The Generative Power of Hope: Anticipating Possibilities in Times of Crises 3030950204, 9783030950200

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Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17

Frederick Bird

The Generative Power of Hope Anticipating Possibilities in Times of Crises

Library of Public Policy and Public Administration Volume 17

Series Editor Michael Boylan, Department of Philosophy, Marymount University, Arlington, VA, USA Editorial Board Members Simona Giordano, Reader in Bioethics, School of Law, Manchester University, Manchester, UK David Koepsell, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Director of Research and Strategic Initiatives at Comisión Nacional de Bioética (CONBIOETICA), Mexico Seumas Miller, Research Fellow, Charles Sturt University, Australia and Delft University, The Netherlands, Australia Gabriel Palmer-Fernandez, Professor and Chair Philosophy, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, OH, USA Wanda Teays, Professor Philosophy, Mount St. Mary’s University, Los Angeles, CA, USA Jonathan Wolff, Professor of Political Philosophy, Blavatnik School of Government, Oxford University, UK

Around the world there are challenges to the way we administer government. Some of these have to do with brute force that is backed by self-interest. However, there are those intrepid souls who think we are all better than this. This series of monographs and edited collections of original essays seeks to explore the very best way that governments can execute their sovereign duties within the sphere of ethically-based public policy that recognizes human rights and the autonomy of its citizens. Proposals to the series can include policy questions that are nationally or internationally situated. For example, regional migration from victims of war, terrorism, police integrity, political corruption, the intersection between politics and public health, hunger, clean water and sanitation, global warming, treatment of the “other” nationally and internationally, and issues of distributive justice and human rights. Proposals that discuss systemic changes in the structure of government solutions will also be considered. These include corruption and anti-corruption, bribery, nepotism, and effective systems design. Series benchmark: 110,000-150,000 words. Special books can be somewhat longer. More information about this series at https://link.springer.com/bookseries/6234

Frederick Bird

The Generative Power of Hope Anticipating Possibilities in Times of Crises

Frederick Bird Political Science Department University of Waterloo Waterloo, ON, Canada

ISSN 1566-7669 Library of Public Policy and Public Administration ISBN 978-3-030-95020-0    ISBN 978-3-030-95021-7 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Contents

Part I Introduction 1 Can You Give Us Good Reasons to Hope?��������������������������������������������    3 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   11 2 A Critical Moment ����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   13 2.1 The Best of Times and the Worst of Times ������������������������������������   13 2.2 A Critical Moment in the History of Human Life on Earth������������   17 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   21 Part II The Generative Power of Hope 3 The Virtue of Hope����������������������������������������������������������������������������������   25 3.1 Hope as a Virtue������������������������������������������������������������������������������   30 3.2 Micro-dynamics of Hope����������������������������������������������������������������   35 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   40 4 Cultivating Hope��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   43 4.1 Personal Perspectives on the Cultivation of Hope��������������������������   43 4.2 Social Perspectives on the Cultivation of Hope������������������������������   49 4.3 Faith, Hope, and Love��������������������������������������������������������������������   52 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   54 5 Habits of Hoping��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   55 5.1 Variations in the Strength of Our Hoping ��������������������������������������   55 5.2 Good Reasons for “Hope” Typically Engender Not Hopefulness but Confidence����������������������������������������������������   62 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   67 6 The Social Practice of Hoping����������������������������������������������������������������   69 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   81

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7 Hope Makes a Difference������������������������������������������������������������������������   83 7.1 Ethical Imperatives and Hope ��������������������������������������������������������   83 7.2 Historical Examples������������������������������������������������������������������������   84 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������   91 Part III Learning from History 8 The Critical Value of a Due Regard for History�����������������������������������   95 8.1 What a Due Regard for History Entails������������������������������������������   96 8.2 Benefits We Gain from Cultivating a Due Regard for History ������  101 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  113 9 After the Fall: Mid-Twentieth Century Reflections on the Crises of Those Times������������������������������������������������������������������  115 9.1 Introduction: Reflections After Two World Wars, the Great Depression, the Death Camps, the Beginnings of the End of the Great Age of Imperialism, and the Dropping of the First Nuclear Bombs ������������������������������������������������������������  115 9.2 Karl Jaspers: The Origin and Goal of History��������������������������������  117 9.3 Albert Camus: The Rebel����������������������������������������������������������������  127 9.4 Hannah Arendt: The Burden of Our Time��������������������������������������  136 9.5 Conclusion: Learning from These Mid-Twentieth Century Reflections��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  146 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  153 Part IV The Crises of Our Times 10 Scrutinizing the Signs of the Times��������������������������������������������������������  157 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  162 11 Humans as Creatures, Cultivators, and Exploiters of the Earth and Its Resources����������������������������������������������������������������  163 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  171 12 The Rise of Science and Reason and Their Contemporary Discontents������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  173 12.1 The Current Situation����������������������������������������������������������������������  173 12.2 Causes of Discontent����������������������������������������������������������������������  176 12.3 Possibilities for Addressing and Reducing Feelings of Discontent����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  185 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  190 13 Increases in Productivity and Their Ambiguous Consequences����������  191 13.1 Increases in Productivity, Fittingly Understood������������������������������  192 13.2 Ambiguous Developments��������������������������������������������������������������  197 13.3 Exploring Several Underlying Causes for These Ambiguous Developments����������������������������������������������������������������������������������  202 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  209

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14 The Political Prospects and Burdens of Our Times������������������������������  213 14.1 Constructive Political Developments����������������������������������������������  214 14.2 Current Political Challenges ����������������������������������������������������������  220 14.3 Politics and Rumors of Politics������������������������������������������������������  227 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  228 15 The Fulfilling and Elusive Pursuits of Happiness and Love����������������  231 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  239 16 Further Reflections on the Signs of Our Times������������������������������������  241 16.1 Why Do We Despair in Desperate Times?��������������������������������������  241 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  247 17 Conclusion: Carpe Diem ������������������������������������������������������������������������  249 17.1 Grounds for Hope ��������������������������������������������������������������������������  250 17.2 Hopeful People Make a Difference������������������������������������������������  253 Works Cited�����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  259 Afterword����������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  261 Appendices��������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  263 Notes������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  287 Works Cited������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  295 Index������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������  305

Part I

Introduction

Chapter 1

Can You Give Us Good Reasons to Hope?

Abstract  This chapter introduces the arguments of the book as a whole. We live in a time of multiple crises. We long for good reasons to hope. Many of us look for something beyond ourselves that might help to make us feel hopeful. This book argues that hope is decisive. It makes a huge difference in our ability to address the crises of our age. However, I argue that hope is not primarily a derivative state of being based on external factors. It is a disposition that can be cultivated by everyone. It is a generative disposition that realistically anticipates possibilities and helps us to address present challenges when the future is uncertain and unknown. In multiple ways, the world in which we live seems threatening and out of balance. It is easy to identify a wide range of disturbing problems. As a result of human activity, the Earth’s climate is warming. This warming has already led to an increase in powerful and destructive storms, expanded areas of drought, increased the number of forest fires, and raised sea levels. We know these problems will worsen over the next several decades even if today we were dramatically to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases that have caused these changes. Already, as a result of these changes, millions of people have been forced to migrate. Over the next fifty years, many millions more will be forced to move as large areas of the Earth become uninhabitable due to climate change. That is just one of many threats facing our world. As I write, we are living amid a pandemic, which has so far infected many millions and resulted in the death of more than four million people. We don’t know when this pandemic will end and how much more damage it will cause. We understand that the economic costs of this pandemic in terms of job losses, closed businesses, and increased public and private indebtedness, have been great. But we don’t know if and when another pandemic will strike in the future. Over the past four decades, within and between nations worldwide, inequalities in wealth have steadily widened. Although rates of extreme poverty have declined, primarily due to industrial development in China, India, and countries like Brazil, increases in the wealth and power of the wealthy make prospects for the other 95% of the world seem much less open and promising.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_1

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Consider several other disturbing trends. For example, many low-skilled workers lose their jobs in industrial countries as intelligent machines perform more tasks. Many communities and large numbers of workers face bleak futures as diverse enterprises involved in extracting, processing, and utilizing fossil fuels and operating vehicles and businesses using these fuels will be closed. These will affect many Middle Eastern, African, Asian, and Latin American countries as well as communities and workers in the North Atlantic countries. Responding constructively to these crises represents a vast and complex challenge. Urban areas continue to grow but so do the low-income slums in many of these metropolitan areas. At the exact time, costs for housing in these areas have grown faster than the income of people living in these regions. When thinking about disturbing and threatening problems, many point to the ways political processes have become more polarized, trust in governments has declined, and demagogic populist figures have gained popularity and power. To be sure, it is possible to observe several positive trends. People are living longer. On the whole, we are healthier and better educated than in any previous period of human history. In general, women enjoy more rights and opportunities. Overall, standards of living have markedly improved for most humans. We can communicate more widely and quicker than ever before. More people, businesses, and community organizations are committed to acting responsibly to address environmental issues. At no previous point in time have so many people been involved in defending and protecting human rights generally and the rights of minorities in particular. However, none of these positive developments, however significant they are, directly modify or reduce the disturbing realities I reviewed in the previous paragraphs. We must take account of these constructive developments because they provide us bases for acting to address the threats the Earth and we humans are experiencing. Nonetheless, we must also add several other problems to the list of disturbing trends, including growth in mental illness and drug abuse, continuing high rates of hunger, and ongoing violent civil conflicts in dozens of countries. Despite many different forms of economic growth, as of 2020, about two billion people globally live in impoverished households. We also face a complex set of inescapable issues as the legacies of more than three centuries during which imperial powers took possession of other peoples’ lands, subjugated these people, and discriminated against them in many different ways. Every age has faced severe threats. Between 1930 and 1945, the world passed through the Great Depression, the rise of Fascism and totalitarianism in several countries, the creation of death camps and gulags, and a world war that killed 60 million people. However, the crises of our current age differ in some critical ways, which I will analyze in the next chapter and Part Three of this book. Current problems are global. They are interconnected. Their long-range impact may well exceed the consequence of any previous set of crises in human history. In any case, most current crises occasion feelings of urgency, even among those who seek to ignore these crises or at least ignore the aspects that do not immediately affect them. Many nervously feel that the climate crisis will quickly become catastrophic and

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unmanageable if we do not act now. Many people worry that if we do not take steps now, the growing inequalities in wealth and power will increase the number of protests, civil unrest, and violent conflicts. Many people feel threatened by how populist leaders are willing to evade legal requirements to abuse their powers. For many reasons, including efforts to maintain their sense of equilibrium, many people feel deeply cornered by all those groups, who, in diverse ways, express their feelings of urgency and threat. Depending on the circumstances, many people feel threatened by expert authorities announcing doom and gloom. They feel upset by migrants moving into their communities. They feel annoyed by well-meaning reformers proposing initiatives that seem likely to raise their taxes, by proponents of new and different lifestyles, and even by constructive developments that make some people feel inadequate despite their value in practice. Several factors operate to undermine our capacity to understand and respond to the current crises. Today many people are moved and, in practice, unbalanced by feelings and moods that confuse and weaken our ordinary problem-solving capacities. For example, as we try to think of our futures – as individuals, families, and nations – many experience strong and pervasive feelings of fear and despair. We are afraid for ourselves and our communities, as we regard the uncertainties of the pandemic, the anger of some minority groups, changes in the global climate, the unending flows of refugees and migrants, and the ways technology changes are replacing what workers used to do. The problem with fears like these is that they are seldom reasonable. As the philosopher Martha Nussbaum has observed, fear has an insistent and dominating character. As far as we give any attention to them, fears tend to rule us (Nussbaum 2018). In addition, in desperate times like the present, many people despair. As the root meaning of this word indicates, desperate times are indeed times of despair. Despair means to be without hope. People experience despair in many different ways. Many people express despair in its basic form as despondency, feelings of fatalism, and the tendency to expect things to turn out worse than we might like. Despair in this form upsets people more than pessimism, which is primarily a view that situations are not likely to develop in beneficial ways. Despair represents an encompassing mood that tends to leave us inert and unable to act constructively. As the condition of being without hope, despair assumes other forms, which I discuss at greater length in Part One. Like other virtues, hope is the mean between typically polar opposite ways of responding to particular challenges, especially to current crises when the future is unknown and uncertain. As I argue at length, hope is the disposition realistically to anticipate possibilities in these settings. While often despair is expressed directly as despair, at times it is expressed in the opposites of wishful thinking and fanaticism connected with wishful thinking. Wishful thinking represents a way of dreaming or desiring valued futures not restrained by realistic assessments of the present. While overt despair might be described as a lack of hope, wishful thinking might be thought of as a form of excessive hoping. However, excessive hoping is not hoping. It is a way of wishing that is often driven by deep and disturbing feelings of what we are missing or what we feel is wrong. In practice, wishful thinking represents a way of orienting to the future that typically fails to be realistic about current realities. As well, wishful thinking

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fails to accept these givens as the gifts with which we have to work as we respond to the crises we face. I will later demonstrate how feelings of gratitude play a role integral to hope. Characteristically, wishful thinking leads us to idealize how to solve the problems we face because the issues are so severe, and our solutions represent the right thing to do. As a hidden form of despair, wishful thinking encourages us to envision how we can and will solve the climate crisis, reduce police brutality, end poverty, and renew politics because these represent obvious wrongs that must be corrected. Moved by despair in overt or hidden forms, it becomes tough to evaluate and pursue realistic possibilities. Two other widely experienced moods, namely, doubts and distrust of science and reason, and resentment more generally, also undermine our capacities to address the crises of our age in practical and collaborative ways. At greater length, I discuss the role of both of these moods in Part three. Both generate skepticism and make it challenging to develop common frames of reference for action among people who disagree. Feelings of resentment are widely expressed in the complaints many people voice about almost everything from the government regulations to the media, from the influence of the wealthy to globalization, from religious fanatics to traffic jams. Both distrust of science and feelings of resentment have gained strength over the past several decades. Both influentially affect how people think about and respond to the crises of our times. Both moods function to weaken our capacity for problem-­ solving concerning widespread issues facing our world today. All of our anxieties and fears and our feelings of distrust and resentment are further magnified by growing feelings of disenchantment with political processes. Too many politicians and public officials seem to be pursuing policies designed to further their own advantage. Politics seems to have become excessively partisan. While some countries suffer from weak governments, others suffer from overly autocratic governments. The widespread feelings of disenchantment with governments matter because these feelings reinforce our sense of powerlessness concerning the crises we face. After all, if we have any chance of addressing crises like climate change, the rise in civil discord, continuing poverty, and the current and future pandemics, we must be able to count on governments to act responsively and effectively. While we rely on governments more than ever to provide a wide range of services and exercise leadership, many people feel disappointed and disenchanted with the role governments actually seem to be playing. As we become more conscious of the scope and depth of the crises we face and sense in ourselves and others the increasing ways fear, despair, distrust, resentment, and political disenchantment take hold of us, we desire to find good reasons for hope. We long to find a way through these crises and beyond our dark moods. We scan the horizons and listen to the news, looking for signs that will put us at ease, seeking to discern pathways leading in promising directions. Often, we attend to articulate would-be prophets who might have a good read on these crises and offer hints of ways forward. At its core, this longing for hope is neither wistful dreaming nor wishful thinking. We long for something that seems realistic and compelling, that will allow us to take practical steps to calm our anxieties, limit our fears and distrust, and make us feel good about ourselves and our world. Would-be panaceas

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and idealistic schemes do attract many followers. However, because of the degree that they are impractical, they often seem to aggravate feelings of despair and disenchantment. For many understandable reasons, we long for good reasons to hope. Characteristically, many of us seek grounds for hope beyond ourselves. We search for something solid external to ourselves – an attractive plan, ingenious technology, a compelling ideology or world view, scientific breakthroughs, and promising views of the future – on which we can hook our desires for hope. In some cases, we attach our longing for hope to particular leaders that both acknowledge our longings, thereby making us feel good about ourselves, and offer plans that seem in some ways to address immediate problems that especially distress us. Two features of this longing for hope are noteworthy. First, hope is, I think rightly, regarded as decisive. When we feel hopeful, we feel more powerful and confident. We believe we can indeed find ways of addressing the crises we are facing. When we feel hopeful, we don’t feel overpowered and trapped either by the enormous difficulties we are experiencing or by our fears, suspicions, resentments, and despair. Many psychological studies demonstrate that when we feel hopeful, we become more active on our own behalf. We increase our sense of agency. Hope makes a difference. A second feature of the way many of us characteristically long for hope is more puzzling and, I think, ultimately questionable. Many of us tend to regard hope as a derivative state of mind and feeling that is occasioned by something else that makes hope seem credible. In a recent book Intrinsic Hope, Kate Davies referred to this way of expressing hope as extrinsic hope (Davies 2018). When we engage in extrinsic hoping, we base our expectations to realize desired outcomes on external factors. When people ask: “Can you give us good reasons for hope,” we are typically inquiring about factors beyond ourselves that we can rely on as we take steps to address the problems we face or the dark moods that overpower us. People have found good reasons for hoping about many different things. A steady upswing of the economy makes many people feel hopeful. Many have grounded their hopes in the progress made possible by modern science and medicine. Many have based their hopes on the belief that God will protect the well-being of the Earth and the welfare of humanity through providence. Others find evidence for hope in signs that we are on the verge of a new axial point in history. Correspondingly, utilizing powers and wisdom unleashed by new technologies and ways of storing and generating information, humans – so some people like to believe – will find ways of addressing the crises of our age. After reviewing efforts to establish and defend human rights in countries around the world since the mid-twentieth century, Kathryn Sikkink, in a book titled Evidence for Hope, found much data pointing to progress, however halting, in the greater recognition and protection of human rights (Sikkink 2017). In contrast, it is more appropriate not to think of hope as a derivative of other factors beyond us. It is more fitting to regard hope as a generative disposition originating within humans. It is people who are disposed to hope – realistically to anticipate possibilities – that initiate changes that open expectations for others. Amid the current pandemic, it has been scientists that have been disposed to hope who have

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found vaccines and medications to treat this disease. It has been hope-driven social entrepreneurs alarmed at the extent of injustices around the world who have started organizations like AVAAZ rallying people globally to protest particular injustices. It has been economists, entrepreneurs, and development workers, disposed to hope who have helped to create micro-credit groups and small businesses, thereby reducing the poverty of many impoverished households. Responding to diverse problems and using an eclectic assortment of ideas and patterns of actions, it has been hopeful people who have become social innovators. To be sure, we live in desperate times. We long to find ways to address these crises effectively. We want solutions. Many think that if we find the correct answers, then we can again begin to feel hopeful. I think it works the other way around. It is people who are already predisposed to hope who will find solutions. It is people who have already cultivated the disposition realistically to anticipate possibilities who have in the past and who will in the future use their imaginations and the imaginations of others to consider alternatives, to think and re-think ways of proceeding, and to experiment mentally and in practice to see what might work. Ultimately, hope doesn’t spring from philosophies, ideologies, or plans. It grows in the disposition of people who, realistically, keeping their minds and hearts open, remain ready to anticipate ways of acting amid crises when the future is unknown and uncertain. Many people would like to find an all-embracing solution to the myriad problems threatening our world today or, if not one all-embracing solution, then at least an ensemble of solutions that seem especially promising. We dream of finding solutions that will be effective, fair, and garner widely based support. We long to find solutions that seem simple to envision and to put into practice, whether we are seeking answers to climate change, the immense dislocation of people that will be occasioned by climate change, declines in biodiversity, poverty, and the loss of jobs and employment income, or systemic racism. To be sure, we must continuously seek to develop these kinds of answers so far as possible. However, as I argue in chapter eight on the “Critical Value of a Due Regard for History,” we must be ready for unexpected changes and disappointments. Even with the best-laid plans, historical existence includes the possibility of tragedies – that is, mistakes, misfortunes, unforeseen setbacks, and unexpected conflicts and resistance. If we are to remain hopeful in the face of these contingencies, then we are challenged to be both patient and flexible. We are also challenged to accept responsibility for tragedies and mistakes as they arise, not in the sense of taking the blame, but in the importance of honestly acknowledging ways our information or judgments may have misled us. We must be ready to learn, and we must be prepared to change course as circumstances change. It is a virtue to be hopeful. That is true in two ways. In the first sense, as Aristotle long ago taught us, virtues represent powers of being. They empower us to face and manage inevitable challenges. By the virtues – these powers of being – we find ways of addressing characteristic problems that we face. For example, courage enables us to manage risks and dangers without timidity or foolishness. Amid scarcities, justice allows us to allocate benefits and obligations fairly without exceeding or depriving anyone. Temperance enables us to manage desires and appetites without either

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ignoring these forces or simply letting them overpower us. Similarly, hope enables us to manage crises in the present when the future is unknown and uncertain without being overcome either by despair or wishful thinking. Hope empowers people. It acts as a generative force, facilitating the flow of ideas and energy. It functions to open up our minds, hearts, and will. It serves as an ongoing invitation to explore, to think and re-think, and to try again. In a second sense, hope is best understood not as a vision of the future, not as our attachment to a particular change program, nor even as specific ways of thinking. Hope is best understood as a disposition. As Aristotle also observed, all virtues are dispositions: overall ways of orienting ourselves to the world. Dispositions represent at once ways of thinking, feeling, and willing. Hope can best be described as the disposition realistically to anticipate possibilities when the future is unknown and uncertain. While this description accounts for what is involved in the disposition of hope, I think it is helpful from an analytical perspective to observe several elements that work together to create and accompany this disposition. Hoping presupposes the readiness to be realistic and imaginative. We can only anticipate real possibilities for the future by starting from where we are at present and by actively using our imaginations. Additionally, in ways that are sometimes overlooked, we are more likely to anticipate to the extent that we accept the realities of our world with something like feelings of gratitude rather than resentment. Furthermore, again in ways that I will further elaborate on in subsequent chapters, the disposition to anticipate real possibilities entails the readiness not to ignore but to override feelings of despair and wishful thinking. Hoping involves realistically acknowledging the pull and attraction of these feelings but then moving beyond them. If we adopt this understanding of hope, then the steps we can and must take to cultivate hope differ from those we might take if we think about hope in extrinsic terms as an expectant and confident outlook occasioned by compelling plans for action. Strategies for action do matter. They make a difference. For the most part, however, people already predisposed to hope devise these plans and rally to support them. To be sure, we find it encouraging as people variously succeed in reducing greenhouse gases, find ways of reducing the extent of global poverty, and take steps to reform and re-invigorate political processes. These kinds of actions strengthen and reinforce our inclinations to hope. At the same time, the mounting apprehensions we feel about the climate crisis, possibilities of financial disasters, and the anger of diverse groups of people who feel disadvantaged, like our perennial fears of death, often act as catalysts spurring us to act. However, the disposition of hope is not fundamentally grounded in and cultivated by either these promising developments or these intuitions of disaster. The psychologist Erik Erikson argues that humans are predisposed to hope from a very early age (Erikson 1964). Hope seems to be an inborn inclination, which, over the years, may become stifled, reduced, and transformed into something like wishing and dreaming. Alternatively, we can find ways to develop and expand this inborn inclination. Our disposition to hope seems to be especially grounded and cultivated by fostering several correlated dispositions. These include a commitment to be realistic, a predisposition to accept without rancor and with gratitude the situations in which we find ourselves, a well-exercised

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readiness to use our imaginations, and the capacity to neutralize feelings that lure us into despair or wishfulness. The disposition of hope is also cultivated by the predisposition to encourage patience. It is tough to generate feelings of hopefulness when one is impatient. Impatient people insistently seek answers and actions. Rather than creating open spaces where one can consider alternative possibilities and thereby help forge collaborations with some who might otherwise oppose or resist our proposals, impatience demands unswerving loyalties. How do we foster realistically grounded feelings of possibility in the face of the serious threats we face and the dark moods that so widely make us despair? My initial answer is that we are most likely to do so now, as many have done so in the past, and many are already doing so in the present by cultivating the disposition to hope. In other parts of this book, I review many examples where people, predisposed to hope, have responded to crises, generated reforms, and found ways of managing the insistent inclinations to despair. I review examples of leaders like Gandhi, Saul Alinsky, Vaclav Havel, Plenty Coup, the Red Lake Ojibway, and the Rabbis who held the Jewish communities together after the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem and the war with the Romans during the first century of the Common Era. We might consider many other examples, including the people, who after the Second World War and the Great Depression, acted to establish a wide range of collaborative national and international organizations and institutions as guards against the devastation the world had experienced in the previous two decades. I think we can include as noteworthy examples the tens of thousands of scientists, health care workers, governmental officials, and even many business people, who have realistically recognized the extent and character of the threat of the COVID 19 pandemic and imaginatively have been exploring ways to contain the virus, offer healthcare, and balance various costs and benefits to maintain some forms of economic activity. To be sure, the pandemic has become more severe, and the financial costs more acute in many areas because governments and many people have been unrealistic, driven by their despair, resentment, and wishful thinking. When analyzing the crises that we are currently facing in part three, I examine the historical roots of contemporary problems and resources that we might draw upon as we seek to address these problems. Thus, for example, while humans have been acting in several ways that put the Earth and its ecosystems at serious risk, as creatures of the Earth, we not only inherit the rich bounty of the Earth. Over the centuries, we have also been learning how to draw upon and cultivate those riches. This is an enormous resource. While many people have come to distrust the practices of reason and science, at the same time, using our capacities to reason, inquire, and analyze, we humans have made tremendous advances in health care, abilities to communicate, and standards of living. This is another significant resource. While humans sometimes have misused our capacities to make productive uses of human skills and natural resources – scarring the Earth, aggravating inequalities, and mindlessly pursuing our particular advantages  – nevertheless, using these productive powers, we have found ways to enhance living standards and reduce poverty. These significantly increased capacities to produce represent a multi-faceted reservoir of resources we can draw upon as we attempt to address the crises of our age. Many of

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us today feel deeply disenchanted with the ways our governments are operating. Still, it is helpful to observe how, over the centuries, we humans have evolved ever more complex and ever more sophisticated systems of governing in response to the ever more complex character of the social worlds in which we live. Again, fittingly both criticized and appreciated, we can find ways of mining this capacity for governing that has been diversely expressed over human history. Finally, as many of us have become distracted and disgruntled by our elusive quests for happiness and love, we are well counseled to acknowledge the critical value of the human capacity to form relations grounded in love and wellbeing. Out of love, much can be accomplished. From a historical perspective, it is helpful to pay attention to these realities, not to argue for optimism. The crises of our age are too severe to be optimistic. We can, however, work to foster and support our feelings of hope. In part three of this book, I reference these human capacities, as they have been developed over time, to observe grounds for encouraging realism, imagination, and gratitude, and therefore hope, because these dispositions are constitutive of hope. In part two, I consider the critical value for us today of due regard for history. Well-formed regard for history can help us make sense of the present and foster sentiments that help strengthen our disposition to hope. I also pause to examine the thoughts of several well-known observers, who after the devastations of 1930s and 1940s – including the wars, the depression, the death camps, the first use of atomic weapons, and the continuing ravages of imperialism – sought both to put these troubling times in perspective and to find bases for hope. Finally, in the Conclusion, I call upon all of us to seize the day, working collaboratively not only with those who agree with us but also with those who differ and disagree. While citizens of particular countries, we are also all creatures and citizens of one Earth.

Works Cited Davies, Kate. 2018. Intrinsic Hope: Living Courageously in Troubled Times. Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers. Erikson, Erik. 1964. Insight and Responsibility: Lectures on the Ethical Implications of Psychoanalytic Insight. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2018. The Monarchy of Fear: A Philosopher Looks at Our Political Crisis. New York: Simon and Schuster. Sikkink, Kathryn. 2017. Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 2

A Critical Moment

Abstract  We are living at a critical moment in the history of human life on Earth. To be sure, at present we are living under conditions that are uniquely favorable for humans. There are many more humans than ever before. Still, in general, we are living longer, with better health, more education, higher standards of living, greater respect for basic human rights, less extreme poverty, and more effective systems of communication than at any previous time in human history. Yet, all is not well. This is a critical moment for at least five different reasons. One, we face the threat of climate change and the diverse effects of this change. Two, the Earth and its ecosystems face a wide range of threats to their well-being, including the reduction in bio-diversity, expanding areas of desertification, the increasing acidification of oceans, and the dramatic decline in coral reefs. Three, we now live in an inextricably globally inter-connected world. Four, we face a wide range of not easily resolvable social, economic, and political problems including growing disenchantment with political processes, increasing inequality with respect to wealth, the threat of nuclear war, widespread feelings of resentment, as well as the threat of new pandemics. Additionally, five, many of us find it difficult to make sense of current crises using the frames of reference we have inherited from the past.

2.1  The Best of Times and the Worst of Times Today, even while considering the current pandemic, humans, in general, are living in good times. In many ways and to a greater extent, we humans enjoy greater benefits than enjoyed by humans during any previous periods of history. Overall, although there are far more of us than ever before, we are living longer. In 1800 mean life expectancy globally was 31 years; in 2017, it reached 72 years (Rosling 2018, p. 55). This increase resulted in large part because of marked declines in the incidence of infant and maternal mortality. As a whole, we live healthier lives. Modern medicine has reduced rates of mortality as well as the pains and duress associated with illnesses. Immunization and vaccinations have significantly reduced the extent to which children suffer from contagious diseases. Smallpox has been © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_2

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eliminated. Recently, wild polio was eradicated from Africa. Despite industrialization and continuing forms of economic development, the number of people living in extreme poverty continued to grow until the 1980s, affecting more than a billion and a half people. Since 1993 over a billion people are no longer living in abject poverty. This dramatic change has occurred for several reasons, including economic growth in China, India, and Indonesia. The global incidence of extreme poverty has now been reduced to about 9% (Rosling 2018, p. 60; Radelet 2015. p. 28). This decline has been steep and substantial. Reasonably staffed and resourced primary school systems have been established in almost all countries. As a result, a larger share of humans can read and write than at any other period of history. 62% of all adults have basic reading and writing skills today compared to 12% in 1800 (Rosling 2018, p.  62). Today, the overwhelming majority of people living in industrialized and developing countries benefit from higher standards of living, measured in relation to their diets, household appliances and comforts, and freedom of movement. Moreover, the proportion of humans dying due to violence has steadily declined over time, with a few exceptions. In his book The Better Angels of our Nature, Steven Pinker examined at length both the evidence of this decline and the several causes for it (Pinker 2011). Humans have developed governments and legal systems, instituted courts and civil institutions to manage and moderate conflicts, and established public policing systems. They have correspondingly reduced deaths in wars and homicides within societies. Humans have also reduced the rate of fatalities from accidents of all kinds (Pinker 2018, p. 113). Although the presence of so many nuclear weapons remains a source of great concern, the number of these weapons has been reduced from a high of 66,000 in 1966 to 15,000 in 2017 (Rosling 2018, p. 61). Furthermore, these weapons have not been used once in war since the Second World War. The political commitment to, and the compliance with, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) has steadily expanded over the same period. National and local human rights organizations have increased both in number and in actions taken to promote human rights. In addition to the UDHR, several other human rights declarations have been adopted, including declarations on the rights to development, women’s rights, and indigenous peoples’ rights. Measured in relation to actual historical developments rather than idealized expectations, much has been accomplished (Sikkink 2017). The rights to free speech, assembly, fair trials, and educational opportunity are more widely recognized and protected today than at any previous point in history. While almost all countries permitted slavery in 1800, only three continue to allow slavery today. While only one country allowed women to vote in 1893, now 193 countries allow women to vote. In 1950, 28% of children were laboring full time. In 2012 only 10% of children 5 to 14 years of age were involved in full-day labor (Rosling 2018, pp. 61,2). By 2018 the number of countries still using the death penalty had fallen to 89. Although discrimination based on race, religion, and gender continues, the incidence of discrimination of all kinds has been measurably reduced (Pinker 2018, pp. 220–225). More people experience a greater range of liberties than at any previous historical moment.

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Although we can point to many examples to the contrary, a strong case can be made that humans individually and collectively feel and act more empathically than ever before. Large proportions of us identify with and feel concerned about many others living beyond our immediate households and friends: we feel for people we associate with in our communities, nations, and faiths; people whose suffering we witness on radios, screens, and newspapers; as well as people we connect with through civil society associations. Jeremy Rifkin, who has called attention to this often-overlooked expansion of empathy in his book The Empathic Civilization, sees signs of an emerging globally diffused biosphere consciousness, evident not only in widely shared global concerns about climate change but also in the emergence of more collaborative business practices (Rifkin 2009). Viewed in several different ways, we are living a good time. More people and a greater share of humans today than at any previous point in history can live the kinds of lives that they have reasons to want to live. They have greater opportunities to receive an education; to gain access to health services; to participate in political processes; to live with whom they want to live; and to obtain adequate kinds of food, clothing, and housing (Sen 1999). More lands have been set aside and protected as conservation areas. Nominally democratic processes govern more countries. Nevertheless, large numbers of humans feel pretty discouraged and disheartened by the times in which we are living. Hans Rosling posed 13 multiple choice questions about the world’s current condition to several different audiences in many different countries. These audiences included influential business executives, political leaders, well-regarded scientists and economists, university professors, journalists, and college students. Almost all groups thought that world conditions were much worse than they were and provided answers that were less accurate than if they had randomly guessed. In his book Factfulness: Ten Reasons Why We’re Wrong About the World – And Why Things Are Better Than You Think, Rosling sought to find out why respondents seemed to think that world conditions were so much more adverse than they were in fact. He identified a set of mindsets that led people to hold excessively pessimistic views about the world. People tended to be miss-led in their apprehensions, he demonstrated, by several factors, all significantly exacerbated by the media. These included a universal tendency to think negatively, several real and imagined fears, a tendency to overgeneralize based on anecdotal evidence, an ever-­ ready instinct to find blame, and factors that seemed to aggravate feelings of urgency (Rosling 2018). In his book Enlightenment Now, Steven Pinker also has sought to explain why so many people hold views of the world that he argued were both excessively pessimistic and factually faulty. He observed how people tend to dread losses more than they look forward to gains; how in keeping with what psychologists call the “availability heuristic,” people are more inclined to remember and be moved by bad, rather than good, news; and how people are powerfully influenced by nostalgia. Politicians and the media both deliberately appeal to these instincts, in the process aggravating the tendencies for people to view our present world condition in more negative terms (Pinker 2018). Rosling and Pinker make persuasive arguments and cite compelling evidence. However, they fail to appreciate fully how and why so many people today feel

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apprehensive and disillusioned. Rosling does mention in passing five global risks that we should worry about. These are the threats of a worldwide pandemic, a global financial collapse, a third world war, climate change, and extreme poverty. While acknowledging these threats as accurate and calling people to address them, Rosling does not focus on them. He cautions us not to panic. Pinker recognizes that inequality in income has become aggravated over the past several decades in several countries, and he acknowledges the threat of climate change. For example, he notes that in the United States, the top 1% of earners received 8% of all income in 1980 and 18% in 2015. In the same country in 1910, the poorest 50% of earners received 5% of all income and the same percentage a century later (Pinker 2018, pp. 98, 99). However, while recognizing those perceptions of aggravated inequality occasion feelings of resentment, Pinker downplays this observation because he is more interested in pointing to diverse evidence of progress. After all, he comments, the economic pie grew during the past century so that the bottom half is better off in many ways, especially when we consider the transfer payments and publicly funded education and health care services from which they, like all citizens, benefit. He also comments on how growing inequality in developing countries is often a mark of economic growth and how economic growth in turn over time occasions benefits most societal members. I think Pinker seriously minimizes the impact of inequality, especially the growing inequality in wealth. Inequality in income and wealth has been increasing in many societies. Moreover, there is evidence that aggravated economic inequalities tend to be associated with several social problems, including higher levels of delinquency, family instability, mental illness, and political polarization (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009; Friedman 2005). Pinker discusses problems associated with climate change. However, the force of his argument is to demonstrate how these “problems are solvable, given the right knowledge.” (Pinker 2018, p.  121) Accordingly, while Pinker acknowledges problems connected with economic inequality and climate change, he tends to discount them because he is interested in pointing to multiple expressions of progress. He writes: “…societies have become healthier, wealthier, freer, happier, and better educated…They have emitted fewer pollutants, cleared fewer forests, spilled less oil, set aside more preserves, extinguished fewer species, saved the ozone layer, and peaked in their consumption of oil…The world’s nuclear stockpiles have been reduced by 85%…The world’s two most pressing problems [threats connected with nuclear weapons and climate change] then, though not yet solved, are solvable: practical long-term agendas have been laid out for eliminating nuclear weapons and for mitigating climate change. For all the bleeding headlines, for all the crises, collapses, scandals, plagues, epidemics, and existential threats, these are accomplishments to savor.” (Pinker 2018, p. 324). Realistically, we live in a complex world, in which, as a result of human initiatives, humans today enjoy many benefits which previous generations did not enjoy. However, this world also faces several serious threats, including climate change, continuing economic inequality, considerable poverty, and widely shared feelings of distrust and lack of confidence in many of our established leaders and institutions. At this point, I think it is essential to recognize that the pervasive feelings of

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suspicion, disillusionment, and fear do not primarily arise because people fail to appreciate thoroughly enough evidence of historical progress, because they are prone to think negatively, or because the media mislead them. The gloom that many people feel today reflects apprehensions of a range of real but often not clearly understood risks, threats, and challenges. In 1859 Charles Dickens started his novel A Tale of Two Cities, which is set in the context of the French Revolution (which began sixty years earlier) with these words: “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair,… – in short the period was so far like the present period, that some of its noisiest authorities insisted on its being received, for good or for evil, in the superlative degree of comparison only.” (Dickens 1859, p.  1) Today, many of our noisiest authorities also tend to describe our world in superlative terms as being either the best or the worst of times. As suggested by Dickens, it is a mistake to oversimplify our times by considering them as either promising or especially perilous. Our times, already a fifth of the way into the twenty-first century, like his times in the middle of the nineteenth century and the middle of the industrial revolution in Great Britain, and the times of the French Revolution, at the end of the eighteenth century, are at once the best of times and the worst of time. Both of these previous times were also moments of significant, critical transition. We also are living in a critical, transitional period. However, in many ways, our present period is not like any others. We are indeed living in a crucial moment in the life of humans on Earth. We cannot respond to the challenges and opportunities of our age, either by simply following or by merely abandoning the patterns of response we have learned over the centuries. We must begin by recognizing that we are indeed living at a very critical moment for all the benefits and opportunities we enjoy.

2.2  A  Critical Moment in the History of Human Life on Earth Although more humans are alive today than ever before, and although, in general, we humans are living longer, healthier, and with higher standards of living, all is not well. To be sure, we do not face the imminent threat of global war. But as I write, we are living through a worldwide pandemic. Although it has resulted in more than four million deaths and considerable economic hardship, it probably won’t be as disastrous as the 1918 flu, which caused at least 20 million deaths and probably many more. We are living through tough economic times because of the pandemic but not a crushing financial disaster like the Great Depression of the 1930s. We do, however, face several slow-moving, inevitable, and troubling crises. These include threats of climate change and the widespread devastating consequences of this change, increasing levels of economic inequality especially with respect to differences in wealth, and the reduced availability of specific valued resources like fresh

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water. Additionally, many of us worry about how our lives seem shaped by distant and influential agents, such as businesses, governments, political leaders, and economic forces over which we can exercise little or no practical influence. While telling many different stories, many people today feel deeply disenchanted with established political and economic institutions that do not seem to be delivering benefits to us as they did for us or forbearers in our own remembered past. Nonetheless, much evidence can be produced to demonstrate that we are, in fact living in very good times. Even though the total number of humans has dramatically increased, a larger proportion of humans than ever before can read and write, live in houses with modern plumbing facilities, and marry spouses they choose for themselves. More people than ever before participating in political processes and civil society associations. Still, diverse feelings of disillusionment, apprehension, suspicion, resentment, and fear are widespread. The current COVID-19 pandemic has aggravated these feelings. These feelings are variously expressed in industrialized and developing countries, in affluent and impoverished classes, in rural and urban settings, by conservatives and liberals. Many people voice feelings of discontent. Overall, to what extent are we living in promising or perilous times? Several years ago, observers like Alasdair MacIntyre and Jane Jacobs, issued warnings about a coming dark age (MacIntyre 1981; Jacobs 2004). The recent report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has warned of significant and devastating consequences that will occur because of existing increases in global warming. These outcomes will become even more severe if dramatic efforts to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases are not undertaken soon (IPCC 2018). On the other hand, as we have seen, other observers like Hans Rosling and Steven Pinker argue that the circumstances in which we are living are much better than most of us imagine. If we are to be genuinely realistic, we must recognize the full complexity of the times in which we are living. We will be better able to respond to the challenges of our age to the extent we begin by acknowledging, assessing, and exploring the possibilities of building on the strengths of our age. The reasons why Pinker and Rosling sound so positive are in part because they are wary of how excessive feelings of pessimism and despair undermine the disposition to take constructive steps to make a difference. Alternatively, the reasons why those like the IPCC have been warning of the dangerous threats facing our world is because they worry about the extent to which people allow themselves to ignore and overlook disturbing realities about the world today out of complacency, short term self-interest, and wishful thinking. We are indeed living at a critical moment in the history of human life on Earth. This moment is not at present a dramatic crisis like the French or Russian Revolutions, the outbreak of World War Two, the Black Plague, or the meteor crash that ended the long reign of the dinosaurs. This moment is more like other slow-­ moving crises occasioned, for example, by the agricultural revolution, industrialization, and the conquest of the Americas by Europeans, changes all of which markedly, permanently, and over a long period, altered patterns of life, directly for those immediately affected and eventually for most of humanity. The present moment differs somewhat from other times because we currently face several quite different yet

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interrelated challenges. These are being occasioned in part by some of the most remarkable achievements of the past. They are occasioned in part by new possibilities associated with the revolution wrought by information technology. The challenges we face are multi-dimensional, profound, and not to be resolved by tinkering. Although they assume differing forms for different peoples and, although they must be addressed locally through the diverse, overlapping communities in which we live, they are all genuinely global in scope and significance. In at least five ways, we are living at a critical moment in the history of human life on Earth. One, the changes in climate wrought by human activity have already caused extensive, permanent damage to the Earth, its ecosystems, and human communities. Global warming has already aggravated weather conditions worldwide, giving rise in different places to more droughts, more flooding, more violent storms, more forest and bush fires, and the destruction of many coral reefs. In several areas, large tracts of forest trees have been killed by a growing infestation of bugs whose numbers in the past have been limited by freezing winter weather. In these areas, warming temperatures have led to greater infestation by bugs, which in turn have destroyed huge pine, spruce, and oak forests. We will face other, greater problems at the current rate of greenhouse gas emissions in the near future. These include the melting of large sections of ice found in glaciers and the polar ice caps, which in turn will cause sea levels to rise, flooding populated low-lying areas abutting the world’s oceans. It is still possible for us to find ways of limiting this damage. However, actions must be undertaken soon if we are going to be able in measured ways to reduce outcomes that will become significantly worse if we fail to act. The World Bank estimates that by 2050 more than 150 million people will have become climate-engendered refugees, fleeing areas that will have become uninhabitable because of climate change. By 2070 the number of climate-change refugees is likely to be much greater, perhaps reaching several billion. What is unique about the climate change crisis is the ways it represents a marked change both in the character of the Earth itself, much like the change that occurred with the end of the age of the dinosaurs, and a change in the relation of humans to the Earth. Two, in several other ways, human activity, especially over the past half-century, has been causing severe and in some cases permanent damage to the Earth and its ecosystems. The run-off from rivers highly polluted by the use of chemical fertilizers has resulted in the drastic reduction of fish life in many rivers and lakes and increasingly higher levels of acidification of ocean waters. Human activity has led to increases in the desertification and deforestation of large formerly wooded areas, also thereby removing an important means for capturing and reducing greenhouse gases. Over the past century, humans have acted in ways that have greatly reduced the viability of many species, including many insects and pollinators, which have played a vital but usually taken-for-granted role in the overall production of food for humans. As a result of human activities, the total available global supply of fresh water has been significantly reduced, especially as a result of the marked reduction of water in many aquafers. All of these changes are serious and are likely to have long-term consequences. To be sure, in some instances we can act to reverse the damages done, especially, for example, through efforts aimed at reforestation.

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Three, we now live in a globalized world. The activities by which the world has become globalized – globally interconnected – have unfolded over several centuries. They have become especially pronounced since the Second World War. These globalizing activities include the expansion of international commerce; old as well as new forms of imperialism; the worldwide expansion of several missionary religions including especially diverse expressions of Islam, Christianity, Buddhism, and Hinduism; the migration of peoples; modern forms of communication; as well as the development of a wide range of international governmental and civil society associations. Globalization in the condition it has now taken represents both new challenges and new possibilities. Because we live in a globalized world and so many of the crises we face are global in character, we can now only address these crises by finding ways to act in globally coordinated ways. Working in some kind of collaborative way to address these challenges will be neither simple nor easy. After all, we speak many different languages; we make sense of the world through many different epistemologies; we adhere to many different faiths and ideologies; and we are governed by many different governments. At the same time, we are divided by many national and regional loyalties, ethnic and organizational identities, fierce antagonisms, and conflicts. Many people feel deeply threatened that this larger global arena we now live in will undermine the local communities and ways of life we care about and love. Accordingly, we live at a critical moment in the history of humans as we seek to address these global crises while still respecting and protecting all of these more local and quite diverse, and often conflicting social groupings which are central to how we live. This will not be easy. Still, because we are globally interconnected in various ways, our capacities as humans to act in some kinds of coordinated ways have increased. The challenge here is to find ways of working together while respecting the diversities of our faiths, epistemologies, economic and political philosophies, and national and ethnic loyalties and identifications. Four, we face a wide range of social, political, and economic crises not directly related to our relationship to the Earth and its ecosystems. Many of these crises are not unlike crises we have faced in the past. However, the number of these crises and their diversity, in turn, make the present situation feel unique. We face at once many different crises, many of which are global in scope. Without trying to make a comprehensive list of these crises, many of which I discuss at greater length in Part Three, I will name a few as illustrative examples. Accordingly, many people are disturbed by the steady increases in inequalities in wealth, rising urban housing prices, the overall scope of ordinary as contrasted with abject poverty, continuing forms of racism, ongoing violent conflicts in many areas, and the fast pace of change. Many people worry about more epidemics, possible violent clashes between the great powers, potential uses of atomic weapons, loss of employment security due to increasing use of intelligent machines, and possible global financial crises. Others are disturbed by the rise in the number of people affected by mental illness, the spread of drug abuse, and increasing numbers of people who just feel unhappy. Many people express concern about the dysfunctional character of current political systems, the decline in faith, and the ever-larger scope of modern state welfare

Works Cited

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systems. As our world becomes more complex, there seems to be so much that both raise our apprehensions and aggravates our anxieties. Five, many people feel that our inherited ways of thinking about and addressing the problems we face today have become less able to help us clearly understand and effectively respond to issues that have become more complex and just different because of dramatic historical changes. Large numbers of people feel disillusioned, confused, and disenchanted. These feelings are expressed in many ways. For example, many wonder why in so-called democratic societies, so much of what happens seems to be dictated by government bureaucrats, the small number of those who lead and manage political parties, and wealthy interests who seem capable of commanding the allegiance of both. Disenchantment with political processes is widespread. Many complain about how housing in large urban centers has become excessively expensive. Many working in cities must either spend excessively long hours commuting or overly long hours working to make ends meet. Although no longer extremely impoverished, many people in the least developing countries feel stuck in degrading and stultifying conditions they see no viable ways of overcoming. Many people feel threatened by the ways the forces of globalization and automation seem to compromise their present circumstances and future prospects. Many people feel puzzled by the fact that the energy and resources they have invested in getting ahead in the world do not seem to have made them any happier. Without pointing to any apparent cause, many people feel that the world no longer appears explicable either in terms of the images with which they grew up or in terms of the models and accounts proffered by currently recognized experts. Correspondingly, the legitimacy of reigning political, economic, and philosophical ideas has weakened and declined for many people. The declining legitimacy of these value systems has not happened because people are turning to attractive alternatives. Many thoughtful people feel puzzled and upset because they cannot find compelling ways to make sense of the modern world. Not for the first time, but as in other times before periods of dramatic transition like the late Middle Ages in Europe, apocalyptic images and visions have gained their appeal. Unlike the crises associated with climate change and globalization, this fifth crisis/challenge is not embodied in objective conditions external to us. Rather, it is embodied and expressed in our frustrated attempts to make sense of our own lives and the historical changes we are experiencing.

Works Cited Dickens, Charles. 1859/1981. Tale of Two Cities. New York: Bantam Books. Friedman, Benjamin M. 2005. The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. New York: Vintage Books, Random House. International Panel on Climate Change. 2018. Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 degrees C: Summary for Policy Makers. Jacobs, Jane. 2004. Dark Age Ahead. Toronto: Random House Canada.

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MacIntyre, Alisder. 1981. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame. Pinker, Steven. 2011. The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined. New York: Viking. ———. 2018. Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. New York: Penguin Books. Radelet, Steven. 2015. The Great Surge: The Ascent of the Developing World. New York: Simon and Schuster. Rifkin, Jeremy. 2009. The Empathic Civilization: The Race to Global Consciousness in a World in Crisis. New York: Jeremy P. Tarcher/Penguin. Rosling, Hans, with Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling Ronnlund. 2018. Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong About the World  – and Why Things Are Better Than You Think. New  York: Flatiron Books. Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. Sikkink, Kathryn. 2017. Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Wilkinson, Richard, and Kate Pickett. 2009. The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger. New York: Bloomsbury Press.

Part II

The Generative Power of Hope

Chapter 3

The Virtue of Hope

Abstract  This chapter begins with a series of examples demonstrating the way to presence or absence of hope makes a huge difference in how people respond to the exigencies of their lives. The chapter then attempts to describe the characteristic features of hope understood as a basic virtue. Like all virtues, hope is an overall disposition. It represents a fitting response to the constant challenge of how to act constructively in the present – with all its confusion, complexities, and conflicts – when the future is uncertain and unknown. Hope is not optimism. It is the disposition to anticipate possibilities in these kinds of settings. It represents the fitting mean between the extremes of responding to these situations either with despair or wishful thinking, anomy (confusion) or fanaticism. After initially describing the character of hope, the chapter then analyzes the micro-dynamics of hope. Hope is constituted by a combination of realism and imagination, duly strengthened by gratitude and the capacity to acknowledge but to override the inclination to respond to current crises with despair or wishful thinking, anomy or fanaticism. Should we be optimistic or pessimistic at this critical moment in the history of human life on Earth? Compared to the past, we know that many things are going quite well. Still, at this moment, optimism seems like wishful thinking. On the other hand, pessimism seems irresponsible, like giving up. Pessimism leads some of us to seek escapes, look for as much happiness as we can in our private lives, and let the world unfold as it will. It leads many to place their bets on various kinds of fantasy-­ like solutions or would-be saviors. If optimism or pessimism appears to be the only option, then guarded pessimism may well seem the more viable alternative. I am writing this book both because I think the debate between optimism and pessimism is fruitless and because I think there is a significant option that this debate overlooks. It is possible to hope. Hoping is realistic and hoping makes a difference. As I will argue at length, hoping does not entail being optimistic. Being optimistic assumes the high probability of positive outcomes about the future independent of what you or I do. In contrast, being hopeful entails the disposition to anticipate possibilities in the present. Hope is a virtue oriented to acting in the present. It is not an account of the future. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_3

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Hope makes a huge difference in how people live, both daily and in difficult circumstances and times of crisis, when experiencing ill health and other deprivations, and even when facing death. As numerous recent clinical studies indicate, people with hope seem healthier and more likely to respond positively to healing processes (Eliott 2005). People who score high on measures of hope also seem to experience a greater sense of agency. As he chronicled his own experience in a Nazi death camp, Victor Frankl observed that those who could cultivate some kinds of realistic hopes could better maintain their spirits and wellbeing under these dreadful and terrifying conditions (Frankl 1946). As Adrienne Martin has recently observed, hope seems to have “a special kind of sustaining power that is uniquely supportive of us in times of trial and tribulation.” (Martin 2014, p. 5). Hope is a fundamental virtue that is expressed and embodied in the disposition, which consists in anticipating possibilities for acting constructively on behalf of oneself or others in settings where the future is uncertain and unknown. At its core as a virtue, hoping is connected with a lively sense of the possibility of exercising some kind of agency. To be sure, hoping has been associated with many other things, such as, holding promising views of the future and desiring some valued objective whose realization remains uncertain. As I will argue further along in this chapter, neither optimism nor uncertain desires well represent the heart of what constitutes the essential characteristics of the virtue of hope. Like other virtues, as the ancient Greeks understood them, hoping is a power of being. It is associated with the disposition to envision possibilities where others see none, to see openings where others apprehend only closed doors and limitations. Hoping expresses itself in the imagining and exploration of possibilities. Hoping is not the same thing as expecting. At one point, the philosopher Gabriel Marcel describes how a pregnant woman embodies hope in her body as she waits for the birth of her child (Marcel 1950). The pregnant woman is expecting: she is waiting and getting herself ready for something that will happen to her and to which her pregnancy entitles her. Expectations are associated with passively waiting and with entitlements. These are not expressions of hope: that is, these are not expressions of anticipating possibilities for constructive action when large parts of the future remain unknown. However, in addition to expecting, the pregnant woman may also be hoping as she prepares herself for the birth of her child and for caring for the child once it is born. In these instances, her hopes are connected with exploring possibilities for actions she can now undertake in the present to be ready for her future. Hope makes a difference. When they feel genuinely hopeful about their historical prospects, people work hard to make a difference: they migrate to places that seem like places of opportunity, they invest in upgrading their businesses, they engage in training programs, they work hard, and they collaborate on joint enterprises. Without hope, they are likely to put their energies into protecting what little they have, worrying about future risks, and seeking to avoid dangers. With hope, people act, making decisive choices. With hope, even risk-aversive people take chances. Hope opens up the sense of possibility. Hope positively affects how people orient themselves to the world. Eagleton observed “hope clings to the nameless conviction that life is worth living.” (Eagleton

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2015, p. 74) Marcel reflected: “When I hope, I strengthen and when I despair, or simply doubt, I weaken or let go of a certain bond which unites me to the matter or question” that concerns me. (Marcel 1950, p. 48). In an off-cited lecture, “Existentialism as Humanism,” the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre argued that “man is nothing but what he makes of himself.” (Sartre 1956, p.  291) Sartre maintained that we could all make meaningful choices about our lives, and if we choose not to exercise that freedom, then that is our choice. Therefore, humans could and must take charge of their lives by recognizing they can and must decide how best to utilize the options they are inevitably offered. In making these claims, Sartre took for granted something that many people find difficult to experience, namely the sense of actual possibilities associated with hoping. In his play “No Exit,” Sartre went further and shamed those who become so overwhelmed by their fears and anxieties that they fail even to take the obvious steps to explore possibilities. I would argue that the failure to act and make effective choices typically follows from the absence of the disposition of hoping. Sartre himself seemed well-supplied with this virtue, although he felt this disposition arose from his existential philosophy. I think he both over-simplified what was involved in acting decisively and deeply misrepresented the character of hope. He summed up his philosophy as follows: “First, I ought to commit myself and then act my commitment according to the time-honored formula ‘one need not hope in order to undertake one’s work.’” (Sartre 1956, p. 299) Sartre took his capacity for hope for granted and failed to see how decisively the presence or absence of this disposition shapes the human capacity for acting decisively. His unacknowledged disposition of hoping was grounded deeply in his personal sense of his vocation as a philosopher and public intellectual (Bakewell 2016). I know of people who have found it possible to hope even in the face of death. Many people, to be sure, engage in many different kinds of wishing as they find themselves dying or threatened with death. They wish for cures, whether these be medical, magical, or spiritual. Kubler-Ross even encouraged terminal patients to wish for unexpected sources of healing. She surmised from her observations, even this kind of wishing – which might be called illusory but which she called hoping – seemed to help equip these patients better to live out their remaining days. In all of these circumstances, wishing is not the same thing as hoping. From a volitional perspective, wishing is passive, a way of expecting against all odds that something beneficial will happen, brought about by others over whom one has no real or instrumental influence. However, I have in mind people facing death whose anticipations are focused on how they might act in the present to live out the ends of their lives with grace and peace. I am thinking of people working to regain or reaffirm a sense of the worth of their own lives, responsive to and cultivating the responses of those they love and seeking to manage their pain and discomfort with as much a sense of agency as possible. One relative, for example, devoted time to planning her funeral service; another friend worked to complete a series of short stories; another colleague engaged in a set of spiritual exercises. They all lived by hope in so far as they anticipated possible ways of acting so they could be present as they lived out the rest of their lives grateful for the lives they have lived.

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Much empirical evidence shows that hope makes an appreciable difference in how impoverished households respond to their circumstances. In so far as they begin to hope, poor people also start to save for later investments, take advantage of offered opportunities, work harder and for longer hours, and more actively address their food security needs. Reporting on studies undertaken in Bangladesh, India, Kenya, and Morocco, Esther Duflo examined factors that allowed impoverished households to hope and then observed in turn how this capacity to hope in turn led these people to act more constructively on their own behalf (Duflo 2012). She argued that hope ought to be added to the list of basic human capabilities, which both Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have articulated as evidence of human wellbeing (Sen 1999; Nussbaum 1999, 2011). When those living in impoverished circumstances begin to hope, they are more likely to spend more of their time orienting their lives to take advantage of possibilities rather than instead investing their time variously protecting themselves from real and imagined threats, compensating themselves for current and past difficulties, and wishing for, and/or taking chances on, lucky breaks. In spite of being the target for diverse service programs and public initiatives aimed at reducing poverty, many impoverished communities seem to be stuck in their poverty, victims of a poverty trap occasioned in part by a lack of the disposition of hope (Bannerjee and Duflo 2011, pp. 271–2). Why and how hope makes such a difference is explained by a model of scarcity developed by Sendhil Mullainathan and Eidar Shafir (2013). Based on a wide variety of psychological experiments, they demonstrate how people can experience scarcity with regard to time, viable options, and economic conditions. They argue that scarcity is not just a physical constraint. It is also and fundamentally a mindset. It is a mindset in which our capacity to consider alternatives, reflect on priorities, and even pay attention is undermined by our ever-present worry and preoccupation with what we experience as scarce. When people experience scarcity – as almost all poor people do – they feel there is no slack, no room to maneuver. They are constantly juggling this or that crisis, this or that emergency. Mullainathan and Shafir argue that the experience of scarcity makes people in general and poor people in particular act dumber and more impulsive and correspondingly less able to benefit from various initiatives aimed at helping them. Although they do not directly refer to the absence of hope, when describing how scarcity makes people feel that there is no slack, they point to a chief feature of hope, which is missing for these people, namely the sense of openness and possibility. In his novel, The Plague, Albert Camus depicted a North African city and how it responded when afflicted by bubonic plague. Initially, the people attempted to deny it, and then tried various ways to escape, wish away the plague, and care for those afflicted. Eventually, there were signs that the epidemic might be waning. As people in the city begin to hope, Camus observed: “And indeed it could be said that once the faintest stirring of hope became possible, the dominion of the plague was ended.” Although fictional, this account testifies to the way Camus, who in earlier writings had called for learning to live without hope, now affirmed in the post-World War Two years the capacity of hope to make a significant difference in how people

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responded to pestilences, such as plagues, economic depressions, and wars (Camus 1948). The papal revolution of the eleventh century represents an interesting and influential case of an instance when the introduction of hope had a significant impact on the course of European history. Hildebrand, a German monk, became the pope in 1073. In 1075 Gregory VII, which was the name taken by the pope, issued a manifesto calling for a number of reforms, including especially the sole right of the Catholic Church and its hierarchy to appoint Cardinals and Bishops, the pre-­ eminence of the papacy, and the sole right of the papacy to establish new ecclesiastical laws. This manifesto directly challenged the authority which secular political authorities, like the emperor, had assumed to name religious leaders. This manifesto resulted in ongoing conflicts between the papacy and emperors over the next 50 years. At the end of this period, the Catholic Church had established its independence from political authorities and had helped to create the clergy as an international order with enhanced legitimacy and influence. The actions taken by Gregory VII had additional unexpected consequences. These actions gave a great boost to the very idea of reform. Several new religious orders were organized in order to help foster reform both within the church itself and European society generally. The Cistercian order was formed shortly thereafter. It became enormously influential, especially when Bernard of Clairvaux became its leader. The reform campaign was later taken up by other religious orders, including the Franciscans and the Dominicans. All these groups sought to establish higher standards of piety, morality, and political rule. They all, directly and indirectly, encouraged people to exercise greater agency with respect to their own lives. The papal reform occasioned other initiatives, including the initial steps to establish universities and to develop rational-­ legal standards and practices (Berman 1983). The reforms that these several initiatives embodied presupposed something which was quite new, and in many ways, astonishing at that time, the end of the eleventh century, namely the possibility for reform. These reforms also occasioned and presupposed what they occasioned: namely, that it was possible and desirable to live by hope. Eugen Rosenstock-­ Huessy analyzed the impact of the papal reform by describing it as the initial revolution in a series of seven revolutions that have shaped European history. Subsequent revolutions included, as well the Italian Renaissance, the Protestant Reformation, the set of political and social changes in Great Britain culminating in the Glorious Revolution, as well as the American, French, and Russian Revolutions. Rosenstock-­ Huessy argued that the papal revolution introduced the idea that radical historical change was possible. In the process, the papal reform, and all the diverse groups directly and indirectly influenced by the ideas of reform which this reform occasioned, have historically shaped how many people have come to think about their own capacities to make a difference in their lives. They have helped to make it seem realistic to engage in hoping (Rosenstock-Huessy 1938). In his 1959 academic lecture at the meetings of the American Psychiatric Association, Karl Menninger called for psychiatrists to pay greater attention to the role that hope played not only in promoting the wellbeing of their patients but in their professional practices. As they were entering the field, he observed that young

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doctors were almost universally motivated by the hope to help their patients. Any doctor who has been in practice for more than ten years, he further observed, has seen the constructive role that the hope of parents, friends, and patients and clients themselves, have made in the health of individuals. He referred to the vital and sustaining role that hope had played for the prisoners at the Nazi concentration camp at Buchenwald. He had visited the camp a few days after it was liberated. Many prisoners were, he claimed, kept alive by hope and others who died were sustained in their martyrdom by hope. At the time of his lecture, the state of Kansas had established a comparatively successful rate with respect to mental health, which Menninger credited, to overt policies to promote hope as an integral aspect of treatment. He acknowledged that modern medicine had done much to enhance human wellbeing by rigorously using scientific methods rather than bogus treatments. Correspondingly, because hope seemed to be therapeutic, he called upon his psychiatric colleagues to undertake scientific studies to discover how and why hope seemed to make a difference (Menninger 1959). Over the past 60 years, many psychologists and psychiatrists have responded to Menninger’s challenge by undertaking studies measuring and analyzing how the presence or absence of hope actually affects how people solve problems, address crises, and think about their own lives.

3.1  Hope as a Virtue People use the words “hope,” “hoping,” and “hopeful” to refer to a wide variety of states of being. They use these terms to point to deep-seated longings, particular wishes, as well as large encompassing visions of the future. Philosophers like Spinoza and Hume thought of hope as the desire for uncertain objectives. Menninger described hope as “the working of the life instinct in its constant battle against various forces that add up to self-destruction.” (Menninger 1959, p. 17) Many people associate hoping with dreaming. Often observers have used the word “dream” to identify the hopes of those seeking to become self-sufficient homeowners as well as to identify the hopes of groups like Puritans, who several centuries ago sought to establish a promised land in America. In his vast three-volume work, Ernst Bloch associated hope variously with utopian visions, campaigns for social change, as well as the deepest and most fundamental human yearnings (West 1991). Erikson described hope as the “enduring belief in the attainability of fervent wishes in spite of the dark urges and rages, which mark the beginning of existence.” (Erikson 1964, p. 118). Before further analyzing the character of what we mean by hope, I think it is useful first to determine what kind of phenomena we have in mind. Is hope a basic human instinct, as the poet Pope suggested when he wrote “Hope spring eternal from the human breast?” Or would it be more fitting to describe hope as a particular kind of emotion or a range of certain kinds of beliefs about the future? It is useful, I think, to regard hope as a virtue. As such, it is one of several virtues, like the classical Greek virtues of courage and temperance, or Christian virtues of faith and love,

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or Protestant virtues of thriftiness and hard work. Christian authors long treated hope as a virtue alongside of faith and love. As a virtue like other virtues then hope can be described a particular kind of human disposition. Aristotle long ago argued that virtues are best understood not as capabilities or emotions but as dispositions (Aristotle 1953, pages 61–6). Dispositions represent overall habits of the self, habits that include and integrate emotive, cognitive, and volitional elements. Dispositions cannot be reduced just to ways of thinking, or to ways of feeling, or to ways of willing; they combine all three. Thus, it is likely that there are in fact cognitive, volitional, and emotive aspects associated with all virtues, including hope. Waterworth says something similar when, after arguing that hope is not an emotion and not a way of willing, she describes hope as a basic human phenomenon in a class of its own (Waterworth 2004, pages 16 and 35). Virtues as dispositions represent overall ways of orienting oneself with respect to particular kinds of challenges. For example, courage represents an overall way of orienting oneself with regard to risks and dangers. And temperance represents an overall way of orienting oneself to impulses, desires, and appetites. How might we best characterize the challenge to which hope becomes a fitting response? What is its corresponding challenge? Is it figuring how to orient oneself to uncertain objects of desire as Spinoza and Hume argued? I think Aristotle already answered that question when he discussed the virtue of temperance, which still remains the relevant virtue in response to this challenge, whether the objects of desire are certain or uncertain. Is the enduring challenge for hope figuring out how to orient oneself to the not fully knowable future or the passage of time? I don’t think this best describes the basic human challenge associated with the virtue of hope. On the one hand, other virtues like patience and perseverance seem especially relevant responses to this challenge. On the other hand, if we regard the unknowable future and uncertain passage of time as the challenge to which hope provides a fitting response, then we are prone largely to think about hope in relation to wishes for and beliefs about the future, at the same time diminishing the volitional aspect of hope and, as I will argue at length, the degree to which hoping fundamentally represents a way of orienting oneself to challenges we are currently facing. The enduring challenge to which hoping represents a fitting response is the question about one’s capacity to act constructively in the contingent present, especially in settings characterized by urgency and in relation to the not fully knowable future. The sense of urgency arises because the situations in which we find ourselves call for our immediate attention, either or both because much is at stake and/or there is only so much time available in which to act. Because the issues at hand are of great significance and time is limited, many people respond with feelings of desperation or fervently held visions of what they would like to happen. As a virtue, hope represents the disposition to anticipate possibilities for acting now: that is, the disposition in the present to imagine and to look for these possibilities while being in the process disposed as well to re-image goals and/or re-imagine means in order to anticipate viable possibilities. The challenge to which hope is oriented is the challenge of becoming disposed to engage in acting in the present with a greater or lesser realistic sense that the present is both, one, in varying degrees closed to many wished-for possibilities because of the sense of urgency and

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lack of time and because so much of what is now possible has been determined by what has already taken place as well as, two, open to possibilities in spite of and in response to the sense of urgency and lack of time. To be sure, the disposition of hoping involves the recognition of contingency, uncertainty, and that multiple factors and forces beyond our control inevitably do affect our capacity to act. Hope, then refers to the disposition in these settings to anticipate possibilities. Anticipating possibilities entails the following: emotional energy to manage anxieties and given attachments in so far as these obstruct the sense of possibility, cognitive energy in sizing up the relevant circumstances in which we find ourselves and in thinking about possible alternatives, as well as volitional energy to strengthen our determination to be both realistic about the present and to pursue realistic possibilities. Many would argue that hope consists of compelling visions of the future. For example, it might be asked: without a “compelling story of what is to come,” how is it possible to motivate people to address the issues of our age? The nineteenth-­ century British thinker Coleridge argued that “hope without an object cannot live.” (Homer-Dixon 2020, page 80) From the perspective of those who think of hope in relation to valued objectives, the dispositional understanding of hope seems to turn hoping either into a state of mind associated with wishing or vague optimism. Because I think hope is best understood as a virtue, I have adopted a dispositional approach to understanding hope. Additionally, I have argued that the disposition of hoping as a virtue is distinct from and often at odds both with wishing and optimism. Further, I think the intentional way of understanding hope in relation to particular future objectives provides an overly cognitive account of hope. For the most part, people are motivated to act not only because they are attracted by compelling visions of the future but also because they have cultivated the disposition to anticipate possibilities in relation to the exigencies of their lives. With such a disposition, they can explore various alternatives, adapt to changing circumstances, and be ready to take advantage of present possibilities even when they do not quite fit with articulated plans. Aristotle described particular virtues as the fitting ways of responding to particular challenges: that is, virtues were ways of orienting one’s life that were particularly suited to addressing typical challenges in ways that fostered one’s wellbeing. Virtues avoided other characteristics but less suitable ways of addressing these challenges. Thus, many people responded to the challenge of risk and danger either by avoidance and acting as cowards or by foolhardiness. Courage represents a fitting response that both seriously recognizes risks and dangers but also continues to act in suitable ways. The foolhardy and the timid either fail to take risks and dangers seriously or allow themselves to be overwhelmed by them. Similarly, with regard to the challenges posed by desires and appetites, temperance is a fitting response because it both acknowledges the strength of the challenge and leads people to moderate their responses rather than seeking either to stifle all desires and appetites or simply to yield to them. Correspondingly, we can, I think, appropriately refer to hoping as the fitting response to the challenge of finding ways of acting constructively in the present, as a moment in ongoing historical developments shaped both by powerful forces and events we cannot change as well inevitable contingencies

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we cannot fully control. By anticipating possibilities, hope makes the present seem open and avoids several characteristic but less fitting responses, such as despair, anomy, fantasizing, and fanaticizing. (a) Despair: people feel despair when we are unable to imagine or anticipate any realistic possibilities for acting constructively in relation to our present circumstances. We despair because we feel that present conditions offer no open space for action. Everything seems fated, determined by powers over which one we exert no possible influence. Marcel observed that “despair is in a certain sense the consciousness of time as closed or, more exactly still, of time as a prison – - whilst hope appears as a piercing through time.” (Marcel 1950, p. 53) Despair occasions people to act in a number of seemingly quite different ways. Some of us become immobilized. We may overeat or under-eat. Despair drives some of us to feel and become desperate. Correspondingly, we become ready to take extreme measures either to get what we want or simply to make ourselves feel for a moment capable of acting. Although there may be few real possibilities for affecting in measurable ways the conditions under which we live, some people weighed down by feelings of despair have argued, like the ancient Stoics, that it is nonetheless possible to determine how we may feel and think about our lives that cannot be changed in any significant ways. Hence, it may be possible, as the Stoics suggest, to cultivate faint hopes that temper underlying moods of despair (1). (b) Anomy: people feel anomy when it seems that there are multiple possibilities – multiple opportunities for choosing or responding – without any sense of their importance, value, or relevance for our lives. To be sure, we recognize that we still live immersed in a world where much is determined by the powers of nature and society beyond our control. However, these powers – especially the social powers – may well seem to act erratically. More relevantly, those feeling anomy, experience their lives in relation to all sorts of welcome and unwelcome opportunities, choices, and appeals (Durkheim 1951, 1964). Kierkegaard referred to these kinds of feelings as the despair of possibility where much seems possible but where nothing becomes actual (Kierkegaard 1849, p. 169). (c) Fantasizing: Feelings of anomy overlap with feelings of wish-fullness and fantasizing. Rather than exploring realistic possibilities, when fantasizing, we typically become overwhelmed by our dreams, desires, wants, yearnings, and fears. When we hope, we act as agents exploring what is realistically possible. When we are fantasizing, we are being moved by our desires and dreams, which we express in the process of expressing our fantasies. When the poet Alexander Pope wrote about hope springing eternally from the human breast, a goodly part of what he probably alluded to were ways humans variously fantasize about realizing diverse objects of desire. Fantasizing may occasion quite imaginative visions of desired as well as dreaded futures. There have been many literary expressions of fantasizing. However, many written utopians and dystopian schemes, like Plato’s Republic, were not primarily expressions of wish-fullness and fantasizing. Rather, they were written either or both to articulate prophetic

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critiques of contemporary circumstances and/or to stimulate imaginative explorations of real possibilities. Whether these imaginative utopias represent fantasizing or hoping depends in large part on how they are invoked and utilized in practice. (d) Fanaticizing: We fanaticize when we seek to impose particular visions on ourselves and/or others without regard to their real possibilities. Fanaticizing may be a response to despair, anomy, or wishing: a way of arbitrarily moving forward when either nothing or everything seems possible. We fanaticize when we are gripped by powerful feelings of how things ought to be. Hope addresses the challenge of finding constructive ways of acting by imaging and anticipating realistic possibilities. Fanaticizing addresses this challenge by attempting to act, often with great conviction and emotion, expecting that current challenges will thereby be mastered. Rather than exploring possibilities, fanaticizing moves people to act in ways that are felt to be necessary. Hope represents a virtuous way of responding to the challenge of finding constructive ways of acting that realistically lives with the uncertainty associated with the contingent character of human existence while avoiding the several and sometimes overlapping alternatives represented by despairing, anomy, fantasizing, and fanaticizing. In a way, all of these alternatives represent diverse and often overlapping forms of despair in their root meaning of being without hope. As a virtue, hope like other virtues is occasioned, cultivated, and strengthened by various practices, which I will discuss further in the next chapter. People are no more likely without some kinds of willed efforts to become naturally hopeful any more than are likely to become naturally courageous, industrious, thrifty, or prudent. While building upon some natural inclinations, these virtues are all cultivated and strengthened through conscious and willed practices. Accordingly, as a virtue, hope is not a simple intrinsic impulse or instinct. However, Kate Davies describes hope in these terms in a recent book titled Intrinsic Hope: Living Courageously in Troubled Times. Her account of hope is appealing in many ways. As someone especially concerned about environmental issues, she acknowledges we live in difficult if not cataclysmically threatening times. She sees what a difference hope can make. She also helpfully distinguishes intrinsic hope from extrinsic hopes, which are based upon reasonable calculations of possible outcomes. However, intrinsic hope for her seems to be some kind of basic life instinct. “Intrinsic hope is not something we need to find or create because it is already inside us. Indeed, it is inherent in all life….It is a warmth that wells up in our hearts that seeks expression in our actions…. It can never be exhausted. Because it is inherent in all life and motivated by love, it can never be completely used or depleted. It is a limitless resource.” (Davies 2018, pp. 14, 66, 67) She comes closer to characterizing hope as a virtuous disposition when she reviews various habits that are associated with hope, such as habits of attentiveness, gratitude, and realistically accepting the world as it is, all of which I regard as being integrally connected with and in part constitutive of hoping. Still, at the same time, she recommends a fairly long list of additional and attractive habits such as loving the world, being forgiving, thinking about future generations,

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cultivating a sense of wonder, developing a sense of responsibility, fostering self-­ discipline, persevering to the end, and celebrating good news. As a whole, her book reads like an engaging, often wise, and deeply concerned recipe for self-help. What she ends up recommending is an orientation to the world broader than cultivating the disposition to hope. In order to bolster the positive feelings of her readers, she writes: “Even if we think there is nothing we can do, there is always something. Just listening to the sparrows chirping outside your window, smelling a fragrant flower, or going for a walk can make you feel more hopeful.” She encouragingly adds: “Whenever you feel hopeless about the state of the world, do something positive. Call a friend, hug someone you care about, smile at a complete stranger, visit your parents…just do something…” (Davies 2018, pp. 137,138,152). Most of us would like to feel hopeful. There are indeed natural inclinations that help to foster hope. However, just trying to become hopeful frequently makes us feel wishful and then despair when our wishes seem frustrated and out of reach. In order to develop and maintain a steady disposition of hopefulness, we need to cultivate a number of interrelated habits of mind, heart, and will.

3.2  Micro-dynamics of Hope While hope is the single virtuous disposition of anticipating possibilities with respect to the challenge of acting constructively in the contingent present, there are several different elements that combine together to form this disposition. In the following paragraphs, I will analyze these, each of which is integral to this virtue. These elements are as follows: one, a disposition to acknowledge as real the prevailing features of the situations in which we find ourselves; two, an orientation to that present that involves reasonable expression of gratitude rather than indifference or resentment; three, a readiness to imagine alternatives; four, the recognition that hope characteristically arises despite good reasons for despairing; and, five, the disposition to assume responsibility for engaging in anticipating possibilities. One, hope is a way of responding to the reality of the world and our lives as they are. Hope is not dreaming or wishing for idealized futures. Hope is a way of moving from the contingent present toward anticipated possibilities. It is impossible to move toward these possibilities without beginning from where we are. Hoping, accordingly, involves the commitment to make implicit judgments about the character of the present and the probabilities associated with alternative courses of action. Hoping, thus, inherently entails the readiness to pay attention to what is going on and how things may or may not be changing. Hoping as distinguished from wishing is realistic. False hopes are ways of describing wishes not well-grounded in reality. False prophets are those who seek to rally people around unrealistic possibilities. Israelite prophet Jeremiah criticized the public intellectuals of his day for misleading the people and their leaders into thinking they could successfully withstand the military expansion of the Babylonian empire. They were, he argued, false prophets. Gabriel Marcel criticized the fascist leaders of Europe for misleading their people

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with promises of successful military expansion that, in the face of opposition, could not be sustained. In order to explore possibilities for acting – which is what we do when we hope – then it is imperative to be as realistic as possible. Otherwise, we are likely to take steps not related to the situation in which we find ourselves. It is important to add that people may be un-realistic both, on the one hand, by ignoring difficulties, underestimating resistance and costs, and exaggerating available resources as well as, on the other hand, by failing to see potentialities, overlooking available strengths, and not noticing factors that are subject to change. The cloak of realism is often associated with those who grimly call attention to ways opposition, lethargy, and the tendency of the powerful to serve their own ends. So-called realists often limit and undermine ventures motivated by idealism. However, these so-called realists may themselves become less than fully realistic when they fail to take account of the contemporary extent of goodwill, the ways popular stereotypes obscure more complex realities, and the way contingencies may in fact allow for possibilities. I think it is critical to add that because hoping presupposes this kind of attention to the realities of the present and because present realities are subject to change, correspondingly, honest and realistic hoping entails a readiness to be flexible in our expectations. Overly rigid expectations lead to several undesirable outcomes: they foster fanatical efforts unrealistically to impose our own visions; they transform themselves into mere wishes, and they often occasion despair. Hoping is not so much a fixed attachment to an uncertain object of desire as the active disposition to explore and anticipate possibilities. In the face of disappointments, disasters, and losses, the disposition of hope leads us to consider other possibilities more fittingly suited to our changed circumstances. Erich Fromm observed that “hope means to be ready at every moment for that which is not yet born and yet not become desperate if there is no birth in our lifetime.” (Fromm 1968, p. 9) In her moral psychology of how people hope, Adrienne Martin observes that the people who hope typically have back up plans (Martin 2014, p. 22). Two, hoping not only presupposes an attentiveness to the reality of our circumstances but also presupposes an orientation to that reality that is in large measure one of gratitude. Typically, in taken-for-granted ways, we orient ourselves to our circumstances with varying degrees of gratitude, indifference, or resentment. Neither indifference nor resentment generates hope. In so far as we feel indifferent, we don’t care enough about circumstances either actively to pay attention or to work at exploring alternatives. Resentment, as philosophers Friedrich Nietzsche and Max Scheler have observed, is associated with empty feelings, feelings of lacking what we want or desire, and aggravated feelings towards others who may have what we would like (Nietzsche 1887; Scheler 1915). Those overwhelmed by resentments find it impossible to accept the world as it is. So, rather than beginning to explore possibilities connected with the world the way it is, those shaped by resentment begin, as do those shaped by their wishing, by orienting themselves toward the world as they would like it to become. What especially characterizes those shaped by resentment is the primacy of negative feelings and the disposition to find ways of discharging those negative feelings. Both Hannah Arendt in The Burden of Our

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Times and Albert Camus in The Rebel called attention to the enervating character of resentment. In addition, in different terms, both signaled the critical value of gratitude as the ground for constructive action and authentic rebellion. After calling attention to pervasive feelings of resentment, Arendt viewed gratitude as the psychological ground overcoming these feelings. “Gratitude expects nothing,” she observed, citing Faulkner, except ‘One’s own anonymous chance to perform something passionate and brave and austere not just in but into man’s enduring chronicle… in gratitude for the gift of [one’s] time in it.’” (Arendt 1951, p. 438; Camus 1951, pp. 20,21). In relation to the present, gratitude recognizes that, however angry we are about these conditions, the present provides us with opportunities for loving, playing, working, protesting, and other forms of acting. Gratitude helps us to see gifts amongst the givens. Not distracted by what we do not have, do not yet have, or what others may have, gratitude allows and invites us to embrace what we have and to look for possibilities. It might well be argued that gratitude is a separate virtue distinct from hoping. That is a valid observation. Nonetheless, the virtue of hoping presupposes not only realistically attending to the circumstances in which we find ourselves but also the disposition to accept with a measure of gratitude our calling to seek constructive ways of responding to these circumstances. It would be naïve and unrealistic to expect people to be grateful when our circumstances are shaped especially by suffering, deprivations, and conflict. However, even under these kinds of conditions, hoping entails being grateful that these circumstances do not wholly define us, that we can raise our voices in sorrow and protest, and that we can explore other possibilities. While being realistic calls us to be attentive to the world in which we find ourselves, gratitude provides us grounds to stand on as we examine this world and grounds on the basis of which we can begin to imagine possibilities. As Jayne Waterworth observes, the act of hoping presupposes feelings of gratitude “that life is worth living.” (Waterworth 2004, p. 115). Three, the virtue of hope involves actively imagining. Often hoping has been, I think wrongly, thought of as the steady commitment to a vision of a desirable yet uncertain future. Certainly, Spinoza and Hume thought of hope in these terms. Such an account makes hope seem like a static state of mind and heart and will. I think hope is much more appropriately thought of as an active disposition, as persons entertain various alternatives, exploring those that seem more or less promising. Hoping involves actively seeking out and considering alternatives, even ones that seem impossibly unrealistic, not directly in order to pursue these, but in order to stimulate thoughts and feelings about overlooked or hidden possibilities. Sometimes hoping involves less overt expressions of searching as when people without decisively aiming at particular desired objects allow themselves to ruminate in the process considering diverse possibilities. Whatever activities help to keep our minds and hearts open fosters hope. Many have found helpful the following kinds of practices: free-associating, thinking outside-the-box, daydreaming, reviewing histories, role-playing, using visual arts and dance, as well as fantasizing. What works for some may not work for others. The key is to allow ourselves to exercise our imaginations. Contrariwise, what especially stifles hope are rigid mindsets, what Marcuse

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referred to as one-dimensional thinking, and ways of thinking about problems in relation to mutually undesirable and exclusive alternatives (Marcuse 1964). It is important to add that the virtue of hope is embodied in the disposition to entertain and to anticipate possibilities, not in the effective determination of these possibilities. Hoping disposes us to keep our minds and hearts open. Planning, charting courses of action, and determining paths to realize desired objectives do not constitute hoping, even though some contemporary psychologists have tended to think of hope in these terms. They have even devised scales to measure hope in relation to these kinds of activities. Rather, hope is the predisposition that makes these kinds of activities seem worthwhile. Four, hope is not a simple virtue. Just as faith involves trusting in spite of circumstances that might occasion distrust and doubt, hope involve anticipating possibilities for constructive action in spite of circumstances that also tend to occasion feelings of despair, inclinations to fantasize about wished for conditions that would be less troubling, fanatical dreams of miraculously transforming these conditions, as well as feelings of anomy. I have discussed these alternatives above. These alternatives often seem psychologically attractive. Often people seem to allow these alternative dispositions to take over. By their own gravity-like psychological force, each of these alternative dispositions may on occasion appear to overwhelm us in self-reinforcing ways. When we feel despair, despair often seems natural. Given our circumstances, why wouldn’t one feel despair? There are equivalent experiences with respect to dreamily wishing for what one desires. When they seem so attractive, why wouldn’t one wish for these things? Fanatics have similar experiences. Having given themselves over to their visions, and the moral value of these visions, then any means seem justified to help further these visions. In a way, anomy is an uncomfortable transitional condition when one feels overwhelmed by multiple diverse appealing desires, all of which seem somewhat compelling and somewhat possible. Feelings of anomy typically give way to feelings of despair, wishing, or fanaticism, or some combination of these dispositions. When we engage in hoping, ordinarily we do not close our minds and hearts to these alternatives. We do not ignore them. They represent real and tempting inclinations. Along these lines, Meg Wheatley writes: “Fear is the necessary consequence of feeling hopeful again. Contrary to our belief that hope and fear are opposites where one trumps the other, they are a single package….Hope never enters the room without fear at its side. If I hope to accomplish something, I am also afraid I will fail.” (Wheatley 2009) These alternatives represent ways of escaping from the tensions of the present, with its realistic constraints and realistic possibilities. Hoping instead represents a way of living with these tensions. Hoping also is a self-reinforcing disposition. The disposition to anticipate possibilities prompts us to continue anticipating even in the face of serious difficulties, being ready sometimes for adjusting our objectives in relation to not fully expected and unwelcomed disappointments. Accordingly, when moved by hope, we recognize but do not allow ourselves to become distracted by the allure of despair, wishing, and even sometimes fanaticism. Hoping acknowledges but neutralizes these alternatives, which in varying degrees ignore or belittle current

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realities, overlook current possibilities, and/or yield to resent-filled moods with little or no sense of aspects of the present for which we may indeed be grateful. Five, hope as a virtue entails the readiness to assume responsibility for investing time and energy in the disposition of hoping. Whenever we engage in hoping, we invest energy in several related activities which I have just reviewed. These include attending to and assessing the relevant features of our circumstances, imaging possibilities, as well as overriding the fears, the attractive but illusory fantasies, and corresponding feelings of despair our circumstances may well occasion. Because hoping as a disposition involves elements of choice and feeling, hope also entails acknowledging that we consciously and emotionally own and embrace hoping as a valued investment of our time and energy. In her philosophically-informed moral psychology of hope, Adrienne Martin argues that hoping entails being ready to offer justifying accounts for why investing effort in hoping is reasonable. She attempts to demonstrate that hoping involves some elements of practical reasoning, as understood by Immanuel Kant (Martin 2014, pp. 24, 69). I think her analysis tends to make hoping seem especially cognitive. While I think there are indeed cognitive aspects of hoping, I think it is more generally fitting simply to observe that the virtue of hoping entails a conscious as well as emotional commitment – whether overt or taken for granted – to paying attention and assessing circumstances, imagining alternatives, as well as acknowledging but not allowing oneself to become excessively attached to fears, feelings of despair, and immediate wishes these circumstances may occasion. While being a way of feeling and a way of knowing, hoping also involves the deliberate or assumed activity of choosing to engage in the realistic anticipation of possibilities as a worthwhile investment of time and energy. In his book Commanding Hope, Thomas Homer-Dixon calls for a kind of hope that is at once honest, astute, and powerful. In relation to my analysis of the micro-­ dynamics of hope, our hope is honest in so far as we are realistic, astute in so far as we use our minds and hearts as we imagine possibilities, and powerful at least minimally as we cultivate our capacity to override our inclinations to despair, either overtly or through wishful thinking. Additionally, in ways that I will discuss further both in the next several chapters, our hope gains power as we join with others to address the crises of our times (Homer-Dixon 2020). The disposition of hoping may well be directed to the realization of a wide range of alternatives, some fairly trivial and others quite life-determining. In the history of Christianity, it has often been presumed that the object of hope was one’s ultimate spiritual destiny. Augustine quite explicitly made the case for understanding hope in these terms. He devoted his little handbook Enchiridion, written near the end of his life to an exposition of the virtues of faith, hope, and love. He discussed hope in only 3 of the 122 chapters in this work, and then primarily used the 7 petitions of the Lord’s Prayer to describe hope. He assumed that one should hope for what was best for one’s life, and he argued that what was best was to live eternally with God in the life to come. He interpreted the first 3 petitions – “Hallowed be thy name,” “Thy kingdom come,“ and “thy will be done” – as referring to this end. He argued that the remaining petitions – “give us this day our daily bread,” “forgive us our trespasses as we forgive our trespassers,” “lead us not into temptation,” and”deliver us from

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evil” – could best be understood as objectives to keep us well prepared for the life to come (Augustine 1956, Ch. 115). As they have discussed the virtue of hope, many Christian writers have followed Augustine’s lead. Calvin, for example, described hope as the virtue that prepares us to be ready to wait for the blessing we will eventually receive from God after death (Calvin, Institutes, III.ii.42). (2). The association of hope with death is quite understandable. All humans die and the fear of death affects almost everyone. Recent psychological studies indicate both the pervasiveness of these fears and how these fears measurable shape how people respond to what is going on in their lives (Solomon et al. 2015). From an evolutionary perspective, these fears are probably deeply grounded in our human psyche. For many centuries, early humans regularly faced threats of death from predatory animals, other humans, disease, exposure to weather, and lack of adequate nourishment. Accordingly, it made sense for humans to cultivate their capacity to anticipate possibilities to avoid or reduce these threats. In contrast, hopes oriented towards life to come after death represent a rather recent development from a historical and evolutionary perspective. These kinds of hopes began to emerge in human communities in the millennium before the Common Era. Over the subsequent centuries, as Solomon and colleagues argue based on their psychological studies of the fear of death, these kinds of hopes have indeed played a major role in helping people manage their fears of death (Solomon et al. 2015, chapters 4, 5, 6). However, in this book, I am primarily interested in the ways the virtue of hope shapes our capacity to act constructively with respect to our current individual lives, communities, public institutions, and economic interactions. I am interested in what might be described as spiritual hopes – various kinds of hope for life after death, for the realization of spiritual enlightenment, as well as hopes for a new age or a New Earth – in so far as these hopes operate as well to occasion constructive historical action in the present and in response to the crises of our age.

