The FBI Abroad: Bridging the Gap Between Foreign and Domestic Intelligence 9781626379121

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FBI ABROAD THE

THE FBI

ABROAD Bridging the Gap Between Domestic and Foreign Intelligence

Darren E. Tromblay

b o u l d e r l o n d o n

The views expressed in this book are solely those of the author and do not reflect the views of any US government agency or other entity. Published in the United States of America in 2020 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Suite 314, Boulder, Colorado 80301 www.rienner.com

and in the United Kingdom by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. Gray’s Inn House, 127 Clerkenwell Road, London EC1 5DB

© 2020 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Tromblay, Darren E., author. | United States. Federal Bureau of Investigation. Title: The FBI abroad : bridging the gap between domestic and foreign intelligence / Darren E. Tromblay. Description: Boulder, Colorado : Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc., [2020] | Includes bibliographical references and index. | Summary: “Explores the FBI’s little-known presence abroad, revealing the inextricable nature of domestic and foreign intelligence activities”—Provided by publisher. Identifiers: LCCN 2020008496 (print) | LCCN 2020008497 (ebook) | ISBN 9781626379022 (hardcover; alk. paper) | ISBN 9781626379121 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: National security—United States. | Domestic intelligence—United States. | Intelligence service—United States. | Law enforcement—International cooperation. | United States—Foreign relations. Classification: LCC HV8144.F43 T76 2020 (print) | LCC HV8144.F43 (ebook) | DDC 327.1273—dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020008496 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020008497

British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library.

Printed and bound in the United States of America

The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1992.

5  4  3  2  1

To my Kate, you are a muse and intellectual inspiration. I love you and adore you completely!

Contents

Acknowledgments

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

ix

A Global Domestic Intelligence Service

1

Origins of the FBI’s Operations Abroad

11

The Bureau’s Foreign Intelligence Legacy

47

Diplomacy and Institution Building

73

Oversight of International Programs

105

Legal Attachés and the US Information Advantage

135

Modern FBI Priorities

169

On the Front Lines

209

Abroad Advisedly: The Legat Program in the Twenty-First Century

247

List of Acronyms Selected Bibliography Index About the Book

255 257 265 277

vii

Acknowledgments

WITH EACH BOOK I WRITE, THE ACKNOWLEDGMENTS LIST gets lengthier and lengthier. Many thanks to my good friend, font of knowledge, and confirmation sponsor John F. Fox. Also, I am grateful to the individuals, institutions, and publications that have given me opportunities to share my research. Many colleagues have endured my pontification as I tested out ideas. Special thanks to Rob, Deborah, J.D., Brian M., Jenny, Fred, “Molly,” Nick, and Dan. Additionally, I am grateful to Richard, with whom I would have been presenting in Hawaii had it not been for the pandemic. I am in debt to friends who have shown me such hospitality— essential to an author decompressing—over the years. KT and Pat, who have allowed me to occupy their home with an invading army of revelers to celebrate the launch of each new book (and who have regularly been quite generous with their liquor cabinet). Connie and Joe, Joe, and Jim, you are all amazing. Many thanks to those who have shared holidays and dinner tables with me— Sylvia and Garry, BZ and George, and Dennis and Pam. Also, I am grateful to my larger family—Suzanne, Katherine and Bob, Matthew, Kay Frances, Kathleen, KdJ (for whom I invented a

ix

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Acknowledgments

cocktail), Tom, and so many others—at Holy Trinity Catholic Church in Washington, DC. I must, as always, tip my hat (and my Manhattan) to the inimitable Judith Chase Gilbert. Finally, I want to acknowledge Keith and Judy for their warm welcome and kindness.

1 A Global Domestic Intelligence Service

INTELLIGENCE SHORTHAND NEATLY DIVIDES FOREIGN AND domestic collection between, respectively, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). The popular mythology of US intelligence evolution portrays the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) as the sole progenitor of the CIA and leaves little room for a discussion of the FBI’s contribution to the development of the US foreign intelligence apparatus or the FBI’s current role as one of multiple agencies that inform US government decisionmakers about the global developments they must navigate. However, this conceptualization of intelligence is not entirely accurate. Revisiting the record is essential—not to assign credit, but rather to understand the trajectory of development and the influences that have brought the US foreign intelligence enterprise to its current form. By comprehending these factors, policymakers responsible for oversight will more clearly understand what to expect and which resources can achieve desired outcomes. In The FBI Abroad, I address several key themes in the development of US national security and diplomacy. First, I highlight an underexplored influence on the formation of the modern US foreign intelligence enterprise by demonstrating that the OSS was not the sole progenitor of the CIA and that the

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The FBI Abroad

FBI’s Special Intelligence Service (SIS) provided a substantial contribution to how the United States thinks about intelligence. Then I cover the establishment and operation of the FBI’s modern Legal Attaché (Legat) program. This exploration of the Legat program examines how the Bureau’s international presence not only helps to gather information vital to US security but also serves as a tool of diplomacy by building cooperative bilateral and multilateral relationships and by helping to establish the rule of law in fragile societies. The book proceeds to cover the Bureau’s role in establishing international institutions, including Interpol, which provide venues for collaboration and norm setting. Finally, in The FBI Abroad I examine the Bureau’s role in the midst of international conflict, ranging from the deployment of agents to the European and Asian theaters in conjunction with US forces during and immediately after World War II to the worldwide responsibilities that the FBI has assumed in fighting terrorism. This book reflects the results of significant research across records of both the executive and the legislative branches of the US government and the limited journalistic and scholarly discussions of the Legat program. The executive branch records included those from the holdings of the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, and Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) releases from relevant agencies, such as the FBI and the CIA—via the latter ’s CREST (CIA Records Search Tool) database. Congressional documents— notably those focusing on oversight of the FBI and US foreign relations—also proved invaluable to me as sources of detailed information regarding the more recent workings of the Bureau’s operations beyond US borders. I hope this book piques readers’ interest and leads to future explorations of related topics via FOIA requests and memoirs of agents’ experiences abroad on behalf of FBI international missions. Even more importantly, I hope that readers take away an appreciation of how integral the FBI is as an actor in the US foreign policy field, both as a provider of information and as an agency with a role in the implementation of policy objectives.

A Global Domestic Intelligence Service

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Role of the FBI in the Origin and Evolution of US Foreign Intelligence Prior to World War II, the United States, unfamiliar with clandestine foreign intelligence operations, especially in peacetime, largely lacked a civilian, foreign-oriented intelligence apparatus. The military fielded intelligence components, but these served parochial missions, such as gathering information of interest to specific services’ operations rather than serving policymakers. Policymakers, in turn, were not exactly demanding information because they, and the rest of the country, tended to hold a worldview in which the United States could remain aloof from international intrigue. Military intelligence, even if it did aspire to serve a wider range of customers, was something of a backwater. These factors meant that the military had little for the FBI to emulate when the illustrious law enforcement agency gained new responsibilities in the run-up to World War II. In retrospect, foreign intelligence coverage developed as a natural extension of the FBI’s role at home. During the mid-1930s, and under the direction of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR), the Bureau focused on the influence of foreign communist and fascist movements within the United States. When, in 1939, the White House sought to develop a coordinated intelligence apparatus, the FBI joined military intelligence as a key player and soon gained responsibility for coverage of the Western Hemisphere. Since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine in the nineteenth century, the United States has viewed the Americas as uniquely significant to US national security. If not a direct impingement on US sovereignty, foreign contravention of the Monroe Doctrine represented an indirect challenge to the US domestic setting. It therefore made sense for the FBI to ride out and meet threats before those threats could reach US borders. The FBI became responsible for the operation of the Special Intelligence Service, which covered Latin America, and the SIS was consciously responsive to the intelligence requirements of customers across the US government. Without a model for intelligence collection, the FBI largely learned by trial and error. That it was able to do so is even more

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The FBI Abroad

remarkable considering its inexperience with clandestine collection prior to this point. J. Edgar Hoover, as early as the 1930s, opposed the concept of undercover operations, which he feared would fundamentally change the nature of the FBI by corroding its transparency and making it less subject to scrutiny.1 Despite these impediments, the Bureau gamely forged the SIS. FBI special agents and, in a few cases, nonagent personnel (known as special employees) adopted nonofficial cover (i.e., identities not affiliated with the US government) and spread throughout Latin America. As the FBI learned by experience, it established intelligence coordinators—known as legal attachés—who were ostensibly part of the diplomatic staff in US embassies and consulates but who, in reality, were responsible for keeping the SIS running. In the creation of legal attachés (legats), the Bureau carried its established bureaucratic model abroad. Whereas no model existed for its nonofficial covert operations, it attempted to model its legats, as much as possible, on its domestic field office arrangements. If this setup sounds familiar to observers of US intelligence history, it is because the SIS-era legats closely resembled who the CIA would later refer to as chiefs of station. This is not coincidental. Despite popular belief—which holds that the OSS (or “A.S.S.,” as Hoover once cattily called it) was the direct predecessor of the CIA—the line of succession is not nearly as straight as publications, including the CIA’s own monograph, The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency, suggest.2 Although the FBI ultimately lost out to the CIA as the United States’ primary foreign intelligence service, its activities—as America’s first civilian foreign intelligence service—provided essential early lessons that informed the future development of US intelligence abroad. The SIS had an approximately two-year head start on the OSS (1940 versus 1942). Furthermore, the OSS expired shortly after the end of World War II, whereas the SIS remained a viable service that, prior to its dissolution, started to delve into Cold War threats. (It is also worth noting that Bill Donovan, the head of the OSS, never served with the CIA, although he certainly had an impact on contemporaries who did.)

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The history of the discussions and debates that led to the creation of the CIA are covered extensively elsewhere. See, for instance, David Rudgers’s Creating the Secret State: The Origins of the Central Intelligence Agency: 1945–1947; Arthur Darling’s The CIA: An Instrument of Government, to 1950; and Melvyn Leffler’s A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War. However, it is worth noting that the FBI did not simply consider the SIS a wartime exigency and, instead, viewed it as worth continuing and expanding to afford the US government global coverage. Although the powers that be ultimately did not select the SIS to fill this role, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG; the short-lived, immediate predecessor of the CIA) subsumed the SIS infrastructure wholesale and hired multiple Bureau personnel who had served with the SIS. It should not, therefore, come as a surprise that aspects of the CIA’s organization bear a distinct similarity to those of the SIS.

Persistence as a Collector of Intelligence Abroad The FBI did not abandon the Legal Attaché program and, instead, maintained a handful of its SIS outposts as overt liaisons with foreign security services. By retaining and expanding this network, the Bureau was able to leverage the intelligence collection capabilities of cooperative governments to address US interests. Furthermore, through its legats, the FBI could help foreign governments achieve security objectives that were mutually beneficial to the United States and the host governments. Development of new legats has not been an arbitrary process. Instead, a review across decades shows that the FBI established legats to facilitate the flow of information pertaining to strategic concerns ranging from counterterrorism and criminal investigative activity to counterintelligence. The Bureau also established legats to counter threat actors’ use of specific implements, including weapons of mass destruction and the cyber environment. Furthermore, the creation of the CIA did not take legats entirely out of more clandestine forms of collection. The FBI continued, on a limited basis, to conduct human intelligence (HUMINT)

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The FBI Abroad

collection from at least one legat post—Mexico City—following the creation of the CIA.3 According to FBI documents released under the Freedom of Information Act, the Bureau initiated one aspect of its Mexican collection—known as BOCOV—specifically out of concern that the CIA was incapable of developing sufficient intelligence coverage along the southern border of the United States.4 Additionally, the FBI, at the request of President Lyndon B. Johnson (LBJ), assumed responsibility for intelligence coverage in the Dominican Republic during the mid-1960s. Both of the above examples kept the Bureau in the Western Hemisphere—the SIS’s primary area of operation. However, new international concerns prompted legat operations farther afield. For instance, when the FBI established a presence in British-controlled Hong Kong during the mid-1960s, it did so with the purpose of developing awareness about Chinese activities that might impact the United States. Furthermore, in the early 1970s, the Bureau launched a program, known as HILEV, to collect high-level political intelligence.5 The FBI, although part of the US Intelligence Community (IC), is not entirely under the auspices of the Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence. Rather, the FBI’s nexus to the IC is specifically through its Directorate of Intelligence (DI). It is important to note that although the origins of the Legat program lie in clandestine intelligence collection, the program is administered by the Bureau’s International Operations Division (IOD), not the DI. Legats are liaisons, not spooks; diplomatic, rather than cloak-and-dagger, in their activities. However, the work they do in conjunction with the United States’ foreign partners does contribute to US governmental decisionmakers’ understanding of global challenges—both those that emanate from abroad and affect the United States and those that issue forth from the United States and have international implications.

A Tool of Diplomacy Since the beginning of the FBI’s operations abroad, the Bureau has functioned as an implement of US diplomacy. Whereas the

A Global Domestic Intelligence Service

7

sharing of intelligence to effect desired geopolitical results, for example, convincing South American governments to take action against Axis operatives, certainly contains aspects of diplomacy, the FBI has also provided a variety of services meant to help advance foreign governments’ capabilities. Through its provision of services, the Bureau enhances US national security by helping foreign governments achieve specific objectives that align with US interests and enhances US soft power through the creation of goodwill in countries that benefit from the FBI’s assistance.

Capacity Building Even before the creation of the SIS, the FBI assisted foreign partners with the development of security services. Since the late 1930s, an FBI agent, as an overt representative of the Bureau, has helped train Brazilian and Colombian authorities. This function evolved into the police liaison positions in the SIS. Although police liaison agents operated under the auspices of the Legat program, they existed in an open capacity.6 Following the FBI’s ceding clandestine collection responsibilities to the CIA, the police liaison function remained in a handful of locations and became the backbone and primary identity of the Legat program. The evolution of the global threat environment informed the FBI’s efforts to train and equip foreign security services. For instance, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Bureau played a significant role in helping newly independent countries fight organized crime and address the possibility of nefarious actors engaging in the proliferation of Soviet nuclear material. By emphasizing professionalization with a respect for the rule of law through initiatives such as the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), the FBI not only enhanced security but also helped to instill new norms in transitional countries.

Providing Technical Assistance J. Edgar Hoover promoted an approach to law enforcement that emphasized the application of cutting-edge technology to combat security threats. This posture has supported the development

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The FBI Abroad

of unique capabilities that the FBI can deploy to provide assistance to foreign partners. The Bureau has augmented the capabilities of other countries through its Laboratory and Criminal Justice Investigative Services Divisions. Furthermore, the FBI has deployed capabilities abroad in times of crisis. The Bureau’s Disaster Squad, formed in 1940 as part of the Identification Division, has deployed abroad on multiple occasions, starting with its response to a 1961 Sabena crash. FBI deployments to sites of atrocities—man-made and natural—have continued up to the writing of this book: After a white nationalist’s March 2019 attacks on two mosques in New Zealand, the Bureau sent agents to assist with the investigation.7 Following the Easter 2019 bombings in Sri Lanka, the FBI dispatched agents to assist Sri Lankan authorities with the investigation.8

On the Front Lines The FBI has a long history of deploying personnel to the front lines of conflict to gather and exploit intelligence that helps disrupt enemy actions directed at the United States. Part of the SIS’s work included the assignment of agents to Europe and Asia, where they worked with—and in some instances traveled alongside—the US military to gather enemy documents that might provide leads for action in the domestic setting. The emerging threat from state and nonstate terrorist actors brought the Bureau into a different kind of fight starting in the 1980s. This included the high-profile rendition of the notorious terrorist Fawaz Younis from the high seas. After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI, along with much of the rest of the US government, shifted its emphasis to support the global war on terrorism. In furtherance of this, the FBI dispatched a long-term presence to both Afghanistan and Iraq. In the latter country, Bureau agents actually accompanied Special Forces operatives to secure evidence.9

A Note on Nomenclature Intelligence jargon can be confusing. The FBI employs special agents (also referred to simply as “agents” throughout this book).

A Global Domestic Intelligence Service

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However, for the CIA, an agent is what the FBI would call an informant, the individual from whom a CIA case officer (roughly the equivalent of an FBI special agent) obtains information. Additionally, the term legal attaché, depending on context, can mean either the posting (e.g., Legal Attaché, Paris) or the official in that posting. Finally, the term legal attaché—regardless of usage—is usually truncated to “legat” (e.g., Legat, Paris). A thought challenge runs through The FBI Abroad: Is the FBI’s international presence, as it has evolved throughout the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, optimal for safeguarding US national security? The changing network of agencies—federal and nonfederal—as well as shifting US strategic interests constantly call into question institutions’ impetus (i.e., is there a valid reason for their continued existence or is their continuance an accident of history?), potential redundancy (this is an important consideration because the Legat program predates the creation of other government agencies that also engage in foreign activities), and adaptability to new challenges. The book takes the Bureau’s international activities out of the simplistic context of law enforcement and situates them within the broader context of US national security. In Chapters 2 and 3, I begin by discussing how the FBI’s international activities have shaped US federal and nonfederal intelligence collection abroad (including investigation). In Chapter 4, I then examine the Bureau’s role in the collection of information not just to satisfy its own immediate domestic security missions but also as an implement of diplomacy and institution building that serves US interests writ large. In assessing this evolution, the book considers how US policy and interagency relationships have shaped the development of the FBI’s Legal Attaché program. In Chapter 5, I assess the FBI’s implementation of the Legat program, specifically how the FBI’s bureaucratic structures and internal culture have shaped the Bureau’s international efforts. Lastly, Chapters 6, 7, and 8 emphasize the Bureau’s activities in the context of US strategic interests during both peacetime and war. Chapter 6

About the Book

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The FBI Abroad

focuses on the legats’ contribution to the United States’ informational advantage, and Chapter 7 addresses how the legats’ work aligns with the FBI’s stated priorities. Finally, in Chapter 8, I examine the role of the FBI on the front lines of state and nonstate conflicts, from World War II to modern counterterrorism efforts.

Notes 1. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities of Components of the Department of Justice, S. Doc. No. 97-682 (1982). 2. FBI 62-80750. July 26, 1946. 3. FBI 67-149000. Intelligence Division Inspection 3/11/75–4/4/75. 4. L. V. Boardman to the Director, May 1955, FBI 67-94639. 5. FBI 67-149000. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 6. FBI 62-80750. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 7. Josh Campbell, “FBI’s Response to New Zealand Attacks Demonstrates Its Quiet Global Reach,” CNN, March 21, 2019, https://amp.cnn .com/cnn/2019/03/21/politics/fbi-new-zealand-attacks/index.html. 8. Joanna Slater, Amantha Perera, and Shane Harris, “Sri Lanka Blames Local Islamist Extremist Group for Easter Bombings That Killed 290: US Offers FBI Assistance in Probe,” Washington Post, April 22, 2019, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/sri-lanka-easter-bombings /2019/04/21/30739822-647a-11e9-a1b6-b29b90efa879_story.html?utm_term =.d80cc4ec74a9. 9. Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, “Inside the FBI’s Secret Relationship with the Military’s Special Operations,” Washington Post, April 10, 2014, https:// www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/inside-the-fbis-secret -relationship-with-the-militarys-special-operations/2014/04/10/dcca3460 -be84-11e3-b195-policedd0c1174052c_story.html?utm_term=.24fa13d8f46d.

2 Origins of the FBI’s Operations Abroad

THE UNITED STATES, PRIOR TO 1947, LACKED A CIVILIAN, peacetime intelligence service. Up until this point in history, the US experience with intelligence had, at best, been a patchwork of military service components—the Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) and the Military Intelligence Division (MID)—that focused on the parochial interests of their specific departments (Navy and War, respectively). Additionally, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) provided assistance to the US Department of State, but only at State’s request.1 All of these functions tended to reflect a conflict-oriented view of the world—with intelligence activities directed at specific threats rather than with an eye toward developing an ongoing awareness of conditions that could impact US interests. By the mid-1930s, US president Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) had begun to acknowledge that foreign threats from the Soviet Union and Germany posed growing concerns to the still-isolationist, peacetime United States. At FDR’s instruction, the FBI conducted a one-time overview of the Fascist movement in the United States, which J. Edgar Hoover described as an “intelligence investigation.”2 On May 10, 1934, the Bureau’s field offices received instructions to gather information about the Nazi movement, with particular emphasis on antiracial and anti-American activities with any possible connections to official representatives of

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The FBI Abroad

the German government in the United States.3 In 1936, FDR directed the FBI to engage in a similar inquiry, focused on identifying Communist influence within the United States.4 FDR’s approach to intelligence in the domestic setting indicated a modification of the previous paradigm. Intelligence resources no longer focused solely on the near-term threats from countries or international movements with which the United States was in an immediate, overt conflict. Instead, the White House committed to securing an informational advantage by assessing the activities of international actors who might eventually challenge US interests. Expansion of collection abroad was the next logical step in this progression. Intelligence activities focused against foreignsponsored targets operating domestically could provide insights into threats from abroad but were hardly optimal for understanding the intentions and operations of foreign-based sponsors of US proxies. It was, therefore, a natural next step when, on June 26, 1939, FDR directed the leaders of the FBI, MID, and ONI to coordinate their activities.5 The assistant secretary of state for the administration—first George S. Messersmith and then Adolf Berle—was responsible for facilitating this enterprise.6 This new process of coordination took bureaucratic form as the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC).7 The IIC was the first de facto US intelligence community. From 1939 until 1941, the FBI’s director, J. Edgar Hoover, chaired the IIC and ensured that minutes from the meetings reached MID, ONI, and State.8 However, the IIC was not simply a coordinating body. In June 1940, it became responsible for the Special Intelligence Service (SIS), which the FBI would operate throughout the Western Hemisphere.9 The SIS originated in a conversation during the previous month between Hoover and Berle regarding the desirability of establishing an apparatus under the auspices of the FBI to gather “secret intelligence in connection with subversive activities throughout the Western Hemisphere.” Consistent with the State Department’s role in the IIC, Berle approached FDR to obtain a directive authorizing the establishment of the SIS.10 On June 20, 1940, FDR orally assigned the FBI this responsibility (excluding

Origins of the FBI’s Operations Abroad

13

coverage of Panama, for which MID would be responsible).11 Berle, via a memorandum dated June 24, 1940, put the arrangement in writing, citing a telephone discussion with FDR, and provided it to the heads of the MID, ONI, and FBI.12 However, FDR did not formally sign a directive authorizing SIS operations until early 1942.13 By this time, the SIS was already fully functioning. Per the instructions from the White House, a division of labor would be made in the intelligence field. The FBI’s SIS would cover the Western Hemisphere, with this authority coming in the form of a request from the State Department. The MID and ONI would cover the rest of the world.14 Furthermore, according to the June 24 memorandum, the State Department, under special circumstances, could request assistance from the FBI on assignments outside of the Western Hemisphere. Funding for the SIS came from the president’s confidential fund, separate from the Bureau’s regular appropriation. This practice kept the funds hidden from the General Accounting Office. The Budget Bureau made the initial allotment, consisting of $400,000, on July 2, 1940.15 (This amount equates to a purchasing power of $7.2 million in July 2018.)16 Subsequent disbursements came from the same fund for unvouchered expenses.17 The scope of the SIS’s duties, in terms of what it would focus its collection against, was the subject of heated debate among agencies, both at the outset of SIS operations and throughout much of its existence. According to Berle’s memorandum, the SIS was not supposed to supersede existing intelligence operations.18 This could be read as an attempt to protect established military intelligence work in the hemisphere, and the military did, indeed, make an effort to limit the scope of SIS operations. In July 1940, General Sherman Miles, the head of MID, argued that the SIS’s intelligence work should be limited to identifying subversion sponsored by Nazi, Fascist, and Communist operatives, with an emphasis on activities that were directly hostile to the United States or involving organizations that were directly linked with elements in the United States.19 Miles’s interpretation was arguably a calculated one, meant to preserve MID’s turf. According to Miles, the primary purpose of

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The FBI Abroad

the SIS was to supplement, through undercover work, the information that US-accredited agents in foreign countries were able to obtain. However, this view of SIS as complementary to existing efforts was not about preventing duplication—at least in the Bureau’s assessment. In an internal FBI memorandum for Hoover, Miles expressed that he was disturbed by the “probability that the Bureau would discover and report intelligence information which his operatives [were] unable to secure.”20 Furthermore, the Bureau believed that Miles, who had been present during Berle’s conversation with FDR, had been “somewhat instrumental” in ensuring that the SIS had “a loosely drawn and dubious outline” beyond simply arguing against a broad mandate for the SIS.21 Miles was hardly the FBI’s only jurisdictional rival and, as discussed later, these rivalries played out not only bureaucratically in Washington but also operationally in the field. Despite the FBI’s history prior to the establishment of the SIS as a reactive, law-enforcement-centric organization, it is clear that the Bureau intended for its intelligence work to extend well beyond simply rooting out foreign subversion. Instead, the Bureau intended to function as an agency providing the highest levels of the US government with an informational advantage. The FBI would disseminate information to specific US agencies, conduct collection on the basis of requests from those agencies, and ensure that the president received data of “urgent and vital interest.” The IIC endorsed this approach on July 26, 1940, when it determined that the scope of SIS operations should not be restricted.22 However, according to a retrospective FBI memorandum from 1948, the SIS would emphasize intelligence collection against individuals and corporations in the Western Hemisphere that were operating “detrimental to the best interests of the United States in connection with the war then being waged in Europe.”23 The SIS responded to what would be known as, in current intelligence parlance, collection requirements. Acting as a “service organization,” it would evaluate and correlate information in Washington. The Bureau would then disseminate this information according to the interests of US government departments: the State Department would receive all material pertaining to Latin Amer-

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ica; the navy would receive all material relating to the activities of foreign naval departments as well as maritime information concerning espionage agents and their activities; the War Department would receive all material pertaining to the movement of troops in Latin America as well as information pertaining to espionage agents’ activities with a nexus to military issues; the Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs (OCIAA, led by Nelson Rockefeller, who would have an occasionally intersecting relationship with the SIS) would be provided with all material on matters pertaining to subversive political activities, enemy propaganda, and data regarding commerce and individuals dealing commercially with sympathizers or subjects of Axis nations; the Office of the Coordinator of Information (COI; led by William Donovan, who would establish the Office of Strategic Services in 1942) was entitled to all information pertaining to the nexus of Latin American activities and enemy activities in Europe; the Treasury Department would receive information regarding the movements of questionable or enemy funds and the individuals responsible for these movements; the Maritime Commission would be given information regarding shipping and port commerce; and finally, the Board of Economic Warfare would receive information regarding strategic materials and commercial data.24 Tension between the Bureau’s and the military’s expectations of the SIS’s role prompted Hoover and the Bureau, on several occasions, to call competitors’ bluffs and suggest that the FBI would divest itself of SIS duties. In August 1940, E. A. Tamm, an FBI assistant director—prompted by Miles’s efforts to curtail the SIS—advised Berle that “there was no reason or need for the FBI in the SIS work if the work was to be confined to subversive activities.”25 As Tamm explained, “It was impossible to draw any line of demarcation between the various fields of information,” and identifying the extent of Nazi presence in a country would require a “comprehensive study of that country’s political, economic, financial, and industrial factors.” Furthermore, Tamm noted, “if foreign infiltration into a country was intended to result in a revolution, that information could be obtained only from information developed from within the industrial, financial,

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and political units of the country.”26 Tamm engaged in a similar conversation with Berle in 1941, during which Berle expressed his opposition to transferring SIS coverage away from the Bureau because the Bureau had, up to that point, done an excellent job, with efficiency and without friction.27 MID, however, was not the only bureaucratic challenger to the FBI’s SIS. In July 1941, FDR appointed William J. Donovan to serve in the newly created COI position. FDR authorized COI— which postdated the SIS by approximately a year and which was not a part of the IIC—to collect and analyze information and data bearing on national security. In June 1942, the COI moved under the auspices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and became the Office of Strategic Services.28 Donovan and Hoover were not strangers to one another, and their relationship was tense. Attorney General Harlan Fiske Stone, who had appointed Hoover in 1924 to run the FBI (then known simply as the Bureau of Investigation), appointed Donovan the same year to serve as the assistant attorney general over the Department of Justice’s Criminal Division. This made Donovan Hoover’s superior and, according to Donovan’s biographer, Douglas Waller, Donovan interfered with the Bureau by overturning decisions with which he disagreed. Both Donovan and Hoover began keeping dossiers on each other. Hoover would continue to do so throughout the course of Donovan’s life.29 The emergence of Donovan and Hoover as prominent players in World War II intelligence inevitably led to competition between their respective agencies. Hoover found an unexpected ally—in the MID—in keeping the Western Hemisphere off-limits to Donovan’s outfit. Approximately a month after the formation of the COI, E. A. Tamm notified Hoover that MID was in concurrence with Hoover’s insistence that the SIS not share responsibility with the COI in the Western Hemisphere and that, because “a matter of this nature cannot be divided geographically,” the FBI’s involvement would be “all or none.”30 Nelson Rockefeller, the coordinator of Inter-American Affairs who worked in conjunction with the Bureau on several matters, also raised an objection with the White House about Donovan operating in the Western Hemisphere.31

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Miles’s alignment with the SIS did not represent a profound change of MID’s outlook about the SIS. Rather, it was likely an act of immediate self-preservation. In March 1941, Miles had argued against one of Hoover’s intermittent threats to abandon SIS work, claiming that neither the army nor the navy had personnel sufficient to take over the work.32 A withdrawal by the SIS would open a vacuum that the OSS could fill and present a new, unknown challenge to Miles’s purview. Better the devil that Miles knew than the one he did not. However, this bureaucratic bulwark did not completely prevent OSS incursions into the SIS’s Latin American jurisdiction. According to an internal FBI document that assessed the operations of the SIS, “some difficulty” was experienced with the SIS in the Western Hemisphere, which the FBI headed off by learning about the OSS’s plans and taking “effective preventive measures and precautions . . . in sufficient time to avert serious difficulty.” The Bureau credited its “constant vigilance and alertness” for preventing significant issues with the OSS.33 This cloak-and-dagger work among US services against each other was not limited to FBI and OSS relations, as a subsequent chapter will illustrate. The alliance of convenience between the FBI and MID to thwart OSS incursions did not prevent continued friction between the first two services. In February 1941, the FBI, MID, and ONI inked a new delimitation agreement that emphasized the Bureau’s functions of soliciting and obtaining data relative to economic, political, industrial, financial, and subversive conditions in Latin America. Another agreement, signed by the MID, ONI, and FBI in February 1942, reiterated previous parameters, with the intention of emphasizing that close cooperation among the headquarters components of the three agencies was a mutually recognized necessity. 34 However, these agreements did not alleviate bureaucratic intrigues. According to the FBI, “The various delimitation agreements covering SIS jurisdiction were honored more by violation than observance especially on the part of the Army.”35 Furthermore, although Berle had expressed support for the FBI’s operation of the SIS, the Bureau encountered conflicts with

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State Department officials that came to a head in late 1943. On October 25, Berle furnished the FBI with a complaint that the SIS was duplicating the work of other departments and agencies operating in Latin America, with respect to political, economic, and financial matters. Furthermore, Berle assessed that the FBI’s reports added nothing to the discussion, because they consisted of “non-expert repetition of data already collected by experts,” according to the Bureau’s reading of Berle’s communication.36 Berle, in this context, noted a need for the Bureau to reduce and curtail its activities and personnel in Latin America.37 In midNovember, Berle met with Tamm and indicated that he had received inquiries from the American ambassadors in Santiago, Chile, and La Paz, Bolivia, as to why the FBI was withdrawing personnel from the region. The Bureau advised Berle that the FBI was merely trying to comply with the State Department’s desire conveyed in the October 25 letter.38 The November meeting smoothed over the dispute. Berle claimed that there must have been a misunderstanding of the October 25 letter, because the State Department did not want the FBI to abandon its Latin American operations wholesale. However, the FBI–State collision had a permanent impact. The Bureau indicated that it planned to revise its approach and define the SIS’s coverage. 39 In early October 1943, the Bureau had already stopped assigning additional special agents and special employees to SIS postings, except in response to specific needs. Between October and December 1943, the Bureau drew down its SIS personnel by 136 agents, along with a number of other employees. These individuals received new assignments in the FBI’s domestic work. October 1943 marked the height of the SIS’s foreign coverage, with 349 agents on foreign assignment and 29 radio employees; 10 translators, cryptographers, and photographers; 11 special employees; and 89 clerical employees. In December 1943, the State Department officially revoked its objection to the FBI’s collection activities, and the SIS resumed reporting on social, political, economic, and financial information. The resumption of coverage was done with the reduced workforce.40 Although the SIS had peaked, the Bureau was by no

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means out of the game, and subsequent events would be significant to the development of US foreign intelligence.

Going into Business With the establishment of the SIS, the FBI had to translate this new concept into a reality. In June 1940, Hoover appointed Percy E. Foxworth to lead the new entity. During the next year, the SIS took shape. In September 1941, the Bureau set an initial goal of deploying 250 agents in Latin America by November 1942. The FBI’s ultimate objective was to have 500 agents assigned to SIS duties by December 1943.41 As previously noted, the Bureau never reached this target, capping out at fewer than 400 agents, because of a revision of the SIS’s mission in the wake of the FBI’s 1943 disagreement with the State Department. Although agents comprised the backbone of the SIS—as they did for the broader Bureau—the SIS also utilized personnel known as special employees. The FBI used these individuals, especially those who had extensive experience in Latin America and a knowledge of the languages, from the outset of the SIS project. In fact, no individuals were designated as special employees unless they were adept in the language of the country to which they were assigned. This needed to be preexisting knowledge because special employees did not receive language training (unlike agents, who, as part of their multiweek preparation, were afforded a crash course in the local languages).42 According to the Bureau’s internal history of the SIS, a number of these special employees provided “considerable information of value from an intelligence viewpoint.” However, perhaps reflecting the agent-dominated culture, the internal history was quick to add that “as a general rule it was discovered that FBI Agents even with their limited knowledge of Latin America and their limited knowledge of the language involved still offered much more promise with regard to eventual success and efficiency in this type of operation.” The Bureau did provide these employees with detailed instructions about the content of reports that previous SIS operatives had submitted, and the special

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employees also received specific instructions about the general manner in which they were expected to operate and in the use of the codes they would use to communicate with the FBI.43

An Office in Manhattan The SIS’s initial mode of operation put the FBI in one of Manhattan’s architectural marvels, Rockefeller Center. John D. Rockefeller Jr. had created Rockefeller Center—which opened in May 1933—as a city within a city.44 The massive development was a microcosm of the metropolis that surrounded it, right down to international intrigue playing out within its corridors. Nelson Rockefeller, Junior’s son, brought together three strains that would make him a recurring figure in the history of the SIS. First, Rockefeller had long been fascinated by the art and culture of Latin America—and his active participation in business interests in the region translated his fascination into real outcomes.45 Second, the intrigue of intelligence operations fascinated Rockefeller, and he was eager—once he became coordinator of Inter-American Affairs and, later, assistant secretary of state—to lend his assistance to the FBI’s operations. Finally, from a practical perspective, he was closely tied to the development of Rockefeller Center. To provide cover—false identities—for the agents it was dispatching throughout the Western Hemisphere, the FBI created a fictitious company. This firm, which the FBI established on August 15, 1940, was known simply as Importers and Exporters Service Company and was originally located in Room 4332 of the iconic 30 Rockefeller Center (the RCA Building). (The Bureau subsequently relocated to Room 3144 when additional space became necessary.)46 Interestingly, the idea of situating the SIS operation in New York preceded the finalization of the Bureau’s responsibility for the operation. According to historian Thomas Troy, a June 1940 report described the SIS as an operation whose head should operate under business cover, with an office in a major city, preferably New York. However, according to Troy, the report skirted the question of which agency should take responsibility for running the SIS.47

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Situating the SIS in Rockefeller Center was consistent with FDR’s habit of calling on society contacts to execute various functions, including intelligence operations. For instance, in 1938, FDR had dispatched Vincent Astor, a yachtsman, to gather information on military buildups in the Japanese-controlled Marshall Islands. (Astor would come into direct contact with the FBI when FDR appointed him, in March 1941, to serve as the area controller for New York, where Astor was responsible for mediating the intermittently tense relationships among the FBI, MID, and ONI.)48 It was FDR who—according to Tamm, writing in August 1940—had suggested contact between the FBI and the Rockefeller Foundation in furtherance of intelligence collection.49 Rockefeller was already primed, even earlier than Roosevelt’s suggestion, to provide the US government—and by extension the FBI—with assistance. In June 1940, Rockefeller had approached FDR’s key aide, Harry Hopkins, with a plan to enhance US engagement with Latin America through the purchase of surplus commodities and an increase of US diplomatic personnel in the hemisphere.50 It was, therefore, very unlikely a coincidence that FDR’s instruction to Tamm came in August, the same month that saw Rockefeller’s appointment to the position of coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. Importers and Exporters Service Company was, in concept, a fine platform for intelligence collection. Agents who were ostensibly working for the firm had job descriptions that included securing information for clients (also fictitious creations) about opportunities to engage in Latin American trade, either importing or exporting products to and from the United States.51 However, the company, for multiple reasons, failed to provide a plausible cover. On the Bureau’s end, the company never seemed terribly interested in doing business. A single clerical employee was the only individual assigned to the dedicated maintenance of the office.52 Furthermore, the office had an unlisted number and its supposed representative in Latin America had no business literature.53 These were hardly the attributes of a firm seeking to turn a profit. The lack of substance of Importers and Exporters Service Company created additional complications. A constant cavalcade

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of Bureau personnel, including agents and Bureau officials from Washington, visited its office.54 This disparity between trade and traffic must have seemed suspicious to any observer. Additionally, as historian Raymond Batvinis notes, a regular stream of salesman and advertising solicitors approached the offices of the ephemeral company seeking opportunities to do business.55 This was an awkward situation for a firm that had only the thinnest of covers. Furthermore, the concept of the firm proved counterproductive for agents operating under its cover abroad. For instance, one FBI agent who worked in Argentina under the guise of the Importers and Exporters Service Company noted that the company’s personnel were “regarded with suspicion by most of the American businessmen inasmuch as [Importers and Exporters Service Company personnel] represent at least a potential competition.” 56 The same agent also indicated that the company’s lack of ability to do real business (and the vague image that it presented to outsiders) created problems for Bureau undercover personnel abroad similar to those of individuals responsible for the New York office. For instance, according to the agent, “I have had business propositions put to me by Argentines which were a little out of our line.”57 The company’s lack of a clear corporate mission left undercover agents with some uncomfortable explaining to do. According to an internal FBI history of the SIS operation, the Bureau disbanded Importers and Exporters Service Company in relatively short order. The FBI shuttered the firm on June 1, 1941, having concluded that the ruse was “more of a nuisance and detriment than an advantage.”58 However, upon considering the option of abandoning its Rockefeller Center quarters in late 1942, the FBI’s executive conference determined that the three rooms at Rockefeller Center, staffed by two special agents (until 1944 when one was reassigned to other work), one stenographer, and one translator, along with two steel safes where all files and records resided, should be maintained.59 The office continued to operate behind an unmarked door and offered no explanation for its presence. Finally, in November 1945, several months after the conclusion of World War II, the FBI relocated the office, as a

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measure of economy, to the New York field office in the United States Courthouse at Foley Square.60 The Bureau, through its Rockefeller Center office, carried out a variety of functions. To give agents nonofficial covers other than with the Importers and Exporters Service Company, the Bureau enlisted the assistance of actual companies with which agents could be embedded as putative employees. Two agents used the SIS office to establish and maintain contacts with companies that could provide covers for SIS personnel.61 Representatives of these companies were, for obvious reasons, reluctant to be overtly associated with the FBI out of fear that it would harm their commercial prospects. The SIS office provided an alternative to calling at the Bureau’s New York field office. Company representatives frequently visited the SIS office, in person, to deliver or receive material necessary for the maintenance of SIS agents’ covers.62 Operatives of the SIS, through its Rockefeller Center presence, conducted other functions in furtherance of maintaining the operation. The special agent in charge of the office assisted in assigning covers to SIS agents still training in Washington, and the office also facilitated training of agents in their cover assignments.63 Additionally, the office had a unique function to protect the Bureau’s operation from US wartime censorship. Mail directed to SIS representatives in Latin America first passed through the SIS office, where personnel opened and resealed mail with the censor’s stamp so that it appeared to have received the same treatment as other outgoing mail. The office also handled the more prosaic functions of obtaining visas and passports for SIS agents.64 The possibilities for intrigue within Rockefeller Center provide a basis for fascinating speculation. Several Axis belligerents had a pre-war presence that overlapped with the FBI’s presence at Rockefeller Center. Most significant of these was Italy, with its Palazzo d’Italia in the center’s Fifth Avenue–fronting International Building. Once the United States entered the war, the government seized the property and covered over the Palazzo’s Italian coat of arms and fascist artwork with planks. The US government also seized German and Japanese properties at Rockefeller Center. A Japanese garden on the eleventh-floor setback of

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30 Rockefeller Center was torn up and replaced with a Chinese garden honoring Madame Chiang Kai-Shek.65 Even more interesting were the possibilities for overlap between the FBI and other US, as well as British, intelligence operatives. Future CIA director Allen Dulles, working for William Donovan, a Hoover rival, rented a suite of rooms that the Japanese government had vacated on the thirty-sixth floor of the International Building. Dulles eventually expanded his operation to the building’s thirty-first, thirty-fifth, and thirty-eighth floors.66 British intelligence, in the form of William Stephenson’s British Security Coordination (BSC), also maintained offices on the International Building’s thirty-sixth floor, making neighbors of the two spymasters. A partially declassified FBI document relates that “[Redacted] and BSC share the 36th floor of the International Building. . . . There is a connecting doorway between the offices of the two organizations and representatives of both pass in and out of each other’s offices at will during the day.”67 (Stephenson’s office was located at 3603; the Security Division of BSC was located at 3555.)68 This mysterious reference may refer to a rather close working relationship between the OSS and BSC. The infeasibility of Importers and Exporters Service Company meant that the FBI had to find another way to provide cover for its agents. The answer remained operating in the commercial field, but rather than maintaining a proprietary cover company, the Bureau arranged for SIS personnel to fill positions in bona fide firms. It preserved a degree of continuity between the two arrangements. The FBI, in its internal history of the SIS operation, noted that, in the search for commercial partners, it specifically focused on companies that provided services rather than products. In the FBI’s assessment, these entities “provided to be most elastic for the purposes of SIS” because they afforded Bureau personnel “a fine opportunity to ask questions covering a variety of subjects without arousing suspicion.”69 The FBI’s annual report on SIS operations in 1944–1945 gives a sense of the scope to which the Bureau engaged with the private sector in arranging covers. According to that document, eighty-three “large American companies” were available

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25

as covers. During the same year, the Bureau also conducted preliminary inquiries into the basic backgrounds of approximately twenty-five additional large corporations to establish the groundwork for approaching these companies for the provision of cover at a future date. 70 The FBI certainly encountered a learning curve in its establishment of a foreign intelligence service, and development of cover arrangements was not exempt from this process of trial and error. The Bureau assessed that selection of covers for personnel was “extremely faulty and weak” until relatively late in the SIS program. Furthermore, personnel were not always well trained to carry out their cover assignments. The FBI attributed this deficit to an initial unwillingness by companies to assume responsibility for “long and sometimes expensive” training.71 As the program became more formalized, preparation for cover assignments became standardized. The FBI did attempt to place agents with companies whose services aligned with agents’ backgrounds and previous experience. After their initial training in Washington, SIS agents were sent to New York—or other cities, as determined by the cover company—for further training. While in New York, the SIS special agent in charge (SAC), the head of the office working from Rockefeller Center, was responsible for briefing newly assigned agents with the details and background of their cover company. The SAC, in collaboration with the agent, determined the best way for the agent to begin associating with the company. The agent, immediately prior to departure for Latin America, participated in an interview in Washington during which his life story, including his work for the cover company, was reviewed.72 The financial services sector was one field in which agents could obtain suitable cover. For instance, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, and Fenner & Beane trained agents who ultimately earned broker licenses and seats on the New York Stock Exchange in preparation for their assignments. One of these agents, Ken Crosby, established the firm’s first office in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Dun & Bradstreet also provided covers that proved useful to agents seeking to examine financial statements to trace enemy involvement in

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illicit activities, such as procurement of war materiel or sponsorship of subversion.73 Sam Papich, who would later become the FBI’s liaison to the Central Intelligence Agency, worked in Dun & Bradstreet’s Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, office.74 Awareness of financial arrangements was valuable intelligence in the coverage of Latin America, where a significant element of the Axis threat was enemy acquisition of resources. In addition to the financial sector, the FBI also made use of media and entertainment entities to provide agents with cover. According to historian Raymond Batvinis, Walt Disney Studios and RKO Pictures both provided useful guises for agents who were traveling in rural areas. One agent, for instance, managed to gather intelligence by posing as a researcher for Walt Disney Studios who was ostensibly looking for native animals that future Disney productions could feature.75 An agent who had accepted an assignment with the SIS later recalled operating under the auspices of a film distributor, a cover that included showing Gone with the Wind, a feature that the agent recalled involved twenty-six reels of film.76 Journalism also proved to be a natural fit for agents on SIS work because the business revolved around the collection and dissemination of information. The Bureau’s first agents in Cuba were ostensibly employed by Newsweek.77 Interestingly, this publication was owned, in part, by none other than Vincent Astor, one of the high-society figures whose services FDR had enlisted for intelligence collection several years prior to the creation of the SIS. The Hearst Magazine Corporation employed agents to research articles and to obtain articles for Cosmopolitan from writers in South America. Similarly, Fulton Oursler, the owner of the International News Service and the editor of Liberty Magazine, accommodated agents as freelance writers but did not actually require them to produce articles. Public relations work, given its symbiotic relationship with the press, also—not surprisingly—proved useful to the SIS. The advertising firm of J. Walter Thompson provided cover for an agent who traveled extensively, ostensibly to conduct surveys about radio listening habits.78 Finance and media were only two of the fields that provided cover for agents’ collection of intelligence. Covers ranged from

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employment with the Armour Meat Corporation to positions in the Anaconda Copper Company. Additionally, whereas FDR coopted socialites to assist with intelligence activities, the FBI created its own. Frank Garvey, an SIS agent, used his status as an expert golfer as a passkey to the upper echelons of Latin American society. Garvey, however, worked his cover assignment a bit too well— his winning a golf tournament became international news, thereby hastening his reassignment by Hoover to new, less conspicuous duties.79 In a similar, albeit less sensational, mix of spying and sportsmanship, Special Agent Allan Gillies, who was assigned to Venezuela, played tennis with the son of an Italian official.80 As the Bureau garnered experience with the use of covers, it inevitably encountered complications. FBI official C. H. Carson observed that “undercover representatives have to work their covers, which means that they really collect intelligence information only incidentally and in their spare time.” This was by necessity, because, as Carson pointed out, agents would otherwise be quickly identified as a result of the incongruity between their supposed employment and their actual activities. Even in the best of circumstances, the FBI determined that one year in any location was the upper limit of how long an agent could remain before being discovered.81 The Bureau also enlisted the assistance of special employees to help in the commercial field. These employees were not agents but rather US citizens who had familiarity in business fields and were willing to help the Bureau. Special employees worked using their true names and represented companies for which they were legitimate employees. According to historian Raymond Batvinis, these individuals worked with the agents to spot potential sources and then served as a cutout to facilitate direct interaction between the agent and the source. Special employees not only brought sources of intelligence into contact with agents but also received information the agents collected for transmission to Washington.82 Cover arrangements were not foolproof. Hoover highlighted how a single compromise could undermine a significant part of the SIS. He wrote, in 1942, that “it is believed that the covers should be protected due to the fact that when the Bureau has fifteen or

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twenty Agents operating under a single cover, and one of these Agents is indiscreet in not protecting the cover, the cover is then lost for the entire group.”83 In general, agents succeeded in implementing their cover assignments. For instance, the FBI’s internal history of SIS operations noted that SIS personnel became “the means for the investment of millions of dollars of [a] firm’s clients in Latin America.” In another example, an SIS agent, as part of his cover work, prepared a “complete survey dealing with the various legal problems encountered by any American corporation going into business in Brazil.” Multiple SIS cover companies received copies of this report and expressed “great interest” in the document. Agents’ success at their cover work created an unanticipated problem for the FBI. According to the Bureau’s internal history of the SIS, companies “manifested a desire to permanently employ [the FBI’s] Agent under any conditions imposed by the FBI in view of the results obtained.”84 However, all the operational security in the world could not overcome the problem of covers that lost suitability because of geopolitical conditions. In 1942, C. H. Carson assessed that “the great majority of cover companies that were feasible and practical prior to the [United States’] entry into the war have become virtually useless” because they simply were not doing business in Latin America. Furthermore, once on the ground, Bureau personnel were conspicuous through no fault of their own. As Carson noted, it was a “sure bet” that anyone able to obtain a passport was “some type of Government representative.”85 The FBI’s highprofile image also contributed to the outing of an agent on at least one occasion. A Chilean businessman who had befriended an agent operating under commercial cover was sure that the agent worked for Hoover because of the agent’s gabardine topcoat and snap-brim hat. The businessman had seen similar images in Time and Newsweek.86 (The latter publication, ironically, provided cover for other Bureau personnel.) Regardless of their covers, SIS agents operated without much guidance. According to an FBI assessment of the program, “Each Agent and Special Employee was more or less working on direct assignment and charter from Washington without any-

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thing approaching adequate local supervision, coordination, or assistance.”87 The SIS established post office boxes in New York City to which special agents, each of whom had been assigned one of these boxes, would transmit information. The boxes were scattered around Midtown and Lower Manhattan.88 The special agent in charge of the SIS’s New York office supervised the operation of the thirty-nine mail drops, from which a clerk would collect the incoming mail each morning.89 SIS operatives used “double talk”—“cryptic” language meant to convey a specific meaning—and secret ink, to clandestinely transmit information via the mail. 90 Despite agents’ use of fictitious names (including seemingly indigenous ones such as “Jose” and “Juan”), the Bureau realized through experience that “to prevent an Agent from being uncovered it was necessary to frequently change his post office box.” Sending mail to agents in Latin America was an equally tedious endeavor, with communications written in double talk.91

Diplomatic Dealings The SIS program also developed an element based at US diplomatic establishments. The FBI did not initially see a need for its agents to have a presence at embassies or consulates. Instead, agents operating under their various nondiplomatic covers would report information back to Washington.92 Although the Bureau was slightly belated in recognizing the need for agents who operated under diplomatic status, this aspect of the SIS program would create the longest-lasting impacts. It became the basis for the modern FBI Legal Attaché program and would also have significant implications for the development of US foreign intelligence beyond the FBI’s own operations. Initial efforts to assign Bureau personnel to US diplomatic establishments were piecemeal in nature. For instance, in September 1940, the FBI assigned an agent to Mexico City. This agent, Gus T. Jones, previously of the San Antonio, Texas, field office, was the first FBI agent attached to a US embassy as an SIS representative.93 Jones had permission to use the facilities of the US embassy, but he

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was not formally attached to the embassy at first.94 He acquired a diplomatic title, “Civil Attaché,” only in 1941.95 Foxworth, in the later part of 1940, embarked on a fact-finding mission throughout Latin America that would provide essential insights into how to develop the SIS program. Rockefeller was again a significant figure in this endeavor. The fact-finding mission—which covered eighteen countries in three months—was ostensibly a Rockefeller initiative but included Foxworth as a surreptitious participant. (The delegation did not go completely unnoticed. According to one participant, it piqued the interest of Japanese and German operatives, who tailed its travels.)96 After the expedition concluded, Foxworth articulated the value of developing ties between the SIS and US diplomatic establishments. It was essential for the FBI to have personnel in strategic locations operating under diplomatic status to ensure these individuals’ “movements were unrestricted to contact and supervise undercover employees.”97 According to Foxworth, an agent in this capacity could make use of all diplomatic channels in transmitting information to Washington.98 This alleviated the need for the tedious methods of communication that agents operating independently had been forced to use. In December 1941, the Bureau developed a process for undercover SIS personnel to submit their reports to the local legal attaché for forwarding to Washington, DC.99 Agents also benefited from all the information the embassy received about matters in which the Bureau had an interest. Furthermore, agents were able to meet with American citizens as necessary. According to Foxworth, “The American citizens in Central and South America have the same confidence in the FBI that the citizens of this country do and they will talk much more freely to someone whose identity was known than they would to a person with no known official connection.”100 However, Foxworth believed that measures should be taken to ensure that knowledge of the FBI’s presence be kept extremely limited. In a memorandum sent late in 1940, Foxworth proposed that in each country where the FBI had an SIS presence, one member of the staff at the relevant embassy—preferably the ambassador or minister—should have knowledge of the SIS presence. Fox-

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worth also explicitly noted that “there [was] no intention whatever that there should be any official connection between the agent and entire embassy or that the agent will furnish any information directly to the embassy.” Furthermore, Foxworth’s vision of the SIS–embassy relationship fell short of what the legal attaché role would develop into, because, according to Foxworth, “All information developed is to be sent directly to [the FBI] and then referred [to other agencies] through the usual channels.”101 During the following year, the FBI assigned additional personnel to US embassies, enlarging the legat presence in response to specific necessities rather than programmatically. For instance, Spruille Braden, the US ambassador to Colombia, asked the FBI to assign an agent—who could pursue investigations of subversive activity and coordinate intelligence activities in Colombia—to the embassy in Bogota.102 The Bureau took a limited view of this agent’s role. It did not initially consider the agent an administrative officer for FBI activities in the country. Instead, the agent received instructions to “render such assistance as might be possible and practicable to the undercover men, particularly in regard to the handling of their correspondence with the Bureau through the [diplomatic] pouch.”103 Similarly, the FBI assigned an agent to the US embassy in La Paz at the request of the State Department.104 As Carson would later note, this function of communication was essential because information that SIS personnel without official cover obtained could be effectively transmitted only by the diplomatic pouch; otherwise, “Any code which offers a reasonable means of security against being broken, must necessarily be so cumbersome as to not permit full, complete, and detailed correspondence of the kind that is needed.”105 The FBI’s initial interest in establishing a systematic deployment of embassy-based agents arose from a desire to facilitate existing, nonofficial cover operations rather than to expand intelligence collection activities. According to a memorandum the FBI prepared for Berle in early 1941, the Bureau needed agents with diplomatic status whose unrestricted movements enabled them to handle communication to and from SIS employees.106 As the Bureau noted, “Embassies and Legations receive information

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sometimes voluntarily, sometimes sought—which should be followed up at the time.” Foxworth had raised this issue in late 1940, stating that the FBI “should have the benefit of information which voluntarily comes to our own embassies.”107 Agents with diplomatic status would certainly be positioned to develop information from targets of opportunity, but this was, at least at the outset, secondary to their function as points of contact for SIS personnel operating under nonofficial cover. Consistent with this growing role, the FBI, in July 1942, decided that its diplomatically covered representative would have local jurisdiction and administrative supervision of the Bureau’s work in the country where the representative was located.108 During the following year, the FBI continued to develop its definition of what its diplomatically designated agents would do. An April 1942 communication from Hoover to Berle indicates the expanding scope of the Bureau’s expectations. According to Hoover: Circumstances are frequently encountered wherein information of such a vitally important and urgent nature is received by Bureau undercover representatives that it must be immediately communicated to the proper diplomatic, military, or naval representatives of the United States stationed in the particular country involved. Unless we have an FBI representative stationed with the American diplomatic missions in such instances, it is virtually impossible to effectively and advantageously communicate the information to the proper American representatives on the spot.109

However, sharing had its limits. According to C. H. Carson, “Actual copies of reports are not furnished by us to local military and naval attaches, although the information is made available to them whenever of interest.”110 Embassy-assigned agents not only received the reporting of agents with nonofficial cover but were also aware of the original sources from which the information came.111 Legal attachés also developed an analytical, or at least narrativeproducing, role. In addition to communicating undercover agents’ information to interested parties, the diplomatically covered agents were, by July 1942, supplementing the information with items from embassy files and other sources.112 In late 1942, the Bureau devel-

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oped a “uniform system of reporting” that entailed the clearing of all information acquired by SIS operatives through the legal attachés. The attachés, in turn, were required to assess the reports and coordinate them with other information developed about the country. The FBI’s stated objective for implementing this process was the elimination of “much unnecessary work at [FBI headquarters] with respect to information obtained by undercover men that is completely out of date, subsequently proved erroneous or already acted upon.”113 By late 1942, the diplomatically covered agents were formally known as legal attachés. Their role, as defined by the Bureau, had progressed from being transmitters of information to being “in charge of FBI operations in [their] particular country.”114 Crystallization of the legal attaché’s role was inevitable. Indicators of this progression were apparent in the increasing scope of legal attachés’ responsibilities throughout 1941 and 1942. By July 1942, before they left Washington, agents assigned at embassies possessed the identities and addresses of the undercover agents working in the country to which they were assigned. Furthermore, the legal attachés were authorized to assign leads and other work to undercover agents.115 This reflected the FBI’s understanding that “undercover operations alone, and not properly coordinated by the local attaché would constitute a very ineffective, inefficient, and ‘sketchy’ foreign intelligence service.”116 By 1942, the Bureau assessed that legal attachés were indispensable to foreign intelligence work. According to FBI official D. M. Ladd, “Undercover operatives [could not] function effectively from an investigative viewpoint, except as a complement and adjunct to open operations.”117 Legal attachés also steadily assumed an operational role. As early as late 1940, Foxworth had suggested that liaison between an SIS agent and the embassy would facilitate the agent’s contact of possible informants about whom the embassies had knowledge.118 Activities in Uruguay, as of 1941, indicated the growing role of legal attachés in the direct collection of intelligence. The legal attaché’s office in Montevideo was located on the second floor of the US embassy. However, the legal attaché also maintained another office in a nearby apartment building, where meetings

