The Great Enterprise. Volume 2 The Great Enterprise, Volume 2: The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China [Reprint 2019 ed.] 9780520340756

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This volume is sponsored by The Center for Chinese Studies University of California, Berkeley

The Great Enterprise

Et surtout, il conviendrait de ne pas oublier que dans la vie tout se mêle, réalités de longue, de moyenne et de courte durée. Entre ces éléments, l'histoire n'est pas choix, mais mélange. Fernand Braudel, Annales 8.1:73.

T h e greatness of the empire, the cause of its life or death, the incipiency of its rise or fall, are not to be found in the distance beyond it. You cannot reach into it from afar and turn its pivot. Wang Fuzhi (1619-1692), Du Tongjian lun, p. 148.

The Great Enterprise The Manchu Reconstruction of Imperial Order in Seventeenth-Century China IN TWO VOLUMES • VOLUME II

Frederic Wakeman, Jr.

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley • Los Angeles • London

University of California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University of California Press, Ltd. London, England © 1985 by The Regents of the University of California Printed in the United States of America 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Wakeman, Frederic E., Jr. The great enterprise. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. China—History—Shun-chih, 1644-1661. DS754.5.W35 1985 951'.03 84-8741 ISBN 0-520-04804-0 (set)

I. Title.

To my mother and father

Contents •

VOLUME II

Chapter Nine

Local Control in North China

Chapter Ten

"Foolish Stratagems in Critical Times"

Chapter Eleven

The Final Pacification o f the North

Chapter Twelve

The Dorgon Regency

Chapter Thirteen

The Shunzhi Court

Chapter Fourteen

A Certain Kind o f Solution

Chapter Fifteen

From Ming to Qing Loyalism

Appendix A

Ministers Who Served Two Dynasties

Appendix B

"Twice-Serving Ministers" in 1644

Appendix C

Banner Officials in Local Administration

784

894

Chinese and Japanese Sources

vii

717

848

Western-Language Sources

Index and Glossary

681

1231

988 1074

1143 1189

1129 1138 1140

CHAPTER NINE

Local Control in North China In m y o w n view, Liu Wenbing, G u o J u n z h e n , J i u T o n g h e , a n d S u n Z h u z e i are like s w a r m s o f bees and colonies o f ants resisting o u r c o l u m n s ' a d v a n c e . A l l o w e d to surrender, they b e c o m e insubordinate. O p p o s e d forcibly, they flee in haste. T h e y tax o u r soldiers' strength and deplete o u r a r m i e s ' rations. F o r t w e n t y years n o w they h a v e p o i s o n e d to death all living things. Whether lord (shi) or c o m m o n e r (shu), e v e r y o n e in S h a a n x i w a n t s to eat the flesh and sleep o n the skins [ o f his e n e m i e s like a savage]. Lei Xing, Memorial from Shaanxi, 1647, Ming Qing shiliao, bing, 6th ben, cited in Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qiyi ziliaojilu, p. 271.

Although Ajige and his military commanders claimed in the spring of 1645 that Hebei, Shanxi, and Shaanxi had been "stabilized" after the Shun armies were expelled from Xi'an, conditions in these provinces were far from settled. Between Beijing and Datong, for instance, in Xuanhua prefecture, militant sectarians who called themselves "Supreme Heaven's Clear and Pure Good Friends" (Huang tian qing jing shan you) took up arms against the new government. Acolytes of both sexes, led by trained boxers, repulsed imperial troops; and when the governor, Zhang Mingjun, rounded up the ringleaders, other messianic figures arose to replace them. 1 The same sect also inspired uprisings in neighboring 1 O n March 13, 1645, Zhang Mingjun reported that the uprising had broken out

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Shanxi, where Governor Ma Guozhu and General Li Jian m o m e n tarily ceased military operations against the Shun rebel Gao Jiuying in order to extirpate the "Society o f Good Friends" (Shanyou hui) around Ningwu, in the northwestern corner o f the province. 2 While Gao Jiuying was appeased with a pardon from the Ningwu military commander, General Gao Xun, Li Jian went on to suppress other sectarians, also identified with the Society o f Good Friends, in the southeastern part o f the province. Although several Qing officials argued that the peasants there were harmless pious folk, others called them "demon bandits" (yaozei) who "acted like they were possessed" ( z u o sui). This was enough reason for General Li to order his men to massacre anyone believed to be a m e m ber o f a popular religious sect, which in practice meant entering and destroying bao (forts) that had been designated by the authorities as communities o f the faithful. Thousands perished in this manner. 3 At the same time, though not necessarily connected with the Shanyou Hui uprising, an analogous millenarian rebellion also broke out to the west around Xi'an, the capital o f Shaanxi. As the viceroy o f the province rather laconically reported to Dorgon:

at a small village called Zhangjiayu. One of the sect's leaders, named Cai Yu, had taken on the ritual name of Yu Chi, who was one of the two guardian deities painted on every yamen door. The primary leader, said to be named Li Yimei, was never captured. Although many were arrested, on May 26, a wizard (yaomin) named Liu Bosi claimed to have excavated a divine tablet, which gave him the right to call himself "Dipper Star" (Tiangang xing). He was arrested and imprisoned before he could attract enough followers to begin an uprising. Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu, pp. 7 1 - 7 2 . 2 According to Qing intelligence reports, the Shanyou hui was an offshoot of a sect called the Duzhangjiao. It was founded by a priestess (yaoju) named Cui. She also incited an uprising across the Great Wall at Shuozhou led by a man named Wu Dakuan. After Wu was captured and beheaded, a number of his followers came across the Great Wall and joined the Shanyou hui in Ningwu, and the sect then proceeded to attack some of the military camps (bao) in that sector. One contingent of troops, commanded by a regular Qing colonel, was defeated. During the summer of 1645 Governor Ma and General Li put together a major force, assembled from various district garrisons, which defeated the Society of Good Friends, beheaded Madame Cui, killed the sect's members, and burned the followers' dwellings. Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 250. 3 Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 2, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 251.

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O n e day I was seated in m y yamen when the rumor [reached me] that a number o f dragons had descended from Heaven. In a short w h i l e one o f the xiangyue (village covenant) headmen sent over one o f the aforesaid "dragons," which turned out to be a d e m o n sutra on the "Imperial Ultimate" (Huang ji). 4

The "demon" behind the sutra was the religious prophet known as Hu Shoulong. Hu was said to have "deluded" the people by making "demon seeds," attracting more than twenty thousand followers to w h o m he announced the coming of the Qingguang (Bright and Glorious) reign year. As soon as the viceroy heard about this assembly of devout millenarians, he sent a military column into the countryside, and his soldiers promptly killed or dispersed the members of Hu Shoulong's "demon band" (yaodang).5

Meng Qiaofang and the Initial Pacification o f Shaanxi The viceroy who acted so ruthlessly in Shaanxi was LieutenantGeneral Meng Qiaofang, the Senior Vice-President of the Board of Punishments who had served with such special valor at the siege of Jinzhou. Entering China at Dorgon's side in 1644, Meng early in the following year had been appointed Senior Vice-President of the Censorate, Right Vice-President of the Board of War, and Governor-General of Shaanxi and the Sanbian. 6 Under his command were redoubtable forces, including the Xi'an banner garrison of Dorgon's long-time favorite, Grand Secretary Holhoi, and the Hezhou garrison of recently surrendered Colonel Ren Zhen. 7 4 Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu (hereafter Shizu shilu), 17:20, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 270. 5 Shizu shilu, 17:20, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 270. 6 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 267. 7 Holhoi's contingent mainly consisted of Chinese Blue Banner soldiers, commanded by Li Guohan, a bondservant who belonged to the Imperial Bodyguards; and Lieutenant-General Bayan, the half-Manchu son of Li Yongfang, the first Ming officer known to have surrendered to the Manchus. Shizu shilu, 21:257b; Arthur W. Hummel, Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, p. 480. Ren Zhen, who had commanded the Hezhou garrison under the Ming and held it

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Yet even these experienced and disciplined soldiers found the province of Shaanxi exceptionally hard to bring under control. During the Ming period, Shaanxi province had incorporated both the heartland of ancient China and parts of the Central Asian world beyond what was once the center of the ecumene. What are now the separate provinces of Gansu and Ningxia were then administered under a single viceroy.8 To Chinese traveling "west of the river" (as the Gansu corridor was then called) this was like a foreign land. Not only were the towns closed and castle-like, sharply demarcated from the countryside like cities in the Middle East and Central Asia; the people were ethnically different as well. 9 By the mid-seventeenth century, this portion of northwestern Shaanxi as well as the Huangzhong area around Lake Kokonor were settled by a complicated ethnic mixture of Mongolian-speaking lamaist Mongours (turen), lamaist and Muslim Tibetans, Muslim and non-Muslim Chinese, Turkic-speaking and Tibetan-speaking Muslim Salars, Tibetan-speaking Muslims of Mongolian origin, lamaist Mongols, and Muslim Mongours.10 Many of these peoples

t h r o u g h the Shun interregnum, surrendered to Ajige. His later service to the dynasty was of considerable importance. During the Jiang Xiang revolt, it was he w h o led one of the major units recovering Puzhou in Shanxi. Ren also drove Sun Shoufa, the Shaanxi rebel leader, into Huguang; and later he became the brigade general commanding all of the forces in southeastern Shaanxi f r o m his headquarters at Xing'an. Er chert zhuati, 10:27-28a; Qing shi liezhuan, p. 38. 8 Gansu, for instance, was divided into twelve commanderies (wei) under native chieftains. These commanderies were tribal territories; administration resided with the chiefs tent. T h e status of the commanderies lapsed toward the end of the Ming, though the native territories remained. The Chinese administrator of these territories was either the provincial military commissioner or the provincial treasurer. Henry Serruys, " T h e Mongols of Kansu during the M i n g , " pp. 2 5 5 - 2 7 1 ; Camille Imbault-Huart, " D e u x Insurrections des Mahometans de K a n - s o u , " p. 496. 9 Joseph Fletcher, "China's Northwest at the Time of the M i n g - C h ' i n g Transition," pp. 4 - 5 . 10 Ibid., p. 26. T h e M o n g o u r s were tribesmen settled under the Mongols in the mountainous borderlands known as Xining, which is between the Gansu corridor and what is n o w Qinghai. Huangzhong lies in central Gansu, separated f r o m western Gansu by the Nanshan mountain range, and f r o m eastern Gansu by the Yellow River. Louis M. J. Schram, The Mongours of the Kansu-Tibetan Frontier, Part 3, p. 52.

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depended in part for a living upon the east-west caravan trade.11 After the Timurid empire declined and collapsed in the latter part of the 15th century, the nomadic communities of Central Asia— Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks—gained critical advantage over the urban centers of Samarkand and Herat and began to attack merchant caravans enroute to Turkestan.12 Not long after this, the spread of European maritime trade with the Orient caused commercial connections to shift elsewhere. 13 The result was a profound economic depression in Chinas northwest. 14 11 A l t h o u g h Lattimore has argued that the M o n g o l s were self-sufficient (they could indeed provide for all of their needs as long as their herds were kept up), Rossabi maintains that in emergencies, such as bad winters w h e n s n o w covered the grazing land, the M o n g o l s relied on stores of grain as well as certain other foreign commodities. Moreover, the spread of B u d d h i s m after Altan K h a n converted to Yellow Sect Lamaism in 1577 meant that they required tea for religious purposes. M o r r i s Rossabi, China and Inner Asia from 1368 to the Present, pp. 4 0 - 4 1 , and 4 9 - 5 0 . Jagchid argues even m o r e vigorously that M o n g o l s resorted to war against the Chinese because they depended u p o n the Central K i n g d o m ' s agricultural society for their o w n economic needs and were kept f r o m n o r m a l intercourse by China's closed-door policy. Sechin Jagchid, "Patterns of Trade and Conflict Between China and the N o m a d s of M o n g o l i a , " pp. 178-183. See also L. Carrington Goodrich and C h a o y i n g Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, pp. 8 - 9 ; T h o m a s J. Barfield, " T h e H s i u n g - n u Imperial Confederacy," p. 52. 12 In Samarkand (whence tribute was sent to China), Shahrukh died in 1447; and his successor, U l u g h - b e g , was killed by his o w n son in 1449. Shortly afterwards, T u r f a n — a relatively peaceful state in the early 1400s—demanded that the Chinese recognize it as a great M u s l i m power. In 1469, however, the M i n g Ministry of Rites refused to bestow the four-clawed dragon robe on Turfan's Sultan Ali, w h o f o u r years later captured H a m i and further hindered the caravan trade. After the middle of the 15th century, not a single tribute mission f r o m Herat reached M i n g China. Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, p. 38; M o r r i s Rossabi, " T h e Tea and H o r s e Trade w i t h Inner Asia during the M i n g , " pp. 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 ; idem, " M u s l i m and Central Asian Revolts," pp. 178-179. 13 I m m a n u e l Wallerstein, The Capitalist World Economy, p. 6. 14 M o r r i s Rossabi, " M u s l i m and Central Asian Revolts in Late M i n g and Early C h ' i n g , " pp. 2 - 5 ; Rossabi, " M u s l i m and Central Asian Revolts," p. 174. B u t see also Fletcher, "China's N o r t h w e s t , " p. 15. Fletcher asserts that: " N e i t h e r the e c o n o m y of sedentary Central Asia as a whole n o r the p o w e r o f the n o m a d s of the Inner Asian steppe can be shown to have depended mainly o n the east-west caravan trade." H e does not, however, introduce evidence in this particular paper to substantiate his assertion. In global economic terms, the

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At the same time the area was increasingly troubled by Mongol raids.15 The collapse of the Chagatai khanate and of unified rule in Kashgar after the death of 'Abd al-Rashid (r. 1533-1565) only worsened matters.16 As the inner steppe nomads gravitated toward the Chinese orbit, they became more and more dependent upon the sedentary populations of the northwest for their economic existence. They also began to compete more avidly with one an-

17th century certainly was characterized by a major revolution in the structure of world trade. The 16th-century shift of the Asian-European carrying trade from caravans to carracks had made the Portuguese king the world's biggest tax-gatherer. But, after its initial expansion, the Iberian commerce in pepper, spices, drugs, and silks did not significantly expand. Rather, increases in European consumption were met through the Levant. With the establishment of the Dutch and English East India Companies in the 17th century, however, many of these goods simply disappeared from the intercontinental caravan trade routes, and there was a dramatic increase in the number of ships sent out from Western Europe. This structural revolution, which was symbolized by the fall of Hormuz in 1622, certainly must have had an influence on the economy of China's Inner Asian frontier, but the precise nature of its impact remains to be studied. For the expansion in maritime trade, see Niels Steensgaard, The Asian Trade Revolution of the 17th Century, passim. As far as regional diplomatic and political relationships were concerned, by the time of the Manchu invasion, the Timurid and Mogul realms in Central Asia had broken up into small kingdoms and principalities. Eastern Turkestan was divided among city-states whose inhabitants spoke Turkic languages, and who shared Islamic culture, but who lacked a sense of single nationality. Because these were mainly Sunnite Muslims, they were cut off from normal relations with the Shi'ite Persians. Yet, they were no closer to China. Central Asians "saw China mostly as a distant empire, a market partly dependent on central Asian commerce, and an enormous body of heathen w h o m Muslims would some day convert." Joseph F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia," p. 218. 15 Batu (c. 1464-1532), entitled Dayan Khan, unified the Eastern Mongols, defeated the Oirats, and pacified Outer Mongolia. From 1480 on, after the Chinese denied his request for trade, every single year saw a major Mongol raid across the Chinese border. By the time of the Qing conquest, the Zunghar Mongols, led by Qaraqula and his son Batiir Qung Tayiji, were attempting to form a unified state by promoting Buddhism, creating a new Mongol script, and developing agriculture. Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts," p. 190; Rossabi, China and Inner Asia, pp. 44-45. 16 Fletcher, "China's Northwest," p. 27; Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early Ch'ing," p. 6.

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other. In H u a n g z h o n g , the native rulers of the M o n g o u r s ( w h o w e r e tusi c o n f i r m e d by the M i n g emperor) resisted the g r o w i n g encroachments of Tibetan lamaseries for land and food; and b y the 1590s, feuds and wars between the tusi and the lamas had devastated the area. 17 Nevertheless, because of the historical c o n f i r m a tion of their authority b y the M i n g throne, the M o n g o u r tusi o f X i n i n g remained loyal to the dynasty w h e n rebellions spread d u r ing the seventeenth century. T h e y crushed a Tibetan revolt in 1642, and opposed Li Zicheng w h e n he attacked X i n i n g that same year. A l t h o u g h the M o n g o u r s ambushed and massacred a m a j o r contingent o f Li's troops in 1644, the "barbarians" of the Gansu corridor w e r e unable to hold off the Shun armies after they m a d e Shaanxi their base. Suzhou was taken after m u c h of the population was slaughtered; and X i n i n g was sacked and m a n y of the tusi w e r e killed. Consequently, w h e n Ajige expelled Li Zicheng f r o m X i ' a n the M o n g o u r s rapidly became Q i n g allies, being confirmed once again in their position by Ajige as well as by Viceroy M e n g Qiaofang. 1 8 T h e alliance w i t h the M o n g o u r s was all the m o r e i m p o r t a n t because M e n g Q i a o f a n g immediately encountered severe resistance f r o m the m a n y armies still remaining in Shaanxi province after the expulsion of Li Zicheng. T h e largest of these, a force o f nearly seventy t h o u s a n d well armed men, was c o m m a n d e d b y a f o r m e r M i n g regional v i c e - c o m m a n d e r named Sun Shoufa. Sun, a military expert b o r n in Shaanxi, had established a small M i n g loyalist r e g i m e o n Z h o n g n a n M o u n t a i n , south of Xi'an. There, in late M a y or early J u n e o f 1645, he had elevated the f o u r t h son of the M i n g Prince o f Q i n to the rank of Prince of H a n z h o n g , w h i c h was the prefectural capital southwest of the mountain. Serving u n d e r h i m , and also a f o r m e r M i n g officer, was Colonel H e Z h e n , w h o n o w led three thousand yi yong (righteous braves) f r o m Z h o n g n a n in an attack o n Fengxiang across the Wei River. T h e M i n g loyalist attack o n Fengxiang was a success, and a n u m b e r of other rebels

17 Fletcher, "China's Northwest," p. 28. In 1551 the Tibetan population northeast o f X i n i n g revolted, defeating the M i n g forces sent against them. 18 Ibid., p. 29; Schram, Mongours, pp. 5 1 - 5 3 .

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responded to Sun Shoufa's call to arms against the new provincial authorities. The most powerful o f Sun's new allies was W u Dading, w h o formerly headed the Ming garrison o f Guyuan in the Liupan Mountains. 19 Sun believed that with Wu's help it would be possible to capture the provincial capital, which was only lightly defended by seven hundred Qing soldiers. In late January or early February o f 1646, the Ming loyalists descended from the highlands southeast o f Xi'an and invested the city. O n February 20, h o w ever, relief arrived unexpectedly in the form o f a column commanded by Meng Qiaofang himself. Breaking through Sun Shoufa's lines, Viceroy Meng regrouped in the city. Leaving defense o f Xi'an proper in Holhoi's hands, Meng first carefully flanked the loyalist troops on both sides with recently defected Han soldiers, and then launched a fierce frontal assault with imperial bannermen.20 Thousands o f loyalists were slaughtered, and the rebel army was routed, fleeing in all directions.21 Meng's lieutenants pursued the fleeing rebels. Li Guohan led his troops eastward, executing more than one thousand loyalists led by a lower degree-holder from Weinan, and attacking rebels under Liu Wenbing across the border near Puzhou in Shanxi; Holhoi pursued other remnants from the Xi'an uprising toward the north.22 The grand secretary rode deep into Shanxi in pursuit, defeating the Earl o f Guangshan, Liu Tichun, at Shanyin near Datong on April 25, 1646. After that engagement, Holhoi claimed to have beheaded over twenty-two thousand rebels, including the loyalists' leader, Sun Shoufa.23 However, Sun was actually at that

19 The others included Liu Wenbing, He Hongqi, Guo Jinzhen, Huang Jinyu, Jiao Rong, and Chou Huang. Guo Jinzhen is probably the same person as Guo Junzhen. 20 Chen De's army flanked the west and Ren Zhen, leaving by the north gate, flanked the east. The assault was led by Imperial Bodyguard Li Guohan and gusa ejen Mergen. According to one source, Ren Zhen defended the west gate. Qing shi liezhuan, p. 38b. 21 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 267; Shizu shilu, 23:273b; Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 422-423. 22 Shizu shilu, 24:285a. 23 Ibid., 25:292a.

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time hiding in the mountains near Xing'an far to the south. There, he had allied himself with local stockade heads who already controlled the mountain refuges, and with the help of Wu Dading and some of the others had begun rebuilding his military strength. Before Sun could succeed, however, Meng Qiaofang got wind of his whereabouts and despatched a light cavalry unit which found his encampment. Though Sun is said to have killed a score or more of his enemies, the Qing soldiers finally overwhelmed the Ming loyalist leader. His head was carried back to Xi'an, but his death neither caused the disbandment of his army (Wu Dading escaped for the time being into Sichuan and then set up a resistance base at Guyuan) nor brought peace to the southeast (He Zhen would continue to ally with the local zhai of bandits long holding sway over that region). 24 The Qing forces by now, under the leadership of Meng Qiaofang, were especially good at rapidly bringing together a number of different fighting units into a single well-coordinated strike force. Once assembled, such a force was nearly indomitable, as victory after victory in the Shaanxi campaign was to show. But dispersing the armies, and moving them from their collective garrison towns to try to extend control across the countryside, was not nearly as effective. 25 Holhoi was able to drive the main forces of He Zhen out of the rural zone between Yan'an and Xi'an; but Liu Wenbing easily managed to evade capture for nearly a year, and with his band of a thousand men dashed "madly and recklessly back and forth," inciting other local groups to defy the provincial government with "passionate displays of power." 26 24 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 4 2 2 - 4 2 3 . 25 There were not enough troops available at this time to man scattered local garrisons. In November, 1646, Meng Qiaofang had detached a portion o f his army to accompany Haoge on his campaign into Sichuan. Haoge and his men encountered Zhang Xianzhong at Xichong on January 2, 1647, and killed the rebel. 26 Memorial dated August 31, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 270. The governor at Yan'an, Wang Zhengzhi, claimed in this memorial that uprisings in his jurisdiction were inspired by Liu Wenbing, w h o along with Zhang Yingyuan "summoned each locale's bandits" for a mass uprising.

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While Holhoi tried to create a rebel-free zone to the north and east of Xi'an, two of Meng Qiaofang's other commanders assumed responsibility for asserting Qing control over western Shaanxi. Liu Fangming and Ma Ning shared several traits in common. Both were natives of Ningxia, and both were former field-grade Ming officers who had served in Gansu and now were Qing commanders belonging to the Han White Banner.27 Brigade-General Liu and Lieutenant-Colonel Ma first moved against Guyuan, which they readily took from Wu Dading, driving him out of the city. Then they moved out to Gongchang, where the highway turned northwest toward the Yellow River and the Gansu corridor. There word came that the Ningxia garrison soldiers had mutinied to the north, killing their governor, Jiao Anmin. Liu Fangming immediately led a detachment in person to Ningxia, where he discovered that the mutineers had been incited by their two adjutantgenerals, Wang Yuan and Ma De. Liu pretended to acquiesce in the fait accompli, and rewarded Ma De with his own command at what is now Yanchi in Ningxia along the Great Wall facing the Maowushu Desert in Inner Mongolia. Actually, however, Liu's intention was to isolate one rebel commander from the other. Once Ma De had left, Liu lulled Wang Yuan's suspicions with a show of great confidence, and then asked him to bring his men out of the Ningxia garrison to attack a nearby bandit group. Waiting in ambush were Liu Fangming's men who fell upon the soldiers, routed them, and seized Wang Yuan who was beheaded for treason. Ma De remained unpunished. The lesson was not lost on the mutineer. In the spring of 1647, Ma De abandoned Yanchi and moved westward to seek refuge in the Helan Mountains, looting military caches along the way. Near Honggucheng, just west of Lanzhou, Ma De fell in with the outlaw He Hongqi. The two rebels were emboldened by their combined numbers to double back on Ma's trail and strike across 27 Both m e n — w h o may have been fellow Muslims too—also earned great military reputations later in the south where Liu fought Coxinga after 1659 and where Ma served in Sichuan, standing firmly on the side of the Kangxi Emperor during the Three Feudatories revolt. Er chen zhuan, 3:21—24, and 6:29-30.

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northern Shaanxi at the city of Anding, north of Yan'an. There they gathered more supporters when a local bandit chieftain named Wang Yilin arose in response, killing the Yan'an garrison commander, Colonel Zhang Ji. In response, the Qing forces divided into two groups. One, under Liu Fangming, pursued Wang Yilin and Ma De, catching up with the rebels at Yuwang, north of Guyuan, where Wang was killed. Ma De managed to escape on horseback, but he was ridden down and captured. Liu ordered his body torn in two as punishment. 28 The second group, commanded by Ma Ning, Zhang Yong, and Liu Youyuan, attacked Ma De's ally, He Hongqi. Their campaign was more protracted because even though He was killed in the initial battle, his allies occupied a number of stockades in northern Shaanxi. One after another, however, these rebel redoubts were surrounded and taken. One chief was allowed to surrender; the rest were beheaded. 29 Around Yan'an proper, where Wang Yilin had originated, banditry had been endemic for decades. The previous year the Ming loyalist Liu Wenbing had easily incited uprisings there, skillfully using his knowledge of the terrain to elude capture. The new governor of Shaanxi, Lei Xing, was determined to hunt down the partisans. In April, 1647, he ordered Bordered Blue and Solid Red Manchu Bannermen to begin a systematic extermination of all outlaws and rebels in districts surrounding Yan'an. The Manchu soldiers did not bother to make body counts in most cases, though they did record the voluminous amounts of weapons, sets of armor, and livestock captured. 30 Many outlaw bands escaped slaughter by fleeing deep into the forested mountains. But this time Liu Wenbing failed to evade the sweep. On April 30 he and some of the other former chieftains of He Zhen were finally taken, along with several "bogus" judges and magistrates bearing Ming seals of appointment. Governor Lei Xing jubilantly reported:

28 This and the above information giving details of the Ningxia mutiny come mainly from Qing shi gao, biography o f Liu Fangming, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269. 29 Qing shi gao, biography o f Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 267. 30 See, e.g., Shizu shilu, 31:372b.

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O n April 18 we mustered our Manchu and Han officers and soldiers to leave the fortifications and set up secret ambuscades, advancing by columns. Within seven days they had encountered the bandits at Qilichuan. At Liangjia, near Bocun, they beheaded some, and chased the others on to Lanzhuanggou. There our men were attacked on all sides. Guo Junzhen and all the other bandit leaders were completely pacified—utterly exterminated—while their chief Liu Wenbing was captured alive. We captured horses, mules, cattle, donkeys, tools, servants, and divided them all up to reward each brigade. [Liu] Wenbing has since been remanded as a prisoner to the provincial [authorities], and on May 9 we cut off his head and ripped apart his corpse. [Guo] Junzhen's severed head was hung f r o m on high as a warning. In this one tour of duty, t w o rebel [leaders] were killed, and their partisans completely wiped out. [This victory] surely was owing to the majesty and charisma (ling) of our emperor, to the sage counsel of the imperial prince—regent, and to the ability of all our Manchu and Han officers to carry out their orders. 31 B y t h e s u m m e r o f 1647, then, t h e Q i n g forces h a d i m p o s e d m i l i t a r y o r d e r u p o n t h e central districts o f Shaanxi, a n d c o n t r o l l e d t h e a p p r o a c h e s t o b o t h sides o f t h e m a i n h i g h w a y l i n k i n g Y a n ' a n a n d X i ' a n . H o w e v e r , t h e provincial capital w o u l d n o t really b e s e c u r e until M e n g Qiaofang's armies controlled the H a n River highlands in t h e s o u t h e a s t e r n c o r n e r o f t h e p r o v i n c e a r o u n d X i n g ' a n a n d Hanzhong.

"Longhairs" in the Highlands M a n y o f t h e loyalist b a n d s that h a d attacked X i ' a n a n d Y a n ' a n h a d o r i g i n a l l y b e e n f o r m e d in t h e h i g h l a n d s , w h e r e heavily f o r e s t e d m o u n t a i n s r a n g e d 1,500 t o 3,000 m e t e r s a b o v e sea level. B e c a u s e o f t h e r u g g e d terrain, a n d because t h e h i g h l a n d s w e r e at t h e j u n c t u r e o f f o u r p r o v i n c e s , t h e area h a d l o n g b e e n k n o w n f o r its o u t -

31 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 271. See also Shizu shilu, 31:370b. Guo Junzhen for years fought alongside Sun Shoufa. Ibid., 30:353.

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law lairs and for the readiness of its natives to flout civil authority: "They all wear their hair [long] and [are not frightened to] look danger in the face."32 The leading rebel in the southeast was Sun Shoufa's former aide, the Ming loyalist Colonel He Zhen, whose army of eighty thousand men had captured Fengxiang in 1645 and had attacked Xi'an that same winter.33 N o w he controlled the town of Xing'an in the Han River highlands. To bring that area under Qing rule, Governor-General Meng Qiaofang in December, 1646, ordered Colonel Ren Zhen and Colonel Wang Ping to lead an expedition into the southeastern corner of the province. Early in 1647 Colonel Wang reached Xing'an, and He Zhen abandoned the city, retreating toward Hanzhong in the west. According to Colonel Wang's report, at a place called Banqiao, He Zhen decided to make a stand and fight. Wang Ping's Manchu-Han troops thereupon won a great victory. Over three thousand of the rebels were killed, and another fifteen hundred surrendered to the Qing. Among the dead, claimed Colonel Wang, was He Zhen himself.34 Whether Wang made a mistaken identification, or whether someone else then claimed the name "He Zhen," is impossible to say. But according to the central government's archives, He Zhen in name at least survived this putative death. As late as December 19, 1648, nearly two years afterwards, He Zhen was reported by Governor Huang Erxing as trying to block grain transportation along the Wei River; and in April of the following year, the He Zhen band was still fighting Colonel Ren Zhen in the southeast.35 As a generic designation, then, " H e Zhen" continued to be used to describe the Xing'an rebels who had launched the original attack on Xi'an in 1645-1646.

32 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 272. The area was also well known for the number of liumin (vagrants) who wandered there from Anhui, Jiangxi, Guangdong, and Fujian. Fu Yiling, "Qingdai zhongye Chuan-Shan-Hu san sheng bianqu jingji xingtai de bianhua," p. 49. 33 Zhou Weizhou, "Shaanxi faxian de liang tong you guan Mingmo nongmin zhanzheng de beishi," p. 47. 34 Shizu shilu, 29:346b. 35 Ibid., 41:276b; and 43:504b-505a.

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A well armed and disciplined paramilitary force, He Zhen's partisans contrasted with most of the more primitively equipped bands of the Xing'an area. His outlaws were mainly local brigands. They clustered in small zhai (stockades) amid the dense undergrowth of these rugged, overgrown mountains, dwelling ten to fifteen men in each with their wives, children, and livestock. The zhai, which were often built around temples, reinforced each other and, though relatively independent, were often identified with a major "king" or "prince" who gave particular zhai leaders military documents appointing them colonels or majors in the rebel force. 36 O n occasion, the "king" would assemble members of a group of zhai around his own stockade into a raiding force, and descend into agricultural communities in the valleys to forage. Li Kui, for example, led members of the scattered mountain zhai of Zhen'an district on periodic raids, and quite appropriately styled himself "Scavenger King" (Saodi wang). Yet in spite of the occasional foray into neighboring communities, these social bandits seem to have enjoyed a measure of popular protection. At least, the authorities were quick to admit that at the first sign of a government military move against the zhai, intelligence was immediately transmitted to the outlaws, who abandoned their redoubts in the foothills and moved into more impregnable stockades in the higher mountains. 37 Zhai outlaws did not normally attack district capitals unless they were backed up by larger and better armed groups of rebels. In April, 1648, such a force appeared in the Ren River valley southwest of Xing'an in the form of Wu Dading's loyalist army. 36 For instance, the famous rebel leader Sun Shoujin (who may have been Sun Shoufa's brother) had during the 1650s his own zhai at Mount Banchang near Xing'an. His stockade was protected by two other nearby zhai, one o f which commanded a high mountain defile which could easily be defended against a much superior enemy force. The back of Mount Banchang housed yet t w o more stockades o f allies w h o guarded Sun's rear. And on the slopes below there were a total o f nine other zhai spread out like points o f a star, which represented a kind o f outer perimeter of defense. Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 277. 37 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 7 3 - 2 7 4 .

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Wu was the Ming officer who had earlier garrisoned Guyuan. Expelled by Liu Fangming, Wu Dading had sought refuge in the highlands of Ziyang district, and now he and his men assembled other loyalist bands and led them in an attack on the neighboring county seat of Hanyin, which they looted. 38 The Qing garrison at Xing'an, just across the Han River, was commanded by Brigade-General Ren Zhen. His troops were at full muster, and General Ren decided that the provocative attack on Hanyin demanded a vigorous response. 39 To avoid alerting the rebels' spies, General Ren had his men prepare to move out at night, and then swiftly on April 21 led them north into the Zhen'an foothills to quell the outlaws. The next day, at a place appropriately called the "Plateau of the Prince of Evil" (Mowangping), Ren's men stumbled upon their first large bandit camp, which they surrounded and attacked. The surprised outlaws tumbled out of their fortification in disarray. They stood little chance against the crack Manchu-Han troops. Several hundred rebels were killed, and others captured, including a chief called "the tiger" (hu). Because the Qing forces had not closed in on the rebel camp until it was quite late in the day, darkness fell before the fighting stopped. In the confusion of twilight many of the bandits escaped. The next day, after counting the captured military patents, weapons, stock, women, and other chattel, the troopers fanned out through the woods hunting down survivors. The captured outlaws were brought before General Ren, who made it quite clear that he had deliberately allowed these men to survive so that they could guide his men on to other hidden rebel camps. As Ren Zhen explained to Governor Huang: This official is in sympathy with our great Qing [dynasty's] policy of clemency. The net was opened up on one side, and I permitted

38 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 274. 39 Previously, the X i n g ' a n garrison had been undermanned, and Ren Z h e n had been reluctant to c o m m i t his troops to mountain warfare because he feared that revolt w o u l d flare up elsewhere. N o w , 4,000 soldiers earlier transferred to serve under Shaanxi G o v e r n o r H u a n g Erxing were returned to the X i n g ' a n c o m m a n d e r . Qing shi liezhuan, p. 38b.

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them to surrender, speaking to them kindly of the edict offering amnesty. I then ordered them to help lead us to kill the [remaining] bandit nie (bastards) and thus prove they deserve [mercy]. The leaders wanted to be released and some were willing to die in their place, yet they followed orders and each of the surrendered males guided us to hunt down and kill [the rest].40 O n April 28, then, General Ren's men, guided by the surviving bandits from the Mowangping camp, moved on from one "lair" to the next, "hacking them to death till we lost count." The only ones to escape were those outlaws who had enough warning to abandon their zhai and flee to the most precipitous and inaccessible areas of the mountains they knew so well. On May 12, Ren's expedition returned to its base, and the general reported to Beijing that even though he could not guarantee that there would not be fresh uprisings and raids in the future, for the moment the Zhen'an mountains were settled and the district magistrate could administer the area in peace.41 The Zhen'an outlaws, however, were not the principal threat to the Qing garrison at Xing'an; nor were they even responsible for the attack on Hanyin. Rather, as Governor Huang explained, the entire Ren River valley was overrun by well organized "longhairs," originally trained by Sun Shoufa and presently operating under a Ming loyalist reign name (Longwu). The presence of Wu Dading in Ziyang district now provided the potential for a major uprising of the zhai and the descent of their bands upon valley settlements; for even though Qing troops had captured Ziyang city from Sun Shoufa much earlier, Wu Dading had been able to acquire the support of numerous local zhai in the mountains outside the city and raided virtually at will.42 Consequently, after only two days' rest in barracks, General Ren Zhen on May 14 led a sweep across the Ren River, bringing

40 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 1, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 274. 41 Ibid., p. 274. Ren Zhen attributed their victory to "the great benevolence o f our emperor on high, and the majesty and charisma (ling) o f the imperial regent." 4 2 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 7 2 - 2 7 3 .

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back 274 heads which were hung outside Xing'an's main gate. Then, after several weeks rest, General Ren took his soldiers to Ziyang city, and from there, on June 22, began the march up narrow defiles and along nearly impassable paths toward Wu Dading's base. The Manchu-Han troops soon were ambushed by Wu Dading and his local allies. The stones and arrows which the hillmen hurled down upon the Qing soldiers nearly broke their ranks, but Ren's men—including some of his own retainers (jiading)— held their position, and Ren Zhen later claimed that it was their staunchness under fire that eroded the local rebels' confidence in Wu Dading's ability to withstand the imperial forces. By the time Ren Zhen disengaged on June 29 and returned to Ziyang's district capital, twelve major stockade leaders (baozhai tou) had surrendered to him, cutting their hair back and commanding their kinfolk and followers to acknowledge the virtuous rule of the Great Qing. 43 The temporary pacification of both the Shaanxi lowlands and highlands helped the Qing government stabilize its domination over neighboring Shanxi province as well. Earlier, in August, 1645, the Shun remnants under Gao Jiuying had betrayed their amnesty by raising the flag of rebellion at Kelan. Li Jian had captured the rebel, beheaded him and killed all of his men. As Meng Qiaofang and his commanders steadily destroyed rebel units to the west, Governor Ma Guozhu proceeded to consolidate Qing control over Shanxi. Guozhu pacified Shanxi in just over a year, arresting and executing remnant bands o f [Li] Zicheng's men lurking among the people. H e pacified the multitude and soothed the law-abiding. The people gradually resumed their occupations. 44

The central government in Beijing replaced Ma, a military man, with a civil governor, Shen Chaoji, and began making formal appointments to the provincial bureaucracy, filling long empty va43 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 272-273. See also Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 267. 44 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 249-250.

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cancies and conducting personnel evaluations once again in conf o r m a n c y w i t h procedures in fully pacified areas where normal g o v e r n m e n t prevailed. 45

Extermination in Shandong T h e pacification o f Shandong, to the east o f the capital, was quite another matter. Despite the most draconian government measures (in December, 1646, a Manchu contingent beheaded over sixteen thousand people in one prefecture alone), the insurgency there continued. 46 In Yanzhou prefecture, the roads were often cut by bandits, and entire districts w e r e frequently overrun by heavily armed men. T h e M i n g magistrates in these districts, and especially around the area k n o w n as N i n e Mountains (Jiu shan), had initially greeted the arrival o f Q i n g forces with relief at having found a n e w ally in their o n g o i n g war against the local bandits. M a n y o f them reported in great detail on the size, location, and leadership o f the rebel groups and pledged to cooperate in destroying them. F r o m their reports provincial-level officials soon received, and communicated to the court, a very clear notion o f the extent o f disorder in the province, and in Yanzhou in particular. For example, W u Choufei, the magistrate o f Z o u xiati in that prefecture, listed 52 gangs (dang) in his district, each one numbering 400-500 members. 4 7 In the opinion o f W u Da, governor o f Shandong in

45 Ibid., p. 250. Shen Chaoji (d. 1648), from Fengtian, proved to be an energetic official, dedicated to restoring order as well as an ostensibly more pristine administration to the province. Subordinates were quickly brought to heel if they were accused o f overbearing attitudes. " M o r e than twenty corrupt clerks" were impeached for malfeasance. The tax burden on the populace was lightened by reducing the quota for courier expenses from 200,000 to 150,000 taels. And instead o f having that particular corvée commutation collected by the rotational lizhang (tax headman), Shen appointed regular tax collectors w h o reported directly to him. WangYunwu, ed., Da Qing yitongzhi, 135:32a; Wang Xuan and Yang Du, comps., Shanxi tongzhi, 104:28a. 46 This military expedition was commanded by Jueshan. Shizu The memorial was received on December 24, 1646. 47 Memorial dated September 23, 1644, Ming-Qing

shiliao,

shilu, 29:348a.

bing, ben 5, in Xie,

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February o f 1647, this situation called for the strongest c o u n t e r measures. W u D a appealed to D o r g o n in the most fervent terms, describing the t u r m o i l in Shandong and pointing o u t that this province was a " f u n n e l " leading into the imperial domains. If this disorder was allowed to continue, "the people will begin to d o u b t that o u r a r m y will ever m o v e [against the rebels], and n o matter w h o the bandit, he will [be able to] use uncertainty to spread f u r ther uncertainty." Therefore, argued Wu, it w o u l d be a great mistake f o r D o r g o n to send the M a n c h u imperial armies o n to the s o u t h to fight to the M i n g remnants. O n c e removed f r o m the n o r t h , revolts w o u l d break out in their rear; in the case o f Shand o n g , this w o u l d m e a n cutting the armies' o w n supply lines. 48 W u D a w e n t o n to point out that what he regarded as a strategic error w a s largely the result of faulty reporting f r o m the province itself. Local officials had been deluding themselves (and their superiors) w i t h glowing accounts of their successful anti-bandit c a m paigns. T h e tried-and-true notion that "to catch the bandits you m u s t catch their king; to shoot a m a n you must first shoot his horse," w a s simply n o t w o r k i n g out in practice. For one, the b a n dits o f S h a n d o n g had a superb intelligence system. Their spies and sympathizers a m o n g the y a m e n clerks warned t h e m the m o m e n t a military expedition was sent into their region, giving t h e m time to "change their stripes" and pose as peasants. If, on the other hand, the guards units in the m a j o r garrison t o w n s waited for xiart m a g -

Qingchu nongmin, pp. 7 8 - 8 0 . Another report listed the gang leaders by name and title, making the point that they had been well k n o w n local "kings" (e.g., "the Great King W h o Soars to Heaven," Chong tian da wang\ or "the Great Scavenger King," Saodi da wang) for a long time "and simply cannot be c o m pared to run-of-the-mill local bandits." Memorial dated October 1, 1644, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 1, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 74. T h e reason for their incomparability, one memorialist explained, was that as soon as one o f these leaders established a large band, he immediately adopted a monarchic title. A n d instead o f roaming about with his men like simple vagabonds or h i g h w a y m e n , these bandits built large and well fortified base camps, defended w i t h elaborate military equipment, guns and cannon, from whence they sallied forth to loot and burn the towns around. Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 1, in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 74. T h e memorialist was Yang Fangxing. 48 Ming-Qing

shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 8 4 - 8 5 .

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istrates to report attacks by these rebellious armies, the imperial reinforcements never arrived in time to catch the criminals. To attack their bases was next to impossible in most cases because they occupied m o u n t a i n t o p s or caves. Cavalry could n o t be used in such terrain, n o r was it usually possible to haul artillery u p the m o u n t a i n s to shell their redoubts. T h e only alternative, argued W u , w a s an all-out policy of jiao, surrounding the bandits' base camps and s h o w i n g n o mercy. For t o o long tactics had been dilat o r y and ineffective, alternating between " s o o t h i n g " and " e x t e r m i n a t i o n . " N o w , D o r g o n was urged to send the Grand A r m y i m mediately to Ji'nan and D o n g c h a n g before the people of S h a n d o n g m i g h t sense the dynasty's hesitation and arise on all f o u r sides against the Qing. 4 9 W u Da's dire predictions of an i m m i n e n t province-wide uprising w e r e partly realized, although his panicked appeal for the G r a n d A r m y to rescue t h e m was not answered. T h e r e was a m a j o r revolt in M a r c h and April of 1647 around Z o u p i n g northeast of the provincial capital, and a total of fourteen zhou and xian w e r e attacked b y one rebel " k i n g " or another. W u Da's successor as governor, D i n g Wensheng, claimed to have completely e x t e r m i nated these rebels in April, but as the attacks continued, he was accused o f being dilatory, and stripped of office by the B o a r d of Punishments. 5 0 This, then, certainly was a critical period for parts o f the province, b u t there was little that successive governors could do except h o p e that each of the district capitals w o u l d m o b i lize its defenses against these armies descended f r o m the m o u n tainous countryside. Usually, as W u Da had pointed out, the m a g istrate's report of an attack arrived long after the struggle was over; and it usually signalled victorious defense against a brief siege, w i t h the magistrate, the local brigade c o m m a n d e r s , the constable, and the gentry all mobilizing their housemen to resist rebel firecart attacks o n their walls. 51 M u c h m o r e unsettling was n o report

49 Ibid. 50 Ding's report of victory reached the capital on April 14, 1647. Shizu shilu, 31:363b. For his punishment see Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 82. 51 See, for example, the report f r o m Ling xian dated the tenth lunar m o n t h of 1647, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 84.

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at all, which might well mean that a city had succumbed to rebels; or, only slightly better, the oral report by a magistrate w h o had been forced to flee his capital because it had fallen to bandits.52 In some cases, however, local officials or gentrymen managed to receive intelligence o f such attacks in advance and so prepared their defenses in time to stave o f f a siege. This was true for the important commercial center o f Zhangqiu on the Grand Canal. T h e leading rebel in this area, active even before the fall o f the M i n g , was an outlaw named Ding Weiyue. For years D i n g had made a practice o f attacking and looting the treasuries o f district capitals in the eastern portions o f Yanzhou prefecture. O n N o v e m ber 10, 1647, the assistant prefect in charge o f the defense o f Z h a n g qiu, a former M i n g sub-director o f studies named W u T o n g l o n g w h o had like most o f the local officials in this part o f Shandong agreed to serve the Q i n g , received reports that Ding had gathered several thousand o f his followers and was preparing to attack the city. Appealing for help f r o m the prefect at Yanzhou, the assistant prefect and the local gentry (xiangshen), led by a man named Zhang Jingji, organized retainers and townsfolk into a defense force which held o f f Ding's men for twenty-four hours and arrested fifth columnists (neiying) within the city.53 Intelligence also helped the Zhangqiu assistant prefect discover, on January 8, 1648, the whereabouts o f Ding's main force o f about one thousand men in the Liangshanbo Mountains where Song Jiang o f Water Margin fame had once had his headquarters. Sending to the Manchu garrison at Dongchang for help, Assistant Prefect W u T o n g l o n g had his men lead the bannermen into Liangshanbo. A t dusk on January

52 A typical example of the latter was the fall of Yixian, the important city between the Grand Canal and the imperial highway. On November 26, 1647, Zhang Ruxiu, Ding Wensheng's successor, reported that 400 mounted bandits and an unspecified number of men on foot had attacked Yixian during the night, and the following day had overcome the yamen guard and scaled the walls with ladders, killing and robbing as they entered the city. The magistrate and director of studies managed to escape, but the rest of the yamen staff was killed by the rebels, who looted the city and returned to their base in the hills. Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 1, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 80. 53 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 86.

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10 the Qing column unexpectedly encountered Ding Weiyue's small army, and a fierce battle ensued. To the glory of the Hurha commander, Sarhuda, the imperial forces won a great victory, killing "innumerable bandits" including Ding Weiyue himself. For the moment, the mouth of the Shandong "funnel" was securely in Manchu hands. 54 While fighting continued to rage along the peripheries of the north China plain, the new government took several measures to reinforce its control over the population in less unruly areas closer to the major cities it now dominated. Four sets of policies were emphasized: the appointment of conscientious magistrates and the correction of yamen functionaries' abuses; the registration of households and the formation of mutual-responsibility units; the control of firearms and livestock; and the use of selective amnesties to discriminate between bandit leaders and their followers.

Magistrates and Yamen Clerks The Qing government clearly recognized, from the moment it occupied Beijing, the importance of appointing good local magistrates. 55 In June 1644, the Board of Civil Appointments noted that special care was to be taken in appointing local military and civil officials to ensure that they fulfilled the task of eradicating local bandits and brought order back to the rural population. 56 These were

54 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, dated early January, 1648, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 8 7 - 8 8 . Zhang Ruxiu's memorial describing the victory reached Beij i n g o n January 15, 1648. Shizu shilu, 35:416a. Sarhuda ( 1 5 9 9 - 1 6 5 9 ) was f r o m the Suwan tribe. H e had joined Nurhaci as a y o u n g man. Later, in 1658, he cleared the A m u r region o f Russians, killing Onufrii Stepanov and his men. H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 632. 55 For the key role o f the Q i n g local magistrate in cases o f subversion and rebellion, see: Paul H. Ch'en, "Disloyalty to the State in Late Imperial China," p. 180. 56 Shizu shilu, 5 : 2 2 , cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 55. This order also s u g gested that local officials' salaries were too l o w and that they should be raised. H o w e v e r , during the Shunzhi and early Kangxi periods, the regular salary o f district magistrates (which was originally about 123 taels per annum) was re-

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not in the majority either Manchu or Han bannermen, but rather regular Han Chinese—and usually collaborators who had already served the Ming as local officials. Bannermen occupied key positions in the higher levels of the government, but there were simply not enough of them to staff prefectural and district posts in any great number. In fact, during the Shunzhi reign, only one out of every twelve or thirteen magistrates was a bannerman. The government had perforce to rely almost entirely upon Chinese collaborators for county-level posts throughout the empire. 57 (See Appendix C.) Fortunately for the new government, there were plenty of former Ming officials and clerks who were quite willing to serve. In the throne's opinion, there were far too many of them—especially supernumerary functionaries and district registrars. On June 8, 1646, an edict was sent to the Board of Civil Appointments which read: T h e court establishes official posts to govern the people, yet supern u m e r a r y functionaries (rongyuan) have just the opposite effect, afflicting the people. Each prefecture is to establish one official to be retired. H e is to resign his rank and not remain temporarily [in the y a m e n ] as a retired official. T h e s e dismissals should be completely carried out. A large district (xian) is to have one magistrate, o n e assistant magistrate, and one w a r d e n . A small district is to have o n e magistrate and one w a r d e n . All registrars (zhubu) are to be dismissed. T h e official duties they originally assumed are to revert to the assistant magistrate in a large district, and to the w a r d e n in a small district. T h e retired officials and registrars w h o have been dismissed should proceed to the Board for r e a p p o i n t m e n t (gaixuan). 5 8

While the throne so decisively trimmed down surplus officials, most of them lower-ranking functionaries and clerks, it also called

duced as various special allowances were diminished or abolished. T h e official salary thus dropped to 45 taels. John Robertson Watt, " T h e o r y and Practice in Chinese District Administration," pp. 378-380. 57 Some historians have argued that the Q i n g regime controlled local government by bringing in Manchu outsiders. This is incorrect. See John Watt, " T h e Yamen as a Socio-political System," p. 25. 58 Shizu shilu, 25:302a.

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for increased efficiency in local government and heightened measures to detect and prevent corruption. Thus, in spite of having a m u c h smaller staff of regularly appointed officials to assist him, the district magistrate was under more pressure than ever to perf o r m effectively. This meant that the magistrate had to rely even m o r e heavily on his private aides, who actually administered local government for him. 5 9 By the end of the Ming period, the distinction between regularly appointed magistrates (almost invariably examination degreeholders) and the yamen sub-bureaucracy was quite sharp. T h e magistrates, w h o were outsiders and generalists, had to rely u p o n their clerks, w h o were insiders and specialists. The creation of a lower bureaucracy of professional taxation and legal specialists did rationalize the functioning of Ming administration, allowing the Confucian-trained district magistrate to stress moral governance while his o w n clerks mastered the law codes; but the fact that the central government refused formally to recognize, much less pay, these clerks meant that the professionalization of local administration remained hors du cabinet.60 This was partly the result of the Ming dynasty's economizing. 6 1 By setting low quotas on the numbers of aides officially allowed, the imperial government forced the growing network of clerks to find informal means of funding themselves. It was relatively natural for the government to permit this to happen because local clerical duties were historically confused with regular corvée service to the local yamen. In theory, in other words, the residents of a locale should provide the kinds of tax collection and self-policing services that were actually, by the 1600s, performed mainly by government agents and policemen. O f course, it was always possible

59 J o h n R . Watt, The District Magistrate in Late Imperial China, p p . 1 4 0 - 1 4 3 . 60 Watt, " Y a m e n , " p. 35. 61 T h i s d r i f t o f p o w e r d o w n w a r d s appears to have b e g u n d u r i n g t h e Y u a n p e riod, o r so at least M i n g Taizu had believed. T h e H o n g w u E m p e r o r t h o u g h t that because t h e M o n g o l s lacked " t h e impartial m i n d of e m p i r e , " they w e r e easily fooled b y c o r r u p t clerks and underlings, w h o t o o k a d v a n t a g e o f t h e b a r b a r i a n s ' " l o o s e " controls over the bureaucracy to entrench t h e m s e l v e s . J o h n D a r d e s s , " M i n g T ' a i - t s u on the Y u a n , " pp. 8 - 9 .

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for the government to assess the cost of these services and levy them upon local landholders. That would have increased the taxes upon the district gentry, however, and—especially during the last years of the Ming when the throne was frightened of losing the gentry's support—such assessments were rejected in favor of informal means of support: legal fees charged by the clerks themselves, salaries paid out of the magistrate's own pocket, and so forth. The new Qing dynasty, also eager to keep down taxes, preferred to follow the practice set by the Ming government. This was a false economy. To reduce local administrative expenses by ordering that the yamen registrar's post be abolished and his services assumed by the assistant magistrate or warden simply increased the work load of the clerks who actually kept track of a district's paperwork. Yet as the work load increased and the importance of the clerical sub-bureaucracy grew, the clerks themselves were just as strictly denied personal access to higher bureaucratic rank. Naturally, their own private compensation for this lack of public reward was embezzlement and bribery.62 Merely emphasizing the importance of appointing good men to the posts of local magistrates was therefore not sufficient to guarantee good local government. The Qing government soon discovered that yamen clerks and runners were one of the most intractable elements in the entire bureaucracy. To be sure, they were all too easily blamed for nearly every failing of district and prefectural government, and became the scapegoats for structural deficiencies such as the incompatibility between the central government's wish to increase the efficiency of local government as a judicial and fiscal agent of the throne, and its refusal to provide the financial wherewithal to pay for more manpower toward that end. But even though there was this tendency to exaggerate the crude self-interest of yamen help, there is no question but that clerks and runners did form in each district yamen a deeply entrenched group of underlings who usually afflicted the local population with every abuse possible. As a result, the Qing government devoted much attention to detecting and punishing the illegal activities of "yamen 62 Watt, "Theory and Practice," pp. 297-303.

Local Control in North China

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grubs" (yadu), and the accounts of eminent local officials of this period are filled with references to their efforts to curtail "the corrupt and dirty practices of yamen clerks" ( l i x u tandu zhifeng).a Consequently, the solution in the end put yet even more stress upon the indispensable local magistrate, whose own integrity was—much like the emperor in the system at large—critical to the control of his subordinates. Hardly trusting hortatory appeals, however, the Qing government proceeded to increase its own sanctions upon regularly appointed officials; and there is no question but that one of the major reasons for the increased efficiency of legal control and tax collection during the first part of the dynasty's reign was the creation of a regular and efficient system of evaluations which judged local officials' performances by new standards of administrative accomplishment. 64 The pressure on the individual local magistrate may have grown nigh intolerable, but his performance was stretched to much greater efficiency by disciplinary regulations which, to a degree extraordinary in premodern bureaucracies, sought to regulate every aspect of official behavior. 65 Above all, during and after the Oboi Regency (1661 — 1669), the Qing bureaucratic review system ( k a o cheng) became almost entirely concerned with evaluating a local magistrate's ability to apprehend and punish felons, and to collect the taxes on time and up to quota. 66 In the short run, this reliance upon the sole figure of the magistrate streamlined government operations and strengthened its local control system. 67 63 See, e.g., Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, p. 2521 (149:2); Huang Zhijun, comp., Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 1839 (112:33). 64 Punishments were strict. In 1659 the Shunzhi Emperor decreed that any official w h o took ten taels or more of public money would be sent into exile. Adam Y. C. Lui, Corruption in China during the Early Ch'ing Period, 16441660, p. 1. 65 Watt, "Theory and Practice," pp. 326-330. "These rules and regulations indicated a degree of formalization for which there are few parallels in pre-modern administration." Watt, "Yamen," p. 34. 66 Watt, "Theory and Practice," p. 330. 67 In the long run, however, this exclusive focus upon the magistrate further denied yamen subordinates access to the central government, which in turn lost direct control over lower-level administration. Frederic Wakeman, Jr., "The Evolution of Local Control in Late Imperial China," passim.

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Local Control in North China

Mutual-Responsibility Units T h e second set of policies adopted by the Q i n g g o v e r n m e n t c o n cerned the registration of households into mutual-responsibility units. A t first, the Manchus employed a variant of the M i n g local control system. F r o m 1644 to 1646, the zongjia system (ten f a m i lies f o r m e d a unit headed by a jiazhang, and every h u n d r e d f a m i lies selected a zongjiazhang) prevailed. O r d e r e d in 1644 u n d e r the " n e i g h b o r h o o d security investigation law" (linbao jiancha fa), this n e w system was designed to control and arrest bandits, fugitives, and traitors (jiangui). T h e goals of the system were thus close to those of the military occupation force, and the zongjiazhang w e r e correspondingly supposed to report directly to the Board of War. 68 As D o r g o n explained in an edict dated September 8, 1644: The villages belonging to each prefecture, county (zhou), district (xian), and garrison (wei) are to establish one jiazhang for every ten families, and one zongjia for every hundred families. Wherever there are bandits, fugitives, felons, and thieves making trouble, then they should immediately be reported by neighbors to the jiazhang. The jiazhang will report to the zongjiazhang, and he in turn to the prefect or magistrate. After the latter have confirmed the accuracy [of the information], they should report to the Board of War. If there is evil secretly committed by one family, and if the nine neighboring families, the jiazhang, and the zongjiazhang do not first report it, they will all be punished severely without leniency/'9 T h e early Q i n g control system was thus initially intended to detect miscreants and to keep the newly acquired population u n d e r tight control. A n effort was made to fix people in place, and to use

68 Wen Juntian, Zhongguo baojia zhidu, pp. 205, 216. T h e Huangchao tongdian states that a full-fledged baojia system was inaugurated in 1644, but Wen J u n tian shows this to be incorrect and a later editorial insertion. Later in the d y nasty the baojia and lijia were placed under the Board of Revenue. E-tu Z e n Sun, " T h e Board of Revenue in Nineteenth-Century China," p. 204. 69 Shizu shilu, 7 : 8 1 b . See a l s o j i Huang, Huangchao wenxian tongkao, 21:5a. O n August 18, 1646, the Board of War was especially advised to use the zongjia to punish those w h o gave shelter to fugitives. Shizu shilu, 27:320a.

Local Control in North China

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the household registration system of the zongjia to keep people from wandering about, especially in troubled areas like Shandong. 7 0 In 1646 the government even ordered that registers be prepared according to the former Ming hereditary categories (military households, artisans' households, and so forth). People were warned that they would be punished if they pretended to be from another category, and the earlier Ming distinction between labor services (yi) and land taxes (Ju) was reiterated.71 Beginning in 1646, when the heads of the zongjia system were supposed to report directly to the Board of War, these registration units were linked with an effort to control access to military supplies, including horses and firearms. This policy was the idea o f Ingguldai, the man w h o had organized logistics for the banner armies and w h o had arranged for supplies from Korea before and after the 1636-1637 Manchu invasion of that country. N a m e d President o f the Board of Revenue in 1644, he had begun urging in November, 1646, that strict laws be promulgated to prevent people from selling military supplies to bandits. O n December 1, 1646, the government announced: In order to shut off the bandits' sources [of supply], it is forbidden for people to trade privately in horses, mules, armor, helmets, 70 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 15. The attempt to connect people with their locale was also extended to students. In 1645 it was announced that many aspirants were falsely registered, and students henceforth would have to prove that their ancestors had been registered locally for 20 years or more in the same place, or else owned property there, in order to be admitted to the exams. H e Bingdi, Zhongguo huiguan shilun, p. 8. 71 Wen, Baojia zhidu, pp. 201-205, 216. The new government had earlier announced, on June 12, 1645, that henceforth the hereditary category of jiang (artisan) would be abolished, and that the levy on the capital labor duties of artisans would no longer be imposed. Instead, the artisans w h o began w o r k ing on the Taihe Palace that year were paid according to the labor they performed. Peng Zeyi, "Qingdai qianqi shougongye de fazhan," pp. 3 - 4 . Even in the 19th century, there were still four vestigial "registries" (ji) kept, divided into the categories of mm (civilian), jun (military), shang (merchant), and zao ([salt] maker). But because the separate labor service tax had been eliminated after the Yongzheng period, these categories had n o real fiscal i m portance. Sun, "Board of Revenue," pp. 201-202.

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bows, arrows, knives, guns, cannons, and muskets. We will follow the request of Ingguldai, President of the Board of Revenue.72

The early 1600s had seen a proliferation of firearms in East Asia, and in China foreign cannons and domestic guns were widely used by regular military units as well as rebels, by local magnates as well as bandits. 73 This was especially true in highly militarized areas like the northwest, or like Shandong, where rebellion and invasion had led, indeed forced, many landlords and peasants to acquire arms. It would take many years for the Qing fully to enforce this regulation, but the obsessive enumeration by Qing field commanders of each weapon captured from enemy forces reflects the government's determination to take weapons out of the hands of civilians and devise regulations to keep them from acquiring new ones. 74 At first, the government focussed its attention mainly on controlling firearms and horses by policing the communications system; transients and travellers were the major target. In April, 1647, special laws were announced for Beijing and its environs. 1.

All arms makers in the city had to register with their local taxation offices. Anyone other than officials or soldiers who wanted to buy a weapon had to register his name and pay a special tax. Private arms dealers would be severely punished.

72 Shizushilu, 28:337b. 73 T h e introduction o f the n e w handguns and cannons at this time m a y e v e n have "helped to feed the late M i n g White Lotus martial arts tradition that for several hundred years thereafter w o u l d argue persuasively for its ability to provide effective protection against these terrifying f o r m s o f firepower." Susan N a q u i n , Shantung Rebellion, p. 192. 74 B y the late 18th and early 19th centuries, arms control w a s so efficient that conspirators w h o w i s h e d to acquire knives f r o m blacksmiths ran the risk o f being d e n o u n c e d to the authorities. Susan Naquin, Millenarian Rebellion in China, passim. See also N a q u i n , Shantung, p. 24. But see also Mark Elvin, The Pattern of the Chinese Past, p. 21. T h e disorderly years o f the last half o f the 19th century were in part the result o f the import and manufacture o f Western firearms, and the gun-running o f American and English merchants. Wakeman, "Evolution o f Local Control," p. 17.

Local Control in North China

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2.

Baojia units would be instituted ward-by-ward.

3.

Strangers should be arrested if seen carrying weapons.

4.

T h e practice of allowing lawless elements either to j o i n M a n chu households as slaves or the rearguards of imperial "correction" forces as camp followers was strictly prohibited; future infractions would be severely punished.

5.

Special Manchu guards units were assigned to checkpoints outside the outer gates of the city to examine everyone entering the capital.

6.

Sheds and guardposts were ordered built outside the walls to house the bannermen assigned to patrol the face of the walls at their base. 75

7.

Provincial officials were told that households engaged in horse breeding henceforth would have to obtain special permits and restrict the sale of livestock to "reliable" elements.

8.

Innkeepers and hostelers were warned that they would have to ask any men riding horses to show that they possessed permits for the animals. If their suspicions were aroused, they would have to report the fact immediately to local defense officials. 76

Conventional military police measures of this sort, however, only curtailed weapons and mounts that were bought and sold. B y O c tober, 1648, the throne was aware that many bandits forged their o w n weapons and traded in horses. The Board of War was therefore ordered to see that, excepting officials and military officers, no one be allowed to raise horses nor possess weapons. Officials were ordered to seize such livestock, paying the owners a fair price, and to confiscate all weapons, storing those which could be used and destroying the rest. Most important, the local chiefs of

75 Beijing had possessed, under the Ming, a system of local police stations called pushe. These way stations for government messengers and guards had constables attached to them. However, by the 17th century, most o f these had either disappeared or were in such run-down condition as to be virtually unusable. James Peter Geiss, "Peking under the Ming," p. 193. 76 Wenxian congbian, 23 ji, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 5 8 - 5 9 .

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control units like the zongjia or baojia were to pledge that their charges w o u l d n o t raise horses nor hoard weapons in the future, being i n f o r m e d that either activity w o u l d be regarded t a n t a m o u n t to conspiring to rebel. 77 As t i m e w e n t on, the g o v e r n m e n t came to rely m o r e and m o r e u p o n the mutual-responsibility units in order to keep w e a p o n s away f r o m bandits, and even to restore them to their rightful o w n ers if they w e r e guaranteed to be " g o o d people" by their "heads of ten h o u s e h o l d s " (shijiazhattg). Less than a year after the initial fiat prohibiting w e a p o n s altogether, D o r g o n decreed that w e a p o n s should be given back to such people so that they could protect themselves against outlaws. R e c e n t l y w e have heard that the p e o p l e have n o w e a p o n s and cann o t repel aggressors. Bandits o n the other hand can profit, and the g o o d p e o p l e have to endure bitter and p o i s o n o u s [misfortunes]. N o w w e think that the w e a p o n s and armor w h i c h the p e o p l e o r i g i nally o u g h t not to have had, and w h i c h were strictly forbidden in the past, such as muskets, f o w l i n g pieces, b o w s and arrows, knives, spears, and horses, o u g h t n o w to be retained in their possession and n o t forbidden. Return to their original o w n e r s those [ w e a p o n s ] w h i c h w e r e initially turned over to the officials. 7 8

T h u s , the " g o o d people" w h o belonged to local mutual-responsibility units w e r e granted the right to to a r m themselves in selfdefense, s o m e w h a t like m e m b e r s of the closely connected baojia and tuanlian organizations of the late 18th and 19th centuries.

Selective Amnesties Just as effective w e a p o n s control seemed to depend u p o n distinguishing b e t w e e n Hang min (good people) and zei (bandits), so did an expeditious use of amnesties appear to require a similar discrimination between the bulk of the peasant population and the

77 Shizu shilu, 40:464a. The chiefs here are called linyou shijia zhang (heads of every ten neighboring households). 78 Shizu shilu, 43:505a. The edict is dated May 6, 1649.

Local Control in North China

* '

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T h e t w o g a t e t o w e r s a n d p a r t o f the b a r b i c a n o f t h e P i n g z e G a t e o n t h e w e s t e r n side o f B e i j i n g . O s v a l d Siren, The Walls and Gates of Peking ( L o n d o n , 1924), p l a t e 77, r e p r o d u c e d t h r o u g h t h e c o u r t e s y o f t h e B a n c r o f t Library, University of California, Berkeley.

permanently disordered elements within it. This distinction rested upon the assumption that most riots and rebellions were caused either by professional trouble-makers or sectarian preachers who "aroused and deluded" the people to follow them. And that assumption in turn was reinforced in 1646 and 1647 by a number of sectarian uprisings that broke out west of Beijing in Shanxi province. In May, 1646, a monk named Liu Guangpu incited a brief uprising in the northwest corner of that province, and it was followed by another rebellion of "heretics" (zuodao) in that same area.79 The latter spread down through the Liiliang Mountains to Ningxiang, west of Taiyuan. 80 The sectarians, led by a man named 79 Shizu shiliiy 25:294s. 80 T h e authorities in Taiyuan were also aroused by a major case involving a M i n g prince's heir, w h o was secretly given shelter by a close relative. M e m o rial f r o m the Supervising Censor for Shanxi, in Gugong b o w u y u a n M i n g Q i n g dang'anbu, comp., Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian, fascicle 3, pp. 9 1 - 9 4 .

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Yang Chunchang, were decimated by the fall o f 1647; but there simultaneously arose yet another movement o f "deviant sectarians" ( x i e j i a o , ) led by a man named Gao Fei, w h o were still resisting imperial troops well into the winter o f 1647-1648.81 This coincided with the most alarming sectarian movement o f the season, Zheng Dengqi's rebellion, which broke out in November, 1647, in southwestern Shanxi near the bend o f the Yellow River. T h e uprising began as a result o f government persecution. Zheng Dengqi and Zheng Huaifa were accused o f assembling followers and plotting rebellion. The authorities managed to arrest Zheng Huaifa, but Zheng Dengqi escaped and fled deep into the mountain country o f Jishan district, close to the Shaanxi border. There, he and his mounted followers occupied stockades (zhai) on the mountain peaks, and Deng began to call himself "Preacher o f the Great Completion" {Dacheng jiaoshi), attracting to his side t w o Buddhist monks, Wang Yuetian and Wang Ming. 82 The t w o monks helped Zheng establish his headquarters in a temple on one o f the mountains in the Longmen range. There, Zheng attracted yet more believers, as well as a member o f the M i n g royal family named Zhu Meichuan. According to reports received by Governor Zhu Shichang, "under the pretext o f offering prayers to the

81 Shizu shilu, 32:20, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252. There were also non-sectarian uprisings at this time. O n October 19, 1647, Governor Z h u Shichang, o f the Han Bordered Red Banner, led 800 cavalrymen against 500 armored outlaws on horseback under Li Hualong and his brother Q i l o n g at Yuxian, thirty li east o f the provincial capital. Zhu Shichang, a former M i n g major w h o n o w held the rank o f general, had suffered Taizong's disfavor in 1638 when he spoke out against the Manchu practice o f enslaving w o m e n prisoners o f war. Taizong called Zhu a traitor and accused him o f being in league with the M i n g . D o r g o n later reinstated the loyal general.

Ming-Qing

shiliao, bing, ben 7, in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, pp. 253-254; Narakino Shimesu, Shindaijuyo

shokkan no kenkyu, p. 544.

82 Dacheng both describes the Yellow Emperor's ordering o f all things and C o n fucius's making a grand harmony or concert out o f individual melodies. It is also a Buddhist term, Mahasambhava or "Great Completion," referring to the imaginary realm in which appeared 20,000 kotis o f Buddhas all o f the same title: Bhismagarjitaghosasvaraja. William Edward Soothill and Lewis H o dous, A Dictionary of Chinese Buddhist Terms, p. 89.

Local Control in North China

715

dead," the Longmen temple group was actually conspiring against the government. 8 3 This rash o f sectarian uprisings, coupled with the continuing incidence o f armed attacks by bandits on yamens in supposedly settled areas, led the Qing government to emphasize once more a policy o f granting amnesties (zhaoju). This time it chose to initiate two new measures. T h e first was to get the dynasty's pacification officials to realize that the " g o o d people" had to be treated differently from those who led them into evil ways. Pacification officials were, on the one hand, told by the throne they must not be afraid to report that the people living in areas for which they were responsible had "developed bandits' feelings." O n the other hand, they were also told to stop regarding certain areas as being intrinsically disloyal. Even those areas long occupied by bandit camps still had some " g o o d and peaceful people" residing in them, and these Hang mitt should not automatically fall under suspicion; indeed, it was very important for them to be distinguished from "genuine bandits" and from the shamans and magicians w h o were arousing them with strange heterodox rumors. 8 4 T h e second measure was directed toward the bandits and rebels themselves. Clemency was promised, on April 18, 1647, to all partisans who turned themselves in to their local yamens or military posts. 85 Recently, robbers and outlaws have flourished, causing the people to flee in alarm and uncertainty by spreading lies. Truly, [the populace] deserves our compassion! We shall henceforth hold wide the door for a special voluntary surrender, allowing [the outlaws] to 83 Donghua lu, Shunzhi 4/10, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252. 84 Shizu shilu, 3 1 : 3 6 4 . It was believed that by the very act o f settling people down, their social character was changed. As one official pointed out early in the Shunzhi period: "When vagabonds (liumin) are settled, then you turn bandits into people. When vagabonds scatter, then you turn people into bandits." Guo Songyi, "Qingchu fengjian guojia kenhuang zhengce fenxi," p. 114. 85 T h e announcement coincided with reports from Governor Y u Qinglian at Baoding that bandits had suddenly appeared in great numbers in Hejian prefecture. The prefect and warden there had been wounded, and the garrison commander had hanged himself.

