The European Handbook of Media Accountability 2016058692, 9781472457660, 9781315616353

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“In response to growing criticism and less trust in media and journalism, ‘media ­accountability’ has moved from being a theoretical concept to a practical approach all over Europe.This impressive handbook offers the first comprehensive comparison of media accountability practices in all European Union countries, and presents a prototype of a European Media Accountability Index.” – Jo Bardoel, Professor Emeritus of Journalism and Media, University of Amsterdam and Nijmegen, the Netherlands. “This authoritative handbook provides a 33-nation assessment of media accountability in and around Europe. Offering scholarly and professional insight, the results of this comparative inquiry are especially timely as political and technological developments pose new challenges to a free and responsible press.” – Scott R. Maier, Journalism Director, University of Oregon, USA. “It is a milestone achievement to compile 33 country reports on a comparative basis with a shared focus covering media accountability offline and online. But this is more than an inventory: it proposes a European Media Accountability Index – something that will hopefully become a standard reference next to those of media freedom. An excellent source for promoting media culture in Europe and beyond!” – Kaarle Nordenstreng, University of Tampere, Finland.

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The European Handbook of Media Accountability

In recent years, the Leveson Inquiry in Great Britain, as well as the EU High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, have stirred heated debates about media accountability and media self-regulation across Europe. How responsible are journalists? How well-developed are infrastructures of media self-regulation in the different European countries? How much commitment to media accountability is there in the media industry – and how actively do media users become involved in the process of media criticism via social media? With contributions from leading scholars in the field of journalism and mass communication, this handbook brings together reports on the status quo of media accountability in all EU member states as well as key countries close to Europe, such as Turkey and Israel. Each chapter provides an up-to-date overview of media accountability structures as well as a synopsis of relevant research, exploring the role of media accountability instruments in each national setting, including both media self-regulation (such as codes of ethics, press councils, ombudspersons) and new instruments that involve audiences and stakeholder groups (such as media blogs and user comment systems). A theoretically informed, cross-national comparative analysis of the state of media accountability in contemporary Europe, this handbook constitutes an invaluable basis for further research and policy-making and will appeal to students and scholars of media studies and journalism, as well as policy-makers and practitioners. Tobias Eberwein is a Senior Scientist at the Institute for Comparative Media and Communication Studies of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria, and the Alpen-AdriaUniversität Klagenfurt, Austria. Susanne Fengler is a Professor of International Journalism and Director of the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism at TU Dortmund University, Germany. Matthias Karmasin is a Professor at the Department of Media and Communications, AlpenAdria-Universität Klagenfurt, Austria, and Director of the Institute for Comparative Media and Communication Studies at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Austria.

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The European Handbook of Media Accountability

Edited by Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler & Matthias Karmasin

First published 2018 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2018 selection and editorial matter, Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler & Matthias Karmasin; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler & Matthias Karmasin to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Names: Eberwein, Tobias, editor of compilation. | Fengler, Susanne, 1971- editor of compilation. | Karmasin, Matthias, editor of compilation. Title: The European handbook of media accountability / edited by Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler & Matthias Karmasin. Description: Abingdon, Oxon; New York: Routledge, 2017. | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2016058692 | ISBN 9781472457660 (hardback) | ISBN 9781315616353 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Mass media–Moral and ethical aspects–Europe. | Journalistic ethics–Europe. | Mass media and public opinion–Europe. | Mass media–Political aspects–Europe. Classification: LCC P94 .E94 2017 | DDC 174/.907--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2016058692 ISBN: 978-1-4724-5766-0 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-61635-3 (ebk) Typeset in Bembo by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Contents

List of illustrations Notes on contributors

x xi

1 Introduction: Putting media accountability on the map Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler and Matthias Karmasin

1

2 Austria: Back on the democratic corporatist road? Matthias Karmasin, Klaus Bichler and Andy Kaltenbrunner

7

3 Belgium: Divided along language lines Karin Raeymaeckers and François Heinderyckx

14

4 Bulgaria: Regaining media freedom Bissera Zankova and Michał Głowacki

24

5 Croatia: Unfulfilled expectations Stjepan Malović

31

6 Cyprus: Behind closed (journalistic) doors Dimitra L. Milioni, Lia-Paschalia Spyridou and Michalis Koumis

39

7 Czech Republic: The market governs Tomáš Trampota

47

8 Denmark:Voluntary accountability driven by political pressure Mark Blach-Ørsten, Jannie Møller Hartley and Sofie Flensburg

54

9 Estonia: Conflicting views on accountability practices Urmas Loit, Epp Lauk and Halliki Harro-Loit

63

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Contents

10 Finland: The empire renewing itself Jari Väliverronen and Heikki Heikkilä

73

11 France: Media accountability as an abstract idea? Olivier Baisnée, Ludivine Balland and Sandra Vera Zambrano

80

12 Germany: Disregarded diversity Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler, Mariella Bastian and Janis Brinkmann

90

13 Greece: Between systemic inefficiencies and nascent opportunities online Evangelia Psychogiopoulou and Anna Kandyla

99

14 Hungary: Difficult legacy, slow transformation Agnes Urban

107

15 Ireland: Moving from courts to institutions of accountability Roderick Flynn

115

16 Israel: Media in political handcuffs Noam Lemelshtrich Latar

128

17 Italy: Transparency as an inspiration Sergio Splendore

137

18 Latvia: Different journalistic cultures and different accountability within one media system Ainars Dimants

143

19 Lithuania: The ideology of liberalism and its flaws in the democratic performance of the media Kristina Juraitė, Auksė Balčytienė and Audronė Nugaraitė

150

20 Luxembourg: Low priority in a confined milieu Mario Hirsch

160

21 Malta: Media accountability as a two-legged ‘tripod’ Joseph Borg and Mary Anne Lauri

163

22 The Netherlands: From awareness to realization Harmen Groenhart and Huub Evers

170

23 Norway: Journalistic power limits media accountability Paul Bjerke

180

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24 Poland: Accountability in the making Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska, Michał Głowacki and Michał Kuś

190

25 Portugal: Many structures, little accountability Nuno Moutinho, Helena Lima, Suzana Cavaco and Ana Isabel Reis

197

26 Romania: Unexpected pressures for accountability Mihai Coman, Daniela-Aurelia Popa and Raluca-Nicoleta Radu

207

27 Russia: Media accountability to the public or the state? Elena Vartanova and Maria Lukina

216

28 Slovakia: Conditional success of ethical regulation via online instruments Andrej Školkay

225

29 Slovenia: The paper tiger of media accountability Igor Vobič, Aleksander Sašo Slaček Brlek and Boris Mance

235

30 Spain: New formats and old crises Salvador Alsius, Ruth Rodriguez-Martinez and Marcel Mauri de los Rios

243

31 Sweden: A long history of media accountability adaption Torbjörn von Krogh

251

32 Switzerland: A role model with glitches Colin Porlezza

259

33 Turkey: Sacrificing credibility for economic expediency and partisanship Ceren Sözeri

268

34 United Kingdom: Post-Leveson, media accountability is all over the place Mike Jempson,Wayne Powell and Sally Reardon

277

35 Summary: Measuring media accountability in Europe – and beyond Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler, Katja Kaufmann, Janis Brinkmann and Matthias Karmasin

285

References301 Index337

ix

List of illustrations

Figures 16.1  25.1  25.2  25.3 

Political control of electronic media in Israel Problems concerning journalism in Portugal (in %) Impact of MAIs on journalistic behaviour in Portugal  Impact of participatory MAIs on journalistic behaviour in Portugal

130 202 203 204

Tables   3.1  Key actors in the Belgian media system   3.2  Characteristics of the Belgian press councils   3.3  Belgian media accountability instruments at the newsroom level   9.1  Number of cases handled by the Estonian press councils 15.1  Domestic newspaper circulation in Ireland in 2015 15.2  Irish editions of UK newspapers circulation in 2015 15.3  Television broadcast group market share in Ireland in 2015 15.4  Radio broadcast group market share in Ireland in 2015 15.5  Complaints to the Irish Press Ombudsman in 2010–2014 19.1 Co-dependence between the state and the media in Central and Eastern Europe  19.2  Composition of the Ethics Commission in Lithuania 23.1  Innovative online newsroom MAIs in Norway 25.1  Respondents of the Portuguese survey of journalistic actors 27.1  Classification of appeals in the Russian Chamber of Appeals 35.1  The European Media Accountability Index – a prototype

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16 19 21 68 116 117 117 117 121 152 154 185 202 220 297

Notes on Contributors

Dr. Salvador Alsius  is a Professor of Media Ethics at Pompeu Fabra University, Barcelona, former Dean of the Catalan Journalists College and member of Consell de l’Audiovisual de Catalunya. Research interests: media ethics, newsroom convergence. E-mail: salvador.alsius@ upf.edu Dr. Olivier Baisnée  is an Associate Professor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques of Toulouse. Research interests: the political sociology of the EU, including democracy theories and the sociology of journalism. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Auksė Balčytienė  is a Professor of Journalism at the Department of Public Communications, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania. Research interests: comparative aspects in studying political communication and journalism cultures, media system change, development of the European public sphere, information and communication policies as well as multicultural and multilingual journalism online. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Ludivine Balland  is an Associate Professor at the University of Nantes, France. Research interests: political sociology, especially with regard to education, journalism and the public sphere, as well as reception studies. E-mail: [email protected] Mariella Bastian  is a Scientific Research Assistant and Research Fellow at the Institute of Journalism and the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism,TU Dortmund University, Germany. Research interests: media accountability, Latin American media systems, media and democratization. E-mail: [email protected] Klaus Bichler  is a Researcher at the Institute for Comparative Media and Communication Studies at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Austria. Research interests: media ethics, journalism, web 2.0. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Paul Bjerke  is a Professor at the Department of Media Studies,Volda University College, Norway. Research interests: media ethics, news journalism, professionalization. E-mail: paulb@ hivolda.no xi

Notes on contributors

Dr. Mark Blach-Ørsten is a Professor of Journalism at Roskilde University, Denmark. Research interests: media and democracy, media systems, political journalism/communication, new institutionalism and the news, media ethics and credibility, media and governance. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Joseph Borg  is a Visiting Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Media and Knowledge Sciences of the University of Malta, Malta. Research interests: media and societal structures, media ethics and media education. E-mail: [email protected] Janis Brinkmann  is a Scientific Research Assistant and Research Fellow at the Institute of Journalism and the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism,TU Dortmund University, Germany. Research interests: media politics, media economics, international journalism, media accountability. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Suzana Cavaco  is a Professor of Ethics and Professional Deontology and Media Economics at the School of Economics and Management, University of Porto, Portugal. Research interests: media and journalism history, journalists’ and communication consultants’ deontology, media economics. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Mihai Coman  is a Professor at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication Studies, University of Bucharest, Romania. Research interests: media anthropology, newsroom sociology, media and religion. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Ainars Dimants is a Professor of Communication Theory at the Department of Communication Sciences, Turiba University, Riga. Research interests: journalism, media management, media policy, the media system in Latvia. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska  is a Professor of political science, chair of the Department of Communication and Journalism at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Wrocław, Poland, and also a founder and past President of the Polish Communication Association. Research interests: political communication, media systems in Central and Eastern Europe, journalism studies, theory of communication. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Tobias Eberwein  is a Senior Scientist and Research Group Leader at the Institute for Comparative Media and Communication Studies of the Austrian Academy of Sciences, Austria, and the Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Austria. Research interests: media accountability and media change, print and online journalism, comparative media and communication studies. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Huub Evers  is a Freelance Media Ethics Expert and a former Professor of Media, Ethics and Diversity at Fontys University of Applied Sciences, School of Journalism, the Netherlands. He is also a member of the Dutch Press Council. Research interests: media and communication ethics, intercultural journalism. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Susanne Fengler  is a Professor of International Journalism at the Institute of Journalism and the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism, TU Dortmund University, Germany. Research interests: international journalism, media self-regulation, economic theory of journalism. E-mail: [email protected] xii

Notes on contributors

Sofie Flensburg  is a Research Assistant at Roskilde University, Denmark. Research interests: media regulation and policy, media ethics, quality journalism. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Roderick Flynn  is a Chair of Film and Television Studies at the School of Communications, Dublin City University, Ireland. Research interests: audiovisual policy in Ireland, Europe and the United States, telecommunications policy, broadcasting policy, social history of communications, political economy of the media, history of media technology. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Michał Głowacki  is an Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Journalism, Information and Book Studies, University of Warsaw, Poland. Research interests: media policy, public service media, media governance and accountability, organizational culture, creativity and innovation. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Harmen Groenhart  is a Lecturer in Journalism Studies at Fontys University of Applied Sciences, School of Journalism, Tilburg, the Netherlands. Research interests: public media accountability, transparency, media journalism, cultural studies. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Halliki Harro-Loit  is a Professor of Journalism at the University of Tartu, Estonia, and is Head of the Institute of Social Studies. Research interests: communication law and media ethics, media policy, studies on cultural memory, media education. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Heikki Heikkilä is a Senior Research Fellow at the Research Centre for Journalism, Media and Communication (COMET), University of T   ampere, Finland. Research interests: digital journalism and online communications, audience research. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. François Heinderyckx  is a Professor of Media Sociology and Political Communication at Université libre de Bruxelles (ULB), Belgium, and Chang Jiang Scholar Professor at the Communication University of China (CUC), Beijing, China. Research interests: journalism and news media, political communication, information and communication technologies. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Mario Hirsch  is a former Senior Lecturer at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques, Strasbourg, a Senior Research Fellow at the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris, and a former editor of the weekly d’Lëtzebuerger Land. E-mail: [email protected] Mike Jempson  was formerly a Senior Lecturer in Journalism at the University of the West of England and is now Honorary Director of the journalism ethics non-governmental organisation The MediaWise Trust (http://www.mediawise.org.uk). Research interests: journalism ethics; media regulation. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Kristina Juraitė  is a Professor and Head of the Department of Public Communications, Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania. Research interests: post-communist media transformations, media literacy, cultural communication, media discourses and audience studies. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Andy Kaltenbrunner is a Co-Founder and Managing Director of Medienhaus Wien and an experienced journalist. Research interests: journalism, political communication, media politics. E-mail: [email protected] xiii

Notes on contributors

Anna Kandyla  is a Doctoral Researcher at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, European University Institute, Italy. Research interests: media policies and journalism, democratic innovations and direct democracy. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Matthias Karmasin  is a Professor at the Department of Media and Communications, Alpen-Adria-Universität Klagenfurt, Austria, and a Director of the Institute for Comparative Media and Communication Studies at the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Alpen-AdriaUniversität Klagenfurt, Austria. Research interests: communication and journalism studies, media economy, media ethics. E-mail: [email protected] Katja Kaufmann is a Senior Scientist and PhD student at the Institute for Comparative Media and Communication Studies of the Austrian Academy of Sciences and the Alpen-AdriaUniversität Klagenfurt, Austria. Research interests: media accountability and media change, mobile media and communication, qualitative methods. E-mail: [email protected] Michalis Koumis  is a Lecturer in Public Relations, at the School of Journalism and Public Relations at Kes College, Cyprus. Research interests: journalism, media, mass communication, public relations, social media and social protest, political marketing. E-mail: koumis_ [email protected] Dr. Torbjörn von Krogh  is a Media Researcher and Writer, affiliated with the Mid Sweden University in Sundsvall and the Institute for Media Studies in Stockholm, Sweden. Research interests: media ethics, media accountability, media criticism. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Michał Kuś  is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Political Science (Department of Communication and Journalism), University of Wrocław, Poland. Research interests: media systems, especially aspects of media control, ownership and deregulation, relations between media and politics. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Noam Lemelshtrich Latar  is a Founding Dean of the School of Communications, IDC Herzliya, Israel, and former Chair of the Israeli Communication Association. Research interests: new media, effects of artificial intelligence on the media and journalistic freedom, robotic journalism versus human journalism, cyber advocacy, interactive communication. E-mail: nll@ idc.ac.il Dr. Epp Lauk  is a Professor of Journalism at the University of Jyväskylä, Finland, and Head of the Department of Communication. Research interests: journalism cultures and history, media and journalism in Central and Eastern European countries, media policy, media self-regulation and social media. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Mary Anne Lauri  is a Professor at the Department of Psychology of the University of Malta, Malta. Research interests: media, media education, social representations, organ donation. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Helena Lima  is a Professor of History of Journalism and Journalism Studies at the Faculty of Arts, University of Porto, Portugal. Research interests: media history, journalism, digital media and political communication. E-mail: [email protected]

xiv

Notes on contributors

Urmas Loit  is a Lecturer in Journalism at the University of T   artu, Estonia. Research interests: media policy, media accountability, broadcasting (in particular, radio). E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Maria Lukina is an Associate Professor on New Media and Communications at the Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia. Research interests: journalism technologies, online media, journalism education. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Stjepan Malović  is a retired Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication at Zadar University, Croatia. Research interests: media self-regulation, theory of mass communication, basic journalism techniques. E-mail: [email protected] Boris Mance  is a Researcher at the Social Communication Research Centre, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Research interest: political communication. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Marcel Mauri de los Rios  is a Professor of Media Ethics and History at Pompeu Fabra University, Spain, and Consultant in Ethics and Communication Law at the Universitat Oberta de Catalunya (UOC), Spain. Research interests: media ethics, journalism history. E-mail: marcel. [email protected] Dr. Dimitra L. Milioni is an Assistant Professor of Media Studies at the Department of Communication and Internet Studies, Cyprus University of Technology, Cyprus. Research interests: alternative and participatory media, audience participation, protest and social movements, citizenship and new media. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Jannie Møller Hartley is an Assistant Professor of Journalism at Roskilde University, Denmark. Research interests: new media and online journalism, investigative journalism, media sociology, reception of news and media ethics. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Nuno Moutinho  is a Professor of Media Economics, Web Marketing and Methodology of Investigation at the School of Economics and Management, University of Porto, Portugal. Research interests: media economics, digital media, political communication, efficiency. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Audronė Nugaraitė  is a Professor at the Department of Public Communications,Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania. Research interests: journalism theory and practice, journalism ethics, integrated communication. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Daniela-Aurelia Popa  is a Lecturer at the Faculty of Communication and Inter­ national Relations, Danubius University of Galati, Romania. Research interests: media ethics, communication law, public relations ethics, business ethics. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Colin Porlezza  is a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Mass Communication and Media Research IPMZ, University of Zurich, Switzerland. Research interests: digital journalism, media accountability and transparency, crowdfunded journalism. E-mail: c.porlezza@ipmz. uzh.ch

xv

Notes on contributors

Wayne Powell  is an Administration Assistant and Communications Officer at the International Water Security Network, University of the West of England, United Kingdom. Research interests: journalism ethics, media regulation, social media. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Evangelia Psychogiopoulou is a Research Fellow at the Hellenic Foundation for European and Foreign Policy (ELIAMEP), Greece. Research interests: cultural governance, media governance and fundamental rights in a European perspective. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Raluca-Nicoleta Radu is an Associate Professor at the Faculty of Journalism and Communication Studies, University of Bucharest, Romania. Research interests: media ethics, media economics, cultural industries. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Karin Raeymaeckers  is a Professor of Journalism Studies and Director of the Centre for Journalism Studies, Ghent University, Belgium. Research interests: media policy, political communication, newsroom research, research of media content. E-mail: karin.raeymaeckers@ ugent.be Dr. Sally Reardon is a Senior Lecturer in Journalism at the University of the West of England, United Kingdom, formerly with Associated Press Television, Sky News & Reuters Television (RTV). Research interests: international news, news agencies, journalism education, media ethics. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Ana Isabel Reis  is a Professor of Radio and Compared Journalism at the Faculty of Arts, University of Porto, Portugal. Research interests: radio, radio journalism, radio and Internet, digital media. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Ruth Rodriguez-Martinez is a Professor of Cultural Journalism at Pompeu Fabra University, Spain. Research interests: cultural journalism, media ethics, new media. E-mail: ruth. [email protected] Dr. Andrej Školkay  is the Head of the School of Communication and Media in Bratislava, Slovakia. Research interests: international journalism, the relationship between media and politics, media regulation. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Aleksander Sašo Slaček Brlek  is a Researcher at the Social Communication Research Centre of the Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Research interests: political economy of communication, theories of public opinion and the public sphere. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Ceren Sözeri  is an Associate Professor at the Communications Department of Galatasaray University, Turkey. Research interests: political economy of the media in Turkey, ethical issues, discrimination and hate speech in traditional and online media. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Sergio Splendore is an Associate Professor of Sociology of Communication at the Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Milan, Italy. Research interests: journalism, political communication, media production. E-mail: [email protected]

xvi

Notes on contributors

Dr. Lia-Paschalia Spyridou is a Lecturer in Journalism and Media Studies and the Coordinator of the BA in Journalism Studies at the University of Cyprus. Research interests: journalism, participatory media, crowdfunding, political communication. E-mail: lia.spyridou@ gmail.com Dr. Tomáš Trampota  is an Assistant Professor at the Institute of Communication Studies and Journalism at Charles University Prague, Czech Republic. Research interests: Czech media system, sociology of media, media regulation. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Agnes Urban  is an Associate Professor and Head of the Infocommunications Department at the Corvinus University of Budapest, Hungary. Research interests: media business models, trends in media consumption patterns, the evolution of the Hungarian media market and the analysis of policy issues concerning media markets. E-mail: [email protected] Jari  Väliverronen is a Researcher at the Research Centre for Journalism, Media and Communication (COMET) and PhD student at the Faculty of Communication Sciences, University of Tampere, Finland. Research interests: changes in journalism, political communication. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Elena Vartanova is a Professor of Media Theory and Economics at the Faculty of Journalism, Lomonosov Moscow State University, Russia. Research interests: media and journalism theory, media systems, media economics. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Sandra Vera Zambrano  is an Académico de tiempo, Departamento de Comunicación, Universidad Iberoamericana. Research interests: journalism studies, sociology of news production, local journalism, political sociology. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Igor Vobič  is an Assistant Professor at the Chair of Journalism, Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia. Research interests: online journalism, news work, political communication. E-mail: [email protected] Dr. Bissera Zankova is a Media Expert and Consultant in Bulgaria. Research interests: media regulation and self-regulation, public service media, new journalism. E-mail: bzankova@ gmail.com

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1 Introduction Putting media accountability on the map Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler and Matthias Karmasin

Media accountability on the rise? Public interest in media issues has recently reached levels probably unseen in Europe since the 1970s.While the international media landscape is shaken by far-reaching transformations, heated debates about the responsibility and accountability of media and journalism take place that were hitherto unknown in democratic societies within Europe. The inflationary use of politically motivated catchwords like ‘fake news’ and ‘lying press’ (Lügenpresse) points to a growing concern with the journalistic key values of truthfulness and accuracy, which was initially cultivated by the extreme political right wing but has by now become a strategic tool on the stage of world politics – as the example of Donald Trump demonstrates – while also being debated among social media users. Strategic international actors with vested political interests, like Russia, increasingly use media channels to influence public opinion in Europe, thus challenging the credibility of Western mainstream media. Similarly, democratically elected governments, not only in Poland and Hungary, are putting rising pressure on national journalists – a phenomenon believed to have been overcome after the end of the Soviet regime. At the same time, the ongoing economization of practical news work, manifesting itself in a transnational trend towards media concentration, an aggravated pressure for profits and, ultimately, an erosion of journalism’s financial basis, make it necessary to reflect on media performance too – not only with regard to autonomy, impartiality and ethics of journalistic actors, but also to media’s professional research capacities as the core asset of journalism. Moreover, technological change propels new challenges and questions: How reliable is journalistic information in the age of digital media? How far do algorithms and robot journalism, and social or automated forms of communication, transform the ways in which we attribute responsibility to professional journalists? Or do these new forms of public online communication even make traditional journalism superfluous? In the light of these and other technological, economic and political constraints, it is no surprise that audience trust in journalistic products is under threat. As demonstrated by the Eurobarometer polls, media trust in countries like France and Greece has literally eroded – probably due to the way the media handled the recurrent Islamist terrorist attacks in France and the budget crisis in Greece. It has been stable only in Northern European countries with their well-equipped public service media and still relatively vivid newspaper sectors. In the given situation, media responsibility and accountability seem to be more important than ever, if journalism wants to justify its social function – and survive. 1

Eberwein, Fengler and Karmasin

The necessity of discussing and reacting to such challenges has not only been absorbed by journalists and their audiences, but also by media policy-makers. At the level of the European Union (EU), for example, the so-called High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism put the topic of media accountability on the agenda in 2013 – in an attempt to protect and promote free and responsible journalism in Europe. In its report for the European Commission (Vike-Freiberga, Däubler-Gmelin, Hammersley and Maduro, 2013), the expert group recommended – among other things – that media organizations should implement or adapt their codes of conduct in reaction to the challenges posed by the current media transformations and subdue themselves to the supervision of independent media councils that should exist in all EU member states. However, the suggestions have yielded fierce protests by the media industry in many countries, which has once more demonstrated the hesitation of media organizations to invest in the transparency they keep on demanding from other powerful actors. How do journalistic actors across Europe deal with media accountability? Which mechanisms for making media responsible towards the public are currently available – and which of them have proven to be successful? How far does the diffusion of media accountability instruments vary in the media systems and journalism cultures across Europe? Are there any transnational commonalities, or do the differences prevail? Is it possible to detect notable problems or dysfunctional developments? And what does scientific research on media accountability have to say in this respect? Our European Handbook of Media Accountability attempts to give answers to these and similar questions. It does so mainly by collecting country reports that summarize and evaluate the status quo of media accountability – and media accountability research – in 33 key countries in Europe and beyond, before juxtaposing their findings and providing a comparative perspective. Taken together, the chapters in this volume constitute the first comprehensive analysis of the current challenges and perspectives of media accountability in the whole of Europe, which we expect to be highly relevant not only for the academic field, but also for media practitioners and policy-makers. However, before the results of our studies are presented in detail, a closer look at the underlying terms and concepts seems indispensable.1

Definitions, concepts and previous research Western democracies have developed detailed legal frameworks for their media industries in past decades in order to ensure media pluralism (Psychogiopoulou, 2012). Furthermore, organizations at the European level, like the EU via the Audiovisual Media Services Directive,2 are involved in the legislative process shaping national media structures (see for example Nikoltchev, 2006; Keller, 2011). In contrast to the legislative framework regulating the structures of the media industry, journalistic output is safeguarded from almost any regulation by the state (Puppis, 2009b, pp. 57, 61). Basic law ensures journalism’s independence from state intervention, and consequently (at least in theory) the state has, with very few exceptions, no right to interfere in the processes and products of journalism – as it had done for centuries, and still does in autocratic states. However, precisely because journalism fulfils a public watchdog function, and because it can also be considered as a ‘public good’, media needs to be responsible to ‘society’3 for the consequences of the journalistic practices they employ and their journalistic output (see RussMohl, 1994; Bertrand, 2000; Bardoel and d’Haenens, 2004). Media self-regulation, then, is the process of setting, implementing and sanctioning rules by the members of the profession themselves (Puppis, 2009b, pp. 36, 57). Bertrand offers a wide definition of media accountability, including not only media professionals, but potentially media users 2