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The FBI Abroad

with confidential informants could occur.119 As of July 1942, Hoover noted that agents assigned to the embassies were authorized to employ informants temporarily and that nearly all of these agents had full-time informants.120 The term legal attaché is specific to the Bureau. By late 1942, the Department of State had authorized the use of the term to denote the FBI representative in US embassies. 121 Prior to this designation, agents had served under several different titles, including special assistant to the ambassador, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, and civil attaché, in Mexico City. 122 (The term civil attaché continued to substitute for legal attaché in Haiti and Mexico because the local State Department presences objected to the latter term.)123 In the larger and more important countries in Latin America, the FBI expanded its diplomatically covered presence from US embassies to US consulates. For instance, the FBI sent two agents to cities in Argentina as assistant consuls who were “to do nothing but intelligence work under the supervision of the FBI Legal Attaché in the particular country involved.”124 Additionally, the State Department allowed the FBI to place diplomatically covered personnel in certain Latin American cities where consulates did not exist. These agents carried the designation of “Vice Consul— Noncareer.”125 In 1942, the Bureau assigned agents, ostensibly as vice consuls, to seven US consular facilities in Chile.126 However, the need for State Department clearance resulted in differing levels of success with the deployment of agents under consular cover. For instance, the US ambassador to Mexico refused to grant the FBI permission to station SIS personnel at consulates, an impasse to which the Bureau responded by deploying a relatively high number of nonofficial cover agents in that country.127 In late 1943, the dust-up with the State Department over supposed duplication of reporting prompted the Bureau to withdraw a segment of SIS personnel from Latin America. This withdrawal included the shuttering of many of the consular offices.128 However, the FBI did not completely abjure the use of consular cover. A 1946 memorandum notes that assistants to the legal attaché sometimes carried the title of Vice Consul.129

Origins of the FBI’s Operations Abroad

35

The FBI’s impact on the development of US foreign intelligence is apparent not simply in its jurisdiction but in its application of the structure that the Bureau originally developed for its domestic work. Legal attaché offices were intentionally modeled after the FBI’s field offices, with the legal attaché in each country in charge of the office and responsible for administrative supervision of the Bureau’s work in the country. Legal attachés, according to a Bureau memorandum, “became in effect the FBI Special Agent in Charge.” Consistent with this model, the Bureau patterned its consulate-based offices after traditional resident agency offices (satellite offices affiliated with a field office) and treated the agents in these locations as “virtual Resident Agents.”130 In May 1942, the FBI began rounding out the staffing of these foreign “field offices” by training and dispatching male stenographers to assist the agents assigned to US embassies.131 Formalization of the legal attaché position established an important template for US foreign intelligence work. As the FBI’s internal history of SIS operations put it: “The year 1942 witnessed the transition of the position of the Legal Attaché from that of an interloper in the intelligence field within the Embassy to that of its foremost constituent.”132 In 1944, Hoover emphasized this theme, stating, “It must be thoroughly understood by all Bureau Legal Attachés that proper cooperation with the American Ambassador, who is, of course, the President’s personal representative and envoy extraordinary in each country, is one of the primary functions of the Legal Attaché.”133 The FBI determined that one of the legats’ roles was to function as an adviser to the chief of mission. According to a Bureau memorandum: “The Legal Attaché was required to keep the Ambassador informed personally and otherwise with regard to the intelligence data obtained and being reported upon.”134 Hoover, in 1944, stated: I think it especially important for our Legal Attachés to recognize the fact that interesting day to day developments are of particular and sometimes great value to the Ambassador, and much benefit can be derived from the Ambassador’s being kept advised relative to these matters. I am particularly desirous that frequent conversations be

36

The FBI Abroad had with the various Ambassadors by the Legal Attachés in connection with [the FBI’s] work, so that the Ambassadors will be informed of the results we are obtaining in the various countries.135

Of course, this approach was not simply to serve God and country. Cozying up to the ambassadors could also prove useful in outflanking bureaucratic rivals. Legal attachés were not simply conduits of FBI information to the ambassadors but instead served as the focal point for all intelligence activities within their respective countries. According to the FBI, ambassadors in nearly every embassy where a legal attaché was assigned designated the legal attaché as the coordinator of intelligence information within the embassy. 136 The legal attachés, starting in late 1942, took charge of intelligence operations—not only those of the FBI—within the country where they were assigned.137 “Coordination was worked out with the local United States Military and Naval Attachés and the Legal Attachés were instructed to be “especially careful in keeping Military and Naval attachés promptly advised of all information having special military or naval interest.”138 In 1947, the FBI ceded—at the direction of the Truman administration—its Latin American operations to the Central Intelligence Group (the immediate predecessor of the Central Intelligence Agency). Although the FBI retained the term legal attaché, the function of that role transitioned to other elements of the US Intelligence Community. Specifically, the functions of the SIS legal attachés began to resemble those of the modern chief of station (COS). The COS is usually the senior representative of the CIA assigned to a US mission and serves as the direct representative of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI).139 (The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 created the position of Director of National Intelligence, which replaces the Director of Central Intelligence as the head of the intelligence community.) Among the COS’s duties is serving as the senior intelligence adviser to US ambassadors.140 This echoes one of the SIS legats’ primary functions. Although the FBI developed its legal attaché position in the context of its Western Hemisphere intelligence work, it also

Origins of the FBI’s Operations Abroad

37

established posts beyond this jurisdiction—out of necessity—as the war progressed. In late 1942, the Bureau assigned an agent to London who would maintain liaison with both British and US intelligence entities. 141 Then, in August 1943, the FBI finalized arrangements to establish a legal attaché office in Lisbon— which the Bureau deemed to be of “strategical importance”—for liaison purposes. The office would ultimately consist of two special agents and two clerical employees.142 Diplomatic status was of particular importance because of the freedom of action that the Portuguese government afforded to Axis operatives.143 This legal attaché would work with British and American officials in Lisbon. 144 According to a 1945 Bureau report, this legal attaché “has probably been the Bureau’s most successful representative in the Eastern Hemisphere from the standpoint of developing friendly and workable liaison with United States and Allied officials and agents.”145 Less than a year later, in April 1944, the Bureau established a legal attaché in Madrid for a similar purpose of working with British and American entities in Spain.146 (The FBI had previously assigned an agent in a liaison capacity to Madrid between February and November 1943.)147 At the time of the legal attaché’s assignment, the Bureau deemed Spain to be of “particular strategic importance in connection with intelligence matters affecting the security of the Western Hemisphere.”148 German intelligence, according to the Bureau’s assessment, was using Madrid as a “focal point” of efforts to penetrate the Western Hemisphere.149 The Bureau also established a presence in France, Germany, and Italy—which we discuss later—as its personnel moved forward with Allied forces. In addition to the agents and special employees under nonofficial cover and the legal attachés operating under diplomatic auspices, the FBI also fielded several mobile individuals who traveled throughout Latin America. These agents were responsible for assessing and facilitating SIS work rather than collecting intelligence themselves. Fittingly, Foxworth himself was the first of these traveling agents. Nelson Rockefeller, in 1940, organized an economic

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The FBI Abroad

delegation—under the auspices of the Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations of Latin America—to survey conditions in Latin America through visits to multiple Latin American countries.150 This was likely a reference to the Office for Coordination of Commercial and Cultural Relations Between the Americas. Foxworth joined this delegation without divulging his SIS affiliation to other members on this two-month junket.151 This trip provided Foxworth with opportunities to make contact with SIS representatives. More importantly, the trip provided him with a sense of the operational environment, which he addressed in an extensive December 1940 memorandum that outlined the tenets of how the SIS program would evolve.152 The Bureau subsequently dispatched other agents in various guises whose work would resemble what Foxworth had done with the Rockefeller delegation. In December 1941, the FBI assigned two agents to a “constant travel status” throughout Latin America for an indefinite duration. One of these individuals operated as a news reporter, and the other used the cover of a State Department courier. The Bureau’s internal history of the SIS Division indicates that the agent under State Department cover usually accompanied and assisted SIS representatives who were establishing SIS presence at an embassy or legation for the first time. These roving agents functioned as couriers and expediters who assisted Bureau representatives in carrying out intelligence work. For instance, their tasks included delivering cipher pads for coded messages.153 According to FBI official D. M. Ladd, the courier under State Department cover was “particularly valuable . . . in connection with the transmission of various types of communications including codes and ciphers.”154 By 1942, the Bureau had three roving agents, two of whom operated under various covers and the third traveled openly as a representative of the FBI. The pool of traveling agents ultimately grew to a total of five—with three under cover and two operating in the open (i.e., as FBI personnel).155 D. M. Ladd indicated that introducing couriers who were openly affiliated with the FBI became possible once the Bureau had established legal attachés in various Latin American countries.156

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Some degree of confusion existed about what these agents’ official functions entailed. They were sometimes referred to as SIS traveling inspectors, although they, at least in the early stages of the SIS enterprise, did not carry out ordinary inspection duties.157 In an attempt to address this misnomer, the FBI executive conference suggested changing the title from Traveling Inspector to Traveling Attaché because these individuals were, on occasion, “relatively inexperienced Bureau agents” and “[took] special messages and instructions to the Legal Attachés and other men in SIS as required and act[ed] more or less in the nature of ‘trouble shooters’ on SIS administrative matters.” Hoover rejected this proposal, advising the executive conference that the inspectors were “to be called Special Agents” because “there are getting to be too many titles.”158 The traveling personnel took on a more formalized role as the SIS program matured. During fiscal year 1943–1944, the Bureau “perfected” the use of two agents who traveled from embassy to embassy when the need for their services arose. These individuals also maintained awareness of the latest SIS policies and procedures, which they communicated to the legal attachés. Additionally, the roaming agents kept the FBI advised of conditions in each country. Finally, they served as the mechanism for the socialization of new investigative techniques and ideas that various SIS offices were using independently of others.159 Although “inspectors” did not always inspect, the FBI did attempt to oversee far-flung SIS operations. In late 1942, Clyde Tolson indicated that the SIS operation in Latin America was inspected by SIS representatives, without supervision from the Training and Inspection Division. The SIS’s “very confidential” status necessitated this measure. This function initially did entail the SIS’s traveling agents.160 Two “experienced mature representatives of the SIS Division” were responsible for assaying the daily activities of both SIS agents and special employees. This procedure provided FBI headquarters with a constant stream of information about “the work, the living conditions, the morale, the problems, and the suggestions” of the SIS personnel. An agent under State Department cover was responsible for assessing the

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effectiveness of SIS operatives serving as legal attachés and consuls. As the SIS Division became an increasingly efficient operation, the nature of inspections also evolved. Starting in 1944, regular Bureau inspectors began evaluating SIS offices, and SIS offices operated with a uniform administrative apparatus.161 This progression of the inspection regime from an entirely SIS-contained function to a process applied to the SIS in the same way that it was applied to other elements of the FBI suggests the increasing integration of the SIS into the Bureau and the Bureau’s adoption of a foreign intelligence function.

1. Raymond Batvinis, The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2007), 45. 2. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations: Book II. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976). 3. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Book III. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976). 4. Curt Gentry, J. Edgar Hoover: The Man and the Secrets (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 206. 5. Joseph E. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War: FDR and World War II Espionage (New York: Random House, 2001), 17. 6. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War, 17. 7. Batvinis, The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence, 68. 8. Thomas F. Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid: Donovan, Stephenson, and the Origin of CIA (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 95. 9. Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 95. 10. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947), https://vault.fbi.gov/special-intelligence -service. 11. AG Francis Biddle to FDR, December 22, 1941, Case File FBI HQ File 64-4104, Box 16, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Department of Justice Records, Record Group 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 12. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948, FBI 62-80750; FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 13. Central Intelligence Agency, Re: Special Intelligence Service of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 12, 1946, General CIA Records, Doc. No. CIA-RDP64-00658A000100130009-5, National Archives, College Park, MD, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP64 -00658A000100130009-5.pdf.

Notes

Origins of the FBI’s Operations Abroad

41

14. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 15. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 16. CPI Inflation Calculator, https://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl ?cost1=400%2C000.00&year1=194007&year2=201807. 17. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 18. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 19. Memorandum for the Director, July 25, 1940, FBI 64-4014, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 20. Memorandum for the Director, July 25, 1940. 21. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 22. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 23. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 24. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 25. E. A. Tamm, memorandum for the Director, August 1, 1940, FBI 644104, National Archives, College Park, MD; Attorney General to Edward A. Tamm, May 28, 1940, FBI 67-15585. 26. E. A. Tamm, memorandum for the Director, August 1, 1940. 27. E. A. Tamm, memorandum for the Director, September 2, 1941, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 28. Central Intelligence Agency, The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: CIA, 2007), https://www.cia.gov /library/publications/intelligence-history/oss. 29. Douglas Waller, Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011), 40. 30. E. A. Tamm, memorandum for the Director, August 18, 1941, FBI 644104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 31. CIA, The Office of Strategic Services; Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Book VI Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities, S. Rep. No. 94-755 (1976). 32. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 33. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 34. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 35. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 36. E. A. Tamm, memorandum for the Director, November 17, 1943, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 37. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, November 6, 1943, FBI 644104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 38. E. A. Tamm, memorandum for the Director, November 17, 1943. 39. E. A. Tamm, memorandum for the Director, November 17, 1943. 40. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 41. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 42. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 43. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 44. “Historical Events,” Rockefeller Center, https://www.rockefellercenter .com/art-and-history/history/.

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45. See Cary Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer 1908– 1958 (New York: Doubleday, 1996). 46. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 47. Troy, Wild Bill and Intrepid, 97. 48. Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War, 55. 49. E. A. Tamm, memorandum for the Director, August 1, 1940. 50. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 51. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 52. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 53. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1; Raymond Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War Against Axis Spies: FBI Counterespionage During World War II (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2014), 106–107. 54. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 55. Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War, 106–107. 56. Letter to J.S. Packard Mgr. Importers and Exporters Service Co. in personnel file of Victor P. Keay, December 14, 1941, FBI 67-36842. 57. Letter to J.S. Packard Mgr. Importers and Exporters Service Co. in personnel file of Victor P. Keay, December 14, 1941, FBI 67-36842. 58. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 59. For the Conference, Clyde Tolson, memorandum for the Director: Re: Organization of SIS Division, November 8, 1942, FBI 66-2554, National Archives, College Park, MD; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1941–1942, Case File FBI HQ File 64-4104, Box 16, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 60. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 61. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 62. For the Conference, Clyde Tolson, memorandum for the Director: Re: Organization of SIS Division, November 8, 1942. 63. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948; FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1941–1942. 64. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1941–1942. 65. Daniel Okrent, Great Fortune: The Epic of Rockefeller Center (New York: Viking, 2003). 66. Douglas Waller, Disciples (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015), 121. 67. Federal Bureau of Investigation, British Intelligence Service in the United States (running memorandum) (Washington, DC: FBI, n.d.). 68. FBI, British Intelligence Service in the United States; Persico, Roosevelt’s Secret War. 69. FBI, History of the SIS Division. 70. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945, FBI Case File HQ File 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 71. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 72. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 73. Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War, 116. 74. Batvinis, The Origins of FBI Counterintelligence, 220; Robert M. Smith, “FBI Is Said to Have Cut Direct Liaison with CIA,” New York Times, October 10, 1971, https://www.nytimes.com/1971/10/10/archives/fbi-is-said-to -have-cut-direct-liaison-with-cia-hoover-move-in.html.

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75. Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War, 116. 76. Society of Former Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Interview of Former Special Agent of the FBI Woodrow P. Lipscomb (1941– 1966),” August 6, 2004, https://socxfbi.org/page/FoundationOralHistry. 77. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 78. Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War. 79. Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War. 80 Society of Former Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Interview of Allan Gillies (1940–1964),” August 4, 2004, https:// socxfbi.org/page/FoundationOralHistry. 81. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942, FBI 644104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 82. Batvinis, Hoover’s Secret War. 83. The Director, July 20, 1942, RG 65, FBI 64-4104, National Archives, College Park, MD. 84. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 85. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942. 86. Leslie B. Rout Jr. and John F. Bretzel, The Shadow War: German Espionage and United States Counterespionage in Latin America During World War II (Lanham, MD: University Publications of America, 1986). 87. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 88. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 89. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1941–1942, Case File FBI HQ File 64-4104, Box 16, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 90. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1; Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. Accomplishment. Mexico–Venezuela (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 91. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 92. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 93. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 94. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 95. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 96. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 97. P. E. Foxworth, March 10, 1941, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 98. P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, Re: Suggested Changes in SIS Work, December 4, 1940, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 99. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 100. P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, Re: Suggested Changes in SIS Work, December 4, 1940. 101. P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, Re: Suggested Changes in SIS Work, December 4, 1940. 102. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948.

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103. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 104. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. Accomplishment Argentina–Japan (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 105. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942. 106. Proposed letter, March 10, 1941 (P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, March 19, 1941), FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 107. P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, Re: Suggested Changes in SIS Work, December 4, 1940. 108. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 109. J. Edgar Hoover to Adolf Berle, April 14, 1942, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 110. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942. 111. The Director, July 20, 1942, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 112. The Director, July 20, 1942. 113. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942. 114. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942. 115. The Director, July 20, 1942. 116. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942. 117. D. M. Ladd, memorandum for the Director, Re: Field Inspectors for SIS, October 26, 1942, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 118. P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, Re: Suggested Changes in SIS Work, December 4, 1940. 119. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 120. R. C. Holloman, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: SIS Inspectors, January 14, 1942, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD; The Director, July 20, 1942. 121. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 122. C. H. Carson to the Director, Interview with George S. Messersmith, United States Ambassador to Argentina, August 23, 1946, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD; V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 123. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 124. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 125. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942. 126. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 127. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 128. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 129. CIA, Re: Special Intelligence Service of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 130. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 131. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1.

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132. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 133. J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum for All FBI Legal Attachés, January 28, 1944, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 134. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 135. J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum for All FBI Legal Attachés, January 28, 1944. 136. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 137. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, October 9, 1942. 138. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 139. Mark L. Reagan, ed., Terms & Definition of Interest for Counterintelligence Professionals (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, June 9, 2014), https://fas.org/irp/eprint/ci-glossary.pdf. 140. Stephen B. Slick, “The 2008 Amendments to Executive Order 12333, United States Intelligence Activities,” Studies in Intelligence 58, no. 2 (2014), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi -publications/csi-studies/studies/vol-58-no-2/the-2008-amendments-to -executive-order-12333-united-states-intelligence-activities.html. 141. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 142. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 143. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 144. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 145. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 146. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 147. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 148. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 149. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 150. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 151. Batvinis, Origins of FBI Counterintelligence, 220. 152. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 153. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 154. D. M. Ladd, memorandum for the Director, Re: Field Inspectors for SIS, October 26, 1942, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 155. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 156. D. M. Ladd, memorandum for the Director, Re: Field Inspectors for SIS, October 26, 1942. 157. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 158. FBI Executive Conference for the Director, October 22, 1943, Records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation 66-2554-2265X7. 159. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 160. For the Conference, Clyde Tolson, memorandum for the Director: Re: Organization of SIS Division, November 8, 1942. 161. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1.

3 The Bureau’s Foreign Intelligence Legacy

DESPITE THE WORK OF THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), as we now know, did not become the United States’ primary foreign intelligence service. Although histories of the Bureau treat the SIS as an anomaly, or at best (as in the case of Batvinis) merely an extension of the Bureau’s domestic spy-catching mission abroad, the FBI—as the war progressed and into early peacetime—did begin to think of itself as the heir apparent to the US foreign intelligence mission. Although the National Security Act of 1947 ended these plans, the FBI continued to work in conjunction with US governmental counterparts as an integral element of the US national security community abroad, rather than simply retreating to the strictly domestic setting. The FBI, as it developed its capability for the collection of intelligence abroad during the war, was already giving consideration to the role that it would play after the conclusion of hostilities. Although the United States had not, historically, fielded a peacetime civilian intelligence service, the Bureau, as early as 1943, acknowledged that this might change. In December of that year, the FBI’s executive conference acknowledged that the Bureau might have to establish a worldwide SIS.1 In 1944, William Sullivan, a future assistant director, provided another indication that thoughts of postwar intelligence coverage were percolating in the

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Bureau. Sullivan, describing a contact, characterized the individual as having “possible value . . . relative to world-wide postwar coverage by the [FBI].”2 (Interestingly, Sullivan, who demonstrated earlier indicators of sycophancy, directed this recommendation to J. Edgar Hoover. Sullivan’s expectation that Hoover would be receptive to such information is a further indication that the Bureau, at its highest levels, was harboring thoughts of global intelligence coverage.) In September 1944, Hoover made his position clear when he advised the State Department that a worldwide intelligence agency was immediately necessary and that the Bureau was uniquely qualified to act in this capacity.3 In addition to the Bureau’s stated interest in—or at least consideration of—assuming worldwide intelligence coverage, Bureau officials’ assessment of Washington infighting over postwar organization of US intelligence further indicated the FBI’s seriousness about maintaining its role as a foreign intelligence service. C. H. Carson, in a 1944 memorandum to D. H. Ladd, voiced his concern that the FBI was new to the field and lacked a well-established position. According to Carson, the Bureau had “many enemies and probably erstwhile friends who now in view of the change in the war picture and changed Fifth Column picture in Latin America would in all probability like to see [the FBI] eliminated from the foreign intelligence picture for good.”4 The FBI also noted the warning from State Department official Fletcher Warren that opposition to the Bureau’s operations in Latin America was only a prelude to the reaction that any efforts to place the FBI in charge of worldwide intelligence coverage would encounter.5 The Bureau also considered the necessity of maintaining intelligence coverage not only in the context of facing bureaucratic rivals but also in maintaining the United States’ position in a postwar world. In July 1945, M. Joseph Lynch, the legal attaché in London, assessed: If [the US government] reverts to the pre-war, lackadaisical attitude toward world-wide intelligence, the United States will be vulnerable and possibly suffer greatly, and we should not allow the British to obtain a position where they will apply pressure on us in international affairs because of their vast intelligence organization.6

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Furthermore, Lynch cautioned, “it can be safely assumed that the Russians will continue to carry on their intelligence activities of a world-wide nature and, accordingly, it seems apparent and necessary for the United States to build up an intelligence organization of a world-wide nature in the postwar period.”7 Support within the FBI for adoption of worldwide intelligence coverage was not unanimous. The executive conference, in 1943, rejected a proposal from Special Agent in Charge N. J. Pieper that would have developed general intelligence information pertaining to certain Asian countries. Pieper’s justification for this plan was his understanding that the FBI might adopt responsibility for intelligence operations in the postwar era. The San Francisco field office would supervise and handle Pieper’s project, with headquarters assisting by acquiring publications and conducting interviews in conjunction with agents in other field offices.8 Following the war, the executive conference revisited the question of foreign intelligence coverage. Although the majority of the conference in April 1946 recommended that the FBI accept responsibility for worldwide intelligence coverage if requested to do so, Clyde Tolson and Tamm objected to the concept. Hoover’s response, at the time, was to avoid worldwide coverage and handle only the Western Hemisphere.9 Hoover’s thinking about foreign intelligence was inextricable from his concerns about domestic responsibilities. D. M. Ladd provided Hoover with an assessment—for the use of the National Intelligence Authority—that “it is not possible to completely separate foreign and domestic intelligence. . . . The handling of intelligence connected with the various foreign nationality groups in the United States vitally depends upon information from their home countries.” Furthermore, Ladd noted, “espionage agents in the United States . . . should begin by the detection of their departure from their home countries and their activities should be followed throughout the various countries in which they may travel on their way to the United States.”10 In a prepared statement for Congress, Hoover observed that “foreign and domestic intelligence, espionage, and counterespionage are inseparable. One goes with the other.”11 Hoover had previously put this concept

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even more starkly in September 1946 when he wrote, regarding the impending relinquishment of the SIS to the Central Intelligence Group (the immediate predecessor to the CIA), “and yet the powers that be think it practical to divide domestic & foreign intelligence. Such a move will create a ‘Pearl Harbor.’”12 In early 1946, the United States began to formalize the establishment of a peacetime intelligence collection and analytic apparatus. On January 22, President Harry S. Truman issued the Presidential Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities. This document established a National Intelligence Authority (NIA)—consisting of the secretaries of state, war, and navy, along with a personal representative of the president—that would be responsible for the planning, development, and coordination of all federal foreign intelligence activities. Members of the NIA would assign individuals from their departments to form a Central Intelligence Group (CIG) that a presidentially appointed Director of Central Intelligence would helm. Although the CIG would become the CIA, this was, as of early 1946, not yet a sure thing. Rather, the CIG’s role was one of correlating and evaluating intelligence planning for the coordination of the NIA departments’ national security–related activities and performing “services of common concern” for the NIA.13 This development left the FBI in limbo. Following the conclusion of the war, the Bureau began to encounter “extreme difficulty” in securing any clear decision regarding the SIS’s future.14 In February 1946, the FBI dispatched a communication regarding the president’s January 22 directive to all legal attachés. This communication conveyed the uncertainty about the future role of the SIS, informing the legal attachés that Hoover had “not advised as yet as to what effects, if any, the creation of the new intelligence organization have on foreign intelligence operations of the Bureau.”15 Although the uncertainty meant that the SIS’s future was hazy, it also meant that the FBI was not out of consideration as the provider of worldwide intelligence collection services. Four plans for a US worldwide foreign intelligence collection apparatus circulated. The FBI’s proposal, which was part of the plan offered by

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the Bureau of the Budget, applied the practices of the SIS to global coverage. Rather than having an overarching bureaucracy, the FBI’s plan would retain the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC). The FBI, Military Intelligence Division (MID), and Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) would continue to assign attachés to countries.16 According to Hoover, the three agencies’ “normal friendly rivalries” would provide a system of checks and balances.17 Each agency was “a specialist in its own field and able to operate without a duplication of effort but closely correlating their operations to insure complete coverage.”18 This division of labor was important to Hoover, who emphasized that the nation’s security was too important to entrust the collection of multiple types of intelligence to any one entity.19 These agencies’ operations, globally, would continue to resemble what was already occurring in the Western Hemisphere. Each attaché would have a clearly defined set of responsibilities. The attachés would have overt personnel, who would gather, correlate, and transmit information. Additionally, each attaché would operate a clandestine organization sufficient for discharging the attachés’ defined responsibilities in the circumstances unique to specific countries.20 These “undercover” operatives would work either directly under the attachés or on instructions received from their respective headquarters in Washington, DC.21 The FBI envisioned using 650 agents, at an annual cost of $10 million—funds would be concealed within the FBI’s operating budget.22 Hoover believed that under this plan the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) “would no longer be necessary.”23 The FBI’s plan—in addition to dividing collection based on agencies’ areas of expertise—also divided responsibilities for collection and analysis. Hoover noted that he could imagine “nothing more unwise and fraught with danger than an investigative agency securing facts and then evaluating those facts.” This was a continuation of the Bureau’s longstanding aversion to analysis—a culture consistent with its law enforcement roots of collecting evidence and handing it over to attorneys for interpretation. Shortly after becoming director in 1924, Hoover established a rule that prohibited agents from even recommending

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the initiation of a prosecutive action. 24 This mindset informed Hoover ’s approach to intelligence. In the FBI’s plan for worldwide intelligence—somewhat like the original purpose of the CIG—there would be a unit for evaluation and analysis (cannibalizing these functions from the OSS) within the State Department to which the FBI, MID, and ONI would provide intelligence data for “appropriate review, analysis, and utilization in international matters.” 25 According to Hoover, an agency responsible for analysis separate from the agencies responsible for collection would be “far more capable of securing a more accurate picture.” Furthermore, a standalone analytical agency was in “an excellent position to judge weaknesses in intelligence coverage and request additional data or a further verification of facts already secured.”26 Consistent with its plan being offered under the auspices of the Bureau of the Budget, the FBI stressed the relatively low costs of what it offered. According to the FBI, its work in the Western Hemisphere had produced “a maximum amount of information with a minimum amount of operating personnel and expense.”27 Even after it became clear that the FBI would not assume responsibilities for worldwide intelligence coverage, Hoover continued to highlight the US government’s missed opportunity for economizing. Appearing before a congressional subcommittee on February 12, 1947, he noted that the FBI could provide worldwide intelligence coverage with a staff of twelve hundred employees at a cost of approximately $15 million. This, Hoover noted, was in contrast to the CIG’s three thousand employees and operational costs of $50 million per year.28 The FBI ultimately lost its fight to assume responsibility for global intelligence coverage. In July 1947, the newly passed National Security Act created the Central Intelligence Agency, the formal successor of the CIG.29 Interestingly, the FBI did not see its loss of status to the CIG as eliminating a future role in foreign intelligence. Instead, the Bureau explicitly stated that its first reason for compiling a history of the SIS Division was to “provide a complete, usable handbook concerning [the FBI’s] entire operations in the SIS field which could be used as a guide

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book in setting up a new SIS operation in the event it became necessary.”30 Indeed, the FBI would continue to play an intermittent role in US foreign intelligence collection when it became responsible, during the Johnson administration, for coverage of the Dominican Republic and during the Nixon administration for the High-Level (HILEV) program.

Interagency Relations The FBI does not operate in a vacuum at home or abroad. Instead, it relies on support from the State Department for facilities. It has also had to develop a relationship with the US government agencies with which its operations overlap. These include the CIA—which is the United States’ primary foreign intelligence service (and which inherited the already-established SIS from the FBI)—as well as federal law enforcement agencies with an international presence such as the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), which formed after the FBI had established its international presence. Finally, the decision by nonfederal law enforcement agencies to deploy presences abroad has created an even more crowded environment.

Interaction with the US Department of State Since the establishment of the legal attaché position as part of the SIS, the FBI has regularly had to interact with the State Department, which hosts the Bureau abroad. To establish a new legat post or to change the staffing levels at an existing one, the Bureau must obtain approval from State as well as from other executive branch and congressional entities.31 The FBI’s relations with US ambassadors are integral to the Bureau’s success. Ambassadors are the chiefs of the United States Diplomatic Mission in the country where they are assigned and have full responsibility for the direction, coordination, and supervision of all US governmental offices and employees.32 This is not simply a diplomatic nicety. In some instances, ambassadors submit annual performance ratings of legats to FBI headquarters and scrutinize the work

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of legats when studying the staffing patterns of establishments to determine where reductions can be made.33 In addition to its operations in the country, the FBI must rely on the State Department for permission to enter the country. FBI—and all other US governmental—employees must obtain a “country clearance,” or approval to enter a country, from the US ambassador to that country. It is the legat’s job to ensure that the ambassador is aware of which personnel are awaiting clearance. This process is not exempt from occasional breakdowns. According to a July 2000 memo from the FBI’s Office of International Operations, a US ambassador denied FBI personnel permission to travel to—or even pass through—the country to which the ambassador was assigned. The ambassador was upset by the repeated travel by non-country-cleared Bureau personnel and would not permit travel to resume until high-level discussions occurred between the FBI and State.34 Once established within an embassy, the legal attaché usually fulfills an integral role, not simply for the FBI but also for the broader embassy community. The legat reports to the ambassador and serves as part of the embassy’s country team.35 This means that the Bureau’s personnel assume duties that range from participating on emergency action committees to formulating mission performance plans.36 According to a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the FBI and State, legats—in addition to their investigative responsibilities—work with the administrative officer of the embassy and respond to requests from other embassy-based State Department employees.37 One area of friction in embassy operations has been the relationship between the FBI and the State Department’s diplomatic security personnel, known as regional security officers (RSOs). Prior to 1991, there was a history of conflict between the two components. However, in 1991, an MOU delineated the roles of FBI legats and RSOs.38 The sensitive nature of the legat’s work creates a unique— and occasionally tense—relationship with the ambassador. Legats are required to keep the ambassador informed about the scope of legats’ activities. Furthermore, legats are explicitly instructed to bring situations within the legats’ area of responsibility that

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could impact US foreign policy to ambassadors’ attention.39 However, investigative needs do from time to time disrupt the FBI– State relationship. For instance, in the early 1970s, the FBI was investigating a plot to assassinate the president of the Philippines and withheld from the US ambassador the name of a Filipino family that might have been involved.40 The ambassador was less than thrilled by this. Consequently, according to an FBI inspection report, “Legat Manila is therefore probably not enjoying the best relations with Ambassador [William H.] Sullivan.”41

Legal Attachés and the Central Intelligence Agency The transfer of responsibility for the collection of foreign intelligence abroad from the FBI to the CIA created decades of rivalry and suspicion. CIA officials believed that the FBI legats were operating with a hazily defined mandate that the legats exploited to outflank the CIA’s relationships with foreign security services. On its end, the FBI viewed the CIA with suspicion—after all, the CIA had subsumed the SIS, and it was reasonable to suspect that the Agency would further encroach on the Bureau’s operations abroad. Not surprisingly, this clash of organizational egos created an environment not conducive to cooperation or communication. Though there were glimmers of improvement as 1947 receded into the past, it was the events of 9/11 that forced legal attachés and their chief of station counterparts to forge better relationships. Rivalry The CIA—the primary agency responsible for the United States’ foreign intelligence collection—viewed the FBI’s Legal Attaché program as a rival service. Allen Dulles, who would become the CIA director in 1953, indicated his view of the Legat program in 1951, when he suggested that the FBI’s placement of personnel abroad equated to building up its own foreign service.42 Furthermore, Agency officials complained that they did not know exactly what the legats were doing. According to a 1951 CIA memorandum, “The authority by which the FBI maintains representatives

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abroad and a definition of their responsibilities have repeatedly been sought by CIA without avail,” and “discreet inquiry to the State Department has disclosed a similar ignorance on the part of that department.”43 In 1952, CIA official Lyman Kirkpatrick, a future CIA Inspector General who had been part of the OSS and CIG prior to the CIA, suggested that the FBI “constitute[d] a second U.S. intelligence service in the foreign field.”44 CIA officials—not necessarily Dulles—continued to object to expansion of the Legat program. In 1954, Dulles expressed support for the opening of a legat office in Tokyo, Japan, despite hearing objections from his subordinates.45 Dulles believed that opening this legat would alleviate the CIA of work imposed by gathering information for the Bureau, as the presence of a legal attaché would allow the FBI to pursue its own leads.46 However, the FBI continued to view the CIA as oppositional to the Legat program. In 1971, FBI official R. W. Wannall concluded that the CIA would resist the FBI’s further expansion abroad unless the White House explicitly ordered the expansion.47 Suspicion The FBI was equally suspicious of the CIA’s activities. Sam Papich, the FBI’s liaison to the CIA, assessed that the Agency would, at some point, take over the Legal Attaché program. This possibility was quite conceivable when Papich offered the assessment in 1952, given how the Truman administration had given CIG the FBI’s SIS operation in 1947. According to Papich, subsuming the Legat program into the CIA would be unfortunate because the FBI had been able to get much quicker services from foreign agencies than the CIA had when it acted on behalf of the Bureau. 48 In 1958, Papich believed that Dulles—who by this point had been the director of the CIA for approximately five years—was implementing procedures pertaining to National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, “Espionage and Counterespionage Operations,” which would put the Legat program under de facto CIA control. Papich was specifically concerned about a provision that would open the door for the CIA to examine or inspect the legats.49

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This fear of domination by the CIA informed the Bureau’s early interactions with the Agency. For instance, in 1952, Hoover provided instructions to a legat that it was not necessary to clear the legat’s travel to neighboring countries with the legat’s CIA counterpart unless the legat expected that he would have reason to interact with the Agency representative in the country to which the legat was traveling.50 Later in the decade, the Bureau again indicated concern about the CIA, this time out of concern that the Agency was exploiting the FBI’s status. In 1957, the legat in Tokyo notified the Bureau that Hoover would receive an invitation to the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) conference but that the CIA would be controlling the conference. According to A. H. Belmont, “It would not be desirable for . . . any Bureau representative to take part in a conference which could be used by CIA to capitalize on Bureau prestige and reputation.”51 Lack of Coordination Such suspicions naturally produce breakdowns in the sharing of information. In 1950, Hoover directed the legat in Madrid to advise the FBI of each instance in which the legat provided information to the CIA’s representative in that city. Hoover insisted on a paper trail between the two government agencies, instructing the legat to provide information to the CIA and other US governmental representatives at the embassy in memorandum form. When this was not possible, the legat should at least put a memorandum to file that documented which information was given, when it was it provided, and to whom it was given. 52 Such a careful—verging on paranoid—approach was not completely indefensible. After all, in 1951, CIA Director Walter Bedell Smith indicated that he needed to use FBI-obtained information for passage to foreign intelligence services as quid pro quo.53 If the CIA was simply going to use Bureau information as currency, Hoover was right to be cautious about what information the Bureau provided to the Agency. Bureau suspicion about the CIA’s handling of information persisted. During a March 1952 meeting, the FBI accused a CIA station of “deliberate withholding of information” from a legat.54

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More than a decade later, the FBI continued to doubt the CIA’s capability or willingness to provide necessary intelligence. In 1969, Bureau official H. L. Child wrote to Tolson that the Legat program had proved to be an invaluable adjunct to all categories of FBI investigative activity, particularly in view of the proven incapability, if not indisposition of CIA and other agencies to adequately service our requests for inquiries overseas, or even more important, to aggressively seek the manifold information of immediate value to the Bureau which is available through well-developed foreign sources.55

One former legat, who had opened the office in Hong Kong, although commending the CIA as having always been “very, very good” to him, acknowledged that it “[wasn’t] always straight up.”56 Frustration with the CIA’s lack of assistance appears to have been one impetus for the FBI’s expansion of its Legal Attaché program in the early 1970s. Contemporaneous with the HILEV program, W. R. Wannall noted that in areas where the FBI did not have legats it was forced to rely on the CIA to cover leads, a process which could take weeks and even months. According to Wannall, “Having men abroad is of material assistance to the Bureau” because these individuals could give “close attention to the matters and [follow] other agencies to see that responses are forthcoming within reasonable time limitations.”57 Of course, third countries could conceivably take advantage of a rift between the two agencies. In late 1951, the CIA director, Walter Bedell Smith, raised such a concern, saying that if the FBI and CIA did not closely coordinate, foreign intelligence could play the two agencies off of one another.58 The CIA noted this concern again in 1952, with one official writing, “Foreign intelligence, uninformed as to the respective official responsibilities of CIA and the FBI, at best are confused and, at worst, are in a position to play one U.S. service against another. In keeping with traditional intelligence liaison practice, they must be expected to exploit the opportunity.”59 CIA records suggest that the Agency believed the Bureau intended to deal with foreign services behind the Agency’s back. One 1952 memorandum noted that legats did “not restrict their

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contacts to police or internal security services.” Furthermore, the CIA suspected that foreign services would turn directly to the FBI for information that the FBI would not release through the CIA. The memorandum’s author assessed that “if the foreign service [was] in a position to turn directly to an FBI attaché rather than use CIA as an unsatisfactory channel, it may be expected to do so, to the obvious future disregard of CIA.” Further suspicion on the part of the CIA flared from the Agency’s recognition that “no case [was] known of a foreign service being referred to CIA by an FBI attaché on the grounds that the matter under consideration was not within FBI competence.”60 The perception that the FBI continued to operate independently of the CIA vis-à-vis foreign governments persisted into the late 1970s. According to a 1978 US congressional hearing, there was no written agreement about the role of FBI legal attachés in foreign liaison activities. Despite the United States’ policy regarding the primacy of the CIA in the foreign field, the FBI continued to levy pertinent requirements directly on its own legal attachés, who did always work with their Agency counterparts.61 Maturation There were occasional glimmers of cooperation as the memory of 1947 receded. In 1958, the FBI assured Dulles that the Bureau was indeed furnishing information to the CIA abroad.62 The HILEV program involved similar dissemination to the Agency. In 1973, L. Patrick Gray, the FBI’s acting director, notified the attorney general that each Legal Attaché, before submitting a [political intelligence] item must coordinate the information with interested agencies [Redacted] where he is stationed. This would, in practically every instance, mean that both CIA and State [Redacted] are informed of the item before or simultaneously with its submission to [FBI HQ] by cable.63

Similarly, the CIA—specifically its Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)—provided information to FBI legal attachés. According to a 1963 memorandum, the FBIS’s Austrian

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Bureau routed items containing information from Eastern Bloc sources about statements by US citizens visiting Communist countries to the legat in Bern, Switzerland, via the US Embassy in Vienna.64 Policy developments, beginning in the early 1980s, formally codified the nature of FBI–CIA relations abroad. Executive Order 12333, issued in late 1981, made the CIA responsible for the conduct of counterintelligence activities outside the United States and thereby made it mandatory for legal attachés to coordinate their counterintelligence functions with the CIA.65 A 2005 memorandum of understanding, “Concerning Overseas and Domestic Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation,” stipulated that legats would coordinate contacts with foreign intelligence, security, and law enforcement services with the chiefs of station. 66 The 2005 MOU required both the CIA and the FBI to keep each other informed of activities and entities that crossed bureaucratic boundaries; provide explicit directions about information sharing; and provide reporting and dissemination guidelines. In 2012, the FBI and CIA approved a joint message “to prevent misunderstandings which occasionally occur by narrow interpretation of responsibilities as well as avoiding duplication of effort which is especially important in the current environment of scarce resources.”67 Relations between FBI and CIA officials abroad have seemingly improved since the September 11 attacks. CIA chiefs of station receive introductions to FBI perspectives and capabilities, and their FBI legat counterparts receive reciprocal CIA training.68 Additionally, this increased integration abroad has expanded to the ground level. In 2007, Thomas Fuentes, who was then the assistant director for the FBI’s Office of International Operations, suggested to the US Congress that there were certain instances when an FBI agent or analyst might be embedded with a CIA station. According to Fuentes, the National Counterterrorism Center and the FBI’s National Security Branch were responsible for determining the circumstances in which such an arrangement was desirable.69

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Lack of Stateside FBI Support for Its Legats Historically, legats have found themselves navigating interagency difficulties without support from FBI headquarters. For instance, during the late 1990s, Legat Rome noted that the Bureau’s National Security Division had not provided assistance or guidance when the legat encountered problems with the CIA.70 Furthermore, legats have, at times, learned about their own agency’s actions from their CIA counterparts. For instance, the 9/11 Review Commission learned that several CIA chiefs of station knew more about the travel of FBI confidential human sources (i.e., informants) than the legats did as a result of an apparent inability or unwillingness of FBI field offices to keep legats informed about CHSs’ activities. Finally, the Bureau’s treatment of legats diminished the legats’ status in the eyes of their CIA counterparts. According to a CIA chief of station, the special agents in charge of domestic FBI field offices tended to dominate the legats. This created the impression that legats lacked the authority to control their areas of responsibility.71 These incidents can lead—over time—to legats lacking the status necessary to interact with their interagency counterparts, thereby impeding the FBI’s ability to successfully operate abroad.

The FBI and the DEA Abroad The Drug Enforcement Administration, which is part of the Department of Justice (DoJ), resulted from the combination of several existing agencies with narcotics-related intelligence and enforcement functions. In 1968, the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) came into existence, under the auspices of the DoJ.72 BNDD was the product of a merger—known as Reorganization Plan No. 1—between the US Department of the Treasury’s Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN) and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare’s Bureau of Drug Abuse Control.73 Following the creation of BNDD, the US government established two additional narcotics-related bodies under the DoJ. The first of these was the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE), which came into existence in 1972.74 The impetus for

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the establishment of ODALE was a belief that the federal government could initiate an effective, combined drug enforcement program that used federal and state—rather than local—officials in targeted cities.75 The Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI) was the second post-BNDD addition to the DoJ. Like ODALE, this new office came into existence in 1972.76 ONNI was formed with the purpose of facilitating intelligence analysts’ coordination of what was a seemingly haphazard counternarcotics intelligence enterprise. The office was positioned to serve as a foreign– domestic bridge, receiving intelligence reports from all sources abroad and distributing pertinent information to enforcement agencies in the United States. As originally envisioned, ONNI would have gathered and evaluated international and domestic narcotics intelligence. It would then integrate the information for customers in various interested agencies. ODALE did not engage in collection, and did not have authority to independently do so, but was, rather, a clearinghouse and evaluator of intelligence information.77 ONNI had an interesting nexus with the Bureau’s operations abroad. William Sullivan, who had become a fierce critic of the FBI’s Legat program prior to leaving his position at the Bureau, led the newly created ONNI. Sullivan’s ignominious exit from the FBI arguably fueled his interest in using the ONNI position to co-opt the resources of his former employer. In 1973, he testified to Congress that FBI informants, “when handled correctly and given specific assignments, should be able to cast light on the nature and flow of specific narcotic traffic in the streets.”78 According to Sullivan, the FBI had numerous “special programs and investigative techniques and procedures,” and a modification of some of these could be pressed into service in domestic counternarcotics work. Furthermore, Sullivan explicitly suggested that two of the FBI’s sacred cows—its Identification Division and its Laboratory—might be usable by Sullivan’s new office.79 The DEA, which entered existence in mid-1973, was the result of Reorganization Plan No. 2. The DEA absorbed the functions and most of the staff from BNDD, ODALE, and ONNI, as well as most of

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the US Customs Service’s intelligence capability.80 BNDD had a significant influence on the DEA’s organization: the former agency’s methodologies, procedures, even its Agent’s Manual established much of the foundation for how the DEA would operate.81 The DEA inherited responsibility from the BNDD for combating a seamless, transnational threat. The principal emphasis of the BNDD had been on halting the flow of narcotics at their foreign sources and, on the domestic side of this problem, disrupting commerce in narcotics at the highest levels of organized, illicit enterprises.82 This approach opened a vacuum at lower levels of enforcement, which provided the context for the creation of ODALE. With the formation of the DEA—and the merger of BNDD and ODALE perspectives—the approach to counternarcotics activities focused on a “seamless continuum.”83 This entailed disrupting entire narcotics enterprises, which ranged from the lowand midlevel figures, who had been under ODALE’s purview, to the high-level traffickers and producers abroad, on whom the BNDD had focused.84 The relationship of the DEA with the FBI has intertwined from the outset of the DEA. Until the early 1970s, the Bureau had avoided counternarcotics work for several reasons, including the burden it already carried with its wide array of investigative responsibilities; a perception that counternarcotics work was “dirty law enforcement”; and a concern that such work had a high potential for corruption.85 Despite the FBI’s aversion to counternarcotics functions, it was repeatedly looked to as a potential inheritor of this mission. In 1973, the same year that the DEA was formed through the merger of several existing offices, Senator Abraham Ribicoff proposed legislation that would have made the FBI responsible for federal drug enforcement through a new FBI entity known as the Division of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs. Ribicoff was reportedly quite annoyed at the Bureau’s reticence at becoming involved with this work.86 Several years later, in 1977, the FBI revisited the issue at the direction of the attorney general, and examined consolidating drug enforcement tasks from the struggling DEA into the FBI. The resulting report, Federal Bureau of Investigation Assumption of Federal Drug Enforcement, otherwise known as the Ash Report,

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reached no definitive conclusions about the advisability of the merger. Instead, it cautioned that, if the merger occurred, it would only be successful if the FBI retained its management, philosophy, structure, Excepted Service status, and law enforcement orientation and perspective in all elements, as opposed to keeping the DEA intact as a separate entity within the FBI.87 Despite the FBI’s concerns about becoming involved with counternarcotics work, it was inexorably drawn into these duties. The most significant step toward integrating the DEA and FBI occurred when the Department of Justice mandated that, starting in 1982, both agencies would have concurrent jurisdiction over narcotics violations.88 Like two recalcitrant children being forced to get along, the DEA would function under the supervision of the director of the FBI, through whom the DEA administrator would report to the attorney general.89 (So much for the Ash Report’s recommendation regarding the need to avoid an autonomous DEA under the FBI.) The DEA remained the lead agency for narcotics issues, and the FBI would focus its resources on drug investigations connected to traditional organized crime families, violence-prone nontraditional organized crime groups such as outlaw motorcycle gangs, and ethnically or racially based organized crime groups.90 Both agencies developed guides with intelligence requirements to ensure that sources, which remained with the agency that had developed them, were fully queried for information of interest.91 The workforces of the two agencies cross-pollinated increasingly. Hundreds of FBI agents received specialized training in narcotics matters, and DEA agents received instruction on the FBI’s mission and service.92 FBI and DEA analysts complemented each other’s operations by working closely together to ensure that all intelligence databases were searched to provide specific targeting information to field agents. According to DoJ guidance, specific areas of responsibility and requisite coordination between the DEA and the FBI would vary with the availability of resources and the extent of the drug crime problem in a particular field division. These variables meant that it was incumbent upon FBI and DEA field office management to identify the major drug-trafficking groups in their areas of responsibility and, thereafter, either indi-

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vidually or jointly target those groups for investigation using the available resources and expertise of both agencies.93 Although it appeared that the concurrent jurisdiction could conclude with a merger of the FBI and DEA, the agencies remained separate entities. Concurrent jurisdiction ended in 1987. This historical interrelationship provides the context for FBI– DEA interactions abroad. The DEA has retained responsibility for narcotics investigations in foreign countries.94 In May 1994, the FBI director, Louis Freeh, who also served as the director of the DoJ’s Office of Investigative Agency Policies (OIAP), issued OIAP Resolution Six to coordinate foreign narcotics investigations.95 According to Freeh, he was motivated by a desire to prevent duplication of effort and maximize investigative resources assigned to foreign countries. 96 Under Resolution Six, the FBI would assign criminal investigative personnel to DEA offices abroad. While seconded to the DEA, the FBI personnel would work on DEA investigations and would not perform investigations on behalf of the FBI’s legats except on an emergency basis, authorized by both FBI and DEA HQs.97 Resolution Six personnel have been part of complex antinarcotics efforts and have worked with a variety of foreign and domestic intelligence entities and multiple intelligence collection disciplines. These personnel coordinate with other DoJ entities— specifically, the US Marshals Service and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives—with a presence abroad. Operating under Resolution Six, personnel interface with their foreign counterparts. Resolution Six personnel collect intelligence using traditional confidential human sources (CHSs) as well as more esoteric methods. For instance, certain Resolution Six personnel participate in the Resolution Six/DEA Electronic Intelligence Collection Initiative that is directed at identifying and developing information about cartel structures.98

Nonfederal Presence Abroad Finally, it is worth mentioning that the FBI has, from time to time encountered—or at least perceived—competition from nonfederal

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law enforcement agencies seeking to develop a global presence. When the FBI was considering rejoining the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC) in 1946, one of its concerns was that the New York Police Department (NYPD) might be selected to represent the United States if the Bureau chose not to do so.99 Ironically, the NYPD would become one of the reasons for the FBI’s quitting the ICPC. In 1950, the Bureau’s executive conference pointed to the ICPC’s circumventing of the FBI in its plans to invite an NYPD physicist to become an honorary technical consultant as a reason for the FBI withdrawal from the organization.100 More recently, the NYPD has expanded its presence by assigning personnel abroad. In 2003, the department established its International Liaison Program. The program’s origins lie in the NYPD’s counterterrorism work following the September 11 attacks. According to a press report, the FBI has not looked favorably on this mission creep.101 However, in 2008, FBI Director Mueller admitted that if he was in NYPD commissioner Ray Kelly’s position, he might have done the same thing if he had the resources to do so. 102 Although the NYPD program began with counterterrorism, it has broadened its bailiwick. International Liaison Program detectives now address a range of crimes. 103 Mueller acknowledged that the program gave the NYPD a return on its investment that the FBI could not offer. Whereas the FBI’s response to an incident that the NYPD was investigating “would come through the security service or from [the FBI’s] counterpart through [the Bureau’s] Legal Attaché and through [the Bureau’s] New York office,” the NYPD, by operating abroad, increased the speed with which it could acquire information.104

Notes 1. Executives’ Conference for the Director. December 22, 1943, FBI 662554. 2. William C. Sullivan to JEH, Re: Joseph E. Casey—Special Assistant to President Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 30, 1944, FBI 67-205182. 3. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945, Case File FBI HQ File 64-4104, Box 16, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD.

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4. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: Present Situation in Argentina, May 13, 1944, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 5. R. R. Roach to D. M. Ladd, SIS Activities in Postwar World Wide Intelligence, September 1944, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 6. Federal Bureau of Investigation, British Intelligence Service in the United States (running memorandum) (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 7. FBI, British Intelligence Service in the United States (running memorandum). 8. Executives’ Conference for the Director, December 22, 1943, FBI 662554-2303. 9. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 10. D. M. Ladd to the Director, National Intelligence Authority, May 2, 1946—provided memorandum to NIA titled Special Intelligence Service of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, February 12, 1946, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 11. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called—July 3, 1947.] FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 12. Hoover notation on “New ‘Pearl Harbor’ Held More Likely to be Internal,” The Sunday Star. September 8, 1946. Located in FBI 62-80750. 13. Harry S. Truman, “71. Presidential Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities,” in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945– 1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1996), https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments /frus1945-50Intel/d71. 14. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 15. Memorandum No. 6, To All FBI Legal Attachés, February 18, 1946, FBI 62-80750. 16. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 17. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called], July 3, 1947. Located in FBI 62-80750. 18. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called], July 3, 1947. Located in FBI 62-80750. 19. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called], July 3, 1947. Located in FBI 62-80750. 20. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 21. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 22. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1; V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948, FBI 62-80750. 23. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called], July 3, 1947. Located in FBI 62-80750.

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24. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called], July 3, 1947. Located in FBI 62-80750. 25. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called], July 3, 1947. Located in FBI 62-80750. 26. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called], July 3, 1947. Located in FBI 62-80750. 27. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 28. Statement of J. Edgar Hoover, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee of Expenditures in the Executive Departments [In H writing—to be read if called], July 3, 1947. Located in FBI 62-80750. 29. David F. Rudgers, Creating the Secret State (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2000), 147. 30. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 31. US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2004), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI /a0418/final.pdf. 32. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 33. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 34. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 35. Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. (2007). 36. John Allen Muhammad, Document Fraud, and the Western Hemisphere Passport Exception, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003). 37. Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003). 38. Terrorism: Interagency Conflicts in Combatting International Terrorism, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 102nd Cong. (1991). 39. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 40. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 41. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 42. Central Intelligence Agency, Director’s Meeting, Thursday, 30 August 1951, General CIA Records, Doc. No. CIA-RDP80B01676R002300070020-0, National Archives, College Park, MD, https://www.cia.gov/library /readingroom/document/cia-rdp80b01676r002300070020-0. 43. Lyman Kirkpatrick, memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Via Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: FBI Representatives Assigned to Foreign Countries, from May 2, 1952, CIA General Records, Doc. No. CIA -RDP80R01731R002900430026-0, National Archives, College Park, MD, https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp80r01731r002900430026-0.

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44. Lyman Kirkpatrick, memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Via Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: FBI Representatives Assigned to Foreign Countries, May 2, 1952; Richard Pearson, “Lyman Kirkpatrick Dies,” Washington Post, March 5, 1995, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive /local/1995/03/05/lyman-kirkpatrick-jr-dies/32464999-518d-438a-91a3 -5bcce00a6ebd/?utm_term=.7611e6cc1879. 45. R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, Assignment of Bureau Representative to Tokyo, Japan, July 27, 1954, FBI 62-80750. 46. R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, Assignment of Bureau Representative to Tokyo, Japan, July 27, 1954. 47. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971, FBI 67149000. 48. Lyman Kirkpatrick, memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Via Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: FBI Representatives Assigned to Foreign Countries, May 2, 1952. 49. R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, November 5, 1958, FBI 62-83338. 50. John Edgar Hoover to Legal Attaché, Paris France, Relations with CIA, March 28, 1952, FBI 62-80750. 51. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) Security Conference, Philippine Islands, November 1957, September 12, 1957, FBI 62-80750. 52. JEH to Legal Attaché, Madrid, Spain, Relations with CIA, October 31, 1950, FBI 62-80750. 53. Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Lunch with Hoover, Ladd, DeLoach, Smith, Dulles, Wyman and Kirkpatrick, November 7, 1951, CIA General Records, Doc. No. CIA-RDP80R01731R002900430040-4, National Archives, College Park, MD, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom /document/cia-rdp80r01731r002900430040-4. 54. Lyman Kirkpatrick, memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Via Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: FBI Representatives Assigned to Foreign Countries, May 2, 1952. 55. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 56. Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Interview with Former Special Agent of the FBI Daniel A Grove (1955–1979),” November 12, 2009, https://socxfbi.org/general/custom.asp?page=foundation. 57. W. R. Wannall to Mr. Felt, Foreign Liaison Operations, July 28, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 58. Memorandum for the Record, Subject: Lunch with Hoover, Ladd, DeLoach, Smith, Dulles, Wyman and Kirkpatrick, November 7, 1951. 59. Lyman Kirkpatrick, memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Via Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: FBI Representatives Assigned to Foreign Countries, May 2, 1952. 60. Lyman Kirkpatrick, memorandum for Director of Central Intelligence, Via Deputy Director (Plans), Subject: FBI Representatives Assigned to Foreign Countries, May 2, 1952. 61. Notification to Victims of Improper Intelligence Agency Activities, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong. (1978).

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62. R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, November 5, 1958, FBI 62-80750. 63. Acting Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, Expansion of FBI Operations Overseas, June 20, 1973, FBI 62-80750. 64. Chief, FBIS, For: Bureau Chiefs, Subject: Letter of Information, September 20, 1963, CIA General Records, Doc. No. CIA-RDP83-00586R000300240004 -1, National Archives, College Park, MD, https://www.cia.gov/library/read ingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00586r000300240004-1. 65. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 66. Central Intelligence Agency, AR 2-2E Annex E–(U), Memorandum of Understanding Concerning Overseas and Domestic Activities of the Central Intelligence Agency and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (Formerly HR 7-1ANNE), Agency Regulation Series 2 (Intelligence Activities) (Washington, DC: CIA, December 23, 1987), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC _0006235758.pdf. 67. Bruce Hoffman, Edwin Meese III, and Timothy J. Roemer for the 9/11 Review Commission, The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Federal Bureau of Investigation, 2015), https://www.fbi .gov/file-repository/final-9-11-review-commission-report-unclassified.pdf /view. 68. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003). 69. Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas, Hearing before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. (2007). 70. National Security Division (NSD) Inspection, 8/4/97–8/22/97, Field Office/Legat Interrogatory, June 26, 1997, FBI 67-149000. 71. Hoffman, Meese, and Roemer, The FBI: Protecting the Homeland in the 21st Century. 72. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Pt 4. (1976). 73. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Pt. 4 (1976). 74. Congressional Resource Guide to the Federal Effort on Narcotics Abuse and Control 1969–76, Pt. 1, A Report of the Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control, 95th Cong. (1978) 75. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Pt. 4 (1976). 76. Congressional Resource Guide to the Federal Effort on Narcotics Abuse and Control. 77. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Pt. 4 (1976). 78. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research, and International Organizations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 93rd Cong., Pt. 1. (1973).

