

Michael Roe, “Ch. 3 1830–50” and T. H. Irving, “Ch. 4 1850–70” in F. K. Crowley (ed), A New History of Australia, William Heineman, Melbourne, 1977, pp. 86, 90, 94–6, 120–1, 124, 127 and 142. 156 C. M. H. Clark, A History of Australia, Vol.V, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1981, pp.32 and 34. Hereafter cited as Australia Vol.v. 157 James G. Kellas, op. cit., p.45; Anderson, op. cit., p.48. 158 MacLachlan, op. cit., p.9.

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their readers and Australia is imagined through the use of English. 159 Anderson mentions that one vital element regarding language is that it has the power to generate imagined communities, building, in effect, a particular cohesiveness. This is where Australian newspaper editors used English, the official vernacular of the British Empire, as an agent of communication in shaping public opinion within an Australian and Imperial framework. 160 The role of the editors in moulding public opinion will be examined by using two examples. Roger C. Thompson explains quite rightly that editorial opinion should not be bracketed with all public opinions. The editors were a favoured group of individuals who continually expressed opinions on external matters much more than anybody else. Government policy makers took notice of editorial comment because it was a good barometer of public opinion. 161 The first example of an editor’s role in moulding public opinion was the attitude shown towards the annexationist theme which was strongly taken up by The Age and Argus which advocated the annexation of Fiji in 1875, New Hebrides in 1883, and New Guinea in 1886. It is worth noting that Frederick Haddon, the editor of the Argus, encouraged a united Australian policy towards the Pacific in order to reduce inter-colonial rivalries. Both The Age and Argus expressed concern at the spread of European colonial rivalries near Australian shores and urged the Imperial government to annex these islands. The 1880s were a period in which patriotic Australian sentiments were developing, just as Australia had a predisposition towards the Empire in the scramble for colonies by other European powers. The Australian colonists saw

159

Anderson, op. cit., p.122. Anderson mentions that “English and Scottish schoolmasters ... swarmed the [white colonies] of Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. Anglicization was also cultural policy... Anglicized Australians did not serve in Dublin, or Manchester, and not even in Ottawa or Capetown. Nor until quite late on, could they become Governors-General in Canberra.” See Anderson, p.89. 160 ibid., p.122. 161 Roger C. Thompson, op. cit., p.4.

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that their destiny lay in the South Pacific under the umbrella of the British Empire. 162 With the establishment of the Commonwealth of Australia in 1901, The Age and Argus considered the importance of acquiring New Guinea. In the period 1901–1904, these papers published a total of 56 editorials: 32 and 24 respectively concerning Pacific island issues. 163 At the outbreak of the 1914–18 conflict, The Age spelt out Australia’s Pacific Ocean fate: We have long since realised that we have a Pacific Ocean destiny, and for some years we have been striving to attain Imperial recognition of our right to enforce a definite Pacific island policy. By virtue of the European war an unexpected path has been opened to the furtherance of our ambition ... (to lay) the foundations of a solid Australian sub-empire in the Pacific Ocean. 164

This future Australian sub-empire had to be seen within the context of an Imperial framework and the future opportunity that would allow Australia to extend its territory in the Pacific Ocean. 165 The second example of the role newspaper editors played in moulding public opinion can be seen in the way they roused up Australian patriotic fervour in defending the “mother” country and Empire from its enemies. Many ordinary citizens considered it their patriotic duty as Australian-Britons to volunteer their services to defend the Empire. Colonial and Commonwealth politicians expressed their allegiance to King and Empire by dispatching Australian contingents to fight alongside their British cousins. Such sentiments were not better expressed than in the Sudan expedition 1885, Boer War 1899–1902, 1914–1918 War, and the Chanak incident of 1922. When the news of General Gordon’s death in Khartoum was received in Australia, the press played an important part in inciting pa162

ibid., pp.25, 36–7, 76, 78–9, 113, and 236fn.16. ibid., pp.163, 256fn.26 and 258fn.74. 164 ibid., p.203. 165 The issues surrounding the Pacific were taken up by W. M. Hughes at the Paris Peace Conference in 1919. Australia’s territorial claims will be not discussed in this study. 163

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triotism for British imperialism and the colony of New South Wales sent a contingent to aid the “beleaguered mother country.” 166 During the Boer War, Australian colonial contingents fought in South Africa, showing solidarity with the Empire, doing their patriotic duty and expressing their loyalty to Britain. When Australian colonial troops left for South Africa, the Argus expressed pride in Australia defending its “racial kinship and heritage.” 167 The conservative press supported the Empire’s action in South Africa, whereas the radical press expressed an alternative view. The Brisbane Worker blamed the daily newspapers for spreading the flames of jingoism and summoning the “savage instincts of race-hatred and blood-thirstiness.” The Bulletin, adopting a pro-Boer position, disparaged the Sydney Morning Herald, the Telegraph, and The Age for believing the “officially cooked” cables of the war. 168 On February 12, 1902 Australian Prime Minister Edmund Barton farewelled the first Commonwealth force from Circular Quay in Sydney to serve in South Africa. He told them that “Australia did not stand for militarism but for truth and justice.” The bulk of Australians supported the war with the dictum: “For the Empire, right or wrong.” 169 When World War One was imminent in early August 1914, the statements of Federal politicians appeared in The Age and Argus including that of Joseph Cook, the Prime Minister, who stated that “... when the Empire is at war. Australia is at war ... [and] our efforts in Australia are for the Empire and for the security of the Empire.” Andrew Fisher, the Federal Labor opposition leader, uttered that “Australia will stand beside our own to help and defend her to our last man and our last shilling.” 170 These statements showed clearly that Australia would come to the support of Britain in such a major crisis. As further proof of Australian loyalty and patriotism to King and Empire, Joseph 166

Stephen Alomes, op. cit., p.20; G. L. Buxton, “Ch. 5 1870–90” in F. K. Crowley (ed), op. cit., p.200; Gordon, op. cit., pp.115–7. 167 Australia Vol.v, pp.169, 172; Gordon, op. cit., pp.152–4. 168 Australia Vol.v, p.170; Sylvia Lawson, The Archibald Paradox, Allen Lane, Ringwood, 1983, pp .183–4. 169 Australia Vol.v, pp.213–214. 170 The Age, August 1, 1914 p.10; Robson, op. cit., p.31; Ian Turner, “Ch. 8 1914–19” in Crowley (ed), op. cit., pp.312–14.

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Cook committed an Australian expeditionary force. The Age was critical of Australia’s small navy being moved from Australian waters for possible duty in Europe, as Australia’s coastal defences could be exposed to a German naval assault. However, it supported Cook’s offer of sending an Australian expeditionary force to the war. 171 After Britain’s official declaration of war against Germany on August 6, 1914 the Argus and The Age offices became centres of information, as ordinary people gathered outside waiting to read the latest cables of the war from London. This showed very clearly that newspapers were the main source of information for ordinary people in 1914 and also in the post 1918 period. 172 It can be argued that Australian nationhood came of age with the landing of Australian and New Zealand forces at Gallipoli on April 25, 1915. C. E. W. Bean, the official historian of World War One and a war correspondent, described Anzac Day as a momentous occasion when “the consciousness of Australian nationhood was born.” Though the Gallipoli expedition was a military disaster, it did help to create the Anzac legend and Australian heroes. 173 As a young nation developing, myth making became an important factor in establishing “an important means of communication, of bringing people together, of giving ... [people] something to hold in common.” 174 The effects of mythmaking made the creation of bonds of social cohesion, community solidarity and the forging of a “true” Australian identity possible in the midst of dramatic political and social upheaval. In the Chanak crisis of September 1922 the Australian Government initially wanted to commit Australian troops to defend the Empire in the Turkish Straits. As the emergency eased, a number of people questioned the motives of London. For the first time, Australian support was not automatic, since the horrors of Gallipoli were still etched in the minds of the post 1918 171

The Age, August 4, 1914 p.8; Ian Turner, “Ch. 8 1914–19” in Crowley (ed), op. cit., p.316. 172 Robson, op. cit., p.32; Ian Turner, “Ch. 8 1914–19” in Crowley (ed), op. cit., p.314. 173 Alomes, op. cit., p.60. 174 Russel Ward, The Australian Legend, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1965, p.235.

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generation. 175 The conservative press played its part in promoting an Australian nationalism within an Imperial framework, unlike the radical press that exhibited an anti-British stance and publicised a different nationalism under the slogan “Australia for the Australians.” The Bulletin espoused a radical nationalism under the maxim “Australia for the Australians.” The bush workers in the pastoral industry, though few in number, contributed to an Australian outlook with a degree of influence that exceeded their “numerical and economic strength, on the attitudes of the whole Australian community.” 176 Some of the ideas of mateship grew out of the loneliness, the hazards and hardships of living in the outback; from behaving in a brotherly manner towards everyone; and from providing free and easy hospitality. The notion of mateship had become a dynamic force in the 1880s. 177 Russell Ward describes the bushman as “a practical man, rough and ready in his manners and quick to decry any appearance of affection ... a great improviser, fiercely independent, but one who would stick to his mates through thick and thin.” 178 The Bulletin became known as the “Bushman’s Bible” because it gave a disproportionate space to outback news, views, and themes. It was a prominent journal in both urban and rural areas, as J. F. Archibald, the editor, invited reader participation by asking them to forward their short stories. The Bulletin promoted Australian literature, the best known of these “nationalist” authors of the 1890s being Henry Lawson, Andrew Barton ‘Banjo’ Paterson, and Joseph Furphy. 179 The Bulletin’s editorial of July 2, 1887 defined Australian nationalism as “By the term, Australian we mean not those who have been merely born in Australia. All white men who come to these shores- with a clean record.” 180 It is evident that the Bulletin was adopting a racial doctrine of white supremacy. This racial attitude becomes very clearly defined on 175

The Chanak crisis will be covered in greater detail in Chapter 4. Russel Ward, The Australian Legend, p.v. 177 ibid., pp.78 and 168. 178 Stephen Alomes, op. cit., p.17. 179 Russel Ward, Australia: A Short History, Ure Smith, Sydney, 1975, p.106; The Australian Legend, p.207; Maclachlan, op. cit., pp .145–51. 180 Ward, Australia: A Short History, p.105. 176

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June 17, 1893 when it declared “Australia for the Australians—The cheap chinaman, the cheap nigger, and the cheap European pauper to be absolutely excluded…” 181 Besides its racial dogma, it showed an anti-monarchical and antiimperialist attitude, advocated the abolition of “nobility” titles, and supported a Republican Australia. After Federation in 1901, Manning Clark tells us that the Bulletin championed the development of an Australian accent. 182 As a publication it was not afraid to criticise the mainstream conservative press. It tried to distinguish itself from other papers. It depicted the Argus as the “foolish old Argus” and “there is nothing Australian about the Argus.” It portrayed the Argus and Sydney Morning Herald as nothing more than imitating the London Times and the popular Age and Sydney Telegraph were also “among the false prophets.” 183 It is interesting that by 1919 the Bulletin too, had, become part of the mainstream press. 184 The next part of this study will focus on the emergence and development of news agencies as news gathering organisations.

5. THE ROLE OF THE NEWS AGENCIES The news agencies play an important role in collecting news and selling it for a fee to newspapers. There were four main news agencies that emerged in the mid-19th century: Havas (France) in 1835, Wolff (Prussia and later Imperial Germany) in 1849, Reuters (Great Britain) in 1851, and New York Associated Press (A.P.) in 1848 which provided the vast majority of international news to newspapers. They formed an association of news agencies (also known as a “Ring Combination”) whereby its members were bound by agreements or “treaties,” renewed at periodic intervals. 185 Around 1870 these four agencies had 181

Ward, The Australian Legend, p.208; Lawson, op. cit., p.153. Ward, Australia: A Short History, p.105; Ward, The Australian Legend, p.208; Australia vol.v, p.224. 183 Lawson, op. cit., pp.182 and 184–5. 184 Lawson, op. cit., pp.250–1; Ward, Australia: A Short History, p.105. 185 Robert W. Desmond, Windows on the World, University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 1980, p.61. Hereafter cited as Windows on the World. It should be noted that after 1870 the Havas and Wolff news agencies received financial 182

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carved up the world into zones, with each agency having the right to collect and transmit news exclusively: for example, Reuters had the monopoly for the British Empire, Turkey, India, and Far East; Havas controlled the news distribution in France, Switzerland, Italy, the Iberian Peninsula, Central, and South America and, in association with Reuters, in Egypt; Wolff handled the news for Germany, Austria, Scandinavia, Russia, the Balkans, and the Netherlands; and finally, New York A.P. was limited to the U.S.A. as well as its affiliated regional network. 186 The agreement between the agencies that lasted for some 50 years had a striking effect on world opinion and a distinct influence on journalism of the 20th century. Kent Cooper described Reuters and Havas’ domination of international news as serving three aims: “1) They kept out A.P. competition; 2) They were free to present American news disparingly… if they presented it all; 3) They could present news of their own countries most favourably and without being contradicted. Their own countries were always glorified. This was done by reporting great advances at home in English and French civilisation, the benefit of which would, of course, be bestowed on the world.” 187 Kent Cooper has overlooked that in the period under review, Great Britain and France were the two leading global powers, each having vast colonial possessions in the Middle East, Africa, Asia, and South Pacific. As stated previously, the press reported on issues concerning elite nations such as Britain and France. Furthermore, the U.S.A. pursued an isolationist foreign policy that restricted itself to the affairs of the Americas. 188 The Australian colonies and later the Comsupport from their respective governments. Reuters never received financial assistance from the British government. 186 John Hohenberg, Foreign Correspondence, Columbia University Press, New York, 1965, p.32; Graham Storey, Reuters, Greenwood Press, New York, 1970, p.53. It should be noted that many foreign news items appearing in the New York Times came from Associated Press. 187 Hohenberg, op. cit., pp.32–3. 188 This U.S. foreign policy stance was known as the Monroe doctrine where they would be not drawn into the problems of Europe. They broke their isolation by entering the First World War on the side of Britain and

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monwealth in its loyalty to King and Empire were drawn into the web of European imperial rivalries, for example in the Boer War 1899–1902 and the First World War 1914–18. From an Australian perspective, Reuters had the monopoly in providing news services and information for the entire British Empire and this showed the dependence of the Australian press on British news sources. 189 The submarine cable in 1872 linked Australia to the outside world, when the proprietors of the Argus and Sydney Morning Herald attended a Reuters Board conference in London in December 1872. They stated that they wanted to receive British news direct from London and not from the Reuters agent in Sydney. They paid a high price for Reuters telegrams supplied in London and went on to appoint their own correspondents. 190 From this emerged the Australian Associated Press (AAP), the Sydney Morning Herald, Argus, and Adelaide Register being its founding members. Sir Lachlan Charles Mackinnon of the Argus returned from London in May 1877 having failed to convince the Times management to have its news cabled to Australia. This failure, however, gave Reuters through AAP the means of supplying world news to the entire Australian press and thus helped to reduce the isolation of the Australian colonies and the future Commonwealth. 191 Storey makes the interesting observation that the Australian press failed to develop its own domestic news agency. They organised themselves in groups on the basis of procuring “the Reuters service in London for selecting and cabling to Australia at the discretion of their London representatives.” Clearly this deprived Reuters of the benefit of a news-distribution operation in Australia and prevented it from having intimate relations with its customers. 192 It can be seen that the news sent by Australian representatives in London back to Australia France against the central powers and also participated at the Paris peace conference of 1919. 189 Storey, op. cit., p.53. The Reuters monopoly in the British Empire was based on Agency Agreements concluded by the four news agencies. 190 ibid., p.70. 191 Mayer, op. cit., pp.27–8; Men who made The Argus, “Proprietors and their Representatives.”; Storey, op. cit., pp.70–1. 192 Storey, op. cit., p.119.

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served three purposes: 1) The representatives reported on news affecting the British Empire; 2) They sent news items which were important for each colony and later the Australian federation which portrayed British decision-making in a favourable light; and 3) They sent reports expressing loyalty towards and sympathy for the British point of view in world affairs. There was an ambiguity in the position of the Australian press that on the other hand showed independence in the selecting and cabling of news, and yet at the same time depended on buying their news from Reuters. It can be further argued that the failure to develop an Australian domestic news agency was attributable to Australia’s colonial settlement, whereby each colony fiercely protecting its own sovereignty and links with the Empire. In order to overcome their differences, the members of the AAP in 1895 concluded an agreement with a rival syndicate comprising The Age, Daily Telegraph, and Adelaide Advertiser, which established the United Cable Association (U.C.A. , also called Australian Press Association). 193 This agreement banned the participation of other metropolitan newspapers without the unanimous consent of all members and also prohibited the use of other foreign cable services. Souter points out that by 1909 this consortium had eight subscribers in addition to its seven members, that it was not an easy group to join, and that its subscribers accused it of exorbitant charges. 194 Responding to these grievances, Senator George Pearce (Labor) set up a Senate Inquiry in September 1909 to investigate the Press cable service. The inquiry presented its findings in August 1910, recommending that a subsidy be offered to allow a new cable company to be established, which would charge uniform rates based on circulation and population and which did not prohibit subscribers from using other agencies. The Fisher administration provided a 6000 pounds subsidy to activate the scheme. The subsidy aimed to help the small publications to get established. Senator George Pearce could not prove the charges of gross inaccuracy and political bias but the U.C.A.’s monopoly had 193

Walker, op. cit., p.205; Mayer, op. cit., p.28; Gavin Souter, Company of Heralds, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 981, p.116. 194 Walker, op. cit., pp.205–6; Souter, op. cit., p.116.

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now been exposed. 195 The inquiry forced the U.C.A. to drop its clause requiring unanimous support before a new metropolitan paper could be admitted. Taking advantage of this new situation, an Independent Cable Association was formed which served the Labor and country press until it went out of business in 1916. In 1912 Hugh Denison, the owner of the Sydney Sun, founded a third rival service without a subsidy to compete against the UCA, and when the Melbourne Herald joined in 1913, this service became known as the Sun-Herald cable service. From 1915– 1921 Keith Murdoch was manager and editor of the service. 196 During World War One, Reuters issued Allied war communiqués and official news releases for the British Empire. It enjoyed a respected position because of its access to information provided by the British government. Some commentators accused Reuters, during and after the war, of having received subsidies and of being an arm of the British government, a charge strenuously rejected by the agency. When Sir Roderick Jones became owner of Reuters in 1916, the ownership agreement stipulated that impartiality on news be maintained and that British citizens remain in charge. 197 As stated earlier, Reuters faced many problems with the Australian press. It resumed its direct news distribution service to the Australian press in 1915 that lasted until the mid- 1920s. 198 This gave it a dominant position, once again, in providing news to Australia. The Melbourne Argus, however, in the course of the 1914–18 war sought to improve its cable services by increasing its options and reducing its dependence on Reuters. On March 7, 1916 it approached the London Morning Post, Central News, and Exchange Telegraph to secure addi195

Souter, op. cit., p.116; Sawer, op. cit., p.104; Walker, op. cit., p.207. Walker, op. cit., p.207; Souter, op. cit., p.116. The United Cable Service and Australian Press Association amalgamated in 1935 to form the Australian Associated Press. It was as a non-profit organisation of Australian papers gathering international news and information in London. See Bonney and Wilson, op. cit., p.301 and R. B. Walker, Yesterday’s News, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1980, p.107. 197 Window on the World, p.300. 198 Storey, op. cit., p.198. 196

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tional news concerning the war. These agreements began respectively on July 1 and October 4, 1916. The Morning Post, like the Argus, was a conservative newspaper standing for tradition, perpetuating the class system and believing in British national superiority. 199 The Argus expanded its options further by securing contracts with United Press Service (UPS) for 250 pounds a year and New York Times for 500 pounds a year in June 1916. W. W. Davies was given charge of the American service. When UPS was expanding as a news agency prior to 1914, Reuters approached it for an alliance that it declined, thus remaining independent. 200 The New York Times was an important source for the Argus in its reports of the 1914– 18 War. For example, the New York Times printed its Current History magazine with supplementary material that gave a day-by-day account of the war and special articles written by qualified writers, as well as a list of texts of important documents and addresses. The New York Times still produced, also, a cumulative index of the entire contents of its daily editions in 1998. 201 Another agreement concluded by the Argus was that of January 1, 1919 with the Daily Express of London. As a newspaper the Daily Express enjoyed a large circulation based on contests, horse racing predictions and lively editorials. Max Aitken (later Lord Beaverbrook) purchased the newspaper in 1913 knowing nothing of the news business. He went to the French front in 1915 to render “eye-witness” reports of the war for his paper. He became Minister of Information in 1917 and acted as a special representative for the Canadian Government. Under Lord Beaverbrook the paper became more vigorous in its coverage of national and international events and Beaverbrook maintained control

199

Historical records of the Argus, “Cable service rates,” p.7; The Press and World Affairs, p.181. 200 Historical records of the Argus, “Cable service rates,” p.7; Windows on the World, pp.126–7 and 277. 201 Windows on the World, p.274. The Argus newspaper produced its own index of its daily editions and a copy of it is held at University of Melbourne Baillieu library.

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until his death in 1964. 202 During the Greek-Turkish War The Age and Argus received reports of the conflict from some of the following sources: New York Times, Daily Express, Morning Post, Daily Telegraph, Reuters Agency, Observer, New Statesman, Chicago Tribune, and L’Echo de Paris. 203 The foreign correspondent was the intermediary between the news story and the reading public.

6. THE ROLE OF FOREIGN CORRESPONDENTS REPORTING THE NEWS

The foreign correspondent comes into contact with the individuals who make the news through their exploits, reflections, and words. He determines what is newsworthy by making his reports of those contacts available to many individuals both at home and overseas. 204 This section will deal with the importance of the foreign correspondent’s role by focussing on four points: (a) The emergence of the modern war correspondent; (b) The importance of London as a news centre in the period under review; (c) The appearance of Australian foreign correspondents; and finally (d) The operation of the press at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and other conferences relating to the settling of the Turkish peace question. 6a) The emergence of the modern war correspondent Peter Knightley tells us that “[William Harvard] Russell’s coverage of the Crimean war [1854–56] marked the beginning of an organised effort to report a war to the civilian population at home using the services of a civilian reporter.” 205 J. T. Delane, the editor of the London Times sent out Russell, to report on this conflict. His reports from the 202

Historical records of the Argus, “Cable service rates,” p.9; The Press and World Affairs, p.182; Windows on the World, pp.171–2; Robert W. Desmond, Crisis and Conflict, University of Iowa Press, Iowa, 1982, p.277. Hereafter cited as Crisis and Conflict. 203 These news sources are quoted in the text of The Age and Argus newspapers. 204 The Press and World Affairs, pp.2–3. 205 Phillip Knightley, The First Casualty, Andre Deutsch, London, 1975, p.4.

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Crimea disclosed the horrible conditions of the British army who were dying of disease and suffering neglect and hunger. He was highly critical of the British Army Command, which led to the recall of Lord Raglan, an individual who had not fought since the Napoleonic wars. Russell sent his dispatches in the form of letters, some of which did not appear in the Times but were circulated among Cabinet Ministers. This led finally to the resignation of Lord Aberdeen’s government. 206 Sir William Codrington, the new Commmander-in-Chief, who was infuriated with the press, was able, with the support of Lord Panmure, the Secretary of War, to issue a general order on February 26, 1856, which imposed for the first time, military censorship. This directive arrived too late to have any effect; but it was to be utilised in the Boer war and in the reporting in World War One which led to the silencing of journalists. 207 There are two other examples of late-19th century foreign journalists who dispatched news to their home offices with the intention of either influencing government thinking or arousing public hostility. J. A. MacGahan, an American reporter working for the London Daily News, revealed to a startled Great Britain and Europe the Turkish atrocities in Bulgaria in 1876. While W. E. Gladstone, the British Prime Minister, was disturbed by these accounts, Lord Beaconsfield considered them as mere “coffee house babble.” When these stories were later authenticated, however, the revelations they contained led to a diminution of Turkish rule in Europe at the time of the Treaty of Berlin. Henri De Blowitz of the London Times, while attending the Congress of Berlin in 1878, gained a scoop over his fellow journalists by obtaining a copy of the treaty which ended the Russo-Turkish conflict and “[having] it published in the Times even before it was signed in Berlin.” 208

206

Hohenberg, op. cit., pp.47–54; Knightley, op. cit., pp.5–14; For a diplomatic account of this conflict see J. A. S. Grenville, Europe Reshaped 1848– 1878, Fontana, London, 1981, chs. 10–11. 207 Knightley, op. cit., pp.15–6. 208 The Press and World Affairs, pp.28–9.

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6b) The importance of London as a news centre in the period under investigation From 1800 to 1945, London achieved its preeminence in several ways: 1) It was regarded as the financial centre of the world; 2) It was the main communication centre of the globe; and finally, 3) It was the chief trading centre, setting prices for commodities and products everywhere. Point 2 is the most relevant for this study. The importance of London as a news centre in the period 1919–23 is unquestioned. It was the administrative seat of the British Empire, where the Houses of Parliament, Government Ministries, the Royal Family, and Law Courts were located. The Foreign Embassies, Consulates and legations were another source of information. The British Foreign Office, as well as the Prime Minister’s and the Colonial Offices provided information on matters pertaining to foreign affairs. 209 Most British Government departments had spokesmen to meet the press who provided background information only to them. Each government ministry in London had its own press personnel. The most enterprising of these was the Foreign and Prime Ministers Offices. 210 The Foreign Office press gatherings tended to be unofficial affairs where the Foreign Office official spoke cautiously to journalists to avoid misinterpretation of certain statements. Background news provided to reporters was not to be published. These press “conferences” were attended by journalists of major British newspapers, special correspondents representing foreign publications and reporters who wanted to know “what lies behind the bare bones of the news.” The outcome of these gatherings was the publication of newspaper articles expressed in terms such as “it is said in Whitehall,” and “unofficial British circles” and information garnered from Embassies was referred to as “diplomatic circles.” 211 Any newspaper wishing to claim leadership in its home nation would locate journalistic staff in London. There was the added advantage of having Reuters close by to provide information for foreign 209

ibid ., pp.171 and 174–5. ibid., p.175. 211 ibid., p.176. 210

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newspapers, since many reporters took their news indirect from Reuters or some other agency, or through the exchange dealings with some of the London papers. 212 From an Australian viewpoint, the war correspondent accounts of the Greek-Turkish conflict which emanated from Athens, Constantinople (Istanbul), Angora (Ankara), Paris, Rome, and London were picked up by the Australian Press Association in London who then cabled these to the Melbourne offices of the Argus and The Age newspapers. 6c) The appearance of the Australian foreign correspondent For a young press, Australian journalists were very active on the international stage in reporting conflict to their home audiences. This trend became pronounced from 1900 onwards. The Argus was the most enterprising newspaper of its era in sending its journalists overseas. Howard Willoughby of the Argus is given the honour of being Australia’s first war correspondent. He accompanied an Australian contingent to New Zealand to report on the Maori war in December 1863. Henry Britton was sent by the Argus in 1873 to investigate the slave trade in the Pacific and in 1874 went to cover the annexation of Fiji. He had become an authority on Pacific island issues. 213 Joe Melvin covered the Australian expedition to Sudan in 1885 for the Argus, whereas William J. Lambie was accredited as a reporter for the Sydney Morning Herald. Some 15 years later, Lambie, writing for both The Age and Sydney Morning Herald from South Africa, would earn the unfortunate distinction of being Australia’s first journalist killed in reporting war action. 214 Other Australian journalists who established a reputation for reporting the Boer War were Donald Macdonald and A. B. Patterson. The former was sent by the Argus in the spring of 1899 just prior to the commencement of hostilities and the latter for the Sydney Morning

212

ibid., pp.171 and 176. Gordon, op. cit., pp.82–4 and 92–4; Pat Burgess, Warco: Australian Reporters at War, William Heinemann, Melbourne, 1986, pp.14–5. 214 Burgess, op. cit., pp.17–8; Souter, op. cit., pp.91–3. 213

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Herald. A. G. Hales revealed to the outside world the lack of proper sanitation in the medical camps. 215 Another Australian correspondent William Henry Donald, of the Sydney Daily Telegraph reported in 1905 on the Japanese naval victory over the Russian fleet at Tsushima. In 1905 he became a writer for both the London Daily Telegraph and New York Herald, and also represented the Argus. Donald’s account of the Japanese victory over a European power had shocked Australians into realising that they were “a lonely outpost of European civilization in a region which is profoundly alien.” 216 For the next 40 years, Australia’s foreign policy makers viewed Japan as a threat to Australian security. They were also concerned to maintain and preserve a white Australian society. During the 1914–18 War Australia’s best-known reporters were C. E. W. Bean and Keith Murdoch. The former was elected by the Australian Journalists Association and beat the latter to be Australia’s official war correspondent. Bean reported on the Anzac landing at Gallipoli in April 1915 and by the time his first account appeared in the Australian press in May, it had been greatly censored. 217 As a reporter he never accepted second-hand information, as he made it his responsibility to “[see] everything with his own eyes.” He was well known to Australian soldiers as he spent time with them in the trenches and battlefields of Gallipoli and France and shared also in their discomforts and perils. He was critical and questioning of Britain’s handling of the use of Australian troops and was inspired by “high-minded patriotism.” 218 The Manchester Guardian paid Bean the ultimate tribute by writing, “He was the best war correspondent the war elicited. He understood war and also that unprecedented war; he went everywhere and had a great eye for the currents of the fight; he is

215

Gordon, op. cit., pp.146–8 and 152–4; Souter, op. cit., pp.102–3; Burgess, op. cit., pp.18–9; Knightley, op. cit., p.74. 216 Gordon, op. cit., pp.172–3; F. K. Crowley, “Ch. 7 1901–14,” in F. K. Crowley [ed], op. cit., p.293. 217 Gordon, op. cit., pp.201–3; Burgess, op. cit., pp.20–4; Souter, op. cit., pp.115–16. 218 Knightley, op. cit., p.110.

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a man of independence, civility and deep feeling without a drop of gush or a thread of fluff about him.” 219 Murdoch’s visit to Gallipoli in late August 1915 resulted in the recall of General Sir Ian Hamilton and the eventual withdrawal of Imperial troops from that theatre. The London Daily Telegraph correspondent Ellis AshmeadBartlett told Murdoch of the difficulty of sending his cables, criticised the handling of the campaign, and believed that a major disaster would develop before winter. Ashmead-Bartlett asserted that the British Government and British public were deprived of the truth. 220 Murdoch agreed to take this report personally with him to London in order to avoid the censor. While en route to London, British authorities detained him at Marseilles, threatening to keep him in custody until he handed over Ashmead-Bartlett’s letter. It appears that H. W. Nevinson, the correspondent of the Guardian, overheard the Murdoch and Ashmead-Bartlett conversation and informed Hamilton about it. Hamilton notified the War Office, which ordered Murdoch’s arrest and revoked Ashmead-Bartlett’s accreditation by ordering him back to London. 221 At the Australian High Commission in London on September 23, 1915 Murdoch wrote down everything he recollected of AshmeadBartlett’s report and forwarded this in a letter addressed to Australian Prime Minister, Andrew Fisher. Knightley describes it as “an amazing document, a mixture of error, fact, exaggeration, prejudice, and the most sentimental patriotism, which made highly damaging charges against the British general staff and Hamilton, many of them untrue.” 222

219

Burgess, op. cit., p.20. Knightley, op. cit., pp.100–1; Zwar, op. cit., pp.24–5. Keith Murdoch was sent as an “unofficial Ambassador” of the Australia Government to investigate the mail problem and scheme involving the disappearance of monies sent to A.I.F. personnel in Egypt. See Zwar pp.21–4. 221 Knightley, op. cit., p.102; Zwar, op. cit., p.28. 222 Knightley, op. cit., p.102; A part of the Murdoch letter can be found in Zwar, op. cit., pp.31–9. 220

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Whatever Murdoch’s motives in writing such a letter, it produced the desired result. Lloyd George, the British Minister of Munitions until 1916, got possession of this document and prompted Murdoch to send a copy to Prime Minister Asquith, who circulated it to the Cabinet. The Dardanelles Committee met on October 14 when Sir Charles Monro replaced Hamilton, and the evacuation of Gallipoli occurred in December 1915. 223 Another Australian correspondent, C. P. Smith of the Argus, did not share the same spotlight as Bean and Murdoch, but contributed nevertheless to the reporting from the Dardanelles in October 1915. After completing his assignment he toured the Balkans, reporting on the war from that front and accompanied W. M. Hughes to the 1921 Imperial Conference in London. 224 It was the above three Australian journalists who reported and described to ordinary Australians the Gallipoli campaign, which took place in an area located on the European side of Turkey. 6d) The operation of the press at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 and other meetings pertaining to settlement of the Greek-Turkish War 225 The main problems faced by the press in covering the Paris Peace Conference and the other discussions for resolving the Greek-Turkish conflict were the issues of official communiqués and the imposition of military censorship in Constantinople, Ankara, Smyrna, and Athens. The Paris Peace Conference was the first international meeting where the victorious Allied and Associated Powers assembled to impose their peace terms on the vanquished Central Powers: Germany, AustroHungary, Bulgaria, and Turkish Empire. The press and diplomats gathered in large numbers from January 1919 to August 1920. The actual number of journalists who attended fluctuated, depending on the importance of the event. For example, during Germany’s signing of the 223

Knightley, op. cit., p.103; Zwar, op. cit., pp.41 and 44. Gordon, op. cit., pp.204–7; Historical Record of the Argus, “Expeditions abroad” pp.3–4. 225 Desmond’s Windows on the World is invaluable in describing the work performed by journalists at the Paris Peace Conference 1919. See pp.402–27. 224

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Treaty of Versailles the number of reporters was high and decreased sharply thereafter. 226 The journalists who attended in Paris were confronted with some serious problems. These included: 1) having to adjust from war journalism to peacetime reporting, which involved complex socio-political and economic questions; and 2) having to cope with a conference conducted in secrecy. As far as the first point is concerned, journalists were confronted with complex territorial issues, the creation of the League of Nations, and reparations, all of which required detailed explanation for their reading public. Many of these news stories appeared in the pages of both The Age and Argus. 227 The second point, which concerns the secrecy in Paris, requires a detailed explanation. The secrecy revolved around the issue of publicity and whether or not the press should be allowed to cover the Conference proceedings. In fact, the Allied and Associated Powers decided on January 15, 1919 to issue daily brief communiqués via its General Secretariat to the press. Lloyd George, the British Prime Minister, was concerned about press leaks and keeping the Germans in the dark regarding Allied intentions. American President Woodrow Wilson was disappointed that Point 1 of his Fourteen Points about “Open Covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frank and in the public view” was being undermined by his 226

Windows on the World, pp. 402–6. The peace negotiations surrounding the fate of the Ottoman Empire and Greek interests in the Near East will be covered in later chapters of this dissertation. 227 This is a small sample appearing in the Melbourne press relating to foreign news. See Argus, “ITALY AND ADRIATIC. Jugo-Slavs Resentful.” “LEAGUE OF NATIONS. President Wilson Hopeful.” January 20, 1919, p.7; “POSITION IN RUSSIA. Allies’ Intervention Sought.,” “PEACE CONFERENCE. AUSTRALIA AND JAPAN. MR Hughes and Japan.,” January, 24, 1919, p.7; The Age, “AUSTRALIA’S POLICY. MR. HUGHES SPEAKS. RELATIONS WITH JAPAN. GERMAN INDEMNITY NEEDED...,” January 23, 1919, p.7; “A STRONG POLAND. America’s Determination.,” “INVITATION TO RUSSIA. Opposition Aroused.,” “Future of Constantinople.,” January 30, 1919, p.5.

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European counterparts. The Confreres agreed not to discuss conference matters with journalists, other than what was contained in the official communiqués. 228 On January 18, The Age headline, “PEACE CONFERENCE. A PLEDGE TO SECRECY. Embargo Placed on Delegates.,” from its special representative in Paris, captured the Allied intentions of imposing press censorship. 229 It mentioned that Empire Press representatives strongly protested to Lloyd George regarding the imposition of secrecy. The Age special correspondent stated that “a meeting of the press and the Allied and associated governments for interchange of views concerning future methods” should take place in order to overcome problems between the Peace Conference and the press. It would seem that this quote could be attributed to Woodrow Wilson. 230 The Council of Ten continued their deliberations on January 16, when President Wilson suggested that the Allies, through their respective press bureaux, invite their journalists to a rendezvous at the Foreign Press club at 5p.m., to explain the difficulties encountered by the Conference. Paul Mantoux, the official interpreter of the Peace Conference, was dispatched to meet the journalists that afternoon to explain these difficulties. The Confreres wanted to keep national differences confined to inside the walls of the Quai d’Orsay and not splashed on the pages of the press. 231

228

U.S. Dept of State, Foreign Relations of the United States: Paris Peace Conference 1919 vol.3, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1943, pp.543–5, 550–3 and 575–7. Hereafter cited as FRUS PPC with the relevant volume number. Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement Vol.3, William Heinemann, London, 1923, p.43. 229 The Age, “PEACE CONFERENCE. A PLEDGE OF SECRECY. Embargo Placed on Delegates.,” January 18,1919, p.11. 230 The Age, January 18,1919, p.11; FRUS PPC vol.3., p.563. 231 Arthur S. Link [Ed], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vol.54, Princeton University Press, Princeton,1986, pp.98–9. Hereafter cited as PPW with the relevant volume number; F. S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919: Organization and Procedure, Oxford University Press, London, 1944, p.65.

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The text of the resolutions embraced by the special committee of journalists nominated by the Allied and American press included: 1) ...it is essential to ensure full publicity to the peace negotiations. 2) ...official communiqués issued by the Peace Conference shall be complete as possible. 3) [Besides] ... the official communiqués, full summaries of each day’s proceedings should be issued ... but for the guidance of the members of the press who will maintain full freedom of comment. 4) ...this committee is opposed to any rule of the Conference which would interfere with the free intercourse between delegates and responsible journalists. 5) ...the committee recommends equality of treatment of the Allied press by the abolition of the censorship in all Allied countries...

It is interesting that the French, British, Americans, Italians, and F. Collin and Frano Cviesta representing the smaller nations unanimously agreed with the first five resolutions. However, the French disagreed with resolution no.6, which recommended “equal representation of the press at the Conferences.” Another additional two resolutions were adopted by the British, Italian, and American press committee. These included: 1) “...[the] direct representation of the press at the sittings of the Peace Conference”; and 2) “that the press of each of the great powers should be represented by not fewer than five delegates and ... the smaller nations which have taken an active part in the war should have proportionate representation.” 232 The Age and Argus report of January 20 showed the unanimity of the British, American, and Italian journalists compared to the French. The Council of Ten included the Prime and Foreign Ministers of Great Britain, France and Italy, the U.S. President and Secretary of State and 2 members of the Japanese Delegation. This body later split into the Councils of Four and Five. The latter body became the conference of foreign ministers with Japan retaining her place. However, the former included Great Britain, France, United States and Italy. The real decision making power at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 resided with the Big Three: Britain, France and the United States. 232 Ray Stannard Baker, op. cit., and pp.50 -1. Paul Mantoux’s meeting with the Allied and American journalists is confirmed in FRUS PPC vol.3, p.612.

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Both Melbourne papers focussed on the French disagreement with what was apparently resolution number one of the two additional ones. Both newspapers mentioned the British, American, and French press positions regarding publicity. British journalists wanted “to attend the conference and issue a semi-official statement daily” whereas the Americans insisted on “an open conference.” The French were doubtful that the conference would remain secret. 233 When the Council of Ten met on January 17 at 10.30 a.m., Lloyd George remarked that if the press were given full summaries of the proceedings, as in resolution no.3, then the conference would never finish. 234 After a lot of debate, Woodrow Wilson got his colleagues to agree to a compromise which would allow the press to attend the Conference. 235 The following rule was adopted regarding full conferences: “Representatives of the Press will be admitted to the meetings of the full Conference but upon necessary occasions the deliberations of the Conference may be held in camera.” Both Melbourne papers reported on the agreed Conference resolution without mentioning the names of any statesmen. 236 There is no doubt that Woodrow Wilson was trying to find some compromise over his “Open Covenants of peace, openly arrived at...” which would satisfy both the press and his critics. Both Melbourne papers informed its reading public that two U.S. Senators Charles F. Johnson, Democrat Maine, and William E. Borah, Republican Idaho, criticised Wilson in Senate speeches for falling prey to the clutches of secret European diplomacy. Senator Johnson asserted “A Strictly American policy is wanted.” However, the newspapers failed to explain the meaning of this statement. Senator Johnson wanted the return of American troops and “to leave to other nations, the nations 233

Argus, “QUESTION OF PUBLICITY. The Press Consulted.” January 20, 1919, p.7; The Age, “Secrecy Order Rescinded.” January 20, 1919, p.5. 234 FRUS PPC vol.3, p.595. 235 Ibid., pp.613–22. 236 FRUS PPC vol.3, p.622; R. Stannard Baker, op. cit., p.49; Argus, January 20,1919, p.7; The Age, January 20,1919, p.5; Charles T. Thompson, The Peace Conference: Day by Day, Brentano’s New York, 1920, p.114.

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beyond the sea, the policing of the world hereafter.” He was supporting an isolationist foreign policy for the United States. 237 The Commonwealth Government viewed the quick demobilisation of the Australian Imperial Force as a top priority, and this was reported in the Melbourne press. 238 While the press was supposedly allowed to cover the conference, The Age and Argus reported on January 23 and April 8, 1919 that secrecy was still in force. 239 Another source of disclosure to the press was that of news leaks. An example of this appeared in the Melbourne press on January 16, 1919 where the French paper, Humanite, was quoted as having published an official document which stated that Britain had told its Allied partners that the Bolsheviks should be allowed to send delegates to Paris. This unauthorised article revealed the differences between Britain and France over Bolshevism. 240 Most journalists were interested in giving the public the facts on important issues and this information came from indirect sources such as members of national delegations who were disenchanted with the progress of the conference. Some British journalists established their own sources of information based on experience and personal associations and wrote well-informed reports

237

Argus, January 20,1919, p.7; The Age, January 20,1919, p.5; Congressional Record-Senate, 65th Congress, 3rd Session, vol.LV11 pt 2, pp.1582–85. 238 Argus, “A.I.F. DEMOBILISATION. Order of Return.,” January 23,1919, p.7; The Age, “DEMOBILISATION. POSITION OF AUSTRALIANS. 3000 EMBARKING WEEKLY.” January 23, 1919, p.7. The issue of A.I.F. demobilisation will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 239 The Age, “PEACE CONFERENCE. POLICY OF SECRECY.” January 23,1919, p.7 and “Big Four’s Secret Sessions. Unproductive of rapid results.,” April 8,1919, p.5; Argus, “PEACE TERMS.... Largely in Secret.,” January 23,1919, p.7. 240 The Age, “PEACE CONFERENCE.... relations with the Bolshevists.,” January 16,1919, p.7; Argus, “PROBLEM OF RUSSIA. French AntiBolshevism.” January 16,1919, p.7; FRUS PPC vol.3, p.545.

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without reference to press officers of national delegations. One such individual was Henry Wickham Steed of the London Times. 241 George Slocombe, Paris Peace Conference reporter for the London Daily Herald, observed that journalism had entered a new period whereby reporters were insisting on answers to their questions. Describing the English correspondent, he remarked: As a body they were loyal, intelligent, conscientious, hard-working and patriotic. On the whole, they were as familiar with the questions at issue as the British ministers who crossed the Channel to represent Great Britain at the Peace Conference and at the many subsequent meetings with Allied statesmen. On the whole they reported the proceedings of these conferences fairly and intelligently, doing justice to the rival claims of contestants, and treating information imparted in confidence with the discretion imposed by the unwritten law of the Press... 242

The Australian Press Association also had a special correspondent covering the Paris Conference proceedings and received its information from Reuters, British, and American sources. The name of the special correspondent is not indicated in The Age article. In fact, Reuters was given the important role “of preparing official reports on the Paris negotiations for distribution to all British officials at home and abroad, as well as to the British press.” 243 The British Peace delegation established its press bureau with Sir George Riddell, the owner of News of the World, to liaise with the press. Riddell was also Vice-President of the Newspaper Proprietors Association and a close personal friend of Lloyd George. G. H. Mair assisted Riddell in the daily running of the press office by meeting re241

Windows on the World, pp.412, 414–5 and 417. Wickham Steed was in Paris from January to April 1919. On his return to London he became the editor of The Times. 242 Windows on the World, p.412. 243 Windows on the World., p.417; The Age, January 18,1919 p.11 “Peace Conference. A pledge to secrecy. Embargo placed on Delegates.” By 1919 Associated Press of America matched Reuters and Havas as a world agency. The Wolff agency lost some of its former exclusive territory, which was now shared by Reuters and Havas.

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porters and informing them of developments taking place at the conference. Ralph Norman Angell, editor of the Continental Daily Mail, and a member of the British delegation provided helpful information to journalists. Even Sir Phillip Kerr (later Lord Lothian), a secretary and adviser to Lloyd George, assisted journalists within permissible limits. 244 The French and Italian delegations’ dealings with the press were indirect and consisted of inviting select reporters and providing them with information that suited their own political purposes. There was an understanding that information would be given orally to journalists of other nations. 245 A major advantage of the British delegation’s press centre was that it was open for guidance and information for both British and foreign reporters. The American delegation had established a similar press office that gave helpful information to journalists. Desmond tells us that the British and American press departments conducted some joint sessions to reveal some of the issues raised by the Big Four—Britain, France, Italy, and the U.S. 246 The Australian delegation appointed Henry Gullett, the war correspondent in Palestine, as its press officer. L. F. Fitzhardinge, the offi244.

Windows on the World., p.415. Windows on the World., pp.415–6. “Under this system, information from the French delegation was channelled among others, through Andre Tardieu, the foreign editor of Le Temps, and Andre Geraud writing as “Pertinax” for L’Echo de Paris, and through Agence Havas. Luigi Barzini and Guglielmo Emanuel, correspondents for the Corriere della Sera of Milan were prominent among the Italian journalists meeting with Premier Orlando, while, also transmitting certain information to journalists of other countries. The Italian situation differed differed from that of the French in one respect, for Salvatore Cortese representing the Associated Press in Rome, also had his own special relations with members of the delegation.” Quoted in Windows on the World, pp.415–6. 246 Windows on the World., pp.415–7. Ray Stannard Baker was in charge of US Press Bureau for the US Peace Delegation in Paris. Arthur Sweetser was his principal assistant. Stephen Bonsal, one time correspondent for the New York Herald 1885–93, Walter Lippman and Charles Merz both on leave from the New Republic along with Frank I. Cobb, the chief of editorial page of the New York World, were the other personnel of the U.S. press bureau. See Windows on the World., p.416. 245.

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cial biographer of W. M. Hughes, says that “Keith Murdoch was on hand for his cable service.” 247 According to the Australian Dictionary of Biography, Vol.10, it mentions that Keith Murdoch was the only Australian journalist to witness the signing of the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. 248 During the Greek-Turkish war, no Australian journalists covered the conflict in Asia Minor, and the subsequent conferences staged to amend the Turkish peace treaty came from the Australian Press Association in London, which took its information as a rule from British and some American sources. Again, this showed the dependence of the Melbourne press on foreign news sources. 249 The Allied Powers continued to issue their usual official bulletins to the press in San Remo in April 1920, in London in February/March 1921, and in Paris in March 1922, as they tried to resolve the GreekTurkish war. 250 This did not stop the customary flow of information being leaked to the press. Andre Geraud, writing as “Pertinax” for the L’Echo de Paris was possibly the most notorious French journalist for publishing confidential information in the press. He had intimate links with the French Foreign Ministry that gave him access to sensitive and privileged details denied to the other journalists. L’Echo de Paris was one of the newspapers that the Melbourne press quoted in its press articles. 251

247

L. F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger 1914–52 Vol.2, Angus and Robertson, Sydney and Melbourne, 1979, p.372. 248 Australian Dictionary, Vol.10, p.623. 249 See earlier footnotes of the difficulties in getting access to the working files of The Age and Argus. 250 For the San Remo Conference 1920, See R. Butler and J. P. T. Bury [Ed], Documents on British Foreign Policy 1st Series 1919–39 vol.8, H.M.S.O., London, 1958, p.2. Hereafter cited as D.B.F.P. with appropriate volume number; At London in 1921 see D.B.F.P. vol.15, p.360; At Paris in 1922, See D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.668. Some of these conferences will be examined in greater detail in the chapters below. 251 D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.146 &n.12 -147; D.B.F.P. vol.9, p.445. D.B.F.P. vol.17, pp.705–6fn.3; George Bernard Noble, Policies and Opinions at Paris 1919, Howard Fertig, New York, 1968, p.310. The other few French journalists

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The press reporting of the Lausanne Conference ended the rule of secrecy that had prevailed at earlier peace conferences. At the Lausanne Conference of 1922–23, the Allies agreed to continue the conventional practice of issuing daily communiqués, through the general secretariat, to the press. Curzon, the British Foreign Minister and Chief Delegate at Lausanne, argued of the importance of maintaining secrecy. However, Ismet Pasha, the main Turkish Delegate at Lausanne, wanted the debate to be public. In the advent of disagreement with the Allies, Ismet suggested that Turkey be allowed to issue its own separate communiqués. The Allies remained unmoved by Ismet’s stance. The Melbourne press only mentioned the provisions of secrecy and that an Inter-Allied bureau was to be created. It only reported on Curzon and Ismet exchanging pleasantries for the success of the Conference. 252 Barrere, a French delegate, stated that “Diplomacy does not ... seek publicity. It is repugnant to diplomacy to do business in the market place...” Curzon and Marquis Garroni, the Italian delegate, supported the view of their French colleague. They were adherents of the old secret European diplomacy. 253 However, the provision of secrecy was scuttled by the various delegations at Lausanne. Henry Wood, ex-Rome correspondent of United Press Associations, and who covered the Lausanne proceedings, described how after the first secret session of the conference the Bulgarians issued “the full text of Venizelos’ speech because it favored their claim to the port of Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis).” This was

who had close links with the French foreign minister were Herbette of LeTemps, Sauerwein of Le Matin and Bassee of Havas news agency. 252 Great Britain, House of Commons, Accounts and Papers, vol.xxvi, 1923, Cmd 1814 Records of the proceedings of the Lausanne Conference 1922–23, pp.10–11. Annex 2 Draft rules for the Conference on Eastern Affairs. Art.9 mentions that publicity for the conference was to be through official communiqués issued by the general secretariat to the press. p14. Hereafter cited as Cmd 1814. The Age, “WORK AT LAUSANNE.,” November 22, 1922, p.11; Argus, “NEW BALKAN LEAGUE.” November 22,1922, p.19; D.B.F.P. vol.18, p.322. 253 Cmd 1814. Minutes of Second Plenary Session November 21,1922.

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followed by the French and Greeks issuing their own statements. 254 Ismet accused the other delegations of violating their promise of secrecy. What followed was that each delegation blamed the other and claimed to be “holier than thou.” The British delegation, with the support of the British and American press, was able to get the secrecy provision rescinded. Thereafter, journalists were allowed to attend and report on the discussions of the commissions and sub-commissions. It is interesting that the Melbourne press did not cover this story. 255 The conference proceedings were covered by British, American, French, and Italian correspondents. W. T. Ellis describes how the journalists at Lausanne stayed in different hotels according to which of the two opposing camps they belonged to. French correspondents stayed at Palace Hotel where they had access to telegraph and telephone facilities and telephoned their stories to Paris. The official French press officer conducted a daily press conference in the same hotel to journalists from Europe, Turkey, and Syria. The Melbourne press quoted reports from such French newspapers as Le Temps, Paris Midi, Petit Parisien, Le Matin, L’Echo de Paris, 254

Henry Wood, “Ripping off the Diplomatic Lid at Lausanne,” Editor and Publisher, Vol.55, no.40, March 10, 1923, p.5. 255 Henry Wood, “Ripping off the Diplomatic lid at Lausanne.,” p.5; India Office Records, Curzon Papers, MSS Eur F112/285, Lord Curzon (Lausanne) to Foreign Office, November 23, 1922. Curzon reports of the Turkish protest of the violation of secrecy. He doubted whether the conference had the ability to control so many correspondents. For copyright permission “I am grateful to the Board of the British Library for allowing me to consult materials in its custody in particular the official files of the India Office Records and in the India Office Private Papers” for my Masters Dissertation. However, the following papers reported on this issue. In the New York Times, “ISMET TALKS GAYLY OF LOVE MARRIAGES... UNDER FIRE OF THE PRESS.,” November 24, 1922, p.3. Ismet criticised the other delegations for divulging details of the conference; Manchester Guardian, “Secrecy Broken. Turks protest.,” November 24, 1922, p.12 in which this Reuters telegram briefly stated “The Turks have entered a protest against an alleged breach of secrecy in conference quarters.”; London Times, “NEAR EAST CLAIMS...,” November 23, 1922, p.10 mentions Greek and Bulgarian claims and also that the problem of secrecy would have to be dealt by the conference.

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Journal des Debats and from the Australian Press Association in London. 256 The British, American, Italian, Romanian, and Bulgarian delegations stayed at the Beau Rivage hotel. It was here that British and American journalists congregated and met McClure, the British press officer, to hear the official British point of view. The Melbourne press quoted stories from such British sources as M. Donohoe of Daily Chronicle, Central News Agency, and the Paris correspondent of Morning Post. 257 The U.S. was represented by Richard Washburn Child, Ambassador at Rome, whose delegation participated as official “observers” at Lausanne. Wood states that: Ambassador Child took the position that as an invited guest at somebody else’s party he could not with propriety give out their news. He kept the press, however, accurately informed on every action taken by the American delegation affecting American interests.

This is why American journalists were dependent on their British colleagues for their information. Both the Argus and The Age covered Child’s speech regarding American interests in the Near East. 258 It can 256

W. T. Ellis, “Feeding the world’s press at Lausanne.,” Editor and Publisher, Vol.37, no.37, February 10, 1923, p.5; The Age, November 25, 1922, p.13; December 4, p.9; February 3, 1923, p.15; Argus, “NEAR EAST MENACE.,” January 29, 1923, p.9; “Case for France.,” February 2, 1923, p.15. This last news item referred to the French Government’s note sent to Mustapha Kemal which helped the Turks to reject the draft peace treaty. Some of the Parisienne newspapers quoted in this news story are cited in the Curzon papers. See Eur F112/285 two telegrams of Marquess of Crewe Paris to Marquess Curzon Lausanne, January 30, 1923. 257 W. T. Ellis, “Feeding the world’s press at Lausanne,” p.5; Henry Wood, “Ripping off the diplomatic lid at Lausanne,” p.5; The Age, “NO PROGRESS AT LAUSANNE.,” November 30, 1922, p.9; “FUTURE OF DARDANELLES.,” February 1, 1923, p.9; Argus, “TURKS ASK FOR TIME.,” February 2,1923, p.9. 258 Henry Wood, loc. cit.; Argus, “NEAR TURKISH FRONTIER. UNITED STATES “Bombshell.,” November 28, 1922, p.9; The Age, November 28, 1922, p.9. The American and British press carried the following head-

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be seen that lifting the veil of secrecy made it easier for Child to spell out his nation’s foreign policy position. In fact, Henry Wood concluded that: The lesson of the Lausanne Conference is merely this: Secret diplomacy is dead for the very simple reason that since the war every nation has learned that the greatest asset of its cause is the fullest publicity ... [a] nation that gets the bad end of a diplomatic bargain is going to cry out the fact in every newspaper in the world that can be induced for the love of truth—or even money—to publish it. 259

This allowed the press to cover the Lausanne conference without the restrictions encountered in Paris in 1919. Another problem confronting the press was the imposition of military censorship in Constantinople, Athens, Angora, and Smyrna. 260 Military authorities controlled the flow of news to the press. In Constantinople, the Allied High Commissioners imposed press censorship that was designed to suppress malicious articles on December 2, 1918. It was under Article 12 of the armistice of Mudros, signed on October 30, 1918 that the Allies were allowed “[to control] wireless telegraphy and cable stations... [with] Turkish Government messages excepted.” The geographical isolation of Angora allowed Mustapha Kemal to “practically monopolise the telegraph,” which gave him the opportunity to influence Turkish Moslems in the Anatolian interior. 261 lines regarding Child’s statement. See New York Times, “AMERICAN DEMAND FOR THE OPEN DOOR AND BAN ON NEAR EAST SECRET TREATIES PRESENTED AT LAUSANNE CONFERENCE... Ambassador Child Stirs Conference with a Message of Warning.,” November 26, 1922, p.1; London Times, “AMERICA DEFINES HER POSITION.... DECLARATION AT LAUSANNE. THE “OPEN DOOR.,” November 27, 1922, p.12. On the same page the London Times printed excerpts of “MR CHILD’S STATEMENT” which came from Reuters. 259 Henry Wood loc. cit. 260 Some of the aspects of military censorship will be discussed in later chapters. 261 National Archives of United Kingdom, London, Foreign Office Correspondence, F.0.608 series British Peace Delegation , F.O. 608/115–6726

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At Smyrna, an inter-allied censorship committee composed of British, French, Greek, and Italian delegates was established to oversee press censorship. This committee drew its authority from the Allied High Commissioners in Constantinople. Greek censorship was established by P. Skeferis and Michael Rodas under the auspices of the Greek High Commission. Its censorship was unequivocal, strict, and even harsh, and its officers clashed with the other inter-allied censorship committee delegates. Smyrna had Greek, French, Armenian, Jewish, and Turkish newspapers operating in the city during the GreekTurkish conflict. The Greek papers Amaltheia, Kosmos, Armonia, Patris, Telegraphos, Estia, Tharos, and Vima were daily publications. French papers included Reforme, Independent, Echo de France, and Levant. The Turkish publications were Kiolou, Islahat, Sendai Hak, Mousavat, Acheg, and Medeniet. 262 On November 11, 1919 the Greek legation in London informed the British Foreign Office about the problems of press censorship at Smyrna. The Greek High Commission “decided to establish an independent censorship vested in its own military authorities and existing alongside of the Allied censorship.” They were concerned about the predilection of the Allied censors for allowing the Turks to publish violent anti-Greek articles. Furthermore, Greek military authorities imprisoned and fined a Turkish journalist of the Sark for writing an inflammatory article, along with the newspaper owner and editor who labelled the Greeks as “parasites, who for a century and a half have sucked the blood of the Turkish people.” The British, French, and Italian delegates on the inter-allied censorship committee protested over

Committee of Union and Progress; Constantinople 9 April 1919. Includes Admiral Webb’s dispatch of March 8, 1919 enclosing copy of report of intelligence section of British Salonika force, Part 4 “Influence of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish Press.” Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres, Ohio University Press, Columbus, 1974, p.341; Bilal Simsir (ed), British Documents on Ataturk vol.1, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1992, p.21. Hereafter cited as Ataturk vol.1. 262 Michael Rodas, Greece in Asia Minor (H Ellada sth Mikran Asia), Kleisiouni, Athens, 1950, pp.85–7. The translation of Rodas’ book is the author’s.

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the Greek action. 263 On November 7, George Horton, the American Consul General at Smyrna, reported the above incident to Admiral Bristol, the US High Commissioner at Constantinople. He described Brunetti, the Italian member of the censorship committee, as “a megalomaniac and an intriguer” who used the censorship board “as ... an organ for Italian propaganda.” Horton refused to participate in the inter-allied committee’s protest over the Greek action, as America had no official representation on this board. 264 There is no doubt that Greek censorship aimed at restricting information that might harm Greek interests at Smyrna. The military communiqués issued to the press did not reveal the actual state of events on the battlefield, as the combatants hid their military plans, played down their defeats or rejoiced in their victories. Some of the military bulletins appearing in The Age and Argus emanated from Athens, Angora, and Constantinople. 265 Journalists writing accounts of the Greek-Turkish war faced interference from military censors and they could overcome such an obstacle only by dispatching information to a private address, or mailing it from another country or having it delivered in person to a newspaper office. Sometimes Government officials might accompany a journalist to a war zone or the

263

F.O. 608/103–7639, Greek Legation to Earl Curzon [to be transmitted] to Mr. Balfour November 11, 1919. George Horton, the American Consul General at Smyrna, identifies Nourysia, the editor, Halil Zeki, the manager, and Dr. Yenouss Fehmi, writer of the Sark newspaper who were courtmartialled and “sent to Athens for imprisonment.” See Turkey Internal, 867.711/27 enclosure George Horton Smyrna to Rear-Admiral Mark Bristol, American High Commissioner, Constantinople, November 7, 1919. A copy of this enclosure with an accompanying letter were forwarded by Horton to Secretary of State in Washington on November 10, 1919. 264 Turkey Internal 867.71/27 enclosure. 265 Argus, “Greeks pursuing the Turks.,” March 30, 1921, p.7; “Greeks still victorious.,” April 7,1921, p.7; The Age, “The Greek offensive. Counter claim by Turks.,” July 23, 1921, p.13; “Greek Army in Retreat.,” September 20, 1921, p.9.

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countryside with the intention of influencing the correspondent to write a favourable news story. 266 In conclusion, this chapter outlined the theoretical framework for studying the press. The success of a newspaper is attributed to strong leadership, good editorial and journalistic staff, and a large amount of advertising revenue. The lack of these characteristics will ultimately lead to a newspaper’s demise. There is no doubt that the newspaper is a valuable historical resource for studying past events and that it can serve as a useful tool for authenticating information when it is compared to official documents. In the period under review the press provided ordinary citizens with much of their daily information. As newer forms of communication such as radio and television developed over the course of the 20th century, newspapers had to compete with these for market and audience share. Newspapers played an important part in fostering and developing a peculiar Australian nationalism within a British Imperial framework. Overall, the Australian press showed a spirit of enterprise by taking advantage of the cable service in 1872 and setting up an Australian Press Association in London to receive and cable news to Melbourne. Even with such “independence,” the great majority of news came from British sources. Therefore, the operations of the Australian press in the period 1919–23 (Greek-Turkish conflict) can be best understood within an Imperial framework. The imposition of military censorship in Athens, Angora, Constantinople, and Smyrna made it difficult for journalists to give their readers an accurate account of the Greek-Turkish conflict.

266

The Press and World Affairs, pp.147 & 49. Some of the obstacles faced by journalists will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

2 AUSTRALIAN PRESS REPORTS This chapter will concentrate on the reporting of the events which unfolded in Anatolia between 1919–22 and also will try to identify periods or phases in the Greek-Turkish war where the Melbourne newspapers adopted an anti-or pro-Greek stance, anti-or pro-Turkish position, and even an anti-French and anti-Italian stance. Two detailed examples will be used to highlight the various positions adopted by the Melbourne press. These are 1) The Greek territorial claims at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919; and 2) The Turkish peace settlement in 1919 and the rise of the Nationalist movement under Mustapha Kemal Pasha’s leadership. The contents of the newspaper articles and editorials will be examined for accuracy, distortion, and bias in the recording of the events. This means that the news articles will be compared with archival sources. The major research questions to be considered are: Was Australia, in the period 1919–23, dependent on Britain in viewing international events? Are there are identifiable periods in the conflict when the papers adopted a pro-Greek or anti-Turkish stance or an antiGreek and pro-Turkish position? Further, subsidiary research questions are: Did the Melbourne papers report the conflict in a particular way? Was the Australian press dependent on British sources for its information? It is also important to stress that newspapers did not possess all the necessary information to be able to write an accurate account of the war for the reasons mentioned below. The journalists of major newspapers and those representing the news agencies were able to derive their stories from government officials, who gave them some information on the Greek-Turkish conflict. Obviously, the war correspondents observing the actual combat in Anatolia were able to file their accounts, which were then dispatched 85

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to their respective newspaper head offices in London. Some of these reports emanated from places such as Athens, Constantinople, Smyrna, Paris, Rome, and London. One issue to consider in relation to war accounts is the notion of wartime censorship, especially with regard to nations that were participants in the conflict. Since there are gaps in the newspaper accounts, the use of Australian and British archival sources and materials from American, Greek, and Turkish origins will be used to supplement the deficiencies in the newspaper accounts. In Australia, where the conflict was far away, the local press reported on matters without fear of press censorship. After all, Australia was a democratic society where the press was free to criticise and report on issues that affected Australia and the British Empire. 267 Two perspectives adopted by the newspapers in the reporting of the conflict will be explained in greater detail below. The first part of this chapter will have five sections, which will examine the Greek territorial claims, and the subsequent Allied committee set up to investigate these claims. The next three parts will focus on Italo-Greek rivalry in Asia Minor, the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna on May 15, 1919 and the Italian Cabinet crisis, which led to the resignation of the Orlando Cabinet. The new Italian government sought to improve its relations with Greece. The second issue will be on the Ottoman Delegation’s presentation of its case before the Allies in June 1919 in Paris and the rise of Mustapha Kemal Pasha’s nationalist movement. 1a) The Greek Territorial Claims at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919: a pro-Greek position The Age and Argus reported on the Greek territorial claims on February 5, 6, and 7, 1919; Venizelos had outlined them on February 3 and 4 before the Council of Ten in Paris. On February 5 both newspapers mentioned that Greece desired the abolition of Turkish sovereignty in Asia Minor and the occupation of Constantinople (Istanbul), but rec267

See Chapter 1, Part 3 (d) of this dissertation which outlines the theory for the operation of the press.

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ognised that international interests were involved. It also laid claim to occupy Trebizond. The newspapers were incorrect in reporting that Venizelos wanted to occupy Trebizond when, in fact, the Greek Premier did not support the idea of establishing a Pontian state. Creating a large number of small states when the surrounding territory was inhabited by a large Turkish population was inadmissible. In Venizelos’ estimation the Vilayet (Province) of Trebizond should form part of the new Armenian State. 268 The Pontian Greeks wanted to form a small republic with a population of some 360,000 inhabitants. The Melbourne newspapers did not mention that the Greeks of Euxine Pontus had petitioned the Peace conference to grant them an independent state along the shores of the Black Sea. 269 It could be argued that Greece did not possess sufficient military and economic resources to defend a potential Pontian state from Turkish aggression. This increased the risk 268

The Age, “Greece states her claims,” February 5, 1919, p.7; Argus, “Claims of Greece, occupation of Constantinople,” February 5, 1919, p.7; FRUS PPC vol.3, pp.872–3; NAA, Series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 44 “Greece before the Peace Congress” by E. Venizelos, Paris, December 30, 1918, p.15. The same document written by Venizelos is located in H.L.R.O, LG/F/92/9/78; Smith, op. cit., pp.71–5; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.134–38; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.105–6 and 109–10; Helmreich, op. cit., pp.39–46. 269 The Age and Argus, February 5, 1919, p.7; NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace conference 1914–1918 44, British War Cabinet WCP. 293. “The Unredeemed Greeks Before The Peace Conference—Memoranda of the Oecumenical Patriarchate and of the National Council of Unredeemed Greeks,” Paris, 1919, pp.9, 18–19. The document was written by the Oecumenical Patriarchate in Constantinople (Fanar) on 14–27 December 1918 and the Unredeemed Greeks in Paris 9 December 1918 and signed by B. Musurus Ghikis, M Mitarangas, S. Seferiadis, N. Kyriakides, Th. Sgourdeos, C. P. Spanoudi and Gregoire Triantaphyllides; FRUS PPC vol.3, p.872. F.O. 608 /82 -2581 Petition from Greeks of Euxine Pontus, February 21, 1919. To this petition Arnold Toynbee minuted on February 22 that Trebizond was necessary to Armenia as an outlet to the Black Sea and that “This solution is understood to be favoured by M. Venizelos.” He commented also of assigning a mandatory power for this new state. Karagiannis, op. cit., p.109; Smith, op. cit., p.72.

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of over-stretching its meagre resources and over-extending its lines of communication in Asia Minor, thus rendering any future Greek occupation of Smyrna problematical. Both Melbourne newspapers were correct in their assessment that the Greeks were concerned about Italian influence extending into North Epirus (Southern Albania). The Greek Government wouldn’t have protested to an Italian occupation of Valona. Concern about Italian influence extending into Northern Epirus indicated an underlying tension and rivalry between Greece and Italy, which eventually would be played out in Asia Minor. 270

270

The Age and Argus, February 5, 1919, p.7; NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 44, “Greece before the Congress,” p.5; It must be pointed out that Smyrna, Constantinople, the capital of the Ottoman Empire, and the islands off the coast of Asia Minor will be the main focus of investigation in this study. The inclusion of Italian influence in Albania is used in passing as an example of Greek-Italian rivalry in South Eastern Europe. The Greek claims to both Western and Eastern Thrace (excluding Constantinople) have been omitted as this relates to the Bulgarian Peace Treaty. NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace 36 contain materials on SouthEast Europe/Balkans: War Cabinet P66 South-Eastern Europe and the Balkans; Hristo Mexi, The Right of the Albanian Nation, Bucharest 1918 [in French]; Albanian Claims Statement by Touran Pasha referred to in min.3 I.C.148; W.C.P. 30 BRITISH EMPIRE DELEGATION. Restoration to Albania of Territories annexed by the Balkan States in 1913 and copy of letter from National Albanian Committee of Geneva to the Prime Minister signed by Dr. Adamidi; The Psychology of an upstart Nation: the Bulgars, n.d, no author’s name (This was given to Sir Joseph Cook, the Australian Minister for Marine); F.O. 608/37–1575 “Greek Territorial Claims,” February 7, 1919, Maj-Gen. W. M. Thwaites for C.I.G.S. The British General Staff supported Greek claims to Nth Epirus on strategic grounds but rejected it on ethnic grounds. Santa Quaranta-Salonika was very important for Greece, as it was the only direct route from Epirus to Macedonia; F.O. 608/37–1242 February 3, 1919 with enclosure Notes on Greek War Aims, 18 January 1919 General Staff, War Office. Venizelos had no objections to Italian retention of Valona as a strategic point on the Adriatic but protested against Italian control over the whole of Albania; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.131–32&fn.42.

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Greece and her neighbors after the Balkan Wars 1912-13

On February 6, both newspapers went further in stating that Venizelos had ably presented Greece’s case before the League of Nations commission and had created a favourable impression. This is incorrect because the Greek claims were presented before the Council of Ten and not the League of Nations Commission as reported in the

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Melbourne press. It was further asserted that Greece claimed Constantinople, where one third of the total population residing in the city were Greek, and that the Supreme War Council had referred the Greek claims to a Commission of Experts. At no stage did Venizelos ever claim Constantinople for Greece as there were international considerations requiring special administration. 271 It is true that the Supreme War Council referred the Greek claims to a commission of experts, but the Melbourne newspapers did not state that Lloyd George had proposed the idea. The newspapers indicated that the commissioners would come from the delegations of America, the British Empire, Italy, and France. The Age further claimed that the committee would be making recommendations to the Peace Conference for a just settlement of the Greek territorial claims. 272 Both Melbourne papers quoted the Paris correspondent of the Morning Post who had interviewed Venizelos regarding the mandate system in Constantinople. The Greek Premier offered two solutions over the future of that city. He suggested that the League of Nations could entrust the control of Constantinople to a single mandatory power or could administer the city itself. Whatever the final outcome on Constantinople, Venizelos strongly advocated the removal of the Sultan. Though not specified in the press reports, Venizelos advocated that the Sultan should set up his new capital at either Konya or Brusa in Asia Minor. The actual reporting over the future of Constantinople can be considered as reasonably accurate, as evidenced from Venizelos’ presentation before the Council of Ten. 273 However, there was no ref271

The Age, “Greece presents claims” and Argus, “Near East Divers Claims.,” February 6, 1919, p.5; FRUS PPC vol.3, p.865; Smith, op. cit., p.72; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.109; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.137. 272 FRUS PPC vol.3, p.875; See for example The Age, February 7, 1919, p.7 where it mentions the composition of the expert committee with 2 members each from the British Empire, United States of America, France and Italy charged with the task of reducing the Greek claims within narrowest limits and make recommendations. Smith, op. cit., p.75; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.138. 273 The Age and Argus, February 6, 1919, p.5; FRUS PPC vol.3, p.865; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.137; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.109.