Introduction

to the process also, when he defines media accountability as “any non-State means of making media responsible towards the public” (2000, p. 107). Media accountability may also subsume the concept of media transparency that has recently been discussed as another promising means to regain or preserve trust in journalism (Meier and Reimer, 2011), implying that media organizations make information about editorial processes, as well as the journalistic actors involved, available to the public (e.g. media ownership, profiles of journalists, newsroom blogs and links to sources). We can classify media accountability instruments (MAIs) by using a slightly modified version of Shoemaker and Reese’s (1996) model of spheres of influence on journalism.4 RussMohl (1994), Nordenstreng (1999) and Hafez (2002) have similarly suggested classifying media accountability instruments according to the specific actor groups involved in the accountability process – be they on the individual, the organizational, the professional or the extramedia level. The earliest MAIs were located at the professional level: Ethics codes and trade journals have been published by journalists’ associations and unions since the late 19th century, and press councils have been set up to decide cases of malpractice in journalism since the 1950s (Brown, 1974; Wiedemann, 1992). Moreover, after the deregulation of the broadcasting sector in Western Europe in the 1980s, media journalism in the mass media gained some prominence (Fengler, 2003). Accountability efforts by individual news outlets (the organizational level) have played an increasing role since the 1970s, when media organizations started to employ ombudsmen and introduce organizational codes of ethics (Marzolf, 1991, p. 196). In many journalism cultures, however, the newsroom has been neglected as an institution of media accountability and responsibility up until today (Meier, 2010). In the digital age, many new media accountability initiatives have emerged online, among them media and newsroom blogs (e.g. the Editors’ Blog of the BBC News5 in the United Kingdom), but also media watchblogs run by media users (like the German BILDblog6), and other media-critical activities on the social web. These new instruments increasingly have participatory features and extend the existing portfolio of media accountability practices at the individual, organizational and extramedia levels (see Domingo and Heinonen, 2008). Our European Handbook of Media Accountability intends to place accountability much higher on mass communications’ research agenda, as – despite the political and public relevance of the topic – empirical studies are scarce, even in Western European countries with a decades-long tradition of media accountability, and are almost non-existent in Southern and Central Eastern Europe. Therefore, this volume aims at encouraging scholars across Europe to become involved in the study of media accountability, and thus provide most valuable insights to questions crucial to the long-term survival of European democracies. Given the lack also of normative texts and the non-existence of many accountability instruments, even in a number of EU countries represented in this book, we are grateful to our authors who have flexibly tackled the subject with broader and more practical insights into specific journalism cultures in cases where academic texts were unavailable. We are confident that this volume will provide valuable insights into accountability practices, and thus more generally into the journalism cultures and media systems that are frequently overlooked within Europe – such as Cyprus, Luxembourg and Malta, among others. As all authors provide a short overview of the media landscape in their respective countries, this handbook is also a helpful tool for everyone interested in a condensed overview of EU media systems. Generally, media accountability has not ranked highly among European mass communication scholars before the EU-funded project ‘Media Accountability and Transparency in Europe’ (MediaAcT), which has provided the first comprehensive comparative study of media accountability in 14 European and Arab states (Eberwein, Fengler, Lauk and Leppik-Bork, 2011; Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014). MediaAcT has produced 3

Eberwein, Fengler and Karmasin

desk studies on media accountability and transparency in each of the evaluated countries, a report on innovative online accountability practices based on qualitative interviews with international experts and a quantitative survey of 1,800 journalists assessing the context factors and impact of media accountability. This handbook expands the MediaAcT network not only to each of the current 28 EU member states plus Norway and Switzerland, but also to Israel, Russia and Turkey, as selected countries with strategic significance for Europe. As those countries are characterized by remarkably different relationships between media and politics, we also continue our debate about potentials and pitfalls of media accountability in journalism cultures with restricted press freedom, starting with the inclusion of two Arab states in the MediaAcT project, and to be continued in the follow-up project to this volume: the Global Handbook of Media Accountability. MediaAcT could build on significant pioneer studies provided by Laitila (1995), who accomplished a comparative analysis of press codes, and Bertrand (2000), who has studied the existence of press councils and ombudsmen in Europe. Furthermore, Nordenstreng (1999) has analyzed structures and practices of media self-regulation in several European countries, while Hafez (2002), as well as Limor and Himelboim (2006), has compared international press codes. Wiedemann (1992), Pöttker and Starck (2003), as well as Puppis (2009b), have compared the history and structure of press councils across Europe. Besides, comparative approaches to the study of media accountability and media self-regulation are rare, as the comprehensive MediaAcT database with national and international studies in the field demonstrates.7 In this respect, the European Handbook of Media Accountability is intended to move media accountability research to a new level – by summarizing and re-contextualizing existing studies, highlighting conspicuous research gaps and developing ideas for future analyses.

Aims and structure of the book In order to facilitate orientation, this handbook offers a country-by-country overview of the practices and context factors of media accountability in 30 European states plus Israel, Russia and Turkey,8 followed by a comparative summary of all reports and a conclusion.9 Therefore, chapters, and thus countries, are arranged in alphabetical order. However, the underlying assumption is that all European countries described in this study can – to a larger or lesser extent – be grouped into ‘media accountability cultures’ which have been identified by the MediaAcT project (Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014). While also taking other models developed by comparative journalism research into account (e.g. Baldi and Hasebrink; 2007; Hanitzsch et al., 2011; Blum, 2014), the MediaAcT research is based on the media systems typology by Hallin and Mancini (2004a; 2012a), who distinguish between •• ••

••

the liberal model (e.g. the United Kingdom, the United States), characterized by highly deregulated media markets, little state interference in the media sector and a highly developed culture of professionalism among journalists; the democratic corporatist model (e.g. Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria), which is also associated with high professionalism among journalists, but differs from the liberal model with regard to the influential role that public broadcasting plays in those countries; the polarized pluralist model (e.g. Italy, Spain, France), characterized by the high influence of political actors on both private and public news organizations, a weak professional culture among journalists and the somewhat marginal role of the print media. 4

Introduction

Adding to Hallin and Mancini’s well-established model of Western media systems, our handbook also integrates •• ••

the Central and Eastern European countries in different stages of political transformation, frequently a hybrid between the polarized pluralist and the liberal model (DobekOstrowska, 2012); countries with restricted press freedom such as Israel, Russia and Turkey.

Research in the MediaAcT project has indicated that while ‘cultures of media accountability’ can, in many cases, indeed be associated with the ‘journalism cultures’ identified in the Hallin and Mancini model, there are also notable differences. As Mazzoleni and Splendore (2014) show in their analysis of the MediaAcT survey of 1,800 European journalists, Austria displays many more commonalities with the polarized pluralist media systems in Central Eastern and Southern Europe, while the Netherlands rather resemble the liberal model which is found in the United Kingdom. Also, according to our research, media accountability in Southern Europe – often labelled as the ‘Mediterranean’ media system, marked by political parallelism – shows much more subtle differences than one could expect following Hallin and Mancini’s influential research. This is even more true for the countries in Central Europe, as can be concluded from the remarkably different orientations that characterize, for example, the Estonian and the Romanian media accountability culture. These comparative insights are picked up and refined by many of the authors of this handbook – most notably in the conclusion, which will also invite readers to come to an independent assessment. The European Handbook of Media Accountability seeks to ignite both an academic and a professional debate – in the countries included in this handbook as well as on a European and a global level. Media accountability – in the broad sense as suggested by Bertrand – has become an evermore important aspect of media policy studies, where the concept of co-regulation has gained increasing attention in recent years. In this context, the handbook may provide valuable insights into the question of efficiency and suitability of self-regulation and accountability practices in media systems shaped by different media policies and economic contexts, and partly still influenced by transformation processes.The handbook also seeks to enrich the European debate in the field of media ethics, by offering the possibility to compare how professional, organizational and individual ethics interplay in the various journalism cultures across Europe. It intends to enrich the debate in journalism studies by offering insights on the maturity and prospects of the profession in the 33 states covered by this volume. It also provides valuable comparative insights into the potential impact of media audiences and their attitudes towards accountability: In the digital age, it is much easier for media users to become actively involved in media criticism. They can respond to journalists and news outlets via Facebook and Twitter, or use social media to network with other citizen media critics. Which media systems are mature – and still independent enough – for a participatory approach towards media accountability? And in which countries do publics – respectively, civil society representatives and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) – actually make use of their new possibilities to play a significant role in holding the media to account? At the same time, the editors and authors of this book hope to provide international media practitioners and media policy-makers with a sound overview of best practice models in the field of media accountability, as well as debates about the necessary media policy framework to foster self-regulation.The annual Press Freedom Ranking by Reporters Without Borders as well as the bi-annual Media Pluralism Index presented by the European Media Institute have considerably impacted on professional debates on and public awareness of issues of media freedom and 5

Eberwein, Fengler and Karmasin

pluralism across Europe. The editors of this book are convinced that it is high time for similar debates about the accountability of journalism, considered to be the lifeblood of independent democracies. In order to stimulate such debates, the research team involved in this book has additionally conducted expert surveys in each of the countries featured in the handbook, based on a 40-item questionnaire assessing the impact of practices and instruments of media accountability across Europe.The result is the first European Media Accountability Index, described in detail in the final chapter of this volume, which offers startling insights into the international state of media accountability and self-regulation. Future developments in the field are intended to be monitored with the help of regular replications of the expert surveys. Hopefully, this will help the debate to continue. *** Although the European Handbook of Media Accountability appears in the form of a conventional anthology, it is a truly collaborative work of research: The results and insights of the comparative evaluation would not have been possible without the knowledge and experience of the 68 authors of the country reports that contributed to this volume. We, the editors, are grateful for their ongoing endorsement. By cooperating on this book, they have helped to build up a research network that is unrivalled in the given area of expertise – and that is sure to consolidate and expand in future projects. In particular, we would like to thank Katja Kaufmann, who supported the editors and the network of collaborators in all phases of the production process – and thus made this ambitious volume a reality. Nonetheless, of course, any uncorrected mistakes and deficiencies remain the responsibility of the editors.

Notes 1 2 3 4

For the following, see also Fengler, Eberwein and Leppik-Bork (2011) as well as Fengler et al. (2015). http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:095:0001:0024:EN: PDF See e.g. the normative concept of social responsibility by McQuail (2005, pp. 161ff.). For our model, we suggest replacing the ‘ideological level’ (Shoemaker and Reese, 1996, p. 214) with the ‘transnational level’, in line with other similar models of influence on journalism (e.g. Hanitzsch et al., 2010). 5 http://www.bbc.com/news/blogs/the_editors 6 http://www.bildblog.de 7 http://www.mediaact.eu/literature.html 8 Given the current political developments, we acknowledge the difficulty of defining the ‘European Union’ versus ‘Europe’. As such, this handbook portrays media accountability practices in an EU of 28 members, as of 2016/2017. 9 The reports do not take into account any political processes after June 2016; they have been collected before the ‘Brexit’ vote - and also before the coup and the constitutional referendum in Turkey.

6

2 Austria Back on the democratic corporatist road? Matthias Karmasin, Klaus Bichler and Andy Kaltenbrunner

Abstract In the last five years, Austria has made many improvements concerning journalistic self-regulation. The print industry managed to re-establish a Press Council and nearly all daily, weekly and monthly papers participate. Furthermore, some minor updates were made to the Austrian Code of Conduct. Some media companies published new internal guidelines or introduced social media guidelines. Last but not least, the Web 2.0 brought many improvements, like successful media watchblogs and interaction between journalists and users. There is still a long way to go. The tabloid newspapers do not participate in the Press Council and there is no form of selfregulation in the audio-visual sector or on the Internet. Internal guidelines are rare, and only one medium in Austria employs an ombudsperson. The potential of the Web 2.0 concerning transparency and accountability is not exploited as much as it could be.

Introduction When Karmasin, Kaltenbrunner, Kraus and Bichler (2011) characterized Austria as a bordercrosser between the Democratic Corporatist Model and the Polarized Pluralist Model – especially when it comes to media ethics – they offered some valid reasons for this, like the lack of professionalization and the absence of self-regulation institutions. Today, the status quo of media accountability in Austria is different, but still ambiguous. In 2014, regulatory policy is still of great importance in Austria. However, none of the laws regulating the media market (Privatradiogesetz – the Private Radio Act, Privatfernsehgesetz – the Private Television Act, KommAustria-Gesetz – the KommAustria Act, Presseförderungsgesetz – the Press Promotion Act etc.) or media content and the rights of journalists (e.g. Journalistengesetz – the Journalism Law, Urheberrechtsgesetz – the Copyright Law, Mediengesetz – the Media Law) claim or foster self-regulation. Free daily newspapers and new forms of digital content are participating in the race for a share of the advertising revenue and, as a result, in some ways have diluted the application of ethical journalistic standards in Austria. Against this, many recent improvements can be seen in the Austrian self-regulation system, for example the founding of the new Press Council (PC), the creation of ethical guidelines for several media and the establishment of some online accountability tools. Furthermore, since 7

Karmasin, Bichler and Kaltenbrunner

2010, the state has supported media accountability through the press subsidies law, supporting the infrastructure of the newly founded PC.

Journalistic culture and media system The Austrian journalism culture and media system is characterized by its contrariness. In Austria, there are 16 daily newspapers reaching 71.8% of the adult population (age 14+ years).This high newspaper circulation is one indicator of Austria belonging to the Democratic Corporatist Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, p. 66). The market concentration shows something else. The daily tabloid newspaper Kronen Zeitung dominates the market with 34.3%, followed by the free daily tabloid newspaper Heute (13.8%), the regional newspaper Kleine Zeitung (approximately 12%) and the tabloid newspaper Österreich (10%). Kronen Zeitung and Heute are linked to each other as their publishers and editors-in-chief (Eva and Christoph Dichand) are married. Quality newspapers, like Der Standard (5.5%) and Die Presse (3.8%) (Media-Analyse, 2013a), have much smaller circulations. Since Kronen Zeitung also owns the only nationwide commercial radio, and is gaining an increasing market share, the ongoing concentration trends characterizing the Austrian media market since the 1970s continue. Concentration processes also exist in the media-related sectors of printing, distribution and advertising sales. In 2014, Mediaprint, responsible for the printing, distribution and advertising of Kronen Zeitung and Kurier, and Styria Media AG (Die Presse, WirtschaftsBlatt and Kleine Zeitung) reached 58% of the adult population (Media-Analyse, 2013a). There are also dominant media companies in the local daily and weekly newspaper market in the federal states, for example the Niederösterreichische Pressehaus (NÖN) in Lower Austria (Kaltenbrunner, Karmasin, Kraus and Zimmermann, 2007, pp. 45ff ). A similar market concentration can be found in the magazine market. In 2000–2001 two of the largest competing magazine groups were merged to form the now-dominant News-Gruppe (Profil, News, Format, Trend etc.). This happened almost without any appeals to the Austrian antitrust court. In practice, the merged magazine group has a monopoly on economic and political weekly magazines. Since the late 1980s, several foreign media houses, mostly from Germany, have started to acquire an interest in Austrian newspapers and magazines. For example, the German WAZ media group (now Funke Mediengruppe) bought 50% of Kronen Zeitung, which led to the foundation of MediaPrint, and Gruner + Jahr (Germany) bought over 50% of the News-Gruppe (for details see Kaltenbrunner et al., 2007, pp. 48ff; Steinmaurer, 2009, p. 507). Coming to the audiovisual sector, the ambiguous position of Austria in Hallin and Mancini’s journalism culture model can also be seen. One key characteristic of broadcasting in Austria is the relatively late deregulation process, which started in the radio sector in 1994 and in the TV sector in 2001. The result of this is that the public broadcaster, Österreichischer Rundfunk (ORF), is still dominant, although its market share is declining rapidly, mainly due to the dualization of the broadcasting sector. While the market share of the ORF is still high (33.9%), Austrian commercial TV is less popular, but its market share is increasing (8.9%). German TV (both public and private stations) has the biggest market share in Austria (42.8%) (AGTT, 2013). In addition, German companies also own the two big Austrian national commercial TV stations: ATV belongs to Tele-München and Puls4 belongs to ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2007, p. 56). The dominant share of the radio market is held by public radio (68.3%) through three national stations, Ö1, Ö3 and FM4, and nine regional stations. The commercial local radio stations and one national station have a market share of around 27.8% (Media-Analyse, 2013b). 8

Austria

The public broadcaster is also dominant in the online sector. Internet penetration in Austria is quite high, at 82%, with 75% of the adult population using the Internet several times a week (Integral, 2014, p. 3). The ORF.at network is the most popular. Around 50% of all users visit the public broadcaster sites at least once a month (ÖWA, 2013). The strong position of public broadcasting in Austria – TV, radio and now the Internet as well – is another major indicator suggesting that Austria belongs to the Democratic Corporatist Model of journalism cultures (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, p. 66). However, the continuing significant political influence on public broadcasting contradicts this. Austria does not fit into the Democratic Corporatist Model if we consider the people working in media production. In Austria, there are around 7,100 journalists, 87 per 100,000 citizens. The typical Austrian journalist is 40 years old, male, works in the print sector and is based in Vienna (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2007, pp. 17ff). When it comes to professional journalism culture, Austria lacks some high professionalization standards. One is journalism education: Only 33% of all Austrian journalists have an academic degree and the tradition of journalism education is not significant. This low degree of professionalization is a major indicator of the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, as described by Hallin and Mancini (2004a).

Established instruments of media accountability There is not a strong tradition of media ethics in Austrian media research and therefore there are few longitudinal analyses. Some minor studies have focused on the foundation phase of the Austrian PC. In 2006, an in-depth study analyzed the chances of a new PC being formed (Gottwald, Kaltenbrunner and Karmasin, 2006). There is no established media accountability in broadcasting and as a result there is no research on this topic. Since 1996, several studies have been conducted about journalists and their ethical attitudes (Karmasin, 1996, 2005; Kaltenbrunner, Karmasin, Kraus and Zimmermann, 2008; Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014). Triggered by the introduction of new journalism training courses in Austria, some research has examined journalism education and journalists’ ethical standards (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2007, 2008). There are some studies about Austrian media watchblogs, which give an overview of and show the main trends in the field of innovative media accountability (Schönherr, 2008; Bichler, 2011, 2012; Kammerlander, 2013). The Verband Österreichischer Zeitungen (VÖZ, the Austrian Newspaper Association) and the Union of Journalists established the Austrian PC in 1961, which existed until 2002. In the 1990s, the Österreichische Zeitschriften- und Fachmedien-Verband (ÖZV, the Austrian Magazine and Special Interest Magazine Association), representing the publishers of weekly and monthly magazines, and the Presseclub Concordia, an independent press club founded in 1859, joined the PC. The PC was a traditional one, concerned only with print products, and it based its judgments on the Ehrenkodex der Österreichischen Presse, the Austrian Code of Conduct for the Press (Gottwald et al., 2006, pp. 9ff). In addition to several problems (restricted powers to sanction journalistic misconduct, no broad public recognition of its existence and insufficient funding) the major tabloid newspaper Kronen Zeitung had never accepted the authority of the PC nor its verdicts. In 1997, the tabloid even tried to sue every member of the PC dealing with a case concerning the Kronen Zeitung (Bernthaler, 2001, pp. 104f). Although the Kronen Zeitung lost the lawsuit, the number of publishers dissatisfied with the structure of the PC increased, and in 2001 the publishers stopped their contributions to it, which effectively led to its dissolution in 2002 (Gottwald et al., 2006, pp. 9ff). After nearly ten years – in 2010 – the joint efforts of the VÖZ, the Union of Journalists, the ÖZV, the Presseclub Concordia, the Association of Editors-in-Chief and the Verband der 9

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Regionalmedien Österreichs (VRM, the Association of the Regional Media of Austria) led to the re-establishment of the PC. Although it is a cooperative instrument within the media industry, it is partly financed by the state. The new PC deals with the newspapers and magazines that agreed to participate, their additional products and their online editions. None of the three major tabloid newspapers participate. Complaints are discussed in one of the two senates, whose members are media professionals representing all six founding institutions and are chaired by a law expert. Its decisions are still based on the Austrian Code of Conduct for the Press, which was last updated in 2013. Due to its lack of continuity, when asked in 2011–2012, journalists ascribed only little importance to the institution of the PC in Austria in media accountability compared to their colleagues in Germany and Switzerland (Fengler et al., 2014). In the first year after its re-establishment, the PC dealt with approximately 60 complaints; in 2013, this number increased to 155 (Österreichischer Presserat, 2014). In October 2011, the supporting associations agreed to allow the publication of decisions concerning non-participating newspapers and magazines, provided that the subjects were highly relevant (Wallner, 2011). The PC is quite active in disseminating its verdicts and statements online (Twitter, press releases etc.) and its members actively report on PC activities as well.They discuss media ethics in public and also visit schools to provide some media education. The Austrian Code of Conduct for the Press was formulated in 1983 and has been revised several times, with the latest revision in 2013.1 It deals with general issues, like freedom of the press, as well as with specific instructions for certain journalistic departments.The Code consists of twelve chapters, dealing with topics like accuracy, truth, the separation of content and advertisements and the coverage of suicides (Österreichischer Presserat, 2013). Although most of the Austrian newspapers claim that they adhere to the Code of Conduct, surveys show that Austrian journalists are mostly unaware of the actual content of the Code (Karmasin, 1996, 2005). The most recent research on journalists’ perceptions suggests that Austrian journalists do not think that the ethical code in Austria has a big influence on journalism. Compared to their German-speaking colleagues from Germany and Switzerland, the Code of Conduct is rated as far less influential (Fengler et al., 2014). Looking more closely at the data on influential tools of media accountability, Austrian journalists answer in a similar way to journalists belonging to the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, like Spanish or Italian journalists. There is no general Code of Ethics for radio or TV journalists. Historically, the state tightly regulated broadcasting in Austria through the influential Public Broadcasting Law (ORF Law). It guarantees the formal autonomy of the public broadcaster, but politicians traditionally try to gain control over the ORF, for example by influencing staff decisions. In 2001, the government created a new authority as part of the liberalization of the TV market: the Rundfunk und Telekom Regulierungs-GmbH (RTR, the Austrian Regulatory Authority for Broadcasting and Telecommunications). The RTR is a non-profit, limited company bound by the instructions of the Federal Chancellery and the Federal Ministry for Transport, Innovation and Technology. It provides operational support to the KommAustria (Austrian Communication Authority) and the Telekom Kontroll Kommission (TKK, Telekom Control Commission). KommAustria is responsible for the administration of broadcasting frequencies, licensing of private broadcasters, legal supervision of private broadcasters and allocation of press subsidies. Since 2013, it has also been responsible for the legal supervision of the ORF. Although institutional self-regulation of the audio-visual sector does not exist, within the ORF several instruments of self-regulation have developed in recent decades. The Redakteursrat 10

Austria

(Journalists Assembly) of the ORF is an internal participation instrument. Journalists attending the Redakteursrat have special rights of information, and may participate in hearings concerning programme content as well as staff decisions. The Redakteursstatut (the Statute of the Redakteursrat) guarantees these rights. There is also a newly developed guide on social media use for ORF journalists. Once a year, the ORF publishes a public value report and, on an irregular basis, publishes journals on media-related issues and organizes public debates on quality. Every now and then there is a call for an independent public broadcasting station. A popular initiative is SOS ORF, which has received support from publicly acclaimed Austrians in politics, arts and the economy, as well as from journalists and several print media outlets. They demand the ORF to be an independent public broadcasting station with independent management and journalists (derFreiRaum, 2006). At present, the commercial TV sector has neither a self-regulation authority nor any publicly well-known guidelines on quality. The Verband Österreichischer Privatsender (VÖP, the Association of Austrian Commercial Broadcasters) acts only as a representative in economic matters for all commercial broadcasters – regional and national alike. Media journalism is not a major concern for daily newspapers or magazines. Small media sections exist in the two quality newspapers, Die Presse and Der Standard. Media topics are mostly found in the review and arts sections, but critics claim that even film and TV reviews – let alone media criticism – do not get enough coverage (Fabris, 2001, p. 19). One of the few examples of permanent coverage of media issues is the website of the daily newspaper Der Standard, which has a department called etat that deals broadly with journalism, advertisements and media policy – and even includes communication research.The target group consists primarily of laypeople, so that most of the articles can be understood without previous knowledge of the media business. There is no nationwide journalistic TV programme dealing with media criticism, journalism or media policy. Some satire shows on TV and radio sometimes ironically discuss the latest media topics. The Vienna-based community TV station, OKTO, airs a monthly show on media topics, also available in the free multimedia library on their website. There are six major trade journals in Austria: Horizont/Bestseller, Medienmanager, Medianet, Extradienst, A3 boom and Der Österreichische Journalist. All serve a small audience consisting mainly of media professionals. While nearly all Austrian daily newspapers and magazines print letters to the editor, only the daily newspaper Der Standard, the weekly newspaper Falter and the monthly magazine Datum have pledged to publish correction columns, where they announce the errors they have made. Another internal initiative involving the audience is the Readers Advisory Board, which the daily regional newspaper Vorarlberger Nachrichten established in 2007.Their readers can participate in the process of news production by adding ideas or criticisms in special meetings (Riedmann, 2007, pp. 190ff). Every year a new sample of readers is chosen from a pool of volunteers. The daily newspaper Der Standard is the only Austrian medium that has an ombudsman, called Leserbeauftragter (the readers’ representative), established in 2007. The readers’ representative arbitrates in conflicts, helps secure quality management and writes the weekly column about the mistakes and errors that have been made. The ombudsman deals with 30 to 60 e-mails each day, concerning complaints, corrections and additions (Föderl-Schmid and Ranftl, 2007, p. 187).

Innovative instruments of media accountability In Austria, innovative offline initiatives – like the ‘open forum’ of the national monthly magazine Datum, where the audience can discuss the latest edition with the editorial team and an external expert – exist, but lack continuity. This is also true for some innovative online formats, like the 11

Karmasin, Bichler and Kaltenbrunner

Steirischer Medienblog (Styrian Media Watchblog2), a local media watchblog, which is updated irregularly, or the Krone-Blog, which is now offline. As far as can be determined, the main reason for the lack of continuity is often lack of time. Another recent initiative is quite successful: the media watchblog Kobuk. The media lecturer Helge Fahrnberger (and now also Hans Kirchmeyr) and his students at the University of Vienna started this blog in 2010 and they continue to publish it on its Facebook page. One factor in the success of this blog is that it is part of a university course, and one of its goals is the publication of mistakes and bad journalism all over Austria (Bichler, 2012). Although Kobuk tries to deal with all media outlets, it does focus particularly on tabloid newspapers. Kobuk is not updated as regularly as the German BILDBlog, but it has a much larger reach (as a blog and on Facebook) compared to the size of the population (Kammerlander, 2013). However, journalists are not often in contact with this form of criticism (Karmasin, Kraus and Bichler, 2013) and the blog lacks continuity during the holiday season (especially from July to September). Besides these monothematic blogs, there are a lot of smaller blogs by journalists or citizens dealing with media-related topics from time to time, for example digitaljournal.zib21.com. The most popular instrument for media criticism in social media is Twitter, where a lot of journalists interact with and scrutinize each other (Maireder, Schlögl and Schütz, 2013). However, critics suggest that this criticism is mainly on a personal level. Another type of participative media criticism can be found in the posting culture of the media section at derstandard. at. Registered users can comment on all articles and a lot of discussion on media issues can be found there, including some reflection on recent developments in the media sector. This kind of forum for interested users results in a public space for a deliberative discourse on the media.

Other media accountability instruments Journalism education and training for journalists in Austria has been lacking in recent decades, and in many ways still is (Kaltenbrunner, 2001). As a result, only 33% of all Austrian journalists have a university degree. The first courses for journalism at a university of applied sciences only started in 2002 in Graz, and in 2003 in Vienna (Kaltenbrunner et al., 2007, pp. 97f). In the past, media ethics has often not been a mandatory subject in journalism education (Weder, 2010, p. 506). More and more academic institutes and institutes of further education now offer advanced training for journalists, e.g. the Kuratorium für Journalistenausbildung and Forum Journalismus und Medien Wien (fjum_wien). The Austrian Press Law forces newspapers and magazines to publish their Blattlinie (editorial policy) once a year. These consist of a policy description, including cursory commitments to democracy and pluralism, sometimes containing ideological opinions. Aside from the industry itself, there are several initiatives and institutions debating aspects of quality in journalism and media ethics, e.g. the Initiative Qualität im Journalismus (initiative for quality journalism), Medienhaus Wien and the Institute for Communication Science at the University of Vienna.