Works Cited Arendt, Hannah. 1951. The Burden of Our Times [Also appearing under the title, The Origins of Totalitarianism]. London: Seeks and Warburg. Aristotle. 1953. The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics Translated, Trans. J.A.K. Thomson. London: Penguin Books. Augustine. 1956. The Enchiridion. Trans. J.  F. Shaw, Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church, ed. Philip Schaff, Vol. III, 237–276. Grand Rapids: Wm. B.  Eerdmans Publishing Company. Bakewell, Sarah. 2016. At the Existentialist Café. New York: Other Press. Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. 2011. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty. New York: Public Affairs. Berman, Harold J. 1983. Law and Revolution: The Formation of the Western Legal Tradition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Camus, Albert. 1948/1960. The Plague. Trans. Stuart Gilbert. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Camus, Albert. 1951/1969. The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt. Trans. Anthony Bower. New York: Vintage Books.

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Davies, Kate. 2018. Intrinsic Hope: Living Courageously in Troubled Times. Gabriola Island: New Society Publishers. Duflo, Esther. 2012. Lecture 2: Hope as Capability. In Tanner Lectures. Durkheim, Emile. 1951. Suicide: A Study in Sociology. Trans. John A.  Spaulding and George Simpson. New York: The Free Press. ———. 1964. The Division of Labor in Society. Trans. George Simpson. New  York: The Free Press of Glencoe. Eagleton, Terry. 2015. Hope without Optimism. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Eliott, Jaklin. 2005. What Have We Done with Hope? A Brief History. In Interdisciplinary Perspectives on Hope, ed. Jaklin Eliott, 3–45. Nova Science Publishers, Inc. Erikson, Erik. 1964. Insight and Responsibility: Lectures on the Ethical Implications of Psychoanalytic Insight. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. Frankl, Victor. 1946/1959. Man’s Search for Meaning. Trans. Ilse Lasch. Boston: Beacon Press. Fromm, Erich. 1968. The Revolution of Hope: Toward a Humanized Technology. New  York: Bantam Books. Homer-Dixon, Thomas. 2020. Commanding Hope: The Power We Have to Renew a World in Peril. Toronto: Alfred Knopf. Kierkegaard, Soren. 1849/1941/1954. Sickness Unto Death. In Fear and Trembling and Sickness Unto Death. Trans. Walter Lowrie. New York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. Marcel, Gabriel. 1950. Homo Viator: Introduction to a Metaphysic of Hope. New York: Harper and Brothers. Marcuse, Herbert. 1964. One Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press. Martin, Adrienne M. 2014. How We Hope: A Moral Psychology. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Menninger, Karl. 1959. Academic Lecture. The American Journal of Psychiatry 116 (6): 481–491. Mullainanthan, Sendhil, and Eldar Shafir. 2013. Scarcity: Why Having Too Little Means So Much. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Nietzsche, Friedrich. 1887/1954. Genealogy of Morals. Trans. Horace B.  Samuel. In The Philosophy of Nietzsche. New York: The Modern Library. Nussbaum, Martha. 1999. Women and Human Development: The Capabilities Approach. Cambridge University Press. Nussbaum, Martha C. 2011. Creating Capabilities: The Human Development Approach. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Rosenstock-Huessy, Eugen. 1938. Out of Revolution. Eugene, Oregon: Wipf and Stock Publishers. Sartre, Jean Paul. 1956. Existentialism as Humanism. In Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre, ed. Walter Kaufmann, 287–311. New York: Meridian Books, Inc. Scheler, Max. 1915/1961. Ressentiment. Trans. William W. Holdheim. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. Solomon, Sheldon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski. 2015. The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life. New York: Random House. Waterworth, Jayne M. 2004. A Philosophical Analysis of Hope. Houndmills, Basingstoke/ Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan. West, Thomas H. 1991. Ultimate Hope Without God: The Atheistic Eschatology of Ernst Bloch. New York: Peter Lang. Wheatley, Meg. 2009. The Place Beyond Hope and Fear. Shambala Sun, Spring 2009.

Chapter 4

Cultivating Hope

Abstract  This chapter reviews various personal and social factors that function to encourage the cultivation of the disposition to hope. Our capacity to hope clearly varies. It is affected by individual temperament and our stage in the life process. It is especially enhanced by feelings of self-esteem, the strength of feelings of vocation, as well as our capacity to cultivate as well feelings of flexibility and patience. Our capacities to hope are affected as well by a number of societal factors, such as presence of truly oppressive conditions or evidence of opportunities, which this chapter examines. As with any other virtue, the degree to which any person is able to develop the disposition of hope depends in large part on that person. In varying degrees, each of us can work at cultivating the characteristics associated with the micro-dynamics of hoping. We can become more adept at paying attention, at fostering feelings of gratitude with respect to unsolicited givens of our lives, at imagining alternatives, at neutralizing instincts that attract us to fantasizing or despairing, and at forthrightly accepting responsibility for engaging in hope. At the same time, it is useful to recognize that there are both personal and social factors that make it easier for some people to cultivate this virtue than others.

4.1  Personal Perspectives on the Cultivation of Hope As people vary in their capacity to cultivate virtues like courage, temperance, industry, and compassion, they also vary in their capacity to cultivate the virtue of hope. Some people are more risk aversive or more assertive than others. By the temperaments with which we are born, some persons are more extroverted or introverted, more convivial or shier. Similarly, some persons find self-discipline easier or more difficult. Those well-acquainted with modern technology are often more likely to anticipate possibilities in this realm than those without this background. Some people have a greater gift for imagining engaging social innovations than others. Truly, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_4

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our natural capacities to foster hope vary. While all persons can find ways of developing and strengthening all recommended virtues, it seems readily apparent that as human beings we differ in our innate capacities to cultivate particular virtues. It is reasonable and ethically fair to acknowledge this variation without exercising moral judgments on those with particular inborn strengths and weaknesses with respect to particular virtues. It is also reasonable to assume that with the exception of some particularly morally handicapped persons, everyone can realize minimum levels of these virtues and find ways of strengthening their moral dispositions. Being able to cultivate the disposition to hope with regard to particular matters provides an experiential basis for cultivating this disposition with regard to other matters. As human beings, we vary in our capacity for cultivating the virtue of hope not only with regard to temperament. Our capacity varies over the course of our lives. Erik Erikson has argued that “Hope is the earliest and the most indispensable virtue inherent in the state of being alive.” (Erikson 1964, p. 115) Erikson had in mind very young children who fervently desire the warmth, food, attention, embrace, and love of their caregivers. These infants begin to learn to hope as they receive the familiar and reassuring response from these caregivers. Hope in these cases is the anticipation that their desires will be fulfilled by the action of another, whose actions remain in some important ways other, willful, and contingent. Erikson argues that these earliest seeds of hope mature over time as the infant grows within caring, mutually interacting relationships with its caregivers. In turn hope functions as the ontogenetic basis of other virtues like basic trust and the capacity for industry, which the maturing child develops over time. I think Erikson usefully identifies the way the disposition of hope initially begins to form in small children. However, as I have demonstrated in the previous chapter, the adult disposition of hope involves more that beliefs in the attainability of uncertain desires. It involves attention to the reality of our circumstances, the capacity to imagine probabilities that may not yet be clearly known, and the ability to neutralize both despair and just dreamingly wishing. Developing these additional capacities as habits of mind, heart, and will takes time. As Kohlberg and others have developed models of moral development (Kohlberg 1981; Kohlberg 1984) and Fowler and others have conceived of models of faith development (Fowler 1981), I suspect it might be possible to construct models of how typically the virtue of hope develops as infants become children and then adolescents, adults, and then finally aged adults. I am not going to attempt here to outline what such a model of hope development might look like. However, one would expect hope to assume a different character in relation to the changes we undergo as we pass through the stages of the life cycle, stages which no doubt also differ with different cultural understandings of the life cycle. Nonetheless, three observations seem pertinent. Thus, one, our sense of realistic possibilities clearly expands as we move from infancy, through adolescence, to adulthood. For example, the life of playful if not at times unchecked imagination fittingly assumes a large role during our juvenile years. Finding appropriate ways to balance our imaginings and the constraints reality imposes on us constitutes an ongoing challenge as we move from adolescence to adulthood. Additionally, two, the capacity to find ways of using language to communicate our sense of what is happening in the world and

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how we might respond makes a huge difference in how we engage in hoping. Our capacity to use language to communicate develops over time. As a child matures, it further develops its capacity to use language more articulately to describe and make sense of her experiences as well as her sense of possibilities. Finally, three, as individuals grow older, gain much experience, look back over their experiences, lose some of their strength, and near the end of their lives, their disposition to hope, formed over many years, no doubt adjusts and does so in many different ways. In the following paragraphs, I will discuss four factors that are positively correlated with the virtue of hope: namely, feelings of self-worth, the sense of vocation, patience, and the capacity to be flexible. Each of these factors on its own help to foster hope and each of these factors in turn is strengthened by hope. In a self-­ reinforcing way, feelings of self-worth, the sense of vocation, patience, and flexibility both occasion and are occasioned by hope. The capacity to hope is strongly correlated with feelings of self-worth or self-­ esteem. When we feel worthwhile and valued, we are more likely to experience our lives in terms of gratitude rather than resentment. When we feel hard-done-by, unappreciated, and un-cared-for, we are prone to act out of our sense of emptiness and what we lack rather than seeking to augment and build upon what we already have. We are more inclined to despair rather than to hope on the basis of feelings of deprivation and degradation. Feelings of self-worth provide positive grounds for making hope seem realistic. Roberto Unger has argued that humans universally are prone to feelings of belittlement, feelings which often are neither fitting nor realistic. These feelings are occasioned by consciences that have become aggressive, pervasive tendencies to make invidious comparisons with others, and uncalled for moralistic evaluations (Unger 2014). (1) These kinds of feelings are clearly enervating. Correspondingly, as we seek ways to cultivate the seeds of hope, it is useful to explore ways of strengthening our feelings of self-worth. Feelings of self-worth may be generated in a number of ways. As Erikson observed, our initial feelings of self-worth arise as infants from the experience of being cared for and loved by our caregivers. That experience is reinforced and repeated through our lives, as caregivers raise us, educate us, set goals for us, and continue to help take care of us. Similarly, feelings of self-worth are aroused and strengthened as we fall in love and find ourselves loved by friends, associates, family, and lovers. As we enter into these relationships, we are encouraged by the love we experience to anticipate possibilities for these relationships. Even though many of these relationships eventually falter, as they begin and grow, our experiences of caring for and being cared about intrinsically lead us to imagine possibilities for how these relationships might unfold and flourish. As Aristotle long ago observed in his Nicomachean Ethics, all friendships, whether convivial or professional, occasion and strengthen feelings of personal wellbeing (Aristotle 1953, chapters 7, 8). These feelings in turn work to cultivate the disposition of hoping. Today and over the past several generations, many people seem to experience precarious feelings about their sense of self-worth. Their uncertain sense of self-­ esteem probably arises from many different causes. Many people seek to enhance their sense of well-being by attempting to achieve in different ways – as athletes,

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performers, students, parents, employees, and being physically attractive to others – only to feel uneasy when we fail to attain overly ambitious goals and when we fail to gain the recognition from others we desire. Even when we attain our goals, we often fail to experience sustained feelings of self-worth because our real sense of self is other and more basic than particular the goals we have set for ourselves. Our feelings of self-worth may be undermined by inevitable crises in our lives, which we manage with less aplomb and savoir-faire than we would like. The considerable contemporary growth in therapies and self-help groups bears witness to the fact that many people have been seeking help in managing their lives and their sense of well-­ being (Rieff 1966; Lasch 1978). Over the past several generations, a small industry has been developed offering counsel, workshops, diets, and workouts promising to help those interested cultivate stronger feelings of personal wellbeing, happiness, and self-esteem. Scientists have undertaken research to find out what factors seem to have the greatest impact on fostering enhanced feelings of well-being. On the basis of their studies, researchers in the so-called science of happiness provide guidelines on “the secrets of a happier life,” how “to feel more Joy”, and how “to bounce back.” A number of psychologists have recently demonstrated on the basis of their research the critical role that feelings of self-esteem play in helping people to deal constructively with the universal existential anxieties occasioned by our awareness of the threat of death (Solomon et al. 2015). The contemporary feelings of despair and disenchantment may well reflect not only the critical character of the global crises we face but also the fact that many people experience precarious feelings of self-worth. In the absence of vibrant feelings of self-worth, it is often difficult to cultivate the sense of gratitude that functions as a spring for hoping. No doubt, it is often the case that our under-developed feelings of gratitude in practice function to reinforce our uncertain feelings of self-worth. The sense of vocation also acts to occasion and reinforce both hope as well as feelings of self-worth. When we experience, the sense of vocation arises immanently: when we have particular gifts – whether these be artistic, athletic, or scientific – we feel driven to exercise and develop these gifts and excel in their expression. Sometimes, the sense of calling is occasioned by the situation in which we find ourselves. Rosa Parks initiated the civil rights movement in Montgomery, Alabama, when she refused to move from her seat on a bus to comply with the local rules of segregation. Many of those who have decided to engage in diverse humanitarian aid programs have done so because they felt moved by the needs we learned about and felt called to try to make a difference. Many wealthy people and organizations like the Carnegies and the Rockefellers have been moved to engage in philanthropic activities because they felt called to utilize their abundance to benefit others. Although probably most people undertake their work as a necessary obligation, still many of us work at our jobs with a sense of calling, occasioned by professional training, fostered by our own personal commitments, and/or reinforced by what we are able to accomplish. While feelings of vocation are always in part connected with objectives that lie beyond us and call us to pursue ends that transcend ourselves,

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these feelings are always also connected in fundamental ways with our sense of identity and selfhood. These feelings of calling strengthen our sense of being worthy. In the process, in a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle, they occasion and presuppose our capacity for hope, in this case, connected with possibilities we seek to realize as we pursue our callings. The virtue of hope is also cultivated by developing the capacity for patience. To the degree that we are patient, we give ourselves certain spans of time to realize what we are desire to realize. Patience assumes several forms. Sometimes, it takes the form of being willing at least momentarily to defer gratification until a later time with the expectation that the gratification will then be greater. Often, patience assumes the form of being ready to wait for times when our chances of accomplishing what we hope to accomplish increase in likelihood. There are many, many examples where being ready to wait enhances our possibilities either or both because we have more time to prepare ourselves and/or because external conditions become more favorable. Patience, much like the Buddhist virtue of equanimity, is the capacity to remain unruffled, not unbalanced by excessive anxieties, being able in peaceful ways to reflect on how the contingencies buffeting us also open us up to new fears and desires. Patience, like equanimity, is not to be without feelings or awareness of the world around us or the emotions stirring within us. Rather, we gain in our capacity for patience by not allowing ourselves to become hooked or alarmed by these feelings, by recognizing that these circumstances and feelings do not define who we really are. Many people have found that practices of mindfulness help to cultivate both equanimity and patience. In the present moment, being patient opens up spaces, both in time and in our emotions, in which we can thoughtfully examine the reality of our situation. Correspondingly, we can then move beyond immediate reactions to explore overlooked or assumed aspects of that reality and we can explore possibilities not at first considered. Patience does not necessarily entail putting off or deferring actions that must be taken as soon as possible. Rather, patience involves giving oneself time and emotional room to be realistic, to pay attention, to listen to others, to imagine, to solicit support, to think, and to strengthen our resolve. In these ways in the present, patience directly helps to cultivate the disposition of hoping. In a virtuous circular manner, as we cultivate our capacity for hoping, we also cultivate our capacity for patience. The disposition to hope is also correlated with a capacity for being flexible. Someone who is flexible is able to adjust as circumstances change. To be flexible implies not only the readiness to explore alternative means to arrive at desired ends but also the readiness, when conditions change, to reimagine ends in terms of both current as well as anticipated means. A person who is capable of being flexible characteristically is not wishy-washy. Someone is really only able to become flexible to the extent that she has a well-developed moral compass, a strong sense of her own values, and a lively sense of what matters most. Accordingly, she is able to explore possible compromises without compromising these values and purposes. Being flexible entails entering into responsive and reciprocating conversations with others and the world around us. It involves both actively paying attention to what others say and what circumstances reveal, being able in the process to listen well to

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varying levels of meaning, as well as being able in turn to well represent ourselves and our purposes and values as we seek to take seriously the concerns of others. Like being engaged in a dialogue, being flexible calls for both a lively engagement with others as well as the readiness to articulate our own concerns as persuasively as possible. Understanding flexibility in these terms makes it clear how the capacity for flexibility also helps to cultivate and strengthen the disposition to hope. Flexibility encourages people to be responsive and actively explore possibilities, just like the disposition of hope. In turn, we can see that the capacity for hoping has the effect of allowing people a measure of flexibility as they seek ways to understand and respond to difficult circumstances. In contrast, those who succumb to despair, and fanaticism as a form of despair, do so often in large part because they adopt far too rigid expectations of what they desire to happen and how these expectations ought to be realized. In a decisive way, our capacity to use language to communicate directly affects the ways we hope. For example, in so far as we can communicate about desperate situations, the situations themselves become less desperate. To some degree at least, by communicating about these circumstances, we are able to distance ourselves from them so that we, rather than these conditions, are in the position of defining who we are. Albert Camus observed: “If despair prompts speech or reasoning and above all, if it results in writing, fraternity is established, natural objects are justified, love is born. A literature of despair is a contradiction in terms.” Commenting on this observation and on Shakespeare’s own position as an author as well as the position of his audiences as they witnessed tragedies like King Lear, Terry Eagleton concluded: “As long as there is language, then hope remains possible….Hope is extinguished when language is obliterated.” (Eagleton 2015, pp. 122–4) Even when writing tragedies, novelists like Camus and playwrights like Shakespeare have aroused in their audiences the sense that persons in their dramas might still, in spite of it all, have acted differently to conditions that they seemed forced by fate to confront. The virtue of hope is nourished by the capacity to use our imaginations creatively. As a means, fantasizing can help expand our imagination about possibilities, so long as we treat these fantasies as metaphors, as occasions for exploring not yet fully examined alternatives from new angles. Regarded in this way, fantasies allow us to gain a sense of distance from conditions we find oppressive. They invite a kind of lightness of being, which may, in turn, help us explore more widely for overlooked and unanticipated possibilities. However, when we begin to regard our fantasies as blueprints or road maps for action, then we are no longer fostering hope but trying to silence our anxieties by attaching ourselves to reassuring or frightening images. As we have seen, fantasizing then becomes a distracting alternative to hoping. For example, I think one can argue that it is fitting to regard Plato’s dialogue, The Republic, not as a blueprint for Athens, Syracuse, or any other ancient city-state but as an imaginative exploration of a wide range of relevant issues and principles that historical actors could consider as they sought to evaluate and reform existing political and social arrangements. Rather than assuming a fatalistic stance that there are no realistic alternatives to the conditions that have resulted from past historical

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actions, the dialogue invites observers to explore a wide range of possibilities including reforms in educational processes and political practices. When considering the use of intelligence to foster imagination, it is important to recognize that intelligence can assume a number of different forms. Often, we think of intelligence primarily in terms of linguistic and numeric abilities. However, we now know that intelligence manifests itself in several different ways including but not limited to spatial intelligence, physical intelligence, artistic intelligence, emotional intelligence, and social intelligence (Gardner 1983). It is possible to further subdivide these distinct forms of intelligence, recognizing the difference between musical, poetic, and graphic arts as well as the difference between particular kinds of physical intelligence, associated for example mechanics and athletics. We can see the relevance of recognizing that intelligence assumes multiple expressions as we consider ways of fostering imagination with respect to realistic possibilities. There are multiple ways of thinking. Often, we can find our ways out of what seem like impossible situations, by temporarily attempting alternative ways of thinking. Sometimes, the roadblocks that seem to frustrate rational problem solving can be re-imagined or negotiated by momentarily turning to art or play-acting, by free-­ associating or fantasizing in search of other ways of understanding and interpreting what is going on. Correspondingly, the cultivation of hope may be fostered by the creative use of our intelligence and imagination.

4.2  Social Perspectives on the Cultivation of Hope Some societies more than others seem to encourage hopefulness. They foster the sense of possibility, feelings of “can-do,” and attitudes that welcome experimentation. As I will observe in a later chapter, Rabbinic Judaism certainly cultivated dispositions among Jews living at that time to explore how to make the best of their circumstances. The Pilgrims and Puritans settled in New England with comparable orientations that encouraged a good deal of entrepreneurial activity. In contrast, we can point to many other communities overwhelmed by feelings of depression, where the cards all seem stacked against them. Consider the contemporary circumstances of most of the Palestinians living in Gaza, where unemployment rates are at nearly 40%, where it is almost impossible to leave, where health care and education are severely restricted, and where it seems almost impossible to conceive of feasible and practical ways of improving these conditions. While the dispositions of individuals and groups are not conclusively determined by these circumstances, societal factors do have an impact on our capacity for cultivating dispositions of hoping. Over time, particular historical developments have influenced how people hope. For example, people are more likely to cultivate feelings of hopefulness in societal settings shaped by constructive economic, political, and cultural changes. Thus, feelings of hopefulness increased in many North Atlantic countries during the century prior to the First World War. During that century industrialization, the diffusion and improvement of health care, scientific discoveries, and the spread of

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educational opportunities not only raised standards of living but greatly increased the sense of new possibilities. Millions of people emigrated from rural areas to cities, from areas of economic stagnations to areas of economic growth, attempting to take advantage of these possibilities. In response to the sense of possibility fostered by these developments, entrepreneurs started new businesses, concerned individuals formed new civil society organizations, governments began expanding their services, and the arts flourished. More and more people felt hopeful. However, we must recognize the relationship between expanding opportunities and the cultivation of feelings of hopefulness is at best ambiguous. Expanding opportunities make it seem reasonable to expect new possibilities, but they do not directly nurture the disposition of hope. To be sure, expanding opportunities make it easier to imagine alternatives. However, they may or may not cultivate attentiveness to current circumstances. Expanding opportunities do encourage feelings of optimism but these optimistic feelings may in fact undermine or act as substitutes for the hard job of genuinely hoping. After all, assuming blithely that in general, all things considered, the future is likely to be an improvement on the past is not only unrealistic but also may well encourage blindness with respect to real possible crises. Being optimistic is a bit like being fatalistic: in both cases, one assumes that forces beyond one’s capacity to control will unfold and shape the future in keeping with their own inherent purposes. The optimist feels these forces are likely to be constructive and the fatalist adopts a view exactly the opposite. At several critical points in the past, expanding opportunities have worked to augment the sense of what is possible. When about 70,000  years ago, humans began developing languages in what Harari refers to as the cognitive revolution, humans greatly increased our ability to store and communicate information. We also markedly augmented our sense of what might be possible. During the so-called agricultural revolution, 8,000 to 14,000 years ago, humans domesticated animals and began to plant and harvest fruits, vegetables, and grains. We greatly expanded not only the supplies of food and goods for those who benefited but also greatly increased the amount of wealth available that was in turn used to support the creation of much higher standards of living for the wealthy and expanded political power for governing elites. While not everyone benefited from these developments (See Brady 2000; Harari 2014), these changes increased the range of possibilities for how people might live. In interesting and ultimately historically decisive ways, during the period between 800 and 300 years before the Common Era, a number of prophets, poets, dramatists, and philosophers in China, India, Persia, Palestine, and Greece set forth ideas about how to live that have both influenced subsequent civilizations and also altered how people hope. In different but comparable ways figures like Confucius, Lao Tzu, the authors of the Upanishads and Bhagavad Gita, the Buddha, Zoroaster, Jeremiah, Isaiah, the author of Deuteronomy, Greek playwrights, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle called attention to the difference between life as most people lived it and character of life as it could and ought to be lived. They highlighted this contrast in a number of different ways. Confucius called attention to the difference between current practices and the ways of ancient sage kings. The Buddha pointed to contemporary ways of living and all the distress associated with them. These ways of living were transitory,

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filled with suffering, and lacked own-being. By following the four noble truths and the eightfold path, it was possible to transcend this realm of samsara and attain a peaceful state of being. Some of these poets/philosophers contrasted our material patterns of life with idealized spiritual ways of living. Others, like Plato, envisioned a utopianlike vision of a world guided by the norms of truth, justice, and goodness. Lao Tzu contrasted living in tune with the Way with the confused, disordered, and lifeless patterns characteristic of so much of ordinary living. Prophets in ancient Israel called attention to the ways their governments and the people deviated from the standards of ancient codes which they failed to honor. In significantly different ways these prophets, dramatists, and poets judged the contemporary patterns of governing and contemporary forms of conduct as deviant in comparison to alternatives that were viewed as being not only superior but also possible. When the sociologist Max Weber analyzed some of these figures and the movements they inspired, he observed that they all, albeit in different ways, devalued the world as people currently experienced it (Weber 1915). Of course, these figures and the subsequent movements – such as, Confucianism. Daoism, Classical Hinduism, Zoroastrianism, Prophetic Judaism, Greek Tragedians and philosophers, and subsequent movements like Christianity and Islam that later emerged out of these movements – did not simply devalue the world as it was. Rather, in a number of different ways, they envisioned fundamentally new possibilities and called attention to how current practices deviated from those possibilities. Instead of simply following current patterns of life set by accepted customs and by the natural cycles of the seasons and aging, it was possible, these figures announced, to achieve something like spiritual freedom, enlightenment, or salvation, and/or to bring into being a new well-ordered commonwealth, a renewed covenant, or a harmonious well-­ ruled kingdom. All of these figures pointed to morally questionable features of contemporary life patterns and declared that it was possible and desirable to hope for outcomes not occasioned by existing patterns of life. In some cases, as in Monastic Buddhism and ascetic Hinduism, these movements cultivated hopes directed towards the realization of often otherworldly spiritual outcomes. However, other movements held out hopes directed toward patterns of living in enhanced ways in the present and future. Social movements bent on reform characteristically act to cultivate feelings of hopefulness in participants. I have already called attention to the hope-fostering impact of the Gregorian reforms in the Middle Ages. In subsequent paragraphs, I will make reference to the hope-cultivating impact of the Gandhian movement in pre-independence India, Alinsky’s community organizing campaigns in low-income urban communities in the United States from the 1930s to the 1970s, and the dissidents who signed Charter 77 in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s. A number of comparable movements come to mind, such as the civil rights movement in the United States in the 1950s and 1960s, the organization of trade unions in response to industrialization, anti-apartheid campaigns in South Africa in the 1970s and 1980s, as well as the diverse assortment of groups and initiatives during the past couple of generations seeking to promote constructive environmental practices. Often these groups have indeed exerted measurable influence on the circumstances they have been seeking to change. To the degree that these movements seem to have made

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some difference, participants in these movements understandably have felt encouraged. In most cases, participants began to feel hopeful as these movements themselves both aroused and called for them to act with hope. With their calls for commitment and their experiences of mutual support, the movements themselves aroused and supported feelings of hopefulness in participants. In her book This Changes Everything, Naomi Klein describes in depth both the devastating threat that the Earth and its people now face due to changes in the climate and the stubborn blindness of most business people and many politicians seriously to acknowledge this threat. However, at the same time, she expresses hope in the possibility of successfully addressing this truly global crisis because of the large number of radically committed indigenous people, labor groups, and environmental activists  – a movement as a whole which she refers to as “Blockadia” – which have been organizing themselves to make a difference (Klein 2014). These kinds of militant movements do in fact act to foster feelings of hopefulness among themselves and those they inspire. That is not insignificant. This widespread and historically noteworthy change of mood makes a difference. These militant movements along with many more moderate and even conservative environmentalists have influenced public debates and fostered a greater public commitment to the United Nations environmental agenda. While discussing societal factors that help to cultivate hope, we must also consider societal factors that function to undermine the disposition to hope. I will call attention to several of these in subsequent chapters. For example, in powerful and immediate ways, currently, widespread expressions of distrust in reason and science make it much more difficult to identify and address a wide range of current crises facing the world today. These feelings of distrust have made it more difficult to gain cooperation in the efforts to vaccinate people against the contemporary COVID-19 epidemic, thereby prolonging the epidemic. These feelings of distrust have also exacerbated attempts to find and utilize science-based initiatives to address issues related both to the environment and public welfare. Another and related societal factor that has functioned to undermine dispositions to hope has been the rise and spread of feelings of resentment. In so far as people allow sentiments of resentment free reign, they become preoccupied with their private agendas, their own sense of being in some ways overlooked, mistreated, or offended. Genuinely public issues tend to be reframed in relation to private agendas. In so far as people allow space for feelings of resentment, it is almost impossible to foster hope. Feelings of distrust in reason and science and feelings of resentment have become more prominent. Accordingly, today as we seek to engender and strengthen feelings of hopefulness with respect to a number of critical contemporary issues, we must work at addressing these negative moods.

4.3  Faith, Hope, and Love I would like to add a brief comment about the role of faith and love in cultivating hope. Faith is both a cultural reality and a virtue. As cultural realities faiths are systems of shared symbols and rituals by which people orient themselves to life in the

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cosmos and its meaning in relation to realities that are regarded as both true and sacred. As a virtue, faith helps people manage existential anxieties associated with contingencies including death, their sense of value including their own feelings of worth, and their sense of meaning. People form their own personal faith usually but not necessarily in relation to particular cultural faiths. Both as a cultural reality and as a virtue, faith has often helped to cultivate the virtue of hope. To be sure, many people have cultivated their own feelings of hopefulness without any overt reference to faith. They hope on the basis of their own inner strength, their own sense of gratitude and possibility, and their own rational but balanced reflections. Still, faiths as cultural realities and faith as a personal virtue have widely functioned to cultivate hope. Relationships occasioned and sustained by love, such as friendship, families, and communities, often cultivate and support the disposition to hope. The seeds of hope are intrinsic to these caring and affectionate relationships. As participants in these love-based relationships, we seek out ways to nourish, strengthen, and celebrate the bonds of affection that are integral to these relationships. Relationships informed by love help to cultivate and strengthen dispositions to hope by several means. In so far people find or would like to find satisfaction in love relationships, they look for ways to arouse, expand, and protect these relationships. The disposition of “looking for ways…” is precisely what people do when we are hoping: we are anticipating possibilities. Additionally, reciprocally beneficial relationships informed by love also help to encourage and reinforce feelings of self-esteem, which also help to strengthen the disposition to hope. The disposition to hope in turn helps prepare the way for a relationship of love to grow and develop. In these settings, the disposition to hope opens up mental and emotional and volitional spaces so that those involved in seeking to establish, expand, or even change the character of their bonds of affection feel room to explore mutually interesting opportunities. At this point, one might ask how the sense of hope engendered by loving relationships can in any realistic way be relevant to the kind of capacity for hoping that will help us address the series of interlocking global crises we face today. In answer, in an era like the present when so many are prone to feelings of despair or the several disguises of despair as wishful thinking, fanaticism, or feelings of anomy, I think it is vital to find ways of cultivating the capacity for hoping. Recognizing our capacities for hoping as an integral feature of the relationships informed by bonds of love can potentially help us to explore ways of strengthening this capacity in relation to other issues and concerns. It was in part because he indirectly recognized these kinds of interconnections that Aristotle called attention to the role of friendship in helping to foster responsible politics. Friendships not only help to foster links that transcended kinship and help sustain the sense of community. They also function to build up habits of anticipating possibilities. While relationships strengthened by bonds of love often function to cultivate the dispositions of hope, the chief problem with these bonds of affection in relation to hope is the ways they tend to become exclusive. Zealous hopes on behalf of exclusive relationships have often acted to undermine wider, more cosmopolitan feelings of identification and concern. In fact, zealous hopes engendered in relation to exclusive loyalties have often become fanatical. Amy Chua has recently called attention

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to the deep-rooted tendencies of people to link themselves with communities of people with whom they share common traditions, ethnic backgrounds, nationality, and faith (Chua 2003). This problem exists on many levels from dyadic withdrawal in small groups to re-energized tribalism within countries. These problems have been examined by many others including Sumner in Folkways, Durkheim in The Division of Labor in Society, and Hamilton and Madison in The Federalist Papers. Cosmopolitanism, ecumenism, activities fostering inter-faith communication and respect, and federalism, fittingly understood, all provide means both for acknowledging the importance of these communal bonds of affection while fostering larger, constructive, trans-communal avenues of collaborations (2).

Works Cited Aristotle. 1953. The Ethics of Aristotle: The Nicomachean Ethics Translated, Trans. J.A.K. Thomson. London: Penguin Books. Brady, Hugh. 2000. The Other Side of Eden: Hunters, Farmers, and the Shaping of the World. Vancouver: Douglas McIntyre. Chua, Amy. 2003. World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability. New York: Doubleday. Eagleton, Terry. 2015. Hope without Optimism. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. Erikson, Erik. 1964. Insight and Responsibility: Lectures on the Ethical Implications of Psychoanalytic Insight. New York: W.W. Norton and Company, Inc. Fowler, James. 1981. Stages of Faith. San Francisco: Harper. Gardner, Harold. 1983. Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences. New York: Basic Books Inc. Harari, Yuval. 2014. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. Toronto: Random House. Klein, Naomi. 2014. This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. Toronto: Vintage Canada. Kohlberg, Lawrence. 1981. Essays on Moral Development: The Psychology of Moral Development. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Harper and Row. ———. 1984. Essays on Moral Development: The Psychology of Moral Development. Vol. 2. Cambridge: Harper and Row. Lasch, Christopher. 1978. The Culture of Narcissism. New York: W. W. Norton and Co., Inc. Rieff, Philip. 1966. Triumph of the Therapeutic: Uses of Faith After Freud. New  York: Harper and Row. Solomon, Sheldon, Jeff Greenberg, and Tom Pyszczynski. 2015. The Worm at the Core: On the Role of Death in Life. New York: Random House. Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. 2014. The Religion of the Future. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Weber, Max. 1915/1946. Religious Rejections of the World and Their Directions. In From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Trans. and ed. H.  H. Gerth and C.  Wright Mills, 323–359. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 5

Habits of Hoping

Abstract  This chapter illustrates the basic argument with analyses of the thought and lives of Mohandas Gandhi, Saul Alinsky, and Vacla Havel. The chapter also examines how the philosophical position which the economist Albert Hischmann referred to as “possibilism,” corresponds to this habit of hoping. The chapter examines other examples of possibilism in the writings of Kathryn Sikkink and Hans Rosling. Our disposition to hope may be more or less deeply embedded, stronger or weaker, more or less resilient, to the degree that this disposition has become a habit of mind, heart, and will. Up to this point, I have been reviewing factors that help to occasion the disposition of hoping. These same personal and societal factors also work to sustain habits of hope. Developing a habit of hoping calls for more than a momentary readiness to imagine possibilities with regard to particular valued objectives. It requires more than good reasons for expecting favorable outcomes with respect to a specific problem. It presumes a steady disposition to anticipate possibilities with respect to whatever crises we may be facing and whatever purposes we seek to pursue. As a virtue, hope like courage represents a disposition oriented not just to particular concerns or targeted issues, such as the current climate crisis or rising levels of inequality, but a disposition oriented generally to whatever challenges may arise. To be sure, in so far as we are hopeful, we may well be able to imagine more possibilities and imagine them more easily with regard to some issues rather than others. Still, the disposition of hope entails the readiness to anticipate realistic possibilities regarding whatever crises may arise, even when the possibilities we now consider have become quite different than those with which we started.

5.1  Variations in the Strength of Our Hoping Our disposition to hope may be more or less deeply embedded, stronger or weaker, more or less resilient, to the degree that this disposition has become a habit of mind, heart, and will. Up to this point, I have been reviewing factors that help to occasion the disposition of hoping. These same personal and societal factors also work to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_5

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sustain habits of hope. Developing a habit of hoping calls for more than a momentary readiness to imagine possibilities with regard to particular valued objectives. It requires more than good reasons for expecting favorable outcomes with respect to a specific problem. It presumes a steady disposition to anticipate possibilities with respect to whatever crises we may be facing and whatever purposes we seek to pursue. As a virtue, hope like courage represents a disposition oriented not just to particular concerns or targeted issues, such as the current climate crisis or rising levels of inequality, but a disposition oriented generally to whatever challenges may arise. To be sure, in so far as we are hopeful, we may well be able to imagine more possibilities and imagine them more easily with regard to some issues rather than others. Still, the disposition of hope entails the readiness to anticipate realistic possibilities regarding whatever crises may arise, even when the possibilities we now consider have become quite different than those with which we started. All the virtues, including hope, are formed over time, through many experiences, and considerable practice. All virtues may be momentary, moderately developed but still fragile and precarious, or firmly developed habits. Throughout this discussion, I am calling attention to the significant differences that become possible when people develop steady, deeply engrained habits of hoping. As it begins to emerge, our initial experiences of hope as a disposition may be variously tested and become stronger and more habituated over time or it may be so severely challenged that the initial disposition weakens and increasingly assumes the form of wishing, fanaticism, or simply despair. To more fully appreciate how our dispositions of hope are aroused, strengthened, and become, on the one hand, firm self-sustaining habits or, on the other hand, become undermined and weakened, it is useful to consider a range of examples. I will begin with a very tough case. Consider the situation of the diverse groups of rebels who began to protest against government oppression in Syria in March 2011. Beginning in December 2010, large public demonstrations had taken place in several Arab countries, including Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. These demonstrations had occasioned the deposing of autocrats in Tunisia and Egypt and would eventually topple the government in Libya. Many people in Syria took to the streets encouraged by these demonstrations. They lived under a particularly oppressive regime which severely limited or denied freedoms of press, expression, and movement. Moreover, since 2006 the country had suffered through a period of a devastating drought that had occasioned economic distress and the immigration of thousands of rural residents into Syrian cities. These were tough times. In the spring of 2011, public protests increased. Some soldiers began to desert the army. Crowds of angry citizens toppled statues. Small groups of militants began to form cells with the aims both of defending their communities and attacking the regime. The government of Syria acted in seemingly contradictory ways. On the one hand, it introduced some small reforms, repealed the emergency law in force since 1963, promised to release political prisoners, raised the salaries of public employees, and scheduled a two-day public dialogue for July. On the other hand, the government also sporadically used military force to attack groups of demonstrators. Spurred on by their anger, by the bravery of others, by their Muslim faith, and by their desires to take back their country from the armed and wealthy elites who held power, many Syrians sought to ride what seemed like the beginning of

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waves of change. They demanded political freedoms and the ouster of President Basher al-Assad. Were they hopeful? I think a case can be made that many of the Syrians who began protesting in 2011 were indeed hopeful – they were busy realistically assessing their circumstances, anticipating possibilities, and imaginatively seeking diverse ways to make a difference. They began forming a Syrian National Council, supported by pro-democracy groups, ardent Muslims, Kurd communities, and informal local community councils. As greater numbers of soldiers deserted the armed forces, they began to organize themselves into a parallel army. Although they lacked a clear vision of the future, engaging in actions to take advantage of current opportunities seemed both possible and imperative. However, the period of civil uprisings during the spring and early summer of 2011 quickly gave way to a period of increasingly chaotic and violent civil war. Greater numbers of rebel groups took up arms. At the same time, several foreign powers were becoming involved, secretly providing weapons, military advisers, funding, and manpower both to rebel groups and to the government. The number of people killed, wounded, and displaced by the war steadily and rapidly increased. Thousands and then hundreds of thousands of refugees began fleeing the country. Differences between rebels, radicals, pro-democracy, and militant Muslim groups became more pronounced. The United Nation Nations and the Arab League engaged in diplomatic efforts to promote peace or at least temporary armistices to allow for humanitarian aid to reach those suffering. By 2013 the situation in Syria had become much more complex, violent, and destructive. An especially radical and violent group, led in part by a number of ex-Iraqi military leaders, established the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL or Islamic State), claiming in the process to have established a new Caliphate with its capital at Raqqa in eastern Syria. The extent of death, destruction, and displacement greatly expanded. Eventually, in efforts aimed to defeat ISIL, both the Americans and Russians sent troops, more money, and military hardware to Syria. Were the Syrians who seemed energized by hope during the civil uprising in 2011 still hopeful? Because they faced such overwhelming military opposition, could it be said that they continued to hope but now they were using military rather than civil means to pursue their objectives? Or, is it more reasonable to conjecture that the hopefulness they had initially experienced and expressed had weakened and for the most part assumed alternative expressions: as confused, directionless anomy; as outright despair; as wishing that the war would soon end or that they would be able to escape or that their particular party would succeed; and as a form of at least temporarily successful fanaticism associated with the Islamic state, some radical Muslim groups, and the state itself? I think it is reasonable to conclude that the genuine hoping evident during the initial months of the Syrian Spring largely had dissipated as the uprising turned into a very chaotic civil war. For the most part what remained – the shards of hope – were expressed in a wide range of feelings: Millions expressed despair as they, their family members, and neighbors were dislocated, wounded, or killed. Many stubbornly fought on but without much hope. Thousands became fanatical as they sought to exploit these conditions to realize their visions and increase their power. With desperate feelings, many sought to find new beginnings as refugees. There were, no doubt, many still moved by some glimmers of

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hope as they engaged as reporters, local aid workers, parents, good neighbors, and shopkeepers, trying against all odds to sustain areas of humanity in the midst of so much suffering and confusion. While it is indeed very difficult to sustain hopeful dispositions under these kinds of circumstances, and despair in its several forms seems more natural and compelling, still, some people even under these kinds of circumstances were probably able to remain hopeful because their initial feelings of hopefulness had in the meantime become habitual dispositions. Since 2011 the content – the subject matter – of their hoping has had to change radically because circumstances had changed (Abouzeid 2018). Our capacity to be hopeful is not static. It becomes stronger as we grow from infancy, through childhood and adolescence to adulthood, and as correspondingly we become able through experiences and challenges to form our emerging capacities for attentive realism, gratitude, and imagination into well-formed habits of hoping. As we can see from references to the experiences in places like Syria, our emerging dispositions for hopefulness may be threatened and weakened by circumstances we can never fully control. To demonstrate how someone with a well-formed habit of hopefulness can not only maintain a sense of possibility under difficult conditions but also can foster hopefulness in others, I will now consider the lives and roles played by Mohandas Gandhi, Saul Alinsky, and Vaclav Havel. The broad contours of Gandhi’s life are well known. He exemplified his ever-­ ready habit of hoping by the ways he continuously invented new means to pursue his objectives, by the ways he mixed a sense of imperative urgency to act with capacity for patience, and by the ways his commitment to basic principles and central purposes allowed him to become flexible with regard to particular tactics. He centrally defined the independence movement in India as swaraj, self-governance. From this perspective, the people of India were not going to accomplish swaraj simply by removing the colonial government. Instead, they had to develop skills at governing themselves. Two of his major initiatives well-illustrate what Gandhi had in mind. One, he advocated wearing clothes Indians made by themselves and for themselves, rather than clothes manufactured in Britain. To symbolize what he had in mind, he spent an hour every day spinning cotton into thread. Two, he led a famous march to gather salt the people needed not by buying it at stores produced by foreigners but by gathering it up from the shores of the ocean. Again, in simple ways, he was symbolizing that what was fundamentally involved in realizing swaraj, self-governance or home-rule, was not centrally about hating the British but about developing practices and institutions that strengthened activities whereby Indians gained greater control over their own lives in the present. He didn’t cease to be interested and involved in the political agendas of the Congress Party. But he was prepared patiently to move toward future goals by undertaking changes in the present that Indians could achieve for themselves without waiting for the colonial government to act. As he is often quoted as saying, “Be the change that you want.” One could tell from the way he acted that Gandhi seemed to be moved by a continuously replenishing source of hopefulness. Whatever disappointments occurred, whatever challenges appeared, he almost always discerned possibilities. Once, to be sure, he stopped a major country-wide non-violent demonstration when some of his

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followers engaged in acts of violence. These acts disturbed him, not only because in pragmatic terms they might discredit the larger demonstration, but because they demonstrated a lack of self-control – an absence of real capacity for Swaraj. While Gandhi did indeed work to realize certain objectives such as fair treatment for Indians in South Africa and later for independence for India, what was vital in all cases, was to take one step at a time in the present. His hope was primarily manifested not in a clear vision of the future but in the readiness to see possibilities in the present. Saul Alinsky was a community organizer active in the United States from the 1930s until he died in 1972. After he graduated from the University of Chicago in 1930, for several years he undertook some graduate studies, worked at odds jobs, and then worked as a labor organizer for the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO). By the late thirties, he had begun organizing community groups in the Back of the Yards district of Chicago. In 1940 he founded the Industrial Areas Organization (IAO). The IAO functioned as the administrative hub for organizing initiatives he undertook in low-income districts in cities across the United States, in Chicago as well as in Kansas City, Detroit, Rochester, Oakland, New  York, and the Latin American barrios in southern California. He was especially active in southern parts of Chicago, where he organized the Woodlawn Organization. He also spent considerable time training other community organizers. Alinsky developed a characteristic approach to community organizing that involved a realistic commitment to working within existing circumstances, the imaginative use of available resources, a flamboyant irreverence for accepted ways of acting, and a dedication to helping empower those with little or no power. He organized larger community organizations by linking up with existing neighborhood associations, whether formal or informal, like religious groups, local clubs, sporting groups, and the like. He was famous for encouraging the use of imaginative tactics, like a threatened sit-in in the washrooms of O’Hara airport and a “shop-in’ filling the floor space with Black shoppers in an expensive downtown department store. He used these tactics in order (successfully) to arouse public attention to the demands of the Woodlawn Organization. He summed his ideas about organizing in a little book, published the year before he died, entitled Rules for Radicals (1971). In that book, he wrote: “The basic requirement for the understanding of the politics of change is to recognize the world as it is. We must work with it on its own terms if we want to change it to the kind of world [that] we would like it to be.” (Alinsky 1971, p. 12) Organizers must be, he argued, “resilient, adaptable to shifting political circumstances, and sensitive enough to the process of action and reaction to avoid being trapped by their own tactics …” (Alinsky 1971, p. 6). Along these lines he observed that the “price of a successful attack is a constructive alternative.” (Alinsky 1971, pp. 12, 130). Listing the features of a successful organizer, he well-characterized himself. The ideal elements of an organizer were, he wrote, curiosity, irreverence, imagination, a sense of humor, and “a bit of a blurred vision of a better world.” (Alinsky 1971, p. 76). Although he didn’t directly comment on his deeply engrained hopeful disposition, Alinsky well-exhibited it. He was always anticipating possibilities where others saw dead ends. Students at a conservative religious college came to him once, complaining

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that the school wouldn’t let them have dances, smoke, drink, or have any fun. When probed by Alinsky, they acknowledged they were allowed to chew gum. At Alinsky’s suggestion, the students then successfully won greater freedom from the school after several hundred of them left wads of the chewed gum on the school walkways. Alinsky expressed a buoyant sense of possibility even when faced with great difficulties and occasional failures. In his book at one point, he said he was an optimist because he felt hopeful, and he believed with hope it was possible to work for a purposive future. However, the word optimist doesn’t really well describe him. He fully acknowledged the powers ranged against the have-nots of this world and the likelihood that some of his organizing efforts would end in failure. Referring to the myth of Sisyphus, he saw life as an ongoing set of struggles, ever working to reach a new plateau, meeting opposition, and then striving towards another plateau. “Because life is there ahead of you and either one tests oneself in its challenges or huddles in the valleys in a dreamless day-to-day existence whose only purpose is the preservation of an illusory security and safety.” (Alinsky 1971, p. 22). Vaclav Havel also well-illustrated the habit of hoping. Havel was a Czech author, who lived from 1930 to 2011 and wrote a number of plays staged both in Czechoslovakia and worldwide. Early in 1977, he was one of several authors of Charter 77, a document calling for the Communist government to honor its existing legal commitments to protect human rights. Later that year he wrote a long, widely distributed essay “The Power of the Powerless,” which was subsequently published along with several shorter essays by other Czech and Slovak intellectuals. Because he voiced his views, he was imprisoned several times by the government, including from 1979 to 1983. After the Velvet Revolution in 1988, the leaders of the Communist party voluntarily relinquished power. Comparable revolutions had previously taken place earlier that year in Poland and East Germany. In early 1989 Havel was elected President of the now free Republic of Czechoslovakia. To understand more fully the role that Havel played and why I think he so well exemplifies someone characterized by the habit of hoping, I must describe more fully the situation in Czechoslovakia in the 1970s. The Czechs had long been governed by foreign powers, by the Austrian-Hungarian Empire until the end of the First World War, by the Germans from 1938 until the end of the Second World War, and by a local Communist regime under Soviet influence since 1948. Since 1948 Czechoslovakia had a state-run economy, a one-party government that permitted no overt political dissent, and a state-regulated social order. Because music associations were permitted, these became one of the only means for the people to express their independence from government supervision. In 1967 a number of writers called for greater freedom of expression. Some of the leaders of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party responded favorably, especially after Alexander Dubcek became leader of the party on January 5, 1968. The government announced reforms allowing for greater freedom of speech, media, and movement. Promising “socialism with a human face,” in April Dubcek announced a new Action Programme that placed greater emphasis on access to consumer goods, formally legalized rights previously anticipated, promised a ten-year transition to more democratic political processes, and federalizing the country into Czech and Slovak parts. In response to this announcement, radical individuals and

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groups became more publicly demonstrative and vocal. This became the so-called “Prague Spring.” A manifesto, entitled “The 2000 Words,” written by Ludvik Vaculik, signed by 70 others, and published in June, called for the public to join efforts to accelerate promised reforms. Dubcek denounced this appeal as being too radical and asserted his country’s loyalty to the Warsaw Pact, while still defending the gradual pace of official government’s reforms. However, in late August armies from the Soviet Union and 4 other Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia. All the hopes raised by the Prague Spring came to a crashing end. Dubcek was removed from office. Although sporadic forms of resistance occurred, a period of “normalization” was imposed upon the people of Czechoslovakia that allowed for even fewer freedoms than had existed a year earlier. 70,000 people emigrated almost immediately and more than 300,000 over the next several years. How was it possible to feel hopeful under these oppressive circumstances? The initiative taken by Havel and others in communication with him demonstrates how it was possible to feel hopeful even under these oppressive conditions. In October 1976 the government arrested members of a rock band, called “The Plastic People of the Universe.” Partly in response to this event and probably even more to initiate a wider more inclusive change in public mood, Havel and others prepared a short document entitled “Charter 77.” After noticing that the government had signed several United Nations covenants and multi-national accords defending human rights, Charter 77 demanded that the government respect and enforce these laws to which they were legally bound. The Charter noted that people supporting the Charter did not represent any particular organization or political platform: rather, they represented all faiths, shades of opinion, and professions. “We believe that Charter 77 will help all citizens of Czechoslovakia to work and live as free human beings.” (Charter 77, p. 227) More than 1000 people publicly signed the Charter. The government reacted forcefully, arresting many of the signatories and arranging to collect more than a million signatures to a petition decrying Charter 77. But Charter 77 had started a change of disposition, which was widely but not overtly felt. In 1978 Havel wrote his long essay on “The Power of the Powerless,” which more fully expressed the sentiments hinted at in Charter 77. This essay well expressed Havel’s particular sense of possibilities. Havel distinguished between “living within the truth” and “living within the lie.” Living within the truth meant living in relation to the basic realities of life, seeking the good of life in everyday activities, engaging in what former Czech president and philosopher, Tomas Masaryk, referred to as “small scale work” on behalf of the nation. Havel provided examples, including the case of a master brewer working to improve the quality of his product; small, local informal groups formed by students, ex-prisoners, and religious congregations; writers circulating their works informally; alternative educational projects; musical groups; as well as all those simply calling on the government to honor its own laws. Havel asserted that a huge hidden population seeking diverse ways to live within the truth existed within the countries of Eastern Europe. This population was, he observed, “pre-political.” They were not moved by a vision of the future but by a love of life in the present. They sought to rehabilitate the values of “trust, openness, responsibility, solidarity, and love.” (Havel 1978, p. 93) What

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was ingenious about Havel’s position was the way he artfully re-imagined the issues at hand so that large numbers of people could identify with the vision he set forth and affirm the sense of possibilities that were real because people already in multiple ways were engaged, and could become further engaged, in “small scale work” that would make a difference. He observed that people already complied with many government rules only as empty rituals and that there was real power that would inherently come to fruition as people began developing what amounted to parallel polities: that is, associations in which they exercised self-government over their own lives. These “Independent initiatives address the hidden sphere; they demonstrate that living within the truth is a human and social alternative and they struggle to expand that space available for that life; they help – even though it is of course only indirect help  – to raise the confidence of the citizens; they shatter the world of appearances and unmask the real nature of power.” (Havel 1978, p. 82) Havel was able to imagine these possibilities not because he had strong reasons for thinking the future might develop in certain ways but because he had already developed a well-­ formed habit of hope. In a subsequent book he expressed these convictions: “Hope is a state of mind, not a state of the world….it is a dimension of the soul; it’s not essentially dependent on some particular observations of the world … It is an orientation of the spirit, an orientation of the heart….Hope is definitely not the same thing as optimism. It is not the conviction that something will turn out well. But the certainty that something makes sense, regardless of how it turns out.” (Havel 1990, p. 180).

5.2  G  ood Reasons for “Hope” Typically Engender Not Hopefulness but Confidence Many people assume that hope itself is a response to factors that make the anticipation of possibilities seem reasonable. From this perspective, feelings of hope follow from and are nourished by independent conditions and ways of viewing these conditions that foster expectations that seem both promising and reasonable. For example, a student hopes to graduate because she has already passed most of her courses and expects to perform well in the courses she has yet to complete. A group planning a backpacking trip over several high mountain passes hopes that all will go well because forecasts do not predict snow for at least another month. A political party expects its candidates to win the election because most surveys show their candidates to be well ahead in the polls. Investors feel hopeful with regard to their investments because relevant economic data indicate rising levels of employment and continuing high returns on investments. We could, of course, cite many more examples where people express their hopefulness with respect to particular objectives based on their understanding of what they regard as compelling evidence. In all of these examples, hope is viewed as a reasonable and fitting response to what we regard as reliable and compelling information about prospects for realizing objectives that are not guaranteed but seem highly probable.

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Many people talk about hope precisely in this manner. They have hope that they will be able, they say, to realize this or that objective because there are indeed good reasons for feeling things will turn out well. In all these cases hope is regarded as an outlook characterized by confidence and occasioned by, and in its own way derivative of, compelling accounts of what is expected to happen with respect to the objectives we are pursuing. It is useful to add that accounts are likely to become compelling for people for a variety of reasons, including the evidence that is communicated, the way that evidence is interpreted, and the degree to which the sources of evidence appear to be authoritative. Clearly, what constitutes a compelling account for some may be regarded as unreliable and irrelevant by others. Accordingly, people may variously base particular hopes on some combination of scientific evidence, common sense, received traditions, public opinion, persuasive arguments, scriptures, and hot tips. At this point, I do not wish to debate the merits of different kinds of accounts on which people base their hopes for realizing particular objectives. Rather, I want to call attention to the prominence in this way of thinking of the compelling accounts that occasion these expressions of hope. People hope – feel confident  – because they feel there are good reasons for hope. Correspondingly, they despair about achieving the objectives they desire and seek to realize when they can find no compelling accounts or good reasons which might encourage confidence. Understanding hope from this perspective, then the most effective means for cultivating hope is to articulate good reasons for how and why it makes sense to feel confident of realizing particular objectives. Understood in these terms, hope is not regarded as a fundamental disposition or a virtue. It is not regarded as an active and general way of orienting ourselves to the world and the situations in the world that we meet from time to time. Rather, it is viewed as a way of referring to calculated odds of realizing particular objectives. We talk about “hope against hope’ when the evidence and reasons are not very strong and “confidence” when the evidence and reasons are more compelling. The critical factors  – those engendering positive expectations – are not located in us and our dispositions but external to us in the evidence and reasons that can be marshaled or not marshaled to demonstrate how promising our prospects are. Correspondingly, from this perspective, it makes sense to develop good reasons – or to explore if we can indeed develop compelling reasons – when we are trying to motivate people to pursue particular objectives, such as working hard to graduate, joining others for a backpacking trip, making particular investment decisions, or, more critically important at this point in time, mobilizing support for a certain set of environmental policies and practices. However, in all these examples, we are correspondingly not attempting to cultivate the virtue of hope or hopefulness. Rather, we are attempting to move people to make one or more decisions with respect to particular objectives. The distinction I am making here can be well illustrated by looking at the way several recent authors have referred to an outlook on the world they refer to as “possibilism.” The economist Albert Hirschman coined the term in a 1971 book entitled A Bias for Hope that examined policies with respect to economic development, especially when he was examining the prospects with respect to Latin America.

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Hirschman invoked this term to argue against what he regarded as overly deterministic models that economists used to consider possibilities for change in economically underdeveloped areas. Calling attention to examples of unintended consequences, cognitive dissonance, and odd and unique events, Hirschman argued for “the irreducibility of the social world to general laws.” (Hirschman 1971, p. 27). Aside from using the word in the title of this book of essays, Hirschman only explored what he meant by hope through his brief discussion of possibilism. The phrases he uses – “passion for possibility” and “bias for hope” – indicate that hope for him was a disposition, a deep-seated inclination to look for possibilities. When talking about possibilism, he did not cite reasons for confidence. Rather he argued against the kind of realists that in turn focus their attention on obstacles and problems that make the situation in developing countries seem difficult. His own disposition to anticipate possibilities is also well illustrated by a book he published a year earlier than A Bias for Hope. In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, he explored the options beyond either compliance or non-compliance that people may pursue in difficult circumstances, especially when they opposed directives announced by those in authority. In addition, either to the alternative of silently acting in compliance with existing orders or the option of quitting, they could in diverse ways find ways to express themselves (Hirschman 1970). Kathryn Sikkink recently wrote a book entitled Evidence for Hope to argue against scholars, public officials, and activists that have become discouraged by a number of setbacks to the human rights movement in the twenty-first century (Sikkink 2017). Her title seems to suggest that she proposes to marshal good reasons for feeling confident about prospects for the efforts of those seeking to promote human rights. Indeed, she argues that those who feel discouraged or fail to see progress with regard to the global human rights movement tend to base their negative judgments in relation to ideal visions of human rights. Calling attention to the growing number of refugees fleeing war-torn conditions and increases in economic inequalities among individuals, she acknowledges that worsening conditions with respect to human rights in a number of areas over the past several decades. Nonetheless, she argues on the basis of historical rather than ideal comparisons that there is indeed evidence for hope. However, it misrepresents Sikkink’s position to assume for her that hope is primarily cultivated by compelling evidence. Because she is so well acquainted with those actively involved in the human rights movement, she knows these people already possess a prior disposition to hope. She writes “Hope sustains human rights work.” (Sikkink 2017, p. 20) She herself well expressed this bias for hoping and also, acknowledging Hirschman as a mentor, affirms her commitment to “Possibilism.” Criticizing both pessimism and optimism, as a possibilist, Sikkink both anticipates possibilities and seeks evidence that demonstrates the credibility for hoping. After all, she writes “hoping is not wishful thinking.” (Sikkink 2017, p. 21). In his recent book Factfulness, Hans Rosling also referred to himself as a “possibilist,” while crediting himself with the invention of the term. In this book and in the Ted talks he has presented, Rosling firmly expressed his commitment to hard facts. Too often, he demonstrated at length, governments, business people, and the

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public, in general, make assumptions and reach decisions based upon views of the world that are distorted by biases, fears, over-generalizations, and dispositions to blame. As I have already observed, repeatedly in many different settings he has administered a simple test of 13 common questions about the current state of the world. The scholars, government officials, businesspeople, and others to whom he administered this test provided answers that were more wrong than if those asked had simply randomly guessed. Overall, they assumed the world was much worse off than it was. It is vital, Rosling argues, that people make up their minds on the basis of facts. To that end Rosling both provides a wealth of information about the current state of the world, demonstrating in the process that the world has experienced more progress than most people assume. To be sure, he recognizes that the world faces several serious threats. He points to five: the threat of a global pandemic, the risk of a global financial collapse, the risk of World War Three, the threat of climate change, and the risks associated with global poverty. However, he remained basically hopeful. It is useful to quote him at length: “People often call me an optimist because I show them the enormous progress they didn’t know about. That makes me angry. I am not an optimist. That makes me sound naïve. I am a very serious “possibilist.” That is something I made up. It means someone who neither hopes without reasons nor fears without reasons….As a possibilist, I see all this progress and it fills me with conviction and hope that further progress is possible. That is not optimistic. It is about having a clear and reasonable idea about how things are. It is about having a worldview that is constructive and useful.” (Rosling 2018, p. 69). This statement makes it seem as if Rosling’s sense of possibilities grew out of his study of the facts, as if his hopefulness was cultivated by good reasons. However, Rosling’s own biographical comments suggest a different order of causality. He acknowledges his predisposition from an early age to seek out possibilities, including his successful attempt to learn how to swallow a sword. Working as a physician, often in developing areas, he had continuously looked for ways to improve the delivery of medical services. He became fascinated with big data because he foresaw the possibilities of helping to overcome the pessimistic and fatalistic ways people thought about problems facing developing countries. His prior disposition to hope led him to collect information that would encourage others also to look for possibilities. It is interesting that he does not refer to his list of five serious global threats until almost the end of his book. Many observers are so worried about these kinds of threats that they view the progress that Rosling documents as being real but only moderately significant. As a realist, Rosling in turn acknowledges the importance of these threats but remains hopeful not only because humans have made progress but also because throughout his life, he has been predisposed to look for possibilities. Recently, in his book Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress, Steven Pinker has also identified himself as a “possibilist.” (Pinker 2018, p. 345) In fact, Pinker sounds like a restrained and realistic optimist. He cites a considerable amount of data, to argue for long-term improvements in health, standards of living, levels of educational attainment, respect for human rights, and peaceful living conditions, now and then set back short-term disturbances. As humans

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have applied their ingenuity and their sympathy, as they have continued to develop benign institutions, and as they expanded both the scope of knowledge and its applications to address human endeavors, humans have benefitted in demonstrable ways. He marshals evidence in defense of both technological and moral progress, including declines in homicides and suicides and increasing enforcement of human rights. He acknowledges humans face a number of huge and serious problems, like climate change, increasing inequalities within societies, and the inevitable role of entropy. He follows up by indicating constructive steps that have been and are being taken to address these difficulties. Correspondingly, he sometimes describes his position as “incrementalism” or “pessimistic hopefulness.” His book makes an especially strong case for progress – with what many might regard as qualified optimism. He makes this claim because he especially seeks to criticize all those ordinary people as well as intellectuals who seem to be given over to feelings of pessimism and despair. He criticizes thinkers like Nietzsche and Foucault for their attacks on Enlightenment ideals of reason, science, and humanism. He goes on at length criticizing religious faiths for their hostility to reason and science. In particular, these anti-Enlightenment movements have, he attempts to demonstrate, directly and indirectly, encouraged the dangerous rise in populism. In a way, Pinker’s self-identification with “possibilism” makes sense. He seems predisposed to anticipate possibilities. However, even more powerfully, he depicts himself as an Enlightenment-based optimist, making a strong and compelling case for the role of reason, science, progress, and humanistic values over against all those momentarily attracted and distracted by romanticism, existentialism, religion, and populism. Rutger Bregman has recently made a case for hopefulness in his book Humankind: A Hopeful History. He wrote this book not to criticize pessimists but so-called realists, people like Hobbes, Golding, and Milgram, who have assumed that humans are by nature inclined to seek their own advantage at the expense of others, even if that meant using violence, cheating, and lying. Bregman argues that this so-called realistic view of humans leads people to limit their expectations and accept as normal adverse conditions that might well be changed to the benefit of those involved. It is also, he demonstrates at length, fundamentally unrealistic. He cites a wide range of evidence to call attention to examples of humans going out of their ways to help each other, to express kindness, and to persevere when conditions become difficult. He cites accounts of soldiers not firing on other soldiers, stranded teenagers working together to protect each other, individuals in South Africa working to overcome the scars caused by Apartheid, grassroots efforts to foster local democracy in places like Brazil and Denmark, the successes associated with community policing, and much more. Bregman re-examines several classical examples, often cited to show just how callous and mean-spirited humans are, to demonstrate that on closer examination, many of the people involved in these cases actually exhibited compassion. Bregman maintains that much of the injustice, oppression, and unnecessary suffering experienced by humans has resulted from the actions of particularly nasty individuals in positions of power. We must, he concludes, adopt a more benign view of human nature. “A new world awaits us if we revise our views of human nature.” (Bregman 2020, p. 381).

Works Cited

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Bregman makes a compelling case that we can expect possibilities to act constructively in response to the crises of our age. The grounds for these possibilities, however, are not to be found either in schemes or organizations developed to address these crises. Nor are they to be located in evidence of historical progress. Rather, Bregman argues, in so far as we recognize that humans, for the most part, are caring and well-meaning, then we will correspondingly find more ways to cooperate with each other for our mutual benefit, even when such cooperation entails taking on reasonable risks in the process. That is: if we cultivate a certain kind of mindset, one that views humans basically as humane and responsible, then, like putting on a new set of glasses, we will see the world and other people more positively and we will discover possibilities we would otherwise overlook. Citing diverse historical evidence and psychological studies, Bregman argues for the credibility of a particular positive cognitive conviction about human nature  – what we might refer to as a particular belief. As we embrace this conviction, we will, he asserts, experience a Pygmalion-like effect: we will be inclined to act more humanely, to honor moral principles, and to discover more possibilities for constructive action. Although the sub-title of the English language version of his book includes the word “hopeful,” Bregman does not directly write about hope. Nevertheless, his book conveys a sense of hopefulness. Bregman himself well exhibits the habit of hoping in the ways he actively seeks examples to reinforce his argument. What I found especially appealing about his book was not his argument, which overstates the case regarding human goodness, when so many contrary examples might also be cited. Rather, it is his gusto, his love of life, and his fundamental disposition to anticipate possibilities. Well-recognizing the crises and disenchantment of our age, many desperately would like to feel more hopeful. Typically, they often look for a revised account of the world and the several threats facing the world – from climate change, increasing inequality, politics charged by resentment, and economic uncertainty to seemingly never-ending waves of refugees – so they can feel more optimistic. In this book, I am not attempting to re-interpret the current status and prospects for our world so that they seem less dire and more promising. Rather, I am arguing for the significant difference that takes place when we cultivate within and among ourselves the disposition for acting with hope: for sizing up the world realistically, acknowledging what we can be grateful for, recognizing but placing our diverse feelings of despair at a distance, while imagining possibilities.

Works Cited Abouzeid, Rania. 2018. No Turning Back: Life, Loss, and Hope in War Torn Syria. W.W. Norton Company. Alinsky, Saul. 1971. Rules for Radicals: A Pragmatic Primer for Realistic Radicals. New York: Vintage Books. Bregman, Rutger. 2020. Humankind: A Hopeful History. Edited by Elizabeth Mantor and Erica Moore. Bloomsbury: Bloomsbury Publishing.

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Havel, Vaclav (1978) The Power of the Powerless in Power of the Powerless: Citizens against the State in central-eastern Europe, ed Vaclav Havel John Keane et al., (Armonk/New York: M. E. Sharpe, Inc.), 23 – 96. ———. 1990. Disturbing the Peace. New York: Vintage. Hirschman, Albert O. 1970. Exit, Voice, and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations, and States. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. ———. 1971. A Bias for Hope: Essays on Development and Latin America. New Haven: Yale University Press. Pinker, Steven. 2018. Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. New York: Penguin Books. Rosling, Hans, with Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling Ronnlund. 2018. Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong About the World  – and Why Things Are Better Than You Think. New  York: Flatiron Books. Sikkink, Kathryn. 2017. Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Chapter 6

The Social Practice of Hoping

Abstract  Using a number of examples, this chapter examines hope as a social practice. It begins by observing that hope is characteristically expressed by people predisposed to consider alternatives, ready attentively to keep track of present exigencies, and prepared to experiment. The chapter reviews a variety of examples such as Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the Red Lake Ojibwe, the social advocacy group AVAAZ, the ancient Israelite Prophet Jeremiah, and the contemporary Humans Rights movement. The social practice of hoping is characterized by four traits. They actively pay attention and monitor the effectiveness of their own initiatives. They engage in ongoing conversations with those who support and those who oppose them. They especially focus on next steps – what complexity scientists refer to adjacent possibilities. They recognize both the importance of acting in a timely manner and that enduring changes often require much time to be implemented. Hope is not fundamentally embodied in plans, ideologies, scientific discoveries, well-articulated views of the future, or particular forms of knowledge. It finds its expression characteristically in people disposed to consider alternatives, ready attentively to listen, responsive to present contingencies, and prepared to experiment. As we have seen, this disposition has many voices. Sometimes, like Fazle Hassan Abed, who founded BRAC, a social agency in Bangladesh, hopeful people act to develop novel ways of addressing ongoing problems like poverty. In this instance, BRAC has helped hundreds of thousands of households to expand their means of livelihood especially in the rural parts of that country through small business operations. I will say more about Abed and BRAC further along in this chapter. However, sometimes in contrast, like the prophet Jeremiah, hopeful people may sound the alarm, hoping others will act in time and appropriately, even while considering possible alternatives if they do not. In this instance, Jeremiah, the prophet of doom, first attempted to arouse his fellow Israelites to be ready for the disaster he prophesied would soon befall them. Later, as the Israelites were in the midst of that disaster, Jeremiah counseled members of his community to look for opportunities for a new life under radically changed circumstances, no longer as members of a distinct © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_6

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political community living in a given territory but as a religiously defined ethnic community living dispersed in many other countries. “Build houses and live in them; plant gardens and eat what they produce…seek the welfare of the city where I [God] have sent you.” (Jeremiah 29: 5–7). Up to this point, I have described hope, hoping, and hopefulness as a disposition. However, in so far as people proceed to act moved by this disposition, it becomes fitting to regard hope not just as a disposition but as a social practice. This characterization especially makes sense in so far as our dispositions to hope are influenced by what I will in further chapters describe as a due regard history. In the following paragraphs, I will more fully both characterize hope as a social practice and describe the way hopeful people find constructive ways of acting in desperate times. I will describe four characteristics of people moved by the power of hope. Paying Attention  First, then, hopeful people imagine and explore practical possibilities. Paying attention entails being realistic. Paying attention also involves being prepared to make compromises when and if compromises seem to be required. In the next chapter, I will consider the example of ancient rabbis, who, after the destruction of the temple in Jerusalem and the military occupation of Palestine in CE 70, found ways of reimaging the character of their community, defined more by ritual and social practices than by territorial rule. Moved by hope, the Rabbis found within their traditions resources to help their community thrive under often very difficult circumstances. Their hope was grounded not so much in a new vision of the future but in a re-imaged view of the present. Consider another quite different example: namely, the work of the International Committee of the Red Cross and all those other people engaged in drafting and gaining acceptance for the Geneva Conventions. Many of these people found egregious violence abhorrent. They were apprehensive about the increasingly destructive character of modern warfare. They were outraged about how many unarmed and defenseless people suffered in these wars. However, they realistically recognized that humans were not about to abandon warfare. So, they sought to develop a set of practical guidelines which both, on the one hand, set limits on how armed conflicts should be conducted and, on the other hand, were likely to gain political and legal support from governments around the world and from their military leaders. In particular, these guidelines have sought to protect the lives of unarmed civilians, wounded soldiers, and prisoners of war: that is, people who posed no threat to their enemies and were unable to defend themselves. To be sure, these conventions are imperfect. They have had to be augmented by international treaties banning or limiting the uses of land mines, chemical weapons, and nuclear weapons. Still, these conventions and treaties have had a measurable impact. They have gained the support of military officials because excessive violence of past wars has often been demonstrated not to have furthered military objectives in any significant ways. Nonetheless, as more warfare takes place within rather than between countries and as insurgents often station themselves in the midst of civilians, it has become clear these conventions and treaties must be further augmented and reformed. However, at this point, I do not want to review the merits, limitations, and challenges facing these conventions and treaties. Rather, I refer to the efforts to

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establish these conventions as an expression of hopefulness: of people, responsive to the crises of their times, seeking to find possible ways of effectively addressing at least some of these challenges. The Red Lake Ojibwe provides an example of the way hopeful people explore practical possibilities. These people successfully resisted the efforts of and federal governments to parcel up their lands and the efforts of missionaries to convert their people away from their traditional faith. Beginning in the 1860s and continuing into the late 1880s, these governments attempted both to seize large parts of the land traditionally claimed by Red Lake Ojibwe, to move other indigenous people onto these lands, and divide up the collectively owned tribal lands into privately held parcels of land. In 1863 the tribal leaders were ostensibly tricked into ceding lands based on a written account that deliberately misrepresented the oral agreement that had been previously reached. Over the next several decades, standing together as a group, tribal elders refused agreements the governments attempted to force on them. They objected to other tribes being settled on their lands and to parceling their lands into individually held allotments. As a compromise, they allowed the Minnesota state government to claim some of their traditional lands north of where they were currently living. Eventually, again as a clever compromise they formally established a governing council in keeping with modern laws but did so in keeping with traditional practices so that council was in fact a meeting of hereditary chiefs. They maintained their traditional religious rites, which they successfully defended as being comparable to the religious practices of Christian churches. Over this time, they demonstrated considerable unity and determination, which was born and maintained by their readiness to identify and capitalize on practical possibilities (Treuer 2019). Few people would cite the examples of the ancient Rabbis, the International Committee of the Red Cross, or the Red Lake Ojibwe chiefs as examples of hope. None seem to be driven by a promising vision of the future. None sought to lead people towards some kind of better tomorrow. They all exhibited dogged determination as they worked at what they were doing. However, they all well-expressed several characteristic features of the role of hope in people’s lives. For example, often hope acts, not as a dominant, publicly exhibited disposition but as an underlying, often presumed predisposition that helps create and support a sense of openness in face of difficulties. Interestingly, as they worked at crafting the stances they are known for, each group exhibited both patience, which is a by-product and catalyst for hope as well as the flexibility – another correlate of hope – to make what we might describe as strategically advantageous compromises. Hopeful people cultivate a lively attentiveness related to the matters that concern them. As a presupposition of the process of anticipating possibilities, hopeful people must be attentive to present circumstances and the ways they have changed. As they seek to anticipate how to respond, they must also work at distinguishing symptoms, corollaries, and underlying causes as well as corresponding opportunities. What especially characterizes the practice of hope is this quality of exploratory and enquiring attention, where hopeful people often look for what others have

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overlooked or taken for granted. In his efforts to help communities in need, John McKnight has well exemplified this kind of attentiveness. He has indeed built it into the kind of community organizing efforts he has initiated in hundreds of communities he has helped. Rather than focusing exclusively or even primarily on the problems these communities face, he works with these communities to assess the often not-fully recognized assets that these communities already possess. These overlooked assets include the skills and talents of individuals, social strengths including friendships and informal associations, tools and equipment to which people have access, existing agencies and enterprises, and much more. In so far as members of these communities primarily regard themselves in relation to their needs  – their handicaps, poverty, or minority status – they will be prone to seek resources from others rather than, while acknowledging these needs, they seek to draw upon their own often overlooked resources and then to explore how they can take effective steps to enhance their own circumstances. To be sure, as these communities have acted on their own behalf, they have often challenged those who have discriminated against them, but they have done so not now pleading for help but with an enhanced sense of their own agency, power, and mandate. In particular, I think it is especially important to note how hopeful people pay special attention to what happens as a result of their initiatives. Moved by our dispositions to hope, we identify and act on the basis of anticipated possibilities. Correspondingly, it makes sense to regard our actions as being to some degree like experiments. We anticipate possibilities and we are called upon to pay attention to how these possibilities turn out as we act to realize them. Accordingly, being attentive in this case calls for actively monitoring or, some would say constructively evaluating, what we are doing. Early in its history, for example, BRAC developed the practice of evaluating its initiatives, so that it would be in a better position to identify both efforts that were not working as planned or had unanticipated adverse side effects as well as efforts that turned out more promising than expected. The professional association of evaluators has become quite skilled in helping both civil society and government organizations actively assess their programs not only financially but also, and in many ways more importantly, in relation to values, outcomes, and effective utilization of human and environmental resources (Patton 2011, 2019). Engaging in Conversations  A second characteristic of hoping as a social practice lies in the way the disposition of hoping is both aroused and reinforced through ongoing conversations with others. Hoping begins with paying attention and especially listening to others about what is going on in the world. As Erik Erikson argued, hoping begins as infants expectantly seek to find and identify signs of reassurance from parents. Through our conversations with others, whether they are present now or, from a historical perspective, they lived in the past or will live in the future, we gain a greater sense of the constraints imposed upon us, the expectations we must take account of, the problems we have not anticipated, and possibilities we might otherwise not imagine. We live in a world with multiple others, most of whom do not think as we do, many of whom are fearful, and some of whom may well, if we listen with open minds and hearts, invite us to explore new ways of thinking.