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erence in the press reports to Venizelos’ statement that “As long as the Sultan remained at Constantinople, even without the title of Calif, he would retain considerable prestige, which would permit him to exercise important influence over the Mussulman world and to cause trouble to all Great Powers including France and Great Britain.” 274 He urged that “Constantinople and its environs be internationalised, namely the Vilayet of Constantinople, the Sanjaks of Ismid, of Gallipoli, of Biga and part of Brusa.” 275 The idea of internationalising Constantinople had appeared in earlier news articles of The Age and Argus. Venizelos was possibly signalling to Britain and France that they had the best opportunity of banishing the Turks from Europe, irrespective of the protests of their Moslem subjects. The whole issue eventually subsided in the end. From a British perspective, the matter was not so easy. The British General Staff, the Admiralty, and Sir Hamilton Grant, Foreign Secretary to the Government of India, argued for the retention of the Sultan at Constantinople, whereas Lord Curzon and Sir Eyre Crowe, Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, wanted total expulsion. 276 Edwin Montagu, the Secretary for India, spoke about the strong agitation on the part of Indian Moslems, and argued very strongly for the retention of the Sultan at Constantinople. The British Government could not simply ignore such opinions, as any rise in Pan-Islamic agitation and the internal problems in India could easily undermine British

274

FRUS PPC vol.3, p.865. FRUS PPC vol.3, p.865; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.109. 276 Argus, “Greece and Turkey,” January 20, 1919, p.7; The Age, “Aspirations of Greece,” January 20, 1919, p.5 and “Future of Constantinople,” January 30, 1919, p.5; NAA, series A981, item no. War Peace Conf. 1914–18 51 pt.1, “The future of Constantinople” Memo by Lord Curzon, January 2, 1918; Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Cab.27 series Eastern Committee. Cab.27/39, EC 2822 “Turkey in Europe,” Memo by Sir E. Crowe, F.O. December 21, 1918; EC 2824 “The strategic importance of Constantinople to the British Empire,” General Staff, War Office, December 22,1918; EC 2843 “The Future of Constantinople,” Memo by Sir Hamilton Grant, December 20,1918. For some of the divergent official British views. See Busch, op. cit., p.84fn.34. 275

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rule in its Indian Empire. 277 The Melbourne papers reported on February 5, 8, and March 24, 1919 on the internal problems in India and the measures adopted by British authorities to quell the disturbances. 278 Melbourne papers seemingly supported the Greek Prime Minister, especially with words such as “ably presented” and “created a favourable impression.” 279 It can be inferred that such expressions indicated a pro-Greek stance on the part of the Melbourne press. Dr. E. J. Dillon, the famous British journalist, described Venizelos as the Ulysses of the conference by eulogising him as: a fixed star in the firmament and his light burned bright through every rift in the clouds. His moderation astonished friends and opponents. Everone one admired his expose of his case as a masterpiece. His statesmen-like setting, in perspective the readiness with which he put himself in the place of his competitor and struck up a fair compromise, endeared him to many, and his praises were in every one’s mouth. 280 277

NAA series CP351/1, item no. Bundle 4/7 British Empire Delegation (B.E.D.) 7 February 7, 1919, min.3 future of Constantinople, p.3; B.E.D. 9 February 20, 1919, min.1 (The Maharaja of Bikaner argued that it was undesirable for Turkey to be considered by an Inter-Allied Commission. After all, the British Government had not decided on a policy for Constantinople: internationalisation or being placed under a mandatory power. Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary 1916–19, replied that no decision would be taken until President Wilson returned back to Paris). Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.129– 31; Busch, op. cit., p.84; Helmreich, op. cit., pp.128 fn.39. 278 All these news stories were marked as official messages of the Indian government. The Age, “LOYALTY OF INDIA. ‘FOUNDATION OF HER HOPES.,’” February 5, 1919, p.7 & “THE FUTURE OF INDIA. IMPORTANT CHANGES FORESHADOWED.,” February 8, 1919, p.11; Argus, “LOYALTY OF INDIA. Internal self control sought.,” February 5,1919, p.7; “THE NEW INDIA. CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES. Checks and Balances.,” February 8, 1919, p.19 & “INDIAN REFORMS. Speech by Viceroy. Anti-Revolutionary Measures.,” March 24,1919, p.5. For a discussion on the internal situation in early 1919 in India. See Busch, op. cit., pp.98–100. 279 The Age and Argus, February 6, 1919, p.5. 280 Dr. E. J. Dillon, The Inside Story of the Peace Conference, Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York and London, 1920, pp.74–6.

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Colonel Stephen Bonsal, one time journalist for the New York Herald and New York Times, an adviser to the Balkan Affairs Committee and later, an intimate colleague of Colonel House, President Wilson’s personal advisor, described the Greek Premier as “one of the most polished of the delegates at Versailles. He suffered from the fact he was so charming that everybody was afraid of him.” 281 In further reporting on the Greek territorial claims, both newspapers noted on February 7 that “Venizelos did not press Greek claims to Constantinople nor territory on either side of the Dardanelles but claimed Dodecanese and Cyprus.” It can be seen that Constantinople attracted a lot of attention in Melbourne newspapers. Further to this report both newspapers speculated that the Dardanelles might be placed under the control of a European mandatory power. At no stage did Venizelos ever consider the Dardanelles being placed under European control. He advocated a policy of internationalisation whereby the Dardanelles would be included in the Sanjak of Gallipoli and form one part of the international state of Constantinople. Both the Age and Argus were accurate in reporting Greek claims to the Dodecanese and Cyprus without going into any further detail. However, they omitted two important details in their news accounts: the further Greek claims to Imbros, Tenedos, Kastelorizo and Rhodes; and Venizelos’ hope that Britain would be generous and surrender Cyprus to Greece. 282 281

Stephen Bonsal, Unfinished Business, Doubleday, Doran & Co, Garden City, New York, 1944, pp. x- xi and 308. 282. The Age, “The claims of Greece” and Argus, “Claims of Greece,” February 7, 1919, p .7; FRUS PPC vol.3, pp.861–2 and 865. The islands of Imbros and Tenedos belong to the Aegean group which are situated geographically near the entrance of the Dardanelles. Rhodes belongs to the Dodecanese chain, which had been under Italian occupation since 1912. The other islands are Kassos, Karpathos, Symi, Khalki, Tilos, Nisyros, Cos, Astypalaia, Kalymnos, Leros and Patmos. In early January 1919, the Italians had struck a reciprocal agreement with the Turks for trade between Adalia, a port on the Asia Minor coast, and Rhodes. The Ottoman Greeks were excluded. Kastelorizo, which is just outside this group, was considered for administrative purposes belonging to the Dodecanese. The French had occupied Kastelorizo in World

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It is important to stress in the case of Cyprus that the British Government had no intentions of ceding it to Greece. Lord Curzon’s memorandum of January 3, 1919 highlighted the strategic value of Cyprus for British interests in the Near East. He stated that: If the Italians gain a footing at Adalia and develop there a powerful naval base, it may be very desirable that we also should possess a naval station east of Malta. Should a strong Power get a hold of Cyprus, it would be a menace to the Suez Canal... 283

He implored his colleagues: [in the] hope that we shall not lightly throw away an asset which, though it may seem of relatively small value now, may turn out in the next quarter of a century to possess a very great and powerful significance. If Greece wants more islands let Italy disgorge the Dodecanese which are a part of the Grecian Archipelago, and to which Italy has no claim but that of very recent conquest.

In the same memorandum he included a joint note written in December 1917 by the Naval and General Staffs on the strategic importance of Cyprus. 284 The British General Staff commented on Greek War One, as the overwhelming population of the island was Greek. Italian claims to Kastelorizo were considered weak. See Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.29, 43&fn.1, 70fn.15, 108 and 175fn.11; Harry. J. Psomiades, The Eastern Question, Institute of Balkan Studies, Salonika, 1968, pp.53–6. 283 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 pt 1 Confidential P-86 “The future of Cyprus,” Memorandum by Lord Curzon January 3, 1919, p.2. It should be noted that in this same file there is a document titled “Memorandum on the Island of Cyprus“ London, 1919 containing the Greek Cypriots appeal to the British nation on March 5, 1919 for union with Greece. The remainder of this document incorporates a chronological order of certain of the most important facts and documents connected with the Cypriots cause for the union of the island with Greece. There are a number of works relating to Cyprus and from the English Press are reprinted in an Appendix. 64ff; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.111, 116–7; Smith, op. cit., pp.72–3. 284 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conf. 1914–18 51 pt.1, P-86 Curzon pp.3–4; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.133.

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war claims on January 18, 1919 basically reiterating the same position Britain had held some 13 months earlier. 285 They supported Greek claims for the Dodecanese but raised concerns about Imbros and Tenedos, believing that Greece should be prohibited from using them for military objectives. They were also very critical of Italy retaining the Dodecanese. 286 At a Departmental Conference held on January 31, 1919 Captain Fuller expressed the Admiralty position which was “that all the islands in the Aegean, including Lemnos, should be Greek, and that it was essential that the Italians should not get any concessions in Anatolia.” He believed that Italy should be granted territorial compensation in the Adriatic and renounce her interest in Adalia as well as in Smyrna. The Air Ministry, too, supported Greek possession of the Aegean islands. 287 There is one important issue relating to the Greek territorial demands which was discussed in both newspapers and which requires a detailed explanation. On February 6, both Melbourne papers reported that the Greek claims in Asia Minor would hinder the Turkish littoral and result in some difficulties in the final settlement of territory for Turkey. Neither newspaper gave any other details. 288 They omitted three important details. Firstly, Venizelos wanted Western Asia Minor, which would include the Vilayets of Aidin and Brusa. However, the 285

H.L.R.O, LG,/F92/12/2 “Secret and Confidential Notes on Greek war Aims,” General Staff, War Office, 18th January 1919, p.3. 286. ibid., p.3. 287 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 Pt. 1, British War Cabinet W.C.P. 118, “Conflicting Claims of Italy and Greece in the Near East,” Lord Hardinge of Penhurst February 15, 1919. This document was marked secret containing the views of the Conference held at the “Astoria” on January 31, 1919 between representatives of the departmental missions of the British delegation. Those present at this meeting were: Lord Hardinge, Sir E. Crowe, Sir William Tyrrell, Captain Fuller, Major-General Thwaites, Brig-General Groves, Commander M. H. S. MacDonald, LtColonel Gribbon, Sir A Hirtzel, Sir H Penson, Mr Fountain, Hon H. Nicolson, Mr P. Baker and Mr Parker (Secretary). Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.129. 288 Argus and The Age, February 6, 1919, p.5.

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independent Sanjaks of the Dardanelles and Ismid which contained Greek populations could be included in the future international state of Constantinople and Turkey. Venizelos claimed Western Asia Minor on ethnic, geographic, and historical grounds and because 1,132,000 Greeks compared to 943,000 Turks lived there. 289 The population statistics quoted by Venizelos were derived from the Greek Patriarchate and Venizelos himself attested to their accuracy. 290 Woodrow Wilson, the American President, queried Venizelos’ figures regarding the Moslem element, and asked whether these had been furnished by “Greek ecclesiastical authorities but he (Venizelos) thought they had been originally derived from official Turkish statistics.” 291 Secondly, there was no reference in the newspapers that a future Turkish state established in Central Anatolia would mean that some 922,000 Greeks would remain under Turkish jurisdiction. Venizelos proposed that mutual and voluntary migration of Greeks from the Turkish State to Greek Asia Minor and of Turks from the Greek side to the Turkish State be allowed to take place. In this proposal both the Greek and Turkish Governments would acquire the real estate and housing properties of those citizens who voluntarily migrated. 292 Finally, neither newspaper revealed that Greek claims to Western Asia Minor were based on Article 12 of Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points that stipulated that: The Turkish portions of the present Ottoman Empire should be assured a secure sovereignty, but the other nationalities which are now under Turkish rule should be assured an undoubted security of life and an absolute unmolested opportunity of autonomous development. 293

289

FRUS PPC vol.3, pp.869– 71; Smith, op. cit., p.73; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.125; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.107–8. 290 FRUS PPC vol.3, p.870; Smith, op. cit., p.72; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.108. 291 FRUS PPC vol.3, p.872. 292 FRUS PPC vol.3, p.872; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.108–9; Smith, op. cit., p.71. 293 FRUS PPC vol.3, p.868.

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Obviously, Venizelos was using population data to Greece’s advantage in order to enhance its claim to Western Asia Minor and to confine Turkish authority to Central Anatolia. He envisaged the Greeks of Asia Minor uniting with mainland Greece when the opportunity arose. The voluntary migration of the Turkish element from Greek authority and vice versa would, he thought, lead to homogeneous populations in Asia Minor, thus, making Greek administration in Western Asia Minor more viable and commensurate with Greece’s resources. It could be argued that the Melbourne press reports of February 6 contained information, which may have suggested that the Greek mandate in Asia Minor might have deprived Turkey of an outlet to the sea. Venizelos explicitly affirmed his desire of creating a free port “with international guarantees on the Western coast of Asia Minor for the import and export of the commerce of the interior. This would be to the mutual benefit of the two nations and especially to Greece who was a commercial maritime nation.” 294 Nowhere in the Council of Ten minutes does Venizelos actually mention the port of Smyrna by name. The reference to a free port on the coast of western Asia Minor would certainly be a reference to Smyrna. It was, after all, a very important port for the commerce of the Anatolian interior. In fact, the British General Staff, with some apprehension, argued that Turkey should have an economic outlet through Smyrna and Scala Nuova and “there were no objections from the point of view of British interests, to Greece obtaining a territorial zone in Smyrna and the Vilayet of Aidin.” 295 After Venizelos had presented Greece’s case at Paris, the Allied experts began their deliberations for assessing the validity of the Greek territorial claims.

294

ibid., p.873. FRUS PPC vol.3, pp.867–75; NAA, series A981/1, item no. War and Peace Conference 1914–18 51 Pt. 1, British War Cabinet, W.C.P. 118, Conflicting claims of Italy and Greece in the Near East; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.129. 295

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1b) The Greek Territorial Committee 1919 The Greek territorial committee was composed of two delegates from each country: Dr. W. L. Westermann and Dr. C. Day representing the United States of America, Sir Robert Borden and Sir Eyre Crowe, the British Empire, M. Jules Cambon and M. Gout for France, and M. de Martino and Colonel Castoldi for Italy. They met from mid-February to March 8, 1919, when they handed down their findings relating to the legitimacy of the Greek claims. 296 One might ponder why there was a delay in reporting the activities of the Greek Committee in the Melbourne press. There are three reasons offered to explain this: 1) Robert Lansing, the American Secretary of State 1915–20, proposed that each committee issue its own communiques to the press and his motion was duly adopted by the Peace Conference. It would appear the Greek commission issued irregular bulletins to the press. 297 2) The Committee hearings were held “in camera” and journalists were excluded from its proceedings. 298 Since information was scanty, journalists relied on rumour, gossip, and guesswork to record and interpret the flood of information for their accounts. The notion of “open covenants” and “open diplomacy” based on Woodrow Wilson’s 14 Points was a sham because press censorship 296

NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 44, British War Cabinet, W.C.P. 401, Report of Committee on Greek Territorial Claims, Paris, March 6, 1919. Within its terms of reference the Committee was authorised to call witnesses and those summoned included: M. Venizelos for Greece, M. Carapanos for Greeks of North Epirus, Turkhan Pasha, Mehmed Bey Konitza, Dr. Turtulis for Albania and M. Vamvacas, Deputy for Dedeagatch in the Turkish Parliament, and M. Antioniades, Deputy for Adrianople, representing the Greeks of Thrace. Karagiannis, op. cit., p.124; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.139. 297 FRUS PPC vol.3, pp.867–8. M. Clemenceau, the President of the Peace Conference and French Premier, and Baron Sonnino, the Italian Delegate to the Peace Conference and Italian Foreign Minister, made sure the Lansing motion was duly adopted. 298 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Committee 1914–1918 44, passim. The Proces-Verbal of the Greek Territorial Committee are all marked secret.

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was in place. 299 Finally the Age and Argus gave greater coverage and prominence to the German question than to the Turkish settlement in the first half of 1919. 300 The Melbourne newspapers reported on the trickle of information emanating from the Greek Commission on March 5, 15, and 20. On March 5, both newspapers printed their first accounts of the Greek Commission discussions on the future settlement of Asia Minor. According to the newspapers, the Greek Commission favoured the dissolution of the Turkish Empire and the creation of a new Turkish state in central Asia Minor. The Commission agreed that Greece should possess “a strip of coastline between Aivali and the island of Chios including Smyrna and Ephesus.” 301 The Melbourne newspapers gave only the briefest summary of the proceedings which were unfolding in Paris. Because the committee proceedings were conducted “in camera,” the journalists were unable to find out what the different positions held by each of the conference delegates were. On February 21 the Greek Committee discussed the Greek claims to Asia Minor. Dr. Westermann disputed both Venizelos’ population figures and whether the part of Asia Minor being claimed by Greece was geographically distinct from the rest of Anatolia. 302 With regard to the population figures, Westermann highlighted the fact that an absolute Greek majority could only be found in the Sanjak of Smyrna, whereas in other areas claimed by Greece, the Turks outnumbered the Greeks, 63% compared to 33%. Westermann, replying to Borden’s inquiry as to the origins of 299

G. Ward Price, Extra-Special Correspondent, George G. Harp, London, 1957, p.106; Vernon Bartlett, Behind the scenes at the Peace Conference, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1920, pp.v-vi& 18–19. This point has been covered in Ch.1 “The operation of the press at the Paris Peace Conference 1919 and other meetings pertaining to settling the Greek-Turkish War.” 300 See The Age and Argus, February-June 1919, passim. 301 The Age, “Readjustment of Frontiers”; Argus, “The Future of Turkey, Greek claims in Asia Minor.,” March 5, 1919, p.9. 302 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 44, British War Cabinet W.C.P. 195 Proces- Verbal no.5. Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Greece. February 21, 1919, pp.2–3; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.172.

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the population statistics stated that “They are taken from the census made for the purpose of military recruiting in the Vilayet of Aidin in 1908. Our information is corroborated by reports from American missionaries.” 303 The area claimed by Greece in Asia Minor was geographically distinct from the remainder of Anatolia. Westermann argued that the economic future of Anatolia had to be seen from both the Turkish and Greek perspectives. As far as he was concerned Greek economic development was closely connected with the fate of the central Anatolian plateau and he advocated placing the whole of Turkey under the aegis of the League of Nations. 304 Borden was surprised at the American suggestion for the proposed Turkish administration. He believed that Greece should possess a secure economic and strategic border in Asia Minor. From a strategic point of view “Greek territory in Anatolia must be conterminous with this neutral territory. Also the entire railway line running from Smyrna to Panderma on the sea of Marmora must be on Greek or neutral territory.” 305 Borden outlined the Greek-Turkish frontier to be: where the river Soussourlou enters the neutralised district. It would follow the river southwards more or less along the 26th degree of longitude and would then cross the valley of the Hermes and follow the watershed to the coast of the Aegean just north of Scalanova. 306 303

NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conf. 1914–18 44, W.C.P. 195, p.3; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.129. 304 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conf 1914–18 44, W.C.P. 195, p.4. 305 ibid., pp.4–5. 306 ibid., p.5. It is interesting to note that Borden commented on Venizelos’ map separating Greece and Turkey in which many Greeks in Meander Valley and Sanjak of Aidin would remain under Turkish sovereignty. The Turks, on the other hand, remaining under Greek jurisdiction in the North East in the Sanjak of Balikesser would see this district left to Greece for strategic and economic motives. Borden continued “It is presumed that a region comprising the coast of the Straits to the North of the red line on the map will be placed under a special regime. If it were to remain under the Ot-

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M. Gout, the French delegate, expressed his government’s view of the Greek claims in Asia Minor. The French view was based on 2 principles: 1) It was important to remove the Greeks from Turkish administration by allowing them to have their own administration; and 2) The Turkish state in central Asia Minor should have adequate outlets to the sea. 307 M. Cambon, the French Delegate and President of the Greek Commission, highlighted the fact that the French frontier proposal differed from the English one in that it would leave Turkey unchanged in the north and in the Gulf of Edremid. Turkey would be granted access to the Aegean Sea and Aidin and the course of the Meander would be left in the Greek zone. Edremid was earmarked for Turkey, even though it had a large Greek population. 308 The Italian delegation sought to impede the deliberations of the Committee with M. De Martino seeking clarification from his government. Sir Eyre Crowe, the other British Empire delegate, was very surprised by the Italian attitude. 309 In fact, Harold Nicolson, a member of the British Peace Delegation also assisting the British Empire on the Greek Territorial Committee, was very scathing of the Italians. He noted in his diary: “I can’t understand the Italian attitude. They are behaving like children, and sulky children at that. They obstruct and delay everything—and evidently think that by making themselves disagreeable on every single point they will force the Conference to give them fat plums to keep them quiet.” 310 One can argue that, given that toman sovereignty the Turkish Government would be prevented, for instance, from placing armed forces there.” p.5; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.172–3. 307 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conf. 1914–18 44, W.C.P. 195,p.9. 308 ibid., p.10. The French delegation proposed frontier line is located in NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conf. 1914–18 44, W.C.P. 195., p.9; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.173. 309 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conf.1914–18 44, W.C.P. 195, pp.7–8. 310 Harold Nicolson, Peacemaking 1919, Constable and Co, London, 1933, p.266.

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the journalists were not privy to the Committee proceedings, they guessed reasonably well that the Turkish State was being confined to central Asia Minor. The next press story on March 15 indicated that the Greek Commission’s report agreed that Greece should acquire the European coast of Thrace with the islands of Asia Minor but not the coastline of Asia Minor and Smyrna. This report omitted some very important information and does not reveal the divergent views among the delegates. 311 On March 3 Galli and De Martino, the Italian Delegates, outlined the Italian Governments position regarding the Greek claims. Galli stated categorically that the Greek population figures given by Venizelos should not be accepted as a means of justifying the Greek mandate in Asia Minor. He cited a number of authorities such as Duekers, the Belgian Consul-General at Smyrna, M. Paillares, a French journalist and correspondent of Lanterne, and M. Antonopoulos, a former Greek Consul-General at Smyrna, to refute Venizelos’ claims. 312 De Martino outlined that Greek ambitions regarding Thrace and Asia Minor could not be detached from the general settlement of Anatolia and the future of Constantinople. The Eastern Thracian decision was linked exclusively with the future settlement of Constantinople. 313 He argued that the Greek claims in Asia Minor could not be separated from the question of the overall destiny of the Moslem populations who inhabited Thrace and Anatolia, and that there could be “no question of settling the political regime of a part of Anatolia without knowing whether the rest will be placed under a regime of assistance, protectorate, or absolute independence.” 314 The Italians were doing 311

The Age, “International Problems” and Argus, “Territorial Claims, Greece and Turkey.,” March 15, 1919, pp. 13 and19. 312 It should be noted that the following document has no page numbers listed and I have assigned pagination to make it easier for citation purposes. NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 44 ,British War Cabinet W.C.P. 234 , Proces-Verbal no.9 Meeting of March 3, 1919 at 3p.m, pp.2–5. 313 NAA, series A981/1 , item no. War Peace Conf.1914–18 44, W.C.P. 234, p.7; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.173. 314 ibid., [WCP 234], p.7; Petsalis-Diomidis, op.cit., p.173.

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everything in their power to suspend the efforts of the Greek Committee, and failing this, “to obtain the extension of its [Greek Territorial Committee] mandate for the settlement of the whole of Anatolia, in which case the discussion of the Greek claims ought to follow and not precede the discussion of the general settlement of Anatolia.” 315 As far as the Italians were concerned the Treaties of London of April 1915 and of Saint Jean de Maurienne of April 1917 were legitimate agreements which allowed Italy to fulfil her territorial aspirations in Anatolia, and Greece had no right to put forward claims in Asia Minor. 316 Obviously, Italian obstinacy was bound to cause controversy with Westermann, who stated that the United States refused to acknowledge these treaties as a basis of territorial compromise in the Near East. Eyre Crowe, on the other hand, indicated that the British Government did not recognise the legality of the 1917 Treaty and that the Italian Government had been officially notified of this decision. Furthermore, he specified that the 1915 treaty did not mention Smyrna but dealt with compensation in Adalia. 317 Both The Age and Argus reports were incorrect in saying that Greece would not gain Smyrna. When the future allocation of Smyrna came up for discussion, the British and French members agreed that Greece should receive Smyrna with some hinterland and its boundary clearly marked out. The Americans accepted this but with some scepticism. 318 The Melbourne press mentioned “the islands of Asia Minor” without going into any further explanation. The Greek Committee had to settle the future disposal of the Dodecanese islands. M. Gout pointed out that the April 1915 Treaty permitted Italian occupation of the Dodecanese by virtue of the Treaty of Lausanne of 1912, and that the Committee should ignore the Greek claim to it. Westermann, again, reiterated his government’s opposition to the 1915 Treaty as a 315

ibid., [WCP 234], p.8; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.173. ibid., [WCP 234], pp.8–12; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.173; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.124 and 130. 317 ibid., [WCP 234], pp.12–13; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.175; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.124. 318 ibid., [WCP 234], pp.18–20. 316

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basis of settlement for the Near East and supported Venizelos’ claim to the Dodecanese on ethnic grounds. 319 However, Westermann argued that Imbros and Tenedos were of strategic importance and should be attached to the State of Constantinople. Eyre Crowe corrected his American counterpart by saying that Imbros and Tenedos were not part of the Dodecanese and that these islands had lost their strategic value since the end of the Great War. Therefore, he argued these islands should be presented to Greece. Gout convinced his British and American colleagues that, as a condition of ownership, Greece should not be allowed to fortify or construct a naval base on these islands. 320 Kastelorizo, an island off the coast of Asia Minor, was also included in the discussions. The Italians, again, cited the wartime agreements that granted it possession of the island, but the French and British insisted that it be awarded to Greece. 321 On March 20 The Age quoting the Paris Correspondent of the New York World and Argus reported a “message from Paris received in New York” as their source regarding the Greek claim to Smyrna. In the same report, The Age mentioned “the ultimate ownership of the islands has been reserved in view of the Treaty with Italy.” However, the Argus correctly identified the islands which had been unnamed in The Age, report as the Dodecanese. Both Melbourne newspapers briefly indicated that the Greek claims were successful and reported that the Americans objected to Smyrna being given to Greece. The Americans were reported as advocating that “Smyrna ought to be internationalised in the interests of the vast hinterland which is served by this port.” The Age and Argus indi319

ibid., [WCP 234], pp.16–17 and 21; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.175&fn.10. The Treaty of Lausanne of October 1912 formally ended the ItaloTurkish war of 1911, which allowed Italy to come into possession of the Dodecanese Islands. It was not until 1947 that Italy relinquished ownership of the Dodecanese to Greece under the terms Treaty of Paris where the former had been an alliance partner of Nazi Germany in the 1939–45 war. 320 ibid., [WCP 234], pp.21–23; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.175&fn.10. 321 ibid., [WCP 234], pp.22– 4; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.175&fn.11.

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cated, without offering too many details, that there was some disagreement among the Delegation members, and provided a minuscule summary of the Greek Territorial committee’s findings. 322 Like any news story, some of the information had some validity while other details had simply been omitted. Press censorship and the “in-camera” discussions of the Greek claims restricted journalists. It is worth commenting, in view of the reports mentioned in the preceeding paragraph that both newspapers failed to mention that Britain, France, and the United States unanimously supported Greek claims to Northern Epirus, and Western and Eastern Thrace. For these countries, the future boundary of the State of Constantinople and its surrounding territory depended only on the portion of Eastern Thrace to be incorporated in the Greek State. 323 It was over the future arrangements for Western Asia Minor, including those for Smyrna and its hinterland that the major differences among the delegates occurred. Both newspapers were correct in stating that the United States objected to Smyrna being given to Greece; but they were incorrect in asserting that the United States held that Smyrna should be internationalised “in the interests of the vast hinterland which is served by this port.” The word “internationalisation” is somewhat puzzling on two counts: First, the Americans stated that it was wrong in economic terms to detach the coastal regions of Western Asia Minor from Central Anatolia and thus deprive the remnants of the Turkish Empire their “most natural exits to the sea.” 324 322

The Age, “Will the Turk be driven from Europe” and Argus, “Claims of Greece,” March 20, 1919, p.7. 323 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 44, W.C.P. 401 “Report of Committee on Greek Territorial Claims” March 6, 1919, Paris, pp. 2–4. It should be noted that regarding Western Thrace the Greek Committee accepted M. Venizelos’ assurances with the Italians expressing reservations that Bulgaria would be given access to the Aegean Sea either through the ports of Kavalla, Salonika or Dedeagatch (Alexandroupolis). Helmreich, op. cit., pp.84–5; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.155–6; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.127–9. 324 ibid., [WCP 401], p.4; Helmreich, op. cit., pp.85–6; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.174; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.130.

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Secondly, internationalisation could have applied only if the boundaries of the State of Constantinople were to be extended for all of Asia Minor. Perhaps the journalist writing this account relied on rumour or speculation about the Americans’ idea of placing Turkey under some international control without knowing all the details that had been discussed in the Greek Committee hearings. The British and French, however, supported Greek claims to Western Asia Minor, believing that the ports of Smyrna and Aivali and some adjacent hinterland warranted union with Greece on ethnic, administrative, and economic grounds. 325 The actual reporting of the question of the unnamed or named Dodecanese published in the Melbourne press requires an explanation. Both Melbourne papers omitted three important details. Firstly, Britain and France had previously recognised Italian possession; secondly, both papers alluded to an unnamed treaty without specifying whether it was the Treaty of Lausanne of October 1912, the secret Treaty of London signed on April 26, 1915, or the St Jean de Maurienne Agreement of 1917; and finally, they did not report that the United States supported giving the Dodecanese to Greece on ethnic grounds, and that unanimity had been achieved regarding the Aegean islands. The word “reserved” in The Age article could have referred to the Greek Government being required to give assurances of not fortifying Tenedos and Imbros or establishing a naval base on these islands. 326 The biggest omission in the press accounts was that concerning Italian obstinacy in opposing every Greek territorial claim on the

325

ibid., [WCP 401], p.4. The British and French delegates were very critical of the American suggestion of placing Turkey under some mandatory control especially the coastal areas of Western Asia Minor containing large Greek speaking colonies. Karagiannis, op. cit., p.129; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.174; Helmreich, op. cit., pp.85–6. 326 ibid., [WCP 401], p.5; The Age and Argus, March 20, 1919, p.7; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.29,45–8&175; Smith, op. cit., p.70. A summary of the Italian claims over the Dodecanese and Asia Minor in the Treaty of London April 26, 1915 and St Jean de Maurienne, August 18, 1917 see Helmreich, op. cit., pp.6–7.

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grounds that the wartime agreements concluded with Britain and France were still valid. 327 Four underlying themes emerge in the Melbourne press regarding the Greek territorial proceedings. In the first place Britain and France regarded Venizelos as a trusted friend and ally and thought that Greek claims should be recognised. 328 Next, the British and French were eager to punish Turkey for her treacherous behaviour in the 1914–18 war. Thirdly, the United States was probably seen as not co-operating with Britain and France. After all, the U.S. had not fought or declared war on Turkey, and handing over Turkish territory to a Greek administration might create future problems in Anatolia. Finally, there was the notion of Allied “solidarity,” while the Italians were seeking to fulfil their own territorial ambitions in Fiume and Asia Minor. 1c) The Italian manoeuvres and Greek-Italian rivalry in Asia Minor: March–May 1919 Both newspapers reported very briefly on the Greek landing and the granting of authority to Greece to administer Smyrna. 329 It could be contended that the lack of information from Paris was due to censorship and the little contact between the press and peace delegations. In its editorial of April 8 The Age reported that the peace conference had been cloaked in secrecy encouraging “speculation, misunderstanding and apprehension.” Further to this, it asserted that the “Big Four”— Britain, France, United States, and Italy—had agreed on the terms to be 327

ibid., [WCP 401], pp.6–12. Nicolson, op. cit., p.278. Nicolson noted in his diary that Venizelos was distressed at American hostility to his claims on Smyrna. He [Nicolson] told him “that the best thing to do was to wait patiently until President Wilson returned and then tackle him direct. He [Venizelos] says that so long as the French and we support him he will not feel really anxious.” 329 The Age, “Greeks land at Smyrna” and Argus, “Greeks at Smyrna,” May 19, 1919, p.7. There are some later press articles which briefly cover the Smyrna landing. See The Age, “The occupation of Smyrna,” May 29, 1919, p.7; Argus, “Greeks enter Smyrna,” May 28, 1919, p.9 and “Future of Turkey” May 29,1919, p.7. 328

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offered to Germany. Though the Polish, Italian, and Yugoslav claims raised difficulties, the Big Four thought The Age would be in a position to resolve such disputes. The tenor of the rest of this editorial was to suggest that peace was close at hand and that the democracies would begin the task of peaceful reconstruction of their domestic economies. 330 The main international news items covered by The Age and Argus between April and May were the German Peace Settlement, the internal German political situation, the Bolshevik revolution and the ensuing civil war in Russia, Japanese territorial claims in China and the Pacific, internal problems in India, Egypt, and Afghanistan, and Italian claims. 331 There is no doubt the German question, Bolshevism, and Japanese claims were of primary concern for Australia for the following reasons. Firstly, so much Australian blood had been shed on the Western front fighting the German army that Australia was demanding its share of reparations from Germany; next, Australia was suspicious of Japan’s intentions in the Pacific; and, finally, it was felt that the spread of Bolshevik ideas might inflame the passions of the militant trade unions and thus threaten Australia’s political and social fabric. Overall, Greek affairs in April–May were overshadowed by more important events as described above. The Melbourne press was not privy to the secret negotiations among the Allies that authorised the Greek landing at Smyrna. Decision-making was the prerogative of the British Government, who did not feel it necessary to communicate matters relating to the Greek question to its Dominions: Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South Africa. For Great Britain, the former Turkish Empire had been an important political and strategic asset in protecting Britain’s vital interests at Suez and the Persian Gulf and in maintaining its communi330

The Age, April 8, 1919, p.4. For example the Australian Archives has files on the Yugoslav and Italian claims. See NAA, series A981, item no. War P 48 parts 1&2 War Peace Conference. Committee for the study of territorial questions relating to Romania and Yugoslavia; NAA, series A981, item no. War P 46, W.C.P. 139 “The Claims of Italy” December 24, 1918 and W.C.P. 140 British Empire Delegation, February 26, 1919. 331 The Age and Argus, April–May 1919, passim.

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cations with India. Asia Minor was also a region of rivalry between the great powers, France and Italy, who wanted to further their own ambitions. Lloyd George considered Venizelos’ Greece an important factor in the protection of British vital interests in the East Mediterranean. In the first half of 1919, Italy, of all the Great Powers, was the most active in Anatolia and it felt exasperated by the attitude of its Allied partners who would not recognise its territorial claims to Fiume, the Adriatic, and Asia Minor. 332 When examining The Age press articles of April–May relating to the Fiume and Adriatic crisis, it can be seen that those of April 12, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29 and May 8, 12, and 14 depict Italy as a recalcitrant in not wanting to cooperate with Britain, France, and the United States. 333 However, there is one example of an article written during this period where it may be suggested that The Age momentarily softened its position towards Italy, although with some caution. Woodrow Wilson by-passed the Italian delegation by directly appealing to the Italian people in an attempt to resolve the Fiume issue. The Age, quoting the Paris correspondents of the Daily Telegraph and Daily News and London’s Daily Express and Morning Post under the heading “British Press Opinions. Was President Wilson to Blame?,” published an 332

A sample of Melbourne press headings regarding Fiume and Adriatic were: The Age, “Italy and Yugoslavia, Relations very grave, have shots been exchanged?” March 1, 1919, p.7; The Age, “The Italian Crisis, President Wilson ‘Adamant,’ Italian Delegation to Leave.,” April 25, 1919, p.7; Argus “Italy insistent must have Fume.,” March 5, 1919, p.9; Argus, “Italy Demands Fiume, An unpleasant rumour.,” March 17, 1919, p.7 shows Italian intractability over its claims to this region. It can be seen from these press headings an anti-Italian stance being adopted by the Melbourne newspapers. Woodrow Wilson, the United States President, was antagonistic to Italian claims in the Adriatic. For a scholarly discussion of this issue see Sterling J. Kernek, “Woodrow Wilson and National Self -determination along Italy’s frontier,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, vol.126, no.4, 1982, pp.243–300; Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Peace Conference, Columbia University Press, New York, 1938, chs 4–5; Arthur Walworth, Wilson and his Peacemakers, W. W. Norton and Co, New York & London, 1986, pp.335–51. 333 See The Age, April 12, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, and May 8, 12 and 14 1919.

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article in which the American President was depicted as being averse to accepting the Italian claims to Fiume. In fact, the Daily Express described Wilson’s appeal as “his notorious manifesto,” the Morning Post likened him “to a ‘rich uncle’ among the allies” and the Daily Telegraph considered that “President Wilson’s step has put the Italians in the right.” However the Daily News clearly supported Wilson’s action because “the Italians persisted in their uncompromising attitude.” 334 Noble and Walworth point out that the Italians had bribed the French press to support their claims in the Adriatic. The success of Italian propaganda and bribery of the French press might have led to The Age being influenced by the French through the intermediary of British press reports. 335 Being in a deadlock situation in the Adriatic, Italy pushed aggressively for her claims in Asia Minor without informing her Allied partners. As the Italians left Paris to return to Rome on April 24, 1919, without having their demands for the Adriatic satisfied, her Allied partners prepared the groundwork for the landing of Greek troops at Smyrna. On May 2, Wilson denounced the Italians for behaving unacceptably and their attitude was obviously aggressive, “creating a threat to the peace in the very middle of the peace conference in which she once participated and from which she has withdrawn.” Lloyd George requested that the British, French, and Americans send warships to Smyrna in response to Italian manoeuvres in South Western Anatolia. 336 On May 6, Lloyd George thought of asking Venizelos to send Greek troops to Smyrna to which Wilson and Clemenceau fully con334

The Age, “The Defection of Italy. SIGNOR ORLANDO RETURNS TO ROME. Parliament to be Consulted at Once. STRONG DESIRE TO SOLVE THE DIFFICULTY.,” April 28,1919, p.7; Rene Albrecht- Carrie, op. cit., ch 5; Walworth, op. cit., pp 344–8. 335 George Bernard Noble, op. cit., pp.335–6; Walworth, op. cit., pp.346 & n.60 and 347 n.64. 336 Paul Mantoux, The Deliberations of the Council of Four (March 24– June 28, 1919) Vol.1, the notes of the official interpreter, translated and edited by Arthur S. Link, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1992, pp. 450, 453–4; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.201; Smith, op. cit., p.77; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.174; Helmreich, op. cit., p.95.

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curred. For Venizelos had informed Lloyd George of Italo-Turkish cooperation and the Greek Premier urged the allies to send vessels to Smyrna to teach the Italians a lesson. 337 Meeting at Lloyd George’s residence in Paris on May 7, the British Premier asked Venizelos about the number of Greek troops that could be spared for the Smyrna expedition. Venizelos replied that two Greek divisions could be despatched immediately. The major problem was the allocation of a sufficient number of ships to transport these troops. Venizelos considered Lloyd George’s gesture a wonderful opportunity to realise his vision of a Greek Empire in Asia Minor. The Greek Premier used his persuasive skills to convince Woodrow Wilson that some 30,000 Greeks of Smyrna faced serious problems from a hostile Turkish population. 338 Further to this, Clemenceau warned that the Turks should be notified as a precautionary measure about the Allies intentions to occupy Smyrna. It was decided to keep the mission as quiet as possible. 339 The initial Allied decision to authorise the Greek landing and its subsequent appearance in the Melbourne press took some twelve days. On May 11, Clemenceau told his colleagues that the Allied decision would be delayed for 48 hours so that they could discuss the whole matter with the Italians. Balfour disputed Italian pretensions to Smyrna under the St Jean de Maurienne Treaty and Wilson opposed them on moral grounds. 340 The French Premier was trying to avoid a 337

Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.201; Mantoux vol.1, op. cit., pp.495–6; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.175. 338 FRUS PPC vol.v, pp.501– 2; Mantoux vol.1, op cit, pp.505–7; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.176–7; Smith, op. cit., p.79; Helmreich, op. cit., p.96; PetsalisDiomidis, op. cit., pp.203–4. 339 FRUS PPC vol.v, pp. 503–4; Helmreich, op. cit., p.96; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.204. It should be noted that on May 6, 1919 a conference held at Hotel Astoria in Paris at 4.30p.m. attended by Venizelos, Admiral Hope, Generals Belin, Bliss and H. Wilson concluded on the steps to be implemented to affect the Greek landing at Smyrna. See FRUS PPC vol.v, appendix conclusions pp.504–05. These conclusions do not appear in Mantoux’s vol.1. 340 Paul Mantoux, The Deliberations of the Council of Four ( March 24–June 28, 1919) Vol.2, the notes of the official interpreter, translated and edited by Arthur S. Link , Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1992, pp.

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potential clash among the Allies by stipulating that Allied forces land jointly [Italian, British, French] and that Italians not be permitted to occupy the forts. 341 In order to strengthen Greece’s position, Venizelos informed his Allied friends that the Italian ship Regina Elena had landed workmen at Scala Nuova to fit out the jetties when 300 sailors with officers landed and re-embarked again. He tried to convince the allies that the region to the south of Smyrna should not be given to Italy, as this would increase Italian influence in Southern Anatolia. He hoped that Greece would acquire a mandate to this territory for ten years and could thereby forestall Italian pretensions to Smyrna. 342 Next day, the Italians rejoined the conference and Sonnino, the Italian Foreign Minister, argued that French, British, and Italian forces should remain on shore in Smyrna so as to give the expedition an international character. Clemenceau thought it undignified to place Allied forces under Greek control, but the Allied decision did not affect the eventual settlement of Smyrna under the peace treaty. Finally, the Allies consented to allowing the Greek force to leave Piraeus and to allowing an Italian contingent to participate in the Allied landing at Smyrna. 343 The Allies had to display some solidarity and unity when they landed at Smyrna, so as not to give the Turks any opportunity for exploiting Allied differences for their own ends. However, the Italians 36–7. This meeting does not appear in Hankey’s notes which are found in FRUS PPC. 341 Mantoux vol.2, op. cit., pp.38. It should be noted the Allies focussed their attention on May 10 as the date to inform the Turks of their decision to occupy the forts at Smyrna and insisted that the Italians be acquainted with the measure to be taken. The Italians should place their senior naval officer at Smyrna under Admiral Calthorpe’s direction. The presence of Admiral Calthorpe in Smyrna just prior and during the landing operations would lend respectability and allow the mission to proceed smoothly. See FRUS PPC vol.v, pp.557 -58; Mantoux vol.2, op. cit., pp.29–31. 342 Mantoux vol.2, op. cit., pp.38–39. 343 FRUS PPC vol.v, pp. 577–78; Mantoux vol.2, op. cit., pp.48–9; PetsalisDiomidis, op. cit., pp.206–7; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.180–1; Helmreich, op. cit., pp.97–8; Smith, op. cit., pp.80–1.

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persisted with their stubborn behaviour even after the Greek landing at Smyrna. 344 The Melbourne press reported very briefly on May 24 that Britain, France, and the United States were seeking an Italian explanation as to its motives for landing troops in Asia Minor. The Argus attributed its information which emanated from London, to the Australian Press Association. 345 This showed that the Australian press had its own representation in the heart of the British Empire for transmitting this information to Melbourne. However, it also showed that the Australian Press Association depended on Reuters, who were solely responsible for “preparing official reports on the Paris negotiations for distribution to all British officials at home and abroad, as well as to the British press.” 346 It is clear the Melbourne press was not given the whole story and thus that it left out some important details. Moreover, the Melbourne press reports of May 24 appear to refer to the Allied discussions of May 17 regarding the Italian landings in Asia Minor. Neither newspaper mentioned Lloyd George’s irritation over the Italian landings at Scala Nova and Marmarice, actions that jeopardised the future settlement of Asia Minor. Orlando, the Italian Premier, regretted what ensued but had no knowledge of the purpose of the landings, which had taken place, and were to counter some local problem. 347 The Big 3— Britain, France, and U.S.—addressed a memorandum to the Italian delegation on May 17 asking them to explain their actions and why they had not notified their Allied partners. 348 At the meeting of May 19, Sonnino tried to justify the Italian position in Anatolia on two grounds: first, that disturbances had occurred at Scala Nova, Adalia, and Budrum and needed to be dealt with; and 344

The Greek landing at Smyrna on May 15 will be discussed below. The Age, “Italy asked for explanation,” May 24, 1919, p.13; Argus, “Italy to explain, why troops went to Turkey,” May 24, 1919, p.21. 346 Desmond, Windows on the World, p.417. 347 FRUS PPC vol.v, p.686; Mantoux vol.2, op. cit., pp.92–4; Busch, op. cit., pp.93–4. 348 FRUS PPC vol.v, pp.686–7; Mantoux vol.2, op. cit., p.92n1; The text of this Memorandum is also cited in PPW vol.59, pp.225–6. 345

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second, that both Smyrna and Adalia had been conceded to Italy under the secret wartime treaties. 349 Lloyd George retorted that Smyrna had not been assigned to Italy under the Treaty of London 1915 and reproached the Italians for not having landed their troops at Adalia, Budrum, and Scala Nova during the 1914–18 war when such a contribution would have been applauded. Lloyd George threatened that if Italy failed to withdraw her troops from Asia Minor, then her allied partners would refuse to discuss her territorial claims. 350 It can be suggested that the Melbourne press adopted an anti-Italian stance by showing the Big Three’s determination to bring an undisciplined Italy to heel. The Greek landing in Smyrna on May 15 overshadowed the Italian pretensions in Asia Minor. 1d) The Greek landing at Smyrna and its reports in the Melbourne press On June 2, The Age carried big headlines “THE GREEKS IN SMYRNA. VENGEANCE ON TURKS. ORGANISED MAN HUNTS. Defenceless Turks Killed.,” reporting on the events at Smyrna some eighteen days after they had taken place. These headlines reveal an intense anti-Greek position on the part of The Age newspaper. Quoting the Daily Express correspondent at Smyrna, who conveyed a tragic story of the events surrounding the Greek occupation, the journalistic account appeared on June 2. It is quoted in full and depicts the Greeks as uncivilised in their behaviour towards the Turks, reporting that:

349

FRUS PPC vol.v, pp.717–8; Busch, op. cit., p.95. FRUS PPC vol.v, pp. 718–9; Busch, op. cit., p.95. Orlando responded to the Big 3’s inquiry by producing his own memorandum of May 18 outlining the position of his government. His note mentioned that article 9 of the Treaty of London recognised Italian claims in Asia Minor. It alluded to recent Greek-Italian negotiations, while its Allied partners sanctioned the Greek landing of Smyrna without consulting the Italian government. He indicated that Italy was amenable to entering into an acceptable settlement of the Mediterranean that at the same time satisfied Italian public opinion. See Mantoux vol.2, op. cit., pp.109-10fn.1 and PPW vol.59, pp.250–1. 350

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23 The Greek troops provoked Turkish soldiers to fire a few shots. A horrible manhunt followed Greek civilians joining in with the troops. Turks who had surrendered to the Greeks for their protection were bayonetted or clubbed and flung into the sea, even when unarmed and under escort. Turkish shops and houses were raided and robbed. When the news of the happenings in Smyrna became known, similar man hunts were organised in the surrounding villages, the Greek troops handing rifles and bayonets to the civilians, including boys from 12 to 16 years of age. The Turks appeal to France and Great Britain not to hand Turkey over their enemies. 351

The above news story requires some detailed elaboration. It would be interesting to ask the journalist writing this news piece: Was the Daily Express reporter actually witnessing and recording the Greek occupation and the subsequent events? Did he interview any eyewitnesses? Did he receive his information from Turkish authorities? and Was he sympathetic to the Turks? These are valid questions to pose, but the first, second, and third ones are answerable. This account contains a mixture of fact, distortion, and omission. There is still a lot of conjecture as to who fired the first shots that is evident in other accounts. Petsalis-Diomidis for example took another view. He argues that: Firing broke out without any apparent reason, as a battalion, with bugles blowing and accompanied by crowds cheering and waving flags passed near the Turkish gendarmerie headquarters. The Greeks returned the fire under the impression that they were under a general attack. Fighting then broke out in some parts of the town, in which Greek civilians played a preponderant role. 352

The report above fails to mention that the Greek troops were greeted as liberators when they landed on the quay at Smyrna. As they marched through the streets of the city, the crowds showed their pa-

351

The Age, “THE GREEKS IN SMYRNA. VENGEANCE ON TURKS. ORGANISED MAN HUNTS. Defenceless Turks Killed.” June 2, 1919, p.7. 352 Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p. 208; Smith, op. cit., p.89; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.222.

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triotism by shouting “Long live Greece” and “Long live Venizelos.” 353 It is true that Greek citizens of Smyrna did plunder and steal from Turkish businesses and houses with the connivance of the Greek military, who stood idly by without intervening. However, the Melbourne press was unaware that, when Venizelos found out about the disgraceful behaviour of his countrymen at Smyrna, he promptly instructed Colonel Zafiriou on May 19 to punish the perpetrators very harshly and to banish some of them to an Aegean island in order to avoid a similar incident. 354 There is no indication in The Age of the total number of casualties on both sides. Moreover, the Daily Express account would suggest that the Turks suffered more than the Greek population. This can be ascertained from some of the eyewitness accounts found in the British archives. For example, Reverend MacLachlan, a Canadian in charge of the international college at Smyrna, told Admiral Bristol that he estimated that some 300–500 Turks had been killed and he later revised this to 400–600. 355 The U.S. Naval Officer of the U.S.S. Arizona, which was berthed at Smyrna harbour, estimated initially that some 100 Turks had been killed. He increased his figure to 300–500 Turks killed and 700–1000 total casualties as murders had happened in the suburbs and nearby villages. There were two Greek soldiers killed and some 15–20 wounded and 20–30 Greek civilians slain with about 40–50 wounded. Furthermore, the U.S. Naval Officer of the U.S.S. Arizona mentioned the death of a Turkish official as being committed by young hoodlums. 356 The Argus, on the other hand, treated the Greek occupation on June 2 in a slightly different manner from The Age. It ran a more moderate and smaller headline, “Contention over Smyrna. The Greek Oc353

F.O. 608/104–11984, U.S.S. Arizona, Smyrna, Asia Minor, May 18, 1919 to Senior Naval officer in Turkey, Constantinople, p.2. 354 Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.208–9; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.222–3. 355 F.O. 608/104–11984, Westermann to Vansittart, June 6, 1919 attaching a record of conversation of Rev. MacLachlan with Admiral Bristol; PetsalisDiomidis, op. cit., p.208fn.41; Smith, op. cit., p.90; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.223. 356 F.O. 608/104–11984, U.S.S. Arizona, Smyrna, Asia Minor, May 18,1919 to Senior Naval officer in Turkey, Constantinople, pp.2–3.

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cupation,” which reversed the order of information, and also included an editorial on the Greek landing. In the same press account, the Argus combined comment on both the Italian press reaction and the Greek occupation of Smyrna. With regard to the latter, the Argus repeated nearly the same text as that which appeared in The Age, but had one notable exception: “It is alleged that the Greek troops provoked some Turkish soldiers to fire a few shots...” The word “alleged” is very important as it suggests that the Argus was sceptical and prepared to give the Greeks the benefit of the doubt, unlike The Age, with its more sensational headline. 357 This scepticism is further developed in the Argus editorial of June 2, 1919, which reveals an anti-Turkish position. It stated that: ...we find a newspaper correspondent at Smyrna describing “Greek atrocities” in which the Turks are being massacred wholesale by the once downtrodden and oppressed Greeks. If the account be correct the Greeks are combining savagery and treachery in a very high degree. Still, although the reports are horrifying, it is not easy to feel very much sympathy for the Turks after their treatment of subject races, especially the Armenians and Greeks. 358

There is no doubt that even if the “Greek atrocities” were true, the editorial writer easily understands the actions of the Greeks against the Turks. The Age, however, did not editorialise on this issue. Both Melbourne newspapers reported that the Italian press reacted with “considerable agitation” and “advised calmness” regarding the Greek occupation in Asia Minor. However, The Age ran this as a separate headline, titled, “Italian Resentment.” 359 Both newspapers adopted a clear anti-Italian tone.

357

Argus, “Contention Over Smyrna. The Greek Occupation.,” June 2, 1919, p.7. 358 Argus, June 2, 1919, p.6. 359 Argus, June 2 and The Age, “Italian Resentment,” June 2, 1919, p.7. It must be noted that both Melbourne newspapers do not reveal the names of the Italian newspapers protesting at the Greek occupation and those Italian ones opposing their government’s quest for empire.

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They both consider that the landing of Italian troops at Sokia, “a short distance south of Smyrna, may provoke trouble with the Greeks.” 360 The phrase “may provoke trouble” indicates a potential clash among Allied partners was imminent in Asia Minor and that the Turks would exploit it to their advantage. The reporting of the Italian landing is cited in two documents sent by Repoulis, acting Greek Prime Minister, and Colonel Zafiriou on May 21 to Venizelos in Paris. Both authors indicate that the Italians were active in spreading propaganda and arming the Turks. 361 What the newspapers do not reveal is that on May 19 Venizelos, with the approval of the Peace Conference, authorised Colonel Zafiriou to dispatch his troops at his own discretion anywhere in the Caza of Aivali and Sanjak of Smyrna. The Greek force was not to proceed any further than Aya Soulouk but could be dispatched as far as Aidin if there was a real danger to public order. Such action could only be undertaken with the consent of the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna. 362 It is worth noting that Zafiriou ignored these instructions and Greek troops occupied: Menemen on 22 May, Magnesia and Aya Soulouk on 25 May, Aidin on 27 May, Kassaba and Aivali on 29 May 1919, Odemish on 1 June, Nazli on 3 June, Akhissar on 5 June, and Bergama on 12 June. 363 Both newspapers continued to briefly report on June 7, June 28, July 1 and 2 on the troubles the Greeks encountered with the Turks and the occupation by the former of the towns of Aivali and Aidin. They do not offer any further details as to the extent of the unrest and

360

The Age, June 2, 1919, p.7 and Argus , June 2, 1919, p.7. F.O. 608/90, Repoulis and Col Zafiriou, Chio, May 21, 1919. 362 FRUS PPC vol.v, pp.722–23; Mantoux vol.2, op. cit., pp.115–16; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.215; F.O. 608/90, Venizelos to Colonel Zafiriou, Smyrna and Foreign Office, Athens. 363 Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.216; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.228. Admiral Calthorpe, the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, acted as the senior naval officer at Smyrna and was replaced on June 3, 1919 by Admiral Fitzmaurice. It should be stated that Greek forces withdrew only from Nazli and Akhissar. 361

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strife happening around Smyrna and its adjacent hinterland. 364 Likewise, they both uncritically reported on July 1 on Venizelos’ request to the powers to expand the Greek zone around Smyrna. All these newspaper accounts certainly revealed an anti-Turkish sentiment and that some problem existed in Asia Minor. 365 These terse newspaper stories fail to tell, however, of an intense Greek-Italian rivalry near Smyrna that nearly brought them into conflict. Admiral Fitzmaurice, the Senior Naval Officer at Smyrna, demanded an explanation from Aristidis Sterghiadis, the Greek High Commissioner, as to why Greek troops occupied Magnesia, Kassaba, Aidin, and Nazli without his express authority. 366 Sterghiadis replied that the Greek action was taken to protect the Christians and to thwart an Italian move towards occupying the Meander Valley. Venizelos considered it important to avoid antagonism with the Italians. The Greek request to advance from Nazli to Denizli was refused on June 7 by Fitzmaurice, who fixed “the most southern point of our occupation the railway line between Aidin and Nazli,” and insisted the Greeks withdraw their army from between the railway line and the Meander Valley. Fitzmaurice mentioned that the Greeks would not be permitted to occupy the region south of Aya Soulouk but would be confined “(on the north) by an imaginary line running straight from Aya Soulouk as far as the city of Aidin.” 367 On June 13, the Greek Commander notified Venizelos in Paris that the Italians were approaching the area between Aya Soulouk and Aidin, thus threatening the Greek occupation of Aidin and Nazli. In reply, Venizelos directed Sterghiadis to occupy the railway line between Aya Soulouk and Aidin. 368 The Melbourne press accounts of 364

The Age, “Greeks in Asia Minor. Towns occupied after fight,” June 7, 1919, p.13 and June 28 “Greeks and Turks in Conflict,” p.13 ; Argus, “Greeks land in Turkey,” June 7, 1919, p.19 and “Greeks and Turks fight,” July 2, p.7. 365 The Age, “Turks murder Greeks,” July 1, 1919, p.5; Argus, “Turks and Greeks. Ottomans murder Greeks,” July 1, 1919, p.5. 366 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.864 and 867–8. See also Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.216. 367 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.868–9; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.217–8. 368 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.865–6; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.218.

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July 1 related to the fact that Venizelos had alerted Clemenceau on June 18 and 20 of Turkish forces gathering near Smyrna and asked that Greek occupation be extended in order to control the railways for the strategic objective of being able to repulse Turkish attacks. Venizelos proposed a new strategic line running from Edremid-BalikesriAkhissar-Sahihli-Nazli and then along the course of the Meander. 369 Clemenceau failed to respond to these letters and Venizelos authorised the Greek Commander on June 22 to disperse the Turks, saying that he would accept all the responsibility for this action before the peace conference. Next day, Venizelos wrote again to Clemenceau informing the latter of the previous day’s decision of dispatching Greek troops to deal with the grave situation outside Smyrna. The Greek Premier cabled Sterghiadis on June 27 saying that it appeared the Supreme Council acquiesced in his personal order granting General Nider, the new Greek Commander, the authority to scatter the enemy if Greek defences were threatened. 370 The Melbourne press did not reveal that Aidin was evacuated and reoccupied by the Greeks. It may be inferred that the Melbourne press withheld such information so as not to embarrass Venizelos who, after all, was a friend of the British Empire. This may have been part of the Melbourne newspapers’ overall position in supporting the Greece of Venizelos. The Greek army evacuated from Aidin on June 29, when Turkish irregulars, on entering the town, burnt, robbed, and killed Greek citizens in response to atrocities committed on ordinary Turkish citizens by Greek soldiers. Venizelos ordered the reoccupation of Aidin two thirds of which had been destroyed by fire. Admiral Fitzmaurice informed Sterghiadis that the Greek action was contrary to his

369

The Age and Argus, July 1, 1919, p.5; D.B.F.P. vol.4, p.866; The text of these letters is written in French. See F.O. 608 /90 Venizelos to Clemenceau, June 18 and 20, 1919. 370 F.O. 608/90 Venizelos [Paris] to High Commissioner of Greece, Smyrna; D.B.F.P. vol.4, p.866; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.218–9; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.229.

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instructions and that peace in Aidin Vilayet would be achieved by withdrawing Greek troops into Smyrna Sanjak. 371 Furthermore Sir Philip Kerr, Private Secretary to Lloyd George, in response to Balfour’s suggestion, interviewed Venizelos on July 7 in Paris to ascertain the reason for the Greek advance in Anatolia without the authority of the Senior Naval Officer. Venizelos explained that his communications to local Greek authorities at Smyrna were held up in Italy and that the alternative route through Malta involved great delays too. He further stated “that after the recent reverses at Aidin, the British Admiral himself had suggested the importance of retaking it in order to prevent the Turks from pursuing their attacks again.” 372 GreekItalian relations were at an impasse, but political events in Rome would eventually lead to a temporary rapprochement between the two countries. 1e) Italian Cabinet crisis of June 1919 and Greek-Italian Rapprochement in Asia Minor The Age covered the Italian Cabinet crisis on June 21, 23, 25, and July 1 with information which emanated from New York and London, the Paris correspondent of the United Press Association and Dr. Dillon, the special reporter of Daily Telegraph in Paris being cited as the main providers of these details. These reports contain some correct, albeit brief details of the unstable political climate which prevailed in Italy and which would lead to the resignation of the Orlando Cabinet and with the nomination of Nitti as Prime Minister and Tittoni as Foreign Minister and Italian delegate at Paris. 373 The Argus, however, covered 371

FRUS PPC vol.1X, pp. 53–5; D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.659 &665 and n.2; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.219; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.229–30; Smith, op. cit., p.91. 372 D.B.F.P. vol.4, p.666fn.1. 373 The Age, “THE ITALIAN CABINET. Its Resignation Reported.,” June 21, 1919, p.13; “THE ITALIAN CRISIS. CABINET RESIGNS. BEATEN BY LARGE MAJORITY. Revolutionary Movement. A COMMUNIST REPUBLIC.,” June 23, 1919, p.7; “THE ITALIAN UPHEAVAL. Nitti Forming New Cabinet.,” June 25, 1919, p.7 and “NEW ITALIAN MINISTRY. Why Signor Orlando fell.,’ July 1, 1919, p.5 ; Argus, “ITALIAN CRISIS. DEFEAT

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the above on June 21, 23, and July 1. One major difference in the two press accounts of June 21 was that the Argus went beyond the mere single line entry of its competitor by offering some explanation of what may have caused the Italian cabinet deadlock. 374 The two most important accounts are those of June 23 and July 1, which offer some reasons for the resignation of the Orlando ministry. In the earlier story, food shortages and the failure of the Italian delegation in Paris to energetically defend Italian claims are cited as reasons. Furthermore, Dr. Dillon spoke of discontent in Italy and of revolutionaries who wanted to establish a Communist Republic. 375 This explanation is true to a point, but it fails to account for other political groups in Italy who were espousing revolution too. In fact, Sir Rennell Rodd, the British Ambassador at Rome, notified the Foreign Office on June 12 that military organisations composed largely of ex-soldiers supported by large business organisations were concerned about the spread of “Bolshevism and anarchical movements.” 376 The account of July 1 is correct in that Giolitti and his followers originally supported Orlando, only to withdraw their support at the end. While The Age did not offer a penetrating analysis of the parliamentary problems existing in Italy, it did indicate that the Chamber of Deputies refused Orlando’s request for a special session to discuss the

OF MINISTRY. Revolutionaries Active.,” June 23,1919, p.7 and “ITALIAN CRISIS. Why Orlando Fell.,” July 1, 1919, p.5. 374 Argus, “ITALIAN CABINET CRISIS.,” June 21, 1919, p.21. 375 The Age, June 23, 1919, p.7; Argus, June 23, 1919, p.7; Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberation to Fascism 1870–1925, Methuen and Co, London,1967, p.536; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.246. 376 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.7–9fn.4; James Joll points out that in 1919 Italy experienced industrial unrest, agrarian disturbances, and membership of trade unions increased. “The Socialist party was in a militant mood, though deeply divided about doctrine and tactics, and there seemed to be good hopes of its being able to use the growing unrest and social ferment to create a genuinely revolutionary mass movement” where the Socialist’s divisions were exploited by the Fascists on their road to power in 1922. See James Joll, op. cit., pp.258– 9.

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peace terms. 377 This press report can be verified by Sir Rennell Rodd’s cable to London on June 23, which indicated that some groups in the Italian Chamber wanted a public discussion on the Peace Treaty and Conference discussions in Paris. The President of the Council on Foreign Affairs made a disappointing speech in parliament regarding Italy’s claims, whereas on internal affairs and food he could only make promises. The Government wished to create a secret committee to discuss the issues in private. Such a procedure was unacceptable to the Giolittians and this sealed Orlando’s fate. Nitti mustered enough support to form a new administration. 378 The Nitti-Tittoni combination was to be more malleable in its relations with Greece in Asia Minor than its predecessor. 379 The Melbourne press was not acquainted with the details of the Allied Powers’ attempts to improve its relations with Italy. These ongoing matters were the sole concern of the British Government. At an informal meeting conducted at the French War Ministry on July 4, Tittoni outlined the new direction in Italian foreign policy to Balfour. Tittoni condemned the sending of Italian troops to Asia Minor but argued that they should remain in Asia Minor for domestic political 377

The Age, “Signor Orlando’s Defeat,” June 27, 1919, p.7. It is interesting to note that Argus did not report this item. 378 The Age, July 1,1919, p.5; Argus July 1, 1919, p.5; Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt (General Editors), British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Series F Europe, 1919–39, Vol.4 Italy and South-Eastern Europe, November 1918– June 1922, (editor) Christopher Seton-Watson, University Publications of America, pp.51–2; Hereafter cited as B.D.F.A. Series F with relevant volume number. 379 On June 28 the Allies met in Lloyd George’s residence in Paris at 10.30a.m. and 6p.m. to discuss its policy stance towards the new Italian Government. Balfour prepared a new memorandum for the new Italian delegation asking them about their attitude towards the retention of Italian troops in Asia Minor. The British Foreign Minister warned that Italy’s aggressive behaviour threatened peace and would lead to her isolation. On the previous day Woodrow Wilson informed Lansing that the Italians had to withdraw their forces from Asia Minor and Fiume before the other Allies would consider extending the hand of friendship. See FRUS PPC vol.V1., pp. 738–9, 759 & 760–2; PWW vol.61., pp.306–7.

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reasons. Primarily, he was interested in coal and raw materials, not in territorial acquisitions in Asia Minor. 380 In another conversation on July 1 Balfour raised the issue of Italian troops with Tittoni. The Italian Foreign Minister replied that Venizelos was an old friend of his and that in the past he had constantly adopted a pro-Greek policy. He anticipated that his past friendship with Venizelos would make it easier to arrive at some understanding between them. 381 Meanwhile events in Asia Minor nearly brought the Greeks and Italians into direct conflict with each other. On July 8, Greek troops were pursuing the Turks near Giovval some 20 miles (32 kilometres) south of Aidin. Consequently, Greek bullets fell inside the Italian zone in which the Italian Commander complained of violations and Admiral Fitzmaurice ordered the Greeks to withdraw to the north of the Aidin railway. 382 Furthermore, a memorandum on July 12 prepared by Crespi, the Italian Delegate to the Peace Conference, complained that the Greeks had proceeded beyond their allotted zone without the consent of the Senior Naval Officer. This brought the Greeks face to face with Italian patrols. It was further claimed that Greek aeroplanes opened fire on Italian troops marching from Girova towards the Meander, and that Greek artillery shelled Italian positions. Crespi demanded that the Supreme Council should make the Greeks understand that the orders of the British Commodore were to be respected. 383 Two days earlier Venizelos had forwarded a memorandum to Clemenceau explaining that the situation in Anatolia was critical. The Turks had become very defiant—they had assembled some 60,000 men at Konya and could mobilise 300,000 men if required. Venizelos was critical of the Italians for encouraging the Turks, and claimed the Ital380

D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.10–12. Clemenceau, Lansing and Mantoux the official interpreter were also in attendance. The remainder of this informal exchange was taken up with the Adriatic issue. See also Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.247; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.265. 381 D.B.F.P. vol.4, p.687fn.1; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.246–7. 382 D.B.F.P. vol.4, p.680; Smith, op. cit., p.108. 383 FRUS PPC vol.7, p.128; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.248; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.271; Smith, op. cit., p.108.

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ian zone south of Aidin served as a staging base for Turkish operations against the Greeks north of the Meander. The Greek leader urged the Peace Conference to take energetic measures against the Turks by restricting Turkish army mobilisation, and that the Italians be censured for encouraging the Turks. 384 The Supreme Council had to find a way to reduce Greek-Italian tensions. At a meeting of the Five Great Powers—Britain, France, Italy, U.S., and Japan—held on July 16 at M. Pichon’s room at Quai d’Orsay, Venizelos and Tittoni were asked to explain their respective positions on recent events in Asia Minor. Tittoni believed that GreekItalian collaboration would make it possible to soothe Turkish passions and Venizelos assented to such a development. 385 Balfour suggested that General Allenby, the Supreme Allied Commander for the Turkish Empire, should be authorised to nominate officers to mark out the Italian and Greek lines. Tittoni and Venizelos indicated that both of them would assume personal responsibility for any further encroachments by their forces. It was decided that the Greek and Italian delegates should conclude an agreement outlining their respective zones of occupation in Asia Minor and notify the conference of their final decision. This would allow the Supreme Council to notify the Turkish Government accordingly. 386 At another meeting of the Heads of Delegations, held this time at the Quai d’Orsay on July 18, Venizelos and Tittoni presented the Greek- Italian lines of occupation in Asia Minor. 387 The area included: ...from the mouth of the river Menderez: thence it will follow the course of the river up to the Ayassoluk-Scalanova road: thence it 384

FRUS PPC vol.7, pp.152–3; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.248; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.272; Smith , op. cit., p.108. Admiral Calthorpe informed Balfour on August 4 by amending details of the earlier dispatch of Venizelos having exaggerated Turkish troop numbers opposing the Greeks. See D.B.F.P. vol.4, p.686 and fn.2. 385 FRUS PPC vol.7, p.155; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.248. 386 FRUS PPC vol.7, pp.157–8; D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.686–88; PetsalisDiomidis, op. cit., pp.248–9; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.273. 387 FRUS PPC vol.7, p.194; Karagiannis, op. cit., p.274.

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will follow the line of the Greek occupation of Ayasoulouk and old Ephesus. From old Ephesus it will follow a line at an average distance of 600 meters from the railway Smyrna-Aidin to the west, then to the south of the said railway, the line to be fixed on the spot by Greek and Italian Governments in order to allow Greek troops to protect the railway from sudden attacks from Comitagis. The line will then reach the river Muschluk-Deresi which will be followed to its junction with the Menderez. Thence it will follow the bed of the Menderez to the east as far as Keuehk. The two Governments agree not to pass beyond the line above established.

In addition, occupation was to be of a provisional nature until the Peace Conference could decide on the final settlement of these regions. Both the Greek and Italian Governments were to protect each other’s co-nationals in their respective zones and inform their respective army commands informed accordingly. 388 Balfour, again, mentioned General Allenby as a suitable candidate for effecting the orders of the Supreme Council, on the grounds that Great Britain had no territorial ambitions in Anatolia. However, Clemenceau criticised General Allenby for his anti-French stance. After some deliberation General Milne, Commander of the British Forces in the Near East was authorised in the name of the Supreme Council, to place all Greek, Italian, and Turkish troops under his supreme command. The Venizelos-Tittoni lines were provisionally endorsed. 389 The Melbourne press was unaware of the Venizelos-Tittoni agreement. Tittoni proposed that Italy sanction Greek claims in Northern Epirus, Thrace, Asia Minor, and Dodecanese, providing the Greeks dropped their claim to the Meander Valley and supported the Italian protectorate over Albania. On July 27, Venizelos and Tittoni signed two documents that temporarily healed the differences between Greece and Italy. The first one re-affirmed Italian support of Greek claims in Thrace (clause 1), North Epirus (clause 2), Asia Minor (clause 4) and Dodecanese (clause 5), in return for Greek support of Italy’s mandate 388

FRUS PPC vol.7, p.194; D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.691–2; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.249. 389 FRUS PPC vol.7, pp.195–8; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.249; Karagiannis, op. cit., pp.274–5; Busch, op. cit., pp.164–5.

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over Albania and Italian sovereignty over Valona and its hinterland (clause 3). It was interesting that the document stated that if “Italian aspirations were not satisfied, Italy was to recover full freedom of action” (clause 7). The future of Rhodes was concluded in a separate agreement which stipulated that “Italy was to allow a free plebiscite, if and when Britain ceded Cyprus to Greece, but not before July 29, 1924.” Furthermore, “this separate agreement was made conditional to clause 7 of the main agreement.” 390 It could be argued that the British Government would have tried to keep any Allied differences secret from, or at least to minimise their impact in the press. Even if we bear in mind the negative reporting of the May 15 events at Smyrna and of Italian incursions in Asia Minor, we have to remember that both Greece and Italy were Allies of Great Britain and had contributed to the 1914–18 war. After all the Turks had been the enemies of the British Empire. 2a) The Turkish Treaty: the anti-Turkish stance Both Melbourne papers started to report on the Turkish settlement on June 28, some eleven days after the Ottoman delegation had presented 390

Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.252–5; Seton-Watson, op. cit., p.556; Albrecht-Carrie, op. cit., pp.242–3; National Archives of the UK, [London], Foreign Office Correspondence, F.O371 Series, F.0371/3599–168801, “Greek Negotiations at Paris Peace Conference,” by Commodore Talbot, p.5. It is worth noting that Count Sforza repudiated this agreement after the Treaty of Sevres on August 10 1920, as it left no territory for Italy in Asia Minor. Karagiannis states that Sforza in his memoirs discloses the purpose behind his move. He said: “I absolutely failed to see how it (i.e., the Tittoni-Venizelos agreement) could be of any use to Italy. With no undue breach of modesty, I considered that it was really not (necessary) for a Great Power like Italy to have written guarantees to the effect that Greece should ‘support’ any essential point of Italian interests at the conference... But when the Foreign Minister of a Great Power, like Tittoni, goes so far at the Paris Conference to consider it an important asset to have Venizelos’ support, one cannot deny that Venizelos must have had in the eyes of all... the sort of legendary power of a charmer, of a siren.” See Karagiannis, op. cit., p.402.

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its case to the Council of Ten. It is worth noting that the Argus account came via the Australian Press Association in London on June 27, unlike The Age story, which originated in Paris on June 17. The delay in reporting this story can be attributed to the coverage of a more important matter—the impending signing of the German peace settlement. The actual news accounts of June 28 contain a cursory outline of the Turkish note of June 17 but fail to include other important details. It would seem that the journalist writing this news story was dependent on the official communique issued by the Council of Ten. The Great Powers concealed critical details from journalists for political and diplomatic reasons. We can also assume that The Age and Argus news editors selected material for its readership from the overseas cables that would depict the Ottoman delegation in an unfavourable light. The Argus headline “TURKEY’S EMISSARIES. Leniency Asked For.,” and The Age’s “TURKISH DELEGATION. An appeal to the Allies.,” convey an implicit anti-Turkish bias with which both newspapers, at a philosophical level, were perhaps questioning Turkey’s ulterior motives in pleading for mercy in Paris. Perhaps both newspapers were reflecting on the events in Gallipoli in 1915 and the atrocities committed by Turks on the Christian populations of Asia Minor in 1915–16. The press accounts explaining that the Turkish delegation presented a note outlining its views were true. They noted that the Sultan and the Turkish nation were not guilty for the war, which had been the work of the revolutionary party once it gained power. The Turks wanted their empire to remain intact but they acknowledged that their country was an economic disaster. They denounced the Greek occupation of Smyrna. 391 What the papers did not explain was that the Ottoman Delegations had revealed the excesses perpetrated against the Christians of the Ottoman Empire. Damad Ferid Pasha, the leader of the Ottoman 391

Argus, “TURKEY’S EMISSARIES. Leniency Asked For.,” June 28, 1919, p.21; The Age, “TURKISH DELEGATION. An appeal to the Allies.,” June 28, 1919, p.13; Some of the information appearing in The Age and Argus can be found in FRUS PPC vol.4, pp. 509–12.