Conclusion Summing up, a reclassification of Austria within Hallin and Mancini’s models of media and politics seems even harder. In 2011, Karmasin et al. saw a clear tendency towards the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model; in 2015, this is no longer so clear. However, the media ethical situation has improved in the last four years: A new PC was established at the end of 2010 and is still very active, especially in disseminating its verdicts and 12

Austria

in commenting on media ethical issues. The often-formulated call for regulated co-regulation (Gottwald et al., 2006) seems to be partly answered, as the state is co-financing the PC. The Austrian Code of Conduct was updated in some minor ways and the members of the PC issued some new guidelines. Furthermore, alternative forms of media accountability, like watchblogs, reach more and more people and increase the influence of civil society. However, some instruments, like the PC or media watchblogs, are still too weak. The three major tabloid newspapers (reaching around half of the Austrian population) do not participate in this self-regulation body and the media watchblogs do not have much effect on journalists. In addition, there is still no self-regulation in broadcasting. As concentration processes in Austria will not stop in this highly concentrated market, the situation might not improve without financial incentives. More investments in measures explicitly and clearly targeted at assisting media quality improvement are necessary. Supporting regulated self-regulation for all kinds of media might therefore be seen not only as an option, but also as an obligation of media policy. One conclusion about the current situation of media accountability instruments in Austria is that Austria does not seem to fit into the Polarized Pluralist Model or the Democratic Corporatist Model. Some indicators, like Austria’s low degree of professionalization in journalism or the high concentration in the market, put the country into the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model. The data from the MediaAcT survey (Fengler et al., 2014) also support this thesis. The recent improvements (the new PC, more education institutions, the empowerment of civil society) particularly seem to bring Austria back towards the Democratic Corporatist Model. Judging by the latest developments in media ethics, Austria seems to be back on the Democratic Corporatist road, but still has a long way to go.

Notes 1 http://presserat.at/show_content.php?hid=2 2 https://steirischermedienblog.wordpress.com

13

3 Belgium Divided along language lines Karin Raeymaeckers and François Heinderyckx

Abstract Belgium is a country with a highly complex political structure related to three different language communities. This results in segmented authority along communities’ dividing lines for several aspects of the political and regulatory framework. The media are part of the political level related to the cultural sphere, and thus media regulation and media accountability are at sub-national political levels. As a result, there is essentially no ‘Belgian’ media regulation, but rather two distinct, and sometimes significantly different, regulation systems. The media depend on different professional accountability instruments as ethical codes for journalism, and councils for journalistic issues, although their power can be different north and south of the language border. The efforts of the individual media to safeguard accountability can be seen in both parts of the country but they are largely related to the individual decisions of the media brands. Some media have letters to the editor as strong features, some media have an ombudsperson and some editors-in-chief establish a personal dialogue with their public on specific case-related issues or on a more regular basis.

Introduction Accountability is closely related to the social responsibility media model. Recent discussions on media accountability have been about the commercialization of media and journalism.The criticism of commercialization concentrates on the structure of the sector and the continuing process of concentration of media institutions, especially in the traditional print media. There is also criticism about content elements, for example, the decreasing difference between editorial and commercial content, the pressure for scoops and the down-market trend. The growing importance of information subsidies, related to cost-cutting measures in newsrooms and the dismissal of journalistic staff, particularly strengthens the position of lobby groups and interested parties. Criticism of the relationship between the media and the political actors was not prominent until recently. In the historical development of our national media market, media brands were characterized by either or both political and ideological ownership. In the concentration process, these affiliations faded out (depillarization), so the discussion about links between political actors and media was not at the forefront. However, one element in the concentration process 14

Belgium

of media actors and media brands recently provoked some criticism. In a media landscape characterized by fading political parallelism, a recent consolidation in the media sector in Wallonia brought back the question of political ties with the media industry as Tecteo, a cable provider and an important industrial actor with strong ties with the socialist party, bought a regional newspaper group Éditions de l’Avenir. The Flemish-language and French-language media markets in Belgium are quite different from one another. First of all, the French-language market is even smaller than the Flemish one and is characterized by a steep decline in newspaper circulation – French-language dailies have lost about a quarter of their circulation in recent years. In Flanders, the erosion is present, but at a more moderate level. Television channels from France are quite popular among French-speaking Belgian viewers (about a third of the market share) while channels from the Netherlands are of very little interest to Dutch-speaking viewers in Belgium. The journalism cultures are also different, with a much more significant trend towards commercialization and tabloidization in the Flemish media. The two journalist communities seem to live in different worlds: there is an astonishing lack of journalistic interest in what happens in the other community, and only in moments of major crisis do journalists from both communities engage in any kind of dialogue. One example of such a crisis moment was the mock newscast from the French-speaking public television channel, Radio Télévision Belge Francophone (RTBF), on December 13, 2006, that staged a string of imaginary events about a unilateral declaration of independence by Flanders. Although there were various signs hinting that this was not a true newscast, as it featured the main news anchor, well-known political journalists and even political figures, the programme made quite an impression on a large number of viewers. The programme triggered a major controversy in the ensuing days and led media makers in the north and south to reflect on their role and functioning, and it was the starting point for efforts to restore the lost lines of dialogue and communication. Other crises have stemmed from debatable choices by news media, as in the coverage of the tragic bus accident in Sierre, Switzerland, in which 28 people, mostly Belgian schoolchildren, died. Controversial initiatives by some journalists triggered a public debate on ethical and deontological values. Some media published photos of the children without the permission of their families, sometimes even retrieving the material from school websites and social media. At these specific moments, the debate with the media representatives themselves, the journalists and their representative institutions is prominent. In other, less dramatic cases and situations, critical voices on the performance of the media are often disputed or altogether ignored by the media sector itself. Many editors-in-chief deny that journalism has embarked on a path of tabloidization and commercialization. The media management strongly argues against these criticisms from academic scholars and online discussion forums and blogs. In their editorials, their interviews and their open letters to the public they argue that the quality of journalism in Belgium is of a high standard. However, this contrasts with the views of the journalists themselves: In a survey of journalists (Raeymaeckers et al., 2013), 79% of Flemish journalists and 90% of French-speaking journalists agree that the “news is more sensational than 5 years ago”. The news media sector is faced with a major sectorial crisis: concentration, consolidation, declining sales and circulations, declining advertising and classified revenues, major newsroom downscaling, casualization of employment and increasing pressure and workload on news workers. The concern for this strategic sector has triggered significant initiatives from the public authorities. In Flanders, media ministers organized three successive Staten Generaal van de Media (2009, Minister Peeters; 2011 and 2014, Minister Lieten). In the French-speaking part of the country, Parliament convened its own États généraux des medias d’information from 2010 until 2014. Different working groups discussed core elements of journalism culture, regulation and accountability. 15

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Journalistic culture and media system When comparing media systems, Hallin and Mancini (2004a) place Belgium, together with Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Austria, Sweden and Switzerland, in the North and Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model. Although Belgium is historically defined in a Catholic cultural and ideological framework, unlike the other countries, the historical characteristics of this model can indeed be found in the Belgian case.The historical development of the media is rooted in a tradition of high political parallelism and a press, until the 1960s, with either or both a clear political and ideological branding. Belgium was one of the early consolidated liberal countries with strong liberal institutions and freedom of the press anchored in the constitution of 1831. The media reflected the cultural and societal cleavages of their time, and this explains why the French language, which was the cultural language of the elite, even in the Flemish-speaking north, initially dominated the historical development of the print media. From 1880–1900, newspapers blossomed, with broad ideological diversity, already segmented into distinct brands for the elite readership and for mass readership. The Second World War was another turning point in the development of the media in Belgium. In the aftermath, many brands disappeared or were taken to court because of their wartime activities. The post-war years are considered to be the starting point of the concentration of media ownership (De Bens and Raeymaeckers, 2010). Today, newspaper ownership is characterized as a double duopoly, in Dutch-speaking and French-speaking Belgium, respectively, with an unusual persistence of family-owned conglomerates. Broadcasting was initially organized as a public service monopoly. Deregulation later opened broadcasting to commercial ownership. Commercial television came to the French-speaking part of Belgium in 1987 with RTL-TVi, while in Flanders the commercial broadcaster VTM was launched in 1989. Print media groups have been significantly involved in the development of commercial television in Belgium (see Table 3.1 for a list of key actors in the Belgian media system). Table 3.1  Key actors in the Belgian media system (source for circulation: CIM certified figures) Group

Brand

IPM IPM L’Avenir

La Libre Belgique La Dernière Heure/Les Sports L’Avenir

Rossel Rossel Rossel/Persgroep (50/50) Persgroep/Rossel (50/50) Persgroep

Le Soir 59,484 Sud Presse 88,148 L’Echo 10,606 De Tijd 27,562 Het Laatste Nieuws + 269,595 De Nieuwe Gazet De Morgen 41,690 Het Nieuwsblad + De Gentenaar 242,650 De Standaard 88,088 Het Belang van Limburg 90,406 Gazet van Antwerpen 88,563 VRT RTBF VTM VIER RTL TVi

Persgroep Mediahuis Mediahuis Mediahuis Mediahuis Public broadcaster Public broadcaster Commercial broadcaster Commercial broadcaster Commercial broadcaster

Circulation 2015 Ownership and characteristics

16

33,472 41,876 81,356

Quality newspaper Popular newspaper Regional newspapers (several editions) Quality newspaper Popular newspaper Financial newspaper Financial newspaper Popular newspaper Quality newspaper Popular newspaper Quality newspaper Regional newspaper Regional newspaper Flanders French-speaking market Flanders Flanders French-speaking market

Belgium

The media landscape gradually became depillarized, starting in the 1960s. At present, none of the major media outlets are clearly associated with a political or ideological position (except for the openly progressive daily De Morgen in Flanders). Historically, some media used to be in the hands of political stakeholders, labour organizations, etc. This is no longer the case and the media are now fully in the hands of commercial stakeholders with only remote echoes to the traditional political and ideological branding. Yet, this might change again in the future, as shown recently when Tecteo (an industrial group active in energy and telecommunication, with strong ties to left-wing political stakeholders) took over the French-speaking regional newspaper group L’Avenir. Public broadcasting is important in Belgium and the subsidies provided to the public service media (PSM) are substantial. However, we see a clear difference between the north and the south of the country. In Flanders, public broadcasting has a market share of 69% while the French-speaking counterpart, RTBF, has only 23%. As media subsidies are in the hands of the different language communities, the attribution system for PSM and for media policy are distinct, with each public service medium (VRT and RTBF) receiving public funds but being constrained by multi-annual (4–5-year) protocols signed with the governments of Flanders and Federation Wallonia-Brussels, respectively. Both VRT and RTBF are allowed to earn additional, though strictly limited, income from other activities (with RTBF being allowed to advertise both on radio and television). In 2013, the endowment granted by the Flemish government to VRT was €289.6 million and the government of the Federation Wallonia-Brussels granted RTBF €228.9 million. Print media also benefit from public subsidies, both direct and indirect. A reduced value added tax (VAT) of 6% is applied to the sales price of print media. Media companies also benefit from a range of measures such as reduced rates for distribution costs and tax measures for investments. Other measures are different in the different parts of Belgium. In the French-speaking part of Belgium, direct public funding still exists, providing limited subsidies to newspapers each year, primarily with the aim of maintaining diversity and encouraging employment. On the Dutch-language side, the system of direct press subsidies was abolished in 1997. Instead, a protocol was initiated between the sector and the relevant political level for more tailored measures of support for innovation, and for the preservation of the reader market. In 2011, Flanders revised the system of media support for print media in the MediAcademie, which also integrated platforms for sustaining different forms of journalism and journalism education. The principle for all forms of subsidies is to sustain a pluriform and independent media landscape, taking up its role in civil society and acting as the Fourth Estate. Press freedom is described as one of the important cornerstones of the Constitution of 1831 of the nascent Belgian nation. Article 25 solemnly states that “The press is free; censorship will never be established”. Freedom of speech is only restricted when promoting hate; inciting violence, and either or both racism and xenophobia; and when defamation or libel are established. For a long period, this press freedom was considered to be unquestioned, thus rejecting all forms of regulation. Since the appearance of radio and television, regulation became inevitable, if only for the organization of the structural regulation of technical infrastructure and spectrum allocation. Regulation soon also integrated elements to protect the general interest by safeguarding plurality, cultural diversity, access to information, protection of minors and editorial independence from political and commercial pressures.The more recent evolution of the media landscape resulting from technological innovation, convergence and the Internet led to new challenges requiring new regulatory initiatives, many of which developed in various forms of self-regulation or co-regulation, especially for matters related to media content. Belgium also issued, at the national level, specific policies to protect journalists’ sources and to regulate the right to reply. 17

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Access to information remains problematic, particularly for anyone engaged in investigative journalism. Research by Dirk Voorhoof (2009, 2010, 2012, 2013) shows that journalists are often denied access to information that they are entitled to, forcing them to turn to the courts of justice. His research shows that a broad range of arguments is arbitrarily used to deny journalists access to the information. The autonomy of journalists was strengthened by specific legislation (April 7, 2005) to help them protect their sources. Prior to that law, the protection of sources was only included in the ethical codes of the journalists’ associations, which proved insufficient as it gave legitimacy to journalists protecting their sources but was of little help when defending that right in courts. The scope of application was broadened in 2006 to anyone who provides information to the public.Thus, it is not restricted to accredited journalists, or journalists as a professional group, but includes bloggers, citizen journalists and activists. The professionalism variables as defined by Hallin and Mancini are different and often specific for different media types. At the level of the language communities, there is a press council and there are codes of ethics; journalists are organized in specific associations but editorial statutes are rare. If they exist, they are often created in the historical process of concentration to safeguard the newsroom identity of ideological branding. Today they might still exist in some media, but they have little influence on important issues, on newsroom organization or newsroom autonomy. The professional organizations of journalists reflect the typical intertwined situation between language communities in Belgium. The VVJ (Vlaamse Vereniging van Journalisten) in Flanders and AJP (Association des Journalistes Professionels) in the French-speaking part of the country are intertwined with the AVBB/AGJPB (Algemene Vereniging van Beroepsjournalisten van België/Association Générale des journalistes professionnels de Belgique) at the national level.The latter organization defends journalists’ rights in matters that are regulated at the national level. The VVJ and AJP defend the rights of journalists in those issues that the language communities and institutions regulate.

Established instruments of media accountability Press Councils The national professional organization of journalists (AVBB/AGJPB) is the cradle of initiatives to draw the lines of ethical codes for journalists. In 1995, these initiatives resulted in the creation of specific institutions such as the ‘Council’ and the ‘College’ for monitoring and safeguarding that ethical code. To improve the performance and increase the visibility of their efforts, a Council for Journalism (Raad voor de Journalistiek – RvdJ) was founded in Flanders in 2002. It involves representatives from the publishers and media companies, journalists and experts from outside media circles. To file a complaint, one must establish that one’s own interests are at stake. The outcome of all complaints procedures is made public. The Council has an impressive track record, and the self-regulatory body appears to sustain the quality of journalism (Voorhoof, 2012). A large proportion of the complaints evaluated by the Council are related to invasion of privacy or perceived invasion of privacy, but there are also complaints related to tabloidization or sensationalism. For the French-speaking part of the country, a Council for Journalism Ethics (Conseil de Déontologie Journalistique – CDJ) was created in 2009 and its missions were defined by law, making it more ‘co-regulator’ (public authorities and the sector) than ‘self-regulator’ (the sector only). It involves representatives from the publishers, journalists, editors-in-chief and civil 18

Belgium Table 3.2  Characteristics of the Belgian press councils Press Council

RvdJ

CDJ

Created Scope Type of regulation Status Missions definition Claims

2002 Dutch-speaking Belgium Self-regulation Private Statutes Interested party

2009 French-speaking Belgium Co-regulation Official Law Anyone

society. Anyone can register a complaint related to the Belgian media in French or in German (German is the third official language in Belgium) (see Table 3.2). Both institutions of self-regulation (RvdJ and CDJ) are highly appreciated by professional journalists as the results of a nationwide survey in 2013 demonstrate. A large majority of Frenchspeaking journalists (65%) praise the CDJ, and almost a third of the respondents see the institution as highly important. The Flemish journalists are also positive about the RvdJ, but slightly more moderately. The AVBB together with the VVJ and the AJP contribute to the work of the Commission for the evaluation of applications to be recognized as a professional journalist (ultimately, the title is given by the Ministry of Interior).They also ensure compliance with the ‘Code of Journalistic Principles’ which were already listed in 1982 and based on the Code of Bordeaux (1954) and the Declaration of Munich (1971).

Codes of ethics Although Belgian newsrooms accepted the international codes of ethics, a specific national Code was approved in 1982 by all journalists’ associations in Belgium. This so-called Code van Journalistieke Beginselen has since been adapted and updated. In 1994, a new list of recommendations was added specifically for reporting news on ethical issues, as well as for reporting on crime-related issues. In Flanders, the Raad voor de Journalistiek is the main self-regulation instrument. Its ethical framework was formalized in 2010 in the Code van de Raad voor de Journalistiek. The Code is intended as a guide to practice; it contains a total of 27 articles, and is supplemented by guidelines for specific cases and situations. The code is inspired by two older texts. The first is the declaration of the rights and duties of the journalist, which was adopted internationally in 1971 (also known as the Munich Declaration of the Duties and Rights of Journalists). The second is the code of journalistic principles, which was endorsed by the Belgian journalists’ association AVBB, the labour unions and the editors of newspapers and magazine press houses in 1982. In addition, a number of media brands have developed their own codes. In French-speaking Belgium, the Conseil de déontologie journalistique (CDJ) established its own Code de déontologie journalistique in 2009, and it was updated in 2013. It consists of 28 articles organized into four sections (truth, independence, honesty and rights of the people). The CDJ adapts its code as the media and journalism landscapes change. They work closely together with their Flemish counterpart as well as with the regulator for audiovisual media, the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA). Together with the CSA, the CDJ publishes a report each year on the activities regarding complaints and specific cases with ethical characteristics. 19

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Editorial statutes and newsroom ethics codes In Belgium, there is no systematic tradition of editorial statutes. Following in the footsteps of newsrooms in France, a number of French-speaking outlets have organized ‘societies of journalists’ (sociétés de rédacteurs or sociétés de journalistes) that formally gather journalists from a specific medium to ensure the independence of journalists from pressures, primarily from their owners, but also from political and economic circles (see Table 3.3). In some cases, newsrooms opted for a ‘foundation’ model that is set up to preserve, even in the long term, the ideological positioning of the medium. The oldest example in the Belgian market is the Council of Het Laatste Nieuws, established in 1955 (Prevenier, 2006; Musschoot, 2010) and inspired by the models of The Guardian and Le Monde. The former family owners of Het Laatste Nieuws wanted the Council to safeguard the liberal roots of the news brand for the future and, even today, new journalists have to subscribe to the ideological code before being accepted for a job at Het Laatste Nieuws. Each appointment of an editor-in-chief needs to be approved by the Council. In the broadcast media, editorial statutes have become commonplace, encouraged by various laws. Although strongly linked with media policy measures, the editorial statute of the Flemish commercial broadcaster VTM is still in preparation. The public broadcaster VRT developed its newsroom statute in 1998 and it has been modified several times since then. The statute defines with precision which members of staff fall within its scope, which is very important in a media organization that employs many non-journalists. It guarantees newsroom autonomy and even judicial support in case external actors try to steer newsroom policy. The statute also supports individual journalists who might want to refuse specific journalistic tasks that do not coincide with their professional and ethical values. The autonomy of the newsroom management and of the editor-in-chief are also protected by the statute, with particular attention to the appointment and dismissal of key newsroom positions. The role of the redactieraad (newsroom council) is defined as an instrument of communication between the general management, the newsroom and the newsroom management. Despite carefully described procedures, statutes are not always enforced.

Ombudsmen Today, only the quality daily De Standaard has a highly visible ombudsman function. Tom Naegels, a well-known author in Flanders, has been the ombudsman since 2009, and since then, he has written many columns in the newspaper and online on specific cases within that newspaper and more generally on the state of journalism from a broader perspective. His columns are reflective and, in some cases, are steered by questions and remarks from readers. He holds up a mirror for the journalists and manages to start conversations between the newsroom and the public. Often his columns result in a conversation on a topic in which members of the public, the ombudsman and journalists participate.

Correction boxes As newspapers sometimes publish information that has to be corrected after publication, one would suspect that correction boxes would be a formal part of most news brands. However, this is only the case for De Standaard. The title publishes corrections daily, often just small errors in names and data. For other types of corrections of a more serious nature, the legislation on the ‘right of answer’ prevails, offering those who feel they have been treated unfairly by a story a 20

Belgium Table 3.3  Belgian media accountability instruments at the newsroom level Newsroom Le Soir La Libre La Dernière Heure

Société des rédacteurs/ journalistes

Since 1983 Since 1972 Since 1982 (with discontinuities) Sud Presse Inactive L’Avenir Since 1990; refounded in 2005 L’Echo Since 2004 Le Vif – L’Express Since 1988 RTBF Since 1984; refounded in 2005 RTL-TVi Jointly with Bel-RTL Bel-RTL Since 1996, later merged with that of RTL-TVi Belga (Press Agency) Since 1992 De Morgen Since 1990 De Standaard De Tijd Since 2005 VTM In preparation VRT Since 1998 Het Laatste Nieuws Council since 1955

Ethics code/charter

Ethics committee

Ombusdman/médiator

Since 1989

No No No

No more No No

Yes Since 2007

No No

No No

Since 2004 Since 1998

No No Since 2008

No No Yes

Yes Yes

No No

No No

Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Yes No No No No Yes No

No No more Yes No No No No

procedure to complain and demand that their remarks be published with visibility equivalent to that of the original story. In Belgium, there is very little research on the accuracy of the media. However, in 2013, accuracy in the quality newspaper De Standaard was investigated, in close collaboration with the ombudsman and the editor-in-chief (Verhoeven and Naegels, 2014).

Letters to the editor Letters to the editor are a widely used feature in all types of print media, with dedicated sections in their pages and often with large extensions in their online operations.These letters to the editor sections are still considered a valuable feedback instrument for the newsrooms in Belgium. As research demonstrates (Raeymaeckers, 2005), elements from the letters section can be used as material for further reporting. However, the research into Flemish newsrooms demonstrated that the letters section was so successful that deliberation was needed for selection and for the content management (including editing) of those contributions. However, some of the editing practices altered the original line of argument, or worse, added arguments written by the newsroom staff into the original letters. The letters to the editor sections have ongoing online discussions that are highly popular because of the possibilities for readers to comment. Since those online comment forums have sometimes provoked a lot of off-topic discussion, contained false allegations or rude language, and were often of doubtful quality, many media have experimented with formats that narrow the open access. The open conversations became more contained by editors who altered or even removed 21

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reactions they judged as harmful. This constant editing and monitoring was time-consuming and also added extra verification costs, so after a period of time the features allowing the public to react were downsized considerably and now are more the exception than standard editorial procedure.

Regulators for audiovisual media In 2005, the Flemish Parliament created the Vlaamse Regulator voor de Media (VRM). This institution replaced and regrouped three institutions: the Vlaams Commissariaat voor de Media, the Vlaamse Geschillenraad voor radio en televisie and the Vlaamse kijk- en luisterraad. All competences of these institutions related to ethics were transferred to the Raad voor de Journalistiek.The VRM acts as a supervision institution for the media, but also has specific autonomy for judging impartiality in the media. It acts to protect the interests of minors and takes the necessary steps in cases of hate speech. Members of the public are allowed to file complaints regarding impartiality, but only if they can demonstrate a personal interest or personal damage in relation to the content they are complaining about. The Flemish government establishes the mission statement of the VRM as well as the criteria and measurements to assess its performance. The VRM is sometimes asked to research certain topics to guide policy measures (e.g. advertising rules, product placement). In the French-speaking part of Belgium, the Conseil supérieur de l’audiovisuel (CSA) primarily regulates radio and television, including cable operators. It issues licenses for radio broadcasting (spectrum allocation), and monitors and takes action if some actors hold ‘significant positions’ that can be considered a threat to pluralism. The CSA collaborates with the CDJ only to communicate the results of the procedures of the latter to the broader public.

Advertising The Raad voor de Reclame or Conseil de la Publicité was founded in 1967 by the established advertisers, media and communication agencies in Belgium. It soon established a number of ethical guidelines, and in 1974 it created the Jury of Advertising Ethics (Jury voor Eerlijke Praktijken inzake Reclame or Jury d’Éthique Publicitaire – JEP). The JEP acts as an institution for self-regulation. It reformed itself in 2008 to include representatives from civil society. The JEP bases its decisions on a complex combination of texts, from laws to codes, conventions and directives; in total, 17 texts are listed on the JEP website. Among those texts, the Consolidated International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) Code of Advertising and Marketing Communication Practice is seen as particularly important.

Academic research The Flemish Government created the Steunpunt Media for the period 2012–2015. It is a centre of expertise and a joint collaboration between teams of researchers in Flemish universities to study news ranging from production aspects to audience research. Media stakeholders can ask for specific research or specific handling of research data. The Steunpunt Media regularly publishes newsletters and archives both broadcast and print news.

Fonds Pascal Decroos The Pascal Decroos Fund for Investigative Journalism is an independent non-profit organization that aims to stimulate investigative and quality journalism. The Fund awards grants to journalistic projects and young journalists who cannot find investors for their projects in the media 22

Belgium

industry. The Fund is partly subsidized by the Flemish Government with an annual grant of €300,000, a form of direct subsidy to sustain journalism quality.

Media journalism and media criticism The Belgian media are not very keen on criticism. In Flanders, mediakritiek.be was an influential online meeting point for media criticism and media professionals, opinion leaders and academics, but it had to close down in 2014 due to financial problems.

Innovative instruments of media accountability We have referred to the tradition of essays and columns of the editors-in-chief, senior journalists and expert journalists. These columns appear in the traditional printed brands but are also prominent online and are often discussed even more broadly by postings and cross-postings on social media. Here we notice a rather top-down approach using a broad range of traditional, new and social media. On some occasions, chat sessions with the public on a specific theme can also be seen.

Conclusions To conclude this chapter, we refer to the atypical structure of Belgium, which has policy granting authority at the national level for some measures (VAT, tax rates, etc.), while for the majority of media-related aspects, authority is at the regional level, thus dividing the measures to safeguard autonomy or diversity into a French-speaking and Dutch-speaking set of policy measures. Key institutions for accountability aspects are the press councils: Raad voor de Journalistiek and Conseil de déontologie journalistique. Both institutions are highly regarded for their expertise and respected for the guidelines they offer and the decisions they take based upon complaints and questions. They are both examples of judgment by peers while the policy level is kept out of the organizations. The different examples of individual media brands having their own ethical guidelines are, in the large majority, inspired by the codes of both institutions (RvdJ and CDJ). Individual media brands having Sociétés de rédacteurs to safeguard newsroom autonomy were often created in the concentration process to defend the ideological branding of the titles; however, those institutions have been proven to have only very weak influence when confronted with challenges in newsrooms, especially with challenges to cost-cutting measures. Regulatory bodies, like policy-makers, struggle to keep up with the disruption in media production, distribution and reception. The blurring lines between the different media forms, and between roles (audience, journalists, producers, etc.) are challenging the structure and logics of accountability and regulation.