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As we communicate with others, we may de facto arouse the sense of hope as well as reinforce feelings of despair. Both expressions of despairing and hoping are often contagious. Therefore, we are well counseled to find ways of sharing our sense of hope and limiting how much we express and thereby help to foster and reinforce feelings of despair. However, that is often not easy to do. After all, in so far as we are hopeful, we do not deny or ignore either the conditions the occasion despair or the attraction of despair. It remains an understandable response to living in desperate times. I think that Joe and Stephanie Mancini, who founded and direct the Working Center in Kitchener, Ontario, well illustrate the virtuous cycle where their realistic expressions of hopefulness occasion and support feelings of hopefulness among those with whom they work. The Working Center operates several dozen social programs in downtown Kitchener. Joe and Stephanie variously meet with their staff and volunteers, which include many of the people helped by these programs. They are very realistic about problems people are facing, what needs to be done, and what it will cost in time, material, and effort to respond appropriately. They are probably more realistic about the problems facing low-income people, recent refugees, handicapped people, individuals suffering from drug problems, immigrant groups, and minorities than anyone else in town. They recently organized several responses to develop more adequate responses to the contemporary opioid crisis. They know how severe this crisis has become. What has always been particularly characteristic of the ways they communicate has been their contagious sense that it is almost always possible to find some kind of humane response. As they communicate their sense of possibility, many others join together making these possibilities into realities (Mancini and Mancini 2015). I want to focus on a particular problem of exclusiveness that often arises as hopeful people communicate with other like-minded people about their hopes. Typically, as I observed, these expressions of hopefulness are contagious. They are also often self-reinforcing. People moved by particular visions of hopefulness bind together. The challenge arises whenever they are addressed by, or they encounter, people moved by other, sometimes contrary visions of hopefulness. Ideally, in these settings, people moved by their own visions of hope will listen to these others, engage in fruitful conversations with them, and find some ways of negotiating some more encompassing vision or appreciably living with their differences. Consider two constructive examples. In the early 1990s, a conflict emerged between the World Resources Institute (WRI), based in Washington, D.C., and The Centre for Science and the Environment (CSE), based in India. They disagreed over fitting ways to assign responsibilities for emissions adversely affecting the climate. Both organizations were seeking ways to reduce GHG emissions effectively. However, the WRI thought the standards for reduction ought to be proportionate to gases currently emitted and the CSE felt that it was fairer to adjust these standards both in relation to the population of countries, thus reducing the responsibilities for highly populated countries like India, and in relation to the degree to which emissions were related to basic necessities or to extra, optional, and luxury type activities. Over time, those most concerned to reduce GHG emissions have worked out compromises that have taken account of the past emissions of the industrialized countries

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and the particular exigencies of developing countries. Representatives from developing and industrialized countries have been able to turn their competing visions of their hopes into complementary ones, where concern for justice and the environment have both been addressed (Bird et al. 2016, chapter four). The worldwide interfaith movement represents another example of constructive conversations among groups with otherwise quite different expressions of hope. In relation to their own spiritual visions, the many different religions of the world encourage among their adherents markedly varied accounts of what they can and should hope for. However, in both local and international settings, global interfaith movements have fostered ongoing dialogues among people from different faiths. Through these exchanges, members of particular faiths learn more about other faiths, gain a greater appreciation of these faiths, learn to respect them, and engage in diverse collaborative activities. On occasion, as exemplified by the activities of the Parliament of the World’s Religions, they have taken common stands on a wide range of ethical issues. Even though they hold different and at times competitive views of many religious matters, through the global interfaith movement, many members of particular faiths have found they can cooperate as they seek to live out their visions of what they can and should be doing about the world in which we live. Sometimes militant groups, moved by their sense of what is realistically possible, adopt uncompromising positions. For example, Greenpeace, the activist environmental group, has a clear and radical view of what must be done now in order to save the planet from the catastrophes that will definitely occur if we do not take drastic actions. Greenpeace has acted to save endangered species, compromised habitats, waterways at risk, and the climate. Greenpeace members have engaged in acts of civil disobedience. Greenpeace sees itself playing a necessary and prophetic role. While it takes a more radical position than most other environmental groups, it engages in ongoing communications with them. While it opposes the more moderate and gradual approaches of these groups, it sees itself as continuously encouraging them to think more radically. Most of the time, Greenpeace members neither view themselves as particularly virtuous nor do they view more moderate environmental groups as particularly villainous. As members see it, Greenpeace has a vital vocation. I think a similar conclusion might be made with respect to most of the increasing number of people in dozens of countries who have been advocating for some kind of Green New Deal. They have outlined a broad agenda of changes that they think governments can and must do to address environmental issues, reduce poverty, and respect the basic rights of racialized minorities and indigenous peoples. As they see it, these proposed reforms are not only practically possible and financially feasible but also necessary, given the current state of society and the environment. Most of those supporting green agendas recognize that they may be required to consider some compromises, at least provisionally, as they seek broader support for their reforms. Many more liberal or conservative-minded people disagree. They see many of these proposed reforms as being impractical, financially undoable, and socially divisive. Those supporting and opposing green agendas can, of course, adopt a variety of positions vis-a-vis each other as they seek to realize the quite different

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expressions of the hopes and/or despair that move them. Problems arise when members of these kinds of groups adopt sectarian mindsets. That is: when they regard themselves as being especially morally worthy and they regard those who oppose their views as acting in ways that are morally questionable. However, while voicing prophetic protests can act to stimulate and broaden public considerations of the most fitting ways of addressing global issues like the climate crisis, racism, and aggravated wealth inequality, expressing these concerns in sectarian language typically functions more to rally support among one’s own group and to occasion hostile responses from those who differ. This is a subtle but decisive point. Accordingly, people moved by hopes, imagining what they regard as realistic possibilities, are well-cautioned to remember that the current realities they must take account of not only include the adverse conditions they are seeking to change but also the diverse groups that take different positions than they do about how best to address these problems. To the extent that more radical groups, like Greenpeace or the advocates of Green New Deals, seek to cultivate ongoing civil conversations with those who disagree with them, they then keep open the possibilities for future collaborations. On the other hand, to the degree that they remain close-minded towards those who differ from them, the character of their hoping itself is affected. As these groups become more strident, they sometimes become less realistic. They become less willing to listen to and appreciate the concerns of those who differ from them. In their process, their hoping may become more fanatic. The practice of hoping is thus shaped by how we engage in conversations with others – both like-minded allies and those who differ. In our globally interconnected world, it is convenient but costly just to engage in self-reinforcing conversations with those who hope – and despair – just like we do. The advantages of participating in open-ended conversations with those who differ are well-illustrated by the actions of Jonathan Powell and Inter Mediate, a London-based charity that has worked successfully to negotiate armistices and peaceful ends of violent conflicts in many different settings. Clearly, it is much more difficult to converse with enemies and violent opponents than with competitive associations or simply people who differ. Powell, who helped to negotiate the end of violent conflicts in Northern Ireland, discussed his experiences at length in a book titled Talking to Terrorists: How to End Armed Conflicts. Powell indicates that it is important to be thoughtful and strategic when we are conversing with enemies. Typically, we must be willing to take part in these exchanges on the turf of opponents, be ready to spend much time listening to them, be prepared to utilize the good offices of third parties, and allow for many different exchanges over much time. We must also be open at times to use their language, while still retaining a firm commitment to our own principles. In the process, while considering the views of those who differ, we are likely to gain a wider, more nuanced sense of reality, begin to imagine possibilities we had previously overlooked, and foster wider commitments as we struggle to address the situations in which we find ourselves. Imagining and Taking Next Steps  As we engage in the social practice of hoping, we characteristically focus our attention and invest our energy in anticipating what

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can now be accomplished. We become interested in fostering and taking advantage of the next steps. As we engage in hoping, we become especially interested in imagining and realizing present possibilities, which complexity scientists refer to as the “adjacent possibilities.” Typically, hopeful people focus on the next steps, not only because we can thereby act realistically to respond to current problems but also because such actions often function strategically to open up further possibilities. Consider the example of the use of the Sullivan Principles in the 1970s and 1980s as a way of fighting against the system of apartheid in South Africa. In keeping with these principles, more than a hundred American-based businesses continued to operate in South Africa, rather than divesting, but in keeping with these principles, they refused to discriminate against Black employees, thereby de facto violating South African laws. Working within the system, as it were, they were taking steps to change the system. However, the Sullivan principles called for these firms to take increasingly more active stances both opposing apartheid and in providing greater opportunities to Blacks South Africans. Businesses were expected to ratchet up their commitments, increasingly fostering greater justice for Blacks. The Sullivan Principles called for the companies to begin by taking moderate steps but called for them over time to take more radical steps. Using the language of organizational theory, Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein, and Graeme Auld well describe the orientation of hopeful people as they work to anticipate and act to undertake the next steps as a strategically developed response to current crises. As we seek to address super wicked problems, such as those associated with the climate crisis and ongoing global poverty, Levin and co-authors argue, we should take actions that over time attract ever wider circles of support and encourage greater levels of commitment. We should, these authors maintain, acts in ways that “constrain our future selves,” thereby developing a kind of locked-in momentum in relation to where we are hoping to go. (Levin et al. 2012) Acting in keeping with this principle, for example, a larger number of firms over time endorsed the Sullivan Principles, and they took more steps to act in keeping with these standards. Depending on the particular situations, hopeful people trying to foster greater justice, less pollution, and desired political changes, have often creatively engaged a wide array of first steps aimed not only to realize particular objectives but also to attract wider circles of support through small and sometimes largely symbolic actions that also functioned to arouse and reinforce higher levels of commitment. Participating in overt public demonstrations and rallies often occasions these kinds of outcomes. As he worked towards the independence and self-­ rule of the people of India, Gandhi encouraged the people of India both to wear clothes they made for themselves and to use salt they had obtained for themselves rather than buying these products from the British, who continued to rule over India. By these acts, people in small ways declared their commitment to bringing about the self-rule or independence of India. And they became readier to act in other ways on behalf of Indian independence. As they sought to foster justice and promote peace, the Protestant theologian and political analyst, Reinhold Niebuhr, urged people to work at finding “proximate solutions to unsolvable problems.” Niebuhr made

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this statement in part to oppose those persons and organizations that adopted excessively idealistic and utopian positions with respect to contemporary issues. He criticized them because they tended to seek radical changes that had little chance of being realized and in practice tended to arouse well-organized opposition. He criticized them as well for the self-righteous way they promoted their positions. These idealists and utopians may have been right and virtuous in their morally uncompromising commitments, but they were, Niebuhr thought, typically impractical. In contrast, as we seek to anticipate and realize practical next steps, he argued, we should seek proximate solutions not as ends but as feasible means that will, he argued, open up further possibilities, albeit in ways we may not now know. The history of the BRAC (Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee), the social organization founded in 1970 by Fazle Hassan Abed, well illustrates the fruitfulness of the hope-filled practice of exploring and engaging in what might well be called proximate solutions. Having first engaged in relief practices helping rural households rebuild houses and villages after devastating floods in that year, Abed became more fully aware of the needs and aspirations of these people. Through BRAC, he began exploring ways these villagers could generate some income for themselves through small business activities. Through BRAC he and co-workers helped villagers to develop enterprises devoted to raising chickens, expanding milk production, and preparing and selling clothing and handicrafts. At first, these were small operations undertaken by a few and then many more villages. Moved by their own dispositions to hope, Abed and BRAC acted in ways that fostered many others to develop and act on their own dispositions to anticipate realistic possibilities. Over time, BRAC continued to expand its operations across Bangladesh and to undertake an ever-wider number of different kinds of initiatives. Several years before Mohammed Yunas and the Grameen Bank began developing microcredit groups, BRAC had already started microcredit groups. BRAC also expanded opportunities for rural communities by developing fisheries, helping to build boats for fishing, working with small farmers to increase the productivity of their operations, as well as developing local non-formal schools for elementary children. By the beginning of the twenty-first century, BRAC had become a huge national organization. I am interested here not in what BRAC has become but in the ways it began and grew, not by working on an overall plan to end poverty in the rural areas of Bangladesh but by pursuing particular local projects – next steps – that seemed feasible in specific villages. One project led to another, and these led to an ever-expanding number of projects in an ever-greater number of villages. The online advocacy group AVAAZ well illustrates how hoping as a social practice focuses attention on identifying and taking the next steps. AVAAZ is an organization supported by all those who use this online platform to raise their voices in protest against, or in support of particular responses to, current crises. As of this writing, AVAAZ includes approximately 65 million users/members from all over the world. Through AVAAZ members/users have initiated almost 3000 campaigns. The causes that AVAAZ ends up promoting are initiated by members, who also support the organization financially. For any particular issue, the organization distributes an online petition, which users/members are invited to support within a limited

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time period. AVAAZ seeks to take up issues as they reach critical, tipping points, thereby maximizing their impact. AVAAZ has led campaigns to save bees from killer pesticides, to establish big and even bigger marine reserves, to drum up support for the Paris environmental agreement during the months before and after the conference, to protect a free and open internet for all, to open hearts for refugees, and to protect tropical forests as the lungs of the planet. AVAAZ was founded in 2007 by Rick Patel, who had previously worked for the International Crisis Group, Tom Pravada, a former congressman from Virginia, and Tom Perriello, the executive director of MOVEON. The aim of AVAAZ is not to solve the issues it addresses but to mobilize widespread support for particular positions as useful next steps. Because they have been able to demonstrate such wide support, AVAAZ has often been able to play a measurable role in influencing how public actions have been taken. AVAAZ, which means “voice” in several Indo-European and south Asian languages, not only has acted to bring wider broad-based support for particular initiatives, but it has also functioned to cultivate stronger dispositions of hopefulness among their members/users. Often people who become involved with AVAAZ in relation to one issue typically go on to get involved with other issues. In the process, through AVAAZ many millions of people have become both more attentive to the issues of the day and more inclined to look for possible ways of addressing these issues. Acting in a Timely Manner and Patiently Taking Time  Four, as they act, hopeful people recognize that time matters in both of the ways I will further examine in a subsequent chapter on “The Critical Value of a Due Regard for History.” Thus, it is important to act in a timely way to take advantage of contingent opportunities or to wait and prepare for such opportunities if conditions are not yet promising. Moreover, we must also recognize that much time is often required to realize the projects we are pursuing. It is, of course, realistic to recognize that time matters in these ways. However, sometimes, driven by our sense of urgency and our own ideals, we find it hard to acknowledge the way time affects the possibilities we imagine and seek to realize. For example, it requires much time to overcome poverty. Two hundred years ago most of the people in today’s industrial countries lived in impoverished households. Although several countries have been able to reduce poverty fairly quickly within several decades, in most cases overcoming poverty has required much more time. To be sure, since the early 1990s, the extent of extreme poverty has been greatly reduced globally, as physical and social infrastructures have been expanded and markets have been extended in countries like China, India, and Brazil. These are welcomed developments. However, many of the households who have benefitted from these developments still remain impoverished but not in such extreme ways. We can in many ways act to enhance the life circumstances of impoverished households. People have acted, for example, to improve educational opportunities, increase access to potable water, develop microfinance associations, and further extend the delivery of health care services. Groups like BRAC and International Development Enterprises have acted to help individual households augment their incomes through expanded agricultural and small business activities. These initiatives make a difference. Still, much time must be invested to foster eco-

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nomic growth and develop the institutions that make this growth possible. When, out of impatience and/or zealotry, efforts have been undertaken to speed up the process of economic development, and poverty reduction, the outcomes have often been adverse. Either, economic growth takes place under conditions of forced regimentation, as in the state-administered collectivization in countries like the Soviet Union; it results in failed experiments, like at least one of the Millennial Villages; or, more typically, it occasions enclave rather than inclusive economic development. The way time matters is well illustrated by the history of efforts to recognize and protect basic human rights. Over several centuries, and especially since the Second World War, moved both by their humanitarian feelings and their sense of justice as well as their disposition to hope, many people and organizations have acted to legally identify and protect a wide range of civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights. The history of human rights has been marked by progress and retrogression, by extending rights to certain populations while denying them to others, by a significant expansion in the number of organizations and institutions organized and established to defend human rights, and by concerted efforts to deny rights to particular groups. For all the struggles, setbacks, and ambiguities characteristic of this history, the basic human rights of an ever-larger proportion of humans now have been recognized in national and international law and defended by an ever-larger number of organizations (Sikkink 2017). We must, I think, acknowledge as well that it will require much time to bring about all those changes necessary to address the current climate change crisis effectively. Given, the urgency of this crisis, that is not a welcome message. We know that disastrous outcomes of this crisis will increase, in relation to melting arctic ice caps, rising sea levels, adverse weather conditions, and millions of people displaced by these changes. So, it is critically important to act with as much deliberate speed as we can muster. Still, it will require time to win over greater support for changes that must be taken, to transition away from economies based on burning fossil fuels, to develop and make accessible new sources of energy, and to help communities currently built around carbon-based energy sources find alternative economic bases. However, as we think about changes that must be taken just to mitigate the climate change disasters that threaten our futures, it is useful and realistic to appreciate as well the significant changes that have already been undertaken since scientists and other observers initially began to stress the importance of thinking globally about the Earth’s biosphere and climate in the 1950s and began sounding the alarm about the climate change in the 1960s. Weather scientists established the World Meteorological Organization in 1946 and shortly thereafter began establishing common instruments and measures to track climate changes. The UN staged a global conference on the environment and development in Stockholm in 1972. Various other developments took place over the next two decades, including a global response to threats to the ozone layer of the Earth’s atmosphere, initial proposals to limit the emission of greenhouse gases, and the establishment in 1988 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). Regularly since that time, the IPCC has prepared scientifically-based assessments of the state of the Earth’s

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climate. In 1992 an UN-sponsored Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro and produced a UN Framework Convention on Climate Change. Countries signing this document promised to work at reducing GHG emissions. Pushed by climate activists, alarmed citizens, and even businesses anxious about possible disasters likely to occur if deliberate actions were not taken, governments, communities, and businesses have been taking steps to reduce and make more effective use of fossil fuels. At the UN climate conference in Paris in 2015, governments from around the world agreed markedly to reduce their emission of GHGs over the next several decades. Much has been accomplished to address the climate crisis since alarms were first sounded more 50 years ago. Much effort has been expended in developing alternative sources of energy, finding ways so that whatever fossil fuels are consumed are used more effectively, encouraging the reduced use of fossil fuels by carbon taxes, and exploring ways so that communities and households whose livelihoods have been organized around the use of fossil fuels can transition to alternative bases for their economies. As they have recognized the seriousness of this crisis, several of the large multinational petroleum companies are working at transforming themselves into energy companies, dedicating ever-larger portions of their operations into sourcing and delivering alternative sources of energy. During the same period of time, support for concerted action regarding climate change has greatly expanded. Many of those especially concerned about the climate change crisis, might well respond to these changes by exclaiming: “So what?” GHGs continue to be emitted globally well above agreed-upon targets. The side effects of global warming are becoming more adverse, affecting greater numbers every year. The number of people not yet ready to acknowledge the reality of this crisis is still large and includes a number of influential political authorities. It is outrageous that many people and many businesses have appeared to ignore this crisis and the devastation it will cause, simply in order to enjoy short-term economic benefits in the present. As we review what is happening, it is understandable to experience both anger and fear. However, fear and anger do not generate hope. Often, they augment our feelings of desperation and panic. Of course, I am referring to this history, not as a sign of progress or grounds for optimism. Rather, I cite examples from the history of the expanding commitment to identify and respond to the climate crisis as a cautionary tale. As we act on the basis of our hopes, we are reminded that much time is required to move towards the fuller realization of those hopes. Even while acknowledging the urgency with which we must act, this history cautions us as well to cultivate a recognition that even dramatic changes take time. Correspondingly, as we acquire some capacity for patience, we allow ourselves time and space to listen to others, to learn from the past, to appreciate steps that have been taken, and to imagine alternatives. As we review this history, we are reminded that humans have already invested much time developing new technologies, building organizational resources, and cultivating ever wider and more varied circles of people committed to acting to address this crisis. Although much still must be done and done in a timely manner, we can now act on the basis of what has already been accomplished. We can be grateful for initiatives that have so far been taken. This history alerts that we, like those who have acted before us,

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can take steps to make a difference, however small, and, therefore, it makes sense now to explore further steps that can and must be made. What we now especially need to address this crisis are ever greater numbers of people in government, businesses, and local communities disposed to anticipate possibilities. Think of Greta Thunberg, the young Swedish teenager, prepared to stand up and demand that adults act. While she powerfully sounded the alarm, it is worth observing the widely shared sense of possibility that encouraged her to act believing it would make a difference. Many others who have joined the current climate change crusade are moved as well not just by their sense of alarm and their anger at those who continue to obstruct the transitions that must be undertaken but also by their sense of the possibilities that their actions might make a difference. As people engage in the practice of hoping, they anticipate and undertake what they regard as practical and generative next steps. Like the people working for BRAC, they do so characteristically with a sense of urgency but also with both patience and flexibility. As I have just observed, it often takes considerable time to bring about desired changes. Starting new initiatives, mobilizing support for these projects, acquiring needed resources – these require much time. Managing opposition, resistance, and inertia also take time. Although we may well be responding to urgent crises – like poverty, climate change, and the current pandemic – still people moved by hope operate with a sense of patience: they recognize that we must allow fitting amounts of time to initiate the steps that must be taken and to gain the momentum we desire. At the same time, as we are able to cultivate some measure of patience, in turn, we open up larger spaces for exploring possibilities, for developing next steps. Moved by hope, we move step by step, often with a sense of urgency, as we seek to foster greater support both in levels of commitment and in numbers involved.

Works Cited Bird, Frederick, Sumner Twiss, Kusumita Pedersen, Clark Miller, and Bruce Grelle. 2016. The Practices of Global Ethics: Historical Backgrounds, Current Issues, and Future Prospects. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press. Levin, Kelly, Benjamin Cashore, Steven Bernstein, and Graeme Auld. 2012. Overcoming the Tragedy of Super Wicked Problems: Constraining Our Future Selves to Ameliorate Global Climate Change. Policy Sciences 45: 123–152. Mancini, Joe and Stephanie, Mancini. 2015. Transition to Common Ground: Building Community at the Working Centre. Wilfred University Press. Patton, Michael. 2011. Developmental Evaluation. New York: Guilford Press. ———. 2019. Blue Marble Evaluation for Global Systems Change. New York: Guilford Press. Sikkink, Kathryn. 2017. Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Treuer, David. 2019. The Heartbeat of Wounded Knee: Native America from1890 to the Present. New York: Riverhead Books.

Chapter 7

Hope Makes a Difference

Abstract  Hope, understood as a disposition involving knowledge, will, and emotion, plays a critical role with respect to the practice of ethics. As we cultivate our capacity to hope, we expand our emotional, mental, and volitional bandwidth. We feel open to considering more options, entertaining second thoughts, and in other ways realistically exploring possibilities. Hope opens up a sense of space for learning, thinking, and re-thinking, and, thereby, for identifying the possibility of possibility. Hope does not so much commend as it encourages and invites. In so far as we are able to engender our own feelings of hope, we find ourselves also able to manage and limit the ways feelings of despair in all their different expressions, weigh us down and claim our attention. This chapter includes a diverse set of examples of how hope made a significant difference as those involved in the cases examined responded to crises they faced. The chapter analyzes the response of the Jewish community to the devastation caused by the war with Rome in year 70 of the common era, the response of the Crow people to the destruction of the buffalo, the base community movement among Catholics in Brazil, and twentieth century social innovators.

7.1  Ethical Imperatives and Hope Knowing what we ought to do is not enough to move us to action. Our knowledge of what we ought to do may be expressed in relation to ideas about what is right and wrong, with regard to duties, in terms of benefits we are likely to receive, or accounts of disasters that are likely to occur if we don’t act as we should. Still, knowing what we ought to do may not be able to move us to act responsibly. Acting in morally responsible ways involves our minds, wills as well as our emotion. Many philosophers have long acknowledged this fact. David Hume, for example, recognized that in addition to knowledge, it was important to appeal to people’s passions. To set people in motion morally, it was necessary not only to engage their minds but also their emotions. Aristotle sensed this problem and, accordingly, focused on

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cultivating moral dispositions, like courage and justice, which involved the mental, volitional, and emotional dimensions. Hope, understood as a disposition involving knowledge, will, and emotion, plays a critical and generative role with respect to the practice of ethics. As we cultivate our capacity to hope, we expand our emotional, mental, and volitional bandwidth. We feel open to considering more options, entertaining second thoughts, and in other ways exploring possibilities. Hope brings into play emotions and imaginings that affect our wills. Hope opens up a sense of space for learning, for thinking and re-thinking, and, thereby, for identifying the “possibility of possibility.” (Duarte 2019). Hope does not so much command as it encourages and invites. In so far as we are able to engender our own feelings of hope, we find ourselves also able to manage and limit the ways feelings of despair, in all of their different expressions, weigh us down and claim our attention.

7.2  Historical Examples Hope makes a great difference in how we address the crises of our times. Here I would like to review several more examples of how the disposition of hoping often fosters creative responses to devastating experiences. I will also review examples when people, acting out of desperation sometimes masquerading as hope, have responded to crises less creatively sometimes with radical calls for change and sometimes with uncalled blithe optimism. The response of Jews to the Jewish-Roman War that resulted in the destruction of the Temple in Jerusalem in year 70 of the Common Era provides an instructive example. The Jewish-Roman War resulted in widespread devastation throughout Palestine. Many people were wounded, lost their lives, and had their lands ravaged. The temple, which functioned as the central pivot of their culture and faith had been leveled. The Jewish people living in and beyond Palestine were faced with a pressing challenge of how best to get on with their lives. Should they, like their forbearers five centuries earlier, set out to rebuild their temple? Should they again like their forbearers two centuries earlier, attempt to re-establish themselves as a semi-­ sovereign state? I will focus on the answers that one particular, very influential movement, provided to these questions. That movement was one that eventually emerged as the guiding spirits for what became Rabbinic Judaism. This movement in some of its early manifestations may well have overlapped with the Pharisees. It had its roots in a non-priestly lay reform movement organized around wise teachers and their students. While these groups sought to revive the ancient traditions and foster observant compliance with traditional rituals, as spelled out in the written Torah, they also added their own teachings and their elaborations on ancient scriptures through writings later described as the oral or new Torah. These writings were subsequently collected and redacted as The Mishnah and later in a much more elaborated form as the Talmud. These groups embraced some new beliefs, such as faith in the resurrection of the dead, but it wasn’t these beliefs that especially

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characterized this movement. Rather, several other characteristics of this movement are noteworthy. One was their emphasis on learning: which meant regularly reading, commenting on, and seeking counsel for daily life from their scriptures. This was a highly literate lay intellectual movement. Additionally, this movement took the initiative to revive or initiate a wide range of community associations – charitable organizations, loans associations, schools, synagogues, and the like – which enabled these groups to become in practice self-governing communities as integral constituents of a larger self-identified, religiously defined ethnic people. Furthermore, for the foreseeable future, this movement relinquished any expectations of attempting to rebuild the temple in Jerusalem or any attempt to create any kind of religious or political capital or sacred center for their movement. Interestingly, a good deal of the Mishnah was devoted to spelling out how rituals at the temple should be performed. Instead of a physical temple, this movement invoked what might be described as a virtual or ideal temple as their center and then called upon families to observe household rituals which in analogical ways reflected rites of the virtual temple. These changes allowed the Jews to become a self-conscious albeit geographically dispersed diaspora people. Although in principle, Jews hoped for the coming of a Messiah, as a messenger from God who would lead the people like David or Moses had in the distant past, what became Rabbinic Judaism in practice was not a messianic movement. They had had bad experiences with people who posed as would-be messiahs. In the seven decades prior to the destruction of the temple, several messiah-like leaders, as well as groups like the Zealots, had succeeded in arousing active movements seeking to overthrow the Romans who exerted military, political, and economic power over Palestine and/or to protest against the religious elite in Jerusalem, who seemed to these dissenters to be doing the bidding of the Romans. These religiously inspired protest groups led to harsh reprisals from the Romans. From the perspective of the Pharisees and later the Rabbinic movement, these protest movements got their priorities mixed up. They, too, seemed to seek power and put excessive fanatical-like faith in their own actions rather than seeking to revive and honor their ancient traditions. Other reform movements appeared among the Jews living in the Near East in the centuries before and after the beginning of the Common Era, like the followers of John the Baptizer, the community involved in and supportive of the religious commune located at Qumran near the Dead Sea, those inspired by the mystic philosopher Philo, and the dispersed groups of followers of the prophet from Nazareth, which eventually became the Jesus movement. What especially characterized the Pharisees and later the Rabbis was the way they cultivated hopes not through expectations of a new and better future but by developing institutions, practices, literacy, and most importantly, a mindset that enabled Jews to live in the present. They saw themselves as a people covenanted with God. They viewed this covenant as a viable reality celebrated and made alive and real through reading and reciting both the old and the new Torah. Eventually, the leaders of this movement developed ways of commenting on and rendering judgments in keeping with their traditions, as spelled out in the Torah, supplemented by the Mishnah, later the Talmud, and other Rabbinic writings, that were at once realistic and imaginative. Although often faced with

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discrimination and arbitrarily subjected to hardships, Jews as influenced by the Rabbinic movement, thought of themselves as resilient, adaptable, well-educated, and often wise people. The Pharisees and later the Rabbis responded to the destruction of the temple in CE 70 and the violent Roman response to the Bar Kokba uprising of CE 130 by silently acknowledging these disasters but not talking or writing about them. Instead, they quite successfully cultivated hopes by honoring traditional commandments, by acting in the present to celebrate their life together, by preserving their institutions, by honoring the Sabbath, and by using their God-given gifts to protect and enhance their lives. As guided by Pharisees and what later became the Rabbis, the response of the Jewish community to the disaster represented by the Jewish-Roman war and the destruction of their temple in CE 70, was remarkably successful. Although in part disguised by all the emphasis on traditions, this movement forged a new identity for Jews, no longer revolving around a physical temple in Jerusalem, but now located broadly in many parts of the Roman Empire and beyond, becoming increasingly urbanized, and sustained by hopes grounded in their traditions, their experiences in rising above their circumstances, their scriptures, and their rituals. In the late nineteenth century, the indigenous American people called the Crow survived equivalently devastating experiences also by cultivating hope. In their case, hope was grounded partly in the particular features of their past and partly in the sense that their survival on their lands called them to trust in an unknown and unknowable future. The Crow, who had traditionally been a largely nomadic people, had come to live in an area of what eventually became the states of Wyoming and Montana. They had survived by hunting buffalo and gathering edible plants. As a result of several agreements, the territory they were guaranteed by the United States government became over time smaller and smaller. As ranchers and homesteaders from the eastern United States began to settle in these areas, the government both further shrank the lands guaranteed to the Crow and outlawed warfare between indigenous peoples, like the Crow and the Sioux. During the same period, the buffalo were almost totally decimated. As a result of these developments, the traditional way of life for these indigenous peoples became increasingly less possible. They had lived by hunting buffalo and fighting and these activities were no longer possible. Finally, the government passed a law requiring most indigenous people to be settled on reservations. A Crow chief, Plenty Coups, commented “When the buffalo went away, the hearts of our people fell to the ground and they could not lift them up again. After this, nothing happened.” (Cited in Lear 2006, page 2) Unlike the nearby Lakota Sioux, the Crow had not taken up arms to fight against United States government policies. They had sought accommodation. As scouts they had helped government troops in their fight against the Sioux, who along with the Cheyenne, had been their traditional enemies. In part, because they cooperated, they ended up being able to live on a portion of their traditional lands, although these had been reduced in extent. They also encouraged their youth to receive a good education in English. The Crow responded as they did by following the direction of their leaders. Plenty Coups, in particular, guided them as he did in large part because of a couple of dreams he had had as a boy, both after his elder brother had died, and as

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part of a deliberate vision quest that he undertook when he was nine years old after participating in a ritual sweat during which he cut off part of a finger. The symbolism of the dreams was interpreted by elders to signify the end of the buffalo, the need to learn skills associated with agriculture and ranching, and the need to act like chickadees and be ready to learn from others. Plenty Coups followed the advice of his dreams. By 27 he had become chief of his tribe. In order to survive as a people on their own lands, the Crow had to reinvent themselves. Plenty Coups moved into a two-story house built by the government. He began farming and ranching, and he opened a store. At the same time, he organized a club called the Crazy Dog society, in which members practiced many of the traditional rites and dances. Like Plenty Coups, the Crow people adopted new ways of livelihood. Some of their young people gained training and entered professional careers. They proceeded into a new way of life by trusting their leader who had guided them on the basis of wisdom he gained by participating in a traditional rite. He aroused their hopes by his personal and positional authority and their hopes were further sustained by the modest and newly discovered benefits they experienced, being able to live for the most part on some of their traditional lands and gaining a range of new skills as ranchers, farmers, tradespeople, and professionals. The experiences of the Crow provide instructive examples where the hopes of the people were not based upon a clear view of the future. Again and again, as the US government broke its word, the Crow had had to readjust their expectations. Finally, after the buffalo had been killed off and the government was forcing the indigenous peoples to move onto reservations and adopt wholly new ways of life, Plenty Coups called for them to hope – to anticipate possibilities for constructive ways of living in the present – without any as yet clear plan of what their future might be like. Jonathan Lear, who wrote a thoughtful philosophical book about the experiences of the Crow, referred to this as an example of radical hope (Hollihan 2002; Lear 2006). Both of these examples demonstrate that hope need not be grounded in visions about valued futures. In The Theology of Hope, Jurgen Moltmann, a twentieth-­ century Protestant theologian, wrote that hope was a vision of a valued and promised future. “Hope’s statement of promise, however, must stand in contradiction to the reality which can at present be experienced…[these statements] do not seek to illuminate the reality which exists but the reality which is coming….The man who hopes will never be able to reconcile himself with the laws and constraints of this Earth, neither with the inevitability of death….” (Moltmann 1965, pp.  4, 7) Moltmann argued that the central Christian message ought to be understood in eschatological terms as a message of hope grounded on this promised, resurrected future. While espousing a view widely shared by many Christians, Moltmann, I think, offered a one-sided account both of Biblical texts and the nature of hope. He failed to recognize hope as a virtue by which many people orient their lives towards a contingent present they regard in decisive ways as being open-ended with possibility. Neither the Jewish communities in the first couple of centuries of The Common Era nor the Crow in the late nineteenth century had clear visions of promising futures. Both, however, had cultivated and found ways to act upon a sense of possibility in the present.

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It is interesting to compare the Crow with a number of other indigenous people in the western United States, including Sioux and the Pawnee, who became involved in the Ghost Dance movement that swept through these groups in 1889 and the early 1890s. It was a difficult time for these peoples. Their lands had been taken from them, the buffalo had all but been totally killed, and the size of their population had been greatly reduced by wars and disease. For the most part, they had been forced to move onto reservations, and they were being pressured to use English for communication. They experienced a “strong sense of collective calamity.” (Wilson 1973, p. 307) Although there had been antecedent ghost dance and prophet dance movements in the 1870s and earlier, the ghost dance movement of 1890 gained widespread support among many different indigenous peoples. It had begun when a prophet named Wovoka, after recovering from a serious illness, announced himself as a kind of messiah. He said that if the indigenous groups engaged in intense dancing over several days, dances he had learned from dead ancestors he had met in dreams while he was ill, that then the indigenous people would be reunited with these ancestors, they would restore the old ways of life, and find ways to overcome the Americans, who had fought against them and taken their lands. Wovoka was a Northern Paiute living in western Nevada. Delegates from a number of the indigenous peoples from the western plains, like the Sioux, Pawnee, and Arapaho, visited Wovoka and returned with stories of the wonders he performed and became enthusiastically ready to perform their own ghost dances. Wovoka urged the people to give up warring ways, to practice loving each other, and to learn to live with the White people. In his account of the ghost dance movement, Brian Wilson described it as a momentary gospel of hope (Wilson 1973, pp. 295, 305). However, I think it is more fitting to view the Ghost Dance movement as a collective expression of something like hope mixed with considerable despair. Although the movement occasioned some initiatives aimed at reviving traditions and was unique in being a movement uniting peoples from disparate indigenous tribes and nations, it especially embodied and expressed wishful thinking, dream-like fanaticizing, and at times symptoms of fanaticism rather than the open-ended search for, and anticipation of, realistic possibilities. While the ghost dance ceremonies served as momentary times when the people performing them felt consoled and energized, the movement had less impact on the social condition of their lives. Hope makes a difference in many different ways. Look at the example of the rise and spread of Ecclesial Base Communities (ECBs) among Catholics in a number of Latin American countries, including especially, Brazil. Between 1960 and 1980 more than 80,000 of these groups were formed in Brazil, sometimes led by clergy or members of religious orders, and often led by lay people themselves. These small groups, typically formed by men and women living within existing parishes, met regularly, read and discussed scriptural texts, frequently explored the implications of these texts for their lives, and sometimes in significant ways sought to reform their communities based on their understanding of these texts. In several locales, those who had participated in ECBs initiated social reforms and, in some areas, became actively involved in municipal politics. Significantly, participation in ECBs had the subtle effect of shifting how those involved thought about authority, whether religious, social, or political: it was no longer associated exclusively with

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hierarchies, whether they assumed the form of ecclesiastical or political structures. Increasingly, authority became also associated with their own activity of interpreting Biblical texts and with communal decision-making. Over time, participation in these groups gave rise to a much livelier sense of hope as an overall disposition, associated with what Paulo Freire, who helped to inspire these groups, referred to as self-conscious awareness of one’s capacities and responsibilities. In particular, in his book Pedagogy of the Oppressed (1970), Freire stressed the importance of dialogue in arousing this kind of awareness and the sense of hope without which dialogues do not really thrive. In diverse ways, these groups helped to cultivate among their participants the sense of hope and the disposition to hope in turn led participants to become more active in their own lives and in their communities. It is instructive to re-examine some of the millenarian movements seeking radical changes during the “Waning of the Middle Ages” in Europe (Huizinga 1924/1956). There were a number of these movements, and they assumed many different expressions, some more religious and some more secular. For example, the Jacquerie engaged in an uprising in the Ile de France in the middle of the fourteen century. Similarly, popular insurrections by peasants occurred in Flanders earlier in that century and in Germany in the late fifteenth century. All these popular protests complained both against degrading circumstances and against the wealthy that enforced these conditions (Pirenne 1937, pp.  195, 196). However, they were not especially movements grounded in hope: that is, movements anticipating significant openings and the fostering of realistic possibilities. Fundamentally, they were expressions of deep-seated resentment and anger combined with anguished longings for a better, fairer world. The so-called Peasant War in southern and central Germany (1524–26) was the largest and most representative of these uprisings: hundreds of thousands of people were involved in a large number of locally organized disturbances. I say so-called “peasant war” because many of those engaged were not peasants but village and town dwelling artisans, shop keepers, millers, cobblers, laborers, miners, smiths, and beggars. Many were protesting against feudal burdens imposed on them in the form of tithes, fees, and servitude both by princes and ecclesiastical institutions. Although these uprisings were locally initiated, many invoked slogans voiced by Luther regarding the “priesthood of believers” and the “Freedom of the Christian,” ideas which he had set forth in widely distributed tracts in 1520 as part of his defense against the attacks launched against him by the official hierarchy of the Catholic Church. Luther himself not only disassociated himself from these uprisings but vehemently opposed them. In many places, these uprisings began as civil protests but then turned violent. Protesters would loosely organize themselves, state their demands, sometimes wait for responses from political and religious authorities, and then, losing patience, begin by over-running convents, abbeys, and castles, desecrating images – which some of those leading these groups felt were idolatrous. They also drove off cattle, burned papers, destroyed or disfigured other accouterments of privilege, and seized kegs of wine. They often quickly became rowdy gangs. Many began to arm and to ready themselves against the counterattacks they expected from the ruling authorities. At the beginning of these uprising, protesters in upper Swabia wrote a declaration of their goals in a statement titled “The Twelve Articles,” which

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they sent off to the League of Princes in Swabia. They began by making a humble plea that each community be allowed to elect and appoint their own pastors, in line with an idea also suggested by Luther. While they felt it was legitimate for the authorities to require a tax on grain, they felt the funds raised should be used to pay for the living of these pastors and for the needy poor in their communities. They felt that the death tax, in particular, should be abolished because it had functioned to impoverish many widows and orphans. Fundamentally, they protested against all forms of servitude. More than 25,000 of these Articles were printed and widely distributed all over Germany. Soon, however, the governing authorities struck back at the rebellious groups. The result was a series of massacres. More than 100,000 rebels were killed. Further, the systems of servitude were re-imposed with even greater force (Lindberg 1996, chapter 6; Massing 2018, chapter 36). The common folk had been moved to act, initially perhaps as exemplified by The Twelve Articles by inklings of hope but later more and more by righteous anger and desires to plunder, and in some cases by fanatical apocalyptic visions. The latter was well exemplified by the role that Thomas Muntzer (1489–1525) played in these uprisings. A well-educated priest, he served as a preacher in a number of different parishes in Thuringia as well as a short stay in Prague. He was influenced by Luther but felt Luther was too conservative and too prone to support the political powers that be in Germany. Feeling he had a sign directly from God, Muntzer believed that God spoke directly to him and not through a book, like the Bible. Once, when two Saxon princes were visiting his congregation, he called them to use him like Nebuchadnezzar had used the prophet Daniel to lead a vanguard to usher in a new order. “Do not, therefore, allow the evil-doers who turn us away from God to continue living…for a godless man has no right to live if he is hindering the pious.” (Muntzer 1988, pp. 248–51) Muntzer organized military bands in the villages in which he was serving. After being expelled from one parish, he traveled through southern Germany, helping to stir up rebellions in these areas before returning again to Thuringia. In one village there he organized the common folk for what he saw as a confrontation between the children of light  – the righteous common folk – and the children of darkness – the governing religious and political authorities. When the common folk paused and sought to negotiate with the well-armed and well-organized troops of the ruling authorities, Muntzer urged them to fight because he felt he had a sign directly from God. More than 5000 of these common folk were slaughtered in the ensuing battle. In an influential book, The Peasant War in Germany, Friedrich Engels depicted Muntzer as a pre-communist revolutionary leading the common folk to overthrow the existing regime in order to establish a fairer, more just society. “By the Kingdom of God, Muntzer understood nothing else than a state of society without class differences, without private property, without a superimposed state.” (Engels 1967, p. 47). However, it is probably more reasonable to regard Muntzer as a fanatic with a Biblically inspired utopian vision, who felt he had a direct call from God to help bring about not “better days” but the “last days.” (Lindberg 1996, p. 157) To be sure, he well-expressed the despair of the common folk, masquerading as righteous anger and unrealistic dreams. He had no plans for how to take constructive steps, building on and transforming current realities in

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order to establish feasible reforms given the realities of sixteenth-century Germany. He had early on thought of himself as a martyr, which he eventually became. Hope makes a difference. However, often people who are animated by lively feelings of hope, do not overtly announce their hopes and then defend them with promising or radical visions, like many of these millenarian groups. Rather, hopes are often presupposed. Consider all those scientists exploring diverse initiatives to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by, for example, finding alternative ways of making cement, alternative sources of energy, more fuel-efficient engines, and more effective methods for sequestering carbon emissions. Currently, many people have expressed interest in the role that social innovators and social entrepreneurs have played and can play in bringing about beneficial social changes (Westley et al. 2007, 2017; Etmanski 2015; Bourgon 2011). Rarely, have these innovators and entrepreneurs overtly declared their commitments to hope. Rather, they have initiated programs to help the handicapped, to foster re-forestation, to develop systems of microfinancing, to curb bullying in schools, to reform policing programs, to develop city and national parks, and much else because they take for granted possibilities for action in spite of real problems and considerable obstacles that have to be faced and addressed. As one kind of example, think about all those people who have initiated social agencies, established settlement houses, and organized community action in low-income areas: people like Jane Addams who founded Hull House in Chicago, Dorothy Day who inspired and led the Catholic Worker Movement, and John McKnight who has helped hundreds of neighborhoods and communities develop their assets. All of these people made memorable contributions because they were moved by and communicated a contagious sense of possibility. All like McKnight called for a rigorous analysis of given realities and all assumed that present realities contained many overlooked and under-appreciated resources (Addams 2010; Kretzmann and McKnight 1993) Globally, we can similarly observe the marked expansion of international non-governmental organizations over the past 70 years and reflect that this expansion was made possible because of the considerable commitment of tens of thousands of people who have been moved to bolster human rights, reduce poverty, and address a wide variety of global issues affecting the Earth, its ecosystems, and inhabitants (Sikkink 2017; Bird et al. 2016). I cite these examples to call attention to the many people and organizations who have been engaged in trying to make constructive differences in the world because they were able to call upon and cultivate their own dispositions to anticipate possibilities. Hoping was just part of their humanity. And, in an often-desperate world where many of us are overwhelmed by, or tempted to succumb to, feelings of despair, their capacity for hoping has made a significant difference.

Works Cited Addams, Jane. 2010. Twenty Years at Hull House. New York: The Macmillan Co. Bird, Frederick, Sumner Twiss, Kusumita Pedersen, Clark Miller, and Bruce Grelle. 2016. The Practices of Global Ethics: Historical Backgrounds, Current Issues, and Future Prospects. Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press.

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Bourgon, Jocelyn. 2011. Serving in the 21st Century: A New Synthesis of Public Administration. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Duarte, Eduarte. 2019. Perceiving the Possibility of Possibility: Making Thinking the Heart of Education. In Thought Work, ed. Elizabeth K. Minnich and Michael Quinn Patton. New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Chapter 5. Engels, Friedrich. 1967. The Peasant War in Germany. In The German Revolutions, ed. Leonard Krieger. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Etmanski, Al. 2015. Impact: Six Patterns to Spread Your Social Innovation. Orwell Cove. Freire, Paulo. 1970/2006. Pedagogy of the Oppressed. Trans. Myra Bergman Ramos. New York/ London: Continuum. Hollihan, Tony. 2002. Great Chiefs. Vol. II. Edmonton: Folklore Publishing. Huizinga, Johan. 1924/1956. The Waning of the Middle Ages. New  York: Doubleday and Company, Inc. Kretzmann, John P., and John L.  McKnight. 1993. Building Communities from the Inside Out: A Path Toward Finding and Mobilizing a Community’s Assets. Chicago: ACTA Publications. Lear, Jonathan. 2006. Radical Hope: Ethics in the Face of Cultural Devastation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lindberg, Carter. 1996. The European Reformations. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Massing, Michael. 2018. Fatal Discord: Erasmus, Luther, and the Fight for the Western Mind. New York: Harper Collins. Moltmann, Jurgen. 1965/1967. Theology of Hope. London: SCM Press. Muntzer, Thomas. 1988. The Collected Works of Thomas Muntzer. Trans. and ed. Peter Matheson. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. Pirenne, Henri. 1937. Economic and Social History of Medieval Europe. Trans. I.  E. Clegg. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and Company. Sikkink, Kathryn. 2017. Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Westley, Frances, et  al. 2007. Getting to Maybe: How the World is Changed. Toronto: Vintage Canada. ———. 2017. The Evolution of Social Innovation: Building Resilience Through Transitions. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Wilson, Bryan R. 1973. Magic and the Millennium: A Sociological Study of Religious Movements of Protest among Tribal and Third-World Peoples. London: Heinemann.

Part III

Learning from History

Chapter 8

The Critical Value of a Due Regard for History

Abstract  In this chapter , I make a case for how a due regard for history can function to help us address the crises that we face today. The argument I am making proceeds along the following lines. First, I will sketch the basic characteristics of a due regard for history. I am here focusing not primarily on knowledge of history but on the sense of history and the readiness to learn from history. Historical consciousness involves something like the readiness to engage in open-ended conversations both with those who lived before us and those who will live after us. By means of these imagined conversations, we are challenged to consider how we are using and managing the legacies of the past and what kinds of legacies we are leaving for the future. I will then review several prominent benefits that accrue from cultivating a historical perspective on the present. These include both useful information, relevant to understanding and making sense of the present, as well as the impact of historical consciousness on our dispositions, that is, how we orient ourselves to the present crises. In the process, I will explore how a due regard for history often functions to foster several ways of thinking and feeling that in turn provide grounds for hope. In this chapter , I make a case for how a due regard for history can function to help us address the crises that we face today. The argument I am making proceeds along the following lines. First, I will sketch the basic characteristics of a due regard for history. I am here focusing not primarily on knowledge of history but on the sense of history and the readiness to learn from history. Historical consciousness involves something like the readiness to engage in open-ended conversations both with those who lived before us and those who will live after us. By means of these imagined conversations, we are challenged to consider how we are using and managing the legacies of the past and what kinds of legacies we are leaving for the future. I will then review several prominent benefits that accrue from cultivating a historical perspective on the present. These include both useful information, relevant to understanding and making sense of the present, as well as the impact of historical consciousness on our dispositions, that is, how we orient ourselves to the present

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crises. In the process, I will explore how a due regard for history often functions to foster several ways of thinking and feeling that in turn provide grounds for hope. A due regard for history gives us perspective on the crises we are currently facing. We can learn much from how others have creatively and not so creatively responded to past crises. A due regard for history helps us to discern opportunities we might otherwise overlook, warns us about unresolved issues from the past that may distort our visions of the present, and helps us to recognize that significant changes typically take place over time. Often what prevents people from responding more effectively to current crises are unacknowledged memories from the past. A due regard for history helps us to confront these memories and resolve the complex issues associated with many of them. With a due regard for history, we are likely to view the present neither with the pessimism that overlooks the achievements from the past, which have contributed much to what is valuable in our lives, nor with the optimism, which in turn overlooks the real tragedies in the past and the possibility and probability that more tragedies will occur in the future. A due regard for history often works to arouse feelings of gratitude, which in turn provide a grounding for hope. Without feeding our imaginations with memories, it is often difficult in realistic ways to imagine possibilities for the future.

8.1  What a Due Regard for History Entails A due regard for history is a way of looking at the present as it is shaped by the past. It is not primarily constituted by reading histories and accumulating knowledge of the past, although it does involve interest in learning what we can both about our forbearers and about the ancestors of other people with whom we come in contact. A due regard for history is not primarily expressed or shaped by some grand scheme of the evolving history of humans. A due regard for history involves a sense of linked participation in the historical process: that is, a sense of participation in history linked to the participation of others both in the past and in the future. It is possible to think about the passage of time in several different ways. For example, from the perspective of nature, we think of time both in relation to the life cycle involving birth, growth, death, and reproduction as well as in relation to the yearly cycle of the seasons. We spend much of our lives thinking of time and orienting our activities in terms of these natural cycles. Clearly, this is an important if not indispensable and unavoidable way of making sense of the passage of time. Viewed in relation to the physical laws of motion, time becomes a dimension interchangeable with space: how far someplace is, depends on time and velocity; or how much time it takes to get there, in turn, depends on distance and speed. This represents another understanding of time, critically important when we are planning trips or undertaking experiments in physics. In our dreams and unconscious life, time occurs quite differently as events that happened long ago may seem to be quite present. Our sense of time is curved by our deepest feelings. We fool ourselves when we fail to acknowledge how these subconscious feelings at times shape our sense of

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who we are. Some like to think of time in terms of progressive achievements. We may, accordingly, review our own lives or that of our communities in relation to what we have managed to learn or in relation to enhanced or diminished life conditions. Some religions view the current passage of time in relation to a particular beginning, the time of creation, as well as a designated end, the telos of history, a final day of judgment. From these examples, we see that humans have thought about the passage of time in many different ways. In so far as we view time historically, we make three basic assumptions. These assumptions constitute the basic features of historical consciousness or what I am referring to as a due regard for history, whether we are thinking about the history of the universe, the history of the Earth, the history of humans, the history of the twentieth century, or the history of our communities. These assumptions reflect no particular value perspective. They remain characteristic of historical consciousness whether one regards the passage of time from a liberal or conservative perspective, or as followers of particular ideologies or faiths. In so far as we regard the world and our lives historically, then we must necessarily embrace these assumptions. One, from a historical perspective we regard time as irreversible and directional, as moving from some beginnings, which may be known or unknown, through the present towards futures which in principle are open and without knowable ends. Historical time is not restricted to humans or to periods of time about which humans have recorded their memories. The whole of the universe has been unfolding in historical time from a distant past, long before our solar system came into being, eventually reaching our present and then moving along towards futures that in principle will come into being long after our solar system no longer exists. Several implications are entailed in this directional, irreversible sense of time. Thus, we cannot stop the passage of time, trying to prevent any changes in our life patterns in the future or trying to live in the present in the same manner as revered ancestors did in the past. New developments will occur, occasioned by technological discoveries, human aspirations, ongoing conflicts, changes in the weather, or unexpected diseases. In addition, in principle, the future remains open, at least to some degree. Although on the basis of our observations of the past and the present, we can make reasonably accurate assessments of future possibilities, they remain possibilities. Furthermore, because from the perspective of historical time, the future remains open, correspondingly, it is impossible to posit any kind of ultimate victory or “final end” in history. To be sure, humans have variously envisioned futures in which people would experience something like a harmonious classless society, a new age characterized by happiness and wellbeing, a final day of judgment, and/or a fully realized kingdom of God on Earth. From a historical perspective, these visions represent imaginary or trans-historical possibilities. They represent ways of expressing moral values and aspirations. From what we know of the history of the universe, we know that there will eventually be an end to the solar system and long before that happens, there is likely to be an end of possibilities for most forms of life on Earth. Many things come to their end within history, including the lives of individuals, organizations, and nations. Nevertheless, although various beings and things come

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to their ends, from the perspective of historical time, the future remains open. Correspondingly, while it is possible and fitting to work at realizing targeted purposes – to take realistic steps to reduce poverty in particular areas, to reform electoral processes, to find more effective and humane practices regarding mental health, or to start new businesses  – we are cautioned to be flexible and open for unexpected developments. Two, from a historical perspective, what happens in the present has been shaped in large part by what has taken place in the past but still remains contingent. From the perspective of the laws of physics and the principles of chemistry and biology, we can observe great regularities in the physical and natural worlds, which determine how much of what happens today takes place because of what happened in the distant and the near past. Even from the perspective of psychology and sociology, we can observe many regularities and close interconnections, so that developments that occurred previously shape how we act and react in the present. From a historical point of view, these regularities remind us that what has already happened determines to a large degree what is now taking place and what now is likely to happen. The present is deeply influenced by the past. We might refer to this characteristic as the path dependency of events viewed historically. Correspondingly, if we really want to understand the present, we are well counseled to seek a fuller understanding of the past. If we really want to understand another person, another country, or another faith, we are wisely counseled to hear stories about their past. The identities of people are deeply shaped both by their past and their memories of their past. However, from a historical perspective, events are to some degree inherently contingent: they might have been, or they might become in some ways different than they now are. This observation is even valid in relation to physical and natural worlds, which over time seem to have been shaped on occasion by not completely predictable cosmic events, unexpected mutations, and not wholly calculable changes in existing patterns. All life systems, whether natural or human, are characterized by regular changes associated with growth and evolution. However, growth and evolution are also susceptible to major discontinuities occasioned both by external changes and internal tensions. Characteristically, scientists regard the relationship between initial conditions and eventual outcomes in terms of higher or lower degrees of probability, where the levels of probability are highest for processes viewed from the perspective of classical physics and chemistry, somewhat lower from the viewpoint of biology and psychology and economics, and much lower from the framework for sociology. The contingent character of human life is well documented. Because human life is especially contingent, the circumstances in which we find ourselves might have been different, and in most settings, we possess alternatives in terms of how we respond to the situations in which we find ourselves. Classically, the comparative influence of the determined and the contingent characteristics of the present were imagined in relation to the powers of fate and of fortune or chance over the unfolding events of our lives. Traditional religions developed rituals especially designed to honor gods and spirits so that the powers of fate and fortune would act on behalf of those performing these rituals. It is difficult, of course, to develop much sense of purposive agency in relation to either fate or

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fortune. If most of the events that take place are determined by the fates – such as the forces of nature, our genetic predispositions, the evolution of economic forces, or the course of current pandemics – then at best, all we can do is to try to align ourselves with these realities. There seem to be few opportunities to realize the purposes of our own design. Fatalism  – the disposition to regard the present as largely predetermined by forces over which we have little or no influence – leads to feelings of resignation and despair. Alternatively, if it seems that much of what happens to us is the result of chance and the quixotic impact of diverse erratic factors like sudden changes in weather, earthquakes, idiosyncrasies of particular rulers, the outbreaks of unexpected disease, or unanticipated economic failures, then it is correspondingly difficult to make any long-term plans. If life circumstances seem to be mostly determined by chance, we may well become resigned as well, not because everything is predetermined, but because efforts to develop plans to realize longrange purposes seem vulnerable to being upset by unexpected developments. A sense of history regards the ongoing course of events as being both determined and contingent. Without denying the influence of either the determined or the contingent character of the present, a sense of history duly cultivated affirms both of these characteristics in ways that promote the sense of possibility and purposive agency. From a historical perspective, there is no way of eliminating the uncertainty that is integral to living as a part of history. The best-laid plans of men and women may go awry. Misfortune and tragedy may occur despite our best efforts. Individuals, organizations, and governments make mistakes, sometimes cataclysmic mistakes. However, with a due regard for history, there are ways of responding to and managing the inevitable uncertainty. We can seek to learn from the past. We can attempt to be as realistic as possible. Inevitably, we must act, and we must assume responsibility for our actions. Accordingly, we must always be prepared to monitor our actions, assess their consequences, keep track of their intended and unanticipated outcomes, and in the process learn what we can learn. Rarely, do outcomes occur just as planned. Regarding our contemporary actions, a historical perspective encourages us to be attentive, discerning in so far as we can those features of our field of action largely determined by what has already taken place and those where we have greater opportunities for introducing changes. Consider, for example, how governments initially responded to the COVID-19 pandemic. They at once faced the challenges both of trying to contain the spread of the disease and attempting to maintain as much of the economies of their countries as possible. In response to these challenges, some governments delayed efforts to reduce the spread of the disease, acted as if the pandemic were not a major threat, encouraged people not to wear face masks, and sought to maintain almost all economic activities. What matters in crises like this is not only the effectiveness of initial responses but, probably even more importantly, the readiness to monitor and learn from the diverse and complex outcomes of these initial responses. By our actions, we cannot shape the world just as we would wish. We are constrained by forces and realities that predetermine much of what is possible. However, we can act, and we can learn from our actions.

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Three, a due regard for history entails a readiness to learn from the past as we seek to live in the present. This assumption is key. Being ready to learn from the past certainly involves respect for received traditions. As a result of our experiences wrestling with diverse difficulties and opportunities, over time, we gain strength and acquire wisdom and we build institutions and ways of life that in turn become embedded in our traditions. However, being ready to learn from the past necessarily involves an open-mindedness regarding all the different kinds of actions that were part of the past. In part, we are thereby challenged not only to learn from publicly well-acknowledged developments – for example, in the areas of politics and social movements – but also from the informal patterns of everyday life. Likewise, we are called to listen to the voices of those who may not be represented in the received traditions. Official histories have tended to be written by those in power in the dominant institutions: thereby overlooking women, the lower classes, and minority groups. Without privileging any group or individuals in particular and without limiting our focus to wellknown areas of life, a readiness to learn from the past necessarily invites us to be ready to learn from whatever happened in the past, whether immediately relevant or not, so long as these accounts elicit our interest and might, after further reflections, help us make sense of what is happening in the present. A readiness to learn from the past inherently involves a readiness to learn from people who are “other” than us. Minimally, this means seeking to learn from other peoples with different traditions from ours, whose descendants are now part of our inextricably globally interconnected world. It entails keeping our minds open to explore what we might learn from all of those whose histories have been overlooked. This mindset also affects how we learn from those we often think we know from our own traditions. Often, we are inclined to regard our forbearers are “our” forbearers because our own sense of identity is so closely linked to them. They are, after all, our ancestors, our revered exemplars, and models we have invoked to justify our values and decisions. Nevertheless, it is useful and fitting to regard them at least in part as strangers, who faced different circumstances than we face and made up their minds in ways different from us. We are much more likely to learn from them when we do not take them for granted. From this perspective, the Protestant theologian Karl Barth once wrote an essay on “The Strange New World within the Bible,” alerting readers to recognize that they were likely to learn most fittingly from the Bible if they duly respected it as an other by means of which they might be addressed in unexpected ways (Barth 1928). There is a tradition in the practice of ethics that takes history seriously from this perspective. I am thinking of authors like Thucydides, Machiavelli in his Discourses, the authors of the Federalist Papers, de Tocqueville, and Jonsen and Toulmin in their review of the history of casuistry. All of the authors explore historical accounts in order both to identify the character of contemporary moral issues and to arrive at and justify ethical judgments (Thucydides 1954; Machiavelli 1950; Jonsen and Toulmin 1988) Ethicists informed by this tradition of ethics are rarely “traditionalists” or “originalists” as these terms are usually understood. They position themselves ready to learn from the past, not in unthinking ways simply to follow dictates from the past, but in order to engage in something more like two-way conversations, seeking to gain insights and to heighten their own sense of what is and is not possible (1).

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8.2  B  enefits We Gain from Cultivating a Due Regard for History When we view the present world crises from a historical perspective, then we look at these crises in light of the three sets of assumptions I have just reviewed. This perspective may occasion several benefits that are useful to consider. I have added the word “may” here because the degree to which a due regard for history fosters these beneficial outcomes depends upon the ways and the extent to which people fully adopt a historical consciousness. One, a due regard for history reminds us that significant changes happen at particular timely moments and these changes require time fully to develop. Changes do not happen when we want them to. Nor do they occur because they are needed. They take place when the times just seem to be opportune. Why, after so many centuries, did the demand to end slavery finally begin to show progress in the eighteenth century and then more fully develop in the nineteenth century? Why was there a sudden widespread willingness to recognize the rights of sexual minorities at the beginning of the twenty-first century? Why did the Soviet Union, which had seemed so powerful, implode at the end of the 1980s? Why, apart from any overt outside pressure, did China at the end of the 1970s adopt such radically new approaches to economic activities? We can, of course, identify circumstantial factors that acted to occasion these and many other sudden changes in direction. I am not raising these questions in order to search for these kinds of proximate causes. Rather, I raise these questions, more rhetorically, to call attention to how, from a historical perspective, certain moments seem to be especially promising when it comes to initiating particular changes. In this spirit, financial advisers typically counsel their clients about times that seem especially good for selling or investing, properties or equities or bonds. As I observed in a previous chapter, although 1968 was not a good time for bringing about fundamental changes in Czechoslovakia, 1988 was. Although many colonized peoples had been seeking independence over a number of decades during the twentieth century, the years after the end of the Second World War opened up as a more promising time to begin to realize these goals. We can, of course, analyze how in relation to specific examples of dramatic change, particular conditions and initiatives helped to occasion fundamental changes. However, I want to make a related but different point. As we review these and many other historical examples, we become aware that desired changes take place because some people and organizations sensed these possibilities and acted on them. What we can learn from reviewing these examples is that timing matters. Failure to take advantage of these moments probably results in lost opportunities. To be sure, we cannot directly determine these kinds of unrealized possibilities by consulting historical evidence. The historical record cannot directly demonstrate what might have been. However, we are forewarned that failures to respond to opportunities associated with propitious circumstances can occasion serious consequences. For example, in relation to current circumstances, we can see how quick and thorough responses to COVID-19 by some governments resulted in dramatically lower infection and mortality rates.

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Interestingly, as a historical review of dramatic changes in the past reminds us of how important it is to keep track of the possibilities and threats connected with the ways the world around is changing and failing to change, that same review cautions us to recognize that it typically takes a great deal of time to bring about fundamental changes. For example, a historical review of what has been involved in successful attempts in fostering economic development within societies as a whole  – as in Europe, North America, or Japan – helps us to recognize that changes leading to industrialization and higher standards of living required much time. In countries like the United Kingdom, the United States, and France, these changes required several generations to be realized in ways that affected these societies as a whole. Building the physical and social infrastructures, developing new, more productive forms of manufacturing and services took much time. It took many decades to develop workable cities, where many of these new enterprises were located. If a country seems to develop very quickly, over the course of a generation, for example, as the Republic of Korea did in the 1960s and 1970s and China has recently done after 1978, then that was because both countries had already developed much of the social and physical infrastructures that laid the groundwork for industrialization. Both possessed well-educated populations and already benefitted from considerable commerce within their countries. Whether they be Soviet-style planners or liberal economists, when humanitarians and politicians announce policies and plan to foster real, unfolding economic growth over shorter periods of time, especially in developing countries, they are attempting to ignore these kinds of historical precedents. When he initiated his Millennial Villages projects in Africa, Jeffrey Sacks expected to see significant progress in locales with little or no built-up infrastructures in a period of five years, which he later changed to ten years (Munck 2013). Of course, constructing the institutions and fostering the practices associated with significant, inclusive economic development is a much longer-range endeavor. When actors seek to bring about demonstrable changes in shorter periods of time, if they are successful, they typically occasion developments within particular enclaves, rather than regions or societies as a whole. These enclave developments often aggravate inequalities and political resentments within societies. As a by-product both of foreign investors and their domestic partners, seeking both to exploit mineral, hydrocarbon, and agricultural resources and to gain economic and political advantage from these arrangements, many developing countries have experienced something more characterized by enclave rather than inclusive economic development (Bird 2014). We can make comparable observations about the efforts to develop democratic political practices in developing countries. It takes much time to develop responsive, resilient, respected, and effective democratic practices. These are best developed locally, from the ground up. Furthermore, they include not only arrangements that make governments accountable through elections to the public but also institutions guaranteeing the rule of law, providing for responsible public administration, protecting human rights, and creating opportunities for political participation at the local level. Countries with well-developed democratic institutions, like the United Kingdom, many of her former colonies like New Zealand and the United States, as

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well as many European countries, developed these institutions over many decades, often over many generations. Attempting to establish democratic practices from the top-down, over very short periods of time, by, for example, allowing for the popular voting for governments at the national level has sometimes had adverse consequences. In many settings, these initiatives have aggravated tensions and conflicts between ethnic and regional groups, operated to occasion the rise of popular demagogues, and in practice weakened the legitimacy and effective authority of legal institutions (Chua 2003; Geertz 1973). I am not here making political arguments either about the most fitting ways of responding to crises or for fostering inclusive economic growth or the development of democratic practices. Rather, I use these cases as historical examples, to observe some general lessons which reviewing these kinds of historical examples helps to foster. As we reflect on these and many other historical examples, we are reminded of two complementary truths. From a historical perspective, we are cautioned at once that we must be ready to respond in timely ways both to crises and opportunities and that working to foster fundamental changes characteristically requires much time. Interestingly, a due regard for history functions to do more than encourage us to be ready to learn from the past, thereby expanding the repertoire of our relevant knowledge, as valuable as this learning may be. A due regard for history also operates at another level helping to cultivate dispositions that inform how we understand and respond to the crises and prospects of our age. For example, being aware of the critical value of acting in timely ways, a due regard for history works to foster attentiveness. Furthermore, as we gain a fuller appreciation that it often takes great stretches of time to bring about fundamental changes – because of opposition, resistance, fears, and the time it takes to modify existing, or create new, organizations – we are encouraged to become patient. In quite different but fundamentally complementary ways, a due regard for history at once calls us to be attentive, and to cultivate corresponding feelings of urgency and calls us to be patient and cultivate a willingness to work through inevitable differences as we move to realize the purposes to which we are committed. As we seek to address the crises of our age, we are well-counseled to be both attentive and patient. Interestingly, both of these dispositions function to arouse and sustain our capacities to be hopeful. Adopting this perspective with regard to the current global climate change crisis encourages us to explore now all the various ways we can and must take the next steps to address these issues and to work away patiently over the long haul seeking and welcoming ever wider and probably more diverse support. Initially, many of the following actions seem both urgent and worth encouraging. We must plant more and more trees, raise and expand carbon taxes to discourage the use of fossil fuels, and invest public and private funds in developing more effective batteries to store energy. We must also expand the uses of solar and wind energy, explore ways of sequestering greater amounts of carbon dioxide, and upgrade mass transit systems. We must also, where feasible, build dikes to protect lands threatened by rising sea levels, develop alternative sources of livelihood for all those who will lose their jobs as countries reduce the uses of fossil fuels, and prepare ourselves to help settle all those millions of households who will over the next half-century be displaced from

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where they have been living as their lands become uninhabitable as a result of climate change. Any serious attention to the climate crisis warns us of much that must be done and done soon. Accordingly, we are well warned to respond in a timely manner, or the crises occasioned by climate change will become more adverse. However, we are also well cautioned that we will face considerable opposition and resistance. Moreover, in many circles struggles to move forward will be aggravated if we become excessively militant. Correspondingly, at the same time, we also counseled to work away at these and related courses of action, with something like patient mindsets, seeking cooperation where we can find it because fully implementing these diverse projects will take time. Two, as we review what has happened over the many centuries of human life, we become conscious of many features that we value about our lives today that have been made possible by what humans in the past have done. We don’t have to reinvent the wheel, the printing press, or how to generate electricity because our forbearers have developed these and tens of thousands of other devices and institutions that we count on every day. As we scan the past, we learn of many taken-for-granted features of our lives that have been made possible by the accomplishments of others long ago and not so long ago. Think of the inventions of languages, writing, controlled fires, and sewing. Consider the revolutions involved in domesticating animals, learning how to plant crops using seeds, and generating energy from steam engines and internal combustion machines. As we reflect on the past, we also see how many of the institutions that facilitate our interactions, like markets, legal systems, community organizations, governments, and even nation-states, were brought into being by purposive actions of people in the past. Even if the people who started them were truly inspired, the many hundreds of religions of humankind were begun at particular moments in the past by particular humans and their followers. Much of what truly moves us today, such as monuments we admire, cathedrals we revere, the music we love, dramas we attend, as well as the poetry and literature we read, were created in the past. It is not necessary to list more examples: often without being fully conscious of the facts, we know that we are in the present deeply indebted to what has taken place in the past. As we review developments of human societies over the course of time, we become aware of the hard work and suffering many others contributed as they constructed the antecedents and foundations of the world we now inhabit. It is possible to identify a wide array of examples. Think of all the engineers, architects, planners, and skilled and unskilled laborers who built the roadways, bridges, canals, public buildings, and Pantheons. Consider all those involved in clearing lands, digging wells, and constructing subways and rail systems. Remember all those men and women as well who lost their lives or were injured, as part of the efforts to defend their lands. Again, it would be possible to cite many more examples. All these examples remind us that our opportunities to live the kinds of lives we have reasons to choose to live were in many ways made possible by the efforts and sacrifices of our predecessors, many undertaking these tasks willingly but many being forced. Many people today, separate from and predating their reactions to the present pandemic, have been feeling that things were not going well for themselves, for

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their communities, and for the world more generally. Although different groups express different concerns, the choruses of complaints have been voiced and echoed from all directions. Many have expressed anger and resentment about the hardships and lack of advancements when they compare themselves to particular others. Many have felt put down by the ways diverse authorities tell them how they should act, should buy, and should play. Many of us worry about the failures of so many others to take the climate crisis seriously. Many people object to the manner in which political leaders seem to be more concerned to advance their own political agendas than to promoting the common good. Many feel wronged because injustices, long identified and promised to be addressed, continue to be ignored. Although expressed quite differently and in relation to many different matters, these kinds of complaints come from the political right and the political left, from the privileged as well as the deprived. It is typically very difficult to figure how to respond to all of these concerns. They are often most forcefully and persuasively voiced by those seeking the most radical changes and opposing any kinds of what they would regard as compromising compromises. The problem here arises, not because these are not in fact fundamental issues that must be addressed but because far too frequently these issues are raised in relation to what is missing and what people do not have. With a due regard for history, it is possible to raise and frame these concerns from a somewhat different perspective. In relation to the diverse contemporary issues, in relation to which many different forms of complaints have been voiced, a due regard for history helps in two ways. First, historical consciousness functions to cultivate feelings of gratitude for what we do have, what is not missing, and what has been accomplished over time. It does not call for us to ignore what is missing and what is unjust. Nor does it in any way move us not to act to right these kinds of wrongs. However, it calls for us to confront these concerns grateful for what we can genuinely be grateful for. Years ago, James Baldwin wrote something different but along similar lines: It began to seem that one would have to hold in mind forever two ideas which seemed in opposition. The first idea was acceptance, the acceptance, totally without rancor, of life as it is, and men as they are: in the light of this idea, it goes without saying that injustice is commonplace. But it does not mean that one could be complacent, for the second idea was of equal power: that one must never, in one’s life, accept these injustices as commonplace but must fight them with all one’s strength. (Baldwin 1955, pp 113,114)

Accordingly, accepting the world as it is without rancor entails, at least minimally, acknowledging that the world as it is includes much for which we can be grateful, including our present opportunities, made possible in part by actions taken by others in the past to protest wrongs of their times. Second, a due regard for history counsels us, as we search for effective ways for initiating campaigns to address the crises of our age and to mount these, in so far as possible, on relevant historically grounded existing developments. We are, correspondingly, counseled to seek changes, building as much as we can on what we have and value and can affirm. For all of his revolutionary rhetoric and sometimes ponderous economic analysis, Karl Marx pointed in this direction when he wrote: “Men make history but not on their own terms, but in terms of the conditions laid down by the past.” (Marx 1851, p. 17).

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So, historical knowledge has the possibility of making us better informed about the many ways actors in the past have acted to construct the conditions and preconditions for the world in which we live. This knowledge can be both interesting and useful as we explore how to make sense of our lives and rise to the challenges of our times. With respect to the current climate crisis, an historical consciousness reminds us that as we act today, we build on the efforts and institutions developed by many predecessors over the past 70 years. At the same, an historical consciousness, appropriately encouraged, can also function to shape the dispositions with which we confront the issues of our day. Because we are not just moved by what we oppose but also what we can affirm, we are in a better position to foster collaborative relations with others who, as we express appreciation for accomplishments these others also value, may well become more open to considering our positions. In any case, as I have already observed, gratitude functions to foster feelings of hopefulness (2). Three, as we attempt to respond to contemporary crises, we can learn much by seeking to understand both the historical roots of these crises and the causes and responses to other comparable crises that have occurred in the past. In terms of how people at the time felt about their life possibilities, many crises in the past have seemed comparably devastating and overwhelming. I will review perceptions and responses to a handful of past crises, in which people found little grounds for benign expectations because the world as they knew it seemed to be coming apart. We can learn much from how people thought about and responded to these crises, both from those responses we today would regard as constructive as well as from those responses we might now consider misguided. What might we learn from the Black Plague, the mid-fourteenth century pandemic that killed an estimated 70 million people worldwide? It has been estimated that more than 20% of people living at that time were killed by this disease. It would be as if one and a half billion people died from COVID 19. Many estimates of the toll of the Black Death pandemic go much higher. The disease killed more than half the population in many European cities. Even greater numbers passed through long periods of illness without dying. In the short term, the pandemic devastated economies worldwide. Today, we know much more about this pandemic than did people living and dying at the time. They did not know the cause of the illness from which they were suffering. They did not know how to reduce the risk of exposure. They did not know what steps might be taken effectively to treat the illness or strengthen their immune systems to fight it off. They lacked modern means of communication to gain and disperse accurate and useful information. They lacked as well effective governmental administrative systems to coordinate public responses to the disease. Most importantly, they lacked the knowledge and skills that have expanded with the development of modern science and medicine. Lacking modern systems of communication, government, science, and medicine, the people of the fourteenth century possessed no effective ways of understanding or responding to the predominant crisis of their age. Eventually, they muddled through. They survived. At the time many of the faithful wondered why God would visit these calamities upon them. Many vented their anger and frustration by blaming and attacking vulnerable minority groups, such as Jews, gypsies, and foreigners

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in their midst. Many just suffered and many were overwhelmed by feelings of despair. In contrast, consider how the people of the world responded to the 1918 flu pandemic. Although nowhere near as devastating, this flu epidemic spread globally, passing through four waves between March 1918 and March 1920, and resulting in the death of an estimated 17 to 50 million people. More people died of this disease than died as a result of the First World War. As a result of developments in science, medicine, means of communication, and government, people were able to undertake a number of constructive steps to control the spread of the disease and effectively treat many of those affected. For example, several island countries like Australia limited their exposure by establishing strict quarantines. Knowing that diseases were spread by germs, many governments at that time attempted to establish rules about social distancing and required the use of face masks. However, when we examine these responses in the midst of the COVID 19 pandemic one hundred years later, we can identify a number of ways in which actions taken at that time were inadequate and sometimes misguided. For example, in many places, like India and Egypt, the spread of the disease was aggravated not only by close living quarters in urban areas but by the fact that so many people, especially those living in impoverished households at the time, were suffering from malnourishment and lack of access to potable water. These people were less able to fight off the disease because their health and immune systems were already compromised. We now know that the disease infected large numbers of soldiers who carried the disease with them as they moved both to the front and back to their homes. Doctors had not yet developed effective vaccines to ward off the infection. Furthermore, they were not sure what kinds of treatments might be most effective in restoring patients to health once they had become infected. Having become intrigued by the capacity of aspirins to relieve discomfort and pain associated with many aspects of colds and ordinary flu, some doctors prescribed amounts of the drug that today would be judged toxic. Overall, while the responses to the 1918 flu pandemic were more constructive than previous pandemics, the infection rates and death rates were excessive. The costs in loss of human life and livelihood were enormous. As scientists continue to research that global pandemic, we will learn much more that will help us better know how to address the comparable crises of our current times. Minimally, we will find ways of learning more from science as open-ended, often and necessarily self-correcting, ongoing discovery processes. We will become more appreciative of the way disease affects some more than others because compromised living conditions, in turn, compromise the capacity of humans to fight off illnesses. We will also become more willing to explore ways to coordinate globally effective responses to global crises. Hundreds of millions of people directly suffered or were adversely affected by the Great Depression, the Second World War, death camps, forced migrations, and other disruptions and deprivations during the 1930s and 1940s. Tens of millions were killed. Many more were injured. Why had the world erupted in these ways? What can we learn by reflecting on these events? In the next chapter, I examine how three well-known authors in the immediate aftermath of these events attempted to

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answer these questions. For the moment, it is useful, I think, to reflect on the wide range of initiatives undertaken in the late 1940s, including the creation of the United Nations and other international organizations like the World Health Organization as well as the endorsement of several international charters, such as the Geneva Conventions and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. While many look to these initiatives as expressions of idealism, while not dismissing this claim, I think it is important to recall how much those engaged in these initiatives were greatly influenced by the realistic sense of the capacity of humans to undertake so much harm to themselves and others. They worked at developing these institutions in hopes, in admittedly imperfect ways, of taking some modest but practical steps of restraining human capacities for evil. The AIDs epidemic represents a more recent crisis. Since it began in the late 1970s, it has resulted in 32 million deaths. Initially, almost everyone who became infected, eventually developed a variety of adverse conditions, including pneumonia and skin cancer, and later died. It was a slow-acting disease. The cause of the disease was not initially known. It significantly affected people in Africa and among homosexual men and injection drug users in some North Atlantic countries. Within a few years, scientists discovered the virus causing the disease, Furthermore, they were able to determine that the virus spread by sexual relations and the transfer of infected blood. Although scientists have worked for almost 50 years, they have been unable to discover a wholly successful treatment or vaccine for the disease. They have, however, been able to find medications that can prolong the life of infected people for many years. Initially, people responded to the AIDs epidemic in various ways, from denying its existence or that it was spread by HIV, interpreting the disease as a judgment on those who suffered, and calling for people to refrain from sexual intercourse except by married couples. Eventually, in collaboration with medical professionals in these cities, homosexual communities in places like San Francisco and New  York City took steps to promote safe sex practices. Several African leaders similarly sought to reduce the dangers of spreading HIV by promoting safe sex practices. Although 1.7 million people became infected with AIDs in 2018, overall, the infection rate has appreciably and steadily declined. The AIDs epidemic is not over, but its impact has become more limited (The Economist 2020). We can learn several things by reflecting on the rise, decline, and response to the AIDS pandemic. We must recognize that pathogens originally inhabiting animals like the HIV and SARs viruses will, from time to time, transform themselves and jump to humans. We must become prepared. Our best chances of managing these kinds of crises arise when we find ways of supporting and paying attention to the findings and counsel of scientists working to understand and control these diseases. While the outbreaks of these kinds of crises often occasion both indifference and denial and hysterical and moralistic responses, we can often find ways of mitigating adverse outcomes by fostering open and objective communication and widespread local cooperation (France 2016). When reflecting on what we can learn from past crises, it makes sense to consider the decline and fall of Rome, especially the decline and fall of the western half of the empire, centered in Rome. This crisis was slow-moving. It had its roots in the

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third century but didn’t finally occur until late in the fifth century. Many have sought to understand why this mighty world empire, ruling over large parts of the civilized worlds in Europe, Asia, and Africa, came to an end. It had seemed to have accomplished so much. It had spread science and education, and commerce over vast areas. All over its large empire, it had constructed roads and aqueducts still admired today. Many different hypotheses have been offered. Slowly over almost three centuries, the empire became less robust, less resilient. Intra-empire commerce declined. Civic life shifted away from the cities. Other peoples, living outside but seeking the advantages of living within the empire, began immigrating in. There seemed to be no viable arrangements at once to extend greater powers of self-­ governing to the provinces and regions while maintaining the coordinating authority of central institutions. I will not attempt here to sort out these analyses. For the most part, Romans themselves lacked a clear sense of what were the most significant sources of the problems they experienced. Many people expressed feelings of malaise. It was tempting to blame problems generally on ineffective leaders, the wealthy, the poor, foreigners in their midst, the old gods, the new religions, the foreigner threatening outside the empire, and bad weather. Many people then felt that things were not alright and that a really good leader, someone like Augustus Caesar or one of the series of powerful and highly regarded emperors during the second century, might revive the energies and a sense of purpose the empire seemed to lack. Like people living in the late Roman Empire, we also face several slow-moving crises. We are not sure how to sort out the troubles we are facing. Often, it is not clear whether particular problems are underlying factors, immediate causes, symptoms, outcomes, or matters altogether unrelated. However, in so far as we can, we are well-counseled to gain a historical perspective on the present. As we gain greater knowledge of the past, we can take steps more clearly to distinguish realistic possibilities from fantasies, serious underlying causes from more ephemeral symptoms. We face much uncertainty regarding, for example, the prospects for our economies, the strength of the viruses we are fighting, and the capacity for cooperation across political divides. Accordingly, we often find it appealing to blame all those who fail to comprehend what we find to be so obvious. However, we are again well-­counseled, above all, to find ways of listening to and communicating with others, finding areas where we can concur, and thereby, modestly working to build solid, inclusive, globally interconnected responses to the crises we are facing. Interestingly, a review of these kinds of historical examples often functions to strengthen two somewhat different but complementary dispositions. These are as follows: one, the insistence on being realistic about what is and is not possible and, two, being ready to use our imaginations as we explore ways to address the problems we face. As we analyze the roots of contemporary environmental, economic, and political crises, we are, correspondingly, well cautioned to be realistic about the scope and depth of the problems we face and the resistance and limits to the solutions we propose. At the same time, historical reviews often function to arouse our imaginations, at times because we are inspired by clever examples from the past and at other times because we are aroused to consider what might have happened if people in the midst of these other crises had acted differently.

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Four, a due regard for history reminds us that we will make mistakes as we seek to respond to the crises of our times and that it is possible to learn from these mistakes. We can all point to many examples in the past where political leaders, businesses, communities, governments, and individuals acted in ways that made matters worse or exerted much effort in actions that had little or no beneficial consequences. The examples are countless. The effort of the Germans to break the political will of the British people by area bombing of cities in Britain in the early stages of the Second World War only functioned to strengthen the determination of the British people to win the war. The German expended extensive resources and many lives on what turned out to be a failed strategy. Nevertheless, first, the allied powers in Europe and then the Americans in Japan employed area bombings against civilian populations, which likewise failed to break the political will of their enemies, at great costs in lives and resources. The Napalming of Tokyo and other cities caused much greater damage and loss of life than the subsequent atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. During the early stages of the Great Depression, many governments initially attempted to revive the economies of their countries through policies of austerity, only to see the economic crisis deepened as a consequence. Many decades later, after the financial crisis of 2008, central financial institutions in Europe attempted to address the economic crises in the fringe countries of Europe again by insisting on policies of austerity only to aggravate the economic situation in counties like Greece and Spain. Readers might point to many other examples. One of the central lessons from a historical review of human activities is that humans will engage in many activities that will fail, result in excessive losses, or otherwise be regarded as mistakes. For various reasons, it seems to be almost inevitable that as we act to bring about beneficial outcomes, we will make mistakes. We make mistakes for many reasons. We act with limited knowledge. We are blindsided regarding the negative consequences of otherwise constructive enterprises. We are excessively motivated by our own short-term interests. Our visions are distorted by feelings of resentment. We are rarely in a position effectively to control all the factors determining our proposed courses of action. Accordingly, as we seek to respond to current crises associated with climate change, environmental degradation, growing inequality in wealth, political disenchantment, as well as the current and future pandemics, a due regard for history cautions us to acknowledge that we will make mistakes even as we try our best to act as constructively as we can. However, it is not always easy to learn from our mistakes. We can cite many examples, such as those reviewed above, where it has been difficult for humans to learn from their own mistakes as well as those committed by others. As I discuss at greater length in Appendix One, because any attempt to describe and understand mistakes occasions explorations of possible fault, including our own sense of accountability, we are often inclined to shy away from these discussions. In addition, we are tempted to discuss mistakes in ways that assign accountability to others and to technical shortcomings. Often, we partially acknowledge mistakes – after all, it is impossible to ignore economic depressions, bombed-out cities, widespread illness and mortality from the spread of diseases, and rising global temperatures – and then simply proceed by admitting that from time-to-time bad things happen.

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However, by evading the question of accountability, we also lose out on the opportunities for learning. Maybe, even more often, we address questions of accountability in excessively moralistic or technical ways. We assign blame to others or to lack of resources. We must begin by recognizing that it is often not easy to learn from the mistakes we make. For example, consider the example of the American war in Vietnam. Beginning in the 1950s, Americans began supporting the government of South Vietnam both financially and militarily. This support greatly expanded during the 1960s, as the civil war in Vietnam became more violent and more aggravated. Eventually, in the mid-1970s, the Americans pulled out their troops. The Vietnamese, after centuries of fighting Chinese, then French, and finally American forces, were able to establish themselves as an independent country. Americans clearly failed in their efforts to support the newly established government in South Vietnam. The country had been divided into two parts by an international treaty after the French, who had established Vietnam as a colony, pulled out in the mid-1950s. A half-­ century later, there is no clear consensus about the mistakes that were made the resulted in America’s failed efforts. Many think that American efforts might have proven successful if they had followed different and better military strategy, if their efforts hadn’t been impeded by the anti-war movement in the country, or if their opponents in Vietnam hadn’t received so much support from the Soviet Union. Others contend that American governments both excessively sought to use military means to address political and social issues and misidentified the very nature of the conflict by failing to recognize the widespread support for the Vietcong movement throughout the country. I use this example, not at this moment to offer a definitive analysis but to acknowledge that learning from mistakes can be very beneficial but is often difficult and can often require considerable time. Alternatively, consider another, equivalently fraught but slightly more constructive effort to learn from the mistakes of the past, namely the reassessment in the late 1980s and early 1990s by the National government of Apartheid practices in South Africa. The government of South Africa had established Apartheid in stages over the course of the twentieth century. These practices resulted in moving large proportions of the indigenous Black population into rural homelands and forbidding almost all Blacks from voting. For a number of reasons, the economy of the country as a whole grew appreciably during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s. As businesses expanded in the urban areas, they needed ever expanding workforce of Black workers. In greater numbers Blacks then correspondingly moved into self-constructed slum-like fringes of urban areas. The living conditions of these areas were often wretched. For understandable reasons, these areas also became staging grounds for protests, which were becoming increasingly violent. The government faced international censure and increasing protests at home. Businesses found the situation increasingly difficult both because of international boycotts and because of difficulties they experienced managing their own workforces. As a result, a significant number of the members of the ruling party became convinced that they simply could not continue successfully to impose the Apartheid system on their country. Not only was the system not working economically but it was likely to aggravate increasing

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violence, which would render economic prospects even more dire. A minority of Whites could not govern a society that was overwhelmingly Black. So, the National Government freed Nelson Mandela from prison and negotiated for changes that allowed Blacks to vote and for the eventual election of a government led by the African National Congress. In an imperfect but still constructive way, the National Government and those who supported it acknowledged that the system of Apartheid they had so long and often violently defended was flawed and that key features of that system had to be abandoned. Considering the examples I have just reviewed as well as those referred to previously in this chapter, a due regard for history reminds that we are likely to make mistakes as we seek to address the crises of our times, that we are cautioned to pay attention so we can spot both opportunities as well as mistakes, and that, while we can learn much by thoughtfully considering our own mistakes and those of others, this process of learning is often resisted or only partially carried forward. Most of us long for simple answers but simple answers for the kinds of complex problems we are facing are frequently misleading. Several observations are, I think, useful in this context. For example, as Charles Perrow noted in his book Natural Accidents, accidents and mistakes are likely to happen in almost all working contexts, whether they involve flying planes, sailing ships, managing hydroelectric dams, running nuclear power plants, or governing political communities. However, recognizing this fact, organizations can develop strategies to reduce the likelihood of accidents and reduce their destructive outcomes. We will be much more able to respond to the next pandemic or the next heat wave if we take steps now to prepare ourselves for these possibilities (Perrow 1983). Additionally, as we move forward to address the crises of our age, acknowledging there are likely to be accidents and mistakes, we are well warned to regard our initiatives a bit like experiments, constantly monitoring and evaluating them to gauge the strength and weaknesses of our projects (Patton 2011). Furthermore, we should be wary of all those agents – whether political leaders, financial experts, business executives, or academics – who claim they never make mistakes. This is, of course, easier to propose than to accomplish. Most politicians and executives are reluctant openly to admit mistakes because they fear that in so doing, they are likely to lose political support or invite costly legal claims against themselves and their organizations. As we consider the several examples I have just discussed, we know that any review of mistakes regarding either public policies or business practices often become highly politicized in negative, often ideological, and frequently moralistic ways. One set of actors blame another set of actors. And vice versa. Most issues are too complex to blame on one or even several actors. So, we are more likely to discern the character of our mistakes by considering several causes, including both immediate and underlying factors. Another response has been to call for dispassionate objective analysis. However, when we are considering issues like climate change and the likely high growth in climate change refugees or the financial insecurity of many low-income and working-class households, it seems inappropriate to consider these crises without the emotions – the fear, outrage, and compassion – these situations occasion. Accordingly, what seems to be called for are public discussions that, while moved by understandable passions, both honor norms of civility and remain well-informed by relevant scientific evidence.

Works Cited

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Works Cited Baldwin, James. 1955. Notes of a Native Son. Boston: The Beacon Press. Barth, Karl. 1928/1957. The Strange New World within the Bible. In The Word of God and the Word of Man. Trans. Douglas Horton. New York: Harper and Brothers. Bird, Frederick. 2014. The Practice of Mining and Inclusive Wealth Development in Developing Countries. Journal of Business Ethics 135 (4): 631–643. Chua, Amy. 2003. World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability. New York: Doubleday. France, David. 2016. How to Survive a Plague: The Story of How Activists and Scientists Tamed AIDs. New York: Picador. Geertz, Clifford. 1973. The Integrative Revolution: Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in New States. In The Interpretation of Cultures. New York: Basic Books, Chapter 10. Jonsen, Albert R., and Stephen Toulmin. 1988. The Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral Reasoning. Berkeley: University of California Press. Machiavelli, Niccolo. 1950. The Discourses, Trans. Christian E. Detmold. In The Prince and the Discourses, ed. Max Lerner. New York: Modern Library. Marx, Karl. 1851. The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bomaparte. New  York: International Publishers. Munck, Nina. 2013. The Idealist: Jeffrey Sachs and the Quest to End Poverty. New  York: McClelland and Stewart. Patton, Michael. 2011. Developmental Evaluation. New York: Guilford Press. Perrow, Charles. 1983. Natural Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies. New  York: Basic Books. The Economist. 2020. June 27, 2020, 72–74. Thucydides. 1954. The History of the Peloponnesian War. Trans. Rex Warner. New  York: Penguin Books.

Chapter 9

After the Fall: Mid-Twentieth Century Reflections on the Crises of Those Times

Abstract  This chapter focuses on the reflections of several writers who sought to identify the deeper causes that resulted in so much suffering and horror in the 1930s and 1940s. More than 70 million people died from the wars and  the death camps.  Many suffered from racism,  imperialism, and the Great Depression. The chapter explores what we can learn today as we review the reflections of authors like Karl Jaspers, Albers Camus, and Hannah Arendt, who themselves sought to learn from a historic examination of this period. How and why had so much destruction occurred? In quite different but complementary ways, these authors stressed the life and death importance of encouraging people to think (pay attention, consider alternatives, use their capacities for reason and imagination), act with a due sense of realism for what was and was not possible, engage in ongoing conversations with others including one’s enemies, and value human solidarity and the Earth with all its bounty and beauty. They found grounds for hope in the human capacities for gratitude, forgiveness, reason, and certain commonalities in our basic human values.