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Delegation, accused the Kaiser’s regime of having concluded a secret treaty with the revolutionary committee who had staged a coup in 1913. This clandestine pact, unknown to the Sultan led the Ottoman Empire to a disastrous war. 392 The amputation of the Turkish Empire was going to create many future difficulties according to the Turkish delegation in the Near East. They wished that Turkey “be granted in Thrace, to the North and west of Adrianople where the Mohammedan population is in overwhelmingly majority, a frontier line which [would] render possible the defence of Adrianople and Constantinople.” Despite the armistice, the Turks wanted the evacuation of foreign troops from its occupied territories. 393 The Age’s report that the Turks had promised to submit a detailed statement on the following Friday and that the Council of Ten had agreed to meet with them again was accurate. However, the Argus did not mention this information. 394 On June 30, both newspapers reported what was largely an abridgement of Balfour’s draft reply to the Turks case of two days earlier. The tone of the news articles captures the anti-Turkish flavour of the Balfour draft note of June 19 in which Balfour claimed that the Turks had proved incapable of ruling over alien races. Wherever the Turks had governed he claimed prosperity had declined and the Turks were unable to convince the Council of Ten of the merits of their case. There is no doubt the headlines, in Argus “Turks’ Pleas unheeded, Empire must be dismembered” and The Age, “END OF TURKISH RULE. Incapable of Governing.,” respectively captured the essence of Balfour’s note. 395 392

FRUS PPC vol.4, p.509; Petsalis -Diomidis, op. cit., p.238. FRUS PPC vol.4, pp.510–11. 394 The Age, June 28,1919, p.13. 395 Argus, “Turks’ Pleas unheeded, Empire must be dismembered,” June 30, 1919, p.7; The Age, “END OF TURKISH RULE. Incapable of Governing,” June 30, 1919, p.7; FRUS PPC vol.6, appendix 11 to CF-78 Draft answer to the Turks pp.577–80. The Balfour draft note is also located in NAA, A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 Pt 1, British Empire Delegation, W.C.P. 1044 “Draft Answer to Turks. Prepared by Mr Balfour,” June 19, 1919. 393

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Two issues that were absent from the press reports of June 30 need an explanation. The first of these was Damad Ferid’s memorandum of June 19 which asked that Greek troops be withdrawn to an area allotted to them by the Peace Conference and that Moslem areas provisionally under Greek control have Allied officers attached to Greek army units, to protect the lives and properties of Moslems. 396 The second issue was the meeting of the Council of Ten at President Wilson’s residence on June 21 where Balfour announced that Montagu, the Secretary of State of India, had sent him a long memorandum full of criticisms. 397 Montagu argued for the retention of the Turks in Constantinople. Furthermore, Montagu made it very clear that the Indian Delegation would under no circumstances sign a treaty removing the Turkish Government from Constantinople. Such a decision “is going to outrage the sentiments of those whom the Indian Delegation represent Constantinople or Room is the city of the [sic] Kalipate.” 398 Even if the Melbourne press had any knowledge of the Montagu note, it would have avoided publishing it so as not to embarrass the Imperial Government and to refrain from showing any disagreement that may have existed among the members of the British Delegation at a time of trying to settle the Turkish Question. On July 2, both Melbourne papers continued their anti-Turkish position by reporting on the Turkish note of June 23 given to the Council of Ten, which basically demanded that the Ottoman Empire remain intact according to the status quo ante bellum. The Age described the Turkish note as “an amazing document containing a startling statement” and Argus as “a remarkable document.” The newspaper sto396

NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 Pt. 1, British War Cabinet W.C.P. 1053 Ottoman Delegation to Peace Conference, June 19, 1919; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.238 and n.30. It should be noted that Petsalis-Diomidis incorrectly records the date of the Ottoman note of June 19 as May 19, 1919. 397 FRUS PPC vol.6, p.576. 398 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 Pt.1, British War Cabinet, W.C.P. 1057 Mr Montagu’s comments on Mr Balfour’s reply to the Turks and Mr Balfour’s remarks thereon, p.5. This document is undated which Montagu probably wrote between 19–21 June 1919.

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ries accurately reported that the Turks were willing to grant independence to Armenia, but wanted to maintain limited control over Palestine under Turkish rule. 399 The newspapers omitted some important information concerning the Turkish memorandum which would otherwise have completed their reporting on the Turkish issue. There was no mention of the islands near the Asia Minor coast, nor of the Arab provinces of Syria, Hedjaz, Asyr, Yemen, or Iraq, which constituted part of the Ottoman state before the war, and which were to be given administrative autonomy under the Sultan’s rule. In the memorandum the Sultan would appoint a governor for each autonomous region, except in the Hedjaz, where a special regime would prevail. 400 The Turks were willing to enter into negotiations with Great Britain over the political status of Egypt and Cyprus. Great Britain was absolutely opposed to surrendering such important strategic assets in the Near East. 401 Even though some of the details mentioned above had been omitted, the headlines in both newspapers certainly captured the audacity of the Turks’ efforts to preserve their empire. The Allied memorandum of June 23 dismissed the Turkish claims. 402 As the Allied Powers finished hearing the remarkable Ottoman case, Mustapha Ke399

The Age, “Turkey demands independence,” July 2, 1919, p.7; Argus, “Turkey unrepentant. Amazing Proposal to Allies.,” July, 2, 1919, p.9 ; FRUS PPC vol.6, appendix X to CF-92 WCP 1066, Memorandum concerning the new organisation of the Ottoman Empire, dated 23 June 1919 given to the president of the peace conference, pp. 692–94. The same document is located in the Australian Archives. See See NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 Pt. 1, W.C.P. 1066, note of Ottoman Delegation to the Peace Conference, June 23, 1919. Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.238. 400 FRUS PPC vol.6, pp.693–94; NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 Pt. 1, W.C.P. 1066, note of Ottoman Delegation to the Peace Conference, June 23, 1919; Petsalis-Diomidis , op. cit., p.238. 401 FRUS PPC vol.6, p.694; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.238. 402 FRUS PPC vol.6, pp.688–91; NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 Pt.1, British War Cabinet, W.C.P. 1044, British Empire Delegation, Answer to the Turkish Delegates (Approved by the Council of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers on 23rd June, 1919).

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mal Pasha was organising a nationalist movement to liberate Turkey from foreign occupation. 403 2b) The rise of Mustapha Kemal Pasha (Ataturk) and his Nationalist Movement Mustapha Kemal’s name first appears in the Melbourne press on August 16, 1919. The absence of any information on Mustapha Kemal before then could be attributed to three important factors. First, the Allied High Commissioners with the intention of suppressing malicious, revolutionary, or diplomatically misguided articles had established press censorship at Constantinople on December 2, 1918. 404 Second, Mustapha Kemal “practically monopolised the telegraph” which gave him the opportunity to influence Turkish Moslems in the Anatolian interior. 405 Finally, British and American agents in Turkey were concerned with the growth of the Kemalist movement but the Allied representatives in Paris possibly discounted it as an irrelevant force. 406 After all the Allies regarded the Sultan as the legitimate ruler of Turkey whereas Mustapha Kemal was considered a rebel. 403

On June 28, 1919 Balfour informed the Ottoman delegation that there would be delays in the Turkish settlement and there was nothing to gain by remaining in Paris. See FRUS PPC vol.6, pp.757–58. There is an account of the Turkish Delegation’s return journey from Paris to Constantinople describing the problems they experienced through some of the European countries. See D.B.F.P. vol.4, enclosure in no.466 “Notes of the Journey of the Turkish Delegation from Versailles to Constantinople,” Lieut Col. W. F. Blaker. pp. 698–703. 404 F.O. 608/115–6726 Committee of Union and Progress; Constantinople 9 April, 1919. Includes Admiral Webb’s despatch of March 8, 1919 enclosing copy of report of intelligence section of British Salonika force, Part 4 “Influence of the Committee of Union and Progress in the Turkish Press.” In this report it further stated that from January 20, 1919 Allied representatives were to collaborate with Turkish censors to watch how far the censors obeyed the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress. Turkish newspapers were divided into pro-committee, anti-committee and independent. 405 Bilal Simsir (ed), British Documents on Ataturk Vol.1, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1992, p.21. Hereafter cited as Ataturk vol.1. 406 Paul C. Helmreich, op. cit., pp.233 and 240fn.11.

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Admirals Calthorpe and Webb, the British High and Deputy Commissioners at Constantinople, informed London of disorders around the Samsoun area orchestrated by Mustapha Kemal and demanded his removal from the Turkish army. 407 On June 27 Admiral Calthorpe notified London by enclosing a copy of a memorandum written by Mr. Ryan, Dragoman (interpreter) at the British High Commission in Constantinople, which contained the substance of a conversation which he and General Deedes had had with the Acting Grand Vizier Sabri Effendi regarding the activities of Mustapha Kemal. Sabri Effendi confessed to “the impotence of the Government to deal really strongly with Mustapha Kemal.” 408 This indicated a lack of resolve and authority on the part of the Ottoman government in dealing with Mustapha Kemal. After constant pressure from the British High Commission, the Ottoman Government instructed all military personnel and civilians in Eastern Anatolia to consider Mustapha Kemal an outlaw. However, Mustapha Kemal had resigned from the Turkish army and had refused to return to Constantinople. He moved into the Anatolian interior to establish his Turkish Nationalist movement. 409 The inclusion of information of this kind, covering the period midMay to early August 1919, would definitely have rendered a fuller account of the internal situation in Turkey. Unidentified news reports originating from Rome described the Turkish political situation as being “chaotic owing to the Central government losing its authority.” The unidentified sources from Rome are not mentioned so we do not know if the journalist writing this account interviewed an Italian government official or an Embassy official 407

Ataturk vol.1, pp.10–11; D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.655&690fn.3; Sonyel, op. cit., pp.19–20. 408 Ataturk vol.1, p.31; Sonyel, op. cit., p.21.The Grand Vizier Damad Ferid Pasha was in Paris at the time of this conversation presenting the Ottoman case before the Supreme Council. 409 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.668–9; Sonyel, op. cit., pp.22– 5. It is interesting to note that the Grand Vizier issued a circular notifying the provinces that congresses being convoked at Sivas and Erzeroum by Mustapha Kemal were “illegal, unconstitutional and against the will of the Sultan.” See Ataturk vol.1, p.49.

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of one of the Allied Powers in the Italian capital. It could be argued that the diplomatic sources did not want to reveal too much detail on the internal situation in Anatolia for political and security reasons. Both Melbourne papers failed to capture the extent of the rivalry between the Constantinople Government and Mustapha Kemal’s movement in Asia Minor. 410 On August 1, Admiral Calthorpe advised Curzon that the Sultan’s government enjoyed very little support beyond the confines of Constantinople. Damad Ferid Pasha was reviled by all sides of Turkish politics as shown by the meeting which took place between the Entente Liberale, Sulh-u-Selamet [Peace and Security], Milli Akrar [National Liberal], Turkish socialist, Social democrat, Trebizond and district decentralisation, Smyrna defence of Ottoman rights, National congress, and Kurdish national parties at Entente Liberale headquarters on July 21, 1919 and by the manifesto they issued. 411 This document contained three resolutions. First, it denounced the formation of the Damad Ferid Cabinet as illegal; second, it said the new cabinet had no authority to conduct foreign policy or to govern the internal affairs of the empire; and, finally, it said that Damad Ferid had shown an inability “in defending and maintaining the sacred rights of the nation.” 412 In order to placate his opponents Damad Ferid proceeded to call for elections for July 27, but without changing the old electoral law, which meant that Parliament would not be convened for at least three or four months, thus giving his administration the opportunity to reassert its lost authority. This it did by issuing orders around July 30 for the arrest of Mustapha Kemal at Erzeroum. 413 If Damad Ferid Pasha had resigned there were other aspirants such as Tewfik Pasha, Izzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza Bey, and Rechid Bey, who would have been ready to assume the position of Grand Vizier. 414 During the Cabinet crisis, 410

The Age, “Turkish situation chaotic,” August 16, 1919 p.13 ; Argus, “Chaos in Turkey.More Allied troops needed,” August 16,1919, p.19. 411 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.712–4. 412 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.714–5. This manifesto appeared in Idrak newspaper [socialist] on July 21 1919. 413 Ataturk vol.1, pp. 87–8. 414 Ataturk vol.1, p.89.

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Damad Ferid offered to resign from office and have the Sultan turn to Tewfik Pasha to form a government. Tewfik Pasha declined the Sultan’s offer, believing that his appointment would not improve the situation. 415 Izzet Pasha was the one person whom the Sultan and Damad Ferid believed to be responsible for the present troubles in Constantinople. In fact Damad Ferid Pasha told Hohler, the Political Officer of the British High Commission in Constantinople, on July 30 that he considered the War Minister a traitor and that he believed that Izzet Pasha, Ahmed Riza, and Mahmoud Churouk Solou were actively involved in the nationalist movement. Even the Crown Prince was sympathetic to the movement after some heated exchanges with the Sultan. Hohler indicated the possibility of arresting and deporting Izzet. 416 The same press reports mentioned that Mustapha Kemal was leading a revolt in Anatolia and that some 100,000 troops would be needed to restore order. 417 The Melbourne papers did not explain who would actually supply 100,000 troops to Asia Minor. Admiral Calthorpe cabled Curzon on August 3 reporting on a telegram which the Greek Admiral had sent to Venizelos and which painted a gloomy picture of the situation in Asia Minor. The Greek Admiral highlighted the peril of visiting the Sea of Marmara and Black Sea ports, believing it would only serve to inflame Turkish passions against the Christians. He was right in stating that the Allied Powers were not in a position to provide Allied troops to combat the Turks. He advocated that an army of 100,000 men be recruited from the ranks of the native Greek and Armenian populations “being officered and commanded by the British.” 415

Ataturk vol.1, pp.66–7 and 89. Ataturk vol.1, pp.66–8; D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp. 668 and 708; Sonyel, op. cit., p.32. For an incisive analysis of the political orientations of the leading Turkish political figures at Constantinople. See Admiral Webb’s telegram to Curzon on August 27, 1919 in Ataturk vol.1, pp.88–90. 417 The Age, August 16, 1919, p.13; Argus, August16, 1919, p.19. The Turks continued clashing with Greek troops around Smyrna. For an early history of the National Defence organisation involving Mustapha Kemal Pasha see Commander Heathcote-Smith’s report of July 24, 1919 in Ataturk vol.1, pp.58–63. 416

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Calthorpe thought it immaterial to comment on such a proposal. 418 It was very strange of General Milne to suggest an Allied occupation of Trebizond to Admiral Calthorpe when the Allies did not possess sufficient troops to check the nationalist movement. The French High Commissioner, Defrance, doubted the efficacy of occupying Trezibond. 419 Both newspapers reveal that “conflicts against the Greeks are general” without mentioning the regions of Anatolia in which these conflicts were taking place. 420 The main area of conflict between the Greeks and Turks was around the Sanjak of Smyrna. However, the reports of Commander Heathcote-Smith, Captain Perring and Lieutenant Slade described the situation along the Black Sea in which Christians and Moslems distrusted each other. 421 Commander Heathcote-Smith highlighted the fact that the absence of Allied Officers along the Black Sea towns of Ordou, Kerasund, Ineboli, and Sinope allowed the Turks to use terror against the Christians. Many Christians fled from the interior to the coastal towns to escape Turkish reprisals. 422 The absence of this important detail in both papers revealed a distorted view of events in Anatolia. There is no doubt the news reports discussed above had an implicit anti-Turkish stance which highlighted that the government was losing control; and the reporting of “conflicts against the Greeks” was aimed at showing the support and sympathy for the Greek cause in Asia Minor. It could be argued that at this early stage the Melbourne press probably regarded Mustapha Kemal as an irrelevant factor. As the Kemalist movement sought to expand and consolidate its authority in Anatolia, both Melbourne newspapers indicated on September 20 that there were two Turkish movements in Asia Minor: one which existed around the Smyrna district and the other, headed by 418

D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.715–6. D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp. 718–19; Ataturk vol.1, p.71. 420 The Age, August 16, 1919, p. 13 ; Argus, August 16, 1919, p.19. There were Greeks living along the shores of the Black Sea and the interior of Anatolia. 421 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.684–6 and 705&fn.2–707; Ataturk vol.1, pp.56–8. 422 Ataturk vol.1, pp 62–3. 419

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Mustapha Kemal which existed at Angora, Sivas, and Erzeroum and which definitely aimed at overthrowing the present Turkish administration. The Kemalists were reported to have been hostile to the Allies. 423 It should be emphasised, while the news portrayal contains an element of truth, the absence of important detail clouds the full truth of the actual events unfolding in Asia Minor. The Melbourne press described the first movement as one “rapidly becoming formidable against the Greeks in the Smyrna district.” According to Admiral Webb’s communication to Curzon on September 10 which enclosed a report of the British control officer at Akhissar who had met all the civilian and military leaders of this movement, the British officer mentioned that this irregular Turkish army was organised in the areas of Aivali, Pergama, Soma, Akhissar, Salihli, Odemish, and Chinar. Webb’s communication also listed the troop numbers and the names of the Commanders. 424 He revealed three important things about this irregular movement: Firstly, that its military organisation was weak and inept and lacked sufficient ammunition to prosecute a major campaign against the Greek army. Next, that the formation of this grouping was in response to the tragic events surrounding the Greek landing at Smyrna, and that the sole aim of this irregular movement was to drive out the Greeks from Anatolia. Finally, that this movement opposed the government but did not intend working towards toppling it. Moreover, it had no connection with Kemal’s organisation. 425 423

The Age, “Move by Turks in Anatolia,” September 20, 1919, p.15; Argus, “Arabs and Turks, More trouble in East, British Mission Captured,” September 20, 1919, p.25. 424 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.756–7. These towns were located outside the Greek zone of occupation. 425 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.757–9. It is interesting that some Foreign Office officials minuted on this paper. On September 23, 1919 W. S. Edmonds minuted that “the Turkish irregulars who are opposing the Greeks in Aidin Vilayet is based from Turkish sources. The suggestion that this movement is distinct from that of Mustapha Kemal can hardly be correct.” G. Kidston thought that the irregular movement’s independence from Mustapha Kemal was probably due to the allied control of the railways. See D.B.F.P. vol.4, p.760fn.1.

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The exact origins of the report on the Kemalist movement might have originated from a telegram from Admiral de Robeck, the new British High Commissioner at Constantinople, telegram to Curzon, on September 13, which highlighted the former’s conversation with the Turkish Grand Vizier, who explained his irritation over the growing influence of Mustapha Kemal. The Grand Vizier declared that this movement had been formed by some 500 officers in the provinces of Angora, Sivas, and Erzeroum who had shown a growing hostility towards the Sultan’s government and the Allies. 426 It is likely that the Turkish press of Constantinople would have been largely supportive of the Sultan’s government. Any anti-Turkish nationalist press stories appearing in Constantinople would have been easily picked up by British journalists. The Inter-Allied censorship committee was in a strong position to clamp down on or restrict any pro-Turkish nationalist news stories which might have been used to inflame Moslem passions in Constantinople. It was a different matter in Anatolia, where the Turkish Nationalists controlled the telegraph lines. However, both Melbourne newspapers ignored two important details from the report mentioned above regarding the Kemalists. Firstly, the Grand Vizier sought the permission of the Allies to dispatch a Turkish force to crush the rebellion or, failing this, their consent in sending Allied contingents to occupy strategic points. De Robeck explained that the first solution raised the spectre of civil war and that the Allies were weary of war. 427 Secondly, neither paper mentions that Mustapha Kemal had convoked congresses at Erzeroum and Sivas. The former congress staged on July 23–August 6, was attended by representatives of the Eastern provinces of Anatolia who met in a modest schoolroom under the presidency of Mustapha Kemal. Some important resolutions were passed including: 1) that the Eastern provinces of Erzeroum, Sivas, Diyarbekir, Elazig, Van, Bitlis, Trebizond, and Samsoun were an integral part of the Ottoman state; 2) that the Christian populations would not be accorded new privileges though their legal rights would be protected; 3) that the Congress adhered to the inviola426 427

D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.760–1. D.B.F.P. vol.4, p.761.

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bility of the Sultanate-Caliphate and national independence; and finally, that the Congress called upon the Sultan’s Government to convene the national legislature and place its control under the National Assembly. 428 Colonel Rawlinson interviewed Mustapha Kemal on the completion of the Erzeroum Congress in an attempt to ascertain the future aspirations of the new nationalist party. Rawlinson proceeded to translate the “National Pact” given to him by Mustapha Kemal. On his return to Constantinople, Rawlinson was instructed to return to London to report to the War and Foreign Offices. 429 In his meeting with Curzon at the Foreign Office, Rawlinson outlined the possibility “of a great future Moslem Republic.” It seemed unlikely that the Nationalists possessed the necessary initiative or resources to achieve such an ambitious programme. 430 The Sivas Congress conducted on September 4–13, modified the Erzeroum declarations. It established a temporary administration in Anatolia and all national organisations were combined into one entity with identical objectives (Society for the Defence of the National Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia). On October 10, Admiral de Robeck informed Curzon that the nationalists were attempting to forge a rapport with the anti-Greek forces around the Smyrna zone. 431 These two congresses gave birth to Turkish nationalism under Mustapha Kemal’s leadership. 428

Turkish Diplomacy, pp.15–6; Sonyel op. cit., pp.28–9. The text of the Erzeroum proclamation is found in Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Cab 24 Series, Cabinet Office and Memoranda 1916–1939. Cab 24/ 93 Cabinet Paper (C.P) 156 “The Nationalist Movement in Turkey,” Appendix.A, p.6; PetsalisDiomidis, op. cit., pp.304–5fns.2&7. 429 A. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, Andrew Melrose, London & New York, 1924, pp.231–4; Sonyel, op. cit., p.40; Michael Llewellyn Smith, op. cit., p.106. 430 Rawlinson, op. cit., p.251; Smith, op cit ., p.106. 431 Ataturk vol.1, pp.134–6; Turkish Diplomacy, p.17; Sonyel, op. cit., pp.32–4. The opening address of Mustapha Kemal to the Sivas Congress and its subsequent resolutions are located in Cab.24/93 C.P. 156 Appendices C and D pp.7–9.

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The Melbourne press continued its anti-Turkish stance on September 25 by carrying rather confusing and misleading headlines such as “Terrorism in Asia Minor” and “Turks ill-treat Greeks.” 432 Citing the Washington correspondent of the New York Times who stated that diplomatic dispatches received from Salonika indicated that the Turks were coercing “unredeemed Greeks” in the Asia Minor interior to pay monthly indemnities, both newspapers stated that “Turkish guerrillas are pillaging and terrorising the population.” 433 There is no doubt that words such as “guerrillas,” “terrorising,” and “pillaging” were designed to influence the Melbourne public opinion against the Turks, who were portrayed as barbarians and to evoke sympathy for the “unredeemed Greeks” of Asia Minor. While the internal situation in Anatolia was uneasy and the Melbourne press did not possess the full story, there were reports of British officials describing measures taken in Turk administered Anatolia to secure public order. The British control officer at Akhissar revealed the economic conditions that existed outside the Greek zone of occupation. He mentioned that Turkish committees had been formed to assist individuals “who have been made homeless and have lost their harvest,” and that money was collected from wealthy Turks and Greeks alike. This money was given to poor Greeks and Turks. 434 On October 28, Admiral de Robeck sent Curzon a report on the Nationalist movement operating in the Samsoun area. The Nationalists had curtailed the activities of brigands and in some localities conditions had improved. However, the report did make it clear that the local Christian inhabitants were not affected by the Nationalists and desired to be left alone. The document indicated that proclamations protecting Christians appeared “to be a matter purely of policy.” 435 Mustapha 432

The Age, “Terrorism in Asia Minor,” September 25, 1919, p.9; Argus, “Turks ill-treat Greeks,” September 25,1919, p.7. 433 The Age and Argus, ibid. 434 D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.759–60. 435 National Archives of the United Kingdom, (London), Confidential Print Eastern Affairs, F.0.406 series, F.0.406/41–148 Vice Admiral Sir de Robeck [Constantinople] to Curzon October 28, 1919 with enclosure “Notes on Nationalist movement in the Samsoun area.” For a bleak view of the plight

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Kemal was trying to convince the Allies that he was sincere in his efforts to protect the Christians and that his movement was not against the Allied Powers. The Turkish Nationalists influence continued to spread in Anatolia. Both Melbourne newspapers continued to report on October 11 that the armistice had reduced the Turkish army to insufficient numbers, which made it difficult to protect the Anatolian railways. 436 It is obvious that the expansion of the Kemalists into Western Anatolia began to pose a serious problem for the Allies, and the press report contained an element of truth. The Anatolian railway, an important strategic asset, was under British control. In fact General Milne withdrew his troops from the Samsoun area in order to avoid a clash with the Nationalists and requested instructions from the War Office as to whether he should support Turkish civil authorities if the Turkish Nationalists gained control of the Vilayets along the Anatolian railway. 437 Admiral de Robeck pointed out the importance of the Anatolian railway. He suggested that: “It is hardly possible to withdraw the troops as this would imply closing of the railway upon which the capital very largely depends for its food supply; it would mean the removal of the one barrier existing in Anatolia against complete lawlessness and it (? would be) of Christians along the south coast of the Black Sea, see the account by Lt Slade. This report along with Admiral Webb’s comment was forwarded to Lord Curzon on September 11, 1919 in F.0. 406/41–110 Rear Admiral Webb [Constantinople] to Curzon September 11, 1919 with enclosure Lt Slade to Rear Admiral Webb September 5, 1919. 436 The Age, “Disorder in Anatolia, Raiding bands roam country,” October 11, 1919, p.15; Argus, “situation in the East, growing worse in Turkey,” 1919, October 11, p.21. 437 Ataturk vol.1, pp.105&fn.7–106. It should be noted that a new Turkish military command at Angora had blown up a bridge in which General Milne responded promptly by closing down the Angora section of the railway. Milne asked the Turkish Government to assure its safety. There were Allied forces stationed along the railway with two Italian contingents at Konya, French detachment at Afion Karahissar and Indian contingents at Afion Karahissar and at Eskishehir.

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so highly detrimental to our prestige that I could not possibly recommend it.” 438

Admiral de Robeck and his French and Italian colleagues adopted General Milne’s recommendation and agreed to inform the Grand Vizier regarding the proposed dispatch of Turkish troops to restore law and order. They outlined that: 1) despatch of 2,000 men would be altogether insufficient to reestablish order especially since Konya incident showed how little reliance could be placed on them; 2) despatch of larger force would throw the country into civil war; 3) that to anticipate such an event Allied Military Authorities think that they would have to withdraw their troops on Anatolian line at least to Gulf of Ismid; 4) that the result of this would deliver immediately to insurgents the railway thus cutting off capital from all connection with interior and rendering revictualling of population impossible; 5) that therefore under Article V of Armistice High Commissioner felt unable to authorise proposed despatch and disposition of troops. 439

What emerges is that the British did not wish to interfere in internal Turkish politics but wanted to ensure that the approaches to Constantinople would not be subject to Turkish Nationalist interference. In the same report both Melbourne papers highlighted that “Nationalist bands roam the country holding the rich to ransom and forcibly enrolling the poor. There is a danger that this movement will influence the Mahometan world. Meanwhile rumours are current of a conspiracy against the Sultan and Grand Vizier.” 440 The last line “Meanwhile rumours are current of a conspiracy against the Sultan and Grand Vizier,” which appeared in the Melbourne press, can be attributed to the Grand Vizier who made some of these remarks to Admiral de Robeck. 441 There is also a possibility that the Grand Vizier might 438

Ataturk vol.1, p.106. Admiral de Robeck’s recommendation was based on the advice provided by General Milne. 439 Quoted in Helmreich p.235. 440 The Age and Argus, October 11, 1919. 441 Ataturk vol.1, pp.122–23. The Grand Vizier presented 2 notes to Admiral de Robeck on September 28 expressing his concern at the safety of the railway and the worsening situation in Anatolia. See Ataturk vol.1, p.122.

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have granted journalists a press conference to reveal the names of individuals who were plotting against the Sultan and his government. However the Melbourne papers do not mention the individual who made these remarks. The use of the word “conspiracy” might have implied sympathy on the part of the Melbourne papers for the Sultan’s Government compared to Mustapha Kemal’s movement. The middle sentence suggests the idea that the journalist is speculating that the growing influence of the Kemalists might inflame the passions of Indian Moslems. There are two reasons given to explain this journalistic sentence. Firstly, on August 7 Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, sent Churchill, the British War Secretary, a memorandum explaining that “...we have today much more danger facing us in Egypt, in Mesopotamia, and in India than anything that we could have foreseen in 1914.” 442 Secondly, Lloyd George’s memorandum of September 16 to Clemenceau, regarding the disposition of the Allied Command at Constantinople, expressed that a British troop withdrawal from the Turkish capital to some part of Asia Minor would be tantamount to striking: ...a fatal blow at British prestige not only in Constantinople but throughout the Turkish Empire and would be accepted by the Mohammedans in every part of the world as a humiliation of the most glaring kind inflicted on the British power. Having regard to the fact that Great Britain is incomparably the greatest Mohammedan power in the world, and has at this moment on the soil of the late 442

Keith Jeffery (ed), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson 1918–1922, published by Bodley Head for Army Records Society, London, 1985, p.120. See Cab24/87 G.T. 8049 “The Future of the Army,” August 25, 1919 written by Edwin Montagu. In this cabinet paper Montagu disagrees with General Wilson’s comments of troubles in India. However Montagu did caution his colleagues regarding a Turkish peace treaty settlement which might agitate Indian opinion. He said that “We shall have lost the confidence of Mahomedans by a treatment of Adrianople, Smyrna, Thrace, Asia Minor, and Constantinople, which will not be in accord with the aims for which we alleged the war was fought and not in accord with the aims for which we asked Indian volunteers to fight with us.” Montagu did not trust French and Italian “who are jealous of British relations with Islam.”

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Turkish Empire, including large reserves in Egypt, between three and four hundred thousand men, such a proposal could not be accepted.” 443

There is no doubt that Lloyd George wanted to ensure the maintenance of British paramountcy at Constantinople and that the French would be involved in garrisoning the Turkish capital. What was important was to maintain Allied unity at a time of the growing unrest in Asia Minor and Turkish cabinet crisis in Constantinople. 444 Both Melbourne papers reported on October 13 on the resignation of the Turkish Cabinet that had taken place some 12 days earlier at Constantinople. 445 In the early part of these articles the Melbourne press accurately reported that the Turkish cabinet had resigned owing to serious nationalist disruption to the peace terms, and that the nationalists were aiming to preserve the Turkish Empire. 446 However the Melbourne press did not mention that the Sultan was hesitant about Damad Ferid Pasha’s resignation from office. In fact, Hohler’s letter to 443

Cab24/88, G.T. 8179A Command at Constantinople. Memorandum communicated by the Prime Minister to M. Clemenceau. September 16th , 1919. 444 The contents of this document written 2 days before the press report of October 11 could not have been picked by the press by some leak or rumour. Maybe the journalist inadvertently was thinking on the same wave length as the General Staff of the unfolding events taking place in Anatolia. In fact the British General Staff were worried of the consequences of fighting the Turkish Nationalists. They were concerned about “a spread of Pan-Islamic feeling allied, perhaps, to Bolshevism, to Trans-Caspia, Persia, Afghanistan and India.” The General Staff was concerned in reducing British garrisons in Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia and that British policy was “antagonizing the patriotic elements in Turkey, and it is no exaggeration ... that our attitude is costing unnecessary millions to the British taxpayer, besides sowing the seeds of unlimited financial liabilities for the future.” See Cab 24/89, GT8292 “Military Policy in Asia Minor.,” October 9,1919. 445 The Age, “Turkish Cabinet falls, treaty may not be signed,” October 13, 1919, p.7; Argus, “Crisis in Turkey,” October 13,1919, p.7. 446 The Age and Argus, ibid.; Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia Vol.2:1919–20, University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982,p.351; Helmreich, op. cit., p.235.

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Kidston on October 4 was full of praise for the former Grand Vizier, who had displayed commendable courage in handling the threat of the Nationalists. Hohler noted that Damad Ferid had resigned at a time when towns close to the Turkish capital were joining the nationalists. The Grand Vizier’s stubbornness might have resulted in the outbreak of civil war. 447 It should be noted that Argus on October 11, quoting the Australian Press Association, stated correctly that Riza Ali had formed a strongly nationalist cabinet. 448 The second part of the accounts of this news expressed that “It is feared unless the allies take drastic steps, the nationalist pressure will result in Turkey’s refusal to sign the treaty.” 449 This sentence as reported in the Melbourne press needs some clarification. For a start, the Allied Powers had not even discussed the peace terms to be offered to Turkey and the “drastic steps” the allies might be forced to take were not stated. It is possible that the journalist writing this story may have interviewed a British High Commissioner or Turkish official in Constantinople, who could have told him in general terms of the growing threat of the Kemalists and the delays in settling the Turkish question. There is no doubt that the journalist at Constantinople had some inkling of the political troubles facing the Turkish Cabinet. Therefore, the correspondent probably had to construct some story from the sketchy details given to him. 447

Ataturk vol.1, pp.124–6. Argus, October 11, 1919, p.21; Ataturk vol.1, p.123. Some of the important positions in the new Turkish Cabinet were: Grand Vizier Ali Riza Pasha, Sheykh ul Islam Ibrahim Haidari Zade, Minister of Foreign Affairs Rechid Pasha, Minister of War Djemal Pasha, Minister of Marine Salih Pasha and Minister of Finance Tewfik Bey. It is interesting to note that Admiral de Robeck informed Lord Curzon of the political leanings of the new Turkish Cabinet members. The new Grand Vizier was known for his honesty and as a “fairly distinguished soldier rather than as politician.” He singled out the War Minister and President of Council of State as having close connections with the nationalists. Ibrahim Haidari Zade was seen as having “Pan-Islamic leanings with a special eye to Mesopotamia.” See D.B.F.P. vol.4, pp.787–8; Turkish Diplomacy, p.18 449 The Age and Argus, October 13, 1919, p.7. 448

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At a political level, there were three letters that outlined the real situation in the Turkish capital. On October 6 Admiral Webb informed Curzon that Rechid Pasha, the new Turkish Foreign Minister, had come to see him expressing some serious concerns. Rechid Pasha stressed that the prolongation of the armistice and the worsening financial situation were making it very difficult for the new Turkish administration to function. The Foreign Minister praised Mustapha Kemal for the patriotism that had brought him into conflict with the previous regime. He saw no problem in coming to terms with Mustapha Kemal. 450 Hohler was somewhat puzzled that the Allies were reducing their armies when they had not even settled the Turkish peace treaty. 451 Admiral Webb urged that “...it is directly in our own interests that the Peace Terms should be settled and announced with the least possible delay and certainly within the next few weeks.” 452 One could argue that Webb was apprehensive at the Allies’ slowness in settling the Turkish peace treaty that left the Christians of Anatolia in an insecure state. Webb’s statement should have given the Allies the opportunity to speed up their deliberations for coming to terms with Turkey. In conclusion this chapter focussed on two vivid accounts in the Melbourne press which covered the Greek territorial claims and penetration into Asia Minor in 1919, which brought the Greeks into conflict with the Italians. The Melbourne newspapers were supportive of Greece in the first half of 1919, except with regard to the events in Smyrna. The Melbourne press displayed a strong anti-Turkish position over these latter events. It could be argued that some moderation was shown towards the Sultan’s Government when it was threatened by Mustapha Kemal’s movement. What emerges from all this is that the Melbourne press was dependent on British sources for its coverage of the Greek-Turkish conflict in Anatolia. Journalists relied on leaks, rumours, and whatever information they could gather from diplomats, embassies, and high 450

Ataturk vol.1, pp.132–3. Ataturk vol.1, p.127; Helmreich, op. cit., p.236. 452 Ataturk vol.1, pp. 142–3; Helmreich, op. cit., p. 236. 451

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commissions to write their accounts of the war and of the peace negotiations in Paris. The major problem faced by journalists was that of censorship, which unfortunately caused a distorted view of events in Turkey. The next chapter will compare the Melbourne press coverage of the Greek-Turkish war with that of British and American newspapers.

3 COMPARING THE SOURCES This chapter will present further examples of both pro and anti Turkish and pro and anti Greek positions in comparing overseas and Melbourne newspapers’ reporting of particular episodes of the GreekTurkish conflict. As explained in the previous chapter, the Melbourne press was dependent on British news sources for its information. There are three subsidiary questions which will be used to compare the Australian version of events with that of London Times and New York Times. These include: Did the Melbourne press report the conflict in a particular manner? Were the Melbourne papers simply reporting verbatim the overseas accounts of the war? How did this impact upon Australian attitudes? The first subsidiary question was mentioned in the preceding chapter. Comparing the press accounts of one nation with that of others raises some interesting methodological issues for contemplation. Reporting warfare in a specific way and covering verbatim overseas accounts of the Greek-Turkish struggle would place the Australian press in a different position compared to its British and American counterparts. This would be actually reflected in the press treatment of events on the field of battle, and in the diplomatic negotiations and mediation of the Allied Powers in settling the Turkish question. The Australian press’ treatment of the Greek-Turkish war was brief compared to the British and American coverage. The major European powers and the United States had major political, strategic, economic, financial, and philanthropic interests in the Near East, whereas Australia had largely an emotional and symbolic attachment to an area where Australian nationhood had been born at Gallipoli in April 1915. The New York Times and London Times were major newspapers with foreign correspondents operating in major European and American cities like London, Paris, Rome, Berlin, Constantinople, and Wash149

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ington who had forged close links with major political and diplomatic figures giving them the ability to communicate a fuller report on the Greek-Turkish imbroglio. The Australian Press Association representing the Australian press in London collected news items and cabled these back to Melbourne. It did not have the luxury of foreign correspondents as did the New York Times and London Times operating in so many foreign locations. However, the Australian Press Association’s location in the heart of the British Empire and its decision-makers gave it unprecedented access to British and other European news. The Australian Press Association was dependent on various news sources for its information, nonetheless, at least Australian readers were being provided with some brief details of the dispute far away from Australian shores. This did not mean that these brief news accounts could not be interpreted by Australian news editors for Australian consumption. It could be argued that the Australian Press Association’s London representative forwarded additional private correspondence to Melbourne news editors for its information. 453 However, there were two major problems confronting both the Australian Press Association and Australian news editors: cabling costs; and trying to capture as much of the essence of the war from these brief news accounts. 454 The Australian press had the disadvantage of distance compared to its British and American colleagues in covering the Greek-Turkish imbroglio. Australia was a white Anglo-Saxon nation situated in the South West Pacific far away from Europe and North America. For 453

Major newspapers like the New York Times and London Times adopted such a procedure. In fact “Press associations also send out what they call “news letters” or “clip sheets” containing items and articles for publication, and these services provide some of the most interesting and useful matter in the newspapers.” See The Press and World Affairs, pp.117–18. 454 Cabling costs in the period under review were expensive which limited the number of words that could be transmitted from London to Melbourne. Advances in new technologies such as radio communication, telephone and improved cables would reduce the cost of press rates from the mid-1920s onwards. See The Press and World Affairs, pp.112–120 and 128–131.

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ordinary Australians who had not fought in the 1914–18 war, the Greek-Turkish conflict possibly represented some obscure encounter on the other side of the world. However, Australian soldiers who fought against the Ottoman Empire at Gallipoli and Syria and Palestine in 1915–18 would have been interested in being kept informed of the unfolding developments in Asia Minor. The memories of the 1914– 18 war were still ingrained in the minds of the post-1919 generation. Two detailed examples will be used for the purpose of analysis. These include: 1) The San Remo Conference of April 18–26 1920; 2) The Greek attempt to occupy the city of Constantinople in July 1922.

1. THE SAN REMO CONFERENCE APRIL 18–26, 1920 The San Remo conference involved the Allied Powers putting the final touches to the long overdue Turkish peace treaty and the German question. There were some agenda items from the conference warranting detailed examination. Four examples will be used to show how the newspapers covered these issues. These are: 1a) The issue of Official Press Communiqués In their reports of April 19, 1920 the London Times and New York Times were very critical of the Allied powers deciding to issue an official bulletin at the end of each Supreme Council session. This procedure had been agreed to by Lloyd George, M. Millerand, and M. Nitti, the British, French, and Italian Premiers respectively. 455 The former newspaper pointed out that the Allies were repeating the same past mistakes of denying information to the press by preventing Allied deliberations from coming under press scrutiny and thus harming public opinion in Allied nations. 456 The London and Provincial Press Conference held during the London Conference of February/March 1920 denounced the Supreme Council decisions being reported in the Paris press, when such details had been refused to the British press. It was essential that the British press should have the same access to informa455

D.B.F.P. vol.8, p.2. London Times, “ALLIED COUNCIL AT SAN REMO. ENFORCEMENT OF THE TREATY. THE COAL ISSUE,” April 19, 1920, p.12. 456

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tion as their French counterparts at the forthcoming San Remo Conference. 457 More significantly, if the British press could not gain access to such information, then the Australian press might have experienced the same hurdles in obtaining information from San Remo. The New York Times, on the other hand, described the allies as “convert [ing] itself into a secret junta” once more in their conference deliberations. G. P. Perris, the New York Times correspondent, believed that the united action of the British and American press had been responsible for changing the attitude of the Supreme Council at Paris in 1919. This was unlikely to be repeated at San Remo. 458 Since the end of the Paris Conference of 1919, America had been adopting an isolationist position with regard to European and Near Eastern affairs. This was evident from the United States Government’s reluctance to officially participate at San Remo, thus giving the major European powers the opportunity to act alone. Further to this, the U.S. Senate had twice refused to ratify the Versailles Treaty on November 19, 1919 457

D.B.F.P. vol.7, p.123; London Times April 19, 1920. It should be noted that during a meeting of the Supreme Council on February 18, 1920 a small committee consisting of Sir M. Hankey of Great Britain, M. Berthelot of France and Signor Trombetti of Italy was authorised “to prepare a daily communique, to be identic in character, for the press of their respective countries, giving such information as to the proceedings of the Supreme Council as the council might think it desirable to issue, and that no other information should be given.” See D.B.F.P. vol.7, p.123. The resolutions of the London and Provincial press conference appeared in London Times, “Protest against Secrecy,” February 20, 1920 p.14 cited in D.B.F.P. vol.7, p.123fn.7. See also London Times editorial entitled “Publicity,” February 20,1920, p.15 condemning the Allied decision of issuing press bulletins; New York Times, “COUNCIL MAY AGREE TO PUBLISH NOTES... Various Newspaper Organisations Protest To Lloyd George About Secrecy,” February 20, 1920, 1:1. New York Times is a daily newspaper published in sections with each section having its own page numbers. For a very brief Australian press account of the British press protest to the Supreme Council, see The Age, “THE TREATY DEADLOCK. Wilson and the Adriatic”; Argus, “FIUME PROBLEM. Mr Wilson’s Threat.,” on February 23, 1920, p.7. 458 New York Times, “Policy of Secrecy Causes Dismay,” April 19, 1920. 1:3. See Chapter 1, part 5.d).

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and March 19, 1920. It is worth noting that the United States had not formally declared war against the Ottoman Empire in the 1914–1918 conflict. 459 On the other hand the Melbourne papers reported on April 20 of America’s unwillingness to participate at San Remo without offering any other details whereas the London Times explained that Mr. Underwood Johnson, the new American ambassador to Italy, “nowise represents America and continues his journey to Rome to-night.” 460 Moreover the London and Melbourne press may have been critical at the absence of American participation at San Remo. The New York Times was hoping that “the absence of America is only temporary and that reasons for her present abstention are likely to disappear.” 461 Perhaps the New York Times believed that the United States had a role to play in the settlement of European and Near Eastern affairs. This raises the proposition that the Australian, American, and British press operating in democratic societies had the right to inform the general public on important matters such as the Turkish peace treaty and the German adhesion to the Treaty of Versailles. The official bulletin would serve as the only means for the press to inform the public of what transpired at San Remo. 462 In fact, G. P. Perris thought it “impossible that on reflection the three Premiers should maintain a 459

New York Times, “Turkish Treaty the First Topic,” April 19, 1920, 1:3; Sally Marks, The illusion of Peace, Macmillan, London, 1976, p.24; Argus, “PEACE TREATY. REJECTION IN AMERICA. SEPARATE PEACE.,” March 22, 1920, p.7; D.B.F.P. vol.7, p.278. For Curzon’s comments regarding the American absence from the London Conference of February/March 1920 over the signature of the Turkish Treaty. See D.B.F.P. vol.7, p.278 460 The Age, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE. AMERICA NOT REPRESENTED.” April 20, 1920, p.7; Argus, “ALLIES CONFER. SAN REMO MEETING. URGENT BUSINESS ON LIST.” April 20, 1920, p.7; London Times, April 19, 1920, p.12. 461 New York Times, “Turkish Treaty the First Topic,” April 19, 1920, 1:3; The United States did participate as observers in the final stages of the San Remo conference. See New York Times, “Premiers Smiling After Session.” April 25, 1920, 1:3; Argus, “American Representatives,” April 26, 1920, p.7; D.B.F.P. vol.8, p.159. 462 The operations of the press in a democratic society has been covered in Chapter 1, part 3 d).

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decree so mistaken.” 463 The New York Times indicated on April 20 that French, British, and Italian journalists were “holding protest meetings and threatening to go home” regarding the secrecy surrounding the conference deliberations. 464 It could be argued that journalists saw the official bulletin as a form of censorship depriving both newspapers and readers of how the Allies made its decisions at San Remo. However, the Allied Powers may have seen the official bulletin serving two important functions. The first of these might have been to maintain allied unity in putting the final touches to the Turkish peace treaty and the German disarmament question, thus preventing the Turks and Germans from exploiting any allied differences for their own advantage. Secondly, it could also be helpful to curb or minimise the polemical attacks of Allied opposition press that could have sowed dissension among the Allied leaders. 465 In this way, since the press was 463

1:3.

464

New York Times, “Policy of Secrecy Causes Dismay,” April 19, 1920,

New York Times, “Allied Premiers reject Wilson’s Views,” April 20, 1920, 1:3. 465 On April 24 Lloyd George and Millerand expressed concerns over the actions of the British and French opposition press over the German question at San Remo. In Britain strong opposition was forthcoming from Lord Northcliffe’s newspapers and in France from M. Barthou, President of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the French Chamber and M. Poincare, then President of the Reparation Commission who had recently publicly criticised British and Allied policy in the London Times on March 13 [p.15], and 26 [p.13] and April 19 [p.12], 1920. Lloyd George and Millerand thought it very important to maintain allied unity in their deliberations. In fact Lord Derby, the British Ambassador at Paris, informed Curzon on April 22 that “the French press follows the habit now usual during international Conferences of endeavouring to strengthen the French case by criticising and belittling Allied negotiators who are supposed not to see eye to eye with French. Pertinax is, as usual, foremost in bitter attacks on English Ministers. Much capital is made out by the assertion that Prime minister has not British public opinion behind him when he does not fall in with French views as regards treatment of Germany. Public opinion seems to coincide with press.” See D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.146 &fn.12–47; D.B.F.P. vol.9, p.445. For some British and Australian press coverage indicating Anglo-French differences over Germany during the San Remo

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not given the complete story, reporters had to base their accounts and conclusions on imperfect information provided by Allied Governments. Such flawed information allowed the allies to give the impression of allied concord and provided the opportunity to conceal their national rivalries from the press. The New York Times published two interesting accounts on April 20 and 21 which attempted to debunk this apparent allied unity. The former article stated that “It [was] easy to gather from the various delegations that there [was] much dissension in high places. The British and French, in addition to holding opposite doctrines as to the enforcement of the Treaty of Versailles have differences in the case of Turkey...” 466 The latter story emanating from Paris mentioned that “The greater number of correspondents say that everything was peaceful and smiling but those who do say everything was not so peaceful as the official communiqués indicates are those who are usually best informed.” 467 Jules Sauerwein, the London correspondent of Le Matin, pointed out that the British and Italians were giving a false idea of unity existing between Lloyd George and Millerand which led Sauerwein to comment cynically that “this impression appears to me inexact and contrary to French interests.” He hoped that Millerand would not budge on the German question and would ultimately persuade Lloyd George to modify his position. 468 G. P. Perris argued that “it is hoped therefore that other voices will now make themselves heard. Assuredly

Conference, see London Times, “Points of View at San Remo,” April 20, 1920 p.15; and “The San Remo Differences,” “Mr Lloyd George’s Two Voices. A Hint to Germany.,” “M. Millerand’s Decision,” April 24, 1920, p.14; Argus, “Germany and Peace Treaty. Allied Premiers Express Views,” April 22, 1920, p.7; and “SAN REMO CONFERENCE. Conditions for Germany. AngloFrench Agreement.” April 26, 1920, p.7. 466 New York Times, “Allied Premiers reject Wilson’s Views,” April 20, 1920, 1:3. 467 New York Times, “Conflicting reports from San Remo,” April 21, 1920, 1:3. 468 ibid.

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information will leak out...” 469 Maybe, Perris was hoping that newsleaks would take place as they did at the London Conference where newspapers had been able to publish some official diplomatic correspondence and conference proceedings. 470 This did not mean that foreign correspondents were passive receivers of information. They had political contacts, personal knowledge, and journalistic experience to be able to write reasonable news stories and to also detect differences among the Allied powers from the available facts. It seems the Allies were determined this time to avoid or reduce the press leaks and rumours of the London Conference. As emphasised above, the London Times and New York Times had made great play of the fact that only official bulletins were being issued. The Melbourne press, on the other hand, did not report on April 20 of the Allied Powers issuing official bulletins to the press at San Remo. It could be speculated that the Melbourne press was not unaware of such information; rather the news editors in both Melbourne papers possibly decided to provide its readers with a mere summary of the details received through the Australian Press Association and Paris Le Temps. 471 This further shows the reliance of the Melbourne press on British sources for its information and that the Australian Press Association had no correspondent of its own covering the San Remo conference.

469

1:3.

470

New York Times, “Policy of Secrecy Causes Dismay,” April 19, 1920,

There are a number of examples from the London Conference that can be used to illustrate this point. On February 16, 1920 the Allies were displeased about a draft reply to President Wilson’s note regarding the the Adriatic question which appeared in Echo de Paris and London Times. On February 19, the Allies drew attention to the fact that Jules Sauerwein, London correspondent of Le Matin had given details of the contents of Wilson’s letter to the Allies. Some of this information was quoted by the Evening Standard. See D.B.F.P. vol.7, pp.60–3 and 135–6. 471 The Age, April 20, 1920, p.7; Argus, April 20, 1920, p.7. The Age and Argus foreign news items between April 19–28 do not make any mention of the allied decision to issue press bulletins.

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1b) Allied response to President Wilson’s note of March 24 over the future Turkish treaty All the news accounts concerning the Supreme Council’s decision to reply to President Wilson’s note of March 24, regarding the American position over the Turkish treaty were based on Allied bulletins issued to the press. 472 This, however, did not stop journalists from writing their own accounts and expressing the feeling that the European Powers were tired of waiting on the United States. Reporting from San Remo on April 19, the London Times special correspondent was critical of President Wilson lecturing the Allied Powers, when he showed 472

Press reports of Wilson note of March 24, 1920 outlining American attitude to the Turkish treaty originally appeared in London Times, “THE TURK MUST GO. PRESIDENT WILSON’S REPLY.,” March 25, 1920, p.15 & “Mr Wilson and the Turk.,” March 31, 1920, p.14; New York Times, “President’s Reply Forwarded.,” March 26, 1920, 1:17; The Age, “THE TURK IN EUROPE. America seeks his expulsion.,” March 26, 1920, p.7 & “THE TURKISH TREATY. Wilson’s Note to the Allies.,” April 1, 1920, p.7; Argus, “TURK MUST GO. United States Insists.,” March 26, 1920, p.7 & “TURKEY’S FATE. Views of Mr. Wilson. Must Leave Europe.,” April 1, 1920, p.7. The full text of the Wilson note appeared in New York Times, “WILSON DENIES PERIL IN OUSTING SULTAN,” March 31, 1920, pp.1:1&3. For the Official documents relating to the Wilson note, see H.L.R.O, LG/F/206/4/22, no.1, Folder 2, Box 110, Turkish Peace Treaty [confidential] Correspondence between President Wilson and the Supreme Council. 1. Note from President Wilson, dated March 26, 1920. 2. Reply drafted by Lord Curzon and approved by the Supreme Council on April 26, 1920. See also Secretary of State to French Ambassador [Jusserand] Washington March 24, 1920 in FRUS 1920 vol.3, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1936, pp.750–3. It should be noted that on March 12, 1920 Jusserand communicated to the United States Government some of the settlement decisions pertaining to the Turkish peace treaty made by the Supreme Council meeting in London. These included: 1) frontiers of Turkey in Europe; 2) frontiers of Turkey in Asia; 3) zone of the Straits; 4) sovereignty of Greece over Thrace; 5) special arrangement to advise and to provide instructors to the new Turkish administration; 6) the independence of Armenia ... relinquishing all rights to Mesopotamia, Arabia, Palestine & Syria; 7) Smyrna; and finally economic matters. See FRUS 1920 vol.3, pp.748–50.

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an unwillingness to commit his country to the Turkish treaty. 473 The journalist captured a sense of apparent Allied unity in reproaching Wilson for his dithering over the Turkish settlement and accurately reported that “I understand that Allied reply to Mr. Wilson’s note will take the form of long explanation why none of the five points he exposes can be fulfilled.” 474 It is possible that, using his contacts, the London Times special correspondent was able to find out that Berthelot, the French Delegate at San Remo, and Lloyd George were determined to press on with or without the involvement of the United States. In fact, Lloyd George considered it intolerable for the Allies to protract the correspondence with the United States, when they were incurring great expense in maintaining Allied troops in Turkey. Edwin L. James, the New York Times bureau Chief in Paris, shared the same tone of the London Times and mentioned an unnamed diplomat who said to him “President Wilson in expressing his opinion on the terms of the Turkish Treaty, asked for further information. The reply sent today is an appeal from Wilson poorly informed to Wilson well informed.” 475 While neither journalist had a copy of the Allied reply to Wilson’s note, they were able to guess correctly that Allied patience had become exhausted. The London Times considered it unnecessary to recapitulate the main points of the Wilson note; whereas the New York Times gave a summary of the Wilson note reminding its readers of the American position in the Near East. 476 Both The Age and Argus stated, briefly, 473

London Times, “Points of View .... MR WILSON’S NOTE,” April 20, 1920, p.15 . 474 ibid., p.16. 475 D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.20–1; New York Times, “PREMIERS REJECT WILSON’S VIEWS...,” April 20, 1920, 1:1; Helmreich, op. cit., pp.306–7. 476 New York Times, “ALLIED PREMIERS REJECT WILSON’S VIEWS ON TURKEY. Letter to President told that our aloofness bars us from criticising Treaty. Sultan to retain Capital.” & “To Give Warning to Germany.,” April 20, 1920, 1:1&3. The Australian archives list a confidential British document dated October 3, 1921 which provides a very good overview of the American press. See NAA, series A2219/1, item no. External Relations vol.27, “The American Press,” Confidential (11767), October 3, 1921.

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that the Allies were preparing an answer to President Wilson’s note, without providing any further explanation. It could be argued that the Melbourne papers did not rate this an important item, as there were other more pressing items for discussion at San Remo. This is evident from both newspapers’ coverage of April 22 which gave more emphasis to the Armenian issue, the financial clauses in the Turkish treaty, enforcement of the military provisions of the Treaty around Erzeroum and Gallipoli, albeit in abridged form. 477 Some of the news items appearing in the Melbourne papers of April 22 were a mere synopsis of the London Times of April 21. Both Melbourne papers were in effect giving its readership information that was important to the British Empire. 478 As mentioned above, journalists did not have a copy of the Allied note, but it was obvious by this time that the Sultan would remain in Constantinople. On April 20 and 22 the New York Times, The Age, and Argus reported very briefly of the Allied decision to allow the Caliph to remain in Constantinople whereas the London Times disregarded this issue. It did not mean that the London Times was not interested, as it had devoted news reports, letters to editors, and editorials in February and March to this issue. 479 Perhaps the New York Times coverage had to be seen within the context of its support for President Wilson’s position of seeing the Sultan expelled from Constantinople and its criticism of the Allied stance. It could be said that the New York Times

477

The Age, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE. SITTING ENDS ABRUPTLY. Caliph Not to be Disturbed.,” April 22, 1920, p.7; Argus, “ALLIES CONFER. FUTURE OF TURKEY. Gallipoli May Be Occupied. U.S.A. Asked to Control Armenia.,” April 22, 1920, p.7. 478 The Age and Argus, April 22, 1920, p.7; London Times, “CONTROL OF THE STRAITS.” “PARTITION PROPOSALS.” “OFFICIAL REPORTS.” “MANDATE FOR ARMENIA.,” April 21, 1920, p.16. These reports came from Reuters, London Times special correspondent and Exchange Telegraph Company. See Chapter 1 which mentions the Argus agreement with the Exchange Telegraph Company in 1916. 479 New York Times, April 20, 1920, 1:1; The Age and Argus, April 22, 1920, p.7. See London Times February/March 1920, passim.

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was adopting an anti-Turkish position. 480 The two Melbourne newspapers were anti-Turkish, but supported the British Government’s decision in retaining the Sultan at Constantinople on two counts. Firstly, the Indian Moslem agitation had been an important factor for retaining the Sultan at Constantinople. It was important to maintain Imperial unity. Secondly, the occupation of the city gave the Allies the opportunity to influence and control the Sultan’s government. This gave the Allies the opportunity to repel any attack from the Turkish nationalists. 481 It should be stated that the Allies, finally, responded to the Wilson note by forwarding their reply on April 26, and Perris remarked correctly that “This letter has not been [during and after the conference] made public.” 482 1c) Coverage of some items relating to the Turkish peace treaty San Remo offered the Allies the opportunity to impose their peace terms on a vanquished Turkey. It also gave rise to Italian antagonism over Greece’s territorial desiderata. 483 The Allies’ deliberate policy of

480

New York Times, April 20, 1920, 1:1. For Wilson’s note of March 24 expressing his opinion of expelling the Sultan from Constantinople. See above fn.20. 481 The Age and Argus, April 22, 1920, p.7; B. C. Busch, op. cit., pp.215–22. For press accounts of Indian agitation, see London Times, “PRIME MINISTER ON CALIPHATE. INDIAN DELEGATION’S CASE.,” & “Caliphate Agitation Growing: Need for vigilance in India.,” March 22, 1920, pp.10&15; New York Times, “Cant Favor Turks. Indians are Told.,” March 21, 1920, 1:5; The Age, “ALLIES IN CONSTANTINOPLE... Deputation to Lloyd George.” March 23, 1920, p.7; Argus, “FUTURE OF TURKEY. Indian Moslems’ Request.” March 23, 1920, p.7. 482 D.B.F.P. vol.8, no. 4, pp.20–1, and Appendix 2 to No. 4; Draft answer by the Entente Powers to the American note, p. 25; Helmreich, op. cit., p.306; New York Times, April 20,1920, 1:1. The parenthesis in the Perris quote was added by the author to emphasise the Allied delay in replying to President Wilson. 483 Under the Venizelos-Tittoni Agreement of July 1919, Greek-Italian relations had improved markedly. With Tittoni resigning as Italian Foreign Minister in November 1919, Nitti became staunchly anti-Greek at San Remo.

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in-camera meetings deprived journalists of the opportunity for reporting first-hand of how the conferees conducted their negotiations and also reached their final decisions on the Turkish Peace Treaty. Three cases will be examined.

The Straits question 484 The Straits issue appeared in the London Times, New York Times, The Age, and Argus newspapers from April 21–26 dealing with a number of important questions including the internationalisation of the Turkish Straits, maintaining Allied troops at Constantinople, ensuring the Turks did not close the Bosphorus, and policing and occupying the Straits. 485 The initial reports were sketchy but became more detailed as the Allies completed their deliberations in settling the Straits question. Some of the press reports were probably based on the recommendaSee fns.388–9 in chapter 2; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.302fn.46; D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.90–1. 484 The Turkish Straits contain the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmora and Bosphorus incorporating the capital Constantinople (Istanbul) which is a narrow body of water connecting the Aegean and Black Seas. It separates the European shores of Turkey including the Gallipoli Peninsula from Anatolian Turkey. During the years 1918–23, the territory on both sides of the Straits was a demilitarised zone under Allied military occupation composed of British, French and Italian forces. 485 London Times, “THE TERMS TO TURKEY. ALLIED CONTROL OF THE STRAITS.” & “CONTROL OF THE STRAITS. SUPREME COUNCIL’S DECISION.” April 21, 1920, p.16; New York Times, “ALLIES ARE READY TO COMPEL TURKS TO ACCEPT TREATY ... Discussed Policing Dardanelles.,” April 22, 1920, 1:1; Argus, “ALLIES CONFER. FUTURE OF TURKEY. Gallipoli May be Occupied.,” April 22, 1920, p.7; The Age, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE. Allies May Occupy Gallipoli.,” April 22, 1920, p.7. London Times, “DISCORDS AT SAN REMO. MR. Lloyd George and The GERMANS.” & “DISCUSSION ON THE STRAITS.,” April 23, 1920, p.18 ; New York Times, “Dual control of Dardanelles.” April 23, 1920, 1:3; Argus, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE. CONDITIONS FOR GERMANY. Anglo-French Agreement.,” April 26, 1920, p.7; The Age, “ALLIES AT SAN REMO. CLEARING THE ATMOSPHERE. The Approved British Specific.” April 26, 1920, p.7.

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tions of the Allied Military and Naval Committee under the chairmanship of Marshal Foch at the London and San Remo Conferences. Some of their recommendations included: “The disarmament and demolition of all works, fortifications and batteries in the zone of the littoral of the Sea of Marmora, and also on the Islands of Lemnos, Imbros, Samothrace, Tenedos, Mitylene, and on the Islands of the Sea of Marmora.” Furthermore it was stipulated that “Allied military forces will be maintained in the zone of each of the Straits in order to ensure that no action is either taken or prepared which may be detrimental to the freedom of the Straits...” 486 It should be noted that in the later stages of their coverage the New York Times and Melbourne press were more detailed than the London Times. The Melbourne press article of April 26 has some similarities to the New York Times news report of April 23. It further showed the attempt by the Melbourne press to reduce its dependence on Reuters by accessing a greater range of news sources. 487 The Straits zone, which incorporated the Gallipoli Peninsula, was a matter of international concern to both the Allies and Australia. The Melbourne press, in particular, regarded Gallipoli as an area of emotional and symbolic importance to Australia which contained the graves of thousands of fallen Anzac soldiers. It was an area which had to be maintained and preserved for future Australian generations. 488 486

D.B.F.P. vol.7, pp.367–77; D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.66–7, 77–83 and 102–106; Domna Dontas, Greece and Turkey: The regime of the Straits, Lemnos and Samothrace, G. C. Eleftheroudakis S.A., Athens, 1987, p.36. For a general discussion of the Straits issue at the London and San Remo conferences in 1920, see Helmreich, op. cit., pp.244–6; B. C. Busch, op. cit., pp.210–1; Dontas, op. cit., pp.35–7. 487 London Times, “DISCORDS AT SAN REMO. MR. Lloyd George and The GERMANS.” & “DISCUSSION ON THE STRAITS.,” April 23, 1920, p.18; New York Times, “Dual control of Dardanelles.” April 23, 1920, 1:3; Argus, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE. CONDITIONS FOR GERMANY. Anglo-French Agreement.,” April 26, 1920, p.7 ; The Age, “THE TURKISH SETTLEMENT.,” April 26, 1920, p.7. For a discussion on the Melbourne press diversifying its news sources, see Chapter 1, fns.199-201. 488 Argus, “ALLIES CONFER. FUTURE OF TURKEY. Gallipoli May be Occupied.,” April 22, 1920, p.7; The Age, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE.

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Both The Age and Argus headlines of April 27 and 29: “ANZAC DAY. Celebrations in England. Impressive Memorial Service.,” and “ANZAC DAY ON GALLIPOLI. Service on Site of Famous Landing.”— reported on the importance of commemorating the Gallipoli campaign and reinforced an Australian national consciousness in the post-1918 generation. 489 The two Melbourne papers editorialised on the Turkish Treaty concerning this issue. On May 17, the Argus editorial commented: “No longer the granaries of Southern Russia be locked against the world by a venal Turkish oligarchy... Truly, the men who lie buried in Gallipoli soil did not give their lives in vain.” On May 13, The Age editorial argued that “The Dardanelles can only be neutral provided some of the Allies provide a garrison.” 490 The London Times, on the other hand, considered the Straits zone including Constantinople an area of vital strategic importance noting that the “[Treaty] articles have been framed so as to invest all the principal Allies with equal rights on this vital subject, and the prohibition of a blockade of the Straits, save with the sanction of the League of Nations...” It chided some sections of the French press for their stance of

Allies May Occupy Gallipoli.,” April 22, 1920, p.7; D.B.F.P. vol.7, p.127 which refers to a creation of an Imperial Graves Commission. Articles 218–21 of the Treaty of Sevres outlines the establishment of Allied Commissions in maintaining and caring of cemeteries, memorials and graves on the Gallipoli Peninsula. See NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Conference 1914–18 7 Pt.2 which contains the text of the Treaty of Sevres offered to Turkey on May 11, 1920. The full text of the Treaty can be found in British Parliamentary Papers, Great Britain Command Paper, Cmd. 964 Treaty Series no.11, 1920, Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Sevres, 10 August 1920, London, H.M.S.O., 1920. 489 Argus, “ANZAC DAY. Celebrations in England. Impressive Memorial Service.” and “ANZAC DAY ON GALLIPOLI. Service on Site of Famous Landing.” April 27, 1920, p.7; The Age, April 29,1920, p.7. 490 Argus, May 17, 1920, p.6; The Age, “The End of the Ottoman Empire.,” May 13, 1920, p.7.

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criticising Britain as having “...some Machiavellian project for getting the exclusive control of the Straits into her own hands.” 491 It is interesting that the New York Times editorials of April 26 and 29 and May 5 do not refer to the Straits issue whatsoever. 492 Since the United States Government had not participated in this settlement, it was not unreasonable for the New York Times to not comment on this matter. There is no doubt that the New York Times would have welcomed United States involvement in the Turkish Treaty, and it commented that “There is already in action a virtual French-British-Italian alliance in place of the French-British-American alliance on which Clemenceau’s policy was based and which was declined at Washington.” 493 In comparison, the Australian and British press had more reasons to editorialise on the Straits issue compared to their American counterparts for the reasons advanced above.

Enforcing the Turkish treaty: troop numbers required The Allies deliberated on the number of Allied troops required to enforce the Turkish peace. The London Times, Argus, and The Age reports of April 24 and 26 are very brief in stating Marshal Foch’s concern of inadequate Allied troop numbers in the various theatres to enforce the Treaty and recommending their numbers be increased by 300,000. The London Times and Argus ran headlines such as “Foch’s view” and “Foch wants more soldiers,” whereas The Age ran the same 491

London Times, May 11, 1920; For French press articles displaying an anti-British position. See London Times, “BRITISH POLICY IN TURKEY. A FRENCH CRITICISM.,” April 23, 1920, p.18; New York Times, “TURKISH PARTITION OPPOSED IN PARIS... DISTRUST OF BRITISH KEEN. Other Papers Join in Condemnation of Lloyd George’s Near Eastern Policy.,” April 20, 1920, 1:3; For relevant Treaty articles on the Straits, See NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Conference 1914–18 7 Pt.2, Section 2 Straits. Articles 37–45 and 178. 492 New York Times, “GREECE IN SMYRNA,” April 26, 1920, 1:12; “THE SAN REMO ACHIEVEMENT,” April 29, 1920, 1:12; “THE STUBBORN TURK,” May 5, 1920, 1:16. 493 New York Times, “THE SAN REMO ACHIEVEMENT,” April 29, 1920, 1:12.

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story by lumping it together with other information from San Remo. It could be argued that both the London Times and Argus considered it an important piece of information compared to The Age. None of these newspapers mentioned which theatres Marshal Foch was alluding too and nor did they question the reliability of the troop numbers necessary to enforce the treaty. The London Times and Melbourne press accounts are almost identical in wording, with the Exchange Telegraph Company and the Australian Press Association quoting the Petit Journal correspondent at San Remo as their main source of information. 494 The New York Times account of troop numbers contained more detail than its British and Australian counterparts. On April 22 it published two accounts on this issue, carrying the headlines “ALLIES ARE READY TO COMPEL TURKS TO ACCEPT TREATY ... Foch says Army of 300,000 may be needed—200,000 Men In Turkey Now.,” written by Perris and “Ready to Fight Turks if need Be” from Associated Press. Both articles are, essentially, based on five items of information. These were: 1. Marshal Foch required 300,000 men and a naval fleet to implement the Turkish treaty; 2. Britain and France did not have sufficient troop numbers to enforce the pact; 3. Anglo-French differences over Turkey and Mustapha Kemal; 4. 200,000 allied troops located within the Turkish Empire strategically placed which could be increased to meet any potential Turkish threat; and, finally, the possibility that Greece might provide the largest troop numbers. 495 The New York Times account of 300,000 troops being required and a naval fleet is much more “accurate” than the British and Australian presses’ version of “increased by 300,000.” All the newspapers, how494

London Times, “Foch’s view.,” April 24, 1920, p.16; Argus, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE ... Foch wants more soldiers.,” April 26, 1920, p.7; The Age, “ALLIES AT SAN REMO.,” April 26,1920, p.7. 495 New York Times, “ALLIES ARE READY TO COMPEL TURKS TO ACCEPT TREATY ... Foch says Army of 300,000 may be needed—200,000 Men In Turkey Now.” & “Ready to Fight Turks if need Be.,” April 22, 1920, pp.1:1&1:3.

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ever, were unaware of the actual behind the scenes discussions among the Allies. On April 20, Marshal Foch stressed that it would take a minimum of twenty-seven divisions (12,000 men equalled 1 division) to enforce the peace terms on Turkey. Lloyd George rejected this idea by stating that Allied interests would be better served in seizing the vital and strategic points of Trebizond, Brusa, and Konya. 496 In addition the New York Times referred to a naval fleet being involved in enforcement. It probably ascribed this news to Admiral Beatty, Admiral of the British Fleet, who indicated that the navy was in a position to occupy certain islands and dominate particular towns along the Black Sea and Turkish coasts which “could provide rallying points for the Christian populations by which they might be enabled to escape if necessary.” 497 In fact, the British General Staff drew “attention to the enormous amount of land and sea transport which would be involved in the operations, and it is not known whence this would be forthcoming.” 498 Items 2, 4, and 5 were “accurately” reported as indicated above. As part of its post-war demobilisation programme, Britain was committed to reducing its military expenditure. Winston Churchill, British Secretary for War, demobilised the British Army as quickly as possible in 496

D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.55–6; H.L.R. LG /F206/4/19, General Staff comments on the report from Marshal Foch on the military measures required to put into execution the treaty of peace with Turkey with Table A, General Staff, War Office, April 7, 1920, Box 109, folder 11, no.13; Helmreich, op. cit., p.295; Smith, op. cit., p.121; Busch, op. cit., p.209. On 20 April, 1920, Marshal Foch’s comments in maintaining a minimum of 27 divisions in Asia Minor was made on the assumption that the Allied Powers would be prepared to occupy the Anatolian interior. Failure to disarm the Turks would give them the opportunity to hide huge quantities of weapons in the interior which could be used against the Allies. Since the Allies were not prepared to assume such responsibility, then the treaty would become unenforceable. See D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp. 54–7. 497 D.B.F.P. vol.8, p.60. 498 H.L.R.O, LG/F206/4/19, General Staff comments on the report from Marshal Foch on the military measures required to put into execution the treaty of peace with Turkey, General Staff, War Office, April 7, p.2.

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line with Cabinet policy. 499 The availability of 200,000 Allied troops within the Turkish Empire, chiefly British, Greek, and French can be obtained from the official documents. In the British Army estimates of 1920–21, there were 6,000, 9,500, 9,000, and 14,000 troops stationed in Egypt, Constantinople, Palestine, and Mesopotamia [Iraq] respectively, and around 72,000 Greek forces [or 6 divisions] in Smyrna. 500 The French had troops stationed in Thrace including the Straits and 3 divisions in Cilicia, in regard to which Millerand faced domestic pressure to demobilise the French army. 501 With the Allies reluctant to boost troop numbers, the New York Times quoting Associated Press guessed correctly that Greece might supply the additional contingents to en-

499

Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Companion Vol.1V, part 2, July 1919–-March1921, Heinemann, London, 1977, pp. 877–8, 881–2, 924–5 and 1030–4; David Fromkin, A Peace to end All Peace, Penguin Books, London, 1991, pp.384–7. By the end of the Great War Britain had 3.5 million men in uniform; by the end of 1919 it had been reduced to under 800,000 men and fell to 370,000 by the end of 1920. Austen Chamberlain who was appointed as Chancellor of Exchequer in January 1919, set about reducing Government expenditure. See K. Jeffrey, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918–1922, Manchester University Press, Manchester,1984, pp.13–15,18 and 20. 500 Gilbert, op. cit., pp.1030–4; D.B.F.P. vol.8, p.55; H.L.R.O, LG,/F206/4/19, The British General Staff commented on the Marshal Foch report on the military measures required to put into execution the treaty of peace with Turkey with Table A, General Staff, War Office, April 7, 1920, p.3. Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, recorded in his diary of a Cabinet meeting held on 21 May, 1920, where he pointed out the small size of the British Army at a time when it was scattered from Ireland, Batoum, Constantinople, Egypt, Palestine and Mesopotamia. It seemed strange to reduce military commitments at a time when Britain had attained such huge post-war overseas responsibilities. See Maj. Gen. Sir C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, Vol.2, Charles Scribners Sons, New York, 1927, pp. 240–1. 501 H.L.R.O, LG/F206/4/19, The British General Staff commented on Marshal Foch report…, p.3; Christopher. M. Andrews and A. S. KanyaForstner, France Overseas, Thames and Hudson, London, 1981, p.215.