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4 Bulgaria Regaining media freedom Bissera Zankova and Michał Głowacki

Abstract The difficulties in embedding genuine media ethics in Bulgaria are closely related to complications in the media system, its post-communist past and its journalism culture. The Bulgarian media have experienced severe problems when encouraging media independence and freedom. Several initiatives and studies have indicated that discussions on media accountability – both in terms of traditional and innovative mechanisms and practices – are rare and neglected. The inadequate regulatory framework, the lack of transparency of media ownership, the close ties between the media, business and politicians, alongside the lack of dialogue between stakeholders, are among the main challenges for developing a sound system of media accountability. The implementation of the new digital technologies can make media accountability mechanisms more open and efficient. Although technically conditions in Bulgaria are promising, media users need to become active citizens in order to vigorously pursue democratic values and demand accountability from media enterprises.

Introduction The entrenchment of genuine media accountability and media ethics is closely related to the problems in the Bulgarian media system. Scholars and representatives of journalist’s organizations started discussions on media accountability and transparency at an early stage of media and political transformation. At the end of the 1980s, the media played a prominent role in stimulating democratic changes, but in 1999, leading Bulgarian commentators raised the alarming question: Are Bulgarian journalists willing to have their freedom? (Nedeltchev, 1999) Recent examples have shown that the media no longer fulfil their basic purpose of being the watchdogs of political power and the voice of society. The economic and political pressure on journalists led to the degradation of the journalistic profession and to the widespread manifestations of auto-censorship. As Spassov (2013) reported, the second annual survey of the media environment in the country, ‘Bulgaria in 2013’, carried out by the Association of European Journalists (AEJ), confirmed this conclusion, showing that the economic pressure put on journalists and bloggers is even stronger than that of political influence.1 The lack of unity and dialogue between professional associations and civil society is 24

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another factor explaining this deplorable situation. There have been few attempts to define the contribution of the new media to media ethics and journalistic professionalization; the research undertaken has indicated that the Internet has not yet improved media accountability and transparency in Bulgarian media enterprises.

Journalistic culture and media system The Bulgarian media system, like the media systems in other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, is a hybrid of the media models defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004a) and combines various layers and elements. Media and journalism are affected by historical, political and social factors and the country’s culture. Collectivism versus individualism (Hofstede, Minkov and Hofstede, 2010) differentiates Eastern from Western Europe in this respect, leaving Central Europe somewhere in the middle (Szücs, 1983). In contrast to Western individualistic societies, collectivistic societies such as Bulgaria and other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, because of their slower pace of modernization and agrarian past, build morality systems characterized by particularistic virtues, low levels of trust and double moral standards (Hofstede, Minkov and Hofstede, 2010). From an economic perspective, the prominent Bulgarian economist Rumen Avramov (2007) claims that capitalism in Bulgaria was a communal capitalism, and individualism and private initiative have been supplanted, to a large extent, by collectivist forms of mentality. The dependence of Bulgarian society on a huge network of personal relationships where “knowing the right people is essential to professional success” (Pfetsch and Voltmer, 2012, p. 397) supersedes individual merits and achievements, and is another manifestation of the national collectivist culture. All these features of social culture impact on the behaviour of people and on the relationships and institutions that they design (Ognianova, 1993; Nikoltchev, 1996; Ibroscheva, 2012; Zankova, 2014; Zankova and Kirilov, 2014). Zlatev (2011, p. 23) suggests that the countries of Southern and Eastern Europe share some common features when implementing self-regulatory mechanisms in the media sector. These features include, above all, incomplete legislative frameworks, the weak institutional capacities of professional media organizations, the low impact of media accountability mechanisms on the media, the lack of awareness of the public of the existence of self-regulation and insufficient independence from business and politics. The lack of independence from business and politics – in connection with the legal framework, which is open to political abuse – has been seen as a condition that has a negative impact on media independence and journalism quality for a long time. The New Bulgarian Media Group (NBMG), the country’s largest media organization, created in 2007 and supposedly owned by Irena Krasteva, the mother of Delyan Peevski, the politician, oligarch and media magnate, was sold to a little-known Irish company, Media Maker, in a one-night deal in April 2014. The NBMG managed, within a short time, to buy the daily paper with the highest circulation (Telegraph), some other influential newspapers (Politika, Express and Monitor), tabloids (Shock), online news websites (blitz.com and vsekiden.com), the national TV channel, Balkan Bulgarian Television (BBT) and the major printing company Rodina. In September 2014, Standartnews referred to an article in The Guardian which cited a report from the European media network (EurActiv), which stated, “officially, Peevski has no property, but it is widely assumed that he controls vast economic interests, and a powerful media group, which is waging a dirty war against his political opponents” (Standartnews, 2014).This is a striking example of the unhealthy fusion of politics, media and business, and the inadequacy of the current regulation of the media, especially media ownership and competition. In 2013, The Economist published an evaluation of the desperate Bulgarian media situation, quoting Orlin Spassov – managing director of the 25

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Media Democracy Foundation and an associate professor of the Faculty of Journalism and Mass Communication at Sofia University St. Kliment Ohridsky – who claimed that “media ownership in Bulgaria is like a Matryoshka doll: there is always one figure inside another”. The ‘Matryoshka doll’ inside the NBMG is largely financed by the Corporate Commercial Bank (CCB), which, though small, holds a large portion of the state-owned assets in crucial public sectors, thus, in effect, financing the group’s media outlets (The Economist, 2013). The problems of the non-transparent nature of the Bulgarian media and the lack of effective media competition rules have been mapped in the international research project MEDIADEM (Smilova, Smilov and Ganev, 2011, 2012a, 2012b). As well as the structural features of the media system in Bulgaria, Smilova, Smilov and Ganev (2011) point to the practice of paid-for content news coverage in journalism and recommend the promotion of the ethical integrity of the journalistic profession (Smilova, Smilov and Ganev, 2012a). As further noted by Dobreva, Pfetsch and Voltmer (2011, p. 293): [W]hile Bulgarian journalists and politicians hold rather hostile and dismissive views of each other they are also involved in a close – apparently too close – network of relationships that at times threatens the integrity of journalistic independence. An optimistic feature of the Bulgarian media system is the soaring importance of the Internet as a more liberal medium for expression.‘Digital Bulgaria in progress’, which measured the progress of the Digital Agenda for Europe (Scoreboard) and the Digital Bulgaria National Programme up to June 2014, reported that there is 93% broadband coverage in the country, against 97% in the European Union (EU) (Digital Bulgaria, 2014). However, the digital culture in the country is not well developed; in 2013, 41% of the population had never made use of the Internet. As noted by Bakardjieva (2012, p. 1359), “[L]arge portions of the Bulgarian population have neither the means nor the knowledge or motivation to connect to the internet”. Popova (2004) considers that a shortcoming of online journalism is the lack of diversity in media content, both in terms of the topics considered and the analysis of them. The number of professional online journalists who possess the special knowledge and skills to produce Internet content and respond to the expectations of virtual users is small. Due to the lack of specialized media literacy courses on online journalism, many media practitioners in the field only gain experience through their everyday writing on the Internet (ibid.). The people’s protests that shook the country twice in 2013 had the effect of mobilizing the development of the Internet and social networks (Euronews, 2013). Though the new media are growing fast, and their social impact is significant, the overall impression of media freedom in Bulgaria is rather discouraging. The recent World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders (2015) confirms that media freedom in Bulgaria is diminishing, and in terms of media freedom, Bulgaria is among the lowest-ranking states in the EU (106th place out of 180 countries). Freedom House (2014) agrees with this assessment and grades Bulgaria as “partly free” in its Freedom of the Press Report. In addition, the Bulgaria Media Sustainability Index Report (2013) concludes: “The Bulgarian media continued its slow slide away from the levels of sustainability reached in the years before the country’s EU accession”.

Established instruments of media accountability During the transition to a pluralist democratic media system, the establishment of an effective self-regulation system was one of the key goals in Bulgaria – even though an arbitration commission has been provided by the Union of Bulgarian Journalists. In the early 1990s, when the 26

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first private media organizations were set up, media development in Bulgaria was largely determined by market forces, without a stable regulatory or self-regulatory framework. Associations of media operators and publishers exercised considerable influence on the legislative process to create the first Radio and Broadcasting Act in 1998 and the ensuing Code of Media Ethics in 2004, both of which were introduced quite late in comparison to other Central and Eastern European democracies. With regard to the content of the code, there was disagreement and dispute among the groups and organizations from the outset. In the initial stage, at least seven different drafts were put forward and none of them were accepted unanimously (Zlatev, 2010). The Code of Media Ethics was drafted within the framework of the PHARE project ‘Technical Support for Improving the Professional Standards for Bulgarian Journalism’ and was signed on November 25, 2004 by the Association of Bulgarian Broadcasters, the Bulgarian Media Coalition, the Union of Bulgarian Journalists, the Union of Publishers and the Association for Regional Media, as well as 45 newspaper outlets, private broadcasters and public service media (International Federation of Journalists, 2005). The Code of Media Ethics was launched during a ceremony involving the president of Bulgaria, the Speaker of Parliament, the prime minister and representatives of media organizations. The Code of Media Ethics underlines a range of ethical principles dealing with accuracy, the protection of minors, non-discrimination and coverage of crimes as well as cases of brutality, journalistic reliability and editorial independence (NCJE, 2004). The negative attitude of journalists, media experts and civil activists towards this Code, because of suspicions of conformism, was not without rationale (Tabakova, 2008). The large sum of money spent on writing such a short document (only four pages) was also the subject of criticism (Raycheva, 2010). Media outlets owned by the NBMG have not signed the Code. In 2005, the National Council for Journalistic Ethics (NCJE) was created as a non-profit public foundation, with two Commissions on Journalistic Ethics, one for the press and one for broadcasting. Internal regulations securing accessible, clear-cut and free-of-charge procedures for handling complaints have been put in place. Professional journalistic standards are considered to be of a universal nature and are mandatory for all actors. Commissions may adjudicate against media that have not signed the Code but cannot impose rectification measures on them (NCJE, 2013). In 2013, the annual report of the NCJE stated that the Commissions had dealt with more than 80 notifications and complaints, some of which did not proceed as the media published the necessary corrections. Other complaints were settled through mediation with the involvement of all interested parties. The Commissions considered the requests of politicians and businessmen concerning the acceptable boundary between privacy and public interest. Disagreements between the associations of media owners, resulting in changes in the structure of the Council for Media Ethics, led to the interruption of the functioning of the two Commissions in 2012– 2013. The debates within the NCJE, with media experts and professionals, facilitated the merging of the two Commissions from 2015 to form a single ethical Commission consisting of twelve members with scope to cover all types of media. In 2013, the NBMG declared that the Bulgarian Media Union (BMU) – a new professional organization comprising 35 members – would design an alternative ethical code addressing print, broadcast, Internet media and possibly advertising agencies, and this was later adopted.The Association of European Journalists – Bulgaria (2014) expressed its concerns about the function of the new code, calling it “an attempt for the privatization of media self-regulation”. The Association further called for better guarantees for its effective implementation, bearing in mind the political affiliations of the NBMG and the repeated violations of fundamental journalistic standards in its publications (Association of European Journalists – Bulgaria, 2014). 27

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In October 2014, the BMU decided on one ethical commission responsible for all types of media. In practical terms, this means that there will be at least three commissions in the country – one with the UBJ, one with the NCJE and one with the BMU – and each will apply similar ethical standards. Apart from this confusion, the transformation of the ethical principles into everyday practice has always been problematic in Bulgaria. As the Bulgaria Media Sustainability Index Report (2014) states, “Bulgaria has a Code of Professional Ethics and two ethical commissions – one for print and one for broadcast media – but the implementation of the standards is neither universally nor vigorously enforced”.The activities of the existing ethical commissions do not enjoy great public popularity, which can make one think that they operate as a closed, self-serving system in the sector. Also, the widening of their competence to encompass Internet publications is a very new idea. A recent research project called ‘The Taboo Topics in Online Media – 2014’, undertaken by the Institute for Modern Politics (IMP) and supported by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, stresses that ethical journalism is a suppressed and neglected theme for Internet media, ranking only third out of 13 topics (Indjov, 2014). Ombudsman-like institutions for media-related issues do not exist in Bulgaria. Letters to editors were very popular in socialist times, as they were able to help media workers to avoid censorship. Nowadays letters are sent in various formats to the media and some of them are published in online editions or blogs. A more important channel for expressing one’s views is online forums, but sometimes these can be very manipulative.

Innovative instruments of media accountability The consistent implementation of the new information and communications technologies can make media accountability mechanisms more open, interactive and efficient. However, as research on online innovations within the MediaAcT project indicates, the Internet has not yet improved the level of media accountability in Bulgaria or the development of online platforms (Głowacki, 2011). Online practices initiated by the media to encourage both media accountability and transparency are not widespread. Media accountability innovations have been emphasized mainly in the contexts of Really Simple Syndication or Rich Site Summary (RSS) feeds, mobile technologies, journalistic blogs, video games and social networks with the most interactive media – online editions of Dnevnik and Capital and the websites of public service media outlets (Głowacki, 2011; Głowacki and Kuś, 2012). Overall, very few media organizations in Bulgaria have introduced mechanisms supporting the actor transparency level; not all of the media organizations that signed the Code of Media Ethics have published the document on their websites. While media blogs written by journalists and published within media organizations do exist, they are not that common (there is such a blog within the online edition of Capital, for instance). So far, social media have been the most popular instruments of media accountability, fostering the transparency of media production. However, media organizations use social networks either to target new audiences or to develop new topics rather than to become involved in issues relating to media ethics and journalism performance. Newsroom blogs, collaborative news production and citizen journalism initiatives introduced by the media have not yet established common practices. Instruments fostering media responsiveness mostly relate to the possibilities for commenting on news. These comments mostly relate to ‘soft news’ and entertainment and they rarely address the ethical standards of journalism (Głowacki, 2011). In Bulgaria, only 9% of Internet users have created a site or a blog. The Open Directory Project (DMOZ, 2014) states that 196 personal blogs are available in Bulgaria. Most of the existing blogs are dedicated to political issues and, except in very few cases, people generally restrain 28

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from making comments on the performance of the media. However, there are blogs where bloggers share views about the Internet, freedom of expression and security on the web. A special blog,2 created within the online version of the Dnevnik newspaper, promotes the blogosphere and blogs in particular as a new type of media. Among the few significant examples of citizens’ activities related to the media is the blog by Veni Markovski,3 a founder of the Bulgarian Internet Society. Within the blog, Markovski analyses recent developments in cyber security and the information society. The blog on media law by Nelly Ognianova,4 a media expert and university professor, is another good interactive model which publishes information about documents from the EU, the Council of Europe and the courts on media standards and freedom of expression (Głowacki, 2011). However, expanding on the role of blogs for political reforms, Dimova and Zankova (2013) emphasize that the main role of blogs is apparently during protests and in shaping discussion. They represent important sources of comments for particular communities but they have not had a substantial effect on changing the political system (especially in the context of the elections in May 2013). In the same vein, Professor Nikolay Slatinsky (2014) wrote:“Many observers and bloggers in Bulgaria reflect on whether the energy expressed on online networks is a reason for social developments, such as the recent protests, or a consequence”. He added: One should view and think about the protests a bit differently (because we are not in the 20th century but in the networked society of the 21st century) [...] And this is a time of network structures, not of the hierarchal ones (like those belonging to the parties); of social horizontal mobilizations and not vertical ones; of spontaneously born communities; of authentic eruptions of social energy. (ibid.) The protests have given birth to the NOresharski website, which exposes the wrongdoings of the government of Prime Minister Plamen Oresharski (2013–2014) and encourages active bloggers, media professionals and designers to protect the professional and objective media. The Protest network has also come about as a result of the protests and its aims are for transparency and integrity in the media, as these are crucial elements in the overall civil society battle against corruption in Bulgaria. Thus, the establishment of novel accountability practices in Bulgaria and more effective accountability mechanisms based on digital communication technologies is intertwined with the establishment of a new active participatory culture and citizens who are strongly committed to genuine democratic reforms under the guidance of new leaders.

Conclusion Media accountability is a desirable goal in Bulgaria, and it can be accomplished as part of the democratic process. It is a multistage process related to the advancement of the whole social organism, with special emphasis on journalism and media culture. The media accountability system in Bulgaria is still rather weak due to problems with media independence, the lack of transparency of media ownership, the low level of journalistic professionalization and divisions within the journalistic community, each division having their own views on established instruments, including codes of journalistic conduct. New media and technologies are still not regarded as encouraging media accountability online; an obstacle may be that only a small number of media outlets are engaging in practices supporting news media transparency and in increasing the level of media responsiveness. In addition, Bulgarian citizens do not pay sufficient attention to blogs as innovative media. There are not many active and modern-minded users 29

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who can bring significant changes to the media accountability systems, according to a sociological survey published on the Mediapool information site.5 The general attitude towards the opportunities created by the web, as a medium predominantly designed for information, business and entertainment, can hamper the expansion of accountability practices on the Internet, as users should be active citizens and should pursue the values of democracy from the outset. In the era of the Internet, the system of media accountability has to be upgraded in order to interact more thoroughly with individuals and audiences. Guaranteeing the independence of the media and raising the professionalism and moral integrity of journalists are essential objectives that can be accomplished through the establishment of accountability mechanisms that suit the demands of the new media environment. However, all reforms in Bulgaria happen very slowly and hesitantly.

Notes 1 169 journalists were interviewed during the period May 10–June 10, 2013, and 31% declared that it was not necessary to exert any pressure on them as they subject themselves to self-censorship in their everyday work. Broadcasting journalists are the group most often pressurized (47%), followed by print and online journalists (41%); radio journalists are pressurized less often (31%). Forty-six per cent of netizens (people who are frequent or habitual users of the Internet) also point out that they have been subject to pressure (The Media Suffer Most from Economic Pressure, a Survey Reveals. Retrieved from http://www. dnevnik.bg/bulgaria/2013/06/25/2089827_mediite_stradat_nai-silno_ot_ikonomicheski_natisk/). 2 http://blogosfera.dnevnik.bg 3 http://blog.veni.com 4 http://nellyo.wordpress.com 5 http://www.mediapool.bg

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5 Croatia Unfulfilled expectations Stjepan Malović

Abstract Media accountability in Croatia is at a low level. Most of the instruments of media accountability are not developed. Media transition, from the Soviet Media Model to one of the recognized media models in democratic countries, is an ongoing and very slow process. Journalists, media experts and the public are unanimous in evaluating the media situation as being in deep crisis. The paradox is that although foreign media corporations own the majority of Croatia’s media companies, those foreign media corporations do not implement in Croatia the high professional standards of their national states.Violation of media ethics strongly characterizes Croatian media. Hate speech, disrespect of privacy, manipulation, sensationalism and abuse of children’s rights are an everyday reality. Established instruments of media accountability, such as press councils and ombudsmen, have not been developed in Croatia and thus do not have any significant influence on the media environment. Neither have innovative instruments of media accountability been developed. Online journalism and web publishing are sources of hate speech and non-ethical messages.

Introduction The media situation in Croatia is worse than ever.“We do not remember the biggest crisis of the media industry in the Croatia”, stated Zdenko Duka, the president of the Croatian Journalists’ Association.1 Why has this happened to the once well-developed media? Even during communism, the media industry was in a better state: journalists were much more professional, had more dignity and better social status. The transition of the media from the former Soviet Media Model to one of the media models known in democratic countries has been very slow, painful and – not over yet. Real media freedom or journalists’ independence has not yet taken hold in Croatia, the youngest European Union (EU) member state. The biggest paradox is that global media corporations own the majority of the media companies.Two global companies (WAZ and Styria) own almost 90% of the daily newspaper market; two of the three national TV companies are under foreign ownership (RTL and Nova TV). The majority of magazines are internationally owned as well. Bearing this in mind, and knowing the 31

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level of journalism within these global companies, the obvious question is: Why is it that these global media corporations do not apply the same high standards of journalism in Croatia? Instead of high media standards, Croatia has poor journalism and a low level of media culture. The public is sick and tired of media where sensationalism is dominant, where manipulation is visible, where big advertisers dictate the media content, where journalists are not independent and do not report statistics correctly and where the news is not accurate, balanced or impartial. Politicians control the media, but they no longer use the primitive method of direct interference with editorial policy. Instead, they now employ advertising agencies to direct the distribution of advertisements to obedient media companies.The compliant media companies get more advertisements and, thus, more income. Despite Croatia fulfilling all the democratic requirements to become the newest EU member, this evaluation of the media environment is not encouraging.

Journalistic culture and media system The Croatian media were under the absolute influence of the ruling Communist Party between 1945 and 1990. The Croatian media were typical of the Soviet Communist Model, as described by Wilbur Schramm in the book Four Theories of the Press (Siebert, Peterson and Schramm, 1956). The Croatian struggle for independence took place at the same time as the transition from Communism to democracy. The media system was also in transition, but both processes were very slow and remain ongoing. In their Press Freedom Index, Reporters Without Borders ranked the Croatian media 65th out of 180 countries in 2014. The Croatian model can be described as a combination of the relics of the Soviet Communist Model and the Mediterranean Model of journalism cultures as described by Hallin and Mancini (2004a). The Soviet Communist Model is evident because of the influence of politics, which is no longer as strong as it was in the former Yugoslavia, but is still an important factor in creating the media environment. The Mediterranean Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a) is visible in the relatively small circulation of newspapers. Media Puls (a Croatian public opinion research company) reported that 475,373 people read newspapers in 2013, about 30% of the population. Croatian newspapers communicate with the elite, and therefore high political parallelism is present. Journalism is commentary-oriented, partly because of political influence, partly because of weak professionalization and visible instrumentalization. The public service Hrvatska radiotelevizija (Croatian Radiotelevision, HRT) is controlled by politicians and has limited independence because the management of the institution is directly responsible to Parliament. Parliament decides the cost of monthly subscriptions and how many advertisements can be broadcast per hour. Such financial arrangements allow the direct influence of the ruling party on the editorial policy of public radio and television. The following figures give a good idea of the media landscape in Croatia during the period 2007–2012. Data from the Ministry of Culture show that, in 2008, the pre-economic recession income of newspaper publishers declined from 3.19 billion kuna (approximately €500 million) to 1.58 billion (approximately €200 million), and the income from TV and radio fell by 10%. Figures presented by the Ministry of Culture referring to the media and journalism are not encouraging. In the five years prior to 2012, almost 35% of jobs in media companies were cut. Newspaper and magazine production in Croatia is at its lowest level in ten years.The number of printed news items and stories in the daily newspapers in 2008 was almost 1,150,000; in 2012, there were only 780,000 news items and stories. The Ministry of Culture stated that there were 4,927 journalists in 2011: 1,786 in the print media, 1,226 in television, 628 in radio, 115 online and 97 with news agencies.There were 1,075 32

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unemployed journalists, which includes the official figure of 600 unemployed journalists and the remainder as freelancers, most of whom had received some financial support to leave their media company and try to find another job. From 2008 to 2013, between 1,500 and 2,100 journalists lost their jobs due to the economic crisis and business decisions made by publishers. We can close this list of negative figures reported by the Ministry of Culture by showing the decrease in journalists’ salaries: about 30–40% since 2009. In this period, one of the oldest and most reputable daily newspapers, Vjesnik, ceased to exist, and another attempt to launch a daily newspaper failed after only several months (21. stoljeće). Several influential daily newspapers were in serious financial difficulty – Jutarnji list, Novi list and Glas Istre. Renato Ivanuš, editor-in-chief of the bestselling daily newspaper 24 sata, said that journalists are also responsible: “Most of the daily newspapers are tabloidized, offering the readers mostly entertainment. Readers partly rejected such content and gave up buying and reading daily newspapers” (Ivanuš, 2014, p. 4). The media in Croatia are not only part of the local economy, but also the global economy. Global media corporations dictate the Croatian media business, especially the print media and the national TV channels. As in the communist era, the government tries to influence the media market. The Croatian Parliament passed a law on value added tax (VAT). For newspaper companies, the rate was to be reduced by 5%, but only for those papers of more than 25,000 words per copy. The publishers were shocked and the public dismayed. Nobody had ever heard of the criterion of 25,000 words per copy of a daily newspaper. The scandal was huge and, finally, the Constitutional Court of Croatia suspended this decision of the parliament.This type of decision shows how confused the government is in aiding the media market. There were also international reactions to the decision: Jim Boumelha, president of the International Federation of Journalists (IFJ), and Mogens Blicher, president of the European Federation of Journalists (EFJ), sent a protest letter to the Croatian president, Ivo Josipović, stating how the decision was against EU law. The government made another unusual decision.Trying to save some media companies from bankruptcy, the Minister of Finance initiated the so-called ‘before bankruptcy settlement’ and, as a result, the Ministry became very important in solving bankruptcy. Almost all media companies were facing bankruptcy and, suddenly, the government, using a magic wand, was able to decide which would survive. Media companies such as EuropaPress Holding (EPH), which is co-owned by the German corporation WAZ; Vjesnik, the biggest printing plant; the news portal Index.hr and others have benefitted from the ‘before bankruptcy settlement’. Of course, such government assistance has resulted in less criticism of the government by the media and more self-censorship among journalists. Publishers were also contributing to the media companies’ market difficulties. For example, due to poor management, the paper Novi list, founded in 1900 and one of the most eminent newspapers in the region, was in serious financial trouble and could not pay journalists’ salaries. The situation was the same for the daily newspaper Glas Istre, also owned by Albert Faggian. Basically, the owner and management were saving their financial interests in several companies by using the cash flow from the daily newspapers. Changes in the Penalty Code, adopted at the beginning of 2013, introduced a new approach to the offence against honour and reputation, called ‘humiliation’, and associated with ‘defamation’ and ‘libel. In 2014, when the first judgments were made, the public was shocked. According to the law, a journalist can report the truth about a person (or company), but a judge can decide that the person has been humiliated by the report and sentence the journalist to jail. It 33

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became an international scandal when an eminent journalist, Slavica Lukić, vice-president of the Croatian Journalists’ Association, was found guilty of humiliating a medical company. As a result of this scandal, the Penalty Code will be changed once again.

Established instruments of media accountability The media in transition economies do not usually have well-developed media accountability instruments.The Croatian media environment, like those in other former Yugoslavian countries, does not efficiently protect ethical standards. In the Soviet Communist Model, ethical issues were part of the journalists’ association activities. However, the communist system had its own methods of media control, which were much more efficient and important than the Code of Ethics or Councils of Honour. The independent Croatian government continued with the same methods of media control, respecting the existing Code of Ethics as a document but having their own criteria of what was and was not acceptable in the media. These were not the best methods, especially when the Croatian media and journalists violated ethical standards in a very visible manner. The violation of media ethics strongly characterizes the Croatia media: hate speech, not respecting privacy, manipulation, sensationalism and abusing children – this is the reality of the Croatian media.

