The German Elections of 1907 9780231894142

Citation preview

STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS A N D PUBLIC L A W Edited by the FACULTY OF POLITICAL SCIENCE OF COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY N U M B E R 479

THE GERMAN ELECTIONS OF 1907 BY

GEORGE DUNLAP CROTHERS

THE GERMAN ELECTIONS OF 1907

BY

GEORGE DUNLAP CROTHERS, Ph.D. ASSISTANT

PROFESSOR

WESTERN

NEW

OF

HISTORY

COLLEGE

YORK

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

PRESS

LONDON : P . S. K I N G & SON, L T D .

1941

COPYRIGHT,

1941

BY

COLUMBIA U N I V E R S I T Y

PRESS

PRINTED I N T H E UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Co EDITH IN

CLAWSON

GRATITUDE

PREFATORY NOTE THIS study of the German elections of 1907 is limited in scope. It does not concern itself with constitutional issues or with domestic, or Prussian, politics. There were reasons for this. In the first place, much documentary material necessary to such a study in German archives was not available. In the second place, these aspects of the 1907 elections have been discussed in other books. 1 Finally, such questions did not impress me as being so important at the time or so timely now as the growth of German national sentiment, which, I have tried to show, the 1907 elections did much to nurture. This, then, is primarily a study of changes in public sentiment with regard to certain " national " questions and policies. A s such, it is handicapped by the absence of adequate means to calculate public opinion. In the Germany of 1907 there were no Gallup Polls or Fortune Surveys. In the absence of these, the student today must rely upon a vast, scattered, and probably none too representative supply of newspapers, pamphlets, and recorded speeches such as those in the Reichstag. The state of affairs in Germany today makes other sources difficult, or impossible, of access. Party records have been destroyed and private papers burned, so that much which might have been helpful is unavailable. From available sources, I have tried to use a representative cross-section. Perhaps I should explain here the use of two words which occur frequently in the text. The first is " R a d i c a l " which I have chosen to use as a translation of the German Freisinnige. The second is " burgher," which I have adapted from the German Burger, because translation is impossible. Burger is a narrower term than " citizen," but more comprehensive than " t o w n s m a n " or " bourgeois." A s it was used in pre-War German political speech, it meant any respectable citizen who was not a Social Democrat. It was applied to farmers, towns1 Theodor Eschenburg, Das Kaiserreich ant Scheideweg. Bassermann, Biilow und der Block (Berlin: Verlag fur Kulturpolitik, 1929). 7

8

PREFATORY

NOTE

men, clergymen, and laborers; and Burger parties meant all political parties except the Social Democrats. I want to thank all those who helped me prepare this study. Especially am I grateful to Dr. Carlton J . H. Hayes for guidance and helpful criticism. For suggestions and patient answers to my questions, I want to thank their Excellencies Dr. Ernst Miiller-Meiningen and Friedrich von Lindequist, Dr. Otto Fischbeck, Dr. Theodor Heuss, and Dr. Karl Bachem. Thanks are due also to my colleague, Richard Wallen, who helped to improve my most cumbersome passages, and to my wife and Mrs. John Scully who helped to prepare the manuscript for publication. G. D. C. OXFORD, O H I O .

CONTENTS CHAPTER I THE

BACKGROUND

N

Colonial Administration The Center. . The Radicals . T h e Social Democrats The Protesting Parties The Reichstag in 1906

18 23 45 55 61 62 CHAPTER

THE

II

DISSOLUTION

66

Prince Biilow T h e Center and Dernburg The Reichstag Debate December Third The Other Parties Biilow dissolves the Reichstag Reasons

. .

CHAPTER

III

T H E ELECTION CAMPAIGN

103

The National Appeal . . . L o s von Rom ! . Protesting Minorities . Against the Social Democrats. T h e Biilow Bloc . . The People's Judgment

105 119

140 142 154 166

. . .

CHAPTER THE AFTERMATH.

66 71 74 76 82 85 95

IV

. . .

185

The National Bloc . The Center . . The Social Democrats The Radicals . . . Conclusion .

185 194 211 229 239

APPENDIX

249

BIBLIOGRAPHY

254

INDEX

267

9

CHAPTER I T H E BACKGROUND GERMANY did not become a united national state until 1871. While other peoples of western Europe developed a consciousness of national unity and acquired strong centralized governments, Germany had remained a semi-feudal conglomeration of small states and petty principalities under the nominal authority of the Hapsburg Emperors. The German people had developed no common political traditions, no vital sense of national unity, nor any ambitious dream of Germany's political destiny. Several factors contributed to Germany's political and spiritual division—the division of the German plain into separate river valleys, the enmities of confessional strife, the jealousies of minor princes, as well as the non-national basis of the Holy Roman Empire. The spirit of separatism was still strong even when the Second Empire was established in 1871, and the impelling force behind the movement for German unification then was not so much popular sentiment as the power of the Prussian army and the statesmanship of Bismarck. There was no universal approval of the new state. Both its form and its extent caused much dissatisfaction. All classes and groups, conservatives and liberals, Prussians and South Germans, Protestants and Catholics, militarists and pacifists, struggled with each other to fashion the Empire according to their own interests and ideals. And there was little readiness to sacrifice personal, sectional, or class interests in behalf of Bismarck's greater Germany. But a gradual change in national sentiment took place between 1871 and the World War. The enthusiasm which had been confined at first to one political party had spread until by 1914 the German people and their political parties were almost solidly behind the ambitious course of military, naval, and colonial expansion which had been marked out for them. 11

12

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

Every political group within the Empire except the Socialists had come to regard the government as essentially good and its national and international aims as essentially desirable. There was a strong sense of national unity; there was pride in the government's achievements; and there was a large readiness to sacrifice party principles and class or sectional interests for the sake of the German Empire's world prestige. In the series of events which marked this gradual metamorphosis in German national spirit before the World War, the elections of 1907 m&y be regarded as the last of major importance. There had been other dramatic events and crises —controversies between Catholic Church and national state, between national state and international socialism, disputes over policies of military, naval, and colonial expansion. Three times the Reichstag had been dissolved, and each time the national idea and the national program gained. With the final dissolution of the Reichstag in 1906 and the elections the following year, all significant opposition to such essentially nationalist policies as military, naval, or colonial expansion came to an end. T w o political groups were especially sympathetic with these nationalist policies—the many conservatives, and the National Liberals. The Prussian Conservatives were the bulwark of the Hohenzollern monarchy. They comprised landed nobles, Lutheran clergymen, and military officers. They were indeed too narrowly Prussian to share the vision of a nationalized Germany, and they were not enthusiastic about Bismarck's Empire. They were fearful of the effect the semi-liberal institutions of the Empire might have upon Prussia. Their interests lay largely in Prussia, in agrarian legislation, military expansion, and maintenance of the conservative monarchy. When their interests were at variance with those of the Empire as a whole, they could, and they did, oppose the Imperial Chancellor. Y e t even the most uncompromising Prussian conservatives reorganized their party in 1874 under the significant name of the " German Conservative Party." They ordinarily

BACKGROUND

13

supported the government. They enthusiastically favored all military bills, and they were early persuaded to support naval and colonial enterprises. Other groups of conservatives were even more nationally minded than those in the German Conservative Party. The more progressive landlords who were willing to be German as well as Prussian and were willing even to make some concessions to democracy were organized into the " Free Conservative P a r t y " or " Imperial Party." These men had a greater appreciation for such national policies as industrial protection and naval or colonial expansion; and they had a greater sympathy with the economic and political interests of the industrial, financial, and commercial classes within the Empire. In time yet other conservative parties appeared. They owed their separate existence to particular grievances or ambitions. There were groups of Anti-Semites. There was an Agrarian League favoring agricultural protection. There was an Economic Alliance opposing industrial tariffs. In most respects these groups were conservative, and they were thoroughly patriotic and nationalistic. Perhaps the most consistent and enthusiastic supporters of the Empire's national program were the National Liberals. They were nominal liberals who had early allowed their nationalism to eclipse their liberalism. Their party represented the middle classes; their membership included some of the ablest captains of industry and the most distinguished professors in Germany. They became the representatives of the industrial system and the proponents of a strong national policy. Whenever the maintenance of civil rights or democracy conflicted with strong national policy, they could be persuaded to support the latter. In the early sessions of the Reichstag they composed an absolute majority; and Bismarck cooperated with them in establishing the fundamental laws of the Empire. The National Liberals and Bismarck shared a mutual antipathy to the Roman Catholic Center Party, which Catholics had organized to defend the rights and privileges of their

14

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

igOJ

church against the central government. The ill feeling inherited from a century and a half of religious strife in Germany had not disappeared, and the Catholics, being in a minority, were fearful of discrimination and intolerance. M a n y German Protestants and liberals, on the other hand, looked upon the Roman Catholic Church as a foreign power and as an obstacle to scientific and political progress. A n d they regarded the organized political activity of Catholics as an intolerable interference in affairs of state. Bismarck was particularly irked by efforts of the Center to influence his policy toward Italy and the Curia and to extend to the Empire the favorable position which the Church enjoyed in Prussia. If Bismarck had acceded to the Center's demands, the national government would have submitted to pressure from an international church; he, as Chancellor, would have risked the enmity of the National Liberals, and he would have submitted to parliamentary pressure. Bismarck had no liking for any of these things. He chose rather to engage the government in a struggle with the German Catholic Church, a struggle which was given the euphonious title of Kulturkampf or " struggle for civilization." But the repressive orders and laws which formed the basis of the conflict from 1872 until 1886 failed to weaken the Center Party. Catholic voters rallied to its support, and in the 1880's it became the largest single party in the Reichstag. In another sense the results of the conflict may have been gratifying to the government, for the supremacy of the national state over the international church had been asserted. In the meantime Bismarck entered a campaign against another opponent of the national state—international socialism. F r o m 1878 until 1890 increasingly repressive laws were enforced against the Social Democratic Party. The nature of the harsh measures was deplored in some circles, but the campaign was generally approved. The repressive laws were supplemented with paternalistic social legislation. But Social Democrats grew in numbers, and their representation in the Reichstag increased.

BACKGROUND

15

Opposition to the exceptional laws developed and, after Bismarck's retirement in 1890, the anti-Socialist laws were allowed to lapse. A more significant indication of the nationalism of the German people lies in the attitude of their political parties toward military, naval and colonial expansion. The readiness of parties to sacrifice party principles or public money f o r these " n a t i o n a l " policies was often regarded as a criterion of patriotism. T h e National Liberals, as has been said already, were more ready than others to make sacrifices for " national " legislation. Conscientious liberals ought to have been very jealous of the Reichstag's power of the purse, but the National Liberals gave up the principle of annual appropriations and accepted the government's demand for a long term program of military expansion. In 1874 they agreed to determine the peace time strength of the standing army for seven years in advance and to surrender the right of the people's representatives to reduce appropriations in that time. Four years later the National Liberals surrendered yet more of their liberalism when they agreed to the exceptional laws against the Social Democrats. Bismarck forced them into this concession by a dissolution of the Reichstag and an appeal to patriotism. The Chancellor thus created a situation in which it was impossible to appear national and liberal at the same time. It was disastrous for the National Liberals. They lost not only adherents, but some of their most prominent members. The sudden decline of the National Liberals brought to an end the Reichstag majority which had voted for the military bills in 1874 and 1881, and it enabled Centrists and Progressives to block military expansion if they chose to join the Social Democrats and national malcontents in opposition. Bismarck foresaw this possibility and tried to use the war scare that followed General Boulanger's rise in France to push through a new army bill in 1887, a year before it was due. Centrists and Progressives refused to approve the bill,

l6

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

so Bismarck dissolved the Reichstag amid a fanfare of patriotic trumpets. In the ensuing elections the patriotism of the National Liberals won them enough seats from Social Democrats and Progressives so that they could form a national majority with the Conservatives. This was the second time that the government had won support for a " national" measure by a dissolution of the Reichstag and a patriotic election. S i x years later the procedure of 1887 was repeated with similar results. Dissatisfaction with the anti-Socialist campaign ripened in the last of the i88o's and the National Liberals were defeated in the 1890 elections. Again a situation arose in which Centrists and Progressives were able to block military expansion. A n army bill in 1893 m e t their opposition; and General Caprivi, now Chancellor in Bismarck's stead, resorted to the expedient tried so successfully before. He dissolved the Reichstag and appealed to the people. The margin of victory was very narrow, but the procedure was effective. No Reichstag ever again defeated an army bill. The government soon embarked upon a naval building program. In this it was motivated by the desire to protect and encourage Germany's fast-growing foreign trade and foreign investments, by a realization of the importance of sea power in world politics, and by a spirit of national pride. The Emperor William I I asserted that Germany's future lay upon the water. Admiral von Tirpitz, Secretary of State for the Navy, was efficient and persistent. The National Liberals were enthusiastic; Conservatives reluctantly followed the government; and even the Center approved of the fleet. B y this date a majority of the Reichstag accepted the national program in so far as it involved the army and the navy. Meanwhile, the pressure of industrialization forced Germany to reverse the mid-nineteenth century trend toward lower tariffs and to adopt a policy of protection and economic nationalism. The Conservatives first demanded agricultural protection in the 1880's. When the Caprivi government arranged trade

BACKGROUND

17

agreements with special advantages to the industrialists, the Conservatives objected; and Caprivi resigned. In 1902 a tariff compromise combined both agricultural and industrial protection. The German market for the Germans was assured, and a German national economy was firmly rooted in law. In these same years the German government gave much attention to the expansion of German trade, territory, and investments overseas. Four tropical colonies were acquired in A f r i c a in the 1880's—German East Africa, German Southwest A f r i c a , Togoland, and Kamerun. T o these were added Kaiser Wilhelmsland, the Bismarck Archipelago, the Marshall and Solomon Islands in the Far East. Then in 1897 Germany acquired the port of Kiaochow and concessions in Shantung. T h e Caroline Islands were purchased in 1899, and two islands in Samoa were secured in 1900. In 1899 German bankers began the economic penetration of Turkey. In 1905 demands for the recognition of German interests in Morocco caused a European crisis. Officially Germany asked f o r the " Open Door," although German chauvinists wanted territory, and the Foreign Office hoped to disrupt the AngloFrench Entente. T h e Germans badgered the French into submitting Morocco's status to an international conference; the French Foreign Minister resigned; and the conference at Algeciras recognized the " Open Door." Germany's was a Pyrrhic victory, however, for French penetration of Morocco was only delayed, and the Anglo-French Entente was actually strengthened. T h e new Chancellor, von Bülow, publicized all this activity as Germany's bid for her " place in the sun." Obviously imperialism had become a major concern of the German government, but among the people there was no general enthusiasm for colonial enterprise. The program of economic nationalism, imperialism, and military and naval expansion outlined above represented Germany's ambition to play a prominent, if not a dominant, part in world politics. It required an adroit and courageous foreign policy. But Germany's policy had not been adroit. Engaged in

l8

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

colonial and military rivalry with France a n d in naval and commercial rivalry w i t h England, Germany had but one firm ally upon the continent. T a l k of " encirclement " w a s already rife. B u t the Reichstag could do little. U p o n occasion Centrists, Radicals, or Social Democrats pointed out the relationship between Germany's strong national policies and her unfavorable international position. T h e r e were complaints about " unstable foreign policy," " z i g - z a g course," Weltpolitik,

" abruptness,"

militarism, " parade n a v y , " " food-profiteering," " the place in the sun," and colonial scandals. But the government and the national parties f r o w n e d upon such remarks and did not relax any part of the national program. T h e government

courted

public opinion with p r o o f s o f glorious success in world politics, or it accused its critics of lacking patriotism. B y 1906 the government w a s still handicapped in f o u r w a y s in its pursuit of national policies. F i r s t : the German people as a whole were not yet aware of the importance of colonies nor consciously proud of G e r m a n y ' s colonial empire. S e c o n d : the Center P a r t y , although it had supported national bills since 1893, w a s still regarded as " n a t i o n a l l y unreliable."

Third:

Progressives, or Radicals, were very critical o f the government's national policies and were regarded as enemies of such policies. F o u r t h : the Social Democratic P a r t y , whose opposition to high tariffs, army, n a v y , and colonial expansion w a s inflexible, w a s the second strongest party in the Reichstag. W i t h each of these f o u r factors in G e r m a n political history we shall deal in the f o l l o w i n g pages. COLONIAL

ADMINISTRATION

German colonial policy had developed as a result of flicting

con-

ideas and interests, almost haphazardly, and led to a

situation in 1906 which even the Imperial G o v e r n m e n t admitted w a s in need of r e f o r m . W h e n G e r m a n y first entered the colonial lists B i s m a r c k ' s conception of imperialism w a s of exploitation and development of colonies by private enterprise. Private colonial companies, however, proved unequal to the

BACKGROUND

19

task. 1 T h e government w a s soon involved in the protection of the dependencies and shortly took over the administration itself. A colonial bureaucracy g r e w up which, without experience, tradition, or g u i d i n g principle, administered the colonies with a regard chiefly to their commercial exploitation and to the lust of the administration f o r power. T h e Colonial Department w a s a mere section o f the F o r e i g n Office but transacted a greater volume of business than the rest o f the office combined.

Its officials were recruited f r o m

other departments, w h i c h were reluctant to place their best men at the disposal o f

the Colonial D i r e c t o r ; and the colonial

bureaucracy too o f t e n included incompetent clerks, social black sheep, and scheming adventurers. A Colonial Council in Berlin was supposed to advise the bureaucrats. B u t the Council w a s more the representative o f colonial land, railway, and mining interests than a body o f disinterested experts; and it did little to curtail the prevalent favoritism or to improve the actual administration o f the colonies. In high places interest in the natives or the colonies themselves w a s slight. Officialdom and the a r m y were the chief concern. Discipline w a s l a x ; the affairs of the various colonies were o f t e n hopelessly c o n f u s e d ; the auditing of accounts w a s years behind; supervision f r o m Berlin w a s insufficient; and the officials showed a peculiar lack of imagination in dealing with the natives and little sympathy f o r the future of

the

colony. A marked absence of personal morality prevailed. Ever

since the able, but unscrupulous,

Carl

Peters

had

acquired E a s t A f r i c a f o r the German Empire and had kept the natives in subjection by various semi-civilized the

colonial

administration

had

had

a

black

devices,

reputation.

W h e t h e r it was because of slight official interest in the real development of the colonies, or inability of the N o r d i c type to withstand the heat and temptations of the tropics, or mere negligence in the choice of colonial officials, f o r fifteen years 1 T h e Southwest A f r i c a n Company yielded its administrative privileges to the government in 1888; the East African Company in 1891 ; the N e w Guinea Colonial Company in 1899.

20

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

the administration was the source of some unusual and juicy scandals. The cases of Peters (East A f r i c a , 1894-5), Leist (Kamerun, 1893-4), and Wehlau (Kamerun, 1 8 9 6 ) , whose shameless treatment of the natives had caused their dismissal from the service, become notorious. But conditions did not improve. The natives were exploited by the traders and planters and too often found no justice in the courts. They were ruled by force. Punishments were brutal, and whipping was a matter of course. A s a result of this kind of administration there were frequent feuds between government officials and the Christian missionaries. The Catholic Styler Mission in Togoland had constant difficulties; in 1904 the Protestant Mission in Southwest A f r i c a , and in 1905 the Benedictine Mission in East A f r i c a were involved in quarrels with the administration. The Caprivi government had let colonial administration take its course, but the advent of Billow 2 in the Foreign Office marked the adoption of an aggressive colonial policy, at least as far as expansion was concerned. The settlement of Samoa, the purchase of the Caroline Islands, the acquisition of Kiaochow, and demonstrations in Manila Bay in 1898 and in Venezuela in 1902-3 were signs of change. Land and mining concessions were granted on a large scale and a program of government railway building was begun; but the administration of the colonies themselves was not reformed. Biilow and his appointees in the Colonial Department conducted affairs with regard chiefly to enhancing the international prestige of Germany and used the colonies as pawns in the game where world-power was the goal. They were satisfied as long as the interests of the colonial companies and of the bureaucracy were served and the desire of the Emperor for world-prestige was gratified. 8 2 B e m h a r d Prince von Biilow, 1849-1930; Foreign Secretary, 1897-1900; Imperial Chancellor, 1900-1909. 3 Mary Townsend, The Rise and Fall of the German Colonial Empire, 1884-1914 ( N e w York: Macmillan, 1930), p. 228ff.

BACKGROUND

21

Toward Bülow's imperialism the German public remained indifferent, but in 1905-6 interest in colonial affairs revived. This was due to revelations of further instances of incapacity and abuse in the colonial administration and to a series of native uprisings which had begun in 1903. The most important of these, that in Southwest A f r i c a , had already cost the German people 400 million marks by 1906 and had not been suppressed. Scandalous conditions in Togo and Kamerun and unethical transactions in Berlin were brought to light by several dissatisfied under-officials whom the administration thereupon prosecuted for revealing government secrets. There were revolts in Kamerun in 1904 and 1905. A f t e r having tried in vain for three years to get a hearing for their complaints against Governor von Puttkamer and some of his subordinates, the A k w a tribe had sent a petition to the Reichstag. Von Puttkamer's assistants in Kamerun promptly sued the complaining chieftains for slander and put them in jail. Difficulties between Catholic missionaries and officials in Togoland in 1903-4 brought to light an unhealthy situation there. Several officers were transferred and others were dismissed. But the course of administrative justice was slow, and the punishments were minimal. In October 1903 the Bondelzwarts, a native tribe in Southwest A f r i c a , objected to the arbitrary execution of one of their chieftains and revolted. Troops from the north of the colony were called upon to help quiet them; and peace negotiations were under way when the Hereros to the north, hitherto peaceful, took advantage of the absence of troops in their vicinity to stage a well-prepared and ferocious attack upon the white settlers. On January 12, 1904 they rose in arms, killing German settlers,4 seizing and destroying property. They were well 4 In general, women, children, Boers, and English were spared. F o r a history of the revolt see the memoranda of the Prussian General Staff in the supplements to the Reichstag Debates [Statistische Bericht über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages (hereafter cited as Reichstag Debates), C C X I I , Aktenstücke 559 and 7 3 4 ; ibid., C C X X V I , Aktenstück 530; ibid.,

22

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

armed. They were good fighters and well led by Samuel Maherero, Prince K a j a t a , and the Herero half-breed Morgena. Additional troops under General von Trotha were rushed to the colony ; and the natives, while not defeated, were so severely weakened at Waterberg in May 1904 and by subsequent forced wanderings in the desert that only small bands continued the conflict. V o n Trotha's cruelty and his vicious campaign against the Hereros, however, alarmed the other tribes ; and in October 1904 the Hottentots under Hendrick Witboi, hitherto friendly to the Germans and traditional enemies of the Hereros, took up the struggle. Hendrick was killed in battle a year later, and many of his people surrendered. But other chieftains, among them Morgena, Simon Copper, and Cornelius, persisted in a guerilla warfare, using the borders of the colony as a safe retreat when pursuit became hot. The Southwest A f r i c a n colony was large and thinly populated.® Difficulties of transporting and provisioning troops were great, and the cost high. In Berlin people were inclined to blame the government or the white settlers for the uprising. T h e natives could not be expected to view complacently the usurpation of their land by the white men. They were irritated by the methods of the traders and angered by the government's failure to protect them. And the laxity of the administration in allowing them to arm probably encouraged them in the hope of success. The Colonial Department had mismanaged the outfitting and provisioning of the military expedition. It had rejected the proffered aid of the W a r Department and had granted monopoly contracts which were most unfavorable to the government. The Tippleskirch Company equipped the troops and made exceptional profits. When, during 1906, it became known that the Minister for Agriculture had a personal interest in C C X L , Aktenstück 107] ; also E. Rausch, Die Wehrpolitik des Deutschen Reiches unter Reichskanzler Fürst Bülow (Doctoral Dissertation, Heidelberg, 1936). 5 There were about 6000 whites in German Southwest Africa in 1903.

BACKGROUND

23

the company and that a certain M a j o r Fischer in the Colonial Department had received a loan of 2-3000 marks from Herr Tippleskirch, matters appeared much worse. The Woermann Line received outrageous prices for shipping provisions to the colony. The harbour company in Luderitzbucht and Swakopmund charged monopolistic harbour fees. A n d it appeared that the Southwest A f r i c a n revolt was being used to enrich certain favored companies. In this situation a fraction of the Center Party commenced a campaign of revelations and criticism of the entire colonial administration. THE

CENTER

T h e Kulturkampf had left the Center Party with influence in the Reichstag which, except for the years 1887-1890, increased after each succeeding election. This was not due to an increase in Centrist voters, but to the decline of the National Liberals and the growth of the Social Democrats whose inflexible policy of opposition left the government dependent upon other parties for majorities. A m o n g the other parties, the Center held the balance of power between right and l e f t ; and the consent of the Center, or at least a part of it, was indispensable for passing government measures in the Reichstag. The purpose of the Center Party was to defend the Catholic religion against discrimination and to maintain the Church's influence in Germany's social and intellectual life. In the pursuit of these aims, the party was open to criticism from several points of view. In the first place the Center was a confessional party. Its membership was bound together almost exclusively by the confessional tie; almost the entire electoral support for the party came from Roman Catholics; local political committees often bore such names as " Sacred Heart," " Corpus Christi," " Sebastian," " St. Joseph," " St. Michael;" and many people felt that, if the party were not Catholic, it had little excuse for existing at all. But Centrist leaders often denied that they

24

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

4

formed a confessional party. Some of the more conservative of them made sporadic efforts to broaden the party's base and to include more Protestants, but they had small success. 7 The Center remained Catholic and included members of the most divergent political and economic interests—landed aristocrats from Silesia as well as labor leaders from Westphalia. The religious tie made party discipline fairly easy, but the presence of both conservatives and radicals in the same party made the Center's actions often unpredictable, since they depended upon whichever wing of the Reichstag caucus could make its views predominate. Critics accused the Center of being guided not by principles but by party or confessional considerations. And they interpreted many of the Center's actions as the endeavor to make the government feel the party's 6 Cf. an address of Peter Spahn at a Centrist convention in 1905 : " T h e Center is not a confessional p a r t y . . . a n d . . . does not wish to be one. It cannot be one either, for there is no political canon a d m i n i s t e r e d . . . by t h e ecclesiastical authorities " [ D a r Zentrum und sein Program nach den Reden verschiedener Zentrumsführer ( " F l u g s c h r i f t e n der Rheinischen Zentrumspartei," No. 7 ; Cologne: Bachem, 1907), p. 9]. Paradoxically, Spahn could also say, " A Catholic w h o . . . remains outside the ranks of the Center is a drawback to his c h u r c h " ( I n the Reichstag, April 13, 1904, Reichstag Debates, C X C I X , 2031). 7 In the spring of 1906 Dr. Julius Bachem, 1845-1918, editor of the Kölnische Volkszeitung and a prominent Centrist, proposed that, inasmuch as there was nothing in the Center program which could not be accepted by an Evangelical, and inasmuch as only few Evangelicals joined, the party should try to attract them and in future elections to support such as believed in religious toleration and had a social conscience. Dr. Bachem's article,. " W i r müssen aus dem T u r m heraus," was published in the HistorischPolitische Blätter, April 1906. T h e reception of his proposal was not generous in either Catholic or Protestant circles. In fact it seems to have been the opening gun in an intra-party battle which was accentuated by differences over the nature of the Christian trades unions and was not ended until 1914. T h e so-called " Kölner-München-Gladbach " wing to which D r . Bachem belonged wished the unions to be inter-confessional. T h e " BerlinT r i e r " group, led by the Reichstag Deputy H e r m a n n Roeren, preferred tosee the unions exclusively Catholic. F o r this see J. P . Bachem, Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentrumspartei (Cologne: Bachem, 1927-1932), V I I , iii.

BACKGROUND power.

8

25

B u t the rivalry between wings of the party accounted

f o r much of the Center's inconsistency, and it was to have important consequences in 1 9 0 6 . In the second place, the Center was accused of being ultramontane, of taking orders from the Pope, and of owing its first loyalty to an international church rather than to the national state. Upon occasion the Pope and the higher clergy had tried to bring pressure to bear upon the Center—usually to persuade the party to support the government. B u t Centrists maintained that, in all cases which their critics cited, the party had refused to submit to pressure and had pursued its chosen policy in defiance of the Church authorities. 8 A s will be seen, the Center acted in the 1 9 0 7 elections in direct opposition to the wishes of the higher clergy. Whether or not the Center w a s ultramontane is disputable. It is only necessary here to state that many German liberals and " free-thinkers " believed it to be so and accused it therefore of having an " anti-national " bias. In the third place the Center's efforts to defend the Church made the party appear to be unpatriotic, or at least lacking in 8 This opinion was shared in some Catholic circles. See Leo von Savigny, Des Zentrums Wandlung und Ende (Berlin: Walther, 1907). It was probably justified in so far as every party would have liked the government to feel its power. 9 The classic example is in connection with the military Septennat of 1887 when the party leader Windhorst let it be known that in political questions the Center was independent and resented interference by the Holy See. National Liberal critics did not agree that the party was politically independent but argued that the Center was simply more Catholic than the Pope. See the article on the Center in the Politisches Handbuch der Nationalliberalen Partei (Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1908), p. 1151 ff. In the summer of 1906 the papal representative at the general assembly of German Catholics at Essen, Cardinal Vanutelli, praised the readiness of the German Catholics to subordinate themselves to the authority of the Holy See. Even Centrists objected, and the Cardinal added the phrase " only in so far as religion is affected," but the National Liberals called this hypocrisy. The Pope tried to clarify matters by asserting in a letter to Cardinal Fischer that the obedience of Catholics in religious matters left a " complete and unlimited freedom in those affairs which do not concern religion." This letter is reprinted in the Vossische Zeitung, No. 543, Nov. 19, 1906.

26

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

enthusiasm for the strong central government. T h i s was because the Center, anxious to preserve the favorable position which the Church occupied in some of the smaller states, endeavored to prevent the Protestant-dominated central government from usurping too much power. The Center thus became a " states' rights" party opposed, in certain instances, to strengthening the national state. T h i s fact along with the party's loyalty to an international church made it appear doubly " anti-national." Inasmuch as a great deal was said about the Center's lack of patriotism in 1906 and 1907, it may be well to survey the party's reaction to important national bills in the two preceding decades. A s a matter of fact, the Center had voted fairly consistently for government bills in recent years and had come to be regarded as a moderately reliable supporter of government policies. T h i s gradual development into a pillar of the state began under Bismarck, but was cut short by the Center's opposition to the military Septennat's of 1887 and 1893. Prior to this Windhorst had encouraged the party to support the government's colonial enterprises in East A f r i c a and after his death Lieber, 10 the new party leader, advocated further cooperation with the administration. In 1895 a Centrist was elected President of the Reichstag. T w o years later, another conservative Centrist, Count Ballestrem, 11 assumed this post and exercised it until the dissolution of the Reichstag in 1906. T h e Centrists helped the National Liberals to pass the new judicial code, and in 1899 a large majority of the party voted for the quinquennial military bill. The Center's vote for the Quinquennat of 1899 documented an important change in the party's attitude toward military expansion. In spite of the change, however, the Center's record never became impeccably national. Centrists approved of adequate defenses, but they insisted upon irritating conditions in the interest of fair taxation and economy. They insisted that 10 Ernst Lieber, 1838-1902. 11 Franz Karl Ballestrem, 1834-1910.

BACKGROUND

2J

expenditures be limited by the people's ability to pay, and they believed that the Reichstag had the right to say how much that was. 12 T h e interpretation of these conditions was a matter of opinion; so there was always room for differences between party and government, and room for the party itself to change its attitude without changing its principles. Economy was always a major preoccupation of the Center's. The party was not associated with any particular economic class or vested interest which might benefit from national policies. It represented a cross-section of all groups, and it represented them largely as tax-payers and consumers. Furthermore, the Center, which was something of a " states' rights " party, deplored increases in the income and wealth of the Imperial Government as compared with that of the states. Finally, the Center demanded economy, especially in the national program, out of regard for the small farmers and business men in South Germany and the Catholic laborers in the Rhineland upon whom taxes fell heavily and to whom such things as colonies and the navy seemed far away. There are several facts which help to explain the Center's favorable attitude toward military expansion in 1899. First of all, it fitted in with the efforts of conciliatory party leaders to cooperate with the administration whenever possible. Second, the party may have been convinced that increases in peace strength were necessary and that the people were better able to pay for them in 1899 than in 1893. Finally, the bill itself was more accepable: the five-year program, or Quinquennat, corresponded with the legislative period of the Reichstag which had been changed to five years in 1888; the two-year military service period, given a trial in 1893; was to be continued; and the government had accepted a reduction of 7006 men which the Center had demanded on grounds of economy. 18 T h e Center 12 Election manifestoes of 1884, 1887, 1890, 1903 in Karl Bachem, op. cit., V I I , viii. 13 Erzberger, " D i e Bedeutung des Zentrums fur das Deutsche Zeitschrift fur Politik, 1909, pp. 223-224.

Reich,"

28

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

voted also for the military Quinquennat in 1905. But the impression which this real support in military matters might have made was weakened by irritating demands for economy, by criticism of army administration, military injustice, mistreatment of soldiers, luxury and aristocracy in the officers' corps, and duelling. 14 T h e Center voted f o r the N a v y Bills of 1898 and 1900 too. B u t again they voted upon upon conditions, chief of which were that anticipated expenditures first be covered fully by fair taxation and that economy be observed whenever possible. Thus in 1900, the Center struck off from the government's proposals seven large and seven small cruisers, and added the proviso that expenses in the naval budget above a certain figure might not be covered by increasing indirect taxes upon goods used by the masses. 16 In succeeding years the party opposed the extravagant program of the N a v y League; 1 6 it continued to insist upon economy, and demanded that those most able to bear the cost of the navy be taxed most heavily. 17 W h e n further naval expansion was proposed in November 1905, the Center press emphasized the need for financial reform, and remarked sharply that those who were so ready to sacrifice life and property for the Fatherland must now " bite into the sour apple of a stiff inheritance tax." 18 The government proposed extensive financial reforms, and the Center again objected to indirect taxes upon goods used by the masses. 14 Generaloberst von Einem, Erinnerungen eines Soldaten, 1853-1933 (5th ed.; Leipzig: Koehler, 1933), p. 69 ff.; Erzberger, Die Zentrumspolitik 1im Reichstag, Reichstags-Session 1903-1904 (Coblenz: Gorres, 1904), p. 44 ff.; ibid., Reichstags-Session 1904-1903, p. 44 ff. 15 This was paragraph six of the 1900 Navy Bill. 16 The Navy League was founded in 1898 and agitated for the adoption of a very extensive building program. In 1906 Otto Prince Salm was president, and General August Keim was executive secretary. 17 The Center was instrumental in reducing the 1904-5 naval budget by 9440,400 marks (Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik im Reichstag, 1903-1904, p. 47). 18 Hansgeorg Fernis, Die Flottennovellen im Reichstag, 1906-1912 (" Beitr'dge zur Geschichte der nachbismarckischen Zeit und des Weltkriegs," X X V I I ; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1934), p. I".

29

BACKGROUND

T h e Center was willing to vote for the naval increases, for the long-term naval program, and for the idea that Germany must be strong enough to deter other states f r o m attacking her; but it made its vote dependent upon the previous acceptance of the necessary tax increases. 19 Spahn declared, however, that if the government felt that the international situation required the increases, the party would take cognizance of that as a fact and vote accordingly. 20 So that, when the Center had secured the reduction of a few indirect taxes, it not only voted for the naval increases but actually helped reject a proposal of the Radicals to raise the additional naval expenses by a property tax, a proposal which would have been absolutely unacceptable to the government or the parties of the right. Not only had the Center supported military and naval policies in the way outlined, but it had given support to Germany's colonial enterprises as well. Before his death in 1891, W i n d horst had used the interests of the Catholics in missions and their opposition to slave trade in East A f r i c a as a springboard for a leap into the camp of government supporters. 21 T h e government admitted Catholic missionaries to the colonies; it asserted its readiness to administer the colonies in conformity with the interests of the natives and of the Catholic Church, and to regard the expansion of Christianity and Christian civilization as the main purpose of imperialism. T h e Center's essential demands were thus gratified, and Caprivi encouraged the Center further by speaking of the joint labors of " the musket and the Bible." 22 A f t e r Windhorst's death, the Center's readiness to combine national expansion with church ex\%Ibid., pp. 33, 34, 38; Gröber in the Reichstag, C C X I V , 279. 2 0 Reichstag

Debates,

Reichstag

Debates,

CCXVT, 2328-2329.

21 H a n s Spellmeyer, Deutsche Kolonialpolitik im Reichstag ( " Beiträge zur Geschichte der nachbismarckischen Zeit und des Weltkriegs," X I ; S t u t t g a r t : Kohlhammer, 1931), pp. 28-48; H a n s Pehl, Die deutsche Kolonialpolitik und das Zentrum, 1884-1914 ( D o c t o r a l dissertation, Frankfurt a.M., 1934). PP- 14-48. 22 H a n s Spellmeyer, op. cit., p. 45.

30

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

pansion was personified in Prince Arenberg 23 who quietly took the leadership of the Center in colonial affairs. The Center was officially in f a v o r of a sound colonial policy which would be economical and moderate, and would correspond to the financial capacities of the German people. It supported imperialism as a means of improving the welfare of the nation and especially as a means of spreading Christianity and Christian civilization; but it refused to support an administration of adventurers, maladministration, and scandal. T h e Center demanded the suppression of the slave trade, protection of the missionaries, and ruthless eradication of injustices to the natives. 24 In so f a r as the Center managed to make its demands effective in points that seemed important to it, it supported the government. Colonial budgets were passed with little difficulty as the Center added imperialism to its national program. In addition to approval of army, navy, and colonial programs, the Center had voted f o r the tariff laws of 1902, and in 1 9 0 6 it was about the only party in the Reichstag to o f f e r Biilow consolation f o r , or confidence in, his foreign policy. The Center had certainly assisted in the pursuit of "national " policies, and it cited with pride the recognition of this fact by the Free Conservative leader, Wilhelm von K a r d o r f f , who had said in 1 9 0 4 : " W e cannot say that the gentlemen of the Center have pursued an ultramontane policy with us to any extent. No, gentlemen, they have been German and national in helping us to restore the German national defenses; they have been German and national in restoring the German fleet; they have been German and national in the colonial policy which they have inaugurated in unison with 23 Franz Ludwig Maria Prince von Arenberg (1849-1907). 24 See the Center's electoral manifestoes for 1 8 8 4 and 1 9 0 3 in Karl Bachem, op. cit., VII, 44s ff., 457 ff.; also Pehl, op. cit., pp. 54-58; Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik im Reichstag und Kolonialpolitik (Coblenz: Gorres, 1906), p. 17 ff.

BACKGROUND

31

u s ; and finally they have carried out a German and national policy in supporting the customs tariff. . ." 25 T h e smoothness of the Center's cooperation with the government in national affairs was interrupted, however, by a series of developments which culminated in the outright opposition of the Center to the government's colonial policy in 1906. Chief of these developments were the determination of Bülow's government to develop the colonies by building expensive railways, the Southwest A f r i c a n revolt, and insubordination within the Center ranks. Differences within the Center with regard to colonial policy were largely the result of the division of the party into conservative and radical groups. It may be well to analyze this division briefly. The conservative and more national element of the Center was composed of two main groups: first, the Catholic nobility, aristocracy, and higher clergy, strong especially in parts of Bavaria and Silesia, and represented in the Reichstag by men like Count Ballestrem and Freiherr von H e r d i n g ; 2 6 second, the bourgeoisie of Rhenish Prussia who, except for their Catholicism, were hardly to be distinguished from National Liberals. T h e leaders of this group were Spahn, Karl Bachem, and Trimborn. 2 7 25 In the Reichstag April 13, 1904 (Reichstag Debates, CXCIX, 2027). Chancellor Biilow remarked the following day: " I thoroughly endorse all Herr von Kardorff has said about the praiseworthy cooperation of the Center in great national questions" (Reichstag Debates, CXCIX, 2074). 26 George Freiherr, later Count, von Hertling, 1843-1919, was a university professor and had entered the Reichstag in 1875. He was party speaker for foreign affairs and chairman of the party in the Reichstag from 1909-1912. In 1917-1918 he was Imperial Chancellor. In April 1905 Hertling angered Center circles in Bavaria by an article in Hochland in which he described the dangers threatening the party if it supported itself entirely upon farmers and handworkers, the " lesser people," and if it should let the influence of such people determine the party's policies. "A big business," he wrote, " needs an errand boy, but it is bad when the errand boy plays the b o s s . . . " Some Center deputies took this as an insult, and Dr. Heim, who was later to support Erzberger against Spahn, replied in an article in which he criticized the party's aristocrats (Schulthess, Europäische Geschichtskalendar, 1905, P- 79)-

27 Karl Bachem, 1858-

, is to be distinguished from Julius Bachem, his

32

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

The more radical wing of the Center party flourished in the South German states. It was supported by the Catholics of the lesser middle class in the South German cities, by Catholic laborers in Westphalia and the Rhineland, and especially by the South German farmers, galvanized into a political machine by the energetic lesser clergy. T h e leaders of this group were more democratic and more consciously Catholic than the conservatives; they were outspoken critics of corruption, more ready to assert the religious basis of the party, and more ready to exploit its powerful position in the Reichstag. Schaedler 2 8 could be considered of this group, also Roeren 29 and Dasbach,* 0 but it was Matthias Erzberger," a young deputy from Wurttemburg, who became its sensational leader in 1905 and 1906. Before the Southwest A f r i c a n revolt broke out, the Centrist radicals had been opposed to Germany's imperialism. In supporting the government whenever possible, the Center had, at the turn of the century, approved of public assistance to two private railway enterprises in A f r i c a . But some of the party radicals, led by Dasbach, opposed even this minimum of expenditure; and gradually the group about Dasbach crystalized into a kind of opposition party within the Center which opbrother. Both men belonged to a famous Cologne family. Karl was a member of the Reichstag in 1906 whereas Julius was not. Karl Trimborn, 1854-1921, was the Centrist deputy from Cologne. H e specialized in social legislation, and was chairman of the Center party in the Reichstag, 1919-1921. 28 Franz Xaver Schaedler, 1852-1913, Dean of Bamberg Cathedral. 29 Hermann Roeren, 1884-1920, state's attorney at the district court of appeals in Cologne, deputy for Saarburg-Saarlouis, leader of the strongly confessional " Berlin-Trier " group. 30 George Friederich Dasbach, 1846-1907, a chaplain, and deputy for Trier since 1898. 311875-1921. Erzberger was the youngest member of the Reichstag in 1906, a journalist, and a tireless worker. A native of Baden, he represented Biberach in Wurttemburg. During the World War he first supported the government, then led the peace party. H e was chairman of the armistice committee and a member of the cabinet under Prince Max and under Scheidemann. H e resigned in 1920 and was assassinated in 1921.

BACKGROUND

33

posed the majority's readiness to appropriate money, and which severely criticized government measures. T h e Southwest A f r i c a n revolt had aroused an interest in colonial administration which w a s not entirely friendly. T h e costs of the w a r and of the government's railway program, disclosures of inefficiency in Berlin and of inhumanity in the colonies—all grounds

created

partly

a

patriotic,

very and

unfavorable probably

impression.

partly

political,

On the

radical wing of the Center made capital of these conditions. A t first the Center w a s willing to appropriate all that w a s needed to suppress the Southwest A f r i c a n revolt. B u t difficulties arose in 1 9 0 4 when the government sought to indemnify settlers in the colony for their losses, and to expedite the railway building program. T h e Center objected to donations to settlers, and opposed railways whose value seemed to be only strategic and temporary.® 2 During the summer of 1 9 0 4 , expenses of the a r m y in S o u t h west A f r i c a increased so that money w a s spent without the consent of the Reichstag. T h e Center objected and expressed its g r o w i n g distrust of the colonial administration. 3 3 T h r o u g h 32 In March 1904 the government asked two million marks as indemnity for losses caused by the revolt, but the Center would approve of nothing except as " loans to the injured, or assistance to the needy." The government had difficulty in differentiating between " injured " and " needy," and in the fall of 1904 requested a further five million marks to be used as aid for the settlers in the Hereroland. The Center struck off two million and required that the remainder be used for the whole colony. In this connection Erzberger made his first speech in the Reichstag on colonial policy and expressed the party's stand with unusual sharpness—that settlers ought to bear the risks of their adventure, and that a subvention to settlers was tantamount to placing a premium upon improper treatment of the natives which caused revolts (Spellmeyer, op. cit., pp. 93-101). For railways whose chance of financial success was favorable, as those in Kamerun and in German East Africa, the Center voted enthusiastically [Erzberger in the Reichstag, May 25, 1905 (Reichstag Debates, CCIV, 6174 fF.), and Schwarze on the same day (ibid., p. 6154 ff.)]. But the party was sensitive about railways in Southwest Africa whose only purpose seemed to be a military one. It was supposed that the revolt would be suppressed long before the railways could be used, so the Center saw no justification for them. 33 Reichstag Debates, CCI, 3343 fT.

34

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

out 1905 the Center continued to approve the requirements for the military campaign in Southwest A f r i c a , but sharply criticized unfavorable monopoly contracts. Shortly after the beginning of the Reichstag session of 1905-6, Erzberger began a series of disclosures in the p r e s s " which were the opening guns in a campaign that caused untold discomfort for the government, which drove the recognized Center leaders into a most disadvantageous parliamentary position and nearly dislodged them from the leadership of the party. Erzberger's articles, which were anonymous, dealt with financial and economic conditions, contrasting the huge sums spent in Southwest A f r i c a with the small actual return; and they made specific charges against the colonial administration which was accused of aimlessness, bureaucracy, inefficiency, corruption, and lack of frankness in its dealings with the Reichstag. Erzberger revealed the unsavory stories of a Kamerun railway concession, of the contracts giving Tippleskirch Company a monopoly in outfitting the Southwest A f r i c a n military expedition, and giving the Woermann Line a monopoly on direct shipping between Germany and the revolt-torn colony. H e could not make specific accusations of incorrect behavior, but he insisted that the whole system did not represent the best interests of the Empire. A flood of criticism was then let loose in the Reichstag. It grew until it reached giant proportions in January and February 1906, with the Radical People's Party and the Social Democrats joining. T h e result was that even the National Liberal leader Bassermann 3S confessed that much had been lacking in the colonial administration.®8 U p to this point the critical attitude of the Center was shared by both wings of the party. Erzberger's press campaign had been condoned by party leaders, but he now began to exceed the limits which they thought he should observe. Material from dissatisfied officials 34 Kölnische

Zeitung, Sept.-Nov., 1905.

35 Ernst Bassermann, 1854-1917. 36 In the Reichstag March 26, 1906 (Reichstag Debates, CCXV1, 2301).

BACKGROUND

35

and government bidders came to him in great abundance. He was inclined to use it without sufficient investigation, and he began to take the part of some of these officials. T h e party conservatives felt that these activities o f the thirty-one year old " upstart " were " undesirable." And when Erzberger became particularly virulent in his attack upon Prince Hohenlohe, 3 7 and his information appeared to be none too reliable, Spahn openly rebuked him in the Reichstag. 3 8 B u t Erzberger, confident in the backing of the South German radicals in the party, politely refused to change his tactics. Spahn, busy three days a week as president o f a district court of appeals in Kiel, practically had to yield the party leadership to the ambitious upstart. Bachem left the Budget Committee because he could not be responsible for Erzberger's stand.8® Hertling had no inclination to " take a hand in this foolishness." 4 0 But Erzberger worked late into the night, read memoranda, wrote ceaselessly during Reichstag sessions, gladly undertook the unpleasant work in commissions, and made himself, by his indefatigable energy and his knowledge, practically indispensable to the party. 41 37 Ernst Prince zu Hohenlohe-Langenburg, b. 1863, Colonial Director, 1905-6, was married to a cousin of the Emperor and had been Regent in Saxe-Coburg-Gotha since 1900. 38March 15, 1906 (Reichstag Debates,

CCXVI, 2029ff.).

39 Karl Bachem, op. cit., VI, 347. 40 From a letter dated April 10, 1906 [Fr. Thimme (ed.) Front Wider Biilow, Staatsmänner, Diplomaten und Forscher su seinen Denkwürdigkeiten (Munich: Bruckmann, 1931), p. 141]. That the distrust of the colonial administration was shared by the conservative elements of the party is indicated by a speech of Bachem's on March 16, 1906 in which he complained that the Reichstag had to ask the administration three times before it could get an answer to a simple question, and he declared that it was small wonder that the faith of the Reichstag in the administration was weakened {Reichstag Debates, CCXVI, 2079). 41 In April 1906 Erzberger published a brochure, Die Kolonial-Bilanz, Bilder aus der deutschen Kolonialpolitik... (Berlin, Germania), in which he presented his case against the colonial administration, raising objections to expenditures and to the slight trade advantages which the colonies offered in return, to the bureaucracy and the absence of any planning, to the license

36

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

T h i s situation did not remain w i t h o u t repercussions national politics. U n d e r party

radicals,

the

colonial bills in M a y

the influence of

Center

took

the

lead

Erzberger

upon

and

in rejecting

the

three

1 9 0 6 , a n d in m a k i n g an essential reduc-

tion in the 1 9 0 6 budget f o r S o u t h w e s t A f r i c a . 4 2 W h e n the colonial bills c a m e up in the R e i c h s t a g , the discussion o f colonial scandals w a s at its height, a n d it w a s k n o w n that in t w o months the g o v e r n m e n t h a d spent nearly half

of

the entire y e a r ' s appropriation f o r the revolt-torn colony. I n D e c e m b e r 1 9 0 5 E r z b e r g e r h a d not yet m a d e his influence in the C e n t e r predominant. T h e g o v e r n m e n t h a d asked f o r a r a i l w a y in the southern portion of S o u t h w e s t A f r i c a , 4 3 w h e r e the greatest difficulties w e r e encountered in p r o v i s i o n i n g

the

troops. E r z b e r g e r objected to this proposed military road, but the C e n t e r as a w h o l e approved o f it. I n the S p r i n g of 1 9 0 6 , h o w e v e r , the C e n t e r f o l l o w e d

Erz-

berger and the radicals. W h e n the g o v e r n m e n t asked f o r an extension o f the S o u t h w e s t A f r i c a n r a i l w a y still f a r t h e r land, the entire p a r t y opposed

i t ; a n d they

w e r e joined

inin

opposition b y the R a d i c a l People's P a r t y and the S o c i a l D e m o crats. exercised by settlers and traders in their dealings with the natives, and to the government's misdirected policy toward the natives. H e made specific proposals for reform—which did not include an independent colonial secretariat. Einem provides an interesting estimate of Erzberger's work at this time. Erzberger, he said, was " an unusually diligent man who thought nothing of working over material late into the night, night after night. H e acquired thereby a fundamental understanding of the budget, whose secrets he soon understood as well as veteran officials. It was astounding how the man worked, writing constantly during the debates and yet letting no word escape him. Erzberger had a powerful command of language, had a sharp and pointed tongue, and he made himself indispensable as a kind of walking encyclopedia. Many well established personalities of the party hated the Wiirttemburg schoolmaster with his democratic ideas and his humble beginnings. But they could not get rid of h i m . . . " (op. cit., 69-70). 42 F r o m 93,142,100 marks to 77,600,000 marks. The Reichstag added the provision that the money might be used for re-transportation of troops to Germany—a gentle hint that the troops should be withdrawn. 43 F r o m Luderitzbucht to Kubub.

BACKGROUND

37

The revised attitude of the Center was based upon reasons which the party radicals had brought forth a year before. They were not impressed by the argument that large numbers of troops would be needed in the colony long after the revolt was suppressed and that during these years the railway would pay for itself by reducing military transportation costs. They did not see that the road would be of immediate military value, since it could hardly be completed within two years. They did not believe that economic conditions warranted the railway from a business point of view. The revolt was already costing exhorbitant sums, and the deputies began to think about having to vote the necessary taxes. Besides, Morgena, who was the most important leader of the rebels at this stage, had been driven into English territory in March and had been taken into custody by the Cape police. The majority of the Budget Committee and of the Reichstag felt that, if the revolt could not be put down quickly after Morgena's flight, perhaps the whole south of the colony ought to be left to the natives. Colonel von Diemling, head of the Southwest A f r i c a n expedition, was so upset by the obdurate stand of the Reichstag majority that he thundered at the House: " A s long as I have the honor to command the troops out there, the south of the colony will not be given up unless his Majesty the Emperor, who alone and no one else has the right to decide, so desires it. . . . Must I first place a couple of starved corpses on the table of the H o u s e ? " (before the railway is approved) ** There had been little chance that the Center or the Radical People's Party would support the railway to begin with. A f t e r Colonel von Diemling's outburst even the nationally inclined Radical Alliance voted against it,45 and the railway bill was defeated. This was on May 26, 1906, and on the same day two other colonial bills were rejected.. 44 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X V I I , 3538.

45 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X V I I , 3542.

38

THE GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

T h e government's request for ten million marks to aid sufferers in the revolt was rejected with general consent. A l though the " national " parties shared in the defeat of this bill, the Center took the lead in the attack upon it and was later blamed for its failure to pass. In 1904-5 the Reichstag had appropriated five millions to aid Southwest A f r i c a n settlers, but the money already voted did not seem to have improved the economic situation in the colony. Many beneficiaries had misused their grants, and the government had not observed the conditions laid down by the Reichstag. Instead of voting the money, the Reichstag adopted the Center's motion asking the government to furnish exact information about the spending of the five millions already appropriated. 48 O n the same day, the Reichstag rejected an appropriation f o r an independent Colonial Secretary. Until this moment, German colonial affairs had been conducted by the Director o f a Colonial Department in the Foreign Office. Colonial business had swollen to large proportions, and the department was overburdened. T h e Colonial Director was responsible to the F o r e i g n Minister, but also had the privilege of dealing directly with the Chancellor. T h e result was that neither Foreign Secretary nor Chancellor had exact supervision over affairs. Billow had given previous notice of

his intention to r e f o r m

the

colonial administration in Berlin, 47 and he now declared that only an independent secretary could create order out of the chaos in the Colonial Department. 48 T h e budget for 1906 contained the items necessary f o r the creation of an independent colonial secretariat. Centrists opposed any enlargement of the Colonial Department from the beginning. T h e y felt that an independent secre46 Reichstag Debates, C C X V I I , 3543-3548; Reichstogssession 1905-6, II, v, Kolonialverwoltung und Schutsgebiete ( B e r l i n : Buchhandlung der N a tionalliberalen Partei, 1906), p. 67; Erzberger, Die Zentrumspolitik im Reichstag, 1905-6, pp. 53-54. 47 In the Reichstag Dec. 5, 1904 (Reichstag Debates, CCI, 3377). 48 Reichstag Debates, C C X V I , 2417-8.

BACKGROUND

39

tariat would make bigger demands and make them more effectively, and that colonial budgets would simply become larger and larger. They feared that the separation of the Colonial Department from the Foreign Office might lead to unfortunate complications in international relations." They lacked faith in the Colonial Department and saw no reason why they should honor it by promoting it to a Secretariat. And perhaps they were influenced, although it was vehemently denied, by the fact that the Colonial Director, Prince Hohenlohe, was an outspoken anti-Centrist and a member of the Evangelical League. 80 The Center tried to compromise by providing for an Assistant Secretary of State (in addition to the Director) who would be made an independent representative of the Chancellor, but had no success. At the second reading of the budget on March 29-30, the post of a Secretary was adopted, but at the third reading on May 26 the Reichstag reversed itself. This astonished political observers at the time, but there were several explanations. Prince Biilow had suffered a physical breakdown in April and was unable to represent the government. His underlings were not as able as he. Colonel Diemling's tactless behavior had caused considerable ill feeling. Finally, the Center was more strongly represented in May than in March, many South German deputies having arrived in Berlin for the closing sessions. It is evident from an analysis of the voting that the conservative Centrists, who had led the party for over a decade, had not wished to carry their opposition so far, but had been overruled by the radicals within the party. There were two record votes on May 26. In the early afternoon of this day the Center voted almost solidly against the South African railway. Later, when the vote on the independent Colonial Office was taken, the conservative leaders wanted to let the 49 Fritzen and Grober in the Reichstag Dec. 6 and 13, 1905 (Reichstag Debates, CCXIV, 132 ff., 269 ff.) ; Erzberger, Die Kolonial-Bilam, pp. 44-47. 50 Karl Bachem, op. cit., VI, 339.

40

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

appropriation pass without a record vote. A n outsider, the Guelphian Count Bernstorff, demanded the vote by name, and Count Ballestrem, through the secretary, asked the Center not to support the proposal. But various members of the house began to stand and the rest could not well remain seated. 51 T h e Center's vote on the Colonial Office was not unanimous. Three conservative Centrists, who had voted on the railway bill a short time before, were conveniently missing. 52 E i g h t members actually voted in favor of the Colonial Secretary. 63 S i x others withheld their votes. That is, out of 82 Centrists in the Reichstag building, eight supported the government, and nine refused to vote against it. A m o n g this minority were some of the most important Center leaders, but the party as a whole followed Erzberger and the radicals. 54 The conservative Centrists no longer controlled the party, and the Center's hard won position as a supporter of national measures was surrendered against the better judgment of one fifth of its members. T h e Reichstag was unable to agree on an Undersecretary for Colonies and restored the status quo by voting for a Colonial Director, then adjourned for the summer. Biilow traveled to Norderney a few weeks after his breakdown and remained away from Berlin. Government was at a standstill. The Morocco crisis was over, and for want of better material, the newspapers took up the colonial scandals. Led by the Centrist press, they dug up further tid-bits for the delectation of the reading—and voting—public. By way of retaliation, friends of the colonies and enemies of the Catholics revived the campaign against the Center Party and against Catholicism in general. 55 51 August Tiedemann's article in Der Tag, Feb. 16, 1907, No. 85; Reichstagssession, 1905-6, II, v, Kolonialverwaltung und Schutzgebiete, p. 19. 52 Bachem, Spahn and Hitze. 53Arenberg, Ballestrem, Fusangel, Hertling, Rinteln, Schwarze, Strombeck and Zehnhoff. 54 Vote list is in Reichstag Debates, CCXVII, 3560-3562. 55 Karl Bachem, op. cit., VI, 317 ff.; Karl von Hertling, in Fr. Thimme, op. cit., p. 141.

BACKGROUND

41

Government officials were naturally irritated by the actions of the Centrists in the Reichstag and by the agitation in the Centrist press, but the officials of the Colonial Department nursed a special grievance against the Center Party because of the secret interference of certain Centrist deputies in the affairs of the colonial administration. Intrinsically the incidents complained of were not important, but much was to be made of them so it may be well to recount them briefly here. The Center had always insisted upon official favor to missionaries in the colonies and, in the course of difficulties between government officials and the missionaries, had taken the part of the latter. In 1903 a standing feud between officials and Catholic missionaries in T o g o had flared up anew, resulting in the arbitrary arrest and temporary incarceration of two fathers of the Styler Mission there; and the Prefect of the mission applied to the Centrist Deputy Roeren for advice. A l though the T o g o officials had soon rectified the error, Roeren, through the Chancellor, arranged for a conference between the Prefect and the Colonial Director, at which Roeren was asked to be present. A s a result of the conference, the wishes of the mission were met, and several undesirable officials in T o g o were transferred, much to the chagrin of the bureaucracy. 59 Ill feeling was kept alive by a series of slander suits in the T o g o courts, and the mutual recriminations continued well into 1906. There was a small clique of officials in T o g o and Kamerun whose immorality angered the missionaries. The officials, in turn, were irritated by the indignation of the missionary fathers. 67 Meanwhile in Berlin Roeren and Erzberger honorably but tactlessly tried to protect certain subalterns from the wrath 56 A memorandum left by Assessor König, w h o was also present, characterized the demand that a certain H e r r Lang be transferred as a " shameful humiliation." 57 Officials complained that the missionaries tried to undermine their authority, and Billow had gone so far once as t o charge Catholic missionaries with much of the responsibility for uprisings in Africa [Fürst Bülows Reden, ed. Johannes Penzier ( B e r l i n : Reimer, 1907-1909), II, 390].

42

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

of official displeasure, and thus incurred the further animosity of the Colonial Department. The story of their efforts is as follows: A subaltern in Togo, Wistuba, by name, who had befriended the missionaries there and at one time had informed them as to the progress of official business, returned to Berlin on vacation and was detained there by what he considered a trumped-up charge of ill health. In company with one Poeplau, an undersecretary in the Colonial Department, he gathered and exchanged materials incriminating to his superiors. Their joint efforts to bring about corrective action having failed, Poeplau delivered his material to Müller-Sagan, a deputy of the Radical People's Party, who took it to the Chancellor with the request for an investigation. Billow thereupon instituted disciplinary proceedings against Poeplau for having divulged government secrets. When the investigation indicated that Wistuba was also involved, proceedings were begun against him as well. Wistuba had been agitated for some time by the fear of an official intrigue against him, and the Colonial Director promised him in December 1904 that what he had done in Togo would not be held against him. The Colonial Director also asked Roeren to try to quiet Wistuba's fears. But Roeren now felt that, if Wistuba were put on trial for what he had done in Berlin, the whole unseemly story of the strife in Togo would be unrolled before the public. In trying to avoid this, he made several efforts to have the disciplinary investigation of Wistuba set aside in favor of a summary settlement by the Chancellor himself. On two occasions he expressed the opinion that the publicity which Wistuba's trial would bring to the scandalous conditions in Togo would have an unfortunate effect upon Catholic public opinion and might alter the attitude of the Center toward colonial bills, a prognostication which coincided remarkably with succeeding events. But department officials interpreted this as a threat that, unless the Wistuba affair were settled in Wistuba's favor, the Center would not support the government's colonial program." 8 58 Memorandum of Assessor Brückner, Feb. 12, 1906.

BACKGROUND

43

Then Erzberger tried to have the trial of Poeplau set aside in favor of a general investigation, and at one time apparently threatened the government with the publication of the material Poeplau had gathered, at the same time promising that it would be surrendered if Poeplau were exonerated. 58 One may regard the actions of Roeren and Erzberger as taken in good faith, but they were in the highest degree tactless and unwise. Government officials, jealous of their traditions, interpreted them in the worst possible light, and their memoranda indicated their extreme irritation. Although both Roeren and Erzberger had acted in a private capacity, so far as that was possible, the government chose to regard their importunities as being made in the name of the whole Center Party, and relations between the administration and the Center were further strained. 00 59 Erzberger was also involved in proceedings against another official named Koch, in July 1907. Koch had furnished Erzberger with materials too, which Erzberger had used, apparently without sufficient corroboration. 6 0 O f the memoranda referred to, three deserve mention: 1. T h a t made by Assessor König after the interview of Roeren and Prefect Bücking with the Colonial Director Nov. 23-24, 1904. 2. T h a t made by Assessor Brückner after Roeren's testimony at the investigation of Wistuba, Feb. 12, 1906. According to Brückner, Roeren declared that if the Wistuba affair were not settled to the satisfaction of the Center, the Center would vote no m o r e colonial credits. T h e official protocol of the testimony, which Roeren read and signed, however, contained nothing of the sort. Roeren denied the accuracy of Brückner's report, but admitted that he may have privately remarked that if the T o g o scandals became public, it would probably have an adverse effect upon the Center's actions. Roeren's letter to Bülow, Feb. 11, 1906, and a telegram of June 2, 1906 in which he requested a private settlement of the Wistuba affair, should be interpreted in the light of his own and the government's desire to avoid publicity. 3. T h e memorandum made by von Loebell, Chief of the Imperial Chancelry, covering Erzberger's first visit to him, Sept. 26, 1905, which set forth that Erzberger said that Poeplau was prepared to give up his material if the charges against him were dropped, but that otherwise the material would be published. Erzberger was never able to deny that he had made this proposal, although he insisted that the essential part of his plea was first to have the trial of Poeplau set aside (which he knew was impossible), and second, to have a general investigation begun, in which justifiable effort he failed. It is to be noted that all three memoranda were drawn up after the Center

44

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

When Spahn made his annual visit to Biilow at Norderney, he came home much discouraged, and afraid of an open break between

Center

and government,

for

the

Chancellor

had

hardly given him an opportunity to talk of political affairs.* 1 Furthermore, Bülow received the leader of the Radical People's Party at Norderney for the first time in his Chancellorship, and discussed with him the situation within the Radical People's Party, where the attitude to national questions appeared to have changed in March 1906. W e shall now try to discover the attitude of German Radicals to national policies and how it changed. deputies had left. Neither Roeren nor Erzberger had ever seen them. Their phrasing showed an incurable bias against both the Center and any interference with the affairs of the department. Such bald résumés of conversations made by prejudiced officials may not be absolutely reliable. But Pehl {op. cit.), who had access to the records of the Colonial Department and who gives the fullest recent account of these incidents, inclines towards faith in the government memoranda. He does, however, make the same error as Roeren's critics in terming Roeren's effort to have Wistuba's trial set aside as illegal. The trial had not yet begun, and Bülow had the right to settle the matter in summary fashion himself (Laws of Mar. 31, 1893, and August 5, 1896), and this was what Roeren wanted. The important letters and memoranda connected with Roeren are printed in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Dec. 13, 1906, No. 291 ; in A. Schreiber, Jenseits des Urteils Roeren gegen Schmidt (Cologne: Boisseree, 1907) ; and in the Reichstag Debates for Dec. 3 and 13, 1906. A long article about Wistuba appeared in the Bayerische Kurier, Jan. 8, 1907, No. 8, and a letter of Roeren's in his own defense appeared in the same paper for Jan. 15, 1907, No. 15. Georg Schmidt, one of the Togo officials whom Roeren attacked in the Reichstag, a man of sensitive honor but lax morality, who had been most active in suing the missionaries in Togo, felt himself slandered by Roeren's speeches in the Reichstag, and published a brief for his own case, Schmidt gegen Roeren. Unter dem Kaudinischen Joch (Berlin: Schwetschke, 1907). Erzberger's various accounts of his interview with Loebell are: a sworn statement at the trial of Koch, July 10, 1906, quoted by Loebell in the Reichstag, Mar. 4, 1907; a published interview in the Lokal Anzeiger, Nov. 14, 1906; his testimony in the proceedings against Poeplau, Feb. 16, 1907, in Germania, Feb. 17, 1907, No. 40, i ; and his account given in the Reichstag Mar. 3-4-s, 1907 (Reichstag Debates, CCXXVII, 198-199; CCXXXIII, 242 ff.). The whole evidence was gone over again in 1920 in the ErzbergerHelfferich trial [Der Erzberger-Prozess (Berlin, 1920)]. 61 Spahn, " Das Jahr 1906," Das Deutsche Volk, July 15, 1928.