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force the Turkish treaty. Venizelos assured the Supreme Council that Greece could provide these additional troops. 502 In item 2, Perris referred to Anglo-French rivalry in Turkey and over Mustapha Kemal, without revealing what these actual differences entailed. There could be several factors underlying this Anglo-French discord. Firstly, Georges Picot, French High Commissioner in Syria, was sent to talk with Mustapha Kemal in late December 1919 which caused concern for the British Government. 503 Next, the French and Italian Governments protested that the Presidents appointed to the three commissions of control at Constantinople were British— appointments made by General Milne. Nevertheless, Anglo-French rivalry in the Levant was resolved at San Remo with the Syrian and Mesopotamian mandates including Mosul coming under French and British administrations. 504 The press would, then, proceed to report on the Greek claims.

Smyrna: Italian opposition to Greek claims The first reports on Smyrna appeared in the London Times and New York Times on April 22. Both newspapers intimated Greece securing Smyrna with the Turks having suzerainty over the town and its hinterland. Both accounts indicate some concern existing in resolving this issue, with the London Times special correspondent using emotive language such as “the fate of Smyrna trembles in the balance,” whereas the New York Times adopted a more measured tone in that “the disposition of Smyrna has not been definitely settled.” Moreover, the former correspondent mentions “fresh proposals” without stating what these were or the name of the source. The latter newspaper, quoted Associated Press as its source, named France as listing “fresh proposals re-

502

D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.55 and 57; Helmreich, op. cit., p.295; New York Times, “Ready to Fight Turks if need Be.,” April 22, 1920, p.1:3 . 503 New York Times, “ALLIES ARE READY TO COMPEL TURKS TO ACCEPT TREATY ... Foch says Army of 300,000 may be needed—200,000 Men In Turkey Now.,” April 22, 1920, p.1:1; Sonyel, op. cit., p.47. 504 D.B.F.P. vol.13, pp.46, 58 &.60; Harry. J. Psomiadis, op. cit., pp.25–6; D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.144–5fn.1 and172–9.

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specting Smyrna.” 505 However, neither newspaper mentioned that, on April 19, Millerand had proposed to the Supreme Council a “formal modification regarding the question of Smyrna.” 506 The journalists who wrote the above accounts either guessed correctly or had close contact with someone from the French delegation. On April 24, The London and New York Times reported that the Smyrna question had been settled “with the assistance of M. Venizelos.” It might be argued that both newspapers regarded Venizelos an important and respected individual, who was prepared to compromise for the common good of all the Allies. The newspaper reports do not reveal that Millerand’s proposals with Curzon’s support were responsible for extending the future League of Nations plebiscite from 2 to 5 years, by which time Smyrna would have been incorporated into the Hellenic Kingdom. Either way, Venizelos had very little option but to accept the French decision. 507 In comparison, the Melbourne press on April 26 reiterated what the London and New York Times had stated on April 24 over the future administration of Smyrna. Both The Age and Argus stated that “The port [of Smyrna] will be internationalised,” something which

505

London Times, “Turkish Questions.,” April 22, 1920, p.18; New York Times, “ALLIES ARE READY TO COMPEL TURKS TO ACCEPT TREATY ... Asia Minor problems left unresolved.” & “Ready to Fight Turks if need be.” April 22, 1920, pp.1:1&3. Articles 66 and 69 outlines the boundaries of Smyrna and Turkish suzerainty. See NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Conference 1914–18 7 pt.2, Section 4 Smyrna Arts 65–83. 506 D.B.F.P. vol.8, p.36. 507 London Times, “The San Remo Differences ... TURKISH TREATY PROGRESS.” & “Smyrna and Armenia,” April 24, 1920, pp.14–6; New York Times, “VOTE INDEPENDENCE TO THE ARMENIANS ... Greece to Administer Smyrna, but under the Sovereignty of the Sultan.” April 24, 1920 pp.1:1&:3; D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.123–6 and with p.130 containing the French modifications agreed to by Venizelos surrounding Smyrna; Helmreich, op. cit., p.292; Busch, op. cit., p.211. The future plebiscite incorporating the city of Smyrna and its adjacent hinterland is covered by Art.83. See NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Conference 1914–18 7 Pt.2.

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their British and American counterparts did not mention. What did internationalisation of the port of Smyrna entail? 508 This meant that Smyrna was an important port, giving the Turkish State an outlet to the sea for its produce, something which had been broached at the Greek territorial meetings of February-March 1919. 509 It should be noted that the Smyrna Commission’s report of February 21 recommended that “clauses will be inserted safeguarding freedom of transit and assigning a part of the port of Smyrna to the League of Nations as a free port.” 510 The Melbourne presses’ reference to “internationalisation” might be attributed to the Governor-General’s proclamation of January 14 prohibiting trade between Smyrna and Australia. 511 It might be suggested that both Melbourne newspapers could have had two underlying motives in reporting this issue. Firstly, the League of Nations might become involved in the Turkish peace settlement in ensuring that the Greek possession of Smyrna did not threaten British economic interests in this region; and, finally, it raised the opportunity to estab508

The Age, “ALLIES AT SAN REMO. CLEARING THE ATMOSPHERE. The Approved British Specific.” April 26, 1920, p.7; Argus, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE....Terms for Turkey.,” April 26,1920, p.7. 509 See Chapter.2, 1b, fns.302-06 . 510 D.B.F.P. vol.7, pp.244fn.5–47; For a discussion on the London Conference on Smyrna, see Helmreich, op. cit., pp.266–9; Alexander Karagiannis,op. cit., pp.360–4. The Treaty of Sevres Article 335 declared Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandretta, Haifa, Basra and Trebizond as ports of international concern. Article 350 states that “ In the port of Smyrna Turkey will be accorded a lease in perpetuity subject to determination by the League of Nations, of an area which shall be placed under the general regime of free zones laid down in Arts 341 to 344 and shall be used for the direct transit of goods...” Moreover Art.78 stated that “The provisions of Part X1 [Ports, Waterways and Railways] relating to the regime of ports of international interest, free ports and transit shall be applicable to the City of Smyrna and the territory defined in Art.66.” See NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Conference 1914–18 7 pt.2. 511 Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, no.3 January 14, 1920; Great Britain, Colonial Office, C.O.418/198. S. Polychroniadis, Greek Charge d’Affaires at London, to Earl of Curzon, September 20,1920.

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lish future commercial ties between Smyrna and Australia, once the future of the Smyrna territory had been settled by the Allies. With the Turkish peace treaty still unfinished, The Age’s headlines of April 26 and 28 “THE TARIFF. Effect on Prices.,” “AUSTRALIAN WINES. Worldwide Favor.,” “Impossible to meet Demand.,” and “The Price of Butter. World’s Parity Demanded.,” reveal the importance of expanding Australia’s foreign trade opportunities. 512 On March 18, Senator Russell pointed out that the Australian Wheat Board had a contract with Imperial authorities to sell Australian wheat to other nations. It was announced in the House of Representatives on April 22 and May 4 that the sale of surplus butter and wool had been concluded with the Imperial Government. 513 Nonetheless, the Argus editorial of April 27 stated that “Trade must be revived between all parts of Europe—indeed all parts of the world...” 514 The emphasis on trade by the Melbourne press would give Australian primary producers, after the signing of the Turkish treaty and lifting of the trade embargo, an opportunity to export its produce into Turkey via Britain. It could, also, assist to increase Australian trade with Greece. The Melbourne press had shifted the focus from the political to the commercial plane. The New York Times was the only newspaper in this study to editorialise over the future of Smyrna. The editorial was largely supportive of Smyrna being completely handed over to Greece. It criticised the Allied compromise which would satisfy neither the Turks nor the Greeks resulting in the Greeks having to fight Mustapha Kemal. It believed the Greeks would eventually consolidate their position around Smyrna and “for almost the first time in 8 or 9 centuries the world will see a Hellas really new and reat.” Although the Allied compromise did 512

The Age, April 26 & 28, 1920, pp.6&9. These articles do not relate to the Ottoman Empire, but it could be argued that Australian primary producers were seeking to expand their into newer export markets. 513 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates vol.XCI. 1920., pp.518–9, 1429–30 and 1707. Hereafter cited ad C.P.D. 514 Argus, April 27, 1920, p.6. This editorial applies to the German settlement, but it has been used within the context of promoting commercial opportunities between Australia and Smyrna.

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not assist Greece in achieving complete sovereignty over Smyrna, the New York Times regarded it as a “great accomplishment for M. Venizelos...” 515 It is against this background, that Italian antipathy towards the Greek claims can be best understood. The news articles appearing in the Australian, British, and American press captured the anti-Greek position of the Italians. On April 24, the New York Times carried the headline “Premier Nitti Predicts War in Asia Minor and Won’t Help,” and its editorial of April 26 was critical of Nitti’s attitude towards the Greece. It argued that the Italians, if threatened, would fight to defend their interests in South-West Anatolia, and continued that “unless Mustapha Kemal is a better diplomat than M. Venizelos which seems hardly probable there is no likelihood that Greek and Italian interests will come into conflict.” 516 There is no question that the New York Times supported Venizelos and doubted whether Greco-Italian interests would clash in Asia Minor. The only underlying concern for this newspaper was Mustapha Kemal exploiting this Greco-Italian rivalry for his own political ends. In comparison, the Melbourne and British press versions have some similarities to the New York Times report of April 24. Neither the British nor Melbourne editorialised over Smyrna and focussed in reporting the real or imagined Italian grievances. The Melbourne press displayed the following headlines on April 26 and 27 “SAN REMO CONFERENCE... Italians are surprised.,” “FIXING INDEMNITIES... Italy and the Mediterranean” and “THE TURKISH TREATY. ITALIAN DISSATISFACTION. GREECE UNDULY FAVORED. Future War Inevitable’ and London Times’ “ITALIAN CRITICISM OF AWARD TO GREECE. Allegations of Injustice.,” portraying the Italians as complaining incessantly. 517 515

New York Times, “GREECE IN SMYRNA.,” April 26, 920,1:12. New York Times, “Premier Nitti Predicts War in Asia Minor and Won’t Help.,” April 24, 1920, 1:1; New York Times, “GREECE IN SMYRNA.,” April 26, 1920, 1:12; D.B.F.P. vol.8, pp.90–1&4. 517 Argus, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE... Italians are surprised.” April 26, 1920, p.7; Argus, “FIXING INDEMNITIES... Italy and the Mediterranean.” April 27, 1920, p.7; The Age, “THE TURKISH TREATY. ITALIAN 516

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Both Melbourne papers stated that leading Italian newspapers were “surprised and indignant at Greece’s territorial acquisitions in view of the smallness of her sacrifices compared to that of Italy.” The Italians were concerned that Greece would be elevated “to the position of serious rivalry to Italy as a Mediterranean power.” 518 These last two points were not reported in the London Times or New York Times. The correspondence between Sir George Buchanan, the British Ambassador at Rome, with Lord Curzon on April 30 was unavailable to the Melbourne press. Nevertheless, some of the issues reported by Buchanan could support the Melbourne newspapers’ anti-Italian stance over Italy’s antagonism towards Greece. For instance, Buchanan remarked that the Italians thought that France and England wanted to create “a powerful Greece for balancing Italy’s power in the Mediterranean” and that “Greece is described as a willing agent for England’s eventual designs in the Levant.” The Italian Government possibly thought that Greece and England would “ control in future the whole trade of the Levant, and to hinder the development of Italian commerce in those regions.” 519 In the Melbourne press, the Italians were depicted as being jealous of the Greek claims. In a letter to The Age editor on April 28, A. V. Maniachi, Consul for Greece in Melbourne, criticised that newspaper’s article of April 27 which had stated that the Turkish peace treaty “unduly favors Greece, and there is dissatisfaction in Italy.” He defended Greece’s gains and blamed Italian dissension on the “Irreconcilables [Imperialists], who have forgotten Mazzini’s catchword. Italia Irredenta.” He categorically stated that “These controversial matters were settled by the present Italian Government and Mr. Venizelos prior to the Powers decision in a spirit of friendship and justice.” 520 Both newspapers depicted the Italian preoccupation with some cynicism to their DISSATISFACTION. GREECE UNDULY FAVORED. ‘Future War Inevitable.,’” April 27, 1920, p.5; London Times, “ITALIAN CRITICISM OF AWARD TO GREECE. Allegations of Injustice.,” April 28,1920, p.15. 518 Argus, 26 and 27, 1920; The Age, April 27, 1920. 519 B.D.F.A. Series F Europe, 1919–39, vol.4 Italy and South-Eastern Europe, November 1918–June 1921, pp.183–4. 520 The Age April 27, 1920, p.5 and April 28, 1920, p.9.

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readers. It could be contended that the Melbourne press considered the Italian action insolent, threatening Allied unity and interrupting the final Turkish peace settlement. 1d) Newspaper editorials on the Turkish peace treaty With the Allied Powers completing their deliberations at San Remo, the Turkish delegation was summoned to Paris on May 11 to receive the peace terms. The newspapers editorialised on the final settlement. 521 On May 13, The Age reacted negatively to the Greek claims and questioned the future existence of the Sultan’s Government. It asked, “Why … Greece [should] be so liberally rewarded is difficult to understand, but M. Venizelos it is believed secured the support of Lloyd George.” It was concerned that Greek control of Smyrna might threaten British financial interests in the town. The Sultan would find it impossible to maintain an army of 50,000 without sufficient troops or money. Since Anatolia was divided into Greek, Italian, and French spheres of influence, it confined the new Turkish state to the Central Anatolian plateau. 522 The Argus, on the other hand, was very favourable to the Turkish Treaty on May 17 by viewing it in Imperial terms. It regarded it as of “greater importance to the British Empire than even the German Treaty” and “devised in its major aspects for the protection of British 521.

For press summary of peace terms, see The London Times, “TURKISH TERMS PRESENTED. M. MILLERAND’S ADDRESS,” “THE TURKISH TREATY. FUTURE OF THE STRAITS. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COMMISSION. LION’S SHARE TO GREECE.,” and “OFFICIAL SUMMARY. SWEEPING TERRITORIAL CHANGES.,” May 12, 1920, pp.15&17–8; The Age, “THE TURKISH TREATY. DRASTIC TERMS SUBMITTED. FORTS TO BE DEMOLISHED.,” and Argus, “TURKISH TREATY. TERMS OF ALLIES. EMPIRE GREATLY REDUCED. DARDANELLES THROWN OPEN.,” May 13, 1920, p.7. 522 The Age, “The End of the Ottoman Empire,” May 13, 1920, p.7. At the conclusion of the San Remo conference, Venizelos sent Lloyd George a personal letter thanking him for his efforts in helping Greece achieve its territorial claims. The text of this letter is in David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties Vol.2, Victor Gollancz, London, 1938, pp.1340–1.

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interests.” It believed that the “dismemberment of Turkey” from the British perspective had “saved India, and even Australia, from the danger of German expansion eastward and its concomitant Prussianism.” The Argus considered the treaty as underwriting peace “in Europe, the Balkans, and Western Asia, and the British Empire will at last breathe freely.” 523 The London Times editorial of May 12, like the Argus, was approving of the peace terms but expressed an uneasiness over its enforcement provisions. The main hurdle was overcoming Mustapha Kemal’s opposition. The editorial asked “Constantinople is under allied guns, but who is going to force this settlement upon the Nationalists and other recalcitrant factions or races in the remoter recesses of the former Ottoman Empire?” It explained that “Decidedly M. Venizelos has done brilliantly for his country.” 524 The London Times seemed sympathetic to the Greek Premier compared to The Age’s cynicism. Unlike the London Times and New York Times, both Melbourne newspapers did not allude to Mustapha Kemal. The New York Times editorial of May 5 concentrated very heavily on Mustapha Kemal. It was anti-Turkish in tone using such words as a “convicted criminal” to describe Kemal. Nonetheless, it acknowledged Mustapha Kemal, stating that “As a national patriot one may admire him, even while realising that his cause is about the worst in the world.” Like the London Times, it highlighted Mustapha Kemal’s opposition to the treaty and his control of Anatolia. It emphasised that Greece and Britain had the prime responsibility for crushing the Kemalists, since the Italians and French had already fulfilled their territorial aspirations in Asia Minor. This newspaper further contended that the relationship between Greece and its Allies partners was an uneasy one. The former believed it could destroy Kemal’s army and the latter cautioned the Greeks from attacking him, fearing the inadequacy of Greek resources or otherwise afraid of the Greeks claiming too much if they succeeded. The editorial concluded “that the determined Kemal

523 524

Argus, May 17,1920, p.6. London Times, “The Turkish Treaty.,” May 12, 1920, p.17.

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will not let go without a fight.” 525 The press coverage will, next, focus on the Greek attempt to occupy Constantinople in July 1922.

2. THE GREEK ATTEMPT TO OCCUPY CONSTANTINOPLE IN JULY 1922 The Greek threat of occupying Constantinople in late July 1922 was an attempt by them to force Mustapha Kemal to act in ending the military stalemate in Asia Minor. On the other hand the Greeks were urging the Allies to settle the Near East question. Another development was the declaration of autonomy around Smyrna which had the intention of laying the groundwork for the eventual withdrawal of the Greek army from Asia Minor. There were Venizelist “movements” in Constantinople and Smyrna which worked towards establishing a separatist state in Asia Minor. The Lloyd George speech of August 4, 1922 outlining his Government’s foreign policy in the Near East was praised by the Greeks and disappointed the Turks. As a result, the articles appearing in the press were largely anti-Greek in tone. 2a) The Greek advance on Constantinople This part will be divided into three parts examining the rumours and internal situation in Greece prior to the Greek attempt to move onto Constantinople and the two Greek notes presented to Allied representatives at Athens requesting their permission to occupy the Turkish capital. The Allies refused the Greek request. Lastly, the Allies took countermeasures to protect Constantinople which subsequently disappointed the Greek Government.

The rumours and the internal situation in Greece The first reported news of the Greek attempt to occupy Constantinople appeared in London Times on July 29 and August 1 and the New York Times and Melbourne press on July 29 and 31 respectively. The newspaper headlines give the impression of disbelief that the Greeks would be so reckless in attempting to occupy Constantinople which 525

New York Times, “The Stubborn Turk.,” May 5, 1920, 1:16. For press reactions to the Turkish Treaty, see Helmreich, op. cit., pp.314–5.

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was still under Allied occupation. Beneath these headlines there is an anti-Greek feeling and impending rumours of a Greek assault on Constantinople. 526 The London Times Near East correspondent sent a dispatch by mail on July 24 from Constantinople to his home office in London which was published on August 1, 1922. He reported of circulating rumors of a Greek threat on the Turkish capital and military concentration in Eastern Thrace and problems encountered by Turkish Nationalists in the Ismid Peninsula. He urged the Allies to defend the neutral zone outside of Constantinople should either the Greeks or Turks violate it. 527 There are two reasons why this item might have been sent by mail. Firstly, the correspondent was providing background information to an anticipated event which could have important ramifications for the British Empire; and secondly, to avoid the clutches of Allied censorship at Constantinople. There is a possibility that the London Times correspondent was accompanied by an Allied military or High Commission official or even by a Turkish Government representative to the Greek-Turkish frontier to witness the Greek military manoeuvres from afar. The journalist might have been influenced to depict the Greeks in an unfavourable light. 528 526

London Times, “GREEK MILITARY ACTIVITY. Allied Warning.,” July 29, 1922, p.9; The Age, “CONSTANTINOPLE MENACED. A Greek advance reported.,” July 31, 1922, p.7; Argus, “GREECE THREATENING. Constantinople Menaced. Allied Warning issued.,” July 31, 192, p.7; New York Times, “GREEK DRIVE ON TURKS IS DOUBTED IN LONDON. Reports that Constantine Plans to take Constantinople Are Not Taken Seriously.,” July 29, 1922, 1:3. 527 London Times, “THE SITUATION ON THE BOSPORUS. NATIONALIST FORCES.,” August 1, 1922, p.9 . 528 London Times, August 1, 1922, p.9. It should be noted the Allied declaration of July 28 issued by General Harington at Constantinople appeared in small print at the bottom of this news article; The Press and World Affairs, pp.117–18 & 146–47; Turkey Internal 867.731/6 F. M. Dearing, Assistant Sec at Dept State, to Washburn Crosby Co. New York, August 10, 1921. This letter mentions the difficulties of cable censorship existing in Greece and Turkey.

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The London Times and New York Times reports of July 29 emanating from Constantinople and Sofia reveal that the transfer of Greek troops from Anatolia was being used to reinforce the Thracian front and that General Hadjianestis, the Commander-in-Chief of the Asia Minor army, was to inspect these troops at Rodosto, a port located on the European side of the Sea of Marmora. The Melbourne press merely said that “Greek troops are passing near the Turkish border” without any further explanation. 529 The London Times mentioned that senior Greek officers were talking about an attack on Constantinople. The correspondent interpreted the rhetoric of some high ranking Greek officers as designed “to strengthen the morale of the troops.” The main problem was whether the Greeks were prepared to defy the Allies by occupying Constantinople, but the Greek manoeuvre could not be discounted either. In response, General Harington, the Commander-in-Chief of Allied forces at Constantinople, issued a communique through Reuter’s news agency stressing that a Greek violation of the neutral zone would be met by Allied force. 530 Unlike the London Times and Melbourne press, the New York Times stated that the Allied High Commissioners at Constantinople 529

London Times, “GREEK MILITARY ACTIVITY. Allied Warning.,” July 29, 1922, p.9 ; New York Times, July 29, 1922, p.3 this report came via associated press; The Age, “CONSTANTINOPLE MENACED. A Greek advance reported.,” July 31, 1922, p.7; Argus, “GREECE THREATENING. Constantinople Menaced. Allied Warning issued.,” July 31, 1922, p.7; Busch, op. cit., p.338. 530 London Times, “GREEK MILITARY ACTIVITY. Allied Warning.,” July 29, 1922, p.9; Smith, op. cit., p.277; In early May 1922, General Hadjianestis visited Smyrna to discuss his plans with Major-General A. Pallis, the Chief of Staff to former Commander-in-Chief General Papoulas, of shortening Greek defensive positions in Anatolia. This involved withdrawing Greek forces from Asia Minor and using them to occupy Constantinople. MajorGenerals Pallis, Polimenakos and Kondylis regarded Hadjianestis as incompetent and resigned their commissions in disgust. See Giannis. P. Kapsis, Hamenes Patrides ( Lost Homelands), Nea Sunora, A. A. Livani, Athens, 1989, pp.195–6.

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were telling their Greek counterparts of their anxiety regarding the Greek concentration in Thrace. This might be seen with Henderson, the acting British High Commissioner at Constantinople, telling the new Greek Charge d’Affaires of the inherent danger in the Greek manoeuvre in Thrace. 531 Both Melbourne newspapers highlighted the precautionary military and naval measures being adopted by British authorities against a rumored Greek attack on Constantinople. This created an impression of Britain displaying and asserting its power in the reader’s minds especially with “30 British warships assembled in the Bosphorus.” This perception was, further, buttressed in the New York Times account with “5 French battalions, 4 British and 1 Italian in Constantinople and a formidable British naval force in the vicinity.” It would have been madness on the part of the Greeks to attack Constantinople, especially, with such a menacing British naval presence which had the potential of blockading Greece. 532 531

New York Times, July 29, 1922, p.1:3; National Archives of the United Kingdom (London), F.O. 424 Confidential Correspondence respecting Turkey Pt.1 “Further correspondence respecting Eastern affairs” July-September 1922. F.O. 424/254 no.82 Henderson [Constantinople] to Earl of Balfour, July 28, 1922. It should be noted that Harington on July 27 cabled the War Office in London reporting of his meeting with Simopoulos, the new Greek High Commissioner at Constantinople. The latter informed Harington that the Greeks were weary of the delays and financial burden of keeping the Greek army in Asia Minor and reinforcing the Thracian front was purely a defensive measure. Simopoulos assured Harington that there was no secret organisation going in for arming the Greeks in Constantinople. See F.O. 424/254 no.86 Lt. Gen Sir C. Harington [Constantinople] to War Office, July 27, 1922. M. Triantafyllakos resigned as Greek High Commissioner over his personal differences with the Government. See National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C, Records of the Department of State relating to Political Relations between Turkey and other States 1910–29. 767.68/279 Caffery [Athens] to Sec of State July 28, 1922. Hereafter cited as Turkey Political. 532 The Age, “CONSTANTINOPLE MENACED. A Greek advance reported.,” July 31, 1922, p.7; Argus, “GREECE THREATENING. Constantinople Menaced. Allied Warning issued.,” July 31, 1922, p.7; New York Times,

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The Age and Argus quoting the “Daily Express” reported that King Constantine had planned the entire stratagem in order to save his throne. King Constantine was portrayed as the arch-villain by the Melbourne papers. They do not describe the actual internal political, economic and financial problems existing in Greece. It does not follow that the Melbourne press was unaware of such episodes and focussed on matters concerning Britain. The New York Times indicated that Constantine probably allowed rumors to circulate regarding Constantinople as a means of deflecting the attention of the Greek people away from “their heavy military and financial burdens” and pressuring the Entente into resolving the Near Eastern question. 533 However, the London Times and New York Times briefly describe in their stories and editorials the machinations of certain Greek Cabinet Ministers pushing for the advance onto Constantinople and the internal conditions in Greece. The Melbourne press avoided such information believing its readership would not be interested in Greek domestic politics and directed its attention on Constantine’s designs on Constantinople. M. M. Theotokis and Stratos, the Greek Ministers of War and Interior, whose names appeared in a London Times report of August 15, were the main instigators in influencing Constantine and the Cabinet to make such a desperate move. The New York Times editorial of August 1 mentioned Gounaris’ ploy as “a brilliant political stroke to save the situation.” In fact, the British documents reveal the French Minister at Athens alluding to Gounaris, ex-Greek Premier 1921–22 and Baltazzis, the Greek Foreign Minister’s, opposition to the advance on Constantinople. Furthermore the internal political, economic, and financial position was becoming unbearable in Greece. 534 “GREEK DRIVE ON TURKS IS DOUBTED IN LONDON. Reports that Constantine Plans to take Constantinople Are Not Taken Seriously.,” July 29, 1922,1:3. 533 The Age and Argus July 31, 1922; New York Times, July 29, 1922 . 534 Turkey Political 767.68/286, Jefferson Caffery, U.S. Charge d’Affaires ad interim, Athens to Sec of State, Washington D.C., August 8, 1922; London Times, “NEAR EAST PERILS. CRISIS MAY RECUR. URGENT NEED FOR PEACE.,” August 15, 1922, p.7; New York Times, “GREECE AND

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The New York Times and London Times referred to the internal situation in Greece from different perspectives. The latter explained that the forced loan had contributed “to a rapid decline in King Constantine’s popularity” with many voters abandoning the Royalists and countless young men avoiding conscription into the Greek army. After visiting Thessaly, Macedonia, and Epirus Mr. S. C. Atchley, Second Secretary and Translator of the British legation at Athens, reported on the general unpopularity of the royalist politicians, whilst King Constantine enjoyed some support in Greece. However, the documentary evidence offers a contrary view to that of the London Times version of events. 535 The New York Times on July 31 described the financial and commercial problems of the Greek Government. It outlined a monthly cost of $7 million in maintaining the Greek army in the various theaSMYRNA.,” August 1, 1922, 1:18; F.O. 424/254 no.78 Bentinck [Athens] to Earl of Balfour, July 27, 1922. In this document the French Minister further mentioned of a Morning Post report that France made a tempting offer for Greece to discard her friendship with England and cast her lot with France. The French Minister understood the story originated from Palestine with the object of creating problems between the Allies. 535 London Times, “Greeks and Turks,” August 5, 1922, p.13; B.D.F.A. series F. vol.5 Italy and South-Eastern Europe, July 1921–December 1923, pp.193–4; Caffery pointed out that “Constantine personally seems to maintain popularity. He has made several visits recently to Venizelists strongholds in the Greek islands and has been enthusiastically received. On the other hand, nobody has a good word to say for the Cabinet; but notwithstanding their weakness. I do not believe they can be overthrown at this juncture.” See Turkey Political 767.68/255 Caffery, Athens to Sec of state, Washington D.C., July 25, 1922. The forced loan was introduced by Protopapadakis, as Minister of Finance, in April 1922 “literally forcing the Greek people to lend their government a portion of their cash holdings... All persons possessing bank notes of 5, 10, 25, 500, and 1000 drachmas were required to appear at their nearest bank to receive new currency which was printed in two equal parts. One half, bearing the picture of the founder of the Bank of Greece, constituted legal tender and was given to the original holder. The other half, bearing the imprint of the Royal Crown, constituted a twenty-year bond at 61/2 per cent interest and was retained by the bank.” See Cassimatis, op. cit., p.73.

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tres and hoped the U.S. might release the balance of $33 million in credits granted to the Venizelos administration. On the former point Bentinck, acting British Minister at Athens, observed that the Greek government’s main problem was that it was spending 10 million drachmas daily on the war and urged that “if we allow Greece to collapse a serious blow will have been dealt to our position, political, commercial and financial in the Near East.” Many British investors faced the possibility of losing millions of pounds in the advent of a Greek financial collapse. 536 Mr. S. de Bilinski, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the National Bank of Turkey, who visited Greece, reported to Bentinck of the difficult financial and economic position facing Greece. On the financial front, the prohibition of exporting Greek drachmas and stock shares, increasing import duties on all luxuries and most necessities, and attempting to stabilise the currency through a consortium of banks, had all failed. Currant and olive crops offered good prospects of earning foreign exchange subject to high prices for exporters. 537 The latter point highlighted the Royalist government’s desire to get access to credits made by the Governments of United States, Great Britain, and France under the Tripartite Loan of 1918, to allow it to maintain its army on a war footing and to be able to meet its financial obligations. However, the Greeks tried unsuccessfully to raise a loan in the British and American markets in 1921–22. In any case, France

536

New York Times, July 31, 1922, 1:1; B.D.F.A. series F. vol.5, pp.208–9. In this dispatch Bentinck, further, mentioned that Greece had great undeveloped wealth in Macedonia and Thrace waiting to be developed after the conclusion of peace. The problem was the ability to raise the necessary capital to develop these regions. On August 7 the Argus carried the small headline “Macedonia for Oil. New Zealander’s Prophecy.” 537 B.D.F.A. series F. vol.5, pp.209–10. De Bilinski had lived in Athens for many years. Around June or July 1922, while visiting Greece, he took the opportunity to interview some leading Greek personalities in Athens. There was no mention of the names of some of these prominent individuals. One can only assume that they were Cabinet Ministers, bankers and proprietors of major business firms. See B.D.F.A. series F. vol.5, p.208.

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would have blocked any Greek moves in getting access to the 1918 credits. 538 Furthermore, the article was correct in stating that the remittances of $50 million from Greeks in America had greatly assisted the Greek economy in 1921. However, it does not mention that these remittances had ceased in 1922 which deprived Greece of much needed capital. 539 With rumours of an assault on Constantinople and internal financial difficulties, the Greeks would now raise the political stakes.

The two Greek notes and Allied refusal The newspapers continued their anti-Greek reporting of the events that were to evolve over the next few days. The newspaper reports begin to highlight the Greeks handing diplomatic notes to Allied representatives in Athens requesting permission to occupy Constantinople. The Allies refused to countenance the Greek plan. It should be emphasized that the Melbourne press treatment of this incident is somewhat brief compared to the London Times and New York Times version of events. Nevertheless, the Melbourne newspapers did manage to portray Greece in an adverse manner and, in particular, were opposed to King Constantine. On July 31, the London Times correspondent reported that press censorship was very rigid in Athens over the past week regarding Greek plans over Constantinople. This could be explained in terms of the Greek Cabinet acting in secrecy attempting to conceal its real intentions, and M. Baltazzis eventually presenting two notes to Allied Ministers in Athens highlighting Greece’s desire to resolve the GreekTurkish conflict. Both notes were issued to the press in which the Greek Government promised it would await the Allies’ reply before proceeding further. 540 The London Times published both Greek notes 538

Cassimatis, op. cit., pp.68–72; Smith, op. cit., pp.242–4 and 251–2. New York Times, July 31, 1922, 1:1; B.D.F.A. series F. vol.5, p.208; Cassimatis, op. cit., p.67. 540 London Times, “GREEK ARMIES MOVING. A NEAR EAST DANGER. THE NEUTRALITY OF CONSTANTINOPLE. An Impudent Demand.,” July 31, 1922, p.8 ; Turkey Internal 867.731/6 F. M. Dearing, Assistant Sec at Dept State, to Washburn Crosby Co New York, August 10, 1921. 539

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in one article whereas the New York Times version appeared on July 30 and 31 and in the Melbourne press on July 31 and August 1. Each newspaper reported on the Greek notes. The Athens correspondent of the London Times forwarded a summary of the Greek notes to his London office without any further explanation. The first note of July 27 mentioned Turkey’s intransigence in delaying peace which forced Greece to take “some direct solution” to protect the Christians in Asia Minor from Turkish reprisals. It concluded that Greece was willing to cooperate with the Allies in arriving at a solution compelling Turkey to stop evading the Entente decisions. The first article appearing in The Age on July 31 is somewhat unclear as to which Greek note is being referred too, as it is interwoven with other information. There are some clues which suggest that it applies to the first note with respect to Greek willingness to collaborate with the Allies and taking some military action against Turkey. The small headline “Greek note to Allies” appearing in the Argus alerted its readers that the Greeks had given the Allies some note. The New York Times reiterated basically what appeared in the London Times regarding the first Greek note. Further, it suggested that the Greek build up in Thrace was part of a plan in assisting King Constantine to fulfil his dream of occupying Constantinople. The words “obscure” in The Age, “not fully known” in the Argus, “some direct solution” in the London Times, and “decisive steps” in the New York Times are ambiguous terms concealing the Greek plans for occupying Constantinople that appeared in the 2nd Greek note. 541 541

London Times, “GREEK ARMIES MOVING...,” July 31, 1922, p.8; The Age, “CONSTANTINOPLE MENACED. A Greek advance reported.,” July 31, 1922, p.7; Argus, “GREECE THREATENING. Constantinople Menaced. Allied Warning issued. Greek note to Allies.,” July 31, 1922, p.7; New York Times, “DISCLAIMS DESIGNS ON CONSTANTINOPLE. Greek Government says it won’t order advance without Allies’ Leave. FRANCE INTERPOSES A VETO Formally refuses to permit occupation of Constantinople—other Allies Like-Minded. Says Greece Wants: End the War,” July 30, 1922, 1:3; F.O. 424/254 no.155 Bentinck [Athens] to Curzon, August 11, 1922; Turkey Political 767.68/260 Bristol [Constantinople] to Sec

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Two days later, the Greek Government concluded that only the occupation of Constantinople would force the Kemalists to conclude peace. It requested the Allies to allow it to occupy the Turkish capital. 542 The Melbourne press quoted unnamed British diplomats who stated that the Greek request to occupy Constantinple was a sign of Greek “impatience” and that the Allies lack of unanimity had also contributed in not finding a lasting solution to the Near Eastern problem. France and Italy would not associate themselves with an Allied ultimatum compelling Turkey to accept the conference decisions of March 1922. The Age reported that the March decisions dealt with Turkey’s admission into the League of Nations, “the protection of minorities and the Dardanelles question,” whereas the Argus saw this arrangement from the point of view that “the Greeks should withdraw from Asia Minor and that sufficient territory should be restored in Thrace to enable Turkey properly to protect Constantinople.” It is contended that the Melbourne press saw the second Greek note in terms of unresolved conference decisions and Allied disunity, coupled with a Greek threat which heightened the political stakes in Anatolia. 543 The New York Times basically reiterated what appeared in the London Times, alluding, however, to the second Greek note on July 31 and arguing that the Greek advance on Constantinople raised the potential of “a terrible new outbreak of war in the Near East” and united the Allies against King Constantine. The New York Times also considered that the Greeks could have been bluffing with the whole venture, citing the Daily Herald’s Athens of State, August 2,1922. This dispatch included newspaper clippings giving the texts of the two notes handed by the Greek Foreign Minister in Athens to the Ministers of Britain, France and Italy. 542 London Times, July 31, 1922, p.8; Smith, op. cit., p.278; F.O. 424/254 no.155 Bentinck [Athens] to Curzon, August 11, 1922; Turkey Political 767.68/260 Bristol [Constantinople] to Sec of State, August 2, 1922 . 543 The Age, “GREEK AGGRESSION. THE THREAT TO TURKEY. Occupation of Constantinople. The FIRST SHOTS FIRED. Greeks cross neutral zone.” August 1, 1922, p.9; Argus, “GREEK THREATS. TROOPS ON THE MOVE. GRAVE POSITION IN THRACE. Constantinople in Danger. Allied Attempt to Avert Bloodshed.” August 1, 1922, p.7.

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correspondent who was officially informed that Greece would not advance on Constantinople without the consent of the Allies. 544 Responding to questions in the Commons on July 31, Lloyd George assured his parliamentary colleagues that Greece had been warned of “serious consequences,” and Baltazzis re-affirmed that Greece had no intention of violating the neutral zone. The press accounts portray Lloyd George exercising firm leadership in the ensuing Constantinople crisis. 545 The New York Times referred to Journal des debats and Le Temps, two major French newspapers, who commented on the Greek request. Both papers argued that Allied naval action would be sufficient to bring King Constantine to heel. The Age and Argus quoted unnamed Parisian newspapers who expressed similar sentiments to that appearing in the New York Times. At any rate, The Age’s small heading “Should Greek Ports Be Blockaded?” conveys a sense of apprehension

544

New York Times, “GREECE THREATENS PEACE IN NEAR EAST BY MOVE IN SMYRNA. Plans to Proclaim Autonomous State, Declaring Against Restoring Conquests to Turks. LANDS TROOPS AT RODOSTO. 25,000 Men With Big Guns Now At Port, Seventy Miles West of Constantinople. TCHATALJA PATROLS CLASH. British Troops Are Moved Up There—Athens, Discouraged, Fears Desperate Move.” JULY 31, 1922, 1:1&3; Smith , op. cit., p.278; F.O. 424/254 no.155 ; Turkey Political 767.68/260. 545 London Times, “GREEK ASSURANCES.,” August 1, 1922, p.10. In the same edition p.17 contains a summary of the House of Commons debate relating to the Greek attempt to occupy Constantinople; New York Times, “... LLOYD GEORGE OPTIMISTIC. Tells Parliament that Greece has Reaffirmed her undertaking not to defy the Allies. Lloyd George’s Reassuring Speech.,” August 1, 1922, 1:21; The Age, “THE GREEK ADVANCE BRITAIN ISSUES WARNING. CONSTANTINOPLE MUST NOT BE OCCUPIED. Greek Minister Gives Assurance.,” August 2, 1922, p.9; Argus, “WARNING TO GREECE. POWERS’ GRAVE VIEW. Assurances From Athens. Observance of Neutral Zone. British Cruisers for Constantinople.,” August 2, 1922, p.11; House of Commons, Parliamentary Debates, vol.157, cols.1018–19. Hereafter cited as H.C. Debs.

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whereas, “France suggests Blockade,” in the Argus indicates support for the French position. 546 In addition, all the newspapers reported of the French Government officially opposing the Greek request to occupy the Turkish capital. The French, in particular, had a very strong antipathy towards King Constantine. 547 The London Times referred to M. Peretti della Rocca, Director of Political Affairs at Quai d’Orsay, telling M. 546

New York Times, “DISCLAIMS DESIGNS ON CONSTANTINOPLE. Greek Government says it won’t order advance without Allies’ Leave. FRANCE INTERPOSES A VETO. Formally refuses to permit occupation of Constantinople—other Allies Like-Minded. Says Greece Wants: End the War,” July 30, 1922, 1:3; The Age, “Should Greek Ports Be Blockaded?,” August 2, 1922, p.9; Argus, “France suggests Blockade.,” August 2/11,1922, p.11. 547 During World War One, King Constantine was issued with an Allied ultimatum in late November 1916, to hand some mountain guns over to them. Allied marines were landed in Athens to force Constantine to comply with the Allied demand. Greek Royalist forces clashed with the Anglo-French marines and in the ensuing battle a number of Allied forces were killed. By June 1917, the French had forced Constantine to abdicate and his young son Alexander assumed the Greek throne. Alexander was to die of a monkey bite in October 1920. The French never forgot the events of December 1916 and would adopt an anti-Greek position when Constantine returned to reclaim his throne in December 1920. The press articles of 1916 and 1917 reflect this very strong anti-Constantine position. Argus, “GREECE ... FRENCH PRESS ANGRY. Let us avenge our death.” December 5, 1916, p.7 & “CONSTANTINE GOES. Abdication of Throne. SON AS SUCCESSOR...,” June 14, 1917, p.7; The Age, “GREEK TREACHERY. THE FIGHTING IN ATHENS. Allies lose 54 Killed.,” December 6, 1916, p.7 & “THRONE OF GREECE. CONSTANTINE ABDICATES.,” June 14, 1917, p.7; New York Times, “ALLIES ACCUSE KING OF GREECE. Cecil says Constantine and Cabinet are deeply involved. Attack on troops.,” December 5, 1916, 1:1–2 & “CONSTANTINE GIVES UP GREEK THRONE. ALEXANDER SECOND SON, IS NOW KING, RULER AND HIS HEIR OUSTED BY ALLIES.,” June 13, 1916, 1:1–2; London Times, “GRAVE EVENTS IN ATHENS. GREEK TREACHERY. ALLIED TROOPS FIRED UPON.,” “KING CONSTANTINE’S BROKEN WORD.,” December 4, 1916, p.8 & “CONSTANTINE TO RESIGN. ALLIED ACTION IN GREECE.,” June 13, 1917, p.6.

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Metaxas, Greek Charge d’Affaires, of France’s opposition to the Greek request. The New York Times expressed it in similar language. The tone of the Melbourne press refers to uncertainty on the part of “Paris officialdom” as to the Greeks’ commitment not to occupy Constantinople without Allied permission at a time when 25,000 men were being amassed in Thrace, and the French were decidedly suspicious of the Greeks “executing their threat to occupy Constantinople.” 548 The editorial page allowed the newspaper to reveal its opinion regarding the Greek threat to occupy Constantinople. It was on this page that it could pour out its anti-Greek aspersions. It will be noted that Smith, Busch, and Sonyel’s publications do not cite any press editorial opinion for such an important issue which had major implications for all the Allies and combatants alike. 549 On July 31, the London Times regarded the Greek action as “inadmissible” and blamed Allied indecision for the uncertainty in the Near East. The Entente had to be impartial in its dealings with both the Greeks and Turks, in order to avoid sending conflicting messages which might be interpreted by the combatants as a signal to advance on Constantinople. Only through strong leadership coupled by maintaining Allied unity and firm resolve could the Allies deal with the pro-

548

London Times, “FRENCH OPPOSITION.” July 31, 1922, p.8; New York Times, “DISCLAIMS DESIGNS ON CONSTANTINOPLE. Greek Government says it won’t order advance without Allies’ Leave. FRANCE INTERPOSES A VETO. Formally refuses to permit occupation of Constantinople—other Allies Like-Minded.,” July 30, 1922, 1:3; The Age, “GREEK AGGRESSION. THE THREAT TO TURKEY. Occupation of Constantinople. The FIRST SHOTS FIRED. Greeks cross neutral zone. A Seething Cauldron of Hate. Sir Ian Hamilton blames the politicians.” August 1, 1922, p.9; Argus, “GREEK THREATS. TROOPS ON THE MOVE. GRAVE POSITION IN THRACE. Constantinople in Danger. Allied Attempt to Avert Bloodshed. Turco-Greek conflict begun. Greeks’ serious step.,” August 1, 1922, p.7. 549 Smith, op. cit., pp.277–80 and 372–3; Busch, op. cit., pp.338–9; Turkish Diplomacy, pp.168 and 183fns.18–19.

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tagonists. The editorial concluded pungently that “in no case can the Greek designs upon Constantinople be tolerated for an instance.” 550 The Age was the only newspaper in this study which did not editorialise on the Greek action. Moreover, its editorials on July 31 and August 1 focussed on such issues as Canberra, butter control, cotton growing, and Victorian fruit growing respectively. The Argus, however, explained to its readers that Constantinople was a city always in the European spotlight and in an imminent crisis situation “that may develop alarming proportions.” Whether Greece occupied Constantinople permanently or temporarily was not at issue, but the “treacherous word” of King Constantine could not be trusted by the Allies. The Argus highlighted that Great Britain and France would face a religious backlash from their Moslem subjects “to allow the headquarters of Islam to be taken by the ‘infidel.’” It highlighted that the Treaty of Sevres could be modified to account for “altered circumstances” but “so radical departure from the text of the Treaty” that the Greek occupation would have “serious consequences that it would have is not to be thought of.” 551 The New York Times agreed with Venizelos’ assertion that it would be “national suicide” for Greece to occupy Constantinople knowing full well it would be at the mercy of Allied naval guns. With Greece diplomatically isolated, the only “spectacular possibility” for Constantine to achieve glory “would be the recovery of Constantinople.” Furthermore, it argued that both Britain and France could achieve peace “tomorrow,” if they were sincere. The Entente was hypocritical in rendering “moral advice” when Christian or Moslem could be sacrificed “in order to gain their own ends without spending their own blood and money.” The editorial ended in admonishing

550

London Times, “An Inadmissible Demand,” July 31, 1922, p.13. The Age, July 31, 1922, p.6 and August 1, p.8; Argus, August 1, 1922, p.6. The British Empire was facing political agitation and strife in Egypt and India in 1922. The Turkish Nationalists had forged close links with other Moslem nations: Afghanistan, Persia, Syria and Albania, countries where Moslem passions could be utilised to create problems for Britain, France and Greece. See Turkish Diplomacy, pp.149–53. 551

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both Constantine and Mustapha Kemal. 552 In the end, the Allies denied the Greek request and would take military countermeasures to protect the neutral zone. 553

Allied countermeasures and Greek disappointment The press reports portray the Allies enacting defensive measures which would allow them to protect Constantinople from a Greek attack. Additionally, the news accounts convey an impression that the Greeks might be feigning but that the Allies could not be complacent either. The Melbourne papers described it as “like toying with lighted matches near a powder magazine.” This meant the Allies firm resolve in dealing with the Greeks would prevent more serious problems in the Near East. 554 The London Times correspondent thought the Greek advance “involved considerable risk” but doubted “whether there was ever any intention of attempting a coup de main against the wishes of the allies.” The New York Times quoted—“military and official circles in London” as dismissing the Greek advance altogether. Rumbold, the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, thought that “My own opinion is that Greek menace to Constantinople is 50% bluff and 50% serious.” 555 However, whether the Greek threat was real or imaginary, the Allies were taking no chances. Several items have been extrapolated from the press accounts showing Allied readiness to meet such an eventuality. Firstly, all the press reports mentioned General Harington taking 552

New York Times, “GREECE AND SMYRNA.,” August 1, 1922, 1:18. The editorial of Daily Chronicle of London criticising the Allies for the new trouble in the Near East is quoted in New York Times, “Greeks Awaiting the Allied Reply,” July 31, 1922, 1:1&3. 553 London Times, “ALLIES REFUSE GREEK REQUEST.,” August 2, 1922, p.7; D.B.F.P. vol.17, pp.908–9; Smith, op. cit., p.279. 554 The Age, “Turkish Peasants panic- stricken.,” August 2, 1922, p.9; Argus, “Matches at Powder Magazine.,” August 2, 1922, p.11. 555 London Times, “NEAR EAST PERILS. CRISIS MAY RECUR. URGENT NEED FOR PEACE.,” August 15, 1922 p.7; New York Times, “... Allied Commander at Thracian Front.,” July 30, 1922, 1:3; D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.906.

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the essential military steps by instructing French forces “occupying the Chatalja sector to oppose any armed advance by the Greeks.” Besides, British units were transferred from Asiatic Turkey and a Sussex battalion was being dispatched from Malta to reinforce the Chatalja zone in European Turkey. The Italians placed 2 of their battalions under General Harington’s control. 556 Furthermore, the press accounts created an atmosphere of cooperation and an esprit de corps among the Allied Generals who were ready to meet the Greek threat. A council of war attended by Allied High Commissioners, General Harington, and Allied Generals and Admirals was held on July 30, to discuss various measures to protect Constantinople. 557 Some differences of opinion among the Allies did not appear in the press. The French High Commissioner advocated the withdrawal of Greek forces to a distance of 5 kilometres from the frontier and that the Allies take harsh measures in suppressing the Greek military mission and naval base in Constantinople. It was the latter French sugges-

556

New York Times, “Allied Commander at Thracian Front.” July 30, 1922, 1:3 & “Shots Fired by Tchatalja Patrols.” July 31, 1922, 1:3; New York Times, “SEND MORE TROOPS TO OPPOSE GREEKS. British Move Forces Across the Bosporus and Order Warships Thither...,” August 1, 1922, 1:21 & “GREEKS HAVE 70,000 ON TCHATALJA FRON. Allied Land Forces only 10.000, but Backed by more than Thirty Warships. GREEK TROOPS DRAW BACK.,” August 2, 1922, 1:19; London Times, “FRONTIER AFFRAY.,” July 31, 1922, p.8; The Age, “A Seething Cauldron of Hate. Sir Ian Hamilton blames the politicians.,” August 1, 1922, p.9; Argus, “... Constantinople in Danger. Allies attempt to avert bloodshed. Turco-Greek conflict begun. Greeks’ serious step.,” August 1, 1922, p.7. 557 New York Times, “SEND MORE TROOPS TO OPPOSE GREEKS. British Move Forces Across the Bosporus and Order Warships Thither...,” August 1, 1922, 1:21; The Age, “Turkish Peasants panic-stricken.,” August 2, 1922, p.9; Argus, “Matches at Powder Magazine.,” August 2, 1922, p.11; London Times, “CONSTANTINOPLE REASSURED. ALLIED TROOPS READY.” & “ALL QUIET ON THE GOLDEN HORN. TURKS CONVINCED.” August 2 &3, 1922, pp.7–8; D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.906; Smith , op. cit., pp.278–9.

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tion which Rumbold and Balfour played down, since it had the potential of provoking a border incident. 558 Secondly, the Allies were outnumbered by Greek forces. Various Allied troop figures of 4,000, 10,000, and 15,000 were quoted in the New York Times and 5,000 in The Age and Argus. The New York Times alluded to 70,000 Greek troops amassed on the Chatalja line. The London Times did not mention Allied troop numbers in its reports, other than an Allied communique indicating Greek contingents being increased from 2 to 4 divisions. Whatever the validity of the newspaper troop statistics, there is no doubt the Greeks had the numerical superiority in a land campaign. 559 The press did not know that the Turkish War Minister was willing to place some 2,000 Turkish troops and 20,000 reservists under General Harington’s command, if required for the defence of Constantinople. Rumbold rejected such a suggestion out of hand. 560 There is no doubt that the inclusion of Turkish troops would have boosted Allied troop numbers. The press depicted the Greeks provoking border incidents as part of its military plan to destabilise the neutral zone. The press reported of two separate frontier incidents involving the Greeks clashing with Turkish and French forces. The latter clash was falsely reported in the 558

Smith, op. cit., pp.278–9; D.B.F.P. vol.17, pp.906 and 909. New York Times, “Allied Commander at Thracian Front.,” July 30, 1922, 1:3; “SEND MORE TROOPS TO OPPOSE GREEKS. British Move Forces Across the Bosporus and Order Warships Thither ... 4,000 Allied Troops in Constantinople.,” August 1, 1922, 1:21; “GREEKS HAVE 70,000 ON TCHATALJA FRON. Allied Land Forces only 10,000, but Backed by more than Thirty Warships...,” August 2, 1922, 1:19; The Age, “Turkish Peasants panic- stricken.,” August 2, 1922, p.9; Argus, “Matches at Powder Magazine.,” August 2, 1922, p.11; London Times, “CONSTANTINOPLE REASSURED. ALLIED TROOPS READY.,” August 2, 1922, p.7. The French and Italian High Commissioners informed their Governments that Allied forces were insufficient to offer serious resistance to a Greek advance on Constantinople. See D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.902fn.2. 560 F.O. 424/254 no.131 Rumbold [Constantinople] to Earl of Balfour, August 1, 1922 & enclosure Lt. General Sir C. Harington to Allied High Commissioners, Constantinople July 29, 1922. 559

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Melbourne press which portrayed Greece in a negative light. It created a wrong impression in the readers’ mind that the Greeks had deliberately attacked the French in order to provoke an Allied response giving the Greeks the pretext to advance on to Constantinople. The London Times refuted this story whereas the New York Times ignored it. 561 In the former episode, the Melbourne press quoting the Paris correspondent of Daily Chronicle created a misleading perception in the readers psyche that the Greeks had deliberately crossed the neutral zone to fight with the Turkish forces. No casualty figures are revealed. The New York Times, quoting Associated Press merely reported of an exchange between Greek and Turkish forces which resulted in 3 being wounded on each side. The London Times reported that the GreekTurkish clash had resulted in 2 Turks being wounded. It cannot be denied that Greek troops did stray into Turkish territory; but it was purely accidental with 3 Greek soldiers being killed. 562 The British documents indicate that on August 1, General Harington had dispatched General Mombelli, the Commander of Italian forces, escorted by British and French officers to swap “maps with 561

The Age, “Turkish Peasants panic- stricken.,” August 2, 1922, p.9; Argus, “Brush with French troops.,” August 2, 1922, p.11; London Times, “FRONTIER AFFRAY.,” July 31, 1922, p.8. M. Bentinck, the acting British Minister at Athens, thought both the Greeks and French were in such an agitated state of mind that a provocation by either of them could have easily lead to some frontier incident. See F.O. 424/254–105. Bentinck [Athens] to Earl of Balfour, July 31, 1922. 562 The Age, “A Seething Cauldron of Hate. Sir Ian Hamilton blames the politicians.,” August 1, 1922, p.9; Argus, “Turco-Greek conflict begun ... Greeks’ serious step.,” August 1, 1922, p.7; London Times, “FRONTIER AFFRAY.,” July 31, 1922, p.8 & “PORTE PROTESTS TO THE POWERS...,” August 4, 1922, p.7; New York Times, “Shots Fired by Tchatalja Patrols.,” July 31, 1922, 1:3. On August 8, Jefferson Caffery informed the State Department of a communique issued by the Greek War Ministry regarding the Greek-Turkish troops clash on the Turkish frontier. The Greeks did acknowledge traversing accidentally on to Turkish territory but accused the Turks of deliberately killing 3 Greek soldiers. M. Bentinck conveyed the same information to Lord Balfour in London. See Turkey Political. 767.68/285 Caffery [Athens] to Sec. of State, August 8, 1922; D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.911fn.2.

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Greek corps’ commander in order to ensure that frontier is clearly defined and to obtain an understanding that both sides shall be held back to a fixed distance and that patrols and aircraft shall not cross the line.” Baltazzis thought it prudent to withdraw the Greek forces away from the frontier. 563 With the easing of the crisis, the Greeks were disappointed at the Allies refusing them permission to occupy Constantinople. The New York Times and Melbourne press accounts report of a Greek grievance against the Allied note of July 31 depriving it of occupying Constantinople which would have brought the war to an end. Both newspaper stories give an underlying idea that the Greeks were upset with the Allies. The London Times did not report anything of the Greek objection probably dismissing it as irrelevant. Subsequently the Allies had warned Greece of the serious consequences of attacking the Turkish

563

D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.910fns.2–11. On August 2, M. Bentinck informed Balfour that that the Greek War Minister responding to General Harington’s telegram had issued strict orders to the Greek Commanding Officer. These involved: “1. To take immediate steps to prevent every incident between troops; 2. To punish severely those responsible for incident; 3. To arrange dispositions of troops so as to prevent any repetition of such incidents.” See D.B.F.P. vol.17, pp.910–11. Likewise the Greek categorically denied that “reconnaissance was ever ordered or executed by cavalry or aeroplanes as stated. No cavalry crossed frontier. Severe orders have again been issued that under no pretext is anyone to cross frontier...” See D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.911fn.2 and Turkey Political 767.68/285. There are 2 small untitled newspaper reports in the New York Times and London Times which provide the briefest of detail regarding General Mombelli’s parley with General Vlahopoulos, the Commander of Greek forces in Thrace, to establish a demarcation line between Greek and Allied troops in order to avoid frontier incidents. An official communique issued by Allied Headquarters published in the London Times on August 12 included more detail than those of August 4. See New York Times, August 5, 1922, 1:3 and London Times, August 4, 1922, p.7 & “CHATALJA SETTLEMENT.,” August 12, 1922, p.7.

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capital. 564 This Greek complaint was presented in a third note on August 3, to Allied diplomats in Athens, in which Baltazzis stated that “the entire responsibility for the continuance of the war falls upon the Allied powers.” It raised, further, concern that the Allied refusal was tantamount to producing “fresh calamities for the Christians of Asia Minor.” 565 Next, the press recounted on the importance of Allied naval power being prepared as a part of the Allied strategy to meet the Greek threat. It was in this area that the Allies had a strategic advantage over the Greeks. Compared to the New York Times and London Times, the Melbourne papers hardly mentioned the British naval build up. It does not mean that the Melbourne press was oblivious to such a development. The New York Times and London Times gave prominence to British naval power. Their news accounts stated that the geographic proximity of the British navy, on “the northern shore of Sea of Marmora from Silivri to Bojado” was in a position to easily bombard the entire wing of the Greek army if it advanced on to Constantinople. Disclosure of British naval ship numbers was designed to impress the readers of the awesome strength of British naval power. For example, the New York Times alluded to battle cruisers with long range guns, six dreadnoughts and two squadrons of light cruisers taking positions. 566 It was the London Times article of August 1 which furnished graphic detail of the location of the British navy spread from Constantinople, Smyrna, Alexandria, and Gilbratar and listed the ships’ names. This article was intended to show British naval authorities taking ap564

New York Times, August 5, 1922, 1:3; Argus, “Greek Complaint,” August 7, 1922, p.7; The Age, “BELLIGERENT GREECE. STILL STRAINING AT LEASH. “Allies Embarrass Situation.” August 7, 1922, p.9. 565 Turkey Political 767.68/286 Caffery [Athens] to Sec of State, August 8,1922; F.O. 424/254.155 Bentinck [Athens] to Curzon, August 11, 1922. 566 New York Times, “GREEKS HAVE 70,000 ON TCHATALJA FRON. Allied Land Forces only 10,000, but Backed by more than Thirty Warships.,” August 2, 1922, 1:19; London Times, “PORTE PROTESTS TO THE POWERS. IONIAN PROCLAMATION NULL AND VOID.” August 4 1922, p.7.

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propriate measures to meet the Greek threat. Admiral Sir Osmond Brock, Commander-in-Chief of the British Mediterranean fleet, was mentioned as commanding the British fleet near Constantinople. 567 All the newspapers further reported of Rear Admiral Sir Reginald Tyrwhitt commanding the third light squadron taking provisions at Malta which was bound for Constantinople. 568 However, all the newspapers were unaware of the Allied Admirals presenting a joint note on August 2 to the Allied High Commissioners. In that note, they remarked that the Greek Government should be informed immediately that Greek ships be prohibited in using the Bosphorus or waters adjacent to the neutral zone. Even the Dardanelles should have been off limits to the Greek navy. They proposed that “any infringement of these orders will be repressed by force.” 569 Balfour believed that “Naval authorities at Constantinople and in the Mediterranean should be warned that they should quietly make what preparations they can to meet any emergency that may arise.” 570 To

567

London Times, “BRITISH FLEET AT HAND. Greeks reassure Allies.,” August 1, 1922, p.10. It should be noted that Britain possessed the naval force to block the Straits and Piraeus and to inflict long term damage to Greece. See Smith, op. cit., p.280. 568 New York Times, “SEND MORE TROOPS TO OPPOSE GREEKS. British Move Forces Across the Bosporus and Order Warships Thither. Greek Government Conciliatory.,” August 1, 1922,1:21; Argus, “WARNING TO GREECE. POWERS’ GRAVE VIEW. ... British Cruisers for Constantinople.,” August 2, 1922, p.11; London Times, “BRITISH FLEET AT HAND...,” August 1, 1922, p.10. According to a Reuter’s dispatch, the departure of the third light cruiser squadron with the 2nd Battalion of the Sussex regiment on board had been cancelled. See London Times, “Calming Down Malta.,” August 2, 1922, p.7. 569 F.O. 424/254.118. Rumbold [Constantinople] to Earl of Balfour. August 2, 1922; D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.911. 570 D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.912. A British War Office letter of July 26 referred to the “Army Council [requesting] the concurrence of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty ... in informing General Harington that he may rely upon the full support from the Naval Commander-in-Chief if the Greeks make move across the neutral line...” See D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.912fn.1.

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complicate matters, the Greeks declared Smyrna an autonomous region. 2b) The autonomy of Smyrna The idea of a separatist Greek state in Anatolia, instigated by Venizelist military officers, had its origins with the return of King Constantine to the Greek throne in December 1920. 571 This “unofficial” movement, also known as the Committee of National Defence (Amyna), revealed the sharp divisions existing in Greek society between the Venizelists and Royalists. 572 Without the support of the Royalist administration in Athens, its chance for survival was negligible. The declaration of autonomy for Smyrna in July 1922 was the second plank in the Greek strategy, to force the Entente to resolve the Near Eastern question. It was part of an overall plan by the Greek Government to commence a withdrawal of its army from Asia Minor, which would leave the local population to become responsible for its own administration and defence. There is no doubt that the Allies were displeased, and the Turks protested over the action of the Greek Government in proclaiming autonomy in Smyrna. The New York Times and London Times devoted more news space than their Melbourne counterparts to this issue. After all, the Smyrna region involved important British, French and American economic and financial interests. 573

571

A plebiscite staged on December 5, 1920 allowed Greek voters to vote for the return of Ex-King Constantine to the Greek throne. The Entente adopted an anti-Greek position thereafter in the Greek-Turkish conflict. 572 The term Amyna and the Committee of National Defence will be used interchangeably. 573 This will be covered in greater detail below in the Lloyd George speech of August 4, 1922 section.

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A Greek “Mikrasiatic” State 574 The press reports highlight the schism (dichasmos) existing in Greek society between Venizelists and Royalists and rumours of a Venizelist coup being organised in the Greek army. In late November 1920, some 150–250 Venizelist officers who had fled or had resigned their commissions in the Greek army, went to Constantinople to establish the Amyna “movement.” 575 Many Venizelists were replaced by Royalist appointees. This point was highlighted in both the Melbourne press and New York Times who reported of ex-Royalist officers being reinstated and having their salaries reimbursed. The London Times remained silent on this matter. 576 A report appearing in the Melbourne press on December 21, mentioned that General Zimbrakakis, an ardent Venizelist officer, along with 60 supporters had organised “a separatist coup in Thrace” which collapsed due to “the soldiers [turning] against them compelling them to flee to Constantinople.” This newspaper story can be substantiated to some extent by the British documents. 577 574

I have drawn heavily on Smith’s book The Ionian Vision and Dr. V. Solomonidis’, Greece in Asia Minor: The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin 1919–22, PhD Thesis, University of London, 1984 to explain the origins of the Committee of National Defence (Amyna) in its quest to establish a separatist Greek state in Asia Minor. 575 Smith, op. cit., pp.175–6 and 237–8; Solomonidis, op. cit., p.226. There was a group of irreconcilables Venizelists officers who disassociated themselves from the new regime. These included: Generals Paraskevopoulos, Iannou, and Othonaios; and Colonels Pangalos, Kondylis and Zafiriou just to name a few. 576 The Age, “Constantine’s Return. The Allies Note to Greece.,” December 6, 1920, p.7; Argus, “ALLIES AND GREECE... Position of Germanophiles.,” December 6, 1920, p.7 ; New York Times, “FRANCE MAY RELENT TOWARD GREEK KING.,” December 2,1920, 1:15; S. Victor Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio,1977, p.178; Smith, op. cit., pp.172–4. 577 The Age, “Enthusiasm in Athens. Separatist Coup Attempted.,” December 21, 1920, p.5; Argus, “Constantine Returns. Venizelist Coup Fails.,” December 21, 1920, p.7. On December 10, 1920 Lord Granville, the British Minister at Athens, informed Curzon that Venizelist officers were mistaken

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The New York Times and London Times, on the other hand, did not report on the news item above. 578 The former reported on November 18, 1920 of a rumour of the Greek army possibly declaring a Republic at Smyrna and also on January 8, 1921 of Royalist officers replacing Venizelists whose loyalty was doubted due to movements operating in Thrace and Constantinople. 579 Two days before the Greek general election of November 14, 1920, the latter newspaper reported of “ambitious officers” possibly taking advantage in the changing leadership of State to establish “‘National Movements’ of the type to which Turkey has unhappily become accustomed.” There were Venizelist officers with republican sympathies. The London Times dubbed them “hotheads.” There is no doubt the newspapers were aware of some Venizelist plot aimed at overthrowing the Constantinist that the Allies would support a “movement” aimed against Constantinist Greece. The former alluded to the possibility of reprisals against Venizelists in Athens. Granville urged that the British High Commissioner or Military authorities at Constantinople should “urge prudence and patience on Greek exofficers there and especially General Emanuel Zimbrakakis who was one of the leaders.,” see D.B.F.P. vol.12, p.542. 578 See New York Times and London Times, December 1920, passim. 579 New York Times, “EX KING OF GREECE WANTS PLEBISCITE TO DECIDE HIS CLAIM... Rumor that Smyrna Army May Declare a Republic.,” November 18, 1920, 1:10 & “MORE VENIZELISTS OUSTED. Eighteen Constantinist Generals and 200 Colonels in Their Places.,” January 8, 1921, 1:7. On November 18, 1920 the London Times reported that the new Greek Government was about to cancel the army vote in Thrace and Smyrna. This was due to the Venizelist Government preventing the Royalists in carrying out their political campaign and censoring their press. It seems to give some credence to the New York Times account of the same day. See London Times, “ARMY STILL VENIZELIST. VENIZELOS PREVENTS COUP D’ETAT.,” November 18, 1920, p.12. The Melbourne press indicated that the army vote would be predominately Venizelist and Rallis, the new Greek Premier, would demobilise the army. However, such a decision was difficult due to the “anarchic conditions of the new provinces in Asia Minor.” See The Age, “THE THRONE OF GREECE.” & “POLITICS IN GREECE.,” November 19 and 20,1920, pp.7&13; Argus , “DEFEAT OF VENIZELOS.” & “THRONE OF GREECE.,” November 19 and 20, 1920, pp.7&21.

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regime and to eventually regain control of the Greek army. 580 It might be argued the Melbourne press was saddened at the failure of the Venizelist coup in Thrace. Moreover, the Argus editorial of December 23 was skeptical of Constantine’s intentions of wanting to improve Greece’s relations with the Entente and Serbia. The editorial concluded that “The shadow of Venizelos still falls across the path of Constantine.” For the Argus a Venizelist Greece was a proven and trusted friend of the Entente compared to a distrusted Constantinist regime. 581 The Amyna “movement” having no formal organisation was split into a military and civilian arm. The latter included the prominent Greek bourgeoisie of Constantinople society: doctors, lawyers, and wealthy merchants and the Patriarchate who were staunchly Venizelist in sympathy. 582 Alexis Alexandris identifies three members of Amyna: Constantine Spanoudis, a journalist, T. K. Stavridis, and Leonidas Iasonidis who visited Venizelos at Nice on December 29. In fact, on December 21, the New York Times published a cable it had received from the Committee of Unredeemed Greeks at Constantinople. This communication strongly espoused the Venizelist cause and supported 580

London Times, “GREEK ELECTION PRECAUTIONS. REPUBLICAN PROSPECTS.,” November 12, 1920, p.11; London Times, “ARMY STILL VENIZELIST. VENIZELOS PREVENTS COUP D’ETAT.,” November 18, 1920, p.12. For a discussion of republicanism in the Greek army, see S. Victor Papacosma, “The Military in Greek Politics” in John T. A. Koumoulides (Ed) Greece in Transition, Zeno Publishers, London, 1977, pp.178–81. On November 19, the London Times reported that General Paraskevopoulos, the Venizelist Commander -in- Chief of the Greek Army in Asia Minor 1919–20, issued a directive to the Greek army on the Smyrna front, to obey the instructions of the new Greek administration. The New York Times quoting a brief Havas message from Athens indicated that Paraskevopoulos’ instruction must have had a soothing effect on the Greek army. See London Times, “M. VENIZELOS’S FAREWELL. NEW GREEK CABINET.,” November 19, 1920, p.9; New York Times, November 26, 1920, 1:15. Smith, op. cit., pp.174–5. The Greek army faced some problems on the Smyrna front, see D.B.F.P. vol.13, pp.180–82. 581 Argus, December 23, 1920, p.6. 582 Smith, op. cit., p.238; Solomonidis, op. cit., p.226.

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the Entente. They distrusted Constantine whom they believed would abandon Venizelos’ foreign policy and endanger Greater Greece. The same story was covered very briefly in the “Imperial and Foreign News” column of the London Times. However, the Melbourne press did not cover this story at all. 583 The Patriarchate was an important symbol and institution in rallying Greek opinion. All the newspapers reported of the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople arguing against the restoration of Constantine, although some minor differences emerge as to how the Patriarchal decision was arrived at. The New York Times reported that “the Greek Patriarch called the Holy Synod and Lay Council into extraordinary session” while the London Times indicated that “five hundred representatives of various Greek organisations in Constantinople ... unanimously requested the Acting Patriarch, Mgr. Dorotheos, to excommunicate King Constantine.” The Melbourne press does not name the Greek groups involved in the decision making process. Maybe, it regarded this as unimportant and purely an internal Greek problem. Moreover, the Melbourne press focussed on the anxiety of neighboring Yugoslavia and Bulgaria concerned about Constantinist Greece controlling vital Aegean Sea communications. 584 From a strategic standpoint, the Argus argued that “British interests and Italian interests in the Adriatic (were) too important to risk interference by an unfriendly Greece with control of communications through the Aegean Sea.” 585 583

New York Times, “CALLS CONSTANTINE KING OF MINORITY. Committee of Unredeemed Greeks Says Majority of the Nation Favors Venizelos.,” December 21, 1920, 1:17; London Times, December 21, 1920, p.9; Alexis Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations 1918–74, Center for Asia Minor Studies, Athens, 1983, p.70 and fn.10. 584 The Age, “THE ALLIES AND GREECE.....The Danger of Secession.,” December 9, 1920; Argus, “CONSTANTINE EXPLAINS... Risks Return Involves. Greece May Lose Her Gains.,” December 9, 1920, p.7; London Times, “OTTOMAN GREEKS AGAINST KING CONSTANTINE.,” & “PATRIARCH PROTESTS AGAINST RESTORATION,” December 8&11, 1920, pp.9&11; New York Times, “EX KING TO SAIL FOR GREECE FRIDAY... TALK OF SECESSION HEARD.,” December 7, 1920, 1:17. 585 Argus, December 9, 1920, p.6.

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There were rumours of secession in the press too. The Melbourne press reported of Crete, Ionia, and several unnamed islands seceding, whereas New York Times mentioned “an independent Byzantium including Thrace, Smyrna and Macedonia coming into existence.” The London Times said nothing of secession in its reporting. Some of these geographic areas were Venizelist strongholds. 586 The New York Times editorial of December 11 thought it not “impossible that some effort might be made to set up here another centre of independent Hellenism.” For Constantinopolitan Greeks, the realisation of such a dream was certainly a difficult enterprise, considering the Turkish capital was under Allied occupation and Turkish nationalism was reviving. The Argus editorial of December 9, argued that the future of Greater Greece was under threat with the return of King Constantine. 587 The sharp divisions permeating Greek society were highlighted in the press accounts. 588 The idea of separatist movements would disappear off the pages of the press until April 1922. Colonel Kondylis and Pericles Argyropoulos, a Liberal politician, were the main instigators of the Constantinople Amyna. Prior to the 1921 summer offensive, Kondylis planned a Venizelist coup in the Greek army which failed to materialise in the end. 589 With the Greek army failing to occupy Angora (Ankara) in September 1921, a Mikrasiatic Amyna, was established in Smyrna in October 1921 involving the 586

The Age, “THE ALLIES AND GREECE.....The Danger of Secession.,” December 9, 1920; London Times, “OTTOMAN GREEKS AGAINST KING CONSTANTINE.,” December 11, 1920, p.9; New York Times, “EX KING TO SAIL FOR GREECE FRIDAY... TALK OF SECESSION HEARD.,” December 7, 1920, 1:17; Smith, op. cit., p.174. 587 New York Times, “CONSTANTINOPLE [Editorial],” December 11, 1920, 1:12; Argus, December 9, 1920, p.6. 588 For example New York Times, “CONSTANTINE SAILS BOUND FOR HOME ... CHURCH SCHISM IMPENDING. Premier Rhallis Threatens an open rupture with the Patriarch of Constantinople.,” December 17, 1920, 1:19. 589 Smith, op. cit., p.238. The military wing of Amyna (Committee of National Defence) was housed and financed by wealthy Greeks of Constantinople.

