The Formation of the Baltic States: A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia 0865270686, 9780865270688

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HARVARD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS XXXIX

Published under the direction of the Department of History from the income of The Robert Louis Stroock Fund

The Formation of the Baltic States A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia

By

STANLEY W. PAGE

CAMBRIDGE

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

1959

© 19J9 ky fhe President and Fellows of Harvard College Distributed in Great Britain by Oxford University Press, London

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: ^9-76

Made and printed in Great Britain by William Clowes and Sons, Limited, London and Beccles

To EDWARD WHITING FOX Whose inspirational guidance, as teacher and friend, did much to make me a happier and more useful person.

Preface This study is the first attempt to examine in detail, and comparatively, the sequence of events through which Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia passed in the process of becoming independent nations. An author knowing none of the Baltic languages might appear somewhat presumptuous in plunging into an investigation of this sort. However, while I deplore my linguistic shortcomings, I estimated correctly that a knowledge of German, Russian, French, and English would, on the whole, be adequate for my purposes. Through most of the war-torn period with which this book is principally concerned the Baltic natives, dominated by Russians and Germans, wrote mainly appeals for support, or propaganda, designed to be read outside their countries and, therefore, published in one or more of the four major languages. One advantage, I think, comes specifically from the fact that I am not a man of the Baltic, or a Russian, German, or Pole. Almost every book thus far published which touches upon my subject, is slanted along nationalist lines or is written from a strongly pro- or anti-Soviet point of view. Whatever my own biases, I was not at the outset inclined toward any group, party, or country, nor was I attempting to prove any side right or wrong, good or evil. In many college classrooms hangs that wonderfully colorful and optimistic map of Europe in 1919- This depicts the Europe that the Allied and Associated Powers had carved out, supposedly on the democratic principle of self-determination of nations. On this map, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, scarcely maintaining a foothold on the shore, intrepidly block the Communist colossus from the Baltic Sea. H o w did this amazing thing happen? How was it possible in the age of the superpower for such pygmy states to come to life, even granting the miracles wrought by Wilson's Fourteen Points? This is perhaps the main question which this book sets out to answer. vii

viii

Preface

T h e events with which this investigation deals are also very close to the center of some of world history's most momentous occurrences. The Baltic peoples were inextricably involved in the Russian revolution, the civil war, and the intervention. A n ignorance of Baltic national affairs in this period precludes a full understanding of many aspects of those three years that shook the world. On a small scale, too, the Baltic arena, in 1919, presented a preview of the Second World War. For it was here that Germans, later to become Nazis, first shed their blood in the struggle against Russia. Even the appeasement of the 1930's was here foreshadowed, as Germany, having already surrendered to the Allies, was given the opportunity to fight on in the East against the menace of Bolshevism. Because of the many shifts in political and cultural domination in the territories dealt with, geographic designations presented a knotty problem. T o avoid confusion, I have, wherever there are two or more names for the same locality, area, or river, used that which is native to Lithuanians, Latvians, or Estonians. All dates referring to Russian events are based on the Western calendar. Professor Michael M . Karpovich of Harvard first directed my attention to this richly rewarding subject for research, and I am above all grateful for his unerring guidance and that kindness which has become proverbial among his former students. Some of the most important parts of this book could never have been written had I not been fortunate enough to receive a Rockefeller Foundation grant, enabling me to spend the summer of 1948 at the Hoover Institute at Stanford. My deepest appreciation is owed Professor C. Leonard Lundin of Indiana University. His critical reading of the manuscript led to numerous changes, all of which, I believe, have served to strengthen the scholarly quality of this work. Extremely valuable, especially with regard to matters of bibliography, were the carefully thought out suggestions made by Professor Robert G . L . Waite of Williams College. T h e staff of Widener Library was always most helpful to me, as was the cheerfully rendered encouragement of Mrs. Harriet Dorman, secretary of the History Department of Harvard. I am indebted to my wife, Annette M . Page, for her perceptive editorial assistance and to A n n Louise

Preface

ix

Coffin for a most competent job of copyediting. I am further indebted t o the American

Slavic and East European Review

for

permission to use portions of articles previously published in that journal. S. W . P. September 30,

1958

Contents INTRODUCTION ι.

National and Social Currents to 1914 THE OBER-KOMMANDO

2. 3.

OST

Occupied Lithuania and Courland Lithuania's Fate in the Balance NATIONALISM AND

4. 5. 6.

1

27 44

BOLSHEVISM

Lenin and the National Question Latvia Chooses Bolshevism Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

57 62 69

GERMAN SUPREMACY 7. Annexationist Germany 8. The Birth of Free Lithuania 9. The Baltikum, March to November 1918 10. The Mission of August Winnig

87 91 98 110

T I M E OF C O N F U S I O N 11. 12. 13. 14.

The Red Interlude of 1919 Germany's Last Stand in the East The Road to Peace Conclusion

125 141 167 183

Bibliographical Note Index

187 189

THE FORMATION OF THE BALTIC STATES

INTRODUCTION ι National

and Social to 1914

Currents

LITHUANIA

In the first half of the thirteenth century, the G e r m a n knights ventured eastward in order to conquer and Christianize the heathen tribes that lived on the shores of the Baltic Sea. Resisting Lithuanian tribes coordinated their efforts and successfully repelled the invasion. H a v i n g thereby achieved a semblance of unity, the Lithuanian tribesmen, led by a series of audacious warrior princes, were able d u r i n g the fourteenth century to extend their domain at the expense of the steadily weakening princes of Russia. M a n y of these princes submitted willingly to the Lithuanians, preferring their overlordship to that of the Tartars. T h e G r a n d Prince of M o s c o w , as the K h a n ' s chief extorter of Russians, had also become their enemy. Hence, the Russian princes urged the Lithuanians to move against Russian lands. Battling against Moscow and the Tartars, the combined Lithuanian and Russian forces had, by 1380, fashioned a Lithuanian state w h i c h extended from the Baltic to the Black Sea and included such Russian centers as K i e v and Smolensk. T h a n k s to their cultural superiority and numerical preponderance, the Russians quickly began to assume social and political leadership in Lithuania. In 1386, however, Lithuania's Prince Jogaila married Jadwiga, Queen of Poland. T h i s marriage established a personal union between the t w o countries and led to Lithuania's conversion to R o m a n Catholicism. T h e Polish nobles lost little time in asserting their cultural superiority; they bullied Jogaila and called h i m a barbarian. Jogaila's cousin, G r a n d D u k e V y t a u t a s (1398-1430), made I

The Formation of the Baltic States

2

an attempt to reestablish Lithuania's independence, but failed largely because of the catastrophic defeat suffered by his forces in 1399 in the battle against the Tartars on the banks of the Vorskla River. In the course of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Lithuania's nobility became completely Polonized and Lithuania fell under Polish political domination. In 1569, by the Union of Lublin, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was compelled to submit to the Polish ruler and the Polish Diet, although retaining the right to organize its administration and its army. Lithuania shared in the Polish decline of the eighteenth century, losing its last semblance of autonomy when, through the three partitions of Poland (1772-1795), it was incorporated in the Russian Empire. In 1863, Tsar Alexander II appointed General Mikhail Nikolaevich Muraviev to the post of Governor General of the Northwestern Region (Severo-Zapadni Krai) and ordered him to crush the Polish Lithuanian insurrection. Having accomplished his mission with a zeal that earned him the by-name of " H a n g m a n , " Muraviev set about to replace Polish-Latinist influences in the territory with their Russian equivalents. H e was particularly anxious to wipe out the Polish cultural dominance in Lithuania. Catholic edifices, clergy, and ritual were subjected to merciless attacks. Churches and monasteries were shut down or destroyed, while the Russian government spent considerable sums on the building and staffing of Orthodox churches and chapels. 1 A l l of this was done on the principle that what was Catholic was Polish, what was Orthodox was Russian. In line with the policy of de-Latinization came an official prohibition of the use of the Latin script in Lithuanian printed matter. It was also decreed that Russian was to be the official school language, and native Lithuanians were forbidden to teach in the schools.2 This might well have spelled finis to the recently begun revival (around 1820) of Lithuanian printed literature in Lithuania Major, where it had been extinct since the sixteenth century as a 1 2

P. N . Batiushkov, Belorussiya i Litva, St. Petersburg, 1890, p. 370. V . Stankevich, Sud'bi Narodov Rossii, Berlin, 1921, p. n o .

'National and Social Currents to igi43 result of the Polonization of the Lithuanian clergy and aristocracy. 3 Russian authorities would scarcely have mourned the loss, since they did not consider that Lithuania had a distinct culture. A s late as W o r l d W a r I, educated Russians considered Lithuanian culture to be interchangeable with that of the Poles, 4 or thought of Lithuania as Russian land, corrupted by the Poles. 5 H o w did the Lithuanian renaissance survive the pitiless Russian measures? First, Lithuanian letters had a geographically convenient place of refuge in Prussian Lithuania (Lithuania Minor). More German than Lithuanian in their loyalties, the Lithuanians w h o lived there had nonetheless maintained an interest in the Lithuanian language. It w a s due to Lithuanian works, 6 printed there in the eighteenth century, that scholars of comparative philology first became interested in the Lithuanian language as the key to Sanskrit. Second, and of even greater importance, was the fact that Lithuanian nationalism, like that of other East European peoples in the 1860's, w a s far too strong to be crushed by such crude attempts at Russification. Prior to the proconsulship of General Muraviev there w a s a rapidly g r o w i n g Lithuanian resurgence. In 1803, the W a r s a w Society of Scholars requested the University of Vilnius to transmit any information it might have regarding the Lithuanian people and their language. 7 T h e romantic era had sent many authors and poets of Europe's unsatisfied national groups on a quest of the pasts of nations. A m o n g the Lithuanians participating in this w o r k were A d a m Mickiewicz and X a v i e r Bohusz (Bauza). T h e former took various motifs for his great poetic works 3 C. R. Jurgela, History of the Lithuanian Nation, New York, 1948, pp. 243-245. For facsimiles of Lithuanian scriptural printing see pp. 212, 233. 4 A. Nekludoff, Diplomatic Reminiscences, 191 i-igij, New York, 1920, p. 380. 5 Natsionalisti ν ]ei Gosudarstvennoy Dume, St. Petersburg, 1912, pp. 100-101. 6 T. G. Chase, The Story of Lithuania, New York, 1946, pp. 201-202. During the eighteenth century numerous Lithuanian books were printed in Prussian Lithuania. Among them were grammars, a dictionary, and the verses of Kristijonas Duonelaitis (1714-1780). 7 J. Puzinas, Vorgeschichtsforschung und Nationalbewusstsein in Litauen, Kaunas, 1935» Ρ· 12.

The formation of the Baltic States

4

(written in Polish) from Lithuanian mythology and history, and the latter wrote an important scholarly work entitled Concerning the Origins of the Lithuanian People and the Lithuanian Language." German and Polish scholars began to collect the folksongs of Lithuania and found them to be unusually rich in number and in signs of creative talent.3 In the 1840's, a Prussian Lithuanian, named Kurschat, drew up the first scientific grammar for the Lithuanian language.10 In 1847, a people's almanac, published by Z. Ivinskis, appeared in Vilnius and circulated throughout the villages until 1862, providing the literate peasantry with reading matter.11 The first Lithuanian newspaper was published in East Prussia in 1832.12 By the 1850's and early 1860's, numerous publications, originally religious in character but becoming increasingly secular, were appearing in Lithuania Major. These writings were produced by, and helped to produce, Lithuanian intellectuals who, rising from the people, did not, like former educated Lithuanians, lose their identity among the Polish upper classes. Adding to the general flow of national consciousness were former students of the University of Vilnius who had become interested in the phenomenon of the national awakening. Following the patterns set by the popular writings they began to use the Lithuanian language in their work. 13 For forty years after Muraviev's ordinances of 1864, the printing of books or periodicals in Lithuania Major was virtually impossible. The natural transition from literary national consciousness to a literate expression of the desire for national existence took place in East Prussia. Auszra ("Dawn") was the appropriate title of the first magazine to carry the message of nationality to the Lithuanian people. Dr. Jonas Basanavicius, physician and graduate of the University of Moscow, founded this periodical in 1883. Printed in Tilsit, it was smuggled across the Russian border into Lithuania Major. The theme of Auszra was national romanticism, a regilding of 8

9 Ibid., p. 13. Stankevich, p. 106. Ibid., p. 107; J. Pellisier, Renaissance nationale lituanienne, Lausanne, 1918, p. 85. In 1849, Kurschat also began publishing a Lithuanian newspaper Keleivis ( " T h e Traveler"). See J. Szlupas, Lithuania in Retrospect and Pros11 pect, N e w York, 1915, p. 86. Stankevich, p. 108; Szlupas, p. 86. 12 13 Jurgela, p. 109. Stankevich, p. 109. 10

National and Social Currents to 1914

5

Lithuania's faded glory. The paper carried some secondary socioeconomic articles sprinkled with anti-Semitism, a phenomenon which one scholar attributes to the animosity of the newly risen Lithuanian petty bourgeoisie toward the well-established rich Jewish bourgeois class. Auszra had no clearly defined views or demands. Its political program confined itself mainly to such matters as freedom of speech and press, Lithuanian schools, and the use of the Lithuanian language in schools as well as in local administration. On the whole, Auszra attempted to maintain a nonpolitical line in the apparent hope that the cultural awakening of a captive nation could take place without political conflict.14 However unrealistic this approach was, the journal exerted an important influence. In the three years of its existence, Auszra became the bible of the Lithuanian intelligentsia, and from its readers sprang the subsequent political leaders of the country.15 The Poles in Lithuania regarded the paper as a vicious tool of Russian intrigue, designed to undermine their cultural domination in the country. The Russian authorities, at the same time, viewed Auszra as a German device, and upon their complaint, its editors were ordered out of German territory. In its earliest days, as well as on later occasions, Lithuania's national movement was considered by outsiders to be nothing more than a mask for the moves of a larger power. Because of financial pressure Auszra ceased publication in ι886.1β However, it was soon succeeded by two new journals—Varpas ("The Bell") and Apzvalga ("Review").17 Definitely political in orientation, they served as the organs, respectively, of the left- and right-wing factions of the nationalist movement, both of which eventually became active political parties. A further stimulus to the national movement was an enormous illegal traffic into Lithuania of books printed abroad. During the last u L. Martov, P. Maslov, A. Potresov, Obshchestvennoye Dvizheniye ν Rossii ν Nachale XXgo Ve\a, 4 Vols., St. Petersburg, 1909, III, pp. 283-284; Stankevich, pp. 1 1 3 - 1 1 4 . 15 Obshchestvennoye Dvizheniye, III, p. 284; hereafter, Obsh. Dvizh. 16 Stankevich, pp. 1 1 4 - 1 1 5 , 120. 17 A. M. Benedictsen, Lithuania, the Awa\ening of a Nation, Copenhagen,

J924>

P· 233·

6

The Formation of the Baltic States

decade of the nineteenth century millions of forbidden books, pamphlets, and magazines circulated within Lithuania. The volume of this underground freightage may be judged by the fact that customs officials confiscated 172,000 items in the period 1891-1902. 18 Among those most eager to obtain this literature were the members of youth societies who strove, by increasing their own knowledge, to advance the cause of Lithuania. One such society expected each of its members to write a weekly report on his social, cultural, and other experiences, and to contribute one kopek weekly toward the purchase of illegal books. These youth groups were subject to administrative persecution and the members of one were arrested and sent to Siberia.13 Russian officialdom finally realized that illegal reading had reached such proportions that the granting of freedom to Lithuanian printing was essential, if only to reestablish censorship. War with Japan and the need for mobilization and propaganda activity throughout the Empire finally convinced the Russians, and, in 1904, the use of the Latin script again became legal in Lithuania.20 What, besides the right to their own language and patterns of thought, did the Lithuanians want? Was their nationalism a force that required a political as well as a cultural form, or could it live in the internationalistic structure provided by the Russian Empire? A partial answer may be derived from an examination of the political and social currents in Lithuania around the turn of the century and a consideration of the Lithuanian reaction to the revolutionary events of 1905. Of the three major parties to rise out of the cultural-national movement, the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party—the most influential political faction in 190521—had the greatest difficulty in choosing between a national, or separatist, and an international, or antiseparatist, orientation. The historical development of the Party 18 Stankevich, p. 120. Much of this illegal literature was financed, written, and printed by the Lithuanians in the United States. See J. J. Hertmanovicius, "Memorandum on the Independence of Lithuania," Chicago, January 29, 1941 (unpublished manuscript in the Hoover Library). w "Stankevich, p. 121. Ibid., pp. 128-129 21 Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, p. 284.

National and Social Currents to 1914

7

explains this. A s late as the 1890's, there w a s little industry in Lithuania. In its inception, then (it was formed in 1896), the Social Democratic Party was not really a working-class organization, but w a s made up of Jewish Bundists, impoverished Polish landowners and small Lithuanian peasants. Within the Party, therefore, there were, in the words of Bolshevik Mickevicius-Kapsukas, the "pettybourgeois limitations of nationalism and particularism." 2 2 In time, of course, as industry filtered into Vilnius and Kaunas, the w o r k i n g classes did begin to join the Party. T h e internationalism, that is, antiseparatism, that entered with these authentic proletarian elements was intensified by the fact that most were not Lithuanians at all, but Poles or Jews. 23 T o maintain themselves against the rising tide of internationalist and non-Lithuanian Social Democrats, the Lithuanian leaders of the Party resorted to stronger expressions of nationalism. T h e schism within the Party was never mended. T h e critical year of 1905 aroused the passions of the opposing factions. In January, the Party's national elements evinced definite separatist tendencies and demanded an independent federal state of Lithuania, and the convocation—with this in mind—of a special constituent assembly in Vilnius—in addition to the assembly in St. Petersburg, which all the revolutionaries of the Russian E m p i r e were at the time demanding. T h e proletarian elements, however, disagreed with that stand, and on numerous occasions adopted resolutions favoring an autonomous Lithuania under a democratic Russian regime. 24 In time the nationalists came to be k n o w n as the Central Committee, while the so-called " V i l n i u s [Proletarian] Opposition" represented the internationalist, or autonomist, faction. In 1907, on the occasion of the Seventh Congress of the Social Democrat Party of Lithuania at K r a k o v , the "autonomists" triumphed 25 and this hastened the dissolution of the Party as a significant force. B y 1909, 22 V. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, "Istoki i zarozhdeniye kommunisticheskoy partii Litvi," Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya, 1929, I, pp. 153-154; Stankevich, p. 123. 23 Mitskevich-Kapsukas, p. 154; E. Angaretis, "Iz deyatel'nosti SDP Litvi ν godi reaktsii," Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya, 1922, XI, p. 74. 24 25 Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, p. 287. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, pp. 156-157.

The Formation of the Baltic States

8

the Lithuanian intelligentsia had led the Party into an anticlerical and progressive, but essentially nationalist-bourgeois position.26 The following incident is characteristic of the nationalist-minded Social Democratic leaders. Since the urban proletariat could not read Lithuanian, the suggestion was made at a Party Congress in 1908 that the Party organ Zarija ("Ember"), be published in Polish and Jewish, as well as in Lithuanian. The reply to this suggestion was that since the money for the printing of the paper was collected in the United States from Lithuanians, if the Polish workers wanted literature in their language, they would have to contribute the necessary funds.27 If, in 1905, nationalism was strong even within the Social Democratic Party, it is not surprising that there was violent anti-Russian action. A police report, dated December 5, 1905, tells of large-scale nationalist demonstrations in Kaunas. "Everything Russian was boycotted while Russian inhabitants were attacked and Orthodox churches were threatened with destruction."28 As a matter of fact, this occurrence was not typical, a fact which, in part, at least, can be ascribed to the spirit of moderation brought about by the Lithuanian National Congress held at Vilnius, December 4-5, 1905. This Congress, according to one scholar, was a result of the desire for united expression in the towns and villages of Lithuania. It was Basanavicius, the aged editor of Auszra, who inspired the creation of the committee to convoke Lithuanians of all classes and parties. After a spirited election of delegates, about 2,000 persons, representing all shades of Lithuanian opinion, appeared at the Vilnius Congress. The manner of election and the number of delegates present proves conclusively that nationalism was general and that the resolutions adopted by the Congress reflected the desires of the people. Late in 1905, then, the Lithuanians expressed their hatred for Tsarist rule, their desire for autonomy of ethnographic Lithuania in a federation with other nations within the Russian Empire, and the wish that Lithuania would soon be freed from Russian and 26

Angaretis, p. 79. V. I. Nevsky, Sovyeti i vooruzhenntye 1931, p. 362. 28

27

Angaretis, p. 74. vosstaniya ν 1905 godu, Moscow,

National and Social Currents to 1914

9

Polish cultural and religious influences. 29 In short, they sought democracy, but, probably because the attainment of independence seemed hopeless, they advanced no demands for separation. N e x t to the Social Democratic Party in membership was the moderately socialistic Lithuanian Democratic Party which was organized in 1902. In its first years it tended to support the postulate of an independent Lithuania, but, in the course of the revolution, it s w u n g toward autonomy, the position of the Congress. Since it was the Democratic Party which had worked hardest to bring the Congress into being, this was a natural development. T h e third and least important party, the L e a g u e of Lithuanian Christian Democrats, was the center of the conservative elements. F o r m e d in 1905, it too started its career on a foundation of separatist ideas, but, by 1907, had fallen in line with the programs of the others in demanding autonomy for ethnographic Lithuania within a democratic Russia. T h e Christian Democrats had no real mass following and remained essentially an organization of the clergy and the uneducated though prosperous peasantry. 30 T h e r e were other political organizations in 1905, but they were so vague that, " i t was impossible to tell just what their programs [ w e r e ] ." 3 1 Currents of political thought in Lithuania after 1905 may be judged by the results of the elections to the Russian D u m a . In the First D u m a — t h a t of 1906, which was boycotted by the Social Democrats—the Democrats held four seats, the Liberals two, and the Clerical Party one. In the Second D u m a (March to June 1907), the Social Democrats held five seats, the Democrats two. In the T h i r d D u m a ( 1 9 0 7 - 1 9 1 2 ) , as a result of the cutting d o w n by the Russian government of national minority representation, the Lithuanians occupied four seats, of which the Social Democrats held three and the Democrats one. 32 A l l Lithuanian delegates, whatever their party affiliation, took the Autonomist position. 33 Just prior to W o r l d 29 31 32

30 Stankevich, pp. 131, 132-135. Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, pp. 290, 293. W. Gaigalat, La Lituanie, Geneva, 1917, p. 128. Gaigalat, pp. 128-129.

33 Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, p. 292; T. D. Sitina, Chleni Gosudarstvennoy Dumi {portreti i biografit), Moscow, 1906.

ΙΟ

The Formation of the Baltic States

War I, the Lithuanian deputies to the Duma, old and new, formed an impromptu national council at Vilnius. Of the fourteen deputies who met, five were Democrats, three were Liberal Nationalists, two were Catholic Nationalists, one was of the Clerical Party, and one took a nonpartisan position. The most notable feature of this event was the evident absence of Social Democratic influence.34 L A T V I A AND E S T O N I A B E F O R E

i860

In 1721, with the signing of the Treaty of Nystad, the Swedish provinces of Livonia and Estonia became part of the Russian Empire. Courland, a Duchy of Poland, came under Russian rule in the course of the third Polish partition of 1795. Among the three peoples who inhabited these Baltic provinces of Russia, the smallest group was the German Herrenvol\. On the land, as owners of huge estates lived the proud descendants of the Teutonic knights—the Baltic barons, or Baits. In the towns dwelt the German burghers, thriving vestiges of the Hanseatic commercial empire. The remaining two ethnic groups, both in serf-like condition, were the Latvians and the Estonians; the former in Courland and the southern half of Livonia, the latter in northern Livonia and Estonia. During the first fifty years of Russian rule over Livonia and Estonia (it began, in effect, about 1710), the nobility found itself in an extremely favorable situation. In the time of Sweden's rule, the relations of lord and peasant had been strictly regulated.35 But Peter the Great had certified the privileges of the knighthood and had granted its Landtag, or Diet, a large measure of autonomy. Thus, the serfs were delivered entirely to the mercies of their owners. The accession of Catherine II, in 1762, marked the beginning of an ever-increasing process of Russian involvement in the affairs of the Baltic Provinces. Though not particularly concerned with limiting the powers of the nobility—she did recertify its traditional privileges 34

Gaigalat, La Lituanie, p. 129. A. Agthe, "Ursprung und Lage der Landarbeiter in Livland," Zeitschrift für die gesamte Staatswissenschaft, Ergänzungsheft XXIX, Tübingen, 1909, p. 24. 35

National and Social Currents to

igi4

II

—Catherine was, nonetheless, anxious to centralize the Russian Empire. 36 In 1764, Catherine toured Livonia and Estonia and obtained information on the condition of the lower classes of town and country. Her interest in this matter had been aroused by certain liberal acquaintances, among them Johann Georg Eisen, a Lutheran pastor and "one of the foremost representatives of the enlightenment in Livonia." Upon her return to St. Petersburg, Catherine instructed the Livonian Governor General, Count Yuri Broun, to impress upon the Livonian knighthood the need for peasant reforms.37 A t the Landtag session of 1765, the Governor General made eleven suggestions to the Livonian nobility. T h e third of these referred to the "miserable condition of the peasants," w h o possessed no property and were punished too severely; also, the limits to the labors that could be required of them were not defined. T o these charges came the unruffled reply of the nobility: Leibeigenschaft (literally "serfdom") was natural to the peasants and was founded in the privileges of the knightly Order.38 T h e peasants naturally did not agree. In 1783-84, ten years after the Pugachev risings had rocked the throne of Catherine, the serfs of central Livonia staged an equally unsuccessful revolt against their overlords.38 However, as in Russia, the time had come for real liberals, rather than for "enlightened" despots, to take the lead in the struggle for human rights. In this respect the most powerful Baltic voice was that of Garlieb Merkel, son of pastor Daniel Merkel, w h o was an ardent admirer of Voltaire. In the fall of 1796, six years after the appearance in Russia of Radishchev's famous work of similar import, Merkel published his monumental plea for serf emancipation. T o students of the American abolitionist movement the motif of 36 N. Wihksninsch, Die Aufklärung and die Agrarfrage in Livland, Vol. I, Die ältere Generation der Vertreter der Aufklärung in Livland, Riga, 1933, p. 205. 37 Ibid. 38 Agthe, p. 47. 39 M. A. Raissner, Est! i Latishi, Moscow, 1916, p. 93.

12

The Formation of the Baltic States

his fury-laden book will not seem alien. Merkel pitted obvious truths against conventional hypocrisy. The Latvian is not ready for freedom: this is the talk heard from all sides . . . Not to be ready for freedom; what does that mean? Freedom is as natural to man as breathing and sensing . . . The Latvian would not be able to get along! What? Does the heathen wild Karakalpak, Bashkir, Iriquois, New Zealander, etc., stand upon a higher level of civilization than the Christian civilized Latvian? . . . He would not feel happy as a free man. If being ready for a condition means to feel happy in it, then the Latvian is ready for freedom but not for slavery.40 Merkel's book, for the most part, is a seemingly endless, but never dull, recitation of cases of brutality such as were perpetrated thousands of times each day by an upper class which was largely unaware of its inhumanity. Despite the abuse heaped upon the author by those whom he exposed, 41 his book made a distinct impression in Livonia. Some bold churchmen raised their voices in behalf of the serf, and some landowners, frightened of sitting on a powder keg, began to speak of reforms. 42 T h e reign of Paul I, however, was far from propitious to reformist tendencies. T h e erratic Tsar, although instrumental in alleviating the condition of the serfs in Russia, rejected a project of the Bait Diet proposing the limitation of serfdom in the Baltic Provinces. 43 In 1802, in Valmiera District, a mob of 3,000 peasants rose, and in 1805 there were uprisings in northern Estonia. These risings, though brutally crushed by the Russian government, happened to coincide with the markedly liberal early period in the reign of Alexander I, 40 G. Merkel, Die Letten vorzüglich in Liefland am Ende des philosophischen Jahrhunderts, Einführung von Georg Wihgrabs, Riga, 1924,

pp. 259-261. Italics are Merkel's. 41 Merkel was described as a "cunning slanderer" and said to be possessed "not of humanitarianism" but of "malice and violent hatefulness for Livonia's nobility and clergy" whom he mistakenly blamed for his own mediocrity which had cost him a higher professional status. His book was a "frightening caricature." "Private feelings of vengeance... had misled the author into becoming the collector of ridiculous anecdotes... with the purpose of making an honored nobility contemptible in foreign eyes." (Ibid., pp. X V I I I , X I X . ) 42 Raissner, p. 159. 43

J. Buchan, The Baltic and Caucasian States, London, 1923, p. 93.

National and Social Currents to 1914

ι?

and he decreed the Bauernverordnung of 1804. This peasant decree and its complement of 1809 did not give the Latvian and Estonian serfs personal liberty, but they clearly defined the rights of the peasants and the lords in relation to the land and, by restricting the hitherto arbitrary behavior of the lord, gready improved the economic position of the serf. In addition to limiting the feudal obligations of the serf, the decrees also permitted him to own or sell land, and the lord was forbidden to sell a serf unless he sold the land along with him." The landlords did not like these laws. T o regain complete control over the land, the Baltic nobles decided to grant personal freedom to their serfs. As early as 1 8 1 1 , the Landtag of the Estonian Gubernia began to work toward the emancipation of the Estonians. Between 1816 and 1819 the decrees emancipating Latvians and Estonians went into effect throughout the Baltic Provinces. The free peasant, no longer protected by law, automatically lost his newly-acquired right to own land and became once more a slave, in an economic, if not in a personal, sense. In addition, Latvians and Estonians had to deal with a legal and administrative machinery which was entirely in the hands of the local Germans so that all decisions regarding pay or working conditions were bound to go against them.45 Not only was the Baltic peasant "free as a bird"—so the peasants themselves bitterly dubbed their landless condition"—but the landlord no longer had any legal obligation to provide for his basic needs. "Only in 1816 was Estonia finally conquered by the Knights," 47 said Karl Ernst von Baer, German scholar and member of the Estonian incorporated nobility. The national awakening of Latvians and Estonians had its first stirrings around 1840. Thereafter, the two peoples, each in its own way, reacted more purposefully to their common hardships. When, u Y a . K . Palvadre, pp. 7 - 8 .

Revoliutsiya 190$-·/ gg. ν Estonii,

Leningrad,

1925,

45 Raissner, p. 160. I have used the more familiar spelling of Gubernia rather than Guberniya w h i c h w o u l d be more consistent with m y transliteration. 46

Palvadre, p. 8.

47

Raissner, p. 176.

14

The formation of the Baltic States

in the 1840's, poor crops made their sufferings unendurable, the Estonians, and especially the Latvians, began turning to Russia for help. On their own initiative the peasants of Livonia sent couriers to Riga to plead with the highest authorities. Occasionally these couriers came into contact with Irinarkh, the Orthodox Bishop of Riga. He treated them so much more kindly than did their own Lutheran pastors, that many Estonians and Latvians flocked to the Orthodox Church in the hope that an acceptance of the Russian faith would lighten their economic woes. It began to be rumoured that land in the "black soil" region of Russia was being granted free to all comers.18 Another story had it that the Tsar had issued a decree concerning land reforms in the Baltic Provinces but that the landlords were concealing it. In some Estonian localities the excitement reached revolutionary proportions. An uprising in Pühajärve in 1841 was put down by Russian troops and numerous executions took place.49 The Germans decried the peasant risings as revolts against Russian authority,50 and the Russian bureaucrats, ignorant of conditions in the Baltic Provinces and harassed by serf unrest throughout Russia, accepted this explanation. The uprisings were not a total failure, for they convinced the landlords of the need for reform in the peasant situation. In 1849, laws were passed giving the peasant economic independence to the extent that he was allowed to lease land.51 Twelve years later, however, when the Russian serfs were freed, the Baltic nobles maintained that the Russian Statutes of Emancipation, stipulating the amount of land to be sold to the peasants, had no significance in their domain, where the reforms of 1816 and of 1849 had already solved the agrarian problem.52 Estonian violence had brought on the reforms of 1849, but a Latvian political move produced the peasant law of June 4, i865-5S Sensing the fruitlessness of going directly over the heads of the 48 Raissner, pp. 160-161. After being subjected to cruel punishment, these couriers were sent back with empty hands. 49 50 Palvadre, pp. 9-10. Raissner, p. 176. 51 52 Palvadre, p. 1 1 . Raissner, p. 212. 53 Palvadre, p. 1 1 . The date is May 22 according to the old calendar.

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15

Baltic upper class to approach the Russian government, the so-called Young Latvians, led by Krisjänis Valdemärs,54 decided to seek support from the Slavophiles and made contacts with Katkov and others. T o win this assistance in their anti-German struggle, Valdemärs and his friends wrote articles in the Russian press stressing the Latvian need for friendship with the Russian people. They further emphasized their sincerity by establishing a Latvian colony in central Russia.55 The Latvians succeeded in making their point, and powerful Slavophile influence promoted the law which gave the Baltic peasantry the right to acquire land.

LATVIA,

1860-1914

The 1860's ushered a new era into Imperial Russia. In the Baltic Provinces, however, the development of capital and industry far surpassed the progress in Russia proper. Among the Baltic peoples, three major sociological trends began about that time. These were: the emergence of a rural bourgeoisie; the flow of peasants—especially in Latvia—into cities to form an urban bourgeoisie and an urban proletariat; and a cultural and national awakening, based on almost universal literacy,55 which spread rapidly among the masses. The cultural awakening of Latvia was pioneered by a group of intellectuals among whom were men of letters, such as Krisjänis Valdemärs, Andreis Spagis, Juris Alunäns, and Krisjänis Barons.57 In 1862 they began to publish the Peterburgas Avizes ("Petersburg Gazette"), a Latvian newspaper,58 whose circulation rapidly expanded to 4,000 copies, a great success for those days. The paper was forced to shut down in 1863 as an indirect result of the Polish 54 H e was the first man bold enough to print his calling cards with the word " L a t v i a n " after his name. For the 1850's this was an audacity since hitherto any educated person of Latvian origins had been considered either German or Russian. 55 56 Raissner, p. 212. Raissner, p. 219. 57 Raissner, pp. 1 9 2 - 2 1 1 ; see also Magazin der Lettisch-Ljterärischen Gesellschaft, Mitava, 1869, Vol. 14, Part 3, p. 40. 58 There had been prior papers in the Latvian language but those had been written by Germans.

The Formation of the Baltic States uprising of that year. However, it had served its purpose and had given an important impetus to Latvian education and expression. From then on—with the growth of a propertied class—Latvian literature rapidly encompassed the various forms of prose and poetry.59 In the 1870's, this movement survived a German attempt to regain cultural influence, and in the decades following the accession of Alexander III, it faced the even tougher obstacle of persistent attempts at Russification. During that time the Latvian public schools became what amounted to organs of Russian cultural propaganda. Even attempts on the part of some Russian teachers and superintendents to conduct the schools along more liberal lines were frustrated by the Russian Ministry of Education. One Russian teacher relates an incident of a police raid upon a Latvian seminary. After a search of the premises a harmless student was apprehended because, among his papers was a theme entitled "The Reforms of Peter the Great." The "crime" was the word "reforms," which the gendarmerie considered a dangerous expression. Another student paid dearly for possessing too great a familiarity with the works of the "reprehensible" Count Leo Tolstoy. One officious inspector closed the student quarters because he found on the premises a copy of the liberal Russ\aya Misl'. It is understandable that the Latvians began to avoid the public schools. The Russifying program was, of course, quite distasteful to the Germans also. Among other invasions into the German cultural sphere was the changing of the venerated German University of Dorpat (Tartu) into a Russian university. By 1900, only the theological faculty still used German; of the entire remaining staff only four were non-Russians.®0 Nevertheless, those most affected were the Latvians and the Estonians. The socially predominant Germans represented themselves to the Russian bureaucrats as loyal supporters 59 A detailed and impressive enumeration of works and authors of the period 1870-1914, can be found in a scholarly volume of essays on Latvia's past written by professors at the University of Latvia. (See P. Schmidt, ed., Die Letten, Riga, 1930, pp. 383-406.) 60 Raissner, p. 267. See also, A. Luther, Alt-Dorpat und das Russische Geistesleben, Berlin, 1920.

National and Social Currents to IQ14

17

of the Tsarist order and depicted the national movements as separatism w h i c h should be suppressed. T o repay their loyalty, the bureaucrats did not molest the local Baltic governmental institutions or the existing social-economic order, but contented themselves by m e d d l i n g w i t h the schools, the legal institutions, and the like. 61 T h i s pattern of collaboration—the Russian administrative agencies and G e r m a n upper class against the Latvians and Estonians—is shown more distinctly by the uprisings of 1905. Until the 1890's, there w a s a general harmony of feeling a m o n g Latvian intellectuals, virtually all of w h o m were concerned w i t h furthering the national awakening. But by 1890, Latvian class lines had become clearly demarcated. In the country, Latvian farmers, and in the cities, merchants and manufacturers, had solidified into a bourgeoisie; though still beneath the Germans in point of individual wealth, they stood well above the Latvian proletariat on the social and economic ladder. T h i s gave rise to a radical trend a m o n g those intellectuals whose economic and family ties were w i t h the proletariat. It occasions little wonder that the leftist intellectualism so rapidly produced a proletarian class-consciousness, for the Latvian national a w a k e n i n g coincided w i t h the industrial a w a k e n i n g of western Russia and w i t h the early Marxist revolutionary spirit in Russia. Nurtured and raised on social democracy, the Latvian proletariat had nothing to unlearn to become revolutionary. " I t is possible," as one scholar wrote in 1916, " t o say that the Latvian proletariat k n o w s of no inspirational idea besides socialism. T h e Latvian worker, if at all politically minded, is inevitably a Social Democrat." 6 2 Observers of varying biases concur in their views regarding the intensity of revolutionary consciousness a m o n g the Latvian proletariat. T h e Russian K . Zalevski, describing Latvian conditions after 1905, stated that " i n no single part of [Russia] did class antagonisms reach the degree of development that they attained in the Latvian region . . . the section most intensively industrialized." 6 3 A f t e r a laudatory description of G e r m a n activities in Livonia, a 61

Raissner, p. 179.

63

Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, p. 271.

62

Raissner, pp. 194, 216.

The Formation of the Baltic States

ι8

German author sarcastically asks: "What are the Latvians doing? They have a temperance league, named Auseklis64 and that includes a kindergarten. In this kindergarten the children are lined up, are given red flags and practice singing revolutionary songs. . . . The Germans work along practical lines while among the Latvians, the dominant social democratic leaders attempt to solve the social problem by Utopian methods."65 The new progressive intellectual current soon became Marxist, and by 1900 the majority of Latvian workers were following a Marxist intellectual and social program. The organs of this new movement were the papers Deenas Lapa ("Daily Paper") and Majas Viesis ("The Family Visitor"). These were edited by Peteris Stucka, Jänis Rainis-Plieksans and others,66 who, with men like A. Rozin and Jänis Asars, were the ideological leaders of the Latvian socialist movement.67 This, in 1905, became the first social segment to organize politically—as the Latvian Social Democratic Party.68 In 1905 there were many crosscurrents in Latvia. The revolutionary force came from the proletariat of both country and city. Guided in every instance by the Social Democratic Party, it was internationalist in spirit rather than separatist. However, the Second Latvian Party Congress, held in June 1905, did demand "autonomy for all separate nationalities within a democratic Russian republic."69 The movement bore an anti-Russian appearance because the same government which fought the Russian revolutionaries of the day also strove to aid the reactionary forces of Livonia and Courland. An anti-German tint colored the revolutionary movement only because the Germans constituted such a dominant economic bloc. Emotional anti-Germanism on the part of the Latvian Social Democrats would have precluded their close association with German workers, socialistic in orientation, who came into the Baltic towns 61

After a Latvian poet-patriot. M. L. Schlesinger, Russland im XX Jahrhundert, Berlin, 1908, pp. 14266 145· P. Schmidt, ed., Die Letten, Riga, 1930, p. 391. 67 68 Raissner, p. 196. Obsh. Dvizh., III, p. 271. 69 E. O. F. Ames, ed., The Revolution in the Baltic Provinces of Russia, London, 1907, p. 12 (published by the Independent Labour Party). 65

National and Social Currents to igi4

l

9

70

in the ISCJO'S. O n the land, particularly in Courland, the passions of the landless peasantry turned against the owners of the huge estates. Only w h e n angered Germans struck back indiscriminately at Latvian farmers and f a r m workers alike did the rural movement acquire the aspect of a struggle along national lines. In the cities the revolution derived its impetus f r o m " B l o o d y S u n d a y , " January 22, 1905, which touched off a series of strikes and demonstrations. Andrievs Niedra, poet, clergyman, and reactionary Latvian leader, has left a colorful account of the feeling among the R i g a w o r k i n g class. " C l e a r l y , " he writes, "there stands before your eyes the enraptured exultant c r o w d : youths with flashing eyes, workers with horny hands, girls—arms outstretched as though awaiting a storm in spring. T h e y sing of their faith in a militant song." 7 1 T h e Latvian urban bourgeoisie wavered—first siding with and then opposing the revolution. Until October 30, the date on which the Russian Constitution was proclaimed, the Latvian Constitutional Democratic Party supported the Social Democrats; but then began to move toward a "nationalist" position in a united bourgeois front against the revolutionary movement. B y 1907, portions of this party had veered so far to the right that they helped to seat G e r m a n candidates w h o were running for election to the T h i r d Duma. 7 2 Generally speaking, the three bourgeois parties demanded autonomy, occasionally spoke of independence—which proved unpopular with the masses—and claimed to desire democracy. W i t h the defeat of the 1905 revolution and the subsequent rapid trend toward reaction and upper-class vengeance, the bourgeoisie s w u n g sharply to the right to support the monarchy against any genuine egalitarian tendencies. Of all the bourgeois parties, the Latvian People's Party had the 70

Ames, p. 5. 1 . Janson, "Latvia ν pervoy polovine 1905 goda." Proletars^aya Revoliutsiya, 1922, XII, pp. 3-53. 72 Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, pp. 272-273. The word "nationalist" is in quotes because among bourgeois parties it had a dubious meaning—at times connoting strong and at other times weak demands as to national independence—which stamped the position as one of class ideology rather than one of patriotism. 2+ 71

20

The Formation of the Baltic States

most consistently reactionary record. Led by Andrievs Niedra, it was composed of the most reactionary members of the Latvian bourgeoisie, plus sections of the petty bourgeoisie of city and country. Its general policy in 1905, and later, was one of compromise with the Government's counterrevolutionary program. It strove to rouse nationalism among the masses in the hope of disorganizing the working class. This nationalism, however, also fluctuated with the Party's momentary class interests. The Party took an antiSemitic line—a feature characteristic of reactionary nationalism— and loudly applauded the governmental punitive expeditions and military tribunals which brought the year 1905, in the Baltic Provinces, to such a gory conclusion.73 During the period 1906-1914, class divisions in Courland and Livonia became ever more sharply defined. One important reason for this was certainly the marked success of the Bolsheviks in retaining dominance over the working class. Peteris Stucka, leader of the Latvian Bolsheviks, proudly attributes his party's success to the astute use of the cell system which enabled the Bolsheviks to obtain leadership in all kinds of working-class organizations, "despite the fact that leadership of the Social Democratic Party [after 1905] fell into Menshevik hands." T o this same organizational excellence Stucka also ascribes his own election and that of other Bolsheviks to the Second Duma, in the face of the prevailing reactionism. Stucka himself was prevented by a technicality from entering upon "[his] parliamentary career."71 But another Latvian Bolshevik, Ozols, did win a seat in the Duma to become one of the storm centers around which the Stolypin government was able to fashion a pretext for dissolving the "rebellious" parliament.75 A t this time, on the Russian Social Democratic scene Latvian Bolshevism was able to wield considerable influence. A t the Fifth Congress of the Social Democratic Party, which met in London on May 13, 1907, the Latvians held the balance of power. By siding Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, pp. 276-278. P. Stucka, "Iz proshlogo kommunisticheskoy partii Latvii," Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya, 1922, XII, pp. 56-57, 59. 75 A. Levin, The Second Duma, New Haven, pp. 307-349. 73 71

National and Social Currents to 1914

21

with Lenin they enabled the Bolshevik faction to gain control of the Party's Central Committee. Cultural progress was steady during the prewar period, and by 1914, the Latvians, at home and abroad, were publishing about sixty papers, including twelve dailies. T h e ]auriä\ais Zinas ("Latest N e w s " ) had a circulation of about one hundred thousand—greater than that of either the Russ\iye Vedomosti or the Rech', prominent Russian papers.76 B y 1914, Latvia abounded also with about a thousand social and economic societies; but so great was the class schism that in both city and country membership in a society was open only to one or the other social class.

ESTONIA,

1860-1914

In Estonia, as in Latvia, the national awakening began around i860. Johan Woldemar Jannsen and Carl Robert Jakobson are the principal names associated with the movement's early stages. In 1857, Jannsen founded the Pärnu Postimees ("Postman"), a newspaper which stressed cultural aspects, taking a religious and moral, but generally nonpolitical approach to problems. 77 During the period 1857-1880 a remarkable cultural flowering was evinced in the formation of musical, scholarly, literary, and other cultural societies and in the publication of numerous books in the Estonian language. 78 Some writers see great nationalistic significance in the fact that this small people, in the very first decade of its intellectual selfawareness, managed to produce a "national epic," the Kalevipoeg, composed by the poet Friedrich Reinhold Kreutzwald out of original Estonian folklore and folk songs.73 A more scholarly opinion, however, regards the work as a personal rather than a national creation. T o be sure, Kreutzwald used Estonian folk songs, but these were lyric rather than epic, and the entire scheme of the work reveals a marked borrowing from the Finnish epic, Kalevala, and 76

Raissner, p. 222. " Raissner, pp. 168, 182. J. H . Jackson, Estonia, London, 1941, pp. 105-107. " J a c k s o n , p. 102; Raissner, p. 168; M. Martna, Estland, die Esten und die estnische Frage, Ölten, 191g, p. 22. 78

22

The Formation of the Baltic States

from the German heroic Lieder,80 Considering the fact that the epic pattern already existed in a language so similar to that of the poet, and that he was educated in a land that was under German cultural domination, it seems most likely. Nevertheless, whether individual or national a product, the "epic" did much to focus Estonian interest on the national past; thus, it contributed to the consciousness of a national existence. As in Latvia, the period 1860-1890 was marked by the rise of the Estonian bourgeoisie, the growth of industry, and the movement from country to city.81 But, in the economic, social, and, to a lesser extent, political spheres, the Germans continued to dominate. In the Gubernii of Livonia and Estonia, less than one-third of 1 per cent of the population controlled 60 per cent of the land. Seventy-five per cent of Livonia's people and about 55 per cent of Estonia's had no land at all, and over 96 per cent in both provinces lacked economic, political, and religious rights.82 Such glaring inequities were bound to force nationalism into the field of practical politics, and of this movement Jakobson was the herald. Known to his enemies as the Robespierre of the Baltic, Jakobson had acquired his liberalism in the progressive circles of St. Petersburg. Returning to his native land, he received permission to publish the newspaper, Sa^ala?3 which began to appear in 1877. Jakobson emphasized the importance of economic and social reforms without which even cultural progress was impossible, and he was the first Estonian who dared to express the idea that his country might some day be free.84 To effect the immediate goal of liberation from the German yoke he sought the aid of the people and the government of Russia. "From the Russians," he wrote85 to poetess Lydia Koidula, "we have nothing to fear. Whatever we bear from them is 80 E. Judas, Russian Influences on Estonian Literature, Los Angeles, 1941, 81 p. 3 1 . Palvadre, pp. 26-30; Martna, p. 18. 82 Martna, p. 33. By "religious rights" is meant the right to choose their own pastors. 83 Raissner, pp. 183, 182. Prior to the conquest of Estonia by the Teutonic knights, Sa\ala was the designation for that Central Estonian region later known as Viljandi. 81 85 Raissner, p. 169. The letter was dated April 28, 1870.