9.1  I ntroduction: Reflections After Two World Wars, the Great Depression, the Death Camps, the Beginnings of the End of the Great Age of Imperialism, and the Dropping of the First Nuclear Bombs A number of extraordinary catastrophes occurred in the 1930s and 1940s. The battles of the Second World War occurred in Europe, North Africa, East and Southeast Asia, and islands and archipelagoes of the Pacific Ocean. Millions of people were killed and many more suffered. The depression of the thirties had had worldwide consequences. The century had begun with great optimism. Industrialization and enlarging webs of commerce had enhanced the living conditions of millions of households. Literacy and modern health care services had greatly expanded. An increasing number of states were being governed in keeping with the rule of law. More and more people experienced the capacity to exercise choices to shape their lives in terms of new © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_9

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opportunities and expectations. It was widely assumed that humans could in constructive ways shape the course of history. But then first came the First World War, in which there were really no victors and much suffering that seemed to have little or no significance. Just after the war, millions died from the spread of the 1918 influenza. What, after all, did all of the so-called progress of the nineteenth century really amount to? In the thirties, much of the world suffered from an economic depression that lasted for more than a decade in many areas and resulted in widespread joblessness, hunger, and homeless. Countless millions suffered. World War Two followed, resulting in the deaths of more than 60 million people as well as much devastation and destruction, including the organized genocide of more than 6 million Jews as well as others. The war in the Pacific ended with the napalming of Tokyo and other cities and the explosion of atom bombs destroying the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, instantly killing hundreds of thousands, and exposing the world to the threat of nuclear annihilation. Both world wars as well as the partitions in South Asia and the Middle East uprooted tens of thousands of people who became refugees and displaced persons. Civil wars and wars of independence had ravaged many places from China, Indonesia, and the Philippines to East Africa. How was it possible to make sense of all of this suffering? On what basis was it possible to hope for a promising future? In the half-decade after the war, a number of notable developments occurred. In order to reduce the likelihood of destructive events like the world war, the holocaust, and the global depression, agents from countries all over the world took steps to establish or further strengthen dozens of international organizations, including the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the World Bank, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, the International Monetary Fund, the International Labor Organization, and the World Meteorological Organization. Representatives from many nations drafted and later adopted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Geneva Conventions. The allied powers established international tribunals meeting in Nuremberg and Tokyo to try selected leaders from the axis powers for violations of international humanitarian law. During this time the United States government created the Marshall Plan to help restore the economies of the European countries, including Germany and Italy. Three other history-changing developments took place in the immediate after-war period. Beginning in 1945 with the independence of the Philippines and the declaration of independence by Indonesia as well as the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947, people throughout the colonized world began to demand their independence from the imperial powers; the Communist Party gained control over China in 1949; the Soviet Union and the United States entered into the fierce and threatening antagonist conflict of the Cold War. All of these developments were triggered by the events of the Great Depression and the Second World War. In diverse ways, the depression, the war, and the Holocaust had challenged many of the reigning assumptions of the prewar period. It seemed that humans at times could act, and have acted, constructively to foster humane, just, and ecologically conserving purposes. They could also aggravate untold misery and cause extensive harm to the Earth, its ecosystems, and its inhabitants. With these recent developments in mind, as they reflected more generally on the unfolding of human history, what might humans learn?

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Shortly after the war ended, in a series of works, published between 1949 and 1951, Mircea Eliade, Reinhold Niebuhr, Karl Jaspers, Albert Camus, and Hannah Arendt, directly and indirectly, addressed these questions. In quite different ways they reflected on what was entailed in living with a sense of history and how, in light of these catastrophes, it might be possible to live with any kind of hope. In the remainder of this chapter, I consider the reflections of Jaspers, Camus, and Arendt. In Appendix Two, I consider the reflections of Eliade and Niebuhr.

9.2  Karl Jaspers: The Origin and Goal of History While calling attention to the great catastrophes of the war and the Holocaust, Jaspers wrote The Origin and Goal of History to “heighten our awareness of the present” (Jaspers 1949, p. v) by viewing contemporary events in relation to the general course of human history. “It requires the whole history of mankind to furnish us with the standards by which to measure the meaning of what is happening at the present time.” (Jaspers 1949, p. xiii) Jaspers expressed his outrage and horror at what had taken place in Germany and other totalitarian regimes. “The dehumanization perpetrated in the concentration camps…was not the work of nature but of man himself, and it can become universal. What does this mean?” (OGH, 147) In this book, he developed a comprehensive view of human history to address this and related questions. Born into a family of north German Protestants in 1883, Jaspers received an MD degree in 1908 before becoming a psychiatrist and a professor of Psychology at Heidelberg University. In 1913 he published a major work on Psychology but a few years later switched fields to become a professor of philosophy. Interestingly, his career moves -- from Medicine and Psychology to Philosophy –paralleled those of William James and like James, he stressed the importance of lived experience and viewed philosophical language not literally but metaphorically in relation to how people used this language. However, he had been deeply influenced by the German idealism of Kant, Hegel, and Schelling. So, rather than becoming a pragmatist like James, after reading Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, he became a major founder of European existentialism. While at Heidelberg, he became a close friend of the sociologist Max Weber and wrote in 1932 a short book honoring him as a politician, scientist, and philosopher. Influenced by Weber, in 1919 he wrote a book on the psychology of world views. He was the tutor of Hannah Arendt for three years, 1926 to 1929, the supervisor of her doctoral thesis, and a lifelong friend. In 1932 he published a huge, ponderous 3 volume work outlining his existential philosophy. Jaspers’ existential philosophy can be briefly characterized. Jaspers maintained that humans gained knowledge in multiple ways: scientifically by using logic and methodologically disciplined empirical observations, existentially through lived experiences, and spiritually through symbolic representations. In all forms, human knowledge confronted limits. Jaspers argued that it was important to avoid false certitude either by making exclusive claims for one way of gaining knowledge or

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treating these limits as absolutes, thereby falsely objectivizing them. In his study of world views, Jaspers analyzed the ways people used these value frames as defensive means to justify their own biases and privileges. Additionally, he argued that most forms of rationality, in the ways they were typically professed, assumed an ideological character that stood in the way of genuine knowledge. Later in his writings on religion, he objected to the closed-minded orthodoxies that seemed to typify organized religions. He proposed several ways to overcome this pervasive inclination to closed and defensive thinking. One way was to engage in open-ended, ongoing communication with others. Communications helped to overcome prejudices, to expose unexamined assumptions, and to modify fixed attitudes. “Knowledge attains its full meaning only through the bond that unites men…The thesis of my philosophizing is: the individual cannot become human by himself. Self-being is only real in communication with another self-being” (Jaspers 1941, pp.  145, 147). Accordingly, philosophy and knowledge more generally were most fittingly understood not as substantive bodies of knowledge but as the activities of thinking, analyzing, and philosophizing enlivened and directed by ongoing conversations. A second way of overcoming the inclination falsely to adopt closed-minded orthodoxies was to recognize the limits of our knowing as horizons and then to recognize that beyond these horizons themselves was a larger reality that encompassed them. Sometimes humans were able to pass beyond these limits, Jaspers observed, by new scientific discoveries or by imaginatively transcending them through heightened awareness or reflection. In the process humans discovered new horizons and, hopefully, Jaspers argued, they also gained a greater appreciation for the Encompassing or Transcendent in light of which they gained knowledge and being. If these statements sound like expressions of faith, they were. They were integral to what Jaspers referred to as “Philosophical Faith,” the title of a book he published in 1947. The years from 1932 to 1945 were very difficult for Jaspers. As a German married to a woman who was a Jew, he and his wife were very vulnerable. For a variety of reasons, he neither in any way demonstrated any even feigned allegiance to the National Socialist regime nor overtly opposed it. Because of his wife, he was removed from his teaching position at Heidelberg University in 1937. He explored the possibility of receiving an academic position at Oxford, but no offer came. He felt much like a prisoner in his own country. His earlier friendship with Martin Heidegger, another founder of Existentialism in Germany, already strained because of philosophical differences, ended when Heidegger publicly supported the National Socialists in connection with an appointment as rector at the University of Marburg in 1933. This act made Jasper feel even more exposed. Until the war ended, he and his wife feared they might be seized by the government and sent to a concentration camp. Once the war had ended, Jaspers was invited to help re-organize and open the University of Heidelberg. He energetically devoted himself to this task and wrote a short book Die Idie der Universitat (1946), calling for expanded liberal arts education. In the fall of 1945, he gave a set of public lectures, later issued as a book, Die Schuldfrage (1945), on the “Question of German Guilt” for what had taken place during the Nazi years. Like many Germans, he had reacted when the allied forces had posted signs near concentration camps reading “You are Guilty” as if all

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Germans were guilty of the horrors committed in these camps. Nevertheless, Jaspers felt it would be politically and morally useful if Germans openly discussed the question of guilt, acknowledging, of course, that, because their experiences differed, Germans probably had a wide range of feelings about their years under National Socialism. “We must learn to talk with each other,” he counseled, “and accept one another in our extraordinary differences.” (Jaspers 1946, Question, 11) Jaspers acknowledged that Germans had suffered in many ways both from the war itself and from the oppression of the Nazi government. To help foster such discussions, Jaspers analytically distinguished between four kinds of guilt. One, some people were criminally guilty because they violated objective standards and should and would be tried either by national or international tribunals, like the court meeting in Nuremberg to hear cases against German leaders accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity. Jaspers recognized that these trials in part assumed the form of victors’ justice. However, in ways that were new and hopeful, these trials gained increased weight and legitimacy because they were justified and operated in relation to principles of international natural and humanitarian law. Two, Jaspers further argued that the current population of Germans and their forbearers were in general politically guilty, at least in minimal ways, for conditions that made it possible for Nazis to seize power back in 1933. To be sure, to degree that they could have exercised any kind of power, some were more politically guilty than others. However, by acknowledging their shared political liability, Germans could now become more politically involved and take steps to ensure their political liberty in the future. Three, as individuals, Germans were in various ways and in varying degrees morally guilty. Although public discussions might facilitate self-awareness, each person was fundamentally answerable primarily or only to her or his own conscience for their moral guilt. Jaspers recognized that individuals had made all sorts of compromises: feigning allegiance they did not feel, remaining quiet when neighbors were seized, allowing themselves to be moved by the patriotism and economic power of the National Socialists, unquestionably obeying political authorities based on traditions, blindly hoping the government would modify its policies, and/or reluctantly and fearfully complying with government policies in order to protect one’s family, business, or profession. Jaspers observed: “But, each one of us is guilty in so far as he remained inactive.” (Jaspers 1946, p. 69) Four, Jaspers referred to what he called metaphysical guilt, a form of guilt everyone experiences, and for which they are answerable only to God. This category remains a bit mysterious. In practice Jaspers seemed to use this category to refer both to survivors’ guilt and the guilt all humans feel to the extent that they inevitably live morally ambiguous lives. Jaspers urged Germans to face their diverse experiences of guilt with honesty and courage in order that they might individually and collectively learn from their past and act constructively to renew their society in the present. In the process, he expressed great hope that Germans could act with considerable patience and maturity. In many ways in the immediate post-war years and subsequently, Germans have been able to respond to this challenge. Nonetheless, Jaspers probably overestimated both his audience’s and his own capacities for largeness of spirit. Like others engaged in the Second World War, Germans had greatly suffered. Still, they

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were in no position to complain because their government had started the war and operated the concentration camps. Jaspers called for Germans to tighten their belts during months of economic distress and asked them respectfully to comply with the order established by the victors. This counsel no doubt irritated some Germans, especially since the allied forces often presented themselves as morally self-­ righteous victors who had just waged and won a morally validated crusade. These same allies had, after all, as Jasper acknowledged in his lectures, acted in morally questionable ways themselves. They had, after all, imposed economically disastrous terms on Germany after the First World War, failed to support and strengthen the League of Nations, ignored Germany when it was passing through its crises in the early thirties, failed to respond more forcefully in the early and mid-thirties as the Germany, Italy, and Japan used military aggression to seize territories of other countries, and engaged in strategic bombings of civilian populations during the war. Jasper argued that these facts in no way reduced the guilt of Germans, even though these facts might be construed as mitigating factors. One of the problems with the kinds of action that Jasper proposed  – such as diverse forms for acknowledging public and private guilt  – was that he did not fully think through the steps that Germans and others might take that would follow from and accompany their acknowledgment of guilt. He rightly worried that without acknowledging guilt, Germans and others would not learn from their past and would react to every criticism with counterattacks. He assumed that the acknowledgment of guilt would lead to a process of purification which would result in Germans seeking ways to make amends and foster inner renewal and transformation. “The feeling of guilt, which makes us accept liability, is the beginning of the inner upheaval which seeks to realize political liberty.” (Jaspers 1946, p. 77) In his huge book On Truth, published in 1947, he made a parallel observation, in this case referring to the experience of tragedy: “Paradoxically, however, when man faces the tragic, he liberates himself from it. This is the way of obtaining purification and redemption.” (Jaspers 1952, p. 41) What Jaspers left out of this account or took for granted was the need for and importance of what Hannah Arendt later referred to as forgiveness. Forgiveness, unlike forgetting, is the act of letting the past become past by acknowledging it and remembering it. Forgiveness allows for the creation of new possibilities. Eventually, former enemies are challenged to find ways to forgive each other – perhaps through acts of contrition and restitution as well as the recognition of new possibilities. In the post-war situation, Jasper might have correspondingly added that Germans were challenged, after they had formally considered the cases of those accused of criminal guilt, to find ways of forgiving each other for their shared but different forms of political guilt as well as their individual feelings of moral guilt. Nevertheless, Jaspers faced difficulties precisely with regard to this kind of letting go of his anger. He argued, it turns out unsuccessfully, that professors, like Heidegger, who had supported the National Socialists should not be re-instated without formal public apologies when the universities were re-opened after the war. Partly as a result of criticism he received in response to these lectures, Jasper began to feel unwelcome in Germany. Although he continued to be actively involved in seeking to foster a renewed civic political culture in Germany, in 1948 he moved

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with his wife to accept a professorship at the University of Basle. Eventually, in 1966, he became a citizen of Switzerland. In The Origin and Goal of History, published in 1949, Karl Jaspers attempted to make sense of the catastrophic as well promising events of the mid-twentieth century by viewing them in relation to the whole of human history. In this book, he set forth a broad interpretation of history from the perspective of his own philosophy. This book was divided into three parts. In the first part, he sketched the outlines of world history from human beginnings until recent times. In the second part, he focused on the present and future, highlighting several significant trends. In the final part, he discussed the meaning of history. He viewed the recent catastrophic events – the war, the Holocaust, the great depression, the use of atomic weapons to bomb civilians – as being inextricably bound up with a mounting crisis that began in the nineteenth century and that represented a turning point in human history. He wrote this book in hopes that by doing so we can better “understand ourselves and our situation.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 232) In the first part, on world history, he sought to affirm the common origin of all peoples and as well as a shared heritage in the consciousness-changing developments during what he referred to as the Axial Age. He began by observing how many critical developments had taken place before humans ever began to record histories, such as the acquisition and creation of languages, tools, kinship systems, and cultures. In spite of their diversity, Jaspers affirmed the oneness of humans in their origins. In this initial part of his book Jaspers also observed the unique role that the West had taken in world history over the past 400 years. He pointed to the instrumental role the West had played in the development of modern science, in establishing the institution of political liberty, and fostering the processes of industrialization. These developments had become goals for the rest of the world. In large part, Jaspers hypothesized, these developments had been fostered by the diversity and tensions that existed in the West between empire and nations, religion and the state, philosophy and religion, Greek and Jewish influences, as well as Roman and Teutonic cultures. As a result of this diversity and these tensions, the West had greatly influenced the contemporary conditions of the world, with all their problems and possibilities. However, while acknowledging these historical differences, Jasper felt it was vital to affirm “The planetary unity of the world and mankind, which is becoming [an ever greater] reality today….”(Jaspers 1949, p. 71) Jaspers observed that about a half millennium before the Common Era an axial period took place at almost the same time in China, India, Greece, and Palestine, when particular poets, prophets, and philosophers in these areas set forth ideas about life that have remained influential ever since. “In this age were born the fundamental categories within which we still think today.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 2) This had been, Jaspers argued, a great turning point in history. While recognizing the diversity between ideas associated with Confucianism and Taoism in China, Buddhism and Hinduism in India, Greek philosophy and drama, and Judaism in Palestine, Jaspers called attention to vital similarities. “Man becomes conscious of Being as a whole, of himself, and his limitations…He asks radical questions. Face to face with the void he strives for liberation and redemption….Consciousness becomes

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conscious of itself, thinking becomes its own object… He discovered within himself the origin from which to raise himself above his own self and the world.” (Jaspers 1949, pp. 2,3) Jasper asserted that what was later called reason and personality were first revealed during this Axial Period. Jaspers’ account of the so-called Axial Period has influenced a number of scholars in subsequent years, who have variously further elaborated upon and modified Jaspers’ characterizations of this period. All recognize the historical impact that the prophets, sages, and poets of this age have had on human cultures. All acknowledge that this period was a turning point in history at least for those societies directly affected. They also recognized the world-shaping influences of earlier and later prophets like Jesus, Mohammed, and sages in ancient Persia and Egypt. Like Jaspers, these scholars noted the shift from thinking and communicating in relation to myths to thinking and communicating in relation to theoretical-like concepts and categories (see Bellah and Joas 2012; Bellah 2011). However, for present purposes, Jaspers’ discussion of the Axial Age is especially significant, not as a framework for understanding ancient history, but as an interesting and fruitful way of at once acknowledging both the diversity of human communities as well as their deep commonalities. We can observe that the terms Jaspers used to identify characteristics of what we might more fittingly refer to as Axial movements were largely drawn from his own existential philosophy. In this way, he was projecting onto these figures features that do not in every case seem apt. Nonetheless, these figures and the movements that celebrated them and maintained written accounts of them do represent turning points in history: they all called attention to the discrepancy between the world as it existed and normative views of how humans ought to live, offered possibilities for overcoming these discrepancies, and have had continuing influence. (2) For a world recently bruised by much violence and destruction, Jaspers sought to remind people of the ways in which they shared in common fundamental values and assumptions in spite of their differences. He was taking the role of a visionary, grounding his vision not on wished-for ideals but on widely honored historical precedents. Jaspers hoped that by means of “this process of self-understanding through the knowledge of whence we come the mirror of the great Axial Period of humanity will perhaps, once more, prove one of the essential assurances.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 140) In part two of The Origin and Goal of History, Jaspers turned his attention to the present and future. He wrote that “the present is no second Axial Period. In the most pronounced contrast to the latter, it is an age of catastrophic descent to the poverty of spirit, humanity, love and creative energy.” (Jaspers 1949, pp.  96–7) Jaspers called attention to the concentration camps, the destruction of the war, and the threat posed by nuclear weapons. However, in this book, he primarily focused not on recent catastrophes but more broadly on a number of historically significant trends that he thought must be seriously considered. Regarding the present, he focused on the much greater role technology played and the dissolution of values. His analysis reflected the feelings of the large numbers of people whose lives had been wrenchingly disturbed over the past several decades. While not directly occasioning the rise of totalitarian regimes, Jaspers appears to assume that these trends facilitated their growth. By means of modern technology, humans had gained mastery and power

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both from the Earth and over the Earth. They could produce more, travel more quickly, and communicate much more easily at great distances. They had greatly enhanced their standards of living. At the same time, technology tended to estrange humans from nature. “Man is uprooted, he loses his soil and his homeland and in return is given a place at the machine; the house and land that are apportioned to him are themselves of the type of the machine, transient, interchangeable, not landscape and not unique home. The surface of the Earth takes on the appearance of a machine-­ landscape.” (Jaspers 1949, p.  111) Modern technology had made it possible to manipulate and coerce the masses as never before. As a result, men and women in modern industrialized societies have become “more at the mercy of circumstances than the peasant in his natural existence.” (Jaspers, p. 124) In spite of potentially alienating aspects of it, Jaspers felt that technology might well be employed in ways that respected the Earth and enhanced human life so long as humans used technology guided by wisdom and humane values. However, Jasper was troubled by this possibility because the present was also characterized by a decline in the hold of traditional values. Religious commitments seemed to have waned. Increasingly, people appeared to think and communicate by invoking slogans and ideological formulae. “In the process, intellectual concepts become banners and badges. Words are used like counterfeit coins…Speech deteriorates into a welter of vague phrases…” (Jaspers, p. 134) No doubt reflecting on the milieu in which the Fascists had gained popular support, he wrote: “In hopelessness there arises the need for illusion, in the aridity of personal existence the need for sensation, in powerlessness the need to violate those who are even more powerless.” (Jaspers 1949, p.  133) Jasper complained about the ways many people in the recent past had excused frightful deeds by their government by saying to themselves something like: “The state is sinful from its origins, I too am a sinner, I obey the commandments of the state, even when they are sinful, because I am no better, and because national duty demands it.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 133) It was important to be realistic. Hence, Jaspers concluded by observing that “there is an immutable evil in man, which has always led to the recurrence of senseless wars, but which has today brought about a quantitative increase both of the diffusion over the Earth and of the measure of destructiveness they cause, the results of which give rise to the phenomena of both civilizational and spiritual disintegration.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 138) Jaspers wrote this book because he was profoundly troubled by events and conditions of the present and, by using a larger historical frame of reference he wanted to indicate grounds for hope both by invoking resources from the past and by exploring the prospects for the future. He acknowledged that humans were capable of harm to themselves and the Earth. They were capable in their “carefree prodigality” of using up and degrading the “limited resources” of the Earth (Jaspers 1949, p. 145). They were capable “under the conditions of political terror of becoming something of which no one had an inkling.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 147) Looking ahead, it was, therefore, fitting to feel anxious. “The only hope is for the horror to become conscious…That which [has been] happening is a warning. To forget is guilt. Nothing but the most lucid consciousness can help us…[Hence] We must keep our anxiety…It is a reason for hope.” (Jaspers 1949, pp. 149, 151) He added that it was

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important to recognize that the future was unknown and contingent. Accordingly, it was dangerous “to flee into certainties…To know the future would be the death of our souls.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 151) He expressed measured confidence with respect to the future. He analyzed what was possible in the future in relation to several realities already well-grounded in the present. Depending on how humans acted, each of these might unfold in benign or destructive forms. Jaspers pointed first to ways increasingly people sought personal and political liberty. Although people held quite different and often opposing views, “All peoples, individuals, and political regimes demand liberty.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 152) Human history in the future would be greatly influenced, Jaspers thought, by the demands of individuals and peoples to gain greater freedom over their lives. Minimally, Jaspers thought liberty entailed finding ways of reducing coercive restraints as well as inner arbitrariness. Although he used different terms, liberty meant for Jaspers something like what Amartya Sen has described as the capability of humans to live the kind of life they have reason to want to live (1999). On the political level, it entailed governing responsive to the will of the people in keeping with the rule of law. Jaspers pointed to two additional emerging realities that were likely in significant ways to shape the future: socialism and world unity. By socialism, he understood not a particular political philosophy but the widespread demand for greater justice with regard to the burdens of labor and the opportunities to share in products of the economy. One challenge that faced human societies with regard to the pursuit of justice was how to find effective ways of restraining and structuring political and economic power. The other challenge was to discover ways to allow for the planning and public administration associated with modern welfare state programs to remain flexible, responsive, and accessible to people affected by them. Excessive planning would not only ignore the contingencies of historical existence but also cripple the human spirit. In the second place, Jasper observed that as the result of technological changes, people all over the world have become interconnected. What we today would call Globalization had arrived. “The history of one humanity has begun.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 193) The challenge was to find means of establishing and maintaining some kind of world order that respected historical exigencies. At times Jaspers sounded almost like a world federalist: “Looking at the situation as a whole, it is obvious that the day of national states is over.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 201) However, overall, his position, while remaining idealistic, is quite different. He argued it was important not to seek to attempt to devise any final worldwide governing structure, which would simply become a new kind of world empire, with its corresponding forms of tyranny. Rather, realistically, world order should be “perennially re-­ established in negotiation and decision, of States governing themselves within legally restricted domains.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 198) Ideally, this kind of global cooperation would be guided by respect for international laws guaranteeing human rights, rights of self-determination, as well the relative but not absolute sovereignty of states. Jaspers recognized that a number of factors might undermine the prospects of realizing some kind of flexible world order, factors we can see continuing to affect our world. These included the continuing expressions of imperial power by

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some states over other states, the dangers posed by the destructiveness of modern weapons, the depletion and degradation of natural resources, the inability to find effective and just limits to economic powers, and the spread of local civil conflicts. Jaspers worried especially about the impatience, which moved people to impose solutions on others and prematurely to abandon difficult negotiations. What was called for, Jasper argued, was “Patience – obduracy – steadfastness…untiring alertness that misses nothing and that is watchful, not for the one single thing…but for all unforeseeable favorable opportunities…” (Jaspers 1949, pp. 205, 206) From Jaspers’ perspective, the post-war world was living in the midst of a deeply troubling and significant crisis, which involved more than simply trying to get on with ordinary patterns of life after the mid-century catastrophes. The world was being shaped and transformed by the growth of technology, aspirations for greater liberty, demands for justice, the emergence of an interconnected global society, as well as the disorienting relativizing of basic values. These diverse forces might occasion promising or perilous possibilities. Jaspers felt that neither humanism nor rational planning seemed capable of addressing the crisis. “Today the situation demands: We must return to a deeper origin, to a fountainhead from which all faiths once welled forth in particular shapes, to this well-spring that can flow at any time man is ready for it. When trust in that which is manifest and given in the world no longer supports life, then trust in the origin of all things must lay the foundations.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 214) What was needed was renewed faith in humans, in possibilities in the world, and in God. While clearly indicating its pivotal importance as the critical factor in response to the challenges of the age, Jaspers did not clearly indicate what he meant by faith. He did not describe faith in relation to particular experiences. He said that faith was not a dogma and did not have a particular content. He felt it had been expressed authentically and diversely by the prophets, sages, and philosophers of the Axial Age in ways that continued to have contemporary relevance. Accordingly, he acknowledged that faith was expressed in multiple ways and this multiplicity was an expression of the vitality of faith. Faith for Jaspers was that disposition by which humans were linked beyond themselves to the origins and depth of their being. It was how humans as spirits, responded to and were enhanced by what Jaspers variously referred to as the transcendent, God, the origin of Being, and/or the Encompassing. God was not an object among objects that could be apprehended by scientific methods. Rather, by faith, humans used symbolic means to orient themselves to the transcendent, the Encompassing, the origin of their beings. “…faith cannot be willed…It is the Encompassing by which socialism, political freedom, and world order must be borne along their path…Without faith, there will be no guidance from the fountainhead of humanity.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 214) Rather than analyzing character and experience of faith, Jaspers largely refers to faith by discussing the by-products of faith: an enhanced sense of possibilities of freedom, the drive that enables humans to master their animal instincts, the mindset that fosters tolerance, and the force that animates activity. After the catastrophes of his age, in response to dramatic social changes, and in face of the contemporary threats of nuclear war, ecological disasters, and mindless technological changes, Jaspers sensed widespread feelings of disillusionment, which occasioned both despairs as

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well as attraction to various pseudo-faiths and utopias. Without using the word, he felt that what was really needed was a revived sense of hopefulness. He felt that faith both helped to sustain meaning and occasion hope. Accordingly, describing faith in possibilities in the world, he wrote: “What critical cognition reveals at its limits, and what corresponds to the immediate experience of self-discovery in this enigmatic world, is the openness, the incalculability of the whole, the inexhaustible possibilities.” (Jaspers 1949, p.  220) Jaspers finished off his account of faith by proclaiming that all humans now “were charged by Deity to work and live for boundless openness, authentic reason, truth and love, and fidelity…” (Jaspers 1949, p. 228) While adopting the tone and voice of an evangelist, Jaspers’ account of what he meant by faith seems vague. He criticized particular faiths as social and philosophical systems because of their controlling character, their rigidity, and the way they often failed to respond to the human desires for transcendence. Still, he recognized them as bearers of the ancient Axial vision of human possibilities. He had made reference to the Axial Age not primarily as an historian but because he wanted to identify grounds for hope in history in the past in a way that remained open for all humans, rather than privileging any peoples or religions. As an account of the phenomenon of faith, Jaspers’ discussion remains unsatisfying. His account is void both of psychological, sociological, and phenomenological description and philosophical analysis. Nonetheless, his account reflects serious concerns, a largeness of spirit, and a humane and open vision. In the third part of The Origin and Goal of History, Jaspers rounded out his book with a discussion of the meaning of history. As spiritual and not just natural beings, Jaspers argued that humans necessarily lived in history, in the unfolding of contingent, unique events. Humans often experienced what Eliade had referred to as the terror of history: namely, calamities, disappointments, and outcomes that seemed unwarranted and unjust. Accordingly, humans frequently sought ways to step outside history: to find solace and self-affirmation in relation to nature, the unconscious, the universal, and in mystical experiences. Nevertheless, Jasper argued, humans must also find ways of addressing the terrors of history by acting constructively in history and seeking the truth of Being in history. He suggested a couple of ways of thinking that he thought would help. Thus, he argued that we should think of the whole of human history as a unity, from the common origin of humanity to the eventual goal. He overtly criticized Augustine’s model, which began with Adam and Adam’s fall, reached its center point in the events of Jesus’ life and death, and then culminated in a promised last judgment. Jaspers felt that this model was too exclusive and wrongly depicted history as a closed system. Jaspers insisted that the unity of history must be conceived in a way that included all people, acknowledged the plurality of peoples, and remained open-ended. He felt that the Axial Age functioned as a symbol of the unity of history because the prophets and sages of that era had identified the common features of human destiny. The unity of history could not be captured by any formula or by any Hegelian or post-Hegelian notion of progress. Rather, the unity of history and humanity was best thought of as a goal and an endless range of tasks. “It must be construed, in its spatial-temporal localization, as the

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spiritual reality of humanity.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 263) It was not necessary to overcome the manifold character of human traditions. Rather unity should be pursued “in the will to boundless communication, as an endless task in the interminable testing of human possibilities.” (Jaspers 1949, p. 264) Accordingly, humans could acknowledge calamities as characteristic of history while continuing to seek constructive opportunities and continuing to communicate broadly with others.

9.3  Albert Camus: The Rebel (1951) Albert Camus was a playwright, novelist, journalist, and philosopher. He was born in 1913 in Algeria to a French father and a Spanish mother. His father died in the First World War when Camus was one. He and his brother were raised by his mother who worked as a cleaning woman. He grew up in poverty. He graduated from college writing a thesis on Augustine and Plotinus. He became active in local theatre. After the Second World War began, he sought to sign up with the French army but was rejected because of ongoing bouts of tuberculosis. In 1942 he wrote what he called his three “Absurds:” a philosophical inquiry on the meaning of life and suicide called the Myth of Sisyphus, a novel entitled The Stranger set in Algiers, and the play called Caligula, about the ancient Roman emperor. He later worked with the resistance movement in southern France. After the war, he kept close company with intellectuals such as Jean-Paul Sartre, Simone de Beauvoir, Alfred Koestler, and others, while still writing and staging plays and novels. His book The Rebel was published in 1951. At the very beginning of this book Camus announced that he had written this work as an attempt to understand why humans over a space of the last fifty years had uprooted, enslaved or killed more than 70 million people and had engaged in these acts largely as the result premeditated thought. “It is incumbent upon us, at all events, to give a definite answer to the question implied in the blood and strife of this century.” (Camus 1951, p. 4) What disturbed Camus was that so many of the actions that had caused so much human misery were planned and justified by people who, for a variety of reasons, thought they were advancing or defending moral visions associated in different instances with the good of their country, with greater freedom, and with efforts to address injustices. In The Rebel Camus does not attempt to identify and examine the historical factors that led up to world wars, the colonization of developing areas, the rise of totalitarian regimes, the sources of the Great Depression, the forced migrations of peoples, the slave camps, the death camps, and other developments that occasioned so much misery and suffering. He assumed his readers were reasonably aware of the historical evidence. Rather, he attempted to address a more probing, more personal, and more philosophical question, a question integrally related to the misery of the century. Recognizing that we live in an imperfect world that includes much suffering and injustice, what means can we rightfully use, he asked, to fight against these imperfections so that we do not in the process occasion more misery and oppression?

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As we look back over the first half of the twentieth century, Camus argued, those with any sense of humanity in their hearts have been or will be moved to say “No” to whatever features of our lives and our world give rise to so much distress and discord. Camus characterized the rebel, for whom the book is named, as anyone who rejects the world as it is or rather rejects these imperfections and rejects the use as well of any arbitrarily determined values as standards for judging what can or cannot be done. Unlike authors such as Eliade, Niebuhr, and Jaspers, Camus was not prepared to invoke religious beliefs as points of reference for making sense of history and finding hope for the future. Rather, he maintained, we must find our basic values in and not beyond history. Camus argued that we can find our basic values in the very act of opposing those features of our lives and our world that we reject. Our rebellion always presupposes other features of our lives that we can affirm, such as our “feeling that somewhere and somehow one is right.” (Camus 1951, p. 13) He further added: “When he rebels, a man identifies himself with other men and so surpasses himself.” (Camus 1951, p. 17) When we rebel against oppressive or irrational conditions, we implicitly identify with others. “Man’s solidarity is founded upon rebellion, and rebellion in turn, can only find its justification in this solidarity….any rebellion which claims the right to deny or destroy this solidarity loses simultaneously its right to be called rebellion and becomes, in reality, an acquiescence in murder.” (Camus 1951, p. 22) In order to understand how the twentieth century unfolded as it had and in order to explore the possibility of alternative futures, Camus did not engage in sociological, economic, or political analysis. Rather, as a moralist, he at once sought to identify critical features of prevailing codes of conduct that led to such excesses and to propose the primary characteristics of codes of conduct likely to be more humane. He concluded, for example, by writing “…instead of killing and dying in order to produce the being that we are not, we have to live and let live in order to create what we are.” (Camus 1951, p. 252) As the author of a constructive ethic, Camus probably most clearly expressed what he had mind in his novel The Plague, published in 1947. This novel depicted what happens to the Algerian city of Oran over the course of a year during a fictitious plague. The plague symbolized all kinds of evils that cause suffering and duress, such as the recent world war, the depression that preceded it, and the colonial oppression of subjected peoples. Initially, the citizens of the town did not want to be realistic about what was happening. “They were all humanists. They disbelieved in pestilence. A pestilence isn’t a thing made to man’s measure.” (Camus 1948, p. 35) As they more fully acknowledged the reality of the plague, the citizens variously looked for easy solutions, ways to escape, or ways to exploit the plague to their own advantage. The hero of the book is a medical doctor, Dr. Rieux, who also served as the voice of the author. He works at healing those who are sick. He thinks of his work as -- what Camus would later call -- a true rebel: that is, as a means of using intelligence “fighting against creation as he found it” (Camus 1948, p. 116) It is useful to think of Dr. Rieux as Camus own chosen prototype of the rebel because so often we are inclined to think of rebels as angry protesters. Instead, Camus described Dr. Rieux as the exemplary rebel, who fights against the pestilences of the

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world and affirmed: “The best way of making yourself useful in a terrible time like this is to do your work well….It is a matter of common decency.” (Camus 1948, p. 150) One of the results of the plague was that people began to despair and lose their sense of shared humanity. “Without memories, without hope, they lived for the moment only. Indeed, here and now came to mean everything for them. The plague had gradually killed off in all of us the faculty of love. Naturally enough. Since love likes something of the future and nothing was left in us but a series of present moments.” (Camus 1948, p.  165) Correspondingly, as people lost hope in their struggles against the power of Nazi military might, against the enslavement by imperial forces, and against the inhumanity of totalitarian rule, they often withdraw into self-protective retreats and/or resort to desperate responses. Eventually, in Camus’ novel, an anti-plague serum is discovered and by its use, the plague begins to abate. A sense of possibility returned to the citizens. “And indeed,” Camus wrote, “it could be said that once the faintest stirrings of hope became possible, the dominion of the plague was ended.” (Camus 1951, p. 243) As the plague was ending, Dr. Rieux reflected that he and those working with him had done what they had to do “in the never-ending fight against terror and its relentless onslaughts.” They had acted like “all who, while unable to be saints but refusing to bow down to pestilences, strive their utmost to be healers.” (Camus 1951, p. 278) With this constructive image of the rebel in mind, we now can examine more closely to see how Camus links this humanistic ethic as a point of departure for understanding the history of the first part of the twentieth century. Beginning with the French Revolution, he observed, people became increasingly aware both, one, of the possibility of acting to change life circumstances as well as, two, of their corresponding unwillingness simply to accept as inevitable and justifiable the circumstances of their lives. Many became ready to rebel. Some rebelled against the dominance of traditional forms of religion. Some, like Nietzsche, rebelled against the way traditional values arbitrarily denigrated much that had vitality in human life. In particular, many people, influenced by Hegel and Marx and their followers, began to assume that they could act to channel the course of history to realize what they regarded as its real destiny and purposes. They variously sought to foster reforms and/or revolutions that would result in more just and publicly accountable forms of industrialization. They sought to reduce the degradation of work and workers. From Camus’ perspective, they also tended to justify whatever means, including, for some groups, violent means to realize their goals. In The Rebel Camus discussed a large number of authors and actors influential in European history over the past century and a half. These include the French revolutionaries, Sade, Nietzsche, Dostoyevsky, Marx, Hegel, Bakunin, Russian Nihilists, Kaliayev, and Lenin among many others. He initially examined those whom he referred to as metaphysical rebels, who were both saddened and disturbed by dissonances characteristic of the basic conditions of human life. These “sons of Cain,” as Camus called them, were outraged by the sense of estrangement that seemed so disconcerting for anyone who could envision other possibilities. Camus especially examined the thought of Nietzsche as illustrative of metaphysical rebellion. At one and same time, Nietzsche, whose thought, Camus argued, had been so wrongly abused in support of

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the National Socialists, both rebelled against the irrationalities of the world and counseled his readers to accept their fate (1). Camus devoted even more space to analyzing the thoughts and actions of those engaged in what he analyzed as historical rebellion. These authors and actors both rejected and protested against the injustices from which contemporaries suffered and worked to direct historical developments in keeping with their visions. Camus especially explored the way historical rebellion in its diverse forms tended to end up accepting and justifying not only increased power and authority for the state but also the use of terror to realize its objectives. Camus reviewed and analyzed a number of figures. I will comment on three of those to whom he devoted especially attention: Hitler, Kaliayev, and Marx. Camus treated Hitler as the par excellent example of nihilism and irrational state terror. He concluded that the terror that the Nazi regime exercised on its own citizens and those of the countries it conquered were without historical parallel. Hitler justified making and tearing up treaties, without regard to promises or principles if these actions would advance his cause. “The crimes of the Hitler regime, among them the massacre of the Jews, are without precedent in history…” (Camus 1951, p. 184) Camus observed that even when Hitler recognized that Germany had lost the war, he insisted that the troops continue to fight because “Since Germany had lost the war, she was cowardly and treacherous and deserved to die.”(Camus 1951, p.  185) Hitler himself had said “If the German people are incapable of victory, they are unworthy to live.” (Camus 1951, p. 185) Camus discussed Kaliayev to identify what he thought of as a just and honorable historical rebel. He wrote a play, The Just Assassins, to pay homage to Kaliayev and his associates. Kaliayev and his colleagues killed the Grand Duke Sergei as part of the eventually failed 1905 revolution in Russia. They called off their first attempt to kill the grand duke because he was riding in a coach accompanied by what they regarded as innocent children. Later, after successfully killing the grand duke and subsequently being arrested, they regarded their own convictions and deaths as warranted. Their crime was justified because the Czarist regime was unjust and oppressive. Nevertheless, recognizing that they lived in a civilized society, and had violated the laws, they recognized their due punishment as also being justified. Camus concluded: “Kaliayev dedicates himself to history until death and, at the moment of death, places himself above history…In a certain way, it is true he prefers himself to history. But what should his preference be? Himself, whom he kills without hesitation, or the value he incarnates and makes immortal? The answer is not difficult to guess. Kaliayev and his comrades triumphed over nihilism.” (Camus 1951, p. 173) Camus analyzed at great length the thought and actions of Marx and his followers. Millions of people over the past century had been deeply influenced by Marxism, its analyses and protests against social and economic injustice, its prophesies of a world not divided by economic oppression and class division, and its faith that history was moving to realize its vision. Marxism had excelled, Camus observed, at exposing the sham character of bourgeois values. At once, Marxism provided both a theodicy that explained the origins of much of what seemed wrong about modern industrial societies as well as a soteriology that foretold how those wrongs could be overcome. However, Camus thought that Marxism as it had been adopted by many

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groups, both nations and movements, had become a failed prophesy. While focusing his analyses on the past and the present, Marx himself never fully thought about the mechanisms that might be best used to realize the socialist future. In fact, often using slogans, he suggested different ways of moving forward in different writings. Thinking especially of the role of Communism in the Soviet Union, Camus noted: “By the logic of history and doctrine, the Universal City, which was supposed to have been realized by the spontaneous insurrection of the oppressed, has been little by little replaced by the Empire imposed by means of power.” (Camus 1951, p. 235) In its earliest manifestations, Marxism had rebelled against the police powers of the state. Referring no doubt to the purges and show trials instituted by Stalin in the late 1930s, Camus observed “in his last incarnation, at the end of his exhausting journey, the rebel once more adopts the religious concept of punishment and places it at the center of his universe. The supreme judge is no longer in the heavens; history itself acts as an impeccable divinity.” (Camus 1951, p. 241) In the mid-1930s in his twenties Camus had become a member of the French Communist Party in Algeria because he thought the party actively sought to address injustices in Algeria. He later withdrew from the party over its stance with regard to French colonialism in Algeria. When The Rebel came out, a number of Camus’ associates in France like Sartre, who continued at that time to support the Communist Party in France, felt that this book was written as a critique of Marxism in general and Communism in particular. I think this response represented a gross misreading of The Rebel. Camus’ vision was larger and more complex. What especially moved Camus was a profound sense of what might be called the ironic and tragic character of the rebellions he examined. Throughout the book, Camus sympathizes with the rebels and the rebellions he described and analyzed in so far as they protested against the inhumane and absurd features of their lives and the world in which they found themselves. “The logic of the rebel is to want to serve justice so as not to add to the injustice of the human condition, to insist on plain language so as not to increase the universal falsehood, and to wager, in spite of human misery, for happiness.” (Camus 1951, p. 285) However, again and again, these rebels and rebellions had lost their sense of balance and limitations. They have taken their rebellions too far. They have become excessive. In response to this problem, Camus concluded his book with several general observations. He reiterated that any form of moral protest that excluded others was in principle untrue to the basic thrust of rebellion which called for solidarity with all other humans. Even in the midst of the Second World War, Camus had sought to maintain communication with German friends. Later he opposed policies for the civil conflict in Algeria that demonized the French or the Arabs or ignored the plight of the French settlers. In addition, he complained about the excessive preoccupation that led many rebels to undertake radically to change the course of history. Not wanting to standby passively in the process of consenting to existing forms of oppression and injustice, they were tempted to master and subdue history. Too often as they dedicated themselves to history, they lost perspective and had in turn become grand inquisitors. Too often, they had excused the use of intolerable means in hopes of realizing their valued ends. Camus called for greater moderation. “Moderation is

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not the opposite of rebellion. Rebellion is itself moderation, and it demands and defends, and re-creates throughout history and its eternal disturbances…. Every undertaking that is more ambitious than this proves to be contradictory.” (Camus 1951, pp. 301, 302) Too often, caught in their fierce rebellion, mesmerized by their own visions, those protesting against falsehood and inhumanity, had become deaf to others who had adopted alternative views. They had sought to impose their visions and their plans rather than negotiating more complex compromises. “The climax of every tragedy lies in the deafness of its heroes. Plato is right and not Moses and Nietzsche. Dialogue on the level of mankind is less costly than the gospel preached by totalitarian regimes in the form of a monologue dictated from the top of a lonely mountain. On the stage as in reality, monologue precedes death.” (Camus 1951, pp. 283–4) Later when referring to the ongoing civil conflict in Algeria, he argued that it was critically important that all those involved continue to communicate with each other in hopes of reaching some kind of negotiated agreement that would respect the rights and interests of all involved. Too often, overwhelmed by their rancour and their sense of threat, none of the groups listened to each other. “To leave room, however, limited it may be, for exchange of views  – that is the essential thing.” (Camus 1961, p. 128) Instead of becoming exclusively focused on addressing historical crises, Camus also felt that it would be good if those deeply concerned about the problems of our times also devoted some of their time, energy, and identity to living in and with nature. While discussing art and rebellion, he observed that “Art, at least teaches us that man cannot be explained by history alone, that he also finds a reason for existence in the order of nature.” (Camus 1951, p. 276) In due measure, Camus called for the rebel to dedicate himself to “the duration of his life, to the house he builds, to the dignity of mankind…[and] to the earth and … [the] harvest that sows its seeds and sustains the world again and again.” (Camus 1951, p. 302) It is necessary to recognize, Camus argued, that within history the outrages of injustice and suffering will never cease. Those seeking to oppose them must, accordingly, seek relative justice. With fidelity to the human condition, they must remain uncompromising with respect to means while accepting approximations with respect to their objectives. Camus felt that much is possible and sometimes, “at a certain point on the farthest plain, it is worth making the supreme sacrifice for the sake of the possible.” (Camus 1951, p. 292) We cannot exercise absolute control over historical developments, but we can choose and defend institutions that will protect human dignity. Taking aim at penal institutions, in particular, Camus asserted: “A revolution is not worth dying for unless it assures the immediate suppression of the death penalty; not worth going to prison for unless it refuses in advance to pass sentence without fixed terms.” (Camus 1951, p. 292) Camus acknowledged that the life of the rebel was not easy. Almost as if he were paraphrasing the apostle Paul (Romans 7: 15) Camus wrote: “Thus, the rebel can never find peace. He knows what is good and, despite himself, does evil.” (Camus 1951, p. 285) It was impossible to be an innocent and purely virtuous rebel. Knowing their own culpability, rebels ought to adopt a conciliatory and modest stance. Camus invoked the goddess Nemesis, “the goddess of moderation and the implacable

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enemy of immoderation.” (Camus 1951, p. 296) The rebel inevitably lives in the midst of tension, Camus argued, as the rebel both seeks to remain true to his values and realistic about the realities of the world. “Moderation, confronted with irregularity, teaches us that at least one part of realism is necessary to every ethic: pure and unadulterated virtue is homicidal. And one part of ethics is necessary to all realism: cynicism is homicidal.” (Camus 1951, p. 297) Camus ended with three images of the constructive rebel: Dr. Rieux the major protagonist of his novel The Plague, Kaliayev, who was the hero of his play The Just Assassins, and revolutionary trade unionism. I have already discussed the first two. Both fought against creation as they found it and accepted limits although in different ways. It is interesting to reflect on the third example, in part because Lenin had sharply criticized trade unionism in his pamphlet What Is To Be Done. Lenin argued that these movements were not sufficiently revolutionary. Because workers as part of the trade union movement lacked revolutionary political consciousness, Lenin had argued that a revolutionary political party, led by its elite, was called upon to help workers realize their true consciousness. Camus in turn celebrated trade unionism for working over the years greatly to improve the benefits and working conditions for millions of workers. To be sure, they had used angry protests and strikes to realize their goals. But, from Camus’ perspective, acknowledging their limits, they had occasioned many benefits. Rather than trying to overcome history, they had sought to foster greater justice and thereby modify history. In The Myth of Sisyphus and in The Rebel, Camus strongly rejected typical notions of hope because he regarded them as illusory. It was deceitful, Camus maintained, to respond to contemporary wrongs and distresses by offering people promises of some eventual fulfillment either in or beyond this life. Because Camus repeatedly insisted on this point, it would seem that Camus felt that people in general and especially those who protested against absurd and inhumane aspects of life should seek to live like brave stoics without hope. Clearly, Camus opposed any kind of privileging of the future over the present, any moves to escape or excuse the present by looking instead to the future. Camus rejected hope understood as belief in a future promised fulfillment based on wishes, literary or intuitive anticipations of the not yet, or prophetic announcements. However, in a number of places he regarded as indispensable hope understood instead as the disposition to anticipate possibilities and to trust that relevant possibilities would emerge. In The Plague, he observed how people counted on this immanent sense of hope as support for their relationships of love and their acts of courage. In 1957 when Camus was in Sweden to receive the Nobel Prize for literature, he talked about how in the midst of the sound and fury of the twentieth century it was vital to look for ways around or through the walls that seemed to oppress people. “Some will say that hope lies in a nation, others in a man. I believe it is awakened, revived, nourished by millions of individuals whose deeds and works every day negate frontiers and the crudest implications of history.” (Camus 1961, p. 272) As expressed in his essays on Algeria and his reflections on his own role as an artist, Camus confessed that he was not optimistic but that he continued to hope, to seek out possibilities rather than submitting to what often seemed like the mindless forces of history. In a contemporary essay on his role as an artist, Camus wrote: “I cannot keep from being

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drawn toward everyday life, toward those whosoever they may be, who are humiliated and debased. They need to hope and, if we are to keep silent, or if they are given a choice between two kinds of humiliation, they will be forever deprived of hope and we with them.” (Camus 1959) In both of his philosophical essays, Camus also seemed to deny that it was possible to make sense of history – in particular, the bewildering and distress-filled history of the twentieth century – in relation to any kind of scheme of meaning apart from history itself. He rejected the evolutionary schemes proposed by Hegelians, Marxists, Liberals, and Social Darwinians. How could the suffering and conflict of the century be accounted for by any kind of progressive framework? Nor was it possible to take comfort in apocalyptic schemes regarding any kind of imagined end of history. From what we can know as humans, Camus argued, history has no end even though both natural and human occasioned disasters may well occur over the ensuing years. Considering the widespread destruction of the last fifty years, from Camus’ perspective it was as well morally impossible to invoke anything like the judgment of history as an evaluative standard. “History in its pure form furnishes no value by itself.” (Camus 1951, p. 288) In spite of these negative judgments about the possibility of discerning meaning in history, Camus ultimately felt it was possible and necessary to affirm living in meaningful ways in history. The problem was that “History without a value to transfigure it, is controlled by the law of expediency.” (Camus 1951, p. 287) Reduced to utilitarian calculations, our lives and history became a dreary business. Rather than over-emphasizing and over-valuing history as the domain for human achievements, Camus argued, we should view history “only as an opportunity that must be rendered fruitful by a vigilant rebellion.” (Camus 1951, p. 302) For Camus meaning was found in fighting against all that degraded human life and the Earth itself. However, as we read these words, we must keep in mind that for Camus rebels who remained true to their rebellion and respected fitting limits acted in many different ways. They might assume the form of trade unionists seeking improved working conditions, doctors working to foster health, active dissenters protesting injustices, and artists like himself expressing their art. They might also assume the form of workers, parents, and friends doing what they felt they were called to do. Meaning was immanent, not transcendent. For Camus meaning seemed to be especially found in the sense of vocation, his own and that of others, and in the multiple often everyday ways this sense of calling typically has found expression. In The Myth of Sisyphus, Camus reminded his readers that as Sisyphus undertook his arduous daily task of rolling his stone up the hill, only to repeat the task on the following day, Sisyphus was probably happy, so long, one might add, as he was also able to care for those he loved and the Earth from which he drew sustenance. Without providing anything like an adequate answer, Camus raised questions about the role of the state in modern societies. In its attempt to find effective ways of regulating modern industrial societies and providing ways of protecting individuals from the risks that were integral to industrial societies, modern states had greatly expanded their economic power and influence. As well, state power had greatly increased with the modernization of the means of violence. However, Camus did not explore the reasons modern political societies were organized the ways they were, and

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how they might more effectively be organized to protect outvoted minorities or to check and balance the power exercised by modern governments. He had supported the international human rights movement. However, instinctively he was suspicious of the role the state had come to play in modern societies. He observed that those involved in historical rebellions in particular often proposed ways of addressing specific injustices that resulted in increasing the power and sway of the state in society. Camus felt that the modern state seemed unable to find fitting ways of limiting its role in society. Just after the war, reflecting both on the Spanish Civil war, the occupation of the eastern European states by the Soviet Union, and the continued oppression of blacks in America, Camus had written the play “The State of Siege.” In this play, he analyzed how the modern bureaucratic and police states exercised repressive force over their citizens. Commenting in 1948 on this play, he wrote, “It is our whole political society that nauseates me…. That is just what I cannot forgive contemporary political society. It is a mechanism for driving men to despair.” (Camus 1961, pp. 78, 83) As he reflected on the state of the world at mid-century, Camus felt that the disasters of the century had occurred for several reasons. Too many people, especially those with power, had been acting with little sense for humane values, without respect for the morality of others, and with a cavalier sense that they could override fundamental moral truths. Too many of these people had been acting as nihilists in practice, no matter what they said. As he ended The Rebel, the message he chose to communicate through the voice of the Russian revolutionary Kaliayev and his colleagues was this: “Each tells the other that he is not God.” (Camus 1951, p. 306) Accordingly, Camus affirmed we ought to act with moderation because we can never fully anticipate our actions' unintended outcomes and by-products. Moreover, our sense of what is right and good is always relative. “We must continuously reconquer what we have within history and in spite of history – the thin yield of… [the ] fields, the brief love of this Earth.” (Camus 1951, p. 306) As we are not God, as we act and fail to act, we are also culpable. We are not innocent. Camus developed this theme in several of his works, especially in The Fall (1957). This novel assumed the form of a confession as Jean-Baptiste Clemence talks to an acquaintance of his experiences and feelings. Although he had in the past as a man fostered charity and been well-regarded and as a lawyer respected the law and went out of his way to help the helpless, he now felt he had done much of this in morally questionable ways to enhance his own sense of worth and importance. A change of mind had overtaken him because one-night several years earlier he did nothing when he had heard a young woman jump off a bridge into the Seine to commit suicide. Jean-Baptiste felt culpable. Similarly, Camus himself felt deeply troubled by the ongoing civil war in Algeria. He could sympathize with the desire of the rebels to foster greater self-government but was horrified by their use of indiscriminate violence against the more than one million French citizens living in Algeria like his relatives. He had vocally supported initiatives to establish a federation in Algeria. The problem was that too many people on both sides of this conflict acted like gods who absolutely knew what was right and acted without a due measure of their own culpability. To what extent did Camus succeed by means of his book The Rebel in fulfilling the task he had set for himself at the outset: namely, understanding and putting into

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perspective the crimes of the twentieth century as well as, given this history of morally outrageous actions, the prospects for the future? He didn’t discuss or explain the imperial expansions of the Europeans, Japanese, and Americans and the uprooting and distress these actions occasioned. He didn’t really examine the factors giving rise to Fascism in Germany and Italy. He didn’t attempt to explain the factors that led to purges in the Soviet Union or the death camps organized by the German National Socialists. Although he sympathized with the distressing condition of an increasing number of industrial workers, he didn’t examine the causes and effects of industrialization. In no way did he undertake any kind of economic, political, or even historical analysis of the crimes of the twentieth century. He had quite a different agenda. He was writing a moral essay. Whatever the political or economic circumstances might have been, Camus sought to understand, what psychological instincts, especially what ways of thinking, allowed so many people who had initially begun for understandable and seemingly justifiable reasons protesting against particular unjust, oppressive, or absurd features of life, subsequently to tolerate, accept, and even justify so much violence against others? Camus sought to address this question by examining the thought and thought processes of a wide range of articulate and highly influential European thinkers from the time of the French Revolution until the present. While he demonstrated why their rebellion made sense, again and again, he also observed the incapacity of many of them to establish and accept reasonable limits. Repeatedly, he called for moderation. He called for all those involved in protesting and rebelling to pay greater attention to what they implicitly affirmed, their own sense of integrity and the loves that sustained them, in order to attain and maintain a fitting balance. He called for them to listen for and to others. Rather than simply asserting their sense of what was right and true, he called them to negotiate inclusive arrangements with allies and opponents. Reflecting on the ways the world had been ravaged in the past half-century, in The Rebel Camus overtly criticized revolutionary terrorists, Hegelians, Marxists, Communists, and National Socialists. Although he used these movements to exemplify his line of analysis, I do not think he was seeking to blame these groups exclusively. His argument had a wider provenance. He wanted to identify both underlying mindsets that, on the one hand, helped to give rise to humanly caused pestilences in whatever form they assumed as well as underlying mindsets, on the other hand, that encouraged people to resist and address these pestilences in reasonable and compassionate ways. In The Rebel Camus was calling on humans of whatever political persuasion and with a chastened sense of their own importance to the unending present task of caring for the Earth and humans living on the Earth. “Rebellion…the very movement of life,” he wrote as he concluded The Rebel, “Thus, it is love and fecundity or it is nothing at all.” (Camus 1951, p. 304)

9.4  Hannah Arendt: The Burden of Our Time (1951) By the time she wrote The Burden of Our Time at mid-century, Hannah Arendt had directly experienced a number of the catastrophes of the twentieth century. Born in a Jewish family in Germany in 1906, in the 1920s she spent a year studying with

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Heidegger and a half year studying with Husserl before spending three years studying with Karl Jaspers. Under Jasper’s supervision, she wrote a doctoral thesis on notions of love in the works of Augustine (1929). Multi-lingual, she understood German, French, Italian, Hebrew, Greek, and Latin, and wrote in English. Under threat from National Socialists, she moved from Germany to France in 1933 and later left France for the United States in 1941. During the 40s she worked with a number of Zionist organizations in France and later in the United States. She gained a position as a professor with the New School in New York City but from time to time held positions at the University of Chicago, Wesleyan University, and Princeton. The Burden of Our Time was her first major published book. Initially published in the United Kingdom with this title, the book was published at about the same time in America and subsequently in Britain with the title The Origins of Totalitarianism and has been usually referred to with this latter title. As I will argue, the initial British title is, I think, more apt. After all, only 3 of its 12 substantive chapters directly focus on totalitarianism. Moreover, and also more decisively, in this work Arendt sought to make sense of the wide range of upheavals and catastrophes the world had experienced in the previous half-century. She begins her work with these words: “Two world wars in one generation, separated by an uninterrupted chain of local wars and revolutions, followed by no peace treaty for the vanquished and no respite for the victors, have ended in the anticipation of a third World War between the two remaining world powers.” (Arendt 1951, p. vii) In the Preface and Concluding Remarks of this book, Arendt both broadly reviews a wide range of disturbing events that resulted in millions of deaths and extensive devastation and characterized the present and prospects for the future. She regarded the contemporary state of crisis as the most profound since the fall of the Roman Empire (Arendt 1951, p. 9). “On the level of historical insight and political thought, there prevails an ill-defined, general agreement that the essential structure of all civilizations is at the breaking point.” (Arendt 1951, p. vii) Good had become so inextricably mixed with evil. For all their brutish treatment of conquered peoples, contemporary imperialisms had, for example, helped to make humans aware that we are inevitably part of one world in which we all have to live together. “Only the claim to global rule has made us aware that mankind is no longer a beautiful dream of unity or a dreadful nightmare of strangeness, but a hard inescapable reality.” (Arendt 1951, p. 434) Arendt felt that the challenges humans were then facing were unprecedented. Many had allowed themselves to succumb to reckless optimism or reckless despair, or both. Belief in progress and confidence in doom, Arendt regarded as “articles of superstition.” (Arendt 1951, p. viii) Too often, in their efforts to make sense of what has been occurring, people have invoked commonplaces. Still, some events and conditions of our age have been both outrageous and without historical precedent. Arendt argued that what was called for was the “examining and bearing consciously the burden which our century has placed on us – neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its weight. Comprehension, in short, means” – in a phrase that might have been written by Camus – “the unpremeditated attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality – whatever it may be.” (Arendt 1951, p. viii)

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As a result of the upheavals of the twentieth century, Arendt felt it was necessary to foster a new beginning. It was impossible, she argued, to take what was “good from the past and call it heritage.” (Arendt 1951, p. ix) It was impossible in any simple way to invoke past morality as a guide for the present. “The subterranean stream of Western history has finally come to the surface,” Arendt observed, “and usurped the dignity of our tradition.” (Arendt 1951, p. ix) Accordingly, it was impossible to utilize “traditional schemes of history” as roadmaps for the future. “Our new difficulty is that we start from a fundamental distrust of everything merely given, a distrust of all laws and prescriptions, moral or social, that are deduced from a given, comprehensive, universal whole.” (Arendt 1951, p.  435) She concluded we must find a way to live together on this Earth or perish, accepting limitations and realistically pursuing possibilities, neither giving into apocalyptic resignation nor utopian fantasies. How then should we proceed? Arendt offers several thoughtful comments both broadly stated and in relation to her more focused analyses of the major issues of the times. In her Preface and Concluding remarks, she highlights three broad themes. First, similar to Camus she challenged us to be grateful for the simple things of life, for our relationships, and for the Earth that nourishes us. She wrote: “Generally speaking, such gratitude expects nothing except – in the words of Faulkner – ‘one’s own anonymous chance to perform something passionate and brave and austere not just in but into man’s enduring chronicle… in gratitude for the gift of [one’s] time in it.’” (Arendt 1951, p. 438) The opposite of gratitude is resentment. One of the marks of our time, Arendt observed, was the pervasive feelings of resentment. These feelings were forcefully expressed in antisemitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism, which Arendt examined at length in the body of this book. As it is typically felt, Arendt observed that resentment led people to grumble about the world as given and to give themselves license to act as they choose often with disregard for those who successes and failures they resented. Second, she focused on the life and death importance of developing our capacities for paying attention and thinking. She elaborated on this theme in most of her later works, including Eichmann in Jerusalem and Life of the Mind. Too often people acted on the basis of ideological convictions that were in many ways opposed to their own best interests. She gave as examples not only the anti-Semitic policies of the National Socialists in Germany and the Apartheid policies of the government of South Africa but also the ways the allied powers initially responded to the threat of totalitarianism in Germany. Third, she expressed hope in the legal and political recognition of crimes against humanity, enunciated by the Nuremberg post-war trials. This recognition reinforced and expressed a newly affirmed sense of human solidarity. Although she conceived of human rights as historically developed rather than being grounded in human nature, she recognized that adopting a Universal Declaration of Human Rights was historically significant. More specifically she argued: “Man as man has only one right that transcends his various rights as citizen [of particular nations that accord him these rights]: the right never to be excluded from the rights granted by his community.” (Arendt 1951, p. 437)

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In spelling out the burdens of her age, Arendt choose to focus on Anti-Semitism, Imperialism, and Totalitarianism. These were the signs of the times that she felt it was especially important to understand. Embedded in the middle of The Burden of our Time, she had observed: “Man, who has not been granted the gift of undoing, who is always the un-consulted heir of other men’s deeds, and who is always burdened with a responsibility that appears to be the consequence of unending chains of events rather than the conscious acts, demands an explanation and interpretation of the past in which the mysterious key to his future destiny seems to be concealed.” (Arendt 1951, p. 208) Without pretending to have found any such magic key – apart from the values of gratitude grounded on realism, paying attention and thinking, and human solidarity – she did attempt to explain and interpret the present in relation to the historical development of these particular phenomena. She began by analyzing modern antisemitism, which Arendt felt raised a number of puzzling questions. Why had a contemporary society like Germany become so frightfully obsessed by the presence of Jews in its midst, especially when the percentage of the population was much less than in places like Poland and Ukraine? Why had so many people in Germany and Austria already in the late nineteenth century become so irrationally preoccupied with this matter that they organized political parties whose mandate was to find ways to expel Jews from diverse parts of society as well as the society as a whole? Why had these attacks on Jews been happening in recent years at a time both when many Jews had been granted citizenship in European nations and many secular Jews had made the decision to assimilate into these societies as good citizens of their respective countries? Finally, why, after the National Socialists decided that they needed to create a volk or a people not polluted by the presence of others who they felt did not really fit in – homosexuals, communists, the mentally ill, and Jews – did they proceed to find ways to expel, to incarcerate, and to kill them not only in such impersonal ways but at great cost both financially and to the effectiveness of their military campaigns? While Arendt recognized that there had been a long history of animosity towards Jews in European societies, often occasioned by Christian groups, she thought that modern antisemitism, expressed by Dreyfus case in France, the development of Anti-Jewish political parties in Austria and Germany, and the attacks on Jews by the National Socialists, was different. In part, she argued that the intensity and irrationality of modern antisemitism were occasioned by the rise of popular sectarian nationalism in modern nation-states, which typically felt threatened by ethnic, linguistic, and religious diversity. As residents of these states became aware of their distinct national identity, many also became conscious of Jews as a group who seemed to be present in all of these states as a seemingly internationally organized community that could communicate with each other in their own language. Partly exploiting the fears of these well-organized others, a number of would-be political leaders found that they could rally great crowds by verbal attacks on Jews and calls to ostracize them and take away their rights. In a number of European countries, Arendt suggests that a nasty form of antisemitism seemed to have been given new life both by modern ultranationalist political parties and demagogic political leaders simply as means of increasing their political following and thereby enhancing their

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political power. Led by Hitler, Germany shared these traits but was distinctive in the ways it pursued its attacks on Jews. Arendt used the words “administrative massacre” rather than “genocide” to capture the particular character of the Nazi attack on Jews. With ruthless inhumane logic, in the mid-1930s the Nazis first worked with Zionist organizations to help Jews emigrate from Germany and then, when this strategy failed to work effectively enough, sought to send Jews to concentration camps. In her study Eichmann in Jerusalem (Arendt 1963), Arendt observed how proud Eichmann, who had studied and applauded the writings of Zionists, had been of his ability to work with diverse Jewish groups to facilitate emigration and later forced expulsion to concentration camps. Still later in 1942, as the allied military forces began to predominate, the Nazis adopted the final solution as the organized extermination of Jews. While acknowledging that these horrific practices were an expression of absolute evil, Arendt felt it was important to recognize the ways these policies were undertaken impersonally almost bureaucratically. She more fully addressed what we can learn from these events as she analyzed Totalitarianism later in this book and what she later referred to as “the banality of evil” in her study of Eichmann. I will return to this question shortly. Arendt devoted a goodly part of The Burden of Our Time to analyzing imperialism both because of its role in helping to occasion many of the horrors of the twentieth century and because, she argued, the age of imperialism was ending. Although Europeans and Americans had engaged in imperial expansion in previous centuries, imperialism became a politically pervasive creed in late the nineteenth century. These countries competed with each other to seize territories in Africa, the Caribbean, and The Pacific. Arendt called attention to several troubling aspects of this imperialistic craze. She noted the ways these expressions of imperial expansion gave increased power and authority to military forces as the agents of government who were called upon to manage seized territories. At the same time, the imperial competition between countries and the expansion of the military force had the effect of making these countries seem ever more threatening to each other. If countries like Italy, Japan, and Germany in subsequent decades engaged in imperial expansion, they were, after all, following the examples of countries like France, England, Belgium, and the United States  – with its seizure of Cuba, Puerto Rica, and the Philippines. What especially troubled Arendt was the ways imperialism in practice functioned as means for the wealthy classes mindlessly to pursue the accumulation of power for the sake of power. In many different ways, the age of imperialism led to the First World War through competition over colonies, increased militarism, and aggravated feelings of threat. The age of imperialism also contributed to the political and economic destabilizing consequences of that war and to the subsequent imperial ambition of the axis powers. Not fully cognisant of the impact of the new forms, and of greatly increased destructiveness, of modern military technology, the European countries sleep-­ walked into the war. The war and the Versailles Treaty gave rise to several unsettling and destructive consequences, including the deaths and harms suffered by soldiers and their families, a revolution in Russia, attempted revolutions in Germany, runaway inflation, tens of thousands of displaced persons, and political instability in

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many of the successor states. Arendt analyzed how both the practice of imperialism and the aftermath of the First World War aggravated feelings of racism in Europe and elsewhere. The imperialists were often blatant racists. The rise of imperialism and racism was, accordingly, not unconnected with the growth in new and angrier forms of antisemitism during these years. As the Turkish, Czarist, and Austro-­ Hungarian empires were dissolved by the war and the peace treaty, a difficult situation was created for minorities living in the successor states. Although the Peace Treaty called for these minorities to be protected, many minorities were not granted full citizenship and faced aggravated discrimination. This was true of diverse groups in the Balkans, Slovaks in Czechoslovakia, Russians fleeing the new Communist regime, diverse ethnic groups in all countries, and Germans and Jews in many countries. The political boundaries of the states established by the Peace Treaty did not correspond neatly with where different nationalities lived. For example, Arendt observed that Poles constituted only 60% of Poland. The new nationalism, fostered in part by the Treaty’s encouragement of national self-determination, often treated minorities as less than citizens. A great proportion of those made stateless by the dissolution of the Czarist and Turkish empires were unable to find effective ways to guarantee their human rights. When the Nazis began to take away citizenship rights from Jews, they were de facto following examples set by other countries in previous years. Arendt noted that “We became aware of the existence of the right to have rights and the right to belong to some kind of organized community only when millions of people emerged who had lost and could not regain their rights because of the new global situation.” (Arendt 1951, p. 294) Overall, although superficially tranquil, many people experienced these as times of social disintegration, economic turmoil, and political destabilization. Arendt commented: “Hatred, certainly not lacking in the pre-war world, began to play a central role in public affairs everywhere, so that the political scene in the deceptively quiet years of the twenties assumed a sordid and weird atmosphere of a Strindbergian family quarrel.” (Arendt 1951, p. 267) Arendt was pursuing an interesting line of argument as she analyzed imperialism as one of the dominant factors that gave rise to the wars, racism, upheavals, and the death camps that marked the first half of the twentieth century. To be sure, she remained especially focused on how Germany under the Nazis had deliberately initiated and expanded a war, which resulted in millions of deaths, and had established death camps deliberately and mindlessly to exterminate Jews. She also had in mind the Soviet Union, which had seized military and political control over a number of countries in eastern Europe. At the same time, using broader strokes, she analyzed how Europeans especially (and Americans as well) through their imperialism, their pursuit of power for the sake of powers, and their racism and treatment of minorities, had fostered ugly and inhumane mindsets, which had indeed reached terrifying expression in Nazi Germany. Although Germany and the other axis powers were defeated in the war, Arendt seems to have written this book in the way she did in order to call people to face up to, and resist, these realities in the present. She declared that the age of imperialism was over – meaning that it was time now to dissolve empires, whether they assumed political and/or economic forms, to root

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out the attendant expressions of racism, and to guarantee for all people the right to have rights. She knew, of course, that the world was still shaped by many forms of imperialism and racism. Although European powers had given up some of their former colonies, resistance to liberating other colonies and modifying patterns of economic hegemony was widespread. Without spelling out the way forward in explicit terms, she called for people to acknowledge the “reality in which we live.” (Arendt 1951, p. ix) By the time Arendt wrote this book about totalitarianism, a number of authors for more than a decade had used this term to depict the particular character of the political regimes of Communists in the Soviet Union and the Nazis in Germany. These regimes were not just despotic dictatorships. They shared characteristics that rendered themselves uniquely powerful and devastating. Arendt added to this literature by stressing themes that seemed to warrant particular attention. She noted, for example, the way these regimes seemed unusually capable of eliciting extreme loyalty and devotion, so intense and so stubborn in fact that large numbers of people were prepared to ignore their own self-interest and to overlook or dismiss the relevance of so-called factual evidence cited against the claims of these regimes. Arendt began her analysis of these regimes, in part citing 1940 remarks of Carlton J. H. Hayes: “In view of the unparalleled misery which totalitarian regimes have meant to their people – horror to many and unhappiness to all – it is painful to realize that they are always preceded [and defended] by mass movements and that they ‘command and rest upon mass support.’” (Arendt 1951, p. 301) In order to comprehend why these regimes had been so successful in eliciting this kind of strong emotional commitment from so many, Arendt called attention to several themes. Thus, these regimes were governed by ideological world views based on unreal, fictitious accounts of the world. To make these worldviews seem credible, they rewrote history, engaged in blatant lies, and forcibly attacked those who questioned or criticized their views. The Soviet government, for example, even stopped providing unemployment insurance during the depression to support their claim that under communist rule unemployment could not and did not exist. Their leaders and their worldviews were regarded as infallible and those persons or circumstances that seemed to suggest otherwise simply had to be purged, exterminated, or destroyed. These regimes did not merely mount huge propaganda efforts to persuade people of the rightness of official views: they sought to indoctrinate the people and conquer their souls. Furthermore, in order to succeed in these efforts, these regimes developed militant, well-disciplined, hierarchically structured organizations to oversee every aspect of public and private life. Elite groups, especially loyal and subservient to the leaders, were formed in the government, military, industry, and political parties. Using secret police and informants, these governments waged reigns of terror against their own people. Paradoxically, while these regimes did arouse and gain intense expressions of loyalty and commitment, they also gave rise to aggravated feelings of distrust and suspicion. Ironically, or perhaps not ironically, the reign of terror increased over the years as overt internal opposition faded. So possessed by their belief in the rightness of their own views, after their military defeat at Stalingrad in 1943, the Nazi regime became increasingly paranoid and

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abandoned ordinary pragmatic concerns in relation to their military campaigns, industrial activities, and the wellbeing of the German people. The military command was subordinated to Nazi directives. Neither military, nor economic, nor political considerations were allowed to interfere with the costly and troublesome progress of mass exterminations and deportations. Additionally, as Hitler and his associates became more fully aware of their eventual defeat, Arendt argued that these leaders prolonged the war in order to bring about the ruin of the society that they had predicted would occur if the people failed to work hard enough for the success of the Nazis vision. In part what had enabled these regimes to gain such power in the first place, Arendt contended, were circumstances, inherited, occasioned, and aggravated by these regimes, which established the basic features of atomized, mass societies. The historical developments differed in the two countries, but the outcomes were similar. During the twenties and early thirties, German society had been devastated by runaway inflation, followed by economic collapse, and the inability of governments to address these problems. The Soviet government acted directly to destabilize ordinary social relations through official policies of forced massive internal migrations of people and collectivization of agricultural production. Both the Communist Party in the Soviet Union and the Nazis in Germany deliberately encouraged disenchantment with traditional political practices and government administration. Officially, both sought to reduce and eliminate inherited divisions between economic classes and to undermine if not destroy ethnic and religious associations in so far as they failed to pledge allegiance to the larger empires these regimes were creating. They sought to organize the people as a single unit and to overcome the ordinary divisions between private and public life. While with considerable sophistication Arendt had analyzed in much historical detail factors that had given rise to modern antisemitism, imperialism, and totalitarianism as these phenomena were especially embodied in Soviet Communism and Nazi Germany, she wrote The Burden of Our Time at mid-century to think about the current world situation more generally. She felt that the disturbing events of the twentieth century represented a fundamental crisis for human civilization and that steps needed to be taken to foster a new beginning. She regarded her age as the beginning and not the end of history. In order to gain a fuller appreciation of what she thought we might learn looking at the present both by historically reviewing how we got here and exploring future prospects, it is useful to consider some of her thoughts in her major philosophical work, The Human Condition, published seven years later. This book is written quite differently. It embodies an abstract argument, profoundly shaped by her respect for ancient Greek thought. Margaret Canovan argued that it was written as a prolegomenon for a future treatise on political philosophy, a work that was in fact never written (Arendt 1957, p. ix). Although in The Human Condition, Arendt made little reference to themes she examined so closely in her previous book, and although her style of writing was remarkably different, nonetheless, in several ways, it can be usefully viewed as an epilogue to The Burden of Our Time.

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For example, in The Human Condition, Arendt further analyzed the ways features characteristic of mass society that had emerged in the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany and had also emerged in modern industrial societies more generally. Failing to acknowledge their fundamental groundedness in the Earth, people in these societies increasingly found their identity in relation to artificial things created by their own industry and technology. Ignoring, taking for granted, or belittling their inevitable connection with active civic life, people living in modern societies increasingly retreated into themselves. As typically expressed, modern consumerism, existential philosophy, and popular culture seemed to encourage this retreat into oneself. People in industrialized societies were becoming, as David Riesman had argued in his book by that title, isolated individuals of a social world he characterized as The Lonely Crowd (Riesman 1961). In mass societies, the public realm was losing importance at the same time as the personal realm was steadily being invaded by modern media. Arendt felt that emerging “Mass society not only destroys the public realm but the private as well.” (Arendt 1957, p. 59) More fundamentally, as she concluded The Burden of Our Time, Arendt had called for a new beginning. “Only a consciously planned beginning of history, only a consciously devised new polity, will eventually be able to reintegrate those who in ever-increasing numbers are being expelled from humanity and severed from the human condition.” (Arendt 1951, p. 439) From our vantage point almost 70 years later, it might be argued both that she under-estimated the degree to which liberal and humanitarian traditions lacked resilience and that she overestimated the degree to which the abstract model of the active life she articulated in The Human condition provided a viable basis for this proposed renaissance. Nonetheless, she did set forth several arguments in this book and in her study of Eichmann in Jerusalem that beautifully spell out the kind of intuitions with which she concluded the earlier work. Thus, for example, in all three works, she depicted and analyzed the mindless thoughtlessness that had become so characteristic of modern bureaucracies, technological society, political jargon, and the media coverage of current events. She had used the phrase “The banality of evil,” to demonstrate the way even expressions of absolutely radical evil, such as the Nazi death camps, were in large part supported by the everyday banality of people who failed to pay attention not only to what was going in the world around them, including the suffering about to descend on others but also often to what was in their own best interests. They failed to consider alternatives, to imagine possibilities, to reflect on what was going on in their worlds. In a word, they failed to think. Arendt maintained that Eichmann had not been vicious or malicious. He was no Iago or Macbeth. “Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal advancement, he had no motives at all.” (Arendt 1963, p. 287) So much evil in the world was occasioned by the failure of people to pay attention and to use their imaginations to explore the feelings of others and alternative possibilities. Correspondingly, I think, Arendt concluded that the ways thoughtlessness had become so pervasive and had worked to undermine so many modern institutions and practices were not problems that could not be addressed. There were many ways to foster thinking, including the cultivation of reciprocating conversations with others. “Men in the plural, that is, men in so far as they live and

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move and act in this world, can experience meaningfulness only because they can talk with and make sense to each other and to themselves.” (Arendt 1957, p. 4) In her last major three-volume work The Life of the Mind, she criticized western philosophy for devoting so much emphasis on knowledge and epistemologically certain knowledge that those involved with that tradition tended to overlook the everyday importance of speaking, imagining, thinking, willing, and exercising judgment. After reviewing the burdens of her age, Arendt expressed several powerful thoughts about what might be involved in a new beginning. In the most general terms, she felt that what really defined humans was not their mortality, which had become the focus of modern existentialists, but their natality, their capacity to give birth to new life. “The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal ‘natural’ ruin is ultimately the fact of natality in which the human faculty of action is ontologically rooted.” (Arendt 1957, p. 247) Since all other living species also give birth, we need to ask what in particular Arendt seemed to have in mind. Her writing on this topic becomes almost poetic. In part humans are able to create new beginnings, Arendt argued because of their capacity to make and keep promises. By making promises, by negotiating treaties, by devising and agreeing to live by contracts and covenants, humans are able both to reduce the unpredictability of their futures and envision and seek to realize particular futures. By virtue of their promising making capacity, in Man the Promising Primate, the anthropologist Wilson has observed the ability of humans to form complex kinship relations (Wilson 1983). Arendt based her argument on natality on the capacity of human love to fill in the spaces between people, to give rise to bonds of affection, mutual identification, and commitment. It is, after all, typically within the context of love, that humans give birth. “Love, by reason of its passion, destroys the in-between which relates to us and separates us from others.” (Arendt 1957, p. 242) Human love gives shape and meaning to human natality. In times of discord and upheaval, Arendt argued that the capacity for new life and new beginnings is practically embodied in acts of forgiveness. Without forgiveness, history becomes unavoidably deterministic. On the one hand, what has happened in the past, all the horrors and miseries can act to bind us through ineluctable chains to the doomed legacies of these events. We can react to these events with vengeance, and in so doing these legacies continue to shape our lives. When appropriate, we can instead exert fitting forms of punishment. Additionally, we can explore ways to forgive. “Forgiveness, in other words, is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven." (Arendt 1957, p. 241) Forgiveness, thus, directly embodies the human capacity for natality, for giving birth to something new. Arendt recognized that there were offenses that were so radically evil, such as the administrative massacres of the death camps, that they could neither be forgiven nor really adequately be punished. However, it seemed to Arendt that it might be possible to find ways of forgiving many of the culpable acts associated with the evils of our time. Such acts of forgiveness also thereby might give rise to new beginnings. Arendt made a powerful case for the life-giving function of forgiveness. However, her account remained incomplete. She did not fully elaborate on how forgiveness

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takes place in practical terms. She did not spell out the ways in which forgiveness necessarily involves remembering and, therefore, not forgetting. She did not explore how political enemies might learn how to forgive. Later so-called Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have experimented with this process and found that it is not a simple matter and that there are multiple ways the process can be either undermined or strengthened. Most importantly, she seems to have taken for granted what is expected of others who may be forgiven – even when in self-forgiveness the other is oneself. That is, she did not analyze the diverse ways by which people might acknowledge their guilt, complicity, and involvements in the devastating and inhumane events of the past. Without owning these experiences, they live both on the surface in ongoing complaints and festering conflicts as well as in subterranean forms of feelings of guilt, shame, and resentment undermining public goodwill and personal peace of mind. Ironically, while not mentioning forgiveness, Jaspers had written about the life and death importance of facing up to the various ways in which all of us -- Germans, Europeans more generally, and all others in some ways involved -- need to acknowledge our diverse forms of complicity and guilt in the horrors that befell the world during the first half of the twentieth century. Forgiveness, whenever it is enacted, describes an interaction between persons. They must both realistically acknowledge the harms, the suffering, the anger, the ignorance, and the misunderstandings that have disrupted their relationships and then, in spite of these searing experiences, allow the past to become past and explore ways to move forward. Arendt recognized that forgiveness represented an expression of the human capacity for love. She credited Jesus of Nazareth as the discoverer of the importance of forgiveness in the realm of human affairs. She argued the “The fact that he made this discovery in a religious context and articulated it in religious language is no reason to take it any less seriously in a strictly secular sense.” (Arendt 1957, p. 238) Arendt considered as miraculous the capacity of humans to forgive, to make promises, to engage in constructive public action, and in these several ways to interrupt the way the life span naturally leads to death. She compared Jesus’ insights into this capacity for action, expressed especially by the power to forgive, with Socrates’ insights regarding the power of human thought. Finally, she confessed that it is in this capacity that we can find the grounds for hope. “Only the full experience of this capacity can bestow on human affairs faith and hope, those two essential characteristics of human existence.” (Arendt 1957, p. 247)

9.5  C  onclusion: Learning from These Mid-Twentieth Century Reflections In many ways, the world in the middle of the twentieth century was much different than today. The global population was decidedly less than half of what is today. Nowhere near as great a proportion of people lived in cities then as they do now. Many of the current countries had not yet come into existence. Economic Inequalities

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had been decreasing for two decades and would continue to decrease for at least two more decades. The current crises associated with climate change, threats to biodiversity, and limited supplies of freshwater had not yet arisen. Yet, many people felt deeply shaken by events that had transpired during the first part of the century. To be sure, most people were glad the world wars were over. Millions were looking forward to asserting their national independence free from the imperial domination from which they had suffered. Although many felt threatened both by the emerging Cold War and the possible use of nuclear weapons, overall, many felt assured by recent efforts to foster greater international cooperation through the establishment of a wide variety of global institutions and decrees like the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva Conventions. Authors like Jaspers, Camus, and Arendt felt that it was vital for humans to reflect on the disasters they had just experienced. How was it possible, they asked, for modern, economically advanced, well-educated, scientifically informed, and politically alert people to engage in practices that resulted in so much suffering and destruction? What had happened didn’t make sense. It was horrible. It was terribly disturbing not just because of the extent of the harm to people, families, and communities but even more so because on some deep and profound level it was not really possible to blame all of this disaster on some crazy and demonic other. Thousands and thousands of people had supported the dictators and their policies and had been involved in creating the conditions that occasioned the economic depression, racism, the intentional bombing of cities, and the death camps. A dark side of human nature had emerged from its subterranean depths. Jaspers referred to this as a “catastrophic descent to poverty of spirit [and] humanity.” (Jaspers 1949, pp. 96, 97) These authors were calling on people to reflect on the destructive and dehumanizing events that had transpired during the first half of the twentieth century. It was impossible now to work at constructing a less destructive and more humane world, they assumed, unless we seriously thought about what practices and what mindsets had played catalytic roles in fostering these destructive and inhumane forces. Today, looking back at the reflections of these authors, we might assume they were largely after the fact trying to make sense of a set of huge crises that had happened in the recent past, while we are trying to figure out how to prepare ourselves for future crises, like climate change and the huge migration of peoples which this change will occasion. However, when we examine the thoughts of these authors closely, we see they were calling attention to practices and mindsets that were not just past but also current. Furthermore, today, while pointing to disasters that are looming in the future, most thoughtful observers point to ways these disasters are already having a considerable impact on the planet as a whole and human life in the present. All of these authors pointed to the life and death importance of encouraging people to think. By thinking they meant paying attention, being alert, considering alternatives, and raising questions about taken-for-granted assumptions. Thinking involved the use of reason and imagination to investigate, reflect, and analyze. Thinking was active and engaged: it involved more than the passive acquisition of

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useful and interesting information. It involved more than mindlessly doing one’s duty, gathering and passing on knowledge, or adopting and defending ideological positions. In their books, these authors challenged their readers to think again about their taken-for-granted beliefs about the world. Without seriously considering alternatives or questioning expressions of conventional wisdom, millions of people had gone along with imperial policies that were deeply racists, supported autocrats leading them into disasters, facilitated the building of death camps and transporting innocent people to these camps, and acquiesced and even sometimes applauded the bombing of cities. Thinking called for all those in any way involved in the disasters of the twentieth century honestly to reflect both on what had happened and what they might learn from thoughtful and probing analysis. As Camus commented at the beginning of The Rebel: “It is incumbent upon us, at all events, to give a definite answer to the question implied in the blood and strife of this century.” (Camus 1951, p. 4) Jaspers had challenged his contemporaries to give serious thought to the ways they had acted and not acted that resulted in the horrors of Nazi Germany. This kind of self-­ reflection is not easy. Still, in exemplary ways over decades, many people in both Germany and Japan, as well as many people in other countries, have thoughtfully reflected on the origins and sustaining forces that resulted in the disasters associated with Second World War. It is not clear in the post-Cold War period, whether Americans and Russians have been prepared to undergo the same kinds of critical self-examining with respect, for example, to the fall of the Soviet Union and the largely unsuccessful military interventions by the Americans in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Somalia, and Libya. In addition to focusing on the critical importance of thinking, these authors called attention to the ways humans at times have sought to force history to unfold in keeping with their own particular designs. Sometimes, humans have done so by creating empires in which they could exert armed power to dominate others. The world wars were initiated in part as particular nations sought either to defend their empires against threats posed by other nations or by countries, like Japan, Germany, and Italy, who attempted to join other countries in establishing empires. Although it now takes other forms, including asserting economic influence over others, the lure of building empires remains a powerful force in the world today. With its “Belt and Road” and its diverse investments and projects around the world, China has been as imperialistic in its designs as have the Americans through their far-flung military bases, global trading practices, and many of their aid projects. Attempts to force history to develop in keeping with our particular ambitions have assumed many other expressions. As Arendt observed, using secret police, extensive propaganda, and uprooting thousands, the totalitarian regimes in the Soviet Union and Germany worked hard at molding their citizens into masses who thought and acted similarly in keeping with the directives of their leaders. As they reflected on the disasters of the twentieth century, these authors in different ways called for moderation, for what Reinhold Niebuhr called “proximate solutions for mankind’s perennial problems.” (Niebuhr 1949, p.  98) Camus’ analysis seems especially interesting and relevant. He focused on all those who find the

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world as we experience it to be deeply unacceptable because of ongoing unmerited suffering, diverse expressions of injustice, ongoing conflicts, faltering communications, and much more. It is understandable, Camus observed, to reject our given worlds because as humans we long for a more humane world. We feel we can only take steps to bring into being this more humane world by saying “no” to the prevailing characteristics of our given worlds. In the modern era, many humans have felt that this other, more humane world was possible. People first had to reject as normative and acceptable the given worlds with their diverse forms of pestilence. The challenge was to find ways of acting with moderation. Camus empathized with all the rebels in their fights against unnecessary suffering, injustice, oppression, poverty, callousness, and tyranny. However, much of the destruction and inhumanity of the twentieth century has occurred, Camus observed, because rebels became excessive, sought to make history bend to their wills, and in other ways lost balance and betrayed the fundamental presupposition of their own acts of rebellion, which was their sense of solidarity with other humans. I do not think it is possible to stress too much the relevance of these observations. As we seek to address today the climate change crisis, increasing inequalities in wealth, the overtly non-negotiable demands of particular insurgents, the way out of the current pandemic, and threats posed by large-scale climate migration, we often feel a sense of urgency that calls for militant action. Even when we know that the outcomes we seek to realize are critically important, we are well cautioned to recall that we can only move forward step by step and that we may from time to time fail at least in part. In The Irony of American History, Niebuhr had noted that “there are no guarantees either for the victory of democracy over tyranny or for a peaceful solution of the fateful conflict between two great centers of power.” (Niebuhr 1952, p. 140) In several ways these authors caution us to proceed moderately, compromising now and then to gain wider support, but continuing to move forward. In the Rebel, Camus outlined a way of proceeding that he referred to as a position of “live and let live….instead of killing and dying in order to produce the being that we are not, we have to live and let live in order to create what we are.”(1951, p.  252) Interestingly, Freeman Dyson used the same phrase many years later to sketch out a viable way for the nuclear powers to scale back the threat of nuclear war. Writing in the early 1980s he argued that current policies regarding nuclear weapons, which emphasized their destructive capacities used against enemy populations, were morally and militarily untenable and extremely dangerous. After all, military weapons by design were meant to be used to defend against and to counter enemy weapons. Dyson proposed a strategy slowly to reduce the stockpile of these weapons while retaining strength enough to retaliate if ever attacked. He referred to this strategy as “live and Let Live.” It involved two principles. In keeping with the first principle, which entailed a public commitment never to use nuclear weapons in a first strike, the major powers were expected to retain enough nuclear weapons to retaliate proportionately if attacked with nuclear weapons. In keeping with the second principle, these powers acknowledged that they placed greater value in protecting the lives of their citizens than in destroying the lives of their enemies. Recognizing the strategic political rather than the military role of nuclear weapons, the strategy of “Live and

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Let Live,” called for nuclear powers to initiate and to continue negotiations over time, probably over many years, to reduce the threat of nuclear war as a benefit for all concerned (Dyson 1984). In addition to the critical importance of thinking and moderation, these authors added that it was also critically important to engage in widespread conversations with others, including others likely to challenge and disagree with us. Sometimes, like Camus, they invoked the vision of human solidarity, recognizing that human solidarity always involved solidarity with one’s enemies, French with Germans, Algerians of European descent with Arab Algerians, believers with non-believers. As the consequence of many different factors, by the mid-twentieth century, Jaspers observed that all humans were now interconnected as members of a single globally encircled humanity. Before, it had seemed natural and possible for humans to regard themselves in relation to their particular languages, faiths, or nationalities. But now, as Arendt observed, we have become inescapably persons connected with all others in common humanity (Arendt 1951, p. 434). Accordingly, acknowledging our common humanity, we are called upon to engage in boundless communication with each other (Jaspers 1949, p. 264). A person only really becomes a person, Jaspers had maintained, in interactive communication with others (Jaspers 1941, p. 147). We were most likely to find truths, Camus argued, not by passively attending to pronouncements delivered by prophets and sages but by engaging in give and take dialogues. It is from this perspective, emphasizing our common humanity and the vital and indispensable role of reciprocating conversation, that we can best appreciate Jasper’s discussion of the so-called “Axial Age.” Jaspers discerned in the Axial Age a common point of reference that respected human diversity. What made the Axial Age “Axial” were a number of influential sages, prophets, philosophers, and dramatists who had deeply shaped cultural values and thinking in diverse cultures but in comparable ways. They all valued humanity and affirmed human possibilities. By invoking the Axial Age as a point of reference, as a true cosmopolitan, Jaspers identified principles and philosophical assumptions that were not western or Christian, but shared values embedded in human history. Implicit in Jasper’s account is the critical assumption that we can only fully appreciate and draw inspiration from the Axial Age by fostering ongoing communications with others in other cultures deeply influenced by their prophets and sages and their wisdom. These authors remind of us both of our shared humanity with all other humans and the value and the critical importance of engaging in interactive and reciprocating conversations with all those others whose actions have bearing on us and whom our actions in turn affect. We are connected together by networks of commerce, webs of communication, and nation-transcending worldwide faiths. We live on and utilize the natural resources of one and the same Earth. We all affect and are affected by one common global climate. We have created thousands of both global public and global civic institutions to facilitate our life together. Yet, trying to deny these realities, many people today seek to build walls and institute barriers to protect ourselves in our own self-defined enclaves. Jaspers, Camus, and Arendt especially call us to pay greater attention to our common humanity, to be ready to listen to the cries

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and claims of others and to engage with them in ongoing conversations. Arendt in particular worried about the rise of what she referred to as sectarian nationalism, which became increasingly intolerant of minorities, whose very presence as communities of people who differed from valued traits of the larger group threatened the latter`s sense of community. As these authors saw it, there is a natural and mutually enhancing relation both between dialogue with the others and thinking and between dialogue with others and moderation. Engaging in open-ended conversations with others, for example, inevitably help to stimulate thinking, as we are challenged to find ways of making sense of and responding to the concerns of others. Similarly, as we are persuaded through reciprocating exchanges with others to take seriously their concerns, we are also moved to adjust our desires and schemes to take others into account, thereby moderating our own visions and plans. Interestingly, long before concerns about environmental threats had become overt and public, these authors began cautioning their audiences to learn to live with the Earth and be in tune with the cycles of nature. Wary of those who sought to shape history in keeping with their fixed vision, Camus encouraged people to live simply in tune with nature, to love the Earth, and to appreciate the way the natural world sprang into life each spring. In place of the resentment so many felt overwhelmed by, Arendt called people to be grateful for the natural beings we are. Instead of striving to become the beings we are not, these authors called us to become the beings we already naturally are. From their perspective, much of the damage which had befallen the world in the first part of the twentieth century occurred because, in their fight against creation as they found it, as they sought to mold the world in keeping with their visions, too often people had lost their own natural connections with the Earth and the cycles of nature. Although in interestingly different ways, all these authors expressed hope. We can, I think, learn much especially by attending to the reflections of Camus and Arendt. Niebuhr`s sense of possibility, which he expressed in all of his writings, was, however, always balanced with his cautionary calls to be realistic about conflict and the ways people characteristically sought and exercised power for their own ends. In The Irony of American History, he had observed: “Nothing that is worth doing can be achieved in our lifetime; therefore, we must be saved by hope.” (Niebuhr 1952, p. 63) Here he associates hope with confident expectations regarding developments that transcend our own lives. Interestingly, he found another, probably more realistic basis for hoping, not in confident expectations but in the capacity of humans to forgive. The passage just cited continued as follows: “Nothing we do, however virtuous, can be accomplished alone; therefore, we are saved by love. No virtuous act is quite as virtuous from the standpoint of our friend or foe as it is from our standpoint. Therefore, we must be saved by the final form of love which is forgiveness.” (Niebuhr 1952, p. 63) While Niebuhr no doubt was alluding to the role of the forgiveness of God, he had in an earlier book stressed the value and the duty to act with forgiving love (Niebuhr 1956). Jaspers thought about hope in relation to his convictions about the openness of the present to possibilities. In the face of difficulties and disappointments, he remained hopeful throughout his life.