716

Local Control

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China

make a fresh start. Strive to bring about a change of heart in the robbers and outlaws, so that the good people may pursue their callings in peace. From now on, regardless of the severity of their crimes, all former bandits who can present themselves at an official post or before the Board of War to avow in detail their real outlaw names and residences will not only be personally pardoned for their offenses, they will also duly receive their own illegal booty as a reward [for turning themselves in].86 During the winter of 1647-1648 this unusually concessive policy, with accurate intelligence reports and the brisk execution of the sect's leaders, enabled the Shanxi provincial government to dissipate the Longmen millenarian movement. In Hebei, local police measures appeared to be bringing the sale and manufacture of weapons under control, and the household registration system seemed to be curbing incidents of sectarianism and local banditry. 87 By the early months of 1648, relative calm had settled over most of north China. O n the periphery, in restive regions like the Han River highlands, a ruthless policy of systematic slaughter had made the cities secure and the major highways safe. In the core regions of the Central Plain, selective amnesties and local control measures had settled the population and curbed all but the most devoted sectarians. For a while, the Qing court experienced a relief f r o m the nearly constant sense of alarm aroused by so many reports of peasant uprisings and loyalist conspiracies during the past year. But this was only a deceptive hiatus; the lull was soon to prove short lived. 86 Shizu shilu, 31:364. 87 Ibid., 45:527b-528a.

CHAPTER TEN

"Foolish Stratagems in Critical Times" River deep, melancholy as we d r u m the sweep. Cold sea, remembrances while we float by raft. At this spot all must haul by land: Are there m e n w h o will stop to lend a hand? Alarums behind, I neglect the year and month, Whirling at anchor, resent m y wife and child, Yet cannot grieve at so deprived a state W h e n qian and kun determine each man's fate.' C h e n Z i l o n g , Chen Zhongyu

quan ji,

14:26b.

Although the major urban centers of Jiangnan were all securely occupied during the winter of 1645-1646, few Qing administrators believed that the region was completely under their control. For one, Chongming Island continued to harbor pirates, and Qing naval forces on more than one occasion clashed with loyalist forces there. 2 Moreover, as the Nanjing governor, Mao Jiuhua, had pointed out to the Manchu court in Beijing, there was a grave risk that loyalist remnants in the lower Yangzi region might link up 1 Qian (heaven) and kun (earth) are the first t w o hexagrams o f the Book of Changes. 2 M e m o r i a l dated A p r i l - M a y , 1647, Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, ben 1, in X i e G u o zhen, Nanming shiliie, pp. 9 1 - 9 2 .

717

718

"Foolish Stratagems

in Critical

Times"

with other resistance forces upstream, and especially with some of the bandits around Anqing. Dissident groups in that region were potential allies of the famous "forty-eight stockades" (sishiba zhai) further inland in Huguang province. There was thus a possibility o f loyalist movements spreading up and down the Yangzi River, choking off the Q i n g administration in Nanjing, where popular opposition to the new rule was evident in districts immediately around the former southern capital. Hence, it was important not to arouse this great mass of people by abandoning the policy o f peaceful collaboration in order to take reprisals for the uprisings of 1645. M a o consequently argued that: We s h o u l d not m e r e l y pay lip service [to the notion that] in order to w i n the p e o p l e w e m u s t w i n their m i n d s . If there is w a r w i t h this great m a s s [ o f people], then w h o will be able to drive t h e m o f f ? If they attack the cities, then which o n e will not be c o n q u e r e d [by them]?3

Partly out o f weakness, then, the Q i n g government continued in 1646 to pursue a policy of collaboration with the local elites of Jiangnan. Particularly favored was the architect of that policy, Q i a n Qianyi, who was invited in March to come to Beijing and become deputy chief of the archives, and editor-in-chief of the Ming History,4

Qian Qianyi and the Taint of Collaboration B y now, Q i a n Qianyi's reputation for personal compromise was notorious. Before going north to take up his new post, Q i a n Qianyi had paid a visit to Tiger Hill outside Suzhou. O n that particular day he was wearing a specially tailored coat with a very small collar and large sleeves. Another Jiangnan scholar who was walking 3 Memorial dated December, 1645, Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 6, in Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu, pp. 128-129. 4 Luther Carrington Goodrich, The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung, p. 100. His official title was elevated to Senior Vice-President of Rites.

"Foolish Stratagems in Critical Times"

719

The erudite collaborator Qian Qianyi (1582-1664). Anon., Qingdai xuezhe xiang zhuan (Shanghai, 1953), vol. 2. in f r o n t of h i m noticed the coat and searchingly asked h i m w h a t kind of style the garment represented. Q i a n Qianyi archly responded, " T h e small collar is to show m y respect for the regulations (zhi) o f the present dynasty. T h e large sleeves are so as n o t to forget the f o r m e r dynasty." T h e scholar sarcastically c o m m e n t e d , "Your excellency is truly capable of being the leader (lingxiu, lit.

720

"Foolish

Stratagems

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collar-sleeve) of two dynasties." 5 Thus, although Dorgon might not have fully realized it at the time, to bring such a turncoat north to the capital raised anew the issue of late Ming political immorality and corruption. Even at the time of the fall of Nanjing, when Qian Qianyi had surrendered to the Manchus, there had been some talk at court of the dubious moral qualities of the Nanjing ministers who had welcomed Dodo. A department director of the Board of Civil Appointments named Xiong Wenju argued against employing these new adherents, w h o m he termed "marketplace troublemakers" (shijing maolan), and extolled instead the more righteous elements who had hidden in the forests and hills.6 Xiong was not lacking in opportunism himself: he had served the Ming, Li Zicheng, and now Dorgon. In fact, he may even have been publicly pilloried by men like Qian Qianyi in the Hongguang court. But his repeated warnings reminded Dorgon, who had been forgiving of simple bureaucratic opportunism while intolerant of idealistic political factionalism, that men who served in the Hongguang regime were more strongly identified with conventional late Ming party strife than northern collaborators. After Qian Qianyi came to Beijing, Dorgon was alerted once again to the danger of employing former Ming officials who might revive the factionalism of the Tianqi and Chongzhen courts. All that summer the court had been jubilant over the reports from Zhang Cunren, the old Liaodong officer who had joined the Manchus in 1631. Named Governor-General of Zhejiang and Fujian as of December, 1645, Zhang had been highly successful in fighting the armies of both the Prince of Tang and the Prince of Lu. 7 As his reports indicated, scores—even hundreds—of officials serving these regimes were surrendering to his forces. By September, 1646, many of these Southern Ming scholar-officials had arrived in Beijing to await assignment under the new dynasty. There were so many of them, in fact, that there were many more applicants than posts to fill. Partly because of this, it was proposed that all of these 5 G e Wanli, c o m p . , Qian Muzhai xiansheng yishi ji nianpu, p. 18. 6 Er chen zhuan, 1 2 : 3 4 - 3 5 . 7 A r t h u r W. H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, p. 57.

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men be carefully investigated in order to make certain that their political histories were acceptable. Yuan Maogong, a supervising secretary in the Board of Rites which was trying to assign these literati to n e w positions, explained the problem to the throne. H e specifically addressed himself to the person of Ruan Dacheng— w h o was by n o w both a pariah among southern literati and a camp follower of the Manchus. 8 Like M a Shiying, Ruan Dacheng had fled f r o m Nanjing before the city was surrendered to D o d o and the Qing forces. After taking temporary refuge with General Huang Degong at Wuhu, Ruan had moved on to Hangzhou until that city, too, succumbed to D o d o . Leaving Hangzhou, Ruan had tried to secure asylum in the city o f j i n h u a in central Zhejiang, but the gentry there refused him entry. H e was therefore forced to go on to Yanzhou and seek refuge with General Fang Guoan. 9 Apparently Ruan and M a Shiying, w h o was then also with General Fang, had competed vigorously for influence over the militarist. Losing the struggle, Ruan surrendered to Zhang Cunren in the autumn of 1646; and while M a Shiying was executed, Ruan was ordered to serve on the staff of the beile w h o had captured him. 10 It was in this capacity that he took revenge upon the good folk of Jinhua, leading back a M a n chu contingent to sack the city that had turned him away. 11 What Yuan Maogong now wished to point out to the regime was that men with reputations as unsavory as was Ruan Dacheng's would taint the new dynasty. Yuan told the throne that Ruan Dacheng had so "disserved the Ming court" as to make the "forest

8 Nevertheless, Feng Quan—Ruan's former ally—had audaciously n o m i n a t e d h i m for a Q i n g post, Li Q i n g , Sanyuan biji, supplement, xia, p. 4a. 9 Fang G u o a n was b o t h a fellow t o w n s m a n and former lieutenant o f M a Shiy i n g . Captured b y the Q i n g , he was beheaded. Zhang T i n g y u et al., c o m p s . , Ming shi (Guofang yanjiuyuan), p. 3498 (hereafter cited as Ming shi). 10 " T h e Governor-General o f Zhejiang and Fujian, Z h a n g Cunren, m e m o r i alized, reporting that the so-called 'Grand Secretaries' X i e Sanbin and S o n g Z h i p u , 'Minister o f War' Ruan Dacheng, 'Minister o f Justice' Su Z h u a n g , and others n u m b e r i n g altogether 48 people surrendered." Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu, (hereafter cited as Shizu shilu) 27:327a, dated September 22, 1646. 11 Robert B . C r a w f o r d , " T h e B i o g r a p h y o f j u a n Ta-ch'eng," pp. 48, 73.

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of scholars regard him as beyond the pale." Because Ruan had "slandered the tens of thousands of scholarly souls o f j i a n g n a n , " to employ him publicly would incur the resentment of the southern literati. Moreover, "if he could disserve a former dynasty, then he would of needs disserve us now." 12 As it soon turned out, Ruan Dacheng rapidly disappeared f r o m the scene. Some claimed that he became a m o n k in Zhejiang, but the far m o r e plausible version of his last days is that he threw h i m self wholeheartedly into entertaining and advising the Q i n g troops, perhaps reliving his earlier hopes of becoming a military hero. Ruan appears to have engaged himself so energetically in these military activities along the Fujian-Zhejiang border, in fact, that he would tuck up his scholar's robes and join the soldiers on the march. During one of these strenuous hikes in the mountains of northern Fujian, he collapsed and died. 13 Ruan's death, however, did not make Yuan Maogong's argument entirely irrelevant. In that same memorial warning against the employment of Ruan, Yuan Maogong also suggested that other former Ming officials be investigated as well. Since they could not be employed immediately, these surrendered literati should return h o m e where they could help restore order and see that power did not fall into the hands of local bullies. I beg for an imperial order to the said board to fully investigate those who have served as southern [Ming] officials at their capital and then order each of them to return to his native place [so that we may have time to] quietly listen and carefully consider the capabilities [of each man] for employment.14 Several weeks before D o r g o n actually received this memorial, Qian Qianyi had already asked to be allowed to return home, ex12 M e m o r i a l dated S e p t e m b e r 7, 1647, Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, 1 : 1 in Nanming shiliao, p. 36. 13 X i e G u o z h e n , Ming-Qing zhiji dangshe yundong kao, p. 108; C r a w f o r d , "Juan T a - c h ' e n g , " p p . 48, 75. 14 M e m o r i a l dated S e p t e m b e r 7, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, 1 : 1 in Nanming shiliao, p. 36.

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cusing himself from work in the capital on the grounds of illness. Although Dorgon continued to regard him with favor, delegating two imperial officials to look after him and granting him permission to use the government post-stations to travel south, Qian Qianyi's retirement coincided with Yuan Maogong's warnings about the unsavory political practices of many collaborators. His departure thus signalled the rise to prominence of younger men like Chen Zhilin who were not so badly tainted by previous political factionalism, nor so strongly associated in the public's mind with opportunistic collaboration. 15

Tu Guobao and the Lake Tai Loyalists Qian Qianyi's political demise after 1646 did not immediately affect the general Qing policy of cooperation with the local elites of Jiangnan. After the initial Songjiang uprising had been repressed with military force, the Grand Coordinator for Military Affairs in the region, Governor Tu Guobao, took on the task of attracting farmers back to their holdings and grain merchants back to their stores. Even in peaceful times, the Su-Song-Tai circuit could not grow enough grain to feed itself, and had to rely upon grain merchants to import rice from other provinces. After the 1645 disorders, when Yang Wencong's troops had plundered the area and when the Lake Tai "White Headed A r m y " had broken into the warehouses of Suzhou, the grain merchants had been frightened off. After recovering these warehouses in August, Governor Tu had managed to identify which portion of this grain "was part of the hard earned capital of long distance merchants," and turned over 23,000 piculs of stored rice to the original owners in order to persuade the grain merchants of Suzhou to go back into business

1 5 Goodrich, Literary Inquisition, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 . The edict granting Qian Qianyi permission to return h o m e to cure his illness was dated August 10, 1646. Shizu shilu, 2 6 : 3 1 7 a . G u o Songyi, "Jiangnan dizhu jieji y u Q i n g chu zhongyang jiquan de maodun j i qi fazhan he bianhua," pp. 1 3 2 - 1 3 3 .

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again. 16 He was thus initially quite successful in restoring some measure of economic stability to the area.17 Tu Guobao's efforts to gain the cooperation of the inhabitants of Jiangnan in this program of economic reconstruction were hampered, however, by the continuing presence of the loyalist forces under Wu Yi in the Lake Tai area. After the failure to take Suzhou, Wu Yi's men had fled into the marshland to regroup. Joined there by other loyalist remnants, Wu Yi had allied his own forces with a small army commanded by a man named Zhou Rui; and together, they established at Changbai Pond the nucleus of a new loyalist confederation. 18 Their first reported victory came on March 2,

16 Measures were also taken to reconstitute the state's salt monopoly. When Li Fayuan took over as salt commissioner in 1645, he found Yangzhou to be " a city in ruins, overgrown with weeds." T h e salt merchants o f the Lianghuai area had all lost their capital and fled. While the government looked to him for revenue to cover military costs, Li repeatedly memorialized in favor o f remitting excessive levies and wastage fees in order to lure the merchants back. Gradually, merchants returned to the area and began to produce and sell salt again. Wang Sizhi and Jin Chengji, " Q i n g c h a o qianqi Lianghuai yanshang de shengshuai," pp. 1 - 2 . 17 Memorial dated October, 1645, Nanming shiliao, pp. 4 - 6 . B y 1 6 4 6 - 1 6 4 7 , the cotton industry o f the Su-Song area had also begun to recover. Peng Zeyi, " Q i n g d a i qianqi shougongye de fazhan," p. 9. For the Qing government's support o f the interregional grain trade, see Chin Shih, "Peasant E c o n o m y and Rural Society in the Lake Tai area, 1 3 6 8 - 1 8 4 0 , " ch. 6, p. 8. Tax remissions were also granted by the central government to help ease the pacification. Henan and Jiangnan were all excused from supplementary taxes in perpetuity, and were also forgiven past arrears as o f June 24, 1645. T h e same measures, plus special grants o f food and clothing to the elderly (who were also exempted from service taxes), were extended to Zhejiang and Fujian later on March 17, 1647. Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, 7 6 : l - 2 a ; Shizu shilu, 3 0 : 3 5 6 - 3 5 7 a . According to a stele erected in Jiading in 1646, peasants were strongly encouraged to reclaim lands abandoned since the Wanli period, and special measures were taken to curb the corrupt practices o f yamen tax collectors. Shanghai bowuguan tushu ziliao shi, eds., Shanghai beike ziliao xuanji, pp. 1 3 9 - 1 4 3 . 18 S o m e sources indicate that Wu Y i was invited to resume command o f the loyalist forces by Zhou Rui. Chen Zilong, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, pp. 3 b - 4 a . T h e superior position o f Z h o u Rui is also accepted by Wen Ruilin in Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 3 9 8 - 4 0 1 . This version was adopted by the compilers o f the dynastic history. Ming shi, p. 3115. Lake Tai appears to have

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1646, when they emerged from the confines o f the lake and took over Wujiang again, killing the magistrate and pillaging the district. 19 Although they quickly abandoned the city, Zhou Rui and Wu Yi's men ventured forth much more boldly after this attack, and gradually came to control the entire east shore o f Lake Tai. Hampered by a lack o f competent sailors, the Qing forces were ill equipped to restrain the fishermen and smugglers who made up the bulk o f Wu Yi's marines; and on May 11, 1646, Tu Guobao's forces, supplemented with soldiers from Songjiang commanded by General Wu Shengzhao, suffered severe casualties as they fought off yet another attack by over one thousand loyalist boats upon the city o f Wujiang. 20 Wu Yi's exploits became known throughout Jiangnan, and news o f his and Zhou Rui's military offensives reached the court o f the Prince o f Lu in Zhejiang. Through Zhou Rui's secretary, Dai Zhijun (who was Yang Tingshu's student), the Lake Tai fighters were put in touch with gentry loyalists who had survived the Songjiang uprising, and especially with Chen Zilong, who was then living in Jiashan. 21 Partly through men like these, who were

offered haven to a number o f different groups at this time: some loyalists associated with the Ming prince Gaoan wang, and a band led by Shen Tianxu and commissioned by Le'an wang. The former was captured and killed by the Qing. Shen, who raided Qing military supply trains for food, was captured by a Qing patrol and tortured to death. Ibid., p. 4114; Zha Jizuo, Guo shou lu, p. 75. 19 Wujiang xiangzhi cited in Wu Weiye, Wushi jilan, 4, shang, 2a; Wang Yunwu, ed., Da Qing yitongzhi, p. 952 (83:15a). Hong Chengchou ordered an official investigation into the reason why the city fell so easily. Tu Guobao discovered that the city's warden had concerned himself solely with police matters, leaving local defense to members o f the gentry and the director o f studies, w h o was indicted for malfeasance for neglecting to defend the city's moat. M e m o rial which reached Beijing on October 20, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, ji, 1 : 1 8 , in Nanming shiliao, pp. 3 9 - 4 2 . 20 Memorial from Tu Guobao, dated May 16, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, ji, 1: 1 4 - 1 5 , in Nanming shiliao, pp. 3 0 - 3 2 . Governor Tu asked to be allowed to divert local funds and assess special taxes to provide for the training o f 2 , 0 0 0 marines and sailors. 21 Members o f Wu Yi's staff included Chen Ji, Zhu Bin, and Shen Pan. Chen, Chen Zhongyu quanji, nianpu, xia, p. 3a.

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themselves in contact with the Ming loyalist court in Zhejiang, W u Yi was directly reached by the Lu regime, which recognized his growing eminence and enfeoffed him that spring as Earl of Changxing. At the same time Wu Yi and Z h o u Rui organized their a r m y into formal banners, cut special seals, appointed regular officials, and created a proper secretariat, which Chen Zilong was p r o m p t l y invited to join. 2 2 C h e n Zilong accepted the invitation to join W u Yi's muju, and together with t w o of his own disciples, Wang Yun and Qian Shuguang, set off for the loyalist camp at Lake Tai. There they set up their offices in the ruins of an abandoned academy on an island in the marshes, but soon became disenchanted with both their quarters and the prospects of Wu Yi leading a successful war against the Qing. Wang Yun gives some hint of the reasons w h y they soon left the academy and took shelter on Qian's family estate, w h e n he wrote that: "Changxing may be one of the heroes of our age, but in m y view his strategy tends to underestimate the enemy. Besides, he has recruited retainers w h o look d o w n u p o n learned scholars. T h e only reason all of these generals serve is to rob and plunder. T h o u g h an army has been assembled, it has not been put in order, and they remain a dissolute bunch altogether." 23 Governor Tu Guobao, on the other hand, continued to regard Wu Yi and his army as a very real threat to the security of all Jiangnan, especially if the loyalists managed to break through the Q i n g lines to the southeast and made contact with the Southern Ming armies fighting in Zhejiang. 24 Wu, in fact, did decide to try to break t h r o u g h the Q i n g cordon encircling Lake Tai by attacking

22 Ibid., p. 4; Xie, Nanming shiliie, p. 90; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 . 23 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quanji, nianpu, xia, 4. Wang Y u n wrote the supplement to Chen's nianpu for the years 1 6 4 5 - 1 6 4 7 . Qian died shortly afterwards. 24 Memorial from Tu Guobao, dated May 16, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, ji, 1: 1 4 - 1 5 , in Nanming shiliao, pp. 3 0 - 3 2 . T h o u g h by July, 1646 Shaoxing was in Manchu hands, the districts between there and N i n g b o were still not entirely settled. T h e "cave lords o f Da Lan Mountain" (Da lan dong zhu), led by Wang Yi, vigorously resisted Q i n g forces in the Siming shan area between the t w o cities. After Wang was defeated, these mountain bands, led by chiefs like H u Shuangqi, continued to defy Q i n g rule through the 1670s. Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 19.

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the city of Jiashan, which was said to be poorly defended. Word came to him, moreover, that the magistrate at Jiashan was secretly in sympathy with the Ming loyalist cause. Wu therefore contacted the official, who suggested a secret meeting between the two of them in Jiashan proper to discuss arrangements for a coordinated uprising later. Wu Yi, who was noted for his physical agility and spiritual boldness, apparently did not suspect that this was a trap. He boldly accepted the magistrate's invitation and entered Jiashan, only to be ambushed. Qing soldiers seized him, and the magistrate turned Wu Yi over to the authorities in Hangzhou, who summarily executed the loyalist on July 15, 1646, outside the Caoqiao Gate. 25 Wu Yi's death did not put an end either to the military activities of the Lake Tai bands or to the hopes of diehard loyalists among the gentry of Jiangnan. For one, the lake itself continued to attract desperadoes and adventurers. The area just south of the lake and marshes, in northern Zhejiang, was a continual source of fresh recruits for the forces in the lake. Because the waterways were such important commercial concourses (merchants transporting goods north from Guangdong or Fujian towards the Yangzi and Huai River valleys had no choice but to pass through this narrow stretch between mountains and sea), and because the area came under the jurisdiction of three often non-cooperative different authorities (Huzhou, Jiaxing, and the imperial authority in Nanzhili), this was a haven for bandits of all sorts; and it would be many years before the Qing officials brought the sanctuary under direct control. 26 Second, Wu Yi's death may have left the northern Lake Tai bands

25 Gu Yuan et al., c o m p s . , Wu jun wubai mingxiati tu zhuan zan, 15:8; Xie, Nanming shiliie, p. 91; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 134. O n e hundred and thirty years later, at the order o f the Qianlong Emperor, Wu Yi's t o m b there became a national shrine. For a slightly different account, see Chen, Chen Zhongyu quanji, nianpu, xia, 4 b - 5 a . 26 Fu Yiling, Mingdai Jiangnan shimin jingji shitan, p. 88. Because they were afraid that a resistance m o v e m e n t w o u l d disrupt commerce, the Anhui merchants residing in Linghu (Guian) had earlier collected subscriptions to pay the Q i n g forces w h e n they arrived there. Linghu was thus spared military casualties, and business continued as usual. Shih, "Peasant Economy," ch. 3, pp. 27-28.

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leaderless, but they soon passed through the hands of various former staff members, ending up under the general command of Zhou Rui. 27 Finally, even though Governor Tu Guobao reported to Beijing on the beauty and calm of the landscape around Suzhou at the end of the summer of 1646, after the execution of Wu Yi that July, there was still a great deal of barely concealed hostility and resentment, especially among younger members of the Jiangnan literati. 28 The prefectural examinations, scheduled for September, 1646, actually had to be postponed until November when it was discovered that some of the candidates were hiding long hair under their hats, and when one candidate publicly excoriated Tu Guobao for being a traitor.29 And that December, a demented scholar from Wuxi named Wang Mou led a suicidal attack on Jiangyin and was killed.30 As long as these seemed to be isolated and aberrant incidents, collaborators like Tu Guobao remained self-confident. But when there were suggestions that these incidents were merely visible manifestations of much broader and more widespread discontent, then he and Hong Chengchou grew worried. Especially troubling was the crescendo of social disorder to the south of Nanjing at Liyang along what is now the Anhui and Zhejiang borders, and the spate of loyalist activity that appeared to extend in a broad belt from the seacoast districts of the Huaiyang area across the Grand Canal into Wanbei (northern Anhui). 31 27 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 3 9 9 - 4 0 0 . 28 M e m o r i a l f r o m Tu G u o b a o which reached Beijing on September 7, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, 1:16, in Nanming shiliao, pp. 3 3 - 3 4 . 29 T h e latter was a m a n f r o m Wujin named X u Sheng. H e accused the governor of betraying the M i n g , adding "Today the literati leave you with a smile o n their face. You do not see t h e m returning h o m e with a sob in their throat." X u and a n u m b e r of others were arrested and executed. Ji Liuqi, Mingji nanliie, p. 282. 30 His followers were mainly vegetable vendors, w h o fled at the sight of a s w o r d . Ji, Mingji nanliie, p. 272. 31 Ming-Qing shiliao, ji, 1:14, in Nanming shiliao, pp. 2 9 - 3 0 ; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 142-145.

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The Liyang and Huaiyang Uprisings The Liyang uprising started as a gentry resistance movement against Qing rule and quickly turned into a revolt of poor peasants, serfs, and tenants led by two bondservants (pu) named Pan Mao and Pan Zhen. The rebellion had begun before the Manchus arrived in Nanjing, and by the time they tried to recover the sixteen qu in this area, they found out that the Pans had attracted a great number of the poor and oppressed menials of southern Jiangsu and had formed them into two large troops of armed men called "pared noses" (xiao hi) and "enamels" (falang) w h o had taken over the district capital.32 Liyang itself had been devastated by warfare, whether looted by Qing troops or pillaged by the peasants: "just empty houses and four bare walls." 33 And even though the Nanjing authorities were able to set up a "secure" area in nearby Gaochun district, they hardly dared to enter Liyang district at all during the fall and winter of 1645, leaving local administration in the hands of the Pans themselves. 34 Closer to Nanjing,

32 Six days after t h e Q i n g a r m y crossed the Yangzi River to attack N a n j i n g , a g e n t r y c o m m i t t e e and the S o u t h e r n M i n g magistrate, Li S i m o , t u r n e d f o r help t o Pan M a o , a local defense leader w h o w a s also a serf o f the Peng family. A f t e r M a g i s t r a t e Li fled on J u n e 23, Pan M a o and his g a n g s u r r e n d e r e d t h e city's p o p u l a t i o n registers to the Q i n g and t u r n e d u p o n t h e gentry, l o o t i n g their h o m e s and t o r t u r i n g their persons for valuables. D a u b i n g m u d u p o n their faces ( w h i c h m a y have been the reason they w e r e called t h e " g a n g o f p a r e d noses," xiao bi dang), the serfs so humiliated and terrified t h e rural l a n d lords a r o u n d Liyang that a counter-militia was f o r m e d . T h e l a n d l o r d s ' v i g i lantes captured and mutilated a n u m b e r of the Pans' m e n , and t h e " p a r e d n o s e s " ( w h o w e r e driven back i n t o Liyang city) asked f o r help f r o m t h e Q i n g . A r m o r e d b a n n e r m e n w e r e m o r e than a m a t c h for the landlords' militia, b u t t h e Q i n g t r o o p s also g o t o u t o f hand and pillaged a n u m b e r of villages in t h e area. A f t e r b r i b i n g s o m e nameless Q i n g h i g h e r - u p s , Pan M a o and Pan Z h e n w e r e a p p o i n t e d a d m i n i s t r a t o r s of Liyang and m o r e or less officially g o v e r n e d t h e area f r o m A u g u s t 15 t o N o v e m b e r 11, 1645. Z h o u T i n g y i n g , Lai jiang jishi benmo, p p . 1 3 9 - 1 5 0 ; Xie, Nanming shiliie, p. 92. 33 M e m o r i a l f r o m M a o j i u h u a , dated December, 1645, Ming-Qing shiliao, king, ben 6 in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, pp. 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 . 34 Liyang xianzhi, juan 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 129. In N o v e m b e r , 1645, several p r o m i n e n t m e m b e r s of the Liyang gentry secretly contacted t h e Q i n g

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trouble was stirring at Tangshan which was looted and partially burned that next summer by a "demon scholar" (yaosheng) leading local bandits.35 A t the same time, reports were also reaching Nanjing (whence they were transmitted to Dorgon in Beijing) o f pirate-loyalists attacking Qing forces in Rugao in Huaiyang north o f the Yangzi. 36 The loyalist activity in the Huaiyang area was known to the Qing officials in Nanjing to have been directly inspired by a M i n g prince, identified in official despatches as the Prince o f Xinchang. This man, w h o had based himself in northeastern Jiangsu at M t . Yuntai, had been linked by a number o f different officials with loyalist elements in Haizhou, Ganyu, and Pizhou districts in the far north ofjiangnan. It was apparently he, then, who had ordered an attack upon the Lianghuai salt capital o f Yancheng, and in response to that command, local bravos like the salt worker Miao D i n g j i or like the local militia leaders Gao Jinzhong and Wang Qiaolin had assaulted the city in October o f 1645. The attack was driven off, however, and the Prince o f Xinchang was eventually tracked down at Haizhou, captured, and brought back to Huai'an to be beheaded.37

authorities in Nanjing and enumerated the crimes of Pan Mao and Pan Zhen, who were arrested by Qing troops. On December 24, both Pans were executed. Zhou, Laijiangjishi, pp. 152-157. 35 The scholar was named Wu Renzhi. Memorial from Jiang Jinyin, dated July 13, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 2, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 122-123. 36 Memorial from Jiang Jinyin, cited in Nanming shiliao, p. 123. 37 X u Zhaochun, ed.,Jiaqing Haizhou zhili zhouzhi; Haizhou zhi, juan 3, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 126; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 370. A number of "bandits" (dao) and pirates supporting the Prince of Xinchang, and including Gao Jinzhong, were arrested and killed by the Qing zongdu of the Huaiyang Grain Transport (Caoyun), Shen Wenkui. The arrests continued on into the late fall of 1645. Shen Wenkui's biography in the Qing shi gao, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 122. Apparently, Gao Jinzhong had earlier surrendered to Hong Chengchou. According to a memorial from the Qing archives, Gao had gathered a following of destitute people on Chongming Island. After Hong invited him to surrender, he at first cooperated with the Qing, providing more than 3,000 soldiers and 69 warships to help recover Chongming Island. If this is the same person, then his return to rebellion must have compromised Hong's policy of granting amnesties. Ming-Qing shiliao, 3:103, cited in Li

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The death of the Prince of Xinchang did not end the resistance movement in the Jiangbei area. Another Ming noble, the Prince of Ruian (Zhu Yile), managed to commission a number of loyalist militia leaders and lower degree-holders in districts throughout the Huaiyang area as well as some closer to Nanjing itself.38 While his military aide, Zhu Junzhao, organized a fifth column in Nanjing, the Prince of Ruian also got in touch with Zhu Yixi, the Prince of Ruichang, who pledged his bandit forces to a coordinated attack upon the old southern capital.39 The Qing government in Nanjing got wind of this forthcoming attack in early September, 1646.40 One of Zhu Junzhao's secret agents revealed the conspiracy to betray the city from within, while another informer at Longtan, thirty kilometers away, reported that loyalists in that area, assembled by Zhu Yixi, were in clandestine contact with the Prince of Ruian.41 As Qing military

38

39

40

41

G u a n g t a o , " H o n g C h e n g c h o u bei M i n g shimo," p. 256; Shizu shilu, 22:264a. In addition to uprisings in Xiuning and Anqing, organized around the s h o r t lived loyalist m o v e m e n t led by Jin Sheng, there was a m a j o r Southern M i n g rebellion upriver at Wuchang led by the Prince of Jing. Z h a n g Tianlu (a f o r m e r M i n g regional c o m m a n d e r under Shi Kefa) suppressed the latter uprising. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 238-241; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 1 4 0 - 1 4 2 . T h e s e included: Xie Z h u o at Liyang, Si Shipan at Yancheng, W u Y u a n c h e n g at G u a n g d e , and Z h a n g Mingsheng near Rugao. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 369; H o n g Chengchou's biography in the Qing shi gao, cited in Li, " H o n g C h e n g c h o u , " p. 259. Shizu shilu, 2 4 : 2 8 - 2 9 . T h e title of Z h u Yixi may have been spurious. Identified as the Prince of Ruichang in s o m e texts, in others he is mistaken for Z h u Yishi, the Prince of Le'an. Z h u Yixi is also sometimes called Z h u Yili. Li, " H o n g C h e n g c h o u , " p. 258. Earlier, o n M a r c h 6, 1646, Z h u Yishi had tried unsuccessfully to s t o r m the eastern Z h a o y a n g Gate. T h e attack was foiled, and a n u m b e r of loyalists were killed as they fled to the safety of M o u n t She's w o o d e d slopes, northeast of N a n j i n g . Ming-Qing shiliao, 1:170, and H o n g Chengchou's biography in the Qing shi gao, cited in Li, " H o n g C h e n g c h o u , " pp. 2 5 8 - 2 5 9 . According to a confession by one of the loyalists to Q i n g judicial interrogators later: " T h e false prince Ruian and Z h u Junzhao plotted to gather the bandit g r o u p s (dang) f r o m each area, but they lacked m o n e y and weapons. T h u s , they first intended to cross into Jiangbei and with secret agents attack and take the t w o districts of Liuhe and Yizhen. O n c e they had acquired m o n e y and w e a p o n s they w o u l d use a base in the mountain passes and s u m m o n the b a n -

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patrols reported that enemy troops were massing outside the Z h a o y a n g Gate by the imperial tombs on the east side of Nanjing, the major officials within the city held a war council. Their military position was far f r o m impregnable, especially if this attack turned out to be the point d'appui for further uprisings in Jiangnan proper, and especially in the Songjiang area. H o n g Chengchou did c o m m a n d a n u m b e r of "southern troops," but as we have already seen, these were almost more of a liability than an asset. H o n g himself dismissed them contemptuously as being "fragile and weak. N o n e have horses and all claim to be lacking armor and arrows; they are still devising means to get equipment." There was no comparing them with Bashan's Manchu troops ("At the first alarm they were quickly filled with zealous ardor, and as soon as they approach the enemy, they rush into the vanguard") or with Z h a n g Dayou's Chinese bannermen; but there were not many of the former and only four thousand of the latter. 42 Nevertheless, it was decided to divide this limited number of crack troops into t w o different groups. O n e unit, under Bashan and General Chen Jin was to march east to Longtan to nip that campaign in the bud, while the other remained behind under H o n g Chengchou and General Z h a n g Dayou to defend Nanjing against the estimated ten thousand troops gathering outside the city's vast walls. 43 Bashan's expedition left Nanjing on September 18, reaching the outskirts of Longtan the following day. The Manchu troops were restrained f r o m indiscriminate slaughter, their disciplined self-

dit gangs f r o m all over Jiangbei in order to accomplish the great enterprise." Deposition in a memorial f r o m H o n g Chengchou dated O c t o b e r 8, 1646, in Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2:170. " M o u n t a i n passes" (shan xian) m a y be the proper n a m e of a place, but I have not been able to find it listed in Z a n g Lihe et al., c o m p s . , Zhongguo gujin dinting da cidian or Gaimusho j o h o b u , c o m p . , Shina chimei shusei. For later revolts in the Anhui mountains, see Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 143; Nanming shiliao, pp. 109-111, 135-136. 42 M e m o r i a l f r o m H o n g Chengchou dated October 8, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2:170. 43 At the same time, the official in charge of river defense, Fan C h e n g z u ( w h o was probably the brother of the celebrated Q i n g martyr Fan C h e n g m o ) , led s o m e of his m e n across the river to Liuhe and Yizhen to quell possible uprisings there. M e m o r i a l f r o m H o n g Chengchou dated O c t o b e r 8, 1646, Ibid.

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control obviously contrasting with some of the Chinese warlords' soldiers' wanton and barbarous behavior one year earlier in Jiangnan. 44 Bashan first cordoned off the entire area and then sent his soldiers to warn, village by village, local residents that they must turn over "bandits" in their midst. The alternative, presumably, was also specified by special courts martial. In the next ten days, villagers either dragged in or denounced over four hundred people, and Hong Chengchou later claimed that all of these "confessed" their guilt under formal interrogation. Then, Bashan returned to Nanjing. 45 By that time, the city was already under attack. Loyalists under the command of the Ming princes had assaulted the Shence Gate, while their allies within the city had tried to start fires to distract Zhang Dayou and the other defenders. This diversion had failed. Using the information given him by informers, Hong Chengchou had already begun to round up supporters of the Prince of Ruian. Now, with Bashan's additional troops, Hong proceeded on October 2 to seal every gate in the city at dawn and arrest "a great number" of suspects, each of whom was officially reported to have been caught carrying official Southern Ming documents. Bashan also took prisoner and executed some of the princes' soldiers fighting outside the Zhaoyang and Taiping gates, and the loyalists' main body of troops fled back into the countryside. 46 Some of the

44 This was testimony to Bashan's own realization that although the populace of that district could in principle be divided into "good people" (liang min) and "bandits" (zei), in practice it was hard to tell between them. "All the officials witnessed a meeting of the town's good people, and they were struck by the difficulty of distinguishing them f r o m actual bandits. If the soldiers were allowed to slaughter indiscriminately, then it would be impossible to separate stones f r o m jade." Memorial f r o m H o n g Chengchou dated October 8, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2:170. 45 Memorial f r o m H o n g Chengchou dated October 8, 1646, Ibid. 46 In H o n g Chengchou's biography in the Qing shi gao it is reported that Zhu Yili (i.e., Z h u Yixi) was captured during the loyalists' attack on the city. This statement was probably based on the entry in the Donghua lu for September 22, 1646, which states that Zhu Yishi (i.e., Zhu Yixi) was taken prisoner on that date. Both of these assertions are belied by a memorial f r o m H o n g Chengchou, dated November 8, which mentions that Zhu Yixi had not yet

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loyalists sought refuge by Lake Tai. The Prince of Ruian, accompanied by his closest lieutenants, sought sanctuary far upstream at Susong, in the southwestern reaches of Anhui. He was unable, however, to escape the relentless pursuit of Bashan's men, who brought back his severed head in the early months of 1647 and—at the orders o f the Board of War in Beijing—carried their grisly trophy from town to town along the great river to illustrate the punishment accorded those who took arms against the ruling dynasty.47

Ming Loyalist Setbacks in 1646 The failure o f the Ming loyalist forces in Anhui and Jiangsu to press their attack on Nanjing coincided with a general loyalist collapse through South China in the fall of 1646. 48 Zhejiang was the first loyalist center to fall.49 The Qing occupation of that province,

been captured. Li, "Hong Chengchou," p. 259. Recently, a document has come to light in the Ming-Qing archives in Beijing which states that Jin Shenghuan captured the Prince of Ruichang in the summer of 1647. See the memorial dated August 31, 1647, in Guggong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang'anbu, comp., Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian, fascicle 3, pp. 9 4 - 9 5 . 47 Shizu shilu, 28:331b, and 30:353b, 360a; memorial from Hong Chengchou dated February 13, 1647, Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2:175; Nanming shiliao, p. 184; biographies of Hong Chengchou and Bashan in the Qing shigao, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 126-128; Xie, Nanming shiliie, p. 93. At this time also, magistrates in some of the counties upriver from Nanjing began to rebuild local Confucian temples, as a sign of restored stability. See, for example, Zhang Qijun et al., eds., Quanjiao xianzhi, p. 344. 48 John E. Wills, Jr., "Maritime China from Wang Chih to Shih Lang," pp. 221-222. 49 Prince Bolo had reached Hangzhou on June 14, 1646. The Southern Ming forces on the other side of the Qiantang River were commanded by Fang Guoan. The Manchu troops were able to cross the river on horseback because the water level had fallen due to drought, and on July 10 Fang's forces were routed and fell back on Shaoxing where Regent Lu had his court. Three days later Qing troops converged on the area, and Regent Lu—after being unable to hold the pass between Taizhou and Shaoxing—fled by sea from Haimen. He found refuge with Zhang Mingzhen, who later took him to the Zhoushan

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which was first placed under the administration of GovernorGeneral Z h a n g Cunren, was greatly aided by numerous local collaborators, many of w h o m were Roman Catholics w h o looked to Tong Guoqi for political leadership. 50 Tong Guoqi was one of the Liaodong Tongs, w h o became adherents of the Manchus. 5 1 Tong Guoqi himself had migrated south to Zhejiang before the M a n chus entered the Central Plain, and in Hangzhou he came into contact with the Christian converts associated with the gentry leader Z h u Zongyuan. 5 2 Zhu's works had a wide currency at the time of the Manchu invasion. They argued that China in the past had been too much centered upon itself, and that the Chinese n o tion of "barbarians" (yi) was a cultural conceit which ignored the fact that different countries had different values. Pleading for cultural universalism, Zhu Zongyuan also maintained that foreigners—whether Christian fathers like Aleni or Manchu rulers like D o r g o n — c o u l d bring with them a new "compass" to find the Dao. Europe itself, he claimed, was an ideal society, where there was little theft, where wisdom was respected, and where all social classes lived in harmony. Zhejiang needed that kind of social guid-

Islands. Ming-Qing shiliao, ser. 1, vol. 2, pp. 153, 160; Memorials in MingQing shiliao, f r o m Z h a n g Cunren, dated b e t w e e n January 3 and D e c e m b e r 21, 1646, in Nanming shiliao, pp. 1 - 8 , 1 2 - 1 3 , 15, 3 4 - 3 5 , 4 2 - 4 4 , 4 8 - 4 9 . L y n n Struve, " T h e Southern M i n g , " p. 60; X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 146; Zha, Guo shou lu, pp. 1, 5 4 - 5 6 ; Q i a n Surun, Nan zhongji, p. 113; William T h e o d o r e de Bary, A Plan for the Prince, pp. 2 1 - 2 4 . 50 Initially, the Q i n g occupation w a s badly hindered both by carpetbaggers and b y local "bandits" or "pirates." For details on the abuses perpetrated by c o l laborators and clerks, see the memorials from Ming-Qing shiliao in Nanming shiliao, pp. 1 5 - 1 7 , 23. For reports o f pirate and bandit activity, see Ibid., pp. 6 0 - 6 2 , 1 0 2 - 1 0 8 , 120, 1 3 6 - 1 3 7 , 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 ; C h e n Botao, Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu si juan, 2 : 2 7 - 2 9 ; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 1 4 6 - 1 4 7 . S o m e resistance continued in the 1650s (see Ibid., pp. 1 4 7 - 1 5 4 ) , but after the establishm e n t o f a permanent Manchu garrison in H a n g z h o u in December, 1649, the level o f disorder lowered. Nanming shiliao, p. 149; Shen, Zhejiang tongzhi, p. 2 5 2 2 (149:3a). 51 T o n g Tulai, w h o had played a major role in the initial military s w e e p t h r o u g h Zhejiang, w a s o n e o f his kinsmen. H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 794. 52 L. Carrington Goodrich and C h a o y i n g Fang, eds., Dictionary of Ming Biography, p. 29.

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ance n o w because "East and West have the same Dao, the same mind." 5 3 T h e Manchus, too, b r o u g h t a c o m m o n Dao to China. After all, Z h u pointed out, the great Shun himself had once been called an "eastern barbarian" (dong yi). Z h u Z o n g y u a n therefore s u p p o r t e d M a n c h u rule, and as he did so, carried with h i m m a n y of the Catholics w h o had already been strongly influenced by his w o r k s . T h e s e collaborators, in turn, depended u p o n Tong G u o q i for support; and Tong, w h o was named governor of Fujian and Zhejiang, had their help in controlling the province. 34 Fujian was a m u c h harder province to control, but the loyalist m o v e m e n t there too was suppressed in the fall of 1646. T h e L o n g w u r e g i m e of the Prince of Tang had been established in August, 1645, u n d e r the protection o f t h e sealord Z h e n g Zhilong at Fuzhou. A l t h o u g h several n o r t h e r n expeditions were launched (including one ill-fated foray into Jiangxi led by the f a m o u s scholar H u a n g D a o z h o u in September, 1645), the main hope of the L o n g w u reg i m e was to link up w i t h the forces of H e Tengjiao at C h a n g s h a in H u g u a n g province. 5 5 However, Z h e n g Zhilong was unwilling to let the Prince of Tang leave his "protection," and ultimately the pirate chief betrayed the loyalist cause by secretly contacting H o n g C h e n g c h o u and offering to surrender. 1 6 H o p i n g to be granted h o n ors and r e w a r d by Bolo, w h o c o m m a n d e d the Q i n g forces press-

53 O k a m o t o Sai, "La Crise politique et morale des mandarins du sud à l'époque de transition," p. 85; see also pp. 5 7 - 5 9 . 54 Ibid., pp. 8 6 - 9 6 . Christianity was especially well entrenched in Zhejiang. D u r i n g the 1630s, opponents o f t h e creed claimed that Zhejiang provincial officials were secretly allied with Christians and served as their protectors. Douglas Lancashire, "Buddhist Reaction to Christianity in Late M i n g China," pp. 9 1 - 9 2 . 55 A m a j o r military effort was made by the Tang regime's armies in central and southern Anhui, where the loyalist official Jin Sheng was eventually killed. A report to the Q i n g government by Zhang Tianlu in the winter of 1645-1646 described the devastation in the four prefectures of Chizhou, Taiping, H u i zhou, and N i n g g u o in vivid terms. Both cities and countryside were e m p t y of life, and the drying bones were like grass in the fields. At night the air s h i m mered w i t h green will-o'-the-wisps. Mitig-Qing shiliao, 3:516, cited in Li, " H o n g C h e n g c h o u , " p. 260. 56 C . R. Boxer, " T h e Rise and Fall of Nicholas Iquan," p. 436.

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ing down upon Fujian from Zhejiang, Zheng Zhilong voluntarily withdrew some of his own forces defending northern Fujian. 57 This opened the way for an attack led by Li Chengdong and Tong Yangjia. Forced to flee from his temporary court, the former Prince of Tang and his wife were captured at Dingzhou on October 6, and summarily executed. Shortly afterwards, Zheng Zhilong formally surrendered, and though his life was spared, he was sent north to Beijing as a prisoner of the Manchus. 58 Meanwhile, Southern Ming forces under Yang Tinglin had been trying to hold the strategic fortress of Ganzhou against a siege mounted by the Qing adherent Jin Shenghuan. When word reached Ganzhou in November, 1646, of the Longwu Emperor's death, the Southern Ming resistance there collapsed, and all of Jiangxi became a satrapy of Jin Shenghuan. 59 By December of 1646 there were only a few major military leaders still resisting the Qing advance in the south: He Tengjiao and Chu Yinxi in Hunan; Zheng Chenggong (Zhilin's son) and Huang Binqing on the southeastern coast; and Qu Shisi and Ding Kuichu in the Liangguang/' 0 To be sure, there were two newly established Southern Ming courts in Guangdong. Su Guansheng, who had been an important supporter of the Longwu Emperor, had escaped from Fujian to Guangzhou (Canton), where he enthroned the second Prince of Tang (who had fled by sea) as the Shaowu Emperor on December 11, 1646.61 Upriver at Zhaoqing, the Prince of Yongming was 57 Z h a , Guo shou lu, p. 138; Q i a n , Nan zhongji, p. 115. 5 8 F u z h o u w a s virtually a b a n d o n e d , its arsenal d e s t r o y e d , b y Z h e n g Z h i l o n g w h e n t h e Q i n g forces entered t h e city o n O c t o b e r 17, 1646. Z h e n g w i t h d r e w t o his base at A n h a i , a n d t h e n s u r r e n d e r e d to t h e Q i n g c o m m a n d e r s in F u z h o u o n N o v e m b e r 21. S t r u v e , " S o u t h e r n M i n g , " p p . 6 1 - 6 2 ; H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p p . 1 1 0 - 1 1 1 . 59 C h u H u a , Hucheng beikao, 1 : 1 1 b . 60 L y n n A n n S t r u v e , " U s e s o f H i s t o r y in Traditional C h i n e s e Society," p p . 1 7 - 1 8 ; S t r u v e , " S o u t h e r n M i n g , " p p . 39, 6 1 - 6 2 , 7 2 - 7 3 . 61 L a c k i n g c o u r t dress, t h e t h o u s a n d s o f officials w h o w e r e a p p o i n t e d t o t h e S h a o w u g o v e r n m e n t d u r i n g t h e n e x t ten days had to b u y theatrical r o b e s f r o m local actors. D a v i d H a r r i s o n Shore, "Last C o u r t of M i n g C h i n a , " p p . 25—27. See also de Palafox, Histoire de la conquete de la Chine par les Tartares, pp. 145-146.

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shortly after that, on December 24, enthroned as the Yongli Emperor.62 But the former court mainly consisted of Cantonese supporters, and the latter of loyalists from other parts of China; and soon the two sides were actually engaging in civil war with each other. 63 While the Shaowu and Yongli courts were fighting each other in January, 1647, Li Chengdong (closely supervised by one of the "old men" from Liaodong, Tong Yangjia) was moving his troops in from Fujian, taking Chaozhou and Huizhou. 64 Sending in forged Southern Ming battle reports to Su Guansheng in Guangzhou, Li Chengdong was able to take the loyalist by surprise on January 20, 1647. A vanguard of no more than one thousand Qing soldiers were mistaken for bandit allies of the Shaowu regime and admitted into the city walls. Within a few days they had taken over the city, caused Su Guansheng to commit suicide, executed the Shaowu Emperor, and frightened the Yongli Emperor into secretly abandoning Zhaoqing at night to flee to northern Guangxi. 65

62 T h e Prince o f Y o n g m i n g , w h o s e n a m e w a s Z h u Youlang, w a s t h e sole s u r v i v i n g g r a n d s o n o f t h e Wanli E m p e r o r . H e was also k n o w n as t h e Prince o f Gui, w h i c h was t h e title he succeeded to after t h e death of the L o n g w u E m p e r o r . Fleeing Z h a n g X i a n z h o n g ' s advance into s o u t h e r n H u g u a n g , t h e Prince o f Y o n g m i n g had earlier, in m i d - N o v e m b e r , been p e r s u a d e d b y his military p r o t e c t o r , D i n g K u i c h u , to b e c o m e regent in Z h a o q i n g u p o n h e a r i n g o f L o n g w u ' s death. O n N o v e m b e r 22, learning that G a n z h o u had fallen, t h e n e w r e g e n t had left G u a n g d o n g for W u z h o u , j u s t across the b o r d e r in G u a n g xi. T h u s , Su G u a n s h e n g and other G u a n g z h o u officials felt they had been a b a n d o n e d b y the n e w regent, and consequently n a m e d L o n g w u ' s y o u n g e r b r o t h e r , Z h u Y u y u e (the Prince of Tang), S h a o w u E m p e r o r o n D e c e m b e r 12 in C a n t o n . W h e n w o r d of this reached W u z h o u , the Prince of Y o n g m i n g ' s e n t o u r a g e decided that he should r e t u r n to Z h a o q i n g and also a s s u m e t h e t h r o n e as t h e Yongli E m p e r o r , w h i c h he b e c a m e t w e l v e days later. S t r u v e , " S o u t h e r n M i n g , " pp. 6 3 - 6 5 ; Shore, "Last C o u r t , " pp. 22, 29; Z h a J i z u o , Dongshan guoyu, p. 87. 6 3 T h e r e w e r e t w o battles b e t w e e n t h e Yongli and S h a o w u forces. T h e Battle o f Sanshui, o n J a n u a r y 4, 1647, w a s w o n by the Yongli loyalists. T h e Battle of H a i k o u (Sanshankou), three days later, saw the tide turn: the Yongli force w a s a l m o s t entirely w i p e d out. Struve, " S o u t h e r n M i n g , " pp. 6 5 - 6 6 ; Shore, "Last C o u r t , " p. 31. 64 Ibid., pp. 3 1 - 3 2 . 65 D e Palafox, Histoire de la conquête, pp. 1 5 0 - 1 7 1 .

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O n February 20, 1647, Li Chengdong took Zhaoqing without encountering resistance, and by April he had Qu Shisi under siege at Guilin. 66 While the loyalists suffered severe setbacks in the far south, partisans around Nanjing discovered that the attack of the Prince of Ruian had exposed a number of their groups to attack and destruction by Hong Chengchou's forces. Furthermore, the uprising itself had enabled Hong to make a strong argument to the Board of War in Beijing to be allowed to retain at his side Bashan, whose army had been on the eve of the Prince of Ruian's attack ordered to take over pacification efforts in the Huguang area, but was now to be kept in the garrison at Nanjing. 67 Finally, the vigorous response of

66 E . C . B o w r a , " T h e M a n c h u C o n q u e s t o f C a n t o n , " p. 88; L y n n Struve, "A Sketch o f S o u t h e r n M i n g Events Affecting the C a n t o n Delta A r e a , " p p . 8 - 1 1 ; i d e m , " U s e s o f H i s t o r y , " pp. 2 0 - 2 2 ; i d e m , " S o u t h e r n M i n g , " p p . 6 7 - 6 8 ; H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p p . 2 0 0 - 2 0 1 ; Le P. Louis Gaillard, Nankin d'alors et d'aujourd'hui, p p . 2 2 8 - 2 3 0 . Li C h e n g d o n g did n o t succeed in taking Guilin. T h i s was p r o b a b l y because of the artillery deployed b y Nicalau Ferreira and his P o r t u g u e s e g u n n e r s f i g h t i n g on t h e side of the Yongli loyalists. T h e siege was lifted o n J u l y 1, 1647. Paul Pelliot, " M i c h e l B o y m , " p. 102. 67 Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, 2 :170. T h e o r d e r had reached N a n j i n g o n O c t o b e r 8, and w a s p r e s u m a b l y issued a r o u n d m i d - S e p t e m b e r in Beijing. H o n g a r g u e d f o r c e f u l l y that because t h e t r o o p s of Yang Wulie, G a o J i n k u , and Lin G u a n g y u a n , w h i c h w e r e 3,000 of his best soldiers, had been sent o n t o Jiangxi, h e b a d l y n e e d e d Bashan's m e n . T h a t a r g u m e n t alone w o u l d n o t have carried s u f ficient w e i g h t , because a n o t h e r 4,000 m e n had been sent as replacements. ( O n M a r c h 31, 1646, t h e Korean e n v o y to the Q i n g court had r e p o r t e d that t h e g o v e r n m e n t w a s already having t r o u b l e m e e t i n g H o n g C h e n g c h o u ' s requests for m o r e soldiers and supplies. W u H a n , c o m p . , Chaoxian Li chao shilu zhong de Zhongguo shiliao, p p . 3 7 5 5 - 3 7 5 6 . ) Because of t h e attack, the c o u r t in B e i j i n g agreed t o let B a s h a n stay. H o w e v e r , H o n g ( w h o m a y have felt that t h e u p r i s i n g reflected badly o n his o w n policy o f amnesty) w a s n o t allowed t o r e t u r n to t h e n o r t h at this time, as he requested. Instead, the t h r o n e o r d e r e d h i m t o c o n t i n u e his w o r k in J i a n g n a n and signalled its approval o f his h a n dling o f affairs there b y giving his w i f e 100 pieces o f w h i t e gold and 200 sable skins. B i o g r a p h y of H o n g C h e n g c h o u in the Qing shi gao, cited in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, pp. 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 . T h e M a n c h u court regarded H o n g ' s pacification o f J i a n g n a n as b e i n g " t h e first a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of establishing t h e Q i n g , " b e cause it m e a n t securing that region's e c o n o m i c resources for t h e c o n q u e s t o f t h e rest o f the country. Li, " H o n g C h e n g c h o u , " p. 252.

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the Nanjing garrison to the attack altogether seemed a sign of Q i n g stability, and thus may have considerably helped Suzhou's governor, Tu Guobao, in his own ongoing efforts to eradicate resistance around Lake Tai.68 In addition to training special marines to attack the Lake Tai bandits, Governor Tu had appointed district officers to each of the counties surrounding Lake Tai and was conscripting soldiers in the area. 69 Closer administrative control over the surrounding countryside made it possible for Tu to interdict the résistants' access to necessary food supplies. The Lake Tai outlaws gained much of their sustenance f r o m fish, but they also needed grain to survive. That meant landing periodically in farming areas to buy or steal rice. D u r i n g such forays they were extremely vulnerable to regular infantry and artillery attacks. 70 As the cordon was tightened in February and March of 1647, reports began to flow into Nanjing of one rebel band after another being taken by Qing military units. 71 M a n y of these surrendering loyalist bands were consequently enrolled as soldiers in units commanded by Wu Shengzhao, the head of the provincial garrison at Songjiang. In fact so many of these surrendering rebels were placed under that officer's c o m m a n d that the court in Beijing became concerned about Wu's reliability. 72 W u Shengzhao was a native of Liaodong w h o was said by some to have been a former aide of Wu Sangui. By the early s u m m e r of 1645, however, he was attached to the command of Li C h e n g dong, w h o m he served as a lieutenant during the bloody pacification of Jiangnan. His greatest accomplishment then was to secure the surrender of t w o major Lake Tai bands: one under Dai Zhijun,

68 For t h e role o f t h e local gentry, especially in t h e D o n g t i n g S h a n area, in h e l p i n g t h e Q i n g g o v e r n m e n t d e s t r o y o u t l a w s , see Q i a n Yong, Lit yuan conghua, pp. 4 - 9 . 69 M e m o r i a l f r o m T u G u o b a o w h i c h reached B e i j i n g o n S e p t e m b e r 7, 1646, Ming-Qing shiliao, yi, 1 : 1 6 , in Nanming shiliao, p p . 3 3 - 3 4 . 70 Shizu shilu, 2 9 : 3 4 4 a . 71 M e m o r i a l f r o m t h e xun'an of S u - S o n g , dated April 5 - M a y 4, 1647, MingQing shiliao, ding, ben 1, in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, pp. 9 1 - 9 2 . 72 X i e , Nanming shiliie, p p . 9 0 - 9 1 .

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w h o brought his soldiers to Songjiang to serve directly under Wu Shengzhao, and another commanded by one of Wu Yi's former aides, Z h o u Qian. 73 Partly because of these successes, Wu inherited Li Chengdong's command when the latter moved on to Fujian in 1646, leaving his former lieutenant to occupy the garrison chief's house, which was the recently commandeered mansion of the X u family. 74 Wu soon developed close relations with several members of the local gentry serving in his secretariat. T h r o u g h their efforts he was not only subverted to Ming loyalism, but was also persuaded to consider a military alliance with the supporters of the Prince of Lu in Amoy, and especially with the naval overlord of Z h o u s h a n Island, Huang Binqing. 75 H u a n g Binqing had initially supported the Prince of Tang, but he had later been persuaded to invite the Prince of Lu and his main military supporter, Zhang Mingzhen (who occupied several islands off of the Fujian-Guangdong coast), to take refuge on Z h o u shan. 76 Later, after the Prince of Tang was captured, almost all of the maritime warlords of the southeastern coast had turned to the 73 Dai, as w e have noted, was Yang Tingshu's student. Ji, Mingji natiliie, p. 280. Z h o u Qian, not to be confused with Z h o u Rui, entered Wu Shengzhao's secretariat. C h e n , Chen Zhongyu quart ji, nianpu, xia, p. 9. 74 T h e house had been built by X u Jie, X u Fuyuan's ancestor. Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 576. 75 Guan Zhizhu and his brother, Y u n p o , were especially noted for using e x a m ples f r o m the classics to try to inspire loyalist sentiments in Wu Shengzhao. But it was Dai Zhijun and Z h o u Qian w h o urged him to contact H u a n g Binqing. C h e n , Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, pp. 7b, 9 - 1 0 a . 76 H u a n g Binqing was originally f r o m Zhangzhou (Fujian). In 1644 he broke up his family and recruited soldiers and sailors in order to "succor the k i n g " (qin wang). H e and his forces got as far north as Shandong before they received w o r d that Beijing had fallen. H e then returned to Nanjing where he was given a seal, appointed a general, and sent to garrison Wuhu. H u a n g was related to Z h a n g M i n g z h e n by marriage. However, that was not to prevent Z h a n g f r o m later killing his military rival. Nanming shiliao, pp. 4 5 3 - 4 5 8 . Z h a n g Mingzhen was a native of Nanjing w h o received his military jinshi in 1638. At the time of the fall of the Nanjing regime, he held the post of major at a garrison just south of N i n g b o . H e transferred his loyalty to the Prince of Lu, w h o m a d e h i m a general, and later an earl. H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, pp. 4 6 - 4 7 . See also Struve, "Uses of History," pp. 1 9 - 2 0 .

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Prince o f Lu, w h o had been invited by Zheng Cai to establish his temporary court (xingzai) at A m o y on D e c e m b e r 30, 1646. 7 7 Dai Z h i j u n and other Lake Tai loyalist leaders believed that i f they could persuade someone as powerful as Huang Binqing to r e c o g nize them as intermediaries, then they might be able in turn to persuade General W u Shengzhao to revolt on land while the Southern M i n g navies attacked by sea—a strategy that was to remain a dream o f Southern M i n g loyalists until at least 1659. Suggestions o f an alliance between Jiangnan loyalists and the southern navies fell upon receptive ears. T h e mainland defeats suffered b y the loyalists in eastern Zhejiang in 1646 threw almost the entire loyalist movement upon coastal ports and offshore islands in Zhejiang and Fujian. T h e defeats also played into the hands o f those advisers to the Prince o f Lu w h o believed that despite Q i n g officials' treachery the previous year, the only possibility for recovery o f their military fortunes lay in cultivating alliances with important regional commanders o f the Manchu dynasty. 78 T h i s hope in turn was predicated upon the realistic assessment that the n e w dynasty had been forced to rely upon untried allies in order to extend itself so rapidly over central China. Nevertheless, both b e cause o f the previous year's deceit and because o f the understandable reluctance o f naval commanders like Zheng Cai to rely too heavily upon land forces, the court o f Lu had to be convinced that reliable allies did exist in Jiangnan. T o determine this, and to c o m municate directly with gentry loyalists, the court o f Lu retained a Jiashan zhusheng appropriately named X i a B a o m o ("Valuable Stratagems" X i a ) . X i a had already conveyed information f r o m

77 Zheng Cai had been one o f the chief supporters o f the Prince of Tang. He refused to give in to the pleas o f Zheng Zhilong to join the Qing and instead threw his lot in with the Prince o f Lu. Later he became extremely important in forging the alliance between that prince and Zheng Chenggong (Coxinga). Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 47, 181. 78 The Qing duju o f eastern Zhejiang had managed to persuade some of the maternal relatives of the Prince of Lu that he was willing to surrender to the new "administrator o f the realm" (jianguo). The Lu courtiers' gullibility had led them to overestimate their chances o f capturing Hangzhou and Jiaxing, and this had directly contributed to their military defeat in that province. Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 109.

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Wu Yi to the Lu court, and now returned to the Songjiang area to contact agents there. 79 Just as the military fortunes of the Zhejiang loyalists disposed them favorably towards an alliance with the Songjiang resistants, so did the political vulnerability of Wu Shengzhao interest him in an uprising. His incorporation of so many Lake Tai rebels had already aroused the suspicions of Governor Tu Guobao and Viceroy Hong Chengchou. 80 General Wu was aware of their misgivings and so was prone to accept Xia Baomo's invitation to conspire with the Zhoushan loyalists. Wu Shengzhao therefore took two important steps early in 1647. One was to exchange gifts and supplies secretly with Huang Binqing: Jiangnan rice in exchange for Zhoushan pearls. The second was, through Dai Zhijun, to get in touch with the leading gentry loyalist of Songjiang, Chen Zilong. 81

Chen Zilong and the Songjiang Mutiny By early May, 1647, after attending funeral ceremonies honoring Xia Yunyi for his loyalist suicide, Chen Zilong seems to have recovered some of his own resolve as a loyalist.82 At the very least, he felt he could do nothing other than remain true to the Ming cause, if only because his public image as a loyalist forbade him other alternatives. He had, in short, resigned himself to "foolish stratagems" in "critical times," as a poem written then revealed. Foolish stratagems: to survive I seek the wilds. Critical times: fit to hide in the wastes. Friends pity Yu Rang. A daughter recognizes Han Kang. The Zhou bronze endures fluctuation. 79 Ibid. 80 Xie, Nanming shiltie, p. 91. 81 T h e initiative in these arrangements is not clearly assigned. Wu may even have contacted Xia o n his o w n , and Dai may have brought Chen to Wu's attention in the first place. 82 H o u Fangyu, Zhuanghui tang ji, Siyi tang shiji, 5:9b; William S. Atwell, "Ch'en Tzu-lung," pp. 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 .

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Qin's ashes spread cross the expanse. Though Heaven's vast, this road's a narrow space. Shall we ever find a soaring place?83 Most telling in this haunting poem, penned by a man caught between dying and rising regimes, was the reference to Han Kang. As the tale was usually told, Han Kang was a man of the Eastern Han w h o sold medicine at Chang'an. He was noted far and wide for refusing to bargain on prices. His daughter, w h o accompanied him on his medicine purchasing and selling trips, once grew angry with him when he lost money by proudly refusing to haggle with a customer. H e told her in response that he, Han Kang, could not bargain even if he wanted to because his reputation forbade it. Like H a n Kang, then, Chen Zilong would remain a loyalist because he could not do otherwise. It was thus concern for his name, or fear of betraying it, that continued to impel Chen Zilong to act; the c o m m i t m e n t to his self-integrity, defined by a personal history of righteous action, drove him one last time to Songjiang to join in Wu Shengzhao's conspiracy. C h e n Zilong may have provided two major services to General Wu. H e may have brought into the conspiracy the circle of literati loyalists w h o had survived the first Songjiang resistance, and he may also have conveyed to the court of Lu the persuasion that General W u could be trusted to revolt as planned. Huang Binqing's o w n misgivings were presumably allayed, because H u a n g himself subsequently agreed to support a naval expedition north under Z h a n g Mingzhen to coincide with an uprising led by General W u Shengzhao in Songjiang—the two to combine on May 20,

8 3 C h e n , Chen Zhongyu quart ji, 1 4 : 2 6 b - 2 7 a . Y u Rang is the hero o f a f a m o u s story w h i c h appears in the Plans of the Warring States (Zhanguo ce), written in the 3 r d - 2 n d century B.C. This story has been translated into Western languages several times. O n e version can be found in Wolfgang Bauer and H e r bert Franke, eds., The Golden Casket, pp. 2 5 - 2 7 . Like Chushingura for the Japanese, the tale o f Y u Rang epitomized the Chinese determination o f a retainer to avenge the death o f his lord. "Zhou bronze" is used here to translate "the ding o f Z h o u . " That particular ritual vessel possessed the manes o f the reign. It s y m b o l i z e d the Zhou's divine legitimacy and right to rule. Here, it is used to signify the absolute legitimacy o f the dynasty.

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1647, in an attack overland and up the Yangzi River on the Qing collaborators and Manchu garrisons in Nanjing. 84 As plans for the uprising were made, news about it became common knowledge among the secretaries and clerks in Wu's yamen. When Chen Zilong moved to the outskirts of Songjiang on May 12—eight days before the two forces were supposed to converge—and dramatically announced to his disciple what he had until then thought to be a secret, the shocked student told his master that everyone in the city knew of the plot, and pleaded with Chen to give up any thought of participating.85 Little wonder then that word of the conspiracy reached the Qing authorities in Nanjing. Two days before the uprising was scheduled to begin, Hong Chengchou received a secret message from Yang Zhiyi, the Assistant Prefect of Songjiang. Yang, who was the son of the famed Donglin martyr Yang Lian, wrote that Wu Shengzhao was planning to mutiny.86 Hong realized that it was too late to reach Songjiang in time to forestall the rebellion, but he immediately alerted Tu Guobao about the imminent invasion, thus arousing military units along the Yangzi shore for what was to prove the decisive battle of the campaign. As an afterthought, Hong also or84 C h e n , Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, p. 10a. O n e of C h e n Zilong's students finished up the last couple of years of Chen's chronological biography. H e tries to show that Chen was not directly involved in the uprising, but there is t o o m u c h other evidence to the contrary. Atwell, " C h ' e n T z u - l u n g , " pp. 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 . 85 C h e n , Chen Zhongyu quanji, nianpu, xia, p. 7b. 86 T h e r e is little evidence that any of the local officials—many of t h e m f o r m e r M i n g g e n t r y m e n n o w collaborating with the Manchu d y n a s t y — w e r e willing to j o i n W u Shengzhao and the Songjiang gentry loyalists. In nearby C h a n g zhou, for instance, "twenty-three righteous scholars" (ershisan yishi) pledged with Liu Shu (jinshi 1643) to rebel for the Prince of Lu. T h e local Q i n g magistrate, Li Shi, happened to be a classmate of Liu Shu, having also w o n his h i g h est degree in 1643. Nevertheless, he remained loyal to the n e w dynasty rather than ally himself with the local gentry under his tongnian. Liu Shu was captured and killed. Li Shi himself p r o m p t l y retired, perhaps because he was afraid of being implicated. In 1661, however, he read second in the palace examinations and re-entered the bureaucracy, rising to become President of Revenue during the Kangxi reign. Ji, Mingji nanliie, p. 275; Wang, Da Qing yitongzhi, p. 916 (80:26a). For Li Shi's life, see H u a n g Zhijun, c o m p . , Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 2890 (172:11a).

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dered that members o f Wu Shengzhao's family held hostage in Nanjing be promptly executed. 87 Meanwhile, Wu Shengzhao had learned o f Yang Zhiyi's betrayal. Believing that some o f the other city officials might have been secretly in touch with the Nanjing viceroyalty as well, General W u assembled his garrison o f two thousand soldiers in front o f the city's walls, and as they were swearing an oath to join the Southern Ming armada and overthrow the Qing dynasty, Yang Zhiyi along with the prefect and magistrate o f Songjiang were e x ecuted in front o f them. 88 W u Shengzhao was still confident that his enterprise would succeed. As far as he could tell, Zhang Mingzhen's armada had rounded the tip o f Jiangnan and was even then preparing a rendezvous up the Yangzi River. How was he to know that natural forces had already doomed the rebellion? Two days before the e x ecution o f the officials o f Songjiang, the Southern Ming armada had stopped to forage at Luyuan about fifty kilometers upriver from Chongming Island. That night the weather turned sultry, and during the early morning watch o f May 18 a small typhoon swept across the Yangzi mouth and struck the fleet at its moorings. Before the ships could weigh anchor and make for the safety o f the open sea, nearly all o f Zhang Mingzhen's vessels and about half o f Huang Binqing's ships foundered. Many o f the sailors and marines managed to swim ashore at Luyuan, but they were greeted by soldiers from the nearby garrison o f Fushan, notified in advance by Tu Guobao o f the imminent invasion. The Qing warriors easily picked off with swords and crossbows a thousand o f the Southern Ming soldiers who straggled ashore, and captured another five hundred, including Zhang Mingzhen's brother, Mingbin. Zhang Mingzhen himself, along with Huang Binqing and Zhang Huangyan, managed to escape by sea.89

87 Wang, Da Qing yitongzhi, p. 1878 (114:15b); Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpti, xia, pp. 9 b - 1 0 a ; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 2 4 7 - 2 4 8 ; Zha, Guo shou lu, pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 ; Willard J. Peterson, " T h e Life o f Ku Yen-wu," Part I, p. 70. 88 Chu, Hucheng beikao, 3 : 3 b - 4 a ; Nanming shiliao, p. 53. General W u had virtually no mass support. Guo Songyi, "Jiangnan dizhu jieji," p. 128. 89 Memorial from Tu Guobao in Nanming shiliao, pp. 5 8 - 6 9 . For Huang Bin-

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Meanwhile, ignorant of the defeat, General Wu Shengzhao had sent one of his own units, commanded by Colonel Zhang Shixun, north from Songjiang to guide the Zhejiang loyalists to his army headquarters. Colonel Zhang waited in vain for the allies to arrive and, as the hours went by, slowly grew convinced that there would be no fleet from the south. He decided that he must look after his own fortunes at this point, and precipitately returned to Songjiang. He and his men quickly overpowered Wu Shengzhao's guards, seized the general, and took over the yamen. Then, using Wu's name, Colonel Zhang ordered other key leaders of the uprising into the prefectural yamen. The most important military rival to take into account was Dai Zhijun, but Colonel Zhang managed to kill him quickly, and the leaderless Lake Tai bandits retreated back across the hills into the lakelands. Zhang then formally reported the revolt to Nanjing and remanded General Wu to the custody of Viceroy Hong. 90 Although the Luyuan debacle and the suppression of the Songjiang mutiny were great victories for the Qing government, they were followed by official suspicion and doubt rather than confidence and euphoria. It was only a few weeks earlier, in April, 1647, that the Qing court had renewed its policy of granting amnesties. N o w that seemed a gesture of weakness, followed as it was by a fresh outbreak of loyalist rebellion in the economic heartland of the empire. Consequently, after the sinking of the Lu armada, Tu was censured by Bashan for requesting that amnesty be granted to Zhang Mingbin on the grounds that he had surrendered without resistance. It was precisely that kind of leniency—Bashan argued—that had encouraged men like Wu Shengzhao to rebel in the first place. The President of the Board of War went on rather grudgingly to admit that there were probably too many Luyuan prisoners to be executed, but he preferred that they be treated as prisoners of war and used for corvée, rather than be admitted into the Qing naval garrisons as regular sailors. He also suggested that

qing's later raids, see t h e m e m o r i a l f r o m Z h a n g C u n r e n , dated F e b r u a r y 8, 1648, in Ibid., p p . 1 0 1 - 1 0 2 . 90 C h u , Hucheng beikao, 3 : 4 a ; C h e n , Chen Zhongyu quart ji, nianpu, xia, p. 10a. Z h a n g S h i x u n is s o m e t i m e s m e n t i o n e d in other sources as Z h a n S h i x u n .