National and Social Currents to 1914

23

but one-tenth the burden of Germans w e drag on our backs. Nobody can turn our people into Russians . . . but if the present power of the Germans goes on for ten more years it will mean the end of our people, and the w o r d Estonian will sink to the level of the expression ' G y p s y . ' " 86 Most educated Estonians supported Jakobson's position, 87 but shortly after his death in 1882, Jakobson's pro-Russian orientation had manifesdy lost its value. One literary Estonian, hopeful that the Germans w o u l d at last be curbed, had hailed the reforms of 1882-83 as " h a p p y d a y s . " T h e R u s s i f y i n g policy, however, turned out to be a blanket big enough to m u f f l e the Estonian as well as the G e r m a n . Only the Russian language w a s thereafter permitted in the public schools,88 and the fate of the University of Dorpat has already been mentioned. Russification was by no means a total detriment to Estonia's cultural development. A r t is universal, and it did not hurt young Estonian writers to be exposed to the richness of Russian literature. Compelled to learn the Russian language—in itself a useful tool— they gained access to one of the world's great sources of literary expression. In some ways, perhaps, the Russian influence w a s a liberating one, f o r only an antidote as strong as the poison could successfully combat the age-old G e r m a n cultural dominance. A m o n g the leading Estonian writers, poet Jacob T a m m , and novelist Anton H . T a m m s a a r e , owe much to Russian influences. Pushkin, Lermontov, K r y l o v , and G o g o l served as important sources of inspiration to the poet; T u r g e n e v and, above all, Dostoevsky strongly affected T a m m s a a r e ' s literary creations. 85 Estonian disenchantment with Russia g r e w rapidly in the w a k e of Russification. I f , prior to 1914, the disillusionment did not result in a concerted nationalist striving, it is because, as in Latvia, the class struggle divided the nation. 1897-1902 were years of striking 86 Palvadre, p. 30. The Germans, in turn, hated and feared Jakobson. See H . Rosenthal, Kulturbestrebungen des Estnischen Volkes, Reval, 1912, 87 pp. 1 4 3 - 1 6 0 . Raissner, p. 169. 88 Palvadre, pp. 3 0 - 3 1 . Prior to 1880, the Estonians had succeeded in introducing their own language into rural district schools. 89 Judas, pp. 6 1 - 1 4 4 .

24

The Formation of the Baltic States

economic advances in Estonia. In Tallinn, especially, a series of large industrial plants were constructed and the city's working-class population increased from 2,500 to 30,000. A t that time, also, Marxist circles, aided by the organizational efforts of workers from Russia, came to life in Tallinn and Tartu.90 Among these Russians was Mikhail Ivanovich Kalinin, later President of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Menshevism appealed to the Estonian worker, and Tallinn became a Menshevik center. Such Bolshevik organizations as did arise were to be found mainly among the 70,000 Estonian workers in St. Petersburg.91 Social Democracy, in any event, was successful in winning a large following among the rural and urban proletariat. Estonian nationalism, therefore, was able to draw its recruits solely from the plutocracy of town and country.92 In 1905, the nationalist elements, led by Jaan Tonisson, editor of the newly reorganized Postimees, established the Estonian Freethinking Progressive Party. This Party demanded the use of the Estonian language in government, social and educational institutions and wanted an Estonian parliament to share control with the Duma over Estonia's budget and administration. A t the same time, however, this group assumed the role of organizing the struggle against the revolution.93 During 1905, the majority of the Estonian people opposed Tonisson's Party. They rallied either to the banner of the Social Democratic Workers' Party, led by Mensheviks Mihkel Martna, Eduard Vilde, and August Rei, and by Bolsheviks Karl Ruga, Keskulya, and Grossman, or to that of the socialist-tinted party of the small bourgeoisie, headed by Konstantin Päts, Jaan Teemant, and Otto Strandmann.94 A general strike in Tallinn on October 27 led to a bloody encounter on October 29 between workers and Russian troops. The 90 V. Velman, "Kratky Ocherk Estonskogo rabochego dvizheniya, 19021922," Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya, 1922, XII, p. 86; also M. Kalinin, "Prebivaniye ν Revele," Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya, 1921, 3, pp. 241-244. 91 Velman, p. 87. 92 Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, p. 281. 93 Obsh. Dvizh., 94 Palvadre, pp. 32-33. Ill, p. 282.

National and Social Currents to igi4

25

following day brought news of the T s a r ' s Constitution Manifesto. T h e concessions of October 30 satisfied neither the socialists nor the left-wing petty bourgeoisie w h o combined forces and continued their revolutionary activity. 95 T e e m a n t demanded arms for the people and called for the establishment of revolutionary councils. Päts, seemingly unable to move either left or right, after some ineffectual maneuvers, fled to Finland. 9 6 Tonisson considered it wisest to accept the T s a r ' s program. In accord with Minister Vitte, he called on the Estonian people to gather in a congress in November to decide upon their future course of action. Feeling certain that conservative elements w o u l d be in the majority, Tonisson believed that he would be able to dominate the congress and, in the name of the national interest, compel the revolutionaries to cease fighting; 97 these expectations were not fulfilled. T h e congress met in T a r t u , December 1 0 - 1 2 , 1905. Tonisson opened the first session with an attack upon the Social Democrats. T h e congress thereupon broke into an uproar, refused to let him finish; and the tumult w e n t on for six hours, ceasing only when Tonisson left the hall followed by 300 delegates. T h e remaining 500, under T e e m a n t ' s presidency, decided to g o on with the revolutionary struggle and they put forth a program characteristic of social democracy. 98 Meeting simultaneously, Tonisson's men produced a nationalist, though not a separatist program. 99 Shortly afterward they joined with the G e r m a n barons in counterrevolutionary military units and called upon the Russian government for punitive expeditions. T h e Russian government was happy to oblige. H o w e v e r , Tonisson w a s as true to his national principles as he w a s to his class. In the First D u m a , he and his Party supported the right w i n g K a d e t position 100 and joined the Union of Autonomists. 1 0 1 A f t e r the dissolution of the 95

Jackson, pp. 117-118. E. Uustalu, The History of the Estonian People, London, 1952, p. 149; Jackson, p. 117. 97 98 Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, p. 282. Palvadre, pp. 48-49. 99 100 Jackson, p. 118. Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, p. 282. 101 This was a Duma bloc of bourgeois representatives of national minorities. It generally supported the Russian Constitutional Democrats. 96

The Formation of the Baltic States

z6

First Duma, he signed the Viborg Manifesto and for so doing spent several months in jail.102 From 1905 to 1914, the liberal political efforts of the Estonians were stifled by the Russian government. In cultural matters, however, the voice of the Estonian nation became more audible. Russian domination of the schools was somewhat lessened after 1905, when Estonian was permitted as the language of instruction for the first two years. A statute of 1906 permitted the founding of private schools in which classes might be conducted in the local language. Although such schools were excluded from support by the regular state or community budgets, Estonians, at great personal sacrifice, made the best of this opportunity. They organized private "societies for education" and, by 1910, 15,000 members were supporting thirty-six schools with 127 teachers and 2,796 pupils. These schools were of foremost national cultural importance in that they withdrew thousands of young Estonians from Russification, created an Estonian school literature, and preserved for Estonia a number of teachers who would otherwise have had to go abroad to earn a living.103 Cultural societies—such as Vanemuine, Endla, and Estonia—some of which had been in existence since the 1860's, continued to exert useful influence. They had as their goal the building of theaters in which the national drama and music might be presented. Another cultural group, Eesti Kirjanduse Selts (Estonian Literary Society) became active in 1907. It sponsored and popularized native literature, science, and art and did research in the cultural history of the Estonian people. Libraries and reading circles sprang up throughout the country, and by 1910, 13,000 volumes were at the readers' disposal. Curiously enough, despite this upswing in cultural activity, the number of Estonian works printed in the period 1905 to 1910 dropped from 400 to 300 per year. In 1911, however, the number rose to over 500, and almost 2,000,000 copies appeared—the highest figure reached until the establishment of Estonia's independence.10' 102

Obsh. Dvizh., Ill, p. 283. H. Kruus, Grundriss der Geschichte des Estnischen Volkes, Tartu, 1932, pp. 197-198. 104 Kruus, pp. 199-203. 103

THE OBER-KOMMANDO OST 2

Occupied Lithuania Courland

and

O n August i, 1914, Germany declared war on Russia; five days later Austria did the same. Russia's entry into the war evoked great enthusiasm throughout the Romanov Empire. Except for the Bolshevik Party, whose members in the D u m a expressed opposition to the "imperialist war," even traditionally antigovernment groups forgot their grievances and rallied behind the Tsar. A spirit of loyalty was manifest even among the national minorities, and soldiers from Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia willingly went to war beside the Russians. 1 Advancing rapidly into Russia, the Germans by September, 1915, had occupied Poland, Lithuania, and Courland. Until September 1917, when Riga fell, a line roughly coincident with the Daugava River remained the boundary of German-held territory in the Baltic area, the so-called Ober-Kommando Ost. General Erich von Ludendorff arrived at Kaunas in October 1915, and decided to take up 1 Goldmanis, Latvian deputy to the D u m a , speaking on A u g u s t 8, 1914, on the subject of Latvian and Estonian loyalty, mentioned that there was no doubt in Latvian and Estonian minds but that it was the Germans w h o had oppressed, the Russians w h o had raised them to their present level. " T h e s e great days show that neither differences of nationality, language or religion will prevent Latvians and Estonians from being ardent patriots of Russia and [from] standing shoulder to shoulder with the Russian people against the rash foe." (A. P. Tupin, Pribaltiisl(y Krai i Voina, Petrograd, 1914, p. 1; see also pp. 2-30 for further testimony as to anti-German and pro-Russian sentiment on the part of the Baltic peoples at the start of the war. See also J . Buchan, The Baltic and the Caucasian States, London, 1923, p. 102.)

28

The Formation of the Baltic States

the task of developing Kultur in Lithuania and Courland, as "Germans had been doing for many centuries." LudendorfT did not credit the "mongrelized peoples" of those lands with the ability to create their own civilization; therefore, he thought it necessary to superimpose that of Germany upon Lithuania and Courland before they became part of a Polish Kultur orbit. Attending Evangelical services in Kaunas, Ludendorff, for the first time "on foreign soil," heard sung, as a hymn, the old song: Ich habe mich ergeben Mit Herz und mit Hand Dir Land voll Lieb und Leben Mein deutsches Vaterland. Ludendorff was so "moved" that he ordered the song sung every Sunday in all the churches.2 Conditions in the occupied territory were in a chaotic state. With the Russian exodus had gone the entire bureaucratic structure, and only the clergy retained some authority. The population, particularly in the cities, suffered severe food and fuel shortages. German Kultur made few friends. The native Germans, the Baits especially, received the German troops well. Otherwise, except for the Jews, "the only non-German group with whom direct linguistic intercourse was possible,"3 the conquerors, in Ludendorif's words, "faced a foreign population composed of various interfeuding tribes [Lithuanians, Latvians, Poles] who could not understand our language, and the majority of whom disliked us." 1 For administrative purposes the Germans organized a purely military apparatus. Some civilians with technical knowledge, "reliable people," recruited from the Reich, were put to work under close army supervision. After a brief experimental rearranging of 2E.

Ludendorff, Meine

ΡΡ· !3 8 . *39·

Kriegserinnerungen,

1914-1918,

Berlin, 1920,

3 Ludendorff, pp. 142-146. "The Latvian retained an attitude of reserve. The Lithuanian believed that now the hour of liberation had arrived, but when [his hope did not materialize] . . . he grew suspicious. The Poles were 4 Ludendorff, p. 148. completely hostile . . . "

Occupied Lithuania and Courland

2

9

territorial boundaries, the districts of Lithuania and Courland emerged. Major von Gossler headed the administration of Courland and, according to Ludendorff, had little trouble. But in Lithuania, Military Governor von Isenberg turned out to be "too impulsive." The police force, a part of the German Army, was totally unfitted to serve the needs of the inhabitants. Nor could a civic type of gendarmerie have handled the situation to suit the German Staff, for armed resistance and small-scale guerilla warfare continually harassed the police and cost the lives of many German soldiers. The administration of justice was, "of course," entirely in German hands.5 An essential function of any military government is that of assuring shelter and provisions for its troops. In performing that function the Germans were ruthlessly efficient. The Lithuanian Bureau at Lausanne, early in 1917, reported 150,000 homeless and starving civilians, 400,000 devastated farms, and the death rate growing alarmingly because of the unsanitary conditions of life.6 "It would have been monstrous," Ludendorff writes, "to spare the territory of the Ober-Kommando Ost at the cost of the homeland for the sake of some falsely humane sentiments."7 Every phase of popular life fell under rigid administrative control, including the press,8 communication, transportation, education, and political activity— which was especially prohibited. As an illustration of German 'Ludendorff, pp. 147-152. New Yor\ Times, May 19, 1917. Throughout 1916 Lithuanian leaders directed numerous pleas to the German government begging for an amelioration of the terrible plight of Lithuania under the military administration. On December 9, 1916, Jurgis Saulys and Antanas Smetona wrote to German Secretary of State Zimmermann, asking for a chance to speak to him in person and explain the Lithuanian needs. The reply to this missive thanked the Lithuanians for their letter but deplored the pressure of other business which made it impossible for Zimmermann to see them. At the same time it was suggested that they express their wishes to the Supreme Commander of the East, the very source of the decrees they had intended to complain about. (P. Klimas, Der Werdegang des Litauischen Staates, Berlin, 1919, pp. 40-42.) 7 Ludendorff, pp. 154-155; see also Jean Manclere, Le pays du chevalier blanc, essai d'histoire du peuple lithuanien, Paris, 1930, pp. 232-238. 8 In Lithuania, one Lithuanian language paper, Dabartis ("The Present"), was published—but by the German authorities. (Klimas, p. x.) 6

3°

The Formation of the Baltic States

benevolence, LudendorfE boasts of the fact that courts took the trouble to translate the laws of the land into German before passing judgment.9 In this political and economic wasteland, there suddenly bloomed a Lithuanian National Diet, 220 delegates strong. This Diet met at Vilnius from September 18 to 22, 1917. Its most important acts were the election of a Nadonal Council, or Taryba, consisting of twenty men, the great majority of whom represented the Lithuanian bourgeoisie, and the adoption of a resolution expressing the desire for independent statehood.10 Elected to the Taryba were: Dr. Jonas Basanavicius, Mykolas Birziska, Saliamonas Banaitis, Kazys Bizauskas, Pranas Dovydaitis, Stepas Kairys, Petras Klimas, Donatas Malinauskas, Vladas Mironas, Stasys Narutavicius, Alfonsas Petrulis, Antanas Smetona, Jonas Smilgevicius, Justinas Staugaitis, Aleksandras Stulginskas, Dr. Jurgis Saulys, Kazys Saulys, Jonas Valokaitis, Jokubas Sernas, Dr. Jonas Vileisis.11 The resolution passed by the Diet of Vilnius reads as follows: Article I. In order that Lithuania may be able freely to develop, it is necessary to make the country an independent state, based upon democratic principles and having ethnographical frontiers which shall take into consideration the interests of economic life. The national minorities of Lithuania shall be given every guarantee for their cultural needs. In order to fix definitively the bases of independent Lithuania and her relations with neighbouring countries, there shall be convoked at Vilnius a Constituent Assembly elected in conformity with democratic principles by all the inhabitants of Lithuania. Article II. If, before negotiations for a general peace are entered into, Germany should declare herself ready to recognize the Lithuanian State and defend the Lithuanian interests in the peace negotiations, the Lithuanian conference would then admit the possibility for the future Lithuanian State of entertaining with Germany relations which remain to be determined, but which shall not prejudice the free development of 9 Ludendorff, pp. 158-160; see also C. Rivas, "Justice" allemande en Lituanie occupee, Geneva, 1917. 10 J. Ehret, La Lituanie, Paris, 1919, p. 237. 11 "Lithuanie," Revue Baltique, September 1918, No. 1.

Occupied Lithuania and Courland

31

Lithuania. The conference makes this declaration in consideration of the fact that the interests of Lithuania, in normal times, are rather in the direction of the west than the east or south.12 Quite obviously, given the conditions of 1917, Lithuanian declarations of independence could be made only through the courtesy of Ober-Kommando Ost. T h e G e r m a n Supreme C o m m a n d actually favored the annexation of Courland and Lithuania, preferably through union w i t h the House of Hohenzollern. 1 3 W h y , then, was the Taryba permitted to m a k e even its limited declaration? Lithuanians abroad, and particularly those in Switzerland, realized from the start that the G e r m a n occupation of their homeland w a s not an unmitigated evil. If nothing else, it had brought under one domain Lithuania M a j o r and Prussian Lithuania, lands hitherto separated by the German-Russian border. But, far more important, Lithuania had been freed from Tsarist rule and might yet find some w a y of extricating herself from G e r m a n rule. D u r i n g 1916, Lithuanian patriots in Switzerland formed a national council whose main purpose was to publicize the existence of the Lithuanian nation in the hope that, whatever the war's outcome, Lithuania's rights w o u l d be taken into consideration. T h e immediate problem was to get G e r m a n y to permit within the occupied country the formation of a political body through w h i c h Lithuania could make her identity k n o w n to the outside world. H a d the G e r m a n s been entirely opposed to any consideration of Lithuanian desires, it seems reasonable to assume that all efforts w o u l d have been in vain. But, fortunately, various G e r m a n groups, including even the annexationist elements, found it momentarily expedient not to hinder the Lithuanian national movement. A l r e a d y in 1916 the military situation of G e r m a n y and her allies w a s critical. Territorial gains in the East, though g i v i n g the G e r m a n press something to boast about, could not affect the proportion of military potential so heavily in favor of the Allied Powers. Manpower, grain, and oil were basic needs. W h e r e a s time strengthened the Allies, w h o could use it to advantage, it could do nothing for 12

Ehret, pp. 237-238.

13

Ludendorff, p. 427.

32

Τ'he Formation of the Baltic States

Germany but further diminish rapidly vanishing resources. The German peace offer of December 1916 was adequate testimony to the fact that the Oberste Heeresleitung (the German Supreme Command) was none too confident of victory. The decision of January 9, 1917, to engage in unrestricted submarine warfare, was, in view of the American attitude, nothing less than the ruined gambler's last despairing plunge. Another such gamble had taken place a few months earlier. On November 5, 1916, the Kingdom of Poland was proclaimed. On the chance of securing hitherto untapped Polish resources of manpower the Germans risked the undying hatred of Russia." But, whatever the need for Polish cannon fodder, the Oberste Heeresleitung15 had no desire to create a monster that would seize hard-won Lithuania and add it to a Gross-Polentum encircling East Prussia. And what better way to keep Polish nationalism from overreaching itself than by permitting a necessarily anti-Polish nationalism to display itself in Lithuania? That is precisely what happened. On November 5, the very date on which the Kingdom of Poland was proclaimed, Ludendorff, through Secretary of State, Gottlieb von Jagow, gave the Lithuanians their "go ahead" signal in the form of a notice in the papers of the occupied region.16 And so, in Ludendorfi's words, "the Lithuanian movement, which had formerly emanated from Switzerland, came to life in its native land."17 Indifferent to the lofty hopes it had inspired, the OHL acted as though the Lithuanian movement existed solely for the purpose of keeping Poland out of Lithuania for the sake of German security. When the movement began to show signs of energy in its struggle for Lithuania's independence, Ludendorff considered it merely an 11

E . Ludendorff, Kriegführung und Politi\, Berlin, 1922, pp. 181-182. Hereafter OHL. 16 Ludendorff, Kriegserrinerungen, p. 374. "It could be assumed that the proclamation of the Kingdom of Poland on November 5 would upset the Lithuanians... Upon my request, Secretary of State von Jagow placed a notice in the papers of the occupied region in order to calm the Lithuanians." 17 Ibid. Ludendorff here refers to the clearing house in Switzerland for the activities of the Lithuanians abroad. 15

Occupied Lithuania and Courland

33

indication that "the Lithuanians themselves had entered the arena against Poland." The March revolution in Russia, especially since the Soviets began to demand peace based among other things on self-determination, gave powerful impetus to the Lithuanian national movement. The O H L became concerned lest Russian promises arouse so uncompromising a desire for independence among the Lithuanians that they would resist German endeavors to absorb their country. Poland too, it was feared, might get the chance "to gain the upper hand even in territories where she had never before held control." During April and May of 1917, Ludendorff exerted great pressure upon the Reich government, demanding, in thinly veiled language, that it act decisively to annex the Ober Ost. On May 30, the Chancellor reluctantly gave Ludendorff the limited satisfaction of authorizing him to form a "confidential council" (Vertrauensrat) in Lithuania. The OHL hoped to use this body, in which Lithuanians were to have the majority of the seats, as its tool. The council, it was expected, would transmit the wishes of the Lithuanian people to the German administration; and, as though through a process of self-determination, sanction the incorporation of Lithuania into the Hohenzollern domain.18 Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg's unwillingness to go along with the OHL arose from his opposition to any act that might stamp Germany as a land grabber and, consequently, jeopardize his "defensive war" and Sicherheits Programm}* Having decided much earlier that Germany could not win the war, he would gladly have settled for the status quo ante bellum.™ Annexation, the Chancellor believed, was a double-edged sword which might one day cut into Germany. As long as a separate peace with the Tsar had seemed at all possible he had resisted the idea of proclaiming the Polish Kingdom, finally giving in when the OHL clamor for more men became 18

Ludendorff, pp. 375-376. H. Freiherr von Liebig, Die Politi\ von Bethmann Hollwegs, 2 vols., Munich, 1919, Part III, pp. 534-535; also P. Scheidemann, The Maying of New Germany, 2 Vols., New York, 1929, I., p. 326; also K. Helfferich, Die Friedensbemühungen im Welt-Krieg, Berlin, 1919, p. 15. 20 J. Wheeler-Bennet, Hindenbttrg, the Wooden Titan, London, 1936, p. 66. 19

34

The Formation of the Baltic States

irresistible. Bethmann-Hollweg had also opposed unrestricted submarine warfare, fearing the capability of the United States to render important aid to the Entente. In the overthrow of the T s a r he had again perceived the possibility of peace with Russia but had, according to his memoirs, also sensed the dangers of the spread of revolution into the war-weary Reich. 21 Bethmann-Hollweg's peace stand and, within that program, the anti-annexationist idea, received strong backing from the Left and the Center parties in the Reichstag. In the existing political framework, the military leaders dominated the Reich; but, though the Kaiser himself listened obediently, " t h e Reichstag had to be respected in a war so national in scope." 22 Having power only in a negative sense, the Reichstag was still the voice of the German people. Hindenburg and Ludendorff, as demigods of victory, helped to exalt the German mass mind. B u t serious food shortages, plant speed-ups, and the other phenomena of an all-out war effort in a blockaded nation were tremendously depressing to the national morale. T h e connection between physical hardships and O H L mastery of the Reich surely was not clear to the masses; but hunger and fatigue make men grumble. T h e people revered their war leaders and asked nothing of them save victory. In the Reichstag, however, their complaints were translated into demands for peace. As the popular protest grew and took the form of strikes and demonstrations, those in the Reichstag closest to the people challenged more boldly the O H L , its war aims, and everything the war was supposed to stand for. T h e motives of the majority leaders in opposing annexation varied, but, on the whole they arose from a concurrence in the views 21 Th. von Bethmann-Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, 2 vols., Berlin, 1921, II, pp. 94-96, 137-139, 174· Once the decision to proclaim the Polish Kingdom was made, it was, writes Bethmann-Hollweg, vital to move swiftly. The Western Powers of the Entente were constantly attempting to persuade the Russian Government to live up to the promise of Polish autonomy made by Grand Duke Nicholas in the spring of 1916. See also Wheeler-Bennet, Hindenburg, p. 90. 22 F. Payer, Von Bethmann-Hollweg bis Ebert, Frankfurt, A. M., 1923, 2 Ρ· 3·

Occupied l^ithuania and Courland

35

of Bethmann-Hollweg 23 or a desire for an understanding with the new Russian government.24 T h e unofficial Russian proposals for peace discussions, on the basis of self-determination in the occupied regions, pleased the peace groups in the Reich who were certain that even an independent Lithuania and Courland would be bound to Germany by economic ties. They further believed that a friendly Russia would quickly supply their starving country with food, the immediate benefits of which would far outbalance any future gain in the possession of Lithuania and Courland. The latter idea implied that Russia would become a permanent German economic colony.25 So, to avoid shattering hopes for a separate peace in the East, the peace groups desired a real and legal process of self-determination in the Ober Ost—not the farce contemplated by Ludendorff and the O H L . In the meantime, peace-minded Germans and Lithuanians mingled freely in Germany, Lithuania, and Switzerland, openly discussing and planning the future status of Lithuania.26 Under such conditions it is not difficult to understand why the Ober Ost became a crucial factor in the bitter struggle between the O H L and the civil government of Germany. Bethmann-Hollweg, sympathetic to the parties of peace, was unable, because of the German Chancellor's nonresponsible position, to bridge the gap between himself and the people's representatives. So, in order neither to yield to nor to infuriate the O H L , he kept making halfway commitments. This, however, failed to save him. Long before the struggle had ended, Bethmann-Hollweg was forced out in favor of a man who would cooperate with the O H L . But his successor, Michaelis, was unable to gag the Reichstag majority's outcry for an end to the suffering which resulted in the Peace Resolution of July 19, 1917, calling for peace "without annexations and reparations." However, Michaelis understood his role as "Bismarckian" Chancellor better than did Bethmann-Hollweg and never intended to permit the Scheidemann, I, pp. 340-341, 318, II, p. 26. M. Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg, Berlin, 1920, p. 235. 25 R. H. Lutz, The Causes of the German Collapse in 79/8, Stanford 26 Lutz, p. 239. University, 1934, pp. 239-240. 23 24

The Formation of the Baltic States

36

Peace Resolution to have any real effect upon the war aims of the OHL. "Self-determination" was something he would interpret as he saw fit.27 With OHL and Reichstag majority, each in its own way and for different reasons, striving to create a Lithuania, it is difficult to see how success of some kind could have been avoided. Upon the Lithuanians, the July Resolution acted as an electric impulse. In the same month came the Russians' last offensive, the catastrophic failure of which hastened the disintegration of the Russian army. By August 1917 the Lithuanian national council in Switzerland was sufficiently emboldened to ask Germany to proclaim the independence of Lithuania, the establishment of a Lithuanian Council (Staatsrat), and the replacement of the military by a civil administration. This claim reached the Reichstag through Erzberger, leader of the Center Party, who from July on, had persistently been demanding "that Germany soon create an independent Lithuania."28 The plans of the OHL still coincided in some important respects with those of the Lithuanians and the Reichstag "Peace Resolutionists." On July 21, just after Michaelis had taken office, the OHL, in line with its policy heretofore, suggested to the Foreign Office that Landesrätf9 (Provincial Councils) be set up in Courland and Lithuania. On July 25, Secretary of State Zimmermann approved this suggestion. In Ludendorff's words, "our interim successes in East Galicia had further clarified the situation." By this he meant that the Russian military collapse had brought the realization of OHL annexationist plans a step nearer. Zimmermann, however, since the future was so unpredictable, advised the militarists to be cautious about "openly stating their aims of a personal union," or even, "to bank too much on its eventual achievement." Having said that, he made it clear that he did not "in any way" wish to be discouraging. The worthy Reichsleitung was still walking the thin wire between Wehrmacht and Reichstag. The improvement of the military situation in the East had in no way changed the thoroughly bad conditions on the home front. 27 29

Scheidemann, I, p. 355, II, p. 44. Ludendorff, p. 376.

28

Erzberger, p. 185.

Occupied Lithuania and Courland As a result of this "concurrence of views" between the Foreign Office and the OHL, General Hoffmann, Supreme Commander in the East, was told early in August to take steps that would lead to the formation of Landesräte.30 Later in the month, acting in opposition to the OHL, Erzberger proposed in the Reichstag the rapid creation of a parliamentary body for Lithuania, whose membership would have the confidence of the entire Lithuanian people.31 In the meantime considerable bargaining had been going on between the OHL and the Lithuanians in Switzerland. Ludendorfi had countered the Lithuanian demand for an elected assembly by proposing the "confidential council"32 to act under the German governor, Isenburg, but this bait had been rejected. Finally Ludendorff permitted an assembly of Lithuanian notables to gather in a committee, in order to draw up a list of men who would then select the Lithuanian representative body. The committee, meeting at Vilnius from August 1 to 4, 1917, agreed that "an independent Lithuania bound to Germany by a military convention, a customs union, and strategic railways was not out of the question." However, if Lithuanian interests were to be protected, it was necessary that "the details of an alliance be further studied and clarified . . . therefore, the committee [felt] the need . . . for the establishment of a permanent body possessing far-reaching authority . . . [for] the opportunity to consult with Lithuanians abroad, to strengthen the participation of Lithuanians in the matter of public life, and to make known their needs and demands in the German and local press."33 The committee, at the same time, agreed upon the manner of selecting a representative body which would designate a national council. Since the military administration forbade elections of any kind, it was decided to designate candidates in private conversations or in larger informal gatherings. Where this was impossible, "the members of the committee on organization would themselves select such men as enjoyed the confidence of local populations." This pro30

31 Ludendorfi, p. 377. Erzberger, p. 187. See p. 33. 33 P. Klimas, Der Werdegang des Litauischen Staates, Berlin, 1919, p. 60. 32

37

The Formation of the Baltic States

3»

cedure naturally left a good deal of room for subjective designation of the "honorable, firm, and intelligent Lithuanians of all classes and political orientation over twenty-five," 34 who were to be chosen as the constituent assembly. This may help to explain the similarity between the composition of the committee of notables which met in the first week of August and the Taryba as finally chosen. Within two weeks, 300 names had been selected. The German authorities ruled out sixty-eight of these as undesirable; the rest were asked to participate in a National Diet.35 Thus there came into being the Diet of Vilnius of September 18-22, from which sprang the Taryba and the resolution charting Lithuania's future. The Taryba's function, as outlined by the German authorities, was "to decide upon the foundation for the future development of administration and economy in Lithuania, under the guidance of the [German] military government." 36 However, in the following months, the Lithuanian national body refused either to prostrate itself before its German protector or to play the game of self-determination in accordance with Ludendorfi's wishes. In Courland, the designs of the O H L progressed far more smoothly than they did in Lithuania. The influential Evangelical clergy was on the German side, as, of course, were the Baits, whose long experience in administering the region was of immeasurable value to the occupying forces. By 1916 the Baits' importance had increased considerably as a result of the wartime evacuation of Latvians and Russians. In 1910, Courland had a population of 741,200." By 1916, it was reduced by almost 500,00ο;38 but the Baits and other Germans had retained their original number, totaling about 65,00ο.39 Their proportion of the total population had thus 34

Klimas, p. 60. J. Gabrys, Vers I'independence lituanienne, Lausanne, 1920, pp. 190-191. Erzberger, p. 187. 37 H. P. Kennard, The Russian Year Boo\ for 1913, London, 1913, p. 52. 38 Presseabteilung Ober Ost, Das Land Ober Ost, Berlin, 1917, p. 431. 39 C. Rivas, La Lituanie sous le joug allemand, 1915-1918, Lausanne, 1918, p. 575. For some years before the war the Baltic landowners (the Baits) in conjunction with the Reich government had been pursuing a policy of importing settlers from Germany. The Baits also brought some from the German colony on the Volga. The purpose of this policy was to strengthen the German 35

36

Occupied L.tthuania and Courland

39

risen from 6 γ 2 to over 20 per cent. T h e decrease in population, and the loss therewith to Courland of those most capable of offering resistance, helps explain " t h e unobtrusive and impartial manner" 1 0 in which Major von Gossler w a s able to govern. A province abandoned by two-thirds of its natives was hardly the proper area in which to conduct a test for self-determination. B u t rarely has a site been more suitable for the setting up of a seemingly representative puppet regime. 41 In proposing an "undisguisedly [i.e., base and to prevent the land from falling into the hands of the many landless Latvians and Estonians. About 15,000 of such colonists were settled in Courland, particularly in the districts of Kuldiga, Talvi, and Aizpute. See Tainstvennaya Broshtura ο Kurlyands\oy Gubernii, Petrograd, 1915, Tipografiya "Nauchnoye Delo." See also, Tupin, pp. 162-163; A- Schwabe, Agrarian History of Latvia, Riga, 1930, p. 1 1 7 ; R. von der Goltz, Als Politischer General im Osten, Leipzig, 1936, p. 79. 40 Ludendorff, p. 149. 41 Though the term was not yet in use in 1914, here in Courland, as throughout the Baltic Provinces, was a made-to-order German fifth column. Nor were the Russians unaware of the danger to themselves of this enemyoriented group of citizens situated so strategically along the German road to their capital. Soon after the war began, the Russian press carried numerous articles accusing the Baits of outright cooperation and espionage—often on the flimsiest grounds—or pointing out the lack of enthusiasm in the Bait press for the Russian war effort and the scantiness of Bait donations. (See G. A. Evreinov, Rossiiskiye Nemtsi, Petrograd, 1915; also A. I. Korostelev, Balti i Voina, Petrograd, 1914.) As early as the first weeks in August 1914, several Baits were tried and sentenced for suspected sabotage in relation to the mobilization of cavalry units which they were in charge of. In January 1915, persons in Riga, overheard using the German language, were liable to arrest. (Matthes Ziegler, Der Deutsche im Auslande, Baltikum, Berlin, 1934,

ρ· ®3·) Though exaggerated, as wartime suspicions of espionage activity so often are, there was certainly sound basis for Russian apprehensions. The sentiments of one Bait just prior to the German conquest will suffice to indicate those of his compatriots. "For weeks we heard the approaching dull thunder of cannon . . . for m o n t h s . . . we read the distorted accounts of the Russian press . . . What could we believe? What might we hope?. . . Bait landowners and German prisoners had been thrown into the jail behind our d w e l l i n g . . . we saw long trains of wounded being sent in and knew that on the last, the worst cars.. . lay our wounded German brothers... For weeks we noted the preparations to receive the 'enemy'.. . and each morning the tension was renewed. And then came a n i g h t . . . when we stood by our windows trembling with h o p e . . . Have the Russians fled yet? Are they evacuating the city?

40

The Formation of the Baltic States

annexationist] Lithuanian policy" (ausgesprochene Litauische Politik) to Chancellor Michaelis on July 21, 1917, Ludendorff had also suggested a völkische Politik for Courland. The völkische Politi\ turned out to be the formation, under von Gossler's supervision, of a Provincial Council, or Landesrat, based essentially on the Baltic barons, who, however, invited the Latvians to take part in forming their own governing body. The 80 per cent preponderance of Latvians was represented by about 40 per cent of the Landesrat members, all belonging to the landowning class.13 This, according to Ludendorff, was not much in the way of Latvian self-rule, but "there was a chance for further steady development [of Latvian influence]."" The Landesrat convened solemnly in Jelgava and, on September 18, asked the Kaiser to accept the Duchy of Courland under his personal protection.45 The Kaiser indicated his willingness to accede to this request.46 "Grotesque travesties of 'representative assemblies,'" was the expression used by Scheidemann in describing "self-determination" in Courland and Lithuania.47 Regardless of what the O H L had intended to make of Lithuanian self-determination, it soon became apparent to Ludendorff that a democratic body, even a German-sponsored one, could become a dangerously explosive force. Ever more impatiently the O H L pressed for authorization to join the Ober Ost in a personal union to Prussia.48 However, neither Michaelis, who fell a victim to his [Jelgava] . . . A r e they blasting the bridges? Yes, yes, yes! Listen—what tremendous crashing and e x p l o d i n g . . . Are they coming? Are they coming? They are coming, our liberators!" (M. von Blaese-Hoerner, Aus dem Eroberten Kurland, Berlin, 1918, pp. 31-32; see also Hanns Dohrmann, Aus Kurlands Befreiungstagen, Berlin, 1917; Emil Herold, Kämpfe um Mitau, Winter 19161917, Berlin, 1917, Hermann Helbing, Die Baltische Frage, Darmstadt, 1916.) 12 Ludendorff, p. 376. The term völkisch is extremely vague. However it was properly understood by von Gossler who readily placed the word deutsch in front of it, so that the term became deutsch-völ\isch or German-national. (See Alfred von Gossler, Verwaltungsbericht der Zivilverwaltung der Baltischen Lände, 75 August bis 15 Dezember, 1918.) 43 "There appeared 80 representatives of the people of Courland, among these 49 Germans, 29 Latvians, 1 Lithuanian and 1 Jew." Mitauische Zeitung, September 23, 1917. "Ludendorff, p. 426. 45 Mitauische Zeitung, September 23, 1917. 16 Ludendorff, p. 426. " Scheidemann, II, p. 98. *8 Ludendorff, p. 427,

Occupied hithuania and Courland

41

pro-annexationist policy, nor H e r t l i n g , his successor, dared to speak out against the rising "parliamentarism spirit within Germany. 4 9 Revolution seemed m u c h too likely a possibility once Russia had proved it could happen. T h e O H L w a s further checkmated by strong opposition to the personal union idea by the princes of Saxony and B a v a r i a , neither of w h o m relished the prospect of further increase in Prussia's p o w e r . T h e S a x o n k i n g , furthermore, regarded himself as the historically legitimate successor to the L i t h u a n i a n throne. 50 W h i l e the O H L , the Bundesfürsten, and the F o r e i g n O f f i c e bickered a m o n g themselves, the Lithuanians m a d e every m o m e n t count. F r o m N o v e m b e r χ to 10, 1 9 1 7 , a conference of L i t h u a n i a n delegations w a s held at Berne. Representatives f r o m the U n i t e d States and Russia attended, as did a delegation f r o m the Taryba headed by D r . Smetona. 5 1 T h e conference registered approval of the 48

K. Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg, Berlin, 1919, p. 519. Erzberger, pp. 187-188; B. Colliander, Die Beziehungen zwischen Litauen und Deutschland, während der Okkupation 191 ζ-1918, Äbo, 1935, p. 184. 51 Lithuanians in America were among the first and most active proponents of Lithuanian independence. As early as September 21, 1914, 250 Lithuanians, delegated from the Lithuanian colonies of the United States, met in Chicago to demand that Lithuania be considered a special question at the peace conference and that Lithuanians be consulted concerning the future of the then Russian province. After the German occupation, the American Lithuanians demanded independence for Lithuania and sent petitions to that effect to President Wilson, the heads of other states, and the Pope. They organized large conventions to promote the cause of Lithuania and, of course, sent delegates to take part in Lithuanian conferences held in Europe. (Klimas, p. xxxviii.) Many Lithuanians who had fled from the German invasion into Russia proper began, after the March revolution, to think in terms of Lithuanian independence. Representatives of all Lithuanian parties and all of the Lithuanian deputies in the Duma met on March 13, 1917, to form a national council, the existence of which was then announced to the Provisional Government and to the Petrograd Soviet. However, the Provisional Government took no official cognizance of this action. On May 27, 1917, a convention of 320 democratically elected delegates of all the Lithuanians in Russia met in Petrograd to demand independence for Lithuania and participation by Lithuania at the peace conference. After the Bolshevik revolution, the original national council broke up over the issue of Bolshevism. However, between November 29 and December 2, 50

42

The Formation of the Baltic States

acts of the Vilnius Diet, and all but the left-wing groups in Russia, who took no part in the conference, recognized the Taryba as a properly constituted organ of the Lithuanian people. Further expressions of the independent spirit were evident in the acceptance of national boundaries as fixed by the Vilnius Diet. These were to include the former Russian Gubernii of Vilnius, Kaunas, Suvalki, and Gardinas, and the District of Naugardukas in the Gubernia of Minsk. Vilnius was to be the state capital. A port on the Baltic was declared necessary to the economic development of Lithuania. 52 Inside Lithuania, having rapidly sized up the divergence within German policy, the Lithuanians boldly directed a chorus of criticism against von Isenburg, their hated military governor. 53 "These complaints," LudendorfE writes, were based entirely on conditions rising out of wartime exigencies, and the administration was in no wise to blame for them. [But] the democratic Lithuanians of Vilnius found a ready hearing among the majority [Reichstag] parties, and these in turn reacted upon the Foreign Office. The Lithuanians gradually refused to recognize the fact that German authority was embodied in the military government. They realized very soon that individual deputies [civilians] were more powerful than the German Government itself. These delegates in turn amused themselves by applying their own theories to Lithuania although they did not know the country. The German Government, anxious to prevent the O H L from carrying out its aims [annexation], permitted the deputies to do as they pleased. Influenced by them, the Foreign Office dealt with the Lithuanian question in Berlin only as it thought necessary to the internal situation of Germany, but with no regard for conditions in L i t h u a n i a . . . . 1917, a new national council was established at Voronezh, this time without the participation of the Bolshevik elements. This council, after proposing some amendments, accepted the decisions of the Vilnius Diet and recognized the Taryba as the basis for the construction of the Lithuanian State. (Klimas, 52 pp. xxxviii, xxxix.) Ehret, pp. 241-243. 53 Smetona, Kairys, and Saulys (President, Vice-President, and General Secretary of the Taryba, respectively) boldly signed a statement declaring "that the Taryba [would] be unable to gain . . . authority in the land [and control over] the actions of the Lithuanian people as long as it [was] forced to deal with Prince von Isenburg [who had] lost the confidence of the Lithuanian people." (Klimas, pp. 98-99.)

Occupied L.ithuania and Courland

43

A n d thus it was impossible to bring about a healthy [he means annexationist] situation in Lithuania. Since the authority of the Military Governor was undermined f r o m Berlin, his every move proved a failure. Lieutenant Colonel von Isenburg found it necessary to offer his resignation. H e realized that all his plans were being sidetracked. I was sorry to see him go. 54 U n r e s t o n the h o m e f r o n t a n d the c o n s e q u e n t d i m i n u t i o n of the m i l i t a r y i n f l u e n c e in G e r m a n y m a d e the L i t h u a n i a n d r e a m of freed o m shine m i r a c u l o u s l y b r i g h t in the f a l l of 1 9 1 7 . B u t that brightness w a s soon d i m m e d by the course of events r i s i n g out of the B o l s h e v i k seizure of p o w e r i n R u s s i a . 54

Ludendorff, pp. 428-429.

3

Lithuania's Fate in the Balance On November 8, 1917, Lenin, head of the newly established Soviet government, enunciated his famous Peace Decree, appealing to all of the warring powers for a democratic peace on the basis of "no indemnities and no annexations." On November 26, People's Commissar Krylenko queried by wireless whether the O H L was prepared to conclude an armistice.1 T o all concerned, the issue of selfdetermination in Lithuania and Courland at once became a matter of utmost urgency. The Lithuanians wanted it on the record, before peace talks began, that they had declared their national independence. Fully aware of their momentary 2 need to "cooperate," they would no doubt have preferred their historic declaration to be free from commitments to Germany. The O H L and the nationalist parties of Germany also wished to see a "voluntary" declaration of Lithuania's independence for use in the imminent peace talks, but not without a clause specifically indicating German support. The Lithuanians were urged to declare their state independent, but, lest the wording of their resolution be injudicious, the O H L threatened to establish a new strategic frontier for Germany, running through Kaunas, Gardinas, and Daugavpils, which would have cut Lithuania in two. 3 The O H L also sought desperately to put an end to the royal competition for Lithuania and to keep the annexationist way open for the Hohenzollerns and Prussia.4 1 2 3

M . Hoffmann, Der Krieg der versäumten Gelegenheiten, Munich, 1923. See A. Smetona, Die Litauische Frage, Berlin, 1917, pp. 29-32. 4 Scheidemann, II, pp. 100-101. Ludendorff, pp. 428-429. 44

'Lithuania's Fate in the balance

45

T h e Social Democratic and Center parties desired an unimposed process of self-determination. 5 In the Reichsleitung, Secretary of State von Kühlmann seemed anxious, above all, to avoid offending any groups, whether outside or inside of the Reich. Where the Entente was concerned, he hoped to keep alive the possibility for a negotiated peace;6 within the Reich he wanted to retain some kind of an equilibrium between the Left and the Right. Victory in the East, however, had given military prestige a powerful boost which accounts for the slight, but unmistakable, promilitarist emphasis in the statements made by Kühlmann and Herding shordy before the armistice discussions at Brest-Litovsk. In response to a query as to the nature of the peace in the East, Kühlmann told Scheidemann that "the Russians themselves [had] already settled the formula: 'without annexations or reparations on the basis of national selfdetermination'—If, then, the western peoples of Russia declare for breaking off from Russia proper, their wishes must surely be granted, even if they require support from us in some form or other. I do not think the Russians attach very much importance to nonRussian territory." 7 T h e Lithuanian Declaration of Independence was proclaimed by the Taryba on December n , 1917. It is notable especially for its stress upon the dependent situation in which Lithuania found herself. Part One of the proclamation speaks of the restoration of the independent Lithuanian State with Vilnius as capital. Part T w o asks the assistance of Germany in defending her interests at the peace negotiations. " T h e vital interests of Lithuania," the statement concludes, "require intimate and lasting relations with the German Empire. For this reason the Taryba is willing to agree to the establishment of a permanent federal attachment between the Lithuanian State and the German Empire. Between the two countries there 5 Scheidemann, II, p. 98, Erzberger, p. 188. T h i s is denied by K l i m a s w h o maintains that all German groups, including the Reichstag majority, made as "condition sine qua non" of a Lithuanian independence declaration an agreement for an eternal and strong alliance with Germany. (Klimas, p. xxvii.) 6 O. Czernin, In the World War, London, 1919, p. 223. 7 Scheidemann, II, p. 99.