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79. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Reorganization, Research, and International Organizations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 93rd Cong., Pt. 1. (1973). 80. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Pt 4 (1976). 81. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Pt. 1 (1975). 82. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Pt. 4 (1976). 83. Drug Enforcement Administration, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999). 84. Drug Enforcement Administration, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Crime of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. (1999). 85. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong. (1976). 86. Federal Drug Enforcement, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Government Operations, 94th Cong., Pt. 1 (1975). 87. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Bureau of Investigation Assumption of Federal Drug Enforcement (Washington, DC: FBI, 1977), http://www.governmentattic.org/10docs/FBI-AshReport_1977-1981.pdf. 88. DEA Oversight and Authorization, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983). 89. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1985, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., Pt 8 (1984). 90. DEA Oversight and Authorization, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983) 91. DEA Oversight and Authorization, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983). 92. Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 98-794, (1984). 93. DEA Oversight and Authorization, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 98th Cong. (1983). 94. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 95. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 96. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 6 (1996). 97. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997).

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98. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 111-115 (2009). 99. H. H. Clegg to Mr. Tolson, June 20, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001. 100. The Executive Conference to the Director, International Criminal Police Commission, June 22, 1950, FBI 74-1-2001. 101. Ali Winston, “Stationed Overseas but Solving Crimes in New York City,” New York Times, August 21, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018 /08/21/nyregion/terrorism-nypd-intelligence-crime.html. 102. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Pt. 5 (2008). 103. Winston, “Stationed Overseas.” 104. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 110th Cong., Pt. 5 (2008).

4 Diplomacy and Institution Building

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) DOES NOT simply gather information. Legal attachés (legats) are not simply technocrats who receive and transmit information to and from foreign counterparts. They transcend this function to serve as components of US diplomacy. Establishing norms that encourage transparency in law enforcement benefits both the United States, by enabling cooperating countries to function as force multipliers in disrupting international threats of common concern, and the countries, by implementing norms, which strengthen the rule of law. The FBI, through its legats, has encouraged norms for law enforcement professionalization through both bilateral and multilateral interactions.

Domestic Origins To understand the FBI’s thinking about its role in the inculcation of professionality and competency in law enforcement, we need to go back to 1935. During that year, J. Edgar Hoover set in motion a program of education for law enforcement agencies. This took shape in the form of the Bureau’s National Academy, presently a professional, ten-week course of study at Quantico, Virginia, for US and international law enforcement managers. According to the FBI, coursework includes “intelligence theory, terrorism and

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terrorist mindsets, management science, law, behavioral science, law enforcement communication, and forensic science.”1 Throughout the decades, the National Academy curriculum has evolved to address current threats. For instance, the FBI announced in the mid-1980s that it would include a forty-four-hour course on the theory and politics of terrorism.2 Back then, the National Academy functioned not simply as a training resource but rather as a way for the Bureau to forge better coordination with state and local authorities. According to Hoover, the FBI created the National Academy at a time when a wave of kidnappings swept the nation, prompting calls for a national police force.3 (This was a threat to the FBI’s jurisdiction.) The National Academy project had the added benefit of aligning nonfederal law enforcement forces with the FBI—a reality that Hoover acknowledged when he told Congress in 1937 that “within the course of the next 3 or 4 years we will have in every community in the country one man who will have had the benefit of this expert training that we try to give all of our own agents.”4 In addition to the National Academy, the FBI further strengthened its influence with state and local authorities via localized trainings. The National Defense Training Schools—during World War II—were early examples of such programs.5 Special agents in charge of Bureau field offices held regional meetings with local law enforcement in furtherance of qualifying law enforcement personnel to assist the government during the war with matters such as handling incendiary devices and prostitution around military camps.6 The FBI, after the war, continued to hold similar regional trainings to improve the capabilities of local officers in areas such as firearms training and taking fingerprints.7 During the 1980s, after the FBI had assumed responsibility for counterterrorism, it conducted a variety of trainings on that subject for local law enforcement as well as the military and other federal agencies. Topics covered at both the FBI academy and regional trainings included hostage negotiations and crisis management.8 As with the National Academy, these training sessions were a way for the FBI to maintain influence with other law enforcement entities. According to Hoover, in his discussion of these activities,

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the Bureau “found it [was] very necessary to have the assistance, the wholehearted assistance and cooperation of local authorities throughout the country.”9 Directors after Hoover continued to acknowledge the value of these relationships. When queried about state and local officials’ willingness to bring the FBI in on a terrorist situation, Director William Webster assessed that this “depend[ed], in large measure, upon the success and effectiveness of [the Bureau’s] liaison and interrelationships which have been developed and fine-tuned in most major cities and in other parts of the country” and, according to Webster, the FBI could “count on almost immediate notification.”10 The Bureau disseminated publications on specific aspects of law enforcement that also set norms. The FBI’s Law Enforcement Bulletin, which began publication in 1932, was the first of these efforts.11 The bulletin, according to Hoover, served two purposes. First, it made available the names, descriptions, and fingerprint classifications of persons wanted by local police authorities.12 (This prefigured the Bureau’s automated information-sharing services such as the National Crime Information Center.) Second, it served as a scientific police journal of interest to all law enforcement agencies.13 Through these two functions, the bulletin implemented Hoover’s vision of the Bureau as an agency positioned to guide (and influence) the broader law enforcement community. In addition to sharing expertise, the FBI institutionalized operational coordination. The Bureau, as early as 1922, noted the “close cooperation established with local authorities.”14 In 1928, Hoover noted that there was “not a single city . . . that [did] not cooperate fully with the Bureau of Investigation.”15 In 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt formalized this arrangement, and directed that all police officers, sheriffs, and all other law enforcement officers in the United States promptly to turn over to the nearest representatives of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any information obtained by them relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage, subversive activities and violations of the neutrality law.16

However, the FBI was selective about how it incorporated state and local agencies into national-level security information sharing.

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Starting in 1939, the Bureau launched what it referred to as the “law enforcement mobilization plan” as a way to resolve difficulties, which entailed quarterly conferences between special agents in charge of field offices and local police officials with the expectation that the Bureau would receive a deluge of sabotage and espionage complaints.17 During World War II, special agents in charge of FBI field offices continued to hold conferences once every three months with heads of the law enforcement agencies in the field offices’ areas of responsibility.18 Such meetings, Hoover assessed, created “a fine spirit of cooperation” between local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.19 Hoover pointed to this cooperation as a response to suggestions that the United States needed a national police force.20

Application to the FBI’s Responsibilities in Latin America When the FBI expanded its purview to include international responsibilities, it applied practices it had developed domestically to its relationships with security services abroad. As in the domestic setting, it was essential for the Bureau to promote a common understanding of intelligence collection and exploit intelligence information to effect operational outcomes, such as arrests, with cooperative foreign security services. The Special Intelligence Service (SIS) could not usually take unilateral action because it was operating on foreign soil and far outside of its jurisdiction as a law enforcement agency. Therefore, it needed cooperative, reliable counterparts. In furtherance of creating these partnerships, the Bureau attempted to build up foreign services’ capabilities. These early efforts at capacity building and norm setting established precedents for functions in which the modern Legat program plays an integral part. The FBI’s role in Western Hemisphere countries predates the formation of the SIS. A special agent had been serving as an openly accredited representative of the Bureau to furnish police training activities to Brazilian and Colombian authorities.21 At the time of the SIS’s establishment, the agent was providing instruc-

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tion to Colombian army and police entities on aspects of counterintelligence, including aspects of espionage, counterespionage, means of obtaining information, surveillance, and evaluation of information.22 The FBI’s Police Liaison program had, by 1943, extended to most of the significant countries throughout Latin America and provided instruction in both criminal and intelligence work.23 By July 1945, there were fourteen police liaison agents in ten Latin American countries.24 Ultimately, the FBI consolidated the initially separate program of establishing and training foreign security agencies into the SIS. This function, which complemented the FBI’s ongoing domestic efforts to educate nonfederal law enforcement, would remain an important Bureau mission long after the war ended. In fact, it became an important aspect of establishing accountable institutions in former Eastern Bloc countries after the end of the Cold War. However, during the 1930s and the first half of the 1940s it served to ensure security in the Western Hemisphere. The Bureau, through the SIS, also helped to establish international norms and best practices in security and law enforcement operations. As with the setup of the legal attaché offices, the Bureau’s efforts to enhance Latin American partners’ capabilities reflected practices the FBI had first implemented in the United States. Beyond providing guidance to security functionaries, the FBI’s police liaisons furnished guidance to executive-level officials in multiple countries.25 For instance, one agent served as a security adviser to Bolivian president Enrique Peñaranda. The agent remained in hiding for three days following the rebellion, which left people hanging from lampposts.26 Although the rebellious faction approached the FBI police liaison following the revolution, the FBI terminated the Bolivian security adviser function in December 1943.27 The Bureau also provided a close confidante to Nicaragua’s President Anastasio Somoza García. According to the FBI, the agent was able to acquire a “great deal of information not available to other branches of the American Government.”28 The FBI’s Police Liaison program was not simply one of instruction and guidance. In some instances, the Bureau took a direct role in establishing countries’ security services. For instance,

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the government of Peru in 1941 requested assistance from the FBI with organizing an intelligence service within the Peruvian army.29 Additionally, during 1943, the Uruguayan government invited the Bureau to assist with the reorganization of its country’s police.30 Furthermore, the Honduran National Police in early 1945 requested assistance from the FBI with establishing an identification unit within the country’s police service.31 Consistent with the FBI’s training of its American services, its work with security services throughout the Western Hemisphere helped it expand its operational reach. According to the internal FBI history of the SIS, police liaison arrangements made it “possible and feasible to obtain almost any type of investigative assistance and information from the police in practically every country in Latin America.” FBI perceptions of the role the Police Liaison program played paralleled the belief that relationships forged through National Academy training would better enable cooperation. For instance, in Ecuador, close collaboration in investigations was “primarily brought about due to the fact that many ex-pupils in Bureau training schools were assigned throughout the Republic.” In Cuba, the relationship was sufficiently close that the Cuban police established and furnished an office for use by the police liaison personnel at its headquarters. The office door even featured signage that identified the FBI as the occupant.32 The FBI’s relationships with Western Hemisphere security services went even further than simply collaboration. The Bureau’s police liaison agents actively directed various foreign services’ work. Between 1943 and 1944, the police liaison agent in Bolivia (as opposed to the ill-fated presidential security adviser position) was granted the use of four agents from the Bolivian National Police to work exclusively on FBI matters. Similarly, the Brazilian police assigned two investigators to the police liaison agent in Rio de Janeiro, who provided the investigators with assignments. In Ecuador, several officers covered leads for the local Bureau personnel.33 The Bureau also perceived less official, but no less effective, cooperation from other countries’ services. According to the FBI’s internal history of the SIS, the close relationship with the Cuban police, “in practical effect, placed that organization at the

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Bureau’s disposal in covering investigations . . . the Cuban police were able to cover many angles of both security and criminal investigations.” Similarly, the FBI indicated that in Chile its “excellent relations” with the Chilean police provided Bureau personnel opportunities to influence and, in part, direct Chile’s investigation of Axis activities.34 It was inevitable that the Police Liaison program would overlap with the SIS’s intelligence collection operations. As early as late 1940, Percy Foxworth, the head of the SIS, recommended that the FBI assist Latin American governments with “any training work for police or in setting up of any intelligence organization within their own departments whenever requested.” Foxworth explicitly assessed that these measures would put the Bureau “in the best position to learn the details of the information possessed by [the local authorities] concerning subversive movements within their own countries.”35 Police liaison agents, although openly assigned, operated under the jurisdiction of the SIS legal attachés.36 Arguably, despite the FBI’s at times contentious relationship with the State Department, the Police Liaison program not only served the FBI’s parochial interests but also implemented US foreign policy. In 1939—a year prior to the establishment of the SIS—the Bureau’s assignment of the agent handling training for Brazilian and Colombian authorities came at the State Department’s request. In Peru, it was the US ambassador who directly requested assistance from the Bureau, in the form of training for a Peruvian police officer, to strike a bargain that would result in the expulsion of the German firm Casa Bayer from the country.37 Following the war, the State Department indicated great satisfaction with the police liaison work and concern that the CIA would not be able to operate in cooperation with local governments and would constantly put the United States at risk of embarrassment (according to a possibly self-hagiographical account memorialized by the FBI).38 The FBI’s police liaison function provided the basis for the modern-day legal attaché position. The State Department, following the war, remained supportive of the Bureau’s retention of a police liaison function as part of the United States’ overall

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intelligence program.39 The FBI also received support from foreign voices: As it was preparing to shutter the SIS’s Rio de Janeiro office, Brazilian law enforcement requested that the Bureau leave an agent in Brazil to serve as a liaison with the Brazilian police. The FBI complied with this request.40 In 1946, when the FBI provided the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) with the titles it had used and the number of people it had in embassies throughout Latin America, it did not include the police liaison agents among the positions it was recalling.41 However, the FBI’s role in establishing and bolstering the capabilities of Latin American security services warrants further examination in the context of how those services operated, at times against American interests, both during and after World War II. For instance, although the Bureau provided assistance to Nicaragua’s Somoza, the FBI also acknowledged, internally, that Somoza was “another of the dictators who ruled with an iron hand,” and that “inasmuch as he was in control of the army and the political arena, there was virtually no effective opposition in the country.”42 In 1978, Congress heard that the SIS had “helped police departments throughout Latin America improve and strengthen their professional capabilities.”43 However, by this point, countries, notably Cuba—where the FBI had provided training starting in 1942 on topics of codes, ciphers and secret messages, detection of deception, espionage, and counterespionage—were using related capabilities against US interests.44 Similarly, it is worth pondering how the previously discussed training of Chilean authorities might have assisted both the anti-American regime of Salvador Allende and the subsequent brutality of Augusto Pinochet.

International Organizations It was inevitable that the FBI would become involved with multilateral organizations in the field of security. From a practical standpoint, especially after the end of World War II, it was impossible for the United States to remain on the sidelines of international relations. Part of this new engagement involved cognizance of criminal developments abroad that could impact

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US interests. Additionally, Hoover’s desire to establish and maintain the Bureau as a leading light for law enforcement nationally and internationally drew the FBI into collaborative relationships that have continued to the present. International Criminal Police Commission The International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC, more commonly known as Interpol) has been closely associated with global law enforcement activities since the first half of the twentieth century. Its origins date to 1923, when it formed as a venue for a small number of European countries to facilitate law enforcement activities.45 According to Hoover, the FBI had been in occasional correspondence with the organization but did not send a representative to an ICPC meeting in 1937.46 That year, the United Kingdom and Austria both invited the Bureau, via the State Department, to join the organization, requesting the presence of a representative at the ICPC meeting in London.47 Hoover was interested in having a representative of the FBI attend the conference but indicated that his desire was simply to “form a closer informal contact” with ICPC members, not to become a formal member of the commission.48 Hoover did not attend the 1937 meeting but instead sent a subordinate as an observer. This subordinate, Assistant Director W. R. Drane Lester, was not a typical Bureau agent. In fact, he is commonly believed to have coined the FBI’s motto “Fidelity, Bravery, Integrity.”49 Lester had graduated from the University of Mississippi with Bachelor of Arts, Bachelor of Laws, and Master of Laws degrees and had been a Rhodes Scholar at University of Oxford, where he received a Bachelor of Civil Law. Prior to joining the FBI, he had taught both Latin and law. Hoover believed that Lester’s studies at Oxford made him particularly suitable to represent the Bureau at the ICPC conference.50 Following the conference, Lester advocated for the FBI’s assumption of a formal role beyond Hoover’s “informal contact.” According to Lester, “The United States should become permanently connected” to the ICPC, although he conceded that the Bureau was unlikely to obtain “practical benefit” from the organization. Rather, Lester’s enthusiasm was that of an academic. He assessed that

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“contacts with outstanding law enforcement officials throughout the world would prove stimulating and helpful to any of [the FBI’s] representatives who attended the annual conferences.”51 ICPC membership would also help the FBI consolidate its position at home. As Lester acknowledged, insights gained from membership would “prove both interesting and helpful” to “law enforcement officials generally throughout the United States.”52 For more than a decade, Hoover had striven to position the Bureau at the center of both federal and nonfederal US law enforcement. Membership on the ICPC would turn the FBI into the conduit through which foreign services would interact with American law enforcement entities. Furthermore, in addition to positioning itself as a conduit, the FBI would outflank competing federal agencies. One Bureau official made this explicit, in 1939, when he wrote that “if we fail to join, the Secret Service or some other Federal Agency may seek to become a member, and FBI might thereby suffer in international prestige.”53 Lester’s participation in the 1937 conference opened the door for the Bureau to become a member of the ICPC. During the conference, the ICPC extended the FBI an invitation to join and, in July 1937, Hoover advised the attorney general that he believed it “desirable to accept this invitation since contacts with outstanding law enforcement officials throughout the world through the medium of membership in the Commission would prove helpful to us in our work.”54 Hoover, perhaps out of expediency, brushed aside Lester’s more nuanced rationale when making the argument for membership to the attorney general. Congress followed suit in July 1938, when it appropriated an amount not to exceed $1,500 for the FBI to accept and maintain membership in the ICPC.55 International developments almost immediately curtailed the FBI’s involvement with the ICPC. The Bureau perceived the ICPC to be dominated by Austria—and therefore influenced by Germany—which an FBI official identified as the Bureau’s “principal objection” to joining the ICPC in 1939.56 The FBI’s declination of an invitation from the German government to attend a 1939 ICPC conference in Berlin reflected this concern. On December 15, 1940, the FBI determined that matters beyond its control had made it

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impossible for the Bureau to assume full ICPC membership.57 The final prewar break between the FBI and the ICPC occurred in late 1941. After learning the ICPC had moved from Vienna to Berlin, the Bureau’s executive conference unanimously recommended severing communications with the ICPC—a decision Hoover communicated to multiple FBI divisions on December 4, 1941.58 The FBI again encountered the ICPC—or what was left of the organization—after the conclusion of the war. However, this occurred under the auspices of the Bureau’s intelligence rather than law enforcement work. Allied forces had acquired the records of the ICPC, which had relocated to Berlin in 1941. (The documents were stored in a garage, as US forces were using ICPC headquarters for billeting.) The FBI presence, which was deployed in conjunction with US forces, examined these documents and provided an update to the SIS European desk in September 1945.59 Belgium took the lead in reviving the ICPC, and the commission became intent on securing FBI participation. In March 1946, Colonel F. E. Louvage, the Belgian delegate to the ICPC, dispatched a letter to the Bureau soliciting Hoover’s input to the reorganization of the ICPC.60 Louvage was certain that if the United States became a member of the ICPC, other countries in the Western Hemisphere—such as Canada—would follow suit.61 In a demonstration of his desire to secure the FBI’s participation, Louvage indicated that if the Bureau sent a representative to a planned June 3, 1946, conference, he would propose that the representative be elected to a post of vice president in the ICPC. 62 Bureau officials did not see this offer as an incentive. As D. M. Ladd wrote to Hoover, “It is apparent from what we have heard so far that [an FBI representative] would quickly be placed in a prominent position in the organization whose representatives we are not familiar with and whose ideologies and backgrounds in some cases will certainly be questionable.”63 Despite the FBI’s reticence and its decision not to send a delegate to the 1946 conference, the ICPC nevertheless treated the Bureau as a participant. The conference, consistent with Louvage’s earlier inducement, elected Hoover as one of the ICPC’s seven vice presidents (to Louvage’s president).64 Hoover’s election

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came as a surprise. After all, as Bureau official C. H. Carson wrote, “it is difficult to see how the Director could be legally elected to an office in an organization in which the Bureau is not a member.” However, Carson noted that there was no discussion of this procedural quibble in the conference minutes.65 The development disconcerted the Bureau. Officials worried that a world police organization not led by Hoover would put him in a subordinate position on par with other members, which, according to Bureau official H. H. Clegg, “would be ridiculous when considering police organizations of any country in the world.”66 This lack of control could become something worse than a threat to Hoover’s ego. Clegg pointed out that “the organization would serve to unite a block of police organizations perhaps in a cooperative effort that might eventually be diverted into undesirable channels particularly if Russia should gain domination of the whole European continent.”67 However, the Bureau, echoing its prewar sentiments about the ICPC, saw some value in Hoover’s vice presidency. This position would allow the Bureau to help formulate law enforcement standards. Perhaps most compellingly, Clegg observed that “if the FBI doesn’t participate as a member there is a possibility that the Secret Service, the Treasury Enforcement Agency, or New York City Police might be selected to represent the United States.”68 On June 26, 1946, the executive conference issued its recommendation regarding participation, which boiled down to bureaucratic calculation. The majority opinion was that the FBI should assume the role of US representative to the ICPC rather than have another organization selected to represent Washington. Hoover concurred with this position.69 Within months of Hoover’s election, the ICPC—specifically Louvage—clearly endeavored to use the director as an implement to solicit new ICPC members. In August 1946, Louvage suggested in a letter to Hoover that Hoover could be of great assistance to the ICPC by serving as an interlocutor to police agencies in South America. The Bureau rejected this attempt to turn Hoover into a pitchman. Carson noted that he objected to any implementation of Louvage’s request “until we see how effective the [ICPC] will be.”70

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Implementation. The FBI began to cautiously develop an infra-

structure that would facilitate US participation in the ICPC. In early 1947, the Bureau’s executive conference agreed that the FBI would handle all inquiries from the ICPC pertaining to the United States. Furthermore, the Bureau would handle outgoing requests, serving as the conduit through which US law enforcement agencies could direct inquiries to Europe.71 The FBI subsequently implemented the ICPC’s request regarding communications infrastructure: the FBI registered the “INTERPOL” cable address in late 1949.72 Incoming cables to the FBI would be addressed to INTERPOL WASHINGTON, and outgoing cables would be addressed to INTERPOL [city of origin].73 The theme of the FBI serving in a leadership (or bottleneck) capacity also arises in how the Bureau planned to act on the ICPC’s leads. When of “sufficient importance,” the FBI would itself address the ICPC inquiry. The Bureau would farm out items of less significance to the “appropriate State or Police Agency with a request that their report be transmitted back to the Bureau.” Initially, the SIS desk at HQ was responsible for coordinating these functions.74 After the FBI disbanded the SIS, the Foreign Liaison Desk assumed responsibility for communication with the ICPC.75 However, the FBI’s establishment of ICPC infrastructure had its limits and hinted at the tension that characterized the relationship between the two organizations. The Bureau’s decision to establish itself as the US point of contact for the ICPC diverged from Louis Ducloux’s vision.76 Ducloux, secretary general of the ICPC from 1946 to 1951, had suggested that the FBI take steps to establish a central office through which all international inquiries would be channeled. FBI official C. H. Carson did “not believe it would be feasible for the Bureau to take any action toward setting up such an office as is suggested.”77 Multiple undercurrents of tension strained the FBI–ICPC relationship since the Bureau’s rejoining of the commission after World War II. Geopolitics—especially the emerging Cold War— made US cooperation with an international body difficult. Domestically, the Bureau perceived itself as challenged by the involvement of other US government agencies in the ICPC. Finally, in

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light of the above, the FBI assessed that what it received from the ICPC did not merit the membership costs. Geopolitics. By the time the FBI began assessing the merits of

rejoining the ICPC in 1946, it was clear that a cold war was developing. Initially, Louvage, in his efforts to woo the Bureau, insisted that the ICPC would remain completely divorced from politics.78 However, almost immediately, indicators that this would not be the case emerged. Approximately one month after the ICPC elected Hoover as a vice president, Louvage indicated that Russia might become an ICPC member in the not too distant future. C. H. Carson sardonically noted that “it requires a considerable stretch of the imagination to picture Russia or any of the Balkan satellites cooperating with the Bureau in extraditing a criminal located in those countries but wanted in the United States.”79 The ICPC’s willingness to engage the Eastern Bloc soon placed the FBI in an uncomfortable position. In 1948, the Bureau had to determine whether it should send a representative to the ICPC’s general assembly that would be held in Prague, Czechoslovakia. The FBI’s Paris legal attaché believed that the Bureau should send representation because new officers would be elected and it was important for Western democracies to be present and voting.80 However, HQ objected to an FBI presence. As Hoover wrote to the legat: “The Bureau has been advised that this proposed meeting will be behind the Iron Curtain and there is a strong possibility that those attending will be shadowed at all times and possibly even harassed and arrested. Accordingly the Bureau does not desire that you be in attendance at this meeting.”81 Czechoslovakia’s participation in the ICPC would become one of the reasons for the FBI’s decision to withdraw from the commission. In 1950, the ICPC issued a series of wanted notices for ten individuals who had escaped aboard a Czech aircraft and had landed in Allie-occupied Germany.82 After Ducloux displayed the wanted notices to the Paris legat, the legat requested the names so that he could advise the Bureau not to act on the notices because the individuals in question were “political refugees” and not criminal fugitives.83 This episode contributed to the Bureau’s decision

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to sever its relationship with the ICPC. According to FBI official V. P. Keay, legal attachés, if queried as to the Bureau’s reason for quitting the ICPC, should advise—among other justifications— that the ICPC “had issued 10 wanted notices for the alleged Czechoslovakian fugitives which the Bureau considered to be a contravention of the organization’s statutes prohibiting the involvement in matters of a political, racial, or religious nature.”84 The FBI also resented the imbalance of influence within the ICPC. In 1950, the Paris legat advised the Bureau that the ICPC was “not in reality an international organization in view of the fact that its General Secretariat is supported by the French Government’s Ministry of the Interior.”85 This domination became an explicitly cited reason for the Bureau’s decision to withdraw from the ICPC. Furthermore, the FBI saw the ICPC bureaucrats as “ambitious and self-serving.”86 Competition. Bureaucratic rivalry also soured the FBI on participation in the ICPC. This had been an issue since the Bureau joined as the ICPC’s US representative. In 1947, when considering the possibility of establishing a separate clearinghouse for the ICPC, the FBI instead advised the ICPC that the Bureau would handle all international inquiries from municipal, county, and state law enforcement agencies.87 However, the FBI would not attempt to handle inquiries from the Secret Service, Post Office, and Immigration and Customs “since they undoubtedly already have liaison established . . . in other Governments handling the particular types of offenses.”88 The ICPC, during that same year, was already developing relationships with other US federal agencies. In 1947, FBI official W. R. Glavin noted that the US Secret Service was cooperating with the ICPC on combating the counterfeiting of currency.89 The ICPC late in 1947 indicated its interest in extending invitations for both the US Secret Service and the Narcotics Bureau (both of which were components of the US Department of the Treasury) to the 1948 Prague meeting. The Bureau’s executive conference suggested that “it was thought possible that the ICPC might be laying the groundwork for eventually collecting a membership fee from other police agencies in the USA.”90

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Following the Prague conference, the Bureau’s assessment of the ICPC’s intentions seemed to be accurate. During the conference, the ICPC had established a subcommittee on narcotics and intended to invite the Narcotics Bureau to participate in this body. Furthermore, the ICPC was interested in enlisting the Secret Service’s participation in the ICPC committee on counterfeiting.91 Part of this encroachment was the FBI’s own doing because, by refusing to attend, it had opened a void that invited filling. Even the FBI’s own legat in Paris recognized the danger of not participating in the conference, writing that “if now we decline to participate in General Assembly meeting in Prague, there is always the possibility that the Commission may decide to involve the Secret Service or some other Federal investigative agency to participate as the U.S. Representative of the American police services.”92 The FBI, despite the erosion of its role in the ICPC, remained a member, at least in part, for several more years to head off other US federal agencies’ advancement. In June 1950, the executive conference, during its assessment of pros and cons of continued Bureau membership, noted that “if some other agency became a member, such as the Secret Service, it would establish a liaison between the Secret Service and [European] police agencies and would give added significance and status to the Secret Service in the minds of foreign police officials who are members of this organization.”93 However, the FBI’s hour had already passed and the ICPC had already de facto ceased to treat the Bureau as the United States’ sole representative to the commission. Hoover, in a July 1950 letter to Louvage, noted that the ICPC did not seem to believe it was necessary “to consult this Bureau regarding the participation of other United States agencies and citizens in the Commission’s activities sufficiently in advance to afford a real opportunity for this Bureau to furnish its opinions regarding such questions.”94 Funding. From the outset of its participation, the FBI believed that its financial contribution to the ICPC yielded returns of dubious value. Even before the June 1946 conference, FBI official D. M. Ladd suggested that obtaining the FBI’s $1,500 annual contri-

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bution was one of the ICPC’s primary reasons for encouraging the Bureau’s participation.95 Even after the conference had selected Hoover as an ICPC vice president, the FBI remained skeptical about the value of ICPC membership. On June 20, 1946, H. H. Clegg wrote to Clyde Tolson, Hoover’s second in command, that it was not “worth $1500 or even $15 as far as any practical value.”96 By mid-1950, the episodes involving Czechoslovakia and other US federal agencies confirmed the Bureau’s skepticism. On July 18, 1950, Hoover directed a letter to Louvage that stated, in part, “I have been forced to the inescapable conclusion that the results which the Federal Bureau of Investigation has obtained from its membership in the ICPC do not justify the financial outlay involved.” This letter notified Louvage that the FBI would sever its relationship with the ICPC at the end of the calendar year.97 Continued arrangements for international engagement. Although

the FBI cut its ties with the ICPC, it did not cease providing services to individual foreign agencies. Hoover authorized the Bureau to notify all Western ICPC members of the Bureau’s withdrawal and its continued willingness to handle requests from individual departments. Vienna, Austria—although ultimately Western European— was excluded from this assurance, because, at the time, Vienna was divided between the United States, the United Kingdom, France, and the Soviet Union, with each country rotating as the primary authority on a monthly basis. The Bureau’s executive conference consequently determined “that it would be undesirable to correspond with this Vienna agency, which is a member of the ICPC or in any way to indicate that their requests would be welcomed.”98 In October 1950, the Bureau notified the ICPC that the FBI would handle investigations, fingerprint searches, and wanted notices for foreign law enforcement agencies only upon receipt of a direct request for such from the appropriate International Exchange representative in the interested country.99 US representation to the ICPC changes hands. The FBI was correct in its assumption that a competing US federal agency would

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fill the void that the Bureau’s departure created. Starting in 1951, the Department of the Treasury began informally representing the United States at the ICPC.100 The FBI, upon learning of Treasury’s interest in taking a more formal role in Interpol, hedged its bets. Bureau officials observed that “although [the FBI’s] experience with Interpol in the past proved unsatisfactory, we may at some future time desire to participate in that organization to a greater degree. In such an event, retention of control of U.S. Membership by the Attorney General would be desirable.”101 In 1958, Congress granted the AG authority to designate Treasury as the US liaison to Interpol, a function Treasury quickly assumed.102 (The ICPC became known officially as the International Criminal Police Organization, or Interpol, in 1956.)103 Treasury proved to be more gracious on the question of bureaucratic turf than the FBI had been. After taking over as the liaison, the department advised Interpol headquarters that all requests to the FBI from member nations or Interpol headquarters should go directly to the Bureau. Hoover’s reply was a simple, paranoid “We must watch this.”104 Even before the FBI officially withdrew from Interpol, it had already started dealing with the ICPC in an informal manner. After refusing to send a representative to the 1948 Prague conference, an FBI official suggested that “in all probability, a complete report of the Conference can be obtained by one or several of the Bureau’s Liaison Agents who are at present in Europe.”105 As the Bureau headed toward a break in relations, it did not distance itself entirely from the ICPC. Writing in July 1950, the FBI’s Paris legat noted that he saw no reason why, if we terminate active membership, we can not continue liaison with the I.C.P.C. Secretariat General and member countries on the same basis with the Secret Service and other “observer” groups. In this way we will enjoy the fruits of membership in I.C.P.C. without financial obligations or the hazards of entangling commitments.106

The FBI began to function in an observer status at Interpol in the early 1960s. Starting in 1961, the legat assigned to the region

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where the ICPC held the annual general assembly attended the event. This arrangement continued until the mid-1970s, when attendance began to resemble a boondoggle for Bureau brass. In 1974, the FBI associate director joined the legat. Bureau attendees at the following year’s conference included not only the legat but also the deputy associate director and the chief of the FBI HQ Liaison Section. As an observer, the FBI’s role involved the submission and presentation of papers on specialized research.107 Under Treasury’s tenure as liaison, Interpol obtained the US central office to which the FBI had objected. This central office, known as the US National Central Bureau (NCB), was established in 1968.108 The role of the NCB is to transmit information of a criminal justice, humanitarian, or other law enforcement related nature between National Central Bureaus of INTERPOL member countries, and law enforcement agencies within the United States and abroad; and respond to requests by law enforcement agencies, and other legitimate requests by appropriate organizations, institutions and individuals.109

Reshuffling of US law enforcement responsibilities brought the Department of Justice back into the picture. Between 1968 and 1973, the US government reorganized its narcotics enforcement apparatus, which culminated in the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration under the DoJ. The attorney general, in 1976, determined that because more than 50 percent of the United States’ activity within Interpol had a direct and significant impact on the Department of Justice, that department should resume its role as liaison.110 Justice and Treasury signed a memorandum of understanding in 1977 that established the two departments as joint managers of the NCB. A 1981 amendment to this memorandum of understanding made NCB a part of Justice, but still under the comanagement arrangement. The passage of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 moved Customs functions from Treasury to the newly created Department of Homeland Security. Reflecting this change, DHS, in 2003, replaced Treasury as the NCB comanager.111 The FBI has gradually built up its relationships with Interpol. As of 1975, the legat in Paris maintained liaison with Interpol’s

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headquarters.112 In 1977, Congress learned that plans were under way to assign FBI personnel to the NCB.113 The FBI ultimately established formal liaison at the NCB in 1983 by assigning a fulltime supervisory special agent to that entity.114 These liaison relationships grew during successive decades. As of 2007, the FBI had full-time detailees at Interpol’s offices in Lyon, France, at the United Nations in New York, as well as at the NCB.115 United Nations Its work in the international field during World War II led to the FBI playing a role in the creation of the United Nations. Between April 25 and June 23, 1945, representatives from Allied countries gathered in San Francisco to develop the UN charter. The Bureau’s responsibilities during the conference were twofold: first, provide security for Secretary of State Edward Stettinius; second, provide general intelligence coverage for the benefit of the State Department.116 The United Nations conference brought Nelson Rockefeller back into the forefront of the FBI’s operations. Since the early days of the SIS operations, he had gone through his own set of intelligence adventures and misadventures. In early 1942, he proposed the creation of a Preparedness Program for the Americas that would focus on disease control, water supply and sewage, hospitalization, properly trained sanitary engineers, medical professionals, and food supplies. He also viewed this as an opportunity for conducting intelligence activities.117 However, this plan for intelligence collection appears to have imploded for several reasons. First, collaboration with the FBI on a specific initiative, which, considering its contemporaneity, was this Preparedness Program, collapsed. Apparently, Rockefeller’s organization had included a mention of the FBI’s potential participation in a February 1942 letter to the Bureau of the Budget, which jeopardized the FBI’s “ultra-confidential” involvement. According to a memo from FBI official D. M. Ladd, “Anyone reading the budget request could easily presume that the Bureau had representatives connected with the organization in view of the fact that one of the objectives set out by Mr. Rockefeller was to the effect that intelligence reports could be obtained through the organiza-

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tion.”118 Undersecretary of State Summer Welles ultimately scuttled this intelligence operation when, in March, he warned Rockefeller against using the program for intelligence purposes.119 Rockefeller may have also been the unwitting victim of a Soviet intelligence operation. During Rockefeller’s time as coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, Laurence Duggan was his primary contact at the State Department.120 Duggan had been the head of State’s Division of American Republics since 1935 and would hold this position until 1944.121 He was, according to the United States’ Venona program, which decrypted Soviet cable traffic, a Soviet spy.122 In 1945, Rockefeller was once again the Bureau’s man. During the previous year, Rockefeller had urged Secretary of State Edward Stettinius to create a new position at the State Department that would be responsible for integrating political and economic elements of Latin American policy.123 Rockefeller’s lobbying paid off, and in late 1944 the Senate confirmed him for the new position of Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs.124 This position was unique in the State Department hierarchy at the time, as all other assistant secretaries were aligned along functional, rather than regional, portfolios.125 Despite his new position, Rockefeller was not included as part of the United States’ official delegation to the conference in San Francisco that would create the United Nations. However, Rockefeller was not one to be impeded by bureaucracy. He arrived in San Francisco as an unofficial participant and set up his headquarters at the St. Francis Hotel, where the Latin American delegations were staying.126 Upon arrival, Rockefeller contacted E. A. Tamm, who was in charge of the FBI’s intelligence operations during the conference, and designated himself as Tamm’s liaison to the Department of State.127 Tamm—although nervous about the odd dynamics, especially because the relationship between Rockefeller and Stettinius had become strained—agreed to this arrangement and even offered to provide Rockefeller a seat in the FBI’s own box for the conference’s opening session.128 The FBI’s San Francisco contingent fulfilled the Bureau’s responsibilities. Two Bureau officials oversaw operations in San Francisco. The first of these was Tamm. In 1941, Tamm had become

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an assistant to the director of the FBI, which put him over the Security Division, the Investigative Division, and the Technical Laboratory Division.129 Stanley Tracy, the assistant director in charge of the FBI’s Identification Division (which was responsible for fingerprints), was the second official responsible for heading up the Bureau’s San Francisco contingent.130 Both men, interestingly, had exposure to intelligence—even prior to the establishment of the SIS—as lieutenant commanders for intelligence in the US Naval Reserve.131 Two FBI squads handled, respectively, intelligence and security.132 The intelligence squad was directly linked to the FBI’s work abroad. Its members came from Bureau personnel who had been working under the auspices of the SIS in Latin America as well as an agent who had served as the legal attaché in London.133 Agents at the conference carried special credentials identifying them as liaison officers of the Delegation of the United States of America, which allowed them to slip in and out of meetings collecting information about foreign delegations’ intentions.134 However, the FBI’s participation in the founding of the United Nations was not limited to the work of its specially assigned agents at the conference. Legal attachés dispatched their own informants to San Francisco.135 Domestic FBI offices also proved to be sources of information. For instance, the SIS office in New York provided the services of “numerous valuable confidential sources.”136 The FBI’s San Francisco field office also provided coverage of Communist-related matters that affected the conference—the ideological tension, which the alignment of the Soviet Union with the Allies during World War II had put on the back burner, was reemerging.137 The intelligence coverage the FBI provided covered both state and nonstate actors that had the potential to impact the international negotiations in San Francisco. For instance, the Bureau identified efforts of the Soviet delegation to disrupt US activities through exploitation of the Mexican delegation at the conference.138 (The FBI had “particularly good” coverage of the Mexican delegation.) Furthermore, the FBI assessed that it had achieved “adequate coverage of most of the delegations of South America.”139 Beyond state actor intrigue, the FBI maintained coverage of nonstate transnational movements with implications on the UN

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negotiations. For instance, it prepared separate memoranda on the presence of the Communist movement in each Latin American country for use by US officials during the conference.140 Additionally, the Bureau covered nationalist groups seeking to exert influence on the nascent United Nations, such as organizations that focused on Polish, Italian, Czech, Korean, Indian, and Armenian issues. The FBI also attended to US ultranationalist organizations.141 Finally, the Bureau watched American entities that sought to make common cause with foreign government representatives. The Council on African Affairs (CAA), based in New York, was one example of such an entity. Intercepts the FBI obtained identified the CAA’s anticolonial outlook and its intentions to engage delegates from Ethiopia, Liberia, India, Panama, Cuba, France, Britain, and Belgium in advocating decolonization further.142 Once the United Nations was established, the FBI served as a liaison to this organization during the Bureau’s short membership of the ICPC. In 1948, Hoover accepted responsibility for liaising, on behalf of the ICPC’s Executive Committee, with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the UN. (He delegated this function to the FBI’s New York field office, where A. H. Belmont became the first official to assume this responsibility.)143 The Bureau’s liaison with the UN was an example of bureaucratic contortionism. Belmont was technically the “representative of Director Hoover, Vice President of the International Criminal Police Commission,” and would “act as a liaison between the United Nations Department of Social Affairs and the International Criminal Police Commission to transmit any requests or material or information between the two groups.” In these interactions, the FBI was “merely a member of the ICPC and act[ed] as liaison with the various police departments throughout the country.”144 The FBI, contemporaneously with its increasing dissatisfaction with the ICPC, assessed its duties vis-à-vis the UN to be arduous tasks. Bureau official V. P. Keay in 1950 noted that, “complete active liaison with the [UN] on behalf of the ICPC could involve substantial time consuming activities.” According to Keay, the Bureau should not take a proactive role at the UN but instead involve itself “only upon the specific request of the ICPC or from the UN Organization.”145 The FBI was disenchanted with

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the UN. ECOSOC meetings proved to be “a complete waste of time” and UN staff members were “more interested in protecting their jobs than in reaching concrete decisions concerning law enforcement problems.”146 With its departure from the ICPC at the end of 1950, the FBI divested itself of its UN responsibilities. Participation in Other Organizations and Working Groups Similar to its efforts to bolster law enforcement capabilities through bilateral engagement, the FBI has a lengthy history of participation in multilateral working groups. These organizations differed from Interpol in that they were not operationally oriented but instead acted as venues for information sharing. The Bureau is likely more comfortable in these environments which do not obligate—or at least urge—the FBI to take action it deems to be inappropriate. Perhaps the FBI’s most significant contribution in the area of multilateral cooperation is in the International Terrorism Financing Working Group. In 2003, the DoJ and DHS jointly designated the FBI as the lead agency for terrorist financing investigations.147 Consistent with this leading role, the Bureau initiated the International Terrorism Financing Working Group (ITFWG), which coordinates intelligence sharing to facilitate disruption of terrorist financing.148 Its members include—in addition to the United States—the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.149 These countries comprise the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing partnership that formed between 1946 and 1956.150 FBI participation in the Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group (FELEG) is an example of how the Bureau’s international law enforcement engagement parallels the United States’ broader international intelligence liaison. Member agencies of the FELEG coordinate international responses to global organized crime, money laundering, and cyber crime.151 Five Eyes countries also composed the Strategic Alliance Group (SAG) and its subgroup, the Strategic Alliance Cyber Crime Working Group.152 The SAG focuses on international criminal issues, including cyber-enabled crime, criminal groups, and financial crimes.153 One of the FBI’s oldest international relationships is with the International Association of the Chiefs of Police (IACP).154 The IACP

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predates the Bureau’s founding, having formed in 1893.155 IACP influence on the FBI dates to at least the 1920s, when the IACP urged the formation of a US repository for fingerprints—a function the FBI assumed with its formation of the Identification Division in 1924.156 The Bureau doubled-down on its membership in 1950, when, in its deliberations about whether to pull out of the ICPC, it noted that it was “affiliated actively with the IACP, which is an international police organization, and the existence of the ICPC does not appear to be necessary other than to provide jobs for those who have them in the organization.”157 IACP–FBI relations continued to be closely linked. For instance, in 1962, Quinn Tamm retired from the Bureau as an assistant director and became executive director of the IACP.158 The IACP lends itself to the Bureau’s preference for working directly with police agencies (as opposed to international bodies). As early as 1947, the FBI indicated that it viewed the IACP as a suitable intermediary for communicating directly with individual municipal, county, and state law enforcement agencies.159 Similarly, the Bureau looked to the IACP as a viable entity for operating the ultimately unrealized clearinghouse the ICPC wanted to see established in the United States.160 The FBI has continued to treat the IACP as a trusted intermediary. For instance, during a 2017 IACP conference, the FBI director Christopher Wray thanked the IACP for sending its leaders—that is, leaders of individual law enforcement agencies—through the Bureau’s National Academy program.161 The FBI has also lent its expertise to several other international initiatives directed at combating criminal activities, including terrorism. These organizations include the Trevi Group, which was founded in 1975 by a group of European countries to address counterterrorism, narcotics, organized crime, police training, and technology. 162 More recently, the FBI contributed assistance to the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI). The US supported the 1996 launch of SECI.163 Law enforcement was one aspect of SECI, which addressed a variety of transnational issues. In 2000, the FBI advised the US Congress that it had assigned three special agents to the SECI project to provide assistance to member countries’ law enforcement agencies. Two of these liaison officers were responsible for providing support to the Human Trafficking Task Force based in Bucharest, Romania.164

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After 9/11, the FBI shifted resources from investigating traditional criminal activities to fighting terrorism. In addition to the Bureau-helmed ITFWG, the FBI is a participant in the Joint Terrorist Financing Task Force.165 This task force, based in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, facilitates coordination among Saudi authorities, the FBI, and the Criminal Investigation Division of the US Internal Revenue Service.166 The Bureau funnels information gathered through the Joint Terrorist Financing Task Force to the Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS) of the FBI’s Counterterrorism Division.167 TFOS, in turn, provides this information to the FBI’s field-based Joint Terrorism Task Forces for action.168 1. Today’s FBI. Facts & Figures. 2013–2014 (Washington, DC: FBI, 2014), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/facts-and-figures-031413-2.pdf/view; The Terrorist Threat Confronting the United States, Hearing Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 107th Cong. (2002) (testimony of Dale L. Watson, Executive Assistant Director, Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence Division, Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news /testimony/the-terrorist-threat-confronting-the-united-states; General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Federal Agencies’ Efforts to Implement National Policy and Strategy (Washington, DC: GAO, 1997). 2. FBI Budget and Oversight for Fiscal Year 1987, Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 99-1013 (1986). 3. Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1951, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 81st Cong., Pt. 1 (1950). 4. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1938, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 75th Cong. (1937). 5. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1944, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 78th Cong. (1943). 6. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1944, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 78th Cong. (1943); Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1943, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 76th Cong. (1942). 7. Department of Justice, Appropriations for 1952, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 82nd Cong. (1951). 8. FBI Budget and Oversight for Fiscal Year 1987, Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 99-1013 (1986). 9. Department of Justice, Appropriations for 1952, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 82nd Cong. (1951). 10. FBI Budget and Oversight for Fiscal Year 1987, Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 99-1013 (1986).

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11. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1940, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 76th Cong. (1939). 12. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1943, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 76th Cong. (1942). 13. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1943, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 76th Cong. (1942); Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1948, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 80th Cong. (1947). 14. Appropriations, Department of Justice, 1924, Hearing Before Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, 77th Cong., Part. 2. (1922). 15. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill, 1930, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of House Committee on Appropriations, 70th Cong. (1928). 16. Frank Rafalko, A Counterintelligence Reader: American Revolution to World War II (National Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2001). 17. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1945, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 78th Cong. (1944). 18. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1945, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 78th Cong. (1944). 19. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1945, Hearing before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 78th Cong. (1944); Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1942, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 77th Cong. (1941). 20. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1948, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 80th Cong. (1947). 21. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947); V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948, FBI 62-80750. 22. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 23. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage. September 1, 1948, FBI 62-80750. 24. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945, Case File FBI HQ File 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 25. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 26. Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Interview of Joseph Campisi (1941–1945),” June 7, 2003. 27. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1; Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Interview of Joseph Campisi.” 28. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. Accomplishment. Mexico– Venezuela (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 29. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 30. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 31. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1; FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 32. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 33. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 34. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. Accomplishment Argentina–Japan (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 35. P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, Re: Suggested Changes in SIS Work, December 4, 1940, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD.

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36. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 37. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 38. Reaction of United States Ambassadors to the Taking Over by the Central Intelligence Group of Intelligence Coverage in Latin America, September 11, 1946, FBI 62-80750. 39. Reaction of United States Ambassadors to the Taking Over by the Central Intelligence Group of Intelligence Coverage in Latin America, September 11, 1946. 40. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 41. D. M. Ladd to the Director, Central Intelligence Group, July 23, 1946, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 42. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 43. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 44. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 45. United States Participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977). 46. John Edgar Hoover, memorandum for the Attorney General, April 13, 1937, FBI 74-1-2001. 47. C. H. Carson to Mr. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, September 16, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001. 48. John Edgar Hoover, memorandum for the Attorney General, April 13, 1937. 49. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Seal & Motto,” https://www.fbi .gov/history/seal-motto. 50. John Edgar Hoover, memorandum for the Attorney General, April 13, 1937. 51. W. H. D. Lester to J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum for the Director, Re: United States Permanently Joining the International Criminal Police Commission, June 29, 1937, FBI 74-1-2001. 52. W. H. D. Lester to J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum for the Director, Re: United States Permanently Joining the International Criminal Police Commission, June 29, 1937. 53. N. H. McCabe, memorandum for Mr. Nichols, Re: Membership in International Criminal Police Commission, July 20, 1939, FBI 74-1-2001. 54. J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum for the Attorney General, July 13, 1937, FBI 74-1-2001. 55. C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, May 2, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001. 56. N. H. McCabe, memorandum for Mr. Nichols, Re: Membership in International Criminal Police Commission, July 20, 1939. 57. C. H. Carson to Mr. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, September 16, 1946. 58. Clyde Tolson, memorandum for the Director, December 1, 1941, FBI 74-1-2001; [Hoover to Divisions One and Four], December 4, 1941. 59. Frederick Ayer Jr. SA to Director FBI, Attention SIS European Desk, Via Army Pouch, September 1, 1945, FBI 74-1-2001. 60. D. M. Ladd to the Director, International Commission of Criminal Police, May 6, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001. 61. Horton Telford to Director, FBI, May 10, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001. 62. Mr. D. M. Ladd to the Director, International Criminal Police Commission, May 15, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001.

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63. Mr. D. M. Ladd to the Director, International Criminal Police Commission, May 15, 1946. 64. Legal Attaché, Paris, Director of the FBI, International Criminal Police Commission, July 5, 1950, FBI 74-1-2001. 65. C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, August 13, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001. 66. H. H. Clegg to Mr. Tolson, June 20, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001. 67. H. H. Clegg to Mr. Tolson, June 20, 1946. 68. H. H. Clegg to Mr. Tolson, June 20, 1946. 69. C. H. Carson to Mr. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, September 16, 1946, FBI 74-1-2001. 70. C. H. Carson to Mr. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, September 16, 1946. 71. The Executive Conference to the Director, January 6, 1947, FBI 66-2554. 72. H. B. Fletcher to Mr. D. M. Ladd, Use of Cablegram Address, August 24, 1949, FBI 74-1-2001. 73. SAC Letter, September 12, 1949, FBI 74-1-2001. 74. The Executive Conference to the Director, January 6, 1947, FBI 66-2554. 75. SAC Letter: (A) COVERAGE OF LEADS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES, November 18, 1948, FBI 94-1. 76. The Executive Conference to the Director, January 6, 1947. 77. C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, Letter Suggesting the Formation of a Central Office for Handling Criminal Inquiries, January 2, 1947, FBI 94-1. 78. Horton Telford to Director, FBI, May 10, 1946, FBI 94-1. 79. C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, August 13, 1946. 80. Executive Conference to the Director, International Criminal Police Commission, June 28, 1948, FBI 66-2554. 81. J. Edgar Hoover to Legat Paris, June 30, 1948, FBI 94-1. 82. Director FBI to SAC, New York, International Criminal Police Commission, July 18, 1950, FBI 94-1. 83. H. H. Clegg to Mr. Tolson, President F. E. Louvage, International Criminal Police Commission, October 24, 1950, FBI 94-1. 84. V. P. Keay to Mr. A. H. Belmont, International Criminal Police Commission, February 17, 1951, FBI 94-1. 85. Legal Attaché, Paris, Director of the FBI, International Criminal Police Commission, July 5, 1950, FBI 94-1. 86. A. H. Belmont to Mr. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, July 18, 1950, FBI 94-1. 87. J. Edgar Hoover to Ducloux, January 2, 1947, FBI 94-1; A. H. Belmont to Mr. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, July 18, 1950, FBI 94-1. 88. C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, Letter Suggesting the Formation of a Central Office for Handling Criminal Inquiries, January 2, 1947. 89. W. R. Glavin to Tolson, October 29, 1947, FBI 94-1. 90. Executive Conference to the Director, December 13, 1947, FBI 66-2554. 91. V. P. Keay to Mr. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, November 15, 1948, FBI 94-1. 92. Telford to Director, June 8, 1948, FBI 74-1.

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93. The Executive Conference to the Director, International Criminal Police Commission, June 22, 1950, FBI 74-1. 94. J. Edgar Hoover to F. E. Louvage, July 18, 1950, FBI 74-1. 95. Mr. D. M. Ladd to the Director, International Criminal Police Commission, May 15, 1946, FBI 94-1. 96. H. H. Clegg to Mr. Tolson, June 20, 1946, FBI 94-1. 97. J. Edgar Hoover to F. E. Louvage, July 18, 1950, FBI 94-1. 98. Executive Conference to the Director, International Criminal Police Commission, November 28, 1950, FBI 94-1. 99. V. P. Keay to A. H. Belmont, November 8, 1950, FBI 94-1. 100. General Accounting Office, United States Participation in INTERPOL, the International Criminal Police Organization, Report of the Comptroller General of the United States (Washington, DC: GAO, 1976). 101. R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, International Organization of Criminal Police (INTERPOL), January 16, 1958, FBI 94-1. 102. United States Participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977). 103. Interpol, “Our History,” https://www.interpol.int/en/Who-we-are /Our-history. 104. R. R. Roach to A. H. Belmont, International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), September 24, 1958, FBI 94-1. 105. R. W. Wall to D. M. Ladd, 1948 Conference International Criminal Police Commission, February 9, 1948, FBI 94-1. 106. Legal Attaché, Paris, to Director of the FBI, International Criminal Police Commission, July 5, 1950, FBI 94-1. 107. United States Participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977). 108. US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General Audit Division, The United States National Central Bureau of Interpol (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2009), https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=33706. 109. 28 CFR § 0.34 - General functions. 110. United States Participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977). 111. DoJ, The United States National Central Bureau of Interpol. 112. Intelligence Division Inspection 3/11/75–4/4/75, FBI 67-149000. 113. United States Participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL), Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong. (1977). 114. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1985, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., Pt 8 (1984). 115. Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. (2007). 116. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 117. Cary Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller: Worlds to Conquer 1908–1958 (New York: Doubleday, 1996). 118. D. M. Ladd, memorandum for the Director, March 15, 1942, FBI 644104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD.

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119. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 120. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 121. John Earl Haynes and Harvey Klehr, Venona: Decoding Soviet Espionage in America (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999). 122. Haynes and Klehr, Venona. 123. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 124. US Department of State, “Nelson Aldrich Rockefeller (1908–1979),” https://history.state.gov/departmenthistory/people/rockefeller-nelson -aldrich. 125. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 126. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 127. Stephen C. Schlesinger, Act of Creation: The Founding of the United Nations (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003). 128. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 129. Attorney General to Edward A. Tamm, January 7, 1941, FBI 67-15585; J. Edgar Hoover to Tolson, Tamm, Clegg, Glavin, Ladd, Nichols, Rosen, Tracy, and Coffey, December 15, 1942, FBI 67-31222. 130. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 131. E. A. Tamm to J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum for the Director, February 6, 1939, FBI 67-15585; Status in U.S. Naval Reserve, September 18, 1939, FBI 67-31222. 132. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 133. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 134. Reich, The Life of Nelson Rockefeller. 135. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 136. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 137. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 138. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 139. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 140. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 141. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 142. Schlesinger, Act of Creation. 143. Director to SAC, New York, International Criminal Police Commission, December 29, 1948, FBI 74-1-2001. 144. SAC New York to Director, Attn: Research Re: International Criminal Police Commission, January 17, 1949, FBI 74-1-2001. 145. V. P. Keay to H. B. Fletcher, International Criminal Police Commission Liaison with the United Nations, February 1, 1950, FBI 74-1-2001. 146. A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, President F. E. Louvage of the International Criminal Police Commission, September 2, 1950, FBI 74-1-2001. 147. Hearing Before the House of Representatives Committee on Science, 108th Cong. (February 25, 2004) (testimony of Robert J. Garrity Jr., Deputy Assistant Director, Records Management Division, FBI). 148. Martin A. Weiss, Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and InterAgency Coordination (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005). 149. Martin A. Weiss, Terrorist Financing: Current Efforts and Policy Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2004). 150. Margaret Warner, “An Exclusive Club: The 5 Countries That Don’t Spy on Each Other,” PBS NewsHour, October 25, 2013.

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151. Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 114th Cong. (December 9, 2015) (statement of James B. Comey, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation). 152. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Cyber Solidarity: Five Nations, One Mission,” March 18, 2008, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories /2008/march/cybergroup_031708. 153. Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Information Sharing & Safeguarding Report 2012 (Washington, DC: FBI, n.d.), https://www.fbi.gov/file -repository/stats-services-publications-national-information-sharing-strategy -1-fbi-information-sharing-and-safeguarding-report-2012/view. 154. A. H. Belmont to D. M. Ladd, President F. E. Louvage of the International Criminal Police Commission, September 2, 1950. 155. International Association of Chiefs of Police, “About IACP,” https:// www.theiacp.org/about-iacp. 156. FBI Oversight, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1980). 157. The Executive Conference to the Director, International Criminal Police Commission, June 22, 1950, FBI 66-2554. 158. Joseph D. Whitaker, “Quinn Tamm, Ex-Assistant Director of the FBI,” Washington Post, January 25, 1986. 159. C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd, International Criminal Police Commission, Letter Suggesting the Formation of a Central Office for Handling Criminal Inquiries, January 2, 1947. 160. The Executive Conference to the Director, January 6, 1947, FBI 66-2554. 161. Christopher Wray, “The FBI and the IACP: Bound Together by Partnership, Friendship, and Commitment,” Federal Bureau of Investigation, October 22, 2017, https://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/the-fbi-and-the -iacp-bound-together-by-partnership-friendship-and-commitment. 162. Otwin Marenin, ed., Policing Change, Changing Police: International Perspectives (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 1996); FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989) 163. US Department of State, “Regional Program—Southern European Cooperative Initiative (SECI),” https://2009-2017.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rpt/55642.htm. 164. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 165. Weiss, Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and Inter-Agency Coordination. 166. “Saudi Arabia: Friend or Foe in the War on Terror,” Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (November 8, 2005) (testimony of Daniel L. Glaser, Deputy Assistant Secretary Office of Terrorist Financing and Financial Crimes, US Department of the Treasury). 167. Counterterror Initiatives in the Terror Finance Program, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th. Cong. (September 25, 2003) (John S. Pistole, Assistant Director, Counterterrorism Division, FBI), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/testimony/identifying -tracking-and-dismantling-the-financial-structure-of-terrorist-organizations; Weiss, Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and Inter-Agency Coordination. 168. Weiss, Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and Inter-Agency Coordination.