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T u G u o b a o ' s behavior should be investigated by the B o a r d of Civil A p p o i n t m e n t s . T h e t h r o n e concurred. 9 1 H o n g C h e n g c h o u fell u n d e r suspicion, too, because the Q i n g court linked h i m w i t h loyalist literati w h o s e role in the conspiracy was vastly overestimated by the officials investigating the revolt after it w a s quelled. T h i s was partly o w i n g to the literati t h e m selves, w h o deliberately aggrandized their o w n importance. 9 2 Shen T i n g y a n g , a m e m b e r of the J i a n g n a n gentry w h o had been a b o a r d o n e of the Lu vessels at L u y u a n w h e n the s t o r m came up, s p o t t e d the Q i n g t r o o p s along the shore and said: If the wind and waves are like this, then what must be the intent of Heaven? I should die myself [in the storm] in order to return [the benevolence of] the country {guo). But to die like this is to die anonymously. 93 In search of a n a m e for himself, then, Shen T i n g y a n g called o u t to the Q i n g officers, identifying himself as a censor in the Lu court. Later, d u r i n g his interrogation at Suzhou, he claimed it w a s he w h o h a d persuaded H u a n g Binqing to j o i n the armada b y telling h i m that m a n y J i a n g n a n literati had still not shaved their heads and r e m a i n e d loyal to the M i n g cause. Disdaining offers of a m n e s t y in o r d e r t o die a loyalist, Shen earned a martyr's fame, and, in so d o ing, helped persuade his executioners that J i a n g n a n was h o n e y c o m b e d w i t h cells of dissident literati. 94

The Roundup of the Literati Believing that the main instigators of the revolt w e r e J i a n g n a n literati secretly conspiring w i t h the Southern M i n g , the imperial g o v -

91 Memorial dated December 16, 1647, in Nanming shiliao, pp. 8 5 - 8 7 . 92 To be sure, simultaneously there had erupted a gentry-led loyalist uprising in the Huai'an area which seemed to the government to be part of a wider conspiracy. Zha, Guo shou lu, p. 100; Nanming shiliao, pp. 8 0 - 8 2 . 93 Wen, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 248-249. 94 Ibid., pp. 249-250.

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ernment entrusted eradication of the traitors to those officials least tainted by their connections to scholarly circles. H o n g Chengchou and Tu Guobao thus momentarily turned over the responsibility for pacification following the Songjiang mutiny to Chen Jin and Bashan. Chen Jin was one of the "old m e n " f r o m Liaodong, w h o had been recommended to H u n g Taiji by Ning Wanwo in 1633.95 Utterly loyal, he accepted his assignment to govern Suzhou in the wake of Wu Shengzhao's uprising determined "to utilize this o p portunity to exterminate the famous scholars of the three Wu." 9 6 U n d e r his administration, the military and police authorities of eastern Jiangnan began the search for the key figures behind the revolt, and soon settled upon the name of Chen Zilong as a leading conspirator. Although Chen had probably been an intermediary between Wu Shengzhao and the Lu court, he was really only on the periphery of the Songjiang mutiny, living outside the city and mainly ignorant of Wu's day-by-day machinations. 97 Nevertheless, to Chen Jin and the Q i n g government, Chen Zilong quickly became known as the symbolic leader of the revolt, and the net around him soon tightened. At first he escaped arrest with Xia Zhixu, Xia Yunyi's brother. Then the Xia family was tracked down. Xia Yunyi's son, Wanchun, w h o had joined the Lake Tai bandits after his father's suicide, was seized and taken to Nanjing. There, H o n g Chengchou, touched by the youth of the prisoner, tried to persuade him to contribute his considerable literary talents to the new dynasty. Xia Wanchun's response was to insult H o n g for being a collaborator. After Xia Wanchun was decapitated, his uncle Zhidan felt that he had no choice but to die

95 A l t h o u g h he was to play a m a j o r role against M i n g loyalists in Fujian, C h e n Jin's m o s t glorious m o m e n t c a m e in 1651, w h e n he led the Q i n g forces that t o o k Z h o u s h a n Island f r o m the S o u t h e r n M i n g navy. H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 592. 96 C h e n , Chen Zhongyu quan ji, nianpu, xia, p. 10a. See also Ji, Mingji nanliie, p. 279. 97 B y t h e late e i g h t e e n t h c e n t u r y the S o n g j i a n g resistance had been entirely t r a n s f o r m e d i n t o an e x a m p l e o f g e n t r y loyalism, m u c h as the J i a n g y i n u p r i s ing w a s so interpreted. T h e district director o f studies in 1784 built a " s h r i n e t o t h e loyal and r i g h t e o u s " in Q i n g p u , c o m m e m o r a t i n g the leadership o f C h e n Z i l o n g . C h e n , Chen Zhongyu quan ji, i n t r o d u c t i o n .

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as well, and so hanged himself in the local Confucian temple. 98 Meanwhile others were captured by Qing patrols and put under arrest. In addition to Yang Tingshu, who was seized because he had been Dai Zhijun's teacher, more than forty famous Jiangnan scholars were executed in Nanjing." Many others were killed on the spot by Chen Jin's troopers, who were garrisoned in the western suburbs of Songjiang. Ultimately about a thousand scholars, including one acting magistrate, were brought in; in Governor Tu Guobao's summary words: "Nothing that chewed was left after the roundup." 100 After Xia Zhidan's suicide, Chen Zilong had sought refuge in the home of a close friend, Hou Qizeng. But as the roundup continued, he had to move on: first to an old servant's house, then to another friend's home. There, he was at last discovered by the police, who surrounded the house until he surrendered. The police immediately took him to Chen Jin to whom Chen Zilong would only say that he had been a member of the Chongzhen court. Despite Chen Jin's frightening reputation, Chen Zilong retained his composure throughout the interrogation. When questioned about his long hair, he simply said: "I am keeping my hair in order to look upon my emperor [with dignity] in the world below.'" 01 U n doubtedly planning a public execution, Chen Jin ordered that the loyalist be taken to Nanjing for further interrogation and trial. But Chen Zilong managed to avoid the ordeal of such a spectacle. O n June 15, 1647, as the police boat passed by night under the Kuatang Bridge on the way from Suzhou to Nanjing, Chen managed to break his bonds and threw himself into the river. Although there were swimmers among the police who jumped into the water and recovered his body, Chen Zilong had drowned himself. The policemen were infuriated by their prisoner's suicide, and, before they threw Chen's corpse back in the river, cut off his head.

98 X i e , Nanming shiliie, pp. 8 0 - 8 1 . X i a Zhidan left a note w h i c h read in part: "Alas, w h a t the n e w dynasty (chao) calls 'rebel' is what the former state (guo) called 'loyalist.'" Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 244. 9 9 Zha, Guo shou lu, pp. 1 2 2 - 1 2 3 ; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 230. 100 Nanming shiliao, p. 58; C h u , Hucheng beikao, 3 : 3 b - 4 a . 101 Atwell, "Ch'en T z u - l u n g , " p. 140.

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Several days later, some of Chen's students recovered the remains and buried them in the Chen family mausoleum. 102 A fitting epitaph for his tomb would have been the last stanza of his poem on "foolish stratagems" in "critical times." Old things pass, and time is spent. Strange landscapes unreel, and ideas are renewed. Hatred has no thousand-day wine, Yet m y mortal burdens still confine. The flowering Han expires with the iris. The elusive Qin fails with the peach blossoms. Beyond the seas and lakes, so still and so alone, I remain between Heaven and Earth, relic of another throne. 103

The purge of loyalist literati did not mean that resistance ended altogether in Jiangnan in 1647, nor that the local gentry's control had been crushed. The gentry retained a great deal of economic power and social influence which it would continue to monopolize for a decade to come. Yet in spite of this residual local autonomy, the back of political opposition in the lower Yangzi region was broken in 1647. The area's yamens would soon be staffed by reliable bannermen, and not until the 19th century would there be any kind of fundamental challenge to the dynasty's hegemony over the people of Jiangnan. So powerfully entrenched was the new government now that it could afford to reverse the former policy of accepting one-time Ming officials virtually without question; it could even risk casting doubts and aspersions upon the men w h o

1 0 2 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quan ji, ttianpu, xia, p. 10; Ji, Mingji nanliie, p. 279; Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 248; Shizu shilu, 3 2 : 3 7 8 ; A t w e l l , "Ch'en Tzu-lung," p. 1 4 1 . 1 0 3 Chen, Chen Zhongyu quanji, 1 4 : 2 7 a . "Thousand day wine" was a legendary potion, one drop o f which intoxicated a person for a thousand days. The iris (zhicao) is s y n o n y m o u s with a rare fungus with a purple stalk which keeps f o r a long time. According to the Hou Han shu, annals o f E m p e r o r Ming's reign: "In the 17th year o f Y o n g p i n g (74 a.d.), zhicao g r e w in f r o n t o f the palace." The plant thus came to symbolize the prosperity and peace o f a g o o d reign. According to the Furui zhi o f the Song shu: "If the ruler is benevolent and humane, then zhicao will grow."

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had forged that policy in the first place, including Hong Chengchou himself. While Chen Jin was conducting his own purge in Songjiang and Suzhou, Bashan was left to handle the interrogations of some of the higher-ranking captives in Nanjing. Wu Shengzhao, of course, had been remanded to Nanjing, and in the course of his questioning revealed that several important gentrymen were involved in the plot. In this atmosphere of heightened suspicion, a Qing major captured a courier on October 1, 1647, bearing documents and letters from the court of Lu. Upon examination, the papers were found to include Southern Ming patents of nobility enfeoffing Hong Chengchou as a duke and Tu Guobao as a marquis. There were also found letters from Huang Binqing addressed to these two men, and containing references suggesting that Hong and Tu had had a prior correspondence with the Zhoushan warlord. Although these papers could easily have been allowed to fall into Qing hands just to discredit Hong and Tu, the government ordered Bashan to make a complete investigation. However, the Qing court also ordered that Hong Chengchou be given every chance to clear himself and that he participate in the interrogations along with Bashan.104

Intrigues in Huai'an In spite of the suspicion directed against him, Hong Chengchou continued to take full responsibility for the continuing pacification of other parts of the region under the Nanjing viceroyalty's jurisdiction. Songjiang was by now under firm control once again, but Hong remained concerned about the security of Jiangning to the south, where there were loyalist forces, and of the Grand Canal zone to the north. 105 Beyond Yangzhou, at Huai'an, the tribute vessels of the dynasty were laden with grain, ready to move north to supply the Qing capital in Beijing. Yet they and the communi-

104 Ji, Mingji nanlue, p. 278; Z h a , Guo shou lu, p p . 109, 123.

105 There were reports of loyalist uprisings at Jiangning in late September, 1647. Shizu shilu, 3 3 : 3 9 7 a .

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cation channel itself were vulnerable to continuing loyalist attacks from the districts to the east. There, in the salt-producing zone of northern Jiangsu where many of the inhabitants were professional smugglers, a group of about two thousand "local bandits" attacked the prefectural capital of Miaowan on October 9, 1647. Striking in the early hours of the morning, they were initially repelled by the Qing major in command of the garrison. But they attacked again in broad daylight, wounding the major and driving the Qing prefect and magistrate out of the town. The loyalists, who were led by an outlaw named Zhang Huashan and a selfstyled Ming Prince of Yi, raised the banner of the Longwu Emperor and gathered more forces to threaten Huai'an. 106 The Qing viceroy in charge of grain transport along the Grand Canal was Yang Shengyuan. From his headquarters in Huai'an he reported to Hong Chengchou that Miaowan "is now turned into a bandit base. In this region of salt fields the inhabitants have all become bandits and their power has really gotten out of hand.'" 07 Yang also told Hong that he had taken immediate steps to defend Huai'an itself, which the rebels had announced they would attack on October 10. While regular garrison units were being sent toward Miaowan, special grain transport troops had been stationed along the canal to protect the laden vessels, many of which had already set sail for the north. But Yang did not believe that he could contain the resistance with the forces at his command alone. To keep the "tendrils of rebellion" from spreading, he required reinforcements immediately. The situation was so urgent that he could not wait for troops from the north to arrive. So he requested

106 Shizu shilu, 3 4 : 1 0 ; Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 2, cited in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 124. T h e Q i n g prefect was W u Rujie, w h o w a s o n e o f the militia leaders o f X u z h o u , described earlier, w h o j o i n e d the Q i n g armies as they m o v e d south. H e w a s particularly g o o d at persuading loyalists to surrender peaceably and, after his stint as prefect in Miaowan, he became provincial j u d g e o f Zhejiang, stationed in N i n g b o . There he helped break up the bandit gangs in the surrounding hill districts and became a notedly popular official. H u a n g , Jiangnan tongzhi, 1 5 1 : 2 4 b - 2 5 a . For the resistance m o v e m e n t led b y Wang Yi in the S i m i n g Mountains until October, 1850, see Struve, " S o u t h ern M i n g , " pp. 1 0 2 - 1 0 5 . 107 Ming-Qing

shiliao, jia, ben 2, cited in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 125.

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at least t w o to three thousand Han and Manchu troops right away f r o m the forces at Hong's disposal. 108 As soon as he received Yang's plea for aid, H o n g Chengchou called a conference in Nanjing with his major military officials, C h e n Jin, Chen Tai, and Zhang Dayou. T h o u g h Governor-General Yang might have exaggerated the military threat to Huai'an, there was n o question but that the empire's most important artery, even n o w carrying sustenance to the capital, had to be protected. H o n g Chengchou therefore drew twenty-five hundred men f r o m the Nanjing garrison, and placed them under the c o m m a n d of Z h a n g Dayou, w h o was provincial tidu. As H o n g later explained in his memorial to D o r g o n : All the troops were to advance in the attack when the best opportunity occurred. They were to obey the plans agreed upon together by the provincial commander of the Han troops and the Grain Transport Governor-General. They had to have complete agreement. Above all, the Manchu and Han officers and men were to be severely restrained, forced to maintain discipline without the slightest transgression, with regard both to exterminating the bandits and to protecting the people as they secure peace in this valuable area.109

These troops were to depart f r o m Jiangning on October 14. By that time the loyalist attack on Huai'an had already taken place. T h e forces that attacked Huai'an the first time were c o m m a n d e d by a man named Z h o u Wenshan, whose eight hundred soldiers were said to be f r o m Yancheng, eighty kilometers to the east. Z h o u Wenshan's men broke though the wall of Huai'an near the east gate, but they were repelled after eight hours of fighting in the early hours of the morning of October 10. Z h o u Wenshan was killed during this engagement. Although the garrison troops remaining in Huai'an were only a little more than a hundred men, they also managed to drive off the second wave of attackers under

108 Ibid. 109 Ibid.

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the Prince of Yi, whose men they ambushed as the loyalist canal boats sailed toward the city. The main loyalist force then retreated back to Miaowan. 110 The reinforcements that arrived a few days later therefore found the situation much less desperate than they had feared. Marching on to Miaowan under the command of Viceroy Yang Shengyuan, the Qing forces proceeded to overwhelm the loyalists, recapturing the city and beheading a number of resistants who fell into their hands.111 Although Zhang Huashan was one of those they killed, the Prince of Yi cut his hair, and posing as a Buddhist monk, managed to escape from the city.112 Yang Shengyuan subsequently ordered a widespread manhunt for the missing prince. Reward posters were circulated throughout the Subei area, and after yamen runners captured and interrogated a monk who personally knew the Prince of Yi, the authorities secured and distributed a description of the man. The capture and interrogation of other Buddhist monks netted the name of a Daoist priest and bandit leader named Sun Shengyu with whom the so-called Prince of Yi might have sought refuge. Sun lived in a village called Shuangdian (Twin Stores), near the city of Rugao to the south of Huai'an. Special investigators and a squadron of military police were sent from Yangzhou, and at midnight on the 18th of January, they surrounded Shuangdian and raided Sun's house. Sun Shengyu was seized, documents of the Ming cause being found in his belongings; and the following day the police officers searched the village thoroughly and arrested three other local loyalists who were also in the possession of Ming documents. One of these three broke under interrogation and admitted that the man they called the Prince of Yi had been hiding in their village earlier, but that he had escaped to a nearby hamlet just before the police arrived. After forcing their prisoner to give them the name of the household where the loyalist leader had fled, the police encircled the hamlet and descended upon the rebel's last refuge. Seized along with the prince 110 Qing shi gao, biography of Kuli, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 123. 111 Shizu shiltiy 34:401b. 112 Ming-Qing shiliaojia, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 125.

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was his son. After the captives were taken back to Yang Shengyuan, who had set up a temporary headquarters in Rugao to supervise the investigation, it was discovered that they were minor imperial nobles formerly attached to the Henan Prince of Zhou. Satisfied of their insignificance, Viceroy Yang ordered them killed, and they were promptly executed.113 The pursuit and capture of the Prince of Yi led to the discovery of other Ming loyalists in the area. Some of these were perfectly harmless individuals, but—in light of the feverish concern of the authorities in Beijing at this point—any evidence of loyalist activity in so sensitive an area as the place where the tribute grain fleet gathered called for the most scrupulous attention. The Qing authorities were especially disturbed at this time by reports of individuals—especially literati—who had already embraced the new dynasty by cutting their hair, and yet had since then reverted to Ming hairstyles or loyalist attitudes.114

113 Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p p . 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 . T h i s d o c u m e n t , w h i c h is a m e m o r i a l f r o m Yang S h e n g y u a n dated N o v e m ber 27, 1647, is also briefly m e n t i o n e d in Shizu shilu, 3 5 : 4 0 9 . 114 T w o o f R u g a o ' s m o s t p r o m i n e n t residents at this time, the d r a m a t i s t Li Y u and t h e poet M a o X i a n g , strictly eschewed such activity. B o t h m e n had their o w n d r a m a t i c t r o u p e s , and M a o X i a n g w a s especially k n o w n for his t h e a t e r parties. T o g e t h e r w i t h his concubine, D o n g X i a o w a n , M a o p e r p e t u a t e d , in t h e seclusion o f his h o m e , the erotic aestheticism of the late M i n g . O n w i n ter n i g h t s , t h e lovers, in the seclusion o f their carpeted b e d c h a m b e r , w o u l d b u r n incense in 15th-century vessels, inhaling the intoxicating smell t o g e t h e r "in a s p e l l b o u n d a t m o s p h e r e w i t h o u t g o i n g to bed until d a y b r e a k . " M a o P ' i chiang, The Reminiscences of Tung Hsiao-wan, p. 53. D o n g X i a o w a n g r e w ill o f c o n s u m p t i o n , h o w e v e r , and b e g a n to waste away. J u s t b e f o r e her death in 1651 at t h e age of 28, she rallied briefly w h e n M a o X i a n g b r o u g h t h e r a u t u m n c h r y s a n t h e m u m s . " E v e r y n i g h t she lighted virescent candles and t h r e w a w h i t e f o l d i n g screen of six folds a r o u n d the flowers o n t h r e e sides, placing a seat a m o n g the flowers and adjusting the position o f t h e c h r y s a n t h e m u m in such a w a y as to m a k e it cast its s h a d o w o n t h e screen in the m o s t graceful m a n n e r imaginable. She then began to drag herself i n t o t h e e n closure, and w h e n she w a s a m o n g the flowers, b o t h her s h a d o w and that o f t h e flowers w e r e t h r o w n o n the screen. T u r n i n g a r o u n d to l o o k at t h e screen she said t o m e : ' T h e fascinating appearance of the c h r y s a n t h e m u m has been fully defined; b u t h o w a b o u t m y slender figure?' O n recalling it t o d a y t h e w h o l e captivating scene rose vividly before m y eyes as if in a picture." Ibid.,

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When the patrols sent out to arrest the Prince of Yi returned to Shuangdian, for instance, one of their officers noticed some characters painted on the wall of the local temple of Guandi which warned of a "suspicious guest" observed in the household of a man named Wu Xintian. His curiosity piqued, the Qing officer went to the Wu household, where he was struck by the impudence of the family tutor, a man named Xu Yuanbo. Xu was taken into custody and thoroughly interrogated. It emerged that his father, Xu Zhiqing, had been a Ming official. When the first Qing forces entered Shuangdian district in August, 1645, however, the father had told his son that he must shave his forehead and accept the Manchus' rule. Xu Yuanbo had dutifully complied. Shortly after that, the young scholar became a tutor in the Wu household, where he had access to the family library and its accounts of Chinese martial heroes. Inspired by these tales of heroic chivalry and Confucian righteousness, Xu Yuanbo secretly tattooed three loyalist slogans on his body: "Shame not for our dynasty" on his chest, "I was born a man of the Ming" on his right arm, and "I will die for the spirits of the Ming" on his left arm. He kept these tattoos concealed, hiding his loyalist sympathies from his employers. Just before the Huai'an attack, however, his slogans had been seen by several prying Wu children as he was taking ofFhis clothes to bathe himself. News of these tattoos had spread from the children in the family compound to the adults, and someone—perhaps a jealous servant—had therefore written the phrase on the Guandi temple that alerted the Qing patrol.115

pp. 5 6 - 5 7 . After her death (many people thought she had actually been carried away by the Shunzhi Emperor), Mao Xiang was recommended for office repeatedly, but he refused each time. Instead, he fell in love with other concubines, entertained frequently, published his o w n poetry, and patronized younger artists like the painters Cai Han and Jin Yue. Chen Weisong, the son o f Chen Zhenhui, lived many years with Mao, studying there. A m o n g the actors in Mao's troupe was a handsome boy named X u Ziyun. M a o placed the youth in Chen's custody, and his verses praising the actor's performances became famous in China's literature. Zhang Luxiang, Chongding Yangyuan xiansheng quanji, pp. x i i i - x i v ; H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, pp. 103, 496, 566. 115 Ming-Qing shiliao, p. 99.

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The Qing censor in charge of this case was particularly concerned about Xu Yuanbo's connections with other loyalists. Had he been secretly in touch with other pro-Ming elements in the region? Xu insisted that he had not, and so it was reported to Yangzhou. The censor was so concerned, however, that he himself went to Rugao to interrogate the suspect in person. He had been suspicious, for instance, of the tattoos themselves. How could Xu have so inscribed his own body? Must he not have had the help of others? Only after seeing how awkwardly drawn were the tattoos was the censor persuaded that Xu had indeed acted alone. But once that fear was allayed, the censor still felt that Xu's crime had to be severely punished. As he memorialized to Beijing: After the Qing dynasty was established and violence and death were eradicated, all of the masses sensed our virtue and were converted to us. H o w could this rebellious creature, Xu Yuanbo, dare to cast himself out of our divine era, and dare to reject our august magnificence and magnanimous bounty? At first he concealed [his evil intent] by cutting his hair. But then, by insanely scratching such words upon himself, he revealed his rebellious nature. H o w can w e possibly refuse to behead him? His wife, née Zhu, should be made the chattel of some meritorious official. His property should be confiscated. And even though his father lives elsewhere and knows nothing of this, treacherous conspiracy is not limited by differences of locale and principles cannot be bent.116

So even Xu Yuanbo's father—who was not in the least implicated—should be punished as well because of the heinous quality of the crime.

Qing Suspicions There thus developed during the winter of 1647-1648 a growing suspicion on the part of some Qing leaders that erstwhile collabo116 Ibid., p. 100. T h e censor's name was Sheng Fuxuan. There was an uprising in C h a o district at about that same time w h e n scholars w h o had already shaved their heads reverted to M i n g loyalism. Ibid., pp. 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 , 1 1 1 - 1 1 9 .

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rators were secretly harboring treasonable sentiments. 117 This suspicion extended even to high officials responsible for the suppression of Ming loyalist activities, like Yang Shengyuan (who was soon removed from office for "carelessness in handling defense matters") and Hong Chengchou (who was already under a cloud because of intercepted letters from Huang Binqing). 118 Hong was shortly to become even more gravely compromised. In October, 1647, at just about the same time that the attack on Huai'an was taking place, guards at the gates of Nanjing stopped a Buddhist monk leaving the city and asked to see his passport. The priest produced a restricted passport signed and sealed by Hong Chengchou. Perhaps because of the restrictions on the passport, the guards demanded that the monk open his baggage. When he did so the soldiers found several suspicious looking documents. Upon examination they turned out to be a letter from the Hongguang Emperor to Ruan Dacheng, along with correspondence indicating that loyalists in the far south were in touch with Viceroy Hong Chengchou in Nanjing. 119 The monk's name was Hanke. The first character, Han, indicated that he had been ordained by Daodu, the famous abbot of Guizong Temple in Nankang (Jiangxi). Daodu was also the teacher of the Cantonese monk Hanshi, many of whose Chan disciples were Guangdong loyalists.120 As boys, Hanshi and Hanke 117 A t this time, there w a s also considerable friction b e t w e e n the local inhabitants o f Jiangnan and the Manchu banner troops garrisoning that area. T h e zongdu, M a G u o z h u , is said to have alleviated these tensions b y disciplinary measures, but there m a y have been e n o u g h popular discontent at the t i m e to keep s o m e loyalist hopes alive. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, p. 1839 (112:33a). 118 Shizu shilu, 3 4 : 1 2 . See X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 124. 119 Peng G u o d o n g , Qing shi wenyan zhi, p. 1; X i e , Nanming shiliie, p. 93; G o o d rich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 494. 120 C h e n B o t a o , Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu, 3 : 2 8 b ; Wang Z o n g y a n , Tianran heshang nianpu, passim; Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 4 9 1 - 4 9 4 . O u t o f a total o f 266 biographies o f Cantonese loyalists contained in C h e n , Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu, and Q u Dajun, Huang Ming sichao, 40 o f the loyalists b e c a m e m o n k s during the wars o f resistance in the south. O f these 40, 27 "served" Hanshi as Buddhist devotees. That these w e r e mainly all gentry leaders can be derived f r o m the high status o f the group. O f the 4 0 loyalist m o n k s , 22 were zhusheng, 3 gongsheng, 4juren, and 2 jinshi. In other

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had been very close friends. Then, before he took the tonsure, Hanke's name had been Han Zonglai. 121 His family had sacrificed m a n y to the anti-Manchu cause, an uncle and three of Hanke's brothers having already died as loyalists. 122 T h e correspondence linking H o n g Chengchou with southern loyalists did not in itself incriminate the viceroy as a secret agent of the Southern Ming cause. However, the very possibility of a connection between Nanjing's leading collaborator and Guangdong loyalist circles was, especially at this time, a frightening thought to the Q i n g court. In early August, 1647, the t w o major loyalist leaders of Guangdong, Chen Zizhuang and Chen Bangyan, had arranged to coordinate a number of uprisings in the Pearl River delta designed to draw the Qing commander Li Chengdong out of Guangzhou. 1 2 3 When Li Chengdong did leave the city to come to the defense of Xin'an, leaving Guangzhou exposed, Chen Zizhuang attacked the city behind him. 124 Meanwhile Cheng Bangyan had carefully positioned his own troops and ships between Li C h e n g d o n g and Guangzhou, at a place called Yuzhuzhou, and w h e n Li's j u n k s arrived there, a battle was fought. The first stage

w o r d s , o v e r ten p e r c e n t o f the i m p o r t a n t loyalists o f G u a n g d o n g d u r i n g t h e M i n g - Q i n g t r a n s i t i o n b e c a m e disciples o f the m o n k H a n s h i . T h e f a m o u s essayist a n d p o e t Q u D a j u n w a s also a disciple o f H a n s h i . See also S t r u v e , " U s e s o f H i s t o r y , " p p . 9 5 - 9 6 ; Shore, "Last C o u r t , " p. 59. 121 X i e , Dangshe yundong, p p . 2 4 3 - 2 4 9 . 122 C h e n , Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu, 1 : 5 1 - 5 2 ; X i e , Dangshe yundong, p p . 243-249. 123 Li's initial m i l i t a r y task w a s t o invest t h e loyalist forces at Guilin, w h i c h h e a t t a c k e d in A p r i l , 1647. A t that t i m e , C h e n B a n g y a n a n d t h e b r i g a n d Y u L o n g a t t a c k e d G u a n g z h o u , w h i l e Z h a n g Jiayu (a H a n l i n b a c h e l o r blacklisted f o r s e r v i n g Li Z i c h e n g ) led an u p r i s i n g in D o n g g u a n . Viceroy T o n g Y a n g j i a , t h e n in c o m m a n d in G u a n g z h o u , u r g e n t l y requested Li C h e n g d o n g t o d r o p t h e siege o f Guilin a n d rescue G u a n g z h o u . A f t e r Li r e t u r n e d t o e a s t e r n G u a n g d o n g , h e killed Y u L o n g a n d d r o v e back Z h a n g J i a y u t o H u i z h o u , then occupied G u a n g z h o u which he n o w protected. Struve, "Sketch of S o u t h e r n M i n g E v e n t s , " pp. 1 3 - 1 6 ; B o w r a , " C o n q u e s t o f C a n t o n , " p. 89; S t r u v e , " U s e s o f H i s t o r y , " p. 22; i d e m . , " S o u t h e r n M i n g , " pp. 6 9 - 7 1 ; Z h a , Dongshan guoyu, p p . 7 6 - 7 7 ; Shore, "Last C o u r t , " p p . 71, 7 7 - 7 8 . 124 D e P a l a f o x , Histoire de la conquête, p p . 1 7 2 - 1 8 2 ; Z h u X i z u , " M i n g G u a n g d o n g D o n g l i n d a n g l i e z h u a n , " p. 47.

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o f the encounter was a success for the loyalists. Chen Bangyan's firecrafts drifted into Li Chengdong's fleet, setting many vessels on fire, and the loyalists exacted a heavy toll. Then a line squall struck both sets o f vessels. In spite o f Chen's claims to superior seamanship, however, Li Chengdong's captains turned the situation around by regrouping their vessels and sailing downwind upon the Ming forces which turned and ran before them. 125 The battle was decisive. Although Chen Bangyan fled to Qingyuan (about sixty kilometers north-northwest o f Guangzhou), Li Chengdong moved steadily after him, destroying militia units and taking towns along the way. O n November 25, 1647, Chen Zizhuang was captured at Gaoming, and taken back to Guangzhou to be executed on December 1. 126 B y then Li Chengdong had besieged Qingyuan, blowing open the city wall with gunpowder and entering it with his twenty thousand men. A hero to the end, Chen Bangyan, wounded thrice, penned his epitaph in a friend's quiet garden: N o fists, n o braves left. N o rations, no soldiers. B o n d e d w i t h mountains and sea, I s w o r e to help restore [the Ming], Fate g a v e us n o help. We w e r e entangled in misfortune. O n e thousand a u t u m n s hence, let this solitary inscription give witness. 1 2 7

125 T h e August-September, 1647 Canton uprising is recounted in detail in Liang Fu, Lingnan lishi renwu congtan, pp. 9 6 - 1 0 5 ; Chen, Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu, shengju, 5:126fF.; Qu, Huang Ming sichao, juan 10; Huang Zongxi, Xing chao lu, 2 : 3 b - 4 a . 126 Qu Qimei, Yue you jianwen, p. 48. Zhang Jiayu was killed in early November at Zengcheng. Struve, "Southern Ming," p. 71; Zha, Dongshan guoyu, p. 79. 127 Liang, Lingnan lishi renwu, p. 105. Shore gives these as Chen Bangyan's last words: "Heaven's created, ah, these many troubles, / 1 am at the water margins [and making my last stand] / As a scholar [playing with] many martial strategies. / Time, alas, is not with me. / After me, ah, what will happen? / [At this point] my person, ah, suffers alone / On Mount Yai [where the Southern Song loyalists made their last stand against the Mongols in 1279] examples o f loyal spirits dwell, / Shining in glory through the ages." Shore, "Last Court," p. 80.

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Chen then tried to drown himself in a pond, but the water was too shallow. Lying in a swoon there, he was taken by Qing troops. Five days later he died the "lingering death," and the 1647 uprising had ended. 128 But none of this was foreordained when Hanke was captured over two months earlier at the city gate of Nanjing. The document he carried suggested to Bashan and Dorgon, as well, that Hong had been communicating with Cantonese loyalists, and that perhaps another union between Jiangnan literati and southern résistants was in the making. Of course, there was always the chance that this document, too, was designed to sow suspicion. However, it soon became known that the monk Hanke's father was Han Rizuan, the former Minister of Rites. And Han Rizuan, as many well knew, had been Hong Chengchou's examination supervisor. Consequently, after conducting the interrogation of four of Hanke's own disciples (who turned out to be quite innocent themselves), Viceroy Hong memorialized the throne, acknowledging his personal connections with the monk and avowing that he had conferred a passport upon him. The criminal monk Hanke is the son of m y former teacher w h e n I sat for the metropolitan examinations: Han Rizuan, w h o was once the Ming Minister o f Rites. It is many years since he left his family. In the first lunar month of 1645 he came to Jiangning from Guangdong to print sutras. Then the Grand Army came to pacify the south, and the roads to Guangdong were blocked so that he could not return. H e stayed for a long time in the capital. I was in Jiangnan, but I never set eyes upon him. N o w because the roads to Guangdong are open, he was to return to his village and asked m e for a passport. I gave him a written passport, but the restrictions on it were extremely severe. Therefore, when he left by the city gate he was searched. In his trunk there was the draft o f a letter from the Prince of Fu to Ruan Dacheng. The characters failed to avoid taboo [words]. There was also a document recording rebellion, which involved current affairs. Hanke did not actually carry out [sedition] in person, but he brought this transgression upon himself. I have been connected with Hanke's family for generations and it is difficult to

128 Bowra, "Conquest of Canton," pp. 89-90; Shore, "Last Court," pp. 78-79.

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avoid suspicion. I dare not trust m y o w n judgment when it comes to [deciding] whether the nature of the crime is severe or light. 129

Hong Chengchou concluded by saying that he would send the original passport issued to Hanke to the Inner Courts in Beijing, and that he would remand the monk's case to the appropriate board. 130 The appropriate bodies in the capital had no doubt about the gravity of the matter. When Hanke arrived in Beijing guarded by Bashan's men, his case was carefully reviewed. Although there was no evidence that Hanke was a conspirator, his diary contained several anti-Manchu passages, for which he was sentenced to lifelong exile in Liaodong. 131 Meanwhile, the throne issued a rescript which read: "Hong Chengchou displayed the partiality of a disciple to his teacher and presumptuously used his imperial orders to grant a passport. This was extremely unreasonable. Let the appropriate offices all memoralize.'" 32 The various boards thereupon discussed the case and agreed that Hong Chengchou's punishment should be severe; they recommended that he be stripped of all his ranks and dismissed from office.133 Any other official would have been promptly punished, but Hong more than any other single figure symbolized the steadfast service of southern collaborators with the regime. To dismiss him so publicly would mean exposing the suspicion of treason among the highest ranks of the dynasty's Han adherents. Dorgon therefore decided for the moment to ignore the recommendation of the Board of Personnel, and pardoned Hong Chengchou. Almost si129 Peng, Qing shi wenyan zhi, 1647.

p. 1. T h e memorial w a s dated D e c e m b e r 11,

130 Ibid. 131 C h e n , Sheng chao Yuedong yimin lu, 1 : 5 4 - 5 5 . In Shenyang, Hanke f o r m e d the Frosty Weather Poetry Club (Bingtian shishe) w i t h other exiled loyalists. Later he b e c a m e abbot o f the D r a g o n Spring T e m p l e (Longquan si) o n M t . Q i a n in Liaoyang, w h e r e his sermons attracted other political exiles f r o m all over the northeast. B y the time he died in 1660, the temple had d e v e l o p e d into a great Buddhist center. Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, p. 494. 132 Peng, Qing shi wenyan zhi, p. 1. 133 Ibid.

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multaneously, Hong's mother fell ill, and he applied immediately for a leave-of-absence to care for her. The furlough was granted, and as Lekedehun succeeded him in the viceroyalty to Nanjing, H o n g temporarily bowed out of the Qing government's service. 134

Loyalist Hopes Revived and Crushed D u r i n g the fall and early winter of 1647 the pacification of Jiangnan continued; and like north China, the lower reaches of the Yangzi experienced a temporary lull. All of that suddenly changed early in 1648 when t w o of the former Ming officials upon w h o m the Q i n g government had depended to govern the south rebelled, one after the other in February and May. The first to revolt was Jin Shenghuan, the former Ming general w h o had completed the Q i n g conquest o f j i a n g x i . General Jin, expecting high honors and a free hand in the province, had become upset when he was only

134 Qing shi gao, H o n g C h e n g c h o u ' s biography, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p p . 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 . H o n g C h e n g c h o u had earlier, on M a r c h 30, 1647, requested m o u r n i n g leave. A l t h o u g h his father had passed away on N o v e m b e r 8, 1643, H o n g did n o t learn of this until a servant f r o m the family h o m e in Q u a n z h o u p r e f e c t u r e m a d e his w a y to N a n j i n g on M a r c h 25, 1647, and told t h e viceroy t h e sad n e w s . See the m e m o r i a l by H o n g C h e n g c h o u in the Beijing U n i v e r sity collection cited in Li, " H o n g C h e n g c h o u , " p. 247. P r e s u m a b l y p e r m i s sion w a s n o t g r a n t e d by D o r g o n on that occasion. At that t i m e , H o n g C h e n g c h o u ' s m o t h e r was still at h o m e in Fujian. O n July 29, H o n g received w o r d that his m o t h e r had left h o m e and was staying over in S u z h o u . O n A u g u s t 4, 1647, she reached N a n j i n g . A c c o r d i n g to H o n g ' s m e m o r i a l o f t h a n k s t o the t h r o n e for e m p l o y i n g h i m as an official in J i a n g n a n , w h e n h e saw his m o t h e r ( w h o w a s nearly 80 and quite frail) and w h e n she saw h i m (his hair h a v i n g t u r n e d w h i t e in the interim), b o t h burst i n t o tears. MingQittg shiliao, 1:509, dated August 10, 1647, and cited in Ibid., p. 246. T h i s a c c o u n t o f their m e e t i n g seems to belie p o p u l a r (and perhaps a p o c r y p h a l ) a c c o u n t s of their m e e t i n g in the capital later, w h e n she berated h i m f o r b e i n g a t u r n c o a t (see chapter 13). A c c o r d i n g to another m e m o r i a l , H o n g C h e n g c h o u ' s m o t h e r w a s w i t h h i m in the capital w h e n he m o v e d to Beijing after his resignation w a s accepted. T h e m e m o r i a l is n o t dated, b u t f r o m internal evidence it appears to have been w r i t t e n in 1648. Ming-Qing shiliao, 3 : 1 3 0 , cited in Ibid., pp. 2 4 7 - 2 4 8 .

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given the title o f regional commander and placed under the supervision o f a Manchu governor-general. 133 Egged on by a Daoist priest as well as by a former follower o f Li Zicheng nicknamed "Piebald Wang" (Wang Zamao—actually Wang Deren), Jin Shenghuan revolted on February 22, 1648, killing the Qing civil governor and declaring his allegiance to the Yongli Emperor. 136 Jin quickly attracted the support o f several leading Southern Ming loyalists like Jiang Yueguang and Qiu Zude, and established his hegemony over northern Jiangxi while laying siege to Ganzhou in the southern region o f the province. 137 Li Chengdong, conqueror o f Guangdong, was also offended when he was only named regional commander under the watchful eye o f Tong Yangjia, viceroy o f the Liangguang. Like Jin Shenghuan, Li resented the Qing method o f appointing Manchu or Han bannermen to positions where they could act as a check against these newer adherents. Tong Yangjia did not make the arrangement any easier to accept because, as an "old man" and close confidant o f leading Manchu princes like Bolo, Tong felt that he could afford to act quite arrogantly toward Li Chengdong. Li's ruffled pride was further inflamed by the incitement he was secretly receiving from his concubine, who was formerly the concubine o f Chen Zizhuang and who remained a staunch Ming loyalist after Li had seized her and forced her to become his wife. Consequently, in May, 1648, when Tong Yangjia ordered Li Chengdong to take his army north and relieve the pressure on Ganzhou, Li mutinied. 138

135 Dong Ming wenjian lu, p. 12. 136 Wang Deren, who had been impeached for his homicidal brutality, forced Jin Shenghuan's hand. O n February 2 0 - 2 1 , his men in Nanchang imprisoned the Q i n g governor, murdered the regional inspector, and cut off their queues. Struve, "Southern M i n g , " pp. 7 7 - 7 8 . 137 Ming shi, p. 3112; Pelliot, "Michel B o y m , " p. 99; Zha, Dongshan guoyu, p. 52; Struve, " U s e s o f History," pp. 2 2 - 2 3 ; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 1 6 6 - 1 6 7 ; Shore, "Last C o u r t , " pp. 8 6 - 8 8 . T h e impact o f Jin Shenghuan's revolt was immediate. Officials as far away as western Huguang and Fujian transferred their allegiances from Qing to Ming. Struve, "Southern M i n g , " p. 78. 138 Shore, "Last C o u r t , " pp. 8 9 - 9 0 .

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Tong Yangjia was at first forced to go back to wearing Ming dress, and then five months later he was killed when he secretly tried to contact the Qing government. The Yongli Emperor, w h o had sought refuge in Nanning, was invited back to Zhaoqing, where he set up court on September 20, 1648, making Li Chengdong a duke; and at the same time other Yongli generals in southern Huguang, under He Tengjiao, were encouraged to retake a number of important garrisons.139 By October, 1648, most of the south was in the hands of Southern Ming loyalists, and Qing authority was confined to a few enclaves in Guangdong and southern Jiangxi, especially Ganzhou. 140 The Southern Ming resurgence, however, subsided nearly as 139 Hua Fuli, the scholar-official who left such a vivid diary of these events, wrote: "At the very end of the fourth moon [i.e., about May 21, 1648], Li Chengdong suddenly reversed his opposition to the Ming court, sending three men—Hong Tianzhuo, Pan Zengwei, and Li Qi—to present an invitation welcoming the [imperial] carriage. On July 29, 1648, the carriage of the Yongli Emperor descended to Zhaoqing. At that time in Nanning city I once again heard the wild fowl crow at the second [drum of the] night watch. I made up my mind to descend eastward, but what a hardship without a boat!" However, Hua—after having his luggage robbed—managed to use a friend's boat to sail down the West River into Guangdong. "All day, all night—the drumming oars descending for 3,000 li. When we passed Zhaoqing I heard in the night the sound of war drums. A voice called out, 'This is the imperial barge.' At first I did not believe it. The next day I saw it and it was indeed [the barge]!" Hua Fuli, Liangguang jiliie, pp. 73-74. See also Liang, Lingnan lishi renwu, p. 117. 140 Tsao Kai-fu, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China," pp. 42-45; Struve, "Uses of History," pp. 23-24; idem, "Sketch of Southern Ming Events," pp. 20-21; idem, "Southern Ming," pp. 79—80. The Southern Ming resurgence inspired the retired Qing collaborator Qian Qianyi secretly to write to his former disciple Qu Shisi, who was a leading minister at the Yongli court. In the letter, Qian claimed that, though he had served the Manchus, "never for an instant had he forgotten our dynasty." Comparing the empire to a chess board, he urged Qu to bring the Ming court back to Nanjing. He also provided Qu with information as to which generals on the Qing side might be about to surrender, and suggested bribing them: "In the present situation we must not be stingy in breaking precedents of reward in order to encourage their spirit of loyalty and righteousness, and discourage their willingness to work for the Manchus." Cited in Shore, "Last Court," pp. 167-168.

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rapidly as it had risen. Ganzhou did not fall to the Ming loyalists. Instead, rapidly massing its forces in central China, the Qing court sent two powerful military columns into the south. Through Huguang came a mixed Mongol-Manchu-Han force o f thirty thousand troops under Kong Youde, Jirgalang, and Lekedehun. 141 Through Jiangxi, bearing down upon Jin Shenghuan immured in Nanchang and Li Chengdong in northern Guangdong, came the other wing o f the southern military expedition, which was commanded by Tantai, Holhoi, Shang Kexi, and Geng Zhongming. O n March 1, 1649, Nanchang fell; and Jin Shenghuan, who was wounded, drowned himself in a pond.142 The following month, Li Chengdong, who had steadily been losing men, accidentally drowned while fording a river near Xinfeng. 143 Meanwhile, in Huguang, Kong Youde and his column closed with He Tengjiao, whom they captured and killed at Xiangtan. B y November, 1649, Huguang was securely under Qing control once more. 144 Through the early months o f 1650, most o f northern Guangdong was overrun. T h e Yongli Emperor and his court fled west to Wuzhou, and eventually via Nanning to Guizhou. Finally, on November 24, 1650, after a harsh ten-month siege involving extra embattlements, a special wooden assault castle, and Dutch gunners, Guangzhou fell to Shang Kexi. 145 During the following ten days the city was

141 Shizu shilu, 27:321z. Jirgalang—whose advance was slowed by Chuang remnants under Li Chixin—administered what was euphemistically called "heavy punishment" to the city o f Xiangtan. He ordered a six-days massacre, and even after he commanded his soldiers to sheathe their weapons, they continued to slaughter for another three days. Half a month later, Wang Hui, a member o f the local gentry, entered the city, which reeked nauseatingly o f death. Corpses filled the streets, which were stained with blood, and no more than a hundred survivors (including many who were critically wounded) remained. Gu Cheng, "Lun Qingchu shehui maodun," p. 145. See also Struve, "Southern Ming," pp. 8 9 - 9 0 . 142 Zha, Dongshan guoyu, p. 52. 143 Dong Ming wenjian lu, p. 27. See also Hua, Liangguang jiliie, p. 74. 144 T h e province, which was terribly depopulated, did not have the resources to support He's armies, along with remnants o f Li Zicheng, Zhang Xianzhong, and Z u o Liangyu's armies. Shore, "Last Court," pp. 3 7 - 3 9 . 145 Shang had 73 cannons o f his own, plus abundant muskets and gunpowder. Ibid., pp. 1 8 3 - 1 8 4 .

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pillaged, and as many as seventy thousand people were killed. The huge funeral pyre of corpses which burned for days outside the east gate of the city—and which was still visible as a mound of congealed ashes in the 19th century—signalled the end of a true Ming restoration in many loyalists' eyes.146 Nevertheless, the military supporters of the Prince of Lu along the southeastern coast continued to try to establish links with whatever remnants there were of the loyalist circles in Jiangnan that had participated in the tragic 1647 uprising. 147 The leading figure behind much of this activity was the sealord Zhang Mingzhen. After the failure of the 1647 expedition, Zhang had rebuilt his navy and established a base at Shacheng, on the Zhejiang-Fujian border. This became the headquarters of Regent Lu's regime, whence raids were carried out along the coast as far as Jiangnan. 148 In July, 1649, Zhang decided to move the center of his activities even farther north, and by August he and the Prince of Lu had ensconced themselves at Jiantiaosuo on the Zhejiang coast between Haimen and Ningbo. There, Zhang began again to make plans for combining an invasion of Jiangnan by sea with an uprising ashore. 149 Many of the gentry loyalists who had hoped for a similar com-

146 Struve, "Sketch o f Southern M i n g Events," pp. 2 2 - 2 4 ; Bowra, "Conquest o f Canton," pp. 9 0 - 9 3 ; Struve, "Southern Ming," pp. 8 1 - 8 2 , 9 0 - 9 2 ; Fr. Jäger, "Die Letzten Tage des Kü Schi-si," p. 198. 147 After Zheng Zhilong surrendered to the Qing, his organization was taken over by his younger brother Zheng Hongkui, his t w e n t y - t w o - y e a r - o l d son Z h e n g C h e n g g o n g , and his kinsman Zheng Cai. T h e last o f these hoped to bear the same relationship o f protector to the Prince o f Lu (Zhu Yihai) as Z h e n g Zhilong had had with the L o n g w u Emperor. Zheng Cai therefore in December, 1646, brought Regent Lu back from the Zhoushan area to his o w n base in X i a m e n (Amoy). Later Zhang Mingzhen rescued the Prince o f Lu f r o m Z h e n g Cai ( w h o then accepted Zheng Chenggong's superior leadership) and became the regent's protector in turn. Struve, "Southern M i n g , " pp. 9 8 - 9 9 . 148 T h e Lu forces operated north o f Fuzhou; Zheng Chenggong's navies d o m i nated the coastline below Quanzhou south to Guangdong. Ibid., p. 100. 149 H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, pp. 4 6 - 4 7 . Struve, "Uses o f History," p. 20; idem, "Southern Ming," p. 102.

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bined attack in 1647 were now either dead or in internal exile.150 Consequently, the Ming loyalists at the Lu court had to turn to a much less prominent social stratum: lower-ranking gentry, adventurers, monks, even bandits. Investing loyalists from Jiangnan with seals of silver or letters of commission, the court of Lu would send these envoys back into Qing-occupied territory as secret agents to contact other sympathizers and prepare for an uprising. If the persons contacted proved to be amenable, then they in turn were invested with a military rank via the letter of commission by the envoy himself. Unfortunately for the Ming loyalists, this was not a very secure way of organizing an armed rebellion. When one Luo Guangyao contacted a number of local magnates and bandit chiefs in the Haizhou area of northern Jiangsu, preparing for a combined land and sea attack on Tianjin in the summer of 1649, the plot was discovered and Luo was arrested. His seizure and subsequent interrogation by officials from the Board of War uncovered other conspirators in the Jiangnan and Jiangbei areas. News of this conspiracy must have alarmed the court in Beijing, but it also considerably set back plans at the Lu court for sending a maritime expedition north. 151

150 It is quite telling to observe that a number o f M i n g princes in Jiangnan surrendered in 1649 in exchange for amnesties. See the memorial f r o m M a G u o z h u dated September 22, 1649, in G u g o n g b o w u y u a n , Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian, fascicle 3, pp. 1 0 1 - 1 0 5 . 151 Report f r o m the Board o f War. T h e first portion o f the d o c u m e n t is missing, and the memorialist's n a m e is not given. From internal evidence, the d o c u m e n t s e e m s to date f r o m the spring o f 1649. Nanming shiliao, pp. 1 5 1 - 1 5 8 . T h e H a i z h o u area w i t h its households o f fishermen and salt makers w a s very difficult for the Q i n g authorities to control. W u Weihua, the viceroy in charge o f the Grand Canal zone, had put d o w n rebellions in Ganyu (led b y a m o n k n a m e d Li Er) and around Huai'an (led b y Z h u Can and G a o Liu) in October, 1648, but the coastal villagers remained a serious problem. T h e y w e r e quick to f o r m gangs and to slip back and forth along the coast to Shand o n g . A r o u n d M t . Yuntai, a peasant army led b y Gao Jinzhong and Feng B a o g u o allied itself w i t h the E l m Garden A r m y o f Shandong, and o n April 17, 1649, attacked and t o o k Haizhou, killing the top officials there. T h e city w a s retaken, but the Yuntai band mainly escaped. Haizhou zhi [Haizhou gazetteer], juan 3, in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 126; Nanming shiliao, pp. 1 2 0 121; Shizu shilu, 4 5 : 5 2 5 b .

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The Southern Ming's hopes for a maritime offensive were also dashed for the time being by a falling out between the two rivals Zhang Mingzhen and Huang Binqing. Huang, who controlled the island o f Zhoushan, was finally, in October, 1649, betrayed by one o f his generals to Zhang and subsequently committed suicide. 152 But once this struggle was over, Zhang Mingzhen again made plans for fomenting an uprising in the north. Transferring his headquarters, and the Prince o f Lu, to Zhoushan Island on N o vember 23, 1649, Zhang again encouraged dissidents'in Jiangnan to plan for an uprising. This time the main contacts were provided by a monk from Jiaxing named Mao Yuanzhai. On March 13, 1650, M a o and six other Ming loyalists held a meeting in an empty pavilion on the estate o f an old official named Han Gongshu. At that meeting they held religious worship, and then together swore an oath to rebel. Ten days later, two o f the m e n — M a o Yuanzhai and Wu Yongzhi—left for Zhoushan, where they were given an audience by the Prince o f Lu and commissioned as Southern Ming officers. Wu Yongzhi remained at the court o f Lu, but Mao Yuanchai returned to the mainland with special letters o f commission and proceeded to contact his original cell o f loyalists while at the same time discussing plans for an uprising with the others. 153 Meanwhile, Zhang Mingzhen prepared and then launched a naval expedition to southern Jiangsu, taking along with him the Prince o f Lu. Quite by coincidence, a Qing force led by Chen Jin was at that time sweeping through the Siming Hills, clearing east-

152 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 47. The general was named Wang Chaoxian. Zhang Mingzhen had been trying to get control o f Zhoushan for some time. At this time his military headquarters at Jiantiaosuo was running out o f supplies. Struve, "Uses o f History," p. 20; idem, "Southern M i n g , " pp. 102-103. 153 This is a report from the anchashi o fJiangnan province after the rebellion was uncovered and the conspirators had been interrogated. It is enclosed in a memorial from the xun'an o f the Su-Song circuit, Qin Shizhen. The memorial is dated November 18, 1652. Nanming shiliao, pp. 2 9 0 - 2 9 9 . Jiangnan was changed from a special imperial district into a province on August 18, 1651, at the behest o f the Board o f War, which for military purposes thought that there should be a unified provincial headquarters, instead o f an upriver (shangjiang) and downriver (xiajiang) command. Shizu shilu, 5 8 : 3 b .

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ern Zhejiang of loyalist bands. On October 15, 1651, Chen Jin's soldiers took the Zhoushan Islands' main defenses, which were betrayed to them by some of Huang Binqing's former lieutenants.154 Most of the members of Zhang Mingzhen's family were killed; and Zhang, having lost his base, had to sail to Xiamen (Amoy) with the prince and seek the protection of Zheng Chenggong. 155 At the same time in Jiangnan to the north, one of the men to whom Mao Yuanchai had given a letter of commission from the court of Lu turned coat and betrayed the entire network o f conspirators to the Qing authorities in Suzhou. The letter of commission which this man handed over to the Qing officials included a plan for attacking Nanjing and leading a northern expedition (beifa) to Beijing; it was sealed with the chop of Zhang Mingzhen. B y April, 1652, all of the conspirators had been rounded up, and the loyalists were completely foiled.156

Wan Shouqi and Gu Yanwu As peace returned to Jiangnan and Jiangbei, the residents there slowly began to rebuild their lives.157 In 1648, the painter Wan 154 Ming-Qing shiliao, ding, 1:34, 36, 3 8 - 3 9 , and yi, 1 : 7 6 - 7 7 , in Nanming shiliao, pp. 144-145, 161, 165-172; Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 151. 155 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 47; Struve, "Uses of History," p. 20. Zheng had just accepted enfeoffment as a duke from the Yongli Emperor. After Zhang Mingzhen's weakened forces were incorporated into the forces of Zheng Chenggong (who accepted the authority of the Yongli Emperor in principle), the Prince of Lu, perhaps in 1653, renounced his regental title and established his residence on Jinmen (Quemoy) Island. He died there nine years later. Zha Jizuo, Lu chunqiu, p. 75; Struve, "Southern Ming," pp. 102-105. 156 Nanming shiliao, pp. 290-291. 157 Governor Tu Guobao's policy of directly sponsoring economic reconstruction was continued by other officials throughout these years, especially in the Jiangnan region's textile industries. The first Manchu administrator of the textile industry and superintendents of the imperial silk works were appointed to office in 1646. They immediately selected reasonably well-to-do families in Suzhou, Songjiang, and Changzhou prefectures to be loom households. The existing weaving facilities were repaired and expanded (in Su-

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S h o u q i had decided to m o v e out o f his "rundown little alley" and had taken his family to Puxi, about 35 li f r o m Huai'an near Lake H o n g z e . There he built a studio for his family called the "Grass H u t West o f the Marshes" (Xi xi cao tang). T h e studio w a s e n tirely surrounded b y water. 158 Less than a year after m o v i n g to Puxi, Wan returned briefly to Jiangnan, paying a visit o f respect to the t o m b o f the M i n g founder. 159 H e also visited the heirs o f his close friend, the collaborator H u a n g Jiarui, w h o had been killed during the 1645 Songjiang uprising. Returning to Huai'an f r o m X u z h o u b y boat, Wan settled in at Puxi once again. T h o u g h his health w a s declining, his fortune w a s improving. His painting and calligraphy w e r e m u c h in demand, and like the famous 16th century S u z h o u painter Tang Yin (zi Ziwei), he enjoyed living o f f his art w o r k s : "Me, I am like Tang Z i w e i , w h o said, 'In m y spare t i m e I paint blue mountains to sell, for I will not use m o n e y unfairly acquired in the vulgar world.'" 1 6 0 H e was n o w able to b u y s o m e property south o f the "Grass Hut West o f the Marshes" and there he built a garden, w h i c h he called N a n cun (Southern Garden) to e v o k e the m e m o r y o f the poetic recluse Tao Yuanming. 1 6 1

zhou 196 r o o m - u n i t s with 450 looms were built, and in H a n g z h o u 95 old w o r k r o o m s were repaired and 302 n e w room-units were completed). In 1647, a Bureau of Weaving and Dyeing (Zhiran Ju) was established in Suzhou, w i t h the help of the Board of Works, and special measures were taken to attract textile workers back to the city. By 1653 the textile industry had recovered and had actually begun to exceed the production levels of the M i n g period. For example, during the Ming, the Suzhou imperial silk works employed 504 artisans at 173 looms. In 1685, the Suzhou works had 800 l o o m s and employed 2,330 artisans. Stele inscriptions in Suzhou lishi b o w u guan, Jiangsu shifan xueyuan lishi xi, Nanjing daxue M i n g - Q i n g shi yanjiushi, comps., Ming-Qing Suzhou gong-shang ye beikeji, pp. 5, 7 - 8 , 10—11; and Shih Min-hsiung, The Silk Industry in Ch'ing China, pp. 3 9 - 4 0 . See also Jonathan D . Spence, Ts'ao Yin and the K'ang-hsi Emperor, pp. 8 2 - 8 9 . 158 Wan Shouqi, Xi xi caotangji, l : 2 0 b - 2 1 a . 159 Ibid., 3 : 3 b - 4 a . 160 Michele Pirazzoli and H o u Ching-lang, " U n Rouleau de Wan Shouqi," pp. 1 5 7 - 1 5 8 . Tang Yin (1470-1523), whose personal seal read, "Foremost Rake South of the Yangzi River" (Jiangnan di yifengliu caizi), was considered one of the f o u r best painters of the Ming. Goodrich and Fang, Ming Biography, pp. 1256-1258. 161 Pirazzoli and H o u , "Wan Shouqi," p. 157.

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In the studio and garden at Puxi, Wan Shouqi gathered around him those friends who had survived the debacle of the late 1640s in Jiangnan.162 Hu Yanyuan, the famous Zhejiang calligrapher, joined this circle which often met for poetry contests, and those who failed to match the rhymes bought the others wine and food. Wan Shouqi's later writings thus abound with references to old friends, accounts of visits to former teachers, tales of visits to the tombs of dead loyalists, and descriptions of poetry composition and painting beside the water's edge.163 Wan Shouqi's paintings were in high demand but not easily acquired. The 19th-century calligrapher He Shaoji wrote in a colophon (1852) to one of these: T h e p a i n t i n g s o f S h o u daoren [ w h i c h w a s o n e o f Wan Shouqi's s t u d i o n a m e s ] are rare. T h e y are generally s p o n t a n e o u s l y d o n e in dry ink and w i t h a sparse brush. H e o f t e n d r e w his retreat, "Grass H u t West o f the M a r s h e s , " for his friends. I d o n o t k n o w the s c e n e r y there m y s e l f , and I i m a g i n e it as stripped bare as in his painting. O n c e , w h e n I w a s in the capital, I w a s able t o see a scroll b y h i m , "Qiu jiang song bie tu" [Picture o f a parting o n the a u t u m n a l river], d o n e f o r G u Y a n w u , w h o , w h i l e transporting rice b y boat, s t o p p e d o n t h e w a y t o visit h i m . Wan offered h i m this painting w h e n G u left.' 6 4

162 Lists of these names can be found in Wan, Xi xi caotangji, 1:25a; 2:19a, 24a. Wan's circle included Z h o u Lianggong, Fang Yizhi, Qian Qianyi, and the X i n ' a n painter C h e n g Sui, w h o w r o t e a famous p o e m about visiting Wan at the "Grass H u t West of the Marshes." Z h u o Erkan, comp., Ming yimin shi, pp. 3 2 3 - 3 2 4 . See also Scarlett Jang, " C h e n g Sui," p. 111. 163 See, e.g., Wan, Xi xi caotangji, 2:10b, 25a, where his name appears as H u Jie164 H e Shaoji, transl. in Pirazzoli and H o u , "Wan Shouqi," p. 160. T h e colop h o n is dated 1852. H e (1799-1873) was a m e m b e r of a f a m o u s family of Suzhou painters. After a court career in the Hanlin and as a proctor in the Historiographical Office, H e returned to Suzhou where he was a well k n o w n calligrapher. H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 287. Wan Shouqi's paintings are t h o u g h t by s o m e art historians to be very representative of the "dry linear style" characteristic of m u c h yimin (remnant Ming loyalists) b r u s h w o r k . Fu Shen, "An Aspect of Mid-Seventeenth C e n t u r y Chinese Painting," p. 609. For the motivations and motifs of yimin painters in the early Q i n g , see especially Ellen Johnston Laing, "Wen Tien and Chin C h u n - m i n g . "

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The famous scroll which Wan Shouqi painted for Gu Yanwu was, as the colophon states, done during Gu's visit to Wan Shouqi in 1651. 165 In 1651 Gu Yanwu was 39 sui. That summer he had paid one o f his repeated visits to the Xiaoling tomb in Jinling (Nanjing). It was very c o m m o n for former Ming loyalists to visit the Ming tombs, but for Gu Yanwu this was one o f six visits to the tomb o f the Ming founder, and there would be another four visits to the Siling tomb o f the Chongzhen Emperor in the north. 166 His obsession

165 Luo Zhenyu, Wan Nianshao xiansheng nianpu, wanpu, p. l i b . The painting was entitled "Qiu jiang bie si" (Parting thoughts on the autumnal river). Wan's own colophon reads in part: "Seeing off the master (xiansheng) as he crosses the river at Huaiyin returning to Tangshi." Wan also refers to Gu by one o f his given names (Guinian) in the colophon. Zhang Mu, Gu Tinglin xiansheng nianpu, p. 1. During the 1920s, the historian Xie Guozhen saw a painting of a boat in the home o f his teacher, Liang Qichao. The painting belonged to a collector named Yu Yueyuan and was stored in his household. On the painting was a colophon explaining that the painting was given by Wan Shouqi to Gu Yanwu in exchange for a poem. Liang Qichao had also added a colophon to the painting. Xie Guozhen, Gu Ningren xuepu, p. 24. 166 Zhang Tingrong, Qing chu si da shi shengming zhi xue, p. 47. See also Willard J . Peterson, "The Life o f Ku Yen-wu, Part II," pp. 209, 243. For an example o f a typical loyalist visit to the Ming tombs, see Gu Yanwu, Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin shiji, 4:18b. After Dodo took Nanjing, the Manchus designated two eunuchs to guard over the Xiaoling (the tomb o f Hong wu). Before then, the tomb was quite dilapidated. There is now to be found near the tumbled pailou in Nanjing that marks the approach to the tomb a stele containing an edict from Chongzhen dated 1641. The edict warns people who defile the area, as it has been defiled and damaged in recent years, that they will be severely punished. Under the Qing forty households from a village nearby were attached to the eunuchs to take care of the tomb. Gaillard, Nankin, p. 237. According to Willard Peterson, Gu Yanwu probably bribed these eunuch guards in order to visit the tomb. (Private communication.) In 1660 Gu wrote a poem about his visits to the Hongwu and Yongle Emperors' tombs: "How long is my acquaintance with these eunuchs and monks guarding the gates? / Gazing at me, they wonder why this man comes so often, / And ask: 'What business have you that brings you over these three thousand miles, / Visiting Changling in spring and Xiaoling in autumn?'" Kojiro Yoshikawa, "Political Disengagement in Seventeenth Century Chinese Literature," p. 10.

The polymath Gu Yanwu (1613-1682). Ye Gongchuo, comp., Qingdai xuezhe xiang zhuart (Shanghai, 1930), vol. 1, ce 1.

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with the mausolea and manes of the first and last Ming emperor may have had something to do with the loyalist suicide of his mother, whose letter to him had so emphatically enjoined: "Do not take office under two surnames" ( W u shi er xing).167 It certainly must have reflected Gu Yanwu's own personal sense of guilt for simply having survived the holocaust when so many of his closest friends and relatives had not.168 In 1647 he had written: I think o f uncles and brothers and cousins w h o have died in the last t w o years, those in-laws and friends w h o have died, those w h o were older than I and have died, those w h o were younger than I and have died, and the number is uncountable. 169

He had had his personal travails, of course, during those years. In 1650, Gu had also written: Having removed m y hair here and there, I took the guise o f a traveling merchant. Alas, w h e n I think of these five years, It has not been easy for me to live like this. M y arduous journeying took m e over land and water; M y e n e m y is waiting at m y gate. 170 167 This at least is faintly suggested in the letter which Gu wrote to the Bureau of Historiography, recounting his mother's death for the editors of the Ming History. "Yu Shi guan zhu jun shu" (Letter to all of their excellencies in the Bureau of Historiography), in Gu Yanwu, Tinglin shi wenji, Tinglin wenji, 3:12b-13a. See also Liu Shengmu, Changchu zhai suibi, l : 2 b - 3 a ; Shi Jin, "Gu Yanwu jingshi sixiang dejiexian," p. 114. 168 Such was also the reaction of the painter Chen Hongshou, who never could forget how he had lost his nerve during the resistance. James Cahill, ed., The Restless Landscape, pp. 146-147. 169 Peterson, "The Life of Ku Yen-wu," Part I, p. 149. 170 Ibid., p. 150. Gu Yanwu's reference to the enemy at the gate was not hyperbolic. At the time of his foster grandfather's (Shaofei) death in 1641, Gu had mortgaged 800 mu of the family land to pay for the funeral. The mortgagee was a Kunshan gentryman named Ye Fangheng, who coveted the Gu family lands. In 1652, one of the servants of the Gu family, a man named Lu En, joined the Ye household and agreed to accuse Gu Yanwu of supporting the Southern Ming in order to help Ye sequester the property. In 1655, Gu was to kill Lu En in revenge. During the following two years, Gu would be sen-

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B y 1651, then, he vivors with w h o m O n S e p t e m b e r 28, Shouqi.171 T h e t w o

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m a y have been eager to seek out f e l l o w surh e c o u l d share his e x p e r i e n c e s a n d m e m o r i e s . G u Y a n w u w e n t t o H u a i ' a n t o call u p o n W a n m e n q u i c k l y f o r m e d a c l o s e relationship. 1 7 2

A t that t i m e it w a s t h e usual practice t o e x c h a n g e a p o e m f o r a p a i n t i n g . 1 7 3 T h u s G u Y a n w u ' s g i f t i n return f o r t h e v a l u a b l e s c r o l l w h i c h Wan S h o u q i painted for h i m w a s a l o n g p o e m , c o m p o s e d in c e l e b r a t i o n o f Wan's years after t h e resistance i n S o n g j i a n g h a d e n d e d . W r i t t e n in t h e s e m i - p r i v a t e l a n g u a g e o f t h e literati o f China, the p o e m w a s a t e s t i m o n y f r o m G u — w h o o n l y appears w i t h i n t h e p o e m as a s i m i l a r l y d i s p l a c e d f e l l o w t r a v e l e r — t o a m a n w h o s e o w n active i n v o l v e m e n t he admired and w h o s e very pers o n m a y h a v e r e p r e s e n t e d t o G u Y a n w u t h e actual h o p e o f a M i n g restoration.

For the Departure of Wan Shouqi the Graduate A White D r a g o n changed into a fish A n d fell into Y u Qie's net. T h e fisherman was t o o frightened to kill h i m But let h i m continue o n his long journey. T h e talent o f myriad generations, Profound and pristine, noble and lively, M u s t appear fettered in times o f danger.

tenced to forced labor, would appeal the verdict, would be beaten and released from jail, and would have to flee Jiangnan for north China after Ye's hired assassins tried to kill him. Ibid., pp. 154-156. 171 Zhang, Gu Tinglin xiansheng nianpu, p. 23. 172 Shortly after this, Wan Shouqi was among a number of Gu Yanwu's close friends who signed a public notice introducing Gu to other scholars in the empire as a man of great repute, and announcing his plans to travel about, looking at rare books, antiquities, and so forth. This letter, which was brought to my attention by Ch'eng I-fan, is enclosed in "Tongzhi zeng yan" (Words sent by comrades), in Gu Yanwu, Tinglin xiansheng yishu huiji, 1888 ed., 4 0 : 1 - 3 . 173 "Artistic activity is the means of expression of friendship. He who inscribes repays the painting with a poem, and he who paints uses (substitutes) the paint for a poem. Painting and poetry assuage longing." Jao Tsung-i, "Painting and the Literati in the late Ming," p. 143.

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He by nature loyal, righteous and unswerving, Angered and retired at once. He cut his hair and changed his features, Telling fortunes west of the river And composing verse of enduring worth. North and south, around Chu district, Night and day, wheels rushing on, He dares to spy out the north. There are no two scholars of like talent elsewhere. He turns back and gazes toward Pengcheng, In former times the grounds of a hegemon. Sometime, once again, the mists here will dissipate. For the moment, though, the mountains and rivers are still defiled. They came so far as to seize Nanjing, The nine provinces in their grasp. So you turn back your carriage to retire east of the Huai, To compose your poems and draw close the study curtains In memory of the former gate porter of Wu city. In the Void you mourn the mountain spirits, No hope for help from the south. I, too, have fluttered here and there, A thousand leagues along mountain paths, In the boundlessness at least attaining some release. We must wait until the waters of the Huai settle. Then, in the clear autumn, I will send a boat of Wu.174 Gu Yanwu's p o e m was deliberately allusive. The White Dragon was the Heavenly Emperor's mythical pet w h o descended to earth in the guise o f a fish. In the original myth the fisherman Y u Q i e struck the dragon in the eye with an arrow, not realizing that it was a divine being. The dragon then resumed its higher incarnation and flew back to the Heavenly Emperor, crying for Y u Q i e to be punished; but the Emperor refused to do so, saying that the White D r a g o n should not have taken such a lowly form in the first place. 175 174 Gu, Tinglin shi wettji, Tinglin shiji, 2: 3a. This p o e m is also to be found in Gu Y a n w u , Tinglin xiansheng yishu huiji, 1906 ed., Tinglin shiji [Collected p o e m s o f Tinglin], 2 : 3 b . 175 T h e m y t h occurs in the Han period work Shuo yuan.