The Formation of the Baltic States

46

should above all exist a military convention and commercial, monetary and customs unions." 8 The agreement that Lithuania become a German protectorate had interesting sidelights. A minority group of the Taryba resigned in protest on the ground that the agreement constituted a definite obstacle to the achievement of the true aspirations of the Lithuanian people.9 Nor was the majority under any delusions as to the nature of its concessions. Embarrassed by the incident, Lithuanians have tried ever since to eradicate it from their historical consciousness.10 The Taryba had made a bargain. In exchange for the acknowledgement of the Reich's mastery over Lithuania, it was hoped that the Germans would at least proclaim to the world the independence, however artificial, of Lithuania. The Taryba further hoped that, as a result of this important concession, the Germans would withdraw 9 Ehret, p. 224. Klimas, p. 107. T h e original collection of documents explaining the origins of the Lithuanian state were published by P. K l i m a s in the German language. It is interesting to note that the French translation, w h i c h appeared after the German collapse and was used as Lithuanian propaganda at the Paris peace talks, shows a deliberate mistranslation of the terms of the document of December 11, 1917. According to the French version, it was not a federal attachment, or union, to, but an alliance with, Germany that was pledged by the Taryba. T h e Lithuanian delegation at Paris undoubtedly feared that the original document would harm the Lithuanian claim to self-determined independence. (See P. Klimas, Le developpement de Γ it at Lituaniett a partir de l'annee igi 5 jusqu'a la formation du gouvernement provisoire au mois de novembre 1918; d'apres des documents officiels, Paris, 1919, p. 142.) A . Voldemaras, one-time Premier of Lithuania, in 1933 commented as follows on the agreement of December 11, 1917. "In reading these terms one wonders h o w the Taryba could have succumbed to conditions w h i c h reduced to naught the independence of Lithuania. Annexation, pure and simple, to Germany would have been preferable to this autonomy . . . T o tell the truth, this arrangement was not consented to but extorted from the [Taryba], Neither the President of the Taryba nor any of its members was ever able to travel to Berlin without special authorization. A person thus never k n e w anything that happened outside of Lithuania or even in Germany. A l l information within Lithuania was controlled through the military censorship. Thus, after the Russian debacle and the collapse of the front, one believed that Germany had w o n the w a r . . . T h u s the German authorities were able to confront the Taryba with the alternative of taking what Germany offered or getting nothing at all." (Augustin Voldemaras, La Lithuanie et ses problemes, Tome /., Lithuanie et Allemagne, Paris, 1933, p. 187.) 8

10

Lithuania's Fate in the Balance

47

their military g o v e r n m e n t and allow L i t h u a n i a n s to set u p their o w n civil administration. A s events transpired, the G e r m a n s proved most reluctant to proclaim the independence of L i t h u a n i a , r e a l i z i n g h o w ridiculous this w o u l d later appear w h e n Part T w o

of the

agreement, a n n u l l i n g L i t h u a n i a ' s independence, w o u l d have gone into effect. T h e G e r m a n s interpreted the " b a r g a i n " as b e i n g entirely t o their advantage. P a r t T w o m u s t never b e c o m e k n o w n to the w o r l d at large. P a r t O n e , the declaration of independence, w o u l d be disclosed to the Russians by the Taryba at the " p r o p e r " m o m e n t in the peace talks. 1 1 In short, the L i t h u a n i a n proclamation of independence w a s to have one p u r p o s e — t o m a k e it easier for the Lithuanian leaders to deliver their country to G e r m a n y . O n December

15, 1917, an armistice between Russia and the

C e n t r a l P o w e r s w a s concluded at Brest-Litovsk. B e t w e e n that date and D e c e m b e r 22, w h e n actual peace talks w e r e scheduled to begin, a conference, designed to m o l d the policy to be adopted at BrestL i t o v s k , w a s held at B a d K r e u z n a c h , headquarters of the

OHL.

T h e O H L attended in the persons of L u d e n d o r f f and H i n d e n b u r g ; w h i l e H e r t l i n g and K ü h l m a n n represented the Reichsleitung.

The

K a i s e r w a s to pass final j u d g m e n t o n the a r g u m e n t s presented. T h e p r o b l e m of w h a t to do in the East w a s t h o r o u g h l y discussed; 1 2 a n d Lithuania's

"declaration

of

independence"

was

ignored. 1 3

Self-

determination w a s freely accepted o n all sides, but only for those Baltic territories still in Russian hands. T h e Kaiser decided that evacuation of L a t v i a and Estonia be suggested to the Russians, so that Estonians and L a t v i a n s m i g h t assert their right to self-determination. 1 4 In the light of K i i h l m a n n ' s

statement to the

Social

D e m o c r a t s , it is not difficult to surmise w h a t lay in store for Estonians and L a t v i a n s , should Russia have entered u p o n this suggestion.

As

regards L i t h u a n i a

and

Courland,

no

decision

was

reached m a i n l y because O H L pressure w a s resisted by particularist claims. T h u s , annexation t o Prussia or to G e r m a n y w o u l d have to a w a i t approval by the k i n g s of Bavaria and Saxony. 1 5 12 Ludendorff, p. 429. Klimas, p. 107. 14 Ludendorff, p. 429. Erzberger, p. 188. 15 Erzberger, p. 187; Ludendorff, pp. 428-429. 11

13

48

The Formation of the'BalticStates

This outcome was satisfactory enough to Kühlmann who favored a general peace on a negotiated basis.16 The O H L , however, had not abandoned its original plan. When Kühlmann arrived at Brest a few days later to join General Hoffmann, Germany's two chief delegates each had a different purpose in mind." A t Bad Kreuznach, Kühlmann had been designated as the peace delegate of the German Reich. General Hoffmann, representing the O H L at Brest, was to be subordinate and to have "only the power to express the wishes or doubts of the O H L , and, if necessary, to protest against the measures of the Secretary of State." 18 This ascendancy of civilian power over the military, at Brest-Litovsk, lasted exactly five days. On December 22, when the peace conference began, the Russians, hoping for a general peace which would include all of the warring nations, presented six main tenets. Their proposal stressed the themes of "no annexations," "no indemnities," "protection of minority rights," and the "right of national self-determination." Kühlmann and Count Czernin, Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, agreed to accept those terms, provided that the Allies accepted the same proposals for a general peace." General Hoffmann immediately objected to this position which was in direct contrast to the ideas of the O H L and which was "essentially dishonest" in that Kühlmann, whose view of selfdetermination was entirely contrary to that of the Russians, regarded the peoples under German control as having already made their decision to break away from Russia. Hoffmann further contended that it was absurd to discuss the Allied position with the Russians, whose delegates had no authority to speak for the Allies. In reality, then, the only question that could be negotiated at Brest-Litovsk was that of a separate peace between Russia and the Central Powers. But Hoffmann, for the time being, accepted his subordinate position 16

Czernin, p. 223. Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg, pp. 536-537. 18 Hoffmann, p. 197. 19 Hoffmann, pp. 198-199. In his diary, under the date December 23, Czernin wrote: "Kühlmann is personally an advocate of general peace, but fears the influence of the military party which does not wish to make peace until definitely victorious." (Czernin, p. 223.) 17

'Lithuania's Fate in the Balance

49

and submitted to Kühlmann. Having been absent from the Bad Kreuznach discussions he had to assume that Kühlmann was acting within the framework of the decisions made on that occasion.20 On Christmas Day, the Russian delegation was told that its proposal had been accepted. Chairman IofTe then expressed his delegation's satisfaction over the fact that "Germany and her Allies were as alien to plans for any sort of territorial seizures . . . as they were to any attempt to destroy or limit the political independence of any people whatsoever." Ioffe further proposed a recess in the negotiations so that "the peoples, whose governments [had] not yet joined in the discussions for a general peace [might] have the opportunity to become sufficiently acquainted with the now established bases for such a peace." 21 When Hoffmann was later informed that the Russians actually expected the Germans, once the peace was signed, to withdraw beyond the 1914 frontier, he told Kühlmaan that he "considered it impossible to let the Russians return to Petrograd holding such a belief." Hoffmann feared a "furious indignation" on the part of the Russian masses, who, when the truth was out, would regard themselves as having been duped. A t a noon breakfast, on the following day, Hoffmann brusquely told Ioffe that Germany had no intention of withdrawing from the occupied territories, and that self-determination had already taken place in those regions. Ioffe could scarcely believe his ears. The Russians, who had already wired home the news of their great triumph, fell into despair and spoke of withdrawing from the conference.22 O n the afternoon of December 27, the reaction from Bad Kreuznach to Kühlmann's "agreement" with the Russians began to pour in. Hindenburg sent a furiously worded wire which said in effect, " Y o u have renounced everything, betrayed the interests of the Reich." Ludendorff, according to Czernin, "kept telephoning every minute, Hoffmann grew more and more excited—while Kühlmann, true to his name, remained perfectly cool." The Russians declared Hoffmann, p. 199. Peregovori ν Brest-Litovs\e, Moscow, 1920, I, p. 11. 22 Hoffmann, pp. 201, 202. 20

nMirniye

5ο

The Formation of the Baltic States

that they could not accept the German interpretation of selfdetermination.23 Having been unsuccessful in dulling the edge of the sword of German militarism, Kühlmann tried to dull its gleam. At BrestLitovsk he defended, as self-determination, that which had taken place in Lithuania and in Courland. Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Trotsky, however, who had taken charge of the Russian peace delegation early in January 1918, strove mightily to expose to the world the hollowness of Kühlmann's contentions. Days went by with the entire argument centered around this single issue. Kühlmann, according to Trotsky, "hoped to show the world that white was just the same as black . . . Hoffmann, on the other hand, [despising] the subtleties of diplomacy, on several occasions put his soldier's boot on the [conference table]. For our part, we never for a moment doubted that in these negotiations Hoffmann's boot was the only [serious] reality."21 On January 12, 1918, General Hoffmann, tiring of the Russian delegation's attitude, and also of Trotsky's obvious playing for time while he awaited the European proletarian revolution, decided to be done with formalities. The Bolshevik Kamenev had just given a speech of "princely arrogance" causing "the blood of the German officers present to boil,"25 when Hoffmann took the floor and made his famous Faustschlag speech. Quite justifiably, from any but the Bolshevik point of view, he first bitterly attacked the Bolshevik opposition to all attempts at self-determination in Russian-held territory.26 For the OHL, he said, the question of the border states was already decided: their legal representatives had declared themselves for separation from Soviet Russia. Further expressions of sentiment on the part of the populations would, therefore, be of no importance. " A complete silence prevailed at the conclusion of [Hoffman's] talk. Even Trotsky was at a loss for words."27 23

24 Czernin, p. 223. L. Trotsky, My Life, New York, 1930, p. 371. Hoffmann, pp. 209, 208. 26 Mirniye peregovori ν Brest-Litovs\e, I, pp. 94-95. 27 Hoffmann, p. 209. 25

Lithuania's Fate in the Balance

51

While "self-determination" was thus being determined, the Lithuanians were desperately trying to make themselves heard. In vain they waited for some acknowledgement by the German government of the Declaration of December 1 1 , 1917. On December 16, 1917, the Taryba had gone yet a step further to demand that all Lithuanian affairs of state be dealt with by a constituent assembly.28 However, a favorable response was hardly to be expected as long as the highriding O H L thought only in terms of a Grand Duchy for the King of Prussia. As matters then stood, no response of any kind was in the offing, for the question of which king would rule Lithuania had become thoroughly enmeshed with the problem of how Alsace-Lorraine was to be apportioned among Bavaria, Baden, and other German states. The question of annexing Courland and Lithuania had, in short, become part of the complicated matter of the balance of power within the Reich. Complicating the situation even further was Erzberger's decision to propose Herzog Wilhelm von Urach, a Catholic from Württemberg, as candidate for the Lithuanian throne. The Lithuanians had indicated their willingness to accept von Urach or some other suitable German prince who was not the ruler of another state. Early in January of 1918, Erzberger, cooperating with the Lithuanians as always, had the Center Party inform the Chancellor that it regarded the Lithuanians' right of self-determination to include the right of electing their own ruler. The Center Party further expressed the hope that such a ruler be a Catholic.29 The Lithuanians, in the meantime, fixed their attention upon the Brest-Litovsk proceedings, hoping that something favorable to their case would somehow emerge from the endless stream of verbiage. The Germans, having given no indication of any change in their administrative policy within Lithuania, nonetheless countered the Russian offer of self-determination by citing the Lithuanian declaration of December 11 as a sign of German benevolence. On January 28 Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruches im Jahre igi8. (A Reichstag Committee report written under direction of Eugen Fischer and Walter Bloch.) 12 vols. Berlin, 1926-1929, VIII, pp. 333, 345. Hereafter, Die Ursachen. Klimas gives the date for this declaration as January 8, 1918 29 (Klimas, p. no). Erzberger, pp. 186, 188.

J +

52

The Formation of the Baltic States

2 and 3, the Lithuanians asked Kühlmann and the military administration for the privilege of sending their own delegates to BrestLi tovsk, but the requests were ignored.80 Thereupon the Taryba decided to embarrass the Germans by the simple device of refusing to express the Lithuanian desire for independence. On January 9, 1918, a message was sent to Under Secretary of State von Falkenhausen informing him that the Taryba would not notify the Russian government officially of the wish for independence, as expressed in Part One of the December 11 agreement, until the Reich government had given the Taryba an answer to the following questions: A. When, and under what conditions, would the administrative power be turned over to the Taryba? B. When would the German army withdraw from Lithuania and the opportunity arise for a Lithuanian militia to be formed? C. When would German acknowledgement of Lithuania's independence take place? To this "ultimatum" the German government replied courteously on January 27 to the effect that the Lithuanian demands for recognition of independence would be met as soon as political circumstances made it possible. Conciliatory though the tone of this reply was, it did not satisfy the Taryba. Aware of the approaching stalemate at Brest-Litovsk, aware also of the support for their cause in the Reichstag,31 and suspecting the Reich of duplicity, the Lithuanians decided to be done with compromise. On February 10, 1918, Trotsky brought the peace talks at Brest to an indecisive ending by his declaration of "no war—no peace." Then or never was the time for the Lithuanians to raise their clamor, before their country, as a speck of territory within an ever expanding German imperium, should have faded from the view of the peoples of the world. So, on February 16, the Taryba unanimously adopted a resolution, again proclaiming the independence 30

Klimas, pp. xviii, 108-109, xix.

31

Klimas, pp. 1 1 1 - 1 1 3 , xxi.

Lithuania's Fate in the Balance

53

of Lithuania, but this time much more boldly and along the lines of the declaration made by the Diet of Vilnius in September 1917. The conditions accepted by the declaration of December 1 1 , 1917, which would have made Lithuania a German protectorate, were entirely omitted.32 Those Taryba members who had resigned returned to that body in order to participate in this action.33 As it developed, declaring independence was much easier than getting word of such declaration into the hands of the Reich's civil authorities. A delegation from the Taryba, desiring to convey the decision to the German government, was refused a travel visa. A letter, written upon the advice of Reichstag Socialists, reporting the declaration to the Chancellor, was held up by the military authorities and did not reach its destination until much later. In the Taryba, individual members pressed daily for a German response to their action, while the Lithuanian delegation in Berlin did the same. It was difficult to understand why the Germans had induced the Taryba to make its binding declaration of December 1 1 , 1917, but, since that date, had refused to recognize the existence of the Lithuanian state.31 The Lithuanians were, of course, unaware of the struggle among the German royal houses. On February 21, Herding finally replied: Germany was prepared to recognize Lithuania as an independent state on the basis of the resolution of December 1 1 , 1917. However, the resolution of February 16, 1918, had upset the basis for any German action. Recognition of Lithuania could, therefore, be accorded only if the Taryba were willing to return to its decision of December 1917. 35 Having just recomposed itself by virtue of its tacit retraction of the resolution of December 1 1 , the Taryba was in a most awkward position. At the same time, the German armies had begun their unresisted push northeastward.36 After some deliberation, on February 28, 1918, the President of the Taryba expressed his dilemma by simultaneously refusing and accepting Hertling's proposal. The 32

33 Klimas, p. 1 1 4 . Ehret, p. 244. 35 " E r z b e r g e r , p. 189, Lutz, p. 239. Klimas, p. 1 1 5 . 36 The Germans renewed their offensive on February 18, 1918, five days after Trotsky's "no war—no peace" declaration.

The Formation of the Baltic States

54

resolution of February 16, he declared, would not be retracted, but the resolution of December n , 1917, would remain in force.37 The Taryba, naturally, preferred an imperfect recognition to no recognition at all. In March 1918, the Taryba decided to send a delegation to Berlin, headed by its president, A . Smetona. The military authorities warned the departing delegates to refrain from any sort of association with Reichstag deputies, and especially with Erzberger. Once in Berlin, they remained under constant supervision.38 On March 23, the delegation presented Chancellor Herding with a resolution which reiterated, almost verbatim, that of December 11, 1917. It concluded with the following words: "In calling the foregoing to the attention of the Imperial German Government, the Lithuanian Taryba requests the aforesaid Government to recognize the independent State of Lithuania."35 Herding, under strong Reichstag pressure,10 responded favorably to this plea, declaring the German Empire "ready to accord Lithuania the protection and support requested and to take the necessary measures together with the representatives of the Lithuanian people." According to him, the federal relations of Lithuania with the Reich and the exact terms of the conventions "still remained to be determined." But it was expected "that the conventions [would] take into account the interests of [Germany] as well as those of Lithuania and that Lithuania [would] assume part of the obligations incurred in the war which had aided her liberation." Herding promised that a charter of formal recognition would soon be forwarded to the Taryba Having received the long-awaited recognition, the delegation urged the German government to take up the discussions on the conventions. This was only natural, in view of the Lithuanians' desire to stabilize their country's economic life and get rid of the military authorities. The acknowledgement of March 23, however, had committed Germany to nothing/2 and the Chancellor preferred Klimas, p. 116. p. 118. " E h r e t , p. 247; Klimas, p. 119. 37

3 9 Klimas,

Erzberger, p. 190. "Erzberger, p. 190. aDie Ursachen, VIII, p. 333. 38

Lithuania's Fate in the Balance

55

to leave f u t u r e developments u n d e t e r m i n e d . T h e delegates

were

told to leave Berlin in v i e w of the fact that V i l n i u s w a s preparing a day of great national r e j o i c i n g as a result of the recognition of L i t h u a n i a ' s independence, b u t w h e n they reached the city they discovered that n o b o d y else k n e w a n y t h i n g about the " g r e a t d a y " and its c o n c o m i t a n t festivities. 43 O n M a r c h 8, 1918, the Landesrat

of C o u r l a n d accepted a resolu-

tion requesting " H i s M a j e s t y K a i s e r W i l h e l m to accept the c r o w n of the D u c h y of C o u r l a n d " and expressing the hope that " C o u r land, L i v o n i a , Estonia, and Ösel w o u l d be joined u n d e r a c o m m o n g o v e r n i n g b o d y a n d attached to the G e r m a n R e i c h . " " A c c o r d i n g to a postwar report by a Reichstag committee, " t h e G e r m a n s in the [Courland]

Landesrat

[ b y this request s o u g h t ]

as close a tie as

possible to G e r m a n y . T h e L a t v i a n s w e r e n o t yet in the position to lend w e i g h t to their desires." 4 5 Erzberger, p. 190. Walters, Lettland, seine Entwicklung zum Staat und die baltischen 45 Die Ursachen, VIII, p. 335. Fragen, Rome, 1923, p. 344. 43

4 1 M.

NATIONALISM AND BOLSHEVISM 4

Lenin and the National

Question

One of the problems confronting Bolshevist theory f r o m its inception w a s that of minority nationalism in the Russian Empire. If the Bolsheviks were to be the champions of downtrodden workers everywhere, then certainly they had to stand up for the rights of the man oppressed, not only for class reasons, but also for national reasons. It w a s precisely because of this twofold oppression within the Russian E m p i r e after the i88o's that so many revolutionists came f r o m a m o n g national minority groups. T h e Bolsheviks had no desire to disassociate themselves f r o m this powerful revolutionary current. Discontent f r o m any quarter of the Imperial structure was grist f o r Lenin's mill. T h e problem lay in how to reconcile the nationalist revolutionary sentiment, striving for independent and nationally minded bourgeois states, with the Marxist slogan: " W o r k e r s of the world—unite." T h e ingenious practical formula which L e n i n f o u n d for uniting t w o such basically conflicting concepts, developed f r o m a lengthy process of ideological evolution. 1 Upon his return to Russia in A p r i l 1 9 1 7 , L e n i n wrote numerous articles and made many speeches explaining the Bolshevik position. F r o m A p r i l to June, many of his polemics were directed against the w a r policy of the Provisional Government, especially the imperialist part of that policy. L e n i n spoke for peace—"peace without 1 For a fuller examination of Lenin's ideas on self-determination see S. W. Page, "Lenin and Self-Determination," Slavonic and East European Review, April 1950, pp. 342-355; see also S. W. Page, "Lenin's Assumption of International Proletarian Leadership," The Journal of Modern History, September 1954' Ρ· 24°> n·

57

58

The Formation of the Baltic States

annexations or indemnities on the basis of self-determination of the peoples." The theme of "peace without annexations" he used as a springboard from which to launch his national formula. He went far beyond the most liberal socialist thought of the day by defining as annexed and, therefore, free to self-determination, all of the subject peoples of the Russian Empire, or of any other state. This definition deliberately disregarded the length of time that any nation may have been within the Russian Empire. "Even a politically illiterate person," wrote Lenin, in answer to an attack on his position, "will know that Courland has always been annexed to Russia" 2 (that is, was still in a state of annexation in 1917). Lenin's attitude created the impression that he stood for complete dissolution of the Russian Empire into its component feudal parts. Mockingly, one of the leftist organs of the day pointed out that Lenin's proposal, carried to its logical conclusions, would reduce Russia to the Grand Duchy of Moscow and Germany to the Electorate of Brandenburg. T o this notion Lenin replied that he considered worthy of self-determination only those peoples who had "preserved [their] peculiarities and [their] will to a separate existence."3 Despite his qualifications, Lenin's statements, taken literally, could have meant nothing less than the breaking off from Russia of all of the non-Russian peoples whose desires tended in that direction. Nothing could have been further from his true intentions. What Lenin wanted—and said he wanted—was a dissolution of the forcible bonds, bonds of conquest and dynastic agreements which fettered the minority peoples to the Russian Empire. Once they had been given their freedom to choose, however, Lenin expected the same peoples to reunite immediately on fraternal (working class) terms. In his "Tasks of the Proletariat in our Revolution," written in April, Lenin declared it essential for the Bolsheviks to "insist upon the promulgation and immediate realization of full freedom of separation for all ['annexed'] peoples." But, he wrote, "the proletarian party strives to create as large a state as possible, for this is 2 3

V. I. Lenin, Sochineniya, 2nd ed., 30 vols., Moscow, 1926-1932, XX, p. 92. Lenin, p. 384.

Lenin and the National Question

59

in the interest of the workers; it strives to bring the nations closely together, to fuse them [not by the use of force, but] by a free, brotherly union of . . . the toiling masses of all nations." 4 Lenin's M a y 1 2 speech on the national question 5 further clarifies his views. T h e Polish Social Democrats, said Lenin, have since 1903 been clashing with the other Bolsheviks of Greater Russia on the subject of liberation for Poland, because of the fear, on the part of the Polish Social Democrats, that the rabid Polish nationalism, given free rein, might stifle the internationalist working class spirit . . . Why should we, Great Russians, who have been oppressing a greater number of nations than any other people, refuse to admit the right of separation for Poland, the Ukraine, Finland? We are asked to become chauvinists, because by so doing we ease the position of Social Democrats in Poland . . . Instead of telling the Polish workers that only those Social Democrats are real democrats who believe that the Polish people must be free—for there is no place for chauvinists in the ranks of the Socialist [i.e., Bolshevik] Party—the Polish Social Democrats declare that just because they find the union with the Russian workers advantageous they are opposed to Poland's separation. They have a perfect right to do so. But these people do not want to understand that to enhance nationalism it is not at all necessary to reiterate the same words. In Russia we must stress the freedom of separation for the subject nations, while in Poland we must stress the freedom of such nations to unite. We Russians must emphasize the freedom of separation, the Poles the freedom to unite. Speaking of the Finns, L e n i n said, " A l l the Finns w a n t now is autonomy. W e desire that Finland be given full freedom. W h e n this aim of ours is brought to life, faith of the Finns in Russian democracy will be strengthened and precisely for this reason will they not separate themselves [ f r o m R u s s i a ] . " Obviously, L e n i n was far more interested in unity than he was in separation—but what he appeared to be stressing was the fact that such unity must be achieved on a voluntary and democratic basis. H e contended that the more " d e m o c r a t i c " the Russian republic became, in terms of shaping itself into a republic of Soviets of 4

3*

Lenin, p. 123.

5

Lenin, pp. 275-277.

The Formation of the Baltic States

6o

W o r k e r s ' and Peasants' Deputies, the more powerfully w o u l d it attract " t h e toiling masses of all nations." 6 T h e real key to w h a t L e n i n meant lies in his interpretation of the t w o c o n c e p t s — " n a t i o n " and " d e m o c r a c y " — o f

w h i c h the broader

idea, "national self-determination," is composed. T h e nation w a s not the familiar historic outgrowth of capitalism; speaking for the proletariat, by " n a t i o n , " L e n i n meant the w o r k i n g class, that is, the people minus the bourgeoisie, the latter presumably liquidated by the time the will of the proletariat had become the determining factor in the nation's destiny. 7 B y democracy, and this is the heart of the problem, L e n i n did not mean the will of the majority, nor even the majority of w h a t remained of a nation after the political emasculation of the bourgeoisie. In his w o r d s :

One must not look backward, but forward . . . away from the usual bourgeois type of democracy which has been strengthening the domination of the bourgeoisie by means of the old monarchistic organs of government—the police, the army, the bureaucracy. One must look forward to the democracy now in the process of being born, which is already ceasing to be democratic, for democracy means the people's rule, but an armed people cannot rule over itself. The word democracy is not only scientifically incorrect when applied to the Communist Party, but is, since March 1917, a blinder over the eyes of the revolutionary people, which prevents it from establishing boldly, freely and on its own initiative a new form of power: the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and any other Deputies, as the sole power in the "state" and as the harbinger of the "withering away" of the state altogether.8 6

Lenin, p. 123. "As the party o£ the proletariat," wrote Lenin in 1903, "Social democracy has as a positive and major task the achievement of self-determination not of peoples and nations, but of the proletariat within each nationality." (Is^ra, No. 44, July 1903.) 8 Lenin, XX, p. 133. (Italics are Lenin's.) See also Lenin's comments in State and Revolution. "But the dictatorship of the proletariat, i.e., the organization of the vanguard of the oppressed as a ruling class [note that Lenin limits the ruling class to a select few of the proletariat] for the purpose of suppressing the oppressors, cannot simply produce a mere broadening of democracy. Along with an immense broadening of democracy, which for the first time becomes democratism for the poor, for the people, and not for the well-to-do, the dictatorship of the proletariat places a series of restrictions 7

ljenin and the National Question

61

T h e new democracy, then, is nothing less than a dictatorship. Adding Lenin's "democracy" to Lenin's "nation," it becomes clear that it is a Bolshevik dictatorship which determines the will of the nation over which it has established dominance. And since, by definition, Bolshevik organizations everywhere must unquestioningly obey the Central Committee, it becomes further clear that whether or not a "nation" joined the "workers' state" would be determined entirely by the Central Committee of the Bolshevik dictatorship of Russia. of freedom upon the oppressors, the exploiters, the capitalists. W e must suppress these if we are to liberate mankind from wage slavery; their resistance must be overcome by f o r c e , . . . it is clear, that where there is suppression there is also violence, there is no freedom, no democracy." (Sochineniya, X X I ,

430-43 !·)

5

Latvia

Chooses

Bolshevism

T h e German conquest had effectively insulated Lithuania and Courland from the cataclysmic Russian events initiated in March 1917. But Latvia, north of the Daugava River, remained largely unoccupied through 1917. There the fall of the Tsar opened the gates to long repressed separatist sentiments. But, as in other minority regions of the Empire, such sentiments were powerfully counteracted by the ever-growing Bolshevik trend. In Latvia, Lenin's words on self-determination proved to be immensely effective. After the March uprising, all administrative authority disappeared abruptly throughout the Empire. Policemen, always the symbol of the old power, hastily abandoned their uniforms. Provincial governors were dismissed from their posts, but the Provisional Government had difficulty in finding experienced replacements. In many cases, the functions of government fell into the hands of local bodies convened to save their districts from anarchy. Frequently, the first to respond to the critical situation were those w h o owned property. A n d so, in Vidzeme and Latgale, that is, unoccupied Latvia, the bourgeoisie in each community proceeded to form administrative councils. From these they attempted to extend their political power over the entire ethnic region. T h e administrative councils acted also as local legislatures and soon began sending delegates to provincial congresses. D r . M. Valters, Latvian Minister of the Interior in 1919, has recorded the opinion that these congresses were "de facto, though not de jure, autonomous and national administrative bodies" 1 1 Walters, Lettland, p. 332. (Since this book is in the German language, Valters' name is spelled in the German way.) 62

Latvia Chooses Bolshevism

63

and suggests that they connoted the yet unspoken popular desire that Latvia be independent f r o m Russia. W h e r e the bourgeoisie of V i d z e m e and Latgale were concerned, Valters is no doubt correct. T i r e d of being subordinate to Baltic barons and Russian bureaucrats, they welcomed their first opportunity to become the dominant class. In the first months after the establishment of the Provisional Government, the basic program of the Latvian bourgeoisie w a s autonomy, in a united Latvia which would be " a n inseparable province of Russia." 2 In March 1 9 1 7 , a Latvian congress, which met at Valmiera, proposed to the Provisional Government that " a n autonomous administrative unit to be called Latvia, [be made u p ] out of portions of the Gubernii of Livonia, Vitebsk and Courland inhabited by L a t v i a n s . " On A p r i l 26, 1917, a congress which assembled in Latgale voted unanimously for a United Latvia. 3 Since the former Russian policy of rigid centralization was no longer feasible, the Provisional Government could not fail to perceive the need for some measure of home rule in the Baltic Provinces. But a Government reform commission, whose investigations resulted in the law granting autonomy to Estonia, brought no immediate benefits to Latvia. 4 A delegation of Latvians which met with the Provisional Government in M a y 1 9 1 7 , w a s turned d o w n on its request for autonomy as well as on that for a united Latvia. In his bitter criticism of the government, 5 Valters overlooks its overwhelming burden of problems, and he fails to mention the importance to Russia's defense of the Latvian front and the Baltic coast. In fact, the biggest obstruction to the aspirations of the Latvian bourgeoisie w a s not the Provisional Government but the rural proletariat of Latvia. A congress of deputies of the bourgeois communal administrations had assembled in R i g a intending to create a parliamentary body. 5 T h a t body w a s to exclude all members of the landless classes, the bourgeoisie apparently taking it for granted that a 2

Manchester

Graham, Latvia,

Guardian,

Diplomatic

March 3 1 , 1 9 1 7 ; April 10, 1 9 1 7 ; quoted by M. W .

Part

III,

University of California, 1941, p. 400. See also H. Dopkewitsch,

Die

Entwicklung

The

Recognition

des Lettländischen

pp. 46-47. ' G r a h a m , Latvia, 5 Walters, pp. 3 3 1 - 3 3 5 .

of

the

Staatsgedan\ens

Border bis

States,

1918,

Berlin, 1936,

4 pp. 400, 335. Graham, Latvia, pp. 400-401. ' G r a h a m , Latvia, p. 401.

The Formation of the Baltic States

64

landowners' council would be gracefully acknowledged by the population at large.7 Failing to reckon with the tenor of the times, they ignored the fact that the Latvian peasant, like the Russian, was land hungry, and that the troops in the Latvian battalions consisted mainly of peasants. Hearing the word "revolution," the peasants thought first of satisfying their long-frustrated desires and were much less concerned with supporting the landowners in a struggle for national liberation. Adding fuel to the flames was the revival of active Bolshevism, extinct in Latvia since the beginning of the war. In May 1917, the paper Cina ("Struggle"), around which the Latvian Bolshevik cadres grouped themselves, moved its editorial offices from Petrograd to Riga. By May 17, the Socialists M. Skujenieks and F. Mender had been forced out of the editorships of the journal read by the Latvian Rifles, and that important organ fell into Bolshevik hands.8 Bolshevik propaganda, besides proclaiming the right of Latvia to secede from Russia, also told the peasants that they were to inherit the land. The Social Democrats, disputing the legality of the landowners' council, convoked a congress of deputies from all districts of Latvia which elected a council for the landless. This council began its activities at the same time as the autonomous (bourgeois) administrative council, and the result was a dualism of authority so typical of all Russia in 1917. The conflict of the classes went on even after the fusion of the two bodies on a democratic basis. The bourgeoisie argued for what they considered to be the national interests of Latvia, but the socialist groups invariably countered by stressing their class demands and frequently threatened to employ revolutionary troops to achieve their ends.® By June 1917, the Provisional Government could no longer ignore the existence of administrative autonomy in most of unoccupied Latvia. On July 5, 1917, it issued a decree permitting the "temporary organization of an administration and local self-government 7

Walters, p. 332. V. Mishke, "Podgotovka Oktyabrya ν Latvii," Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya, 9 1928, I, pp. 38-39, 50. Walters, pp. 333-335. 8

Latvia Chooses Bolshevism

65

in the provinces of Livonia and C o u r l a n d , " this to be subordinated to the Provisional Government's Commissar of Provinces. A temporary Provincial Council was to be elected f r o m the districts and cities on the basis of one member to every 15,000 inhabitants, cities having a smaller population to elect one member each. 10 Elections were to be held early in September and soldiers received the right to vote, thereby assuring a democratic outcome. 1 1 T h e concessions made to Latvian autonomy by this decree were far f r o m complete. A m o n g other limiting factors was the control over the Council's tax measures by the Russian Minister of Finance, as specified by Section T w o , paragraph four, of the decree. 12 O n July 30, 1 9 1 7 , upon the initiative of the Livonian Council at Riga, there assembled at R i g a representatives of the most important Latvian organizations of Courland, Livonia, and R i g a in order to discuss the legal status of Latvia. Participating in the discussions and the decisions were seven representatives f r o m the Council of the Social Organizations of R i g a , six f r o m the Council of W o r k men's Deputies of R i g a , three f r o m the Council of Latvian W o r k men, Soldiers, and Landless (peasants), eight f r o m the Executive Committee of the Battalion of Associated Latvian Rifles, six f r o m the Provisional L a n d Council of Courland (elected by refugees in Moscow), six f r o m the Provisional L a n d Council of Livonia, six f r o m the City Council of R i g a , one f r o m the Latvian Section of the Executive Committee of the T w e l f t h A r m y , eight f r o m the Latgale Section of the Executive Committee of the First L a t v i a n Rifles Regiment, one f r o m the Latvian Bureau of the F i f t h A r m y , and one f r o m the Peasant Union. T h e Conference unanimously adopted the following decisions: One. T h e Latvian people have the f u l l right of self-determination. T w o . Latvia is indivisible, and includes Southern Livonia, Courland, and Latgale (called Inflantia, i.e., the districts of 10

A. Bllmanis, Latvian-Russian Relations, Documents, Washington, 1944, pp. 39, 40. 11 12 Walters, p. 340. Bllmanis, Documents, p. 41.

Τhe Formation of the Baltic States

66

Three.

Four. Five.

Six.

Daugavpils, Rezekne, and Ludza in the Gubernia of Vitebsk). Latgale as an individual component of Livonia enjoys full self-determination in all matters of local municipal government, administration, schools, and churches. Latvia is an autonomous political unit within the Russian democratic republic. Legislative, executive, judicial, and local municipal power is in the hands of the Latvian nation and its Constituent Assembly, which is elected by general, equal, secret, and proportional vote. The Conference protests against annexations, and in general against all attempts to determine the legal political status and frontiers of Latvia or its constituent parts without the knowledge and acquiescence of the Latvian nation.13

Valters correctly evaluates the resolution of the Riga Conference as a compromise agreement between the Left and the Right, evidence thereto being points four and five which are clearly contradictory. Point four places Latvia within the confines of Russia, whereas point five speaks of the Latvian nation and its Constituent Assembly. Valters claims that the resolution indicated a triumph of the national over the socialist (that is, internationalist) idea, but his only basis for this statement lies in the fact that it was later so interpreted (after the bourgeoisie had won out). A less biased analysis proves that matters stood where they had started, with the bourgeoisie favoring independence,14 but the workers and peasants seeking only autonomy within a federated Russian state. Since events directly following the Conference more accurately reflect the then prevailing Latvian sentiment, it becomes clear that it was the socialist rather than the bourgeois ideas which led the field. Riga, bombarded by the approaching Germans on the day before the September elections were to be held, fell soon thereafter. Else13

Bllmanis, p. 42.

M

Walters, pp. 339-340.

Latvia Chooses Bolshevism

67

where, the elections duly took place and were conducted in perfectly democratic fashion. "The majority," Valters writes, "was socialist or still further left." The newly elected Council met at Valmiera but soon disintegrated as a result of chaotic conditions caused by the retreating Russian armies and the rising Bolshevik spirit. A dictatorship of the proletariat took the place of the democratic Council. A Soviet of Workers and Landless Peasants became the central authority, and soviets of landless peasants were formed in place of the local councils.15 The class war then entered upon its terroristic phase. Private property rights were canceled and revolutionary tribunals were set up. Arrests and death sentences became the order of the day, and the bourgeoisie found it virtually impossible to remain politically active. Bolshevik influence increased each day, and In the November elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly, Lenin's party captured 72 per cent of the votes.16 Whatever their earlier motives in striving for Latvian independence, the bourgeoisie soon realized that their very existence in Latvia hinged upon their success in separating the country from a Bolshevik-dominated Russia. A mass flight of bourgeois intellectuals to Petrograd had begun soon after the September elections. In the ensuing months they organized a nationalist propaganda center in conjunction with the Latvian Refugees Committee, established early in the war by Duma deputies Jänis Goldmanis and Jänis Zälltis. Literature of all kinds was prepared and delivered to class sympathizers wherever accessible. The center published the newspapers Baltija ("The Baltic Land") and faunä Deenas Lapa ( " T h e New Daily Paper") and sent daring emissaries to Riga and Courland. Contacts were made with Russian intellectuals, most of whom were anti-Bolshevik.17 The representatives of the Allied Powers in Petrograd were also approached and proved highly receptive since they 15

Walters, pp. 340-341. The Bolsheviks got 97,781 votes out of 136,080 cast. See O. H . Radkey, Jr., The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 191J, Cambridge, 17 Mass., 1950, p. 33. Walters, pp. 341-346. 16

The Formation of the Baltic States

68

w e r e sympathetic to any g r o u p s w h i c h opposed the Bolshevik peace aims. 18 In the same period, a so-called L a t v i a n N a t i o n a l C o u n c i l , h o p i n g to further the idea of L a t v i a n independence, w a s established

at

V a l k a o n the L a t v i a n - E s t o n i a n border. C o m p o s e d of delegates f r o m all of the political parties except the Bolsheviks, 1 8 it represented less than 30 per cent of the L a t v i a n people not u n d e r G e r m a n rule. U n a b l e to attract substantial popular support w i t h i n L a t v i a , the C o u n c i l strove to gain support elsewhere. Its f o r e i g n affairs division, headed by G o l d m a n i s , initially sent C o u n c i l m e m b e r s only t o parts of Russia w h e r e , as in the U k r a i n e , the nationalists w e r e also seeki n g independence. 2 0 T h e N o v e m b e r revolution forced the C o u n c i l to g o u n d e r g r o u n d , but o n N o v e m b e r 18, h a v i n g proclaimed L a t v i a ' s independence

and

created

executive

nine

constituted

itself

departments

the to

"legal

government,"

provide

it

administrative

machinery. 2 1 T h e " g o v e r n m e n t " then set about rather sluggishly to establish its claims outside the f o r m e r Russian E m p i r e . B y January 1918, w h e n Estonian diplomats were busily at w o r k in Scandinavia, the L a t v i a n C o u n c i l h a d a single representative, Z i g f r i d s Meierovics, abroad to speak for L a t v i a in the A l l i e d Councils. 2 2 S o m e success w a s achieved in that the F r e n c h g o v e r n m e n t , t h r o u g h its A m b a s s a dor at P e t r o g r a d , g a v e the C o u n c i l provisional de facto recognition. 2 3 A t the session of the Russian Constituent A s s e m b l y , o n January 18, 1918, G o l d m a n i s declared that L a t v i a considered herself

morally

justified to determine her destiny and the needs of the

Latvian

people. 24 T h i s , as all else that happened in the short-lived Constituent A s s e m b l y , w a s but a candle in the w i n d . A m o n t h later all of L a t v i a w a s overrun by the G e r m a n A r m y . 18 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Russia, 2 : 816; A. Piip, Memorandum on Latvian Chronology, 1918-1919, pp. 1-2, quoted by Graham, Latvia, p. 500. 19 M. W. Graham, New Governments of Eastern Europe, New York, 1927, 20 Walters, p. 343. p. 326. 21 Graham, New Governments, p. 327; C. A. Manning, The Forgotten 22 Graham, Latvia, p. 400. Republics, New York, 1952, pp. 140-141. 23 Graham, New Governments, p. 327. 24 Graham, Latvia, p. 403.

6

Estonia Rejects

Bolshevism

STRUGGLE FOR AUTONOMY

A t the time of the March revolution, few, if any, Estonians thought in terms of outright separation from Russia. They fought beside the Russian troops in Petrograd and made no efforts to capitalize upon the resulting confusion. 1 In April 1917, Kerensky, as a representative of the new Russian government, addressed thousands of Estonians w h o had assembled to hear him outside the national theater in Tallinn. "Estonians," he said, " y o u are free either to come with us or to follow your own path." T h e crowd responded enthusiastically with the cry: " W e shall go with you." 2 Most Estonians hoped for autonomy within an all-Russian federation, but so soon after the downfall of the Romanov regime, the symbol of their centurieslong subjugation, they were not yet sure of what moves they might properly make. However, events showed them how to achieve at least the legal aspects of autonomous government. A m o n g the Great Russian political parties the sterility of thought with regard to the problem of nationalities was suddenly made obvious by the revolution. Only the program of the Socialist Revolutionaries called for the federal form of state, and this, for varying reasons, was opposed by all of the other leading parties. According to Victor Chernov, Socialist Revolutionary leader and member of the Provisional Government, Russia's political thinkers were either "idolaters of centralized government" who believed that only such 1 2

M. Martna, Estland, die Esten und die estnische Frage, Ölten, 1919, p. 3. G. Gaillard, L'Allemagne et le Baltikum, Paris, 1919, p. 74. 69

ηο

The Formation of the Baltic States

a government "could determine the scope of local and regional self-government," or were "doctrinaires of economic unity and centralization, of the concentration of the 'fatherlandless' proletariat through the growing concentration of 'fatherlandless' capital." 3 Members of the First Provisional Government, though aware of the nationalities problem, failed to recognize its true character. Desiring to preserve Russia's territorial integrity, they tended to consider the nationalist manifestations of the day as anti-Tsarist, rather than anti-Russian. They chose to believe that a universal democracy replacing the old "prison house of peoples," though leaving the state centralized as before, would evoke universal enthusiasm and satisfaction. " T h e Provisional Government," according to Chernov, "did not realize that the more heavily the oppression of the autocratic regime had borne down upon the stubborn spring of the peoples' national feelings, the stronger would be the force of release.'" Propaganda of the day speaks glowingly of the grants of freedom made by the Provisional Government to Poles and Finns in March and April of 1917.5 There is no questioning the sincerity of the manifesto of March 29, which proclaimed to "Brother Poles" the striking of [their] hour of decision" in which "Free Russia call[ed] [them] into the ranks of the warriors for the people's liberty." 6 However, the act of March 20, restoring "to full application the Constitution of the Grand Duchy of Finland," 7 and Kerensky's liberation speech before the Finnish Diet on April 13, were nothing more than acknowledgements of acts of the Finnish national movement which the Provisional Government had been too weak to obstruct. The victory of the Finns over the Provisional Government may help to explain the augmented expectations of their ethnic cousins V . Chernov, The Great Russian Revolution, New Haven, 1936, p. 265. Chernov, p. 287. 6 A . J. Sack, The Birth of Russian Democracy, New York, 1918, pp. 251255. 6 Sborni\ TJ\asov i Postanovlenii Vremmenogo Pravitel'stva, vipus\ pervi, Feb. 2j-May 5, 1917, St. Petersburg, 1917, pp. 423-424; also Revoliutsiya, 1917 goda, Khroni\a Sobitii, 6 vols., Moscow, 1923-1930, I, p. 94. 7 Sborni\ U\azov, pp. 23-24. 3 1

"Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

71

in Estonia. Increasing pressure exerted by Estonian leaders induced the Provisional Government to issue the law of April 12, 1917, captioned " T h e Provisional Establishment of the Administration and Local Self-Government of the Gubernia of Estonia." 8 The law, besides providing for the enlargement of the Gubernia of Estonia to include the Estonian-speaking territories of Livonia Gubernia, also established a provisional administrative machinery, headed by a Commissar and two assistants to be appointed by the Provisional Government. The national organ of self-government under the Commissar was to be called the Guberns\y Zems\y Soviet, and was to be composed of delegates from districts and towns on the basis of one delegate for every 20,000 inhabitants. Towns of less than 20,000 were to be allowed one delegate each. Clause Five of the act defined the matters of administration, which were to be the main concern of the Commissar and of the Guberns\y Zerns Soviet (or National Council). The Guberns\y Soviet was to devise an administrative machinery, which, upon the approval of the Russian Provisional Government, was to function as the Provisional Law of the land.® In the rural districts, the organs of self-government were to be known as Provisional Zems\y Soviets, and were to be formed of delegates from seven to fifteen volosti.10 Jaan Poska, Mayor of Tallinn, a man highly esteemed by both Russians and Estonians, was appointed Commissar of Estonia. 11 Jüri Jaakson was named Vice-Commissar in the north, and Konstantin Päts assumed the corresponding office in the south. Poska, not yet satisfied, began to press the Provisional Government for permission to establish an Estonian regiment. This was a complex problem, for Estonian soldiers, numbering 2,000 officers and 100,000 men, were dispersed all over the former Empire. 12 Poska, however, citing the well-known valor shown by the Latvians in defending their own land against the Germans, finally succeeded in convincing 8

Sborni\ U\azov, pp. 255-256. Sborni\ U\asov, vipus/ζ vtoroy, p. 177. 10 Sborni\ XJkflsov, vipu.s\ pervi, p. 257. 11 Graham, New Governments, p. 254. 12 Jackson, Estonia, p. 128.