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bourgeoisie of that city. Like their Constantinople counterparts, they believed the Greek government was about to evacuate its army from Smyrna, leaving the Christians to their own fate. They wanted to create an independent Greek entity and defend it with a volunteer army. 590 The press reports of October 1921 convey a sense of desperation on the part of the Greek Government in seeking Allied mediation to end the Greek-Turkish conflict. Therefore, the suspicions of Amyna were not unjustified under the circumstances with Gounaris and Baltazzis visiting London, Paris, and Rome. 591 Amyna sought the support of Sterghiadis and General Papoulas, the Commander-in-Chief of the Greek army in Asia Minor, to give their “movement” some legitimacy in their quest to establish a separatist state in late 1921. Without the endorsement of these two prominent individuals, the survival of Amyna was questionable. Sterghiadis dismissed Amyna’s approaches out of hand. He believed an autonomous Asia Minor would not enjoy the financial support of the Greek Government and was bound to create divisions within the Greek army. Besides, Sterghiadis’ authoritarian demeanour would have found Amyna an aggravation and a threat to his dictatorial rule in Smyrna. Sterghiadis enjoyed the support of the Greek Government. Moreover, he contended that the Greek lines could not be held in Anatolia. 592 In late December 1921, Dr. Siotis, a prominent member of the Constantinople Amyna, approached Papoulas seeking his support. The 590

Solomonidis, op. cit., p.227; Smith, op. cit., pp.238–9. The Age, “GREEK MISSION TO LONDON. Munitions or Mediation Sought.,” October 13, 1921, p.7; Argus, “GREECE DESIRES PEACE. British Mediation Sought.” & “GREEKS IN ASIA MINOR. Entente with Powers Sought.,” October 13 &18, 1921, p.7; London Times, “GREEK NEGOTIATION WITH ENTENTE” & “GREEK RESORT TO DIPLOMACY. M. GOUNARIS LEAVING FOR PARIS.,” October 28&17, 1921, pp.9 and10; New York Times, “VOTES CONFIDENCE IN GREEK GOVERNMENT. National Assembly Does So in the Absence of Participation by Venizelists.,” & “GREEK PREMIER MEETS SETBACK IN FRANCE. Sought Moral Support in War on Turks and Recognition for Constantine.,” October 17 and 27, 1921, 1:17& 1; 8; Busch op. cit., pp.321–3; Smith, op. cit., pp.41–2. 592 Smith, op. cit., pp.248–9; Solomonidis, op. cit., p.228. 591

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latter indicated that he could not act without the authority of the Greek Government, although, Papoulas did seem interested. Contact with Papoulas was resumed in early February 1922, when Siotis visiting Smyrna brought with him a long memorandum prepared by the Constantinople Amyna for Papoulas to read. This memorandum mentioned that Venizelos should represent the new “Mikrasiatic State” in London and Paris. 593 Wishing to keep his options open, Papoulas dispatched Siotis and Col. Sarayannis of his staff to approach the Athens government. The Greek Government was disinterested in an “unofficial organisation” and exhorted all Greeks wishing to contribute to the struggle either to enlist or donate money. 594 Amyna approached Venizelos for his advice in March. His recommendations involved three elements. Firstly, the establishment of a provisional administration and that the appeal to the Greek army to aid in the struggle should be delayed until the time “when old Greece recalled the Greek functionaries and the army.” Secondly, the new regime should launch its own State Bank by issuing its own bank notes. Laying its hands on the income of the Ottoman Public Debt and the Regie des tabacs (central administration office-state in charge of tobacco products under French control) was bound to affect important Allied interests. Finally, on the question of political leadership, Venizelos endorsed Sterghiadis as the most appropriate individual to head the new state. Otherwise, it would be a lost cause. Sterghiadis 593

Solomonidis, op. cit., p.229; Smith, op. cit., pp.249 and 252–3. In the same memorandum, a six point programme of action was also added. It included: “1. A mass meeting in Smyrna at which Papoulas would be given a vote of confidence and invested with the powers to proceed with the establishment of the “Ionian State.” 2. Formation by Papoulas of a government of his choice. 3. Announcement to the army of the formation of a government, and the invitation to the army to swear an appropriate oath, should this be deemed necessary. 4. Announcement to the Greek government of the formation of the new regime and the reasons which led to it. 5. Announcement to the Powers and a request for their support. 6. An invitation to the Greek communities of Europe, America, Egypt, Rumania..., to support the new state ‘with their money and their blood.’” See Smith, op. cit., p.253. 594 Solomonidis, op. cit., p.229; Smith, op. cit., p.254.

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was experienced in dealing with issues of diplomacy, civil administration, and had good rapport with the Turks. 595 With the conclusion of the Allied Conference on 22–26 March 1922, the Greeks had intimated their acceptance of the armistice, which would have led to an eventual evacuation of their army from Asia Minor and Smyrna reverting back to Turkish rule. 596 There were Greeks in Smyrna who were opposed to the Allied proposals. The London Times is the only newspaper in this study that clearly identifies an Amyna movement or League of National Defence operating in Smyrna. It published details of this on April 6, 20, and 25. The editorial of April 6 clearly shows that this movement “deserves the most careful attention” meaning the London Times was afraid that such an organisation could jeopardise peace in the entire Near East. The press accounts indicate that Smyrniote Greeks were prepared to resist the Allied proposals and to create a separatist State in Asia Minor called the “Government of Ionia.” On April 25, London Times reported that differences between Royalists and Venizelists was undermining the process of achieving separatism. The London Times reports lend some credence to the meeting between Greek Government and Amyna officials. 597 On March 31, Gounaris and Theotokis met with Papoulas and Siotis in Athens. Gounaris told them that an Ionian state had no prospect of surviving without the assistance of Athens and rejected “their diplomatic, economic and strategic pretensions.” The Greek Govern595

Smith, op. cit., pp.259–60; Solomonidis, op. cit., p.231. Information on Regie des Tabacs was provided by Embassy of France in a letter dated September 6, 1996 to the author. 596 The text of the Allied proposals offered to the belligerents in Paris on 26 March 1922 is cited in D.B.F.P. vol.17, Annex 1 to no. 568, pp.749–54. 597 London Times, “ANATOLIA’S PLIGHT. Allied Control Essential.” & “Peace in the Near East.,” April 6, 1922, pp.8&13; “Imperial and Foreign News” column April 20, p.11; “GREEK ARMY THREAT. ATHENS DEFIED. WARNING TO THE KING.,” April 25, p.12; Solomonidis, op. cit., p.233. Sir Harry Lamb, the British Consul at Smyrna, informed Rumbold that a “committee for organising the people of Asia Minor” was openly operating in Smyrna, see D.B.F.P. vol.17, pp.652–3.

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ment would withdraw its army, under the cover of a general peace settlement which included guarantees for minorities. Amyna was overly optimistic with its troop estimates of 45,000 men, which only existed on paper. 598 Returning to Smyrna, a letter was waiting for Papoulas indicating Amyna’s negotiations with Venizelos. It roused Papoulas to action with promising reports of British support. Sir John Stavridi, the exGreek Consul in London 1903–20 and a personal friend of Lloyd George, with Harold Nicolson in attendance, telephoned General Frantzis, a member of Amyna, who was leaving London. Frantzis was to tell Papoulas and the Patriarchate that the British Government strongly disapproved of Amyna. 599 Papoulas never welcomed Venizelos’ support and finally realised that he had been duped by Amyna. The real intentions of the “movement” aimed against the Greek Government were finally exposed in Papoulas’ own mind. On April 28, the London Times reported of Papoulas’ fallout with Amyna in which he stated that “I declare that I cannot be influenced by patriotic leagues, but faithful to the King, will implicitly obey orders from Athens.” With his subsequent resignation in May 1922, the future of the “movement” looked doubtful. To compound Amyna’s problems, Sterghiadis was given a free hand by the Greek Government to deal with them as he saw fit. 600 598

Smith, op. cit., p.262; Solomonidis, op. cit., p.230. Turkey Political 767.68/194 Caffery (Athens) to Sec of State, Washington D.C., 30 March 1922. In this communication, Caffery reported rumours of a movement being organised in Asia Minor, after the Greek army evacuated Smyrna. The Greek Foreign Minister remarked that this “movement” would not be given “any encouragement and counted on U.S. Government becoming involved in settling the entire Near Eastern question. Caffery was concerned that a Greek withdrawal might lead to an exodus of refugees into Greece.” 599 Smith, op. cit., pp.263–4; Solomonidis, op. cit., p.232. 600 Smith, op. cit., pp.264–5; Solomonidis, op. cit., p.233; London Times, “LOYAL TO ATHENS. GREEK COMMANDER’S SMYRNA PROCLAMATION.,” April 28, 1922, p.13. In a report titled The Allied Forces of Occupation (Turkey). British Military authorities at Constantinople, believed

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In the summer of 1922, Venizelos made an effort to moderate Sterghiadis’ hostility towards Amyna. He dispatched two of his supporters G. Exindaris and D. Lambrakis to visit Sterghiadis. Nothing emerged from the two meetings. Exindaris reported that the heavy strain of administration had made Sterghiadis a very nervous person and “that the confidence and respect of the liberals for him had been succeeded by animosity and mistrust.” In the end, the Amyna “movement” collapsed. 601 On June 28, 1922 Sterghiadis and Hadjianestis came to Athens to confer with the Government regarding the situation in Anatolia. Lindley informed Balfour that the ground was being prepared “to persuade the Greek public that Asia Minor is of secondary importance from the national point of view and that the future of Greece lies in Europe.” Equally Greek press reports were highlighting the importance of Macedonia, Epirus, and Thrace to national security. The Greek public was being primed for an eventual troop withdrawal from Asia Minor. 602 On July 8, Lindley reported of a conversation he had with Sterghiadis. The Greek High Commissioner recommended that the Powers should establish an autonomous zone under the Sultan’s sovereignty with sufficient territory to be self-supporting. A gendarmerie and administration would be created from the local population and 30,000 Greek conscripts of Asia Minor, together with 50,000 Greek troops would defend the region against Kemal during the transition phase. It was important for the Powers to act now, while it still had

that the resignation of General Papoulas, was linked to the Greek Government, attempting to assert its authority over the military. They believed that elements within the Greek army had become too greatly influenced by Mikrasiatic Amyna. See F.O. 424/254 enclosure in no.68, “The Allied Forces of Occupation (Turkey),” General Headquarters, Constantinople, July 10, 1922. 601 Smith, op. cit., pp.271–2. 602 Turkey Political 767.68/216 Caffery (Athens) to Sec of State, Washington D.C., June 28, 1922; D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.874. Lindley’s dispatch, also, referred to Greek press articles reporting of Bulgarian and Albanian guerrilla activity in Macedonia and Epirus.

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time. 603 On July 14, Baltazzis informed Lindley that the Smyrna zone was to be reorganised allowing the local population a greater responsibility in the administration of the territory. The former expressed the desire “that the Administration thus established would be made permanent in the final (peace) settlement.” 604 Lindley believed that it was to Britain’s advantage “to get [the] public accustomed to this fact by the erection of a permanent autonomous Administration by the Greeks.” He continued that “It can be represented to Turkish opinion as a concession when this Administration has been taken out of Greek hands and transferred to those of the Allies...” Lindley was concerned as to how the idea of an autonomous zone could be reconciled with the March 22–26 Allied proposals. 605 Sterghiadis was soon to proclaim officially the autonomy of Smyrna on July 30, 1922.

The proclamation of autonomy and Allied and Turkish reactions The New York Times and London Times’ version of events surrounding the autonomy of Smyrna was more detailed than the Melbourne press. Sterghiadis announced two proclamations to the population of Smyrna: one in the name of the Greek High Commission and the other by the Greek Government. Both decrees had been prepared and authorised by the Greek Government. The Greek Government had no intention of handing Smyrna back to the Turks. All the newspapers

603

Smith, op. cit., p.280; F.O. 424/254 no.18 Lindley (Athens) to Balfour, July 8, 1922. 604 F.O. 424/254. no.67 Lindley (Athens) to Balfour, July 14, 1922. Lindley remarked that while Greeks and Armenians had been killed by the Kemalists, it was clear that the Christian population in the Smyrna zone would “either fight or leave the district en masse if a Turkish Administration is reinstalled.” Whatever the outcome, British prestige was bound to suffer in the Near East. The term “autonomy” might be avoided or even disguised but it would be “impossible to readmit a Turkish Administration and Turkish forces into the zone.” 605 ibid.

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have concentrated on the one promulgated in the name of the High Commission. This will be referred to as Sterghiadis’ proclamation. 606 Both Melbourne papers allotted several lines on August 1 relating to Sterghiadis’ proclamation of autonomy at Smyrna. The wording was identical in both news reports. Some minor differences emerge as to how this news item was presented to the readership of both newspapers. The Age included it among other news whereas the Argus used a small heading “Greeks serious step,” to inform its readers that the Greek action was fraught with danger. Both press accounts regarded the Greek declaration as a “grave step” which aimed at presenting the Allies “with a ‘fait accompli’ and settle the vexed question of the Greek military evacuation of Smyrna.” The Melbourne press alluded that the new self-governing state would have a charter containing full religious and political freedom for Moslems and Christians. 607 The word “charter” is not written down in either Sterghiadis’ or the Greek Government’s proclamations. Nonetheless, the Greek Government’s decree assured equality to all citizens irrespective of race and religion to participate in the public life of the new state. Such a measure would have served to maintain racial and religious harmony among Christians and Moslems living in autonomous Smyrna. 608 This was part of the Greek Government’s strategy to 606

The text of these two official proclamations is cited in National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C., Records of the Department of State relating to internal affairs of Greece 1910–29. 868.01/122 Horton [Smyrna] to Sec. of State July 31, 1922 with enclosures 1 “Proclamation of the Greek High Commission at Smyrna issued by Aristidis Sterghiadis 30 July 1922 and official text of the decision of the Greek Government Ministerial Council. P. Protopapadakis and Ministers in English. Enclosure 2 The Greek version of the proclamation ... Hereafter cited as Greece Internal. The Greek texts are cited in Michael Rodas, Greece in Asia Minor (H Ellada sth Mikran Asia), Kleisiouni, Athens, 1950, pp.315–7. The translation of Rodas’ book is by Stavros Stavridis. 607 The Age, “A Seething Cauldron of Hate. Sir Ian Hamilton.,” August 1, 1922, p.9 ; Argus, “Greeks’ serious step.,” August 1, 1922, p.7; Greece Internal. 868.01/122 enclosure 1. 608 Greece Internal 868.01/122 enclosures 1&2; Rodas, op. cit., pp.315–6.

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prepare the local Smyrniotes for their own self-government. There is an underlying sense of annoyance, on the part of the Melbourne press, in seeing Greece challenging the authority of the Allies and delivering an ultimatum to them. The New York Times and London Times reported on the Smyrna announcement on July 31, August 1 and 2, 1922 respectively. The latter newspaper reported on August 1 and 2 that Sterghiadis’ proclamation had been favorably received by all the local inhabitants irrespective of race or religion. In particular, it mentioned the Turkish Mayor of the town of Chassan Pasha and representatives of the Greek, Armenian, Jewish, and Circassians communities calling upon Sterghiadis “to express their joy and gratitude.” But on August 2, the New York Times reported that the Greeks were the only ones to exhibit “general satisfaction and enthusiasm” for Ionian self-government who were the preponderant element in Smyrna. The London Times noted the importance of the Caliph in its report. Sterghiadis declared that the Sultan’s authority as Caliph and his prestige would remain intact throughout the Islamic world. He described “the Angora government as insurgents against the Sultan and apostates against the Caliph.” The Greek army would be responsible for the defence of Ionia. Sterghiadis realised that the ultimate success or failure of the new state depended on maintaining racial harmony among the different nationalities. It was a clever tactic in keeping the Sultan’s title as Caliph among the local Moslem population to ensure their loyalty to the new state and that they were not deprived of their basic religious rights. It could be argued that Sterghiadis recognised or even conceded that the Sultan was the legitimate ruler of Turkey and not the Turkish nationalists headed by Mustapha Kemal Pasha. 609 609

London Times, “THE NEW STATUS OF IONIA. GREECE AND THE CALIPH.,” August 1, 1922, p.9 & “CONSTANTINOPLE REASSURED. ALLIED TROOPS READY.,” August 2, 1922, p.7; New York Times, “self-government in Thrace?,” August 2, 1922, 1:19; Smith, op. cit., p.281. It is interesting that the London Times Near East correspondent on August 15 stated that Sterghiadis did not make “promises lightly that the prerogatives of caliph of Islam [would] be safer in autonomous Ionia than they

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The idea that Sterghiadis’ proclamation was received with “joy and enthusiasm” by all the communities as noted in the London Times is incorrect. In fact, the New York Times stated that the proclamation “was greeted with subdued resentment and contempt by the Turks” who formed the largest element “of the inland population.” The Turks believed that the loss of Smyrna would have a major impact on the economic life of the Turkish Empire. Furthermore, the Greek High Commission censored the press of Smyrna. It was Greek propaganda aimed at showing the Entente and the Sultan’s Government that the local communities supported the proclamation of autonomy. 610 However, George Horton, the US Consul in Smyrna, and Michael Rodas, the Press Counsellor of the Greek High Commission in Smyrna, present us with personal assessments of the prevailing mood in Smyrna. Both of them mentioned that the Greeks had shown little enthusiasm for the proclamations and also indifference by people in the interior. Rodas tells us that some 3,000 people had gathered outside the Greek High Commission to hear Sterghiadis’ decree. Most of these were civil servants whose nationality was not mentioned. On the hand very few Greeks, Armenians and Turks attended to hear the proclamations. 611

[would be] in Nationalists Turkey...” He suggested that “Greece might eventually agree to hand over Ionia under certain guarantees to the government of Constantinople. It does not seem possible that she will ever consent unless militarily defeated to surrender it to Kemalist government...” See London Times, “NEAR EAST PERILS. CRISIS MAY RECUR. URGENT NEED FOR PEACE.,” August 15, 1922, p.7. 610 New York Times, “self-government in Thrace?,” August 2, 1922, 1:19; Michael Rodas, op. cit., pp.85–7 and 136–9. These pages describe the imposition of press censorship in Smyrna in 1919. Sterghiadis ensured the local Greek press did not print inflammatory news articles which would incite Turkish passions. 611 Greece Internal. 868.01/122; Rodas, op. cit., p314. It is interesting that the London Times Smyrna correspondent report of August 11 picks up on Rodas and Horton’s assessments of “general indifference and apathy” displayed by Smyrniotes towards the proclamation. See London Times, “Ionian autonomy.,’ August 11, 1922, p.7.

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On the previous night, Emin Souregia Bey, a journalist and owner of Islahat, was astonished at the Greek Government’s official decree containing the sentence that “Turkey aimed in exploiting conquered races by subjecting them to systematic forced islamisation and massacre under their control.” Such a sentence was considered offensive to Turkish honor. Emin Bey visited Turkish clubs and announced that no Moslems should participate in the public rally outside the Greek High Commission. It is strange that an otherwise sensitive Sterghiadis did not react to such an anti-Turkish phrase. He left it to the personal initiative of Alexander Svolos, the Greek Commander at Brusa, to erase the words “islamisation” and “massacres” from the Greek Government’s official decree. However, these two words remained in the Greek Government’s official proclamation. This may suggest that Greek press censorship temporarily broke down in Smyrna, allowing the Turks and foreign propagandists to exploit these two words for their own advantage. They stated that the Greeks had invited the Turks to participate in the autonomy, and together with the Greek Government’s official proclamation, reminded them of the words “Islamisation” and “massacres.” It was evident that the tactics employed by those opposed to the Greek autonomy made their mark on the local Turkish populace. In fact, Sterghiadis was terribly upset at the failure of the public rally to attract a large crowd. 612 On July 31 and August 1, the New York Times quoted dispatches from Reuters and Associated Press. The former dispatch stated that Prince Nicholas was rumored to become the Governor of Smyrna with elections to be staged in the new state. This story is supported in the British documents to some extent. Thereafter this rumor was denied by the Greek Foreign Ministry. Appointing someone from King Constantine’s family to be Governor of this new state would have been opposed by the Asia Minor Greeks, who were predominantly 612

Rodas, op. cit., pp.314–6. The newspaper accounts give a distorted view of the actual feelings of the inhabitants in Smyrna. See London Times, “THE NEW STATUS OF IONIA. GREECE AND THE CALIPH.,” August 1, 1922, p.9; New York Times, “GREECE PROCLAIMS SMYRNA PROTECTORATE. To be called ‘Occidental Asia Minor’—Moslem Smyrniots said to welcome it.,” August 1, 1922, 1:21.

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Venizelist. In fact, Jefferson Caffery informed the State Department on July 25 that the Asia Minor Greeks were hostile to Constantine and his Government for “openly opposing [their] attempts to form an organisation to resist the evacuation of Asia Minor by the Greeks. [They] are endeavouring to persuade Mr. Venizelos to represent them in Europe.” 613 The latter dispatch basically reiterated what the London Times reported regarding Sterghiadis’ proclamation. However, the New York Times included several things which the other newspapers ignored. Firstly, a gendarmerie composed of local elements would be responsible “for law and order in the interior.” Secondly, there was no provision for establishing a local parliament. Furthermore, there were several clauses in the proclamation dealing “with the protection of the interests of foreigners.” Finally, the Smyrna press published Sterghiadis’ proclamation in several languages and “posters were pasted on billboards and handbills distributed with the same announcement in the Turkish and Greek languages.” All the items above are correct, with the exception of the second part of point two. Nowhere in Sterghiadis’ proclamation does it actually mention the protecting of the rights of foreigners. There is no doubt Sterghiadis would have been conscious of taking the necessary measures to protect foreign interests at Smyrna. If the new Smyrna regime could revive the province’s “dying trade and commerce” and maintain racial harmony, obviously, this would have a positive effect in revitalising foreign business activity and attracting new business investment into this state. 614

613

New York Times, “Immediate Declarations of Autonomy.,” July 31, 1922, 1:3; D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.905; Turkey Political 767.68/255 Caffery [Athens] to Sec of State, July 25, 1922. 614 New York Times, “GREECE PROCLAIMS SMYRNA PROTECTORATE. To be called ‘Occidental Asia Minor’—Moslem Smyrniots said to welcome it.,” August 1, 1922, 1:21 & “self-government for Thrace?,” August 2, 1922, 1:19; Turkey Internal 867.9111/6 Admiral Mark L. Bristol, U.S. High Commissioner Constantinople to Sec of State, August 3, 1922 enclosing Press items for w/e August 3, 1922; Greece Internal. 868.01/122 1922 Enclosure1.

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On August 2, the London Times Near East correspondent who wrote this dispatch commented that Sterghiadis’ proclamation resembled the “Cretan precedent” and that Ionia was not an island and contained a non-Greek majority. The clause “Cretan precedent and Ionia was not an island” simply highlighted the Christians being outnumbered by the Turks in the Smyrna Province. At some future date, the Turks would demand union with Turkey exposing the Christians to Turkish reprisals. This would explain the importance of including the Turks in the administration of the autonomous zone. Sterghiadis wanted to see the religious and racial fanaticism which dominated the past abandoned and replaced by “peaceful labor and economic progress” which would raise the moral character of all the citizens. It would seem the London Times’ reference to the “Cretan precedent” was obtained from the Greek newspaper Chronos who first published this on July 26. 615 This was the second part of Greece’s plan to force the Allies to act. The press focussed its opposition to the Greek autonomy at Smyrna, which also involved evacuating the Greek army from Asia Minor. In fact, the London Times and Melbourne Press accounts of July 31 and August 2, reported on the French press prodding the Entente to demand that King Constantine abandon his policy in Asia Minor. Otherwise, Greek ports would be blockaded. The latter news story gave the impression that the Entente should impose a naval 615

London Times, “CONSTANTINOPLE REASSURED. ALLIED TROOPS READY.,” August 2, 1922, p.7; Greece Internal. 868.01/122 Horton [Smyrna] to Sec. of State July 31, 1922 Enclosure 1; Turkey Internal 867.9111/6 Admiral Mark L. Bristol, U.S. High Commissioner Constantinople to Sec of State, August 3, 1922 enclosing Press items for w/e August 3,1922; Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1770–1923, St Martin’s Press, New York, 1972, p.171. In the aftermath of the Greek-Turkish conflict of 1897, the island of Crete became an autonomous province under the Sultan’s suzerainty. Prince George of Greece was appointed governor to administer the island’s affairs by the major European powers. Outnumbering the Moslem element, the Greeks desired union with Greece. This union was achieved, finally, with the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in October 1912. For a discussion of the Cretan issue, see Dakin, pp.154, 171 and 194.

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blockade whereas the former alluded to the British navy taking appropriate measures. This account was taken from the French newspaper Le Temps who obtained its story from the Quai d’Orsay. Moreover, the New York Times was the only newspaper to identify Le Temps in its report regarding the action above. 616 The New York Times argued that the Greek proclamation was “almost certain to divide allied opinion.” In the same article, reference was made to the possible British and French reactions to this autonomous state. It surmised that “British interests would far prefer a weak autonomous state at the western end of Asia Minor” and that “the French will just as vigorously oppose the creation of a new state whose autonomy is certain to stir up new nationalist aspirations in Syria.” Jefferson Caffery’s confidential dispatch of August 8 to the State Department confirms the New York Times hunch to some extent. The London Times explained the Ionian autonomy as a Greek ploy in shifting some financial costs of the war “from the Greek to Asiatic shoulders.” The journalist writing this story was concerned that the protection of minorities could become an Entente responsibility and maybe ultimately shifting the burden onto the Sultan’s government. This raised serious questions about the future of Christian minorities in Asia Minor. 617 The Melbourne press quoted reports from Athens 616

The Age, “Should Greek Ports Be Blockaded?,” August 2, 1922, p.9 ; Argus, “France suggests Blockade.,” August 2, 1922, p.11; London Times, “FRENCH OPPOSITION.,” July 31, 1922, p.8; New York Times, “GREECE THREATENS PEACE IN NEAR EAST BY MOVE IN SMYRNA. Plans to Proclaim Autonomous State, Declaring Against Restoring Conquests to Turks...,” July 31, 1922, 1:1; F.O. 424/254 no.108 Sir Miles Cheetham [Paris] to Earl of Balfour, July 31, 1922. 617 New York Times, “GREECE THREATENS PEACE IN NEAR EAST BY MOVE IN SMYRNA. Plans to Proclaim Autonomous State, Declaring Against Restoring Conquests to Turks...,” July 31, 1922, 1:1; London Times, “NEAR EAST PERILS. CRISIS MAY RECUR. URGENT NEED FOR PEACE...The Ionian move.,” August 15, 1922, p.7; Turkey Political 767.68/286 Caffery [Athens] to Sec of State August 8, 1922. In fact, Caffery offered 3 reasons why Britain did not desire a Greek evacuation from Smyrna. He stated that “first, they fear a general massacre of Christians by the Turks;

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which stated that the Greek Government would adhere to Allied decisions “regarding Asia Minor provided that they include the autonomous state and safety of Christians.” This item shows the Greek Government’s intention of making Smyrna a viable political entity, before withdrawing its troops from Anatolia, thus, leaving the Christian populations to be protected by the Entente. Horton’s dispatches to the State Department of July 30 and 31 take up some of these issues. 618 On August 1, the New York Times editorial considered the Greeks were on stronger ground in proclaiming autonomy over Smyrna. It saw Smyrna becoming part of Greece and that “Ionia the birthplace of European civilisation would be brought back to Europe at last.” Population statistics and the presence of an occupation army were cited in Greece’s favor. No one could really gauge the stamina of the Greek army but doubts were expressed over the Turks’ ability to dislodge them from Smyrna. However, the New York Times believed that the Greek claim to Smyrna was as valid as the Turks’ on ethnic grounds. 619 This paper seemed to be supportive of an autonomous Smyrna. The London Times editorial of July 31, on the other hand, stated the permanent regime being instituted at Smyrna was a new complication in executing the Allied proposals for a Greek evacuation of Anatolia “as one of the conditions of peace in the Near East.” It alluded to financial problems facing Greece. Nonetheless, the Greek decision was considered by the second, they believe that evacuation at this time would upset the balance of power in the Near East to their prejudice; third, they fear the immediate effect on British interests in Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia.” The French were concerned at the Kemalists threatening their interests in Syria whereas the Italians preferred a Greek withdrawal from Smyrna. 618 The Age, “Should Greek Ports Be Blockaded?,” August 2, 1922, p.9; Argus, “Angora Desires Peace. Greek reply to Allies.,” August 2, 1922, p.11; Greece Internal 868.01/122; Turkey Political 767.68/236 Horton, [Smyrna] to Sec of State July 30, 1922. Sterghiadis informed Horton that “We can do no more and wish to retire our army. Our plan is to turn over the province to its people who will place their cause in the hands of the allied powers, Greeks to remain pending final settlement.” 619 New York Times, “Greece and Smyrna.,” August 1, 1922, 1:18.

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London Times to be “inadmissible.” This editorial was certainly antiGreek. On August 1, the Argus editorial basically focussed on Constantinople. However, its passing references to Smyrna gave the impression of King Constantine being an untrustworthy individual whose actions threatened peace in Anatolia. Possibly the Argus reckoned the Greek action at Smyrna might have to be accommodated “to meet the altered circumstances.” It was important, somehow, to maintain the Treaty of Sevres in some form. The Argus would have been concerned about its ultimate impact on the British Empire. Alternatively, The Age was completely silent. 620 The newspapers turned their attentions to the Turkish, Mikrasiatic Amyna, and Allied Governments reactions. The London Times and New York Times devoted more space compared to the Melbourne press to the reactions of the different parties. For example, the London Times printed reactions on August 4, 11, 12, and 18 whereas the Melbourne press only did so on August 10 and 21. The New York Times printed reactions on August 4, 6, and 21. The latter newspaper quoting an Associated Press report from Constantinople merely reported of the Ottoman Government presenting a note to Allied representatives, officially protesting at the Greek declaration of autonomy in Ionia. It did not state the actual contents of the Ottoman note. The London Times on August 4 went beyond the New York Times story of the same day by stating that the “Turkish note expressed surprise” at the Greek action. At any rate, the Greek proclamation jeopardised peace and infringed the sovereign rights of Turkey. The article concluded with the Porte declaring the Greek proclamation “null and void.” On August 6, the New York Times account of the Turkish Nationalists protest over autonomous Smyrna had similarities to the London Times version of two days earlier. 621 620

London Times, “An Inadmissible Demand.,” July 31, 1922, p.13; Argus, August 1,1922, p.6. 621 New York Times, “SUBLIME PORTE PROTESTS makes formal remonstrations against autonomy for Smyrna.,” August 4, 1922, p.4 & “ALLIES STRENGTHENING TCHATALJA LINE FORCE...,” August 6, 1922, 1:6; London Times, “PORTE PROTESTS TO THE POWERS. IONIAN PROCLAMATION NULL AND VOID.,” August 4, 1922, p.7; F.O. 424/254.

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The Melbourne press did not report the Ottoman note but presented the view of Nationalist Turkey instead. However, the wording in both news articles of August 10 is similar but each Melbourne paper presented it differently to its readership. The Age used a small heading “Control in Asia Minor” whereas the Argus included it in its general cables column possibly thinking it to be an unimportant event at this time. Both Melbourne papers’ report originated from an unnamed source in Constantinople. They quoted Yussuf Kemal Bey, the Turkish Nationalist Foreign Minister, responding to an interjection in the Angora Assembly that “Greek autonomy ... could not effect the final settlement” due to Turkey continuing the conflict “indefinitely until the national pact had succeeded.” The origins of this story could be traced to the “semi-official Angora Telegraph Agency ... telegraphing summaries of press comments in the Angora newspapers” to Constantinople. 622 It must be noted that the London Times report of August 12 emanating from Constantinople mentions Hamid Bey, Representative of the Angora Government at Constantinople, handing over a protest note regarding Ionia from Raouf Bey, the Turkish National Prime Minister and acting Foreign Minister, during Yussuf Kemal Bey’s illness, to Allied High Commissioners. The Turkish Nationalist note bearing the signature of Raouf Bey was published in the newspaper Aksham. The Melbourne press did not report on the Turkish Nationalist Foreign Minister illness possibly thinking it to be unimportant. Any changes or illnesses in the political leadership at Angora would certainly have worried the British Government in its efforts to establish peace in the Near East. 623 no.120 Rumbold [Constantinople] to Balfour, August 3, 1922. The text of the Ottoman Government’s note protesting over autonomous Smyrna is cited in Turkey Internal 867.9111/6 Adm. Mark L. Bristol [Constantinople] to Sec of State, August 3, 1922: Enclosure of press items for w/e August 3,1922. 622 The Age, “Control in Asia Minor.,” August 10, 1922, p.9; Argus, August 10, 1922, p.7; F.O. 424/254 no.152, Rumbold [Constantinople] to Curzon, August 15, 1922. 623 London Times, “ANGORA’S NEW PROTEST.”, August 12, 1922, p.7; The text of Raouf Bey’s note is in Turkey Internal 867/9111/7 Admiral

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It is interesting to ascertain how the journalist writing the story appearing in the Melbourne press on August 10 managed to bypass Allied press censorship in Constantinople. This story gives a view of Nationalist Turkey wishing to continue the struggle until the Greek army withdrew completely from Asia Minor. However, the Melbourne press did not mention the reporting of Turkish newspapers Vakit and Le Journal d’Orient of Hamid Bey’s interview with a correspondent of the Greek newspaper Kathimerini. This story appeared in the Athenian newspaper Patris stating that Hamid Bey regarded the autonomy in Smyrna as “unimportant and illegal.” He declined to “tell ... on what conditions the Angora Government is willing to make peace because it will be believed that the Government is anxious to make peace” and he didn’t expect the animosity existing between “our two countries will persist after the conclusion of peace.” 624 In an interview conducted on August 5 at the Hotel Commodore, Stephanos Beinoglou and Antonios Athinogenis, representatives of Mikrasiatic Amyna, disclosed to a New York Times reporter the purpose of their mission to America. The latter stated “We are here to inform the American people of what is going on in western Asia Minor and to ask for the moral help of the United States, its people and its Government. In that connection we will present a memorandum to the State Department.” Beinoglou criticised the Allied March proposals for placing the Asia Minor Greeks in a dilemma to face deportation or death. His criticism was that “We do not ask the civilized world to go to Western Asia Minor and to fight our battles. We will do that. All we ask is the right to remain free. For we are free and European diplomacy would take away our freedom.” An evacuation of the Greek army would not stop the Asia Minor Greeks from defending themselves against the Turkish Nationalists. He outlined that 100,000 troops could be raised, including remnants of Bristol [Constantinople] to Sec of State, August 17, 1922: Enclosure: press items for w/e August 17 published in Turkish newspaper Aksham. 624 F.O. 424/254 no.152, Rumbold [Constantinople] to Curzon, August 15, 1922; Turkey Internal 867.911/4, Adm. Mark L. Bristol [Constantinople] to Sec of State, August 10, 1922 with Enclosure: Press items for W/E August 10, 1922. See Vakit and Le Journal d’Orient, a French newspaper.

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the Greek army, to defend autonomous Smyrna and that volunteers “from America, Egypt, Constantinople and Europe would flock to our colors to fight the Turks.” The idea of attracting volunteers was a difficult undertaking requiring funds, planning, and coordination for it to succeed. 625 Neither the London Times nor the Melbourne press carried this story because they thought it to be unimportant. At this stage, the Melbourne press and London Times gave prominence to such issues as German reparations, the Irish question, and the political instability in Italy. If Beinoglou had included volunteers from Australia, then it is conceivable that the Melbourne press would have printed this article. The Argus could have easily published the interview above, since it had access to the New York Times news service. 626 The Allied reactions to autonomous Smyrna were published in the London Times and New York Times on August 18 and 21. Both news accounts are similar in their message. The London Times stated that Entente diplomats in Athens presented an identical note to Baltazzis that autonomous Ionia “could not be accepted as affecting the decision of the Allies as the ultimate fate of Anatolia.” This meant the settlement on Ionia was a matter for discussion between the Allies and Turkey. The Allies had registered “a formal reservation” over the whole affair on August 15. 627 The Melbourne press took a different 625

New York Times, “ASIA MINOR PEOPLES PLAN TO DEFY TURKS ... EXPECT GREEKS HERE TO AID...,” August 6, 1922, 1:6. On May 11, 1922 Mikrasiatic Amyna sent two missions abroad to explain its position regarding the eventual evacuation of the Greek army from Anatolia. One mission went to Europe headed by A. Psaltof, A. Lambrou, S. Papamichalis and Eustathopoulos and the other to America led by A. Athinogenis and Serefiadis. Mikrasiatic Amyna encountered difficulties with Sterghiadis. See Rodas, op. cit., p.296. 626 London Times, August 5, 1922, pp.8 and 13; August 7, p.8; Argus, August 7, 1922, p.7 August 8, p.7; The Age, August 7, 1922, p.9; August 8, p.8. 627 London Times, “Ionian autonomy not recognised.,” August 18, 1922, p.7; New York Times, “NEAR EAST MEETING SOON. Allies Plan Conference to be Held in Venice Next Month.,” August 21, 1922, 1:11; F.O. 424/254 no.161 Bentinck [Athens ] to Curzon August 15, 1922 Enclosure: Note Verbale presented to the Greek Government; also in D.B.F.P. vol.17,

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stance from the other two papers. It reported on the Allied note within the context of a parliamentary discussion in the Greek Chamber as to whether the new administrative instructions in Smyrna had been postponed. Stratos answered that autonomy measures would be accelerated. There is an innate feeling of desperation on the part of Athens in wanting to evacuate Anatolia and quickening the tempo of autonomy at Smyrna. The Melbourne press did not mention the contents of the Allied Note nor provide background information on the discussion in the Greek Chamber to its readers. They incorrectly named M. Stratos as Prime Minister, when Protopapadakis held that office. 628 All the press accounts fail to mention Baltazzis’ discussions with the British and French Ministers. Baltazzis told Bentinck that the proclamation was aimed at the large Moslem population “which was friendly to the Greeks and anti-Kemalist.” Sterghiadis was anxious to give the Moslems “a large share in the administration.” The language of the French Minister was pro-Kemalist whereas the Italians seemed closer to the British position. Moreover, Lancelot Oliphant, a British Foreign Office official, had sent letters to the French and Italian Ambassadors in London on August 4 informing them that the British Government had yet to receive detailed information on the Greek proclamation. The Greeks had no right to establish a permanent administration around Smyrna, since this was a matter of dialogue between the Allies and Turkey. On August 10, the Italian Ambassador replied that his Government concurred with the British position. 629 The autonomy of Smyrna proved to be a short-lived affair. However, Lloyd George made a pro-Greek speech in the House of Commons on August 4 praising the Greeks.

pp.925–7; Smith, op. cit., p.281; Rodas, op. cit., pp.317–8. The text of the Allied note to the Greek Government over autonomous Smyrna appeared in Constantinople newspaper Orient News on August 19, 1922. A copy of this clipping was forwarded to State Dept . See Turkey Political 767.68 /298. 628 The Age, “GRECO-TURKISH QUARREL.,” August 21, 1922, p.9; Argus, “Greco-Turkish Position. Administration of Asia Minor.,” August 21, 1922, p.7. 629 F.O. 424/254 no. 161; D.B.F.P vol.17, pp. 916&fns.6–17.

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2c) Lloyd George speech of August 4, 1922 and reactions to it After the Greek Government’s effort to occupy Constantinople had been thwarted by the Allied Powers. Lloyd George’s speech of August 4, 1922 to the House of Commons, outlining British policy in the Near East, was reported in the London Times, New York Times, The Age, and Argus on August 5 and 7 respectively. The London Times account of this address is a detailed summary and captures Lloyd George’s pro-Greek and anti-Turkish sentiment. Lloyd George argued that Britain would only accept a Near East settlement which gave “efficient and adequate protection” to Christian minorities from Turkish reprisals and that “Our business was to hold the balance justly and fairly between both parties. It was not a question of Musulman and Christian.” He did, also, make mention of deportations and massacres of minorities in the Pontus region. He criticised Mustapha Kemal for declining to accept the Allied armistice conditions of March 1922, and the Turkish nationalists stalling tactics. The Greek march on to Constantinople was forestalled by an allied occupation of the Turkish capital which undoubtedly would have ended the conflict he contended. There is a probability Lloyd George personally would have welcomed a Greek occupation of Constantinople, and by denying the Greek request, the Allies were forcing the Greeks to settle the conflict in the Anatolian interior. He believed the Greeks could still defeat the Turkish Nationalists. 630

630

London Times, “BRITISH NEAR EAST POLICY. PREMIER ON A ‘JUST PEACE.’ GREEK ARMY PRAISED.,” August 5, 1922, p. 8; A. E. Montgomery, “Lloyd George and the Greek question 1918–22.,” in A. J. P. Taylor (ed), Lloyd George Twelve Essays, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1971, p.282; Busch, op. cit., p.339; Turkish Diplomacy, p.168; Harold Nicolson, Curzon, Howard Fertig, New York, 1974, p.270, hereafter cited as Curzon; The text of Lloyd George’s speech of August 4, 1922 is cited in H.C. Debs vol.157, cols.2001–10; Turkey Political 767.68/257 Post Wheeler, Counsellor of U.S. Embassy London, to Sec of State Washington D.C., August 8, 1922. This dispatch includes the text of Lloyd George’s speech to the Commons on August 4 and extracts of British newspapers of his speech in London Times, August 5, “British Near East Policy.”; Daily Telegraph, August 5, “Turkey and Greece”;

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However he praised the Greek army in the most laudable terms. He stated that: He did not know of any other army that could have gone so far as the Greeks had gone. It was daring enterprise. They established their military superiority in every encounter and they were only beaten by the combination of the country and the long lines of communication that had to be maintained. 631

The newspapers were uninformed of the visit to London by Lindley, the British Minister at Athens, to meet both Lloyd George and Balfour on August 3. He informed them that the Greek army lacked financial resources to remain in Asia Minor indefinitely, and that unless, British assistance was forthcoming, a Greek collapse was inevitable. 632 Prior to departing for London, Lindley told Jefferson Caffery, the U.S. Charge d’Affaires at Athens, on July 20 that Greece and Britain wanted peace but the French had other ideas. He believed the French had three motives for wanting a continuation of the conflict. Firstly, the French wanted the reparations issue and its debts to the U.S. and Britain settled to its advantage; secondly, it considered the Kemalists posing a threat to its rule in Syria and a prolongation of the war might weaken the Turks to its benefit; and finally, the French aimed at preventing a commission of inquiry from going to Anatolia to investigate Turkish atrocities. Lindley seemed very critical of French intentions in the Near East and would be urging the British Government “to proceed alone, tactfully putting aside Italian and French interference in the settlement of the [Greco-Turkish War].” 633

Morning Post, August 5, “Adjournment of Parliament”; Daily Chronicle, August 5, “Premier’s warning to Greece.” 631 London Times, “BRITISH NEAR EAST POLICY. PREMIER ON A ‘JUST PEACE.’ GREEK ARMY PRAISED.,” August 5, 1922, p.8; H.C. Debs., 157., col.2008. 632 D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.919fn.5; Turkish Diplomacy, p.168; Smith , op. cit., pp.282–3. 633 Turkey Political 767.68/253. Caffery (Athens] to Sec. State, Washington D.C., July 21, 1922.

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The reporting by The Age and Argus of Lloyd George’s speech on August 7 is a brief version of that appearing in the London Times. There are some omissions in the Melbourne press coverage of the same item. The Melbourne press did not mention the Prime Minister’s praise of the Greek army, Kemal’s inhibiting tactics, or the plight of Christian minorities in Pontus. The absence of such information could partly be explained, by the Melbourne press supporting Britain’s overall peace efforts in the Near East including the guarantees and protection of Christian minorities in Asia Minor. The Melbourne press captured some of the anti-Turkish feeling of Lloyd George by referring to the 1914–18 war. It reported that “the collapse of Russia and Rumania was almost entirely due to Turkey. When she slammed the gates of Dardanelles Turkey prolonged the war for two years.” The word “Dardanelles” conjures up images of 1915, the Gallipoli campaign where Australian blood was shed in fighting the Ottoman Empire. Not mentioning the praises of the Greek army could be viewed as an anti-Greek position on the part of the Melbourne press. It was that the Greeks who had threatened to occupy Constantinople and not the Turkish Nationalists. 634 There was no difficulty for the Melbourne press in obtaining the full text of the House of Commons debate of August 4, through its Australian Press Association representative in London or by obtaining copies of Hansard. They could also have accessed major British newspapers and Reuters who had parliamentary and gallery correspondents reporting on the actual proceedings of the Houses of Commons and Lords. 635 The New York Times account, like that of the London Times, is a vivid synopsis of the speech above, compared to the Melbourne press. 636 There are 3 aspects to the New York Times’ report which give 634

The Age, “Belligerent Greece still straining at leash. Allies Embarrass situation.,” August 7, 1922, p.9 and Argus, “PEACE IN ASIA MINOR. Must be Just and Enduring. Lloyd George on British Policy.,”August 7, 1922, p.7; H.C. Debs., 157. cols.2001–2 and 2004–8. 635 Crisis and Diplomacy, pp.80–1. 636 New York Times, “MUST CURB TURKS, SAYS LLOYD GEORGE.” Allies won’t make peace and leave minorities unprotected, He declares in Commons, EXTERMINATION TURKS’ AIM, Greek also guilty of out-

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it a different flavour to that of its London and Melbourne counterparts. Firstly, the New York Times mentioned the names of the British politicians who embraced different positions over Lloyd George’s speech. It was correctly reported that Lieutenant-Commander Kenworthy and General Surtees had expressed pro-Turkish sympathies whereas Major Glyn favored the Greek position. This was something the London Times, The Age, and Argus newspapers did not mention in their reports. 637 Secondly, American observers are attributed with revealing to the outside world the Turkish atrocities being committed in Pontus. The New York Times balances this by alluding to isolated excesses perpetrated by Greek soldiers. Finally, it reported correctly that the Turks aimed at achieving a homogeneous population. 638 All the newspapers failed to report on Lt-Commander Kenworthy, Major Glyn, and Brigadier-General Surtees references in their parliamentary speeches of restoring British trade in the Near East. 639 Beneath such statements hid a whole world of conflicting aims and rivalries among great powers scrambling to obtain favorable economic concessions in Asia Minor. From late 1921, the French and the Italians were concerned at U.S. penetration into the Eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia. In order to bolster their respective economic positions, the French, under the Franklin-Bouillon agreement of October 1921, secured concessions to iron, chrome and silver mines, railways, and ports for French enterprises. 640 The Italians secured from the Constanrages, but in isolated cases-Bound to defend Constantinople, WILL HOLD BALANCE EVEN. Turkish envoy arrives with new proposals-Greek note defends move to take Constantinople.,” August 5, 1922, 1:3. 637 New York Times, August 5, 1922,1:3; H.C. Debs., 157., cols.1991–2001; Sonyel, op. cit., pp.86–7. 638 New York Times , August 5, 1922,1:3; H.C. Debs., 157., cols.2005–06& 09. See New York Times editorial of August 7, 1922 which refers to Mustapha Kemal’s policy of creating a Turkey free of Christian populations. 639 H. C. Debs., 157., cols.1992, 1997–8 and 2000. 640 Harry. J. Psomiadis, op. cit., p.35; Louis P. Cassimatis, op. cit., pp.61–2 and 66; D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.464; In early September 1921, Briand, the French Premier, sent Franklin-Bouillon, a French journalist and Turcophile Senator, empowered by the French Government to negotiate with Angora over

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tinople Government in April 1922 concessions to the Heraclea mines and certain projected railways under the Tripartite Agreement for Italian firms. 641 American diplomats in Europe and Turkey were sending reports to the State Department in Washington about the opportunities for American companies to secure economic concessions in Anatolia. Two examples will be cited. Firstly, Admiral Bristol, the U.S. High Commissioner at Constantinople and Lewis Einstein at the U.S. Embassy at Prague reported on the activities of the Standard Oil Company of New York seeking oil concessions in Anatolia and it, also, had the option of obtaining permits for land in the Smyrna zone. 642 Secondly, replying to a U.S. Geological Service request of November 21, 1921 George Horton, the U.S. Consul at Smyrna, in a report titled “Mineral deposits and industries in the district of Smyrna, Asia Minor” provided the State Dept on February 20, 1922 with a detailed account of the whole mining industry for the year ending 1921. His report emphasised that

French troop evacuation, the release of French prisoners and the protection of minorities in Cilicia. The full text of this agreement is in Cmd.1556 Turkey no. 2, 1921, Dispatch from H.M. Ambassador at Paris Enclosing the FrancoTurkish Agreement signed at Angora on 20 October, 1921. 641 The Tripartite Agreement was an arrangement signed at Sevres on 10 August, 1920, where the Allied Powers parcelled out Turkey into spheres of economic influence. The French and Italian zones were defined in Cilicia and South West Anatolia. As a mandatory power Britain could put up its own economic sphere of influence in Mesopotamia and Palestine. The full text of the Tripartite Agreement is cited in Cmd. 963. No. 12, 1920, Tripartite Agreement. Agreement between the British Empire, France and Italy respecting Anatolia, signed at Sevres on 10 August, 1920; D.B.F.P. vol.17, pp.807 and 812fn.4; Psomiadis, op. cit., p.29. 642 Turkey Internal 867.6363/94 Bristol, U.S. High Commission Constantinople, to Sec of State May 15, 1922 with enclosure of a letter to Allen W. Dulles, American Embassy Constantinople, from Miller Joblin, Standard Oil Company of New York at Constantinople April 23, 1922; 867.6363/99 Lewis Einstein, U.S. Embassy Prague to Sec of State, September 18, 1922.

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mining companies wanted the resumption of peace, so that mining production and investment could surpass the pre-1914 levels. 643 There were British commercial interests who considered the Greek occupation of Smyrna as a hindrance to their economic interests. Viscount St. Davids, the Chairman of the Smyrna-Aidin Railway, suggested at the company’s annual meeting that the British Government should make the Greeks withdraw from Asia Minor. He indicated that Turkish reparation collections under the peace treaty should be allocated to British merchants at Smyrna who should be compensated for loss of business and used to restore the railways back to working order. The British Minister at Athens had been instructed by London on March 27 to approach the Greek Government immediately, to settle all outstanding debts owed to the Smyrna-Aidin railway company. Viscount St. Davids considered financial restitution to British merchants as an important factor of reviving British trade in Turkey. 644 Australia did not have any economic and financial interests in Turkey in the period under review. 645 It might be argued the Melbourne papers were acting in Australia’s national interest by encouraging Australian foreign trade through its news articles, at a time of uncertainty and problems in the global economy. It should be noted that Britain was by far the most important outlet for Australian primary 643

Turkey Internal 867.63/13 Horton, U.S. Consul Smyrna to Sec of State February 20, 1922. 644 Turkey Internal 867.77/404 Bristol, U.S. High Commission Constantinople, to Sec of State April 11, 1922 with enclosure of a clipping from London Times dated April 1, 1922 which covered the meeting of the SmyrnaAidin railway company. Bristol mentioned “it would be well to give careful consideration to the statements in this article in considering reports circulated in the press .... I have often had foreign business men state that they would like to have the Turkish rule back in Smyrna.”; Greece Internal 868.01/99 &101. R. Skinner, American Consulate-General London England to Sec of State, April 3 and May 10, 1922. 645 Turkey Internal. 867.602/56 John Randolph, American Consul to Mr Allen W. Dulles, Chief Division of Near Eastern Affairs, Dept of State, Washington D.C., April 10,1923. This memorandum is titled “Foreign interests and concessions in Turkey.”

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produce but other market opportunities existed too. 646 On August 4, The Age headlines “Sale of Beef to Germany. Steamer loading shipment” and “Zinc Concentrates for Germany” indicated the importance of Australia resuming trade with Germany. The export of Australian beef from Queensland and zinc concentrates from Port Pirie in South Australia would give Australian cattle producers and mining companies the opportunities to supply the German market once again. There was mention of the Argentinean trade commissioner in Germany signing an agreement with a German syndicate with the Argentinean Government supplying meat for 2 years and, so it was important for Australian beef producers to counteract Argentinean supply and competition in the German market. 647 In fact, The Age reports of July 1 and 28 reveal Argentina being a serious competitor to Australian beef exports to Europe. One of the news reports highlighted the reputation of Australian beef producers suffering due to the British Government’s disposal of old stocks accumulated under the wartime controls. Furthermore Andrew Williamson, the Chairman of Australian Estates and Mortgage Co., mentioned foreign trusts oversupplying meat on the British market below cost price making it difficult for Australian producers to compete. He criticised the British Government for failing to introduce a licensing system regulating the supply of meat into Britain. 648

646

For Australian trading partners for the period under review. See Table 5.1 in Barrie Dyster & David Meredith, Australia in the International economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p.88. 647 The Age, “SALE OF BEEF TO GERMANY. STEAMER LOADING SHIPMENT,” and “Zinc Concentrates for Germany.,” August 4, 1922, p.11; The lifting of the trade embargo and the arrival of ships from Hamburg indicate the resumption of commerce between Australia and Germany. See Argus, “TRADE WITH GERMANY. EMBARGO LIFTED TO-DAY. Flood of Goods Not Expected.” and “ELEVEN VESSELS LISTED. To Lift Hamburg Cargo.,” August 1, 1922, p.7. 648 The Age, “THE PASTORAL OUTLOOK. Reviewed by Mr. J. M. Niall. The Meat Trade Struggle.” & “BEEF EXPORT TRADE. ARGENTINE COMPETITION SERIOUS.,” July 1 and 28, 1922, pp.15 and 10; The

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The Argus headline on August 1 “TARIFF ARRANGEMENT. NEW ZEALAND TRADE. Wines and Fruit Trade prospects.” showed the Australian and New Zealand Governments agreeing to reciprocal tariff measures in admitting a range of goods at reduced rates or duty free into each others domestic market. This measure was designed to improve trade between these two Dominions. Australia was having problems striking trade reciprocity with another Dominion: Canada. 649 The Australian Government was pursuing tariff concessions with representatives of France, Belgium, and Italy, but this had not yielded any satisfactory outcomes. If Australia had struck reciprocal tariff agreements with France and Italy, then Australian producers could have expanded their markets in Europe. Additionally Australia could use its British, French, and Italian trade connections as a springboard into Anatolia in time. 650 There were other international factors in August 1922 that would have worried Australian exporters. For example the dominant international news items in The Age and Argus from AuAge., “AUSTRALIA’S MEAT TRADE. COMPETITION OF FOREIGN TRUSTS.” July 17, 1922, p.15. 649 Argus, “TARIFF ARRANGEMENT. NEW ZEALAND TRADE. Wine and Fruit Trade prospects.,” August 1, 1922, p.7; This agreement was criticised in both Australia and New Zealand, before being sanctioned by both Parliaments. See The Age, “TRADE RECIPROCITY. Agreement with New Zealand. New Tariff Schedule.,” July 29, 1922, p.16; “TARIFF RECIPROCITY. CRITICISM IN NEW ZEALAND. Minister satisfied with reception of Agreement.” and “TRADE RECIPROCITY. NEW ZEALAND AGREEMEN. Debate in Parliament. Are Australian Interests Safeguarded?,” August 4 and10, 1922, pp.10–11. 650 Argus, “TARIFF ARRANGEMENT. NEW ZEALAND TRADE. Wine and Fruit Trade prospects.” and “Other Agreements Likely. Delay in Negotiations.” August 1, 1922, pp.7–8. See Argus, “BUTTER FOR FRANCE. High Import Duty the Barrier.,” August 7, 1922, p.6 report with the Cooperative Butter and Cheese Factories Association of Victoria complaining to Mr Rodgers, the Australian Minister of Customs, of the high French duties which disadvantaged Australian primary producers. It simply wanted to compete on equal terms with Holland, Denmark, Sweden and Argentina in the French market.

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gust 1–15, 1922 were Anglo-French differences over German reparations, political crisis in Italy and labour unrest in the U.S. It is interesting to note the July 26 report in The Age mentioning of the difficulties in exporting Australian coal to the U.S. because of serious industrial problems in that country. 651 Further to this, both Melbourne papers reported on August 7 that the London stock exchange experienced some difficulties citing a slump of the German currency, problems with other exchanges, and the possibility of a resumption of the GreekTurkish conflict. All these issues added up in causing financial uncertainty and challenges for Australian firms exporting to Europe and North America. 652 There were various reactions appearing in the press relating to Lloyd George’s speech. Some of it was cynical and others exuberant in nature. The New York Times was the only newspaper not to publish articles relating to Greek and Turkish attitudes to Lloyd George’s statement. This can be explained by America not having army and naval forces stationed in Anatolia opposing the Kemalists. After all, the Near Eastern question was a European and not an American concern. 653 However, this did not mean the New York Times was inattentive to the unfolding events in Anatolia. Its editorial of August 7, referred to Lloyd George’s speech in passing. It highlighted the slaughter 651

See The Age and Argus 1–15, August 1922 passim. For example The Age editorialised on August 14 that it was important for Britain and France to establish a common policy over German reparations. There disagreement over this issue might imperil peace and preclude German finances from improving. See The Age, August 14, 1922, p.6; for Italian political crisis and American industrial unrest See Argus, “RIOTING IN ITALY. RENEWED DISORDER...” and “AMERICAN STRIKES. RAILWAY PARALYSIS...,” August 7, 1922, p.7; The Age, “SERIOUS AMERICAN STRIKES. COAL FROM AUSTRALIA. Twenty Vessels Chartered.” and “Steamers Loading Coal at Newcastle.,” July 26, 1922, p.10. 652 The Age, “LONDON’S BUSINESS. THE ERRATIC EXCHANGES. No serious Effect Apparent.,” August 7, 1922, p.9; Argus, “BRITISH TRADE REVIEW. STOCK MARKET DULL. Variety of influences. Concern Over Foreign Exchanges.,” August 7, 1922, p.7. 653 New York Times , August 5–10, 1922 passim.

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of Christians and “the question of civilisation.” In the former case, the editorial refers to the work of Near East Relief, an American organisation, caring for young children who upon reaching 12 years involved “boys [being] forcibly Islamised” and “girls sent to harems.” The next part was derogatory in tone, describing the Turk as “a Central Asian nomad, skilled only in war, in diplomacy and in low grade agriculture” and “The war of Greek and Turk [as] a war of progress and stagnation.” It saw little prospect of the Turks becoming westernised. 654 The London Times editorial of August 5 was censorious of the Prime Minister supporting the Greek position in Asia Minor. It asserted that “...we should have welcomed a clear statement from the British Government on Near Eastern policy” and that the speech was “disappointing.” 655 Other unfavourable articles appeared in the London Times on August 9. For example the Near and Middle Eastern Association’s signed memorandum protesting to Lloyd George against the treatment of Turkey including criticisms from Indian Moslems. 656 Turkish opinion was disillusioned and troubled with Lloyd George’s statement and this would make peace very difficult. The London Times correspondent at Constantinople reported that Angora remained silent without offering any further explanation. In fact, the Angora Government instructed Nationalist newspapers and representatives in Constantinople “to avoid angry or extravagant comment.” 657 On August 15, 1922, Sir Horace Rumbold, the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, informed Lord Curzon of local Turkish press opinion concerning Lloyd George’s speech. Yeni Shark and IIeri were moderate in their responses whereas Tevhid-i-Efkia made “The strongest statement of the defiant kind ... a paper which is in its general tone pan-Islamic.” Moreover, the muted tone of the Turkish 654

New York Times, “MAKING TURKS.,” August 7, 1922, 1:12. London Times, “Greeks and Turks,” August 5, 1922, p.13. 656 London Times, “NEAR AND MIDDLE EAST ASSOCIATION. PROTEST TO LLOYD GEORGE.,” “EXTREMIST ANGER.,” August 9, 1922, p.7. 657 London Times, “DISAPPOINTED TURKS.,” August 9, 1922, p.7; F.O. 424/254.no.152 Sir H. Rumbold to Marquess Curzon of Kedleston, Constantinople, August 15, 1922. 655

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press was to avoid Allied censorship. The Greek press of Constantinople praised the speech in very “jubilant language.” 658 The joyous Greek response in Athens to Lloyd George’s speech was reported in The Age and Argus on August 12 which described it as the “magnanimous equity ... and the admiration for the noble references to Greece’s rights in fighting for the full reconstitution and deliverance of the Christians from the sanguinary and barbarous tyranny of the Turks.” 659 The London Times reported that Theotokis, the Greek Minister of War, decided to circulate appropriate passages of the speech to “the Greek army in a special order of the day.” 660 The Melbourne press and London Times’ accounts create an impression of the Greeks considering Lloyd George’s statement as an encouragement to continue struggle in Asia Minor but the press was unaware of the real military situation in Anatolia. The morale of the Greek army was not a healthy one. There were senior Greek officers expressing disquiet, that without Allied financial assistance, the Greek army would have to withdraw from Asia Minor, thus leaving Christians to fend for themselves. Alternatively, it would have to hold a suitable defensive line to meet a Kemalist attack. 661 658

F.O. 424/254.no.152. The Age, “The Rights of Greece. Lloyd George speech pleases.,” August 12, 1922, p.13; Argus, “Greeks Jubilant. Mr. Lloyd Georges noble speech.,” August 12, 1922, p.21; Busch, op. cit., p.340. 660 London Times, “GREEK APPROVAL.,” August 9, 1922, p.7; Sonyel, op. cit., p.169; Smith, op. cit., p.283. On August 7 M. Bentinck, the acting British Minister at Athens, telegraphed Lord Balfour to inform him that the Athens “Press on the whole is enthusiastic but some anti-government papers less so and Venizelists organs somewhat reserved and references to Constantine.” See D.B.F.P. vol.17, p.919. 661 F.O 424/254. Enclosure in No.67 Colonel Hoare Nairne (the British Military Attach) to Mr. Lindley, Athens, July 13 1922; Smith, op. cit., pp.2745; For a discussion of the Kemalists attack on August 26 against Greek positions leading to the latter’s evacuation of its army from Asia Minor in early September 1922, see Turkish Diplomacy, pp.171-72; Smith, op. cit., pp.288-97; D.B.F.P.vol.17., pp.936&fn.1-37&fn.2 and 946&fnn.1-3& 47&fn.1. 659

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In conclusion, the San Remo Conference highlighted generally the pro-Greek and anti-Turkish sentiment of the press. The Italians are depicted as sneering at the Greek territorial successes. Brief news bulletins were issued by the Allies to the press which deprived them of insights into Allied decision making at San Remo. Journalists rightfully complained of press censorship. The press was strongly anti-Greek over the Greek Government’s attempts to occupy Constantinople and the proclamation of autonomy at Smyrna. It is evident that the news accounts portray the French as the chief instigators in adopting stern measures against the Greeks. There is, also, a notion of a strong British naval presence in the Near East which could have easily blockaded Greek ports. The news accounts highlighted the Allies united determination to meet and resist the Greek menace. Furthermore, the news accounts used in this chapter can be supported to some extent from the archival sources. The next chapter will seek to identify an Australian foreign policy position in the whole Greek-Turkish conflict.

4 AUSTRALIAN FOREIGN POLICY IN ASIA MINOR 1919–23 This chapter will attempt to identify the Australian foreign policy position during the entire period of the Greek-Turkish conflict. The identification of an Australian foreign policy during this period produces a dichotomy of almost contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, there were four obstacles, which made it awkward for the Australian Government to adopt an independent foreign policy. Firstly, the British Government was solely responsible for formulating and implementing the foreign policy for its entire empire. Secondly, Australia had no official diplomatic representation in other counties, other than a High Commissioner in London. Thirdly, all official diplomatic correspondence between London and Melbourne came via the Colonial Office and was marked for the attention of the Governor-General, whose secretary forwarded copies of such cables to the Prime Minister, although after 1919, Hughes was able to communicate directly with the British Prime Minister. Lastly, the Imperial Conference held in London was the only forum which allowed Dominion Prime Ministers to discuss foreign issues with the Imperial Government. Australia along with other Dominions such as Canada, South Africa, and New Zealand, operated within an Imperial framework and depended on Great Britain for its diplomatic information and national security courtesy of the royal navy. On the other hand, three factors are important as evidence that Australia was beginning to develop its own Australian foreign policy in international affairs. Firstly, Australia had contributed troops and raw materials, and had incurred a huge war debt in assisting Great Britain and its Allies in defeating the Central Powers. The 1914–18 War greatly contributed to the development of an Australian national 235

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identity. Next, the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 allowed Australia to have two voices: one as an individual nation and the other as a member of the British Empire Delegation in advancing its territorial claims in the Pacific. 662 It was an important breakthrough for Australia when it was allowed to sign the Treaties of Versailles in 1919 and of Sevres in 1920 as if it were an “independent” nation. 663 In the last case, Australia had no direct involvement in the Asia Minor campaign but the British Colonial Office did inform the Australian government of some of the events unfolding in Anatolia. When Mustapha Kemal Pasha drove the Greek army out of Asia Minor in early September 1922, the British Government asked Dominion leaders to dispatch troops to Chanak to defend Imperial interests in the Turkish Straits. The Chanak crisis exposed the conflict between Imperial and Australian national interests, and it was during the Chanak

662

The possession of the ex-German colonies in New Guinea and Japanese expansion in the Pacific were the primary concern for the Australian Delegation at Paris in 1919. Australia administered New Guinea under the mandatory system on behalf of the League of Nation. For a brief discussion of these issues in the Melbourne press and relevant documents, see The Age, “Australia’s Claims Stated.,” January 20, 1919, p.5; “Mr Hughes and Japan.,” January 23, 1919, p.7; “THE GERMAN COLONIES. Mr Hughes Speaks for Australia.,” January 27, 1919, p.5; “THE GERMAN COLONIES. DECISION OF CONFERENCE. Mandatory Scheme Accepted. MR HUGHES RELUCTANTLY AGREES.,” February 3, 1919, p.5; “THE AUSTRALIAN VIEW. AN OFFICIAL STATEMENT. INDEMNITY QUESTION. Control of Pacific Islands.,” May 10, 1919, p.13; Argus, “AUSTRALIA’S DEMANDS. Stated by Mr. Hughes.,” January 20, 1919, p.7; “PEACE TERMS. AUSTRALIAN DEMANDS. SAFETY IN PACIFIC...,” January 27, 1919, p.7; “... Japanese Programme.,” February 3, 1919, p.5; “CONQUERED TERRITORIES... Pacific Islands for Australia. Our Laws Prevail.,” February 4, 1919, p.5; “Saturday’s late cables. THE PEACE CONFERENCE. Japan’s Position Explained.,” February 17, 1919, p.5; Japan and Pacific Islands. What Britain Promised.,” April 24, 1919, p.5; “AUSTRALIAN INTERESTS. INDEMNITY AND THE ISLANDS. Federal Ministry's Views.,” May 10, 1919, p.19; FRUS PPC vol.3, pp.720-2,746-7,799-800; FRUS PPC vol.5, pp.500,506-08. 663 This chapter will focus on Turkey and the Treaty of Sevres.

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crisis that Australia faced the prospect of becoming directly involved in a war with Turkey. The Melbourne press should be viewed as the medium for disseminating information on foreign affairs originating from British sources and the Australian Press Association and on the evolving events in Asia Minor. It must be reiterated that the newspaper was a very important source of information for the ordinary citizen, at a time when other forms of communication, such as radio or television, simply did not exist or were in their infancy. The press does not make foreign policy or set the policy agenda other than by using its columns or editorials to criticise or praise a Government’s foreign policy stance. In the long run, however, a newspaper’s constant criticism of a Government’s foreign and domestic policy might affect its future electoral outcome. The major research and subsidiary questions, which will form the basis of this chapter, are as follows: 1) Is it possible to identify an Australian foreign policy position towards the Greek-Turkish conflict in its entirety? Did Australia establish a more “independent” foreign policy in areas of immediate British interest? Did the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 and Imperial discussions of 1921 and 1923 assist in the development of an Australian foreign policy? To what extent did Chanak lead to a more independent Australian foreign policy at the Imperial Conferences? 2) What was the function of the British Colonial Office in providing the Prime Minister’s department through Governor-General’s office, with details relating to British foreign policy and Imperial issues? Did The Age and Argus support, attack, query, or even question British foreign policy in Anatolia? Were these papers supportive or critical of the Australian Prime Minister W. M. Hughes’, call to defend the Empire at Chanak in September 1922? After the Chanak incident abated was the Australian government demanding more information on British foreign policy? Four issues regarding the Australian foreign policy position in Asia Minor will be examined below. These are 1) The Turkish Peace Settlement 1918–21; 2) The Imperial Conferences of 1921; 3) The Chanak crisis and the Lausanne Conference 1922–23; and 4) the Imperial Conference of October 1923 and the post Lausanne period.

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1.1 THE TURKISH PEACE SETTLEMENT 1918–21 This section will be divided into three parts. Firstly, the emphasis will be on the Turkish peace moves of early October 1918, which paved the way for Turkey’s surrender. Furthermore, the reactions of ordinary people and politicians to the Turkish armistice and demobilisation will be explored. Part B will focus on the internal political situation in Turkey in 1919 and the peace deliberations which led to the signing of the Treaty of Sevres in August 1920 and its subsequent modification in 1921. Finally, the opportunity for trade along with the appointment of Australian Trade Commissioners in the Near East will be examined. 1.1a) Turkish peace initiatives The surrender of Bulgaria to the Allies in late September 1918 left the Ottoman Empire in a very vulnerable position. 664 In fact, W. M. Hughes, the Australian Prime Minister, regarded Bulgaria’s capitulation “as splendid news” and declared that “tomorrow it will be Turkey.” The Turks made various moves towards peace in early October, asking the Allies for an armistice. On October 10, the Melbourne papers citing, London’s Daily News correspondent in Berne, reported that the Turkish Cabinet had resigned. Furthermore, a report from Athens stated that the Turkish Governor of Smyrna had dispatched emissaries to Mitylene “to negotiate with the Allies for peace.” 665 This 664

The Bulgarian collapse and final surrender was reported in the Melbourne press. For example, see The Age, “BULGARIANS HEADLONG RETREAT.,” September 25, 1918, p.9; “Bulgar Armies in Flight. Allies Take Prilep and Doiran.,” September 26, p.7; “THE ENEMY ALLIANCE BROKEN. BULGARIA OUT OF THE WAR. PEACE TREATY SIGNED. UNCONDIATIONAL SURRENDER...,” October 2, 1918, p.9; Argus, “BULGARS FLEE.,” September 25, 1918, p.15; “BULGARS FLEE. ON WHOLE FRONT...PRILEP AND DOIRAN TAKEN.,” September 26, p.7; “BULGARIA SURRENDERS. Allies’ Terms Accepted.,” October 2, 1918, p.7. 665 The Age, “TURKEYS TROUBLES... RESIGNATION OF CABINET. Smyrna Seeks Peace.,” p.7; Argus, “TURKISH CRISIS. MINISTRY RESIGNS. MOEVEMENT FOR PEACE. BEGUN IN ASIA MINOR. EN-

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brief news account did not state the names of these private Turkish agents or the peace terms of Rahmi Bey, the Turkish Governor of Smyrna. A British cruiser brought Carabiber, Director of Foreigners’ Affairs for Smyrna Province, and the French merchant, Charles Giraud, to Athens from Mitylene to present Rahmi’s letter to the Allies. Lord Granville, the British Minister in Athens, interviewed Carabiber on board the British ship to ascertain what Rahmi had in mind. Carabiber stated that Rahmi was interested in overthrowing the present Turkish Government, providing he would gain reasonable terms from the Allies. Some of Rahmi’s conditions included: 1. Constantinople to remain the capital of Turkey. The Straits to be under Turkish control with the right to fortify them, but with complete freedom of passage to ships of all nations; 2. Completely free governments for Syria, Mesopotamia and Armenia but with the retention of nominal Turkish sovereignty; 6. The question of the Khalifate not to be raised, thus leaving it in the state that it was before the war; 7. Entente to show clearly that no other Turkish statesman could get such good terms. 666

Lloyd George’s reply from Paris that negotiations could only be conducted with official Turkish envoys and that Rahmi’s terms were unacceptable was conveyed to Carabiber by Granville on October 9. Carabiber returned to Smyrna empty-handed and nothing was heard of this proposal again. 667 VOYS SENT TO ALLIES.,” p.7; Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Cab.24 series Eastern Reports. Cab.24/145. Eastern Report LXXX1X, October 10, 1918. “Turkey: Rsignation of Talaat and Enver.,” p.4. 666 Dept of State, Papers relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States 1918: Supplement 1: The World War vol.1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1933, pp.341–3. Hereafter cited as FRUS PPC 1918: Supp.1: WW vol.1; G. Dyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918,” Middle Eastern Studies, vol.8, no.2, 1972, pp.154–5. 667 FRUS PPC 1918: Supp.1: WW vol.1, pp.352–3; Dyer, op. cit., pp.154–5.

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Another Turkish approach was made through the intermediary of the Spanish Government. The Spanish Foreign Minister forwarded a note to Juan Riano, the Spanish Ambassador in Washington from the Turkish Charge d’Affaires that was handed to President Wilson on October 14. President Wilson notified the Allies of this Turkish approach. Great Britain was not interested in any Turkish peace initiatives, but only wanted to achieve a complete and decisive military victory over the Ottoman Empire. At the time the Turks were signing the armistice at Mudros, Robert Lansing notified the Spanish Ambassador on October 31 that the United States was going to communicate the Turkish note to the Allies. 668 A slightly differently worded version of Lansing’s note appeared as a separate news item in the Argus on November 2. The Age did not publish Lansing’s note but only made a passing reference to it amongst the news of Turkey’s surrender. 669 The most successful Turkish peace move was the release of General Sir Charles V. F. Townshend, the hero of the siege of Kut-elAmara in Mesopotamia 1915–16, by the new Turkish Government of Izzet Pasha on October 15. Townshend’s release paved the way for the Turkish armistice and both Melbourne papers gave a brief account of it on November 2. 670 Townshend offered his services for reestablishing peace between Turkey and Great Britain. The British General left Constantinople and arrived in Mitylene on October 20, where he sent a long cable to London outlining Izzet’s peace conditions and which described the internal situation in Turkey. London immediately instructed Townshend to travel to Port Mudros on Lemnos to await further instructions. 671 On October 22 the British War Cabinet, considered the message sent by Townshend and decided that:

668

p.153.