5 Oversight of International Programs

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION COULD NOT permit a program such as the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) to run without headquarters (HQ) direction (i.e., interference). From an examination of the SIS headquarters apparatus and the subsequent elements that oversaw the FBI’s operations abroad in successive decades, we can gain insight into the Bureau’s perceptions of its changing role in the international setting. It is worth noting that the FBI initially judged that a bureaucratically behemothic HQ element with oversight of the SIS was to be avoided. In a 1948 assessment of the program, Bureau official V. P. Keay wrote that “it did not become necessary to build an unduly top-heavy organization” at HQ.1 Keay had a long career in the FBI’s international operations. He had worked in Argentina under the auspices of the Importers and Exporters Service Company prior to becoming a supervisor over the SIS’s South American Unit at Headquarters and then assistant chief of the SIS section.2 Later in his career, Keay became chief of the Correlation–Liaison Unit, a position that gave him oversight responsibilities for the post-SIS Legat program.3 At its most robust, the SIS HQ apparatus had no more than twenty-four supervisors, and this was only for a brief period during the height of the SIS’s operations.4 Assistant Director Percy Foxworth established a supervisory staff at FBI HQ under the auspices of the National Defense Division, of which the SIS was an element.5 105

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Initially, the SIS at HQ was structured along geographical lines. Supervisors handled regions, such as Central America, or individual countries, such as Mexico and Cuba. This evolved, according to C. H. Carson, because political and economic information was of particular significance in the context of the country to which it pertained. However, this organization was not especially useful for information about subversive movements (e.g., the German American Nazi Party, the Spanish Falange), which were active in multiple Latin American countries. This type of activity, according to Carson, must be supervised, studied, and coordinated in its totality in Latin America rather than on a country-by-country basis. Carson proposed establishing an additional supervisor at HQ who would oversee the program transnationally in addition to the existing oversight along geographic lines.6 Carson also pushed for a stronger analytical function within the SIS. According to his proposal, additional supervisors would be responsible for establishing a component that would correlate matters “pertaining to Latin America as a whole, particularly with respect to certain organizations which operate throughout the area.”7 Incoming reporting was also analyzed. According to Hoover, in mid-1942, the HQ supervisory staff carefully evaluated the information obtained by SIS personnel prior to the Bureau’s submission of that information to the State Department. Interestingly, Hoover emphasized the need for HQ staff to have subject matter expertise, explaining that supervisors covered the countries with which they were most familiar because this positioned them “to more correctly evaluate the information.” Furthermore, the evaluation of information was used to refine the SIS program, because, according to Hoover, if the review and evaluation of information at HQ identified the information to be of no value, the SIS operative who had submitted the material was “immediately removed from SIS work or transferred to another location.”8 In the autumn of 1942, the FBI’s executive conference considered a proposal from Carson for restructuring the SIS. As outlined in this proposal, the SIS Division would be organized into

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three units: administration, personnel, covers, informants, and so forth; espionage and sabotage; and subversive activities as well as political, economic, and social material. The intent of the proposal was to align the SIS Division with the organization of the Bureau’s Investigative Division, where supervisors oversaw categories of violations rather than geographic territories. This proposal, the executive conference determined unanimously, would result in “more efficient operation of the SIS Division.”9 Hoover, however, disagreed with the executive conference. In a handwritten note on the proposal, he jotted, “I don’t agree. I think the geographical setup is best for SIS. We are more interested in this project in the picture of a country than in development of cases of specific violations of their laws.”10 A reorganization did finally occur in the wake of Hoover’s veto. In late November 1942, he agreed to a proposal for the establishment of three units: operations; the Caribbean Area; and South America (except for Venezuela and Colombia). The unit responsible for the Caribbean area would include coverage of Mexico, Central America, the countries located in the Caribbean Sea, Venezuela, and Colombia. According to a memorandum from Bureau official D. M. Ladd to Hoover, this allocation of responsibility was based on a perception that these countries were “more greatly influenced by the United States than [were] the other Republics to the South and therefore have more problems similar to each other and different from the others.”11 (The Caribbean and South American units were merged in fiscal year 1944–1945 into a single investigative unit.)12 According to the Bureau’s internal history of the SIS program, the reorganization, although agreed upon in November 1942, did not take place until September 1943.13 In mid-1944, the FBI made a significant change to the SIS Division by consolidating all foreign coverage under it. Prior to this point, the Liaison Section of the Security Division (previously known as the National Defense Division) had been responsible for the Bureau’s representatives in Canada and Europe.14 Hoover had raised the question in early 1944 of why supervision of the FBI’s international presence was split across two separate HQ components.15 Ladd responded that the FBI’s operations outside

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of the SIS’s purview were different because they were solely of a liaison nature. According to Ladd, if the Bureau personnel in Lisbon, London, Madrid, and other foreign cities were permitted to conduct investigations, it would be desirable to consolidate them under the SIS Division.16 Subsequent to this, however, the executive conference unanimously approved an inspection suggestion that “all foreign intelligence work be supervised in the SIS Division in the same manner as intelligence work throughout Latin America.” The FBI’s representatives in London, Lisbon, Madrid, and Ottawa received notification that, as of July 4, 1944, they would be supervised by the SIS Division.17 The SIS component at HQ expanded with the expectations and reality of work beyond Latin America. In July 1944, the FBI established a new dedicated supervisory component for personnel assigned to Europe. The FBI’s presence in the European theater required a new supervisor at HQ to handle reporting from Europe that required attention in Latin America. Similar to its foray into Europe, the assignment of Bureau personnel to Asia necessitated the establishment of another supervisory position at HQ.18 As the SIS program expanded, the need for analysis again became an issue of concern. The SIS Division had been preparing monographs, but these were done by SIS supervisors who produced them in addition to their other duties.19 According to E. A. Tamm, the FBI should operate a small, carefully staffed unit— similar to the OSS’s Research and Analysis Unit—to prepare monographs on Latin American countries as well as on radical and subversive movements as they operated abroad. Tamm believed that such an arrangement was essential for “marketing” the results of the Bureau’s intelligence collection and that, “unless these results are written up in interesting form, a large part of the effectiveness of intelligence coverage is lost.”20 Hoover concurred with Tamm’s suggestion and, on the basis of a January 16, 1945, memorandum from the executive conference, Hoover approved the assignment of special agents—four supervisors—to the SIS section who would prepare monographs.21 Among the agents assigned to this new function was William C. Sullivan, who Carson assessed to be “particularly adapted to the handling of

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research” and “patient, thorough, and painstaking as to detail.”22 Sullivan, of course, would be the architect of the FBI’s infamous COINTELPRO operations and, later, one of the Bureau’s most outspoken critics. The SIS program took on trappings of permanence—rather than of a war-time exigency—as it became more fully integrated with the FBI and the US government writ large. In August 1944, the executive conference unanimously approved a proposal to have regular Bureau inspectors rather than SIS inspectors conduct the SIS field service reviews, reasoning that it would “further mesh the work of the SIS Division with the Bureau.”23 Following a series of inspections by two agents of all FBI offices and installations throughout Latin America, the Bureau standardized the operation of the SIS, aligning it with the rest of the Bureau. The FBI furnished a complete, detailed manual of instructions to each SIS office codifying this standardization. Consistent with the theme of integrating the SIS with the broader FBI, the manual followed the format of the manual that governed the administration of the FBI’s domestic offices, although it made certain adaptations to account for conditions unique to SIS operations.24 From the outset, the Bureau had operated the SIS to collect intelligence not only in support of the Bureau’s mission but also to answer requirements from other US government agencies. As the SIS matured so did its provision of information and analysis. The Monograph Unit made copies of these products available to interested government agencies, including the army, navy, State Department, Treasury, the president, the attorney general, and the coordinator of Inter-American Affairs.25 Once World War II ended, the Bureau continued to collect intelligence for dissemination to other components of the US government. The SIS section supervisors prepared a daily summary of “interesting and informative material of an important nature” that the FBI provided to Admiral Sidney Souers, the United States’ first director of Central Intelligence.26 Analysis wound down as it became apparent that the Central Intelligence Group (CIG) would supplant the FBI in the field of foreign intelligence. The Bureau abolished its Monograph Unit in June 1946.27

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However, the analytical aspect of the Monograph Unit likely had a lasting impact on the FBI. Sullivan, who had been part of the unit, joined the Central Research Desk when the Bureau created that entity, as part of the Security Division, in 1947.28 A 1951 assessment of Sullivan’s role on this desk noted he had “done much to direct the type of work performed on this desk.”29 Until mid-1957, the work of the Central Research Section resembled that of the Monograph Unit in that it was “devoted to the preparation of detailed, lengthy, scholarly, classified documents for use by [the FBI’s] field offices and selected outside Government agencies.”30

Transition The end of the SIS prompted the Bureau to rearrange its management of legal attachés. On April 30, 1947, the SIS section officially closed. However, legats continued to operate in specific locations in the role of police liaisons. Supervision of the legats transferred to the Foreign Service Desk of the Liaison Section, which had previously overseen the non-SIS liaison posts prior to their consolidation into the SIS. A single supervisor at HQ was responsible for overseeing the activities of the liaison posts that remained at Rio de Janeiro, Havana, Madrid, Paris, London, Mexico, and Ottawa.31 As the Bureau evolved during the Cold War, HQ’s oversight of the Legat program remained largely unchanged. According to the Church Committee, the liaison section of the Counterintelligence Branch of the FBI’s Intelligence Division handled the administration of the legal attachés as well as the FBI’s relationships with other agencies.32 The location of legal attaché oversight under the Counterintelligence Branch reflected the perception, formed in the wake of World War II, that the legats were of particular value in the field of counterespionage. In 1946, the Bureau noted that the State Department supported the continuance of a police liaison function due to its ambassadors’ belief that the arrangement would be the best way to handle counterintelligence matters.33 The FBI converted its Liaison Section to the Special Coordination Unit in July 1970, only to later reconstitute the Liaison Section in November 1972.34 As of 1973, the FBI had

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established a dedicated Foreign Liaison Unit, which handled legal attaché issues as well as other international cooperation, under Section CI-4 of the Intelligence Division.35 Reorganization resulted in the realignment of legal attaché management. According to a 1980 inspection report, Unit CI-3F was responsible for the operational management of the Legal Attaché program.36 Section CI-3 of the Intelligence Division, under which CI-3F operated, was responsible for a broad range of disparate functions, ranging from analysis to automated data processing for the foreign counterintelligence (FCI) program, providing responses to the executive branch and Congress, as well as the management of legal attachés.37 By the early 1980s, the FBI’s management of its Legat program was increasingly uncoordinated. Although CI-3F had responsibility for the operational management of the Legal Attaché program, the Bureau’s Criminal Investigative Division—a completely separate entity from the Intelligence Division—could assign work to legats without coordinating these assignments through Intelligence Division management.38 Consequently, CI-3F did not know what legats’ workloads looked like. According to a 1980 inspection report, the unit was “unable to make intelligent decisions regarding staffing levels, training, assignments of special projects, realignment of territories and other areas relating to effective management.”39 Nearly two decades later, a series of bureaucratic reshuffles failed to address the underlying disconnect between HQ and the legats. In a 1997 inspection report, Legat Rome complained that “frequently there appears to be a lack of institutional knowledge [at Headquarters] and it often takes several telephone calls to be pointed in the right direction.” Furthermore, Rome complained, “all too frequently, requests for investigative assistance are answered too slowly and with insufficient detail.”40 The FBI during the mid-1980s sequestered its international functions into a separate component from its counterintelligence operations. In late November 1986, Director William Webster approved the establishment of a new Office of Liaison and International Affairs, which assumed responsibility for the legal attaché posts (of which the FBI had thirteen at the time).41 This

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office was outside of the Intelligence Division and, instead, was part of the Office of the Executive Assistant Director for Investigations.42 In addition to legats, the new Office of Liaison and International Affairs handled coordination with Interpol and other international collaborations such as the United States–Italian narcotics working group and the United States–Japan organized crime working group.43 By the mid-1990s, the Cold War had ended, and the FBI refocused its resources against criminal—rather than counterintelligence—matters. It was within this context that the Bureau folded the standalone Office of Liaison and International Affairs into the Organized Criminal Enterprise (OCE) Program and created the International Relations Branch (IRB) within the Criminal Investigative Division. The IRB, according to congressional testimony, was responsible for oversight of the legal attachés (of which there were twenty-three); foreign liaisons; relationships with Interpol and more than seventy foreign police, security, and intelligence officials located in Washington, DC; foreign police cooperation; and international training. 44 Congressional testimony during the following year indicated that the IRB had been renamed the International Relations Section and, in addition to its other duties, handled liaison offices in Honolulu, Miami, and San Juan.45 Director Louis Freeh reorganized the Bureau again less than five years after the creation of the IRB. In 1998, he announced the formation of a new International Operations Branch (IOB).46 This branch would be on par with the Criminal Investigative Division (CID), led by its own assistant director. Contemporaneous with the creation of this new branch, the FBI began managing the Legat program from the Office of International Operations (OIO). The OIO was responsible for providing administrative and logistical support to legal attaché offices and their employees and dependents. It, like its predecessors, maintained contacts with foreign police and security officers assigned at foreign countries’ diplomatic missions in the United States as well as with Interpol. Additionally, the OIO served as the point of coordination with other US federal agencies that operated internationally.47 The OIO

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also accepted an explicitly analytical role following the September 11 attacks, when, in conjunction with other FBI HQ divisions, it worked to identify areas such as South America, where narcotics traffic had been historically active and which had an increasing nexus to significant terrorist-related activities.48 Circa 2010, the FBI established an International Operations Division (IOD). This new division was part of the Bureau’s Criminal, Cyber, Response and Services Branch. Special agents and professional staff work within IOD to coordinate investigations in partnership with the FBI’s criminal and intelligence divisions, foreign law enforcement, and US foreign intelligence and security services. In addition to facilitating the collection activities essential to investigative work, IOD is also responsible for the FBI’s significant international training component.49

Accountability Part of HQ’s role in administering the Bureau’s Legat program is ensuring accountability. Experience in this area has been mixed. As noted previously, the FBI, during the latter part of the SIS program, established an inspection apparatus and developed a uniform manual for legal attaché operations adapted from the guidelines for the operation of domestic field offices. However, as of 2004, OIO indicated that the FBI’s Inspection Division was reviewing legats using the domestic field office rubric. According to OIO, a number of the areas were not applicable to legat operations, and OIO conferred with the Inspection Division to revise the inspection guide.50 Whereas the FBI had attempted to integrate the SIS with the Bureau writ large, the problem had become how to differentiate the Bureau’s international operations from its domestic responsibilities. The FBI has had to repeatedly revisit its management of legal attachés in addition to the inspection process. A 1981 inspection report recommended that the Intelligence Division develop a plan for implementing effective management of the Legal Attaché program.51 However, in 2003, OIO was just starting to analyze legats’ pending leads on a quarterly basis, analyze the data, and

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demand explanation or resolution of identified problems. The OIO also used Attaché Annual Accomplishment Reports to identify offices’ goals and objectives for the upcoming year and monitor accomplishments.52

The Right People in the Right Places (Sometimes) The FBI did not abandon its SIS apparatus entirely. Although the CIA assumed most of the SIS’s mission in Latin America and was arguably informed by some of the SIS’s practices, the Bureau retained several of its legal attaché posts. These posts were no longer coordinators of clandestine intelligence operations but rather overt representatives of the FBI. The growth of the Legal Attaché program reflected geopolitical developments during the Cold War, after the Cold War, and throughout the seemingly endless global war on terrorism. Despite their overt presence—and, in some cases, perhaps because of it—legats do gather intelligence in the course of working with foreign security services that has helped decisionmakers understand the world in which they must operate. Although the FBI wound down its SIS, it continued to field legal attachés in several countries of strategic interest. These countries were Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, Spain, France, the United Kingdom, and Canada.53 According to Hoover in July 1947, the State Department confirmed that the position of an agent in charge would be known as a “legal attaché.”54 (Interestingly, despite the State Department’s recognition, there is no statutory or regulatory basis for the existence of legats.)55 The agents in these locations continued the SIS’s police liaison function and were, indeed, officially referred to as police liaison agents.56 The Madrid legat provides an example of the continuity between war and peacetime assignments. Initially, the office in Madrid, which the SIS established in 1943, functioned primarily to obtain information developed by other intelligence services that pointed to German espionage and subversion activities directed against the Western Hemisphere. In 1947, the FBI ended the SIS program but

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maintained the Madrid legal attaché, “due to the importance of Spain in the postwar political unrest in Europe.”57 Hoover, in August 1946, informed the FBI’s Paris outpost that its “principal responsibility” would be to function as a “police liaison post” following the discontinuance of the SIS program. According to Hoover, the legat would gather “information which will be of assistance to the Bureau in connection with its domestic field responsibilities.” Consistent with his views of the inseparability of domestic and foreign intelligence, Hoover gave the legal attaché a wide mandate, stating that “it should, of course, be realized that a wide variety of information will be of assistance in this regard: for instance, any matters bearing on world communism would be of definite assistance in connection with the Bureau’s investigation of subversive activities in the United States.” However, he also cautioned that the office would not take responsibility for obtaining foreign intelligence. This, Hoover believed, would ensure that the FBI was of “no concern” to the Central Intelligence Group. 58 By avoiding contretemps, the FBI could avoid being challenged on the legitimacy of its presence abroad. The FBI has attempted to make it clear that legal attachés are not clandestine operatives. In 1958, Hoover explained that the legats’ role was “merely to maintain contact with the federal or local law enforcement agencies in those countries for information which would be of assistance to this Bureau, primarily in the criminal field and secondarily to carry out any responsibilities this Bureau has in the internal security field.” 59 Four decades later, Director Louis Freeh similarly emphasized that “FBI agents stationed overseas are not intelligence officers; they are not a shadow intelligence agency; and they do not engage in espionage.” 60 Perceptions to the contrary would disrupt the effectiveness of liaison activities, not to mention endanger the lives of legal attachés. Legats are not sui generis. Bureaucratic factors prescribe or proscribe their establishment. After all, the FBI cannot simply plop an agent into a country without the approval of the Department of State, to whom ambassadors, the top US officials on the

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ground, are responsible. Furthermore, the Bureau must seek funding from the US Congress, which gives legislators a say in the advisability of creating new legal attaché positions. Finally, the FBI has its own rubric for assessing the wisdom of creating a new legal attaché post. The FBI examines multiple variables before deciding to establish a legal attaché. One important consideration is the usefulness of the legal attaché in combating issues that impact the Bureau’s area of responsibility. Threat assessments of specific terrorist or criminal activities, which pose a threat to US interests, are therefore important inputs. The nature of the country where a legat might be established is similarly significant. Specifically, the FBI takes into account the country’s strategic location from geographic, political, and economic perspectives.61 Furthermore, the FBI must consider how the country’s security services will add value to the Bureau’s mission. Specifically, the FBI assesses countries’ respect for the rule of law and their commitment to—and capability for—cooperating with the Bureau to advance investigations. 62 (In certain cases, the FBI has established legal attachés to encourage the development of these cultures and capacities.) In addition, the Bureau takes a regional approach to its legat coverage—with one legal attaché post often covering multiple countries—and this consideration informs decisions about the creation of new posts. The FBI assesses the workloads of existing offices and the ability of existing staffs to cover areas beyond the country to which they are posted.63 Establishing a legal attaché is not an academic question—the FBI incurs costs in the process. The regional approach to coverage requires the Bureau to account for the cost of travel within a given territory.64 Is it more cost-effective to send legats on road trips or to establish a permanent office? Furthermore, in congressional testimony, the FBI noted that one of the most significant cost considerations when opening a new legat office is the technical threat level posed by foreign intelligence services within the country. Legats must operate at the secret level and are located in the controlled access area of embassies.65 Opening a legal attaché office can also incur other, less quantifiable costs. For instance,

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during the mid-1990s, the FBI was making preparations to open a legal attaché office in Beijing.66 Contemporaneously, the FBI was investigating the activities of Wen Ho Lee, a suspected Chinese spy, at the Department of Energy’s Los Alamos laboratory. The Bureau, according to the Final Report of the Attorney General’s Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation (the Bellows Report), had been cautious about its investigation of Lee specifically because of its desire to establish a legat post in Beijing.67 At the interagency level, the Bureau must cooperate closely with the State Department, as well as foreign counterparts, to establish a legat post. Prior to assigning FBI personnel overseas, the US Department of State and the appropriate ambassador must concur on the posting.68 Furthermore, the US ambassador must actually make a formal request for the presence of an FBI legal attaché.69 (This process is mandated by National Security Decision Directive 38, which gives the chief of mission—that is, the ambassador—control of the size, composition, and mandate of overseas full-time mission staffing for all US government agencies.)70 Little has changed since the initial State–FBI negotiations during the operation of the SIS about establishing legal attaché positions. Finally, consistent with the overt role of legal attachés, the FBI must obtain concurrence about the assignment from the host government’s foreign ministry.71 The role of the State Department in establishing legal attaché posts has, at times, created difficulties for the FBI. For instance, circa 1970, when the Bureau wanted to open a legal attaché in San Jose, Costa Rica, to cover Central American matters, the US ambassador in Costa Rica objected to this development. The FBI settled on an alternative location, Managua, Nicaragua, for its coverage of Central America. According to a later assessment, the Bureau characterized the Managua legat as being “in the right area but in the wrong place.” Conditions in Managua resulted in the morale of that legat being “lower than in any other foreign post.”72 Following a severe earthquake, the FBI determined that the territory could be adequately covered by the legat in Mexico City and that the Bureau should close the short-lived Managua legal attaché.73

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The Bureau encountered a similar redirection from the State Department when the FBI attempted to expand its legat presence in Asia. After learning that the FBI was interested in establishing an outpost in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, the State Department discouraged this ambition and the FBI opted for Singapore, where it opened a legat in 1972. Unfortunately, the State Department was unable to provide the FBI with adequate space in Singapore, and out of frustration, the Bureau hinted that “if State [could not] produce a satisfactory solution to our space problem in Singapore, we should then insist on opening in Kuala Lumpur in accordance with our original desire.”74 The FBI ultimately did not open a legat in Kuala Lumpur until after the 9/11 attacks, when it rapidly ramped up its overseas presence to fulfill its counterterrorism mission.75 Finally, the State Department blocked the FBI’s expansion at a second location in Asia. As early as 1969, the FBI had given consideration to the possibility of opening a Saigon legat.76 By September 1970, the Bureau had developed plans, prompted by a request from President Richard Nixon, to establish a number of new legats, including one in Saigon.77 However, in December 1970, when the FBI requested permission from the State Department to establish the Saigon legat, it encountered “intolerable restrictions” from the ambassador and canceled the project.78 Congress also plays a significant role in determining the FBI’s legat presence. In 1996, legislators agreed to furnish the FBI with $3,450,000 for the post–Cold War expansion of its Legal Attaché program. However, the legislators were skeptical about the FBI’s short- and long-term planning for this expansion and stipulated that the Bureau could not spend the funds until the FBI had developed a plan for its international operations in conjunction with the Departments of Justice and State.79 The FBI put a good face on this criticism, with a deputy assistant director stating that, “quite candidly, Congress has taken planning for FBI Legal Attaché offices out of the choppy one-year cycle and prompted us to develop a long-term, comprehensive response to a rapidly changing and worsening international crime situation.”80 In 1999, the FBI provided assessments for existing and planned legal attaché offices to Congress.81 (In what might be an example of

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bureaucratic passive-aggressiveness, the FBI in 2000 stated that it was “deeply grateful” to Congress for “support and innovative contributions for the Legal Attaché Program.”)82 Appropriators again exercised their oversight of the Legal Attaché program when, as part of the conference report that accompanied the 2002 Supplemental Appropriations Act for Further Recovery From and Response to Terrorist Attacks on the United States, it directed the FBI to submit a report to Congress discussing new and existing legats to ensure that the Bureau was deploying resources to the highest-priority locations.83

Personnel The FBI has, from the outset, struggled with how to staff its legal attaché posts. Many applicants envision a career with the Bureau as one of bringing criminals to justice, not of being diplomats. The Legat program has historically been an odd fit within the organization, especially in terms of how overseas assignments contribute to an agent’s career progression. As a result, elements within the FBI have perceived legat posts as everything from perks to purgatories. This has created a workforce characterized by similarly variable professionalism. This conundrum was especially pronounced when the FBI launched its SIS program in 1940, at a time when the FBI was synonymous with chasing bank robbers. The “overwhelming majority” of agents who joined the SIS were, according to the Bureau, “young and somewhat limited in FBI Domestic Field investigative experience.” Furthermore, almost none of the agents had prior administrative and supervisory experience.84 The following words could have been pulled from a Department of Justice (DoJ) inspector general’s report written more than fifty years later; according to officials in OIO, some of the agents selected for positions abroad lacked the management skills and judgement needed to handle overseas assignment properly. In some instances, individuals were selected who did not have management or supervisory experience. Instead, they were picked primarily because they spoke the language

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The Bureau during the SIS era could be forgiven for decisions that largely kept its experienced agents out of SIS work. According to a 1948 internal history, the FBI acknowledged that it did not usually afford consideration to veteran agents with assignments in the Domestic Field Service as SIS candidates (indeed, most of them did not volunteer for these positions).86 The fact that the inspector general (IG) could say almost the same thing as above in 2004, however, is troubling. The FBI largely relied on agents to volunteer for SIS work. According to a 1948 Bureau assessment of the program, “While there was never any hard and fast Bureau rule with regard to the use of volunteers only on foreign assignments, efforts were at all times made to utilize volunteers if available.”87 Agents personally wrote to request consideration for SIS work.88 The SIS interviewed agents who had indicated an interest in an SIS assignment and maintained lists from which it could select.89 However, at least early in the SIS operation (but after the FBI had begun deploying agents to Latin America), Foxworth advised Hoover that the division “tried not to indicate to any applicant that we were actually performing any work in South America.”90 Additionally, the FBI did at times seek out appropriate candidates for service. The SIS obtained an alphabetical list of all of the Bureau’s single agents with at least one year of experience. Using this list, the SIS progressively reviewed agents’ files, and when it identified an agent who “appeared adaptable to SIS work,” the files were briefed for further consideration.91 Additionally, according to Foxworth, the SIS solicited recommendations of employees who might be suitable for SIS service. The SIS protocol was to simply obtain a name and then determine whether it wanted to approach the applicant.92 As a domestically focused agency, the FBI encountered a lack of international affairs experience within its ranks. According to a 1948 Bureau assessment of the SIS, “Agents were, of course, more or less completely unfamiliar with the countries in which

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they were trying to operate and usually very deficient with regard to the use of the language thereof.”93 More than half a century later, little had changed in this respect. A 2004 Department of Justice inspector general’s report related that employees selected for legat positions typically had only approximately three months of language training prior to starting their assignment in a legat office.94 The FBI acknowledged that the training it afforded to SIS personnel was deficient. According to a 1948 internal assessment of the program, “Agents were briefed far too hurriedly and sent out on assignment far too rapidly for proper assimilation and adjustment into the program with resultant ill effects.”95 A 1943 FBI executive conference memorandum provides a snapshot of the slapdash training: It consisted of a five-week period of classroom instruction in Spanish or Portuguese, individual training on the country to which the agent was assigned, and training on aspects of the agent’s cover. The entire process lasted, on average, all of two months.96 More than half a century later, preparation of legats sounded remarkably similar. According to FBI official John Pistole, testifying to Congress, “Each of our Legal Attachés and assistant Legal Attachés go through mandatory training . . . both to the sensibilities of the particular culture and the other agencies and the interrelatedness of the agencies in that embassy.” According to Pistole, training time varied from several weeks to several months.97 Despite the inadequate training during the SIS era, the FBI nevertheless blamed the agents who sometimes reconsidered their assignment. According to a 1948 memorandum, “Some Legal Attachés proved completely inadequate to their task and had to be replaced. A very few began to resign and enter the Armed Services. . . . A much larger percentage of resignations began to occur from the undercover personnel and some of these Agents after short periods of assignment became thoroughly disgusted with local conditions and completely disillusioned.”98 Although the SIS proved to be an anomaly in the FBI’s history, the legat legacy that it left has continued to present a conundrum when it comes to finding the right people. At times, Bureau

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officials have taken a skeptical view of what seem to be plush assignments. According to William Sullivan, who, by the time of this criticism, was virulently critical of the legat program: We would be deluding ourselves if we believed that our Legal Attaché positions are not the “plums” of the Bureau. They carry fine salaries, plus living allowances, opportunities for foreign travel et cetera. These positions do not even begin to require, across the board, the heavy pressures and complex responsibilities which our field office administrators shoulder day in and day out.99

At the time of his assessment, the legat roles were indeed “plums”—according to a 1973 inspection, some of the legats had been in place for more than a decade.100 This was certainly consistent with Sullivan’s bitter question, “How many Legats have asked to return to the field down through the years?” Little had changed three decades later. According to a 2004 DoJ Office of the Inspector General (IG) report, “Legats had sometimes been appointed to these positions as a consolation for not being promoted to other positions, or as a reward for long service near the end of their careers.”101 On the other hand, elements of the Bureau have avoided legal attaché posts because of career considerations. According to a 1973 inspection report, “The selection of Legal Attachés has never been part of a coherent career development plan.”102 The 2004 DoJ IG report similarly identified that—according to officials and employees at both FBI headquarters and various legat offices—legat positions were not, historically, viewed as career enhancing. Instead, employees assigned to legat offices were part of a “wine and cheese circuit” devoid of substantive— career-enhancing—work.103 A 2007 Government Accountability Office report confirmed the continuance of this problem. The deputy assistant director of the Bureau’s Counterterrorism Division explained that the FBI had not yet found a way to provide career rewards and incentives that would mitigate problems with staffing overseas positions.104 These perceptions have not only stalled careers but also derailed them. As the IG pointed out, the negative perception of the Legat program resulted in some legat staff encountering dif-

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ficulties with finding career-enhancing positions after they returned to the United States.105 It is reasonable to believe that this could produce a downward spiral in the quality of personnel in legat positions by dissuading high performers from requesting these assignments. The reputational position of a legat—between the Scylla and Charybdis of sybaritic existence or professional backwater—is at odds with the level of importance with which the FBI has invested the role. Legats, according to a 1973 FBI inspection report, are “extremely important, responsible, and prestigious.”106 More than thirty years later, the FBI reiterated the essentiality of the legat role, telling Congress, “Legat liaison activities are essential to the successful fulfillment of the FBI’s lead Federal law enforcement mission to prevent terrorist attacks against citizens and interests of the United States.”107 These assessments of significance are consistent with the legat’s role as the senior Bureau official in the country or countries to which the legat is assigned.108 Legats are members of the US ambassadors’ staffs and have specific instructions to keep the ambassadors apprised of any developments that could impact foreign policy considerations.109 The legat also functions as the Bureau’s face vis-à-vis the police and intelligence officials in the countries under the legat’s purview.110 Because of the legats’ high-visibility status, the FBI has historically emphasized the need for personnel who exhibit many of the characteristics desirable in a Foreign Service officer. According to one inspection report: A Legal Attaché should not only have a thorough background in Bureau work but should also be a personable, outgoing individual who is a good mixer and able to meet people easily. He should also be capable of engaging in social endeavors, enjoy entertaining, and should have a spouse with similar personality traits and desires.111

Several decades later, the DoJ’s Office of the Inspector General assessed that the Office of International Operations sought personnel who had “a proven history of working in a multi-cultural, multi-task force environment, who are skillful in dealing with personnel issues. . . . These individuals should be self-motivated, versatile, possess exceptional interpersonal and liaison skills, and

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be able to work with a wide variety of people in a foreign environment.” Finally, as befits an employee of the FBI in general, individuals in legat positions “should demonstrate good judgement and common sense.”112 However, the FBI does not offer the appropriate career incentives (and disincentives) to attract (or dissuade) the personnel it desires. Consequently, there is a gap between expectations and realities when it comes to legats’ integrity. According to a DoJ Office of Professional Responsibility official, “The number of OPR investigations of Legat personnel was higher than would be expected.” The Bureau did acknowledge this issue when, during a conference for legal attachés, an OIO official advised the attendees that he was spending too much time dealing with OPRrelated issues. Between 1999 and September 2002 (the period covered by a DoJ IG assessment of the FBI’s Legal Attaché program), there were four allegations of inappropriate relationships, five instances of voucher fraud, two allegations of waste and misuse of government property, and an allegation of misuse of position leveled against legat office employees.113 More recently, in late 2018, the Wall Street Journal reported that multiple FBI employees stationed in various Asian cities were recalled to Washington in connection with prostitution-related allegations.114 The disjointed history of the Legat program’s place in the Bureau contributed to—and suffered from—inconsistency in the process for vetting and selecting individuals to serve in these positions. Historically, the Domestic Intelligence Division (which had responsibility for the Bureau’s Foreign Liaison Unit) in conjunction with the FBI’s foreign offices selected agents for assignments abroad. The division considered these assignments to be of a “highly specialized nature.”115 By the early 1970s, a Bureau inspection determined the procedure for selecting legats had varied over the years and usually consisted of a review of the agents’ language proficiency, experience at FBI HQ, and Office of Preference list.116 (The FBI established its Office of Preference Program to reward agents by transferring them to an office of their choosing based upon seniority and consistent with the FBI’s needs and budgetary considerations.)117

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In 1973, an FBI inspection issued a recommendation that the Bureau establish a selection board to review recommendees for legat positions. The inspection further recommended that candidates for legal attaché positions be qualified in the language of the country to which they were to be assigned—imagine that! A liaison official being required to speak the language of those with whom the official is dealing—and preferably one additional language. The same inspection also raised the question of establishing a maximum five-year period of legat assignment (in contrast to the then-current state of affairs in which legats could remain in place indefinitely, with some holding their positions for more than a decade).118 Eventually, the FBI adopted this termlimit concept, and legats can now spend no more than five consecutive years abroad in a single location or six consecutive years abroad in two locations.119 This push for greater standardization and transparency led to a number of changes in the selection process. By the late 1980s, the FBI had instituted a consistent process for selecting legal attachés. Teletypes that advertised legal attaché vacancies listed selection criteria: investigative skills, managerial experience, language proficiency, and language aptitude.120 According to a 2004 DoJ IG report, the FBI used a multistep process to choose legal attachés. The Legat Screening Panel (LSP), consisting of FBI senior managers and analysts, ranks applicants’ qualifications against the criteria in the vacancy announcement. A second panel, known as the Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection (SAMMS) Board, reviews the top-ranked candidates. The SAMMS Board has the prerogative to come up with its own rankings rather than use those developed by the LSP. The potential for second-guessing by the SAMMS Board does seem to be a point of failure for transparency because, at least as described by the IG, it appears to provide an opportunity for moving the goalposts. Finally, the SAMMS Board recommends three candidates, in ranked order, to the FBI director, who is responsible for the final selection.121 Nonagent personnel, first in the form of clerical assistants and then in more specialized functions, have been a part of the

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FBI’s legat operations almost from the creation of the position. In May 1942, the Bureau began training and dispatching male stenographers to assist agents who were deployed to diplomatic establishments as part of the SIS program. During its inspections of SIS offices, the Bureau had to start using female stenographers because male clerical employees were not exempt from the Selective Service draft regulations. By the end of SIS operations, nine clerical employees remained on foreign assignments at liaison posts.122 Clerical employees continued to have a function at legal attachés after these transitioned from the SIS to overt offices. According to a 1955 Bureau memorandum, the stenographer had to function as receptionist, chief clerk, typist, and code clerk.123 Nonagent personnel’s responsibilities, as of 1985, included encrypting and decrypting cables, performing certain liaison functions within the US Embassy, and accomplishing all office functions, including responding to official requests, when the legat was traveling.124 By the late 1990s, analytical personnel began to acquire a role in legat offices. In 1997, for instance, the Bureau proposed adding a GS-12-level intelligence analyst to the Mexico City legat. According to the Bureau, this analytical employee, who needed to be fluent in Spanish, would review information about Mexican narcotics-trafficking operations.125 After the September 11 attacks, the Bureau continued to bolster the analytic capacity of legat posts. In 2003, the FBI examined the possibility of assigning reports officers, analysts responsible for the dissemination of intelligence information, to legats.126 In 2006, the director Robert Mueller III advised Congress that since September 11, investigative analysts had been assigned to eight legal attaché offices.127 The FBI has exacerbated the structural deficiencies of the Legat program by failing on occasion to provide adequate staffing to the offices. In 2004, the DoJ IG observed that the Bureau had attempted to manage the workload at the Ottawa legat office by assigning short-term temporary duty (TDY) staff who rotated through on stints ranging from thirty to sixty days. The IG found this to be a disruptive practice because agents often returned to the United States before actually completing the legat

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work for which they had assumed temporary responsibility.128 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) made similar discoveries in a 2007 report. According to the GAO, TDY employees were filling legat positions in two countries where there had been terrorist attacks against US interests. These were supposed to be covered by permanently assigned personnel.129 The churn in personnel has undercut a primary legat responsibility: the development of effective liaison relationships. In its 2004 report, the IG identified that the reliance on TDY staff inhibited the establishment of long-term liaison relationships essential to the intelligence business.130 The GAO’s report similarly found that “FBI officials at headquarters and overseas . . . agreed that the types of relationships necessary to facilitate joint investigations and operations with foreign nations cannot be built or sustained by agents on short-term, temporary assignments at overseas posts.”131 Legats’ roles will become increasingly complex—perhaps to the point of impracticality—as the FBI contends with an ever more diverse set of responsibilities in the face of changing geopolitics, economics, and technology. Individuals filling legal attaché positions are expected to have a broad-based knowledge of the FBI’s programs. The number of programs has greatly expanded over the years. According to a 1996 report, the number of federal crime categories that could have had an overseas element had doubled since before 1980.132 In furtherance of their assignments, legats are supposed to maintain close personal liaison relationships with all principal law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies in their territory.133 This is a dizzyingly diverse set of actors and functions. Legats are required to remain abreast of all of these issues and actors and to provide an annual accomplishment report that presents detailed information about the office’s operations and accomplishments, the law enforcement structure of the host country, liaison contacts, detailed threat assessments, and major case information.134 In recent years, the FBI has taken steps indicating that it is aware of the need for specialized liaison. In 2015, it announced the creation of two weapons of mass destruction (WMD) assistant legal attachés.135

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Also in 2015, the Bureau established three cyber assistant legal attachés, in London, Ottawa, and Canberra.136 Given the growing complexity of its international operations, the FBI would benefit from creating a permanent Foreign Service cadre similar to those which the Department of Agriculture and the Department of Commerce maintain. Early in its international operations, the FBI recognized the value of starting individuals on a dedicated foreign-oriented career path. In its internal history of the SIS, the FBI acknowledged that older and experienced domestic field agents encountered much greater difficulty in learning languages and adjusting to conditions abroad than did younger men who had recently graduated from colleges and universities.137 In subsequent years, the FBI proposed steps that would bring its legal attachés onto a similar footing with Foreign Service officers. For instance, a 1973 inspection report suggested that the FBI should explore the possibility of providing legal attachés training through the State Department’s Foreign Service Institute.138 In 1989, the Bureau stated that it was attempting to establish an internationally focused workforce. Its long-range legal attaché succession process was supposed to identify qualified managers who could develop their language skills and individuals with language proficiency who could develop their managerial skills.139 However, developments such as the pervasive use of TDY personnel, the general perception in the rest of the FBI that the work is not career-enhancing, and the increasingly diversified workload over which legats are supposed to have mastery suggest that the FBI—or perhaps on a larger scale in the DoJ—should field a dedicated career element, similar to the position of Foreign Service officer, to handle liaison activities.

Notes 1. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948, FBI 62-80750. 2. V. P Keay to Importers Exporters Service Company, October 6, 1940, FBI 67-36842; Memorandum for Mr. Glavin Re: V. P. Keay, November 17, 1941, FBI 67-36842; W. R. Glavin to Tolson, Victor P. Keay, July 1, 1945, FBI 67-36842. 3. P. Mohr to Tolson, Victor P. Keay, January 16, 1952, FBI 67-36842.

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4. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 5. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 6. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, April 30, 1942, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 7. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, April 30, 1942. 8. The Director, July 20, 1942, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 9. The Organization of SIS Division, November 8, 1942, FBI 66-2554. 10. The Organization of SIS Division, November 8, 1942, FBI 66-2554. 11. D. M. Ladd, memorandum for the Director, Re: Organization of SIS Division, November 21, 1942, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 12. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945, Case File FBI HQ File 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 13. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 14. D. M. Ladd to the Director, Supervision of Bureau Liaison Representatives in London, Lisbon, Madrid, Ottawa and Italy, July 5, 1944, FBI 644104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 15. D. M. Ladd, memorandum for the Director, January 27, 1944, FBI 644104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 16. D. M. Ladd, memorandum for the Director, February 19, 1944, FBI 644104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 17. D. M. Ladd to the Director, Supervision of Bureau Liaison Representatives in London, Lisbon, Madrid, Ottawa and Italy, July 5, 1944. 18. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 19. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 20. Executive Conference to the Director, SIS Survey, January 16, 1945, FBI 66-2554. 21. J. P. Mohr to W. R. Glavin, Special Agent Supervisors, SIS Section, Security Division, January 31, 1945, FBI 64-4104, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD; Executive Conference to the Director, SIS Survey, January 16, 1945; FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 22. C. H. Carson, Re: William C. Sullivan, March 31, 1946, FBI 67-205182. 23. FBI Executive Conference, August 1944, FBI 66-2554. 24. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 25. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 26. C. H. Carson to D. M. Ladd, Central Intelligence Group (Admiral Souers’ Office), March 8, 1946, FBI 62-80750. 27. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 28. William Sullivan to Hoover, December 19, 1949, FBI 67-205182. 29. W. R. Glavin to Tolson, February 21, 1951, FBI 67-205182. 30. W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, Recommendation for Incentive Award, June 26, 1959, FBI 67-428100. 31. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 32. Foreign and Military Intelligence, Book I, Final Report of the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to

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Intelligence Activities, together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views, S. Doc. No. 94-755 (1976). 33. Reaction of United States Ambassadors to the Taking over by the Central Intelligence Group of Intelligence Coverage in Latin America, September 11, 1946, FBI 62-80750. 34. E. S. Miller to Mr. Felt, Liaison Section, July 14, 1972, FBI 62-HQ118045. 35. Intelligence Division (INTD) Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 36. Intelligence Division (INTD) Inspection 12/1–19/80, February 20, 1981, FBI 67-149000. 37. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1982, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., Pt. 6 (1981); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., Pt. 7 (1982); Intelligence Division Inspection 9/8/92–9/25/92, November 5, 1992, FBI 67-149000; Intelligence Division Inspection 3/11/75– 4/4/75, August 27, 1975, FBI 67-149000. 38. Intelligence Division (INTD) Inspection 12/1–19/80, February 20, 1981. 39. Intelligence Division (INTD) Inspection 12/1–19/80, February 20, 1981. 40. National Security Division (NSD) Inspection, 8/4/97–8/22/97, Field Office/Legat Interrogatory, June 26, 1997, FBI 67-149000. 41. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1988, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., Pt 4. (1987). 42. Authorization Legislation and Oversight of the US Department of Justice (DEA and FBI), Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 100-577 (1987). 43. Authorization Legislation and Oversight of the US Department of Justice (DEA and FBI), Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 100-577 (1987). 44. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1995). 45. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1996). 46. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1999, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong., Pt. 6 (1998). 47. US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2004), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI /a0418/final.pdf. 48. Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2007, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 109th Cong., Pt. 10 (2006).

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49. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2013, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 112th Cong., Pt. 2B (2012). 50. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 51. Inspection of Intelligence Division (INTD), March 10, 1981, FBI 67149000. 52. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 53. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 54. J. Edgar Hoover, Re: Legal Attaché, July 21, 1947, FBI 64-4104, National Archives, College Park, MD. 55. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 56. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 57. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. Accomplishment. Mexico–Venezuela (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 58. Director, FBI, to Attaché, Paris, France, August 13, 1946, FBI 64-4104. 59. JEH to Tolson, Belmont, Mohr, and Nease, December 29, 1958, FBI 6280750. 60. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, United States Senate, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 61. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 62. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 103rd Cong., Pt. 1 (2009). 63. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 64. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 65. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 66. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1996). 67. Oversight of the FBI, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 107-447 (2001); Final Report of the Attorney General’s Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation (“The Bellows Report”), May 2000, Attorney General’s FOIA Reading Room Records, https://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/attorney-generals-foia-reading-room -records-bellows-report. 68. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 69. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 70. US Department of State, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 38, https://www.state.gov/bureaus-offices/under-secretary-for-management /office-of-management-policy-rightsizing-and-innovation/. 71. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978).

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72. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971, FBI 67149000. 73. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 74. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, FBI 67149000. 75. Hearing Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States (April 14, 2004) (statement of John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, Federal Bureau of Investigation); Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2007, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 109th Cong., Pt. 10 (2006). 76. H. L. Child, Jr. to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969, FBI [Official & Confidential. Section 1]. 77. C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, Re: Expansion of FBI Foreign Collection Efforts, September 21, 1970, FBI [Official & Confidential. Section 1]. 78. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 79. Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 2076: Making Appropriations for the Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies for the Fiscal Year Ending September 30, 1996, and for other Purposes, H.R. Rep. No. 104-378 (1995). 80. Russian Organized Crime in the United States, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996) (statement of Jim E. Moody, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI). 81. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 82. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 83. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 84. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 85. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 86. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 87. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 88. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 89. Executive Conference, November 8, 1942, FBI 66-2554. 90. P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, March 8, 1941, FBI 644104. 91. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 92. P. E. Foxworth, memorandum for the Director, March 8, 1941. 93. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 94. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 95. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 96. For the Conference, Clyde Tolson and W. R. Glavin, memorandum for the Director, July 28, 1943, FBI 66-2554.

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97. Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003). 98. V.P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 99. W. C. Sullivan to the Director, FBI Foreign Liaison Program, June 16, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 100. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 101. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 102. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 103. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 104. Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists (Washington, DC: GAO, 2007). 105. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 106. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 107. Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Border, Maritime, and Global Counterterrorism of the House Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. (2007). 108. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 109. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978); Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23– 11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 110. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 111. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 112. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 113. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 114. Aruna Viswanatha, “FBI Personnel Recalled from Asia Amid Probe into Prostitution, Partying,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2018. 115. H. L. Edwards to Mr. Mohr, Mexican Border Coverage, April 20, 1955, FBI 67-94639. 116. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 117. William J. Anderson, Director, General Accounting Office, to Hon. William H. Webster, Director FBI, Re: Fewer Agent Transfers Should Benefit the FBI and Its Agents as Well as Save Money, September 24, 1981, https:// www.gao.gov/assets/140/135159.pdf. 118. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 119. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 120. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies’ Appropriations for 1990, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 101st Cong. (1989). 121. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 122. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 123. R. T. Harbo to Mr. Tolson, Supervision of Foreign Liaison by SA Nathan L. Ferris, May 31, 1955, FBI 67-94639. 124. Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., Pt. 2 (1985).

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125. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 126. Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003). 127. The FBI Transformation Since 2001, Hearing Before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies, 109th Cong. (September 14, 2006) (testimony of Robert S. Mueller, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation); Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2007, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 109th Cong., Pt. 10 (2006). 128. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 129. GAO, Combating Terrorism. 130. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 131. GAO, Combating Terrorism. 132. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 133. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 134. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 135. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2015, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 113th Cong. (2015). 136. The White House of President Barack Obama, Fact Sheet: Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015 (Washington, DC: The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, 2015), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press -office/2015/07/09/fact-sheet-administration-cybersecurity-efforts-2015. 137. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 138. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 139. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies’ Appropriations for 1990, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 101st Cong. (1989).

6 Legal Attachés and the US Information Advantage

THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S LEGAL ATTAchés are not clandestine intelligence collectors—but they do function to obtain information from foreign contacts that is essential to US national security. This collection usually relates to a specific investigative matter, but from time to time the Bureau has experimented with using its legats to obtain data to inform US policymakers (the HILEV program) or to address an emerging strategic threat (e.g., China). Although the FBI lost its clandestine Special Intelligence Service (SIS) role to the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the reality is that the Bureau—even while it was operating the SIS—was more comfortable with its legat operations than with its use of agents under nonofficial cover. Reflecting on the legacy of the SIS program, the FBI in an internal history stated: It was definitely a mistake to undertake the establishment of intelligence coverage solely on the basis of clandestine operations. Representatives should have been set up in the beginning in the various Embassies and strategic Consulate with complete staffs organized along the lines of Bureau Domestic Field Offices. This coverage should have been supplemented by strategically placed clandestine coverage following careful study on the part of Bureau Embassy representation as to the covers applicable and offering the greatest chance of success.1

Therefore, it was not a jarring transition when the Bureau surfaced its legal attachés and converted their function to that of police liaison positions. J. Edgar Hoover continued to think of them as 135

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collectors, advising the legat in Paris to extend his liaison contacts with various government agencies and police organizations because “a great deal more information can be obtained through development of police contacts. . . . You should endeavor to develop this source in all matters relating to the Bureau’s domestic responsibilities.”2 The legat’s role is not simply to investigate crimes after the fact but to preempt the emergence of threats to US domestic national security, whether from crime or terrorism or other pressures. In 1965, FBI official W. M. Felt provided Clyde Tolson, Hoover’s second in command, with an assessment that the FBI’s foreign liaison operations afforded the FBI early knowledge of “vital developments” abroad.3 Director Louis Freeh echoed this sentiment several decades later when he referred to the FBI’s legats as forming a “distant early warning system to alert us to new and emerging crime threats.”4 Freeh also recognized the role of legats in heading off international terrorism.5 Even more recently, in 2012, the FBI advised Congress that one of the roles of the Legal Attaché program was to prevent terrorism from reaching into the United States rather than to reactively investigate it.6 Consistent with Hoover’s objective in training US and foreign security services, the legal attachés have continued to leverage the capabilities of local colleagues in furtherance of acquiring information. In 1969, an FBI memorandum pointed to the value of foreign services, suggesting that the legats had an important function in developing sources who could handle Bureau inquiries immediately.7 Bureau official Ray Wannall summed up this function in 1971 when he pointed out that the FBI legats enlisted the assistance of foreign authorities who were best positioned to cover necessary leads in both the criminal and security fields.8 Hearings on the (ultimately unrealized) statutory charter for the FBI identified principal law enforcement, security, and intelligence agencies in legats’ areas of responsibility as the means by which overseas leads in FBI cases were covered.9 In 1996, a deputy assistant director in the FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division highlighted the operational value of foreign services in helping the FBI to expand the United States’ “perimeter of law enforcement protection.”10 This practice of extending the Bureau’s reach through its partners

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abroad has continued into the twenty-first century. In 2003, the FBI explained to Congress that legats “were able to mobilize the investigative assistance of foreign governments.”11 The Bureau again affirmed the role of foreign services as resources that extended the FBI’s reach when, in 2011, it characterized international counterparts as “force multiplier[s]” and pointed to their expertise and information as resources of value to the FBI.12 Despite the close coordination in the acquisition of information, the FBI legats did not historically take an operational role in their cooperation with local services. Discussions of the potential FBI statutory charter in the late 1970s emphasized that legats were not envisioned as being operational. However, in the event of unusual circumstances, which required a legat to conduct an interview, this should be done at the US embassy or in the presence of local authorities.13 After September 11, legats seemed to acquire greater operational latitude. In a 2004 report on the Legat program, the Department of Justice’s inspector general (IG) acknowledged that the legat staff might become directly involved in specific investigations but usually conducted these in conjunction with foreign law enforcement agencies, in compliance with the host country’s laws and procedures.14 As an example, an FBI official, Jennifer Hale Keenan, who served in Pakistan in the aftermath of September 11, accompanied Pakistani authorities on raids against suspected terrorists. (Keenan also on at least one occasion broke with protocol when she unilaterally arranged for technical surveillance on a phone booth in Afghanistan that al-Qaeda operatives used.)15 In addition to coordinating with the local services, legats must coordinate their activities with the US Department of State because of the potential foreign policy implications.16 By 2007, the FBI highlighted legats’ ability to pursue investigative activity but noted that this occurred on a country-by-country basis.17

Anomalies Although legal attachés, as a rule, have not—since the end of the SIS—engaged in collection beyond the exchange of information via official liaison, several exceptions have occurred. Both the

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Mexico and Hong Kong legat offices posed as anomalies in acquiring information. Hong Kong came into existence with a mission of developing data about Communist China. The legat in Mexico City, a post which dated to the SIS days, was atypical in that it operated sources. A short-lived program known as HILEV made use of information gathered by legats to inform the Nixon White House about political developments—an area in which legats have not otherwise been involved. Mexico The FBI’s legal attaché in Mexico City dates to the earliest days of the SIS program. In October 1940, the special agent in charge of the FBI’s San Antonio field office traveled to Mexico City in an official capacity and was attached to the US embassy there.18 The legat (known as a civil attaché in Mexico) was closer in its operations to those of a regular field office than to operations of the other legat posts because of the large number of fugitives who crossed the border from the United States.19 Mexico, after World War II, continued to be an exceptionally important legat post. In the mid-1950s, the FBI explained that the legal attaché presence in that country was larger than in other countries because Mexico’s proximity to the United States meant it was of “unique interest.”20 Criminal investigations involving border crossings were numerous in the late 1960s.21 The Bureau also had a Cold War–era interest in Mexico from a national security perspective. Mexico functioned as a haven for subjects, or the associates of subjects, in FBI security cases.22 The legat in the mid-1950s intensified its coverage of Soviet activities in Mexico City. As the Cold War progressed, the FBI also became concerned about Mexico’s role as a base for subversive activity. According to a 1975 memorandum, the legat initiated inquiries into Mexico-based terrorist and subversive organizations to determine whether these organizations had links with similar organizations in the United States. By 1975, FBI Headquarters, in conjunction with the legat, had determined that no connections existed.23 Mexico’s status as a neighbor of the United States led to more fluid operations between domestic Bureau field offices and the

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legat personnel. As early as the SIS days, the opportunity for unimpeded travel between the two countries created problems for the legat that were “more numerous and somewhat different” from those that SIS personnel in other countries encountered.24 Bureau personnel on both sides of the border collaborated in ways unique to the Mexican legat. As of 1955, the senior agent at the legat’s resident agency in Monterrey, Mexico (which had been established in 1951), conferred regularly with the special agent in charge of the San Antonio office in furtherance of investigations pertaining to northern Mexico.25 The most unusual feature of the Mexican legat program was its use of sources. According to a 1971 inspection report, the Bureau’s operation in Mexico was unique in that it was “actively developing informants.”26 These informants, however, were not spying on Mexico. Rather, the FBI operated them to obtain information pertaining to substantive domestic cases.27 Unlike in the domestic setting, the FBI’s sources in Mexico were “investigative informants” to whom the Bureau furnished leads.28 According to a 1972 FBI inspection report, informants were necessary because there was “no efficient, nationwide police or intelligence agency in Mexico upon which [the FBI could] regularly call for reliable assistance.”29 Use of human sources in Mexico was a longstanding means of operation. A 1955 memo indicated the existence of sources by directing the transfer of an informant from Mexico City to Nuevo Laredo, Mexico.30 Furthermore, a 1969 memo explained that the legat in Mexico “operat[ed] a large number of informant nets in Mexico.” For instance, the informant nets provided “intensive knowledge of potentially subversive activities” along the border with the United States.31 A 1973 inspection report was consistent with the theme of ferreting out subversive activities, stating that informants’ functions included the infiltration of various subversive organizations within Mexico.32 Watch the borders. A particularly amusing piece of Bureau lore

is the “watch the borders” story. According to Bureau official Cartha deLoach, Hoover, annoyed with the narrow margins of a Bureau communication regarding an internal security matter, had

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scrawled “watch the borders” on the paper. Headquarters personnel scrambled, assuming that Hoover was referring to a development in Mexico or Canada.33 Although Hoover was referring to an administrative detail, the Bureau did, indeed, watch the borders. The Mexican government objected to the SIS’s handling of intelligence work that addressed the problems created by the fluidity of movement between Mexico and the United States. In early 1944, the Mexican authorities issued an objection to FBI agents crossing the border on official matters. The result was that the Bureau’s civil attaché (i.e., the legat) in Mexico City had to dispatch personnel from Mexico City to the northern parts of the country that were more easily accessible to the FBI’s domestic field offices in the Southwest than to the civil attaché’s office.34 After World War II, the FBI instituted a program to deal with border issues. This new initiative was known as Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border (BOCOV) and began operation in 1948. According to an FBI inspection report, BOCOV’s purpose was to “detect any counter subversive activities detrimental to U.S. security interests by individuals within the 25-mile zone south of the U.S.–Mexican border.”35 The Liaison Section—which was responsible for legats—of the Domestic Intelligence Division at FBI headquarters supervised the BOCOV program.36 BOCOV’s existence was a closely held secret not simply because of its intelligence collection function but because it contravened bureaucratic boundaries. The program originated from the FBI’s perception that there was a “lack of coverage by responsible U.S. agencies, particularly the Central Intelligence Agency and the Immigration and Naturalization Service.”37 Having assessed that its counterparts had not lived up to their obligations, the FBI implemented BOCOV with “a high degree of secrecy because of lack of FBI jurisdiction to develop informant coverage in Mexico.”38 Although Mexico was outside of the Bureau’s area of responsibility in terms of intelligence collection, the FBI believed that the “CIA’s inadequacy” justified the Bureau acting to “preclude a ‘Pearl Harbor in our own backyard.’”39 The FBI’s policy was to “not identify [its] sources to the Agency.” According to one FBI memo, this policy even extended to scenarios in which the

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CIA, unaware of the Bureau’s involvement, attempted to recruit sources who were already reporting to the FBI. Instead, “in order to protect [its] coverage in the border area, a valuable, trusted, and reliable confidential source would continue to be utilized even if he were contacted by CIA.”40 The legal attaché in Mexico City played an important role in BOCOV. In 1951, a resident agency (i.e., satellite office) of the legat opened in Monterrey, Mexico. Monterrey was an operationally convenient location, because, according to one FBI report, “a consulate exists which serves as a cover for our agents.” In 1952, the FBI opened another resident agency in Guaymas, Mexico, but closed it when the State Department closed its consulate at that location. The Bureau subsequently established a resident agency at Guadalajara, Mexico.41 Field offices on the US side of the border were integral to the BOCOV program and operated in conjunction with FBI coverage in Mexico. The El Paso, San Antonio, Phoenix, and San Diego divisions all participated in BOCOV. 42 Initially, one agent per border office handled this program. However, in 1949, the San Diego office received authority to assign an additional agent to the program, and in 1951, the Bureau granted the San Antonio office authority to assign more agents to BOCOV because of the length of the Mexican border.43 Bureau offices on both sides of the border worked together. For instance, agents at the Monterrey resident agency periodically conferred with the San Antonio office.44 The FBI even launched Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO) operations against the Communist Party (CP) in conjunction with BOCOV. COINTELPRO was an initiative the FBI had started in 1956 with the intent of disrupting the activities of the Soviet-sponsored CP in the United States (CPUSA). In 1961, FBI HQ assessed that “there is definitely a place for consideration of some of the tactics currently employed in the Counterintelligence Program” on BOCOV, and the five border offices, as well as the office of the legal attaché, “should be alert for the application of disruptive tactics.”45 However, whereas COINTELPRO CPUSA focused on disrupting the activities of a US-based group, COINTELPRO in the context of BOCOV was aimed at disrupting the

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CP south of the border. For instance, FBI HQ directed the El Paso field office to consider using informants to create controversy within the Chihuahua State Committee of the CP of Mexico. HQ would direct El Paso’s proposals to the legat in Mexico City to ensure that El Paso’s efforts would “not destroy existing informant coverage of that office in the Chihuahua State Committee.”46 The BOCOV COINTELPRO operation was, in the FBI’s assessment, successful. According to a 1962 HQ inspection, “Closely supervised disruptive and counterintelligence activities against the Communist Party have produced very good results both in United States and Mexico.”47 It is important to bear in mind that the BOCOV COINTELPRO activities were not simply meddling for the sake of meddling. The FBI had already discovered, through its SOLO operation, that the Soviet Union was providing assistance to the CPUSA through the Communist Party in Canada. Therefore, it was plausible, especially considering what the Bureau knew of US Communist fugitives in Mexico, that the Soviets might be similarly using the Mexican CP as a conduit to the United States. The FBI imposed its own limitations on the BOCOV COINTELPRO operations to keep them focused on results rather than simply sowing discord for its own sake. According to a 1961 communication from HQ, “Harassment is not to be undertaken merely for the sake of harassment but in each instance the tactics are to be undertaken with a specific purpose in mind of disrupting communist and related activities.”48 Regardless of the intent and execution of the BOCOV COINTELPRO operations, it is interesting to note that the FBI was clearly (and reasonably) venturing into the CIA’s turf. As with BOCOV-related collection, the Bureau was operating outside of the United States to acquire what it believed to be information essential to its domestic role. With BOCOV COINTELPRO, the FBI was doing nothing less than covert action—directed against political actors—abroad. This was the bailiwick of the CIA, which, years before the implementation of BOCOV COINTELPRO, had already overthrown a Latin American regime when it toppled the government of Guatemala in 1954.