8

The Formation of the Baltic States the Provisional Government. Permission to form an Estonian regiment was granted on April 21, 1917,13 but it was many months before the transfers, necessary for the forming of the army, could be effected. During the time of these negotiations, much of the real power in Estonia had fallen into the hands of the rapidly formed soviets. Soldiers and sailors, especially in Tallinn, grew increasingly turbulent as the weeks passed, and their revolutionary excitement soon affected the workers. Poska, back in Tallinn as Commissar, was "definitely powerless to act without the acquiescence of the Executive Committee of the Soviet." 14 In Tartu, Päts was virtually a prisoner of the Soviet. O n July 7 and 8, 1917, elections to the National Council took place. Because of difficulties caused by wartime and revolutionary conditions, the elections were conducted indirectly—each elector representing 1,000 votes. T h e parties of the soviets polled only 24 per cent of the ballots cast.15 Of the sixty-two deputies elected, the Democratic Bloc, consisting of rural and urban land and property owners, of businessmen and of intellectuals, won well over one-third of the votes, and non-Marxist labor groups somewhat less than onethird.16 T h e discrepancy between the power of the soviets and their popular backing, as revealed by the election returns, Menshevik leader Martna ascribes to the circumstance that the soviets were mainly Russian in composition. T h e delegates to the soviets were largely the representatives of the many thousands of Russians w h o worked in the newly built war plants in Tallinn and on fortifications, or performed the vast amount of paper work in the government bureaus. Many delegates came from the army and navy, both branches of the service having important bases in Estonia.17 Thus, 13 C. Grimm, Jahre deutscher Entscheidung im Baltikum, 1918-1919, Essen, 1939, p. 52. " D . F. White, Survival through War and Revolution in Russia, Philadelphia, 1919, pp. i n , 112. 15 Jackson, pp. 128-129; Bulletin de l'Esthonie, April 1919. 16 Martna, p. 197; O. Bernmann, Die Agrarfrage in Estland, Berlin, 1920, p. 10; quoted by Grimm, p. 53. "Martna, pp. 175-176.

Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

73

Martna explains the two opposing directions of Tallinn's revolutionary currents. T h e Estonians, seeking a democratic basis for their autonomy, were concerned principally with their own interests and assumed that the Russians would do the same. But the Russians believed that once the revolution's aims were achieved in Russia, all Estonian problems would be solved. " F r o m the point of view of the soviets of workers and soldiers, desires of any kind, peculiar to the Estonian people, simply did not exist." With total disregard of the Estonians' ability to read them, the soviets printed most decrees and other matters of public importance in the Russian language, "exactly as it had been done in the days of the Tsars." 1 8 T h e very small number of Estonian workers or soldiers w h o became delegates to a soviet knew the Russian language though they lacked the fluency of the Russian delegates. But Estonian was out of the question as a language of discussion. " T h e uneducated Russian," Martna writes, " w o u l d hear nothing of it, and the Bolshevik intellectuals saw [in attempts to converse in Estonian] a separatist spirit which clashed with the aims of the international proletariat." T h e Estonian Bolshevik leaders in the soviets raised no issues which were specifically Estonian. 19 Since they intended eventually to seize power in Estonia, they valued their ties to the Russian delegates more than those that bound them to the Estonian people. T h e first meeting of the National Council took place on July 14, 1917. Simultaneously, the local autonomous bodies, provided for in the decree of April 12, began to be formed. 20 T h e Council passed a series of resolutions relating to Estonia's newly established autonomy, demanding, among other things, the expropriation of the Russian Crown lands and their division among the laboring classes. Prominent in the Council were Päts and Teemant, who headed the Agrarian Party, Poska and Tonisson, leaders of the Democratic (National Liberal) Party, and Aadu Birk w h o led the Radical Democrats. Jüri Vilms and Strandmann of the Radical Socialists, Julius Seljamaa and Ants Piip of the Social Laborites, 18 20

Martna, pp. 176, 177. Graham, Governments,

19

p. 255.

Manna, pp. 176-177.

The Formation of the Baltic States

74

and Menshevik Martna were other conspicuous figures.21 Neither the Bolsheviks nor the Socialist Revolutionaries took part in Council activities; indeed, they protested through the soviets that, because it had not been popularly elected, it lacked legal status. 22

SOVIET

POWER

E v e n more than autocracy and the T s a r , Estonians prior to 1 9 1 7 had resented the Russian bureaucratic machinery and the general air of superiority displayed by Russians. T h e revolution effected litde change in these respects. T h e tactics of the soviets characterized all that was Russian. Despite the freely elected National Council, the actual administrative apparatus of Estonia remained entirely in Russian hands. 23 T h e National Council resolved to abolish private schools and to set up a single system of state schools with Estonian as the language of instruction; 2 1 but when the school year started, the Minister of Education made no mention of reforms. " T h e old school bureaucrats were still on the job and prepared themselves for the new school year in the same old w a y . " T h e T a l l i n n City D u m a , elected in September 1 9 1 7 , decided to establish Estonian as the language of administration, but Kerensky's government insisted that the official language in Baltic cities was to be Russian. " U n d e r certain conditions G e r m a n might be employed, but never Estonian or L a t v i a n . " Despite " a u t o n o m y " in the postal service, the railroads, etc., the higher administrative offices were staffed by Russians. 25 T h i s explains w h y Bolshevik attacks against the Russian Provisional Government evoked a favorable response in Estonia after the July elections. 26 T h e Bolsheviks' peace campaign was generally popular, as was their fight against capital punishment. T h r o u g h 21

Jackson, pp. 129-130. Bernmann, p. 10; quoted by Grimm, p. 53; Jackson, pp. 129-130. 23 Martna, p. 118. 24 Jackson, p. 130. 25 Martna, p. 118. 26 S. Chudenok, "Iz vospominaniya ob Oktyabr'skoy revoliutsiya ν Estlyandii," Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya, 1927, (10) 69, p. 239. 22

Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

75

most of 1 9 1 7 , too, the Bolsheviks were still regarded as being in the Social Democratic camp and were thought of as being guided by democratic principles. T h e y spoke freely of national self-determination, and the true meaning of L e n i n ' s doctrine was not yet understood. Besides, the Bolsheviks acted with much greater energy than did any other political group. 27 T h e summer and early fall of 19x7 saw a sharp rise in Bolshevik popularity. In the local elections that fall, they captured 35 per cent of the total vote; and, after the revolution of November 7, when the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly took place in Estonia, 39 per cent 28 of the votes went to them. T h i s high figure may be ascribed to the rise of Bolshevik f o l l o w i n g in Russia at large, which affected Estonia because of the many Russian soldiers, sailors, and w o r k m e n living there," and the belief that the Bolsheviks would relinquish their power to the Constituent Assembly. 3 0 L e n i n ' s concept of a proletarian dictatorship had never, of course, been previously applied. B u t in Estonia, as elsewhere, the Bolsheviks lost little time putting theory into practice. T h e powerful T a l l i n n Soviet was originally composed of a bourgeois w i n g , including a K a d e t faction, a center of Mensheviks, Socialist Revolutionaries and Social Democratic Internationalists, and a left w i n g of Bolsheviks and Anarchists. A s the Bolsheviks g r e w in strength, so did friction within the Soviet. B y September 1 9 1 7 the Bolsheviks, supported only by the tiny Anarchist and the Social Democratic Internationalist parties, were ranged against the other parties. 31 It w a s then that the Bolsheviks, confident of their power, began to take provocative action by calling for the creation of peasant committees and helping poor peasants to seize lands of the landowners. On one occasion, in September, the Bolshevik fraction of the Soviet ordered one of its members to take twenty-five sailors 27

Martna, pp. 175, 178. Pravda, No. 206 (December 5, 1917); as cited by Radkey, p. 33. The Bolsheviks won 119,863 votes out of a total of 299,844 cast. " M a r t n a , p. 178, also Chudenok, p. 241. 30 31 Jackson, p. 1 3 1 . Chudenok, pp. 240, 242. 28

Τ'he Formation of the"BalticStates

76

into Haapsalu District to help the peasants and farm workers seize and divide up the lands of a certain estate. This was successfully accomplished, but the following night, soldiers of the Estonian National Regiment fell upon the member of the Soviet and the sailors, killing the Bolshevik and six of his men. This incident marked the beginning of open warfare between the Bolsheviks and their opponents. Since the armed forces at the disposal of the Bolsheviks outnumbered those of the Whites by about three to one,32 the outcome was foreordained. The Estonian regiments were disarmed and their officers imprisoned or forced to do the bidding of the Bolsheviks. Only the First Estonian Regiment, stationed in Haapsalu, remained intact.33 The November revolution in Estonia saw all power pass bloodlessly to the soviets, that is, to the Bolsheviks. The post of Commissar Poska was taken by the Estonian Bolsheviks, Kingisepp and Meister,31 and Karl Radek became Commissar of War for Estonia. The Soviet appointed commissars to all government offices and enterprises, took over all communication and transportation, and closed or dispersed a series of bourgeois organizations. A militaryrevolutionary committee, formed just prior to the seizure of power under the presidency of Bolshevik Peterson, proceeded at once to the business of setting up a red terror. In the words of a Bolshevik writer, "a purging of saboteurs began."35 The National Council, which attempted to carry on with a "business as usual" policy, was forced to disband on November 28, 1917,36 and J. Anvelt, leader of the Estonian Bolsheviks, assumed chief executive powers.37 A few minutes38 before its involuntary adjournment, the Maapaev (National Council, Guberns\y Soviet), having nothing to lose, de32

Ibid., pp. 243, 239. W. Wrangeil, Geschichte des Balten Regiments, das Deutschtum Estlands im Kampfe gegen den Bolschewismus, Reval, 1928, p. 1. 31 Grimm, p. 54. 35 Chudenok, p. 243. For a full account of the activities of the militaryrevolutionary committee of Estonia during the late fall of 1917 and the early winter of 1918, see Krasni Ar\hiv, 4 (101), 1940, pp. 3-63. 36 Wrangell, p. 1. 37 Grimm, p. 54. 38 Wrangell, p. 2. 33

Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

77

clared itself the repository of supreme power in Estonia and proclaimed the country's independence. T h e resolution of the Maapaev stated: T o determine the future form of the government and create a democratic sovereign power in Estonia, as well as to resolve on all further questions, an Estonian Constituent Assembly will be convoked. T h e National Council proclaims itself the sole repository of supreme power in Estonia; its decrees are laws for all inhabitants of the country until the convocation of the Constituent Assembly. T h i s assembly will be elected directly, by democratic vote, and upon having determined a form of government, will definitely establish the legislative and administrative power. Between the sessions of the National Council, power is to be in the hands of a Committee of Elders of the National Council w h o will have the right to make and publish d e c i s i o n s . . . and to issue extraordinary ordinances for the regulation of the public life of the country, such acts being provisional until ratified by the larger body. 39

T h e ensuing three months in Estonia present a perfect picture of Leninism as applied to the national question. During this period, at Brest-Litovsk, the Russian delegation fought the verbal battle for "no annexations and self-determination of nations," and it was precisely the Baltic peoples about whom the argument raged. In Petrograd the air was filled with democratic declarations. In an Izvestia article of January 24, 1918, Lenin's definition of annexation was reiterated "as any union to a large and strong state of a small and weak people, and their retention within the boundaries of the larger nation by force, regardless of when this attachment occurred." Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, and the Ukraine were said to come entirely under this definition, and if the Russian Republic seriously accepted the slogan "without annexations," then it must grant these regions the right to decide for themselves. It is significant that Estonia was not mentioned along with the other four countries, and analysis of the situation of each of those 33 Pour l'Esthonie independante, Recueil des documents diplomatiques publie par la delegation esthonienne, Copenhagen, 1918, pp. 9-10.

7»

The Formation of the Baltic States

countries as of January 1918, disproves the theory that the Bol sheviks were motivated by anything like the Western concept of democratic national self-determination. That Poland, her independence already acknowledged by the Provisional Government, would want any part of a federation with Russia was unthinkable. Lithuania was entirely in German hands, and whichever way a democratic plebiscite turned out it could no longer cost Russia anything. By the Ukraine, the article did not mean the anti-Soviet Rada in Kiev, but the Soviet government in Kharkov which had expressed its allegiance to the Russian federation.40 In unoccupied Latvia, the Bolsheviks knew from the results of the November elections that the majority favored union with Red Russia." The parallel elections in Estonia had resulted in a 61 per cent anti-Bolshevik vote. Therefore, hoping that two months would suffice to produce a victory for them, the Bolsheviks announced that elections to the Estonian Constituent Assembly would be held in January. A Bolshevik victory would not only make the seizure of power in Estonia legal, and thereby easier, but would also provide a talking point for the Soviet delegation at Brest-Litovsk in 10 Czernin, p. 302. On January 12, 1918, the Central Executive Committee of the Pan-Ukrainian Council of Workers', Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies decided "to delegate [names and titles of members chosen] to take part in the [Brest-Litovsk] negotiations. The delegates were instructed, at the same time, to declare categorically that all attempts of the Ukrainian Central Rada to act in the name of the Ukrainian people [were] to be regarded as arbitrary steps on the part of the bourgeois group of the Ukrainian population, against the will and interests of the working classes of the Ukraine and that no resolutions formed by the Central Rada [would] be acknowledged either by the Ukrainian Soviet Government or by the Ukrainian people, that the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government regard[ed] the Council of People's Commissars as representatives of the Pan-Russian government, and [therefore] entitled to act on behalf of the entire Russian Federation; and that the delegation of the Ukrainian Workers' and Peasants' Government. . . [would] act together with and in full agreement with the Pan-Russian Delegation." 41 On January 20, 1918, Izvestia stated that Latvia had "nowhere and never evinced any attempt to separate from Russia [and that the proletariat of [Latvia was] sufficiently enlightened to know that political independence of so small a nation at the gateways of the great imperialist powers [was] an empty illusion." (See p. 138.)

"Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

79

its demands that the Germans grant the peoples of Lithuania and occupied Latvia a democratic chance for self-determination. In the meantime, the Bolsheviks lost no time in proceeding to crush the centers of Estonian nationalism and to establish the power of the soviets. " I n Estonia," an Izvestia article of January 27, 1918, reports, the Soviets of Workers, Soldiers and Farmhands are gradually liquidating the organs of autonomy. The Guberns\y Zems\y Soviet [National Council] and the majority of the regional zemstva have already been abolished. The Executive Committee of the Narva Soviet decided to dissolve the City Duma, despite the fact that the Bolsheviks hold the majority in this Duma. This decision rose out of the unsuitability of having two parallel organizations whose competency would necessarily overlap. In the Nemkulsky Volost', the volost' workers' soviet dissolved the volost' zemstva and took all matters under its own direction. They have also acted in other volosti, as for example, in the Alferovsky Volost'. The question about dissolving the Tallinn City Duma stands next on the agenda. On January 10, the Congress of the Estonian Workers' and Soldiers' Soviets will meet. At this time the question of replacing the organs of self-government by soviets throughout [Estonia] will be brought up. A later issue of Izvestia42 revealed the intensity of the resistance to the Bolshevik program at the meeting of the Congress of Estonian Soviets. Anvelt spoke of the administration by the soviets in the agricultural department. Their work, he said, "was handicapped by the absence of intelligent people, since persons of high education [shunned] the soviets." Bleiman, a Socialist Revolutionary, complained that education was also handicapped "since all traces of work done under the Zems^y Soviet had disappeared and his committee had been forced to start from scratch." In Tartu there had been "attempts by the bourgeoisie to fan the flames of national hatred but these [had been] suppressed more rapidly than the 42 Izvestia, February 7, 1918. The spelling Izvestiya would be more consistent with my transliteration. However, I have used the spelling Izvestia since it is more familiar.

8o

The Formation of the Baltic States

bourgeoisie had expected." In the Viljandi District, Merits, President of the Executive Committee, reported that the "creation of soviet power was bringing on increasing violence because of interference by the Viljandi cavalry. The zems\y government [continued] to function despite the soviet order that it dissolve. The cavalry freed the arrested counter-revolutionaries. The 'Black Hundreds' paper, Uus Sa\ala ("New Sakala") [had been] closed and all its property confiscated." Anvelt, having been elected to the presidium, took the occasion to "acquaint the assembly with the new folly of the bourgeois circles, with their silly idea of an independent Estonian state, and expressed the Bolshevik point of view on this question—and this was supported by many succeeding speakers." However, this view was opposed by the Socialist Revolutionary representatives C. Cuyto, G. Kruus, and Bleiman, who maintained their earlier position that Estonia should be an independent republic. "Thereupon the assembly flew into an uproar and was quieted with difficulty." 43 On December 27, 1917, the Executive Committee of the Estonian Workers' and Soldiers' Soviet issued a decree establishing a Tallinn banking commissariat to control all banking activities until such time as all private banks and financial institutions should have been fused with state banks. Estates and other bourgeois property were seized wherever possible, and an attempt was made to surround a small nucleus of Bolshevik Estonian soldiers with a socialist estosoldiers (estovoini) army." The nationalistic press was restricted to prevent its influencing the coming elections. During December and January many leading papers were shut down, their publishers "called to account," and their offices and editorial premises requisitioned and turned over to Bolshevik organs.*5 Others were permitted to publish but were forced to carry Bolshevik propaganda.46 In general, everything possible was done to bring about a Bolshevik victory. Anvelt openly ordered the local soviets "to make a

Izvestia, January 24, 1918, February 7, 1918. "Izvestia, January 27, 1918, February 7, 1918, January 20, 1918. 15 Izvestia, January 27, 1918; February 7, 1918. Some papers had been shut down directly after the Bolshevik rising. (See Krasrti Archiv, 4 (101), 1940, 46 p. 11.) Martna, pp. 177-178.

Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

81

sure that only political parties in favor of a Bolshevik Government and against separation from Russia were elected."47 "When the Tsarist Government gave such orders to the gendarmerie," wrote the Social Demo\raat, an Estonian paper, "it did so secretly, out of shame. The men in power now have not even this feeling left.'" 8 From the point of view of the Bolshevik leaders, the January elections were a failure. After some 70 per cent of the returns were in, it was clear that the Bolsheviks had won no more than a third of the votes, and that the parties who stood for an independent republic had gained an absolute majority. On January 21, 1918, an abrupt halt was called to the balloting; and the meeting of the Estonian Constituent Assembly was forbidden.49 The election, by Western standards, had provided a true index to the desires of the Estonian people. But to Lenin and to Soviet Commissar of Nationalities Stalin, the bourgeoisie and their "socialist collaborators" did not count, and only those who voted the Bolshevik way, that is, for union with Russia, could be regarded as having expressed the "democratic" will. " A Plan for the Establishment of the Estonian Workers' Commune" appeared in Izvestia on February 14, 1918 and stated the following propositions: The Estonian Workers' Commune is an autonomous part of the Russian Soviet Republic. Relations with the Russian Republic and questions concerning external affairs of the Estonian Commune are decided by way of agreement with the central power of the Russian Soviet Republic. The Estonian Workers' Commune is fully autonomous in all local questions and to it belongs the unconditional right at any time, without requiring the agreement of other nations or governments, to secede from Russia and, either unite with some other state or declare itself independent. In the light of the January elections which, in effect, demanded independence, this plan, published in February, and permitting secession by "unconditional right at any time," showed complete " J a c k s o n , p. 1 3 1 .

48 49

Social üemokraat, January 12, 1918; quoted by Jackson, p. 1 3 1 . Martna, p. 178, Jackson, p. 132.

The Formation of the Baltic States

82

disregard for the rights of all who opposed the Bolsheviks, as well as how little intention there was of ever permitting such secession. The plan for Estonia foreshadowed the liberal secession rights granted to the Soviet republics after the formation of the U.S.S.R. In view of the monolithic nature of the Bolshevik Party, such a right is as much a "scrap of paper" for the Estonian S.S.R. of today as it was for Estonia in 1918. When on February 18, 1918 the German Army resumed its advance, the Russian Army, no longer capable of resistance, hastened to evacuate the territories in the German path to Petrograd. This marked the ending of Bolshevik power in Estonia. The Russian and Bolshevik withdrawal was accelerated by nationalists who, even before the German entry upon Estonian soil, seized the occasion to rouse the Estonian troops. These, in turn, attacked the few remaining Red Guards and those Bolsheviks who had bravely endeavored to dig in and save the revolution. Some fighting took place in Tartu, and the nationalists arrested many members of the Haapsalu city and county soviets.50 On February 23 the Bolsheviks abandoned Tallinn.51 For the first time Ln seven centuries, if only for forty-eight hours, Estonia was free from foreign domination. The Committee of Elders of the Maapaev emerged from hiding and, on February 24, again proclaimed the independence and territorial extent of Estonia.52 The Germans entered Tallinn the following day. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk was finally signed on March 3, 1918. Paragraph two of Article Four declares that "Estonia and Livonia [were] without delay [to] be cleared of Russian troops and the Russian Red Guard [and were to] be occupied by a German police force until security [was] ensured by proper national institutions and until public order [had] been reestablished."53 So began the German rule over the entire expanse of the Baltic Provinces. 50

Izvestia, February 24, 1918. Jackson, p. 133. 52 Pour I'Esthonie independante, 53 Texts of the Russian "Peace,"

51

pp. 1 7 - 1 8 . U.S. Department of State, 1918, p. 13.

Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

83

A T T I T U D E S TOWARD BOLSHEVISM

F o r centuries Latvians and Estonians had shared a common fate and common oppressors. In general they held the same religious beliefs. Their national and economic hatreds were directed toward the Baltic Germans rather than toward the Russian government. Both countries evince similar phenomena of topography and climate and each, having one major Baltic port, had, along with Finland, more contact with the W e s t than did any other regions of the Russian Empire. A high percentage of land in each country was in the hands of a few landowners, resulting in a rural populace of debt-laden small farmers and landless peasants. 51 As compared to most of Russia, 55 Latvia and Estonia both had considerable industrial development, but the industrial proletariat in each country comprised only a small percentage of the total population. In this respect, the percentage difference between Latvia and Estonia was too small to be of any significance. 56 In Latvia, however, the red terror was carried out by natives and was directed against a minority nationalist group. It was not an instrument to seize power but a means of establishing a Bolshevik dictatorship. In Estonia, on the other hand, the terror was used against the majority, and Estonian Bolsheviks required Russian assistance in their November seizure of power as well as in subsequent efforts to consolidate their dictatorship. W h y , one might wonder, should two nations, alike in so many respects, have diverged so sharply in their attitudes toward Bolshevism? Manifestations of Bolshevik strength in prewar Latvia have little bearing upon this matter. T h e war not only brought exile and imprisonment to Latvian Bolshevik leaders, but also caused the transfer of much of Latvia's factory proletariat into the interior of Russia where industry 54 55

Martna, p. 18; Ames, The Revolution in the Baltic Provinces, pp. 2-4. Kennard, The Russian Year Boo/{ for 1913, p. 61; A. Pullerits, Estland,

Tallinn, 1931, p. 146. 55 In 1914, 18 per cent of the Latvians worked in industry. In 1922, about 16 per cent of the people of Estonia worked in industry.

4+

The Formation of the Baltic States

84

was better protected from the invader.57 At the start of 1917, then, Bolshevism was a force of no consequence in the political orientation of Latvians. The most apparent differences between the two peoples are those of language and race. During the revolution these factors became important because of the kinship between Estonians and Finns. On December 6, 1917, a Finnish government, headed by Per Svinhufvud, proclaimed the independence of Finland. That bold action, especially since it was officially acknowledged by Lenin on January 1, could scarcely have gone unnoticed by the Estonians.58 Perhaps the best answer to the question of why the Latvian behavior differed so markedly from that of Estonia can be derived from a consideration of the war's impact upon the two countries. No region in the entire Russian Empire suffered more than Latvia. Cut in two since 1915, unoccupied Latvia was part of the war's front for more than two years and represented the last bastion on the German road to Petrograd. The result, naturally, was widespread misery among the Latvian people whose existence was seriously disrupted. The military experiences of the two peoples reflect their wartime fortunes. The Estonian army, formed in 1917, saw no combat as a unit until it was turned against the Bolsheviks in February 1918. The Latvian Army, on the other hand, formed early in the war, was always in the thick of action. By 1917, its soldiers knew privation and the disillusionment that only front-line warfare can produce. The Bolshevik slogans echoed their desires.59 Follow57

Mishke, p. 37. For a comment on the strong bonds of sympathy between Finns and Estonians, see E. Uustalu, The History of the Estonian People, p. 169. 53 In December 1916, Russian Generals Brusilov and Ruszky described Riga as a "center of revolutionary propaganda." Earlier that year there had been cases of mutiny in the Seventh Siberian Army Corps then stationed in the Riga area. (A. M. Nikolaieff, "The February Revolution and the Russian Army," Russian Review, Autumn, 1946.) On June 4, 1917, Russian General Boldirev, upon visiting the position of the First Latvian Brigade, wrote in his diary: " I hoped to find exemplary cleanliness and order among the Latvians, but it appears that the Revolution has wrought havoc here too—they all profess to be Bolsheviks and stand for 'peace without annexations, reparations, etc.' " (G. E. Vulliamy, The Red Archives, London, 1929, p. 209.) 58

Estonia Rejects Bolshevism

85

i n g the N o v e m b e r R e v o l u t i o n , the e i g h t L a t v i a n r e g i m e n t s w e n t over to the B o l s h e v i k s almost as one m a n to become R e d Guards, 6 0 and they eventually provided the f o u n d a t i o n for the R e d A r m y . S o loyal d i d they prove, that they w e r e the sole regiments of the old Russian A r m y to become incorporated into the R e d A r m y w i t h all their units intact. 61 T h e y aided L e n i n in the P e t r o g r a d seizure of p o w e r , became his b o d y g u a r d , and later took part in the civil w a r s in South Russia and at the U r a l s Front 6 2 and helped to put d o w n the revolt of the leftwing

Socialist

Revolutionaries

in

Moscow. 6 3

According

to

one

writer, " t h e L a t v i a n Rifles w e r e the decisive factor in the Bolshevik t r i u m p h , and it w a s n o coincidence that the first supreme comm a n d e r of the R e d A r m y , Väcietis, rose f r o m their r a n k s . " 6 1 T h i s very idea w a s expressed by L e o K a m e n e v Addressing

the

first

Congress

of

on January 13, 1919.

Soviets of

the n e w l y

formed

L a t v i a n Soviet Republic, he said, " W e have not forgotten a n d shall not f o r g e t that w h e n the proletariat of Russia, first in the w o r l d to take decisive action, finding n o support in other countries, above all f o u n d it in y o u — y o u r o r g a n i z e d R i f l e s — o u r brothers." 6 5 60 P. Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev Sotsialisticheskoy Sovyets\oy Latvii, Moscow, 1919, part I, p. 142. 6 1 D . Fedotoff-White, The Growth of the Red Army, Princeton, 1944, pp. 18, 25-28. 62 A. P. Lieven, " V iuzhnoy Pribaltike," Beloye Delo, III, p. 183. 63 G. Vernadsky, Lenin, Red Dictator, New Haven, 1931, p. 233. " C . Grimm, Jahre deutscher Entscheidung im Baltikum, 79/5-/9/9, Essen, 1939, p. 44. 65 Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, part I, pp. 12-13.

GERMAN SUPREMACY 7

Annexationist

Germany

It is hardly necessary to dwell upon the fact that Wilhelmine Germany exhibited vigorous aggressive tendencies. During World W a r I much propaganda warned the world of Pan-Germanism, placing few limits to German territorial ambitions. One horrified Frenchman envisaged a Germany which included Belgium and Persia in her domain; 1 another told of German designs upon north and central Africa, the Malayan Archipelago, half of South America and other regions.2 In 1917, S. Grumbach, a Swiss Socialist, published a volume entitled Das Annexionistische Deutschland. This book, by recording pro-annexationist statements of the war period, presents overwhelming testimony of the prevailing German spirit. " N o one," declares Grumbach, "would dare to maintain that there exists elsewhere a nation in which all the middle class parties [as well as most other groups including the press and professional persons of all types] are so united behind an [openly proclaimed] annexationist program. Nor is this a program solely for annexing specific regions. It is an entirely systematized plan which includes not only c o l o n i e s . . . but above all stretches out its claws after European territory to the East and to the West." 3 Most shocking to Grumbach, apparently, was the fact that Germany, since the best parts of the globe were already parcelled out, regarded the European brotherhood itself as fair game for conquest and exploitation. A. Cheredame, The Pangerman Plot Unmasked, New York, 1917, p. 79 Loiseau, Lc Pangermanismc, Paris, 1921, pp. 130-131. 3 S. Grumbach, Das Annexionistische Deutschland, Lausanne, 1917, pp. 1-2. 1

2H.

87

The Formation of the Baltic States

88

A n official German account, written by E. Volkmann as part of a study of the reasons for Germany's collapse in 1918, concurs generally in the conclusions of Grumbach. However, where Grumbach presents the German annexationist spirit as something instinctive and all-class pervading, Volkmann quite credibly indicates that at the war's beginning the vast majority of all Germans thought of conquest largely in terms of establishing buffer areas against future aggression. A greedy annexationist program, Volkmann contends, arose only after the conquests in the East and in the West were achieved. Germany, he maintains, had a cleaner record than Russia, France, and other nations which entered the war with clearly defined annexationist goals. 1 Grumbach particularly notes "disturbing symptoms," as they appeared from time to time among the Social Democrats. Even Scheidemann, he points out, was guilty of a declaration, hailed by the annexationist press and parties, which stated "that only a child could believe that [the] war would end without having altered some antiquated boundary lines." It was not the statement itself, as much as the specific occasion on which it was made and the interpretation it was so universally given, that caused Grumbach to doubt Social Democratic sincerity.5 On the subject of Social Democrats and annexationism, Volkmann again agrees with Grumbach. Theoretically, as Volkmann has it, the Majority Socialists took an oppositional attitude toward annexationist plans. But to the initiates of the Party it was no secret that the Party leaders might be approached on the themes of "economic and military guarantees," "boundary corrections," and "colonial acquisitions." 6 A m o n g the Majority Socialists the Peace of Brest had wrought considerable divergence of opinion. " W e should have torn up the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and thrown it at the Government's feet as I wished," writes Scheidemann referring to the Treaty's ratification. T h e Treaty had placed the principal exponents of peace in a difficult situation, and, after heated debates, the Social Democrats 4 6

Die Ursachen, XII, pp. 31-33. Die Ursachen, XII, p. 76.

6

Grumbach, p. 7.

Annexationist Germany

89

had decided to abstain from voting on it in the Reichstag. For this Scheidemann blames Ebert who, he writes, confused the annexationist issue by holding that the Party must either support the Treaty or give the impression that it was against peace generally and wanted the war to continue. 7 Though Scheidemann fails to mention it in his memoirs, certain "disturbing symptoms" 8 did crop up within his Party in the months following Brest-Litovsk. Whatever the causes, the consequences of the indecisive Social Democratic action on the Peace soon became painfully impressed upon the Party as a whole. If even the Social Democrats wavered, inevitably others in the Reichstag progressive bloc did. The victory in the East, given luster by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, cast a roseate glow upon the military situation in the West. The war lords were heeded, the "jingoes again got swollen heads." The Reichstag majority phalanx against annexations cracked in many places, especially since some of its members "altered their views on war aims to fit the good or bad news they received from the front." A typical example, writes Scheidemann, "was Dr. Müller, for whom the Vorwärts had invented a very neat name—Tree-Frog Annexationist. When the news was good this kind of politician jumped onto the highest branch and, when bad news came, climbed down again." 5 Altogether, it is safe to assume that most Germans believed that the conquered Baltic regions had become theirs for good. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk contained many vague provisos. It left unspecified the length of the period German "police forces" were to remain in Livonia and Estonia. Despite the many diplomatic considerations that indicated caution, Ludendorfi, for one, had never a moment's doubt as to what path to follow. " T h e policy hitherto carried out in Courland," he writes, "seemed suitable for Livonia and Estonia." 10 The government, even before the beginning of the discussions at Brest, had expressed some views only vaguely 7 8

Die Ursachen, pp. 130, 125.

See Martna, p. 169. If not outright approval of annexationist sentiment, there was, in some quarters, a marked hesitation toward outspoken disapproval. 10 'Scheidemann, II, pp. 119, 134. Ludendorff, p. 532.

The Formation of the Baltic States

9°

concealing its aims in the Baltic,11 and later confusion among the Reichstag progressives enabled it to take a decisive stand in formulating its Baltic policy.12 As summed up by one member of the government, German policy proceeded to operate "on a basis of a military and economic attachment of Lithuania as well as of the Baltic Provinces to the German Empire, [even] against the opposition to such a solution as was displayed in Lithuania as well as, in part,13 among the Latvians and the Estonians. T h e attachment of the border states was also advocated by the military groups [as] the simplest way of achieving security in the East." 14 In one form or another the entire Baltic region was to become a part of the German war loot. Militarily, it was to provide a buffer area against attack from the east. Nothing was said by the Germans of aggression on their part, but the deadly effect to which the new bases might be used against Russia could scarcely have been overlooked by the German war lords; and naturally, the addition of several million people would bolster the Reich's striking power. 15 Economically, the lands were intended to provide space for colonization and to serve as an important source of agricultural products. 16 " S e e p. 45. T h e Berliner Tageblatt of A p r i l 27, 1918, carried a statement by Hertling calling for the "creation of a united Baltic State with a constitutional monarchy, attached to the Reich and Prussia through a personal union." 13 "In part" meant about 90 per cent of the people. 1 1 Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg, p. 581. According to Vice-Chancellor Payer, "Estonia and Livonia, having been occupied by us, stood more or less at our disposal." (Payer, Von Bethmann-Hollweg bis Ebert, p. 245.) 15 F. Weiss, Die Baltische Frage, Berne, 1917, pp. 8-10. " . . . a large scale plan of German settlement as well as the bringing back into the German political and economic sphere of those German peasants presently living in Russia and deprived of their rights, w o u l d strengthen our military manpower potential." A n d , quoting Paul Rohrbach, " A l l of this [the Baltic Provinces], under German control and culture, would provide an extraordinary recruiting land for the strengthening of our a r m y . " See also Die Ursachen, VII, p. 339. 16 Weiss, p. 10. Q u o t i n g Rohrbach. Annexation of the Baltic Provinces " w o u l d provide for the possibility of developing wheat production and cattle breeding w h i c h would take care of Germany's needs forevermore." See also, K . von Westarp, Konservative Politi\, im letzten Jahrzehnt des Kaiserreiches, 2 vols., Berlin, 1935, II, p. 600; A . Volck, Völkisches Erleben, Lübeck, 1924, pp. 218-220. 12

8

The Birth of Free

Lithuania

It became apparent to the Lithuanian leaders soon after BrestLitovsk that the successful cat-and-mouse game they had been playing with the divided makers of German policy was ending. T h e cat, having made up its mind, was obviously sharpening its claws for the kill. T h e Treaty, which registered the definitive victory of Germany in the East, had shattered the solidarity of the Reichstag opposition and had thereby strengthened the general annexationist design of the Reich government. T h e German conquest of Livonia and Estonia in the period February 18 to February 25 soon evinced itself as an additional menace to Lithuanian hopes for national freedom. When the K i n g of Saxony, backed by his government, had first demanded the Lithuanian Crown as his share in the spoils, he was not taken too seriously. T o the war lords, annexation in the East meant the enlargement solely of Prussia. In view of German historical development, however, Prussia could not ignore particularist claims. Inadvertently aiding the claim of Saxony was Erzberger's sponsorship of D u k e Wilhelm von Urach, as K i n g of Lithuania, and Lithuanian willingness to accept this solution. T h i s made it imperative for the Reich to settle the issue as rapidly as possible, before the Lithuanians succeeded in obtaining a king of their own— von Urach, which the German annexationists wished to prevent. 1 From February 1918 on, Saxony's newspapers began to raise a 1

4*

Die Ursachen, VIII, p. 345.

91

92

The Formation of the Baltic States

clamor for Lithuania,2 and pressure by the Saxon government received a favorable response; one high official of Saxony was placed on the staff of the Ober Ost Command, while another was assigned to the Reich Commissioner in charge of the Baltic territories. The latter official was to inform the Government of Saxony of anything that might be of interest to it in Lithuania.3 The new territories at Germany's disposal effectively solved the problems of balance of power and compensation. Saxony would take Lithuania by way of a personal union while Prussia would extend her power over Courland, Livonia, and Estonia. Such, at any rate, was the promise given by the Kaiser to the King of Saxony. The actual process of union with Saxony was delayed by a number of factors, one of which was opposition on the part of the Prussian Ministry of State (Staatsministerium). This powerful office continued to demand that the entire Baltic area be annexed to the Reich through Prussia and the House of Hohenzollern.4 Whether Saxon King, or Kaiser, the question had been brought into the open, in that the German press generally began to argue over what state Lithuania ought to be attached to.5 The Lithuanians realized that their hour of doom was at hand. Their declarations of independence obviously had no meaning to Germany. A democratic republican solution, under German military rule was sheer fantasy. The Lithuanians' acceptance of Erzberger's proposal had, of course, been predicated upon their desperate need to establish a Lithuanian state which, in the eyes of the world, would bear the unmistakable stamp of sovereignty. A king, even one of German extraction, as long as he would symbolize and legitimize the national entity of Lithuania, was better than any kind of union with Germany—for from such a union there would be no escape. But, besides the knotty task of carrying out any plan seeking 2 Gaillard, L'Allemagne et le Baltikum, pp. 123-126, Ehret, La p. 250. 3 Die Ursachen, VIII, p. 345. * Payer, Von Bethmann-Hollweg bis Ebert, pp. 245, 246. 6 Gaillard, pp. 123-126, Ehret, p. 250.

Lituanie,

The Birth of Free

"Lithuania

93

independence from Germany, the Lithuanians faced the problem of reconciling a monarchical state with the democratic principles laid down by the Diet of Vilnius. Equally embarrassing was the legal fact that only a Constituent Assembly had the right to determine the form of government under which the new state was to live. These two issues caused considerable dissension in the Taryba, leading three ardently anti-monarchical members to resign in protest.® However, the majority in the Taryba took the view that their primary object was independence for Lithuania, and with the aims of the Saxon King apparently on the verge of accomplishment, the time for careful observation of principle and legal forms was past.7 In April, after having decided upon von Urach, the Taryba attempted to send a delegation to Berlin to inform the government there of its decision and to discuss issues which had to be resolved. The German military authorities refused to grant the delegation permission to make the journey. Using tactics similar to those then employed in Livonia and Estonia, the military authorities sought to undermine the Taryba's decision by circulating petitions, whose source was disguised, among the peasants for signature. These pleaded with the Kaiser to take the signers' land "under the glorious sceptre of His Majesty and graciously accept the Crown of the Grand Duchy." As an incentive for signing the petitions the peasants were offered the prospect of freedom from requisitions and cancellation of fines.8 At the end of June the Lithuanian deputation was finally permitted to make the trip to Berlin. However, the Chancellor found no time to see them. They were referred instead to Freiherr von Falkenhausen, Undersecretary of State in charge of the Ober Ost, whose attitude is clear from his statement that "conditions in Lithuania having become so bad due to requisitions, it was better to let the military authorities take the responsibility than place a 5 Klimas, pp. xxviii, xxix. Kairys, BiriiSka, and Narutavicius resigned, but six new members, including M. Yeas and A . Voldemaras, were subsequently admitted into the Taryba. (Klimas, p. 175.)

7

Erzberger, Erlebnisse im Weltkrieg,

8

Klimas, pp. 1 2 4 - 1 2 7 .

p. 194.

94

The Formation of the Baltic States

new Lithuanian government in that position.'" Frustrated repeatedly in its attempts to come to some agreement with the Reich, the Taryba decided to act on its own initiative. In July, it drew up a monarchical constitution, illegally 10 declared itself the Lithuanian Council of State and proclaimed as King, Duke Wilhelm von Urach, who was to ascend the throne as Mindaugas II.11 The Taryba subsequently made several efforts to reach some personage in the Reich government in order to get official sanction for its action, or, barring that, a chance to discuss the matter and perhaps reach a compromise.12 But the German government, with the exception of Vice-Chancellor Payer, was not interested in making concessions. Both "Mindaugas II," who never did reach Lithuania, and the new State Council remained unrecognized. Letters, whose envelopes bore the caption "Lithuanian Council of State," were returned unopened by the military administration because of the "illegal title." 13 On the whole, the German authorities behaved as though nothing had changed in Lithuania. However, things were changing in Germany. A s a direct result of the military debacle in the West, Hertling resigned and on October 3, 1918, Prince Max von Baden became Chancellor of the Reich. A s his Secretary of State, in charge of the affairs of the Empire, he appointed Erzberger, long the most ardent champion of Lithuanian independence. It was the best thing that could have happened to Lithuania. On October 5 Prince Max delivered his opening address to the ' E r z b e r g e r , p. 192. 10 T h i s was an illegal act in the sense that only a constituent assembly w o u l d have had the authority to designate a council of state. 11 Klimas, pp. 144-145. 12 Erzberger, p. 194. Dr. Gaigalat, Lithuanian member of the Prussian Parliament, representing the Taryba, tried to obtain, for the Taryba delegates, an audience with the Foreign Secretary of the Reich. H e was unsuccessful. O n July 27 the Lithuanians made an attempt to obtain an audience with the Chancellor but were informed two days later that " H i s Excellency" would not be able to receive them. 13 Erzberger, p. 195. On A u g u s t 1, the military administration declared "that the time for the change of title f r o m Taryba [which the Germans called Landesrat] to Council of State had not yet arrived, [that] until further notice the designation Taryba must be used." (Klimas, p. 150.)

The Birth of Free "Lithuania Reichstag.

"The

[peace]

program of the

95

[Reichstag]

Majority

parties, upon w h i c h , " said the Chancellor, " I take m y

stand...

aims in particular at the immediate formation of popular representative

bodies

on

a broad

basis

in

the

Baltic

Provinces,

in

Lithuania and in Poland. W e will further the bringing about of the necessary preliminary conditions thereto without delay by the introduction of civilian rule. A l l these lands shall regulate their constitution

and

their

relations with

neighboring

peoples

inde-

pendently." 1 4 T h e s e remarks outlined the general program for the occupied regions. O n October 2 1 , Prince M a x received a Lithuanian delegation and told it specifically h o w the G e r m a n government stood in relation to Lithuania. " T h e Reich G o v e r n m e n t , " he declared,

has no intention of tracing by itself the boundaries between Lithuania and Poland. It is expected that a Lithuanian Government will take over legislative power. The Taryba has the competence to form a provisional government in concurrence with all the levels of the population and the various nationalities. The formation of a future representative assembly on the broadest possible basis shall be the task of the Lithuanian Provisional Government. The transformation of the [German] military government into a civil government, as promised by the Government of the Reich, is now in the process of accomplishment. This civil government will exercise executive power only until such time as the Lithuanian Government, having organized itself, shall be ready to take power into its own hands. Although the Imperial Government desires as quickly as possible to recall all the German troops now in Lithuania, it is, at the same time, ready to do justice to the repeatedly expressed desires of [Lithuania] and to allow these troops, as well as means of transportation, to remain in [Lithuania] for some time. The Provisional Government of Lithuania will undertake to organize a militia and a police force.15 T h i s statement was the actual proclamation of Lithuanian independence. 14

Immediately

thereafter the Lithuanian

government

R. H . Lutz, Fall of the German Empire, 1914-1918, 2 Vols., Stanford, 1932, II, pp. 377-378. 15 H. de Chambon, La Lituanie pendant la Conference de la Paix (1919), Paris, 1931, p. 4.

96

The Formation of the Baltic States

began to take shape. The monarchical idea, now that the threat of annexation had passed, was hastily discarded. On November 2, 1918, the Council of State declared itself dissolved. By this act, the Taryba reverted to its original status, and this brought the formerly recalcitrant members back into the fold. Only a future constituent assembly, it was resolved, should have the power to determine the form of government.16 For the intervening period, the Taryba drew up a Provisional Constitution. A directory of three members, headed by A. Smetona, was charged with supreme and executive powers. Legislative power rested with the Taryba, and a ministry, responsible to the Taryba, was to be formed. In the session of November 5, 1918, the Taryba charged Augustin Voldemaras with the task of forming such a cabinet.17 In the Voldemaras Cabinet, Dr. Stasinskas held the portfolio of the Interior; M. Yeas, J. Tubelis, Dr. J. Yeas and P. Leonas were designated, respectively, Ministers of Finances, Agriculture, Education, and Justice.18 Agreements were made with the White Ruthenians and Jews, whereby they were given six and three seats, respectively, in the TarybaOnly a small Polish minority remained outside of and hostile to the new government.20 On paper, the Lithuanian government was now ready to function. In actuality, difficult times lay ahead. Whatever the intentions of the German Chancellor, as expressed in his declaration of October 2i, by November and December of 1918 there was anything but discipline in the German Army in Lithuania. Far from aiding the Lithuanian government in bringing about conditions of order, or even remaining at their posts until ordered to withdraw, the German troops, already inseminated with Bolshevism, began a disorderly retreat immediately after the signing of the Armistice, adding to the already existing misery and confusion.21 In the closing days of 1918, the Russian Army drove across the defenseless country in the 16

18

Klimas, p. xxxvi.

17

Ehret, p. 260.

Pirmasis Nepri\lausomos Lietuvos Desimtmetis. 1918-1928,

1930; cited by B. Colliander, Die Beziehungen Litauen, 1915-1918, Äbo, 1935, p. 233. 20

Chambon, p. 5.

21

Kaunas,

zwischen Deutschland 19

Ehret, p. 261. Chambon, pp. 4-5.

und

The Birth of Free Lithuania

97

wake of the retreating Germans. In late December 1918, the Germans left Vilnius, whereupon Bolshevik forces approaching from the North engaged Polish volunteers in an armed struggle for control of the city.22 On the night of January 5-6, 1919, the Red A r m y seized Vilnius, and the Provisional Government of Lithuania fled to Kaunas. 22

Izvestia, January 11, 1919.

9

The Baltikum, March November 1918

to

In devising their formula for the annexation of Livonia and Estonia, the Germans made a series of moves which were bound to result in the most stubborn resistance on the part of the conquered peoples. Their plan for an Anschluss based upon the traditional masters of the region, blithely disregarded the age-old Baltophobia of Latvians and Estonians. The plan's legal justification was an added insult. By the treaty of Nystad (1721), the Germans explained, Peter the Great had concluded agreements with the nobility of Livonia and Estonia, whereby its rights were to be guaranteed internationally for all time. The Romanov Dynasty having fallen, the Baltic barons were once again free and could make whatever agreements they wished, with whomever they pleased, including such as would place them and their lands, as of 1721, under the German Imperial House. 1 This rationalization ignored completely the lapse of two centuries and the change in status in the peoples of Livonia and Estonia from serfs to free and freedom-loving, nationally conscious people. In Courland all had proceeded most smoothly and matters had come to the desired German fruition in the Landesrat request for the Personal Union on March 8, 1918. Why, then, could the experiment not be executed successfully in the rest of the Baltic territory? The German Imperial and military mind either could not or did 1 A . von Gossler, Verwaltungsbericht der Zivilverwaltung Lände, ιζ August bis 7 5 Dezember, rgi8, pp. 8-9.