BACKGROUND THE

45

RADICALS

German liberals had never been agreed upon " n a t i o n a l " issues. There was a contradiction in their political philosophy which required both loyalty to the autocratic German national state, and fidelity to the ideal of liberal, parliamentary government. This contradiction was a constant source of difficulty and led to friction and secession. A s we have seen, the National Liberals subordinated their liberal convictions to the " national necessity" whenever their patriotism might be called in question. T h e German Radical Party, 8 2 however, clung to liberalism, to demands for real parliamentary government and freedom of trade. In 1886-1887 the German Radical Party opposed the military Septennat and declared its opposition to all army increases. For this the party was punished by large losses in the 1887 elections. These losses were recouped in 1890, but certain Radicals were unwilling to oppose any more military bills. Six of them voted for Caprivi's Quinquennat in 1893, but the majority of the Radicals practically read the six members out of the party. These seceded and formed the Electoral League of Liberals, or Radical Alliance. The new party 63 supported national bills. They voted for the army bills of 1899 ar>d I 9°5> the naval bills of 1898 and 1900, increases in ship subsidies, and the expenses of colonial enterprise. In this respect the Radical Alliance differed from the rest of the German Radical Party which persisted in rejecting so-called national bills. 94 62 Formed in 1884 by the union of the German Progressive Party and some National Liberal secessionists under Heinrich Rickert (1833-1902). 63 The most prominent members were Heinrich Rickert, Karl Schrader (1834-1913), and Theodor Barth (1849-1909). 64 Eugen Richter, Politisches ABC Buck (10th ed.; Berlin: Fortschritt, 1903), p. 63. With respect to domestic politics, the Radical Alliance leaned farther to the left than their less " national" brethren; they were more vigorous in opposition to tariffs; they were cordial to the Social Democrats; and they even advocated a parliamentary bloc of liberals and Socialists

46

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

The majority of the German Radical Party reconstituted itself in 1893 under the leadership of Eugen Richter 85 as the Radical People's Party and refused to become " national." They kept their faith in economic laissez-faire and in parliamentary, responsible government. The party represented men of convinced liberal views, large commercial and banking interests, and the lesser merchants. Many of its members and friends were Jews. Belief in laissez-faire involved belief in free trade, and both Radical parties opposed the tariff legislation of 1902. The Radical People's Party carried the logic of free trade much farther, and questioned the value of colonies and the whole theory of national imperialism. The Radical opposition to colonial enterprise was not opposition to imperialism per se, but to imperialism which did not develop naturally along lines marked out by the self-interest of untrammeled business enterprise. The Radicals had originally given somewhat hesitant support to Bismarck's colonial policy, but they became afraid that the government would exceed the bounds of this modest policy, and in the late 1880's they moved over into opposition. The Radicals represented the prevalent belief that colonies were not worth the effort, and they seized upon all the evils, dangers, and inhumanities of the white conquest of Africa as focal points for their opposition. Not even the coolness of Caprivi's administration toward colonies nor Caprivi's interest in tariff reduction moved them from their obstinate opposition [Theodor Barth and Friedrich Naumann, Die Erneuerung des Liberalismus. Ein politischer Weckruf (Berlin: Hilfe, 1906)]. In 1903 the Radical Alliance was joined by Friedrich Naumann's National Socialist Party. Naumann (1860-1919) was one of the most vigorous political thinkers in Germany. His National Socialists were, as the name suggests, leftist in domestic politics, but rightist and chauvinist in national affairs. See their manifestoes of 1896 and 1903 in Chr. Grotewold, Die Parteien des deutschen Reichstages (Leipzig: Weigand, 1908), p. 230. For Naumann see the biography by Theodor Heuss, Friedrich Naumann, der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1937). 65 1838-1906.

BACKGROUND

47

to any tariff or colony. Their criticism of Germany's colonial policy became milder, and temporarily there were conciliatory words; their opposition w a s not expressed in fundamentals, but in criticism of details. In effect, however, there was no change. 68 Uncertainty as to whether capital outlay in colonies would really pay dividends was the crux of Radical opposition to imperialism. This was especially so in the case of A f r i c a n railways, where there was insufficient trade to warrant large investments. The Radicals insisted that, if a railway were a good investment, private enterprise could undertake it without government interference. A n d they refused to consider such railways in the light of world politics. 87 In addition the Radicals were disgusted with the expense of colonial enterprise and the scandals in the colonial administration. In December 1905 one of them bluntly told the Reichstag, " O u r people are tired of colonies." 88 The same financial and theoretical considerations played a large role in the opposition of the Radical People's Party to increases in military and naval expenses. T h e Radicals estimated the national necessity in such matters much more modestly than the government, and they did not allow patriotic emotion or national pride to influence their decisions. 66 F o r a more complete discussion see Spellmeyer, op. cit., p. 33 ff. Although the Radicals condemned the " D r a n g nach weltpolitischem Abenteuer," the occupation of Kiaochow did not meet with their customary opposition. One reason for this was that the Radicals regarded all colonies largely as markets, and prospects of sales were more favorable in China than in Africa. Richter even looked with favor upon a railway in Shantung (Eugen Richter, op. cit., pp. 99-100). 67 Richter, op. cit., p. 100 ff. A resolution of the Radical People's Party convention at Wiesbaden, Sept. 1905, read: " I n view of the lack of success in the colonies, the convention declares itself decidedly opposed to a continuation and expansion of the present system of colonial policy. It does not consider it a task of the Empire to make possible through subventions or guarantees the construction of colonial railways for which the economic prerequisites do not yet e x i s t . . . " (Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 26, 1905, No. 267, i ) . 68 Kopsch, on Dec. 2, 1905 (Reichstag Debates, C C X I V , 97).

48

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

It is curious that, although the German naval program was advocated by patriots to protect German commercial interests abroad, it was just those trading interests, represented in the Radical People's Party, w h o opposed the naval program. In the first place they were men of liberal views who were antagonized by the form in which the plans were presented. The naval bills of 1898 and 1900 laid down a program to be followed until 1917 and required the Reichstag to surrender its right to make appropriations annually. Such a surrender left the government comparatively independent of the Reichstag and was objectionable to men who believed in the responsibility of ministers to parliaments. A second reason for the Radicals' objection to the German navy bills was the fear that such bills gave unnecessary publicity to plans which would remain on paper for many years, would alarm other countries, and instigate more rapid naval building abroad. In the third place, the Radicals objected because they knew that the cost of the new navy would be raised by indirect taxes which would handicap trade and commerce. Finally they argued that German trade had developed phenomenally without a navy and would continue to do so. Naval power, they said, would never be a substitute for good will. F o r a navy to be paraded in the interest of a " so-called Weltpolitik " they had no sympathy at all. 89 T h e Radical People's Party opposed big military bills too. They approved of an army strong enough to defend German interests at home and abroad, but they felt that the government's demands exceeded the limits of necessity. T h e y voted for annual military appropriations, but they criticized the army administration in details 70 and objected to laws like those of 1899 and 1905 which determined the peace strength of the army for five years in advance. A n d they felt that, as a rule, 69 Reichstag dritte Parteitag

Debates, C L X X I , 5828 ff.; Richter, op. cit., pp. 122-129; Der der Freisinnigen Volkspartei ( B e r l i n : Fortschritt, 1897), p. 26.

7 0 T h e y demanded shorter military service, restrictions o n military courts, abolition of duelling, etc.

BACKGROUND

49

the international situation did not require a r m y

increases,

especially sudden and dramatic ones. 71 In 1905 the administration met one of the Radical demands by

permanently

establishing

the

two-year

military

service

period, but the government's insistence that military requirements be voted quinquennially instead of annually caused the Radical People's P a r t y to remain in opposition. 72 E v e n within such a small party as the Radical

People's

Party, 7 3 perfect agreement on all questions w a s not possible. Precisely these questions of army, n a v y , and colonies f o r m e d a point upon which various w i n g s of the party began to differ. A s long as E u g e n Richter lived, the party opposed all bills which infringed upon the Reichstag's right to make appropriations annually. B u t a y o u n g e r group felt that a change in platf o r m was necessary. T h e y were more sensitive to the development of national sentiment among the people, more ambitious f o r the future o f their party, and not so closely bound to the abstractions

of

19th-century

liberalism.

In

their

opinion,

colonial expansion, a large navy, and a large army were more important than futile insistence upon the constitutional rights of

the Reichstag. In their opinion, colonies might help to

expand German trade, and German trade might need a fleet to protect it a f t e r all. T w o events enabled the Radical People's P a r t y to adopt the views o f the national w i n g of the party. O n e was the Southwest A f r i c a n revolt; the other was the death of E u g e n Richter in 1906. W h e n the first extra credit f o r the Southwest A f r i c a n revolt w a s asked in 1904, the entire Radical g r o u p voted f o r the 2,821,200 marks.

Exact

information

was

lacking, but

the

Radicals showed no inclination to bicker. T h e speaker f o r the Radical People's P a r t y explained that they could not reject 71 Der

dritte Parteitag

dcr Fretsinnigen

Volkspartei,

op. cit., pp. 134-13S. 72 Reichstag Debates, C C I I I , 5417.

73 There were 18-19 members in the Reichstag 1903-1906.

p. 23;

Richter,

50

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

this demand " because men's lives are in the balance." 74 Believing that the restoration of security to life and property was the important consideration, the Radical People's Party withheld its criticism, and continued to vote all the supplementary credits needed. They even voted f o r a colonial railway in December 1905 because it seemed indispensable from a military point of v i e w . " The readiness of the Radical People's Party to help the government suppress the revolt might have had little significance alone, but it coincided with other signs of the party's growing sympathy with " national " policies. In the spring of 1905, the party rejected the military Quinquennat as a whole, but voted for certain technical improvements and increases in the troops. T h e reasons given were that new times required such advances and that the efficiency, if not the size, of the army had to be kept at its maximum. 7 4 In the fall of the same year one of the Reichstag deputies declared at the Radical People's Party convention that colonies were definitely worth while and that the party should cease being so critical. 77 Furthermore, the party was perceptibly more friendly to the naval bill presented to the Reichstag in the winter of 1905. The naval bill of 1906 was clearly framed to meet the wishes of the Radicals as far as possible. There were three main proposals: six large cruisers for the foreign fleet, seven new tor74 Reichstag Debates, C X C V I I , 369. 75 In the budget committee Muller-Sagan remarked that just because the Radical People's Party supported this railway it did not follow that they would be ready to vote for others [Otto Wiemer, Die Freisinnige Volkspartei und die Reichstagswahlen von 1907 (Berlin: Deutsche Presse, 1907), p. 7; also Spellmeyer, op. cit., p. 109]. 76 Reichstag Debates, CCIII, 5417. 77 Dr. Eickhoff said that Germany's " international foreign trade must be supported in every way. In the face of the changed world political situation, something must be done for the economic development of the colonies, by building railways, for instance. N e w times require new politics, and it may be that some day something will come of our territories" (Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 26, 1905, No. 267, i ) . Richard Eickhoff (b. 1854) was a university professor and stood on the extreme right wing of the party.

BACKGROUND

51

pedo-boat divisions, and the increased displacement of battleships. O f these only the first was included in a navy bill. T h e others were incorporated in the ordinary budget for 1906-7. The Radicals made no determined opposition to these naval proposals. T h e y repeated their old arguments, but they admitted that Germany ought to have as good a fleet as the other powers. They agreed that the changes were technically necessary, and that they would undoubtedly be approved. T h e tone of their criticism was friendly, and they were especially pleased that the most important of the new demands were included in the annual budget. 78 Nevertheless, they rejected the navy law in the Budget Committee, although they considered its contents justifiable. Patriots considered this putting party doctrine above the interests of the Empire,7® but the Radical People's Party still refused to take any part in binding the Reichstag in its right to make appropriations annually. T h e y objected to any long term program because it was unnecessary and unconstitutional, and because the program would be revised in a few years anyway. They would vote for the provisions included in the budget, but for no more. 80 A t the second reading of the naval laws, the Radical People's Party astonished everyone by agreeing to support the proposals entirely only if the costs of the new program were covered by a tax on property, and not " by indirect taxes . . . on the necessities of life, or by stamp taxes which injure trade and industry, and handicap commerce." 81 This new consideration was a purely tactical one. The Radical People's Party was ready to ignore the " weighty con78 Frankfurter

Zeitung,

N o v . 18, 1905, N o . 320, i i ; Fernis, op. cit., p. 16 ff.

79 Fernis (op. cit., p. 3 6 ) passes the same judgment, although he admits (p. 3 9 ) that the Reichstag's right to make annual appropriations did remain only on paper after the l a w s of 1898 and 1900; for if the Reichstag passed the laws, it w a s then obliged to make the needed appropriations. 80 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X V I , 2330-2331.

81 Ibid. Müller-Sagan made this statement on behalf of the Radical People's Party and the South German People's Party. T h e proposal of the property t a x was made in the form of an amendment t o the navy bill ( R e i c h s t a g Debates, C C X X I I I , Aktenstück 313).

52

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

stitutional considerations " which had always determined its attitude before. But it was not yet prepared for " positive cooperation." The party's great leader, Richter, had clung to the Budget Right of the Reichstag as to a dogma. W h i l e he lived the younger group, which was anxious for a revision of the party's stand in national questions, had been pacified by promises of a change after Richter's death. Richter died in March 1906 and released the younger men from the shackles with which their respect for their leader had bound them. But that same loyalty to the party leader, which strongly influenced German parliamentary life, demanded that the volte face be made neither too openly nor too suddenly. The proposal of a property tax enabled the party to give up its dogmatic arguments about annual appropriations without desecrating the memory of its late leader. 82 The property tax was an old liberal, and Center, demand. Its proposal in 1906 must have embarrassed the National Liberals and the Center as well as the Economic Alliance and the Radical Alliance. When the Reichstag vetoed the property tax, the Radical People's Party voted against the navy bill as a whole. They voted for the increase in ship displacement, however, and for the torpedo-boat divisions provided for in the budget; and that made a decided impression. Similarly the party broke with tradition in colonial policy. Their deputies had opposed the independent Colonial Office both in the first reading in the Reichstag and in the Budget Committee. But after Richter's death they suddenly favored the proposal. They offered no adequate explanation for the sudden change in attitude; but they explained rather weakly that, after the unfortunate experiences with the existing system, a change could well be considered, and that they preferred to accept the government's judgment in a matter which was a 82 Letter of Dr. Muller-Meiningen to the author. That the Radical People's Party did not take its own amendment seriously seems to be indicated by the fact that half of their deputies were absent when the vote on it took place.

BACKGROUND

53

question of method and not of principle. 83 Although the Colonial Secretariat was rejected in the end, the Radical People's Party supported the government until the case was hopeless. The transformation of the Radical People's Party and the significance of its attitude to naval and colonial bills was disguised at the time by the party's refusal to vote for the indemnity to Southwest A f r i c a n settlers, or for the extension of the Southwest A f r i c a n Railway, and by the critical and unfriendly speeches of some of the Radicals who made great capital of colonial scandals." In spite of this continued criticism, the real change within the party did not escape notice in government circles. Biilow declared later that at this moment he perceived the possibility of forming a new national majority. " For the first time since the founding of the Empire," he wrote, " the old Radicals stood firmly on the ground of our colonial, defense, and world politics. T h e way in which the Radicals supported the government measures left hardly a doubt that the change was considered not temporary but permanent." 85 The government began to show the Radicals favors. A l ready some of them had been decorated. A representative of the royal family attended the memorial service for Richter. T h e leader of the Radical People's Party after Richter's death 86 was invited to Norderney, the first time Biilow had bestowed this favor upon a Radical leader. There he informed Biilow of the efforts of the younger wing of the party to revise their negative approach to national questions, and to accommodate the party's platform to the program of the govern83 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X V I , 2426.

84 E s p e c i a l l y B r u n o A b l a s s , b. 1866, and Julius K o p s c h , b. 1855. 8 5 D e u t s c h e Politik E n g . trans, by

Marie

( B e r l i n : H o b b i n g , 1 9 1 3 ) , p. 225. [imperial A.

Lewenz

(New

York;

Dodd

Mead,

Germany, 1914),

pp.

190-191]. 8 6 R e i n h a r d t S c h m i d t - E l b e r f e l d , b. 1854, V i c e - P r e s i d e n t of the R e i c h s t a g , 1895-1900.

54

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

ment. 87

T h e Radical press continued its criticisms, and Radical deputies were yet to liven the Reichstag debates with philippics anent colonial scandals and mal-administration. But Biilow could be certain that, after a little gesture in their direction, the whole party would troop into the government camp. One Radical party has not been mentioned—the South German People's Party, whose six Reichstag deputies and whose electorate came almost entirely f r o m Wiirttemburg. The leaders of the party had been close friends of Richter, and the South Germans had voted quite regularly with Richter's party. T h e one distinguishing characteristic of the group was an outmoded devotion to the rights of the lesser federated states. In " national " questions, they were perhaps even less national than Richter, and they had vigorously expressed their lack of faith in German colonial policy. A t a South German Party convention in 1905, the party leader, von Payer, had bewailed the cost of the A f r i c a n wars and complained, " O u r colonial government does not know what it wants, and says nothing about what it ought to do." 88 A year later he repeated his criticisms and concluded, " T h e question is if we ought not to give up the whole God-forsaken German colonial territory." *9 But there were indications that the South German People's Party, as well as the Radical People's Party, was prepared to revise its attitude to national questions. Its members had taken the lead in efforts to bring about a union of the three Radical groups. That meant that they were ready to give up their dogmatic opposition to army, navy, and colonial bills; for the proposed union would have to include the colonial enthusiast Schrader, the " Hunnenpastor " Naumann, and the 87 Letter of Dr. Muller-Meiningen to the author. 88 Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 25, 1905, No. 266. Friedrich von Payer, 1847-193189 Ibid., Oct. 1, 1906, No. 271, ii. On the same occasion, another South German leader, Conrad Haussmann, 1857-1922, expressed similar opinions. Another colleague, the Reichstag Deputy Christian Storz, b. 1865, however, was a colonial enthusiast.

BACKGROUND

55

nationally minded Müller-Meiningen. Late in 1905 leaders o f the three parties met in F r a n k f u r t and drew up a minimum program upon which it w a s hoped the parties might u n i t e . " Nothing w a s said o f colonies, but all agreed upon an open declaration in f a v o r of a r m y and n a v y defense. T h i s w a s already a sacrifice f o r the South Germans, as N a u m a n n pointed out to his colleagues. 9 1 T h e Radical Alliance accepted the program in F e b r u a r y 1906 and the South Germans in September 1906. In November the leaders met again in F r a n k f u r t and agreed to establish a common electoral organization. N o t h i n g was certain, and the actual amalgamation of the three Radical parties w a s more than three years off. B u t the tendency within the two People's Parties was clearly toward a relaxation of the old " anti-national " dogmas. T H E SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

T h e virus of nationalism had infected all o f the truly German political parties, even the Social Democrats. B u t it had affected these the least. T h e i r opposition to national policies was constant because it w a s a part of their fundamental opposition to all things which, in their opinion, served to benefit or

to

perpetuate

capitalism.

" navalism," Weltpolitik,

They

opposed

" militarism,"

protective tariffs, and i m p e r i a l i s m —

because the capitalists reaped the advantages therefrom while the masses labored and bore the expense. T h e i r basic syllogism was simple: capitalism is evil; the German army, n a v y , and colonies are instruments o f capitalism; ergo, they are evil. Beyond this, socialist reasoning became diffuse and o f t e n subjective. It included a curious mixture of M a r x i s m , Manchesterism, humanitarianism, and even patriotism. 9 2 90 Grotewold, op. cit., pp. 177-178. 91 Erster Delegiertentag des Wahlvereins der Liberalen (Berlin, 1906), P- 1492 K u r t Mandelbaum, Die Erörterung innerhalb der Sozialdemokratie über das Problem des Imperialismus, 1895-1914 (Doctoral Dissertation,

Frankfurt a. M., 1926), passim. See also August Bebel's speech in the Reichstag, March 27, 1906 (Reichstag Debates, CCXVI, 2350IT.).

56

THE

War,

in

GERMAN

Socialist

ELECTIONS

thought,

was

OF

not

I907

possible

between

" peoples," but was an expression of the economic rivalries of the ruling classes. T h e interest of the people demanded peace. S o the Social Democrats advocated a foreign policy based on the principle that Germany's task w a s to live in harmony with other nations. A n d they opposed an aggressive policy founded upon the idea that Germany should require concessions of other nations by a show of force and power. T h e y criticized "power politics " and they opposed the instruments upon which such a policy rested f o r support—armaments and " militarism." T h e y opposed the German army because they considered it to be the aggressive instrument of German capitalism in

Welt-

politik. B u t more than that, they considered the army an instrument of the ruling classes f o r keeping the laborer in subjection — b y teaching him to repress his o w n personality, by accustoming him to blind obedience, and by using the army to suppress the labor movement with force if need be. T h e i r opposition was the more bitter because the common man paid the bill and was o f t e n mistreated in the ranks. 9 3 But the German Socialists' criticism of militarism ceased where defense of German land was in question. A n d for all their opposition to the German army, they a l w a y s recognized the principle of national defense. T h e y did not oppose the idea of an army, but the " system," which they called " militarism." Their idea of

an army w a s a militia, without

aristocratic

officers' corfS, without mistreatment of soldiers, without useless parades and drills, with less p o w e r f u l military courts, less blind obedience, and less oppressive discipline. Such an army, they said, would be adequate f o r defense, but would be a poor 93 W i l h e l m Schroeder, Handbuch der Sozialdemokratischen

Parteitage von

1863 bis 1909 (Munich: Birk, 1910), pp. 311-331; report of the Reichstag deputies to the Social Democratic Congress at Mannheim [Protokol über die Verhandlungen

des Parteitages

der sozialdemokratischen

Partei

Deutsch-

lands. Mannheim, 1906 (Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1906), p. 82 ff.]; Karl Liebknecht, Militarismus und Antimilitarismus (Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei, 1907), pp. 13-14; Handbuch für sozialdemokratische

Vorwaerts, 1898, 1906), articles on militarism.

Wähler,

1898, 1906 ( B e r l i n :

BACKGROUND

57

instrument for use against the people themselves.94 For the German army as it was they would give no support whatever. They did vote for small reforms in the interest of the common soldier, but they voted solidly against all military increases and army appropriations. With the same considerations the Social Democrats opposed the German naval program. A battle fleet, they argued, was an aggressive instrument of imperialism and Weltpolitik and no longer a simple instrument of defense. It was directed against England, they said, and would simply alienate Germany's best customer. They did not believe that German trade needed a fleet to protect it. They observed with candour that all the recent increases in German military and naval strength had not increased respect for Germany abroad one whit. Furthermore, they argued, the capitalists grew rich on the contracts while the common people paid for the ships.95 The Social Democrats also opposed colonial expansion and Germany's colonial policy, but their reasons for doing so were curiously varied and even contradictory. The most obvious was that imperialism was capitalistic, and that the profit motive governing imperialism was the source of all the evils it involved. The Social Democrats opposed imperialism in the Reichstag and agitated against it among the people. But as defenders of exploited classes, they showed a lively interest in the welfare of the African natives. They railed against the cruelties of traders and officials, the exploitation and extermination of the natives, the expropriation of their land, the disregard for their rights, the abuse of their bodies, the sale of firearms and alcohol, graft, corruption and immorality. They 94 Protokol iiber die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands, 1906, p. 82 ff.; Reichstag Debates, CCXVI, 2313 ff., 2346 ff.; Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 19 ff. 95 Protokol Parteitages, 1906, pp. 85-86; Reichstag Debates, CCXIV, 154 ff., CCXVI, 2313, 2346; Fernis, op. cit., p. 8 ff. In connection with the 1906 naval law, the Social Democrats supported the People's Party proposal to levy a tax on property, and they made the most of the embarrassment it caused the National Liberals and the Center.

58

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

sought to mitigate these evils; but the evils were, they said, the inevitable results of capitalistic imperialism. They said they would support a colonial policy without these evils, a policy whose purpose was to spread European civilization, to raise living standards, to educate, and befriend the native. But a capitalistic imperialism they would never support. 88 The Socialists' humanitarian arguments, however, were innocuous in the face of the materialistic counter-arguments of the imperialists. When confronted with statements that colonies brought cheap raw materials, new markets, new land for settlers, prosperity to industry, jobs and high wages to laborers, the Socialists were compelled to reinforce their position. Strangely, the party sought this reinforcement in a Manchesterian critique of imperialism. The Socialists argued from the capitalist's point of view that colonies would not pay profits, and that they cost far more in administrative expenses, military expeditions, and naval protection than they would ever repay in trade or production. They insisted that imperialism, along with protective tariffs, simply increased the price of raw materials for industry and of consumer's goods for the laborer. They asserted that conquest of strange lands was no prerequisite for the expansion of trade and that backward lands could be developed more cheaply and with better chances for profit under a system of free competition without military power. In other words, the Socialists felt that free trade and the " Open Door " were the policies best suited to the interest of both labor, capital, and the natives. 97 96 Protokol Parteitages, C C X V I I I , 4071, 3977 ff.

1904, p. 86 ff.; 1906, pp. 86-88; Reichstag

Debates,

9 7 T h e Social Democratic election appeal in 1881 read: " T h e various peoples should pursue the work of civilization in peaceful competition, and every isolation of one nation from the other is an obstacle to progress" (Mandelbaum, op. cit., p. 19). See also Bebel's arguments in the Reichstag {Reichstag Debates, CCXVIII, 4052). The Social Democrats were ready to support Germany's Morocco policy in 1905 in so far as its purpose was to protect German trade interests by guarding the sovereignty of Morocco against France. See Bebel's address in the Reichstag Mar. 29, 1905 (Reichstag Debates, CCIV, 5697).

BACKGROUND

59

While Socialists thus asserted that imperialism was not in the best interests of trade and capital, they argued with equal self assurance on the other hand that imperialism strengthened capitalism by providing markets, raw materials, and investment opportunities; and it was, therefore, an obstacle to the ultimate goal of a non-capitalist society.98 The Socialists' attack upon German imperialism was thorough and left no aspect of it unassailed. They pointed out that colonies would never provide an adequate outlet for Germany's surplus population, that trade with the colonies was insignificant, and that imperialism " affords opportunities for senseless economic ventures by a few capitalists, and enriches them while it increases the taxes which bear so heavily on the laboring class." 98 They argued that favors to colonial trade raised domestic prices, and that the competition of African natives lowered domestic wages. The struggle for colonies, they said, caused international friction and weakened, rather than strengthened, Germany's international position. 100 This variously documented opposition of the Social Democrats to colonies was expressed in resolutions of party conventions, in articles in the press, in the endless speeches of Bebel and Lebedour, and in the negative votes of the deputies in the Reichstag. A s a matter of fixed policy the Social Democrats rejected all items of colonial budgets, except perhaps such ones as for a school for white children in Africa. In a moment of weakness in 1904 they withheld their votes on the first extra budget f o r the suppression of the Southwest African revolt, but they 98 Leipziger Volksseitung, of articles on colonies.

Oct. 8, g, 10, 1906, Nos. 233, 234, 235, a series

99 Max Schippel, Sozialdemokratisches Reichstagshandbuch. Ein Führer durch die Zeit- und Streitfragen der Reichspolitik (Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1902), p. 54; see also speeches by Bebel and Lebedour in the Reichstag (Reichstag Debates, CCXIV, 153 ff., and CCXVIII, 3981 ff.). 100 Reichstag Debates, CCXVIII, 4063. See also the resolutions on imperialism and militarism adopted by the International Socialist Congress at Paris, 1900, and by the German Social Democratic convention at Mainz, 1900.

60

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

immediately resumed their opposition; and in 1906 they voted against the Southwest African railway, the indemnity to Southwest African settlers, and the Colonial Secretariat. Their continued opposition was certain; and, in a Reichstag where they commanded one fifth of the seats, 101 their opposition could not be taken lightly. There were voices raised in Social Democratic circles against the party's fixed policy of negation. They came from a group of men who were called " Revisionists " because they wished to revise some of the orthodox party dogmas. They had turned their attention to Germany's national policies at times and had criticized the party's obstinate refusal to see any good in them. The leader of the Revisionists, Eduard Bernstein, had made out a case for German imperialism because of advantages accruing directly and also indirectly from a strengthened world position. 102 A colleague defended the German naval program, asserting that Germany's esteem in a world which Socialists could not change for the present depended upon the power of the German army and navy, and declaring that not Germany but England should take the first step toward disarmament. 103 But the Revisionists seldom spoke in the Reichstag; they did not determine party policy; their theories had been overwhelmingly condemned at the party convention in Dresden in 1 9 0 3 ; and their influence seemed to be diminishing in 1906. The difference between Revisionists and Orthodox Social Democrats in national questions was largely one of theory, but not of practice. The Revisionists did not recommend supporting the capitalistic government and its imperialism and militarism. They merely insisted that the existing system could be reformed. The Orthodox considered capitalism incapable of 101 In November 1906 they filled 78 seats. One deputy, Dreesbach, had died N o v . 6, and his seat, the 79th, was vacant. 102Eduard Bernstein (1850-1932). H i s Voraussetzungen dcs Sozialtsmus und die Aufgaben der Sozialdemokratie (Stuttgart, 1899) was the first full exposition of revisionism. 103 Richard Calwer (1869-1927), " Englands Absichten und die demokratie," Sozialistische Monatshejte, I X ( 1 9 0 5 ) , 919-922.

Sozial-

BACKGROUND

6l

reform. South German Social Democrats often participated in the normal parliamentary life of their more democratic state assemblies. But in national affairs the verdict of both Revisionists and Orthodox was against the government, either because it was not reformed, or because it could not be reformed. 104 T H E PROTESTING

PARTIES

It remains to be observed that various members of the Reichstag were deputies of certain national minorities who made a fairly regular practice of creating difficulties for the government as a matter of protest. Among these the largest group were the Poles, who usually had from 15 to 20 deputies. Both Center Party and Poles represented Catholic minorities and they often voted together in the Reichstag. But the Poles were divided into aristocrats and radicals. The radicals were led by Korfanty 1 0 5 and carried on a " great Poland " and anti-German agitation of which neither the aristocrats in their own party nor the Centrists approved. In 1906 the radicals were irritated at the Center's lukewarm support of their program. And at the same time the whole Polish group was especially irritated by the Prussian government's school policy. Several children had refused to receive religious instruction except in Polish and had gone on strike. The government's reaction was to make difficulties for the parents. The movement grew until at one time about 60,CXX) children were absent from school. The government was firm, however, and the strike died a lingering death in the spring of 1907. In the meantime, Polish antagonism to the German government was especially strong. 104 In the Reichstag, the leaders of the revisionist or right wing of the Social Democratic Party were Georg von Vollmar (1855-1922) and Eduard David (1863-1930) in addition to Bernstein and Calwer who were more active as publicists. The Orthodox, or left wing Socialists, were led by August Bebel (1840-1913) and in the press by Karl Kautsky (1854-1938), founder and editor of Die Neue Zeit, Franz Mehring (1846-1919), the party's historian and editor of the Leipsiger Volkszeitung, and Karl Liebknecht (1871-1919). 105 Albert Wojciech, alias Korfanty, b. 1873.

62

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

A second group of "protesters " were from Alsace-Lorraine. They did not demand independence so much as a position of equality within the Empire. O f the nine deputies from Alsace and Lorraine who might be called protesters, five were close allies of the Catholic Center to which they were attracted by common religious interests. Others were more or less independent in their political affiliation. A third group of protesters were the Guelphs, loyal supporters of the last George V of Hanover and his house, deposed in 1866. T h e Guelphs objected to being amalgamated with Prussia, and wished to have their place as one of the federated states of Germany restored to them. In 1906 the House of Hanover was interested in the succession to the Duchy of Brunswick, which had fallen to them by right of succession in 1884. A t that time the Bundesrat had appointed a regent until the Guelphs should give up their intransigent claims to Hanover. T h e regent died September 13, 1906; and the Duke of Cumberland, now head of the Guelph line, sought in letters to the Emperor and to Biilow to weaken the considerations against his house. But he refused to give up his claims to Hanover, and the affair dragged on until March 1907 when the Bundesrat appointed another regent. T h e Guelph minority had grievances, but it was German and not anti-national in the same sense as the Poles. Only four Guelphs could be considered " protesters," and they were associated with the Center. Three others voted generally with the National Liberals or the Economic Alliance. In addition to these three groups of protesters, there was always one lone Dane from the northern district of Schleswig w h o insisted on a plebiscite for his home province and otherwise voted with the Radicals. T H E REICHSTAG

IN

1906

During the summer of 1906 the topic of chief interest in the press was the German colonial policy. T h e Moroccan settlement reached at Algeciras had not satisfied those who were eager for

BACKGROUND

63

German expansion, since Germany did not acquire any territory, and the international agreement guaranteeing equal economic opportunity was of doubtful value. Billow's policy was attacked from all sides. Furthermore, the government seemed unable to end the struggle with the natives in Southwest Africa. The backbone of the revolt was broken, but numerous armed bands continued their resistance, waging a guerilla warfare which was especially difficult for the German troops to combat. Casualties as a result of fighting were few, but many died of fever. Within Germany the Centrist, Radical, and Socialist press discovered new scandals and elaborated upon the old ones. Criticism of the government was current everywhere and was reflected in the attitude of the Reichstag. When the Riechstag closed its session in May 1906, only a minority of the deputies appeared ready to support the government's colonial policy without qualification. This " national " minority was composed of those groups who had approved of Germany's military, naval, and colonial policies from the beginning, or who had come to support them during the one generation of Germany's existence as a national state. There were 52 German Conservatives, 22 Free Conservatives, 20 members of Anti-Semitic parties or the Economic Alliance, 5 1 National Liberals, 1 0 members of the Radical Alliance, and a small number of nationally-minded deputies of no particular party affiliation. This made about 160 in a Reichstag of 397 members. Although only this minority supported Germany's colonial policy completely, it was an even smaller minority that was opposed to Germany's colonial policy altogether or opposed to imperialism on principle. Only the 78 Social Democrats and the 16 protesting Poles were certain to obstruct Billow's policies. The remaining deputies of the Reichstag did not oppose German colonial expansion on principle, but they were exceedingly critical of Billow's policy and administration, and of

64

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

IÇOJ

what they called " the system." B y this they meant the inefficient and corrupt administration, the extravagant investment of public funds in enterprises of questionable value, and the almost complete disregard of the welfare of the natives in the colonies. Composing a part of this " semi-opposition " were the 25 deputies of the Radical People's Party and the South German People's Party. They seemed on the point of accepting Billow's policies as essentially proper, but their press continued to be very critical of the administration throughout the summer, and their actual support was only a possibility. Even were the Radicals to join the colonial minority which supported Billow, the government could then count upon only 185 votes in the Reichstag—just nine short of a majority. The final decision as to whether the Reichstag would or would not support the colonial administration rested with the Catholic Center Party. T h e votes of its 100 members could be cast either for or against the government, and it became extremely important which of the two wings of the party should dominate—the radicals led by Erzberger, or the conservatives led by Spahn. A s we have seen, the radical wing was trying to push the Center into forthright opposition to Bulow's colonial administration, and the conservative Centrists seemed helpless to thwart them. Were the Center to combine with Poles and Social Democrats to oppose Billow, they could form a majority of 194 votes. Such a bare majority would certainly be increased by the votes of the five Alsatians and the four Guelphs, and perhaps by the votes of the one Dane, three members of a Bavarian Farmers' League, and of one or more independent liberals and other Alsatians. The questions which arose in 1906 concerning the fate of Germany's colonial policy were then, first: would Erzberger and the radical Centrists continue their campaign against Billow's colonial system, and would the rest of the Center Party follow them ? Second : would the Radical People's Party

BACKGROUND

65

and the South German People's Party, in spite of their anticolonial tradition, and in spite of their continued criticism of the colonial administration, actually support the colonial government in a crisis? Third, if the Center should oppose the government and the Radicals support it, what would Biilow do ? Would he meet the Centrist demands by giving up his aggressive colonial policy and adopting one of retrenchment and reform? Or would he try to convert his national minority of 185 into a majority by an appeal to the patriotism of the German people or to the mission of the German state? These questions were answered by events in November and December 1906.

CHAPTER II THE DISSOLUTION T H E political situation in Germany when the Reichstag resumed its labors in the late autumn of 1906 was not extraordinary. In spite of the press campaign against the colonial administration, and in spite of the attitude of the Center toward Bulow's colonial policies, neither the press nor the Reichstag deputies seemed to be aware of any impending crisis. T h e public had little evidence of any change in attitude on the part of the Radicals, nor did they have much reason to regard such a change important. There was plenty of interest in the colonial scandals and in the A f r i c a n revolt, but other questions occupied the public mind as well. The rise in food prices had become alarming and was being connected with the tariff laws; the Polish school strike was just beginning; and there were new evidences of the Emperor's " personal r e g i m e " which agitated the public. But these were only clouds upon the horizon. None seemed likely to turn into a storm, and the muddied waters of domestic politics were expected to take their troubled, but uninterrupted, course into the new year. One further item of public interest appeared to complicate the situation. It was the question of Bulow's hold on the Chancellorship. PRINCE

BULOW

T h e Imperial Chancellor had been ill at his estate in Norderney all summer. T h e weakness and inactivity of the government in his absence, the colonial scandals in the press, the growing impertinence of the Center, and the Reichstag's rejection of colonial bills all weakened Bulow's hitherto strong position at court. A n d behind the scenes his position appeared to be in danger. Biilow was not an aggressive chancellor in the Prussian tradition. H e was a politician, adroit and supple, able to shift his course with the winds of royal and public opinion, and well 66

THE

DISSOLUTION

67

equipped to handle the temperamental Emperor. A n elegant public speaker, he could paint the darkest horizons in pastel hues. Persuasion, not compulsion, was his program. Flattery, not the mailed fist, was his forte. He blandly accepted the petty annoyances which the Reichstag made, and he gave minor concessions here and there. W h y not ? But at court and in conservative circles, where parliamentary politics were never fully comprehended, and where any concession to the Reichstag was interpreted as cowardice, Biilow had a reputation for being weak and yielding. During 1905-6 the established relations between Emperor and Chancellor became somewhat strained as a result of Billow's brusque rejection of the Emperor's pet scheme for a Russo-German-French alliance, and because of the disappointing outcome of Billow's Morocco policy which had accomplished little and left Germany isolated. In these circumstances, Prince Philipp zu Eulenburg, leader of a court " camarilla," came into favor again. Biilow did not let the reins of government slip from his hands, but he was away from Berlin and the Emperor for months. A t court dissatisfaction grew with the power of the Center, with the failure of colonial bills, and with the administration's weakness toward the Reichstag. Since M a y there had been rumors that the Chancellor would never recover his strength, and during his absence from Berlin the rumors grew that the Emperor's disfavor, or intrigue, or ill-health would relieve him of his proud post before the winter set in. 1 1 Princesse Marie Radziwill, Une grande dame d'avant guerre. Lettres de la Princesse Radziwill au Général de Robilant 1881-IÇ14 (4 vols., Bologna : Zanichelli, 1933-1934), H I , 250-258. The fullest account of the " c a m a r i l l a " is in Fritz H ä r t u n g , Verantwortliche Regierung, Kabinette und Nebenregierung im Konstitutionellen Preussen 1848-IÇ18 ( M u n i c h and Berlin, 1932). 355 ff- B ü l o w ' s proper rival for the Chancellorship was Count Posadowsky, Imperial Secretary for the Interior, according to Rudolf Martin [Deutsche Machthaber ( B e r l i n : Schuster and Loeffler, 1910), p. 151] and Martin Schmidt [Graf Posadowsky, Staatssekretär des Reichsschatzamtes und des Innern, 1893-1907 (Doctoral Dissertation, Halle, 1935), pp. 158-173].

68

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

Rumors came to a climax early in November when the press published the inside information that the camarilla had its candidate ready in the person of General Helmuth von Molke, chief of the General Staff, who might become temporarily a kind of vice-chancellor.2 But the rumor faded. Maximilian Harden 3 began a campaign in his Zukunft against Eulenburg, and the latter travelled to breathe fresher air abroad. On the eve of the Reichstag session, the Emperor concurred in the dismissal of a favorite of his, General Podbielski, Minister for Agriculture, who was discovered to have maintained a financial interest in the notorious Tippleskirch Company, and he seemed thus to indicate his readiness to support Biilow and his policies further. During the summer, however, the Emperor had been restless and, early in the autumn, he made two public utterances which aroused a storm of protest against his " personal regime." * Even the national and conservative press joined in the criticism. When the National Liberal leader Bassermann addressed an interpellation on foreign policy to the Chancellor on the second day of the Reichstag's session, he spoke as much of the " personal regime," the camarilla, and the government's inactivity as of foreign policy. Biilow, in an evasive reply, gently admonished his master and by inference sharply criticised the camarilla. The flurry subsided. It had probably served to strengthen Billow's position for the moment, but it could have done little to restore his waning friendship with the Emperor. 2 Berliner Tageblatt, No. 562, 570, Nov. 4, 8, 1906; Vossische Zeitung, No. 513, 516, 517, Nov. 2, 3, 1906. The rumor was officially denied in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 263, Nov. 9, 1906. Bulow questioned the truth of any such rumors, especially that Eulenberg's intrigue had endangered his position [Memoirs of Prince von Biilow (Boston: Little Brown, 1931-1932), II, 287-288]. For the opposite, however, see Otto Hammann, Utn den Kaiser (Berlin: Hobbing, 1919), p. 15 ff. For a defense of Eulenburg, see Johannes Haller, Aus dent Leben des Fursten Philipp zu Eulenburg und Hertefeld (Berlin: Paetel, 1924). 3 Alias Witkowski, 1861-1927. 4Wippermann, Deutschcr

Geschichtskalcndar,

1906, ii, 120-128.

THE

DISSOLUTION

69

Royal dissatisfaction with the Center Party, which was especially noticeable during the summer months of 1906, further complicated Billow's problems. T h e Emperor's religious utterances showed considerable sympathy for Catholicism, 8 and he certainly tried to be fair to his Catholic subjects. But he was never in love with the Center, and in 1906 he had a particular grievance against the party. It had not only caused the defeat of the colonial bills, but it had caused the resignation of Prince Hohenlohe, in whose appointment to the Colonial Department the Emperor had been interested personally. 8 In May, the Emperor had made an impulsive effort to silence Spahn's criticisms of the colonial administration by asking that he be threatened with removal f r o m his judgeship. 7 T h e influence of outspokenly Protestant circles, the absence of Catholics at court, and the propaganda of the Evangelical League undoubtedly augmented the Emperor's dissatisfaction with the Center. H e had gone so far in recent utterances with regard to the Center that Biilow asked the Foreign Secretary, who was more intimate with the Emperor, to calm and silence him. " It would be a real service," Biilow wrote, " i f you could make H i s Majesty aware that his continued attacks on the Center lead him nowhere, . . . that any party which can control a parlia5 M a x Buchner, Kaiser tVilhelm II, seine Weltanschauung und die deutschen Katholiken ( L e i p z i g : Koehler, 1929), passim; also Richard Kralik, Allgemeine Geschichte der neuesten Zeit von 1815 bis zur Gegenwart ( G r a z and V i e n n a : Styria, 1915-1923), V , 377. T h i s does not mean that the Emperor may not also have been prejudiced against the Center. Karl B a c h e m emphasizes this prejudice w i t h a l o n g and detailed list of citations and asserts that the Emperor's prejudice extended t o the Catholic Church as well {op. cit., V I , 262-270). 6 Hammann, op. cit., p. 8. 7 Vorwaerts, July 7, 1928, published a letter of the Emperor's t o the M i n ister of Justice, in w h i c h the Emperor expressed his irritation with an e x ceptionally sharp speech of Spahn's in the Reichstag, M a y 26, 1906, and ordered that Spahn be instructed in behavior befitting a justice of one of H i s Majesty's courts. N o t h i n g came of this, and it m a y be assumed that the Emperor repented or allowed himself to be persuaded of his error, or the Minister of Justice simply ignored the impulsive request ( M a r t i n Spahn, " D a s Jahr 1906").

JO

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

IÇO7

mentary majority tries to make itself a nuisance to the government. . . . If, therefore, irresponsible advisors excite His Majesty against the Center, it must be because they fail to understand the results of such a way of going to work." 8 Biilow himself probably never delighted in the parliamentary situation that made him dependent upon the unpopular Center and gave him the reputation for acceding weakly to its irritating demands. In retrospect Biilow even declared that a change in this situation was a kind of historical necessity, although he also said that he had never anticipated the permanent exclusion of the Center from the parliamentary majority. 9 Although anti-Catholic sentiment at Court embarrassed Billow in his policy of cooperation with the Center, the Protestant, anti-Catholic propaganda was hardly successful enough to compel him to become an enemy of the party in order to maintain his position. F o r six years he had conducted affairs in cooperation with Center leaders, and there seemed no reason why this state of affairs could not continue, unless the Center Party itself changed essentially. The radical tendencies within the Center, and the nature of its recent behavior, however, gave much cause for irritation, and they help to explain Billow's growing anti-Center bias and the strength of the anti-Center campaign at court. 10 There was criticism of Billow's administration upon other counts, but it was not important enough alone to have made the Chancellor feel uneasy. Prices, especially for foods, had risen S Memoirs, I I , 283. Princess Radziwill wrote during the anti-Center election campaign on Jan. 9, 1907 : " L e fin fond de tout ce qui nous arrive, c'est l'affreuse jalousie qui ne fait que s'accroître du parti protestant de la Cour . . . contre les Catholiques, et comme l'Empereur vit dans ce milieu sans s'en douter, il en subit l'influence" (op. cit., I I I , 275). 9 Imperial

Germany, pp. 183, 188, 189.

10 K a r l Bachem insists that dislike for the Center and Catholicism in general was more important than the impolitic behavior of the party's radically inclined members. T h e actions of Erzberger and Roeren were, according to Bachem, only the incident used by the government as an excuse to settle a long standing score (op. cit., V I , v ) .

THE

DISSOLUTION

71

higher. 1 1

steadily for three years, and were going In spite of agitation among consumer and commercial groups, the government did nothing. T h e liberal, radical, and socialist press blamed the government, or the tariffs, and wanted action. T h e Ministry of Agriculture changed hands, but inactivity still ruled. The school strike in Posen reached the stage where 40,000 children were participating. A n d colonial scandals still occupied the press. When the Reichstag opened its session on November 13, Biilow seemed to be firmly in the saddle. B u t the possibility existed that, in the combination of circumstances tending to undermine his status at court, Bulow may have felt himself compelled to do something exceptional to consolidate his position—to engineer some dramatic national coup, perhaps, to weaken the Social Democrats, or to free himself from the Center. THE

CENTER AND

DERNBURG

The crux of the situation in the Reichstag lay in the uncertain reaction of the Center to colonial bills. I f the government were determined to carry on an enlarged colonial program, it became extremely important whether Spahn and Hertling could maintain their conservative leadership of the Center Party, or whether the leadership would fall completely into the hands of Erzberger and his coterie. The Center gave no indication that its opposition to the Colonial administration had abated. Roeren publicly declared that the " system " was rotten, and that it must be changed. " I f the government does not grant the Reichstag increased means of control," he said to a Centrist assembly in Trier, " then we must seriously doubt if we ought to approve a single penny for the colonies." (Lively applause). 1 4 The more conservative Hertling did not g o so far, but he declared to a similar Centrist assembly in Westphalia that the 11 Monthly price tables in the Statistische Korrespondens, (1903-1907). Prices fell slightly after December, 1906. 12 Germania, N o . 245, ii, Oct. 24, 1906.

XXIX-XXXIV

72

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

colonial administration had been too egotistical and bureaucratic, that too many black sheep were sent to the colonies as officials, and that, although a new Colonial Director might contemplate thorough reforms, the Center could not be optimistic.13 Germania, the Center Party's organ in Berlin, anticipated real difficulties before Christmas. The colonies, it said, were costing too much and were not spreading Christianity. It demanded the punishment of unworthy officials and declared that the Center could never trust the colonial administration until the clique of bureaucrats who ran it had been completely broken up.14 These demands and threats of the Center did not augur well for the government's colonial program. But there was still the possibility that the conservatives within the Center Party could persuade the Centrists in the Reichstag to adopt their moderation. If so, all would be well.15 I f not, the government would have unusual difficulties, not only with the particular estimates soon to come before the Reichstag, but with all ambitious colonial bills in the future. Shortly after his return to Berlin in September, Biilow had suddenly appointed Bernhard Dernburg to the Colonial Department in the place of Prince Hohenlohe, whose lust for public office had been dissipated by the events of preceding months.18 Dernburg was director of the Bank für Handel und Industrie, a business man with a reputation for ruthlessness. He had been associated with the Radical Alliance at one time, and he was the son of a well known liberal politician and newspaper editor, but he had never been active in politics. His appointment, which came as a surprise, was expected to bring order 13 Germania,

No. 228, i, Oct. 4, 1906.

14 No. 255, i, 260, i, Nov. 6 and 11, 1906. 15 This estimate of the situation, which appears to me correct, was given by Bassermann at the Wiesbaden convention of the National Liberal Party in October, 1907 (National liberal e Blatter, No. 20, Oct. 15, 1907). 16 Hohenlohe declared upon resigning that upon accepting office he had been assured that he would shortly be Colonial Secretary. Without the secretariat, he said he was unwilling to accept responsibility for affairs (Deutsche Stimmen, No. 25, Sept. 15, 1906).

THE

DISSOLUTION

73

into the chaotic colonial administration, check reports of colonial scandals, show that the government was bent upon cleaning the Augean stables, and restore quiet and confidence in the country at large. 17 It was regarded as an admission of the failure of the existing bureaucracy, and was a concession to the Center. A t the same time it was bait for the Radicals. 18 Dernburg proceeded to justify the confidence placed in him by cancelling the worst of the monopoly contracts and by plunging energetically into the business of departmental reorganization and reform. In the course of time, he came upon the records of the dealings which Prince Arenberg, Roeren, and Erzberger had had with the Colonial Department in their efforts to protect missionaries in Togoland and certain Catholic officials in Berlin. Colonial officials had regarded this activity of the Centrist deputies as a sinister interference with the colonial administration. While the deputies had acted in a private capacity as far as possible, the officials chose to regard their actions as being taken on behalf of the whole Center Party. Dernburg adopted the viewpoint of his underlings and, anxious to clear up all irregularities of the past, he took steps to have a reckoning with the Center leaders. Spahn and Grober 1 9 were invited to a conference with Billow and Dernburg on Nov. 9, 1906, and they were presented 17 Hammann, op. cit., pp. 8-9. Dernburg (1865-1937) became Colonial Secretary in 1907. In 1914-1915 he made a futile visit to the United States to arrange a war loan and present Americans with the German point of view. Later he was a member of the W e i m a r Convention, then Finance Minister in Scheidemann's cabinet. H i s appointment in 1906 flattered the business c o m munity, and, although Dernburg was the baptized son of a baptized father and his maternal grandfather was an evangelical pastor, it pleased the Jews. 18 T h e Radical press soon became Dernburg's champion against the attacks of the Conservative press (Vossische Zeitung, N o s . 413, 415, 420, Sept. 4, 5, 8, 1906). B u l o w never elaborated upon his reasons for appointing Dernburg. H i s frivolous comment to the effect that he appointed a J e w because the Protestants would not have a Catholic and the Catholics did not want a Protestant illustrates the unsatisfactory nature of Billow's Memoirs ( I I , 293). Biilow knew, of course, that a man of Dernburg's energy and business ability was bound t o win favor with the Radicals. 19 Adolf Grober, 1854-1919, came from Wurttemburg and was less conservative than Spahn.

74

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

with complaints about the actions of Roeren and Erzberger. Apparently the two Center leaders were not complimentary in their own remarks about their two colleagues, 20 and they gave Bülow and Dernburg a free hand in dealing with Roeren in the eventuality that he should make difficulties again. 21 Furthermore, they assured the Chancellor that they would try to restrain their unruly associates. But the Center caucus t w o weeks later chose Schaedler, Erzberger, and Roeren to speak on colonial affairs. Spahn did not like the plan at all, and cautioned Roeren at length to be careful. But Roeren considered Spahn's information false and ignored the warning. The radical Centrists directed the party's politics. THE REICHSTAG DEBATE

The colonial debate which lasted six days in the Reichstag, from November 28 until December 4, was far more important than the items which occasioned it. These were two supplementary estimates for Southwest A f r i c a — 2 9 million marks for the military expedition there, and nine million marks for the extension of the railway in the south of the colony. Bülow acknowledged the seriousness of the occasion by admitting that Germany's colonial policy was going through a crisis. But he warned the Reichstag that there was no question as to whether Germany would or would not colonize, for Germany had to colonize. 22 Dernburg had prepared for a general debate on imperialism by compiling two long memoranda in which he tried to estimate the capital value of the colonies as an investment, and in which administrative expenses of the colonies were compared with their revenues. The memoranda were not received cordially. Centrists, Radicals, and Social Democrats were unsparing in their criticism. They likened the memoranda to the prospectus of a bank direc20 Memoirs

of Prince Bülow,

I I , 295-296.

21 Martin Spahn, " D a s J a h r 1906 " contains a letter from P e t e r Spahn to his son describing this interview. 22 Reichstag

Debates, C C X V I I I , 3957-8.

THE DISSOLUTION

75

tor, more " Byzantine than business-like," " pure milk-maid reckoning," and comparable to Potemkin's efforts to hoodwink Catherine the Great. The specific question for debate being the appropriation f o r military suppression of the Herero and Hottentot uprising, the way was opened for a general criticism of the policy of suppression versus conciliation. T h e Social Democrats accused the administration of " hunting down " and " exterminating " the aborigines, and they demanded a policy which recognized the rights of the natives to justice and to land. 23 Erzberger for the Centrists proposed the complete evacuation of the south of the colony to save money and to give the natives a place to live. The government and its friends—Conservatives, Free Conservatives, National Liberals, Anti-Semites, and Agrarian Leaguers—argued that the white man had a right to impose his will upon the native; that the native could not be conciliated, therefore he must be subdued; that to retreat would be to lose face and prestige, to be traitor to the brave soldiers spilling their life blood in the colony, and to encourage revolts all over Africa. But the Radicals, the Centrists, and the Social Democrats wanted to know why 14,000 men, 13 big guns, and 6 machine guns were needed to put down 300 (sic) poorly equipped natives. They insisted that real conciliation had not been attempted, that so long as the natives were oppressed there would be uprisings, and that the cure for such was not slaughter, but a reform of colonial policy. This attack upon the military policy in Southwest A f r i c a , and the implication that the opposition parties, by exercising the budget rights of the Reichstag, might attempt to control that policy, was regarded by the government and the national parties as an illegal interference with the Emperor's powers of supreme command. The Reichstag, they said, was in no position to undertake the direction or conduct of the war. 24 2 3 Ibid.,

pp. 3980, 4059.

24 The Emperor's supreme command was involved inasmuch as the con-

76

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

The Reichstag opposition objected to the policy of suppression not only for reasons of humanity, but upon grounds of economy. The Center was anxious for the reduction in the number of expensive troops in Southwest Africa and insisted that the Reichstag, by control of the budget, had a right to demand active response from the administration to popular demands for economy and reform. DECEMBER

THIRD

The most spectacular aspect of the debate had to do with scandals. Bülow had introduced this unpleasant subject himself, and had made himself a bit ridiculous by complaining that all the washing of dirty linen in the press was not good for Germany's prestige, by defending German officialdom in general, which no one had attacked, and by asking plaintively if people really expected him to look after such details as furnishing boots for the army in Africa. 2 5 Dernburg had then announced the cancellation of the worst of the monopoly contracts; and, in the debate which followed, the government and its supporters contended that the evils of the past were due to the " system," that the government intended to change the system, that abuses duct of the Southwest African campaign was under the supervision of the General Staff. T h e railway t o Keetmanshoop was the particular plea of the General Staff, and their autumn memorandum on the campaign declared that the railway was absolutely necessary for the suppression of the revolt (Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I , Aktenstück 530). It was difficult for members of the Reichstag to visualize conditions in A f r i c a and to understand the need for the railway and the troops demanded by the military officials. T h e revolt was almost over, but it would be eighteen months before the railway could be put into use. T h e Bethanier Cornelius was subdued M a r c h 3, 1906, and peace was restored in the north of the colony. Morgena was defeated M a y 4, 1906 and was later taken into custody by Cape police. Fielding was driven across the border November 17, 1906. Only Josef Christian and A b r a h a m Morris remained with small armed followings, perhaps 300-500 men ( N o r d d e u t s c h e Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 276, Nov. 25, 1906). Under the circumstances, many deputies were not convinced by the General Staff's memorandum. 25 T h e Tippleskirch Company bought boots for the African troops, gave them a polish, and sold them to the Colonial Department at a handsome profit.

THE

77

DISSOLUTION

were being corrected as rapidly as possible, and that the Reichstag should have patience. The first two Centrist speakers were surprisingly conciliatory. Schaedler was restrained, and although he criticized the administration in general, his tone was friendly. So was that of Erzberger. The party Benjamin had finally submitted to pressure from the leaders. In July he had declared an armistice in his press campaign to allow the government an opportunity to show its good faith. In October he had delivered to Dernburg much of his material. And now, his moderation made a decided impression. He recognized the reasonableness of the government's arguments, and he cheerfully admitted that Dernburg had done more toward bringing order into the Colonial Department in two and a half months than the Colonial Council had in 15 years. He acknowledged Dernburg's correction of many of the evils of which the Center had complained, and admitted that if Dernburg continued as he had begun there would be small cause for further complaint. 28 The Center press echoed Erzberger's tone and admitted that Dernburg's good beginning in Berlin promised well for reform in the colonies themselves which, if realized, would restore the Reichstag's faith in the colonial administration. 27 The attitude of the Centrists toward Dernburg's work thus far was shared by the Radicals, but neither party felt that sufficient guarantees for the future had yet been given. They feared that Dernburg did not intend to be as thorough as they 2 6 Reichstag Debates, C C X V I I I , 4029-4030. T h e Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung commended Erzberger's moderation ( N o . 288, Dec. 9, 1906). E v e n the Reichsbote gave him credit f o r much of Dernburg's reforms, r e m a r k i n g that dirty linen could not be washed with rose-water (cited in Germania, No. 276 ii, Dec. 1, 1906). The Kölnische Zeitung also recognized the value of Erzberger's agitation and hoped that his mild tone meant that the Center would now vote f o r the Independent Colonial Office as well as the t w o appropriations under consideration (No. 1288, Dec. 3, 1906). But Bebel observed prophetically that the Center's cries of " H o s a n n a h " might easily become shouts of " C r u c i f y H i m ! " (Reichstag Debates, C C X V I I I , 4052). 27 Germania, No. 273 ii, Nov. 28, 1906; Kölnische Nov. 30, 1906.

Volksseitung,

No. 1021,

78

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

wanted him to be, or that if he had such intentions, he would not be able to overcome the " system " and the ruling traditions of the colonial bureaucracy. They wanted more than a reform of the " system," for, as they said, a system could not be considered apart from the men who composed it; a system did not sign monopoly contracts or go travelling with pretty little cousins. 28 They and the Social Democrats argued that with all Dernburg's labours there were still evils which the government, though possessing complete knowledge, failed to prosecute, or prosecute energetically; that the government was inclined to " hang the little thief and let the big one g o ; " that it was unresponsive to criticism in the Reichstag; and that its policy toward the natives was brutal. 29 These complaints were buttressed by a host of allegations and facts quite overwhelming and, when the incautious Roeren came to speak for the Center on December 3, there ensued a sharp exchange of personalities between him and Colonial Director Dernburg. The events of December 3 brought out into the open the feud between the Center and the Colonial Department and destroyed the effect which the Center's moderation thus f a r had made. There were several reasons why Roeren's action was more provocative than Erzberger's. In the first place, Roeren's task was to defend the missions and to criticize immorality and injustice in the colonies—which would not increase the government's regard for him in any case. In the second place, he ignored Spahn's warning to be cautious, since he did not believe a dissolution was imminent. In the third place, he feared that Dernburg, hampered by the tradition of the Colonial Department, would do nothing to rectify the situation in the colonies without prodding. Finally, on the day he was to speak, Dernburg came to the Reichstag prepared, not so much to refute Roeren's 28 The Governor of Kamerun, von Puttkammer, had made out a false pass for a certain young lady who travelled as his cousin. 29 See especially the speeches of the Radicals Kopsch and Ablass (Reichstag Debates, C C X V I I I , 4002-4010, 4072-4089), of Bebel and Lebedour (ibid., pp. 4059 ff., 3980 ff.), and Roeren (ibid., pp. 4078 ff.).

T H E DISSOLUTION

79

accusations (which to a considerable extent he could not do), as to discredit Roeren personally by disclosing in an unfair light Roeren's efforts in the past three years to demand official favors for the missionaries and his tactless efforts to protect Wistuba. Roeren was spectacular in his attack on scandals, and he made some revelations of revolting brutalities in the colonies, especially in Togo, on the basis of information furnished him by the Catholic missionaries. 80 He then made specific charges against the administration, such as using the colonies to get rid of undesirable officials in Berlin, protecting and refusing to punish guilty officials, and, even in Dernburg's short regime, of hushing up cases of real injustice. He went on to say: " I believe that if these conditions continue in spite of the denunciations here in the Reichstag, then we are honestly obligated in all conscience to question whether we should grant a single penny more for the colonies until the whole system is broken and essentially abolished." 31 Dernburg was irritated by Roeren's refusal to give him his chance when, by the opposition's own admission, he was doing remarkably well; and he was antagonized by the request of the missionaries in Togo for the transfer of another official which was made directly to the Colonial Department upon Roeren's advice. He lost patience and replied to Roeren in a sarcastic and insulting manner somewhat unusual on ministerial benches. Given a free hand to deal with Roeren as he saw fit, he made public for the first time the story of Roeren's relations with the Colonial Department, 82 and he accused Roeren of undue interference in administrative affairs and of threatening the government with the opposition of the Center Party. He made a slurring remark about Roeren's ability as a judge, maligned the 30 Much of what Roeren said could not be proved, and some of it was false, as his suit against Schmidt showed (Schreiber, op. cit.). But conditions were undoubtedly bad, and Roeren was not sparing in his remarks. 31 Reichstag

Debates,

32 Supra, p. 41 ff.

C C X V I I I , 4094.