669

FRUS PPC 1918: Supp.1: WW vol.1, pp.359–60 and 428; Dyer, op. cit.,

Argus, “TURKEY’S NOTE TO AMERICA.,” November 2, 1918, p.19; The Age , “TURKEY SURRENDERS...,” November 2, 1918, p.13. 670 The Age, “TURKEY SURRENDERS...,” November 2, 1918, p.13; Argus, “TURKEY SURRENDERS...,” November 2, 1918, p.19. 671 Dyer, op. cit., pp.161–5.

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The Admiral (British Commander-in-Chief in the Mediterranean), therefore, should inform the Turkish Government that he was authorised to receive an accredited representative to arrange the terms of an armistice. A telegram would be sent on the following day informing him of the conditions of an armistice upon which he was to insist. 672

Over the next few days, the War Cabinet continued to discuss the Turkish armistice. On October 31 the War Cabinet received news that Turkey had accepted and signed the armistice, but had made two requests over the armistice clauses. The first of these was that a small number of Turkish soldiers be allowed to remain when the forts were occupied. The War Cabinet categorically rejected this proposal (Clause 1). The second request was that no Greek warships be allowed to proceed to Constantinople or Smyrna, although they were ready to allow Greek warships destined for operations in the Black Sea to pass the Bosphorus at night (Clause 1). The War Cabinet deemed it unwise for Greek warships to proceed to Smyrna and Constantinople. Lord Robert Cecil believed that the presence of Greek warships in Smyrna would lead to problems with Italy. Lord Curzon argued that Allied forces should occupy Constantinople because “Such an action [would be] the surest indication to every Turk that he had been beaten... [He] advocated it very strongly from the point of view of the mentality of the East [Clause 7].” 673 1.1b) Turkey’s capitulation The Ottoman Empire’s acceptance of the Allied armistice terms at Port Mudros, Island of Lemnos, on October 31, 1918 signalled its defeat in the 1914–18 war. This was reflected in the huge banner headlines of the Melbourne press on November 2. Both newspapers reported that Sir George Cave, the British Home Secretary, announced in the House of Commons on October 31 that Turkey had signed the 672

Great Britain, Cabinet Office, Cab.23 series War Cabinet. Cab.23/14 W.C. 489A October 22, 1918 and App.1 Telegram from General Townshend, October 21, 1918. 673 Cab.23/14. W.C. 494A, October 31, 1918; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.93–5; Dyer, op. cit., pp.168–9.

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armistice, which allowed for the free passage of the Allied fleet from the Dardanelles to the Black Sea, the occupation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus fortresses, and the immediate release of Allied prisoners. Furthermore, under the terms of the armistice the British fleet was to occupy Constantinople. Cave also mentioned the role of General Townshend in the armistice deliberations between Turkey and the Allies. 674 The Melbourne public was given the full text of the Turkish armistice which showed the extent of Allied control over Turkey by The Age and Argus on November 4. 675 The Turkish surrender was editorialised in both Melbourne papers. Both of them emphasized the Allied victory over the Turkish army. The Age described it in the following terms: “...To Australia the surrender of Turkey and the opening of the Dardanelles have a special and somewhat grim significance. The Turks were the first enemies encountered by the flower of our young army in Europe.” It continued that “...According to the Allied peace terms, as announced hitherto, her [Turkey’s] European position will be acknowledged...” and “...[it] was proposed that the Dardanelles be neutralised under the agreement between the Powers. These matters remain for the final peace settlement as dictated by the Allies...” 676 674

The Age, “TURKEY SURRENDERS. UNCONDITIONAL CAPITULATION. DARDANELLES OPENED. ALLIED FLEET PASSES THROUGH. CAPITAL AND FORTS TO BE OCCUPIED.,” November 2, 1918, p.13; Argus, “TURKEY SURRENDERS. ARMIES LAY DOWN ARMS. ALLIES ENTER DARDANELLES.,” November 2, 1918, p.19; H.C. Debs., vol.110., cols.1643–4; Cab.23/14 W.C. 494A October 31,1918 which refers to Sir George Cave’s speech to the Commons on the Turkish armistice. 675 NAA, series A2/1, item no. 19/814, Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Government House, Melbourne, November 2, 1918 urgent memorandum signed by George Steward, Official Secretary to Governor-General transmitting telegram from Secretary of Colonies for the Prime Minister relating to the publication of the armistice with Turkey. Copies handed to Acting Prime Minister Watt and also for release in the press; The Age, “THE TURKISH ARMISTICE. ALLIES’ TERMS STATED.,” November 4, 1918, p.7; Argus, “TERMS OF ARMISTICE. OFFICIAL TEXT.,” November 4, 1918, p.7. 676 The Age, November 4, 1918, p.6.

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The Argus, on the other hand, mentioned that “In its immediate bearing on the military situation no less than in its inevitable future consequences the unconditional surrender of Turkey is a signal triumph for the Allies and an overwhelming disaster for Germany.” It concluded that “In the happy ending of the struggle with Turkey we have absolute assurance of the utter failure of German designs upon India and those Eastern sea communications of the Empire which are so essential to the security of this Commonwealth.” 677 Both newspapers stressed that Turkey’s surrender shattered the German dream of having a vast Empire stretching from Berlin to the Persian Gulf. A victorious Germany would have been in a position to threaten British trade in the Near East and sea communications to India. In any case, Germany’s final defeat was not far away. 678 There were, as well, reports in the Melbourne press on November 2, which showed the Turks’ final capitulation in Mesopotamia, which would have delighted many ordinary Melburnians. 679

677

Argus, November 2, 1918, p.18. The Age, November 4, 1918, p.6; Argus, November 2, 1918, p.18. 679 The Age, “THE TIGRIS SURRENDER. Seven Thousand Prisoners.” November 2, 1918, p.13; Argus, “VICTORY ON THE TIGRIS. TURKISH ARMY CAPTURED. 7,000 Prisoners Counted.,” November 2, 1918, p.19; NAA, series CP78/22, item no. 20/290, Operations in Mesopotamia. Milner, Colonial Secretary to Governor-General Sir R. Munro Ferguson, April 30, 1919. Enclosing 8th supplement to London Gazette of April 8, 1919: dispatch of Lt-General Sir W. R. Marshall, Commander-in-Chief of Mesopotamian expeditionary force, for period of October December 31, 1918. The Melbourne public would have been very pleased in late October 1918 with the news of the British Empire’s victories over the Turks. These military triumphs indicated the Turks final collapse was very close. See The Age, “TURKS SMITTEN AGAIN. BRITISH OCCUPY ALEPPO.” & “ADVANCE IN MESOPOTAMIA. Enemy Driven Across Tigris.,” October 29, 1918, p.5; Argus, “ALEPPO TAKEN BY BRITISH. DASHING CAVALRY FEAT. PURSUIT OF RETREATING TURKS.” & “ADVANCE ON TIGRIS. By Mesopotamian Army.,” October 29, 1918, p.5. 678

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1.1c) Australian reactions to the Turkish armistice Both politicians and ordinary citizens received the news of the Turkish armistice with jubilation and enthusiasm. It should be noted that The Age was the only newspaper to publish excerpts of the parliamentary addresses relating to the Turkish armistice. The Argus did not mention the parliamentary statements. It referred only to an answer given by Mr. Watt to the House over regulations which allowed the Federal Government to close down the hotels, if necessary, during the official peace celebrations. 680 The Age reported that in both Houses of Federal Parliament, great excitement and cheering was displayed by politicians from both sides regarding Turkey’s surrender. Acting Prime Minister Mr. Watt read out a telegram from the Colonial Secretary which contained a message from the British Prime Minister to his Australian counterpart which gave details of the Turkish armistice. Mr. Tudor, the leader of the opposition, believed like Watt, that the end of the war was not far away. Senator George Pearce, Minister of Defence, gave the details of Turkey’s capitulation to his colleagues and praised the role and achievements of the Australian Light Horse in defeating the Turks in Palestine. 681 There is no doubt that the Melbourne press accounts of late September and early October 1918 supported George Pearce’s praise of the Australian Light Horse accomplishments in Palestine and Syria. 682 680

The Age, “Announcement in Parliament. AN ENTHUSIASTIC DEMONSTRATION... IN THE SENATE.,” November 2, 1918, p.13; Argus, “PEACE REJOICINGS. Hotels May Be Closed.,” November 2, 1918, p.19. 681 The Age, “Announcement in Parliament. AN ENTHUSIASTIC DEMONSTRATION... IN THE SENATE.,” November 2, 1918, p.13; CPD. vol.LXXXV1., pp.7358–9 &92. For the contribution of the Australian Light Horse in Palestine and Syrian campaigns. See The Age, “PALESTINE CAMPAIGN. THE AUSTRALIAN LIGHT HORSE. GENERAL CHAUVEL’S REPORT. Camouflage in Jordan Valley.,” October 15, 1919, p.10. 682 For eg. see The Age, ‘The Victory in Palestine.... THE TURKISH ROUT. HAIFA AND ACRE CAPTURED... BRILLIANT STRATEGY WINS. Rounding up of the Turks. Fifty Australians Guard 7000 Prisoners.,’ September 25, 1918, p.9; “Work of Anzac Lighthorse.,” September 30, 1918,

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Ordinary citizens had congregated outside the offices of The Age and Argus on November 2 to read of Turkey’s capitulation. News spread very rapidly through the city—telephone exchanges were busy, ordinary people expressed joy, and bells rang out in different parts of Melbourne. People continued to pass outside The Age office to read the news board regarding the latest war cables. One woman was quoted as saying that “My boy is fighting in Palestine” and “Perhaps they will let him come home now. Thank God he will be safe.” There was even a reference to the epithet, the “unspeakable Turk.” 683 The Argus version was restrained compared to that of its competitor. It carried the headline “NEWS IN THE CITY. SUBDUED REJOICING. MEMORIES OF OUR GALLANT DEAD.” This moderation can be seen in the phrase “subdued rejoicing.” Moreover, “subdued rejoicing” meant in the Argus that: there was no tendency to lose self-control in wild displays of enthusiasm. The long time of trial had been too keenly felt for that, and irreparable loss of the noble lives which had been laid down in the great cause forbade any unworthy or meretricious manifestation...

Some people discussed what had developed and what might happen. Both newspapers reported on the elation in the Melbourne Stock Exchange and Melbourne cafes, in Ballarat, Bendigo, Wonthaggi, Sydney, Brisbane, Hobart, and Perth. On November 4, both newspa684

p.7; “PALESTINE TRIUMPH. BRITISH NEAR DAMASCUS.,” October 3, 1918, p.5; “Damascus Entered. AUSTRALIANS FIRST TO ENTER.,” October 4, 1918, p.7; Argus, “Palestine Victory...,” “AUSTRALIAN HORSE 600 Capture 7,000 Turks.,” September 25, 1918, p.15; “PALESTINE COUP. A GREAT TRIUMPH. ENERGETIC LIGHT HORSE.,” September 30, 1918, p.5; “DAMASCUS. BRITISH REACH OUTSKIRTS.,” October 3, 1918, p.5; “DAMASCUS... AUSTRALIANS FIRST INTO THE CITY.,” October 4, 1918, p.7. 683 The Age, “THE DOWNFALL OF THE ENEMY ALLIANCE. REJOICINGS THROUGHOUT AUSTRALIA. CROWD OUTSIDE ‘THE AGE’ OFFICE.,” November 2, 1918, p.13. 684 Argus, “NEWS IN THE CITY. SUBDUED REJOICING. MEMORIES OF OUR GALLANT DEAD.,” November 2, 1918, p.19.

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pers reported on thanksgiving services in Melbourne, Ballarat, and Sydney. 685 The Age and Argus offices, again, became centres of information in early November 1918 for ordinary people who were ecstatic over Turkey’s final surrender. This showed very clearly the importance of newspapers as the main source of information for ordinary people in the post 1918 period. 686 The news of the Turkish armistice is a good example of how a news story had a major impact on the lives of ordinary people. Many Australians had friends, relatives, and sons who had died in Gallipoli, France, Palestine, Syria, and Mesopotamia helping the British Empire defeat the Central Powers. For many people it was time to bring the surviving troops back home. 687 1.1d) Demobilisation and the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 The major problem facing Australia in the post-armistice period was that of demobilising its armed forces. There was also the issue of garrisoning the defeated Ottoman Empire. Both Melbourne newspapers reported on November 2 that the New Zealand Prime Minister, Mr. Massey, had suggested that the Anzacs should be included in the Allied force which would occupy the forts in the Dardanelles. Massey was to cable the Colonial Secretary in London regarding his proposal. He believed the people of New Zealand and Australia would be welldisposed to his idea. 688 On November 5 George Pearce stated correctly that he had not received any details from London regarding the proposition that the Anzacs go to the Dardanelles. While he thought Massey’s idea had 685

The Age, “Country Rejoicings... Other States.,” November 2, 1918, p.13; “Celebrations in Melbourne ... Services of Thanksgiving.,” November 4, 1918, p.7; Argus, “Cheering in the Cafes... Demonstration on Change ... JUBILATION IN SYDNEY...,” November 2, 1918, p.19; “THE EVE OF VICTORY. Germany Self-Destroyed.,” November 4, 1918, p.7. 686 See fn.169 Chapter 1. 687 Measuring the impact of news accounts on ordinary people has been discussed in other parts of this thesis. 688 The Age, “Anzac to Guard Dardanelles.,” November 2, 1918, p.14; Argus, “Mr Massey’s Suggestion.,” November 2, 1918, p.19.

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some merit, he believed that relatives of Australian soldiers would have been displeased about such a proposition. The Australian Government wanted to commence demobilisation of its armed forces. However, the Colonial Secretary informed the Australian Government on November 4 that Australian and New Zealand troops would be included in the Dardanelles occupying force. The GovernorGeneral’s office communicated this information to the Australian Government on November 6. 689 Sending cables marked for the attention of the Australian Prime Minister from the Colonial Office in London to the Governor-General’s office was how Great Britain kept its Dominions informed. 690 Another London cable dispatched on November 7 authorised the Governor-General’s Office to inform the Australian Prime Minister that the Australian press should officially be informed of the decision to send Australian troops to the Dardanelles. It appears that George Pearce passed this information onto the Melbourne press who, in turn, informed their readership on November 8. 691 On November 20, both Melbourne papers reported that George Pearce stated that the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, composed of the 5th, 6th and 7th N.S.W. and Queensland units, was to be sent to the Dardanelles. The 689

The Age, “Guarding the Dardanelles.,” November 4, 1918, p.7; NAA, series A2/1, item no. 19/814, Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Government House, Melbourne, November 6, 1918. Secret Memorandum written by George Steward, Official Secretary to Governor-General, giving details of telegram from Colonial Secretary. London 4th November, 1918 relating to the inclusion of Australian and New Zealand regiments in Dardanelles occupying force. 690 This point will be discussed below. 691 NAA, series A2/1, item no. 19/814, Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Government House, Melbourne, November 8, 1918. Secret Memorandum written by George Steward, Official Secretary to Governor-General, giving details of telegram from Colonial Secretary. London 7th November, 1918. There was no objection to publishing information relating to occupation of Dardanelles by Anzac forces; The Age, “The Dardanelles Forts. TO BE GARRISONED BY ANZACS.,” November 8, 1918, p.7; Argus, “ANZACS ON GALLIPOLI. Ministry Awaiting Details.,” November 8, 1918, p.7.

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Imperial authorities rejected Pearce’s appeal that having volunteers selected from various units go to Gallipoli. 692 According to Henry Gullett, two Anzac regiments left Kantara (Egypt) in late November and landed in Gallipoli on December 5. In their short six week stay at Gallipoli, Australians were involved in “locating the graves of fallen Anzacs, and in collecting trophies for the Australian National Memorial collection.” 693 The dispatch of Australian troops to garrison the Dardanelles forts has to be seen as an emotional issue. It was, after all, from the military disaster of 1915 in Gallipoli that Australian nationhood was founded. The Anzacs were returning to Gallipoli in December 1918 as victors whose military exploits on the Middle Eastern fronts had greatly contributed to the final defeat of the Ottoman Empire. While demobilisation preoccupied the Australian Government over the greater part of 1919, 694 the British Government, like its Australian Dominion, faced the difficult task of demobilising its huge army. 695 This raised the question of maintaining and garrisoning the 692

The Age, “Disposition of A.I.F. Units. LIGHT HORSE AT CONSTANTINOPLE.,” November 20, 1918, p.9; Argus, “AUSTRALIANS IN TURKEY. NO VICTORIANS SENT.,” November 20, 1918, p.9. Gullett states it “was the 7th Light Horse Regiment, under LieutenantColonel Richardson, and the Canterbury Mounted Rifles commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Findlay [from New Zealand]” that went to Gallipoli. See H. S. Gullett, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18: Vol.7 Sinai and Palestine, Angus and Robertson, 1938, p.786. 693 H. S. Gullett, op. cit., pp.786–7. 694 See The Age and Argus, January- October 1919 passim. 695 For news articles in the Melbourne press regarding British demobilisation. See The Age, “THE BRITISH FORCES. Their Present Disposition.,” January 27,1919, p.5 ; “Britain’s Army at the End. A Total 3,500,000.,” February 1, 1919, p.11; Argus, “British Demobilization.,” January 31, 1919, p.5; “British Demobilization.,” February 1,1919, p.17. Winston Churchill’s memorandum of January 19, 1919 titled “The Armies of Occupation” spelled out that Great Britain had some 3,350,000 officers and soldiers in uniform on armistice day on November 11, 1918. Within two months of armistice day some 500,000 men had been discharged. The whole problem was to maintain an army of 1,150,000 men out of a figure of 3,350,000 by releasing all the others as quickly as possible. The armies of oc-

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occupied regions of the former Ottoman Empire. In an afternoon session of the Council of Ten held at the Quai d’Orsay on January 30, Lloyd George told his Allied counterparts that Great Britain could not permanently maintain 1,084,000 men in the Turkish Empire, and tried to achieve two things: that the military burden be shared among the Great Powers; and that the allocation of permanent mandatories in the former Ottoman Empire be resolved. Britain was not prepared to incur huge financial costs in garrisoning the occupied territories. Woodrow Wilson stated that the United States could not participate in the occupation, as they had not declared war against Turkey. The American President suggested the military advisors should make recommendations on the best ways of achieving an equitable military burden in the occupation and control of the former Ottoman Empire. 696 The Melbourne press reported on February 3, 1919 on an official Allied bulletin issued in Paris which instructed the Allied military advisors to report on the best way of equally sharing the military burden. 697 cupation were distributed as follows: Home Army, Armies of the Rhine and Middle East, Detachment of the Far North and of Siberia and Garrisons of the Crown Colonies and India, see Martin. S. Gilbert,Winston S. Churchill: Companion Vol.4 Part 1 Jan 1917–June 1919, William Heinemann, London,1977, pp.463–7. 696 PPW vol.54., pp.369–71; Helmreich, op. cit., pp.28–9. It should be noted that Eleftherios Venizelos talked with Henry White, a member of the American Peace Delegation at Paris, on January 31 regarding a press article referring to a Supreme War Council decision to examine the whole issue of Allied troop distribution in Turkish Empire and how many forces each Allied nation was prepared to supply. The Greek Premier was prepared to make three Divisions available for inclusion in any Allied army to be dispatched to Turkey. White passed this information on to President Wilson. Next day Wilson wrote to White stating that it was dangerous “to send Greek troops to any part of Asia Minor for example because Greece makes claims to certain coast regions there, but ... any claims to participation they may have ought to be considered.” See PPW vol.54., pp.402–3 & 427. 697 Argus, “Position of Turkey.,” February 3, 1919, p.5; The Age, “THE GERMAN COLONIES. DECISION OF COLONIES.,” February 3, 1919, p.5.

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The military representatives, who submitted their report to the Council of Ten on February 5, made the following recommendations. The British, French, and American representatives suggested the military occupation be confined to the territories already occupied because any further military occupation would involve additional costs for the Allies. The Italians objected to this, believing the military occupation should be extended to all territories of the Turkish Empire. Britain was assigned Palestine and Mesopotamia; Cilicia and Syria were allotted to France; and the Caucasus and Konya were given to Italy. It was hoped that any military occupation in Armenia and Kurdistan would be assumed by the United States. There was no possibility of America assuming such responsibilities, since they had not declared war on Turkey. 698 The idea that Australia would contribute troops to garrison the Turkish Empire at a time when the army was being demobilised was looked upon unfavourably by Hughes in Paris and the Cabinet in Melbourne. On January 24 Watt, the Deputy Prime Minister, sent a cable to Hughes to have a record of interview given by the latter to the Paris correspondent of the United Press Association of America in which Australia’s demands at the peace conference were outlined. This interview appeared in the Argus and The Age on January 20. The Cabinet endorsed Hughes’ first three demands. 699 It was point 4) “She [Aus698

NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–18 51 pt.1, W.C.P. 63 Military Representatives to Supreme War Council, “A report on the military occupation of the Turkish territories and Trans-Caucasia.” February 5, 1919. This document was given to Cdr Latham by the British delegation in Paris ; Helmreich, op. cit., pp.29–30. 699 NAA, series CP. 360/8/1, item no.3, Watt to W. M. Hughes 24th January 1919. Hughes demands included: 1. Australia wanted the German islands in the Pacific and exacting indemnities from Germany; 2. She favored the League of Nations but did not want promiscuous immigration and claimed the right to make whatever economic arrangements she pleased; and 3. She was opposed to freedom of the seas which limited Great Britain’s naval supremacy. See Argus , “AUSTRALIA’S DEMANDS. Stated by Mr.Hughes.,” January 20, 1919, p.7; The Age, Australia’s Claims Stated.,” January 20, 1919, p.5.

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tralia] opposes intervention in Russia, but is in favour of military support for Poland,” which the Cabinet in Melbourne misinterpreted. They found it difficult to judge the situation without all the available evidence and relied on the judgment of Allied statesmen to settle such issues. Watt hoped that Australian troops would not be deployed without the consent of Cabinet. Hughes replied to Watts’ cable from Paris on February 9. He found it difficult to comprehend Cabinet’s attitude in letting Allied statesmen take the initiative. Hughes stated: I do not understand your reference to Australian troops taking part in any European campaign. If by that you mean in any project for restoring order in Russia or assisting Poland or in any other of exRussian countries I want to say emphatically that I should not agree to such a thing in any case whether Allied statesmen or anybody else agreed to it. Not one Australian shall go on such an enterprise if I can prevent it. 700

The quotation above could equally have served as an answer to any British Government request to Australia to contribute forces to garrison the former Ottoman Empire. Demobilisation of the Australian Imperial force continued uninterrupted in 1919. Reports on the last Australian units to leave Palestine and Mesopotamia were published in the Melbourne press in August and September 1919. 701 The press reports also mention that an Australian wireless squadron operating in Mesopotamia was to be released from duty on October 15. The names of Australian wireless squadron personnel appeared in the London Gazette of June 3, 1919 in a notice honoring them for their outstanding and gallant services and devotion to duty. 702 Moreover, an Australian wireless squadron was 700

NAA, series CP. 360/8/1, item no.3, Prime Minister Hughes to Deputy Prime Minister Watt Paris 9 February, 1919. 701 Argus, “A.I.F. out of Palestine. Departure of Last Troopship.,” August 16, 1919, p.19; “AUSTRALIAN SPECIAL UNITS. to be released immediately.,” September 22, 1919, p.8; The Age, “Returning Troops. Australians in Mesopotamia to be released shortly.” September 22, 1919, p.7. 702 NAA, series CP. 78/22, item no 20/290, Milner (London) to Governor-General Sir Munro Ferguson, 9 July, 1919 enclosing a copy of the 6th

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engaged in Central Kurdistan in the summer operations of 1919, assisting British and Indian troops to establish law and order in the mountainous regions outside of Mosul. 703 While efforts at demobilisation continued, the Colonial Office provided the Australian Government with some secret cables on the internal situation in Turkey.

1.2 THE INTERNAL SITUATION IN TURKEY 1.2a) Cabinet crises and internal Disorders March–April 1919 The Colonial Office informed the Governor-General’s office on March 7 and 15, and April 17 1919 of the problems faced by the Turkish Government in Constantinople. The first cable outlined that Tewfik Pasha and the Sultan were under pressure from their political opponents for having failed to take strong measures against the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.). Even the ministerial changes made by Tewfik had failed to save his government and he resigned. The British did not reveal the reasons which led to Tewfik’s resignation nor did they speak of the differences that existed among the different political groupings in Constantinople. 704 supplement of the London Gazette dated June 5 listing the names of Australian personnel. 703 NAA, series CP. 78/22, item no. 20/290, Amery for the Colonial Secretary (London) to Governor-General Sir Munro Ferguson, 24 March 1920. Enclosing the 4th supplement to the London Gazette containing a dispatch from Major General Sir George F. Macmunn, officiating C-I-C, Mesopotamian Expeditionary Force describing events from January 1–September 1919; C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War 1914–18 Vol.V The AIF in France, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1939, pp.760–2. 704 NAA, series CP 78/30/1, item no. Box1 , Secret Cablegram from Sec of State for Colonies (London) for Acting Prime Minister, 7 March 1919; Cab 24/145. Eastern Report CX1 March 13,1919, p.4; Turkey Internal. 867.002/47 Samuel Edelman, American Vice Consul, Berne, Switzerland, March 1, 1919 with enclosure Near Eastern Intelligence report, Geneva, February 28, 1919: The New Turkish Cabinet. This report mentioned that “Among the Liberal Turks here (Switzerland) the new Cabinet is considered makeshift composed for the most part of weak and inefficient men, the leading roles being in the hands of Franco and Rechid Bey which would clearly indicate the potential

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The new Cabinet which consisted of Entente Liberale elements had a mean disposition and expressed fierce opposition to the C.U.P. 705 There was no mention of the fact that Damad Ferid Pasha, who was known for his Anglophile leanings, had assumed the position of Grand Vizier. Damad Ferid Pasha was ready to apprehend anyone Britain demanded but his government required financial assistance to carry out its political responsibilities. Admiral Webb’s telegram to London gave some insights into the character of some of the Turkish cabinet ministers. For example, Ali Kemal Bey, an important journalist who wielded considerable power was vehemently opposed to the C.U.P. Abdul Kaddi Effendi, an important Kurdish chief, was given a cabinet post as a reward for the role Kurdistan had played in the Entente Liberale movement. 706

power which will be exercised by the Italian and French Governments respectively.” The political parties in Turkey were divided into 1) Committee— Tejeddud [Renovation] Party, Hurriet Vatan Pervesan [Liberal Popular Party], and Wilson Prinsipieri Osmanli Firkasi [Society of Turks professing the principles of President Wilson]; 2) Anti-Committee CUPs—Selamat-IAmmi [National Security Party], Hurriet-I-L’Italif (Liberty and Unity Party]; 3) Coalitions—Vatan Jemieti [Party of he Fatherland] and; 4) Parties nominally independent—Selamet-E-Osmanie [Ottoman Salvation Party], The Radical party, The Sultanate and Social Democratic Party. The Turkish press was divided along the same political lines. See F.O. 608/115–6726 Enclosure Committee of Union and Progress, Constantinople, compiled by Intelligence Section of British Salonika Force, March 8, 1919; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.95fn.1. 705 The Committee of Union and Progress had a general council and central executive committee and sub-committees in the towns known as “clubs.” These “clubs” were located in Constantinople and the provinces who received their instructions directly from the central executive committee and carried out surveillance over the civil officials and police in their districts. See FO.608/115–6726. 706 NAA, series CP 78/30/1, item no. Box 1, Secret cablegram from Secretary State of Colonies (London) to Acting PM March 15, 1919; Cab.24/145 E.R. CX1, March 13, 1919, p.4; The names of the new Turkish cabinet under

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Against this background both Melbourne papers in March 1919 presented their readers with information relating to the deliberations of the Greek Territorial Commission which was investigating the Greek claims to Smyrna, the Dodecanese, and Thrace. 707 They did not, however, publish any news articles dealing with the Cabinet crisis in Constantinople, probably because they wanted to concentrate their reports on the diplomatic efforts of the Great Powers to resolve the Greek claims. The overall emphasis in the news article was on the dissolution of the old Turkish Empire. At this stage, the Allies had not even considered the peace terms to be offered to Turkey. 708 On March 20, The Age headline, “Will the Turk Be Driven From Europe?” was based on the report of the Paris correspondent of the New York World who stated that Anglo-Indian representatives had expressed their concerns about the expulsion of the Turks from Constantinople to the British Peace Delegation. The expulsion of the Turks raised the possibility of alienating Moslem sympathies when “[they] had supported the Allies during the war.” 709 From an Australian press and diplomatic perspective, the Indian views could not be ignored, as India was an integral part of the British Empire. E. S. Montagu, the Secretary for India, presented a memorandum to the British Empire Delegation on April 3 which supported the Indian Moslem support for retaining the Turks in Constantinople. W. M. Hughes and Sir Joseph Cook, the Australian Minister for the Navy, were also in attendance when Montagu argued the Indian case. 710 Damad Ferid Pasha’s leadership is listed in Turkey Internal 867.002/48 Lewis Heck (Constantinople) to Sec of State, Washington March 13, 1919 . 707 For a discussion of the Greek Territorial Committee see Chapter.2. 708 Argus, “Future of Turkey. Greek Claims in Asia Minor.,” March 5, 1919, p.9; “Near East Decision.,” March 14, p.5; “Territorial Claims. Greece and Turkey.,” March 15, p.19; “Claims of Greece.,” March 20, p.7; The Age , “Readjustment of Frontiers.,” March 5, 1919, p.9; “International Problems.,” March 15, p.13. 709 The Age, “WILL THE TURK BE DRIVEN FROM EUROPE?,” March 20, 1919, p.7. 710 NAA, series CP 351/1, item no. Bundle 4/7, British Empire Delegation 16. Minutes of B.E.D. April 3, 1919; NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace

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Another Colonial Office dispatch of April 17, 1919 described the insecurity and increasing disorders that were prevalent in Turkey. The situation in Smyrna had not improved and Greek and Turkish brigands on the Asiatic side near Constantinople were committing murders. Moreover, there were individuals in the Turkish interior who had no knowledge of the Entente’s victory. Some display of force may have been necessary. There was “news of events at Odessa and Egypt ... leaking out and lending color to the C.U.P. propaganda.” 711 The above cable appears to be a short summary of Admiral Webb’s telegram sent on April 7 from Constantinople to London. The Australian Government was not informed of Damad Ferid’s concerns over the internal situation and activities of the C.U.P. Damad Ferid proposed to Admiral Webb that a central committee be created in Constantinople to find solutions to Turkey’s internal problems. Two Commissions were to be dispatched to the interior under the leadership of a Prince to implement these solutions. Damad Ferid’s idea of having British officers appointed to the central committee and roving commissions was rejected by Webb who told the former that this was a Turkish Government responsibility. Nevertheless, Admiral Webb believed that Damad Ferid’s proposals were framed with the genuine intention of resolving the internal crisis besetting the Empire. 712 It is interesting that parts of Admiral Webb’s telegram appeared on April 23, 1919 in the Melbourne press. This article created the impression that Sultan Mehmed V1 had very little authority outside of Conference 1914–18 51 pt.1, W.C.P. 459 British Empire Delegation. Future of Turkey-Smyrna and Constantinople. Memo by Sec of State for India (circulated with re ference to to BED -16 minute 1). 711 NAA, series CP 78/30/1, item no. Box 1, Secret cablegram from Secretary State of Colonies (London) to Acting PM April 17, 1919. 712 Cab.24/145 E.R. CXV1 April 16, 1919, p.4; The Sultan sent missions to mollify the populations of Anatolia. These missions were composed of high ranking military officers led by a Prince from the Imperial family. There mission objective was to reduce party conflict, racial antipathy and pave the way for national unity. See Turkey Internal 867.00/869. Ravndal, American Consul General (Constantinople) April 24, 1919 via Paris (Wallace) April 28, 1919 to Sec of State, Washington; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.197&fns.74&5.

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Constantinople and that criminal elements controlled the countryside. 713 It also had several omissions which require a brief explanation. Firstly, there was no reference to the troubles in Smyrna, which revolved around opposition to Greek claims to Smyrna by the Italians who, since the armistice, had been increasing their presence in South Western Anatolia. Commodore John Latham, a member of the Australian Peace Delegation at Paris, received a copy of the British Delegation’s discussion of January 31, 1919 over Greek-Italian rivalry in the Near East. It can be presumed that the other members of the Australian Peace Delegation would have read or been aware of the existence of this document. 714 Secondly, there was no information on the events in Odessa or Egypt, or on the activities of the C.U.P. The events in Odessa led to the evacuation of the French and Greek forces who had failed to defeat the Bolsheviks in the Crimea, while in Egypt, nationalist elements were trying to overthrow British rule. There was the fear that Bolshevik agents might make contact with the C.U.P. and Egyptian nationalists with the intention of fomenting troubles against the British. In particular, Bolshevik agents could have stirred up troubles in the Anato713

Argus, “Crime in Turkey. Brigands Roam Country. Christians Fear Massacre.,” April 23, 1919, p.9; The Age, “Disorders in Turkey. Brigands Dominate the Country.,” April 23,1919, p.7. The military Intelligence report describes the organisation and leaders of the CUP. It stated that “The influence of the CUP in the provinces is due largely to the fact that the Government of Turkey is highly organised and that control of the political machine in Constantinople amounts to an almost equal control throughout the Empire... Decentralisation of the Government would do much to weaken the influence of the CUP.” See FO 608/115–6726. 714 Turkey Internal. 867.00/859 Heck (Constantinople) to Sec of State, Washington, March 11, 1919; Cab.24/145. E.R. CXV11, April 23, 1919, p.5; NAA, series A981/1, item no. War and Peace Conference 1914–18 51 Pt. 1, British War Cabinet, W.C.P. 118, Conflicting claims of Italy and Greece in the Near East; F.O. 608/103–4520 Situation at Smyrna summary of events November 30–March 6, 1919 written by D.M.I., March 11, 1919; F.O. 608/94–6634 “Italian activities in Smyrna” 6 April 1919. This report outlines the Italian activities around Smyrna between 30 November 1918–18 March 1919; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., pp.193.fn59 & 95fn.65.

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lian interior. Accordingly, the military censor tried to suppress these news stories. 715 Finally the newspapers offered no explanation regarding the causes of the internal disorders. Ahmed Riza, President of the Senate in the Ottoman Parliament and also head of the newly-formed National Bloc, informed Heck and Admiral Bristol of the American Embassy that the internal anarchy was due to the large number of deserters and demobilised soldiers who found it difficult to return to normal civilian life and resorted to brigandage for survival. As well, Ahmed Riza was censorious of Damad Ferid’s action of continuing the arrests of C.U.P. members. Many ordinary Turks were displeased with the arrests and, believed rightly or wrongly, that Britain and France were responsible for them. 716 715

Cab.24/145. E.R. CXV1, April 16, 1919, p.4; Turkey Internal 867.00/869. Ravndal [Constantinople) April 24, 1919 via Paris ( Wallace) April 28, 1919 to Sec of State, Washington; NAA, series CP. 78/30/1, item no. Box.1, Secret Cablegram from Sec of State for Colonies (London) to Acting PM April 17, 1919. This cable gives a brief description of the FrancoGreek troop evacuation from Odessa and the possibility of Bolshevik agents getting a foothold in Egypt. F.O. 608/115–7383, “Bolshevik propaganda in Turkey,” April 16, 1919 with Enclosure Maj. G. G. Barker, GHQ to High Commissioner, Constantinople, March 19, 1919. This report mentioned that Bolshevik leaflets had been distributed on tramcars and ferries around Constantinople. Senator Abdur Rahman Sheref Bey was purportedly involved in the propaganda campaign. There were CUP elements who wanted to establish close links with the Bolsheviks; Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.191fn.55. It should be noted that references to CUP and Bolshevik contacts appeared in the Melbourne press in early June 1919. See The Age, “Trouble Brewing in Turkey.,” June 5, 1919, p.7; Argus, “Bolsheviks in Turkey.,” June 5, 1919, p.7. 716 Turkey Internal 867.00/867 Lewis Heck (Constantinople) to Sec. of State, Washington, April 2, 1919. The Constantinople press published an Imperial Edict (Irade) on April 3 that Ahmed Riza had been dismissed as President of the Senate. His removal was due to his involvement with the “National Bloc,” a grouping, believed by many non-Moslems to be “too strongly Moslem in its tendencies.” See Turkey Internal 867.00/868 Heck (Constantinople) to Sec of State, Washington, April 4, 1919.

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The April 23 article discussed above stated that the Peace Conference’s verdict on the future of the Turkish Empire was bound to be unfavorably received by the Turks because it raised fears of a wholesale massacre of Christians. The last sentence in the April 23 article contained an element of truth that “the fear [of] a large-scale massacre will occur” of Christians should the Allied delay in settling the Turkish question. This would jeopardise peace in the Near East. However, on May 20, quoting “inspired French comments” (probably referring to an official of the French Foreign Ministry), The Age reported that the Greek occupation of Smyrna was seen “as the first step in the dismemberment of the Turkish Empire.” 717 1.2b) Turkish reactions: Greek occupation of Smyrna May-June 1919 The Colonial cables to Australia on May 24 and 31 are based on Turkish reactions in Constantinople to the Greek occupation of that city. There was no mention of the actual disturbances that occurred in Smyrna. Both telegrams indicated strong Moslem hostility towards the Greeks. A peaceful mass meeting of Moslems took place in Constantinople to protest over the handing over of Smyrna to Greece. Allied Military officials and the Turkish ministry had done everything in their power to maintain law and order in Constantinople. The British High Commissioner believed the veneer of calm that existed would be shattered by some unexpected and trifling incident. A new Turkish Cabinet came into office at a time of national crisis, when it appeared the Turkish Empire was on the verge of disintegrating. 718 As was the case with previous Colonial Office cables, the Australian Government was not told the complete story as to what happened in Constantinople and Smyrna, being informed only that the situation in Turkey was very serious. On May 17 Admiral Webb informed 717

Argus, “Crime in Turkey. Brigands Roam Country. Christians Fear Massacre.,” April 23, 1919, p.9; The Age, “Disorders in Turkey. Brigands Dominate the Country.,” April 23, 1919, p.7 & “How Turkey will be Divided.,” May 20, 1919, p.7. 718 NAA, series CP 78/30/1, item no. Box 1, secret cablegrams from Secretary for Colonies (London) to Acting Prime Minister, May 24 and May 31, 1919.

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London that Morgan’s, the British Consul General, telegram from Smyrna described the looting of Turkish shops and the killing of Turks by both Greek soldiers and citizens. The undisciplined Greek army had failed to maintain law and order on their first day of occupation in Smyrna. 719 The Melbourne press accounts of May and early June 1919 reported on the Greek landing in Smyrna and the dreadful deeds committed by Greek soldiers and citizens on ordinary Turks. Such news stories portrayed the Greeks in an unfavorable light by depicting the Turks momentarily as victims of Greek reprisals. 720 It can be argued that the Colonial Office refrained from passing on such unpleasant information to the Australian government to avoid depicting Greece in a negative light. After all, it was Britain, along with its Allied and Associated partners, who had approved the Smyrna expedition and that Venizelos was considered a loyal and trusted friend of the Entente. However, the Australian Delegation in Paris and Government officials in Melbourne would have read accounts of the Smyrna events in the London, Paris, and Melbourne newspapers. When the Turks were in Paris in June 1919 to present their case before the Supreme Council, an English translation of a document written by Damad Ferid was passed onto Commodore Latham. This document contained a summary of a Turkish report written by Nadir Pasha as to what had happened in Smyrna. 721 In Constantinople, the Sultan’s decree, recommending that the Moslem inhabitants should protest peacefully and refrain from violent 719

Cab.24/145 E.R. CXX1 May 22, 1919, p.3. Argus, “Greeks at Smyrna,” May 19, 1919, p.7; “Future of Turkey. Greeks enter Smyrna.,” May 28, p.9; “Future of Turkey,” May 2, p.7; Argus, “Contention Over Smyrna. The Greek Occupation.,” June 2, p.7; The Age, “Greeks land at Smyrna” May 19, 1919, p.7; “The occupation of Smyrna.,” May 29, p.7 ; “THE GREEKS IN SMYRNA. VENGEANCE ON TURKS. ORGANISED MAN HUNTS. Defenceless Turks Killed.,” June 2, p.7. 721 NAA, series A981/1, item no. War Peace Conference 1914–1918 51 Pt. 1, British War Cabinet W.C.P. 1053 Ottoman Delegation to Peace Conference, June 19, 1919 (Reports of the General Commanding 17th Army Corps, Nadir Pasha of 20–22 May; Commander of Gendarmerie of Smyrna on May 19 ); Petsalis-Diomidis, op. cit., p.208fn.41. 720

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acts was published in the Turkish press. There was a huge Moslem meeting conducted outside the Sultan Ahmed Mosque where Moslem clerics made polemical speeches condemning the Greek occupation. The crowd passed resolutions of allegiance to the Sultan. Turkish women also played a prominent part in the protest meetings, and Turkish businesses in Constantinople had closed as a sign of mourning. 722 Furthermore, a flood of telegrams from the Anatolian interior, addressed to the Sultan, Turkish Cabinet, and Allied High Commissioners, protested against the Greek occupation. In fact, Ravndal, the U.S. High Commissioner in Constantinople, received more than two hundred telegrams from Thrace and Asia Minor where some individuals threatened bloody retaliation. 723 Such specific information as this did not appear in the Melbourne press at all or it was simply missing in the Colonial telegrams. Another omission in the Melbourne press accounts was the resignation of the Turkish Cabinet and the appointment of a new one. This was a matter that primarily concerned the British Government and not Australia. On May 17, the Turkish Cabinet resigned after ten arduous weeks of trying to ameliorate the shocking results of five years of misgovernment. Damad Ferid was reappointed Grand Vizier and Minister of Foreign Affairs, and the new cabinet contained some of the old faces. The new Turkish Government postponed the trial of some the C.U.P. leaders and various political parties appeared to be combining 722

Turkey Internal 867.00/879. Ravndal (Constantinople) May 24, 1919 via Paris (Wallace) May 27 for Sec of State Washington; Turkey Internal 867.00/878. Ravndal (Constantinople) May 24, 1919 via Wallace (Paris) May 26, 1919 to Sec of State; Cab.24/145. E.R. CXX1 May 22, 1919, p.3; Sonyel, op. cit., p.14; Busch, op. cit., p.162. 723. Turkey Internal 867.00/877 Ravndal (Constantinople) May 21, 1919 via Wallace (Paris) May 24, 1919 to Sec of State, Washington; Cab. 24/145 E.R. CXX1 May 22, 1919, p.3. The US Consul at Smyrna who had these translated into English received some telegrams from Turkish communities in Alacheir, Baindir, Salihli, Cassaba, Pergamos, Niphio, Menemen and Aidin. See RG45 Naval Records, Collection of Office of Naval Records Subject file 1911–27: Smyrna Boxes 833–34 (Copies of these telegrams in possession of author); Sonyel, op. cit., p.14.

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into “a unified front against the enemies of Islam as the Greeks are called.” 724 Admiral Webb considered the situation in Asia Minor was fraught with great danger since the Greek occupation. His assertion was proved correct by the unfolding events. In their articles of June and early July 1919 the Melbourne press reported the fighting between Greek troops and Turkish irregulars outside Smyrna and the murder of Christians. These news articles were certainly anti-Turkish in tone. 725 After a long delay the Allies proceeded in imposing their peace terms on Turkey in August 1920. 1.2c) The Treaty of Sevres and its modifications On April 29, 1920 the Colonial office sent a four page cable to the Australian Government in which it summarised the Allied decisions reached at San Remo regarding the Turkish peace settlement. It outlined that: 1) the Chaltaja line was to be the frontier between Greece and Turkey-in-Europe; 2) Smyrna and its hinterland were to be placed under Greek administration with Turkey retaining a nominal suzerainty over this region; Smyrna was to be a free port for the Turkish hinterland, and a plebiscite was to be staged in 5 years time to allow the inhabitants to vote for union with Greece; 3) Britain had the mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine, whereas Syria came under the French mandate; 4) The Armenian issue proved a difficult one in terms of settling the future boundaries. The Allies were disappointed over the US decision to decline the Armenian mandate; 5) Constantinople should remain the Turkish capital. The internationalisation of the Turkish Straits allowed the Allies to control and garrison both shores of the Straits and the Sea of Marmora. The retention of the Sultan’s Government in Constantinople under Allied guns constituted the best available protection for the dispersed Greek and Armenian minorities in Anatolia. Indian Moslem feelings were also taken into account in 724

Cab.24/145 E.R. CXX1 May 22, 1919, p.3; Turkey Internal 867.00/878. Cab.24/145 E.R. CXX1 May 22, 1919, p.3; The Age, “Greeks in Asia Minor. Towns occupied after fight.” June 7, 1919, p.13 ; “Greeks and Turks in Conflict,” June 28, p.13; “Turks murder Greeks,” July 1, p.5; Argus, “Greeks land in Turkey,” June 7, 1919, p.19; “Greeks and Turks fight,” July 2, p.7; “Turks and Greeks. Ottomans murder Greeks,” July 1, p.5. 725

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the decision to keep the Sultan in Constantinople; 6) An inter-Allied Commission was to control Turkish finances; and finally, Britain, France, and Italy had inserted a “self-denying” clause whereby each party agreed not to compete for economic concessions within fixed, specified zones of Anatolia. That is, France and Britain would not compete against Italy in Southern Anatolia while Italy and Britain would not compete against France in Cilicia. Both France and Italy were responsible for the protection of minorities in their allotted area. This was known as the Tripartite Agreement. The telegram concluded that the provisions of the Turkish Treaty, like other peace settlements, was framed on the principle of nationality. Greek, Armenian, and Arab aspirations were being met, while the Treaty permitted Turkey to prevail as a nation state under Allied supervision. It was hoped that Turkey would become a modern and civilised state. The Turks had until May 10 to reach Paris to receive the peace terms, and then were to be given three weeks to respond before the Allies made their final verdict. 726 The Australian Government was not provided with copies of the minutes of the San Remo conference, other than a synopsis of the cable outlined above. The synopsis gave Australian officials some insights into the peace terms to be imposed on Turkey. Details of Allied differences and rivalries were not given to Australia, as Britain regarded this as the prerogative of Whitehall. In any case, the dominant issues reported in the Melbourne press were those regarding the future of Armenia and the Turkish Straits, and Italy’s concerns over Greece’s emergence as a serious rival in the Eastern Mediterranean. From an Australian perspective, the Turkish Straits was by the far the most important issue because of the symbolic importance of the Gallipoli Peninsula in the Australian psyche. Australian policy makers read about these matters in the Melbourne press, in news stories which emanated from official Allied press bulletins issued in San Remo. This would

726

NAA, series CP 317/7, item no. Bun 4, Dycypher of tel. received from Sec of Colonies (London) to Prime Minister, April 29, 1920.

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have provided them with some background information on the Colonial Office dispatches. 727 On May 5, the Colonial Office telegraphed the Governor-General in Melbourne in an attempt to ascertain whether the Australian High Commissioner in London was authorised to sign the Turkish Treaty. J. Starling, the Official Secretary to the General-Governor, forwarded this cable to the Prime Minister’s secretary for a reply. On May 10, Hughes’ approval to the High Commissioner to sign the Turkish treaty on behalf of the Commonwealth was forwarded to J. Starling, who relayed this information to London. Hughes sent a separate cable to Andrew Fisher in London on May 13 informing him of his approval. Sir Robert Garran, the Commonwealth Solicitor-General, was sent copies of some of these cables. This showed that the GovernorGeneral was a channel of communication between Melbourne and the Colonial Office. 728 727

Argus, “ALLIES CONFER. FUTURE OF TURKEY. Gallipoli May be Occupied. USA asked to control Armenia.,” April 22, 1920, p.7; “TERMS FOR TURKEY. Straits to be Opened. Armenian Problem... Italians are Surprised.,” April 26, p.7; “FIXING INDEMNITIES.... Mandate for Armenia... Italy and the Mediterranean.,” April 27, p.7; “... Control of Armenia.,” April 28, p.11; The Age, “SAN REMO CONFERENCE. Armenian Mandate. Caliph Not to be Disturbed. Allies May Occupy Gallipoli.,” April 22, 1920, p.7; “THE TURKISH TREATY. ITALIAN DISSATISFACTION. GREECE UNDULY FAVORED.,” April 27, p.5; “TURKEY’S TREATY OF PEACE.,” April 28, p.9. 728 NAA, series A 981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Government House, Melbourne, May 6, 1920. Memorandum transmitting information from Sec of Colonies, May 5, 1920 to the attention of Prime Minister. Copy to Sir Robert Garran May 11, 1920; Prime Minister’s Dept. Memo for the official secretary to General-Governor to be sent to Sec of Colonies, London. Copy to Sir R. Garran May 11, 1920; Decode of cablegram sent by PM (Rt Hon W.M. Hughes) to High Commissioner for Australia, London, May 13, 1920. Hughes used the Imperial War Conference of 1918 to raise the issue of the Australian Prime Minister having the authority to deal directly with his British counterpart and was annoyed at the restriction of communication to between the Governor-General and the Colonial Office. He questioned the

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As had been the case in Versailles, Australia was given the opportunity to sign the Turkish Treaty as an “independent” nation. The Turkish Treaty signed by Andrew Fisher on August 10 appeared in the Melbourne press two days later. Both Melbourne newspapers spoke of the importance of providing land for the cemeteries in Gallipoli, an issue which directly concerned Australia. 729 Lord Milner, the Colonial Secretary, sent a letter, dated August 20, to the Governor-General informing him of the treaties that had been signed at Paris. Some of the other instruments which Fisher had signed on behalf of Australia were the Thracian Treaty, the Greek and Armenian Minority Treaties, and role of the Governor-General in Dominion affairs. Hughes succeeded in achieving the right of direct access to the British Prime Minister, thus, avoiding both the Governor-General and Colonial Office. In 1920, Hughes succeeded in having his own cipher for direct dealings with the British Government and London’s increasing tendency to forward confidential Foreign Office papers directly to Dominion Prime Ministers further undermined the Governor-General’s position. “From 31 December 1927 the governor-general ceased to be the official of communication between the Australian and British Governments. The functions of coding, decoding and dispatching official correspondence, previously carried out by the Governor-General’s official secretary, were taken over by the cables section of the Prime Minister’s Department.” See W. J. Hudson and M. P. Sharp, Australian Independence: Colony to Relunctant Kingdom, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988, pp.52–3 and 80; Christopher Cunneen, Kings’ Men: Australia’s Governors-General from Hopetoun to Isaacs, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1983, pp.144–6,150– 2,162 &168. 729 The Age, “TURKS SIGN PEACE TREATY.,” August 12, 1920, p.7; Argus, “PEACE WITH TURKEY. Treaty Signed on Tuesday.,” August 12, 1920, p.7; NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 19, 1920–21 The Parliament of Commonwealth of Australia. Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and Turkey signed at Sevres, August 10, 1920. Pt. V1 Graves (articles 218–25) p.30; Fisher informed Hughes that he had signed the Turkish treaty. See Decode of Cablegram received by the Prime Minister (Rt Hon W. M. Hughes) from High Commissioner for Australia, London, August 11, 1920 (recd August 12,1920). The full text of the Treaty of Sevres is in NAA, series A981/1 , item no.War 78 Peace Conf.4 4B 4C, Cmd 964 Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Sevres August 10, 1920.

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the Treaty for Central European frontiers. Milner’s letter was received by the Governor-General’s office on October 1 when, in turn, it was passed onto the Prime Minister. 730 Milner’s letter also referred to the Tripartite Agreement. On November 17, Milner sent another letter to the General-Governor enclosing copies of the Tripartite Agreement and Treaty of Peace with Turkey for the attention of the Australian Government. J. Starling transmitted this information to the Prime Minister on December 26. It is interesting that the Parliamentary library and the Clerks of the Senate and House of Representatives received copies of the Turkish peace Treaty in early April 1921. However, G. A. W. minuted on April 5, on receiving Starling’s dispatch, that he had not seen any copies of the Tripartite Agreement and that all his efforts had proved futile. 731 The author has been unable to find a copy of this agreement in the Australian archives. It is likely the Colonial Office did not send a copy of the Tripartite agreement to the Australian Government. After all, it was the right of the British Government not to provide such information to its Dominions. As a mandatory power, Britain could establish its own economic spheres of influence in Mesopotamia and Palestine. 732 The internal events of November-December 1920, which paved the

730

NAA, series A 981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Lord Milner (10 Downing Street London) to Governor-General Sir Munro Ferguson, August 20, 1920; Commonwealth of Australia, J. Starling, Official Sec to Governor-General to Sec of Prime Minister Dept, October 1 1920 transmitting a copy of Sec for Colonies dispatch. 731 NAA, series A981/1 , item no.Turkey 19 , Lord Milner (10 Downing Street London) to Governor-General Sir Munro Ferguson, November 17, 1920; Commonwealth of Australia, J. Starling. Official Sec to generalgovernor to Sec of Prime Ministers Dept, December 26, 1920. The author cannot identify the individual who initialled Starling’s letter as G. A. W. It appears that GAW was an official of the publicity branch in the Prime Minister’s department. 732 The full text of the Tripartite Agreement is cited in Cmd. 963. No.12, 1920, Tripartite Agreement. Agreement between the British Empire, France and Italy respecting Anatolia, signed at Sevres on 10 August, 1920.

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way for the return of King Constantine to Greece, gave the Allies the opportunity to modify the Treaty of Sevres in favor of Turkey. When the Allies gathered in London to modify the Turkish Treaty in February-March 1921, the Colonial Office continued its customary practice of not providing Australian officials with a copy of the London Conference minutes. On March 1 and 11, 1921 the Colonial Office sent the Governor-General’s office a summary of the Allies’ measures which were intended to modify the Treaty of Sevres. J. Starling relayed this information to the Prime Minister on March 3 and 14. 733 The first cable briefly outlined the appointment of commissions of inquiry to investigate the Greek and Turkish claims to Eastern Thrace and Smyrna. Both countries were to accept the Commission’s findings without demurring and the remaining Treaty articles would remain unchanged. The Allies imposed conditions on the two belligerents for the acceptance of the Commissions that there would be an immediate cessation of hostilities and an exchange of prisoners. The Greeks referred the matter to Athens whereas the Turks accepted the commissions of inquiry. However, the Turks had to consult with Angora with regard to any changes that might be made to the remaining treaty clauses. The Commissions of inquiry which appeared in the Melbourne press on February 28, March 2 and 7, depicted the Turks as being moderate whereas the Greeks were portrayed as uncompromising. Both Melbourne papers reported on March 7 that Kalogeropoulos, the Greek Prime Minister, told the Conference that the Greek National Assembly had unanimously rejected the commissions and that Greece would not surrender its gains under the Treaty of Sevres. The Turkish Nationalists were conciliatory in their acceptance of altera733

NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Cable from Colonial Office (London) received by Governor-General, March 1, 1921 for your PM; Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Government House, March 3, 1921 J. Starling, Official Sec to Governor-General to Sec of Prime Minister’s dept; Cable from Colonial Office (London) received by Governor-General, March 11, 1921 for your PM; Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Government House, March 14, 1921 J. Starling, Official Sec to Governor-General to Sec of Prime Minister’s dept.

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tions to the Sevres Treaty, so long as they were compatible with Turkish aspirations and independence. For the Turks this meant a complete Greek withdrawal from Smyrna. The second Colonial telegram, on March 11, mentioned the rejection of the commissions by Greece. 734 Furthermore the second cable did not allude to any Allied differences. Count Sforza, the Italian Foreign Minister, seized the opportunity to propose that impartial commissions be established to investigate the matter of Eastern Thrace and Smyrna. The French Premier, Briand, supported Sforza’s suggestion, which forced Lloyd George to accept this proposal. In a candid interview conducted at the Foreign Office, de Martino, the Italian Ambassador in London, told Sir Eyre Crowe on March 2 that the commissions of inquiry were an Italian ruse intended to alter the Turkish Treaty and allow the Allies to come to terms with Mustapha Kemal. 735 The Melbourne press did report on February 23 that there were Allied differences with France, who supported the Turks, whereas Britain was unwilling to entrust Christian populations to Turkish rule. Both Allies supported modifications to the Turkish Treaty. 736 734

NAA, series 981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Cable from Colonial Office (London) received by Governor-General, March 1, 1921 for your PM; Cable from Colonial Office (London) received by general-governor, March 11, 1921 for your PM; The Age, “THE SEVRES TREATY. Future of Smyrna and Thrace. A Commission Suggested.,” February 28, 1921, p.7; “Turkish Success Reported.,” March 2, p.9; “THE SEVRES TREATY. Greek Position Stated.,” March 7, p.7; Argus, “TURKEY CLAIMS. Commission Suggested...,” February 28, 1921, p.7; “Concession to Turkey. Sevres Treaty Modified.” & “Greeks reject proposal.,” March 2, p.9 ; “Treaty of Sevres. Modification Opposed.,” March 7, p.7; D.B.F.P. vol.15., pp.174–88,193,199–200, 202, 265–9, 274–7, 279; Turkish Diplomacy, pp.97–9; Busch , op. cit., pp.241–3; Smith, op. cit., p.193. 735 D.B.F.P. vol.15., pp.179, 185, 187–93; D.B.F.P. vol.17., pp.69–70; Turkish Diplomacy, pp.97–9. 736 The Age, “Will Allies Support the Treaty of Sevres. London Conference begins.,” February 23, 1921, p.9; Argus, “ALLIES CONFER. PROBLEM OF TURKEY. Should Treaty be Varied? Some Concessions Likely.,” February 23, 1921, p.9. The Entente was strongly opposed to the return of King Constantine to Greece.

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The most important issues in the second Colonial cable were the Allied compromise over the future of Smyrna and the Allied proposals for modifying the Sevres Treaty. According to the Allied modifications regarding Smyrna: a) Turkey would retain sovereignty over Smyrna; b) Smyrna would be garrisoned by Greek troops, but a gendarmerie under Allied supervision, recruited proportionally from the local population, was to be responsible for order in the remainder of the territory; c) Administration would be shared equally among the parties involved; d) A Christian Governor was to be appointed by the League of Nations Council and Assembly; and e)all these arrangements could be reviewed after five years by the League of Nations on the demand of either party. 737 Both Melbourne papers reported that on March 12, Briand and Sforza were to present the Smyrna proposal to the Turks, and Lloyd George and Curzon to the Greeks. The two belligerents requested time to examine the proposal. The Melbourne press reports indicated that the Greeks had accepted the Allied proposition subject to certain modifications whereas Bekir Sami, the Turkish Nationalist delegate, would need to consult with his Government on his return to Angora. 738 On March 14, based 737

NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Cable from Colonial Office (London) received by Governor-General, March 11, 1921 for your PM; The text of the Smyrna proposals is in D.B.F.P. vol.15., pp.370–1. There is an interesting variation and omission in the Smyrna compromise between the Allied text and Colonial cable of March 11. The Allied text stated in Clause 5 that “A Christian Governor to be appointed by the League of Nations and assisted by an Elective Assembly and an Elective Council” whereas the Colonial cable expressed “Christian Governor to be appointed by League of Nations Elective Assembly and Council.” In clause 7 of Allied compromise “The Christian Governor would be responsible for the payment to the Turkish government of a fixed annual sum which might be augmented with the prosperity of the province. It had better not be called “tribute,” as that term might, for opposite reasons, give both the Greeks and Turks something to cavil at” which did not appear in the Colonial Office cable. See D.B.F.P. vol.15., pp.370–1. 738 The Age, “The Turkish Treaty. Modifications outlined.,” March 12, 1921, p.13; Argus, “GREECE AND TURKEY. Sevres Treaty Modified.

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on an official communique the Melbourne press accounts reported that the Turks protested over the retention of Greek troops in Smyrna and accused the Greeks of being responsible in delaying the peace in the Near East. Lloyd George told the Turks that they had originally accepted the commissions whereas the Greeks had refused. He continued that “The new proposals had been prepared to meet this situation, and entirely suspended the original proposals. They must be examined as a whole, without reference to the previous proposals.” 739 The remainder of the Allied Concessions stipulated that 1) Turkey’s admittance to the League of Nations was conditional on her behaving properly in the execution of the modified treaty; 2) the demilitarised zone on both sides of the Dardanelles and Sea of Marmora were to be reduced; 3) Constantinople and Ismid Peninsula were to be evacuated and Allied occupation confined to Gallipoli and Chanak; 4) The Turkish Finance Minister was to be the honorary President of the Financial Commission. A Turkish envoy was to have a vote on internal Turkish finances and a consultative voice on issues concerning Allied interests; 5) The size of the Turkish army was to be increased; and 6) finally, the Ottoman Government was to recover its freedom in the granting of concessions. 740 Most of the Allied concessions, which showed the Allies determination to try to satisfy most of the Turks’ claims, appeared in the Melbourne press on March 12 and 14. 741 Bekir Sami indicated that these Agreement Now Probable. Governments Need to be Consulted.,” March 12, 1921, p.7; D.B.F.P., vol.15., pp.366–7, 371–2, 377–8 and 381–8. 739 The Age, “News to Turkey. Modification of Treaty. Turks must promise to act honourably.,” March 14, 1921, p.7; Argus, “GREECE AND TURKEY. Modification of Treaty. Assurances Demanded.” & “Terms Announced. Concessions to Turkey.,” March 14, 1921, p.7; D.B.F.P. vol.15., pp.404–7. 740 NAA, series 981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Cable from Colonial Office (London) received by Governor-General, March 11, 1921 for your PM. 741 The Age, “The Turkish Treaty. Modifications outlined.,” March 12, 1921, p.13; “News to Turkey. Modification of Treaty. Turks must promise to act honourably.,” March 14, p.7; Argus, “GREECE AND TURKEY. Sevres Treaty Modified. Agreement Now Probable. Governments Need to be Consulted.,” March 12, 1921, p.7; “GREECE AND TURKEY. Modification of

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new concessions would need the approval of Angora. He suggested the Greeks’ refusal to an international enquiry over Smyrna and Thrace had shown their claims to be baseless, and that the Allies should withdraw their moral support and financial assistance. 742 Before leaving London, Bekir Sami told Lloyd George that it would take him two weeks to return to Angora to present the new Allied proposals to the Grand National Assembly. Lloyd George in return informed Bekir Sami that the quicker Angora approved the Allied proposals, the sooner peace could be established in the Near East. The Prime Minister impressed upon him that Britain had done her utmost to meet Turkish demands and that it would be a great mistake on the part of Angora “... to throw [away the Allied] concessions for the sake of impossible demands in Thrace and elsewhere.” 743 Otherwise, Turkish demands would lead to the resumption of hostilities between Greece and Turkey. The Melbourne press reported on March 22 on Greek mobilisation, and, on April 5 reported that Greeks domiciled in Australia were volunteering to return to fight in Asia Minor. The Greek army was engaged in a short campaign against the Kemalists which ended in a military stalemate. This was reported in the Melbourne press and the story shows that the Greeks dominated the early stages while the Kemalists successfully counter attacked and forced the Greeks to withdraw. 744 A. V. Manianchi, the Greek Consul, sent two letters to the Treaty. Assurances Demanded.” & “Terms Announced. Concessions to Turkey.,” March 14, p.7. The Turkish claims and Allied proposals involved modifying the territorial, political, financial and economic clauses of the Treaty of Sevres. See D.B.F. P vol.15., pp.179–81, 371–81. 742 D.B.F.P. vol.15., pp.406–7; Turkish Diplomacy, p.100. 743 D.B.F.P. vol.15., pp.440–1; Smith , op. cit., p.197. 744 The Age, “Greek Reservists Called.” March 22, 1921, p.7; “Greeks Open Offensive. Hostilities in Asia Minor.,” March 26, p.9; “Fighting in Asia Minor. Both Sides Claim Victory.,” March 28, p.5; “Greek Offensive. Further Turkish Retreat.,” March 29, p.5; “The Greek Advance. Is it a real success? Turkish strategy hinted.,” March 31, p.7; “Fighting in Asia Minor.,” April 2, p.11; “Turks Claim big Victory. Greeks stopped by counter-attack.,” April 5,

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editors of The Age and Argus on the Greek position on March 23 and 28. The first letter explained that the call up of Greek reservists was part of the Royalists’ determination to enforce the Treaty of Sevres by continuing the policy of the previous government in Asia Minor. The Turks could not be relied on to govern other races. Manianchi noted that Greece’s “existence was always bound with the Western powers” and his country “[was]... the medium through which peace in the East [could] be secured.” In the second letter, Manianchi mentioned that the Greek assault on the Brusa front had not altered the situation and that the Greek army was staying in Smyrna. It appears that Manianchi was very critical of the Allies making concessions to the Turks. He was mistaken in his belief that Greece “[was] acting with the full countenance of the allied powers.” The Allies were anti-Greek and the French and Italians supported the Kemalists. 745 There are some similarities and differences between The Age and Argus accounts of April 5. Both newspapers stated the majority of volunteers came from the Queensland cane fields and that very few of them came from Victoria. These young Greeks were imbued with patriotism and the great idea of wanting to help Constantine capture Constantinople. The Age described some of these young Greeks as having “plenty of money and a few of these spoke English” whereas the Argus did not mention this. The Argus stated that some of them were p.7; Argus, “Greeks Mobilising. Athenians Sing War Songs.,” March 22, 1921, p.7; “Fighting in Asia Minor. Claims by Both Sides.,” March 28, p.7; “GREEKS ADVANCE. Turkish Town Bombed...,” March 29, p.5; “Greeks pursuing Turks. Blockade of Asia Minor Threatened.,” March 30, p.7; “FIGHTING IN ASIA MINOR. Greek Advance Unchecked. Did Allies Sanction Campaign?.,” March 31, p.7; “Greeks still Victorious.,” April 1, p.7; “Greco-Turkish war. Both sides claim Victory.,” April 4, p.7; “Fighting in Asia Minor. Greek Forces Checked.,” April 5, p.7; “GREEKS SUFFER REVERSE. Flank Turned by Turks.,” April 7, p.7; “Greeks Admit Retreat. Are they weary of campaign? ,” April 8, p.7. 745 The Age, “Calling up Greek reservists.,” letter to editor, March 23, 1921, p.10; Argus, “Greece and the Allied Powers.,” letter to editor, March 28, 1921, p.7.

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reservists and quoted “one bronzed Greek” who said that “Several thousand of my countrymen from Australia are rallying to the colours, there will be 5,000 men from South Africa and 70,000 from America.” This was indeed a boastful claim. The Age merely reported that the volunteers “insisted they were not reservists and had not been called up.” According to The Age, the Greeks only required a passport to leave Australia compared to the “turbaned Turks” who needed “a special permit, giving ministerial consent to their departure from Australia.” 746 The important issue for Australia, however, was the impact of the London Conference decisions on Australia. On March 1 the Colonial Office stated that a protocol would change the Treaty of Sevres and that Australia would be invited to sign it because it had signed the original treaty. This was contingent on the Greeks and Turks accepting the commissions of enquiry. The Australian Government was to nominate a delegate to sign it, 747 since Andrew Fisher had returned to Australia completing his term as High Commissioner in London. W. M. Hughes sent a cable to his Canadian counterpart on March 10 requesting that the Canadian High Commissioner in London sign the protocol for Australia. Meighen, the Canadian Premier, had no objection to this arrangement. 748 The Prime Minister requested the Governor-General on March 10 to ascertain the date the protocol had to be signed from the Colonial Office. J. Starling’s note to the Prime Minister’s office on March 18 mentioned that there was to be delay of some weeks in the signing of the protocol. Next day Hughes cabled Ottawa informing Meighen that Australia would not be requiring Canadian assistance. For a short time 746

The Age, “Volunteers from Australia. Greeks and Turks going to the front.,” April 5, 1921, p.7; Argus, “GREEKS RETURN HOME. Support for Constantine.,” April 5, 1921, p.7. 747 NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Cable from Colonial Office (London) received by Governor-General, March 1, 1921 for your PM. 748 NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Decode of Cablegram sent by PM (Rt Hon W M Hughes) to PM of Canada, Ottawa, 10 March, 1921; copy of cablegram by the PM (Rt Hon W M Hughes) from PM of Canada, Ottawa, 12 March, 1921; Argus, “MR. FISHER RETURNS. A Hearty WELCOME. “No Complaints.,” March 16, 1921, p.10.

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J. R. Collins, the only Commonwealth official in Europe had been considered to sign the protocol for Australia, but nothing came of this in the end. 749 There is no doubt that the Governor-General, Hughes, and the Cabinet would have read about the Greek and Kemalist positions from the pages of the Melbourne press. Australia looked at trade and the appointment of trade commissioners as a possible way of opening up Australia’s links with the Near East.

1.3 TRADE LINKS WITH THE NEAR EAST Since Australia had no official diplomatic representatives, other than a High Commissioner in London, there was nothing to stop the Australian Government from appointing Trade Commissioners as a way of developing close economic ties with other nations. These commissioners could be viewed as quasi-ambassadors. The Melbourne press printed news articles concerning trade commissioners 750 and, as early as March 749

NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 19, Commonwealth of Australia, Federal Government House March 18, 1921. J. Starling Memo for PM information to Sec of PM transmitting cable from Sec of Colonies, March 17, 1921 regarding protocol originally proposed for modifying Turkish Treaty; Decode of cablegram sent by PM (Rt Hon W M Hughes) to PM of Canada, Ottawa, March 19, 1921. 750 The Age, “TRADE COMMISSIONERS. NEW FEDERAL SERVICE. Representative in China Chosen.” February 28, 1921, p.6; “PRIMARY PRODUCTS NEW MARKETS WANTED. Trade Agencies to be Established.,” November 5, p.13; “TRADE COMMISSIONERS. Do they Stimulate Trade?,” November 9, p.8; “The Commissioner in America.,” February 9, 1922, p.7; Argus, “AUSTRALIAN TRADE. OPENING FOREIGN MARKETS. Trade Commissioner Service.,” February 28, 1921, p.6; “FIELDS FOR NEW TRADE. Growing Eastern Markets. Australia’s Opportunity.,” November 2, p.15; “TRADE WITH AMERICA. Australia’s Opportunities.,” November 7, p.6; “TRADE IN THE EAST. VIEWS OF NEW COMMISSIONER. Australia’s Great Opportunities.,” January 20, 1922, p.6; “TRADE WITH EUROPE. Australia’s Great Opportunity.,” May 11, 1922, p.10. Australia opened up a trade commission in New York in 1918 as a way of forging close links with the USA in the Pacific. This could be seen as Australia’s first steps in establishing links with nations outside the British Empire. It should be noted that Great Britain was the largest export market for Austra-

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1919, the Commonwealth Board of Trade had emphasised to Cabinet the importance of appointing trade commissioners to various overseas centres. There were immediate openings for Australian trade representation in Egypt and Mesopotamia. This indicates that Australian officials were thinking of the Middle East as a region where Australian exports could be expanded. 751 However, no such appointments could be made until Hughes returned from the Paris Conference. This matter was raised at a meeting between Hughes and Commonwealth Board of Trade officials on June 29, 1920, in which the former stated that Australia should have trade representatives in England, Europe, America, India, and the East. Hughes pointed out that Canada had spent a great amount of money in London and that this had turned out to be a good investment for her. Canada succeeded in attaining 240,000,000 pounds worth of war contracts which assisted in meeting all her war costs. Hughes considered the appointment of trade commissioners as a crucial issue which could boost Australian trade. 752 Captain E. D. A. Bagot, an Australian Wireless Squadron officer, in a lecture delivered at the Melbourne Wool Exchange in August 1919 and in a private letter sent to Prime Minister Bruce in August 1923, argued that Mesopotamia offered Australian exporters good opportunities once the Berlin-Bagdad railway was completed. This would help to shorten the distance to London. Bagot even offered his services for representing Australia in Iraq. 753 While

lian primary goods. See Hudson and Sharp, op. cit., pp.63–4; P. G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901– 49, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1983, p.59 751 NAA, series A457/1, item no. AC 306/6, Commonwealth Board of Trade. Minute paper: Subject. Trade Representation of Commonwealth Abroad. March 6, 1919. 752 NAA, series CP703/1, item no. 23/316, Commonwealth Board of Trade, “Australian Trade Representation Abroad” signed by L. E. Stevens. Copy of this forwarded to Sec. of PM’s dept, for information, which clearly set out how the matter stood, signed Percy Whitton. 753 Argus, “TRADE WITH MESOPOTAMIA. Australia’s Opportunity.,” August 14, 1919, p.9; NAA, series A 458/1 , item no. H 510/3, E. D.A. Bagot,

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Great Britain controlled the key strategic points in Suez and the Persian Gulf, Australian exporters could safely export their goods to Europe and the Middle East. 754 Another region which individuals thought might attract Australian trade was Smyrna. On September 20, 1920 S. Polychroniadis, the Greek Charge d’Affaires in London, sent a letter to Curzon explaining that Manianchi, the Greek Consul in Melbourne, had contacted the Department of Trade and Customs to seek clarification regarding the distinctions made of trade between Smyrna and Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine. Manianchi was referred to the Governor-General’s proclamation of January 14, 1920, which stated that Syria, Mesopotamia, and Palestine, as former territories of the Turkish Empire, were administered by Allied Governments whereas Smyrna remained under Turkish sovereignty. For this reason, the proclamation prohibited imports and exports between Smyrna and Australia. Polychroniadis urged Curzon to exempt Smyrna from the January 14 proclamation, arguing that this region was under Allied control. He believed that “direct commercial intercourse between [Smyrna] and Australia might be of benefit as well

Woodville South Aust to Rt Hon S. M. Bruce, Prime Minister, Federal Parliament, Melbourne: “Official Representation in Iraq” August 7, 1923. 754 In December 1921 Australia trade representatives were in the following locations: E. S. Little, Government Trade Commissioner, Shanghai China, C. H. Voss, Commercial Agent, Paris France, and M. Sheldon, Commissioner for Commonwealth , New York USA. J. B. Suttor was commercial commissioner for N.S.W. in Kobe Japan. Canada was by far the most enterprising of the Dominions with trade representatives in Buenos Aires [Argentina], Brussels [Belgium], Rio de Janeiro [Brasil], Shanghai, Havana [Cuba], Paris [France], Rotterdam [Holland], Milan [Italy], Yokohama [Japan], New York [USA] and Christiana [Norway]. The representative of the Canadian External Affairs department [M. M. Maloney] in Washington used the British Embassy. See CO 532/216 -11691 “Dominion Commercial Representatives in Foreign Countries.” March 10,1922.