98

der

Baltischen

The Baltikum

99

not wish to distinguish between an expression of popular will and an expression of its own will, as reflected by the puppets in the Courland Landesrat. The Baits and other Germans constituted about 8 per cent of the population and were scattered fairly evenly throughout the so-called Baltikum (Courland, Livonia, Estonia). Therefore, it occurred to the Germans that administrative and other functions of government might be simplified if the entire region were united under the same governing body. The Kaiser would be the actual ruler anyway and bothersome ethnic lines would thus be done away with. If Latvians and Estonians, who didn't particularly like each other,2 were to object to so indiscriminate a commingling of their national differences, what did this matter? Soon a swarm of German colonists would overrun the regions,3 only the German language would be permitted in schools,4 and Latvians and Estonians, their insignificant languages and cultures having become a blurred memory, would merge with the German stock.5 Twelve days after the Courland Landesrat had made its declaration for Anschluss, the City Council of Riga 6 directed the following plea to the Kaiser. " T o His Majesty, Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia—inspired by a feeling of deepest gratitude, the City Council of R i g a . . . has recognized the need and expressed the desire that the Provinces of Livonia, Estonia and Courland . . . be united in an 2

Martna, Estland, p. 92. ' S . Broedrich-Kurmahlen, Das Neue Ostland, Berlin, 1915, p. 3. "Once these Baltic regions are conquered, land for settlement shall have been created for a long time h e n c e . . . the central position of Germany makes the adjoining lands of settlement more precious than any colonial territory . . . " See also H . S. Weber, "Das Deutsche Baltentum," Das Grössere Deutschland, December 9, 1916, p. 1591 and H . Helbing, Die Baltische Frage, Darmstadt, 4 1916, p. 19. Walters, Lettland, pp. 345-346. 5 Broedrich-Kurmahlen, p. 14. " N o doubt about it—given mixed settlement [of Germans and natives] in the Baltic lands, and within one generation we shall have created a purely German country." 6 Since the German occupation of the city in September 1917, the German administration had taken over the schools, established German as the primary language, forbidden publication of all but one pro-German newspaper and banned all cultural organizations. By March 20, 1918, the Riga Council was completely German-dominated. (Walters, pp. 345-346.)

ΙΟΟ

The Formation of the Baltic States

hereditary m o n a r c h y . . . under the rule of the exalted House of Hohenzollern and be bound to Germany through a Personal Union, for all time and in unwavering loyalty." 7 T h e next step was to carry into execution the pious wish, expressed by the Riga Council and the Landesrat of Courland, that the entire Baltikum become part of Hohenzollern lands. W h a t better prelude to annexation of the entire region as a unit than to have this desire reiterated by a council in which there would be representatives from each of the provinces 8 —that is, a United Provinces Council? T h e Council, it was expected, would seat docile Latvians and Estonians in numbers sufficient to provide an appearance of self-determination for the benefit of the German antiannexationist groups, for the Russian government, and for other interested parties. A t Brest-Litovsk, Russia had ceded Lithuania and Courland, but had not renounced her sovereignty over Livonia and Estonia. It was plain to the Germans that the Soviet government was in no position to prevent an undisguised annexation of those provinces, and that self-determination, even on a fair basis, would prove nothing to the Russians. However, "self-determined" Anschluss would look better than arrant seizure, and it was important to the Germans, in view of the increasingly difficult situation in the West, to keep diplomatic and economic relations as normal as possible in the East.9 O n April 12, 1918, there met at Riga a United Council {Landesrat) of Estonia, Livonia, Riga, and Saaremaa (Ösel). This United Council, thirty-four of whose fifty-eight members were Germans, 10 decided to "ask the German Emperor to take Livonia and Estonia under permanent military protection and to aid them in separating from Russia." It further expressed "the wish that a constitutional monarchical state with a unitary constitution and administration be formed out of Livonia, Estonia, Courland, the Islands, and Riga Walters, pp. 348-349. Courland, whose Landesrat had already made its "choice," was excepted. 9 Helfferich, Oer Weltkrieg, pp. 574-576. 10 Jackson, Estonia, pp. 134-135. 7

8

The Baltikum

ιοί

and be annexed to the German Empire through a Personal Union with the King of Prussia." 11 In their attempts to make the United Provinces Council appear as a truly representative body the Germans had used every means, from bribery to bullying, to get collaborationists. Their methods and the manner in which the Estonians opposed them may be gleaned from a report presented to the German government on July 3, 1918, by the Estonian delegation at Copenhagen. 12 This document describes the elections to and the sessions of the Provincial Assemblies of Livonia 13 and Estonia, out of which came the delegates to the United Provinces Council. In Livonia the idea of the election was concocted by the Diet of the Nobility. It was presented to the country at large without warning or any prior information as to the significance or function of the projected provincial council. It was determined beforehand that the Assembly was to consist of thirty-two large landholders, thirtytwo rural community representatives, seven nobles, eight clergymen, and approximately ten urban representatives. Each city was to send its mayor, each of whom had been appointed directly by the German Military Government or, upon its dictation, by such city councils, whose membership, as in Tartu or Viljandi, had been German before the revolution. The peasantry was to be represented by the Communal Elders, four from each county (Kreis), of whom each was to represent one further electoral subdivision. In the Tartu District, on March 29, orders were issued for elections to be held on April 3. Kambja, Rongu, Wara, and Jögeva were designated as the localities in which the elections were to take place. In three of the four counties, the elected Elders refused to consider themselves competent to make political decisions which only the Estonian Council, elected by the entire nation in 1917, had the right to make. In the three localities where resistance was encoun11

Walters, p. 349. Dokumente zur Beleuchtung der gegenwärtigen Lage in Estland, Helsingfors, 1918. 13 This meant southern and northern Livonia taken together and including Latvians and Estonians. 12

I02

The Formation of the Baltic States

tered, orders were issued, on the morning of April η, for new elections to take place the same day. This time, wherever possible, the candidates were hand-picked, either for their pro-German sympathies or their unscrupulousness, and in certain sections the entire purpose of the elections was misrepresented. The Assembly in Riga, it was stated, was to be convoked to discuss the food problem. On April 8, 1918, the "successful" candidates were given free tickets for the journey to Riga and ordered to leave at once. They traveled together with the German landowners and the other German delegates. In Riga on April 9, they were assigned quarters and told that a preliminary meeting would take place that evening. Just before the meeting a pro-German clergyman, Jürmann by name, called on them "in order to discover what point of view the rural Elders intended to take." In his opinion, it was impossible to remain under Russian rule since that did not correspond with Estonian interests. Independence, he declared, was out of the question, as was a union with Sweden, "toward which we yearn in memory of the good old days, [for] Sweden was neutral and would not take a position in opposition to Germany... England was far away and could not help us, and therefore, there remained no choice excepting that we place ourselves under German protection."14 At nine o'clock the preliminary assembly met in the Hall of the Little Guild. Both Latvians and Estonians were present but were unable to establish contact because none of the Estonian Elders spoke Latvian. A few spoke German but these did not know which, if any, of the Latvians spoke that language. The German nobility was heavily represented. The chairman of the preliminary assembly was Provincial Councillor Baron Stael-Holstein. The same gentleman, "having been neither nominated nor elected,"15 also became chairman of the official Assembly which met on the following day. His statements, made in German, were translated into Latvian and Estonian by Pastor Jürmann. The Baron's point of discussion was the separation of Livonia from Russia, and he informed the gather11

Dokumente

zur Beleuchtung,

p. 8.

15

Dokumente

zur Beleuchtung,

p. 10.

The Baltikum ing that the representatives of Estonia, 16 that is, the Estonian Provincial Assembly sitting in Tallinn, had voted unanimously for Estonia's separation from Russia. 17 A resolution favoring separation from Russia was then proposed, but, despite the fact that such a resolution was to have no bearing upon the official Assembly of the next day, the Estonian Elders refused to commit themselves without further deliberation. Back at their hotel, the Elders were joined by a number of collaborationists w h o tried to persuade them of the necessity of voting for separation. Otherwise, it was said, the Germans would either withdraw their troops and let the Bolsheviks in, or would view the Elders as enemies and take drastic measures. After much discussion the Elders finally managed to confer among themselves. T h e y agreed unanimously that right though the idea of separation might be, it was not up to them to decide the fate of Estonia; that this must be done either by the people as a whole or their legally elected representatives; that there could under no circumstances be any question of Latvians and Estonians in any sort of combination. T h e Elders agreed to draw up a declaration to be read at the following day's Assembly and to submit it in writing so that there could be no distortion of their meaning in any subsequent report of the Assembly. On the morning of April 10, while they waited for the meeting to begin, the Elders were again besieged by landowners, preachers, and others w h o attempted to convince them of the need of turning to Germany. T h e German military authorities called the Assembly to order at half past ten. T h e discussion, completely dominated by the German language, a German chairman, and officers of the German A r m y , attempted mainly to arouse enthusiasm for a vote of separation from Russia. One of the Elders then took the floor to say that he and his colleagues had no power to resolve anything in the name of the Estonian people and that only the duly elected representatives 16 The Germans did not regard the Estonian part of Livonia as part of Estonia. 17 This was true, but the Estonian Elders, also unanimously, had declared specifically that they were voting as individuals and not as representatives of the Estonian people. {Dokumente zur Beleuchtung, p. ίο.)

io4

The Formation of the Baltic States

of united Estonia could make such a decision. He further expressed the desire to read the prepared declaration and then to turn it over to the Secretary (Protokoll) in written form. This the Chairman refused to permit on the ground that whatever had to be conveyed could be done orally. When the Estonians held firm, a ten-minute recess, for deliberation, was announced. During the brief pause in the proceedings each Elder found himself surrounded by persons attempting to explain to him that he actually did represent his people, and that even if he did not wish to make statements as a delegate, he might certainly voice his personal opinions. T o this the Elders replied that they personally favored separation from Russia, but did not consider themselves authorized to speak for the entire people, and that they had not come to Riga merely to express their personal opinions. In the meantime it had been decided to allow the Estonians to read their declaration, and this they did when the Assembly resumed session. The declaration stressed the Elders' incompetency to decide for their nation, described Estonia as ethnically and politically distinct from Latvia, and pointed out that Estonia had legally constituted herself as an independent democratic nation desirous of living in peace with all other nations. The declaration was given a poor translation into German but was not translated into Latvian. Then the Estonian Elders decided to leave the Assembly. Some had already left the hall when Chairman StaelHolstein cried out that, in the name of the German Military Government, he could not permit any person to leave. The Elders remained but took no active part in the subsequent proceedings and refused to vote on resolutions or on the membership to the United Provinces Council. The Assembly was adjourned at noon. A Baron Stackelberg called upon the Elders after lunch to inquire into who had composed their declaration, insisting that it was not a collective work. If, therefore, any of the Elders wished to deny their part in its formulation, the submitted declaration would be returned to them and they would be left unmolested. Otherwise they and their people were probably in for harsh treatment by the German authorities. Stackelberg finally suggested that the Elders

The Baltikum return to their villages to arrange for meetings in which the people could express themselves en masse. Upon learning that such public meetings were forbidden, Stackelberg consulted with the military authorities and permission for village meetings was granted. T h a t night most of the Elders left Riga and returned to their homes. In the Estonian (Tallinn) Provincial Assembly, the Germans met with somewhat less resistance mainly because the question of merging Latvians with Estonians did not enter into the discussions. Major General von Seeckendorf opened the Assembly on April 9 and declared that the main issues to be taken up were those of the separation from Russia and the election of fourteen delegates to the United Provinces Council. Like their colleagues in Riga, the Elders at Tallinn had no desire to take part in the voting on any resolutions whose significance would be distorted to suit German annexationist plans. But the Germans allowed the outlines of the mailed fist to be seen. One Estonian, who declared himself unwilling to become a traitor to his people, was threatened with legal reprisals. It was stated, at one point, that the German government would consider any w h o abstained from the voting as partisans of the Russian government. 18 This type of coercion brought about the above-mentioned unanimous vote for separation from Russia; however, the Elders had voted as individuals rather than as representatives of Estonia. It is clear that the United Provinces Council, the product of the two Assemblies, which made its plea to the German Emperor on April 12, 1918, could have but little validity in the eyes of either Latvians or Estonians. T h e Russian government paid it equally scant respect. In May 1918, Ioffe, Russian Minister to Germany, characterized a Baltic delegation as "representatives of the nobility," and refused to acknowledge its right to speak for the Latvian and Estonian people. 13 T h e Germans themselves remained unconvinced that the wishes expressed by the United Provinces Council would serve their purpose. Soon after April 12 they sent word throughout the territory 18

Martna, pp. 105-107.

19

Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg, p. 580.

The Formation of the Baltic States asking that as many signatures as possible be collected attesting to the popular basis for the activities of the United Provinces Council. T o this end the Germans and their collaborators used economic, military, and psychological pressure. F o r instance, those persons w h o went about in quest of signatures were given special permission to carry firearms. In certain regions, a peasant could not get his corn milled until he had signed a petition pasted up by the mill owner. 20 D u r i n g the course of the year, G e r m a n impatience with Estonian obstinacy resulted in w h a t amounted to a reign of terror. M a n y prominent Estonian leaders, including Päts and Strandmann were arrested, 21 and Jiiri V i l m s w a s shot. 22 Germanization was instituted in the schools. Newspapers were published only under the most rigid censorship, and freedom of movement and travel was greatly curtailed. 23 A l l political parties, all associations, and all kinds of meetings were forbidden. 24 F o r attending a prohibited meeting, twelve members of the disbanded Estonian Council were sentenced to prison terms of fifteen years. In the Latvian territories, also, resistance to G e r m a n y was stub20

21 22 Martna, pp. 108-109. Martna, p. 165. Jackson, p. 129. These restrictions, supposedly directed against espionage, even existed on the Estonian islands. "It was total madness," a member of the German occupation force was later to write, "to apply the strict passport regulations to the island territory... to forbid the inhabitants of isolated islands to stand outside their house doors in the evening . . . The islands are a completely closed off economic region. For antiespionage activity only the coast guard was necessary. And yet for a long time the most rigid restrictions of the mainland were put into useless and senseless effect on the islands. It was as though the administration wished above all to antagonize each separate inhabitant, including even the pro-German Baits—and if this was the intention it succeeded extremely well." (L. Schücking, Ein Jahr auf Oesel, Berlin, 1920, pp. 12-14.) 24 Dokumente zur Beleuchtung, p. 6; Martna, pp. 156, 164-168; see also A. Winnig, Am Ausgang der deutschen Ostpolitik, Berlin, 1921, p. 8. By September 1918, the German authorities, in private correspondence, were admitting that in Estonia "the hatred of Germans had reached a level that made a popular uprising a possibility to be seriously reckoned with." See Die Rote Fahne (Riga), January 17, 1919. It was this "invincible opposition" which, according to Major von Gossler, made the projected personal union of Estonia to Germany, by way of the King of Prussia, unfeasible. (Die Rote Fahne, January 18, 1919.) 23

The Baltikum born. Only one, numerically tiny, Latvian group favored union. This, the party of the extreme right bourgeoisie, "was regarded by the other [bourgeois] parties as traitorous to the national cause and avoided like the plague." Latvian political life took place entirely underground and was centered in a so-called Democratic Bloc, which, by October 1918, held daily meetings in Riga with a lookout posted to warn of the approach of the German secret military police. The Bloc, which under common pressures managed, at least, to get men of dissident views around the same table, still represented the class division of the pre-occupation period. The Social Democratic, or Bolshevik, Party was still the largest single party. Its majority following of 72 per cent, however, had dropped, since the elections of November 1917, to a plurality of about 30 per cent.25 This can be ascribed in great part to the Party's loss of the support of the Latvian troops which had withdrawn with the Russian Army. The Bolshevik-minded Latvians, though anti-nationalist and proRussian, in the sense that they preferred that Latvia remain within a Russian federation, were against Anschluss with Germany. The nationalist parties, the largest of which was Ulmanis' Peasant Party, were equally anti-German in their orientation, though they leaned toward the Entente for support rather than toward Russia. Certain Latvian Socialists were "honest opponents of the Entente, and opposed as well to the old Germany, but believed it possible to work with the new democratic Germany." However, even these wanted complete independence and would have nothing to with a union to Lithuania and Estonia.26 Still in existence was the Latvian National Council at Valka, 27 whose leaders, Arveds Bergs and V . Zamuelis, hoped to be able to extend their influence over an independent Latvia. Although their political goals were the same as those of the bourgeois elements of the Democratic Bloc, they carried on an intense personal rivalry for leadership.28 A resolution passed by the Democratic Bloc in 1918 called for an 25 A. Winnig, Am Ausgang der deutschen Ostpolitik, Berlin, 1921, pp. 16, 26 13, 62. Winnig, pp. 13, 12. 28 "Supra., p. 68. Gossler, p. 15.

ιο8

The Formation of the Baltic States

internationalized and neutral Latvia "in case the cross currents of international politics [made] a return into a democratic Russian federation impossible."29 As the adoption of this resolution indicates, the threat of German domination had induced the Bolsheviks to admit that the existence of an independent Latvia was, if nothing more, at least an outlying possibility. What caused this almost universal anti-German sentiment among the Latvian people? Was it the doing of the Democratic Bloc which, as Valters claims, was in touch with "all local political and cultural circles, heads of associations and representatives of city and rural councils"30? Did it grow out of the harsh political methods of the Germans31 and the starvation level on which the industrial populations of Latvia, as well as those of Estonia, were forced to subsist?32 Whatever the forces at work, Latvian, and Estonian, intransigence, together with objections by the German Bundesrat, destroyed the Kaiser's scheme for uniting the Baltikum to Prussia through a personal union. Instead, as the next best thing, the German government recognized the Baltikum as an independent (German puppet) state. The Military Governor, von Gossler, was ordered to transform the military administration into a civil administration and thus begin the process of transferring all power into the hands of the local 30 Walters, p. 347. Walters, p. 351. p. 11; see also, Gossler, p. 10. "Even though Germany was officially at peace with Russia, the chaotic conditions along the Baltic boundaries made a strong military occupation of the border a necessity—so that actually the [Baltic] land, as hinterland of this militarized region, was still regarded [by the Germans] as under wartime conditions [im Kriegszustand]. This explains the restrictions and hardships, such as traffic, passport, and personal regulations, to which the population was exposed. The unfavorable food conditions were made worse by the conscienceless smuggling into Russia. Food products were concealed by the malicious and avaricious portion of the populace and severe penalties had frequently to be invoked against these persons." 32 In July 1918, salaries of the workers in the Baltic war factories ranged from 5.60 to 6.50 marks. A t the time, potatoes cost 75 pfennig per pound, bread, 1.90 per pound. "My attempts," Winnig writes, "to speak to Latvian workers met with no success. The people did not trust me and acted as though they understood no German." (Winnig, p. 7.) As to Estonia, the German Commissioner himself conceded that war plant wages were only at half the subsistence level. (Winnig, p. 8.) 29

3 1 Winnig,

The Baltikum Landesrat (Provincial Council). The Landesrat met in Riga at the end of October and elected a provisional government of the new "state," its purpose being to draw up a constitution. In November, this provisional government organized a militia, the so-called Baltische Landeswehr, recruited mostly from among Baltic Germans, but joined also by a few right-wing Latvians and some Russian Whites. The Landeswehr was commanded by officers of the German Army. 33 Such was the situation in the Baltikum as Imperial Germany entered into its final days. The Landeswehr, meant to serve merely as a stage prop for a showpiece government, was soon to play a part far more dramatic than its creators had imagined. 33 E. von Dellingshausen, Die Baltischen Landesstaaten, Langensalza, 1926, pp. 28-29; Μ. Ziegler, Der Deutsche im Baltikum, Berlin, 1934, p. 84; Baltischer Landeswehrverein, Die Baltische Landeswehr, Riga, 1929, pp. 5-6, 16-17; "Dokumenti iz arkhiva Knyazya Α. P. Livena." Spravka "O Baltiiskom Landesvere" Beloye Delo, II, p. 197; K. von Braatz, Fürst Anatol Pawlowitsch Liewen, Stuttgart, 1926, p. 4.

10

The Mission of August

Winnig

Prince Max von Baden's October 5 address to the Reichstag 1 did not represent the Chancellor's true sentiments regarding the occupied territories in the East. His actual feelings may be gauged from the draft of the speech which he had intended to make but which was discarded lest it offend Woodrow Wilson and endanger the badly needed armistice. In this draft, Prince Max had interpreted Wilson's Fourteen Points and "without distorting their meaning . . . stubbornly in point after point defended [Germany's] rights, which Wilson, after all, had promised to respect." 2 Referring to point six, which demanded the evacuation of Russian territory and the right of Russia to conduct her own internal policies, the Prince pledged Germany "to consider no further Russian territories as independent unless Russia herself consider [ed] them independent." Interpreting Wilson's point rather freely, he stated that the President, as was "clear from his treatment of Poland," did not "consider all territories formerly under the Tsar as Russian territories." Therefore he assumed that he was "in agreement with Wilson [if he did not] characterize the Baltic, Lithuanian [and other minority regions] as Russian land in the narrower sense." Germany, he went on, was "prepared to evacuate these territories, [upon receipt of] guarantees that their future [would] be self-determined by representations elected under completely free circumstances [such as could] be assured through international supervisory commissions. See page 95. Prince Max von Baden, Erinnerungen pp. 367-368, 353. 110 1

2

und Dokumente,

Berlin, 1927,

August Winnig

III

This, of course, includes the right of any separated territory to join anew with Russia or to enter into any other combination." 3 It was clearly the Chancellor's hope that Germany, through an Ostpolitik based on methods of persuasion rather than of force, might yet be able to retain a degree of dominance in the areas taken from Russia.* Max von Baden's words imply that, given the chance at honest self-determination, some of the peoples in the non-Russian areas conquered by German arms might willingly subordinate themselves to the Reich. That precept of the Kaiser's last Chancellor was taken over by the Social Democrats who came to head the German Republic. Late in October 1918, a Social Democratic trade union leader named August Winnig arrived in Riga with the assignment of persuading the Latvian and Estonian leaders to adopt a friendly attitude towards Germany. Winnig's memoirs boast of his conviction "that historical progress went counter to the creation of small and feeble national states—but demanded the creation of large centrally administered economic regions. Therefore, I held the opinion, that [armed] might would decide who got the Russian border regions, but that they must not become independent."5 In regard to the military situation in the West, as it appeared in August 1918, Winnig feared that, in the event of a defeat, Germany's industrial and commercial position would be dealt a terrific blow. He felt that it would then become necessary "to let the superfluous portion of the German population flow into a region where it would not become lost to the German Volkstum. Such territories [are] the Baltic Lands with their great capacity for receiving settlers. For these reasons I always favored the German plans for colonization in the Baltic lands'* Winnig, through his Socialist connections, easily gained access 3

V o n Baden, pp. 3 6 2 - 3 6 3 . Part of this optimism w a s due to the belief a m o n g G e r m a n leaders that the English and Wilson were favorably inclined toward the idea of permitting G e r m a n y to serve as the protector of European civilization against Bolshevism. (See A . Rosenberg, A History of the German Republic, London, 1 9 3 6 , pp. 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 . ) 5 6 W i n n i g , Ostpolitik p. 5. W i n n i g , p. 6. Italics are W i n n i g ' s . 1

112

The Formation of the Baltic States

to the homes of Latvian and Estonian party leaders and even managed to be present at a meeting of the Latvian Democratic Bloc at the time when the soon-to-be-made proclamation of the Latvian Republic was being discussed. In most instances, however, he and his condescending proposals were met by Latvians and Estonians with suspicion and Deutschfeindlichkeit (Germanophobia). 7 In November the German collapse in the West became official. Most of the barons and members of German officialdom in the Baltikum were thoroughly convinced that the end had come in the East too, as German soldiers and sailors began to form soviets and as Latvians and Estonians began to assert their national rights. O n November 13, the re-emerged Estonian National Council proclaimed the Estonian Republic, and the German soldiers, intoxicated with the idea of democracy, greeted it with wild enthusiasm.8 German officials in Tallinn hurriedly packed and a disorderly flight toward Germany was soon in progress.9 That same day, to Winnig's delight, barons and military authorities, having conferred with the leaders of the Riga Soldiers' Council, decided to give him the responsibility of negotiating with the Latvians and Estonians, designating him Plenipotentiary of the Reich for the Baltic Lands. " T h e lovely title," he writes, " w a s a trifle long, but it read . . . of the Reich, not of the German Reich, simply . . . of the Reich—for who could Winnig, pp. 13-19. A . Winnig, Heimkehr, Hamburg, 2nd ed., 1935, p. 17; Winnig, Ostpolitik, p. 40. Strikes in the factories, and nationalist demonstrations began on November 8. According to von Gossler, chief of the German administration, this rebellious activity could not be halted "since among the German troops in Tallinn the revolution was already stirring. On Saturday, November 9, in the evening, a soldiers' and sailors' council had been elected, and already on Sunday the soldiers declared that they would under no conditions fire upon the population." Deprived of the use of force, the German authorities, fearing the effects of an unchecked revolutionary current upon German officers and officials, soon paid heed to the demands of Poska who insisted that the convocation of the Maapaev was the only way to keep the popular passions from flaming into violence. On the morning of November 13, posters throughout Tallinn "announced to the population that the Estonian Republic was considered in existence." (A von Gossler, Verwaltungsbericht, Ρ· Ϊ3·). 9 Winnig, Ostpolitik,p. 40. By the 15th some of the officials had already arrived in Riga. 7

8

August

Wintiig

" 3

be in doubt as to which country was meant? The Reich was precisely the German Reich the world over. I have always been proud of the designation and have refused all attempts to smuggle the word 'German' into the title."10 Somewhat ironic, in view of the hasty German departure from Estonia and Latvia, was the fact that Article Twelve of the Armistice of November n insisted that German troops remain in all former Russian territory until such time as the victors deemed the situation suitable for complete withdrawal." In drafting the terms of the Armistice,12 the political and military leaders of the Allied and Associated Powers were puzzled over how to deal with eastern Europe which was, at the time, inaccessible to Allied troops. If the Germans were to withdraw their forces all at once, the Bolsheviks, with whom the Allies were at war, could be expected to fill the ensuing vacuum and, among other things, overrun the lands of the "small peoples."13 For lack of a better way to solve the problem,14 the German stopgap was written into the Armistice. Since he was officially subordinated to the German Foreign Office in Riga, Winnig normally should have consulted that agency as well as the Baltic Military Command regarding his official actions. But the Foreign Office and the Military Command, both hostile to the new German regime, kept him at a distance.15 Since directives 10

Ibid., p. 36. The Times (London), November 12, 1918. The pertinent portion of Article Twelve reads as follows: " . . . all German troops at present in territories which before the war formed part of Russia, must.. . return to within the frontiers of G e r m a n y . . . as soon as the Allies shall think the moment suitable, having regard to the internal situation of these territories." 12 See Mermeix, Les Negotiations Secretes et les Quatre Armistices Avec Pieces fustificatives, Paris, 1919, pp. 257-259. 13 Balfour particularly expressed his concern over the fate of the Latvians and the Estonians. u Foch urged the need "to be sober about unrealizeable prescriptions." 15 Winnig, Heimkehr, pp. 12, 20. Winnig ascribes the aloofness of the Foreign Office to bureaucratic indifference. The "suspiciousness and coolness" toward him on the part of the Military Command, he attributes to the fact that "they saw in [him] the 'comrade' [Social-Democrat], that is, the personification of the revolutionary forces which had caused mutiny and the collapse." Foreign Office bureaucrats left over from the old regime and the 11

ii4

The 'Formation of the Baltic States

from the government of the revolution-torn Reich were not forthcoming, Winnig found himself left to his own devices and suddenly cast into a role of great, and to him quite welcome, importance. Article Twelve came to this arch-nationalist as a deus ex machina giving him time to scheme out ways in which something for the Vaterland might yet be snatched from the flames of defeat. "In my opinion," to use Winnig's own words, " w e had to liquidate the old Politic in the Baltic lands and seek to create the foundations for a new Politi\. T h e goal to be pursued was to undergo only a surface but not a fundamental alteration. I could not agree with a Politik of complete indifference toward the destiny of these lands." He regarded the rescuing of the Baltic Germans as his duty.16 His main object, however, was to see that German influence survived in the Baltic, that the German path to the East remained open. The Latvians and Estonians could be dealt with later; the task at hand was to keep the Bolsheviks out. In this immediate aim, Winnig coincided with the Latvian bourgeoisie of the Democratic Bloc and the Latvian National Council, the two groups then about to coalesce into the Government of the Latvian Republic. A s Plenipotentiary of the Reich his first official acts, promulgated three days before the proclamation of the Latvian Republic, were designed to strengthen all Latvian parties against the Bolsheviks. Thus, he released from prison all political offenders but the Bolsheviks, an action supported by the Latvian Socialists, and on the same day, November 15, he called off the censorship of the press and the rule against public meetings. However, the prohibition against publishing newspapers without German permission remained in effect. Winnig permitted the Socialists to publish their paper and supplied them with the means to do so. He denied the Bolsheviks the same privilege and turned down most of their requests for permission to hold public meetings." military men, aside f r o m evincing their antagonism to the German Republic, probably preferred not to become associated with the signing away of the conquered territories. 16 W i n n i g , Ostpolitik, p. 37. In his later written Heim\ehr (p. 21) W i n n i g also refers to a desire to save the German landed property and the German schools. " W i n n i g , Ostpolitik, pp. 38, 39.

August Winnig

IJ

5

At one of the Bolshevik meetings, W i n n i g took it upon himself to attempt a mass conversion, attempting to explain that history showed the most important revolutions to have been the least violent, whereas bloody upheavals had often proved needless and of no great historical importance. "And so," he relates, "I spoke as though to workers in Leipzig or Hamburg. These people listened attentively enough, but when I had gone they ridiculed me." A report described what occurred at the meeting after he had departed. A voice from the assemblage: "Why was the German Menshevik allowed to speak?" The chairman: "He would otherwise not have permitted us to hold this meeting." Voice: "We have been insulted." Chairman: "You should have told him that when he spoke." Voice: "We shall still tell it to him. We shall yet wade in German blood up to our ankles." Chairman: "That is our hope but we may not speak of it yet. The Menshevik has the power at present."18 Thanks to the Bolshevik menace within Riga, and to the inexorable approach of the Red Army toward the city, W i n n i g was able to retain his grip on the situation even after November 18, when the Latvian Republic was proclaimed. For the new Republic rested upon the shakiest of foundations. The Provisional Government, as it finally evolved out of discussions between the Democratic Bloc and representatives of the National Council, was hardly a democratic one. Valters' flowery words about democratic intentions and coalition principles 19 notwithstanding, the Cabinet emerged as a coalition exclusively of bourgeois party leaders. The members of the National Council deserted their leaders and subordinated themselves to the bourgeoisie of the Democratic Bloc.20 Kärlis Ulmanis, Head of the Peasant League, became Premier; Zilitis, former Duma deputy and member of the National Council, was named Minister of W a r ; and Valters, the sole cabinet member with a socialist taint, abandoned his earlier principles to become 18 20

Winnig, Ostpolitik Gossler, p. 15.

5+

p. 39.

"Walters, Lettland,

p. 358.

ιχό

The Formation of the Baltic States

Minister of the Interior. T h e Chairman of the People's Council, consisting of seventy-four members, w a s Jänis Cakste. M . Skujenieks and G . Z e m g a l s were designated as his aides. 21 T h i s government represented a minority of the population. A s though to underline its bourgeois orientation, one of the major points in the Provisional Constitution adopted w a s a statement to the effect that the government, until the meeting of the Constituent Assembly, had no right to alter the existing social order. N u m b e r e d among the Council members were ten Mensheviks and three Socialist Revolutionaries 22 in grudging opposition; and excluded entirely f r o m representation were the Baltic Germans, the extreme rightist pro-German bourgeoisie, and that 30 per cent of the people which w a s Bolshevik in its sympathies. T o reward those Baits w h o were willing to cooperate with the government, the posts of envoys to V i e n n a and Prague were allotted to Barons Rosenberg and Schreiner. 23 On an evening late in November, W i n n i g managed to bring the Latvian chiefs together with a party of Baits to discuss possible G e r m a n representation in the Latvian government. W i n n i g ' s bait to the Latvians was their need for aid f r o m the Baits in the impending struggle with the Reds. In an atmosphere of high tension, as "archfoes f o r the first time sat next to each other at a table," W i n n i g proposed that the Germans be given what he admits would have been an exorbitant 25 per cent of the seats in the People's Council. W i n n i g also made the offhand suggestion that the Ministries of Culture and Agriculture be turned over to Baits, but, not wishing to frighten off the Latvians, he laid n o immediate stress upon that idea. 21 W i t h regard to representation in the Council, Valters W i n n i g ' s proposal with an offer of seats proportionate to ber of Baits in Latvia. W i n n i g asserted that the G e r m a n s ' and cultural status rather than their actual numbers, 21

countered the numeconomic ought to

22 Walters, p. 358. Walters, pp. 360, 358. A. Bilmanis, A History of Latvia, Princeton, 1951, pp. 308-309. 24 Winnig, Heimkehr, pp. 21-24.

23

August Winnig

" 7

be the yardstick in determining their influence in the Council. T h a t argument Valters decried as being anti-democratic. W h e n W i n n i g inquired why half of the population, including all the Bolsheviks, had been denied representation, Valters asked whether he would have preferred Bolshevik participation. W i n n i g ' s gambit on behalf of the Baits came to naught when Baron Rosenberg broke the ranks of his class associates by declaring that the Baits recognized the point of view of the Latvian Regime and expected no special privileges in exchange for their cooperation. 25 T h e Baits remained completely unrepresented and, of course, unreconciled. F o r the immediate future, however, they were compelled to join forces with the Latvian bourgeoisie in fighting off the Bolsheviks. T h e innately weak structure of the Ulmanis government was further undermined by the Riga working class, its restlessness heightening with every new report about the advancing Red Army. T h e Latvian government, having no arms with which to equip a force that might combat the Bolsheviks within and without the city,26 was compelled to turn to W i n n i g for assistance. T h a t only direst necessity prompted the Latvian government to seek help from its recent oppressors is readily admitted by Winnig, who also gloats over the Russian advance which was bound to force the Latvians into his clutches. 27 Nonetheless, W i n n i g resented the fact that Latvian and Estonian nationalists were basing their hopes upon the Allied Powers. Apparently he expected the Latvians to accept his humbug about German moral obligations to protect the new Republic from the Bolsheviks. 28 Bitterly he accuses the Latvians of being ungrateful. D u r i n g the period of the German occupation dating from the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, diplomats from the Baltic lands had received encouraging assurances of sympathy from the Entente governments. T h e Entente replied to Estonian appeals with a warmth which increased as their struggle against Bolshevism became an end in itself rather than a means for creating a new Eastern Front against 25 27

Winnig, Heimkehr, Winnig, Heimkehr,

pp. 21-24. pp. 59-60.

26 28

Walters, p. 366. Winnig, Ostpolitik, p. 68.

118

The Formation of the Baltic States

the Central Powers.29 Latvia received less cordial treatment, but on November n , 1918, British Foreign Minister Balfour did grant de facto recognition to its Provisional Government,30 and this no doubt greatly emboldened the nationalists to establish their undemocratically based Republic. The Estonian National Council had received de facto recognition from France and Britain as early as March 1918.31 Winnig's measures to curb the Bolshevik elements within Riga could not halt the steady progress of the Red Army. The idea which underlay Article Twelve of the Armistice was realizable only in the distorted manner in which Winnig and those who shared his sentiments shaped it into an instrument of German foreign policy. Neither the German military leaders in the East nor the German government ever had any honest intention of fulfilling its conditions, and the Latvian Provisional Government soon registered an official complaint that German armed forces were evacuating Latvia "contrary to the stipulation of Article Twelve" and "without having received any order from the Allied Powers."32 However, even if the German military and civilian leaders had wished to carry out the article's humiliating terms, they would have been thwarted by the partly Bolshevik-minded and universally war-weary men in the ranks. The Riga Soldiers' Council refused to obey commands to active duty.33 But Winnig's Politi\ demanded an effective anti-Bolshevik fighting force, and, considering the state of morale in the ranks,31 the only possible answer was a volunteer corps. Von Gossler, the civil administrator and himself a Baltic baron, was quick to accept the 29

2

Memoire

sur l'independance

de l'Esthonie,

Paris, 1919, pp. 46-47, 50,

5 ~53· 30

Graham, Latvia, p. 406. Pour l'Esthonie, Copenhagen, 1918, p. 16. Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, 13 vols., Washington, 1947, II, pp. 480-481. The complaint was made on December 20 in a letter to American Ambassador Davis in London. 33 Ibid., p. 481; Winnig, Ostpolitik, pp. 63-65. 31 "[Virtually every soldier] among the 150,000 men stationed in the Baltic lands believed that he ought to be the first to return home." (Winnig, Heim\ehr, p. 9.) 31

32

August Winnig

119

idea. It w a s more difficult to convince General von Kathen, Military C o m m a n d e r of the Baltic Forces. W i n n i g and von Gossler approached him on this question but did not dare to state the issue as one of G e r m a n Politi\. Instead, they proposed the f o r m i n g of a rear-guard volunteer division f o r the sole purpose of protecting G e r m a n men and supplies then in the process of disorderly withdrawal. E v e n this purely military consideration failed to inspire von Kathen, w h o declared that, since the army w a s n o longer in existence, such a tactic was impossible. 35 W i n n i g persisted but the General remained adamant. T h e impetus to the formation of this rear-guard body came from a patriotic man in the ranks, Sergeant Siemens, w h o , as Chairman of the Central Soldiers' Council of R i g a , proposed to the commander that the men in the ranks be given the responsibility, rather than an order, to save their comrades. Siemens w a s certain that such an appeal to the long-disparaged human dignity of the G e r m a n enlisted man w o u l d be effective. V o n K a t h e n yielded, accepted that proposal, and a certain number of men did respond to the appeal. " T h i s , " writes W i n n i g , " w a s the moment when the Iron Division w a s born. Its formation was grudgingly permitted by the commanding staff, but this in no w a y hindered its acquiring a bad name in the Reich. Within a f e w days it was designated as the first move of the counter revolution." 3 6 T h e Iron Division, as eventually constituted out of thousands of volunteers recruited in Germany, 3 7 was to become a factor of prime importance in the events of 1919 in the Baltic states and of great importance in G e r m a n history as well. F o r the immediate future, however, these G e r m a n rear-guard volunteers, together with volunteers f r o m the Baltic Landeswehr, were unable to muster a fighting force greater than 700 men, too f e w to 35

Winnig, Ostpolitik, pp. 64, 65. Winnig, Ostpolitik p. 67. Despite Winnig's scornful observation, this occurrence, viewed in retrospect, does seem to have been one of the first postwar links in the chain that led to Hitler. 37 A. Winnig, Das Reich als Republi\, 1918-1928, Berlin, 1929, p. 157; also, Freiherr von Steinacker, Mit der Eisernen Division in Baltenland, Hamburg, 1920, p. 8. 36

120

The Formation of the TSaltic States

stop the Red A r m y . Christmas D a y , prophesied the Riga Bolsheviks, would witness the Red entry into Riga. 38 W h e n , just before Christmas, t w o English warships steamed into Riga Harbor, Ulmanis asked that their crews be sent ashore to help protect the Latvian government. T h e English denied this request. O n December 23, W i n n i g and Lt. Col. Bürkner, Chief of Staff of the German C o m m a n d , drove to the harbor to confer with the English about German obligations under Article T w e l v e of the Armistice. A l t h o u g h informed that 700 Germans and Baits confronted some 16,000 Russians, the English demanded not only that the Germans retain Riga, but also that they recapture all of the already evacuated portions of the Baltic region. T h e English also demanded that all further return to Germany of German soldiers cease, to which Bürkner replied that mutiny would result. T h e English threatened to hold Germany responsible for all damage inflicted by the Red A r m y , and then grew "more reasonable and contented themselves with the promise that the Germans would do their best in holding off the Russians." H o w ever, Bürkner made it clear that he considered the fall of Riga to be imminent. T h e conference ended rather coolly when the English refused to reply to W i n n i g ' s query as to what the English themselves proposed to do about saving the territory in question. "In the course of the next days," writes W i n n i g , "the English Colonel came to me daily to find how matters stood [and to ask w h y the Germans refused] to arm the Latvian militia. I explained that we already had our hands full with the Russians and could not create a danger for ourselves in Riga." 3 9 W i n n i g omits to state that he particularly wanted the Latvians to remain in a helpless condition. T h a t way they might be forced to conclude an agreement 10 with him which would have been the opening wedge in the colonization of Latvia by Germans and which was intended to pave the way for eventual German annexation. Since German arms were being withheld from Latvians and were being given to Baltic Germans, the Latvian government easily saw through W i n n i g ' s scheme. 38 Winnig, 40 See

Ostpolitik, p. 74. page 123.

39

Winnig, Ostpolitik, pp. 75-76.

August

Winnig

121

Declaring that Latvia would make no ties to a "rotting cadaver," it sought desperately to arm its own people. Ignoring Winnig's warnings as to the pro-Bolshevik tendencies of Latvians, "the best troops in the Red A r m y , " the British equipped a Latvian militia of 420 men. In the meantime, the situation in Riga became ever more chaotic. Bolshevik activity increased and there was talk of imminent revolt." When the Latvian government consulted Winnig as to how to quell the rising revolutionary ferment, the German Military Command again asked the English whether they intended to help. T h e English suggested the possibility of naval bombardment. When the Germans proposed that the English aid in policing Riga, the latter sent a small detachment which marched through the city and returned to its ship. On December 26 one of the two Latvian units mutinied and declared itself pro-Bolshevik. 12 Ulmanis, frightened, pleaded that the Germans intervene against the mutineers. On the ground that he and the Germans did not wish to take violent action against the native population, Winnig turned down Ulmanis' request, but suggested that he try the English. Ulmanis, w h o had already met with refusal in that quarter, thought that if the Germans made the request, the English might take some action. Winnig sent a man to the warship in the harbor, who returned with the reply that the English could do nothing on land. Their single 41

Walters, p. 366. Winnig, Ostpolitik, pp. 76-77. The Bolsheviks within Riga were in close underground touch with their comrades in Russia. As early as December 14, the "government" of Soviet Latvia had already composed itself on Russian soil, and Peteris Stucka had been designated President. As a result of his underground contacts with Riga and his thorough knowledge of the situation there, Stucka was so confident of success that he had his government set the date, January 13, 1919, for the first Congress of Latvian Soviets. He even invited Sverdlov, then President of the All Russian Central Executive Committee of the Communist Party, to attend the Congress. (See P. Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev Sotsialistiches\oy Sovyets\oy Latvii, Moscow, 1919, part I, pp. 8-12.) In Stucka's words: "Sverdlov was somewhat shocked by my assurance. With a smile he asked me, 'Are you not a bit premature, Petr Ivanovich, inviting me to a congress before you have even set one foot on Latvian soil? However, I shall be at the congress.' I assured [Sverdlov] that we intended to keep our word. And we were right." (Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, p. 8.) 42

122

The formation of the Baltic States

march through the city had brought an admonition from London. However, they were willing to help out in any way that did not involve leaving the ships. A plan was finally worked out whereby German units of the Landeswehr would collaborate with the English naval force. On December 27, as "the salvos of the ships' cannon thundered over the city," the rebellious Latvians were disarmed and interned, and the leader of the Landeswehr ordered ten of the mutineers shot. "This," writes Winnig, "subsequently gave the Latvian Government an excuse to bewail the inhuman cruelty of the Germans. At the time of the execution, however, the Government raised no objections."43 Quelling the revolution inside Riga had in no way lessened the danger to the Latvian government from the approaching Reds. Its own militia had proved to be disloyal, and it was clear that the English would make no serious move to defend Riga. The Latvian government might fall back into Courland, but who would protect it there? A German volunteer force remained the last hope for the survival of the Ulmanis government on Latvian soil. " I f , " as Winnig put it, "the recruiting in the Reich turned out successfully, one might, using Courland as a base, recapture Riga and the rest of Livonia." Ulmanis, of course, was left with no choice but that of accepting the proposal, and Winnig "should have been neglectful of [his] duty and stupid, had [he] not sought to use what was probably the final opportunity for maintaining and strengthening Germandom in Latvia . . . The German natives . . . would have to be a real [armed] power in the land . . . and the possibility for Germans to enter and settle in Latvia had to be made certain in order to strengthen the German core economically and numerically."" On December 29, 1918, the Government of Latvia reluctantly signed the agreement with Winnig as "German Ambassador to the 43

Winnig, Ostpolitik, pp. 76-78. Winnig, Ostpolitik^, Ρ· 83. See Winnig, Heimkehr, pp. 59-60, for further details about the development of this plan. 44

August

Winnig

Governments of the Republics of Estonia and L a t v i a . " T h e first two articles read as follows: Article I. The Provisional Latvian Government declares itself willing to grant full Latvian citizenship to all men of a foreign [German] army who shall have served at least four weeks in the ranks of the volunteer corps in the struggle with the Bolsheviks for the liberation of Latvian State territory. Article II. The German Baltic members of the Latvian State have the right to join the ranks of the German [Reichsdeutschen] volunteers corps. On the other hand, for the duration of the campaign, there will be no objections to the use of German [Reichsdeutsche] officers and non-commissioned officers as instructors in the ranks of the German Baltic companies of the Landeswehr. A grant of citizenship naturally implied the right to settle in Latvia. " T h e terms of this agreement," W i n n i g reports, " I immediately conveyed to Baltic recruiting centers [in G e r m a n y ] so that it might aid them in gaining recruits." 45 Within a f e w days, Winnig, the volunteer corps, the Ulmanis government, and the British vessels had been chased out of Riga by the Red A r m y . T h e Government's next stop, Jelgava, fell to the Reds on January 10, 1919. Liepäja, one of the two remaining towns of any size in Courland, then became the seat of the Latvian government and the headquarters for G e r m a n volunteer operations. On January 10, 1919, Izvestia, under the headline " T h r e e Capitals" announced that the working class, within one week, had taken Riga, Vilnius, and Kharkov. " T h r e e new centers of the fraternal Soviet Republics." 45

5*

Winnig, Ostpolitik,, p. 83.