Press council Neither a press council nor an ombudsman existed in Croatia during the Communist era. The Croatian Journalists’ Association, including the International Centre for Education of Journalists (ICEJ), in cooperation with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung office in Croatia, initiated a wide public debate to consider this. After a long and sometimes very hard debate, in 2006 the Croatian Journalists’ Association decided to establish the Croatian Press Council. On December 7, 2011, the Croatian Press Council was founded with the official name Hrvatsko vijeće za medije (Croatian Council for the Media). However, its activities were not visible to the public and it became clear that the Council had not been established in an appropriate way. The daily newspaper Večernji list reported, on March 14, 2014, that the Assembly of the Croatian Council for the Media had decided to continue working, despite organizational and financial problems. The Council, according to their official website, has issued five decisions relating to the violation of media ethics since 2012. In 2014, the Croatian Council for the Media only released two statements. The first was on April 10, when it expressed concern about the verdict against the journalist Slavica Lukić. She was sentenced for humiliation for reporting the activities of the medical company Medikol.The second statement was issued on June 18, because the City Council of Vrgorac, a small city in southern Croatia, banned the filming of a public session of the City Council. This was a clear limitation of the media’s freedom. It is not surprising that today the Croatian Council for the Media is a relatively anonymous institution in the media environment, having no strong impact on respecting ethical codes.

Journalists’ Council of Honour The older institution for media ethics is the Vijeće časti Hrvaskog novinarskog društva (Council of Honour of the Croatian Journalists’ Association). The Council of Honour is still active and is a parallel institution to the Croatian Council for the Media. The Croatian Journalists’ Association 34

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finances both organizations.The difference is in activity. Members of the Council of Honour are elected members of the Croatian Journalists’ Association, and it acts only at the request of people or institutions that are asking for justice.The Council of Honour’s verdicts are only published on the website of the Croatian Journalists’ Association2 and thus hardly any of the Council’s activities are accessible to the wider public. Of all the reports in 2014, only two of the Council’s sessions were accessible, one held on February 3 and the other on March 17. The session held on May 12 is not accessible. Council members received 19 complaints in total against a violation of media ethics, and in 10 of these cases, the journalists were found guilty. Most of the complaints were against journalists in the print media (8), mostly from the daily newspaper Jutarnji list, then the online media (7), TV (3) and a local newspaper (1). Complaints were mostly because of the offensive nature of articles (4), human rights violations (3) and children’s rights violations (3).There were various other reasons, such as underreporting, plagiarism, violation of privacy, not publishing corrections and publishing the national flag with a Nazi swastika instead of the coat of arms. The credibility of the media is rapidly decreasing if one compares the limited activities of the two organizations with the real violation of ethics in the Croatian media and the very strongly expressed public dissatisfaction with media accountability.

Ombudsmen The Croatian media has no experience of ombudsmen. While debating on funding at the Press Council, the role of ombudsmen was clearly explained, but nobody established this function in the media companies. However, the daily newspaper Večernji list established a reader’s representative. The experienced journalist and former chief editor, Ružica Cigler, successfully communicates with readers, building understanding between journalists and their audience: Readers mostly react negatively to the messages we publish, whether they are in the news or in commentaries. They tell us how dissatisfied they are with politicians. Secondly, readers warn us about mistakes that we make. And, they often suggest which stories we should investigate. … Each reader complaint about a violation of media ethics is forwarded immediately to the editors and journalists. I regularly comment and analyze our mistakes, regarding readers’ remarks. I can act independently, with no problem in criticizing the work of the journalists, because my position, as a member of the management, allows me that freedom. (Ružica Cigler, interviewed 5.6.2014) The public service broadcaster, Croatian Radiotelevision, established the post of a Commissioner for radio and television users. Former radio journalist Zvonko Šeb was appointed as a Commissioner, but his activity is almost unknown to the public and the audience does not use this channel as an instrument of media accountability. The Commissioner reported that in the period from January 29 to March 9, 2014, he had 214 contacts, an average of 5.14 per day. Most of the contacts were related to the editorial policy of Croatian Radiotelevision (77).Viewers and listeners were not satisfied by the news selection and re-broadcasting of some shows. Eleven user complaints were about the language used in the programmes, the partiality of the reports, the low levels of professionalism and inviting a Serbian pop singer to a talk show. 35

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Commissioner for Information The Croatian Parliament established a new form of media monitoring: the Commissioner for Information. Anamarija Musa was appointed at the end of 2013, and she has a background in the law, not the media.The institution was designed as a parliamentary monitor for information, including the media, but the office was not built into the budget lines for 2014 and, according to the daily newspaper Novi list, it is almost inactive.

Audiovisual media monitoring Agencija za elektroničke medije (The Agency for Electronic Media) is the government body for monitoring and regulating audiovisual media and the Internet. It is an influential and very strong institution, and among its powers is the ability to ban an existing radio or TV station. As of May 2014, the Agency punished eleven different media outlets, mostly local radio and television companies, but not a single website.The Agency offers an e-mail address for sending complaints to, but there is no trace of any such communication on the website.

Codes of ethics The Croatian Journalists’ Association adopted a Code of Ethics a long time ago, during communism, and it is still the only code existing at the national level. Most of the important media companies have their own ethical codes and some form of organization that concerns itself with respecting media ethics. The codes are made along the lines of the ethical codes in Germany, the USA and some other countries. In principle, they are not bad documents, but the problem starts when the codes are applied to media production. Sometimes, a company’s management uses their own code of ethics to solve internal problems. For instance, the Director of Croatian Radiotelevision was not happy with the activity of the president of the Croatian Journalists’ Association and filed a complaint with the Commission for Ethics of Croatian Radiotelevision. In the same media company, the management punished one of the editors for presenting a war criminal in a show. As one can see, management and journalists are not sure which methods they should use to solve ethical and professional problems. A possible reason for this is that only one magazine, Novinar, published by the Croatian Journalists’ Association, regularly publishes stories on media issues. Novinar is the only trade journal in Croatia, and it is only printed four times per year.

Media criticism in the mass media Mass media, mostly newspapers, regularly criticize TV programmes from the point of view of the viewers. Other media, especially newspapers, are not regularly criticized.

Innovative instruments of media accountability The Internet in general, and social media in particular, are new media, and online journalism is a new type of journalism. Most of the well-known problems from the mainstream media are not applicable to online journalism. One of the problems is that the Internet is developing so fast that users do not have time to understand what works best. The Internet is the fastest growing media in Croatia. In 2013, 63.4% of 16–74-year-olds used the Internet (Majnarić, 2014, p. 3). 36

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Just over half of daily users (53.4%) of the Internet are adults, which is less than the EU average (61.7%) and puts Croatia in 22nd place among EU states. Croatia is in 24th place among EU states in terms of broadband connections, with 20.8% of households connected, which is less than the EU average of 28.8%. “The number of Internet users in Croatia has increased significantly. Users access information from news portals, blogs and social networks, among other sources; this information was previously accessed through daily newspapers” (Ivanuš, 2014, p. 15). These figures explain why the innovative instruments of media accountability are mostly present on the Internet. Of course, young people make use of all of the advantages of the Internet, including the ability to easily express their opinions.The main ethical problem for the Internet is the anonymity of user’s comments and false profiles on social networks. Comments frequently cross the line of decency and moral and ethical standards. Groups of anonymous users post hate speech, violating human rights, which offends both authors and readers. This problem is well known all over the world, but solutions are not easy to find. People offended by anonymous comments have asked for protection and have placed the blame on the news portals’ editors. Editors of the websites have experimented with different methods, such as controlling the content, giving authorization to the commentators, etc. Unfortunately, these are rarely successful. One of the most eminent websites, the news portal Net.hr, decided to ban commentaries from their pages. Supporters of media ethics approved of this decision and considered it a solution to the problem. However, very soon, the number of visits to Net.hr decreased. On November 10, 2013, Hrvatska izvještajna novinska agencija (HINA, the Croatian News Agency) published a story about dealing with hate speech on the Internet. While the ability to communicate with each other contributes to democratic ideals and public demand, the practice shows how many users post indecent comments, full of offence and hate speech. Net.hr, which banned the comments, registered that almost 95% of comments were hate speech. HINA conducted a survey about the level of hate speech on websites and found out that the major news portals, such as 24 sata, Večernji list, Slobodna Dalmacija and Croatian Radiotelevision, registered from 5% to 30% hate speech. RTL Croatia stated that the majority of news stories on their website are not commented on and they have no problem with violations of ethical standards. The problem still exists and media-related institutions are looking for solutions. Until now, the existing institutional instruments of media accountability have not monitored websites. Dissatisfied users are using the Internet and informal ways of expressing their opinions, but the efficiency of such communications and the impact of these complaints are still limited.

Online media criticism Media blogs and citizens’ and journalists’ websites critically address media issues. Students of journalism at Sveučilište sjever (University of the North) decided to research why journalists use ‘copy and paste’ journalism.Two university staff members, Mirela Bačić and Silvija Novosel, and over 50 students’ analysed the media and how it respects copyrights or plagiarizes published news.The results of the research were published on the website pressedan.hr in January 2014, under the significant title “If journalists are plagiarizing, who will trust them and who will read their news?” Such an innovative media accountability instrument shows how students of journalism, future journalists, are taking care of the industry’s professionalism. Another group of students started the blog InPublic.3 Its introductory text explains how it started and the purpose of the website: “Behind the story of InPublic is an ordinary idea which came spontaneously to two handsome boys and one creative girl while enjoying an afternoon 37

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coffee”, wrote the authors, students of journalism at the Faculty of Political Sciences of Zagreb University, on their blog almost a year after its start.They are writing about Facebook journalists, social networks, the media, PR – and, as they proudly reported, enjoy writing. Media consumers are also using social networks to express their opinions of the media. For example, the columnist Mirko Vragović was asked the following question on djecamedija.org: “Do we get the truth from media?” Vragović answered this and a lot of other questions, which are part of the project Djeca medija (Children of the Media), initiated by several Croatian institutions, including Matica Hrvatska (Matrix Croatica) as well as Zagreb University’s Fakultet političkih znanosti (Faculty of Political Sciences) and Hrvatski studiji (Croatian Studies).

Other media accountability instruments Journalism courses teach media ethics, deontology and similar subjects, but mostly at a theoretical level. Students receive general information about ethical issues and their importance in professional activity, but they have no opportunity to build good criteria for recognizing what is ethical and what is not. Media companies do not train journalists to maintain ethical standards, and many media companies even force journalists to practice sensationalism. Young journalists are confused: they come from school having one ethical approach, but in the newsrooms they have to apply a completely different approach. Professional training in the field of media and journalism ethics is almost non-existent. Journalism associations, syndicates and other similar institutions are to blame for this.

Conclusion Media accountability instruments in Croatia are not well developed. Media accountability is still not understood as one of the milestones of media freedom and journalists’ independence, because all of the key players in the media environment are unwilling to apply forms of accountability. The level of self-regulation is the best indicator: On paper, Croatia has some instruments, such as a press council, but real self-regulation does not exist. Even worse, each self-regulation initiative is discouraged by publishers, media companies and even by the government. A significant effort could be seen at the Council of Europe Ministers’ conference on media and the information society, held in Belgrade in November 2013. However, the Croatian delegation distanced itself from the declaration on self-regulation, explaining that self-regulation was only another name for the exclusive control of the media oligopoly. The delegates further stated that the small group of owners had proved many times how difficult it is to protect free speech, but how efficiently they could protect their own interests. Such a governmental approach, in a country in transition where the government is still the key decision maker, has discouraged supporters of self-regulation.

Notes 1 http://www.hnd.hr 2 http://www.hnd.hr 3 http://www.inpublic.hr

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6 Cyprus Behind closed (journalistic) doors Dimitra L. Milioni, Lia-Paschalia Spyridou and Michalis Koumis

Abstract This chapter maps the status of media accountability in the Republic of Cyprus, examining the instruments of media accountability used by the Cypriot media in terms of their structural features as well as their journalistic content. Although in Cyprus the key traditional institutions of accountability seem to be in place, effective mechanisms for transparency are lacking, due to deep-rooted structures that have prevented the development of autonomous media organizations. Cypriot journalists have managed to develop an independent body for self-regulation, but they neglected to efficiently incorporate media audiences and develop a culture of open interaction with the public, creating the sense that it is a process taking place behind closed (journalistic) doors. At the same time, the public has not yet utilized the available digital tools to take up the role of the ‘media watchdog’.

Introduction The study of media accountability in Cyprus has not received much scholarly attention. The reason behind this can be traced to the historical context that shaped the current media landscape in Cyprus: the Cypriot media have been striving to achieve independence, first from colonial rule and later from state interference, and they have neglected to establish institutions that would make media organizations accountable to the public and civil society. The new channels for audience engagement in journalism, enabled by Web 2.0 technologies, open up possibilities for further developments concerning accountability in Cyprus, but up to now, this potential has been unfulfilled.

Journalistic culture and media system Although Cyprus was not included in the seminal comparative analysis of Hallin and Mancini (2004a), it seems to be a rather distinctive case of the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model. In terms of press circulation, the development of the commercial printing press and the general freedom of the press came late, due to the Ottoman occupation until 1878 and the British colonial administration until 1960, as both regimes placed restrictions on the struggling 39

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Cypriot press (Sophocleous, 2006). The course towards the establishment of liberal democratic institutions was again interrupted by the Turkish occupation in 1974.The advent of commercial broadcasting in 1990 (radio) and 1992 (television) did not permit the establishment of a deeprooted culture of newspaper reading or an economically strong and independent mass circulation press.This is reflected in the low rate of newspaper circulation – Cyprus runs low in Europe, together with the other Mediterranean countries.1 The Cyprus Association of Newspapers and Periodicals Publishers suggests that print newspapers suffered 40% losses in circulation from 2009 to 2013 and an additional 12% until mid-2014, while magazines’ circulation plummeted by 70% between 2009 and 2013.2 This leaves electronic media as the main source of information – in terms of traditional media use.3 Internet penetration has been rising steadily from 49.7% in 2008 to 57.8% in 2010 to 65.6% in 2014 (Cyprus University of Technology, 2015). The weak status of the commercial press goes hand in hand with political parallelism, which is particularly evident in the Cypriot media. In the case of Cyprus’ press of Cyprus’ eight national newspapers, one is the mouthpiece of the communist party and three others are closely linked to political parties. Partisan press decreased in circulation during the last decade, but without assuming a clear ideologically neutral editorial line, especially regarding the ‘Cyprus Problem’ (Christoforou, Sahin and Pavlou, 2010). As far as the broadcast media are concerned, political instrumentalization is manifested through the close ties of media companies with political parties. The lack of investigative journalism and the dependence on official sources and political forces are evident in their content (Sophocleous, 2008). The large number of media enterprises operating in a small market inevitably leads to small circulations and ratings and limited advertising revenue. In terms of concentration of media ownership, as there are no restrictions vis-à-vis print media, the biggest publishing groups control numerous publications – newspapers and widely read magazines (Vassiliadou, 2007). Limits on the concentration of ownership regarding radio and television stations are in place as a result of the Law on Radio and Television Stations of 1998, which also set limits on cross-media ownership. As analogue television transmission officially ended in 2011, some local television stations shut down, unable to afford the cost of nationwide transmission (Freedom House, 2013b). In terms of public broadcasting governance, Cyprus clearly follows the government model. The public Radiofoniko Idryma Kyprou (Cyprus Broadcasting Service – CYBC) is under the jurisdiction of the Minister of the Interior, who has the authority to give directions of a general character regarding its performance; also, it may, at any time, dismiss the Chairperson or any other member “without giving a reason for this”, as stated in the relevant law.4 The Council of Ministers appoints the Chairperson and Vice-Chairperson and seven more members of the board of directors for a mandate of three years. The lack of autonomy of the public broadcaster is also a result of its funding model: Since 2000, CYBC has been funded directly by the state, and all revenue gained from advertising is deducted from this budget.The amount of public funding is defined by the Parliament every year and this gives political parties ample opportunity to interfere with the functioning of CYBC; this tendency intensified during the financial crisis in 2013, and ever since CYBC is faced with increasing pressures to cut back on resources (Spyridou and Milioni, 2014). In terms of the professionalization of journalism, Enosi Syntakton Kyprou (the Union of Cyprus’ Journalists), with 560 members, is the main association representing journalists’ interests.5 The Union of Journalists is represented in the administration of Kypriako Praktoreio Eidiseon (Cyprus News Agency – CNA) and occasionally speaks at parliamentary hearings regarding media-related matters (Vassiliadou, 2007), yet journalistic autonomy in Cyprus is compromised by the lack of insulation from government, commercial interests, and more recently job insecurity. Lastly, the role of the state is quite strong in Cyprus: Besides the public service broadcasting, the state owns and controls the Cyprus News Agency. It is argued that the Cypriot media 40

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operate under complete freedom, without state interventions (Sophocleous, 2008); Cyprus has a ‘free’ press status, being at the 25th position in the Freedom House index6 and at the 24th position in the Press Freedom Index of Reporters Without Borders.7 However, studies of Cypriot media content show that most media tend to abstain from rigorous criticism of state policies in certain areas.This is explained by the fact that the state is a main source of information and “primary definer” of news (Hall, Critcher, Jefferson, Clarke and Roberts, 1978). In a recent study, Milioni,Vadratsikas, Papa and Spyridou (2014) found that most print and TV media in Cyprus rarely challenge the official immigration policy. The same holds true regarding the coverage of the ‘Cyprus problem’, with the media on both sides of the Green Line supporting the official state policy (Christoforou, Şahin and Pavlou, 2010). Laws regulating the function of the media in Cyprus are generally in place; however, the effectiveness of the state to enforce media policies has been called into question – especially during the initial phase of commercial broadcasting in Cyprus.The term ‘savage deregulation’, which has been used to characterize the Mediterranean countries’ media landscape (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a), is also quite accurate in the Cypriot context. The introduction of commercial radio and television in 1990 and 1992, respectively, caught the Cypriot state unprepared: Provisional licenses for commercial broadcasters were granted and remained in force for more than ten years until a new law on broadcasting was introduced in 1998; permanent licenses were granted in the autumn of 2001.

Established instruments of media accountability Press Council and Ethics Code The Press Law of 1989 established a Press Council in Cyprus, with authority on issues of journalistic ethics. Its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers, after nomination by the Association of Publishers, the Union of Journalists and parliamentary political parties. Among others, the Press Council is entrusted with powers to investigate complaints or initiate investigations in connection with the conduct of the press. A second, nine-member body, the Press Authority, is entrusted with the power to determine the ceiling price for newspapers and the commission received by distributors. Again, the Council of Ministers appoints its members, nominated by the associations of newspaper publishers, journalists, owners of printing companies and representatives of public service departments (EMR, 2005). In practice, the two bodies have never operated properly. The government and political parties’ involvement in appointing the members of the two bodies was perceived as a crude interference into media freedom and independence. Consequently, the six members representing the journalists and publishers withdrew, while the Chairperson of the Council continued to exercise his duties until the expiration of his mandate and no new members were appointed thereafter (EMR, 2005; Sophocleous, 2008). Under the threat of new legislation that would establish a state-controlled monitoring body, and based on the perception that state interference is detrimental to freedom of expression, in 1997 journalists and publishers hurriedly established Epitropi Dimosiografiis Deontologias (the Cyprus Media Complaints Commission – CMCC), a self-regulatory and self-funded body. The journalists, publishers and commercial broadcast media owners agreed to adopt a Code of Journalistic Ethics. Six months later, the public service broadcaster CYBC also signed the code and agreed to subject itself to the authority of CMCC. The Code of Ethics was incorporated as an appendix to the Law on Radio and Television Stations of 1998 (EMR, 2005). The 13-member Cyprus Media Complaints Commission plays the role of a press council, monitoring the compliance of the print and broadcast media with the Code of Journalistic 41

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Ethics. It examines complaints about alleged breaches of the Code of Ethics by print and broadcast media, and in exceptional cases it can initiate an investigation. However, it has no sanctioning power other than obliging the incriminated media organization to publish the decision. In cases of generalized misbehaviour by the media, it issues guidance notes within the spirit of the Code (EMR, 2005;Vassiliadou, 2007). Despite the consensus surrounding the CMCC, it has been described as “a shadow and invisible institution” without a strong presence, practically unknown to the general public (Sophocleous, 2008).This view is partly confirmed by the published CMCC decisions: Between 2003 and 2013, the Commission examined 27 complaints per year on average. A closer look at the source of the complaints filed from 2011 to 2013 shows that the complaints filed by citizens accounted for less than a third of the total complaints; the rest were filed mainly by the Commissioner for Children’s Rights and the police, antiracism non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and political parties and politicians. Although its existence is a positive step, the Commission has a long way to go in order to function as a rigorous instrument of accountability of the media to the public.

Regulations and regulatory bodies Several laws, regulations and governing bodies have been established in Cyprus to safeguard fundamental values. Article 19 of the Constitution guarantees freedom of expression. The Press Law of 1989 regulates a wide spectrum of issues related to press freedom, rights and obligations. The Law on Radio and Television Stations of 1998 allowed the operation of private commercial broadcasters, setting the requirements for media pluralism, and since the 2004 amendment, it also regulates public broadcasting. Significant restrictions on the concentration of ownership exist: There are limits to the percentage of a media company’s capital share that can be held by natural persons (and their close family members) or companies, and shares in the capital of a media company can only be nominative; no company can hold more than one radio license or one television license; no license can be granted to anyone already in possession or in control of more than 5% of shares in any audiovisual or print media (EMR, 2005). Archi Radiotileorasis Kyprou (Cyprus Radiotelevision Authority – CRTA) was established under the Law on Radio and Television Stations of 1998. Its members are appointed by the Council of Ministers for six years; their mandate is renewable and they should have no connections with broadcasting media. CRTA oversees issues related to licensing, concentration of ownership and independence of media workers, and has the power to impose sanctions, varying from warnings and recommendations to fines and license suspension or revocation. Since 2004, its power has extended to the public service broadcaster. CRTA issues guidelines and recommendations relating to compliance with the Code of Ethics, but it has the power to sanction a broadcaster only after an application by the Cyprus Media Complaints Commission (EMR, 2005;Vassiliadou, 2007).

Transparency None of the media outlets in Cyprus have published an internal code of ethics and neither do they link to any external guidelines for journalistic ethics. Published mission statements can be found in only five media outlets, referring to standard journalistic values such as impartiality, independence, pluralism and truth (Politis, Phileleftheros), but also explicit political values either in nationalistic terms, such as the ‘survival of the Greek culture and identity in Cyprus’ (Simerini) and ‘the preservation of memory of our territories occupied by Turkey’ (CYBC), or in terms of 42

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a left ideology, e.g. ‘the opposition to nationalism, chauvinism, intolerance’ (Haravgi). None of the media organizations studied make the full profiles of journalists available to the public. The only element of transparency present in most outlets is some information on media ownership (naming the publishing company that owns the organization).

Ombudsman According to the law governing the function of broadcasting media in Cyprus (Radio and Television Regulations of 2000), all broadcasting media are required to constitute an ethics committee for monitoring media content and to report regularly to the CRTA. Despite the fact that there is a legal provision for an ombudsman-like institution, this has not been established. No media organization is known to have constituted such a committee or to have officially appointed an editor or journalist to receive and follow up on audience complaints regarding media practices. In 2014, CYBC launched a public deliberation inviting citizens to voice their opinions about how they envision their national public broadcaster. This initiative notwithstanding, there are no established processes for continuous interaction between the CYBC and the public. The Commissioner for Administration (Ombudsman), who investigates complaints regarding the violation of human rights or the rules for fair administration, assumes the role of the media ombudsman to a small extent. In September 2010, the Ombudsman’s office issued the ‘Guiding Principles for the Media against racism, xenophobia and discrimination’,8 a nonbinding code with some general principles and good practices. However, between 2011 and 2014, the Ombudsman examined only three media-related cases.

Other instruments of media accountability Regarding other media accountability instruments (MAIs) inside journalism,9 self-criticism in the media is not a widespread trend in the Cypriot media. Except for sporadic articles critically commenting on media-related issues, only three outlets have regular media pages (the quality newspapers Kathimerini and Phileleftheros and the news portal onlycy.com). The media column in Kathimerini covers CMCC decisions regarding violations of the ethics code and issues related to the public broadcaster. In the media column of Phileleftheros, a common theme is sharp criticism of the CYBC, e.g. for absorbing exorbitant public funds to produce outdated, low-quality and unpopular content.The column also publishes the decisions of the CRTA and the Ombudsman regarding law violations and ethical misbehaviour by the media. Less often the newspaper criticizes the commercial media approach to news making, namely their tendency to dramatize, generalize and exaggerate, especially in crime reporting. The onlycy.com column, besides rather gossipy comments about media people, denounces certain media practices in Cyprus, e.g. biased reporting, lack of critical political reporting and meritocracy in hiring journalists, dramatization and sensationalism in newscasts and the repression of journalists by media owners. The publication of reader letters is not a widespread practice in the Cypriot media. They are found mainly in print newspapers, most of which dedicate one page to reader letters most days of the week. Yet, readers mostly do not touch on issues related to the media, with the exception of some occasional references to media organizations’ attachments to political parties. Authorship of stories is not prevalent in Cyprus either, as only a third of news articles are authored. Even less common is the practice of quoting news agencies when used as sources. In many cases, the news agency is mentioned at the end of the article, yet the reader cannot distinguish between information originating from news agencies and the journalist’s own reporting. Lastly, the Cypriot media do not use the Internet to provide ‘deep links’ to original sources and 43

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thus make the journalistic research process more transparent.When links are present, they mostly link to YouTube videos of an ‘infotainment’ character.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Greek-Cypriots are rapidly taking up the habit of using social media regularly as part of their online activities: The World Internet Project 2014 survey shows that half of Internet users visit social networking sites daily or several times a day. Posting online is quite marginal, as in 2014 48% of internet users stated that they never posted their own content online and half of them never reposted or shared links or content online. Yet in Cyprus, the use of digital tools to hold the media to account is still in its infancy. Innovative digital instruments of media accountability, such as newsroom blogs discussing production, online ombudsmen and correction buttons, are absent from Cypriot media. In terms of blogging, many blogs discuss issues of public concern; however, media watchblogs, dedicated to monitoring and criticizing the work of professional media in terms of agendasetting, inaccuracy and bias of reporting, and editorial opinion (Domingo and Heinonen, 2008), are practically non-existent. An exception is the collective blog ‘Second Reading’10 (Defteri Anaynosi), self-described as an online Cypriot magazine providing alternative information. On its Facebook page, it states that its aim is not only to provide alternative information, but also to question “the discourses of power structures and their decoding”, functioning as a resistance mechanism against “censorship, communicative hysterias and the media spectacles” and aiming to emancipate active audiences.11 Media-related content exercises relentless criticism of local and international media, analyzing news reports and denouncing their use as a propaganda tool that serves the interests of media owners and political elites. Citizen participation in online media emerges as the great promise of the digital age, often framed as a tale of emancipation in a digitally enabled democracy. Part of this narrative is ‘participatory’ journalism, understood as the initiatives undertaken by professional media to integrate user contributions in news making (Paulussen and Ugille, 2008). Reader comments are the most common feature of user-generated content, embraced by many online news media outlets worldwide. Despite voices arguing for the ‘myth’ of empowerment as the media steer users’ actions and dictate the content they produce (van Dijck, 2009; Kperogi, 2011), there is evidence that users’ comments challenge the dominant media framing (Karlsson, 2010a; McCluskey and Hmielowski, 2012), thus increasing media accountability. Although most Cypriot online media outlets have enabled reader commenting, only a very small number of reader comments make any critical reference to the media.When they do, readers voice their anger about the dependency of the Cypriot media on political and economic elites and the respective bias in their reporting, lamenting the lack of autonomy. Some readers note how the mainstream media failed to warn citizens about the upcoming financial crisis and its disastrous effects. Other common grievances concern the inaccuracy of reporting and that journalists are not ‘telling the whole story’. In a few cases, journalists are acclaimed for revealing political scandals or asked to investigate a story further. Collaborative story-writing with citizens can take a lot of forms (provision of story ideas, information collection, solicited or unsolicited content production, etc.). A common criticism of the professional media is that the adoption of audience participation features does not result in a real boundary shift between journalists and their audiences (Karlsson, 2010b). Users maintain the roles they already had in traditional media settings, namely the role of the (active) recipient as opposed to the role of the active user who enjoys control over the journalistic process (Hermida, 2011).This clear demarcation of audience-generated content and journalistic 44

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content can also be found in the Cypriot media that have incorporated user-generated content (UGC) mechanisms. In the newspaper Phileleftheros, readers can find the “voice of the citizens: you report, we investigate”. In practice, this is an e-mail account for filing complaints, and editors decide which issues “are worth investigating”.12 Similarly, the English-language Cyprus Mail includes two opportunities for audience engagement: the ‘guest column’ feature, where readers can pitch to the editor a blog post of 100 words, and the ‘got a tip’ feature that readers can use when they have an ‘inside scoop’ on a story or topic the newspaper has covered.13 These initiatives can be seen as a first step towards opening up to readers, yet it is unclear how readers are allowed to participate in crucial editorial processes such as the framing and editing of news stories. Moreover, there is a lack of transparency as the solicited communication between reader and editor is private. Recently, the online portal Tothema included a web page called ‘The citizen’s complaints’, and the party newspaper Haravgi announced in its print edition of March 3, 2014, a call to readers to “become reporters for one Sunday”. In 2013, an innovative effort began in Cyprus with the creation of the participatory journalism platform We Report Cyprus,14 developed by academics to enhance the public broadcaster’s participatory practices.The online platform, which invited members of the audience to collaborate with journalists of CYBC in news reporting, ran in trial form for six months. In this pilot period, there was a moderate audience response and mixed reaction from CYBC: While the medium-level executives and journalists strongly supported the platform as an innovative and dialogical service that would enhance the position of CYBC in society, its rigid and hierarchical structure and a certain disregard for innovation through the use of new technologies prevented its unreserved acceptance (Spyridou and Milioni, 2014). In terms of media-critical NGOs, the Cyprus Community Media Centre helps civil society organizations and minority groups to communicate their message to a wider audience, and organizes public events about media pluralism and media literacy, contributing to a wider critical discussion about the mainstream media in Cyprus. Another NGO with a noteworthy mediacritical activity is the Movement for Equality, Support and Anti-Racism (Κίνηση για Ισότητα, Στήριξη, Αντιρατσισμό – KISA), which focuses on issues of migration, racism, discrimination and trafficking. Besides the publication of a ‘guide for journalists’ that contains recommendations for journalists so that they avoid racist discourse when handling immigration-related stories, KISA files regular complaints to CMCC regarding discriminatory media discourse. The use of social media in journalism has the potential to enhance accountability, make news making more transparent and involve the audience in an open debate about journalism quality. Most Cypriot media and journalists use Facebook and Twitter as a supplementary channel to publish and disseminate news. However, they use Twitter mainly as a dissemination tool and a monologue, as their posts almost always link to their own media website with no interaction with the public (Neofytou, 2013).