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More recently, the FBI launched another effort to develop intelligence awareness along the US–Mexico border. In 2009, the Bureau established its Southwest Intelligence Group (SWIG). According to the director, Robert Mueller, creation of the SWIG reflected the input of the legal attaché in Mexico and included intelligence from the legat as well as the FBI’s border offices.49 The SWIG is located at the Drug Enforcement Administration’s El Paso Intelligence Center and consists of one senior executive service FBI agent and eight intelligence analysts.50 The FBI’s handling of issues pertaining to the Canadian border has apparently not been as coordinated as its BOCOV and SWIG efforts. Legat Ottawa, having been established in April 1942, is another post that can trace its lineage to World War II and the SIS era.51 In the early 1970s, the FBI noted that because of the “long, common, and relatively open border” the Bureau had many cases—both of a criminal and a security nature—with Canadian ramifications. 52 According to a 2004 Department of Justice IG report, the Toronto, Canada, Police Service had developed a strong relationship with the FBI’s Buffalo, New York, field office and preferred to deal with that office rather than with the legat staff in Ottawa, Canada. At the time of the report, the FBI was developing a “Border Liaison Officer” position for the Buffalo field office. This position would coordinate contacts with Canadian security services in the region and keep the Ottawa legat apprised of developments.53 Hong Kong The establishment of the Hong Kong legal attaché was another oddity in the development of the FBI’s international presence. Whereas the Bureau had established other legats to facilitate a bilateral exchange of information, Legat Hong Kong was set up specifically to collect against the activities of a third country. In 1966, the FBI opened its legat in the British Crown Colony of Hong Kong to provide coverage of Chinese Communist activities.54 According to a 1973 FBI inspection report, “The principal function of Legat, Hong Kong, is to assist the Bureau in its counterespionage efforts directed against Chinese Communist espionage

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operations targeted against the U.S.” Indeed, according to the same report, the office “thriv[ed] on Chinese Communist activities.”55 Hong Kong was, however, similar to other legal attachés in its methods of gathering information. The post had no paid informants or sources and instead operated in a liaison capacity. The FBI credited the office as a consistent contributor to the Bureau’s provision of “foreign political intelligence” to the White House. According to an FBI inspection report, intensified liaison with intelligence contacts was a route that the legat could use to obtain current intelligence information.56 Although Hong Kong was well positioned for cloak-and-dagger work against the emerging Chinese threat, the bulk of the legat’s work—consistent with the day-to-day mundanity that is the reality of the intelligence business—consisted of reviewing files and liaising with the US Consulate General.57 According to the first FBI legat in Hong Kong, conditions in the city during the office’s early years were tense. As the legat described in an interview with the Society of Former Special Agents, “There was a spillover from the [Chinese] Cultural Revolution, and the local unions . . . were trying to show that they were ‘redder than red.’ . . . And they were trying to outdo the mainland commies.”58 The operation of Legat Hong Kong highlighted a difficulty— insufficient resources coupled with overwhelming expectations— that had intermittently plagued the FBI’s international operations from the earliest days of the SIS program. The office was responsible for covering the entire southwest Pacific region, which entailed road trips that did not permit for the development of reliable contacts. By the FBI’s own admission, it did not consider the Hong Kong legat’s personnel complement sufficient for discharging the Bureau’s responsibilities. Despite these FBI-imposed obstacles, the legat was the focus of ire from Bureau officials who claimed that the “Legal Attaché has required an abnormal amount of supervision in regard to administrative matters.”59 William Sullivan specifically blamed the agent assigned as the legat for “obviously failing to make the office productive” and advised Hoover that a new legat should replace the existing agent or that the office should be closed.60

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Despite Sullivan’s ranting, the FBI did not shutter the Hong Kong office. It continues to operate as of this writing. Interestingly, during the office’s early years, the legat—in deference to political sensibilities—could not visit Taiwan, even on personal travel.61 Times have changed. Legat Hong Kong’s suboffice is now located in Taipei, Taiwan.62 Furthermore, in 2002, slightly more than two decades after the United States granted diplomatic recognition to the People’s Republic of China, the FBI established a legal attaché in Beijing.63

HILEV The FBI launched a relatively short-lived program known as HILEV (for high-level intelligence) to provide the Nixon White House with insights about foreign political developments that legal attachés collected during the course of their duties. However, HILEV was not a return to clandestine collection à la the SIS but rather an effort to fully exploit the information to which legal attachés had access in the course of their duties. HILEV was one of two intelligence initiatives that the FBI launched to provide the Nixon White House with information. The first of these was the intelligence letter for the president (codenamed INLET), which the Bureau began producing in November 1969. INLET’s function was to ensure that the president was fully informed of significant intelligence developments the FBI identified under its purview for security responsibilities.64 The Bureau instructed its field offices to flag information that had “qualities of importance and timeliness necessary to secure the President’s interest and to provide him with meaningful intelligence for his guidance.”65 Field offices were supposed to derive this information from “ongoing investigative operations which were being conducted within [the FBI’s] jurisdictional authority” and this initiative did not involve the expansion or redirection of investigations.66 The FBI discontinued the INLET program in December 1972, although field offices received instructions regarding their continuing responsibility to be alert for “high-level intelligence data” of the type that INLET had provided to the president.67

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In its 1969 instructions to field offices, the FBI outlined six types of information that should be flagged for INLET distribution. These categories were: information of national or international significance that was security related; important current or pending developments in major security cases; current information that was representative of or called attention to a significant developing intelligence trend; material that had a bearing on national security, particularly that from sensitive or penetrative coverage of foreign establishments that could affect American relations with foreign countries or assist in formulating US policy; “inside” information concerning demonstrations, disorders, or other civil disruptions that was of more than local significance; and items with an unusual twist or concerning prominent personalities that may have been of special interest to the president or the attorney general.68 Inevitably, it was the last item, information involving “an unusual twist,” that caught the public’s attention. It is, however, important to note that the FBI had explicitly advised field offices that “mere rumors or nebulous information will have no place in this letter.”69 The FBI was not engaged in gossip-mongering for the president’s titillation. Instead, it justified INLET as the continuation of the FBI’s practice, through multiple administrations, of providing presidents and attorneys general with intelligence information. INLET also represented a degree of interagency self-consciousness. As the Bureau later noted: It is a common practice of other members of the United States intelligence community (i.e. Central Intelligence Agency, Department of State) to provide the President with important intelligence information bearing on the national security on a regular basis. The “INLET” program was nothing more than an administrative device designed to insure that such information would reach the President on a timely basis.70

HILEV was the natural extension of the INLET program. After the creation of the Central Intelligence Group (CIG; precursor to the CIA), the FBI made it clear that legats would “not be concerned with the responsibility of obtaining foreign intelligence.”71 In September 1970, Nixon asked Hoover to expand the

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FBI’s foreign liaison operations, specifically in furtherance of gathering “better intelligence.”72 The FBI did not view this request as instituting a substantively new function. Rather, as a Bureau communication to the attorney general explained, “the only change in operations that occurred as a result of the President’s requests that FBI collect political intelligence was a formalization of the practice that had been in effect for many years.”73 As a 1973 inspection report highlighted, legats, following the September 1970 meeting, became responsible for developing “highlevel foreign political intelligence.”74 The origins of HILEV lie in the same line of thinking that drove the creation of INLET. Like INLET, HILEV was not meant to be a departure from current practices but, instead, an effort to ensure that information gleaned from those practices reached customers who would benefit from it. Furthermore, INLET, in asking for information that would impact foreign relations, presaged HILEV’s emphasis on international developments. Finally, the FBI’s choice of language—“high-level”—to describe information of interest in both programs suggests that at least subconsciously Bureau officials had cut both INLET and HILEV from the same conceptual cloth. Implementation of HILEV began almost immediately. According to a September 21, 1970, memorandum, C. D. Brennan provided Sullivan with an assessment that, in order to develop “highgrade political intelligence,” the Bureau should increase the scope and size of existing legat operations and open several new offices in “selected strategic areas.”75 However, after this initial start, there was apparently a several-month lag. In December 1970, Henry Kissinger, the national security adviser, inquired of Hoover about what had happened to the legat expansion proposal. After learning that the delay was on the part of the State Department, Kissinger indicated that he would raise the issue with the president, and several days later, Hoover received a call from Secretary of State William Rogers, who indicated his agreement with the majority of the Bureau’s proposal for new legal attachés, with the exception of Helsinki.76 With approvals in place, the FBI opened new legal attaché offices in Beirut, Caracas, Copenhagen (in lieu of Helsinki), La Paz, Managua, and Tel Aviv.77

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The selection of Beirut as a legat location makes for an odd story. It was Sullivan—who would, in less than a year, become a vehement, some might even say unhinged, critic of the FBI’s Legat program—who proposed the creation of a post in the city. Sullivan’s proposal reads like he’s importuning for a personal favor. On September 22, 1970, he wrote: There is one country in which I am reasonably certain we could get an office and develop some very fine sources of information, and this is Lebanon. I say this because I have known Mr. William J. Baroody, Director of the American Enterprise Institute in Washington for some years. He is Lebanese. He makes regular trips to Lebanon, has many friends and relatives there, and has much influence in that country. . . . There is not the slightest doubt in my mind that Mr. Baroody would give every assistance possible to us should we elect to open an office in Lebanon.78

When Sullivan launched his bureaucratic attack on the Legat program in June 1971, he spared Beirut, stating that it and several other offices be allowed to continue operating.79 An August 1971 inspection of legats made a different assessment, stating that this one-man post had been established in territory “where there had previously been little need for coverage,” and if the White House reduced its interest in HILEV items, the Bureau “could not justify continuation of this office.”80 Although HILEV originated from the same strain of thinking that had informed the INLET program, it rapidly diverged by expending resources specifically for collection rather than benefiting from information obtained in the course of existing liaison functions. According to an August 1971 inspection report, Beirut, Caracas, Copenhagen, La Paz, Tel Aviv, and Managua were “primarily intended as intelligence collectors and not as sources of normal Bureau cases.”81 The FBI determined the locations for several of these new offices solely because the geographic areas had the potential for intelligence development and despite the fact that the locations offered “no hope of a substantial, substantive Bureau case load.”82 For instance, coverage of Bolivia and Peru via the La Paz office was “initiated for the sole purpose of developing HILEV data and cannot be justified on any other grounds.” It was only a

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happy coincidence that “several of these offices are making a substantial contribution to the Bureau’s domestic jurisdiction in addition to their HILEV work.” Tel Aviv was an example of this type of office. It began “solely as a source of HILEV material.”83 Unlike La Paz, the Bureau at Tel Aviv developed work in the criminal and security fields and the legat developed good relations with the principal Israeli investigative agencies.84 Similarly, the Caracas legat was initially opened to collect intelligence but subsequently developed a substantial criminal and security case load.85 Institution of HILEV was not without complications. For instance, Bern’s submission of HILEV items was, according to a 1972 inspection, considerably below average because the “‘nonpolitical’ attitude of the Swiss makes collection of political intelligence in this area most difficult.” (However, the inspector added, hopefully, the addition of Austria to Bern’s territory might assist the legat in developing additional HILEV items.)86 A 1973 inspection report put Legat Bern’s situation in even starker terms: in addition to Switzerland’s political sensitivity to remaining neutral, it had “strict laws prohibiting espionage and intelligence activities.”87 The combination of these factors made HILEV a difficult proposition for Legat Bern. The White House displayed additional interest in the HILEV program in mid-1971. In May of that year, Nixon asked Hoover to consider further expansion of the FBI’s Legat program.88 According to Hoover, the president’s enthusiasm for establishing additional posts was premised on the value of information that the Bureau had developed up to that point.89 As Bureau official D. J. Dalbey commented in a June 1971 memo to Tolson: If it is the judgement of the President and his Advisers that the Bureau is able to provide unusually good information, and that they need more of it, we certainly are in no position to deny or disagree. It safely can be said that the people in the White House know better the value of the information which we have provided.90

The FBI, in response to the White House’s request, identified multiple locations where offices should be established or reestablished. The Domestic Intelligence Division nominated the creation

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of new posts at Canberra (which did not open until approximately a decade later); Kuala Lumpur (for which Singapore substituted); and New Delhi.91 Additionally, the Bureau suggested reopening Rio de Janeiro—otherwise, it would be passing up the opportunity to develop political intelligence items in a “country which, like most of Latin America, is in the throes of deciding between communism and capitalism”; Manila—to afford closer coverage of a region that was “apparently drawing farther away from its former close alignment with the United States”; and Santo Domingo.92 Again, the Bureau emphasized intelligence coverage rather than liaison functions in its plans for expansion. Writing in May 1971, W. R. Wannall stated that “there are areas of the world where political and other developments would be of keen intelligence interest and we have included some of these although we cannot expect that a substantial volume of data pertinent to the Bureau’s domestic jurisdiction will be developed.”93 New Delhi— had it been established—would have been one such post. The legat at that location would have covered India, East and West Pakistan, and Nepal, areas where the Bureau previously had “no coverage” but where it perceived that the “potential for political intelligence [was] high.”94 Geopolitics intervened in the FBI’s plans to establish this office. In 1972, Bureau officials determined that “in view of recent developments in India and Pakistan and the resulting cooling of relations between the United States and India” it would be “an inappropriate time” to establish a legat in New Delhi.95 (Ultimately, the FBI would not open a legal attaché office in New Delhi until 2000.)96 Elevated interest in high-level intelligence items also had implications for existing legat posts. For instance, in 1973 the Bureau was interested in ensuring that the Tokyo legat was using intensified liaison with Japanese intelligence contacts to develop current intelligence information regarding Chinese Communist activities in Japan.97 Furthermore, the FBI deemed its presence in Tokyo to be of particular importance as the United States reduced its military commitment to Japan and as the economic goals of the two countries increasingly diverged. In Europe, the FBI saw untapped value in its Rome legat. According to a 1971 inspection report, the Bureau

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expected the legat in this location to expand his contacts in Italian cities, including Naples, Milan, Florence, and Venice, to improve HILEV collection.98 The Bureau increased the personnel complement at several offices in conjunction with HILEV. For instance, it enhanced the staff of Legat Paris, which also handled exotic locations such as Monaco, from two to three agents. These individuals were expected to maintain “widespread contacts in important social, political, and economic circles in order to obtain foreign political intelligence.” HILEV also impacted Legat Bonn’s operations in requiring the office to have “high-level contacts in political, social, economic, and military circles in Germany and the Netherlands in order to develop high-level political intelligence.”99 Sullivan blasted the concept of HILEV. On June 7, 1971, he characterized the HILEV information as falling into four categories: gossip; opinions of native contacts or individuals from a third country; “planted” information that contacts intended for White House consumption and that would serve “the interests of their own countries”; and information that appeared to be of value, although Sullivan was quick to point out that “this is not in sufficient quantity to justify the expense of our operations.”100 A few days after drafting this memo, Sullivan berated another Bureau official for daring to make observations to Hoover, in opposition to Sullivan’s perspective, about the expansion of the Legat program.101 After the other official interrupted Sullivan’s tirade with the curt observation that Sullivan could “go to hell,” Sullivan all but threatened physical violence, telling the official that the “next time you want to tell me to go to hell, I dare you to come to my office—and be prepared for the consequences.”102 Despite himself, Sullivan was at least partially correct about HILEV’s limited value. In 1973, the FBI assessed that Singapore was not submitting items of a caliber that would justify the maintenance of a legat office there. Similarly, the Bureau determined that Brasilia was not developing material that—from an intelligence viewpoint— justified the office’s existence. La Paz, as of 1973, also fell short of the FBI’s expectations.103 (Interestingly, in 1972, the FBI had acknowledged the lack of substantive work but recommended the continuation of the office because it had been able to make a significant

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contribution to the HILEV program.)104 Copenhagen’s production was similarly insufficient to justify the office’s existence.105 By the mid-1970s, the FBI had backed away from the HILEV concept. In late 1973, the acting FBI director advised the attorney general that the FBI was “not ‘pushing’ the intelligence collection program” and that “no pressure [was] being used on the FBI representatives to increase their production of intelligence items.” Rather, this activity demanded only an “extremely minor portion of their time” and nearly all of them were “fully occupied” in handling the Bureau’s regular work.106 By 1975, it was clear that the FBI’s legats were out of the foreign intelligence game. An inspection report from that year emphasized that the legats’ primary responsibility was “to obtain information or assistance . . . as may be needed in connection with domestic matters . . . which fall within the Bureau’s jurisdiction. Their primary responsibility does not involve the collection of general intelligence. This is the responsibility of CIA and the State Department.”107

Echoes of the SIS The push to open new legal attachés did revive memories of the SIS. For instance, in June 1971, D. J. Dalbey wrote that his “limited experience with and memory of the Bureau’s SIS operations during World War II convinced [him] that [the FBI] should be able to produce superior information.”108 Furthermore, an August 1971 inspection report noted, in respect to the La Paz legat, that “the office gives [the Bureau] coverage in an area we have not visited since the days of SIS.”109

Evolution of the Legat Program in Response to Changing US Strategic Interests Hoover very astutely recognized that foreign intelligence issues were inextricable from domestic. Although the creation of the CIA circumscribed the Bureau’s clandestine mission, the FBI found a new use for its legal attaché positions, which it transformed from clandestine collection platforms to overt liaisons

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with foreign government entities. A continued international presence would help the Bureau navigate geopolitical and geoeconomic conditions that had significant implications on the domestic security field for which the FBI was responsible. The development of legats clearly reflected the changing nature of concerns on the home front. Cold War concerns about foreign intelligence activities segued into post–Cold War worries about criminality emanating from newly free states in Eastern Europe. After the September 11 attacks on New York, Washington, DC, and Pennsylvania, counterterrorism was the driving consideration in the expansion of the Legat program. Even more recently, the emergence of cyber-enabled threats has prompted the FBI to establish new kinds of partnerships. Cold War Considerations Threats from Communist countries—those in the Eastern Bloc as well as China—prompted the development and sustained the operations of FBI legats. The legat at Bonn was one of the FBI’s busiest in Europe, as the US presence in Germany created an inviting target for Soviet intelligence activities.110 Furthermore, Bonn remained busy because of its “heavy stress” on efforts to detect East German intelligence service activities directed against the United States via US visitors to East Germany.111 Bonn received interagency assistance in looking for these nefarious activities. The legat’s office clerk/stenographer’s primary role was working with the Communications Intercept Service program, which identified individuals in the United States who were in contact with individuals behind the Iron Curtain, information that came to the legat via the US Army’s Operations and Research Detachment.112 The FBI’s growing emphasis on the Chinese threat resulted in the establishment of a Hong Kong office in 1966. According to Dan Grove, the Bureau’s first Hong Kong legat, the FBI’s China desk had grown from one man to seven or eight, and each of these individuals drafted memos endorsing the establishment of an FBI presence in Hong Kong, particularly “in view of some of the programs that [the Bureau was] developing.”113 In 1966, the FBI opened its office in Hong Kong.114 A 1971 inspection report

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corroborated Grove’s assessment of the geopolitical impetus for the office. According to the report, the Bureau originally opened the office to provide coverage of Chinese Communist activities.115 In 1973, looking ahead, the FBI predicted that the Hong Kong legat would be significant because the “Bureau undoubtedly in the future [would] uncover information indicating that [the Chinese] represent as great, if not greater, challenge than the Soviets have in the past.”116 Legat Hong Kong was a bureaucratic oddity. Hong Kong at the time of the legat’s establishment was a British Crown Colony. This meant that the United States did not have an embassy in Hong Kong. Instead, its representation was a consulate general. The Bureau’s legat was referred to within the consulate as a “legal liaison officer” (although the FBI continued to refer to the position, internally, as a legat). This was a sensitive situation for the FBI, which realized that its personnel were “actually guests of the British Government in Hong Kong and must act in such a way as not to disturb the delicate relationship involving the colony and Great Britain and Communist China.”117 One of the implications of this diplomatic dance was British authorities’ insistence that the Hong Kong legat not conduct liaison relations with Taiwan from the Hong Kong office.118 Switzerland presented a similarly tricky challenge in balancing the need to respond to international developments against the realities of diplomatic relations. According to a 1973 FBI assessment, the Bern office—which had opened in 1961—was of “particular value to the Bureau in view of the fact that many international swindlers, stolen security cases and organized crime cases frequently involve secret deposits made in Swiss banks.”119 The legat had historically been able to obtain “limited but valuable information” about these activities from his sources.120 There is also an indication that the legat in Bern was involved with the FBI’s counterintelligence activities against the Eastern Bloc services. According to a 1963 communication, the CIA’s Foreign Broadcast Information Service provided the Bern legat with items from Eastern Bloc sources that reported statements by US citizens who visited Communist countries.121 Juris-

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dictionally, Bern covered not only Switzerland but also Austria and the “tiny principality of Lichtenstein.”122 Although Bern was clearly an outpost that addressed a variety of international concerns, the FBI had to do a high-wire routine to avoid upsetting Swiss sensitivities. As a 1971 Bureau assessment put it, “Operations in Switzerland are most delicate because of the fierce independence of the Swiss.”123 The legat had to “demonstrate a high degree of diplomacy in order to achieve the cooperation of Swiss agencies with which he deals.”124 Switzerland would not permit the FBI to use the formal title of legal attaché because that appellation was too widely identified with the Bureau. Instead, the FBI’s representative in Switzerland was simply known as an attaché.125 Political developments in Europe also influenced the Bureau’s legat presence in Madrid. The Madrid legat, which the Bureau had closed and reopened on several occasions since the SIS years, also covered Portugal.126 (The FBI maintained an office in Lisbon between 1943 and 1946.)127 After the Portuguese revolution, which overthrew the country’s dictator, in the mid-1970s, the Madrid legat succeeded in establishing good relations with the newly formed Portuguese police agency. The Madrid legat was less productive in Spain itself because “Spain [was] run by a dictatorship and there is very little room for criminals to become active.”128 This latter assessment raises questions similar to those prompted by the Bureau’s SIS-era relationships with some of the Latin American regimes about complicity with nondemocratic governments. The Western Hemisphere—familiar territory from the SIS days—also provided its share of political developments that shaped legat coverage. In 1970, the FBI identified Bolivia, which the Bureau noted was where Che Guevara had been killed, as a strategic location because of its bordering Chile, “where a communist regime is about to take over,” and Peru, where US interests were being confiscated.129 These geopolitical conditions—and the need to develop intelligence for the HILEV program—were the sole impetuses for the Bureau’s desire to develop a legat in Bolivia.130 However, the FBI was aware of the potential for difficulties in establishing a legat, because the Bolivian government was “oriented away from the

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U.S.”131 (This was the paradox of the HILEV experiment: because legats were overt and only operated with the approval of hostcountry governments, they were not ideal collectors in the areas of greatest significance to US policymakers.) The Bureau did succeed in establishing its La Paz office, which opened in December 1970.132 Unfortunately, conditions under which the legat operated were unpleasant, both physically (the extremely high altitude) and politically (the unstable political situation). The Bureau considered La Paz to be a hardship assignment.133 Ultimately, it closed the office in December 1973 and determined that the legat in Buenos Aires would thereafter cover Bolivia. Buenos Aires also became responsible for covering Chile after the military coup that installed Augusto Pinochet overthrew Salvador Allende’s regime.134 The End of the Soviet Union The end of the Cold War led the US government to redirect national security–related resources on the basis of the (mistaken) assumption that the end of the Soviet Union represented the triumph of democracy and the end of an existential threat to the United States. This moment marked an inflection point for the development of the FBI’s Legal Attaché program. Not only did the Bureau establish legats in the former Soviet Union—including Moscow—but these legats also assumed a more prominent role as a tool of statecraft. Although the FBI had always used its international engagement to encourage the development of accountable and professional law enforcement agencies, its expansion into the former Eastern Bloc made it a key player in helping to build institutions that could support emerging democracies. Eastern Europe. Although it may seem naive thinking from a

modern-day perspective, at the end of the Cold War the United States had hoped that Russia would become a responsible democratic country once its Communist government collapsed. The FBI’s actions when it established a Moscow-based legat in 1994 were consistent with this widespread optimism. According to the FBI, the establishment of the legat “greatly strengthened” the FBI’s relationship with Russian law enforcement and intelligence agencies.135

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Organized crime with a nexus to Russia was a significant impetus for the FBI’s decision to establish a Moscow legat. According to the Bureau, a “gradual increase in racketeering and other types of activity by a very small minority of emigres from Russia and other parts of the Soviet Union” made a Moscow legat necessary. By opening the new legat office, the FBI hoped to facilitate an increased level of cooperation and a more frequent exchange of information with its Russian counterparts. The legat’s workload demonstrated the need for its existence. Its caseload had grown from 35 cases in 1994 to more than 375 cases by 1998. Between 1994 and 1998, the legat had responded to 660 requests (i.e., leads) from the FBI’s domestic field offices. These leads addressed a variety of criminal activity, ranging from violent extortion attempts to kidnappings and multi-million-dollar fraud schemes against financial institutions in both the United States and Russia.136 In addition to combating traditional criminal activity, the FBI hoped to counter threat actors’ acquisition of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) through its expansion in Russia and Eastern Europe. Both the Bureau and Russian authorities feared the possibility that rogue nations or terrorist entities would illicitly acquire nuclear materials.137 The FSB—the Russian agency that succeeded the KGB in handling Russian internal security—advised the Moscow legat in 1995 that it was the agency responsible for investigating nuclear trafficking. Russia was not the only location vulnerable to the theft or diversion of WMD material. To guard against this, the FBI developed a plan for expanding its Legat program in the former Soviet Union.138 In 1997, the FBI established legat offices in Kiev, Ukraine, and Tallinn, Estonia. The next year, it proposed the establishment of a legat in Kazakhstan that would cover the Central Asian republics.139 (The Almaty, Kazakhstan, legat opened in 2000.)140 By 2000, the FBI was working with the US Congress to open additional Eastern European legat offices in Prague, Czech Republic, and Bucharest, Romania.141 (The FBI opened its Prague legat office in 2000 and its Bucharest legat in 2001.)142 Under Robert Mueller, who succeeded Freeh, the FBI continued its Eastern European expansion, opening legat offices in Sarajevo, BosniaHerzegovina; Sofia, Bulgaria; and Tbilisi, Georgia.143

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Counterterrorism-Driven Expansion The threat from international terrorism also drove the FBI’s legat expansion in the 1990s. With the passage of the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, the FBI acquired significant counterterrorism responsibilities with an extraterritorial aspect.144 As early as 1996, the Bureau cited the explosive growth of terrorism as justification for expanding its legal attaché presence.145 Louis Freeh, who served as the FBI’s director through most of the 1990s, significantly expanded the number of legat offices, with an emphasis on countries in which terrorism was prevalent or countries that were important counterterrorism partners.146 Both the Islamabad, Pakistan, and Amman, Jordan, legats opened (in 1996 and 2001, respectively) during Freeh’s tenure.147 Similarly, part of the Bureau’s justification for establishing a legat at Almaty, Kazakhstan, was the country’s border with Iran, a state sponsor of terrorism.148 Following the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, counterterrorism work took on a new urgency. Under Director Robert Mueller, who entered office shortly before the attacks in September 2001, the FBI opened legats in a number of locations with significance to the global war on terrorism: Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates; Baghdad, Iraq; Doha, Qatar; Jakarta, Indonesia; Kabul, Afghanistan; Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia; Rabat, Morocco; and Sanaa, Yemen.149

Reassessment A routine criticism of the FBI is that it has historically relied too much on statistical analysis to assess the effectiveness of the work it does. The work of legats, which focuses on liaison and capacity building rather than investigations, does not lend itself to statistical evaluation. This has made legats bureaucratically vulnerable at times—especially prior to the 1980s, when the FBI’s extraterritorial counterterrorism responsibilities were clearly established. The continued existence of the Legal Attaché program, in some form or another since World War II, indicates that there has been a consistent strain of support within the Bureau for this

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function. Hearings during the late 1970s on the (ultimately unsuccessful) creation of a statutory charter for the FBI, articulated the value proposition for legats. These offices return substantial dividends on a modest investment. Their staffs are productively and efficiently occupied. Their skilled liaison with our counterparts in areas of the world where the domestic responsibilities of the FBI are effected [sic] by developments abroad plays a vital role in successfully carrying out our mission.

Furthermore, any reduction of the Legat program “would have adverse impacts on the other field investigative programs.”150 However, Bureau officials also indicated an uncertainty about how to quantify legats’ value. In a 1971 inspection, FBI official C. D. Brennan stated, “We are not in a position to balance the value of the information expected against the costs.”151 Two years later, another inspection report stated that although “it is recognized that some of the beneficial results of [Legats] are intangible commodities and that short-sighted economies could be detrimental to the Bureau’s interests, it remains essential that our foreign liaison responsibilities are discharged with fiscal care and efficiency.”152 The most virulent critique of the legal attaché came from an unexpected source: William Sullivan, a high-ranking Bureau official who had served in the SIS. In June 1971, Sullivan directed a scathing memorandum that negatively assessed the expansion of the FBI’s Legat program and how it would incur a cost of more than $1 million. Sullivan, in the memo, wrote, “Frankly, I do not think that what we are getting from our foreign liaison offices warrants such a tremendous expenditure.” With the memo, Sullivan took direct aim at the FBI’s offices in Tokyo (“the product is not worth the huge sum we have been spending on it”), Buenos Aires (“I do not think what we are getting out of this office is worth the large sum of money we are putting into it”), Bern (“I fail to see that the product coming out of this office . . . has in any way equaled the large expense involved”), and Madrid (which the Bureau had reopened in 1969).153 Hoover, with whom Sullivan’s relationship had gone from sycophantic to sour, was taken aback by Sullivan’s venomous critique.

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Four years earlier, in 1967, Sullivan had personally inspected the legat offices in Bern, Bonn, London, Paris, and Rome. In 1966, he had inspected the offices in Hong Kong and Tokyo (which he vilified in the 1971 memo).154 Hoover had encouraged Sullivan to make a clear-eyed assessment during the 1966 trip and “stressed to Mr. Sullivan [Hoover’s] desire to have him make a very penetrative examination in order to see whether we are producing sufficient work to maintain these distant offices.”155 Despite this invitation to provide a candid appraisal, Sullivan had instead been “generally laudatory of these operations” and in his 1971 diatribe cited no changes that would have prompted a reversal of his position.156 Interestingly, Sullivan’s early experiences with the FBI’s operations abroad had been mixed. In 1942, he had volunteered for the SIS.157 A Bureau instructor who was responsible for training individuals deploying under the auspices of the SIS suspected that Sullivan was “not the type who might operate successfully in a foreign field since it is felt that strange places, peoples, customs, etc., his difficulty in acquiring conversational Spanish, plus his condition of health would tend to be too great a barrier and a problem for him.”158 When Sullivan did obtain a confidential assignment outside of the Western Hemisphere in 1943, he returned to the United States approximately three months later, forty pounds lighter, under a “severe nervous strain,” and suffering from a stomach disorder and abdominal pains.159 One is left to wonder if Sullivan’s mid-1971 memo, in the midst of the Bureau’s push to expand abroad in support of the HILEV program, did not draw its vitriol from his earlier unsatisfying experience with foreign operations. Bureau coverage of the Pacific provides an example of how the FBI assessed and reassessed the distribution of legat posts. In 1961, the FBI established a legal attaché in Manila, Philippines, because of Manila’s central location in Southeast Asia.160 (The FBI had maintained an outpost in the Philippines between 1945 and 1946, in conjunction with its SIS program.)161 However, by 1969, the FBI was doubting the value of its Manila legat because the individual responsible for this assignment found himself spending a large portion of his time “on the road” covering all of Southeast Asia, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Australia.162 The FBI shut-

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tered the Manila office for the first time in July 1969, citing reasons of “economy and efficiency.”163 Hong Kong assumed the territory that Manila had covered.164 The Bureau considered several locations as replacements. Shortly before closing the Manila office, it identified Canberra, Australia, or Bangkok, Thailand, as more logical locations for coverage of Southeast Asia.165 Canberra, according to a 1971 memo, would cover Australia and New Zealand, alleviating the need for the Hong Kong legat to engage in its “present futile efforts to cover the area by road trip and give on-scene coverage to this huge area where our work has been increasing.” However, the primary function of a Canberra legat would be the development of HILEV items for the Nixon White House.166 Rather than pursuing the Canberra and Bangkok options, the FBI reopened the Manila office. In January 1972, the Bureau reestablished the Manila legat in conjunction with the relatively new HILEV initiative.167 This time, the office was to cover only the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand.168 The FBI established a Singapore legat office in April 1972, which took responsibility for territory, including Thailand and Malaysia, that the Manila legat had previously handled.169 The FBI would eventually open a Bangkok office in 1990 and one in Kuala Lumpur in 2004, after the 1971 plan for an office in this location came to naught.170 Reopening the Manila office was no easy feat. According to a 1972 internal FBI account, the legat encountered extremely poor weather and political instability. In addition, the legat had to develop new sources and contacts as well as renew former ones.171 This last problem, of course, was one of the FBI’s own making. By 1975, the establishment of an Australian legat had once again become an appealing concept for the FBI. A 1975 inspection report noted that “quantitatively and qualitatively the majority of [the Manila] Legat’s work is located in Australia” and thus a legat in that country would be preferable in both operational and economic terms. However, the FBI believed that the “internal political situation” in Australia indicated that 1975 “would not be an opportune time” to relocate the Manila office.172 The Bureau finally established a Canberra legat in 1982.173 It also shuttered

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The FBI Abroad

Manila again only to reopen it again in 1988 to address terrorism, the narcotics trade, and international organized crime.174 Manila is by no means the only example of the FBI constantly reassessing the value of legal attachés. In 1980, it closed the Buenos Aires legal attaché only to reestablish it in 1997.175 Buenos Aires itself had opened in 1967 to replace the Rio de Janeiro office.176 (Rio de Janeiro being, of course, an SIS legacy, having opened in July 1942.)177 In 1999, Legat Brasilia replaced Legat Montevideo after the FBI determined that the workload was insufficient to justify an office at the latter location.178 In 2006, Legat Astana replaced Legat Almaty, which had opened in 2000.179 1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 2. Director, FBI to Attaché, Paris, France, August 13, 1946, FBI 64-4104. 3. Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division, May 20, 1965, FBI 67-149000. 4. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 5. The Threat from Russian Organized Crime, Hearing Before the House Committee on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1996). 6. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2013, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 112th Cong., Pt. 2B (2012). 7. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 8. W. R. Wannall to Mr. Felt, Foreign Liaison Operations, July 28, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 9. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 10. Russian Organized Crime in the United States, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th Cong. (1996). 11. John Allen Muhammad, Document Fraud, and the Western Hemisphere Passport Exception, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Immigration, Border Security, and Claims of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003). 12. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Fiscal Year 2011, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 111-999 (2011). 13. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 14. US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2004), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0418 /final.pdf. 15. Terry McDermott and Josh Meyer, The Hunt for KSM (Boston: Little, Brown, 2012).

Notes

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16. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 17. Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Coast Guard and Maritime Transportation of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 110th Cong. (2007). 18. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. Accomplishment. Mexico–Venezuela (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 19. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 20. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Request for Bureau Lecturer, March 21, 1955, FBI 62-80750. 21. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 22. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Request for Bureau Lecturer, March 21, 1955. 23. Intelligence Division Inspection, 3/11/75–4/4/75, FBI 67-149000. 24. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 25. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, April 18, 1955, FBI 67-94639; H. L. Edwards to Mr. Mohr, Mexican Border Coverage, April 20, 1955, FBI 67-94639. 26. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971, FBI 67149000. 27. Intelligence Division Inspection, 3/11/75–4/4/75, FBI 67-149000. 28. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 29. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 30. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, April 18, 1955. 31. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 32. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 33. Cartha DeLoach, Hoover’s FBI (Washington, DC: Regnery, 1995). 34. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 35. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 4/2/70–4/17/70, April 23, 1970, FBI 67-149000. 36. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, Mexican Border Coverage, April 18, 1955, FBI 67-36842. 37. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 4/2/70–4/17/70, April 23, 1970. 38. L. V. Boardman to the Director, May 1955, FBI 67-94639. 39. L. V. Boardman to the Director, Special Agent Nathan L. Ferris, May 13, 1955, FBI 67-36842. 40. Sam J. Papich to the Director, Relations with CIA, March 5, 1970, FBI 62-80750. 41. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, Mexican Border Coverage, April 18, 1955. 42. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 4/2/70–4/17/70, April 23, 1970. 43. L. V. Boardman to the Director, Special Agent Nathan L. Ferris, May 13, 1955. 44. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, Mexican Border Coverage, April 18, 1955. 45. Director, FBI, to SAC San Diego, Counterintelligence—Border Coverage Program, January 9, 1961, FBI 100-43445. 46. Director, FBI, to SAC San Diego, Counterintelligence—Border Coverage Program, January 9, 1961. 47. J. H. Gale to Tolson, Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division, November 15–December 3, 1962, December 11, 1962 [Sizoo personnel file].

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48. Director, FBI, to SAC San Diego, Counterintelligence—Border Coverage Program, January 9, 1961. 49. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Fiscal Year 2011, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 111-999 (2011). 50. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 111-1001 (2010). 51. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1 52. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 53. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 54. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971, FBI 67149000. 55. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 56. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 57. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 58. Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Interview with Special Agent of the FBI Daniel A. Grove (1955–1979),” November 12, 2009, https://socxfbi.org/page/foundation. 59. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 60. W. C. Sullivan to the Director, FBI Foreign Liaison Program, June 16, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 61. Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Interview with Special Agent of the FBI Daniel A. Grove.” 62. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Contact Us: Overseas Offices,” https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/legal-attache-offices. 63. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 64. E. S. Miller to T. J. Smith, Statement by Congressman Leslie Aspin (DWisc.) Re: FBI’s INLET Program, April 5, 1973, FBI 65-73268. 65. T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, FBI Intelligence Letter for the President, Acronym: INLET, Research Matters, June 14, 1973, FBI 65-73268. 66. T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, FBI Intelligence Letter for the President, Acronym: INLET, Research Matters, June 14, 1973. 67. E. S. Miller to T. J. Smith, Statement by Congressman Leslie Aspin (DWisc.) Re: FBI’s INLET Program, April 5, 1973. 68. T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, FBI Intelligence Letter for the President, Code Name “INLET,” Research Matter, February 2, 1973, FBI 65-73268. 69. T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, FBI Intelligence Letter for the President, Acronym: INLET, Research Matters, June 14, 1973. 70. T. J. Smith to E. S. Miller, FBI Intelligence Letter for the President, Acronym: INLET, Research Matters, June 14, 1973. 71. Director, FBI, to Attaché, Paris, France, August 13, 1946, FBI 64-4104. 72. J. K. Ponder to Mr. Tolson, Foreign Operations—Legal Attaché Offices (LEGAT), September 14, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 73. Acting Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, Expansion of FBI Operations Overseas, June 20, 1973, FBI 62-80750. 74. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 75. C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, Re: Expansion of FBI Foreign Collection Efforts, September 21, 1970, FBI [Official & Confidential].

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76. Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan, July 21, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 77. J. K. Ponder to Mr. Tolson, Foreign Operations—Legal Attaché Offices (LEGAT), September 14, 1971. 78. Federal Bureau of Investigation, [Official & Confidential]; W.C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson, Re: Expansion of FBI Foreign Intelligence Collection Efforts, September 22, 1970). 79. W. C. Sullivan to the Director, FBI Foreign Liaison Program, June 16, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 80. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 81. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 82. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 83. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 84. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 85. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 86. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973. 87. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 88. J. K. Ponder to Mr. Tolson, Foreign Operations—Legal Attaché Offices (LEGAT), September 14, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 89. Memorandum for Mr. Sullivan, July 21, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 90. D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, Estimated Cost of Proposed Expansion of Foreign Liaison, June 8, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 91. J. K. Ponder to Mr. Tolson, Foreign Operations—Legal Attaché Offices (LEGAT), September 14, 1971. 92. J. K. Ponder to Mr. Tolson, Foreign Operations—Legal Attaché Offices (LEGAT), September 14, 1971; Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 93. W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, Re: Expansion of Foreign Liaison, May 27, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 94. W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, Expansion of Foreign Liaison, May 28, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 95. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973. 96. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 97. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 98. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 99. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 100. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson, Estimated Cost of Proposed Expansion of Foreign Liaison, June 7, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 101. J. K. Ponder to Tolson, Disagreements Involving Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan, September 9, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 102. J. K. Ponder to Tolson, Disagreements Involving Assistant to the Director William C. Sullivan, September 9, 1971. 103. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 104. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 105. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973.

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106. Acting Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, Expansion of FBI Operations Overseas, June 20, 1973, FBI 62-80750. 107. Intelligence Division Inspection, 3/11/75–4/4/75, August 7, 1975, FBI 67-149000. 108. D. J. Dalbey to Mr. Tolson, Estimated Cost of Proposed Expansion of Foreign Liaison, June 8, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 109. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 110. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973. 111. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 112. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973; Legal Attaché Bonn to Director, John Howard Lawson, IS-C, April 10, 1967, FBI 100-370750, National Archives, College Park, MD. 113. Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Interview with Former Special Agent of the FBI Daniel A Grove (1955–1979),” November 12, 2009, https://socxfbi.org/page/foundation. 114. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969, FBI [Official & Confidential. Section 1]. 115. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 116. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 117. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 118. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969. 119. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973; W. C. Sullivan to the Director, FBI Foreign Liaison Program, June 16, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential. Section 1]. 120. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973; Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973. 121. Central Intelligence Agency, Chief FBIS, For: Bureau Chiefs, Subject: Letter of Information, September 20, 1963, General CIA Records, Doc. No. CIARDP83-00586R000300240004-1, National Archives, College Park, MD, https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp83-00586r000300240004-1. 122. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969. 123. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 124. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973. 125. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 126. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1989, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., Pt. 6 (1988); Intelligence Division Inspection 3/11/75–4/4/75, August 7, 1975, FBI 67-149000. 127. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 128. Intelligence Division Inspection, 3/11/75–4/4/75, August 7, 1975. 129. C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, Re: Expansion of FBI Foreign Collection Efforts, September 21, 1970, FBI [Official & Confidential. Section 1]. 130. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973. 131. C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, Re: Expansion of FBI Foreign Collection Efforts, September 21, 1970. 132. Acting Director, FBI, to the Attorney General, Expansion of FBI Operations Overseas, June 20, 1973, FBI 62-80750.

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133. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973. 134. Intelligence Division Inspection 3/11/75–4/4/75, FBI 67-149000. 135. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-422 (1996). 136. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998). 137. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 138. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-422 (1996). 139. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on General Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998). 140. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 141. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 142. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 143. Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2007, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 109th Cong., Pt. 10 (2006). 144. FBI Oversight and Authorization, Fiscal Year 1993, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1992). 145. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 146. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Vol. II, S. Rep. No. 107-351, H. Rep. No. 107-792 (2002). 147. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2003, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 108th Cong., Pt. 10 (2003). 148. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 149. Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2007, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 109th Cong., Pt. 10 (2006). 150. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 151. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 152. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 153. W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson, Estimated Cost of Proposed Expansion of Foreign Liaison, June 7, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential. Section 1]. 154. R. R. Beaver to the Director, Re: Expansion of Foreign Liaison, June 18, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential. Section 1]. 155. J. Edgar Hoover, memorandum for Mr. Tolson, December 9, 1966, FBI 67-205182.

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156. R. R. Beaver to the Director, Re: Expansion of Foreign Liaison, June 18, 1971. 157. Sullivan to the Director, May 25, 1942, FBI 67-205182; Sullivan to Director, Re: Office of Preference, November 14, 1942, FBI 67-205182. 158. Joseph F. Santoiana, Jr., memorandum for Mr. Clegg, Re: Special Agent William C. Sullivan Spanish Language Training, August 3, 1942, FBI 67-205182. 159. C. H. Carson, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: W. C. Sullivan, March 11, 1943, FBI 67-205182. 160. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 161. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948, FBI 62-80750. 162. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969. 163. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 164. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 165. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969. 166. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 167. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 168. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 169. Intelligence Division Inspection, 3/11/75–4/4/75, August 7, 1975. 170. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Thinking Local, Acting Global: FBI Opens Office in Malaysia,” July 7, 2004, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2004 /july/malaysia_legat070904. 171. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 10, 1973. 172. Intelligence Division Inspection, 3/11/75–4/4/75, August 7, 1975. 173. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., Pt. 7 (1982). 174. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Legat Manila: Then and Now,” August 20, 2013, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/legal-attach-manila -then-and-now. 175. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., Pt. 1 (1981); DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 176. H. L. Child, Jr., to Mr. Tolson, Re: The Legal Attaché Program, May 23, 1969. 177. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 178. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 103rd Cong., Pt. 1 (2009). 179. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 103rd Cong., Pt. 1 (2009).

7 Modern FBI Priorities

THE FAR-FLUNG NETWORK OF LEGATS (SEE TABLE 7.1) exists to advance the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s missions and associated objectives. As such, legats’ investigative priorities mirror the priorities of the Bureau, which, of course, are not immutable given the changes in threats that new technologies, economic realities, and political alignments create.1 Successive directors have noted the growing and diversified number of FBI responsibilities. J. Edgar Hoover viewed the Bureau as engaging in two types of work, internal security and general criminal investigations.2 By 1980, the Bureau articulated its three priorities as white-collar crime, organized crime, and foreign counterintelligence.3 Then, Director William Webster added a fourth— terrorism.4 By 1990, according to Webster’s successor, William Sessions, the FBI had six priority programs: organized crime, drug enforcement, counterterrorism, white-collar crime, crimes of violence, and foreign counterintelligence.5 By 2019, the FBI had eight priorities: protect the United States from terrorist attacks; protect the United States against foreign intelligence operations and espionage; protect the United States against cyber-based attacks and high-technology crimes; combat public corruption at all levels; protect civil rights; combat transnational/national criminal organizations and enterprises; combat major white-collar crime; and combat significant violent crime.6

169

170 Table 7.1 Modern Legat Presence Americas Bogota, Colombia Brasilia, Brazil Bridgetown, Barbados Buenos Aires, Argentina Caracas, Venezuela Mexico City, Mexico

Ottawa, Canada Panama City, Panama Santiago, Chile Santo Domingo, Dominican Republic San Salvador, El Salvador Africa

Accra, Ghana Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Algiers, Algeria Cairo, Egypt Dakar, Senegal

Lagos, Nigeria Nairobi, Kenya Pretoria, South Africa Rabat, Morocco Asia

Bangkok, Thailand Beijing, China Canberra, Australia Hong Kong, China Jakarta, Indonesia Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

Manila, Philippines New Delhi, India Phnom Penh, Cambodia Seoul, South Korea Singapore, Singapore Tokyo, Japan Eurasia

Astana, Kazakhstan Ankara, Turkey Athens, Greece Bucharest, Romania Budapest, Hungary Kyiv, Ukraine

Moscow, Russia Riga, Latvia Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina Sofia, Bulgaria Tbilisi, Georgia Warsaw, Poland Europe

Berlin, Germany Bern, Switzerland Brussels, Belgium Copenhagen, Denmark London, England

Madrid, Spain Paris, France Rome, Italy The Hague, Netherlands Vienna, Austria Middle East

Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates Amman, Jordan Baghdad, Iraq Doha, Qatar Islamabad, Pakistan

Kabul, Afghanistan Riyadh, Saudi Arabia Sanaa, Yemen Tel Aviv, Israel

Source: Courtesy of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Office of Public Affairs.