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to the interests of the United Kingdom as to the inhabitants of [Smyrna].” 755 It would appear that Curzon passed this information onto Milner. On October 4, Milner notified the Governor-General that Curzon had advised him that Greek troops had initially been sent under Allied authority and that they would remain in Smyrna pending the ratification of the Turkish Treaty. The Governor-General passed Milner’s communication to the Prime Minister’s department, stating that trade could be resumed between Smyrna and Australia. 756 It can be seen that the summary cables from the Colonial Office in 1919–21 provided Australian officials with some of the detail on the unfolding events in Anatolia. The newspapers provided Australian policymakers with another perspective on the Greek-Turkish conflict. Since Australia did not have diplomatic links with the Near East, it was considering Mesopotamia, Egypt, and possibly Smyrna as regions in which to foster future Australian trade opportunities. Hughes was a nationalist who sought to chart an “independent” Australian foreign policy within an Imperial framework. The 1921 Imperial Conference would give Hughes the opportunity to question British foreign policy.

2. THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE 1921 Hughes encouraged the British Government to hold the 1921 Imperial Conference in London. He cabled Lloyd George on October 7, 1920 advising him that: In my opinion it is absolutely essential that Dominion Prime Ministers should meet in London next year. We ought not in fact we dare not allow ourselves to drift along. The necessity for clear un755

NAA, series CP78/22, item no. 20/961, S. Polychroniadis, Charge d’Affaires, Legation de Greece, to Earl Curzon, H.M. Sec. of State for Foreign Affairs, September 20, 1920; Commonwealth of Australia Gazette, no.3 January 14, 1920. 756 NAA, series CP 78/22, item no. 20/961, Milner (London) to Governor-General Sir Munro Ferguson, October 4. Received by GovernorGeneral’s office on November 18, 1920, copy to PM November 18, 1920; R. Shepherd, Sec PM’s Dept to Official Sec to Governor-General, November 30, 1920.

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derstanding—policy—call it what you will on certain matters vitally affecting Empire is urgent and obvious... the British Government shapes its policy in [the] main without consultation with or even notification to Dominions whose very existence may be virtually affected thereby eg. Egypt India... I most earnestly recommend that you call a meeting of the Dominion Prime Ministers next year in London—say about June. Delay for another year is most dangerous.

This cable was sent through the customary channels to the Colonial Office, where Milner promptly forwarded it to Lloyd George, who responded positively to Hughes’ suggestion. 757 It was important to Hughes that the Dominions be consulted and involved in the formulation of the Empire’s foreign policy. On June 16, 1921 both Melbourne papers reported on a speech given by Hughes at a luncheon in London in which he stated that the two crucial issues facing the Empire were defence and foreign affairs. He also mentioned “the sound of war in the Near East.” 758 Lloyd George’s opening address at the Imperial conference was published in the Melbourne press on June 22. He outlined some of the important issues to be covered by the Conference. These included: the reparations issue; maintaining Japanese friendship by renewing the Anglo-Japanese Treaty; making peace with Turkey; and the enforcement of the peace treaties. The Dominions’ new status allowed them to be “as equal partners in dignity and responsibility in the British Commonwealth of Nations.” C. P. Smith of the Argus accompanied Hughes to London and his news articles on the Imperial Conference appeared in the Melbourne press. 759 757

Hardinge, op. cit., pp.459–61. The Age, “Mr Hughes in London. Speech at Luncheon.,” June 16, 1921, p.7; Argus, “IMPERIAL PROBLEMS. SPEECH BY MR HUGHES...,” June 16, 1921, p.7. 759 The Age, “IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OPENING CEREMONY.,” June 22, 1921, p.9; Argus, “EMPIRE AFFAIRS. CONFERENCE OPENS. MR LLOYD GEORGE SPEAKS.,” June 22, 1921, p.7. Great Britain, House of Commons, Reports from Commissioners, vol.X1V sess. 1 1921, Cmd. 1474. Imperial Conference Proceedings and Documents: Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of U.K., the Dominions and India held in June, July and 758

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Hughes’ opening speech of June 21 gave him the opportunity to query Britain’s foreign policy. He asked: I am sure you will quite understand our desire to know the reasons for your policy in Mesopotamia, in Palestine, in Russia, in Egypt, and your policy in Greece and Turkey. If I have singled these things out it is not because they cover the whole field of foreign policy but because these matters are perhaps the most obvious.

Hughes divided British foreign policy into two parts: present and future. The present, he argued allowed all shades of opinions to be expressed which made amendments to foreign policy easier. However, the past involved uncertainty, which would deprive the Dominions of an effective voice on foreign policy. Hughes complained that they might be told of a decision only after it had been made, or might not be consulted beforehand. This problem could be overcome by improving communications between London and the Dominion capitals, which Hughes considered essential. Hughes complained that while the press was able to provide “a good imitation of the substance” of official telegrams, the telegrams themselves were delayed in transmission for several days. 760 Next day Curzon provided the Conference with an excellent historical summary of the Greek-Turkish conflict. He stated that the Allies in Paris had appealed to the Greeks to accept Allied mediation but that they were about to renew hostilities against the Turks. Hughes outlined the Australian attitude to the Greek-Turkish war. He stated: The general feeling of the people of Australia, at any rate, I think, ... is that we ought not to be involved in this trouble. We ought not to spend one shilling or to risk one life to further the ambitious August 1921. Summary of proceedings and documents. App.1 Opening speech by Lloyd George June 20, 1921, pp.11–15; Historical Record of the Argus, “Expeditions abroad” pp.3–4. For a discussion on the Anglo-Japanese treaty and other issues at the Imperial conference. See Peter Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1983, pp.222–9; Hardinge, op. cit., pp.468–9. 760 NAA, series A4640/1 item no.14, Imperial Meetings 1921 vol.1 E2 June 21, 1921, pp.2–3 ; Cmd 1474. pp.18–19.

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projects of King Constantine... I could not help thinking, while he was speaking, how mysteriously the finger of Providence moves. A monkey, we are told, has done this thing. He bit Alexander so sorely that he sickened and died! But why did he stop there? Why did he only bite King Alexander?

The Melbourne press reports of July 2 captured the essence of Hughes’ comments—that the monkey bite had resulted in “Treasure [being] poured out and human lives sacrificed in a bloody war.” 761 Hughes had contempt for the Greeks, a feeling which had emerged during the 1914–18 war and admiration for the Turks. He believed that it was important to conciliate Moslem feelings. He probably thought that Moslem uprisings in Egypt, Mesopotamia, and India would have a deleterious affect on British strategic interests in Suez and the Persian Gulf and that the Kemalists were in a strong position to stir up Moslem passions in Mesopotamia and the Arab world. Perhaps the Australian Prime Minister considered it important to come to terms with Mustapha Kemal. 762 It could be argued that Hughes was unhappy with the early Greek successes and elated when the Kemalists finally checked the Greek advance on Angora in September 1921. This can be evidenced from his anti-Greek remarks at the Imperial Conference. 763 After his return from London, Hughes addressed Federal Parliament on September 30, highlighting the achievements of the Imperial 761

NAA, series 4640/1, item no. 14, E4 June 22, 1921, pp.11–4; E5 June 22, 1922, 4–30pm, p.6; Hardinge, op. cit., p.485; The Age, “The Bite of Monkey. Mr Hughes Epigrammatic.,” July 2, 1921, p.13; Argus, “The Bite of Monkey. Mr Hughes at War.,” July 2, 1921, p.19. 762 NAA, series A4640/1, item no. 14, E5, pp.6–7. 763 See The Age, “A Greek Offensive.,” July 14, 1921, p.7; “Asia Minor Hostilities. Greek successes reported.,” July 21, p.7; “Hostilities in Asia Minor. Further Greek Successes.,” July 25, p.7; “Greek Victory in Asia Minor.,” August 4, p.7; “Greek Army in Retreat. ... Intervention now Sought.,” September 20, p.9; Argus, “Fighting in Asia Minor. Greeks occupy Eskishehr.,” July 23, 1921, p.17; “TURKS OVERWHELMED. ROUTED BY GREEK FORCES...,” July 28, p.7; “PLIGHTOF KEMALISTS. Equipment Inadequate. Populace Welcomes Greeks.,” August 4, p.7.

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Conference. He mentioned the change in the relationship between Britain and the Dominions whereby the latter was to have a voice in the formulation of the Empire’s foreign policy. Furthermore, he added Dominion leaders were shown copies of inward and outward Foreign Office cables dealing with foreign issues, which was indeed a major advance for the Dominions. Hughes also mentioned that Australia with its five and a half million inhabitants was a negligible force in international affairs, but that as a member of the Empire “she spoke in trumpet tones that were heard and heeded throughout the earth.” Egypt was considered of vital importance to Australia due to its pivotal position in the lines of communications with Britain. The AngloJapanese Treaty and the Pacific were two issues which Hughes placed great emphasis on, especially as these were of primary concern to Australia’s defence and security. What is interesting is that the GreekTurkish war only got a passing mention in his speech. 764 The Age editorial of October 1 was critical of Hughes’ questioning of Lloyd George over Britain’s policy in Mesopotamia, Greece, and Turkey. It continued that: In what terms did Mr Hughes express Australia’s excited views on these outlandish affairs and what are those views? What are for instance Australia’s aspirations in the matter of Anatolia? How many Australians know where it is? ... He must not mistake his own voice for that of the Commonwealth. When he says Australia demands consultation about remote parts of the world of which it knows nothing, he is palpably and grievously mistaken. We shall not go blindly along the road to war through ignorance of Anatolia; on the contrary we are likely to encounter serious trouble by foolish and ignorant interference with other people’s business. Australia wants to be consulted only in her own direct concerns.

It would appear The Age saw Hughes’ meddling over Imperial policy in Anatolia as something dangerous which might involve Australia in a future war. Indeed, the editorial was prophetic, as was to be borne 764

Argus, “IMPERIAL CONFERENCE. REVIEW BY MR. HUGHES. OBSTACLES TO DISARMAMENT. PROBLEMS OF THE PACIFIC.,” October 1, 1921, p.19; CPD vol.XCV11 1920–1, pp.11630–45.

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out by the events in Chanak in September 1922. The Age reminded its readers that no Australian naval or military expedition could leave without the sanction of Parliament. It thought that under the circumstances the Imperial conference had been unnecessary. 765 The Chanak crisis was to sharply expose the myth of Imperial consultation and resulted in a conflict between Imperial and Australian national interests.

3. THE CHANAK CRISIS AND THE LAUSANNE CONFERENCE This section will focus on three areas relating to the Chanak emergency as it concerned Australia: firstly, the reactions of Australian politicians and discussions in the Federal Parliament regarding the crisis; second, the response of ordinary Australian citizens to the crisis; and, finally, Australian attempts to seek League of Nations mediation will be explored. The abatement of the Chanak crisis in early October 1922 allowed the Allies and Greece and Turkey to negotiate an armistice in Mudania which temporarily halted the Greek-Turkish conflict. The ensuing discussions in Lausanne in 1922–23 finally led to the establishment of peace in the Near East. However, Australian participation in the Lausanne Conference was refused by the British Government, and the issue of Anzac graves at Gallipoli was the one issue which primarily concerned Australia. 3a) Australian political reactions and parliamentary debates On September 15, 1922 the British Cabinet met at 4 p.m. to discuss the growing Kemalist threat around Chanak, a town located on the Asiatic side of the Dardanelles. Sir Hamar Greenwood, the Chief Secretary for Ireland, recommended that Australasia be invited to collaborate with Britain. The War Minister, Sir L. Worthington-Evans, supported the idea of Dominion assistance. Lloyd George sent a cable drafted by

765

The Age, October 1, 1921 [editorial].

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Winston Churchill, the Colonial Secretary, to Dominion Prime Ministers later that evening to elicit their support. 766 Lloyd George’s dispatch was couched in emotional language designed specifically to appeal to Dominion sentiment. It stated that: I should be glad to know whether the Government of Commonwealth of Australia wish to associate themselves with the action we are taking and whether they would desire to be represented by a contingent. Apart altogether from the vital Imperial and world-wide interests in freedom of Straits for which such immense sacrifices were made made in the war, we cannot forget that the Gallipoli Peninsula contains over twenty thousand British and Anzac graves and that these should fall into the ruthless hands of Kemalists would be an abiding source of grief to the Empire. The announcement that all or any of the Dominions were prepared to send contingents even of moderate size would undoubtedly in itself exercise a most favourable influence on the situation and might conceivably be a potent factor in preventing actual hostilities. 767

The cable was received early Saturday afternoon at Government House in Melbourne and passed on to Hughes at Sassafras on the afternoon of Sunday September 17. Hughes consulted as many of his colleagues as he could find and issued a press statement regarding the Turkish situation. The Australian leader was prepared to send an Australian contingent “if circumstances required,” and the Australian Parliament was to be given the opportunity to “express its opinion on the

766

Cab.23/31, 49/22 Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at No.10 Downing Street, Friday September 15, 1922 at 4p.m.; Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p.486; Spartalis, op. cit., p.235. 767 NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 20, Prime Minister Secret Decypher of cablegram received by Governor General from Colonial Secretary, September 16, 1922; Spartalis, op. cit., pp.235–6; Peter M. Sales, “W. M. Hughes and the Chanak Crisis of 1922,” in Journal of Politics and History, vol.XV11, no.2, December 1971, pp.393–4.

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whole matter.” Both The Age and Argus published Hughes’ public statement regarding Lloyd George’s request for Australian assistance. 768 The Melbourne press reports of September 18 and 19 reflected the dangerous and tense situation unfolding in Chanak, which raised the possibility that Australia would become embroiled in an AngloTurkish conflict near the Dardanelles. The British were taking military and naval precautions to prevent the Kemalists from crossing over into Europe to pursue the Greek army. 769 Moreover, the Argus editorial of September 18, titled “NEAR EAST CRISIS,” blamed Greece for the crisis that had broken out in the Near East. According to the editorial the Allies could have prevented it had they been united at all stages in the Greek-Turkish conflict. Nevertheless, the British dispatch was viewed positively as a sign that the Dominions were being consulted in a matter of importance to the Empire. While the dispatch of Australian troops would depend on future developments, the editorial had a favorable view of the fact that “The British Government considers that the mere offer of Dominion troops might be a potent factor in preventing actual hostilities.” The editorial was concerned that “PanIslam768

Fitzhardinge, op. cit., pp.486–7; Spartalis, op. cit., p.237; Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, Session 1922, vol.2 pt.2, Statement made by Prime Minister re Turkish Situation; Argus, “MR HUGHES’S REPLY. GREAT BRITAIN SUPPORTED. PREPARED TO SEND TROOPS. PARLIAMENT TO BE CONSULTED.,” September 18, 1922, p.7; The Age, “NEAR EAST WAR CLOUD. BRITAIN CALLS ON THE DOMINIONS. AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT PROMISED IF NEEDED. DISCUSSION BY PARLIAMENT TO-MORROW.,” September 18, 1922, p.7. 769 Argus, “MENACE OF WAR. CRISIS IN NEAR EAST. FREEDOM OF DARDANELLES. BRITAIN’S MESSAGE TO DOMINIONS. CONTINGENTS OF TROOPS INVITED.,” September 18, 1922, p.7 and “NEAR EAST CRISIS. SITUATION STILL TENSE. BRITISH TROOPS AT CHANAK. EMPIRE READY TO SEND HELP.,” September 19, 1922, p.7; The Age, “NEW WAR SMOULDERING. ALLIES TAKE GRAVE ACTION. APPEAL TO DOMINIONS. CONTINGENTS INVITED.,” September 18, 1922, p.7 and “The Rampant Turks... ALLIED TROOPS ENTRENCH ON DARDANELLES COAST.” & “AUSTRALIA’S PART. SHOULD TROOPS BE SENT? CABINET MEETING SUMMONED...,” September 19, 1922, p.9.

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ism ... being trumpeted throughout Egypt and India” was something that Australia could not ignore in terms of “the supreme value to the Empire of these gateways to the East.” The Age editorial of September 19 was both anti-Greek and antiTurkish in tone, the referring to Turkey as “the unspeakable Turk” and the Greeks as “the shifty Greek.” It broached almost the same issues as the Argus editorial. Although, The Age thought “the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean” was not “sufficiently grave to threaten Imperial danger [and that] there [was] force enough at hand to put the rebellious Turk in his place and to maintain the neutrality of the Straits,” it concluded that, “for the sake of peace …the Dominions [should] range their strength beside that of the mother country, believing as they do, that the British Empire is a great world force that gives humanity hope of a return to reason.” 770 In both editorials there seemed to be underlying support for Hughes’ initial public response to the Lloyd George cable. Some Australian politicians supported Hughes’ public stance and others were vehemently opposed to it. Massey Greene, the Minister of Defence, Sir Ryrie Granville, the Assistant Defence Minister, Dr. Earle Page, the Country Party leader, and Sir Henry Barwell, the South Australian Premier, endorsed Hughes’ action. They hoped that the Chanak crisis would be resolved by diplomatic means, but agreed that, if hostilities did begin, Australia would assist Britain as in 1914. On September 18, a military conference held in Sydney, attended by the Minister and Assistant Minister of Defence and Sir Harry Chauvel, Inspector-General of Australian forces, discussed the possibility of dispatching one division if hostilities did break out. Sir Harry Chauvel added that he “had much to do with Kemal Pasha after the armistice” and regarded him “as a very able soldier.” He considered that “the Turk properly led [was] a very tough proposition.” 771 770

Argus, “NEAR EAST CRISIS.” [editorial], September 18, 1922, p.6; The Age, September 19, 1922, p.9. 771 Argus, “IF WAR OCCURS. OTHER LEADERS’ VIEWS. MINISTER FOR DEFENCE.,” “Country Party’s Support.,” “Anything Might Happen” Sir Harry Chauvel’s View.,” “OPINION OF LABOR. Mr Charlton Suggests Referendum.,” September 18, 1922, p.7; “STATE LABOR VIEW.

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The Australian Labor Party and the Trade Union Movement accused Hughes of committing Australian troops without consulting the Australian people. 772 Matthew Charlton, the Federal Labor Party opposition leader, believed that the Australian people should be allowed to express their opinion in a referendum and “could not see any reason why Australia should become involved in a struggle against the Kemalists.” The Victorian State Labor leader, Mr. Prendergast, endorsed Charlton’s views. Another Federal Labor, MP Mr. Brennan, described the Chanak crisis as a “gigantic game of bluff.” 773 In its editorial of September 18, the Argus ridiculed Charlton’s referendum proposal as well as Prendergast’s support of it. 774At the same time, the Victorian Trades Hall Council and the Brisbane branch of the Waterside Workers’ Federation passed resolutions condemning Hughes’ stance. The former was concerned about unemployment among ex-soldiers and ordinary workers and condemned the secret diplomacy that had contributed to the Chanak crisis. The Council of Action, composed of miners and engineers in Sydney, proposed to use the strike weapon in key industries such as “the manufacture of army supplies and transport of troops and war equipment” to prevent the dispatch of Australian troops to the Near East. 775 Mr Prendergast’s Objections.,” “MILITARY CONFERENCE. Australia’s Contribution.,” September 19, 1922, p.7; The Age, “AN AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT. Provisional Arrangements. TO GET THE FORCE OFF.,” September 18, 1922, p.7; “Labor Party’s attitude. Mr Charlton Opposes the War.,” “Gigantic Game of Bluff. VIEWS OF MR BRENNAN M.P.,” “State Labor Leader’s Views.,” “Speech by South Australian Premier.,” “Country Party’s Position. MR PAGE URGES CO-OPERATION.” September 19, 1922, p.9. 772 The accusation levelled against Hughes will be examined below. 773 Argus, “OPINION OF LABOR. Mr Charlton Suggests Referendum.,” September 18, 1922, p.7; “STATE LABOR VIEW. Mr Prendergast’s Objections.,” September 19, 1922, p.7; The Age, “Labor Party’s attitude. Mr Charlton Opposes the War.,” “Gigantic Game of Bluff. VIEWS OF MR BRENNAN M.P.,” “State Labor Leader’s Views.,” September 19, 1922, p.9. 774 Argus, September 19, 1922, p.7. 775. The Age, “ATTITUDE OF LABOR. TRADES COUNCIL RESOLUTION.,” September 22, 1922, p.9; “WATERSIDE WORKERS’ VIEW.

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The Federal Parliament was the major forum where the politicians could discuss the Chanak crisis. On September 19, Hughes informed the House of Representatives on the events surrounding the receipt of the Lloyd George cable and on the importance of Australia associating itself with Britain for the sake of Imperial unity. Australia was not interested in Greek-Turkish differences. Hughes considered it important for Australia to be provided with the “fullest information ... by the British Government.” Australia was prepared, however, “to uphold the provisions of the Sevres Treaty against the Kemalist attacks. The integrity of the hinterland of Gallipoli is essential for the preservation of freedom of the Straits.” On the other hand, it was unnecessary, Hughes said, “for any individual to offer their military service.” 776 Charlton outlined his party’s opposition to conscription and believed that secret diplomacy had contributed to the war. He supported a referendum on the dispatch of Australian troops. Earle Page, however, stated that “We shall support Great Britain in demanding the freedom of the Straits and will fight shoulder to shoulder with her until we have secured a successful issue of the conflict.” Sir Robert Best supported Earle Page’s position and found Charlton’s referendum proposal as “utterly futile and impractical.” 777 ‘THE AMAZING AUDACITY OF MR HUGHES.,’” September 21, 1922, p.9; “Labor Issues Manifesto. THREAT TO ORGANISE STRIKES TO PREVENT WAR.,” October 2, 1922, p.9; Argus, “STRIKES TO PREVENT WARS. TRADES HALL POLICY. “No Munitions and No Transport.,” October 2, 1922, p.7. 776 CPD [House of Representatives] vol.C, pp.2347–50; The Age, “Where Australia Stands. Co-operation with Great Britain. IMPORTANT RESERVATIONS. ‘NO FILIBUSTERING EXPEDITIONS.’ Whole-Hearted Support for Vital Principles. IMMEDIATE ACTION NOT NECESSARY. GOVERNMENT’S PLEDGE ENDORSED.,” September 20, 1922, p.11; Argus, “AUSTRALIA’S DUTY. WILL FIGHT IF NECESSARY. EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE. Speech by Mr. Hughes.,” September 20, 1922, p.11; Sales, op. cit., p.399. 777 C.P.D. [House of Representatives] vol.C, pp.2351–2 and 2356–7. The Senate debate on Hughes’ statement on the Near East. See C.P.D. vol.C [Senate] September 20, 1922, pp.2399–2423; The Age, “IN THE SENATE. Approving

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Both The Age and Argus editorials of September 20 were very critical of Charlton’s referendum proposal and seriously questioned the Labor Party’s attitude towards the war. Hughes’ parliamentary speech was regarded as moderate in tone and as sanctioning Australia’s association with Britain at such a crucial moment in the aftermath of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Nevertheless, both newspapers indicated that the Dominions were under no obligation to assist Great Britain. The Argus editorial concluded that “There was only one material point before the House yesterday, and Mr. Charlton skilfully evaded it. Does Australia share with Great Britain responsibilities in the Dardanelles, and are he and his party willing that Australia should meet those responsibilities?” 778 The Age editorial expressed some opinions that were different from those of its competitor. Firstly, Earle Page was criticised for saying “If Great Britain [goes] to war ... Australia as part of the Empire is at war as well.” As well, the newspaper thought it was indisputable that the parliamentary session had been held with elections in mind. Finally, Hughes’ National Government, whether in foreign or domestic affairs, was considered by the newspaper as “an infliction and offence to decent administration. Disastrous failures and political bribery are not necessarily recommendations for leadership when the country is threatened with the dangers from without.” Furthermore, the editorial concluded, “A Liberal Government, recruited from town and country will be much safer for the country both in war and peace” than Hughes’ National administration. 779

motion carried.,” September 21, 1922, p.10; Argus, “AUSTRALIA’S REPLY...,” September 21, 1922, p.9. 778 The Age, September 20, 1922, p.10; Argus, “THE WAR CLOUD.” (Ed), September 20, 1922, p.10. 779 The Age, September 20, 1922, p.10. The press reports for staging a Federal election are in The Age, “THE FEDERAL ELECTIONS. OFFICIAL ANNOUNCEMENT. POLLS IN DECEMBER. Parliament to Finish Next Week.,” October 6, 1922, p.9; Argus, “FEDERAL ELECTIONS. ‘BEFORE CHRISTMAS.’ MINISTERIAL STATEMENT. Session to end Next Week.,” October 6, 1922, p.9.

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

From September 26 to 30, the Kemalists continued to build up their military force outside the neutral zone in Chanak that meant that an Anglo-Turkish war was still a distinct possibility. The Melbourne press captured the way the situation that was evolving around Chanak was reaching a climax. It also appeared that the Allies were trying to prevent a new war and were prepared to make concessions to the Turks. Furthermore, the establishment of peace with the Angora Government and the settling of outstanding issues between Greece and Turkey was of the highest priority for the Allies. 780 On September 29, Hughes used the House of Representatives to warn Mustapha Kemal that “in the Great War, we put far more troops into the field than ever Turkey could maintain today and if occasion 780.

Argus, “REAL ENTENTE-CORDIALE. FRENCH PRESS PRAISING BRITAIN. WILL TURKS ACCEPT ALLIED NOTE? MAY LOSE FRENCH AND ITALIAN SUPPORT.,” “PEACE OF EUROPE.” PRETTY WELL ASSURED.” Lord Curzon Leaves Paris. “Anglo-French Unity Preserved.,” ‘TURKS IN NEUTRAL ZONE. Retire ar British Command.,’ September 26, 1922, p.19; ‘TURKS AND NEUTRAL ZONE. ALLIES’ STERN ORDER.” Go Out or be Driven Out.”Was Raid Authorised?,’ September 28, p.9; ‘NEAR EAST DANGER. LONDON OFFICIALS GLOOMY. BOLD TURKISH DEMANDS FEARED. IS KEMAL PASHA BLUFFING?,’ ‘NEUTRAL ZONES. UNRECOGNISED BY KEMAL. False Allegations Made.’ Characteristic of the Turks.,’ September 30, p.31; The Age, “Will Kemalists Accept Offer? Contradictory Reports from Near East. General Belief that Conference will be Held.,” “Marquis Curzon’s Mission.,” September 27, 1922, p.13; “Clouds Darken in Near East. Kemal’s False Allegations and Bluff. REFUSES TO RECOGNISE NEUTRAL ZONE. Reply to Allied Note Still Delayed. Avoidance of Clash at Chanak Still Difficult.,” September 30, p.13. The Allied invitation to the Angora Government was made in Paris on September 22 and 23, 1922. See Ataturk vol.4, pp.493–511 and 517–26; Argus, “ALLIED NOTE ISSUED. BRITAIN, FRANCE AND ITALY AGREE. TURKEY INVITED TO CONFERENCE. RETURN OF THRACE PROMISED. KEMAL PASHA’S ANSWER AWAITED.,” September 25, 1922, p.11; The Age, “ALLIED TO NOTE. INVITATION TO CONFERENCE. AN IMPORTANT ADDENDUM. Support for Turkish Aspirations Promised.,” September 25, 1922, p.9.

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demands we shall do so again. With that I leave the matter, and hope Kemal will understand exactly where Australia stands.” Both Melbourne papers reported Hughes’ address on September 30, although The Age editorial of October 2 considered his speech as “extremely foolish.” 781 The Melbourne press stated that the London press had given prominence to Hughes’ comments regarding Australia’s attitude to the Near East crisis. On October 7, Churchill cabled Hughes, informing him that “secret Turkish communications which have fallen into our hands reveal clearly that the threatened action by Australia and New Zealand in the event of war is a serious factor in Turkish calculations.” 782 The press reports of October 6 and 10 dealt with the easing of the Chanak crisis, occurring after the Allies, Turks, and Greeks had agreed to an armistice at Mudania paving the way for a peace conference to resolve the Near Eastern conflict. Hughes told the House on October 9 that the situation had improved enough to indicate that war would now be averted. 783 781

C.P.D. [House of Representatives] vol.C1., p.2944; The Age, “POSITION REVIEWED. Statement by Prime Minister. OUTLOOK STILL GRAVE. Swift Developments Expected. ELECTIONS MAY BE POSTPONED.,” “Cabinet Considers Situation. Statement by Mr Hughes.,” September 30, 1922, p.13; October 2, [editorial] p.8; Argus, “POSITION STILL REVIEWED. SPEECH BY MR. HUGHES. Trust in Britain.,” “FEDERAL CABINET VIEW. MR HUGHES DETERMINED. Kemal Must Not Forget.,” September 30, 1922, p.31; Spartalis, op. cit., p.243. 782 The Age, “Australia Warns the Turks.,” October 2, p.9; Argus, “Australia Warns the Turks.,” October 2, p.7; NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 20, Secret cablegram received by Governor General from Sec. of Colonies, October 7, 1922; Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol.4 Companion part 3, Documents April 1921– November 1922, Heinemann, London, 1977, p.2079; Sales, op. cit., p.402. 783 Argus, “NEAR EAST PEACE. SUCCESS OF CONFERENCE. QUICK RESULTS ACHIEVED. THRACE GOES TO TURKEY. Kemalists Evacuate Chanak.,” October 6, 1922, p.9; “PEACE OUTLOOK. CONFERENCE RESUMED. LORD CURZON HOPEFUL. ...Turks Less Intransigent.,” “PROSPECTS BRIGHTER. Statement by Mr Hughes.,” Octo-

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Addressing a Mayoral luncheon in the Melbourne Town Hall on October 9, Hughes took the opportunity to outline Australia’s view on foreign affairs. His speech highlighted the clash between Imperial and Australian national interests over Chanak. He told his audience that: We stood by the British Government because there must be one mouthpiece for the Empire. We had a right to hear what that policy was, but, once it was declared, it must be adhered to. We should not be made the shuttlecock of circumstances... We demand that we shall be consulted in matters of foreign policy before that policy is laid down ... but once it is laid down we are committed to it. Otherwise there is no unity in our Empire, and no safety for this Commonwealth of ours. 784

It can be argued that Hughes was displeased with the way the Imperial Government thought that the Dominions would automatically contribute troops, as they had in August 1914. The Age editorial of October 11 thought that Australia’s loyalty to the Empire was a commendable quality “to be encouraged and strengthened.” However, it was felt that the Chanak crisis had raised some concerns regarding Imperial relations, and that Lloyd George’s Near Eastern foreign policy “was seriously questioned by probably a majority of the British people.” In fact, the editorial can be construed as being anti -Lloyd George. In addition, The Age expressed concern that Australia, at no stage was ever consulted in the formulation of Imperial policy during the Chanak crisis. Even a resident Australian Minister in London would not have resolved the difficulties “as that of direct consultation between the British and Australian Governments over the cables.” The Age advocated that Imperial relations could be improved if “...[when] asking Australia’s cooperation the British Government will as far as possible, completely inform the Commonwealth Government, and ber 10, p.9; The Age, “WAR CLOUDS CLEAR. AGREEMENT AT MUDANIA... Turks Retire from Chanak.,” October 6, 1922, p.9; C.P.D. vol C1[House of Representatives ]., p.3342. 784 Argus, “OUR FOREIGN POLICY. DEFINED BY PRIME MINISTER...,” October 10, 1922, p.9.

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that the Commonwealth Government, before committing the country, will first consult the Parliament and inform the people by free publicity, in order that Parliament may be guided by public opinion.” 785 At a private level, Hughes was dissatisfied with Britain for not providing Australia with detailed information on the crisis developing in Chanak. The Australian Prime Minister considered that Lloyd George’s telegram of September 16 “to take prompt action against the Kemalists came as a bolt from the blue.” 786 On September 20, Hughes sent Lloyd George a long cable complaining that the British Government’s call to the Dominions had first appeared in the press, before it had been received officially in Australia. The Australian Government stressed that it desired: ...to most strongly emphasise … that the Dominions ought to be consulted before any action is taken or irrevocable decision made by Britain, then and then only can our voices be heard and our counsels heeded. The Empire is one and indivisible or it is nothing. The Australian people are sick of war. They regard war, except in defence of vital national interests, as not only a blunder but a crime. While they recognise fully the importance of the freedom of the Straits and would be angry and grieved if the sanctity of the Anzac graves or Gallipoli were violated, they had no sympathy whatever with the ambitious projects of King Constantine. 787

Hughes wanted more information regarding British foreign policy in the Near East and stated:

785

The Age, October 11, 1922, p.10. NAA, series A 981/1, item no. Turkey 4, Copy of tel. sent by Prime Minister [Mr Hughes] to the Right Hon Lloyd George, September 20, 1922. 787 NAA, series A 981/1, item no. Turkey 4, Copy of tel. sent by Prime Minister [Mr Hughes] to the Right Hon Lloyd George, September 20, 1922, pp.1–2; The full text of this communication is cited in Fitzhardinge, op. cit., pp. 487–91 and Spartalis, op. cit., pp.237–40. It will be noted that some of the cables sent by Hughes or received by him during the Chanak and pre-Lausanne Conference period were several pages long. For conciseness I have only quoted excerpts from the documents that were relevant for this study. 786

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23 The Commonwealth Government hopes that the British Government will not misunderstand this frank expression of its views. On a matter of such grave importance frankness is imperatively demanded ... And above all [Australians] should not be asked to join in an unjust or unnecessary war. 788

Next day, Lloyd George forwarded his reply to answer some of Hughes’ comments. The British Prime Minister tried to allay Australian concerns and fears over the British stance at Chanak. He mentioned that: There was no idea here of trying to rush opinion of Australia or any other Dominion. The threat to the neutral zone, however, was extremely sudden and stopping it meant an effective declaration of policy by the British Empire within a comparatively small number of hours. We made public the statement of policy issued on Saturday because we remembered all that Dominion Statesmen including yourself have said regarding your legitimate grievance in the first week of August 1914, because nothing had been officially done to explain to Governments and the public the serious and critical character of the issues by which we were then faced. I very much regret that we should not have succeeded in making the position plain to you.

He proceeded to respond to Hughes’ grievances. He said, Britain’s efforts were concerned with preventing Mustapha Kemal from threatening the Turkish Straits, and with establishing peace in the Near East. He further claimed that King Constantine and Greek interests had been ignored in the British decision, that Britain’s main interest in the Near East was the freedom of the Straits, and that the disposal of Thrace was not considered a prime concern to the British Empire. 789 788

NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 4, Hughes to Lloyd George, September 20, 1922, pp.4–5. 789 NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 20, Cablegram recd by Governor General from Colonial Secretary, September 21, 1922, for your PM from PM; Spartalis, op. cit., pp.241–2. Lloyd George sent another cable on September 23 explaining to Hughes the foreign policy positions of both France and Italy in the Near East. See NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 20, Secret

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It may be argued that Hughes’ complaint was favorably received in London. Churchill informed Hughes on September 20 that “I will make it my business to keep you informed privately as the situation develops.” The Colonial Office dispatches provided both the Governor General and the Australian Prime Minister with up-to-date information on the Chanak issue. 790 In another dispatch, Churchill told Hughes that special staff were being appointed to “keep [him] continuously informed of political and military developments” and that “special arrangements for decyphering [had] been made” available in Melbourne to handle the increased volume of Colonial Office messages. 791 As the Colonial Office continued to supply Australia with details of the Chanak crisis, there were complaints from Australia that the press cables were arriving ahead of the official telegrams and that this put the Australian Government in an awkward position in Parliament. The Federal Labor Party pressed Hughes to lay the official cables he received from London before the Parliament. Hughes declined Labor’s request. 792 On September 30, Hughes’ telegram to Churchill offered a solution to overcome the difficulties of communications:

cable in secret cypher recd by Governor General from Sec of Colonies, September 23, 1922 (My telegram 21 September. As promised in last paragraph of my previous message [i.e Lloyd George] regarding Hughes’ point of 20th September regarding policies of Allies). 790 Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol.4 Companion part 3, Documents April 1921–November 1922, p.2003; Sales, op. cit., pp.397–8. For Colonial Office cables of keeping Australia informed of developments at Chanak. For example, NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 20; C.O 532/213–47981, CO532/228–47942. 791 Cab.24/139 CP. 4211, Co-operation of the Dominions. pt.1 Sec. of Colonies to Governor General: for your PM September 20, 1922; pt.4 Tel. from Governor General (Forster) to Sec of Colonies, September 21, 1922; Sales , op. cit., p.400. 792 NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 20, P. E. Deane, Sec to PM to Official Secretary of Governor General J. H. Starling to send cable to Sec. of Colonies undated, sent in cypher September 30, 1922 after authorisation by His Excellency (Intd) JHS; Sales, op. cit., p.400; C.P.D vols.C and CI [House of Representatives]., pp.2612 and 2945.

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23 [regarding] 1) the departmental entanglement between Foreign Office and Colonial Office 2) cyphering and decyphering in London and Melbourne I venture to suggest that you will while possibilities of this country being involved in war exist arrange for us to receive information direct from Prime Minister or Foreign Office whoever has it and to send messages enclair where possible.

Churchill acknowledged Hughes’ concern in the delays experienced in receiving official telegrams from London. In order to improve the flow of information between London and Melbourne, Churchill stated, that all important messages would “be marked clear the line” ensuring that they were given top priority. Nonetheless Churchill wished to maintain the main channel of communication between the Colonial Office and the Governor General and thought it impractical that “direct communication from Prime Minister or Foreign Secretary would save no time.” It can be seen that Hughes’ efforts to change the Colonial Secretary’s mind had come to nothing. 793 Ordinary Australians, too, would be caught up in the unfolding events in Chanak. 3b) Reaction of ordinary Australians and institutions to the Chanak crisis The first press reports on the Chanak issue evoked images of Gallipoli in 1915. It is clear that words such as “Anzac graves,” “freedom of the Straits” and “the Gallipoli Peninsula” would have induced many Australian ex-servicemen to offer their services out of loyalty to the King and Empire. Many of these ex-soldiers had previous fighting experience against the Turks during the 1914–18 conflict. Perhaps, for some, the renewal of hostilities would have given them a sense of purpose and

793

NAA , series A981/1, item no. Turkey 20, P. E. Deane, Sec to PM to Official Secretary of Governor General J. H. Starling to send cable to Sec. of Colonies undated, sent in cypher September 30, 1922; NAA, series A981/1, item no. Turkey 22, Decypher Cablegram recd Governor General from Sec of Colonies, London, September 30, 1922: For Your PM, copy sent to PM and PM’s dept October 1, 1922 ; Sales, op. cit., p.400–1.

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adventure in their lives, after experiencing bouts of unemployment. Maybe some of them had found it difficult to adapt to civilian life. 794 On September 19 and 20, both Melbourne papers were full of reports of volunteers in Melbourne, Hobart, Sydney, Bendigo, Geelong, Adelaide, and Ballarat offering their services. The Melbourne City Council was prepared to make the Town Hall available as a recruitment centre should an Australian contingent be dispatched to the Near East. Even the Melbourne headquarters of the Royal Australian Airforce received telegrams and phone calls from ex-pilots wanting to offer their services. There were senior Airforce Officers who discussed the abilities of Australian pilots who had played a prominent part in the Turks’ defeat in Palestine in 1917–18. One ex-pilot stated that “The Turks ought to know what to expect if they persist in their present funny business.” Military officers of the Defence Department were offering their services too. 795

794

Argus, “SOLDIERS REUNION. UNEMPLOYMENT PROBLEM. Lord Stradbroke Offers Advice.,” December 22, 1922, p.10; “UNEMPLOYED SOLDIERS. Permanent Work Wanted.,” December 30, 1922, p.8; The Age, “SOLDIERS’ REUNION. GOVERNOR AT NORTHCOTE.,” December 22, 1922, p.8; Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, Session 1922, vol.2 pt.1., “Report of the Repatriation year ending June 30, 1922,” pp.8–10. The Repatriation report gives details of assistance provided to Ex-Soldiers. 795 The Age, “AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE. Ex-Pilots Offer Services. “WHAT THE TURKS GOT IN PALESTINE.,” “DEPOT FOR RECRUITS. Town Hall to be Available.,” “Tasmanians Offer for Service.,” “Volunteers in New South Wales.,” September 19, 1922, p.9; “A Force from Australia. BENDIGO RETURNED MEN EAGER.,” “PERTH RETURNED MEN. EAGER TO ENLIST.,” “MOBILISATION IN SOUTH AUSTRALIA.,” “THE NEWS IN GEELONG.,” September 20, 1922, p.12; Argus, “Enthusiasm in Sydney.,” “Volunteers at Brisbane.,” “Diggers Ready in Adelaide.,” “Ballarat Men Offer.,” “Prospective Volunteers.,” “Australian Legion Assistance.,” “AUSTRALIA PREPARED. MANY OFFERS OF SERVICE.,” September 19, 1922, p.7; “Volunteers in Perth.,” “WILL BACK MINISTRY. Bendigo Soldiers’ Decision.,” “Sydney Barracks Besieged.,” “Australia’s Aerial Arm.,” September 20, 1922, p.12.

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Ex-Naval personnel sent personal letters to the Navy Board offering their services. Two letters will be used for illustrative purposes. Henry Downes of South Australia offered his services after reading a news article in the Adelaide Mail on the decision of the Labor Council of Action in Sydney to call a general strike in the event of trouble in the Near East. J. E. Capstickdale stated that since demobilisation he had lived in British North Borneo where he “[had] been handling Mahommeddan Malay labour ... [and had] acquired a pretty thorough knowledge of the Malay language and of Mahommedan customs.” Such experience he thought could be useful in dealing with Moslem Turks and believed that “we [were] entering upon a Holy War.” 796 The Returned Servicemens League (R.S.L.) was another organisation that played a role in rallying ex-AIF personnel. Its statement, published in both The Age and Argus, hoped that many ex-AIF veterans would do their patriotic duty, as they had in 1914. According to the R.S.L. this time Australia was in a better position to send a wellprepared and experienced army to face the Turks. Hughes told Parliament on September 19 of a letter of support he had received from the R.S.L. Executive. Further telegrams of support were received from R.S.L. branches in Burwood, Petersham, and Concord in Sydney, Moss Vale sub-branch (N.S.W.) and Tasmania. 797 796

NAA, series MP525/1, item no.330/1/31, Henry Downes Woodville Nth, South Australia to Admiral Sir W. R. Cresswell, October 2, 1922, recd by Dept of Defence, Navy Office, October 11, 1922.; Sec of Navy Office to Henry Downes, October 17, 1922; J. E. Capstickdale Lt R.A.N.R., Cremorne, N.S.W. to Naval Board, Melbourne, September 18, 1922; Sec of Naval Board to J. E. Capstickdale, September 29, 1922. 797 The Age, “WILL FIGHT AGAIN. EX-SERVICEMEN READY. R.S.L. ISSUES A MANIFESTO.,” September 19, 1922, p.9; Argus, “READY TO FIGHT AGAIN. Returned Soldiers’ Declaration.,” September 19, 1922, p.7; C.P.D. [House of Representatives] vol.C, p.2351; NAA, series A458/1, item no.G337/12, Acting Federal President, The Returned Sailors and Soldiers’ Imperial League of Australia to Rt Hon W. M. Hughes, Prime Minister of Australia, Melbourne, September 19,1922. This letter received at PM’s Dept October 18, 1922; tels Tasmanian RSL, Burword and Moss Vale to Prime Minister, Melbourne, September 18, 1922.

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While Australian authorities appreciated the efforts of individuals who offered their services, it was faced with the problem of transporting them. On September 19, both newspapers reported that the Federal Government would have to requisition passenger ships by spending money to refit and recondition them for war. There was enough available shipping to dispatch some 8,000 troops to the Near East by the end of October. Training facilities existed to prepare the Australian troops in Liverpool in N.S.W. and Broadmeadows and Seymour in Victoria. 798 One Australian firm, Associated Equipment Company Limited, had offered the Australian Government a mechanical transport unit and spare parts to assist in the war effort. It had employees who had served in the A.I.F. and the British Expeditionary Force who were willing to offer their services. W. G. Hosking, the Shipyard Manager of the Adelaide firm, Poole and Steele, offered his expert knowledge on submarines and claimed that he had been “sent by the [Australian] Government to Great Britain to study submarine construction and design.” 799 No official mobilisation order was ever issued by the Australian Government. Two other institutions who reacted publicly to the Chanak crisis were the Church and the Australian Red Cross. The Churches were concerned about the possible outbreak of war, while the Australian Red Cross offered its assistance if war did break out. Archbishop Kelly, the Catholic Archbishop of Sydney, like the Moderator of the Presbyterian Church, hoped that no new war would occur in the Near East and urged Christians to pray for peace. The Presbyterian Church prayed that all politicians, the League of Nations, and the Turks would find a peaceful solution to the Near East crisis. 800 The most outspoken 798

Argus, “... Transportation Problem.,” September 19, 1922, p.7; The Age, “AN AUSTRALIAN CONTINGENT. Provisional Arrangements. TO GET FORCE OFF. Arranging Transports.,” September 19, 1922, p.9. 799 NAA, series A458/1, item no.G337/12, Associated Equipment Co. Ltd. to The Prime Minister, Federal Parliament House, Melbourne, September 18,1922; W. G. Hosking [Adeliade] to Prime Minister, September 18, 1922. 800 The Age, “ARCHBISHOP KELLY HOPES FOR PEACE.,” September 19, 1922, p.9; “A CALL TO PRAYER. TO BE READ IN ALL PRES-

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cleric was Dr. Mannix, the Catholic Archbishop of Melbourne, who spoke at Wonthaggi on September 28 regarding the possibility of conflict in the Near East. He criticised the Australian Government for blindly committing itself to assist Britain when neither Canada nor South Africa was anxious to plunge itself into another war. Mannix hoped that no Australian soldiers would be sent to fight on the other side of the world. He looked forward to the day when the Australian people would “begin to think out things for themselves.” 801 It might be argued that the Churches were supportive of the Labor Party’s and Trade Unions’ stance over the Near East. The Australian Red Cross (A.R.C.) watched the Chanak crisis with some interest. It had to decide on the type of humanitarian assistance it would render to Australian contingents being dispatched to the Near East. Sir W. Vicars, the President of A.R.C., and E. Abel of Western Australian Division, indicated their willingness to assist the Australian Government. A decision was reached at a meeting of the Central Council of the A.R.C., chaired by the wife of the Governor General, Lady Forster, which was held at Federal Government House on September 29. It was decided: …that in the event of an Australian contingent being mobilised for service abroad each division of the Australian Red Cross Society should provide for the military unit embarking from its State on the same basis as in the last war, and should also make preparations to send further hospital comforts for the sick and wounded wherever they may be stationed. 802

BYTERIAN CHURCHES.,” September 23, 1922, p17 ; Argus, “Presbyterian Church.,” September 23, 1922, p.29. 801 Argus, “Dr. Mannix on Position.,” September 29, 1922, p.11. 802 The Age, “The Red Cross Ready.,” September 19, 1922, p.9; “Australian Red Cross Society.,” September 20, p.12 ; Argus, “Australian Red Cross.,” September 20, 1922, p.12; “RED CROSS SOCIETY. Prepared for Emergency.,” September 30, p.31; NAA, series A458/1, item no.G337/12 , E Abel, General Secretary, West Australian Division of Australian Red Cross [Perth] to Prime Minister [Melbourne] , September 21, 1922.

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In the end, however, the assistance of the A.R.C. was not required. Another group concerned with the Near East crisis was the League of Nations Union. An urgent meeting of the Council of the League of Nations Union held in Melbourne endorsed Hughes’ action inviting the League to settle this matter. Article 11 of the League Covenant was cited as the basis for allowing Sir Joseph Cook to act in Geneva. However, the League of Nations Union also referred to the fact that the League of Nations was facing some problems in trying to arbitrate on this issue. There were four issues to consider. Firstly, the League Covenant applied to member states and non-member states were not bound by it. Second, according to Article 17 in the League Covenant, a non-member state could accept the obligations of League membership in the event of a dispute between a member such as Greece and a non-member such as Turkey. Thirdly, Turkey might accept League membership with the intention of giving the League authority to act. Similarly, Turkey could reject League mediation, which would make it difficult for the League to intercede. Finally, all the member states had defined frontiers, which made it easy to identify the aggressor. Unfortunately, Turkey had never ratified the Treaty of Sevres, which rendered it “impossible to formulate any appeal to the Turkish people or to its leadership upon the basis of any accepted settlement as a commencing point.” 803 Several prominent individuals including J. G. Latham, Meredith Atkinson, and Professor Harrison Moore addressed a public meeting organised by the League of Nations Union on September 27. J. G. Latham told his audience that Turkey “had not agreed on the Covenant of the League of Nations and she was not a member of the League. In these circumstances it was not for the League to intervene.” Meredith Atkinson stated that “not one of the small nations of the 803

Argus, “LIMIT TO LEAGUE’S POWER. TURKEY NOT A MEMBER. Mediation Rests with Her.,” September 20, 1922, p.11; The Age, “THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. Can It Intervene? Public Meeting to be Held.,” September 20, 1922, p.12; The text of the League of Nations Covenant is cited in Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement, MacMillan, London, 1991, pp.64–76.

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Near East was fit to govern a minority race and the care of these should be temporarily in the hands of the League of Nations.” Professor Moore outlined the history of the Near East up to the period of the signing of the Treaty of Sevres. He identified two important issues which aroused Turkish resentment. Firstly, the loss of Adrianople (Edirne) to Greece and, secondly, “the internationalisation of the Dardanelles.” 804 Hughes looked forward to the resolution of the Chanak crisis by the League of Nations. 3c) Australian and League of Nations involvement in the Near East The Melbourne press reported on September 19 that Hughes directed Sir Joseph Cook, head of the Australian Delegation to the League of Nations, “to bring the Near East crisis before the League without delay.” The Prime Minister’s Department issued an official statement that Hughes had forwarded an urgent cable to Cook in Geneva. While the contents of the dispatch did not appear in the press accounts, the press accounts did allude to Hughes’ concern “about the possibilities to Australia of the developments in the Near East.” 805 In fact, Hughes’ secret cable to Cook of September 18 underlined the Australian Premier’s ambivalent attitude towards the League of Nations. He believed the Near East crisis afforded the League the opportunity to show itself as the institution for resolving international disputes. Hughes told Cook that “if [the] League ignores situation and continues to debate third rate matters in this crisis, we might as well 804

Argus, “LEAGUE’S PART IN CRISIS.,” September 28, 1922, p.9. On September 20, the South Australian branch of the Australian League of Nations Union sent Hughes a cable “approv[ing] Australian Prime Minister’s proposal to submit Near East dispute to League confident Australian opinion supports this course.” The Secretary of League of Nations Union in London was also informed. See NAA, series A458/1, item no.G337/12, Australian League of Nations Union, South Australian Branch [Adelaide] to Hon. Prime Minister, Melbourne, September 20, 1922. 805 The Age, “PLEA FOR PEACE. Appeal to the League of Nations. SIR JOSEPH COOK INSTRUCTED TO ACT.,” September 19, 1922, p.9; Argus, “ACTION BY MR HUGHES. INTERVENTION FOR PEACE. Message to Sir Joseph Cook.,” September 19, 1922, p.7.

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close its doors, save our money.” It was even suggested that Turkey be encouraged “to appear before the League and discuss matters with other nations.” The cable concluded, in a rather cynical tone, that “If the League refuses to consider question or to take action, please inform us without moment’s delay. We shall then consider withdrawing from League as protest.” Next day Cook was further instructed to discuss with the other Empire delegates the importance of making every effort to finding a pacific solution before Australia would have to commit itself to war. 806 Hughes told the House of Representatives on September 19 that the Australian Delegation had been asked “to bring [Australia’s] urgent views before the League that it may intervene.” Charlton criticised Lloyd George for failing to utilise the League as a conduit for resolving the Chanak issue. It would appear that the Labor leader supported Hughes’ position of seeking the involvement of the League. Indeed the Labor Party supported the League as an institution for resolving conflict. Sir Robert Best for example admired the League as an institution which would use its influence to bring about peace. He regretted, however, that America’s non-membership of the League had deprived that organisation of a very important power whose influence would have been crucial in resolving the problems of the Near East. 807 In contrast, it is interesting that The Age editorial of September 25 ridiculed the League of Nations as an international organisation which: “is not to be considered seriously as a safeguard against the occurrence of war. Even in a situation which when it has been carried to the brink of war is still agreed to be amenable to peaceful negotia-

806

NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 20, Cablegram by PM (Hughes) to Sir Joseph Cook, Australian Delegation to League of Nations, September 18, 1922 (secret); Decypher of “Clear the line” cablegram sent by PM (Hughes) to Sir Joseph Cook, Geneva, September 19, 1922. 807 CPD vol.C [House of Representatives]., pp.2351–2 and 57; Argus, “AUSTRALIA’S DUTY ... EFFORTS TO PRESERVE PEACE. Speech by Mr.Hughes... Eager to Preserve Peace.,” September 20, 1922, p.11; The Age, “Where Australia Stands...,” September 20, 1922, p.11.

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23 tions the League of Nations at no stage took any initiative to interfere or to effect a settlement.”

Hughes and Dr. Nansen of Norway, the League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, were praised for their efforts in seeking the involvement of the League, before a new European war broke out. The Great Powers were reproached for resorting to secret diplomacy which raised the haunting memories of August 1914. The editorial believed that diplomacy, treaties, the reduction of armaments and the League of Nations had all failed to establish peace, and that public opinion was something that had been ignored. One thing that emerged from the 1914–18 conflict was ordinary people’s revulsion of warfare. People felt that the politicians’ responsibility was to trust and inform their citizens on international affairs, rather than to engage in secret diplomacy, so that ordinary people of any nation would have the opportunity to pressure their politicians to settle the differences between two nations on the verge of war peacefully. 808 The Argus editorial of September 27 was less trenchant towards the League of Nations than that of its competitor. It argued that: The time is not ripe for the League to attempt to use more than moral suasion as its contribution to preserving the peace of the world. As Lord Balfour has said, the League must grow by slow stages, building achievement upon achievement, and gaining increased confidence. But that is not to say that it should refrain from leading its moral support to the decision of the impending conference, at which all the countries involved in the crisis will be represented. It seems to be an excellent opportunity for the League to help in expediting the return to peace conditions, and at the same time to add to its own prestige. 809

As indicated above, the Argus editorial appeared sanguine over the future of the League compared to The Age. Cook worked closely with his British and Dominion colleagues in Geneva. His work was reported in the Melbourne press on September 23 and 25 respectively. In the former story, Cook told the Australian 808 809

The Age, September 25, 1922, p.8. Argus, September 27, 1922, p.18.

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Press Association that the British Empire was collaborating with the League and was united in its exhortations to Lloyd George to encourage the intercession of the League. As a voting bloc the British Empire was “equal numerically and in voting powers to France, Belgium, Spain, Italy, Holland, Portugal or any other of the six continental nations.” Cook sent Hughes three private cables outlining what had been discussed by the British Empire Delegation (B.E.D.) at Geneva. The first one was in response to Hughes’ cable of September 18. Cook told Hughes on September 20 that the B.E.D. had been “sympathetic [to] your suggestion and decided to inform London accordingly.” Cook alluded to the fact that the Allied Powers did not want the League to become involved. 810 The second cablegram forwarded by Cook was written by Lord Balfour, who spoke to Hughes of the difficulties of the League conducting its own independent negotiations at a time when the Allies were involved in their own deliberations. Lord Balfour, the chief British Delegate at the League of Nations, believed that “Such a course would produce inextricable confusion and weaken rather than strengthen the forces making for peace.” The final cable was based on a conversation which Cook had had with both Lord Balfour and Lord Robert Cecil on September 21 in Geneva. Both British delegates favored the use of the League’s good offices. Balfour also cabled Curzon in Paris requesting him to come to Geneva. 811

810

Argus, “EMPIRE”S WORK FOR PEACE. Striking Meeting At Geneva. Intervention of League of Nations.,” September 23 1922, p.29; The Age, “At the League of Nations. EMPIRE DELEGATION UNITED.,” September 23, 1922, p.17; NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 20, Decypher of cablegram recd by the Prime Minister ( Mr Hughes) from Sir Joseph Cook, Australian Delegate to the League of Nations Assembly, Geneva, September 20, 1922. 811 NAA, series 981/1, item no.Turkey 20, Decypher of cablegram recd by the Prime Minister (Mr Hughes) from Sir Joseph Cook, Australian Delegate to the League of Nations Assembly, Geneva, September 21, 1922: Personal and Private from Lord Balfour. (cable received 22–9–22); cablegram received by Prime Minister (Mr Hughes) from Sir Joseph Cook, Australian Delegate to

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The press articles of September 25 reported on the League of Nations’ consideration of three proposals, which had been submitted to it. These proposals were made by Dr. Nansen of Norway, H. A. L. Fisher of Great Britain, and Count Ishii of Japan and were in turn submitted to the drafting committee. Cook encouraged the Powers to utilise “the machinery of the League to bring about a settlement.” The news report of September 25 indicated that League intervention was unlikely as the British Empire Delegation were waiting for a lead from their English colleagues in London, who, in turn, relied on information from Lloyd George. 812 On September 22, Cook sent Hughes another cable which detailed the direction sought by the B.E.D from Curzon and Lloyd George in Paris and London. Curzon saw no difficulty with a League Assembly resolution which would urge its Council to use its good offices to establish peace, if asked to do so by the powers. This kind of action by the League would suffice under the circumstances Curzon thought. Lloyd George informed Balfour that “... [Britain] strongly favored placing the key of Straits in hands of the League of Nations,” and “would cordially welcome the help of League of Nations in securing a peaceful settlement and ... hope[d] that British Empire Delegation will be able to support the resolution which is to be moved on subject.” 813 the League of Nations Assembly, Geneva, September 21, 1922. (cable received 22–9–22); Spartalis, op. cit., p.242. 812 Argus, “APPEAL TO LEAGUE. Three Proposals Debated. Intervention Improbable,” September 25, p.11; The Age, ALLIED NOTE TO TURKEY....Feeling at Geneva.,” September 25, p.9; 813 NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 20 , Decypher of cablegram recd by the Prime Minister (Mr Hughes) from Sir Joseph Cook, Australian Delegate to the League of Nations Assembly, Geneva, September 22, 1922: Personal and Private from Lord Balfour. (cable received 23–9–22. Repeated to Prime Minister Wentworth Hotel, Sydney 23–9–22.). The South African Prime Minister General Smuts supported a future regime of the Turkish Straits being placed under the aegis of the League of Nations. See Argus, “Matter for League. General Smuts on Position.,” September 27, 1922, p.19; The Age, “South Africa’s Belated Reply. TEXT OF THE MESSAGE PUBLISHED.,” September 27, 1922, p.13.

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On September 27 and 29, the Melbourne press stated that the League of Nations was close to finalising its position on the Near East. The September 27 story alluded to the motion by the League of Nations political committee to invite the Council “to take steps to promote peace in the Near East without interference with the pending Conference negotiations.” This motion neutralised Hughes’ proposition of League mediation and H. A. L. Fisher’s suggestion that “the League should intervene only when invited.” Cook accepted the League’s decision for the sake of maintaining unanimity and considered “the resolution [to be] tame and innocuous.” In the press no mention was made of the fact that Cook’s remark that “the resolution [was] tame and innocuous” actually referred to Nansen’s proposal. 814 The September 29 report quoted a brief excerpt of the revised resolution adopted by the League of Nations on September 27, a resolution which effectively ruled out any intervention by that organisation in the Near East. 815 On his return to London, Sir Joseph Cook gave a press interview regarding his personal assessment of the League. He believed the League had achieved some notable successes regarding problems in Upper Silesia and Austrian finances. However, the League was not ready to assume responsibility for the Near East. As no peace treaty existed with Turkey, the League could not do nothing, and two sets of negotiations would have complicated matters. He hoped the “contending nations would accept the British view in favour of hand-

814

The Age, “ ... League of Nations Moves.,” September 27, 1922, p.13; Argus, “LEAGUE’S PEACE EFFORTS. Council Asked to Act. Steps Apart from Conference.,” September 27, 1922, p.19; Commonwealth of Australia, Parliamentary Papers, General Session 1923 and Session 1923–24, vol.2, “League of Nations Third Assembly (September 4–30, 1922) Report of the Australian Delegates.,” p.37. 815 The Age, “ ... League Offers its Services.,” September 29, 1922, p.9; Argus, “League’s Co-operation.,” September 29, 1922, p.11; The text of this League resolution is cited in League of Nations Official Journal, Special Supplement no.9 October 1922, “Resolutions and Recommendations adopted by Assembly during its Third Assembly from the reports of the 6th Committee, p.39.

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ing over the control of the Straits to the League.” 816 The Allies were to attend the Lausanne peace conference to resolve the Greek-Turkish conflict. 3d) Australian participation at Lausanne Peace Conference 1922–23 817 On October 27 and 28, 1922 Hughes received two cables through the Governor-General’s Office from the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Devonshire. Both cables excluded Australia from participating in the forthcoming Lausanne Conference. The former cable informed Hughes that the Allied Powers—Great Britain, France, and Italy—had issued invitations to Japan, Romania, Greece, and both Turkish Governments of Angora and Constantinople “to send representatives to Lausanne 13th November to conclude Treaty to end War in East which would replace Treaty of Sevres.” It was anticipated that the Dominions would “be kept informed from time to time of the general lines of policy on which British plenipotentiaries propose to proceed and of the course of negotiations...” The British Government hoped “that this procedure [would] be in accordance with wishes of your Government” and that the British representatives were conversant “with the Imperial aspect of the problem and with the keen interest taken by the Dominion Governments in its solution.” 818

816

Argus, “WORTH OF THE LEAGUE. VIEWS OF AUSTRALIANS. “Won Its Spurs Already” Mr Justice Rich a Convert.,” October 4, 1922, p.11; The Age, “THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS. HAS WON ITS SPURS. Australian Delegates Impressed.,” October 4, 1922, p.11. 817 The Lausanne Conference was divided into two phases: the first one ran from November 1922–February 1923 and the second one from April–July 1923. Three commissions were set up to examine various issues. For example the first commission handled Territorial and Military questions, the second commission examined the Regime of Foreigners and the third commission heard Economic and financial matters. Each Commission had its own subcommissions investigating a specific area such as the 5th sub-commission (First Commission) on graves and prisoners. 818 C.O.532/219 Dominions no.87 Tel. From Sec. of State for Colonies to Governors General of Canada, Commonwealth of Australia, New Zealand

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The October 28 cable explained why the Dominions were excluded from the Lausanne Conference. In the course of private conversations between Poincare, the French Premier, and Curzon, the former stated that should the British Dominions be represented at Lausanne, then France would insist on equal representation for both Morocco and Tunis. Curzon explained “that the status of the Dominions and India was once and for all settled in Paris in 1919 with the full concurrence of Monsieur Clemenceau...” Moreover, the Dominions had signed the Versailles and Sevres treaties and also had “become separate members of the League of Nations.” Devonshire concluded that “...in any case practical considerations render it desirable to limit the number of the plenipotentiaries at Lausanne.” 819 It can be seen that Curzon and Poincare did not want their Dominions and colonies to attend the forthcoming Lausanne Conference, so that the peace negotiations would not be prolonged as had happened in 1919–20 in Paris. Furthermore, the Melbourne press did not publish any articles relating to the exclusion of the Dominions. The contents of such secret cables which dealt with the question did not appear in the Melbourne press, which gave the impression that Imperial relations were unimpaired. The press articles focussed instead on the invitations issued to the various participating nations. 820

and Union of South Africa, October 27, 1922; Fitzhardinge, op. cit., pp.492–3; Spartalis, op. cit., pp.243–4. 819 NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 22,Decypher cablegram recd by Governor General from Secretary. of Colonies, London. October 28, 1922. This cable is also in C.O.532/219 no.87 tel; Spartalis, op. cit., pp.244–5; Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p.493. 820 Argus, “Delegates from Nine Countries.,” October 23, 1922, p.9; “Near East Conference. Turkish Representation.,” October 27, p.11; “NEAR EAST CONFERENCE. Invitations to America.,” October 30, p.7; “PEACE CONFERENCE. Lord Curzon to Attend. Claim by Russia.,” November 11, p.29; The Age, “The Near East Conference.,” October 21, 1922, p.13; “THE EAST CONFERENCE.,” October 23, p.7; “PREPARATIONS FOR LAUSANNE. Will Britain and France Agree? Meeting in Paris arranged.,” November 16, p.9.

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When Hughes received the two telegrams discussed above, he was disenchanted with the decision of the Imperial Government, and he took the time to reflect and compose his thoughts over Australia’s exclusion from the Lausanne meeting. On November 2, he dispatched a long, scathing telegram to Devonshire through the Governor-General’s Office, expressing his concerns at the way Australia had been treated by Britain. Hughes stated: Now we are informed that [at] a conference which is going to effect substantial modifications in the Treaty of Sevres, we are not to have representations. We are assured that a valiant defence of our rights and status was made; that M. Poincare was very plainly told that the question of our status was finally settled in 1919 and could not be re-opened,... This habit of asking Australia to agree to things when they are done and cannot be undone, and when in practice there is only one course open to us--and that is to support Britain is one which, if persisted in, will wreck the Empire. You have already seen Canada and South Africa standing aloof on the plea that they had not been consulted. What is wanted, I have pointed out many times in the Imperial Cabinet and what we are entitled to, is a real share in moulding Foreign and Imperial policy. The Empire must speak with one voice in foreign affairs, but whose voice is that to be? Surely not that of a British political party! As things are, foreign policy matters affecting all are treated as the footballs of British political parties. In British domestic politics that is all right, but in foreign affairs we cannot tolerate such a state of affairs... I do not know that we are deeply concerned about the Sevres Treaty, but war in the Near East may come out of it—so much has been demonstrated—and Egypt and India and the Far East would then be affected. Australia would have to fight to defend the Suez Canal. The Sevres Treaty will affect the Moslem world and so Egypt and India. If it affects India it will not leave the Far East as it is. You tell us in the face of all this that we are not to have representation at this conference. Two Englishmen will represent the Empire: we shall of course be kept fully informed of how things go:

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And that we shall have the right to sign the Treaty or to decline to do so. I can only say that it is most unsatisfactory. 821

On November 2 this telegram was presented to the British Cabinet who “recognise[d] the force of [Hughes’] criticism.” However, it took nearly two weeks for Hughes to receive an official reply from London. The British Government faced political troubles on both the domestic and international front, which was reflected in the accounts of the Melbourne press. Bonar Law replaced Lloyd George as Prime Minister on October 19 and he called for a general election for November 1922; and on the international scene the Kemalists had taken over the administration of Constantinople on November 5 and had abolished the Ottoman-Sultanate, which forced Sultan Mehmed to leave Constantinople on November 17 on board the British warship H.M.S. Malaya for Malta. In the end, the British Government did not modify its original decision to exclude Dominion representation at the Lausanne Conference. 822

821

NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 22, Cablegram in secret cypher by Governor General to Sec of Colonies, November 2, 1922 [written by Mr Hughes]. The same document is located in NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 4; Spartalis, op. cit., pp,245–6; Fitzhardinge, op. cit., pp.493–5. 822 The Age, “BRITISH ELECTION CAMPAIGN.,” October 27, 1922, p.9; “THE NEW CABINET.,” November 8, p.9; “CLOUDS DARKEN IN THE NEAR EAST.,” November 9, p.9; “NEAR EAST CRISIS ... TENSION AT CONSTANTINOPLE.,” “BRITAIN’S FOREIGN POLICY. NEW GOVERNMENT’S VIEW. Allies Must Make Common Action.,” November 10, p.9; “BRITISH ELECTIONS. REVIEW BY LLOYD GEORGE. A MINORITY GOVERNMENT. WHAT OF THE FUTURE.,” November 23, p.9; Argus, “BRITISH NOMINATIONS. MANY CANDIDATES.,” November 6, 1922; “BRITISH POLITICS. CABINET CHOSEN. Election Campaign Speeches.,” November 8, 1922; “WARSHIPS LEAVE. BOUND FOR TURKEY. DISQUIETING SITUATION. TREATIES NOT OBSERVED.,” November 11, p.29; “ELECTION PROSPECTS.,” November 13, p.7; Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918–1922, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986, pp.344–50,352, 357–9; Sonyel, op. cit., pp.95–6.

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On November 16, Devonshire notified Hughes that the Australian Government would be frequently supplied with information regarding the Conference. The diplomatic exchanges between London and Melbourne sharply exposed the differences between Australian national interests and those of the Imperial Government. The issue of the Dominions’ involvement in the formulation of the Empire’s foreign policy had been broached and agreed to at the 1921 Imperial Conference. This arrangement now seemed somewhat hollow. Australia protested that it could no longer be taken for granted and insisted that it be supplied with more information than it had been previously. To his credit, Curzon provided Hughes with a lot of documents relating to the Lausanne Conference. 823 The future of the Anzac graves was the only issue, which primarily concerned Australia at Lausanne. Journalists were able to cover the proceedings of the Lausanne Conference without the restrictions imposed by previous conferences. The press reports of various commissions and sub-commissions gave ordinary people some insight into how the various delegations conducted their affairs at Lausanne. 824 Even before the commencement of the Lausanne meeting, Devonshire informed Hughes on November 14 that an alteration to the treaty with Turkey was to be divided into two categories. Category A concerned the issues of cardinal importance which would require complete Allied support if they were to succeed. The Allied graves were one of these issues. Without Allied backing to category A, Curzon “[would] not feel justified in entering [the] Conference.” Category B concerned 823.

NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 22, Secret Cablegram in secret cypher recd by Governor General from Sec of Colonies, London, November 16, 1922 [telegraphed to Mr Hughes at Wellington N.S.W. 4–15p.m. Nov.17 1922]; Spartalis, op. cit., pp.246–7; Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p.495. Spartalis mentions that the Hughes papers contain many documents of the Lausanne Conference sent by Curzon. See Spartalis, op. cit., p.292fn.86. Also NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 22 is a large file containing many cables from the Colonial Office keeping Australia informed on the developments of the first and second phases of the Lausanne Conference. 824 For a discussion of the initial problems encoutered by journalists at Lausanne. See Ch.1 fns.252–59.