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Over his career, Camus struggled to find a viable way of thinking about hope. In his early writings, he had pointedly rejected contemporary views of hope, both as expressed in religious terms as a promised future or in secular terms as some form of optimism. In his later writings, he both found a viable way of thinking about hope and recognized how terribly important it was for those who sought to fight the pestilences that plague our world to find grounds for hope. He found grounds for hope in the vocation of the rebel, in the solidarity rebels found with other humans as they sought to protect both the Earth and what was human about humans. Arendt argued that what was unique about humans was not their mortality but their natality, their capacity, even after all the destruction they have been prone to occasion, to bring into being something new. It was not fated that humans had to become trapped in cycles of revenge and counter revenge, even though these patterns of action and reaction often occurred. The world wars, the death camps, the great depressions, and the brutality associated with imperialism and totalitarianism had ravaged the world. However, if humans learned from these horrors, it might be possible for us to move forward. Arendt found bases for hoping in the human capacities for thinking, making promises, loving, and forgiving. Thus, for example, as humans exercised their capacity to think, they could revisit and learn from the past. Because humans had the capacity to make and keep promises, they could create new institutions based in large part on the agreements enacted by these promises, like complex kinship networks, friendships, communities, and systems of governing. Using both their capacities for thinking and making promises, humans could and have reformed old agreements. By virtue of their capacity to create relationships formed and informed by love, humans have found ways to reach across the gaps between people and establish new bonds of affection. Finally, because humans can forgive, they can, while remembering the past, act to allow the past to become past. While benefitting from the heritage of the past and learning from its inevitable failings, humans can take steps to bring into being new beings, agreements, institutions, and patterns of living. While inevitably shaped by the past, we are not condemned without options to live out our lives wholly determined by what has already happened. Interestingly, during the early post-war years when these authors were reflecting on the history of the first half of the twentieth century, a number of new agreements and institutions were being established, like the United Nations, the World Health Organization, the World Meteorological Association, the General Agreement of Trade and Tariffs, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva Conventions, which have had and continue to have an ongoing impact on how humans interact with each other and with the Earth. In the process former as well as contemporary enemies pledged to work together to address issues facing the world, to manage their conflicts, and to allow and encourage ongoing, open-ended, and potentially problem-solving communication. Recognizing the extensive horrors which the world had passed through, by establishing these institutions and agreements, those involved resolved to acknowledge our common humanity and to anticipate possibilities for constructively addressing the crises which would inevitably arise.

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Works Cited Arendt, Hannah. 1951. The Burden of Our Times [Also appearing under the title, The Origins of Totalitarianism]. London: Seeks and Warburg. ———. 1957. The Human Condition. 2nd ed. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. ———. 1963/1965. Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, Revised and Enlarged Edition. New York: Penguin Books. Bellah, Robert N. 2011. Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bellah, Robert N., and Hans Joas. 2012. The Axial Age and Its Consequences. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Camus, Albert. 1948/1960. The Plague. Trans. Stuart Gilbert. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Camus, Albert. 1951/1969. The Rebel: An Essay on Man in Revolt. Trans. Anthony Bower. New York: Vintage Books. Camus, Albert. 1961. Resistance, Rebellion, and Death. Trans. Justin O’Brien. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. Dyson, Freeman. 1984. Weapons and Hope. New York: Harper Colophon. Jaspers, Karl. 1941/1956. On My Philosophy. In Existentialism from Dostoevsky to Sartre. Edited and selected by Walter Kaufmann. New York: Meridian Books, Inc. ———. 1946/1961. The Question of German Guilt. Trans. E.B.  Ashton. New  York: Capricorn Books. ———. 1949/1953. The Origins and Goal of History. Trans. Michael Bullock. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd. ———. 1952. Tragedy is Not Enough. Trans. Harald A. T. Reiche, Harry T. Moore, and Karl W. Deutsch. Boston: The Beacon Press. Niebuhr, Reinhold. 1949. Faith and History: A Comparison of Christian and Modern Views of History. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. ———. 1952. The Irony of American History. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. ———. 1956. An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. New York: Meridian Books. Riesman, David, with Nathan Glazer and Rueul Denney. 1961. The Lonely Crowd, New Abridged Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press. Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. Wilson, Peter J. 1983. Man The Promising Pgrimate. New Haven: Yale University Press.

Part IV

The Crises of Our Times

Chapter 10

Scrutinizing the Signs of the Times

Abstract  This chapter introduces part three, which analyzes the crises of our times in relation to five different fundamental human capacities. As humans have developed these capacities, they have both found ways greatly to enhance human life and also have helped to occasion the crises that we now are experiencing. Subsequent chapters both analyze the origins of these crises and explore ways that we might address them. While the climate crisis may well be the most critical and potentially catastrophic, the chapter argues for a number of reasons we cannot ignore other crises associated with increasing inequality with regard to wealth, growing political disenchantment, widespread feeling of distrust in reason, and extensive feelings of resentment, all of which render collective problem solving more difficult. We face many challenges in our world today. On account of climate changes, fires have been burning out of control in places like Australia, Greece, California, Siberia, and Western Canada; seawater levels are rising already displacing tens of thousands of people; and areas of drought have occasioned food crises in the Sahel and the Middle East. All of these troubles are likely to worsen in the coming years as average climate temperatures continue to increase. Violent conflicts simmer in a number of areas, from Yemen, Syria, Iraq, and Somalia to Venezuela, Palestine, Ethiopia, and Ukraine, not primarily as anti-colonial struggles for independence but as ongoing struggles born of ethnic differences, feelings of economic desperation, and anger at continuing political oppression, reinforced at times by religious and ideological zeal. After decades of increasing cooperation, conflicts over trade relations have become more aggravated. Although the portion of humans suffering from extreme levels of poverty has declined, more than two billion people live in households suffering from poverty that is very debilitating although less than extreme. In the meantime, hundreds of thousands of people lack access to potable water, ordinary plumbing facilities, and adequate housing. Furthermore, inequalities with regard to wealth have become more extreme both within countries and globally. At the same time, feelings of distrust and disenchantment with political processes are growing, affecting both developing countries and industrial democracies. Widespread political protests have arisen all over the world, including western © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_10

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China, Iraq, Chile, Mali, Hong Kong, Ecuador, Belarus, and Lebanon. Interrelated with all of these developments is the fact that there are far more humans living now than ever before, that the increase in population has been very rapid over the past several generations, that getting used to these increases is challenging even in the best of times, and that as a whole, we humans are consuming ever greater quantities of many scarce and many non-renewable resources. Many, probably most people experience the changes of our time in more local and personal terms. The costs for housing in urban areas continue to rise, requiring larger portions of household income than has been the case over the past several generations. As we find greater and more ingenious uses for electronic systems of communication, we worry both about our increasing dependence on these systems and the ways they can be used to gather information about us. As the ever-changing, modernizing world presents us with more opportunities, we become more anxious and distracted about whether and how we can take advantage of these possibilities. Although more and more of us live more closely packed together in increasingly sizeable urban complexes, our sense of community often declines. As more than ever before, in urban areas we often find ourselves living in the midst of strangers. We spend frustratingly large amounts of time commuting to and from work. Many of us are distracted and distraught trying to figure out how we can adjust to, and/or take advantage of, all of these changes. At the same time, we are distracted and frustrated by the current pandemic and new variants of the virus that has resulted in at least 4.5 known deaths and probably many more How do we make sense of what is happening in our world? Although we have some sense of a number of the large global issues facing the world today, we are not sure if and how we can really make a difference. What difference, really, will it make if we conscientiously recycle and compost what we used to throw out with our garbage, if we cycle rather than drive to work, and if donate funds to help schools educate girls in developing countries? What can we meaningful do now about civil conflict and severe weather in distant parts of the Earth? Why should we be extending ourselves, possibly making sacrifices, when so many others seem to coast along? How, with so little power, can we act in ways that have any constructive impact? How do we put all of these crises and challenges, all these noteworthy achievements and constructive developments, into perspective in relation to our own pressing personal issues, which we cannot ignore? In a word, how can we best sort out what is of greatest significance to us personally, collectively, and globally? What are the signs of our times? The Second Vatican Council (1963–65) produced a thoughtful analysis of the challenges facing the world in the early 1960s. In that document, titled Gaudium et Spes, the “Joys and Hopes,” the ecumenical council called upon humans of conscience to “scrutinize the signs of the times,” and in the process “recognize and understand the world in which we live” and to comprehend “the new stage of its history.” (the Vatican 1966, pp. 201, 202) That document was wide-ranging in its analysis. It called attention both to the great powers which humans have developed and also examples of how those powers have often been used in ways that have not promoted the welfare of all. It expressed sympathy with developing countries,

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called for the responsible and restrained use of violent means, and challenged humans to cultivate communities in which families and their members could flourish. Gaudium et Spes attempted to put into perspective the issues of that time. Taking a hint from this document, I think we also might benefit from a thoughtful attempt to “scrutinize the signs of our times.” In the next several chapters, I attempt to gain perspective on some of the most challenging concerns facing our world at this critical moment in time. I do so by focusing on five broad themes, each representing a range of human achievements and capacities. These are as follows: one, our capacity not only to live like other living beings as creatures of the Earth but also our capacities interact with the Earth and its ecosystems to cultivate and extract valued resources; two, our capacities to reason, communicate, and develop knowledge, especially through the sciences; three, our capacity to utilize human skills and the resources of the Earth to produce goods and services and thereby greatly to enhance our life conditions; four, our capacity to develop systems to govern our communities and the Earth as a whole and to do so in ways responsive to the needs, desires, and will of people in these communities; and, five, our capacities to love and to form vibrant friendships, families, and communities informed by these bonds of affection, identification, and caring. In broad terms, these five sets of capacities are associated with our biological embeddedness as creatures of the Earth as well as the cultures, economies, polities, and social bonds humans have created and developed over time. Adopting a historical perspective, I look at the often ambiguous, results of how humans have exercised these capacities over the years and especially in the contemporary world. In relation to each of these capacities, we now face a series of critical situations, each of which calls for fundamental rethinking about how we are, we can be, and we should be utilizing these capacities. I have adopted a historical approach as well because I want to draw attention to the ways the crises of our age have not primarily emerged as strange and alien forces that befall us. They have, rather, emerged as they have in large part because of how over time we humans have developed our human capacities and powers. We have developed these powers in ways that have both greatly enhanced human life and in ways that have led to the crises we are now facing. I also analyze these crises always from the perspective of hope that I have developed in previous chapters. Today we face a number of crises that are both varied and urgent. Although some of these crises are more urgent and threatening than others and some more easily understood and targeted than others, we cannot, I think, ignore any of them. Nonetheless, I think a strong case can be made regarding environmental issues and in particular global warming as the crisis that is likely to have the most wide-­ranging and severe impact on the Earth and humans living on the Earth. We find evidence of the climate change crisis in rising sea level, the increase in violent storms, expansion in the number of areas suffering from drought and corresponding crop failures, expansion as well in the number and severity of forest fires, and growing numbers of people forced to move from where they have been living as a result of these changes. We know all of these conditions will grow worse over the next fifty years even if we are able to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases dramatically over the

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next couple of decades. Accordingly, many argue that we should focus all our energies both to taking the necessary steps to reduce global warnings and to work at developing fitting policies and programs to manage the adverse consequences that are already occurring and will in the future become even more adverse even if we act with deliberate speed to reduce global warming. The climate change crisis clearly demands urgent attention. However, if we hope effectively to respond to the climate change crisis, we cannot ignore the other crises I consider in the next several chapters. For example, in order to gain wide support for our efforts to reduce greenhouse gases, we must find effective ways to support all of those communities and households that will be adversely affected as coal mines are closed, refineries are shuttered, vehicles and machines and powerplants powered by fossil fuels are no longer being produced, and the extraction of oil and gas is greatly reduced. Globally thousands of communities and millions of households will be adversely affected. There are no simple solutions for those affected. We cannot just transfer funds to these communities and households. To be sure, we must, and we can take deliberate steps to “green” our economies. But these transitions will not be simple. They will be disruptive. I have recently addressed these issues in an essay titled “What About the Coal Miners? Addressing the Downside of Responsible Environmental Practices.” In this case, we must find ways of drawing on our history of productive capacities so that these communities and regions and households adversely affected can find alternative economic bases for their means of livelihood. These are complex problems that can not be resolved quickly (Bird 2022). Additionally, we cannot ignore a number of other crises, which pose immediate threats to hundreds of millions of households. So long as these threats continue to undermine the wellbeing of these households, it remains difficult if not impossible for them – and the political authorities governing them – to give serious sustained consideration to the climate change crisis. Think of all those people whose lives and livelihoods are endangered either by overtly violent conflicts or real unresolved conflicts that have been suppressed using violent means in places like northwest China, Afghanistan, Syria, Azerbaijan, Yemen, Palestine, Mali, Sudan, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Venezuela, and other places where the conflicts are less overt. Think as well of all those millions of households suffering from some form of poverty, hunger and malnutrition, and/or inadequate housing. Consider all those individuals and households who regularly experience slights, oversights, and outright discrimination by public agencies, businesses, and other people because of the color of their skin or their ethnic background. Note well all those indigenous peoples who continue to be treated unfairly and feel that actions must now be taken to compensate them for the losses they have suffered, and they continue to suffer. Add to these crises the distress caused by the current COVID-19 pandemic, the ongoing AIDS epidemic, the contemporary opioid crisis, and the threat of yet other epidemics, all of which not only have undermined physical health, occasioned severe economic side effects, and increased social and mental distress for millions. Clearly, many millions of people are understandably preoccupied with immediate dangers, social disturbances, and deprivations. All these issues demand

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active concerted public attention based on the actual suffering and distress large numbers of people are currently experiencing. Correspondingly, it sometimes becomes more difficult for them – and for those governing the regions in which they live – to become actively engaged in addressing climate change crises, despite the fact that many of these households are likely to be especially adversely affected by climate change. Currently, they experience so many other blows to their immediate wellbeing. We must also consider the growth in feelings of distrust with regard to science, reason, and authorities who invoke science and reason as grounds for their actions and recommendations. These feelings of distrust and disenchantment are contagious. To be sure, many people have not been affected by these sentiments. However, many have been. In so far as these feelings of distrust grow and spread, they function to undermine our capacities -- and the capacities of our governing authorities -to identify and address the diverse crises of our age. So, even as we seek to find ways for more effectively addressing the climate crisis as well as the other crises to which I have referred, we are challenged as well to explore fitting ways both of framing this crisis of distrust and generating greater and wider levels of trust. No simple matters. As we reflect on the emergence and growth of distrust – regarding science, reason, and pubic authorities – we gain an increased appreciation of the appeal of charismatic populous leaders who have been able to elicit trust as they seem, at least to their followers, to be able to get things done, even while at the same time they act to encourage these more general feelings of distrust in reason, science, and ordinary public authorities. For a variety of reasons, then, we are called upon to consider a wide range of crises even as we assign priority to climate change and other environmental crises. I doubt if we can successfully mobilize strong and widely shared support to address these crises unless we also encourage and appreciate corresponding efforts to respond to other crises I have reviewed. Addressing these other crises does not entail allowing ourselves to become distracted. These other crises are serious matters and in their own way also represent critical moments in the history of human life on Earth. Moreover, although it will take time and ingenuity and it will call for us to find ways of collaborating with those with whom we disagree, it is possible in significant ways to take constructive steps to address each of these crises on their own terms. To be sure, there are no simple ways forward. The varied problems we face today do not result from any particular political, legal, economic, or social arrangements. We are not facing these crises now because we are living in artificial, humanly constructed social arrangements, rather than in more natural environments like our ancient foraging ancestors, as some observers suggest. Nor are we facing these crises now because, unlike more primitive communities, we have introduced institutions like private property and hierarchical governing authorities, as Ludwig Bregman seems to maintain, echoing arguments originally made by Jean-Jacques Rousseau. These crises have not befallen us because our economic and political institutions have been shaped by modern capitalism, as many have asserted. While there is much truth in these several critiques, the crises we face today are more

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complex than any of these analyses allow and they grow out of the ways we humans over the long course of our histories have developed our several noteworthy capacities. I do not think we will be better placed to address the crisis of our age responsibly and effectively either by identifying particular evils that must be conquered or by rallying around a particular vision of the future. In most cases, the diverse challenges we face  – regarding, for example, GHG emissions, ongoing racism, the increasing wealth of the wealthy, and dysfunctional political processes – must be addressed in relation to particular contingencies, not some overarching worldview. What matters most – and this is the core argument of this book – are the dispositions with which we seek to understand, address, and mobilize others to address the issues we are called upon to address. As we take steps to address these urgent crises, we must find ways of acting with as much energy and purpose as we can muster. We must also relax. I use the word “relax” here to suggest that our aims should neither be to bend history to our visions nor to allow ourselves to be bent by the forces of history but always to seek out what is possible. While fittingly acting with a due regard for history, we must, correspondingly, act with hope, the disposition realistically to anticipate possibilities. Moved by hope, we can be realistic about the crises we are now facing and at the same time explore ways of taking the next steps, appreciate that even little steps can make a difference. We can also take greater account of the fears and interests of our opponents while seeking strategically useful compromises, and in other ways keep moving forward. We see widespread evidence of this disposition in the scientists seeking ways to contain the current coronavirus, governments and businesses exploring ways to mitigate the economic fallout of this pandemic, and communities and households finding ways of making do in these difficult times. To be sure, we all are tempted by feelings of dismay and despair. Some, more than others, have been overwhelmed by these feelings, especially those who have suffered deaths of loved ones and more drastic economic consequences. Furthermore, we do, and we will make mistakes. Still, in so far as we can cultivate the disposition of hope and thereby anticipate realistic possibilities, we have found, and we will find, ways both of addressing the crises of our age more creatively and managing our lives with a greater sense of wellbeing. That makes all the difference.

Works Cited Bird, Frederick. 2022. What About the Coal Miners? Addressing the Downside of Responsible Environmental Practices. In Sustainability Ethics, ed. Michael Boylan.

Chapter 11

Humans as Creatures, Cultivators, and Exploiters of the Earth and Its Resources

Abstract  We, humans, live as creatures of the Earth. We are a particular life form that has assumed the character it has after billions of years during which other life forms have evolved on Earth. Beginning with simple micro-organisms that inhabited the Earth for several billion years, life forms have evolved bringing into being more complex and more diverse forms of plant and animal life and even much, much later human life. As creatures of the Earth, we possess a range of capacities and vulnerabilities we often take for granted. As creatures of the Earth, our relationship to the Earth has changed over time in ways to which we must pay attention. This chapter considers a variety of crises humans now face as a result of the ways we have acted with regard to the Earth and its ecosystems. In particular, this chapter examines a range of unresolved issues arising in relation to questions about whether and in what ways particular individuals and groups can rightfully claim to exercise legitimate proprietary of designated parts of the Earth. We, humans, live as creatures of the Earth. We are a particular life form that has assumed the character it has after billions of years during which other life forms have evolved on Earth. Beginning with simple micro-organisms that inhabited the Earth for several billion years, life forms have evolved bringing into being more complex and more diverse forms of plant and animal life and even – much, much later – human life. As creatures of the Earth, we possess a range of capacities and vulnerabilities we often take for granted. As creatures of the Earth, our relationship to the Earth has changed over time in ways to which we must pay attention. We belong to the Earth. We are part of its fauna. The Earth was circling the Sun long before there was any life on Earth. It will probably still be circling the Sun long after life in general and human life becomes extinct. The composition and character of our physical beings are shaped by the Earth’s gravity, the cycles of its moon, the seasons of its year, as well as its water and its air. It is, correspondingly, fitting and critical that we acknowledge ourselves as part of this larger Earth system. As we humans have developed our diverse capacities  – to create and use languages, to reason and develop science, to produce goods and services, to govern our communities, and to develop social relations -- we have been inclined to think of ourselves as © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_11

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special and distinct. In many ways this assumption is fitting but only in so far as we also and initially recognize that we are also embedded in the larger world of nature, to which we are vulnerable and from which we have gained great benefits. Humans have gained great powers and benefits because of our relationship with the Earth. At the same time, as a result of the way this relationship has developed over time, we also currently face several crises at this moment in our history. I will examine four current inescapable issues. The first emerges because of the tremendous growth in the population and interconnectedness of humans. The second crisis concerns our increased vulnerability as creatures of the Earth, which arises in part because of the size and interconnectedness of our population. The third has arisen because of our often, careless use of the great benefits and powers we derive as creatures of the Earth. The fourth crisis concerns the ways the norms and laws of property humans have devised to manage our relationship with the Earth have often given rise to ambiguous consequences. One, over time but especially since World War Two the population of humans has grown tremendously and has become far more interconnected. Over thousands of years, the size of the human population has grown steadily but slowly until the past century. It has grown rapidly over the course of the past century and especially during the past seventy years. In 1900 there were slightly more than 1.5 billion humans. By 1950 we humans numbered about 3 billion. As of 2020, the number of humans has grown to almost 8 billion. This increase has occurred primarily as a result of a dramatic decline in the rate of deaths, especially deaths of infants and young children as well as declines in death that result from diseases and wars. As a correlate of our increased numbers, we humans, in general, live longer and healthier lives. We have learned how to make more effective use of the Earth’s resources. It would simply be impossible for 8 billion people to live on Earth if we still continued to sustain ourselves by foraging as we humans did for thousands of years or even primarily by farming as most humans did prior to the industrial revolution. Over the past several centuries, we humans have also become much more interconnected as a result of several different globalizing forces including the spread of world religions, the rise in international commerce, and the expansion of global communication. Although we may think of ourselves primarily in relation to national identities, particular religious faiths, or distinct ethnic backgrounds, we have become an ever more intricately interconnected species. As a result of both of these factors, humans have correspondingly had a greater impact on the Earth and its ecosystems. In order to feed, clothe, and shelter humans and provide places for us to work and play, we humans have been utilizing, extracting, and consuming ever greater amounts of land, water, minerals, fish stocks, animals, and other natural resources. We have also been dumping ever greater amounts of emissions and wastes into the Earth’s air, lands, and waters. Even as we work to utilize more of the Earth’s resources sustainably, our impact on the Earth has markedly increased since World War Two, both because of the growth in population and the rise in standards of living. How should we act to address the increase in the size and the interconnectedness of humans? While our interconnectedness makes us more vulnerable to the spread

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of disease, it also helps to establish lines of communication that increase the possibilities for us to collaborate together, in spite of our differences. While the size of our population is a matter of justifiable concern, I doubt if truly drastic measures are called for. We know that several factors help birth rates decline as a result of individual choices rather than government regulations. Thus, birth rates decline both as a greater percentage of women receive more years of education and as overall economies grow and standards of living increase. Both of these actions are desirable on their own merits. Two, as creatures of the Earth and like all other creatures of the Earth, we are inherently vulnerable to the forces that are a characteristic part of the Earth as it has evolved. Minimally, the Earth and life on Earth have been shaped by the movement of tectonic plates, by massive earthquakes and volcanoes, by severe changes in global climate, and by the hunger and drives of predatory beasts and tiny viruses. As we review human history, we know as well that we are vulnerable to deadly attacks by insects and micro-organisms that have on many occasions caused widespread death and disruption, such as plagues in the sixth century, the Black Death of the fourteenth century, the 1918 Flu, and the current Covit-19 pandemic. It is not possible completely to avoid disasters like these or those posed by other creatures like mosquitos, ticks, and black flies. It is, nevertheless, possible to become much better prepared. Since the 1980s we have witnessed much devastation from earthquakes, hurricanes, and the outbreaks of plague-like diseases, such as the AIDs crisis and several Ebola outbreaks. During this same time, many countries have spent hundreds of billions of dollars preparing themselves to fight dangers like terrorism – which in reality have posed some but comparatively little direct threat to most countries. Unfortunately, we humans have spent corresponding much less preparing ourselves to address these kinds of natural disasters. As a result of the COVID – 19 pandemic, an ever-greater number of humans are becoming conscious that we must become much better prepared to address these kinds of threats, which arise from the Earth, its biosphere, and other creatures. We don’t know when the next pandemic will arise. We are still fighting the AIDs crisis. Billions of humans are now, or soon will be, threatened by rising sea levels, droughts, violent weather, and deforestation, as a result of the current and future climate changes. We must find ways of becoming better prepared to address these threats in timely ways. Three, over many long centuries the Earth has stored up resources that now enable us to live as we do. As the Earth has developed, it has passed through ice ages, extinctions, volcanic eruptions, huge deluges, and great upheavals that have bent the Earth’s surfaces into mountains and valleys. Over thousands of centuries, tiny microbes added oxygen to the Earth’s atmosphere. In the process, the Earth has brought into being the soils, springs, rivers, minerals, woods, grasslands, air, winds, and other creatures that have provided the conditions that have not only made human life possible but allowed human life in many places to flourish. Often humans have been inclined to take these phenomena and the corresponding possibilities for granted. To be sure, after many centuries, we humans have learned how to utilize these resources more effectively. We have learned how to generate more energy and more food and to use minerals, buried hydrocarbons, soils, and even the rays of the

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sun and the winds of the Earth for previously unknown but beneficial purposes. However, these resources are the by-product of many centuries in the life of the Earth. It is, therefore, also fitting and critical that we both acknowledge our indebted to the Earth and appropriately express respect and gratitude for the bounty and the beauty of the Earth, which we humans neither brought into being nor in any fundamental sense merited as the result of our own actions. As humans have learned how to make use of these resources, we have correspondingly gained increased capacities to shape our lives. In various ways, we have transformed these potential resources into valued assets and have enriched our lives in the process. Minimally, as we recognize this truth, we are called upon to act as faithful trustees of the resources of the Earth at the same time as we find ways of using them for our own benefits. Correspondingly, we must recognize that over the past several centuries, and especially over the past half-century, we humans have often been careless and reckless as we have cultivated as well as exploited the Earth and its resources for our own ends. In particular, by our actions, over the centuries but increasingly so recently, we have in major ways reduced the Earth’s forests, put strains on the availability of freshwater, degraded arable soils, and greatly depleted sources of a number of minerals. We have acted as if there were no reasonable limits as we dumped into the air, waters, and lands of the Earth excessive amounts of gases, effluents, and garbage that in turn have contaminated and degraded the natural environments in which we live. We face several interrelated crises today because of that history. To be sure, we have learned how to use the Earth’s resources more sustainably. Nevertheless, much work must be done soon – and can be done soon – to restore a more livable balance with the Earth. Currently, humans are exploiting the resources of the Earth in ways that will have long-term adverse consequences. Contemporary environmental scientists have been gauging the impact of humans on the Earth and its ecosystems in relation to nine variables. These variables are as follows: climate change, chemical pollution, the chemistry of the oceans, ozone depletion in the stratosphere, nitrogen and phosphorous cycles, reduction in global freshwater supplies, changes in land use, biodiversity, and atmospheric aerosol loading. In relation to each of these variables, these scientists have identified planetary boundaries after which irreversible adverse conditions are likely to occur. They note they we have already crossed these boundaries with respect to climate change, biodiversity, and the nitrogen cycle. We are nearing comparable boundaries with respect to the depletion of fresh water supplies and the reduction in the extent of arable land. With regard to those variables where we have already crossed the boundaries, if find ways of acting effectively, we can mitigate but not undo much of the damage that human activity has occasioned. Viewed from the perspective of these environmental scientists, we humans currently face very serious challenges, to which we are only beginning to respond. Four, over the centuries human communities have developed norms, rules, and laws of property to identify fitting ways of accessing, using, and protecting the land, the waters, and other resources of the Earth. Norms and laws of property have assumed two overlapping forms. First, on one level they have stipulated which

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communities – and their acknowledged political institutions – can rightfully claim sovereign authority over particular territories. Over many centuries these norms identified and protected what particular people regarded as their homelands or domains as distinct from the homelands and domains of others. Often, they have used religious symbolism and rituals to name, distinguish, and guard these territories and these resources. At a second level, political authorities of distinct communities in turn have established norms and laws identifying who rightfully could claim lands within these territories as their own properties and in what ways they could use these lands and resources. These culturally established norms and laws have assumed many different expressions. In diverse settings lands have been held by communities as a whole, by designated lineage groups, by incorporated organizations, and by individual proprietors. While not actually owning lands, many households have held a conditional right to use lands as tenants, so long as they contributed as expected to the landlords, who held title to these lands. A major shift in the character of norms and laws of property occurred when particular plots of land came to be viewed as commodities that could be bought and sold in keeping with communally established rules. Prior to these changes practical access to lands was typically obtained by inheritance, rules of tenancy, or seized by force. These several kinds of norms and laws of property have functioned constructively in many ways to structure the relationship of humans to the Earth. At the first level, they have provided a means for distinct peoples to identify their homelands and have extended to them the right and obligation to defend their homelands from outsiders who might attempt to seize or exploit these lands. At the second level, these norms and laws have functioned to defend the rights of proprietors to use their lands as they might choose, in keeping with whatever conditions political authorities might establish. These conditions typically have included rights to tax these lands, obligations to protect the lands from designated abuses, and regulations  – such as zoning laws – stipulating permitted and prohibited uses. In practice, these norms and laws of property have also characteristically functioned to transform lands into economic assets. Correspondingly, it has been possible for owners to generate income through products and services produced using the land either for subsistence or for sale in markets, renting the land and structures on the land to others, borrowing funds based on the estimated value of the land, or treating lands as a form of security or savings. In market economies, modern norms and laws of property have functioned to view land as a commodity, which could be bought and sold and whose value was often best determined in utilitarian terms by its exchange value. As a result, modern norms and laws of property have often functioned to encourage increasingly more productive uses of land. However, these laws and rules of property, as they have been developed over time, have also helped to occasion a number of current problems, which I examine further in the following paragraphs. These problems are solvable. However, finding adequate and fair solutions will require re-examining our basic assumptions about our relations as humans with the Earth and its lands. With 8 billion people and all our complex contemporary economic activities, it would be impossible today to manage our relationships with the Earth and all its

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bounty and beauty without laws and norms of property. Nevertheless, our current regimes of property laws and norms have had ambiguous outcomes on the relationship of humans to the Earth and to each other. In the following paragraphs, I will briefly review three critical, unresolved, and inescapable issues occasioned by current normative regimes with respect to ownership, rights, and obligations associated with property laws and norms. The first issue revolves around the relationship between settlers and indigenous peoples. For centuries most humans lived as part of peoples that were migratory or semi-migratory. Many eventually settled but often in lands that were regarded as homelands for other peoples. Over the years many peoples, who had been migratory, became settled indigenous peoples, like the Maories in New Zealand, who had arrived in these islands from other islands in the Pacific only a few centuries before Europeans arrived. In addition, some peoples with imperial ambitions -- like the ancient Hans in East Asia, Medieval Arabs across North Africa, or more modern European empires worldwide -- directly seized or occupied lands where other people already hunted, raised crops, and had established villages. Interactions, including sometimes disputes and violent encounters, between settlers and/or imperial powers, on the one hand, and indigenous peoples, on the other hand, have occurred over many centuries. Often, settlers and indigenous peoples operated with different normative assumptions regarding the fitting title to and rights of property with respect to the territories and lands where they were living and interacting. Depending on local circumstances, often these diverse peoples became intermixed. This is not a new issue. It has become aggravated in recent times for a number of reasons, including the ruthless ways settlers in some settings have abused indigenous populations and their lands and because claims and interests of indigenous peoples have gained greater attention in keeping with widely accepted notions of basic human rights and ideas about national self-determination. These conflicts have become more intense and more openly contested in many places, including diverse Latin American, African, Asian, and European countries as well as the United States and Canada. Indigenous people argue that many lands were often wrongly taken from them, that they should be accorded greater sovereignty over their own territories, and that they should be fairly compensated for harms suffered. Although they present in different forms in different countries, these remain critical issues for millions of people. For example, over the past two and a half centuries, many indigenous peoples living in territories that have become part of the United States and Canada have lost extensive tracks of land due to betrayal by friendly settlers, legal connivance, and overt use of violent force. Many of these peoples have variously attempted both to honor and maintain their cultures and ways of life and to act as good citizens and community members as part of the United States and Canada. Nevertheless, many issues remain unresolved, including debates regarding fitting reparations or compensations for harms suffered and discussions with respect to their rights as distinct peoples to exercise some form of effective sovereignty over areas in which they live. Although the issues involved are complex, it is possible, I think, to point to some initiatives that seem promising. For example, in some areas, indigenous people are

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gaining greater self-governing powers, such as the Nisga’a in British Columbia, Inuit in the territory of Nunavut, and the Assembly of First Nations in Canada as a whole. In places, such as Canada, governments have begun to acknowledge the harms and damage they have inflicted on, as well as treaties they have violated with, indigenous peoples. While these represent the next steps and much more must be done, it is significant that these issues are receiving much greater public attention. The second issue emerges because of the ways official property regimes in practice have functioned to render most humans with limited titles to lands they have been able to claim as their own. To be sure, most humans have been able to make some limited claims to land. They have variously been able to exercise claims to use of lands as tenants, to the use of community lands managed by political authorities in the communities in which they lived, to titles over their own dwellings, or to ownership over small landholdings. Ownership over lands has been allocated in many different ways. However, the vast majority of all lands have been held by a small proportion of humans. This pattern, which has varied somewhat over time and across different countries, has aggravated inequalities in the wealth of households because for centuries title to land has functioned as a major embodiment and source of wealth. Furthermore, disproportions in wealth have been further aggravated because of the way the value of lands especially in urban areas tends to increase as particular areas become attractive places for businesses and residences. In the nineteenth century, Henry George called attention to this problem in his book Poverty and Progress. George complained about the way property laws at the time – and, we might add, and still today – operate so that some property owners greatly increase their wealth, as their property values increase, through no efforts on their part, but simply because of changes taking place in neighborhoods and cities as a whole (1879; Collier 2018). Broadly, attempts to allocate title to lands in ways that seem fairer and less disproportionate have assumed two complementary expressions: both to reduce the holdings or the wealth accruing to wealthy landowners and to institute reforms that would provide more opportunities for other members of societies to increase their land ownership. While today wealthy households can both store and increase their wealth through the title to many kinds of financial instruments and other forms of property, traditionally most wealth was held and increased in value through ownership of land. Taxes on land have, accordingly, functioned both as a primary means of raising revenues for governments and as a way of modestly limiting the wealth of the wealthy. From time to time, land reforms have been instituted by governments in order to make available to other portions of society the unused or underutilized land that had been part of wealthy estates. Ignoring the largely unwritten territorial claims of indigenous people, by the Northwest Ordinance of 1885 and the Homestead Act of 1862, the United States allowed tens of thousands of settlers to lay claims to lands in the Midwest and further west, thereby permitting many comparatively poor people – along with a number of wealthy investors –to gain title to lands west of the original colonies. More recently, a number of economically developing countries have sought to extend legal property rights to low-income households who already were living on and working lands, for which they lacked legal recognition. It is

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possible to imagine a number of other initiatives that might be pursued to address the ongoing disparities in land and property holdings. For example, just as the United States government introduced tax breaks for mortgage payments in order to foster homebuilding and homeownership after the Second World War, governments might offer tax incentives and subsidies directed to expanding the number of lowincome families who own and can reasonably make payments for their homes. While all of these initiatives have not been without significance, the overall problem remains largely unresolved. The continuing disparities in the allocation of land ownership result from many factors, including the ways land transfers are financed, how debts are managed, and the limited character of many land reforms (DeSota 2000). The third unresolved issue regarding property laws and norms concerns the practice of designating and protecting lands and waterways so that the Earth and its biosphere can function in the best interests of the Earth, all of its creatures, and the biosphere. This is, to be sure, something of a metaphysical question. The Earth and its biosphere are evolving. They have changed dramatically over the centuries. Recognizing these facts, we can, nevertheless, break this larger, more metaphysical question into a variety of discrete, practical questions. For example, in order to protect thousands of critically endangered creatures, we must act to protect the habitats they depend upon. It is possible to ask as well, about the habitats that need to be set aside and protected so that humans can both survive and live reasonably well. For example, how much arable land and fresh water needs to be protected to meet the needs and wants of 8 billion people, many of whom aspire to live at higher standards of living? How much land and water needs to be put into use to generate energy to respond to humans’ need to live reasonably well? What portions of the Earth can be set aside to build the cities and physical infrastructures that have become integral to human societies? At what point, as humans expand their property claims over the Earth, do we begin to undermine the capacity of the Earth and its biosphere to meet our own human needs for food and water, the habitats necessary for the wellbeing of other species, and the overall carrying capacity of the Earth? Many natural scientists have now designated a new era in the history of the Earth, which they label the Anthropocene. They use the label to mark the extensive ways in which human activities now are deeply shaping the character of the life systems of the biosphere as well as the physical systems of the Earth itself and its climate. Correspondingly, we are forced to ask how should we draw the lines regarding property rights in order to protect the Earth so that it and its biosphere can thrive on its own terms? In order to address this collection of related issues, human communities have designated large numbers of areas free from commercial, industrial, and residential developments. These include conservation areas, parks, wilderness preserves, marine districts, and nature reserves. They have agreed to set aside large parts of the oceans as well polar regions as common territories, beyond the property or territorial claims of any countries or businesses. They have attempted to forge agreements to regulate and fairly allocate waters from rivers passing through many countries. However, from several perspectives, the efforts humans have so far undertaken seem to be far from adequate. The Earth’s climate is changing with disastrous

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consequences so far and catastrophic consequences looming in the future. A worrying rate of species is becoming extinct as a result of human activity. Large tracts of land have been degraded by overuse so that they can no longer provide habitats for diverse creatures and fields for human cultivation. In a number of countries, aquafers that met the needs of humans and farm animals are drying up. From a larger, Earth-long historical perspective, humans are creatures of the Earth. We have developed great powers by learning how to utilize innate abilities cultivated in us through centuries of the Earth’s evolution and by learning how to make use of resources embedded in the Earth, its ecosystems, and the atmosphere. We humans in general have greatly benefited from learning how to identify, appreciate, and make use of these powers. In the process, we have at times lost sight of the gifted character of the Earth’s resources and our powers. We have fostered and become mesmerized by a kind of arrogance of power. As nations, communities, enterprises, families, and individuals, we have come to think of the little bits of the Earth and its resources as being fundamentally “ours” because we have laid claims to them, in keeping with relevant norms and laws of property, and found ways to utilize them. However, in light of the global crises associated with the climate, the limited supplies of many of the Earth’s resources, and the marked and growing inequalities especially with respect to wealth, it has become time to reconsider our relationships with the Earth. It is, I think, promising that ever-larger numbers of communities are recognizing and becoming alarmed by these crises and are involved in taking the next steps to address them.

Works Cited Collier, Paul. 2018. The Future of Capitalism: Facing the New Anxieties. New York: HarperCollins. De Soto, Hernando. 2000. The Mystery of Capital. New York: Basic Books. George, Henry. 1879. Progress and Poverty and Progress: An Enquiry into the Causes of Industrial Depressions, and the Increase of Want with the Increase of Wealth. The Remedy. New York: K. Paul, Trench, and Company.

Chapter 12

The Rise of Science and Reason and Their Contemporary Discontents

Abstract  We are living at a time when humans both greatly benefit from the accomplishments of science and reason and yet in many different ways express considerable discomfort and distrust of the sciences and reason. A greater proportion of humans than ever before are now literate and numerate and well educated and yet for diverse reasons feelings of discontent with sciences and reason remain widespread. These feelings make it much more difficult to address the crises of our times. This chapter analyzes several different underlying factors that have functioned to arouse and aggravate these feelings of distrust, including the great expanse in the fields and diversity of knowledge, the degree to which people become dependent upon the authoritative knowledge of strangers whose help as professionals and experts they seek and feel dependent upon, the sometimes uneasy relationship between faith traditions and modern science and reason, as well as a number of examples of the questionable uses of science and reason. Adopting a hopeful perspective, the chapter ends by exploring possibilities for addressing and ameliorating some of these underlying factors and thereby in at least small ways taking steps at managing and limiting these feelings of discontent. 

12.1  The Current Situation We are living at a time when humans both greatly benefit from the accomplishments of science and reason and yet in many different ways express considerable discomfort and distrust of the sciences and reason. Over the past several centuries uses of reason and the practices of science have come to play a far wider and more influential role in human affairs than ever before. Humans rely on science and reason to access the information we want, to build the appliances we use, to undergird the medical services we count on, to plant our crops and raise our animals, and to develop the devices by which we communicate with each other. By the uses of reason and science, we have greatly increased the productivity of our productive processes, developed diverse means of transporting ourselves, reorganized our workplaces, and even dramatically altered the way we engage in armed conflicts. In © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_12

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particular, the sciences have greatly contributed to the efforts to control and in some cases eliminate diseases, partly by discovering remedies, partly by recognizing the importance of hygiene, and partly by fostering healthier diets. People now live longer and healthier lives for all of these reasons (Deaton 2013; Pinker 2018). Scientific modes of inquiry – whether employed in the recognized disciplines of science, individual experimenters and inventors, or business enterprises – have led to countless discoveries that have enhanced the quality of human lives, especially during the last several centuries. These methods and modes of inquiry have often been put to use just to find out more about the world and universe in which we live. A number of the sciences, broadly understood, like epidemiology, psychology, economics, and even management studies, have been utilized for very practical purposes in relation to medical practices, therapies, the public management of economic activities, and the operations of businesses. By practices of reason and science, we have greatly expanded both our stores of knowledge as well as our means of accessing and communicating this knowledge. As educational systems have greatly expanded and as an increasingly large proportion of all humans receive some form of education, humans as a whole have gained greater skills at using reason and understanding the elementary principles and findings of the sciences. A greater percentage of people today are literate and numerate than ever before. These are all very remarkable developments seen from the perspective of how the overwhelming majority of humans lived just two hundred years ago. Overall, the sciences and the uses of reason have played an enormously influential role in the development of modern societies (Harari 2014; Whitehead 1925). (1) Although they share many common characteristics, human cultures like human languages are diverse. Distinct peoples greatly prize their own cultures. Given this diversity and the ways people value their own cultures, it is easy to see how different peoples might misunderstand each other, disagree about many things, and find it difficult to resolve conflicts. Viewed from this perspective, the practice of reason and the modern sciences have played a unique and highly beneficial role. These practices have developed what amounts to a universal common language of science and reason, embodied in these methods, concepts, logics, and corresponding received bodies of knowledge. Although people often engage in reasoning using different patterns of reasoning and making different kinds of epistemological assumptions about the character of reliable knowledge, in practice these differences can be understood and discussed. In so far as people give intelligible explanations for their positions, then it remains possible for other parties to engage in conversations about these matters. Broadly, the sciences and the practices of reasoning have established methodologies to arrive at observations and conclusions that are regarded as objective, because they are expected to be the same for all observers. It is important to add several comments about the “objectivity” of the sciences, which is established both by the methods sciences use and the public discourse through which scientists communicate their findings. Accordingly, scientific findings are based upon verifiable and in principle repeatable empirical observations. They are not based on opinions or unverifiable observations. Scientists communicate their findings publicly inviting others both to replicate their studies and to offer reasoned

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comments and criticisms of them. The norm of objectivity is thus closely connected with the practice of open and reasoned discussion (Weber 1904a; Bird 2020). Accordingly, uses of reason and practices of science have often played a useful role in finding common points of reference for sorting out conflicts and disagreements. (2) However, ironically, even as the uses of reason and the practices of the sciences have come to play more extensive and beneficial roles in human societies, an increasing number of people have come to express discontent and distrust with these uses and practices. Even as greater proportions of humans are educated and have become literate and numerate, as we have learned to rely on reason and the sciences to provide our health care, our means of traveling, our appliances, and our means of communicating, many people in diverse ways have come to express discomfort and hesitations about the claims of the sciences and the role of sciences in our lives. Many of us allow ourselves to suspect the scientific findings we find inconvenient, to discount evidence counter to our biases and beliefs, and to dismiss rational arguments that challenge our political preferences. We can note many different examples of this distrust. These include the decision of thousands of parents not to allow their children to be vaccinated against measles, the millions of people who reject biological evidence for evolution, the millions who deny the evidence for climate change, and/or the role of humans in causing these changes, as well as the widespread distrust of the counsel offered by economists and other experts on a wide range of topics. This distrust is embodied and expressed as well in the popularity of charismatic political leaders as well as the suspicion of the media as conveyors of unreliable and biased information. These feelings of distrust and discontent regarding the uses of reason and the practices of science represent significant and troubling obstacles obstructing and confusing our efforts to think about, understand, and attempt to resolve the many perils and problems that confront the world today. These feelings of distrust make it difficult to talk and “reason” together in order to negotiate compromises or foster collaborations with groups that differ with respect to their values and sense of identity. The distrust of reason and science, which assumes many different expressions, constitutes a problem of considerable significance. For example, it has become much more difficult to address the challenges and threats associated with climate change, when large numbers of people choose not to acknowledge and to respect the scientifically established evidence for climate change. It has become very difficult to sort out the probable benefits and losses associated with public policy decisions – like Britain’s decision to leave the European Union or judgments regarding trade policies – when large numbers of people refuse seriously to consider empirical studies of likely economic outcomes of these policies. Correspondingly, if we are adequately to address almost all of the great problems that face us today – from climate change to the current pandemic, from poverty to cultural diversity -- we must find a way of gaining cooperation among people from many different backgrounds who think about the world and these problems in quite different ways. Cultivating this kind of cooperation becomes much more difficult in a world in which distrust and discontent with reason and science have been gaining in strength.

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This development of human capacity for reasoning has never been without ambiguity. Those able to exercise power, either on the basis of their political positions, religious offices, or wealth, have often used particular expressions of the capacities for reasoning and communicating for their own ends. When Pinker asserts that the serious and severe problems we face in our world today “are solvable, given the right knowledge,” (Pinker 2018, p. 121) he optimistically overlooks the ways those able to exercise considerable power have at times used reason and knowledge for their own purposes.

12.2  Causes of Discontent Some of this distrust and discontent has been, no doubt, fundamentally irrational, occasioned, and aggravated largely by fears and spite. Some of this distrust has been deliberately fomented by groups seeking their own political advantages. However, in many cases, these feelings of distrust and discontent are related to factors that make these feelings seem understandable if not fitting. Correspondingly, it makes sense both to explore both factors that have functioned to aggravate these feelings of discontent and distrust and to see what kinds of practical steps we might take to limit and restrain them. I will undertake this exploration in the remainder of this chapter. I will argue that these hesitant feelings have been occasioned by a variety of factors, which have triggered these responses in some people more than others. For example, some people possess a high regard for science and reason in general but object to what they regard as particularly abusive uses of science and reason. Many people generally trust the sciences and uses of reason but become wary about the claims of science and reason when they seem to call into question deeply held religious beliefs and ideological commitments. Accordingly, while some feelings of distrust and discontent with respect to claims of reason and science are pervasive, these negative feelings are unevenly dispersed. While among some groups, feelings of suspicion are strong, many people entertain much milder and more focused feelings of discontent. A particular person may be especially bothered by one of these factors but not really upset by the others. Feelings of discontent for others may be aggravated by the accumulated effect of several of these factors. These feelings of guarded trust mix with feelings of suspicion and distrust in ways that are not easy to map. Accordingly, addressing the contemporary crisis connected with feelings of distrust and discontent with respect to the uses of reason and science is not a simple matter. Still, I will argue that it is possible over time either to alter many of the factors occasioning these hesitant feelings or to learn to live with these factors, so we don’t become overwhelmed by them. One, distrust and discontent regarding the uses of reason and the sciences in part represent an understandable response to the vast increase in the volume, the specificity, and the diversity in the forms of knowledge generated by the sciences and the practices of reason. Compared to the past, the present is marked both by an exponential increase in the overall amount of knowledge – produced by the sciences and

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the practices of reason – as well as a tremendous increase in the means of communicating and storing knowledge both in written and electronic forms. These increases have resulted in several outcomes. More information is much more readily available than ever before. Also, in many areas advances in knowledge tend to be correlated with expressions of this knowledge that have become highly specialized and difficult for those not well-versed to comprehend. Consider, for example, the uses of mathematical algorithms in the sales and purchase of equities and establishing credit ratings. Consider, as well, the amount of knowledge generated by each of the sciences as well as by businesses and governments. Often, access to particular bodies of knowledge is only available to those highly trained in particular disciplines. Where does that leave the rest of us? This tremendous growth in knowledge leaves many of us feeling relatively ignorant and sometimes vulnerable, at least with respect to the more advanced levels of knowledge, for example, in the fields of economics, medicine, law, biology, and meteorology. Are there forms of knowledge that we should know – that it would be vital for us to know – with which we haven’t acquainted ourselves or cannot at present fully comprehend? Correspondingly, we often count on information brokers, whom we hope are reliable, to help us sort out what kinds of information we really need, where to go to get access to that information, and how to make sense of it. We surround ourselves with appliances and use automobiles most of us don’t know how to fix, and so we must call on other experts. Many of us cannot keep up with changes in tax laws and so we seek the help of accountants to complete our tax forms in ways that best benefit us. While individually, we are generally better educated than our ancestors even a century ago, still because of the increase in knowledge with respect to a host of fields of knowledge that impinge upon our lives, we feel relatively ignorant in relation to many different fields. These are often not comfortable feelings. To be sure, many people have gained great expertise in knowing how to make effective use of knowledge brokers. Many have not. Thus, understandably many people translate their discomfort into feelings of distrust and discontent with respect to the sciences and reason more generally. Ironically, both the growth of knowledge and the increase in its accessibility have had the unanticipated result both of overwhelming us and giving rise to a situation where truth claims seem to be relativized. When so many sources are providing different types of, and perspectives on, information about matters that concern us, then how do we know which sources are indeed more objective, empirically more conclusively demonstrated, and have more fully considered relevant variable? In varying degrees, many of us correspondingly feel bewildered by the volume and variety of information that seems to have a critical bearing upon our lives. Two, distrust and discontent with the uses of reason and the practices of sciences have been aggravated as well by the changing role played by public media. When public media in the form of newspapers and journals were initially established in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, they often both attempted to provide reliable, objective accounts of information useful to the public while they also expressed the point of view of their publishers and editors. Often, but not always, these newspapers and journals clearly distinguished between the news and the editorials they

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printed. As radio and later television were added as means of publication, similar hazy efforts were made to distinguish news and editorial content. Beginning in the twentieth century, public authorities in many industrialized democratic societies established and funded public broadcasters. The aim was to help educate the public in general about what was going on in the world, in areas as diverse as culture and the arts, sports, commerce, and industry, world affairs, as well as politics. It was assumed that a well-educated public would be in a better position as a result of these efforts to exercise their responsibilities as citizens. In many countries, the public media became an expression of public reason. It was never neutral and politics remained partisan. However, in countries where public broadcasters were well funded compared to those where they received little support, political practice generally were less polarized (3). The situation has dramatically changed since the 1970s as many print and broadcasting firms have become more overtly partisan, as funding for public broadcasting has declined, and as the role of social media has greatly expanded. Much of the media that people access presents information about the world from overtly partisan or value-laden points of view. In the process, many of us often come to trust those sources of information that reinforce our own ways of thinking about what is going on in the world. As a result, we tend to disregard those sources of information that present information that seems to us to be discordant. Many of us have so far accustomed ourselves to these ways of presenting information that we assume that all presentations of information through public media and social media are shaped by biases, points of view, and ideological commitments. Many of us regard it as impossible or misguided the assumption that the media should somehow try to be objective. Referring to the social sciences, the philosopher Richard Rorty echoed this perspective when he wrote: “If we get rid of traditional notions of ‘objectivity and ‘scientific method,’ we shall be able to see the social sciences as continuous with literature …as (a means of) interpreting other people to us.” (Rorty 1982, p. 20) Without at this point attempting to analyze all the causes for, or the mechanism of, this shifting character of public and social media, I simply want to reflect on the impact of these changes on how people think about the practices of reason and uses of science. Both are committed to public discourse and objectivity. However, when large numbers of people come to regard the media, whether public or social, as communicating inherently from biased and partisan perspectives, then the arena for sorting out overlapping consensuses or shared understandings shrinks. The role that reasoning can play in negotiating conflicts diminishes. Our regard and respect for the practices of reason and science decline. Public discussions, whether through the media or legislative assemblies, no longer aspire to actualize themselves as public deliberations aiming for the art of the possible. Rather than communicating with those who differ in order to explore realistic compromises in the public interest, public discussions often assume the form of shouting matches designed to expose the faults of opponents and rally supporters. Accordingly, the changing role of the media both reflects and aggravates changes associated with declining regard with respect to the practices of reason.

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Three, over the past several centuries many people have reduced their respect for the practices of reason and the sciences because others have used reason and science to question many of the beliefs held by communities of faith. The interactions between science and reason and religious communities and their articles of faith have assumed many different expressions. The rational and scientific critiques of religions have led some people to renounce their faith and others to reinterpret their faith in more moral, spiritual, and/or private terms. Here, I am primarily interested in the impact of these interactions on how many people who continue to regard themselves as being religious in turn feel about practices of reason and science. Both the historical and physical sciences have called into question a number of traditional religious beliefs. For example, many religious adherents – many Muslims, Christians, Jews, and Hindus --have believed that some of the most hallowed texts directly represent the words of God or the gods, mediated in some cases by prophets. In contrast, from the perspective of the historical sciences, these texts are presumed to be written by humans --- perhaps spiritually inspired humans but humans, nevertheless. Many religious thinkers and followers have discovered many lively ways of affirming their core beliefs while acknowledging the historical character of their revered texts. Many others have not. They have either held fast to the assumption that these texts were not products of human effort, like other culturally transmitted writings, or they have become less religiously committed. Additionally, the physical sciences have challenged the literal accounts of many of the beliefs and events found in religious writings. In some places, religious texts make reference to events that seem impossible from the perspective of the natural sciences. These include accounts of virgin births, people raised from the dead, miraculous appearances of gods, people living hundreds of years, and extraordinary natural occurrences. Modern biological and physical sciences have produced strong, universally accepted arguments and evidence both that the universe is billions of years old and that the human species, like all other current species, evolved out of earlier life forms over many centuries. Correspondingly, many people have found many religious claims to the truth to be less credible as a result of the challenges posed by the physical and biological sciences. Many of these people still remain religious, reframing their faith in less miraculous terms. Others, including some fundamentalists followers of different faiths, have developed a kind of offensive response. They regard their religious texts as stating literal truths much like the respected texts of the sciences but are now viewed as alternatives or supplements to the latter texts. Typically, these fundamentalists criticize as invalid and wrong the findings of scientists who claim that religious texts were written by humans, claim humans evolved from primate ancestors, claim that the Earth is billions of years old, and/or claim that no humans can be born of virgins. Many of these religious critics of the practices of reason and science have developed quite focused attacks. They accept and respect many of the practices of reason and science, but they argue, often using rational arguments and scattered scientific evidence, that scientific and rational criticisms of religious beliefs are, for diverse reasons, invalid and unsubstantiated. In the name of reason and science, some critics of religions have become quite zealous. They view religious faith as pernicious because of the way some religious

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spokespeople have overtly denounced scientific findings and have sought to persuade public schools to use faith-based science texts as part of their science curriculum. These zealous critics of religious faith have directly sought to persuade people to renounce the irrationality built into faith commitments. Diverse proponents and opponents of religion and science have engaged in these debates about the relationship between faith and reason for a long time. The outcomes have varied. I think it is reasonable to make the following observations. After considering historical, rational, and scientific arguments, some people have become less religious. Many people continue to be religious but think of their faith in more symbolic and spiritual terms. Many people regard their faith primarily in relation to communities with which they have been involved and the practices and rituals of these communities. At the same time, many people who remain religious – and not necessarily nor usually as fundamentalists  – feel a degree of wariness whenever scientists or secular rationalists seem to be making exclusive and imperious claims for the superiority and dominance of rational and scientific ways of thinking. Both overt and more subtle encounters have taken place between religious mindsets and rational and scientific mindsets, whether articulated by knowledgeable defenders or by individuals trying to make sense of their world in relation to traditions that matter to them. As a result of these encounters, some religious-minded people have come to regard certain claims of sciences and reason with less regard and more suspicion. Four, many people have become discontented with, and distrustful of, the practices of science and reason because of particular applications of science and reason they regard as questionable or abusive. It is possible to produce a fairly long and varied list of particular applications that have aroused heated and articulate criticisms. Over the next several paragraphs I will review a number of examples where science and reason have been put to use in ways critics have felt were in varying degrees mindless, intrusive, careless, inhumane, and unfair. I will look at uses of reason and science to rationalize the organization of work, urban development, and education; to systematize information regarding risks and opportunities using algorithms; and to collect information about people based on their uses of the internet. In all of these examples, discontent has not emerged because of reason or science as such but because of the questionable aspects of the ways reason and science have been applied. From the perspective of ordinary people, in all these cases science and reason have been utilized by people in positions of power to impose their plans and visions on others. Correspondingly, from the perspective of many ordinary people, science and reason have frequently been put to use in these cases not for neutral but for partisan objectives to the disadvantage of ordinary people (4). Consider the wide variety of cases by which administrative agents have used mindlessly rational models to organize workforces and to engage in city planning. Frederick Taylor is often cited as an example of working to promote efficiency in businesses first by distinguishing each of the different actions taken by laborers as they worked to make products and then figuring how to arrange and undertake each of these tasks in ways that used the least amount of time. In the process, Taylor regarded the laborers simply as if they were machine parts. Although many workplaces were organized to maximize efficiencies in keeping with Taylor’s model, in

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the end, the model proved to be a less productive way of organizing workers than initially anticipated because it failed to consider the social and personal needs and aspirations of the workers themselves. To cite another example, many people have engaged in city planning by using rational models to distinguish neighborhoods and their functions. Many of these models have come to grief both because they developed huge housing blocks in which few wanted to live except those too poor to find any other place to live and because these models failed to appreciate the ways cities flourished when different types of functions were intermixed (Scott 1998; Jacobs 1961). IQ tests represent another example of morally ambiguous uses of science. In principle, these tests were designed to test the capacity of students to learn based upon their native intelligence. However, in practice, these tests often measured the degree to which students had already developed certain basic skills in literacy and numeracy because of learning they had already picked up at school and in their homes. The tests typically overlooked other forms of intelligence, such as emotional, social, artistic, physical, and spatial intelligence, thus underestimating the abilities of large numbers of students (Gardner, 1984). Furthermore, these tests were used in practice to label many students in ways that seriously disadvantaged students for whom the tests themselves had poorly measured their abilities for a number of different reasons, including their lack of experience with taking these kinds of tests. In her book The Weapons of Math Destruction, Cathy O’Neil examines a number of instances when mathematical algorithms have been used to promote particular valued objectives but with dubious consequences for many of those affected. For example, if a bank wanted to determine your creditworthiness a generation or two ago, bank managers would seek relevant financial information about you based on first-hand personal knowledge. Given the prejudices of times, some people were given low credit ratings because they grew up in households that had low incomes or were minorities. As the population has increased, as increasing numbers of people are applying for loans, then it has proven useful to assign everyone impersonal credit ratings based on factors, such as whether they pay their credit card bills on time, the size of their incomes, and the value of what they own. While much of this makes sense, several problems arise. Because some information is not readily available such as household income, then proxies have been used  – like zip code addresses – to determine the average income of the neighborhoods in which people live. These kinds of proxies often provide distorted information for particular persons based on biases built into the proxies. Furthermore, often it has not been easy for many people to learn the actual basis of their credit ratings, which represent the composite of factors. In many instances, several different proxies have been used to establish an overall rating, as, for example, in rating the quality of education in universities and colleges. Since it is not easy to measure the quantity and quality of what students actually learn while attending particular colleges, then other criteria have been used as proxies, such as the size of the endowments of the colleges, the number of merit scholars being admitted, the reputation of the colleges, their dropout rates, and other comparable items. These kinds of rating systems sometimes have had a pernicious impact, when, for example again in the cases of rating

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colleges, the colleges themselves are encouraged to spend extensive sums to enhance their scores for these proxies rather than on the educational activities themselves. Further, because reputation becomes increasingly valued, as measured by these scores, then potential students and their families have often invested extra efforts and funds to prepare themselves to compete for admission in the most highly ranked colleges rather than expending fewer funds and efforts to attend alternatives which might, in fact, be a better fit for them. Mathematical algorithms are being used in an increasing number of settings. Many financial transactions are made automatically or very quickly based on algorithms that rate investment possibilities. Leading up to the 2008 financial crisis, many high-risk debts were divided up and then repackaged as supposedly more reliable securities based on algorithms, about which many of those involved had little or no practical knowledge. Algorithms have been used to rate the likelihood of convicts being arrested again after they finish their sentences, to evaluate the effectiveness of teachers based on the scores their students achieve on widely used set examinations, and to screen potential job seekers based on personality test scores. While these systems function to help administrators make decisions when considering large numbers of people under review, they also tend to build in not always self-evident biases, because individuals are being gauged in relation to general criteria and because unexamined assumptions are overlooked. In a well-known example, the US government published a report in the early 1980s, titled A Nation at Risk, arguing that the country’s educational systems were in serious trouble because average scores on Scholastic Aptitude Tests, administered to most high school students applying to attend colleges, between 1965 and 1980 had declined by 50 points in the verbal test and 40 points in the math tests. Those writing this report and citing this evidence failed to observe that the drop in average scores resulted almost wholly from the fact that a much larger number of students were taking these tests (O’Neill 2016). In the future organizations and individuals will probably make much greater use of sophisticated statistics and mathematical algorithms than at present because they find them useful. They will make use of devices and processes that use these mathematical-­based systems to help direct them to where they want to travel, to explore for information they seek, to help sort out where they will invest, to establish creditworthiness and much more. However, we know that these mathematical systems are also flawed in so far as they inevitably use available group data to make evaluations when relevant personal data is not available. We know that these systems are also flawed in so far as the information they utilize is not fully transparent. At present, I am concerned about the ways the careless use of these models has had the unanticipated consequences of arousing within many people feelings of suspicion, distrust, and resentment regarding the objectivity and reliability of the rational systems of the sciences and mathematics. Accordingly, even while many of us utilize the sciences and information technology to achieve desired objectives, we have become aware of the ways these systems have often been used to advantage those with power and wealth and to discriminate against those least advantaged. We know that the careless use of these kinds of systems played a role fostering excessively risky investments that helped to occasion the financial crisis in 2008. Accordingly,

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we can appreciate that increasing use of these systems have functioned to add to, occasion, and reinforce pervasive feelings of suspicion regarding the credible uses of science and reasons in our world today. Many people have come to feel deeply suspicious at the ways modern science and reason, especially as these have been embodied in modern information technology, are being used largely secretively to gather information about people generally and specific groups of people in particular. These fears respond to the concerted efforts of governments to gather information about their citizens, to use satellites imaging to track their movements, and informants to gather information on individuals regarded as persons of interest. These suspicions are aroused even more by the fact that the largest information system firms, businesses like Google and Facebook, have been accessing and systematizing information about people using their platforms, based on how individuals use these platforms. These firms have used the data they have gathered not only to provide better services but also to help advertisers more effectively target their ads. Furthermore, on occasion, this data has ended up in the hands of groups attempting to influence voters. In practice, using sophisticated scientifically developed technology and sophisticated mathematical models, some large firms, as well as governments, have gained extensive powers of surveillance over the lives of millions of people (Zuboff, 2019). Correspondingly, fears and suspicions of many people have been aroused. It is clear from the examples I have reviewed that particular agents can apply the knowledge and logics of reason and science in ways that serve the interests of powerful agents while overlooking if not abusing the interests and basic humanity of many others. In the process, these self-interested uses of science and reason trigger among many people feelings of distrust and discontent about these disciplines. Five, Current distrust of the sciences and other practices of reason has been occasioned by a fundamental sociological change in the way humans in our contemporary world obtain the basic information we rely on to make critical decisions about our lives. To put the present circumstances in perspective, imagine how people in ancient foraging communities or in farming areas even a couple of centuries ago went about making critical decisions. In these settings either people like elders, patriarchs, and matriarchs we knew and whose authority we respected and took for granted directly made these decisions or we consulted them when we were making the decisions ourselves. They made the decisions on the basis of respected traditions and out of regard for these honored authorities. Today in our complex modern industrialized societies as well as in many developing societies, we turn to countless other experts and professionals to provide authoritative guidance about the critical decisions affecting our lives. Although we may come to know some of these experts and professionals quite well and become friends with a few, for the most these experts and professionals are strangers. Depending upon the issues we are currently facing, we variously consult the knowledgeable counsel of real estate agents, pharmacists, agricultural experts, dentists, doctors, experts offering advice regarding healthy eating practices and diet, travel consultants, lawyers, investment brokers, therapists, and many other recognized authorities. We listen to and consider the advice and wisdom offered us by knowledgeable experts regarding the weather, political developments, economic prospects,

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changing standards regarding fitting forms of childcare, and how best to prepare for retirement. We look to these varied professionals and experts as knowledgeable authorities. Their legitimacy in our eyes variously arises from the regard others have for them, from the knowledge they have accumulated as well as their apparent competency in utilizing this knowledge to provide desired services and our own experiences in benefitting or not benefitting from the counsel we have received. In practice, albeit in diverse ways, these professionals and experts draw upon and put into useable form the accumulated knowledge based on the sciences and practices of reason as related to particular topics (Giddens 1990). We can, I think, make a number of relevant observations about the ambiguous role these authorities play in our lives. Thus, the overall extent of knowledge is vast and continues to expand in ways that are practically impossible to follow. At the same time, the internet now allows us much greater access to areas of knowledge in which we are interested. Still, we tend to rely on particular professionals, experts, and advisors as key information brokers. We may treat the internet sources we consult as additional or alternative information brokers. Overall, then, we find ourselves dependent on an array of seemingly knowledgeable authorities, whose claims to expertise are based on varied sciences and other forms of rationally accumulated and organized knowledge. At the same time, the expert and professional advice we receive varies in its capacity to help us sort out what we are attempting to understand as we attempt to make effective and well-informed decisions. Some of this authoritative counsel typically turns out to be more prescient, more insightful, and helpful than others. Correspondingly, after the fact, we often pause and wonder whether the counsel offered by our financial advisors, real estate agents, doctors, consultants, employment counselors, and therapists was really that wise. Maybe, if we had followed alternative advice, we would be better off. This overall situation fosters varying degrees of guarded trust mixed with considerable suspicion. These feelings of distrust are strongest especially among those with less hands-on knowledge regarding the matters for which we are seeking advice, those who have acted on advice that in retrospect seemed misdirected or not all that useful, and those most vulnerable in relation to particular concerns for which they have sought counsel. This situation also fosters among many people general feelings of resentment arising from our feelings of dependence on expert others, our varying feelings of vulnerability, and our sense that these authoritative knowledge brokers themselves gain advantages by providing expert counsel. Our sense of dependence on, as well as our guarded trust mixed with suspicions of, the experts and professionals whose counsel we seek lead us in varying degrees to develop feelings of distrust in the science, knowledge, and reasoning of knowledgeable authorities more generally. Often these feelings of discontent are further reinforced by an educational divide between those who have benefitted from more years devoted to education and professional training and those whose educational attainments are much less (Collier 2018). In many settings those less well-educated harbor feelings of resentment both because of the power, those with greater education often are able to exercise, and because in many cases those with greater education often are economically better off.

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12.3  P  ossibilities for Addressing and Reducing Feelings of Discontent Several different kinds of historical developments have led many contemporaries to harbor feels of discontent and distrust regarding the practices of reason and science. These feelings of distrust are one of the troubling characteristic features of this critical moment in the history of human life on Earth. If we are to have any possibilities for reducing these feelings of suspicion and distrust, we must begin by taking them seriously and seeking to understand those holding these feelings. Accordingly, having reviewed several of the factors that have triggered these feelings of distrust in reason and science, we can now more fittingly explore possibilities for addressing and reducing the adverse influence of these factors. At the outset, we must acknowledge several characteristics of the present critical moment, giving rise to these feelings of discontent, that are not likely to change. These represent historical developments that we must acknowledge and seek to understand as we explore humane and reasonable ways of fostering and strengthening the practices of reason and science in spite of these troubling reactions. For example, the dramatic increase in the volume, diversity, and specialization of knowledge is likely to continue. As I have observed, these changes make many people feel comparatively uninformed and vulnerable. The expansion and growing influence of social media is also likely to continue. Many people are, correspondingly, likely to receive much of their information about the world from value-­ informed sources, which in practice act to confirm our own pre-formed views of the world. Many people will continue to use scientific evidence and their powers of reasoning for self-serving purposes, at times making abusive uses of both science and reason. Influenced by diverse cultural traditions, people will continue to think and reason in many different ways, often in relation to values associated with different spheres of their lives. Finally, with at least a degree of arrogance, some individuals and groups will continue to maintain that our private, sometimes religiously based, views should be regarded as equivalent if not superior to the widely accepted, objectively determined truths derived by evidence-based scientific methods. All of these development trigger distrust and discontent with the practices of reason and science. As we proceed to explore ways of fostering greater respect and regard for the practices of reason and science, we must take these developments into account. In the next few paragraphs, I explore several possibilities. I discuss these as possibilities worth considering rather than as projects that must be pursued. I am writing this book, not in order to provide blueprints for the future but to call attention to the decisive role that hope has played and can play in helping us address the crises of our times. So, as an expression of hope, I am here exploring possibilities not necessarily as definitive answers to our problems but to encourage active thinking and imagining about how to respond to the crises of our times. Thus, in the first place, I think it would be very beneficial for societies to take steps to expand and strengthen means of communicating useful, rationally informed, scientifically based, and objective information about the world to residents of their

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societies. Societies can undertake these steps in several complementary ways, including efforts to broaden and increase the funding for public broadcasters. In so far as they are not dependent for funding on commercial advertising, public broadcasters are better positioned to communicate impartially. In so far as they receive increased public funding, they are better positioned to develop programming likely to attract wider audiences. As public funding has declined, audiences of public broadcasting have also declined in size and political discourse has become more polarized. In so far as societies find ways of empowering public broadcasting, societies will expand their means of communicating useful, objective knowledge related to a diverse range of concerns, such as ways of managing the current pandemic, relevant financial analyses, and data on educational practices. Even after they become well funded, re-establishing well-regarded public broadcasting will take time. In addition, it is important to take care so that public broadcasters primarily act to serve the public and not current governments in power. Hence, public broadcasters must be governed by boards, which remain independent, while representative, of the diverse political parties and regions, civil society groups, as well as the private sector of the societies in which they operate. Governments can also expand and strengthen the role they sometimes have played in providing up-to-date, well-researched knowledge to citizens with respect to a wide range of topics of concern to the public. For example, through agricultural extension programs, governments have often provided up-to-date information useful to farmers as they grow, harvest, and market their products. In some areas, both medical doctors and the general public can receive easy-to-understand medical information they can use to help understand, in preliminary ways to diagnose and consider the relative merits and risks related to alternative forms of treatment. Government administrative units become aware of the wide array of information that might be useful to the broader public. It would seem to be possible for some of these administrative units to attempt from time to time to communicate some of this information, much like Harvard Medical School publishes a monthly medical letter to keep their subscribers well-informed of relevant medical knowledge. Expanding on what they already are doing, it would seem useful if units of public administration regarded it as part of their mandate to keep the public well informed with regard to relevant knowledge related to their areas of responsibility. They might regularly distribute this information using diverse media. In the process, these administrative units would embrace as an integral part of their mandate the responsibility to serve as honest and reliable information brokers to the public. Of course, many public administrative offices have already been providing these services. As a result of these kinds of initiatives, even though the volume and diversity of knowledge relevant to people living in the modern world will continue to expand, these kinds of initiatives may well reduce the extent to which people end up feeling overwhelmed, uninformed, and vulnerable with respect to what they do not know. In the second place, I think it would be useful if governments on behalf of their citizens explored ways of exercising more oversight over the uses of large data, social media, and the internet. Clearly, efforts must be undertaken to see where these practices infringe on the rights of citizens to privacy and to the informed

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consent for uses of information about themselves. Additionally, because of the extensive influence of these practices, it makes sense for governments to establish public commissions to review and exercise some direction in the public interest over the uses of large data, social media, and the internet. It would also be useful if governments overtly acted to restrain the deliberate exercise of disinformation during political campaigns. Along these lines, in 2019 the Alliance for Democracy developed a Pledge for Electoral Integrity, which leaders from a number of North Atlantic Countries signed, promising not to “fabricate, use, or spread data or material that were falsified, fabricated, doxed, or stolen for disinformation or propaganda purposes.” My third suggestion concerns the ways we think and communicate about the practice and authority of the sciences. I think it is useful to regard the authority of the sciences as compelling yet also limited in several ways. The sciences have proven to be enormously useful practices, both in terms of what they have discovered and the procedures and methods by which they undertake their investigations. The sciences operate by making verifiable empirical observations, often involving experiments, and by developing and using clear concepts and principles, to guide and organize both their inquiries and the public presentation of their findings. The latter point is essential. In principle scientists communicate their findings, as well as the bases for their findings, to the public universally: that means, openly to anyone who is ready to examine their studies, no matter what their religious, political, or ideological commitments. Moreover, in principle, they invite others to examine their research, to look for flaws in their data collection and analysis, to replicate the studies if they can, to suggest further ways of expanding or modifying the research, to confirm their research, and/or to find ways of developing practical applications. Over time, some research findings gain in authority as they are confirmed and applied. Other scientific studies, while not being directly disconfirmed, are modified or augmented by further scientific developments, as, for example, the theory of relativity developed by Einstein augmented the laws of motion, discovered by Newton. Viewed from this perspective, the practices of the sciences have developed historically over time, as subsequent research has functioned to clarify, confirm, amend, and sometimes call into question previous scientific findings. Overall, this has been a largely orderly, public process. At times scientists within particular disciplines, like physic, psychology, biology, and economics, have acted as if particular formulations of their findings were indisputable orthodoxies. Often scientists state their conclusions, assuming their audiences will accept them because, after all, as scientists, they should be trusted. As an example, the Noble prize-winning economists Bannerjee and Duflo observe:”.. economists hardly ever take the time to explain the often complex reasoning behind their more nuanced conclusions.” (Bannerjee and Duflo 2019, p. 6) This stance is, I think, mistaken and counter to the basic ethos of the sciences, which in principle insists upon the public character of science and invites public examination and criticism as means by which sciences explain and clarify the knowledge that they produce. In principle, scientists do not simply declare certain findings to be true based

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on the fact they are scientific. Rather they declare finding to be valid based upon empirically grounded research which anyone is invited to examine. When scientists defend their findings as if they are almost hallowed orthodoxies, they not only do a disservice to the enterprise of science, they also at times may occasion adverse reactions among people, less well-informed, who find themselves puzzled, disturbed by, or wanting to raise questions about particular scientific findings. Out of respect for the diversity of cultural systems, it is useful at the outset, to acknowledge and respect the different ways of knowing and arriving at truth claims in different cultural systems. Truths communicated by poetry, art, common sense, faith, and science differ in what they are paying attention to and how they are expressed. Following the physicist Niels Bohr’s suggestions, these truth claims are fittingly viewed as different, sometimes overlapping, and often complementary (5). Correspondingly, it is especially useful to acknowledge the way religious systems have often functioned to help people realistically orient their lives in relation to concerns about the meaning of their lives, the values by which they gauge worth, especially their own sense of worth, and the feelings of trust by which they deal with the contingencies of life including death. That is, religions have effectively operated for many centuries helping people to orient their lives to the world, not by seeking to analyze the forces, regularities, and causal relations in the world of nature and human relations, but by addressing questions related to meaning, value, and trust. The sciences can indeed provide much information relevant to thinking about these concerns. However, the sciences do not in their basic practices address these kinds of concerns (6). Four, as we seek to address contemporary feelings of discontent and distrust with respect to the practices of reason and science, we must explore ways of strengthening and reforming our systems of education so larger proportions of young people gain greater competence in, and appreciation of, these practices. Again, this is not a simple matter. Many educators have been working hard to bring about desired changes. They have urged us to think of education not just or primarily as a means of expanding the knowledge of students, important as that remains, but on developing their skills in learning how to learn, how to access relevant knowledge, how to engage in problem solving and reasoning, and how to communicate effectively. Educators have also been exploring ways whereby they and the students can actively evaluate students’ own progress in learning that encourage rather than discourage further learning. Educators have also been exploring educational reforms that function in practice so that larger proportions of students gain a greater sense of competency in the diverse sciences and math. We live in an age where people are better educated than ever before and where the practices of reason and the sciences have greatly enhanced the conditions in which people live. It is ironic, then, that so many people harbor feelings of distrust and discontent regarding the practices of reason and science. The underlying causes of suspicious feelings are multiple, and, in several ways, they are self-reinforcing. Although I have suggested steps that might be explored to address these feelings, I also recognize that there are no easy remedies. This is another mark that we are living at a critical moment in the history of human life on Earth.