8o

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

IÇOJ

character of Roeren's protégé, Wistuba, and announced that he was thus " exposing " Roeren with much regret. 33 Roeren replied with more venom. H e resented Dernburg's insults, his " stock-jobber and counting house " tone. H e denied the accuracy of memoranda drawn up by some " young and green assessor ; " and, with an invidious allusion to Dernburg's business past, he closed by refusing to be exposed, " A c h , Mr. Colonial Director, with your reputation, you aren't qualified to expose me !" " Dernburg then accused not only Roeren but the Catholic missionaries and the whole Center Party of misusing their influence by interfering in administrative and judicial business. H e declared in a heated peroration that this was an intolerable situation, an " abscess," which had to be lanced, and which he was now lancing. 35 The government's brief against Roeren convinced no one but the administration's supporters. Although Roeren had undoubtedly made a nuisance of himself, the Chancellor had thanked him in March 1906 for his efforts to bring about a peaceful settlement of the T o g o affair. Dernburg could not j u s t i f y the government's practice of indicting informers without also investigating the truth of their accusations. 38 His evidence was not sufficient to prove the existence of a formidable " backstairs " government. But his attack was a tactical success in that it discredited Roeren, distracted public interest from the 33 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X V I I I , 4102.

34 Ibid., p. 4115. Z5 Ibid., p. 4118. Most accounts of this debate are sympathetic with Dernburg and are taken from the official press, the anti-ultramontane press, or from Schulthess' Europäischer Geschichtskalendar. But Dernburg was the less restrained of the two, and the more impolite to begin with. See accounts in the Freisinnige Zeitung ( N o . 436, Dec. 6, 1906), and by Bernstein ( " T h e German Elections and the Social Democrats," Contemporary Review, XCI (1907), 4 7 9 ff )-

36 Poeplau, Wistuba, and Koch, who accused government officials of misdeeds, were all prosecuted for divulging government secrets before their charges were investigated thoroughly ( F r a n k f u r t e r Zeitung, No. 335 ii, Dec. 4, 1906).

THE

8l

DISSOLUTION

faults of the government, and focused attention upon the faults of the Center. The anti-Center press started a hue and cry. The Reichsbote shouted, " Los von Rom!" It rejoiced in the " light thrown into the most obscure corners of the Center Tower " which disclosed the " vilest misuse of the position of a Reichstag deputy." Enraptured over Dernburg, it sighed, " A man at last!" " The Radical press interpreted Dernburg's action as a direct effort to precipitate a crisis and as a declaration of war upon the Center. It was delighted that the concessions to clericalism were over, and that the " obnoxious and reactionary clerical supervision " had been denounced." Even the Kreuzseitung accepted the government's story and was properly indignant at the Center's interference in administrative affairs. 89 The Center was alarmed at the turn events had taken and planned a course of action to quiet the storm which Roeren and Dernburg had created. Roeren was to make a statement absolving the party from all connection with his actions. Then Erzberger was to say a few words in his defense.40 And Ballestrem began the sitting on December 4 by sharply calling Roeren to order for his untempered remarks on the previous day. The government also adopted a more moderate tone. Bülow appeared in the Reichstag on December 4 to approve of the Colonial Director's action and to state that he had proceeded upon the general instructions of the Chancellor himself. But his tone was reserved. Then Dernburg declared that he had had no intention of making politics, and admitted that he had never believed that the Center would make good Roeren's threat not to vote colonial credits. 37 Nos. 283 and 285, Dec. 4 and 6, 1906; also the Tägliche N o . 568, Dec. 5, 1906. 38 Berliner Tageblatt, 567, Dec. 4, 1906.

N o . 616, Dec. 4, 1906; Vossische

Zeitung,

Rundschau, N o s . 566-

3 9 No. 567, Dec. 4, 1906. 40 Martin Spahn, " D a s Jahr 1906," a letter of Peter Spahn to his son dated Dec. 17, 1906.

82

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

The events of December 4 were an anti-climax, a mending of rashly torn fences. The anti-Center press, which had burst into " Hosannahs " over the events of December 3, disappointedly confessed that it was " nothing after all." The incident could not remain without further repercussions, however, for anti-Center hatreds had been aroused and could not be quieted quickly. A f t e r one day's set-back, the cry against clericalism, ultramontanism, Rome, and the " Caudine F o r k s " was raised again in an effort to drive the government back to the position it had assumed on December 3. The Center was nonplussed. Germania considered the whole business a riddle and tried to minimize it by pointing out that, had Billow really desired a break with the Center, he would have spoken differently on December 4. Germania knew that Dernburg's action had been deliberate, but did not feel that either he or Bulow had intended a break with the Center which would drive the party into permanent opposition. 41 Perhaps the government had assumed that the Center would not stand behind Roeren. The party had wavered between chivalrously defending Roeren and callously surrendering him to the governmental lions as a political sacrifice, 42 but in the end it was allowed no choice. Goaded into self-defense by its opponents, it took up Roeren's cause again, and thus indirectly continued his attack upon the Colonial Department. T H E OTHER

PARTIES

The events of December 3 had complicated the situation in the Reichstag, where the debate had been originally upon the colonial policy of the government, but was now broadened to include the relationship between the government and the Center. On the eve of the Reichstag session, the Radicals had been as loud as the Center in denouncing the colonial administration, and in demanding reforms. They had criticized military inca41 No. 281 ii, Dec. 7, 1906. 42 The Kolnische Volksseitung distinguished between Roeren's actions and the Center party, but defended Roeren personally ( N o . 1041, Dec. 5, 1906).

THE DISSOLUTION

83

pacity, monopoly contracts, and the clique of bureaucrats in the Colonial Department. They were especially critical of Billow's behavior in the Poeplau affair—avoiding a general investigation of scandals by prosecuting the informer. 4 3 They did not share the optimism of Dernburg's memoranda and they reasserted their opinion that private capital could develop the colonies without government spending. Radical deputies adopted a purely negative attitude of criticism in the Reichstag. They were bitter in their attacks on scandals, and the Radical press praised Erzberger's good work. The Radicals did not attack Dernburg, however. They could not hold him responsible for evils of the past; they felt that his beginning was commendable and his program sound. And when Dernburg attacked Roeren so spectacularly, the Radical press dropped its criticism to join the hue and cry against the Center. In the Reichstag, where the question of colonies was still on the agenda, the Radical deputies could not somersault so quickly as the press; and Miiller-Meiningen continued the criticism of the government, although Dernburg's action had certainly appealed to his anti-ultramontane bias. He spoke of worse revelations yet to come, the Chancellor's culpable activity in the face of known scandals, wastage, and the need for reform before money could be voted. Perhaps this was sham, for in the same breath he assured Dernburg of his party's support for a policy that was economical and that brought justice to the natives. 44 This was, however, no proof that the Radicals were prepared to vote for the government's bills. The feud between Dernburg and the Center was of small moment to the Social Democrats, and they took no part in it. Toward the Center they maintained a benevolent neutrality and continued their opposition to imperialism. In the press and in the Reichstag, they left no doubt of their objection to all 43 Berliner Tageblatt, No. 606, Nov. 29, 1906; Frankfurter Zeitung, Nos. 330 ii and 335 ii, Nov. 29 and Dec. 4, 1906; Reichstag Debates, CCXVIII, 4072. 44 Reichstag Debates, C C X V I I I , 4129 ff.

84

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

colonial appropriations, whether they were conditioned by amendments, whether they were reduced to a minimum, or whether all which the government desired were voted. The Socialists would concern themselves with colonies only in so far as it might be possible to remove abuses and alleviate the lot of the natives, the severity of which, Bebel said, w a s itself largely responsible for revolts such as that in Southwest A f r i c a . German honor, he declared, if the Reichstag must talk of honor, required not so much appropriations to wipe out a few poor natives, as more honest officials and a humane native policy. F o r officials like von Puttkamer, who, Bebel said, belonged on the gallows, and for patriots like Woermann and Tippleskirch, who made fortunes of the country's misfortune, the Social Democrats had nothing but scorn. It was to be expected that the various groups o f Conservatives and the National Liberals would support the government's colonial policy and its efforts to carry on that policy without hindrance from the Reichstag. A s agrarians, the Conservatives had little economic interest in colonial development; but, as patriots and as patrons of the army, they supported the government program zealously enough. They resented aspersions cast upon the administration, and they would have no share in parliamentary tactics which appeared to them to be an effort to usurp administrative powers. T h e y agreed that the lives lost in A f r i c a belonged on the colonial balance sheet, but argued that for this very reason German honor obligated the Fatherland to see that these lives were not lost In vain. Retrenchment now, they insisted, would be false economy.** But the Conservative Party was not happy over Dernburg's attacks on the Center. Center and Conservatives had worked together f o r many years—especially on land legislation and in cultural questions. T h e Conservatives were nearly as Protestant as the Center was Catholic, and both parties had a mutual interest in the maintenance of religious instruction in the schools. S o 45 Reichstag Debates, C C X V I I I , 3993 ff. (Richthofen); (Arendt) ; p. 4154 ff- (Kardorff) ; p. 4017 ff. (Lattmann).

p.

4103 ff.

THE

DISSOLUTION

85

the Conservatives made it clear that their disapproval of " supplementary governments " and improper political pressure was without personal implications, for they wished to arouse no antagonisms among their parliamentary friends in the Center. 49 When Dernburg attacked Roeren and the Center, the National Liberals, however, were delighted .They had not taken kindly to Dernburg at first, for they had been great champions of Prince Hohenlohe, and they were a bit jealous of his successor. 47 But when German colonial policy was attacked in the Reichstag, they came to the defense. A n d when it was combined with an attack upon the Center, they came the more willingly. T h e National Liberals were the champions of imperialism par excellence, and they defended German colonial policy with great show of erudition. N o amount of railway building and no appropriation seemed to be too much for them, for the National Liberal vote was not determined by humanitarian or by petty financial concerns, but by considerations of prestige. 48 A s the Reichstag continued its labours, the rising tide of anti-Center sentiment flowed readily in the Radical, National Liberal, and Free Conservative press. There was serious talk of forcing the colonial bills through the Reichstag, the exile of the Center, and a new political alignment. 4 " BULOW

DISSOLVES T H E

REICHSTAG

W h e n the Reichstag debate ended on December 4, the colonial bills were sent to the Budget Committee which began its sessions the following day. 46 Georg Vogel, Die Konservativen und die Blockpolitik versity of Berlin Dissertation: Typescript, 1925), p. 32.

Btilows

(Uni-

47 Perhaps this was because their o w n Dr. H e r m a n n Paasche (1851-1925) had aspired to be Colonial Director. Paasche had made t w o trips to Africa and had written books about them. H e was vice-president of the German Colonial Society, and Vice-President of the Reichstag. 48 Semler in the Budget Committee, December 7, 1906. Johannes Semler, b. 1858, was a H a m b u r g lawyer, the party's speaker for colonial questions and foreign trade. 49 The National Zeitung accurately prophesied the alignment of the parties in the next Reichstag ( N o . 677, December 7, 1906).

86

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

Here Erzberger foolishly brought up a new wild story and the effect of his recent moderation was lost. He accused the National Liberal Dr. Semler of having conspired to finance an expedition of settlers to the Spanish island of Fernando P o which was to have ended in German annexation of the island. The story leaked out, but proved to be the exaggeration of gossip, and there was further resentment aroused against the Center. With regard to the appropriations to quell the uprising, Spahn had thought that it would be possible to approve the government's figures. But he learned of excess expenditures in the colony of more than 60 million marks, and, guided by an obsession for economy, he recommended an essential reduction both of the troops in the field, and of the amount demanded for their support. 50 On the next day the Center Party proposed that troops be reduced to 2500 as of April 1, 1907, and that 15,288,000 marks instead of 29,220,000 be voted. The government, however, relying upon the authority of the military command and of the civil governor of Southwest A f r i c a , von Lindequist, 51 maintained that, although the end of the war was expected soon, various efforts to negotiate peace thus far had failed, and a reduction beyond the contemplated 4000 men and a military strength of less than 8000 men was unthinkable. A t this stage, the Radicals supported the Center proposal. They thought that 2500 men were enough. They complained that the government was not taking the Center proposals seriously, and they announced that the Radical People's Party would vote for them. Before the Budget Committee met again on December 1 1 , Colonel von Diemling, head of the military expedition in Southwest A f r i c a , cabled explicitly that even if the Bondelzwarts should surrender, 8000 men would still be necessary to cope 50 Martin Spahn, " Das Jahr 1906." 51 Friedrich von Lindequist, b. 1862. In 1907 Undersecretary, and 1910-11 Secretary, of the Colonial Office.

THE

DISSOLUTION

87

with the few remaining armed bands and to maintain order. 52 Governor von Lindequist refused to be responsible for conditions if fewer men were voted, and the government insisted that its figures were the absolute minimum: 29 million marks, 12,000 men in December and 4000 fewer by April 1907. The Radicals weakened. In an effort to meet the government more than half way, they proposed that the government's figures be approved on condition that the administration promise to return the troops as rapidly as possible, that a police force be organized to replace the troops, and that, beyond the 4000 men whom the government was willing to withdraw, preparations be made before April 1907 for further withdrawals to the point of bare necessity. T h e idea of cheaper police troops as substitutes for the army had been a suggestion of the Centrists, and they were disappointed that the government paid no attention to it. In fact, the government avoided it. V o n Loebell told Spahn that the Chancellor would gladly see the troops reduced, but was in no position to go below the minimum figure set by the military command. 53 Thereupon the Centrist amendment was altered to provide that 4000 men be sent home before April first, and to this the government agreed; in addition, preparations were to be made before April first for the further reduction of the troops to 2500 men, and to this the government would not agree. Biilow advised Count Ballestrem to have the Center reach some compromise on the basis of the Radical proposals. But this the party could not do. 5 * The Budget Committee came to no agreement, and action was postponed until the plenary session of the Reichstag, where the same impasse was in prospect. The Center press saw nothing alarming in this, opined that the government would yield, but 52 T h e telegram was not made public at the time. Spahn was the only one of the Budget Committee w h o saw it. H e thought it of small import, although much was made of it by the government later. 53 Martin Spahn, " D a s Jahr 1906." 54 Ibid.

88

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

IQOJ

let it be read between the lines that the Center might compromise." 5 The National Liberal and Radical press, however, wanted no compromise and prayed for strong leadership which would compel the Center either to bend or to break. 58 While this uncertainty existed among the politicians, the Chancellor had already prepared for the eventuality that the Reichstag might reject the government's minimum demands. Encouraged by the undaunted Dernburg and the aggressive von Loebell, Biilow had determined upon a dissolution of the Reichstag, should the government bills be defeated upon the second reading. The Emperor's approval was obtained as early as December 6 or 7, 57 when the Center was beginning to demand military reductions, and Erzberger was making further sensational accusations in the Budget Committee. A few days later, members of the Bundesrat made secret trips to their capitals to receive the approval of their princes.58 The Bundesrat met again December 12, and Biilow was able to carry his views in favor of a dissolution against the opposition of Posadowsky, Tirpitz, and the finance ministers of Prussia and the Empire. Posadowsky had been accustomed to the support of the Center for his social policies. A Center in opposition would severely handicap him, and besides, he had 55 Germania, No. 284 ii, Dec. 12, 1906; Kölnische Volkszeitung, No. 1062, Dec. 12, 1906. 56 Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 577, December 13, 1906; Berliner Tageblatt, Nos. 631-632, Dec. 12-13, 1906. 57 The Emperor was in Breslau December 5 and in Klitschdorf December 6, and did not arrive in Berlin until 7 : 4 5 p. m. on December 7 ; but it is quite certain that the Emperor's approval was obtained during these days, while the Emperor was absent from Berlin [Theodor Eschenburg, Das Kaiserreich am Scheideweg (Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1929), p. 42; Memoirs of Prince von Bülovj, II, 296-297 ; Adolf Wermuth, Ein Beamtenleben, Erinnerungen (Berlin: Scherl, 1922), p. 225]. 58 Princess Radziwill wrote December 18-19, " Ainsi je sais que Lerchenfeld (Bavarian representative at the Court in Berlin) a dû se rendre avant la séance à Munich en mission secrète pour que son Régent fût au courant de ce qui se préparait. Il en a été fait de même auprès des autres Princes " (Lettres au Général Robilant, III, 268 ff.).

THE

DISSOLUTION

89

no wish to turn so suddenly upon his supporters. Tirpitz was also grateful for the Center's assistance. But such a radical shift in party alignment as Bülow contemplated would not be disastrous for him, since the navy was a national affair and the Emperor was strongly behind it. The dissolution of the Reichstag was authorized. The order was already drawn up, and the Emperor's signature was upon it. The place and date of the heading were lacking, but these could be written in at the last moment. The whole proceeding was secret. Bülow did not take any of the Reichstag leaders into his confidence, or warn them of his intentions. He even denied to Ballestrem that a dissolution was being considered.5" This may have been because he feared that party leaders would have objected. F o r at the moment of Billow's decision to dissolve, two men as close to the government as Freiherr von Zedlitz and Bassermann had declared themselves against it.80 When the Budget Committee met December 1 2 - 1 3 , the Southwest African railway bill fared well. A f t e r both a successful settler and an economic expert had testified, and Dernburg had pointed out the permanent economic advantage of the railway, Spahn declared that the picture had been altered. Dernburg admitted that the government had failed before to show that the railway would have more than military value; and on the morning of December 1 3 the railway was voted in the committee—the terms of the bill having been altered to meet the Center's proposal that the appropriation be a loan instead of an outright grant. 59 Karl Bachem concludes from Bülow's duplicity that the Chancellor wanted a dissolution so badly that he was afraid to warn the Center lest it should support him {op. cit., VI, 389-390). This thesis is corroborated by the fact that Bülow kept his secret until the last moment. It was customary for any imperial order such as that for a dissolution to be brought to the Reichstag in a red folder. But Bülow used a white one on December 13, apparently to confuse the opposition. On the other hand this thesis does not account for the fact that both Bülow and von Loebell had made efforts to bring the Center around to the government's point of view. 60 Hans Delbrück, " Die Auflösung des Reichstages," Preustische bücher, C X X V I I (1907), p. 184.

Jahr-

90

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

When the Center came to decide what attitude it should take toward the appropriation for the suppression of the revolt, it faced a dilemma. The storm of feeling against the party aroused by Dernburg's attack on Roeren had not abated. In fact, the thunderings of the anti-Center press were growing louder. There was talk of a dissolution, but there was also talk against it—all mere conjecture. 81 When the Center met in caucus Spahn mentioned the possibility of a dissolution, but was not taken seriously. Other party conservatives, who might have favored voting for the whole government bill, apparently did not speak.82 The government had so far ignored the Center's proposal to substitute police troops for the military, and the party may have thought that a full discussion of the proposal in the Reichstag might cause the government to take it seriously. 63 Other factors influencing the Center's attitude were their interest in economy, the desire to make their demands for reform effective, and probably irritation at the way Roeren and the party had been treated.84 The Center decided to vote only for its own amendment. The Reichstag met on the afternoon of December 13 for the second reading of the colonial bills. That morning Dernburg maliciously published in the press the documents which told the 61 The usually well informed Frankfurter Zeitung reported, for example, that " as yet no one of the persons w h o might be considered as being in authority had busied himself with thoughts of the necessity for, and the possible outcome of, a dissolution of the Reichstag " ( N o . 341 ii, Dec. io, 1906). 62 A letter of P. Spahn, dated Dec. 21, 1906 ( M . Spahn, " Das Jahr 1906"). 63 Ibid. 64 The Social Democrats later pointed out that the Center's motive could have been neither opposition to colonial development nor insistence on economy, for the difference between 20 million and 29 million marks was a mere pittance compared to the 800 million marks which the Center had already helped to appropriate for the colonies. They concluded, therefore, that the Center's vote must have been due to anger because they could not continue their " supplementary government" with Dernburg in office [Die Sozialistische Arbeiter Internationale 1907 (Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907), p. 102], Spahn's letters to his soti do not show any resentment over Dernburg's action, but the events of December 3 must have lessened the willingness of the Center to yield to the Chancellor.

THE

DISSOLUTION

91

Colonial Department's side of the story about Roeren's pressure on the administration. 85 Ballestrem allowed Roeren more than half an hour to give the Reichstag his side. He was able to show that Bülow, as well as he, had desired as little publicity as possible; and that until recently he. Roeren, had been given to understand that his efforts to mediate between officials and missionaries had been appreciated. But the anti-Center parties did not care. The Center and the Radicals had presented their proposals to the Reichstag in slightly altered form."® The Hompesch (Center) amendment provided for the reduction of the troops in Southwest A f r i c a to 8000 by April first, preparations for further reduction to 2500 after that date, and an appropriation of approximately 20 million instead of 29 million marks. The Ablass (Radical People's P a r t y ) amendment was a pious wish. It said nothing about the actual number of troops to be maintained, but requested further reduction beyond the 8000 men demanded by the government if and when the local authorities might consider it possible. When the sitting began, Spahn reported the Budget Committee's failure to agree and took great pains to explain the meaning of the Center amendment—that it provided all the troops the government demanded, and required only preparations for reduction before April first. He pointed out that such work as maintaining harbor, railway, telegraph, and transport facilities could be done by less expensive police troops, and that, inasmuch as there were fewer than 1 5 0 0 men actually in the field against the rebellious natives, 2500 active troops should be sufficient.87 Bülow made no pretense of listening to Spahn. He chatted with colleagues on the government bench,68 and, when his turn 65 Xorddcutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, N o . 291, Dec. 13, 1906. T h i s w a s probably both a warning to the Center and an answer to an article in Germania the day before. 66 Reichstag

Debates, C C X X V I , Aktenstücke 612 and 617.

67 Reichstag

Debates, C C X V I I I , 4357 ff-, 4373 ff-

68Zentrum und neuester Kurs

( B e r l i n : Germania, 1907), p. 16.

92

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

came to speak, he rose and defended the government demands as the absolute minimum. It was a question, he said, " of making a last effort in order to restore enduring peace and security to our colonies. I f we should be frightened before this last sacrifice, we would, in my opinion, be guilty of a grievous failure and a national crime. . . . I cannot admit, gentlemen, that this august body will make a decision so regrettable and so critical from a financial and military, political and national point of view. Should I be disappointed in this, as the responsible leader of the affairs of the Empire, and in the face of the German people and of history, I should not be in a position to subscribe to such a capitulation." 40 That Biilow could have meant only a government victory or a dissolution of the Reichstag must have been clear to all members of the house, although the Socialist Lebedour was the only one bold enough to express such a conclusion. Whether the Center's amendment involved a " national crime " or a threat to the honor and integrity of the Fatherland was doubtful. Since the middle of October, the most important band of natives in revolt had been inactive and had indicated their desire for peace. Several chieftains, whose agreement to a capitulation was necessary, were hard to find; but on December 23, through the heroic efforts and good offices of one of the Catholic missionaries ( ! ) , 120 Bondelzwarts laid down their arms and signed a peace treaty. T w o days later 35 more followed suit. Refugees interned in the Cape Colony were soon returned and settled on the land. Colonel von Diemling and the General Staff, however, demanded at least 8000 men in December 1906, in addition to local police, in order to cope with the remaining 150 natives in arms, and to assure the peace. T h e Reichstag majority felt that something was wrong with the way the natives were being treated if it took 8000 soldiers to keep 150 natives quiet. 70 69 Reichstag Debates, C C X V I I I , 4359. 70 In addition to the 150 natives under arms, however, there were several

THE

DISSOLUTION

93

T h e Radical People's P a r t y had, by this time, left off criticism and opposition. T h e party spokesman explained that his colleagues had not really renounced the attitude they had taken during the first reading, that they desired to give the government full backing in its efforts to restore peace, and felt it unwise to limit the troops to a minimum number. T h e i r amendment would, he said, take into account the demand o f

the

German people f o r a minimum o f expense. W h e n Dernburg explained that the government was willing to accept the Radical amendment, the other parties to the right gave their adherence, and the Radicals, f o r the second time in the year, were allied with the Conservatives on a colonial question. T h e debate having indicated that otherwise party positions had not changed, and that the Center and the Social Democrats would reject both the government bill and the Ablass amendment, Biilow made a final plea in which h e made a national issue of the impending vote and declared it to be a test o f Germany's whole colonial policy. It is not a question here [he said] whether we shall appropriate a few millions more or less for our colonies. It is a question . . . of whether we shall keep our colonies at all or not. It is a question . . . of whether we shall endanger the world's regard for us, the honor of our arms, our position in the world, our self-respect, simply in order to save a comparatively paltry sum at the end of a campaign which has already cost us hundreds of millions . . . Shall the German people prove themselves to be more petty, shall the German people stand here more mean than other peoples? That is the question to which the federated governments desire an answer. . . . There are situations where shrinking before a crisis means lack of courage and sense of obligation. I f you want a crisis, you may have one. 71 thousand prisoners to be released whose conduct would be uncertain. It was this fact which moved the military command to caution. For this and the great difficulties which the soldiers encountered see the memorandum of the Prussian General Staff sent to the Reichstag, Feb. 24, 1907 (Reichstag Debates, CCXXXX, Aktenstück 107). 71 Reichstag Debates, CCXVIII, 4379.

94

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

The Reichstag might have questioned Billow's judgment, or Billow's right to make a national issue out of the vote; it might have recognized certain exaggerations in the Chancellor's speech; but it could not have failed to understand what Billow meant. President Ballestrem put the question in a way which surprised the house: Ablass Amendment, government bill, and Hompesch Amendment, in that order—undoubtedly because, having been assured that a dissolution was not anticipated, he felt that the Center amendment had the best chance of success. 71 A deputy asked for the floor to move a change in the order of voting, but Ballestrem cut him off with unwonted abruptness. As the voting proceeded it became increasingly evident that the Reichstag would reject all three proposals. Spahn busied himself with efforts to persuade the national parties to approve simply the title and introduction to the government bill, in order to assure a third reading. But the effort met with the sudden refusal of Bassermann." Both Spahn's efforts and Ballestrem's calculations went awry. Biilow did not even allow the Hompesch Amendment to come to a vote, and, immediately after both Ablass Amendment and government bill had been defeated, he rose amid the improper but enthusiastic cheers from the Bundesrat bench and read the hastily dated order f o r dissolution. The right was delighted. The Social Democrats cheered ironically. The Center was silent. 74 72 The likelihood of success was, however, slight. Since the Social Democrats were certain to have voted against the Hompesch Amendment, the entire right wing of the Reichstag would have had to vote with the Center or abstain. Under the circumstances, this was not likely. The vote on the Hompesch Amendment ought to have been separated, and the voting ought to have been as follows: 1. Disposition as per Hompesch Amendment; 2. Ablass Amendment; 3. Government bill; 4. Appropriation as per Hompesch Amendment. 73 Articles of August Tiedemann and Otto Arendt in Der Tag, Feb. 17 and 19, 1907. 74 The Ablass Amendment was defeated 171-175, the majority being composed of 80 Centrists and allied Guelphs, 76 Social Democrats, 13 Poles, four Alsatians, one member of the Bavarian Farmer's League, and one inde-

THE

95

DISSOLUTION REASONS

T h e sudden dissolution of the Reichstag answered certain questions which had been raised by the political events of the preceding months. T h e Center did not change its attitude of criticism and opposition. T h e Radicals did change their stand, and they supported the government. The Chancellor acted with unwonted vigour and dissolved the Reichstag. But Billow's unexpected action provoked two questions, the answers to which are still partly a matter for conjecture. W h y the dissolution? A n d why the element of surprise? It must be admitted that the two supplementary budgets in themselves were not important enough to warrant a dissolution. The railway had been assured. A s for the troops, the Center's amendment met the government's requirements until April i , 1907 when the bill expired anyway. The Center simply asked pendent Guelph. Ballestrem and three other Centrists voted with the minority. The government's bill was defeated 168-177. From the Center, only Ballestrem voted for the government. One Centrist abstained. Otherwise party lines held fast. There were 48 deputies absent, 20 Centrists, three Poles, two Social Democrats, five Alsatians, one Guelph, and only 17 from among the other parties. T h r e e seats were not filled: the Social Democrat Dreesbach had died November 26; the Centrist Brenner had died November 30; and the election of Raab (Economic Alliance) had been declared invalid. In a full house, the vote may be calculated to have been 206-188 against the government. T h e vote on the Ablass amendment was as f o l l o w s : Party Conservatives Free Conservatives Economic Alliance German Reform Party National-Liberals Radical Peoples' Party Radical Alliance South German Peoples' Party Dane Independent Center Poles Alsatians Guelphs Social-Democrats

Yea 49 19 11 6 49 18 9 3 I 2 4

171 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X V I I I , 4382-4384.

Nay

1

Absent 3 3 2 2 2, 1 3

80 13 4 1 76

1 20 3 5 1 2

175

48

96

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

the government to prepare for further withdrawals by that date. The reduction of the appropriation to 20 million marks was no insurmountable obstacle to the government, since excess expenditures were often covered by final supplements to the budget at the close of the fiscal year. There were reasons, however, why Billow could not accept the Center amendment. If the government's estimates were correct, the final decision with the Center would only have been postponed until discussion of the 1907-8 budget in March. T h e military commander and the civil governor of Southwest A f r i c a assured Billow that the government estimates represented a minimum, 75 so there seemed little to be gained by postponement. There were other, more intangible reasons why Biilow could not make concessions. The parliamentary situation and the events of the year gave to the colonial debate and the voting a significance far beyond that which the intrinsic merits of the two bills under consideration warranted. Dernburg recognized this with two long memoranda, the Reichstag with six days of debate. Imperialism in general, and the costs, benefits, and methods of Germanys' whole colonial policy were debated far more than the little railway in Southwest A f r i c a or the 29 million marks for the military expedition there. A n examination and trial of Germany's whole colonial system was involved, and the Reichstag condemned it. It was this general condemnation of the administration which was important. Biilow could not, as patriot or as egoist, tolerate such a condemnation. It incensed the military, the aristocracy, and the court, who seemed to regard problems of national policy which involved Germany's prestige as their own domain and more or less beyond the ken of the Reichstag. Billow felt himself responsible, and these influential circles held him responsible, f o r a policy much more aggressive than that which the Center would have 75 Excellenz von Lindequist assured the author that, at the time, he considered acceptance of the Center's amendment impossible, and that, as far as he was concerned, this was the justification for the dissolution.

THE

DISSOLUTION

97

him adopt. His efforts to invigorate the colonial administration had already been defeated once in 1906. Another such defeat, coupled with the Reichstag's condemnation of the bureaucratic administration and a moral victory f o r the Center, would leave small chance for larger plans in the near future ; and Germany's colonial development might have to be altered in a way which would not please the government and its nationalistic supporters. But perhaps it was not so much Germany's colonies or Germany's prestige which was uppermost in Billow's mind. T h e Chancellor's own prestige was at stake, and of this he was inordinately proud. It has been observed that in court and conservative circles Biilow had been criticized for his readiness to yield to the importunities of political parties, particularly the Center and the Social Democrats. A n d when these two parties obstructed a colonial program, disgraced a royal prince, attacked the bureaucracy, and questioned the judgment of the General Staff, the wrath of the Emperor was great, 76 and the reputation of Prince Bülow was diminished. The Protestant campaign against the Center at court and the intrigue of the camarilla probably further weakened the Chancellor's position, but there is little to indicate that pressure from the Emperor forced Biilow to dissolve the Reichstag. 71 " T h e dissolution was 76 The Emperor was not only irritated by the Reichstag's refusal to approve the railway in May 1906, but was in favor of building the road without the Reichstag's approval, on the grounds of military necessity. H e was dissuaded from this plan only with difficulty (Hammann, op. cit., p. 9). The Radicals were much alarmed at the Emperor's proposal ( Vossische Zeitung, No. 409-410, Sept. 1-2, 1906). 77 The Austrian Ambassador told Princess Radziwill upon " reliable " authority that the dissolution was entirely the Chancellor's doing, and that he persuaded the Emperor to agree (Radziwill, Lettres au Général Robilant, III, 275 ff.). This is Bülow's story too (Memoirs of Prince von Biilow, II, 296). On the other hand, Holstein believed that the Emperor was responsible, and Zedlitz-Trutzschler states that the Emperor, out of anger at the Center, ordered Biilow to break with the Catholic Party [Friedrich von Holstein, Lebensbekenntnis in Briefen an eine Frau, ed. H. Rogge (Berlin: Mittler, 1932), p. 2701 Robert von Zedlitz-Trutzschler, Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof (Berlin and Leipzig: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1924), pp. 185-186],

98

THE GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

the work of the Chancellor alone. Billow was in no position to yield to the Reichstag further; he could not afford to compromise; and undoubtedly he felt compelled to prove that he could be firm. However, if Billow's position at court were really weakened, it was largely because of the Center's criticism of the colonial administration. And whatever the requirements of Billow's personal position, the dissolution is inconceivable apart from the Center's attitude toward the colonial administration all through 1906. For more than a year the Center had made difficulties, criticized, made revelations, rejected government bills, and slashed government appropriations with unwonted acrimony. Its interference had become unbearably obnoxious to the bureaucracy. The Center would not give Dernburg a chance. Whether this was out of regard for morality, economy, public opinion, or party politics 78 could make little difference to Billow. The Center was blocking his program and ruining his reputation. From Billow's point of view either the Center would have to mend its ways, or he must get along without it. The Center did not mend its ways. The radical Centrists continued to direct the party's policies. They chose Roeren to speak, and Roeren would not take the admonition to be cautious. The party did not disavow Roeren, but made itself his champion. It would not accept the compromise the government offered. And in the heat of controversy even the conservative members of the party voted against the government. Had Billow accepted the Center's terms, he would have appeared to place his stamp of approval upon the Center's recent criticisms and demands for reform and retrenchment. This he could not afford to do. Fortunately for Biilow, the Radicals provided him with a possible means of escape from the dilemma in which the Center had placed him; and the readiness of the South German People's 78 A frequent explanation is that the Center was simply trying to bring pressure to bear upon the government in order to impress the government with its power (Biilow, Imperial Germany, pp. 186-187).

THE DISSOLUTION

99

Party and the Radical People's Party to support national policies played a major role in Billow's decision to dissolve the Reichstag. 79 They seemed anxious to participate in the positive work of the Reichstag. They were ready to vote for national and colonial bills, and Biilow probably felt that they would not raise insuperable obstacles to further government legislation. 80 It is likely that Biilow did not regard with horror the possibility that he might have to make concessions to liberalism, 81 and it would be a fine feather in his cap to attach the Radicals to the national policies of the state. The Center's complaint after the dissolution was that Biilow did not give the Center a chance to mend its ways—that is, that the abruptness of his action cut off all possibility that the Center might vote for the government bill. Billow's action was certainly abrupt. Although it had been determined upon beforehand, there was no definite warning. Biilow had told Spahn and Grober that he would tolerate no interference with government plans this time, but he had not specifically threatened to dissolve and he had told Count Ballestrem on December 11 that no one was even thinking of a dissolution. 82 He employed the ruse of bringing the order for dissolution into the Reichstag in a white folder instead of the customary red one, and he ignored the Center's plans for further negotiation which many felt to be certain of success.83 W h y ? 79 Ib;.d., pp. 189-190. 80 Tariff and trade laws, upon which the Radicals could not possibly agree with the Agrarians, were fixed for five years to come. 81 There are indications that Biilow, although a Conservative himself, really f;lt that Germany's best interests would be served by a strong liberal party attached to the government, as a kind of counteractive force to Conservative arrogance [August Stein, Es ivar allcs gans anders (Frankfurt a.M.: Frankfurter Societatsdruckerei, 1922), p. 65 ff.; Thimme, op. cit., p. 136; Memoirs of Prince von Biilow, II, 332]. Biilow often complained to Basserrrann of the weakness of the liberals compared to the power of the Center Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 53, note). 82 Karl Bachem, op. cit., VI, 390; Cermania, op. cit., pp. 86-87. 83 Hdstein, op. cit., p. 270; Die Zukunft,

No. 3, Jan. 4, 1911; Pehl,

L V I I (Dec. 22, 1906), p. 444;

IOO

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

There are two possible reasons for Billow's action. The first is that he did not want to compromise. The Centrists claimed that, had Biilow waited for a third reading, the Center would have voted for the Ablass Amendment or something like it. But the Center had refused to moderate its position from December 6 - 1 3 , and Spahn had told von Loebell that his party could not do it. Spahn and some of the conservative Centrists might have been willing, and Spahn gave some indication that he was willing, but Spahn was unable to control the party in 1906. The best that the government could have expccted was that Spahn and enough of the Center conservatives would either vote for the government or absent themselves, and thus make possible the passage of an amendment which the administration could accept. Biilow might have obtained the same result at the second reading had he given beforehand the warning which he carefully omitted. Apparently a rather unpleasant compromise won by virtue of a slight rift in the Center party was not sufficient to satisfy Biilow, for the parliamentary situation would not have been altered, and the Center would have been free to continue its policies of the past year. A second explanation for Biilow's action is that he really wanted an election, hoped that the Ablass Amendment would not be accepted, and hastily dissolved the Reichstag before it could be adopted in a third reading—that is, that Biilow consciously precipitated a crisis. This theory is popular because it seems to explain both the viciousness of Dernburg's attack upon the Center and the secrecy of the preparations for the dissolution.84 But it does not account for Biilow's real efforts to perBernstein, " The German Elections and the Social Democrats," p. 483. Bassermann wrote in a note on the dissolution: " Ballestrem told me that it would have been easy for him to negotiate between Center and Chancellor " (Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 43, note). If Bassermann's note is accurate, Ballestrem must have forgotten that two days before he had been unable to do this (supra, p. 87). 84 Holstein wrote to his sister December 16: " T h e colonial bill could have been passed if a dissolution had been threatened beforehand. Fifteen members of the Conservatives alone were absent at the vote. Had they been called for

THE

DISSOLUTION

IOI

suade the Center to vote for the Ablass Amendment on the second reading, and it attributes to Bülow some rather trivial motives—most of which are variations on the theme that Bülow dissolved the Reichstag in order to improve his personal reputation at court. T h e Centrists declared that Bülow had long before decided to utilize the first opportunity to rid himself of them and thus counteract the Protestant propaganda at court against him. 85 Unfriendly critics declared that Bülow's aim was purely to restore his prestige at court by playing the strong man and distracting attention from the criticisms of any camarilla or army clique. Others believed that Dernburg's rash but popular performance had forced Bülow's hand,*® although this theory does not take into account Bülow's own determination to deal roughly with Roeren. Y e t others felt that Bülow stumbled into the dissolution without any particular plan, that he had not thought seriously of a " bloc of national parties " until after the dissolution, 87 or that he had not given adequate consideration to the difficulties which would beset the bloc parties in their efforts to cooperate. 88 T h i s estimate of Bülow seems unfair, however, since he claims to have considered party realignment as an " old problem," 89 and his increasing interest in the Radicals during 1906 was obvious. —but the leaders had no idea. S o Bülow wanted the dissolution " (Lebensbekenntnis in Briefen an eine Frau, p. 2 7 0 ) . 8 5 Zentrum und neuester Kurs, p. 12; K a r l Bachem asserts, without being able to prove, that the bloc parties, i. e. the Radicals, had an agreement with Bülow, made during the summer vacation, and were ready for the dissolution (op. cit., V I , 378). 86 F r i t z Härtung, Deutsche Geschichte vom Frankfurter Frieden bis zum Vertrag von Versailles (3rd ed.; Bonn and Leipzig: Schroeder, 1930), p. 2 4 3 ; Hammann, op. cit., p. 12. 87 Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 48. 88 Martin Schmidt, Graf Posadoivsky, Staatssekretär des Reichsschatzamtes und des Reichsamtes des Innern, 1893-1907 (Doctoral Dissertation, Halle, 1935), P. 160. 89 Imperial

Germany, p. 188.

I02

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

More sympathetic observers asserted that Billow attacked the Center in order to enlist the Radicals in the national cause and in the positive aspects of legislation. 90 Billow's success in doing so gave him much satisfaction later. 91 But at the time, the Radicals appear to have been more nearly a means than an end. That is, Biilow did not abuse the Center in order to strengthen the Radicals so much as he used the Radicals to weaken the Center. The most apparent explanation for Billow's actions in December 1906 is that the Chancellor was beset with t w o difficulties which might both be resolved by the single expedient of firm action. These difficulties were: first, a temporary shift in the leadership of the Center Party which resulted in the Center's merciless criticism of the colonial administration and refusal to support Billow's colonial program; second, a real dissatisfaction at court with the inactivity of the government, with the Algeciras policy, with Billow's weakness toward the Center and the Social Democrats, and with his inability to silence the Reichstag's criticisms. In this situation, Biilow, contemplating the availability of the Radicals as strong government supporters, saw in an election the possibility of defending his colonial policy and at the same time of reinforcing his reputation at court. A successful election and a strong national majority in the Reichstag, a defense of the troops and the military command, a campaign against the Center and the Social Democrats — a l l this would be very popular in influential circles. Biilow would be a hero. 90 Supra, p. 53 f. 91 Biilow, Imperial

Germany, p. 178.

CHAPTER III THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN THE election campaign which followed the dissolution of the Reichstag in December 1906 aroused unusual interest. Although this was partly due to the active participation of high government officials, the issues of the campaign commanded special attention. Most of the agitation centered about four main problems: imperialism, ultramontanism, socialism, and Billow's " bloc politics." The first of these issues, imperialism, grew out of the Reichstag's debate over Southwest A f r i c a . That debate had expanded, even before the Reichstag had been dissolved, into a discussion of Germany's entire colonial policy. It expanded further during the election campaign to a point where it involved the larger issues of German imperialism and world politics. The administration was largely responsible for this development, for it saw that a campaign on behalf of Germany's colonies would enable the government to appeal to the patriotism of the voters and to brand its enemies as unpatriotic. Many indifferent Germans could be aroused from political lethargy by the cry that vital interests of the Fatherland were in danger; and, therefore, a patriotic or national appeal offered the government and its supporters the surest means of increasing their vote. In the second place, it seems obvious that Biilow desired a kind of national referendum that would enable him to proceed with ambitious plans for colonial development. Finally, the patriotic appeal was the only one which could hold Bulow's supporters together. T h e Reichstag majority for which the Chancellor hoped was to be composed of parties having little in common beyond their enthusiasm for national policies. If Radicals, National Liberals, and Conservatives were to find any basis for common action, it would be largely in their agreement about these national policies. The government, therefore, made them the paramount issue of the campaign. 103

IC>4

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

The second issue in the campaign, ultramontanism, was the result of the traditional hatred of Roman Catholicism by German liberals and Evangelicals. In the years following the Kulturkampf this hatred had been restrained, as the government relied more and more upon the Roman Catholic Center Party for the support of its policies. When, however, the government broke with the Center Party in 1906, the confessional bitterness hitherto held in check was vigorously expressed. Biilow's grievance against the Center was that it tried to curtail Germany's colonial development. But National Liberals and Radicals began to attack the Center because it was Roman Catholic and was associated with a " foreign " power, the international church at Rome. This attack upon the religion as well as the politics of the Center was a second factor in the election. The third issue in the campaign, socialism, was not new in German politics, because the government and the " burgher " parties habitually opposed the Social Democrats. The unity and vigor of their opposition in 1907, however, was unusual. This was a reaction to the astonishing gains of the Social Democratic Party in the 1903 elections and to the success of the Social Democrats in obstructing colonial legislation in the Reichstag. Many who had been indifferent to the socialist " menace " became genuinely alarmed and spurred into action. The fourth issue of the 1907 campaign, " bloc politics," was unique. It was a matter not to be contested between the groups which opposed each other in the campaign, but for the parties supporting the government to settle among themselves. These parties, from which Billow hoped to fashion a majority for his colonial policy, differed in their attitude toward domestic affairs. Indeed, such a wide gulf separated agrarian Conservatives from free-trade Radicals that to anticipate cooperation between them appeared fantastic. Yet this was just what Billow seemed to expect; and the question as to whether or not his hopes would be realized, the question as to whether or not

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I05

Radicals and Conservatives would actually form a national parliamentary bloc, became vital in the campaign. Each of the issues mentioned will be discussed separately in the following pages. THE

NATIONAL

APPEAL

T h e dissolution of the Reichstag had hardly become common knowledge before the Reichstag was labeled " unpatriotic," and the minor appropriation for Southwest A f r i c a was magnified into an issue of Germany's whole imperialistic and " national " future. The same day on which the Reichstag was dissolved, the Norddeutsche Allegemeine Zeitung published the official interpretation of the dissolution. It said: The Reichstag has been dissolved because its majority refused to grant the Federated Governments the means needed to fulfill a national obligation. The rejection of demands which were indispensable for the future of Southwest Africa keenly affects Germany's position in the world. . . . Southwest Africa's importance as a national possession, the importance it has acquired because of the blood of murdered German men and women, because of the sacrifices and struggles of our troops, because of the suffering and heroic deaths of so many brave men, and its importance to our economic strength in the future—all this lies heavily in the balance. . . . It is not a question of Southwest Africa alone. How we persevere there, whether we go forward with tenacious willingness to make sacrifices, or whether we weaken after having overcome the greatest dangers, has become . . . a great test of whether Germany is capable of developing from a European into a World Power or not.1 This was the essence of the national appeal: suppressing a native uprising in A f r i c a was a " national obligation " affecting Germany's " position in the world;" German blood flowing in A f r i c a made it an affair of honor as well. According to daily articles in the government press, the Reichstag had been " essentially unpatriotic," and because of a " punctilious regard 1 Dec. 13, 1906, Extra.

IOÓ

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

for economy," it had "left the heroes in the lurch before the enemy." It had endangered Germany's position in the world and " sullied the national honor." Therefore, said the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, the government had dissolved the Reichstag to ask the Germans, " a people of warriors and soldiers," what they thought " about the defense of Germany's military honor." 2 When Biilow felt obliged to present the government's case directly to the public, in a letter to General von Liebert, head of the Imperial Union for Combating Social Democracy, his whole argument rested upon the assertion that " the adverse vote of December 13 was a blow to the Federated Governments and to the national dignity." Biilow did not offer any proof that this was so, but he used the assertion as a premise from which to conclude that the campaign was one " for the honor and welfare of the nation." 3 Whether or not Germany's honor was actually involved by the action of the Reichstag is a matter of opinion. Not all the German people regarded the case of Southwest Africa as representing all German colonies, nor did they all associate national honor with the course of imperialism. This division of opinion constituted an obstacle to the government's program. The government, therefore, endeavored to educate the public in matters colonial, and to arouse a national pride in the colonies. The government made unusual efforts to convince the German people: first, that Southwest Africa stood for colonial expansion in general; second, that colonial expansion affected Germany's position as a world power and therefore her honor; third, that Germany must have a Reichstag which would defend that honor. The Colonial Department led in this campaign of education. T o the stupefaction of the bureaucrats, Dernburg and 2 Dec. 23, 1906, No. 300; also leading articles on 16, 17, 21 Dec. 1906, Nos. 294, 296, 298. 3 This letter, called the Sylvester Letter from its date, " Sylvester's Eve, 1906," is printed in the appendix to this work.

THE

Lindequist

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

IOJ

went directly to the people w i t h the gospel

of

imperialism. O n J a n u a r y 8 the Colonial Director addressed a meeting

of

representative

scholars,

authors, and

artists

in

Berlin. H e painted the economic future of the colonies in rosy hues and characterized the A f r i c a n expansion of

Germany's

superior civilization as a national obligation. H i s implication w a s that the Reichstag w a s making it difficult f o r the government to fulfill this national obligation. T h i s , he said,

was

because the real meaning of imperialism had not been understood in the broad ranks of the German people. H e implied that only such understanding would prevent the loss of the colonial possessions which the G e r m a n people had " so nobly won in hard and feverish competition." * T h r e e d a y s later D e r n b u r g repeated to the representatives of

German

trade

and

commerce

assembled

in Berlin

that

colonial development w a s a national question of the first rank. In Munich, on January 20, he declared that public opinion in f a v o r of colonies should be strengthened; that Germans needed to learn the importance o f colonies and the need f o r sacrifices and patience in developing them. H e admitted that the government w a s partly to blame because it had lacked any firm colonial policy. In

Stuttgart

February

3,

promised

railway

he

t w o days later, and

tried

to

building,

supply

in F r a n k f u r t

the needed program.

government

financing

of

on He

other

public w o r k s , concessions to attract capital, development of natural resources, indirect taxation, education of the natives f o r labor, better training of colonial officials, and a campaign of education a m o n g the German people.' Lindequist spoke in Dresden, H a m b u r g , and Cologne, and during J a n u a r y the government press kept up a running debate with the opposition papers about colonial scandals, appropria4 Schmoller, Dernburg, Delbrück ... über Reichstagsauflösung politik ( B e r l i n : W e d e k i n d , 1907), pp. 4-16.

und

Kolonial-

5 B e r n h a r d D e r n b u r g , Zielpunkte des deutschen Kolonialwesens (Berlin: Mittler, 1 9 0 7 ) ; Koloniale Ersiehung (Munich: Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 1907) ; Koloniale Lehrjahre ( S t u t t g a r t : Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1 9 0 7 ) ; Koloniale Finanzprobleme ( B e r l i n : M i t t l e r , 1907).

108

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

tions for Southwest A f r i c a , and the Reichstag's lack of patriotism. A f t e r December 27 the government was embarrassed in its contention that the Reichstag had been unpatriotic by the news that the Bondelzwarts in Southwest A f r i c a had surrendered.® T h e government had known of the possibility of such a surrender, but had not stressed it in the Reichstag. The opposition press began to ask if the government had not kept the Reichstag in the dark, if there could still be need for 8000 troops, and if the Center had not been right all along. Such questions placed the government press on the defensive. A f t e r one attempt to cite the surrender as further proof that the Center had misjudged the situation, 7 the Norddeutsclie Allgemeine Zeitung devoted itself to pointing out that the Center had not known the facts and was, therefore, still unpatriotic, that 8000 troops were still needed, and that the government had not intentionally misled the Reichstag, nor indeed misled it at all. Undaunted, it insisted that colonies and national honor were the essential issues of the campaign. T h i s was certainly the opinion of the Chancellor. Billow broke precedent by entering the campaign personally on two occasions: he wrote a public letter to the president of the Imperial Union for Combating Social Democracy; and he spoke at a banquet given by a newly organized Committee for Action on Imperialism. In each instance he emphasized the " national" implications of the elections. His preoccupation was with the election of a " reliable Reichstag majority," as the press had expressed it earlier, with which the government "could solve satisfactorily the great and difficult problems involved in maintaining and improving Germany's position as a great World Power. 8 This meant a Reichstag that would appropriate the colonial credits demanded by the government. 6 Ironically, because of the good offices of a Roman Catholic missionary, Father Malinowsky, stationed at Heiragabis. 7 Norddeutsche

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

N o . 302, D e c . 28, 1906.

8 Norddeutsche

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

N o . 300, D e c . 23, 1906.

THE ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

IO9

In order to produce this patriotic majority, Bülow asked for the sympathetic cooperation of all " national elements," for the subordination of special interests to the " national duty and obligation." The task of the hour, he said, was to produce " a Reichstag majority that will not refuse support in national questions." 9 T h e political leaders who had supported Bülow in the Reichstag's colonial debate approved heartily of the Chancellor's appeal to patriotism. They assumed with Bülow that the government's program for Southwest Africa symbolized Germany's whole colonial development. They agreed that colonial development was necessary if Germany were to assert her position as a World Power. And they believed with Bülow that Germany ought to assert that position. T h e conservative parties accepted the " national" issue because their patriotism was one o f the few conservative principles which might attract the voting masses. They not only adopted but elaborated upon the national theme of the official propaganda. The dissolution, the German Conservative party said, was a result of matters " which belong in the realm o f foreign policy and the defense of our greatly increased overseas interests." They could not, they added, " leave the government in the lurch in its effort to defend the honor, might, and dignity of the nation, and to make it secure, whether by the defense of the German Empire itself, or of the colonies so dearly bought and so bravely defended with the blood of countless sons of our land." 10 The Free Conservatives cried, " Voters, the German people will never turn coward as long as the enemy faces our troops in the field. W e shall never give up our colonies won with costly German blood, or surrender our colonists to the wild man's lust for murder. . . . Help elect a Reichstag of which Germany may again be proud." 11 9 Schulthess, Europäischer 10 Ibid.,

Gcschichtskalcnder,

1907, p. 12.

1906, p. 227.

11 Wahlaufrufe und Wahlkundgebungen zur Reichstagswahl 1907 (Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907), pp. 23-24.

IIO

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

The Conservatives were especially indignant at the Reichstag's effort to control a military action by curtailing the budget. They regarded this as an attack upon the Emperor's supreme military authority, and they resented it. 12 The leaders of the lesser conservative parties echoed the call to national duty and appealed to the patriotism of their voters with such catchwords and phrases as " virgin territory drenched with streams of blood," " struggling brothers in A f r i c a , " " safety of German soil," " German honor," " German blood," " German civilization." 13 Before the election finally took place, the blood of the Southwest A f r i c a n settlers was becoming a tiresome subject. T h e Conservatives' indignation with the Reichstag and the Hottentots was giving place to alarmed cries against the Social Democrats, but " the national honor " remained the Conservative catchword to the end. The National Liberals did not let the Conservatives outdo them in patriotic enthusiasm. They followed the advice of the Kölnische Zeitung which claimed on the first day of the campaign that the Reichstag had been dissolved because it had left the government in the lurch in a national issue and advised that this fact " be emphasized at the beginning and kept in the center of the discussion." " The party's appeals to the electorate pointed to the support which the National Liberals gave the colonial administration, to their great regard for the heroic youths who gave their lives in Africa, and to their own refusal to stack arms before the Hottentots. The National Liberals were concerned not only for Southwest A f r i c a but for a vigorous and ambitious colonial policy in general. And they demanded no colonies at all rather 12 Kreuzzeitung,

No. 584, Dec. 14, 1906.

13 Appeal of the German Social Party ( V o s s i s c h e Zeitung, No. 595, Dec. 20, 1906) ; appeal of the Christian Social Party ( W a h l a u f r u f e und Wahlkundgebungen zur Reichstagswahl 1907, pp. 34-35) ; appeal of the German Reform Party (ibid., pp. 31-34) ; appeal of the Agrarian League (ibid., pp. 25-26). 14 Norddeutsche

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

No. 293, Dec. 15, 1906.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

III

than the faint-hearted and pusillanimous policy of the Reichstag majority. 1 5 Although the National Liberals took great pleasure in the campaign against the Center, and although a part of their press confessed that the national issue was only a ruse to bring about a defeat of the Center, 16 there was no doubt that the party as a whole considered the colonies deeply involved, and that they regarded appeals to the honor of German arms and to the love of Fatherland as very effective election propaganda. The Radical parties, which had hitherto been scornful, now joined the national chorus. They explained away the sudden reversal in their attitude with floods of patriotic oratory and a modicum of logic. The actual vote on December 13, they said, had to do simply with the support of a military operation which was—conveniently—not to be confused with the colonial administration in general. Criticized for supporting what they had hitherto condemned, the Radicals explained that they did not condone the evils of the colonial administration in the past, but that they did approve of Dernburg's reform policy which coincided essentially with Radical demands. In general, the Radicals avoided discussing the larger issues of imperialism and world politics and concentrated on the Reichstag's failure to provide for the troops in A f r i c a . On the night of the dissolution a convention of the Radical People's Party in Berlin set aside the regular order of the day to discuss the burning event. The party leaders explained that, 15 Nationalliberale Blatter, N o s . 1 and 2, Jan. 5, 15, 1907; Kolonialpolitik, nicht Kolonialskandal und Nebenregierung ( B e r l i n : Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907) ; the official National Liberal election appeal (Schulthess, op. cit., 1906, p. 229) ; "Ziele und Bestrebungen der Nationalliberalen Partei," Wahlaufrufe und IVahlkundgebungen zur Reichstagswahl 1907, p. 17; the appeal of the Reichsverband der Vereine der Nationalliberalen Jugend (ibid., p. 11) ; National Liberal leaflets in the collection of the Preussische Staatsbibliothek. 16 Der Hannoversche Courier, Dec. 14, 1906, cited in Germania, N o . 287 ii, Dec. 15, 1906 : "There is no colonial issue T h e election campaign is directed a g a i n s t . . . the rule of the Center." For a contradiction, see the National Zeitung, N o . 694, Dec. 16, 1906.

112

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

whatever they might think of imperialism in general, they felt obligated to appropriate what was needed to suppress the Hottentot revolt as long as German soldiers were in the field. They assumed that those who had opposed them on December 1 3 were unpatriotic. " Surely no one who takes his Fatherland seriously," explained one of the candidates for election, " would desert the children of our own flesh who have fought against the wild hordes in Southwest A f r i c a . . ." 1 7 Leaders of the Radical People's Party drew up a handbill to present the sentiments expressed at this meeting. Radicals could not and would not, the leaflet said, " surrender to need and hunger the troops who have fought a brave and tenacious fight against a cruel enemy under the greatest hardships and sufferings. . . . Whatever one may think of the extraordinary sacrifices which imperialism demands, there can be no doubt in the mind of any German: We shall not leave our fighting boys in A f r i c a in the lurch." 1 8 The Radicals hoped to win many votes from the Social Democrats with this slogan about leaving the soldiers in the lurch. The government gave the slogan its official blessing. 19 But just how the soldiers were being left in the lurch, or what lurch, was not explained. It sounded patriotic, and so did the talk about flowing blood and bleaching bones of murdered settlers and starving soldiers. There were no soldiers starving, and more were dying of typhoid fever than in battle. But political orators and authors of election handbills were oblivious to these unromantic realities. In succeeding weeks the Radicals confined their patriotic zeal to the military expedition in Southwest A f r i c a and avoided the larger national issues which Bulow included in the campaign. Apparently they were as yet uncertain of themselves 17 Otto Wiemer, Die Freisinnige Volkspartei und die Reichstagswahlen von 1907 (Berlin: Deutsche Presse, 1907), p. 31. 18 The leaflet was published with slight variations in several electoral districts. 19 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 294, Dec. 16, 1906.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

II3

with regard to imperialism and " all national questions." But they were anxious to appear as defenders of the German army and German honor. In addition to political parties, numerous patriotic and theoretically non-political organizations in Germany shared in the agitation. The national campaign offered them a rare opportunity to disseminate their propaganda. It also provided an incentive for the organization of new groups, and in some cases it resulted in activities of these societies which could hardly be called non-political. The N a v y League threw all its resources into the contest and, with the blessing of " Wilhelmstrasse," published appeals, distributed pamphlets, corresponded with political figures, and gave advice upon campaign strategy. T h e N a v y League's program was not directly affected by the Reichstag's attack upon colonies, but the League's leaders realized that any patriotic spirit aroused on behalf of the colonies would be of great importance to the fleet. T h e League's president urged members to give their assistance to the national parties, to persuade Catholics to vote against the Center, and to vote for the welfare of the Fatherland themselves. 20 With Billow's approval the N a v y League made itself a kind of central office for the distribution of election literature, and it received at least 30,000 marks from an election fund in which the Chancellor had interested himself. T h e League distributed 20,000,000 leaflets with titles such as " German People, how does the Reichstag majority provide for the heroic sons in Southwest A f r i c a ? " T h e secretary of the League, M a j o r General Keim, showed Biilow a sentimental poem about death in the desert, entitled " T o German Mothers," and then had 1,000,000 copies printed. Another pamphlet, entitled " For the soldiers in Southwest A f r i c a , " was mawkish. " Germans!" it 20 C i r c u l a r letters t o local l e a d e r s of t h e

Navy

and 28, 1906, a n d p u b l i s h e d in E r z b e r g e r , Bilder kampj

League, dated Dec.

aus dem

19

Reichstagswahl-

1907 ( B e r l i n : G e r m a n i a , 1907), pp. 46-47. S e e a l s o the a n n o u n c e m e n t

of the B a v a r i a n b r a n c h of the N a v y L e a g u e ( M i i n c h n e r Allgemeine N o . 596, D e c . 24, 1906).

Zeitung,

114

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

read, " Think of your honest brothers in distant A f r i c a ! Think of the costly blood that has been spilt out there for Germany's honor! Many a courageous German soldier now sleeping the eternal sleep beneath the thornbush in the torrid desert waste might have seen his parents and his homeland once again if only the railroad which the government and the experts recommended had been built . . ." Other pamphlets, like " The truth about the German colonies " and " Laborers, Colonies, and the Fleet," were more logical. The latter, written by a " Young National Liberal," told the laborers that colonies meant cheap raw materials, hence higher wages; lower prices for tropical food products, hence cheaper living ; and increased production, hence more work. It declared that the fleet was to protect trade more than the colonies ; and it closed with a typical appeal to all laborers who had been soldiers—that meant nearly all—not to forget the hungry, bleeding, dying brother soldiers in the African wastes and to drive out the Reichstag majority which had left them in the lurch. These and other pamphlets the Navy League put at the disposal of national candidates free of charge. Major General Keim was indefatigable and a bit incautious in his correspondence and in his frequent visits to the Imperial Chancelry. His letters contained encouragement for candidates of national parties, requests for information, and proffers of the Navy League's assistance. Keim arranged for the appearance of several naval officers as campaign speakers. He interested himself in helping candidates for the national parties to avoid competition between themselves ; he urged the men in "Wilhelmstrasse 77 " to do the same ; he advised the National Liberals to be more national, the government to be more liberal, the Conservatives to be less unfriendly to the Radicals, and the Radicals to be less distrustful of the Conservatives; and he even urged the head of the Imperial Chancelry to dissuade the

T H E ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

115

21

Radical press from attacking " reaction." All of this activity received the Emperor's blessing when, the campaign over, he said to Prince Salm, the president of the Navy League, at a Court Ball: " My dear prince, the elections turned out admirably and I am happy that your Navy League did its work so nobly!" 22 The Pan-German League was not less energetic in its labors for the national cause. It gloried in a campaign " for the honor of German arms, for the retention of the colonies, for the protection of Germany's esteem in the world;" and it advised its members to take energetic action for " the victory of the national parties over Center, Poles, and Social Democrats." 23 Local Pan-German groups held rallies to educate the people in imperialism and world politics. Members spoke at the meetings of political parties, denouncing " the enemies of national development." Other members distributed leaflets. In Dresden, 21 Much of Keim's correspondence, revealing activities the correctness of which he was himself in doubt [Letter to Eickhoff which the latter read in the Reichstag (Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I , 167)], was copied by a young man in the employ of the Navy League and found its way into the columns of Der Bayerische Kurier, where its publication, February 4-9, caused much excitement. 22 August Keim, Erlebtes und Erstrebtes, Lebenserinnerungen (Hanover: Letsch, 1925), p. 118. Although many members of the League were Roman Catholics, the League's officers plunged into the campaign against the Center. Keim defended this policy by saying that the Center P a r t y had too often criticized the Navy League (ibid.). T h e Navy League had a membership of 599,000 in 1900 and over 1,000,000 in 1908 (ibid., pp. 97 and 106). In 1908 the League's organ, Die Flotte, was published in 480,000 copies. 23 Election appeal in the Alldeutsche Blatter, No. 51, Dec. 22, 1906. T h e Pan-German League had recently dealt with colonies at its annual meeting in Berlin, Sept. 2, 1906. Colonial scandals had been debated, and one member, who was interrupted by " Bravoes," said bluntly, " W e do not want to make the people in the colonies into Christians, but we want them to work for us. W e might as well say it plainly. All this dither about humanity is silly. German sentimentality has robbed us of a man like P e t e r s " (Vossische Zeitung, No. 412, Sept. 4, 1906).