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As Gu used the myth, however, Yu Qie was like the Manchu conquerors themselves. Having captured the White Dragon— noble Wan Shouqi—they recognized him for what he was and were "too frightened to kill" such a divine creature. And Wan himself, like the holy dragon, was let free to wander again once he had changed back to his spiritual form. 176 In his changed form, Wan Shouqi "dares to spy out the north"— a line which referred to the Tang hero Quan Gao, who carried out an important mission to the north for Emperor Xuanzong (r. 847-859) during the late Tang "restoration." Quan Gao also returned from the north to care for his sick mother, which may be the way in which Gu Yanwu (who had not actively served in the loyalist cause for that reason) viewed Wan Shouqi's attachment to home and hearth at this point. But though the poem clearly admitted that Wan Shouqi had thus retired from active service in the Ming cause, it also suggested two lines later that he may just have been biding his time. For, "he turns back and gazes toward Pengcheng," the base of a "hegemon." Pengcheng was in ancient times the name for the area just around Xuzhou, which was the seat of the hegemon of Chu, Xiang Yu, who led the attack against the Qin in 209 B.C. It may take years—Gu Yanwu seemed to be saying—for the enemy to be overthrown, but eventually the waters of the Huai would settle and: "sometime, once again, the mists here will dissipate." There was no question of the illegitimacy of the Qing occupation as far as Gu's poem to Wan was concerned. Wan himself was 176 T h e r e are deeper resonances here: hints o f g r a n d e r o u t c o m e s . In t h e original m y t h , t h e W h i t e D r a g o n ' s trip to earth is a descent " i n t o a clear and cold a b y s s . " T h a t s a m e i m a g e of t h e " a b y s s " occurs in t h e explanation o f the first h e x a g r a m (qian) of t h e Book of Changes. T h e r e the entire h e x a g r a m describes t h e imperial d r a g o n , and t h e " a b y s s " itself is closely linked w i t h 9 - 3 , w h i c h is e n j o i n e d as t h e m o m e n t of s u p r e m e action w h e n the d r a g o n begins t o c o m e o u t of hiding, and prepares to ascend again. T h e i m a g e o f an o b v i o u s d y n a s t i c r i s e — s u g g e s t i n g a n e w M i n g d y n a s t y — i s reinforced b y the r e f e r ence t o C h u w h e r e t h e rebellions against t h e Q i n first b r o k e o u t . H e r e , t o o , t h e r e is a h i n t that like the Q i n , the M a n c h u s are b u t a harsh e p h e m e r a l d y nasty, i m p o s i n g o r d e r after a period of anarchy t h o u g h d o o m e d to fall in a f e w s h o r t years.

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said to draw his study curtains to compose poetry in honor o f the "gate porter o f W u , " which referred to Mei Fu o f the Latter Han who refused to take office under Wang Mang the usurper. Mei Fu was supposed to have become an immortal; so also should Wan, without "hope for help from the south," mourn like a spirit for the defiled mountains o f China. Like Gu, Wan would find in the very formlessness o f his transient life the freedom they ultimately desired. T h e final two lines o f Gu Yanwu's poem spoke ambiguously o f sending a boat for Wan once the Huai waters had settled. Was Gu Yanwu inviting Wan Shouqi to join him on his travels? O r was he hinting that the resistants o f Wu would rise again, and fetch Wan Shouqi for their cause when the moment came? T h e Manchu conquest o f China was far from completed. There would be a Southern Ming regime to look toward for more than another decade, and other Ming loyalists—however credible— years after that. Yet the occupation o f Jiangnan was consolidated. O n e wonders, then, how Gu Yanwu could seriously have suggested that Wu would rise again. Certainly, Gu Yanwu and Wan Shouqi may have felt that the Qing dynasty was bound to be transitory. T h e analogy with the Yuan dynasty, as well as the Qin, was always present; and Gu Yanwu had earlier written with pointed parallels o f the supposed discovery o f the famous Xin shi (History o f mind) in a well in Chengtian Temple in Suzhou in 1638. That rediscovered account o f the Southern Song, written at the time by the painter Zheng Sixiao, had predicted that the Yuan would only last a century, or even less. Gu himself had underscored that prediction, which turned out to be true, and hence more than implied that the same would be so for the Manchus. 177 Besides, even if the Qing did reign for awhile, as the Yuan had, the culture o f China would continue to flourish and would thus survive such an intermittent period o f barbarian rule.178

177 Gu, Tinglirt shi wen ji, Tinglin shiji, 5 : 1 2 - 1 3 a . Many Ming scholars considered the Xin shi a forgery. Yoshikawa, "Political Disengagement," pp. 1 1 - 1 2 ; John D. Langlois, Jr., "Chinese Culturalism and the Yuan Analogy," p. 376. 178 The Yuan analogy was frequently made by early Qing writers. As John Lan-

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But to argue for the transiency of the Qing was not at all the same as to continue calling for a genuine Ming restoration. In that sense, the sheer allusiveness, the deliberate lack of clarity, the ambiguous statements about spiritual development against the backdrop of the ambitions of Wu—all of these obscurities in Gu Yanwu's poem to Wan Shouqi may have reflected Gu's own private belief that while a time might come for resistance, the hope for a genuine loyalist restoration had nearly vanished. Indeed, at one point during his travels in this period, Gu Yanwu wrote of scholars w h o lamented the fall of the Ming: "The remnants (yimin) conceive of schemes to gain hegemony. Roaming here and there they feel such melancholy. But do not laugh at an impoverished ra."179 One would hardly laugh at a man imprisoned in 1670 for writing an anti-Manchu tract, but one may at least suggest that Gu's own restlessness, his constant traveling the length and breadth of China, reflected a longing to escape from the oppressive realization that, in actuality, the Ming was no more.1*" glois had remarked about Gu Sili's compilation of Yuan poetry (the Yuan shi xuan): " K u (Gu) seems to be suggesting that culture as he knows it and loves it w o u l d continue during the Manchu period of rule over China, a period which, again by analogy, would prove to be ephemeral." John D. Langlois, Jr., " K u Ssu-li, the Yuan-shih-hsuan, and Loyalism in Late 17th-Century China," p. 3. Langlois has also observed that, "When the fighting was over, culturalistic notions enabled the Han people to participate in the new SinoM a n c h u polity, committed to the belief of the universality and continuity of their culture." Langlois, "Chinese Culturalism," p. 357. 179 Gu, Tinglin shi wenji, Tinglin shiji, 3:1b. T h e term yimin, which dates back to the Book of Odes, can be translated as "remnant people." Yimin are usually distinguished f r o m zhong yi (loyal and righteous) w h o were loyalist martyrs. See Langlois, "Chinese Culturalism," pp. 378-379. 180 O n the "longing to escape f r o m the oppression of the actual," see Irving Babbitt, Rousseau and Romanticism, p. 72. O n Gu's travels and his arrest in 1670, see Etienne Balazs, Political Theory and Administrative Reality in Traditional China, p. 31. Peterson also suggests that Gu's loyalism was ambiguous. " T h e Manchu conquest provided the occasion for Ku to manifest an u n c o m promising stance of virtue on an externally determinable basis. . . . His refusal to take examinations under the Ch'ing may in part be interpreted as his choosing to avoid the intense social competition in which he had failed to advance as a y o u n g man. Instead, he devoted his energies to alternative means of establishing a reputation, the achievement of which could be re-

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Other contemporaries seem to have reached the same conclusion, especially after the second Guangdong uprising failed in 1650.181 Yan Ermei, who by then had acquired a considerable public reputation as a lyricist, gave up his wanderings to settle down. 182 He accepted the patronage of Governor Zhao Fuxing, w h o sent an envoy to Yan's temporary dwelling at Dahewei to invite him respectfully to be his guest.183 With his hair tied up in a knot under a red-tasselled hat, Yan rode to the governor's guest house with all his belongings. He wept with relief at finding a place to settle down, and summed up his present and past for himself: Well, I ' m b e d d e d a n d b o a r d e d j u s t like the g o o d old days. A scholar s h o u l d persevere a n d cultivate his will. People s h o u l d discipline t h e m s e l v e s t o k e e p f r o m r o t t i n g away. T h e early m o r n i n g skin o f

garded as having been incumbent upon him as the adopted son of a paragon of virtue. Whatever his motivations, the fall of the Ming was the occasion for Ku to change his life completely." Peterson, "Ku Yen-wu, Part I," p. 152. The theme of travel as a means of escape from the present is also to be seen in the poetry of the loyalist painter Gong Xian. Zhuo, Ming yimin shi, p. 330. See also Jerome Silbergeld, "The Political Landscapes of Kung Hsien in Painting and Poetry," p. 564; idem, "Kung Hsien's Self-Portrait in Willows," pp. 7 - 1 0 . O f course, travel itself was part of what we have come to think of as a literati style of life in late imperial China, especially after the 15th century. Timothy Brook, "Guides for Vexed Travelers," p. 41. Lovell has noted: "Indeed, it would be difficult to think of a society in history in which travel played as significant a role in the life of a certain social caste as it did to the educated Chinese. . . . In a life not infrequently touched by disappointments, and partings and sudden deaths, his imagination found solace in the cosmic imagery of man as a traveler through the journey of life." Hincheung Lovell, "A Question of Choice, A Matter of Rendition," pp. 63-64. For the extraordinary amount of time spent by Chinese literati in traveling, which was regarded as a life-long activity, see Li Chi, The Love of Nature, pp. 5-6. 181 Struve, "Uses of History," p. 102. 182 Yan Ermei's lyrics were still known to Xuzhou people in the 20th century. Xie Guozhen, Gu Ningren xuepu, p. 140. 183 Yan was then staying with a wealthy landowner named Tao Yu, m. Wanming.

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frost is stripped away by rushing water; the strong wind tests the mettle of the grass. Men are like this too.184

Nor did Wan Shouqi heed Gu Yanwu's call to "flutter here and there." Wan did take a trip to Kunshan early in 1652, but his purpose was to invite Gu Yanwu's close friend Gui Zhuang to come back to Huaiyin with him and become his son's tutor. Perhaps he had intimations of his own frailty and wanted to be sure to provide for his son's education, because only a few days after he returned with Gui Zhuang to the "Grass Hut West of the Marshes," Wan Shouqi fell ill of the spleen. The disease took a rapid toll on the painter. In a few weeks he was near death, and on the third day of the fifth lunar month, at the age of 50, Wan Shouqi passed away.185 His last painting remained unfinished, but he did manage to write a few final lines of poetry evoking for one last time the brittle evanescence of those troubled and bitter years. The poem "Wind and Rain at a Time of Sickness" is mostly missing, but the lines remaining read: Thousands of layers of dreams, Ten thousand li from home, Wandering to the ends of the earth. Day by day the autumn light approaches. What year is it now? Muddled, won't remember. So many feelings in the corner of the room Where there still hangs a calendar of Chongzhen.186 184 Yan Ermei, Baichun shan ren ji, 9:29b. 185 Pirazzoli and Hou, "Wan Shouqi," p. 158; Gui Zhuang ji, pp. 547-548. 186 Wan, Xi xi caotangji, 4:6b.

C H A P T E R ELEVEN

The Final Pacification of the North I rode by starlight, crossing west of the river on patrol. Nothing but desert lies before one's eyes. This is another world: hundreds of leagues of broken columns of rising smoke, mountains bare of foliage, lands that yield no grain. Along the roadway, there are none but barbarians (fanren) w h o surround us back and front. Zhang Zhongyuan, Despatch from the Gansu Corridor, 1650, Ming Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmin qiyi ziliao jilu, p. 282.

The sense of relief in the Qing court, which was encouraged by the glowing reports of its pacification officials during the winter of 1647-1648, was very short-lived. The spring of 1648 brought with it a sudden reversal of fortunes for the Manchus: many of the areas in north China which the court had thought were under control burst into rebellion once more. The reversal coincided with, and may even have been a direct response to, the resurgence of loyalist activity in south China after Jin Shenghuan and Li Chengdong reverted to the Ming cause. One of the first areas where rebellion broke out in the north was around Tianjin. The disorder there that Lei Xing tried to subdue had continued after the revolts of 1644-1645. In fact, Zhang Xin, the former Ming Minister of Punishments from Shandong, was demoted and disgraced as governor of Zhili for having glossed over the defeats which he had suffered at the hands of these "coastal 784

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bandits" in the summer of 1647.1 His successor, Li Youlong, soon realized how well entrenched and dangerous the rebels were—especially those claiming to represent the Ming royal house. In March of 1648 a bandit leader in Qingyun, south of Tianjin on the Shandong border, announced himself to be the heir apparent of Emperor Xizong (r. 1621). This man, Yang Sihai by name, was joined by a Sanhe woman named Zhang who pretended to be Xizong's former consort. Uniting with another bandit leader named Zhang Tianbao, the rebels made Ming seals and flags, and gathered enough forces to hand Li Youlong a severe defeat. Three months later, in June, Li and Brigade General Su Pinghan sent another military contingent against the rebels, but inflicted only minor casualties on the Ming loyalists. That August the rebels once again assembled to attack the important district capital of Jinghai on the Grand Canal south of Tianjin. This time Li Youlong was able to seize some of the rebel leaders, but he was already coming to feel that piecemeal measures of repression were simply making matters worse in the Tianjin area. Counting on the support of the Vice-President of Revenue, Wang Gongbi, Li argued that zhaoju (soothing) should be applied, and invited some of the bandits to his own camp. This failed to stem the rebellion. O n September 18, 1648, Li and Su Pinghan claimed to have exterminated a number of rebels east of Tianjin, but Li was soon removed from his post for the same reasons as his predecessor's dismissal. The region would continue to be troubled by rebellion until well into 1649, when the court finally sent in "heavy troops" and increased the size of the Tianjin garrison. 2

1 Da-Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu (hereafter Shizu shilu), 34:3, 34:18, cited in Xie Guozhen, ed., Qingchu nongmiti qiyi ziliaojilu, p. 53. Zhang had been recommended for the governorship o f Tianjin in 1645. He was demoted o n August 9, 1647, and resigned shortly afterwards on the pretext o f illness. His son, Zhang Duan, also appears in the Er chen zhuan. Zhang Duan was among the Shandong gentrymen recommended for high office by Wang Aoyong, governor o f Shandong. Like Chen Mingxia, Zhang Duan had passed the jinshi examination o f 1643, and was posted to the Hongwen Yuan. H e later became a grand secretary. Er chen zhuan, 12:14a-15b. 2 Er chen zhuan, juan 6, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 53; Shizu shilu, 40: 461b. See also Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 7; Xie Guozhen, Nanming shilue, p. 97.

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The Elm Garden Army Even though the Tianjin uprisings caused considerable consternation at court, they were soon overshadowed by the alarming activities of the Elm Garden Army (Yuyuan jun). This was a collection of loyalist bands operating out of the forested district of Caozhou in southwestern Shandong along the borders of Hebei and Henan. For years, gangs of armed men had been raiding across those borders, attacking cities in Hebei's (Beizhili) Darning prefecture or in districts around Kaifeng in Henan. 3 The government tolerated these forays as long as they remained sporadic incidents. However, there was always the potential for large armed units from Caozhou to actually seize a district capital and unite both with local bandits as well as with rebel or Ming loyalist units from the neighboring provinces of Hebei and Henan. In that event, communications along both the Grand Canal and the imperial highway running through Darning prefecture in Hebei would be threatened, and consequently government control over southern Hebei, southern Shandong, and northern Henan would be placed in jeopardy. That threat materialized in the fourth lunar month (April 2 3 May 21) of 1648 when an Elm Garden Army leader named Li Huajing surrounded and besieged the city of Dongming just across the Hebei border from Caozhou. As local dissidents arose in response, Li Huajing seized Dongming, and then turned back into southern Shandong where by late summer he had managed to attack and capture Caozhou itself and the surrounding district capitals of Cao, Dingtao, and Chengwu. 4 While the Shandong rebels pushed westward across the Hebei border, local gangs joined

3 M o s t recently, in February, 1647, a bandit named Kong Wu had plundered Nanle in Darning before being killed by Kong Xigui. At the same time, the Shandong rebel D i n g M i n g w u attacked Kaizhou in Darning. T h e local prefect was killed, but a spirited resistance was led by the magistrate and D i n g was killed in turn. Kong Xigui's biography in Er chen zhuan, juan 4; Darning Juzhi [Prefectural gazetteer o f Darning], Xianfeng edition, juan 4, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 97. 4 Caozhou juzhi [Caozhou prefectural gazetteer], cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 91.

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in the attack on cities like Qingfeng and Nanyue. In these district capitals, which were closer to the major garrison town of Darning, the local military officials and gentry were able to drive off the rebels, but casualties were heavy on the imperial side.5 In the other direction, driving up toward central Shandong, the rebels attacked the town of Juye and kept it under siege from August 30 to September 5 before being driven off by reinforcements. 6 To the south, Li Huajing's men crossed the Henan border and the Yellow River to attack Guide. Closer to Kaifeng, the Hebei rebel general Liu Zhibing laid siege to Lanyang on September 20.7 Soon the entire north bank of the Yellow River opposite Kaifeng had fallen into rebel hands, and the city of Fengqiu had become the headquarters for an army from Caoxian commanded by Fan Shenxing, who— it was reported in official despatches—transformed mere local "bandits" (kou) into dangerously ambitious "brigands" ( d a o ) . B The Elm Garden Army—which was said to total twenty thousand—was actually a conglomeration of more than twenty selfcontained rebel brigades ( y i n g ) of about one thousand men each, scattered across the three provinces. 9 Battle reports described their encampments as being housed in large fortified castles (lou) with inner redoubts and defended by cannons, even including Portuguese ( F o l a n g j i ) artillery.10 The towers were often crowned with large white banners, and the rebels kept their women and live5 Darning Jitzhi [Darning prefectural gazetteer], Xianfeng edition, juan 4, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmitt, p. 97. 6 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 91. 7 Biography of Gao Di in Er chen zhuan, juan 4, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 97; biography of Wu Jingdao in Qing shigao, liezhuan 27, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 98. 8 Biography of Wu Jingdao in Qing shi gao, liezhuan 27, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 98. 9 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 91. 10 It is not clear from the Qing battle reports whether these castles had belonged to the rebels in the first place or were captured in the course of the uprising. Usually, they were named after families (e.g., Majialou, the "Ma Family Castle"), with the surnames differing from those of the ying leaders, so that it is possible that these were taken by the rebels after they had decided to attack the district capitals.

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stock in the encampments with them. When Manchu and M o n g o l troops attacked the rebel fortifications, they sometimes simply burned the castles down, destroying everyone in the conflagration. At other times they were more discriminating, killing the men and distributing the livestock and w o m e n among their o w n soldiers. Few prisoners were taken, and most of these were simply interrogated on the spot, then decapitated and their heads displayed as public warnings. 1 1 T h e various ying or brigades of the Elm Garden A r m y were linked in their c o m m o n opposition to the Manchu, Mongol, and Chinese soldiers fighting on the side of the government, as well as by a loose system of alliances between one ying and the next. For example, the main road to Caoxian was occupied by t w o major rebel camps, about ten li apart. They were quite separate groups, one c o m m a n d e d by a man named Fan and the other by someone named Xiao, but they regarded each other as allies and would come to the other's aid if under attack. 12 Overall, their strategy hardly seems to have been coordinated, and what gave them general unity in the eyes of the Qing officials reporting on their activities was the use of Ming titles, princely ranks, and official designations. Li Huajing himself had even ensconced a distant Ming royal relative in his headquarters at Dongming, and orders and patents were being issued in the name of a Tianzheng Emperor. 1 3 What also gave the Elm Garden A r m y an appearance of organized coordination in the eyes of D o r g o n and his advisors was the possibility of a conspiracy linking the rebel leaders with the f o r mer warlord of Shandong, Liu Zeqing, w h o was now residing in the imperial capital. At the time the Grand A r m y had crossed the Yellow River to attack Yangzhou, Jiangbei loyalists like Yan Ermei had hoped that Liu Zeqing would support the Southern M i n g cause. However, Liu saw greater opportunities on the side of the

11 See the various detailed battle reports by Major Tong Wenhuan and Captain Z h a o Chengji in Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 98. 12 See Major Tong Wenhuan's report on his engagement with these rebels in Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 98. 13 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 91.

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Qing. When D o d o sent Junta, the distinguished Tunggiya general, to Huai'an to invite Liu's collaboration, the Shandong warlord surrendered his personal army o f fifty officers and t w o thousand men to the Manchu general, receiving in exchange amnesty and the rank o f viscount third class.14 Perhaps it was the relatively low rank o f his aristocratic title that nettled Liu Zeqing into sedition. He was a man well known for his ambition, often being heard by banquet guests to boast: "At twenty-one I threw down my brush. A t thirty-one I became a general. B y forty-one I was a well known political figure. After all, w e don't know what will happen in the next twenty years, do we? " 15 H e was known as well for his impetuousness, having killed a yamen lictor with his fists during a brawl while he was a student attending the local examinations.16 Such rashness may have also prompted the treacherous activities that began to come to light after September 5, when a man named Cheng Wanzhan led one thousand armed men in an attack on the district capital o f Dan, which lies just east o f Caoxian.17 After the attack on Dan was foiled, the local magistrate reported that Cheng Wanzhan was none other than the estate bailiff (zhuangtou) o f Liu Zeqing, whose own family members were prominent local magnates in Caoxian itself. Dorgon reacted to the news warily. "It is impossible to know yet," he told the Board o f War, "whether he [Liu Zeqing] has bitten the hand that feeds him, or whether others are spreading rumors."18 There was no point in needlessly provoking a prominent collaborator like Liu w h o came, after all, f r o m the province where most of Dorgon's highest civil officials originated. Other Shandong notables now collaborating

14 Y a o Guangxiao et al., eds., Ming shilu (hereafter Ming shilu),

17:9a, 13b;

Kunshan y i m i n ningren Gu Y a n w u (Wen Bing), Sheng'an benji (Jiayi shian) (hereafter W e n Bing, Jiayi shian), p. 41; X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 11; Arthur W . H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing Period, pp. 531-532. 15 X i a Y u n y i , Xu xing cun lu, p. 68. According to rumor, L i u — w h o had been a bandit—became a general after giving Grand Secretary Z h o u Yanru a bribe o f 200,000 taels. Zhang Y i , Sou wen xu bi, 1:13a. 16 X i a , Xu xing cun lu, p. 68. 17 Ming-Qing

shiliao, bing, ben 7, cited in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, pp. 9 4 - 9 5 .

18 Ibid., p. 95.

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with the Manchus might regard an accusation o f treason as slander, an effort by Liu's many political enemies to take unjust advantage o f the participation o f his retainers in the Elm Garden A r m y affair, and perhaps even turn on the dynasty themselves. If Liu Zeqing was indeed implicated in this local rebellion, that would have to be demonstrated with hard evidence. Let him be constantly watched from dawn to dusk and not allowed personally to send someone towards the region of Caoxian. If anyone arrives from Caoxian, then he must promptly leave again. Nor must we allow his kinsmen to approach other families, nor if their retainers come, can they be allowed to enter.19

The Board o f War was to treat Liu with special consideration and not place him under arrest. "Wait until the crisis o f Caoxian is settled," Dorgon commanded, "and then things will appear more clearly." 20 The military suppression o f "the crisis at Caoxian," like the quelling o f the rest o f the uprisings that autumn in the three provinces' border area, fell under the general supervision o f the Director-General o f Conservancy, Yang Fangxing. 21 However a great deal o f support was provided by the governor o f Henan, W u Jingdao, w h o placed general responsibility for suppressing the rebels in the hands o f the former Ming general Gao Di. It was Gao, then, who began to clear the south bank o f the Yellow River in Henan, driving the Elm Garden forces back towards Lanyang, while Brigade General Kong Xigui cut off the escape route to the east. 22 The Qing hero o f this campaign was a major named Tong Wenhuan who had been transferred along with his elite cavalry unit from a Mongol garrison force to Wang Jingdao's command. O n September 20, Major Tong defeated Liu Zhibing's Elm Gar-

19 Ibid. 20 Ibid. 21 T h e Eastern Conservancy comprised all Henan and Shandong rivers (including the Yellow River) plus the Grand Canal. The Director-General's office and residence were in Jining. Susan Naquin, Shantung Rebellion, p. 21. 22 W u Jingdao's biography, Qing shi gao, nongmin, p. 98.

liezhuan,

27, cited in Xie,

Qingchu

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791

den rebels at Lanyang, and helped drive the enemy back across the Yellow River toward Fengqiu where Fan Shenxing was killed. By October 28, Gao Di's men were attacking and burning bandit castles along the north bank of the Yellow River. Two days later, to the east, General Kong Xigui had despatched two Manchu detachments toward Caoxian. The latter interrogated prisoners of war captured enroute until they discovered the whereabouts of a force of over ten thousand rebels near the "Zhang Family Castle" (Zhangjialou) outside Caoxian, under the command of a "duke" named Zhang Guangsu. The Manchus subsequently sent an elite cavalry and infantry force of one thousand soldiers to attack the bandit camp near the district capital. In the ensuing encounter, thousands of Elm Garden rebels were killed, twelve major officers were captured, and those who escaped were surrounded in their barricaded Zhangjialou. When the ramparts were taken and destroyed, the rebels locked themselves in the tower itself, which was set on fire by the Manchus. The rebels either perished in the flames or were killed as they fled the burning redoubt. Caoxian was now thrown open to Qing troops, and the road between that city and Dongming was cleared of rebel cavalry by Major Tong Wenhuan's Mongols between November 4 and 6, 1648.23 Dongming itself had been besieged by a joint Chinese-Manchu force since September 13. The rebels had first put up a defense outside the city, fighting fiercely and reluctantly yielding ground. By September 17, they had abandoned their first line of defense to retreat into the city. Four days later, a group of rebel cavalry and infantrymen tried to relieve the city from the northeast, but the Qing forces managed to drive them off. On October 11, the attackers offered to negotiate with Li Huajing, who led the defense of Dongming. Parleys were held, and the Qing commanders offered to spare Li Huajing and the other Elm Garden leaders if they would surrender the Ming relative whom they had enthroned as the Tianzheng Emperor. Li refused, both then and again on October 30, to yield the Ming pretender. On November 16, heavy

2 3 T h i s account is based o n successive military reports filed w i t h W u Jingdao's report in Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, cited in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, pp. 98-99.

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Manchu artillery units finally reached Dongming, bringing cann o n strong enough to break through the city's thick walls. All t h r o u g h the 17th, and on into the early hours of the next day, the Manchu cannon bombarded the city. O n November 18 the n o r t h west corner of the wall collapsed, and the Manchus breached the Elm Garden rebels' defenses. Many were killed in the massacre that followed, but Li Huajing and Li Hongji were taken alive for questioning. The "crisis at Caoxian" was over for the time being, and prisoners were now in Qing hands w h o could prove Liu Z e qing either guilty or innocent of involvement in the conspiracy. 24

The Case of Liu Zeqing Even before the fall of D o n g m i n g and Caoxian new evidence had come to light which implicated Liu Zeqing in the uprising. O n N o v e m b e r 4, 1648, while Major Tong Wenhuan's cavalrymen were clearing the road between D o n g m i n g and Caoxian, a young maid named Chen Gui was seized by the police as she clambered over the back wall of Liu Zeqing's family compound in Beijing. U n d e r interrogation by the Board of Punishments she said that she had seen a letter f r o m Liu to his mother in Caoxian warning her of the impending uprising before it occurred. Furthermore, she had heard r u m o r s in the household that another letter had been sent by Liu to the Elm Garden rebels, promising to lead an uprising in the capital on October l. 25 O n the basis of this new evidence, and with most of the principal protagonists in its hands, the government felt that the time had come to round up members of the Liu family. O n December 3, D o r g o n issued an imperial rescript charging Liu Zeqing with treason and ordering a complete investigation of the case. W u Dahai, President of Punishments, then assigned judicial agents to interrogate Li H o n g j i and Li Huajing, w h o soon broke down and told t h e m what they wanted to know. According to their testimony,

24 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 1, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 9 2 - 9 4 . 25 T h i s and t h e f o l l o w i n g i n f o r m a t i o n c o m e f r o m the legal report b y W u D a h a i in Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 9 4 - 9 7 .

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Liu Zeqing's nephew, Liu Zhigan, had secretly visited the south disguised as a Buddhist monk. He had returned in the company o f two men, Zheng Longfang and Yao Wenchang, who were formerly colonels in Liu Zeqing's command and now served as generals for the Southern Ming court. The two men had been assigned to plot a Ming loyalist uprising in Caoxian. If Li Huajing and Li Hongji were to join them—Liu Zhigan had p r o m i s e d — they would then be named general and prince respectively. The plan had been to initiate an uprising in Caoxian timed to coincide with an uprising in Beijing, led by Liu Zeqing. Consequently, having told them about the conspiracy, Liu Zhigan had left for the capital to coordinate plans with his uncle. Eight days later, on July 17, 1648, Liu Zhigan had returned from Beijing and had contacted Li Hongji, ordering him to attack Caoxian on August 24. As it turned out, the attack did not actually take place until September 5, but this was the conspiracy behind it. 26 Based on Li Huajing and Li Hongji's testimony alone, the government's case did not directly incriminate Liu Zeqing. For, the two rebels only had the word o f Liu Zhigan that his uncle was engaged in the conspiracy; they could not personally assure the investigators o f Liu Zeqing's direct complicity. Soon, however, the Board o f Punishments' agents produced new evidence that did implicate him. Under interrogation, Liu Zeqing's stepson, Jixian, reported that the old general had been infuriated when his nephew, Zhigan, was not selected by the Qing government to become a member o f the prestigious Imperial Bodyguard. He had then sent one o f his retainers with the following message to member o f the Liu family in Caoxian: "In my opinion, [the Manchus] are a bunch o f small fry. The Qing state does not know how to employ people. Its good fortune won't last long." 27 The retainer also brought a specially sealed letter for Zhigan, which Jixian and the others were not allowed to see. Remembering the maid's story o f a letter setting the date o f O c tober 1 for Zeqing's own uprising in the capital, the interrogators from the Board o f Punishments re-questioned Liu Zhigan, asking 2 6 Ibid. 27 Ibid., p. 9 5 .

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him if he had received a letter from his uncle at that time. "Yes," Zhigan responded, "there was a letter enclosed in a parcel; but I lost it and have forgotten the words written on it." Other members of the family having also confirmed that Zhigan had received a letter, the question was finally put to General Liu Zeqing himself. Zeqing's answer was that, "I originally sent out two letters to the family. One was solely for Liu Zhigan to read." What, the investigators persistently asked, was in the letter? "I only remember the other one," Liu Zeqing insisted.28 Finally, the interrogators confronted Liu Zeqing with a report from one of the guards assigned to watch him during the period of house arrest. The guard's report stated that he had seen the general late one night burn a sheaf of documents. What were these papers if not incriminating evidence of some kind? After repeated questioning, Liu Zeqing at last confessed that the papers he had burned included his Ming patent of nobility, conferring the title of the Marquis of Dongping upon him for becoming one of the four Guardian Generals. The Board of Punishment investigators were thus able to conclude several points with a reasonable degree of certainty. First, Liu Zeqing had indeed sent a retainer to Caoxian against imperial orders. Second, he had sent two letters, one of which was secret. Zhigan's tale that the secret letter had been lost and that he had forgotten its contents the investigators found difficult to believe. [Third,] there is the burning of the document. Zeqing has confessed that this was a Ming patent of nobility. Yet it has already been five years since our dynasty received the mandate. He ought to have surrendered it sooner instead of secreting it away until now. After all, what could his intention be? Fourth was the matter of motivation. His nephew Zhigan had indeed been passed over for appointment into the Imperial Bodyguard, and it was the communication between the two of them that plausibly seemed to lie at the heart of the conspiracy. Fifth was the testimony from the Elm Garden rebels themselves that Zhigan had adopted a Buddhist disguise to get in touch with Ming loyal28 Ibid.

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ists. Finally, and most infuriating of all in certain respects, was Liu Zeqing's cavalier and sarcastic comment that the Manchus were "small fry," or as he literally put it, "shrimps frying meat." T h e government investigators bitterly picked up Zeqing's own slur to c o m m e n t on his ingratitude: On the day we sallied forth to the hunt, we were aroused with bravery and fought to victory. When you capture a wild beast, then you roast him together for food. Even though Zeqing hunted [with us], these words were truly [uttered by him].29 Yet however annoyed he may have been by Liu's deprecation, D o r g o n was still very conscious of the political risk of making a H a n adherent like Zeqing appear a martyr to Manchu paranoia. T h e prince-regent therefore insisted that the Manchu and Chinese presidents of all six boards try the case, and that all officials of vicepresidential rank and above be made privy to the matter. O n December 9, after Zeqing had been formally convicted as chief conspirator of the Caoxian uprising, he, his nephew Zhigan, Li H o n g j i , and Li Huajing were all executed. The remaining m e m bers of the Liu family were banished f r o m Shandong and sent into exile. 30

The Muslim Revolt of 1648 While these events were unfolding in Shandong, far to the west, along the Central Asian frontier, another kind of rebellion was erupting: Muslim communities revolted against Q i n g rule in Gansu and western Shaanxi. The causes of the Muslim revolt of May, 1648 are obscure. As has been mentioned earlier, some historians argue that the decline in Central Asian trade provoked an economic depression that led to a rising crescendo of Muslim revolts in the late Ming, with many Chinese Muslims joining in the large rebellions that coalesced around the figure of Li Zicheng.

29 Ibid. 30 Ibid.

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Economic advantage and trading privileges had been a primary cause o f friction between the Ming court and the merchants and rulers o f Turfan during the 16th century. In fact, warriors from Turfan had raided the Gansu corridor in the 1520s after repeated clashes between Ming border troops and Muslim soldiers over the evasion o f tributary regulations. In the course o f these disorders, and especially after the conquest by Turfan o f Hami in 1513, tens o f thousands o f Hami Muslim refugees fled into Chinese territory and were settled in the Gansu corridor at places like Suzhou, Ganzhou, and Liangzhou. These refugees later provided a direct link to Hami, which was important to the 1 6 4 8 - 1 6 4 9 uprising. They also increased the competition for available resources with both non-Muslim and Muslim Chinese settlers already residing in those places. Banditry became quite common, especially as the decline in the horse and tea trade may have affected the livelihood o f Muslims whose commonest shared surname (Ma, horse) underscored their prominent role in horse breeding and the transport o f trading goods. Lao Huihui ( " O l d Muslim"), the rebel leader who helped Li Zicheng at a nadir in his fortunes, was only the most famous o f many different outlaws along the frontier. Some o f them were no doubt driven to banditry by the reduction in the postal system in the late Ming (one-third o f the postal station attendants were dismissed in an economy measure in 1629, and many o f these in fact were Muslims). Revolt became chronic, and Muslim uprisings occurred steadily until the fall o f the Ming dynasty—on the average, one every six or seven years.31 I f the Muslim merchants o f the northwest expected better trading conditions under the Qing, they were bound to be disappointed. At that time, communications with tributary states—and hence trading relations with Turfan and other Central Asian kingdoms—were the responsibility o f the College o f Translators (Si yi guan) o f the Board o f Rites. 32 The head o f this office during the

31 Morris Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early C h ' i n g , " pp. 2 1 - 2 7 . See, for example, Ma De's uprising in September, 1647, in Ningxia. Shizu shilu, 3 3 : 3 9 7 a . 32 During most o f the Qing period, relations with Mongolia, Kokonor, and the Muslim states in western China were under the supervision o f the Court o f Colonial Affairs (Lifan Yuan), which was formally established in 1638 as the

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early Q i n g w a s Sun C h e n g z e (jinshi 1631, Beijing), a former m e t ropolitan censor-in-chief, w h o had agreed to resume that post after D o r g o n entered the capital, and w h o also became sub-director o f the C o u r t o f Sacrificial Worship (Taichang si). 33 It is not k n o w n w h e t h e r Sun h i m s e l f issued the trading regulations that s o o n w e r e m a d e k n o w n b y the Board o f Rites, but they certainly received his approval; they also reflected the same general restrictive trading policy earlier i m p l e m e n t e d by the M i n g . Khalka M o n g o l s w i s h i n g to trade w e r e told that caravans w o u l d not be allowed through the passes at Z h a n g j i a k o u (Kalgan) and Gubeikou north o f Beijing along the Great Wall. 34 E n v o y s f r o m Turfan were again g i v e n the o l d M i n g regulations w h i c h had earlier provoked warfare in the west, and warned that infringements w o u l d be strictly punished. 3 5 T h e y w e r e also told that w h i l e their caravaneers w o u l d be allowed to trade at Lanzhou, they w o u l d be kept under the m o s t careful military guard. 3 6 Furthermore, the old horse and tea trade w a s to

successor to the M o n g o l Office (Menggu Yamen). After the M a n c h u s entered Beijing, the chief counsellor (chengzheng) of the C o u r t of Colonial Affairs was given the title of president (shangshu) so as to rank equally with the heads o f the Six Boards. In 1659, the C o u r t was integrated with the Board of Rites and, after a two-year hiatus, the rank of president was again conferred on its director. T h e president of the C o u r t was always a Manchu, and he was seconded by M a n c h u and M o n g o l vice-presidents. During the first decade of the n e w dynasty, however, the responsibility of the C o u r t (whose president after 1647 was Nikan) was restricted to Mongolian judicial, political, and military affairs. Trading regulations for other Central Asian states and tributaries issued directly f r o m the Board of Rites. T h e College of Translators, formerly k n o w n as the Residence for Envoys of the Four Tributary States (Hui t o n g si yi guan), b o r e responsibility for arrangements concerning representatives f r o m Korea, Siam, Tonkin, and Burma—leaving Central Asian affairs entirely up to the Lifan Yuan. Lii Shipeng, " Q i n g d a i de lifanyuan," passim. 33 W h e n Beijing fell to Li Zicheng, Sun, w h o was fifty years old at the time, thrice tried to kill himself, but his life was saved by a Shun official w h o had k n o w n Sun w h e n he was a magistrate in Henan. Sun eventually agreed t o j o i n the Shun regime, and was thus compromised into service with the Q i n g . H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, pp. 6 6 9 - 6 7 0 . 34 Shizu shilu, 13:14b, dated January 31, 1645. 35 M o r r i s Rossabi, " M u s l i m and Central Asian Revolts," pp. 190-191. 36 Shizu shilu, 26:310a, dated July 1, 1646. See also Ji H u a n g , Huangchao wenxian tongkao, 3 3 : 3 b ; Joseph F. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia," p. 218.

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be carried on only outside o f Chinese borders at the former horse markets set up by the Ming dynasty.37 These strict trading regulations on the one hand represented the determination o f former Ming officials like Sun Chengze to rebuild the system o f restricted privileges and access that had been a cornerstone o f earlier dynastic diplomacy. O n the other hand, while they reflected the Manchus' own special awareness o f the strategic importance o f special trading rights to ambitious tribal leaders, they also represented Dorgon's determination to assume the same role in the Asian world order that the Ming dynasty had held before the rise o f his father, Nurhaci. B y inviting tribute missions in July, 1646, the Qing government was both reconstructing the Ming trading system to keep order among foreign allies, and asserting a claim for the supremacy o f the new Son o f Heaven over alien vassals. 38 Unfortunately, however, the immediate effect o f this decision was undoubtedly to arouse Turfan and its own dependencies against Qing rule, and probably to exacerbate the economic conditions that had led to social disorder and rebellion in the past. Yet economic explanations are not the only reasons given for the growing incidence o f Muslim rebellions in the late Ming, culminating in the 1 6 4 8 - 1 6 4 9 revolt. Partly because o f the rebellion o f the so-called " N e w Sect" (Xin jiao) among Gansu Muslims in the mid-nineteenth century, some historians have suggested that endemic communal conflict between Muslims and non-Muslims was exacerbated during the Ming, growing even worse under the

37 Shizu shilu, 26:311a, dated July 4, 1646. The Qing established six branches of the Tea Horse Office (Cha ma si) in northwestern China, but the trade did not flourish. B y the 1670s much o f the tea collected by the government was used to pay soldiers rather than purchase horses, and within fifty years the Qing was exporting more o f its tea to Russia and western Europe. Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts," p. 191. 38 Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of Sino- Western Relations, pp. 5 - 6 ; Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early Ch'ing," passim-, Gertraude Roth Li, "The Rise o f the Early Manchu State," p. 31. Turfan did accept tributary status then. Hami did not submit until 1696. Fletcher, "China and Central Asia," p. 218.

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Qing. 39 Even more intriguing is the suggestion that religious impulses lay behind the revolts, which may have been inspired by militant Sufi sects.40 The most famous leader of the Muslim rebels in western Gansu was a man named Milayin.41 The prefectural gazetteer of Ganzhou predictably describes him as a "cruel and crafty" Muslim who had raised his own band of soldiers to help the local officials track 39 Raphael Israeli, " C h i n e s e versus M u s l i m s , " passim. 40 During the 12th and 13th centuries, schools (tarikats) were founded by Sufi masters devoted to restoring a fundamentalist orthodoxy that would remove the non-Islamic customs creeping into Muslim communities in Persia and Central Asia. O n e o f these sects, which was characterized by a silent dhikr (remembrance), was founded by Baha'al-Din Naqshband in the late 1300s. T w o centuries later, the Naqshbandiyya teaching was transmitted through Central Asia by Makhdum-i A'?am; and then by his grandson, M u h a m m a d Yusuf, as far east as Hami. Muhammad Y u s u f himself travelled as far as Suzhou, into the Gansu corridor, and there is a strong likelihood that later Naqshbandiyya leaders or " k h o j a s , " who claimed descent from the Prophet, and w h o founded their own political dynasty in Kashgar after the Chagatai khanate foundered, may have incited the Gansu and Kokonor Muslims to rebel. Joseph Fletcher, "China's Northwest at the T i m e o f the M i n g - C h ' i n g Transition," pp. 1 6 - 2 0 . See also Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts," p. 173. B u t even though this link between the Sufi religious leaders o f Central Asia and the Muslim rebels o f China's northwest exists, it is a tenuous connection. There is, in fact, no direct evidence connecting the presence o f the Naqshbandiyya sectarians in Hami or among Hami refugees in Gansu and Ningxia with the rebels themselves. Moreover, citing numerous instances o f Muslims cooperating with the Qing government, Lipman has argued that Naqshbandiyya Sufism, "far from being inherently subversive in a n o n Muslim state, is very flexible and can come to an understanding with the secular political order."Jonathan N . Lipman, " M u s l i m s in Northwest C h i n a , " p. 12. 41 In Chinese texts Milayin is often referred to by his given name, Layin, suggesting that M i was a surname. In the following general account o f the rebellion, I have relied at various points upon the brief narratives supplied by: Camille Imbault-Huart, " D e u x Insurrections des Mahometans de K a n - s o u , " pp. 4 9 7 - 5 0 4 ; Fletcher, "China's Northwest," pp. 2 9 - 3 1 ; Rossabi, " M u s l i m and Central Asian Revolts in Late Ming and Early C h ' i n g , " pp. 3 1 - 3 2 ; Rossabi, " M u s l i m and Central Asian Revolts," p. 191; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 572; and Louis M . J . Schram, The Mongours of the Kansu- Tibetan Frontier, Part 3, pp. 5 3 - 5 4 . M y main sources, however, are given in the footnotes.

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d o w n and kill remnants of Li Zicheng's rebel force. 42 In May, 1648, Milayin and another Muslim leader, Ding G u o d o n g , initiated an uprising against the Q i n g . Persuading the f o r m e r M i n g Prince of Yanchang, Z h u Shichuan, to declare them in legitimate loyalist rebellion, the t w o M u s l i m leaders quickly took Ganzhou and Liangzhou, then swept swiftly d o w n the spur of the Great Wall to cross the Yellow River at Lanzhou and attack the i m p o r t a n t garrison city o f Gongchang. 4 3 T h e i r presence before the city of Gongchang, to w h i c h they laid siege, struck terror in many. While they claimed to have a million followers, official sources enumerated one h u n d r e d t h o u s a n d r e b e l s — H a m i and Chinese Muslims f r o m Gansu, Chinese M u s lims f r o m Liangzhou w h o had arisen in response, Shun remnants, and local outlaws w h o answered their call for rebellion in the n a m e o f the M i n g prince. I n f o r m e d of the uprising, the Q i n g court prepared to send a m a j o r military expedition, and eventually appointed gusai beise Tunci head of the expedition of banner troops, seconded b y gusa ejen Handai of the Q i n g royal family, w h o c o m m a n d e d M o n g o l troops of his own. T h e Q i n g g o v e r n m e n t also declared a little later that year that areas in central and s o u t h ern Shaanxi like Xi'an, Yan'an, Lintao, and H a n z h o n g — a l l of w h i c h had been damaged f r o m hailstorms the previous y e a r — w o u l d receive tax remissions. 44 Governor-General M e n g Q i a o fang ( w h o was then residing in the garrison at Guyuan) had n o quarrels w i t h either policy, but he did suggest that he himself strike right away, before the rebels had time to consolidate their confederation and take the city of Gongchang. H e therefore i m mediately despatched a relief force under Z h a o Guangrui and M a N i n g to save G o n g c h a n g . T h e Manchu-Chinese force sped to G o n g c h a n g and, on May 25, drove the Muslims away f r o m the city after killing over three thousand of them. 4 5 Milayin and Ding G u o d o n g fell back u p o n Lintao, w h e r e the 42 Ganzhou Juzhi [Ganzhou prefectural gazetteer], juan 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 280. 43 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. 44 Fletcher, "China's Northwest," pp. 2 9 - 3 0 . 45 Shizu shilu, 38; 447a.

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local Muslims arose after their arrival. Meng Qiaofang divided his pursuing troops into three separate columns: one commanded by Colonel M a Ning, one by Zhao Guangrui, and one by Major Z h a n g Yong. O n June 10, 1648, Zhang Yong's force led the attack against Lintao, although Ma Ning's men also participated. T h e city was retaken after an attack on the barracks, where seven h u n dred rebels under the Muslim leader Ma Hanshan were killed. 46 With Lintao in their hands, the Qing commanders now only had to overcome the Muslim defenses at Lanzhou in order to remove the last impediment to their force crossing the river into western Gansu. M e n g Qiaofang decided to supervise this part of the campaign personally. While Zhang Yong continued to hunt d o w n other Muslims in the area, and captured and killed the Ming prince Z h u Shichuan, M e n g led his personal troops to Gongchang and thence to the walls of Lanzhou, where he rendezvoused with his three c o m m a n d e r s — M a , Zhao, and Zhang. The attack on Lanzhou was brief. The Muslims quickly abandoned the city and crossed back into the hexi (west of the river) region, burning the bridge across the Yellow River behind them. Only one major Muslim rebel contingent remained east of the river, and within a few days that group, holding Lanzhou under the c o m m a n d of Ding Jiasheng, had been annihilated. All major strongholds on the east side of the Yellow River were now under the Q i n g forces' control again, as Meng Qiaofang triumphantly memorialized to Beijing on June 24, 1648.47 By July, 1648, then, the imperial forces were ready to cross the Yellow River and pursue Milayin and Ding G u o d o n g toward Liangzhou. The rebels put up very little resistance in that city, which was retaken in August, and understandably retreated to m o r e familiar h o m e territory around Ganzhou, their point of origin. T h e circumstances of their defeat there are not very clear. Ac46 Shizu shilu, 38:448b. T h e casualties are given in Meng's biography in Qing shi gao, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. 47 Shizu shilu, 38:449b. See also his memorial of July 30, 1648, in ibid., 38:455b, where he speaks of finally "pacifying" all the M u s l i m partisans in the Lanzhou area, which suggests that, with the help of loyal M o n g o u r troops, the m o p p i n g u p operations took another full m o n t h .

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cording to a fanciful tale recorded by the 19th-century historian Wei Yuan in the Shengwuji (Record of imperial military exploits), Meng Qiaofang himself reached Ganzhou in October, 1648, and quickly tricked the rebels out of their fort and into an ambush he had carefully prepared. Yet although he and Zhang Yong are then supposed to have killed unbelievably vast numbers of rebels, the siege of Ganzhou somehow lasted more than six months. 48 Eventually, after Zhang Yong had been made acting commanderin-chief of Gansu, his forces—led by Manchu Plain Red Bannermen—used scaling ladders to attack the western wall. O n March 5, 1649, Zhang Yong and seven hundred of his men were able to penetrate the southwestern corner of Ganzhou city where they engaged in five days of fierce street fighting. Seventy percent of Zhang Yong's men were casualties. Thus, although he claimed a victory and said that over half of the Muslim rebels were killed, and although Meng Qiaofang reported that the Muslims of Ganzhou had been pacified, the situation was more likely a military stalemate, and the result actually a negotiated surrender. 49 O n April 2, 1649, Milayin and Ding Guodong came out of the city and surrendered it to the Qing troops. As part of the arrangement, Milayin was himself given the rank of colonel in the Qing army, and appointed to the Lanzhou garrison, though in effect remaining in Ganzhou. 50 Milayin's adherence to the imperial government lasted just about as long as there were sufficient Qing troops in Ganzhou to counterbalance his forces. That was not for very long. On April 27, 1649 —less than four weeks after Meng's victory memorial—Milayin decided that the military balance was once again in his favor. For as soon as the western Gansu Muslim rebellion had ostensibly been settled, bringing Governor-General Meng great acclaim at 48 I m b a u l t - H u a r t , " D e u x Insurrections." A c c o r d i n g t o M e n g ' s o w n b i o g r a p h y in t h e Qing History, he and Z h a n g Yong did start the siege t h e n , and attacked G a n z h o u b y n i g h t , b u t t h e long interval b e t w e e n t h e attack and t h e s u r r e n d e r o f t h e city is n o t filled w i t h historical detail. 49 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 281; Shizu shilu, 4 2 : 4 9 7 b . 50 Qing shigao, b i o g r a p h y o f M e n g Q i a o f a n g , in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268.

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court, the imperial government had begun requesting troop transfers f r o m the Shaanxi theater to Sichuan to confront the increasingly powerful forces of the Southern Ming there. These transfers stretched their occupying forces in Shaanxi dangerously thin, but there was little else that the Qing leaders could do in the face of the Southern Ming resurgence in 1648 and 1649. In the early m o n t h s of 1649, in fact, a Southern Ming victory over the Q i n g did not appear totally unlikely. Milayin's decision to resume his war against the imperial government may thus have been as much determined by his knowledge of the growing warfare in the south as by pressure f r o m his own followers, or a putative belief in the need for a jihad against the infidels. Milayin's plans for a revolt apparently were k n o w n to the Ganzhou garrison commander, Liu Liangchen. Before the c o m m a n d e r could take steps of his own, however, the Muslim leader sent w o r d to the governor of Gansu, Zhang Wenheng, that he himself had caught wind of a possible mutiny. Milayin suggested that he and Governor Z h a n g confer, and proposed that they meet at a banquet in the northern part of Ganzhou city. Within his own military unit, Milayin had to face the opposition of his lieutenant-colonel, w h o was probably an officer planted in his men's midst by M e n g Q i a o fang. Before Zhang arrived for the feast, then, Milayin had the lieutenant-colonel poisoned and, when the governor did present himself, led his men f r o m ambush to kill Zhang Wenheng and seize control of the city on April 27, 1649. Several other Q i n g officials were killed, although the magistrate and a senior military official accepted office under the rebels. 51 Since Ding G u o d o n g responded almost immediately, the same sequence of events virtually took place all over again. Muslims i m mediately arose in Suzhou and Liangzhou, and Milayin proceeded south to attack Lanzhou and Lintao where both magistrates were killed. This time, however, Meng Qiaofang crossed the Yellow River right away, and drove Milayin back into Ganzhou as quickly

51 Shizu shilu, 43:504b; Qing shi gao, biography of Zhang Wenheng, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 279; Ganzhou juzhi, juan 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 280.

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as possible. The city did not surrender, and Meng began to prepare for a long siege by building high embankments and digging trenches around the city. Before Ganzhou could be thus encircled, however, Milayin broke out of the Q i n g enclosure and fled. He did not get far. That night Meng's soldiers tracked down the M u s lim rebel at a small oasis nearby, and after a brief skirmish Milayin was finally killed. 52 In the meantime, the other Muslim leader, Ding Guodong, had installed himself in Suzhou at the western terminus of the Great Wall, about 660 kilometers southeast of Hami, then ruled by Babai Khan. Perhaps because so much of his support came from Hami refugees, and almost certainly because he wished military supplies and reinforcements from the Hami Muslims, Ding Guodong invited Sa'id Baba, the son of the Prince of Hami, to come to Suzhou and rule as the Prince of Turumtay. 53 Shortly after Sa'id Baba arrived, Lanzhou fell, and Meng Qiaofang immediately moved his army out to Suzhou to invest the Prince of Turumtay's new capital. The city was surrounded with deep moats and high palisades, and the siege promised to be a long one. Before it could be fully pursued, however, Governor-General Meng suddenly found his rear base in jeopardy. According to his official biography: [ D i n g ] G u o d o n g had once again seized Suzhou [garrison] in alliance with Tuluntai w h o was called Prince Luntai, while G u o d o n g n a m e d himself viceroy. T h e walls were defended, and [the rebels] e m e r g e d to pillage Wuwei, Zhangye, and Jiuquan. At that s a m e time, the P i n g y a n g bandits [of Shanxi] Y u Yin and Han Z h a o x u a n responded to the revolt o f Datong's rebel general, Jiang X i a n g , and with three hundred thousand men stormed Puzhou. T h e throne or-

52 Qing shi gao, b i o g r a p h y o f M e n g Q i a o f a n g , in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. 53 In C h i n e s e texts T u r u m t a y is identified as "the turbaned M u s l i m (chart tou hui) T u l u n t a i . " See Qing shi gao, biography o f M e n g Q i a o f a n g , in X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. D i n g G u o d o n g m a y also have tried to get s u p p o r t f r o m the M o n g o u r s o f X i n i n g . B u t there the local tusi, because o f their s t r u g g l e s with the lamaseries, had a history o f supporting the ruling dynasty in B e i j i n g . Furt h e r m o r e , after A u g u s t 16, all o f X i n i n g ' s taxes were remitted at the order o f the throne. Fletcher, " C h i n a ' s N o r t h w e s t , " p. 31. See also Rossabi, " M u s l i m and Central Asian R e v o l t s , " p. 192.

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dered [ M e n g ] Q i a o f a n g and Ese to send back their armies to resist t h e m . Q i a o f a n g left braves (yong) [under M a N i n g ] to besiege S u z h o u and led his army back east. 54

It was thus the mutiny of Jiang Xiang—an even more critical event than the conspiracy of the Elm Garden Army—at Datong, just 250 kilometers west of Beijing, that forced Meng Qiaofang to abandon Suzhou and turn back to the aid of the beleaguered and nearly overwhelmed Qing armies in Shanxi.

Jiang Xiang's Rebellion Jiang Xiang's rebellion, which occupied the attention of the court and Prince-Regent Dorgon for nearly a year, may have been the end result of famines and floods in north China plus the Ming resurgence in the south, but the immediate cause was Dorgon's appointment of Ajige, Prince Ying, to take general command of the Datong border area.55 Earlier, Dorgon had invited some of his allies among the Khalka Mongols to cross over the wall into the frontier zone. However, the tribesmen could not resist the temptation to raid the Chinese homesteads in the area, seizing women and livestock. 56 Dorgon's intention in appointing Ajige to this command, then, was motivated both by the urgent need to bring the unruly Khalkas to heel, as well as perhaps by the desire to distance Ajige from Beijing where he and Dorgon were rivals for political power. However, General Jiang Xiang chose to interpret the appointment as an abrogation of his authority as satrap of Datong and most of northern Shanxi. On January 15, 1649, while the civil governor, treasurer, and prefect were all outside the city walls tal-

54 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. 55 For reports of starving mobs in Xuanhua district, near Datong, in the winter of 1648-1649, see Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 73. There were also reports of severe floods during the spring and early s u m mer. See Shizu shilu, 45:526b. 56 Zeng Guoquan, sponsor, Shanxi tongzhi, 18:20a, and 78:16b.

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lying cavalry supplies and taxes, Jiang Xiang closed Datong's massive gates and declared himself in rebellion.57 Ajige responded with alacrity. Receiving news of the revolt almost immediately, he rode through the night ofJanuary 15 in time to contain Jiang Xiang's main force that next day at Datong. H o w ever, he was not quick enough to keep Jiang Xiang from sending out a column under one of his lieutenants, Jiang Yingxun, to arouse similar rebellions at Shuozhou and Ninghua. 58 For some time, Jiang Xiang and his aides had been secretly corresponding with former Ming military officers in other Shanxi garrisons, encouraging them to plot a rebellion against the Qing. 59 Now, these soldiers threatened to arise like "wild animals," and overthrow Qing rule. 60 Almost overnight, Kelan and Puzhou fell into the hands of rebel forces.61 As "the seditious miasma coagulated

57 Shizu shilu, 4 1 : 4 8 7 b ; Zhang Tingyu, et al., comps., Ming shi (Guofang yanjiuyuan), pp. 4 1 1 8 - 4 1 1 9 (hereafter Ming shi); Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 5. Having been constructed to withstand Mongol cavalry attacks, Datong's cannon-mounted battlements were ordinarily impregnable to almost any group that chose to assault the city. James Peter Geiss, "Peking under the M i n g , " p. 130. O n e o f the first instances o f Qing loyalism occurred at this time. T h e intendant for this military circuit, X u Yifan (1629 jinshi, Jiangnan), was trapped inside the city. A gentry man who had elected to j o i n the Qing in 1644, he had already served in the capital as a senior secretary in the Board o f Rites. When the revolt began, X u Yifan tried to persuade some o f the inhabitants to carry out their duty to remain loyal to the new dynasty; but, while he harangued the mob, he was cut down by the mutineers' swords. Er chen zhuan, 1 : 2 4 . 58 Zeng, Shanxi tongzhi, 7 8 : 1 6 b - 1 7 a . 59 Shizu shilu, 41:489a. Jiang Xiang also sent a letter to Liu Zeqing, inviting him to j o i n him. News o f that was divulged, and it was one o f the factors leading to Liu's execution for the Elm Garden Army conspiracy. Ma Daoyuan, Wu Meicun nianpu, p. 47. 60 Er chen zhuan, biography o f Zhu Shichang, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252. 61 In certain respects, this was a sergeants' revolt. There were many cases o f lower-ranking petty officers and non-commissioned officers who were contacted by officers under whom they had formerly served in the Ming army, and who then turned against their commanders, or killed the local magistrate, and took over the towns they occupied. The rebellion at Puzhou was a typical example o f this. Zeng, Shanxi tongzhi, 1 8 : 1 9 - 2 0 a , 28a. In other cases, rural

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into a mass," the provincial governor's Manchu-Han forces were stretched thin. 62 In the northeast, "bandits" from Daizhou took over Pian Pass and Hequ, and formed an alliance with the wellknown outlaws Liu Qian and Zhang Wugui. Like the rural loyalists of Jiangnan in 1645, these diehards would storm and take a rural fort, and then forcibly cut off the queues of the peasants they found hiding within the walls of each stockade. 63 This powerful confederation soon controlled most of the mountain passes in northeastern Shanxi, as well as most of the countryside as far south as Xinkou, where its men severed the main highway to Taiyuan, cutting the capital of the province off from the northern road to Beijing. 64 Ningwu itself was occupied by the remnants of the army of Li Ji who had pacified Yanmen (Daizhou) for the Qing. Several of his officers, including General Liu Wei, had been secretly corresponding with Jiang Xiang's officers in Datong. When the uprising began there they revolted in turn, killing Li Ji and declaring allegiance to the Ming. 65 This force, which included 3 colonels, 11 majors, 40 captains, and 5,400 cavalry and infantry, went on to occupy Ningwu under the general supervision of Circuit Intendant Zhao Menglong. Soon the Ningwu army became the most dominant force in the upper Fen River valley, controlling a chain of redoubts and stockades as well as the district capitals of Ninghua and Jingle to the south along the river itself.66 There was thus a solid band of resistants cutting the Qing armies along the Great Wall off from central Shanxi. Only the central road from Hebei, via Gu Pass, remained open. To the west of Taiyuan, the towns of Shilou, Yonghe, and Jiaocheng were all in rebel hands. According to Regional Inspector

62 63 64 65 66

redoubts (bao) were seized by local Ming loyalists, while the outlaws inhabiting the mountain stockades (zhai) linked together once more to overthrow civil authority. Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255. Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 253. Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 256. Zeng, Shanxi tongzhi, 78:17. Shizu shilu, 45:534.

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Cai Yinggui, the inhabitants of each zhou and xian w e r e arising against the provincial government. Ming decrees and rebel placards w e r e appearing everywhere. District magistrates w e r e p a n icked. N o t only could they not defend their city walls; they could barely h o p e to defend their inner yamens because of the general a t m o s p h e r e of fear and riot. 67 In Jiexiu, a f o r m e r M i n g general w h o had retired to a Buddhist monastery and was k n o w n only as M o n k H o u assembled a gang (dang) and took over the town. 6 8 At Pinglu, w h e r e soldiers loyal to Jiang Xiang had killed the military rations intendant and taken over a postal courier station, a m e m b e r o f the local gentry n a m e d Li Yukui (jinshi 1622), w h o had served b o t h in the M i n g Censorate and as regional inspector of N i n g x i a , raised an a r m y and actually took over T o n g Pass and the district capitals o f P u a n d j i e counties. 69 T o add fuel to the flames, thousands of Shaanxi bandits were crossing the Yellow River by crudely rigged boats and rafts, coming into the province to loot for t h e m selves. S o m e were Central Asians, and m e n w i t h long rifles w e r e sighted riding on camels t h r o u g h the Liiliang Mountains. 7 0 As the rebellion spread rapidly across all of n o r t h e r n Shanxi, Ajige coolly tried to gather intelligence. By January 28, 1649, M o n g o l reinforcements had reached his camp outside D a t o n g , and scouting parties were able to ascertain that eleven t o w n s in that area w e r e in open revolt. 71 T h e next day, January 29, M a n c h u heavy artillery units arrived, bringing big hongyipao (red cloth cannons) to h a m m e r h o m e the siege; and within ten days the court despatched additional banner forces to Ajige's command. 7 2 A l t h o u g h the n o r t h e r n route into Hebei was severed, the m a i n road f r o m Z h e n d i n g t h r o u g h Gu Pass was still open as far as Taiyuan; and it was along this highway that other reinforcements w e r e sent to relieve Governor Z h u Shichang. T h e c o m m a n d e r o f this relief force was n o n e other than N i k a n (d. 1660), venerable

67 68 69 70 71 72

Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 253. Z e n g , Shanxi tongzhi, 18:28. Wen Ruilin, Nanjiang yishi, pp. 4 2 1 - 4 2 2 . Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 253. Shizushilu, 41:484b. Ibid., 4 1 : 4 8 5 a , 486b.

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leader of the Nara clan who had fought at Nurhaci's side after Ula was defeated in 1613, and who had gone on to become a key intermediary between the Manchus and Mongols. In 1639, it had been Nikan who was placed in charge of recruiting Mongols for the Manchu armies; and it was he, as well, who led those Mongols into Henan after the occupation of Beijing. 73 Now president of the Court of Colonial Affairs in the capital, he had been despatched from his diplomatic duties to relieve Taiyuan from the east.74 His arrival was most welcome to Governor Zhu Shichang. A new threat to Taiyuan had materialized in the person of Jiang Jianxun, the brother of the man whom Jiang Xiang had sent out of Datong to arouse rebellions elsewhere. Jiang Jianxun, who now called himself "Governor of Shanxi," had been one of those who revolted at the time of Jiang Xiang's mutiny. Pushing down near Taiyuan, he had occupied the town of Xinzhou, and from there was beginning to move on toward the provincial capital. Now, with the reinforcements at hand, Governor Zhu drove the rebels back to Xinzhou, and under the town's walls engaged the Ming loyalists in battle. Jiang Jianxun was soundly defeated in the engagement that followed. The Manchu, Mongol, and Han bannermen killed over two thousand of Jiang's soldiers, captured many horses and sets of armor, and would have continued pursuing the routed remnants had the roads north of Xinzhou not been dangerously narrow and steep.75 Nikan, however, did not remain at Taiyuan for very long. Once this battle was over, he speedily cleared the main highway and rode north to try to recapture Ningwu, which he invested for nearly a month before giving up that siege to join the main body of Ajige's forces directly attacking Jiang Xiang. 76 Once Nikan departed, Jiang Jianxun was able to regroup his forces in southern Shanxi, where he attracted tens of thousands of rebels and out73 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 591. 74 Er chen zhuan, biography o f Zhu Shichang, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252. 75 Shizu shilu, 42:491b-492a; Yang Guotai et al., eds., Taiyuan xianzhi, 16:3. 76 Er chen zhuan, biography of Zhu Shichang, cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252.

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laws, including the ones crossing the Shaanxi border, to join his army. While rebels took advantage of Nikan's move toward Datong to capture the city of Baode on the Shaanxi border and the towns of Yonghe and Shilou in the Liiliang Mountains, Jiang Jianxun took Jiaocheng southwest of Taiyuan, and from there moved on Fenzhou. Capturing Fenzhou, he then proceeded north toward Taiyuan, and set up a military headquarters for his large army in Jinci, where the founder of the Tang dynasty had performed libations during his historic uprising a millenium earlier.77 From there, Jiang Jianxun launched his attack on Taiyuan, trying to take the city by surprise with an assault in the dark of night. The attack failed; but even though his men were driven off, Jiang Jianxun did not cease to be a menace to the Qing garrison in Taiyuan. 78 He kept the main body of his forces nearby, and was in an excellent position to renew his assault at any moment. Moreover, while the Qing forces were tied down at the siege of Datong, Jiang Jianxun also plainly intended to cut off the southern tip of the province, just below Pingyang and Lu'an, and turn that part of Shanxi into his own preserve by occupying all of the district capitals.79 Governor Zhu explained how serious the situation was in a terse memorial to the court: Since the siege o f N i n g w u has been terminated, the bandits ( z e i ) have gradually pressed in upon the provincial capital. Even t h o u g h w e are defended by M o n g o l troops, their strength is halved and the bandits have forgotten the meaning o f fear. If w e wait until after Jiang X i a n g has been wiped out to transfer the army back [to Taiyuan] to destroy each [of the individual rebel groups], I am afraid that [the outlaws] will multiply and sprout n e w tendrils. Moreover, the autumn harvest taxes for military expenses derive f r o m the provincial capital and f r o m remittances from [more prosperous] t o w n s farther south like Fenzhou, Pingyang and Lu'an. If any [of these] places are surrounded, then the entire province will feel the impact. Yet as s o o n as Pian Pass and N i n g w u are recovered, the bandits w e s t o f the [Fen] river will observe the trend and give up their evil

77 Zang Lihe et al., comps., Zhongguo gujin dinting da cidian, p. 704. 78 Yangetal., Taiyuan xianzhi, 16:3. 79 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255.

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ways. I request that you despatch several h u n d r e d M a n c h u t r o o p s to d e f e n d the provincial capital. If there are crises south of the capital, t h e n [we should] rush part of these [forces] to exterminate [the rebels]. T r o o p s should be sent separately to garrison Daizhou, and t h e n w e can take Pian Pass and N i n g w u in succession. T h e bandits dread the M a n c h u troops as t h o u g h they w e r e ghosts. Your m i n i s ter is t h u s inspired to m a k e the above request. 8 "

Dorgon's prompt response was to command the Board of War to deliberate and take appropriate action, for the prince-regent had clearly come to feel that the province was almost out of Qing control. While continuing to make preparations for a long campaign involving a major expeditionary force, Dorgon had special edicts prepared to try to hold public opinion to the Manchu side and persuade any who might still be wavering to remain loyal to the government. Two such edicts were issued on February 26, 1649. The first edict was addressed to the civil and military officials, soldiers, and civilians of the province of Shanxi: J i a n g X i a n g has rebelled and is in terror of being executed. H e has collected adherents and assembled followers, fabricating lies and deceits to beguile t h e m to kill officials and soldiers. All of y o u are m i s t a k e n to believe these are true, and thus to rebel en masse. . . . I c a n n o t bear to see you die because of y o u r o w n stupidity. T h e r e fore, a special edict is ordered to announce your collective p a r d o n . If, o n the day the p a r d o n arrives, you can repent y o u r earlier faults, t u r n over a n e w leaf and return to us, w e will forgive y o u r f o r m e r crimes and continue to n u r t u r e you in our benevolence. B u t if you cling s t u b b o r n l y to y o u r delusions and continue to believe Jiang X i a n g , y o u will bring death u p o n yourselves. 8 1

The edict went on to explain that the Grand Army of the Qing was fast arriving in Shanxi, and that those who waited too long after its occupation would not be spared. The second edict was prepared especially for those besieged at Datong. It read: 80 Er chert zhuati, biography ofZhu Shichang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 252. 81 Shizu shilu, 42:492.

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Jiang Xiang has himself committed a great crime by rebelling, arousing the masses and misleading the innocent. . . . I have ordered the Grand Army to surround the city, building fortifications and digging trenches so that none of the people within the city can escape. After [the siegeworks are finished] we will employ heavy artillery for our assault, and then execute a complete massacre. If any of you—officials and commoners—will either arrest Jiang Xiang and turn him over to us, or kill him and surrender to us, before the siege embankments are constructed, your former crimes will be forgiven and you will continue to receive our benevolent nurture. Not only will you save your lives; you will also preserve your parents, wives and children intact. You should speedily decide upon this!82 T h e r e was n o formal response to this threat. O n M a r c h 6, 1649, even before his expeditionary force left Beij i n g , D o r g o n received his first genuinely positive battle report f r o m Ajige. T h e initial n e w s was bad: the rebel Liu Q i a n had taken the outer fortifications of Daizhou, which had been in Q i n g hands, and the city had been barely able to resist. Ajige, however, had p r o m p t l y despatched Bolo to rescue the city. With scaling ladders, the M a n c h u troops had retaken the outer fortifications. Trapped b e t w e e n those ramparts and the inner walls, the rebels w e r e slaughtered, and the siege of the city was lifted. 83 T h r e e weeks later, D o r g o n himself led a c o l u m n of troops o u t of the capital t o w a r d Shanxi under the banner of "imperial rectification" (zheng). 84 As the Grand A r m y d r e w near, several of the districts a r o u n d D a t o n g took advantage of his offer of amnesty to surrender to him. At Shanyin, halfway between N i n g w u and D a t o n g , the local magistrate led his o w n soldiers out o f the city walls and asked to be allowed to render allegiance to the p r i n c e regent. 8 5 T h e s e defections gave D o r g o n h o p e that he could still persuade the defenders of D a t o n g to surrender. W h e n he reached that city o n April 23, he sent w o r d within that several district capi82 83 84 85

Ibid., Ibid., Ibid., Shizu

42:492b. 42:494-495a. 42:497a. See also Erich Hauer, "Prinz Dorgon," pp. 4 1 - 4 2 . shilUy 43:502b.