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Many people regard the practices of reason and science with feelings of awe mixed with discontent. We are variously impressed almost to the levels of incredulity at the accomplishments represented by landing humans on the moon, discovering black holes throughout the universe, identifying, and overcoming a number of deadly diseases, using satellites to guide our day-to-day travels, engaging in thousands of financial transactions in seconds, discovering the relationship between gut bacteria and some forms of mental illness, and much more. For many of us the knowledge embedded in the appliances and electronic devices we daily use, not to mention the economic models used by governments and businesses to guide their transactions, seem almost incomprehensible if not arcane. We are daily confronted with so much information. It is often hard to make sense of it all. No wonder then many of us at times are tempted by feelings of suspicion regarding the truth claims associated with particular rational arguments and the sciences. In modern democratic societies, we encourage people to develop and act on their own views certainly with regard to public policies as well as choices affecting their own lives and their own beliefs. Accordingly, many people act with similar assumptions, like consumers, with respect to truth claims based on reason and scientific inquiry. We seek to sort them out from our own perspectives and see what is really believable. However, in so far as we adopt our own views of these claims, we also allow greater space for feelings of distrust and discontent regarding practices of reason and science. In the process, the legitimate authority of reason and the sciences are correspondingly eroded. From a historical perspective, it is useful to recall that we continue to be living in an age deeply shaped by the practices of reason and the sciences. Several centuries ago, people were far more inclined to act not primarily guided by norms of rationality and the sciences but on the basis of traditions, the directions of autocratic rulers, popular superstitions, and revered legends and myths. To be sure, we can find many examples today of people fascinated by occult traditions expressed in astrology, indigenous myths and rituals, local magical practices, and diverse apocalyptic visions. Still, for the most part, these fascinations represent attempts by many people to find greater balance in a world where the practices of reason and sciences seem to have become oppressively dominant. It is also useful to examine this current crisis embodied in the distrust and discontent with reason and the sciences from the perspective of hope. As the disposition realistically to anticipate possibilities, hope encourages us to explore possible next steps in addressing this crisis. It is understandable to express alarm when large numbers of people overtly deny widely respected scientific findings, regarding global warming, for example, or rationally organized and empirically monitored electoral processes. Still, while not ignoring these expressions of distrust and discontent, it is useful both to explore some of the underlying factors that aggravate these suspicions and to explore ways of ameliorating these underlying factors that occasion these feelings of discontent. Constructively addressing these underlying conditions, the disposition to hope helps as we are thereby encouraged to address these kinds of problems with realism and imagination, patience, and flexibility. Hope does not

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directly provide solutions. Rather, it opens our minds and heart enough so that we begin to explore possibilities.

Works Cited Banerjee, A., and Esther Duflo. 2019. Good Economic for Hard Times. New York: Public Affairs. Bird, Frederick. 2020. A Defense of Objectivity in the Social Sciences, Rightly Understood. Sustainability: Science, Practice, and Policy 16: 83–98. (July 25, 2020). Collier, Paul. 2018. The Future of Capitalism: Facing the New Anxieties. New York: HarperCollins. Deaton, Angus. 2013. The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Gardner, Howard. 1984. Frames of Mind: The Theory of Multiple Intelligences. New  York: Basic Books. Giddens, Anthony. 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Harari, Yuval. 2014. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. Toronto: Random House. Jacobs, Jane. 1961. The Death and Life of Great American Cities. New York: Vintage Books. O’Neil, C. 2016. Weapons of Math Destruction: How Big Data Increases Inequality and Threatens Democracy. Broadway Books. Pinker, Steven. 2018. Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism, and Progress. New York: Penguin Books. Rorty, Richard. 1982. Consequences of Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press. Whitehead, Alfred North. 1925. Science and the Modern World. New York: Macmillan. Zuboff, Shoshana. 2019. The Age of Surveillance Capitalism. New York: PublicAffairs.

Chapter 13

Increases in Productivity and Their Ambiguous Consequences

Abstract  Over time humans have discovered ways to make much more productive use of the Earth and its resources as well as our own innate capacities. From a historical perspective what especially characterizes the modern world in which we live in the remarkable productivity by which humans utilize natural resources and human skills and energy to produce a wide array of goods and services, to generate flows of incomes for billions of people larger and more reliable than previously believed to be possible, and to establish vast stores of wealth enjoyed by millions of people. The increases in productivity have greatly reduced the extent and the ravages of poverty even as they have allowed for a huge expansion of the human population. However, the outcomes of this tremendous increase in productivity remain deeply ambiguous. The social organizations of production have aggravated divisions between the industrialized and industrializing worlds, on the one hand, and the economically un- and under-developed worlds, on the other hand. They have also aggravated divisions between those with great wealth and those with little or no wealth. In addition, in the pursuit of greater productivity, humans have left a huge and disturbing set of footprints on the Earth, its ecosystems, and climate. In order to respond to the crises of our age, we must, correspondingly, re-imagine the processes of productivity in ways that both allow the fundamental benefits of productivity to be enjoyed more fully by more humans and to live with the Earth and its ecosystems in more respectful and sustainable ways. These are significant, not easily realizable challenges. Nevertheless, we can take effective steps to respond to these challenges. Over time humans have discovered ways to make much more productive use of the Earth and its resources as well as our own innate capacities. From a historical perspective what especially characterizes the modern world in which we live in the remarkable productivity by which humans utilize natural resources and human skills and energy to produce a wide array of goods and services, to generate flows of incomes for billions of people larger and more reliable than previously believed to be possible, and to establish vast stores of wealth enjoyed by millions of people. The increases in productivity have greatly reduced the extent and the ravages of poverty even as they have allowed for a huge expansion of the human population. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_13

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However, the outcomes of this tremendous increase in productivity remain deeply ambiguous. The social organizations of production have aggravated divisions between the industrialized and industrializing worlds, on the one hand, and the economically un- and under-developed worlds, on the other hand. They have also aggravated divisions between those with great wealth and those with little or no wealth. In addition, in the pursuit of greater productivity, humans have left a huge and disturbing set of footprints on the Earth, its ecosystems, and climate. In order to respond to the crises of our age, we must, correspondingly, re-imagine the processes of productivity in ways that both allow the fundamental benefits of productivity to be enjoyed more fully by more humans and to live with the Earth and its ecosystems in more respectful and sustainable ways. These are significant, not easily realizable challenges. Nevertheless, we can take effective steps to respond to these challenges. The basic process of productivity involves humans using natural resources, including the energy, from Earth and its ecosystems and the Sun as well as our own strength, will, intelligence, and skills to produce goods and services to meet our needs and wants. These needs and wants include goods and services consumed as well as a means of livelihood or income, revenues to support our governing processes, and wealth or economic security. The basic unit of productivity is an enterprise, which for many thousands of centuries was indistinguishable from the households in which people lived. Every enterprise produces four different kinds of outcomes; namely, one, goods and services that are designed for consumption; two, livelihoods or source of income for those who work at and manage these enterprises; three, the accumulation of wealth and power for those can claim control over the assets that the enterprises utilize and help to occasion; as well as, four, the resulting impact on the Earth and its ecosystems.

13.1  Increases in Productivity, Fittingly Understood For centuries humans lived by foraging, which involved consuming resources that could be easily found and taken. Human communities sustained themselves by appropriating and extracting these resources. Even as we have found ways to gain greater control over economic resources, humans have continued to address many of our needs and wants by appropriating and extracting. We have found ways of conquering new territories and consuming their resources; we have enslaved captive peoples and utilized their forced labor, and we have extracted minerals from the earth, hunted animals on the land, fished in the waters, and gathered ready to eat fruits, nuts, and vegetables. None of the activities, many of which continue to today, have been specially marked by increases in productivity. They represent ways of taking and using natural and human resources much as they are found and in the process of consuming these resources also using them up. Slowly over many long centuries and then more rapidly in modern times, humans have devised ways of making much more productive uses of natural and human resources. These increases in productivity have resulted from many quite different

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developments. I will review a number of these without attempting to place them in any strict chronological order. The initial increases in productivity came with the invention of simple and then more complex tools, the invention of the wheel, and the capacity to use fire for cooking and smelting. Productivity noticeably increased as humans discovered new and more powerful sources of energy greatly exceeding human strength and the strength of our animals. Humans have found ways of harnessing water and wind power. Productivity greatly increased with the invention of the steam engine, electricity, internal combustion, more recently nuclear energy, and even more recently power derived from solar, wind, and biomass sources. At the same time, humans have continued to devise new technologies to expand and make more effective production processes. As humans have become more literate and numerate, we have been able to utilize our enhanced skills to undertake more complex and technical tasks and to discover new and more proficient ways of working. Many have argued that increases in productivity have been especially fostered by certain kinds of legal developments that initially allowed people to claim certain lands as property, then to identify and claim enterprises, trade secrets, and technological information, as well as investments as property, whose protection was guaranteed by the state. Other legal developments have played a significant role in spelling out and protecting contractual agreements and other institutions integral to the creation of markets for products, financial exchanges, labor, and business enterprises themselves (Cooter and Schafer 2012; Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Certainly, basic changes in the social organization of productive enterprises have fostered greater productivity. As enterprises themselves specialize and then buy from and sell to other enterprises, they have all been able to become more proficient at what they do. Correspondingly, specialization, the division of labor within enterprises, and the utilization of modern standards for managing complex organizations have significantly raised levels of productivity within enterprises (Chandler 1981). The overall productivity of individual enterprises, as well as all the enterprises within particular societies, have been greatly enhanced by the development of physical infrastructures (roads, rail lines, electrical grids, water systems, and sewage systems), social infrastructures (education, health systems, welfare systems as well as civil society organizations), and public infrastructures (police systems, legal frameworks, offices of pubic administration; reliable currencies, systems of credit, banking systems). Finally, many have argued that the cultivation of certain values and dispositions – hard work, savings, promise-keeping, and the pursuit of enhanced life chances -- have played a critical role in the emergence of modern as contrasted with traditional enterprises (Weber 1904a, 1904b-5). Financial institutions have also played a role in fostering increases in productivity. Using credit and investments provided through financial institutions, new businesses have been launched and more productive processes have been initiated. Over many centuries as human communities developed our skills in agriculture and commerce, learned how to craft more products and extract more minerals, we have raised our standards of living, accumulated more wealth, developed cities and monuments, and enhanced the economic security for many millions of people. In modest ways, these several expressions of economic development significantly

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altered the patterns of how people have lived. However, with industrialization, the productivity of human enterprises has greatly increased and the impact on human societies and the Earth has become much more marked. Enterprises have become much larger and wealthier; they have hired more people, and they have exerted greater influence. Many of the largest enterprises have become multi-national in character. For ever-larger proportions of adults, workplace and home have become separate. Average income has risen steeply. An ever-larger proportion of humans have come to live in cities so that by the second decade of the twenty-first century over half of all humans now live in humanly constructed urban environments. It is critically important to distinguish between increases in the total volume of economic benefits, measured for societies as a whole and/or on a per capita basis, and increases in the degree of productivity. In part, the increases in the overall amount of goods and services, income, and wealth produced in modern societies simply reflect the fact more humans are engaged in productive processes, more land is being set aside for growing crops and raising an increasingly larger population of animals, more minerals and hydrocarbons are being extracted from the Earth, and more fish are being grown and harvested. However, such increases in the extent of what is being produced –in the form of goods, services, incomes, and wealth --do not necessarily represent increases in productivity. In fact, to the extent that increases in the overall volume of what is being produced result from the extraction of non-­renewable resources, like oil, the wealth of a particular region over time may well be regarded as having declined because the potential of what might be described as “stored” or “saved” hydrocarbons and other minerals has been markedly reduced. In contrast, increases in productivity occur whenever we find ways of making more effective use of given natural and human resources. For example, lands produce more productively when we make effective uses of irrigation and fertilizer, when we use more productive seeds, and when we use mechanical means to help in harvesting. As a result, given hectares of land produce greater economic value. Correspondingly, as humans, we expand our productivity by developing our skills and by finding ways of using more effective tools, so that as a result, over given periods of time we give rise to greater economic value. The growth of particular economies, or the economies of wider regions, often results both from the expansion of the economy – in the form of cultivating more lands, extracting more hydrocarbons and minerals, and expanding the size of the labor force as well as from changes occasioned by increased productivity – by introducing new sources of energy, new technologies, new ways of organizing productive processes, new sources of credit and wealth, and/or better-educated workers. The distinction between economic development occasioned by the expansion of the economy and economic development occasioned by enhanced productivity is critically important. Whenever we expand production without any increases in productivity, we are in the process of simply consuming more resources – whether human and/or natural – by engaging more workers, by cultivating more land, by using up and thereby reducing the overall extent of non-renewable resources. In a world of limited resources, this kind of expansion of production remains problematic. Increases in productivity, rightly understood, add economic value by utilizing natural resources and human capabilities more effectively, more sustainably, and more respectfully. As a result of both of these processes, the economies of the

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industrialized and industrializing societies of the world have measurably grown beginning with the United Kingdom in the mid-eighteenth century. For the remainder of this chapter, I will critically examine first the beneficial and then the threatening aspects of this tremendous growth in the productive capacities of humans. Thus, one, without this considerable expansion in productive powers, it would simply be impossible for anywhere close to the 8 billion now living on Earth to carry out our lives in ways that are minimally decent and effective. The changes in the extent and character of production have made it possible to provide food, shelter, livelihoods, diverse opportunities and services, and social circumstances for billions of more humans than would have been possible if humans were still living on the basis of foraging or even simple agriculture. This growth in productive powers has enabled billions to live and, for the most part, to live lives longer and healthier than their distant ancestors. This initial consequence of this growth of productive powers has been interestingly related to a second consequence, namely, the marked reduction not only in the proportion of humans living in materially impoverished households but also, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, the reduction in the number of persons living in extremely impoverished households. Although billions of humans still live lives ravaged by poverty, more humans now live and live materially decent lives than at any previous period of human history as a consequence of a number of factors, including the growth in the productive powers by which humans utilize natural and human resources to meet our needs and wants. Three, as a result of this appreciable expansion of our productive powers, as well as other related factors, at present larger numbers and proportions of humans than heretofore are able to live the kind of lives we have reasons to want to live. More people, and to a greater extent than any time in the past, are able to realize and enjoy the kinds of basic capabilities identified by the economist Amartya Sen. These include capabilities of receiving a reasonable education – gaining thereby skills in numeracy and literacy, obtaining access to adequate health care services, participating in some forms in relevant political processes, and gaining the possibility of obtaining income sufficient for a decent livelihood (Sen 1999). We live in a world where most of us live in secure housing with some kinds of plumbing facilities and can communicate with others by multiple means including mobile phones. The overwhelming large proportion of humans currently have greater freedoms over where we will live and with whom we live than humans have experienced in the past. In large measure, most humans enjoy these benefits because we humans have collectively found ways of using natural and human capabilities far more productively. Of course, in spite of this remarkable growth of productive powers, several billion humans have not comparably benefitted. Further along, I will address the challenge this divergence in benefits represents. For the moment, however, it is useful to appreciate how the growth in productivity, happening largely in the past two centuries, has greatly enlarged and extended the opportunities of humans who have benefitted to live the kinds of lives we would like to live. As the economies of many nations have grown as a result of these increases in productive powers, they have given rise to two complementary developments. On the one hand, these growing economies occasion expansions in the goods, services, and the flow of incomes to households. On the other hand, by means of the taxes

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levied on the earnings and assets of individuals and businesses, these increases in productive power also make it possible for government revenues greatly to expand. In the industrialized and industrializing states, governments, in turn, spend a large proportion of these revenues to establish and maintain the physical, social, economic, and legal infrastructures associated with viable modern market societies. I am offering these observations here because many of us deeply feel that we are not really able to live the kinds of lives we would like because we are hemmed in by numerous constraints. In many urban areas, housing prices are rising faster than our incomes; we don’t have the capacity to influence political processes the way we would like; we spent excessive time commuting to and from work; our cities seem over-crowded; compared to recent ancestors, our taxes continue to increase; we face real environmental threats against which we cannot readily and easily protect our families; and we face vague threats that the processes of automation may reduce ours and our children’s and grandchildren’s employment opportunities. While these constraints are indeed real, nonetheless, there are many reasons why from a historical perspective we are called to appreciate the benefits that the expansion of production has made possible, Four, one critically important benefit is that, as a result of the increases in production and productivity, we have greater possibilities for addressing the crises of our age than we would without them. I will review these possibilities in relation to several broad themes, beginning with globalization. The increase in productive powers has both greatly contributed to the worldwide human interconnectedness associated with globalization and in turn, has been a beneficiary of globalization. Increases in productivity have facilitated global communication as well as international travel. They have made it possible to stretch cables linking diverse areas of the world and to transport people and goods all over the Earth. These increases have made it possible for large numbers of people to migrate to new homes and for enterprises to expand their trade and commerce. To be sure, globalization assumes many different expressions. It has also been associated with imperialism, the missionary expansion of the world faiths, the creation of hundreds of new nations, as well as the development of a large number of international intergovernmental and civil society organizations. Most critically and not incidentally, a globally interconnected world is also better situated, than a non-globalized world, to explore, however uncertainly, ways of responding to current global crises. In this sense, without a number of the current expressions of globalization, it would be almost impossible to address most of the crises of our age – from the threats of climate change and increasing inequality to pervasive feelings of political disenchantment – almost all of which require a global response. Additionally, as a result of increases in productivity, and the associated developments in technology, it may well be that we humans will find some ways of limiting and/or ameliorating some of the adverse effects of several of the probable environmental disaster looming in our future. For example, we may find ways of sequestering some of the noxious gases our industries produce. We may also find ways of expanding the sources of alternative forms of energy, using solar power, wind power, the heat produced by garbage, and other sources. We may as well discover reliable ways of shielding parts of the Earth from harmful solar rays. There is some possibility we can find more effective ways of conserving and recycling fresh water. Simply as a by-product of the tremendous expansion of available information, there

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are chances that by using our imaginations some of us will hit upon devices and practices that in small ways may be able to mitigate some of the troubling aspects of crises we are likely to be facing in the years ahead. While I doubt that we will discover technological fixes for most of the environmental and social crises our world is facing, we may well be able to utilize some of the benefits of our collective productive powers to render some of these challenges less threatening. Finally, increases in productivity offer the possibility of reducing the level and extent of poverty experienced by the more than 2 billion people still living in impoverished households in 2020. Diverse means have been used to enhance productivity. I reviewed these above. As the least developed, low-income countries find ways of establishing these means within their societies – as these countries correspondingly experience some forms of economic growth -- the levels and rates of poverty in these societies will decline. Finding ways of fostering greater productivity in these least developed areas offers the prospect of reducing the extent of poverty that affects these areas. This is an inescapable challenge that we cannot ignore even as we set out to address a number of the other crises that face us in the future. It is useful to review the constructive benefits that the expansion of the productive powers of humans have occasioned especially as I now turn to consider the threatening and challenging social and environmental by-products of these developments. If we have any chance of adequately addressing these threats and challenges, we will do so by building on rather than ignoring or deprecating the strengths of our past and present increases in productivity.

13.2  Ambiguous Developments Increases in productivity of humans over time, and especially since the onset of industrialization, have given rise to two very troubling developments. One, both globally and within particular industrialized societies, increases in productivity in the forms they have usually taken have occasioned great divergence and inequalities between those who have especially benefited from these increases and those who have not. Two, everywhere and especially in the industrialized and industrializing societies increase in productivity in the form they have usually taken have had a devastating impact on the Earth, its climate, and its ecosystems. One, increases in productivity have occasioned a marked divergence between those who have benefited from this expansion and those who have not or have not benefitted in any significant ways. These divergences are by-products of the ways industrialization and economic growth have taken place. In most countries, the processes of industrialization have taken place over many years, often several generations, and frequently occasioning resistance and conflict. Moreover, the processes associated with industrialization have been ongoing, in a number of countries proceeding much further than others and in a large number of the least developing countries making only minimal forms of progress. Initially, in the nineteenth century, most European countries began industrializing, along with several countries that had once been British colonies (the United States, Canada, New Zealand,

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Australia), and Japan. Especially after the Second World War, while the processes of industrializing continued in the countries where they had begun, they also spread to a number of countries in east and south Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East. However, the benefits from the processes of industrialization have been uneven. Those who have benefitted most enjoy much higher standards of living, much higher incomes, much greater economic security, much greater wealth, and much greater capacities both to manage economic shocks and disturbances and to take advantage of economic opportunities. While overall, the processes of industrialization – and the greater productivity they have occasioned  – have indeed greatly reduced the global proportion of all households living in poverty, nonetheless as of the second decade in the twenty-first century more than 2 billion of nearly 8 billion humans continued to live in poverty (1). In addition, although levels of income and wealth inequality declined appreciably both globally and within most nations between 1945 and 1975, since 1980 inequality in wealth has expanded globally and within most countries. Given the overall tremendous increases in productivity, the expansion of wealth, the marked growth in available energy, the proliferation of tools and devices to facilitate production processes, and even the much greater accessibility of both health services and educational opportunities, it is indeed disturbing that so much poverty and so much extreme inequality continue to exist (2). People born in countries that have benefited from increases in productivity resulting from industrialization enjoy what Branko Milanovic in his book Global Inequality refers to as a “citizenship premium.” (Milanovic 2018) Their life chances are much greater than those who happen to be born elsewhere. During the period after the Second World War countries like the Republic of Korea, Japan, China, Thailand, and Taiwan became much more economically productive. As countries like Brazil, Mexico, Chile, and South Africa did so as well, many observers began to see signs of convergence between these newly industrializing countries and countries that had been industrializing over longer periods of time. Generalizing from these cases, they began to assume it would be possible for many other countries to follow their example. If other countries just worked at it, over time, these observers assumed, it would be possible for people in most, if not all, countries to enjoy the modern standards of living. Eventually, it was hoped, everyone might enjoy this kind of citizenship premium. However, these observers overlooked a number of factors that either or both especially favored the countries that have already industrialized or had made much progress in that direction and have made it particularly difficult for most of the least developed countries to take those steps likely to make their economies more productive. It is useful to review a number of these factors. Probably, most importantly, those countries that initially industrialized and those that have made considerable progress towards industrializing had already developed a number of preconditions that have made it possible for them to develop measurably more productive economies. These preconditions include any or all of the following: systems of education that allowed significant portions of their people to develop skills in literacy, numeracy, problem-solving, and learning how to learn; minimal physical infrastructures, including roads and other transportation systems; some operational forms of public administration, able, if needed, to protect property holdings, adjudicate conflicts, and to collect taxes; modestly developed patterns of

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local commerce; and at least reasonable amounts of disposable or investable wealth – in the forms landed estates, savings, livestock, and the like – some of which could be drawn upon to invest in new enterprises. These examples are meant to be suggestive. Many of the least developed countries do not possess minimally adequate supplies of these preconditions. In addition, other factors have functioned to frustrate the efforts of many of the least developed countries to take significant steps in developing more productive economies. Thus, for example, when it comes to marketing their goods and services internationally, many least developed countries have been at a competitive disadvantage for several reasons. Many of the developed countries offer subsidies to equivalent industries, in the form of tax cuts, especially in the areas of agriculture, and use their good offices to help particular firms develop international markets (Collier 2007, Ch. 6; Banerjee and Duflo 2019, Ch. 3). A number of the least developed countries have at least marginally suffered both from brain drain, as numbers of their most skilled young people have migrated to industrialized countries for educational purposes and job opportunities, and from capital flight, as wealthy local citizens and businesses have placed much of the liquid asset in overseas banks and investments (Bannerjee and Duflo 2011). The relationships between the industrialized countries and the least developing countries have often been aggravated by the typical patterns of investment of the former in the latter. Many firms based in industrial countries have characteristically operated in the least developed countries to extract resources as cheaply as they can in the form of minerals, fossil fuels, agricultural commodities such as cotton and coffee, as well as inexpensive goods and services produced by low wage workers. Typically, the investing firms have operated as enclaves, withdrawing as much of the desired resources as they can without in any significant ways seeking to integrate their operations within the economy of the host countries as a whole. As a result of these forms of enclave investing, some local people and governments have gained considerable income in the form of royalties, taxes, and wages, while aggravating inequalities between those who have benefited and the rest of society. Only rarely and over much time have these forms of enclave investment functioned to foster the institutions and other initiatives associated with increases in productivity for the society as a whole. Rather, these kinds of investments typically aggravate the feelings of resentment among those who feel they are missing out on opportunities enjoyed by those lucky enough, well-connected enough, or clever enough to take advantage of these enclave investments. These forms of investing have occasioned what a number of observes have referred to as the “resource curse.” (Humphreys et al. 2007) As a result of these developments, more than half of all humans (four of nearly eight billion people) live in countries where per capita levels average somewhere in the range of $4 US dollars/ day and where most households possess little or no savings they might draw upon in times of crisis (Rosling 2018, pp. 34–37; Bird 2014). Several aspects of this global situation are especially troubling. To be sure, a good number of previously economically undeveloped countries in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America since the Second World War have begun the process of industrializing. However, it has proven to be very difficult to foster significant forms of inclusive economic development in a large number of the least developed countries in spite of international efforts to encourage economic growth

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through aid programs, some forms of investment, and targeted development initiatives. The reasons why these countries have not been able to find ongoing ways of enhancing productivity are complex and have been the subject of much controversy and debate (Collier 2007, 2009; Milanovic 2005, 2018; Easterly 2001, 2007; Sachs 2005; Bannerjee and Duflo 2011). Because other nations seem to be forging ahead in appreciable ways, the stalled development in the poorest counties has occasioned among many residents, feelings of resignation, despair, resentment, and anger. What remains especially troubling is the fact that – despite some moderation in global income inequalities as countries like China, India, Japan, Russia, Brazil, and Mexico have industrialized – overall global inequalities in wealth have continued to increase. These inequalities in wealth matter for a number of reasons. Those with greater wealth, whether in the form of ownership of properties, equities, savings, insurance policies, possessions, and/or other investments proportionately enjoy greater possibilities for augmenting their wealth, increasing their incomes, and managing shocks in form of economic, health, and natural disasters. In a word, they possess both much greater economic security and much greater economic opportunities. To be sure, some developing countries have measurably increased their wealth both as a result of industrialization in the cases of countries like China and the Republic of Korea and a result of their control over sources of petroleum, in the case of countries like Saudi Arabia. However, the disparities persist with respect to most developing countries. Overall, from the 1930s through the 1970s, a period existed characterized by appreciable decreases in both wealth and income inequalities within the industrialized countries. These decreases in inequalities resulted from both what Milanovic refers to as malign factors, such as the two world wars, the inflation occurring after the First World War, and the Great Depression of the 1930s, as well benign factors, such as the introduction of progressive income tax systems and social welfare programs (Milanovic 2018; Piketty 2014). However, since the mid-1970s inequalities in income and wealth have increased in varying degrees within the industrialized and industrializing nations despite and because of increases in productivity in these countries. Many of those with better access to wealth have been able markedly to raise their income levels and accumulate greater wealth, more so in countries like the United States and the United Kingdom than in other countries, like Japan and the Netherlands. Why have inequalities increased during the last quarter of the twentieth century and on into the twenty-first century? The reasons for this situation are complex and have occasioned much controversy. Some, like the historian Scheidel in his book The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality and the economist Piketty in his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, argue that increasing inequality occurs naturally as the result of the power exercised by those with greater wealth, unless some kinds of disasters in the form of wars, disease, depression, or revolutions intervene (Scheidel 2017; Piketty 2014). To be sure, Piketty has championed an international tax on wealth, which he thinks might help to limit these natural trends short of these disasters. Other observers point to a number of additional factors resulting from conscious policy choices by businesses and governments that have operated to aggravate inequalities in wealth and income in the industrialized and industrializing countries since the 1970s. These factors include all of the following that especially benefit the wealthy: reduction in tax rates for highest incomes; the absence in many countries of

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effective wealth tax aside from property taxes; the steady and appreciable increase in the share of business earnings that assume the form of returns on capital rather than income to workers (in spite of the marked increase in the income levels of senior executives); the invention of a number of new forms of traded financial wealth; the marked increase in the average value of share prices compared both to markedly lower increases in average income levels; as well as the expansion and the increased utilization of tax havens as sites to avoid domestic taxes (Mazzucato 2018; Autor et al. 2017; Palen et al. 2010). Other factors aggravating inequalities in wealth and income, especially exacerbating the situation of the least advantaged strata of the society include the following: decline in full time and full year labor market opportunities and jobs losses as a result of technological changes, globalization, and business decisions favoring temporary employment; as well as appreciable increases in consumer prices especially for housing, higher education, and insurance (Avent 2016; Brynjolfsson and McAfee 2014; Hyman 2018). The growing inequalities in income and wealth of the industrialized and industrializing nations matter for a number of reasons. As Wilkinson and Pickett have demonstrated in their study of 20 industrialized nations, countries with higher levels of inequality also suffer from statistically significant higher levels of a number of social problems, including drug abuse, mental illness, homicide rates, lower levels of aspiration for 15-year-olds, and lower levels of trust (Wilkinson and Pickett 2009). Higher levels of economic inequality have also been associated with higher levels of political polarization, public anger, and widely held feelings of resentment (Friedman 2005). At first quite slowly and then more rapidly, as humans have greatly increased our productive powers since the beginning of industrialization, we have utilized natural resources as if they were abundant and, in many cases, except for mineral resources, as if they would be replenished by the ordinary cycles of nature. For many centuries, as humans lived by foraging, they would simply move on, migrating to new locales that seemed more promising when they had exploited particular sites as much as seemed possible. In most cases, if and when they returned, these former locales would often be restored. Even those people who met their needs by slash and burn productive practices found natural processes had revived the locales they used for grazing and gathering. However, as humans discovered how to domesticate animals and use seeds to plant crops, for the most part, they learned to respect these resources and use them sustainably and not to “mine” the lands and animals (Diamond 2005). Nonetheless, the instinct to seek ways of exploiting the Earth and its ecosystems, in so far as this was possible, seems to have been deeply embedded in humans. Long before industrialization and rapid population growth expanded and intensified these tendencies, many of those humans with the capacity to do so found ways to exploit the Earth, its ecosystems, and other humans: we extracted minerals from the Earth, we cut down large stretches of forest to set aside lands for planting, we enslaved other humans, and we over-grazed and degraded arable lands. Although eventually, slavery ceased (for the most part), with industrialization and the corresponding growth in human population, the human impact on the Earth and its eco-systems has become more pronounced. More lands came under cultivation. Mining practices greatly expanded as humans found uses for a much wider range of minerals. Humans began extracting ever-greater quantities of oil, gas, and coal. We dumped ever

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greater quantities of waste materials into rivers, lakes, oceans, and landfills. We added hundreds of thousands of tons of waste gases into the atmosphere. Many thousands of local bodies of water have become so polluted, we can no longer use them as sources of potable water and edible marine life. In the early 1970s, a group of scientists produced a report identifying what they referred to as “The Limits to Growth.” Extrapolating on the basis of current knowledge, they forewarned of a near future when supplies of petroleum might become exhausted when a number of minerals might no longer be accessible, and when productive activities would have to be greatly reduced because of limited supplies of needed resources (Meadows et al. 1972). The current situation is in many both better and much worse than their predictions. As a result of our productive activities, humans have left a huge and devastating footprint on the Earth and its ecosystems. Deforestation and desertification have increased in many areas. The amount of water available from underground aquafers has been greatly reduced, greatly threatening both affected agricultural and residential areas. Fish stocks have been markedly reduced in many regions. There are now limited supplies of many rare earth minerals. Because of human activity, especially the reduction and degradation of particular habitats, a large number of species have either become extinct or are now threatened with extinction. Most decisively, largely as a result of how humans have acted to increase their productive powers, humans have markedly changed the character of the Earth’s climate. As a result of these activities, humans added to the atmosphere huge quantities of carbon dioxide, methane, and other greenhouse gases (GHGs), which have had the effect of raising levels for average temperatures. GHGs have been added to the atmosphere in multiple ways, both directly from unfiltered and even some filtered exhaust systems and smokestacks used in production, heating, and transportation; from the greatly increased population of cattle and sheep raised for human consumption; and indirectly from the way warming temperatures cause evaporation of methane from the previously frozen tundra. In many different ways the aggravated impact of humans on the Earth and its eco-systems have already given rise to destructive feedback loops, as climate change occasions more unseasonable weather in the form of droughts, flooding, and more destructive storms; as rising sea levels caused by melting arctic glaciers and ice fields have forced tens of thousands of people to flee from where they had been living; as degradation of lands and desertification also have caused thousands of people to seek new homes. All these difficulties will simply get worse as climate change continues, as it will, even if humans greatly reduce our production of GHGs. In several different ways, then, as humans have augmented our capacity to produce, we have had a troubling impact on the Earth and its eco-systems.

13.3  E  xploring Several Underlying Causes for These Ambiguous Developments It is valuable and critically useful to reflect on how and why humans have developed their impressive productive capacities with such ambiguous outcomes. As observers like Bannerjee, Duflo, and Collier have observed, I don’t think we learn much about

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these outcomes by invoking ideological positions blaming various others (Bannerjee and Duflo, 2011; Collier 2018). The expansion of human productivity has not occasioned these ambiguous outcomes all over the Earth simply because of Capitalism, Conservatism, or Liberalism. Nor do we gain much insight by trying to find the source of these problems in generic characteristics of humans with their penchant for self-regard and self-deception. In the paragraphs that follow I will discuss several factors that have significantly influenced the ways that humans have developed their productive capacities that have in turn resulted in the ambiguous outcomes that I have been reviewing. Correspondingly, if we are to find effective ways of reducing the adverse by-products of productive processes, then we must also explore ways of addressing these underlying factors. One, as we humans have developed productive enterprises and engaged in productive activities, for most of our history humans have largely taken the Earth and its ecosystems for granted. As I have already observed, we have assumed that the Earth would be able to provide practically endless supplies of water, clean air, arable land, fossil fuels, wood, minerals, and habitats for animals and fish we hunted. For centuries we underestimated our own impact on the Earth. Beginning as foragers, humans sought to take from our natural environments the resources we needed and wanted and to dump our wastes with the presumption that the Earth and its ecosystem had in practice limitless capacities to provide these resources and to absorb these wastes. To be sure, most humans have had a certain respect for “nature” and the “ways of nature.” We have become aware of the powers and orders of the Earth and its ecosystems in storms, changing weather conditions, the fertility of soils, the bounty of the seas, the reproductive capacities of living creatures, the recognizable patterns of physical environments, the energy and transformative force released by fire, as well as the regenerative capacities of living things. We have become conscious that our own capacity to survive was connected with our abilities to learn how best to live with and make use of these “ways of nature.” Nevertheless, as we have found ways to become more productive, as we correspondingly gained power, humans have tended to regard ourselves as the critical agents and have often taken the Earth, its climate, and its biosphere for granted, sometimes with disastrous consequences. This is not just a modern phenomenon. In his book Collapse, Jared Diamond describes how several ancient peoples, including the Anasazi on the Colorado Plateau, the Mayans in Middle America, and the Vikings living in Greenland, ultimately perished because they failed to use natural resources sustainably (Diamond 2005). In many areas and over long periods of time, as we have produced and further developed our productive capacities, humans have assumed we “owed” little to the Earth and its eco-systems for resources we extracted and cultivated and the wastes we deposited and emitted. To be sure, humans have recognized that we did need to identify the “ways of nature” so we could access these resources, cultivate our crops, and rid ourselves of our wastes as effectively as possible. But if we “owed” anything, typically these were debts or costs that were paid to other humans who exercised some form of claim over these resources or worked to access them or cultivate them. Even today, for many people the term “sustainability” has been interpreted almost exclusively in human terms -- not as the continuing vitality of the

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Earth, its climate, and biosphere – but as utilization of the Earth and its resources by the present generation in ways that allow future generations to make equivalent uses. As humans have tended to adopt with respect to our productive enterprises this kind of utilitarian, human-centric orientation, we have generally overlooked the deleterious impacts of our productive activity on the Earth and its ecosystems. Only comparatively recently, since the 1970s, in response to dire warnings associated, for example, with climate change, reduced supplies of fresh water, rising sea levels, and endangered species, have large number of people and countries begun to change our perspective on the Earth and natural environment. Only fairly recently, since this time, have some of those engaged in productive enterprises begun to take some steps to operate sustainably and, critically, to develop and utilize accounting systems that allow us to measure the character and extent of our impact on the Earth, its biosphere, and its climate (WCED 1987; Dashwood 2012; Gleeson-White 2014). Two, since the 1970s, our reigning assumptions about the purpose of business activities have shifted in decisive and troubling ways. Increasingly, it has been assumed that the primary purpose of businesses is to offer healthy returns for owners and investors. As Milton Friedman wrote in 1970, albeit still using normative terms, “The primary social responsibility of business is to make a profit.” (Friedman 1970) It has become a widely accepted assumption that most businesses, if not otherwise restrained or inspired, will make their critical decisions with the aim of maximizing their financial worth as gauged by their potential value if sold or the current value of their shares on financial markets. This financial model of the nature and purposes of business has become ascendant since the 1970s. Interestingly, while this model is, of course, normative, it is widely regarded as describing the taken-for-­ granted reality of how businesses operate. This financial model is widely invoked to describe the basic nature of businesses in much the same manner as gravity is invoked to describe why planets circle around the sun or why prices go up when supply drops and demand increases. The financial model for how business enterprises operate has gained widespread support for several reasons. It has, for example, been assumed that as businesses function in keeping with this model the economy as a whole will grow, standards of living will improve, and customers will benefit. We know, however, that the incomes of most middle-class and working-class households, as gauged by their purchasing power, have not proportionately improved. Nonetheless, it has been widely assumed that the financial model for business enterprises provides the most fitting way of describing the basic feature of the core business of businesses while also providing a workable framework for measuring how well businesses are in fact doing. In the past, business people often attempted to gain a good sense of how well their enterprises were doing by variously reviewing their relationships with employees, customers, suppliers, creditors, and/or competitors. Often, to be sure, these surveys resulted in imprecise and incomparable assessments. Accordingly, it has seemed convenient to many business people to gauge the overall wellbeing of their enterprises by consulting a single measure, such as their financial value. Over time, the financial model has gained wider acceptance at the same time as investors have

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gained greater control over business enterprises (Mazzucato 2018; Fligstein 1990; Herman 1981). It has been possible to mount a very compelling case for the credibility and reliability of this model based on the assumption that any increases in the value of financial investments were in principle and in practice residual. According to this assumption, business enterprises are in principle expected to use their earnings first to pay their employees, their suppliers, their rents, their debts, and their taxes, to make appropriate upgrades in their operation, and then to use what remains to benefit their investors. Correspondingly, if businesses enterprises are doing so well that they can meet their regular expenses and still reward their investors, then to that degree, it has been assumed, enterprises must be doing very well indeed (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In practice, profits have often not been treated as residual. Many businesses have been especially concerned to maintain reasonable profits in order to keep and attract investors. However, the financial model of business enterprises has also operated both to foster and justify practices by many businesses that have resulted in the disturbing trends I discussed previously regarding environmental damage, the decline in employment opportunities, and the increasing inequality in wealth. We can observe a number of different ways by which the ascendancy of the financial model of business enterprises has played a significant role in causing and reinforcing these trends. Many more businesses now hire a significant portion of their workforce on a temporary basis (Hyman 2018). Many businesses have resisted adopting more responsible environmental practices in fear that adopting these practices will endanger their financial status. The financial model has functioned to strengthen the influence of financial investors on business strategies. As the overall share of business income going to investors has appreciably increased, the share allocated for wages and salaries of employees has appreciably decreased. As a result of these strategies, post-tax corporate profits in the United States increased from an average of 5% GDP in 2000 to between 8% and 9% for the 2010s. If profit levels had remained at 5% of GDP, then average wage levels would be 6% higher (Economist 2019, pp. 7, 8, 14–16; see Autor et al. 2017). As a way of understanding and managing businesses, the shareholder model of businesses reflects these financial assumptions. It assigns privileged status for financial interests above all other interests of businesses. This model has been criticized by a number of observers and interested parties, most recently by the Business Roundtable, an influential association of chief executives in the United States. Acknowledging the vital role that businesses play “creating jobs, fostering innovation, and providing goods and services,” the statement signed by more than 200 chief executives, on behalf of their companies, asserted their “fundamental commitment to all our stakeholders.” (Business Roundtable, 2019) The Business Roundtable expressed an important but modest commitment to an understanding of productive enterprises, now viewed in relation to multiple stakeholders. This statement expressed no overt commitment towards alternative views of corporate governance that might, like policies adopted in Germany, for example, provide for greater representation of workers on corporate boards. Even so, the Economist magazine was

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so initially alarmed by this statement that it argued in a lead editorial that “this new form of collective capitalism will end up doing more harm than good.” Overlooking the way the German model of governance has operated to render executives more responsive and responsible to several stakeholders on whose contributions their businesses depend, the Economist editorial instead opined that the model proposed by the Business Roundtable “risks entrenching a class of unaccountable CEOs who lack legitimacy.” (The Economist 2019) (3) Three, as human societies have discovered ways to make productive practices even more productive, they have become attracted if not mesmerized by the possibilities of economic growth. Typically, we view economic growth as good because it results in higher standards of living, enabling more and more people to live the kind of lives they have reason to choose to live, to paraphrase Amartya Sen’s account of economic development (Sen 1999). After all, economic growth has greatly reduced the extent of poverty over the past couple of centuries. However, economic growth, in the typical forms that it has been expressed during this time, has also been associated with damage to the environment, global warming, and increased inequalities in wealth. Many of those concerned about these adverse outcomes have become advocates of a no-growth economy (Daly 1991, 1996; Daly and Cobb 1994; Pilling 2018). Much depends, of course, on how we understand and measure economic growth. Typically, economic growth has been gauged in terms of increases in the average per capita income, which is calculated by dividing gross domestic product (GDP) for countries by their total population. Criteria for determining GDP have varied over time but have usually been based on market prices and include a number of arbitrary indicators. Often, unpaid work and some government services were not included no matter how much these activities contributed to actual productivity. Moreover, fairly high average per capita income may co-exist with extensive and aggravated inequalities, as they do in a number of petroleum-producing states, and thereby offer quite distorted views of the actual character of the economies of these countries. Many observers have expressed concern about these ways of thinking about this matter. In a book entitled Mis-measuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up, Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi point to multiple ways by which the standard measures of economic growth not only mislead people to make questionable decisions but also inaccurately describe the world they were designed to measure. (Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2010). Even if fairly accurately estimated, per capita income represents a measure of the capacity to consume. It is an outcome of the current state of productive practices rather than a factor explaining the bases for increased productivity. Critics of the conventional standards for identifying, measuring, and pursuing economic growth call attention to how the goals embedded in these conventions have led businesses to operate in ways that aggravated inequalities and ravaged the environment. They note that, above certain modest levels, higher incomes are not correlated with greater happiness. They argue that attempts to foster growth and greater productivity, as these are generally understood, represent mindless pursuits that endanger the planet and, while enhancing life conditions for many over the past

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several centuries, are now occasioning conflict and social unrest. There is much merit in the arguments of these critics. In many settings, the pursuit of economic growth, identified with increases in average per capita income and higher average standards of living, has occasioned adverse outcomes. These include greater consumption of limited natural resources, increased inequalities in income and wealth, enclave development in many of least developed countries, the increased burning of greenhouse gases, and the growing power of financial interests. However, a strong case can be made, that the primary problem now is the particular way we have chosen to understand and measure economic growth. In this chapter, I have purposefully chosen another way of understanding economic growth as increases in productivity, that is, increases in the effective utilization of natural resources and human labor. Economic growth, rightly understood, has occurred as humans have discovered ways of making more generative uses of the Earth’s limited resources and our own abilities. Economic growth, rightly understood, has functioned as the primary means for reducing global poverty. In a world where more than two billion people live in impoverished households, economic growth, understood in these terms, remains a vital objective. Furthermore, economic growth, understood – as I have in this chapter – as the increase in the effective uses of natural resources and human labor, is in fact a critically valuable practice in a world like ours with limited natural and human resources. Interestingly, many economists mismeasure productivity by adopting a financial perspective that presumes that a business is more productive – and, correspondingly an economy is more productive  – if it can maintain or increase its output while employing fewer workers over less amount of time. This approach associates productivity with the more effective utilization of given financial investments, including investments in technology and management. To be sure, the labor of workers who remain employed is being used more effectively. However, there are good reasons for maintaining that productivity of labor ought to be gauged in relation to all those adults who are ready and interested in engaging in some kind of socially beneficial work. Many of those adults who are unemployed, underemployed, or who dropped out of the labor force often do not find socially productive ways of engaging themselves. Correspondingly, this situation represents an under-­productive utilization of human labor. A well-functioning labor market ought to be able both to find workers for firms ready to employ them and also to find positions where those seeking work can be engaged. Where the rates of unemployment and under-­ employment are high, especially but not only among young adults, in many developing areas and in many urban slums, this represents a serious social problem (The Economist 2013; Davis 2006; Wilson 1987, 1996; Cass 2018). (4) Four, the tremendous growth in the total world population has also aggravated some of the adverse by-products associated with increases in productivity. To be sure, the great expansion in the human population in large part has been made possible by the increase in productivity as well as improvements in health care and hygiene. Furthermore, increases in productivity have not directly caused population expansion. However, increases in productivity and the expansion of modern means of production in almost all regions of the Earth have provided the basis for feeding

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and sheltering a global population that has increased during the past two centuries from one billion to almost eight billion people. In turn, the growth of the world’s population has aggravated both of the negative outcomes I have reviewed, namely the divergence between those who have especially benefitted from increases in productivity and others and the aggravated impact of the productive processes on the Earth and its eco-systems. Accordingly, even as many of the least developed countries have found ways of increasing their productive capacities  – they have, for example, introduced modern agricultural practices, modern commerce, and developed some industrial capacity -- the possible advantages from these developments have in many cases not been fully realized as their populations have also markedly increased. Population increases clearly affect the relationship of humans to the Earth. More humans simply consume more – more food, energy, wood, water, and other natural resources. Expanded forms of consumption in turn put greater pressure on the Earth and its eco-systems. The economist Angus Deaton has argued that the population growth should not be viewed as a problem because, he observed, over time humans have discovered ways of living well in spite of population increases much greater than had been expected by those, like Malthus and Erhlich, who have expressed dire warnings about population growth. Deaton expressed these views in part because he opposed, as have many others do as well, draconian efforts to manage population growth through forced sterilization and public laws limiting family size (Deaton 2013). However, humans have discovered several less draconian and more humane and effective ways of limiting population growth by fostering regular education of girls and encouraging them to continue their schooling through their adolescent years, by enhancing standards of living by means of economic growth, rightly understood, and by developing public old-age insurance schemes. All of these initiatives have had a measurable impact in reducing population growth. The growth in population both in some countries and worldwide has aggravated the problems associated with global and national inequalities and the negative impact of humans on the Earth and its ecosystems. Correspondingly, adopting these kinds of initiatives are likely both to reduce the growth in population and ameliorate these adverse impacts. Five, there are ways by which increases in productivity have tended to arouse and encourage a range of negative emotions, including greed, gluttony, lust for power, excessive zeal to succeed as well as widespread feelings of resentment among those less successful in competitive markets. While many people have responded to the augmented opportunities with a sense of satisfaction and gratitude, many others have found that opportunities have aroused their desires to gain even more. Noticing others who have greatly augmented their life circumstances and wealth, they want more. The open-ended way in which increasing productivity seems to create new opportunities fosters among many people, especially among those who have already succeeded in some ways, both competitive feelings to exceed as well as feelings of wanting greater amounts of desirable goods in the form of more comforts, more properties, more entertainment, larger accommodations, more insurance, more services, and greater security. Those managing businesses operating in competitive markets, directly and indirectly, encourage these kinds of responses. These

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businesses work at encouraging people to consume and to consume more because greater consumption is good for their businesses (Bell 1976; Galbraith 1958). Without overgeneralizing, we can observe that sometimes and for some people, the opportunities occasioned by the growth in productive capacities have stimulated and occasioned excessive drive to succeed, excessive appetite for power, excessive avarice to gain wealth, and/or excessive desires to consume. At the same time, the same processes that have resulted in growth in productivity have occasioned among others, less successful in competitive activities, disorienting feelings of resentment. None of these negative emotions are necessary or inherent by-products of increases in productivity. In many ways, these negative feelings are probably for the most part aggravated by growing inequalities and what seem for some like open-ended opportunities to exploit given laws and circumstances for personal or corporate advantage. Still, they have affected many people. The critical point, however, concerns the ways these negative feelings, in settings and among people when they have become dominant, have in turn operated to occasion the negative outcomes associated with an increase in productivity, such as inequalities in wealth and abusive relationships with the Earth and its ecosystems.

Works Cited Acemoglu, Damon, and James A.  Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty. New York: Crown Publishers. Autor, David, David Zorn, Lawrence F. Katz, Christina Patterson, and John Van Reenen. 2017. The Fall of the Labor Share and the Rise of the Superstar Firm. National Bureau of Economic Research Paper, May 1, 2017. Avent, Ryan. 2016. The Wealth of Humans: Work, Power, and Status in the Twenty-First Century. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Banerjee, Abhijit V., and Esther Duflo. 2011. Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty. New York: Public Affairs. Banerjee, A., and Esther Duflo. 2019. Good Economic for Hard Times. New York: Public Affairs. Bell, Daniel. 1976. The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. New York. Basic Books. Bird, Frederick. 2014. The Practice of Mining and Inclusive Wealth Development in Developing Countries. Journal of Business Ethics. 135 (4): 631–643 Brynjolfsson, Erik and Andrew McAfeee. 2014. The Second Machine Age: Work, Progress, and Prosperity in a Time of Brilliant Technologies. New York: W. W. Norton. Cass, Oren. 2018. The Once and Future Worker: A Vision for the Renewal of Work in America. New York: Encounter Books. Chandler, Alfred D. 1981. The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Collier, Paul. 2007. The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ———. 2009. Wars, Guns, and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places. New York: HarperCollins. ———. 2018. The Future of Capitalism: Facing the New Anxieties. New York: HarperCollins. Cooter, Robert D., and Hans-Bernd Schafer. 2012. Solomon’s Knot: How Law Can End the Poverty of Nations. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Daly, Herman E. 1991. Steady State Economics. Washington, DC: Island Press. ———. 1996. Beyond Growth: The Economics of Sustainable Development. Boston: Beacon Press.

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Daly, Herman E., and John B. Cobb Jr. 1994. For the Common Good. Boston: Beacon Press. Dashwood, Hevina S. 2012. The Rise of Corporate Social Responsibility: Mining and the Spread of Global Norms. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Davis, Mike. 2006. Planet of Slums. New York: Verso. Deaton, Angus. 2013. The Great Escape: Health, Wealth, and the Origins of Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Diamond, Jared. 2005. Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fall or Succeed. New York: Viking. Easterly, William. 2001. The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. ———. 2007. The White Man’s Burden: Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good. New York: The Penguin Press. Fligstein, Neil. 1990. The Transformation of Corporate Control. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Friedman, Milton. 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Make a Profit. New York Times Magazine. (13 September, 1970). Friedman, Benjamin M. 2005. The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth. New York: Vintage Books, Random House. Galbraith, John Kenneth. 1958. The Affluent Society. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company. Gleeson-White, Jane. 2014. Six Capitals or Can Accountants Save the Planet? Rethinking Capitalism for the Twenty-First Century. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. Herman, Edward S. 1981. Corporate Control, Corporate Power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Humphreys, Macmartan, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph P. Stiglitz, eds. 2007. Escaping the Resource Curse. New York: Columbia University Press. Hyman, Louis. 2018. TEMP: How American Work, American Business, and the American Dream Became Temporary. New York: Viking. Jensen, Michael C., and William H. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3: 305–360. Mazzucato, Mariana. 2018. The Value of Everything: Making and Taking in the Global Economy. London: Penguin Books. Meadows, Donella H., Dennis L. Meadows, Jørgen Randers, and William W. Behrens III. 1972. The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome Project on the Predicament of Mankind. New York: Universe Books. Milanovic, Branko. 2005. Worlds Apart: Measuring International and Global Inequality. Princeton: Princeton University Press. ———. 2018. Global Inequality. Harvard University Press. Palen, Ronen, Richard Murphy, and Christian Chavagneux. 2010. Tax Havens: How Globalization Really Works. Ithaca: Cornell University Press). Piketty, Thomas. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Trans. Arthur Goldhammer. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Pilling, David. 2018. The Growth Delusion. London: Bloomsbury. Rosling, Hans, with Ola Rosling and Anna Rosling Ronnlund. 2018. Factfulness: Ten Reasons We’re Wrong About the World  – and Why Things Are Better Than You Think. New  York: Flatiron Books. Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2005. The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for our Time. New  York: Penguin Press. Scheidel, Walter. 2017. The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality: From the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press). Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books. Stiglitz, Joseph E., Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi. 2010. Mis-Measuring Our Lives: Why GDP Doesn’t Add Up. New York: The New Press. The Economist. 2013. Generation Jobless: Youth Unemployment. The Economist, April 27, 2013, 58–60.

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———. 2019. “What Companies are for” and “Briefing: Corporate Purpose”. The Economist, August 24, 2019, 7, 8, 14–16. Weber, Max. 1904a/1949. Objectivity in Social Science and Social Policy. In The Methodology of the Social Sciences. Trans. and ed. Edward A. Shils, and Henry A. Finch, 50–112. New York: The Free Press. ———. 1904b–5/1958. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. Trans. Talcott Parson. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. Wilkinson, Richard, and Kate Pickett. 2009. The Spirit Level: Why Greater Equality Makes Societies Stronger. New York: Bloomsbury Press. Wilson, William Julius. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. New  York: Vintage Books. World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED). 1987. Our Common Future. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chapter 14

The Political Prospects and Burdens of Our Times

Abstract  Although for centuries humans were governed by monarchs and chiefs and lived in a world of empires, tribes, and scattered nations, where people were largely regarded as subjects, as a result of historical developments we now live in a world of nation-states where governments seek to govern ostensibly in keeping with laws and in the name of – and for the benefit of – people regarded as citizens. These historical developments are noteworthy. Still, this is clearly a work in progress. We now face a wide range of challenges with respect to our diverse systems of governing both these nation-states and the world as a whole. These include developing effective systems of public administration in many developing countries, managing aggravated conflicts between antagonistic groups within countries, and addressing the challenges posed by nuclear weapons. Most of us feel very ambivalent about how we are governed. We both expect governments to provide more services associated with physical, social, financial, and legal infrastructures and we object to the diverse ways government regulations and government taxes intrude upon our lives. Political disenchantment is widespread. Still, if we are to find effective ways of managing the most significant crises of our age, we must explore ways so that we can act collectively through our governments to address these challenges both locally and globally. Over time humans have engaged in some remarkable changes in the ways we govern the societies in which we live. Since the emergence of agriculture, most societies have been governed by monarchs or chiefs, together with notables answerable to them. Their legitimacy as rulers has typically been guaranteed by birth, traditions, as well as religious beliefs and rituals and reinforced by the use and threatened use of violent means. The societies over which they governed variously assumed the form of tribes, nations, and empires. Many of the largest empires, like the Chinese, Roman, Byzantine, Ottoman, Hapsburgs, and Mongolian, or the later European and American empires, exerted power over huge territories and many different peoples. Rulers often sought to augment their power by conquering other societies, enslaving some of those they conquered, and exploiting their mineral and agricultural resources for their own advantages. What has changed dramatically over the past © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_14

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several centuries is that we now live in an international order not characterized by an assortment of empires, tribes, and some nations but an international order of nation-states. Moreover, these nation-states for the most are, or at least publicly aspire to be, governed not by monarchs and chiefs, legitimated by birth, tradition, and religious beliefs and rituals but by governments who in large part gain legitimacy by governing in keeping with some kinds of laws and in the name of the people. Furthermore, for the most part, members of these nation-states are regarded as citizens who, as citizens, possess a number of rights. The typical features of modern nation-states which I have just named are, of course, normative attributes. In practice, many nation-states fail to act in ways that fully honor these normative standards. Nonetheless, whether we are considering the Peoples Republic of China, Democratic Republic of Congo, or the present patterns of governing in Turkey, Fiji, or Chile, these standards are widely invoked to legitimate modern nation-state systems of governing.

14.1  Constructive Political Developments In the following paragraphs I will call attention to several remarkable achievements associated with these changes in the patterns of governing, both with respect to how nation-states are now governed and with respect to how, overall, humans have established institutions that facilitate our capacities to act collectively to exercise some practical forms of governance regard to the Earth and humanity as a whole. I will call attention to the prospects this legacy of developments has brought into being. I will then turn to examine a number of troubling features of this same legacy. These constitute serious, not easily resolvable burdens. These include all of the following: widespread disenchantment with political processes in many democratic states, the challenges posed by under-represented indigenous peoples and minority groups in many countries, the excessive influence on political processes exerted by financially powerful interests, threats posed both by the use or misuse of nuclear weapons and by cyber warfare, difficulties faced by the international community of nations of acting effectively in concert to address global issues like the climate change, and manifold obstacles that have made it so difficult for the least developed countries and regions to develop. As I analyze the opportunities and threats associated with the systems by which we humans currently attempt to govern both our separate societies, which comprise more than 190 individual nation-states, as well as the overall global collection of nations, I have purposefully invoked sentiments expressed by Hannah Arendt shortly after the Second World War. Reflecting back over the past several decades, with their wars, death camps, devastating depression, ongoing civil conflicts, and widespread feelings of despair, she noted that we now as never before faced the challenge of finding ways “to live in and rule together on [“and” – we would today add the words  – “with respect for”] an overcrowded Earth.” (Arendt 1951, page 435) These words are found in a book, titled in a British edition The Burden of Our

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Times but titled less accurately in its American edition as The Origins of Totalitarianism. In her preface she challenged her contemporaries to examine and bear “consciously the burden which our century has placed on us – neither denying its existence nor submitting meekly to its weight…[which called for an] unprecedented attentive facing up to, and resisting of, reality – whatever it may be.” (Arendt 1951, page viii) Globally, the political situation today both offers unprecedented prospects, for which we can be grateful, as well as complex and disturbing challenges, which represent burdens we cannot ignore. Today we live in a world of nation-states, a large proportion of which are governed in principle and often in practice in keeping with what I will refer to as the democratic agenda. I am using the term democratic agenda heuristically to refer to a broad range of characteristics much wider than the question of whether regular elections are held or not held for some legislators and government officials. Minimally, the democratic agenda calls for those in positions of political authority to govern in name of and for the benefit of the people. Whether they are elected or not, whether or not they overtly intimidate the people by use and threat of violence, and whether or not they, in fact, succeed in enhancing the well-being of their citizens, most contemporary governments gain and maintain their legitimacy by governing in the name of and for the stated purposes of benefiting the people. To be sure, many nation-states are still governed by monarchs or autocrats who make a pretense of governing in the name of the people but make little or no efforts to govern in keeping with what I am calling the democratic agenda. However, I want to focus on the large number of nation-states that have instituted at least some policies in keeping with this agenda. The democratic agenda includes a number of additional features, to which de Tocqueville referred in his books Democracy in America and The Old Regime and the French Revolution (de Tocqueville 1945, 1955). These features represent a cosmos of widely supported normative expectations. The initial and basic feature is the right of each nation-state to govern itself and thereby to exercise sovereignty over its own affairs free from the imperial influence of other governments. Understanding and interpreting what this means in the modern globalized world after the colonial era has not been as simple as it may seem. Additionally, in democratic states, governments are expected to operate in keeping with systems of laws, which in principle guide and limit both the exercise of power and contests for and transfers of power. Moreover, the rule of law itself assumes and entails the existence of courts or tribunals where claims can be heard, and conflicts can be resolved. Furthermore, in keeping with the democratic agenda, full members of nation-states are regarded as citizens rather than as subjects. As citizens, people have various kinds of rights, which may be more or less fully spelled out in law. These rights include, among others, the right to own and sell property and the right to enter into private contractual agreements, both rights for which the state is expected to enforce and guarantee. Other basic rights include, as well, the right to free expression, the right to fair trials, and the right to life and bodily integrity. In addition, nation-states governing in keeping with the democratic agenda have typically established systems of public administration, staffed by presumably competent civil servants. These systems are expected to provide a range of public services

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including policing, tax collecting, facilitating commerce and finance, providing education, as well as developing and maintaining physical and social infrastructures. In democratic nation-states, military forces are expected to be commanded and directed by civilian public authorities. Finally, in keeping with the democratic agenda, those who govern are expected to be answerable to, and receive their mandate from, citizens. Accordingly, many countries have instituted periodical electoral systems so that qualified citizens can vote for officials and legislators to represent their interests (Bendix 1964, 1978). These are the basic features of the democratic agenda. De Tocqueville identified other features, such as the valuable roles in democratic states played by arrangements allowing for local systems of self-government in villages, counties, and provinces; by the public media; and by civil societies associations. As I pursue my discussion of the political prospects and burdens of our times, I will also have reason to consider these features. However, the features named above fairly well represent the fundamental elements of the democratic agenda, broadly understood. Each of the features named above plays a vital role in helping to actualize the others. Each is integral to the whole. In given states, some of these features have been instituted much earlier than others. In Germany, for example, systems of public administration and the rule of law were developed before people were recognized as citizens and the franchise was extended to them. In contemporary China in some areas systems allowing voting at the village level have been instituted before they have even been considered at the national level. Many developing countries have established legislatures and systems of voting before they have developed anything like effective systems of law and public administration. In a noticeable number of countries, concerted efforts have been undertaken to blend modern secular patterns of governing with traditional, often religiously sanctioned, forms of governing. In some countries, like Somalia, efforts have been undertaken to give voice to traditional elders. In a number of countries with sizeable Muslim populations, efforts have been made to allow traditional Muslim law and the clerical interpretation of that law to play a significant public role. Viewed as a whole, the democratic agenda as it has been institutionalized in various nation-states is clearly a work in progress. For the moment, I think it is important when assessing the impact of the democratic agenda on the wide variety of modern nation-states to look at and appreciate the accomplishments associated with the dramatic changes in the ways societies in our world are now governed. For the present, let us examine this somewhat less than half-full glass. The modern transition from a world of empires, nations, and colonized people to a world of independent, self-governing nation-states, the vast majority of which govern in the name of the people they rule is indeed significant. The fact that most of the people living in these nation-states are regarded as citizens, who possess a range of rights as citizens, is also significant. It is noteworthy as well that most of the governments of these nation-states seek to govern by means of some kind of system of public administration, staffed largely not by an entourage of those personally loyal to the leaders but by competent civil servants. It is worth noting as well that many modern nation-states have developed systems whereby from time-to-time citizens elect

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representatives, who variously act to promote the well-being of the people. Only in a few countries do military officials directly govern and when they do so, often they justify their political role by arguing that it will only be temporary. Finally, most of the world’s current collection of nation-states ostensibly govern in keeping with some system of laws as well as on the basis of some kind of basic charter. We know of many exceptions to all of the general observations I have just made. We can point to countries currently or recently governed by autocrats, like the military dictatorships in North Korea and Syria and the way the Saud family rules Saudi Arabia. We can point to a number of countries where elections are not held, or only sham elections take place. We know that many of the basic rights of citizens, as gauged by compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are ignored or violated by governments of a large number of countries. Nonetheless, we must, I think, make several observations. Over the past several centuries the political expectations have shifted. People judge their own governments and evaluate the governments of other countries by invoking the standards associated with one or more of the items associated with the democratic agenda, as I have outlined it. Although falling noticeably short of basic principles, for example, significant progress has been made in countries around the world in making changes that more fully honor basic human rights. As Kathryn Sikkink documents in her recent study, led by grassroots movements in many different countries, millions of people now experience greater freedoms, more protection of personal dignity, and wider opportunities to lead the kinds of lives they choose to lead (Sikkink 2017). As I proceed, I will discuss at greater length a number of currently unresolved serious difficulties facing both developed and undeveloped countries today. For the moment, however, to be realistic, we must also appreciate the degree to which a significant portion of nation-states today have embraced or are attempting to embrace modern systems of self-governing in the name of the people – and the characteristic features associated with these systems. Most of the changes by which countries have sought to institutionalize practices associated with the democratic agenda have been brought about by groups within these countries demanding these reforms. In Europe, it was the city-dwelling commercial and professional classes as well as religious reformers who took the lead in instituting these reforms (Macpherson 1977; Walzer 1968) North and colleagues have argued that in some areas these kinds of reforms were adopted when a goodly proportion of the wealthy elites realized they could more effectively protect their wealth in a more open and competitive society where competition occurred in keeping with institutions characteristic of modern legal systems (North et al. 2009). De Tocqueville observed the energizing role played by diverse civil society associations (1945). In almost all cases, changes fostering economic growth and expansion characteristically preceded and accompanied political reforms. In a recent essay, Stephen Krasner has argued for what he refers to as “good enough governing.” For a number of reasons, this is a helpful suggestion. Initially what matters most when efforts are undertaken to establish modern systems of governing is developing the capacity to exercise effective administration in keeping with some kind of system of laws. Developing these administrative and legal capacities are important so overt violence is contained, civil conflicts are managed, some

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forms of basic physical and social infrastructures are established, property rights – both collective and individual – are respected, opportunities exist for some minimal forms of industry and commerce, and people are recognized as citizens with some basic rights. Under “good enough governing” much can and has been done to enhance the wellbeing of people, even though regular elections may not be held, there may be laws but not the rule of law, legislatures may not be truly representative and exercise much power, and the scope for civil liberties remains severely limited. It is useful to recognize that the chances of developing a functioning democracy are enhanced by first working to establish a number of what seem to be useful preconditions such as something like a viable and productive economy, experiences of participating in forms of local self-governing, the development of a significant number of educated and skilled people able to act as public administrators, as well as publicly trusted offices and tribunals for sorting out and managing economic as well as ethnic, linguistic, and religious conflicts. It is necessary to recognize that even working to foster “good enough governing” takes considerable time. While still acknowledging the value of the democratic agenda, it seems useful in the meantime to foster and appreciate “good enough governing” as a constructive next step (Krasner 2020). I also want to call attention to the remarkable degree to which humans over the past two centuries have gone about establishing a wide variety of institutions, which in proximate, sometimes unplanned, and frequently partial ways have functioned in practice to help govern the Earth and the overall interactions between the countries and the peoples of the Earth. These institutions have developed slowly, sometimes failing, like the League of Nations, to realize their objectives and sometimes more successfully realizing their objectives, like the United Nations. Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century agents from interested countries have been establishing a wide variety of worldwide organizations designed to manage particular kinds of global activities. For example, in 1863 the International Committee of the Red Cross was organized to coordinate efforts to protect and offer medical assistance to prisoners, wounded soldiers, and civilians during times of war. In 1874 the Universal Postal Union was established to coordinate global mail services. In 1894 and 1904 international committees were established to organize and manage worldwide athletic competitions related to the Olympics and football/soccer. During the same period, representatives from many countries developed the initial form of the Geneva Conventions. The International Labor Organization was organized in 1919 to work at establishing universally acceptable standards for working conditions. A greater number of international organizations came into being in the years just after and in response to the Second World War: including the United Nations, the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (which later transformed itself in 1994 to the World Trade Organization), the World Health Organization, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Food and Agricultural Organization, and many, many more. The latter includes a range of UN agencies, organized to promote and defend human rights, address issues related to climate change, protect and promote the interests of children, offer support and aid to refugees, and encourage trade and development among the least developing

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countries. In addition, we must remember the role played by organizations like the World Court, the International Criminal Court, as well as agencies monitoring international agreements such as those embodied in the Law of the Seas and the treaty banning chemical and biological weapons. All these organizations have worked at facilitating greater cooperation between countries with respect to particular kinds of concerns, some quite narrowly focused and some like the United Nations itself, conceived in broader and more open-ended terms. None have attempted in any way to “govern the world” in any kind of hegemonic fashion. All have sought to facilitate communication and cooperation among nation-states in relation to limited areas of interest. To this company of official, governmental and semi-governmental agencies, we must also recognize and add the vital role played a huge assortment of international civil society associations, all of which again have been organized to address particular global concerns. I have in mind here a wide range of international environmental groups, like the World Wide Fund for Nature and Greenpeace; a host of aid and humanitarian organizations, like Oxfam and Care; groups organized to facilitate trade, like a number of industry associations; international scientific associations, like the World Meteorological Association; groups seeking to foster understanding and cooperation among the faith communities, like the Parliament of the World’s Religions; and groups organized to foster responsible business practices, like Transparency International and the Global Compact; and many more. As a whole, these groups foster international cooperation for the purpose of addressing particular areas of global concern. They help to manage private and public responses to ongoing issues that call for concerted collective action. They help to “govern” the world, not by exercising dominance but by fostering collaborations and by actively addressing issues at hand (Bird et al. 2016). The development of these international organizations represents a remarkable achievement as well as a multi-faceted set of resources that we may well be able to draw on as we now face a number of troubling unresolved global crises. As a form of global governing, the role played by these diverse public, private, and civil international organizations differs from two imagined alternatives. One, several groups have proposed attempts to enhance effective global collective action with regard, for example, to the threat of climate change or the promotion of democracy, by fostering alliances between like-minded advocates. I am thinking here, for example, of the call by a number of radical groups to develop stronger ties among themselves in order to lead the fight to deal with climate change (Klein 2014). What is striking about almost all of the examples of international organizations I have just reviewed is that for the most they have sought collaboration among people from different nations, faiths, and ideological groups to address global issues on which they have focused. They have sought to foster collaborative public actions not just despite differences but in some ways out of recognition and respect for those differences. The global interfaith movement represents an important expression of this kind of cosmopolitan outlook. Two, on the other hand, historically, many people have been involved in trying to establish more commanding systems of global governance. In a book titled Governing the World, Mark Mazower, reviews the history of these

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kinds of initiatives, since the establishment of the “Concert of Europe” in the years after the end of the Napoleonic Wars. The “Concert” was a working arrangement among major European countries to avoid wars between these counties by maintaining a balance of power among them. Mazower discusses a number of other initiatives, including the efforts to promote international law, establish the League of Nations, develop the United Nations, and maneuvers by international businesses to assert a commanding role with regard to international economic policies in practice (1). He observes that none of these initiatives succeeded in developing effective governance over global affairs. He correspondingly ends his study concluding that “the idea of governing the world has become yesterday’s dream.” (Mazower 2012, p. 427) In contrast to the position taken by Mazower, I am arguing that this broad and varied range of international organizations in practice exercises a practical expression of “good enough governing” over many areas of world affairs, not by asserting commanding authority, but by fostering reciprocating conversation and collaborations at identifying, addressing, and managing, at least to a degree not previously realized, a wide range of issues facing the world today (Slaughter and LaFarge 2021) (2).

14.2  Current Political Challenges Having highlighted several noteworthy prospects associated with our collective efforts to govern both our separate communities and nations as well as the world as a whole, I will now consider a number of serious not easily resolved difficulties we face as we attempt practically, fairly, and responsibly to exercise self-governance over our separate and interrelated national and global destinies. These difficulties represent the burdens we must realistically acknowledge and confront. We cannot, for example, effectively address issues like growing inequalities or climate change unless we can find ways so that our diverse systems of governance operate to facilitate constructive actions. The challenges of governing modern nation-states and the larger community of nation-states are not simple. These challenges are affected both by ongoing issues associated with putting into practice effective and fair systems of governing as well as addressing and responding to the issues which have become especially troubling and aggravated during the end of the twentieth and the beginning of the twenty-first centuries. Managing Aggravated Political Differences  I will begin by discussing an ongoing political challenge that has not become especially more difficult but remains a persistent aggravation: namely, how to govern countries or the world more generally in the face of abiding, often acrimonious political differences. These differences are sometimes regional and often reinforced by religious, ideological, ethnic, and linguistic conflicts. In many settings, these conflicts reflect economic class antagonisms. These ongoing differences have in many settings occasioned what de Tocqueville referred to as a tyranny of a minority, where a small group – a military

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or a wealthy elite, which may also belong to an ethnic minority – dominates the larger society. They may also assume the form of a tyranny of a majority – where permanently outvoted minorities are dominated by the majority. Consider, for example, the way dominant groups in Myanmar have oppressed the Rohingya. Over time, self-governing nation-states have arrived at several standard ways of addressing these challenges. These include strengthening the protection of individual and communal civil rights and in the process working to establish and reinforce institutions and practices associated with the rule of law. These also include efforts to develop and protect federal systems that both expand self-governing powers to local and provincial levels and in addition institute means whereby these provincial governments are also represented in the national structures of governing. Charles Taylor has developed a thoughtful argument related to these issues in defense of what he refers to as the politics of recognition. He begins by observing the vital role that fitting recognition by others plays in human life. He notes that so much of our understanding of ourselves and how we are related to the world around us develops dialogically. “The thesis is,” he writes, “that our identity is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, often by misrecognition of others, and so a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves.” (Taylor 1992, page 25) In keeping with this argument, we can observe that many people in the past and in the present have not been recognized fittingly and fairly or have been misrecognized within impersonally organized institutions, such as states, educational systems, and businesses, when they have not been accorded the rights and prerogatives others enjoy. Issues of recognition, however, become more complicated and more controversial when people who are members of communities shaped by particular cultural traditions seek to establish and protect practices associated with these traditions. These have included the rights in designated settings to communicate in their own languages, to educate children in keeping with their own traditions, to resolve some disputes involving family life within traditional communal tribunals, to wear certain forms of traditional clothes and decorations, and to exercise within limits some forms of self-governance. There is an ongoing debate about the extent to which it is possible to accord special rights and privileges to particular groups without engaging in what seems like reverse discrimination. These issues remain particularly aggravating with regard to indigenous peoples. How should currently established governments act to find fair and effective ways of addressing the concerns of indigenous peoples on whose lands migrating or colonizing people long ago settled? These issues arise where settlers arrived many centuries ago as well as when they arrived more recently. Today, many indigenous groups have been demanding that dominant governments engage in actions to de-­ colonize the current situation. They call for the establishment of nation-to-nation treaty relationships, while in many settings still, in not always easily clarified ways, seeking to be treated much like full citizens of the modern nation-states in which they live. Existing political and legal traditions do not offer any simple models for

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resolving these differences. One approach, exemplified by the James Bay Treaty of 1975, between the Cree and Inuit people of northern Quebec and the Quebec government, extended to these people the powers and authority associated with municipal governments. Many indigenous groups regard this kind of arrangement as inadequate. Will Kymlicka has argued that in countries where indigenous groups have had a history of self-governing within specified territories, it might be possible to regard these groups as “nations within.” (Kymlicka 1995) In the 1990s, a treaty between the Nisga’a and the British Columbian and Canadian governments recognized the self-governing authority of this particular first nation in keeping with the provisions of this agreement, which also respected the basic citizenship rights of the non-indigenous peoples living in this area. Globally, we can see multiple examples where political antagonisms between different groups within societies not only remain not fully resolved but are expressed in ongoing violent conflicts. Over time, some of these may be peacefully resolved, some resolved by violence, a few resolved by secessions, and many continue to molder on. These conflicts are real, unavoidable, disturbing, and characteristically not easily resolved. They add to and complicate the challenges of governing. The Role of Political Parties  Another ongoing challenge revolves around the role of political parties. Political parties have come to play influential, often decisive, but characteristically ambiguous roles in how modern self-governing nation-states govern themselves. When reviewing various forms by which states might be governed, classical political theorists made little or no mention of the role played by political parties. In practice, however, political parties have become inescapably involved in how nation-states, ruling in the name of the people, have been governed. In representative democracies, political parties have been organized both in order to mobilize popular support among voters and to develop power blocks among legislators on behalf of particular policies. As organized constituencies, political parties function to enhance the influence of individual citizens and individual legislators. In principle, political parties are voluntary associations organized with regard to any one or more of a number of factors, including similarities in economic class, religious and ethnic identifications, geographical regions, and/or ideological beliefs. In most democratic societies, citizens align themselves with one or more of a number of alternative parties. In single-party states, like the People’s Republic of China, political parties play a different role, not as pressure groups organized in order to gain and keep power or criticize the policies and actions of those who have power but as pressure groups organized to support and implement the policies of governments. In three ways political parties have acted in practices to contravene basic democratic values. One, although they interact with citizens in many ways, in practice many political parties function much like oligarchies. Although the elites who lead political parties may poll and seek out the advice of party members and in some cases be elected by them, these elites have often dominated party policies (3). Correspondingly, many citizens feel they have little direct influence over how governments actually operate aside from the capacity to choose between parties

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dominated by distant elites (Macpherson 1977). Two, some of the initiatives undertaken to address the undemocratic character of political parties have tended in practice to aggravate a second problem, namely the emergence of strong, popular, charismatic leaders, who, while attracting mass personal followings, tend, like ancient monarchs and chiefs, to rule on the basis of their own personal visions. For example, reforms initiated to allow an expanded role for the public in the process by which parties select candidates have also been associated with the rise of populist leaders, whose acclaim, in turn, tends to be grounded more on their popularity than on their demonstrated competence in managing the multi-dimensional responsibilities of governing modern complex societies. The rise of populist political leaders has attracted much recent attention and fears regarding the weaknesses of politics in the contemporary world. However, worries about the way democratic political systems seem vulnerable to this problem have long been expressed, beginning with Plato, echoed by de Tocqueville, and analyzed by Weber in his discussions of demagogic, charismatic leaders, and plebiscitary democracy (Weber 1946, 1978). Three, as political parties court popular support, they frequently seek to market themselves in ways designed to enhance their strength. Often, overtly, they characterize themselves, not as those best able to address the complex issues of the day, but as those best able to respond to the desires and dreams of those whom they hope will support them. In the process, while making use of modern media, and organizing popular mass rallies, they tend at times to address the public not as citizens, bearing the responsibilities of governing, but as consumers of political ideas. While Cass Sunstein in Republic.com 2.0 demonstrates the ways social media have aggravated these tendencies, the problem is not new (Sunstein 2007). The problem began to take shape as political parties promised to best represent voters by mirroring their individual and collective desires, independent of realistic deliberations based on negotiations with representatives of other relevant constituencies and objective investigations of the issues at hand. The alternative, of course, was for political parties to promise effectively to represent the best interests of the public by their ability and commitment to engage seriously in these kinds of deliberations, informed both by negotiations with others and by relevant empirical investigations. However, as a result of these developments, followers of political parties have become both more partisan and less disposed to change their minds based on the arguments of others and empirical information (Banerjee and Duflo 2019, pp. 1–9). These development foster both greater political polarization as well as increased political disenchantment (4). Many people have expressed concern about a fourth problem connected with how the overall assortment of political parties affects the capacity to govern in the name of the people. This problem arises when there are more than two parties competing for power in a given nation-state. In countries with multiple parties where the candidate with the most votes wins, even if that candidate receives much less than a majority, then the party electing the most members of parliament often, in fact, receives a proportion of all votes cast much smaller than its proportion of elected representatives. Furthermore, the proportion of elected representatives from smaller parties often is decidedly smaller than the proportion of total votes cast in favor of

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these parties. These outcomes seem unfair, especially to members of smaller parties. Their votes seem to make little real difference except as a vague and indirect means of registering criticism and dissent. In response to this perceived problem, a variety of proportional voting systems have been developed. These systems result in increasing the number of representatives from smaller parties and reducing the number of representatives from the parties with the highest number of votes. The proportions of actual representatives more closely reflect the proportions among parties of votes cast. That seems fair. However, proportional voting schemes give rise to other problems. In some cases, radical minority parties have gained disproportionate influence. In some cases, it has proven to be difficult to put together viable coalitions among parties in order to govern with practical majorities. In almost all cases, the political parties and their leadership have gained increased power, thus reinforcing the oligarchic character of political parties, in comparison to the influence of individual representatives and voters themselves (5). It seems impossible to govern self-governing nation-states in the name of the people apart from the seemingly indispensable roles played by political parties. At the same time, the roles parties play also seem to occasion diverse feelings of discontent. Political parties have been criticized for not being democratic enough, for not being fairly represented in parliaments, for having fostered consumer orientation to politics, and for becoming excessively concerned with their own political advantages. How to address these diverse concerns represents an ongoing project, one that has been with us since the emergence of modern self-governing nation-states. In recent years these concerns seem to have occasioned stronger and more pervasive feelings of discontent. State Building in Post Conflict and Least Developed Countries  A large number of the least economically developed countries face the enduring challenge of establishing and maintaining effective national systems of self-governing, in places previously either, on the one hand, ruled by imperial powers or by local chiefs or monarchs and/or, on the other hand, recovering from periods of civil wars. State building designed to foster self-governing in the name of the people in these settings has not been easy to accomplish. Many of these countries have been divided by ethnic differences and have been sites where powerful foreign-based companies have invested in operations designed to increase their earnings by extracting minerals and hydrocarbons and by harvesting crops for export. Many of these countries have included among their citizens only small proportions of educated professionals in fields like law, medicine, engineering, accounting, and economics – professionals who might play constructive roles in state-building. In many cases, these countries have been able to construct fewer reliable and widespread physical infrastructures, such as electrical grids, road systems, and water systems, than they minimally need. A number of internationally based and nationally based agencies have been involved in fostering state-building in many least economically developed and post-conflict countries. They have taken steps to expand and improve systems of public education and public health, develop working legislatures, organize elections, and train civil servants as managers of systems of public administration. These efforts have met

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with mixed results. In a number of countries  – nations like Nigeria, Botswana, Kenya, Mauritius, and Ghana -- these efforts have occasioned moderate success. Most of these countries also benefit from reasonably effectively functioning economies which make the project of state-building more economically feasible. State building has not proceeded as well in many other least developed and post-conflict states, no matter how much aid they have received or whether or not they managed to stage elections and hold regular meetings of legislatures. In many developing states, powerful government officials have developed mutually self-benefitting ­alliances with the most powerful economic enterprises, which frequently generate their wealth by exporting resources. Sometimes referred to as neo-patrimonial structures, these kinds of governing arrangements have directly resisted if not opposed efforts to develop effective legal institutions and neutral systems of public administration (Handley 2008). More generally, in large part, state-building in the name of the people has proven to be more difficult than expected in many of these countries because they have lacked many of the preconditions that enhance the possibilities of successful state-building. For the most part, most of these countries have made at best modest progress developing the range of institutions that de Tocqueville felt were especially important for fostering democratization: namely, minimal forms of legal institutions, self-governing councils at local levels, and the creation and expansion of civil society. The political challenges facing these least developed and post-­conflict nation-states will not be easily or quickly resolved. The challenges of state-building in these countries, including those countries that continue to be governed by self-appointed autocrats, occasion a range of serious social, economic and political problems. Many of these countries have been less able to maintain public order, less able to develop social infrastructures, less able to foster economic growth, and less able to manage political conflicts. These remain ongoing challenges. Challenges Facing Governments in Industrialized Countries  Governments in industrialized countries face a range of different challenges. They face ongoing issues, concerning, for example, funding health care, updating physical infrastructures, responding adequately enough to the climate change crisis, and finding effective and politically viable ways of managing increases in wealth inequality. As more and more people live in large urban centers, they face a range of issues associated with making cities more livable, such as, controlling housing prices, enhancing educational systems, managing transportation services, addressing drug crises, and reforming correctional systems. In many settings, governments seeking to govern in the name of the people face the additional challenges of protecting the political independence of governing processes from the capacities of the financially wealthy excessively to influence these processes for their own objectives. In addition, all these governments face the continuing challenge of raising revenues that are both adequate enough and judged to be fair. In many ways, these challenges represent nothing more than business as usual. However, as governments address these concerns, making inevitable compromises, many in the public have become disenchanted with their governments.

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The Challenges regarding Armed Force  Governments of the world face two especially perplexing challenges with respect to the uses of armed force. The first concerns the serious threat posed by nuclear weapons. If any of these weapons were actually used, they would cause both immediately unbelievably extensive destruction, mostly to civilians, as well as extensive long-term damage because of radioactive fallout. By their nature, these weapons are not designed as a means to realize the military objective of countering and disarming enemy forces. Yet, huge stockpiles of these weapons exist. Although some significant progress was made in the 1980s and 1990s in reducing these stockpiles, not much progress has been made since then. In the meantime, several additional countries have developed nuclear weapons. There remain the possibilities that these weapons might be used because of faulty information, because of accidents, or because they fall into the hands of rogue groups. Another, quite different issue revolves around the threats posed by insurgent groups who, while operating not in distinct military zones but in the midst of civilians, use acts of terror to attack other civilians and political leaders. Because it is hard to counter these attacks without also endangering civilian populations, often, as in the liberation of Mosul from the Islamic State, counter-attacks have been launched that have in fact endangered a large proportion of the civilian population. The question remains: are there other viable ways of addressing these kinds of challenges? (Gross 2010; Smith 2005). Global Perspectives  We face a number of different global crises today. As we now see in the midst of the present epidemic, we cannot effectively address these crises only as Canadians or as Chinese, as Christians or Muslims, as young people or indigenous peoples, as trade unionists or as financiers. Operating with different values and different interests, with diverse feelings about the urgency of the crises we are facing, we must find ways of working together in spite of all our deeply felt differences. Accordingly, if we are not to succumb to feelings of despair, we must find ways globally of cooperating together. Minimally, such global cooperation requires that we explore ways of collaborating with many others, including groups whom we have heretofore regarded as strangers, foreigners, opponents, competitors, and even enemies. If we are going to gain the global cooperation required to address the climate crisis and the social consequences of this crisis, the current and future pandemics, global poverty, and other issues, how can we cultivate the springs of hope globally? What kinds of examples can we find that make this kind of global response seem possible? After all, most of the examples of hope I have cited and will have been more limited in their scope. These are serious questions, not easily answered. Nevertheless, we can point to examples where competitors, opponents, and even enemies have found ways of cooperating. I already discussed the example of Jonathan Powell. In his book, Talking to Terrorists: How To End Armed Conflict, for example, Powell demonstrates from his experiences working with Basque separatists and armed conflicts in northern Ireland how it is possible for enemies first to talk and then work together. During the 1970s and 1980s, the Soviet Union and the United States developed a

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system of d’etant, that fostered a number of cooperative projects between these countries seen by themselves and others as armed enemies. In a previous book, The Practices of Global Ethics, together with four co-authors, I called attention to the wide range of internationally cooperative initiatives to address global issues, from public agencies like the World Health Organization and the World Bank, the G-20, and Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, to civil society agencies like the International Crisis Group and the World Wildlife Fund. The range of these institutions and organizations is wide. They make a difference. As well, we can point to initiatives associated with the Paris Agreement on the Climate, the International Agency on Atomic Energy, and the Law of the Seas. Although we face recurrent local and nationalistic reactions against these examples of global cooperation, we are collaborating more globally today than ever before. Still, we must recognize that the current networks of global cooperation by themselves cannot adequately address the crises of our age. But they provide grounds for hope, for anticipating possibilities, for taking the next steps, and for exploring alternatives. At the same time, given the diversity of human communities and their quite different views of their own best interests as well as current conflicts between and within communities, as we seek to foster greater global cooperation, we must allow for those whose collaborations we seek to define in part the bases of their cooperation in relation to their own quite different values and agendas.