TIME OF CONFUSION 11

The Red Interlude

of 1919

ESTONIA'S W A R OF INDEPENDENCE

T h e Provisional Government of Estonia came into existence on November 19, 1918, after lengthy conversations between W i n n i g and the Estonian leaders. Konstantin Päts, freed from prison by W i n n i g ' s order, 1 was chosen as both Premier and Minister of W a r in the n e w regime. 2 Poska became Deputy Premier and Foreign Minister. 3 T h e Ministries of Agriculture, Finance, Communications, and Labor were occupied, respectively, by Strandmann, Juhann K u k k , E . S ä k k , and A u g u s t Rei. 4 T h e n e w government w a s confronted by many difficult problems. A t least t w o divisions of G e r m a n troops were still on Estonian soil. 5 T h o u g h supposedly neutral politically, they made m u c h trouble for the Estonian government by taking along w i t h them in their retreat all rolling stock on the railways 6 and whatever military supplies they could carry, including those taken from the erstwhile Estonian regiments. 7 W h a t they could not remove they deliberately destroyed. Rather than let 15,000 rifles stored in T a l l i n n fall into Estonian hands, the T a l l i n n Soldiers' Council had the barrels removed and flung into the sea.8 T h e Germans cut telephonic and ' W i n n i g , Heimkehr, p. 11. Päts sat " g l u m l y " through the conference " s p e a k i n g hardly a w o r d . " 2 M a r t n a , Estland, p. 1 7 1 ; Pullerits, Estland, p. 339. 3 G r i m m , Jahre deutscher Entscheidung im Baltikum, p. 128. 5 W i n n i g , Ostpolitik, ' P u l l e r i t s , p. 339. p. 41. 6 The Times (London), December 13, 1918. 7 M a r t n a , p. 171. " W i n n i g , Ostpolitik, p. 41. 125

126

The Formation of the Baltic States

telegraphic communications, monopolized the use of the railroads to the exclusion of Estonian troops,' and mercilessly plundered Livonian farms.10 This behavior has been ascribed to spitefulness, to a deliberate desire to make the new Republic helpless in the face of Bolshevik agression and thus force it to seek German aid,11 and to a pro-Bolshevik spirit among the German troops, causing them to resent Estonia's rejecting union with Russia.12 In April 1918, the Estonian Army had been dissolved by German order.13 During the weeks following the national proclamation, therefore, the Estonian Republic lacked the military force necessary for re-establishing order in the wartorn country. The creation of a new national army was, moreover, a vital matter because a vanguard of Estonian and Latvian Bolsheviks had invaded Estonia from Pskov in November and this action portended an early attack by the Red Army. 14 A reorganization of the army was undertaken the very day on which the Republic was proclaimed, 15 but the troops lacked even the most basic weapons, not to mention basic training. T h e result was many cases of desertion when the green soldiers were forced into action against the Red Army. 16 Financially, the Provisional Government had difficulties. W i n n i g had started it with a grant of one million rubles from a fund squeezed out of the Estonian people in the course of the German occupation. Early in December, the government, having, in Winnig's words, "squandered the money," came back for more. Claiming that Estonian outrages had been committed upon Germans, W i n n i g refused further financial aid.17 In the midst of such difficulties, the real Red A r m y offensive was Martna, p. 172. The Times (London), December 30, 1918. Several Estonian lives were lost w h e n German troops opened fire upon a government-sponsored demonstration in Tallinn meant to celebrate the deliverance of Estonia. (See Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference, 1919, II, pp. 46211 Martna, p. 173. 468.) 12 The Times (London), December 13, 1918. 13 Martna, pp. 151, 171; Dokumente zur beleuchtung, p. 4. w The Times (London), December 28, 1918. 15 W i n n i g , Ostpolitik, 16 Martna, p. 189. p. 40. 17 W i n n i g , Ostpolitik, pp. 42, 44. 9

10

Red Interlude of igig

127

launched. On November 29, 1918, the Estonian Workers' Commune, headed by J. Anvelt, was proclaimed in the occupied regions.18 Early in December, the Russian Council of People's Commissars issued a decree recognizing the independence of the Estonian Soviet Republic (or Workers' Commune)." The soviets of Estonia, organized by the first bands of Bolshevik invaders, were declared the supreme authority of the land until the Congress of the People's Deputies of Estonia had met. The Russian Soviet Government further ordered all Russian military and civil authorities to support and assist the Estonian soviets in their struggle for the liberation of Estonia, and ordered the People's Bank to advance the Estonian Soviet Republic the sum of 10,000,000 rubles.20 At the same time units of the Red Army began to advance along the coast from Petrograd and inland from Pskov. Narva and Tartu were soon captured. By December 10 more than half of Estonia was in Bolshevik hands and Tallinn was in dire peril.21 Concerning the battle for the capital, the turning point of Estonia's war of independence, one writer has employed the David and Goliath theme. J. Hampden Jackson's book, Estonia, appeared in 1941, shortly after the re-absorption by Russia of the Baltic countries. Recalling the legendary days of 1918-1919, he makes light of foreign aid given the Estonian army, and points out that a thousand adult volunteers, plus the Tallinn schoolboys, headed by a few instructors from the city fire brigade, using only axes, obsolete rifles, and superhuman gallantry, beat off the Red Army. Then, following up their first success "by sudden raids and the surprise appearance of armored trains, Laidoner [Commander-in-Chief of the Estonian Army] upset the morale of his opponents. By grim fighting a few hundred Estonian soldiers drove eighteen thousand Bolsheviks from Narva." 22 It is true that a numerical superiority favored the Red Army, but 18 N . L. Meshcheryadkov, ed.; Malaya Sovyets\aya Entsi\lopediya, 1 9 3 1 , X , p. 387. 19 Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, Part II, pp. 8-9. w Izvestia, December 8, 1918. 21 The Times (London), December 13, 1918. ^Jackson, Estonia, p. 137.

Moscow,

128

The Formation of the Baltic States

at the highest estimate it w a s three to t w o rather than forty to one in ratio. 23 T h e superiority in materiel probably rested w i t h

the

Estonians and their allies. E v e n in a land battle, f o u g h t a l o n g the coast, a squadron of British warships 2 4 w a s n o m e a n w e a p o n to have o n one's side. A m o n g other things it g a v e the Estonians c o m m a n d of the sea, e n a b l i n g t h e m to land b e h i n d Russian lines, 25 and provided far heavier artillery than the Russians could muster. If the Bolsheviks retired f r o m their positions outside T a l l i n n o n D e c e m ber 14, it w a s the heavy b o m b a r d m e n t by the British squadron that drove t h e m to flight,26 not the " a x e s " of the T a l l i n n schoolboys. T h e n a v a l squadron also supplied the Estonian A r m y w i t h " t h o u s a n d s of rifles, m a c h i n e g u n s a n d a large quantity of w a r supplies." 2 7 A s to actual numbers, an Estonian Minister, by January 7, 1919, estimated that the Bolshevik forces east of T a l l i n n w e r e in excess of 15,000 m e n and w e r e reinforced by bands of local Bolsheviks. T h e Estonian troops he estimated at 10,000 to 12,000 in n u m b e r . T h e s e , it is true, w e r e extended a l o n g a hundred-mile front, f r o m T a l l i n n to P ä r n u , but that same f r o n t k e p t the Bolsheviks equally occupied. H o w e v e r , to the anti-Bolshevik side, by that date, m u s t be added about 1,000 F i n n i s h volunteers 28 and, as the days passed, m o r e a n d m o r e Finns, c o n v o y e d across the G u l f of F i n l a n d by the British, w e r e added to the volunteers serving u n d e r S w e d i s h G e n e r a l E k s t r o m . A l m o s t f r o m the start, the Estonians received the assistance of the Russian detachment k n o w n as the N o r t h e r n Corps, 2 9 w h i c h is estimated to h a v e been 1,000 t o 3,000 m e n as of January 1919. The Times (London), January 7, 1919. Three cruisers and three torpedo boats docked at Tallinn on December 12. 25 The Times (London), December 31, 1918. On December 28, 1918, the Secretary of the British Admiralty announced the capture by the British Navy of two Russian destroyers. 26 The Times (London), December 21, 1918. 27 According to K. Pusta in an interview given the correspondent of the Temps. Quoted by A. Delpeuch, Les allies centre la Russie, Paris, 1926, p. 330. 28 The Times (London), January 9, 1919, January 6, 1919. 29 The Times (London), January 9, 1919; Grimm, pp. 156-158; K. Smirnov, "Nachala Severo-Zapadnoy armii," Beloye Delo, I, p. 118. 23 24

Red Interlude of igig

129

This Russian corps was later to assume considerable importance as the nucleus for the army of General Yudenich. It originated in October 1918, in the region of Pskov, then under German occupation. By the Supplementary Peace Treaty, signed at Berlin, August 27, 1918, supposedly filling the loopholes in the Treaty of March 3, signed at Brest-Litovsk, Russia renounced her sovereign rights over Estonia and Livonia, and the Germans agreed to remove all their troops on Russian territory east of the frontiers of Estonia and Livonia, such frontiers to be determined by a Russian-German Commission. 30 However, the prospect of a Red Russia for their permanent neighbor left the German authorities none too happy. T h e White movement, then, which might serve to prevent Bolshevik infiltration into German-held territory, was generally approved of by the Germans. 3 1 Russian Whites seeking refuge in the Pskov region began to petition the German Command for permission to organize into military units. T h e Germans for a time withheld their permission. They still thought in terms of a conquest of Russia, in which eventuality Russian allies would become a nuisance. In view, also, of the decisive struggle going on in the West thev were reluctant to do anything that might upset the equilibrium in the East. Finally the Germans gave in, allowed the Whites to organize, and supplied them with arms and equipment. On October 2, 1918, these volunteer units were officially named North Army. 3 2 Orphaned politically by the German withdrawal in November and driven out of Pskov by the Bolsheviks, a larger portion of the Russian North A r m y placed itself under Estonian command and helped drive the Red A r m y beyond the ethnological frontiers of Estonia—a feat accomplished by February 24, 1919. T h a t success opened the way for the subsequent White Russian offensive on Petrograd under the command of General Yudenich. 30

Texts of the Russian "Peace" (U.S. Department of State, 1918), p. 179. A . P. Lieven, " V iuzhnoy Pribaltike," Beloye Delo, III, p. 189. 32 Smirnov, Beloye Delo, I, pp. 1 1 8 , 124.

31

The Formation of the Baltic States

13°

SOVIET "LITHUANIA" T h e Peace of Brest-Litovsk reopened the channels of communication between Russia and Lithuania. 3 3 In April 1 9 1 8 the Central Bureau of the Lithuanian section of the Bolshevik Central C o m mittee sent comrade A n n a Dobrovich to Vilnius to work among dissident members of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party to the end of establishing a communist party. 31 T h e dissemination in Lithuania of Soviet printed matter and a steady trickle into the country of indoctrinated refugees returning from Russia made possible a slow development of a Bolshevik movement. 35 B y the time of the German withdrawal the tiny, misleadingly named, C o m m u nist

Party

"Stricdy

of

Lithuania

and

speaking," writes V .

Belo-Russia

had

been

Mickevicius-Kapsukas,

formed. 36 "this

was

only [the party] of Lithuania and western Belo-Russia. A different communist party functioned in eastern Belo-Russia." 3 7

Early

in

December, the party, under the direction of Mickevicius-Kapsukas recently arrived from Moscow, set u p a provisional revolutionary 33

Aiding this development was the demoralization that set in among the Germans remaining in the East after large forces had been transferred to the West. See S. Girinis, "Kanun i sumerki sovyetskoy vlasti na Litve," Vroletars\aya Revoliutsiya (8) 1922, pp. 76-77. 31 Mitskevich-Kapsukas, "Istoki," p. 172. 35 Girinis, p. 77; see also A. E. Senn, "Die Bolschewistische Politik in Litauen 1 9 1 7 - 1 9 1 9 . " Forschungen zur Osteuropäischen Geschichte, Berlin, 1957. PP· 98-99· 36 For the history of this development see Mitskevich-Kapsukas, "Istoki," pp. 172-177 and, by the same writer, "Bor'ba za sovyetskuiu vlast' ν Litve i zapadnoy Belorusii (1918-1919)" Proletarskaya Revoliutsiya (108) 1931, p. 75. Mitskevich-Kapsukas claims only 250 party members and candidates in Vilnius in December 1918. 37 Mitskevich-Kapsukas, "Istoki," pp. 171-178. The Communist Party grew largely out of a left-wing faction of the Lithuanian Social Democratic Party. That faction, desiring to stress its internationalism, as opposed to the nationalminded pro-Taryba socialists, had, early in 1918, organized itself into the Social Democratic Party of Lithuania and Belo-Russia. The evolving Communist Party naturally approved of the internationalist, i.e. pro-Soviet orientation of its Social Democratic predecessor.

Red Interlude of

igig

government of Lithuania in anticipation of the Red Army's occupation of the country.38 Lithuania was poor soil for a prospective soviet regime. Before 1918 the Bolshevik movement had had no roots in the land, and the bulk of the population was ignorant of the meaning of sovietism.39 Nevertheless, when the Red Army moved into Vilnius District early in January 1919 (that was as much of Lithuania as it was able to occupy) the Bolsheviks hopefully designated it the Soviet Republic of Lithuania and attempted to establish a Russian-patterned soviet society. On January 13, 1919, all "bourgeois" institutions, including dumas, magistracies, and rural councils, were ordered closed and "bourgeois" officials were removed from their positions. T w o days later, the Provisional Revolutionary Government of Lithuania ordered the Bolshevik military-revolutionary committees to hasten the organization of volost\ uyezd, and city soviets. On January 17, the Revolutionary Government decreed the nationalization of land, forests, waterways, and fisheries. In the same month, a branch of the People's Bank of the Soviet Republic had been opened in Vilnius, and plans were in progress for the opening of the People's Bank of Lithuania.40 By the end of March the most important manufacturing enterprises had been nationalized. Tentative efforts were made to solve the complicated nationalities' problem in the Bolshevik manner. Twenty-two newspapers in six languages began to appear in Vilnius, three of which were Communist. By official decree, all languages were to enjoy equal treatment, and local commissars and institutions were ordered to answer letters in the language used by the writer.41 Bolshevik writer Girinis describes the acclaim given the "liberating" Red Army by the people of Vilnius, telling of their eagerness to support the measures introduced by the Soviet regime, to partici38

Mitskevich-Kapsukas, "Bor'ba," p. 76. Mitskevich-Kapsukas, "Istoki," p. 178. 40 Izvestia, January 15, 1919, January 17, 1919, January 19, 1919, January 3 1 , 1919. 41 Izvestia, April 4, 1919, January 3, 1919, January 19, 1919. 39

The Formation of the Baltic States

132

pate in the new institutions, and to become members of the Communist Party. "But this positive popular feeling," he admits, "changed within two or three weeks into furious hatred toward the comrades." This he blames on the unreadiness of the population to accept the soviet idea, and he cites the regime's need to import Russian administrators who reminded the population of the times of Pro-Consul Muraviev.42 So small was the Bolshevik following in Lithuania that it was found expedient to extend the Communist Party label to the Mensheviks, certain members having first been excluded from the Party for joining the Taryba. Mensheviks were also invited to accept responsible posts in the Revolutionary Government. Otherwise only the Jewish Bund gave the Bolsheviks political support of any importance. When, on February 6, 1919, the newly elected Soviet of Workers' and Red Army Deputies opened its sessions, the Communist Party (Bolsheviks and Mensheviks) held 130 seats, the Bund 46. Internationalists, Polish Social Democrats, and Left Socialist Revolutionaries held a total of 19 seats. Twenty Communists had been delegated by the Red Army. 43 Altogether these groups represented but a trivial segment of the population. Revolutionary Lithuania was a shadow politically, a pygmy territorially, and a shambles economically. Much as the Russian Soviet government wished to maintain the fiction that an independent Soviet Lithuania existed—this if only momentarily and in order to draw attention from the Tizryfoz-dominated part of Lithuania—44 that proved to be impossible. On February 18, the Vilnius Soviet of Workers' Deputies unanimously approved a resolution to unite with the Soviet Republic of Belo-Russia. On February 20, the third session of the Lithuanian Congress of Soviets accepted the resolution. Perhaps to camouflage the true reasons for that union, the Congress delegates "fully aware of their unbreakable ties with all Soviet Republics," further resolved to "guarantee to the Governments of Soviet Lithuania and Belo-Russia [early] discussions with the 42

Girinis, p. 83. Izvestia, January 15, 1919, January 28, 1919, February 9, 1919. " S e e Mitskevich-Kapsukas, "Bor'ba," pp. 81-82.

43

Red Interlude of igig

133

Soviet Socialist Governments of [Russia], Latvia, the Ukraine, and Estonia concerning the creation of one united federation." On March 1 1 , 1919, the first united Congress of the Communist Parties of Lithuania and Belo-Russia elected 18 delegates to the All-Russian Party Congress. 45 Early in May, shortly after Polish legionnaires had captured the district and city of Vilnius, Izvestia carried a polemic over the reasons for the loss. One statement, attempting to defend the Lithuanian Bolsheviks against charges of negligence, attributes it entirely to military considerations, explaining that the Poles were simply too strong.46 A n opposing view blames the fall of Vilnius on political and organizational weaknesses on the part of the Bolsheviks in charge, and in so doing provides an illuminating account of the state of affairs during the four months of Soviet rule. In Vilnius itself, where all of the central organs of Soviet power were active, the White Guards had a fully organized underground system for recruiting soldiers and for gathering the means for an attack against Soviet authority. The . . . White Guard cells were closely connected with the Polish centers and were able to penetrate into our soviet circles and into the Red Army. It must be mentioned here that the building of soviets . . . went at a tortoise pace. Anyone recendy in Vilnius could easily observe the antagonism existing between the population and the soviets. It would be more correct to characterize it in this manner: In the literal sense of the word, there stood on the one side our party comrades in soviet organs and in smaller organizations. On the other side stood vast numbers of merchants, speculators, intelligentsia, landlords, Catholic priests, bureaucrats, and all of the other White Guard elements who, with assured hands, created their cadres. The small numbered proletariat and working class people of the city, too occupied with daily tasks, paid no heed to our comrades. In a word, our forces in the city were too small. To all practical purposes we had not succeeded in gaining control over the city. In addition to all that the Soviet power . . . made many political errors. First: Too little attention was paid to internal government. The work was poor in that respect. 45 46

Izvestia, February 20, 1919, February 22, 1919, March 12, 1919. Izvestia, May 8, 1919.

134

Tie Formation of the Baltic States

Second: The Latvian and Lithuanian comrades lightly abolished the Che\aa without replacing it by some other organization, and did this early in the occupation, in a land foreign to soviet power, abounding with anti-Semites, speculators, Junker mercenaries, and kulaks. That is why the White Guards were so successful and rapid in organizing.48 Refuting the above charges, a defending writer claims that, though there was no actual Che\a, a similar organization, "the socalled Special Department," did exist in Vilnius. "But if its work was ineffective it was due to the lack of a solid proletarian base. There was hardly any industrial proletariat in Lithuania, and what workers there were, represented various nationalist currents."49 He further claims that there was a lack of supplies with which to equip the volunteers who joined the Red Army; whereas the White forces were well-equipped. He also states that the population distrusted the Red Army because of its "disorderly requisitions."50 The Bolsheviks, in short, found no cooperation in Lithuania. As long as the Red Army remained, the Revolutionary Government was able feebly to make its presence known. When the Red Army withdrew, the only real basis for such a government vanished. 47 The Cheka had been abolished to make it possible for the Mensheviks to enter the Government. (See A. E. Senn, "Bolschewischtische Politik, etc.", p. 108.) 48 Izvestia, May 3, 1919. 49 Izvestia, May 8, 1919. On the occasion of the actual union of the Lithuanian and Belo-Russian republics on February 27, 1919, A. F. Myasnikov, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Belo-Russian Soviet, had characterized the conflict of nations in Lithuania as "microbe chauvinism" (Izvestia, March 24, 1919). 50 Izvestia, May 8, 1919. Girinis reports that when the peasants refused to accept the unfamiliar Kerensky money, or Kerenkis, offered them by the Red Army in exchange for food, Slivkin, Commissar for Provisions, divided the Vilnius District into small sections and surrounded these with troops who then conducted a search for the requisite amount of produce. To sections inhabited by Christians, Slivkin despatched detachments composed entirely of Jews. To sections inhabited by Jews he sent units made up of Poles. The resulting requisitions were thorough but so was the resulting hostility to Communism of the rural population. (Girinis, pp. 84-85.) Further details about Bolshevik rule in Vilnius may be found in the collection of official documents reproduced in Krasni Archiv, 5 (102) 1940, pp. 3-44.

Red Interlude of igig SOVIET

135

LATVIA

In Latvia's working class, Soviet rule did find some basis for the establishment of a government able to call upon a substantial percentage of the population for support. A workers' rebellion heralded the coming of the Red Army into Riga, and similar risings also anticipated the Reds' capture of Jelgava and Ventspils. 51 T h e taking of Ventspils marked the most westward advance of the Red Army. At the height of its power the Latvian Soviet government held sway over three-fourths of Latvia. T h e fact that it had both a popular and a territorial foundation helps to explain the relatively long duration of Soviet power in Latvia. Soviet Latvia, from the very outset, occupied a warm spot in the hearts of the "founding fathers" of Bolshevism. Aside from their gratitude for Latvian military support in the revolution, the Bolsheviks considered Red Latvia to be of foremost importance to the revolutionary cause. Bolshevism's sole access to the Baltic, south of Petrograd, it opened the gates to the Scandinavian countries and "transformed the Baltic Sea into the Sea of Social Revolution." 5 2 Latvia also was expected to provide the springboard from which the Red forces might aid the revolution in Germany. O f equal importance was the fact that Latvia, the only non-Russian part of the former Russian Empire which showed a Bolshevik trend, proved to the world that Bolshevism was not merely a Russian, but an international phenomenon, suitable to non-Russians as well as to Russians, to the W e s t as well as to the East. Inevitably, Soviet Latvia was linked in Bolshevik minds with a long chain of proletarian revolutions which were expected to follow upon the Red successes in Hungary and in Bavaria. Upon learning of the exciting events in Central Europe, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Latvia published a manifesto triumphantly announcing the fact that the world revolution was in motion: But it does move—the revolution. First Hungary—now Bavaria. The revolutionary workers, peasants and soldiers of Bavaria have united to 51

Izvestia, January 14, 1919, January 17, 1919.

s'lzvestia,

December 25, 1918.

The Formation of the Baltic States

i36

proclaim the dictatorship of the proletariat—to build a socialist . . . society. A red army is being organized. Connections are being established with the Soviet republics of Russia and Hungary. T o you, our natural allies [Hungary and Bavaria] go our first greetings... Read this, German workers in soldiers' uniforms who are here fighting against your Latvian brothers . . . Read this and blush—those of you who can still feel shame. Those of you who are fighting through ignorance on the side of the Junkers . . . throw down your weapons and come over to us. Those of you who wish to be "honest counter-revolutionaries" go back home and fight in the open against your brothers in Bavaria who have founded the same kind of Soviet republic as we. Or go to Württemberg where the same struggle is in progress—or go to Essen . . . to Berlin where workers' soviets are openly declaring themselves on the side of the Soviet Republics of Russia, Hungary, and Bavaria. The revolution of the working classes is advancing victoriously; nothing can stop it from becoming a world revolution. Your lying prophets who have always declared that only in dark Russia could a Soviet Republic arise, have now been answered by—Hungary. Your social traitors who tell you that a Soviet regime is not suited to Germany are today refuted by —Bavaria. And tomorrow—Württemberg and Austria. It is the final hour. Who is not with us is against us.53 Shortly afterward, at a session of the Riga Soviet the following "guiding lines for the Red Army in Latvia" were laid down: Latvia is the gateway through which the Russian Revolution must invade Western Europe. Our duty now, after the proclamation of the Soviet regime in Hungary and Bavaria, is to reach the Prussian frontier as quickly as we possibly can. . . . An advance of the Red Army into Germany promises to be most successful. Through the collapse of German Imperialism and the outbreak of revolution in Hungary the Red troops can now venture to push forward against Europe in the north and south simultaneously. The divisions of the Red Army fighting in Latvia have to deliver the decisive blow! 54 Soviet Latvia was meant to serve a twofold purpose: a funnel through which revolution was to flow into Europe, and a model to the West of a non-Russian Soviet Republic, the laboratory wherein 53

Die Rote Fahne, (Riga) April 9, 1919. Popov, The City of the Red Plague, New York, 1932, p. 240.

54 G.

Red Interlude of igig

137

the Bolshevik politicians might put their international theories into practice. Latvia thereby became the archetype of the later nonRussian Soviet Republic. It displayed a theoretical independence coupled with a real union to Russia via working-class brotherhood —the Communist Party. It was the earliest working application of Lenin's solution to the problem of national existence within an internationalist scheme. A s the experiment unfolded itself in 1919, it revealed a Republic of Latvia fiercely claiming its existence as a sovereign state independent from Russia. One such instance occurred on January 30, 1919, when President Stucka sent a note of protest to the German government. A German diplomatic representative had been arrested in Riga, and his government had registered its complaint with the Russian government rather than that of L a t v i a . " Despite his protest, Stucka knew that the independence of Soviet Latvia was purest myth. On independence, he wrote in 1919, W e should be Utopians if we believed that such a toy Soviet Latvian Republic could exist as an independent socialist formation. N o , we are Marxist internationalists . . . who clearly reply that not even Russia or Germany can exist as Communist states if the rest of the world remains imperialist. A n d if there rise side by side two socialist soviet republics— they will, on the strength of that fact alone, be united by closer bonds, without treaties, than any other states which have concluded written pacts among themselves.56

T h e alleged independence of Soviet Latvia was thus merely propaganda intended for foreign consumption. Stucka found it necessary to explain this "slippery" theory to his own comrades. Before us rises the question of the relations of our Soviet Latvia to other states. Here some will smile at one another, wondering what I, who so often expressed myself with acrid irony about Latvian independence in bourgeois and petty bourgeois programs, will now say about independent Latvia. But I have no cause for blushing, and I have not changed my views even one iota. A n d not only I, but I hope, the whole of 55

Izvestia, February 1, 1919; Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, part II, pp. 18-19. Nasha Pravda, no. 41, February 27, 1919.

S6

i38

The Formation of the Baltic States

Latvian Social Democracy, including each of its conscious members, has not changed its views on this question, although one must admit that the path is slippery and it is easy to slip on it and slide into nationalistic tendencies. T h i s is w h y that small group of Latvian Communists in Petrograd expressed itself negatively to the Russian comrades, when at the time of the Brest peace talks, the idea arose of declaring the independence of Estonia and Latvia [i.e., the unoccupied part of L a t v i a ] . A t that time, the proposal was directed against G e r m a n imperialism and we [felt that a declaration of independence] would not save us from military invasions but only produce confusion in our midst, since it would be impossible on one fine day to deny all that w e had the day before been preaching. A n d w e gave almost the same answer in November 1918, at least in the first parts [of our discussion] concerning the impending advance f r o m the [Russian] side. A n d that time, the conditions were different. Latvia was already torn away [ f r o m Russia] and —although in strange hands, was united. A n d the independence of Latvia could not signify a greater separation of her from Russia. On that occasion w e finally accepted the [Russian proposal] to announce the independence of Latvia, for the reason that otherwise the G e r m a n social betrayers, like their bourgeois bosses, would cry that Soviet Russia was not the bearer of freedom for small peoples but was imperialistic in its plans. In the final analysis we then already [correctly anticipated] that the freedom of Latvia would in actuality be won by the Latvian proletariat. Only malicious foes and ignorant w a r correspondents can speak of the conquest of Latvia by the Russian Red A r m y . But if we accepted that proposal, w e did so k n o w i n g that we would establish a socialist soviet society, for such a society finally solves even the national question. Under [socialism] talk of a policy of warring and persecution against the w o r k i n g people, even if belonging to another state or to another nation, is nothing but the delirium of a diseased mind. If we turn back our glance to the history of our party . . . w e nowhere find in it the slogan of independent Latvia. W e have always scoffed at that slogan. 57 W h e r e internal o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s concerned, the rulers of S o v i e t L a t v i a acted u n e q u i v o c a l l y a c c o r d i n g to their internationalist sentiments a n d r a p i d l y established legal bases f o r u n i o n w i t h 57

Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, part I, pp. 21-22.

Soviet

Red Interlude of igig

J

39

Russia. O n January 1 7 , the L a t v i a n Congress of Soviets decided to base its internal functioning upon the Constitution of Soviet Russia 58 and " t o accept without change its basic statutes." 5 3 T h e Congress further entrusted the L a t v i a n Soviet of People's Commissars

"to

w o r k out a new situation of cooperation between the R S F R

and

Latvia . . .

in their common

[ w o r k i n g class] struggle against the

intervention of foreign imperialists . . ," 6 0 T h e organization of the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t of L a t v i a was, except for minor differences rising out of peculiarly L a t v i a n conditions, an accurate replica of the Soviet G o v e r n m e n t of Russia. 61 E a r l y in February the Soviet Government of L a t v i a ordered Russian currency introduced into Latvia. 6 2 T h e bourgeoisie w h o remained in the Bolshevik zone,

Stucka

writes, " d i d not live sweetly. T h e stern hand of the w o r k e r made itself felt w h e n the idle folk were sent directly f r o m the boulevards of R i g a into forced labor." 6 3 Besides facing random arrest or execution,

as ordered

tribunals, 64

the

by

the methodically

bourgeoisie

were

functioning

gradually

revolutionary

deprived

of

money,

linens, and clothing and generally compelled to trade homes with 58

Izvestia, January 21, 1919. Izvestia, February 7, 1919; Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, part II, p. 1 1 . 50 Izvestia, January 2 1 , 1919. 61 Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, part II, p. 14. "Because of economic conditions peculiar to our land we decided not to emulate slavishly the construction of the Soviet power of the R S F S R " (p. 38). Stucka further points out that the Latvian-devised scheme of government was approved by Sverdlov when he attended the First Congress of Latvian Soviets. 62 Izvestia, February 4, 1919. As in Lithuania, (Supra., note 50) the new currency was Kerensky money, or Kerenkis. The people had little confidence in it. On April 16, Die Rote Fahne reported that on "April 1 1 , the death sentence passed upon Yedid Gordon for non-acceptance of the Russian currency was commuted to a fine of 25,000 rubles or five years of hard labor." 63 Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, part I, pp. 148-149. " S t u c k a admits that about 1,000 persons were executed by order of the revolutionary tribunals. (Stucka, Pyat' Mesyatsev, part I, p. 147.) It is interesting to note that 1905 was recalled down to the minutest details. Numerous persons of Bait origins were convicted by the tribunals for their anti-revolutionary activities of fourteen years earlier. For instance, "Sweedra, son of August Jacob, sentenced to death for reporting the revolutionary Sarin to the punitive expedition of 1906 thus bringing about the shooting of comrade Sarin." (Rote Fahtie, February 23, 1919.) 59

140

The Formation of the Baltic States

working-class families.· 5 When food became scarce, the system of equal rations was changed to a distribution of food according to categories. T h e third category, consisting of "all bourgeoisie sentenced to forced labor, people over sixty-five, and, in general, all members of the bourgeoisie doing no socially useful w o r k , " received the smallest rations.66 A s it became known that the White troops were drawing near, the position of the Riga bourgeoisie became increasingly frightful, since for every Red A r m y defeat some of their numbers were executed.67 T h e change of Bolshevik temper from exaltation to bitter vindictiveness is best seen in two pronouncements made by Stucka, one early, the second much later in the occupation. In the first instance, speaking before a bourgeois audience in January, the kindly appearing President of the Republic assured his listeners that there was no danger of massacre. T h e irresistibly advancing Red movement, he said, did not distinguish between nationalities. " W e want equal rights for all peoples. W e do not even want to kill capitalists. W e only want to destroy their economic power [and] relieve them of the burden of their fortunes. A s soon as they have become workers, the distinction will be removed." In March, after the advancing Whites took Jelgava, Stucka declared that "the bourgeoisie must [not only] be degraded, they must be annihilated as a class." 6 ' In their last ditch fight for Riga, the Bolsheviks ordered all bourgeoisie capable of digging a trench to the front. Just before the Bolsheviks gave up the city they attempted a mass execution of political prisoners. However, they were able only to kill thirty-three persons before the arrival of the attacking forces.69 65 Popov, pp. 7 4 - 7 5 , 86-87, 1 2 0 - 1 2 2 ; Rote Fahne, April 26, 1919; M. Hunnius, Bilder aus der Zeit der Bolschewikenherrschaft in Riga, Heilbronn, 68 1927, p. 17. Popov, p. 138. 67 Popov, pp. 208-209; Baltischer Landeswehrverein, Die Baltische Landes68 wehr, Riga, 1929, p. 137 Popov, pp. 70, 205, 257. 89 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia, p. 678; E . Doebler, Briefe aus dem Bolschewi\engefängnis, (Riga, 7 9 / 9 ) , Gütersloh, 1926. For other accounts of Bolshevik rule of Riga, see A . Stenbock-Fermor, Freiwilliger Stenboc\, Stuttgart, 1929; E . Pinding, Roter Sturm über dein Baltenland, Marburg, 1936.

12

Germany's Last Stand in the East ESTONIA AND LITHUANIA TAKE SHAPE

T h e political structures of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia were fairly well formed by the beginning of 1919. Their provisional governments clearly indicated that the regimes would be patterned on the democracies of Western Europe and the United States. T h e aim of complete independence was, of course, implied in the existence of the Baltic governments, and each thought in terms of boundaries drawn generally in accordance with its country's ethnological frontiers. In this respect the governments of Lithuania and Latvia still faced many difficulties, not only in obtaining what was theoretically theirs, but also in retaining whatever they already held against Russian, German and, in the case of Lithuania, Polish aspirations. Another problem with which the three provisional governments were forced to cope was that of getting juridical recognition. This, to small nations, on the verge of being engulfed by large ones and desperately in need of financial, diplomatic, and other assistance, was a matter of life and death. Throughout 1919, the de facto governments of Lithuania, 1 Latvia, and Estonia, pleaded with the Allies for de jure recognition. T h e Baltic countries, in addition, had to find a way of stabilizing relations with Russia. Estonia, first of the three to see its ethnic territory cleared of 1 Lithuania did not receive de facto recognition f r o m Great Britain until September 24, 1919.

141

The Formation of the Baltic States

142

Soviet troops, was the first to elect a Constituent Assembly. In neither Lithuania nor Latvia did conditions permit this prior to 1920. The elections, boycotted by the Bolsheviks, took place during April 5-7, 1919. Eighty per cent of the electorate took part in the voting 2 and the results showed a decided trend toward the left, though in essence the country remained bourgeois-oriented. In actual figures the results of the election were as follows: 3

Socialist Revolutionary Social Democratic Labor National Democratic Estonian Peasants' League Christian German Russian

Per cent

Seats

4 37 25

7 41 3°

21

4 5 3

OO

Party

I

I

5 3

The Provisional Government, clearly too far to the right to be representative of the popular sentiment, resigned its powers to the Constituent Assembly on April 23, 1919. The new Cabinet, formed in accordance with the popular will, was a coalition of the three dominant parties with Strandmann as Premier. Strandmann's foreign program, as enunciated on May 12, stressed peace with Russia and the need for recognition abroad. Internally, social legislation and, above all, immediate agrarian reform were the keynotes of his address. On June 4, 1919, the Constituent Assembly adopted a provisional constitution which was thoroughly democratic in spirit. By October 10, 1919, expropriation of the large estates and redistribution of the land was officially under way. 4 In Lithuania, local government sprang up spontaneously as the population formed township and county administrative bodies. A Conference of Township Deputies met at Kaunas in January 1919, J. Buchan, The Baltic and Caucasian States, London, 1923, p. n o . Bulletin de l'Esthonie, April 1919, p. 14. 1 Graham, Governments, pp. 270-278.

2 3

Germany's Last Stand

143

to provide a kind of climax to this development. 5 T h e Provisional Government of Lithuania underwent a process of adjustment similar to that experienced by the Estonian government. Between N o v e m b e r 1918 and A p r i l 1919, four changes of Cabinet occurred. T h e s e were headed, in turn, by Voldemaras, Slezevicius, Dovydaitis, and Slezevicius again. T h e changes were caused partly by the need for personnel in the then all-important delegations to Paris and the return to Lithuania of refugee intellectuals. In the main, however, the changes reflected the struggle for power between the Christian Democratic and the Populist parties. 6 T h e Populist Party stood for separation of Church and State as well as for land reform involving the breaking up of large landed estates; the Christian Democrats took an opposite stand. 7 T h e fourth Ministry, headed by Slezevicius, finally balanced the relations between the Cabinet and the legislative Council of State and made both more representative of the popular will and of political trends. T h e composition of this Cabinet pretty well reflects the cooperation of all the Lithuanian parties except the Bolsheviks. Premier and Minister of Foreign A f f a i r s , Slezevicius, was a Populist; so too was Vileisis, Minister of Finances. Of the other fourteen members, three were Nationalists, two each were Christian Democrats and Social Democrats, and four were nonpartisan. Of the remaining three members, J. V o r o n k o and J. Vigodskis were ministers without portfolio, respectively, for W h i t e Ruthenian and Jewish affairs. 8 O n A p r i l 4, 1919, the Council of State changed the provisional constitution. T h e n e w constitution left the Council its legislative power, but placed supreme power into the hands of a single President elected by the Council. 9 It provided for a responsible ministry, included a bill of rights, and called for the convocation of 5

Jurgela, History of the Lithuanian Nation, pp. 513-514. Ehret, La Lituanie, p. 263. Ehret loosely uses the term Socialist to designate the small-farmer elements who opposed the Christian Democrats. 7 J. J. Hertmanowicz, Historical Outlines on Lithuania, Chicago, 1921, p. 13. 8 E . J. Harrison, Lithuania 1928, London, 1928, pp. 217-218. 9 Ehret, pp. 264-265. s

144

The Formation of the Baltic States

a Constituent Assembly. 10 Antanas Smetona was the unanimous choice for the Presidency of Lithuania." One of his first official acts was the confirmation, on April 12, of the newly formed Slezevicius Cabinet. T h e Provisional Government of Latvia found conditions during the first half of 1919 far too grim to concern itself with anything beyond the sheer business of remaining alive. Left by mid-January with but a shred of Latvian-speaking territory in Courland, among a native population partially sympathetic but also partly Bolshevik in its leanings, the government was in no position to do any theorizing about the future national institutions of Latvia. Its territorial frontier against the Red A r m y was guarded by German volunteers and the Baltic Landeswehr, composed principally of Baltic Germans. Internally, it was the German police that kept the workers of Liepäja from throwing out a government, in whose formation they had had no part.12 Winnig, having obtained the agreement which granted German fighters Latvian citizenship and the right to settle on Latvian land, 13 tried, during his last days in Courland, to gain, in return for German aid, written stipulations as to the amount of land to be awarded each German settler." Ulmanis and his government steadfastly evaded making any specific commitments. Although they could not afford to dispense with German volunteers, they hoped, as time went by, to be able to obtain assistance elsewhere. A t the moment Sweden seemed particularly promising for the recruitment of anti11 Ehret, p. 265. Graham, Governments, p. 375. R. von der Goltz, Meine Sendung in Finnland und im Baltikum, Munich, 1920, p. 131. 13 Walters, p. 368. According to Valters, this was the German interpretation. T h e Latvian Provisional Government, in signing the agreement, had made a mental reservation which intended to distinguish between those volunteers w h o fought "in the interests of the Latvian State" and those w h o fought for G e r m a n interests. By the application of such a principle, of course, all of those recruited in Germany could be denied the right to o w n land in Latvia. u W i n n i g , Ostpolitik, p. 103. H e hoped thus to bind the Latvian government to a contract which w o u l d reinforce the none too specific stipulations of the agreement signed on December 29, 1918. 10

12

Germany's Last Stand

145

15

Bolshevik volunteers. The Baits, however, who stood to lose whether the Latvians or the Bolsheviks gained the upper hand, had offered to donate one-third of their land for distribution to volunteers from Germany. 15 The German recruiting agencies, which mushroomed after January 1919, were to promise that land to the applicants for duty in Courland. The recruits were not always told that actual front-line fighting awaited them there.17

RUDIGER VON DER G O L T Z

There was, in any case, no danger that Latvia would be forsaken by Germany. In that country, by the end of January 1919, there existed a panicky fear that the Red Army would establish direct contact with the German Spartacists.18 Making use of this fear were the diehard group in the German Army and Pan-Germanists generally, who felt that an audacious thrust might yet regain some of the soil and honor won by German forces in the East.13 With this resurrection of an Ostpolitik came definite measures toward making an effective fighting force of the haphazardly formed Baltic detachments. By the middle of January, General Hoffmann ordered Major Josef Bischoff, an officer with an excellent record during the war, to Liepäja to begin the process of organizing an army along the tried and proven lines of Prussian discipline.20 Soon thereafter, General Rüdiger von der Goltz, having successfully completed his mission in Finland, where he had become known as the scourge of Bolsheviks, was given the assignment "to stem the [Red] tidal wave on the north-east boundary [of Germany]." 2 1 Von der Goltz arrived 15

The Times (London), January 24, 1919; Winnig, Ostpolitik pp. 103-104. Goltz, Meine Sendung, pp. 176-177. Their land, the Baits felt, was their land, regardless of what the people of Latvia might plan in the way of agrarian reform. " J . Bischoff, Die Letzte Front, Berlin, 1935, p. 31. 18 Winnig, Reich als Republik, p. 157; Goltz, Meine Sendung, pp. 122-123. 19 Goltz, Meine Sendung, p. 127. All further reference to Goltz is to this book. 20 21 Bischoff, pp. 23-24. Goltz, p. 123. 16

146

The Formation of the Baltic States

in Courland on February 1, 1919, to take over the command of the Iron Brigade. In his own words, Originally expected only to save East Prussia, I increasingly saw my task in the larger idea, that of the future of the seriously threatened Deutschtum . . . At the same time, however, one ought save what might yet be saved from the unfortunate outcome of the war. In the East, Germany was the victor. Had the troops in the East not mutinied we should still be near [Petrograd] . . . Why, then, might the unfulfilled Ostpolitik as of August 1918, not still be possible, though under the banner of anti-Bolshevism and aided by "White" Russians. This especially since England's power seemed confined to the sea . . . With such a goal before my eyes was I to stumble over blades of grass? I certainly was not going to worry over a Provisional Latvian Government, created two months before by the evacuating German authorities, whose ministers had fled to the Devil [referring to Ulmanis who was seeking help abroad], possessing only the smallest fraction of its territory, supported entirely by German bayonets . . . as long as [the Latvian government] refused to cooperate in matters which would decide the fate of both Germany and of Eastern Europe . . . Had it not been for the extreme left German parties and the German Soldiers' Council of Liepäja, which supported this so-called Provisional Government against the German General, 22 I should, when necessary, have disregarded [the Provisional Government] entirely. As it was, however, it meant depending upon one's own resources and the help of loyal co-workers, to conceal one's intentions and attempt to push them through against a world of foes. This great goal before my eyes, it meant seizing upon whatever means I considered right to attain it, always remembering to be able legally to justify my actions to the world. I fought against four enemies; the Bolshevik Army, the Liepäja Soldiers' Council influenced by the German radicals . . . the German-hating, half-Bolshevik Government of Latvia, and the Entente. 23 22 This is a misrepresentation. As von der Goltz himself clearly states (p. 139), it was the apparent reestablishment of an old-style German Army that the radicals and Soldiers' Councils feared. They opposed von der Goltz on those grounds and not because they especially cared what happened to the Latvian government. 23 Goltz, pp. 126-128. To von der Goltz any form of liberalism was synonymous with Bolshevism.

Germany's Last Stand Since the actions of von der Goltz matched his words, it is clear why he was so little trusted by his unwilling associates. His reconquest of most of Courland, including Jelgava, by March 18, earned him only a grudging expression of "satisfaction" from Ulmanis. The latter had for lack of funds, been unable to enlist volunteer aid from Sweden or elsewhere, and desired, more than ever, to conscript an army of pro-government Latvian troops. In this, he was steadily hampered by von der Goltz, who explained to the British, American, and French missions in Liepäja that he did not wish to become surrounded by Bolshevik-minded Latvian troops.21 By virtue of their Baltic fleet the British were the prime shapers of Allied policies in Latvia. Unwilling to intervene decisively on the side of the Latvians, they also believed it necessary to keep a sharp eye on von der Goltz. Since the Germans obtained most of their supplies and reinforcements by sea, the British established a blockade of the coast of Courland.

A L L I E D POLICY IN LATVIA

Article Twelve of the Armistice, providing that the defeated Germans remain on territory they had conquered, had grown out of the Allied interventionist program which was in full swing when the war ended. At the same time, and largely due to the same motives, the French and English governments had given de facto recognition to the governments of Latvia and Estonia, thereby implying that they favored their eventual de jure existence. Once the Bolshevik surge toward the Baltic had begun, these governments, particularly that of Estonia, were given some armed support, though still on a small scale. If, then, the Baltic governments surmised that the Allied Powers were interested in their survival, they can scarcely be accused of wishful thinking. But the existence of independent Baltic states was less important to the Allies than the continuation of the anti-Bolshevik struggle. Additional proof of this is seen in their negotiations with the Kolchak government; this, in spirit at 24

Goltz, pp. 149, 1 5 3 , 160.

6+

148

The Formation of the Baltic States

least, ran counter to any actions or promises implying ultimate recognition of the Baltic governments. Kolchak, Commander-in-Chief of the Russian Black Sea Fleet since 1916, had resigned his commission before the fall of the Kerensky government.25 Considering the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk as a Bolshevik sellout to the Germans, he offered his services to the British government. His offer accepted, he was ordered to the Mesopotamian Front. O n the journey to Mesopotamia, in April 1918, Kolchak was suddenly informed that the British government needed him to help in the reconstruction of the Eastern Front in Siberia.26 Not long after that, the famous Czechoslovak-TransSiberian incident removed Siberia from the military and political control of the Bolsheviks. By the summer of 1918, there existed in Siberia several regional anti-Bolshevik governments, ranging politically from conservative to socialist. Certain Russian leaders came to an agreement with representatives of the Entente on the desirability of establishing a single All-Russian (non-Bolshevik) government. After considerable controversy and compromise, such a government, called the Directorate, was formed on September 23, 1918.27 The Directorate was destined to lead a futile and directionless existence. Composed of irreconcilable elements, it was at a further disadvantage in being located at Omsk, where an arch-conservative group, having some military forces, had seized regional control. In a coup d'etat on November 18, 1918, the Omsk regional leaders replaced the Directorate by a conservative all-Russian government, with Kolchak as Supreme Ruler. The Entente representatives at Omsk had supported the coup since the Directorate had given no indication that it would be of any value to the interventionist efforts. "Against all common sense and geography," as Miliukov writes, the remote Omsk government, rather than rich Southern Russia, 25 P. Miliukov, "Admiral Kolchak," New Russia, I, no. 3, February, 19, 1920, p. 72. 26 K . A. Popov, Dopros Kolchaka, Leningrad, 1925, pp. 99-100, 103-107. 27 E. Varneck and Η. H. Fisher, The Testimony of Kolchak. and Other Siberian Materials, Stanford, 1935, p. 238.