Conclusion Three main features characterize the status of media accountability in Cyprus. First, the main traditional institutions of accountability (legal framework, regulatory bodies, Press Council and ethics codes) seem, in principle, to be in place. In practice, however, the abundance of formally constituted institutions is not translated into a functional system that secures transparency and a culture of accountability which would restore the public’s sinking confidence in legacy media. The reason for this weakness can be traced back to the historical conditions under which the media and other democratic institutions were developed in Cyprus, and the deep-rooted structures and cultures that prevented the development of democratic institutions 45

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with an adequate degree of autonomy from political power and private interests. In the present, the main regulatory body (CRTA), while increasingly active recently, is regarded by the public as “toothless” (Cyprus Radiotelevision Authority, 2013), especially regarding the violation of laws against the concentration of ownership by powerful media groups. A second point is related to journalists’ attempts at self-regulation through the Cypriot Press Council. Cypriot journalists have managed to establish an autonomous body for monitoring deviations from ethical standards by print and broadcast media. Yet, it seems that as they struggled to shield the monitoring process from state and political interference, they neglected to efficiently incorporate civic society actors and media audiences and to create a culture of transparency and open interaction with the public. Although the Cyprus Media Complaints Commission is quite active in examining complaints, the role of actors outside journalism is minimal, creating the sense of a process taking place behind closed (journalistic) doors. Lastly, so far, media organizations have hardly utilized the digital tools at their disposal to initiate a genuine interaction with citizens. At the same time, citizens have not (yet) stepped in to fill the void left by traditional accountability instruments and engage themselves actively by taking up the role of the ‘media watchdog’.

Notes   1 Because the publication of information about newspaper circulation is non-obligatory in Cyprus, such information is not always readily available. The UNESCO Institute for Statistics states that in 2004, the newspaper circulation ratio in Cyprus was 124.7 per 1000 people (Vassiliadou, 2007).  2 http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/eidiseis-media/893/206152/antepithesi-tou-typou-me-nea-igesia-syndesmou-ekdoton--proedros-o-npattichis   3 32% of Cypriots never read a newspaper and 58% spend up to seven hours reading a newspaper per week. The predominance of broadcasting media is evident, as Cypriots spend 17 hours weekly watching television, 13 hours listening to the radio and 3 hours reading the newspaper (Cyprus University of Technology, 2013).  4 http://europam.eu/data/mechanisms/PF/PF%20Laws/Cyprus/Cyprus_Law%20on%20the%20 Cyprus%20broadcasting%20corporation_1959_amended2010.pdf  5 http://www.esk.org.cy/en1.htm  6 http://freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-press/2013/cyprus#.U_EiUICSxuB  7 http://fr.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/classement_2013_gb-bd.pdf  8 http://www.ombudsman.gov.cy/Ombudsman/Ombudsman.nsf/All/2CE6A4946E6E99D6C2 2578D20035AAB1/$file/kateythintiries_arhes_MME_kata_ratsismoy_xenofovias_diakriseon. pdf?OpenElement   9 The following findings are drawn from an analysis of 170 randomly selected news articles from 17 outlets between January and July 2014. 10 http://2ha-cy.blogspot.gr 11 http://www.facebook.com/DefteriAnaynosi/info 12 http://www.philenews.com/el-gr/vima-politwn 13 http://cyprus-mail.com 14 http://www.wereportcyprus.org

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7 Czech Republic The market governs Tomáš Trampota

Abstract The Czech media landscape, and in particular the professional and public sectors, is characterized by the limited and ineffective media accountability instruments (MAIs) typical of transforming democracies like the countries of the former Soviet bloc. Even though sections of the media have established their own codes of ethics and ethical boards, the major accountability instruments are regulatory bodies closely connected to the state. Commercial and tabloid media devote limited space to media critics. Online media do not offer much space to media criticism or media accountability issues.

Introduction The Czech Republic, formerly Czechoslovakia, opened its media system to commercial forces in the 1990s, and this influenced the contemporary state of the professionalization of journalism and media ethics. The negative perception of syndicalism and self-regulation mechanisms among media professionals after the revolution era led to a decrease in the quality of journalism and to the negative image of journalists by the public. Nowadays media accountability is more regulated by media laws and by regulatory bodies established, interconnected and constrained by the structures of state. As a result of the economic difficulties after the 2008 crisis, public relations, advertisers and third actors increasingly influence journalistic practice.

Journalistic culture and media system The major contours of the Czech media landscape were shaped in the early 1990s. The fall of the socialist totalitarian regime associated with a ‘one-party government’ led to the establishment of private print media and the transformation of formerly state-run broadcast media and press agencies into public service equivalents. In the following few years, private broadcasters entered the airwaves. The first commercial radio station started up in 1991 and, later, television stations also sprang up (at a regional level in 1993 and at a national level in 1994). Also in 1991, the Act on Radio and Television Broadcasting, the Act on Czechoslovak Television and the Act on Czechoslovak Radio established the major regulatory bodies that govern the broadcast 47

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media: the Council on Radio and Television Broadcasting and the Council on Czechoslovak Radio. One milestone was in early 1993 when the former Czechoslovakia split into the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic, giving rise to two separate media systems. The split of the former Czechoslovak television into two separate media organizations preceded the division of the state. Another milestone in the development of the broadcast media was the launch of TV Nova, the first national commercial television station. Created in February 1994, it was the television market leader within two months and, from that point on, became the major trendsetter in TV journalism. It signalled a shift to more tabloid-like news and a preoccupation with economically motivated data like viewing figures, ratings and shares. During the 1990s, the majority of the Czech print media dating from the communist times was privatized and later resold to foreign investors, mainly from German-speaking countries (Germany and Switzerland). This trend led to a fear of foreign political influence on the media and the resulting negative historical consequences, reflected by the book apocalyptically named The End of the Czech Press (Čelovský, 2001). As the following years demonstrated, the fear was unjustified. The new owners were more interested in the economic efficiency of these publishing houses than they were in political goals. The new era of print media started around 2010 when successful Czech entrepreneurs – some with their own political aspirations – started buying out the publishing companies. The transformative process accelerated in 2013 when Andrej Babiš, a Czech billionaire with Slovak roots, announced his intention to enter Czech politics and run for election to parliament that year with his party Ano (Yes). A few months before the election, Babiš, with his major stakes in the agricultural industry, bought one of the biggest publishing houses, Mafra, thus gaining control of the influential dailies Mladá Fronta Dnes (Young Front Today) and Lidové noviny (People’s Daily). Although his party was new to Czech politics, it won almost a quarter of the parliamentary seats and Andrej Babiš subsequently became Vice Premier and Minister of Financial Affairs. Such political, media and economic influence in the hands of one person was unprecedented in modern Czech history and triggered a fear of a potential Berlusconization of the Czech media landscape. In the summer of 2014, the two biggest publishing houses, owned by Czech entrepreneurs (Czech News Center – formerly Ringier Axel Springer CZ – owned by Daniel Křetínský and Patrik Tkáč; and Mafra, owned by Andrej Babiš) who had only entered the industry within the previous five years, reached two-thirds of Czech daily press readers. As in the majority of Western democracies, these five years of development were characterized by the digitization of the communication space, increased Internet penetration and the escalating use of smartphones and mobile communication devices for news consumption. The number of Internet users in the Czech Republic has almost doubled in the last eight years, increasing from 3.5 million users in 2005 to 6.8 million in 2013. These changes in the Czech media landscape, along with the economic crisis of 2008, significantly affected information flow in the Czech Republic as well as the political role of the media. It is hard to find the correct place for the transforming democracies of the former Soviet bloc within Hallin and Mancini’s (2004a) three models of media systems. In the majority of those countries, the historical continuity of media system development was disrupted by WW2 and by developments during the second half of the 20th century. Even if there were important connections with the development of Austria and Germany until the birth of the autonomous state of Czechoslovakia in 1918, the socialist totalitarian regime after the Second World War governed the media within the Leninist doctrine. The strict and censored political function of the media within the centrally controlled media system severely biased journalistic culture, norms and professional practice for 40 years. Historically, Czech journalistic culture shows some traces of the 48

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Democratic Corporatist Model, e.g. the slower development of the mass and tabloid press, the strong importance of party press, etc. Thus, the contemporary Czech media system visibly differs from its equivalents in neighbouring countries. Historically, the Czech Republic was one of the ‘Western’ countries listed by Hardy (Hardy, 2008). However, by the post-war revolution, it had become a part of the eastern Soviet bloc. After the 1990s, any distinctions from Western national media systems remain blurred – by the flow of economic sources and by the flow of media content. For example, the 1990s saw the launch of foreign lifestyle magazines in the Czech language, but they were little more than translations of the originals. As Hardy notes in the case of other ‘Western’ media systems, in the 1990s, the Czech media headed for a convergence with the liberal model of media (Hardy, 2008). They did this mainly by opening the media system to commercial broadcasters and private entrepreneurs, by fast deregulation of media ownership regulation and by having almost no regulation of the print media, leaving this media segment to be regulated by market forces. Nowadays, the Czech media are subject to international, that is, European regulation, initiated by the application of landmark European Union directives, Television Without Frontiers, Open Network Provision and the forthcoming Directives and Regulations (Harcourt, 2005). Systemic social transformation encompasses a wide variety of processes, involved in the elimination of the communist legacy and in ‘triple’ or ‘quadruple’ transformation. Moreover, as post-communist countries are integrated into European and global community, they are overtaken by global processes of political and economical change and come under ever stronger impact of external forces. Thus, developments in postcommunist countries must be studied as resulting from the interplay of transformation, integration and globalization. (Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008b, p. 20) The current developmental arc of Czech media supports Slavko Splichal’s hypothesis that post-communist countries have seen the Italianization of their media (Splichal, 1994). The Czech print market was re-established in the early 1990s, when three types of print media reappeared on the market. The first type comprised formerly socialist periodicals that were previously connected to the state and later underwent privatization (Mladá fronta Dnes, Právo, etc.). The second type was made up of dailies that transitioned from being dissident samizdat (illegally printed press of very low technical print quality caused by very limited access to copy machines, often copied by typewriter) periodicals into official ones (Lidove noviny). The third kind consisted of newly established dailies (Blesk). Nowadays, there are eight national dailies – including one free paper and one sports daily – and one network of regional dailies published in the Czech Republic. The most read daily is the tabloid Blesk (Flash), brought to the Czech Republic in the 1990s by the Swiss publishing house Ringier. It has an average circulation of around 264,000 copies per issue. The daily with the second largest circulation is Mladá fronta Dnes (Young Front Today), which sells 170,000 copies, and the third is the left-wing daily Právo, which sells 97,000 copies. Since 2008, the circulation of the daily press has been decreasing annually by around 10%. Simultaneously, the advertising revenue brought in by the print media has been plummeting, causing serious problems within the industry and adversely affecting journalistic work conditions. Key publishing houses have laid off a large number of employees in recent years and as a result the number of journalists has fallen while the total amount of content the remaining employees are required to produce has remained the same, leaving less time for reporting, (double) checking information and for their own research and analytical work. Journalistic practice under such conditions leads to the reproduction 49

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of ­information from other media and stronger dependence on the press and public relations agencies, as well as poorer editorial practices. The audiovisual media in the Czech Republic are organized in a dual system of public and commercial broadcasting. The formerly state-owned Czechoslovak television became a public system in 1991, and in the past decade, supplemented its two basic channels with the news channel CT24, the sports channel CT4 and, recently, with CTD, a channel devoted to children. Czech television is financed by TV fees that all households supplied with electricity are required to pay. The first licences were granted in 1993 for commercial television stations (regional television FTV Premiera) and in 1994 for national TV (TV Nova). For many years, TV Nova dominated the market for TV advertising, being more interesting to audiences and thus to major advertisers than the second private television company, Prima TV. In effect, TV Nova had a monopoly on the TV advertisement market. The Czechoslovak broadcasting media followed the pattern of development of Western European media systems in the 1970s and 1980s (Hardy, 2008), but at a faster rate: a short era of the monopoly of public service broadcasting, the abrupt and aggressive launch of commercial media and the establishment of a dual system with the commercial media in a strong position. Nowadays, the Internet has the highest expansion rates. It is the only media segment where advertising revenues have increased in recent years. However, media houses operating in the Czech Republic are still unable to establish working business models for economically selfsufficient online news portals. In some cases, the online news portals of publishing houses have ended up creating unintentional in-house competition by redirecting the potential attention of the audiences from the print versions to online portals without yielding substantial benefits from web-based advertisements. The problems created by the regulatory model of public service media have reared their heads a couple of times in the past two decades. The lower chamber of Parliament elects the councillors who populate the regulatory bodies of Czech television and Czech radio (the Council on Czech Television and the Council on Czech Radio). This leads to potential political constraints upon their work and the work of the broadcast media. Political pressure led to the so-called television crisis in late 2000 and to an occupational strike by news staff. Subsequently, there were changes made to key legal acts (on radio and television broadcasting, on Czech television and on Czech radio). The new acts came with new patterns of nomination and election of councillors to the regulatory bodies, but the power to elect them remained in the hands of Parliament. This parliamentary model leads to a situation in which the division of councillors reflects the proportion of political powers within the parliament and, in some cases, after parliamentary elections, when the composition of the lower chamber of parliament is changed, to invoke changes in the composition of regulatory bodies (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a). In 2013, there was widespread suspicion of potential political constraints on Czech television when some news staff accused the management of political censorship. The crisis divided the public broadcasting television newsroom into two camps. Twenty-four news staff signed a petition against the management. The situation calmed down after six months and two of the chief dissenters – both renowned anchor people – left television and launched a new online video news project under the auspices of a private publishing house.

Established instruments of media accountability Media accountability instruments do have a rather institutionalized character in the Czech Republic. Uninstitutionalized forms of media journalism in the mass media have decreased in recent years. The Czech Republic does not have any media ombudspeople. Trade journals are 50

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more focused on media business issues and put questions of ethics to one side. Instruments of media self-regulation and accountability (both institutional and otherwise) are rather limited in scale and are of symbolical power. They are mostly applied by public service broadcasters (Czech television and Czech radio). The institutionalized instruments of media accountability include regulatory bodies established by the Law on Radio and Television Broadcasting, the Law on Czechoslovak Television, the Law on Czechoslovak Radio and the Law on the Czechoslovak Press Agency. All of these laws were instituted in 1991 and recently renewed. These legal acts established the Council on Radio and Television Broadcasting which controls all broadcast media, the Council on Czech(oslovak) Radio, the Council on Czech(oslovak) Television and the Council on the Czech(oslovak) Press Agency. The Czech print media is extremely deregulated and is not subject to regulation by any particular institution. The community of professional journalists is represented by the Syndicate of Czech Journalists, which, of late, represents only a small proportion of practising journalists. This is because of the continuing negative sentiment associated with syndicalism and trade unions from the previous socialist era. The Syndicate of Czech Journalists has an Ethical Committee and an Ethical Code. The Ethical Code of the Syndicate is very limited and composed of a mere 51 print lines gathered into three chapters dedicated to three themes. The first is about people’s rights to true and unbiased information. The second calls for a high degree of professionalism within journalism. The third is about establishing trustworthiness, decency and seriousness, thus increasing the authority of the media. The Ethical Commission has eleven members, including university scholars, practising journalists and former journalists. A similar body with symbolic and advisory power is the Council on Advertisements, which mainly assesses advertising, noting instances that exceed the acceptable definitions of decency, moral and ethical principles or promote hatred, racism, sexism, xenophobic thinking, etc. Based on these judgments, the Council on Advertisements recommends that problematic advertising be withdrawn. The key public service broadcaster on Czech television has its own Code that covers important ethical issues and the establishment of an ethical committee, which was adopted by Parliament in July 2003. The Code of Czech television is based on the Council of Europe Programme on public broadcasting. Parts of this 46-page document are devoted to journalistic practice. It calls for pluralistic and diverse content that holds to high ethical standards, asks that journalism not be constrained by market pressures and requires the accurate reflection of the variety of philosophical conceptions and religions within society. The Code also mentions that Czech television must be based on the ideals of openness, impartiality and independence. One of the principles embedded in the Code is the support of original production geared towards enabling television as a cultural institution. The Code also states that Czech television has a duty to defend its employees. Article 5 of the Code is devoted to the editorial standards of news and current affairs programming. Dissemination of news and current affairs is prescribed as a primary function of Czech television. It also highlights the importance of quality with regard to disseminated information and requires that facts be double-checked, sources be confirmed, and newsroom autonomy be safeguarded. Article 6 is devoted to the rules of talk shows, stressing plurality, impartiality and balance. Other parts of the Code deal with religious issues, educational programmes, entertainment and sports programmes, as well as issues of discrimination, privacy, etc. Since the late 1990s, major current affairs programmes, magazines and dailies have established their own ethical codes. In 1998, the weekly Týden was the first print medium with its own ethical code and it focused mainly on precise information, impartiality, lack of bias and diversity, respect for individual rights, respect for the privacy of people, etc. Other print media codes appeared after 2000: the daily Hospodářské noviny (an economics daily), Mladá fronta Dnes (Young Front Today), etc. 51

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Outside the media organizations and state bodies, there are no Czech self-regulatory bodies devoted to journalism.

Innovative instruments of media accountability In addition to traditional media accountability instruments, new self-regulatory possibilities have been brought about by the Internet and digital media. In the Czech Republic, few projects have been launched in this segment. There are a couple of autonomous web portals focused on the media world, independent of and unconstrained by big media houses and, therefore, potential platforms for relatively independent reflection. Examples include Mediář.cz, Lupa.cz, Digimedia. cz and others. However, much of their content is devoted to the economics of media markets and personal information on media staff and markets. A relatively small part focuses on commentary and criticism of the media. There are also sites connected to larger media companies, which are, therefore, not quite autonomous in terms of producing impartial news from the media landscape. One example is mediaguru.cz, which is connected to a media agency and, as a result, is potentially constrained with regard to themes and content. New media tools such as Twitter and Facebook are not used for media criticism or the reflection of media outcomes at all, even though they are widely used by the Czech population. It seems that users of these communication channels are not particularly interested in the field of media criticism or media accountability. Recently, the Czech version of the European Journalism Observatory project1 was launched, covering the actual state of Czech journalism and incorporating a focus on ethical issues.

Conclusion Compared to Western European democracies, there are a limited number of media accountability instruments within Czech journalism culture. Print media is extensively deregulated and frequently without ethical regulation. A few current affairs weeklies have their own ethical guidelines; however, most are governed by the economic principles of the liberal market. Support for the social responsibility function of media comes mostly from institutionalized regulatory instruments, such as the regulatory bodies established by law. The journalistic community is rather passive when it comes to peer criticism and self-regulating deliberative acts. Moreover, critical coverage of ethical issues within the media occur only very rarely compared to media business issues focusing on the economy of the media (profit, viewership, economic results) or to traditional art criticism focusing on film production, book reviews, etc. Criticism and in-depth analysis of journalistic practices are very rare within the mainstream media. The commercial media, whether print or broadcasting, rarely follows the principles of social responsibility and media accountability. Economic forces and the logic of demand and supply increasingly drive their practices. Quantitative parameters of readership, viewership and listenership are considered more important than the other values of journalistic practice. This trend intensified after 2008, a year that brought economic crises and hardships to the print media industry in particular. All of the media segments apart from Internet-based outlets suffered a decrease in advertising revenues and the daily press experienced a continuous decrease in readership. This situation led to the most intense reduction of employees from media houses since the Velvet Revolution in 1989. This, in turn, led to an increase in the workload of journalists who still had jobs, and this naturally weakened the quality of journalistic practices. In recent years, there has been another problematic trend within the Czech media: news media owners of Czech origin who obviously possess genuine political biases and interests, thus limiting the political neutrality and objectivity of the Czech media. Regulation of the media is limited to 52

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institutionalized forms propagated by regulatory bodies. The only free and unbiased platform for media criticism appears to be the Internet and the blogosphere, neither of which are being utilized to their full potential.

Note 1 http://cz.ejo-online.eu

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8 Denmark Voluntary accountability driven by political pressure Mark Blach-Ørsten, Jannie Møller Hartley and Sofie Flensburg Abstract In Denmark, the public debate on media ethics and accountability has reached an all-time high in recent years, culminating, in 2013, in an update of the common and institutionalized guidelines for press ethics. As recently as the summer of 2014, in light of a media-hacking scandal, the politicians again suggested new and more restrictive sanctions of the news media in general, while the publisher’s organization accused the politicians of being opportunistic and of threatening press freedom. For many years, internal disputes between both the press organizations and specific media, as well as between the media industry and the government, complicated the development of broadly accepted official rules and sanctions. Finally, political intervention in 1992 established a Press Council, which is now well institutionalized and widely accepted. Internal ethical guidelines have been unusual in the media industry, but in the late 1980s and 1990s, the three largest national dailies developed ethical guidelines, and in the last five to seven years, more and more news media have followed. Today, 64% of the news media are subject to such rules, most of which are to be found on the websites of the media organizations. Ethical documents are most common – and most specific – in broadcasting companies and well-established dailies as well as in the bigger regional media organizations. Guidelines are less common and less specific in web-based news media and local newspapers.

Introduction As a part of the Democratic Corporatist media system, Denmark has a long history of selfregulation of the press, most notably through a common set of ethical guidelines that were first established in 1960 by the Danish publishers’ organization and through the Press Council that was established by the Media Liability Act in 1992 (Mogensen, 2001).This puts the development of guidelines and a press council in Denmark a bit behind other Nordic countries. In Sweden, for instance, the Press Council was set up in 1916 and ethical guidelines were established in 1923; in Norway, the Press Council was established in 1929, followed by ethical guidelines in 1936. Still, according to the categories set up by Fengler et al. (2014), Denmark today, together with countries like the Netherlands and Germany, would be on the list of the most advanced countries when it comes to measuring the whole system of media accountability. 54

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However, the existence of a well-functioning media accountability system has not reduced media criticism in Denmark in recent years. On the contrary, both the Danish public and Danish politicians have probably never been more critical of the news media than at this point in history (Blach-Ørsten and Burkal, 2014). Changes in both technology and in the economy have put Danish news media and journalism under pressure, leading to questions about both the credibility and legitimacy of journalists and the news media (Blach-Ørsten, 2013). Despite this criticism, the Danish news media have been hesitant in using new technology or other innovative ideas to help increase media accountability.