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tals had already opened their gates to the Qing soldiers, and that Jiang Xiang had better quickly do the same. Reextending his offer of a pardon to others, Dorgon was especially propitiatory toward a messenger from General Jiang. The messenger was sent back to the city with Dorgon's sealed statement that "there must have been some difficulty which caused [Jiang] to revolt," and which also contained an offer of absolute pardon if the general would surrender immediately. 86 Dorgon received no answer, and—gradually convinced that none would shortly be forthcoming—returned within a week or so to the capital. After he departed, however, General Jiang did attempt a sally to break the tightening enclosure around his city. O n May 8, couriers reached Beijing with news from Bolo, who had joined Ajige at the siege, that two rebel contingents, totalling over five thousand soldiers, had emerged from Datong to establish camps along the roads leading north of the city. This effort to enlarge the defense perimeter was a failure. Manchu troops broke through the camps' defense, and pursued the routed rebels back to the shelter of the city walls where Jiang had himself to lead out yet another thousand-odd men to rescue the survivors. 87 Bolo could not press his advantage. Although the siege was still maintained at Datong, the imperial forces were diverted by new rebel victories around Fenzhou southwest of the provincial capital. Governor Zhu's warning in his earlier memorial had proved correct. The Qing officials simply could not afford to ignore Jiang Jianxun's activities in the wealthier southern portions of the province, nor the possibility of a fresh rebel convergence upon Taiyuan itself. O n June 6, 1649, Dorgon elevated Bolo to a prince of the first degree (qin wang) and named him Generalissimo to Settle the West (Ding xi dajiangjun). His responsibility henceforth would be to destroy the rebel contingents in the southern and western portions of the province, while command of the siege forces at Datong would be left in the hands of Nikan. 88 86 Ibid., 43:502-503a. 87 Ibid., 43:506a. 88 Ibid., 43:510a; Qing shi gao, biography of Bolo, in Xie, Qingchu p. 255.

nongmin,

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Bolo's arrival completely altered the situation around Taiyuan. As his Manchu troops advanced, Jiang Jianxun's men fell back upon their former headquarters at Jinci. Bolo was reluctant to attack the town, because he knew that the Tang shrine there was filled with gold and jade that he feared might burn if artillery were used and assault troops unleashed. He therefore proceeded to invest the town but, before Bolo's men could finish digging a moat, Jiang Jianxun desperately tried to break through the Manchu envelopment with his own cavalry, hoping to flee back to Fenzhou. The Manchu lines were unassailable. Jiang Jianxun was killed, his cavalry elite cut down, and his leaderless infantry back in the town methodically slaughtered. 89 Bolo then proceeded without respite to press on down to the Fen River valley. Subduing Fenzhou, and a number of districts in the southwestern sector near the provincial capital (Wenshui, for instance), Bolo quickly expelled the enemy from Jiaocheng, and then sent a force to Pingyang which drove the southern rebels back down the river. Other soldiers under Bolo's command then proceeded against a force o f t e n thousand rebel soldiers at Jiang, defeating the loyalists and beheading over two thousand of them. By July 6, 1649, word had reached Beijing that at least the central part of Shanxi as far south as Hezhou on the Fen River was safely pacified.90 And within two more weeks Bolo was able to report that the rebel force near Pingyang had been roundly

89 Yang, Taiyuan xianzhi, 16:3; Shizu shilu, 46:538b. 90 Qing shi gao, biography o f Bolo, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255; Shizu shilu, 44:520a. It must have been difficult to keep this army o f "imperial rectification" from looting. An edict of June 23, 1649, read: "Armies on the march . . . may not acquire more than the prescribed amount o f cooking pots, bedding, fodder knives and horse troughs. Capable officials must be sent to investigate this personally for themselves. . . . They must continue to discipline the soldiers, so that not a single good is forcibly seized from the people. Shortly, let officials be sent to investigate, and if there are any w h o have plundered and harmed the people, then let them be immediately investigated and severely punished, and let their commanding officers be tried with them. . . . From now on if there are any w h o steal a single piece o f property from a Han person, let them be beheaded on the spot. If their household slaves (jianu) commit a crime, then the punishment must be extended to the head o f the household." Shizu shilu, 44:512.

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defeated by Manchu troops and forced to flee across the Yellow River into Shaanxi.91 Because of this good news, orders were issued from Beijing to Bolo to return to the capital with his troops. Bolo respectfully suggested that this would be a mistake. Even though Taiyuan, Fenzhou, and Pingyang had all been recovered, many local districts were still in arms against the Qing. If he did withdraw from the central and southern portions of the province at this point, the rebel remnants would fill the void he left behind. All that had been won would be lost again.92 The Manchu prince's warning was substantiated by a fresh outbreak in Pingyang prefecture in midAugust. O n August 28, 1649, Governor Zhu Shichang sent a memorial to Beijing which reported that local "robbers and bandits" had arisen there in large numbers. These were not Shaanxi interlopers but rather local district-level forces that were attacking outposts, and even district capitals. Two Qing officers and the district magistrate of Xiaxian had all been killed. A second report four days later brought slightly better news—Bolo had recovered Xiaoyi district near Fenzhou—but the southern tip of the province was obviously besieged by local bandits and vulnerable to fresh attacks from Shaanxi. 93 Dorgon therefore agreed to Bolo's request that he be allowed to remain in central Shanxi, and the prince-regent would later send additional forces from the northwest under Mandahai to help restore local control to the regular provincial government. 94 In the meantime, Dorgon himself made another trip to Datong,

91 Shizu shilu, 44:520a. Li Yukui's zhai was destroyed when the Qing army reached Pinglu. Though his son was killed, Yukui escaped into Shaanxi where he was eventually apprehended, imprisoned, and executed. Wen, Nanjiang yishi, p. 422. 92 Qing shi gao, biography o f Bolo, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255. 93 Shizu shilu, 45:527b, 529a. 94 Qing shi gao, biography of Bolo, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255. The c o m mander o f Qing forces in the northwest, Mandahai, was aided by his younger brother Wakda. Both noble Manchus (the two were sons o f Daisan, o f the royal family) faced the large regular rebel force at N i n g w u commanded by General Liu Wei.

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arriving there on August 7 with fresh troops for the siege.95 The purpose of his visit included escorting some of the Khalka Mongols back across the Great Wall.96 He was thus obliged to leave Datong just as the siege began taking its heaviest toll and, on September 29, 1649, was back once again in Beijing when the tide decisively turned. O n that day, the three commanders of the siege— Ajige, Nikan, and Grand Secretary Sunahai—received a secret courier from Datong in their quarters. This man, Captain Liu Bao, brought word to them from Brigade General Yang Zhenwei from within the city walls. Yang's message read: We originally belonged to the virtuous people, but were forced to revolt by the rebellious bandit Jiang Xiang. When the Grand A r m y surrounded D a t o n g w e wanted to behead Jiang Xiang and surrender, but unfortunately our strength was wanting. You simply waited. N o w our soldiers and civilians are starving and in danger o f all dying. We have asked each official [secretly] for a plan, and twenty-three in all have joined us in a conspiracy agreeing to behead Jiang Xiang and surrender. 97

The three Manchu commanders consented to the arrangement without consulting the court, because this tallied precisely with the offer which Dorgon had earlier made to the soldiers of Datong. Once Yang Zhenwei received Ajige's affirmative response, the conspiracy was set in motion. Jiang Xiang's guards were disarmed, his two brothers (Jiang Lin and Jiang Youguang) were seized, and on October 4 all three men were decapitated. The following day, October 5, after the three men's heads had been presented to Ajige, Nikan, and Sunahai, the Grand Army entered Datong. One of its first acts upon occupying the city was to raze the city's walls down to a level of five chi (1.8 meters). Datong was to be a mutineer's bastion no more. 98 The fall of Datong did not bring all resistance in Shanxi to an 95 Shizu shilu, 4 4 : 5 2 3 b .

96 Zeng, Shanxi tongzhi, 18:25b. 97 Shizu shilu, 46:535, memorial received in Beijing on October 7, 1649. 98 Z e n g ,

p. 422.

Shanxi

tongzhi,

18:26a; Shizu

shilu, 4 6 : 5 3 5 ; Wen, Nanjiang

yishi,

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end, but it certainly did mark the conclusion o f the mutiny in the northern part o f the province. In the city itself, some o f the freebooters w h o had formed part o f Jiang Xiang's quasi-private a r m y were n o w incorporated into the Q i n g banner f o r c e s . " Elsewhere, mutinous units like General Liu Wei's army at N i n g w u saw no alternative but to turn themselves over to the Q i n g . T h e day after Jiang's assassination, Liu's army, which controlled nearly all o f the upper Fen valley, surrendered en masse to Mandahai, and the north o f the province was again largely at peace. 100 T h e victory in the north freed Mandahai's troops to help B o l o subdue southern Shanxi. There, local b a n d i t s — s o m e o f w h o m w o u l d continue to roam the province for y e a r s — w i t h paramilitary units, bearing banners, operating alone or in conjunction, had overrun m a n y district capitals. In the far southwest, for instance, a m a j o r resistance force under Y u Y i n and Han Zhaoxuan had taken the city o f Puzhou on the Yellow River and, with the help o f Shaanxi forces, had avowed its allegiance to the Yongli Emperor. T h e Q i n g crushed this uprising ruthlessly. Drawing upon the help o f Shaanxi Viceroy M e n g Qiaofang, the imperial troops stormed Puzhou. As described in the official battle report by the local c o m mander o f the Pingyuan garrison, the Manchu and Han generals launched a carefully coordinated attack on Puzhou shortly before dawn on N o v e m b e r 11, 1649. O n e group o f M a n c h u troops used scaling ladders to climb the north wall, while others blocked o f f other exits f r o m the city. T h e scaling party entered the city at 5 A.M., and began a systematic slaughter that lasted until n o o n and t o o k approximately ten thousand lives. "Corpses filled the streets and thoroughfares." S o m e o f the defenders tried to fight their way

99 Wang Fuchen is a good example o f this sort o f person. Wang, a former outlaw, had been a colonel under Jiang Xiang. After surrendering, he enlisted in the Solid White Banner and became a member o f the Imperial Bodyguard. His accomplishments under Hong Chengchou's command in the southwest in 1653 led to promotion to brigade-general, and eventually command o f the armies o f eastern Yunnan. Wang joined Wu Sanguis revolt in 1674, and nearly lost the imperial side the civil war by taking most o f Gansu and Shaanxi away from the Qing. Eventually, Wang hanged himself in 1681 at Xi'an. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, pp. 8 1 6 - 8 1 7 . 100 Shizu shilu, 4 5 : 5 3 4 .

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out of the southern gate, but over one thousand of those were killed by Manchu-Han troops. Countless more were thrown into salt pools and drowned. Those who managed to swim out of the salt ponds were met on the west bank by Qing soldiers and cut down as they clambered onto the shore. Altogether nearly a hundred loyalist officers and civil officials were killed.101 What was most telling about the Puzhou massacre was the chilling efficiency with which the bannermen carried out their assignment. In contrast to the feverish bloodlust of the freebooting renegades who conducted most of the slaughter at Yangzhou, Jiangyin, and Jiading, the Manchu-Han forces that "rectified" the loyalists of Puzhou did so with cold calculation. If the Grand Army was aroused by mutineers who would subsequently reject promises of amnesty, then the horrible consequences must be clear to all who observed. There were still battles to be fought. Meng Qiaofang's army marched and rode to Ronghe, north of Puzhou on the Yellow River, where one of Jiang Xiang's allies, General Bai Zhang, had attacked the city with an army of six thousand. [ C o l o n e l Z h a o ] Guangrui crushed them, decapitating over t w o thousand. [Bai] Z h a n g marched north, f o l l o w e d by the i m p e rial a r m y w h i c h pressed the o u t l a w s into the river w h e r e m a n y d r o w n e d . [Bai] Z h a n g w a s subsequently struck and beheaded. T h e s u r v i v i n g o u t l a w s entered Sunjizhen [just south o f R o n g h e ] , and w e r e exterminated. We again proceeded toward Jinshi [east o f P i n g y a n g ] but before w e had g o n e t w e n t y li our army e n c o u n t e r e d resistance f r o m the intendant appointed b y [Jiang] X i a n g — W e i D e n g f a n g o f the B l u e B a n n e r — w h o s e several thousand m e n relied u p o n the m o u n t a i n o u s terrain [for protection]. His general, Z h a n g Wanquan, c a m e to his help w i t h another four thousand m e n to d o battle. [ Z h a o ] Guangrui beheaded Wanquan, and returned to attack D e n g f a n g , beheading General Wang G u o x i a n and another three

101 Shizu shilu, 45:9; Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 256-257. The Pingyuan commander claimed to have killed both Han Zhaoxuan and Yu Yin, the leaders of the loyalist force. However, they or their namesakes were later beheaded at Yuncheng. See below.

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thousand men or more. Senior Secretary102 Dumin was also ordered to attack Jiezhou [east of Puzhou]. He destroyed Bian Wang, Zhang Wu and Dang Zicheng, the chief rebels there; and Yonghe, Jishi and Jiezhou all fell [to our troops]. Dumin exterminated the remaining bandits at Houma postal station. Gente also destroyed Guo Zhongjie, who had been appointed chief military commissioner [by Jiang Xiang]. In the 9th lunar month [October 6-November 3], [Zhao] Guangrui advanced against Yuncheng, beheading [Yu] Yin and [Han] Zhaoxuan so that all of the treacherous rebels who were [Jiang] Xiang's followers were utterly destroyed.103 O t h e r imperial units cleared the h i g h w a y between Taiyuan and P i n g y a n g . T w o of the district capitals, Taigu and Pingyao, refused to surrender. In b o t h cases n o quarter was given: the rebels w e r e o v e r w h e l m e d and killed. 104 To the east, near the H e b e i - H e n a n b o r d e r in the Taihang range, rebels had cordoned off the city of Lu'an, occupying m o s t of the districts between it and P i n g y a n g o n the n o r t h - s o u t h highway. In late November, 1649, t w o columns o f M a n c h u - H a n troops were sent out f r o m the Fen valley b y M a n dahai. T h e resistance was stronger than expected; the defenders, b o t h m o u n t e d and afoot, were well armed. Nevertheless, the Q i n g troops pushed on, district by district, fighting along the way, until they had reached Lu'an which gave u p w i t h o u t a s t r u g gle. T h e "bandits" had fled elsewhere, and w o u l d prove to be a p r o b l e m for civil administrators of the province later w h e n the G r a n d A r m y was w i t h d r a w n to maintain a cordon sanitaire a r o u n d Beijing; b u t the fall of Lu'an meant that Shanxi had officially been "pacified." Henceforth, local control and the suppression o f criminal or resistance forces w o u l d depend u p o n the regular civil authorities. T h e Jiang Xiang m u t i n y was officially settled. 105

102 Zhangjing was a rank assigned to many Manchu banner officers. 103 Qing shigao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. See also Shizu shilu, 4 5 : 5 2 8 - 5 2 9 , 533b-534a, and 46:542a. 104 Shizu shilu, 46:544b. 105 Shizu shilu, 46:545a; Qing shi gao, biography o f Liang Huafeng, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 255.

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The Subjugation of the West While M e n g Qiaofang's Shaanxi forces were marching to the aid o f B o l o and Mandahai, the province they had left behind predictably roiled with fresh rebellions in response to the resurgence o f the Southern M i n g court and the Jiang X i a n g mutiny. In the southern part o f S h a a n x i — w h i c h was assigned by D o r g o n to W u Sangui, the Prince W h o Pacifies the West (Ping xi w a n g ) — a man named Z h u Senfu, w h o claimed to be a m e m b e r o f the M i n g royal family, named himself Prince o f Qin. His main supporter was a local outlaw, Z h a o Ronggui, whose ten-thousand-man a r m y defended the prince in his headquarters at Jiezhou, not far f r o m the Sichuan border. W u Sangui, with the help o f Imperial Guardsman Li Guohan and General X u Zhankui, killed more than seven thousand men when they attacked Jiezhou. B o t h the outlaw and prince's bodies were among the corpses later discovered in the rubble. 1 0 6 O n the heels o f the Jiezhou incident, a major rebellion b r o k e out at Yan'an. T h e governor there was Wang Zhengzhi (jinshi 1628, Beizhili), w h o had been Vice-Minister o f Finance under the M i n g , and w h o had been named to that same position under the Q i n g . In 1645, Wang had been appointed Right Vice-President o f War, though actually posted into the field to serve as governor o f Yan'an. W h e n the J i a n g X i a n g revolt first broke out, Governor Wang had sent his ranking military commander, General Wang Yongqiang, to prepare defenses against the rebel. Instead General Wang had contacted the Jiang X i a n g forces secretly, and then had mutinied. According to a report from Governor Huang Erxing, on April 19, 1649, the mutineers had attacked Yan'an, taken the city and surrounding nineteen districts, and killed Governor Wang Zhengzhi

106 Shizu shilu, 4 2 : 4 9 7 b - 4 9 8 a ; Qing shi gao, biography o f X u Zhankui, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 7 5 - 2 7 6 . Wu Sangui absorbed some o f these rebel units into his own personal army, and was consequently reprimanded by the Qing court for not having killed a number o f Ming officers and soldiers captured on that battlefield. Tsao Kai-fu, " T h e Rebellion o f the Three Feudatories against the Manchu Throne in China," p. 51.

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and the circuit intendant. 107 Liu Denglou, the garrison commander at Yulin, between Yan'an and the Great Wall, also decided to mutiny. Colonel Liu Denglou had been a subordinate of Liu Fangming, regional vice-commander of the troops left behind to garrison Ningxia when the Sichuan campaign forces were mustered. Liu Denglou had earned considerable military honor in the campaign against Ma De in 1647, and was rewarded with the Yulin garrison. Now, hearing of Jiang Xiang's revolt, he "changed clothing" and declared himself "Great Ming Regional Pacification Commander." After killing the circuit intendant, Colonel Liu sent a letter to Liu Fangming, asking for support and aid. Liu Fangming, furiously loyal to the Qing by now, showed the letter to Ningxia Governor Li Jian, and vowed his determination to crush the rebel.108 Before any of the major Qing officials in the province could do much more than absorb the alarming news that two major military centers, Yan'an and Yulin, were both in open rebellion, reports reached Governor Huang Erxing on April 23, 1649 that Wang Yongqiang had occupied still other district capitals, that the Mongol leader Zhamusu had taken arms against the Qing in the Helan Mountains, and that Liu Denglou had allied with Zhamusu and instigated a mutiny at the Dingbian garrison where he had won the populace's support. 109 Obviously, throughout Ningxia, in reaction to the Jiang Xiang revolt, many of the professional soldiers who had originally accepted the Qing were having second thoughts; and some of those were now willfully rebelling against the new government in northern Shaanxi.110 Wu Sanguis army made short shrift of Wang Yongqiang's rebel forces. O n May 8, 1649, Wu reported that his men had encountered Wang's army, routed the enemy, and taken more than seven thousand heads.111 Moving north, Wu Sanguis troops captured 107 108 109 110

Shizu shilu, 43:502b; Er chen zhuan, 1:22-23. Qing shi gao, biography of Liu Fangming, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269. Shizu shilu, 43:504a. Qing shi gao, biography of Liu Fangming, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 270. Shizu shilu, 43:502a, 504a. 111 Shizu shilu, 43:506a.

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and killed some of the local district officials appointed by Wang. O n July 2, it was reported that Wu, gusa ejeti Mergen, and Li Guohan had led their first attack on Yan'an prefecture, where many of the outlaw bands simply melted away at the sight of the imperial forces.112 The rebellion was by no means over after the city was retaken: local bandits northwest of Xi'an had to be quelled, and throughout the month of August, 1649, the provincial forces fought bands of rebels like the two thousand men led by "Iron Cudgel" Zhao (Zhao Tiegun) around Yan'an.113 All of these engagements were minor ones, however, and more a matter of mopping up resistance from small, fairly isolated bands than fighting major armies. Still, the casualties on the rebel side were far from negligible. Through those several weeks, Wu Sangui and Li Guohan's men beheaded at least four thousand six hundred "outlaws"; on September 5, they could claim that Yan'an and Suide prefectures were under complete control. 114 Yulin, too, was brought under control about the same time. While Li Guohan and Li Jian's soldiers fought the Mongol Zhamusu, Liu Fangming moved along the Great Wall to engage his former lieutenant, Liu Denglou, in battle at a place called Guantuan Manor near Yulin. The battle fought by the two sides was one of the most severe in the campaign. In fact, at one point Liu Fangming's own officers threatened to withdraw under the heavy arrow fire of the enemy, but Fangming taunted them back into battle and eventually defeated and then killed Liu Denglou. 115 The imperial forces' victories in central Shaanxi and Ningxia coincided with Meng Qiaofang's triumphant march through southern Shanxi against Jiang Xiang's allies. By the time Wu Sangui, Li Guohan, and Liu Fangming had finished their operations, Meng was ready to return to Shaanxi, where he led his men quickly across the province to resume his place at the head of the forces besieging the rebels under Ding Guodong at Suzhou. Now, with 112 113 114 115

Ibid., 43:506b, 517a. Ibid., 4 5 : 5 2 6 b - 5 2 7 . Ibid., 45:528b. See also Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 7 4 - 2 7 5 . Qing shi gao, biography o f Liu Fangming, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 270; Shizu shilu, 46:544a.

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his rear secure and a full contingent o f soldiers at his disposal, M e n g found Suzhou an easy prize, and it was almost anticlimactic to attack and take the Muslim stronghold. "In the eleventh lunar month [December 4, 1649-January 1, 1650]," Viceroy Meng laconically reported to Dorgon, "our braves took Suzhou. They killed [Ding] Guodong, [Tu] Luntai, and such o f their partisans as Hei Chengyin." Altogether, he said, more than five thousand rebels were beheaded. "West o f the river all is at peace."116 In the course o f a little over two years Meng Qiaofang had recovered over one hundred cities and fortified towns. President o f the Board o f War after 1650, Meng became one o f the most highly decorated o f all the Chinese w h o served the Manchus. He was ennobled as a baron in 1652, and would be described by the Kangxi Emperor— w h o saw him posthumously entered in the Temple o f Eminent Statesmen—as one o f the two most useful Han officers in the conquest o f China. The victories that earned him such merit, however, took a terrible human toll. During his tenure as viceroy o f Shaanxi, Meng killed or captured more than 176,000 people.117 T h e fall o f Suzhou and the death o f Ding Guodong and Turumtay decisively ended the 1648-1649 Muslim rebellion in western Gansu. Nevertheless, in order for the area to remain settled and under control, pacification policies would have to be devised to keep those Muslim communities reasonably content and free from conflict. Initially, this meant tried-and-true, conventional methods o f social welfare and administrative improvement. The new civil governor, Zhang Zhongyuan, w h o entered the province on March 29, 1650, embodied these measures. At first horrified by the sight

116 Qing shigao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. See also Lanzhou fiizhi [Lanzhou prefectural gazetteer], juan 6, also cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 280. Word of the fall o f Suzhou reached the court on January 16, 1650. 117 Schram, Mongours, p. 54; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 572. Four years after Meng Qiaofang's death in 1658, a stele was placed in the Jianfu Temple in Xi'an by the grateful gentry o f Shaanxi, praising him for extirpation o f "spurious" officials and troops. There was also a stele, the text o f which was written by Wang Shizhen, placed in a temple in Beijing. Zhou Weizhou, "Shaanxi faxian de liang tong you guan Mingmo nongmin zhanzheng de beishi," p. 47.

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of the "ravaged masses" when he reached Gongchang on May 2, he felt it his first duty to comfort the "hundred surnames," and— the prototypical civil official coming in to heal the wounds of war once the campaigners had moved o n — h e soon ascertained by personally making inquiries in surrounding villages that the inhabitants of the province suffered much at the hands of venal yamen officials. Military officials, in particular, were the cause of m u c h complaint, and Governor Zhang accordingly encouraged formal legal arraignments, and promised swift punishment. But he was also deeply worried about conditions in hexi, "west of the river" and on up the Gansu corridor. Riding across the Yellow River, he was awed by the desert, and even frightened of the "barbarians" he n o w saw all around him. I announced our dynasty's virtue and majesty to keep them in o r der. I was prepared to distribute tobacco, tea, and silver certificates to t h e m as bounty, commanding them both to fear and to enjoy [our presence]." 8

O n June 27, 1650, Zhang Zhongyuan reached Ganzhou, where his immediate problem was deciding how much bounty to distribute a m o n g the garrison troops there. A stickler for regulations, Z h a n g did not think that the former extremely low quotas were appropriate, but he did not dare on his own to charge what he did w a n t to distribute to office expenses. He therefore personally rewarded m o n e y and clothing to the soldiers and officers according to their rank, having had the forethought to bring those supplies along to encourage the military support of the garrisons along the frontier. His policy, he felt, was a great success. U p o n receiving the b o u n t y — h e was quick to note in his report to the court—the troops huzzahed, "May the Emperor live forever," and saw G o v ernor Z h a n g off with great fanfare. The experience convinced him that the soldiers were solidly behind the dynasty, and that future mutinies might be prevented. Moreover, it is said that in the Gansu region there are not only M u s l i m rebellions. Constant uproar is the rule rather than the ex-

118 Ming-Qing

shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 282.

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ception, with officials being murdered for the goods [in their possession]. Frontier customs being so horrible, they may let themselves be pacified but they do not let themselves be w o n over. Fortunately, today's pacification officials are not so easily compromised. The garrison commanders are deeply concerned for the welfare of their officiers and soldiers. They pacify in harmony and rectitude, and each one carries out his duties conscientiously. Consequently, of all the civil and military officials, high and low, there is not a single one w h o does not respectfully uphold the law. At first, I experienced the gravest concern for this region, but that has changed to great relief. The emperor and the prince-regent can n o w be freed from the anxiety with which they once looked toward the west. 119

For Zhang Zhongyuan, then, the best way to alleviate the ravages of war and rebellion was to have incorruptible officials encourage loyalty and respect for the law. But such measures as paying military bounties to frontier armies, while perhaps well designed to gain the immediate favor of the garrison troops and to protect the inhabitants from looting, could not offer a long-term solution to the problem of communal conflict on the frontier. Earlier, however, such a solution had been proposed. On June 25, 1648, while the Muslim rebels and the Qing forces still engaged in hostilities, He Bi, a supervising secretary in the Office of Scrutiny of the Board of War, presented a long and important memorial to the throne about ways to exert local control over that particularly troubled region. He began by praising the speed with which Meng Qiaofang had succeeded, in less than half a month, in recovering the major cities of Gansu by crushing the Muslim rebels. "Subduing such despicable wretches" ( x i a o c h o u r ) was "like catching foxes and rats in your hands," but it had been done with despatch thanks to the prince-regent's majesty and charisma, and thanks to the fighting spirit of Governor-General Meng's troops. There was nonetheless the very great possibility that conflict with the Muslims might recur. No one—He quickly added—could disagree with the sage policy of imperial clemency, but it might be pointed out that those who committed such rav-

119 Ming-Qing

shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 283.

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ages (Milayin, after all, was at that time momentarily a colonel in the Qing army) were not all killed. Furthermore, Muslims and Chinese were continuing to live alongside each other in the major cities of the northwest. "Their customs are different and this results eventually in mutual suspicion." He therefore proposed that a policy of ethnic resettlement be adopted. Muslim communities, he suggested, should be located at least fifty li from the Han zhou, xian, or wei nearest to them, wherever there were secluded areas suitable for colonization. There they should be taken with their families, and transformed from martial horsemen into peaceful peasants. Forbid them to breed horses or to keep weapons. Command their religious leaders to take charge, regulating their movements back and forth. Let them all cultivate the soil, and so gradually allay their ferocious natures. According to this "long-term plan," local Chinese inhabitants should also make periodic surprise visits to such Muslim communities to make sure that these rules were being carefully observed. 120 He Bi's segregation policy received an imperial endorsement: the Muslims were henceforth to be resettled and kept apart.121 With the help of their Mongol and Mongour allies, the Qing administrators moved Hami and Chinese Muslim communities a considerable distance away from settled urban clusters, market towns, and garrisons; they also tried to sever all relations between Suzhou Muslims and Hami itself. Jiayu Pass was blocked off, and the Qing government was to refuse to accept tribute from Western

120 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 282. 121 O n e important reason for the government's decision to resettle the M u s l i m communities in this w a y was its o w n experience in interracial dwelling. A s w e have seen, in both Liaoning and later in Beijing, the Manchus had developed the practice o f separating ethnic groups in an effort to forestall c o m m u nal tension. This kind o f segregated ethnic resettlement was used later to deal with M u s l i m rebels in the 19th century. When Muslims surrendered to Z u o Zongtang, especially in the Suzhou area, "The M o s l e m s were ordered to migrate in groups to n e w isolated areas." Wen-djang Chu, The Moslem Rebellion in Northwest China, pp. 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 .

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Asia until 1855, w h e n the M a n c h u s accepted the apologies o f a M o g u l e m b a s s y for Hami's alliance with D i n g G u o d o n g . 1 2 2 T h e M u s l i m resettlement did n o t put an end to all rebellious a c tivity. In X i n i n g , w h e r e the M o n g o u r tusi had stood b y the g o v e r n m e n t during the Gansu rebellion, a revolt b r o k e out in 1653, led b y a M u s l i m mulla. B u t even t h o u g h s o m e Q i n g officials then claimed that the leader o f the revolt had been in touch w i t h H a m i , careful investigation proved this not to be the case. 123 A l t h o u g h there are n o grounds for attributing inter-religious h a r m o n y t o the Q i n g policy o f segregating these different c o m m u n i t i e s , there did ensue m o r e than a century o f peace along the n o r t h w e s t e r n frontier. 1 2 4

Southeastern Shaanxi and the Han River Highlands W h i l e the dust finally settled in the arid n o r t h w e s t , southeastern S h a a n x i continued t o remain a problematical zone o f administration f o r the Q i n g authorities. T o s o m e degree this was because that part o f C h i n a , well within the Great Wall, was oddly e n o u g h m o r e savage and less accessible to military force than the frontier zone. In the latter region, traders had settled in mercantile cities and garrison t o w n s , offering supplies and refreshment to the caravaneers, h e r d s m e n , and bandits around them. T h e s e urban oases had p r o -

122 Fletcher, "China's Northwest," p. 21. 123 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 8 3 - 2 8 4 . The report is dated January 19, 1654. 124 There were, o f course, major wars with the Hodja in Yarkand in 1 7 5 8 - 1 7 5 9 , and with the Muslims o f Ush (Ili) in 1765; but within Gansu itself there were no major rebellions until 1781 and 1784, when it is possible to be much more positive about tracing connections to the Naqshbandiyya "new sect" o f Sufi militants. Rossabi notes that later during the Qing, when Muslims rebelled, they did so on their own without the cooperation o f Chinese dissidents. Rossabi, "Muslim and Central Asian Revolts," p. 193. Perhaps this was the result o f Manchu apartheid policies, which may ultimately have so separated the Han and Hui as to make them mutually hostile communities during the inter-ethnic struggles o f the 1850s and '60s.

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vided coherent reservoirs of manpower from their tightly fashioned Muslim communities when the call for rebellion was heard. Once military hostilities were over, however, the concentrated populations of these towns and cities were brought more easily under control than scattered rural inhabitants. 125 In the southeast, on the other hand, resistance was not so tightly focussed. In contrast to the cities and towns of the caravan routes were the small stockades and mountain redoubts of a forested terrain where men could hide out for years from their pursuers. As we have seen, Ren Zhen's earlier campaigns around Xing'an may have temporarily helped the local magistrate to rule, but his victories did not settle the conflict definitively.126 One reason for this was proximity to Sichuan, which meant that it was much easier for rebels and outlaws in this part of Shaanxi to get in touch with Ming loyalist groups in the south. Thus the army of Ming Colonel Tang Zhongheng, which operated along the Sichuan-Shaanxi border, included two Ming princes (Zhu Changying and Zhu Youdu), one Ming commander, and one Ming censorial military supervisor, as well as a Mongol commander named Shibulai. When Ren Zhen defeated Tang, after a harsh campaign during the last days of the Jiang Xiang revolt, many Ming seals were captured by the Qing troops, so that the connections with the loyalist movement were quite obvious to all.127 Perhaps more characteristic of this region than a border-crossing Ming loyalist force was the z/w/'-dwelling confederation of outlaws under the "Earl of Xing'an" (Xing'an bo), Sun Shoujin. Although the name suggests that Sun Shoujin was Shoufa's brother, 125 Breaking u p the M u s l i m communities into smaller farming units may have helped alleviate the immediate problem of rebellion, but it later created a greater capacity for revolt across the countryside—as became evident in the M u s l i m revolts of the mid-19th century. 126 In the 12th lunar m o n t h of 1650 [December 23, 1650-January 20, 1651], H e Keting led a revolt in X i n g ' a n but he was quickly captured and killed. Qing shi gao, biography of M e n g Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268. 127 Shizu shilu, 46:544a. Tang was beheaded, and the rest handed over to authorities in Xi'an for punishment. Ren Zhen's report is dated N o v e m b e r 23, 1649.

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it is even more probable that this outlaw leader had taken on the n a m e as a kind of rebel mantle after Sun Shoufa's initial coalition was defeated. Sun Shoujin occupied a mountain fort at Donghe. His major ally, whose own fort was on the Ren River, was General Tan Qi; and there were another thirteen allied stockades built on the hills all around Sun's fort on Banchang Mountain, just south of Ziyang. T h e location of these redoubts was u n k n o w n until Q i n g M a j o r Yang Jiuming scouted the area in the late spring of 1652, and then reported the existence of the rebel camps to his superiors. By then Ren Zhen (who had been awarded the title of tutor to the heir apparent for his military victories in these rude highlands) had pleaded ill health and had returned to the capital, where he was attached to the Han Solid Yellow Banner. Shanxi Governor Ma Zhixian therefore had to turn to someone else, and appointed General Z h a o Guangrui to assemble a punitive force in Xing'an in order to destroy the rebels. 128 General Zhao made careful preparations, getting permission to request neighboring districts to send supplies to Ziyang to outfit an extended campaign. By May 21, 1652, he was ready to send his expedition out of Ziyang, under Major Zhang Dejun, and ford the H a n River heading toward Banchang Mountain. Unlike many outlaws w h o fled at the first sight of government troops, Sun Shoujin's allies immediately girded the line of mountain tops, brandishing long rifles and challenging the columns of Qing troops. T h e battle raged for a long time. The Qing column withstood the initial fire on its flanks, but the Manchu-Han troops then had to fight their way up the mountainside against a crushing hail of rocks and missiles f r o m the rebels above. By the end of the day, w h e n light waned, the Q i n g troops had not been able to break through the defile, and it was only the next day, after flanking the "longhairs" (changtou), that they defeated the outpost that guarded the inner reaches further on. That same day, May 22, the imperial forces marched on, planning to camp in the high mountains. However, they ran into an ambush, and fought till dusk, with both sides taking heavy casualties. It was not until the day after that, May 23,

128 Qing shi liezhuan,

pp. 3 8 b - 3 9 a .

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that the m o u n t a i n mists cleared away e n o u g h for M a j o r Z h a n g D e j u n to assess the situation. As zhai after zhai l o o m e d into sight o n the m o u n t a i n s above them, the Q i n g soldiers realized that only an extended siege w o u l d serve to reduce Sun Shoujin's defenses. M a j o r Z h a n g divided his forces into a n u m b e r of different g r o u p s w h i c h w e r e assigned to pin d o w n individual redoubts, as well as to block off escape f r o m the rear. T h u s encircling the bandits, he h o p e d to starve t h e m into surrender. M o r e than six weeks later, on July 1, 1652, Sun's Ren River ally, Tan Q i , m a d e u p his m i n d to surrender to the Q i n g . Fearing that once Sun Shoujin's c a m p fell—an eventuality w h i c h appeared m o r e and m o r e likely—his m e n w o u l d have to bear the b r u n t of an extermination campaign, Tan requested amnesty f r o m M a j o r Z h a n g . W h e n clemency was granted, Tan's retinue, w h i c h included t w o M i n g colonels, one magistrate, four light colonels, f o u r m a j o r s and nine captains, "all shaved their heads." While yet other bands also decided to acknowledge Q i n g sovereignty in that area, Sun's h o p e for rescue f r o m his allies quickly waned. Shortly after Tan's surrender, M a j o r Z h a n g attacked the Banchang enc a m p m e n t , and killed the rebel leader along w i t h m a n y of his followers. T h e zhai was then literally ploughed under. 129 T h e defeat of Sun Shoujin left only one m a j o r outlaw g r o u p still at large in southeastern Shaanxi, and even that band k n e w the end w a s near. T h e "Pole Bandits" (Gan zei) led b y H e Shisheng had terrorized Luonan district since 1647. According to the district gazetteer, this well armed g r o u p of five hundred m e n w o u l d periodically descend u p o n valley villages and plunder them, killing h u n dreds o f m e n and w o m e n . "This was truly the greatest scourge experienced by the people of Luo[nan] in a thousand or m o r e years." 1 3 0 In 1651, however, H e Shisheng was drastically defeated b y a Q i n g contingent. 1 3 1 T w o years later, h o p i n g to bolster his forces, he m a d e an alliance w i t h another local bandit n a m e d W a n g You, and the t w o g r o u p s of m e n coalesced. Already, however, the

129 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 7 6 - 2 7 8 ; Qing shi gao, biography o f M e n g Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269. 130 Luonan zhi [Luonan gazetteer], cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 279. 131 Qing shi gao, biography o f M e n g Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 268.

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district inhabitants o f Luonan were forming "righteous braves" ( y i yong) to hunt d o w n the outlaws. Wang You therefore betrayed H e Shisheng to the authorities in exchange for his o w n life, and the Pole Bandits were exterminated. 1 3 2 A l t h o u g h the chronicles o f southeastern Shaanxi during the first decade o f Q i n g rule are mainly accounts o f crushing o n e band after the other, the pacification o f the entire province w a s not j u s t a matter o f military suppression. Had the government's hard-pressed forces been compelled to destroy or imprison every single rebel "within the passes," the provincial authorities could never have mustered the m a n p o w e r to govern effectively. E v e n as aggressive military c o m m a n d e r s defeated individual rebel bands, the o v e r all success o f the government's settlement depended u p o n securing the surrender o f other outlaw or loyalist units. A n d the question then b e c a m e what w a s to be done w i t h those n e w adherents. M e n g Q i a o f a n g described the p r o b l e m — a n d proposed a solut i o n — q u i t e straightforwardly in 1651: T h e customs of Shaanxi are cruel and harsh. The soil is barren and the people poor. Moreover, there are many high mountains and deep valleys which serve as refuges for outlaws and robbers. Since our great Qing stabilized the realm (ding ding), we have swept away the bandit evil. I have promulgated the emperor's benevolence and sternness, and repeatedly both soothed (fu) and attacked (jiao) [the rebels]. All of the major bandits have already been exterminated, one after the other. Only in the mountains of the north and south are there still some bad elements hiding in the thickets, a couple of hundred or perhaps sixty [in each gang], emerging at odd intervals to plunder the villages. When I send troops to kill or arrest them, they have already fled back into the mountains; and then when the soldiers have been recalled, [the bandits] again grab the opportunity to skulk out and wreak terror on the people. According to the e m peror's benevolent proclamation, which we received earlier, all of the outlaws and robbers in each local area were either driven [to crime] by hunger and cold, or forced [into banditry] by corrupt officials. They are thus to be pitied—and if they can reform them-

132 Shangzhou zhi [Shangzhou district gazetteer], juati 14, in Xie, Qitigchu nongmin, pp. 2 7 8 - 2 7 9 .

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The Final Pacification of the North selves, then they will be soothed [i.e. allowed to surrender] and their crimes will be forgiven. H u m b l y sharing the emperor's mercy, I have [issued] special [orders to] implement the policy of amnesty (zhaoju). As soon as that was done, there began arriving, one on the heels of the other, those w h o sincerely submitted in surrender. Yet the original reason for their becoming implicated as outlaws was starvation and exposure. If they go off one by one to become peasants again, for that same reason they will have no family ties, no land to be tilled, no seeds to plant, and no stock to be tended. And if we order them to become traders, then they will have no capital to use, not to speak of their being unaccustomed to management. If we intend to split them up and send each to a garrison to be enrolled in the military registers, [we must remember that frontier posts in] Gansu are three thousand li away, and in Ningxia two thousand li distant. Halfway there they will come to dread the hardship of travel and perforce run away, only to join together later [to rob]. Soon we would be back in the same intolerable situation as before.' 33

W h a t M e n g d e s c r i b e d h a d already b e e n h a p p e n i n g t h r o u g h o u t t h e p r o v i n c e . P r e f e c t u r a l r e p o r t s f r o m Yan'an, f o r instance, stated that m i l i t a r y g r o u p s w h i c h h a d b e e n allowed t o s u r r e n d e r n o t o n l y r e q u i r e d special h a n d l i n g and preferential t r e a t m e n t ; their i n d i v i d u a l leaders h a d b e e n a l l o w e d t o k e e p their c o m m a n d s u n d e r e r s t w h i l e r e g u l a r m i l i t a r y authority, and t h u s w e r e virtually a u t o n o m o u s . 1 3 4 What M e n g Qiaofang therefore proposed was a one-time-only sol u t i o n . A s each g r o u p o f o u t l a w s accepted amnesty, t h e y s h o u l d b e a s s i g n e d collectively to t h e provincial treasurer, w h o w o u l d p a y t h e m m o n t h l y rations out of tax funds which he normally used to m a k e u p q u o t a deficiencies. B y t h u s h o l d i n g t h e p u r s e s t r i n g s t o local m i l i t a r y salaries at t h e provincial level, t h e state t r e a s u r e r w o u l d retain central a u t h o r i t y over local d e f e n s e b u d g e t s — a t least f o r this k i n d o f i n c o r p o r a t e d f o r m e r rebel o r o u t l a w unit. T h e n e w soldiers w o u l d t h e n be attached t e m p o r a r i l y to t h e r o s t e r o f t h e

133 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 276. 134 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 275. This report, which is dated N o v e m b e r 4, 1650, is not complete: the last portion of the d o c u m e n t is obliterated.

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provincial commander-in-chief and trained for "imperial pacification" (zheng)—that is, given regular advanced military training. Then, as regular military units lost their own men through attrition, these new recruits could gradually be assigned to fill quotas in their place. In the meantime, the Boards of Revenue and War in Beijing would each receive a register (ce) listing the names and rations of each ding so absorbed by the imperial military administration. 135 Although Meng Qiaofang's suggestion was accepted as an interim solution, the question of financing long-term military costs remained unsolved. These new recruits could be carried for awhile on the provincial treasurer's rosters and paid with surpluses from one area earmarked to cover land tax deficits in another. But over time these funds would eventually be exhausted. Meng Qiaofang therefore also proposed that both in Shaanxi and Sichuan (over which he concurrently held the post of governor-general after 1653) the old system of self-supporting military colonies ( t u n t i a n ) be revived. If possible, the members of the army of occupation should till the land themselves; but, if the soldiers were unwilling to do so, then peasants should be brought in to "implement the regulations for military colonies for them.'" 36 Nevertheless, it would be many years before Shaanxi recovered from the devastating and disastrous calamities of the conquest era. In the southeastern highlands, for instance, the mountain slopes were overrun

135 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 276. One of the difficulties in returning to the former Ming military ration system was that a number of provinces simply did not have reliable registers. This was especially true in the west and northwest. See, for example, the memorial dated October 23, 1661 in Gugong bowuyuan Ming-Qing dang'anbu, comp., Qingdai dang'an shiliao congbian, fascicle 4, pp. 18-19. 136 Qing shi gao, biography of Meng Qiaofang, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 269; Er chen zhuan, 2:8a. In Shaanxi, the tuntian system had fallen into complete disuse during the late Ming, and during the Chongzhen reign many of the colonies' fields had simply been taken over by local magnates. After the system was revived by Meng Qiaofang, the soldiers did prove unwilling to till the land themselves and threatened to mutiny if forced to farm. Instead, peasants were brought in as tenants of the military fields. Gu Yanwu, Tinglin shi wen ji, Tinglin wenji, 1:1 lb— 12a.

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with new growth and wild animals; and farmers were replaced by hunters and herb gatherers. Not until the development o f maize cultivation, and the immigration o f "shed people" (peng min) from the coast in the early 18th century, did the region come to agricultural life again.137

The Shanxi Mountain Outlaws Shanxi, to the east, was also in a ravaged state after the Jiang Xiang rebellion was suppressed. In theory, pacification was now over; in fact, mopping up operations were considerable military affairs, and responsibility for them was now placed in the hands o f the new civil governor, Liu Hongyu. Liu, who held a Ming degree, was a Chinese bannerman. 138 Entering the province on horseback through Gu Pass in the middle o f summer, he found huts and cottages in ruin, and the people wasted "as from consumption." Bandits had "trampled down" the counties and districts o f the east, and the difficulties o f restoring a modicum o f prosperity were nearly overwhelming. Governor Liu dutifully ordered that reconstruction and rehabilitation measures be put into effect; he proclaimed an imperial amnesty, and formulaically encouraged the people to resume their former occupations. 139 But even as the peasants tightened their belts until the next harvest, outlaws continued

137 Evelyn S. Rawski, "Agricultural Development in the Han River Highlands." During the 18th century, the highlands became a very important manufacturing and mining area. Coal was mined, paper was made, iron was cast, and lumber was prepared for the market. Some o f the paper factories in the area had several hundred workers each, and the iron factories employed tens o f thousands o f people. The factories were owned by rich merchants from Xi'an or Hanzhong, who turned over management to local labor contractors. Throughout this period, however, the region continued to be characterized by social banditry. The area was devastated during the White Lotus rebellion o f 1 7 9 6 - 1 8 0 1 and never recovered its economic vitality thereafter. Fu Yiling, "Qingdai zhongye Chuan-Shan-Hu san sheng bianqu jingji xingtai de bianhua." 138 Narakino Shimesu, Shindai jüyo shokkan no kenkyü, p. 545. 139 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 257.

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to prey upon villagers without the slightest interference from official forces. Many of these gangs antedated the Jiang Xiang revolt, being as much a part of the mountain landscape of Shanxi as its watchtowers and fortresses. Two main groups of outlaws, however, were especially intolerable, the bandits of the Wutai Mountains originally led by Gao Ding, and the forces that had rebelled in the south that now were led by the elusive Zhang Wugui. The Mt. Wutai area, in eastern Shanxi, was a perfect refuge for outlaws raiding down through the passes into the towns around Zhending in western Hebei: "the forests were thick and the mountains dense." 140 Banditry was endemic, as General Tong Yangliang explained to his superiors in Beijing: B e c a u s e the m o u n t a i n s o f Wutai are strung together for over eight h u n d r e d li, filled w i t h l o f t y peaks and inaccessible precipices, w i t h n a r r o w refuges and deep gullies, they are called "the place to flee soldiers" (bi bing zhi di). T h u s have the bandits L o n g - l e g g e d Liu [i.e., Liu C h a n g t u i ] and Third G a o [i.e., G a o San] assembled a g r o u p o f desperadoes w h o use the m o u n t a i n s as a refuge f r o m w h i c h to w r e a k havoc. O u r troops are f e w and the m o u n t a i n s are vast. W h e n the soldiers pacify in the east, the bandits flee to the w e s t . W h e n w e strike in the w e s t , they hide in the east. We have in this manner d e p l o y e d our troops for a full year. E v e n t h o u g h over half [ o f the o u t l a w s ] have been destroyed or have been granted amnesty, w e have n o t y e t been able to w i p e t h e m out completely. L o n g - l e g g e d Liu's force w e a k e n e d , but he slipped away; and w h i l e w e repeatedly searched for Third Gao, he t o o escaped, o n l y suddenly to b e c o m e a blight [again].' 4 '

A plan had evolved, even before Governor Liu arrived, to blockade the Wutai outlaws—"Third Gao" (Gao Ding) and "Longlegged Liu" (actually named Liu Yongzhong)—at their main encampment in a place called Caojiashanzhai (Mountain stockade of the Cao family). The passes leading into that area had been barricaded by a force of over 1900 soldiers from different garrisons

140 Qing shi gao, biography of Li Yinzu, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 257. 141 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 258.

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around the province. However, Governor Liu did not believe that this strategy was going to succeed. Unless a more forward policy were adopted, the outlaws would continue to move at will in the higher mountains, easily evading the government troops. Liu Hongyu therefore decided on his own to assemble a joint force o f 300 regular Manchu armored infantry, 520 o f his men, and 770 soldiers from the Ningwu garrison to attack the Wutai stockades and destroy the bandits once and for all.142 T h e brief campaign was launched during the early summer o f 1650. It soon proved to be a failure. The outlaws simply melted back into the mountains, or headed farther north to escape through the passes near Mt. Heng. Consequently, Liu and General Tong Yangliang held a planning conference at Daizhou on October 6. In Tong's words, " w e agreed in general that we should seize the mountain stockades and occupy each o f the major roads." 143 This time, greater precautions were taken to prevent the bandits from escaping. Tong tried to block mountain passes north and south by sending special detachments under his own lieutenants; and in the north, at Hunyuan, he ordered that country militia (minzhuang bingding) be enrolled to supplement his forces and block egress from the Mt. Heng area. Yet once again, most o f the outlaws escaped capture or death. Receiving intelligence o f the government troops' movements, the gangs simply split up and fled to other mountains, or into densely wooded foothill areas. In fact, the government forces' attack actually had the effect o f increasing bandit depredations, because—ousted from their base o f operations—the rebels were forced to plunder settled villages along the way. 144 Perhaps for this very reason—that is, the accelerated disorder caused by unsuccessful government campaigns—the authorities backed off. B y 1651, when he was informed that Gao Ding had fled across the border into Beizhili, Governor Liu simply gave up plans for continuing the campaign altogether. The government troops could easily destroy the "lairs" Gao had left behind, but it would be vir142 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 5 7 - 2 5 8 . 143 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 258. 144 Ibid.

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tually impossible, in the absence of a coordinated regional campaign, to destroy the rebels with one province's forces alone.145 From the fall of 1651, then, until the spring of 1654, Gao Ding and the numerous small bands of the Wutai region continued to move in and out of the mountains and across the Shanxi-Zhili border virtually unhindered. As long as Gao and his men stayed immured within the high mountains, they were not likely to draw attention to themselves. But in the winter months of 1654, his outlaws moved out of the Shanxi range and down into the Hutuo River valley to the flatlands near Zhending, the important garrison town astride the highway crossing to Beijing. Alarmed local commanders there soon called for a cooperative campaign with soldiers from both Beizhili and Shanxi, and the Zhili governor, Wang Laiyong, brought Gao Ding to the court's attention and argued that the time had come for a concerted military effort against the Wutai outlaws. On April 28, 1654, the throne endorsed the project: "Good. Speedily execute your plans."146 The joint campaign was conducted under the general aegis of

145 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 5 8 - 2 5 9 . 146 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 258. Wang was seconded in his request by the f o r m e r M i n g official, aged Lu G u o n a n . G o v ernor Liu H o n g y u at first welcomed the plan for a combined military c a m paign, and announced that he had called in his m a j o r garrison c o m m a n d e r s and was m a k i n g arrangements to confer with his counterpart, G o v e r n o r Wang, in Zhili. Ultimately, however, Liu resisted the idea of simply bringing the t w o provincial military groups together under joint supervision, arguing that the campaign required the leadership of a higher-ranking figure w h o could c o m m a n d the obedience of regular provincial officers beneath h i m . Liu may have been pointing to a potential difficulty in chain of c o m m a n d in making this suggestion, but there was also the suggestion that he wished to place responsibility for major decisions in someone else's hands. H e pointed out, for instance, that Gao Di was n o w in Zhili, a full 400 li f r o m his original base at Wutai in Shanxi. Therefore, he argued, the court should appoint s o m e o n e in Zhili—and specifically a senior official like Lu G u o n a n — t o take charge of the campaign. T h e Board of War rejected this request. O n J u n e 16, 1654, its officials pointed out that Lu G u o n a n was virtually retired f r o m public service, and reiterated the feasibility of a j o i n t c o m m a n d . Ibid., p. 259.

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the Board of War, whose president, Ma Mingpei, was a descendant of the famous Liaoyang military family whose women had committed mass suicide in 1621 because they thought that their husbands had died in battle against the Manchus. Actually, of course, the men had surrendered, and Ma Mingpei himself was a Chinese Bordered Red bannerman. 147 Under his administrative supervision, the joint Shanxi-Zhili force combined extermination with a policy of selective amnesties, announcing publicly: "Let each bandit purge his thoughts and genuinely surrender. If there are [those who] delay, we will despatch troops to surround and destroy [them]." Gao Ding himself never formally surrendered, and may have been killed in a skirmish; but his brother-inlaw, "Three-Dog Dong" (Dong Sangouzi, actually named Dong Jinglu), did turn himself and his men in, and other bands of outlaws followed suit as soon as it became obvious that neither province offered refuge to them. By late summer, 1654, the Wutai Mountains were cleared of resistants.148 Although Gao Ding had roamed north and south along the mountain ridges and had moved far into Zhili at times, he and his men were still firmly based in a single area: the Wutai Mountain region. The other major bandit group that survived the Jiang Xiang revolt was not so locally centered. The elusive outlaw Zhang Wugui was—in contrast to Gao Ding—extraordinarily mobile, riding along the eastern rim of Shanxi from one end of the province to the other. If he had a single bailiwick, it was the southwestern corner of Shanxi, below Pingyang. But he was found on so many occasions in the northeast that he cannot be solely identi-

147 Ma Mingpei was also a classical scholar, and had earned the lower degree by the age o f 17, being a precocious reader and writer. After serving in the Board o f Works under H u n g Taiji, he was sent to Shanxi in 1644 to track d o w n Shun remnants in the Taihang Mountains. Gradually he put together a contingent o f tough Suiyuan troops from what is n o w Inner M o n g o l i a w h o accompanied him to Hunan to campaign in 1645. B y 1646 he was assigned to secure grain supplies in Jiangnan and was named Vice-President o f the Board o f Revenue. Ma was so efficient at this that he was named President o f War, the post he n o w held. Ma shijia pu, Zuanxiu, n.p. 148 Ming-Qing

shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmiti, p. 260.

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fied as a local bandit leader, confined to a single place. In 1649 he was to be found up in Wutai, the following year back in Pingyang, and then again by the end of 1650 in the north once again. Zhang Wugui's extraordinary mobility made him seem all the more dangerous to the authorities, especially because he appeared to arouse local district-level gangs wherever he went. As one official put it after a rebel attack on a district city, Zhang Wugui moved "with the force of a prairie fire which [was so hot that] one could hardly approach.'" 49 Jiang Xiang's revolt had given Zhang Wugui his first opportunity to forge a major rebel confederation. The disorder engendered by the mutiny throughout Shanxi made it easier to recruit followers, or to persuade smaller outlaw groups to join in a major uprising. And although Zhang had no visible connection with Jiang Xiang, he was able to exploit the Ming loyalist overtones of the resistance to lend his paramilitary forces more of an imperial military character. Whether or not he actually received his official warrants from Ming sympathizers, he did hand out military ranks to lieutenants commanding ancillary gangs. A follower of Zhang's captured much later was found bearing a document of appointment as "lieutenant colonel," dated Yongli 6 and under the rubric "Battalion of Loyalty" (Zhongyi ying).150 By the early months of 149 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 262. T h e sources tell us very little about such a legendary figure. Even his name is uncertain. At times he was k n o w n as Zhang Wugui; on other occasions he was simply called Zhang Wu. H e first appears in the Ming-Qing shiliao in the 7th lunar m o n t h o f 1646 (August 1 1 - S e p t e m b e r 8) under the name o f Zhang Wu, and is described as being the leader—along with another outlaw named Wang X i a o q i — o f district-level bandits around Pingyang. At the time, he was v i e w e d merely as the local leader o f a band o f 1,000 men w h o assembled in h i g h mountain valleys and descended into more settled areas to plunder small villages and hamlets. O n l y local troops were required to "pacify" his m e n o n this occasion and drive them back into the mountains west o f Pingyang. Yuanqu xianzhi [Yuanqu district gazetteer], ch. 7, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 260. 150 Wenxian congbian, ji 13, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 263. O n e source claims that Zhang styled himself Prince o f Wei. Qing shi gao, biography o f X u Zhankui, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 261.

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1649, therefore, Zhang Wugui had assembled a veritable army, led by himself, by his brother Zhang Wuchang, by Wang Shui Tianbing (who is probably the same person as Wang Xiaoqi), and by a man named Yan Ce. This force first attracted the attention of the provincial authorities when it appeared in the northeastern m o u n tains and laid siege to the district capital of Wutai. O n February 18, 1649, Zhang Wugui's men nearly took the city walls after a fierce attack; and it was not until a relief force of sixteen hundred men arrived f r o m the provincial capital on February 20 that the imperial soldiers were able to drive off the rebels after killing m o r e than one thousand of them. 151 Zhang Wugui returned briefly to his old haunts in Pingyang, but by 1650 he and Wang (now k n o w n to the imperial forces as Wang Taiping) were back in the Wutai area once more, assembling a force near Longquan Pass and threatening Baoding where Lu Guonan had mustered a large garrison of Zhili troops. Qing soldiers were brought back f r o m garrison posts along the Great Wall to drive Zhang back into the Shanxi m o u n tains; and although he once again eluded capture, many of his stockades were destroyed, a number of his men were captured, and t w o of his generals were beheaded. 152 For the next four years Zhang Wugui lay low, rebuilding his strength. In 1654, however, he reappeared in southwestern Shanxi again, emerging f r o m the Zhongtiao Mountains to attack the capital of Xiaxian with scaling ladders, and to plunder the county seat of Quwo. 1 5 3 But on February 20, 1655, his fortunes ran out. A M a n c h u scout discovered the general location of his headquarters in the Zhongtiao Mountains; and, provided with even more detailed information about the terrain by a local degree-holder f r o m Xiaxian, four columns of imperial Manchu troops, local district soldiers, and private retainers (neiding) marched secretly out of the Xiaxian and Pinglu county seats during the night of February 22 and converged shortly before dawn around a settlement called Majiagou (Ma Family Gully) on top of M o u n t Yindong. T h e in-

151 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 6 0 - 2 6 1 . 152 Er chert zhuan, biography o f L u Guonan, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 261. 153 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 262.

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habitants of Majiagou got wind of their attackers even before the sun had risen on February 23, and in the dark a number of the rebels managed to escape. But when there was light enough for the Qing troops to examine those they had killed, they were elated to discover that one of them was the legendary leader, Zhang Wugui himself. We killed in battle four bandits, and wounded two others rows. Among them was the bandit chief Zhang Wu[gui]. was a foot and a half long. Beside his body we found the seal of a so-called general, along with a document marked, Year of Yongli.'"54

with arHis hair wooden "Eighth

Meanwhile, orders were issued by Governor Chen Yingtai to pursue their advantage by rounding up all known supporters of the rebel in the Pingyang and Hedong areas. O n March 30, Jing Qizhen—one of Zhang Wugui's major lieutenants—was captured; and in the following weeks, vigilant Qing patrols captured or killed numerous small bands of ten to fifteen armed men in the mountains of the southwest. By the summer of 1655, all of southern Shanxi was under peaceful control, and the social banditry prevalent there since late Ming times had finally been curtailed.155 By then central Hebei (Beizhili) was fully pacified as well. Later, in 1655 and 1671 there would be occasional reports of bandits and outlaws, some of whom terrorized local officials, but these signs of disorder were seldom seen after 1650.156 Shandong, however, was yet another matter. The execution of Liu Zeqing and the suppression of the Elm Garden Army did not bring peace to Shandong. There was a great victory in March, 1649, over the famed

154 Ming-Qing shiliao, bing, ben 9, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 262. 155 Wenxian congbian, ji 13, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 2 6 2 - 2 6 4 . 156 Qing shi gao, biography o f Wu Zhengzhi; Shizu shilu, 37:12, 78:15, all in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 60. Northeastern Hebei, especially the coastal area around Shanhaiguan, was devastated during these years o f warfare and rebellion. In 1659 Gu Yanwu traveled through this region and recorded its i m poverishment and depopulation. Willard J. Peterson, "The Life o f Ku Yenwu, Part II," p. 206.

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bandit leader Sun Huating w h o had occupied the hilly district of Changqing, outside the provincial capital, for nearly a decade. 157 But in southwestern Shandong, along the borders with Hebei and Henan, remnants of the Elm Garden A r m y continued to make forays into those other provinces and impede traffic along the Grand Canal. 158 This was evidently a problem demanding the kind of t h o r o u g h attention that Wu Da had called for earlier: transferring personnel and troops f r o m other provinces to make certain that this strategic area was demilitarized, its redoubts torn down, the fabric of gentry society restored, and a strong local government apparatus built. It also required someone with the authority to c o m m a n d the military forces of all three provinces, because most of the rebel forces attacked provinces other than their own, and then slipped back across their border into their native sanctuaries. 159 In the wake of the Jiang Xiang rebellion, then, D o r g o n decided to create a new post: viceroy (zongdu) of the three provinces of Beizhili, Shandong, and Henan, with headquarters at D a rning.160 T h e man chosen to fill this important post was Z h a n g Cunren. 1 6 1

157 Sun had extended his protection to a Ming pretender, the Prince of Yi. Governor Lii Fengchun sent 880 troops into the mountains, and after fierce fighting captured Sun, his chief lieutenants, and their wives. Shizu shilu, 42: 494-495a, 499a; Ming-Qing shiliao, jia, ben 3, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 90. 158 Bi xian zhi [Bi district gazetteer], Guangxu edition, juan 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 80—81. 159 Fu Zongmao, Qingdai dujii zhidu, p. 11. 160 Although there were other viceroyalties—like the one held by Meng Qiaofang—this appointment marked a more regular use of viceroys (or governors-general) to deal with bandits raiding across provincial borders. Dorgon created 11 viceroyalties and 26 governorships. The Shunzhi Emperor created 14 viceroyalties. Under Dorgon, about 85% of his viceroys were Manchus. After 1655, when the system of viceroys was more or less permanently fixed, roughly 90% were Manchus; after 1678, about 70% were Manchus. Cheng Tingheng, ed., Darning xianzhi, 12:166; Tsao, "Three Feudatories," pp. 157-159; Fu, Qingdai duju zhidu, pp. 41-42; Narakino Shimesu, "Shindai tokubu Man-Kan hiritsu no hendo ni tsuite." 161 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 11.

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Viceroy, Gentry, and Elders Zhang Cunren was one o f the Ming colonels under Zu Dashou who had surrendered to the Manchus in 1631. In 1640 and 1641 he advised the Manchus that the city o f Jinzhou could be conquered by subverting the Mongols garrisoned within the city. His was also a strong voice in Qing government circles (after 1636 he served as president o f the Censorate) for encouraging more Chinese defectors to join them, emphasizing the services which men like Hong Chengchou and Zu Dashou could perform for the Manchus. Zhang was the one who wrote, in fact, to Wu Sangui first urging his surrender. He was also an excellent field officer, and in 1642 was appointed a meiren ejen or lieutenant-general in the Chinese Bordered Blue Banner. The next year, under Jirgalang's overall command, Zhang took charge o f the cannon o f his banner, and his artillery force proved to be very important to General Yecen during the subjugation o f Shanxi and especially at the capture o f Taiyuan in 1644. He served in much the same capacity, as an expert in siege warfare, under Dodo in Henan and Jiangnan. The most difficult test o f his skills, however, began when he was appointed governor-general o f Zhejiang in 1645 and was thus charged with forging an overall policy o f pacification for a province that everyone knew was going to be difficult to control. O n the one hand, Zhang Cunren had to fight off attacks against Songzhou by Southern Ming forces under Ma Shiying and Fang Guoan. O n the other hand, he also had to devise an effective civil policy for the provirfce itself.162 This was where he proved himself to be more than just a military expert. Fully aware o f the difficulty o f imposing the hair-cutting order, he had skillfully used the gentry o f Songzhou to "soothe" the people, and rewarded the gentry in turn with lighter taxes and a resumption o f the civil service examinations. Then, as later in Shandong, he declared that the key to pacification was securing the loyalty o f the scholars in the region. 163

162 See chapter 10. 163 Er chen zhuan, 2 : 1 2 - 1 3 ; Hummel, Eminent Chinese,

pp. 5 6 - 5 7 .

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Portrait of H o u Fangyu (1618-1655), holding a scroll. Ye Gongchuo, c o m p . , Qingdai xuezhe xiang zhuan (Shanghai, 1930), vol. 1, ce 1.

Consequently, one of Viceroy Zhang's first acts after taking office in Darning was to proceed in person to Guide county in northern Henan to pay a call of respect upon H o u Fangyu. For an imperial viceroy to defer to a thirty-two-year-old romantic poet may have appeared unprecedented, but Zhang Cunren had good reasons for wooing the man later tragically depicted as the leading protagonist of The Peach Blossom Fan. After the fall of Yangzhou,

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where Hou had fled to escape Ruan Dacheng's agents in Nanjing, the poet had returned to the Hou estates in Henan. As idealized by a contemporary biographer, Hou Fangyu passed the following few years in discreet and genteel semisolitude, "discussing literature with one or two old Confucian scholars (rw)."164 In fact, Hou was passionately involved in devising ways to restore gentry control over the local countryside—a problem that obviously concerned his family's landowning interests in the very region that had spawned the Shun rebel regime. Hou Fangyu had thus devised local counterinsurgency measures which involved both the revival of the old xiangyue (village covenant) system, and the systematic organization of a network of local gentry leaders expert in paramilitary activities. Zhang Cunren knew of Hou Fangyu's efforts in this regard, and he therefore came to Guide both to seek Hou Fangyu's counsel and to be put in touch with members of that network in Shandong. 165 Flattered by Zheng Cunren's visit, Hou Fangyu agreed to cooperate. First he provided the viceroy with the names of important local militia leaders in Shangdong like Jia Shitai. Then he agreed to help call together village elders ( x i a n g z h a n g ) to activate the covenant system. Zhang Cunren himself subsequently called on Jia Shitai as well, in order to gain his support; and together this coalition of local gentry and the viceroy divided the countryside into sectors which they made the personal responsibility of individual village elders who were provided with military supplies, official titles, and—perhaps most important—the assurance of rapid and effective military support across provincial boundaries in the event of outlaw or rebel attacks.166 At the same time Viceroy Zhang also took conventional military measures to discover the whereabouts of the enemy and cut back on its mobility. Spies were placed in the Elm Garden Army itself. Bridges across the Yellow River were deliberately dismantled to keep the rebels from seeking refuge on one side or the other. Whenever possible, the lou (towers and castles) of suspect rebels 164 H o u Fangyu, Zhuanghuitangji, 165 Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 63. 166 Ibid.

Zhuanghui tang wenji, first biography, p. l b .

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were seized and razed. As the counter-insurgency forces steadily increased their pressure against partisans and outlaws, the Elm Garden Army bands began to disperse. Some resumed their occupations as peasants; some retreated deeper into the mountains. Others, like the famous "Nine Mountains Bandit," Wang Jun, surrendered to Viceroy Zhang in person.167 The gentry loyalist leader Ye Tingxiu, who had provided the Elm Garden Army leaders with one of their important linkages to the Southern Ming court, fled the area altogether and sought refuge in Beijing, hiding for awhile in the home of the poet Gong Dingzi, who had decided to collaborate with the Manchus. Ye's own family members, left behind in southern Shandong, were all killed by government forces.158 It was thus a tripartite alliance—village leaders, provincial gentry, and regional viceroy—that finally "pacified" Shandong for the Qing, and ended decades of ongoing rebellion in the Henan-HebeiShandong triangle. In 1651, Hou Fangyu took the imperial Qing examinations, but he failed to win a degree. Afterwards, he deeply regretted having given in to pressures from family and friends to sit for the civil service tests. Yet, had he passed, his putative duties as a literary official in the capital would have been far less of a betrayal of the loyalist cause than his actual collaboration with Zhang Cunren in the countryside. 169 The next year, 1652, Shandong was declared

167 Bi xian zhi, G u a n g x u edition, juan 8, in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, pp. 8 0 - 8 1 . Wang Jun surrendered in 1652. 168 X i e , Qingchu nongmin, p. 12. 169 H o u Fangyu's y o u n g e r brother, Fangxia, had taken and passed the jinshi e x amination o f 1646. In 1651, H o u Fangyu along w i t h several other scholars founded a club called the Society o f the Six Masters o f the S n o w Garden ( X u e y u a n liu zi she). His fellow club m e m b e r s — w h o included S o n g L u o ( S o n g Quan's s o n and the future governor o f j i a n g s u ) — s t r o n g l y encouraged h i m to sit for the examinations. H o u was also told that the Shunzhi E m p e r o r w a s determined to b e c o m e intimate w i t h Confucian officials, and this had a strong influence o n his decision. T h e m o s t important reason, h o w e v e r , w a s the continuing pressure o f family members, w h o held up the e x a m p l e o f his y o u n g e r brother to him. Gao Yang, Mingmo sigongzi, p. 57; Langlois, "Chinese Culturalism," pp. 3 7 4 - 3 7 6 .

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pacified and a secure portion of the Qing domain. 170 For his o w n services, Viceroy Zhang was named a Manchu viscount of the first class (jinggini hafan)."1 Two years later, still untitled, Hou Fangyu died. He was only 37 years old, and it is said that the dominant mood of the poet's last few years was bitter remorse and sad regret.172 170 Shandong did remain a difficult province to govern. Tax evaders continued to hide in caves and become bandits, the coast was hard to control, and sectarians gave it a reputation for restiveness down into modern times. But in 1655 when the Yellow River repeatedly flooded Caozhou prefecture, many of the elm trees were washed away and Qing troops finally entered the isolated villages where the Elm Garden Army had first arisen, and slaughtered the last diehards. For descriptions of the 1655 flood, see Caozhou juzhi [Prefectural gazetteer of Caozhou], cited in Xie, Qingchu nongmin, p. 90. See also Shen Yiji, ed., Zhejiang tongzhi, p. 2682 (158:20b); He Zhiji, ed., Anhui tongzhi, p. 2268 (199:8a); Jing Su and Luo Lun, Landlord and Laborer in Late Imperial China, p. 44. 171 Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 57. 172 Gao, Mingmo si gongzi, p. 60. See also Langlois, "Chinese Culturalism," p. 376.

CHAPTER TWELVE

The Dorgon Regency Wherever Our imperial expeditions took place it was always the Uncle Prince who led Us and devised the winning strategy. Whether laying siege to cities or fighting on the battlefield, he could not but conquer and capture. While the Uncle Prince is youthful, he is also conscientious, being righteous and forthright. Loyal and virtuous, he embodies the state (ti guo). He has helped realize the great enterprise. Fulin, Coronation Speech upon Being Named the Shunzhi Emperor, Da Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu, 9 : 2 2 a .

O n May 2, 1644, only seven days before Dorgon made up his mind to embark upon the conquest o f China, Grand Secretary Hife presented to the Qing court at Shengjing the Manchu translations o f the three dynastic histories o f the Liao, Jin, and Yuan dynasties. These histories, Hife explained, contained many lessons from the past, including the "gains and losses o f governing" which those earlier conquest dynasties had experienced: "Although these events are long past, they can still influence the present. Although the persons have long died, they can still suffice to be a mirror for the ages." 1 T h e translation projects had been started in the first

1 Da Qing Shizu Zhang (Shunzhi) huangdi shilu (hereafter Shizu shilu), 3 : 2 2 b . Hife, who was the uncle o f Soni, was generously rewarded for his eloquence

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place back in 1636 because Taizong (who had just changed the name o f his dynasty from the Latter Jin to the Qing) had believed that every Manchu official should study the history o f these three dynasties and "take their good points as appropriate examples and their defects as appropriate warnings." 2 The warnings that Taizong himself had drawn from all three, but above all f r o m the Jin, was the danger o f sinification: "Later generations entered the Chinese way and forgot archery."3 That was still a concern in 1644 for many o f the beile who, somewhat reluctantly, went along with Dorgon's decision to invade the Central Plain. But what D o r g o n himself also drew from the history o f dynasties such as the Jin was the danger o f internecine factionalism leading to ruinous disputes between the tribal aristocracy and the imperial throne.4 Reading the History of the Jin, one could easily see how such cleavages within the conquering elite could encourage the formation o f Chinese bureaucratic cliques, which in turn intensified the hostility between sinified emperors and nativist nobles. One could also see, in the reign o f Xizong (1135-1148) for example, how readily Chinese bureaucrats had supported the throne because it promoted centralized civilian authority, while the Jurchen generals and aristocrats had opposed sinification because its institutional ramifications threatened their independent control over their own domains. Disagreements over administrative reforms were thus transformed into bloody struggles for power which crippled the Jin ruling house, just as continuing sinification after 1161 weakened the dynasty's tribal base.5 D o r g o n must have wondered, while he mulled over the deci-

that day. H e was given an imperial saddle horse and 40 ounces o f silver. Shortly afterward, h o w e v e r , he antagonized Tantai, D o r g o n ' s major adviser, and was dismissed f r o m his post. Arthur W . H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese of the Ch'ing

Pe-

riod, p. 663. 2 Shizu shilu, 3:23a. See also Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 1:1; and Zhang Q i y u n , ed., Qing shi, 1:32. 3 Gertraude Roth Li, " T h e Rise o f the Early Manchu State," p. 182. 4 Jing-shen Tao, " T h e Influence o f Jurchen Rule on Chinese Political Institutions," p. 125. 5 Jing-shen Tao, The Jurchen in Twelfth-Century China, pp. 3 9 - 4 1 , 113-114.