Il6

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

the League's local officer was head of the committee f o r the national parties and was thanked for his activity by Billow and Dernburg. In Hamburg and in Zurich, League members made contributions for the support of national candidates. Elsewhere, local Navy League groups published appeals in the press on behalf of the national parties. Four of the pamphlets recommended by the Navy League were printed as supplements to the Alldeutsche Blätter, and nine other pamphlets were recommended for use in the campaign. The editor of the Alldeutsche Blätter and officers of the Pan-German League advertised in their paper that their talents were at the disposal of national groups, and they spoke in various districts. Just before the turn of the year, a group of patriotic professors at the University and higher schools of learning in Berlin invited like-minded men to a discussion of German imperialism on January 8. They were motivated by a belief in the importance of imperialism for Germany's future, and by the relative indifference of the German public. They proposed to counteract the " pusillanimous demand that Germany limit herself to purely domestic politics " by enlightening the widest possible circles as to the importance of Germany's colonial policy.24 Dernberg spoke at the meeting, and the Berlin professors, after venting their spleen at the unpatriotic Center, resolved " to establish a committee to widen and deepen the people's understanding of imperialism and world politics." 25 The Committee for Action on Imperialism thus established, with Professor Gustav Schmoller as chairman, published 500,000 copies of the stenographic report of their meeting as campaign literature. They also distributed a second pamphlet, 24 Schmollcr, Dernburg, Delbrück . . .über Reichstagsauflösung und Kolonialpolitik. The invitation is printed on the back side of the title page. Among the signers were the following professors at the University of Berlin: Hans Delbrück, Adolf Harnack, M a x Sering, Dietrich Schäfer, Theodor Schiemann, Gustav Schmoller, and Adolf Wagner. 25 Wippermann, Deutsche

Geschichtskalender,

1907, I, 9.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

l l j

a " Guide to Imperialism," which was an academic discussion by several experts. T h e committee also sponsored a banquet, January 19, at which Biilow spoke. Early in January 1907 an " Electoral League of Former A f r i c a n s " was established in Berlin. Its chairman was Karl Schlettwein, whose testimony in the Reichstag's Budget Committee had made such a favorable impression. Its purpose was to furnish speakers and leaflets in the national cause. 2 " T w o days after its organization there were requests from 71 electoral districts, and the officers begged all former residents of A f r i c a to volunteer as advisory experts to accompany campaign speakers. T w o weeks later the League announced that its members were speaking in 82 different places and that no more requests for their services could be met. In all, its members spoke 1200 times during the campaign. Besides this, the League issued a brochure called " O u r Sandpile A f r i c a " with timely material for speakers to use against the enemies of A f r i c a n colonization. T h e many veterans' organizations were unable to remain idle in a campaign announced as so vital to the national honor. Veterans' leagues made themselves into election machines to serve the national parties. Officials organized meetings and urged local veterans' groups to distribute leaflets and vote in the national cause. They admonished former soldiers not to forget the thousands of graves of brave fellow soldiers who gave their lives for the honor and greatness of the Fatherland. Veterans were told that disaster could be avoided only if a Reichstag were elected that had a proper understanding of national honor. They were told that their duty was clear, and they were urged to canvass from " mouth to mouth and house to house " and to vote against those who " covered the brave comrades in Southwest A f r i c a with mockery and derision." 27 26 Norddcutsche

AUgemeine

Zeitung,

N o . 7, Jan. 9, 1907.

27 Appeal of the Deutsche Kriegerbund in the supplementary elections [Erzberger, Bilder aus dem Reichstagswahlkampj 1907 ( B e r l i n : Germania, 1907), p. 5 5 ] ; appeals and declarations of the Deutsche Kriegerbund and

Il8

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

This political activity was resented by Centrists and Social Democrats who also had supporters among veterans. In isolated cases local veterans' leaders themselves were independent enough to object to partisan politics. But the patriots replied that distributing leaflets, publishing appeals for the national cause, and combating Guelphian, Polish, and Socialist agitation was merely defending the military command in wartime and cultivating monarchical and patriotic sentiment among the people. Those who called it political activity, the veterans' leaders said, were not to be helped.28 As the enthusiasm for the national cause spread, there was hardly an organization in Germany but took some stand in the elections. A students' league at the University of Kiel issued a call to all students to follow Dernburg against the unpatriotic Centrists and Socialists, just as one hundred years before the aroused students of Germany followed Fichte against the French. The League of German Higher Schools and a Burschenschaft group in the University of Munich expressed similar sentiments. 29 Many of the various groups which took official notice of the campaign managed to avoid actions or statements which might be regarded as improper or partisan. But when the League of German Civil Servants urged its members to support only candidates who stood upon national ground, when the Central League of German Industrialists collected a campaign fund to be used against Centrists, Poles and Social Democrats and urged its members to vote, when the Union of Christian (Protestant) Trades Unions of Germany demanded a Reichstag friendly to its aims, or when the League of Traveling Salesmen got the government's approval of the request that of the Kyfthaiiserbund der deutschen Landeskriegerverbande (IVahlaufrufe und H'ahlkundgebungen, pp. 87-92). 28 Statement of the executive committee of the Deutsche Kriegerbund (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, N o . 41, Feb. 17, 1907). Statement of the chairman of the Prussian district (ibid., N o . 13, Jan. 16, 1907). 29 IVahlaufrufe und Wahlkundgebungen cur Reichstagswahl 1907, pp. 969 8 ; Norddcutschc Allgemeine Zeitung, Nos. 1 and 12, Jan. 1 and 15, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

119

they be allowed to be at home in time to vote, there was little doubt that such organizations were striving for the political defeat of the Center and the Social Democrats, and that the basis—or the excuse—for such activity was the national cause. Whether or not the situation warranted it, the government and its supporters made a national issue of the campaign. They spoke eloquently of starving soldiers, military honor, German dignity. They interpreted the Reichstag's action as a refusal to support the government in a national cause. They blamed the Center for an unconstitutional interference with the military command. They regarded the attack upon the government's colonial policy as evidence of a monstrous lack of patriotism and love of Fatherland. Thus they sought to glorify themselves and to discredit the " unpatriotic scoundrels " who had formed the Reichstag's majority, namely, the Centrists, Social Democrats, Poles, and Guelphs. LOS VON ROM !

For the patriotic campaign against them, the Centrists themselves were largely responsible. Their impolitic votes in the Reichstag and their sensational attacks upon the colonial administration had incensed not only the administration and the Court but all who made a fetish of patriotism. The Centrists had forgotten that a party which was as strong as they were, and a party which was as vulnerable as they were because of their religious affiliations, needed to exercise restraint. They were now made aware of the fact that actions which can be justified are not always politic, for the patriotic propaganda of the election campaign was directed squarely at them. The campaign against the Center did not stop with criticism of the party's so-called " anti-national" nature, however. Hostility to the Center as a confessional, ultramontane, and particularist party led to a campaign of unexpected vindictiveness. Although the government disapproved of arousing religious hatreds and constantly admonished its supporters to keep their campaign in a purely political and national course, the liberal

120

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

and evangelical press leveled frenzied attacks against the clerical party. Harden wrote in Die Zukunft, " W h o could have thought that the Center was so much hated?" The government attacked the Center, not on confessional grounds, but because the party seemed to let its confessional interests stand in the way of its patriotism. The Center's sins, the government said, were those of " anti-national arrogance," " pusillanimous and sour-tempered rejection " of national bills, illegitimate interference in the administration, placing party welfare and solidarity above the interests of the Fatherland, and " misusing its responsible position " as the largest party in the Reichstag. It is not certain how effective Bulow expected the campaign against the Center to be. A considerable reduction in the Center's numerical strength in the Reichstag was not likely; therefore, Billow's hope was probably that the campaign might persuade the Centrists to be more national-minded and might weaken the Center enough to dissuade it from joining Poles and Social Democrats in opposing national bills in the future. 80 In his N e w Y e a r ' s Letter to General von Liebert, Bulow outlined his case against the Center. He described the Center's commanding position in the Reichstag and explained that, as long as the Center had continued its commendable support for national bills, he had not regarded the Center's advantage as dangerous. However, according to Bulow, the situation became critical in the spring of 1906 when the Center began to misuse its position of trust for petty party ends. T h e Center had established a " black-red-bloc " of Catholics and Socialists, Bulow said, and it had used it for its own purposes at the expense of the nation. Such a bloc, he added, had to be broken. In his address to the Committee of Action on Imperialism, Bulow spoke in the same vein. He accused the Center of having caused the government losses of millions of marks by rejecting 30 This was the substance of a piece in the Sud-deutsche ReichskorresPondens, probably inspired in Berlin, and cited in the Miinchner Allgemeine Zeitung, Nos. 583 and 21, Dec. 16, 1906 and Jan. 13, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

121

colonial demands in 1906, and he complained that the Center treated national interests as a football to be kicked about in the contest for religious, confessional, and particularist advantages. Bülow had two grievances against the Center. In the first place, it tried to control his administration. Germany did not have a ministry responsible to the Reichstag, and Bülow seemed to feel that the efforts of any political party to hold him accountable in any way were dangerous to Germany and unconstitutional. Bülow therefore resented the Center's actions and described them as the misuse of a trust. Bülow's second grievance was that the Center had exploited a situation involving Germany's prestige in order to further its own ends. W h a t these ends were no opponent of the Center explained. Neither Bülow nor any of his supporters ever gave the Centrists credit for having acted in good faith and for the good of Germany. T h e government's argument was that the Center, in opposing colonial bills, had acted unpatriotically. A f t e r Bülow and the government press indicated clearly that the Center was to be defeated if possible, the other " burgher " parties followed the government's lead. The Conservatives joined the campaign against the Centrists with reluctance, for there were many bonds of interest between the two parties. They had cooperated for years in the Prussian Landtag and they had a common interest in religious instruction in schools, and in agrarian protection. These facts were recognized repeatedly in the Conservative press. 31 The Conservatives no longer regarded the Center as an enemy of the national state. 32 " The Center is indeed . . . unreliable in national things, ambitious and inclined to misuse its power," wrote the Hamburger Nachrichten, " but between it and " the Socialists, there was a " tremendous difference." 43 31 Kreuzzeitung,

N o . 588, Dec. 16, 1906; V o g e l , op. cit., p. 37 ff.

32 Hans Delbrück wrote, " Bitterly as w e may fight the Center, no one any longer regards the Center as an enemy of the Empire whose policy aims at the destruction of the national s t a t e " (Preussische Jahrbücher, C X X V I I [1907], 187). 33 Cited in the Berliner

Tageblatt,

N o . 644, Dec. 20, 1906.

122

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

igOJ

The Conservatives disapproved of the attacks upon the Center as a confessional party because they knew that such tactics would only induce Catholics to support the Center more firmly than ever. The Conservatives did not even mention the Center in their election appeal.34 They made constant efforts to keep in touch with the Catholics" and showed so little enthusiasm for the anti-Center campaign that the government press called them to order. When the Kreuzzeitung wrote on December 31 that in many districts the Conservatives should " combine with the Center in which . . . conservative principles are well represented," the Norddentsche Allgemeine Zeitung replied that this was " treason," and that " the Kruezzeitung seems to regard the dictates of party egotism as more important than the obligations of national honor." s" In contrast to the hesitant action of the Conservatives against the Center, the campaign of the National Liberals and the Radicals was fearless. They were excited about fighting at the government's side against the Center, and they came to regard the expulsion of the Catholic party as an end in itself and as the chief reason for the dissolution. Not only were they motivated by patriotic resentment at the Center's reluctance to support costly national enterprises, but by jealousy of the Center's strength in the Reichstag, opposition to the Center's so-called " clerical-reactionary spirit," and opposition to Catholicism in politics. The National Liberal election appeal almost ignored other issues, being directed largely against the Center. It read in p a r t : The dissolution of the Reichstag and the call to the German people was the only step remaining when it was proved that the national parties in the house had not become strong enough to cast off the humiliating yoke of the Center. For many years the 34 Schulthess, op. cit., 1906, p. 227. 35 Kreuzzeitung,

N o s . 588, 593, 600, 608, Dec. 16, 19, 23, 30, 1906.

36 Wippermann, op. cit., 1907, i, 2.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I23

Center has laid this yoke upon the Reichstag . . . so that there is a danger in the Empire now that everyone abroad may see that we are not capable of bringing a war that was thrust upon us to an honorable end. . . . Whom will the German people follow? The General Staff, or Herr Erzberger and his companions ? . . . Whom will the German people follow ? The call to national duty, or Herr Roeren and his fellows ? ,T Reference to the " Centrist y o k e " indicated that the National Liberals were especially galled by the size and influence of the Catholic party. The National Zeitung confessed that the Center's position in the Reichstag had been a " nightmare " to the liberals and that they had heaved a " great sigh of relief " when the dissolution was announced, because, the paper added, the German people were " free again." 38 Der Hannoversche Courier asserted that the election was about the " domination of the Center, which finally became unbearable even to our long-suffering government," and not about colonies at all.39 The liberals in Munich rejoiced that the domination of the Center was ended, a fact which they termed a " truly national accomplishment." 40 The National Liberals opposed the Center also because they believed that the Catholics were " unreliable " nationally, and subordinated the nation's needs to party or confessional interests. According to the National Zeitung, the issue was whether or not a party whose own interests stood higher than the Empire's interests should be allowed to determine the course of the ship of state any longer. 41 National Liberal leaflets characterized the Center's action in the Reichstag as " a murderous attack upon the honor and power of Germany in world politics" which " wounded deeply every patriotic and 37 Schulthess, op. cit., 1906, p. 229. 38 National

Zeitung,

No. 690, Dec. 14, 1906.

39 Cited in the Norddcutsche

Allgcmcine

Zeitung,

No. 293, Dec. 15, 1906.

40 Appeal of the united liberals in Munich ( M i i n c h n e r Allgemeine No. 593, Dec. 22, 1906). 41 National

Zeitung,

No. 1, Jan. 1, 1907.

Zeitung,

124

T H E

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

monarchical heart in the land." Therefore, it was concluded, " the Center must not be trump in Germany any longer." 44 The National Liberal executive committee referred to Centrists as " secret and public enemies of the Empire," 4 3 and Der Hannoversche Courier declared bluntly that the Center must be got rid of. 44 The Radicals did not own a good " national " record themselves, so that, except for their assertion that the Reichstag had left the African soldiers in the lurch, they based their criticism of the Center upon other than national grounds. For instance, they denounced the Center as a " reactionary" party with economic and political principles which were the exact opposite 42 A leaflet reproducing a speech of D r . Pfleiderer in Berlin, Jan. 1907 (Reichstagswahlen 1903-1912, No. 77).

i6,

43 In a circular letter which Grober read in the Reichstag (Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I , p. 124). H o w the National Liberals mixed patriotism with irritation at the Center is illustrated by this appeal of the National Liberal Youth in Berlin: " Help us in the struggle against the unbearable power of the C e n t e r ! F o r years a deep and restrained dissatisfaction has been astir everywhere because our government is dependent upon the will of the Ultramontanes in everything it does; nothing decisive may take place against the will of the Center. In the administration t o o . . . the Center has illegally misused its power in the crudest ways. . . . W e young liberals have stood for years at the head of the struggle against the Center and are not yet tired of pointing out that our government falls into danger when the Center is the decisive power. T h e Center refuses the means needed for the Empire to carry on an existing w a r ; the Center supports the highly treasonable agitation of the P o l e s ; the Center makes its approval for a colonial railway, the need for which it recognises, dependent upon the government's calm acceptance of its supplementary pressure . . . " (Reichstagswahlen 1903-1912, No. 188). Bassermann's appeal to the National Liberal Youth was in the same vein ( J V a h l a u f r u f e und Wahlkundgebungen sur Reichsiagswahl 1907, p. 12). D r . Pfleiderer (see note 42 above) analyzed the Center's stand on expensive national questions more accurately. H e traced the Center's vote on December 13, as well as its lack of enthusiasm for great national bills, to the fact that a gradual democratization of the Center was giving the leadership of the party over to the demagogic and more confessional South German element who hated Prussia and the centralized bureaucracy, and who competed with the Social Democrats for the favor of the masses. T h e masses were known to be unpatriotic? 44 Cited in the Norddeutsche

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

No. 4, Jan. 5, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

125

of those professed by the Radicals. 45 And they were critical of the Center's close association with the Conservatives. They denounced the Center's policies in cultural affairs with especial vehemence. These policies, which involved supporting confessional schools, religious training in state schools, readmission of exiled Catholic orders into Germany, and laws against obscene literature, the Radicals called ultramontane. And they were ready to make this ultramontanism the main issue of the campaign. The Vossische Zeitung believed that defeat of the " religio-political presumptuousness " of the Center, the guarantee of free thought against the " obscurantists," and the defense of German culture against an " impatient clergy bent on persecution " were all more important than colonial issues and provided better slogans for the election. 46 Ultramontanism, the same paper remarked, was more important than a colonial budget, and the government's fight against it ought to be permanent. It made the Radical viewpoint clear in the following paragraph: An electoral campaign can be carried on against the Center enthusiastically only if the present squabble is to be more than a temporary intermezzo. Whether or not the Center voted for or against the supplementary budget is of secondary importance for the majority of the nation; even if the party had supported the government . . . the break with the Center and ultramontanism would have been a necessity, and a welcome, gratifying event. The people are dissatisfied with the dominion which the Center and the clergy, with the help of the government, exercises upon legislation and public life, with the situation which has made the leading circles of the state constantly dependent upon them, with the pressure which this party exerts upon the schools, science, art, and culture. The people can be aroused against this gagging of the spirit, against clergy and clericalism. But first they must be sure that the gov45 Speeches of Wietner and Kaempf, quoted in the Berliner Tageblatt, No. 636, Dec. 15, 1906 and the Vossische Zeitung, No. 18, Jan. 11, 1907. 46 Vossische

Zeitung,

No. 584, Dec. 14, 1906.

I2Ö

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

ernment is in earnest about the struggle against clericalism and the obscurantists.47 The Munich liberals declared that the campaign against the Center was a campaign for the guaranty of religious freedom, political freedom, freedom of conscience, freedom of knowledge, faith and education.48 The National Liberals wrote about " enslavement of the mind," " religious intolerance" (of Catholics), and the "clerical yoke." 4 9 They confirmed the Radicals' assertion that the campaign was indeed against the " clerical-reactionary spirit." 5 0 A final charge which the National Liberals and Radicals made against the Center was that the Catholic party was subservient to the Roman Curia. The Center, they said, being Catholic, was prevented from being patriotic by the international and political ambitions of the Roman Catholic Pope. As this was tantamount to condemning Roman Catholicism by asserting its incompatibility with German patriotism, the government and circumspect elements among the national parties avoided this kind of propaganda and publicly censured it. Bassermann, however, declared early in the campaign that the slogan, " L o s von R o m ! " offered good prospects for the election.01 The Vossische Zeitung quoted with approval, " As long as a part of the nation receives its orders for the settlement of political affairs from the Vatican, we will find ourselves in a state of civil war." 52 A National Liberal leaflet asserted that, up to the present, the Pope with his Centrists and 47 No. 585, Dec. 14, 1906. The same paper explained later that no one was thinking of a Kulturkampf, " but the German people is certainly fed up with —very fed up with—the domination of ultramontanism" (No. 57, Feb. 3. 1907). 48 Münchner

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

No. 593, Dec. 22, 1906.

49Leaflet in Berlin (Reichstagswahlen 1903-1912, No. 7 7 ) . 50 National 51 Münchner

Zeitung,

No. 38, Jan. 23, 1907.

Allgemeine

Zeitung, No. 582, Dec. 15, 1906.

52 A. Böhtlingk, Das deutsche Volk unterm the Vossische Zeitung, No. 5, Jan. 4, 1907.

römischen

Joche,

cited in

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

127

Poles had ruled the German Fatherland. 53 A National Liberal speaker declared that the question was whether Germany's destiny was to be determined in Berlin or in R o m e . " And an appeal of the National Liberals concluded that acting as " mercenaries for a priesthood thirsting for power " was contrary to " Protestant self-consciousness." 65 Count Posadowsky, who was dissatisfied with the dissolution and the turn events were taking, is reported to have said, " That isn't Center-baiting any longer—that is Catholic-baiting." 56 Under the circumstances the Catholics began to talk of a new Kulturkampf. This did not mean official government action against the Catholic religion, for there was no danger of that. But the Catholics feared a revival of the public's opposition to Roman Catholicism in politics and public life. The government assured the Catholics that no new Kulturkampf was intended. Bülow, in irritation, reminded them that their position in Germany was really favorable. 87 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung frequently declared that there was no religious motive in the attack upon the Center, and it cautioned the national parties to be circumspect.58 The liberal parties, however, were not to be stayed. " Cautious restraint," wrote Der Hannoversche Courier, " would vitiate the great purpose of the dissolution, which was to liberate imperial policy from control by the Center." 59 The 53 Erzberger, Bilder

aus dem Reichstagnvahlkampf,

54 Dr. O. Lassar ( V o s s i s c h e Zeitung,

p. 13.

No. 41, Jan. 25, 1907).

55 Erzberger, Bilder aus dem Reichstagswahlkampf, p. 20. The National Liberal press tried to publicize a tale about a gift of the Caprivi government of 500,000 francs to Pope Leo X I I I for which the Pope was to persuade the Center to vote for the military bill in 1893 (National Zeitung, No. 690, Dec. 14, 1906). Germania replied (No. 290 i, Dec. 19, 1906). 56Trimborn to J. Bachem, Jan. 8, 1907 [Hermann Cardauns, Karl born (M. Gladbach: Volksvereinsverlag, 1922), p. 1 1 2 ] .

Trim-

57 Sylvester Letter (see appendix). 5S See especially " Kein Kulturkampf bei den Wahlen " in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 304, Dec. 30, 1907. Other comments in the same paper (Nos. 294 and 300, Dec. 16 and 23, 1906). 59 Cited in Germania,

No. 1, Jan. 1, 1907.

128

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

Vossische Zeitung was piqued by the government's continued assurances that no Kulturkampf was intended. Was the ten years' labor under Bismarck, or the great name of Falk thus to be censured, the paper asked? And was the real Kulturkampf entirely a regrettable incident? 80 Two nation-wide Protestant organizations carried on their campaign against the Center. These were the Evangelical League and the Imperial Anti-Ultramontane Union. Both societies made the pretense of opposing Roman Catholicism only in so far as it was a political power, but their appeal was to " Protestant-minded " German citizens. They used national catchwords to arouse the voters against the party which they regarded as the " greatest obstacle to religious and confessional peace in Germany." 61 It was a shameful humiliation, said the secretary of the Evangelical League on more than one occasion, that, in the land of the Reformation, an " ultramontane child of the Jesuits " had been president of the Reichstag. It was a slap in the face to the forty million Protestants in Germany, he declared, that a Catholic party, strictly ruled by a Roman priesthood, could cast the decisive votes in Parliament.62 The issue, said a leaflet of the Evangelical League, was nothing less than the " independence of the German national state, rooted in the Reformation." 63 During the campaign, the Imperial Anti-Ultramontane Union was formed by the union of the Baden Anti-Ultramontane League and the Berlin Anti-Ultramontane Election League. This organization agitated against " ultramontani s m " (i. e. the Center) as a threat to Germany's national 60 No. 27, Jan. 17, 1907. 61 T w o election appeals of the Evangelical League are printed in IVahlaufruje und IVahlkundgebungen zur Reichstagswahl 1907, p. 91, and in Erzberger, Bilder aus dent Reichstagswahlkampf, pp. 9-10. 62 Addresses of Lie. Paul Braunlich Jan. 12 and 17, 1907).

( G e r m a n i a , Nos. 10 i and 14 i,

63 Leaflet of the Arbeitsausschuss des Evangelischen Bundes fur Berlin und Umgegend ( R e i c h s t a g s w a h l e n 1903-1912, No. 100).

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I2Q

independence and to German civilization, because it exploited the economic, political, religious, and social life of the nation in behalf of the international dominion of the Church. 4 4 T h e Protestant leagues represented an extremist viewpoint that was not widely shared. But the publicity given to such sentiments as they preached augmented the animosities already aroused by the anti-Center campaign. T h e Centrists, accused of being anti-national, reactionary, confessional, and subservient to Rome, fought back as best they could. T h e " national " propaganda was a handicap which they sought to overcome by minimizing the national issues in the campaign, and by advertising themselves at the same time as national and patriotic in every respect. In addition, the Centrists re-interpreted recent events so as to emphasize issues other than the national one, which they sought to discredit. Finally, they made German Catholics impervious to national propaganda by arousing in them fears of persecution by liberal and Protestant elements within the Empire. T h e Center was irritated that, despite all its votes for colonial appropriations in the preceding two decades, its enemies still called the party a foe o f colonial and world politics. 95 Centrist leaders claimed that they had consistently supported an " economic, reasonable colonial policy corresponding to the financial resources o f the people." They admitted that certain colonies were of great economic value and national importance. 66 They did not want to give up any colony, nor, they insisted, could their actions be interpreted to imply that they did. Centrist demands might have been presented under some such slogan as " retrenchment and reform." T h e reforms which 64 Three proclamations of the Union may be found in the Norddeutsche Allgcmeine Zeitung, No. 303, Dec. 29, 1906; Wahlaufrufe und IVahlkundgebungen sur Rcichstagswahl,p. 1 0 1 ; Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I , 133. 65 Grober, addressing a provincial assembly of the Rhineland Center P a r t y (Germania, No. 13 ii, Jan. 16, 1907). 66 Der

Bayerische

Kurier,

No. 9, Jan. 9, 1907.

I30

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

Centrists advocated were intended to develop a " truly civilized and Christian " colonial policy. They included enhanced regard for missionaries, more just and humane treatment of natives, elimination of immoral and corrupt officials, administrative efficiency and sound finance." The retrenchment which Centrists advocated involved economies, respect for the taxpayer, and an early end to the waste of money and men in Africa. 68 They contended that this was possible without endangering a " moderate " colonial program. In support of this contention, they specified instances in which, in their opinion, money was being spent needlessly, or in pursuance of aims which were not moderate. For instance, in the party's view, the surrender of the Bondelzwarts in the last days of December was proof that large military expenditures in Africa were unnecessary. It proved, they said, that there was no question of leaving soldiers in the lurch, and that the " national " slogans were therefore simple fabrications. If the government demanded more than 2,500 men for Southwest Africa after this surrender, Centrists declared, the reason could not be the Hottentots, but the larger needs of ambitious world politics.88 The Center admitted the need for a " moderate Weltpolitik," but made abundantly clear that it opposed an aggressive Weltpolitik. " We need millions for our colonies, we need a colonial army in Africa, for we must — raise sheep," scoffed Der Bayerische Kurier.10 Erzberger carried on a steady debate with the government press as to the price of colonies and imperialism." Germania pointedly calculated the enormous costs of the 67 Program set forth in Germania, No. 287 i, Dec. 15, 1906; also Erzberger, Warum ist der Reichstag aufgelöst worden? (Berlin: Germania, 1907), p. 5. 68 Germania, No. 286 ii and 287 i, Dec. 14 and 15, 1906; Der Kurier, No. 348, Dec. 15, 1906. 69 Germania, Nos. 296 i, 297 i, 298 i, Dec. 28, 29, and 30, 1906; Volkszeitung, No. 25, January 9, 1907. 70 No. 347, Dec. 14, 1906; also Kölnische 1906.

Volkszeitung,

71 Germania, Nos. 6 i, 7 i, 9 i, Jan. 8, 9, and 11, 1907.

Bayerische Kölnische

No. 1107, Dec. 27,

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

army, navy, colonies, and shipping subventions, and it objected to the inevitable increases in taxation if the government's prodigality continued." The Center's criticism of Bülow's colonial administration and of the costs of Bülow's ambitious Weltpolitik clarified the " national " issue to a certain extent. The Center would not vote meekly for all expensive policies just because Bülow called them " national," and it felt that its demands for economy and reforms were as " national " as Billow's wasteful search for German prestige. The other parties, however, called the Center's attitude " anti-national." Under these circumstances, the Center sought to prove its patriotism in other ways. Professor Martin Spahn published a small history of the Center in which he emphasized the Center's patriotic labors during the foregoing two decades and tried to give documentary evidence of the party's " national " character." Centrist press and orators proclaimed their love for the Fatherland.7'* Party proclamations avowed that all Centrists were deeply concerned for the Empire's greatness and honor. The party promised to show by its actions that " national honor rested close to its heart." 75 72 Trimborn, quoted in Germania, N o . 292 i, Dec. 21, 1906; also Die Kosten der Weltpolitik und der Kolonien ( C o l o g n e : Bachem, 1907). E r z berger wrote, " T h e Center is fighting for a sound financial p o l i c y . . . ^gainst an economy of debt. The Center is for the protection of the lower and middle c l a s s e s ; . . . against the increase in indirect taxes " ( W a r u m ist der Reichstag aufgelöst worden? p. 2 9 ) . 73 M. Spahn, Das deutsche Munich and Mainz, 1907).

Zentrum

(Kultur und Katholizismus,

V;

74 Germania protested plaintively that it w a s shameless slander the w a y the government and the national parties denied the Center any national sentiment and made the party out to be without honor or conscience ( N o . 295 i, Dec. 25, 1906). 75 Erzberger, addressing the Berlin electorate (Germania, N o . 9, Jan. 11, 1907). See also Erzberger, Warum ist der Reichstag aufgelöst wordenf ( f o r w a r d ) ; Kölnische Volkszeitung, No. 1082, Dec. 18, 1906; election appeal of the Westphalian Center Party (Germania, N o . 1 ii, Jan. 1, 1907) ; leaflet of the central committee of the Center Party in Berlin (Reichstagswahlen 1903-1912, N o . 191) ; also Germania, N o . 295 i and ii, Dec. 25, 1906.

132

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

Having proved to their own satisfaction that they were " national," the Centrists concluded that Bülow's patriotic appeal had no basis in fact and was an electoral trick. 7 " They were led to this conclusion by the belief that a nine million mark reduction in a colonial budget was insignificant and of no " national " moment. Such argument, however, did not prevent the government and national parties from branding the Center as un-national just the same. Centrists, meanwhile, sought to re-interpret recent events so as to bring to the fore a different, but related, issue—that of the Reichstag's right to control the budget. It was without question the Reichstag's right to limit appropriations in the interest of the taxpayer. Centrists argued that Bülow's efforts to coerce the deputies into voting colonial bills just because they were " national " was an attack upon that constitutional right. If the Reichstag were to be stigmatized as un-national and dissolved because it would not dance blindly whenever the Chancellor piped a national tune, they said, then it was nothing but a tax-appropriating machine with no power, and its budget rights were a farce." Trimborn declared that the question was not whether a few million marks would be voted for the colonies, " but whether the Reichstag's right of appropriation should retain its importance, or whether it would suffice in the future for anyone to strike the floor with the sabre and say, ' The imperial command has spoken; the Reichstag must be silent.' " The Center, 76 Germania, No. 2 ii, Jan. 3, 1907. 77Erzberger addressing the Berlin electorate (Germania, No. 4 i, Jan. 5, 1907) ; Erzberger, IVarum ist der Reichstag aufgelöst worden? p. 30; Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik im Reichstag J906, p. 47; Germania, Nos. 293 ii and 12 ii, Dec. 22, 1906 and Jan. 15, 1907; appeal of the Center Party (Schulthess, op. cit., 1906, p. 288) ; appeal of the Rhineland Center Party (Kölnische Volkszeitung, No. 1102, Dec. 24, 1906) ; appeal of the Westphalian Center Party (Germania, No. 1 ii, Jan. 1, 1907) ; resolution of the Rhineland Center Party convention in Cologne, Jan. 3, 1907 (Germania, No. 6 i, Jan. 8, 1907) ; Spahn addressing the electorate in Bonn, Dec. 30, 1906 (Kölnische Volkszeitung, No. 1118, Dec. 31, 1906).

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

133

he concluded, would " never retreat ignominiously before the sabre's rattle." Ts Centrists stressed this rather factitious argument, but the government ridiculed it, retorting that, while the Reichstag had a perfect right to reduce a colonial budget, the Chancellor had an equal right to ask the German people if such a reduction corresponded to their wishes. Confronted thus with the stigma of anti-nationalism, and finding that the government scorned their demands for economy and ridiculed their defense of the Reichstag's budget rights, Centrists turned elsewhere for an issue more likely to bring them the support they needed. They found it in the theory that the campaign was directed against the Center because of a general dislike of Catholicism. " The Catholic religion is in danger!" they said. Beginning cautiously two days after the dissolution, Germania suggested that the reasons for the movement against the Center were not political, but confessional—" anti-Catholic animosity and the spirit of the Kulturkampf." 79 Trimborn said shortly that the cause of the anti-Center campaign was " antireligious sentiment and inclination, and the anti-Catholic feeling in certain circles." " The spirit of the Kulturkampf," he warned his Catholic hearers, " will play its role in the coming election campaign." 80 Gröber repeated a month later that the dissolution was rooted in hate of the Center which was leading to a new Kulturkampf.8l Germania echoed these beliefs as those of the great majority of Center voters, and it declared that the paramount interest of all Catholics in Germany was 78 Germania, No. 292 i, Dec. 21, 1906; article in the Kölnische No. 1078, Dec. 17, 1906.

Volkszeitung,

79 No. 287 i, Dec. 15, 1906. 80 Address in Cologne, Dec. 18, 1907 (Germania, No. 292 i, Dec. 21, 1907). 81 Address in Cologne, Jan. 14, 1907 (Germania, No. 13 ii, Jan. 16, 1907). The same predictions of a new Kulturkampf were made in the appeal of the Rhineland Center Party (Germania, No. 296 i, Dec. 28, 1906) ; also in that Allgemeine of the Center Party in the district of Kelheim ( N o r d d e u t s c h e Zeitung, No. 15, Jan. 18, 1907).

134

T H E

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

that the " Center's tower " should hold fast. All Catholics, it implied, should defend themselves against the impending Kulturkampf by voting for the Center. 82 The Centrists blamed Billow for the revival of this spirit of the Kulturkampf. The support he was giving to the Radicals and his appeal " against the Center," they pointed out, encouraged the anti-Catholic fanatics. Biilow did not support these fanatics, but he did not restrain them, and it is possible that he secretly approved of their propaganda, at least as an election device. The Centrists thought so anyway. 8 8 When the government protested that it had no intention of disturbing the Catholic religion, Centrists said that such declarations were irrelevant. They were not afraid of what the administration intended to do, they said, but they were afraid of " certain parties and movements " which, if these gained the upper hand, " would not respect the rights of Catholics." They were afraid of what might happen if the liberals, Radicals, and Rome-baiting Evangelicals won the election. 84 The combination 82 Germania, No. 291 ii, Dec. 20, 1906; No. 9 ii, Jan. 11, 1907. 83 Spahn expressed the Center's grievance thus: " The liberal press' applause (for the Reichstag dissolution) was directed against the Center because it represents that philosophy of life . . . of which the Catholic Church is the foundation. No wide awake observer . . . has any illusions about the strength of the movement against the Catholic Church which has already found expression in the Reichstag in attacks on our confession booths. The Imperial Chancellor furthers this m o v e m e n t . . . when he advertises the outworn argument that the Center consists largely of Catholics " (address in Cologne, Jan. 14, 1907, reported in Germania, No. 13 i, Jan. 16, 1907). That Biilow knew how anti-Catholic sentiment would be aroused by his campaign against the Center seems obvious. That he coyly refrained from giving his support to fanatical Protestants because he knew they would do their work well in spite of him is possible. General Keim, whose estimate of his own influence in the Wilhelmstrasse was probably exaggerated, also indicated that Biilow favored enlisting Protestant sentiment against the Center [Keim to Lie. Weber ( D e r Bayerische Kurier, No. 35, Feb. 4, 1907)]. 84 Germania, Nos. 289 i, 291 ii, Dec. 18 and 20, 1906; Nos. 2 ii, 9 ii, 11 ii, 13 ii, and 20 i, Jan. 3, 11, 13, 16, and 24, 1907; Kolnische Volkszeitung, Nos. 1082 and 1089, Dec. 18 and 20, 1906; Nos. 14 and 55, Jan. 5 and 19, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I35

of liberalism and government working together had brought on the first Kulturkampf, they pointed out, and the same combination might, nay would, bring on a second Kulturkampf,8S Thus it was that Centrists appealed to their voters with alarms for the defense of the Catholic religion. The confessional appeal was not always made discreetly. Thus Der Bayerische Kurier implied that the sacred relics of the Church were in danger. " Unite! " it cried to the Catholic population of Bavaria, " unite in the battle for the defense of your most sacred relics, your religion, your faith!" 88 A Centrist leaflet aroused voters with the following appeal: " Catholic voters! If you do not want the crucifix to be thrown out of the schools, the churches to be broken into, the relics to be destroyed, the seminaries to be closed, the bishops to be expelled from their century-old episcopates, pious nurses to be driven from the hospitals, members of orders to be ridiculed and dispersed, the churches to be deprived of their most ancient rights, then use your ballot so that no liberal and Social Democrat majority ever comes into parliament!" 87 This kind of confessional appeal did much to nullify the national, colonial, and patriotic propaganda of the other parties, and the Radicals complained about it. 88 It may be assumed that much of the Center's success in the elections was due to the exploitation of the Catholic's fear of persecution. Two other accusations were made against the Center during the campaign, but the Centrists could do little more than deny them. Such denials, being purely negative, were not as convincing as the government's positive accusations, but the Centrists made them anyway. Centrists were accused of trying to establish a " secondary government " and to exercise an illegal influence upon the ad85 Der Bayerische Kurier, No. 24, Jan. 24, 1907. 86 No. 4, Jan. 4, 1907. 87 Leaflet in Wiirzburg, cited in the National Zeitung, No. 27, Jan. 17, 1907. 88 Berliner Tageblatt, No. 33, Jan. 19, 1907.

136

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

89

ministration. In reply, the Center press declared that the Center had been no worse in this respect than the Conservatives and the National Liberals. 90 Roeren especially was accused of exercising a " s i n i s t e r " influence; so he defended himself in letters to the public, and the Center press took up his cause doggedly, if with some reluctance.91 Centrists were also accused of interfering with the Emperor's powers of command because of their desire to reduce the military items in a colonial budget and thus restrict military activity. Centrists declared that such a reduction had nothing to do with the Emperor's prerogatives. They pointed out that military budgets had been reduced in the past, and that increases in colonial troops had been vetoed before without the government's becoming sensitive about the independence of the army command. Centrists explained this new touchiness as follows: either the government was not serious and was simply misrepresenting facts in an effort to discredit the Center, or it was serious and was attacking the right of the Reichstag to control all budgets, military included. In either case, they concluded, the government's action was unjustifiable. 92 One further aspect of the campaign against the Center was the government's fruitless effort to disrupt the Center's solidarity. Bülow probably was not sanguine over this possibility, but he certainly hoped that the national issue would 89 Cf. supra, pp. 41-44, 80. 90 Articles about the " supplementary government" of Conservatives, Free Conservatives, and National Liberals in Germania, Nos. 291 ii, 292 ii and 293 i, Dec. 20, 21 and 22, 1906. 91 Roeren's letter of self-defense in the Kölnische Volkszeitung, No. 38, Jan. 13, 1907. There are articles in defense of Roeren in Germania, Nos. 288 i, and 290 ii, Dec. 16 and 19, 1906. 92 Spahn explained that there was no declared war and that therefore the Emperor's powers of command were not involved (address at Bonn, reported in Germania, No. 2 ii, Jan. 3, 1907). Similar reasoning is to be found in the appeal of the Westphalian Center Party (Germania, No. 1 ii, Jan. 1, 1907) ; an address by Gröber in Cologne, reported in Germania, No. 13 ii, Jan. 16, 1907; and an address by Erzberger in Berlin, reported in Germania, No. 9 i, Jan. 11, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

137

create dissension within the Center Party, and also that " nationally minded " Catholics would perhaps desert the Center for other parties or form a new party of their own. Not all Roman Catholics in Germany were regular supporters of the Center Party. 93 Many were not members, and some actually tried to wean other Catholics away from the party. During the campaign of 1906-7 these men adopted the cloak of patriotism. They became " national Catholics " and were praised by the government as models of political and religious perspective. When a small group of these anti-Center Catholics met at Düsseldorf, Jan. 10, 1907, and drew up a manifesto expressing dissatisfaction with the Center's policy which, they said, " wounded patriotic and monarchical sentiments," they were lauded by the government press and Biilow himself." The Düsseldorf resolution recommended voting for those who, " uninfluenced by party interests, would fight for the prestige and power of the Empire and for the maintenance and security of her colonial possessions . . ." 65 The " national Catholic " movement was small, but within a week there were fifteen patriotic Catholics candidating against regular Centrists and promising to " stand with the government in all national, army, navy, and colonial questions." 94 Many of them published their private manifestoes against the Center and received favorable publicity in the government press. 97 93 According to the Statistisches Jahrbuch German population was 36% Roman Catholic. Lorrainers regularly polled fewer than 25% mately 1,328,000 Roman Catholics cast their

(1905, p. 1, and 1915, p. 1) the But Center, Poles, and Alsaceof the votes. In 1907 approxivotes for other parties.

94 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, N o . 11, Jan. 13, 1907; Bülow's address to the Committee of Action on Imperialism (Schulthess, op. cit., 1907, p. 13). 95 Schulthess, op. cit., 1907, pp. 4-5. 96 Leaflet of a " national Catholic " group in Leobschutz (Reichstagswahlen 1903-1912, N o . 2 0 1 ) . 97 E. g. that of Prince Waldburg-Zeil-Trauschburg, in the Allgemeine Zeitung, N o . 16, Jan. 19, 1907.

Norddeutsche

138

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

T h e Center scorned these " national Catholics," and, despite the government's approbation and the blessing one or two of them received f r o m the Archbishop of Cologne, not one approached winning a seat in the Reichstag. Within the Center itself, the more nationally minded members and the aristocrats were dissatisfied with the turn of events. Many felt that the party had erred in obstructing the government's national policies, or at least had made a tactical mistake in so doing. They felt that the Center had been forced into defending a point of view it really did not share. Count Hertling thought that the Center electorate realized that the Center's important position in the Reichstag involved extra responsibilities and that the party ought not to continue its policy of negation in questions of national defense. 9 8 Count Ballestrem had voted with the government on December 1 3 , and it is evident that a number of aristocratic Center deputies f r o m Silesia, who were not in the Reichstag f o r the vote, shared his disapproval of the Center's policy. 09 T h e difference of opinion between nationally minded aristocrats and the Center leadership was especially strong in B a v a r i a and led to an open dispute over election tactics. T h e aristocratic Centrists were troubled not only by the Center's lack of enthusiasm for national policies, but also by the progressive democratization of their party. There were, f o r instance, at least eight labor-union secretaries among the official Center candidates, and the official candidates in Osnabriick and Arnsberg were actually withdrawn in f a v o r of labor secretaries. Professor von S a v i g n y called this action a " cowardly concession " and a " crass surrender " to the fear of Socialist competition. 100 98 Letter of Hertling's, dated Dec. 20, 1906, in Thimme, Front Biilow, p. 143.

Wider

99 Letter of the former Center deputy, von Machin, to the Schlessische Volksseitung, reprinted in the Berliner Tageblatt, No. 30, Jan. 17, 1907. 100 Leo von Savigny, Die Reichstagsaufiosung, das Zentrum tionalen Parteien (Berlin: Walther, 1907), p. 2 ff.

und die na-

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I39

Billow and the national press tried to capitalize upon the dissatisfaction which these tactics aroused among conservative Centrists, 101 and the Chancellor intimated in his Sylvester Letter that " nationally minded " Centrists would be welcomed as government supporters. But Biilow succeeded in neither " exploding the Center tower " nor discrediting the Center's democratic leadership. T h e injured nationalists or aristocrats within the Center made little impression upon the rest of the party, and internal dissensions led only to the occasional secession of a few dissatisfied individuals. In view of the accusation that the Center was dominated by Rome, it is interesting to note that the Curia and the higher clergy were distinctly unfriendly toward the Center during the campaign. T h e Church was unable, of course, to take sides officially, but there was little doubt as to its

sympathies.

Cardinal Fischer, Archbishop of Cologne, appealed for political unity based upon " love of Fatherland, our great, dear Fatherland, love for our people, and advancement of its welfare."

102

He even supported " national Catholic " candidates. 103 The patriotic Cardinal Kopp, Archbishop of Breslau, wrote privately to Biilow: " There cannot be very many people who approve o f the attitude o f the Center Party or find it a subject for rejoicing. I need not tell you that I am not one of them. At the Vatican it is severely censured and they are very disturbed over what has happened."

104

In Rome, according to press reports, the Church leaders were astonished at the Center's stand and wondered if the party were crazy—although they were careful to observe that the quarrel between the Center and the German Government was purely 101 Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, Nos. 9 and 13, Jan. 11 and 16, 1907; Berliner Tageblatt, No. 56, Jan. 31, 1907; Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung, Nos. 38, S3, and 54, Jan. 23, and Feb. 1, 1907. 102 Nationalliberale

Blätter,

No. 4, Feb. 15, 1907.

103 Ibid., No. 6, Mar. 15, 1907. 104 Biilow, Memoirs,

II, 299-300.

I4O

THE

political. 1 0 8

The

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

clerical Nera

Roma

OF

I907

published

a

full

page

p o r t r a i t o f the E m p e r o r and praised his attitude t o w a r d the C h u r c h . 1 0 6 B u t the C h u r c h took no action b e y o n d such e x p r e s s i o n s o f s y m p a t h y or disapproval. T h e national press in G e r m a n y praised the patriotism and nationalism o f the higher clergy and implied that G e r m a n C a t h olics o u g h t to f o l l o w their example. P a r a d o x i c a l l y , they continued to berate the C e n t e r f o r being a n instrument o f

the

Church. T h e Center itself w a s n o t disturbed by the attitude of

the

h i g h e r c l e r g y o r the activity o f the " national C a t h o l i c s . " N o r w a s it troubled by the disaffection a m o n g its o w n aristocrats o r the g o v e r n m e n t ' s e f f o r t s to f o m e n t division w i t h i n the party. I t persevered in p r o c l a i m i n g its o w n brand o f patriotism ; it loudly d e f e n d e d the budget rights o f the R e i c h s t a g ; and welded

its

supporters together

in the heat o f

it

confessional

animosity. PROTESTING M I N O R I T I E S

T h e national m i n o r i t y g r o u p s loosely allied w i t h the C e n t e r took little notice o f the general issues o f concentrated

upon their o w n

the c a m p a i g n

long-standing

grievances.

but The

central committee o f the P o l i s h P a r t y described the dissolution of

the R e i c h s t a g as an appeal to the people because o f

the

g o v e r n m e n t ' s disagreement w i t h the R e i c h s t a g m a j o r i t y . B u t the P o l e s did not regard colonies, e c o n o m y , b u d g e t rights, or supplementary

governments

as

vote-getting

issues.

Their

appeal w a s f o r the d e f e n s e of individual r i g h t s and culture against P r u s s i a n

one

Polish

domination. 1 0 7

105 Berliner Tageblatt, N o . 640, Dec. 17, 1906; a n d a r e p r i n t f r o m t h e Wiener Politische Korrespondenz in t h e National Zeitung, N o . 699, Dec. 19, 1906. T h e s e r e p o r t s w e r e denied in t h e Kölnische Volkszeitung, N o . 1095,

Dec. 22, 1906, but Cardinal Kopp's letter to Bülow is probably reliable. 106 Berliner

Tageblatt,

N o . 36, J a n . 21, 1907.

107 Election m a n i f e s t o ( Wahlaufrufe stagswahl 11)07, PP- 56-58).

und Wahlkundgebungen

zur

Reich-

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

141

There was little cooperation between Center and Poles during the campaign, although the membership of both parties was predominantly Catholic, and the candidates of the Poles were often Catholic clergymen. The reason for this was that the German Catholics in the Ostmark were antagonized by the activity of the radical group of the Polish Party which had been swelled by Prussia's school policy and the school strike. As a protesting group, however, which was eager to improve its position as a national minority, the Poles voted for Centrists in the second balloting where that was possible. In other cases, they voted for Socialists or Radicals, but never for National Liberals or Conservatives. Their success in the election had little to do with imperial politics, but was due to local resentment of Prussia's anti-Polish land and school laws. The Alsatians, like the Poles, had national, political, and religious grievances which played a more important part in their electoral program than imperial politics. Their opponents deplored their failure to help " carry on " in the colonies, and the government press suggested that their deputies had not represented the will of the Alsatian people. The Alsatian deputies defended themselves with the same arguments which the Center used, because, as a correspondent for Germania wrote from Strassburg, " the colonial scandals and the entire maladministration of the colonies had aroused the electorate, and it would not have gone so well for the five deputies in their districts if they had voted for the government." 108 The Guelphs were both Protestant and German, and their grievances were neither religious like the Center's, nor national like those of the Poles. Their peculiar demands embraced the empty theory of states' rights and the hopeless claims of a humiliated prince. Against them the National Liberals waved the patriotic banner and branded them as doubly unpatriotic, first for their loyalty to the wrong prince, and second for their vote on the colonial bill. The Guelphs had no appeal enticing 108 Germania,

No. 296 ii, Dec. 28, 1906.

142

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

enough to counteract this patriotic propaganda, and they fell back upon the weakest planks in the Center's platform— economy, taxes, budget rights, and the dignity of the Reichstag. 108 The Center press, in turn, supported the Guelphs' contention that the government's handling of the succession in Brunswick contained a threat to the rights of the federated states. 110 The crisis in the affairs of Brunswick, caused by the death of the regent in September 1906, had provided the Hanoverians with an excellent opportunity to revive their propaganda in favor of the Duke of Cumberland. But the Duke's obstinate refusal to accept a compromise probably alienated as many supporters as the Guelphian propaganda gained. 1 1 1 The one lone Dane, who had voted for the colonial appropriations because he knew that a dissolution would cause him the hardship of a winter campaign in Schleswig, campaigned upon the sole issue of a plebescite as anticipated by the Treaty of Prague. AGAINST T H E SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

The Reichstag majority of December 1 3 , 1906 was composed of Social Democrats as well as Centrists, so campaigners " for the honor and welfare of the German n a t i o n " regarded Marxists as well as Papists as enemies. But the attack upon the Socialists was not as spectacular as that against the Centrists. The reason was that Social Democracy was already in disrepute, but an officially authorized attack upon the Center was sensational. In fact, the Center was the object of so much of the election publicity that it appeared at times to be the 109 Election manifesto ( W a h l a u f r u f e und Wahlkundgebungen zur stagswahl 1907, pp. 54-56) ; Reichstagswahlen 1903-1912, No. 193. 110 Germania,

Reich-

No. 297 ii, Dec. 29, 1906.

111 After the election, the Duke complained that he had been ill-informed as to the state of public opinion in Hanover and Brunswick. H e was apparently surprised that a strong patriotic appeal could defeat the cause he represented.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I43

primary, and the Socialist Party only the secondary, enemy. Many observers concluded that this was the case, but it is doubtful if Bulow intended it so. T h e Chancellor's first press notice of the dissolution condemned the Socialists and Centrists equally for their rejection of the government's measure, and the government press censured both alike for their " party spirit " and their " misuse of the Reichstag's budget rights." The liberal and Radical press, however, concentrated upon the Center. It was probably to call attention to the campaign against the Social Democrats that Bulow addressed his N e w Y e a r ' s letter to General von Liebert, president of the Imperial Union for Combating Social Democracy. In this epistle Billow warned that a " Robespierre" and " the sword of a B o n a p a r t e " would be the inevitable consequences of a Socialist success, and he declared that his slogan w a s : " A g a i n s t Socialists, Poles, Guelphs, and Centrists," thus giving the Socialists the place of honor. The press added that the order in which the Chancellor had named the parties was intentional and had especial significance. In his speech to the Action Committee on Imperialism, Biilow dismissed the Socialists summarily. H e was satisfied to assert that they had never done any constructive good work, and he implied that they probably never would, because their Revisionists, who might have accomplished something, had been silenced. They talked of future Utopias but, he declared, they did nothing for the real freedom or welfare of the people. T h i s seemed to be enough. T h e audience knew that the Socialists were their enemy. The choice of the winter of 1906-1907 for a campaign against the Social Democrats seemed folly at the time. Scandals had implemented the Socialist attack upon colonies. Recent examples of the Emperor's " personal regime " had temporarily impaired respect for the monarchy. Winter with its attendant hardships for the poor was approaching, and the Social Democrats were riding a wave of good fortune which had swept them eighty strong into the last Reichstag. The threat that

144

T H E

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

Revisionism might split the party was small, since the Revisionists had been overwhelmed at the party congress in Dresden in 1903. The party and the trades unions had buried the hatchet at the congress in Mannheim in 1906. T h e party's organization was permanent, and the coffers were full. Under these circumstances, Billow's optimism in supposing that a few patriotic slogans might counteract the Socialist appeal seemed unwarranted. True, the call to national honor had never failed a German Chancellor yet. A n d Biilow had two strings to his bow, since the defeat of either Center or Social Democrats might be construed as a government victory. But there was no certainty that either party could be defeated. One encouraging fact f o r Bulow was that since 1 9 0 3 a certain section of the public had become acutely conscious of the Socialist " peril." Shortly after the Social Democratic " three million victory " in the elections of 1903, a group of prominent patriots met in Halle to discuss the dangers inherent in this Socialist success. A consequence of the meeting was the Imperial Union for Combating Social Democracy, founded in Berlin, M a y 9, 1904. Its aim was to encourage cooperation between the various non-Socialist parties and to add vigour to their campaigning. This " Imperial L y i n g Union," as the Socialists affectionately called it, had done considerable work in by-elections prior to 1906, and immediately after the dissolution in December, it began trying to bring about agreement among the "burgher " parties upon non-Socialist candidates in the elections. It had collected funds in anticipation of the campaign. Its activities were vigorous and extensive, involving the distribution of leaflets, conducting a speakers' school, publishing a political correspondence, organizing " n a t i o n a l " labor unions, 1 1 2 and collecting an anti-Social Democratic library which was at the 112 In this respect, its success was limited. T w e n t y - t w o labor unions with about 24,000 members became affiliated with the Imperial Union. T h e speakers' school had trained 91 speakers by 1907. The political correspondence was sent free to 1,275 newspapers.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

145

disposal of " national" politicians. Membership on the eve of the elections was 144,000, divided among 287 local groups. In addition, there were 340 affiliated organizations. Ten directors or central committeemen were members of the Reichstag; six more were members of the Prussian House of Representatives or House of Lords. Most of these were affiliated with the National Liberal, Free Conservative, or Conservative Parties. During the election campaign, the Imperial Union was active in 82 districts. In 32 of the 36 districts which the Socialists lost, the Imperial Union participated in some way—either by organizing campaign tactics, distributing leaflets, furnishing speakers, or furnishing money to the " burgher " parties. It published 22 new leaflets, making 72 in all. More were published by local groups. N o fewer than 10,149,330 leaflets were dispersed. The political correspondence was expanded into a special "election correspondence" in 15 issues between December 27 and February 1. A Handbook for Non-Social Democratic Voters was hurried to the press. Funds for all this activity came from members and supporters. The Imperial Union received none of Prince Billow's election fund, but without outside aid, it was financially so well off that it was able to reject an offer of 100,000 marks guaranteed by patriotic business men should the need for it arise. 113 T h e Imperial Union's propaganda was not erudite. It was intended for laborers. It revived popular misconceptions as to the barbarity of socialism: that the Socialists wished to rob man of his property, to extirpate the family, exterminate religion, abolish the monarchy, and " take our Fatherland from 113 Statement of Dr. Albert Bovenschen, former executive secretary of the Imperial Union, to the author. Literature about the Union may be found in its large collection of leaflets, of which No. 75 recounts the activities in the election; in the Union's publications, Handbuch fur nicht-sozialdemokratische Wahler (Berlin: Reichsverbandsverlag, 1907), and Zehn Jahre Rcichsverband gegen die Sosialdemokratie (Berlin: Reichsverbandsverlag, 1914) ; and in Eduard Liebert, A us einem bewegten Leben, Erintverungen (Munich: Lehmann, 1925), p. 175 ff.

146

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

us." It declared that the party was a tyranny and the " future state " a penitentiary, and that the party robbed the poor only to embitter them against others and the state. The Imperial Union sought to arouse misgivings in labor circles as to how Socialist party dues were spent, to arouse mistrust of the party's bureaucracy that " lived off the pennies of the laborers," and to encourage doubts as to the efficacy of the party's program. It sought to convince laborers of the impotency of the Social Democratic deputies in the Reichstag, and of the unsatisfactory results of trade unionism and strikes. And it made much of the Socialist's lack of patriotism. One of the most florid passages in the Imperial Union's literature was inspired by the refusal of the Social Democrats to vote credits for the suppression of the Southwest African revolt. It read: " If the leaders of the Social Democrats can only arouse hatreds, then they think nothing of the wealth and goods which our German fellow citizens sacrifice there in Africa, nothing of the health and lives of our German warriors in Africa, nothing of Germany's honor. They will not give the government the means for continuing the struggle, and they range themselves with Hottentots and Hereros against their own Motherland." m The Social Democrats were forced to redouble their polemics. The Socialist press called Union members " pogromists," " hooligans," " bandits," " counter-revolutionary, murdering incendiaries," " stink bombs," et cetera. 118 The party scoffed at the Union's activity and, as they later admitted in sorrow, underestimated both the strength of the Union and the power of its patriotic appeal. The anti-Socialist campaign varied in nature and vigour according to the locality and the parties conducting it. The Conservatives were the only political party to concentrate their attack almost entirely upon the Social Democrats. The National 114 Leaflet No. 68. 115Liebert addressing the Reichstag (Reichstag Debates, CCXXVII, 1 7 1 ) .

THE ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

147

Liberals and Radicals recognized the fundamental opposition of all " burgher " groups to the party of revolution, but they expended their best efforts against the Center. In Saxony the " burgher " parties tried to arouse people against the Socialists by exciting them with propaganda against the C e n t e r ! 1 1 8 This was because in this Protestant and industrialized state Centrists were hated more than Socialists, although there were no Centrists there. In northern Germany there were also relatively few Centrists, but the Center was not hated so fanatically there, and anti-Socialist agitation was not complicated by as much anti-Catholic sentiment. T h e tried tactics of years were employed to discredit the Socialists and their candidates. Pamphlets, leaflets, and orators branded the Marxian theory of revolution as " uncivilized." Socialist appeals to class hatred were called " barbarous." Agitators termed the Socialist " future state " impractical, and the socialist leaders " egoists " and "demagogues " who "collect party dues to support themselves in luxury." They told the laborer that the negative parliamentary tactics of his leaders were not only futile but traitorous to labor's own interest. They attacked the Socialists with appeals to national honor and patriotism, and they vented their wrath upon the " un-", " anti-", and " inter-national " Marxists who scoffed at army, navy, colonies, and Fatherland. 1 1 7 It was not expected that these arguments would dissuade confirmed Socialists from loyalty to their party. T h e " burgher " groups hoped for success largely among two particular classes of people. First, they hoped that many respectable 116 Dresdner Anzeiger and Leipziger Zeitung, cited in Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 297, Dec. 20, 1906, and No. 4, Jan. 5, 1907; also K. Bachem, op. cit., VI, 404. 117 Leaflets of the national parties in the Prussian State Library are mostly for candidates in Berlin and Stettin, cities where the Socialists, not the Center, were the immediate enemy. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung filled many of its columns with refutation of Socialist arguments (see especially Nos. 300 and 304, Dec. 23 and 30, 1906; and Nos. 14, 16 and 21, Jan. 17, 19 and 25, 1907).

148

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

igOJ

citizens who had joined the Socialist ranks as protest voters in 1903 would rally to the " national cause." Second, they hoped that the millions of indifferent citizens, who ordinarily did not vote, would be aroused to action by the " national appeal." 1 1 8 The Social Democrats were jubilant as the campaign began. " L o n g live our friends the enemy!" cheered the Leipsiger Volkszeitung the day after the dissolution. Socialists rejoiced in the unexpected opportunity to increase their strength in the Reichstag before the allotted time. They boasted about their parliamentary negativism. They were eager for the coming " bout with the ' burghers '." And they launched a campaign of propaganda that left no aspect of German economic or political life unassailed. Vorwaerts accepted the challenge which the Reichstag's dissolution involved and boldly proclaimed war upon " costly " and " boundless " naval expansion, IVeltpolitik, and " misdeeds in the colonies which sullied the national honor." This was only the beginning. Vorwaerts went on to treat other subjects with equal vigor—the " personal regime " of the Emperor, the dangers threatening civil liberties, tariff " usury," restrictions on imports, food profiteering, prison laws and anti-trades union legislation. 119 Before election day the Socialists had added to their list of complaints such counts as the government's attack upon the Reichstag's budget rights, alleged threats to direct and universal suffrage, the likelihood of a coup d'etat, 120 the government's policy of debts and indirect taxation, the use of patriotism to drug the people, militarism, navalism, capitalism, Junkerdom, agrarianism, the high cost of living, low wages 118 Norddcutschc Jan. 10, 1907.

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

No. 304, Dec. 30, 1906; No. 8,

119 No. 291, Dec. 14, 1906. 120The Hamburger Nachrichten demanded that the government "annul the electoral law by imperial decree and issue a new one provisionally for the new election." This demand and those of other Conservative papers such as the Reichsbote and the Deutsche Tagesseitung for a coup to deprive the masses of the franchise alarmed the Radicals (Berliner Tageblatt, Nos. 639 and 652, Dec. 17 and 24, 1906).

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I49

of civil servants, proposals to abolish sickness insurance, stagnation of social legislation, et cetera ad infinitum. With invidious impartiality they dubbed the campaign either the " Hottentot Elections " or the " Hunger Elections." The Socialists elaborated these multifarious issues with endless variations and tiresome repetition, but the warp and woof of the variegated pattern was not a Marxian critique of society or an appeal to socialism as a political philosophy. It was a practical emphasis upon the laboring man's interest in lower indirect taxes, lower tariffs, and reduced expenses for colonies, army, and navy. Socialist leaflets and the Socialist daily press made no effort to explain the Marxian theory of value, class struggle, or revolution. They showed how armies and colonies cost money; they asserted that from this expenditure the capitalist realized profits while the laborer realized nothing; and they reprinted juicy scandals to prove that the government of the " burghers " was corrupt as well as selfish. The apparent reluctance of the Social Democrats to advertise their revolutionary principles was the result of both circumstances and tactics. 121 In books and magazines, the Revisionists and the Orthodox criticized each other's interpretations of Marxian principles, and freely aired the most radical party doctrines. But the common devices of political agitation— leaflets, broadsides, speeches, and press articles—were ill adapted to the development of theories. They presented best the catchwords and practical arguments of a program, and the Socialists used them. There was an indirect advantage for the Socialists in this procedure, since many people who voted for Social Democrats were not party members and might have been alienated by too much emphasis upon radical and revolutionary theories. 121 The " burgher" press complained that the Social Democrats misrepresented themselves. Thus the Vossische Zeitung: " One looks in vain for the class struggle in the election leaflets of the Social Democrats" (No. 19, Jan. 12, 1907).