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Counterterrorism Although counterterrorism immediately conjures images of September 11, al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State, the role of legats in combating terrorism predates these modern manifestations. The London legat, as of the early 1970s, was handling work pertaining to developments in Northern Ireland. Specific cases related to Irish matters included arms trafficking and Neutrality Act investigations. The Tel Aviv legat also handled a variety of terrorism-related issues on both the Arab and Israeli sides of the conflict, especially as it played out in the United States. As of 1973, the Israeli government had provided the FBI with informants, who the Israelis had previously operated and who the Bureau believed would be valuable in its investigation of Arab terrorist activities in the United States. The legat in Tel Aviv also addressed the issue of the extremist Jewish Defense League. Additionally, the FBI’s legat in Manila helped to disrupt potential political violence by gaining access between January and March 1973 to voluminous material regarding the Pacific Counseling Service—a front for a Marxist revolutionary movement— and as a result identifying four hundred persons associated with subversive activities.7 Libya, during the 1980s, emerged as a significant sponsor of terrorism against US interests. As of 1983, the legat in Bonn played a critical role in developing information about former Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) members who were responsible for training Libyan terrorists.8 In 1988, the Bureau assured Congress that the Legal Attaché program was “directly responsible for worldwide investigative initiatives against terrorists, including the arrest and extradition of fugitives to stand trial for their crimes.”9 The dissolution of the Soviet Union made the 1990s a different type of threat environment than the Cold War setting in which the modern Legat program had come of age. As the director of Central Intelligence R. James Woolsey famously said about the post–Cold War era, “We have slain a large dragon. But we live now in a jungle filled with a bewildering variety of poisonous snakes. And in many ways, the dragon was easier to keep track of.”10 During the 1990s, the FBI specifically expanded its

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legal attaché coverage to improve its ability to liaise with foreign governments on issues of terrorism.11 According to Louis Freeh, who served as the FBI’s director for much of the decade, the FBI reopened its Tel Aviv legat (1996) and established posts in Ankara (2000), Cairo (1996), and Islamabad (1996) with its counterterrorism mission in mind.12 Concerns about terrorism also informed the FBI’s reopening of its legat in Brasilia (1999), because suspected terrorists were present in the triborder region at the convergence of Brazil, Argentina, and Paraguay. Similarly, the legat in Bangkok (1990) handled a variety of “sensitive and volatile” matters, including terrorism.13 Legats played important roles in some of the significant terrorism cases of the 1990s. An FBI legal attaché facilitated the investigation—which ultimately led to the capture—of Eyal Ismail, who was then charged with participating in the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center.14 FBI legal attachés also contributed to the capture and indictment of Ramzi Yousef, who was part of the Bojinka plot to bomb airliners over the Pacific Ocean and who also faced charges for his involvement in the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.15 The September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon were not indicative of a new trend in global threats but rather the escalation of issues that had percolated over the previous decade. Legats had a role in the frantic attempts to develop information about the “20th hijacker,” Zacarias Moussaoui. The FBI’s Minneapolis field office identified Moussaoui based on a tip from a flight school at which Moussaoui was enrolled.16 Minneapolis requested information on Moussaoui, who was traveling in the United States on a French passport, from the FBI’s legal attaché in Paris.17 The legat in London also attempted to acquire information for Minneapolis, because Moussaoui had, at one point, resided in London.18 In the aftermath of the attacks, the legats assumed an expanded role. The Bureau dispatched almost three hundred agents and eightyfive nonagent employees to more than thirty legal attaché offices to pursue leads and coordinate the investigation of the attacks with foreign counterparts.19

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Counterintelligence Counterintelligence—in the sense of foreign countries attempting to achieve an informational advantage vis-à-vis the United States—by definition has an international component. From its beginnings tracking down foreign spies in Latin America, the FBI Legal Attaché program has played a significant role in the Bureau’s counterintelligence mission. Some of the legats’ counterintelligence work is the result of established partnerships. For instance, by 1973 Legat London had achieved very close liaison with British authorities on matters including the “identification of Soviet agents in the free world.”20 Furthermore, the FBI’s partnerships with foreign security services have produced leads that have furthered specific investigations. In one instance, the FBI obtained information from cooperative foreign sources that led to the arrest and conviction of individuals who were attempting to acquire sensitive military hardware and provide it to a hostile foreign power. Thanks to a legal attaché in a European country, the FBI was able to obtain the evidence needed to convict the individuals on conspiracy to violate the Export Control Act.21 This series of events prevented a US adversary from obtaining capabilities and underlying knowledge that would have posed a threat to American interests. Legal attachés have also facilitated the ferreting out of US and foreign nationals spying on behalf of a foreign power. The FBI’s legat in Paris worked with the French government to develop information about the espionage activities of Joseph George Helmich.22 In January 1963, Helmich, while stationed in France, had walked into the Soviet embassy in Paris with classified teletype tape, accepted money from Soviet military intelligence (the GRU), and spent the next several years spying for the Soviet Union.23 Helmich pled guilty in late 1981 to one count of espionage after being indicted on four counts.24 The case against John Walker—a Naval warrant officer who spied on behalf of the Soviet Union for eighteen years—involved contributions by no fewer than seven legal attaché offices.25 In Tokyo, the FBI’s legal attaché directed an investigation pertaining to espionage activities in Japan by an individual with experience in US military intelligence.26

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Congressional testimony from the early 1980s draws several intriguing allusions to the role of FBI legats in uncovering foreign “illegal” (i.e., nonofficial cover) intelligence officers. In 1980, a legal attaché obtained information from a Western European country about an illegal who had moved to the United States. This illegal, after being arrested during a business trip to Europe, admitted to the legat that he was, indeed, an officer of a hostile intelligence service.27 A similar instance involved a reverse flow of information between the legat and a Western European country. Through an FBI double agent, a legat obtained information regarding a Western European resident in contact with intelligence officers in a third country. Using the information, the Western European country’s intelligence service was able to initiate an operation against the resident.28 Some of the legats’ counterintelligence work reflects ongoing conditions in a country rather than the presence of a single spy. For instance, according to a 1973 inspection report, the Russian embassy in Mexico was an extremely active establishment, which meant that the legat became involved in a number of important espionage cases involving Russian diplomats, “illegals,” double agents, and contact cases. Furthermore, the legat’s sources covered American citizens who were traveling to Cuba via air from Mexico City, where the Cubans had an embassy (which they were denied in the United States). Finally, the Bureau was interested in Mexico City because of the presence of a diplomatic establishment representing Communist China (which, like Cuba, did not have a USbased embassy).29 Mexico was not the only country that contained unique entities of ongoing interest. Legat Paris, according to a 1971 inspection, had fielded a “flow of security matters” due to the presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s headquarters, located in Brussels, which was under the legat’s purview.30

Criminal Investigations The criminal activities that the FBI has responsibility for disrupting often connect to the international setting. As the Bureau assessed in 2006, “International cases have become the rule, rather than the

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exception.”31 Broadly speaking, the Bureau must contend with criminal enterprises that originate overseas but have an impact on US interests; US threat actors who have, embarrassingly, exported criminality to foreign countries; and fugitives from justice who have fled the United States. In many cases, these categories of criminality overlap. Furthermore, technology has facilitated criminal actors’ increasingly global reach. Finally, geopolitics and geoeconomics provide context for certain criminal activities. This means that the Bureau must position its legats where crime currently arises at the same time it attempts to anticipate developments that will create new vulnerabilities threat actors can exploit. Disrupting International Criminal Activities Originating Abroad The problem of international organized crime is not new, but it is persistent. FBI legal attachés have worked to counter criminal activity as changes in the global environment have created new vulnerabilities that threat actors can exploit. For instance, the FBI noted in 1997 that Asian, Italian, and Colombian groups had taken advantage of Brazil’s economic growth and its weak federal controls to establish themselves in the country. The Bureau premised its reopening of the Brasilia legat in 1999 on this assessment. Similarly, in 1997 the FBI attributed the growth of Russian organized crime to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Bureau sought to reopen a legat in Copenhagen, Denmark—which it did in 1999— as one element of its response to this increased criminal threat. The response was explicitly twofold: provision of information, which would help Scandinavian law enforcement to identify organized crime entities, and acquisition of information from Scandinavian authorities about organized crime entities and activities in the United States. The Bureau also expanded its presence to cover Prague, Czech Republic, to combat the Russian organized crime threat, which was moving into that country.32 Geopolitics of a clandestine sort has also informed the expansion of the Bureau’s Legat program. Part of the push to open a Prague legat was the Bureau’s awareness that Russian and Italian criminal figures had met in that city to discuss the division of territory.33

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Foreign governments and nonstate political actors are not the only entities that seek to control territory—criminals do, too, and the US government, including the FBI, needs to understand how this can change the balance of power in a given region. In addition to established criminal networks, the FBI’s Legat program has addressed specific forms of crime that conditions abroad have facilitated. For instance, the Bureau made an argument for establishing a legat in Prague (which opened in 2000) on the basis of its assessment that Prague had become “a haven for international fraud as a result of its rapid privatization and entrance into the international banking community.” The FBI also justified the opening—in 1999—of a legat office in Lagos, Nigeria, with the argument that doing so would help to curb the impact of Nigerian criminal enterprises in the United States.34 Smuggling, of both narcotics and humans, is an activity that exploits a permissive environment, with smugglers taking routes they assess to be paths of least resistance. The FBI has directed its presence abroad to halting trafficking of various sorts. In the late 1990s, the Bureau cited the Czech Republic’s presence on the Balkan route for smuggling narcotics into Western Europe as part of the justification for opening a legat office in Prague.35 The FBI also identified its legats in Bangkok, Thailand, and Rome, Italy, as combating alien smuggling, with the former focusing on organizations based in Bangkok and on activities transiting Thailand, and the latter addressing smuggling of aliens from Balkan countries.36 Policing Unsavory Exports The FBI’s foreign presence must also address the reality that malfeasance originating in the United States can spill over into the rest of the world. This is not simply a criminal problem but potentially a diplomatic one—again emphasizing the unanticipated role of criminality in geopolitics. Prior to the Cuban revolution, the FBI maintained a legal attaché office in Havana, a holdover from the Special Intelligence Service (SIS) days. The legat oversaw the surveillance of Americans who had gambling interests in Havana.37 Legat coverage in Havana included the use of multiple criminal informants.38 The Bureau also afforded simi-

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lar coverage to individuals in Europe. According to a 1972 inspection report, the legat in Rome was successful in developing coverage of organized crime figures who had relocated to Italy.39 More recently, the FBI has helped international partners disrupt gang-related activity that originated in the United States. Part of the Bureau’s reason for reopening its Copenhagen legat was to address Danish and Swedish police commissioners’ concerns about rising levels of violence in their countries associated with US-based motorcycle gangs.40 Then, in 2006, the FBI announced that it would open a legat office in San Salvador, El Salvador, for the intended purpose of working with law enforcement in that country to target the leadership of MS-13.41 Although MS-13 is a transnational street gang with strong ties to El Salvador, it originated in Los Angeles, California.42 On at least one occasion, legats have assisted in capturing a fugitive linked to a US-based gang. In 1996, the FBI announced the arrest and extradition to the United States from Tanzania of Kobi Mowatt, a former Washington, DC, gang member responsible for multiple acts of murder, robbery, kidnapping, and drug dealing.43 From time to time, legats have provided security support to US dignitaries present in legats’ areas of responsibility. For instance, in 1961, the legat in Mexico City reported that, at the request of the US ambassador, he had met Edward M. Kennedy upon Kennedy’s arrival at the airport in Mexico City. (The legat also notified the Bureau that Kennedy was interested in meeting with “leftists.”) 44 Several years later, the legat in Manila took an active role in ensuring the security of the president of the United States during his visit to the Philippines. In 1966, the legat notified the Bureau that his office was “the only one in the entire Embassy taking the position that the security problem in connection with the President’s visit is a serious one requiring more than complete dependence on the Filipinos to accomplish and provide adequate protection.” The legat skeptically observed that “the attitude of Embassy officials seems to be that of hoping that the Filipinos will be on good behavior; that police will somehow be able to do the job which is their responsibility; and the President will not expose himself more than absolutely necessary.”45

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There are also some tantalizing indications that the FBI’s legats on occasion contributed to the FBI’s counterintelligence program (COINTELPRO) and similar operations that were directed at disrupting the activities of groups the Bureau deemed to be subversive. A 1962 inspection report assessed that the Bureau’s Domestic Intelligence Division had “closely supervised disruptive and counterintelligence activities against the Communist Party” in Mexico.46 The FBI had initiated its COINTELPRO campaign against the Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA)—a bought-andpaid-for proxy of the Soviet Union—in 1956. According to a 1956 FBI HQ memorandum, the objective of COINTELPRO in terms of the CPUSA was to “further the rift inside the [CPUSA] without any embarrassment to the Bureau” and, by the “adroit movement of specially selected informants inside the [CPUSA,] . . . increase the disagreements among Party leaders.”47 Subsequently, the FBI used its Paris legat in furtherance of disruption operations against militant and other African American entities. Although the Bureau did not formally initiate a distinct COINTELPRO campaign against “Black Nationalist Hate Groups” until mid-1967, it was already seeking to sow disruption in this constituency as of 1966. When Black Panther Party leader Eldridge Cleaver, who was then in Algeria, received an anonymous letter that claimed BPP elements in California were attempting to undermine his influence, Cleaver surmised that the letter had originated with the BPP representative in Scandinavia. In reality this letter was the handiwork of the FBI. After receipt of the letter, Cleaver had three of the BPP’s international representatives expelled from the party. Encouraged by its apparent success, the Bureau directed its legat in Paris to mail a follow-up letter that again would appear to come from Connie Matthews, the BPP’s Scandinavian representative, to the BPP’s chief of staff in Oakland, California, suggesting that Cleaver had “tripped out” and encouraging the Oakland faction to “take some immediate action.” The FBI’s instructions to the legat were for the legat to mail this letter when Matthews was in, or had recently passed through, Paris en route from Algeria.48

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The Paris legat also assisted the Bureau in its campaign against Martin Luther King Jr., who was hardly in the same menacing category as the BPP. Nevertheless, in 1966, the legat requested permission from the FBI to inform the pastor of the American church in Paris of King’s background “in an effort to convince him that his continued support of [King] may result in embarrassment for [the pastor] and [the church].”49 This activity represented an unsavory reversal of the role of legats in exporting American vices to foreign countries. Instead, the FBI’s disruption of King’s visit represented the exportation of hate.

Establishing Norms Through its legats, the FBI, since the establishment of its police liaison program in the 1940s, has helped countries establish professional law enforcement services. This, ideally, helps to solidify the rule of law, especially in emerging democracies. Although institutions of civil society have not always taken root in the areas where the FBI has worked to improve law enforcement, the Bureau’s contribution to this process has been laudatory. The assistance it provides is nothing less than an implement of diplomacy, which enhances not only the FBI’s investigative mission but also the United States’ bilateral relationships. It also brings practical benefits by leveraging the capabilities of local security services to assist the FBI in disrupting transnational criminality. After the end of the Cold War, the FBI made a concerted effort to assist former Eastern Bloc countries to develop professional and accountable security services. In 1992, the FBI explained that the disintegration of communism in the Eastern Bloc prompted it to address emerging democracies’ law enforcement needs.50 The Bureau initiated an endeavor, starting in October 1994, to provide countries in the former Soviet Union and Eastern and Central Europe with law enforcement training assistance. As the FBI explained to Congress, “Training and assistance significantly enhances the development of criminal law enforcement institutions in these foreign countries by introducing western law enforcement investigative techniques applied under the rule of law.”51

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Director Louis Freeh noted of the former Eastern Bloc states, “What they have not been doing well, and what they do not have anybody else to teach them except the Americans, is the rule of law which we steadfastly and persistently apply to all of our efforts. . . . We need to teach them the police ethics, the protocols that we use, the notions of due process.”52 Internationally focused FBI programs to train foreign law enforcement forces have been an element that US diplomacy has leveraged since World War II. The police liaison function under the auspices of the SIS was an early example of this. During the Cold War, the FBI handled police training on behalf of the US Agency for International Development.53 After the Cold War, the Bureau continued to understand its role in the context of American diplomacy. Speaking in 1994, a deputy assistant director in the FBI’s Criminal Division explained that “enhancing basic law enforcement capabilities and establishing law enforcement institutions which honor basic human rights” in countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet Commonwealth of Independent States, advanced US foreign policy objectives.54 The State Department’s funding of Bureau programs confirms the FBI’s role as an integral part of US foreign policy. A State Department–funded International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, which provided professional criminal law enforcement training to developing countries’ law enforcement components, included the FBI as a participant.55 Furthermore, the Department of State Freedom Support Act and Support for Eastern European Democracies program provided resources for Bureau training and technical assistance to foreign law enforcement elements.56 FBI efforts to combat financial crime provides one example of how the Bureau’s law enforcement elements integrate with State Department objectives. The FBI’s International Training & Assistance Unit worked on behalf of the State Department’s Financial Action Task Force to train Hungarian law enforcement, industrial, and banking personnel on topics of money laundering and asset forfeiture.57 The FBI as a security service engages in specialized diplomacy that involves leveraging its law enforcement expertise. A corner-

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stone of these efforts is what the Bureau refers to as “cop-to-cop” partnerships.58 In an effort to advance this approach, the FBI proposed expanding its legat presence. It specifically highlighted the role that a new post in Ankara, Turkey (which the Bureau proposed in 1997 and which ultimately opened in 2000), would play in enhancing the FBI’s overall working relationship with Turkish officials, building on the already-good working relationship it maintained with the Turkish National Police and the Istanbul Police Department.59 The FBI’s existing presence also assumed new responsibilities after the Cold War. For instance, the Vienna, Austria, legat (which had opened in 1992) handled the development of cooperative relationships with police officials in Hungary, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Moldova, Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania.60 In addition to its significant role in enhancing international norms that promote respect for the rule of law and in strengthening US diplomatic relations, the FBI’s assistance through training to foreign security services assists the Bureau in its efforts to combat transnational criminal activity. In 1996, the FBI advised Congress that by “providing training and assistance to foreign law enforcement . . . the FBI gains immeasurable benefits in unprecedented coordination of international investigations, while at the same time, improving the quality of the investigative product received from those countries.”61 Nearly a decade later, Director Robert Mueller III made a similar assessment, stating, “Investments in improving foreign law enforcement capabilities through training and outreach will, in the long term, improve the quality and degree of cooperation we receive on matters of common interest.”62 International Training and Education The FBI, through its National Academy program, started developing “cop-to-cop” partnerships decades before the term came into common usage by Bureau officials in the 1990s. By 1942, the Bureau’s National (Police) Academy, which started in 1935, had matriculated participants from the Quebec Provincial Police (Canada), New Scotland Yard (United Kingdom), Municipal Police (Shanghai, China), and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.63 Hoover remained committed to this international engagement even after

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the Bureau was out of the foreign intelligence field, telling Congress in 1951 that the National Academy had graduates from “many foreign countries.”64 In 1962, President John F. Kennedy— whose administration, through initiatives such as the Peace Corps, had demonstrated a commitment to capacity building— directed the FBI to extend its National Academy program to foreign partners.65 Starting in 1963, the FBI began reserving up to twenty spaces in National Academy classes for officials from nonUS police agencies.66 By 2007, 10 percent of the spaces in each of the four annual National Academy classes were reserved for students from foreign law enforcement agencies.67 Foreign graduates of the National Academy program fulfill a similar role—facilitation of FBI missions in those graduates’ areas of responsibility—that Hoover anticipated state and local officials would play. In 1964, an FBI inspection reported that the Bureau’s foreign liaisons would assist the Bureau in maintaining contact with police agencies abroad, which would provide “the benefit of firsthand knowledge concerning developments in [those agencies’] countries.”68 This expectation, on the Bureau’s part, has remained consistent across decades. A 2003 Congressional Research Service report explained that through the National Academy, the FBI has built a cadre of international contacts who could provide assistance with international criminal investigations.69 In 2004, a Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General (DoJ IG) assessment highlighted the specific function of legal attachés in these relationships, specifically the legats’ responsibilities for maintaining close contacts with the graduates of the National Academy who were present in the legats’ territories, meeting with graduates regularly on matters of mutual interest, and holding periodic training for National Academy graduates.70 International Law Enforcement Academy In addition to its National Academy at Quantico, the FBI also conducts significant training of foreign law enforcement officials through the International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA). The ILEA, located in Budapest, Hungary, began operating in April 1995. Appropriately, the FBI’s National Academy program pro-

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vides the model for ILEA, which the FBI leads and the State Department funds.71 Although the Bureau is responsible for the operation of ILEA, the faculty represents a cross section of US law enforcement agencies and on occasion features instructors from other countries and from the European Law Enforcement College.72 ILEA, according to the FBI, was a direct outcome of a delegation of federal law enforcement leaders that Director Louis Freeh led to Central and Eastern Europe. The delegation’s purpose was to assess whether the United States and countries in the region could develop new, joint anticrime programs.73 Cooperation with Eastern European states on ILEA presented the FBI with the challenge of overcoming a legacy of politically driven policing that had become entrenched under Communist regimes. The specific purpose of the academy was, therefore, to train managers of “non-partisan law enforcement agencies” from Russia and Central and Eastern European countries.74 ILEA focuses on creating a principled cadre of law enforcement professionals. According to Freeh, the Bureau sought input from US embassies and country contacts to vet the “character, the integrity, and the honesty” of participating officials. Furthermore, Freeh indicated that the ILEA refused to train intelligence officers.75 The curriculum for ILEA is multifaceted and responsive to both the needs of participants and the priorities of the United States. A standard ILEA offering is an eight-week professional development program, similar to the one the FBI offers at Quantico.76 Additionally, ILEA offers curricula tailored to the needs of specific countries. Offerings have included counterterrorismrelated instruction. For instance, in 1997, the FBI and Department of Defense (DoD) provided counterproliferation training—one objective of which was to prevent terrorist groups from obtaining nuclear materials—to officers from Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.77 Following the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States, counterterrorism became an even greater priority for the ILEA. In 2003, the FBI’s deputy assistant director for counterterrorism noted that former Soviet bloc countries that had participated in ILEA had transferred their emphasis from traditional organized crime and white-collar crime to counterterrorism activity.78

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Budapest was the first ILEA location. In 1998, the United States, in conjunction with the government of Thailand, established a Bangkok ILEA facility.79 Then, in 2000, the United States partnered with the government of Botswana to open an ILEA campus in Gaborone that would train personnel from member states of the Southern African Development Community, East Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa.80 The United States and the government of El Salvador officially opened an ILEA facility at San Salvador in late 2005. 81 This facility serves officials from the Caribbean as well as Central and South America.82 There is also an ILEA facility on US soil, in Roswell, New Mexico. No, the Roswell location is not an attempt to take international collaboration to an intergalactic level. Rather, the focus of this ILEA facility, according to the US Department of State, is to enable participants to “efficiently combat crime in their respective countries and, at the same time, prevent the movement of transnational criminal elements into the United States and throughout the world.” Unlike the other ILEA locations, which emphasize a regional approach, the Roswell ILEA provides training to a global student body.83

Training to Advance Specific Missions In addition to the National Academy and ILEA, the FBI has provided specialized training to foreign security services. This certainly serves US interests and focuses on areas of concern to the country’s decisionmakers. However, in the process of imparting expertise that helps foreign governments help the United States, the Bureau also enhances global security. Counterproliferation In the decade following the Cold War, significant international concern focused on the idea that a malignant state or nonstate actor could acquire nuclear material, which the dissolution of the Soviet Union had potentially set loose. Senators Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar had established the groundwork for post– Cold War counterproliferation and ultimately succeeded with

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the passage of the Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991, which authorized the DoD to transfer $400 million from existing accounts to support counterproliferation efforts.84 The FBI, in conjunction with the DoD, attempted to proactively address the possibility of proliferation by providing training to foreign governments that might be impacted. The FBI took a significant step in 1995 toward facilitating international counterproliferation cooperation. During April of that year, the Bureau hosted the International Law Enforcement Conference on Nuclear Smuggling at its academy in Quantico, Virginia. This event reflected the concerns raised by Nunn and Lugar in that it was conducted under the auspices of the Freedom Support Act, a 1992 law with included $400 million in Nunn-Lugar funding.85 The conference included 150 law enforcement officials from twenty-three countries, including Russia—specifically its Federal Security Bureau (FSB) and Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD)—and newly independent former Soviet states.86 This conference focused on topics such as nuclear materials and weapons proliferation from the countries of the former Soviet Union, counterproliferation proposals, and training initiatives.87 Countries attending the conference tended to agree that there was not a “buyer’s market” for nuclear materials. Individuals engaged in nuclear smuggling were doing so opportunistically rather than in furtherance of terrorist activities.88 In response to congressional action, the FBI and the DoD initiated a counterproliferation program in the mid-1990s that included a significant training component. In 1995, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) directed the Department of Defense to implement two joint International Counterproliferation Program (ICPP) initiatives. One would entail a partnership between the DoD and the FBI, and the other would partner the DoD with US Customs.89 The 1995 NDAA legislation obligated training funds for a joint FBI–DoD-implemented program to support training related to weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) for the Baltic countries, Eastern Europe, and the Republics of the former Soviet Union.90 Training objectives included enhancing the capacity of countries to deter, detect, investigate, and respond to

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crimes involving WMDs.91 Consistent with the 1995 conference, the ICPP emphasized the potential role of organized crime entities in proliferation.92 The FBI focused its participation in the ICPP on training law enforcement officials and their respective agencies.93 The FBI and DoD established groundwork for the ICPP during the next year. In 1996, Congress learned that the DoD and FBI were in the process of submitting a joint counterproliferation program report to legislators that would provide information about plans to provide international training seminars on nuclear smuggling. During the same year, the FBI notified Congress that an FBI team had conducted a training assessment in the Czech Republic in conjunction with the Bureau’s legat in Vienna. A team of FBI representatives from the international coordination unit, the FBI Laboratory, and the engineering section met with officials from Czech law enforcement, nuclear safety entities, and Rez Institute faculty members. According to the FBI, “the information provided by the Czechs, with regard to their specific requirements, will result in establishing a training prototype for other countries requesting support in counterproliferation matters.”94 However, the FBI was slow to implement its portion of the ICPP. Until fiscal year 2001, the FBI’s contribution to the ICPP consisted of only an ILEA-hosted awareness seminar for high-level government officials. This seminar for parliamentarians, members of the presidential office, judges, and law enforcement personnel focused on examples of successful legislative and law enforcement techniques. The sluggish pace of the Bureau’s efforts in the early years of the ICPP is indicated by the fact that although the FBI received approximately $1 million from the DoD between 1997 and 2001, it spent less than half of this funding. In 2001, the FBI began to enhance its training activities. It started to provide courses beyond the ILEA seminar pitched at the law enforcement officers who were responsible for investigating and responding to smuggling incidents. An example of these new offerings was a training that used practical exercises that simulated the seizure of nuclear or other smuggled material. Other new courses included crime scene management and crisis management.95

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Transnational Criminality Although the FBI has a long-established practice of training foreign police agencies through its National Academy program, the 1990s saw a significant expansion of the Bureau’s outreach to agencies in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. This was part of the United States’ broader response to the peace dividend at the end of the Cold War. While the US government reduced its defense and intelligence resources, it shifted its focus to strengthening international cooperation. Through this approach, the United States sought a dual objective of enhancing the fight against transnational criminality and filling the political vacuum created by the disintegration of Soviet-imposed communism with liberal, democratic regimes that respected the rule of law. The FBI launched its efforts to develop links with law enforcement agencies in the former Eastern Bloc during the first part of the 1990s. An early foray into this field involved a supervisory special agent (SSA) working in the European/Asian organized crime unit, who, in 1993, provided training in Poland on organized crime and money laundering techniques.96 (The FBI would eventually open its legat in Warsaw, Poland, in 1997.)97 Later that year, two SSAs from the same unit provided forty-hour training sessions on organized crime investigations and the “enterprise theory of investigation”—the identification of a criminal organization and its activities, with an eye toward forfeiture—to counterparts in Hungary (where the FBI would launch an operational task force in 2000 in conjunction with Hungarian authorities) and the Czech Republic (a legat would open at Prague in 2000).98 These initial forays presaged a more systematic approach to training the services of formerly hostile states. According to the FBI, it began providing instruction to countries in the former Soviet Union as well as Eastern and Central Europe in October 1994. The Bureau, at the invitation of a country, would conduct an assessment of the country’s training needs.99 By 1996, the FBI was off to a strong start with this process, having conducted analyses of capabilities in Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Romania, and Ukraine. In addition to these formerly Soviet-dominated countries, the FBI also

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conducted assessments of India, Paraguay, Peru, Tunisia, and Uruguay.100 After the assessment, the Bureau would design and deliver training and assistance programs.101 These programs often took the form of one- or two-week seminars taught by senior FBI street agent instructors, who emphasized practical experience, and they focused on operations and technical skills.102 Locations where criminal activity had a nexus to the FBI’s investigative responsibilities became priority spots for training.103 In addition to training in organized crime and money laundering, the Bureau expanded its scope to include training in financial institutional fraud, economic crime, kidnapping, drug trafficking, and bank robbery.104 Russia is one country where the FBI’s investment failed to bring about desired results. This was certainly not for lack of effort. By 1998, FBI agents had provided instruction at police academies throughout Russia, and Bureau personnel had trained more than two thousand Russian officers.105 Through its program at Quantico, the FBI had attempted to teach officers of the Russian MVD about internal police controls, how to “police the police,” and how to ensure that both police leadership and rankand-file personnel were free of corruption. Although the FBI made an effort to ensure that those responsible for Russian law enforcement “under[stood] the principles of due process,” as of this writing approximately two decades later, the impact of this well-intentioned endeavor has been negligible.106

Capabilities In addition to providing knowledge via training, the FBI has furnished actual capabilities to foreign governments. This activity has run the gamut from providing up-to-date technology to supplying specialized investigative expertise. By working as a partner, the Bureau strengthens its own and broader US government relations with countries. Disaster Squad The FBI’s Disaster Squad is one Bureau component that has deployed to provide unique assistance in responding to cata-

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strophic events. In 1940, the Bureau created this group in direct response to the crash of a Pennsylvania-Central Airlines DC-3 near Lovettsville, Virginia. 107 The crash—caused by a severe lightning discharge near the aircraft that disabled the crew— killed all twenty-five individuals on board, which included an FBI agent on his first assignment and an FBI stenographer on vacation.108 FBI agents and fingerprint experts responded to the crash site and assisted local authorities with identifying victims, whom the crash had strewn across a large swath of land.109 This episode prompted the FBI to establish a permanent squad as part of its Identification Division that could rush to the scene of disasters. 110 The work of the Disaster Squad is specialized and grisly. It is composed of agents and highly specialized fingerprint examiners.111 Domestically, this squad has responded to a multitude of tragedies, ranging from airplane crashes to a ship explosion and the eruption of Mount St. Helens in Washington State.112 Hoover, in 1965, graphically described what squad personnel encountered, telling Congress that “the bodies in many cases are dismembered and partially burned, making it a very unpleasant task that is performed by the Disaster Squad.”113 In addition to its work within the United States, the Disaster Squad has a long history of responding to incidents abroad. Many of these have involved US citizens. As an element of the US government, the FBI deploys the Disaster Squad internationally at the request of the State Department. 114 An early example of the squad’s work overseas was its response to a request from the Belgian government for assistance with investigating a 1961 plane crash.115 This incident, which killed everyone aboard a Sabena 707, was particularly devastating, as its fatalities included the entire US Figure Skating team, which was on its way to the World Championships in Prague, Czechoslovakia.116 The Disaster Squad again found itself responding to an airplane crash that claimed sporting figures in 1980, when it traveled to Warsaw, Poland, to assist with the identification of Americans, including members of the US Amateur Athletic Union Boxing team.117 In addition to catastrophic accidents, the

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Bureau’s Disaster Squad has had to respond to at least one act of mass violence: Jonestown, Guyana, following the poisoning deaths of hundreds in 1978. 118 Beyond man-made—whether accidentally precipitated or intentionally perpetrated—catastrophes, the Disaster Squad has also provided assistance in the wake of natural disasters. After a tsunami devastated countries in Southeast Asia in late 2004, the Disaster Squad traveled to Thailand to identify victims.119 FBI Laboratory The FBI has for many decades been proud of its scientific approach to various mission sets. At the center of this scientific approach is the FBI Laboratory. The Bureau initially established this entity in 1932.120 In 1942, J. Edgar Hoover explained to Congress that the Bureau had “one of the largest technical laboratories in the world for the purposes of identification and the scientific study and analysis of crime.”121 Hoover also believed in the Bureau’s role as a trailblazer and beneficiary in measures and signatures intelligence (MASINT), essentially, and in 1955, he noted the laboratory’s “research and developmental work” in furtherance of identifying “new scientific devices or techniques” that might be “of use as investigative aids.”122 Near the end of his life, Hoover justifiably stated that “the FBI Laboratory has made science a fully productive member of the FBI team.”123 Within approximately a decade of its establishment, the FBI Laboratory was playing an integral role in supporting Bureau operations abroad. To facilitate SIS communications, the FBI Laboratory developed the code agents could use to transmit information to Washington.124 FBI legal attachés could use this code with the US Department of State’s cable communications facilities to send intelligence data to the Bureau via the State Department’s Codes and Communications Section. This was a far more effective system than the “Y” code that agents without communications facilities used for clandestine communication with Washington. The “Y” code usually required three pages of close typing—in the guise of a normal letter—to encipher a single line of information. In stereotypical spy style, the laboratory in its

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work to support SIS operations was also responsible for providing instruction on the use of secret ink.125 Even after the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency curtailed the FBI’s international role, the Bureau’s scientific capabilities continued to be of value internationally. The laboratory continued to maintain a Cryptanalytical and Translation Section.126 According to multiple former employees, the Bureau put its expertise in cracking clandestine communications to noble use by providing a closely held service for the US Navy and the Defense Intelligence Agency during the Vietnam War: deciphering messages from pilots who had been captured by North Vietnam as prisoners of war, including future Senator John McCain. Aviators were trained to encrypt information if captured.127 POWs would include messages in letters to spouses, loved ones, and family members, and these were then furnished by the Navy to the FBI.128 After the end of the Cold War, the laboratory became another resource the FBI used to more closely engage foreign partners. For instance, in 2000, the Bureau planned to arrange for a scientific fellowship exchange that would involve Hungarian forensic experts working in conjunction with their counterparts at the FBI Laboratory.129 After 9/11, as the Bureau expanded its Legat program, the laboratory worked with the legats to ensure that the FBI’s international partners were aware that the FBI’s Combined DNA Index System (CODIS) was available for assisting with the identification of criminal actors.130 Identification Services The FBI’s Criminal Justice Investigative Services (CJIS) Division is the successor to the Identification Division. CJIS, formed in 1992, became the hub of the Bureau’s fingerprint and biometric data as well as other information-sharing capabilities such as the National Crime Information Center. In 2000, the FBI announced that CJIS would provide international access to identification and other information services that had practical crime-solving applications. The FBI’s objectives were twofold: facilitating investigations by sharing law enforcement data and promoting common

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international standards for interoperability of law enforcement data systems.131 CJIS continued to play an important role in the FBI’s international collaboration after 9/11. The FBI noted in 2003 that CJIS sent teams to Pakistan to provide equipment and associated training for Pakistani law enforcement to conduct computerized capture of fingerprints.132 Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction In addition to the FBI’s role in providing training under the auspices of the ICPP, the Bureau also provides technical assistance to build countries’ capacity for countering WMD threats. In 1996, on the basis of work by foreign law enforcement agencies, the US government assessed that states in the former Soviet Union were in “urgent need” of survey and detection equipment to counter the trafficking of nuclear material. 133 Between 1997 and 2001, the DoD provided $10.2 million for counterproliferation efforts in seventeen countries of the former Soviet Union as well as in states in Central and Eastern Europe. With the DoD-supplied money, the Bureau furnished partner countries with protective equipment, including hazmat suits to facilitate the handling of seized nuclear materials, evidence collection and sampling kits, chemical detection equipment, and radiation pagers.134

Operational Cooperation The FBI has gone beyond providing training and equipping foreign counterparts and has actually become involved, operationally, with foreign counterparts both abroad and at home. This concept is not entirely new. Such an approach makes sense as threats move across borders ever more quickly and the click of a mouse half a world away can cause grave consequences for US interests. FBI involvement with foreign security services has built on the general liaison activities of legal attachés to accomplish specific investigation objectives. For instance, since the mid1970s, legal attachés have worked to coordinate investigative

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activities under the direct supervision of the Foreign Liaison Unit at FBI Headquarters (HQ) and have liaised with foreign officials on investigations that foreign agencies conducted at the Bureau’s request. 135 During the late 1980s, three Italian law enforcement agencies provided assistance with the investigation of drug trafficking violations, with the outcome being the arrest of fourteen suspects in locations ranging from Miami to San Francisco and Italy. 136 The FBI also exchanged specific investigative information as it attempted to engage countries of the former Soviet Union during the 1990s. For instance, the Bureau and Russia’s Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) regularly exchanged data regarding cases of white-collar crime and organized crime. 137 This exchange of intelligence has led to the development of evidence admissible in legal proceedings to disrupt threats. For instance, in 1995, the FBI explained to Congress that, starting in 1992, the Bureau had worked with the People’s Republic of China’s Ministry of Justice (MPS) on criminal investigations. By 1995, this cooperation had proceeded to a point where MPS information was usable in US courts.138 Similarly, the FBI reached a similar level of cooperation with Russian law enforcement during the 1990s. In 1998, the FBI advised Congress that Russian police officers who had worked on investigations with the Bureau had testified in US courts and before grand juries.139 Such evidence has also moved in the opposite direction. When the West German government prosecuted the hijackers of a Trans World Airlines flight who were also responsible for the murder of a US Navy diver, it relied heavily on evidence the FBI had developed, and an FBI special agent actually provided assistance to the West German prosecutor throughout the legal proceedings.140 During the 1980s and 1990s, the FBI became closely intertwined with foreign investigations of specific threats. For instance, during the 1980s, the Bureau, in conjunction with Italian authorities, engaged in efforts that resulted in finding more than sixty subjects involved with heroin smuggling and distribution in multiple regions of the United States.141 Cooperation with the Italians continued into the 1990s. In 1996, the FBI

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described how a joint eighteen-month investigation had disrupted a Colombian–Italian–US narcotics conspiracy and resulted in the arrest of eighty individuals. 142 Similarly, the FBI worked with Japan’s National Police Agency to conduct joint organized crime investigations.143 After the end of the Cold War, the FBI, consistent with its efforts to engage former Soviet states, established operational relationships with security services in those countries. For instance, the FBI and the Russian MVD jointly investigated bank embezzlement as part of a case that the Bureau’s Los Angeles field office had initiated.144 The FBI’s extraterritorial responsibilities in terrorism matters mean that investigations may involve the deployment of Bureau investigators to foreign soil. For instance, following the 1995 Aum Shinrikyo–perpetrated chemical attack on Tokyo’s subway system, FBI agents traveled to Japan because two of the victims were US citizens.145 The Bureau took an even larger role in the wake of the 1996 bombing of the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia that killed nineteen American service members. In the wake of this attack, the FBI dispatched 125 employees, including a special agent in charge, to Saudi Arabia and provided support to the investigation through the legat in Rome.146 (The FBI would open its Riyadh legat office the following year.) 147 On October 12, 2000, al-Qaeda operatives attacked the USS Cole in the Yemeni port city of Aden. The Bureau responded by sending more than a hundred agents.148 The increasing prevalence of terrorist activity directed at US interests abroad, especially in the wake of 9/11, led the FBI to establish permanent capabilities for responding to extraterritorial incidents, which are discussed in a subsequent chapter. In addition to mass casualty attacks such as those in Japan and Saudi Arabia, the FBI has also dispatched agents to investigate threats to US leaders. The Iraqi Intelligence Service had sponsored a 1993 plot to assassinate President George H. W. Bush, which the government of Kuwait interrupted by arresting sixteen individuals. In response to the Kuwaiti arrests, the Bureau dispatched a team to conduct an extraterritorial investigation in conjunction with the Kuwaiti government.149

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Investigating the Investigators The 1990s were an optimistic time for US–Russian relations. Francis Fukuyama had introduced his “end of history” theory, which suggested that democratization was inevitable. The FBI, attempting to do its part to bolster free societies in former Eastern Bloc countries, not only trained and equipped foreign security services but even assisted in rooting out corruption in those countries’ forces. In furtherance of this anticorruption campaign—which the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) had launched—the FBI provided training at Quantico for MVD officers who would staff an internal investigations unit.150 Additionally, the FBI participated in specific investigations. According to 1998 congressional testimony, the Bureau had been involved with several sensitive joint investigations with both the MVD and the Russian Federal Security Bureau (FSB) to identify corrupt Russian officials.151 The problem with such a relationship is that today’s partner can become tomorrow’s adversary. In November 2017, the US Department of Justice identified the FSB as being behind the hacking of Yahoo!152 Collaboration with foreign services can provide those services with insights about how the United States acquires intelligence—insights that foreign services can then use to hide their future activities.

Permanent Arrangements The FBI progressed, naturally, from ad hoc collaboration with foreign agencies on specific investigations to more permanent arrangements of operational engagement. Such arrangements have been issue-oriented, to varying degrees of specificity. They can be divided into two categories. The first type of engagement is the task force approach, epitomized by the Bureau’s relationship with Hungarian law enforcement. A second approach involves embedding Bureau personnel with foreign services. Task forces, which the FBI has used internationally against a variety of threats ranging from organized crime to terrorism and child pornography, are a mechanism the Bureau has long relied on in the domestic setting. Specifically, the well-established Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF) model dates to 1980, when the New York

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field office established the first JTTF, itself styled after a bank robbery task force that the field office and the New York Police Department (NYPD) had created in 1979.153 New York’s JTTF established the model—including the deputizing of nonfederal authorities so that they could pursue leads that would otherwise be beyond their jurisdiction—for future JTTFs.154 The FBI’s JTTFs were created piecemeal, based on specific terrorism issues within offices’ areas of responsibility. For instance, the New York JTTF focused on investigating the October 1981 Brinks armored truck robbery in Nanuet, New York.155 The Chicago Terrorism Task Force was occupied with the criminal activity of the FALN, a terrorist group trying to bomb its way toward Puerto Rican independence.156 Consistent with its efforts to engage former Eastern Bloc countries after the end of the Cold War, the FBI launched an ambitious project in Hungary that would leverage the task force concept. The Bureau had already opened ILEA in Budapest when, in 1998, Director Louis Freeh announced a six-point plan for assisting Hungarian law enforcement with combating organized crime. One element of this plan included support to joint strike forces.157 This spirit of collaboration, building on support to operational activities, reached a new milestone in 2000, with the establishment of the FBI–Hungarian National Police Organized Crime Task Force in Budapest.158 (In 2003, the Bureau explicitly cited both the 1979 bank robbery and 1980 JTTF task forces as inspirations for the Budapest project.)159 This was not simply an informationsharing body but instead, according to one FBI official, a working squad which would “develop and operate criminal informants” and “gather intelligence.”160 Through the task force arrangement, the Bureau introduced “sophisticated investigative techniques” to its Hungarian counterparts.161 FBI agents assigned to the task force were authorized to carry weapons and, in conjunction with the Hungarian officials, make arrests. Furthermore, the Bureau was ultimately responsible for hiring and firing of ten Hungarian officials who would work with the five Bureau officials out of Hungarian National Police Headquarters.162 The Bureau invested in the Hungarian Task Force not because of a belief in the theoretical value of the endeavor but rather as a

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way to take the fight against organized crime to the enemy. Russian organized crime figures had previously treated Budapest as a portal to Western Europe and the United States. The task force had both immediate and widespread impacts. Hungary had initially requested the Bureau’s assistance with breaking up the Russian elements that exploited Budapest as a base of operations.163 Shortly after the establishment of the task force, Russian criminal Semyon Y. Mogilevich, who was associated with a money laundering operation involving the Bank of New York, fled Budapest for Moscow.164 The wider impacts have included the opening of investigations throughout the world and in a number of FBI field offices.165 Whereas the Budapest effort focused on Russian organized crime, the FBI has also applied its international task force approach to various problems. In late 1998, the FBI, in conjunction with the Greek police, launched a task force supervised by Legat Athens targeting the terrorist organization Seventeen November, which had killed five Americans and injured twentynine Americans during the organization’s twenty-five years of operation. Psychological expertise was one unique capability that the FBI brought to the Greek task force. FBI profilers planned to probe the victimology aspects of the attacks and examine the group dynamics of Seventeen November.166 The Bureau’s ability to grapple with the psychology of criminality has also been applicable to the threat from predators. In 2004, the FBI launched its Innocent Images International Task Force, which consists of child exploitation investigators from multiple countries.167 In addition to the task force concept, the FBI has demonstrated a willingness to embed its personnel with friendly foreign law enforcement services. In 2012, the Bureau noted that it had special agents sitting with police departments in Romania, Estonia, Ukraine, and the Netherlands.168 This approach has been particularly applicable to threats in the cyber field. For several decades, the FBI has attempted to work with its foreign counterparts to combat illicit activity facilitated by the emergence of new technologies that render national borders and authorities largely impotent. For instance, in 1996, the Bureau explained to Congress

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that there was a need to instruct foreign counterparts about computer crimes.169 Fast-forward to 2015. The FBI Cyber Division established three cyber legal attaché positions in London, Ottawa, and Canberra. These individuals would sit with host country security agencies to facilitate information sharing.170 In 2016, Director James Comey noted that the FBI was “embedding more cyber agents and cyber analysts overseas to have them sit with local police and local counterparts—as old fashioned as that seems—so we can get the evidence to make the case, and then get our foreign counterparts to arrest these people.”171 Facilitation of Foreign Operations on US Soil The FBI’s collaboration with foreign governments has included the collection of information on US soil. Historically, the FBI’s Foreign Police Cooperation (FPC) activities included investigations within the United States on behalf of partners abroad.172 FPC activities result from a request received by the FBI from a foreign police or intelligence agency.173 There is solid rationale for this cooperation. First, it helps to diminish threats that have international implications that may impact US interests. Second, as with other aspects of FBI foreign cooperation and collaboration, assistance with investigations within the United States helps to forge lasting relationships with necessary partners. During the 1990s, FPC activities included not only gathering information for foreign security services but also actually allowing a foreign service to work alongside the FBI within the United States. The Practical Case Training (PCT) program, which the FBI initiated in 1994, provided on-the-job training for Russian officers. Russian MVD officers participated in a joint investigation that targeted Vyacheslav Ivankov.174 Ivankov, who the FBI arrested in 1995, was a Russian mobster who supervised the extortion of several million dollars from an investment advisory firm.175 The MVD officers were closely integrated with their New York counterparts. They sat in a New York FBI facility, accompanied FBI agents on surveillance, and assisted in the monitoring of court-authorized wiretaps.176 The PCT also facilitated MVD officers’ presence in San Francisco and Los Angeles.177

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1. US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2004), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI /a0418/final.pdf. 2. Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1951, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 81st Cong., Pt. 1 (1950). 3. FBI Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1980). 4. Federal Bureau of Investigation Oversight, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 109-76 (2005). 5. FBI Oversight and Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1991, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990). 6. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Mission & Priorities,” https://www .fbi.gov/about/mission. 7. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 8. Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1984, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., Pt. 6 (1983). 9. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1989, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., Pt. 6 (1988). 10. Central Intelligence Agency, “R. James Woolsey: Uncompromising Defender,” in Directors of Central Intelligence as Leaders of the U.S. Intelligence Community, updated June 27, 2008, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for -the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/directors -of-central-intelligence-as-leaders-of-the-u-s-intelligence-community/chapter _12.htm. 11. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Law Enforcement, Counterterrorism, and Intelligence Collection in the United States Prior to 9/11, Staff Statement No. 9, http://govinfo.library.unt.edu /911/staff_statements/staff_statement_9.pdf. 12. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Doc. No. 107-1086, Vol. II (2002). 13. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 14. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 15. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 16. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S. Rep. No. 107-351, H. Rep. No. 107-792 (2002).

Notes

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17. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, S. Rep. No. 107-351, H. Rep. No. 107-792 (2002). 18. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, Threats and Responses in 2001, Staff Statement No. 10, https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/archive /hearing10/9-11Commission_Hearing_2004-04-13.htm. 19. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Vol. II. 20. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 21. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1980, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 96th Cong., Pt. 5 (1979). 22. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1984, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., Pt. 6 (1983). 23. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1984, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 98th Cong., Pt. 6 (1983). 24. Director of National Intelligence, A Counterintelligence Reader, Vol. 3, https://www.dni.gov/files/NCSC/documents/ci/CI_Reader_Vol3.pdf. 25. Statement of William Webster to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, February 27, 1986, CIA General Records, Doc. No. CIARDP87M01007R000100210001-3, National Archives, College Park, MD, https:// www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-rdp87m01007r000100210001-3. 26. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1987, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 99th Cong., Pt. 6 (1986). 27. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1982, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., Pt. 6 (1981). 28. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1983, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., Pt. 7 (1982). 29. Intelligence Division Inspection, 10/23–11/9/73, November 26, 1973. 30. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971, FBI 67 -149000. 31. Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2007, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 109th Cong., Pt. 6. (2006). 32. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 33. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 34. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997).

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35. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 36. General Accounting Office, Combating Alien Smuggling: Opportunities Exist to Improve the Federal Response (Washington, DC: GAO, 2005). 37. Staff Interview, Before the Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, 94th Cong. (August 20, 1975); Legat Havana to Director FBI, American Gambling Activities in Cuba, February 25, 1958, FBI 62-75147. 38. Donahoe to Belmont, January 16, 1961, FBI 105-76826; Legat Havana to Director FBI, American Gambling Activities in Cuba, February 25, 1958. 39. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/18–9/1/72, January 2, 1973, FBI 67-149000. 40. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 41. Science, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2007, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 109th Cong., Pt. 6. (2006). 42. US Attorney’s Office Central District of California, Department of Justice, “Task Force Investigation Targets Leadership of MS-13, Including Former Top ‘Shot-Caller’ of L.A. Faction, a Dozen ‘Shot-Callers’ Who Supervised Cliques and Three Members Accused of Murder” [press release], May 17, 2017, US Attorney’s Office, https://www.justice.gov/usao-cdca/pr/task-force -investigation-targets-leadership-ms-13-including-former-top-shot-caller-la. 43. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 44. Legat Mexico City to Director, July 20, 1961, FBI 94-55752. 45. Legat Manila to Director, FBI, October 14, 1966, FBI 62-111200. 46. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson, Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division, Inspector J. K. Ponder, December 11, 1962, FBI 67-205182. 47. A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security—C., September 24, 1956, FBI 100-3104; A. H. Belmont to L. V. Boardman, Communist Party, USA, Counterintelligence Program, Internal Security—C., September 26, 1956, FBI 100-3-104. 48. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III, S. Doc. No. 94-755 (1976). 49. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans, Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, Book III, S. Doc. No. 94-755 (1976). 50. FBI Oversight and Authorization, Fiscal Year 1993, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1992). 51. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1996).

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52. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 53. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson, Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division, Inspector H. Lynn Edwards, July 1–21, 1964, July 31, 1964, FBI 67-205182. 54. Recent Developments in Transnational Crime Affecting US Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy; Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters with Panama, Treaty Doc. No. 102-15; and 1994 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Doc. No. 103-606 (1994) (statement of James Frier, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Division, FBI). 55. Recent Developments in Transnational Crime Affecting US Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy; Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters with Panama, Treaty Doc. 102-15; and 1994 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, Before the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Narcotics, and International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Relations, S. Doc. No. 103-606 (1994). 56. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1996). 57. Congressional Research Service, International Terrorism: A Compilation of Major Laws, Treaties, Agreements, and Executive Documents. Report Prepared for the Committee on Foreign Affairs, US House of Representatives (Washington, DC: US Government Publishing Office, 1994). 58. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1996). 59. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 60. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1998, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 105th Cong. (1997). 61. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2. (1996). 62. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies appropriations for 2004, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 108th Cong., Pt 10. (2003). 63. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1943, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 76th Cong. (1942). 64. Department of Justice, Appropriations for 1952, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 82nd Cong. (1951). 65. Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas, Hearing Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. (2007). 66. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 92nd Cong., Pt. 1. (1972). 67. Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas, Hearing Before the House Committee on Homeland Security, 110th Cong. (2007).

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68. J. H. Gale to Mr. Tolson, Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division, Inspector H. Lynn Edwards, July 1–21, 1964, July 31, 1964. 69. Todd Masse and William Krouse, The Federal Bureau of Investigation: Past, Present and Future (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2003). 70. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 71. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 72. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998); Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 105-809 (1999). 73. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 74. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 8 (1995). 75. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 76. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 77. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 105-809 (1999). 78. Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003). 79. US Department of State, “ILEA Bangkok,” https://bangkok.ilea .state.gov. 80. https://www.state.gov/j/inl/focus/combating/ilea/c11283.htm. 81. US Department of State, “ILEA San Salvador,” https://sansalvador .ilea.state.gov. 82. US Department of State, “ILEA San Salvador,” https://sansalvador .ilea.state.gov. 83. US Department of State, “ILEA Roswell,” https://roswell.ilea.state.gov. 84. Paul I. Bernstein and Jason D. Wood, The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2010), https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Portals/68/Documents/casestudies /CSWMD_CaseStudy-3.pdf. 85. Bernstein and Wood, The Origins of Nunn-Lugar and Cooperative Threat Reduction. 86. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-442 (1995); Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-422 (1996); “Russian Intelligence Services: Old Rivalries, New Problems,” Stratfor, July 7, 2014, https://worldview .stratfor.com/article/russian-intelligence-services-old-rivalries-new-problems; Russian Organized Crime in the United States, Hearing Before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 104th

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Cong. (1996) (statement of Jim E. Moody, Deputy Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI). 87. Statement of Jim E. Moody, Russian Organized Crime in the United States Hearing. 88. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-422 (1996). 89. Jennifer D. P. Moroney, Aidan Kirby Winn, Jeffrey Engstrom, Joe Hogler, Thomas-Durell Young, and Michelle Spencer, Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2011). 90. Moroney et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program; Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-422 (1996). 91. Moroney et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program. 92. Nina M. Serafino, Security Assistance and Cooperation: Shared Responsibility of the Departments of State and Defense (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2016). 93. Moroney et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of the International Counterproliferation Program. 94. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 95. The Report of the General Accounting Office on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Efforts to Help other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, Before the Committee on Armed Services, S. Doc. No. 107-813 (2002). 96. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1995, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 103rd Cong., Pt. 2A (1994). 97. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 98. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “International Partnerships Fight International Crime: The Budapest Project,” October 31, 2003, https:// archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2003/october/budapest_103103; Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1995, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 103rd Cong., Pt. 2A (1994); Kristin M. Finklea, Organized Crime in the United States: Trends and Issues for Congress (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009). 99. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2. (1996). 100. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 101. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1996). 102. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 103. Department of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1997, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1996).

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104. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-422 (1996); International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 105. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998). 106. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 107. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The FBI Laboratory: 75 Years of Forensic Science Service,” Forensic Science Communications 9, no. 4 (2007): 3, https:// archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/lab/forensic-science-communications /fsc/oct2007/research/2007_10_research01_test2a.htm. 108. Federal Aviation Administration, “FAA Historical Chronology, 1926– 1996,” https://www.faa.gov/about/history/chronolog_history/media/b -chron.pdf; FBI, “The FBI Laboratory.” 109. Corruption in Russia, Hearing Before House Banking, General Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee, 105th Cong. (September 10, 1998) (testimony of Thomas J. Kneir, Deputy Assistant Director. FBI Criminal Investigative Division), https://fas.org/irp/congress/1998_hr/98091006_clt.html. 110. FBI, “The FBI Laboratory.” 111. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong., Pt 1 (1970). 112. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 91st Cong., Pt 1 (1970); Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., Pt. 1 (1981). 113. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1966, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 89th Cong. (1965). 114. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Handbook of Forensic Services (Quantico, VA: FBI, 2013), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/handbook-of-forensic -services-pdf.pdf/view. 115. Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1962, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 87th Cong. (1961). 116. Julissa Treviño, “The Devastating Impact of the 1961 Crash that Wiped Out the Entire US Figure Skating Team,” Smithsonianmag.com, February 15, 2018, https://www.smithsonianmag.com/smart-news/1961-plane-crash-killed -us-figure-staking-team-headed-championships-180968171/; Kelyn Soong, “The Terrible Plane Crash that Devastated US Figure Skating—and Still Shapes It Today,” Washington Post, February 20, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com /news/retropolis/wp/2018/02/20/the-terrible-plane-crash-that-devastated-u -s-figure-skating-and-still-shapes-it-today/?utm_term=.07f3a9913d25. 117. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1982, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 97th Cong., Pt. 1 (1981). 118. FBI Oversight, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 96th Cong. (1980).

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119. FBI, “The FBI Laboratory.” 120. Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1962, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 87th Cong. (1961). 121. Department of Justice Appropriation Bill for 1943, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 76th Cong. (1942). 122. Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1956, Hearing Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 84th Cong. (1955). 123. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1972, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Appropriations, 92nd Cong. (1971). 124. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 125. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 126. David Kahn, The Codebreakers (New York: Scribner, 1996). 127. Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Interview of Former Special Agent Ronald M. Fergurson (1969–1993),” December 16, 2008, https:// socxfbi.org/page/FoundationOralHistry. 128. Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Interview of Former Special Agent Bell P. Herndon,” August 18, 2008, https://socxfbi.org/page /FoundationOralHistry. 129. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 130. Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003); The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 131. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 132. Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 108th Cong. (2003). 133. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-422 (1996). 134. The Report of the General Accounting Office on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling, Before the Committee on Armed Services, S. Doc. No. 107-813 (2002). 135. Intelligence Division Inspection, 3/11/75–4/4/75, August 27, 1975, FBI 67-149000. 136. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1991, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 101st Cong., Pt. 2 (1990). 137. Rewrite of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and Fiscal Year 1995 Foreign Assistance Request, Hearing Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103rd Cong., Pt. 2 (1994). 138. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt 2. (1995).

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139. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998). 140. Antiterrorism Act of 1990, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 101-1198 (1990). 141. Authorization Legislation and Oversight of the US Department of Justice (DEA and FBI), Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 100-577 (1987). 142. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 143. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1990, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 101st Cong., Pt. 2 (1989). 144. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998). 145. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 104-442 (1995). 146. The FBI Investigation into the Saudi Arabia Bombing and Foreign FBI Investigations, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). 147. DoJ, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. 148. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “USS Cole Bombing,” https://www .fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/uss-cole-bombing. 149. The FBI Investigation into the Saudi Arabia Bombing and Foreign FBI Investigations, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997). 150. Testimony of Thomas J. Kneir, Corruption in Russia hearing. 151. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998). 152. US Department of Justice, “Canadian Hacker Who Conspired with and Aided Russian FSB Officers Pleads Guilty” [press release], DoJ Office of Public Affairs, November 28, 2017, https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/canadian -hacker-who-conspired-and-aided-russian-fsb-officers-pleads-guilty. 153. Garrett M. Graff, The Threat Matrix: The FBI at War (New York: Back Bay Books, 2011); US Department of Justice, The Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2005). 154. Jerome P. Bjelopera and Kristin Finklea, Domestic Federal Law Enforcement Coordination: Through the Lens of the Southwest Border (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014). 155. FBI Oversight and Budget Authorization for Fiscal Year 1986, Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 99-208 (1985). 156. FBI Oversight and Budget Authorization for Fiscal Year 1986, Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 99-208 (1985); Clara Bingham, Witness to the Revolution (New York: Random House, 2011). 157. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 158. FBI, “International Partnerships Fight International Crime: The Budapest Project.”

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159. FBI, “International Partnerships Fight International Crime: The Budapest Project.” 160. Raymond Bonner, “FBI Going to Budapest to Fight the Mob,” New York Times, February 21, 2000, https://www.nytimes.com/2000/02/21/world/fbi -going-to-budapest-to-hunt-the-mob.html. 161. Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs, 108th Cong. (October 30, 2003) (testimony of Grant D. Ashley, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI), https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news /testimony/eurasian-italian-and-balkan-organized-crime. 162. FBI, “International Partnerships Fight International Crime: The Budapest Project”; Bonner, “FBI Going to Budapest to Fight the Mob.” 163. Bonner, “FBI Going to Budapest to Fight the Mob.” 164. FBI, “International Partnerships Fight International Crime: The Budapest Project”; Bonner, “FBI Going to Budapest to Fight the Mob.” 165. Testimony of Grant D. Ashley, Hearing Before the Senate Subcommittee on European Affairs. 166. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 167. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 111-115 (2009). 168. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2013, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 112th Cong., Pt 6. (2012). 169. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics, Before the Committee on Appropriations, S. Doc. No. 104-457 (1996). 170. The White House of President Barack Obama, “Fact Sheet: Administration Cybersecurity Efforts 2015” [press release], The White House Office of the Press Secretary, July 9, 2015, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press -office/2015/07/09/fact-sheet-administration-cybersecurity-efforts-2015. 171. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2017, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong. (2016). 172. Intelligence Division Inspection, 3/11/75–4/4/75. 173. National Archives, “Classification 163: Foreign Police Cooperation,” https://www.archives.gov/research/investigations/fbi/classifications/163 -foreign-police.html. 174. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998). 175. James O. Finckenauer and Elin J. Waring, Russian Mafia in America (Boston: Northeastern University Press, 1998). 176. An Examination of the Russian Economic Crisis and the International Monetary Fund Aid Package, Hearing Before the House Committee on Banking and Financial Services, 105th Cong. (1998). 177. Testimony of Thomas J. Kneir, Corruption in Russia hearing.