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sion to seize Beijing, whether or not the Manchus w o u l d be able to avoid a similar end. For them, there was the perennial tension bet w e e n the Chinese imperial throne and a transmural aristocracy; there also existed a faction-ridden corps of civil servants to be adopted f r o m the fallen Ming; and, in addition, there w a s the M a n c h u s ' o w n military banner system which readily lent itself to partisan conflict a m o n g aristocratic cliques. 6 Moreover, there already existed, in the f o r m of the Assembly of Princes and H i g h Officials and of the Inner T h r e e Courts, political institutions w h i c h intensified and focused these potential antagonisms bet w e e n the M a n c h u aristocracy and the Sino-Manchu C o n f u c i a n monarchy. 7

The Princes' Assembly and the Throne's Secretariat T h e Assembly of Princes and H i g h Officials (Yizheng w a n g dachen huiyi) could be traced back to 1622 w h e n N u r h a c i had appointed eight of his beile to a deliberative council w h i c h was t o rule the e m p i r e collectively. 8 T h e following year eight ministers (dachen) w e r e m a d e deliberative officials, but their function w a s primarily censorial and mainly intended to alert N u r h a c i to plots a m o n g the beile. As H u n g Taiji succeeded N u r h a c i and t u r n e d a w a y f r o m collective rule by strengthening the throne, the p o w e r and n u m b e r of the ministers increased. In 1626 the banners w e r e placed u n d e r the c o m m a n d of gusan ejen, banner c o m m a n d e r s

6 For general discussions o f these problems, see: Xiao Yishan, Qingdai tongshi, 1 : 3 7 7 - 3 7 9 ; and Harold Lyman Miller, "Factional Conflict and the Integration of Ch'ing Politics," p. 3. 7 D o r g o n was also very concerned about factionalism because o f the maneuvering that took place among the beile when the Shunzhi Emperor was enthroned. Consequently, after the government was set up in Beijing, it was announced that any efforts to form factions among the aristocracy would result in the instant death o f the individual involved. Li Ge, "Guanyu Duoergun yongli Fulin wenti de kaocha," p. 266. 8 Zhaolian, Xiaoting zalu, 4: 5b.

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w h o w e r e actually called together into an assembly, w h i c h was f u r t h e r expanded in 1637 after Taizong had declared himself Q i n g emperor. 9 T h e Assembly was e m p o w e r e d to discuss military affairs and to advise on foreign affairs. It represented the collegial power, s t e m m i n g f r o m the earliest days of the M a n c h u s ' rise, o f the tribal aristocracy. A l t h o u g h clearly advisory to the e m p e r o r and carefully kept under bureaucratic restraint, the Assembly of Princes and H i g h Officials thus could not act as a collective b o d y f o r imperial government. 1 0 If the Assembly represented collective aristocratic rule, the other institution dating f r o m earlier days obviously stood m o r e for the t h r o n e and its decision-making. What would be k n o w n after 1658 as the N e i g e (Inner Secretariat, or Grand Secretariat) was originally a clerical unit supposed to translate Chinese d o c u m e n t s into M a n c h u , and vice-versa. As of 1614, literary clerks (bitieshi) w e r e f o r m a l l y appointed to keep the financial accounts of the niru. T h e s e evolved into scholars (ruchen) appointed to record state affairs and translate Chinese materials. At first, they were not necessarily civil a p p o i n t m e n t s , b u t held military ranks. After 1631, w h e n H u n g Taiji established six ministries (boards), civil officials began to fill these clerical ranks; and in 1634, w h e n the Board of Rites tested and appointed sixteen translators with the juren degree, the position b e c a m e a regular civilian one. T w o years later, the Hall of Literature (Wenguan, originally founded in 1629) w h i c h they o c cupied came formally to be k n o w n as the Inner T h r e e C o u r t s (Nei San Y u a n ) : the N e i Guoshi Y u a n (Inner C o u r t of Historiography) w h i c h compiled the Veritable Records, conserved imperial edicts, and p r o v i d e d c o m m e n t s on imperial proclamations; the Nei M i s h u Y u a n (Inner C o u r t of the Secretariat), which handled diplomatic correspondence, complaints against officials, edicts, and funeral orations; and the N e i H o n g w e n Yuan (Inner C o u r t of Vast Learn-

9 The beile in the meantime were given bureaucratic rank. In fact, the term beile came to mean prince of the third rank while the first two ranks were called u>ang.

10 According to Silas Wu, it was the "supreme deliberative body whose power was second only to that of the emperor." Communication and Imperial Control in China, p. 13.

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Regency

ing), which delivered lectures to the emperor on morality and served as the tutoring office for the imperial heirs. These Inner Three Courts were at first supervised by four grand secretaries— t w o Manchus and two Chinese. In 1636, the grand secretaries were reduced by one to two Manchus and one Chinese; and the latter remained, until 1644, Fan Wencheng.11 These t w o institutions, the Assembly and the Inner Three Courts, seemed at first glance to correspond to two similar M i n g bodies: the Assembly o f Nine Ministers and Censors (Jiu qing kedao huiyi), which consisted o f the heads o f the Six Ministries, the Censorate, the Transmission Office, and the Court o f Judicature and Revision; and the Grand Secretariat o f the emperor, including even the Hanlin Academy as the unit closest to the throne and normally held responsible for historiography, drafting important documents, scholarship, compilations, and so forth. In fact, however, the Ming and Qing institutions originally functioned quite differently. T h e M i n g Assembly o f Nine Ministers and Censors, for instance, served as a court audience and was convened for important policy discussions; but the assumptions about this body were clearly that it was an advisory group, waiting upon the emperor, whereas the Qing Assembly o f Princes and High Officials was a much more powerful body and represented the earlier Manchu traditions o f collegial rule. That distinction was maintained at first under the new dynasty. While the Assembly o f Princes was convened to discuss diplomatic and military affairs and to ratify the emperor's decisions in these areas, the Assembly o f Nine Ministers (High Officials) was strictly advisory, being convened sometimes with Manchus and Chinese together, sometimes with the ministers separated, to suggest policy formulations, to make nominations for high government positions, and to discuss administrative regulations. T h e Assembly o f Nine Ministers often met with the

11 Robert B. Oxnam, Ruling from Horseback, p. 33; idem., "Policies and Institutions o f the O b o i Regency," p. 269; Wu, Communication and Imperial pp. 14-15; X i e Guozhen, Ming-Qing

zhiji

Control,

dangshe yundong kao, p. 120; Piero

Corradini, " A propos de l'institution du nei-ko sous la dynastie des T s i n g , " pp. 419-420.

The Dorgon Regency

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Assembly o f Princes, b u t obviously existed as a secondary b o d y to that m o r e p o w e r f u l one. 12 Just as the Assembly of Princes represented a tradition of collective leadership a m o n g the beile (as opposed to the p o w e r of a single leader like Taizong) and thus reflected M a n c h u particularities, so did the position of grand secretary at first differ for the M a n c h u s f r o m the office u n d e r the M i n g . U n d e r Q i n g Taizong the post of g r a n d secretary was not nearly so exalted a position as it had bec o m e d u r i n g the late Ming. 1 3 Actually serving as personal secretaries to the e m p e r o r - k h a n , f r o m w h o m they derived their power, the t w o M a n c h u and one Chinese grand secretaries held rank equal only to that of a colonel. After the capital was moved to Beijing, they continued to function primarily as secretary-advisors. M e morials w e r e submitted by the Six Boards directly to the emperor, so that only those memorials not directly related to one of the six f u n c t i o n i n g ministries w o u l d go t h r o u g h the Inner T h r e e Courts. 1 4 T w o n e w conditions combined to increase the importance o f the Secretariat, t h o u g h not at first necessarily of the grand secretaries themselves. O n e of these was the conquest itself. T h e acquisition of m a n y m o r e troops, the complexity of g o v e r n m e n t in Beijing, and the confused lines of c o m m a n d between the capital and the provinces led to a d e m a n d for m o r e formal channels o f

12 Wu, Communication and Imperial Control, p. 13. When a high official wished to speak to a Manchu prince during joint meetings o f the Assembly o f Princes and the Assembly o f Nine Ministers, he did so on his knees. Wang Sizhi and Jin Chengji, "Cong Qing chu de lizhi kan fengjian guanliao zhengzhi," p. 137. 13 Charles O . Hucker, The Ming Dynasty, p. 89. 14 Wu, Communication and Imperial Control, pp. 1 0 - 1 3 . In 1644, as part of the n e w government's policy to restore Ming institutions, Dorgon established a separate Hanlin Academy that was incorporated into the Inner Three Courts. The Academy remained part of the Nei San Yuan until 1657, when it recovered its administrative independence. From 1662 to 1670 it was again incorporated in the Inner Three Courts. "Except for some changes in the titles o f the staff members, this incorporation did little to alter either its procedure or its functions. In 1670, the Hanlin Academy became an independent institution, and remained so until its abolition in 1906." Adam Yuen-chung Lui, The Hanlin Academy, pp. 3 - 4 ; see also Ibid., p. 215, and Lawrence D . Kessler, K'ang-hsi and the Consolidation of Ch'ing Rule, p. 29.

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communication. 15 The government's new policy was finally set on April 11, 1645, when Dorgon issued an edict announcing that thenceforth, all yamens, large and small, inner and outer, would basically follow the Ming rules for memorials. General policy would be that the Six Boards would be the main clearinghouses for memorials. The boards themselves had the right to memorialize the moment documents were prepared, and were then to await imperial endorsements before carrying out the orders. Other yamen should attach themselves to a board by function, and then memorialize through the board; or rather, have the board memorialize for them. 16 15 T h e n e w regime was also extremely conscious o f the bureaucratic confusion that had so crippled the Ming dynasty. T w o characteristics o f the government which the Q i n g had inherited were attacked. First, there was the tendency o f ministry officials to tuiwei or shift one's responsibility to someone else. Supervising Secretary Zhu Zhibi (Office o f Scrutiny, Board o f Revenue) described that practice as follows: " T h e nation's affairs rest entirely in the Six Boards, yet the trouble with the Six Boards is simply that they are always evading responsibility. O n the whole there is far more hesitation and fear o f getting involved in affairs than there is resolve to bear responsibility and blame on one's own. O n c e a matter is encountered those with talent are unwilling to decide and those without talent are unable to decide. I f the matter is s o m e what important, then a meeting is called to discuss it. Otherwise, it is postponed for days and months, while an external investigation and report are ordered. O r else it is loaded off on someone else, while a governor is charged with looking into the matter and memorializing. O r else there is so much fear o f even beginning that a department is named responsible, and that's all there is to it. Carelessness and perfunctory performance o f one's duties—constant discussion without result—that's all there is to it." Cited in Wang and J i n , " C o n g Q i n g chu de lizhi," p. 136. T h e second defect attacked was the actual confusion o f functions between ministries. From the outset, high Q i n g officials were determined to draw very clear distinctions between the responsibilities o f the various boards, and thus prescribed very strict punishments for those w h o erred in assigning particular matters to the most appropriate lei (category) for the board in question to take action. See the Shilu citations in Wang and J i n . 16 Just after becoming a regent, D o r g o n had abolished the practice o f having Manchu princes manage the Six Boards. Although the move may have been primarily directed against Dorgon's main rival, Haoge (who until then c o n trolled the Board o f Revenue), it also reinforced Dorgon's personal control over the bureaucracy. Dorgon took great care to be certain that members o f

The Dorgon Regency

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This rationalization m a d e excellent sense because of the g r o w ing v o l u m e of paper as ad hoc offices tried to approach the princeregent directly. What proved m o r e difficult to regulate, however, was the precise connection between high provincial military and civil officials and the throne. D u r i n g the first year of Q i n g rule in the Central Plain, matters both strategically i m p o r t a n t and relatively ordinary (e.g. logistics, surrendering officials, and so forth) w e r e reported directly to the throne by M a n c h u and Chinese regional c o m m a n d e r s . For routine matters, this practice was n o w t o cease. T h e April 11 edict ordered that provincial c o m m a n d e r s desiring to memorialize should write up their c o m m e n t s and f o r w a r d t h e m to the board appropriately concerned w i t h the matter. If the b o a r d agreed w i t h the recommendation, it could then m e morialize on behalf of the provincial official. If there was disagreem e n t , then the matter should be referred to the Censorate (Duchayuan) w h i c h w o u l d m a k e a final recommendation on behalf of the bureaucracy. Finally, sensitive matters should c o m e directly to the throne's o w n secretariat. All documents on topics which do not concern one of the boards; or which enumerate matters of government policy (zheng shi), secrets concerning foreign states, or special military strategy, must be sent directly to the Inner Courts (Neiyuan). 17

This procedure w o u l d hardly resolve the issue satisfactorily. First, the question of what constituted " g o v e r n m e n t policy" (zheng shi) remained unanswered. T h e r e was a quite m u r k y area w h i c h b o r d e r e d o n secret policy making and which m i g h t be b r o u g h t f o r w a r d via the boards just as well as being sent to the Secretariat. In the f o r m e r case, of course, state security was at stake, since so

his o w n clique w e r e g i v e n key roles in the boards or the Inner T h r e e courts. For example, G o n g a d a i — o n e o f his strongest s u p p o r t e r s — w a s placed in a crucial position in the Board o f Civil Appointments, as later w a s another f o l lower, Tantai. Oshibuchi Hajime, "Shincho Junji shoseki n o habatsu teki k o s o ni tsuite," pp. 1 - 2 . See also Pei Huang, Autocracy at Work, p. 84; O x n a m , Horseback, p. 43. 17 Shizu shilu, 15:168a.

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The Dorgon

Regency

many of these documents were routinely copied by clerks and circulated outside the bureaucracy.18 Eventually, therefore, the throne would devise a special secret memorial system quite apart from the regular apparatus for forwarding routine memorials about the day-to-day business of administration. This would serve even more to strengthen the position of the Secretariat—the word in both Chinese and English carries the same connotation of secrecy and confidentiality. The development of this system, however, was not just a matter of the throne's penchant for keeping its own counsel. While it made perfectly good sense for capital yamens to rationalize their activities by attaching themselves functionally to one of the Six Boards, the major defect in these new memorializing arrangements was the relationship between provincial authorities and central ministries. If only routine business were being conducted, then a stand-off between a governor-general and a board president might have been tolerable. The matter could then, as previewed, have been sent to the Censorate for adjudication and final recommendation to the throne. But what of times of emergency? The exigencies of the conquest did not allow for lengthy negotiations between provincial authorities and central government officials. Thus, the throne's Secretariat was inevitably reinforced. For, only a group so close to the emperor as to be absolutely reliable transmitters could rapidly convey sensitive matters directly to the throne for immediate decision. This too formed part of the secret memorial system which later emerged. 19

Dorgon's Ascendancy The second factor which increased the responsibilities of the Neiyuan was Dorgon's ritual ascendency after the conquest of Beijing. 20 The occupation of the imperial capital and the establishment of the Qing as pretender to the Chinese Mandate of Heaven strengthened Dorgon's position enormously, permitting him to 18 Ibid., 20:241b, dated October 15, 1645. 19 Wu, Communication and Imperial Control. 20 Oshibuchi, "Shinchô Junji shoseki," p. 3.

The Dorgon Regency

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lay claim b o t h to the military legacy of N u r h a c i and Taizong, and to the n e w role of a Chinese sage-statesman. T h e t w o mantles w e r e c o m b i n e d in one w h e n the Q i n g capital was transferred f r o m Shengjing (Mukden) to Yanjing (Beijing) in the person of the y o u n g Shunzhi Emperor. 2 1 T h e emperor's retinue had entered the Central Plain t h r o u g h Shanhai Pass on O c t o b e r 9, 1644, and by O c t o b e r 18 it had reached the Grand Canal at T o n g z h o u , giving D o r g o n and the court in Beijing ample time to prepare for the w e l c o m i n g rites. T h e following day, O c t o b e r 19, the six-year-old b o y was b r o u g h t t h r o u g h the Z h e n g y a n g Gate and w e l c o m e d ceremoniously b y the prince-regent. It was n o w possible to c o m plete the plans m a d e on M a y 9 and install Shunzhi as e m p e r o r of China. 2 2 T h e f o r m a l ritual of imperial ascension was orchestrated b y Feng Q u a n , w h o had already been asked, along w i t h Xie Sheng, to develop the rites and regulations for the Temple of the Imperial Ancestors (Tai miao) and the Altars of the Soil and Grain (Sheji tan). 23 Despite his political notoriety, Feng Q u a n — w h o was fifty years o l d — w a s acknowledged to be an erudite student of ritual, and an expert in collational rites. H e outdid himself for this occasion. T h e imperial ascension itself had to await the beginning of a n e w sexagenary cycle, and the next jiazi day which m a r k e d such a b e g i n n i n g fell o n lunar double-ten day ( N o v e m b e r 8, 1644). 24 D u r -

21 T h e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n Beijing (Yanjing) and imperial rule w a s underscored b y D o r g o n in the letter w h i c h he sent to the Shunzhi Emperor in S h e n g j i n g , formally inviting h i m to transfer his capital. In the letter, D o r g o n pointed out that Yanjing had been an imperial capital for a long time, and f r o m it the M i n g had ruled a vast realm. It was also the perception o f the M a n c h u aristocracy that establishment o f a permanent capital in Beijing w o u l d curtail its o w n privileges b y strengthening the monarchy. M a n y nobles resisted the m o v e . Z h e n g Kecheng, " D u o e r g u n dui Manzu fengjianhua de gongxian," p. 10. 22 Z h a n g , Qing shi, 1:34. 2 3 X i a o , Qingdai tongshi, 1:382. 24 A t this time, as well, the calendar w a s tested and corrected. O n July 29, 1644, A d a m Schall—at the order o f his religious superior—had s o m e w h a t reluctantly petitioned D o r g o n , submitting that the Jesuits' version o f the calendar was the m o s t accurate available. T h e prince-regent agreed that it was i m p o r tant for the Q i n g dynasty to have as accurate a calendar as possible. T h e Jesuit m e t h o d o f determining the calendar was therefore tested against the official

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The Dorgon Regency

ing the next several weeks, therefore, Feng Q u a n and other m e m bers of the Board of Rites put the young boy through a series of carefully rehearsed performances both to mark his own impending occupation of the dragon throne and to celebrate Dorgon's personal triumph as the conqueror of Beijing. O n the first day of the tenth lunar m o n t h (October 30), Shunzhi was taken to the Altar of Heaven in the southern suburbs and there was made to conduct sacrifices to Heaven and Earth. 25 At the same time, ritualists went to the Temple of the Imperial Ancestors and the Altars of the Soil and Grain in the Forbidden City to carry out the ceremonies that Feng Q u a n and Xie Sheng had formulated. The following day, Shunzhi conferred the title of Sacred Duke (Yansheng gong) u p o n the 65th heir of Confucius, and that of Doctor of Classics (Wujing boshi) upon the cadet of that line as well as upon descendants of famous men of antiquity. 26 And on November 1, "considering that D o r g o n , Prince Rui, was of the highest merit, [the Emperor] ordered that the Board of Rites erect a tablet to c o m m e m o r a t e him." 2 7 Thus, when the jiazi day arrived on November 8, it was both an occasion of enthronement and a celebration of Dorgon's newly exalted role as superior prince-regent. The Shunzhi E m p e r o r had his ascension promulgated for him with the formal announcement of the n e w Q i n g reign era, which was accompanied by remissions

astronomer's prediction o f eclipses for September 1. Schall's computation was the most accurate, and on October 31, 1644, the Jesuits' calculations were adopted and Adam Schall was made director o f the Qin Tian Jian (Board o f Astronomy). Shizu shilu, 6:65b; Lo-shu Fu, A Documentary Chronicle of SinoWestern Relations, pp. 3 - 5 ; George H. Dunne, Generation of Giants, pp. 3 2 4 325; Jonathan D. Spence, To Change China, pp. 3 - 4 . 25 For the cosmological importance of this altar, which established the Son o f Heaven's claim to be the center o f the universe, see Arthur F. Wright, "The C o s m o l o g y of the Chinese City," p. 71. For a description o f the ceremony itself, translated from the Da Qing huidian, see E. T. Williams, "The State Religion o f China during the Manchu Dynasty," pp. 1 2 - 1 4 . 26 For a description of these offices, as well as the names o f the men so honored, see H. S. Brunnert and V. V. Hagelstrom, Present Day Political Organization of China, pp. 4 9 3 - 4 9 4 . 27 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:34.

T h r o u g h this inner gateway of the Zhengyang Gate, which still stands at the southern end of Tiananmen square in Beijing, only emperors could pass in M i n g and Q i n g times. Osvald Siren, The Walls and Gates of Peking (London, 1924), plate 77, reproduced through the courtesy of the Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley.

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o f taxes and pardons; and at the same time a speech was read f o r h i m in f u l s o m e praise of D o r g o n ' s exploits. M u c h of the praise concerned D o r g o n ' s military feats: besides being credited w i t h strategically planning the conquest of n o r t h China, Prince Rui w a s also singled o u t for his role in the campaigns of 1628 and 1635 against the C h a h a r M o n g o l s , in opening u p lands at Yizhou, and in c o n d u c t i n g the sieges of Songshan and Jinzhou. A n d in addition to being acclaimed for realizing Nurhaci's "great enterprise" b y leading the M a n c h u s into the Central Plain, D o r g o n was credited w i t h placing Shunzhi u p o n the throne. 2 8 T h e six-year-old e m p e r o r was m a d e to say that: In addition, he helped Us to ascend to the throne and aids U s personally, his considered calculations being of merit and excellence. He is as great as the Duke of Zhou! The Duke of Zhou once received the mandate handed down by King Wu w h o m he helped establish as ruler, acting on his behalf to manage the governing of the realm, devoting all his loyalty and filial piety.29

A c c o r d i n g to the emperor's speechwriter, w h o was probably Fan Wencheng, D o r g o n even "surpassed" (guo) the revered D u k e of Z h o u because: The Uncle Prince also led the Grand Army through Shanhai Pass to smash two hundred thousand bandit soldiers, and then proceeded to take Yanjing, pacifying the Central Xia. He invited U s to come to the capital and received U s as a great guest.30

Shunzhi's speech ended with the announcement that Prince Rui was to be given the additional rank of Uncle Prince Regent (Shufu

28 It has been suggested that the Manchus' decisive role at the battle o f Shanhaiguan was exaggerated in the Veritable Records in order to exalt Dorgon's leadership during the conquest. Wang Chongwu, "Wu Sangui yu Shanhaiguan zhi zhan," p. 153. 29 Shizu shilu, 9:22b. 30 Ibid.

The Dorgon Regency

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shezheng wang), elevating him even higher by virtue of his special relationship to the throne. 31 Two days later, on November 11, the emperor did reinstate the princedom of Su to Haoge, while Ajige was named Prince Ying, but in the same announcement, Shunzhi also demoted Jirgalang from full Prince Regent to Assistant Uncle Prince Regent (Fu zheng shuwang). Dorgon was thus now without peer among the Manchu aristocracy.32 Confucian court ritual played an important part in further enhancing Dorgon's elevated status once Shunzhi ceremonially occupied the throne in Beijing. The Board of Rites developed the kinds of new rules of precedence that Jirgalang had hoped would not be forthcoming when he suggested that the administration proceed first to Dorgon, and then to his fellow regent. O n June 16, 1645, only a little more than six months after being raised above the other Manchu princes, Dorgon was distinguished still further. A change was announced in the ceremonies at court, and it was declared that thereafter all documents were to refer to Dorgon as the Imperial Uncle Prince Regent (Huang shufu shezheng wang). 33 At that time, the Board of Rites announced that: A t all major c e r e m o n i e s — l i k e g o i n g to the hunt, g o i n g o n c a m paign, or r e v i e w i n g the t r o o p s — l e t all the princes, beile, beise and d u k e s a s s e m b l e at a spot w h e r e they will be a n n o u n c e d b y the B o a r d o f Rites. T h e assembly will be told to wait. T h e n w h e n the Prince [Rui] approaches, each o f the officials will kneel in order o f rank and see h i m off. Awaiting the Prince's return, the [other] princes m a y retire w h e n ordered to retire. Beile and b e l o w will escort the Prince to the gate o f his residence and m a y then retire. Their o w n attendants will kneel and w e l c o m e [the Prince] as they did before. 5 4

31 T h e Chinese title Shufu, translates "Uncle" (Ecike) in Manchu, but ecike is not just a kinship term; it also designates a rank one grade above that of an imperial prince. Chen Jiexian, Qing shi zabi, 1 : 3 9 - 7 9 ; Zheng Tianting, Tan weiji, p. 111. 32 Zhang, Qing shi, 1:35. 33 Ibid., 1:37; Zheng, Tan weiji, p. 118. 34 Shizushilu, 16:16b-17a.

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The Dorgon

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Manchu princes o f the blood were clearly differentiated from the other nobility in that they could retire after initially welcoming the Imperial Uncle Prince Regent, but they were still forced to assemble ritually before his arrival and to attend his departure ceremoniously. Moreover, even though princes o f the first degree (qin wang), along with a few select second-degree princes (jun wang) like Abatai, were not forced to kowtow along with the other princes in the presence o f Dorgon, they were nevertheless brought under these new protocols and hence formally enclosed in the same set o f rituals that the entire court obeyed. 35 Thus, while being singled out from other lower-ranking princes in that they did not have to kowtow when receiving a helping o f food from Dorgon's own hand at a state banquet, they did have to stand to accept the gift. And, even more tellingly, when the Imperial Uncle Prince Regent issued an order, the messengers bearing his command or his gifts did not have to dismount if they encountered any o f the princes on the way, nor did they have to dismount in front o f any prince's gate, regardless o f that noble's rank. Rank, not person, thus became the criterion for regulating human relations at court; and, at the same time, the envoys o f the highest o f them all, the Imperial Uncle Prince Regent, bowed to no one. 36

35 Abatai, commander of the expedition into China in 1643 that took ninetyfour cities and 360,000 prisoners, was in command of the troops in Shandong at this point. He had been named a jun wang on May 7, 1644, as a reward for having taken Jinzhou. Shizu shilu, 4 : 4 0 b - 4 1 a . He died in 1646, leaving his title to his son Yolo. Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 4. 36 Shizu shilu, 1 6 : 1 7 b - 1 8 a . On February 10, 1646, Dorgon felt obliged to chide all o f his beile, beise, and high officials for not paying enough respect to the emperor and for trying to "curry favor" by fixing all of their attention upon the prince-regent, to whom they bowed as though he were the true monarch. Zheng, Tan wei ji, p. 115. Shortly after this, Dorgon told Fan Wencheng, Ganglin, Ning Wanwo, and several other officials that he had contracted rheumatism and found it uncomfortable to prostrate himself before the Shunzhi Emperor. On January 24, 1648, a number of Dorgon's favorites, including Baiyintu and Xihan (Gongadai's younger brother), told the prince-regent before the entire court that they thought it would be a grave error for him to risk his health by kowtowing to the emperor. This new policy, which Dorgon approved, had been formulated by Suni, Lengsengji, Fan Wencheng, and Ganglin. Oshibuchi, "Shincho Junji shoseki," pp. 6 - 7 .

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A s the distance between D o r g o n and his kinsmen widened, the importance o f the Inner Courts was enhanced. D o r g o n made a special point o f inviting leading young Ming degree-holders like Wang Chongjian—a Restoration Society m e m b e r — t o join one o f the Inner Courts. 37 He also agreed in 1645 to revive the Hanlin A c a d e m y in name as a merging o f the Inner Three Courts. Li Ruolin, a protégé o f Feng Quan, w h o had been a corrector (Jiantao) in the Ming Hanlin Academy, was n o w made both VicePresident o f Rites and a supervisor of instruction in the H o n g w e n Yuan. 3 8 In the latter position, he recommended for appointment to the Inner Courts a slate o f six middle-ranking former Hanlin academicians, including Hu Shian (jinshi 1628, Sichuan) and Cheng Kegong (Jinshi 1643, Darning) w h o both went on to b e c o m e grand secretaries in the 1660s. 39 The connection between the Board o f Rites and the Inner Courts was not merely coincidental. True, the figure o f Feng Quan incorporated one o f the major links because he joined the Inner Courts as a grand secretary in 1645 while still remaining President o f Rites. 40 But there was also—in addition to the connection between

37 Wang, a native of Beijing, passed the 1643 jinshi exams. H e had fled the capital w h e n it fell to Li Zicheng, but he returned in 1645 to join the Q i n g g o v e r n m e n t . D o r g o n appointed him a bachelor in the Guoshi Yuan. In 1658 Wang became President of Rites, retiring with his reputation reasonably intact in 1661. In addition to f o r m i n g a famous cenacle at his Garden of Felicity (Yi yuan) in the southern suburbs of the capital, Wang was also well k n o w n for fathering a large n u m b e r of successful progeny. O f his six sons, five served in high office. Altogether, four generations of his family were able to enter the Hanlin. D u D e n g c h u n , Sheshi shimo, p. 3b; H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, pp. 815-816. 38 O x n a m , " O b o i Regency," p. 269. 39 Er chen zhuan, 8 : 6 - 7 , 9 : 1 4 - 1 7 a , 18-21a; H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, pp. 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 . D u r i n g the first t w o reigns of the Q i n g , successful jinshi winners could only sit for the palace examinations (chaokao)—which were a prerequisite for entry into the Hanlin—if they were recommended by a senior official. In 1646 about one hundred n e w jinshi were r e c o m m e n d e d to sit for the palace exams. T h e main criteria were age, appearance, and literary skill. In 1646, 49 were actually appointed probationers, as were 23 in 1647. Lui, Hanlin Academy, pp. 1 2 - 1 3 , 24. 40 T h e r e were other m e m b e r s of the Board of Rites at this time w h o provided

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i m p e r i a l rites and t h e p o w e r o f t h e regency's p e r s o n a l s e c r e t a r i a t — an ideological b o n d b e t w e e n C o n f u c i a n ritual and the r e s t o r a t i o n o f M i n g i n s t i t u t i o n s like the H a n l i n A c a d e m y . W h e n F e n g Q u a n t e n d e d t o t h e c e r e m o n i e s o f t h e ancestral altars, o r w h e n M i n g c o u r t p r o t o c o l w a s i n t r o d u c e d , t h e ritualists w e r e seeking t o p r e s e r v e s y s t e m s o f rule that b a r b a r i s m and rebellion h a d t h r e a t e n e d . T h e i m p u l s e w a s p r o f o u n d l y conservative, and certainly m u c h m o r e t h a n m e r e l y s e n t i m e n t a l . If t h e s y s t e m c o u l d b e p r e s e r v e d , o r r e s t o r e d w i t h o u t its m a n y flaws, t h e n C o n f u c i a n a d v i s o r s w o u l d o n c e again play a m a j o r role in c o u r t decisions, r e a s o n a b l y j u s t g o v e r n m e n t w o u l d prevail, and the society w o u l d b e r e c o n s t r u c t e d a l o n g t h e hierarchical lines m o s t p r e f e r a b l e t o t h e elites that h a d r u l e d b e f o r e t h e fall o f the M i n g dynasty. To call f o r o l d f o r m s , t h e n , w a s b o t h ideologically l e g i t i m a t e and politically astute. T h u s , it w a s w i t h m o r e t h a n nostalgia in m i n d that F e n g Q u a n p e r s u a d e d H o n g C h e n g c h o u to j o i n h i m in m e m o r i a l i z i n g t h e t h r o n e w i t h a r e q u e s t to r e t u r n to certain k e y m e t h o d s o f t r a n s m i t t i n g official d o c u m e n t s . T h e practice w h i c h t h e y a d v o c a t e d , a n d w h i c h h a d b e e n used b y t h e M i n g g o v e r n m e n t , w a s called piaoni ( c o m p a r i s o n c o p y ) . T h i s w a s a s y s t e m w h e r e b y a c o p y o f each b o a r d ' s m e m o r i a l w a s sent to the Secretariat (Neige) f o r t h e g r a n d secretaries t o peruse. T h i s w o u l d h a v e been a m u c h m o r e f u n d a m e n t a l c h a n g e in t h e Q i n g s y s t e m than t h e decision m e n t i o n e d

strong personal connections with the Inner Courts t h r o u g h their earlier service in the Hanlin Academy. Sun Zhixie (Shandong), for instance, had served in the Hanlin before the fall of the Ming, and now joined the Board of Rites, w h e r e he repeatedly memorialized in favor of normative regeneration by f o r bidding extravagance, discouraging the arrogance of young scholars, and encouraging the proper hierarchy in society. Qing shi liezhuan, 79:25. Yao Wenran (Tongcheng, Anhui), w h o also served in the Board of Rites during the early D o r g o n regency, had been a m e m b e r of the Hanlin w h e n Li Zicheng took Beijing. " W h e n the M i n g fell," his biography in the provincial gazetteer read, "he locked himself in his house to c o m m i t suicide, but with help he was revived. At the beginning of the Shunzhi reign he was selected to serve as a supervising secretary in the Board of Rites." H e Zhiji, ed., Anhui tongzhi, 180:2a. U n d e r the Kangxi Emperor, Yao rose to become President of P u n ishments, dying in office in 1678. His great-great grandson was Yao Nai, founder of the so-called Tongcheng School in the early 19th century. H u a n g Z h i j u n , c o m p . , Jiangnan tongzhi, 146:16a; H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 900.

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above to have documents concerning state policy and national security forwarded to the Secretariat. If the piaoni system were restored, then all of the information coming f r o m the boards would routinely be sent to the Inner Courts, and the power of the grand secretaries in the Q i n g government would be on a par with the power they had enjoyed under the Ming. 41 Although most high-ranking Chinese collaborators might agree on the importance of putting more power in the hands of Han officials, the fact that this conservative innovation was proposed by an official w h o was associated with some of the worst abuses of the Ming secretariat and its eunuch allies may account for the m o m e n tary failure of this motion to pass. Feng Quan's current activities, too, were beginning to draw criticism; and, not long after the i m perial ascension ceremonies, Sun Chengze, w h o was a junior m e t ropolitan censor in addition to directing the Court of Sacrificial Worship, impeached Feng, implicating such other members of the Inner Three Courts as H o n g Chengchou and Xie Sheng. 42

Regional Rivalries D o r g o n refused to permit Feng Quan to resign. He seemed to regard attacks upon this particular favorite minister as a sign of renewed factionalism. More and more, Feng Quan was b e c o m ing identified with a "northern party," and his opponents with a "southern party," supposedly led by Chen Mingxia. D o r g o n tried to keep a balance between these factions by strongly supporting both "party leaders." 43

41 Z h a n g , Qing shi, 246-3786. See also Zheng, " D u o e r g u n , " p. 8. 42 Ibid. Sun Chengze enjoyed particular favor under D o r g o n , w h o admired his integrity and out-spokenness. Once, Sun even went so far as to criticize the i m p r o p r i e t y of using Manchu rituals to worship Heaven. D o r g o n refused to punish h i m for this explicit j u d g m e n t that Han ritual was superior to the M a n c h u s ' o w n ceremonies. Zheng, " D u o e r g u n , " p. 9. 43 Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:82. Feng Quan's leadership of the " n o r t h e r n " clique did n o t preclude his forming alliances with prominent southern officials. H e and Qian Qianyi were especially close, and r u m o r had it that Qian o w e d Feng a political debt because he had twice turned to him for help: once during the

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Chen Mingxia—the famous Restoration Society member w h o had placed first in the 1643 metropolitan examinations and third in the palace examinations of that year—had joined Dorgon's court in 1645 at the age of forty. 44 After the fall of Beijing to Li Zicheng, w h o m he had served, Chen had returned to his home in Liyang, Jiangsu, where he learned that the Nanjing regime of the Prince of Fu had issued orders for his arrest as a traitor to the Ming. Forced to flee, he had taken to the road disguised as a monk, making his way into Anhui province. At Mount Lao, which is on Lake Chao southeast of Hefei, he met up with his old friend and in-law Fang Yizhi, from nearby Tongcheng. 45 Fang gave Chen enough money to travel on to Fujian, and from there, by a circuitous route, he finally managed to make his way north and inland across the Yellow River at Suizhou to Darning. In Darning, Chen looked up his classmate (tongnian) Cheng Kegong, who had just been invited to join the Qing government. By now it was the eleventh lunar m o n t h (November 29-December 28) of 1644. While Chen Mingxia stayed at Cheng's house, the latter went to the governor of Baoding, Wang Wenkui, and told him of Chen's availability. Governor Wang in turn recommended Chen Mingxia to Beijing, and Dorgon personally invited him to an audience at court. 46

C h o n g z h e n reign when he was impeached and needed to bribe a eunuch w h o m Feng knew, and then a second time after Qian joined the Q i n g government and needed protection against his critics. Sun Kekuan, " W u Meicun beixing qianhou shi," p. 6. 44 In addition to earlier sections on Chen Mingxia, see his biography in Er chen zhuan, 11:1 —6a; and Ji Liuqi, Mingji beiliie, p. 117. For Chen's connection with Dorgon's supporters (Tantai, Gongadai, Xihan, and so forth), see O s h i buchi, "Shincho Junji soseki," p. 6. 45 After Ruan Dacheng began to have Fushe members arrested, Fang Yizhi disguised himself as a drug peddler and escaped to southeastern China, where he refused to join the Prince of Tang's court in Fuzhou. It was after this that he returned to Anhui. Fang Yizhi's second son, Z h o n g t o n g , was married to the third daughter of Chen Mingxia. Chen Mingxia's son, furthermore, was married to a daughter of Fang's younger brother. This information was supplied by Dr. Willard Peterson. See also H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 232; X u Zi, Xiaotian jinian fukao, p. 84 (3:29b). 46 Tan Qian, Beiyou lu, p. 388.

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During that audience, Chen Mingxia boldly beseeched Dorgon to take the dragon throne for himself. The prince-regent rejected the suggestion, saying: "This dynasty has its own household laws with which you are not familiar."47 However, Dorgon was evidently quite flattered by the proposal, and subsequently named Chen Mingxia Vice-President of Civil Appointments which was a crucially situated post. As one of the new government's leading Han personnel officers, Chen was able to nominate other literati from the Fushe circles in the south. He was also in a position to introduce greater order and regularity into the bureaucratic appointment and evaluation procedures of the Qing. Moreover, his opinion on other matters was taken quite seriously. After Nanjing fell to Dodo's army, for instance, the Nine Chief Ministers and Metropolitan Censors (Jiu qing kedao) recommended that the city retain the same ancillary function as a southern capital as it had enjoyed under the Ming. But Dorgon preferred to heed Chen Mingxia's advice that the Manchus could "rule the south while residing in the north," and thus only assigned to Nanjing the same administrative offices which any regular province had.48 Although his contributions to reforming Manchu personnel procedures were widely recognized, Chen Mingxia was thought by many people to be too prone to favoritism, especially along regional lines. Just as Feng Quan was blamed by southerners for skewing examination results, so was Chen Mingxia accused by northerners of packing the Board of Civil Appointments in which he served with his cronies.49 Chen also made recommendations directly to the throne, and it was he who first brought the Jiangnan poet Li Wen to Dorgon's attention. 50 But in that instance, too, his recommendation was felt to be untoward because Chen wanted to have Li Wen promoted directly into the new Hanlin Academy. This

47 Z h a n g , Qing shi, p. 3787. See also Zheng, " D u o e r g u n , " p. 8. 48 Z h a n g , Qing shi, p. 3788. 49 For example, he r e c o m m e n d e d the appointment of his 1643 jinshi classmate and fellow provincial Jin G o n g j i n g to the Office of Personnel Scrutiny in the b o a r d — a post which Jin assumed in 1646. Huang, Jiangnan tongzhi, 150: 21b-22a. 50 H u a n g , Jiangnan tongzhi, 166:7a.

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was opposed by other ministers as partisanship, and during the winter of 1644-1645, Chen Mingxia was somewhat under a cloud, having been docked three months salary at the insistence of the Manchu court. 51 Feng Quan, however, was potentially far more vulnerable to such attacks than Chen Mingxia because of irregularities in his personal conduct as well as because of his notorious intimacy with the eunuch Wei Zhongxian, w h o had once adopted him as a g o d child (ganer). He perforce relied much more upon the protection of his Manchu sponsors, therefore, than Chen Mingxia did. 52 Perhaps that was the reason why Feng Q u a n made the decision in July, 1645, to curry favor with the Manchus by voluntarily adopting their shaven heads and plaited queues. For a year now, D o r g o n had been willing to waive the requirement that Chinese adherents adopt tribal hairstyles. He had made that decision in the first place with great reluctance. 53 He was therefore extremely pleased when Feng and t w o of his closest allies, Li Ruolin and Sun Zhixie, appeared before him in Manchu fashion with shorn forehead, and requested that all Chinese be made to accept the "national custom" (guo su) of the Manchus. 5 4 This gesture not only led D o r g o n to issue the infamous haircutting order that provoked the resistance m o v e m e n t in Jiangnan, it also reinvigorated the prince-regent's affection for Feng Q u a n himself. Feng was therefore well protected w h e n the next major attack upon his person came in October, 1645. 55

51 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 369. 52 In addition to learning h o w to speak Manchu (which he studied every day), Feng Q u a n made a special point of cultivating the friendship of the "old m e n " f r o m Liaodong, and especially Fan Wencheng with w h o m he enjoyed a very relaxed relationship. Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:8b. 53 Because there was so much indecision about the haircutting order, many officials were uncertain about the government's intention. A number of them in some yamens had already decided to shave their heads and wear the queue because they believed the policy would eventually be enforced. Zhang, Sou wen xu bi, 1:9a. 54 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 354. 55 Zhang, Qing shi, 246:3786.

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The Impeachment of Feng Quan O n October 6, W u Da, the investigating censor for the Zhejiang circuit, submitted a long memorial which denounced the recurrence of corruption among high officials and singled out Feng Q u a n — t h e adopted son of Wei Zhongxian—as "a bewitching and treacherous jackal w h o wantonly feeds off of the country and brings calamity upon the people." 56 According to Wu Da, people throughout the empire were gripped by a tremendous sense of outrage when Feng Q u a n first received the throne's grace and was appointed to the Inner Courts. It was no accident that during the past six months the area around the capital had been struck by u n usually heavy thunderstorms and had been repeatedly flooded. However, Feng Q u a n himself refused to recognize the connection between these natural disasters and his own deviant practices, for which he was unwilling to take responsibility. Comparing Feng Q u a n to the obstinate Song minister Wang Anshi, Wu Da went on to say that he had asked Fan Wencheng and other high officials to support his efforts to denounce Feng, and they had done so most energetically; but so far, there had been no response f r o m the throne. Feng Quan, accordingly, was openly contemptuous of his attackers, his crimes becoming more blatant as time passed. 57 He had extorted a bribe of 30,000 ounces of silver f r o m General Jiang Xiang w h e n he surrendered. H e had compromised other Han officials in the eyes of the court. He had permitted his son Feng Yuanhuai to use the premises of the Inner Courts to hold banquets. A n d he had formed a treacherous association with Li Ruolin to p r o m o t e their partisan interests. Feng Quan was truly as vile as Ruan Dacheng, also a former intimate of Wei Zhongxian, and a 56 Qinchuan jushi, comp., Huang Qing zouyi, 1:3a. See also Wang Xianqian, comp., Donghua lu—Shunzhi chao, 2:15a; Shizu shilu, 2 0 : 7 - 9 a . 57 Wang Anshi was evidently viewed quite negatively during the early Qing. In 1663, when ordering a temporary revision in the syllabus of the civil service examinations, the Kangxi Emperor denounced Wang Anshi by way of attacking the eight-legged essay, which was Wang's invention. Adam Yuen-chung Lui, "Syllabus of the Provincial Examination Under the Early Ch'ing," p. 392.

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man whose corruption had brought about the fall of the Southern Ming regime. 58 Wu Da's impeachment was followed by that of seven others, extending the list of accusations to include the charge of bribing Sun Zhixie to accept Feng Quan's son Yuanhuai as an officer in Sun's military command. One memoralist, Li Senxian, again raised Feng Quan's relationship with the infamous eunuch Wei Zhongxian. Li's impeachment blamed the fall of the Ming dynasty upon Wei Zhongxian's corruption and cruelty, and then in turn denounced the eunuch's adopted son, Feng Quan, for being the instrument of those evil policies. He therefore proposed that the new Qing dynasty demonstrate its commitment to moral government by publicly executing Feng Quan in the marketplace. 59 In Dorgon's eyes, this was going much too far. He himself had vowed to clean up the impure customs of the Ming, but he certainly did not intend to permit his dynasty to be turned into an instrument to punish officials linked by Donglin sympathizers with the forces conventionally believed to have caused the fall of the previous royal house. After the Board of Punishments had investigated the charges and reported them to be without substance, the prince-regent called a meeting of all grand secretaries and supervising secretaries. The meeting was held in the Zhonghe Palace. As soon as the officials had gathered, Dorgon told them quite bluntly that Feng Quan and Li Ruolin had been the first officials voluntarily to comply with the Manchu practice of shaving the head, and that both males and females in the household of Sun Zhixie had adopted Manchu clothing styles. Whereas "all three men were rendering respectful obedience to the regulations of the court," the officials now impeaching them had obviously formed a partisan faction secretly bent upon attacking the adoption of Manchu customs by Chinese civil servants. It was this kind of behavior—not Feng Quan's past activities—that had really led to the fall of the Ming dynasty, and he would not permit it to continue. 60

58 Q i n c h u a n jushi, Huang Qing zouyi, l : 3 b - 7 a . 59 Z h a n g , Qing shi, 246:3786; Xiao, Qingdai tongshi, 1:382. 60 Wang, Donghualu—Shunzhi chao, 2:15b. See also Zhang, Qing shi, 246:3787; Sun Z h e n t a o , Qing shi shulun, p. 37; Sun, "Wu Meicun," p. 12.

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After a shocked silence, the sub-director of the Court of Sacrificial Worship, Gong Dingzi, desperately tried to draw the discussion back onto defensible territory. The critical point—he said boldly—was that Feng Quan had once served Wei Zhongxian. But Gong himself was also quite vulnerable in this regard. Not only was the Anhui poet's personal life notorious; he had served Li Zicheng as well. 61 Feng Quan, who of course was present, immediately riposted by attacking Gong Dingzi for having collaborated with the Shun rebels, claiming he had accepted a post as Li Zicheng's police censor. The prince-regent asked the Anhui poet if this were so. Yes, Gong admitted, and added: "But why just mention me alone? Who has not changed his allegiance in the past? Wei Zheng also changed his allegiance to Tang Taizong." 62 Dorgon

61 Gong was considered one of the "Three Great Poets of the Eastern Yangzi" (Jiangzuo san da jia) along with Wu Weiye and Qian Qianyi. From Hefei (Anhui), he had been a censor under the Chongzhen Emperor, and had served Li Zicheng as superintendent of the Northern Beijing Police. He was notorious because of his infatuation for the talented poetess and painter Gu Mei (Sheng), who became his concubine. According t o j i Liuqi, Gong said—at the time Beijing fell to the Shun rebels—that: "I am certainly willing to die, but what can I do since my concubine doesn't dare [to commit suicide]?" Ji, Mingji beiliie, p. 611. In 1646, when Gong applied for mourning leave for his dead father, he was impeached for immoral conduct. Although his service to the Shun regime was noted, the key charge against him was frivolity: banqueting and drinking instead of devoting himself to public administration. He was also accused of having homosexual affairs with female impersonators, of fornication with actresses and of lavishing gifts upon Gu Mei, w h o m he bought for 1,000 ounces of gold. His mad infatuation for her, the impeachment said, made him the laughingstock of Jiangnan, and—more seriously— led him to neglect his parents, wife, and children. When his father had died, he had not even stopped carousing and now he had the audacity to ask for mourning leave. Gong was demoted two degrees in rank and transferred. Sun, Qing shi shulun, p. 37; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 431. 62 Sun, Qing shi shulun, p. 37. Wei Zheng, who was associated with the C o n f u cian revival in the early Tang and who was noted for his frank remonstrances to Tang Taizong, had served many masters. During 617-618 he was the adviser to t w o of the rebels (Yuan Baocang and Li Mi) who were contenders for control over north China; in 618 he surrendered to Tang Gaozu and became a servitor of the Tang prince Li Jiancheng; and in 626, when Li Jiancheng was murdered by Li Shimin in the famous incident at the Xuanwu Gate, he trans-

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simply brushed aside the reference to the famous Tang statesman. " O n l y if a person has already proved himself to be loyal and truthful can he reprove others," the prince-regent told Gong Dingzi. "You yourself are not upright, so how can you reprove others?" 6 3 D o r g o n then peremptorily dismissed the charges against Feng Q u a n , w h o remained in office. 64

Manchu-Han Dyarchy Feng Q u a n continued to try to use Confucian bureaucratic regulations to break d o w n the distinctions between Manchus and Hans by adhering to strict seniority in ranking the government's grand secretaries. Early in 1646 he memorialized the throne, explaining h o w honored he had been by D o r g o n who had gifted him with a Manchu bride, w h o had allowed him to be registered a m o n g the officials listed just at the end of the Manchu population file, and w h o had continuously treated him like a "venerated guest" (jing ke). Now, he had one further request to make: While continuing to tremble [at the thought of my debt to the throne], I especially would would like to beseech you to rank Fan Wencheng just after Ganglin. If the sequence is based on seniority, then you should also rank Kicungge after Ning Wanwo.65 That year, in determining the processional ranks for the metropolitan examinations, D o r g o n ordered that Fen Wencheng be ranked just after the Manchu Grand Secretary Ganglin, and just ahead of N i n g Wanwo, w h o was followed in order of seniority by the

ferred his allegiance to the assassin, w h o became Tang Taizong. H o w a r d J. Wechsler, Mirror to the Son of Heaven, passim. 6 3 Wang, Donghua lu—Shunzhi chao, 2 : 1 5 b ; Sun, Qing shi shulun, p. 37. 64 D o r g o n , b y acts such as this, acquired a reputation a m o n g contemporaries for unusually generous magnanimity. Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, cited in Z h e n g , " D u o e r g u n , " p. 9. 65 Z h a n g , Qing shi, p. 3787.

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Manchu Kicungge. " T h e empire is a single whole," Dorgon declared. "There are no distinctions between Manchus and Hans." 6 6 O f course, there continued to be considerable distinctions between Manchus and Hans—Dorgon's pronouncement notwithstanding. In capital posts, for instance, Manchu officials always rated a higher rank than their Chinese counterparts: Manchu grand secretaries and board presidents were given rank one; Chinese in those same posts were given rank two. 67 Manchu officials also continued to move readily back and forth from military (wu) to civil (wen) ranks in ways denied Chinese officials unless they were Han Bannermen. Manchu officials, if punished, might be dismissed from their position but not reduced in rank—which was a privilege denied Han Chinese. And while Manchus and Chinese were both named to counterpart positions as dual presidents o f boards, the seals o f office were always kept in the Manchus' hands, and it was only they who attended the official sacrifices at the Temple o f Heaven. 68 Simply imposing bureaucratic orders o f precedence and rank did not altogether abolish the privileges o f the conquest elite. Yet there were ways to try to bring about more equality, i f not more regulation and control, by the Chinese officials who were now increasingly coming to dominate the old Offices o f Scrutiny in the Metropolitan Censorate, which had controlled personnel evaluation under the Ming rulers. In 1646, at the behest o f Chen Mingxia who then took over the Board o f Civil Appointments, the practice o f annual evaluations o f officials was again introduced, even though this resumption was bitterly opposed by many Manchus. 69 Chen Mingxia also tried to enlist D o r gon's support against the aristocratic arrogance o f Manchu officials

66 Ibid. During this period Fan Wencheng was often heard to say, "I am made o f Ming bones and Qing flesh." Zhang Yi, Sou wen xu bi, 1:8b. See also Zheng, "Duoergun," p. 7. Fan attended, at this time, to the rebuilding in Yangzhou o f the altar to the famous Song philosopher Fan Zhongyan, whom he claimed as an ancestor. Yao Wentian, comp., Yangzhou Juzhi, 25:26b. 67 Kessler, K'ang-hsi, p. 123. 68 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 349. 69 Ibid., p. 355; Zha Shenxing, Renhaiji,

1:1b.

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attending court sessions. During morning audiences, for instance, when the coaches of Chinese and Manchu officials converged at the palace gates, the Manchu grooms would casually shove aside Chinese attendants to get their masters through first.70 If a Chinese servant insisted that his own master had precedence by court protocol, the Manchu groom would as often as not lay his whip upon the man until the Han Chinese attendant was altogether cowed. When Chen Mingxia brought this to Dorgon's attention, the regent ordered that each side must give way to the other, and explicitly prohibited his Manchu officials from abusing their conquerors' privileges in this fashion.71 In this way both the Manchu regent and his Chinese advisors benefitted from the ritualization of personal relationships at court, which began to replace the more egalitarian companionships of the military camp and the casual indifference of tribal aristocrats toward civil servants with Confucian pomp and circumstance. Dorgon did not exercise his control over this new Manchu-Han government with collaborators alone.72 That would have been impolitic, if not impossible, especially during the early years. His brother Dodo, who replaced Jirgalang as assistant regent in 1647, was an important ally. Dorgon also relied heavily upon three of Nurhaci's grandsons, who were also followers of Dorgon himself: Bolo, Nikan, and Mandahai. After being rewarded with princely titles in 1644, they became Dorgon's agents for keeping an eye on other Manchu military leaders. In fact, after 1644 nearly every major military expedition had one of these men sent along to super-

7 0 U n d e r the M i n g all o f f i c i a l s — e x c e p t for the v e r y aged or ill w h o c o u l d b e carried in s e d a n - c h a i r s — h a d t o g o b y f o o t f r o m the C h a n g ' a n Gate t o the M e ridian Gate. In the early Q i n g , M a n c h u princes, beile, and beise w e r e a l l o w e d t o ride their h o r s e s t h r o u g h the gate into the F o r b i d d e n C i t y until t h e y reached t h e j i n g y u n Gate w h e r e t h e y had t o d i s m o u n t and p r o c e e d o n f o o t . Z h a o l i a n , Xiaoting xulu, 1: 6a. 71 Tan, Beiyou lu, p. 355. 7 2 D u r i n g 1644, o f the S i x B o a r d s ' vice-presidents, 7 w e r e M a n c h u s , 9 w e r e C h i n e s e b a n n e r m e n , 1 w a s a M o n g o l , 1 w a s a regular C h i n e s e official, 4 w e r e o f uncertain p r o v e n a n c e . T w o p o s i t i o n s w e r e unfilled. O f all these, 11 w e r e transferred f r o m M u k d e n . O x n a m , Horseback,

p. 42.

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vise the other commanders. 73 Ubai, another important military supporter of Dorgon, was also a check against aristocratic military intrigue, commanding as he did the vanguard troops of the Four Banners, and serving in all major military engagements from 1637 to 1645. In Beijing itself after 1646, Dorgon's major private advisor, outside of Fan Wencheng, seems to have been Tantai, the cousin of Nurhaci's ruthless general Yangguri.74 Close allies, too, were the two Manchu nobles most noted for their literary skills in Manchu and in Chinese: Ganglin and Kicungge. Ganglin, of the Gualgiya clan, was descended from tribesmen from Suwan and was attached to the Emperor's Yellow Banner.75 Early on, Ganglin had become a specialist in translating Chinese, and was named head of the Manchu Secretariat. By 1636, Ganglin had become Grand Secretary in charge of the Guoshi Yuan (Historiography Office), and it was he who submitted the crucial memorial that year in favor of establishing a regularly ranked bureaucracy. Later, after the Manchus took Beijing, he received the Zuo Maodi peace 73 D o r g o n ' s secret agents in the capital after 1644 were called qishiyuan (detectives). T h e y were mainly Manchus. This system was extended to the p r o v inces in 1649. T h e r e were also Manchu officials called qixinlang (counselors) appointed to the yamens of governors and governors-general by D o r g o n ; they were given the power to send Manchu memorials in secret directly to the p r i n c e - r e g e n t . It should be noted, however, that the investigative activities of the qishiyuan and qixinlang were hampered because they did not have very casual access to the H a n Chinese. A d a m Yuen-chung Lui, "Censor, Regent and E m p e r o r in the early Manchu Period," p. 87; idem, Corruption in China during the Early Ch'ing Period, 1644-1660, p. 50. 74 O x n a m , Horseback, p. 45; H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, pp. 798, 899. Tantai stood at the head of a g r o u p of Dorgon's cronies w h o were identified by the Shunzhi E m p e r o r in April, 1652, as being: Baiyintu, Gongadai, Xihan, X i n a b u k u , and Lengsengji. Oshibuchi, "Shincho Junji soseki," pp. 4, 8 - 1 1 . 75 In 1598 a Suwan chieftain named Solgo had led 500 tribesmen to j o i n N u r haci. His son was the famous Fiongdon (1564-1620) w h o was Nurhaci's best general, leading the attack on Fushun in 1618 and helping capture Gintaisi and defeat the Yehe. His son Tulai (1600-1646) helped overcome Li Zicheng, and later served under D o d o and Bolo in the south. For his military services, Tulai was n a m e d a duke, but he was posthumously disgraced in 1648 w h e n he was accused of having plotted to support Haoge. H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 247.

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mission in 1644, and regularly took charge of the M a n c h u e x a m i nation candidates' testing, as well as being given responsibility for editing the Veritable Records of both Nurhaci's reign and the later M i n g reigns. 7 6 K i c u n g g e was another example of a M a n c h u specializing in literary studies, and therefore c o m m i t t e d in part to strengthening the civil bureaucracy w i t h Chinese f o r m s of organization. Selected b y N u r h a c i to be his private secretary, Kicungge (whose ancestors w e r e Warka tribesmen) was the first to petition in 1631 that the Six B o a r d s be established. H e himself became President of Rites after the n e w g o v e r n m e n t was organized. H e was not j u s t a civil official: he also headed a banner c o m p a n y as a nirui ejen after 1634 and campaigned under D o r g o n against the Ming. However, once the Q i n g g o v e r n m e n t was established in Beijing he became a p r o m i nent m e m b e r of the Inner Three Courts, taking charge of the H o n g w e n Y u a n in 1645 as a grand secretary, supervising e x a m i n a tions, and editing Nurhaci's Veritable Records along w i t h Ganglin. 7 7 B o t h m e n w e r e therefore trusted by D o r g o n in matters that he could n o t entrust to his Chinese bureaucrats. Obviously, D o r g o n realized h o w i m p o r t a n t it was to use C h i nese collaborators, b u t only up to a certain point. 7 8 This emerges

76 O s h i b u c h i , "Shincho Junji soseki," p. 5. H e also supervised the compilation o f the Tianqi records. D u r i n g Li Zicheng's occupation, the Shun soldiers destroyed a great number o f the central government's records and sacked the libraries o f the M i n g imperial princes. According to Q i a n Qianyi, all o f the N e i g e library holdings w e r e destroyed, even t h o u g h the various grand secretaries' offices and the emperor's privy papers were left intact. There w a s n o certifiable c o p y o f the Veritable Records for the C h o n g z h e n reign, nor w e r e there entries for 1624 and the sixth m o n t h o f 1627. After the M a n c h u s t o o k over, they put 100 clerks and copyists to work, sorting and collating w h a t e v e r had n o t been destroyed b y the rebels. O n March 26, 1651, Ganglin urged that officials in the central and provincial administrations be ordered to find private copies o f the Veritable Records and o f the Capital Bulletin (Dibao). H e also ordered u n o r t h o d o x histories (yeshi) to be collected. Zhang, Qing shi, 2 4 6 : 3 7 8 6 ; Lynn A. Struve, "The H s u Brothers and Semi-official Patronage o f Scholars in the K'ang-hsi Period," pp. 1 2 - 1 4 . 77 Z h a n g , Qing shi, p. 3786. 78 D o r g o n o n c e e v e n warily asked Feng Quan: " D o y o u still r e m e m b e r y o u r old master?" Feng Q u a n diplomatically responded that, if D o r g o n r e m e m b e r e d

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again and again in the records kept of his daily meetings with members of the Inner Three Courts. 79 "When it comes to using Manchus," Dorgon said at one briefing where he was concerned about the accuracy of a report by a Chinese official, "I know all there is to know about each one of them. But when it comes to Han, then I don't know if they are good or if they are corrupt." 80 As always, however, Dorgon's vision was informed with a sense of expediency. A great many of the Chinese collaborators who were recommended for office ended up, like Feng Quan, by being impeached for immorality or administrative abuses. Yet even though Dorgon remarked upon this to his grand secretaries, he was quick to add: "The officials which we should choose don't all have to be good. That would be like having to choose military officers from among dwarfs. That's no good. They would probably have to be sacked." 81 The result was that once an official had been selected and admitted to the Inner Court, Dorgon felt he had come to know the man, and thus preferred him to an outsider. "How is [Yang Fangxing] doing?" he asked his grand secretaries at one such session on July 22, 1645, referring to an official who had submitted a memorial. "Extremely well," the grand secretaries responded. Dorgon approved of the answer: " [Yang Fangxing] came out of the Inner Courts. I know him well." 82

the C h o n g z h e n Emperor, then so too would one o f the latter's f o r m e r ministers recall him. Zheng, "Duoergun," p. 8. 79 These briefings are to be found in Duoergun shezheng riji. This is an extraordinarily revealing documentary record, which consists o f secretarial notes o f court sessions between D o r g o n and his grand secretaries, running f r o m J u n e 22 to August 29, 1645. During these sessions, D o r g o n w o u l d have his grand secretaries read officials' memorials aloud to him, and then he w o u l d ask f o r further details before making his o w n comments. The conversation—which is recorded in vernacular Chinese with classical comments—ranges f r o m discussions about the size and cost o f the beams used in the construction o f the palace, to the marital habits o f the Ming emperors. The court notes w e r e f o u n d during the X u a n t o n g period and w e r e later printed by the Palace Museum. 80 Duoergun shezheng riji, p. 4. 81 Ibid., p. 5. 82 Ibid.

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O f course, Dorgon may have had good reason to suspect the political loyalty of certain Chinese collaborators. There were too many cases of high-ranking adherents who had either, like Liu Zeqing, turned coat once again; or who, like Hong Chengchou, were suspected of being in contact with loyalist circles in the south. This was especially so in 1648, during the recrudescence of Southern Ming loyalism, when even Qian Qianyi fell under suspicion, was accused of secretly aiding a loyalist agent named Huang Yuqi, and was finally arrested and put on trial in Nanjing. 83 Qian was sixty-six years old by then, and he defended himself before the judge by pointing out his age and emphasizing how many favors he had received from the Qing dynasty. At the same time, the governor-general of Jiangnan, Ma Guozhu, petitioned the throne on his behalf, saying: He has served in the highest councils of state. His sons and nephews have likewise gone up for the examinations under the Q i n g — a t which action Qian showed great delight. Surely Qian has shown no sign of forgetting the favors of your majesty. 84

Eventually the court decided in Qian Qianyi's favor, declaring that there was no evidence that he had ever met Huang Yuqi. Released from prison in 1648, Qian returned home to his beloved concubine, Liu Shi, who later helped him edit an anthology of Ming poetesses and grew to share his deep and growing interest in Buddhism. During the following sixteen years, Qian Qianyi was to acquire a towering reputation as a critic, essayist, and historian: the

83 H u a n g Yuqi, a w e l l - k n o w n activist, had been arrested o n M a y 18, 1648, in o n e o f the Buddhist temples at T o n g z h o u injiangsu. W h e n he w a s taken into c u s t o d y he w a s found to have seals belonging to the office o f the g o v e r n o r general. Q i a n Qianyi, then in retirement, was thought to have k n o w n H u a n g Y u q i , and to have been party to the plot. A s w e have seen, Qian Q i a n y i w a s secretly in t o u c h w i t h M i n g loyalists, including Q u Shisi, in the south. Peng G u o d o n g , Qing shi wenyan zhi, pp. 1 - 2 ; Luther Carrington Goodrich, The Literary Inquisition of Ch'ien-lung, pp. 1 0 0 - 1 0 5 ; L y n n A n n Struve, " U s e s o f H i s t o r y in Traditional Chinese Society," p. 79; Ge Wanli, c o m p . , Qian Muzhai xiansheng yishiji nianpu, pp. 1 - 2 . 84 G o o d r i c h , Literary Inquisition,

p. 101.

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author of twenty-two scholarly books on topics ranging from Buddhist metaphysics to Nestorianism in the Tang period. 85 Yet, he never quite managed to divest himself of suspicions that he had compromised himself—as a collaborator in the eyes of Ming loyalists, and as a traitor in the eyes of Qing loyalists.86 In 1664, Qian Qianyi finally died at the age of 82; and his widow Liu Shi, w h o had taken the vows of a Buddhist nun a year earlier, soon found that fellow townsmen were able to take advantage of his dubious political reputation to try to appropriate the family's property.87 Shamed by this scandal, Liu Shi took her own life, and her rest85 Qian Qianyi had been in Beijing when the Nestorian m o n u m e n t was discovered near Xi'an around 1624. He was the first Chinese student of Tang Nestorianism, Manicheism, and Mohammedanism. Goodrich, Literary Inquisition, pp. 101-102. Qian Qianyi's cultural accomplishments also justified his collaboration with the Manchus. Believing that culture (wen) had limitless potential and could flourish under non-Han rule, Qian even implied at times that the greatest opportunities for the expression of the Chinese cultural heritage came when barbarians occupied the dragon throne. Under such dynasties government was fairly lax—"the net of the laws was lenient and generous, and men did not have to take official positions"—and therefore one found that during the Yuan, say, poetry societies abounded and literature was stimulated to develop. John D. Langlois, Jr., "Chinese Culturalism and the Yuan Analogy," p. 370. 86 Gu Yanwu, for instance, refused to have anything to do with Qian Qianyi, and never exchanged namecards with him. When Gu was denounced by his former servant Lu En, and jailed, Gu's good friend Gui Zhuang went to Qian Qianyi for help. Gu Yanwu was not aware of the visit. Gui Zhuang appealed to Qian's humaneness, and told him that Gu Yanwu wanted to come and pay a visit of respect to Qian Qianyi, taking him as his teacher. O n that basis, Qian Qianyi promised to intercede and speak on behalf of Gu. After he did so, Gu Yanwu was released, but he immediately wrote out a placard which was posted on the streets and which boldly stated over Gu's signature: "I am not Qian Qianyi's disciple (mensheng)." Xie Guozhen, Ming-Qing biji tancong, p. 50. O n e contemporary said of Qian Qianyi: "He is a person too eager to get position, burning within [with the desire to win the gaze of his sovereign]; he is without principle, going f r o m the one side to the other." Sun, " W u Meicun," p. 11. 87 By the time of his death, Qian had regained some respectability. In 1664, for example, he was paid a visit of respect by Huang Zongxi and his brother Z o n g y a n . Indeed, Huang Zongxi was responsible for Qian Qianyi's funeral arrangements. T o m Fischer, "Loyalist Alternatives in the Early C h ' i n g , " p. 8.

This is purportedly a portrait made in 1643 of Madame Hedong (Liu Shi), Qian Qianyi's wife, by Wu Zhuo. According to James Cahill, it may actually be a picture of a beautiful woman in the abstract, with her name added to it in order to enhance its provocative qualities. Such pictures were frequently painted during and after the Kangxi period (1622-1722). Reproduced through the courtesy of the Fogg Art M u seum, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

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less spirit was said to haunt Qian Qianyi's house for over a century, until an 18th-century magistrate turned the building into a temple. 88 Even though Dorgon distrusted collaborators like Qian Qianyi, especially if they were closely affiliated withjiangnan literati coteries, he had the good sense not to let this prevent him from using them as adroitly as possible to enhance his own power and authority. Given the much more extreme suspicion o f the other Manchu princes, Dorgon functioned as a protector o f these Han adherents most o f the time; and he utilized them in turn along with the Liaodong "old men" and his Manchu agents to take on more and more o f the trappings o f a real monarch, and not just a regent. Consequently, other top-ranking princes, like Jirgalang or Haoge, continued to feel resentment at their inferior treatment and strongly disapproved o f the way in which Dorgon was turning the situation in Beijing to his personal advantage. In the spring o f 1648 this restlessness came very much into the open with the impeachments first o f Jirgalang and then o f Haoge.

The Arraignment of the Princes O n March 27, 1648, Jirgalang was arraigned before the court on a variety o f charges, ranging from the misuse o f his position to acquire housing in the capital to a rupture o f precedent when the Shunzhi Emperor was taken from Shengjing to Beijing. Most damaging o f all was the accusation that he, Jirgalang, had considered having Haoge made ruler at the time that move took place, and for this crime Jirgalang was reduced from the first to the second rank o f princes o f the blood. 89 On March 29, 1648, Haoge himself was impeached, and it became clear, in Dorgon's eyes at least, that there had existed a major conspiracy to push forth Haoge's candidacy as emperor, that in fact there was a league o f nobles who had sworn an oath to support Haoge, and that this

88 Ge, Qian Muzhai, p. 26; Hummel, Eminent Chinese, p. 530. 89 Zhang, Qing shi, 1 : 4 3 ; Shizu shilu, 3 7 : 2 - 6 .

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league included men like Suni and even Dorgon's adviser, Tantai. The charge was substantiated by testimony before the Assembly that Haoge had encouraged his candidacy, and had spoken out against Dorgon. Consequently, Haoge was convicted and sentenced to death. Dorgon, in his mercy, reduced the sentence to imprisonment, and permitted Haoge to commit suicide once in jail. 90 Tantai, however, was not punished. In 1648 he was given command of the Qing forces in Jiangxi, and along with Holhoi ordered to subdue the revolt there led by Jin Shenghuan. 91 His victory would be rewarded in 1649 with the title of viscount, and in 1650 Tantai was to become Dorgon's President of Civil Appointments. 92 At the time that Dorgon caused Haoge to be killed and brought about the humiliation ofJirgalang, he also increased his own status vis-a-vis the Shunzhi Emperor, Fulin, who was now ten years old. Early in 1648 Dorgon ceased prostrating himself before the monarch during court audiences, and that next winter he had his own title changed to Imperial Father Prince Regent (Huang fu shezheng wang). 93 This claim to paternal as well as regental authority over the emperor was substantiated by Dorgon's military supremacy over all the other Manchu leaders. In addition to commanding his own Solid White Banner, Dorgon had by then taken over the Solid Blue Banner, which had originally been Hung Taiji's. In April, 1649, Dorgon's brother Dodo died. Dorgon thereupon claimed 90 91 92 93

Zhang, Qing shi, 1:43; Shizu shilu, 3 7 : 7 - 1 4 . Zhang, Qing shi, 1:43. H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 899. T h e change took place o n December 21, 1648, w h e n the emperor performed the winter solstice ceremonies at the Altar o f Heaven and the Altars o f the Soil and Grain. At that time it was announced that several ancestors, as well as D o r g o n , were to be raised in rank. The ostensible reason for this elevation o f the regent w a s — a s announced three days later—because D o r g o n had brought peace to the tianxia (under-Heaven). D o r g o n actually made the change because he wished to distinguish himself from the real uncles o f the Shunzhi Emperor as well as to indicate even more clearly that he was higher in rank than other princes o f the blood like Jirgalang. The title in Manchu, Han i ama wang, means "Father-Prince o f the Khan." In earlier Manchu texts the w o r d "father" or ama is used as a m o d e o f reverential address. For instance, w h e n Nurhaci and Bujantai met, they called each other ama (Chinese Ju). Z h e n g , Tan weiji, pp. 113, 1 1 6 - 1 1 8 .

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c o m m a n d of Dodo's Bordered White Banner, giving him control of three of the Manchus' Eight Banners, while Fulin himself only personally commanded the two imperial Yellow Banners. 94 Dodo's death also provided D o r g o n with the occasion to take steps to halt the growing ambitions of his older brother, Ajige, w h o was then forty-three years old. Ajige had commanded several of the tiiru in the White Banners of D o r g o n and Dodo. In 1644 he was named Prince Ying and given a rank of the first degree while being sent to northern Shaanxi against the forces of Li Zicheng. While D o d o was sent to Nanjing to pacify Jiangnan, Ajige was given the other major contingent of Qing forces and sent into Hubei after the fleeing Shun forces. There he accepted the surrender of Z u o Menggeng and was lauded for his military prowess; but he prematurely reported Li Zicheng's death, and for this mistake was recalled to Beijing. Late in 1648, however, Ajige was once again placed in command of a major military force and sent to Datong to campaign against the Khalkas; as we have seen, his approach provoked the rebellion o f j i a n g Xiang. 95 T h e rebellion o f j i a n g Xiang was momentarily contained by Ajige, but the actual suppression of the rebels awaited the arrival of D o r g o n himself, w h o commanded the siege of Datong in person. It was at this time, when news arrived that D o d o had contracted smallpox in Beijing and was dead, that Ajige decided to press his o w n claims for better treatment from Dorgon. H e did this by sending Ubai to Dorgon's encampment to present the case for Ajige's promotion on his behalf. 96 Ajige's case was, first of all, directed to clearing his own reputation because of the mistaken report about Li Zicheng's death. H e did not confront this issue directly, but rather chose to point out to D o r g o n that D o d o had not been an entirely blameless military c o m m a n d e r either. For instance, he had not completely exterminated the Shun rebels at Tong Pass when he defeated Li in battle there. N o r had he managed completely to defeat the Sunid M o n gols w h e n he pursued them to the Kerelun and Tula rivers in 1646. 94 H u m m e l , Eminent Chinese, p. 217. 95 Ibid., p. 5. 96 Shizu shilu, 44:21b.