I5O

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

Furthermore, Social Democratic thinking upon certain subjects had itself become confused because of compromises it had made with the nationally organized world and with the fact that even Socialists were at times patriotic. T h e fact that Social Democrats confined theory to longer brochures and magazine articles, however, was unimportant. Their stand upon the issues in the election was precise and clear enough. They were opposed to Germany's colonial policy and agreed that all colonial credits should be rejected. For the system as it was, " not a man nor a penny " was their slogan. They were opposed to " militarism," to the big navy, and to Weltpolitik. Their opposition to Germany's " national " policies was unanimous, but the reasons f o r their attitude varied with different groups and individuals within the party. T h e party's official declarations admitted, almost emphasized, the fact that Social Democrats might possibly support a colonial policy that was free of oppression and exploitation. Socialists, they said, distinguished between a humanitarian policy beneficial to the natives and a capitalistic policy of exploitation. 122 But they could not conceive of any capitalistic colonial policy meeting their requirements. So the emphasis which they laid upon their approval of humanitarian imperialism did not change their actual opposition to all colonial appropriations. W h e n the Socialists were accused of evading the issue, Vorwaerts published a clear-cut condemnation of Germany's imperialism and recommended that her colonies be given up. Vorwaerts let it be " roundly declared that the Social Democrats approved not one penny for the colonies and that they would regard it as a gain for Germany if . . . ( G e r m a n y ) were relieved of them." 123 Vorwaerts did not say that all colonization was bad, but only that Germany's was bad—and costly. T h e price of the original investment in colonies, it said, plus the 122 Election manifesto of the Social Democratic Party [English translation in B. C. K. Ensor, Modern Socialism as Set Forth by Socialists (London: Harper, 1910), p. 369]. 123 No. 296, Dec. 20, 1906.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

151

cost of subventions, of keeping the natives in subjection, of defense in w a r time, and of corruption in peace time was not justified by returns f r o m trade or production. Arguing in terms of national benefits rather than in terms of an international proletariat, Vorwaerts concluded that " the abandonment of the colonies would constitute . . . a substantial financial, military, ethical, and commercial gain for the Empire." This was probably the opinion of the majority of active party members, but such a bald denunciation of Germany's colonies was infrequently repeated. Socialists denounced Germany's colonial policy regularly, but they avoided dogmatic opposition to all colonies. T h e orthodox Kautsky modified a hitherto negative approach to imperialism by confessing that colonies built up by actual settlement and friendly treatment of the natives could not be condemned. H e cited the Quaker colonization in America. But he pointed out that such a settlement required a moderate climate, and he concluded that it was out of the question as f a r as Germany was concerned, since her colonies were all in the tropics. In the tropics, he explained, the capitalistic plantation system was inevitable and always resulted in the exploitation of labor. T h e unexpected implication was that Kautsky would not have opposed colonial expansion if a colony with a temperate climate could have been found. 124 The Revisionists went much farther than Kautsky. Calwer wrote that, while the Socialists had reason to oppose the government's colonial policy, the Social Democrats ought to realize that German capitalists were faced with foreign capitalist competition and had no choice but to colonize, if Germany's economic f u t u r e were to be assured. Every industrial land was expanding, Calwer argued, and in such circumstances " Social Democrats in Germany cannot demand that German industrialists remain quietly at home with no ambitions in world politics at all." Since capitalism must first fasten the world in its chains 124 " D i e Situation des Reiches," Die Neue Zeit, X X V , i (Jan. 12, 190 7), pp. 484-500.

152

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

before a socialistic economy could be realized, he concluded, it was proper that capitalism be encouraged to expand.125 Orthodox Socialists considered Calwer a heretic, for their conclusions were almost the opposite of his. Alexander Helphand, who wrote under the pen name of Parvus, argued that imperialism was necessary for the survival of capitalism and that therefore German Social Democrats should fight imperialism tooth and nail—lest the day of reckoning between capitalism and labor be indefinitely delayed.128 Social Democrats would not have admitted that Bülow's national appeal caused them embarrassment, but the colonial issue and the national slogans placed them on the defensive. Socialists scoffed at patriotism, imperialism, and the army and navy, but they could not repudiate such articles of the national faith for fear of alienating too many voters. In order to conciliate those party supporters who were neither thoroughly proletarian nor international in their outlook, the Social Democrats qualified their opposition to national bills. For instance, the party officially explained that rejection of army budgets did not mean that the Socialists wanted to leave Germany defenseless. It merely meant, they said, a vote of nonconfidence in the government ( !) or it bespoke the party's objection to financing the army and other unproductive national enterprises by indirect taxes.127 Except for this evidence of moderation, the Socialists asserted their objections to the " instruments of capitalistic Weltpolitik " with customary vigor. They answered the appeal to national honor and patriotism with scorn. First, they said, the issue of the moment did not involve national honor or justify the elaborate appeal to patriotism. Second, they said, patriotism was only " oratorical nonsense " — a soporific with 125"Der 25 Januar," Sozialistische 126Die Reichstagswahlen Buchdruckerei, 1907).

Monatshefte,

und die Arbeiterschaft

127Handbuch für Sozialdemokratische pp. 19, 23-26.

Wähler

X I (1907), 105. (Leipzig:

Leipziger

(Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907),

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

153

which the ruling classes drugged the laboring masses into complaisant acquiescence in the economic and social status quo. It was not true that the Socialists " stepped gingerly around the colonial issue like a cat around hot porridge," but it was a fact that they did not allow colonies or patriotism to remain the sole issues in the campaign. A s quickly as possible, they discounted these issues and substituted the economic interests of the ordinary man. Thus the high cost of living, tariffs, taxes, Weltpolitik, civil rights, social legislation, trade unionism, budget rights, the Emperor's "personal regime," or the possibility of a reactionary Reichstag—these became issues as important to the Socialists as colonies or the national honor. The Social Democrats published four different election appeals of the central committee in Berlin. 128 They published a new handbook for Socialist voters, a pamphlet containing " Hints about the Reichstag Election," 1 2 9 ten exemplary leaflets which were copied and multiplied a thousand fold, and they reprinted Kautsky's Sozialdemokratie und Patriotismus. They distributed 55,500,000 leaflets and spent 1,570,000 marks. 130 Their organization was the most efficient of all the political parties. Their aims and policies were simple: to gain as many seats in the Reichstag as possible and to oppose all " burgher " candidates. With their program and their organization, the Socialists were exceedingly optimistic and remained so to the end of the campaign. Discounting the fact that politicians must be optimists and that party leaders must put up a bold front during a campaign, it is safe to say that the confidence of the Socialists was real. Bebel and Singer hoped for a Social Democratic gain of at least ten or twenty seats. 131 Such a gain was not unlikely. N o . 293, Dec. 16, 1907; Nos. 12, 20, and 23, Jan. 15, 24,

128 Vorwaerts, and 27, 1907. 179 IVinkc 130 Richard zur Gcgcmvart

:ur

Reichstagswahl

( B e r l i n : Vorwaerts, 1907).

Lipinski, Die Sozialdemokratie von ihren ( B e r l i n : Dietz, 1927-1928), II, p. 222.

Anfängen

bis

131 Bebel, as reported in Vonvaerts, N o . i, Jan. 1, 1907; Singer in an interview in the London Daily Mail, reported in Schultheis, op. cit., 1907, P- 14-

154

T H E

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

T H E BULOW BLOC

The natural corollary of a campaign against the Center and the Social Democrats was the union of all other parties against them. Biilow may have had the idea of such a " national bloc " in mind for several months, but the press and the political leaders did not adopt it immediately. There was confusion and uncertainty as to how the fantastic combination of Conservatives and Radicals was supposed to cooperate, and agitation for united action began only slowly. The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung first vaguely indicated the hopes of the Chancellor two days after the dissolution. It suggested that the national issue ought to enable the various parties of the minority of December 13 to concentrate on the main issue and minimize their individual differences. The essential thing, the article continued, was " that the feeling of general unity in a spirit of national reliability and patriotic unselfishness be given practical and forceful expression . . . from extreme Right to the Radical L e f t . " 132 Three days later the same paper urged that all animosity between the parties of the Reichstag minority be avoided. 133 On the same day that the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung first proposed " general unity," the Free Conservative Post suggested that the " burgher " parties adopt an agreement according to which they could consolidate their efforts in districts where Centrists or Social Democrats were important contenders and, in so doing, mutually exchange or apportion districts. 134 On the following day, December 16, Der Hannoversche Courier, which was a strongly National Liberal paper, advocated an election.cartel from Kanitz (Conservative), Liebermann (Anti-Semite), and Hahn (Agrarian League), to Kopsch (Radical People's Party), Naumann (National 132 No. 293, Dec. 15, 1906. 133 No. 295, Dec. 18, 1906. 134 No. 586, Dec. 15, 1906. The Post was often the mouthpiece of Freiherr Octavio von Zedlitz, a man politically close to Biilow.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

155

Socialist), and Barth (Radical Alliance). And on this same day, Bassermann, whose first reaction to the dissolution was pessimistic, wrote optimistically about a " phalanx from Count Kanitz to Blumenthal (an Alsatian Radical), from Conservatives to South German Democrats." 135 Shortly thereafter, the Free Conservatives stated officially that the parties " must emphasize what unites us, not what divides us." 136 It was evident that any bloc of political parties, or even any such electoral cooperation as was anticipated in the press, would have to be based upon a partial surrender of party doctrines in the name of the " national idea." The government, the Free Conservative, and National Liberal press were ready to make this surrender, but the influential Conservative and Radical papers hesitated. The Kreuzzeitung called the scheme " enticing " but " impracticable" and could only recommend cooperation from place to place as might be needed to guarantee a common front against the Socialists.137 The Conservative Korrespondenz remarked later that the call for a bloc had met with little response.138 The Conservative press approved of cooperation with the National Liberals if the latter would offer " inducements." Some agreements were reached, but the Conservative press was afraid the Liberals would get the better of the deals, and in many districts the Conservatives refused to make any concessions.139 Neither the Conservative Party nor the Agrarian League adhered fully to the proposed bloc, since they preferred the Centrists to the Radicals. Yet there were Conservative leaders like Otto von Manteuffel, vice-president of the Prussian 135 Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 50. 136 Election manifesto (Post,

No. 594, Dec. 20, 1906).

137 No. 593, Dec. 19, 1906. 138 Dec. 28, 1906. 139 Jos. Kaufhold, Die Konseri'ative Parlei und die Reichstagswahlen 1907 (Berlin: Isslieb, 1907), pp. 33-34; G. Vogel, op. cit., p. 38; Norddeutsche AUgemcine Zeitung, Nos. 9 and io, Jan. 11 and 12, 1907. In Frankfurt a.O., the Conservatives refused to support Bassermann and compelled the National Liberal leader to seek another and a " safer " district.

156

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

House of Lords, and publicists like Hans Delbrück who worked patriotically on behalf of the bloc. Max Lorenz wrote that a slogan involving Weltpolitik was general enough to allow all parties to keep their identity as parties, but that it would allow " the dissonances of battle to be blended in a finer and more fundamental harmony. . . . Germany must pursue Weltpolitik." 140 And Delbrück wrote that patriotism was just an empty noise if it did not enable Conservatives to support the Radicals who had recently become " national." 141 The Radicals knew that the dissolution marked them as a government party in the new Reichstag, but they were not eager to adopt their new role without compensation. This compensation they expected to find in an increase in the number of Radical deputies in the Reichstag and in a liberalization of government policies. The Berliner Tageblatt was especially outspoken in demanding that the government meet certain Radical requirements. It demanded that Bülow reinforce the administration with leading liberal men, that he make concessions, and that he give " especial guarantees " that Radicals would be treated with more respect. After all, the paper remarked, the Radicals were not supporting colonial demands " just for love of Prince Bülow." 142 Two days later the same paper suggested that the dismissal of von Studt, Prussian Minister for Education, was the proper kind of a guarantee.143 A further Radical suggestion was that the government guarantee that the anti-Center program would be permanent.144 These remarks of the Radicals obviously did not win them the confidence of the Conservatives. But the Radicals did not particularly care for the confidence of the Conservatives. They were profoundly anti-reactionary, and one reason why they 140 Anti-Sozialdemokratische

Korrespondenz,

141 " Politische Korrespondenz," Preussische pp. 190, 381.

No. 74, Dec. 17, 1906. Jahrbücher,

C X X V I I (1907),

142 Nos. 634 and 635, Dec. 14, 1906. 143 Nos. 638 and 645, Dec. 16 and 20, 1906. 144 Schräder, interviewed in the Berliner

Tageblatt,

No. 634, Dec. 14, 1906.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

157

opposed the Center was, they said, that it was reactionary. They were against the " entire reaction " and could see no advantage in freeing themselves from the " Centrist yoke " only to come under the yoke of the agrarians. The Radical press would have little to do with the idea of a bloc. Radicals were loth to give up their campaign against " reaction " because, they said, that would leave the Socialist Party as the only refuge of an honest Radical. The bloc was therefore a dream, they said. Only in a few districts did they deem it possible to unite " burgher " groups upon one candidate, and the most that they would consider was cooperation between Radicals and National Liberals, or perhaps some wider common action in the second balloting.145 In view of the reluctance of Radicals and Conservatives to cooperate, the government tried to make the prospect of a " national bloc " more enticing. To the Conservatives it was presented as a patriotic duty. For the Radicals, the practical value of the government's favor was emphasized. "Liberalism is campaigning this time," wrote the Süddeutsche Korrespondenz in an article which was probably inspired, " where . . . the government is foregoing every anti-liberal pressure. The government has its own interest in the maintenance of the burgher Left in the Reichstag." 146 And the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung was probably trying to please the Radicals when it recommended that local officials refrain from molesting any of the parties of the proposed bloc in their conduct of the campaign.147 The first clear statement about the kind of bloc which the government expected came from Prince Bülow, himself. In his Sylvester Letter, the Chancellor outlined his hopes for the cooperation of the conservative and liberal parties of all shades 145 Freisinnige Zeitung, No. 446, Dec. 18, 1906; Berliner Tageblatt, 641, Dec. 18, 1906; Nos. 643, 644, Dec. 19, 1906; Vossische Zeitung, 588, Dec. 16, 1906; Otto Wiemer, op. cit., p. 34. 146 Cited in the Berliner

Tageblatt,

147 No. 299, Dec. 21, 1906.

No. 644, Dec. 19, 1906.

No. No.

I58

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

in national questions, and he traced the origin of this idea back to the spring of 1906, when the Center became " unbearably arrogant " and the Radicals showed a tendency to forget some of their doctrinairism. Billow did not hope f o r a firm and permanent bloc. " H o w e v e r , " he said, " the parties of the Right, the National Liberal Party, and the Radical groups further to the left . . . should be able to win enough ground so as to comprise a majority f r o m time to time." Here w a s not only official recognition of the proposals f o r an electoral bloc current in the press, but also a statement that the " bloc " was expected to f o r m the government's majority in the new Reichstag—at least f r o m time to time. T h e press reaction, however, was not favorable. Bülow's proposal had been coupled with a series of left-handed compliments to the Radicals, 1 4 8 with the result that the left wing of the proposed bloc became more vociferous than ever in declaring its political independence. T h e Radicals were still not willing, at least in public, to compromise with " reaction," whether in the cloak of the agrarian Junker or the ultramontane clergy. They did not object on principle to voting with the Conservatives f r o m time to time, but they were a f r a i d of being made the tool of the Conservatives. A n d they repeatedly demanded a liberalization of the government, almost as if they had already won the election by their efforts alone. They regretted that the t a r i f f s were to remain unchanged, that no effective measures were planned against the rise in food prices, that the clergy would still dominate Prussia's cultural life, and that nothing more was promised in the way of constitutional guarantees. 1,49 T h e Radical press had only scorn for a " majority from time to time " i f , on all other occasions, a reactionary Center-Conservative majority were to control the Reichstag. 148 Biilow wrote of their lack of " a sense of historical continuity," and of the fact that they had overcome their " negative doctrinairism " and had acquired a " growing understanding for big national questions." 149 Vossische Zeitung, Nos. 3. 11, and 18, Jan. 3, 8, and 11, 1907; Berliner Tageblatt, Nos. 2 and 16, Jan. 2 and 10, 1907; Walther Goetz, " D i e Reichstagsauflösung," Süddeutsche Monatshefte, Jan. 1907, pp. 116-118.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I59

T h e Conservatives were no more pleased than the Radicals with the Chancellor's suggestion. They knew that any reorientation resulting from a government victory at the polls would benefit the Radicals more than themselves. They complained that the Radicals poisoned public opinion against them and tried to steal seats from them, 150 and they insisted that Radicals should not be allowed much influence in the government because they were a " drawback to the state " and " not nationally reliable." 151 Bülow promised them that agrarian tariffs would not be changed, while the Süddeutsche Korrespondenz assured them that the election of a few patriotic Radicals did not inevitably involve the adoption of anti-Conservative policies. 152 But in vain. Billow's proposal of a national majority from time to time had uncovered certain difficulties. The Center was becoming more bitter and more alienated, and Centrists seemed unwilling to be used as only part-time employees. The Radicals were demanding the permanent exclusion of the Center from the government concern. A n d certainly the Conservatives needed more persuading. Under these circumstances, Bülow made a personal appearance in the campaign—before the highly respectable patriots and savants of the Action Committee on Imperialism. 153 Speaking at a banquet on January 19, the Chancellor advocated more than a majority from time to time. H e hoped for a " marriage of conservative and liberal spirits," 154 and vaguely 150 Conservative

Korrespondenz,

N o . 4, Jan. 11, 1907; K a u f h o l d , op.

cit.,

PP- 33-34151 V o g e l , op. cit., p. 44. T h e R a d i c a l press p u b l i c i z e d t h i s a t t i t u d e of the C o n s e r v a t i v e s ( q u o t a t i o n s f r o m t h e Schlesische Tageblatt,

Morgenscitung

in t h e

Berliner

N o . 7, Jan. 5, 1907).

152 Cited in t h e Vossische

Zeitung,

N o . 8, Jan. 5, 1907.

153 T h e r e h a d been s o m e r e g r e t that the S y l v e s t e r L e t t e r h a d been d r e s s e d to the u l t r a - r e a c t i o n a r y Imperial U n i o n A g a i n s t S o c i a l [Hans

Delbrück,

CXXVII

" Politische

Korrespondenz,"

Preussische

ad-

Democracy Jahrbücher,

(1907), p. 376].

154 S c h u l t h e s s , op. cit., pp. 9-14. T h e p h r a s e o l o g y w a s

Hammann's—chosen

l6o

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

outlined a modest legislative program upon which both " spirits " might unite. Continued high tariffs, army, navy, and colonial bills, social legislation, bourse and assembly reforms, were the main suggestions. " May all national elements," the Chancellor concluded, " from the Conservative Right to the Radical Left subordinate their special interests to their national duty and obligation." Neither the Conservative Right nor the Radical Left was impressed. The Radicals called Billow's proposal " right pretty " but were conscious that in constitutional, cultural, and economic questions, Conservative and Radical principles were poles apart. 158 Kaempf, Radical deputy from Berlin, likened the proposed spiritual marriage between Conservatives and Radicals to a union of fire and water. A colleague remarked that the children of such a union were not likely to be strong, and that the parties would soon seek divorce.156 The Conservatives were equally disdainful. The Conservative Korrespondenz expected little good to come of the marriage and, noting that its success would depend wholly upon the complete self-sacrifice of the Conservatives, felt that only an occasional liaison would be possible.157 The Kreuzzeitung was filled with distrust toward the whole proposal and was ready to give the marriage validity only in colonial affairs. 158 Had the press been completely representative of public opinion, there would have been little hope for Billow's bloc. Even in the press, however, there were signs that some Radicals as well as Conservatives wished to follow the government's advice and suppress special party interests for the good of the national cause. Conciliatory elements in the Radical groups carefully so as not to alarm the Conservatives too much [Otto Hammann, Um den Kaiser (Berlin: Hobbing, 1919), p. 24]. 155 Freisinnige Jan. 22, 1907.

Zeitung, No. 18, Jan. 22, 1907; Vossische Zcitung, No. 35,

156 Vossische Zeitung, Nos. 38 and 41, Jan. 23 and 25, 1907. 157 No. 7, Jan. 21, 1907. 158 No. 34, Jan. 21, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

l6l

argued on grounds of practical politics that cooperation with the Conservatives was essential to any increase in Radical seats, that the endeavor to fight Center and Conservative parties at the same time was foolish, and that demands for guarantees and immediate liberalization of the administration were impolitic.159 Tolerant Conservatives did not expect Radicals to give up their principles. Delbrück admitted that a Radical could not honestly vote for a Conservative, but he insisted that a Conservative could easily vote for a Radical because it was a patriotic duty.1®0 H e advised Conservatives to support a man like Naumann who, he pointed out, was at least " nationally minded." 1 , 1 More important than these press outpourings in determining the election results were those politicians and party leaders who understood and sympathized with Bülow's more or less fantastic project. The leaders of the Radical parties and the National Liberals met in Berlin the day after the dissolution and soon reached a general agreement as to policies, and they reached specific agreements for cooperation in the campaign. They agreed to unite on common candidates in nearly all districts of the Empire which were endangered by Socialists or Centrists. Where separate candidacies would not be dangerous, common action was reserved until the second balloting. 162 While the press debated the possibilities and merits of cooperation, leaders of the four important bloc parties met daily in Berlin. They had no authority or mandate, but they were able to exert considerable influence upon party members and to make the bloc a reality. Otto von Manteuffel, Conserva159 Articles of the Frankfurter cited in Vogel, op. cit., p. 41.

Zeitung

and Süddeutsche

160 " Politische Korrespondenz," Prcussische 161 In the Neckarzeitung, 22, 1907.

Jahrbücher,

quoted in the Berliner

Korrespondenz, C X X V I I , p. 188.

Tageblatt,

No. 39, Jan.

162 Frankfurter Zeitung, cited in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 296, Dec. 19, 1906; Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 51. The agreements were not binding on local party leaders, so not all of them were observed (Vossische Zeitung, No. 30, Jan. 18, 1907).

1Ö2

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

igOJ

tive vice-president of the Prussian House of Lords, Octavio von Zedlitz-Neukirch, leader of the Free Conservatives in the Prussian House of Representatives, Dr. Robert Friedberg, chairman of the executive committee of the National Liberal Party, and Otto Fischbeck, executive secretary of the Radical People's Party—all leaders of their parties in Prussian politics —met regularly in ManteuffePs office. They tried to coordinate the efforts of the bloc parties, and Manteuffel, who was the main spark of the group, brought such pressure to bear upon rcluctant Conservatives that a Conservative writer remarked later that his party gave way to the liberals in many places in a way that was hardly to be explained.1®3 The efforts of the self-appointed committee did not meet with universal success, but in several districts, even on the first balloting, it was possible to unite all factions against the Socialists. This occurred in Lübeck, Breslau, Königsberg, and several Saxon districts. Equal in significance to the cooperation of the bloc parties was the amount of money at their disposal. For the first time, they had enough—more than enough. 164 Most of the money came from business men and manufacturers, particularly from the Central League of German Industrialists. This league proposed that members assess themselves one mark for every laborer in their employ, the money to be sent to Berlin for a general election fund. The fund was to be spent only in districts where the " national " parties were not competing with one another, and in propaganda only against Poles, Guelphs, Centrists and Social Democrats. 1 " Prince Bülow interested himself 163 Kaufhold, op. cit., p. 27. 164 This statement was made to the author by Dr. Fischbeck, who had the political parties in mind, and by Dr. Bovenschen, who was thinking of his Imperial Union Against Social Democracy. 165 The circular letter containing this proposal was printed in Tremonia and reprinted in the Kölnische Volkszeitung, No. 29, Jan. 10, 1907. Among the signers were Albert Ballin, head of the Hamburg American Line, Prince Salm-Horstmar, president of the Navy League, and Paul von Schwabach, head of the Bleichröder banking house.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

163

in the collection of this fund, and Paul von Schwabach, head of the Bleichroder banking house, was the Berlin agent for its collection. It was passed on to Octavio von Zedlitz-Neukirch, who distributed it among the parties and politically active societies on behalf of the unofficial bloc committee of which von Manteuffel was chairman. It was from this fund that the Navy League was furnished 30,000 marks for expenses connected with publishing and distributing election brochures. The entire amount thus collected and distributed was probably more than 600,000 m a r k s . 1 " A further reason for cooperation between the national parties and for the success of the " national" campaign was the activity of the various branches of the administration—especially of Loebell and the Imperial Chancelry, of Dernburg and the Colonial Department, and of Prince Bulow himself. In addition to his two public statements and his part in the collection of campaign funds, Bulow was diligent and lavish with his advice. It was Billow who persuaded Count Arnim-Muskau and his Free Conservative supporters to turn over the district of Rothenburg-Hoyerswerde to the National Liberal leader Bassermann so that the latter might have a " safe " district from which to be elected on the first ballot. 187 While Bulow tried to avoid the appearance of favoring " official" candidates, his efforts to encourage unity among the national parties led to embarrassing complications, and occasional disputes arose as to whether certain candidates had received the blessing of " Wilhelmstrasse 7 7 . " 1 S 8 Biilow's 166 The facts with regard to the bloc committee were given the author orally by Dr. Fischbeck. Cf. B u l o w ' s defense in the Reichstag (Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I , 6 3 ) . 167 Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 52. 168 E. g., in Borna, the 14th S a x o n district, where General Liebert w a s the candidate of the Free Conservative Party. One of General Keim's letters implied that B u l o w regretted the candidacy of Liebert's A n t i - S e m i t i c opponent. T h e Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung denied this ( N o . 47, Feb. 24, 1907). A similar situation existed in the 7th Liegnitz district. B u l o w seems to have made a statement to the successful Radical candidate which

164

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

intimacy with General K e i m and the N a v y League involved him in some of that energetic General's political enthusiasms. T h e Chancellor's electioneering activities and his defamation of the Center and the Social Democrats were much criticized later, but Bülow was well satisfied with his own behavior. Bethmann-Hollweg, Prussian Minister f o r Interior, and Count Posadowsky, Imperial Secretary of State f o r the I n terior, were only reluctant supporters of the Chancellor. Bülow regarded Bethmann as a nervous doctrinaire, and Princess Radziwill found him nervous and apprehensive during the campaign. 1 6 9 Posadowsky fulfilled his obligations, but did little more. H e was politically opposed to agrarianism and was irritated that the Chancellor did not break with the ultra-conservatives. 1 7 0 Bülow was well seconded in the campaign, however, by Loebell, chief of the Imperial Chancelry, who supported and imitated his superior in conferring with political leaders, encouraging propagandists, recommending speakers, and reducing friction within the bloc. Dernburg and Lindequist both mounted the political stump on behalf of the national cause and the colonies. The Colonial Department furnished lists of officers who were ready to speak about the colonies—with lantern slides—on the basis of personal experience. 171 A t least one of these officers placed himself at the disposal of the N a v y League only because of the expressed desire of his Superior Command. Several employees in the Admiralty helped the N a v y L e a g u e with the manual labor involved in mailing pamphlets. T h e Imperial Post Office apparently furnished the addresses of postmasters so that these officials could have the pamphlets distributed as in 1903. The charge was made, too, that school the latter interpreted as official recognition, but which the Free Conservative candidate resentfully disputed (Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I , 598). 169 Radziwill, op. ext., I l l , 277. 170 Letter of T r i m b o m to J. Bachem (Cardauns, op. eit., p. 1 1 2 ) . 171 Alldeutsche

Blatter,

Jan. 26, 1907, p. 30.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

165

teachers were advised to participate actively in the campaign in the interest of the bloc parties. T h e Prussian Ministry of State requested the Ministers of the various departments to see that officials were enabled and encouraged to vote. 172 Bethmann issued an order which read in part : " It is the absolute duty of every patriotic person, and it must therefore be especially required of every eligible official, that he make use of his suffrage rights." 173 Ministers of other departments made similar recommendations. Civil servants appealed to in this fashion needed little imagination to discover how they were expected to vote. One over-zealous railway director seems to have appealed to his officials " to vote in the spirit of the government against the two enemies of the Fatherland, Social Democrats and Centrists." 174 Bethmann apparently urged the heads of Prussian districts and mayors to avoid taking sides in the campaign, but the liberal and Centrist press complained of discrimination. 175 The Social Democrats also had this discrimination to contend with, but it does not appear that the electioneering activities of officials, or the discrimination exercised by them was any greater in 1907 than in previous elections. A s it turned out, the government forces worked effectively enough. The national electoral bloc became a vital, if frangible reality. O f course the Center and the Socialists made fun of the bloc. The Leipziger Volkszeitung labeled its candidates " longsighed-for, Semitic-anti-Semitic, agrarian-industrial, conservative-radical, bigoted-liberal, mish-mash candidates . . ." The Center press delighted in trying to frighten the Conservatives with the bugbear of a liberalized empire, in scoffing at the extravagant hopes and claims of the Radicals, and in baiting 172 Norddeutsche 173 Ibid.,

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

N o . 302, D e c . 28, 1906.

N o . 304, D e c . 30, 1906.

174 Duisburger 175 Germania, 28, 1906.

Volkszeitung,

c i t e d in Germania,

N o . 29s ii, D e c . 25, 1906; Berliner

176 N o . 293, D e c . 19, 1906.

N o . 25 ii, J a n . 30, 1907. Tageblatt,

N o . 657, D e c .

l66

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

IQOJ

both extremes of the bloc against each other. Centrists tried to keep alive the bond between them and the Conservatives by alternately complimenting the latter, sympathizing with them, or threatening them with becoming a " negligible quantity." 1 , 7 S o they hoped to weaken the already " ten times divided bloc." 178 B u t the effort, if it was more than an attempt to make sour grapes sweet to the Center voters, failed. T H E PEOPLE'S

JUDGMENT

T h e elections took place on January 2 5 . T h e national and colonial issue, the unusual campaign against the Center, and the lively opposition to the Social Democrats had caused widespread interest, and nearly eighty-five per cent of the qualified voters went to the polls. 178 B y late evening of the first election day, indications were that the government and the national parties had won a victory. The following were elected on the first b a l l o t : 1 8 0 Conservatives Free Conservatives Anti-Semites Agrarian League and Economic Union National Liberals Radical Alliance Radical People's Party . . Unattached Dane

43 10 3

Center Poles Social Democrats Alsatians

91 19 29 4

6 19 1 6 5 1

A s the returns filtered in late at night, a crowd gathered about the Imperial Chancelry. Biilow addressed the enthusiasts, thanking them f o r their nationalism and saying: " M y great predecessor in office . . . said several years a g o : ' Just put the German people in the saddle. They'll ride.' I hope and believe 177 Gertnanta, No. 295 i, Dec. 25, 1906. 178 Ibid., No. 294 i, Dec. 23, 1906. 179 A s compared with 76% in 1903. 180 Wippermann, op. cit., 1907, I, 24.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

167

that the German people has proved today that it can still ride." 181 The next day the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung boasted, " . . . the German people, when national questions are involved, can ride down everything that stands in the way of the nation. They will not tolerate the slightest weakening of their national strength, even when only an A f r i c a n colony and a couple of thousand men are concerned. . . . The national, imperial, and world political idea has won a brilliant victory among the German people." 182 This resounding national victory had been won at the expense, not of the Centrists, but of the Social Democrats. The Center came through the ordeal unscathed. Assured of 91 Reichstag seats, its prospects were excellent in more than half of the 36 districts where its candidates were still in the running. The Poles had actually increased their representation, but the Socialists had suffered grievous loss. In 1903 they had won 56 seats on the first ballot, this time only 29. In 1903 they had participated in 118 second elections, this time in only 9 1 — a n d with prospects none too good, for it was against the Socialists that the bloc could best cooperate. The campaign against the Center was unceremoniously, perhaps regretfully, dropped. The official press, glorying in the prospect of a national Reichstag, not only ceased its attacks upon the Center, but now proposed that the Center should join with the other " burgher " parties to make the victory over the Social Democrats complete. 188 This pleased the Conservatives, who had not relished the anti-Center campaign, because it left them free to concentrate their efforts upon the Socialists, whom they regarded as the chief danger to the state. It was fortunate for the Conservatives that in no district where they showed any strength were they compelled to make a choice between the Center and one of the parties of the national bloc, 181 Schulthess, op. cit., 1907, p. 15. 182 No. 22, Jan. 26, 1907. 183 Norddeutsche

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

N o s . 27 a n d 29, F e b . 1 a n d 3, 1907.

l68

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

and in no instance did they have to oppose the Center on the second ballot. Consequently, their silent treatment of the Center during the rest of the campaign did not constitute treason to the national cause. National Liberals and Radicals, however, could not reconcile themselves to the complete failure of their anti-Center campaign and now bewailed the government's readiness to f o r g e t i t : first, because they had to face the Center in many of their districts; second, because of their incurable prejudice against the Catholic party; and

finally,

bccause they f e a r e d the possibility of

a

" blue-black bloc " of Conservatives and Centrists. Conservative elements within the Center w e r e well satisfied, f o r the government's suggestion coincided with their natural affiliations with the " burgher " parties. M e r e coincidence had associated Center and Social Democrats on December 1 3 . T h i s coincidence

had

been

magnified

into

a

" black-red

bloc,"

although both Catholics and Socialists indignantly denied that there was anything between them. Socialists insisted that the Center w a s the very bulwark of capitalist society, 1 8 4 and Centrists were equally emphatic in repudiating the " Revolutionaries."

185

Politics had made them bedfellows, but they chose

not to sleep together. Until a f t e r the first balloting, there w a s not a sign of cooperation between them. 1 8 8 T h e Center even helped the bloc to victory

over

the

Socialists

in

Breslau

and K ö n i g s b e r g and rejoiced in the d e f e a t of the revolutionary party. 1 8 7 N o w in the second election, the conservative Centrists in Silesia refused to support the Socialists, and in every dis184 Leipziger Volkszeitung, No. 295, Dec. 21, 1906; Vorwaerts, Dec. 28, 1906; Nos. 3, 4, and 18, Jan. 4, 5, and 22, 1907.

No. 301,

185 Address of Trimborn in Cologne (Germania, No. 292 i, Dec. 21, 1906). T h e Kölnische Volkszeitung was determined that there should be no Centrist votes cast for Social Democrats ( N o . 1092, Dec. 21, 1906). Germania declared that the Center must still guard throne and altar against the Socialists ( N o . 1 ii, Jan. 1, 1907). 186 Except perhaps in Hanau, where Centrists seem to have abstained in favor of the Socialists. 187 Germania, No. 23 ii, Jan. 27, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

169 188

trict, decided to vote for the national candidates. The Center therefore resented all references to an imaginary black-red bloc. " However," wrote Germcmia, " even if an election agreement had been concluded between the Center and the Social Democrats, those who regarded the destruction of the black-red majority as the chief end of the campaign ought not to complain." 1S" Thus Germania defended many local Center committees in southern Germany who agreed to cooperate with the Socialists on the second ballot. The paper did not applaud such action but insisted that it was " understandable." 180 The " understandable " readiness of Centrists to work with Social Democrats found its most complete expression among the democratic elements who controlled the party in Bavaria. The Bavarian Centrists concluded an agreement with the Social Democrats for mutual aid. Since, they said, support for a liberal candidate was out of the question, party voters should support the Social Democratic candidates. 181 The Center aristocrats and higher clergy protested against such an entente with the godless Socialists. The Archbishop of Munich expressed his deep regret " on both monarchical and religious grounds." The Archbishop of Bamberg did not see how any " conscientious Catholic could support and encourage the Social Democrats by voting for them." 192 And a group of aristocratic Centrists, among them Count Hertling, publicly regretted the decision of the Centrist committee because " it 188 Germania, No. 26 i, Jan. 31, 1907. 189 No. 25 ii, Jan. 30, 1907. 190 No. 29 i, Feb. 5, 1907. 191 The agreement covered five districts. Socialists were to support the Centrists in Immenstadt, Wiirzburg, and Forchheim, and Centrists were to vote for Socialists in Munich and Erlangen. The Center's recommendation to its followers was: to abstain from voting in the districts where the liberal candidate had been left in the minority (Munich I I ) , but to support the Socialists actively where liberals had obtained a plurality (Munich I ) , or where their prospects were favorable (Erlangen-Furth) (Bayerischer Kurier, Nos. 33, 34. and 45, Feb. 2, 3, and 14, 1907). 192 Wahtaufrufe und Wahlkundgebungen zur Reichstagswahl 1907, pp. 44-45.

170

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

contradicted the Center Party's principles and its political interest." 193 In the Bavarian Palatinate, the Centrist committee likewise entered into an agreement with the Social Democrats, because, they said, it was " impossible for a Centrist to vote for a National Liberal or any one supported by the National Liberals." 194 The Centrists adopted similar tactics in Baden and Alsace. 195 In the Rhineland, Centrist policy was not clear. A conference of party leaders recommended that Centrists vote only for such candidates as would guarantee to uphold the existing Reichstag suffrage, support further social legislation, oppose exceptional laws or limitations upon the right of coalition, and work for complete religious freedom. 196 Strictly interpreted, these con193 Ibid. As a matter of fact, only about half the Center's followers heeded the advice of the committee, with the result that the Socialists lost one district in Munich. In Erlangen, the Center was unable to persuade the Agrarian League to stay away from the polls, and that district was won by the bloc. The Socialists, however, played their part magnanimously. They voted for the Center in Immenstadt, and withheld their votes in Würzburg, so that the Center won handsomely. They voted for the Center in Forchheim, but the bloc won. 194 Nationalliberale Blatter, No. 9, May 1, 1907. The committee recommended abstaining in Speyer, which the Socialists easily retained, and voting Socialist in Kaiserslauten, which was ultimately won by the bloc. In return for this support, the Socialists voted for the Center in Germersheim and Zweibrücken, and the Center won both seats from the National Liberals. 195 In Baden, the Center supported the Socialists in Pforzheim and Karlsruhe and enabled them to retain these two seats. The Socialists reciprocated with passive, if not active, support for the Center in Freiburg, which the Center successfully defended, and in Donnaueschingen, which they won from the National Liberals. In Alsace, the Center press announced that Catholic voters had a free hand, but urged them not to support a " burgher " candidate. The " national " press published an anti-Social Democratic letter of Archbishop Fritzen's, dated Jan. 14, 1894, but the Archbishop, although sympathizing with the bloc candidacy, refused to be drawn into making a public statement in 1907. When Centrist votes were split in Strassburg, the Social Democrats won this former Radical seat. In return, the Socialists helped the Alsatian Centrists to defend their districts of Colmar and Strassburg Land. 196 Wahlaufrufe und Wahlkundgebungen zur Reichstagswahl 1907, pp. 40-41.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

I7I

ditions eliminated nearly all bloc candidates except one or t w o Swabian

Agrarian

Leaguers

and

the

Radical

Blumenthal.

A c t u a l l y , Centrist leaders began to negotiate with the National Liberals

for

mutual

cooperation

in Rhenish

Prussia.

But

feeling between the t w o parties was n o w too bitter to allow the usual common opposition to the Socialists. T h e negotiations broke down, and the Centrist press recommended that supporters of the Catholic party cast n o votes at all—especially n o votes f o r the National Liberals. 1 ' 7 District committees then determined their o w n tactics, with a resultant lack of unanimity. In t w o districts, they decided to support the bloc, and in other districts they recommended withholding votes. B u t large numbers of Centrists were industrial laborers, and, being somewhat confused, ignored the advice of their committees. M a n y voted directly

f o r the Socialists with the result that the

Center,

directly or indirectly, assisted in the Social Democratic victories in six districts. 1 9 8 Bloc parties w o n with full Center support in t w o districts

199

and with the Center's abstaining or divided

vote in three others. 200 Altogether, the Center assisted the Socialists in 12 districts and was responsible for the Social Democratic victory in eight o f them. Such vote-trading with the " godless, anti-reactionary enemies of society " on the part of the Center was pure opportunism, fostered mainly by anger at the anti-Catholic campaign, and by a desire to avenge the government's " shabby " treatment of the party. T h e Socialists' share in the cooperation was equally

un-

principled and opportunistic, since, f r o m their point of view, Centrists were capitalistic, reactionary, and withal

religious.

T h e official Socialist w o r d for the second election was that 197 Kölnische Volkszeitung, N o . 100, Feb. 4, 1907; Norddeutsche meine Zeitung, N o . 25, Jan. 30, 1907.

Allge-

198 Bielefeld, Bochum, Dortmund, Wiesbaden, Hanau, Duisburg. 199 Remschied and Elberfelde. 200 Altena, Hagen, Frankfurt a.M. T h e Socialists had no chance at all in the other three districts.

172

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

" under no circumstances dare a Socialist vote be cast for Conservative, agrarian, anti-Semitic, or National Liberal candidates." Socialists were to support other parties—Centrists, Poles, Guelphs, Alsatians, and Radicals—only on condition that the candidates would guarantee opposition to exceptional laws and limitations upon the suffrage or the right of association. 2 0 1 There was some opposition to this recommendation in the Rhineland, where the Center was more conservative than in Bavaria, 2 0 2 and where the Young National Liberals were really liberal. But the Socialists were a disciplined party, and the dissenters could not carry their colleagues with them. 2 0 3 Socialists normally supported Radicals wherever possible in the second balloting, and it was fortunate for them that they had to make the choice between Radicals and Centrists in only four districts. T w o of these districts were in Württemberg, where a tradition o f cooperation between Radicals and Socialists against the Center guided the Socialists in their choice. 2 0 4 In the Prussian district of Ottweiler, the small but decisive vote of the Socialists seems to have been cast in favor o f an independent liberal against the Center. In Würzburg in Bavaria, the Socialists abstained, and the Centrist candidate 201 Schulthess, op. cit., 1907, p. 17. 202 Much Centrist support in the Rhineland came from laborers, but the party was led by lawyers, business men, and government officials. Of the 38 Centrist deputies from Hanover and Rhenish Prussia in 1907, nineteen, or one half, were either lawyers or government officials. In Bavaria, on the other hand, the party was led by the lesser clergy, successful farmers, and artisans. Of 34 Centrist deputies from Bavaria in 1907, only five were government officials or lawyers, but eight were clergymen, five were gentlemen farmers, four were small farmers, and four were artisans. 203 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung reprinted an article from the socialist Rheinische Zeitung objecting to the ruling against all National Liberals (No. 27, Feb. 1, 1907). In general, the Socialists in the Rhineland supported the Center in all six districts in which it was engaged. With this help, the Center retained the seat of Mörs-Rees and won the former National Liberal stronghold of Hamm-Soest. 204 In Freudenstadt, orders were to vote Radical. In Balingen, orders were not to support the Radical Haussmann; but half the Socialists preferred him to the Centrist, and he was elected.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

173

defeated his Radical opponent. In all other districts, the Socialist choice was easy, and the party supported Radicals, Poles, Alsatians, and Centrists—preferring Poles and Alsatians to Centrists. Thus, guided by principles of opportunism, revenge, and obstructionism, they assisted the Center to victory in 1 2 districts and helped Radicals or left-wing liberals to win in thirteen.205 The Polish protesters listed as their order of preference: first, Centrists; second, Socialists; and third, Radicals who were not obnoxiously anti-Polish. 209 Guelphs and Centrists, as well as Alsatian Catholics, gave each other mutual support. Thus the Reichstag opposition of December 1 3 composed a fairly effective electoral bloc of heterogeneous minorities, protesters, Marxists, and Catholics. The Conservative-National Liberal-Radical bloc was welded together more firmly by their common " national interest." With Conservatives freed from the embarrassment of having to choose between Centrists and Radicals, and with Radicals actuated by patriotic zeal and hope of political reward, the bloc from Kanitz to Blumenthal became a powerful reality. The weakest corner of the bloc's structure was the Radical Alliance, whose anti-reactionary prejudice was not dulled by nationalistic fervor. Members of this party felt that the results of the election were already satisfactory from a national point of view, and they now proposed to consider other issues, such as the danger of a reactionary Conservative-Center majority. Karl Schräder warned his friends that the " greatest danger threatens from the right." 207 The party asked its followers to 205 With Socialist support the Center won: Osnabrück, Göttingen (Guelph), Hamm, Saarbrücken, Donnaueschingen, Freiburg, Germersheim, Zweibrücken, Würzburg, Immenstadt, Colmar (Alsatian Centrist), and Strassburg Land (Alsatian Centrist). The Radicals won Uckermünde, Rügen, Grimmen, Glogau, Lüben, Lowenburg, Landeshut, Osterburg, Schleswig, Oldenburg, Herford, Freudenstadt, and Balingen. 206 Schulthess, op. cit., 1907, PP- 17-18. 207 Berliner

Tageblatt, No. 51, Jan. 29, 1907.

174

T H E

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

vote only for candidates " whose program and person give assurance that they would not support reaction." 208 The followers were more national than Radical, however, for in the ten districts in which the party had a choice between Socialists and a more conservative bloc candidate, they voted Socialist in only one.209 They even cast the decisive votes for the successful Anti-Semitic candidate in Weimar. The Radical People's Party left second election tactics to the discretion of local committees, and the party's supporters voted for the bloc in all cases but one. 210 Thus, the Radicals voted for the bloc against the Socialists in 37 districts; in 35 of these districts, theirs was the deciding vote; in ten cases their vote had been cast for the Socialists in 1 9 0 3 ; in four cases they supported Anti-Semites, and in three of these, the Anti-Semite won only because of Radical support. 211 This was remarkable because the Radicals represented Jewish banking and commercial interests and were, furthermore, opposed to race prejudice on principle. Such, however, was the power of the national appeal and the hope of political preferment! The final balloting was completed by the evening of February 5. The table on the following page shows the results. 212 The national parties received about five million votes, or 4 3 % of those cast on the first ballot, and they won 2 1 6 seats (compared with 1 7 7 seats for the same parties in 1 9 0 3 ) . The Center, Poles, and Social Democrats together, while they 208 Schulthess, op. cit., 1907, p. 17. 209 Friedberg in Hesse, where the Socialists lost anyway. 210 Wiesbaden City, where they apparently split, to the advantage of the Socialists. 211 Eschwege, Meissen, and Weimar. Rinteln was the fourth district. Left wing liberals also voted for the Anti-Semites in Cassel. 212 The table is adapted from statistics in Vierteljahrshefte zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, 1903, Erganzungsheft IV, 5-7; ibid., 1907, Erganzungsheft IV, 7-9; and from the complete election statistics which fill these two volumes. A slightly revised set of the same statistics was published in Reichstag Debates, CCXLV. The revised statistics have been used.

THE ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

175

received about six million votes, or 5 2 % of those cast, received only 168 seats (compared with 2 1 6 in 1903). T h e Socialists had won only 14 additional districts in the second balloting, bringing their total strength in the new Reichstag to only 43 deputies—38 fewer than in 1903. T h i s was such a spectacular defeat that some explanation seemed to be necessary. T h e chief grievance of the Socialists, and the one which explains why, with 2 9 % of the votes cast, they could win only 10.8% of all the Reichstag seats, was the antiquated division of electoral districts. Since the founding of the Second Empire there had been no increase in the number of seats and no change in the distribution. In that same time the population had increased f r o m 41.5 million to 61 million. Most of this increase was concentrated in industrial, i. e. Socialist, areas, so the northern and eastern agrarians had a great advantage. T h e Parties

1907

1903 Votes

Conservatives 948,448 Free Conservatives . . . 333,404 Anti-Semites 244,543 Agrarian League & Economic Union . . . . »8,759 National Liberals . . . . i,3i7,4io Radical Alliance 243,230 Radical People's Party 538,206 So. Ger. People's Party 91,217 Center 1,875,273 Poles 347,784 Social Democrats . . . . 3,010,771 Alsatians 101,921 Guelphs 102,083 Danes 20,801 Middle Class Party . . . Independents & other parties 189,843

%

%

Seats

Votes

10.0

54

1,060,209

35

21

471,863

9-4 4-2

2.6

11

248,519

2.2

1.2

4 51 9

224,030

2.0

1,630,581

14.5 3-2

21

736,006

6

138,607

6.5 1.2

100 16

2,179,743 453,858

19.4 4-0

81

3,259,029

28.9

9 7 1

103,626

0.9

43 7

83,072

0.7

1

15.425

O.I

1

49,627

0.4

2

290,022

2.5

2

139 2.6

5-6 1.0 19-7 3-7 31.7 1.1 1.1 0.2

2.0

6

1903

359,320

60 24 16

13 54 14 28

7 105 20

1907

P o p u l a t i o n ( 1 9 0 0 a n d 1905) . . .

56,367,178

60,641,278

Qualified voters Participating voters Abstaining voters

12,531,210

13,352,278

9,531,210 — 76.1% 2,997,384 — 23-9%

Seats

n,303,537 — 8 4 7 % 2,049,34 3 — 15-3%

176

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

Social Democrats were able to point out, by choosing proper districts for examples, that it took 464,738 Social Democratic votes to win six seats, whereas the Conservatives won 20 seats with only 210,278 votes. They concluded that the Socialists would have had 1 1 5 seats instead of 43 if they had received their just proportion. But this, of course, did not explain why the party did less well in 1907 than in 1903, when the same electoral divisions existed. Of the 46 seats lost by the Social Democrats, 213 only one, the Socialists pointed out, had been won in 1903 with a Social Democratic vote of more than 5 0 % of the votes cast. Under the new circumstances involving full cooperation between Conservatives, National Liberals, and Radicals, they observed, their losses were not to be wondered at nor to be cause for alarm. Furthermore, they took consolation in the fact that, although the percentage of actual voters casting Socialist ballots was less, the percentage of qualified voters who supported the Socialists was really greater in 1907 than in 1903—by about 0.2%. 2 1 4 The Socialist defeat was most spectacular in Saxony, where the Socialists had won 22 of the 23 Reichstag seats in 1903 and had given this highly industrialised area the nickname of the " red kingdom." By 1907 it was evident that what had happened in 1903 was the result of special circumstances which had persuaded large numbers of the " lesser bourgeoisie " to vote " red." One factor affecting the Saxon vote in 1903 was a reactionary local electoral law, introduced in 1896, which had deprived the liberals of what they regarded as their rightful influence in the Landtag and had given the Conservatives a large majority. 2 1 5 Apparently in a spirit of revenge, many took 213 Two had been lost before the dissolution, 44 were lost during the election, but eight new ones were won—making the total loss 38. 214Sozialistische Arbeiter 103-109.

Internationale

(Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907), pp.

215 As a result of the 1903 Landtag elections in Saxony, the lower house was composed of 56 Conservatives, 23 National Liberals, one independent liberal, one Radical, and one member of the Reform party.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

177

advantage of the Reichstag elections to register a protest— either by voting Socialist, or by refusing to vote, which amounted to nearly the same thing. Another factor was the royal household. K i n g Albert died in 1902 and the new king was a Roman Catholic. W h e n his civil list was increased and a marriage quarrel in the family of the C r o w n Prince resulted in divorce in February 1903, there was much dissatisfaction. Furthermore, increase in the income tax and a serious decline in railway receipts, believed to have been the result of Prussian railway traffic regulations, increased public discontent. 218 Partly as a result of these dissatisfactions, the Socialist vote in S a x o n y increased from 299,000 in 1898 to 441,000 in 1903. The situation had altered perceptibly before 1907. A second change in the monarchy took place: K i n g George died and was succeeded by his son Friedrich August. B y the end of June 1905 negotiations between the German states had reached the point of agreement upon railway fare reform. A n d , although the government had done nothing about it, it had talked much of electoral reform. A conference in October 1903 had considered changes in the electoral law, and shortly thereafter the government sent the Landtag a memorandum on reform. A bill based on the government's recommendations failed to pass, but in November 1904 the subject was debated again in the Landtag. The government, however, felt that the proposed system of plural voting did not provide adequate guarantees against the Socialists. 217 Then, in the middle of the 1907 campaign, the press announced " upon reliable authority " that a new proposal for electoral reform was ready for the consideration of the Landtag. 218 Whether or not this was a purely tactical maneuver, it was bound to soften the animosity of some liberals. Furthermore, the anti-Catholic aspect of the 1907 campaign found a 216 For this and the following, see Gebhardt, Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte (7th ed.; Stuttgart: Union, 1930), II, 661; and Hans Block, " Das Wahlergebnis in Sachsen," Die Neue Zeit, X X V , i, 668-672. 217 Schulthess, op. cit., 1904, pp. 1, 18, 73, and 95; ibid., 1905, p. 130. 218 Dresdner Journal, cited in the Norddeutsche 14, Jan. 17, 1907.

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

No.

178

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

ready response in S a x o n y where the population w a s so militantly Protestant that it would not even approve the Catholic king's civil list until assured that not a penny would be passed on to Rome. 2 1 9 These facts, combined with the undeniably potent appeal to patriotism, reversed the verdict of 1903. T h e Social Democratic vote in S a x o n y receded f r o m 441,000 in 1903 to 4 1 8 , 0 0 0 in 1907, although nearly 100,000 more votes were cast in 1 9 0 7 than before. The Socialists polled only 4 8 % of the popular vote instead of 5 8 % , so that even on the first ballot, they lost five of their 2 2 seats. Then, when Radicals and liberals voted f o r Conservatives and bloc candidates on the second ballot, the Socialists lost nine more seats. But the victory of the bloc parties was not confined to Saxony. The Socialists lost other seats—especially in seaboard cities and in areas where the Centrists could not help them. One factor in this victory was the cooperation between Radicals and agrarians, yet something more than this caused the Socialist defeat. F o r in only one, or perhaps two, districts could the existence of the national bloc alone account f o r the victory of the national candidate. In 44 districts it was due either to the increased vote f o r the "burgher " parties, or to a decrease in the vote for the Socialists. What accounted for this? The Socialists had many explanations. In the first place, the national parties were much more active in 1907 than in 1903. They were better organized, and they had money to spend. This unusual activity, supplemented by the energetic labors of the Imperial Union Against Social Democracy, the N a v y League, the colonial societies, soldiers' leagues, veterans' associations, national gymnastic associations, husking leagues, and shooting clubs, was a primary cause of the Socialist defeat. But what caused this activity? The only factor common to all parties of the victorious bloc which was not present in the 1903 campaign was the colonial issue and the appeal to national sentiment and patriotism. T h e 219 Schulthess, op. cit.,

1904, p. 157.

THE

national

" hurrah"

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

program—the

179

Socialists

themselves

admitted i t — w a s the m a j o r factor in their defeat. It not only furnished the cohesive force in Billow's bloc, but it brought o u t otherwise indifferent voters, and it attracted a certain number of luke-warm Socialists. T h e Socialists had " underestimated the recruiting power of the colonial idea . . ."

220

T h e Radicals were loth to admit that it w a s patriotism and not liberal principles which had attracted numbers to their ranks, but the nature of the campaign indicates that it w a s so. T h e r e were, of course, other explanations f o r the unpopularity of

the Socialists.

Their

success in the

1903 elections

had

aroused real anxiety. N u m e r o u s strikes and increased membership in trades unions alienated public opinion, especially the employers of hand labor. 2 2 1 T h e g r o w t h of consumers' leagues alienated small dealers. T h e Christian trades unions and the Catholic W o r k e r s ' L e a g u e s drew off some men w h o might have voted Socialist. T h e r e were other factors which the Socialists had misjudged. Opposition to imperialism occasioned by scandals had been dulled by D e r n b u r g ' s energetic action. T h e tariff had helped the small farmer. A n d industrial prosperity had helped to hide the rise in living costs. T h e facts

222

Socialists called attention to all these

and did so well at rationalizing a w a y the unpleasant

results of the election that a Radical paper w a s prompted to remark wittily that the Socialist point of view w a s :

"First,

we have really not suffered a d e f e a t ; second, the defeat was not our f a u l t ; third, the mistakes we made are reparable." 220 K . K a u t s k y , " D e r 25 J a n u a r , " Die 221 A

Neue

Zeit,

223

X X V , i, 588-596.

s t r i k e in the C r i m i t s c h a u t e x t i l e area in S a x o n y in t h e w i n t e r of

1903-1904 w a s a c c o m p a n i e d b y v i o l e n c e a n d c a u s e d m u c h m i s e r y b e f o r e the l a b o r e r s surrendered. 2 2 2 Vorwaerts, Stuttgart

N o s . 34-35, Feb. 9, 10, 1907; report of the p a r t y t o t h e

Congress

( S o z i a l i s t i s c h e Arbeiter

Internationale,

Bebel's a d d r e s s t o the party c o n g r e s s at E s s e n

pp. 306-323) ; K . K a u t s k y , " D e r 25 J a n u a r , " Die Neue 596; O t t o B r a u n , " D e r 25 J a n u a r in O s t p r e u s s e n , " ibid., 223 Cited by H a n s Delbrück, Jahrbücher, C X X X , 192.

" Politische

pp.

101-110) ;

( P r o t o k o l Parteitag, Zeit,

1907,

X X V , i, 588-

672-676.

Korrespondenz,"

Preussische

l8o

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

There were representatives of the " burgher " parties who chose to see in the election the happy sign of the ultimate downfall of Socialism. 2 " Their hopes were based upon the great loss in the number of Social Democratic seats, the reduction in the percentage of votes cast for Social Democracy (only one seventh of the increase of votes went to the Socialists), the higher percentage of qualified voters participating, the cooperation between the " burgher " parties, and the probability that the Center would not help the Socialists in future elections. T h e Socialists, however, kept a stiff upper lip and took consolation in the fact that the gains of 1 9 0 3 had been largely maintained, if one counted votes and not Reichstag seats. They reasoned philosophically that " what was a political defeat f o r other parties was only a historical experience f o r the Social Democrats," and that " nothing had been lost but illusion." 225 T h e Center, in contrast to the Social Democrats, not only held its own, but actually increased the number of its seats in the Reichstag. This was undoubtedly due to the strength of the religious bond which kept the party together, to good organization and strict discipline. It was due in part to the assistance of Socialists at the second ballot, to the reluctance of Conservatives to oppose the Center, and to the adherence of four former Alsatians. The Center's success was a bitter pill f o r the anti-ultramontane Radicals and National Liberals, but they had to admit that their anti-Center campaign had been fruitless. They even consoled themselves with the thought that " any h a l f - w a y sensible person " knew beforehand that " the result could not have been different." 229 Y e t they insisted that the campaign had been fought essentially against the Center, and that this fact 224Ibid., C X X V I I , 382-383; R. Jaffee, " D i e Letzten Reichstagswahlen," Pretissische Jahrbikher, C X X V I I I , 300 ff.; Franz Ludwig, Die Reichstagswahlen von 1907 und die Sozialdemokratie (Berlin: Schwetschke, 1907), II. 225 Leipziger

Volksseitung,

Nos. 22 and 25, Jan. 26 and 30, 1907.

226 Miiller-Meiningen in the Vossische Zeitung, No. 69, Feb. 10, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

l8l

had been largely responsible for the increased vote and the consequent defeat of the Socialists. 22 ' Although the Center's numerical strength had not been touched, its position in the Reichstag was greatly altered. The national parties were so strengthened by the defeat of the Socialists that they could now dispense with the Center, whose votes were no longer needed for " national " bills. " N o longer Catholic, but German " was " trumps," they said, and that was the significance of the election. 228 A n unfortunate by-product of the election was the increased anti-Catholic sentiment aroused by the campaign. In isolated areas, over-zealous supporters of the national parties resorted to boycotting Catholic concerns, and the Pan-German League added " anti-ultramontanism" to its other patriotic obligations.229 It remains to be noted that the Guelphs suffered real defeat. O f the four Guelphs who had been associated with the Center, one yielded his seat to a Centrist, two were beaten, and only one returned to the Reichstag. The Poles and Alsatians were more fortunate. The Poles increased their representation to 20 by winning two former Center seats. O f the Alsatians, four candidated as Centrists in 1907. N o districts were lost, and one new one was acquired. 230 The parties of the bloc had won. They had increased their votes in the crucial places and had shown significant gains both in the number of followers and of Reichstag members. The Radicals increased their vote by one-half and their Reichstag seats by one-third. They attributed this gain to the anti-Center campaign and to the prospect of a " veering to the left," but they could not disregard the fact that the " national " issue had 227 Vossische

Zeitung, N o . 61, F e b . 6, 1907.

228 Ibid., N o . 77, F e b . 15, 1907; Nationalliberale Blätter, N o . s, M a r . 1, 1907; Süddeutsche Korrespondenz, cited in Germania, N o . 33 i, F e b . 9, 1907.

229 Resolution adopted by the Pan-German League, Feb. 9, 1907 (Alldeutsche Blätter,

Feb. 10, 1907).

230 Strassburg Land.

182

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

dominated the campaign and that the one tangible result of the election was that the government could now steer a " national " course, especially where colonies were concerned. It w a s observed that " f o r the first time, the entire German people were brought into closest contact with the colonies."

231

And

the

election was considered a " most significant triumph of G e r m a n imperialism," policy."

232

the beginning

of

a " new era

in colonial

233

But a colonial triumph w a s only part of the larger victory of patriotism and national honor. A f t e r watching the returns come in on the night of F e b r u a r y 5, a crowd gathered b e f o r e the Chancellor's palace where Biilow spoke and expressed his satisfaction that his " trust in the German people " had not been misplaced. T h e victory, he said, belonged to the " G e r m a n spirit." T h e enthusiastic throng then proceeded to the Imperial Palace where the Emperor greeted them happily, if with m i x e d metaphors: " T o use the w o r d s of the Chancellor, you can ride, and y o u will ride down w h a t stands in our w a y . . . . D o not let this festive hour g o up in smoke as a temporary w a v e patriotic enthusiasm, but stand fast . . ."

234

of

It w a s an epochal

moment. 2 3 5 " W h o e v e r personally saw this flood of enthusiasm, will never forget the d a y , " wrote the Post

ecstatically. 236

" T h e Reichstag w a s elected as a protest against the antinational arrogance of an unnatural party constellation," Biilow declared.

" This

arrogance outraged

the national

231 Die Kolonialpolitik seit der Reichstagsauflosung Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1909), p. 5.

von 1906

232 J. Ellis Barker, " Germany at the Parting of the Ways," Century, L X I , 226. 233 H u g o Bottger, Die neue A era der deutschen Karl Heymans, 1907). 234 Norddeutsche

Allgcmeine

Zcitung,

sensitivi-

Kolonialpolitik

(Berlin: Nineteenth (Berlin:

N o . 32, Feb. 7, 1907.

235 Princess Radziwill gossiped cynically: " It meant nothing really, for the demonstration positively was arranged; I know certain bankers w h o were asked to organize it, and it cost them dear. . . . But then, the same bankers are now ennobled and received at c o u r t ! " (Radziwill, op. cit., II, 285). 236 Feb. 7, 1907.

THE

ELECTION

CAMPAIGN

183

237

ties." The election, he explained later, was not pressure politics but " an appeal to the patriotism and common sense of the nation. The answer that the people gave showed that they did not approve of the obstacles placed in the way of the government's national policy . . ." 238 One commentator explained, " The patriotic conscience of the German-thinking electorate was provoked." 239 The success of the election was due to the " national consciousness of the German people," wrote another.240 The Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung observed proudly, " A reliably national majority enters the new Reichstag. . . . To have created this new Reichstag is the work of the German citizenry. Nothing is more significant than . . . the national firmness and unity with which the ' burgher ' parties . . . marched to the polls." 241 For the political parties, the lesson of the election was to take care never to be found on the wrong side of any question in which patriotism was involved, " in national questions never to be found wanting." 242 That this lesson in national solidarity should remain without effect was not expected. " Economic questions," wrote a National Liberal journalist, " seem to have been . . . definitely pushed into the background for the next few years. Questions of national power and honor, of colonies, of military and naval armament . . . have come to the fore." 244 Bülow was not insensitive to the advantages a national victory at the polls might bring him in the conduct of Germany's foreign policy. During the campaign, he had called 237 Statement to the Publishers' Press Association of N e w York. Bülow says the expression was not his, but that of an underling in the press bureau of the Foreign Office who gave out the statement ( M e m o i r s , II, 3 1 0 ) . 238 T o the French journalist Huret whose article in Figaro was quoted in the German press (Germania, No. 166 ii, July 23, 1907). 239 Franz Ludwig, op. cit., II, 90. 240 Alldeutsche

Blätter,

Feb. 2, 1907.

241 No. 32, Feb. 7, 1907. 242 A. Dix, Blockpolitik. Ihre innere Logik, ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Aussichten (Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907), 33. 243 Ibid., p. 32.

184

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

attention to the hopes of the anti-German press that the government would be defeated, and he had remarked that it was " quite clear that the decision of the German voters for which the foreign press hoped . . . would be prejudicial to Germany's prestige and a threat to the peace of the German people." 244 A n d he observed later that " the solid force with which the national idea finds expression in all sections of the middle classes when the defense of the Empire is concerned must be set down as a valuable asset for the prestige of Germany abroad." 245 T h e organ of the Pan-German League spoke more bluntly: " It is . . . clear that a national majority in the Reichstag must have the inevitable effect of compelling the government toward energetic action in world politics." 2,48 244 Speech of Jan. 19, 1907 (Schulthess, o/>. cit., 1907, p. 13). 245 Imperial Germany, p. 192. 246 Alldeutsche

Blätter, Jan. 26, 1907.