8 On the Front Lines

ALTHOUGH MOST OF THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS) operations focused on ferreting out subversion in the Western Hemisphere, the Federal Bureau of Investigation dispatched special agents into the European theater of war starting in 1942. The first example of this was the assignment on November 16, 1942, of an FBI special agent to London, where he would maintain liaison relationships with British and US intelligence officials.1 Germany continued to bombard London until 1945, putting the Bureau’s man in harm’s way, although he was not working directly against the Axis military forces.2 In November 1942, the Allied forces launched Operation Torch—the invasion of North Africa. Prior to the landings, the coordinator of information had dispatched twelve officers who worked as vice consuls to establish networks.3 Following the landings, the US War Department requested the FBI’s assistance with conducting an investigation of an American citizen’s collaborationist activities during the German occupation. No less than Assistant Director Percy Foxworth—the head of the SIS—accepted this mission, along with FBI Special Agent Harold D. Haberfeld.4 Tragically, both men died while on assignment when, on January 15, 1943, the Army transport plane on which they were flying toward North Africa crashed in the jungles of Dutch Guiana.5 The FBI dispatched two agents to see the assignment through.6

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Into the European Theater The FBI—as it had done on an ad hoc basis in North Africa—began deploying agents to Europe as the Allies advanced. In September 1943, the FBI attached an agent to the United States Intelligence Group in North Africa, and he traveled with that group into Sicily and Italy.7 This group progressed as the Italian campaign advanced, with the agent arriving in Rome on June 6, 1944.8 Following the liberation of Rome in June 1944 and the opening of a US embassy in that city, the FBI established an office for liaison purposes under the auspices of the US Consulate.9 The FBI staffed this outpost with seven agents and one stenographer until it closed in October 1945 at the recommendation of General Edwin L. Siebert, the G-2 chief for the European theater.10 While working from the consulate, the agents carried the title “Vice Consul” specifically to maintain “anonymity for future operations abroad.”11 In July 1945, the FBI assigned a legal attaché to handle regular liaison work until the closing of the Rome office in October 1946.12 (The FBI would reopen the Rome office by the mid-1950s.)13 Once established in Rome, the FBI’s personnel pursued leads regarding individuals who had worked on behalf of the Axis powers. According to the Bureau’s internal history of SIS operations, one of the primary functions was the prompt interview of individuals suspected of treason for their collaborationist activities and the collection of evidence to build cases against those individuals. One of these investigations was the high-profile case against the poet Ezra Pound (a favorite author of future CIA counterintelligence chief James Angleton). The Bureau’s Italian presence interviewed Pound, obtained original documentation of payments that the Italian government had made to Pound, and acquired the records of propaganda broadcasts that Pound had made in Rome. These items became evidence in the treason case against Pound.14 The Bureau’s legat also collected intelligence on the developing geopolitical situation. According to the internal FBI history of the SIS, the legat had been “very successful” in developing information about the Yugoslavian political situation, including Sovietinspired atrocities in that country. Additionally, the legat gathered

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information about the conflicting claims of Yugoslavia and Italy on the Port of Trieste and the Province of Venezia Giulia.15 In early 1944, the FBI recognized the need to enhance its foreign language expertise in order to match its growing international responsibilities. The executive conference unanimously recommended—and Hoover approved—hiring between five and six German-speaking special agents as well as two or three Frenchspeaking special agents. Training for these agents would focus on SIS and espionage topics. After becoming familiar with how the German military intelligence service (ABWEHR) operated in the Western Hemisphere, these new agents would deploy to Germany and France once the Allies occupied those countries and review the records of the ABWEHR and question its personnel. These activities would focus on determining the names of any individuals engaged in espionage within the United States or “definitely establish the fact that there are not now, and have not been, any espionage or sabotage agents operating in the United States except known to and controlled by the Bureau.”16 This second, nearly impossible task of proving a negative illustrated the FBI’s deductive, investigative orientation that, in its focus on decreasing ambiguity and closing cases, clashed with the inductive, ambiguity-accepting approach necessary for intelligence work. Whether the FBI could have overcome this mindset had it become responsible for global intelligence coverage is debatable. Certainly by the time the Bureau attempted to enhance its intelligence infrastructure after 9/11, the reactive culture had so permeated the organization that it was not able to successfully implement an effective intelligence program.17 Ernest Hemingway “liberated” Paris on August 25, 1944, and the FBI was not far behind him. In September 1944, two Bureau agents established an office in Paris for the purpose of liaison with Army intelligence at the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF).18 The agents assigned to SHAEF moved on to Germany, but the FBI assigned two more agents as attachés, who commenced their assignments on June 30, 1945, at the US Embassy in Paris.19 The term attaché was used specifically to preserve anonymity for future operations abroad.20 This was yet

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another indicator that the Bureau entertained the idea of becoming a global intelligence service. Following the conclusion of the war, the Paris office continued to operate—staffed by one agent and a stenographer—and was responsible for liaison with all sections of the French police, the International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), and the British intelligence service.21 While in France, Bureau personnel focused on unraveling Axis spying and subversion that had occurred during the war. Part of the SHAEF agents’ brief was to ensure that Army intelligence units were aware of the FBI’s targets of interest and forwarded information about these targets when it became available.22 As in Rome, the Paris contingent—through the Army Intelligence Corps—conducted interviews, specifically of German espionage agents.23 The Bureau’s personnel had right of first refusal for conducting interviews of American citizens who faced accusations of Axis collaboration.24 What would now be referred to as “document exploitation” was an important FBI function in Paris. The Paris office obtained access to captured files that helped to resolve Western Hemisphere espionage cases.25 Activities in France also pointed toward the developing Cold War. According to the FBI, France was a “particularly fertile field for the Bureau in which to increase its knowledge of International Communist trends.” Because of the Soviet Union’s status as an ally, the US Army could not work Communist matters, but Army officials indicated that the Bureau’s liaison unit at SHAEF should maintain awareness of developments and keep the Army apprised.26 When Allied forces moved into Germany, the FBI followed. The Bureau contingent at SHAEF, which reached ten while still in France, entered Germany once that country surrendered.27 On June 7, 1945, the FBI established an office at Frankfurt. Eventually, FBI agents also developed a presence in Berlin, Heidelberg, and Freising.28 The 1938 Anschluss, which brought Austria under Germany’s sphere of influence, made a focus on Austria a natural extension of the FBI’s presence in Europe. In early August 1945, the Bureau assigned two agents to the American military headquarters at Salzburg. The FBI’s presence subsequently expanded

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its Austrian contingent to Vienna with the headquarters of the United States Forces for Austria after the city came under international control. According to the FBI, its relationship with Army intelligence in Austria was “excellent at all times.” The Bureau maintained a presence in the country until October 25, 1945.29 The FBI’s objectives in Germany were similar to those in France and Italy. According to the Bureau’s internal history of the SIS program, the “principal objective of the Bureau’s Agents in Germany was to handle the investigations of treason cases involving American citizens in the European area and to cover the specific ‘targets’ furnished them by the Bureau in connection with investigations.” Furthermore, the FBI’s presence on the ground positioned it to interrogate prisoners and exploit captured documents in furtherance of identifying German intelligence activities in the Western Hemisphere.30 The Bureau, through the office it had established in Frankfurt, also assisted the US High Commission with processing war refugees who were emigrating to the United States.31 Similar to its work in France, the FBI, while it maintained a presence in Germany, focused resources on the nascent Cold War. The Bureau’s internal history of SIS operations notes that its personnel in Germany “closely followed the spread of Russian influence in all of the occupied territories” and found “definite evidence that Russian intelligence was operating in the American occupied zone” to discredit US governance of the region and support the establishment of “Communist dominated local governments.”32 In late 1945, the FBI reduced its presence in Europe in compliance with restrictions the US Army placed on it. The Bureau, by September of that year, had built up a presence of seventeen agents, as well as necessary clerical personnel, across Europe. However, Edwin L. Siebert, a US Army brigadier general responsible for Army intelligence in Western Europe, proposed that the FBI reduce its presence across the entire European theater to two agents, who would engage in “virtually no intelligence activities except maintenance of formal liaison at [SHAEF].”33 The FBI deemed these “intolerable restrictions, limitations, etc.”34 And in

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response to Sibert’s recommendation, it withdrew all agents who had been assigned as liaisons to the Army in Europe.35

The FBI and the Asian Theater In addition to coverage of Europe, the FBI, through a variety of operations that required a Bureau presence on the ground in a war zone, developed intelligence about developments in Asia. One aspect of this effort was liaison with friendly intelligence agencies. In an annual report on the operations of the SIS, the Bureau noted: In an effort to spread the net of coverage as far as possible in the Far East, where Special Agent assignment cannot be made due to the war situation, liaison has been continued with the Australian and New Zealand Security Services by a free exchange of information of mutual interest, inasmuch as these organizations have had long-standing lines of information in the Asiatic area.36

Additionally, FBI operations in the Western Hemisphere contributed to the United States’ understanding of the Japanese threat. Through its collection in Brazil, the FBI was able to provide a large quantity of material that contributed to the United States’ awareness of Japanese industrial facilities and transportation infrastructure.37 Similar to its entry into continental Europe, the FBI followed US forces into Asia. The first example of this was in the Bureau’s establishment of an office in Manila, the Philippines, on March 15, 1945.38 Two agents traveled to the Philippines for the purpose of maintaining direct, continuous liaison with US Army intelligence.39 These agents were assigned to the headquarters of General Douglas MacArthur.40 In August 1945, Japan surrendered, ending World War II. MacArthur and Army intelligence headquarters departed the Philippines for Tokyo, and the FBI followed suit. The Bureau contingent that proceeded to Japan included two special agents and an FBI inspector who had been in the Philippines conducting a review of the FBI’s operations there.41 In both the Philippines and Japan, FBI personnel worked in conjunction with the Army’s Counter Intelligence Corps.42 The

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Bureau shuttered its posts in both the Philippines and Japan because of these assignments’ decrease in importance.43 The FBI’s work in Asia represented a microcosm of its functions globally. It worked to untangle the subversion in which Japan had engaged. Specifically, liaison agents in Japan conducted a complete investigation of propagandist “Tokyo Rose,” who, through the course of an interview, yielded a signed statement that outlined her background and her history of collaboration with Japan. Furthermore, the FBI enhanced its collection through the establishment of liaison with the Army’s intelligence component in Japan, which facilitated the Bureau’s acquisition of information about targets of interest. The Bureau also advanced the United States’ efforts to counter global communism. Through its presence at Tokyo, FBI representatives acquired a significant amount of information about the Communist Party of China, the Communist Party of Japan, and the operations of the Soviet Military Mission in Japan.44 Finally, similar to its efforts to bolster the security services of friendly countries in Latin America, a Bureau representative in Manila served as the principal adviser and consultant for the reorganization of that city’s police department.45

Preventing Revolution in the Western Hemisphere The FBI entered the European and Pacific theaters to exploit Axis material once those militaries had been routed. However, the Bureau’s personnel in the Western Hemisphere periodically found themselves in the midst of violent revolutionary situations. Quelling such disturbances was important to US security because such shifts in power could send a country on a pro-Axis course. Bureau involvement in politically volatile regions was—consistent with the Legat program—at the behest of the US Department of State. For instance, a report that the Bolivian military attaché in Berlin, Germany, was planning to foment a revolution in Bolivia prompted the State Department in the summer of 1941 to request the assignment of an FBI agent to the US embassy in La Paz. Furthermore, information that legats collected kept local US

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diplomats apprised of developing situations. During the May 1944 revolution in Ecuador, the legat provided the US ambassador with “practically all of the information” the ambassador received about the unfolding events. Similarly, in El Salvador, which the FBI described as “constantly boiling with revolutionary plots and counter plots,” the Bureau—through contacts in the country’s political factions—was able to keep the US ambassador informed of developments, “even to the point of advising beforehand when revolutionary attempts could be expected.”46 The FBI also claimed credit—as a result of its coverage in Paraguay, which the Bureau described as being governed in such a way as to breed “constant unrest and rumors of political disturbances”—for advising the US embassy in that country of what was happening and “also to accurately state what was going to happen.”47 From time to time, Bureau personnel found themselves in harm’s way as unrest swept through countries. For instance, the FBI noted that during the October 1945 revolution in Venezuela, Bureau representatives “found it necessary to expose themselves to danger in order to obtain information.”48 The FBI, on occasion, entered into the thick of revolutions because of the close relationships that its personnel sometimes maintained with national leaders. One Bureau agent spent eleven months as a security adviser to Enrique Peñaranda, the president of Bolivia who was deposed in a December 1943 revolution.49 The agent later assessed that he “must have done a poor job [as a security adviser] because [Peñaranda] was deposed.” Conditions, according to the agent, were chaotic, with “people hanging from lampposts and furniture being thrown out of windows and people stealing lighting fixtures from houses.”50

Revisiting Latin America Although it drew down its legal attaché presence after the establishment of the CIA, the FBI found itself involved in addressing Latin American crises during the 1950s and 1960s. The first of these was the overthrow of Cuban president Fulgencio Batista in 1959. In response to the Cuban revolution, the FBI had to with-

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draw its personnel from Havana.51 Although the Bureau had to pull out of Cuba, it found itself in the midst of another Latin American crisis approximately five years later. In 1965, the White House brought the FBI into the center of a crisis that had erupted in the Dominican Republic. Bureau involvement with Dominican issues dates to World War II, when the FBI assigned an undercover agent to the Dominican Republic in November 1941 to identify the extent of Axis activities. At the height of its coverage, in June 1943, the FBI had four agents assigned to the country. The Bureau ultimately closed its Dominican Republic office in the summer of 1946.52 During and after World War II, the FBI’s coverage of Dominican Republic–related issues uncovered multiple plots to overthrow the country’s government. The SIS, through informants in the Caribbean region, had identified exiled political leaders who were plotting to overthrow the government of Rafael Trujillo. Additionally, the SIS gathered intelligence about Trujillo’s efforts to stymie opposition activities. According to the FBI’s internal history of the SIS, the Bureau received reports of measures—including murder—that Trujillo used to quash dissent. Furthermore, the FBI was aware of Dominican government efforts to exert influence in the region. In 1943, the Bureau’s civil attaché (equivalent to a legat) in Port au Prince, Haiti, discovered that a Dominican consul in Haiti, acting on behalf of Trujillo, was leading a group that planned to assassinate Haitian president Élie Lescot.53 Although the FBI ended its presence in the Dominican Republic after the conclusion of World War II, it continued to handle intelligence pertaining to the country throughout the 1950s. As of 1956, an agent in the Domestic Intelligence Division’s Nationality Unit was specifically responsible for matters pertaining to the Dominican Republic.54 In July of that year, the Bureau’s New York office provided intelligence to FBI Headquarters regarding the attitude of the Dominican Republic’s government toward US policies and toward the Meeting of the American Presidents in Panama. 55 The Bureau presumably gained additional access to Dominican Republic information

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when former FBI agent Joseph S. Farland became the US ambassador to that country in 1957.56 Fidel Castro’s seizure of power in Cuba led the United States to view the Dominican Republic as a Caribbean counterweight to the Communist regime in Havana. In 1964, Juan Bosch, a leftist leader, was ousted from office by a military coup that installed a junta. Then, on April 24, 1965, a coalition of civilian and military personnel attempted to return Bosch to office.57 The FBI, via its San Juan office, gained insights about the coup plotters.58 Additionally, through its SOLO source, the FBI learned that on May 9, 1965, Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, had assessed that Moscow was “very surprised, perplexed, and disappointed” by President Lyndon B. Johnson’s activities in the Dominican Republic.59 Once the coup erupted, Johnson ordered the FBI to establish an intelligence network—known as Operation DOMSIT [a truncation of “Dominican situation”]—that would operate from the US embassy in Santa Domingo.60 Johnson encouraged the urgent dispatch of a legat to “see ‘who’s who’ and ‘what’s what.’”61 The FBI responded quickly to Johnson’s request. As William C. Sullivan, then the assistant director of the Domestic Intelligence Division (who would later denigrate the FBI’s international coverage), assessed the FBI’s response to events in the Dominican Republic as having a tremendous significance over and above basic investigations. . . . President Johnson’s Administration is being put to a severe test in the Dominican Republic. If he fails, it will not only damage his administration politically, but it would undoubtedly cause an entirely different course of action to be chartered in such matters. If he succeeds, then what the president did in the Dominican Republic may well become the established course of action for all other countries in Latin America threatened with communism.

According to Sullivan, the Bureau’s responsibility was not merely one of intelligence collection but rather one of “keeping the communists out of the new Dominican coalition Government.”62 By late May 1965, the FBI had established an intelligence collection apparatus in the Dominican Republic. J. Edgar Hoover

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advised President Johnson that the FBI would have fourteen agents in the Dominican Republic within a few days and, by early June 1965, was able to tell the president that the FBI had twenty men in the country who were “producing excellent results.”63 The Santo Domingo legat developed informants, potential informants, and confidential sources of information that, according to a 1966 FBI inspection of its Domestic Intelligence Division, was “noteworthy under operational circumstances.”64 Although it had shuttered its office nearly two decades earlier, the FBI’s SIS operations apparently laid the groundwork for its 1965 deployment. According to Hoover, “When the President ordered us back into the Dominican Republic, we were able to renew many of our old contacts and get valuable information.”65 Bureau personnel assigned to the Dominican Republic were certainly in harm’s way. According to Hoover, in late May, snipers were shooting at the FBI’s Santo Domingo office.66 By June a sixman squad of Marines was protecting the physical property.67 The FBI’s response to the Dominican Republic situation also prompted reorganization at headquarters. Hoover authorized the creation of a special section to handle Dominican issues, which would include twelve agents, six stenographers, and two clerical employees who would handle the operational and dissemination responsibilities associated with the crisis.68 This entity, known as the Latin American Section, came into existence on May 27, 1965.69 On November 18, 1965, the section created a Dominican Security Index, which served as a record of all Dominican subversives in the Dominican Republic as well as in other countries.70 Additionally, the Bureau’s response to the Dominican situation drove closer integration of the FBI with its counterparts in the US Intelligence Community. Hoover approved the establishment of a teletype arrangement within the section to facilitate dissemination of information to the Department of State, the US military agencies, and the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).71 (According to historian Christopher Andrew, the CIA station chief in the Dominican Republic was already aware of the Bureau’s operations because the head of the Bureau contingent reportedly approached the individual and bluntly stated that the

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agents were at sea, since the FBI’s experience was in criminal, rather than political, investigations.)72 The Santo Domingo legal attaché office continued to operate until at least 1967, after which it was shuttered.73 However, in 1971, the FBI considered reopening the facility “entirely for the purpose of developing HILEV items.”74 Santo Domingo would provide coverage not only of the Dominican Republic but also of “current political developments in Haiti.”75 An inspection report indicates that the Bureau anticipated reactivating sources it had developed in response to the 1965 events.76 The FBI ultimately held off on reopening the office until 2001.77 With the end of the Cold War, latent tensions that the world’s two superpowers had kept largely in check erupted in a number of countries. In March 1992, a majority of the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina, a Yugoslavian republic, voted for independence against the wishes of the Bosnian Serb minority.78 Shortly thereafter, Bosnian Serbs laid siege to Sarajevo and targeted Muslims and Croats in order to carve out a Serb Republic. The situation degenerated further in early 1993 when Muslims and Croats, who had previously been allied against the Serbs, began fighting each other. Then, in 1995, Bosnian Serb president Radovan Karadžić cut off aid convoys from reaching several locations and issued a new order to conquer the city of Srebrenica. Subsequently, Serb forces captured a UN-protected “safe area” in Srebrenica and slaughtered approximately eight thousand Muslim males. In 1995, the United States brokered the end of the war, with Bosnian Muslim president Alija Izetbegović, Croatian president Franjo Tuđman, and Yugoslav president Slobodan Milošević, representing Bosnian Serbs, signing the Dayton Accords for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina in December.79 The other consequence of the Bosnian war was indictments of several individuals for war crimes, and this is where the FBI became involved. In July 1995, the United Nations’ war crimes tribunal in the Hague indicted several individuals for genocide related to the siege of Sarajevo. The FBI, at the request of the US Department of State and the war crimes tribunal, sent forensic teams to identify and recover remains that would be used in the

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prosecutions.80 Furthermore, the Bureau and several other US government agencies stepped in to help build up the capabilities of the newly created governments of Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (both of which constitute Bosnia and Herzegovina). At the specific request of the US ambassador to Bosnia, the FBI assigned two agents to Sarajevo in a transnational advisory capacity to the police of the two governments. Agents would evaluate investigative technique, oversee training, and provide guidance on building cases against organized crime groups operating within Bosnia. Additionally, the agents would provide assistance to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Stabilization Force, which the United Nations authorized to implement the military aspects of the Dayton Peace Agreement, with evaluation of criminal intelligence data that had the potential to support organized crime and corruption cases.81

Counterterrorism Throughout its history, the FBI has engaged in activities abroad that have presaged its specifically counterterrorism-focused efforts. During World War II, the Bureau dispatched agents and stenographers to Latin America as part of the SIS program to conduct reviews of physical security at strategically significant industrial facilities, including companies, mines, and ports. 82 This effort—which included prevention of sabotage (a terrorist act)—was an extension of an initiative for which the FBI had become responsible domestically in 1939.83 Certainly, the Bureau’s responses to insurgencies and violent nonstate actors, both in Latin American states during World War II and in the Dominican Republic in the mid-1960s, were analogous to counterterrorism work. Furthermore, in 1965, around the time of the Dominican situation, the State Department solicited guidance from the FBI on how embassies in South American countries could protect themselves against increasing terroristic activities.84 Finally, the establishment of the Disaster Squad represented a willingness to deploy in response to catastrophes—a function the Bureau would build upon in its counterterrorism mission.

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Establishing an Extraterritorial Counterterrorism Role The FBI became statutorily responsible in the mid-1980s for responding to terrorist activities outside of the United States. Multiple pieces of legislation—the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984 and the Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986—made the FBI responsible for investigations of hostage taking, murder, manslaughter, and serious bodily injury crimes (i.e., the stock-in-trade of terrorists) against US citizens abroad.85 Congressional testimony from 1987, shortly after the new legislation took effect, indicates the amount of work these new responsibilities created: investigations outside the United States had required eighteen direct agent work-years.86 By 2008, the FBI had established extraterritorial squads at its Washington, DC, New York, Miami, and Los Angeles field offices, which deployed in response to overseas violations of US federal law.87 Rendition One of the earliest (and most interesting) examples of the FBI at work in the international counterterrorism field involves the capture of Fawaz Younis. In 1985, Younis, a Lebanese national, perpetrated the hijacking of a Royal Jordanian airliner.88 Younis, along with several other Shiite terrorists, demanded the removal of all Palestinian guerillas from Lebanon and threatened to kill passengers one by one until the demands were met.89 Because passengers on the flight included US nationals, the case against Younis became the FBI’s responsibility.90 The FBI put its new authorities to use against Younis in September 1987. Younis, who was reportedly hungover (not the best condition for a member of a militant Muslim religious organization to be in), was aboard a motorboat traveling through international waters in the Mediterranean Sea—lured there by the CIA—toward what he thought was a meeting on an eighty-foot yacht with an international narcotics dealer.91 What Younis did not know was that the supposed narcotics dealer—as well as the two women on deck, alluringly attired in shorts and halter tops—was an undercover FBI agent. Once Younis came aboard the yacht, the agents arrested him and transferred him to the far less luxurious USS Butte.92

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Younis’s arrest served two purposes. First, it led to his conviction and a thirty-year prison sentence in 1989, thereby removing a dangerous nonstate actor who had posed a threat to both US and foreign interests from the international setting. It also served a second function of deterrence. Younis was the first individual returned to the United States to face charges for violating an extraterritorial statute.93 As the FBI’s associate deputy director Oliver “Buck” Revell noted: “The fact that Younis was captured in international waters served notice that the US Government is willing to go to substantial lengths to apprehend those responsible for acts of terrorism against US nationals.”94 Following the Younis episode, the US Department of Justice put the FBI’s extraterritorial counterterrorism operations on a firmer footing. In 1980, the DoJ had issued an opinion that the FBI had no authority under US law to arrest a fugitive in a foreign country without that country’s consent. (This did not apply to the Younis case because Younis was picked up from international waters.) The FBI’s Criminal Investigative Division subsequently requested that the Bureau’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC) consider multiple scenarios to determine what authority the Bureau had in such circumstances. Specifically, the FBI was concerned about how the limitation might impair the United States in situations of “overt physical assault on [its] citizens by terrorists” and “large-scale trafficking of drugs into the United States by foreign criminal organizations.” After assessing the circumstances, the FBI’s OLC requested the DoJ’s OLC to reexamine the 1980 opinion in light of the Bureau’s new extraterritorial responsibilities. In 1989, the DoJ OLC partially reversed its 1980 decision and opined: There are instances where extraterritorial arrests without the host sovereign’s consent may be justified under international law. For example, in response to an actual or threatened terrorist attack, we would have good grounds under general principles of international law to justify extraterritorial law enforcement actions over a foreign sovereign’s objections.95

This opinion was officially known as “Authority of the FBI to Override Customary or Other International Law in the Course of

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Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities,” a title that makes its purpose abundantly clear.96 However, as of 1992, the FBI appeared to back away from this robust interpretation. Congress was less than thrilled with the perception that the FBI could “kidnap people overseas without the consent or knowledge of the local government.”97 In 1990, Senator John Edwards suggested that the DoJ’s decision granted the FBI an “illegal authority” to “snatch or kidnap individuals overseas.”98 In its 1992 testimony during a congressional oversight hearing, the FBI provided assurance that it exercised its extraterritorial jurisdiction “only with host country approval and in close coordination with the US Department of State.”99 Establishing a Permanent International Counterterrorism Response Infrastructure By the late 1990s, it was alarmingly clear that international terrorism would be a continuing threat to US interests abroad. In 1998, the FBI established five rapid deployment teams (RDTs) composed of experts from the Laboratory Division, investigators from the evidence response teams, and medical personnel who could respond to terrorist incidents and other situations in foreign or remote locations.100 These teams are based at FBI field offices, with specifically identified members, and when on duty are supposed to be able to move within four to eight hours.101 The August 1998 bombings against US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania—and to a lesser extent the crash of TWA 800—provided the impetus for forming these teams. According to the assistant director of the FBI’s Laboratory Division, who, along with Director Louis Freeh and the assistant directors in charge of the Washington, DC, and New York field offices, developed the concept for the RDTs while en route to the 1998 bombing sites, the intent was to have a response capability that was “as fast as finding transportation to get to [the site of] the incident.”102 Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Director Robert Mueller III established counterparts at FBI Headquarters to the field-based RDTs. In June 2002, the FBI established “flying squads” that would provide support globally for terrorism investigations.

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As originally envisioned, these teams would include experts on counterterrorism, Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) requirements (one suspects that this specification was in response to the inability to obtain a FISA on Zacarias Moussaoui prior to 9/11), foreign languages, intelligence analysis, and how headquarters relates to the CIA.103 By 2005, the original flying squad concept had evolved into something more amorphous. According to a report by the National Academy of Public Administration, the concept had gone from one of discrete standing teams to a pool of personnel from which groups could be assembled as necessary.104 The fly teams have deployed to locations as diverse as Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, Pakistan, the United Kingdom, and Spain.105 The flying squads were supposed to have a coordinating function. For an incident outside of the United States, they would establish liaison with the host government and report back to FBI HQ with “real time analysis and recommendations.”106 The flying squads also had to interface with the RDTs. By 2003, the RDTs were no longer the specialized, fast-moving entities originally intended. Instead, they now provided the “capability to deploy large numbers of personnel to crime scenes.”107 The flying squads would coordinate the arrival of the RDTs.108 Although undoubtedly well intentioned, Mueller’s fly team concept created an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and fostered a condescending attitude toward the field. One of Mueller ’s early decisions was to build up the role of HQ. He believed that the FBI should have “centralized management with distributed execution.”109 In 2001, Congress approved Mueller’s proposal to reorganize the FBI, which, among other measures, would consolidate management of counterterrorism cases and operations under the assistant director for the relatively new Counterterrorism Division.110 The flying squad concept was in line with Mueller’s approach. According to the FBI, around the time of the concept’s introduction, “often the need for a specific expertise cannot be fulfilled within a Field office’s immediate resources. In many instances, a Field office may not know how to draw upon such expertise or the Field office may be overwhelmed by the magnitude and immediacy of the

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crisis.” Furthermore, the Bureau suggested that the flying squads would “help the field to recognize a need for specific skills or expertise.”111 Consistent with Mueller’s emphasis on HQ, responsibility for the FBI’s deployable resources became HQ-centric. The Counterterrorism Division’s Operational Response Section became the point of coordination for deployment of both the HQ-based flying squads and the field office–based RDTs.112 Mueller ’s flying squad concept discounted the possibility that expertise for such squads could as easily be drawn from field offices, which were responsible for the actual collection of intelligence and thus had, by necessity and experience, developed knowledge of subject matter. A streamlined approach, to accomplish more with less, would be for the FBI to identify its distributed expertise, wherever it might exist, across the enterprise and leverage it in response to an incident. Headquarters’ role would be a more limited one of knowing where, from throughout the corporate FBI, it could obtain the best and brightest human capital available. The next chapter in development of the FBI’s ability to deploy resources internationally in response to terrorist incidents was the creation of the High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG). In mid-2009, the DoJ announced the creation of the HIG, which would be responsible for the interrogation of the “most dangerous and high-value terrorists.” Although the HIG is an interagency initiative, with approximately thirty to thirty-five professional interrogators, analysts, subject matter experts, and linguists from across the intelligence, law enforcement, and defense communities, it would be housed within the FBI.113 (The HIG was formed at the suggestion of a task force established by Executive Order 13491 to study interrogation practices following the divulgence of detainee-related scandals at Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.)114 Although the FBI would house the HIG, the National Security Council was responsible for HIG policy guidance and oversight.115 The HIG is administered by an interagency group of officials. Its director is an FBI representative who is assisted by two deputies, one each from the CIA and Department of Defense

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(DoD).116 Its mobile interrogation teams (MITs) are the most relevant component of the HIG to the FBI’s operations abroad. MITs are responsible for questioning terrorism subjects overseas. The MITs’ primary focus is the collection of intelligence that can be used to prevent terrorist attacks.117 This function of disruption contrasts with the FBI’s law enforcement mission of building cases for prosecution. Placing this body under the auspices of the FBI seemed, prima facie, to make sense based on the Bureau’s previous experience. As Mueller pointed out in 2010, the concept around which the HIG was organized—assembling a group of individuals available when a subject came into US custody—had been utilized both overseas and within the United States. These individuals from the FBI and other contributing agencies brought familiarity with the subject matter to the incident response. In other words, Mueller saw the HIG as simply a codification of an existing practice. The downside, which Mueller suggested the HIG would remedy, was that “all too often what happens is somebody is detained, you did it by exceptional work by the intelligence community or otherwise, and so you very quickly have to put together the teams.” Creation of the HIG would obviate this ad hoc approach and instead make expertise available “on a moment’s notice.”118 However, despite the fact that the FBI is invested with responsibility for the HIG, some reports suggest that it has not been fully successful in this role. According to Politico, an American political opinion magazine, the FBI has failed to advocate for the HIG’s deployment. Furthermore, the HIG has not become the FBI’s model for interrogations. Instead, the Bureau writ large has continued to use a decades-old behavioral analysis–based interrogation strategy.119 Part of this disjuncture may be attributed to the cordoning off of the HIG from the rest of the Bureau. As of 2011, there was no plan to consult with the HIG when an arrest occurred in the United States.120 The HIG has, instead, become a bureaucratic stepping stone. None other than the now-disgraced Andy McCabe was the HIG’s first director. At the time of his appointment, McCabe was perceived by Bureau officials as an

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up-and-comer.121 Though it may have been viewed by some as a vote of confidence in the HIG, the fact that an individual already perceived to be on his way to other things was put in charge suggested that substance was not nearly as important as status. Guantanamo After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the FBI became significantly involved with the interrogation of detainees. The Bureau was a key participant—albeit one that ultimately discovered controversial conditions—at Guantanamo. In December 2001, FBI Headquarters directed the Miami field office to coordinate with the US military to establish an FBI presence at the US Naval base in Guantanamo. The FBI’s Miami field office, in January 2001, sent its first personnel to Guantanamo: a supervisory special agent, an assistant agent in charge (ASAC), and two special agents. By March 2002, the FBI had a continuous presence at Guantanamo of twenty-five to thirty people. FBI personnel at Guantanamo included agents responsible for conducting interviews as well as personnel who analyzed detainees’ behavior, which could be used to develop interview strategies, and translated detainee interviews.122 The Bureau’s presence at Guantanamo gave other agencies heartburn. For instance, the CIA was concerned that the FBI’s involvement would result in a “possible loss of control” by the agency.123 By late 2002, FBI agents at Guantanamo began raising concerns about the US military’s harsh interrogation techniques.124 For instance, whereas the Bureau advocated a rapportbased strategy, the military used tactics that included forcing a detainee to perform dog tricks and placing women’s underwear on the detainee’s head.125 Coordination of FBI personnel participating in the Guantanamo interrogations evolved over time. Initially, the activities of FBI agents assigned to Guantanamo were directed by the Bureau’s field offices. However, HQ quickly took control of this function. The Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU, originally known as the [Guantanamo] Task Force) became responsible for the FBI’s operation in Guantanamo.126 The head of the

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MLDU, in turn, reports to the Counterterrorism Division’s Counterterrorism Operational Response Section (CTORS).127 Other Interrogations The Bureau also cooperated, uneasily, with the CIA at other debriefing sites. In March 2002, Abu Zubaydah, an al-Qaeda logistician, was confined at a location known as Detention Site Green.128 (Detention Site Green was reportedly located in Thailand.)129 In March 2002, Arabic-speaking FBI agents with experience interrogating al-Qaeda subjects questioned Abu Zubaydah and learned that Khalid Sheikh Mohammed was the planner of the September 11 attacks. Then, on April 20, 2002, the FBI interrogators learned, from Abu Zubaydah, of individuals who had planned to detonate a uranium-based explosive in the United States.130 However, when CIA interrogators assumed control of the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah and used techniques that were not permitted under Bureau interview policies, FBI agents communicated strong concerns to Bureau HQ. Mueller, after learning in August 2002 about the CIA’s tactics, issued a decision that the FBI would not participate in the interrogation of Abu Zubaydah.131 Subsequent to the Abu Zubaydah episode, the FBI and CIA reached a modus vivendi. In 2003, the two agencies entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) regarding the detailing of FBI agents, who would provide assistance with debriefing certain high-value detainees at “sensitive CIA debriefing sites.” The MOU covers aspects of how to protect information that the FBI agents detailed to CIA sites obtained. According to a publicly released report from the DoJ’s Inspector General, “The FBI agreed to . . . limit knowledge of the existence of the MOU.”132 Oops. Afghanistan Removing the Taliban—the regime that had given Osama bin Laden free rein—became viscerally essential after the September 11 attacks. The United States launched its campaign against the Taliban in early October 2001.133 Starting in December of that year, the FBI sent a small contingent of eight agents to Kandahar for the purpose of obtaining actionable intelligence that would

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advance the Bureau’s counterterrorism mission.134 Much of this information came from interviewing detainees and reviewing captured documents.135 According to the team leader of this contingent, “Deployment of FBI agents into a theater of war working side by side with the military was unprecedented.”136 Operations in Afghanistan exceeded even the SIS’s operations alongside the military in Europe and Asia. Although similarities existed—especially at the beginning of deployments to Afghanistan—the FBI began moving into areas of combat. In early 2004, at the Department of Defense’s request, the Bureau positioned personnel to move forward with military units. Beside their military counterparts, FBI agents assisted with “sensitive site exploitation” missions: the collection of time-sensitive information from priority targets, including caves and other locations that al-Qaeda personnel had vacated.137 Management of the FBI’s presence in Afghanistan followed the Mueller-driven centralization of functions at headquarters. Until June 2002, the New York field office managed the Bureau’s Afghanistan operations.138 Once HQ took over the Counterterrorism Division’s Counterterrorism Operational Response Section, specifically CTORS’s Military Liaison and Detainee Unit, it became responsible for Afghanistan operations.139 Iraq Whatever one thinks of the Iraq War, the FBI had no choice but to participate, and it did this job well and with integrity. It is important to note that the Bureau pushed back against Vice President Dick Cheney’s efforts to cherry-pick intelligence in support of a casus belli. When a staffer from Cheney’s office contacted an agent about reviewing the FBI’s intelligence holdings for data that would link al-Qaeda to the Iraqi regime, the agent refused help with the deck-stacking.140 However, the Bureau is not a policymaking agency, and once the White House had reached a decision, it was the FBI’s duty to support that policy. In February 2003, the military requested the FBI assemble a team that could deploy to Iraq and collect information about threats to the homeland.141 Rather than wait for the

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military to forward pertinent information to the Bureau, the FBI sought to collect and analyze information in Iraq. Director Mueller, on February 10, 2003, signed Operations Order 1015, which defined the FBI’s mission in Iraq as follows: to “deploy a task-organized exploitation unit to fully exploit all Iraqi Intelligence Service sites and personnel for information regarding planned terrorist attacks in the United States, or against US personnel or interests outside the Iraq theater of operations . . . and to gather intelligence related to other matters of US national security.”142 According to journalist Garrett Graf, counterintelligence—in addition to counterterrorism—was part of the Bureau’s mission, and as one Bureau executive told Graf: “We took the Iraqi intelligence service whole.”143 The FBI’s presence that addressed the Iraq threat, first from a position in Kuwait and then in Iraq itself, was a cobbled-together enterprise. Instead of using a flying squad or an RDT, the Bureau assembled agents from different units. The initial seat-of-thepants nature of the FBI’s involvement was epitomized by the ad hoc procurement process, which involved the Bureau wiring $100,000 to its personnel in Kuwait, who went and bought whatever they needed—including a Humvee.144 In addition to this initial assemblage of personnel, the FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) became a part of Bureau operations in Iraq and elsewhere. The FBI established HRT in the early 1980s, after determining that the special weapons and tactics (SWAT) program was insufficient for the FBI’s counterterrorism mission.145 HRT exceeds the capabilities of a normal SWAT team in areas of communications, command and control, and the use of sophisticated electronics. Additionally, HRT has a high degree of expertise in handling several types of weapons and explosive devices for breaching and diversion.146 HRT has expanded over the decades, growing from an ancillary responsibility to a fulltime capability. Originally, HRT was under the command of a team leader who was also an assistant special agent in charge of the Washington field office, and members of the team divided their time between normal investigative responsibilities for the Washington field office and HRT training.147 In 1995, the FBI

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moved HRT under the newly created Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), which the Bureau had established in response to recommendations following the handling of the Ruby Ridge and Waco standoffs.148 (CIRG also includes the SWAT Training Unit.) The FBI bills HRT as “federal law enforcement’s only full-time counterterrorism unit.”149 HRT is now composed of full-time personnel who are prepared to deploy to incidents such as terrorism and violent crimes.150 As indicated by its evolution, HRT is not made up of investigators so much as it is a home for door-kickers (admittedly an essential function when dealing with terrorists and other violent criminals). HRT personnel, in the context of Iraq, embedded with DoD Special Forces.151 By positioning HRT at the tip of the spear, alongside military operators, HRT agents can establish a chain of custody for evidence collected in the midst of a war zone.152 Starting in 2005, all HRT agents in Iraq worked under the DoD’s Joint Special Operations Command.153 These HRT agents indisputably put themselves in harm’s way to obtain evidence. In April 2006, an HRT agent participating in a US Special Operations raid on targets in Ramadi, Iraq, was knocked unconscious and injured by ball bearings when a suicide bomb exploded. He was fortunate, relatively speaking, as two Army Rangers died during the same raid. Furthermore, the FBI’s legal attaché in Baghdad from 2007 until 2008 indicated that FBI agents at times fought side by side with military counterparts to hold off insurgents’ attacks.154 Another specialized FBI component participated in both the Afghanistan and Iraq operations. This component, from the Criminal Justice Investigative Services Division (CJIS)—the successor to the Bureau’s fabled Identification Division, which was responsible for the FBI’s fingerprint files—has handled the collection of biometric information, a modern-day extension of fingerprint identification. In Afghanistan, CJIS gathered biometric records from incarcerated individuals.155 As detainees were brought in from the battlefield to detention facilities, CJIS collected DNA samples and fingerprints.156 CJIS also fulfilled a similar function in Iraq between 2003 and 2004.157

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Establishing Afghanistan and Iraq Legats The FBI expanded its presence in Afghanistan and Iraq by establishing legal attachés in those countries. In 2005, the Bureau assigned a temporary duty assistant legal attaché (ALAT) to the US embassy in Kabul. The FBI followed this by establishing a permanent legal attaché office in January 2006. 158 Opening a legat in Iraq similarly complemented FBI operations. In 2005, the FBI opened its legat office in Baghdad. The FBI has described Legat Baghdad as “probably our most dangerous overseas assignment. Attacks on the Green Zone, where our offices are located, are common.”159 Whereas the Counterterrorism Division (CTD) handled the agents who worked in counterpart with the military, the FBI’s Office of International Operations was responsible for the legat. In 2008, the Bureau, to handle these war-zone legats, created an International Fusion Cell (IFC) within its International Operations Division (the successor to the Office of International Operations). An agent who was in charge of the IFC viewed it as “an excellent model for Legat operations in conflict zones.” Composition of the IFC reflects its unique mission. Personnel, by and large, are veterans of multiple war-zone deployments.160

Expansion Beyond a War Footing As the FBI built up a permanent presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, its operations began to include capacity building—a wellestablished legat function. For instance, in Afghanistan the legat staff has provided training assistance to the country’s security services. Topics covered have included postblast analysis, crime scene processing, major case and law enforcement management, public corruption, fraud, fingerprint collection, database management, forensics, and laboratory accreditation.161 In Iraq, the legat’s office is responsible for similar work. In 2004, FBI executives traveled to Iraq as part of a training needs assessment team. On the basis of findings from this exercise, the Bureau agreed to provide training on topics including organized crime, counterterrorism, kidnapping, and intelligence

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analysis. The FBI agreed to assist Iraqi authorities with establishing a fingerprinting system.162 Furthermore, the legat is responsible for the joint US–Iraqi Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF). The MCTF was a response, initiated in 2005, to the kidnapping and murder of multiple Iraqi public officials. Like the FBI’s practical case training of foreign law enforcement officers, the mission of the MCTF is to “investigate attacks on the stability of the nation” and “train a core group of Iraqi National Police Officers in complex criminal investigations.” Although the MCTF includes several US government agencies, the FBI’s deputy legal attaché and two assistant legal attachés oversee its day-to-day operations.163 One unique aspect of the FBI’s work with local security services in Afghanistan and Iraq was the need to vet the personnel who were joining these reconstituted agencies. It would have been foolish not to pay close attention to the allegiances of individuals who were emerging from a society in turmoil. Part of CJIS’s collection of biometric records in Afghanistan focused on vetting police officials.164 In Iraq, the FBI provided training on the recruitment, selection, evaluation, and assessment of candidates for the Iraqi Police Service.165 The FBI also delved into solving crimes that—though not directly related to US interests—contributed to a culture of respect for the rule of law. For instance, one of the Bureau’s objectives in Iraq was to investigate Saddam Hussein and personnel working on his behalf for crimes against the Iraqi population.166 Furthermore, the FBI established a rapid deployment Art Crime Team in 2004 to specifically respond to the looting of art and antiquities from the Baghdad Museum.167 Investigating American Malfeasance Unfortunately, certain US entities that were ostensibly part of rebuilding Iraq engaged in criminal activities. The FBI has been an integral element in routing out this rot. After identifying “wide-ranging contractor fraud schemes” in countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan, the FBI established its International Contract Corruption Initiative in 2005. Then, in 2006, the FBI, along

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with several other US agencies, established the International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF).168 Iraq and Afghanistan are two locations where the ICCTF is deployed. In conjunction with the ICCTF, the FBI works to “proactively address international corruption and fraud involving US interests.”169 The ICCTF in Iraq reports to an ALAT, and in Afghanistan, to a senior-level agent on a one-year deployment.170 As of 2009, the FBI has conducted investigations of fraud in conjunction with the Defense Criminal Investigative Service, the Army Criminal Investigation Command Major Procurement Fraud Unit, Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, and the US Agency for International Development.171 The FBI also handled the high-profile case of the four Blackwater contractors who were charged with murdering multiple Iraqis. On September 16, 2007, multiple Blackwater security contractors opened fire in Baghdad and killed fourteen Iraqi civilians.172 In October 2007, the FBI assumed responsibility from the US Department of State for the investigation.173 Four Blackwater employees were ultimately convicted in 2014 on charges stemming from the incident.174 This was not an isolated event. In relation to a 2012 investigation of a separate issue, an FBI official noted that Blackwater “operated in a manner which demonstrated systemic disregard for US government laws and regulations.”175

Changes at Home to Support Operations Abroad The FBI’s counterterrorism operations abroad necessitated the creation of new entities at headquarters. These components, the Document Exploitation Unit (DocEx) and the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), responded to counterterrorism-related needs but evolved from areas of expertise that the FBI had developed over decades. DocEx Operations abroad yielded troves of information for the Bureau to analyze. This formed part of the FBI’s mission when its SIS men

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deployed with the US military in Europe and Asia. However, the FBI did not establish the Document Exploitation Unit within its Counterterrorism Division until 2003.176 DocEx identifies and disseminates intelligence obtained in the course of reviewing physical documents and computer data that intelligence agencies operating abroad have seized.177 TEDAC The FBI has a long experience with the forensics of explosives. It became responsible for the Bomb Data Center (BDC) in 1972.178 Through the BDC, the FBI provided US law enforcement agencies with up-to-date statistical and technical information on improvised explosive devices and equipment and training for investigations of bombings.179 Once the United States initiated military operations in Iraq, improvised explosive devices (IEDs) became a high-visibility threat to US personnel. In late 2003, the FBI Laboratory began operating the Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC) to coordinate and manage a unified national effort to gather and exploit information on IEDs, including those recovered abroad. 180 TEDAC was formally established in 2004 to serve as the single interagency organization to receive, fully analyze, and exploit all priority terrorist IEDs. 181 The CIA, Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives contribute to TEDAC’s efforts. TEDAC collects unexploded IEDs, postblast debris, and bombmaking material from sites worldwide. In addition to disseminating its findings to US and foreign counterparts, TEDAC also helps to develop countermeasures to defeat IEDs and to train first responders. 182 By 2008, the Bureau’s activities in Iraq were “in large measure” focused on the recovery and analysis of IEDs and of vehicle-borne IEDs.183 According to journalist Garret Graf, as of 2011, approximately 70 percent of the FBI Laboratory’s resources were directed to investigations of Iraqi IEDs.184

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Another Front Although the FBI’s counterterrorism mission abroad focuses on Afghanistan and Iraq, the Bureau has also opened a front against violent gangs, including MS-13, which, in all practical respects, is a terrorist organization. Returning to the SIS territory of Latin America, in 2007 the FBI established a joint US–El Salvadoran Transnational Gang unit (TAG) in El Salvador as a vehicle for exchanging information about gangs and gang members.185 The FBI expanded this model to Guatemala in 2009 and to Honduras in 2011. According to a Bureau assistant director, “Each TAG is a fully operational unit” that conducts gang enforcement operations.186 The TAG’s work abroad—like the SIS and Legal Attaché programs—has a dual purpose. It indisputably contributes to security within the United States through the collection of “actionable, strategic intelligence” (as described by the assistant director) for domestic use by the FBI and its law enforcement partners.187 According to a US Government Accountability Office study, the TAG’s exchange of information has assisted investigations of gangs ranging from Charlotte, North Carolina, to Los Angeles, California.188 The FBI’s investment in the TAG also helps to strengthen foreign law enforcement. As part of the TAG, the Bureau has vetted 120 police officers. This process arguably helps to highlight and encourage integrity in foreign law enforcement agencies. These officers work alongside FBI agents who are assigned to the TAG.189 For instance, the TAG assisted with prison searches in El Salvador that located more than a thousand items of contraband.190 Working with Bureau agents in such practical scenarios creates an opportunity for foreign security services to learn best practices that bolster their long-term capabilities.

1. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1 (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 2. Betsy Mason, “Bomb Damage Maps Reveal London’s World War II Devastation,” National Geographic, May 18, 2016, https://www.nationalgeographic .com/science/phenomena/2016/05/18/bomb-damage-maps-reveal-londons -world-war-ii-devastation/.

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3. Central Intelligence Agency, The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency (Washington, DC: CIA, 2007), https://www.cia.gov /library/publications/intelligence-history/oss/acknow.htm. 4. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 5. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1; Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Percy E. Foxworth, 1906–1943,” https://www.fbi.gov/history/wall-of-honor /percy-e-foxworth. 6. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 7. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948, FBI 62-80750; Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, July 20, 1945, Case File FBI HQ File 64-4104, Box 16, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 8. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. Accomplishment Argentina–Japan (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1941–1942, Case File FBI HQ File 64-4104, Box 16, RG 65, National Archives, College Park, MD. 9. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 10. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948; FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 11. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 12. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 13. R. T. Harbo to Mr. Tolson, Supervision of Foreign Liaison by SA Nathan L. Ferris, May 31, 1955, FBI 67-94639. 14. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 15. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 16. Executives Conference, February 16, 1944, FBI 66-2554. 17. Darren E. Tromblay, Spying: Assessing US Domestic Intelligence Since 9/11 (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2019). 18. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 19. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 20. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 21. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1; FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 22. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 23. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 24. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 25. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 26. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 27. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948; FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 28. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 29. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 30. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 31. FBI Statutory Charter, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 95th Cong., Pt. 1 (1978). 32. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2.

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33. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948; FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 34. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 35. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 36. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 37. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 38. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 39. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 40. Federal Bureau of Investigation, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. Accomplishment. Mexico–Venezuela (Washington, DC: FBI, 1947). 41. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 42. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945; FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 43. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948. 44. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 45. FBI, Special Intelligence Service: Annual Report, 1944–1945. 46. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 47. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 48. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 3. 49. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 50. Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI, “Joseph F. Campisi Interview,” June 7, 2003, https://socxfbi.org/page/FoundationOralHistry. 51. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, November 2, 1960, FBI 67134975. 52. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 53. FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 2. 54. Organization—Espionage Section, From W. A. Branigan to Mr. Belmont, July 12, 1956, FBI 67-95998. 55. W. A. Branigan to Mr. Belmont, Personnel Matters—Espionage Section, July 23, 1956, FBI 67-95998. 56. Tim Weiner, Enemies: A History of the FBI (New York: Random House, 2012); Dennis Hevesi, “Joseph S. Farland, 92, Envoy Who Helped in Kissinger Ruse, Dies,” New York Times, February 1, 2007, https://www.nytimes.com /2007/02/01/obituaries/01farland.html. 57. Joseph B. Treaster, “20 Years After Dominican War, Wounds Linger,” New York Times, May 1, 1985. 58. Weiner, Enemies. 59. Director, FBI to the Attorney General, Communist Party USA, International Relations, Internal Security—C, May 12, 1965, FBI 100-42809. 60. Weiner, Enemies. 61. J. Edgar Hoover to Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, and Sullivan, May 20, 1965, FBI [Clyde A. Tolson. Part 1]. 62. W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, Dominican Situation, May 24, 1965, FBI 67-95998.

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63. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. De Loach, June 4, 1965, FBI [Clyde A. Tolson. Part 1]. 64. W. M. Felt to Mr. Tolson, Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division, Harry J. Morgan, Inspection Staff 3/28/66–4/4/66 (Discontinued) 5/9/66– 5/20/66, June 1, 1966, FBI 67-205182. 65. J. Edgar Hoover to Tolson, Belmont, Sullivan, DeLoach, October 25, 1965, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 66. J. Edgar Hoover to Tolson, Belmont, DeLoach, and Sullivan, May 26, 1965, FBI [Clyde A. Tolson. Part 1]. 67. Memorandum for Mr. Tolson, Mr. Belmont, Mr. Sullivan, Mr. De Loach, June 4, 1965, FBI [Clyde A. Tolson. Part 1]. 68. W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, Dominican Situation, May 24, 1965. 69. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, May 13, 1966, FBI 6795998. 70. W. M. Felt to Mr. Tolson, Inspection—Domestic Intelligence Division, June 1, 1966, FBI 67-205182. 71. W. C. Sullivan to A. H. Belmont, Dominican Situation, May 24, 1965. 72. Christopher Andrew, For the President’s Eyes Only (New York: HarperCollins, 1996). 73. J. Edgar Hoover to the U.S. Department of State, February 2, 1967, FBI 67-95998. 74. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971, FBI 67-149000. 75. W. R. Wannall to C. D. Brennan, Expansion of Foreign Liaison, May 28, 1971, FBI [Official & Confidential]. 76. Domestic Intelligence Division Inspection, 8/17–9/9/71, 1971. 77. US Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2004), https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI /a0418/final.pdf. 78. Chuck Sudetic, “Turnout in Bosnia Signals Independence,” New York Times, March 2, 1992. 79. Reuters, “Chronology: What Happened During the War in Bosnia?” July 21, 2008, https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSL21644464. 80. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2001, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 106th Cong., Pt 6 (2000). 81. The Impact of Organized Crime and Corruption on Democratic and Economic Reform, Hearing Before the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe, 106th Cong. (2000). 82. V. P. Keay, memorandum for Mr. Ladd, Re: World-Wide Intelligence Coverage, September 1, 1948; FBI, History of the SIS Division, Vol. 1. 83. Memorandum: Re: Plant Protection Program, Federal Bureau of Investigation, July 31, 1940, FBI 99-0. 84. J. Edgar Hoover to Tolson, Belmont, Sullivan, DeLoach, June 2, 1965, FBI [Clyde A Tolson, Part 1]. 85. FBI Oversight and Authorization, Fiscal Year 1993, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1992). 86. DEA and FBI, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 100577 (1987).

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87. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hearing Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 110-910 (2008). 88. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989). 89. George Lardner Jr. and Nancy Lewis, “FBI Dupes Terrorism Suspect, Brings Him to US for Trial,” Washington Post, September 8, 1987. 90. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989). 91. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Fawaz Younis/Operation Goldrenrod,” https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/fawaz-younis; Federal Bureau of Investigation Oversight, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2005); Terrorism: Interagency Conflicts in Combating International Terrorism, Before the Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc. No. 102-493 (1991); Terrorism and America: A Comprehensive Review of the Threat, Policy, and Law, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. (1993). 92. FBI, “Fawaz Younis/Operation Goldrenrod.” 93. Terrorism and America: A Comprehensive Review of the Threat, Policy, and Law, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 103rd Cong. (1993). 94. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989). 95. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1989). 96. Department of Justice Authorization for Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1992, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1991). 97. Department of Justice Authorization for Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1992, Hearing Before the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1991). 98. FBI Oversight and Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1991, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. (1990). 99. FBI Oversight and Authorization, Fiscal Year 1993, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 102nd Cong. (1992). 100. Oversight of the FBI, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. (2001); Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Doc. No. 107-1086, Vol. II (2002). 101. Administrative Oversight of the Investigation of TWA Flight 800, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 106-534 (1999); Combating Terrorism: Coordination of Non-Medical R&D Programs, Hearing Before the House Committee on Government Reform, 106th Cong. (2000). 102. Administrative Oversight of the Investigation of TWA Flight 800, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 106-534 (1999). 103. Hearing Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (2004) (statement of John S. Pistole, Executive Assistant Director for Counterterrorism/Counterintelligence, FBI); Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations

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for 2003, Hearing Before the House Committee on Appropriations, 107th Cong., Pt. 10. (2003); Federal Bureau of Investigation, Terrorism 2002–2005 (Washington, DC: FBI, n.d.), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services -publications-terrorism-2002-2005-terror02_05.pdf/view. 104. National Academy of Public Administration, Transforming the FBI: Progress and Challenges (Washington, DC: NAPA, 2005). 105. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Ten Years After: The FBI Since 9/11. Counterterrorism,” https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/about-us/ten-years -after-the-fbi-since-9-11/just-the-facts-1/counterterrorism-1. 106. Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 107-920 (2002). 107. General Accounting Office, Combating Terrorism: Interagency Framework and Agency Programs to Address the Overseas Threat (Washington, DC: GAO, 2003). 108. Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 107-920 (2002). 109. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2005, Hearing Before a Committee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 108th Cong., Pt. 10 (2004). 110. Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001, Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, S. Doc. No. 107-1086, Vol. II (2002). 111. Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 107-920 (2002). 112. Statement of John S. Pistole, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (April 14, 2004). 113. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (September 16, 2009) (statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation), https://www .justice.gov/sites/default/files/testimonies/witnesses/attachments/2009/09 /16/2009-09-16-fbi-mueller-statement-oversight.pdf; Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2011, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 111th Cong., Pt. 6 (2010). 114. High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group, Interrogation Best Practices (Washington, DC: FBI, 2016), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/hig -report-august-2016.pdf/view. 115. Statement of Robert S. Mueller III, Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary (September 16, 2009). 116. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group,” https://www.fbi.gov/about/leadership-and-structure/national-security -branch/high-value-detainee-interrogation-group. 117. Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2011, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 111th Cong., Pt. 6 (2010). 118. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 111-1001 (2010). 119. Ali Watkins, “Elite Terrorist Interrogation Team Withers under Trump,” Politico, December 5, 2017, https://www.politico.com/story/2017 /12/05/elite-terrorist-interrogation-trump-279930.

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120. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2011, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 111th Cong., Pt. 6 (2010). 121. Watkins, “Elite Terrorist Interrogation Team Withers.” 122. US Department of Justice, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2008), https://oig.justice.gov/special/s0805/final.pdf. 123. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program (Washington, DC: Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, 2012). 124. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 125. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 126. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 127. Federal Bureau of Investigation, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States: The FBI’s Counterterrorism Program Since September 2001 (Washington, DC: FBI, 2004); DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 128. Matt Apuzzo and James Risen, “CIA First Planned Jails Abiding by US Standards,” New York Times, December 10, 2014. 129. Annabelle Timsit, “What Happened at the Thailand ‘Black Site’ Run by Trump’s CIA Pick,” The Atlantic, March 14, 2018, https://www.theatlantic.com /international/archive/2018/03/gina-haspel-black-site-torture-cia/555539/. 130. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program. 131. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 132. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 133. Council on Foreign Relations, “The US War in Afghanistan: 1999– 2019,” https://www.cfr.org/timeline/us-war-afghanistan. 134. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 135. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 136. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 137. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 138. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 139. Statement of John S. Pistole, Before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (April 14, 2004). 140. Garrett M. Graff, The Threat Matrix (Boston: Little, Brown, 2011). 141. Graff, The Threat Matrix. 142. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 143. Graff, The Threat Matrix. 144. Graff, The Threat Matrix. 145. FBI Oversight and Authorization, Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 98-287 (1983). 146. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1988, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 100th Cong., Pt. 4 (1987). 147. FBI Oversight and Authorization, Before the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 98-287 (1983). 148. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1996, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 104th Cong., Pt. 2 (1995); Oversight of the

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Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 105-679 (1997). 149. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The Hostage Rescue Team,” February 1, 2013, https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/the-hostage-rescue-team-30 -years-of-service-2. 150. US Department of Justice, Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Critical Incident Response Group Tactical Section Procurements (Washington, DC: DoJ, 2015). 151. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2009, Hearing Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 103rd Cong., Pt. 1 (2009). 152. Graff, The Threat Matrix. 153. Adam Goldman and Julie Tate, “Inside the FBI’s Secret Relationship with the Military’s Special Operations,” Washington Post, April 10, 2014. 154. Goldman and Tate, “Inside the FBI’s Secret Relationship.” 155. Oversight of US Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008). 156. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 157. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 158. Oversight of US Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008). 159. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “The FBI in Iraq: The Work of Our Legal Attaché,” https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/news/stories/2007/june /iraq062907. 160. Federal Bureau of Investigation, The FBI Story 2011 (Washington, DC: FBI, 2011), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/stats-services-publications -fbi-story-fbistory2011.pdf/view. 161. Oversight of US Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008). 162. FBI Oversight, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 109-921 (2006). 163. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 111-1001 (2010). 164. Oversight of US Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan, Hearing Before the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 110th Cong. (2008). 165. FBI Oversight, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 109-921 (2006). 166. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 167. FBI, The FBI Story 2011. 168. Commission on Wartime Contracting, How Good Is Our System for Curbing Contract Waste, Fraud and Abuse? (Washington, DC: US Congress, 2010).