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Yet despite these lapses Dodo had been named assistant regent in 1647. N o w that Dodo was dead, did not he—Ajige—also deserve to be assistant regent? After all, he was the son of Nurhaci and the uncle of the Shunzhi Emperor. Why could Dorgon not name him an Uncle Prince (Shu wang) and thus recognize his merit?97 Dorgon's reply, conveyed by message through Ubai, was couched in shocked tones. Dodo was only recently dead, yet Ajige was casting aspersions upon his military record already, as though all that Dodo had actually done—defeating Li Zicheng, taking Xi'an, pacifying Jiangnan and Zhejiang, driving out the Sunid Mongols, winning victories over the Khalkas—had amounted to very little. It was clearly a self-seeking ambition on Ajige's part, and Dorgon would have none of that. "It is quite unreasonable," he curtly said, "to request on one's own to become a Shu wang." 98 Undaunted, Ajige responded to Dorgon's rejection by requesting permission, now that the campaign against Jiang Xiang was proving successful, to build a mansion in Beijing. At the time, Dorgon was opposed to allowing the Manchu princes to create large establishments—both because it enhanced their own stature vis-à-vis his own, and because it was too reminiscent of the opulent displays of Ming princes who had been such a burden on the populace before their dynasty fell.99 He therefore decided to take this opportunity to punish Ajige with more than just a brotherly 97 Ajige also protested against the exceptional arrangements made for Dodo's second son, Doni, to succeed his father as a prince o f the first rank. Shizu shilu, 44:22a. 98 Shizu shilu, 44:22a. 99 O n July 26, 1645, Dorgon had asked his grand secretaries how the Ming e m perors had chosen their brides. The answer was that the Ministry o f Rites would inform a chosen princely establishment (wang ju) that it could select w o m e n from within its domain (guo). When Dorgon suggested that this might be done now for the Manchu royal kinsmen, the grand secretaries were adamantly opposed. "At this time, the empire has just been settled. The people's feelings would be fearful and apprehensive. This matter certainly should not be carried out." They also warned him that the princely establishments o f the Qing should keep down their expenses and not be given large allowances. O n e reason for the fall of the Ming had been that the prince's households were such an enormous financial burden. Dorgon agreed with this policy, and announced that he would wait until later to fix the nobles' allowances. Duoergun shezheng riji, p. 7. Later, Dorgon also consulted his other Manchu advisers,

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reprimand. He decided to use the Assembly of Princes and High Officials to chastise Ajige publicly. Since entering Beijing, Dorgon had deliberately tried to make the Assembly into more of an advisory body that discussed, but did not initiate, policy. Just as Taizong had diminished its functions as a collective council of the eight beile by adding ex-officio banner ministers and commanders ( g u s a n ejen), so had Dorgon carried this transformation even further by increasing the m e m bership of the group to include grand secretaries and the presidents of the Six Boards. 100 Instead of acting as a check upon his o w n growing authority, which in turn derived from his manipulation of the regency-dominated throne, the Assembly became a forum where Dorgon could arrange for the arraignment and denunciation of other powerful aristocrats—in this case, his own brother— w h o challenged him.101 Thus, Dorgon now answered Ajige's request by summoning the Assembly together, and then enumerating before them Ajige's past crimes: how he had in Datong on his own and without proper authority promoted all the civil and military officials one grade

telling them that he was contemplating the enfeoffment of each of the princes, j u s t as M i n g Taizu had done. Suni and other members of the Manchu aristocracy opposed this measure, saying as well that under the Ming princely estates had engrossed too much land, harming the public welfare. In 1650 a schedule of awards of land was finally established. Princes of the blood (qin wang) were given 1,440 mu; second-degree princes (Jun wang), 900 mu\ beile, 720 mu; and beise, 540 mu. These relatively limited land grants, which were comparatively so m u c h smaller than Ming nobles' holdings, persisted t h r o u g h o u t the Q i n g dynasty. Zheng, " D u o e r g u n , " p. 10. 100 W u , Communication and Imperial Control, p. 13; O x n a m , Horseback, pp. 70-71. 101 Critics of the way in which the power of the Assembly had waned c o m plained that the agenda was dominated by the throne, and proposed that each board prepare its own agenda and have its representatives speak for it. T h e y also urged fellow members to speak out more courageously. "In recent years' meetings, there have been those w h o speak out because they t h e m selves are propitious, those w h o remain silent in order to follow the m a j o r ity, and those w h o watch the great ministers and are not willing to offend t h e m by speaking. Is this not contrary to the purposes of having a discussion at all?" Shizu shilu, juan 136, cited in Wang and Jin, " C o n g Q i n g chu de lizhi," p. 137.

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and just as arbitrarily dismissed officials elsewhere; how he had disobeyed orders and attacked Hunyuan (a city about sixty kilometers southeast o f Datong); and how he had formed a cabal with Wakda, to whom he repeatedly gave goods and property. O f all o f these charges the last was by far the most serious, because it strongly implied the Ajige was trying to gain the support o f Wakda and his brother Mandahai (the sons o f Daisan, who campaigned together with Ajige against Jiang Xiang) in a conspiracy against Dorgon. The Assembly consequently judged that Ajige should be stripped o f his princedom, that personnel serving under him should be cashiered, and that Wakda's properties should be confiscated. Dorgon was content at this point to pardon Ajige, however, and forbade him to attend to board affairs or to entertain Han officials—the last being a precaution against seeking to form a faction with Chinese bureaucrats outside Manchu inner circles. 102

The Revival of Literati Networks During his ascent over the other royal princes, Dorgon drew his Chinese advisers upward with him. Chen Mingxia, for instance, acquired even more prestige and influence.103 In 1646 his presence in the capital was deemed so important to Dorgon that Chen was ordered to "overcome his feelings" and remain in office despite the Confucian obligation to return home and mourn the death o f his father.104 Two years later, in 1648, when Dorgon first began appointing Han Chinese to the presidencies o f the Six Boards, Chen Mingxia was made full President o f the Board o f Civil Appointments, ranking alongside the Manchu president, Tantai. 105 As Dorgon himself relaxed his own attitudes about "corrupt Ming customs" and as official patronage by high-ranking Chinese ministers became more common, the old networks and alliances began to reform. Increasingly, the ranks o f the provincial examina-

102 Shizushilu, 44:22b. 103 Oshibuchi, "Shincho Junji soseki," p. 4. 104 Chen Mingxia appealed this decision, and was actually allowed to return home for temporary mourning. 105 Zhang, Qing shi, p. 3788.

The Dorgon Regency

887

tion supervisors were being filled by literati from the south. In 1646 all but one of the eighteen examiners were northerners; by 1648, six of the twenty were from the south. The change was even more evident a few years later. In 1651 nearly half, and in 1654 two-thirds, of the provincial examiners were of southern origin. (See Table 7.) The southerners' revival was even more evident in the palace examinations. In 1646, the top three candidates had been f r o m Shandong, Zhili (Hebei), and Shuntian prefecture; in 1647, all were f r o m Jiangnan. (See Table 8.) And in 1649, when results

Table 7. Provincial Examination Supervisors Provenance

1645

Banner Shuntian Zhili Shandong Shanxi Shaanxi Henan Jiangnan Jiangxi Zhejiang Fujian Huguang Guangdong Sichuan Total (excluding bannermen) Percentage of northerners Percentage of southerners Source: F a s h i s h a n , Qing mi

shuwen.

1646 2

3 3 2 1

1 7 3 2 2

1648

4 2 3 3 2 4

1651

2 1 3 5 3 1 1 9

1

2 2 2

2 7

1 2 4 1

1

5 1 3

1 1

1657

2

3 2 10 1 2

2 2

1654

1660

3 2 2 3 2 1 2 3 4 5 2 1

1

12

18

20

26

24

26

27

75%

94%

70%

53%

33%

31%

44%

25%

6%

30%

47%

67%

69%

56%

O (N O cn

p«-} o O * Oo o n-î *

3 6ß 2S ^ n ) LO ^ - "2 U —¡ J3 "rt o Ërt O ' s m m Ä M* c^ to
CO 1

LO OS

sO CN OS

IO co OS so" OS 00 co"

OS

o SO 00

r00 r-"

00

vP

^P

vÇ

CO 1

CO 1

SO

s?

V? l o sO r—1 T-H

V® o fS

CN

V? rH CS

IO SO CO so" SO CO ^f CN

I 3 9 _ I 4 ° , 148; prefectural, 118; candidates taking, 119, I20n, 322, 876; metropolitan, 1 2 0 - 1 2 2 , I36n, 279, 367, 444, 762, 872, 954, 996; palace, 120, 147, 277,

1254

Index

2 8 0 - 2 8 1 , 384, 74.511, 86311, 866, 887, 888-889, 9 i 9 n , 954, 956, 957; g r a d i n g of, I 2 i n ; case of, in 1621, 122; case of, in 1640, 230; supervisors of, 438n, 886-887, I004n; system of, 438n, 1051; and civil service, 442, 973n; quotas for, 442n, 486n, 954, 95 Sn, 1020, 1041; case of, in 1646, 444; case of, in 1643, 785; syllabus of, 869n; quota of, for Manchus, 954, 1041; case of, in 1657, 997, 1004-1005, 1008; f o r military degrees, 1041. See also Degrees; Palace examinations Examiners, 101, 115—124, 133, 137, 444, 460, 762. See also Examinations: supervisors of Exchange rates See C u r r e n c y : exchange rates of Executions, 12, 33n, 42n, 63, 65n, 67, 89, 110, 130, 1 3 m , 136, 152, 154, 165, 190, 196, 199, 217, 219, 237, 253n, 264n, 267n, 269n, 273n, 276, 287, 295, 314, 330, 386, 4 i o n , 521, 525, 535, 560, 580, 581, 587n, 588, 649, 653, 655n, 658, 659, 673n, 682n, 691, 693, 698, 699, 716, 7 2 m , 727, 728, 730, 737, 738, 746, 747, 750, 756, 795, 811, 8 i 5 n , 928, 938n, 961, 986, 988, 1004, 1019, 1035, 1068, io83n, 1109, 1114. See also Decapitations Exile, H 4 n , 131, 143, 146, 333, 341, 356n, 362n, 366, 37on, 763, 769, 795, 904n, 953, 963, 986n, 994, 1005, I076n, 1 1 2 m . See also Banishment Expeditions, i 6 3 n , 195, 198, 201, 210, 2 i 3 n , 214, 220, 245, 249n, 257n, 500, 762; b y Manchus, 301, 305; n o r t h e r n , 348, 353n, 399, 403, 405n, 4 i 2 n , 5 i o n , 513; led b y emperors, 374—378, 1030— 1036; southern, 404, 411, 521, 767; maritime, 744—745, 769 Exploitation, 108, 228, 237, 246n, 632n Extermination, 692, 830, 838; Q i n g policies of, 308, 493, 497, 500, 701-703 Extortion, 140, 289n, 339n, 434n, 61 i n , 622n, 639n, 662—663, 948, 978, I002n, io6in

Fa {X (chastisement), 326n Fa wang j£;3E (Buddha), 1113 Factionalism, 79, 8 6 - 9 2 , 105, 122-123, I25n, 134, 141-142, 151, 257, 268, 2 73 n > 331, 387, 445, 720, 723, 849, 850n, 865-870, 905, 9 6 2 - 9 6 7 , 9 8 m , 1007, 1051-1054, 1064, 1072, 1084, 1 0 9 m , 1092-1093, n o o n ; in the Southern M i n g court, 340n, 353n, 355-368, 379-380; d u r i n g the late Ming, 937-939, 94i~942, 97i~972, 1008, I052n. See also Partisanship Factions, 15, 63, m - 1 1 5 , 1 5 m , 231, 253n, 284n, 374, 886, 925, 9 5 1 - 9 5 8 , 963, 971, 989, i o n , 1100; a m o n g the M a n c h u princes, 300. See also Cliques; Dang; Pai; Pengdang Factories, 6 i 4 n , 834n Falang i j i S j (enamels), 729 Falga (Ma. hamlet), 53 Families, 7 m , 186-187, 2 0 i n , 216, 221, 309, io66n, 1081, I094n, 1123; survival strategies of, 96; d u t y to, 5 l 6 n . See also Elites: families belonging to; Kinship Famines, 7, I5n, 83n, I07n, I43n, i 6 i n , 225, 227n, 233, 254n, 338, 4 i 3 n , 428, 6 2 7 - 6 3 6 , 805, ioo6n, I054n, 1106, n o 9 n ; relief measures during, 322, 4 5 5 - 4 5 6 , 476, 912-913; of 1640, 513. See also Philanthropy Fan 788 Fan ?j§ (feudatory), 347 Fan king |jf pf (frontier screen), 348—349 Fan C h e n g m o m ^ H , 732n, 997, 1016; as governor-general of Fujian, 1105-1107; m a r t y r d o m of, 1113-1117 Fan C h e n g x u n f a ^ W l ' I I I ( > Fan C h e n g z u f S ^ f f i , 73 2n Fan Dali J Q M M , 9 i 3 n Fan Fucui iQ t f t ^ i , 146 F a n j i n g w e n n i m i C , 147, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 , 269, 944-945 Fan Shenxing l a t B t j , 787, 791 Fan wang Jl (protective feudatories), 24n Fan W e n c h e n g 60, 70, 7 1 - 7 3 , 173, 204, 2 i 8 n , 305n, 3o6n, 316, 4 i 5 n ,

Index

628, 62911, 852, 860, 86211, 873n, 875, 902, 91311, 91411, 953, 964, 966, 9 7 2 974, ix 16; and the surrender of H o n g Chengchou, 215—217; and the Manchus' decision to invade China, 302-309; and Feng Quan, 868n, 869-872; and Chen Mingxia, 9 7 1 - 9 7 4 Fan Yiheng i¡| — 362n Fan Yongdou I S à c ^ . 455n Fan Zhiwan 153-154 Fan Z h o n g y a n f a ft 629n; altar to, 873" Fang (ward), 330 Fang Daxian 4 1 1 , 425, 433n, 491-493, 1004 Fang Guoan ^ ¡ i ^ , 575n, 721. 734n, 843 Fang Kaizhang 256n Fang Kezhuang J § 4 2 6 , 439, 458 Fang Kongzhao ^ JLÍS. 39°n Fang Xiaoru , 2Ó9n, 453n Fang Yiyuan j j — j c , 589 Fang Yizhi 8in, 1 3 6 - 1 3 9 , 248n, 359, 6o2n, 6i5n, 644n, 773n, 866, io89n; family of, in Tongcheng, 390n Fang Yuegong ^ { S K , I076n Fang zhang Pj jk. (ward chief), 330 Fang Zhenru j j Ù M , 391 Fang Z h o n g t o n g J j 4 a ig, 866n Fangcun 328 Fangs J j , of Tongcheng ftSjM, I36n, 39on Fangshan Jf |_L|, i64n Fattren J1 A- $ee C o m m o n e r s Fanren § A (barbarians), 784 Farmers, 24n, 202n, 336n, 370n, 47 m , 6i6n, 630, 723, io65n Farming, 72, 337, 832; rights to, I038n. See also Agriculture; Cultivation Farms, 4l9n, 627; management of, 6 0 5 - 6 1 1 , I053n Fashions, 95n, i075n, 1081. See also Clothing Fate, 23, 143, 223n, 761. See also Destiny Father-ruler, 325. See also Ruler-father Fe Ala, 45n Feast of the Lanterns, 26 m Feasts, 199. See also Banquets

1255

Fees, 903n; of a customary nature, io64n; of wastage and meltage, 1071 Fei Mi J f ® , 3 6 m Fei iJE River, 521 Fei Yingdong See Fiongdon Feifu f¡t¡)llff ("inner organs"), 949 Fen ft (one-hundredth of a tael), I070n Fen m River, 501; valley of, 807, 810, 814-819 Fenfang ft Pi (guard divisions), 481 Feng Baoguo M f f i S . 769" Feng cheng JHft£ (phoenix walls), I56n Feng Dao ¿ l i t , 645n F e n g j i a y o u ¡ g Ü i L 67on Feng Jie 439 Feng Kezong, 523-524 Feng Menglong ¡J§f?fH, I 0 I > 768 Haining 1050; Chen family of, 445, 9o6n, 1005 Hair: cutting of, 47n, 60, I79n, 2i7n, 306, 3 ion, 3l2n, 317, 403n, 409n, 414, 416-420, 475, 647-655, 659, 672-673, 698, 748, 755-759, 776-778, 830, 868-870, 994n, n i 7 n ; styles of, 150,

Han Guangwudi t M j t ^ . ' f f i , 3 ° i , 375 Han i ama wang (Ma. "Father-Prince of the Khan"), 882n Han Kang 744 Han Kuang 81 Han Lin 274n Han M o 568 Han gg River, i6n, 507, 696, 829; highlands of, 693-696, 716, 827-834 Han Rizuan $$ 0 ¡U, 7 6 3 Han R u y u 254n Han Siwei H i t , 439 Han studies, school of, 1093

I2Ó4

Index

Han Wei Liuchao baisan mingjia ji ÍÜffé (Collection of Famous Writers f r o m the Han, Wei and Six Dynasties), i o j n Han Wudi 4in, 675m Han Xinkang 1075 Han Yu gtjgf, 358n, 5i7n Han Zanzhou ¡¡if fUJH, 344n, 571 Han Zhaoxuan ^ B g i i , 805, 8i8n, 819 Han Zonglai p f ^ K E , 760 Hancheng U S » 4^3 Handai $$f$, 800 Handicrafts, 598, 6i4n, 615n, 632, Ó44n, 772n, 907n, io66n. See also Weaving Han (Ma. khan), 49n, 55 Hangzhou fltjH'l, 99", 127, 248, 349, 357, 401, 444n, 528, 573n, 587n, 605n, 642, Ó54n, Ó55n, 66in, 664-668, 721, 727, 742n, 7 7 m , 9o6n, 907n, 913, 935n, 1017, 1027, 1051, I058n, n o 6 n , 1108, H24n; w o m e n of, 339n; gentry of, 356n; fall of, 672n; resistance m o v e ment in, 735n;Catholicism in, I005n; garrison of, 1 1 3 2 - 1 1 3 3 Hangzhou £¡t¡J'['|, Bay, 680, I075n Hanke ¡¡g bJ, 759-763 Hankou P , 4Ó2n Hanlin H } ^ Academy, 69n, 1 2 1 - 1 2 5 , 241, 2 4 7 - 2 5 1 , 268, 281, 387n, 422n, 435, 5°3, 773n> 852» 85311, 863n, 864n, 868, 9i5n, 922n, 933, 953n, 955n, 956, 969-973, 979-980, 984, 996, 1007, io65n, I072n; network dominated by, 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 998n; compilers of, 123, 391, 586n, 956; bachelors of, 274n, 280, 282, 285, 381-386, 579n, 760; roster of, 280; chancellors of, 32m; preceptors of, 534; secretaries of, 588; revival of, in 1645, 863; officials and academicians of, 956n, 1136; probationers °f, 937. 997n; formal administration of, 1007-1009 Hanshi ¡S 759 Hanxiuzhai fjj, 138 Hanyin ¿|¡ f j | , 696-697 Hanzhong ggcjj, 369, 502, 693-694, 800, 834n, 1027; Prince of, 688 Hao iff (expansion), 1091 Hao j j (impetuous), 518

Hao if?. See Magnates Hao Bi # | 5 i | , 825-826 Hao Gang 439 Hao Luo $15 933 Haodu jfEii; (magnate worms), 246 Haoge 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 , 298n, 300, 4 1 1 , 4i3n, 519, 5 2 1 - 5 2 3 , 854n, 861, 892, 899n, 900—901, 1017; campaigns of, in Sichuan, 69on; conspiracy of, 875; impeachment of, 881 Haojia jF'gi (great families, great households, local magnates), 108, 371, 625n, 629n,710 Haojie zhi shi ^ ^ ¿ z t (heroic scholars), 518 Haonu ^.tj^ ("brazen servants"), 623 Haoxia fzfài (local magnates), 234, 248n Haozhou KiHi, 522 Harahotton (Black City), 893 Harvests, 3on, 48n, 58n, I07n, 237, 431, 6 1 1 , 620, 630, 834, 999 H e foj, Colonel, 403 H e Gang f5JHj, 377~378, 560 He Hongqi M & ì f è , 689n, 691-692 H e Junyao H f S " ^ , 387n He Kai {BJ^, 587 H e Kegang f6J"5T[H, 180, 188-190 H e Keting fcij n j ^ , 828n H e Ruizheng fSJÌffi®, 274n H e Shaoji {5J|gig, 773 He Shisheng f5J±ff", 830 He Tengjiao M R R , 534, 736, 766; death of, 767; capture of, 895 He Wangsheng g EE 991, 994 H e Yingrui j S J f f i ^ , 3 2 m H e Zhen 688-695 Headmen, 651, 94m Headshaving. See Hair: cutting of Heaven, 181, 190, 265, 301, 599, 649n, 744, 748, 7 5 1 , 865n, 946n, 974, 1078, io82n, io83n, io89n, n 18; sacrifices to, 283, 858; displeasure of, 304; and the throne's legitimacy, 375n; and Earth, 598n, 858. See also Mandate of Heaven Heavenly Emperor, 778 Hebei 3 I n > 3 354, 449 n , 477, 496, 62m, 636n, 657, 776, 949, 956-960, n o i , 11 ion, 1119; of brothers, 49n Homosexuality, 94—95, 622, 87m H o n g C h e n g c h o u J t ^ P j g , i93n, 194196, 21 i n , 227, 233n, 369n, 486, 489, 560, 565, 573n, 592, 597, 642-644, 664n, 725n, 728-740, 743-745, 749~ 754, 758-764, 8i7n, 843, 864, 878, 891, 906, 926n, 948, 953-954, 964, 972n, 973, 1007, i o n , 1028, 1031, 1042, 1112, 1136; defeat of, by Li Zicheng at T o n g g u a n , 211; defense of Songshan by, 211—216; surrender of, 216, 2 i 7 n , 219; m o u r n e d by the Ming, 219; and the M a n c h u decision to invade China, 304-307; as adviser to D o r g o n , 3o6n, 309n; and the Z u o M a o d i peace mission, 407n, 409n; recommendations of officials b y , 418n; and the purge of the Censorate, 922925; m o t h e r of, 924; investigation of, in 1652, 932; as a special c o m m i s sioner, 973; and the conquest of south China, 1025-1035; retirement and death of, 1034-1035 H o n g Shiqin 998n H o n g Tianzhuo ¿ f t ^ S , 766n Hong ye jjt H-. See Great Enterprise H o n g c h u l A f g , 675n Hongguang E m p e r o r , 346, 349, 352n, 362-371, 376, 38m, 382n, 386387, 390, 396n, 407, 494, 511, 516, 522, 527, 535, 557, 5 510, 567, 575n, 588, 727, 779, 9i5n,

1000; region of, 68, 326-330, 340341, 342, 372, 395, 399; repair of dike system in, during early Qing, 908—915 Huai'an 118, 243, 255n, 329, 340, 346n, 347, 350, 378n, 401, 522, 5 3 1 , 6 7 5 - 6 7 9 , 730, 748n, 7 5 2 - 7 5 5 , 769n,

7 7 1 - 7 7 7 , 789, 908, 11 ion; Grand Coordinator of, 248, 325; gentry of, 347n; defense of, 348, 393; loyalist attack upon in 1647, 752-758 Huaibei ^ t . 406n Huainan I09n Huaining 91, 139 Huaining US®!, Marquis of, 589 Huaiqing !35 n , 4 1 2 , 5°3 n . 1131 Huaiyang j g g l , 329, 348, 350, 397, 401, 667n, 728, 915, 1026; mility affairs in the area of, 352, 728-730 Huaiyin j f ^ , 774n Huaizong Princess, 531 Huaizong Duan huangdi HI tr ¡ § i H ' S (Upright Emperor W h o Cherishes the Ancestors), 945n Huan H , Duke, 309 Huang ^ (uncultivated), io6on Huang H , Madame, 524n Huang Binqing 393, 58711, 666n, 674n, 737, 741-748, 752, 759, 770 Huang ce 'sUffl (yellow registers), 919 Huang Chao JjL, 290 Huang Chuang jlifM] (Dashing Huang), 327n _ Huang Chunyao j f i i - ) ® , 384, 656-657, 659, 668n

Huang Daozhou

134, I37n,

I46n, 147, 356, 3 6 3 - 3 6 5 , 38311, 673,

736 Huang 348, 558, Huang Huang

Degong 327, 342, 3 4 7 354-355, 379 n , 393, 520, 534-535, 572-573, 584, 654n, 669n Duanbo 585 Erxing jit Wi , 694, 696n, 821

1268

Index

Huang Fei Jtcffi, 669-672 Huang fu shezheng wang j|i 5£ EE (Imperial Father Prince Regent), 882, 893 Huang ji U S (Imperial Ultimate), 683 Huang Jiarui j l ^ i S , 118, 351-354, 667, 672, 772 Huang Jiazi 597, 640, 652-653 Huang Jingfang MM&J, 231, 234 Huang Jinyu ^ c i r ^ , 689 Huang Long 196-199, 669n Huang Mingjingshi wenbian ¿1 H^lfgtft; (Collection of Writings on Ming Statecraft), 115, I37n Huang Nanyang [f] , 668n Huang shang jli^t (king's merchant), 455n Huang Shixin Hk, 412 Huang Shu j f gjf, 379 Huang shufu shezheng wang jH.fi 3CM (Imperial Uncle Prince Regent), 861-862 Huang tian qing jing shan you J i -¡"¡If ¡fj U ¿ r ("Supreme Heaven's Clear and Pure Good Friends"), 681 Huang Tu'an pj 426 Huang Wenlu. See Huang Fei Huang Xixian ig^f Ig, 328 Huang Yuqi 878 Huang Zhouding M f f l ^ , 589 Huang zhuang j|i ££ (imperial estates), 336, 42m, 469n Huang Zongchang 439 Huang Zongxi J i f ^ f ! , 101, 120, I26n, 140, 356n, 595n, 879n, io66n, 1080-1093 Huang Zongyan 879n Huang Zunsu jiirij: J f , n o Huangchao tongdian M^iSft (Administrative encyclopedia o f the Qing), 7o8n Huangpu j ^ g j , River, 669, 993, 1045 Huangshi guizu CL "is f t Si (imperial nobility), 332n Huangzhong ^ I c f , 685—688 Huangzhou ¡I'M, 339" Huanshi ("official households"), 6o8n

Huaqingshi IjE- pf , 1062 Huashan lj!|lj, 675 Huating I02n, Ii4n, 569, 629, 653, 661, 679 Hubei Mit- 17, 362n, 426, 597n, 883, I070n, 1102, n i l — 1 1 1 2 , 1134—1135; serf revolts in, 63 5n, See also Huguang Hubei p (households slaves), 63 5n. See also Jiapu Huguang S l j g , 13711, 195, 231. 273n, 322-323, 338n, 352n, 359n, 362, 363n, 445, 461, 56on, 582, 6i3n, 614, 633n, 634, 685n, 718, 738n, 739, 765n, 766767, 887, 888, 926n, 927n, 956, 957, 972, 1026-1027, 1030, 1130, 1133, 1139; rebellions in, 227-233; officials from, 270, 3i6n, 444n; commoners' fields expropriated in, 338; tax reductions in, 347n; military affairs in, 392n, 1131-1132; governors of, 4i8n Hui ^ (associations), 627 Hui 0 (Muslims), 827n Hui Ben , 991 Hui dtan 01 (Administrative regulations), 44m Hui Dong MW, 1091-1093 Hui tong si yi guan ^[W] 0 H f g (Residence for Envoys of the Four Tributary States), 406, 797n. See also Si yi guan Hui Yingzhao M M ' S ' 5°3 Huiguan (provincial lodges, Landsmannschaften), 240, 627 Huimi WiM (decadent), 967 Huishou H i p , 677 IIIn Huiyuan Huizhou (Anhui), i8n, 56on, 622, 736n, 1056 Huizhou M-i'H (Guangdong), 738, 76on, 994 n Hujun fjiiJE (bodyguards, Guards Army), 12, 45n, j i n , I74n Hukou yushengji ffi P i & ^ f E (Record of a survivor from the tiger's mouth), 3i3n Hulao fH '']' Pass, 510 Humaneness. See Ren Humanism, i09on

Index Hummel, Arthur W., 98611 Hun jfj[ River, 59, 65 Hunan 194-195, 21011, 233, 613, 665, 737, 838, 895, 91611, 91811, 99311, 1030-1034, 107011, 1099, 1 1 0 1 - 1 1 0 4 , 1119; officials from, 376; rice exports from, 612—613. See also Huguang Hunehe, 48 Hung Taiji ft^gi, 54n, 83-86, I28n, 129, 142, 152, 158-162, 184-186, 749, 838n, 850-851, 1009, 1016; Ningyuan raid by, 130; name of, I58n, 206n, 208, 297; reliance on Chinese collaborators by, 160-163; and collective leadership, 160—163; consolidation of power by, 163-166; and Chinese officials, 163-170, 194201; and the siege of Dalinghe, 170— 194; and the surrender of Zu Dashou, 180-194; Liaodong adherents of, 196-202; ambivalence about ruling China on the part of, 204, 302-303; and Dorgon, 2o6n, 22 in; worries about sinification of, 206; portrait of, 207; heirs to, 297-298. See also Qing Taizong Hungary, 2n Hungba Tulu Nikan, 589 Hunting, 43n, 4Ön, 48n, 53, 65, 206, 2o8n, 318, 795, 834, 861, 893, 922, 924, 1041 Hunyuan /fE-®, 836, 886 Huo ijj (capture), 46n Huo Da flfjJl, 427 Huo Weihua H t H , I25n Huolu gigg, 496 Huoqi (lively contracts), 6i8n Huoshen ^cff Temple, 922-923, 932 Huqiu j ^ i r - See Tiger Hill Hurha 703 Hurha MiSSI- 5 2 I n Hutong (alleyway), 451 Hutuo gßffc River valley, 837 Huzhou äl^H, 6, 99n, 444n, 605n, 6i4n, 727, 1051, n o 6 n ; epidemics in, 8n; floods in, I09n Hydraulic administration, 9o8n; cycles of, 9i5n. See also Hedao zongdu;

1269

Irrigation; Water conservancy Hydrography, 915n Hydrologists, 914, 9i5n. See also Hedao zongdu Iberia. See Spain Idealism, 1007, 1065, 1093; reaction against, 1092 Ideology, 289, 863-864, 1009 Ili ftfg, 827n Illiteracy, 117, 327n. See also Literacy Illness, 862n, 893, 936, I034n, 1067, 1106. See also Disease; Medicine; Quarantine Immigration, 834, 9i5n Impeachment, 57, 63, 8in, 133-134, 211, 2i2n, 254n, 329, 356n, 358n, 359n, 363n, 379, 386n, 392n, 488n, 573n, 587n, 699n, 7Ó5n, 865-872, 877, 881, 904, 921-925, 948n, 970, 977, 979, 983-984, 988, 1000, 1004, 1056, 1060 Imperial Academy. See Guozijian Imperial Canal Commissioner (Ming), 908. See also Hedao zongdu Imperial Guards, ion, I2n, 25, n o , I74n, 315, 534, 683n, 793, 794, 817, 997n, I049n; Office of, I74n Imperial Hat and Girdle Department, 265 Imperial Households Bureau, 437n, 455". 899n, 902, 1015, 1140 Imperial Sacrifices, Court of (Ming), 232, 269n, 32m, 334n. See also Sacrificai Worship, Court of (Qing) Imperial silk works, 77 m Imperial Son-in-Law, 44m, 589 Imperial Stud, Court of, 202, 32m, 356n, 405, 527n Imprisonment, 358n, 359n, 3Ó2n, 3Ó3n, 38511, 386, 39m, 393n, 4i9n, 435n, 489n, 521, 526, 574, 640, 781, 8i5n, 831, 879n, 882, 904n, 984, 1004, 1046 Incense, I05n, I20n, I29n, 268, 3i5n, 756n,936 Incense-Smelling Sect, 429n Income, 6o5n; of the government, 1058, 1070. See also Revenue Indenture, 610, 63 5n. See also Enserfment

1270

Index

India, 112411 Indian Ocean, 411 Indians (North American), 43n Industry, 47, 834n, i o ó i n , io66n, 1126 I n f a n t y , 5 m , y 8 n , i 6 i n , 171, 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 , 201, 214, 492, 589, 740, 791, 807, 814,

836, 976, 995, I039n, H25n. See also Armies Inflation, 5n, 6 - 9 , Ó32n, I039n, 1062. See also Economy Ingguldai ^ f f i ü í f i , 2ion, 709-710

Inheritance, 34m. See also Heirs; Occupations: inheritance of Inn Valley, 2n Inner Asia. See Central Asia Inner Courts. See Neiyuan Inner Secretariat. See Neige Inner Three Courts. See Nei San Yuan Innocent X (Pope), 4n Insanity, iooón Insects, 1015; imagery of, 1110 Institute of Economics (Chinese Academy of Social Sciences), I058n Instruction, supervisors of, 124, 934 Instructions for Practical Living, 1093 Intellectualism, i090n Intellectuals, io84n, I092n Intelligence (information), 668n, 695, 700, 702, 808, 971, i o o 2 n , 1012;

systems of, 86, 151, 199, 2i2n, 496, 506, 682n; gathered for Li Zicheng, 2j8n; gathered by Ming, 2óon. See also Military reports Intendants, 588, 8o6n, 808, 818, 1136. See also Xundao Interpreters, 4 m , 44n, yon Interrogation, 90, 171, I74n, 175, 184, 190, 389, 523, 530, 733, 748. 750, 757, 758, 7 6 9 , 77°, 7 8 8 , 791, 792, 994, 1 0 0 3 Investigation, 794, 932, 948, 950, 985, 106m; Provincial Office of, 38n; Bureau of, I22n; law governing, 708 Investments, 477n, ó l j n , 6i8n, Ó23n, I 0 5 7 n , 1062; p a t t e r n s o f , 6 o 8 n ; r e t u r n

on, I057n. See also Entrepreneurship Iron, 74n, I37n, 834n; smelting of, 47. See also Blacksmiths Irrawaddy River, I034n I r r e d e n t i s m , 3 6 8 - 3 7 9 , 410, 510, 6 6 5

I r r i g a t i o n , i 6 n , 17, I 0 9 n , 6 0 5 - 6 1 1 , 9 0 8 ,

912-915, I053n. See also Hedao zongdu; Hydraulic administration; Yellow R i v e r Water Conservancy Irtysh, 3on Islam, 687n, 799n, 827n. See also Mohammedanism; Muslims Istanbul, Italy, 3n, 75n Jade, 155, 733n, 814; girdles made of, 3i2n

Jagchild, 686n Jails, 88n, 89n, 154, 166, 264, 273n, 672, 777n, 895, 1068, 1107. See also Prisons Jangturi (Ma. headmen), 74 Janissaries, 1020, 1039 Jao Modo, n i 2 n Jaobtai, 1034 Japan, 598n, 6o7n, 632, 744n, 1038, I039n; trade with, 2n, 5; specie exchanges with China by, 3; massacre of Macaonese embassy in, 4n; and relations with Korea, 24, 36, 62; pirates f r o m , I05n; historians of, 610 Jesuits, 77, I28n, 333, 634, 857n, 929n, ioo6n. See also Catholics Jewelry, 59n, 149, 289, 743, 900, l o o m , 1075. See also Precious stones Ji iS, 1 0 9 6 Ji Hf (altar of grain, god of grain), 249n, 25on, 252, 262n

Ji (concentrations), 494 Ji (registries), 709n Ji Prince of, 43 5 Ji Liuqi If 59i Ji shen (god of grain). See Grain: god of Ji yong ££ J§ (skilled braves), 433 Ji Yongren 1113 Jia ^ (families, house), 384a, 432 Jia ^ (ten-household unit), 9 i 6 n 11 Jia Hanfu 34 Jiading S r ^ , H 3 n , 384, 6o5n, 6i5n, 645, 653, 668n, 724n; massacre of, 522, 6 5 5 - 6 6 1 , 818

Jiading (housemen, liegemen, retainers), 39, 433, 616, 698, 701 Jiajing I r i f l Emperor, 9, 14, 32, 336;

Index

reign of, 341, 609, 62511 Ji'an 352n, 1 1 1 9 Jian hao zu bing f f f t t P J J j i ( " a r r o g a t e d titles a n d b a r r e d [our] troops"),654 Jian zhen ( " m a i n t a i n rectitude in t h e face o f difficulty"), 1098 J i a n c h a n g U H , 428n Jianfu ¡jig T e m p l e , 823n Jiang £ (artisan), 709n Jiang D e j i n g $ f i g ] S , 23on, 231, 2 3 5 - 2 3 6 J i a n g Gai 143 Jiang Hede 106m J i a n g J i a n x u n ft®®, 809-810, 813—815 Jiang jing hui (Association t o Discuss t h e Classics), i o 6 6 n J i a n g Lin 816 Jiang ming zhi cai ("efficacious and e n l i g h t e n i n g " ) , iooon J i a n g R u o l a i M^S^ti, 586, 668n Jiang Shiquan 1122 J i a n g X i a n g H J | [ , 294, 484, 490, 8o6n, 8 i 7 n , 869, 884, 1124; rebellion of, 685n, 8 0 5 - 8 1 9 , 828, 834, 838-842, 883, 960, 1 1 3 2 , 1 1 3 3 ; edict t o Shanxi civilians d u r i n g the revolt of, 811; allies of, 822 Jiang xue (preach), 109m J i a n g Y a n iHj®, 68on J i a n g Y i n g x u n g j g l l , 806 J i a n g Y o u g u a n g H ^ f j f c , 816 Jiang Yueguang H 9 n , 248n, 3 2 m , 340, 342n, 347, 356, 364, 368, 379, 389, 585, 765 J i a n g Z h i l o n g flC^fll. 991 Jiangbei fl^fc, 146, 328. 347. 352. 399, 564n, 73 i n , 7 6 9 - 7 7 1 , 908, 969; defense of, 330n, 350, 372, 378; g e n t r y of, 342n; resistance m o v e m e n t in, 7 3 1 , 788 J i a n g - H u a i , 567 J i a n g n a n i l j f , 8, 1 7 - 2 1 , 33n, 9 4 - 9 7 , 107-109, 124-126, 1 3 2 - 1 3 5 , 140-144, 230, 236n, 276, 280, 349, 362, 372, 445, 4 5 8 - 4 6 1 , 541, 559, 620n, 645, 722, 724n, 725, 7 3 0 - 7 3 4 , 762, 773, 777n, 838n, 843, 867, 87m, 883-889, 891, 9o6n, 9i2n, 913, 9l6n, 9 2 m , 927n, 9 3 5 n . 936, 942n, 955~958, 965, 969, 997n, I004n, I055n, 1063, io83n,

1271

1108, 1130; grain prices in, 6; local officials in, 64, 1069; w e a l t h y h o u s e holds and g e n t r y of, 93, 94n, 342, 383, 399, 727, 905n, 1050, 1058, io69n, 1074; literati of, 100, 320, 385, 444, 762, 939, 989, 1003; literati societies of, 1 0 0 - 1 0 5 , 1 1 3 , 1 0 5 5 - 1 0 5 7 ; cities of, 1 0 3 - 1 0 8 ; climate of, 107; tax resistance m o v e m e n t in, I09n, I094n; M a n c h u c o n q u e s t of, H 4 n , 195, 276n, 522, 589, 646, 740, 764, 1 1 3 2 ; l a n d o w n e r s of, 114, 1068; uprisings in, Ii8n, 723, 7 6 7 - 7 7 1 ; t a x a t i o n in, 134, 905n, 1019, io6in, I070n; M i n g loyalism in, 248, 591-680, 868, 990, 1042—1046; defenses of, 2 5 1 , 320n; military affairs in, 256, 48on, 994n; Li Z i c h e n g ' s plans to c o n q u e r , 384; resources of, 399, 604-623, 739; land t e n u r e in, 470; social stratification in, 623-680, 722, 938; clans of, 666n; g e o g r a p h i c a l legitimacy of, 666n; 1647 and 1652 p u r g e of literati in, 7 4 8 - 7 5 2 , 7 7 1 ; c h a n g e d i n t o a p r o v i n c e , 770; textile industries in, 7 7 1 ; g o v e r n o r general of, 878; circuit of, 939; judicial c o m m i s s i o n e r of, 948n; coast of, 1004; B u d d h i s m in, 1005, I077n; m e r c h a n t s of, 1018; C o x i n g a ' s invasion of, 1042-1049, 1075; natives o f , f o r b i d d e n to serve in B o a r d o f R e v e n u e , 1061; attack in 1660-1661 o n g e n t r y of, 1 0 6 6 - 1 0 7 3 ; e x a m i n a t i o n scandal in, 1076; p o p u l a t i o n of, H 2 4 n . See also A n h u i ; Jiangsu; N a n z h i l i Jiangnan di yifengliu caizi 0 S^ — IS, ¡5f[ (Foremost R a k e S o u t h of t h e Yangzi R i v e r ) , 772n J i a n g i n g ¿1®?, 99n, 526n, 569, 591, 7 5 2 - 7 5 5 , 978, i048n, 1054, 1132. See also N a n j i n g Jiangsu 92, 112, 118, 154, I74n, 231, 4 2 5 - 4 2 7 , 520, 586n, 7 2 9 - 7 3 5 . 7 6 8 - 7 7 1 , 866, 878n, 915, 1019, I076n, 1130, 1134, 1 1 4 1 ; officials f r o m , 417. See also J i a n g n a n Jiangui i f ^ J , (traitors), 708 Jianguo f j i f (administrator o f the realm), 236n, 345, 346n, 742n, ioo3n;

1272

Index

conception of, 245m. See also Regency Jiangxi "¿Lffi, 98, m , 233, 24.0, 352n, 362n, 385n, 4 i 2 n , 4 i 7 n , 425, 582, 603, 614, 634, 665, 666n, 694n, 736, 739n, 767, 882, 887-889, 9 1 7 , 956, 1 0 1 8 , 1019, 1 1 0 7 - 1 1 0 8 , 1 1 1 9 , 1 1 2 m , 1130, 1 1 3 8 ; Qing pacification of, 195, 1 1 3 2 ; ministers from, 2 7 1 ; tax reductions in, 346; administration of, 461 Jiangxue i f ip (lectures), 103 Jiangyin /LI®, 359n, 4 0 1 , 522n, 62yn, 655, 668n, 670, 673, 728, 749n, 1 0 1 7 ; siege of, 670; massacre of, 818 Jiangzuo san da jia fllÎîH^;^ ("Three Great Poets of the Eastern Yangzi"), 87m

Jiaxing H H , 8n, 9 6 - 9 7 , 99n, iosn, 107, 339n, 39on, 444n, 602, 6 i 2 n , 641, 642n, 6 5 1 - 6 5 5 , 668n, 672n, 727, 742n, 77°, 935, 943, 1044, 1075, 1106; lineages of, 97; floods in, I09n Jiayu ^ |l|g Pass, 826 Jiazhang H: (head of household), 708 Jiazhuang ^ (family estate, manors), 370n, 429 Jiazi ^ -f- (beginning o f the sexagenary cycle), 857 Jibian ¡filli (incitement to revolt), 60in Jidu Pi I L 9 0 1 , I004n Jie M, 808 Jie dang (to form factions), 1 0 1 1 Jie dang huaijian ("forming a party to nurture sedition"), 977 Jianmin iBIisi; (menials), 621 Jie lu ping kou ielM^aE (using the Jianming fuyi quanshu ^ Bft jjjÇ ^ • (Simplified comprehensive tax caitiffs to pacify the bandits), 396n registry), 107 m J i e p i a o ^ ^ (cut receipts), i o 6 i n Jianning 573n Jiefan 46n, 65 Jianshen ("presented sashes"), 6o8n Jiexiu ft;, 808 Jiansheng §£ £ (National University Jiezi yuan |JJ (Mustard Seed student), 94n, 994, 1020 Garden), 1081 Jianshui, 1030 Jigang pu ¡K IS ft (manager o f Jiantao ¡¡$Jf>f (corrector), 863 bondservants), 623n, 624n Jiantiaosuo 768, 77on Jihad, 803 Jianu Ijfctff. (household slaves), 8i4n, 1057 Ji-Liao X 3 S border zone, 2 1 1 Jianwen Emperor, 335, 3Ô3n Jilin ^ # , 4 2 J i a n z h o u ^ t t l Jurchen, 42, 49n, jo Jin fa, 282 Jiao (attacks, extermination, extirpaJin H, Marquis of, 249n tion), 4 i 6 n , 493, 500, 6 9 9 - 7 0 2 , 831. Jin ^ dynasty ( 1 1 1 5 - 1 2 3 4 ) , 55, 79, See also Extermination I42n, i64n, 167, 205, 369, 5 i 7 n , 583, Jiao Anmin ^ È J Ç g ; , 691 8 9 m , 892; emperors of, 2o8n, 3 1 9 , Jiao Bingzhen M ^ t M , 999 849; haircutting policy of, 648n, 650; Jiao Chongrui, 1002 history of, 849; clothing of, 975n; Jiao Mengxiong 5^9 conquest o f China by, io89n Jin ^ dynasty ( 1 6 1 6 - 1 6 3 6 ) , 57, 6 9 - 7 2 , Jiao Rong ffi 689n 82, 1 6 2 - 1 6 4 , 167, 849; aristocracy of, Jiaocheng 483, 8 0 8 - 8 1 1 , 814 6 1 ; Ming tribute to, 83n; headquarters Jiaofu j§IJJto (extermination), 497 of, 184; name of, changed to Qing, Jiaoshan I046n 206; tradition o f imperial rule of, 303. Jiaotai £15 ci Palace, 454 See also Jin guo Jiapu ^ ( H (household servants), 6i7n, Jin dian (Golden Temple), 1 1 2 0 622n, 635. See also Bondservants Jin Gao lÈiBj, 526n J i a q i n g E S E reign, 9i6n, 1 1 4 1 Jin Gongjing 867n Jiashan U j | , 1 3 3 , 628n, 680, 727; local Jin guo (country of Jin), 57, 65, 74, elite of, 631 172 Jiashen Ç (the year of 1644), 996n Jiaxiang J f p , 4 3 1 , 492 Jin khan. See Hung Taiji; Nurchaci

Index

Jin Li &5E, 491, 1026, 1031 Jin Sheng 730n, 736n Jin Shenghuan ^ K f f l , 331, 368, 733n, 737, 765-767, 784, 882, 1132 Jin Shizong :3r f t 208-210 Jin Taizong 208-210 Jin Taizu ^ icffi, 208 Jin Weicheng 965, 1131 Jin Xizong 208, 84.9 Jin Yue ¿feij], 757n Jin Yuhe 412, 1131 Jin Zhijun 254, 409n, 417, 426, 437, 458, 486, 904n, 94jn, 961-966, 1007, 1010 Jin zhong bao guo ft 1§ ("Repay the Dynasty with All Your Loyalty"), 56011 Jinan 1 4 2 - 1 4 3 , 324, 435, 468, 48on, 495n, 701 Jinci §jjg|, 810, 814 Jing ¡¡¡Hi (animal that devours its mother upon being born), 24n Jing (Confucian moral spirit), 374 Jing g ! (standards), 326n Jing Prince of, 73 in Jing Benche iU^fg:, 668, 669n, 673 Jing (venerated guest), 872 Jing Qizhen 841 Jing xu $1 (mark out discriminations), 381 Jing yin shishe M B M n t (Club o f Startled and Secretive Poets), 938 Jing zhai Mfi( (capital debt), ioo2n Jing'an si j ^ S ? tF- See Temple of Peace and Tranquility Jingbing Jfl SL (crack cavalry, picked troops), 227, 412 Jingcha Jj^SK (metropolitan inspection), 953n, ioi3n Jingdezhen H24n Jin'ge ^ I f , 523n Jinggini hafan (viscount o f the first class), 848 Jinghai HpJS, 406n, 785 Jingkang chuanxin lu in fli f# {fl % (A Credible record o f 1126), 248n Jingkou M D , 434", 653n Jingle 807 Jingling f ; gg, 947

1273

Jingnan (Pacifies the South), Count of. See Huang Degong Jingnan fy (Pacifies the South), Prince of. See Geng Zhongming Jingpu, 665n Jingshi jgfU: (statecraft), 1084 Jingxing #g£> 496 Jingying dizhu g g S f t i i i - See Managerial landlords Jingyun I I Gate, 874n Jinhua ^ i j g , 529, 721 Jining 155, 231, 243, 4o6n, 4 1 1 , 424n, 428, 430n, 432n, 434, 790 Jinjiang H d , 99, 607 Jinling 774 Jinmen H4n, 673n, I003n, I004n, I049n Jinshan 673, 975n, I046n Jinshen haoyou zhijia (families of gentry or magnate status), 615 Jinshi xfizb (metropolitan graduate), 1 1 5 - 1 2 0 , 1 3 3 - 1 3 7 , 140, 322, 4i7n, 759", 785, 819, 906n, 9i3n, 933, 953n, 954, 995-998, 1 1 3 1 , 1138; military, I74n, 1031; examinations for the degree of, 2 1 1 , 955n, 1008; year of, as a variable accounting for collaboration, 271; class o f 1643, 438n; quotas for, 442; provincial registration of, 445; numbers of, 665-667; examination of 1646, 846n; candidates o f Manchu origin, 954n; class of 1659, 1094. See also Examinations Jintan ^ i ® , 103, 140; lineages, I03n Jinxian 4i7n, H2in Jinyi wei £ $J (Embroidered Uniform Guard), I2n, 88n, 114, 126, 322, 382n, 4o6n, 477n, 523, 623, 1025 Jinze ^ # , 6 7 2 Jinzhou i^iH'l, 64, 74, 79-86, I23n, 1 7 1 - 1 7 7 , 187-189, I92n, 195, 198, 221, 862n; Manchu attacks on, 45n, 210—214; plans to use Zu Dashou to attack, 189-194; surrender of, 2 2 1 - 2 2 4 ; siege of, 683, 860 Jirgalang 166, 185, 196, 2i2n, 222, 298n, 303n, 767, 843, 861, 874, 882n, 895—902, 928, 932, 948—950,

1274

Index

9 7 2 - 9 7 5 , 985; as regent, 299-300, 302; i m p e a c h m e n t of, 881 Jishan ffiiUl. 35 378, 399", 645, 666, 9 4 m Jishizhong | p iji (surveillance officials), 488n Jiu bian ( N i n e Frontiers), 36, 239n Jiu chen j § g? ( " o l d ministers"), 947 Jiu Han bing U § § (Old H a n Troops), 182 Jiu Hanjun HgfijpL ( O l d H a n A r m y ) , 201 Jiu q i n g huiyi A ® ! # ¡ 8 (Assembly of C o u r t Ministers), 365 Jiu q i n g k e d a o huiyi ^ f i l M i ! # i l (Assembly o f N i n e Ministers and Censors), 852, 867 Jiu ren H A ( ° ' c ' m e n ) ; 44*5, 738, m 6 n , 1133 Jiu shan j l ill ( N i n e M o u n t a i n s ) , 431, 699 Jiu T o n g h e ^ 3 ® * , 681 Jiu Zhongguo Ifc + S (rescue C h i n a ) , 403 J i u g o n g A ' g ' M o u n t a i n s , 507 J i u j i a n g A i l » 2 4 1 . 2 4 8 , 362n, I034n, "37 Jiuquan 804 Jiushijiu pian A "PAH (Ninety-Nine Ways of Destroying the Manchus), 8on J i z h o u iu^'H, 36n, 153, 254 Jolo 9 2 ®n Ju fH (solicitous), 518 Ju jing qiong l i g S U l ( " d w e l l i n g in seriousness a n d investigating principles to t h e u t m o s t " ) , 1093 ( c h i e f l i n e a g e ) , 1116 Juanna fllfpi ("subscriptions), I020n J u d g e s , 373n, 692; military, 26n; prefectural, i 3 7 n ; provincial, 992. See also Judicial affairs J u d i c a t u r e and R e v i s i o n , C o u r t of, 485, 852, 913, 9 5 3 n Judicial affairs, 12, 1 7 m , 201, 278; system of, 462; officials of, 73 i n , 792, 959; p r o c e d u r e s of, 958, 966 Jueshan 699n

Jumara 995n Jun JJL (military), 709n Jun f f (ruler, lord), 284 Jun tian [33 (equalized l a n d h o l d i n g ) , 594n Jun tian jun yi J% E H i ^ S ; (equal fields, equal l a b o r services), 1069 Jun wang 51531 (second-degree princes), 2 2 m , 862, 885n J u n k s , 346, 373n, 760. See also Boats J u n t a f p i g , 521, 522, 789 Junzi er shi [fnBvf ( T h e superior m a n always), 444n J u r c h e n , 42, 47, 5411, 61, 72, 80, i68n, 249n, 257, 369, 650, 849, io89n, 109m; p o r t r a i t of, 34; three m a i n g r o u p s of, 42; customs of, 208; tribal organization of, 2 7 m . See also J i a n zhou Jurchen Juren Sjk/\ (provincial g r a d u a t e ) , 123, 228, 229n, 274n, 276n, 322, 4i7n, 75yn, 851, 9o6n; e x a m i n a t i o n s f o r t h e degree of, Ii4n, 276n, I004n; military, 199, 1033; location o f residences of, I058n; tax e x e m p t i o n s of, i o 6 3 n . See also E x a m i n a t i o n s Jusen (Ma. slave), 42n, 49n, 72 Jushi H ± (laymen), 675 Justice, M i n i s t r y of, 2 8 m , 1053; ministers of, 232, 269n. See also Judicial affairs Justice, Office of Scrutiny of, 587n J u y e g j j g f , 787 J u y o n g J g f l f Pass, 247, 2 5 8 - 2 6 0 Kaiguo da ji §fl[H A f t ( " m a j o r plan t o f o u n d a state"), 369 Kai G u o Shi G u a n H j l l j ^ t g (Historiographical O f f i c e o n t h e F o u n d i n g o f t h e D y n a s t y ) , I096n K a i f e n g Hfl^f, 99n, 227, 336n, 348, 354, 3 7 1 , 413, 500, 510, 526, 648n, 7 8 6 787, 9 l 4 n ; g e n t r y of, 228n; J u r c h e n siege of, 249n K a i p i n g US2!1, 636n K a i y u a n ffijt, 42n, 50, 6on, 63, 7on, i68n, 675 Kaizhong Hfl cja (system of grain certificates), 35 K a i z h o u gflil'H, 786n

Index

Kalgan. See Zhangjiakou Kang |§f, Prince. See Giyesu Kang Yuanxun K&jc1Sb< S°2 Kangxi (HfE Emperor, 6311, 88n, 1 5 m , 20511, 26411, 69m, 823, 86411, 86911, 89611, 90411, 9i6n, 91911, 92311, 93811, 968, 100211, 100811, 1009, 101811, 102m, 103811, 103911, 1068, 107211, 1083, 1133, 1 1 4 0 - 1 1 4 1 ; and the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, 18, 1 1 0 0 - 1 1 0 9 , 1117, 1 1 2 1 - 1 1 2 5 ; ancestry of, 45n; land expropriation by, 47 m ; education of, 897, 1011; mother of, 930; enthronement of, l o o m ; attitude toward eunuchs of, l o i j n ; grandfather of, i o i 7 n ; anti-bondage measures of, 1056; support for, 1093; visit to Nanjing by, I095n; celebration of M i n g loyalists by, 1096 Kangxi reign, 562n, 630, 645, 745n, 880, 1100—1104; economic recovery during, 20n; historical romances of, 292; waterworks projects during, 914—915; welfare system during, 989ns fiscal surplus of, 1078 Kao cheng % Jjj£ (bureaucratic review system), 707 Kaoman %jjljfj (time for scrutiny), 953n Karacin, 78, 130 Kashgar, 687, 799n Kazakhs, 686 Ke Madame, 89-90, 356n Ke hua (polite talk), 588-589 Ke Qifeng faite®, 589 Ke R u j i f n j & f f i , 1132 Ke Tianxiang f B J ^ i B , 4 8 4 Ke Yongzuo inf^af^, 589 Kechun tgijsiti, Princess, 1101 Kelan ^ r f t , 698, 806, 1060 Kerulen River, 203n, 883 Kessler, Lawrence, 1 0 2 m Khalkas, 55, 203n, 797, 805, 816, 883-884 Khan, 3 m , 4111, 54n, 55, 65—66, 83, 157-165, 171, 175-179, 186-191, 196-199, 208, 218, 297; gifts f r o m , 186; seal of, 203. See also Altan Khan; Nurhaci; H u n g Taiji Khanate, 203n, 224, 303

1275

Khojas, 799n Khoshotes, I034n Khubilai Khan, 385n Khungtaiji. See H u n g Taiji Khurasan, 4i6n Kicungge 872-873, 876, 891, 899-902 Kings, 158, 215, 218, 334, 89m; rituals of, 284n; of brigands, 695. See also Emperors; Merchants: of the king; Monarchy; Regicide; Rulers; T h r o n e Kinship, 44n, 47n, 49n, 140, I58n, i 6 i n , i65n, i68n, 181, 185, 187, 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 , I96n, I98n, 202n, 203n, 2ion, 2 i 7 n , 223, 228n, 229n, 248n, 249, 253n, 256n, 265n, 269a, 274—276, 279n, 286, 289, 291, 297-299, 309, 32on, 325, 335-339, 599-631, 744, 758, 764n, 776, 779, 783, 790, 792, 8i5n, 875n, 886, 901, go6n, 928, 932, 936, 938n, 978, 982, 985, 990n, 994n, 996, 997n, 1003, 1005, 1008, I009n, 1 0 1 1 - 1 0 1 2 , 1 0 1 6 - 1 0 1 8 , 1046, I049n, I075n, io82n, io83n, I094n, 1102, 1105, 1108, n i 2 n , 1 1 1 4 - 1 1 1 5 , 1118, 1122, 1123. See also Clans; Lineages Kirchheimer, O t t o 596 Kirghiz, 686 Knights errant, 248 Koko Temul, 3 in Kokonor, 202n, 203n, 796n, 799n; Lake, 685; aborigines of, I034n Kong f i , family of, I96n K o n g Shangren 100, 117, 361, ioo9n,I078n Kong Sizhen JLE3M, 1 1 0 3 - 1 1 0 5 , I i i 7 n K o n g W u J L E , 786n Kong Xigui H , 4 2 m , 475, 526n, 790, 1 1 3 2 Kong Youde f L ^ M , 77, 1 9 6 - 2 1 0 , 501, 767, 903n, 926n, 972, 1103 Korea, 31-48, 57n, 73n, 197, 2 0 6 - 2 1 0 , 215, 42on, 464n, 632n, 709, 797, I039n, 1108, 1126; cities of, 33n; Manchu correspondence with, 42, 128; prohibition of iron exports by, 47; rulers of, 6on, 128, 206n, 2ion, 2 i 2 n , 297n, 42on, 892; Manchu invasion of, in 1627, 61, 83n, 129, 163; border of,

1276

Index

127; grain supplies of, 16311; Manchu invasions of, during 1636—1638, i68n, 210, 709; naval forces of, 199; envoys from, 300, 739n, 895n Koreans, 24, 6on, 449n; as soldiers, 47, 62-63, 66, 2ion, 2i2n; adherents of the Manchus among, 127, 298, 309n, 3i5n Kou xH (bandits). See Bandits Kouwai P ^f (outside the passes), 38n K o w t o w , 179, 185, 222, 3isn, 861-862, 943n, 1 1 1 5 , 1 1 2 2 Koxinga. See Coxinga KM miao an Iff (Temple Lament Case), 1068 Kuandian K i l t , 49n, 57n Kuang Lanzhao 975 Kuang tu JE (deranged fanatics), 329 Kuangshe S i t (Assistance Society), 103, 112 Kuatang Bridge, 750 Kuimao 2§Jj[] (date), 986 Kun i f (earth), 3i2n, 717 Kiindelen Khan (Ma. Respected Emperor), 55 Kuni |lj (Ja. country), 1038 Kunlun 929n Kunming JeHfj, 1120; prison in, n o i n Kunning i f Palace, 263 Kunshan 102, 387n, 397, 565, 652-655, 668n, 672, 679, 783, 890, 891, I074n; gentry of, I094n Kunyi i f |||, Princess, 263 Kuttenberg, 2n Kyodotai [WJ £§ (Ja. Gemeinschafi), 6ion Kyoshin shihai (Ja- gentry rule), I053n Labor, 4n, 27n, 473n, 9i4n, io63n; supply of, 612, 628n, 1054; free market in, 6i6n, 620, 62m, 627; cost of, 62on; contractors of, 834n Labor services. See Corvee Laborers, 6o5n, 609, 616, 62on, 62 m, 893. 913- See also Chang gong; Duan gong Laita g i g , 1 1 2 0 Laizhou ^iiN'l, 76, 128, 198, 432n

Lamaism, I79n, 203n, 3i6n, 686, 688, 8o4n Lan jjfi, 483 Land, 66, 235n, 443n, 885n, 913, 1054, I057n, io63n; registration of, ion, 97, 607, 9i9n, 920, 92m, 1058, io65n; taxes on, I3n, 97, I44n, 333n, 463, 905n, 1058; expropriation of, 15n, 42m, 469-474, 607, 625n; reclamation of, 25-26, 49n, 457, 622n, 860, 910, 918, 921, 1059, I070n, 1106; occupancy of, 4 m , 199, 472; ownership of, 97, io8n, 147, I55n, 336, 396n, 418, 4i9n, 480, 485, 604-612, 618, 845, 907n, 9i9n, I053n, I055n, 1057, 1 0 6 1 - 1 0 7 2 ; confiscation of, 336-338; grants of, 336n, 469, 47on, 885, no6n; abandonment of, 349, 9i6n, 9l7n, 9i8n; exchange or purchase of, 455, 474, 6o6n, 6o8n, 618; cultivation of, 464, 9i7n, 919, H24n; surveys of, 464, 490, 92in, 1061, 1070; tenure of, 472-476, 594n, 639n, 663; price of, 612, 1062; commended to Manchus by Chinese, 899n; surface rights to, 1055; subsoil right to, 1055; concealment of amount owned, io64n; restored to rightful owners, 1120. See also Landholding; Polder; Real estate Landholding, 46n, 250, 336, Ö75n, 706, 916, 1057, io6on; reform of, 228n; equal fields system of, 237n. See also Freeholders Landlords, io8n, 228n, 428—431, 471, 475. 605n, 6o6n, 607-614, 6i7n, 62m, 624n, 627, 663, 710, 729n, 1053-1058, 1067; interests of, I09n, 233n; in north China, 134; as leaders of militia, 369, 424n, 507; troops of, 432, 656; amount of land owned by, I058n. See also Absentee landlords; Managerial landlords; Rentiers Landsmannschaften. See Huiguan Lang Tingzuo f P g r f e , 1031, 1044-1049 Langlois, John, 78on Langzhong gßcf (department directors), 447 Lanhada ß P ^ i i , 47n

Index Lantian ¡5, 507 Lanyang jgjßl, 787, 790 Lanzhou |SS!:J'H, 797-803, 1109, Hi2n Lanzhuanggou gj|£#|, 693 Lao Ife, Mount, 866 Lao Huihui ("Old Muslim"), 323, 796 Lao She i042n Laobaixing (the people), 574 Laos, 103 5n Latter Han §g, 302, 744, 780 Lattimore, Owen, I96n, 686n Laval, Pierre, 596n L a w , 18, 46n, 69, 72n, 1 6 0 - 1 6 1 , 169, 334, 476, 580, 620n, 621, 635n, 7 1 0 - 7 1 1 , 825, 867, 879, 910, 941, 961, 976, 988, 1004, I057n, 1065, io68n,

1071; enactment of, by Qing, 305, 62m; Han versions of, 44m; reforms of, 457, 1084; experts on, 477, 705, 912-913; and order, 598, 644; status under, 6i7n, 62m; enactment of, by Ming, 62on, 62m; fees connected with procedures of, 706; arraignments by, 825. See also Code (Ming); Code (Qing); Courts (law); Criminal law; Fugitives: laws governing; Judicial affairs; Litigation; Martial law Layin. See Milayin Lean Prince of, 7 25n, 73m Lecturers, 438n, 852 Ledehun 1104 Ledu ÜJgE. 901 Legalism, 456

the Manchus to the Shun leaders, 303n; 304n; from Shi Kefa, 353n; from Dorgon to the Southern Ming, 403—404; from the Hongguang Emperor to the Manchus, 407; of enfeoffment from the Prince of Lu, 752 Levant, 687n Lhasa, 203 n Li M (hamlet), 9i6n Li {¡?|J (legal precedents), 910 Li BS (principle), lo8 7 n, 1091 Li HI (propriety, rites), 6on, 517. See also Rituals Li character for, 289n Li Madame, 138, 263, 524n, 564n, 1121-1122

Lese majeste,

124, 353n, 357, 436n

Letters, 794, 994; from the Manchu khan to the people of Dalinghe, 184; from

147, 233, 237", 241,

Li Banghua 248-253, 945

Li Li Li Li

Benshen Biao $ 200, 210 Ma Guozhen ,^|Hf|=Ì, 1 1 2 , 1 1 0 4 20 Ma Guozhu 4> 486, 502-503, 56on, 682, 698, 759, 769, 878, 99m, 994, 1 0 2 8 , 1 0 3 2 Ma Hanshan H H U j , 801 Ma Hongliang J i , 597n Ma Hongru Iioin Majinzhong . ^ J S , ® , , 3Ó2n

Index

Magnates, 247, 302, 326, 370-371, 3 7 6 - 3 7 8 , 39611, 42911, 430, 513, 526, 6 1 5 - 6 1 6 , 62511, 62911, 769, 789, 833, 106011, io6in, uo6n. See also Haojia;

Haoxia Mahakala, 20411 Mahasambhava, 71411 Mai si zhaojiang Í B E (buy silk and hire workers), 907n Mai xian j j P f j (selling leisure), 27 Maishen Jj" (selling the self), 620, 624 Maishen wetiyue f í é ^ j í f á (contracts of indenture), 636 Maitreya, 203n Maize, 834 Majiagou M M M (Ma Family Gully), 840

Majialou MMWk (Ma Family Castle), 7«7n Majors, 695, 753, 790, 807, 830 M a k h d u m - i A'zam, 799n Malacca, 6, 632 Mambun Roto, 4jn Man (minority), 601 Managerial farming, 609—614, 623n, 628n; techniques of, 6i5n M a n a g e r i a l landlords, io8n, I09n, I053n

Manchu bannermen, 76, 162, 173, 692, 704, 765, 809, 958, 1013, 1016, 1038, 1100, 1140

Manchuria, 48n, 46711; defenses of, 908, 1130

Manchus, 24n, 44-48, 269n, 371, 561, 766n, 780, 795, 850, 973n, 1013,

n o 8 n ; first appearance of the term for, 42n, 206; adaptability of, 42n; attacks on Ming China by, 44n, 86, 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 , 137, 142, 147, 1 5 3 - 1 5 6 , 1 6 3 - 1 6 5 , 170, 198, 201, 205n, 220n, 227, 297, 3 0 1 - 3 0 3 , 306-308, 3 1 7 , 323,

348, 4i9n, 429, 860, 862n; economic relations and conditions of, 47n, 48n, 83, I27n, 201, 2ion; ethnic relations with Chinese of, 49n, 65-74, 476, 759n, 872-876, 952, 958, 971; slave

system of, 49n, 714ns language and documents of, 50, 52, 58n, 61, I58n, I72n, 848, 851, 868n, 875, 929n, 954n,

9S9. 973n, 997, 1008, I042n, 11 ion;

1285

Chinese adherents and advisors to, 53n, 1 6 2 - 1 6 3 , 166. 201, 205n, 209n, 215, 220, 224n, 843, 868, 949, 1036, 1124;

principles of hereditary succession of, 54n; capitals of, 59, 65, 72—74, 2 2 2 224, 296; chieftains, rulers, and military leaders of, 65, 164, 735, 875n, 113 3 ; strategy for conquering China of, 65, 194, 302-309; homeland of, 65, i037n; troops, cavalry and garrisons of, 82, 134, 173, 178, 209-210, 234n, 297, 306, 310, 4i9n, 450, 702, 7 1 1 ,

732-734. 735n> 745. 788, 807, 811, 818, n o i , 1108, 1 1 1 2 ; and communications with the Ming, 83-86; relations with Korea of, 83n, 128, 163, 209; succession crises of, 1 5 8 - 1 6 0 , 298, 8 9 5 - 9 0 1 , 931;

examinations of, 162; households of, i62n, I057n; O l d Han troops of, 174, 182, i85n, 200; control over Mongols by, 202n, 2 0 6 - 2 1 0 ; values of, 206;

paternalism of, 2i8n, 298, 422, 1 0 0 5 - 1 0 1 4 ; resistance to, 3 1 7 , 4l6n, 4 2 m , 489—492, 522n, 6 5 2 - 6 7 4 ,

749-752, 988-995; military leaders of, 416, 485, 875; and rumors of their return to Liaodong, 450; education of, 459—461; settlement in north China of, 460; conquests of, 522, 780, 1083, 1089; legitimacy and rule of, 583, 594, 736, 89m, 988, I039n; contempt for turncoats of, 588; nativism of, 647, 1020, 1067, 1072; court of, 717; writings against, 763, 781; entrance into Beijing of, 797; emperors and royal family of, 8i5n, io83n, 1095, 1121; as governors-general, 842n; and the decision to conquer China, 848-850; tradition of collective leadership of, 853; princes of, 853n, 861, 874n, 884, 1114; rituals of, 856n; secretariat of, 875; officiers of, 902, 982; ranks status and stipends of, 902n, 998n; legal practices of, 910; registration of, 926; as provincial governors, 1021; m o n o p o l y of military authority by, 1036; corruption of, 1037; f o r m of

1286

Index

government of, 1 0 7 1 - 1 0 7 2 , I093n, 1124—1125; demeaning references to, 1096. See also Bannermen; Customs: of the Manchus; Manchu bannermen Mandahai 815-820, 874, 886891, 892n, 902, 924 Mandarins. See Literati Mandate of Heaven, 2 in, 2o6n, 208, 217, 223, 227, 283, 291, 301, 303, 312, 449, 452n, 457, 582-584, 794, 856-860, 928, 945, 948, 981, 1095-1096, 1 1 1 6 , 1123; Manchu belief in, 2o6n; loss of, 2 3 7 , 303; transfer of, 241, 276, 283, 314; recovery of, 373; and legitimacy, 375 Mang gong f t I (busy labor), 620 2In Manggultai > : 5 8 , i6on, I75n Mangui j f ö g , 4 m Mani, 1115n Manicheism, 879n Manila, 2 - 6 , 632 Manjiadong j f f i ^ f i , 431. 492-493, 5i9n Manju (Ma. Manchu), 42n Manju i yargiyan kooli (Ma. T h e Manchu veritable records), 52, 56, 61, 68, 84 Manors, 51, 170, 429, 473-475, 6 1 1 , 6i8n, io64n. See also Estates Mansfeld, 2n Mansions, 884, 900, i o i 7 n Mansur, 202n Manufacturing. See Industry Manzhou ffi^H, 42n, I72n Manzhouguo jjfBjMIH (Manchu state), 176 Manzi, xianbao (DüH ("Southern barbarian, hand over your valuables"), 659 M a o ilP, Lake, 669-672, 1044-1045 Mao Chenglu ^ ^ i j i f ; , 130, I98n, I99n M a o Er ^ Z l , 662 Maojiuhua 439, 59i~594, 717. 729n M a o Wenlong | , 71, 126-132, 197, 199 M a o Xiang f g , I37~i39, 147-149. 292, 359, 36m, 629n, 75Ón, I002n, io8in Mao Yilu — no