Journalistic culture and media system Denmark is part of the Northern European or Democratic Corporatist Model. This systemic perspective suggests that there are four major dimensions in which media systems in Western democracies can be compared. These are (1) the structure of media markets, (2) the degree of political parallelism, (3) the degree of journalistic professionalism and (4) the role of the state, in particular the degree of state intervention in the media system (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a; Strömbäck, Ørsten and Aalberg, 2008). When it comes to questions of media accountability, two of these four points are particularly important: journalistic professionalism and state intervention; but we will also just briefly touch upon the first two characteristics. Looking at the Danish media market, and media consumption, traditional media still stand out. A recent study on news consumption (Schrøder, 2014) found that public service television and radio (Danmarks Radio – DR, TV 2) together with the online news sites of the national Danish newspapers (this includes the broadsheets Politiken, Berlingske, Jyllands-Posten and the tabloids Ekstra Bladet and BT) were the most popular news sources used by the Danish population. Studies on news production and distribution show that the traditional morning newspapers still produce the largest number of original news stories and are often also the preferred sources for online news quotes (Lund, Willig and Blach-Ørsten, 2009; Møller Hartley, 2011; Blach-Ørsten and Willig, 2014). Despite the traditional media’s strong stand in Denmark, streaming services, like Netflix and HBO-Nordic, are gaining ground. Regarding the degree of political parallelism, this feature is historically found to be very distinctive in Denmark and all the Nordic countries (Esmark and Ørsten, 2008; Allern and BlachØrsten, 2011). Since the 1970s and 1980s, the so-called party press has died out (Pedersen et al., 2000). However, many newspapers can still be linked to political ideologies, at least with respect to their editorial stances, if not with respect to news journalism (Esmark and Ørsten, 2008; Allern and Blach-Ørsten, 2011). Increasingly, as a consequence of a more competitive market for news distribution, we also see that media organizations are aiming their news production at certain segments of Danish society, thus differentiating themselves in both subject orientation and ways of writing for the specific segments (Willig, 2010). The degree of journalistic professionalism is a concept which refers both to the degree of journalistic autonomy from political influence and to the existence (or lack) of distinct professional norms. Denmark has a high degree of journalistic professionalism rooted in both the strong professional norms and increasing professionalization of the education of journalists. A School of Journalism was established in Aarhus 1970, and in 1998, journalism became part of the curriculum at two Danish universities: Roskilde Universitet (Roskilde University) and Syddansk Universitet (the University of Southern Denmark). Another sign of high professionalism is the strong position of the journalists’ union, Journalistforbundet (the Alliance of Journalists),1 in Denmark. Most Danish journalists are members of this union, which has around 16,000 members. A recent debate among union members 55

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revolved around the fact that people who work in communications, public relations officers, spin doctors, etc. can also be members of this organization. Many journalists have raised this as an ethical problem, as journalists and communication officers are seen to have opposing interests in relation to the publication of issues of public concern. In 2013, several concerned journalists created their own sub-organization within the larger union, representing only journalists.2 The role of the state is also central to the Democratic Corporatist system, particularly the degree of state intervention in the media system. In Denmark, the state has been largely responsible for the development of radio and television, and for offering subsidies to the press. The subsidy schemes for broadcasting and print media are separated in legislation. While public service television and radio stations are financed by a license fee and remain subject to specific requirements, since the 1960s, privately owned newspapers have primarily been subsidized indirectly through value added tax (VAT) exceptions, favourable loans, lower postage prices and minor grants (Rambøll Management Consulting, 2009). However, in the past decade, political attention has turned to the media subsidy system, and in 2013 a new law on media subsidy was passed. The primary goal of this reform was compliance with the changing competitive conditions in the media industry – first and foremost because of the growing numbers of online news media, which are today included in the subsidy scheme. As mentioned above, when it comes to questions of media accountability, two of these four points are particularly important: journalistic professionalism and state intervention. This is also where the corporatist part of the corporatist media system becomes very apparent, as most democratic corporatist countries also have relatively strong systems of self-regulation (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, p. 172). Denmark has a long history of corporatism. Drawing on Katzenstein’s ‘Small States in World Markets’, Hallin and Mancini (2004a, p. 54) offer three general trademarks of the particular form of Northern European corporatism: an ideology of social partnership, centralized and concentrated interest group formation, and voluntary and quasi-formal bargaining and coordination between state bureaucracy, interest groups and political parties (Esmark and Ørsten, 2008). All these corporatist trademarks have helped shape the media accountability system in Denmark to some extent, most notably in the establishment of common ethical guidelines and a press council. Thus, the Media Liability Act dictates that ethical guidelines should be set up, but leaves it to the journalists and the publishers – in the best corporatist tradition – to decide together what these guidelines should be. However, despite these solid foundations, media criticism is on the rise (Blach-Ørsten and Burkal, 2014), and surveys of the Danish population and Danish politicians reveal that trust in the news media seems to be going down. This is mainly due to a string of media scandals in Denmark.Though not as bad as the News of the World scandal in England, several Danish media outlets have recently had controversies regarding their journalistic practice. In one the most debated cases, a tabloid put the face of a (as it turned out) totally innocent man on the front page, naming him as the murderer of a young girl (Blach-Ørsten and Burkal, 2014). In May 2013, this led to the renewal and updating of the Danish ethical guidelines for the press. In the following, we will take a closer look at these guidelines as a form of an established media accountability instrument (MAI).

Established instruments of media accountability Unlike in Norway and Sweden, the establishment of a press council and the development of official ethical guidelines were controversial issues in Denmark throughout most of the 20th century. As this section will show, internal disputes within both the press organizations and specific media, as well as between the media industry and the government, complicated the 56

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development of broadly accepted official rules and sanctions for many years. Though the Press Council, as well as the advisory rules of sound press ethics today, are acknowledged by the press, serious public debate, especially between politicians and press representatives, frequently arises, along with suggestions about tightening the sanctions for violation of the ethical rules. The first steps towards the institutionalization of press ethics were taken in the 1930s when the Joint Council of the Press3 appointed a committee with the task of discussing the possibilities of establishing a journalistic honorary institution. The Ministry of Justice supported the efforts and suggested formalizing the system in legislation. However, this suggestion was met with heavy criticism by the press, pointing to the contemporary limitations of press freedom in Nazi Germany (Mogensen, 2001). The occupation of Denmark by German forces only strengthened the focus on press freedom, while post-war legal battles increased discussions about press ethics in the presentation of crime and court proceedings. Ongoing debate and fear of political regulation led to the development of the first ‘sound press ethics on press coverage of criminal proceedings’, published by the Danish publishers’ organization in 1960. In 1964, the first Press Council followed (Mogensen, 2001). However, these initiatives were not supported by the journalists’ organization, which in the negotiations had demanded a representation equal to that of the publishers in the Council. When this demand was not met, the journalists withdrew their support of and participation in the Council (Kruuse, 1991). In the 1970s, negotiations between the two organizations were reopened, but once again the publishers refused to give in to the journalists’ demands (this time for specific rules, e.g. the securing of the journalist’s right to refuse to write a story). New guidelines were enacted without the journalists’ support, and furthermore, several national dailies insisted on maintaining their editorial freedom to interpret the rules (Kruuse, 1991). Political intervention finally solved the disagreements when the Media Liability Act was passed in 1991, creating the current Press Council and committing the mass media to follow the advisory rules of sound press ethics. In the new Press Council, the seats were divided equally between publishers, journalists, lawyers and representatives of the public, with the lawyers holding the chairmanship. The law states that the mass media are obliged to respect ‘sound press ethics’, which are outlined by the publishers’ and journalists’ organizations. In this way, the industry defines the exact rules, while the legislation ensures their legitimacy. The Press Council handles complaints from individuals, organizations and companies. Two sorts of complaints can be made: one regarding an affected source’s right to reply to inaccurate reporting potentially causing, for example, financial damages, and another regarding violations of sound press ethics. Only people who are directly affected by the criticized publication can complain and direct the editor of the mass media in question to publish a reply from the affected source or the decision of the Council to a specified extent. It cannot impose a sentence on news media or assure the complainant financial compensation. If a news medium does not comply with the Council’s directions it can be reported to the police, by filing charges against the specific media organization for violating the Media Liability Act and, if convicted, it can be sentenced to a fine or custody. The last and only example of this goes back to the early 1990s (Fielden, 2012). In principle, the Council can take up a case on its own initiative, but it has only done so on one occasion so far. Though the system was heavily debated and criticized when introduced, it is now broadly accepted. All publishing houses and organizations are automatically members of the organization, but web-based only publications have to sign up themselves. As a result, only around 60% of the web-based news media are registered according to a 2014 study (BlachØrsten, Hartley, Flensburg and Olsen, 2015). 57

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The effort involved in creating a national and professional system of press ethics, as well as the general scepticism towards written rules of journalism, seem to be the key reasons why only a few of the Danish media, until recently, have developed their own ethical guidelines or codes of conduct. The exception is the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR), which has had written ethical principles since the 1960s. However, in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, the three largest national dailies developed ethical guidelines, and in the last five to seven years more and more news media have followed.Today 64% of the news media are subject to such rules, most of which are published online (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2015). Ethical documents are still most common – and most specific – in broadcasting companies and well-established dailies as well as in the bigger media organizations where rules typically apply to several different media. Guidelines are less common and less specific in web-based news media and local newspapers. In 2013, the ethical guidelines issued by the Press Council in 1991 were updated after a tense debate on media ethics broke out among the Danish public (see above). After a debate between the publishers’ organization and the union of journalists, the updated guidelines were published in May 2013.They now repeat many of the old guidelines, while adding a focus on online media and young people as news sources. Though the Danish media seem to be opening up to the idea of establishing journalistic norms and rules and making them transparent to the public, the implementation of other MAIs is moving more slowly. While the first media ombudsman was appointed in the U.S. in 1967, the first media ombudsman appointed in Denmark was in 1999 at the newspaper Aktuelt. This newspaper closed in April 2001. In January 2001, the broadsheet daily Politiken followed Aktuelt and appointed their first ombudsman, naming the post ‘The Readers’ Editor’, as was the case at the British newspaper The Guardian, which served as an inspiration for Politiken. Since 2001, the ombudsman at Politiken has been the only ombudsman in the Danish newspaper landscape. This year, another national daily broadsheet newspaper, Berlingske, published their first ‘editorial account’, where the paper addressed good and bad stories in the preceding year. Both of the major Danish public service TV stations (DR and TV 2) are today required by law to have an ombudsman. DR appointed its first ombudsman in 2004, and TV 2 in 2008 (Lund, 2009). However, a 2007 report on the Danish news ombudsmen concluded that, at that time, the ombudsmen at the public service television stations were unknown to the greater public (Ørberg, 2007). Today, both ombudsmen at the public service television stations have their own websites that inform the public about their work. They are also more visible in the public debate because media ethics have moved up on the public agenda in Denmark in recent years. Both ombudsmen publish regular reports about their work and the most controversial cases. In their latest reports, related to cases and complaints from 2013, both ombudsmen note an increase in the number of cases brought to their attention (Mollerup, 2013; Benneke, 2014). They also address the number of cases where the Press Council has voiced criticism of their respective television stations, but the number of criticisms of the two television stations by the Press Council each year shows no clear tendency to be increasing, though some years are obviously ‘worse’ than others. The Danish Press Council criticized TV 2 five times in 2013, whereas DR was criticized four times. The Readers’ Editor at Politiken does not publish annual or biannual reports; instead, he writes a column every Saturday in which either a particular case from the week or specific complaints from the readers are discussed – or the general status of media ethics. Turning to media criticism in the mass media, Jensen (2009) states that, on a general level, there is still very little media criticism. However, two regular programmes do focus on media criticism. One is the weekly radio programme People and Media that has been on air on DR-radio since 2001. Another is the regular TV programme Presselogen, aired on Danish TV 2. Both programmes feature a debate among journalists, editors and experts on a current issue where the 58

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media’s coverage or other types of action are called into question. Also, the different Danish newspapers have columnists who also comment on media affairs and media coverage from time to time. Likewise, letters to the editors may address issues of media ethics and conduct. Scholarly attention towards issues of media ethics, accountability and credibility has been remarkably sporadic in Denmark compared to the other Nordic countries. Following the Media Liability Act and the introduction of a general code of press ethics in 1991, one book on media ethics was published the same year (Kruuse, 1991). Since then, however, media ethics have been the focus of only a small number of scholarly works. In 2006, a special issue of the journalistic journal Journalistica was published. The special issue focused on the development of the Danish Press Council, the general code of ethics and on a survey of journalists which asked them about their knowledge and practice of the general code of ethics. It showed that journalists, by and large, were well aware of the ethical guidelines, but also that many were quite concerned about the ethical standard of Danish journalism (Buch, 2006). Also in 2006, a report on Danish media and their news sources was published. Among other things, the report focused on the news sources’ evaluation of the credibility of different news media, and concluded that sources were generally sceptical of the news media, but found few actual errors in the news reports where they had been used as sources (Skovbjerg and Schultz, 2006). In 2014, a study on credibility and the Danish news media was published (Blach-Ørsten and Burkal, 2014). This study combined the efforts of the previous studies and analysed both the ethical practices of journalists and news sources’ opinions of the news media. The study found little evidence to suggest that Danish news media was facing a credibility crisis, but concluded that journalists worried a little more about ethics in 2012 than had been the case in the 2006 study. Also, news sources remained sceptical about the news media on a general level, while they were unable to find many errors in the news stories where they themselves had been cited.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Despite the fact that Denmark has a long history of media accountability, this tradition is mostly based on the external Press Council and the internal guidelines at the media organization level. Thus, even though Denmark can be considered strong in the online presence of media, both by journalists and readers, digital development seems to have had little impact on MAIs. There are very few media blogs or citizen’s websites providing critiques of the media. However, new niche online magazines, such as Mediawatch.dk, do critically examine developments in the media business, and although the traditional media no longer have designated pages for covering the media itself (see above), when they are on the news agenda, they tend to write about particular stories. In television, programmes such as Detektor, or a series of programmes on media scandals, provide readers and viewers with media criticism, often debating ethical issues with the participation of journalists, editors and researchers. Following the model of digital media accountability (Heikkilä et al., 2014), it is worth examining the processes of enhancing both liability and answerability via digital media. Heikkilä et al. distinguish between three types of transparency that can possibly enhance digital accountability innovation: actor transparency, production transparency and responsiveness (Heikkilä et al., 2014, pp. 59-61).

Actor transparency In Denmark, little, if anything, is disclosed about the production process before publication. A study shows that the larger the media organization, the more likely it is to have ethical guidelines and 59

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to publish them on its website (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2015). Information about individual journalists is rare and mostly exists in niche magazines. Equally, information on ownership is hard to find, despite the fact that more and more news organizations in Denmark are merging and being bought up by other media organizations outside Denmark. Heikkilä et al. (2014) conclude that in Europe there is a lack of coordination between the general guidelines approved by the Press Council and the journalists’ union, which means that it is generally hard to find information on individual news sites about how to complain to the Press Council. This is also the case in Denmark. Although the large media organizations, in particular, have information on how to complain directly to them, there are no cases where a media organization guides the public on how to complain to the Press Council, for example. This indicates that the media assumes that the public can and will find this information by themselves elsewhere.

Production transparency In the production phase, it is possible for news organizations to provide users with additional information about the editorial processes, for example via blogs or videos of internal meetings. There are no examples of this form of transparency measure in Denmark, but the use of hyperlinks in published articles is extensive. However, international research shows that for many years the use of hyperlinks has been in the form of linking to extra reading material, whereas linking to the source of certain information is less common. As no research has been carried out in Denmark on this issue, we cannot tell whether the same is the case in Danish online news production. Heikkilä et al. (2014) also mention the use of video streaming or blogs about how and why certain stories are covered on a European level, but this is yet to be seen in Danish news production. As a last point, it is worth mentioning the increased use of social media. Many journalists have profiles on Twitter, whereas Facebook still seems to be private at the journalists’ level and public at the news organizations’ level. This is then used to promote stories or look for sources and, again, little if anything is said on the production process itself (Hartley, 2011).

Responsiveness On the whole, the Danish media have implemented means for users to comment, which allows for media criticism. Some media organizations use a login process, and others have free access to debates, both on their websites and via Facebook. Most of these forums are moderated after the publication of the comment, and comments are removed if they are offensive. Again, social media seems to be a strong way of criticizing internally, as the journalists can openly discuss choices made by other journalists, and there is a variety of such discussions, for example on Twitter under the hashtag #medienyt. An area where Danish news organizations have improved their responsiveness is error management. Almost all online sites have active by-lines, which allow users to contact and complain directly to the journalists behind the story. Denmark’s Radio (DR), one of the national public service broadcasters, has recently implemented a voluntary panel of people who get points in a form of competition where they can win prizes when making the organization aware of errors.

Other media accountability instruments A high degree of journalistic professionalism is a key component in the Democratic Corporatist Model, and also an important aspect of a media accountability system. In Denmark, journal60

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istic professionalism, understood as the increasing independence from political parties and the development of independent journalistic and editorial news values, can be traced to the years just after the Second World War. As an early part of professionalizing journalism, journalists were invited to take courses at the University of Aarhus. In particular, courses in history and economics were considered to be essential in upgrading the traditional journalistic education that took place in the news media. Also from the 1940s onwards, books on journalism written by journalists focused on the development of a politically independent press as an essential part of a well-functioning democracy. Here, an obvious inspiration was the British press, which is the focus of many of these books. However, it is also very clear from these writings that it is the ideal of the independent fourth estate that stands as a beacon of journalistic professionalism. The media’s role is to hold the politicians accountable, but little space is given to the extent to which the media is also to be held accountable. Of course, there is some focus on the laws guiding media regulation, but when it comes to the accountability of the fourth estate itself, one book claims: “The democratic press decides for itself how it sees fit to fulfill the obligations that are the foundations for its independence” (The Press, 1953, p. 114). Despite further professionalization of the education of journalists in Denmark, the idea that the press “decides for itself ” how it fulfils its role in society is still prevalent. In a column from 2014, written by the head of the Danish publishers’ association, the prevailing argument is to leave the press alone: they are doing a good job, and should be left in peace – by the politicians – to do just that (Politiken, June 10, 2014).

Conclusion Both Hallin and Mancini (2004a) and the analysis by Fengler et al. (2014) consider Denmark to be a country with a well-established history of media regulation and self-regulation, and therefore also one of the most advanced countries in terms of media accountability. The main reason for this categorization is that Denmark has a well-institutionalized Press Council and commonly accepted ethical guidelines for journalists. Also, in recent years, Denmark has seen a big increase in the number of media that have developed their own ethical guidelines. Except for the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (DR), which has had written ethical principles since the 1960s, such documents have been unusual in the media industry. With regard to more innovative forms of media accountability, we see that their existence in Denmark is limited, which might have to do with the strong presence of more formalized forms of MAIs. We can conclude that media accountability has moved to the top of the political agenda in Denmark in recent years, and even though in many ways Denmark has a well-established accountability system, this debate only seems to intensify. So far, the pressure on the news media seems to be handled within the established routines of a Democratic Corporatist media system, but the politicians seem more eager to attack and criticize the news media than they ever have before. If the news media wants to maintain their traditional political independence, a stronger focus on accountability and transparency is needed. Research has shown that, in general, the credibility of the Danish news media is strong, but also that news media and journalists still feel a reluctance to open up the newsroom. How the news media will adjust to the demands of more accountability and transparency seems to be one of the biggest challenges facing Danish news media in the future, and may even be a challenge to the entire model of media regulation within the Democratic Corporatist media system.

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Notes 1 http://journalistforbundet.dk 2 https://www.facebook.com/journalisterne?pnref=lhc 3 The Joint Council of the Danish Press was established in 1914 as a collaboration between different Danish press organizations. Among other things, the Council awarded travel scholarships, arranged courses in journalism and functioned as a political negotiator (Mogensen, 2001).

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9 Estonia Conflicting views on accountability practices Urmas Loit, Epp Lauk and Halliki Harro-Loit

Abstract Broad press freedom was a major outcome of Estonia’s liberation from the Soviet regime. Among CEE countries, Estonia was the first to inaugurate the ideas of media accountability, self-regulation, and a Press Council. The tradition of the Estonian language press acting as an agent of 19th-century nation-building and 20th-century national survival advanced the accountability concept. Journalism education in Estonia (established 1954) subtly supported national values over Soviet ones. Hence, most journalists developed a professional identity in line with democratic values and cynical attitudes about communist ideology.The idea of socially responsible media was implicitly present in this professional identity. Competition and commercialization in the 1990s and 2000s have undermined furthering the practice of media accountability. Traditional MAIs (press councils, ombudsman and ethical code) have little authority among journalists and the public, whereas online MAIs are still embryonic and uninfluential.

Introduction After declaring independence, the Estonian state granted full freedom of expression and press freedom. However, until the Estonian Constitution was passed in 1992, there was practically no regulation of the media.The old laws were no longer followed; any understanding of ‘good journalism’ and ethical conventions was limited among journalists, and the new regulations were still to be introduced.Thus, for a while, freedom of speech and freedom of the press were interpreted among journalists as freedom from any kinds of restrictions. In the early 1990s, this absolutely unlimited freedom created an atmosphere where journalists often did not follow the elementary conventions of their profession and underestimated the sensitivity of certain issues in society. It became evident that some regulation of media practices was necessary, although journalists had a controversial attitude towards ideas of any kind of regulation.They principally agreed with the necessity of an ethical code (according to a 1995 survey, 64% of journalists interviewed considered it necessary), but the proposals to establish rules were often seen as attempts to reinstate censorship. Therefore, a case-by-case method was chosen for setting rules and developing the understanding of ‘good journalistic practice’. As early as 1991, Avaliku Sõna Nõukogu (Estonian Press Council – EPC) was established, taking the Finnish experience as an example (Lauk and 63

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Høyer, 2008, p. 15). In this way, the accountability mechanism was developed on the basis of casuistry. Less effort was made for creating the Code of Ethics (which was adopted only in 1997). The code has not been updated since its adoption because of clashes of different views on the functions and implementation of self-regulatory mechanisms among media elites. In the course of the struggle for the upper hand in self-regulation practice, another Press Council (Pressinõukogu – entirely controlled and driven by the media industry) was established. Thus, Estonia today has two Press Councils that base their decisions on the same Code of Ethics but have different principles of composition and different statutes. No ombudsman institution has been introduced in the Estonian press. However, in 2007, an ethical advisor was appointed at the Estonian National Broadcasting Company. The advisor basically fulfils the functions of an ombudsman. New web-based forms of accountability, supported by the public and/or NGOs, are only just emerging and have minimal influence on media practices.

Journalistic culture and media system The Estonian-language media is produced for and consumed by less than a million people. According to the 2012 census, the largest minority language in Estonia is Russian, which is spoken by 25.6% of the population.Their media consumption habits are more oriented towards Russia than towards the local market, which is rather limited (see more about the Russianlanguage media in Estonia: Jõesaar, Jufereva and Rannu, 2014). Since the early 1990s, two parallel developments have characterized the media environment in Estonia: (1) a high degree of press freedom and (2) a laissez-faire market policy. In Estonia, a combination of extensive freedom of the press1 and a highly concentrated but unregulated market has clearly resulted in the favouring of economic and business interests over socio-cultural and political ones (Van Cuilenburg and McQuail, 2003).Within an oligopolistic market situation and minimum state interference, nothing impedes the corporate interests from taking the upper hand. At present, two large media corporations dominate the Estonian media market: Eesti Meedia2 and Ekspress Grupp (both owned today by Estonian investors, the latter being a quoted company with a core investor). The press market is of an oligopolistic character: the two aforementioned companies publish the two competing national dailies, Postimees (Eesti Meedia) and Eesti Päevaleht (Ekspress Grupp). After the ownership of Eesti Meedia by Estonian investors, Ekspress Grupp3 acquired the only national tabloid, Õhtuleht, as well as the largest magazine publishing company, with 34 magazines and seven web portals, which all were heretofore equally shared by the two corporations. Ekspress Grupp also owns the major Internet news portal Delfi and publishes two major national weeklies (Eesti Ekspress and Maaleht); Eesti Meedia publishes five of the largest regional dailies. A Bonnier-owned business daily, Äripäev, does not compete with the other dailies for the general public, but is more targeted at the business sector. The 2008–2010 economic recession continues to strongly influence media development. Although the number of titles of newspapers and magazines has not declined a great deal,4 the circulations and readership have significantly decreased. The circulation numbers of major newspapers have been dropping since 2008, on average by 42%.5 Readership has dropped by 13% since 2008. For example, from 2008 to 2014, the largest daily, Postimees, has lost 20% of its circulation, while its Russian-language edition’s circulation dropped by 47%. The business daily Äripäev has lost 44% of the circulation. In 2014, the largest circulation of newspapers was 50,000 (Postimees and Õhtuleht). The decrease in newspaper reading correlates with increases in both the use of the Internet (63% of the population uses the Internet daily6) and reading newspapers online. 64

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The advertising market has also experienced a decrease, an especially dramatic one for ­ ewspapers and magazines,7 which are gradually losing their positions in the market to televin sion and the Internet. In the first quarter of 2010, the share of newspaper and television advertising revenues equalized (at a level of 31%); in 2014, the revenue for television exceeded that of newspapers (26% vs. 23%). The income of newspapers is also decreasing in absolute figures, whereas all other sectors have been growing. Meanwhile, the proportion of Internet advertising is growing rapidly: from 11% in 2008 to 19.2% of the total advertising revenue in 2014.8 However, the newspaper sector remains the most influential. Newspapers also produce most of the original news content, both online and offline (Balčytiene and Harro-Loit, 2009, p. 524). Television and especially private radio mainly follow the news agenda set by newspapers, and to a great extent reproduce the newspapers’ news flows. The broadcasting sector consists of one public service broadcasting (PSB) company Eesti Rahvusringhääling (Estonian National Broadcasting – ERR) with two national TV channels and four national radio channels, as well as two major commercial companies with four national TV channels, and a few regional and local broadcasters (distributed via cable). In addition, nearly 30 commercial radio channels operate. Along with the increasing availability of a range of cable and satellite channels, the fragmentation of the Estonian TV market is gaining pace. The aggregated share of the three largest TV channels (ETV, Kanal 2 and TV3) has dropped from 54% in 2008 to 43% in 2013.9 Both daily TV watching time and radio listening time have decreased throughout recent years. In November 2013, an average person watched TV for 3 hours and 51 minutes and listened to the radio for 3 hours and 48 minutes. From July 1, 2010, Estonia switched entirely to digital terrestrial television transmission.10 The majority of journalistic positions in Estonia exist at three companies: Eesti Meedia, Ekspress Grupp and Estonian National Broadcasting, all based in the capital, Tallinn. The overall number of journalistic jobs in 2009 was about 1,200.11 During the years of economic recession, the number of full-time journalists decreased to about 900.12 The Estonian Journalists’ Union had 350 members in 2014 (including retired journalists, students and freelancers). In most democratic media systems, the media-related laws and written codes of ethics are supplemented with unwritten norms and tacit rules of journalistic practice: how journalists relate to their information sources as well as towards their audiences. Hallin and Mancini (2004a) interpret these as elements of ‘journalistic culture’ within the framework of professionalism, political parallelism and the market. Hallin and Mancini did not include the former Communist bloc countries in their comparative media analysis. They based their typology on an assumption of relatively stable and slow processes of societal and media development. Their three models do not, therefore, embrace rapidly changing media systems, such as in Estonia. However, combinations of various elements of these models are detectable. Developed formal education, general recognition of the ideology of public service among journalists and the existence of self-regulation mechanisms indicate similarities to the Democratic Corporatist Model. Lack of authority of the self-regulation concept, relatively low levels of professionalism and journalistic autonomy and a weak professional organization relate Estonian media to the Polarized Pluralist Model. Also, a strong element of the Liberal Model is present – the dominance of commercial media that largely determines the nature of the Estonian journalism culture. Hence, in comparison to other European countries, Estonian journalism culture contains a mixture of elements of all three models. The same tendency – the appearance of a few similarities – emerges in the analysis of the accountability culture. Mazzoleni and Splendore (2014, pp. 168–169) created an index of accountability culture which suggests factors that could measure the sensitivity of journalists to the idea of accountability. In a comparison of 14 countries, Estonia stands quite alone – the 65

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journalistic culture is not similar to that of the other former Communist bloc countries (e.g. Poland, Romania) or to Finland, which is closest culturally, linguistically and geographically. For example, Estonian journalists’ support for traditional media accountability instruments (MAIs) is the lowest among all 14 countries. Simultaneously, the perception of journalists on the impact of traditional MAIs is the second highest after Finland among the surveyed countries, and comparable to Switzerland. This indicates that the accountability mechanism is visible in Estonia, and journalists keep an eye on the web pages of the two Press Councils irrespective of their critical attitudes towards self-regulation practices. The argument relies on the finding of a much higher sensitivity to audience criticism among Estonian journalists than in any other surveyed countries (74% of Estonian journalists agreed that they were concerned about audience criticism) (Lauk, Harro-Loit and Väliverronen, 2014, p. 94). In summary, according to the in-depth analysis of survey data on the proximity of media accountability cultures in different countries (Mazzoleni and Splendore, 2014, pp. 172–173), Estonia stands apart from Finland and also from other surveyed countries by its attitudes towards MAIs (see also Lauk, 2014). However, the same analysis demonstrates that in the context of bias towards organizational versus professional values, Estonian journalists prioritize professional values (similar to the UK, Switzerland and Finland). It is possible to argue that, within the small community of Estonian journalists, being ‘accountable’ is perceived as ‘personal capital’: Any complaint upheld by a Press Council is seen as damaging to their image, and at the same time, public pressure to be accountable is palpable.