Germany's Last Stand

149

was henceforth regarded as the nucleus of the future All-Russian government, and as the focal center of "national resistance to Bolshevism." 2 8 Allied, or, as General D e n i k i n suspected, French pressure, induced him, the leader of the South Russian resistance, to recognize the supreme authority of Kolchak on June 12, I9i9· 28 Yudenich, leader of the Russian Northwest A r m y , operating from Estonia, also recognized the supreme authority of the O m s k government. 30 Allied policy in the Baltic, therefore, with regard to Russian and minority nationalist aspirations, becomes comprehensible in terms of the understanding arrived at by the Allied governments and the All-Russian Provisional government at O m s k . In Clemenceau's statement of M a y 26, 1919, the Powers declared their willingness to render material assistance to A d m i r a l Kolchak and those associated with him for the purpose of creating an allRussian government—on condition . . . "that there be regulation of mutual relations with the newly formed border states, with the concurrence of the L e a g u e of Nations, pending which, their autonomy be recognized." 3 1 O n June 4, K o l c h a k replied, stating in effect that the independence of Poland was recognized, but that the final delimitation of her Russian frontiers as well as the final settlement of the Finnish and Bessarabian questions, rested with the Constituent Assembly. W i t h regard to the "national g r o u p s " of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and to the Caucasian and TransCaucasian countries, their autonomy w a s recognized in principle; the scope of such autonomy would be determined separately in each instance. T h e collaboration of the L e a g u e of Nations was admitted as a means for reaching a satisfactory agreement. 32 28

Miliukov, p. 73. A. I. Denikin, Ocherk} Russ!{oy Smuti, 5 vols., Berlin, V, pp. 95, 98. A letter from Denikin to Kolchak, expressing anti-French sentiments, had been intercepted and published by the Bolsheviks. To this Denikin attributes a personal hatred against him on the part of Clemenceau which may have led to the choice of Omsk over South Russia as the "All-Russian" antiBolshevik center. (Denikin, V, p. 89.) 30 L. Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, 2 vols., New York, 1930, I, p. 205. 31 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia, p. 369. 32 Foreign Relations, Russia, p. 377. 29

The Formation of the Baltic States In contrast to the explicit decision on Polish independence, the vague statements regarding the future of the Baltic peoples m a k e it plain enough that K o l c h a k had no intention of depriving his N e w Russia of the Baltic coast. W h e n , by the middle of June, the Allies, without granting the K o l c h a k government recognition, accepted the O m s k proposition, 33 it was clear that the Baltic governments could be sure of little more than sympathy. B y the beginning of 1919, the Allies were pursuing an interventionist policy in the Baltic and were attempting to employ three forces—Germans, Baltic governments, and W h i t e Russians—each pulling in a separate direction. T o make matters worse, there w a s policy disagreement between the American and British missions at Liepäja. Lieutenant Colonel W a r w i c k Greene, w h o headed the American Mission, was sharply critical of the British-imposed blockade of Courland. H e also disapproved of the aid in arms and equipment which " h u n baiter" M a j o r A . H . K e e n a n , H e a d of the British Mission, was giving the Latvians. Considering the G e r m a n s to be the only effective anti-Bolshevik force available, Greene thought it necessary, while protecting the Latvians f r o m the Germans, to do nothing that might undermine the military authority of the G e r m a n Command. 3 1 T o judge by American comments about von der Goltz and by the G e r m a n General's friendly words about the attitude of the American Mission, it w o u l d seem that the Americans were unduly impressed by von der Goltz's talk of living up to Article T w e l v e of the Armistice and of saving the W e s t f r o m Bolshevism. 3 5 33 34

Foreign Relations, Russia, p. 379. Foreign Relations of the United States, The Paris Peace Conference,

igig, 13 vols., Washington, 1947, XII, pp. 139, 141, 178. These thirteen volumes will hereafter be referred to as Peace Conference. 35 Peace Conference, XII, pp. 1 4 6 - 1 4 7 ; Goltz, p. 154. A s late as June 22, Colonel E. J. Dawley, then temporary head of the American Mission, in a report enumerating the "real" purposes of Germany in the Baltic campaign, cited firstly the aim of fighting Bolshevism and only fourthly that of extending and maintaining German influence outside of Germany. " T h e Allies," Dawley writes, "have stooped to harassing the German occupying forces and have never attempted to define their position in a straightforward and constructive manner. They have neither treated with the German as an ally,

Germany's Last Stand Suddenly the Allied governments were made painfully aware of the fact that their Baltic interventionist compound was not only unstable but was downright explosive. On April 16 a detachment of the Landesu/ehr, manned by Baits and led by the youthful Baron Hans von ManteufTel, arrested the Latvian government. Premier Ulmanis, however, managed to find refuge on a Latvian steamer in Liepäja Harbor under the protection of British warships. Whether or not von der Goltz was the master-mind behind the so-called April Putsch is still a matter of conjecture.36 The manner of utter disrespect which he and his volunteers displayed toward the Latvian government certainly did much to inspire the disgruntled Baits to resort to violence. The Allies, in any case, had not a moment's doubt about whom to hold responsible. " T h e whole affair," states an April 23 report sent to the Commissioners Plenipotentiary in Paris, "took place with the connivance and support o f . . . von der Goltz, commander of the German Army ostensibly defending Latvia and Article X I I of the November Armistice." 37 Von der Goltz himself denied all complicity in the coup, but, admitting his heartfelt sympathy toward the "maltreated" Baits, proceeded to make political capital out of the incident. Brazenly declaring the affair to be an internal matter of Latvia and hence none of his concern, von der Goltz made certain that a new Latvian government was swiftly formed. "About ten days after the coup d'etat," he writes, "the Entente made a categorical demand that the [Ulmanis] regime be restored. Land Marshall Bröderich and Baron Stromberg... came to m e . . . to ask what to do. I declared: 'By tomorrow at noon the new regime must be organized; otherwise the game of the Baits is lost.' fought him as an enemy, or considered him as their agent or servant, which in fact he was. . . . They have been prone to insult him as an interloper and let things go at that." (Peace Conference, XII, p. 205.) 36 For a lengthy and exceedingly well-documented presentation suggesting that von der Goltz "aided and abetted—if he did not personally plan and direct—the coup," see R. G. L . Waite, Vanguard of Nazism, The Free Corps Movement in Poslu/ar Germany, 1918-1923, Cambridge, Mass., 1952, pp. 1 1 4 - 1 1 6 . 37 38 Peace Conference, XII, p. 147. Goltz, pp. 176, 184.

IJ2

The Formation of the Baltic States

T h e new government, actually installed on May 10, was headed by Pastor Niedra, who, clad in a Red A r m y outfit, had just escaped from Bolshevik-held Riga. Its ministers, one-third of them Baits and the rest pro-German Latvians, von der Goltz describes as "fervent patriots w h o placed love for their country above party loyalty." T h e anti-Bait and anti-German uprising brought on in Courland by the coup d'etat was squelched by von der Goltz. During its fifty-four-day tenure the puppet regime performed flawlessly. V o n der Goltz had little trouble in convincing the Reich Government that a capture of Riga by the Landeswehr would be "an internal affair of Latvia." 39 T h e Niedra regime, having raised the morale of the Iron Division by affirming the promise of land for its soldiers,40 ordered the liberation of Riga by the Landeswehr and "accepted" the aid of the German volunteers. Shortly before the fall of Riga on May 23, von der Goltz had held out, to a highly interested member of the German Foreign Office, vistas of an eventual German advance from Riga to Petrograd, the capture of which by the Germans might lead to an "essential change in the terms of the Versailles Treaty. A t the same time, all responsibility for the further advance could be heaped upon the unruly General, thus covering [the German government] against the Entente."" T h e series of rash moves by von der Goltz opened Allied eyes to the dangers of permitting a large and growing German force to operate in Latvia. This realization probably marks the turning point in the Baltic governments' tortuous journey to legal status. Allied diplomacy decided to replace the German volunteers with soldiers drawn from the Baltic countries. T h e general plan was worked out in a series of conferences at Paris in May 1919. A joint Allied Commission was to go to the Baltic, remove the "perfidious" Germans from the anti-Soviet Baltic front as fast as possible, and Goltz, pp. 183-185, 190. Bilmanis, History of Latvia, p. 322; Goltz, p. 189. 41 Goltz, p. 190. Some Latvian companies under Colonel Balodis and some White Russians also participated in the capture of Riga. See S. Tallents, Man and Boy, London, 1943, p. 309. For other accounts of the campaign see F. von Steinaecker, Mit der Eisernen Division im Baltenland, Hamburg, 1930; also K . von Braatz, Fürst Anatol Pawlowttseh Lieven, Stuttgart, 1926. 39

40

Germany's Last Stand

*J3

expedite the raising and equipping of native Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian troops, or, if necessary, Scandinavian volunteers.42 The German withdrawal was finally brought about by December 1919, thanks to Allied pressure upon the German government and the efforts of the fighting men of Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania. The first diplomatic moves by the Allies consisted in the sending of notes to the German Armistice Commission at Spa, demanding that the German forces in Latvia reinstate the Ulmanis government and that von der Goltz be promptly removed from the command of the Iron Division. A reply on May 9 from General von Hammerstein declared that the German government had had no part in the fall of the Latvian government, that Germany was observing meticulous neutrality in Latvian affairs, and, making no mention of von der Goltz, stated further that all German troops would be withdrawn as soon as a truce had been drawn up between the German and the Soviet governments." The last point served as a reminder that the Germans had not yet lost their usefulness. The Allies reaffirmed Germany's obligations under Article Twelve of the Armistice, but declared themselves, under certain conditions, willing to forego the demand that von der Goltz be removed. The conditions—von der Goltz was to help establish a coalition government representing all parties of Latvia in approximate ratio to their strength, to rearm the Latvian troops which he had disarmed, and to authorize the immediate and unhindered mobilization and training of the local Latvian forces." Von der Goltz, flushed with victory, was little interested in compromises. Soon after the capture of Riga, he ordered the Iron Division to advance northward "in aid" of Niedra's Landeswehr. Von der Goltz was "surprised" to encounter stiff resistance on the part of the joined forces of the Estonian Army and the Latvian Northern Corps, the latter led by Captain Zemitäns.45 The Latvian 42

D. H. Miller, My Diary at the Conference of Paris, with Documents, 21 vols., New York, 1924, X V I , pp. 246-247, 350-356, 363-364. 43 Miller, XVIII, pp. 3 1 3 - 3 1 5 . 44 Miller, pp. 373-375. 45 Bilmanis, History of Latvia, p. 322; Goltz, p. 198. Von der Goltz's "surprise" was over the fact that the Estonians should have fought against

154

The Formation of the Baltic States

units had originally been formed on March 31, 1919, under auspices of the Estonian government, on a small corner of territory in Northern Latvia from which General Laidoner had driven the Red Army. This had been done in response to Ulmanis' appeals for help.46 On June 23, 1919, the combination of Iron Division and Landeswehr sustained a decisive defeat at Cesis, in northern Latvia and was driven back into Riga. In the meantime it had become clear to the Allies that von der Goltz was more trouble than he was worth. It would do little good to arm the Baltic countries against Bolshevism, only to permit their military strength to be dissipated in fighting the Germans. On June 13 the Allied Council at Paris decided to instruct Foch to order the Germans to evacuate Liepäja and Ventspils at once, and, in accordance with Article Twelve of the Armistice, to complete the evacuation of all territory which before the war formed part of Russia." British General Sir Hubert Gough, appointed June 4 to head the Inter-Allied Mission in Latvia, wired to von der Goltz on June 10, ordering him to withdraw his troops into Courland and to permit Ulmanis to set up a government and to organize a Latvian Army. 48 Appearing personally in Riga on June 13, Gough demanded also that the Niedra government and the Landeswehr return to Courland. Gough's order, which "destroyed all the German hopes," was bitterly received by von der Goltz. 49 However, such strong emphasis was lent it soon after by the Estonian-Latvian forces driving upon Riga that he had no choice but to comply. A n armistice between the German and Estonian commands was concluded at Strazdmuiza, the army w h i c h professed the intention of saving them from the Bolsheviks. T h e Estonians, of course, understood his motives perfectly and hated the Germans as much as they did the Bolsheviks and trusted them as little. (See Wrangeil, Geschichte des Balten Regiments, pp. i i o - n i . ) 46 Pusta, p. 15. 17 E. L . W o o d w a r d and R. Butler, editors, Documents on British Foreign Policy, / 9 / 9 - / 9 J 9 , first series, III, 1919, London, 1949, p. 1. T h i s volume will hereafter be referred to as British Foreign Policy. See also Peace Conference, V I , p. 374. t8 British Foreign Policy, pp. 1-2; Goltz, pp. 198-199, 202. " G o l t z , pp. 199, 202-203.

Germany's Last Stand

155

near Riga, on July 3 under the supervision of Allied representatives, headed by Colonel Sir Stephen Tallents, British Commissioner for the Baltic Provinces. The armistice, among other things, provided for the separation from the Iron Division of the Landeswehr, which, under command of an Englishman, became a unit of the Latvian Army. 50 The evacuation of the Latvian capital was completed on July 5, and on July 8, Ulmanis, sailing from Liepäja, made his triumphant re-entry. The newly formed Latvian government was minus a number of Latvians, among these Zälltis and Goldmanis, and included three Baits.51 The Latvian Army, provided with equipment by Britain and France and commanded by Colonel Jänis Balodis, was, by July's end, brought to the respectable size of two divisions, a third being in the formative process.52 On June 18 Foch had communicated the Allied wishes to the German Armistice Commission. Von Hammerstein replied that only the naval blockade prevented the rapid exit of the German forces from Courland, and on June 29 the German Naval Armistice Commission was notified that the blockade was lifted.53 In the ensuing three months the Reich government acquiesced in general terms to Allied demands for an earfy evacuation and transmitted numerous orders to that effect to von der Goltz. At the same time it let the leaders of the volunteers corps know that haste in executing the orders was not essential, that they need not take the evacuation orders too seriously and should, upon their own responsibility, do whatever they thought the situation called for. "Against the 'orders' of the government," writes Bischoff, did not necessarily mean "against the 'will' of the government." 54 In attempting to delay the evacuation, the Reich government and the Supreme Command, by that time in close mutual association, 50 British Foreign Policy, p. 10; Bischoff, p. 150. For a detailed account of the negotiations leading to the armistice, see S. Tallents, pp. 324-331. 51 Goltz, p. 209. 52 A. Niessei, L'evacuation des pays baltiques par les Allemands, Paris, 1935, p. 20. 53 British Foreign Policy, pp. 1-2, 8-9. 54 Bischoff, p. 176; see also F. W. von Oertzen, Die Deutschen Freikorps 1918-1923, Munich, 1936, p. 87.

6*

I56

The Formation of the Baltic States

were, in fact, trying to play both ends—Allies and volunteers— against the middle. There were, on the one hand, reasons of Politi\ for wishing the volunteers to remain where they were. One segment of the ruling circles, in a chain leading from Winnig and other nationalists to von der Goltz, still had hopes of retaining control in the Baltikum.55 Gough believed that the Germans meant to keep their troops in Latvia until the Baltic ports froze, making it difficult for British sea power to make itself felt.56 There was, of course, a fear, shared by most Germans, that the returning volunteers would be followed into East Prussia by the Red Army.57 A further factor of Politi\ was the White Russian military force, which was growing rapidly in Courland thanks to the support in money, clothing, and equipment which it received from the Reich.58 The German government and military leaders wanted that force to have as much time as possible in which to develop its strength and they knew that once the Germans had been evacuated, the Russians would have lost their justification for remaining on the soil of Latvia.59 The hierarchy of the German Army, including the influential General Hans von Seeckt, was already thinking far beyond the Baltikum. The important thing to these leaders was to prevent the Entente from surrounding Germany, and the last place for a break-through seemed to be Entente-oriented Latvia.60 The Germans, in short, were already laying the foundations for an alliance with Russia. Nor, as it happened, was von Seeckt deterred when the Bolsheviks finally defeated the Whites. In January 1920, while speaking of the need to build "a wall [in Germany] against Bolshevism," von Seeckt also declared it necessary that German policy 55 British Foreign Policy, pp. 40-41. In the summer of 1919, having served since January as Reichs\ommissar for East and West Prussia and for Germanoccupied territory of the former Russian Empire, Winnig was appointed Oberpräsident of East Prussia. 56 Peace Conference, VII, p. 433. 57 British Foreign Policy, pp. 127-128. 58 Bischoff, pp. 166, 181. 55 Oertzen, pp. 84-85. 60British Foreign Policy, p. 41. ". . . only through Courland was it still possible to break through the Versailles ring [around Germany]." (Bischoff, p. 191.)

Germany's Last Stand

!J7

be unfailingly directed toward a "political and economic understanding with Russia." 81 The Reich's delay of the evacuation was prompted also by fear of the volunteers. A t various times since the Iron Division's capture of Jelgava, the government had promised these volunteers either land in Courland or positions in the Reichswehr,62 The terms of the Treaty of Versailles made it clear enough that neither promise could be fulfilled. The Latvians used Article 292 of the Treaty, canceling all obligations to Germany, as one of their pretexts for breaking their agreement with Winnig. 63 Worse yet, there would be no jobs open to the returning Baltic veterans because, having been labeled "reactionaries," they were faced with a boycott by the trade unions." With nothing but a skeleton military force at its disposal, the German government was in no hurry to see return a powerful army which, bitterly disappointed,65 might attempt to overthrow it.66 On August i, Allied impatience having grown acute, Foch, for the first time, specified a date—August 30—by which the evacuation was to be completed. H e further demanded that the Germans submit by August 15 a detailed plan for the evacuation, and ordered that it be carried out by sea so that the Allies could oversee and expedite the movement of troops. Foch also forbade the sending of new volunteers into Latvia. 67 61

F. von Rabenau, Seec\t: Aus Seinem Leben, 1918-1936, Leipzig, 1940, 0 p. 252. Bischoff, pp. 88, 192-193. 63 British Foreign Policy, p. 50. The Latvian government also declared that the agreement had never enjoyed anything better than a provisional status. Some positions in the Reichswehr might be found for the officers of the volunteers corps. But how were the younger and provenly capable leaders, who had excelled in commanding detachments of regimental size, to be given places adequate to their deserts in the tiny Versailles-determined German Army? (Oertzen, pp. 86-87.) "Bischoff, p. 193. 65 At a meeting held at the Jelgava Club on July 27, the representatives of 10,000 soldiers "urged the German Legation to support their claim to citizenship and land in Latvia 'promised by the big land-owners for the liberation of Latvia from Bolshevism.' " (British Foreign Policy, p. 50.) 66 The Kapp Putsch of March, 1920, in Berlin was largely a product of the bitterness among the Baltic veterans. i7

British Foreign Policy, p. 47.

IJ8

The Formation of the Baltic States

T h e G e r m a n government declared that the time allotted for the evacuation was too brief and, although von der G o l t z had informed General G o u g h that an evacuation by land w o u l d require at least seventy-four days, 68 maintained that evacuation by sea would cause undue delay. T h e G e r m a n s explained that the volunteers had not received the land due them from the Latvian government. I f , therefore, they were collected " f o r transport into a p o r t , " it " w o u l d bring the troops into close touch with Latvian authorities, Latvian troops and civilians" and " l e a d to large demonstrations against the Latvian government." 6 9 T h e Reich either did not w a n t to face the unpleasant truth that it had failed the volunteers or wanted the latter to go on believing that their cause was still being ardently championed. 70 A t about the same time, in private talks concerning the determined Allied stand on evacuation, the Social Democratic leaders of the Reich assured von der Goltz that the government would hold nothing against such volunteers as might care to remain in L a t v i a . " But, k n o w i n g that the return of the volunteers could not much longer be delayed, the government began the evacuation by ordering the departure of small units f r o m different parts of Courland, which, upon their return to G e r m a n y , could be easily disarmed and "scattered into the winds." 7 2 One such unit, the First Infantry Battalion of the Iron Division, had been scheduled to detrain from Jelgava on A u g u s t 23. Just before the troop's departure, Major Bischoff, acting in a manner which he believed to represent the true desires of his government, 68

Peace Conference, VII, p. 433. British Foreign Policy, pp. 60-61. The insincerity of the Government's concern for the rights of the volunteers, as expressed in the course of the diplomatic negotiations of July and August, is well revealed by the comments of Foreign Minister Hermann Müller in September, by which time there was no longer any point in continuing to masquerade. Müller complained that the volunteers were not submissively accepting their disappointment and that they were accusing the Latvian people of breach of contract. (Bischoff, p. 183.) n Goltz, p. 242. '2 Bischoff, p. 189. 69 70

Germany's Last Stand

!59

took it upon himself to forbid the evacuation." T h e G e r m a n government, although it had not sponsored the " m u t i n y , " used the incident to advantage by informing the Allies that its orders had been disobeyed. Volunteers, in the meantime, continued to arrive in Latvia in the guise of "vacationers." 7 4 A n ultimatum by Foch on September 24, along with American threats of severe economic reprisals, as well as the resumption on October 2 of the blockade of the coast of Courland, finally caused the Germans to act in a more decisive fashion. B y order of Noske, G e r m a n Minister of Defense, the sending of all supplies was halted as was the recruiting of volunteers for the Iron Division. On October 2 the G e r m a n government requested the Entente Commission to ascertain for itself that the Government had done everything in its power to bring about the return of the troops. 75 Anticipating just such a situation, a plan, laid early in July by von der G o l t z and unofficially approved of by the G e r m a n government, 76 then went into operation. THE

"WEST

RUSSIAN"

ARMY

Of the original Russian Northern Corps, 77 the part which, early in 1919, did not join the Estonian forces, intended to pass through 73 Bischoff, pp. 194-195. On the night of Sunday, August 24, the German and Landeswehr troops held a demonstration against Latvia and the Allies, with 10,000 men taking part in a giant torchlight parade. On the main street provocative talks were given, in one of which Bischoff declared, "The die is cast—there is no going back. Now we march on Riga." On Monday, August 25, the Germans began to attack and rob Latvian soldiers and plunder and destroy Latvian military establishments, including the Jelgava headquarters. In Riga this was thought to be a prelude to another Putsch like that of April 16. (See Riga Baltische Heimat, August 27, 28, 1919.) Representatives of the volunteers sent a paper to the German government stating that they disobeyed their Government's orders only because they knew it to be acting under Allied pressure. "As soldiers, brought up in the duty of obeying, we must still place our consciences above such orders . . . and save our Fatherland . . . from the breakthrough of the Bolshevik hordes." (O. Wagener, Von der Heimat Geächtet, Stuttgart, 1920, pp. 33-35·) 74 Bischoff, p. 176; Niessel, p. 20. They came by way of Tilsit and 75 Klaipeda. Bischoff, pp. 211-212. 76 77 Goltz, pp. 228, 242-243. See page 128.

ι6ο

Τbe Formation of the Baltic States

Germany and Poland and eventually join General Denikin in South Russia. However, it stopped on the way, at Liepäja, and decided to join the German volunteers in their fight against the Red Army. 78 Prince Anatol Lieven, a Russian of Bait origin, was placed at the head of the small troop, consisting mostly of officers. Throughout 1919 the detachment increased in size, attracting Russian White refugees and anti-Bolsheviks w h o had been released from German prison camps.75 A t the same time other Russian volunteer corps were being organized by Colonel Bermondt (Avalov-Bermondt) and Colonel Virgolich. When von der Goltz had started his drive on Jelgava and Riga in February, Lieven had found it expedient to join his forces with those of the German General. T h e idea of driving the Bolsheviks out of Latvia appealed to Lieven since it coincided with his own idea for using Latvia as a base for driving through Pskov and Daugavpils to the Bologoye station of the Moscow-Petrograd railway, and thereby cutting the communications between the two vital Bolshevik centers. This plan was later approved of by the staff of the Russian Northwest Army, led by Yudenich, whom Lieven regarded as his immediate superior. Lieven's status as subordinate to Yudenich was made official in June 1919 by order of Kolchak. Once Latvia was freed from the Bolsheviks, Lieven's units were to become the right wing of the Northwest Army. 80 T h e difference between the basic aims of von der Goltz and Lieven came into focus only after the conquest of Riga. V o n der Goltz and Major Fletcher, Chief of the Landeswehr, hoping to regain the Baltikum for Germany, meant to advance northward beyond Riga; Lieven refused to cooperate. Fletcher pleaded with him not to desert him, but Lieven replied that the struggle between Bait and nationalist Latvian or Estonian would create undying hatreds,81 and that he must, therefore, remain neutral. Lieven feared, 78 A . P. Lieven, " V iuzhnoy Pribaltike," Beloye Delo, III, p. 190. It originally stopped at Riga but withdrew to Liepäja when Riga fell to the Reds. 7S Beli Ar\hiv, I, pp. 107-108; Goltz, p. 221. 80 Lieven, " V iuzhnoy Pribaltike," p. 192. 81 Lieven, p. 203; Braatz, Fürst Anatol Pawlowitsch Lieven, pp. 106-109.

Germany's Last Stand

161

further, that if he helped attack the Estonians, they would simply cease supporting Yudenich. 82 Lieven had been badly wounded in the fight for Riga and he returned to Jelgava. There, while convalescing, he supervised the formation of the volunteer units, swelled by daily additions from Germany. In May and June, Bermondt and Virgolich, whose units were still quite small and ill-equipped, 83 placed themselves under Lieven, chief of the Russian forces in Courland, in exchange for which he promised not to interfere in the internal organization of their commands. 84 In June the Germans had been forced to withdraw into Courland. Von der Goltz, foreseeing the campaign to get him out of the Baltikum, had devised the following scheme to circumvent Allied plans. T h e Russians had Allied support in the Baltic, and, throughout Russia, W h i t e governments had been formed with Allied approval. If, then, a W e s t Russian Government could be formed by prominent Russians in Berlin, such a government could grant citizenship to the German volunteers and induct them into a Russian army, the obvious nucleus of which already existed in the forces under Lieven's command. T h e Germans could then fight on in the " W e s t Russian" army. T h i s would absolve the German government of all responsibility for the volunteers and wipe out the legal basis for the Allied demands that they be evacuated from Latvia. Exactly how Lieven would have reacted to participation in this scheme is hard to say. Aware as he was of differing German and Russian aims in the Balti\um, he also knew that, for whatever reasons, the Germans were far more willing to fight the Bolsheviks than were the Allies. 85 T h e long-range German hopes of retaining the Baltic territory, he did not take too seriously. In common with the other W h i t e Russian generals, he regarded all that might happen on former Russian territory during the civil war period as unofficial, since only the re-established legal Russian state would decide the final disposition of such territory. In June, before Lieven 82

Lieven, pp. 203, 202. P. M. Avalov, Im Kampf gegen den Bolschewismus, Hamburg, 1925, 84 85 p. 153· Lieven, p. 203. Lieven, p. 205. 83

162

The Formation of the Baltic States

could have been put to the test by von der Goltz, General Yudenich, acting under English instructions, ordered Lieven's detachments, minus all Germanophile elements, to Narva. 86 Lieven obeyed the order as reluctantly as Yudenich had given it. For Lieven it meant giving up hope that he might execute his own plan of attack via Pskov and Daugavpils, and he disliked leaving Courland which was proving such an excellent base for Russian recruitments.87 Allied wishes to the contrary, neither Yudenich nor Lieven desired to sever relations with the Germans. These circumstances explain the amazing role which Bermondt was to play. He, along with Lieven, had been ordered "by Yudenich" to report to Narva. However, Bermondt refused to obey on the ground that his detachments were not yet ready for action. This "disobedience," since it left the way open for the Pskov campaign and for continuing relations with the Germans, coincided with the actual wishes of both Lieven and Yudenich. Hence it is understandable that Lieven designated Bermondt as his successor and that Yudenich appointed him Supreme Commander of all the Russian forces in Courland.88 Before leaving Jelgava, Lieven had a final talk with Bermondt,89 cautioning him that the best interests of the Russian cause could be served only if Bermondt led his forces to the Daugavpils anti-Bolshevik front. An attack by way of Riga, Lieven explained, would, under the prevailing political conditions, be a mistake. Bermondt agreed to carry out his superior's suggestions, but, ignoring them completely, attacked Riga, and thereby, according to Lieven, utterly destroyed the possibility of a Russian success in the west.90 Bermondt's army in Courland grew rapidly during September and reached a total of 15,000 men. The Allies grew uneasy about that potential combination of conservative Germans and conserva86 This was another of the moves designed to cut the ground from under the Germans. Lieven relates how the command from Yudenich reached him in Jelgava and was conveyed in an automobile driven by British officers. 87 a8 Wrangell, p. 1 1 3 . Bischoff, p. 180. 89 Still too ill to join Yudenich personally, Lieven went to Germany to 90 recover. Lieven, p. 208.

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tive Russians, 91 especially since it worried the Baltic governments and tended to keep them f r o m concentrating on the Bolsheviks. So the Allies continued to press Yudenich to order Bermondt's Russians to move to Estonia. Yudenich did issue a n u m b e r of orders to that effect but, according to one unfriendly opinion, always managed to let Bermondt k n o w that it mattered little whether or not he obeyed. 92 Whatever the case, Bermondt, on various pretexts, constantly disobeyed. Yudenich no doubt believed that Bermondt was w o r k i n g for the W h i t e Russian cause and was remaining in Courland where he could get more help f r o m the G e r m a n s t h a n Yudenich was getting f r o m the English. However, Bermondt was an adventurer par excellence. Never failing to profess great devotion to Russia, he was mainly interested in promoting his o w n career. 93 F r o m his point of view, the G e r m a n side had more to offer, since it opened vistas to goals far greater than he could expect as a mere subordinate to Yudenich. In the meantime, von der Goltz had been busy organizing a W e s t Russian " g o v e r n m e n t . " Early in August, a W e s t Russian "Council of State" was formed. A m o n g its leaders were the diplomat Baron L u d w i g Karlovich K n o r r i n g , H e r m a n Vasilyevich von Berg, a Moscow industrialist, and Colonel Petr Petrovich Durnovo, Chief of Staff with General Gurko. 9 4 Despite m a n y attempts by von der Goltz to interest bigger men, particularly General G u r k o , "bestk n o w n a m o n g Russian Generals in Western E u r o p e , " in this scheme, n o Russian of real repute wanted his n a m e connected w i t h so spurious an enterprise. 95 For lack of a better m a n , the " W e s t Russian g o v e r n m e n t " confirmed Bermondt's appointment as Supreme C o m m a n d e r of the West Russian A r m y , so that by 91

92 93

Wrangell, p. 1 1 2 .

Du Parquet, L'aventure

allemande en Lettonie, Paris, 1926, pp. 151-154.

In the opinion of Colonel Tallents, Bermondt was a megalomaniac who envisaged himself as a future Tsar of Russia. (British Foreign Policy, p. 86.) 94

Goltz, p. 256; Bischoff, p. 180; British Foreign Policy, p. 279. General

Gurko, then living in Copenhagen, had served as Head of the Russian General Staff from the fall of 1916 to the spring of 1917. 95 Lieven, pp. 205-207; Braatz, p. 125.

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The Formation of the Baltic States

October 6, 1919, all was in readiness. O n that date the 30,000 German volunteers in Courland, 96 all of w h o m had been granted West Russian citizenship, were officially transferred into the service of the West Russian Army. 9 7 T h i s brought the total number of men under Bermondt's command to about 5o,ooo.S8 H o w seriously the Germans regarded their transfer of allegiance is recorded by Ernst von Salomon, then a member of the Baltic corps. T h e volunteers attached the Russian insignia to their caps but " s l y l y " covered it with that of the G e r m a n corps. " J o k i n g l y w e accepted the banknotes which Bermondt had printed, the security for which w o u l d be the army materiel which w e w o u l d capture. W e drank the distasteful Russian Schnaps and learned to curse in Russian. T h u s , since w e were n o longer to be Germans, w e became Russian." 3 9 Bermondt, with a considerable force behind him, now thought in terms of conquering Moscow. A s self-appointed savior of the Russian monarchy, and thereby a participant in the universal antiBolshevik cause, Bermondt thought he had a right to expect neutrality, at least, on the part of the Latvian government, through whose territory his troops would have to pass on their " s a c r e d " mission. T h e Germans under his command never lost sight of their particular cause. " T h e slogan T h e F i g h t Against Bolshevism," von Salomon writes, " w e did not take seriously. W e had had opportunity enough to observe w h o benefited f r o m that. T h e first battle [against the R e d A r m y in Courland in M a r c h ] w e had w o n for E n g l a n d . In the second battle w e intended to take back f r o m the English w h a t w e had w o n for them in the first."100 T h e Latvian government, however, like the G e r m a n s themselves, had little faith in the G e r m a n anti-Bolshevik banner. It wanted neither G e r m a n s disguised as Russians, nor Russians, whether dis96

S7 Avalov, pp. 218-219. Bischoff, p. 212. Avalov, pp. 218-219. 99 E. von Salomon, Die Geächteten, Berlin, 1933, p. 131. 100 Von Salomon, p. 131. Von der Goltz, Bischoff, and all those connected with the Baltic campaign persistently maintained that Ulmanis' Latvia was nothing more than an English colony. 98

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guised or undisguised, on its territory and demanded German evacuation. So, relates von Salomon, "Bermondt decided to start his crusade with the conquest of Riga and with that we [Germans] were in agreement." 101 The official pretext for the attack upon Riga was the complaint that the Latvian government had broken its agreement to grant citizenship to foreign anti-Bolshevik volunteers.102 The battle for Riga, which began on October 8, became the Waterloo of the Iron Division. The Latvian Army, considerably outnumbered but excellently equipped, managed grimly to hold on to Riga until, on October 15, the British-French Baltic fleet took a hand in the fighting.103 The heavy guns of the naval squadron drove Bermondt's forces from their positions on the south bank of the Daugava and forced them back to their base at Jelgava.104 The Latvians then took up the pursuit and, giving the enemy no peace, finally drove them across the Latvian border into Lithuania. There, having occupied large sections of the country, Bermondt's army became a thorn in the side of the Lithuanians who were then engaged in battle with the Bolsheviks. Turning upon their latest intruders, the Lithuanians defeated them at Radviliskis on November 21-22 and again, soon after, at Siauliai. The fighting ceased upon order of the Inter-Allied Mission in Lithuania, and Bermondt's army was given until December 15 to evacuate Lithuania.105 That force then straggled back into East Prussia, its trail of looting, rape, and murder dogged by Lithuanian regulars who were aided in the north by Latvian detachments.106 Having arrived on German 101

Von Salomon, p. 131. Walters, p. 368. 103 Niessel, p. 24. In the course of the battle, Premier Ulmanis and several Ministers of the Latvian government mingled among the combatants for morale-raising purposes. Ulmanis himself was wounded and subsequently was awarded the French Croix de Guerre and the Legion d'Honneur. 104 The Bermondt forces managed to keep Riga under shell and machinegun fire for over a month. By November 1 1 , when the shelling ceased, Riga was a badly damaged city. (See Jspostita Latwija, I. Riga, Riga, 1920.) 105 Jurgela, pp. 514-515. See also Hertmanovicius, Memorandum on the Independence of Lithuania. 106 Jurgela, pp. 515-516. 102

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The Formation of the Haltic States

soil, the veterans of ( w h a t to them had been) an heroic and selfsacrificing struggle to save the Vaterland, were greeted w i t h unrestrained abuse. Small wonder that many of them became w i l l i n g tools for the reaction. 107 107 For another account of this German adventure in the Baltic, see Waite, pp. 94-139.

13

The Road to Peace THE

P O W E R S AND

RUSSIA

W i t h all that has been written about the Paris Peace Conference it is scarcely necessary to discuss it in detail. It is necessary, however, to summarize the main currents of thought at Paris on the subject of Russia, for such thinking bore directly upon the destinies of the Baltic states. W i t h regard to Russia, there were various policy orientations. Reflecting the universal war-weariness of the period, there was, on the whole, a desire that the fighting be brought to an end. Opposed to this sentiment were the French leaders, who, barring the participation of F r e n c h troops, advocated intervention. 1 T h e r e was a universal dislike, if not fear, of Bolshevism. T h a t attitude, however, was tempered by feelings of concern for the suffering Russian populace, as expressed by Lloyd George, and by feelings of sympathy, voiced by Wilson and the British Premier, for the egalitarian strivings of the revolution. It was also admitted that the people of Russia might favor the Soviet government, in which case, of course, the Powers, by intervening against Bolshevism, might be acting contrary to that which their war aims had advertised. 2 1 L. Fischer, The Soviets in World Affairs, I, p. 165. The French rightwing press believed in letting "the young American Army" or other troops carry out the policy of intervention. See G. B. Noble, Policies and Opinions at Paris, New York, 1919, pp. 273, 295. 2 Peace Conference, III, pp. 581-584, 589-593; D. Lloyd George, The Truth About The Peace Treaties, London, 1938, pp. 317-318. 167

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The Formation of the Baltic States

T h e r e was a strong sense of obligation to the W h i t e Russian leaders and their armies. Commitments had originally been made with such military purposes in mind as restoring an Eastern Front against Germany and of preventing the Germans from breaking through to the Baku oil fields. Although the initial Allied reasons for supporting the W h i t e armies no longer existed, it was considered unfair, after the heavy sacrifices the Whites had made, to abandon them before they had achieved their ends. T h e program of continuing the aid to the Whites, championed by the doggedly anti-Red Winston Churchill and the French, received only reluctant support from Woodrow Wilson and Lloyd George. Lloyd George, besides grudging the cost to British taxpayers of such a program—he suspected that the French would not pay their share 3 —also regarded the Whites' cause as hopeless. Wilson pointed out that the intervention of foreign forces was causing the Russian people to unite behind the Bolsheviks. 4 T h e French political leaders hated the Soviet regime which had betrayed the Entente and had repudiated Russia's debts to France, and they feared that the rising Bolshevik tide might wash through Germany into France. 5 T h e French, supported by Churchill and by a coalition of pre-Bolshevik Russian statesmen in Paris, the so-called Russian Political Conference, 6 originally desired to bring about a military coalition which would put an end to Soviet rule. T h a t notion, impractical if only because of mutinous tendencies among Allied troops then in Russia, was opposed by the governments of the United States and Britain and, in France, by the left-wing parties. 7 W h e n it became clear that no major Allied force could be mustered for the purpose, the French government and military began to 3 F. Owen, Tempestuous Journey, Lloyd George His Life and Times, New York, 1955, pp. 507-521; Lloyd George, pp. 316-317. i Peace Conference, III, pp. 582-584. 5 Owen, p. 513; Peace Conference, III, p. 649. 5 This "anti-Bolshevik junta," as Lloyd George calls it, included such men as Sazonov and Guchkov. For a detailed account of the activities of the Russian Political Conference in Paris, see M. S. Margulies, God Interventsii, 3 vols., Berlin, 1923, II, part 4. 1 Peace Conference, III, p. 582; Owen, p. 514; Strakhovsky, Intervention at Archangel, pp. 137, 163 and passim·, Noble, pp. 271-272.

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advocate a cordon sanitaire, made up of anti-Bolshevik countries around Russia, which, by blocking Bolshevik access to economically vital areas, w a s intended to starve out Bolshevism and prevent it f r o m spreading. 8 In the cordon scheme the resurrected state of Poland was necessarily cast in the role of key bastion. T h a t same country, it might be added, the French also conceived of as the strongest link in the chain of nations she was then forging around the defeated Central Powers.

LITHUANIA

versus

POLAND

F r o m the very outset of the Peace Conference there ensued at Paris a bitter propaganda duel between the Polish delegation and that of the hitherto unrecognized Lithuanian state. D e Chambon, a pro-Lithuanian French writer, tells of the huge Polish delegation whose propaganda machine sought to impress upon the world the picture of the Poland of 1772, of which the G r a n d D u c h y of Lithuania was only a province. 9 According to de Chambon, the Poles were not above the most brazen lies. A m o n g these was a statement to the British government in January 1919, alleging that Voldemaras, head of the Lithuanian delegation and Foreign Minister of his country, had, before his departure for Paris, turned over the management of the affairs of Vilnius to the Polish government. A falsehood released to the press told the world that Lithuania and Poland had reached a complete accord. 10 Pro-Polish literature has it that the Lithuanians exploited " t o their advantage, the complete ignorance of Lithuanian affairs among the western nations." 1 1 T h e Poles pointed out that the Lithuanian 8

Peace Conference, III, pp. 582, 649, 651. H . de Chambon, IM Lituanie pendant la Conference de la Paix (1919), Paris, 1931, pp. 12-14. 10 De Chambon, p. 13. On June 30, 1918, an understanding to cooperate against the Germans was signed in secret by A. Roniker, representing the Polish Regency Council and Voldemaras and OlSauskas of the Taryba. This understanding never became effective. See W. Wielhorski, Polska a Litwa, London, 1947, p. 280. 11 X . Gorzuchowski, Les rapports politiques de la Pologne et de la Lituanie, Paris, 1927, p. 91. 9

The Formation of the Baltic States Delegation turned out propaganda pamphlets which estimated the population of Lithuania as between four and eight and a half million and which exaggerated Lithuania's cultural and historical influence. 12 " B u t the epitome was reached when a wall map, designed by M . Gabrys [of the Lithuanian delegation] and widely distributed among the delegates to the Conference, depicted Lithuania's territory as more than twice its actual size." 1 3 T h i s accusation well illustrates the nature of the controversy; by such methods Lithuania was desperately trying to put herself on the m a p and to prove her respectably-sized existence and statesworthiness, 14 while Poland was trying just as hard to make Lithuania appear small, backward, and generally unworthy of serious consideration for independent statehood. 10 Despite exaggerations on both sides, certain facts emerge. T h e Polish government wanted to incorporate all of Lithuania, though professing that "Poland recognize [ d ] Lithuania's right to an independent existence." T h i s line out of a Paris address by Paderewski, on A p r i l 12, 1919, was coupled with the declaration that Poland 12 As a matter of fact the Lithuanian Delegation did make one territorial claim wherein Lithuania was described as having an area six and a half times the size of Belgium and a population of ιο,οοο,οοο, sixty-five per cent of which were Lithuanians. See Memoire relatij a la reconstitution de la Lituanie independante, Paris, 1918, pp. 15-16. 13 Gorzuchowski, p. 91. The writer is probably referring to Carte de la Lituanie, edited by the Lithuanian Information Bureau in Lausanne. 14 For samples of Lithuanian territorial claims see J. Purickis, L'etat Utuanien et te Gouvernement de Gardinas (Grodno), Lausanne, 1918; V. Bartuska, L'etat lituanien et le Gouvernement de Suvalkai (Suvalkj), Lausanne, 1918. 15 From Poland's Territorial Problems, Paris, 1919, p. 24. "Among the educated class [of Lithuania] the Lithuanian nationalists are few in number and the Poles remain the chief cultured element of the country; the Lithuanian language has not yet developed beyond a very primitive stage . . . Such a small State [Lithuania] could not really be independent under present conditions, and if not allied to Poland, would inevitably come under German influence . . . only a very small part of the Lithuanian people can judge for themselves what political independence means, how it differs from local national autonomy and what advantages or disadvantages may result from the separate political existence of ethnographic Lithuania." See also W. Lutoslavski, Lithuania and White Ruthenia, Paris, 1919; H. Groppin, Pologne et Lithuanie, Paris, 1919.

The Road to Peace would, nevertheless, "endeavor to renew the ancient U n i o n existing between the t w o nations." 1 6 Lithuania, on the other hand, and regardless of w h a t terms the Poles might offer, was completely opposed to union with Poland. 1 7 Both nations claimed Vilnius; the Lithuanians on the ground that it was their ancient capital, and the Poles because they claimed that it had been founded by Slavs (Poles) and had become a Polish cultural center. 18 T h e Poles offered this argument in addition to their general claim to all of Poland of 1772, including Vilnius. If at the Conference, the policies of Britain and the United States toward Poland and Lithuania were indecisive, in the sense that they wanted to make fair evaluations of all claims, the aim of the French government was unilaterally in favor of restoring the Poland of 1 7 7 2 . " T h e Peace Conference faced a baffling situation in attempting to determine Poland's boundaries. T h e fixing of her eastern boundary w a s made especially complex by the anti-Soviet w a r and by the possibility that a " l e g i t i m a t e " Russian government w o u l d someday reappear. 20 A Sub-Commission on Polish A f f a i r s w a s placed in charge of eastern Polish frontier study and given complete authority to examine the Polish-Lithuanian boundary question. Lithuanians Voldemaras and Yeas were invited to appear before the Commission on A p r i l 23, 1919, and provide it with statistical, ethnographic, and economic information. T h e y made their appearance, but remained just long enough to object to the fact that the placing of Lithuanian boundary determination under a commission on "Polish A f f a i r s " gave the impression that the Lithuanian question was a mere corollary to the Polish question. T h e Poles, they said, might henceforth claim that the Peace Conference had practically decided upon the joining of Lithuania to Poland. 2 1 16 Gorzuchowski, p. 90. See also R. Machray, Poland, 1914-1931, London, 17 1932, p. 121. Gorzuchowski, p. 90. 18 The Lithuanian-Polish Dispute, 2nd Assembly of League of Nations at Geneva, 1921, London, 1921, pp. 88-91; Gorzuchowski, p. 87. 19 M. Anysas, Der Litauische-Polnische Streit um das Vilnagebiet, Wiirzburg, 1934, p. 5. 20 Gorzuchowski, pp. 91-92 21 Miller, My Diary at the Conference, XVI, pp. 134-135.