Mao Yuanzhai ^ijHiSF, 77° Maowushu Desert, 691 Marines, 213, 394, 570, 669, 725n, 740, 746, 995, 1045 Market towns, 99n, 108, 376, 625, 657-660, 826 Marketplaces, 105, 1 3 1 , 152, 206, 246, 312, 318, 576, 602, 6i6n, 625, 637, 653, 659, 671, 870, 986, I075n; idlers of, 238, 244. See also Markets Markets, 8, 48n, 58, 108, 318, 584, 605n, 614, 6i8n, 798, 907n, 1052, I053n, I057n, Ii24n. See also Market towns Marquises, 348, 62on, 752, 925-927 Marriage, 60-62, 118, 333n, 616, 619, 621, 866n, 872, 884n, 891, 900, 929, 936n, 1017; social alliances based upon, 51—53, 97, 98n, 169; matchmakers for, 97; ties of, 99n, 631 ; of the Prince of Fu, 339n; between different ethnic groups, 478; disputes over, 638 Martial arts, I7n, 279n, 376, 431, 435n, 602, 637, 659-664, 7ion Martial law, 329 Martyrs, 80, 9on, n o , 2i9n, 2Ó9n, 355n, 410, 588, 596n, 673n, 732n, 748, 795, 837-838. 942-947. 988, 1095, 1105, 1113-1124 Marxism, I09n, 566 Marxist historians, 420n Mashang tianzi . l l J l ^ i (horseback Son of Heaven), 285 Masons, 47 Massacres, 4n, 6, 83n, 143, 165, 172, 180, 185, 188, 216, 222, 267, 274, 288, 29on, 295, 314, 317, 325-327, 453, 491. 506, 556-569, 583, 653n, 654, 682, "]6jn, 768, 792, 8 1 2 - 8 1 4 , I034n; at Qian'an and Yongping, 165, 172, 185. See also Jiading: massacre of Masters, 959n; relationship of, with disciples, i2on, 1051. See also Lords Materialism, 1091 Mathematics, 76, 400n, 446n, ioo6n Maunder m i n i m u m , 7n M c D e r m o t t , Joseph, 6 2 m McKinley, William, 415n Measurement, units of, io64n Medicine, 23, 48, 118, 226n, 525n, 651,

Index

676, 744, 866n, 991, 101711, 1077,

1106; students of, 1075. See also Drugs; Physicians Meditation, 1113 Mediterranean, 2n, 3n, 8 Mei villa, I075n Mei Fu fljjjg, 780 Meihua Peak, 565 Meilou 138 Meiren ejen (Ma. lieutenant-general), 843 Meishan $ |JL|. See Coal Hill Memorials, 37-42, 133, 162, 234, 2472 5 1 , 320, 325, 722, 802, 825, 864, 868, 876, 896, 925, 928, 9 4 4 - 9 4 5 , 9 5 1 - 9 5 3 , 967, 968, 978, 980, 983, 994, 1007, 1038, 1 0 5 1 - 1 0 5 5 , 1064, 1099; as

channels of communication, 853—856, 875n; of impeachment, 923n; from the boards, ç6çn. See also Palace memorials; Piaoni Mencius, 25on, 286, 5i6n, 5i7n, 648, 97m

Meng fft Mountains, 428 Meng gu ("valley of darkness"), 1113

Meng huang jR jË. (Manchu Emperor), 217

Meng Qiaofang

164, 180, 191,

69on, 694, 698, 800-804, 8 1 7 - 8 2 3 , 825, 8 3 1 - 8 3 4 , 842n, 959, 1026, 1032,

1132, 1133; and the initial pacification of Shaanxi, 683-693 Meng she ^Ütt (alliances and clubs), 1053 Meng Zhenbang 3Ï jJS^lS, 400 Mengdi (sworn members), I052n Mengge Timur ffi ^ tt 5S. 5°n Menggu yamen JSlijfSjH (Mongol Office), 797n Menghui ^ ^ (sworn societies), I052n Mengjin ¿ ^ , 4 1 2 Mengzhu ® (convenant leader), 104 Menhu H P (coteries), 359n Menials, I75n, 374n, 630 Mensheng H i t (disciples), 879n Mercantilism, 623n Mercenaries, 3n, 16, 19, 30, 35n, 66, 77, 78n, 128, 2i2n, 239, 296, 373n, 602

Merchants, 6, I4n, 27, 35, J9n, 7on, 77n, 94, 98, 105, 109, 149, i68n, 1 7 m , 183,

1287

246n, 349n, 3 5 m , 374n, 395, 43on, 4Ô2n, 466, 468, 477n, 478n, 614, 6i5n, 622, 6 2 7 - 6 3 3 , 639, 6 5 0 - 6 5 1 , 686, 727, 776, 796, 834n, 904-905, ioi8n, I057n,

1066; households of, 94n; class of, I07n; of cloth, 258n, 633, 639; of the king, 455n, 468; from America and England, 7 ion. See also Shanxi: merchants from; Traders; Zheng shang

Mergen J l g f ® , 687n, 822

Mergen daicing (Ma. wise warrior), 297 Meridian Gate, 25 m, 874n, 984-986 Messengers, 191, 193, 199, 26on, 28m, 294, 71 in, 862. See also Couriers Messianism, 203n, 681. See also Millenarianism Metallurgy. See Foundries Metaphors, 238n, 294 Metaphysics, 879, 967, io87n; controversies over, during late Ming, i090n Metzger, Thomas, io86n Mexico, 5-6, 6o7n Mi Shoutu /fcgpll], 3 2 I n Miao |g, I37n Miao f t , Madame, 1122 Miao Dingji ¡¡jgjfl^, 730 Miao Zuotu UffËifc, 4 2 7 Miaowan 752—756 Miaozhu j l g i (subsoil owner), 6i8n Middle classes, 98, 108 Middle East, 685 Migration, 38n, 42n, 127, 612, 628n Milayin 799-805, 826 Militarists. See Warlords Militarization, 18, 226, I039n Military, 226n, 232, 446, 852; budgets and costs of, 9, 37n, 63, 128, 134, 225, 333". 349, 455, 5ion, 811, 9i9n; establishment of, during Ming, 24-27; ranks within, 26n, 54n; works on, 44n; technology and training of, 74, 78n, 220, 325, 725n, 1125; discipline in, 82, 3i3n, 351, 362, 465, 8i4n; chain of command of, 130, 481, 664; taxes for, 147, 23on; rewards to, 154, 351, 972; scouts for, I74n, 177; decentralization of, 197; camps and bases of, 198—200, 227n, 233, 249, 320n; vanguards of, 201, 227n, 234, 260, 309n, 3 1 1 , 328;

1288

Index

values of, 205, 1038, 108411; aristocratism of, 301—302; v o l u n t e e r forces

214, 220, 2 2 7 - 2 3 6 , 245, 321, 327,

under, 32on, 326n, 375n; r e f o r m s of,

3 3 6 - 3 3 8 , 3 4 8 - 3 5 3 , 371, 6 6 1 - 6 6 5 , 839; military policies of, 30, 3 i n , 58n, 65,

in N a n j i n g , 322n; river defenses of,

7 9 - 8 6 , 126, 212, 217, 253—257;

328n, 397; salaries of, 394, 395, 7 9 8 n ,

territory of, 62n, 86, 1109; restoration of, 8 7 , 2 5 7 , 3 0 1 , 3 0 8 , 3 3 1 , 3 4 6 , 4 0 0 , 436, 533n, 590, 656, 668n, 6 7 m , 760, 777, 7 7 9 n , 781, 1075; c o m m u n i c a t i o n s w i t h the M a n c h u s by, I52n; seals,titles and commissions of, i67n, 692, 788, 828, 1075, io83n; administrative statutes of, 236; N e w and O l d Treasuries of, 239; royal house of, 250n, 714, 785, 788, 820, 9 i 9 n ; fall of,

832; rosters and quotas of soldiers for, 440, 832. See also Armies; Couriers; Intelligence; Logistics; Officers Military aristocrats, 344, 355, 364, 379n. See also Military nobility Military commissioners, 589, 685n, 1134 Military deserters, 4 i 7 n M i l i t a r y elite, 185, 196, 2 2 6 n ,

Military Military Military Military

1039-1041

experts, 399, 1030 governors, 143, 241, 345 governors-general, 211 intendants, 440n, 637, 642, 653,

808

Military nobility, 1036, 1071. See also Military aristocrats Military patents, 696 Military police, 755 Military reports, 153—155, 211, 2 i 9 n , 593. See also Intelligence M i l i t i a , 17, 2 5 , I 0 2 n , 2 3 4 , 2 4 8 , 2 5 7 , 2 9 m , 296n, 329, 424n, 432, 492, 560, 564, 629, 640, 6 5 1 - 6 5 7 , 659, 663, 670, 729n,

761, I039n; c o m m a n d e r s and leaders of, I i 4 n , 309, 330, 432, 7 3 0 - 7 3 1 , 753, 845; proposals f o r and debates a b o u t , 2 3 5 n , 373n, 3 7 6 - 3 7 9 ; training of, 330;

regulations for, 60 i n . See also Fubing; Local defense; Military: v o l u n t e e r forces under; Xiangbing Millenarianism, 682 Miller, L y m a n , 1 i o o n Millet, 46n M i n 10. See Fujian Min (civilian), 709n Min tian Js^ EH ( c o m m o n e r s ' fields), 338 See Ming Chengzu Yongle Emperor M i n g dynasty, 480, 7 i 4 n , 728, 798, 876, 8 9 m , io8on, lo83n; g o v e r n m e n t of, 9 n , ion, 42n, 6 2 , 8 1 , 8 3 , 2 0 4 , 2 1 5 , 2 2 9 , 273n, 705, 853n, 864, 865; f o u n d i n g of, 23, 967, io8on; military system of, 2 5 - 3 7 , 7 6 - 7 7 , 83, 131, 144, 157, 1 6 4 173, 178, 183, 194, 1 9 7 - 2 0 2 , 2 1 0 -

265, 266n, 304, 644n, 662, 782n, 864, 870, 884, 981, 9 9 6 n , 1052, 1071, I078n, 1080,io82n, io84n,

I090n,

I092n; rise of military elite u n d e r , 415; registration o f f o r m e r officials of, 416; e n d of hopes of restoring, 768, 781; history of, 943, 1123; prevalence of clubs d u r i n g , I052n; m o r a l laxity d u r i n g , 1092; loyalty and disloyalty to, 1097, 1121; military officials of, 1134—1135. See also Armies: M i n g ; C o d e (Ming); S o u t h e r n M i n g M i n g G u a n g z o n g i3 jfezR, 245n, 337 Ming History. See Ming shi M i n g History Office, 1083. See also Guoshi Yuan M i n g loyalists. See Loyalists Ming mo sibaijia yimin shi ^ E9 Hf i U I K i i (Poetry o f the f o u r h u n d r e d r e m n a n t s f r o m the end o f the M i n g ) , 1080 M i n g M u z o n g BJgsSn, 534" M i n g Shenzong jjif See W a n l i Emperor Ming shi Bfjjil ( M i n g History), 322, 343, 578n, 584, 615, 718, i o 8 4 n , 1094;

compilers of, 294n, 724n, 776n, 1083 Ming shi jilue (Summary of M i n g History), 59on, i o 8 3 n M i n g Shizong BfJt&TK- S e e j i a j i n g Emperor M i n g Sizong Sn • See C h o n g z h e n Emperor M i n g T a i z u H^ ffl.. See H o n g w u Emperor

Index

Ming Veritable Records, 24411, 44411, 6o8n. See also Veritable Records M i n g Xizong B^ISth. See Tianqi Emperor Ming Xuanzong f ^ l E ^ . 947 M i n g Yingzong 31, 315. 4«4n Ming zhi wang [ $ ¿ 3 : (Prince of the Ming), 534 Mingfengshan, 1 1 2 0 Mingji nanlüe ^ ^ Bg (An Outline of the Southern Ming), 591 Mingju H^gfe, 1100 M i n g - Q i n g Archives, i o i 5 n Mingzhi daoren Bfl/er.ji A . 677 Minhu g ; J3 (commoner, free households), 46, 162, I070n Mining, 2n, 3, 5n, 13, 30, 47, 349, 4i3n, 834n; costs of, 4n; levies for, I09n Ministers, 14, 2 7 - 3 3 , 39. 62, 79, 125, 1 3 1 , 133, 149, 1 5 1 , 154, 176, 179, 205, 217, 223, 228-235, 2 4 2 > 260-268, 275, 285, 308, 337, 572, 583, 585, 965, 9 8 3 984, 1009, 1052, 1072, io85n, 1 1 1 4 , 1135; dismissal and appointment of, 146, 230n; impeachment of, I07n; corruption of, 268; suicide of, following the Chongzhen Emperor's death, 269; reception of the Manchus by, 314; in Nanjing, 339~344; relationship with rulers of, 1009; integrity of, 1087 Ministries, 14, I7n, 258, 28m, 346n, 968n; secretaries of, ion; heads of, 270; personnel of, 28 m . See also Boards; Finance, Ministry of; Personnel, Ministry of; Punishments, Ministry of; Rites, Ministry of; Six Boards; Six Ministries; War, Ministry of; Works, Ministry of Minzhuang bingding jsj; )tfc ftT (county militia), 836 Minzu yingxiong K S l J i i i i (racial hero), 566 Mishan 1101 Mishu Yuan j f ü ^ l ^ (Secretarial Court), 43 8n, 942n, 969 Missionaries, xv, 76. See also Christians Miyazaki Ichisada, 6o9n Miyun 32n, 254, 255n, 305n, 419

1289

Moats, 63, 176, 185, 2i4n, 246, 725n, 804 Mobs, 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 , 300, 314, 383, 574-575. 577, 626, 633-639, 650, 8o5n. See also Riots Moguls, 687, i i 2 4 n ; land-grant system of, 47on; embassies of, 827 M o h a m m a d Yusuf, 799n Mohammedanism, 87911. See also Muslims Molucca, 4n Monarchy, 203, 207-209, 227, 263n, 304, 334; usurpation of, 30, 269n, 285, 335; Sino-Manchu and Confucian forms of, 850; authority of, 1126. See also Emperors; Kings; T h r o n e Monasteries, 203n, 680, 688, 8o4n Monetization, 8, 48n. See also Commercialization Money. See Currency Mongol bannermen, 3l7n, 809, 1140 Mongolia, 4 m , 57, 152, 201, 202n, 203n, 2o6n, 210, 335, 562n, 687n, 691, 796, 838n, 959 Mongols, 31-36, 73, 1 7 m , I72n, 196, 201, 202n, 220, 259, 485n, 504n, 561, 685, 686n, 76m, 822, 826-828, 843, 87m, 874n, 882, 898n, 929n, 959, 975n, ioi6n, io89n, 1109, n 15; warfare with, 23, 31-44, 53, 248; as settlers in China, 24n, i38n; rule of, 24n; cavalry units of, 27n, 501, 8o6n; f r o m Urianghai, 30; of Turned origin, 30, 130; raids by, 31, 4 m , 687, 805; confederation of, 32n; as Ming military officers and auxiliaries, 41, 210; as mercenaries, 66, 2i8n; f r o m Karacin, 78, 130; as Latter Jin officials, 161; households of, i62n; as Manchu allies and soldiers, I96n, 301; f r o m Chahar, 201, 202n, 204n, 297, 860, 1109; chiefs and khans of, 202n, 203; as threat to the Ming, 202n; belief in Buddhism of, 203n; language of, 203, 259, 687n, 929n; abduction of Ming Yingzong by, 315; expulsion of, f r o m Beijing, 336n; and the Southern Song, 385n; influences of, upon frontier c o m manders, 504n; soldiers of, 506, 788, 800, 809, 8 1 1 , 1107, 1109; of Zunghar

1290

Index

origin, 68711; and the invasion o f Persia, 892n; princesses of, 897; as governors, 1021. See also Bannermen; Customs: of the Mongols; Eastern Mongols; Khalkas; M o n g o l bannermen; Oirats; Southern Mongols; Sunids; Tartars; Western Mongols Mongours, 685-688, 8oin, 827 Monism, 109 m

795; as soldiers, 796; as merchants, 796; states and communities of, 796n, 799n, 827n, 828; and communal conflicts with non-Muslims, 798. See also Islam; White C a p Muslims Mutinies, 17, I23n, 192, 199, 226, 246n, 288, 351, 359n, 691, 765, 803, 8 1 8 825, 833n, 839, 960, 1109. See also Jiang Xiang: rebellion o f Mutual-responsibility units, 703, 7 0 8 -

Monks, I2n, I7n, 375n, 388, 563, 576n, 585, 626, 654, 675, 7 1 3 , 722, 759, 769, 770, 808, 826n, 84on, 845n, i o o i n , ioo5n, i075n, 1077, 1078, io8on, 1 1 1 3 . See also Tonsure Monopolies, 77n, 202n. See also Emperors: monopolies of; Salt: monopoly of; State: monopolies of Morality. See Ethics Mortgages, 475, 620n, 776n Mourning, 123, I37n, 218, 325, 392, 422, 988, i o o i n , I076n, 1096, 1102; for the Chongzhen Emperor, 316, 3 i 7 n ; taking leave for, 7Ö4n, 8 7 m , 886n Mowangping (Plateau of the

712. See also Baojia Muye zhijin ( " m o n e y sent through darkness"), 903n Muyou HI J ; (aides, secretaries), 294,

Prince o f Evil), 696 MM HÄ (land measurement), 884n, 916, 9i8n, 945, I057n, 1 0 5 8 - 1 0 5 9 M u H u ^ C Ä , 528n Mufu Hffif (tent government), I7n, 400, 726 Mughals. See Moguls Mukden. See Shengjing; Shenyang Muke H ^ f (aides-de-camp), 153 Mukun (Ma. lineage, sib), 49n, 53, 55n Mulberry, 239n; cultivation of, 516, 604-609, 6i2n Mulla (Turk, teacher of the law), 827 Murder. See Homicide Music, 16, 95n, 107, 138, 149, 227a, 244-246, 312, 360, 3 9 6 - 4 0 1 , 446, 630, 644n, 900, i o o i n , 1 0 7 6 - 1 0 8 1 . See also Opera Musicians, 4 m , 148, 319, 622. See also Entertainers Muslims, 229, 323, 504n, 686, 691, 800805, 823, 826; revolts b y , during the early Qing, 195, 7 9 5 - 8 0 5 , 821—827, 828n, I034n; revolts b y , in late M i n g ,

2 95n>399 Myths, 228n, 566, 7 7 7 - 7 8 0

Nagasaki, 2n Naito Torajiro, 44n Najiao S i (accepting each other as friends), 971 Nan % (baron), 1103 Nan chao ijijj (southern courts), 205n Nan chao (southern dynasty), 73n, i67n, 316 Nan Nan Nan Nan

cheng l^fi^ (Southern City), 3i6n chizi f%"ftf} -J- (Southern Pool), 453 cun lij|-f (Southern Garden), 772 dang ("southern party"), 977,

989, 995-997, 1 ioon Nan min ^ J i i ; ("southern people"), 648n N a n Shufang ffj i J J § (South Library, Southern Study), i o n , I039n, I072n N a n Y i k u i ^ — H , 504n, 1 1 3 4 N a n yuan [S] (Southern Park), I 3 n N a n yuan shishe ^J H f f jjtt (Poetry C l u b of the Southern Garden), 603 Nan zheng (southern expedition). See Expeditions Nanchang rij H , I i 9 n , 352n, 765n; fall of, 767 Nanhai 466n Nanhai M M park, 987 Nanhe Earl of, 589 Nanjiang yishi WjMWsS. (Neglected history of the southern regions), n o n , io83n Nanjing jjf, 10, 75, 100, 103, 132, 280, 3 2 1 - 3 3 4 , 3 3 9 - 3 4 6 , 3 5 1 , 352, 387. 395,

Index

4 1 1 , 5 1 2 , 5 2 3 , 5 2 5 , 5 2 7 , 5 2 9 , 5 3 5 , 640, 642, 652, 664, 729, 750, 778, 845, 878, 883, 978, 1003; T r e a t y of, xv; weisuo system in, 25; R e s t o r a t i o n Society m e e t i n g s in, 1 1 3 , n 6 n ; provincial e x a m i n a t i o n s in, 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 , U 9 n , 148, i o o j n ; pleasure q u a r t e r of, 1 1 7 — 1 1 9 , 359 - 3 274-276 Wang Taiping EE^fe 2 ! 1 , 840 Wang Tianxiang H i e , i69n Wang Tingdui , 329 Wang Wenkui E E Ü I , 866, 1026, 1033 Wang X i 984, 996, 1008 Wang Xian EE'S, 659 8 Wang Xiaoqi 39n, 840 Wang Xie E E ® , 33cm, 347 Wang Xigun E E i s l l , 392n Wang Xiuchu EE5f i l , 558-559, 56311 Wang Xiufu EE^ffii, 1043 Wang Yang 597 Wang Yangming EE HI > 5i7n, 6o2n, 1091—1095; and social solidarity, 629-630 Wang Y i EEiS, 595", 726n, 7S3n Wang Yilin EE — 6 9 2 Wang Yingxiong 362n Wang Yongji c?, 254, 26m, 4i2n, 909, 9 1 2 - 9 1 3 , 963, 965, 989n, 1004, ioojn,1134 Wang Yongqiang E E ^ C ® , 820-822 Wang You 830-831 Wang Yuan EE7C> 691

1321

Wang Yuanqi E E H ^ , io89n Wang Yue EE j£®. 485 Wang Yuetian JE J! 7'4 Wang Yu EE'i®> 7 2 6 Wang Zaijin EEiEl!r, 78-79 Wang Zamao (Piebald Wang), 765 Wang Zhan E E ® , 6 5 1 - 6 5 4 Wang Zhengzhi EEiE/fe, 69on, 820 Wang zhi li Shiying li ye EE^iEdrS ^j-tjj, (the prince's accession was Shiying's [act o f ] force), 343 Wang Zhigang EE ¿ W , 354, 526n, 1 1 3 5 Wang Zhijin 589 Wang Zhilin EE , ¿ 5 $ , 629 Wang Zhiming -¿¿BR, 532n, 534, 574, 580 Wang Zhizuo EE/fefti. 9 1 7 " 118 Wang Zizhi Wang zu (eminent lineages), 97 Wang Zuocai E E f e ^ , 652, 671 Wang Zuogua E E £ # b 2 1 1 Wangu chou qu ^"¿"SSft (Sorrows of the Ages), 653n, 943 Wanli .USE Emperor, u n , 32, 62, 88n, 1 1 5 , 269n, 336n, 337~339, 453, 724n, 73 8n, 937n; and corruption, 1 1 ; court audiences of, 14, i^n; tax revenues of, 1071 Wanli reign, I7n, 76, 338n, 43on, 463, 6i4n, 615, 624, 633, 724n Wanping 'iG 2 ^, io6sn Wanshou ^ H P Hill, 263n, 265. See also Coal Hill War. See Warfare War, Board of, 185, 416, 438, 446, 461, 476, 683, 708n, 716, 739, 769, 770n, 789, 8 1 1 , 833, 837n, 838, 903n, 904n, 9l2n, 918, 959, 970, 1003; vicepresidents of, 195, 441, 1 1 3 1 , 1 1 3 2 ; presidents of, 9i5n, 1 1 3 2 ; corruption in, 989n War, Ministry of, 1 1 , 27, 36, 44n, 57n, 79, 8on, 155, 198, 2i2n, 214, 2i9n, 237, 253, 26on, 274, 280, 32on, 321, 325, 33on, 344, 350, 368n, 369, 373, 380, 569, 6j3n; ministers of, 79, 86, 89n, 1 4 1 , 152, 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 , 232, 233n, 235, 2 5 m , 280, 3 2 m , 323, 346n, 347,

1322

Index

35811, 369, 381, 39211; vice-ministers of, 340, 352n, 363, 368, 435 War, Office of Scrutiny of, 825, 949, 978n Wardens, 663n, 704-706, 7i5n, 725 Warehouses, 47n, 723 Warfare, 4 m , 74, I28n, 168, 170, 176, 204n, 209n, 227n, 2óon, 301, 688, 766n, 1054, m o n , ii25n; tactics of, I047n; technology of, 1125—1127. See also Artillerymen; Battles; Cavalry; Pikemen Warka, 876 Warlords, 39, 71, 81, 127, I29n, 139, 170, 197, 210, 243, 254, 277n, 321, 326, 329, 340-355, 361, 378, 415, 490, 510, 513, 593, 741, 752, 768, 788, 1072, 1 1 3 7 Warrants, n o , 839 Warring States, 375n Water conservancy, 227n, 234n, 254n, 456, 608, 6ion, 989n, io65n; system of, 9o8n; reform of, during early Qing, 908-915; specialists in, 9i3n, 9i5n. See also Hedao zongdu; Hydraulic administration; Irrigation; River Control, Commissioner-in-Chief for Water Margin, 43on, 6o2n, 702 Watson, James L., 6 i 7 n Wealth, 2i7n, 240, 246n, 303, 306, 317, 336, 435n, 982 Wealthy households, i6n, 94-96, 104, 134, 13711, 288n, 335-336, 39 l n > 434, 615, 639; exploitation of, 237; grain hoarding by, 23 8n; seizure of goods f r o m , 246n Weapons, 47-52, 68, 7 3 - 7 4 , 82, 84, 130, !56, I75n, 194, 20in, 263n, 298, 305, 3 r 7 n > 32on, 349, 376, 493, 629n, 662, 670n, 692, 696, 709-710, 716, 73 m , 732, 746, 826, 1043, I047n, 1 1 1 9 ; control of, 710-716; manufacture of, m o n ; improvements in, I i 2 5 n . Sec also Archery; Artillery; Cannons; Firearms; Martial arts Weather, 156, 199, 634, 746, 761, 869, i o i 5 n . See also Climate Weaving, 6o5n, 610, 61 in, 613, 632, 640n, 907n. See also Handicrafts

Weber, Max, io85n, I i 2 5 n Wei jgf (commanderies, guards, guard units, garrisons), 25, 27, 593, 685n, 826 Wei Prince of, 839n Wei Dazhong f f l ^ c f , 8 2 1 1 WeiDengfang 818 Wei ding ® Je ("bogus settlement," "bogus stabilization"), 453n, 1124 Wei Geng g g g t , I076n Wei Guan M i l - 427 Wei guan (fj"g" (spurious officials), 330-331, 367, 37i, 381, 435, 499 Wei ke (eminent examinations), 97 n Wei Lian 629 Wei Lii 4m Wei iff River, 625n, 688, 694; valley of, 484, 506 Wei Xiangshu H ^ f l i , 9^9, 952-953, 958, 962-964, 965, 979-981, 984, 989, I096n Wei Xuelian, 274n Wei Yijie 944-945, 967, iooon, 1005, io2on, io6on Wei Yingjun ftjigg, 589 Wei Yinwen 5 1 2 , 588 Wei Yuan 802 Wei yuan j | (petty functionary), 56m Wei Yunwen i f r f t ^ t , 556 Wei Zaode f & U f t , 2 30, 231, 237, 250, 254, 261-262, 268, 288 Wei Zheng § g j f , 871 Wei Zhenyuan, 1054 Wei Zhongxian f&)i&K> 15, 69, 79-86, 89n, 91, 1 1 5 , 119, I28n, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 , 247n, 26sn, 316, 356, 358n, 359n, 366, 38on, 385, 391, 587n, 623, 868-872, 9i2n, ioi6n; struggle with Donglin Academy of, 89, 105, Il9n, 124, 228n; followers of, 90, 9m, Il5n, 119, I25n, I40n, 443, 444n; death and disinterment of, 90, 265n Wei Z h o u y u n ffifHljt, 418, 426, 45on, 461, 910, 965 Wei Z h o u z u o IfjJlOift^, 4i8n, 425, 909 Weiguo f $ g i , D u k e of, 589 Weinan 625n, 689 Weisuo ffiffi, 2 5 - 3 7 , 236 Welfare, I07n, 449. See also

1323

Index

P h i l a n t h r o p y ; Relief offices Well-field system, 22611, 449 Wells, 243, 48311 Wen (civil, culture, literature), 873, 879n, 957

25cm

Wen Bing

W e n J u n t i a n P i f l í ^ , 708n W e n Ruilin i g # g £ , 559, 56511, 671, io83n Wen Tianxiang 133, 209n, 385, 566, 601, 6 4 9 n W e n Tiren

80, I 2 2 n ,

123-125,

128, 329, 387, 396n, 587n; attacks o n Q i a n Q i a n y i b y , 123-126, 136; e x ploitation of partisan controversies b y , I25n; as g r a n d secretary, 126; attacks o n Z h o u Yanru b y , 132; i m p e a c h m e n t a n d r e s i g n a t i o n o f , 132—136, 232;

clique of, 141, 23 m W e n W a n g ^CEE, 242 Wen Xinguo ÍH, 649n Wen xuan jSf (Literary selections), 679n W e n Z h a n c h i ffiifcjf, 8 i n W e n Z h e n g m i n g ytWiW, 133 Wen Zhenmeng j!jü¡;, n o n , 132-134, 25on Wenguan (Hall o f Literature, chancellery, secretariat), 162, 851 W e n h u a D i a n £ l j g | g (Hall of Literary Glory, W e n h u a Palace), 126, 282, 287, 53 i n , 9 7 4 Wenren A ( m e n o f culture, literati), 358, 423, 645n

Wenshang 4o6n Wenshe " ¿ i t (Literary C l u b ) , 603, 644, 941, 1050,

I052n

W e n s h u i ^TfC. 814 Wenxiang jiao (IncenseSmelling Sect), 43on Wenyi (Cultured and Intrepid),

of, I094n Willing to Study, ioo6n, I093n W i n e , 39n, 143, 258, 263, 267, 285, 307, 3 3 8 - 3 3 9 , 361, 395, 630, 7 5 m , 773, 982, 1056, 1097

Wineshops, 9 j n , 1 4 m Wives, 4 m , 44n, 45n, 55n, 98, 143, 191, 223, 228n, 280, 284n, 285n, 286n, 305,

328, 337n, 893, 9o6n, 929n, 959n, 985, i o o i n , i o o 6 n , I046n, 1077, I094n, 1121; gifts of, i 6 i n ; and children, 945n. See also Kinship; M a r r i a g e Wo chao $£¡8] (our dynasty), 172 Wo guo zhi min (people o f o u r c o u n t r y ) , 647 W o m e n , 72, 165, 209n, 229n, 275, 285, 3 i 3 n , 339n, 478n, 491, 496, 787, 943, 1018, I 0 3 4 n , I 0 5 7 n , I 0 9 4 n , 1118, 1123;

in the M i n g palace, I2n; literacy of, d u r i n g late M i n g , 611. See also Wives W o o l , 5n W o r k e r s , 30, 47n, 9 s n , 149, 1 7 m , i83n, 772n, 1 0 4 0 - 1 0 4 1 , lo66n; associations

of, 1 0 5 W o r k s , B o a r d of, 2 j 4 n , 4 i 7 n , 838n, 895n, 904n, 908, 9 0 9 - 9 1 1 , 9 i 2 n , 945n, 947n, 965, i o i 4 n , i o i 6 n ,

1122

Wenyi bao

Western Hills, 336n, 455n Western M o n g o l s , 53 Western M o u n t a i n R a n g e . See D o n g t i n g Western Peace, Stockade of, 3 7 0 - 3 7 1 W h e a t , j n , 46n, 106; price of, I5n W h i t e C a p Muslims, 195, I034n W h i t e D a g o b a , 929n W h i t e D r a g o n , 777 W h i t e gold, 739n W h i t e H e a d e d A r m y , 671, 723 W h i t e Lotus sectarians, 41, i n n , I i 8 n , 4 i 3 n , 4 3 m , 509, ioo6n; rebellion of, in 1622, i n n , 118, 429; rebellion of, in 1796-1801, 834n W i d o w s , 3 i 3 n , 645, 892, 1056; suicide

j? (Literature and Art),

S&7n W e n z h o u fiM, 1113 West Lake, 401 West R i v e r , 766n Western D e p o t , I 2 n Western H a n . See F o r m e r H a n

9i3n, 1018;

presidents of, 4 i 7 n , 418n; vicepresidents of, 913 W o r k s , Ministry of, 91, 908; ministers of, 232, 270n, 356n; vice-ministers of, 392n W o r l d e c o n o m y , 1 - 1 1 , 20 Writers, 140, 328n. See also Poets

1324

Index

Wu Jg, 383, 665-666, 677, 778, 780, 107711; palace of, 396; locust plagues in, 627. See also Tai, Lake Wu St (military), 370 W u Sfc, King, 860 W u , Silas, 85m W u Changshi ig. g Bj, 978 W u Changxing. See W u Yi W u Choufei ^ f i l f R , 699 W u Da J g j g , 699-702, 842, 869-870, 905 W u Dading j g , 689-690, 695-698 W u Dahai ¡ ^ ¿ $ 5 , 792n 68211 W u Dakuan W u Dan ^ 0 . , 664 W u Ding 993 W u Fuzhong, 23 9n, 26on W u ¿p Gate, 962, 964 W u Guolong M S f | , 9 i 3 n W u Han 566n W u Hancha J ^ É ^ , 1078 W u Huiwen ! p 4 3 4 W u Jingdao 787n, 790, 7 9 m W u j i n g z i ig&n, 894 W u j u n dudu fu E f l f f l f f (Chief Military C o m m a n d of the Five Armies), 26, 37 W u Keji l i f l , 585 W u Liangfu 899n, 931 W u Linzheng, 244 W u Liuqi ^ l A i É f , 1135 W u long hui (Black Dragon Society), 637, 639, 651 W u Minglie Jg $ 994 W u Ä Pass, 507 W u Qian, 266n W u Renzhi 730n WuRong^^,623 W u R u j i e J ^ & j f t , 7 5 3 n , H33 W u Sangui j ^ - g , 139. 147. 152, 194, 198, 2i9n, 220, 223n, 234, 283n, 290301, 403, 482-486, 489, 501, 528n, 740, 820, 843, 99on, 993n, 1 0 3 3 - 1 0 3 6 , 1042, 1076, io83n, n o i n , 11 ion, 1124; and the battle of Songshan, 212—213, 2i4n; surrender to Manchus of, 223— 224, 291-292, 2 9 5 - 3 0 1 , 305-309, 31 in; proposal to recall from Ningyuan of, 244, 254, 291; communications

from father to, 291, 295n; negotiations with Li Zicheng of, 291-297; infatuation for Chen Yuanyuan of, 292; and the battle of Shanhaiguan, 309—315; army of, 3 1 m , 821; princedom of, 3i2n, 1036; despatched to destroy Li Zicheng's remnants, 317; and a Southern Ming alliance, 405; headshaving of, 420n; and the Rebellion of the Three Feudatories, 8i7n, 1099—1113; summer house of, 1120 W u Sheng I g ^ , 146, 1 5 3 - 1 5 4 , 231, 325n, 362n,364,379n W u Shengzao j ^ j g i j g , 4 ° i W u Shengzhao 565, 655n, 725, 740-743, 747-752; uprising of, 649n, 744-748; defeat of, 1042 Wu shi er xing f K f i ^ i i i (Do not take office under t w o surnames), 776 W u Shifan M 1 & S , " 2 0 W u Shizong i^-tSJg, 1 1 1 7 - 1 1 1 9 W u Songyun 485 W u Su S ^ J I , 328-329, 402 W u Tonglong 7°2 W u Weihua 426, 485, 489, 769n, 948n, 1033 W u Weiye I23n, 132, 24m, 427, 87m, 893, 938n, 98on, 997, I004n, 1094; success in examinations of, 120, 1 2 1 ; collaboration of, 9 3 4 945; portrait of, 940; parents of, 942n; attempt to revive clubs by, 1066; last years of, 1076-1080 Wu wen zhi shu $£>£¿.111 (the writings of an illiterate), I092n W u Xiang ^¿¡jS, 174. 198, 291-295; death of, 295 W u Xintian 757 W u Xuan 400 W u Yan ^ ^ , 5 8 9 W u Yang Jg.f.. See W u Yi W u Yangchun 623 W u Yi H J 5 , 662-663, 668n, 671, 724-727, 741 W u Yingji I03n, 141 W u Yingxiong ig-Jigtg, 1100, 1109 W u Yongzhi ^ . j f ¡ ¿ , 770 W u Yuancheng, 73 m W u Zhifan ^ ¿ ¿ , 6 7 0

Index

W u Zhikui J g ^ i t , 655-660, 668 Wu Zhuo, 880 W u Zichang 484, 1025, 1026 Wu-Cai garrison, 393 Wuchang j ^ H , i6n, 195, 393n, 507, 73 in Wufeng Lou Ti-B,® (Tower of the Five Phoenixes), 947 Wuhu 5 7 1 - 5 7 3 , 669n, 741; fall of, 721 Wujiang ^ f i , 148, 649n, 653, 662, 670, 725, 890, 891; rice riots in, 626; local gentry of, 663 Wujie E l f i (Fifth Elder Sister), 1122 Wujin jjg, 6i7n, 728n, 996 Wujing (Five classics), ioon Wujing boshi S a l t i l i (Doctor of Classics), 858 Wulai (unreliable), 434 Wulaizi te H rf- (unreliable elements), 625n, 637 Wuliangha X H ^ p • See Urianghai Wulin 571 Wusong ^ i® military command, 668-670 Wusong River, 654n, 657 Wusu, 7on W u t a i - K l t Mountains, 835-840 W u w a n g ¿ t BE • See Z h o u W u w a n g Wuwei , 804 Wuweizhou fcfl:)'!'!, 564n Wuxi flEi§, 15, 167, 263, 276, 302; Li Zicheng's collaborators f r o m , 115116; loyalist conspiracy of 1650—1654 in, 4 1 7 - 4 1 9 Wuxian 891, io65n, I078n Wuying Palace, 3i5n, 344, 453, 573-574, 1007 Wuying Dian 0 , 3 1 I t (Palace of Martial Heroes). See Wuying Palace Wuzhou g'>H, 738n, 767, 903n Wuzhu huangdi ÉEt j i ^ Ì È (unclaimed land), 918 Xenophobia, 76 Xi ¡51; (washing out), 493 Xi bing (military truce), 213 Xi bing S (to wash up weapons), I56n

1325

Xi Xi Xi Xi

chang . See Western Depot H u f f l . See West Lake Shi g j t i , I077n xi cao tang |fi g§ 1$. ^ (Grass H u t West of the Marshes), 772-773, 783 Xia j { (China), 860, 945 Xia fa (knight), 602n X i a B a o m o I f | (Valuable Stratagems Xia), 742 Xia Chengde J j j S c i i , 2 1 5 - 2 1 7 Xia Dayu j [ -fc ^ , 402 Xia j | dynasty, 326n, io89n Xiajinghai 215 Xia Wanchun J ^ j j p , 749 Xia Xiaogong. See Xia Yunyi Xia Yan M s , 32 Xia Yunyi J , 113, 115n, 392n, 399n, 645, 666-669, 743; suicide of, 672-673, 749 Xia Zhixu 749 Xiajiang " f j l (downriver), 770 Xiamen I X H , 573 n , 768n, 771, I003n, I049n,1108 Xi'an eStSc, 234, 4i3n, 483, 500-501, 506, 521, 683-689, 693-694, 800, 8i7n, 822, 828n, 834n, 879, 884n, 1133; banner garrison of, 683; attack on in 1646, 689; uprising of, 689 Xian H (districts), 348, 481, 808, 826, 9i7n, io69n, 1138, 1 1 4 0 - 1 1 4 1 . See also Districts Xian f[i] (immortal), 1114 Xian Jf (worthy), 286, 586 Xiandi (former emperor), 3i3n Xiandi zhuan i t ^ A I (The biography of Han Xiandi), 283n Xianfeng H^iS reign, 9i8n, 1 1 4 1 Xiang jffl army, 374n Xiang dang J f J i i (village bands), 602 Xiang yong ^ H (village braves), 3 1 m , 428n Xiang Yu 246-252, 383, 779 Xiang Yuxuan [ £ ] 3 i $ f , 9 3 3 Xiangbing % J£ (local militia, village troops), 17, 3 1 m , 376, 4 3 1 - 4 3 3 , 493, 637, 639n, 657, 658, 660, 662, 664 Xiangdao (guide), 5i2n Xianghe §'/6J, 435n Xiangma (highwaymen), 429

1326

Index

Xiangshen $$ $$ . See Local gentry Xiangtan ftfig, 767, 89511 Xiangyang JJ|!§, i6n, 233, 36211, 372, 507, 101711 Xiangyue ^ ^ (village covenant), 494, 683, 845 Xiangzhang H (village elders), 845 Xiansan guan "g" (officers on inactive duty), 933 Xiansheng fc ^ (master), 774n Xiao (filial piety), io87n, 1 1 1 4 Xiao Jj| (owl), 24n Xiao j|f (surname), 788 Xiao bi dang f O U . ^ (gang of pared noses), 729 Xiao jing yan yi (Exploration and Amplification of the Classic of Filial Piety), 942n, I094n Xiao kou (small bandits), 226 Xiao Qiyuan H f g x , 979 Xiao ren 'J^ A (small people), 184 Xiao S a n j i e ^ H i t , 526 Xiao suan Jfj Jf (audit and accounting), 905 Xiao Y i n g x u n H B f ] | , 5 2 6 Xiao Yishan f j f — [Jj, 903n, 95on Xiaochang /J\ B|| (male prostitutes), 95n Xiaochour /]\|5| ^ ("despicable wretches"), 825 Xiaoduan ^ ifj Empress, 898n Xiaohun ("heartache"), 36m Xiaoji (light cavalry, spirited chargers), 5m, 227n Xiaokang Empress, 45n; portrait of, 930 Xiaoling 'J^H River, 193; first battle of, 174, 177; second battle of, 178 Xiaoling (tomb), 774 Xiaoxian ^ j D ; , io67n Xiaoyi ^ ¡ft, 815 Xiaozhuang Empress, 898ns portrait of, 897 Xiaxian g j g j , 815, 840 Xichong g§ , 690n Xie Bi|§}|ig, 4 3 6n Xie dang f R U (deviant clique), 81. See also Factionalism Xie Guozhen HilllM, 5 fk (deviant sectarians), 714

Xie Qiguang I B j f f t ^ , 427, 435, 437-441, 460, 904-905 Xie Sanbin HfEi j f , 72m Xie Sheng H } ® , 133, 146, 152", 4°7n, 426, 435-437, 857, 865 Xie shuo J J R ( " d e v i a n t doctrines"), 1092 Xie Zhaozhi H f * 94" Xie Zhuo M M , 73in Xifengkou O passes, 130, 164 Xihangg^|, 862n, 866n, 875n Xihua H l f l Gate, 562n, 574, ioi5n, 1103 Ximin I B S ; (chattel, menials), 6i7n, I056n Xin (feelings), 517 Xin, Prince of, 87 Xin 5i9n Xin ba |TfU (newly promoted), 947 Xin jiao iff ¿ft; (New Sect), 799 Xin pu lii f r v f H ("The Green of the Rushes"), 936 Xin ren |ff A (new men), 447 Xin shi Ejj (History of mind), 780 Xin xue (intuitive idealism), 1091 X i n a b u k u ) ^ f 3 ^ j ( , 875n Xin'an 9n, 143, 6i7n, 760, 773n Xinbin f f i > 49 n Xinchang fff |§, Prince of, 730 Xincheng Earl of, 589 Xinfeng g f g , 767 Xing fj" (behavior), 957 Xing Jf)5, Madame, 5i2n Xing'an H i g , 685n, 689-697, 828, 959 Xing'an bo H ^ - f ^ ("Earl of Xing'an"), 828 Xingfu guxue HiJEc^S^ (revival of ancient learning), i42n Xingguo pi H , Duke of. See Zhao Zhilong Xinghua 586 Xingjing p}]^. See Hetu Ala Xingling f g (native sensibility), I24n Xingping H 2 ) 1 . Earl of, 589 Xingshan ji||_L| Temple, 529, 530 Xingzai ff^E (temporary court), 256n, 268, 742 Xinhui jff-j», 63 6n Xining 685n, 688, 827, n i 2 n ;

Index

revolt in, 688n Xinjing f f f f i . 657 Xinkou iff n , 807 Xinluo, Marquis of, 262 Xinyang if|5f§, 107411 Xinzhou f f 'J-|-|, 809 Xiong h^ (surname), 675n Xiong hao Ml® ("cruel bullies"), 652n Xiong Tingbi g g g f f i , 39, 47n, 57, 63-69, 78-80, 90, 1019 Xiong Wenju 425, 459, 720, 909 Xiongnu i a ) ^ , 4m, I42n, 679 Xiping g§ zp (Western Peace), 370 Xiucai ^ ^ (district degree-holders), 70n, 73, 94, 162, 229n, 276n, 280, 906n Xiuning ftc^E, 389n, 622, 73on Xiushui ^^fC, 6i4n, 651; walls of, 654 Xizhi g§ ¡ t Gate, 260 Xu Ben'gao 114 Xu Biao I7n Xu Can , 9o6n Xu Da j ^ j g , 3 m Xu Dagui 1133 Xu Dahua 8in Xu D i n g ^ , n 15 Xu Dingguo f f 413, 501, 509-511, "35 Xu Du H4n, 373n, 374n XuFang^ft,383n Xu Fanglai 5»9 Xu Fuyuan 113-115, I37n, 677, 74m; mansion of, 741 Xu Guangqi j t f t , 75~77, 94", I37n, 577, 56m, 635, 944n Xu Guoxiang ^ H i g , 1056 Xu Heng f ^ , io85n Xu Hongjue g§, 589 Xu Hongru ^¡¡JHf, 429, 43 in, 432n X u j i e ifclig, H 3 , 7 4 i n Xu Li Sao Ujljtll

(Li Sao

Continued),

111311

Xu Xu Xu Xu Xu Xu Xu

Long l i H , 656 Mingzheng 656-658 Minshi 6nn Qian^W,383 Qianxue , noon Qiyuan 507", H34 | f River, 599

1327

Xu Ruke i££ni5J, 80 X u Sheng 728n Xu Shiqi ^ i i R , 356-358, 39on, 668n Xu Wangjia 599 Xu Yan 599 Xu Yifan ^ — , 426, 8o6n X u Yingfen 3I2n> 4 ' 7 " X u Yuanbo f ^ x f f , 756-758 X u Yuanwen io83n, I094n X u Yuzhong rpEE l i . See X u Yan Xu Zhankui f f £ Jg, 820 Xu Zhenfu 670n Xu Zhiqing ^ ¿ J ® , 757 Xu Zhoujue j^iN'Iff, 589 XuZiyun^^B,757 Xuanda 1026 Xuande jf^f, reign, 622n. See also Ming Xuanzong Xuanfu 36n, 212, 246, 341, 484 Xuanhua 'n.tfc, 246, 294n, 47m, 484, 681 Xuantong g f t reign, 877n Xuanwu Gate, 2Ó3n, 87m, 986 Xuanye • See Kangxi Emperor Xue Guoguan g£|H!!, I4i- T 47, 23 m Xue Guoyong 1? IS ffi, 64n Xue hai leibian (Classified anthology from the ocean of learning), 454 Xue Suoyun M f f i f ò , 425, 459, 909, 1004 Xue zheng ip jgf (educational policy, literary chancellor), 486, 969 Xuedu ip J§; (study-worms), 246n Xuemai jfixMff^ (arteries), 16 Xueshu (learning), 1092 Xueyuan liu zi she § |3| 7 \ - f St (Society of the Six Masters of the Snow Garden), 840n Xueyuan she SlSjjtt- See Snow Garden Society Xun f § , Prince. See Mandahai Xun'an (civil governor), 77on Xunchen Hjjgl (hereditary military nobles, meritorious nobility), 343, 364 Xundao jK )i| (circuit intendant), 400 Xundao |)I|3J (directors of studies), 967 Xunfu ì® ìli (grand coordinator, governor, governorships, provincial

1328

Index

administration commissioners), i j n , 37n, 89n, 255n, 32on, 481; English translation of title of, 48 m ; pattern of appointments of, 48 m , 1020. See also Governors; Grand coordinators Xungui fj[)ji|; (meritorious nobility), 332n Xunnan (died as martyrs), 946n Xunzhi |lf (gradual approach to perfection), 457 X u y i gf gg, 522 Xuzhou f£'}H, 118, 119n, 136, 143, 328330, 348, 354, 372, 400, 402, 429, 48on, 515, 519-522, 527n, 635, 640n, 675, 753n, 772, 779, 782n, 908, 9l4n Yadu ^f j i ; (yamen grubs, yamen worms), 246n, 447, 455, 707 Yai H;, Mount, 76 m Yalu River, 51, 83n, 126-128; campaign of 1621 along, 197 Yamen, 108, n o , 298, 416, 448, 464, 478n, 625n, 639n, 650, 682n, 747, 751, 808, 854-856, 868n, 875n, 896n, 921, 9 4 m , 953, 985, 1052, 1104; subbureaucracy of, 237n, 258n, 61 in, 625n, 656, 700, 705, 789, 873n, 988, ioi8n, io6on, i o 6 i n , 1064, 107m; sacked by Li Zicheng, 313; policemen of, 374n, 433n; correction o f clerical abuses of, 703—707. See also Clerks; Local government; Runners Yan Prince of, 269n, 335 Yan C e 840 Yan dang g j ^ ("eunuch party"), 387 Yan Ermei gglQftd, 400, 5 1 3 - 5 1 6 , 521, 564, 6o2n, 674-675, 782, 789 Yanguan U ' g ' (speaking officials), 921 Y a n j i e H f ] * , 434, 435n Y a n j i h e n g gg ^ -f-, 8on YanJunfu 1075 Yan Maocai fHIBci', 652 Yan Mountains, 892 Yan Song 32, 33n Yan Yuan §f7C > 109m Yan Zhenbang JgcH^i, 504n Yan zhongjishi ^ ( f & E ^ f (Narrative o f events in Yan), 384 Yan'an 36n, 48on, 504, 655, 691-693, 800, 820-821, 832, i o i 7 n

Yanchang H , Prince of, 800-801 Yancheng § 5 $ ; , 730, 73 m , 755 Yanchi S ® , 691 Yang J j (nourishment, to nourish), 70, I72n; Manchu policy of, 179, 185, 217. See also Enyang;

Ujihe

Yang A i | § ^ , i 4 8 n Yang Chunchang 714 Yang E 392 Yang Fangxing | § ^ j S , 4o6n, 481, 493, 5l9n, 70on, 790, 1033 Yang Guanguang 285 Yang Guifei H f t f c , 256n Yang Hao ^ i f t , 62, 1 4 m Yang H e ^ f H , 87, 211 Yangjisheng 32n Yangjiu 42411 Y a n g j i u m i n g fipJiffl, 829 Yang Lian 8on, 81, 82n, 91 Yang Maoxun $§J£|!j, 1033 Yang M i w u ^ ^ f f i . See Yang A i Yang Rucheng, 383 Yang Shen , 297 Yang Shenghua, 276n Yang Shengyuan | § i f 3 a , 164, 753~759 Yang Shicong $ § ± 1 ! , 439 Yang Shifu 529n Yang Sichang $ § | i ] | l , I34n, 137«». H i , I42n, 152, 211, 227, 233n, 323, 352n, 387n, 390n, 587n Yang Tingjian 933. 942" Yang Tinglin 58711, 737 Yang Tingshu 109, 119, 140, 1 4 m , 383n, 401, 603, 649, 725, 7 4 m , 750 Yang Tongting B M & , 6 4 3 n Yang Wei 540 Yang Weiyuan 389, 533, 574 Yang Weizhen H f f M , 93 94 75 In > 9 ° i ; massacre at, 165, i66n, 185; land exchange in, 474 Yongzheng fJilE Emperor, 63 5n, 709n, 903n, 1009, 1 0 1 1 - 1 0 1 2 , U23n; fiscal surplus of, 1071; economic reforms of, 1126 Yongzheng $1IE reign, 1056, 1 1 4 1 Y o t o g l i , 185-187 You zhen £¡¡H (Right True), Prince,

Index

298. See Also Jirgalang You zhi zhi shi ^ ' ^ ¿ . z b (scholars of resolve), 518 Youji (majors), 7011 Youzhu huangdi ^f i ^ t t b (land with owners), 918 Yu |S|. See Xia Dayu Yu if (dikes), 6o6n Yu (musical note), 1076 Yu Prince. See D o d o Yu Boxiang f f i & S P . 638> 660 Yu Chi fUf j § , 682n Yu lm ¡ P i t t , 2i2n Yu Long, 76on Yu lou ( j a d e gutters), I j 6 n Yu min ^ ("fish for people"), I002n-I003n Yu ^ Mountain, I075n Yu Qie 777-779 Yu Q u e 945 Yu R a n g 743 Yu Weixin , ^ J | f f , 432 Yu Yin 804, 8i8n, 819 Yu Yinggui, 235 Yu Ying-shih ^ ^ B t . i09on Yu Yongsui -"f M ' 597 n Yu Yuan 9o6n Yu yuan j u n ^ jji. See Elm Garden Army Yu Yueyuan 774n Yu zhai 3? Jjf (Jade Stockade), 413 Yuan j j , Madame (consort of the Chongzhen Emperor), 263, 531 Yuan 7c dynasty, I2n, 24n, 25, 41, jon, I38n, 203n, 205n, 456, 780, 87911, 892, 975n, io8on, 108511, I090n; government of, 2$n; capital of, 3 in; emperors of, 203; evil practices of, 277n; system of registering the population of, 616; poetry of, 78 m ; transition f r o m , to the Ming, 9o8n, 936n; collaboration with, io85n; painting in, io89n Yuan Baocang 87m Yuan C h o n g h u a n 76-86, I23n, 1 2 6 - 1 2 9 , 13 m , 142, 197, 926; execution of, 131 Yuan Hongdao J t S S j l i , !02n Yuan Huang ^ ^ , 631 Yuan Huazhong f i i f c f p , 82n

13 31

Yuanjixian 352n, 363, 4i2n Yuan M a o g o n g 721-723 Yuan qi 7c ü (original dynamism), 87 Yuan shi xuan 7 n f $ (Selections of Yuan poetry), 7 8 m Yuan Shizong '5 5n> 495n Yuan xue Ipjip. See Willing to Study 6 Yuan Yingtai 3 Yuan Zheng Äiüt» 4 0 1 Yuanma si (Pasturage Office), 202n Yuanshe J^jjtt (Origins Society), 942n Yuanshen, 67 m Yue fö (covenant), 105, 422 Yue King of, I077n; lady of, 1076 Yue Fei g j f f l , 33. 79. 56on, 601 Yue Qijie i Ä J t * , 526 Yuhe £E M Bridge, 893 Yulin 503 n, 821 Yuncheng jSjä;, 8i8n, 819 Yuncongdao f Ü ^ f t , I28n Yun-Gui U K ; , 57 1 . I J 3 i Yunhean 199 I0 n Yunnan 3 . H4 n > 118, I37n, 426, 48on, 56on, 9 1 1 , 972, 990, 1 0 3 0 1036, 1 0 9 9 - 1 1 0 1 , 1 1 1 2 , 1130, 1 1 3 1 , 1139; officials from, 270—271; conquest of, I034n; pacification of, 1034; local elite of, 1121. See also Yun-Gui Yunnanfu j t ^ f f f , 1030-1036, 1 1 2 0 Yuntai g Jg, Mount, 648n, 730, 7Ö9n, I049n Yunxian j S ^ I , H4n; Three Masters of, 114 Yunying « ^ , 9 3 5 Yusheng (Jade Cord), 576 Yushi ("royal examinations"), 956n Yutai, I55n, 545 Yutian 3EEB, 314" Yuwang f j H g , 692 Yuxian ¿ 1 , 7 1 4 1 1 Y u y a o ^ ^ , 9 8 , 269n Yuzhuzhou 760 Yuzizhang ^ ^pjjpf, 170, 1 8 2 - 1 8 3 Zaju ÜfflJ (plays), n i 3 n Zambesi River, 44n Zang | 1 (horse broker), 948 Zanhuang Jf" j=|, 496, 499

1332

Index

Zao }j| (salt-maker), 70911 Zaoli | | (black-jacketed runners), 28m Zashi (miscellaneous works), 274n. See also Bieshi Zei . See Bandits Zeian $$ (list of people serving Li Zicheng), 9i2n Z e n g Guofan f g ^ , 373, 400n Z e n g Xian 32 Z e n g Yangxing # § ^ , 1 1 1 2 Zeng Yinglin, 237 Zengcheng J^jjJ, 7 6 m Zezhou 322, 328 Zhafu (letter of deputation), 1043 Zhai |ji (fortified blockhouses, military camps or stockades). See Stockades Zhamusu 821 Zhan guo ce ip; g§ ^ (Plans of the Warring States), 744n Zhan Shixun U t i : ® ] , 747 n Zhan Zhaoheng 367n, 397n Zhang 5S, Madame, 785, I076n Zhang Bingzhen 462 Zhang Cai ¡jS^R, 104, m n , 135, I46n, 639n Zhang C h a n g 5 S H , 25n Zhang Changgeng 1031 Zhang Chengyin, 58, 62 Zhang C h u n i j g ^ , 204n Zhang Cunren ^ t , 180, 195, 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 , 2i7n, 223n, 437-438, 501, 628n, 647n, 720-721, 735, 747n, 843-847, 1027, 1031 Zhang Dai "JUtS, 1081 Zhang D a y o u l l ^ i t 732-733. 754 Zhang Defang 'Wis.Jj', 5jgl|Uj, 753, 755 Zhang Ji mt, 692 Zhang Jian 589 ZhangJiayu 285, 760, 7 6 m Zhang Jie 397, 525, 574 Zhang Jingji 702 Zhang Jinyan 213, 232, 233n, 369, 413, 502, iooon Zhang Ju ¡ j g g , 589 ZhangJuzheng SHJgrlE, 32, 39, 338, 464, 63 m , 937 n Zhang Liixiang ioo6n, 1093 Zhang Mingbin ¡ J g i g S , 746-747 Zhang Mingjun i | n § i ? , 681 Zhang Mingsheng ¡]J| Bfl , 73 in Zhang Mingzhen '¡¡¡^¡•¡M, 734n, 741, 744, 746, 768, 7 7 0 - 7 7 1 , 990-991, 993-995, 1003-1004 Zhang Pu " j i f f , 104, 1 1 0 - 1 1 2 , 132, 135, 146, I47n, 623 Zhang Puwei ¡jg U S , 666n Zhang Q i 3 B R , 274, 275n, 628 Zhang Q i ¡jg-fc, 513 Zhang Rui 969 Zhang Ruoqi 2l2n, 425, 489 Zhang Ruxiu j j g f i f f , 702n, 703n Zhang San 34°, 34*5, 356, Zhang Zhang Zhang Zhang

363, 39on Shixun ^ t & l i , 747 Shu'an "}§ i g , 602 Sizhi 146 Tianbao "jjl^cft, 785

Index

Zhang Tianlu "jg^ifc, 572, 7 3 m , 73611 Zhang Tianzhi ¡jg^fSt, 980, 984-985 Zhang Wanquan 818 Zhang Weixi ¡ l i f t , ^ , 645 Zhang Wenheng ^g^t^r, 204n, 803 Zhang Wenkui 1003-1004 Zhang Wu 9n, 2 7 0 - 2 7 1 ; loyalists of, 399-401, 595n, 742-743, 770-771; border with Fujian of, 768; governorgeneral of, 843; circuit of, 923ns border with Jiangnan of, 1044; landowners and gentry of, 1068; administration of, by Fan Wencheng, 1106 Zhen H (guards units, market towns), 108, 433, 481 Zhen'an H g ç , 695-697 Zhending fli^, 3i3n, 4i8n, 47m, 483, 496, 497, 499, 808, 835, 837 Zheng 412 Zheng ÇE (imperial pacification, imperial punishment, imperial rectification, subdue), 59, 247, 306, 812, 833 Zheng , Prince. See Jirgalang Zheng regime of, 664n, 1108 Z h e n g Hp, state of, 444n Zheng Cai 742, 768n Zheng C h e n g g o n g See Coxinga Zheng Dengqi 714 Zheng Eryang g f l n H , 440 Z h e n g g u i f e i f&Uffi,, 337 Zheng H o n g k u i î t , 570, 672n, 768n Zheng Huaifa 7H Zheng Hui fUS®, 487 Zheng Jing J | 5 g , 1099, 1108 Zheng Lian I052n Zheng Longfang f f i l ^ , 793 Zheng Man JH5JJ, 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 Zheng run IE [S] (legitimacy and intercalation), 453n Zheng Sanjun 132, 147, 232, 364 Zheng shang jgr 3g (official merchants), 43 7n Zheng sheyuan jjj&fliJI (soliciting members), I05n

Zheng shi JJ3jf (government policy), 855 Zheng Sixiao fj5]g"pf, 780 Zheng xu huang nan lu iE K i l l 4® St (Principal and supplementary record of locusts and unfledged locusts), 387n Zheng Xuan fH$ia, 320 Zheng Yuanhua fUSxife, 3 5 i n Zheng Yuanxun 35m Zheng Zhilong 329, 570, 587n, 666n, 736-737, 742n, 768n, 994n, I049n; surrender of, 666, i o i 7 n Zhengde ¡E W. Emperor, 336n; reign of, I3n, 202n, 43in, 624n Zhengding IE 48on Zhengren Shuyuan I® A IS K (Witness Academy), io66n Zhengyang JE^k Gate, 219, 264, 267n, 407n, 857, 859 Zhengzhi JE . See Kaiy uan Zhenjiang H j I , 9 9 n , !07, 127, 354, 434n, 444n, 570, 654n, 1048, 11 ion Zhi , the Robber, io9on Z h i c a o ^ l f . (iris), 7 5 i n Zhi iJIJ (regulations), 719 Zhili ¡ t ^ , 165, 195, 210, 269n, 458, 461, 784, 837-838, 887, 888, 910, 956, 957, 969, ioi6n, I072n, 1 1 3 2 ; Gulf of, 197, I98n, 210; circuit of, 4i8n; officials f r o m , 424n, 1129; governors of, 461; magistrates of, 461. See also Beizhili; Nanzhili Zhiran ju ^rj (Bureau of Weaving and Dyeing), 772n Zhong (brought together), 386 Zhong (loyalty), 5i6n, io87n, 1095, 1114 Zhong kou c ^ t ( m e d i u m bandits), 226n Zhong yi / S t i (fidelity and justice, loyal and righteous), 6o2n, 78m Zhong zheng (Loyal and Upright), 566 Zhongcheng she ^ l ^ j j t t ("Society of Loyalty and Perfect Sincerity"), 665 Z h o n g g u o tflHI- See Central K i n g d o m Z h o n g h e Dian t ^ f P S i (Palace of Central Harmony). See Z h o n g h e Palace Z h o n g h e c|3 f p Palace, 870, 1007 Zhonghua c|=>¥> 3 i 7 n

Index

Zhongnan Mountain, 688 Zhongtiao cf3 Mountains, 840 Zhongxiang Hif^, i6n Zhongxing c ^ H (restoration). See Restorationism Zhongyi ying ^ H H ("Battalion of Loyalty"), 839 Zhongyuan cf3 JjjC. See Central Plain Zhongzhen ("Loyal and Honest"), 1116

Zhou jf| (counties, districts), 276n, 34.8, 375, 808, 826, 9i7n, 1138, 1140— 1141.

See Zhou Zhou Zhou Zhou

also Districts Jf, Duke of, 582n, 860 IS, Madame, 244n, 263 Prince of, 336n, 340, 524n, 756 Biao J f 140, 14m, 340n, 359n,

383-386, 389n

Zhou Changjin Jf] g f r , 388 Zhou Chaorui Jf 82n Zhou Chen Jf'fct, 608 Zhou Jf dynasty, 250n, 282, 945, 1075; heroes of, 410; bronzes of, 743 Zhou Jf dynasty (Wu Sangui), io89n, i i o i , 1105, 1118; armies of, 1118; emperor of, 1119 Zhou Guozuo Jf 995, 1003 Zhou Kui Jf 288, 531-532 Zhou Lianggong J S J ^ X , 427, 679n, 773n, 1000-1001

Zhou li Jf jjg (Rites of Zhou), 446n Zhou Lixun Jf i£j|i|, 113 Zhou Mi jgsjB, 453n Zhou Qian Jf §£, 741 Zhou Quan Jf H , 386, 596, 639n, 653n Zhou Rui J f 724-728, 74m Zhou Shifeng Jf f±J§,, 331 Zhou Shike, 92m Zhou Shunchang Jf HUH, 105, lion, 383n Zhou Taishi Jf ^Ulf, I03n Zhou Weichi Mf&ft, 386 Zhou Wenshan Jf |JL|, 754 Zhou Wuwang JSJiE^BE, 945 Zhou Xin jjfj , 945 I 2 3> 2 3°> 2 3 ! > 284, Zhou Yanru 329, 342, 367n, 576, 587n, 789n; as chief examiner, 120, I2in; candidacy for grand secretary of, 123; conflict of,

1335

with Wen Tiren, 132; as grand secretary, 146—156; accusations of bribery against, 149; bungling of military affairs by, 149—156; attacks on eunuchs by, 151; death of, 154-155 Zhou Yingqiu JfJUfi;, 386 Zhou Yuanjing Jf Iff gfc. See Shi Erjing Zhou Yuantai Jf 7C3H> 32m Zhou Yuji Jf $g 245 Zhou Zhong Jf|ji, 103-104, Ii5n, 116, 140, 14m, 277n, 28on, 383-386, 943n;

success in jinshi examinations by, 230; as a collaborator with Li Zicheng, 276-279, 283; arrest of, 386-387

Zhou Zixin Jf § §T , 401 Zhoushan ill Island. See Dinghai Zhu t ^ . See Ming dynasty: royal house of Zhu (monk leading riot), 626 Zhu , Madame, 758 Zhu Bin 725n Zhu Can 769n Zhu Changxun ifc 'ffr/ij. See Fu, Prince of (Zhu Changxun) Zhu C h a n g y i n g ^ f S , 828 Zhu Chunchen ^ ¡ f i g i , 264 Zhu Cican, 263n Zhu Cihuan 263n Zhu Cilang 247, 331, 528-533See also Heir apparent Zhu da wang ("Zhu the Great King"), 9i5n Zhu Dadian 392 Zhu Gongjian 1075 Zhu Guangfu j f c ^ f l . 1075 Zhu Guobi 344n Zhu Guochang ^ g | , 32m Zhu Guosheng ^ g g g S , H5n Zhu Guozhi ^ ¡ H f e , I048n, 1068, 1101 Zhu Hao jjiflfg, " 4 n Zhujihuang^^^,653 Zhujizuo ^ f g i f t , 586 Zhujunzhao 731 Zhu Meichuan ^ f S J I I , 714 Zhu Senfu 820 Zhu Shichang j K i S H , 714, 808-811, 813

Zhu Shichuan Zhu Shiqin

800-801 435

1336

Index

Zhu Tianlin 668n Zhu Xi ¿jjJP,, 51711, 94m, 109311 Zhu Yigui g , 5711 Zhu Yihai y, fe. See Lu, Prince of (Zhu Yihai) Zhu Yile ^ i t ' l l . See Ruian, Prince of Zhu Yili 73 In > 733 n Zhu Y i n g ^ ^ , 6 5 9 Zhu Y i s h i ^ | g 5 , 7 3 i n Zhu Yixi ^ H i S . 73in, 733n Zhu Yizun J|:, 12311, 943 Zhu Youdu 828 Zhu Youlang f£| $$. See Yongli Emperor Zhu Yousong . See Fu, Prince of (Zhu Yousong) Zhu Yuanzhang t ^ x S * . 24n> 48$n Zhu Yuyue See Tang, Prince of (Zhu Yuyue) Zhu Zhibi 854n Zhu Zhichen , 32 m, 589 Zhu Zhijun 42m, 502 Zhu Z h i x i ^ ; £ S g , 9 i 4 n Zhu Zhiyu ^ ¿ . i j f s , I002n, I048n Zhu Zongyuan 735~736 Zhuang (estates), 6o6n, 9i8n. See also Estates Zhuangfei f t i f i (Secondary Consort), 898n Zhuang nu ("estate slaves"), 1054 Zhuang Tinglong 59on, 938n, ro83n; case of 1661-1663, I095n Zhuang Zejing ®|Jj®C, 589 Zhuang Zigu ^FEI, 558-559 Zhuangding ~f (estate serfs or laborers, retainers, reservists), 71, 161, 2i6n, 301, 470, I056n Zhuangliedi 77, 88n. See also Chongzhen Emperor Zhuangtou (estate bailiff, estate heads), 473-475, 789 Zhuangyuan 7K7G- See Primus Zhubu (registrar), 704-705 Zhufang (garrison town), 592n Zhuge Liang f g J I J g , 374, 568, 1084 Zhuge Wuhou • See Zhuge Liang Zhuhou j^f'fil (nobility), 249n Zhujiang HUE (foundry artisan), i69n

Zhumeng (chairman), 147 Zhuo Erkan, 1078-1080 Zhuozhengyuan ¡¡& |H, 664n Zhuozhou ¡I'M, 69n, 91 Zhusheng fg^L (first-degree graduate), 759n, 1031-1033 Zhushi (bureau secretaryship), 998n Zichan ^ jj?, 444n Zichuan 428, 235 Zixin g Jff (renew themselves), 962 Z i y a n g ^ ^ , 696-698, 829 Zizhi tongjian ^ j p S S (Comprehensive Mirror for the Aid of Government), 167 Zong ren fu ^ X H? (Imperial Clan Court), 1020 Zong shang (head merchants), 462n Zong Zhihuang, 348n, 567n Zongbing ffi^ (brigade general), 255n, 1044 Zongdu 7|f (governor-general, governor-generalships, Grand Coordinator, military governor, regional commanders, viceroy). See Governors-general Zongdu junwu jjEf? (governorgeneral for military affairs), 38 Zongjia f § Fp (ten-household security units), 708-712, 918 Zongjiazhang ^ Jfc (head of tenhousehold security units), 708 Zoo, 263n Zou g|5, 428n, 432, 433n, 699 Zou UP, Madame, 575 Zou Laifu 649n Zou Shunmeng gj|5 Hi 589 Zou xiao an H ¡H (Statement of Accounts Case), 1069, 11 ion Zou xiaoce H §£)fl)}(file a statement of accounts), 1064 Zou Yi I f , 24m Zou Yuanbiao g P x l H , : l 5 n Zouping gp^p, 701 Zu jjfe. See Clans Zu Dacheng jjig.^:®;, 215, 216 Zu Dale 190, 215-216, 221-223 Zu Darning ¡¡fi^^S, 2 1 5 - 2 1 6 Zu Dashou ijii.;^*, 130, 164-165, 1 7 1 172, 174-177, 194-195, 210-212, 39m, 843; first surrender and betrayal

Index

of, 180—194; and the campaign of 1630, 197—198; defense ofjinzhou by, 2i2n; final surrender of, 221—224; lieutenants of, 1 1 3 7 Z u Kefa jjjg. n J ' S , 1 8 5 - 1 8 9 , 194, 204n, 205n, 220, 224, 436-438 Z u Zehong ffijfgt, 188, 1 1 3 3 Z u Zepu ffl^S- 1 9 5 , 4 0 7 " . 1 1 3 4 Z u Zerun ffi^ffi, 1 8 5 - 1 8 9 , 1 9 4 - 1 9 5 Z u Zeyuan ¡ j S ' P j g , 1027, 1033, 1 1 3 3 Z u h u ^ p > (renting household), 618 Zunhua 5H ^ , I 6 4 - 1 6 6 Zun y i ¡ S i t . 3