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169. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 111-1001 (2010). 170. Commission on Wartime Contracting, How Good Is Our System for Curbing Contract Waste. 171. Oversight of the US Department of Justice, Before the Committee on the Judiciary, S. Doc. No. 111-907 (2009). 172. Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Four Former Blackwater Employees Found Guilty of Charges in Fatal 2007 Shootings at Nisur Square in Iraq,” October 22, 2014, https://www.fbi.gov/contact-us/field-offices/washingtondc /news/press-releases/four-former-blackwater-employees-found-guilty-of -charges-in-fatal-2007-shootings-at-nisur-square-in-iraq. 173. Sue Fleming and Andy Sullivan, “FBI Takes Lead in Blackwater Investigation,” Reuters, October 4, 2007, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-iraq -blackwater/fbi-takes-lead-in-blackwater-investigation-idUSN0430861520071005. 174. FBI, “Four Former Blackwater Employees Found Guilty.” 175. US Attorney’s Office, Eastern District of North Carolina, “Academi /Blackwater Charged and Enters Deferred Prosecution Agreement” [press release], August 7, 2012, https://archives.fbi.gov/archives/charlotte/press -releases/2012/academi-blackwater-charged-and-enters-deferred-prosecution -agreement. 176. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2005, Hearing Before a Committee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 108th Cong., Pt. 10 (2004). 177. Departments of Commerce, Justice, and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 2005, Hearing Before a Committee of the House Committee on Appropriations, 108th Cong., Pt. 10 (2004). 178. Federal Bureau of Investigation, FBI Bomb Data Center: 1998 Bombing Incidents, General Information Bulletin 98-1, https://www.hsdl.org/?view &did=458703. 179. Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes, Part 1, Hearing Before the House Committee on Internal Security, 93rd Cong. (1974). 180. FBI, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States; Statement of Christopher A. Wray, Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the House Committee on the Judiciary (December 7, 2017). 181. Statement of James B. Comey, Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Before the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary (May 21, 2014). 182. FBI, Report to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. 183. DoJ, A Review of the FBI’s Involvement. 184. Graff, The Threat Matrix. 185. Government Accountability Office, Combating Gangs: Federal Agencies Have Implemented a Central American Gang Strategy, but Could Strengthen Oversight and Measurement of Efforts (Washington, DC: GAO, 2010). 186. Statement of Stephen E. Richardson, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI, Before the House Homeland Security Committee (January 18, 2018). 187. Statement of Stephen E. Richardson, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI, Before the House Homeland Security Committee (January 18, 2018).

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188. GAO, Combating Gangs. 189. Statement of Stephen E. Richardson, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Division, FBI, Before the House Homeland Security Committee (January 18, 2018). 190. GAO, Combating Gangs.

9 Abroad Advisedly: The Legat Program in the Twenty-First Century A REVIEW OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION’S work abroad highlights a more complex origin story of the US foreign intelligence enterprise than the popular intelligence mythology presents. The Bureau currently collects intelligence through overt liaison relationships—leveraging other governments’ security services (which in a number of cases the Bureau has helped to improve) to obtain information essential to its role as the United States’ primary intelligence service in the domestic setting. However, historically, the FBI played a substantial role in the development of modern US foreign intelligence by establishing methods of operations that informed efforts to create a permanent US peacetime civilian foreign intelligence enterprise.

The Domestic Origins of Foreign Intelligence The United States’ foreign intelligence infrastructure did not spring sui generis from the National Security Act of 1947. It is the continuation of a trajectory the FBI launched as the nation’s first civilian foreign intelligence service with the establishment of the Special Intelligence Service in 1940. Aspects of the SIS were certainly new to the FBI—and to US intelligence writ large—but the Bureau did draw on its domestic work for models it could emulate abroad. For instance, it used its field office structure as a template

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for the legal attaché offices, which served as intelligence coordinators for the respective countries in which they operated. It is unlikely a sheer coincidence that the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)—which inherited the SIS apparatus—established its operations around chiefs of station, whose functions are remarkably similar to the original role of the legal attachés. There is no certainty that the FBI could have successfully adapted to worldwide intelligence coverage after the war. Its operations domestically consisted of running spies and criminals to ground—a deductive function that aspired to a finite solution. However, its operations abroad incorporated intelligence collection requirements from other government agencies, which was a deductive function that required acceptance of perpetual uncertainty and a willingness to kaleidoscopically revisit intelligence in light of new information. The FBI, having originally tightly compartmented the SIS, began to integrate the program into the Bureau writ large. One wonders if the collection-requirementsoriented culture of the SIS would have remained intact in an agency that for multiple decades had been functioning as a reactive, case-building law enforcement organization. Furthermore, there is a fundamental difference between wartime and peacetime intelligence collection. The FBI’s reactive corporate mentality was well suited to an environment in which it was required to ferret out Axis spies and smugglers. This was analogous—albeit on a much larger scale—to pursuing cases and disrupting threats to the United States. Peacetime intelligence collection was less about identifying and ending enemy activities and more about helping US policymakers maintain an informational advantage. The FBI was well equipped to prevent the other side from gaining an informational advantage— counterintelligence—but unproven in seeking out information that addressed policymakers’ needs.

The Complexity of Foreign Intelligence Again, the FBI’s operations abroad, past and present, disrupt the idea of a hard distinction between foreign and domestic intelli-

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gence. Even after the establishment of the CIA, the FBI continued to collect intelligence outside of the country that tied back to developments in the United States. Communist Coverage along the Mexican Border (BOCOV) and the HILEV (High-Level) programs illustrate that Bureau collection outside of the domestic setting was not an effort to usurp the CIA’s role but, rather, an effort to obtain information the FBI did not believe the Agency was covering sufficiently. The Bureau needs an international perspective. Developments abroad have implications for the domestic setting, and early warning through the lens of an organization that understands the picture within the United States can help preempt or at least deter threats before they impact the homeland. The development of a transnational cyber domain that threat actors have sought to exploit emphasizes the need for a globally informed FBI presence. Similarly, the global pervasion of violent extremism— whether Islamic, white nationalist, or some other ideology— requires international awareness with an understanding of the implications for the domestic setting. However, this is not a new necessity. As early as the 1930s, the FBI, at the direction of the White House, had to assess how global fascism and communism manifested within the United States. Through both its Legat program and its operations on the front lines, the FBI draws information of foreign intelligence value into the US national security ecosystem. Legal attachés obtain information through their liaison with friendly—or at least issue-cooperative—foreign security services. Although the FBI does not engage in unilateral intelligence collection in foreign environments, it benefits from other services’ ability to do so (and has, since the early days of the National Academy, assiduously cultivated relationships that facilitate collection by proxy). Furthermore, FBI personnel, including Hostage Rescue Team (HRT) members, work alongside US forces to seize information from threat actors abroad. Intelligence available on the battlefield may be of little significance to the personnel who have secured it but, in the context of FBI analysis, of great value to US national security.

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A Component of Diplomacy The FBI’s longstanding overt role abroad makes the Bureau a valuable implement for US diplomacy. Even before the creation of the SIS, the Bureau was helping to strengthen Washington’s bilateral relations by assisting several Latin American countries’ security services. Despite the clandestine nature of many of the SIS’s operations, the FBI continued to field police liaison positions in cooperative countries. This police liaison function ultimately became the primary identity of the legal attachés, which transitioned from clandestine intelligence coordinators to points of contact to the US government. The FBI’s international presence became even more geopolitically significant following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Through the provision of training and equipment, the Bureau attempted to help former Eastern Bloc countries transition into societies where security services were professional entities capable of upholding a respect for the rule of law. Finally, the FBI has extended services, such as its Disaster Squad, to assist foreign entities. All of these functions have the potential to foster goodwill toward Washington and contribute to the accrual of US soft power.

A Cautious Approach to a Continuing Necessity Although the FBI’s Legat program is essential to the conduct of intelligence work in the domestic setting, it is also necessary to consider—and seek ways to mitigate—the program’s vulnerabilities. According to an old intelligence dictum, “There are friendly nations but no friendly intelligence services.”1 No two governments’ global priorities will ever perfectly align (although the Five Eyes have historically been more aligned than not). Because their primary role is liaison, legats are particularly vulnerable to foreign counterintelligence (i.e., activities which undercut the United States’ informational advantage). As transmission belts for information back to Washington, legats are perfect conduits for governments seeking to feed information that advances those governments’ objectives to US decisionmakers. This intelligence/counterintelligence dynamic requires walking a delicate line. For instance, how does a legat handle

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information that may be credible from a government known for unscrupulousness, deception, and even violence? This is the conundrum that presented itself in March 2011, when Russia’s internal security service, the Federal Security Bureau (FSB), provided the legat with information about Tamerlan Tsarnaev and Zubeidat Tsarnaeva. According to the FSB, both of these individuals were adherents of radical Islam and Tsarnaev planned to join criminal groups in Dagestan and Chechnya. 2 Two years later, Tamerlan and his brother, Dzhokhar Tsarnaev, bombed the 2013 Boston Marathon. In 2011, however, it was possible that the Russian government was seeking to enlist US assistance for an entirely internal Russian issue. The problem of geopolitical manipulation through law enforcement channels is not new, and fear that Soviet-dominated countries would use Interpol as a political weapon was one of the reasons why J. Edgar Hoover pulled the FBI out of Interpol. Although the Bureau cannot abandon its international engagement, it should remain cognizant of foreign government efforts to manipulate the United States through information passed via legat channels.

Looking Ahead The FBI’s international operations have a legacy of adaptation to new functions and challenges. Although the Legal Attaché program played a significant—if overlooked—role in the establishment of the United States’ foreign intelligence apparatus, it cannot return to clandestine collection. Clandestine operations unbeknownst to host countries undermines the effectiveness of overt liaison. However, the Legat program would benefit from a reexamination of its mission, staffing, and relationship with counterparts. First, the Bureau should focus on the legats’ mission as one element of US statecraft. This goes beyond the ethos of “cop-tocop bridges” that former director Louis Freeh attempted to establish in the late 1990s.3 Instead, the legal attaché role needs to work at the policy level, providing assistance to foreign governments with developing mutually beneficial security policy. To accomplish this, the FBI needs to think of legal attachés not as “cops”

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but as specialized diplomats. Consistent with this function, the Bureau should focus on deploying individuals with appropriate credentials and experience. The FBI’s selection of W. R. Drane Lester—a special agent who had been a Rhodes Scholar at Oxford and who taught both Latin and law prior to joining the Bureau— to serve as an early representative to Interpol provides an example of what international interaction should look like.4 If the FBI does not have such cosmopolitan personnel within its ranks, it needs to ask why not and identify ways to rectify the shortage. The creation of a polished cadre of domestic security diplomats does not negate the role of special agents with operational, but not academic, backgrounds. Rather, the FBI should assign these individuals as needed, whether to work in conjunction with a foreign government on a specific issue or to provide training in a particular, practical field. Developing a bureaucratic structure that facilitates fluidity in assignments abroad would position the FBI to help develop long solutions—policy—while providing the skills to implement policies. This dual approach is essential to establishing security capabilities. Finally, the FBI should serve as the undisputed lead for overt foreign security liaison. Currently, multiple agencies at both the federal (e.g., Drug Enforcement Administration) and nonfederal (e.g., New York Police Department) levels have carved out niches for themselves under the noses of the legats. This has the potential to create confusion, especially when nonfederal entities such as the NYPD are operating abroad and interfacing with foreign partners. Domestically, the FBI has a well-established practice of developing standing multiagency bodies, notably the Joint Terrorism Task Forces, to coordinate a wide variety of federal and subfederal agencies’ work on issues of concern. The federal government should designate the Bureau to serve a similar coordinating role for overt foreign liaison on domestic security matters. Legats would implement this function. Domestic security is an integral element of foreign intelligence. Conditions within the United States can upset the international environment in which Washington must operate to protect and promote its interests. It is the Bureau’s responsibility, as the

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United States’ primary domestically oriented intelligence agency, to collect against and analyze these conditions and to communicate its findings to appropriate domestic and foreign partners. Furthermore, the discrete domestic situations in specific countries combine to form a contiguous security picture that can help identify implications of the developments abroad for the US domestic setting. Through its legats, the Bureau can obtain early warning about activities in the foreign setting and assess how these might impact the FBI’s primary area of responsibility.

Notes 1. James M. Olson, “The Ten Commandments of Counterintelligence,” Central Intelligence Agency, May 8, 2007, https://www.cia.gov/library /center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol45no5/html/v45i5a08p .htm. 2. Inspectors General for the Intelligence Community, Central Intelligence Agency, Department of Justice, and Department of Homeland Security, Unclassified Summary of Information Handling and Sharing Prior to the April 15, 2013, Boston Marathon Bombings (Washington, DC: OIG, April 10, 2014), https://www.oig.dhs.gov/assets/Mgmt/2014/OIG_Bos_Marathon _Bom_Rev_Apr14.pdf. 3. The Threat from Russian Organized Crime, Hearing Before the House Committee on International Relations, 104th Cong. (1996). 4. John Edgar Hoover, memorandum for the Attorney General, April 13, 1937, FBI 74-1-2001.

Acronyms

ABWEHR ALAT ASAC BNDD BSC CAA CHS CIA CID CIG CIRG CJIS CoI COS COINTELPRO CTORS CPUSA DEA DI DNI DocEx DoJ ECOSOC FBI FBIS FBN FCI FELEG FOIA FSB GAO

German military intelligence service assistant legal attaché assistant agent in charge Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs British Security Coordination Council on African Affairs confidential human source Central Intelligence Agency Criminal Investigative Division Central Intelligence Group Critical Incident Response Group Criminal Justice Investigative Services Office of the Coordinator of Information chief of station Counterintelligence Program Counterterrorism Operational Response Section Communist Party USA Drug Enforcement Administration Directorate of Intelligence Director of National Intelligence Document Exploitation Unit Department of Justice Economic and Social Council Federal Bureau of Investigation Foreign Broadcast Information Service Federal Bureau of Narcotics foreign counterintelligence Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group Freedom of Information Act Federal Security Bureau (Russia) Government Accountability Office

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Acronyms

HIG HRT HUMINT IACP IC ICCTF ICPC IED IIC ILEA IOB IOD ITFWG JTTF LSP MASINT MCTF MID MIT MLDU MOU MVD NCB NDAA NIA NYPD OCE OCIAA ODALE ODNI OIAP OIO OLC ONI ONNI OSS PCT RDT SAG SAMMS SEATO SECI SHAEF SIS SWAT SWIG TDY TEDAC TFOS

High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group Hostage Rescue Team human intelligence International Association of the Chiefs of Police Intelligence Community International Contract Corruption Task Force International Criminal Police Commission improvised explosive device Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference International Law Enforcement Academy International Operations Branch International Operations Division International Terrorism Financing Working Group Joint Terrorism Task Force Legat Screening Panel measures and signatures intelligence Major Crimes Task Force Military Intelligence Division mobile interrogation team Military Liaison and Detainee Unit memorandum of understanding Ministry of Internal Affairs (Russia) National Central Bureau National Defense Authorization Act National Intelligence Authority New York Police Department organized criminal enterprise Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement Office of the Directorate of National Intelligence Office of Investigative Agency Policies Office of International Operations Office of Legal Counsel Office of Naval Intelligence Office of National Narcotics Intelligence Office of Strategic Services practical case training rapid deployment team Strategic Alliance Group special agent mid-level management selection Southeast Asia Treaty Organization Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force Special Intelligence Service special weapons and tactics Southwest Intelligence Group short-term temporary duty Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center Terrorist Financing Operations Section

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US Congress. House Committee on Homeland Security. Homeland Security Beyond Our Borders: Examining the Status of Counterterrorism Coordination Overseas. 110th Cong. 2007. US Congress. House Committee on Internal Security. Domestic Intelligence Operations for Internal Security Purposes. Pt. 1. 93rd Cong. 1974. US Congress. House Committee on International Relations. The Threat from Russian Organized Crime. 104th Cong. 1996. US Congress. House Committee on the Judiciary. Department of Justice Authorization for Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1992. 102nd Cong. 1991. ———. Drug Enforcement Administration. 106th Cong. 1999. ———. FBI Authority to Seize Suspects Abroad. 101st Cong. 1989. ———. The FBI Investigation into the Saudi Arabia Bombing and Foreign FBI Investigations. 105th Cong. 1997. ———. FBI Oversight. 96th Cong. 1980. ———. FBI Oversight and Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 1991. 101st Cong. 1990. ———. FBI Oversight and Authorization, Fiscal Year 1993. 102nd Cong. 1992. ———. John Allen Muhammad, Document Fraud, and the Western Hemisphere Passport Exception. 108th Cong. 2003. ———. United States Participation in the International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL). 95th Cong. 1977. US Congress. House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform. Oversight of U.S. Efforts to Train and Equip Police and Enhance the Justice System in Afghanistan. 110th Cong. 2008. US Congress. House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure. Crimes Against Americans on Cruise Ships. 110th Cong. 2007. US Congress. House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control. Congressional Resource Guide to the Federal Effort on Narcotics Abuse and Control 1969– 76. Pt. 1. 95th Cong. 1978. US Congress. Senate Committee on Appropriations. Departments of Commerce, Justice, State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1985. Pt. 2. 98th Cong. 1985. ———. Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, and the Judiciary Appropriations for 1951. Pt. 1. 81st Cong. 1950. ———. Departments of State, Justice, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, 1962. 87th Cong. 1961. ———. Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1973. Pt. 1. 92nd Cong. 1972. ———. Commerce, Justice, Science, and Related Agencies Appropriations Fiscal Year 2011. S. Doc. 111-999. 2011. ———. Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1999. S. Doc. 105-809. 1999. ———. International Crime, Terrorism, and Narcotics. S. Doc. 104-457. 1996. US Congress. Senate Committee on Armed Services. The Report of the General Accounting Office on Nuclear Nonproliferation and Efforts to Help Other Countries Combat Nuclear Smuggling. S. Doc. 107-813. 2002. US Congress. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. Diplomacy and the War on Terrorism. 108th Cong. 2003. ———. Recent Developments in Transnational Crime Affecting U.S. Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy; Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty in Criminal Matters with Panama, Treaty Doc. 102-15; and 1994 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. S. Doc. 103-606. 1994. US Congress. Senate Committee on Government Operations. Federal Drug Enforcement. Pt. 4. 94th Cong. 1976. ———. Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973. Pt. 1. 93rd Cong. 1973.

Selected Bibliography

263

US Congress. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs. Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Pt. 2. S. Doc 104-422. 1996. ———. Russian Organized Crime in the United States. 104th Cong. 1996. ———. Terrorism: Interagency Conflicts in Combatting International Terrorism. 102nd Cong. 1991. US Congress. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. Administrative Oversight of the Investigation of TWA Flight 800. S. Doc. 106-534. 1999. ———. Antiterrorism Act of 1990. S. Doc. 101-1198. 1990. ———. Authorization Legislation and Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice (DEA and FBI). S. Doc. 100-577. 1987. ———. DEA and FBI. S. Doc. 100-577. 1987. ———. DEA Oversight and Authorization. 98th Cong. 1983. ———. DEA Oversight and Budget Authorization. S. Doc 98-794. 1984. ———. FBI Budget and Oversight for Fiscal Year 1987. S. Doc. 99-1013. 1986. ———. FBI Oversight. S. Doc 109-76. 2005. ———. FBI Oversight. S. Doc. 109-921. 2006. ———. FBI Oversight and Authorization. S. Doc. 98-287. 1983. ———. FBI Oversight and Budget Authorization for Fiscal Year 1986. S. Doc 99208. 1985. ———. FBI Statutory Charter. Pt. 1. 95th Cong. 1978. ———. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. S. Doc. 105-679. 1997. ———. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, 107th Cong. 2001. ———. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. S. Doc. 110-910. 2008. ———. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. S. Doc. 111-115. 2009. ———. Oversight of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. S. Doc. 111-1001. 2010. ———. Oversight Hearing on Counterterrorism. S. Doc. 107-920. 2002. ———. Oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice. S. Doc. 111-907. 2009. ———. Terrorism and America: A Comprehensive Review of the Threat, Policy, and Law. 103rd Cong. 1993. US Congress. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and interrogation Program. 2012. US Congress. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Report of the Joint Inquiry into Intelligence Community Activities Before and After the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001. S. Rep. No. 107-351, H. Rep. No. 107-792. 2002. US Congress. Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Foreign and Military Intelligence. Book I. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Together with Additional, Supplemental, and Separate Views. S. Doc. 94-755. 1976. ———. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Book II. Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. S. Rep. No. 94-755. 1976. ———. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Book III. Supplementary Detailed Staff Reports on Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans. S. Rep. No. 94-755. 1976. ———. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Book VI. Supplementary Reports on Intelligence Activities. S. Rep. No. 94-755. 1976. ———. Final Report of the Select Committee to Study Undercover Activities of Components of the Department of Justice. S. Doc. 97-682. 1982. US Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General. Audit of the Federal Bureau of Investigation Critical Incident Response Group Tactical Section Procurements. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 2015.

264

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———. Federal Bureau of Investigation Legal Attaché Program. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 2004. https://oig.justice.gov/reports/FBI/a0418/final.pdf. ———. The Department of Justice’s Terrorism Task Forces. Report No. I-2005-007. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 2005. ———. A Review of the FBI’s Involvement in and Observations of Detainee Interrogations in Guantanamo Bay, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Washington, DC: US Department of Justice, 2008. US Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1945–1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment, ed. C. Thomas Thorne Jr. and David S. Patterson. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1996. Viswanatha, Aruna. “FBI Personnel Recalled from Asia Amid Probe into Prostitution, Partying.” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2018. Waller, Douglas. Disciples. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015. ———. Wild Bill Donovan: The Spymaster Who Created the OSS and Modern American Espionage. New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011. Warner, Margaret. “An Exclusive Club: The 5 Countries That Don’t Spy on Each Other.” PBS NewsHour, October 25, 2013. Watkins, Ali. “Elite Terrorist Interrogation Team Withers Under Trump.” Politico, December 5, 2017. https://www.politico.com/story/2017/12/05/elite-terrorist -interrogation-trump-279930. Weiner, Tim. Enemies: A History of the FBI. New York: Random House, 2012. Weiss, Martin A. Terrorist Financing: U.S. Agency Efforts and Inter-Agency Coordination. Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2005. Whitaker, Joseph D. “Quinn Tamm, Ex-Assistant Director of the FBI.” Washington Post, January 25, 1986. Winston, Ali. “Stationed Overseas, but Solving Crimes in New York City.” New York Times, August 21, 2018. https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/21/nyregion /terrorism-nypd-intelligence-crime.html.

Index

Abu Ghraib, 226 ABWEHR. See German military intelligence service Accountability, 113–114 Afghanistan: counterterrorism in, 229– 230; legal attachés in, 233–234 African Americans, 178 Agency for International Development, 180 Agents, 8–9; diplomatically designated, 32–33; DoS and overseas, 115–116; Freeh and FBI oversees, 115–116; Mexican border crossed by, 140; nonagent personnel and, 125–126; police liaison, 7, 135–136, 179; SIS voluntary work of, 120; special, 29, 76, 214; traveling, 37–40; undercover, 30–31, 33, 51; Virtual Resident, 35 ALAT. See Assistant legal attaché Allende, Salvador, 80 Allied forces, 83, 209 Amateur Athletic Union Boxing team, 189–190 Ambassadors: Hoover and advisement of, 35–36; legal attaché formal request by, 117; US diplomacy by, 53–54 Analysis, aversion to, 51 Analytical personnel, 126 Andrew, Christopher, 219 Angleton, James, 210 Argentina, 34 Armour Meat Corporation, 27 Army Intelligence Corps, 212–213

Art Crime Team, 234 ASAC. See Assistant agent in charge Ash Report, 63–64 Asia, 118 Asian theater, 214–215 Assistant agent in charge (ASAC), 228 Assistant legal attaché (ALAT), 233 Astor, Vincent, 21, 26 Australia, 161 “Authority of the FBI to Override Customary or Other International Law in the Course of Extraterritorial Law Enforcement Activities,” 223–224 Axis powers, 210, 217 Baghdad Museum, 234 Baroody, William J., 148 Batista, Fulgencio, 216–217 Batvinis, Raymond, 22, 26–27 BDC. See Bomb Data Center Beirut, legal attaché program in, 148 Bellows Report, 117 Belmont, A. H., 57, 95 Berle, Adolf, 12, 15–18 Bern legat, 155–156 Bilateral relations, 250 Bin Laden, Osama, 229 Black Nationalist Hate Groups, 178 Black Panther Party, 178 Blackwater security contractors, 235 BNDD. See Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs BOCOV. See Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border

265

266

Index

Bomb Data Center (BDC), 236 Bombings, 8, 194 Border Liaison Officer, 143 Bosch, Juan, 218 Bosnia, 220 Boston Marathon attack, 251 Braden, Spruille, 31 Brennan, C. D., 147, 159 British Crown Colony, 143, 154 British Security Coordination (BSC), 24 Buenos Aires, 34, 156, 159, 162 Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD), 61, 63 Bush, George H. W., 194 Butte USS, 222

CAA. See Council on African Affairs Canberra legat, 161–162 Career considerations, 122 Carson, C. H., 27–28, 31–32, 84, 85–86; FBI’s enemies from, 48; subversive activities and, 106; Sullivan assessment by, 108–109 Castro, Fidel, 218 Censorship, 23 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 1; clandestine operations of, 135–136; creation of, 5; Dulles as director of, 55–56; FBI coordination lacking with, 57–59; FBI encroaching on, 142; FBI relationship maturation with, 59–60; FBI rivalry with, 55–56; FBI suspicions of, 56–57; Foreign Broadcast Information Service of, 154–155; Immigration and Naturalization Service and, 140– 141; legal attaché program objections of, 56, 248; Libyan terrorists training by, 171; National Security Act creating, 52–53 Central Intelligence Group (CIG), 50, 52, 80, 109 Centralized management, 225–226 Chain of custody, 232 Checks and balances, 51 Cheney, Dick, 230 Chiang Kai-Shek, Madame, 24 Chicago Terrorism Task Force, 196 Chief of Station (COS), 36 Chiefs of station, 4 Child, H. L., 58 China: Cultural Revolution of, 144; MPS of, 193; US impacted by activities of, 6

Chinese Communist, 174; Hong Kong legat and, 143–145, 153–154; Japan activities of, 150–151 CHSs. See Confidential human sources CIA. See Central Intelligence Agency The CIA (Darling), 5 CID. See Criminal Investigative Division CIG. See Central Intelligence Group CIRG. See Critical Incident Response Group Civil Attaché, 30, 34, 217 Civilian intelligence service, 47–48 CJIS. See Criminal Justice Investigative Services Clandestine operations, 135–136 Cleaver, Eldridge, 178 Clegg, H. H., 84, 89 Clerical assistants, 125–126 CODIS. See Combined DNA Index System CoI position, 16 COINTELPRO. See Counterintelligence Program Cold War, 4, 77, 85–86, 110, 153–156 Cole USS attack, 194 Combined DNA Index System (CODIS), 119 Comey, James, 198 Commercial partners, 24 Communications Intercept Service program, 153 Communism: COINTELPRO operations against, 141–142; in Latin America, 95; US countering global, 215. See also Chinese Communist Communist Coverage Along the Mexican Border (BOCOV), 140–143, 249 Communist Party (CP), 142 Communist Party of the United States (CPUSA), 178 Comprehensive Crime Control Act (1984), 158, 222 Confidential human sources (CHSs), 65 Congress: counterproliferation program and, 186; FBI kidnapping people and, 224; FBI’s legat presence and, 118–119; legat liaison activities and, 123, 136, 157; Mueller’s FBI reorganization from, 225–226 Coordination: CIA and FBI lack of, 57– 59; intelligence, 4; operational, 75;

Index in operational management, 75, 111, 192–198; special unit for, 110 Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations, 38 Copenhagen legat, 177 Cop-to-cop partnerships, 180–181, 251– 252 Correlation–Liaison Unit, 105 COS. See Chief of Station Costs, legal attaché incurring, 116–117 Council on African Affairs (CAA), 95 Counterintelligence, 111; Branch, 110; cautious approach to, 250–251; legal attaché functions of, 60; of US, 60, 173–174 Counterintelligence Program (COINTELPRO), 141–142, 178 Counternarcotics intelligence, 62–64 Counterproliferation, 184–186 Counterterrorism: in Afghanistan, 229– 230; extraterritorial squads for, 222; Guantanamo and, 228–229; interrogations on, 229; in Iraq, 230– 232; legat expansion from, 158, 171–172; RDT’s for, 224–228; September 11 attacks and, 66, 153, 158, 183–184; in World War II, 221–233 Counterterrorism Division, 233 Counterterrorism Operational Response Section (CTORS), 229, 230 Country clearance, 54 Cover companies, 28 Cover operations, 31–32 CP. See Communist Party CPUSA. See Communist Party of the United States Creating the Secret State (Rudgers), 5 CREST database, 2 Criminal activities, 97–98, 176 Criminal investigations, 174; exports policed by, 176–179; ILEA for, 182– 184; international, 175–176; international training in, 181–182 Criminal Investigative Division (CID), 112, 223 Criminal Justice Investigative Services (CJIS), 191–192, 232 Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG), 232 Crosby, Ken, 25 Cryptanalytical and Translation Section, 191 CTORS. See Counterterrorism Operational Response Section

267

Cuba, 78; Batista overthrown in, 216– 217; Castro seizing, 218; Havana, 176–177 Cuban Revolution, 216–217 Cultural Revolution, of China, 144 Cyber Division, 198 Czech Republic, 186 Czechoslovakia, 86–87 Dalbey, D. J., 149, 152 Darling, Arthur, 5 Dayton Accords, 220 Dayton Peace Agreement, 221 DEA. See Drug Enforcement Administration Defense Intelligence Agency, 191 DeLoach, Cartha, 139 Department of Homeland Security, 91 Department of Justice (DoJ), 61; IG of, 137; Office of Professional Responsibility in, 124 Department of State (DoS): country clearance obtained by, 54; criminal law enforcement training from, 180; DEA and, 53; FBI’s interactions with, 53–55; legal attaché role of, 34, 117, 215–216; overseas agents and, 115– 116; police liaison function of, 79–80 Department of the Treasury, 90–91 Detention Site Green, 229 DI. See Directorate of Intelligence Diplomacy: agents designated for, 32– 33; bilateral relations and, 250; Latin America and, 34; SIS establishing, 29–30; Swiss cooperation through, 155; tools for, 6–7; US ambassadors, 53–54 Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act (1986), 222 Diplomatically covered agents, 32–33 Director of National Intelligence (DNI), 36 Directorate of Intelligence (DI), 6 Disaster Squad, 8, 188–190, 221 Division of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs, 63 DNI. See Director of National Intelligence Dobrynin, Anatoly, 218 DocEx. See Document Exploitation Unit Document exploitation, 213 Document Exploitation Unit (DocEx), 235–236 DoJ. See Department of Justice Domestic intelligence, 49–50, 247–248

268

Index

Domestic Intelligence Division, 124, 149–150, 219 Domestic security, 252–253 Domestic work, of legal attaché, 35 Dominican Republic, 217–219 Dominican Security Index, 219 Donovan, Bill, 4, 15–16, 24 DoS. See Department of State Double talk, 29 Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), 53; FBI and, 61–65; narcotics enforcement by, 91; Reorganization Plan No. 2 of, 62–63; SWIG of, 143 Ducloux, Louis, 85 Duggan, Laurence, 93 Dulles, Allen, 24, 55–56 Dun & Bradstreet, 25–26 Eastern Bloc, 179–180, 187 Eastern Europe, 156–158, 183 Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 95 Ecuador, 78 Edwards, John, 224 El Salvador, 184, 237 Embassies, 39; cover operations of, 31– 32; Hong Kong, 154; legal attaché in, 54–55; legat presence from, 31 Engineering section, 186 Espionage cases, 174 Europe, 108, 213 European theater, 210–214 Executive branch, 2 Export Control Act, 173 Exports, 176–179 Extortion, 198 Extraterritorial squads, 222 Fact-finding mission, 30 Farland, Joseph S., 218 Fascist movement, 3 FBI executive conference, 39 FBI laboratory, 190–191 FBIS. See Foreign Broadcast Information Service FBN. See Federal Bureau of Narcotics FCI. See Foreign Counterintelligence program FDR. See Roosevelt, Franklin D. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). See Specific topics Federal Bureau of Investigation Assumption of Federal Drug Enforcement (report), 63

Federal Bureau of Narcotics (FBN), 61 Federal Security Bureau (FSB), 185, 195, 251 FELEG. See Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group Felt, W. M., 136 Fictitious company, 20 Field offices, 35, 94; Hong Kong, 153– 154; legal attaché in, 4; Minneapolis, 172; Nazi movements from, 11; New York, 23; San Antonio, 138–139; San Francisco, 49; special agents in charge of, 74 Field service reviews, of SIS, 109 Final Report of the Attorney General’s Review Team on the Handling of the Los Alamos National Laboratory Investigation, 117 Financial Action Task Force, 180 Fingerprints, 74, 189 Firearms, 74 FISA. See Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Five Eyes Law Enforcement Group (FELEG), 96, 250 Flying squads, 224–225 FOIA. See Freedom of Information Act Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), 59, 154–155 Foreign Counterintelligence (FCI) program, 111 Foreign intelligence: domestic and, 49– 50, 247–248; exploitation of, 58; FBI role in, 3–5, 48; Hoover and, 49–50; legal attaché end of, 152; legal attaché template for, 35; training of, 25; of US, 1, 252–253 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), 225 Foreign language expertise, 211 Foreign Liaison Desk, 85 Foreign Liaison Unit, 111, 124, 146–147, 159 Foreign Police Cooperation (FPC), 198 Foreign policy, US, 79 Foreign security agencies, 7, 252; FBI partnerships with, 173; legal attachés with, 192–193; SIS and, 77–78 Foreign Services: desk, 110; officers, 123, 128; operational value of, 136–137 Foxworth, Percy E., 30–33, 105, 209; Hoover appointing, 19; as SIS leader, 79; SIS service and, 120; as traveling agent, 37–38

Index FPC. See Foreign Police Cooperation Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 2, 6 Freedom Support Act (1992), 185 Freeh, Louis, 65, 112; cop-to-cop bridges from, 251–252; Eastern Bloc comments of, 180; FBI agents oversees and, 115–116; federal law enforcement leaders and, 183; Hungarian law enforcement and, 196–197; international terrorism and, 136; legat locations opened by, 172; terrorism and, 158 Front lines, 8 FSB. See Federal Security Bureau Fuentes, Thomas, 60 Fukuyama, Francis, 195 Funding, of ICPC, 88–89

GAO. See Government Accountability Office García, Anastasio Somoza, 77 Garvey, Frank, 27 Geo-economics, 175 Geopolitics, 86–87, 175–176 German military intelligence service (ABWEHR), 211 Germany, 153, 212–213 Gillies, Allan, 27 Glavin, W. R., 87 Global intelligence, 211 Government Accountability Office (GAO), 127 Government agencies, 9, 117, 136, 234, 248; FBI’s support from, 53; foreign assistance to, 221; in ICPC, 85; intelligence collection for, 109; paper trail for, 57 Graf, Garrett, 231, 236 Gray, L. Patrick, 59 Green Zone attacks, 233 Grove, Dan, 153 Guantanamo, 226, 228–229 Guevara, Che, 155

Haberfeld, Harold D., 209 Havana, Cuba, 176–177 Hazmat, 192 Headquarters (HQ), 105; accountability ensured by, 113–114; centralized management from, 225–226; supervisory staff of, 106 Hearst Magazine Corporation, 26 Helmich, Joseph George, 173 Hemingway, Ernest, 211

269

Herzegovina, 220 HIG. See High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group High-level intelligence (HILEV), 6, 53, 59; information of interest in, 147; INLET program and, 145–148; intelligence collection in, 152; intelligence development locations for, 148–149; limited value of, 151– 152; Nixon enthusiasm for, 149–150 High-Value Detainee Interrogation Group (HIG), 226–227 Hijackers, 193, 222 HILEV. See High-level intelligence Homeland Security Act (2002), 91 Honduran National Police, 78 Hong Kong, 6, 138; Chinese Communist and, 143–145, 153–154; embassies, 154; field office in, 153– 154; legal attaché in, 143–145 Hoover, J. Edgar, 4; ambassador’s being advised and, 35–36; coordination directions from, 57; Disaster Squad description by, 189; FBI laboratory and, 190; foreign intelligence and, 49–50; Foxworth appointed by, 19; global intelligence agency from, 48; ICPC and, 81, 88; intelligence investigation from, 11–12; Johnson advised by, 218–219; law enforcement approach of, 7–8, 73– 74; on Law Enforcement Bulletin, 75; legal attaché’s function and, 135– 136; legal attaché’s mandate from, 115; National Academy and, 74; operational units from, 107; police liaison post from, 115; prosecution action forbidden by, 51–52; SIS compromise and, 27–28; subject matter expertise and, 106; Sullivan assessment encouraged by, 160; watch the borders and, 139–140 Hopkins, Harry, 21 Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), 231–232, 249 HQ. See Headquarters HRT. See Hostage Rescue Team Human intelligence (HUMINT), 5 Human Trafficking Task Force, 97 HUMINT. See Human intelligence Hungarian law enforcement, 196–197 IACP. See International Association of the Chiefs of Police

270

Index

ICCTF. See International Contract Corruption Task Force ICPC. See International Criminal Police Commission ICPP. See International Counterproliferation Program initiatives Identification Division, 189 IEDs. See Improvised explosive devices IFC. See International Fusion Cell IG. See Inspector General IIC. See Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference ILEA. See International Law Enforcement Academy Immigration and Naturalization Service, 140–141 Importers and Exporters Service Company, 20–22 Improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 236 Information: of interest, 147; types, 146; Western Hemisphere producing, 52 INLET program, 145–148 Innocent Images International Task Force, 197 Inspector General (IG), 120, 137 Intelligence: analyst, 126; Army Intelligence Corps for, 212–213; civilian intelligence service for, 47– 48; communities, 227; coordinators, 4; counternarcotics, 62–64; Division, Section CI-3, 111; domestic, 49–50; global, 211; global agencies, 48, 52; HILEV locations development of, 148–149; Hoover’s investigation of, 11–12; HUMINT, 5; Iraqi service of, 194; legal attachés activities on, 36; military, 13; officers uncovered, 174; Section CI-3 Division of, 111; US peacetime, 50. See also Central Intelligence Agency; Foreign intelligence; High-level intelligence; Special Intelligence Service Intelligence collection: FBI collaboration in, 92–95, 218–219; for government agencies, 109; HILEV concept in, 152; of legal attachés, 137–138; legat program and, 5–6; for national security, 9–10; of SIS, 14, 79; trial and error in, 3–4 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act (2004), 36 Inter-American Affairs, 93, 109

Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference (IIC), 12, 51 International Association of the Chiefs of Police (IACP), 96–97 International Communist, 212 International conflict, 2 International Contract Corruption Initiative (2005), 234 International Contract Corruption Task Force (ICCTF), 235 International coordination unit, 186 International Counterproliferation Program (ICPP) initiatives, 185–186 International criminal investigations, 175–176 International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Program, 180 International Criminal Police Commission (ICPC), 66, 84, 212; allied forces acquiring records of, 83; Czechoslovakia in, 86–87; FBI competition with, 87–88; FBI relationship severed with, 89; FBI’s strained relationship with, 85–86; funding of, 88–89; geopolitics and, 86–87; government agencies in, 85; Hoover and, 81, 88; implementation of, 85–86; influence imbalance of, 87; international engagement with, 89; Lester on membership in, 82; Narcotics Bureau and, 88; US representation to, 89–92 International Fusion Cell (IFC), 233 International initiatives, 97–98 International Law Enforcement Academy (ILEA), 7, 182–184 International Law Enforcement Conference, 185 International Liaison Program, 66 International Operations Branch (IOB), 112 International Operations Division (IOD), 6, 113 International organizations, 80–84 International Relations Branch (IRB), 112 International terrorism, 136 International Terrorism Financing Working Group (ITFWG), 96 International Training & Assistance Unit, 180 INTERPOL, 85, 90 Interrogations, 213, 228–229 Investigative analysts, 126 Investigative experience, 119–120

Index Investigative informants, 139–141 Investigative initiatives, 171 Investments, 28 IOB. See International Operations Branch IOD. See International Operations Division IOI. See Office of International Operations Iraq: Abu Ghraib, 226; civilians killed in, 235; counterterrorism in, 230– 232; legal attachés in, 233 Iraqi Intelligence Service, 194 Iraqi National Police Officer, 234 IRB. See International Relations Branch Iron Curtain, 86 Ismail, Eyal, 172 ITFWG. See International Terrorism Financing Working Group Ivankov, Vyacheslav, 198 Izetbegovi, Alija, 220 Japan: Chinese Communist activities in, 150–151; surrender of, 214; Tokyo Rose collaboration with, 215 Johnson, Lyndon B. (LBJ), 6, 218–219 Joint Terrorism Task Force (JTTF), 195– 196, 252 Joint Terrorist Financing Task Force, 98 Jones, Gus T., 29 Journalism, 26 JTTF. See Joint Terrorism Task Force Keay, V. P., 87, 95, 105 Keenan, Jennifer Hale, 137 Kelly, Ray, 66 Kennedy, Edward M., 177 Kennedy, John F., 182 Khobar Towers bombing, 194 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 179 Kirkpatrick, Lyman, 56 Kissinger, Henry, 147 La Paz office, 156 Laboratory Division, 224 Ladd, D. M., 33, 38, 83, 92; FBI operations and, 107–108; intelligence assessment from, 49–50 Latin America: Communist movement in, 95; Coordinator of Commercial and Cultural Relations of, 38; diplomatically covered presence in, 34; fact-finding mission in, 30; FBI activities in, 18, 48; FBI’s limited knowledge of, 19–20; FBI’s responsibilities in, 76–80;

271

investments in, 28; legal attachés in, 37, 173, 216–221; Rockefeller, N., policy and, 93; Section, 219; SIS operations in, 39–40; SIS personnel withdrawal from, 34–35; US engagement with, 21; World War II and, 216–221 Law enforcement: cop-to-cop partnerships in, 180–181; in Czech Republic, 186; DoS training in criminal, 180; of Eastern Bloc, 187; FBI formulating standards for, 84; federal leaders of, 183; Hoover’s approach to, 7–8, 73–74; Hungarian, 196–197; mobilization plan of, 76; Mueller and foreign, 181; from police liaison agents, 179; Scandinavian, 175. See also Criminal investigations Law Enforcement Bulletin, 75 Law-enforcement-centric organization, 14 LBJ. See Johnson, Lyndon B. Leffler, Melvyn, 5 Legal attaché (Legat) program, 2, 9; accountability of, 113–114; in Afghanistan, 233–234; ambassadors’s formal request for, 117; in Asia, 118; in Australia, 161; in Beirut, 148; in Bern, 155–156; in Buenos Aires, 156, 162; in Canberra, 161–162; Child on, 58; CIA objections to, 56, 248; Civil Attaché and, 30, 34, 217; clerical assistants in, 125–126; Congress and, 118–119, 123, 136, 157; in Copenhagen, 177; costs incurred in, 116–117; counterintelligence branch administering, 110; counterintelligence functions of, 60; counterterrorism of, 158, 171–172; criminal networks targeted by, 175– 176; domestic work of, 35; DoS and, 34, 117, 215–216; in embassies, 31, 54–55; FBI expanding, 58; in field offices, 4; foreign intelligence ended of, 152; foreign intelligence template from, 35; with foreign security agencies, 192–193; Foreign Service officers and, 128; in Havana, Cuba, 176–177; in Hong Kong, 143–145, 153–154; Hoover’s mandate to, 115; illegal intelligence officers uncovered by, 174; intelligence abroad and, 5–6; intelligence activities of, 36; intelligence collection of, 137–138; as

272

Index

intelligence coordinators, 4; interagency difficulties of, 61; investigative initiatives of, 171; in Iraq, 233; in Latin America, 37, 173, 216–221; liaison relationships in, 127; in Lisbon and Madrid, 37; locations, 170tab; in Madrid, 114–115, 155; mandatory training in, 121; in Manila, Philippines, 160–161; in Mexico, 138–139, 141; in Moscow, 157; Mueller opening offices of, 126, 158; narrative-producing role of, 32– 33; negative perceptions of, 122–123; Nixon requesting expansion of, 149– 150; operational management of, 111; operational role of, 33–34; OPR investigating, 124; in Ottawa, 143; in Paris, 151; personnel of, 119–128; police liaison positions in, 135–136; reassessment of, 158–162; recommendees for, 125; reduction of, 159; reporting system of, 33; reputational position in, 123; in Saigon, 118; in San Francisco, 94; in Santo Domingo, 220; in Soviet Union, 156; statutory charter for, 137; in strategic countries, 114–115; strategic offices for, 147–148; Sullivan critical of, 122, 148, 159; Sullivan on supervision of, 144–145; terrorism and, 171–172; threat assessments from, 116; in Tokyo, 173; undercover operatives of, 51; of US embassies, 31; US strategic interests in, 152–153; vulnerabilities of, 250–251; Western Hemisphere coverage by, 155–156 Legat liaison activities, 123, 136, 154, 157 Legat program. See Legal Attaché program Legat Screening Panel (LSP), 125 Lescot, Élie, 217 Lester, W. R. Drane, 81–82, 252 Liason relationships, 127 Libyan terrorists, 171 Local authorities, 75 Louvage, F. E., 83–84, 86 LSP. See Legat Screening Panel Lugar, Richard, 184 Lynch, M. Joseph, 48–49 MacArthur, Douglas, 214 Madrid legat, 114–115, 155 Major Crimes Task Force (MCTF), 234 Malfeasance, in US, 234–235

Manhattan office, 20–29 Manila, Philippines, 160–161 MASINT. See Measures and signatures intelligence Matthews, Connie, 178 McCabe, Andy, 227 McCain, John, 191 MCTF. See Major Crimes Task Force Measures and signatures intelligence (MASINT), 190 Memorandum of understanding (MOU), 54, 229 Messersmith, George S., 12 Mexico: FBI agents crossing border of, 140; investigative informants in, 139–141; legal attachés in, 138–139, 141; subversive activity in, 138; US border with, 139–143 MID. See Military Intelligence Division Miles, Sherman, 13–14, 17 Military, US, 228 Military coup, in Dominican Republic, 218 Military intelligence, 13 Military Intelligence Division (MID), 11, 13, 51 Military Liaison and Detainee Unit (MLDU), 228–229 Miloševi, Slobodan, 220 Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), 185, 193, 195 Ministry of Justice (MPS), 193 Minneapolis field office, 172 MITs. See Mobile interrogation teams MLDU. See Military Liaison and Detainee Unit Mobile interrogation teams (MITs), 227 Mobilization plan, 76 Mogilevich, Semyon Y., 197 Mohammed, Khalid Sheikh, 229 Monograph Unit, 109–110 Monroe Doctrine, 3 Moscow legat, 157 Motorcycle gangs, 177 MOU. See Memorandum of understanding Moussaoui, Zacarias, 172, 225 MPS. See Ministry of Justice MS-13 gangs, 177 Mueller, Robert III, 143, 157, 224; FBI reorganization from, 225–226; foreign law enforcement from, 181; on HIG, 227; investigative analysts advisement by, 126; legat offices

Index under, 126, 158; NYPD program and, 66; Operations Order 1015 signed by, 231; Zubaydah interrogation and, 229 Multilateral cooperation, 96 MVD. See Ministry of Internal Affairs Narcotics Bureau, 88 Narcotics-trafficking operations, 126 Narrative-producing role, 32–33 National Academy program, 73–74, 181–182, 187 National Archives and Records Administration, 2 National Central Bureau (NCB), 91–92 National Counterterrorism Center, 60 National Crime Information Center, 191 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), 185 National Defense Division, 105 National Defense Training Schools, 74 National Intelligence Authority (NIA), 50 National police force, 74 National Police Organized Crime Task Force, 196 National security, 1; INLET program and, 146; intelligence collection for, 9–10; of US, 3 National Security Act (1947), 47, 52–53, 237 National Security Branch, 60 National Security Council, 226; Decision Directive “38,” 117; Intelligence Directive No. “5,” 56 NATO. See North Atlantic Treaty Organization Navy, US, 11, 50, 191, 193 Nazi movements, 11–12 NCB. See National Central Bureau NDAA. See National Defense Authorization Act New York field offices, 23 New York Police Department (NYPD), 66, 196 NIA. See National Intelligence Authority Nixon, Richard, 118, 146–147, 149–150 Nonagent personnel, 125–126 North Africa invasion, 209 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 174, 221 Nuclear smuggling, 185 Nunn, Sam, 184 NYPD. See New York Police Department

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OCE. See Organized Criminal Enterprise Program OCIAA. See Office of the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement (ODALE), 61–62 Office of International Operations (OIO), 112, 123–124 Office of Investigative Agency Policies (OIAP), 65 Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), 223 Office of Liaison and International Affairs, 111–112 Office of National Narcotics Intelligence (ONNI), 62 Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI), 11, 13, 51 Office of Preference Program, 124 Office of Professional Responsibility (OPR), 124 Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 1, 17, 51, 108 The Office of Strategic Services, 4 Office of the Coordinator of InterAmerican Affairs (OCIAA), 15 OIAP. See Office of Investigative Agency Policies OIAP Resolution Six, 65 OLC. See Office of Legal Counsel Omnibus Diplomatic Security and AntiTerrorism Act (1986), 158 ONI. See Office of Naval Intelligence ONNI. See Office of National Narcotics Intelligence Operation DOMSIT, 218 Operation Torch, 209 Operational management: coordination in, 75, 111, 192–198; of legal attaché program, 111; role of, 33–34; units for, 107; value of, 136–137 Operations Order “1015,” 231 OPR. See Office of Professional Responsibility Organized crime, 157, 175 Organized Criminal Enterprise (OCE) Program, 112 OSS. See Office of Strategic Services Palazzo d’Italia, 23 Paper trail, 57 Papich, Sam, 26, 56 PCT. See Practical Case Training program Peace Corps, 182 Peacetime intelligence, of US, 50

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Index

Peñaranda, Enrique, 77, 216 Pennsylvania-Central Airlines DC-3 crash, 189 Personnel: agent and nonagent, 125–126; analytical, 126; issues facing, 123– 124; Latin American, 34–35; of legat program, 119–128; SIS, 34–35, 121 Pieper, N. J., 49 Pinochet, Augusto, 80 Pistole, John, 121 Police force, national, 74 Police liaisons: agents, 7, 135–136, 179; DoS function of, 79–80; post, 115; program, 77–79 Political refugees, 86 Post office boxes, 29 Pound, Ezra, 210 Practical Case Training (PCT) program, 198 Prague conference, 90 Preparedness Program for the Americas, 92 A Preponderance of Power (Leffler), 5 Presidential Directive on Coordination of Foreign Intelligence Activities, 50 Pre-war, 23, 48 Priority programs, 169 Prosecution action, 51–52 Al-Qaeda, 137, 171, 194, 229–230 Quantico, Virginia, 73, 185, 188 Rapid deployment teams (RDTs), 224 Reassessment, of legal attaché program, 158–162 Regional security officers (RSOs), 54 Reorganization Plan No. 2, of DEA, 62–63 Reporting system, of legal attaché, 33 Research and Analysis Unit, 108 Revell, Oliver (“Buck”), 223 Revolution, 215–216 Ribicoff, Abraham, 63 Rio de Janeiro, 162 Rivalry, with CIA, 55–56 Rockefeller, John D., 20 Rockefeller, Nelson, 15–16, 20, 37, 92–93 Rockefeller Center, 21, 23–24 Rogers, William, 147 Roosevelt, Franklin D. (FDR), 3, 11, 12, 75 Royal Jordanian airliner hijacking, 222 RSOs. See Regional security officers Rudgers, David, 5 Russia: espionage cases involving, 174; MVD of, 193; officer training in, 188, 198; organized crime in, 157, 175

SAC. See Special agent in charge SAG. See Strategic Alliance Group Saigon legat, 118 SAMMS. See Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection Board San Antonio field office, 138–139 San Francisco, CA, 49, 94 Santo Domingo, 220 Scandinavian law enforcement, 175 SEATO. See Southeast Asia Treaty Organization SECI. See Southeast European Cooperative Initiative Section CI-3, of Intelligence Division, 111 Security services, 7, 78–79, 233 September 11 attacks, 60, 126, 229; counterterrorism and, 66, 153, 158, 183–184; FBI interrogations after, 228; ILEA after, 183–184; terrorism of, 172 Serb minority, 220 Service organization, 14 Sessions, William, 169 Seventeen November, 197 SHAEF. See Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force Short-term temporary duty (TDY), 126– 128 Siebert, Edwin L., 210, 213 Singapore, 118 SIS. See Special Intelligence Service Smith, Walter Bedell, 57–58 Smuggling, 176, 185 Souers, Sidney, 109 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 57 Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), 97 Southwest Intelligence Group (SWIG), 143 Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act (1991), 185 Soviet Union: CPUSA assisted by, 142; dissolution of, 156, 171; legal attachés in, 156 Special agent in charge (SAC), 25 Special Agent Mid-Level Management Selection (SAMMS) Board, 125 Special agents, 29, 74, 76, 214 Special Coordination Unit, 110 Special employees, 27 Special Intelligence Service (SIS), 2, 247; agents voluntary work for, 120; Berle supporting, 17–18; closed section of, 110; collection operations of, 79; corporations as covers for, 24–25;

Index diplomatic establishment of, 29–30; field service reviews of, 109; foreign coverage of, 18–19; foreign security agencies and, 77–78; Hoover and compromises of, 27–28; intelligence collection of, 14, 79; investigative experience in, 119–120; Latin America operations of, 39–40; Latin American personnel withdrawal by, 34–35, 121; as law-enforcementcentric organization, 14; operatives of, 23; in Rockefeller Center, 21, 23– 24; subversive activities and, 12–13; training of, 121; traveling inspectors of, 39; treason suspects interviewed by, 210, 213; uncertain future role of, 50–51; undercover reports by, 30–31 Special Operations, US, 232 Special weapons and tactics (SWAT) program, 231 SSA. See Supervisory Special Agent Statecraft, 156 Statutory charter, 137 Stenographers, 126 Stephenson, William, 24 Stettinius, Edward, 93 Stone, Harlan Fiske, 16 Strategic Alliance Cyber Crime Working Group, 96 Strategic Alliance Group (SAG), 96 Strategic interests, 114–119, 152–153 Street gangs, 177 Subject matter expertise, 106 Subversive activities, 106; in Mexico, 138; SIS and, 12–13 Sullivan, William, 47–48, 55, 62, 108– 109; Dominican Republic response and, 218; FBI operations experiences of, 160; HILEV’s limited value from, 151–152; Hoover encouraging assessment by, 160; legal attaché supervision and, 144–145; legal program criticism by, 122, 148, 159; US return of, 160 Supervisory Special Agent (SSA), 187 Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF), 211– 212 SWAT. See Special weapons and tactics program SWIG. See Southwest Intelligence Group Switzerland, 155 TAG. See Transnational Gang unit

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Taliban, 229 Tamm, E. A., 15–16, 49, 93, 108 Tamm, Quinn, 97 Task Force approach, 195–198 TDY. See Short-term temporary duty TEDAC. See Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center Terrorism: Chicago Terrorism Task Force and, 196; criminal activities and, 97– 98; FBI against, 75, 194; Freeh and, 158; global war on, 8; HIG for, 226; international, 136; legal attaché and, 171–172; politics of, 74; of September 11 attacks, 172; with WMD, 157; Younis acts of, 222–224 Terrorist Explosive Device Analytical Center (TEDAC), 236 Terrorist Financing Operations Section (TFOS), 98 Threat assessments, 116 Tokyo legat, 173 Tokyo Rose, 215 Tolson, Clyde, 39, 49, 89, 136 Training: criminal investigation’s international, 181–182; FBI, 74; of foreign intelligence service, 25; of foreign law enforcement, 180; in legal attaché program, 121; of Libyan terrorists, 171; PCT, 198; of Russian officers, 188, 198; of SIS personnel, 121; in transnational criminality, 187–188; WMD, 185– 186 Trans World Airlines flight, 193 Transition, 110–113 Transnational criminality, 187–188 Transnational Gang unit (TAG), 237 Traveling agent, 37–40 Traveling inspectors, 39 Treason, 210, 213 Troy, Thomas, 20 Trujillo, Rafael, 217 Truman, Harry S., 50 Tsarnaev, Dzhokhar, 251 Tsarnaev, Tamerlan, 251 Tsarnaev, Zubeidat, 251 Tu man, Franjo, 220

UN. See United Nations Undercover agents, 30–31, 33, 51 United Nations (UN), 91, 93, 96–98, 220; FBI and founding of, 94; FBI as liaison to, 95; Preparedness Program for the Americas and, 92

276

Index

United States (US), 31; Agency for International Development of, 180; Amateur Athletic Union Boxing team from, 189–190; ambassador diplomacy of, 53–54; Chinese activities impacting, 6; civilian intelligence service of, 47–48; counterintelligence of, 60, 173–174; criminal enterprises in, 176; FBI priorities form, 169; foreign intelligence of, 1, 252–253; foreign policy of, 79; global communism countered by, 215; HIG consulting in, 226–227; Hong Kong embassy and, 154; ICPC representation of, 89–92; Latin American engagement with, 21; legal attaché strategic interests of, 152–153; malfeasance in, 234–235; Mexican border with, 139– 143; military, 228; national security of, 3; Navy, 11, 50, 191, 193; NCB of, 91–92; peacetime intelligence of, 50; Special Operations of, 232; Sullivan’s return to, 160; transnational criminality fight of, 187–188; Younis returned to, 223 United States Diplomatic Mission, 53 Venezuela, 216 Venona program, 93 Violent extremism, 249 Virtual Resident Agents, 35 Walker, John, 173

Waller, Douglas, 16 Wannall, W. R., 56, 58, 136, 150 War crimes tribunal, 220–221 Warren, Fletcher, 48 Weapons of mass destruction (WMD), 127; terrorism with, 157; threats countered of, 192; training on, 185–186 Webster, William, 75, 111, 169 Welles, Summer, 93 Western Hemisphere: FBI’s role in, 76– 77; FBI’s security services in, 78–79; information produced from, 52; legat coverage in, 155–156; security of, 37; World War II and revolution in, 215–216 WMD. See Weapons of mass destruction Woolsey, R. James, 171 Working groups, 96–98 World Trade Center. See September 11 attacks World War II, 22; in Asian theater, 214– 215; counterterrorism in, 221–233; European theater in, 210–214; Japanese surrender in, 214; Latin America before and after, 216–221; Western Hemisphere revolution in, 215–216 Wray, Christopher, 97 Younis, Fawaz, 8, 222–224 Yousef, Ramzi, 172 Zubaydah, Abu, 229

About the Book

HOW IS IT THAT THE FBI, A DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AGENcy, operates beyond the US borders? What role does the bureau play in emerging democracies? In what ways does it contribute to US diplomacy and global security? Darren Tromblay tackles these intriguing questions to assess the FBI's presence abroad, revealing the inextricable nature of domestic and foreign intelligence activities. Darren E. Tromblay has served as an intelligence analyst with the US government since 2005. He holds graduate degrees from George Washington University and the National Defense Intelligence College and has published widely on domestic security issues.

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