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The Formation of the Baltic States

The Lithuanians had reason to be suspicious. T w o weeks earlier, the Polish and Lithuanian armies, each in the process of driving back the Red Army, had been on the verge of a junction. In view of the fact that the Poles had seized the district of Gardinas, claimed by Lithuania, there was the danger that the two armies would meet as foes rather than as allies. The Commission on Polish Affairs, in a letter read to the Council of Foreign Ministers by M. Cambon, suggested that Marshal Foch be instructed to straighten out this problem and "if possible to assure the union [of the two armies] against their common adversaries, the Bolsheviks." United States Secretary of State Lansing quickly objected "to this obvious [French] attempt to make a military matter out of a political one," thereby glossing over the basic issue of Polish aggrandizement.22 On April 19, the Poles drove the Bolsheviks out of Vilnius, thereby snatching the city from the grasp of the approaching Lithuanian Army. The Lithuanian regions of Augustovo and Suvalki, southwest of Polish-held Vilnius, were still held by German forces. In the May 24 meeting of Foreign Ministers at Paris, Colonel Georges of France attempted to get a ruling to force the Germans to evacuate that Lithuanian territory in order to let the Poles get in. Again Lansing objected, refusing to see the "subtle demarcation between Germans on Lithuanian territory and Poles on Lithuanian territory." If Germans were withdrawn from the Augustovo-Suvalki area, he asked, why not let Lithuanians occupy it rather than Poles ? Colonel Georges replied that the Lithuanians had only 7,000 troops —not enough to send men to that region if they were to keep fighting the Bolsheviks. Whereupon Lansing said that in such a case it was better to leave the Germans where they were.23 A Lithuanian appeal to the Supreme Council, on June 13, resulted, five days later, in the drawing of a line of demarcation beyond which the Polish Army was not supposed to pass. On July 12 the Lithuanians reported that the Poles had not observed the demarcation line. Marshal Foch then requested the Polish government to withdraw its troops to the south of the line at the earliest possible 22

Miller, XVI, pp. 153-154.

23

Miller, XVI, pp. 370-379.

The Road to Peace

173

convenience. The Polish reply was a further penetration into Lithuania. Thereupon, on July 27, the Supreme Council drew up a new demarcation line, which, in the words of Foch, "permitted the Poles to occupy a larger zone of Lithuanian territory." The Poles regarded this line almost as lightly as they had regarded its predecessor.24 E. J. Harrison of the British Commission at Kaunas in 1919, tells of his own changed opinion of the Poles as the result of being an eyewitness to their tactics. His views were "fully shared" by Colonel Ward, the chief, and other members of the British Military Mission, one of whom stated that he was "out to oppose Poland in Eastern E u r o p e . . . because the Poles [were] the Prussians of Eastern Europe minus the Boche efficiency."25 T H E B A L T I C PARADOX

Throughout the winter of 1918-1919, those men favoring cessation of armed conflict with Russia made several attempts to reach some sort of agreement. In December 1918, the British government initiated a move to request the Soviet and all other governments in Russia to call a truce for the duration of the Peace Conference, and to send delegates to Paris so that all claims might be heard. The Soviet government, as indicated by Litvinov's Christmas message,25 was more than willing to comply, but the French government, in the words of Foreign Minister Pichon, would "make no contact with crime"27 and refused to allow Soviet representatives to come to Paris. This led to the idea of a meeting on the Island of Prinkipo, where, it was thought, representatives of the Allied and Associated Powers and representatives of each of the governmental factions in 21 C . Grauzinis, La Question de Vilna, Paris, 1927, pp. 45-48. For the texts of the Lithuanian protest against the Polish violations see Revue Baltique, August 15-September i, 1919, pp. 328-330. 25 E. J. Harrison, Lithuania Past and Present, London, 1922, pp. 97-98. 26 The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Jane Degras, Ed., Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, I, 1917-1924, London, 1951, pp. 129-132. 27 Fischer, I, p. 159.

174

The Formation of the Baltic States

Russia might come to terms. President Wilson issued the invitation to the conference which was to open February 15, 1919. T h e invitation was accepted by Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia, with reservations as to their own national independence.28 T h e Soviet government was also willing to negotiate;29 but again the French, aided and abetted by Churchill, squelched the proposal. Shortly thereafter, on the occasion of the Bullitt Mission, the Soviet government again evinced its desire to arrive at a peaceful settlement, and the proposals for peace, submitted by Lenin through Bullitt to the Paris Peace Conference, definitely stated that the Soviet government would make no forcible attempt to upset the de facto governments then existing upon the territory of the former Russian Empire.30 This last attempt to reach an agreement met the same fate as the Prinkipo proposal. By April 1919, as far as the Baltic governments were concerned, the Soviet government, with which they were at war, had shown a sincere desire for peace and had indicated that the popular will of the Baltic peoples would be taken seriously. T h e Allied governments, on the other hand, had produced nothing better than vague statements indicating that peace might be at hand, followed by chilling disappointments. Throughout that time, of course, the three Baltic governments, aware that negotiations were then in progress between the Allied governments and Kolchak, Supreme Ruler of (White) Russia, remained resentful of the fact that they were not asked to participate in the discussions which would determine their status.31 O n March 9, 1919, the Russian Political Conference presented a note to the Peace Conference demanding that the final solution of all questions relating to the states separated from Russia be indefinitely postponed and that all such questions be settled only with the consent of the Russian nation. O n March 24, 1919, the Latvian delegation in Paris refuted these demands and politely requested 28 Neu/ Yor\ Times, February 14, 1919; see also U.S. Dept. of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia, pp. 49-50, 52-53. 29 Soviet Documents On Foreign Policy, pp. 137-139. 30 Soviet Documents, pp. 147-150. 31 Graham, Latvia, pp. 469-470.

The Road to Peace

τ

75

32

that Latvia's de jure independence be recognized. An Estonian note which arrived the following day asked for the same thing but in less polite terms. With burning indignation, the writer, Poska, addressed himself to the President of the Peace Conference expressing the desire for immediate de jure recognition of the Estonian state whose de facto existence had been achieved by its own efforts. " W e threw ourselves," the letter says, "into the struggle with Bolshevik Russia in the full confidence in the aid of the Allies and in their sympathy for the independence of our country . . . our people are already beginning to . . . wonder if their superhuman efforts have not been in vain." 33 On April 19, the President of the Peace Conference was presented with a joint request by A . Piip, J. Cakste, A . Voldemaras, G . Sydorenko, and N . Chkheidze, asking for immediate de jure recognition of the independence from Russia of Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, the Ukraine, and Georgia.34 The events begun by the German coup in Liepäja on April 16 had led to a sizable flow of arms, equipment, and money from the Allies to the Estonian and Latvian governments, and of moral, if not monetary or military, support to the Lithuanians.35 This aid, from the Allied point of view, was intended not to bolster Baltic nationalism, but as a means of replacing German anti-Bolshevik troops by native anti-Bolsheviks. Whatever the Allies' intentions, the result of their actions was a tremendous strengthening of the armed forces behind each of the governments and a consequent strengthening of their determination to become independent. In Estonia, greater power was added to an already existent army; in Lithuania and Latvia, the new and quite visible national troops undoubtedly served to intensify patriotic sentiment. By late spring of 1919, the Baltic governments and their people found themselves in an uncomfortable and paradoxical situation. 32

33 Miller, X V I I I , pp. 23-25. Miller, X V I I , pp. 341-344. Miller, X V I I I , pp. 23-25. 35 The Lithuanians had equipped their three brigades by purchasing some weapons from German arsenals and by seizing sizable stores of materiel in fighting the Russians. (Jurgela, p. 514.) 34

i76

The Formation of the Baltic States

They were fighting a war of independence which, regardless of its outcome, was likely to gain them nothing more than confinement within the boundaries of some larger state. Even if they won the war, the only prospects then confronting them were Kolchak's "Russia, One and Indivisible," or, as in the case of Lithuania, undesired union with Poland. The Allied governments were aware of the Baltic paradox, but, caught in a dilemma, were unable to resolve it. If they granted the Baltic countries de jure recognition they would antagonize the Russian Whites and thus weaken the morale of those who constituted the anti-Bolshevik spearhead. By denying de jure recognition they would hurt the anti-Bolshevik cause by alienating the Baltic peoples. Unwilling to state the exact case to the Baltic governments—namely, that they could be assured of no reward for their efforts—Allied diplomacy resorted to duplicity and evasion. The legal future of the Baltic countries was left pending— to be determined by direct negotiations between Kolchak and the Baltic governments in collaboration with the League of Nations. How this situation worked out in practice is best seen in Estonia where the White Russian strength in the Baltic area was concentrated. The first offensive launched by Yudenich on May 13, 1919, had received the support of the Estonian army. Thanks largely to Estonian efforts,36 Pskov was captured, and this made it possible for Yudenich to concentrate on taking Petrograd. During the summer, however, a good deal of ill feeling had arisen between the Estonian government and the Yudenich forces. Part of this feeling was due to Estonian suspicions that the Russians had somehow aided von der Goltz's advance beyond Riga.37 But the main cause of Estonian uneasiness was the White slogan of "Russia, One and Indivisible." The Estonians could see no point in further assisting the Whites if 36 Ν . N . Ivanov, Ο Sobitiyakji pod Petrogradom ν i^ig Godu, Berlin, 1921, p. 55. 37 A . P. Rodzyanko, Vospominaniya ο Severe-Zapadnoy Armii, Berlin, 1 9 2 1 , pp. 5 0 - 5 1 . Rodzyanko attributes this suspicious attitude among other things to the accidental landing of three German planes in territory under control of the Northwest Army.

Τhe Road to Peace

l

77

38

their own independence was not guaranteed. This feeling was not confined to the government alone but had become widespread among the people.39 Leftist elements had initiated a strong movement for peace, the achievement of which they claimed was blocked only by the Russian Northwest Army.40 T o remedy this unhealthy situation, British General Peyton March arrived in Tallinn on August io, 1919, for the purpose of recreating harmony among the anti-Bolshevik factions.41 T o this end a government of Northwest Russia was hastily42 organized and instructed to sign an agreement with the Estonian government.43 At the same time, General March made it clear to the Estonians that Allied support, that is, pressure upon Kolchak in their behalf, could come about only if the Estonian Army aided in the White Russian cause.44 On August 1 1 , Yudenich, on condition that the Estonians render him immediate military aid, recognized the independence of Estonia.45 The Estonians, of course, knew that the Northwest government had been formed because of English pressure and that it would be disposed of by the Russians at the earliest possible opportunity. What little value this government's recognition would have on the day of final reckoning, was further apparent from the attitude of Kolchak and his advisers toward Finnish participation in the Petrograd campaign. At about the same time that Yudenich recognized Estonia in exchange for military aid, Kolchak adamantly refused to acknowledge the independence of Finland, despite General Mannerheim's offer to supply 100,000 men for the occupation of Petrograd.46 (Actually, only two weeks after the recognition of 38

212.

10

Kirdetsov, G., U Vorot Petrograda (1919-1920), 39

Berlin, 1921, pp. 210-

Rodzyanko, p. 126.

Wrangell, Geschichte des Balten Regiments, p. 122.

"Kirdetsov, p. 221. M. S. Margulies, God Interventsii, 3 vols., Berlin, 1923, III, p. 204. On General March's order this government was organized in forty-five minutes. "Kirdetsov, p. 221. "Margulies, III, pp. 202-214. 42

45

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919,

p. 220. 16

Strakhovsky, Intervention

208-209.

at Archangel,

Russia, p. 702; Kirdetsov,

Princeton, 1944, pp. 203,

i78

The Formation of the Baltic States

Estonia by Yudenich, his authority to act in such matters was categorically denied by the Russian Embassy in Washington.) 17 On June 4, 1919, Kolchak had declared to the Allies that the future status of Estonia was to be "an autonomous arrangement within the boundaries of a reconstituted Russian State with the rights of nationalities guaranteed without prejudice to the unity and sovereignty of Russia as a whole." This statement was reiterated on August 29 in a note sent to the United States Department of State by Bakhmetev, the Russian Ambassador.48 Thus, despite the agreement of August 11, the Estonians remained uncertain about their future status. In addition, they were unhappy to note that there was a high degree of dissension within the ranks of the Russians whom they had so reluctantly joined. This was probably inevitable in an army which, united in its anti-Bolshevik effort, was hopelessly disunited on matters of politics, personality, and prestige. Acting, as they were, under British surveillance, the Russians naturally affected a surface harmony; but the deeply rooted internecine conflict erupted with a vengeance late in August. A t that time, Pskov, the only ethnic Russian territory under control of the Northwest Army, and hence an especial bone of contention, was held conjointly by Estonian and Russian troops, the latter under General Balakhovich. A n anti-Bolshevik offensive was being planned, and in this venture the Estonians agreed to participate. On the night of August 23, General Yudenich, having sent a detachment down from Tallinn, "captured" Pskov and had Balakhovich and his staff arrested. The official reason was "organized looting" on the part of the troops of Balakhovich. However, according to Ivanov, a liberal anti-Bolshevik, the real reasons were the democratic way in which Pskov was being governed, and the fear that the Pskov offensive might succeed and thus place Yudenich in a bad light. Colonels Puskar and Parts, the Estonian command" T h e personal feelings of Yudenich on the subject of Estonian independence were made clear by his off-the-record remark of December 1918: "Estonia is a part of Russian land, a Russian Gubernia. T h e Estonian Government is a g a n g of criminals w h o have seized power." (Ivanov, p. 16.) 48 Foreign Relations of the United States, 191p, Russia, pp. 705-706.

The Road to Peace

*79

ing officers in the Pskov region, were "inexpressibly shocked by the treacherous attack of Yudenich upon Pskov at such a crucial moment," and Estonian troops declared themselves "ready to shed blood for an honest Russian cause but not for traitors."49 Another version of this same story maintains that it was General Rodzyanko, not Yudenich, who sent the troops to arrest Balakhovich and his accomplices, accusing them of counterfeiting.50 A t any rate, the incident caused the Estonians to abandon Pskov, and shortly thereafter the district fell into the hands of the pleasantly surprised Bolsheviks. T h e Bolsheviks offered to hold peace talks with the Estonian government. T h e Estonians, by this time, were so uncertain as to which side to base their hopes upon, that they went so far as to arrange for pourparlers with the Soviet government to take place on September 10 at Pskov. 51 But, having setded none of their differences with the Soviet government in September, they agreed in 43

50 Ivanov, pp. 112-113. Wrangell, p. 126. C. R. Pusta, temporary head of the Estonian delegation in Paris, found it expedient, at this time, to explain to the President of the Peace Conference the reasons for Estonia's willingness to talk peace with Soviet Russia. He made the following points. (1) Estonia had always been fighting a defensive war and this had achieved its ends with the ejection of the enemy troops and the reestablishment in the country of order and a legal government. (2) Estonia was feeling great fatigue and, more than that, disappointment as a result of delay on the part of the Peace Conference to take action with regard to the independence of Estonia. (3) There was danger to Estonia from German volunteer armies still in Latvia and still recruiting men from Germany. (4) The signs of demoralization in the Russian Northwest forces, as shown by the dissension between Yudenich and Balakhovich, and the resulting abandonment of Pskov, originally conquered by Estonian forces, might lead to new hard struggles against huge Bolshevik forces. For this the Estonian army was ill-equipped due to the failure of the Allied powers to keep Estonia well supplied. (5) Estonia had grave financial problems. (6) Soviet Russia had offered peace and independence. Kolchak refused to acknowledge Estonia's independence. Without a promise of independence one could not convince the people that they must make further sacrifices. (7) Estonia, even when not fighting the Bolsheviks, would always remain a firm bulwark against Bolshevism and serve as part of the cordon sanitaire. (Lettre de la delegation Esthonienne adressee a M. le President de la Conference de la Paix ä l'occasion de la proposition de paix faite par le Gouvernement des Soviets, Paris, le 29 Septembre 1919.) 7+ 51

i8o

The Formation of the Baltic States

October to join Yudenich in his second offensive on Petrograd. That resolve was due in part, at least, to a "last chance" hope for de jure recognition by the Allies. A further influence upon their decision was probably exerted by the Estonian General Staff, which, unlike the Estonian government and people, was, throughout this period, unwaveringly anti-Red.52 The October offensive began with marked success but, unfortunately for the Russian White cause, it coincided with Bermondt's "West Russian" attack upon Riga. Yudenich frantically attempted to dissociate himself from Bermondt's action, proclaiming the latter a "traitor and an enemy of the fatherland,"53 but to no avail. The Estonians, already highly suspicious, immediately abandoned the Yudenich forces to prepare to face the greater German menace approaching from the south.51 This, of course, made it necessary for them to seek peace with Soviet Russia.55 The Bermondt attack upon the Latvians, incidentally, left so few men confronting the Soviet forces on the Latvian front that the Reds were able to shift troops to the Petrograd sector. On November 14, the Yudenich army, utterly routed and driven back into Estonia, was disarmed and interned by the Estonian government.56 The rationality motivating the Estonians applied in equal measure to Latvia and Lithuania. As regarded national independence, the definite Soviet offer seemed of far greater value than the very dubious bid offered by the other side. Moreover, in accepting the repeatedly offered Soviet terms, the peoples of the Baltic countries 52 C. R. Jurgela, "The Baltic Policy of the United 6tates" (unpublished manuscript in Fordham University Library), p. 38; Ivanov, p. 130; Rodzyanko, p. 126. 53 Beli Ar\hiv, I. "Doklad Glavnokomanduiushchemu vooruzhenimi silami Iuga Rossii ο polozhenii dele na zapadnom fronte voobshche i ο armii polk. Bermonta Avalova ν chastnosti k 15 Oktyabrya 1919 goda." 54 Lieven, " V iuzhnoy Pribaltike," p. 208. Another alleged reason for the Estonian desertion was the fact that Yudenich, in anticipation of seizing Petrograd, proceeded to make a number of official appointments and among these named a Russian as Governor-General of Estonia. (Graham, Estonia, p. 364.) 55 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia, pp. 710, 712, 713, 715-720. 56 K. Pusta, The Soviet Union and the Baltic States, N.Y., 1943, p. 17.

The Road to Peace

181

would be gaining not only independence but—equally important— an end to the years of living under wartime conditions. Conversations among Baltic representatives during September and October of 1919 clearly brought out the desire of each country for peace.57 For the moment, however, only Estonia, whose territory was cleared of the Red Army, was ready to enter into actual negotiations, and these began on December 5. On December 3 1 , 1919, Estonia and Russia agreed to an armistice. On February 2, 1920, by the Treaty of Tartu, Russia agreed to "unreservedly recognize the independence and autonomy of the State of Estonia, and renounce voluntarily and forever all rights of sovereignty possessed by Russia over the Estonian people and territory." 38 With the collapse of the White Russian armies in the autumn of 1919, the major Allied reason for opposing independent action for peace on the part of the three Baltic States had disappeared. Estonia had set the example and Lithuania and Latvia were quick to fall in line. The Lithuanians, having driven out the Bolsheviks, proceeded, in the spring of 1920, to negotiate with the Soviet government. A treaty of peace, acknowledging Lithuania's ethnographic frontiers, Vilnius as her capital, was signed July 12.59 A n incident which occurred a few days later foreshadowed the sort of thing that the State of Lithuania would have to contend with in the way of subsequent relations with Poland. At that time, the Red Army was driving on Vilnius, and the Poles, then in possession of the city and aware of their inability to hold it against the Russians, made an agreement with the Lithuanian government, at Spa (Belgium), to evacuate Vilnius before the Red Army reached the city in order that the Lithuanians might get in first. The Poles also agreed to give up the Gardinas-Vilnius-Daugavpils stretch of railroad. A s the Lithuanian troops approached Vilnius, on July 14, they were suddenly attacked by Polish forces. Though managing " Foreign Relations of the United States, 1919, Russia, pp. 7 1 5 - 7 1 6 . "Treaty between Esthonia and Russia," The Esthonian Review, February 1920. See also Treaty of Peace Between Russia and Estonia, London (H. J. Ryman, Ltd.), 1920. 59 League of Nations, Lithuanian-Polish Dispute, p. 15. 7* 58

The Formation of the Baltic States to drive off the Poles, they were delayed, and the Russians entered the city first. Shortly thereafter, however, the Russians yielded Vilnius to the Lithuanians, who transferred the seat of government there from Kaunas.60 On October 7, 1920, the Polish government solemnly agreed to recognize Vilnius as Lithuanian; on the following day, Pilsudski, head of the Polish government, sent his close friend and future Polish Minister of War, General Zeligowski, to capture the city.61 The so-called "Zeligowski coup" was successful. Vilnius fell to the Poles on October 9, 1920. Adding insult to injury, and hoping before long to absorb all of Lithuania, the Polish government gave to the Vilnius District the name Central Lithuania. This action was to remain a fruitful source of the most bitter hatred between the two nations. Actual fighting between Latvia and Russia had ended in January 1920, when, with the aid of Polish forces, the Bolsheviks were driven from Latvian soil. The Latvian government was ready, immediately thereafter, to make peace, and, on January 31, 1920, Latvian Foreign Minister, Meierovics, wired the Soviet and Estonian Plenipotentiaries at Tartu that Latvia wished to associate herself with Estonia in the peace agreements. The wire did not reach the negotiators until after the Treaty had been signed, but this, and other moves by the Latvian government made it plain to the Soviet government that, as far as Latvia was concerned, the war had ended.62 Negotiations between Latvia and Russia ensued, and the treaty of peace, recognizing Latvia as an independent nation, was finally concluded on August ir, 1920.63 60 Lithuanian-Polish Dispute·, also Jurgela, History of the Lithuanian Nation, pp. 520-521. 61 Pilsudski himself was subsequently to admit this. (See Machray, p. 178, also H. Koitz, Männer um Pilsuds\i, Breslau, 1934, p. 45.) 62 Graham, Latvia, pp. 437-438. 63 Latvian Foreign Ministry, 1928, Recueil des principaux traites conclus par la Lettonie avec les pays etrangers, 1918-1928, pp. 1-29.

14

Conclusion Accounts of the liberation of the three Baltic countries variously report that Soviet Russia voluntarily granted the Baltic peoples the right to secede and to form independent nations; that they had to fight their way to freedom against the resistance of the Soviet regime, but were aided by the Allies, who wished the new states to form part of the cordon sanitaire; that the Baltic peoples received no cooperation from the Allies in their struggle and achieved their independence only by dint of their own heroic battles against Russians, Red and White, against Germans and Poles. Certainly Soviet Russia did not desire the secession of the Baltic States, and it is equally true that the Baltic peoples had to fight their way to freedom against Soviet resistance. In this struggle they received aid from the Allied Powers, who, however, had no intention of enabling them to establish independent regimes. The French wanted Lithuania to become part of Poland. T o Latvia and Estonia, the Allies made no commitments beyond promising that their claims would be taken up with the White Russians and the League of Nations. It is essentially true that no great power had as its political aim the establishment of any one of the Baltic States. From this fact, however, it is manifestly absurd to conclude that the achievement of their liberation is explained solely by the courage and the heroism of their people. There was, of course, a positive effort toward liberation on the part of the people of the three countries, and this was undoubtedly an important factor in the final outcome. But a far more valid understanding of the emergence of the three states is?

The Formation of the Baltic States is derived from a consideration of the interrelationship of the great powers at the moment of history when the Baltic States were born. T h e past has amply shown that it is impossible for strategically situated Lithuania, Latvia, or Estonia to remain independent alongside a powerful neighbor. T h e y came into existence in the years 1919-1920, when both Germany and Russia were exhausted. But, aside f r o m the momentary prostration of the two great Baltic nations at that time, the period 1919-1920 also marked a high point of English, French, and even American involvement into East Baltic affairs. This joint action, directed simultaneously against Germany and Bolshevik Russia, produced an historically abnormal state of affairs. It was, one may conclude, no definite design that led to the establishment of the Baltic States, but rather the fact that the historically unusual juxtaposition of forces in the postwar, revolutionary, and interventionist vortex of the Baltic, produced, within that region's normal pattern of great power strivings, a temporary quiescence which made it possible for the Baltic peoples' feeble efforts to win their nations a short-lived independence. Once British, French, and American pressure was withdrawn, and Russia and Germany had regained their strength, the delicate equilibrium could no longer endure and neither could the Baltic States.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE INDEX

Bibliographical

Note

For information on the three countries prior to 1914 see Obshchestvennoye Dvizheniye ν Rossii ν Nachale XXgo Veka. F o r material on prewar Lithuania, see Sud'hi Narodov Rossii by Stankevich and articles by Mitskevich-Kapsukas and Angaretis in Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya, Palvadre's Revoliutsiya igo^-oj gg. v. Estonii and articles by V e l m a n and Kalinin in Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya throw light upon prewar Estonia, as does Raissner's Esli i Latishi which also deals with Latvia. Proletars\aya Revoliutsiya contains useful articles on Latvia by Janson and Stucka. Events in German-occupied Lithuania and Courland are covered mainly in the writings of Ludendorff, Erzberger, and Scheidemann. T h e account of Lithuania in Erzberger's Erlebnisse im Weltkriege is based largely upon the documents in Der Werdegang des Litauischen Staates by Petras Klimas. Die Ursachen des deutschen Zusammenbruches in 1 9 1 8 , a postwar report drawn u p by a Reichstag committee, fills numerous gaps in the narrative. Essential information on Latvia in 1917 may be found in Walters' Lettland, in Bilmanis' collection of documents on Latvian-Russian relations, and in Graham's Latvia. For Estonia from March 1917 to March 1918, see Martna's Estland, Jackson's Estonia, Izvestia, Krasni Ar\hiv, and C h u d e n o k ' s article in Proletarskaya Revoliutsiya. T h e nature of German rule over Livonia and Estonia in 1918 is revealed in Dokumente zur Beleuchtung der gegenwärtigen Lage in Estland, a paper of protest drawn up in 1918 by the Estonian Delegation at Copenhagen. T h e final weeks of the German occupation of those regions are described in W i n n i g ' s Am Ausgang der deutschen Ostpolitik and his Heimkehr. Izvestia and Krasni Archiv, along with articles in Proletarskaya Revoliutsiya by Mitskevich-Kapsukas and by Girinis, shed light upon the Red attempt to sovietize Lithuania in 1919, and Izvestia also gives many details about the longer lasting Soviet regime in Latvia. Additional material about Red Latvia is in Stucka's Pyat' Mesyatsev Sotsialisticheskpy Sovyetskpy Latvii, in Die Rote Fahne (Riga Bolshevik organ), and in Popov's The City of the Red Plague. Numerous reports concerning 187

ι88

The Formation of the Baltic States

Estonia's anti-Bolshevik military effort are to be found in The Times of London. As for German attempts during that same year to regain the lost Balti\um, the most revealing work is that of General von der Goltz, Commander of the German volunteer forces in Latvia. Also important are J. Bischoff's Die Letzte Front, A. P. Lieven's article in the White Russian journal Beloye Delo, and Volume XII of The Paris Peace Conference, 1919 series published by the United States Department of State. Documents on British Foreign Policy, First Series, Volume III, contains vital material on the Allied endeavors to compel the Germans to leave Latvia. With respect to the diplomatic negotiations of 1919 and the Baltic countries' endeavors to gain recognition, D. H. Miller's My Diary at the Conference of Paris with Documents is indispensable. Gorzuchowski's Les Rapports politiques de la Pologne et de la Lituanie tells of the Lithuanian-Polish frontier dispute. The writings of Ivanov, Rodzyanko, Kirdetsov, and Margulies provide valuable accounts of events pertaining to the Russian Northwest Army. For the activities of the Baits and other Baltic Germans in the period under discussion see M. Ziegler, M. von Blaese-Hoerner, H. Dohrmann, Η. Helbing, Κ . von Braatz, F. von Steinaecker, Ε. Doebler, Μ. Hunnius, Ε. Stenbock-Fermor, Ε. Pinding, Ε. von Salomon, and W. Wrangeil. Also useful are the histories of Latvia by Bilmanis, Sväbe, and Spekke, The History of the Estonian People by Uustalu, and Jurgela's History of the Lithuanian Nation.

Index Alexander I, 12 Alexander II, 2 Alexander III, 16 All-Russian Provisional Government (Omsk), 149, 150 Alunäns, J., 15 Anvelt, J., 76, 80, 127 April Putsch (Liepäja), 151, 159, 175 Article Twelve (of November 11, 1918, Armistice), 133, 114, 118, 120, 147, 150, 151, 153, 154 Asars, J., 18

50-52. 77. 78, 82, 88, 89, 91, 100, 117, 130, 148 Bröderich, Land Marshall, 151 Broun, Y . , 11 Bullitt, W., 174 Bund (Jewish), 7, 132 Bürkner, Lt. Col., 120

Cakste, J., 116, 175 Catherine II, 10, 11 Chernov, V . , 69, 70 Chkheidze, N., 175 Churchill, W., 168, 174 Clemenceau, G., 149 Baer, K . von, 13 Congresses and conferences: Bakhmetev, B., 178 Estonian—Congress of Estonian Balakhovich, General, 178, 179 Soviets, 79, 80; German-—Bad Balfour, Α . , n 8 Kreuznach Conference, 47-49; Balodis, J., 152, 155 Latvian—First Congress of LatBanaitis, S., 30 vian Soviets, 121, 139; Latgale Barons, K . , 15 Congress, 63; Riga Conference Basanavicius, J., 4, 8, 30 of Latvian organizations, 65; Bauernverordnung (1804), 13 Second Congress of the Latvian Berg, H. von, 163 Social Democrats, 18; Valmiera Bergs, Α . , 107 Congress, 63; Lithuanian—Berne Bermondt (Avalov-Bermondt), P., Conference, 4 1 ; First United Con160-165, !8O gress of the Communist Parties Bethmann-Hollweg, T . von, 33-35 of Lithuania and Belo-Russia, 133; Birk, Α . , 73 Conference of Township Deputies Birziska, Μ., 30, 93 at Kaunas, 142; Congress of Bischoff, J., 145, 155, 158, 159 Soviets, 132; Russian—Social Bizauskas, Κ . , 30 Democratic Congress of 1907, 20 Bleiman, Estonian Socialist RevoluCordon sanitaire, 169, 183 tionary, 79, 80 Cuyto, C., 80 Bohusz (Bauza), X . , 3 Czernin, O . , 48, 49 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of, 45, 47, 48, 89

190

Index

Denikin, Α . , 149, ι6ο Directorate (Omsk), 148 Dobrovich, Α . , 130 Dovydaitis, P., 30, 143 Durnovo, P., 163 Ebert, F., 89 Eisen, J . , 1 1 Ekstrom, General, 128 Erzberger, M., 36, 37, 51, 54, 91, 92, 94 Estonian cultural societies, 26 Estonian National Council, 7 1 - 7 7 , 79, 82, 1 0 1 , 106, 1 1 2 , 118 Estonian Workers' Commune, 81, 127 Falkenhausen, Freiherr von, 52, 93 Finns, 59, 70, 84, 128, 177 Fletcher, Major, 160 Foch, F., 1 1 3 , 154, 155, 157, 159, 17 2 » 173 Gabrys, M., 170 Gaigalat, W., 94 Georges, Col., 172 German Soldiers' councils: at Liepäja, 146; at Riga, 1 1 2 , 1 1 8 , 1 1 9 ; at Tallinn, 125 German Supreme Command. See OHL Goldmanis, J . , 27, 67, 68, 155 Goltz, R. von der, 1 4 5 - 1 4 7 , 1 5 0 - 1 5 8 , 160-163, 176 Gossler, Α . von, 29, 39, 4 0 , 1 0 6 , 1 0 8 , 118 Gough, Η., 154, iJ 6 » J 5 8 Greene, W., 150 Grossman, Estonian Bolshevik, 24 Grumbach, S., 87, 88 Gubernsky Zemsky Soviet. See Estonian National Council Gurko, General, 163

Hammerstein, General von, 153, 155 Harrison, E., 173 Herding, G . von, 4 1 , 45, 47, 53, 54, 90, 94 Hindenburg, P. von, 34, 47, 49 Hoffmann, M., 37, 48-50, 145 Hohenzollern, House of, 31, 33, 44, 100 Ioffe, Α., 49, 105 Irinarkh, Bishop, 14 Iron Division, 1 1 9 , 146, 152, 153, 155. 157-159» 165 Isenburg, Lt. Col. von, 29, 37, 42, 43 Ivanov, N., 178 Ivinskis, Z., 4 Jaakson, J . , 71 Jadwiga, 1 Jagow, G. von, 32 Jakobson, C., 21-23 Jannsen, J . , 21 Jogaila, ι Jürmann, Pastor, 102 Kairys, S., 30, 42, 93 Kalevala, 21 Kalevipoeg, 21 Kalinin, M., 24 Kamenev, L., 50, 85 Kathen, General von, 1 1 9 Katkov, M., 15 Keenan, Α., 150 Kerensky, Α., 69, ηο, 148 Keskulya, Estonian Bolshevik, 24 Kingisepp, Estonian Bolshevik, 76 Klimas, P., 30 Knorring, L., 163 Koidula, L., 22 Kolchak, Α., 147-150, i6o, 1 7 4 , 1 7 6 179 Kreutzwald, F., 21 Kruus, G., 80 Krylenko, N., 44

Index Kühlmann, R. von, 45, 47-50, 52 Kukk, J., 125 Kurschat, Lithuanian scholar, 4 Laidoner, J., 127, 154 Landeswehr, Baltic, 1 0 9 , 1 1 9 , 1 2 2 , 1 2 3 , 144, 1 5 1 - 1 5 5, 159 Lansing, R., 172 Latvian Democratic Bloc, 107, 108, 112, 114, 115 Latvian National Council, 68, 107, 114, 115 Latvian Refugees Committee, 67 League of Nations, 149, 176 Lenin, V., 21, 44, 57-61, 67, 75, 77, 81, 84, 85, 137, 174 Leonas, P., 96 Lieven, Α., 160-162 Lithuanian Declaration of Independence, 45, 47, 51-54 Lithuanian National Congress (1905), 8,9 Litvinov, M., 173 Lloyd George, D., 167, 168 Lublin, Union of, 2 Ludendorff, E. von, 27-29, 32-38, 4°. 47. 49» 89 Maapaev. See Estonian National Council Malinauskas, D., 30 Mannerheim, C., 177 Manteuffel, H. von, 151 March, P., 177 Martna, M., 24, 72-74 Max von Baden, 94, 95, n o , h i Meierovics, Z., 68, 182 Meister, Estonian Bolshevik, 76 Mender, F., 64 Merits, Estonian Bolshevik, 80 Merkel, D., 11 Merkel, G., 1 1 , 12 Michaelis, G., 35, 36, 40

191

Mickevicius-Kapsukas, V., 7, 130 Mickiewicz, Α., 3 Mindaugas II, 94 Mironas, V., 30 Muraviev, M., 2-4, 132 Narutavicius, S., 30, 93 National self-determination. See Selfdetermination, national Newspapers and periodicals: Estonian—Pärnu Postimees, 21, 24; Sakala, 22; Social Demokraat, 81; Uus Sakala, 80; Latvian—Baltija, 67; Cina, 64; Deenas Lapa, 18; Die Ro/e Fahne, 106, 139; Jaunä Deenas Lapa, 67; Jaunäkais Zinas, 21; Majas Viesis, 18; Peterburgas Avises, 15; Lithuanian—Aplvalga, 5; Aus^ra, 4, 5, 8; Dabartis, 29; Keleivis, 4; Varpas, 5 ; Zariga, 8 Niedra, Α., 19, 20, 152-154 North Army (Russian). See Northern Corps Northern Corps, 128-129, 159 Northwest Army (Russian), 149, 160, 177 Northwest Russia, government of, 177 Noske, G., 159 Nystad, Treaty of, 10, 98 OHL (Oberste Heeresleitung), 31-38, 40-42, 44, 47, 48, 50, 51, 155 Ozols, I., 20 Paderewski, I., 170 Paris Peace Conference. See Peace Conference, Paris Parts, Col., 178 Päts, K., 24, 25, 71-73, 106, 125 Paul I, 12 Payer, F., 90, 94 Peace Conference, Paris, 167, 169ϊ 7 ΐ . 173, 175» 179

Index

192 Peace Resolution, German

(1917),

35. 3 Peterson, Estonian Bolshevik, 76 Peter the Great, 10, 98 Petrulis, Α . , 30 Pichon, S., 173 Piip, Α . , 73, 175 Pilsudski, J . , 182 Political parties: Estonian— Agrarian, 7 3 ; Anarchist, 75; Bolshevik, 24, 74-76, 80-84, I 2 6 , 1 4 2 ; Christian, 1 4 2 ; Democratic (National Liberal), 7 3 ; Freethinking Progressive, 24; German, 1 4 2 ; Kadet, 75; Labor, 1 4 2 ; Menshevik (Social Democrats), 24, 25, 72, 74, 75, 1 4 2 ; National Democratic, 1 4 2 ; Radical Democratic, 7 3 ; Radical Socialist, 7 3 ; Russian, 1 4 2 ; Social Democratic Internationalist, 75; Socialist Revolutionary, 74, 75, 79, 80, 1 4 2 ; Social Laborite, 7 3 ; German—Center, 6

36, 45, 5 1 ; Social Democratic, 45, 47, 53, 88, 89, 1 5 8 ; Spartacist, 145; Latvian—Bolshevik, 20, 64, 68, 83, 84, 107, 108, 1 1 5 - 1 1 8 , 120, 1 2 1 , 126, 1 3 5 - 1 4 0 ; Constitutional Democratic, 1 9 ; Menshevik, 20, 64, 1 1 6 ; Peasant, 107; People's, 1 9 ; Social Democratic, 18, 1 9 ; Socialist Revolutionary, 116; Lithuanian—Catholic Nationalist, 1 0 ; Christian Democratic, 9, 1 4 3 ; Clerical, 9, 1 0 ; Communist (Bolshevik), 130, 1 3 1 , 1 4 3 ; Democratic, 9, 1 3 0 ; Left Socialist Revolutionary, 1 3 2 ; Liberal, 9; Liberal Nationalist, 1 0 ; Menshevik, 1 3 2 ; Nationalist, 1 4 3 ; Polish Social Democratic, 59, 1 3 2 ; Populist, 1 4 3 ; Social Democratic, 6, 7, 9, 10, 1 4 3 ; Russian—

Bolshevik, 27, 5 7 - 6 1 , 74, 75, 78, 1 1 4 , 1 2 7 - 1 2 9 , 1 3 5 , 156, 1 6 5 ; Kadet, 25; Socialist Revolutionary, 69, 85; Union of Autonomists, 25 Poska, J . , 7 1 - 7 3 , 76, 125, 175 Prinkipo Island proposal, 1 7 3 , 174 Pugachev, E . , 1 1 Puskar, Col., 178 Pusta, C., 179 Kada, Ukrainian, 78 Radek, K . , 76 Radishchev, Α . , n Rainis-Plieksans, J . , 18 Kech', Russian newspaper, 20 Rei, Α . , 24, 125 Rodzyanko, General, 179 Rosenberg, Baron, 1 1 6 , 1 1 7 Rozin, Α . , 18 Ruga, K . , 24 Russian Political Conference, 168, 174 Russification, 2-4, 16, 17, 23, 26 Kusskaya MisV, Russian periodical, 16 Russkije Vedomosti, Russian paper, 20 Säkk, Ε . , i25 Salomon, Ε . von, 164, 165 Saulys, J . , 29, 30, 42 Saulys, K . , 30 Saxony, King of, 47, 91-93 Scheidemann, P., 45, 88, 89 Schreiner, Baron, 1 1 6 Seeckendorf, Major General von, 105 Seeckt, H. von, 156 Self-determination, national, 35, 36, 38-40, 44-52, 57-62, 66, 75, 79, IIO, I I I Seljamaa, J . , 73

Index Sernas, J . , 30 Siemens, Sergeant, 1 1 9 Skujenieks, M . , 64, 1 1 6 Slavophiles, 15 Slezevicius, Lithuanian Premier, 144 Smetona, Α . , 29, 30, 4 1 , 54, 96, Smilgevicius, J . , 30 Spagis, Α . , ι ; Stackelberg, B a r o n , 1 0 4 , 105 Stael-Holstein, B a r o n , 1 0 2 , 1 0 4 Stalin, J . , 81 Stasinskas, Lithuanian Minister, Staugaitis, J . , 30 Stolypin, P., 20 Strandmann, O . , 24, 7 3 , 106, 142 Strazdmuiza, Armistice o f , 1 5 4 , Stromberg, B a r o n , 1 5 1 Stucka, P., 18, 20, 1 2 1 , 1 3 7 - 1 4 0 Stulginskas, Α . , 30 Sverdlov, P., 1 2 1 , 139 S v i n h u f v u d , P . , 84 Sydorenko, G . , 175

143, 144

96

125, 155

Tallents, S., 1 5 5 T a m m , J . , 23 Tammsaare, Α . , 23 T a r t u , Treaty o f , 1 8 1 , 1 8 2 Tarjba, 30, 3 1 , 38, 4 1 , 42, 4 5 - 4 7 , 5 1 - 5 4 , 93-9 6 » ! 3 2 . l 6 9 Teemant, J . , 24, 25, 73 T ö n i s s o n , J . , 24, 25, 73 T r o t s k y , L . , 50, 52 Tubelis, J . , 96 Ulmanis, K . , 1 0 7 , 1 1 5 , 1 1 7 , 1 2 0 - 1 2 2 , 144, 146, 1 4 7 , i 5 I , 1 5 3 - 1 5 5 , 165 United Provinces Council, 1 0 0 , 1 0 1 , 105 Urach, W . v o n , 5 1 , 9 1 , 93, 94

193

Väcietis, J . , 85 Valdemärs, K . , 15 Valokaitis, J . , 30 Valters, M . , 62, 66, 1 1 5 - 1 1 7 , 1 4 4 Versailles, Treaty o f , 1 5 2 , 1 5 7 V i b o r g Manifesto, 26 V i g o d s k i s , J . , 143 Vilde, E . , 24 Vileisis, J . , 30 Vilms, J . , 73, 106 Vilnius, Diet o f , 30, 38, 42, 53, 93 Virgolich, Col., 160, 1 6 1 Vitte, S., 25 Voldemaras, Α . , 46, 93, 96, 1 4 3 , 1 6 9 , i 7 i . 175 V o l k m a n n , E . , 88 V o r o n k o , J . , 143 Vytautas, 1 Ward, Col., 1 7 3 Warsaw Society of Scholars, 3 " W e s t Russian" A r m y , 159, 1 6 1 , 163, 164 West Russian " g o v e r n m e n t , " 1 6 1 , 163, 164 Wilhelm I I , Kaiser, 34, 40, 47, 55, 9Z> 93. 99. I 0 5 > 108. i n Wilson, W . , n o , 1 6 7 , 168, 1 7 4 Winnig, Α . , 1 1 1 - 1 2 6 , 144, i ; 6 , 1 5 7 Y e a s , J . , 96, 1 7 1 Y e a s , M . , 93, 96 Y o u n g Latvians, 1 5 Yudenich, N., 129, 176-180

149,

Zälltis, J . , 67, 1 1 5 , 1 5 5 Zamuelis, V . , 1 0 7 Zeligowski, L., 182 Zemgals, G . , 1 1 6 Zemitäns, Captain, 1 5 3 Z i m m e r m a n n , Α . , 29, 36

160-163,

Harvard Historical

Monographs

* Out of print 1. Athenian Tribal Cycles in the Hellenistic Age. By W. S. Ferguson. 1932. 2. The Private Record of an Indian Governor-Generalship. The Correspondence of Sir John Shore, Governor-General, with Henry Dundas, President of the Board of Control, 1793-1798. Edited by Holden Furber. 1933. 3. The Federal Railway Land Subsidy Policy of Canada. By J. B. Hedges. 1934. 4. Russian Diplomacy and the Opening of the Eastern Question in 1938 and 1839. By P. E. Mosely. 1934. 5. The First Social Experiments in America. A Study in the Development of Spanish Indian Policy in the Sixteenth Century. By Lewis Hanke. 1935.* 6. British Propaganda at Home and in the United States from 1914 to 1917. By J. D. Squires. 1935.* 7. Bernadotte and the Fall of Napoleon. By F. D. Scott. 1935. 8. The Incidence of the Terror during the French Revolution. A Statistical Interpretation. By Donald Greer. 1935. 9. French Revolutionary Legislation on Illegitimacy, 1789-1804. By Crane Brinton. 1936. 10. A n Ecclesiastical Barony of the Middle Ages. The Bishopric of Bayeaux, 1066-1204. By S. E. Gleason. 1936. 11. Chinese Traditional Historiography. By C. S. Gardner. 1938.* 12. Studies in Early French Taxation. By J. R. Strayer and C. H. Taylor. 1939. 13. Muster and Review. A Problem of English Military Administration 1420-1440. By R. A. Newhall. 1940. 14. Portuguese Voyages to America in the Fifteenth Century. By S. E. Morison. 1940.* 15. Argument from Roman Law in Political Thought, 1200-1600. By M. P. Gilmore. 1941.* 16. The Huancavelica Mercury Mine. A Contribution to the History of the Bourbon Renaissance in the Spanish Empire. By A. P. Whitaker. 1941.

Harvard Historical Monographs 17. The Palace School of Muhammad the Conqueror. By Barnette Miller. 1941.* 18. A Cistercian Nunnery in Mediaeval Italy: The Story of Rifreddo in Saluzzo, 1220-1300. By Catherine E. Boyd. 1943. 19. Vassi and Fideles in the Carolingian Empire. By C. E. Odegaard. 1945. 20. Judgment by Peers. By Barnaby C. Keeney. 1949. 21. The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917. By Ο. H. Radkey. 1950. 22. Conversion and the Poll Tax in Early Islam. By Daniel C. Dennett. 1950.* 23. Albert Gallatin and the Oregon Problem. By Frederick Merk. 1950. 24. The Incidence of the Emigration during the French Revolution. By Donald Greer. 1951.* 2 5. Alterations of the Words of Jesus as Quoted in the Literature of the Second Century. By Leon E. Wright. 1952.* 26. Liang Ch'i Ch'ao and the Mind of Modern China. By Joseph R. Levenson. 1953.* 27. The Japanese and Sun Yat-sen. By Marius Β. Jansen. 1954. 28. English Politics in the Early Eighteenth Century. By Robert Walcott, Jr. 1956 * 29. The Founding of the French Socialist Party (1893-1905). By Aaron Noland. 1956. 30. British Labour and the Russian Revolution 1917-1924. By Stephen Richards Graubard. 1956. 31. R K F D V : German Resettlement and Population Policy. By Robert L. Koehl. 1957. 32. Disarmament and Peace in British Politics, 1914-1919. By Gerda Richards Crosby. 1957. 3 3. Concordia Mundi: The Career and Thought of Guillaume Postel (1510-1581). By W. J . Bouwsma. 1957. 34. Bureaucracy, Aristocracy, and Autocracy. The Prussian Experience, 1660-1815. By Hans Rosenberg. 1958. 35. Exeter 1540-1640. The Growth of an English County Town. By Wallace T. MacCaffrey. 1958. 36. Historical Pessimism in the French Enlightenment. By Henry V y Verberg. 1958.

37. The Renaissance Idea of Wisdom. By Eugene F. Rice, Jr. 1958. 38. The First Professional Revolutionist: Filippo Michele Buonarroti (1761-1837). By Elizabeth L. Eisenstein. 1959. 39. The Formation of the Baltic States: A Study of the Effects of Great Power Politics upon the Emergence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. By Stanley W. Page. 1959.