14.3  Politics and Rumors of Politics Whether viewed from the perspective of individual nation-states or globally in relation to the overall community of nations, the political prospects of our times are truly ambiguous. Contemporary political burdens and prospects are indeed complex and disturbing. We can point to much that is troubling, including pervasive feelings of disenchantment with politics in general, the challenges of fostering global responses to global issues, and much more. Over the last century and many centuries before, humans have crafted institutions, developed laws, and organized thousands of civil society and public organizations most of which have been operating constructively to help in governing our communities, countries, and the world itself. Governments now play a much larger role in the lives of people, both in relation to the many and diverse aspects of our lives their actions affect and in relation to the budgets governments now expend. At the same time, many people both expect more of their governments and seek to buffet themselves from what they regard as the nuisance which political processes represent. Nonetheless, at the present many new problems have emerged and many old problems remain unresolved. If we have any chance of addressing the multiple crises of our times, we must find ways so that we can utilize our governing processes effectively to help us coordinate and mobilize our individual, local, communal, national, and global responses. At all levels, governments are charged with this responsibility. Correspondingly, as we seek to address the issues of our day, we must also take steps to revive, reform, reinvigorate,

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and reaffirm our capacities to govern our communities, small and large. We are all vulnerable to the degree that our political processes fail to help us address the crises of our age. We have witnessed our vulnerability in the diverse responses of governments to the current pandemic. Clearly, something must be done. What is to be done? In 1902 the Russian political leader, V.  Lenin addressed this question about the crises facing Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century in a pamphlet that used this question, phrased at the time as a directive, as its title. To be effective in reforming political systems, to transform them so that they could better address the crises of the age, and, therefore, accordingly, to realize their vision of a just society, Lenin argued that it was necessary for those seeking these changes to organize themselves into a well-disciplined party. Such a well-organized party or movement would then be able to gain power and to persuade others to cooperate to bring about desired reforms aimed at enhancing the wellbeing of the people of society generally. Lenin was articulating his vision of “democratic centralism.,” whereby a well-organized and well-informed elite movement worked to bring about desired changes in the name of, and for the benefit of, the people (Lenin 1929; Selznick 1952). It is sometimes attractive to think we might be able both to articulate a commanding vision to address the problems of our age and to organize a large movement of people, groups, and countries committed to realizing that vision. However, at present, we will still live in a much more pluralistic world, where we must take account of multiple voices and diverse concerns. Clearly, when current political prospects seem uninviting or threatening, considering alternative visions may well function to revive our sense of possibilities. However, if we have learned nothing else from history, we have learned there are no panaceas. There are downsides to most promising initiatives. What especially undermines our capacity to address the burdens of our age are our own fears and anxieties, our feelings of disenchantment and despair. From a historical perspective, we know people in many countries have found ways of recovering from disturbing crises. Still, the crises we now face are in many ways unique. Furthermore, we know, as well, that many countries have not recovered from past disasters. What has mattered most in the past and in the present is the disposition of enough of the leaders and the people to keep our minds and hearts open and, thereby, to imagine possibilities even as we realistically take account of the situations in which we  find ourselves. From a historical perspective, we humans have found ways of addressing and not addressing multiple, serious political crises in the past. We have learned and we can learn from our histories.

Works Cited Arendt, Hannah. 1951. The Burden of Our Times [Also appearing under the title, The Origins of Totalitarianism]. London: Seeks and Warburg. Banerjee, A., and Esther Duflo. 2019. Good Economic for Hard Times. New York: Public Affairs.

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Bendix, Reinhart. 1964. Nation Building and Citizenship: Studies of a Changing Social Order. New York: John Wiley and Sons. ———. 1978. Kings or People: Power and the Mandate to Rule. Berkeley: University of California Press. de Tocqueville, Alexis. 1945. Democracy in America. The Henry Reeve Text as revised by Francis Bowen, ed. Phillips Bradley, 2 Vols. New York: Vintage Books. ———. 1955. The Old Regime and the French Revolution. Trans. Stuart Gilbert. Garden City: Doubleday and Company. Gross, Michael L. 2010. Moral Dilemmas of Modern War: Torture, Assassination, and Blackmail in an Age of Asymmetric Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press. Handley, Antoinette. 2008. Business and the State in Africa: Economic Policy-Making in the Neo-­ Liberal Era. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Klein, Naomi. 2014. This Changes Everything: Capitalism vs. The Climate. Toronto: Vintage Canada. Krasner, Stephen D. 2020. Learning to Live with Despots. Foreign Affairs (March/April, 2020), 49–55. Kymlicka, Will. 1995. Multinational Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Lenin, V.I. 1929. What Is To Be Done. New York: International Publishers. Macpherson, C. 1977. The Life and Times of Liberal Democracy. Oxford University Press. Mazower, Mark. 2012. Governing the World: The History of an Idea, 1815 to the Present. New York: Penguin Books. North, Douglass, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast. 2009. Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History. Cambridge University Press. Selznick, Philip. 1952. The Organizational Weapon: A Study of Bolshevik Strategy and Tactics. New York: McGraw Hill. Sikkink, Kathryn. 2017. Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Slaughter, Anne-Marie, and Gordon LaFarge. 2021. A More Inclusive International Order. Foreign Affairs, March/April 2021, 154–162. Smith, Rupert. 2005. The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: The Penguin Group. Sunstein, Cass. 2007. Republic. Co 2.0. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Taylor, Charles. 1992. Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition, ed. Amu Guttman. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Walzer, Michael. 1968. The Revolution of the Saints: A Study in the Origins of Radical Politics. New York: Atheneum. Weber, Max. 1946. Politics as Vocation. From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology. Trans. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills. Oxford University Press. ———. 1978. Economy and Society. Univesity of California Press.

Chapter 15

The Fulfilling and Elusive Pursuits of Happiness and Love

Abstract  Humans have been seeking happiness and love forever. In the following paragraphs, I will explore how contemporary expressions of these quests are related to other more often cited signs of our times. Briefly, because many people are pre-­ occupied by their pursuits of happiness and love, these pursuits in turn often shape our understanding of and readiness to respond to other crises characteristic of our times. In multiple ways and in varying degrees people are fulfilled, energized, distracted, and frustrated by the ways our search for happiness and for the loves of our lives affect our experiences. In many ways, our pursuits of happiness and love have consequences for other domains of life – the means by which we communicate and reason, how we produce and consume, how we interact with the Earth and its ecosystems, and how we think about and engage in politics and systems for governing our collective life. Humans have been seeking happiness and love forever. In the following paragraphs, I will explore how contemporary expressions of these quests are related to other more often cited signs of our times. Briefly, because many people are pre-occupied by their pursuits of happiness and love, these pursuits in turn often shape our understanding of and readiness to respond to other crises characteristic of our times. In multiple ways and in varying degrees people are fulfilled, energized, distracted, and frustrated by the ways our search for happiness and for the loves of our lives affect our experiences. In many ways, our pursuits of happiness and love have consequences for other domains of life – the means by which we communicate and reason, how we produce and consume, how we interact with the Earth and its ecosystems, and how we think about and engage in politics and systems for governing our collective life. While humans have always been eager to experience happiness, understood broadly as a sense of wellbeing, in many ways overt conscious efforts to find happiness have grown in intensity and expanded in scope over time, especially in modern times. For many centuries, over many millennia, humans focused their attention simply on trying to find ways of surviving. They directed their attention and energy in finding food and shelter, cooperating with other members of their communities, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_15

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and defending themselves against enemies, predators, and harsh environments. No doubt, whether in foraging or in simple agriculture-based economies, humans often experienced moments of happiness  – contentment, satisfaction, and peace. Moreover, from ancient times humans have also sought and experienced happiness by engaging in play, games, sports, and other leisure activities. No doubt, as well, some of those with sufficient power and wealth overtly sought to find means to protect and expand their sense of well-being by maximizing their comforts, constructing beautiful places to live, and expanding and protecting their sources of nourishment and pleasure. These may well represent some of the earliest intentional organized efforts to find happiness. However, probably earlier and always as a rival way of pursuing happiness, humans have sought and experienced moments of happiness by means of religious rites and festivals. Humans have long looked forward to these rites, as what Durkheim referred to as moments of collective effervescence, as times when they could celebrate and when they were momentarily free from the drudgery and dangers of everyday existence. The life of the Buddha well illustrates the tensions and dynamics of these early intentional pursuits of happiness. He had lived a life organized around the comforts, pleasures, and elegance of regal happiness. He came to regard this kind of life as transient, threatened now and in the future by suffering, and ultimately lacking in own-being. He renounced that kind of life in order to pursue a kind of happiness that he regarded as more enduring and intrinsically more valuable, as a celibate monk. Many others, moved by Buddhism as well as other faiths, including movements like Stoicism and Epicureanism, have consciously sought happiness in comparable ways of life. Over time and much more over the past several centuries, many more humans have consciously engaged in activities in hopes of expanding and protecting our experiences of happiness. Over and beyond our efforts to survive, to secure nourishment and shelter, to find opportunities for work, to defend ourselves against diverse threats, and to undertake what is expected of us by other members of the communities in which we live, increasingly more humans have sought ways to experience happiness. For many, many people the pursuit of happiness has come to be regarded as a fundamental right, as a taken-for-granted basic aim of life, and as an ultimate point of reference for ethical decision-making. I offer these observations without directly attempting to define happiness. People entertain many different notions both about what we mean by happiness and how we feel we are most likely to experience happiness. It is not necessary for the observations I am making to provide a definitive account. I simply want to call attention to the way the goal of experiencing happiness – moments of wellbeing – has become a conscious aim to which an increasingly large number of people devote good portions of their thinking and actions. Without referring to details, we can observe that over the past several centuries, many observers have debated about how best to understand happiness, how most fittingly to pursue happiness, and what are the major sources of unhappiness. Many psychologists, economists, and those influenced by Utilitarian mindsets have associated – some would say “reduced” – the search for happiness with efforts to maximize pleasures and minimize pains. Many romantics would agree, seeing in the

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pursuit of pleasure through romance the epitome of happiness. Others have felt that happiness can best be realized through experiences of agency, the pursuit and realization of objectives, and feelings of power. When Nietzsche argued that the will to power was a fundamental life instinct, he was not primarily referring to experiences of dominating or exercising power over others but the experiences of feeling empowered or being able to access and mobilize one’s energy – in spite of anxieties and contingencies – in expressions of creativity and forms of self-mastery. Many others have sought to find happiness through access to and possession of objects and events they can obtain and experience. In this way the search for happiness follows naturally from the basic instincts associated with efforts to care for oneself and family by finding and constructing safe and pleasant places to live, covering oneself with comfortable and attractive clothes, gaining the means to communicate and travel, as well as seeking out enjoyable forms of play and entertainment. Clearly, today humans seek to find happiness in many different ways. At the same time, as more humans have consciously both pursued happiness and done so in varied ways, increasingly larger numbers of humans have become conscious of the ways they feel less than happy. It is possible, in turn, to point to several developments that have taken place in response to this widely experienced condition. For example, well-­ known thinkers, including Freud and Fromm, have pointed to the ways people wrongly pursue happiness in relation to goals and objectives not well-designed to realize their dreams (1). Additionally, many groups and agents have gone into business to provide therapies of all kinds with aim of helping people to live with less suffering and unhappiness in their lives. As a whole, increasing numbers of people today have become intensely preoccupied with the pursuit of happiness as a compelling and central life goal. Interestingly, a number of observers have even argued that realization of happiness ought to be the standard by which we measure economic activity. They have made this proposal in part as a way of criticizing the mindless pursuit of greater wealth and higher incomes. Nonetheless, these proposals reflect the broadly held assumption that regards the pursuit of happiness as a basic right and realization of happiness as an intrinsically valuable good. Still, as greater numbers of people devote more energy and time consciously involving themselves in the pursuit of happiness, they also from time-to-time experience feelings of frustration accompanying and occasioned by this pursuit. Several observers have called attention to marked increases of seriously unhappy people in several of the industrial countries, including especially the United States and Russia, and, to a lesser extent, nations like Great Britain, Australia, and Canada. Each of these countries has experienced fairly high rates of deaths caused by suicides, opiate overdoses, and/or alcohol liver diseases. In the United States, more than 700,000 people died from opiate overdoses between 2000 and 2020, a sum greater than all the Americans who died in the two world wars. Anne Case and Angus Deaton, economists who have studied these increases, refer to these as deaths of despair. The individuals who have died by these causes probably represent a small proportion of a much larger population of people who have been experiencing times when they feel unhappy, dispirited, and glum. Some groups of people have been much more likely to be overwhelmed by these feelings. In the United States,

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the rates of death of despair have been especially high not among visible minorities but among working-age Whites who have not graduated from college. Interestingly, a decidedly larger proportion of this population group have either dropped out of the labor force or become under-employed. They are also much more likely not to have been married. Whatever other factors may be involved, probably the unhappiness of many of these people has been connected with the degree to which they have missed out on employment opportunities and the love and caring often found in regular family life. The extent to which the pursuit of happiness has become such a preoccupation probably intensifies these uncomfortable feelings (Deaton and Case 2020; Gawande 2020). I have noted briefly that increasingly people consciously seek to find more certain, more immediate, more satisfying experiences of happiness. They do so in many different ways. This is one of the characteristics of our times. Some observers feel that the intensity and preoccupation of the pursuit of happiness have had the unintended effect of reducing public-spiritedness or encouraging people to think about public issues largely in relation to our own personal and private pursuits of well-being. Furthermore, as this pursuit has become more intentional and more organized, correspondingly feelings of frustration growing out of this pursuit has become vocal and more widely expressed. In this context, it is worth observing that most people, both now and in the past, have probably sought and realized moments of happiness within relationships created and sustained by webs of affection and bonds of love. Accordingly, while still interested in the larger social, economic, and political implications of the ways contemporary humans seek happiness and sometimes experience corresponding periods of frustration, in this section of this chapter. I will primarily analyze the pursuit of happiness with regard to the ways relationship formed and energized by bonds of love affect this pursuit and in turn affect how we orient ourselves to the other crises of our age. I am using the term “love” here both broadly and precisely. I am using the word love both to describe a particular disposition, which, like courage and hope, has often been regarded as a virtue, and to describe the intense reciprocating bonds between oneself and another or others with whom we interact. These social bonds of affection both function to occasion and in turn to be occasioned by the corresponding disposition of love. These two realities, the dispositions experienced by individuals and the social bonds connecting the self with the other, are separate and yet inextricably interconnected. Within these bonds of affection, one cares about the other, seeks to fulfill desires in company with the other, cultivates an identity in relation to the other, feels nourished by the other, and seeks to be responsive to the other. Within relationships formed and informed by love, people give of themselves to, and receive gifts from, the other. People forms webs of affection –bonds of love – with all kinds of others. Consider the bonds of love, which function to create and in turn are sustained by, the relationships between parents and children, friends, lovers, family members, owners and their pets, members of communities and tribes, fans and teams and other entertainers, and even patriots who share a common love of their country. These are all overtly social relationships (2). While all of these

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relationships differ in decisive ways, each is created and sustained by bonds of love: by intense feelings of connection, which include desires to be engaged with the other, caring about the other, and feelings of being nourished by the other. Before saying more about the social reality of love, the way webs of affection connect the self with varied others, we must reflect on the character of love as a discrete multi-faceted disposition. Like all dispositions, love is at once a way of feeling, willing, and knowing. It is an overall way of orienting oneself to the world by determining which particular others, among potentially many possibilities, one will devote oneself to and enter into an ongoing interactive relationship with. Relationships of love always involve an element of excluding, turning away from some person or persons, as an integral aspect of being attracted and responding to particular others. At the same time by means of their love, we humans have created and sustained the bonds of caring and webs affection that form friendships, families, all sorts of charitable activities, and communities. As a disposition, love is characterized by several different features, all of which are present, even while some may be more salient, in particular expressions of love. Love often involves a compelling attraction to the other, such as a mother’s response to a newborn baby or a patriot attraction to her country. Our feelings of love are also moved by diverse desires, ranging from neediness and wanting to be helpful to longing to capture the pleasure we find as we interact with others. When we love, we also seek to care for the other and often to take care of the other. When we love others, we are more likely to empathize with them and often to develop our own sense of identity in relation to them. Characteristically, feelings of love arouse and flow from commitments we make in relation to particular others. Ordinarily, relationships formed and informed by love give rise to and are accompanied by ongoing reciprocating communications with others. Over time humans have created all sorts of relationships – families, kinship networks, friendships, local communities, charitable associations, large communities of faith, and nations – formed and informed by bonds of love. The human hunger for and capacity for love represent noteworthy characteristics, not absent from other species, but especially highly valued by humans. After all, it is within relationships informed by love that we cultivate and affirm our character, our moral values, our sense of conscience, and our fundamental sense of who we are. It is within the context of these kinds of relationships where we find support as well as the implicit request to be honest with ourselves. Even while so much else challenges us, distracts us, and calls for our energy, time, and attention, in the present much of what we do, we do to express our love, to gain love, and to help ourselves when we experience loss, rejection, or misunderstanding in our relationship informed by love. Because so often we have pursued happiness in the context of these relationships, our feelings of unhappiness are often colored by our experiences of disappointments in these relationships – with regard to friends, family, community, and country. In the following paragraphs, I discuss several noteworthy features of the contemporary world related to the elusive pursuit of happiness and love. One, it is important, I think, to appreciate the significant role that the human capacity to love has played in creating and sustaining relationships  – including

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families, friendships, communities generally, and communities of faith in particular – that have been and are central to human civilization. In his book Sapiens, Yuval Harari argued that larger communities, such as nations and faiths, were established as humans developed the capacity to create fictions such as legends around which they could then organize people into these larger groupings (Harari 2014). While not denying the validity of Harari’s observation, at the same I think he overlooks the ways these communities are sustained by bonds of caring and webs of affection. Douglass North and his co-authors call attention to the tremendous proliferation of voluntarily organized associations in modern industrial democracies. Along with the role of the rule of law, these features help to create and sustain what these authors refer to as “open access” social orders in which commerce and industry thrive and the overall standards of living rise. While the proliferation of these kinds of associations are indeed made possible by laws and rights granting people greater freedoms, as the authors observe, they also are in many instances created and sustained by bonds of caring and webs of affection. Correspondingly, as we work to address the diverse crises of our age, it is important not to lose sight of the role that relationships formed and informed by love have played in creating and sustaining some of the basic features of our complex, modern, and highly varied world. In this context, it is worth observing how a number of movements seeking to address contemporary crises have directly appealed to this human capacity for love. For example, a number of those calling for action to address the climate crisis directly appeal to governments and people to act now if they genuinely love their children and their grandchildren. By not acting in decisive ways now, governments and people are maintaining conditions that will leave the world in a much worse place for those we profess to love. Similarly, as we take steps to support the claims made by indigenous peoples, many people say they are acting out of love for their countries and for the indigenous peoples who are part of this larger sense of what it means to be a country. Certainly, many of those involved in programs of humanitarian service, like Doctors Without Borders, do so out of a larger sense of love for those burdened by poverty and disease. Two, in order to appreciate the bearing of the pursuit of love on contemporary crises, we must consider the relationship between love and work. While many different kinds of relationships are formed or informed by strong feelings of love – feelings of attraction, desire, companionship, and caring – almost none of these can be sustained over time without work, without concerted efforts to provide a practical basis for the relationships. I use the word “work” in order to make two different but complementary observations. In order to be sustained over time, all families and communities must address their basic economic needs. These variously involve providing or finding the resources which these relationships require in order to operate, such as housing, furniture, meeting places, nourishment, tools, means of communication and transportation, forms of entertainment, sources of revenues, means of protection, and the like. In addition, in order to make their relationships vibrant and resilient, members of families, communities, and friendships must also work at managing their relationships. Managing these relationships involves many things including identifying and maintaining fitting divisions of labor – who is expected to

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do what and when – as well as systems for sorting out real and potential conflicts. As we manage our relationships, we undertake all sorts of tasks integral to the life of our relationships, such as preparing meals, arranging meetings, managing finances, staging celebrations, caring for children, cleaning up, making repairs, and so forth. In so far as “work” in these forms is not undertaken or not undertaken effectively, then the relationships themselves, no matter how intense and satisfactory, are likely to run into troubles. Today, many relationships formed and informed by bonds of love are buffeted by these kinds of troubles. Consider all those millions of families and thousands of communities that, because of failing crops, precarious commercial opportunities, unemployment, underemployment, and/or lack of adequate transfer payments, suffer from poverty. The strains on these households and communities are significant. They are much more likely to suffer breakup of families as well as higher rates of delinquency and mental instability (Wilson 1987, 1996). The contemporary situation regarding the internal work of sorting out family dynamics differs significantly from the experiences of families traditionally and even as recently as several generations ago. Traditionally, especially in societies still structured on the basis of strong lineage relationships, how people lived as families was largely determined both by widely shared norms, which changed only little and gradually over many years, and the example and directives of elders. However, over time, especially in urban areas of industrialized societies, a large proportion of the individuals forming couples and families expect to establish their own ideas of how to be families and their own norms regarding matters like the division of labor, the raising of children, and the resolution of differences. This shift in normative expectations raises the prospect that ever-larger agenda of matters need to be sorted out, more issues are likely to occasion conflicts because of differences in family backgrounds, and that more self-conscious family “work” will need to be done (Berger et al. 1974). The high rates of divorce and separation in many industrial countries indicate, among other things, that many couples and families face challenges resolving the issues regarding the work that is an integral aspect of their relationship. Many have a hard time figuring out how best to do the “work” of managing their relationships. Three, it is useful to consider the relationship between identity politics as well as the politics of recognition, both of which began to become prominent during the last several decades of the twentieth century, and the hunger and desires of people to be loved. Ordinarily, we seek to love and be loved, to be fully recognized, acknowledged, and accepted, within relationships formed and informed by love: that is, within friendships, families, and close communities. In contrast, within larger, impersonal milieux characteristic of business, science, education, and government, ordinarily, people have rather sought to be regarded more impersonally as fellow workers, scientists, teachers, and students, and as citizens and officials without regard to their personal characteristics, such as their ethnic affiliation, faith, family background, or sexual identity. Taking the latter characteristics into account in the past has almost always been associated with discrimination. Identity politics and the politics of recognition have sought in part to reverse this situation, calling for overt public recognition of persons with regard to identities established in relation to their

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affiliations with particular ethnic or linguistic groups and/or their personal and private sexual identity. Those influenced by these ideas have sought in the impersonal worlds of business, science, education, and government to be recognized and acknowledged in terms of their own personal views of identity. Correspondingly, it would seem they want to be regarded not just impersonally as fellow workers, scientists, students and teachers, citizens and officials, but also personally in terms of their chosen self-identities. It is understandable and normal for people to hunger for personal recognition and acceptance. Within relationships formed and informed by love, as a result of engaging in the give and take activities of sharing and listening, caring for and being cared for, we gain recognition, acceptance, and the lively sense of who we are. Likewise, we are likely to feel enhanced by corresponding feelings of community. To be sure, for many different reasons, things don’t always work out as we would like within these relationships. Clearly, those who call attention to the subtle, as well as overt ways in which diverse minorities are discriminated against within the impersonal worlds of business, science, education, and government, have contributed to public well-being. However, identity politics at times seems to ask for and demand something more. At times it seems to require that others extend to them the kinds of special recognition, acceptance, and regard associated with personal relationships while still acting impersonally and respectfully. Identity politics seems to require others at once to act with discrimination, understood positively as offering selective attention to special others, while at the same time not discriminating, understood negatively as failing to treat others fairly based on impersonal standards. Depending on how they are expressed, identity politics have occasioned antithetical responses. Identity politics have functioned beneficially to expose forms of injustice within impersonally organized settings. They have also initiated fruitful negotiations, which have resulted in some settings in establishing, in relation to a particular faith, ethnic, and linguistic traditions, alternative school systems, supplementary welfare programs, tolerance for alternative forms of dress, and even tolerance for some forms of community-based judicial hearings. However, in other settings identity politics has become associated with forms of special pleading, asking for extra benefits not readily available to others in these impersonally organized milieux. Correspondingly, identity politics have often become more personally fraught, both for their supporters and critics, than one might expect. It might be assumed that the elusive pursuits for happiness and love are private matters that have little bearing on the major public issues of our age. However, these personal pursuits are interrelated to these public issues in several ways that are worth considering. For example, our human capacity to love and form relationships informed by caring, charity, and commitment constitute a vital resource as we seek to address these issues. Moved by love, people form communities devoted to helping community members and others and to addressing many of the issues of our day. To the degree that people find support in relationships formed and informed by love, in mutually beneficial friendships, families, and communities, they are both more likely to experience periods of well-being and feelings of happiness and less likely to feel overwhelmed by feelings of resentment. Both in the past and currently,

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communities of faith, as communities shaped by commitments to care for other community members, have played large roles in establishing and dispensing charitable assistance. Finally, if people truly love their grandchildren, then, as the environmental activist Greta Thunberg and many others have asserted, they are more likely to be moved to act to address issues that will only make life worse for these grandchildren if constructive concerted actions are not taken. Contrariwise, the pursuits of happiness and love can often have quite opposite consequences. To the degree that people become fascinated and preoccupied with the lure of finding happiness in immediately gratifying experiences – in pleasures, family outings, community celebrations, and the like  - they may then find that actions devoted to addressing the public issues of our age are distracting and bothersome. Accordingly, many people regard public discussions of political issues, like climate change, global poverty, and threatened ecosystems, as instances of self-­ important posturing by others expressed in often repeated and hence boring rhetoric. Why become concerned about such matters about which, many people feel, so little constructive and significant can be done? It makes more sense to engage in our pursuits of happiness and love, where we are more likely from time to time to benefit from self-enhancing experiences and relationships of mutual affection and care. For many people, much of the time, the pursuits of happiness and love seem to be intrinsically valuable, self-authenticating activities. To be sure, it is certainly possible to engage in these kinds of activities while also acting to address other public issues. However, to the extent that people find themselves less happy than they would like and bereft of genuinely satisfying relationships with friends, family, and other social groupings, then they may well find it difficult to think about and respond to other public issues of our age. Without providing more illustrative examples, I simply want to offer a modest observation. Our human capacity to love and our seemingly intrinsic interest in seeking to promote human wellbeing – what some would call happiness or human flourishing – for ourselves and those we care about are vital resources that we can draw upon as we seek to address the critical issues facing our world. At the same, we can see ways in our contemporary world by which these pursuits of happiness and love have become in many ways both more intense, more complicated, and more distracting.

Works Cited Berger, Peter, Brigitte Berger, and Hansfried Kellner. 1974. The Homeless Mind: Modernization and Consciousness. New York: Vintage Books. Deaton, Angus and Anne Case. 2020. Deaths of Despair and the Future of Capitalism. New York Times. Gawande, Atul. 2020. Why Are Americans Dying from Despair? The New  Yorkers. (March 16, 2020). Harari, Yuval. 2014. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. Toronto: Random House.

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Wilson, William Julius. 1987. The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. ———. 1996. When Work Disappears: The World of the New Urban Poor. New  York: Vintage Books.

Chapter 16

Further Reflections on the Signs of Our Times

Abstract  Assuming many different expressions, feelings of despair are widespread today. We see evince of this despair in the distrust of science, decline in civility, aroused feelings of anxiety and fear occasioned by the crises of our times, pervasive feelings that current world conditions are not as they should and might be, and especially in increasing feelings of resentment. These feelings of despair attract and absorb our energy, cast shadows over visions, and make whatever possibilities exist seem small, illusory and insignificant. Typically, many of us adopt one or more of the following strategies. We just soldier on, trying to ignore conditions that occasion our despair. Alternatively or additionally, out of fear and anxiety, we find ourselves attracted by apocalyptic images and scenarios. Alternatively or additionally, we express wishful commitments to unduly optimistic ideals. And/or finally, we seek out solace in diverse forms of spiritual exercises. Each of these life strategies is attractive and represent ways of managing our feelings of despair. However, none of these life strategies represent anything more than dim hopes. Alternatively, we can seek out ways to cultivate our capacity for hope.

16.1  Why Do We Despair in Desperate Times? We are living at a critical moment in the history of human life on Earth. To be sure, as a whole, even though the global population is much larger than ever before, we humans are living longer and healthier lives at higher standards of living than ever before. Nevertheless, we face a range of diverse crises that are unique in their scope and the ways they impact upon us and the Earth. For example, the crises aggravated by climate change affect everyone as well as the Earth and most living creatures. Based upon what we know now, climate changes will have lasting, long-term, and adverse impacts on how humans live. We already are experiencing the effects of these crises in rising levels of the Earth’s oceans, increases in severe storms, more droughts, and increases in forest fires. These conditions have also forced tens of thousands of people to flee lands no longer hospitable to their traditional patterns of life. At the same time, we find ourselves buffeted by many other crises, which I have © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_16

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reviewed in the previous chapters. These include increasing inequalities in wealth, continuing high levels of poverty even as levels of extreme poverty have declined, aggravated feelings of political disenchantment and polarization, ongoing not easily resolved violent conflicts in many countries, and depleting supplies of fresh water in a number of areas. We can easily add to the list of crises as we consider rising levels of drug abuse, people suffering from mental health challenges, soaring costs for housing, continuing expression of racial and ethnic discrimination, and the current and probable future pandemics. As I already observed, many people find it hard to focus on the climate crisis, as catastrophic as this crisis is likely to be, because they are so preoccupied with other more immediate crises. As we reflect on the crises our world is facing today, and the unique set of challenges each of us faces, it is natural to experience feelings of dismay and despair. The most serious challenges we face today are disturbing if not frightening, extensive in scope and impact, not easily resolved, and interrelated in complex ways. How can we, for example, at once help reduce the poverty of the billions living in impoverished households, dramatically reduce greenhouse gas emissions, help to resettle tens of millions of people displaced by global warming, re-establish confidence and legitimacy in political processes, and render our cities more liveable and resilient? At the same time, how can we support and protect our families, keep up with our fast-changing worlds, and manage the threats and reality of violence whether in the form of drugs, civil conflicts, or the ongoing oppression of indigenous peoples? How can we, in the meantime, find ways to address the current pandemic and somehow re-establish and revitalize our ordinary lives? As we think seriously about the state of the world today, even as we reflect on the many ways in which the life circumstances of millions and millions of humans have been greatly enhanced during the past several generations, nonetheless, many of us are inclined to feel overwhelmed and discouraged. How is it possible to address all these crises? What makes the current situation in which we find ourselves so disturbing and occasions so much dismay and despair is that the outlooks of so many people seem to be shaped by moods and habits of interaction that make it much more difficult to work at resolving the diverse global and personal problems we face. For example, many people have lost faith – or have appreciably less confidence – in the institutions and values that we humans have typically called upon to address challenges we have faced in the past. As I have observed, many people express less trust in the practices of reason and science. Furthermore, to refer to another worrying development, while political discourse has always been contentious, argumentative, and rhetorical, in recent years increasingly many of those involved in politics have seemed to abandon many of the norms associated with civility. While ignoring or failing directly to respond to the arguments of others, whom they mock, they seek primarily to arouse and placate those who share their own views. In addition, currently, many people feel overwrought and undermined by feelings of fear and anxiety. These feelings are occasioned by the large unresolved issues like the global threat of climate change as well as personal matters, such as feelings of financial insecurity and the ways others seem to belittle our ways of life. These feelings are aroused as well by uncertain economic prospects, associated with reduced job

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security, rising urban housing prices, increasingly large household and government debts, and a high rate of unemployment and/or underemployment especially in developing economies. These fear and anxieties also reflect the uncertainty and apprehension many people feel regarding the capacity of our governments to find effective solutions to a diverse array of social, economic, and political problems. To be realistic, we must take account of another theme that runs through the previous six chapters but on which I have not yet focused. Namely, today widespread, deeply held feelings of resentment represent an extensive and troubling problem. These feelings seem to know no boundaries. They are expressed by the political right and the political left, both of whom feel hard done by current circumstances. Feelings of resentment hover in the background as people outside particular thriving locales in the least developed countries struggle to make ends meet as their local economies sputter and stagnate. Feelings of resentment shape the attitudes of many young people in developing countries who feel their own prospects are frustrated and undermined by meager job opportunities, their own practical political impotence, and the ways reigning political and economic elites ignore their concerns. Feelings of resentment infiltrate the thoughts and feelings of many working-­ class and middle-class households in the industrializing and industrialized countries whose own household economies have stagnated while the wealthiest households over the past 40 years have increased both their wealth and incomes. Feelings of resentment color the complaints and criticisms of liberals who can’t comprehend why more political support isn’t shown for what they regard as their reasonable proposals for dealing with the issues of our age. As well, these feelings taint arguments of conservatives who feel their opponents are just proposing self-serving schemes that will further undermine what these conservatives hold dear, such as their families, communities, and traditions. Feelings of resentment arise when people sense the possibility that things could be different and better, that others – in their own locale or in other locales – already benefit from these possibilities, but they see no realistic steps forward they might take on their own to realize these possibilities. They strongly desire – really, wish – things were different. But they feel helpless and frustrated. They are prone to diffuse feelings of blame – what Roberto Unger calls feelings of belittlement. They especially blame others, who they think should, and wish they would act differently to make things alright. In many instances, probably in unconscious ways, those experiencing strong feelings of resentment may also blame themselves for not being able to find more effective ways of making a difference. To the extent they experience personal feelings of belittlement, some of them may also feel impelled to act out, lashing out at others or at themselves (Unger 2014). Resentment is a strong, self-­ justifying, and self-reinforcing emotion. The pervasive feelings of resentment spring from a number of factors. They arise especially in modern open societies, as Max Scheler observed, when individuals compare their own life circumstances with others and wonder how and why others seem to benefit from advantages in ways they don’t (Scheler 1915). Feelings of resentment can be occasioned as well when we wonder how and why others behave the ways they do or take positions they take, which we in turn regard as offensive

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and excessively self-regarding. Feelings of resentment may be triggered by our sense that our lives as we experience them are simply not turning out as we had been led to believe they would. Feelings of resentment especially arise in settings where people, moved by their own pursuits of happiness, instead experience disappointments, frustrations, and unhappiness. Feelings of resentment often arise whenever we feel judged  – and especially unfairly judged  – by others, often in situations where we cannot directly identify who in particular is judging us. Feelings of resentment make people feel belittled and bitter. Correspondingly, feeling resentful, people tend to act querulously, cranky, self-preoccupied, and more ready to react than to patiently respond. Unlike anger, which is energizing, resentment is enervating. Here, I would especially like to focus on feelings of resentment as they have been occasioned by deeply ambivalent attitudes towards the role of government in modern industrial nation-states. In alternating moments, many people both want their national governments to do more and to do less. When they are feeling the government might do more, they want to hold the governments accountable when the economy is not working as well as it might, when they feel their jobs might be threatened by technological changes or by the arrival of immigrants, when they feel that public health services or the schools or policing services do not meet their expectations, or when they worry about how climate changes are aggravating adverse weather conditions. On the other hand, they complain about the excessive role of governments when particular regulations interfere with customary practices, when they calculate their taxes, or when governments make mistakes, as they all inevitably do. In fact, as nations have industrialized, the role of governments has greatly expanded in part to manage the risks occasioned by markets in industrial societies and in part to provide public services, in the forms of education, policing, social insurance, and emergency aid almost everyone counts upon. We often fail to appreciate that it would be impossible for the diverse markets integral to industrial societies to operate without the physical, social, economic, and legal infrastructures largely established and funded by governments. In any case, feelings of resentment related to our ambivalent attitudes towards government are widespread (1). These widespread feelings of resentment occasion at the same time two quite different but mutually self-reinforcing sentiments. These feelings occasion on the one hand what I would describe as a culture of complaint and on the other hand strong feelings of wistful wishing. When we engage in complaining, we both express and arouse feelings of being hard done by. Correspondingly, we are moved to begin pondering what we wish might happen, so that we wouldn’t have to complain. However, because wishes are wishes, as we engage in wishing we become aware of how the real world differs from our wishes and we again find ourselves feelings hard done by. Neither of these sentiments is particularly constructive. Both are expressions of despair – the absence of the realistic sense of openness, which is characteristic of hope. Both sentiments make it much more difficult to address crises of our age in a problem-solving way. While there are, of course, good reasons to despair, nevertheless feelings of despair – mingled with fear, distrust, and resentment – make responding to the crises of our age much more difficult. Despair attracts and absorbs energy, casts shadows over visions, makes openings seem small and distant and illusory, encourages

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cynicism, and fosters and feeds off of frustrations and disappointments. Given the crises that overwhelm us and the dark moods that undermine us, what are our options? We can in the present moment take steps to identify, acknowledge, and find energy from the springs that foster hope. However, before exploring this possibility, realistically, it is useful to consider alternative options for coping in desperate times, many of which many of us have found attractive. We can, of course, just soldier on. Many of us have been doing do just that. We attempt to make light of the crises unfolding around us, seeing in them just current expressions of well-known patterns. There have always been wars and rumors of wars, poverty and wealth, periods when the Earth was colder or hotter, politicians who looked out for the public good and those that didn’t. To be sure, things have changed. The Earth is populated by more humans and more of us live in cities. We can communicate in many more ways, and we have invented more destructive weapons. However, all we can do is to do our best to use the opportunities we have to make reasonable lives for ourselves. Rather than aspiring to realize inaccessible dreams or gloomily carping about what we don’t have, we just try to get by. Distracted neither by compelling aspiration nor by disturbing threats, we try to make the best of what’s available. When Thoreau wrote that “The mass of men live lives of quiet desperation,” I suspect he had in mind those of us who just try to soldier on: those of us not inclined to raise fundamental questions, who shy away from dangers, who do our jobs reasonably well, who live ordinary lives, and who assume the problems of the age will be managed by others or just go away (Thoreau 1959, p. 5). Sometimes intentionally but often without much thought, we seek to protect ourselves both from allowing ourselves to get too involved with the crises of our age, about which we feel we can make little difference. We also attempt to ignore our own latent feelings of fear, threat, resentment, distrust, and impatience. We can, I think, easily understand and well appreciate why many of us feel this way. In an era of much wrangling and disputation, just soldiering often makes sense. It often serves as a protective and comforting way of life. Still, as we become more fully aware of the climate crisis and the by-products of this crisis, as seek to find a safe way through the current pandemic, as we reflect on the struggles, near and far away, aroused by angry men and women, and as we consider the losses occasioned by the present economic downturn, many of us have become overwhelmed by feelings of fear and fright. The world seems out of control. Fires are raging in the south and in the north; hurricanes are destroying homes and farms; government leaders blatantly break laws and lie to their citizens, and millions of people are losing their jobs: we don’t need movies or books: the apocalypse seems to be upon us. As the popular song expresses it: “It’s the end of the world as we know it.” To be sure, plagues in the past may have killed far more; economic depressions in the past may have caused far greater hardship; former political leaders may have been even more ruthless; during the last Little Ice Age, humans may have had to endure more severe weather conditions; and for many, the last world war seemed to threaten the civilization to which we had become accustomed. Yet, for many of us, the current situation feels truly threatening, if not potentially catastrophic, if we don’t find ways very soon, if not today, of addressing the crises of our age. As I have already argued, there is much merit in these observations and feelings. Feelings of fright, some observers

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proceed further to argue, can function in a helpful way to convince people of the need to act with deliberate speed to address issues like the climate crisis or global poverty. These observers further argue that, as these and other crises worsen, more people are likely to feel threatened by the consequences of these changes. A great many – perhaps most humans – will suffer. Consequently, this line of argument assumes, they will be readier to act. Feelings of fright, accordingly, can sometimes serve as catalysts for gaining greater support for more active involvement and for needed policies changes (Dufresne 2019). Sometimes, perhaps. However, aggravated sense of threat and growing feelings of fright often – if not predominantly – occasion other kinds of responses. People may well become more frightened and more defensive. As a result, they may become less willing to consider changes, readier to follow populist leaders, more inclined to retreat from public worlds with all their problems. Accordingly, while I can understand why many people today feel apprehensive and frightened, I find few if any grounds for hopes in these feelings. Many of us seek to rise above and ignore our feelings of despair through idealism. We imagine futures that are less distressing. We know what should be done. We are, after all, well aware of the problems people are currently facing. Correspondingly, spurred on by our wishes of what we would like to happen, with bursts of optimism, we assume these highly valued goals can be achieved. Surely, ought implies is, or at least is possible or can do. Often, to be sure, we find we can realize some proximate targets. In any case, it feels good to be idealistic. It is reassuring to feel we are taking steps to do what should be done. Often as idealists, we regard ourselves as realistic because we are so conscious of the trying circumstances we are attempting to address. As idealists, we are often more inclined to focus our attention on promising rather than perilous possibilities. However, idealists are often less than fully realistic about the opposition and resistance they are likely to face as well as about the mistakes and oversights they are likely to make along the way. Sometimes the militancy with which we pursue our ideals reflects not only the urgency of the problems we are trying to resolve but also our own doubts and fears of failure which we don’t really want to acknowledge. In so far as we become in fact unrealistic, we are correspondingly likely to act in ways that often occasion overt despair. Because the goals we seek remain not fully realizable because the expectations we have aroused seem beyond reach, others, less inspired, become discouraged. Some idealists then double down and become more fanatical. Often, as idealists, we reassure ourselves by ever more firmly embracing our ideals when things go wrong. Typically, our idealism moves us to act and our actions, even if they fail to realize our objectives in the ways we wish they would, can be defended as doing what we can. One of the oldest and most respected ways of living during desperate times is to engage in some form of spiritual practice, like mindfulness. After writing an overview account of the history of humankind and looking at the problems of our age, Yuval Harari has recently offered a compelling testimony to the value he has found from the practice of mindfulness (Harari 2014, 2018). Those who practice mindfulness acknowledge that we cannot in any significant way resolve the crises we face. However, we can at least determine how we will orient ourselves with regard to the desperate situations in which we find ourselves. In different ways, ancient Stoics,

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Epicureans, and Buddhists assumed a stance much like this. As he reflected on the sufferings and misfortunes of the world after World War Two, Mircea Eliade adopted a similar view. From this perspective, the world is full of suffering and distress. The forces of history seem propelled without any real concern for justice and human welfare. However, humans can momentarily achieve some happiness, joy, and peace of mind by stepping outside the mindless flow of history. Sure, we live in desperate times. But, so what! By practicing meditation or by participating in rituals that foster collective effervescence, we can from time to time enhance our own sense of wellbeing. Note well: practicing mindfulness or other spiritual exercises can often function as a form of escaping the trying circumstances in which we find ourselves. However, these practices, just like engagement in activities of playing, can also function to help us re-set our inner dispositions so that we are psychologically and socially readier to confront the demands of the day and imagine and anticipate realistic possibilities. Each of these responses  – soldiering on, panicking, embracing idealism, and practicing mindfulness or other spiritual exercises  – can be combined with other responses or pursued by themselves. Rather than overtly despairing, many people follow one or more of these ways of living in desperate times. Each response is understandable and, in many ways, appealing. Each in its own way is self-­ reinforcing. However, none directly embody hopefulness as the disposition realistically to anticipate possibilities within the flow of current history. Correspondingly, each in its own way often represents hidden forms of despair, that is, ways of living without hope. To be sure, both those driven by feelings of panic and by ideals do directly attempt to respond to the exigencies of our times as they understand them. However, each in its own way embraces realism halfway, one more fully reacting to disturbing circumstances and the other more fully committed to searching for promising possibilities. In so far as they represent any expression of hopefulness, they embody dim forms of hope.

Works Cited Dufresne, Todd. 2019. Democracy of Suffering. Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press. Harari, Yuval. 2014. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind. Toronto: Random House. ———. 2018. 21 Lessons for the 21st Century. London: Jonathan Cape. Scheler, Max. 1915/1961. Ressentiment. Trans. William W. Holdheim. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe. Thoreau, Henry David. 1959. Walden. New York: Rinehart and Company, Inc. Unger, Roberto Mangabeira. 2014. The Religion of the Future. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Chapter 17

Conclusion: Carpe Diem

Abstract  To the case already made for the critical value and possibility of living with hope, I add two additional arguments in this concluding chapter. One, referring to the expositions in the previous seven chapter, this chapter calls attention to often overlooked grounds for hope. These include powers humans have gained – and benefitted from – learning how to utilize the resources of the Earth, cultivating their own powers of reason and imagination, more productively utilizing natural and human resources, developing more effective and humane systems of governing, and developing and expanding social relations as expressions of our capacity for love. I call attention to these developments not as signs of progress but as assets we are called upon to appreciate and draw upon to address the crises of our times. Two, the chapter also calls attention to the ways it is people moved and informed by hope that especially make a difference as we take next steps and then more next steps, over and over again, to respond to the crises that challenge us. The Latin words “Carpe Diem” are usually translated as “seize the day.” Typically, the phrase has been invoked to excuse oneself, or counsel others, to take advantage of the present moments in order to enjoy oneself before circumstances get much worse. I am invoking the term here for a related but significantly different purpose. As I have attempted to demonstrate, to the degree that people feel hopeful, we correspondingly feel we can seize the day: we can imagine and explore possibilities; we can face and find ways of responding to crises; we can take advantage of the present to create opportunities. The Latin words “Carpe Diem” are usually translated as “seize the day.” Typically, the phrase has been invoked to excuse oneself, or counsel others, to take advantage of the present moments in order to enjoy oneself before circumstances get much worse. I am invoking the term here for a related but significantly different purpose. As I have attempted to demonstrate, to the degree that people feel hopeful, we correspondingly feel we can seize the day: we can imagine and explore possibilities; we can face and find ways of responding to crises; we can take advantage of the present to create opportunities.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7_17

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We face a number of serious, threatening crises in our world today. I have reviewed these over the previous seven chapters. Still, in so far as we find ways of cultivating the disposition of hope, like many of our forebearers in the past and many of our contemporaries in the present, we can find ways of addressing these crises constructively. As I have argued, hope is not optimism. It is not a wishful desire for uncertain objects. It is not a promising view of the future. It is embodied in the robust and energetic disposition realistically to anticipate possibilities in the present when the future is uncertain and unknown. In previous chapters, I reviewed many examples of how hopeful people have solved problems, constructively addressed crises, and in other ways made a difference. Hope is a generative disposition. It functions to help people open doors, consider alternatives, and explore possibilities. To be sure, the crises we face today differ from those in the past. They are more intrinsically global. They affect the fundamental relationship of humans with the Earth. Still, in so far as we cultivate our capacities to hope, in the many different ways we are inclined to express our hopes, we can – as many of us already have been – take the next steps to confront the crises we face.

17.1  Grounds for Hope While it may be neither wise nor really possible to respond to the crises we face at this moment in human history with optimism, there are many grounds for responding with hope. In the following paragraphs, I will review a number of these, in each case referring to them not as guarantors but as grounds, which we may draw upon as we seek to cultivate our capacities for hope. To begin with, we can in part ground our hopes on the powers we humans have been able to develop over the centuries. Accordingly, while analyzing contemporary crises with a historical mindset in the previous seven chapters, I have also reflected on many social and natural assets humans can and have drawn upon as we attempt to address these crises. For example, over time humans have learned much about how to cultivate the bounty of the Earth, its seas, its soil, its mineral, and its flora and fauna. We have also learned much about how to cultivate them sustainably, gratefully, and with due respect. Similarly, over time, humans have learned how to develop our powers for reason and communication. We have developed languages, sciences, and systems of mathematical calculation. We have developed systems of communicating in written form and we have established ways of creating and storing vast amounts of knowledge. We have developed skills at thinking. As a by-­ product of these developments, we have greatly enhanced our capacities to educate ourselves and provide medical services and health care. As a result of these developments, we live longer, and we are better educated than humans have ever been. Over the centuries, we have also greatly expanded our capabilities to utilize natural resources as well as human skills and dispositions to produce goods and services to meet human needs and wants. Correspondingly, in many ways, we have enhanced our life circumstances and a much smaller portion of humans live in poverty. These

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increases in productivity now allow almost eight billion people to live on Earth. Moreover, as a result of these developments, we are in a position now so that we can, if used fittingly and fairly, draw upon many of these collective productive processes to help address many of the crises of our age, from global poverty to climate change. For example, we now possess the means to sequester measurable amounts of CO2, to remove small but significant amounts of this gas out of the atmosphere, and to generate ever-larger supplies of energy from renewable sources. We also have the capacity to develop physical infrastructures to supply the roads, electricity, and water in ways that have helped and can help least developed countries further develop. Over time, humans have also developed diverse legal, political, and social institutions that have functioned to help us govern our communities, nations, and our inter-national interactions, as all of these polities have become more complex. To be sure, all of these institutions operate both functionally to realize and protect shared collective purposes as well as, at least in part, dis-functionally in ways that undermine these aims and values. Still, we can and must call upon these governing systems as we seek to address the crises of our times. We can also appreciate the extent to which the nations of the world have more fully developed responsible systems of public administration, more fully recognized the people they govern as citizens, and more fully acknowledged their basic human rights. In all instances, these are imperfect works in progress. Finally, as a by-product of our capacity for love, we have acted to build friendships, families, and communities. Moved by love, we have devoted ourselves to realizing diverse valued objectives. We have joined together to offer charity to those in need and we have offered our time, talents, and energy variously on behalf of our countries, or grandchildren, and the planet, which is our common home. These developments at once represent actual but ambiguous developments. While reviewing these developments in previous chapters, I also called attention to problems these developments have occasioned. Nevertheless, these developments have made a difference. We would experience our lives differently and much more adversely without these developments. At the moment, I am making reference to these historical developments not as signs of progress but as resources, which we can call upon as we seek to address contemporary crises. As I observed in Chapter 7, John McKnight has encouraged residents of low-income neighborhoods to begin to take steps to empower themselves not simply by finding effective ways to protest about how badly they have been treated but also by identifying and learning to utilize overlooked assets in their midst. Similarly, these historical developments represent often overlooked or taken-for-granted assets in our midst. They represent strength and potentialities. They remind us that we can more appreciatively and imaginatively utilize these assets. Most valuably, as we reflect on these historical developments, we become more fully conscious of the institutions, inventions, powers, and resources we have inherited from the past. We don’t have to reinvent either the wheel or the internet, our languages or our legal traditions, the wisdom embodied in our literature, or the social and physical infrastructures we have come to count upon. For all the looming crises we face, we still enjoy a wide array of assets that have been handed down from the past and that greatly enhance

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the possibilities in the present. We can be, and we are challenged to be, appreciative of these assets. I have written the previous seven chapters from a historical perspective because I think it critically important that we find ways today, in the midst of all the outrage and alarm we feel regarding the crises we face, to cultivate fitting sentiments of appreciation and gratitude for assets we have inherited from the Earth and as a result of what our forebearers have accomplished. Fostering these sentiments is not a trivial matter, because these sentiments are integrally related to our capacity, in turn, to cultivate dispositions to live by hope. Without gratitude, rather than realistically and flexibly anticipating possibilities, our longings for hope often become desperate and shade off either into wistful wishing or often fanatic demanding. Accordingly, gratefully appreciating what can be validly appreciated as a result of historical developments constitutes another, albeit partial, ground for our hopes. We can also in part ground our hopes on our capacities to learn much by critically reviewing these historical developments. As I discussed in Chapter 8 and Appendix one, although it is often not easy, we can learn from the mistakes we have made and the difficulties we have encountered. For example, we are still in a process of exploring what we can learn from the mid-twentieth-century horrors of the Great Depression, the Second World War, the Death Camps, and dropping the first Atomic Bombs. We can and must inquire: In what ways had many of us acted that functioned in practice to occasion these events? What might we now learn to reduce the possibilities that events like these will happen in the future? In so far as we seek to blame these events on particular others, we haven’t learned as much as we might. Still, as I pointed out in Chapter 9 while discussing the thoughts of Jaspers, Camus, and Arendt, as a whole, humans have learned much from reflecting on these events. In the immediate post-war years, representatives from many nations – including fierce ideological opponents – established a number of institutions in hopes both of restraining human capacities for evil and of promoting our capacities to work together for the common good. In the meantime, we continue to learn how insidious feelings of resentment can be. Although not without serious setbacks, we are learning that unless we find ways of operating our diverse economic activities in ways that foster equivalent opportunities for all, many households will suffer from economic deprivations and many people will feel angry and deprived. In relation to the climate crisis, we are learning – albeit often slowly – that this crisis is real and potentially catastrophic, that we must find and utilize other sources of energy than burning fossil fuels, that we must act decisively over the next little while, and that we must find ways of acting globally, which entails collaboration with rivals, opponents, and enemies. Trying to build coalitions of only like-minded allies may aggravate our problems. As we reflect on a serious contemporary problem, namely the increasing expressions of distrust in the practices of reason and science, we can learn much by exploring some of the diverse factors that have functioned to occasion these doubts and hesitancies. While some people probably express distrust irrationally, in a number of ways these feelings of distrust have been aggravated by conditions that we can constructively address. I discussed these in Chapter 12. For example, some of this distrust arises from ongoing conflicts between the claims of religion and the claims of the sciences. I think much of this conflict springs both from the excessively imperious stance of some defenders of science, who denounce all religious activities and

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from the equivalently imperious views of some defenders of religion, who think they can ignore and dismiss the empirically grounded scientific evidence. There are useful ways of moderating these conflicts, especially to the degree we recognize that faith communities characteristically communicate using symbolic expressions in relation to questions of meaning and value while the sciences communicate characteristically using public and empirically verifiable discourse. To be sure, some of this distrust of reason and science has been occasioned by abusive uses of science and reason, which we are well-advised to recognize and limit. Finally, we can in part ground our hopes on the fact that humans as a whole have become globally much more interconnected. To be sure, many of us experience this aspect of globalization as both problematic and threatening. Understandably, we worry about losing our more locally based sense of identity. We worry about the controls exercised upon our lives by distant powers. Still, we can point to many examples where we have found, and we can find, ways of strengthening our sense of identity and limiting the influence of distant authorities, while still recognizing and affirming our global interconnectedness. Many examples of global collaboration, such as the United Nations and the Interfaith movement, have functioned to call attention to and enhance local or particular communities. In the meantime, we not only, in fact, have become more globally interconnected but we have also become more conscious of this fact. We are indeed all residents of one Earth and members of one, especially influential species. We all are vulnerable to particular easily spread viruses, including those causing influenza as well as the current pandemic. We are all influenced by how the Earth’s climate changes. We will all be affected, albeit in slightly different ways and in different degrees, by slow ongoing changes of the Earth’s biosphere, such as depletion of fresh water held in aquafers, losses of arable lands, and decreases in fish stocks. At the same time, as a result of the missionary expansion of several religions, the migration of peoples, the expansion of communication networks and international trade, we have become more globally interconnected. We benefit in multiple ways from resources that come to us from distant lands, and our treasuries of wisdom have been enriched by the learnings and stories of many other peoples. At the present moment, we are becoming increasingly conscious that we are all in this together, whether we are referring to the present pandemic or the current adverse consequences and future threats posed by climate change. Furthermore, to the extent that we are all in this together, and that in addition to our very important separate and distinct national, ethnic, linguistic, local, and religious identities, we recognize and acknowledge ourselves as citizens of one world, then the chances improve that we can work together, while still honoring and respecting our differences and ongoing antagonisms.

17.2  Hopeful People Make a Difference Hope springs not from some goal or destination, some creed or world view outside of us. It arises from people who cultivate the characteristics associated with hopefulness, like realism, gratitude, imagination, and the capacity to override their own

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sense of despair. It is associated with people who are able to balance their sense of urgency with a measure of patience, their focus on what must be done with a degree of flexibility. Our dispositions to hope, to be sure, are aroused and strengthened by the example of other hopeful people. We are inspired by well-known people like Gandhi, Vaclav Havel, Saul Alinsky, Fazle Hassan Abed, Nelson Mandela, and Greta Thunberg, all of whom I have previously discussed. Our hopes are aroused and strengthened by many others, people like Wangari Maathai, the Kenyan biology professor who in 2004 won the Noble Peace Prize for her efforts to foster tree planting across east Africa. Our hopes are encouraged by organizations like Rotary International, which through it more than 35,000 clubs worldwide has been involved in a wide range of community initiatives, including establishing five global peace colleges. We are also often inspired by groups of people, less well known, working in diverse ways to anticipate and realize possibilities in response to the crises of our lives, such as thousands of humanitarian and civil societies associations, businesses committed to sustainable development and fair employment and marketing practices, and public officials and politicians working to protect and enhance the lives of our communities. We can find many different examples of people whose disposition to anticipate realistic possibilities has led them to initiate promising courses of action. I think of people not usually cited as examples of hopefulness like Karl Schwab, who helped found the World Economic Forum and later the Schwab Foundation. Schwab and the Forum and Foundation he established have forthrightly acted both to foster more socially responsible business practices and more effective and constructive social innovations. In times like the present, when it is so easy to point to evidence of injustice, violence, threatening environmental changes, hunger, and oppression, it is helpful to identify and appreciate the many different kinds of people moved by hope to make a difference. Thomas Homer Dixon, author of the book Commanding Hope, well represents how hopeful people make a difference both through his writing and his activities. To be sure, from my perspective, Homer-Dixon adopts an excessively cognitive understanding of hope. However, he cites many examples in his book of people like Stephanie May, who, because she was predisposed to hope, initiated and led a successful campaign to end arial nuclear bomb tests. Although he has long called attention to potentially catastrophic results from climate change and conditions that give rise to genocidal-like atrocities, Homer-Dixon has always also sought to explore ways we can act to reduce these threats. Previously he wrote a book, The Upside of Down, in which, while reviewing many of the crises of our times, he also explored how we might respond constructively. Presently, he has established at Royal Roads University, a research institute, called the Cascade Institute, to “identify high-level interventions that would act to shift humanities course towards fair and sustainable prosperity.” Through this institute, he and his colleagues are exploring a wide range of initiatives to find ways of reducing greenhouse gases and developing alternative sources of energy. Characteristically, hope is generated by hopeful people not by bold plans and clever schemes. Interestingly, it is possible to illustrate this point by analyzing a

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current global initiative, namely the United Nation’s Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The UN initiated the SDGs in 2015 as a follow up of a previous UN project, called the Millennial Development Goals (MDGs). The MDGs focused especially on efforts to reduce poverty and conditions associated with poverty in developing countries, such as hunger, lack of education, lack of adequate healthcare, and underdeveloped physical infrastructures. Between 2000 and 2015, as the result of concerted efforts by governments, businesses, and civil society agencies, as well as rapid economic growth in countries like China, India, and Brazil, considerable progress was made with respect to these goals. Levels of extreme poverty declined, child mortality rates were markedly reduced, the percentage of girls attending school greatly improved, and levels of hunger were reduced. As this project was nearing its end, the UN convened several consultations to explore a possible follow-up to the MDGs. Eventually, the UN adopted the SDGs as an appropriate next step for actions to be undertaken between 2015 and 2030. The SDGs differ from the previous program in several significant ways. The program is far more global in several different ways: it contains a wider spectrum of goals – seventeen as compared to ten – with much greater emphasis on environmental objectives and its focus for action stretches to the whole world and not just economically developing countries. Furthermore, the number of agencies and organizations that have committed themselves to work to realize the SDGs has also greatly expanded. The SDGs represent an exemplary global initiative in many different ways. Certainly, the SDGs call for people living in the contemporary world to recognize that we humans currently face a number of interrelated troubling problems that must be addressed not just nationally but internationally, that these problems are serious and will require some time to address, and that much can be accomplished if we collaborate globally. It is significant that many different governments, businesses, and civil society associations have made some kind of commitment to realize these goals and address the many different sub-targets identified as means to make progress towards the realization of these goals. It is significant that at once the SDGs seek to foster, in Jeffrey Sachs’s words, economic prosperity, social inclusion, environmental sustainability, and good governance (Sachs 2015). However, this UN project can be, and has been, criticized from several different perspectives. It is certainly born of great idealism. It is also realistic at least in the sense of recognizing a number of serious problems that must be addressed. Still, it can be argued that the SDGs do not focus on the root causes of the problems they seek to address. After all, the SDGs focus on goals to be achieved not on the underlying factors that have given rise to the conditions the goals seek to ameliorate. For example, if we were to ask why, during a period of economic expansion over the past 50 years, have rates of global poverty – just ordinary not extreme poverty – not appreciably declined and inequality of wealth has greatly increased, then we would be forced to inquire more seriously about how the underlying forms of businesses enterprises and economic exchanges may have acted to aggravate these problems. We might, correspondingly, seek to address these kinds of structural problems not at present a focus of the SDGs. Similarly, if we were to ask why global warming has continued to increase at worrying rates in spite of varied public commitments to

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address the problem, then, again, we would be forced to look more deeply at political and economic factors aggravating these problems (1). These kinds of criticisms point to the fact the SDGs may well have a limited impact on the problems they are attempting to address. But, proponents of the SDGs might respond by saying, “Why is that a problem?” In so far as people around the world work at realizing these goals, then some beneficial changes have been occurring and more will occur before this program has finished. No doubt, some advocates of SDGs have oversold the significance of these goals, just as Human Rights advocates sometimes have exaggerated the impact of efforts to champion human rights. Still, groups committed to both sets of goals have measurably fostered constructive developments that have benefitted large numbers of people (Sikkink 2017, Chapters 6 and 7). These developments matter even if they may be limited in their scope and depth. However, for present purposes, I want to call attention to a somewhat different aspect of the SDGs and, we might add, the Human Rights movement as well. My basic argument is as follows: it is not the statement of the seventeen SDGs, and the explanations of their meaning and the articulation of their sub-targets that generate hopes. Hopes spring from all those people prepared to explore ways of realizing these goals in their communities. To be sure, many hopeful people have worked at developing and promoting the SDGs. However, whether this global initiative has gained or will gain any traction in particular settings depends on the degree to which people in diverse locales both effectively take account of local conditions and imaginatively explore local possibilities. Much depends on the sense of agency, and the hopes that occasion feelings of agency, that people in these locales experience as they take steps to address feasible targets. As civil society organizations, businesses, government agencies, and concerned citizens act to realize these goals, they have and will inevitably meet opposition, resistance, and disinterest. They have and will face difficulties mobilizing support and acquiring needed resources. To the extent, they have made, and they will make, a difference, they have and will both realistically keep track of contingent developments and anticipate interesting possibilities. To the degree that the SDGs represent a hopeful initiative, it has been, and it will be, because of all the hopeful people who have been and will be acting in diverse ways to realize these goals. We can make a comparable account of responses to the current COVID-19 pandemic. That is, to the extent that we can find grounds for hope in these desperate times, it is, and it will be because hopeful people have found constructive ways of responding to this crisis. Hundreds of millions of people have or will be infected by the current coronavirus and the death tolls will probably reach several million before the epidemic is over. As I write, globally the number infected has reached more than 300 million and the confirmed deaths have reached more than 4.5 million. Most observers assume that both figures probably significantly under-estimate actual infections and deaths. Furthermore, as the virus mutates, it is likely that it will assume new more contagious, and, perhaps, more lethal forms. This pandemic has occasioned much suffering and loss, much grieving and confusion. Ordinary life patterns have been disrupted. Thousands of businesses have

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had to close. Millions have lost their jobs. Many children are either not being educated or are being educated under the most difficult and trying circumstances. Although most governments and health care agencies have attempted in responsive and responsible ways to respond to the crises as they emerged, they stumbled, made mistakes, and developed sometimes contradictory policies. Was the virus communicated by touch or was it air-born? Was it mostly attacking the elderly or the population in general? Did everyone who was infected show symptoms or were many infected people symptom-free? Could we overcome it by cultivating herd immunity? Would we be able to overcome the pandemic soon or would it be around for years? Although some infected people remain symptom-free, others have continued to have debilitating symptoms for many weeks and months. In order to contain the virus and limit the spread of the disease, governments around the world have instituted a number of dramatic and drastic actions. They have asked their citizens to social distance themselves and wear masks and avoid large gatherings. They have forced many businesses to close. In many businesses, employees are primarily working from home. These changes have raised the levels of unemployment and increased the extent of poverty. In order to help businesses operate and help unemployed workers, governments have greatly expanded public spending. Many say and say, again and again, we are living in strange times. Furthermore, we do not know when this crisis will end. Because several people who became ill and recovered from the disease and became ill a second time, we don’t know how much immunity we will have when we become ill or when we receive effective vaccines. We are suffering not only from an epidemic, whose end we don’t know – nor do we know how we will recover once it ends – but also from the most serious economic recession since the 1930s. After several  years, millions of us are suffering from COVID fatigue. This is a complex and global crisis, which has already caused and will continue to cause much suffering and distress. Whether we are fully conscious about what has been happening, we humans have been responding to this crisis with some mixture of hope and/or despair, whether this despair is overt or hidden. We experience and see around us many examples of the typical responses to crises where the future is uncertain and unknown. Many of us have been overwhelmed by diverse expressions of despair. It is tempting to view what is happening to us in apocalyptic images. For many, this seems, indeed, like the end of the world as we know it. Others despair less overtly. Some seek to deny or make little of the crises through which we are passing. After all, many of us wonder, isn’t the epidemic much like although a bit more severe than the annual flu season? Tens of thousands of people die from the flu each year. We wonder whether wearing masks makes that much difference. Many of us have been inclined to feel that it is a mistake to follow scientists so closely, when, often, they seem to change their analyses and prescriptions and disagree on their analyses. For many others, despair takes the form of wishful thinking. We want to believe that we will soon have available one or more vaccines that will protect us from this particular coronavirus and that our economies will quickly rebound. Many

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of us have just soldiered on, doing our jobs in difficult and sometimes risky situations, as workers in hospitals, warehouses, public transportation, and large retail stores. In contrast, a great many people have found ways of responding to this crisis with some measure of hope. I use the word “hope” here not to refer to our wishes that a cure will soon be found and that the virus will soon become less virulent – wishes that I suspect almost everyone shares. I am thinking about the disposition of many people to imagine and anticipate realistic possibilities in the midst of all the uncertainties we face. To begin with, I am thinking of all those health care workers exploring the most effective and safe means to provide care for infected patients and make tests available so people can know whether they have been infected. I am thinking of all those scientists working to develop both vaccines to help protect people from the virus and to develop as well beneficial treatments. These efforts have been impressive with respect to the deliberate speed with which scientists are undertaking this work and the extent of collaboration globally among them. I am thinking as well of all those retail shop operators who have found quite new and different ways of maintaining or opening up their businesses so that their clients remain safe. Consider all those companies as well that have developed clever means to continue their activities with many of their employees working from home. As examples of hopeful people making a difference, I think we must include as well large numbers of public officials all over the world and at all levels of government. These officials have faced the challenge of how best to set public guidelines that would both effectively reduce the spread of the disease and at the same maintain a vigorous economy and keep open as many businesses, educational, and community activities as possible. These are complex challenges and in the process of setting these guidelines, public officials have at times made mistakes, sometimes very serious mistakes. However, many of these officials have responded and learned from their mistakes. To be sure, many have not. For the most part, many of them seem better prepared and more responsive as the world passed through the second wave of COVID 19 than they were as a whole at the outset of this epidemic. Still, as we move into the third and fourth waves of this pandemic, we also see many people becoming more careless. In addition, and most importantly, millions of people have responded to this crisis with their own, often unheralded versions of hopefulness. They have done so by taking stock of their situations; trying to keep track of available public information; respecting the guidelines set by governments, community associations, and businesses; and trying to keep themselves and their household healthy and safe. They have also explored ways of facing additional challenges of educating children at home or over the internet, finding new ways of entertaining themselves, engaging in new home-based enterprises, and living with the frustrations of vacations not taken, friends and relatives not seen, sports events not attended, and religious services in which they could not participate in person. In addition, millions have also had to attend to family members who became ill and who have died from this disease. In response to this pandemic, millions of people have acted with hope: while being realistic about the circumstances in which they have found themselves, they have

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anticipated possibilities for managing their lives as best as they could. They have – millions of us have – gone along with the great experiments in which we find ourselves: we have followed public guidelines, acted with caution, tried as best we can to render our lives as engaging as possible, in hopes that we will get through this pandemic as soon and as resilient as possible. That response makes a great deal of difference. We are all able capable of strengthening our capacities for hope. Hope does not lie outside us. It is not embodied in plans, technologies, cognitive methodologies for discerning patterns, ideological platforms, religious visions, or other promising views of the future. While these external realities may act to encourage our hopes, our hopes fundamentally emerge and grow within us. Hopes live in the dispositions of people – both in individuals and groups of people. The disposition of hope creates a sense of space and openness, that allows us to consider alternatives. When we encounter tragedies and difficulties, hope encourages us to learn what we can learn and to imagine ways forward. While realistically acknowledging the problems we face, in all their complexity, hope invites us to explore how we can and must now act. Clearly, in order to respond effectively and responsibly to the crises of our times, we must make use of our sciences, we must also utilize our powers of reason, we must find ways of using natural resources and our own skills and dispositions as productively and sustainably as possible, and we must find ways of acting together – collaborating across boundaries. These are moral imperatives. They require concrete efforts and changes in life patterns. It is not enough to engage in hope – in the sense of longing and wishing –that we will find adequate and feasible ways to meet these challenges. However, in so far as we engage in hoping by cultivating our capacities realistically to anticipate possibilities, then we can and will find ways – as many have already found ways – of taking the next steps in addressing these moral imperatives.

Works Cited Sachs, Jeffrey D. 2015. The Age of Sustainable Development. New York: Columbia University Press. Sikkink, Kathryn. 2017. Evidence for Hope: Making Human Rights Work in the 21st Century. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Afterword

I will include in this afterword a few words about how I came to write this book mixed with a few acknowledgments. In a way, this book follows directly from a book I co-authored on The Practices of Global Ethics (2016). That book reviewed a number of the global crises discussed in this book, especially the crises connected with climate change, continuing global poverty, and increasing levels of global inequality regarding wealth. That book, like this one, calls attention to the exemplary role of the global interfaith movement. Most decisively, in the concluding chapter, titled “Hope and History,” for which I wrote the initial draft, we observed how so many of the people involved in initiating effective responses to these crises were sustained by dispositions to hope. So, for their contributions to that book and their comments on the drafts of chapters I wrote, I would like to thank Sumner Twiss, Kusumita Pedersen, Clark Miller, and Bruce Grelle. I would especially like to thank Bruce for the conversations about global ethics that we held over several years, which eventually led to the book project with the other co-authors. When I used the words “Hope and History” for the conclusion of that book, I was inspired by lines from a poem by Seamus Heany, in which he refers to those times when “hope and history rhyme.” I initially found Heaney’s poem in a book, Getting to Maybe: How the World is Changed (2005), written by my wife, Frances Westley as well as Brenda Zimmerman and Michael Patton. In Chapter 7 of this book, I refer to that book and these authors as examples of hopeful people, who as social innovators, have made a significant difference in the many groups and communities they have helped. I would also like to thank several colleagues who have read and commented on sections from this book. These include Stuart Herman and Craig Boydell and Thomas Homer-Dixon. Thomas has also written a book similar to mine called Commanding Hope: The Power We Have to Renew a World in Peril. Although we have different views about the character of hope, we share a similar sense of crisis about our world and comparable feelings about the critical importance of hope.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7

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Finally, I would especially like to thank my friends Linda and Stuart Glaser. They played an interesting role in the origin of this book. For a long time, they have encouraged me to put into written form my basic philosophical presuppositions. Their confidence in me gave me the confidence to write this book. I am indeed grateful for their friendship and support.

Appendices

 ppendix 1: Further Thoughts on the Critical Value A of a Due Regard for History Addressing Challenges Inherent in Historical Consciousness Many people have resisted or rejected adopting a due regard for history. For reasons I will explore below, many have found historical consciousness unreliable, morally uncomfortable, and unappealing. Instead, they have explored ways of trying to ignore history, escape from historical consciousness, or find alternative ways of framing what is happening in their lives and in the world. I will explore two challenges and ways of addressing these challenges while retaining a historical perspective on current world crises. The Dialectic Character of History  The first challenge arises because the stories and reports people produce about the past are not simple mirrors of what happened in the past and because different people produce often very different accounts of the past. These stories and reports inevitably reflect our contemporary understandings of the past. They are likely to be different depending upon when they were written or voiced and by whom. Historical consciousness is thus inherently dialectical. It involves both what happened and subsequent understandings of what happened. These are two different realities, but they are inextricably interwoven. Historical knowledge, correspondingly, differs from knowledge generated by the natural sciences. That knowledge is in principle universal and therefore the same for everyone. On the basis of that knowledge, we can make predictions that often possess very high degrees of probability. Historical knowledge differs in several ways. For example, histories of North America over the past several hundred years are likely to be different if told from the understanding of settlers or indigenous peoples, Blacks or non-Blacks, urban dwellers or those who have primarily lived in rural areas. Additionally, historical knowledge presumes the capacity of humans to express © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7

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agency and thereby to act in ways not completely predictable. Finally, our knowledge of other humans must always consider the ways these other humans understand and make sense of their own lives. Their accounts of their own lives may be self-serving or distorted as they seek to justify otherwise ambiguous behavior. They may adopt official interpretations of what is supposed to be taking place and/or they may fall victims to self-deception. Nonetheless, their accounts of their lives are part of the reality of how they have lived. Historical knowledge thereby differs from non-historical knowledge. Historical knowledge does not assume the form of a universally valid set of reports. Rather, as we encounter different peoples, we become aware that we live in the midst of multiple histories, reflecting different and sometimes conflicting experiences and understandings. People in North America, for example, are becoming increasingly conscious of how indigenous groups and Blacks understand the past quite differently than the standard historical accounts written by European settlers (Treuer 2019; Darity and Mullen 2020). The particular dialectic character of historical consciousness gives rise to two different but related practical concerns. Thus, one, given the character of historical knowledge, many observers contend that it is not really possible to arrive at reliable, objective accounts of the past. Accordingly, these people assume that historical accounts are not much different than fictional accounts (Rorty 1982). At the same time, we now are much more conscious that there are multiple accounts of the past, differing in relation both to the points of view of different authors and to the different times in which they are written. If we want to understand the present and the prospects for the future better by seeking to gain historical perspective, then we are faced with the complex challenge of trying to attend to, balance and integrate multiple different accounts of the past. These are serious, not easily resolved concerns. Because of its dialectical character, from the perspective of the natural sciences, historical consciousness seems both, one, to lack reliability and objectivity and, two, to assume multiple and correspondingly, potentially conflicting accounts of the past. Many critics correspondingly wonder whether there can be any real value in historical accounts because they seem to accord so much attention to the viewpoints of observers and because there seem to be so many different accounts about the same phenomena. To address these concerns, some historians have attempted to write what they regard as scientific histories that duly report on what actually happened in the past. While respecting these efforts to provide reliable and supposedly objective accounts, these efforts cannot expunge from historical knowledge its dialectic character; that is, the way historical knowledge always represents contemporary accounts of the past, colored by contemporary questions, values, and contemporary taken-for-granted understandings. In a recent essay, titled “A defense of objectivity in the social sciences, rightly understood,” I have addressed this issue for the study of history as well as the social sciences in general. I argue that the norm of objectivity applies to historical studies and the social sciences as well as the natural sciences. In the first place, this norm calls for all observers to make their accounts public. As such, public accounts by their basic character are addressed to anyone, whether they hold similar or different values. Moreover, in principle, public accounts invite audiences to examine

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these studies, to look for and report on any oversights, possible misrepresentations, or errors in reasoning or observation. Accounts are objective to the extent they are public and also to the extent the evidence and methods used make it possible for people to interact with the subjects of their investigations  – whether these be microbes, chemical elements, populations, or organizations – in reasonably reliable ways. Objectivity in this sense assumes a practical pragmatic form, whether the confirming proof is evidenced in follow-up studies replicating earlier experiments or attempts to modify organizational behavior in line with previous studies. Furthermore, especially with regard to history and the social sciences, the norm of objectivity calls for observers to distinguish between judgments regarding empirical evidence and judgments of value and to show how they arrived at these judgments. In the aforementioned essay, I begin by criticizing misplaced attempts to define objectivity as efforts to mirror realities (often in quantifiable terms). I then further elaborate on the practical steps to be taken to establish objectivity both in how observers communicate their findings and how they develop their findings in the first place. I argue both that audiences can rightfully expect historical and social scientific accounts to be objective and, therefore, reliable and that there are practical ways of meeting this expectation. Correspondingly, I think there are well-­established ways of affirming both the dialectic character of historical consciousness as well as its objectivity and reliability (Bird 2020). The fact that our histories of the past are multiple, reflecting the diverse perspectives of varied communities represents a different kind of challenge. This challenge has magnified as the processes of globalization have brought us into contact with many different peoples. This challenge calls us to do more than taking account of the information provided by others, which we and our literate ancestors overlooked. The collective identities of communities, nations, and faiths are integrally connected with how they remember their pasts. We are, correspondingly, challenged to find ways both of respecting how groups remember their pasts, however idealized and stylized these memories may be, while attempting at the same time to construct elements of a shared history taking account of diverse others. Therefore, we are invited to find ways of interweaving our histories together. Perhaps, as the global interfaith movement contends, by participating in ongoing dialogues we are encouraged to cultivate more cosmopolitan ways of understanding our lives. In any case, we must abandon the linear Eurocentric sense of history, encouraged by thinkers as diverse as Augustine and Hegel, and struggle to see the world as well with the eyes of people shaped by other traditions, including Chinese, Indian, and Muslim traditions, because of the wide-spread influence they continue to have. The Tragic Character of History  A second challenging character of historical consciousness involves the recognition that from a historical perspective some of the events of our lives are likely to have been, and may yet still become, tragic. As our lives unfold, we are likely to experience diverse forms of suffering and misfortune. We are likely to experience defeats, setbacks, losses, and unexpected disappointments. Despite our best efforts, children suffer. Despite thoughtful planning, well-organized initiatives, such as efforts to help the poor through public

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housing, may in practice occasion extensive unanticipated adverse consequences. Military efforts to stamp out terrorist organizations may well have unfortunate and unanticipated outcomes because these initiatives indirectly function as occasions for these organizations to increase recruits. An assassin kills a young and promising president like John Kennedy. A young Jewish prophet named Jesus, promoting nonviolent reforms, is killed because authorities fear he might attempt to seize political power as “king” of his people. A costly and grueling civil war is fought in part to guarantee full citizenship to all Americans but then the benefits of full citizenship are denied to millions both by the enactment of Jim Crow laws and by diverse practices of discrimination and segregation. Sometimes, suffering and misfortune take place as the result of willful malicious acts. We humans, after all, have developed great skill at devising means to injure and harm each other. Suffering and misfortune also often happen because of thoughtlessness, as people fail in fitting ways to pay attention and use their imaginations. Often suffering and misfortune happen as by-products of what seem to be irresolvable dilemmas. For example, in an area with minimal amounts of rainfall, growing populations in cities and rural areas both, need more water for their households and agriculture, and also need more electrical power as populations grow. Yet, it seems that the only way to meet these demands is to build a series of dams that will flood arable lands and force many indigenous people to move from the traditional lands. We can multiply these kinds of examples. Much depends on how we interpret these events. Many people have come to think that the passage of time is inevitably linked with suffering and distress. The Buddha in The Dhammapada observed that human existence is marked by transitoriness, suffering, and the absence of own-being. These are not avoidable and therefore tragic characteristics. They are inherent features of human life. Those who would seek to be free of suffering are correspondingly counseled fully to acknowledge and indeed meditate on these features as a means of eventually transcending them. In Work and Days, Hesiod invoked the legends of Pandora to explain why human life is so full of pain, drudgery, and strife. In the book of Genesis in the Bible, the suffering and pain women experience in childbirth are described as the inherited plight of women because of events that occurred between God and humans before human history really began. In the Bhagavad-Gita, the prince Arjuna hesitates before the battle thinking about the injury and harm that would cause suffering to his relatives against whom the fight is being waged. However, in the verses of this book he is counseled by the avatar Krishna to proceed into the battle, which is unavoidable both because it has already been happening, because by his basic dharmic nature Arjuna is a warrior, and because it is his caste duty to fight. The battle is not really tragic; it is a part of Arjuna’s fate and life. The ancient Epicureans observed that in spite of thoughtful and well-planned schemes, events typically turned out in ways more troubling and distressing than we expected. The way to protect ourselves was to recognize that while we can never fully determine the conditions of our lives, we can always at least determine our own attitude towards these circumstances. These several and diverse ancient authors variously assumed that the kinds of suffering and misfortune described were inevitable features of human existence.