CHAPTER IV THE AFTERMATH IN spite of the apparent success of the national campaign, the political alignment in the newly elected Reichstag remained a matter for conjecture. O f several numerically possible majorities upon which the government might base a legislative program, only two were probable. First, the new national bloc might cooperate in domestic as well as national questions and form a constant government support. T h e doctrinaire character of German politics, however, seemed to preclude such close cooperation between Conservatives and Radicals. T h e Conservatives were alarmed at the way the Radicals demanded liberalization of the administration. T h e Radicals were not eager to work with agrarians, and they continued to agitate for concessions. It was probably in the hope of calming them that an imperial order of January 27 promised mitigation of the rigorous trials and punishments for lèse-majesté. F o r further favors the Radicals were asked to wait. Billow preached patience, and, although one w a g remarked that this was like preaching sedition to the Gracchi, the Radicals waited only impatiently. T h e " hurrah spirit " of the campaign w a s kept alive for several months, however, and this, plus the hope of liberal reforms, kept the Radicals in line. T h e y were held in check also by the fear that Biilow and the Center might become reconciled. Should the Center become appeased, the second of the two likely majorities would take shape. This was a ConservativeCenter bloc which might exclude Radicals from their place at the government's board. F r o m the Radicals' point of view, such an occurrence would vitiate their strenuous efforts in the campaign and the concessions which they had already tacitly made. T o prevent it, the Radicals demanded the permanent exclusion 185

l86

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

of the Center as a pledge that the government was in earnest in extending the hand of fellowship to them.1 The Center might have taken advantage of this situation and, by glossing over the insults they had received, become reconciled with Bülow. Then they might have continued to exercise the paramount influence in the Reichstag. There are indications that Bülow had considered this possibility at the time of the dissolution. At the close of the year he had spoken of a national majority only " from time to time." His notorious phrase about the marriage of conservative and liberal spirits had not excluded the participation of the Catholics. And he declared later that he had not anticipated the permanent exile of the Center.2 But circumstances beyond Bülow's control had made the reconciliation, which many anticipated, impossible. The Center had been deeply injured, and its wounds refused to heal, at least without the unguent of government contrition. Spahn complained that Bülow had treated the Center " miserably badly," and he declared that the party " would not stand for it." 3 When Bülow accused the Centrists of " anti-national arrogance," their sense of injury increased, and Germania assured the Chancellor that the Center's distrust had become too great to be set aside easily.4 The Emperor's words about " riding down " all opposition did not help matters. 6 And the attacks of the anti-Center press aggravated the bitterness. It was particularly Bülow's attitude, however, which the Center resented, and which compelled the Center press to reiterate that the Chancellor could not command the confidence which the party had shown him in the past.8 The Centrists did not intend to pursue a policy of revenge, one of their number 1 Vossische

Zeitung,

2 Memoirs,

II, 310.

No. 61, Feb. 2, 1907.

3 In Bonn, Dec. 30, 1906 ( K ö l n i s c h e Volksseitung,

No. 1118, Dec. 31,1906).

4 No. 26 ii, Jan. 31, 1907. 5 Radziwill, op. cit., I l l , 284. 6 Germania,

Nos. 32 ii and 34 i, Feb. 8 and 10, 1907.

THE

AFTERMATH

187

explained, but they would necessarily remain reserved and mistrustful. 7 The Center's complaints were probably political " feelers," and may have indicated the Center's hope that Bülow would try to regain their friendship, but their sense of injury was none the less real. The Radicals demanded that Bülow close his ears to the Center sirens, and they made the exclusion of the " ultramontane " party the sine qua non of their cooperation. From Billow's own point of view, there was no assurance that the Center would not involve him in difficulties over national bills again. And the anti-Catholic sentiment at court and among the Protestant electorate, especially after the campaign, was a force to reckon with. Under these circumstances, Bülow's choice, if he had not already made it, was practically made for him. 8 He would divorce the Center permanently and cast in his lot with the national bloc—but not before he had made trial of it, and it had stood the test. An intimation of Billow's decision came early in February in a reply of his to the Central League of German Industrialists. The League had congratulated the Chancellor upon the defeat of the Social Democrats, and Bülow might have used the 7 Schaedler, as reported in the Berliner

Tageblatt,

No. 48, J a n . 27, 1907.

8 F u r t h e r than this, Bülow's reasons for r e f u s i n g to adopt a conciliatory policy toward the Center will probably always remain a m a t t e r f o r conjecture. T h e r e m a r k s of Count Lerchenfeld a r e w o r t h notice. " A t that time it was expected that the Chancellor would resume his relations w i t h the Center. But Bülow chose not to. Once when I recommended a certain course to him with the r e m a r k t h a t very often the alternate use of the whip a n d sweetmeats seemed the proper way to handle political parties, he rejected my counsel with a reference to his personal honor. T h i s could h a r d l y have been the real motive of his action, h o w e v e r ; f o r a minister fights against, or allies with, parties without his personal honor ever being called in question. I t was rumored at the time that B ü l o w hoped to strengthen his position with the Emperor, w h o w a s just then in an anti-Center mood, by baiting the Center party. But this explanation does not appear very plausible to me, and so, I have never been clear about Bülow's tactics. T h e s e remained the same d u r ing the next few years, that is, he continually returned to attack the Center without p r o v o c a t i o n . . . " [ H u g o Lerchenfeld-Koefering, Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten ( B e r l i n : Mittler, 1935), pp. 375-6].

188

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

occasion to leave the Center out of his remarks. Instead, Billow went out of his way to state categorically that the results of the campaign were as much a condemnation of the Center as a judgment against the Social Democrats." T w o days later, February 9, the Paris Temps published an interview with with " someone close to the Chancellor " who reported that Bulow was not considering any reconciliation with the Center, that he would not repulse advances, but that he would make none himself. The report added that the Emperor was even less cordial toward the Center than Bulow and that His Majesty's recent speech was directed against the Centrists as well as the Socialists. 10 The Grenzboten, which was frequently " inspired," characterized this interview as as definite a repudiation of the Center as could be expected. 11 Taken in conjunction with Biilow's reply to the Industrialists, the interview seems to indicate the Chancellor's intention to avoid a reconciliation with the Center. The first absolute proof that Bulow had cast his lot with the new bloc and had rejected the Center came with the opening of the Reichstag and the election of the Reichstag president. The speech from the throne discreetly avoided mention of the party alignment, but for more than a week Bulow and his associates had agitated for a bloc presidency. 12 The claims of the Center (as the largest party in the Reichstag) to be represented in the chair were ignored, and the inclination of the Conservatives to support an aristocratic Center candidate like Count Hertling was overcome. Bulow at first supported the candidacy of Count Hatzfeld. 1 3 The Conservatives, however, 9 Schulthess, op. cit., 1907, p. 25. 10 The Temps interview was reprinted in the Berliner Feb. io, 1907.

Tageblatt,

N o . 74,

11 Feb. 14, 1907, cited in Vogel, op. cit., p. 57. 12 Eschenburg, op. cit., pp. 63-65; Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik tag 1907 ( B e r l i n : Germania, 1907), p. 14.

itn

Reichs-

13 Hermann, Duke of Trachenberg, Prince von Hatzfeld, b. 1848, w a s elected from Breslau by the bloc parties with the aid of the Center.

THE AFTERMATH

189

were unwilling to have their candidate thrust aside, and they insisted upon Count Stolberg-Wernigerode, to whom Hatzfeld deferred. T h e Radicals were persuaded to accept Count Stolberg, probably because they were afraid that the Conservatives and Centrists might agree to split the three offices between them. An agreement between Centrists and Conservatives had not been unlikely. But many Conservatives were reluctant to deny Biilow the chance to try the new national majority, and they yielded to his importunities. Besides, the Center itself hesitated to accept responsibility for legislation when its parliamentary position was so uncertain. It preferred to await developments and be free to adopt a course of pure opposition if that appeared to be advisable. T h e Centrists seem to have refused to join the Conservatives in an effort to elect Hertling." And when the Conservatives offered Spahn the first vice-presidency, that too was refused." The Center was already following the policy of watchful waiting and semi-opposition that was to characterize it for the next two and a half years. 16 T h e bloc presidency was elected. Count Stolberg became president, the National Liberal Paasche and the Radical Kaempf first and second vice-presidents. T h e marriage of conservative and liberal spirits had met its first test, and Billow was free to break definitively with the Center. T h e rupture between Centrists and Chancellor was made complete by two speeches which Biilow made during the first week of the Reichstag session. In these addresses Biilow reviewed the election campaign, praised the national parties, and outlined vaguely the proposals upon which he hoped the bloc would unite, but his most dramatic sentences were reserved for excoriating the Center and the Social Democrats. H e revived the campaign against the Center and criticized the Catholic 14 Radziwill, Op. cit., I l l , 285. 15 Germania,

No. 45 ii, Feb. 23, 1907; K . Bachem, op. cit., V I I , 2.

16 Germania, No. 36 i, Feb. 13, 1907; Erzberger, Zentrvmspoiitik Reichstag IQ07, p. 15.

im

I90

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

party harshly. Unless this w a s the only w a y f o r B ü l o w

to

signalize his divorce f r o m the Center and win the affection of the Radicals, it was an attack of unnecessary severity. It clarified the situation, but it filled the Center with gall, the acrid taste o f which remained until B ü l o w left office. Spahn, Gröber, and Schaedler were bitter, and their replies to B ü l o w

were

unusually sharp. 17 T h e Center deputies broke off social relations with B ü l o w and did not resume them. T h e tische

Blätter

Historisch-poli-

remarked that cooperation between Center and

Bülow w a s now unthinkable, and Schacdlcr said that the only solution to the unfortunate situation w a s for B ü l o w to fall ill and be replaced by another chancellor. 1 8 In the Reichstag the Center became an opposition party, confidently a w a i t i n g the time when the conflict between Radicals and

Conservatives

should create a breach into which they might step and send B ü l o w into retirement. T h e " B ü l o w Bloc " w a s a phenomenon in G e r m a n politics. Bismarck's dissolution of the Reichstag over an a r m y bill in 1887 had led to the formation of a similar cartel of conservative and liberal groups bound together by national rather than economic interests. B u t Bismarck's cartel had not been rigid or exclusive. T h e Conservatives had deserted the National Liberals to pass the grain tariffs in conjunction with the Center. A n d the Centrists, outside the cartel, had not severed relations w i t h the Chancellor, nor had they refused to work with him. B y 1907, however, a parliamentary spirit more nearly like that in E n g l a n d or France prevailed, and the c h a n g i n g upon which Bismarck

majorities,

had relied, were no longer

possible.

Neither the Center nor the Radicals would serve B ü l o w

as

part-time employees, and whether B ü l o w willed it or not, he was now bound to a specific Reichstag m a j o r i t y so firmly that he could not legislate with any other combination. 17 Reprinted in Germania, 1907).

(Erzberger),

1 8 R . Kralik, Allgemeine Styria, 1915-18), V, 386.

Zentrum

Geschichte

und

neuester

Kurs

(Berlin:

der neuesten Zeit ( G r a z and V i e n n a :

THE

AFTERMATH

I9I

E n c o u r a g e d by the election results, the government set about the task of passing the budget and holding the bloc together. B u l o w ' s plan w a s to avoid controversial measures and to focus the bloc's energy upon a " national " program consisting of the colonial items which had been defeated in 1906. T a r i f f r e f o r m w a s out of

the question. Financial r e f o r m w a s

dangerous.

Biilow postponed even those projects upon which he hoped the bloc could u n i t e — f u r t h e r social legislation, r e f o r m of the trades union and assemblage laws, a new bourse law, and changes in the criminal code. F o r the first time in history the Emperor's address f r o m the throne dealt with colonial questions. A f t e r stating that the Reichstag's first duty w a s to pass the budget with the colonial supplements, the E m p e r o r announced that a reduction of the troops in A f r i c a was contemplated, since the crisis caused by the native revolts had passed. H e also announced that bills for an independent

Colonial

Office and

for

an

indemnity

to

the

S o u t h w e s t A f r i c a n settlers would be presented to the deputies. U p o n this much the national bloc could surely unite. T h e budget for 1907 was calculated to avoid controversies over new taxes, and it appealed to patriotic sentiments. ticipated expenses above the existing

revenues

An-

were to be

covered by a bond issue o f 265,000,000 marks, the greater part of which (179,000,000) w a s to be used f o r such national causes as defense, land forts, the railway net, and a further development of the German marine. 1 9 T h e first reading of the budget, F e b r u a r y 25 to M a r c h 3, consisted of a debate over the recent campaign. T h e Chancellor attacked the Center and the Social Democrats, and they in turn accused the government o f having used undue, even

illegal

means to influence the elections. Biilow defended his activity during the campaign as not only justifiable, but commendable. T h e Socialists presented an interpellation asking Biilow what he proposed to do about the illegal activities of the Chancelry, 19 Imperial Finance Minister Stengel to the Reichstag (Reichstag C C X X V I I , 15).

Debates,

ig2

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

the Admiralty, Colonial Department, and Post Office, and about the political activities of the " non-political" N a v y League in the campaign. 20 When the interpellation was placed on the calendar, Biilow refused to reply, apparently feeling that he had silenced all criticism by stating that not a red cent of public funds had been used f o r agitation purposes. 21 Thereupon the debate was repeated—with embellishments. Biilow and his supporters felt that the administration could not be defenseless in an election and that it should be able at any time " to correct false allegations as to its aims and measures. . . . The government should issue in abundance and under the signature of the Chancellor, official corrections, explanations and notifications as to its intentions, through posters, the use of the mails and other like means, so that they will reach all voters." 22 That is, the electorate should be enlightened. T o this the opposition made no objection. But it did complain about the phraseology of Billow's public statements, his abusive words with respect to the Center and Social Democrats, and official assistance given to the other parties. Perhaps, the abused parties admitted, there had been no more actual interferences in, or influencing o f , elections locally than heretofore. But the present complaint was of a Chancellor making public statements, insulting political parties, and conducting the agitation in such a way that, if imitated by a minor official in a specific electoral district, it would have been enough to nullify the election. 23 The only result of this debate, however, was that the opposition parties got a chance to blow off steam. The second reading of the budget took place from April 1 0 to M a y 1 0 and the entire bill was adopted with only minor changes. One of these was the rejection of the government's demand f o r a kind of high military command f o r the colonies in addition to the colonial secretary and under-secretary, which 20 Ibid., C C X X V I I , 41. 21 Ibid., C C X X V I I , 63. 22 Ibid., C C X X V I I , 594. 23 See especially Bebel (ibid., C C X X V I I , 595 ff.).

THE

AFTERMATH

193

latter the Reichstag approved. V e r y little alteration was made in the military and naval budgets. T h e third reading took place M a y 13-14. T w o supplementary budgets for 1906, introduced March 6, provided for 29,220,(XX) marks f o r military expense in Southwest A f r i c a and a further 8,900,000 f o r the extension of the Kubub-Keetmanshoop railway in the same colony. T h e latter sum was to be in the f o r m of a loan to the colony and to be paid back. These were the bills whose rejection had caused a dissolution three months before. Dernburg accompanied them with long memoranda on the military and economic value of railways in A f r i c a . Dernburg stated that the native revolt was over and that he anticipated a material reduction in the number of colonial troops during the year, to go hand in hand with the development of a local police. During the second reading, the Center's proposal to strike off 9,000,000 marks f r o m the military demands was defeated. In the third reading both bills were accepted M a y 13. A supplement to the 1907 budget, asking 7,500,000 marks to complete

the

indemnity

payments

to

Southwest

African

colonists, was passed too; but the appropriation was reduced to 5,000,000 marks because there was objection to paying large indemnities to land companies, to wealthy planters w h o were able to bear their losses, and to settlers w h o had left the colony permanently. T h e government had recognized no obligation to repay the settlers for their losses but felt that repayment was expedient f r o m the point of view of the colony's economic development, and upon grounds of patriotism and gratitude. T h e national majority agreed. T h e termination of the Southwest A f r i c a n revolt was expected to provide a saving of 31,000,000 marks. A

fourth

supplement to the 1907 budget provided f o r the reapplication of 17,000,000 marks of the amount thus saved to the permanent expenses of the colonial administration. It provided also for an indemnity of 25,000,000 marks for typhoon sufferers in the Caroline Islands.

194

T H E

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

T h i s was the " n a t i o n a l " program for 1907. One further item not originally on the agenda was a proposal—supported by E n g l a n d — t o consider disarmament at The Hague. Billow's rejection of this invitation received the hearty support of the whole Reichstag, with the exception of the Social Democrats. England's superiority in commercial, naval, and colonial power made the Germans uncomfortable, and it seemed to make them defiant of anything E n g l i s h — w e r e it the so-called policy of encirclement, or a proposal for disarmament. The Germans were certain that no one was serious about disarming, they were certain that England was dissembling, and they thought to win the world's respect by frankness. Therefore, they refused the invitation, while professing their desire for peace." T H E CENTER

N o dramatic change in the attitude of parties to national questions took place as a result of the elections. Y e t there were indications that the campaign was not without effect and that the " anti-national" parties took their defeat to heart. The Centrists had increased their numbers in the Reichstag indeed, but they returned to Berlin in a chastened mood because the losses of the Social Democrats had deprived them of their authoritative position in the house. The Centrists did not apologize for their " un-national " behavior in 1906, but they moderated their criticism and stressed their patriotism. They renewed their profession of faith in national policies, and they also renewed their allegiance to the conservative and aristocratic leaders of the party. The rising sun of the Centrist radicals, whose tactics had precipitated the crisis in colonial affairs, suffered an eclipse, and the growth of democratic sentiment within the party was checked for a decade. Roeren did not speak during the entire sitting of the Reichstag in the spring of 1907, and Erzberger, while he spoke often, confined himself to factual and often 24 See debates in the Reichstag, Apr. 30, 1907, especially Billow's speech (Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I I , 1252).

THE

AFTERMATH

195

constructive comments on details of the budget. Erzberger's energy during the campaign had done much to counteract the unfavorable impression he had made on the older leaders of the party, but he was unable to clear himself of the charge of improper action in the Poeplau affair, and his reputation suffered accordingly. 25 His leadership was discredited to the extent that, according to one Centrist, Erzberger had but to take a stand upon a controversial measure and the party would adopt the opposite course. 28 Although Erzberger and the radical Centrists retained much influence in parts of South Germany, 2 1 the party as a whole did not become the " people's party " which it threatened to become in 1906 until the difficult years of the World War. A f t e r the elections of 1907, the Center's policy was again guided by men of more conservative temperament, and their patriotic speeches in support of army, navy, and colonies presented a sharp contrast to the polemics of Roeren and Erzberger in 1906. In their efforts to restore the reputation of the party as " nationally reliable," however, the Centrists were handicapped by the fact that a sudden reversal of policy would cause them to lose face. They did not withdraw their former criticisms and demands for economy, but they seemed eager to prove that the Center would support national policies in the future. On the first day of the new Reichstag's debates, Spahn declared of his colleagues: 25 A Reichstag member made this observation in the Augsburger Post Zeitung, organ of the conservative Centrists in Bavaria, and it was reprinted in Germania, No. 57 i, Mar. 9, 1907. 26 Fehrenbach's observation ( M . Spahn, " D a s J a h r 1 9 0 6 " ) . 27 Within limited geographical areas the inclination to appeal to the economic interests of the common man continued to alarm the conservatives. The Bavarian Center bluntly reaffirmed its policy of cooperating with Socialists ; it voted confidence in the leaders who had determined that policy; and it attacked the Centrist nobles and higher clergy as traitors to the party [Report of a party meeting in Munich (Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, No. 39, Feb. 15, 1907) ; resolution of the Bavarian Center Party of March 4, 1907 (Germania, N o . 54 i, March 6, 1907)].

I96

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

W e all agree that we are obligated to maintain our army and navy at the peak of their development and at the perfection of organization which their tried reputation and capacity for work deserve. Nevertheless, we must consider whether or not economies may not be made out of regard for our financial situation . . . W e . . . are firm in the belief that the German people are destined not only to be a member of the family of civilized nations, but to march at the head of civilization. 28 S p a h n made a remarkably imperialistic speech later in the spring, d u r i n g the second reading of the budget. H e criticized the colonial administration, yet he praised colonies so highly that one could not tell just w h e r e he or his party stood. In the course of his argument, he s a i d : Whoever enlightens himself as to what real meaning lies in the rapid economic development in Germany and the increase in population connected with it, which requires the importation of goods and compels us to seek markets for our manufactures in colonies, he will say to himself: the bold expansion of Germany is, if involuntary, a historical necessity. From this I draw the conclusion that we for our part can no longer refrain from doing justice to this necessity. I was never in doubt that, once we could get organization established the way we wanted, we could no longer refuse to keep our colonies for the German Empire and to develop them so that they would constitute for us an economic value . . . France's European position was weakened by the war 1870-71; but because Jules Ferry with his great energy bent France's strength toward colonies and practiced imperialism, he raised France's position as a great power; and therefore, I think that from the point of view of our position as a great power we cannot renounce our colonies. 29 T h e elections seem to have persuaded Spahn that the Center should

add

Machtpolitik 2 8 Reichstag 2 9 Ibid.,

the

arguments

of

economic

determinism

and

to its religious and humanitarian reasons f o r the Debates,

CCXXVIII,

C C X X V I I , 17, 24. 1357-1358.

THE

support

of

imperialism.

197

AFTERMATH

Then,

commenting

u p o n the

inde-

pendent colonial office a n d the creation o f a colonial m i l i t a r y c o m m a n d , S p a h n said f u r t h e r : A f t e r this adjustment has been made, w e shall keep colonial troops in greater numbers in the colonies and thereby our colonies will attain a larger importance for our foreign policy. I consider the politics of world power as perhaps necessary. M a n k i n d streams together, and in this flow of men w e require an a r m y ; w e dare not let ourselves be carried a w a y by the stream, but must try to rule and direct the course of the stream ourselves. A n d I repeat in this connection a remark at which the late Representative Richter once took offense, but which I still think correct: of all our colonies, the one most important f o r our possession of w o r l d power is not K a m e r u n , not Togoland, and not Southwest A f r i c a , but G e r m a n East A f r i c a , because it brings us close to E n g l a n d , both on the borders and opposite to India. I do not overvalue the (economic) yield of the colonies. If we need them, if they have importance, f o r our position as a world power, then w e must keep them. In this respect they m a y yield us returns. . . . F o r us and our decisions, our colonial possessions must be considered in the light of our foreign policy.®0 T h i s w a s t o o m u c h p a t r i o t i s m f o r the g o v e r n m e n t to s t o m a c h a n d S p a h n w a s rebuked. C o l o n i e s a s p a w n s in the g a m e o f w o r l d politics ? P e r i s h the t h o u g h t ! S1 S p a h n h a d e x p r e s s e d such s e n t i m e n t s b e f o r e . B u t the significant f a c t is that it w a s he, a n d not E r z b e r g e r , w h o w a s n o w s p e a k i n g f o r the p a r t y . The

Center's

stand o n particular colonial bills

illustrates

the conflict b e t w e e n a desire to a v o i d b e i n g " anti-national " a n d the desire to escape f r o m m a k i n g a too sudden volte-face.

The

p a r t y r e j e c t e d the supplementary b u d g e t p r o v i d i n g f o r 29,000,000 m a r k s t o c o v e r the e x t r a o r d i n a r y c o s t s o f suppressing the r e v o l t in S o u t h w e s t A f r i c a a f t e r their a m e n d m e n t t o strike o f f 9,000,000 o f this a m o u n t h a d f a i l e d to pass. T h e y h a d a p p r o v e d 30 Ibid., C C X X V I I I , 1362.

31 Dernburg's reply to Spahn (ibid., p. 1378), and Betel's astonishment (ibid., p. 1367).

198

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

the Kubub-Keetmanshoop railway in December, and they did so again. T h e independent Colonial Office they had rejected before, because they thought the colonial administration should not be separated from the Foreign Office, and they did so again. It was in this connection that Spahn made the remarkable statement quoted above. But he conceded that the Colonial Office would be approved this time and that, now the colonies were established, there was less chance of conflict or tension with other nations, and that probably the Colonial Office would not be as dangerous now as it might have been. 35 T h e indemnity f o r Southwest A f r i c a n planters the party also rejected." But at the second reading of the 1907 budget f o r Southwest A f r i c a , Count Hompesch made this statement for the party: Although the government's proposal approaches the standpoint of the Center Party as of December 1 3 of the previous year, it does not guarantee any security against a continuing burden of debt, the size of which at present has no foundation in the situation in the colonies. Since a proposal for amendment would be futile, and since we on the other hand should like to avoid the misconception that we would deny to the colony the necessary protection, we shall withhold our votes . . . " This was, if not a change in principles, a fundamental change in tactics out of regard for the power of the national idea. A n d it was a bid f o r an armistice in the battle raging over the Center's patriotism. Schwartz (Lippstadt) extended the olive branch even more definitely. While he criticized some of the government policies in detail, he declared that a new era in colonial policy had now dawned, the " Dernburg era." He offered a few suggestions about building more railways and roads and closed " with the wish that the new colonial director will be able to fulfill the promises he made upon his entrance 32 Ibid., p. 1358. 33 Instead, they suggested assistance in the form of loans (ibid., p. 944). 34 Ibid., p. 1498.

THE

AFTERMATH

199

into office. Then . . . German East A f r i c a will become the pearl of all our colonies!" 35 During the summer Spahn indicated that the government might have been right after all about the requisite number of soldiers for Southwest A f r i c a . " A n d Germania, which had deplored the colonial " army " a day before Spahn spoke,37 soon afterwards found occasion to be grateful that the number of active soldiers there was as large as it actually was. 38 Clearly the Center was seeking to build up a reputation as a reliable national party, and it was evident that at the first favorable moment, the party would again support colonial measures. The opportunity for such active support came earlier than had been anticipated and in a very unexpected fashion. Dernburg, a full-fledged Colonial Secretary after May 17, made an official visit to East A f r i c a in July and August 1907, and on the basis of his investigation he presented to the Budget Committee of the Reichstag (Feb. 18, 1908) a program for colonial development and reform. Dernburg's recommendations included much that the Center had been demanding for 20 years, especially with regard to the treatment of the natives and the importance of natives in the economic development of the colonies. 38 The Center was not slow to exploit the auspicious occasion and immediately supported Dernburg against those who felt that the exercise of humanity was a sign of weakness. It was, ironically, Erzberger who proclaimed in the Reichstag the Center's support for the government's new policy. 40 The Center and the Colonial Secretary were now in agreement on several important points: there was to be system instead of dis35 Ibid., p. 1413. 36 In a speech at Rheinbach (Kölnische Voiksseitung, 1907).

N o . 693, A u g . 12,

37 N o . 182 ii, A u g . 10, 1907. 38 N o . 192 i, A u g . 22, 1907. 39 Protocol of the sitting of the Reichstag Budget Commission for Feb. 18, 1908. 40 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X X X I , 4093.

200

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

organization; the practices of the white traders were to be carefully checked; evils and abuses were to be made public and corrected rather than hidden; Christian principles of humanity, justice, and neighborliness rather than those of materialistic exploitation were to be applied; the interest of the natives was to be regarded as equal to, or paramount with, that of the white settlers; justice was to be guaranteed to the natives and forced labor eliminated; exorbitant profits of monopoly contracts were to be curtailed; colonial troops were to be reduced; and the administration of finances was to be made more efficient. 41 This program formed the basis for cooperation between Dernburg and his erstwhile political enemies for the next two years. In that interval the Center was a more reliable support for the government's reform program than the professional imperialists, and more than once the Center defended Dernburg's policies against the criticisms of Semler, Paasche, von Liebert and Arendt. 42 In the spring of 1 9 1 0 , after the Center was once again firmly in the Reichstag saddle, having practically forced the resignation of Biilow the year before by combining with the Conservatives on a finance measure, Dernburg signed a number of contracts giving more than ordinary concessions to the business group exploiting the diamond mines in Southwest Africa. The Center was free again to criticise, and did so—freely. 43 Not only did it oppose the concessions but demanded that the 41 Die Wahrheit iiber die deutschen Kolonien (Berlin: Germania, 1908), a Center pamphlet quoting extensively from the speeches of Dernburg and the Centrist deputies in the Budget Commission, Feb. 18 and 25, 1908, and in the Reichstag, Mar. 18 and 19, 1908. 42 Speeches of Schwartz and Erzberger in the Reichstag, Feb. 26 and 27, 1909 (Reichstag Debates, C C X X X V , 7180 ff., 7 2 i 9 f f . ) . Erzberger celebrated this proof of the Center's true love for the colonies in " Die Bedeutung des Zentrums fur das deutsche Reich," Zeitschrift fur Politik, II (1909), 224. 43 Erzberger's speeches in the Budget Committee, Jan. 25 and Apr. 18, 1910; Reichstag Debates, CCLXI, 2793 ff- and 2905 ff.; Pehl, op. cit., pp. 88-89. Erzberger also published a pamphlet exposing the policy of concessions [Millionengeschenk (Berlin: Germania, 1910)].

THE

AFTERMATH

20I

colonies themselves pay more of the expenses of their own administration. Dernburg resigned. But the Centrists continued to support colonial measures under his successor, von Lindequist. They continued to demand minor humanitarian reforms in the interest of the natives, but they gave constant support to colonial railway bills and to bills furthering the economic development of the colonies. In 1912 Erzberger even published a guide to prospective colonists which was factual and objective and on the whole favorable to colonial enterprise.*4 One more quotation may serve to signalize Erzberger's and the Center's fully developed conviction as to imperialism. In 1912 the one time bête noire of the colonial administration replied to a Social Democrat's unbelief as follows : My predecessor has doubted the necessity of imperialism, thus showing that he has come into the world a generation too late; for the German people is today so thoroughly convinced of the necessity of imperialism that any talking in this regard simply comes too late.45 T h e army budget of 1907 caused the Center to resume its position of the previous eight years—approval accompanied by criticism, and demands for economy. O n the opening day of the new session, Bulow inadvertently mentioned that economies in the military administration were to be anticipated. But he had done this without consulting his war minister, much to the latter's surprise and indignation. 48 W h e n questioned about Bulow's promises, von Einem informed the Budget Committee that economies were to be anticipated, but not until: 1. the land defenses had been built up; 2. the army was re-equipped with new weapons; 3. the new uniforms had all been provided. 47 But Erzberger, who reported for the commission, 44 Kolonial Bcrufe

(Berlin: Germania, 1912).

45 Rcichstag Debates, C C L X X X I V , 1325; see also Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik im Reichstag

1Ç12, p. 47.

46 Einem, op. cit., pp. 77, 109. 47 For this and the following quotation, Reichstag Debates, 1041, 1047.

CCXXVIII,

202

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

complained that these were the very items in which increases appeared in the 1907 budget. A n d with respect to the whole policy of armament, Erzberger s a i d : It is not to be denied that the German people must make great sacrifices for its army; but we must not forget that the army is not an end in itself, but a means to the end that peace be secured and that the basis for the economic and cultural development of Germany be assured. The limit to these expenditures lies in the ability of the German people to bear them. The main task of the Reichstag, in the interest of the true welfare of the Fatherland, appears to lie in finding the just mean between what is needed for the assurance of peace, and what the German people can bear. This w a s the standpoint f r o m which the party had viewed nearly all " national " expenditures f o r several years. But the difference between this and Erzberger's caustic criticisms of colonies the year before is clear. T h i s was just run-of-the-mine. Beyond it, the Center made no objection to the military budget. In subsequent years the Center continued to demand, along with higher pensions f o r veterans and the elimination of duelling, small economies and more efficiency in the financial administration of the army. But the arguments, the tone, and the point of emphasis became increasingly patriotic and national. B y 1 9 1 0 the deputy Hausler was s a y i n g : W e can not economise on equipping our army. W e dare not outfit, arm, or clothe our soldiers less well than any of our military rivals. The restless progress of technical improvements in this regard gives prospects rather for constantly increasing sacrifices. This calls for just that much more emphasis upon the elimination of all items from the budget which have nothing to do with the wartime efficiency of the army. 48 When important army increases were proposed in the Reichstag in 1 9 1 2 , the Center joined the other parties, with the ex48 Reichstag Debates, C C L I X , 8 1 2 ; Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik stag 1909-1910, p. 58.

itn Reich-

THE

AFTERMATH

203

ception of the Poles and the Social Democrats, in support of the bill. Erzberger defended the government measure enthusiastically against the accusation that such increases in Germany's army were a threat to peace. H e not only defended the bills as justifiable and the whole army program as necessary to Germany's welfare and the peace of Europe, but he made great sport of the Social Democratic demand for a militia, proving to his own satisfaction that a militia would be just as expensive as the regular army. 49 A f t e r the passage of this defense measure he wrote that the political purpose of the military increases had been realized; that it had been proved to nations abroad that the German people was by no means at the end of its resources, and that it would shirk no necessary sacrifice to maintain its position as a great world power. 60 That was true, and the " national " Center had helped to prove it. In aspects of legislation which may be called " national," the Center had made its best record before 1907 in supporting and patronizing the navy. A third important enlargement of the fleet had been approved by the Reichstag in 1906, and no great naval issue was expected until 1911 or 1912. The naval budget of 1907 was passed without remarkable debate. The widening of the Kiel canal, already made necessary by the increased displacement of German battleships approved in 1906, was adopted as a matter of course. The larger appropriations for the building of the von der Tann, heavier by nearly 4 thousand tons than the Bliicher, laid down the year before, was agreed to. A n d the Center made no protest. The increased tonnage of the British Invincible 51 and the German von der Tann appeared to make ships of the Bliicher class less desirable, and it made the older ships of lesser weight of doubtful fighting value. T h e German Admiralty considered the possibility of speeding up production in order to replace the 49 Reichstag

Debates,

CCLXXXIV,

50 Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik

1372.

im Reichstag

1912, p. 57.

51 T h e British Invincible w a s larger than the Dreadnought. what follows see Fernis, op. cit., p. 56 ff.

F o r much of

204

THE GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

old and lighter ships with more of the new and heaviest type, but this would mean a new bill long before 1 9 1 1 . Tirpitz had felt that the earliest possible moment f o r a new proposal was 1 9 0 9 - 1 9 1 0 . 5 2 But it became quite clear that the parliamentary situation in 1907-8 was extraordinarily favorable for such an enterprise. In fact, there developed almost a rivalry between Center and bloc parties to see which could be most zealous in the navy's cause. 03 The Center's zeal in the undertaking was undoubtedly due in part to a desire to steal the thunder of the Radicals and perhaps split the b l o c . " But inasmuch as there was little likelihood of this occurring over a national bill, it seems much more plausible that the Center was merely trying to give added proof of its patriotism and thus illustrate the fallacy of the election propaganda. Undoubtedly the Center deputies who spent a week at the Kiel regatta in June 1907 were made acquainted with the new problem facing the A d m i r a l t y ; and Spahn, whose home was in Kiel, picked up not only ideas, but specific information. In a speech at Rheinbach, A u g u s t 1 1 , Spahn declared that Germany could not close its eyes to the kind of ships rival states were building, and that Germany must follow the example of those states who built battleships with displacements of 2 2 , 0 0 0 - 2 3 , 0 0 0 tons, and that a proper program for Germany would be to build new ships of at least 20,000 tons and reduce the life of ships of the line f r o m 25 to 2 0 years. He pointed out that this could be accomplished inside the limits of the building program already laid down. It would speed up the construction of heavy ships, and involve an increased annual outlay of at least 40 million marks, but, Spahn concluded, the expense was a burden which the German people must b e a r . " 52Hassell, Tirpits, Sein Leben und Wirken (Stuttgart: Belser, 1920), P- i/353Tirpitz, Erinnerungen (Leipzig: Koehler, 1919), p. 175. 54 Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 104. 55 Kolnische Volkssettung, No. 693, Aug. 12, 1907.

THE

AFTERMATH

205

This zeal for a larger fleet caused a flurry of comment. Bebel remarked acidly that everything Spahn was now advocating had been the program of the Navy League for years, only Spahn and his companions once opposed it. " Now of a sudden," said Bebel, " the light has dawned on Herr Spahn, after his party has been excluded from the government circles. The party quietly pockets the insults they have received and, in the manner of certain people, prays: Lord, receive us into thy grace. We will make recompense for all our sins!" 56 The Kölnische Volkszeitung interpreted Spahn's speech as an approach to the government and a steering away from the democratic Center leadership, but the more radical Center press was embarrassed. Germania opined that Spahn had been speaking solely for himself." This was literally true; but Spahn was the party's real leader and his views carried weight. During the summer of 1907 the Admiralty was confidentially assured that the Center was rather expecting a new navy bill and would willingly support one.58 Meanwhile it became clear that the government could count upon the suppport of the nascently national Radicals, especially for a bill which did not involve the question of a long term program. Tirpitz decided to exploit this favorable situation by disregarding his modestly planned program, and by proposing the construction of four big ships per year instead of three. A bill providing for this change was made public in November. Germania was critical and questioned whether, in a field so governed by technical considerations, any regulation by legislation were advisable. 56 Protokol

Parteitages

1907, p. 319.

57 No. 188 ii, Aug. 17, 1907 (Germania the Kölnische Volksseitung).

was steadily less conservative than

58Tirpitz, Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht (Stuttgart and Berlin: Cotta, 1924), p. 46; Bachem (op. cit., V I I , 134-135) vehemently denies that Tirpitz could have received any official Center commitment. H e is probably right. But it is still quite probable that the Admiralty heard the private views of many of the Center deputies and got their personal reactions. And although Bachem completely ignores Spahn's Rheinbach speech, Tirpitz undoubtedly did not.

206

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

It was rather late for the Center to be raising such considerations. It was largely decoration, though, for Germania admitted that the Center's chief concern was for the way in which the bill was to be financed. 59 In the Reichstag, Spahn, forgetting his enthusiasm of August, recommended an especially careful examination of the financial situation and even demanded more specific information before the Center could be certain that a change in the naval bill was necessary. But in the Budget Commission, the party recognized the necessity of reducing the life of the large ships, and in the second reading approved the bill in full. T h e Center's interest lay largely in the problem of paying for the new ships, which, it constantly asserted, was the crux of the whole bill. T h i s emphasis was not only in keeping with the Center's interest in taxation and economy, but it was an excellent way to attempt division of the bloc parties; for it was evident that Conservatives and Radicals could agree only with the greatest difficulty upon how the money was to be raised. T h e bloc, however, held fast, and refused to consider the problem of taxation. A s a result, the Center could only demand that the increased costs be met as soon as possible out of the regular revenues, and when the administration reported that a tax proposal was being prepared, the Center let its nationalism win, gave up the insistence upon the financial problem, and voted blithely with the Reichstag majority for the naval increases. There was little that the Center could say about its action except that it was normal. The party had always voted for navy bills. Besides, as Erzberger pointed out, the shortening of the life of the big ships was a purely technical question and any layman could see that Germany could not afford to lag behind in the progress being made in the shipbuilding industry. In subsequent years the Center continued its support, and in the crucial years of 1911 and 1912 defended the navy as a necessity and 59 No. 268 i, Nov. 20, 1907.

THE

AFTERMATH

2QTJ

insisted that the entire navy program was wholly correct and had been well executed.40 The fact that the Center had supported the Navy Bill in 1908 was not remarkable. But the enthusiasm with which Spahn spoke, and the willingness with which the party adopted the measure and surrendered its considerations were remarkable, and these were undoubtedly important factors in the bill's having been presented at all as early as 1908. The Center had thus encouraged the passage of the most provocative of all the German pre-war navy bills. Although the Reichstag attempted to guide or restrain Germany's colonial, military, or naval policies, it could do relatively little to control the purely diplomatic aspects of these questions or to guide the administration in its conduct of foreign affairs. The Chancellor was not responsible to the Reichstag, and he was especially secretive in matters of diplomacy. The deputies had little influence here, and their debates over Morocco crises or Germany's encirclement amounted to little more than expressions of opinion. Nevertheless, as such, they were a measure of the national temper of the German people. It is curious that of all the " respectable" parties who were not definitely conservative, the Center alone took advantage of the foreign situation to support Billow's diplomacy and thus give proof of their patriotism. Even after the shabby treatment the party had received in the election campaign, the Center refused to use the debate over the Chancellor's budget to criticize Bulow's conduct of foreign affairs, as many had expected. This action was in conformity with the Center's general practice, but under circumstances which justified a deviation from tradition, it can be taken as further proof that the Center was anxious to restore its reputation as a dependable national party. " W e are . . . of the opinion that, at a discussion of foreign policy, all thought of inner dissension should be put away," said Hertling. " Therefore, I am minded to handle this thing entirely sine ira 60 E r z b e r g e r ' s discussion in Zentrumspolitik 1910-11, p. 6 6 - 7 1 ; 1912, p. 66.

im Reichstag,

1907-8, p. 101;

208

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I gOJ

—not, however, sine studio—for with you I am moved by zeal for the honor of the German name!" 81 In such a spirit Hertling supported Billow's refusal to participate in discussion of disarmament at The Hague even more firmly than speakers of other parties. It was impossible, he said, to find a " just, fair or reasonable yardstick " to measure disarmament.62 Hertling further adopted Biilow's view that the encirclement of Germany was neither real nor dangerous, and he defended the Algeciras settlement. The Center's only complaint was that the Reichstag did not have enough information to judge Germany's diplomacy. Otherwise, Centrist deputies were uncritical. The Center's purpose in thus supporting a policy, the conduct of which its voice could not influence, could only be to impress others of the party's nationalism or perhaps to lead the party back into the straight path of patriotism from which it had been lured by its own radicals.88 61 Reichstag Debates, CCXXVIII, 1234. 62" I consider the whole disarmament question to be at its best an academic discussion," Hertling said. " I believe that the cause of European peace would be well served if the question were to disappear from the order of the day for a decade We have heard that the American President Roosevelt, in his annual message of December 3, said that it would be criminal were a people not to prepare for war, and we have recently heard how the same American President, at the opening of the Jamestown Exposition, said that the best way to secure peace was to prepare for w a r . . . In two points we in this house are all agreed: we desire a calm, consistent, peaceful policy, but we want at the same time to avoid the appearance of being guided by a sense of weakness... I believe that from the German point of view it is best that we do not take part in the discussion of this question at a l l . . . Let the other nations discuss; they will soon discover that the difficulties are insurmountable, and it will be clear that, if here or there an understanding should be reached, it will only be an apparent understanding, and it will be clear that, if any agreements are made, because of their impracticability, they will remain only on paper" (Reichstag Debates, CCXXVIII, 1237-8). In 1911 Spahn admitted that this brusque refusal to discuss disarmament had been a mistake (Reichstag Debates, CCLXVI, 5974). 63 Poellnitz, Zentrum 1907), P- 31-

und Deutschtum

(Oldenburg, Leipzig: Stalling,

THE AFTERMATH

20g

A year later Hertling was more critical of Germany's newly adopted policy toward France in Morocco, but only because it was too conciliatory and not energetic enough.** Y e t another year later, Hertling and the Center approved of this more conciliatory policy toward France but criticised Biilow for the " zig-zag " course which gave the French nothing to rely upon, and then complained that the partial reconciliation with France after the Casablanca affair should have been possible four years earlier.65 The Center's approval of Biilow's conciliatory policy was in odd contrast to the arrogant nationalism of the National Liberals and many ultra-nationalistic Reichstag members for whose presence in the Reichstag, ironically enough, Biilow was himself largely responsible. In this same session of 1908-1909 the Center defended Germany's valiant support of Austria in the Bosnian affair. The patriotic proclivities of the conservative Centrists coincided with the pro-Austrian inclinations of the South German Catholics and made the Center's defense of the Austrian alliance especially vigorous. 46 When the possibility of a naval agreement with England played a big role in the Reichstag debates and in the discussions of the Budget Commission of 1908-1909, the Center accepted the government's interpretation of the abortive negotiations. The Center asserted that the aim of German ship building was not to rival England, but simply to defend its own coasts and commerce, and that a naval accord might be reached when the goal was attained, but not before. 67 A f t e r Biilow's fall, the Center, once again in the government's majority, supported the foreign policy of Bethmann64 Reichstag Debates, CCXXXI, 4215 ff. 65 Reichstag Debates, CCXXXIII, 6161 ff., and CCXXXVI, 7803«. (Erzberger, Dec. i i , 1908; Hertling, March 29, 1909). 66 Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik irn Reichstag, 1908-1909, p. 48 ff.; Reichstag Debates, CCXXXIII, 6162; CCXXXVI, 7803 ff. (Erzberger, Dec. 11, 1908; Hertling, March 29, 1909). 67 Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik im Reichstag 1908-1909, pp. 51-52; Reichstag Debates, CCXXXVI, 7806 (Hertling, March 29, 1909).

2IO

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

Hollweg even more generously than they had supported that of his predecessor, whose " z i g - z a g " course they compared unfavorably with the more restful conduct of affairs after 1909.®® This confidence in a calmer foreign policy, however, did not lead logically to any ambition for reduced army and navy budgets. On the contrary, the Center, having learned that fundamental criticism of national questions could not be undertaken with impunity, found ample reason for supporting the increased appropriations of 1 9 1 1 - 1 9 1 2 , and for evading all " national " issues in the 1 9 1 2 election campaign. Shortly after the 1907 election the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung had expressed the opinion that " the dissolution of the Reichstag will have had a satisfactory result in one respect, if the Center recognizes the lesson indirectly administered to it and the now well established fact that the German people will not be toyed with in national questions." 89 From this point of view, the election had certainly been a success. For, in the years immediately following the elections of 1907, it was quite clear that the Centrist members of the Reichstag were determined to rectify the harm done to the party's reputation by the demagogic activities of the party's radicals in 1905-1906, and were determined not to be found wanting again in any national question. The Catholic press was full of expressions of patriotism. The annual Catholic assembly in 1907 discreetly avoided all political discussion. Only a few Centrists were as outspoken in their devotion to the " national " cause as Hertling and Spahn, and the Center press certainly did not equal them in professions of patriotic faith. Certain Centrists may even have moved uneasily in their patriotic role, but for a decade after the elections of 1907 the party sang its part in the patriotic chorus. 68 Erzberger, Zentrumspolitik im Reichstag, igog-ig 10, pp. 40-41; Reichstag Debates, C C L X V I , 5972 (Spahn, March 30, 1911). 69 No. 41, Feb. 17, 1907.

THE

AFTERMATH

211

T H E SOCIAL DEMOCRATS

The lessons of the 1907 election were not overlooked by the Social Democrats either. They mulled over their losses for several months, and, while they agreed upon the external causes of their defeat, they differed as to the factors within the party which might have been responsible. The Revisionists, who had suffered especially heavy casualties, blamed their misfortunes upon the party's inflexible opposition to imperialism and Revisionism, which, they said, had frightened many likely socialist voters into the ranks of other parties. The defeat of the Social Democrats, the Revisionists claimed, was due to the party's disregard for its non-socialist sympathizers, to its dogmatic orthodoxy, its suppression of free discussion, its refusal to adapt tactics to realities, and its needless exaggeration of the evils of capitalism. 70 Socialist success in future elections, they predicted, would depend upon a revision of radical dogmas, less emphasis upon extreme theories, more upon practical reforms, and a direct appeal to the non-socialist, but sympathetic voters. 71 A t least, some of them contended, these voters ought not to be antagonized by unnecessarily provocative statements.72 The orthodox Social Democrats, however, refused to bow to defeat by changing either their principles or their tactics. They were determined only to improve and expand their techniques 7 0 R . Calwer, " D e r 25 Januar," Sozialistische Monatshefte, X I ( 1 9 0 7 ) , 1 0 1 - 1 0 7 ; O. H u e , " Z u m Sozialdemokratische Parteitag in Essen," ibid., P- 695. 71 E. Bernstein, " D e r Wahlkampf und das Mandat," ibid., p. 183. S o m e political observers believed with the Revisionists that the elections had proved that the " future state " was farther off than ever, and that the class revolution was not inevitable. T h e y believed that the Social Democrats would, or should, develop into an ordinary parliamentary party [ H . Delbrück, " Politische Korrespondenz," Preussische Jahrbücher, C X X V I I ( 1 9 0 7 ) , p. 382-383]. 72 One delegate at the Social Democratic Congress in 1907 made a plea for more temperate language, and cautioned the party leaders specifically against using "expressions which can be held against us in later election c a m p a i g n s . . . " (Protokol Parteitages 1907, p. 3 2 6 ) .

212

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

igOJ

in agitation and propaganda." They did not admit that condemning Revisionism was a mistake. They scoffed at the prediction that the party would become less dogmatic. They believed rather that misfortune would weed out the unorthodox, the timid, and the conciliatory, and that the fiery furnace of defeat would improve the temper of those remaining in the party, thus making it more compact, more proletarian and revolutionary than it had been before." But the party did not become more revolutionary. Instead, the movement toward moderation and conciliation gained momentum, and German Socialism gravitated slowly to the right." The elections of 1907 stimulated this development. The Social Democrats broke with orthodox tradition before the election campaign was over when they cooperated with the Center, a " burgher " party whose political tenets were alien to their own. The Social Democratic Congress at Hanover in 1899 had agreed that collaboration with " burgher " parties was permissible in certain instances, but slight use had been made of this concession before 1907. Socialists had made local agreements with National Liberals and Radicals,™ but the fact that these parties were more nearly related to the Socialists mitigated the offense connected with such a deviation from orthodox custom. Collaboration with the Centrists, however, was another matter. It involved ignoring principles completely 73 Articles by Kautsky, Mehring, Hoffman, Wurm, Bloch, Braun, Linde, Büsold, Schultz and Rühle in Die Neue Zeit during February and March 1907 recommended more and better leaflets, more newspapers for country districts, mouth to mouth agitation, better party libraries, educational campaigns with more speakers and more local work, conferences of party secretaries and newspaper editors, et cetera. 7 4 K . Kautsky, " D e r 25 Januar," Die Neue Zeit, X X V i (1907), 588596; F. Mehring, " Nach den Wahlen," Die Neue Zeit, X X V i (1907), 649652. Both Orthodox and Revisionist points of view are discussed in W. E. Biermann, " Die neuere Entwicklung des Sozialismus," Zeitschrift für Politik, I (1908), 488-513. 75 C. J. H. Hayes. " German Socialism Reconsidered," American torical Review, X X I I I (1917), 92-93. 76 E. g., in Baden.

His-

THE AFTERMATH

213

for the dubious advantage of a few more seats in the Reichstag. This was attaching more importance to parliamentary representation than might be expected from a frankly revolutionary party. However, since German Social Democrats had always valued Reichstag representation highly, their action in 1907 was not especially significant. Y e t it revealed a growing readiness to play ordinary politics, and it violated tradition enough to facilitate further cooperation with other political parties in the future, especially the extensive collaboration with the Radicals in 1912. Another result of the elections of 1907 was to encourage the Socialists to emphasize the practical results of their parliamentary labors more than heretofore. They had been so chastised with imputations of " non-cooperation," " perpetual denial," and " party of negation " that they set about demonstrating the injustice of these accusations. While they clung to the label " revolutionary," they demanded recognition of their " positive " parliamentary labors on behalf of reform and thus appeared to be resolving into a party of reform rather than of revolution. A further consequence of the events of 1906-1907 was a prompt moderation in the tone of Social Democratic speakers, especially in the Reichstag. This may have been due to the chastening effects of the electoral defeat itself or more specifically to the realization that extreme statements antagonized valuable friends. The party radicals noticed it and complained that the elections had apparently had an enervating effect upon the Reichstag deputies who, they said, did not exhibit their customary " aggressive spirit of sharp and stinging criticism," and did not represent the interests of the worker as forcibly as heretofore. 77 Others had noticed the change too and remarked that the Socialists seemed to have taken account of the currents prevailing within the new Reichstag. 78 77 Protokol Partcitages 1907, p. 249. 78 ATationallibcrale Blatter, No. 11, June 1, 1907.

214

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

The proceedings of two Socialist congresses which met in Germany in 1907 provide further evidence of a disposition among German Social Democrats toward moderation. A t the International Socialist Congress at Stuttgart the German delegation was dominated by conservative trades union representatives and stood well to the right in international Socialism. German Social Democrats were always less uncompromising than their Marxist comrades in most other countries, 78 but in 1907 they were especially conciliatory. They repudiated Herve's Anarcho-socialism and joined the Revisionists of other countries in a vain effort to moderate the customary resolutions on imperialism and militarism. Only the presence of orthodox Socialists in large numbers from the small countries of Eastern Europe prevented the congress from adopting Revisionist resolutions which the majority of the German delegation helped to frame. A t the German Social Democratic Congress which met three weeks later at Essen, the party radicals were incensed by the moderation of the Reichstag deputies and the delegates at Stuttgart. Resolutions of censure were introduced by the Orthodox but the majority of the party did not respond, and temperate counsel prevailed. The Revisionists profited by the drift away from extremism and they increased their numbers. A t the Social Democratic Party Congress in 1908 they mustered 1 1 9 votes to 258 on a resolution condemning them. When it is observed that 60 of the 258 delegates in the majority qualified their vote of censure by stating that, in their opinion, local committees might well be left to themselves, it is clear that the Revisionists had won many friends since the day in 1903 at Dresden when they were overwhelmed by a vote of 288 to 1 1 . There is no way to measure the influence of the 1907 elections upon this growth of Revisionism, but it must have been substantial. 79 Hayes, op. cit.; R. Michels, " Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie," fur Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, X X V (1907), p. 148.

Archiv

THE

AFTERMATH

215

A l t h o u g h the German Social Democrats remained an opposition party until the W o r l d W a r , between 1907 and 19x4 they became less truculent and their opposition, especially in national questions, became less confident. T h e growth of patriotic sentiment and the decline of hostility to army, navy, and colonial measures among Social Democrats after 1907 can be traced in the press and especially in the reaction of party leaders to national bills in the Reichstag. In the debates over colonial budgets in the 1907 spring session of the Reichstag, Bebel and Lebedour continued their criticism of the previous year and revived scandals and charges of mal-administration. T h e y disapproved of the budget f o r Southwest A f r i c a , which provided for a reduction of the troops in the colony to 4,000, because even these troops, they said, appeared to be the nucleus of a colonial army to be kept there as a threat to England's hold on the Cape! T h e y opposed the independent secretariat and the creation of a colonial military command, and they delivered polemics upon the cruelty, futility, and unreasonableness of imperialism. Singer and Lebedour even accused Dernburg of willfully misrepresenting the value of the colonies. A t the second reading of the budget for Southwest A f r i c a , Lebedour was the only deputy who spoke. H e criticised Dernburg's " N e w E r a " because it was frankly capitalistic and would, in his opinion, be no better than a bureaucratic era. 80 But in all this there was little reminder of the vigor of former Social Democratic attacks upon colonies, and the Socialists were praised for their reticence, which was attributed to their realization that the colonial issue had defeated them. 81 T h e orthodox Social Democrats were displeased, and imperialism became a subject of special controversy within the party. The German delegates at the Stuttgart Congress SO Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I , 157, 284-292, 400-406; C C X X V I I I , 949951, 1366-1372, 1418-1426, 1499-1500, 1502. 81 Die Kolonialpolitik seit der Reichstagsaufldsung von 1907 Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1909), pp. 24-25.

(Berlin:

216

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

provoked an argument by fostering, in the committee on imperialism, a resolution which avoided an irrevocable condemnation of colonial enterprise. The committee's report proposed that: " The congress declares that the need or the necessity of colonies in general, and especially for the working classes, has been greatly exaggerated. It does not, however, disavow on principle and for all time, that kind of imperialism which, under a socialist regime, might become a civilizing medium." 82 David and Bernstein were willing to go beyond the committee's report. Bernstein frankly used the argument of the " white man's burden " and declared that socialists could not want the African natives returned to barbarism but that this would follow if the colonies were given up as the party radicals suggested. " The colonies are there," he said. " We must reckon with the fact." 88 The Orthodox, however, objected to such reasoning, and they had their way, although the majority of the German delegation supported the committee's report. W u r m explained for the Orthodox, " W e dare not pursue any opportunistic policy in order eventually to gain the good grace of the ruling classes. . . . W e can pursue only a policy of principles and must therefore reject every kind of imperialism." 84 Kautsky and Lebedour admitted that socialists should try to prevent the ruling class from exploiting the natives and to see that imperialism be as benevolent as possible, but they insisted that a truly benevolent policy would not be imperialism. This resolved the debate into a dispute over words and the congress ultimately replaced the disputed sentences with a more orthodox paragraph. Nevertheless, the orthodox German Socialists were agitated by the " weakness " of the majority of the German delegation at Stuttgart, and it was all Bebel and Singer could do at the 82Internationaler Sozialisten Kongress zu Stuttgart 1907), P- 24. For the final resolution see pp. 39-40. 83 Ibid., p. 28. SAIbid.,

p. 112.

(Berlin: Vorwaerts,

THE

AFTERMATH

217

Essen party congress to persuade the delegates that the whole argument was " a squabble over the Emperor's beard," since the Socialists would not get into power for a long time. Meanwhile, Bebel argued, all were agreed that the rights of the natives should be protected and exploitation condemned. The congress was pacified, but the debate between Revisionists and Orthodox continued in the Socialist press. Kautsky, who had qualified his opposition to imperialism during the electoral campaign by admitting the value of colonies where actual settlement took place, published his thesis in brochure form. 8 8 Actual settlers, he said, replaced the backward economy of the aborigines with advanced methods of production from their own higher civilization, and they often surpassed the motherland in their capacity for production and benefited humanity by increasing the general productive power of mankind. N o socialist, Kautsky concluded, could oppose that kind of imperialism. He admitted that such settler's colonies had always resulted in the suppression of the natives, but he insisted that this was not an inevitable result. Kautsky's surprising concession astonished the Revisionists, but because he went no further, they found much fault with his thesis. 89 Other orthodox Socialists condemned all imperialism without reservation. They damned " capitalistic imperialism " and they would not consider a " socialistic imperialism." The electoral defeat did not shake their convictions or change their arguments. Imperialism, they said, enabled capitalism to expand and prolong its life, thus delaying the final emancipation of labor. It was not, they declared, so much a search for markets and raw materials as a desperate effort to keep capitalism alive by expanding it into areas where the fantastic profits necessary to the " system " were still possible.87 85Sosialismus und Kolonialpolitik

(Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907).

86 M. Schippel, "Kolonialpolitik," Sosialistische Mcnatshcfte, X I I (1908), 3-10; L. Quesnel, " D e r Wert unserer Kolonien," ibid., X V I (1912), 1124-1131. 87 K. Emil, " Der deutsche Imperialismus und die innere Politik," Neue Zeit, X X V I ( N o v . 2, 1907), 154 ff.

Die

218

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

Parvus, an ultra-orthodox Socialist, had other reasons for protesting against colonies. He argued that imperialism was just a weapon, like tariffs, which capitalists used to defend themselves against destruction by rival capitalists. If the Socialists could abolish imperialism and tariffs, Parvus intimated, capitalism would destroy itself. 88 These were theoretical objections to imperialism to which the orthodox Socialists added many practical and humanitarian arguments. Imperialism was objectionable, they said, because it was supported by the abuse of political power to guarantee profits and cheap labor to a few colonial investors; it caused international rivalries which bred hatreds and led to wars; and it involved the ruthless exploitation of natural resources and the extirpation of the natives. The orthodox Socialists would try to ameliorate the lot of the natives, but they would have nothing else to do with imperialism—until they had won political power at home.88 The Revisionists answered these arguments in the Sozialistische Monatshefte. Their contentions, based on Bernstein's Voraussetzungen der Sozialdemokratie, were briefly as follows: The idea that colonies prevented the victory of socialism was based on the untenable assumption that the coming of socialism depended upon the consolidation of wealth in the hands of a decreasing number of capitalists and upon the inevitable misery of an increasing body of the proletariat; Marx had opposed colonies which enabled workers to escape from the yoke of capitalism and thus relieve the pressure which would make society ultimately explode; but society was not going to 88 Parvus knew that Socialists would not soon have the political power to do this, but he prophesied optimistically that modern capitalism, based as it was upon tariffs and colonial empires dividing the world into separate economic units, would fall anyway because economic forces were inexorably creating a world-wide economy which would inevitably dissolve lesser economic units and capitalism with them [Die Kolonialpolitik und der Zusatnmenbruch (Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei, 1907), 97 ff.]. 89 Parvus, op. cit., passim; K. Emil, " Der Internationale Kongress in Stuttgart," Die Neue Zeit, X X V ii ( 1 9 0 7 ) , p. 667.

THE

AFTERMATH

2ig

explode, and Germany's tropical colonies were unsuited to settlement that would relieve the misery of the masses at home; therefore, there was no reason left for opposition. The Revisionists declared that socialists should not be concerned with acquisition of colonies per se, but with the manner of acquisition and administration. They did not think that valuable colonies, where administration was efficient and the treatment of the natives was humane, could be condemned. They would not arbitrarily denounce all use of force because, they said, a higher civilization had a right to impose its benefits upon the natives in the name of civilization; nor would they condemn the expropriation of the natives in the name of humanity, because, they said, it was an unavoidable step in the civilizing process.80 In addition to declaring that the expansion of civilization justified imperialism, the Revisionists asserted that colonies brought certain benefits to the mother country. The immediate welfare of German labor, they pointed out, depended upon the prosperity of German capitalists, and the latter, therefore, should not be prevented from competing with capitalists of other countries for imperialistic benefits and spheres of influence, lest the German laborer suffer. Colonial markets, they declared, would bring employment, and cheap raw materials from the colonies would bring higher wages. Besides, they observed, Europe's advanced economy required the products of the tropics, and the colonies themselves often contributed singularly to the world's economic development.81 Finally, Revisionists argued that capitalism must first run its course completely, developing into a world-wide economy, before it could give place to socialism, and that national colonial expan90 M. Schippel, " Marxismus und Koloniale Eingeborenenfrage," istische Monatshefte, X I I (1908), 278-280.

Sozial-

91M. Schippel, " Tropenerschliessung und Europäischer Wirtschaftsentwicklung," Sozialistische Monatshefte, X I I (1908), 82 ff.; G. Hildebrand, "Vorfragen der Kolonisation," Sozialistische Monatshefte, X I I I (1909), 352-356.

220

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

sion was just one of the necessary steps in society's evolution from national state to world power, to world economy, and from thence to socialism. The conclusion which the Revisionists drew, as stated emphatically by Calwer, was that, inasmuch as colonies raised the domestic wage standard, inasmuch as other nations were capitalistic and colonized, and inasmuch as capitalism must first run its course, then German Socialists ought even to encourage imperialistic expansion—even in undesirable forms—since it was a step in the direction of Socialism. 92 The Revisionists—even Calwer—did not recommend supporting the German colonial system as it was : they simply asked German Socialists not to condemn all colonial expansion so arbitrarily. The Socialist defeat in the 1907 elections gave them a strong argument for the adoption of their ideas. 88 But the party maintained its traditional opposition to colonies on principle and in 1 9 1 2 published a pamphlet in which all the orthodox arguments were repeated. M Nevertheless, the Revisionists had some success since the Social Democrats in practice gradually adopted a more friendly attitude toward imperialism. They approved colonial bills which essentially benefited the natives, such as measures against slavery, sale of intoxicating liquors, and whipping, and bills which provided for improved sanitation and education. They voted credits for the improvement of an East A f r i c a n railway, for a fisheries project in Southwest A f r i c a , and for research in the oil lands of New Guinea. In 1 9 1 4 the Socialists apparently would have supported a comprehensive railway construction program in East A f r i c a , but the government would not accept their demands for the protection of the natives. The 92 Calwer, " Der 25 Januar," and " Kolonialpolitik und Sozialdemokratie," Sosialistische Monatshefte, X I (1907), 101-107, 192-200. 93 Bernstein wrote bluntly that the defeat was the natural result of the warped treatment that the colonial question had received at the hands of the Socialists [" W a s folgt aus dem Ergebnis der Reichstagswahlen," Sosialistische Monatshefte, XI, i (1907), h i ] . 94 Imperialismus odcr Sozialismus (" Sozialdemokratische Flugschriften," X I I ; Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1912).

THE

AFTERMATH

221

Socialists had proposed these because they did not want to be in a position where, as a consequence of their approval of the railways, they might be obliged to vote credits for any revolt that might occur.*' In 1 9 1 4 Gustav Noske, the Socialist expert in colonial affairs, published a history of the Social Democratic approach to imperialism in which the demands of the Socialists for humane administration were painted in the best light and the outrages of capitalistic imperialism in the worst. 9 6 T h e first two thirds of the book described German colonial policy with a vindictiveness that would stamp him as one of the most irreconcilable of the Orthodox. Y e t in dealing with the years after 1907, Noske emphasized the occasions when the Social Democrats in the Reichstag were ready to support this or that colonial appropriation, sometimes beyond the requirements of welfare or humanity, and he analyzed the value of colonies in a favorable light. Noske was not a Revisionist, and undoubtedly he published with the permission of the party leaders, so his book may indicate that within a f e w normal years the Social Democrats might have arrived in their historical development at the point where the Radicals were before 1907 when they did not oppose colonies on principle but opposed only " the system." 87 T h e German Social Democrats had always qualified their criticism of militarism and army and navy bills with the assurance that they had no intention of leaving the Fatherland defenseless. In the spring of 1907 Noske and Bebel stated this qualification of their anti-militarism with special emphasis. During the second reading of the army budget, Bebel criticised the military administration, the severity of army training, and the maltreatment of soldiers, and he demanded higher pay for 95 Spellmeyer, op. cit., pp. 134-136. 96Kolonialpolitik und Sosialdemokratie

(Stuttgart: Dietz, 1914).