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issues where reaching agreement during the discussions to come was considered to be “most desirable.” 825 The newspaper accounts of December 11, 1922 and January 26 to 30, 1923 which appeared in the Melbourne press highlighted the symbolic, political and emotional importance of the Anzac cemeteries on the Gallipoli Peninsula to Australia’s national identity. It was on this peninsula that Australian nationhood was born. The newspaper stories of this time were strongly anti-Turkish in sentiment. On December 8, 1922 the 12th meeting of the Territorial and Military commission under Lord Curzon’s presidency discussed the issue of the Anzac graves. Both Melbourne papers presented a fairly accurate account of what Curzon stated at this meeting. Curzon raised the issue of the Allied cemeteries staying in Allied possession. He mentioned “that ownership as defined in the Treaty of Sevres, and not sovereignty, was intended.” However, the newspapers failed to mention Curzon’s reference to Article 218 under the Treaty of Sevres which granted Allies ownership to the cemeteries in Gallipoli. One of the Turkish demands of “the right to fortify Gallipoli against a surprise attack” had left the Allies confused regarding Turkish intentions. 826 825

NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 21, Secret cablegram in secret cypher recd by Governor General from Sec of Colonies, London, November 14, 1922. Category A included: Western Thrace, Frontiers of Western Thrace, Freedom of the Straits, Capitulations, Islands in the Aegean, Frontiers of Syria and Iraq, mandated territories in Syria and Palestine, Allied graves, Indemnities, Mudania, Constantinople. Catergory B included the Protection of Minorities, Turkish Military Forces, Financial and Economic Clauses; Curzon Papers MSS Eur.F112/285, Points Alluded to in Lord Curzon Tel. no.433 to Lord Hardinge, Paris, November 14, 1922 ; Tel.no 600 from Lord Hardinge (Paris) to Lord Curzon November 15, 1922. 826 The Age, “FUTURE OF DARDANELLES. The Discussion at Lausanne.,” December 11, 1922, p.10; Argus, “FUTURE OF NEAR EAST. OPTIMISTIC FEELING. Agreement on Many Points. Ownership of Gallipoli Cemetries.,” December 11, 1922, p.9; Great Britain, House of Commons, Accounts and Papers, vol.xxvi,1923, Cmd 1814 Records of the proceedings of the Lausanne Conference 1922–23. no.15 Territorial and Military Commission. Minutes of the 12th meeting (4th meeting of the Straits Commission), December 8, 1922, 4p.m., pp.169 and 171. Hereafter cited as Cmd.1814;

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The newspaper articles from January 26–30, 1923 showed Turkish obstinacy over the future of the Anzac graves. On January 26, both Melbourne papers reported accurately that the Turks had made “the monstrous demand” at the meeting of the graves sub-commission that the “Anzac cemeteries on Gallipoli should be dug up and made smaller.” It might be argued the words “monstrous demands” would probably have registered on a sensitive nerve with many ex-A.I.F who had fought with comrades buried in Gallipoli. The British refused to even entertain these Turkish pretensions. Both newspapers failed to include the support given to the British delegates by their Allied colleagues over such a sensitive issue. The Turks were notified that British troops would not evacuate Gallipoli “until assurance[s] [were] given that the cemeteries ... would be respected.” The newspaper articles did not identify the area where the Australian and New Zealand Governments had invited the Imperial War Graves Commission (I.W.G.C.) to set up the Anzac cemeteries at Ari Burnu. The Turks did not mention that Ari Burnu “should be strictly limited to actual ground occupied by graves already concentrated and identified.” 827 The following day on January 27, The Age reported that MajorGeneral Sir Fabian Ware, the Vice Chairman of the I.W.G.C., had apprised the Australian Press Association that he was in close contact with Sir Joseph Cook with regards to the Turks’ position regarding the Anzac graves in Gallipoli. In fact, the news article mentioned that Cook “[was] following the graves controversy with the deepest interest.” Cook represented Australia on the I.W.G.C. and provided the The same minutes can also be found in NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 25, no.1 Territorial and Military Commission, Turkey Confidential, Draft Minutes, December 8, 1922 [E14604/130003/44]. 827 The Age, “GRAVES ON GALLIPOLI. A MONSTROUS TURKISH PROPOSAL. CEMETRIES SHOULD BE DUG UP AND MADE SMALLER.” January 26, 1923, p.9; Argus, “TURKS TO PAY LESS. Demand Refused. Gallipoli Cemetries Threatened.,” January 26, 1923, p.9; NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 22, Tel. (in code) recd by Governor General from Sec of Colonies, London, January 25,1923, telegraphed to PM Hughes Sydney, January 26. This same document is in Curzon Papers Eur.112/285, tel.230 Lord Curzon (Lausanne) January 24,1923; F.O.424/256. no.117.

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Australian Prime Minister with copies of the minutes from the I.W.G.C. discussions which took place in London. Ware supported Curzon’s refusal in Lausanne to yield anything to the Turks in relation to the Sevres Treaty clauses over the Anzac graves. Moreover, Ware stated that the I.W.G.C. in Gallipoli under Colonel Hughes was a civilian institution and that it would not authorise the shifting of the graves except for “absolutely sanitary reasons.” Ware was doing everything possible “to keep that sacred piece of ground” in the hands of the British Empire. 828 Fabian Ware wrote two notes to the British Prime Minister Bonar Law expressing concern regarding the future of the Anzac graves. Firstly, in an undated memorandum to Bonar Law probably written in late November 1922, outlining the concerns of the I.W.G.C. regarding the future of the Anzac graves, Ware pointed out that the Australian and New Zealand Governments had made personal and urgent representations to their High Commissioners that “the Dominion Graves may be as fully preserved under any future arrangement that may be made with the Turkish or Greek Government as is now provided by [Articles 218–25 of] the Treaty of Sevres.” The I.W.G.C. wanted to continue the task of completing the unfinished cemeteries on the Gallipoli Peninsula, where only a few permanent structures had been erected. Secondly, Fabian Ware prepared a draft letter for Bonar Law to sign and send in his own name to Curzon in Lausanne. The letter repeated the Australian and New Zealand Governments’ concerns over the Anzac cemeteries on Gallipoli. To simplify matters, Bonar Law sent Ware’s two documents to Curzon. 829 There was in Bonar Law’s 828

The Age, “GRAVES ON GALLIPOLI .The Turkish Suggestion. INTERFERENCE STRONGLY OPPOSED.,” January 27, 1923, p.15 ; Australian Archives, A458/1 P336/6 ATT1, Imperial War Graves Commission Minutes of Proceedings for 1921–22; NAA, series A458/1, item no.F337/7, Imperial War Graves Commission Minutes of Proceedings 1922–23. 829 Bonar Law Papers 111/12/36. Memorandum for the Prime Minister “War Graves in the former Ottoman Empire” written by Sir Fabian Ware n.d.; Bonar Law to Lord Curzon [Lausanne] November 29, 1922 enclosing Ware’s two documents. Copyright permission “I am grateful to the Board of

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mind the possibility that these two documents would further encourage and strengthen Curzon’s position when he raised the issue of the Anzac graves with the Turks. On January 29 and 30, 1923 both Melbourne papers continued to report on the Turks’ intransigence over the Anzac graves. The news reports which covered the 23rd session of the territorial and military commission held on January 27, highlighted the interchange between Ismet Pasha, the leader of the Turkish Delegation at Lausanne, and Curzon. Both news reports centred on Ismet’s remarks that the Gallipoli cemeteries would serve as a “strategic base” in some future military campaign against Turkey. 830 The newspaper accounts did not mention that the whole problem surrounding the Gallipoli graves was the Turkish reservations over Articles 6 and 7 from the report prepared in the sub-commission on prisoners of war and graves. The Turks may have been worried that the British Empire’s claims for cemetery space on the Gallipoli Peninsula were, perhaps, excessive and that Turkey had the right to reduce it to a smaller area. 831 On January 29 the Melbourne press reported on Curzon’s admonishment of Ismet for “hav[ing] not taken the opportunity now offered of carrying out his elementary duty of humanity and honor.” This statement depicted the Turks as unwilling to make concessions on the the British Library for allowing me to consult materials in its custody in particular the official files of the India Office Records and in the India Office Private Papers” for my Masters Dissertation. 830 The Age, “GRAVES ON GALLIPOLI. TURKS REFUSE TO MODIFY THEIR BEHAVIOUR.” January 1923, p.8; “PEACE IN THE NEAR EAST. AN IMPASSE AT LAUSANNE.” … “GALLIPOLI CEMETRIES. ATTITUDE OF TURKEY.,” January 30, 1923, p.7; Argus, “NEAR EAST MENACE. Deadlock at Lausanne.” January 29, 1923, p.7; “LAUSANNE TREATY, Rejection Feared. Turks still truculent.....Anzac Cemetries.” January 30, 1923, p.9; Cmd.1814., pp.418–9. 831 Cmd.1814 Annex (D) to no.26 Report of the Sub-Commission to examine the provisions to be inserted in the Treaty regarding provisions of war and graves (January 25, 1923) signed by Admiral Chelotti of Italy, 2. Graves, pp.422–24. All articles 1–13 with the exception of Articles 6 and 7 were adopted by all the parties.

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graves issue. In fact, Curzon’s private telegram to London on January 27 mentioned that the “Papers will report debate, which will produce a lamentable impression in England and Dominions and will confirm belief that Angora Turks are really outside the Pale.” 832 Curzon’s assessment that the Turks were being portrayed in a negative light in the Dominions proved to be correct. The Argus editorial of January 29 thanked Curzon “for his staunch defence of the provisions in the Sevres Treaty that the Anzac graveyards ... shall remain inviolate for all time.” It reproached the Turks “for behav[ing] with such treacherous ingratitude which made necessary the sacrifice of so many treasured Australian lives.” For Australians the Anzac cemeteries represented sacred ground which they were prepared to defend from Turkish encroachment. The Argus did not consider this “mere cheap sentiment” but “the expression of the Nation’s sacred feeling, and that feeling the Nation will not allow to be outraged.” Hughes’ cable to Curzon, sent through the Colonial Office on January 27, made it clear that the Turks’ stand on the Anzac graves issue was unacceptable and that “Australia will regard it as a casus belli.” The Australian Government was not prepared to yield on this issue at all. 833 The united stand adopted by Britain and its Dominions eventually led to the Turks finally giving way on the Anzac cemeteries and the provisions for protecting the graves were later to be embodied in Articles 139–151 of the Treaty of Lausanne. This victory was Hughes’ last involvement in international and Imperial affairs as Prime Minister. 834 832

The Age, “GRAVES ON GALLIPOLI. TURKS REFUSE TO MODIFY THEIR BEHAVIOUR.” January 1923, p.8; Argus, “NEAR EAST MENACE. Deadlock at Lausanne.,” January 29, 1923, p.7 ; Cmd.1814., p.419; Curzon Papers Eur F112/285 Lord Curzon (Lausanne) January 27, 1923. 833 Argus, January 1923, p.6; Australian Archives, A981/1 Turkey 22 , Secret cypher recd by Governor General from PM Hughes January 27, 1923 for transmission to the Colonial Secretary, London; Curzon Papers MSS Eur.F 112/285 Tel to Lord Curzon (Lausanne) from Foreign Office, January 29, 1923: Your tel.no.240 (of January 27th): War Graves from the Colonial Office; Spartalis, op. cit., p.247. 834 NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 22, Cablegram recd by Governor General from Sec. of Colonies, London, January 30, 1923, copies sent to PM’s

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4. THE IMPERIAL CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 1923 AND THE POST LAUSANNE PERIOD. 835 On October 8, 1923 the Melbourne press reported briefly on Curzon’s survey of international affairs. The Australian Prime Minister, Sir Stanley Bruce, was not in attendance when Curzon outlined the recent history of the Greek-Turkish conflict. Curzon justified Britain’s foreign policy in the Near East, saying it had prevented war from spreading to Europe during the time of the Chanak crisis, while it was the Lausanne Treaty which had finally established peace in the Near East. He mentioned that the Straits solution concluded was favorable to British and Imperial interests and that Britain had repaired its relations with the Moslem nations. On the other hand, Curzon’s speech did not refer to the fact that the Dominions had been approached for assistance in September 1922, which was possibly a major oversight on his part. 836 However, an important milestone in Colonial politics was reached at the 1923 Imperial Conference when Britain granted its Dominions the right to conclude their own treaties with foreign powers and to keep other Dominions informed of the impact of such arrangements. It was clear that Britain was giving independence to its Dominions in international affairs. On October 8, both Melbourne papers quoted a leading article from the British journal Nation regarding the status of the Dominions. The article highlighted the fact that the Dominions had achieved their status as nations both in the international community and also as members of the British Empire. While the news report did acknowledge that Britain would retain the day-to-day running of international affairs, it emphasised that the Dominions had to be kept fully informed on international events. This development would give Dept on Jan 31,1923; NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 21 ,Duke of Devonshire to Lord Forster, 10 Downing Street, February 23, 1923; Fitzhardinge, op. cit., p.496; Spartalis, op. cit., p.247. 835 This section will focus only on the Near East. 836 The Age, “EMPIRE’S FOREIGN POLICY. CURZON’S SPEECH AT CONFERENCE...,” October 8, 1923, p.9; Argus, “FOREIGN POLICY. LORD CURZON’S SPEECH.... The Near East.,” October 8, 1923, p.9; Great Britain, House of Commons, vol.X11 pt.1, 1923. Cmd.1987 Imperial Conference 1923: Summary of Proceedings., pp.10–2 and 32–8.

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the Dominions the chance to make an informed judgment before committing themselves to action. The article referred to the rash decision of Lloyd George in September 1922, when the British Government issued an emotional appeal for Dominion support. The Imperial Conference sanctioned the right of the Dominions to negotiate, sign and ratify treaties as sovereign nations with other foreign states. 837 As the Imperial Conference completed its deliberations, Stanley Bruce, on his return journey to Australia, visited the Gallipoli cemeteries. He arrived in Constantinople accompanied by Sir Fabian Ware on February 6, 1924 on board the Orient Express, and was well received by the Turks. Bruce took the time to do some sightseeing around the main sites of Constantinople, such as Santa Sophia, and also dined at the British Embassy. The Melbourne press provided its readers with a good summary of Bruce’s visit to the cemeteries on the Gallipoli Peninsula. From February 8–10, Bruce spent his time inspecting all the cemeteries at Helles, Anzac, and Suvla on the Gallipoli Peninsula and “laid a wreath on the great stone of the cemetery at Anzac Beach.” Bruce persuaded the Turkish Governor of Gallipoli of “the depth of Australia’s interest in these cemeteries, and he [Bruce] is satisfied that his visit was not without important influence on the native mind in their attitude towards memorials of such hallowed interest to Australians.” For the Australian leader this visit brought back memories of 1915 where he had served with the 29th Division of the British Army. 838 It would appear that Bruce was the first Dominion or British 837

W. J. Hudson and M. P. Sharp, op. cit., pp.75–6; The Age, “...Dominions Higher Status.,” October 8, 1923, p.9 ; Argus, “DOMINIONS’ NEW STATUS. Effective Consultation. Reform Badly Needed.” October 8,1923, p.9; C.O 532/244 -53102 November 2, 1923 with enclosures: Appendix A. Draft resolution to the negotiations, signature and ratification of international agreements; Appendix B. Historical memorandum on the position of the Dominions in relation to the signature of treaties. 838 The Age, “GALLIPOLI REVISITED. Mr Bruce Revives Memories...,” February 11, 1924, p.9 ; “MR BRUCE ON GALLIPOLI. Inspection of Cemetries. Australians Love of Adventure.,” February 12, p.9; Argus, “MR BRUCE ON GALLIPOLI. Voyage in Snowstorm. Visit to Cemetries.,” February 11, 1924, p.9; “ANZAC CEMETRIES. VISITED BY MR. BRUCE.

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leader to visit the new Turkish Republic of Mustapha Kemal. Bruce arrived back in Australia in late March 1924 to resume his prime ministerial duties. On April 3, 1924 Bruce addressed the House of Representatives regarding the Turkish Peace Treaty which had been signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923. The Melbourne newspapers gave differing emphases to the ensuing parliamentary discussions. In fact, The Age emphasised the speech of Matthew Charlton, which must be viewed within the context of the debate on the Turkish Treaty. Its editorial was highly critical of Labor as a political party which vacillated and lacked coherent policies on important issues such as foreign affairs and defence. On the other hand, in the Argus, the coverage of the Charlton speech was not as detailed. Both Melbourne newspapers alluded to the fact that the Lausanne Treaty was being discussed in parliament. 839 Bruce took the opportunity to outline a brief history of the Near East conflict, the Chanak crisis and the Lausanne Conference to the House. He emphasised the importance of ratifying the treaty, which would officially, end the state of war, which had existed between Australia and Turkey since 1914. In August 1923, Lord Devonshire had urged Bruce to ratify the Lausanne Treaty, as the British Parliament was about to do. The Conservative Government of Stanley Baldwin, however, lost the November 1923 election to the British Labor Party. Ramsay Macdonald, the first British Labor Prime Minister, encouraged Bruce to speed up the ratification process and the Australian leader promised to raise the matter in Parliament on his return to Australia. Bruce pointed out that Tribute to Sons of Pioneers.,” February 12, p.11; NAA, series A458/1, item no.R337/7, Soldiers’ Graves. The Prime Minister’s Report: Gallipoli., pp.5–6 ; Australian Archives, A458/1 P337/7, Sir Joseph Cook, High Commissioner, Australia House (London) to Rt Hon. S. M. Bruce, Prime Minister of Australia, Melbourne , March 6, 1924 enclosing a report 1924 of Sir Nevile Henderson, the British High Commissioner at Constantinople, dated February 11 sent to Foreign Office in relation to Bruce’s visit to the Gallipoli cemetries. 839 The Age, “FUTURE WARS. Must Australia Be Involved? Labor on Foreign Relations. SPEECH BY MR. CHARLTON.,” April 4, 1924, pp.8 and 10; Argus, “FEDERAL PARLIAMENT. House of Representatives.,” April 4, 1924, p.15.

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the most important part of the Lausanne Treaty for Australia was the protection of the Anzac graveyards on the Gallipoli Peninsula. 840 Charlton outlined the Australian Labor Party’s position regarding ratification of the peace treaty. He stated that Labor was prepared to ratify the treaty so that peace could finally be established in the Near East, but that the Labor Party wanted no involvement in foreign affairs, which dragged the Commonwealth into war. Labor could not accept the new doctrine “that every time Britain is at war Australia must also be involved.” 841 John Latham, the member for Kooyong, disputed Charlton’s remarks that Australia should have the option of remaining at peace or at war when Britain was at war. He declared that from a legal standpoint that “If the British Empire is at war, then, legally Australia also is undoubtedly at war.” However he argued, it was up to Australia to decide for herself if she was to contribute troops or not. Latham concluded that the only way that Australia could “avoid being considered at war when Britain is at war is by severing her connection with the Empire.” Scullin and Lazzarini, the Labor Party M.P.’s, supported Charlton’s stance, and both were critical of Latham as well as Lloyd George’s actions in September 1922. At the end of the parliamentary debate, Bruce moved a motion urging members to sanction the Treaty of Lausanne. His motion was endorsed by the House. 842 Lord Forster issued an official proclamation through the 840

C.P.D. vol.106, (26 March-18 June 1924) Treaty with Turkey, House of Representatives pp. 335–7. Bruce’s reference to Lord Devonshire is a cablegram sent by the Colonial Secretary to Lord Forster. See NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 1, Devonshire 10 Downing Street, Commonwealth of Australia, Dominions Treaty no.31 to Lord Forster, August 20, 1923 listing the instruments signed by the British Empire at Lausanne on July 24, 1923. It included instruments requiring the ratification of the Australian Government. These were: Treaty of Peace, Straits Convention, Convention respecting Thracian frontier, Convention respecting conditions of residence, business and jurisdiction and Commercial convention. 841 C.P.D. vol.106., pp.339–40. 842 ibid., pp.340–3 and 52; COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA, Parliamentary Papers General Session 1923 & Session 1923–24 vol.11, “The Par-

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Commonwealth Gazette on October 9, 1924 to end the war between the British Empire and Turkey. 843 In conclusion, it is clear the newspaper was the most important source of information for ordinary people in the period under review. While public opinion is difficult to measure due to the unavailability or lack of newspaper working files of both The Age and Argus, we do know that many ordinary citizens gathered outside the offices of the Melbourne newspapers to read about the cables of the Turkish Armistice of October 1918. There response was joyous and they were grateful that Australian troops would soon be returning home. At the beginning of the Chanak crisis many ex-AIF personnel wanted to enlist to defend the Empire. It was through the press reports that they obtained information about the crisis. Hughes complained to London at this time that the press cables were arriving quicker than the official Colonial Office telegrams. Overall the Melbourne press was largely supportive of British foreign policy in the Near East but was concerned when it appeared that Australia might become involved in an Anglo-Turkish conflict. The ghosts of 1915 were still present in the minds of the post 1918 generation. Hughes used Australia’s involvement in the 1914–18 War to argue for Australia’s participation as a member of the British Empire Delegaliament of Australia, Treaty of Peace with Turkey & other instruments signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923 together with Agreements between Greece & Turkey signed on 30th January 1923 & subsidiary documents forming part of the Turkish Peace Treaty [no.63] pp.1757–1804. 843 NAA, series A981/1, item no.Turkey 23, Henry Lambert (for Sec of Colonies) 10 Downing Street Commonwealth of Australia, Dominions no.390 to Governor General August 19, 1924 (recd by G.G. Sept 22,1924): contained copy of extract from London Gazette of 12 August containing an Order-in-Council of Aug 12 ordering that Aug 6 was to be treated as the date of termination of war with Turkey; Commonwealth Gazette no.73, October 9, 1924: Proclamation of the termination of war with Turkey by Governor General Lord Forster August 6th, 1924; Commonwealth of Australia, Prime Minister’s dept, October 3,1924, Minute paper for executive council, approved in council, signed Forster, October 8, 1924.

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tion and as an individual nation at the Paris Peace Conference of 1919. The granting of these two requests allowed Australia to sign the Treaties of Versailles and Sevres as an independent state. Hughes tried to chart an “independent” Australian foreign policy within a British Imperial framework in the post 1919 period. He used the 1921 Imperial Conference to know more about Britain’s foreign policy in the Near and Middle East and felt antipathy for King Constantine of Greece. Hughes persuaded Lloyd George to furnish Dominion Prime Ministers with Foreign Office documents so that they could keep abreast of international affairs and participate in the formulation of Imperial foreign policy. While Australia was not directly involved in the Greek-Turkish conflict, the Colonial Office did provide Australia with summary information on the events unfolding in Anatolia, and there were Greek attempts to forge trade links between Smyrna and Australia in late 1920. The Melbourne papers reported on the San Remo, London, and Paris Conferences of April 1920, February 1921, and March 1922. It was the Chanak crisis of September 1922, however, that exposed the difference between Australia’s national interests and those of Britain. Lloyd George used emotive terms, such as “Anzac graves” and “Gallipoli Peninsula” to appeal to Dominion sentiment and to get the Dominions to contribute troops to defend Imperial interests in the Turkish Straits. Throughout the Chanak crisis and the Lausanne proceedings, the Australian Government was provided with many documents, which kept them fully abreast of developments. The sanctity of the Anzac graves was the most important issue for Australia at that time and it was even prepared to risk war with Turkey over this affair. This is well documented in the Melbourne press accounts of September 1922 and January 1923. Finally, the 1923 Imperial Conference granted the Dominions the right to conduct their own treaties with foreign powers. This was indeed a new development in the evolution of the relations between Britain and its Dominions.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION This study examined the press as a primary source of historical information. Newspaper articles were dissected line-by-line and paragraphby-paragraph so as to permit an analysis of and exploration into the deeper meanings of the reports of the Greek-Turkish conflict as they appeared in the columns of the Melbourne press. The author confined his work to specific examples of press reports and of episodes to show the pro and anti positions of the Melbourne press towards both the Greeks and Turks at various moments during the period of the conflict. This study could perhaps be used as a model for examining other conflicts by using the press as a resource. It has been shown that the newspaper was an important source of information for both ordinary citizens and the governing elites in the period under review. While historians mainly use manuscripts and printed documentary collections to write their accounts, this study has shown that newspaper accounts can also, to some extent be substantiated from the surviving documentary evidence. The comparisons that were made between newspaper articles and archival sources have served as a useful exercise in that they allowed for double-checking, cross-examination, and even verification of the information contained in the newspaper accounts. It is evident from British and American archival sources that British and American diplomats based in Constantinople, Athens, Angora, and Smyrna forwarded summaries and English translations of the local press reports to London and Washington. The provision of such information gave British and American foreign policy makers insights into public opinion in the Near East. The Australian archives also contain many files which include newspaper cuttings from Australian, British, and American newspapers. Journalists did not have access to secret documents of the British Foreign Office, Colonial Office, Governor General’s Office, or Prime 323

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Minister’s Department when they were writing their journalistic accounts of the Greek-Turkish War. In the period 1919–22, correspondents operating in Paris, London, Rome, Angora, Athens, Constantinople, and Smyrna all had to deal with the problems posed by Allied press communiques and press censorship. The Allied Powers—Great Britain, France, and Italy—issued daily communiques to the press regarding their deliberations on the Turkish Treaty in 1919–22 in Paris, San Remo, and London without any further explanation. Journalists relied on news leaks, confidential information received from government officials and close intimate contacts with major political or diplomatic figures to be able to write their news stories on the Greek-Turkish war. From their diverse sources, journalists were able to give their readers some insights into differences among the Allies in settling the Turkish question. In Athens, Constantinople, Smyrna, and Angora press censorship was strictly enforced, which made it difficult for journalists to write freely about the war. Their news stories had to be cleared by military censors before they could be published in Greek and Turkish papers. An inter-Allied Military press committee in Constantinople and Smyrna ensured that journalists did not write and that local newspapers did not publish inflammatory articles. Foreign journalists based in Athens, Constantinople, or Smyrna could overcome these restrictions only by sending their stories by private mail to their home office in London. During the Greek-Turkish conflict, the Australian Press Association (A.P.A.) based in London collected news information from British, American, and European sources which they then cabled to the Melbourne offices of The Age and Argus newspapers. The Australian press tried to reduce its dependence on British news sources by establishing the A.P.A. in 1872 but it still operated within an Imperial framework. While Australia had no correspondents of its own covering the Greek-Turkish conflict, Australian citizens were nevertheless supplied with information on the events unfolding in Anatolia. Some of the news accounts emanating from Athens or Constantinople may have been censored but the Melbourne press did not experience the press restrictions operating in Athens, Constantinople, and Angora.

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Australia during the period under review was an open and free society, which allowed the press to operate independently of the State. Press censorship did operate in Australia during the course of the First World War, but many of the wartime press restrictions had been lifted by early 1919. All the press reports used in this study show that Turkey was accorded more coverage than Greece. This can probably be explained by the fact that the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Nationalist movement was considered more important to Australia than Greece. The Melbourne press reports were pro-Greek as long as Venizelos was in power. Since Venizelos was a trusted and loyal friend of Britain, it can be assumed that Australia considered him a friend too. When Venizelos lost the election of November 1920, which paved the way for the return of King Constantine in December 1920, the Melbourne press adopted an anti-Greek stance in the Anatolian war. While the Melbourne press was not pro-Turkish, there is an argument to support the contention that it may have been more sympathetic to the Sultan’s regime in Constantinople than to Mustapha Kemal Pasha’s movement in Asia Minor. The Melbourne press was very sympathetic to Great Britain’s interests in the Near East, which was an area of economic, financial, and strategic importance for the British Empire. Italy was depicted as a griping and untrustworthy alliance partner in the press accounts whereas France received more sympathetic treatment. During the Chanak crisis of September 1922 when Australia faced the distinct possibility of becoming involved in a new Anglo-Turkish war, the press gave this episode very extensive coverage. This can probably be explained by the fact that ex-AIF personnel volunteered their services to fight in the Near East and the Australian Government faced the prospect of sending a contingent to assist Britain. Hughes complained in September 1922, at the time of the Chanak crisis, that press cables were arriving faster than the official messages of the Colonial Office. Indeed the information contained in the official messages was already public before it arrived in Australia, which is further evidence of the importance of the press in the period under examination. Another reason for the attention given by the press to the Chanak crisis is that Australians had previously fought the Turks at Gallipoli in

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1915, and in Palestine and Syria in 1917–18. The Chanak crisis therefore brought back the memories of Gallipoli, which was still very present in the minds of the post 1918 generation. The key words “Anzac graves” and “the Dardanelles” were the ones used by Great Britain to elicit Dominion support. The Anzac graves on the Gallipoli Peninsula had an important symbolic, emotional, and political significance for Australia. The Melbourne press, too, used these key or emotive words in their press reports. While Great Britain retained the exclusive control of foreign policy for its entire empire, Hughes tried to chart a more “independent” foreign policy for Australia within an Imperial framework in the post1919 period. He argued that Australia’s military contributions to the 1914–18 war had earned her the right to be a member of the British Empire Delegation and to sign the peace treaties as an independent state. Australia was also one of the original founding members of the League of Nations. This is the beginning of Australia trying to chart its own “independent” path in the post 1919 world. Hughes used the 1921 Imperial Conference as a forum for improving the lines of communication between London and Melbourne. Lloyd George obliged him by sending copies of Foreign Office documents. The Australian archives show that Australia was not as insular as might sometimes be suggested. While Australia did not have overseas consular or ambassadorial staff, she appointed, or considered appointing, trade commissioners as a way of promoting and expanding Australian trade opportunities. In any case, trading opportunities with the Near East had at least been considered. Nor should it be forgotten that Britain at that time was Australia’s largest export market for its primary products. The development of the role of Trade Commissioners at the beginning of this century is an area which has the potential for further research. Overall, this dissertation has contributed to, and increased our knowledge of, the study of the Greek-Turkish war from an Australian standpoint. The Australian archives show that the Australian Government was being provided with information on the events unfolding in Anatolia. While this information may have not been voluminous, it did give Australian policy makers some insights into British, French, and Italian foreign policy in the Near East. Equally so, the Melbourne

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press and its various news sources did its part to keep its readers abreast of events in Anatolia.

BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES Unpublished Documents (a) Australian Archives, Canberra , ACT A2/1 19/814. Armistice with Turkey 1918. A457/1 AC306/6. Commonwealth Board of Trade. Minute paper: Subject. Trade Representation of Commonwealth Abroad. March 6, 1919. A458/1 F337/7. Imperial War Graves Commission Minutes of Proceedings 1922–23. A458/1 P336/6. ATT1 Imperial War Graves Commission Minutes of Proceedings for 1921–22. A458/1 G337/12. Cables received by W. M. Hughes 1922. A458/1 H 510/3. E. D. A. Bagot, Woodville South Aust to Rt Hon S. M. Bruce, Prime Minister, Federal Parliament, Melbourne: “Official Representation in Iraq” August 7, 1923. A981 IMP 104. Imperial War Conference and Imperial Cabinet and Misc documents June 17, 1918–1919. A981 IMP 105. Imperial Conference 1921—summary of proceedings and documents Cmd 1474. A981 IMP 106. Imperial Conference 1921 correspondence and records. A981 1MP 110 and 111. Imperial Conference 1923. A 981/1 Turkey 1. General 1921–34. A 981/1 Turkey 4. Near East Cables to Lloyd George from W. M. Hughes 1922. A981/1 Turkey 19. Turkey relations with Great Britain 1920–22. A981/1 Turkey 20. Turkey relations with Great Britain 1922. 329

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A981/1 Turkey 21. Turkey relations with G.B. Pt.3 Lausanne Treaty 1922–3. A981/1 Turkey 22. Turkey relations with Great Britain. Lausanne Treaty ratification 1923–4. A981/1 Turkey 23. Turkey relations with Great Britain Pt.5 Lausanne Treaty ratification 1924–5. A981/1 Turkey 25. Lausanne Conference. Minutes of Proceedings 1922–3. A981 War P15 pt. 1. Supreme War Council and Conversation of Ministers Jan 12–Mar 21 1919. This file contains some of the following: the whole Treaty of Sevres Final edition cabinet P155 Whitehall texts in French, Italian, and English languages and Peace Congress Paris Secret IC.131 and 132 February 3 and 4, 1919 Greek Territorial claims presented by Greek Premier Eleftherios Venizelos. A981 War P15 pt.2. Supreme War Council & conversations of meeting of Foreign Ministers Mar 18–June 22, 1919. Contains 1) Peace Conference Paris secret June 17, 1919. Secretary’s notes of a meeting of the Supreme Council of Allied and Associated Powers at Quai d’Orsay, Damad Ferid Pasha’s statement on June 17, 1919. 2) Stenographic notes of a meeting held at President Wilson’s House in Paris May 17, 1919, 4.30 p.m. attended by Indian delegation regarding peace Turkish treaty. A981 War P19. War Peace Conference British Empire Delegation minutes. A981 War Peace 36. South Eastern Europe/Balkans. A 981 War Peace Conference 1914–1918, 44. A981 War Peace Conf.1914–18 51, pt.1. A981 War 78 Peace Conf.4 4B 4C Cmd 964 Treaty of Peace with Turkey signed at Sevres August 10, 1920. A2219 Volumes of papers on external relations, 1900–23, 24 VolumesE. L. Piesse especially Vol.27 contains documents “Turkey Sept 25, 1922 Argus” and “Near East notes on Diplomatic arrangements and proposals from 1915 to 30 June 1922” and “The American Press” Confidential (11767), October 3, 1921. A4640/1 item 14. Imperial meetings 1921 Vol.1 notes and meetings nos E1–E34.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

A4640/1 item 15. Imperial meeting Vol.2 minutes of meetings and subcommittees. A4640/1 item 16. Imperial meetings Vol.3 memoranda E series papers nos 1–56. A5954 1044/2 [publication] Imperial conference 1923. Summary of proceedings. A5954 1044/3 [publication] imperial conference 1923. Summary of conclusions. CP78/22 20/290. Operations in Mesopotamia 1918–19. CP78/22 20/961. Trade between Smyrna and Australia 1920. CP78/30/1 Box 1 Cables from Secretary of State of Colonies 1918–20. CP317/7 Buns 1, 2, and 4. Cables received through Governor General’s Office. CP351/1 1/14. Preliminary Peace Conference 1919 Sir Robert Garran verbatim proceedings. CP351/1 Bundle 1/16 Sir Robert Garran, Memoranda re: Peace Conference 1919. CP351/1 Bundle 4/7 British Empire Delegation. CP360/8/1 items 2 and 4 Cables exchanged between Mr. Hughes and Mr.Watt October-December 1918 and April-August 1919. CP541/1 Vol.1 1918 Secretary copies of cablegrams April 1918–July 10, 1921. CP703/1 23/316. Commonwealth Board of Trade, “Australian Trade Representation Abroad.” (b) Australian Archives Melbourne MP 367/1 General Correspondence Files, Department of Defence, 01 Jan 1917–31 Dec 1929. 437/1/115 pt 2. Press Censorship Conference, April 16–18, 1918. MP 525/1.330/1/31 Volunteers for Near East 1922.

(c) Australian Archives Perth PP 14/1 Commonwealth Of Australia Department of Defence, Melbourne, November 25th 1918, file 2/1/357. Relaxation of Press Censorship.

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Great Britain (a) National Archives of United Kingdom (formerly known as the Public Record Office) London F.O.406/41–50 Eastern Affairs 1918–22. F.O.424 Confidential Correspondence respecting Turkey Pt.1 “Further correspondence respecting Eastern affairs” July-September 1922. (held on microfilm at National Library of Australia, Canberra). F.O.608 British Peace Delegation 1919–20. Cab.23 Cabinet: Conclusions of meetings of the Cabinet covering years 1919–1922. (held on microfilm at Deakin University & National Library of Australia, Canberra). Cab.24 Cabinet Office: Cabinet Minutes and Memoranda covering years 1919–1922. (held on microfilm at Deakin University & National Library of Australia). Cab.24 Eastern Reports. (held on microfilm at National Library of Australia). Cab.27 Eastern Committee 1918. (held on microfilm at National Library of Australia, Canberra, ACT). (b) Colonial Office (available on microfilm at State Library of Victoria and National Library of Australia under the title of Australian Joint Copying Project). C.O.418/132–186 Australia Governor-General, Dispatches 1915–21. C.O. 532 Original Correspondence. (c) House of Lords Record Office Lloyd George, David, Earl of Dwyfor Papers. (microfilm copies held by author). Law, Andrew Bonar Papers. (microfilm held by author). (d) India Office Curzon Papers. (microfilm copies held by author).

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United States National Archives and Records Administration, Washington D.C. Records of the Department of State relating to Internal Affairs of Turkey 1910–29. (available on microfilm at University of Melbourne Library, Middle Eastern collection). Records of the Department of State relating to Political Relations between Turkey and other States 1910–29. (available on microfilm at University of Melbourne Library, Middle Eastern Collection). Records of the Department of State relating to internal affairs of Greece 1910–29. (some microfilms in author’s possession). RG45 Naval Records, Collection of Office of Naval Records Subject file 1911–27: Smyrna Boxes 833–34 (photocopies of telegrams in author’s possession).

PUBLISHED DOCUMENTS (a) League of Nations League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement no.9 October 1922, “Resolutions and Recommendations adopted by Assembly during its Third Assembly from the reports of the 6th Committee. (held at University of Melbourne). (b) Australia Australian Parliament, Parliamentary Debates 1918–24 (CPD). Australia Parliament, Parliamentary Papers, Session 1922, Vol.2 pt.2, Statement made by Prime Minister re Turkish Situation. Parliamentary Papers, Session 1922, Vol.2 pt.1, “Report of the Repatriation year ending June 30, 1922.” Parliamentary Papers General Session 1923 & Session 1923–24 Vol.11, “The Parliament of Australia, Treaty of Peace with Turkey & other instruments signed at Lausanne on 24 July 1923 together with Agreements between Greece & Turkey signed on 30th January 1923 & subsidiary documents forming part of the Turkish Peace Treaty” [no.63] pp.1757–1804. Commonwealth of Australia, Gazette, no.3, January 14, 1920. Gazette no.73 October 9, 1924: Proclamation of the termination of war with Turkey by Governor General Lord Forster Aug 6th,1924.

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The Age Archives, “editors of The Age” No page numbers shown. A copy of this document was provided by Mr. Michael Wood , the archivist for the Age. Argus and Australasian Ltd, Men who made “The Argus” and “The Australasian” 1846–1923 Vol.1, Melbourne, (1923?). Special collection of the Victoria University of Technology [V.U.T.], Footscray Campus library. Historical Records of “the Argus” and “Australasian,” held in the special collection at V.U.T. Footscray Campus library. F. K. Crowley, Modern Australia in Documents 1901–1939, Vol.1, Wren Publishing, Melbourne, 1973. (c) Official War Histories C. E. W. Bean, The Official History of Australia in the War 1914–18 Vol.V The AIF in France, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1939. H. S. Gullett, Official History of Australia in the War of 1914–18: Vol.7 Sinai and Palestine, Angus and Robertson, 1938. (d) Great Britain Command Papers and Parliamentary Debates Cmd.963, Vol.Li, 1920, Tripartite Agreement. Cmd.964, Vol.L, 1920, Treaty of Sevres. Cmd. 1474, Vol.X1V sess. 1 1921, Imperial Conference Proceedings and Documents: Conference of Prime Ministers and Representatives of U.K., the Dominions and India held in June, July, and August 1921. Summary of proceedings and documents. Cmd.1556, Turkey, No. 2, 1921, Angora Accord 20 October 1921. Cmd.1570, Turkey, No. 1, 1922, Correspondence between Britain and France respecting the Angora Agreement of October 10, 1921. Cmd.1641, Vol.XXII, 1922, Paris Pronouncement of the Allies, 27th March. Cmd.1814, Vol.XXV1, 1923, Lausanne negotiations 1922–23. Cmd.1929, Vol.XXV, Treaty Series 16, Treaty of Lausanne, 24 July, 1923. Cmd.1987 Imperial Conference 1923 : Summary of Proceedings . House of Commons Parliamentary Debates 1918–22.

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(e) Great Britain

COLLECTED DOCUMENTS Documents on British Foreign Policy,1919–1939, first series, Vols. IV, VII, VIII, 1X, XII, XIII, XV, XVII, XVIII. H.M.S.O. Kenneth Bourne & D. Cameron Watt [General Editors], British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports and Papers from the Foreign Office Confidential Print, Series F Europe, 1919–39, Vols 4&5 Italy and SouthEastern Europe, November 1918–June 1921 & July 1921–December 1923, University Publications of America. Keith Jeffery (Ed), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson 1918–1922, published by Bodley Head for Army Records Society, London, 1985. Paul Mantoux, The Deliberations of the Council of Four 2 Vols., Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1992. Bilal. N. Simsir (Ed), British Documents on Ataturk 4 Vols., Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1984–92. (f) United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference 1919, 13 Vols., United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1942–47. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States 1920, 3 Vols., United States Government Printing Office, Washington, 1935– 36. Papers relating to the Foreign Affairs of the United States 1918: Supplement 1: The World War Vol.1, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington D.C., 1933.

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Arthur S. Link [Ed], The Papers of Woodrow Wilson Vols. 54, 59, 61, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1984–88.

DICTIONARIES Various authors, Australian Dictionary of Biography Vols.5, 6, 10, 12 1851–1890, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1974, 1976, 1986, 1990. Vernon Bogdanor (Ed), The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Institutions, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1987. Gordon Marshall (Ed), The Concise Oxford Dictionary of Sociology, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1994. David Robertson, The Penguin Dictionary of Politics, Penguin Books, London ,1985. David L. Sills (Ed), International of the Social Sciences Vols.1–2, 5, 11, 15–17, Macmillan & Free Press, New York, 1972. Richard Weiner, Webster’s New World Dictionary of Media and Communication, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1990.

MEMOIRS, DIARIES, AND BIOGRAPHIES Vernon Bartlett, Behind the Scenes at the Peace Conference, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1920 Stephen Bonsal, Unfinished Business, Doubleday, Doran & Co, Garden City, New York, 1944. Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1978. Maj. Gen. Sir C. E. Callwell, Field-Marshal Sir Henry Wilson: His Life and Diaries, Vol.2, Charles Scribner’s Sons, New York, 1927. E. J. Dillon, The Inside Story of the Peace Conference, Harper and Brothers Publishers, New York and London, 1920. Marc Ferro, Nicholas 11: Last of the Tsars, Oxford University Press, New York, 1993. Translated by Brian Pearce.

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L. F. Fitzhardinge, The Little Digger 1914–52 Vol.2, Angus and Robertson, Sydney and Melbourne, 1979. David Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties Vol.2, Victor Gollancz, London, 1938. Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill, Vol.3, 1914–1916, Vol. 4, 1917– 1922, and companion volumes, Heinemann, London, 1977. D. Gilmour, Curzon, John Murray, London, 1994. H. Nicolson, Peace Making 1919, Grosset and Dunlop, New York,1965, originally published in 1933. Harold Nicolson, Curzon, Howard Fertig, New York, 1974. Lord Riddell, Intimate Diary of the Peace Conference and after 1918–23, Victor Gollancz, London, 1933. C. E. Sayers, David Syme: A Life, F. W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1965. S. R. Sonyel, Ataturk-The Founder of Modern Turkey, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara, 1989. Peter Spartalis, The Diplomatic Battles of Billy Hughes, Hale and Iremonger, Sydney, 1983. Charles T. Thompson, The Peace Conference: Day by Day, Brentano’s, New York, 1920. Desmond Zwar, In Search of Keith Murdoch, Macmillan & Co, South Melbourne, 1980.

MONOGRAPHS AND GENERAL STUDIES A. Alexandris, The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish relations 1918–1974, Center for Asia Minor Studies, Athens, 1983. Peter H. Amann, Revolution and Mass Democracy, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1975. B. Anderson, Imagined Communities, Verso, London and New York, 1990. M. S. Anderson, The Ascendancy of Europe 1815–1914, Longman, London & New York, 1986.

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Christopher M. Andrews and A. S. Kanya-Forstner, France Overseas, Thames and Hudson, London, 1981. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism, Meridian Books, New York, 1959. Frederick B. Artz, France under the Bourbon restoration 1814–30, Russell & Russell, New York, 1963. G. H. Bennett, British Foreign Policy during the Curzon Period 1919–24, St. Martin’s Press, London, New York, 1995. George L. Bird and Frederic E. Merwin, The Press and Society, Greenwood Press, Westport, 1971, originally published in 1942 by Prentice-Hall. Norman Blaikie, Approaches to Social Enquiry, Polity Press, Oxford, 1993. B. Bonney and H. Wilson, Australia’s Commercial Media, Macmillan & Co, South Melbourne, 1983. Emile Bourgeois, History of Modern France Vol.2 1852–1913, Octagon Books, New York, 1972 originally published 1919. George Boyce, James Curran & Pauline Wingate (Ed), Newspaper History: from the 17th century to the present day, Constable, London and Sage Publications, Beverly Hills, 1978. Karl D. Bracher, The German Dictatorship, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1978. E. K. Bramsted & K. J. Melhuish, Western Liberalism, Longman, New York, 1978. W. M. Brasch, The Press and the State, University Press of America, Lanham, 1986. P. Burgess, Warco: Australian Reporters at War, William Heinemann, Melbourne, 1986. Peter Burke, “Overture,” in Peter Burke (Ed), New Perspectives on Historical Writing, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Peter Burke, History and Social Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom, 1992. B. C. Busch, Mudros to Lausanne:1918–1923, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1976. E. H. Carr, What is History? Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1970. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, Italy at the Peace Conference, Columbia University Press, New York, 1938.

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Louis P. Cassimatis, American Influence in Greece 1917–29, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 1988. B. Chapman, Police State, Macmillan, London, 1971. C. M. H. Clark, A History of Australia, Vols.3, 5, 6, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1973, 1981, and 1987. G. Kitson-Clark, The Critical Historian, Heinemann, London, 1970. G. A. Cranfield, The Press and Society from Caxton and Northcliffe, Longman, New York, 1978. F. Crowley (Ed), A New History of Australia, William Heinemann, Melbourne, 1977. D. Cryle, The Press in Colonial Queensland, University of Queensland Press, St Lucia, 1989. Christopher Cunneen, Kings’ Men: Australia’s Governors-General from Hopetoun to Isaacs, George Allen and Unwin, Sydney, 1983. Douglas Dakin, The Unification of Greece 1770–1923, St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1972. R. W. Davies, Soviet History in the Gorbachev Revolution, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1989. Robert W. Desmond, The Press and World Affairs, Arno Press, New York, 1972. Robert W. Desmond, Windows on the World, University of Iowa Press, Iowa City, 1980. N. Petsalis-Diomidis, Greece at the Paris Peace Conference 1919, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1978. D. Dontas, Greece and Turkey, Eleftheroudakis, Athens, 1987. Barrie Dyster and David Meredith, Australia in the International Economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. G. R. Elton, The Practice of History, Fontana, London, 1967. P. G. Edwards, Prime Ministers and Diplomats: The making of Australian Foreign Policy 1901–49, Oxford University Press, Melbourne,1983 in association with the Australian Institute of International Affairs. R .W. Fogel and G. R. Elton, Which road to the Past?, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1983. David Fromkin, A Peace to End All Peace, Penguin Books, London, 1991.

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S. Galai, The Liberation Movement in Russia 1900–1915, Cambridge university Press, Cambridge, 1973. Harry Gordon, An Eyewitness History of Australia, Currey O’Neil Publishers, Melbourne, 1981. R. Grunberger, A Social History of the Third Reich, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1979. Paul C. Helmreich, From Paris to Sevres, Ohio State University Press, Columbus, 1974. H. Holborn, A History of Modern Germany 1840–1945, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1982. Richard G. Hovannisian, The Republic of Armenia Vol.2: 1919–20, University of California, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1982. H. N. Howard, The King-Crane Commission, Khayats, Beirut, 1963. H. N. Howard, The Partition of Turkey: A Diplomatic History 1913– 1923, Howard Fertig, New York, 1966. W. J. Hudson & M. P. Sharp, Australian Independence: Colony to Relunctant Kingdom, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988. G. Hutton and L. Tanner (Ed), The Age 125 Years the Age, Thomas Nelson, Melbourne, 1979. K. Jeffery, The British Army and the Crisis of Empire 1918–22, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1984. James Joll, Europe since 1870, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1978. Roy A. Medvedev, Let History Judge, Vintage Books, New York, 1971. Giannis P. Kapsis, Hamenes Patrides, [Lost Homelands], Nea Sunora, A. A. Livani, Athens, 1989. (Greek). James L. Kellas, The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity, Macmillan, London, 1991. W. L. Langer, The Revolutions of 1848, Harper Torch Books, New York, 1971. S. Lawson, The Archibald Paradox, Allen Lane, Ringwood, 1983. R. Leach, Political Ideologies, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1988. G. B. Leon, Greece and the Great Powers 1914–1917, The Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1974. Christopher Lloyd, The Structures of History, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. C. J. Lloyd, Parliament and the Press, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1988.

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John Locke, Two Treaties of Government, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1963. Sally Marks, The Illusion of Peace, Macmillan, London, 1976. F. S. Marston, The Peace Conference of 1919, Oxford University Press, London, 1944, issued under the auspices of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. H. Mayer, Press in Australia, Lansdowne Press, Melbourne, 1968. Mary McCauley, Politics and the Soviet Union, Penguin Books, Harmondworth, 1982. N. McLachlan, Waiting for the Revolution, Penguin Books, Ringwood, 1989. J. C. Merrill and H. A. Fisher, The World’s Great Dailies, Hastings House, New York, 1980. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, David Spitz (Ed), W. W. Norton, New York, 1975. A. E. Montgomery, “Lloyd George and the Greek question 1918–22.” in A. J. P. Taylor (Ed), Lloyd George Twelve Essays, Hamish Hamilton, London, 1971. Kenneth O. Morgan, Consensus and Disunity: The Lloyd George Coalition Government 1918–1922, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986. George Bernard Noble, Policies and Opinions at Paris 1919, Howard Fertig, New York, 1968. E. Nolte, Three Faces of Fascism, Mentor, New York, 1969. Kenneth E. Olsen, The History Makers, Louisiana State University Press, Baton Rouge, 1965. S. Victor Papacosma, The Military in Greek Politics, Kent State University Press, Kent, Ohio, 1977. S. Victor Papacosma, “The Military in Greek Politics” in John T. A. Koumoulides (Ed), Greece in Transition, Zeno Publishers, London, 1977. Rob Pascoe, The Manufacture of Australian History, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1979. R. Pipes, The Russian Revolution 1899–1919, Fontana press, London, 1992. H. Psomiadis, The Eastern Question, Institute for Balkan Studies, Thessaloniki, 1968.

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L. Von Ranke, The Theory and Practice of History, (Ed) George G. Iggers and Konrad Von Moltke, The Bobbs-Merill Co, Indianapolis, 1973. L. Von Ranke, The Secret of World History, Fordham University Press, New York, 1981. A. Rawlinson, Adventures in the Near East, Andrew Melrose, London & New York, 1924. L. L Robson, Australia and the Great War, Macmillan, South Melbourne, 1979. Michael Rodas, Greece in Asia Minor (H Ellada sth Mikran Asia), Kleisiouni, Athens, 1950. C. C. Rodeo et al., Introduction to Political Science, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1967. George H. Sabine and Thomas L. Thorson, A History of Political Theory, Holt-Saunders International, 1973. Leonard Shapiro, The Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Vintage Books, New York, 1971. Alan Sharp, The Versailles Settlement, Macmillan, London, 1991. L. Siebert et al., Four Theories of the Press, Books for Libraries, New York, 1956, reprinted in 1973 by arrangement with University of Illinois Press. Anthony D. Smith (Ed), Nationalists Movements, Macmillan, London & Basingstoke, 1976. Michael Llewellyn. Smith, Ionian Vision, Allen Lane, London, 1973. David Mack Smith, Mussolini’s Roman Empire, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1979. S. R. Sonyel, Turkish Diplomacy 1918–1923, Sage Publications, London, 1975. G. Storey, Reuters, Greenwood Press, New York, 1970. G. Souter, Company of Heralds, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, 1981. Michael Stanford, The Nature of Historical Knowledge, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1986. David Thomson, Europe since Napoleon, Penguin Books, London, 1990. Roger C. Thompson, Australian Imperialism in the Pacific, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1981.

343

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Arnold J. Toynbee, The Western Question in Greece and Turkey, Howard Fertig, New York, 1970. R. B. Walker, The Newspaper Press in New South Wales, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1976. R. B. Walker, Yesterday’s News, Sydney University Press, Sydney, 1980. Arthur Walworth, Wilson and his Peacemakers, W. W. Norton, New York & London, 1986. R. Ward, The Australian Legend, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1965. Christopher Seton-Watson, Italy from Liberation to Fascism 1870–1925, Methuen and Co., London, 1967. Samuel R. Williamson Jr, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, Macmillan, Basingstoke, 1992. Sir Llewellyn Woodward, Prelude to Modern Europe 1815–1914, Methuen, London, 1972. C. M. Woodhouse, Modern Greece, Faber and Faber, London, 1987. M. E. Yapp, The Making of the Modern Near East 1792–1923, Longman, New York and London, 1987.

ARTICLES J. G. Darwin, “The Chanak Crisis and the British Cabinet,” History, Vol.35, no. 213, February, 1980. G. Dyer, “The Turkish Armistice of 1918,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol.8, no.2, 1972. W. T. Ellis, “Feeding the world’s press at Lausanne,” Editor and Publisher, Vol.37, no.37, February 10, 1923. Sterling J. Kernek, “Woodrow Wilson and National Self-determination along Italy’s frontier,” Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, Vol.126, no.4, 1982. Peter M. Sales, “W. M. Hughes and the Chanak Crisis of 1922,” Journal of Politics and History, Vol.XV11, no.2, December 1971. Henry Wood, “Ripping off the Diplomatic Lid at Lausanne,” Editor and Publisher, Vol.55, no.40, March 10, 1923.

NEWPAPERS The Age (Melbourne) held on microfilm at RMIT Central Library. The Argus (Melbourne) RMIT Central Library.

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The Times (London) held on microfilm at University of Melbourne Library. New York Times (New York) University of Melbourne Library.

UNPUBLISHED THESES Alexander Karagiannis, Greece’s Quest for Empire at the Paris Peace Conference 1919–20, PhD Thesis, Indiana University, 1981 [available through University Microfilms International]. Victoria Solomonidis, Greece in Asia Minor: The Greek Administration of the Vilayet of Aidin 1919–22, PhD Thesis, University of London, 1984.

INDEX Adalia, 94, 95, 96, 104, 114 Adrianople. See Edirne, See Edirne, See Edirne, See Edirne, See Edirne Adriatic, 88, 96, 110, 111, 125, 152, 156, 201 Amyna, xiii, 197, 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 217, 219, 220 Anatolia, 1, 3, 7, 13, 49, 85, 96, 97, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 106, 108, 110, 111, 113, 114, 122, 125, 127, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 172, 174, 175, 178, 185, 196, 203, 207, 216, 217, 220, 223, 225, 226, 229, 230, 232, 236, 237, 255, 256, 261, 265, 276, 280, 321, 324, 326 Angora, 10, 49, 66, 81, 83, 84, 138, 139, 142, 202, 210, 216, 218, 219, 225, 231, 266, 268, 270, 279, 288, 306, 315, 323, 324, 334 Anzac, 55, 67, 162, 244, 246, 247, 248, 281, 282, 291, 294, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 317, 319, 321, 326 Argus, 1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 26, 27, 30, 32, 33, 39, 40, 41, 45, 46, 49, 52, 53, 54, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 77, 78, 80, 83, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108,

109, 110, 114, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 209, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 228, 229, 230, 232, 236, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 261, 263, 264, 267, 268, 269, 271, 272, 273, 274, 277, 279, 280, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 311, 312, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 324, 330, 334, 343 Associated Press, 57, 58, 59, 61, 75, 76, 165, 167, 168, 193, 212, 217 Ataturk. See Mustapha Kemal Pasha Athens, 10, 30, 49, 66, 69, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 119, 162, 176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 193, 194, 197, 198, 199, 200, 204, 205, 206,

345

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THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

207, 208, 209, 213, 215, 220, 223, 227, 232, 238, 266, 323, 324, 337, 339, 340, 342 Australia, xiv, xv, xvii, 2, 3, 4, 5, 10, 13, 16, 17, 20, 22, 27, 29, 30, 31, 33, 44, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 57, 59, 61, 66, 67, 68, 85, 86, 109, 149, 150, 162, 170, 171, 175, 220, 227, 228, 229, 231, 235, 236, 237, 242, 246, 247, 248, 250, 251, 252, 258, 260,
262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 270, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 295, 296, 300, 301, 305, 306, 308, 310, 311, 312, 315, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 324, 325, 326, 331, 332, 333, 334, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342 Australian, xiii, xiv, xv, xvi, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10, 13, 15, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 26, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 74, 75, 76, 77, 80, 84, 85, 86, 109, 114, 129, 132, 146, 149, 150, 152, 153, 154, 156, 158, 162, 164, 165, 171, 172, 224, 227, 228, 229, 233, 235, 236, 237, 238, 244, 247, 248, 251, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 261, 262, 263, 265, 266, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 278, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 297, 298, 300, 301, 302, 305, 306, 310, 311, 312, 313, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 321, 323, 324, 325, 326,

329, 331, 332, 333, 336, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343 Australian Labor Party, 4 Australian Press Association, 66, 77, 84, 114, 150, 156 Australian Red Cross, 297, 298 Balfour, AJ, 83, 93, 112, 122, 124, 125, 126, 127, 130, 131, 133, 179, 181, 191, 192, 193, 196, 207, 208, 215, 217, 223, 232, 302, 303, 304 Bean, CEW, 55, 67, 69, 252, 334 Briand, Aristide, 225, 267, 268 Britain, 1, 2, 3, 13, 16, 17, 43, 54, 57, 58, 64, 67, 72, 74, 75, 76, 78, 85, 92, 94, 96, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 114, 116, 126, 127, 128, 132, 140, 144, 152, 154, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 170, 171, 175, 179, 180, 182, 185, 189, 195, 208, 215, 222, 223, 224, 226, 227, 228, 230, 235, 236, 239, 240, 241, 247, 248, 249, 250, 253, 257, 259, 261, 262, 265, 267, 270, 273, 275, 277, 278, 280, 281, 284, 286, 287, 289, 291, 292, 297, 298, 304, 306, 307, 308, 311, 315, 316, 319, 321, 324, 325, 326, 329, 330, 332, 334, 335 British, xiv, xv, xvi, xvii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 13, 14, 16, 17, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 43, 44, 45, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 64, 65, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 117, 119, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 130, 131,

347

INDEX

132, 133, 134, 136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 158, 159, 160, 161, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 172, 173, 174, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 185, 186, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 195, 196, 197, 198, 201, 203, 205, 206, 208, 212, 214, 215, 217, 218, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 235, 236, 237, 239, 240, 241, 243, 244, 246, 248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259, 260, 263, 265, 273, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 281, 282, 283, 284, 286, 288, 290, 291, 292, 296, 297, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 312, 313, 314, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 323, 324, 325, 326, 330, 331, 332, 335, 338, 340, 343 Bruce, Stanley M, 274, 275, 316, 317, 318, 319, 329 Brusa, 91, 96, 166, 212, 271 Bulgaria, 2, 16, 64, 69, 106, 201, 238 Cambon, Jules, 99, 102 Canada, xiv, 52, 109, 229, 235, 272, 273, 274, 275, 298, 306, 308 Chanak, 3, 4, 6, 14, 17, 18, 27, 53, 55, 56, 236, 237, 269, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 297, 298, 300, 301, 316, 318, 320, 321, 325, 343 Charlton, Matthew, 4, 284, 285, 286, 287, 301, 318, 319 Chatalja, 190, 191 Chauvel, Sir Harry, 284

Chicago Tribune, 6, 63 Christian Science Monitor, 7 Chronos, 214 Churchill, Winston, 144, 166, 167, 248, 249, 282, 289, 293, 294, 337 Clemenceau, 99, 111, 112, 113, 121, 125, 127, 144, 145, 164, 307 Constantine (King of Greece), 13, 177, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 189, 196, 197, 198, 200, 201, 202, 203, 212, 214, 217, 232, 266, 267, 271, 272, 279, 291, 292, 321, 325 Constantinople (Istanbul), 10, 13, 26, 66, 69, 70, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 97, 103, 105, 106, 107, 117, 119, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 149, 151, 159, 160, 161, 163, 167, 168, 170, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 206, 207, 210, 213, 214, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 226, 227, 231, 232, 233, 239, 240, 241, 242, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 269, 271, 306, 309, 311, 317, 318, 323, 324, 325 Country Party, 284 Crowe, Sir Eyre, 92, 96, 99, 102, 104, 105, 267 Curzon, George N, xv, 6, 26, 78, 79, 80, 83, 92, 95, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 146, 147, 153, 154, 157, 169, 170, 173, 178, 184, 185, 194, 198, 218, 219, 220, 222, 231, 241, 268,

348

THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

275, 276, 278, 288, 303, 304, 307, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 332, 337, 338 Cyprus, 94, 95, 128, 132 Daily Chronicle, 80, 189, 193, 223 Daily Mail, 5, 7, 76 Daily Telegraph, 6, 7, 44, 60, 63, 67, 68, 110, 111, 122, 222 Damad Ferid Pasha, 129, 131, 134, 135, 136, 145, 146, 253, 254, 255, 257, 259, 260, 330 Dardanelles, 17, 69, 94, 97, 161, 162, 163, 185, 196, 224, 242, 246, 247, 269, 281, 283, 287, 300, 326 Delane, JT, 63 Devonshire, Duke of, 306, 307, 308, 310, 316, 318, 319 Dillon, EJ, 93, 122, 123, 336 Dodecanese, 94, 95, 96, 104, 105, 107, 127, 254 Donohoe, M, 80 Egypt, 58, 68, 109, 132, 144, 145, 167, 189, 204, 220, 248, 255, 256, 257, 274, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 284, 308 Eleftheron Vima, 6 Ellis, W. T., 68, 79, 80, 343 Embros, 6, 7 Estia, 7, 82 Faisal (Syria), 26 Fiume, 108, 110, 124 Foch, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168 France, 3, 13, 16, 17, 29, 30, 38, 57, 58, 59, 67, 72, 74, 76, 80, 82, 91, 92, 99, 106, 107, 108, 110, 114, 116, 126, 152, 154, 165, 167, 168, 173, 181, 182, 185, 186, 187, 189, 204, 215, 226, 229, 230, 246, 250, 252, 257, 262,

265, 267, 275, 292, 303, 306, 307,
324, 325, 334, 338 Franklin-Bouillon, 225 French, xiii, 7, 26, 29, 36, 37, 38, 42, 58, 62, 72, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 85, 88, 94, 99, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 111, 112, 113, 121, 124, 127, 137, 142, 143, 144, 145, 151, 154, 155, 157, 158, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 174, 175, 179, 180, 181, 186, 187, 188, 190, 191, 192, 193, 197, 204, 214, 215, 219, 221, 223, 225, 226, 229, 233, 239, 250, 253, 256, 258, 261, 267, 271, 288, 307, 326, 330 Gallipoli, 14, 17, 55, 67, 68, 69, 92, 94, 129, 149, 151, 159, 161, 162, 163, 224, 246, 248, 262, 263, 264, 269, 281, 282, 286, 291, 294, 311, 312, 313, 314, 317, 318, 319, 321, 325 Germany, 2, 16, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 55, 57, 69, 105, 109, 154, 158, 228, 243, 246, 250, 340 Giornale d’Italia, 6 Gladstone, W. E., 64 Greece, xiv, xvii, 1, 5, 8, 13, 49, 82, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 94, 95, 96, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 110, 113, 117, 121, 124, 127, 128, 147, 157, 160, 162, 165, 167, 168, 169, 171, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 186, 187, 189, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 213, 214, 216, 222, 223, 224, 227, 232, 249, 254, 256,

349

INDEX

258, 259, 261, 262, 266, 267, 270, 271, 276, 278, 280, 281, 283, 288, 299, 300, 306, 320, 321, 325, 333, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344 Greek Territorial Committee, 99, 102, 104, 254 Greeks, 1, 7, 13, 79, 82, 83, 87, 88, 94, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 102, 108, 112, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121, 125, 126, 127, 137, 138, 141, 147, 171, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 200, 202, 204, 205, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 214, 216, 219, 221, 222, 223, 224, 227, 231, 232, 233, 258, 259, 261, 266, 267, 268, 270, 271, 272, 278, 279, 284, 289, 323 Greek-Turkish war Greco-Turkish War, 1, 5, 8, 10, 11, 13, 17, 27, 31, 77, 83, 85, 148, 149, 278, 280, 324, 326 Greene, Massey, 284 Havas, 57, 58, 75, 76, 78, 199 Heidegger, 8, 9 Hitler, Adolf, 26, 38, 40, 336 Horton, George, 83, 208, 211, 214, 216, 226, 227 Hughes, William Morris, xiv, 3, 45, 46, 47, 53, 69, 70, 77, 235, 236, 237, 238, 250, 251, 254, 263, 264, 272, 273, 274, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 296, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 308, 309, 310, 312,

313, 315, 320, 321, 325, 326, 329, 331, 337, 343 Ikdam, 7 Imperial Conference 1921 & 1923, 69, 235, 237, 276, 277, 279, 280, 310, 316, 317, 321, 326, 329, 334 Imperial War Graves Commission, 312, 313, 329 Iraq Mesopotamia, 132, 167, 274, 275, 311, 329 Ismid Peninsula, 92, 97, 143, 177, 269 Italians, 13, 72, 94, 95, 96, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 108, 111, 112, 113, 115, 119, 120, 124, 125, 147, 155, 172, 173, 175, 190, 216, 221, 225, 233, 250, 256, 263, 271 Italy, 4, 8, 13, 16, 38, 39, 41, 42, 58, 72, 76, 88, 91, 95, 96, 98, 99, 104, 105, 108, 109, 110, 111, 113, 114, 115, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 152, 153, 172, 173, 181, 185, 220, 226, 229, 241, 250, 256, 262, 263, 265, 275, 292, 303, 306, 314, 324, 325, 335, 338, 343 Journal des debats, 186 Kemalists, 4, 138, 139, 142, 144, 146, 175, 185, 208, 216, 223, 230, 232, 270, 271, 279, 282, 283, 285, 288, 289, 291, 309 Kerr, Sir Phillip, 19, 76, 122 Kurdistan, 250, 252, 253 Lambie, 66 Latham, 250, 256, 259, 299, 319 Lausanne Conference 1922-23, 78, 237, 311

350

THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

Law, Bonar, xv, 45, 65, 309, 313, 332 Le Journal d’Orient, 219 Le Matin, 7, 78, 79, 155, 156 Le Temps, 7, 8, 76, 79, 156, 186, 214 League of Nations, 70, 90, 91, 101, 163, 169, 170, 185, 250, 268, 269, 281, 297, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 307, 326, 333 League of Nations Union, 299, 300 Lenin, 38, 41 Lloyd George, David, xiv, 6, 7, 11, 12, 49, 69, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 91, 110, 111, 112, 114, 115, 122, 124, 144, 145, 151, 152, 154, 155, 158, 160, 161, 162, 164, 166, 174, 176, 186, 197, 206, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 230, 231, 232, 239, 249, 267, 268, 269, 270, 276, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 286, 290, 291, 292, 293, 301, 303, 304, 309, 317, 319, 321, 326, 329, 332, 337, 341 London, xiii, xv, 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 36, 37, 43, 48, 49, 50, 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 75, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 86, 93, 95, 100, 102, 104, 107, 110, 114, 115, 122, 123, 124, 129, 134, 140, 144, 149, 150, 151, 152,
153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198,

199, 200, 201, 203, 204, 205, 206, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 227, 230, 231, 232, 235, 238, 240, 243, 246, 247, 249, 251, 252, 253, 255, 257, 258, 259, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 289, 290, 293, 294, 299, 300, 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 315, 318, 320, 321, 323, 324, 326, 332, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344 London Times The Times, 29, 64, 81, 150, 155, 156, 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 165, 168, 175, 177, 181, 183, 184, 193, 194, 195, 196, 199, 200, 205, 206, 210, 211, 214, 216, 217, 220, 222, 225, 231 Macdonald, Donald, 66, 318 Macedonia, 88, 181, 182, 201, 207 MacGahan, J. A., 64 Maniachi, A. V. (Consul for Greece, Melbourne), 173 Mantoux, Paul, 71, 72, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 125, 335 Melvin, 66 Moniteur Oriental, 6 Montagu, 92, 131, 144, 254 Morning Post, 6, 61, 62, 63, 80, 91, 110, 111, 181, 223 Mudania, 281, 289, 311 Mudros Armistice, 6, 7, 81, 240, 241, 338 Murdoch, Keith, 18, 20, 61, 67, 68, 69, 77, 337 Mussolini, Benito, 38, 39, 41, 342

351

INDEX

Mustapha Kemal Pasha. See , See , See , See , See , See , See , See , See , See , See , See , See nationalism, 9, 15, 23, 43, 46, 49, 50, 51, 56, 84, 140, 202 Nea Hellas, 6 New South Wales, 32, 44, 50, 51, 54, 295, 343 New York Times, 7, 8, 13, 29, 58, 62, 79, 81, 94, 141, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 222, 224, 225, 230, 231, 344 New York World, 7, 76, 105, 254 New Zealand, 22, 52, 55, 66, 109, 229, 235, 246, 247, 248, 289, 306, 312, 313 Nicolson, 11, 12, 96, 102, 108, 206, 222, 337 Orlando, 76, 86, 114, 115, 122, 123, 124 Ottoman Empire, xiv, 1, 2, 8, 16, 49, 70, 88, 97, 129, 131, 132, 151, 153, 163, 174, 175, 224, 238, 240, 241, 246, 248, 249, 251, 313, 325 Pacific Ocean, xvi, 14, 30, 52, 53, 58, 66, 109, 150, 236, 250, 273, 280, 342 Page, Earl, 284, 286, 287 Paris Peace Conference, xvii, 2, 5, 10, 14, 31, 53, 63, 69, 71, 72, 75,

85, 86, 100, 128, 236, 237, 246, 321, 335, 339, 344 Patris, 82, 219 Pearce, 35, 47, 48, 60, 244, 246, 247, 336 Persian Gulf, 109, 243, 275, 279 Petite Parisienne, 7 Poincare, 307, 308 Reuters, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 65, 75, 79, 81, 114, 159, 162, 212, 224, 342 Rodas, 82, 209, 211, 212, 220, 342 Rodd, Sir Rennell, 123, 124 Rome, 30, 39, 66, 76, 78, 80, 86, 111, 122, 123, 134, 149, 153, 173, 203, 324 Scala Nuova, 98, 113 Schutz, 8, 9 Smith, CP, xv, 5, 6, 32, 41, 42, 50, 56, 69, 87, 91, 95, 97, 107, 111, 112, 113, 116, 117, 122, 125, 126, 136, 137, 140, 166, 178, 183, 185, 186, 188, 190, 191, 195, 197, 198, 200, 202, 203, 204, 206, 207, 210, 220, 223, 232, 267, 270, 277, 342 Smyrna (Izmir), 3, 5, 7, 10, 17, 49, 69, 81, 82, 83, 84, 86, 88, 96, 98, 100, 101, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 127, 128, 129, 135, 136, 137, 138, 140, 144, 147, 157, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 174, 176, 178, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 220, 221, 226, 227, 233, 238, 239, 241, 254, 255, 256, 258, 259,

352

THE GREEK-TURKISH WAR 1919–23

260, 261, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 275, 276, 321, 323, 324, 331, 333 South Africa, 52, 54, 66, 109, 235, 272, 298, 304, 307, 308 South Australia, 228 South Australian Register, 22 Spowers, 19 St Jean de Maurienne agreement, 107, 112 Stalin, 38 Sterghiadis, 120, 121, 203, 204, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 216, 220, 221 Suez Canal, 1, 95, 308 Sydney Morning Herald, 18, 22, 54, 57, 59, 66, 67 Syme, David, 18, 19, 22, 32, 337 Syria, 79, 132, 151, 157, 168, 189, 215, 216, 223, 239, 244, 246, 250, 261, 275, 311, 326 Tanin, 7 Tasmania, 50, 296 The Age, xiii, xv, 1, 3, 5, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 30, 32, 39, 40, 41, 44, 45, 49, 52, 53, 54, 55, 60, 63, 66, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78, 80, 83, 86, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 114, 115,
116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 136, 137, 138, 141, 142, 143, 145, 146, 152, 153, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 177, 178, 179, 180, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 198, 199, 201, 203, 209, 215, 216,

217, 218, 220, 221, 222, 224, 225, 228, 229, 230, 232, 236, 237, 238, 240, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 254, 256, 257, 258, 259, 261, 263, 264, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 277, 279, 280, 281, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 309, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 320, 324, 334, 340, 343 The Bulletin, 54, 56 Thrace, 88, 99, 103, 106, 127, 130, 144, 157, 167, 177, 179, 182, 184, 185, 188, 194, 198, 199, 201, 207, 210, 211, 213, 254, 260, 266, 267, 270, 292, 311 Tittoni, 122, 124, 126, 127, 128, 160 Treaty of Lausanne of 1912, 104 Treaty of Sevres, 128, 163, 170, 189, 217, 238, 266, 267, 270, 271, 272, 299, 300, 306, 308, 311, 313, 330 Tripartite Agreement, 226, 262, 265, 334 Turkey, xiv, xvi, xvii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 13, 16, 17, 27, 30, 58, 78, 79, 83, 92, 93, 96, 98, 100, 101, 102, 103, 107, 108, 114, 116, 117, 120, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 135, 140, 142, 145, 146, 147, 148, 155, 157, 158, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168, 170, 171, 177, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 190, 193, 194, 199, 206, 207, 210, 211, 213, 214, 215, 216,

353

INDEX

217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 231, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 249, 250, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 272, 273, 277, 278, 280, 281, 282, 284, 288, 289, 291, 292, 293, 294, 299, 301, 303, 304, 305, 307, 309, 310, 311, 312, 314, 315, 318, 319, 320, 321, 325, 329, 330, 332, 333, 334, 337, 339, 340, 343 Turkish Nationalists, 139, 142, 145, 177, 189, 217, 219, 222, 224, 266 United States of America, 91, 99 Vakit, 7, 219 Venizelos, 78, 86, 87, 88, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 111, 112, 113, 117, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128,

136, 160, 168, 169, 172, 173, 174, 175, 182, 189, 200, 204, 206, 207, 213, 249, 259, 325, 330 Versailles, 2, 70, 77, 94, 133, 152, 153, 155, 236, 264, 299, 307, 321, 342 Victoria, xiii, 47, 51, 229, 271, 297, 332, 334, 344 Von Ranke, Leopold, 4, 23, 24, 342 Ware, Fabian, 312, 313, 317 Westermann, 99, 100, 101, 104, 105, 117 Wilson, Woodrow, xvii, 16, 19, 61, 70, 71, 73, 93, 94, 97, 99, 108, 110, 111, 112, 124, 131, 144, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 167, 240, 249, 253, 330, 335, 336, 338, 343 Wolff, 57, 75 Wood, Henry, xiii, 22, 78, 79, 80, 81, 334, 343 Zafiriou, 117, 119, 198

355