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In contrast, historical awareness always comes with the consciousness that the passage of time may occasion suffering and misfortune, which are not necessary and inevitable but in practice and in principle avoidable. From this perspective, many experiences of suffering and misfortune are regarded as being tragic. In a number of writers with a more developed sense of history, many distressing and destructive happenings are regarded as being potentially avoidable even though often probable. These events, therefore, were regarded as tragic. For example, Thucydides invokes a theme that runs through his history of the Peloponnesian Wars that reminds readers that protagonists might have acted differently than they did. Therefore, the suffering and disasters occasioned by that set of wars were not inevitable but resulted from choices, sometimes well-meaning choices, and sometimes poorly considered choices. He wrote his history in hopes that by considering what had happened, his readers would be able to learn to consider their choices more thoughtfully. A similar intent is evident in The Analects of Confucius. Without directly citing but clearly invoking examples from the recent long period of civil wars in China, the Analects variously articulate the ways those charged with the responsibility of governing or advising others who do govern, should most fittingly act to foster public wellbeing, and thereby avoid public discord and misery. The ancient Jewish prophet Jeremiah voiced comparable views in the oracles he delivered. He warned the ancient Jews that these people faced the dangers of war, destruction, and exile if they failed to heed his message to honor and respect the norms and rituals set forth in their ancient codes and writings. He did not regard the disasters that eventually occurred as inevitable but as the tragic outcome of the failure to respond to God’s warnings, which he was voicing. Expressed in many different forms, a historical consciousness includes an awareness of tragic possibilities. Another way of making this same point is to note that the flow of historical time from the past through the present to the future is punctuated now and then by crises. Crises are critical moments; often but not always they are turning points; they are times when we are challenged to make decisive decisions; they are occasions when, if we fail to rise to the challenge, tragic consequences are likely to occur. Sometimes, we are fully aware that we are facing a huge crisis and we have a good sense of the character of the crisis. For example, describing the changing relationship of humans to the Earth, its biosystems, and its climate, the Millennium Assessment Report in 2004 declared that “We are at a critical point in the history of the Earth.” The report called attention to looming crises that would only become more devastating in scope and consequences if humans failed to respond in a timely manner. Sometimes, however, we do not seem either aware of the crises we are facing or of the scope and depth of these crises. In his play, Oedipus Rex, written at the time of the Peloponnesian Wars, Sophocles used the legends of Oedipus, for a number of reasons, no doubt, including, possibly, its symbolic use to characterize the ways his contemporaries had sleep-walked their way into a series of disastrous military and political adventures based upon initial moves that had seemed to them at the time to be clever and successful. Many observers have argued that the nations of Europe entered into the First World War, without a clear sense of the crises they were in fact unleashing. Many would argue that the United States and its allies similarly launched

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their “War on Terrorism” in 2001 without being fully aware of the forces they were unleashing. Crises do not appear in any kind of order or in any discernable sequence. Crises may slowly emerge or violently erupt. They may arise because of initiatives pursued by others, as unanticipated by-products of otherwise successful ventures, and as the result of inattention. Crises are an inextricable feature of human history for many reasons: humans are diverse and pursue purposes and objectives that are likely to conflict; history brings changes and even when changes seem promising, many are likely to resist changes; and human desires often exceed for most people what they can practically obtain and achieve. A historical consciousness includes the recognition that we, like our ancestors, are likely to face crises that may have promising and/or tragic consequences depending on our responses. Most of us are quite familiar with crises and tragedies. The World Wars were tragic, as was the Great Depression of the 1930s and the Great Recession in the aftermath of the financial crisis of 2008. The current pandemic represents another huge crisis. A huge crisis is looming because humans have been so slow to respond to the warning of scientists about climate change. After almost a half a century during which inequalities in wealth declined, it has been tragic for many especially ill-affected as these inequalities have steadily increased in many parts of the world since the 1980s. With a historical mindset, we recognize that crises will inevitably arise and that tragedies will always be possible. A recognition of tragic possibilities brings with it an ethically charged awareness that events may have happened differently and occasioned less misfortune and suffering if those involved had found other ways of acting. With regard to the future, acknowledging the possibility of tragedy and misfortune brings with it the recognition that in spite of good intentions and careful plans our best efforts to manage the crises of our times may be unsuccessful. Circumstances might turn out to be more promising if we chose to act differently. With respect to the past, as we acknowledge both the possibility and reality of tragedies and misfortunes, we in turn occasion feelings of accountability that we and others might have acted differently to reduce the suffering and distress that have occurred. As we become conscious of the tragic possibilities of history, we also feel accountable. Correspondingly, we face the challenge not only of making sense of the suffering tragedies and misfortunes produce but also of managing our own feelings of accountability. How have people addressed this challenge? Mircea Eliade has written a number of books demonstrating how most of the peoples, living before the advent of organized states and the prophets who gave rise to the major world religions, sought to live without historical consciousness and to ignore these feelings of accountability. Rather, in large part, through periodic rituals, they sought to align themselves with the cycles of the seasons and human life cycle. Many others have sought to neutralize both the sense of history and corresponding feelings of accountability through meditations and rituals promising mystical experiences. All too aware of human suffering, like the Buddhists and Epicureans to which I already referred, many people have deliberately not viewed their lives in historical terms. The philosophy of progress represents another, semi-historical way of addressing this challenge. From this perspective, tragedies and sufferings are acknowledged as an inevitable feature

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of history. However, feelings of accountability are typically managed by viewing suffering and distress instrumentally as unfortunate but necessary means to realize valued objectives. Tragedies are viewed like friction or transactional costs as by-­ products involved in whatever projects we are seeking to realize, whether that be constructing huge hydroelectric dams, fostering industrialization, ending wars quickly, or working to create a classless society. Viewed from this perspective, many expressions of the philosophy of progress seem heartless. Nevertheless, we must recognize that many prophets proclaiming visions of promising futures have indeed inspired many others to commit themselves to realize desired outcomes. Reaching for what seems to be impossible has often functioned to bring into being new possibilities. However, often visionary movements have not fully acknowledged the misfortune and tragedies which the pursuit of these visions has occasioned. Many people have used apocalyptic imagery to make sense of both remembered and anticipated sufferings and misfortunes. Apocalyptic scenarios characteristically function well as means of acknowledging and making sense of tragedies and distresses we have already experienced, or we expect to experience. They often well-­ express feelings of judgment both about what seems to be wrong with the times in which we are living and about those reigning powers that seem to play especially pivotal roles in causing and in benefiting from what’s wrong with the world. Whether expressed in biblical imagery, in science fiction, or dystopian novels and movies, apocalyptic stories identify particular others and particular patterns of behavior as the especially accountable sources for the problems we are facing. However, while apocalyptic accounts excel at expressing judgment, they less clearly indicate how, in historically constructive ways, to address the challenges that they highlight. Often, they encourage their audiences to withdraw attachments and identifications with the evil forces they identify. In addition, many apocalyptic accounts then encourage their followers and audiences to be ready to act in keeping with the intervention by some kind of extraordinary power, whether that power is identified with God, an anticipated revolution, prophets for promising utopias, or longed-for messiahs. In contrast to these alternatives, in so far as we adopt a due regard for history, we address the challenge posed by the possibility of tragedy and the accompanying feelings of accountability by embracing both. We are helped in doing so by openly accepting responsibility for the outcomes of our actions and by offering and accepting forgiveness when it is fitting to do so. Responding to the possibility of tragedy and the corresponding feelings of accountability with a due regard for history involves two overlapping activities: namely, one, truthfully acknowledging the tragedies and mistakes that occur and, two, finding ways of accepting responsibility where and when it is appropriate. One, remembering the past fittingly, accordingly, means finding ways of acknowledging painful memories. In principle, this is the function of acts of confession or penance. Fundamentally, acts of confession are meant to serve as a way for us honestly to acknowledge what has happened as well as to acknowledge our feelings about what had happened. Confessions become distorted and corrupted whenever those involved begin to add to our accounts attempts to justify ourselves – often

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expressed as efforts to explain – as well as attempts to persuade to whomever we are confessing to regard us favorably, sometimes even by excessively blaming ourselves. In these ways, the purpose of confessions – truthfully to acknowledge troubling events – becomes skewed and undermined when the focus shifts to issues of assigning blame and avoiding blame. Engaging in confession – recalling troubling memories – is much like exercising mindfulness. In both cases, the point is to allow oneself fully to acknowledge what has happened in the past without pre-­emptively seeking to assign worth or value. Psychologists warn us that we cannot really completely ignore our past because traumas we experienced in the past tend to haunt us if we have not found adequate ways of acknowledging and resolving them. At an individual level, Freud observed that many people experience emotional distress in the present because they remain deeply affected by past traumas, often mostly forgotten at a conscious level, which they had experienced long ago when they were younger and when they did not yet have the personal strength to accept and address. Typically, these traumas live on in unconscious memories. In a way, those parts of the past associated with these traumatic events have not yet become past. These unresolved traumatic parts of the past continue to affect people in the present. They do so typically in ways that are not overt and direct. The hidden or repressed memories of these traumatic times indirectly surface, Freud observed, through phobias, aggravated anxieties, other expressions of emotional distress, as well as in dreams. Analyzing dreams, by using the free associations of patients and the assistance of therapists, Freud discovered that people could begin to acknowledge, address, and resolve their past traumas, now using their strength and wisdom as adults in the present. To be sure much more is involved in successful psychoanalytic therapy than this short description can convey. However, for the purpose of my discussion of memory, this reference to Freud’s analysis demonstrates how unresolved past traumas can live on in present as currently troubling legacy issues. Accordingly, to the extent that we do not directly acknowledge and seek to address major traumatic events from the past, then there is a strong likelihood that we may well experience various kinds of distresses in the present that represent indirect manifestations of the unresolved traumatic events of the past (Freud 1953). Several decades ago, Charles Bosk undertook a study of how surgeons in a university hospital managed medical errors. Errors do occur. They are much more likely to reoccur to the degree that they are not acknowledged and analyzed. However, acknowledging errors committed during surgeries is a risky business because doing so may well invite those injured to undertake costly suits against doctors and hospitals and expose medical staff to career-damaging censure. Bosk discovered that surgeons at this university hospital had developed a couple of ways to foster truth-telling, which effectively managed their risks. One way was to insist on the norm that all residents, interns, nurses, and subordinate surgeons verbally report immediately to the senior surgeon, whether that surgeon was on duty or not, every error that might be fixed or repaired immediately or soon, no matter how minor. The most serious infraction was to be found not reporting an error even if it was successfully fixed. The second strategy to foster truth-telling about past incidents directly

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involved senior surgeons themselves in what Bosk referred to as “hair shirt” sessions. Meeting with other members of the medical staff, surgeons would tell of difficult operations in which they had options to pursue one of several procedures. They had chosen to follow a standard recommended procedure. However, in retrospect, seeing how the operation had turned out, they now felt it would have been wiser to follow an alternative procedure they had instinctively preferred. It is easy to see that these so-called “hair shirt” sessions —what we might describe as “mia culpa” moments – were ritualized exercises that both protected the surgeons and hospitals because “standard” procedures had been followed and allowed for truth-­ telling to occur so that the medical staff could acknowledge errors and learn from them. Bosk entitled his book To Forgive and To Remember, highlighting the way by which finding fitting ways of truth-telling about the past – remembering – in critical ways facilitated learning and also functioned to allow potentially traumatic events to become past. Of course, that is what forgiveness does. Forgiving is definitely not forgetting. Rather forgiving allows troubling events in the present as well as in the past to be acknowledged – confessed, reported, or named – learned from, and then accepted as being no longer occasions for hard feelings, recriminations, reprisals, or penalties. It allows difficult moments from the past to become past. It is useful to consider Truth and Reconciliation Commissions in this context as efforts to deal with these kinds of unresolved legacy issues. Truth and Reconciliation Commissions have been established in South Africa, Chile, Argentina, Canada, and a number of other countries to address diverse kinds of unresolved traumatic events from the past. In Chile and Argentina, these commissions focused on people who had gone missing  – had been abducted and mostly killed  – during government crackdowns on radical opposition groups. In South Africa, the commission considered all sorts of acts of violence and terror committed both by the government and opposition groups during the Apartheid era. That commission distinguished between criminal acts and acts that might broadly be considered political. In Canada, the commission focused primarily on abuses associated with the residential school systems established for indigenous children. These commissions heard individual cases and sometimes granted amnesty to particular persons who acknowledged their actions and sought ways to foster reconciliation in the present. These commissions variously sought to allow for a more truthful account of what had actually happened. They functioned at least in part to allow some of the unresolved feelings associated with traumatic and tragic events from the past to be expressed, acknowledged, and resolved. In many ways, all of these commissions were imperfect, especially as means of addressing concerns to foster justice with respect to the possible redistribution of resources. However, at least in fragmentary ways, they provided means publicly to acknowledge injustices committed in the past that had long remained hidden, covered over by excuses, or forgotten. The commissions represented public efforts overtly to learn from the past (Daye 2004). Two, it is critically important to work at being realistic and truthful about past events and about historical antecedents of the present. However, what often makes it difficult to engage in these kinds of investigations and to acknowledge these truths are our feelings of hesitation and reluctance to accept responsibility where and

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when it is fitting. Reviews of the past often give rise to uneasy feelings of accountability either or both related to how we and those we care about might have acted differently in the past or might be expected to act differently in the present. Our reluctance here especially arises as we feel and fear accusations of blame. These fears are often both conscious and unconscious, imaginary and real, raised by ourselves and by others. These fears often function to distort and derail steps we might be taking to accept responsibility in fitting ways. At the outset, it is useful, therefore, in broad strokes to distinguish the difference between accepting and assigning responsibility, broadly understood, and accepting and assigning blame. The latter represents one of many different ways of assigning and accepting responsibility. It represents a special case. When we assign and accept blame, we are determining the moral culpability of particular persons and organizations. In relation to recognized standards, we measure intentionality, and we identify norms that have been violated, harms caused, and possible mitigating circumstances. Correspondingly, we determine culpability and assign penalties and punishments. In contrast, when we accept and assign responsibility more broadly, we review the past with an eye to what we must now do. Accordingly, we are called to accept the past, acknowledge ourselves as being shaped by that past, and learn from the past with all its mistakes as well as constructive developments. As we assume responsibility for our own lives, we are inevitably called to acknowledge that everyone makes mistakes. We can see this fact by reviewing historical examples as well as our personal histories. As Bosk’s study of surgeons makes clear, the failure openly to acknowledge mistakes can be very costly. Several years ago, I conducted studies of situations in which a number of businesses failed to acknowledge mistakes at great costs to themselves as well in many cases to customers and neighbors (Bird 1996). While not forgetting the past, accepting responsibility allows and encourages us to be forthright about our mistakes because assuming responsibility allows us in the present to explore alternative ways of acting that might avoid the mistakes we made in the past. Furthermore. it is useful to recognize that we may be accountable in a number of different ways that are not strictly blameworthy. That is, there are ways of acting that result in harms and misfortunes that involve neither the conscious violation of accepted norms nor malicious intentions. We may make mistakes and occasion harms by failing to pay lively attention to what is going on, by failing to consult in-­ depth with others affected by our activities, by failing to consider adverse unanticipated outcomes, and by failing to exercise greater imagination. These are all examples of thoughtlessness. In a recent essay, titled “Beyond Banal Business Practices,” I reviewed a number of cases where much of the harm specific international businesses occasioned in developing countries resulted from various expressions of thoughtlessness. I noted, for example, how Shell in Nigeria, following standard business practices at the time, both developed a wide range of corporate social responsibility initiatives but also flared 85% of the associated gas that rose to the surface as the oil was being extracted. This practice not only occasioned air pollution but wasted a very valuable, non-renewable resource, which might have been used to generate enough electricity to empower wide areas of Nigeria. In this case

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as well as others I examined, harms often resulted from failures of imagination, failures to engage in extensive conversations and consultations with affected populations, and the tendency, in unthinking ways, to follow current business practices (Bird 2019). Recalling past traumatic events – including childhood traumas, medical errors, and acts of violence and conflicts – functions to enhance feelings of agency in the present to the extent we can acknowledge the ways we exercised responsibility either or both as we allowed these events to occur and/or as we hid them away without openly recalling them. Of course, by the very act of openly talking about these past traumas – by speaking the truth – we take responsibility. We change the dynamic of feeling. No longer do see ourselves primarily as being passively acted upon. No longer as overt or complicit perpetrators, do we see ourselves as passively being overcome by our fears or passions. By confessing, we also take ownership of our actions and our feelings. In an insightful essay, titled “Responsibility,” Herbert Fingarette explored the parallels between ways psychoanalysis encourages patients to recall their complicity in childhood traumas and the ways Buddhist monks were encouraged through meditation to recall sins committed in previous lives. In both cases, patients, as well as monks, were encouraged not to think of themselves in passive terms primarily as victims. The objective of these exercises was not the backward-looking ways of assigning blame but the forward-looking ways now in the present of recognizing the capacity to recall the past in ways that acknowledged our capacity to accept and forgive ourselves. By the act of recalling these memories, acknowledging one’s responsibility, and forgiving one’s self, one also gains a sense of agency and wellbeing (Fingarette 1962). In the last several stanzas of his poem “A Dialogue of Self and Soul,” Yeats well expressed this sense of wellbeing that gains strength as we fittingly remember our past and acknowledge our responsibility for what transpired. Yeats begins by reviewing his experiences as a boy and young man, what he refers to as the “ignominy of boyhood; the distresses of boyhood changing into man.” He acknowledges the pain in coming to recognize his own clumsiness as seen in the “malicious eyes” of others. And now in more mature years, he recalls those who have opposed him. He confesses there is no escape: this has been the life he has lived. It has included most painfully his unrequited love of “a woman not kindred of his soul.” Yet, Yeats gratefully affirms his life. He writes: “I am content to live it all again and yet again.” He finishes his poem lyrically accepting the life he has lived, “forgiving the lot,” and affirming: “when such as I cast out remorse, such a sweetness flows into the human breast.” In the last lines, he exclaims: “We must laugh and we must sing [because] we are blest by everything and everything we look upon is blest.” (Yeats 1997) We remember the past fittingly when we can begin to acknowledge the traumas of our past and our active or tacit complicity in the events even in the ways we may have sought to protect by hiding ourselves from remembering these events and the shame and horror we may have experienced. For many reasons we may not want to recall the dark features of these events, the anger, helplessness, guilt we may have experienced as well as the indifference we may have overtly expressed to cover these feelings. Unacknowledged, these events live on as repressed memories, as

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displaced anger, as inexplicable anxieties, even as the unconscious compulsion to assuage feelings of anger and complicity by putting ourselves in a position to engage in acts that constitute repetitions of the initial traumatic events. However, as we acknowledge these events, as we find ways of forgiving ourselves and others, we thereby allow these events to become past and we can move on and act in new ways rather than unconsciously or consciously continuing to react to traumatic events that have not yet become past. In her book The Human Condition Hannah Arendt described forgiveness as a great human invention because by acknowledging and accepting the past, it becomes possible to create something genuinely new, it becomes possible to move beyond the chains of actions and reaction. “Forgiveness, in other words,” she wrote, ”is the only reaction which does not merely re-act but acts anew and unexpectedly, unconditioned by the act which provoked it and therefore freeing from its consequences both the one who forgives and the one who is forgiven." (Arendt 1957, p. 241) At the end of Chapter 8, I argued that a due regard for history both reminds us that in our attempts to act constructively, we will make what we subsequently will regard as mistakes and encourages us to learn from these mistakes while warning us that learning from these events is often not easy. I cited the example of the American war in Vietnam as a series of events that it made sense to review and from which we might learn. After all, from the perspective of American public policy, this war turned out differently and more disastrously than expected. Adopting a due regard for history, how and what can we learn from a historical review of this war? How might Americans find constructive ways of realizing something like forgiveness with respect to this war? I do not have space here for a thorough analysis and review. However, it is possible to identify several relevant historical realities for anyone seriously seeking to learn from this war. One, we know the war resulted in much loss of life – as many as 50,000 Americans and many, many more Vietnamese. We know that many villages and agricultural lands were destroyed. We know that American failed in its efforts to support the official government of South Vietnam. We know that North Vietnam and South Vietnam united to form one country. We know that the war effort occasioned considerable protest by American citizens who opposed the war, more extensive protests than had been occasioned by any other previous war in American history. There was much misfortune and suffering. Although they might come up with different lists, most Americans would probably agree that many mistakes had been made. Two, we can also appreciate that it is often difficult to learn from these kinds of experiences for several reasons. For example, with regard to these kinds of experiences, we often are inclined to focus on questions of blame and often in partisan terms. However, in so far as we become preoccupied with themes about blame, we tend to do engage in activities both of faulting others for their mistakes and of seeking to justify our own behaviors. However, neither of these activities facilitates any form of relevant learning. We are more likely to foster learning in so far as with open minds we do not look for particular people to blame and we acknowledge that many of us shared responsibility for not discerning relevant problems sooner. We are more

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likely to learn from these kinds of experiences in so far as we do not initially seek to find a single, comprehensive answer but allow and invite multiple learnings, recognizing that over time we may – in so far as we do not force a premature closure of discussions – achieve greater consensus. It helps to acknowledge it is often not easy to learn from our mistakes and learning takes time. Three, it always helps to review these kinds of experiences from a historical perspective. This observation is particularly relevant to the American War in Vietnam. Americans overlooked the fact that for many long years the Vietnamese people have worked to maintain their independence from foreigners that have sought to incorporate Vietnam within their spheres of influence. For centuries they resisted and fought the Chinese. More recently they resisted and fought the French, finally freeing themselves in the mid-1950s. Correspondingly, in so far as Americans sought to exert influence over public policy in parts of Vietnam, many Vietnamese were likely to resent and oppose these efforts by a new foreign power, no matter how well-intentioned that power might have been. Furthermore, it was largely foreigners, together with some Vietnamese, who decided to divide the country into two countries, based not on ethnic nor linguistic differences but on current political preferences of the ruling elites. Any serious attempt to survey the Vietnamese people would have found that overwhelmingly the people thought of themselves as a single people with a long common history. As they got involved in Vietnam in the 1950s and early 1960s, most Americans overlooked these historical realities. They did so for many different reasons, in part because they didn’t seem to be really interested in the history of this far away country and in part because of the particular ways they choose to respond to fears that the Cold War with the Soviet Union had aroused among them. Four, with regard to experiences like the American War in Vietnam, it is useful to reflect on the ways governments and citizens prioritize and integrate political strategies, broadly understood to include economic and social policies, with military strategies. Ideally, military strategies should follow from and support well-thought-­ out political strategies. However, as the Americans began to deploy military resources in Vietnam in the late 1950s and early 1960s, many citizens were becoming concerned at the subtle and not so subtle ways military intelligence and military influence were having a disproportionate impact on political decision-making. As he was leaving office, President Eisenhower, who had been a general and had led allied forces during the Second World War, warned about the growing power of the “military-industrial complex.” Many critics of the war argued both that military strategies quickly came to dominate public policies with respect to the conflicts in Vietnam and that many of these strategies, such as the napalming of villages and bombings of civilian populations in places like Hanoi, not only violated the Geneva conventions but were counter-productive even in military terms. It is not clear, more than a half of a century later, about the extent to which Americans have explored what they might learn from more frank reflections on this and subsequent military interventions in places like Somalia, Iraq, Libya, and Afghanistan. Nonetheless, the observation I made several paragraphs above, about the capacity of humans to confront their mistakes and find forgiveness, remains valid. Hannah

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Arendt’s arguments about the human possibilities for learning from the past and achieving forgiveness are valid, as the examples cited above demonstrate.

 ppendix 2: After the Fall, Part Two: Mid-Twentieth Century A Reflections by Mircea Eliade and Reinhold Niebuhr Mircea Eliade: Cosmos and History When Eliade wrote Cosmos and History: The Myth of the Eternal Return, he had toyed with the idea of titling the book a Philosophy of History. Begun in 1946 and published in 1949, this was Eliade’s most personal academic book. Born in 1907, Eliade was a Romania, who early on learned many different languages. He had written a master’s thesis on the Italian Renaissance and, after travels and study in India, a doctoral dissertation on Yoga, which he later published. He wrote novels and plays in Romanian. He had been involved in political movements in Romania and during the war represented the government of Romania in posting in Great Britain and Portugal. After the war and the communist takeover in Romania, he felt unwelcomed in his home country and settled in France. Subsequently, he wrote all of his academic works in French. In 1956 he accepted an academic position at the University of Chicago and remained there until his death in 1986. Early on Eliade seems to have collected an encyclopedic knowledge about the religions of the world, especially primitive and archaic religions. Prior to writing Cosmos and History, Eliade had written Patterns in Comparative Religion in which he identified some of the characteristic features of religions in general, which he described in relation to various kinds of sacred objects, places, times, symbols, and rituals. Eliade felt that it was difficult to make sense of the events that had just occurred. “And in our day, when historical pressure no longer allows any escape, how can man tolerate the catastrophes and horrors of history – from collective deportations and massacres to atomic bombings—if beyond them he can glimpse no sign, no transhistorical meaning; if they are only the blind play of economic, social, or political forces, or, even worse, only the result of the “liberties” that a minority takes and exercises directly on the stage of history?” (Eliade 1949, p. 151) Many people suffer and had suffered, from natural disasters, military campaigns, and economic forces. Thinking especially of Romania and southeastern Europe more generally, he asked how it was possible to tolerate and justify “the sufferings and annihilations of so many people who suffer and are annihilated for the simple reason that their geographical situation sets them in the pathway of history; that they are neighbors of empires in a state of permanent expansion?” (Eliade 1949, p. 151) He felt that it had been and continued to be impossible for most people to find value in history: that is, in the secular, unrepeated and unrepeatable unfolding of contingent events. He maintained that those who had argued that history had meaning had not had to suffer like people living in the Balkans. Eliade criticized the Marxist view that attempted

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to make sense of some kinds of historically occasioned sufferings by arguing these sufferings just represented the means by which new and more promising phases of history came into being. He argued as well that by calling humans to accept their destiny, Nietzsche and Heidegger had elevated despair, pessimism, and amour fati into “the rank of heroic virtues.” (Eliade 1949, p. 153) In his political involvements in the 1930s Eliade had associated with Romanian nationalists who were disenchanted with modern liberalism. In Cosmos and History, he continued passionately to express anger with liberal assumptions about freedom and progress. At best, he argued, people could try to oppose the minority who really made history and face the probability of being contained or deported or they could emigrate, find solace in their private lives, or commit suicide. In this book, Eliade expressed a very bleak view of possibilities for constructive historical actions in the modern world. In contrast to the modern assumptions that held humans responsible for the development of their own wellbeing and that of the planet, Eliade seemed to favor the way humans in traditional societies found meaning by participating in regular, repeated ritual activities. By means of these rituals, humans attuned themselves to nature and the cosmos. As they participated in these repeated events, people in traditional societies were energized as they came into contact with what they regarded as sacred realities. They experienced these sacred realities as being powerful and really real in contrast to their everyday lives which lacked the same sense of reality. Eliade made a strong case for this argument by citing religious texts from all over the world. In their daily lives, people did what they had to do to feed, clothe, and shelter themselves, protect themselves against human and natural threats, and respond to the misfortunes that inevitably befell them. Their lives were often trying and distressing. However, by means of their participation in their oft-repeated rites, Eliade maintained people acted to regenerate themselves and time itself. Eliade argued that man in traditional societies lived in “terror of losing himself by letting himself be overwhelmed by the meaninglessness of profane existence.” (Eliade 1949, p.  92) By means of participation in these rites, people engaged in “the abolition of concrete [historical] time.” (Eliade 1949, p. 85) By this means, “tens of millions of men were able, for century after century, to endure great historical pressure without despairing – or falling into spiritual aridity that always brings with it a relativistic or nihilistic view of history.” (Eliade 1949, p. 152) These people were, Eliade asserted, truly free. “Modern man’s boasted freedom to make history is illusory for nearly the whole of the human race.” (Eliade 1949, p. 156) In contrast, a traditional man was “free to be no longer what he was, free to annul his own history through periodic abolition of time and collective regeneration.” (Eliade 1949, p. 157) Eliade acknowledged that some traditional societies had attempted to live with a historical consciousness but not a secular historical consciousness. In so far as traditional societies, like the ancient Israelites, interpreted their lives in historical terms, Eliade observed, they treated history as the scene for theophanies of God. If they prospered, that was because God had established a covenant with them. If they suffered, it was because God was chastising them. Typically, however, in so far as they viewed their lives in historical terms, people in many societies, traditional and

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modern, tended to view history simply as a finite period, “a fragment between two atemporal eternities.” (Eliade 1949, p. 112) Correspondingly, in so far as these people made sense of history or felt any grounds for hope, it was in relation to trans-­ historical realities and the end of history. In Cosmos and History Eliade saw no way of making sense of the catastrophes of the twentieth century in terms of secular historical thought and little hope for the future. The problem with the modern secular views was that they attempted to explain and justify what happened over time, including most of the misfortunes that humans suffered, simply as the outcomes and by-products of human actions. Such a view made historical outcomes, especially the suffering endured by the millions whose lives were taken or degraded by wars, economic distress, and political policies, seem arbitrary. The corresponding suffering could neither be tolerated nor justified. Eliade maintained that this form of modern secular historical consciousness led to despair. From Eliade’s perspective, modern secular historical consciousness fostered a sense of hopelessness. “It is a despair provoked not by his own existentiality, but by his presence in a historical universe in which almost the whole of mankind lives prey to a continual terror (even if not always conscious of it).” (Eliade 1949, p. 162) Buffeted by the atrocities and catastrophes of the recent past, Eliade expressed his own considerable disenchantment and disillusion with the world in which he found himself. Modern humans could not easily reinvigorate and re-­ capture the cosmic ahistorical consciousness of archaic societies, however appealing Eliade attempted to make them appear. They were destined to live with some kind of historic consciousness and correspondingly to experience the misfortunes of history not well armed to make sense of them or to revitalize their spirits. However, in a few enigmatic statements in the last few pages of his book, Eliade seemed to see grounds for hope. He felt that a certain kind of faith in God – a faith that assumed all things were possible for God – could free man from the terror of history. This kind of faith – which he asserted was emancipated from any kind of natural law – was particularly well-suited, he thought, for the modern man who had fallen away from the world of archetypes and repetitions. This kind of faith, which he described as Christian faith, enabled men to defend themselves against the terror of history. Eliade never really explained how this kind of faith might help humans live constructively in history. His references to faith seem magical. Earlier in the book, he had suggested that this kind of faith might enable people to live with suffering because they believed that God too had suffered, that the God who was in Christ had been crucified, tortured, and died. However, Eliade depicted himself in this and his other academic books as a historian of religions and not a theologian. I think it might be argued that these last few statements offered Eliade a way out of a dilemma he had created for himself when writing this book. Presupposing his previous study on the patterns of religion, he was trying in this book to philosophize about history. For him the catastrophes of the twentieth century made all the Hegelian, Marxist, Liberal and even existential views of history seem naïve, heartless, and ultimately vacuous. At an earlier point in the book, writing about the terror of history, he had conjectured as follows: “There is reason to foresee that, as the terror of history

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grows worse, as existence becomes more and more precarious because of history …. humanity, to ensure its survival, will find itself reduced to desisting from any further “making” of history in the sense in which it began with the creation of the first empires, will confine itself to prescribing archetypal gestures, and will strive to forget, as meaningless and dangerous, any spontaneous gestures which might have historical consequences.” (Eliade 1949, pp. 153–4) Nonetheless, although they had enabled millions of people to live with suffering and misfortune, I think Eliade sensed that traditional ideas about archetypes and cycles of history, even as they were re-invoked by people like T.S. Eliot and James Joyce and celebrated in his own works, did not really provide adequate solace for most people living in modern societies. These people were constantly being reminded about historical events and historical expectations. He had argued that secular historical worldviews seemed hopelessly unsatisfactory as frameworks for making sense of modern catastrophes, for helping people manage their own sufferings, and for providing any viable grounds for hope. At the same time, I think he realized that his own romantic vision about returning to the world of myth and the ritual participation in rites that renewed time was just that –namely, an appealing but ultimately romantic vision. Hence, his brief, concluding invocation of faith that God, for whom all was possible, would in some mysterious way enable modern, fallen humans, without recourse to archetypes, to live in history without being overwhelmed by the terror of history. By themselves, these concluding statements represent more a credo than exposition. They provide no real thoughtful account of how to make sense of suffering and why and how it is possible to live with hope. As a result, what this book as a whole conveys is the way Eliade seemed overwhelmed by the catastrophic events of the twentieth century (1). Nevertheless, we can and must add some appreciative words with regard to the position Eliade sets forth in this book. Although we are indeed creatures of history, humans do not just live in history. Although we are shaped by both human and natural history, as part of nature humans are called upon to live in keeping with, and with respect of, the regularities and forces of nature. The rituals and symbols associated with traditional archetypes have helped humans live in keeping with, and with respect to, these regularities and forces. As he was preparing Cosmos and History for publication, Eliade came in contact with Carl Jung and saw an affinity between his own views about archetypes and Jung’s quite different appreciation of the role of archetypes in the psyche of humans. In later books, Eliade continued to call attention to and celebrate the role of archetypes in the repeated rituals of traditional religions. He never really again revisited the sense of despair that the catastrophes of the mid-twentieth century had occasioned. He also never further attempted to make sense of history and explore prospects for hope. However, at an experiential level, many people in the years since the Second World War have found a basis for viewing their own lives in hopeful terms as a result of therapeutic practices associated with the depth psychology and the engagement in archetypical ritual practices of indigenous, new, and traditional religions.

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Reinhold Niebuhr: Faith and History As Eliade attempted to write an interpretation of history in his book Cosmos and History, so Niebuhr set forth a general interpretation of history in his book Faith and History. This book was also published in 1949 although it was based on a series of lectures Niebuhr had delivered several times, first initially at Yale university in 1945 and then later at universities in Glasgow, Aberdeen, and Uppsala. In this book, Niebuhr sought to defend his own views of a Christian understanding of history, which he contrasted with both classical and modern secular understandings. Niebuhr had been articulating his views of history for a number of years. In 1934 he devoted several chapters in Reflections at the End of an Era to spelling out the relevance of a Christian understanding of history. A year later he published a series of sermons, titled Beyond Tragedy: Essays on the Christian Interpretation of History. He devoted much of his second set of his Gifford Lectures, later published as Human Destiny, outlining the significance of a Christian view of history. In all of these works as well as in Faith and History, Niebuhr wrote as an ethicist, who was pre-eminently concerned to promote effective and responsible conduct by individuals, groups, and governments. In these works, he was not overtly trying to put the recent cataclysmic events into a historical perspective. However, he used Faith and History especially to criticize the liberal optimism characteristic of many Americans as they regarded their successes overcoming the depression and their enemies in the war. Niebuhr was born in 1892 in the United States in a German American family. After college, in 1915 he became a pastor of a largely German-speaking Protestant congregation in Detroit. He stayed there for 13 years, during which time he was very involved with pacifist groups like the Fellowship of Reconciliation. In 1928 he moved to New  York City where he became a professor of theology at Union Theological Seminary. As a result of his experiences among the working classes in Detroit and as a result of the Great Depression, by the early 30s, he had both abandoned his pacifism and become influenced by Marxism. He helped found an association of Christian Socialists. In 1932 he published Moral Man and Immoral Society in which he strongly argued that those seeking to foster justice needed to recognize the extent to which social interactions were often conflictual and pervasively shaped by the exercise of power. Critical of the injustices occasioned by Capitalism, he was not initially impressed by the New Deal efforts to aid the unemployed, revive the economy, and support the laboring classes. By the end of the decade, he looked at the New Deal reforms more favorably and became a major advocate for American financial and manufacturing support for the allies. Having from the early 1930s warned of the danger posed by the fascist governments in Europe, once the war began in 1939, he campaigned forcefully for American intervention in the war on the side of the allies. In the early 1940s, he started his own journal Christianity and Crises, in which he regularly commented on current events, and he help to found Americans for Democratic Action, a major liberal political action group. In the post-war years, he especially warned Americans against the threat posed by the Soviet Union. In 1952 he published a much-heralded book, The Irony of American History, in which he called upon his framework for interpreting

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history to examine critically the strengths and weaknesses of American society. He retired from Union Theological Seminary in 1961 and died in 1969. He was one of the most influential American Christian leaders of the mid-twentieth century. Niebuhr did not write Faith and History directly to comment on the catastrophes of the recent past and/or to explore promises of the post-war years. He did not use this work to shed light on how and why these particular events had occurred, what thoughtful people might learn by analyzing them, and/or how they might best prepare themselves to reduce the likelihood of similar disasters in the future. There was a kind of timeless quality to these lectures. They paralleled many of the thoughts Niebuhr expressed in his Gifford Lectures delivered in 1941/2. In many ways, Niebuhr used these lectures to criticize overly optimistic liberals and pacifists in addition to all those intellectuals as well as the general public who were inclined to assume that overall history unfolded in progressive ways, albeit with setbacks now and then occasioned by unfortunate disasters. Since he had regularly spoken and written publicly about current issues, the absence of direct reference to the war, the depression, and the Holocaust in these lectures did indicate the absence of concern. Rather, in these lectures, he was attempting to make a more general philosophical and theological statement. Niebuhr acknowledged that humans lived in history, shaped by linear time. Humans both possessed the freedom to introduce novelty and were creatures deeply determined by forces of nature and history they could not fully control. History was the realm of indeterminate possibilities. “History is thus a realm of endless possibilities of renewal and rebirth.” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 28) “Where there is history at all there is freedom…” (Niebuhr 1943, p.  80) Niebuhr recognized that over time humans had used their freedom constructively to enhance their possibilities. They had enlarged their powers through inventions – think of the inventions of the wheel, agriculture, literacy, printing, artistic representation, complex organizations, and the steam engine. Niebuhr observed that humans had invented technologies that had improved the conditions of their lives. By economic growth, they had produced higher standards of living. In particular, Niebuhr argued that the development of the institutions of constitutional democracy represented a constructive historical development. In an earlier work, The Children of Darkness and the Children of Light, Niebuhr had drawn upon the Biblical tradition to vindicate constitutional democracy as a robust form of government that both acted to limit power and foster cooperation. However, Niebuhr argued that all these human developments were morally ambiguous. Social progress in no way resulted in moral progress. “The two-fold possibility of creativity and destruction in human freedom accounts for the growth of both good and evil through the extension of human powers.” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 123) Accordingly, he observed in his Gifford Lectures, “It is not possible to make some simple distinction between the period of creativity in a civilization and the period of decline, because every civilization and culture, every empire and nation, reveals destructive elements in its period of creativity, even as there are creative elements in its period of decline.” (Niebuhr 1943, p. 306) Even without taking account of the inevitable role of entropy, reflecting on the overall course of history, Niebuhr observed: “All things in history move towards both fulfillment and dissolution,

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towards the fuller embodiment of their essential character and towards death.” (Niebuhr 1949, p.  287) Many people had sought meaning in history by looking forward to a future that would in some way correspond to their dreams and ideals. Again and again, Niebuhr called attention to the ways these expectations had been unfulfilled. During the last couple of centuries, in part as a result of industrialization and their own improved standards of living, many people assumed the inevitability of progress. However, from Niebuhr’s perspective, the catastrophes of the twentieth century had more than effectively made these assumptions seem naive and foolish. The problem was that humans continuously overestimated their powers and their virtue. As individuals, groups, and states, humans repeatedly attempted to view themselves as the center of history. “The selfishness of men and nations is a fixed datum of historical science.” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 94) Niebuhr used to quip that the one doctrine of the Christian faith that has been empirically substantiated was the doctrine of original sin. The doctrine holds that all humans, not by nature, but by how they choose to live, demonstrate their excessive self-regard as well as their tendency to deceive themselves about the pervasiveness of this self-regard. “…all history is involved in a perennial defiance of the law of God.” (Niebuhr 1943, p. 29) Among humans the will to live tended in practice to manifest itself as the will to power. As a consequence of human sinfulness, human societies and history have experienced ongoing conflicts and those with power have sought even greater power. Those with the advantage of greater power, whether this is economic, political, or religious, correspondingly have typically sought to protect and enlarge their power at the expense of others and the well-being of the larger community. Niebuhr, thereby, concluded that history is “not a realm of indeterminate growth and development. It is a realm of conflict. In this conflict new forces and forms of life challenge the established powers and orders. They are a reminder to the established forms and powers of the contingent character of all historic configurations and a judgment upon the pretension which denies this contingency.” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 224) Niebuhr maintained that it was impossible to make sense of history on its own terms. Characteristically these terms were both partial and unable to solve the enigmas that were characteristic of history. Too often the wicked prospered and the innocent suffered. “…rewards and punishments are not exactly proportioned to relative guilt and innocence of men and nations.” (Niebuhr 1949, p.  133) It was impossible to make sense of the catastrophes of the twentieth century in any simple way. The meaning of history was far more complex than could be conceived by either classical or modern philosophies of history. Instead, Niebuhr defended what he referred to as the Biblical understanding of history. The Biblical tradition interpreted history in relation to ideas of the sovereignty and providence of God. These ideas presupposed, “by faith, a center, source, and end of the historical process more powerful than the human agent and more omniscient than the human observer…” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 57) From the Biblical perspective, “God makes Himself known. His sovereignty over history is disclosed in specific events and acts which are revelatory of the meaning of the whole process.” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 46) While Niebuhr does represent the Biblical tradition in making these assertions, he oversimplifies the process by which particular events are deemed to be revelatory of meanings. It

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is more appropriate to argue that historical events, whether of the destruction of the temple in ancient Israel or the death of Jesus, only become revelatory when they are fittingly interpreted by prophetic-like figures, who moved by the Spirit, find ways of making sense of these events. For Niebuhr, the revelatory event par excellence was the life, crucifixion, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth. This event was, Niebuhr believed, the center of history. In this event, God’s sovereignty was expressed not by the overt success of this or that cause or the triumph of this or that power but by the sacrificial death of the man who was the incarnation of God. “To make suffering love rather than power the final expression of sovereignty was to embody the perplexity of history into the solution.” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 143) Niebuhr further elaborated: “That love which could not maintain itself in history becomes the symbol both of a new beginning which man could make if he subjected his life to the judgment of Christ, and of the mercy of God which alone could overcome the fateful impotence of man ever to achieve so perfect a love.” (Niebuhr 1949, pp.  143–4) Although particular events sometimes provided “tangents of moral meaning,” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 132) Niebuhr felt that it was possible only in relation to the cross of Christ, through faith, to gain a sense of the overall meaning of history. From this perspective, history moved from creation until the final fulfillment, through periods of greater and lesser well-being, times of struggle and times of peace, without any clear pattern. “Only the divine forgiveness toward all men,” Niebuhr confessed referring to the historical event of the cross of Christ, “overcomes the confusion of human history.” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 28) Niebuhr sounds like a preacher, which in fact he was throughout his life even after he also became a professor. To be sure, he was also a public figure and a well-­ respected and widely influential political analyst. Repeatedly, he drew upon Biblical imagery as a symbolic system to caution against easy optimism, to expose the self-­ serving aspects of many seemingly acceptable public initiatives, and to prepare people for unanticipated consequences of many well-meaning policies. He recognized what he referred to as the tragic necessity in a world with nuclear weapons for countries like the United States to become nuclear-armed. His faith led him to a position he called Biblical Realism. From this perspective, the meaning of history could only be grasped in relation to the whole of history and could only be understood by faith. In the meantime, he argued that humans could and should seek to further “proximate solutions to man’s perennial problems…” (Niebuhr 1949, p. 98) As an attempt to interpret the meaning of history in response to the catastrophic events of the mid-twentieth century, these lectures seem perplexing. Niebuhr was addressing audiences whose lives had been greatly affected by these events. To be sure, he broadly referred to these events as he criticized idealists who felt that it was in some way possible to find redemption in history. If, as he argued, it was sometimes possible to discover the “judgment of God” in historical events, what might his several audiences learn by reflecting on these events to discern the “judgment of God” in their own histories? Beginning in the early 1930s Niebuhr had warned about the dangers to world order posed by the fascist powers. He had also warned of the way current economic policies had aggravated these problems. In these post-­ war lectures, he might well have added a number of observations, especially to his

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American audiences. For example, he might have analyzed the way the peace Americans help forge after the First World War contributed to the instability in what became fascist states; how the economic depression begun in the United States further aggravated these conditions; how protectionist trade policies of the early 1930s further intensified these problems; how the failure to take more forcible steps – such as imposing tough economic sanctions – against these states in early 1930s as they violated international laws increased the threat of war; how the failure of the United States to participate in the League of Nations made collective action against these states much more difficult; how during the war allied planes might have bombed the train routes leading to concentration camps; and how during the war the allied policy of strategic bombing of cities led to deaths of hundreds of thousands of civilians with little or no impact on the military capacity of its enemies. As Niebuhr did observe in his book The Irony of American History, in many ways Americans continued to think of themselves as a largely innocent nation. In relation to the war, the United States had emerged in the eyes of many Americans as the champion that had turned the war around to create a victory for the allied powers. While there is much truth in this observation, it remains only part of what Americans might have learned by reflecting on the war in light of the broader theological perspective that Niebuhr defended. The overriding message that Niebuhr seemed to communicate in the after-war years was that America needed to remain strong in order to be prepared to address the threat posed by the Soviet Union in a world now shaped by realities of the Cold War. He did recognize the need for America to help restore the economies of Europe and Japan both to avoid civil unrest in these countries and to support the emerging world order. However, in these lectures, Niebuhr provides few hints about how his audiences might best learn from these past and current events in order to pursue those “proximate solutions” he thought it was imperative to pursue. These lectures exhibit a further irony. Throughout his career, Niebuhr seemed to embody a kind of realistic hopefulness. He observed that the course of history often resulted in tragic outcomes but as he announced boldly in the title of his earlier book of sermons Beyond Tragedy, from a Biblical perspective tragedy was not the last word. Beyond tragedy, it was possible to hope. However, Niebuhr seemed to be deeply suspicious of any initiatives to identify hope with any particular historical developments – whether these were causes, parties, leaders, or policies. In so far as humans turned to these causes and movements as new messiahs – as they often had in the past, they were bound to be gravely disappointed. In these lectures and in his other books, he viewed the fulfillment of hope not as a historical but as a trans-­ historical possibility. For many peoples around the world in the years after these mid-century catastrophes the challenge was to find in various proximate solutions – that is, in particular causes – realistic bases for hope. Whether these causes assumed the form of a new world order, Zionism, de-colonialism, communism in China, economic growth, the spread of democracy, globalization, and/or new technologies, Niebuhr is persuasive in warning of the danger of regarding any of these initiatives as more than ambiguous and proximate means for addressing the problem emerging in the years following the war. Because he felt that the position of world federalists was hopelessly utopian, Niebuhr failed to appreciate the ways a number of

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international initiatives in the post-war years helped to foster global cooperation and thereby exemplified exactly what he called for by advocating proximate solutions for perennial problems. Niebuhr seemed to take it for granted that humans were predisposed to be hopeful. In many ways, he remained hopeful in spite of all of his emphasis on realism. He assumed that most of his contemporaries were inclined to be “children of light” seeking out new possibilities. To be sure, in spite of the recently concluded world war and the emerging cold war, many in his American audiences were feeling optimistic. Their economy was expanding. Their country was recognized and honored as a world leader. However, at the same time, many people around the world found it very difficult to view their own historical prospects hopefully. The impoverished half of the world experienced little hope. Those living in the path of war were still living in the midst of the devastation wrought by the war. Many despaired because much of the suffering of the twentieth century seemed to grow out efforts by various groups who sought to overcome particular injustices to further their own visions. While Niebuhr critically analyzed the dangers posed by those who sought some kind of ideal historical solution to these ongoing problems, he less fully spelled out the grounds for, and the character of, hopeful constructive actions in history. Like Augustine, Niebuhr assumed that in order to discern meaning in history it was necessary to view the whole of history from the beginning to the end. He defended an Augustinian understanding of history because it viewed history from the creation of the universe until the final consummation. Only by adopting this kind of large inclusive perspective was it possible, Niebuhr argued, to find a way of reconciling the ongoing discrepancies between the moral quality of the lives of humans and the benefits and distress they experienced in their lives. History would finally be consummated in the last judgment beyond history in which God would reward and punish humans justly in keeping with God’s own standards of righteousness. Like many others, Niebuhr adopted this Augustinian model of history as if there were no real alternatives. However, as I have indicated elsewhere, Biblical writings like those of Amos, Jeremiah, and Deutero-Isaiah, expressed an alternative view of the providence of God, in which the meaning was found, informed by memories of the past, by critically assessing and responding to the threats and opportunities of the present moments in time. The Irony of American History does focus on the threats and opportunities of the present viewed especially in relation to global Cold War conflict between the forces of communism, represented and led by the Soviet Union, and the forces of liberal democracy, represented and led by the United States. He wrote this book several years after the countries of eastern Europe had established communist governments, the Communist Party had seized control of the government in China and established the Peoples’ Republic of China, communist parties had gained strength especially in Italy and France, and several leaders of independence movements in the colonial world, people like Sukarno in Indonesia, Kenyatta in Kenya, and Nehru in India, had expressed their overt commitment to socialists ideas and principles. Although Niebuhr makes references in this book to several features of American history, these are primarily cited in order to shed light upon the current global struggle epitomized

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by the Cold War. He soberly acknowledged that “there are no guarantees either for the victory of democracy over tyranny or for a peaceful solution of the fateful conflict between two great centers of power.” (Niebuhr 1952, p. 140) The situation of the United States at that time was unique. It had entered both the first and the second World Wars late but had played a crucial role on the side of the allied forces. In contrast to other countries who had suffered from the Great Depression during the thirties and the war in the first half of the forties, the United States had come out of the Second World War much stronger economically and politically more influential than when it entered the war. America had envisioned itself as leading a crusade as it engaged in the Second World War. It thought of itself as a virtuous country fighting against evil both in Europe and in Asia. Rather than asking itself how it had happened that the leading industrialized countries had been overwhelmed by such a serious and long-lasting economic depression and then engaged in such destructive wars, in the post-war years Americans were congratulating themselves on the decisive ways they both overcame the depression and won the wars. Niebuhr’s book, and the lectures that preceded the book, challenged Americans to think again about the new cold war situation in which they now found themselves. However realistic, however prudent, and however appealing Niebuhr’s interpretation of history, it was unapologetically Christian. To be sure, many non-Christians regarded Niebuhr’s political analysis as astute and insightful. Still, the symbols Niebuhr used as foundations for his thought were Christian.

Notes

Chapter 3 1. It is possible to identify an additional, fifth alternative response to the challenge of acting constructively in the contingent present: namely, the disposition people experience when faint hope is almost indistinguishable from faint despair. This disposition characteristically takes the form of Stoic-like determination and resolve. Without knowing or anticipating what might result from the current course of action, those experiencing faint hope/faint despair typically continue in their accustomed patterns of action either because they value the course of action in which they are engaged – because it is habituated or commanded – and/ or because they are prepared to wait to see what the potentialities of this way of being will bring forth. I will not here discuss this alternative further, except to note that in Being and Time, Heidegger argues for a position much like this (Division Two, Chapter Two: “Dasein’s Attestation of an Authentic Potentiality-­ for-­Being, and Resoluteness”). 2. Because of his strong conviction in the ways God’s sovereignty acts to govern and care for the world, Calvin’s works have also fostered this-worldly hopes that have variously influenced political movements, economic activity, and even scientific endeavors. Chapter 4 1. In contrast to Unger, I think that the disposition for self-evaluation is an integral feature of human cultures. It is as much a part of our basic being as our mortality and our drive to make sense of our lives. Accordingly, we not only develop our life patterns in relation to our own schemes of value, but we also engage, both overtly and unconsciously, in evaluating others as well as ourselves. Hopefully, we can find ways of engaging in these valuations in ways that are both realistic, humane, and generative of our own sense of self-esteem. 2. Can the virtue of hope be exercised for malevolent as well as benevolent purposes? I think hope may accompany other virtues, in ways most of us assume, as well as other vices. Intemperate individuals may draw upon their capacity to © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7

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imagine possibilities in order to feed their desires without reasonable limits. Foolhardy people may exercise their disposition to anticipate possibilities to undertaking ever more foolish risks. We might argue that in both cases these people are not being fully realistic about possible outcomes. Nonetheless, they are combining aspects of the virtue of hope with dispositions usually described as vicious. It is important to remind ourselves of these demonic possibilities with respect to hope. We can think of many examples of people capable of realistically exercising an impressive amount of imagination in order to pursue selfish purposes that cause harm to many others. Consider all those business people who have found all sorts of clever ways, not to evade, but to avoid taxes, by registering branches of their firms in tax havens in other countries and by ingenious uses of transfer pricing practices. Note well, the way many people involved in the international drug trade have found ways of flourishing by developing useful contacts, corrupting police officers, and exploiting the drug dependencies of many of their dealers. Recall any of a number of examples of rebel groups who have used acts of terror both to frighten their enemies and as means of recruiting followers, who in turn have been attracted by the ability of these groups to unsettle their enemies and express agency and the anger of suppressed groups. An exemplary instance of the vicious exercise of the capacity for hope has been the long-running organized efforts by many groups and persons in the United States to suppress the voting rights of targeted groups, including especially racialized minorities and indigenous peoples. Using a variety of devices, from literacy rules, poll taxes, requirements for photo identification, overt intimidation, and restricted access to polling stations, those seeking to suppress the votes of targeted groups have used their imaginations to explore realistic possibilities for realizing their objectives. These efforts have been further developed recently by attempts in some areas to argue that ballots mailed to polling stations but not yet counted by the end of election days should be discounted as invalid. Whether by using traditional Jim Crow laws or more modern initiatives, many people have been exercising their capacities realistically to anticipate possibilities – their dispositions for hope – in order to discriminate against other citizens. Chapter 6 1. In another essay on the practice of mining in developing countries, I have argued most of these operations assume the form of enclave rather than inclusive development and therefore aggravate inequalities and social conflicts (Bird 2014). Again, in a recent chapter – titled “What is the Business of Business? Time for a Fundamental Rethinking” – I have argued the ascendency and dominance of the financial model for operating and evaluating business practices have aggravated all of these adverse economic, social, and environmental consequences (Bird 2021). Chapter 8 1. Several years ago, I drew upon this tradition in order to propose some practical ways to engage in the practice of business ethics (Bird 2007; Bird 2016a).

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2. See David Treuer (2019). Treuer reviews the history of indigenous people in the United States and Canada. While not ignoring all of the suffering and oppression these peoples experienced, Treuer insists it is also vital to remember the many of examples by which the indigenous peoples have acted with mastery to protect themselves and defend their rights. Chapter 12 1. Recognizing the large and instrumental role of the human capacity for reason, a number of philosophers, including especially the German idealist George Friedrich Hegel, have argued that history could best be interpreted in relation to the increasing role that reason has played in human societies. Hegel viewed historical developments in progressive terms as the movement of humans from childlike almost non-rational consciousness of primitive societies through to the adult-like and far more rational consciousness of modern societies (Hegel 1956). Influenced by Hegel’s arguments, the sociologist Max Weber especially called attention to the ways reasoning has been utilized or drawn upon in modern societies not only in the sciences but also to organize modern military forces, to structure public and private systems of administration, to institutionalize modern legal systems, and even to organize ways of thinking about and composing modern classical music (Weber 1904b–5; Weber 1916; Weber 1978). While recognizing the pervasive influence of reason in modern societies, Weber felt that the role the practices of reasoning played were often ambiguous and not necessarily progressive. For example, although rationally organized, in practice bureaucracies often operated in arbitrary and mindless ways. 2. Scientists engage in their investigations recognizing that outcomes they observe and/or predict are likely to happen with higher or lower degrees of probability. These probabilities are much higher, sometimes close to 100%, in the classical physical sciences than in the social sciences, where probabilities are lower (Weber 1904a; Bird 2020). 3. Sue Gardner on the history of public broadcasting. 4. Some of these feelings of discontent already began to emerge in the Romantic movements of the nineteenth century and in the Existentialist movements of the twentieth century, as expressed by various poets, novelists, philosophers, and social critics. Articulate critics called into question several features often characteristic of the practices of reason and science. These included especially the imperious role played by many champions of science and reason and the mindless, positivistic application of reason and science to human affairs. Critics included observers like Jacques Ellul, Foucault, and James Scott, all of whom analyzed these practices from the perspective of their technocratic applications (Ellul 1964; Scott 1998; Foucault 1975a, b). For the most part, these critics were not criticizing the practices of reason and science as such. Rather, they were criticizing the ways these practices failed to appreciate more fully the role of feelings and emotion in human activities and the ways other cultural systems, like faiths and popular philosophies, have operated to help humans address their desires and needs for meaning, trust, and value.

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5. Bohr (1985), see especially pages 91–6; 121–140; 311–319. Similar arguments were made in different terms by William James (1890) and Schutz (1962). 6. The problem is that while reason and the sciences have excelled at describing, analyzing, and explaining what happens to humans and to the larger world in which we live, they have not excelled in the same ways in identifying the meanings and values of human life, areas to which faiths as cultural systems have been especially devoted. Chapter 13 1. Different standards have been used to measure poverty in different countries. The figure I have used is an approximate one, using the WB standard of a per capita income of $2.25/day generally, but modifying this standard for industrialized countries which set poverty lines much higher. The Extent of extreme poverty, defined by a per capita income of less than $1.25/day, was markedly reduced between 1990 and 2015. 2. Economic inequality by itself is not a problem. It is reasonable and fair to offer differential economic rewards to people based on their efforts, their contributions, and the risks and difficulties they face as part of what they do. However, certain levels and degrees of inequality become problematic, especially when they seem to accrue to people, based on factors like the current possession of much wealth, privileged information, and conscious deception. 3. Much of the argument in the past several paragraphs is based on a recent article I published on “What is the Business of Business? Time for Fundamental Re-­ Thinking.” (Bird 2021) 4. Clearly, if business enterprises generally, and large businesses, in particular, are going to operate in ways that more seriously take up the concerns of the diverse stakeholders upon which their effective operations depend, then they must explore regular ways in which these concerns are represented in the boards and councils that exercise governance over these organizations. Minimally, these boards and councils should seek to promote and protect the good of these enterprises as a whole and not primarily the good of any one group of stakeholders like the investors. Given a history during which the situation of many workers has deteriorated and the impact of productive enterprises on the Earth and its ecosystem remains aggravated in spite of noteworthy reforming efforts, serious consideration of alternative patterns of corporate governance seems to have become imperative. It has been argued by Oliver Williamson that a firm should be identified as a nexus of treaties. Following Williamson’s suggestion, I think it makes sense to view a firm as the nexus of a number of negotiated (overtly or implicitly), value-creating interactions with diverse stakeholders. A firm comes into being and continues its operations as a result of these several sets of interactions, which executives and boards are expected to manage and govern (Bird 2001). Those defending the shareholder model of a firm offer what I would regard as an imbalanced view because they examine how well a firm is performing solely or primarily in relation to how well it is able to reward its shareholders. In practice, not only, one, do investment markets have a life of their own

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affected by many other factors, including market speculations, in addition to how well the firm is performing on a day-to-day basis but also, two, firms often choose to prioritize returns to shareholders over the interests of laborers and other stakeholders Chapter 14 1. This outlook was well illustrated by the influence of the so-called “Washington Consensus.” For a critique of efforts to promote the dominance of the international business community, see David Korten 1995. 2. Since the Second World War a wide range of international public and civil societies organizations have been established to address a number of specific, targeted concerns. For the most part, these organizations further their particular mandates by fostering cooperation among the nations of the world. However, a number of these international bodies have, or have gained, some measure of commanding authority over practices in particular countries with respect to the mandates for which they are responsible. For example, the WHO can dictate how countries should respond to particular epidemics, the IAEA has authority to inspect all nuclear facilities, and the ICC can compel countries to abide by its ruling. These instances of international cooperation represent both examples and potential resources for facing the enlarged array of global crises which we are now facing. In practice, the whole of these international public and civil society organizations and institutions constitute what has sometimes been referred to as the Liberal World Order. A number of scholars have developed a different view. They describe the Liberal World Order as a set of arrangements established to maintain a hegemonic dominance of the United States, its allies, and their economic interests (Arrighi and Silver 1998; Arrighi 2007) Certainly, it is true that the United States and its allies initially worked with others to establish many intergovernmental agencies with reasonable expectations that the emerging form of international relations would support their economic interests. However, all these agencies – like IMF, the World Bank, the UN, and the WHO – developed agendas of their own, responsive in part to other countries and interests, including the increasingly large number of developing countries. The agendas of many of these international intergovernmental organizations have also evolved over time, becoming somewhat more responsive to concerns voiced by environmental groups, human rights advocates, and developing countries. In addition, the character of the so-called Liberal World Order has also been shaped by the creation and activities of multiple international civil society organizations. In fact, a strong case can be made that over time and especially since the end of the so-­ called Cold War, the attempts of the United States and several of the other great powers to assert economic, diplomatic, and military dominance has functioned to threaten and weaken the Liberal World Order (Johnson 2003; Wertheimer 2019). For example, the attempt of the United States, using its several hundred military bases located outside of that country, to function as a global police force has functioned ambiguously both as a means of containing some local military threats while at the same time tending to prioritize military over diplomatic

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responses to complex local conflicts and dragging out conflicts rather than resolving them. 3. A century ago, in his book Political Parties Robert Michel initially called attention to the oligarchic character of political parties. Similar conclusions have been reached by many other observers, including Schumpeter (1942) and Macpherson (1977). 4. Interestingly, one factor that has aggravated this problem has been an initiative introduced to deal with this problem. In the name of democracy and transparency, many people have argued that political discussions and decision-making ought to be conducted as publicly as possible. Candidates ought to be nominated through public processes. Legislative debates ought to be public. Along with other factors, the efforts to make political discussions and decision-making more public and transparent have occasioned an unanticipated and largely unwelcome outcome. However, at its core, if they are governing for nations or communities as a whole and arriving at decisions regarding truly complex matters, then it is in the public interest for politicians to make use of the best information, to exercise their own skills and wisdom, and to deliberate with others of opposing views, in order arrive at positions in the best interests of all concerned. This kind of deliberating often works most effectively when those involved can pay close attention to each other, considering the arguments and evidence offered by others, as they seek to arrive at policies good for the community as a whole. In so far as these decision-making processes become public, then politicians have been characteristically inclined to speak and listen to those parts of the public that are most likely to support them. Under these conditions, it often makes less sense to deliberate, because deliberating often leads to seeking compromises with opponents. 5. Often the public discussion regarding this problem has taken it for granted that this problem must be solved either by adopting a first-past-the-post or a proportional system of voting. It seems reasonable as well to consider another alternative by which this problem can be resolved by staging run-off votes between the two candidates receiving the highest of votes in any political jurisdiction in which no candidate received a majority of the votes cast. Chapter 15 1. See, for example, Freud’s discussion on Civilization and Its Discontents (1953), Fromm’s Man For Himself, and Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic (1966). 2. Bonds of love also help to bring into being and are sustained by the relationship between one’s self and various enterprises which one may become engaged with and devoted to, such as the artist with her art (music, writing, graphic, and other arts), a professional with her profession, or a naturalist with the world of nature. Chapter 16 1. A few years ago, I wrote an essay, titled “Out of Sorts,” in which I examined complaints voiced both by the Tea Party on the political right and by the Occupy movement on the political left. Although they expressed their protests differently, in uncannily parallel ways both movements focused on a range of comparable issues. For example, both were upset by increases in perceived inequalities,

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one blaming the government and the other the super-wealthy. Both felt economic markets were being unfairly distorted, one blaming excessive government ­regulation and the other pointing to the roles played by the wealthy as well as government subsidies and tax breaks. Both groups complained about unfairness in the way current tax systems operated, one group primarily focusing on the volume of taxes and the other on diverse ways the current systems seemed arbitrary and unfair. Given their overlapping sense of particular problems that needed to be addressed, it would seem that it might have been possible over time through deliberation and negotiation to devise various pragmatic ways of addressing these issues. However, such a practical approach was impossible. Each group perceived the other as holding views that directly threatened what they valued (Bird 2016). As Collier has recently argued, the public articulation of these kinds of movements has been excessively ideological (Collier 2018). Both groups responded to and expressed widespread feelings of resentment. They attracted considerable support from many people who felt deeply unhappy with contemporary politics.

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Index

A Abed, F.H., 69, 77, 254 Addams, J., 91 Africa, 14, 102, 108, 109, 115, 116, 140, 168, 199, 254 Agriculture, 87, 193, 195, 199, 213, 266, 281 AIDs, 108, 160, 165 Algeria, 127, 131–133, 135 Algorithms, 177, 180–182 Alinsky, S., 10, 51, 58–60, 254 Americas, 18, 30, 63, 102, 111, 135, 137, 198, 199, 203, 215, 263, 264, 284, 286 Anomy, 33, 34, 38, 53, 57 Apartheid, 66, 76, 111, 112, 138, 271 Apocalyptic, 21, 90, 134, 138, 189, 257, 269 Arabs, 56, 57, 131, 150, 168 Arendt, H., 36, 37, 117, 120, 136–148, 150–152, 214, 252 Aristotle, 8, 9, 31, 32, 45, 50, 53, 83 Assets, 72, 91, 166, 167, 192, 196, 199, 250–252 Atomic bombs, 110, 121, 252 weapons, 11, 20, 121, 219 Attention, 5, 11, 15, 28, 29, 31, 35–37, 44, 47, 50–53, 56, 59, 63, 64, 66, 71, 72, 75, 77, 84, 91, 101, 104, 112, 117, 121, 122, 130, 136, 140, 142, 144, 147, 148, 150, 158–161, 163, 168, 169, 185, 206, 214, 218, 223, 227, 231–233, 235, 236, 238, 246, 251, 253, 254, 256, 261, 264, 266, 267, 272, 279, 282, 289, 292 Augustine, 39, 40, 126, 127, 137, 265, 285 Augustus Caesar, 109 Australia, 107, 157, 198, 233

Austria, 139 Authorities, 5, 17, 29, 64, 80, 87–90, 103, 105, 109, 119, 130, 140, 160, 161, 167, 169, 178, 183, 184, 187, 189, 215, 216, 220, 222, 253, 266, 291 AVAAZ, 8, 77, 78 Axial Age (period/movements), 121, 122, 125, 126, 150 B Baldwin, J., 105 Banality of evil, 140, 144 Banerjee, A., 199, 223 Bangladesh Rehabilitation Assistance Committee (BRAC), 69, 72, 77, 78, 81 Belittlement, 45, 243 Bellah, R.N., 122 Bhagavad-Gita, 50, 266 Biodiversity, 8, 147, 166 Biosphere, 15, 79, 165, 170, 203, 204, 253 Black Plague (Black Death), 18, 106, 165 Bloch, E., 30 Bosk, C., 270–272 Bregman, R., 66, 67 Buddha, 50, 232, 266 Buddhism, 20, 51, 121, 232 Bureaucracies, 144, 289 Businesses, 3, 4, 8, 10, 15, 18, 26, 50, 52, 64, 69, 76–78, 80, 81, 98, 110–112, 119, 134, 160, 162, 169, 170, 174, 177, 180, 183, 189, 193, 196, 199–201, 204–209, 219–221, 225, 233, 237, 238, 254–258, 270, 272, 273, 288, 290, 291 Business Roundtable, 205, 206

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 F. Bird, The Generative Power of Hope, Library of Public Policy and Public Administration 17, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-95021-7

305

306 C California, 59, 157 Calvin, J., 40 Camus, A., 28, 29, 37, 48, 117, 127–138, 147–150, 152, 252 Canada, 157, 168, 169, 197, 233, 271, 289 Capabilities, 28, 31, 124, 194, 195, 250 Carbon dioxide (CO2), 103, 202 Carpe Diem, 249–259 Catholic Church, 29, 89 Charter 77, 51, 60, 61 China (Chinese), 3, 14, 50, 78, 101, 102, 111, 116, 121, 148, 158, 160, 198, 200, 213, 214, 216, 222, 226, 255, 265, 267, 275, 284, 285 Christianity, 20, 39, 51, 280 Christians, 30, 31, 40, 71, 87, 89, 139, 150, 179, 226, 278, 280–282, 286 Citizens, 11, 16, 56, 61, 62, 80, 121, 128–130, 135, 138, 139, 141, 148, 149, 168, 178, 183, 186, 199, 214–218, 221–224, 237, 238, 245, 251, 253, 256, 257, 274, 275, 288 Citizenship premium, 198 Civility, 112, 242 Civilizations, 15, 50, 137, 143, 236, 245, 281, 292 Civil rights civil rights movement, 46, 51 Civil societies, 15, 18, 20, 50, 72, 186, 193, 196, 216, 217, 219, 225, 227, 254–256, 291 Climate change refugees, 112 changes, 3, 5, 6, 8, 15–17, 19, 21, 65–67, 74–76, 79–81, 103, 105, 110, 112, 147, 149, 157, 159–161, 166, 175, 196, 202, 204, 214, 218–220, 225, 239, 241, 242, 244, 246, 251, 253, 254, 261, 268 Cold war, 116, 147, 275, 284–286, 291 Colonial-era, 215 Colonies, 102, 111, 140, 142, 169, 197 Common Era, 10, 40, 50, 84, 85, 87, 121 Common good, 105, 252 Communism, 131, 143, 284, 285 Complexity, 18, 76, 259 Compromises, 21, 47, 70, 71, 73, 74, 105, 107, 119, 132, 162, 175, 178, 225, 292 Consensuses, 111, 178, 275 Consumers, 60, 189, 201, 223, 224 Contingencies, 8, 32, 36, 47, 53, 69, 124, 162, 188, 233, 282 Conversations, 47, 72–75, 95, 100, 118, 144, 150, 151, 174, 220, 261, 273

Index Coronavirus disease-19 (COVID-19), 10, 18, 52, 99, 101, 106, 107, 160, 256, 258 Crises, 4–11, 16–21, 26, 28, 30, 39, 40, 46, 50, 52, 53, 56, 67, 71, 73, 75–81, 84, 95, 96, 99, 101, 103–110, 112, 115–152, 157–162, 164–166, 171, 176, 182, 185, 189, 192, 196, 197, 199, 219, 225–228, 231, 234, 236, 241, 242, 244–246, 249–252, 254, 256–259, 261, 263, 267, 268, 280, 291 Critical moments, 13–21, 25, 159, 161, 185, 188, 241, 267 Cyber warfare, 214 Czechoslovakia, 51, 60, 61, 101, 141 D Davies, K., 7, 34, 35 Death deaths of despair, 233 Death camps, 4, 11, 26, 107, 115–117, 127, 136, 141, 144, 145, 147, 148, 152, 214, 252 Deaton, A., 174, 208, 233, 234 Decline and fall of Roman Empire, 137 Deforestation, 19, 165, 202 Delinquency, 16, 237 Democracies, 66, 149, 157, 187, 215, 218, 219, 222, 223, 236, 281, 284–286, 292 Democratic agenda, 215–218 Democratic centralism, 228 Depression (economic) the Great Depression, 4, 10, 17, 107, 110, 115, 200, 252 Desertification, 19, 202 De Tocqueville, A., 100, 215–217, 220, 223, 225 Development (economic) enclave development, 102, 207 Development (psychological), 40 Dickens, C., 17 Discrimination, 14, 86, 141, 160, 221, 237, 238, 242, 266 Disenchantment, 6, 7, 21, 46, 67, 143, 157, 161, 214, 227, 228, 278 Dismay, 162, 242 Dispositions, 5, 7–11, 18, 25–28, 31, 32, 34–39, 43–45, 47–50, 52, 53, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 63–65, 67, 69–72, 77–79, 84, 89, 91, 95, 99, 103, 106, 109, 125, 133, 162, 189, 193, 228, 234, 235, 247, 250, 252, 254, 258, 259, 261, 287, 288 Distrust, 6, 10, 16, 38, 52, 138, 142, 157, 161, 173, 175–177, 182–185, 188, 189, 244, 245, 252, 253

Index Doctors, 30, 107, 128, 134, 183, 184, 186, 236, 270 Droughts, 3, 19, 56, 157, 159, 165, 202, 241 Duflo, E., 28, 187, 199, 200, 202, 203, 223 Durkheim, E., 54, 232 Dyson, F., 149, 150 E Eagleton, T., 26, 48 Earth, 3, 4, 7, 10, 19, 20, 52, 79, 91, 97, 116, 123, 132, 134, 136, 138, 144, 151, 152, 158, 159, 163–171, 179, 191, 192, 194, 196, 197, 201–204, 207–209, 214, 218, 231, 241, 245, 250, 252, 253, 267, 290 Ecclesial Base Communities (ECBs), 88 Economic growth (economic development), 4, 14, 16, 50, 79, 102, 103, 197, 199, 206–208, 217, 225, 255 Economics, 3, 4, 10, 14, 16–18, 20, 21, 28, 29, 40, 49, 50, 56, 62–64, 67, 79, 80, 85, 98, 99, 101–103, 105, 109, 110, 112, 116, 119, 120, 124, 125, 128, 130, 134, 136, 140–143, 146–148, 157, 160–162, 167, 174, 175, 177, 183, 187, 189, 192–194, 196–201, 206–208, 217, 218, 220, 222, 224, 225, 233, 234, 236, 242–245, 252, 254–257, 275, 276, 278, 281–284, 286–288, 290, 291, 293 Ecosystems, 10, 19, 20, 91, 116, 159, 164, 166, 171, 192, 197, 201–204, 208, 209, 231, 239, 290 Egypt, 56, 107, 122 Eichmann, 138, 140, 144 Eisenhower, D.D., 275 Eliade, M., 117, 126, 128, 247 Enclave development, 102, 207 Energies, 9, 21, 26, 32, 39, 75, 79, 80, 91, 103, 104, 109, 122, 132, 160, 162, 165, 170, 191–194, 196, 198, 203, 208, 227, 231, 233, 235, 244, 245, 251, 252, 254 Enterprises, 4, 26, 72, 77, 102, 110, 171, 174, 188, 192–194, 196, 199, 203–205, 225, 255, 258, 290, 292 Environments, 52, 73, 74, 79, 161, 166, 194, 203, 204, 206, 232 Epicureans, 247, 266, 268 Erikson, E., 9, 30, 44, 45, 72 Europe, 21, 35, 61, 89, 102, 109, 110, 115, 141, 217, 220, 267, 276, 280, 284–286 Evolution, 98, 99, 171, 175

307 F Faiths, 15, 20, 30, 31, 38, 39, 44, 52–54, 56, 61, 66, 71, 74, 84, 85, 97, 98, 118, 125, 126, 130, 146, 150, 164, 179, 180, 188, 196, 219, 232, 235–239, 242, 253, 265, 278–286, 289, 290 Fanaticize, 34 Fantasize, 33, 38 Fates, 48, 98, 99, 130, 266 Federalist Papers, 54, 100 Finance the financial model of the firm, 204, 205 Fingarette, H., 273 First Nations, 169, 222 Flexibility, 45, 48, 71, 81, 189, 254 Foraging, 161, 164, 183, 192, 195, 201, 232 Forest fires, 3, 159, 241 Forgiveness, 120, 145, 146, 151, 269, 271, 274–276, 283 Fossil fuels, 4, 79, 80, 103, 160, 199, 203, 252 Foucault, M., 66 Fowler, J., 44 Frankl, V., 26 Freud, S., 233 Fromm, E., 36, 233 G Gandhi, M., 10, 58, 59, 76, 254 Geertz, C., 103 General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT), 116, 218 Genocide, 116, 140 George, H., 169 Germany, 60, 89–91, 116–118, 120, 130, 136–144, 148, 205, 216 Ghost dances, 88 Global Compact, 219 Global institutions, 147 Globalization, 6, 20, 21, 124, 196, 201, 253, 265, 284 Governing good enough governing, 217, 220 governance, 219 Governments, 4, 6, 10, 11, 14, 18, 20, 21, 50, 51, 56–58, 60–62, 64, 65, 70–72, 74, 80, 81, 86, 87, 99, 101–104, 106, 107, 110–112, 116, 118–120, 123, 135, 138, 140, 142, 143, 162, 165, 169, 170, 177, 182, 183, 186, 187, 189, 196, 199, 200, 206, 214–217, 221, 222, 225–228, 236–238, 243–245, 255–258, 271, 274–276, 280, 281, 285, 293

308 Great depressions, 4, 10, 17, 107, 110, 115–117, 121, 127, 152, 200, 252, 268, 280, 286 Greece, 50, 110, 121, 157 Greenhouse gases (GHGs), 3, 9, 18, 19, 79, 80, 159, 160, 202, 207, 254 Green New Deals, 74, 75 Greenpeace, 74, 75, 219 Gregory VII, 29 Guilt the question of guilt, 119 H Happiness, 11, 25, 46, 97, 131, 206, 231–239, 244, 247 Harari, Y., 50, 174, 236, 246 Havel, V., 10, 58, 60–62, 254 Health, 10, 15, 16, 26, 30, 49, 65, 78, 98, 107, 115, 134, 160, 175, 193, 195, 198, 200, 207, 224, 225, 242, 244, 250, 257, 258 Hegel, G.W.F., 117, 129 Hesiod, 266 Hinduism Hindus, 179 Hirschman, A.O., 63, 64 History A due regard for history, 95–112, 162, 269, 274 dialectic character of history, 263 historical consciousness, 95, 97, 101, 105, 263–265, 267, 268, 277, 278 terror of history, 126, 278 the tragic character of history, 265 Hitler, A., 130, 140, 143 Holocaust, 116, 117, 121, 281 Homer-Dixon, T., 32, 39, 254 Homestead Act, 169 Hope cultivating hope, 43–54, 63, 86 Demonic hope, 288 habits of hope, 55–67 hope as a virtue, 30, 39, 87 micro-dynamics of hope, 35–40 Housing, 4, 15, 20, 21, 157, 158, 160, 181, 195, 196, 201, 225, 236, 242, 243, 266 Humans human capacities, 11, 27, 108, 145, 146, 152, 159, 235, 252, 289 human labor, 207 Hume, D., 30, 31, 37, 83

Index I Ideals idealists/idealism, 36, 77, 108, 117, 246, 247, 255 Identity politics, 237, 238 Ideology (ideologies), 7, 8, 20, 69, 97 Imaginations, 8–11, 37, 44, 48, 49, 58, 59, 96, 109, 144, 147, 189, 197, 253, 266, 272, 273, 288 Immigration, 56 Imperialism, 11, 20, 115–117, 138–143, 152, 196 India, 3, 14, 28, 50, 51, 58, 59, 73, 76, 78, 107, 116, 121, 200, 255, 276, 285 Industry industrialization, 14, 18, 49, 51, 102, 115, 121, 129, 136, 194, 197, 198, 200, 201 Information, 7, 8, 19, 50, 62, 65, 95, 106, 148, 158, 173, 175, 177, 178, 180–189, 193, 196, 223, 226, 258, 265, 290, 292 Infrastructures physical, 78, 102, 170, 193, 196, 218, 244, 251 public/legal, 193, 196, 244 social, 78, 102, 193, 196, 218, 244, 250, 251 Injustices, 8, 66, 105, 127, 130–132, 134, 135, 149, 238, 254, 271, 280, 285 Intelligence, 49, 128, 181, 192, 275 Intelligent machines, 4, 20 Interfaith, 74, 219, 253, 261, 265 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 18, 79, 227 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 218, 291 International community of nations, 214 International Criminal Court, 219 International Development Enterprises, 78 International Monetary Fund, 152, 218 International order, 29, 214 Iraq, 57, 157, 158, 275 Islam, 20, 51 J Japan, 102, 110, 120, 140, 148, 198, 200, 284 Jaspers, K., 117–128, 137, 146–148, 150, 151, 252 Jeremiah, 35, 50, 69, 70, 267, 285 Jews, 49, 84–86, 106, 116, 118, 130, 139–141, 179, 267 Judaism, 49, 51, 84, 85, 121

Index Jung, C.G., 279 Justice, 8, 51, 74, 76, 79, 84, 119, 124, 125, 131–133, 247, 271, 280 K Kaliayev, 129, 130, 133, 135 Kant, I., 39, 117 Kierkegaard, S., 33, 117 Klein, N., 52, 219 Knowledge, 16, 66, 69, 83, 84, 95, 96, 103, 106, 109, 110, 117, 118, 122, 145, 148, 159, 174, 176, 177, 181–189, 202, 250, 263, 264, 276 Kohlberg, L., 44 Kubler-Ross, 27 L Land land reforms, 169 Languages the common language of science, 174 Law legal development, 193 systems of laws, 215, 216 Learning from our mistakes, 111, 152 Lebanon, 158 Levin, K., 76 Liberal liberalism, 277 Liberal World Order, 291 Life expectancy, 13 Limits to growth, 202 Living standards, 10 Love bonds of love, 53, 234, 235, 237, 292 as a virtue, 53, 234 Luther, M., 89, 90 M Mali, 158, 160 Mancini, J., 73 Mancini, S., 73 Mandela, N., 112, 254 Marcel, G., 26, 27, 33, 35 Marcuse, H., 37, 38 Marshall Plan, 116 Martin, A., 26, 36, 39 Marx, K. Marxism, 130, 131

309 McKnight, J.L., 72, 91, 251 Media public, 177, 178, 223 social, 178, 185, 223 Medicine modern, 13, 30 Menninger, K., 29, 30 Microcredit, 77 Migrations, 20, 107, 127, 143, 147, 149, 253 Millenarian movements, 89 Millennial Development Goals (MDGs) Millennial Villages, 79, 102 Millennium Assessment Report, 267 Mindfulness, 47, 246, 247, 270 Misfortunes, 8, 99, 247, 265–269, 272, 274, 277–279 Modern times, 192, 231 Moltmann, J., 87 Mortality, 13, 101, 110, 145, 152, 255, 287 Muntzer, T., 90 Muslim faith, 56 Myanmar, 221 N Nation nationalism, 139, 141, 151 nation-states, 214, 219–221, 225, 244 National self-determination, 141, 168 National socialism (Nazis), 119, 140–143 Next steps, 75–78, 81, 103, 162, 169, 171, 189, 218, 227, 250, 255, 259 Nietzsche, F., 36, 66, 117, 129, 132, 233 Nigeria, 225, 272 Norms normative expectations, 237 North, D.C., 217, 236 Nuclear powers, 112, 149, 150 Nuclear weapons, 14, 16, 70, 122, 147, 149, 214, 226, 283 Nuremberg, 116, 119, 138 Nussbaum, M.C., 5, 28 O Objectivity, 174, 175, 178, 182, 264, 265 Ojibway, Red Lake, 10, 71 O’Neil, C., 181, 182 Optimism, 11, 25, 26, 32, 50, 62, 64, 66, 80, 84, 96, 115, 137, 152, 246, 250, 280, 283 Ownership, 168–170, 200, 273

Index

310 P Palestine, 50, 70, 84, 85, 121, 157, 160 Pandemics, 3, 5–7, 10, 13, 16–18, 65, 81, 99, 104, 106–108, 110, 112, 149, 158, 160, 162, 165, 175, 186, 226, 228, 242, 245, 253, 256–259, 268 Parliament of the World’s Religions, 74, 219 Passage of time, 31, 96, 97, 266, 267 Patel, R., 78 Path dependency, 98 Patience, 10, 31, 45, 47, 58, 71, 80, 81, 89, 119, 125, 189, 254 Paying attention, 39, 43, 47, 70, 72, 108, 138, 139, 147, 188 Peasant war, 89, 90 Perrow, C., 112 Pessimism, 5, 18, 25, 64, 66, 96, 277 Pinker, S., 14–16, 18, 65, 66, 174, 176 Planetary boundaries, 166 Plato, 33, 48, 50, 51, 132, 223 Plenty Coups, 10, 86, 87 Political disenchantment, 6, 110, 196, 223, 242 Political parties, 21, 62, 133, 139, 142, 186, 222–224, 292 Politics, 6, 53, 59, 67, 88, 100, 178, 221, 223, 224, 227, 228, 231, 237, 242, 293 Pollution, 76, 166, 272 Populist leaders, 5, 223, 246 Possibilism, 63, 64, 66 Possibilities anticipating, 26, 32, 35, 38, 59, 252 Poverty abject/extreme, 3, 14, 16, 20, 78, 242, 255 Powell, J., 75, 226 Power The Power of the Powerless, 60, 61 Prague Spring, 61 Preconditions for economic growth, 198 Prejudices, 118, 181 Production, 19, 77, 143, 192–196, 198, 202, 207 Productivity increases in, 191–209, 251 Professionals, 29, 45, 46, 72, 87, 108, 183, 184, 217, 224, 292 Progress, 7, 16, 17, 64–67, 79, 80, 101, 102, 116, 126, 137, 143, 169, 188, 197, 198, 216, 217, 225, 226, 251, 255, 268, 269, 277, 281, 282 Promises, 36, 87, 130, 133, 145, 146, 152, 223, 281

Prophets false, 35 Providence, 7, 282, 285 R Rabbis Rabbinic Judaism, 49, 84, 85 Realist realistic, 5, 6, 9, 18, 25, 29, 31–33, 35–39, 44, 45, 47–49, 53, 55, 59, 65, 66, 70, 73, 75, 77–79, 85, 88, 89, 96, 98, 99, 108, 109, 123, 128, 133, 151, 162, 178, 217, 223, 243, 244, 246, 247, 254, 255, 258, 271, 284, 286–288 Reason goods, 132, 163, 250 Rebel rebellions, 37, 128, 129, 131, 134, 136, 149 Reformation, 29 Reforms, 9, 10, 29, 48, 49, 51, 56, 60, 61, 74, 84, 85, 88, 91, 98, 129, 169, 170, 188, 217, 223, 227, 228, 266, 280 Religion religious rites/rituals, 71, 232 Reparations, 168 Resources natural, 10, 150, 164, 166, 191, 192, 194, 195, 201, 203, 207, 250, 259 Revolution Americans, 29, 136 French, 17, 18, 29, 129, 136, 215 Glorious, 29 Rifkin, J., 15 Roman Empire, 86, 109, 137 Romania, 276 Rorty, R., 178 Rosenstock–Huessy, E., 29 Rosling, H., 13–16, 18, 64, 65, 199 Rousseau, J.-J., 161 S Sachs, J.D., 200, 255 Sartre, J.-P., 27, 127, 131 Scarcities, 8, 28 Scheler, M., 36, 243 Science scientists, 46, 107, 174, 179, 180, 187, 188 Second World War, 10, 14, 20, 60, 79, 101, 107, 110, 115, 116, 119, 127, 131, 148,

Index 170, 198, 199, 214, 218, 252, 275, 279, 286, 291 Securities, 20, 28, 60, 167, 182, 192, 193, 198, 200, 208, 243 Sen, A., 15, 28, 124, 195, 206 Shareholders, 205, 290, 291 Sikkink, K., 7, 14, 64, 79, 91, 217, 256 Social innovation social innovators, 8, 91 Socialism, 60, 124, 125 Soldier on, 245 Sophocles, 267 South Africa, 51, 59, 66, 76, 111, 138, 198, 271 Sovereignty, 124, 168, 215, 282, 283, 287 Soviet Union, 61, 79, 101, 111, 116, 131, 135, 136, 141–144, 148, 226, 275, 280, 284, 285 Spinoza, 30, 31, 37 Spiritual, 27, 39, 40, 51, 74, 123, 126, 127, 179, 180, 246, 247, 277 State-building, 224, 225 Sudan, 160 Sufferings, 15, 37, 51, 57, 58, 66, 73, 104, 106, 107, 116, 127, 128, 132, 134, 144, 146, 147, 149, 157, 159–161, 232, 233, 242, 247, 256, 257, 265–269, 274, 276–279, 283, 285, 289 Sullivan Principles, 76 Sunstein, C.R., 223 Sustainable development, 254 Sustainable development goals (SDGs), 255, 256 Syria Syrian Spring, 57 T Taxes, 5, 80, 90, 103, 167, 169, 170, 177, 195, 196, 198–201, 205, 216, 244, 288, 293 Taylor, C., 221 Taylor, F., 180 Technologies, 5, 7, 19, 43, 80, 122, 123, 125, 140, 144, 182, 183, 193, 194, 196, 207, 259, 281, 284 Temperaments, 43, 44 Thinking, 4–6, 9, 10, 18, 21, 25, 27, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37–39, 49, 53, 62–64, 72, 79, 84, 88, 96, 97, 100, 118, 122, 126, 131, 136, 138, 139, 144, 145, 147, 148, 150–152, 178, 180, 185, 188, 206, 219, 232, 250, 257, 258, 266, 276, 289 Thoreau, H.D., 245

311 Thucydides, 100, 267 Thunberg, G., 81, 239, 254 Time historical time, 97, 267 Totalitarianism, 4, 137–140, 142, 143, 152, 215 Trade, 133, 134, 152, 157, 175, 193, 196, 218, 219, 226, 253, 284, 288 Trade Unions, 51, 133 Transparency International, 219 Trust distrust, 6, 10, 16, 38, 52, 138, 142, 157, 161, 173, 175–177, 182–185, 188, 189, 244, 245, 252, 253 Truth and Reconciliation Commissions, 146, 271 Truths, 51, 61, 62, 103, 120, 126, 135, 150, 161, 166, 177, 179, 185, 188, 189, 271, 273, 284 Twentieth century, 87, 97, 101, 111, 128, 129, 133, 134, 136, 138, 140, 141, 143, 146–149, 151, 152, 178, 200, 228, 237, 278, 279, 282, 285, 289 Twenty-first century, 64, 77, 101, 194, 195, 198, 200 U UN Climate Conference, 80 UN Convention on Climate Change, 80 Underemployment, 237, 243 Unemployment, 49, 142, 207, 237, 243, 257 United Nations, 52, 57, 108, 116, 147, 152, 218–220, 253, 255 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), 14, 108, 116, 138, 147, 152, 217 Urgent sense of urgency, 81 Utopias, 34, 126, 269 V Values, 5, 8, 11, 21, 33, 37, 38, 47, 48, 53, 61, 66, 72, 78, 95–112, 118, 122, 123, 125, 128–130, 133–135, 139, 149–151, 167, 169, 174, 175, 181, 185, 188, 193, 194, 201, 204, 205, 218, 222, 226, 227, 235, 242, 246, 251, 253, 263–276, 287, 289, 290 Vatican Council, 158

Index

312 Virtues, 5, 8, 9, 25–40, 43–45, 47, 48, 52, 53, 56, 63, 133, 145, 152, 277, 282, 287, 288 Vocation, 27, 45, 46, 74, 134, 152 W Wars First World War, 116, 120, 127, 140, 284 Second World War, 10, 14, 20, 60, 79, 101, 107, 110, 115, 116, 119, 127, 131, 148, 170, 198, 199, 214, 218, 252 Warsaw Pact, 61 Washington Consensus, 291 Waterworth, J.M., 31, 37 Wealth inequality of wealth, 255 Weber, M., 51, 117, 175, 193, 223 Welfare state welfare, 20 Wheatley, M., 38 Working Center, 73 Works, 6, 8, 9, 11, 26–28, 30, 31, 36, 37, 39, 43, 45, 46, 52, 55, 59–62, 64, 70–73, 76, 80, 96, 98, 103, 104, 117, 126–129, 133, 135, 137, 138, 140, 143–145, 147, 152, 158, 160, 164, 166, 180, 192, 193, 196, 206, 207, 209, 216, 218, 226, 232, 236–238, 242, 251–253, 255, 256, 258, 266, 271, 276, 279–281, 287, 292

World Bank, 19, 116, 152, 218, 227, 291 World Commission on the Environment and Development (WCED), 204 World Health Organization, 108, 116, 152, 218, 227 World Meteorological Association, 152, 219 World Order, 124, 125, 283, 284 World Resource Center, 73 Worlds, 3, 4, 6–11, 15–21, 25, 26, 33–37, 44, 47, 49, 51, 52, 59, 60, 62–67, 70, 72–75, 77, 79, 80, 89, 91, 97–102, 104–107, 109, 115–118, 121, 122, 124–133, 135–138, 141–149, 151, 152, 157–159, 164, 174–176, 178, 180, 183, 185, 186, 188, 189, 191, 192, 194–197, 200, 206–208, 215–221, 223, 226–228, 233, 235, 236, 238, 239, 242, 244–247, 250, 251, 253–258, 261, 263, 265, 267–269, 276–279, 283–285, 287, 290–292 World Wide Fund for Nature, 219 Wovoka, 88 Y Yeats, W.B., 273 Yunas, M., 77 Z Zionism, 284