97 Spellmeyer {op. cit., pp. 124-140) discusses the development of a more favorable attitude toward imperialism on the part of the Social Democrats after 1907.

222

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

a r m y privates. But he stressed the willingness of all Socialists to have an army if it were democratic. 9 8 T h e government and the Conservatives did not take Bebel's statement at its face value, and Noske was authorized by the party caucus to state the Socialist position more frankly. Noske created a sensation when he said: Gentlemen, Herr von Oldenburg and the Prussian War Minister acted yesterday as though we Social Democrats wanted to have no soldiers whatever. No Social Democrat has ever demanded that. . . . I cannot believe that there is a single man sitting in this house who does not long for the time, along with us Social Democrats, when armaments will be set aside and war will no longer be waged. W e know, however, that that is demanding or wishing for an air-castle, and we reckon quite definitely with the present and the present-day state. And for the present-day state we have demanded a people capable of defense. . . . From anyone who wants to cast aspersions at Social Democracy as acidly as the W a r Minister did yesterday, we Social Democrats can require that he take a look at our program and enlighten himself as to what our endeavors really are. In the Social Democratic program there stands as our military plank, " Education of the people for the ability of all in defense." . . . Our stand on militarism is conditioned by our conception of the principle of nationality. W e demand the independence of every nation. And that means that we also realize fully that the independence of the German people is to be defended. W e are of the opinion that it is our eternal duty and obligation to see to it that the German people is not pressed against the wall by any other people. . . . If such an attempt were to be made, we would, as a matter of course, defend ourselves with more determination than any of the gentlemen on the right side of the house, who act as if they had a copyhold on patriotism. Gentlemen, we Social Democrats have heretofore insisted only that we were enemies of a war of conquest. . . . W e Social Democrats demand, as we have always demanded, the education of youth for purposes of defense. That is the opposite of what people have so often said falsely and slanderously about us—that we Social 98 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X X V I I I , 1058-1068.

THE

AFTERMATH

223

Democrats conspired to bring about the defenselessness of Germany. . . . We will exert ourselves to drive back aggression with greater determination than any member of the bourgeois parties would or could muster.9® That this statement was considered heresy in some Social Democratic circles is not surprising. When the W a r Minister and the " burgher " party leaders commended it, it became more than heresy, it became treason. The Socialist press began a heated debate over militarism. The Orthodox were indignant that the Reichstag deputies had authorized such a conciliatory statement, and they considered it a desertion of Liebknecht the younger, who had just been arraigned for treasonable writing. Liebknecht had recommended that the army be discredited among the young men about to serve and among the parents of those already serving. 100 This would have involved the kind of direct action which German Social Democrats always feared to adopt. The Social Democrats commended Liebknecht for his bold stand, but they themselves chose not to draw Liebknecht's radical conclusions. Actually they were embarrassed by two conflicting purposes: as representatives of the common man, they wanted better conditions in the army, and as socialists they wished to create dissatisfaction with the army. Confronted with this dilemma, they were content to demand reduction in the size of the army, the abolition of " militarism," and the "gradual transformation of the standing army into a citizen's army on a democratic basis, founded on the military training of the entire male youth." 101 The orthodox Social Democrats were dissatisfied with the Reichstag faction's moderation. But they themselves were not 99 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X X V I I I , 1098 ff.

100Karl Liebknecht, Militarismus und Antimilitarismus (Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei, 1907). Liebknecht was later sentenced to a short prison term, and his brochure was banned [Der Hochverratsprocess gegen Liebknecht vor dem Reichsgericht (Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907)]. 101 Concise program published in May 1907 [Die Wahl-Lügen bürgerlichen Parteien (Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907), p. 54],

der

224

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

prepared to accept any program as radical as the Frenchman Herve's plan for a general strike upon the outbreak of a war because it involved obligations which they could not promise to fulfill. 102 Apparently then, they expected to fight in the army of the dreaded ruling classes, yet they resented efforts to court the favor of these classes as Noske had done. A t the 1907 party congress the orthodox Socialists intended to rebuke Noske with a resolution that " only such party speakers should speak during the reading of military budgets who offer a full guarantee that they will take a decided stand against militarism in the spirit of the International Congress at Stuttgart." 1 0 8 The Stuttgart Congress had condemned militarism bluntly. The resolution it had adopted obligated Socialists to oppose armaments and to reject appropriations for armies and navies; it obligated them, in case of war, to try to bring the fighting to an early close, and to use the war-time crisis to arouse the people and accelerate the end of capitalistic rule; but it also contained this clause: " The congress sees in the democratic organization of armies as expressed in the so-called ' citizen armies' in place of standing armies, a good guarantee against war-like attacks upon one nation by another, and against the existence of national differences." 1 0 4 Noske had said nothing that could not be reconciled with the Stuttgart resolution. But it was not so much what Noske said to which the Orthodox took exception, but the conditions under which he said it and the " soldiers' league tone " that he used. Lebedour expostulated: " I have the impression that Noske, at the time of his speech, and similarly in a lesser respect Bebel too, stood beneath the depressing influence of the election 102 Karl Emil, " Anti-Militarismus," Die Neue Zeit, X X V ii (1907), 241-245; " D e r Internationale Kongress in Stuttgart," Die Neue Zeit, X X V ii (1907), pp. 665-666. 103 Protokol Parteitages 1907, Resolution 96. 104 Translation from Win. E. Walling, The Socialism of Today Y o r k : Holt, 1916), pp. 613-614.

(New

THE

AFTERMATH

225

results." 105 Noske would not retract, Bebel and David defended him, and the congress at Essen rejected the condemnatory resolution. The vociferous applause, with which the doctrinaire speeches of the orthodox Socialists were received at Essen, indicated that the party radicals were noisy. But they were still a minority. The party as a whole did not renounce the radical anti-militarist stand taken previously, but it appeared willing to tolerate efforts such as Noske's to minimize its anti-militarism for the benefit of voters outside the party. Perhaps the party, too, stood beneath the depressing influence of the election results. In this situation the Revisionists preached their brand of anti-militarism more fervently than ever. They admitted the evils of militarism and the desirability of abolishing them. But they did not see in the German army, based as it was upon universal military obligation, an instrument to keep the laboring classes in subjection, and they did not feel that a people's militia was the proper weapon for defense in a world where Germany faced so many other standing armies. They accepted the ideal of a citizens' army, but they regarded the existing German system as a good basis for such an ideal, and they felt that, with the evils of the system eliminated, the German army would approximate the Social Democratic requirements. They insisted that if war should come, the Socialists themselves would be obliged to fight, not to protect the ruling classes, but to defend their own dearest possessions, their borders, property, security, and freedom. 104 The agitation of the Revisionists and the inclination among other Social Democrats toward moderation, however, had no immediate effect upon the party's declared policy. The Revis105 Protokol

Parteitages

1907, p. 246.

106 Karl Leuthner, " Sozialdemokratischer Antimilitarismus," Sozialistische Monatshefte, X I (1907), 624-631; M a x Schippel, " Nationalitäts und sonstiger Revisionismus," ibid., 712-719; Wolfgang Heine, " W i e bekämpfen wir den Militarismus," ibid., 911-918.

226

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

ionists admitted that there were many reasons for continuing to reject army and navy bills. Besides, the Socialists had a tradition to uphold. Therefore the party continued to reject military budgets and to denounce " militarism " with orthodox fervor. 1 0 7 This was especially true of the press, which was consistently more radical than the deputies in the Reichstag. Nevertheless, the Socialists in the Reichstag did grow less antagonistic toward military measures and ultimately reached the point of active cooperation. In connection with an army Quinquennat in 1911, the mildness of Socialist criticism occasioned comment. Noske repeated his assertions of 1907, this time without causing a sensation, but he also reaffirmed his party's conviction that armaments were an obstacle to human progress and refused to vote a penny for a government which " treated the masses of the people as enemies." 108 One year later Haase reaffirmed the Socialists' contention that " they would protect and defend their land and their civilization against robbery and aggression as a matter of course." 1 0 9 One more year and the Social Democrats voted credits for an army bill, although they voted against the bill itself. Their action was due to the government's having met a traditional Socialist demand that the defense program be financed by those who wanted it or who made profits out of it, that is, by progressive, direct taxation of the rich. Y e t one year more, and the Socialists voted war credits. It may be doubted whether the party could have done this in 1906, and it may be assumed that the elections of 1907 provided an impetus to the trend which made it possible in 1914. A s early as 1908 the Socialists were preparing themselves for this step when they laid special emphasis upon the way in which the N a v y Bill of that year was to be financed. Socialist press and Reichstag deputies condemned that bill because of its 107 See Die Sozialdemokratie utid das Heer (" Sozialdemokratische Flugschriften," V ; Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1910). 108 Reichstag Debates, CCLXIV, 4879-4885. 109 Ibid., C C L X X X I V . 1311.

THE

AFTERMATH

227

provocative nature, its needlessness and its cost, and Bebel seems to have been one of the few men in Germany who fully understood the international implications of the measure. 110 Y e t even Bebel admitted that if Germany were to have ships, they ought to be the best. 111 More significant than this admission, however, was the importance which the Social Democrats attached to the problem of financing the naval increases. Bebel demanded direct taxation of the rich, and David implied that the Socialists might even have supported the bill if direct taxation had been introduced. Socialists would oppose the bill " on principle," he s a i d — " unless new sources of revenue be found." 112 A g a i n in 1912 the question of taxation seems to have been the main obstacle to a Socialist vote in favor of a navy bill. T h e Social Democrats rejected the measure, partly because there w a s no provision for direct taxation, but their moderate attitude was dramatized when Noske visited the fleet and inspected the new submarines. Obviously the Socialists' opinion of the navy had changed since 1906. T h e attitude of the German Social Democrats toward defense bills depended in part upon their conception of socialism as a national or an international movement. Actually they were more nationally than internationally minded, and their declarations of patriotism became almost commonplace after 1907. O f course, they explained, their concept of the Fatherland differed from that of the ruling classes, 113 but the results were much the same. llOFernis, op. cit., p. 86. 111 Reichstag 112 Ibid.,

Debates,

C C X X X , 2726.

C C X X I X , 19-3.

113 D a v i d said in the R e i c h s t a g s h o r t l y a f t e r the e l e c t i o n , " T h e

nation

i s v e r y i m p o r t a n t t o us, but t h e r e is s o m e t h i n g m o r e i m p o r t a n t a n d

that

is m a n k i n d . . . . W e

our

people..."

too . . . love

( R e i c h s t a g Debates,

our

Fatherland.... Our

Fatherland

C C X X V I I , 232). M e h r i n g w r o t e ,

is

"Since

t h e g r e a t m a j o r i t y of e v e r y c i v i l i z e d n a t i o n is c o m p o s e d of the proletariat, t h e r e f o r e t h e i n t e r e s t s of the proletariat a r e t h e national i n t e r e s t s " [ " E i n e S c h r a u b e o h n e E n d e , " Die Neue

Zeit,

X X V I i (1908), p. 460].

228

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

A t Stuttgart the German delegates embarrassed the International Socialist Congress by refusing to accept the implications of socialism as an international movement. 1 " Bebel would not assume that there was no difference between nations, or that it mattered little if Germany belonged to France or France to Germany. Civilization and culture, he said, could develop only on the basis of independence with the aid of a mother tongue. 116 Vollmar declared upon the same occasion that, " It is not true that international is the same as antinational. It is not true that we have no Fatherland. I know that, and why, socialism must be international. But love of mankind cannot hinder me for a moment from being a good German . . ." W e do not want to enable anyone, he continued, " to reproach us with a caricature of internationalism and so give the ruling classes the opportunity to hide their egotism in the cloak of nationalism and arouse the sentiments of the nation against us." 1 1 9 Such sentiments as these, combined with the nature of Social Democratic opposition to national bills in the Reichstag after 1907, indicate how very moderate the German Social Democrats had become. T h e German Socialists, it has been observed, were never extremely radical. F r o m the inception of their party, they had been moderate, and they became more so with the years. There are several apparent reasons for this. In the first place, German Socialists placed more reliance upon parliamentary obstructionism than upon direct action, and as the party's strength in the Reichstag increased, the requirements of parliamentary politics exercised a restraining influence. Furthermore, the desire to attract the maximum 1X4"The International Congress was not shattered, but left hanging on the snag of nationalism" ( P a u l Feucht, " Der Internationale SozialistenKongress in Stuttgart," Preussische Jahrbiicher, C X X X , 102). 115 Internationaler Sozialisten-Kongress zu Stuttgart, p. 82. See also quotations and comment in Arthur Dix, Sozialdemokratie, Militarismus, und KoloniolpoKtik auf den Soztalisten Kongressen 1907 ( B e r l i n : Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907), p. 8 ff. 116 Internationaler

Sosialisten-Kongress

zu Stuttgart,

p. 92.

THE

AFTERMATH

229

number of followers resulted in an attenuation of radical d o g m a s . 1 " Then the g r o w i n g influence of the trades unions within the party after the party congress at Mannheim in 1906 put emphasis more than ever upon reform rather than revolution. Preference f o r reform rather than revolution came also from the many laborers who tried (and in prosperous pre-war Germany often successfully) to become members of the " burgher " class. Not least among the factors contributing to the growth of moderation in German Social Democratic circles were the elections of 1907 and the defeat of the Socialists. T h e Socialists learned by experience the power of the patriotic appeal even among the masses, and they learned the dangers of alienating their less radical supporters. The movement toward moderation existed before 1907, but the events of that year definitely accelerated it—especially in matters colonial, military, and national. T H E RADICALS

It has been seen that the Radicals discovered the importance of strong national policies sometime before the elections of 1907 took place. T h e main evidence of this change however, had been a slightly friendly attitude toward the N a v y Bill of 1906, a readiness to create an independent colonial office, and approval of the Southwest A f r i c a n budget in December 1906. During the election, the Radicals became allied with parties who supported all national bills, and it was obvious that, in succeeding months, the Radicals would be expected to do likewise. Their membership in Billow's bloc depended upon their doing so, but it remained to be seen how enthusiastically they would do so. Another question was how they would adjust 1 1 7 R . Blank, " D i e soziale Zusammensetzung der Sozialdemokratischen Wählerschaft Deutschlands," Archiv für Sozialwissenshaft und Sozialpolitik, X X , 507 ff.; Mandelbaum, op. cit., pp. 7-9. Mandelbaum concludes that socialism became more and more an idea that lived in the heads of the party leaders, but that for every-day tactical decisions w a s irrelevant. S e e also Hayes, " German Socialism Reconsidered."

230

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

themselves to being a part of the government's majority, and how much they would profit by their new position. Once Billow had made the choice between the Radicals and the Center in February 1907, he faced the necessity of courting the good will of the intractable People's Parties. T h e Radicals themselves were intoxicated with the government's favor and with the prospect of playing a positive role once more. W i t h naive arrogance they demanded a permanent break with the Center and tangible evidence of a more liberal governmental policy. B u t their bark was bigger than their bite. In general, they were satisfied with words, and they meekly supported the government's proposals. A t first they were skeptical about the bloc. It put them in strange company, and there was much speculation as to how long this " mating " of conservative and radical spirits would last. T h e circumstances of the betrothal did not warrant e x pectations of a long period of connubial bliss, for, as the Radical von P a y e r remarked, this marriage had the remarkable distinction of having been concluded without the active participation of either party. 1 1 8 N o r did von P a y e r regard the prospect of an early divorce as a special misfortune. The

Radicals

continued

their agitation

for a " steering

toward the l e f t , " but they really expected little reform in economic matters. T h e y began to talk of realizable demands, such as a conciliatory policy at T h e H a g u e (disarmament was not originally

on the agenda),

Prussian

suffrage

shorter military service, school reform, reform of

reform, assembly

and association laws, reform of the bourse, and further social legislation. 119

Even

this program

would

have

strained

the

structure of the bloc, and it was postponed by common consent until such time as the foundations were more secure.

The

Radicals apparently accepted the promise of a mitigated law 118 Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I , 115. 119 Berliner Tageblatt, N o . 90, Feb. 19, 1907; Vossische Zeitung, N o . 91,

Feb. 23, 1907; and von Payer in the Reichstag

CCXXVII, 112-115).

(Reichstag

Debates,

THE AFTERMATH

23I

against lèse-majesté, plus the satisfaction of being represented in the Reichstag presidency, and the definite break between government and Center as sufficient guarantees against the future. T h e road to the left was eschewed for the nonce, and traffic took the highway traveled by the " hurrah " majority of the Reichstag. T h e liberal reforms ultimately achieved during the two years of the bloc's existence were tangible, but not dramatic. Friedrich Naumann almost split the bloc wide open in the summer of 1907 by demanding Prussian suffrage reform as the price of further Radical cooperation. His colleagues were willing to support him only in the press, however, and, knowing the demand to be unattainable, they let it drop for the sake of unity within the bloc. 120 Various proposals for electoral reform were debated in the Prussian House of Representatives in 1908, but agreement was impossible. The long promised electoral reform in Saxony, which became a reality in 1907, was neither liberal enough nor far-reaching enough to give Radicals in the rest of Germany much satisfaction. Not much more successful were the efforts of the Radicals toward liberalising the Prussian school system. The Minister for Education, von Studt, was personally opposed to any change, and a reform bill proposed by the National Liberals was defeated in March 1907. The Radicals became more insistent than ever that von Studt be dismissed. Biilow deferred to them, and von Studt, who was persona grata to the Center and the Conservatives, was suddenly released in June. His place was taken by a relatively unknown bureaucrat from the Ministry of Public Works, L u d w i g Holle. The new appointee filled his post innocuously enough. H e became ill shortly and died in 1909 before any reforms were put through. Simultaneously with von Studt's release, that of Count Posadowsky, Imperial Minister for the Interior, was made public. Posadowsky had won the ill will of Biilow by his 120 Eschenburg, op. cit., p. 77 ff. and 108 ff.

232

T H E GERMAN

E L E C T I O N S OF

I907

opposition to the dissolution and his luke-warm support of the bloc policy. He was also disliked by the Radicals because of his close association with the Center, upon which he had relied for support in his program of social legislation. Posadowsky regretted Dernburg's alienation of the Center. " There goes that young man," he said (Dernburg was 4 1 ) , "storming about like the elephant in the china shop, shattering all my best pieces into fragments." 1 2 1 The new Imperial Secretary was the future Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, whose appointment could hardly have been regarded as a step in the direction of liberalism. In two other respects the hopes of the Radicals were more nearly met. A new exchange law was adopted in May 1908 which abolished the stock exchange register and removed the prohibition against dealing in grain futures—both of which restrictions had been desired by the Conservatives who now deferred to the Radicals. One month earlier, a new imperial associations law had been accepted which was a significant advance in many ways, but it contained two clauses which were hard for the Radicals to allow. The law excluded youths under 1 8 from political leagues or rallies, and a notorious " paragraph seven " forbade the use of any other language but German at assemblies in districts with more than 6 0 % German-speaking inhabitants. In other districts, the permission to use a foreign language was granted for only twenty years. Because the Radicals accepted this paragraph as a necessary evil, Barth resigned from the Radical Alliance in disgust. 122 One indirect result of the election was the impetus given to the movement for union of the three Radical parties. During 1905-6 serious preparatory work had been undertaken, but this had progressed no further than an endorsement of the idea of union and of a common program that might be used. B y 1907, the new attitude of the Radical People's Party toward national 121 Wermuth, op. cit., p. 257. 122Theodor Barth, Der Freisinn im Block (Berlin: Concordia, 1908).

THE

AFTERMATH

233

matters eliminated one of the chief sources of friction between it and the Radical Alliance, and the experiences of the campaign had uncovered a larger willingness to ignore specific differences and to work together. So, immediately after the elections, new and stronger recommendations f o r common action were made, 128 and when the Reichstag session opened, negotiations led to the establishment of a common organization for the three Radical parties in the Reichstag. T h i s included a common chairman, common speakers, and common representation on committees. 15,4 T h e parties themselves, however, retained their separate entities for three years before merging into a single party. In national questions the Radicals justified the faith that Bulow had placed in them when he dissolved the Reichstag. A f t e r the elections of 1907 they never again vetoed a bill that might have been called " national," and they approved not only colonial bills, but army Quinquennat and naval expansion. Their volte face embarrassed them, and they tried hard to j u s t i f y it. They swore that their principles remained constant and that they were as true to these principles as Penelope to Ulysses. Only whereas they had opposed navy and colonial bills formerly, they now supported them. Their simple explanation was that they had always demanded reasonable policies, and policies had become reasonable. Just w h y the Kubub-Keetmanshoop railway, or the indemnity to A f r i c a n settlers was reasonable in 1907 and unreasonable in 1906 was a fine point, and the Radicals had a difficult time indeed trying to convince the party's critics that it was so. Their most cogent argument was that they had cause to believe that colonies would be administered from a more business-like and economic point of view than had been the case heretofore. They still deplored the disparity between costs and benefits received, but they were hopeful that the new 123 Naumann's article in the Berliner Tageblatt, N o . 86, Feb. 16, 1907; excerpts from other articles in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, N o s . 38 and 39, Feb. 14 and 15, 1907. 124 Norddeutsche

Allgemeine

Zeitung,

N o . 46, Feb. 23, 1907.

234

T H E GERMAN ELECTIONS OF

IÇOJ

( D e r a b u r g ) administration would succeed in making colonial enterprises profitable. 1 2 5 O n e has the feeling that Biilow w a s prescient when he appointed D e r n b u r g to the Colonial

De-

partment ! T h e Radicals had to face the ridicule of critics w h o confronted them with their past " national " sins and accused them o f deserting their f o r m e r cause. T h e Radicals now voted f o r colonial troops, the Socialists observed, f o r a Colonial Office, and f o r parts of the military budget which they

formerly

opposed, and they did not even mention their demand

for

démocratisation of the officers' corps—perhaps out of regard f o r their new colleagues? Bebel jeered, " Y o u have said ' A ' now and y o u will have to say ' B

. . . N e x t year y o u will have

a delightful task to perform. . . . I f y o u want this kind of imperialism, then y o u will have to provide the means." the Radicals did not

128

But

flinch.127

A spark of their f o r m e r critical attitude in colonial affairs appeared when the Radicals insisted that the appropriation f o r indemnifying the A f r i c a n settlers be reduced f r o m 7,500,000 to 5,000,000 marks. T h e y also complained of

mistreatment

of the natives, and they introduced a resolution asking the government to gather information w i t h a view to c o d i f y i n g the native law. B u t such action w a s merely criticism of the colonial administration, not opposition to it or to the colonies. T h e r e was no opposition to imperialism f r o m any of the " burgher " parties f r o m 1907 on, and the existence of Germany's colonial empire w a s no longer to be shaken. E v e n in 1909, when the friendly relations between the Radicals and the government were ended, the People's Parties continued to support colonial policies. B y this time D e r n b u r g had r e f o r m e d 125 Wiemer to the Reichstag (Reichstag Debates, CCXXVIII, 1363-4). 126 Reichstag Debates, C C X X V I I I , 1369.

127 Speeches of Muller-Meiningen, Haussmann, Wiemer, Kopsch, and Schrader (Reichstag Debates, CCXXVII, 281-4, 292-3, 410; CCXXVIII,

1379-1382, 1615-1616).

THE AFTERMATH

235

the administration and accelerated the economic development of the colonies, and the Radicals were satisfied. Toward measures of national defense the Radicals adopted a sympathetic attitude also, surrendering traditional arguments in behalf of the national cause. In 1907 they endorsed the military budget. T o taunts that they had deserted their previous position, Miiller-Meiningen replied that they " would have the same attitude to this question as previously. Our principle," he said, " was always to place the interests of the nation above those of the party. . . . W e are completely in accord with the W a r Minister that only the best material . . . is good enough for the German soldier." 128 He even discounted any promises as to economy, and he declared that, if economies were in order, they should be made elsewhere. Mùller-Sagan had made a speech a few days before this in which he declared that his party was ready, if need be, to increase the military budget. And the Breslauer Xeitung declared that this statement represented the views of the whole party. 1 " A f t e r such declarations, the government could take with fairly good grace the Radicals' criticisms of mistreatment of soldiers and their demand for reform of the military penal law. The Conservatives even regarded these criticisms as an indication that the Radicals were showing a more friendly interest in the army. 130 This was apparently correct. When the next army Quinquennat was proposed in 1911-1912, the Radicals (now united into the Progressive People's Party) allowed themselves to be persuaded by the military experts that military expansion was necessary. The old spirit of independent criticism was gone, and Wiemer, who spoke for the party in the Reichstag, almost pathetically passed over the traditional considerations of his 128 Reichstag Debates, CCXVIII, 1071. 129 Statement of Bebel in the Reichstag (Reichstag Debates, CCXXVIII, 1058).

130 Liebermann von Sonnenburg to the Reichstag (Reichstag Debates, CCXXVIII, 1077).

236

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O7

colleagues. T h e Radicals recognized the demands of improved technique and had always believed, Wiemer asserted, that the army ought to be kept at the peak of technical efficiency. 181 W h a t doubts they had as to the need for certain increases were resolved in commission, where the Radicals were convinced that the government's demands were justifiable. T h e traditional Radical objection to binding the Reichstag for five years in advance was ignored. 182 T h e Radicals supported both the army increases and the five-year program for the first time in their history when the bill came to a vote. Only the Social Democrats, the Poles, and the Alsatians were left in opposition. 188 A s to disarmament, the party stood staunchly behind Bulow. Wiemer declared that Germany could not give any international conference the right to limit Germany's preparedness and that Germany should decide herself what armament corresponded with her needs. 184 Haussmann personally did not think that Billow's policy would be taken well abroad and that it was really a policy of self-isolation, but he was disavowed immediately by Muller-Meiningen in the name of the party. T h e swing of the Radicals into the national camp was further illustrated by their stand upon naval expansion which again became a topic for public discussion in the fall of 1907. T h e elections had returned a strong national majority to the Reichstag with real enthusiasm for imperialism and defense measures. T h e National Liberals were fervent expansionists, and the Radicals seemed eager to give proof of their recent conversion to the national cause. T h e Admiralty probably learned that Radical sentiment would not be opposed to a new naval law, 185 131 Reichstag

Debates,

C C L X I I , 3567-9.

132 W i e m e r merely commented in an aside that such a practice seemed undesirable both f r o m a parliamentary and a technical point of v i e w (Reichstag Debates, C C L X I V , 4 8 6 5 ) . 133 V o t e recorded in Reichstag 134 Reichstag

Debates,

Debates,

C C L X I V , 4926-4928.

C C X X V I I I , 1251.

135 Dr. M u l l e r - M e i n i n g e n informed m e that the A d m i r a l t y was taining close contacts with several of the Radical leaders.

main-

THE

AFTERMATH

237

and Tirpitz apparently decided that the time was ripe for a fourth m a j o r bill to strengthen the fleet.1'8 H e had a proposal made to order f o r the Radicals—simply to shorten the life of capital ships. Such a plan would make possible a more rapid construction of modern battleships and increase the navy's fighting power tremendously without involving the traditional objections of the People's Party to navy bills, inasmuch as the fleet was not to be increased in numbers and the question of binding the Reichstag f o r the future was not affected. Apparently certain Radicals knew of the Admiralty's proposals before they were made public, for the editor of Fortschritt was able to corroborate the statement of naval needs made by Spahn at Rheinbach, and the Berlin correspondent of the Frankfurter Zeitung prophesied the nature of the new navy bill nearly as soon as Spahn. 137 W h e n the government's proposal was made public, Radical press comment was not unfavorable, and in November 1907 Wiemer and Eickhoff announced their readiness to support the measure. T h e press and the Radical deputies in the Reichstag pointedly observed that the question of binding future sessions to a long-term plan did not arise, and they seemed concerned only about the necessity of the proposal and the manner of raising the revenue to cover the costs. 118 These were not questions of principle, so the forecast was for a favorable Radical vote. In the committee hearings, the Radicals satisfied themselves as to the need f o r reducing the life of battleships, 149 so that the only remaining consideration was the expense. Fortunately, the cost was to be relatively slight for the first year, and, while the Radicals and the Center both regretted this, the matter of 136 T i r p i t z , Erinnerungen,

p. 175; Aufbau

der deutschen

Weltmacht,

p. 46;

Fernis, op. cit., p. 57. 137 Review article in the Kölnische

Volkszeitung,

N o . 763, Sept. 4, 1907.

138 Fernis, op. cit., pp. 65-73139 Norddeutsche

Allgemeine

Nos. 8-9, Jan. 10-11, 1908.

Zeitung,

N o s . 289-293, D e c .

10-13, 1907;

238

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

financing the reform was postponed when the government promised to present a satisfactory tax proposal in the near future. On the condition, which could have been little more than a formal one, that the requisite revenues be provided in due time, and that they correspond to the ability of the taxpayer to pay, the Radicals voted for the bill. 140 In 1908 the Radicals not only voted for an increase in the strength of the German navy which was to have far-reaching international repercussions, but they announced, obiter dictu, that issues involving the army and navy were, in their opinion, no longer political questions. They concluded, therefore, that the judgment of the military and naval experts ought to be binding, and that the Reichstag's duty was simply to bring the speed of building into harmony with the financial capacities of the Empire." 1 W i t h Germany increasing in prosperity, Admiral Tirpitz could write his own ticket. Nevertheless, some of the Radicals questioned the Admiralty's judgment, and, when the violent repercussions of the 1908 bill became evident abroad, they developed an interest in naval limitation and in Admiral Galster's project for a " little naval w a r . " 142 T h i s hesitancy did not last long, however, and three years later the Radicals supported another navy bill. B y this time they no longer regarded the unconstitutionality of laying down a long-term program by law as a determining factor. T h e y received the new navy bill favorably even though it provided for three new ships of the line, the first of which was not to be laid down until 1919. They criticized the growing influence of von Tirpitz and the Admiralty, the huge expenditures, and the method by which the money was to be raised, but their eventual approval was fairly certain from the first.143 140 Reichstag

Debates,

C C X X X , 2720-2721.

141 Reichstag Debates, C C X X X , 2734-5; Frankfurter Jan. 30, 1908; Fernis, op. cit., pp. 87-88.

Zeitung,

N o . 30,

142 Galster's plan involved the defense of Germany's coasts alone and w o u l d have obviated the need for many large battleships w h o s e virtue lay largely in attacking power. 143 Fernis, op. cit., pp. 114-137.

THE AFTERMATH

239

T h u s the Radicals had become a fully accredited national party, hardly to be distinguished from National Liberals or Conservatives when national bills were concerned. It was a long road from Eugen Richter to Muller-Meiningen, but the Radicals had travelled the length of it in half a dozen years. CONCLUSION

T h e national Reichstag elected in 1907 gave way in 1912 to a new body chosen after a campaign in which " patriotism " and " national honor " played no part. The Social Democrats became the largest party in the legislature, yet there was no diminution in the resolution with which the great majority of the deputies supported national policies. The conviction that the Fatherland's interests would be served best by the pursuit of strong military, naval, and foreign policies had been firmly established. A n d Germany approached the crucial years of the W o r l d W a r united by the persuasion that a big battle fleet, a large and powerful army, far-flung imperial interests, and an aggressive foreign policy were the surest guarantee of prestige and security. T h e importance of the 1907 elections rests in their share in the development of this national sentiment. They were not so much a direct cause of any particular chauvinistic policy, but they were an event which at once signalized the growing pervasiveness of the " national idea " and also contributed to its growth. Patriotism, which had once meant love of Fatherland, and had come to include love of army and navy as well, was now, largely because of the events of 1906-1907, identified also with imperialism and IVeltpolitik. The success which accompanied the agitation for these policies made them and patriotism nearly synonymous in the public mind. Furthermore, the fate of the political parties which criticized imperialism and IVeltpolitik while clinging to the reputation of being patriotic, made it clear that imperialism and patriotism could not be separated in the future.

240

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

T h e elections also showed what a subtle and powerful factor the label " patriotism " was in politics. Being a concept with a high emotional content and without precise meaning, it was readily exploited. A n d its persuasive force is indicated by the fact that Billow could win an election largely because he made his action appear " patriotic " and that of his opponents " unpatriotic." His appeal to national honor, regardless of its relevancy to the issues involved, contained more magnetism than any issues the opposition could discover. It persuaded parties with diverse political aims to work together, and it defeated the Social Democrats who were notoriously uninterested in it. These facts seem to j u s t i f y paraphrasing as follows Dr. Johnson's remark about patriotism being the last refuge of a scoundrel: Patriotism is the safest refuge of a politician. A n d one might add a corollary: A politician labeled " unpatriotic " is undone. T o have made this clear to Germany's political leaders was one contribution of the 1907 elections to Germany's national development. A s a result of the national elections, then, the following situation existed in Germany: There was a Reichstag ready to support aggressive military, naval, colonial, or foreign policies. Imperialism and Weltpolitik had been added to the concepts represented by the term " patriotism." A n d the campaign agitation had aroused a good deal of patriotic enthusiasm which the political parties reflected in the respect they showed f o r national bills in the Reichstag and f o r the patriotic label. T h e existence of this situation did not lead to the immediate adoption of a more aggressive Weltpolitik as many had anticipated. There appear to be t w o reasons why it did not. In the first place, the German government had no responsibility toward the electorate and it was not very responsive to public opinion. F o r years Prince Biilow had followed policies which were as aggressive as Germany's position in Europe warranted, and, in so doing, he had acted in advance of public opinion. T h e 1907 elections marked the moment when the German

THE

AFTERMATH

24I

people caught up with the spirit of Billow's policy. They gave him a mandate to continue, but did not compel him to do so. In the second place, Germany's pursuance of Weltpolitik depended more upon the general European situation than upon any mandate from the German people. And Germany's position in Europe had changed for the worse since 1904. The AngloFrench Entente and the Algeciras Conference left many in Germany uneasy, and there were many who hoped, the Emperor among them, that the outcome of the elections would strengthen Germany's position by proving to the world the solidarity of German national sentiment. But such was not the case. A s Professor Carroll remarks, " The day had long since passed when a German election could change the diplomatic situation." 144 National Reichstag or not, Germany still had to face the hostility of France and England in Morocco, the jealousy of Russia, France, and England in Turkey, and the displeasure of England over Germany's growing fleet. A patriotic Reichstag was of little value in meeting these situations, and, in spite of the national victory, the German government appeared to have no desire for any more international crises. Furthermore, since the Emperor had never favored antagonizing France in Morocco because it diverted German energies from Turkey, it came about that Germany adopted a conciliatory tone toward France. The Casablanca incidents in 1907 and 1908 were settled amicably and were followed by the Franco-German agreement over Morocco in 1909. It is true that Germany reverted momentarily to Weltpolitik in 1911, but this could hardly be attributed to the existence of a nationalistic Reichstag. Actually, the Reichstag was much displeased with the outcome of the Agadir crisis and criticized the administration for not acting forcefully enough. Apparently the German people were, by this time, more chauvinistic than their government! 144E. M. Carroll, Germany and the Great Powers 1866-1914 ( N e w Y o r k : Prentice Hall, 1938), p. 558.

242

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I9O"J

Germany's defense of Austria's refusal to submit the Bosnian annexation to a European conference in 1908 was also the result of the European situation. A f t e r the Reval meeting between the English K i n g and the Russian Tsar in 1907, fear of encirclement increased in Germany, and the conviction grew that the Austrian alliance was Germany's best guarantee of security. T h e choice before Biilow in 1908 was not one between a more or a less aggressive foreign policy, but between two policies both of which were bold and provocative in themselves. Biilow might restrain Austria and further German Weltpolitik in Turkey, or he might defend Austria and risk alienating Turkey. T h e pursuit of either policy would ultimately antagonize the Entente powers. German chauvinism was strong enough to support either policy, but the German patriots themselves were divided upon the issues. Ultra-imperialists felt that a defense of Austria, no matter how valiant, was the wrong king of power politics because it would sacrifice prestige and interests in Turkey which they considered vital. Biilow, however, was persuaded that Germany's prestige would be served best by a defense of the Hapsburg ally, and on this occasion he ignored imperialistic ambitions in Turkey to choose what seemed to him the greater security of a strong " middleEuropean " alliance. Although this action provoked much unfavorable comment in Germany, it was not condemned as pusillanimous or unpatriotic. Ironically enough, the ultranationalistic groups in the Reichstag, who had been strengthened by the recent elections, criticized Billow's policy most, while the Centrists defended him. Although the German government did not take advantage of its mandate to adopt a more aggressive imperialism, it did reform the colonial administration and shift the emphasis in colonial affairs f r o m Weltpolitik to internal improvements. Public interest aroused during the controversy over colonies demanded this, so the elections of 1907 may be said to have inaugurated a new era in German policy within the colonies." 8 145 Townsend, op. cit., p. 246.

THE

AFTERMATH

243

T h e administration was reformed and, thanks to the Reichstag's support, Dernburg and his successors were able to increase the productivity of the colonies remarkably. Railway mileage in the colonies increased f r o m 471 k m in 1904 to 3,867 km in 1912. T h e capital of business companies increased during the same period from 185 million marks to 505 million marks. Total colonial trade grew from 71 million marks to 263 million marks a year. T h e value of annual production in the colonies increased from 8.3 million marks in 1906 to 31 million in 1912. Exports of cotton, rubber, hides, cocoa, vegetable fats and oils also increased, and, although Germany's trade with her colonies was only one half of one per cent of her total foreign trade, the future promised substantial benefits. 149 In the meantime, the Reichstag and the administration developed a more adequate sense of justice toward the aborigines. A land policy favoring native ownership and production was introduced. Slavery was gradually eliminated, and compulsory labor was confined to public works and was paid. Codes regulating punishments and the use of the lash were revised. Schools were increased and both medical and scientific research was encouraged. B y 1914 the German people were proud of their colonies, and even the Socialists were developing a sympathetic interest. T h e prospects of early aggressive action after 1907 which the election results had encouraged were more nearly realized in the realm of naval expansion where Tirpitz took advantage of the favorable situation in the Reichstag created by the elections to speed up the naval building program. A navy bill like that of 1908 was probably inevitable, but the elections of 1907 made it possible in 1908 rather than in 1910 or 1911. In addition, the patriotic agitation during the campaign contributed to the chauvinistic spirit among the people upon which Tirpitz could rely in refusing to consider naval limitation or compromise with England. 146 Ibid., chs. i x and x.

244

T H E

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

I907

The elections of 1907 thus seem not to have fostered a more aggressive foreign policy or a more ambitious Weltpolitik as many had predicted, but they did mark the beginning of improvement in German colonial administration, and they contributed substantially to Germany's naval expansion. It must not be assumed, of course, that the political developments in 1906-1907 caused the ambitious programs of Dernburg and Tirpitz, or the German public's endorsement of colonies and Weltpolitik. T h e agitation for national honor in 1907 engendered much new patriotic sentiment, but pressure bringing about new attitudes toward these national issues came also from fundamental social, economic, and world political conditions. The rapid industrialization of Germany, combined with the astonishing growth in the population, created a situation which more and more Germans chose to meet by the acquisition of new markets, colonies, a protected foreign trade, and Weltpolitik. T h e preaching of the Emperor, Prince Biilow, Tirpitz, and the patriotic societies w a s beginning to affect the public, and the German people discarded as invalid or impracticable the several alternative solutions to Germany's new problems. Free trade, emigration, internationalism, or pacificism found fewer and fewer advocates, and the programs of the chauvinists and national economists were gradually accepted. T h e part which the 1907 elections played in this development consisted in spreading nationalist doctrines by agitation and convincing political leaders that patriotism and national honor were concepts which they must not question or disparage. A t the beginning of this book it was observed that, as late as 1906, the German government was still handicapped in its pursuit of " national " policies and that one factor which made the government's tasks difficult was the lack of public interest in colonies. T h i s obstacle disappeared after 1907. A m o n g other factors which were regarded at that time as obstacles to a national program were the size and " national unreliability " of the Roman Catholic Center Party, the reluctance of the

THE

AFTERMATH

245

Radicals to support ambitious " national enterprises," and the strength of the " anti-national" Social Democrats. These too disappeared after the power of the national appeal was demonstrated. Those who deplored the size of the Center were disappointed in the outcome of the elections. But the Center, although larger, w a s less of a hindrance to " national policies " after 1907 than before. The reasons for this were that Centrists no longer exercised a balance of power when the Reichstag acted on " n a t i o n a l " bills; secondly, the Center radicals had been discredited and leadership had reverted to nationally minded men like Spahn and Hertling; and finally, the election had given the party such a lesson in the importance of patriotism in politics that it was never " found wanting " again. T h e reluctance of the Radicals to support national measures before 1906 had been considered a third hindrance to the government's action, but the Radicals began to approve of " n a t i o n a l " bills and were welcomed as allies by the government. Their new attitude became permanent and, although they lost the government's favor after 1909, they had, by that time, become irrevocably " national." Finally, the Socialists were not a serious obstacle to Germany's pursuit of national policies after 1907. F o r five years they were weakly represented in the Reichstag. Their " antinational " agitation grew more temperate, and Revisionist influence within the party increased. E v e n when the Socialists became the largest single group within the Reichstag in 1912, they did not revert to more dogmatic and inveterate opposition but grew increasingly sympathetic toward Germany's national legislation. In one other respect, which this study has largely ignored, the elections of 1907 had a noteworthy result—in the development of the constitutional relations between the Chancellor and the Reichstag. In his memoirs, Bulow referred euphemistically to his bloc as a " prudent and progressive transition to a more liberal internal administration, with the more frequent

246

THE

GERMAN

ELECTIONS

OF

1907

and fuller collaboration of parliamentary leaders in the government." 1 4 1 It is hard to see upon what grounds Biilow based this judgment for, as we have discovered, few reforms in internal administration followed the election, and the collaboration of parliamentary leaders with the government seems to have been no greater than before—unless one considers the brief attachment of the Radical parties to the government's majority as increased parliamentary collaboration. The election and the bloc, however, did signalize a change that was gradually taking place. After the election, Biilow as Chancellor was bound to a specific Reichstag majority and dependent upon the support of certain parties only. He could never work with the Center again, and he had to rely upon the conservative parties, the National Liberals, and the Radical groups. When these parties failed to agree, his position became well nigh impossible. Annually recurring deficits had made tax reform imperative by 1909. The changes adopted in 1906 had not met requirements, and the expanded colonial and naval budgets had aggravated the situation. But Billow's bloc could not agree upon reform. The Conservatives would not consent to direct, progressive taxation, and they refused to vote with the Radicals and the National Liberals for the government's finance bill in 1909. Instead, they joined the Centrists in a " blue-black bloc " and passed a bill of their own choosing. This broke up the national bloc and Biilow had no reliable majority left, inasmuch as the Centrists would not work with him amicably. After the finance bill had passed in its amended form, Biilow resigned. There were probably other reasons for the Chancellor's resignation. Biilow did not have the complete confidence of the Emperor after the Daily Telegraph affair, and he was probably irritated by his inability to effect a reconciliation with England because of Tirpitz's refusal to moderate his provocative naval plans. The determining factor, however, was probably the weakness of his parliamentary position. He resigned when his 147 Memoirs, II, 332.

THE

AFTERMATH

247

majority failed, thus involving the chancellorship in a kind of responsibility to the Reichstag which the constitution had not intended. It is true that, when his successor faced a somewhat similar situation in 1912, he did not resign, but remained to work with an altered party alignment. Nevertheless, Billow's bloc has been regarded as one of the preliminary steps toward ministerial responsibility. Without underestimating the significance of this political aspect of the 1907 elections, it would seem that a fair evaluation of their importance would stress their contribution to German patriotic tradition and the national Zeitgeist. T o have intensified national sentiment and to have made explicit the " national-mindedness " of the German people by proving their susceptibility to the patriotic appeal was a noteworthy contribution to the era. The events of 1906-1907 at once represented, and also added to, strong forces at work among the people, forces activating that sense of national solidarity and pride which found yet more complete expression in the future.

APPENDIX THE Imperial Chancellor sent the following letter concerning the election campaign to the chairman of the Imperial Union against Social Democracy, General von Liebert: BERLIN, SYLVESTER'S EVE,

1906.

In the communication of the Imperial Union for Combating Social Democracy of the 18th of December of this year, I was urged to issue a clarifying statement before the Reichstag elections take place. I am happy to comply with this suggestion and request the publication of this answer. The parliamentary situation which I met upon my entrance into office was not essentially different from that in the late Reichstag; the " burgher " L e f t , split into three or four groups; the Right, more united indeed, but just as weak in numbers as all the Liberals put together; in the middle the strongest party, the Center, even at that time practically able to create a majority with Poles, Guelphs, etc., and Social Democrats on the one hand, or with Conservatives and the right wing of the Liberals on the other. It was impossible, especially after the elections of 1903, to conduct business without the help of the Center. T h e Imperial Chancellor was completely dependent upon the cooperation of this party; he was compelled to seek its approval for the economic and national legislation necessary f o r the best interests of the land. I deny that he ever surrendered sovereign rights or showed any weakness in religious or cultural questions out of deference to the Center. A t any rate it must not be forgotten that the most important tasks, the strenghtening of the naval defenses, the commercial treaties, and the reform of the finances could only be performed, and were performed, with the help of the Center. I have always felt that the dependence of parliamentary events upon the good will of one party, amid the multiform German party machinery, was unfortunate. I had no reason to change it so long as the Center was willing to work constructively with the Federated 249

2$0

APPENDIX

Governments and did not surrender to the temptation to misuse its parliamentary strength. But in the spring of this past year three pressing demands, the Keetmanshoop railway, the indemnity f o r settlers, and the establishment of a Colonial Secretariat, were rejected by an opposition majority led by the Center and the Social Democrats. A t that time I was not recovered f r o m my severe illness and could do nothing. But the determination grew within me to oppose with all my strength further efforts to make a trial of strength out of serious and important imperial affairs. In connection with the need to protect the government's authority and its position above the parties, it appeared to me that a certain shift in the doctrinaire outlook of the representatives of liberalism and a g r o w i n g opposition to the Social Democratic movement justified the hope that the German people themselves might make possible a change in the parliamentary situation. In Germany there is no united liberal party possessed of the clear purpose and the ability required to play a constructive role in politics (positive Politik zu machen). This is not the time to check over the mistakes that were made and the opportunities that were lost. But, discord within, negative doctrinairism, overemphasis upon principles, and undervaluation of what was practically possible, all prevented the attainment of that influence upon governmental affairs for which liberalism has striven. Only in the last decade has much of this been changed. I am thinking of Eugen Richter's fight against Social Democracy, of the gradual victory over the Manchester doctrine, and especially of the g r o w i n g understanding for great national questions. Much is yet to be learned: moderation, perspective, and the ability to see things close at hand, a sense of historical continuity and practical needs. I have no faith that the elections will produce a large, united, liberal party to take something like the place of the Center. But the parties of the right, the National Liberal Party, and the Radical groups farther to the left, with methodical action in the election campaign, could win enough ground so as to build

APPENDIX

251

a majority from time to time. I do not believe that the sharp differences which have hitherto existed in economic questions between the parties of the right and those of the respectable left are any insurmountable obstacle. The absolutely necessary ptotection of agriculture is guaranteed for a decade to come in the new commercial treaties, and many a Radical has admitted in private that the treaties themselves have not had an unfavorable effect upon urban interests. At any rate, the opponents of the commercial treaties must admit that commerce and industry are enjoying a continued upswing. From the other side a good bridge already spans the gulf (between conservatives and liberals). The Conservative parties and the National Liberals have become thoroughly reliable in all important questions which involve the nation's fortune or misfortune, unity and political power. The nation is more important to them than party; that is their reputation, and they will maintain it. The more the left is prepared to satisfy the great national needs for colonies, army, and navy, the wider and stronger the bridge will become. Indeed the nationally-minded elements within the Center, too, will find it simpler to work with the other non-socialist parties in such rational questions if, with the disappearance of the possibility of a black-red majority, the Center's party egotism were robbed of the means of bringing ruthless pressure to bear upon the administration. The most unfortunate consequence of the fact that the Center could make use of the Social Democratic votes to build an opposition bloc was the importance acquired thereby by the Social Democrats themselves in the recent Reichstag. Herein lies a further important field for the common care and labor of national elements. Contrary to the idea, still unfortunately ruling in certain liberal heads, that reaction threatens the empire from the right and that one must fight side by side with the Social Democrats, the real reaction, or the real danger of reaction, I am firmly convinced, comes from Social Democracy. Not only are its communistic dreams of the future incompatible with civilization, and the means to their

252

APPENDIX

realization brutal force—everything that has any kinship with the spirit of reaction anywhere in Germany is strengthened and justified by the way the socialists undermine the concepts of authority, property, religion, and Fatherland. T h e sword of Bonaparte followed the insane, petty, prolix equalizer, Robespierre. It had to come to free the French people from the Reign of Terror of the Jacobins and Communists. When, therefore, the Center willfully sought to force upon the government an unacceptable condition, especially upon an occasion which involved the honor of German arms and our appearance before the world, and immediately after a frank discussion of the unendurable meddling with the inner colonial service, and when it voted down a moderating Radical amendment with the help of the Social Democrats, the constitutional means for protecting the authority of the government had to be used, and the Reichstag had to be dissolved. T h e division on December 13 was a blow to the Federated Governments and the national dignity. I can work with any party that respects the large national viewpoint. Where this viewpoint is disregarded, my friendship ends. N o one in Germany wants a personal regime. The great majority of the German people also wants no party regime. It is the German individuality, German destiny, that we make our political decisions up to the hour of danger on the basis of feeling and general concepts rather than on the basis of real interests and national objectives. A s far as the Emperor and the Imperial Princes are concerned, there are no Catholics and Protestants in Germany, but only plain Germans who enjoy the equal protection of the laws. Y e t the strongest party in the Reichstag consists exclusively of Catholics. The platform of the Center says " F o r truth, freedom and the right." But is it true when the appeal of the Rhineland Center Party says that a new Kulturkampf lurks in the background? T h e Catholic Church is better off in equalitarian Germany than in many Catholic lands, and no representative of the Federated Governments is thinking for a moment of giving up religious parity, of infringing upon freedom of

APPENDIX

253

conscience, or of threatening the Catholic religion. In any statement to this effect religion is being used simply for the protection of the interests of party politics. Although no other state has done more than the German Empire for the present and the future of the laborers, for their material and spiritual needs, although the German laborers are the best educated in the world, nevertheless millions belong directly or indirectly to a party whose aim is to revolutionize state and society from the ground up. T h e German people must free itself from such pressure. T h e liberal townsman and landsman is no less involved than the conservative. Not matter how great the dissension which conditions in separate electoral districts may produce, the parties which stood beside the government on December 13 must keep in mind f r o m the beginning what it was that united them then: the struggle for the honor and welfare of the nation against Social Democrats, Poles, Guelphs, and Centrists. I put the Social Democrats first because every set-back of the Social Democrats will be a reprimand for their blind over-confidence, a strengthening of a faith in the orderly progress of our inner development, and a strengthening of our position abroad, and because the likelihood would therefore be less that a " burgher " party, with the help of the Social Democrats, should ever occupy a dominant position above the other " burgher " parties again. T H E IMPERIAL

CHANCELLOR.

BULOW

BIBLIOGRAPHY OFFICIAL

PUBLICATIONS

Der Erzberger Prozess: Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen im Beleidigungsprozess des Reichsfinanzminister Erzberger gegen den Staatsminister a.D. Dr. Karl H elf rieh. 1920. Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Reichshaushalts Kommission. Vierteljahrsheft zur Statistik des Deutschen Reiches, 1907, Supplements I, II, III. Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich. Stenographische Berichte der Verhandlungen des deutschen Reichstags. YEARBOOKS

Annual Register. London: Longmans Green. Schiemann, Th., Deutschland und die Grosse Politik. Berlin: Reimer. Schulthess, Europäischer Geschichtskalender, Munich: Beck. Wippermann, Deutscher Geschichtskalender. Leipzig: Meiner. NEWSPAPERS

Bayerischer Kurier. (Munich) Centrist organ representing the democratic element in the party as opposed to the aristocrats and nobility. Berliner Tageblatt. Politically independent, but close to the leaders of the Radical Alliance. Conservative Korrespondenz. Frankfurter Zeitung. Most respected liberal paper, representing financial and industrial interests, and very friendly toward the South German People's Party. Freisinnige Zeitung. (Berlin) Founded by Eugen Richter as the organ of the Radical People's Party. Germania. (Berlin) Official organ of the Center Party. Kölnische Volkszeitung. Center Party organ in the Rhineland. Kölnische Zeitung. Organ with National Liberal connections. Leipziger Volkszeitung. Social Democratic daily edited by Franz Mehring. Münchner Allgemeine Zeitung. Represented anti-Center, agrarian Bavaria. National Zeitung. National Liberal organ in Berlin. Neue Preussische (Kreuz) Zeitung. (Berlin) V e r y conservative, although independent of party. Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung. (Berlin) Semi-official paper with small circulation, but frequently cited by other papers. Die Post. (Berlin) Free Conservative. Reichsbote. (Berlin) Organ of the Agrarian League. Der (Rote) Tag. (Berlin) Independent (nicknamed for its red headlines). Tägliche Rundschau. (Berlin) Organ of the Evangelical League. Vorwaerts. (Berlin) Central organ of the Social Democratic Party. Vossische Zeitung. (Berlin) Independently radical.

254

BIBLIOGRAPHY

255

PERIODICALS

Alldeutsche Blatter. Organ of the Pan-German League. Anti-Sozialdemokratische Korrespondenz. Published irregularly by M a x Lorenz for use by other newspapers. Deutsche Stimmen. Bi-weekly National Liberal paper which changed into the weekly Nationalliberale Blotter in 1907. Historisch-politische Blätter für das katholische Deutschland. Hilfe. Personal organ of Friedrich Naumann. Hochland. Organ of the anti-confessional Centrists. Die Neue Zeit. Edited by K a r l Kautsky for orthodox Social Democrats. Preussische Jahrbücher. Conservative monthly edited by Hans Delbrück. Sozialistische Monatshefte. Organ of the Revisionists. Statistische Korrespondenz. Süddeutsche Monatshefte. Liberal monthly. Die Zukunft. Personal organ of the sensational Maximilian Harden. G E N E R A L HISTORIES OF G E R M A N Y

I N T H E SECOND

EMPIRE

Brandenburg, Erich. Von Bismarck sum Weltkriege: die deutsche Politik in den Jahrzehnten vor dem Kriege. Berlin: Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft für Politik und Geschichte, 1924. (English translation by A . E. Adams, From Bismarck to the World War, a History of German Foreign Politics 1870-1914. London: Oxford University Press, 1927). Dawson, William H. The German Empire 1867-1914. 2 Vols.; London: Allen and Unwin, 1919. Gebhardt, Bruno. Handbuch der deutschen Geschichte. 7th ed.; 2 V o l s . ; completely revised and edited by Robert Holzmann; Stuttgart: Union, 1930. Härtung, Fritz. Deutsche Geschichte vom Frankfurter Frieden bis zum Vertrag von Versailles, 1871-1919. 3rd ed.; Bonn and Leipzig: Schroeder, 1930. Kralik, Richard. Allgemeine Geschichte der neuesten Zeit von 1815 bis zur Gegenwart. 6 Vols.; Graz and Vienna: Styria, 1915-1923. Wahl, Adelbert. Deutsche Geschichte von der Reichsgründung bis zum Ausbruch des Weltkrieges. 4 Vols.; Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1931-1935. Ziekursch, Johannes. Politische Geschichte des neuen deutschen Kaisserreiches. 3 Vols.; Frankfurt a.M.: Frankfurter Societätsdruckerei, 1925-1930. LITERATURE ON POLITICAL GENERAL

PARTIES

WORKS

Bergsträsser, Ludwig. Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland. 6th ed.; Mannheim, Berlin and Leipzig: Bensheimer, 1932. Burger, Alexander. Geschichte der Parteien des deutschen Reichstages. I. Das Zentrum und die ihm nahestehenden Parteien. II. Die Nationalliberale Partei. III. Die Freisinnigen Parteien. I V . Die Parteien der Wirtschaftlichen Vereinigung. V . Die Deutsch-Konservative Partei und die Reichspartei. V I . Die Sozialdemokratische Partei. ( " K u l t u r und Fortschritt," Nrs. 236, 266, 275, 314, 361, 371) Gautzsch b. Leipzig: Dietrich, 1909-1911.

256

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Erzberger, M. Die politischen Parteien und ihre Tätigkeit. ( " Staatsbürger Bibliothek," I ) M. Gladbach: Verlag Westdeutschen Arbeiterzeitung, 1907Grotewold, Chr. Die Parteien des Deutschen Reichstags. Leipzig: Wigand, 1908. Naumann, Friedrich. Die politischen Parteien. Berlin: Hilfe, 1911. Salomon, F. Die deutschen Parteiprogramme. 2 V o l s . ; Leipzig: Teubner, 1912. Stillich, O. Die politischen Parteien in Deutschland. I. Die Konservativen. II. Der Liberalismus. Leipzig: Klinkhardt, 1908, 1911. CON SER V ATI VE

PARTIES

Handbuch der Deutsch-Konservativen Partei, vierte umgearbeitete und verbesserte Auflage, abgeschlossen am 22 November ign, bearbeitet und herausgegeben vom Hauptverein der Deutsch-Konservativen Partei. Berlin, 1911. Kaufhold, Jos. Die Konservative Partei und die Reichstagswahlen 1907. Berlin: Isslieb, 1907. Stenographischer Bericht über die Verhandlungen der Delegiertenversammlung der Deutschen Konservativen am Freitag, den 30 November 1906. ... Herausgegeben vom Hauptverein der Deutschen Konservativen. Berlin: Möller and Borel, 1906. Vogel, Georg. Die Konservativen und die Blockpolitik Bülows, 1907-1909. Phil. Diss.; Berlin: Typescript, 1925. N A T I O N A L LIBERAL PARTY

Allgemeiner Delegiertentag der Nationalliberalen Partei am 19, 20 und 21 Mai 1905 in Dresden. 2 H e f t e ; Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1905. Neunter allgemeiner Vertretertag der Nationalliberalen Partei am 5 und 6 Oktober 1906 in Goslar. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1906. Zehnter allgemeiner Vertretertag der Nationalliberalen Partei am 5 und 6 Oktober 1907 in Wiesbaden. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Brandenburg, E. " Fünfzig Jahre Nationalliberale Partei 1867-1917." Historische Zeitschrift, C X I X , 62 ff. Die Kolonialpolitik seit der Reichstagsauflösung von 1906. Hrsg. vom Centralbureau der Nationalliberalen Partei; Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1909. Nationalliberale Parlamentarier 1886-1909. Hrsg. vom Centralbureau der Nationalliberalen Partei; Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1909. Politisches Hatidbuch der Nationalliberalen Partei. Hrsg. vom Centralbureau der Nationalliberalen Partei Deutschlands. Abgeschlossen Dezember 1907; Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1908. Programmatische Kundgebungen der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1866-1907. ( " Nationalliberale Schriften," V ) Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. The same, 1866-1909, 1909.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

257

Reichstagssession 1904-5. II, ii, Schutzgebiete; III, vii, Heer und Flotte. Berlin : Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1906. Reichstagssession 1905-6. II, v, Kolonialverwaltung und Schutegebiete', III, vi, Kriegsflotte, vii, Heerwesen : I V . Die Tagung vom 13 November bis 13 Dezember 1906. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1906-1907. Reichstagssession 1907. Die Tagung vom 19 Februar bis 14 Mai 1907. Berlin : Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Reichstagssession 1907-8. Berlin : Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1908. RADICAL PARTIES

Archiv der Fortschrittlichen Volkspartei. Non-governmental Archive No. 3. Reichsarchiv, Potsdam. Barth, Th. and Naumann, Fr. Die Erneuerung des Liberalismus. Ein politische Weckruf. Berlin: Hilfe, 1906. Barth, Th. Der Freisinn im Block. Berlin: Concordia, 1908. Erster Delegiertentag des Wahlvereins der Liberalen zu Berlin am 17 und 18 Februar 1906. Berlin, 1906. Zweiter Delegiertentag des Wahlvereins der Liberalen zu Berlin am 6 und 7 April 1907. Berlin, 1907. Klein-Hattingen, O. Geschichte des deutschen Liberalismus von 1871 bis sur Gegenwart. 2 Vols. ; Berlin: Fortschritt, 1911-1912. Konstituirende Generalversammlung des Wahlvereins der Liberalen am 2 und 3 Dezember 1893. Berlin : Hermann, 1893. Der dritte Parteitag der Freisinnigen Volkspartei. Nürnberg, 12, 13, 14 September 1897. Hrsg. vom geschäftsführenden Auschuss ; Berlin : Fortschritt, 1897. Der vierte Parteitag der Freisinnigen Volkspartei. Görlitz, 20 bis 22 Oktober 1900. Hrsg. von Müller-Sagan; Berlin: Fortschritt, 1900. Der sechste Parteitag der Freisinnigen Volkspartei. Wiesbaden, 23 bis 25 September. Hrsg. von Dr. O. W i e m e r ; Berlin: Deutsche Presse, 1905. Protokoll der Verhandlungen des Wahlvereins der Liberalen zu Berlin, 11 und 12 Februar, 1905. Berlin: Hilfe, 1905. Richter, Eugen. Politisches ABC Buch. Ein Lexikon parlamentarischer Zeitund Streitfragen. 9ter Jahrgang ; Berlin : Fortschritt, 1898. ioter Jahrgang, 1903. Wiemer, Otto. Die Freisinnige Volkspartei 1907. Berlin : Deutsche Presse, 1907.

und die Reichstagswahlen

von

T H E CENTER

Bachem, Julius. " W i r müssen aus dem Turm heraus." Historisch-Politische Blätter. March 1, 1906. Bachem, Karl. Vorgeschichte, Geschichte und Politik der deutschen Zentrumspartei, 1815-1914. 9 Vols. ; Cotogne : Bachem, 1927-1932. Bergsträsser, Ludwig. Der politische Katholizismus. Dokumente. ( " Der deutsche Staatsgedanke"), 2 V o l s . ; Munich: Drei Masken, 1921-1923.

258

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Betz, Anton. Beiträge zur Ideengeschichte der Staat- und Finanzpolitik der deutschen Zentrumspartei. 2nd ed.; R e g e n s b u r g : Manz, 1930. Broermann, H . and Grobbel, K . Unterm Zentrumsbanner. Werden und Wirken der Zentrumspartei. Dokumente zur Zeitgeschichte. Berlin: D e r W e c k r u f , 1926. Erzberger, M . " Die Bedeutung des Zentrums f ü r das Deutsche Reich." Zeitschrift für Politik, II (1909), p. 212 ff. Die Kolonial-Bilanz. Bilder aus der deutschen Kolonialpolitik. Berlin: Germania, 1906. Die Zentrumspolitik im Reichstag. Eine Übersicht über die Tätigkeit der Zentrumsfraktion. Reichstags-Session 1903-4; 1904-5; 1905-6; Coblenz: Görres, 1904-1907. Reichstags-Session 1907; 1907-8; 1908-9; 1909-10; 1910-11; 1912; B e r l i n : Germania, 1907-1912. (Erzberger, M . ) Die Wahrheit über die deutschen Kolonien. Glänzende Rechtfertigung der Kolonialpolitik des Zentrums durch Staatssekretär Bernhard Dcrnburg. B e r l i n : Germania, 1908. Zentrum und neuester Kurs. H r s g . im A u f t r a g e der Zentrumsfraktion des Deutschen Reichstags. B e r l i n : Germania, 1907. Muser, Oskar. Der Ultramontanismus und das Zentrum. Lahr i.B.: Schauenburg, 1907. Pehl, Hans. Die deutsche Kolonialpolitik und das Zentrum 1884-1914. Phil. Diss., Frankfurt a.M., 1934. Poellnitz, B. von. Zentrum und Deutschtum. Offenes Wort eines deutschen Katholiken. Oldenburg and L e i p z i g : Stalling, 1907. Savigny, L e o von. Des Zentrums Wandlung und Ende. B e r l i n : Walther, 1907. Schauff, Johannes. Die deutschen Katholiken und die Zentrumspartei. Cologne: Bachem, 1928. Spahn, Martin. Das deutsche Zentrum (see Campaign Literature). " D a s Jahr 1906." Das Deutsche Volk (Wochenzeitung) No. 29, Jul. 15, 1928. " Zur Geschichte der Zentrumspartei," Hochland, I X , ii, 294 ff. Staatsbürger Bibliothek. H r s g . vom Verband der Windhorstbunde Deutschlands. I V . Das Latuiheer. V . Die Kriegsflotte. M . Gladbach: V e r l a g Westdeutsche Arbeiterzeitung, 1908. Das Zentrum und sein Program nach den Reden verschiedener Zentrumsführer. ( " F l u g s c h r i f t e n der Rheinischen Zentrums-Partei," VII) Cologne: Bachem, 1907. SOCIAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY

Bernstein, Eduard. " Die Entwicklung der Sozialdemokratie von der Sekte zur Partei," Zeitschrift für Politik, I I I ( 1 9 1 0 ) , 498-551. " T h e German elections and the Social Democrats," Contemporary Review, X C I (1907), 479-492. " Die heutige Sozialdemokratie in Theorie und P r a x i s , " Archiv für Soziahvissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, X X V (1907). Biermann, W . E. " Die neuere Entwicklung des Sozialismus," Zeitschrift iür Politik, I (1908), 488-513.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

259

Blank, R. " Die soziale Zusammensetzung der Sozialdemokratischen Wählerschaft Deutschlands," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, X X (1905), 507 ff. Dix, Arthur. Sozialdemokratie, Militarismus und Kolonial-Politik auf den Sozialisten-Kongressen 1907. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Dörzbacher, Erwin. Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie und die nationale Machtpolitik bis 1914. Gotha: Klotz, 1920. Ensor, R. C. K . Modern Socialism as Set Förth by Socialists. 3rd ed.; London: Harper, 1910. Feucht, Paul. " Der Internationale Sozialistische Kongress in Stuttgart," Preussische Jahrbücher, C X X X (1908), 96 fr. Hayes, C. J. H. " German Socialism Reconsidered," American Historical Review, X X I I I (1917), 92 ff. Handbuch für sozialdemokratische Wähler, 1898. Hrsg. vom sozialdemokratischen Parteivorstand; Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1898. Handbuch für sozialdemokratische Wähler anlässlich der Reichstagsauflösung 1906. Hrsg. vom sozialdemokratischen Parteivorstand; Berlin: V o r waerts, 1906. Der Hochverratsprozess gegen Liebknecht vor dem Reichsgericht. Berlin. Vorwaerts, 1907. Internationaler Sozialisten Kongress zu Paris 1900. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1900. Internationaler Sozialisten Kongress zu Amsterdam 1904. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1904. Internationaler Sozialisten Kongress zu Stuttgart 1907. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 190;. Jaffee, Robert. " Die letzten Reichstagswahlen und die Zukunft der Sozialdemokratie," Preussische Jahrbücher, C X X V I I I (1907), 300 ff. Liebknecht, Karl. Militarismus und Antimilitarismus. Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei, 1907. (English translation, Militarism. N e w Y o r k : Huebsch, 1917). Lipinski, Richard. Die Sozialdemokratie von ihren Anfängen bis zur Gegenwart. 2 V o l s . ; Berlin: Dietz, 1927-1928. Ludwig, Franz. Die Reichstagswahlen von 1907 und die Sozialdemokratie. (Die Politik. I. Nach dem Dreimillionen-Sieg. II. Die Reichstagsivaltlen von 1907) ; Berlin: Schwetschke, 1907. Mandelbaum, Kurt. Die Erörterung innerhalb der Sozialdemokratie über das Problem des Imperialismus 1895-1914. Phil. Diss.; Frankfurt a.M., 1929/1930. Mehring, Franz. Geschichte der deutschen Sozialdemokratie. 4 Vols.; Stuttgart: Dietz, 1903. Michels, R. " Die deutsche Sozialdemokratie. Parteimitgliedschaft und soziale Zusammensetzung. Im internationalen Verbände, eine kritische Untersuchung." Archiv für Sozialu-issenschaft und Sozialpolitik, X X I I I (1906), X X V (1907). Noske, Gustav. Kolonialpolitik und Sozialdemokratie. Stuttgart: Dietz, 1914. Parvus (Helphand, Alexander). Die Kolonialpolitik und der Zusammenbruch. Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei, 1907.

2ÖO

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Protokoll über die Verhandlungen des Parteitages der sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands. Mainz bis Jena, 1900-1913; Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1900-1913. Schippel, Max. Sozialdemokratisches Reichstagshandbuch. Ein Führer durch die Zeit- und Streitfragen der Reichspolitik. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1902. Schröder, Wilhelm. Handbuch der sozialdemokratischen Parteitage von 1863-1909. Munich: Birk, 1910. Sozialdemokratische Agitations-Bibliothek. V I . Sozialistentöter Bülow im Deutschen Reichstag. V I I . Eine Abrechnung mit dem Reichslügenverband. I X . Die Reichstagswahlen des Jahres 1907 und die politische Lage. Rede Bebels. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907. Sozialdemokratische Flugschriften. V . Die Sozialdemokratie und das Heer. X I I . Imperialismus oder Sozialismus. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1910, 1912. Die Sozialistische Arbeiter Internationale. Berichte der sozialdemokratischen Organisationen Europas... Bericht des Parteivorstandes der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands an den internationalen SozialistenKongress zu Stuttgart. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907. Townsend, M. E. The Attitude of the Social Democrats towards German Colonialism during the Years 1903-1906. Columbia Univ. Master's Thesis: Typescript, 1917. Victor, M. " Die Stellung der deutschen Sozialdemokratie zu den Fragen der auswärtigen Politik," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, L X , 147, ff. Walling, William E. The Socialism of Today, a Source Book. Edited by W . E. Walling, J. G. Phelps Stokes, Jesse Wallace Hughan, Harry W . L a i d l e r . . . New Y o r k : Holt, 1916. STUDIES OF SPECIAL PERIODS OR PROBLEMS

Armin (pseudonym). Hei Rechts, hei Links. Ein politisches Kampfesbild aus 1909. Berlin: Deutscher Schriftenverlag (1909). Barker, J. Ellis. " Germany at the parting of the ways," Nineteenth Century, L X I (1907), 209-226. Blind, Karl. " The new situation in Germany," Nineteenth Century, L X I (1907). 458-471. Böhmer, Rudolf. Die Bedeutung und Aufgabe des nationalen Blocks im Reichstage, zugleich ein Beitrag zur Beurteilung und zum Verständnis der Zentrumspolitik. Munich: Lehmann, 1907. Böttger, Hugo. Die neue Aera der deutschen Kolonialpolitik ("Burschenschaftliche Bücherei," III, iv) Berlin: Carl Heymans, 1907. Carroll, E. M. Germany and the Great Powers, 1866-1914. New Y o r k : Prentice-Hall, 1938. Dix, Arthur. Blockpolitik. Ihre innere Logik, ihre Vorgeschichte und ihre Aussichten. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Eschenburg, Theodor. Das Kaiserreich am Scheideweg. Bassermann, Bülow und der Block. Berlin: Verlag für Kulturpolitik, 1929. Fernis, Hansgeorg. Die Flottennovellen im Reichstag 1906-1912. ( " Beiträge zur Geschichte der nachbismarckischen Zeit und des Weltkriegs," X X V I I ) Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1934.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

2ÖI

Haferkorn, Joachim. Bülows Kampf um das Reichskanzleramt im Jahre 1906. ("Berliner Studien zur neueren Geschichte," V ) Würzburg: Triltsch, 1939. Haller, Johannes. Die Aera Bülow. Eine historisch-politische Studie. Stuttgart: Cotta, 1922. Hallmann, Hans. Der Weg sum deutschen Schlachtflottenbau. ( " Beiträge zur Geschichte der nachbismarckischen Zeit und des Weltkriegs," X I V / X V ) Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1933. Härtung, Fritz. Verantwortliche Regierung, Kabinette und Nebenregierungen im Konstitutionellen Preussen 1848-1918. (" Forschungen zur Brandenburgischen und Preussischen Geschichte," X L I V ) Munich and Berlin, 1932. Kremer, Willy. Der soziale Aufbau der Parteien des Deutschen Reichstages von 1871-1918. Phil. Diss.; Cologne, 1934. Präger, Erich. Die Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft 1882-1907. Berlin: Reimer, 1908. Rausch, Eugen. Die IVehrpolitik des Deutschen Reiches unter Reichskanzler Fürst Bülow. Phil. Diss.; Heidelberg, 1936. Schöne, Gerhard. Die Verflechtung wirtschaftlicher und politischer Motive in der Haltung der Parteien zum Bülowschen Zolltarif 1901/2. PhiL Diss.; Halle, 1934. Specht, Fritz and Schwabe, Paul. Die Reichstagswahlen von 1907. Berlin: Heymann, 1907. Spellmeyer, Hans. Deutsche Kolonialpolitik im Reichstag. ( " Beiträge zur Geschichte der nachbismarckischen Zeit und des Weltkriegs," X I ) Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1931. Thimme, Fr. (ed.). Front wider Bülow. Staatsmänner, Diplomaten und Forscher zu seinen Denkwürdigkeiten. Munich: Bruckmann, 1931. Townsend, M. E. The Rise and Fall of Germany's Colonial Empire 18841918. New Y o r k : Macmillan, 1930. Wertheimer, Mildred. The Pan-German League. New Y o r k : Columbia, 1924. Zehn Jahre Reichsverband gegen die Sozialdemokratie. Berlin: Reichsverbandsverlag. 1914. Zimmermann, A. Geschichte der deutschen Kolonialpolitik. Berlin: Mittler, 1914. BIOGRAPHY AND AUTOBIOGRAPH Y

Bauer, Ernst. Erzbcrger. Bilder aus seinem Leben und Wirken. 2nd ed.; Munich: Diemer, 1925. Bebel, August. Aus meinem Leben. 3 Vols.; Stuttgart: Dietz, 1910-1914. Buchner, Max. Kaiser Wilhelm II. Seine Weltanschauung und die deutschen Katholiken. Leipzig: Koehler, 192g. Bülow, Bernhard Fürst von. Denkwürdigkeiten. 4 Vols.; Berlin: Ullstein, 1930-1931. (English translation, Memoirs of Prince von Bülow. Boston: Little, Brown, 1931-1932). Deutsche Politik. Berlin: Hobbing, 1913. (English translation, Imperial Germany. Translated by Marie A . Lewenz; New York, Dodd Mead, 1914).

2Ö2

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fürst Bülows Reden nebst urkundlichen Beiträgen su seiner Politik. (Mit Erlaubnis des Reichskanzlers gesammelt und hrsg. von Johannes Penzier) 3 Vols.; Berlin: Reimer, 1907-1909. Fürst Bülows Reden. (Auswahl hrsg. von Wilhelm von Massow) 4 Vols.; Leipzig: Universal-Bibliothek, 1911-1914. Cardauns, Hermann. Adolf Gröber. Unter Benutzung des Nachlasses. ("Sammlung von Zeit und Lebensbildern," X X X ) M. Gladbach: Volksvereinsverlag, 1921. Karl Trimborn. Nach seinen Briefen und Tagebüchern. ( " Sammlung von Zeit und Lebensbildern," X X X I ) M. Gladbach: Volksvereinsverlag, 1922. Ehren, Hermann. Graf Frans von Ballestrem, ein Lebensbild. Breslau: Ostdeutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1935. Einem, Generaloberst von. Erinnerungen eines Soldaten 1853-1933. Leipzig: Koehler, 1933. Haller, Johannes. Aus dem Leben des Fürsten Philipp zu Eulenburg und Herlefeld. Berlin: Paetel, 1924. Hammann, Otto. Erinnerungen. I. Der neue Kurs. II. Zur Vorgeschichte des Weltkrieges. III. Um den Kaiser. Berlin: Hobbing, 1918-1919. Hassel, Ulrich von. Tirpitz, sein Leben und Wirken. Stuttgart: Belser, 1920. Hertling, G. von. Reden, Aussprachen und Vorträge. (Gesammelt von A . Dyroff) Cologne : Bachem, 1929. Heuss, Theodor. Friedrich Naumann, der Mann, das Werk, die Zeit. Stuttgart, Berlin : Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1937. Holstein, Fr. von. Lebensbekenntnis in Briefen an eine Frau. (Hrsg. von Helmuth Rogge) Berlin: Ullstein, 1932. Hutten-Czapkski, Bogdan Graf von. Sechsig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft. 2 Vols.; Berlin: Mittler, 1936. Kardorff, Siegfried von. Wilhelm von Kardorff. Ein nationaler Parlamentarier im Zeitalter Bismarcks und Wilhelms II 1828-1907. Berlin: Mittler, 1936. Keim, August Generalleutnant. Erlebtes und Erstrebtes. Lebenserinnerungen. Hannover : Letsch, 1925. Liebert, Eduard. Aus einem bewegten Leben. Erinnerungen. Munich: Lehmann, 1925. Lerchenfeld-Koefering, Hugo Graf. Erinnerungen und Denkwürdigkeiten 184s bis 1925. Berlin: Mittler, 1935. Martin, Rudolf. Deutsche Machthaber. Berlin: Schuster and Loeffler, 1910. Müller-Meiningen, Ernst. Parlamentarismus. Betrachtungen, Lehren, und Erinnerungen aus deutschen Parlamenten. Berlin and Leipzig ; de Gruyter, 1926. Radziwill, Princesse Marie. Une grande dame d'avant guerre. Lettres de la Princesse Radziwill au Général de Robilant 1889-1914. 4 V o l s . ; Bologna: Zanichelli, 1933-1934. Scheidemann, Philip. Memoiren eines Sozialdemokraten. 2 Vols. ; Dresden : Reusner, 1928. Schmidt, Martin. Graf Posadowsky. Staatssekretär des Reichsschatzamtes und des Reichsamtes des Innern, 1893-1907. Phil. Diss., Halle, 1935.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

263

Schreiber, A . Jenseits des Urteils Roeren gegen Schmidt. Ein kritischer Rückblick. Cologne : Boisseree, 1907. Seitz, Theodor. Vom Aufstieg und Niederbruch deutscher Kolonialmacht. Erinnerungen. 3 V o l s . ; Karlsruhe: Müller, 1927-1929. Tirpitz, A l f r e d von. Erinnerungen. Leipzig: Koehler, 1919 (English translation, My Memoirs. 2 Vols. ; New York, Dodd Mead, 1919). Politische Dokumente. I. Der Aufbau der deutschen Weltmacht. II. Deutsche Ohnemachtspolitik im Weltkriege. Stuttgart, Hamburg, Berlin : Cotta, 1924-1926. Wermuth, Adolf. Ein Beamtenleben. Erinnerungen. Berlin: Scherl, 1922. Wetterlé, Abbé E. Behind the Scenes in the Reichstag. Sixteen years of Parliamentary life in Germany. (Translated by George F. Lees) N e w Y o r k : Doran, 1918. Wilhelm II Hohenzollern. Ereignisse und Gestalten aus den Jahren 18781918. Leipzig and Berlin : Koehler, 1922. Zedlitz-Trützschler, Graf Robert von. Zwölf Jahre am deutschen Kaiserhof. Berlin and Leipzig: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1924. C A M P A I G N LITERATURE

Bothlingk, Arthur. Das deutsche Volk unterm römischen Joche. Frankfurt a.M., 1907. Bräunlich, Paul. Die Nebenregierung der Zentrumsherren im Kolonialamt und die Auflösung des Reichstags im Jahre 1906. ( " Brennende Zeitfragen dargestellt fürs deutsche Volk," I ) Munich: Lehmann, 1907. Zeitgeschichtliches zur Reichstagswahl. I. Zentrum und Regierung im Kampf. II. Zentrum und Sozialdemokratie in Bund. Leipzig : Braun, 1907. Dernburg, Bernhard. Koloniale Erziehung. Munich: Münchner Neueste Nachrichten, 1907. Koloniale Finanzprobleme. Vortrag gehalten auf Veranlassung der Handelskammer in Frankfurt a.M. am 3 Feb. 1907. Berlin : Mittler, 1907. Koloniale Lehrjahre. Vortrag gehalten in Stuttgart am 23 Januar IÇ07. Stuttgart: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft, 1907. Zielpunkte des deutschen Kolonialwesens. Zwei Vorträge. Vortrag gehalten auf Veranlassung einer freien Vereinigung von Gelehrten und Künstlern am 8 Januar 1907. Vortrag gehalten auf Veranlassung des Deutschen Handlestages am 11 Januar 1907. Berlin : Mittler, 1907. Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft. Deutschland, halte fest an deinen Kolonien. Berlin : Pass and Garleb, 1907. Deutsches Volk, wie sorgt die deutsche Rcichstagsmehrheit für die heldenmütigen Sühne in Südwestafrika? Leipzig: Staakmann, 1907. (Dix, A r t h u r ) . Arbeiter, Kolonien, und Flotte. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Das erlösende Wort. Vertrieb Patriotischer Zeitschriften; Berlin: National Zeitung, 1907. Erzberger, M. Bilder aus dem Reichstagswahlkampf IÇ07. Die Agitation der Zentrumsgegner beleuchtet nach deren Wahlschriften. Berlin: Germania, 1907.

264

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Warum ist der Reichstag aufgelöst worden? Ein offenes Wort an die Wählerschaft. Berlin: (Germania), 1906. Die Zentrumspolitik im Reichstage mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der Kolonialpolitik. Eine Übersicht über die Tätigkeit der Zentrumsfraktion in der 11 Legislatur-periode vom 3 Dezember 1903 bis 13 Dezember 1906. Berlin: Germania, 1907. Fischer, Ferd. Die wirtschaftliche Bedeutung Deutschlands und seine Kolonien. Leipzig: Akademischen Verlagsgesellschaft, 1907. Die Heuchelei. Vertrieb Patriotischer Zeitschriften; Berlin: Feyl, 1907. Hillger, Hermann, and Blaustein, Arthur. Hillgers Wegweiser für die Reichstagswahl. Berlin: Hillger, 1907. Hirsch, Paul, and Borchardt, Bruno. Die Sozialdemokratie und die Wahlen zum Deutschen Reichstag. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907. Hauviller, Ernst. Der Ultramontanismus. V e r l a g Wartburg, 1907. Ilgenstein, Heinrich. Deutsches Volk! Wahre deine heiligsten Güter. Berlin: Concordia, 1907. Für die Kämpfer in Südwestafrika. Berlin: Deutscher Verlag, 1907. Kardorff, Wilhelm von. Bebel oder Peters. Die Amtstätigkeit des Kaiserlichen Komissars Dr. Karl Peters am Kilimandjaro 1891/2. (Peters was the author) Berlin, 1906. Kautsky, Karl. Sozialdemokratie und Patriotismus. 2nd ed.; Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1906. Sozialismus und Kolonialpolitik. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907. Kleines Wahl-ABC des Bundes der Landwirte für die Reichstagswahl 1907. Berlin: Bund der Landwirte (1906). Die koloniale Lugenfabrik. Berlin: Koehler, 1907. Kolonialpolitik nicht Kolonialskandale und Nebenregierung. Ein Rückblick auf die letzten Reichstagsverhandlungen. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Kolonialpolitische Aktionskomite. Kolonialpolitische Führer. Berlin: Wedekind, 1907. Die Kosten der Weltpolitik und Kolonien. Cologne: Bachem, 1907. Lauff, Joseph. An die deutschen Mütter. Liebknecht, Karl. Wahl-Zeitung. Nos. 1-4, January 1907, Berlin. Lügen des Herrn Erzberger, zur Aufklärung der deutschen Wähler. Zentralburo der Nationalliberalen Partei. An die Reichstagswähler! Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1906. Nationalliberal Wähler! Wahlparole: Gegen das Zentrum. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Parvus (Helphand, Alexander). Die Reichstagswahlen und die Arbeiterschaft. Leipzig: Leipziger Buchdruckerei, 1907. Political handbills in the non-governmental archive. Reichsarchiv, Potsdam. Preuss, Eduard. Koloniale Erziehung des deutschen Volkes. Berlin: Wiemer, 1907. Reichstagswahlen 1903-1912. Bound leaflets in the Prussian State Library. Reichsverband gegen die Sozialdemokratie. Flugblätter 50-72.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

265

Handbuch für nichtsozialdemokratische Wähler zur Reichstagswahl am 25 Januar 1907. Berlin: Reichsverbands-Verlag, 1907. Rolf, Franz. Gegen den Zentrumsturm. Politische Betrachtung. Frankfurt a.M.: Neue Frankfurter Verlag, 1907. Savigny, Leo von. Die Reichstagsauflösung, das Zentrum und die nationale Parteien. Berlin: Waither, 1907. Schmidt, Geo. A . Schmidt gegen Roeren. Unter dem Kaudinischen Joch. Ein Kampf um Recht und Ehre. Berlin: Schwetschke, 1907. Schlechtendahl, G. A . Ist das Zentrum eine Gefahr für das Deutsche ReichT Munich: Lehmann, 1902; 3rd ed., 1907. Schmoller, Dernburg, Delbrück, Schafer, Sering, Schillings, Brunner, Jastrow, Pcnck, Kahl über Reichstagsauflösung und Kolonialpolitik. Offizieller stenographischer Bericht über die Versammlung in der Berliner Hochschule für Musik am 8 Januar 1907. Kolonialpolitischen Aktionskomite, ed.: Berlin: Wedekind, 1907. Sozialdemokratischer Parteivorstand. Handbuch für Sozialdemokratische Wähler anlässlich der Reichstagsauflösung 1906. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907. Winke zur Reichstagswahl. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907. Spahn, Martin. Das deutsche Zentrum. ( " K u l t u r und Katholizismus," V ) . Munich and Mainz, 1907. Stengel, Karl Freiherr von. Deutsche Kolonialpolitik. Berlin: Deutsche Kolonialgesellschaft, 1902. 2nd ed., 1907. Thissen, Otto. Der Wahlkampf 1906-7. Ein Gedenkblatt aus bewegter Zeit für die Zentrumswählerschaft des Deutschen Reiches. Cologne: Bachem, 1907. Vorwaerts zu den Wahlen! Berlin: Deutsche Tageszeitung, (1906). Wahlrede eines Demokraten. Leipzig: Uhlig, 1907. Das ist Wahrheit! Berlin: Vertrieb Patriotische Zeitschriften, 1907. Die Wahrheit über die deutschen Kolonien! Berlin: Nauck (1907). Wahlaufrufe und Wahlkundgebungen zur Reichstagswahl 1907. Fürst Bülows Abrechnung mit Zentrum und Sozialdemokratie im neuen Reichstag. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Die Wahl-Lügen der bürgerlichen Parteien. Eine Sammlung und Widerlegung der im Wahlkampfe von den bürgerlichen Parteien zur Verleumdung der Sozialdemokratie und der Sozialdemokratischen Vertreter verbreiteten Lügen. Berlin: Vorwaerts, 1907. Warum ist der Reichstag aufgelöst worden? Berlin: Koehler (1907). Warum wurde der Reichstag aufgelöst? Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907. Wettstein, Oberleutnant a.D. Streitflichtcr auf die Frage: Was kann aus Deutsch-Südivestafrika gemacht iverden? Zürich, 1907. Wolff, Georg. Entzveder Rechts oder Links. Wahlbetrachtungen. Berlin: Hobbing, 1907. Zahn, K . Rom und die Deutschen. Ziele und Bestrebungen der Nationalliberalen Partei. Berlin: Buchhandlung der Nationalliberalen Partei, 1907.

INDEX Ablass, Bruno, Radical politician, 53 n. Ablass Amendment, to 4th supplementary budget for Southwest Africa, 1906, 91, 93, 94, 95 n„ 100, 101, 252 Action Committee on Imperialism, 108, 116, 120, 137 n„ 143, 159 Admiralty, German, 164, 192, 203205, 236-238 Africa, Centrist policy for, 130; colonization, 117; native revolts in, 105, 191; German troops in, 111, 124, 191. See also German East Africa and German Southwest Africa Agadir crisis, 241 Agrarian League, a conservative party, 13; and imperialism, 75; and Bulow's Bloc, 154-155; and the elections 1907, 166, 171, 175 Agrarians, 99 n., 178, 185 Agriculture, German Ministry of, 71 Akwa Tribe, in Kamerun, 21 Albert, King of Saxony, 177 Algeciras, conference in, 17, 62, 102, 208, 241 AUdeutsche Blatter, 116 Alsace, elections in, 170 Alsace-Lorrainers, see Alsatians Alsatians, minority party, 62; opposition to Biilow, 64; opposed to Ablass Amendment, 94 n., 95 n., 137 n., 141; in elections, 166, 170 n„ 172, 173, 175, 180, 181; and military policy, 236 Anarcho-socialism, 214 Anglo-French Entente, 17, 241 Anti-Catholic campaign, 171, 177 Anti-Catholic sentiment, 147,181,187 Anti-Center campaign, 119-129, 133, 167, 168, 181 Anti-Center parties, 91 Anti-Center press, 90, 186 Anti-German press, 184 Anti-national parties, 194 Anti-Semites, political party, 13, 63; and imperialism, 75; and Billow's Bloc, 154; and elections of 1907, 163 n„ 166, 172, 174-175; and antiultramontanism, 181 Arenberg, Prince von, Centrist politician, 30, 40 n.. 73 Arendt, Otto, Free Conservative politician, 200

Army, see military Arnim-Muskau, Count, Free Conservative politician, 163 Arnsberg, Center politics in, 138 Associations Law, 1907, 232 Austria, German policy toward, 209, 242 Bachem, Julius, Centrist news-paper editor and party leader, 24 n. Bachem, Karl, Centrist politician, 31, 35, 40 n„ 205 n. Baden, elections in, 170 Baden Anti-Ultramontane League, ' 128 Ballestrem, Franz Karl, Count, Centrist politician and President of the Reichstag, 26, 31, 40, 81, 87, 89, 91, 94, 95 n., 99, 100 n„ 138 Ballin, A., head of the HamburgAmerican Line, 162 n. Barth, Theodor, Radical politician, 45 n„ 155, 232 Bassermann, Ernst, National Liberal politician, 34, 68, 72 n., 89, 94, 99 n„ 100 n„ 124 n., 126, 155, 163 Bavaria, Center Party in, 31, 195 n.; elections in, 135, 138, 169-170, 172 Bavarian Farmers' League, 64, 94 n. Bavarian Palatinate, elections in, 170 Bayerischer Kurier, 130, 135 Bebel, August, Social Democratic politician, 61 n., 77 n., 84, 153, 205; on colonial policy, 215-217; on militarism, 221-225; and naval expansion, 227-228 Benedictine Mission, in German East Africa, 20 Berlin, elections in, 147, 162 Berlin Anti-Ultramontane Election League, 128 Berliner Tageblatt, 156 Bernstein, Eduard, Social Democrat and Revisionist, 60, 61 n., 216, 218, 220 n. Bernstoff, Count, Guelphian politician, 40 Bethmann-Hollweg, Theobold von, Secretary of State for the Interior, Imperial Chancellor, 164-165, 209, 232 Bismarck, Otto, Prince, Imperial Chancellor, 11, 13-16, 18, 26, 46, 128, 190 Bismarck Archipelago, 17 267

268

INDEX

Black-red Bloc, 120, 168-169, 251 Bloc, national, 101, 154-161, 165-168, 170 n„ 171, 173-174, 178-179, 185, 187-191, 103-104, 206, 229-232, 245247 Bloc parties, 101, 162, 181, 204, 206 Blue-black Bloc, 168, 246 Blumenthal, Daniel, Alsatian Radical politician, 155, 171, 173 Blücher, German battleship, 203 Bonaparte, 143, 252 Bondelzwarts, native tribe of Southwest Africa, 21, 86, 92, 108, 130 Borna, election campaign in, 163 n. Bosnian crisis, 209, 242 Boulanger, G , French General and War Minister, 15 Bovenschen, Albert, Secretary of the Imperial Union against Social Democracy, 145 n., 162 n. Brenner, Centrist politician, 95 n. Breslau, elections in, 162, 168 Breslauer Zeitung, 235 Brückner, Assessor, official in the Colonial Department, 42 n., 43 n. Brunswick, Duchy of, and the House of Hanover, 62; succession in, 142 Budget, German, for 1907, 191-193 Biicking, Prefect of the Styler Mission, 41, 43 n. Bülow, Bernhard. Prince, Foreign Secretary and Imperial Chancellor, his imperialism, 17, 20-21, 31, 240-241, 244; physical breakdown and rumored retirement, 39,40,66, 68; and colonial scandals, 42, 76, 83; and Brunswick, 62; appoints Colonial Director, 72-73; relations with the Center, 30, 44, 69-70, 7374, 80-82, 87, 91. 185-188, 190; relations with Radicals, 53, 54, 230236; opposed in the Reichstag, 63, 64, 67, 245-247; on 1906 budget for Southwest Africa, 92-93; his colonial policy attacked, 63-65, 96; and dissolution of the Reichstag 1906, 88-89 , 92. 94, 95, 98-102; his prestige at stake, 97; his activity in the election campaign, 103, 106, 108-109, 112-113, 116-117, 132. 164, 192; election campaign against the Center, 104, 120-121, 127, 131, 134, 136-139; election campaign against the Social Democrats, 143-145,152; and the Radicals in the campaign, 156; and the national bloc in the campaign. 103-104. 154, 157-163; on the election results, 166, 182-

183; and the bloc after the election, 189, 191 ; foreign policy. 194, 207-209, 242 ; 200, 201, 249, 253 Bundesrat, and Brunswick succession, 62; approves dissolution, 88, 94 " Burgher " parties, 104, 121, 144-145, 147, 154, 157, 167-168, 178, 180,183, 212, 223, 234, 253 " Burgher " press, 149 n. Burschenschaften, 118 Calwer, R., Social Democratic journalist and politician, 60 n., 61 n., 151-152, 220 Camarilla, 67-68, 97, 101 Capitalism, 151-152 Cape Colony, 92 Caprivi, General G. L., Imperial Chancellor, 16-17, 20, 29, 46, 127 n. Caroline Islands, 17, 20, 193 Carroll, E. M., American professor 241 Casablanca affair, 209, 241 Catherine the Great, of Russia, 75 Catholic-baiting, 127 Catholic Worker's Leagues, 179 Center Party, nature and position in the Reichstag. 23-27, 31-32, 64, 194-195. 249; opposition to, 13-14, 67,69-70,81 ; and the Kulturkampf, 14, 23 ; attitude toward military policy, 15-16, 26-28. 201-203; and naval policy, 16, 28-29, 203-207, 237; and foreign policy, 18, 30, 207-210. 242; and national policies, 18. 26, 30-31. 196, 199, 244245; and the colonial administration, 23, 26, 29-43, 78; and colonial policies. 71-72, 74-76, 86-87, 89-96, 98, 108, 193, 196-201, 250; and patriotism, 26, 208, 210, 245; relations with Biilow and his policies, 44, 64-66, 69-70, 97, 164, 185192, 246, 251-253; and scandals in Togoland. 41-43; and Colonial Director Demburg, 73, 77-80, 82; and William II, 69; and minority parties, 61. 62. 173; opposed by the Radicals, 83. 143, 161 ; and the Conservatives, 84-85, 166, 168, 189; relations with the Social Democrats. 83. 85. 168, 172-173, 178, 212; and the Reichstag's dissolution, 88-89, 94 , 98-99, 100; opposed in the election campaign. 104, 111, 113, 115-128, 142-144, 147, 154, 159; election campaign tactics, 129-142,

INDEX 166, 169-170, 173; and election résulte, 167, 174-175, 180-181, 210; opposed by the national bloc, 154166, 189; later relations with the bloc, 230-231; and property tax, 52, 57 n.; and 1887 cartel, 190; and von Studt, 231, and Posadowsky, 232 Center-baiting, 127 Center press, and the 1906 Navy Bill, 28; on colonial scandals, 63, 77, 87; on campaign issues, 131, 136, 142, 165, 171; on reconsiliation with Builow, 186; and naval expansion in 1908, 205; and patriotism, 210 Center Tower, 81, 134, 139 Central League of German Industrialists, 118, 162, 187-188 Centrist yoke, 123, 157 Christian, Josef, leader of the Southwest African revolt, 76 n. Christian Trades Unions, 118, 179 Clerical yoke, 126 Clericalism, 81-82, 126 Colonial Council, 19, 77 Colonial Department, section of the Foreign Office, 19; Billow's appointees in, 20 ; and the Southwest African revolt, 22-23 ; and creation of a colonial Office, 38-39; relations with the Center, 41-42, 73, 77-79, 82, 91 ; and appointment of Demburg, 72, 234; and Tippelskirch Co., 76 n.; Radical criticism of, 83; in the election campaign, 106, 163-164, 192 Colonial expansion, 11-13, 15, 109 Colonial Office, proposal to create it an issue in German politics. 38-40, 52-53, 60, 77 n., 191, 197-198, 215, 229, 234, 250 Colonial policy, of Germany, 17-23; the Center's attitude toward, 2943, 196-201 ; attitude of the Social Democrats toward, 57-60, 215, 219221 ; attitude of the Radicals toward, 46-47, 233-235; debated in the press, 62; debated in the Reichstag, 74-85, 90-93, 96; an issue in the election campaign, 103-104, 116, 119, 129-130, 150-153, 182-183 ; after the elections of 1907, 191, 194, 234-235, 242-243 Colonial railways, 33, 47. See German Southwest Africa Colonial Scandals, 18, 21, 33-43, 53, 54, 66, 79, 107, 143, 215

269

Colonial troops, 197, 200 Communists, 252 Conservatives, political party, 12-13, 63, 249; attitude toward national questions, 12-13, 16-17, 103, 206, 239, 251; and the National Liberals, 16; and German colonial policy, 75, 84, 95 n.; and the Center, 84-85; and the anti-Center campaign, 121-122, 125, 165-168, 180; and the Center after the elections, 188-189, 200; and the Radicals, 93, 114, 232, 235; and the election campaign, 109-110, 166, 175-176, 178; and the national bloc, 104-105, 154-162, 173. 185, 190,246; opposed to Social Democrats, 146, 172, 222; 100 n„ 136,141, 145, 231 Conservative - Center majority or bloc, 173, 185 Conservative press, 81, 121, 148 n., 155 Conservative Korrespondenz, 155,160 Copper, Simon, leader of the Southwest African revolt, 22 Cornelius, leader of the Southwest African revolt, 22, 76 n. Crimitschau textile strike, 179 n. Cumberland, Duke of, 62, 142 Curia, 14, 126, 139 Daily Telegraph Affair. 246 Danish Party, 62, 64, 95 n., 142, 166, 175 Dasbach, Georg, Centrist politician, 32 David, Eduard, Social Democratic politician, 61 n„ 216, 225, 227 Delbrück, Hans, Conservative journalist, 116 n., 121 n., 156, 161 Dernburg, Bernhard, Colonial Director and Colonial Secretary, appointed, 72; policies, 73, 96, 179, in Reichstag debates on colonies, 74, 76-83, 85, 88-90, 93; encourages dissolution of the Reichstag, 88, 101; activitv in the election campaign, 106-107, 116, 163-164; policies after the elections, 193, 198201, 215, 234, 243-244; and the Center, 77-82, 98, 100,198-201,232; supported by the Radicals, 111, 234; 118 Diemling, Colonel von, head of militarv forces in Southwest Africa, 37, 39, 86, 92 Disarmament, 60, 194, 208, 236

27O

INDEX

Dreesbach, Social Democratic politician, 95 11. Dresden, Social Democratic Congress at, 144, 214 Dusseldorf resolution, of national Catholics, 137 E a s t Africa, see German East Africa Economic Alliance, a conservative party, 13; and property tax, 52; and Guelphs, 62; number in the Reichstag, 63; and policy in Africa, 95 n.; and election results, 166,175 Eickhoff, R., Radical politician, 50, 237 Einem, General von, Prussian War Minister, 201 Elections, see Reichstag elections Electoral League of former Africans, 117 Electoral League of Liberals, see Radical Alliance Encirclement, 18, 194, 207-208, 242 England, German rivalry with, 18; German policy toward, 190, 194, 197, 209, 215, 241, 243, 246 E n t e n t e powers, 242 Erzberger, Matthias, Centrist politician, leader of Center radicals, 32,40,64, 71. 74, 197; attacks colonial administration, 33, 35-36; reveals colonial scandals, 34, 86, 88; relations with the Colonial department, 41,43,44 n„ 73; on colonial policy, 75, 77-78; to defend Roeren. 81; praised by Radical press, 83; attacked by the government, 123; supports Dernburg, 199, 201; leadership discredited, 194195; on defense, 201-203, 206 Essen, Social Democratic Congress in, 214, 217, 224-225 Eulenburg, Philipp, Prince zu. 67-68 Evangelical League. 39, 69. 128 Evangelical press, 120 Evangelicals, 24 n., 104, 134 Falk, Prussian Minister for Education, 128 Fatherland, 28, 103, 111, 112, 113, 117, 119, 127, 131, 139. 145, 147, 165, 202, 221, 227, 228, 239. 252 Federated Governments, 105, 106, 249, 252 Fehrenbaeh, Konstantin, Centrist politician. 195 n. Fernando Po, 86

Ferry, Jules, French Foreign M i n ister, 196 Fichte, 118 Fielding, leader of the Southwest African revolt, 76 n. Finance bill, 1909, 246 Fischbeck, Otto, Radical politician, 162, 163 n. Fischer, Cardinal, Archbishop of Cologne, 25 n., 138, 139 Fischer, Major, official in the Colonial Department, 23 Food prices, rise in, 70-71 Foreign Office, 19, 20, 198 Foreign policy, of Germany, 17-18, 30, 68, 183, 194, 197, 207-210, 240242 Fortschritt, 237 France, German rivalry with, 18; German policy toward, 190, 209, 241; colonial policy of, 196 Franco-German accord over M o rocco, 1909, 241 Frankfurt program, 55. 232 Frankfurter Zeitung, 237 Free Conservative Party, and national questions, 13; number in the Reichstag, 63; and colonial policy, 75. 95 n.; opposed to the Center, 85; in the election, 109, 136 n.; and the Imperial Union against Social Democracy, 145; in the national bloc, 155, 163, 164 n . ; and the election returns, 166, 175 Free Conservative press, 155 Friedberg, Robert, National Liberal politician, 162 Friedrich August, King of Saxony, 177 Fritzen, Archbishop of Strassburg, 170 n. Fusangel, Centrist politician, 40 n. Galster, Admiral, 238 General strike, 224 General Staff, Prussian, 76 n., 92, 93 n„ 123 George V. King of Hanover. 62 George. King of Saxony, 177 Germania, 130, 133. 141, 169,186,199, 205, 206 German Conservative P a r t y , see Conservatives German East African, 17, 19, 20, 29, 197. 199; railway in, 220 German East Africa Co., 19 n. German honor, 106, 113, 123, 146

INDEX

27I

German people, national spirit and patriotism, 11, 12, 15, 103, 183, 241, 247; attitude to colonies and imperialism, 18, 107, 109, 112, 116, 123, 133, 182; flattered by Bülow, 166-167; appealed to by Bülow, 250-253; attitude to defense, 201204; and national questions, 210, 244; and German foreign policy, 194, 207, 240-241 German Radical Party, 45, 46 German Reform Party, 95 n. German Southwest Africa, 17, 20; revolt in, 21-22; military budget for, 85, 90-96, 108, 125, 193, 197, 198,215,229; indemnity to settlers in, 33, 38, 53, 60, 191, 193, 198, 233-234, 250; railway in, 36-37, 39, 50, 53, 60, 74, 76 n„ 85, 89-96, 193, 198, 233, 250; revolt in, 21-23, 31, 33-34, 49, 59-60, 63, 66, 75, 84, 92, 112, 146, 193; troops in, 91, 95, 193, 199; an issue in the election campaign, 103, 105, 106, 108-110, 112, 117, 130; policy in, 197, 200, 220 German Southwest Africa Co., 19 n. Germany, unification, 11; political situation in, 66; prestige, honor and world position as campaign issue, 105-106. 108-109, 111, 113, 115, 119, 121, 123, 127, 131, 137, 146. 184, 252; no responsible ministry, 121; suffrage in, 175; national policies encouraged by the elections, 238-241, 244 Government press, 137, 139, 141, 155 Gracchi, 185 Grenzboten, 188 Gröber, Adolf, Centrist politician, 73, 99, 124 n., 133, 136 n., 190 Guelphs, political party, 62; opposition to Bülow, 64; vote on colonial bills, 94 n., 95 n.; campaign against, 118-119, 143. 162; campaign activity, 141-142; supported by Socialists, 172; and Centrists, 173; and election results, 175, 181, 249, 253

Hamburger Nachrichten, 121 Hammann, Otto, head of German press bureau, 159 n. Hanau, elections in, 168 Hannoverscher Courier, 123,124,127, 154 Hanover, 62, 142 n. Hanover, Social Democratic Congress at, 212 Hanoverians, 142 Hapsburg Emperors, 11 Harden, Maximilian, journalist, 68, 120 Harnack, Adolf, professor, 116 n. Hatzfeld, Hermann Prince von, 188, 189 Haussmann, Conrad, Radical politician, 54 n., 172 n., 236 Helphand, Alexander, 152, 218 Hereros, native tribe of Southwest Africa, 21, 146 Hertling, Georg Count von, Centrist politician, leader of conservative Centrists, 31, 35, 71, 138, 169, 245; vote on colonial bills, 40 n.; considered for Reichstag presidency, 188-189; supports Bülow's foreign policy, 207-209; his patriotism, 210 Hervé, French Socialist, 214, 224 Historisch-politische Blätter, 190 Hitze, Franz, Centrist politician, 40 n. Hohenlohe, Ernst Prince, Colonial Director, 35, 39, 69, 72, 85 Hohenzollern monarchy, 12 Holle, Ludwig, Minister for Education, 231 Holstein, Baron F. von, official in the Foreign Office, 100 n. Holy Roman Empire, 11 Hompesch, Alfred Count von, Centrist politician, 198 Hompesch Amendment, to 4th supplementary budget for Southwest Africa. 1906, 91. 94, 95, 96 Hottentots, native tribe in Southwest Africa. 22. 110. 130. 146 " Hottentot Elections," 149 Hottentot revolt, 112 " Hunger Elections," 149

Haase, Hugo. Social Democratic politician. 226 Häusler, Centrist politician, 202 Hague, disarmament conference at The, 194, 208, 230 Hahn, member of the Agrarian League, 154

Imperial Anti-Ultramontane Union, 128

Imperial Chancelry, 114, 163, 166, 191 Imperial Party, see Free Conservative Party Imperial Post Office, 164, 192

272

INDEX

Imperial Union Against Social Democracy, 106, 108, 143-146, 159 n„ 162 n„ 178, 249 Imperialism, German government and, 17-21; the Center and, 30, 196-197, 201; Social Democrats and, 57-59, 83-84, 150-152, 214221; National Liberals support, 85; an issue in the Reichstag debates, 96; an issue in the elections, 103-116, 130, 150-152, 179, 182; growing belief in, 239-242 Indemnity for Southwest African settlers, see German Southwest Africa India, 107 Invincible, battleship, 203 Italy, 14 Jacobins, 252 Jesuits, 128 Junkers, 158 Kaempf, Johannes, Radical politician, Vice-president of the Reichstag, 160, 189 Kaiser Wilhelmsland, 17 Kajata, Prince, leader of the Southwest African revolt, 22 Kamerun, 17, 20, 21, 41, 197 Kanitz, Hans, Count von, Conservative politician, 154, 155, 173 Kardorff, Wilhelm von, Free Conservative politician, 30 Kautsky, Karl, Social Democratic journalist and politician, 61 n., 151, 153, 216, 217 Keetmanshoop, 76 n. Kiel, University of, 118; Canal, 203; Regatta, 204 Keim, General August. 28 n., 113, 114, 134 n., 163 n., 164 Kiaochow, 17, 20, 47 n. Koch, official in the Colonial Department, 80 n. Kölnische Volkszeitung, 168 n., 205 Kölnische Zeitung, 110 König, Assessor, official in the Colonial Department, 41 n., 43 n. Königsberg, 162, 168 Kopp, Georg, Cardinal, Archbishop of Breslau, 139 Kopsch. Julius, Radical politician, 47 n., 53 n„ 154 Korfanty, Polish nationalist, 61 Kreuzzeitung, 122, 155, 160 Kubub-Keetmanshoop railway, 193, 198, 233, 250

Kulturkampf, 14, 23, 104, 126 n., 127128, 133-135, 252 Laissez-faire. 46 Lassar, O., National Liberal speaker, 127 n. League of German Civil Servants, 118

League of German Traveling Salesmen, 118 Lebedour, Georg, Social Democratic politician, 92, 215, 216, 224 Leipziger Volkszeitung, 148, 165 Leist, Governor of Kamerun, 20 Leo XIII, Pope, 127 n. Lerchenield, Hugo Count von. Bavarian Minister in Berlin and member of the Bundesrat, 88 n., 187 n. Lèse-majesté, law against, 231 Liberal press, 120, 165 Lieber, Ernst, Centrist politician, 26 Liebermann von Sonnenberg, Max Hugo, Anti-Semitic politician. 154 Liebert, General Eduard von, head of the Imperial Union against Social Democracy, 106, 120, 143, 163 n., 200, 249 Liebnecht, Karl, Social Democratic journalist, 61 n„ 223 Lindequist, Friedrich von, Governor of Southwest Africa and UnderSecretary of the Colonial Office, 86, 87, 86 n„ 107, 164 Loebell, Friedrich von, chief of the Imperial Chancelry, 43 n., 44 n., 87, 88, 89 n., 100, 163. 164 Lorenz, Max, journalist, 156 Lorrainers. minority party, 62 Los von Rom, 81, 119, 126 Luderitzbucht, 23 Lübeck, 162 Machtpolitik, 196 Maherero, Samuel, leader of Southwest African revolt, 22 Malinowsky, Father, Roman Catholic missionary, 108 n. Manchesterianism, 55, 250 Manila Bay, 20 Mannheim, Social Democratic Congress in, 144, 229 Manteuffel, Otto von. vice-president of the Prussian House of Lords, 155, 161-163 Marshall Islands, 17 Marx. Karl, 218 Marxianism, 55, 147, 149

INDEX

273

National Liberal press, 85, 88,127 n., Marxists, 142, 147, 173, 214 154, 155, 183 Mehring, Franz, Social Democratic National Liberal Youth, 124 n., 172 journalist and historian. 61 n. Militarism, 18; Social Democratic National labor unions, 144 opposition to, 55-57, 148-150, 214, National parties, in the election campaign, 114-117, 122, 127, 162221-226 163, 178, 181; after the election, Military bills, 1874, 15; 1887, 15, 189 25 n„ 45; 1893, 16, 26, 45, 127 n.; 1899, 26, 27, 45, 48; 1905, 28, 45, National press, 139-140 49, 50; budget 1907, 201-202, 221; National Socialists, 154 1911, 226, 233, 235-236; budget National Zeitung, 123 Nationalism, see patriotism 1912, 203 Military expansion, and Conserva- Naumann, Friedrich, National Socialist politician, 46 n., 54, 154, tives, 12; and the Center, 26-27; 161, 231 and the Radicals, 48-49, 235-236 Naval expansion, of Germany, 28, Middle Class Party, 175 45, 48, 50-51, 57 n., 203-207, 226Middle European Alliance, 242 227, 229, 236-238, 243-244 Moltke, Helmuth von, Chief of the Navy Bill, 1898, 28, 45, 48; 1900, 28, Prussian General Staff, 68 45, 48; 1906. 50-51, 57 n., 203, 229; Monopoly contracts, 76, 78 budget 1907, 203; 1908, 205-207, Morgena, leader of the Southwest 226, 237-238, 243; 1912, 227, 238 African revolt, 22, 37, 76 n. Morocco, German policy in, 17,58 n., Navy League, 28, 113-115, 162 n., 163-164, 178, 192, 205 62, 67, 209, 241 Nera Roma, 140 Moroccan Crisis, 17, 40, 207 Morris, Abraham, leader of the New Guinea, 220 New Guinea Colonial Co., 19 n. Southwest African revolt, 76 n. Zeitung, Müller - Meiningen, Ernst, Radical Norddeutsche Allgemeine 105-6, 108, 122, 127, 147 n„ 154,157, politician, 52 n., 54 n., 55, 83, 235, 167, 183, 210 236, 239 Noske, Gustav, Social Democratic Müller - Sagan, Hermann, Radical politician, 221-227 politician, 42, 50 n„ 51 n., 235 Munich, University of, 118 Oldenburg - Januschau, Elard von, Conservative politician, 222 National Catholics, 137-140 Open Door policy, 17, 58 National honor, an issue in the 1907 Orthodox Social Demócrata, 60-61, elections, 144, 147, 148, 152, 182, 149, 152, 211-212, 214-218, 221, 223183; in the 1912 elections, 239, 225 240, 244 Osnabrück, 138 National Liberals, political party, Ostmark, 141 strength and position in the Reich- Ottweiler, 172 stag, 16, 23, 63, 249; attitude toward the Center, 13-14, 25 n., 31, Paasche, Hermann, National Liberal 85; election campaign against the politician, vice-president of the Center, 104, 122-123, 126-127, 168, Reichstag, 85 n., 189, 200 170-171, 180; attitude toward de- Pan-German League, 115-116, 181, fense and national questions, 12184 16, 45, 75, 84, 103, 209, 236, 239, Papists, 142 251; and the elections. 1907, 110- Parvus, see Helphand, Alexander 111,114, 141, 166, 175-176; and the Patriotism, German, 15, 18; and the national bloc, 155, 157-158, 161, Center, 26; an issue in the 1907 173, 246, 250; and the Social elections, 103, 109, 119-120, 126, Democrats, 146-147, 172. 212; and 140, 146-148, 152-153, 156, 166, 178, property tax, 52, 57 n.; 26, 62, 136, 182-183; and colonial policy, 193; 145, 190, 231 and the Center after the elections, National Liberal Executive Commit194, 197, 198, 204, 210, 245; and tee, 124 the Social Democrats, 222, 227-

2/4

INDEX

228; in the 1912 elections, 239; stronger after 1907, 240, 244, 247 Payer, Friedrich von, Radical politician, 54, 230 Peters, Karl, explorer and governor of German East Africa, 19, 20, 115 n. Pfleiderer. Dr., National Liberal politician, 124 n. Pius X, Pope, 25 n. Podbielski, General Viktor von, Secretary of Agriculture, 22, 68 Poeplau, official in the Colonial Department, 42, 43, 80 n., 83, 195 Poles, see Polish Parly Polish agitation combatted, 118 Polish Party, nature and position in the Reichstag, 61, 64, 120, 137 n., 249; opposed Ablass Amendment, 94 n., 95 n.; activity in the 1907 elections, 140-141; supported by Social Democrats, 172-173; campaign against, 115, 118, 119, 124 n., 127, 143, 162, 253; and election results, 166, 174-175, 181; and military policies, 203, 236 Polish school strike, 61, 66, 71, 141 Posadowsky, Arthur, Count von, Imperial Secretary for the Interior, 67 n„ 88, 127, 164, 231-232 Post, Die, 154, 182 Potemkin, 75 Prague, Treaty of, 142 Progressive People's Party, 15-16,18, 235 Protestants, 11, 128-129, 134 n„ 252 Protestant leagues, 128-129 Prussia, and the German Empire, 11-12; the Catholic Church in, 14; culture, 158; hated by South German Catholics, 124 n.; House of Lords, 145, 162; House of Representatives, 121,145, 162, 231; Ministry of State, 165; Polish policy, 140; railway policy, 177; school policy, 141, 231; suffrage reform in, 230-231 Prussian Conservatives, 12 Puttkamer, Jesco von, governor of Kamerun, 21, 78 n., 84 Quaker colonization, in America, 151 Raab, Friedrich Wilhelm, AntiSemitic politician, 95 n. Radical Alliance, a national party, 45; strength in the Reichstag, 63; and the Frankfurt program, 55;

and property tax, 52; association with Dernburg, 72; and colonial policy, 37, 95 n.; and the national bloc, 155, 173-174; in the election campaign, 166; and election results, 175; Barth resigns from, 232; agreement with other Radical parties, 233 Radical People's Party, nature and strength, 18, 45-46, 64; attitude national policies, 18, 46, 99, 103, 124-125, 229, 233-234, 239, 245; and naval expansion, 29, 48, 50-53, 204-206, 229, 236-238; and military policies, 45, 48-50, 235-236; attitude toward colonial policy and imperialism, 34-37, 46-47, 50, 5254, 64, 66, 73-75, 77-78, 82-83, 8687, 91, 93, 95 n., 221, 229, 233-235; Billow's relations with, 44, 53, 9899, 101-102, 190, 250; proposes property tax, 29,51,52; and Frankfurt program, 55; and the Dane, 62; allied with Conservatives, 93; in the elections with the national bloc, 104, 105, 154, 162, 173, 178; election campaign against the Center, 104, 122, 126, 135, 168, 180; campaign against reaction, 114, 148 n.; and imperialism as an election issue, 111-112; opposed by the Center, 134,165; supported by the Polish Party, 141; antiSocial Democratic campaign, 147; supported by Social Democrats, 172-173; campaign tactics, 163 n., 166, 173; and the election results, 174-176, 179, 181; in the national bloc in 1907, 185, 187, 189-190, 229232, 246; cooperation with Socialists, 212-213; and school reform, 231; and the Associations Law, 232; union with other Radical parties, 232-233; and disarmament, 236; and trade treaties, 46, 251 Radical press, 63, 81, 85, 88, 115, 143, 155, 157-158, 159 n., 179, 237 Radziwill, Princess Marie, 164,182 n. Reform Party, 176 n. Reformation, 128 Reichstag, German, Center Party in, 14, 23, 26, 30, 32, 35, 120, 122, 128, 138, 181, 190, 194, 199, 200, 245; and the Chancellor, 63-64,102,121, 245-247; and colonial policy, 3340. 63, 66, 77, 84, 87, 92, 94, 97, 103, 107, 111, 113, 191, 193, 243; debates, 74 ff., 191 ff.; dissolved

INDEX

three times, 12; dissolution 1879, 15; dissolution 1887, 15, 190; dissolution 1893,16; dissolution 1906, 12, 88-90, 92, 94-95, 97-101, 103, 105, 106, 110, 123, 127, 134 n„ 140, 143, 144, 148, 156, 193, 252; and foreign policy, 18, 194, 207, 208; legislative period five years, 27; and military command, 110; national Reichstag an issue in the elections, 114, 117-119, 124, 154, 182-184; national after 1907, 231, 239-241; and national questions, 16, 84, 96, 109, 202, 238; National Liberals in, 13; and naval policy, 203, 206, 209, 236. 243; party alignment in, 63, 158, 167, 185-186, 249; Radicals in, 156-157, 233-237; Social Democrats in, 18, 143, 146, 148, 153, 175, 176, 180, 213, 215, 221, 226, 228, 245; labeled unpatriotic. 105, 108 ; 90, 188. 189 Reichstag Budget Commission, 35, 37, 85-89, 91, 117, 197, 201. 206, 209 Reichstag Budget Rights, 27, 51-52, 75-76, 132-133, 140, 142-143, 148, 153 Reichstag elections, of 1887, 16; of 1893, 16; of 1903, 104, 249; of 1903 in Saxony, 177 Reichstag elections of 1907, the campaign. 103 ff.; importance, 181184, 210, 239-247; returns, 166, 174-181; reviewed by Billow, 189; debated in the Reichstag, 191192; effect upon the Social Democrats. 211-214, 220, 225-226, 229; 12, 25 Reval conference, 242 Revisionism, Social Democratic, 144, 214. 245. See Revisionists Revisionists, 60-61. 143. 149. 151, 211-212, 214. 217-221, 225-226 Rheinbach. 204, 237 Rhenish Prussia. 31 Rhineland. 32, 170-172 Reign of Terror, 252 Richter, Eugen. Radical politician, 46, 49. 52-54. 197, 239, 250 Rickert. Heinrich, Radical politician, 45 n. Rinteln, Viktor, Centrist politician, 40 n. Robespierre, 143, 252 Roeren. Hermann. Centrist politician. 24 n.. 32. 41. 43. 71. 73, 74, 78-83. 85, 90, 91, 98, 101, 123, 136, 194-195

275

Rome, 82, 127, 129. 139, 178 Roman Catholic Church, 12, 14. 25, 29, 104, 129, 134 n., 135, 139, 140, 252 Roman Catholicism, 104, 122, 126128, 133-135, 253 Roman Catholic orders, 125 Roman Catholic party, 168, 171, 189. See Center Party Roman Catholics, 11, 13, 14, 23, 29, 133, 115 n„ 120, 122-123, 126, 127, 129, 133-135, 137, 140, 141, 169, 173, 177, 186, 252 Roosevelt, Theodore, President of the United States, 208 n. Rothenburg-Hoyerswerde, 163 Russia, 241 Salm-Horstmar, Otto, Prince, President of the Navy League, 28 n., 115, 162 n. Samoa, 17, 20 Savigny, Leo von, professor, 138 Saxony, anti-Socialist campaign in, 147; national bloc in, 162; elections of 1907 in, 176-178; electoral reform in, 231 Schaedler, Franz Xaver, Centrist politician, 32, 74. 77, 190 Schafer, Dietrich, professor, 116 n. Schleswig. 62, 142 Schmidt, George, colonial official, 44 n., 79 n. Schmidt-Elberfeld. Reinhardt, Radical politician, 53 n. Schiemann, Theodor, professor and conservative journalist, 116 n. Schlettwein, Karl, Southwest African planter, 117 Schmoller, Gtistav, professor, chairman of the Action Committee on Imperialism, 116 Schrader, Karl, Radical politician, 45 n.. 54, 173 Schwabaeh, Paul von, banker, 162 n., 163 Schwarze, Wilhelm, Centrist politician. 40 n., 198 Semler. Johannes, National Liberal politician, 85 n., 86. 200 Sering. Max. professor, 116 n. Shantung, 17. 47 n. Singer, Paul, Social Democratic politician. 153. 215, 216 Silesia, the Center Party in, 24, 31, 13S. 168 Social Democratic Party, and Bismarck, 14-15; strength and posi-

276

INDEX

tion in the Reichstag. 16, 18, 23, 63, 144, 213, 239. 245. 249, 251; and Bulow, 64, 97, 102, 164, 189, 191-192, 249-253; and the Center, 83, 90 n„ 120, 124 n„ 138, 168, 171173, 194, 195 n„ 212; colonial policy and imperialism, 34, 36, 5759, 74-75, 78, 83-84, 93, 94 n„ 95 n „ 201, 215-221, 250; cheer for dissolution of the Reichstag, 94; and foreign policy, 18, 56; militarism and defense, 56-57, 203, 221-228, 236; and N a t i o n a l Liberals, 15, 212; and national policies, 12, 18, 55, 240, 245; and t h e navy, 57, 226-227; an iseue in tlie election campaign, 103-104, 110. 112, 115, 118, 119. 121,135,142-148, 154, 187188, 249-253; opposed by the national bloc, 154-155, 157, 161-162, 165; activity in the campaign, 141, 148-153, 166-167,169, 171-174; election returns show d e f e a t of, 167, 174-176; significance of d e f e a t discussed, 179-181; effect of d e f e a t on, 211-213; becomes more m o d erate, 212-215. 225, 228-229; in Saxony, 177-178; on disarmament, 194; patriotism, 227-228; and t h e Radical parties, 212-213. See also Revisionists, Orthodox Social Democratic P a r t y Congress, a t Hanover, 1899,212; at Dresden, 1903,144,214; a t M a n n h e i m , 1906, 144, 229; a t Essen. 1907, 214, 217, 224-225; in 1908, 214 Socialism, German. See Social Democratic P a r t y Socialism, international, 12, 214; congress a t Stuttgart, 1907, 214216, 224, 228 Socialist press, 63, 146, 149, 217, 223, 226 Socialists, see Social Democratic Party Spahn, Martin, professor, 131 Spahn, Peter, Centrist politician, on the n a t u r e of the Center P a r t y , 24 n.. 134 n . ; leader of nationally minded and conservative Centrists. 31, 35, 71, 78. 100. 210. 245; on t h e navy, 29, 204-207. 237; on colonial policy. 40 n., 86-87, 89, 91, 136 n., 196-199; relations with Bulow. 44, 73. 74. 99. 186. 190; and William I I . 69 n . ; and t h e dissolution of the Reichstag. 90. 94; considered for vice-president

of the Reichstag. 1S9; on military policy, 195-196; on disarmament, 208 n. Solomon Islands, 17 South G e r m a n People's P a r t y , 5455, 64; and navy bill, 51 n.; a n d colonial policy, 54, 65, 95 n.; n a tional stand and t h e Reichstag's dissolution, 98-99; and the national bloc, 155; and election returns, 175 Southwest Africa, see G e r m a n Southwest Africa Sozialistische Monatschcjte, 218 States' Rights, 26-27 Stettin, 147 n. Stolberg-Wemigerode, U d o C o u n t von, Conservative politician, President of the Reichstag, 189 Storz, Christian, Radical politician, 54 n. Strassburg, 141, 170 n. Strombeck, Innozenz von, Centrist politician, 40 n. Studt, K o n r a d von, Prussian M i n ister of Education. 156, 231 Stuebel, Oskar, Colonial Director, 41, 42, 43 n. Stuttgart, International Socialist Congress at, 214-216, 224, 228 Styler Mission. 20, 41 Süddeutsche Korrespondenz, 157,159 Suffrage reform, in Saxony, 177; in Prussia, 231 Supplementary g o v e r n m e n t . 135-136, 140 Swakopmund, 23 Sylvester Letter. 106. 120, 139. 143, 157, 159 n„ 249-253 Tariffs, 16, 17, 30. 46, 158-160. 190191 Temps, Paris, 18S Tirpitz, Admiral A. von, Secretary of State for the X a v y , 16. 88-S9, 204-205. 237-238. 243-244, 246 Tippelskirch & Co., 22-23, 34 . 68, 76 n„ 84 Togoland, 17, 20, 21. 41-42, 73. 7980, 197 T r a d e unionism, a n d t h e Social Democrats. 146, 229 T r i m b o r n . Karl, C e n t r i s t politician, 31. 132-133 T r o t h a . General von, G e r m a n militarv c o m m a n d e r in Southwest Africa. 22

INDEX Turkey, German policy in, 17, 241242 Ultramontanism, 25, 82, 103-104, 124 n., 125, 126 n., 128, 187 Vatican, 126, 139 Vanutelli, Cardinal, 25 n. Venezuela, German policy in, 20 Veterans, 118 Veterans leagues, 117 Vollmar, Georg von, Social Democratic politician, 61 n., 228 von der Tann, German battleship, 203 Vorwaerts, 148, 150-151 Vossische Zeitung, 126, 128 Wagner, Adolf, professor, 116 n. Waldburg - Zeil - Trauschburg, Konstantin, Prince von, 137 War Department, 22 Waterberg, 22 Wehlau, Governor of Kamerun, 20 Weimar, elections in, 174 Weltpolitik, German, 18, 48, 55-57, 115-116, 129-131, 148, 150-153, 156, 184, 197, 239-244 Westphalia, Center party in, 24, 32 Wiemer. Otto, Radical politician, 235-237 Wilhelmstrasse, 113-114, 134 n„ 163 William II, Emperor of Germany, and Brunswick, 62; and Bülow, 67,

277

97, 187 n., 246; and the Catholic Church, 140; and Catholics, 69-70, 188, 252; and the Center Party, 186; and colonial policy, 20; approves of the Reichstag's dissolution, 88-89; and foreign policy, 241 ; and naval expansion, 16 ; and the Navy League, 115; his " p e r sonal régime," 66, 68, 143, 148, 153, 252 ; his supreme military command, 75, 110, 136; on the election results, 182; address from the throne, 191; and Weltpolitik, 244 Windhorst, Ludwig, Centrist politician, 25 n., 26, 29 Wistuba, colonial sub-altern, 42, 43, n., 79-80 Witboi, Hendrick, leader of the Hottentot revolt, 22 Woermann Line, 23, 34, 84 World politics, see Weltpolitik Württemberg, elections in, 172 Würzburg, elections in, 172 Wurm, Social Democratic politician, 216 Zedlitz und Neukirch, Octavio Freiherr von, Free Conservative politician, 89, 154 n., 162-163 Zehnhoff, Hugo am, Centrist politician, 40 n. Zukunft, Die, 120