Established instruments of media accountability Press councils The public discussion on the draft media laws from 1989 to 199113 provoked the idea of introducing a self-regulatory mechanism, which resulted in the adoption of the Finnish version of the press council concept (including the name and some organizational terminology). The first Press Council (EPC) was established in 1991 under the umbrella of the publishers’ association Eesti Ajalehtede Liit (Estonian Newspaper Association – ENA).14 During its first six years of existence, the EPC dealt with more than 100 cases and worked out a set of case-based guidelines on how to report certain topics. Based on these guidelines, the media’s Code of Conduct was formulated and adopted in 1997. In order to ensure the EPC’s impartiality and to weaken the structural connection with the publishers’ association, the EPC was reorganized in 1997 into a non-profit organization that included representatives from both media and lay organizations who delegated their representatives to the body for examining complaints (Lauk, 2009, p. 75). Along with growing market competition, a conceptual tension emerged in interpreting the functions of the Press Council: Is the Press Council a guardian of the freedom of the press (i.e. protecting institutional right of expression) or is its primary function to safeguard individuals’ right of free expression? Should the Press Council strive to develop a dialogue between the media and the public on the quality of journalism or just deal with the complaints? The reorganized EPC functioned for a while as the only institution critical towards the media and articulated several important ethical issues, both by including them in the explanations of the adjudications and by issuing special statements. The critical discourse of the EPC was increasingly disliked among media leaders, and resistance to the EPC gradually emerged. Although the Rules of Procedure of the EPC obliged the news media to publish or broadcast the full texts of its adjudications within seven days, the newspapers often ignored this commitment. As a result of a conceptual conflict between the EPC and the Estonian Newspaper Association, the latter withdrew its membership by late 2001, and the broadcasters (both pri66

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vate and public) followed suit (Lauk, 2008, p. 204). In 2002, the ENA established another Press Council to deal with complaints concerning their member publications. Some Internet news portals, commercial TV channels and ERR also recognize this Press Council (Lauk, 2009, p. 73). In 2014, Prime Minister Taavi Rõivas forced Tallinna TV (TTV) to join the ENA Press Council. Tallinna TV is run by the Municipality of the City of Tallinn and holds the licence of a national TV station. Politicians and the media have accused TTV of populist political propaganda in favour of the Central Party, which forms the majority in the city council. The Prime Minister ruled that journalists of TTV cannot take part in the government’s press conferences since TTV is ‘biased’ in its coverages (Helme, 2014). Later he relented and consented to allow TTV to attend the press conferences if TTV “would subject itself to journalistic ethics”, meaning that TTV should join the ENA Press Council (Järvekülg, 2014). At the request of the ENA, none of the media connected with the ENA Press Council publish the EPC’s adjudications or any other materials coming from the EPC. All ENA member newspapers advise the public to send their complaints to the ENA Press Council, and do not mention the possibility of asking for an alternative opinion from the EPC. In response to enquiries from the EPC, newspapers mostly claim that they recognize only the ENA Press Council and ignore the adjudications of the EPC (Lauk, 2009, p. 73). In this way, the leading media hamper the EPC’s critical voice. The efficiency and ability of a press council to act impartially depend upon its independence from the media industry. The composition of the ENA Press Council is heavily weighted in favour of the media industry. The first chairman of the ENA Press Council was the former managing director of the Estonian Newspaper Association. The council predominantly consists of editors-in-chief (four to five out of ten members), including the chairperson. The lay members are individually invited by the ENA and are not delegated by their organizations. The original EPC, where six members out of nine represent public NGOs and three are representatives of the Journalists’ Union, continues to adjudicate complaints. The EPC also provides expert opinion and evaluates the quality of media content and performance.The EPC publishes its adjudications on its website.15 Although the EPC has no procedural measures to be accepted by all media as a self-regulatory body, it has earned credibility with a proficient analytical approach. Occasionally, the state authorities have requested its expert opinion (Lauk, 2009). The ENA Press Council deals only with complaints concerning materials directly affecting the complainant, whereas the EPC accepts complaints irrespective of whether the plaintiff is the person involved or not. The EPC may also initiate cases on matters of principle importance, releases statements on important ethical issues and gives advice in complicated cases. Neither press council deals with the cases that are involved in legal actions. The time limit of the complaints with which the ENA Press Council deals is three months; with EPC, it is six months. During 2007–2013, the EPC received 224 complaints and the ENA Press Council 337 (see Table 9.1). In 2009, for the first time since 1991, the total number of complaints exceeded 100. Some people file their complaints to both bodies, and occasionally they get different decisions. Statistics for the EPC are available from 2003 onwards, and for the ENA Press Council, from 2007 onwards (sources: http://www.asn.org.ee/statistika.html, http://www.eall.ee/pressinoukogu/statistika.html). The majority of adjudications concern newspapers. The overall proportion of upheld cases is high (2011: 56%; 2012: 54%; 2013: 49% of adjudicated cases). The respective proportions in Finland, for example, have been 29–30% throughout the existence of the Finnish press council (the Council for Mass Media) (Lauk, 2014, p. 187). These statistics simultaneously reflect two phenomena: the low professional culture of Estonian journalism on the one hand, and the growing awareness of journalists and the public about the 67

Loit, Lauk and Harro-Loit Table 9.1  Number of cases handled by the Estonian press councils EPC

2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

ENA PC

Complaints

Adjudications

Upheld cases

Complaints

Adjudications

Upheld cases

25 17 16 19 21 21 48 41 40 23 30

23 16 13 8 19 16 27 17 33 12 20

9 7 6 3 10 10 14 7 20 7 8

– – – – 24 45 54 42 67 49 56

– – – – 21 34 31 34 61 38 52

– – – – 7 17 21 25 33 20 27

potential of media self-regulation on the other. While the EPC received about 100 complaints over the first six years of its existence, within the past six years the two press councils together have received on average about 80 complaints annually (ibid.). As there are no specific rules (unlike in Finland) on how to publicize the upheld decisions of the Press Council, the news media often act rather arbitrarily, publishing the decisions in the most unnoticeable way possible (ibid., p. 189).

Codes of ethics The Code of Ethics for the Estonian Press (the Code)16 was accepted by all Estonian media organizations in 1997, and both press councils base their adjudications on the same code. An independent code was adopted by the business daily Äripäev in 1993 and has been amended twice. The general ideology of the Code is biased towards a teleological approach. It weighs the ethical behaviour of journalists from the viewpoint of the importance of the information to the public interest.The Code allows journalists to use ethically questionable means for getting information in cases “where the public has a right to know information that cannot be obtained in an honest way” (Code, art. 3.7). In the context of this particular article, the Code has been often criticized as it leaves the door open to discussions about whether or not journalists can really behave in a dishonest way. Another particularity of the Estonian Code is to lay the responsibility for the quality of journalism both on journalists and the media organizations, and to particularly emphasize the responsibility of news organizations for publishing truthful and accurate information (Code, art. 1.4). The Code has not been amended since its adoption, although since about 2000, the issue of updating and amending the Estonian Code has surfaced now and again. The same institutions that adopted the Code in 1997 and formed the supporting organization of the EPC (Ajakirjanike Liit [Union of Journalists], the ENA, broadcasters and some NGOs) should accept the amendments. The problem is, however, that the ENA and its Press Council have ignored the existence of the EPC since 2002, and during the ensuing decade it has been impossible to start any negotiations. However, in 2010, the ENA unilaterally changed the wording of the Article 3.7, replacing the word ‘honest’ with ‘public’, and thus changing the meaning of the article.17 Other than the change in wording, there was no explanation, no terms of reference, no press releases and no news stories about the occasion. Nobody was informed, including the EPC, who uses the same code in its work. Neither was any information provided to journalists, j­ournalism teachers 68

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or students. Only when the EPC made a special request was scant information provided. If making amendments in a legitimate way, the ENA should involve at least all the other parties who adopted the original Code (Lauk, 2014, p. 191). A conclusion that emerges is that the ENA and its Press Council do not regard the Code as significant enough to be publicly debated and try to avoid issues that may question their authority in interpreting journalistic ethics. Also, according to a MediaAcT survey,18 Estonian journalists do not much appreciate their code of ethics, but consider internal guidelines of their media organisations the primary guides of their everyday work. 82% of respondents evaluated these guidelines highest, while 74% emphasized the code of ethics. Research also reveals that the majority of journalists who do not regard ethical issues and the Code important have no journalistic education (Kangur, 2009; Ahonen, 2010).

Ombudsman Estonian newspapers have never had ombudsmen, nor does a general nationwide ombudsman operate in Estonia. The Estonian National Broadcasting Act (2007) did, however, institute the post of an Ethical Advisor for the Estonian National Broadcasting Company. The law provides the Advisor with independence; broadcasting management does not have any power over the Advisor, who is directly accountable to the Broadcasting Council. The Ethical Advisor deals with complaints from the listeners and viewers, monitors the programmes and makes appropriate proposals for resolving problems. The incumbent advisor does not always act with full transparency for the general public, but often glosses over problems and criticizes the rest of the media rather than bringing any acute ethical issues of public broadcasting to the public agenda. For a period of time, the Ethical Advisor also sat on the ENA Press Council.

Media journalism Media journalism as a form and discourse of media self-reflection is practically non-existent in Estonia. For example, during 2003–2007, the three leading newspapers (Eesti Päevaleht, Postimees and Eesti Ekspress) published a total of 40 articles containing some media-critical viewpoints. The authors mainly represented three interest groups: media scholars and teachers (15 articles), journalists (10) and politicians (5) (Tonka, 2007). In 2008, the same newspapers, together with the cultural weekly Sirp, published 41 media-critical articles (Raidla, 2009). The range of issues discussed remained rather narrow: the influence of commercialization on journalistic content, infotainment, coverage of scandals, issues of balanced and neutral reporting and public interest versus profit interests. Many important critical topics, such as media usage of power, freedom of expression, ethics of reporting or use of anonymous sources were completely absent from the debate. The context of the current political and journalism culture in Estonia does not favour the development of media-critical discussion, as the owners, editors-in-chief and other media leaders are highly allergic to any criticism addressing their outlets. Journalists are overly cautious in publicly expressing critical views about the quality of journalism, as there seems to be a silent agreement of not criticizing colleagues’ work. This has to do with the small size of the journalistic population, where everyone knows everyone else, personally or indirectly. The Journalists’ Union’s initiative to introduce an online media-critical outlet, Klopper, failed in the early 2000s after a couple of years of irregular appearance, because there were very few journalists who dared to publicly criticize their working environment. While the media in Estonia take the right to criticize everything and everybody, they remain opaque and inaccessible for criticism directed at themselves, and any question of the responsible use of this right is carefully avoided. Critical voices from outside the media that point to violations of 69

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ethical principles of reporting, power abuse by the media or simply bad journalism are often accused of attempting to restrict the freedom of the press or even to establish censorship.This argument easily finds public support and understanding.The memories of past censorship and the all-penetrating control by the authorities are still fresh and painful among both journalists and the public. Some media-critical material, however, appears in niche publications, such as Õpetajate Leht (The Teachers’ Paper) and the cultural weekly Sirp (Sickle), which receive state subsidies and are less dependent on the market. Media-critical articles written mainly by media scholars and students are also published on the website of the EPC.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Are blogs new instruments of accountability that enable individual journalists to highlight their personal moral sensitivity and disclose their information-processing practices to the public? Do Estonian journalists have enough incentives and autonomy to use weblogs as an opportunity to explain their professional decisions or even openly confront editorial opinion? The findings of an analysis based on eleven interviews with Estonian journalists and editors (Harro-Loit, Lang and Himma-Kadakas, 2012) demonstrates that personal blogs of professional journalists do not function as accountability instruments. Some blogs on media quality and ethics have occasionally appeared and soon stagnated (e.g. the latest entry on Priit Hõbemägi’s blog on ‘media-ethics-criticism-analysis’ dates back to July 2008). Two to three journalists, however, systematically evaluate journalistic quality in their personal blogs, but have only a marginal audience and no self-regulative effect. There is only one widely known blog (Memokraat19) that, among other cultural and societal issues, regularly publishes journalism critique. A survey of 226 reporters and editors working in Estonian daily newspapers showed that only five kept a public blog focused on media analysis. Micro-blogs (Twitter) open to the public were used by 57 respondents, while 159 (more than 70%) had a social network account (Facebook), which also functions as a microblog, commenting space and accountability instrument (Laurson, 2011). Transparency of the news-making process and the reluctance of media organizations to open up this process to the public seems to be a central dilemma for the editors-in-chief.While some degree of critical discussion is tolerated in the newsrooms, it is not communicated to the public, but regarded as confidential. This demonstrates that a dialogic model of accountability is not common in the Estonian media. Self-regulation in online media is gradually emerging. This is mainly related to the practice of using audience commentaries as feedback to the news and articles in online newspapers and news portals.The media organizations initially distanced themselves from this ‘non-journalistic’ content and denied any responsibility for the anonymous comments published on their pages. Only after the Leedo v. Delfi case (Supreme Court case 3-2-1-43-09), where the news portal Delfi was sued for moral damage and had to pay 5,000 EEK (about €320) to a businessman, did online media take measures to avoid indecent and offensive comments. The notice-and-take-down policy relies on readers to report unacceptable comments, which consequently have to be taken down. However, this measure does not always work effectively, especially in cases of a large influx of comments.

Other media accountability instruments According to the aforementioned MediaAcT survey, almost 70% of Estonian respondents stated that their professional training included journalism ethics, and nearly 60% declared having a university education (Radu and Popa, 2014, p. 258). The survey results also indicated that courses in media ethics increase the awareness of journalists about both traditional and new MAIs (ibid., 70

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p. 261). Our experience of teaching media ethics at the University of Tartu supports this result. Courses on journalism ethics and information law have been a part of journalism curricula since the early 1990s. The didactics includes the training of value clarification and case analyses based on discourse analysis (e.g. students are trained to distinguish between different parties in morally controversial cases). The aim is to raise both students’ sensitivity towards possible value (or legal) conflicts in various situations, as well as their ability to see a variety of solutions and to reason their principles of behaviour. International comparisons are used for developing the ability to critically analyse existing accountability instruments in the student’s home country. In some newspapers, such as the business paper Äripäev, the editorial guidelines support accountability. It is not known, however, how the in-house rules are implemented in daily practice. A study on journalists’ autonomy (Niinepuu, 2012) shows that normative ethics and journalists’ individual autonomy are interpreted differently in different media organizations.

Conclusion The Estonian media experienced drastic structural changes during the 1990s. By the end of the decade, the market began to stabilize and foreign investments arrived. Certain expectations emerged that foreign owners’ experience and know-how would be a good basis for the further development of journalistic professionalism and democratic media culture (Balčytiene and Lauk, 2005, p. 100), but this was not the case. Furthermore, foreign investments created a serious dilemma for the local managers and media elite: they should have simultaneously been able to ensure profit for the investors and develop the quality of national journalism. In fact, aggressive commercial policies were pursued at the expense of journalistic standards (Lauk, 2009, p. 78). Along with commercialization, Estonian journalism has largely lost its traditional cultural and integrating roles. On the other hand, investigative journalism is gradually developing, which was completely unthinkable under the Soviet occupation. The small Estonian media market can give jobs to a limited number of journalists. In some regions, only one employer operates, while the majority of jobs are concentrated in the capital, Tallinn. Therefore, journalists more often than not prioritize loyalty to the employer rather than to professional ideals. Hence, journalists have less freedom of choice and autonomy than their news organizations. By the level of media literacy and communication competencies of the public, Estonia stands at the forefront among the Baltic countries, since the national curriculum includes elements of media education and the media educators have been active for about a decade (Ugur and HarroLoit, 2010). In 2010, the activity of Eesti Meediakoolitajate Liit (Estonian Association of Media Educators) was revived. Nevertheless, research indicates that even the generation who has grown up in the ‘Internetized’ environment tends to behave as passive consumers rather than active content creators and commentators (Runnel, Pruulmann-Vengerfeldt and Reinsalu, 2008). Civic organizations rarely raise questions on media quality. Lastekaitse Liit (Union of Children’s Welfare) is a positive exception in this field, having initiated several debates and conferences and produced complaints to the press councils. As the Estonian case demonstrates, the ideally favourable conditions for the media industry – unrestricted freedom of the press and an oligopolistic non-regulated market – do not automatically promote media accountability and self-regulation. Legislation and court practice do not yet support media accountability. Too often journalists have to choose between loyalty to the owners and ethical principles of the profession. Freedom of the press has become freedom for the press and enables the media organizations to abuse freedom of expression by blocking certain uncomfortable voices. 71

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Effective self-regulation needs an environment where media organizations are motivated to discuss media quality and ethical problems openly and publicly to avoid unethical practices. In Estonia, these conditions are still insufficient. Although a Code of Ethics and press councils exist, they are easily ignored by both news organizations and journalists.The only self-regulation body that is recognized by the media is under the control of the media owners and serves their interests. Media-critical debates occur when politicians publicly refer to the poor performance of the media, especially the press. The reaction of the media is usually allergic and defensive: those who criticize are accused of being ignorant, for wishing to re-establish censorship or for being demagogic, etc. In the current circumstances, where civic control over the media is nearly non-existent and the legislative practices do not encourage news organizations to be strict in following ethical rules, MAIs have little effect.

Notes   1 In the rankings of Freedom House and Reporters Without Frontiers, Estonia is placed in the top 15 nations, among the Nordic countries, Belgium, the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Switzerland.   2 In 2013, Eesti Meedia, owned by Norway’s Schibsted AS, was sold to Estonian companies. In 2014, Eesti Meedia obtained the possession of the Baltic News Service, which until then had been owned by Finland’s Alma Media.   3 The right to buy out these holdings emerged from an earlier contract between the two companies. Possession of Õhtuleht and the magazines’ publishing company were rendered to Suits Meedia OÜ. However, on its homepage, Ekspress Grupp exhibits them as a part of its conglomerate. See also http:// www.egrupp.ee/companies/as-ajakirjade-kirjastus   4 In 2013, 127 newspapers, about 320 magazines and 485 other periodical publications were published in Estonia. Source: National Library of Estonia (http://www.nlib.ee/trukitoodangu-statistika).The data by the Estonian Newspaper Association indicate far smaller numbers of newspaper titles than the National Library of Estonia (Vihalemm, Lauristin and Kõuts, 2012).   5 Calculation based on data by the Estonian Newspaper Association: http://www.eall.ee/ajalehetoostus/ index.html   6 Data by Eurostat for 2013.   7 In 2009, newspapers’ advertising revenues declined by 41%, and 56% for magazines, compared to 2008 figures. By 2013, advertising revenues for magazines had started to recover slightly, but remain at 53% below the 2008 level. Advertising revenues for newspapers have been continuously shrinking, and by 2013 the decline was 54% compared to 2008 (calculations based on data by TNS Emor).   8 Data for nine months. Source: TNS Emor (http://www.emor.ee).   9 Media consumption data in this article by TNS Emor. 10 However, much of the small cable networks still operate in analogue mode, and consequently the options for launching all possible digital services have been limited on all platforms (Mapping Digital Media recommendation 9.2.1.2 – Loit and Siibak, 2013). 11 The research project ‘Changing Journalism Cultures: A Comparative Perspective’ (University of Tartu, 2008–2011) identified 1,193 journalistic jobs in all the media in 2009. Freelancers were not included. 12 Statistics made for the global journalism studies project ‘Worlds of Journalism’ by the researchers of the University of Tartu. 13 Four drafts of media-targeted laws were presented for public discussion, but none of them were ever adopted. 14 http://www.eall.ee 15 http://www.asn.org.ee 16 http://www.asn.org.ee/english/code_of_ethics.html 17 In the English translation the wording was not amended. 18 Online survey, conducted in 2011–2012 by the EU-funded research project “Media Accountability and Transparency in Europe” (MediaAcT) among journalists of twelve European countries (Austria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Spain, Switzerland) and two Arab countries (Jordan and Tunisia); total 1,762 respondents. The project’s homepage: http://www.mediaact.eu 19 http://memokraat.ee

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10 Finland The empire renewing itself Jari Väliverronen and Heikki Heikkilä

Abstract The news environment in Finland is becoming increasingly competitive in the face of technological developments and economic hardship in the media market. For many, this signals a threat to the quality of news and public trust in journalism. Rather than seeking an alternative to the institutions of self-regulation, the majority of media organizations, journalists, and the public are expecting a renewal of these institutions. In recent years, the professional community of journalists and the Press Council have worked actively to update the codes of ethics and to enhance the role of the Press Council, particularly in the digital environment. However, given the scope of their remit and their possibly diminishing resources for these activities, it is not clear whether the strategy for renewal will be enough.

Introduction Media accountability is a culturally accepted norm in Finland, which has been safeguarded mainly through a well-established self-regulatory system. In recent years, however, this institutional framework has been challenged both from outside and within the profession. On the one hand, a number of notable cases of controversial reporting have led citizens to question the functionality and efficacy of the self-regulatory mechanism. On the other hand, journalists have argued that the decline in the (ethical) quality of reporting in an era of economic and technological change in the media environment (Pöyhtäri, Väliverronen and Ahva, 2014) should also invoke changes in the self-regulatory system. Despite these problems, the sense of crisis in journalism in Finland is much less severe than, for instance, in the United States.This is due to the fact that the main elements of the Democratic Corporatist media system (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a) still hold. Therefore, questions about the quality of news and the future of journalism are primarily addressed by traditional stakeholders – Journalistiliitto (The Union of Journalists) and established media organizations – and through conventional means of self-regulation (codes of ethics and the Press Council). This strategy tended to have a positive societal impact and ensured a high level of legitimacy for journalism in the past, but in the current situation its validity is less obvious. In any case, contemporary challenges in the digital environment set high demands on the resilience of the 73

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profession and the established means of self-regulation. Another problem lies in the logic of selfregulation, which is retrospective. This may curtail new innovations in conceiving how public trust in journalism might best be pursued and attained.

Journalistic culture and media system Finns are traditionally avid users of news media, and the consumption of media products has been increasing in the 21st century. In 2012, an average Finn spent 8 hours 39 minutes daily with the media (TNS Gallup, 2013). Television has long been the medium of choice for the people, but in recent years the Internet has gained in popularity and challenged the status of television, especially among the younger age groups. Nonetheless, the national public service media,YLE, still has a weekly reach of 85% of the nation’s population for television alone (Finnpanel, 2014). The robustness of the media system also pertains to newspapers, despite the gradually decreasing subscription figures of both the national and regional press. Finland still ranks third in the world in daily newspaper circulation per 1,000 adults (Finnish Newspapers Association, 2014). While the social and cultural status of news appears to be solid, the economic and technological structures of news production are under transformation. Due to the growing importance of the Internet and social media in people’s lives, media organizations are investing more and more resources in online news reporting ( Juntunen, 2010). This process has increased competition between media outlets and forced them to reform their newsrooms, formats and layout. In the face of the economic recession sweeping across Europe, the reforms have coincided with extensive reductions in production costs. This has resulted in an unprecedented wave of layoffs of journalists and the outsourcing of their work. It is estimated that from 2009 to 2013, about 1,000 journalists – that is, about 10% of the members of the Union of Journalists1 – lost their jobs (Aalto, 2014; Honkonen and Lankinen, 2012). Some scholars argue that these transformations in the media market and news organizations mark a cultural shift from high modern to liquid modern journalism (e.g. Kantola, 2013). At the core of this shift is a change in practical work ethics: Journalists put less emphasis on the collective basis of journalism ethics as defined by the code of ethics and the Press Council and stress the judgment of individual journalists more (Koljonen, 2013; Pöyhtäri et al., 2014). At the same time, they endorse a more open and voluntaristic attitude towards imperatives set by new technologies and diverging consumer cultures. In recent studies, Finnish journalists have expressed their ambiguity about these developments. On the one hand, they acknowledge the increased need to communicate with audiences and to serve audiences’ (perceived or imagined) needs. On the other hand, they also hold onto the perception of their role as independent and detached watchdogs (Heikkilä and Väliverronen, 2013; Pöyhtäri et al., 2014). A cultural negotiation between these two principles is obviously possible, but by no means simple.

Established instruments of media accountability In the case of Finland, the two main established instruments of media accountability are the Press Council ( Julkisen sanan neuvosto [The Council of Mass Media – CMM]) and the journalistic code of ethics ( Journalistin ohjeet [Guidelines for Journalists – GJ]). The GJ constitute a tool for everyday news work, whereby daily decisions in newsrooms are judged. At the same time, the GJ is the framework against which the CMM aims to resolve complaints about journalistic conduct issued by individuals or organizations. In addition to these two, established instruments of media accountability encompass critical media-related journalism produced by professional 74

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journalists, academics or members of the public. In the following sections, the latest developments in this field are briefly mapped out.

The Council of Mass Media and Guidelines for Journalists A formal code of ethics for journalists has existed in Finland since 1957 and has been monitored by the CMM since 1968 (Mäntylä and Karilainen, 2008). Due to this well-functioning connection, this institutional setting for self-regulation has been widely accepted in the news business. Currently, the vast majority of journalistic media in Finland subscribe to the GJ, which also enjoy widespread support among journalists. In a recent study, 98% of Finnish journalists agreed fully or to some extent with the statement that the GJ should be adhered to in all situations (Pöyhtäri et al., 2014).The strong support for nationwide rules has rendered other ethical codes, such as in-house guidelines, unnecessary or complementary at best. At present, only some media organizations have made significant additions to the GJ in their in-house rules, and even fewer have made them available to the public. Among the public, the view of the CMM and the GJ has lessened, especially after a few recent high-profile cases of controversial reporting. The two school shooting incidents in 2007 and 2008 brought questionable practices of obtaining and publishing information into the spotlight (Raittila, Koljonen and Väliverronen, 2009), and the media’s aggressive probing into politicians’ alleged corruption and wrongdoings regarding electoral funding (2009–2011) triggered heavy public criticism about journalists’ lack of fairness and the efficacy of the self-regulatory system in resolving the cases (Väliverronen, 2012). Such criticisms, coupled with the above-mentioned changes in the journalistic field and the media market, have necessitated a speedy reaction by the profession. As a result of this, the GJ have been revised more regularly. Previously, the code of ethics was modified approximately every ten years, but in the past ten years there have been three updates, the most recent in 2014.2 Recent revisions pertain to statutes about error correction, especially online, and the demarcation of advertising and editorial content. These are also the issues that have generated the most complaints to the CMM in the past few years (CMM, 2013a, 2014a). Another reaction to the changing times is the composition of the CMM. In 2013, two more members – one industry representative and one member of the general public – were added to the council. Currently, the council consists of the chairperson, eight representatives of the industry and not less than five members of the public. The reforms illustrate the growing need of the CMM to improve its reputation and to connect better with the public. In this task, the organization has assumed a more active online presence. Some members of the council regularly explain their decisions in a blog on the CMM website,3 and some use the CMM Facebook page to discuss matters of media accountability. In addition, the CMM has attempted to broaden public knowledge about the GJ by promoting their introduction to the national school curriculum (CMM, 2013b). Even if the latter attempt was unsuccessful, the initiatives have been well received generally. As a token of this, the call for the two vacant audience representative positions in the council generated well over 500 applications (CMM, 2013c). Given the increasing attention on the CMM, it is not surprising that the number of complaints to the council about the conduct of journalism has been growing (CMM, 2014a, p. 5). This may also be partly due to the solid trust in the CMM and its new communications strategy.4 All of this highlights the positive status of self-regulation and the general interest in the quality of journalism in Finland, but it has also shown the CMM’s limits in managing the flow of complaints. The council has been criticized about the slow processing of complaints and its 75

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policy to pre-screen them. In 2013, over two-thirds of complaints failed to make their way from the pre-screening to the council meeting proper (CMM, 2014a, p. 4). The high number of complaints raises the question of the CMM’s ability to manage the increasing workload. This issue ultimately boils down to money. The CMM is predominantly funded by media outlets, which are currently struggling with finances and the reorganization of their own operations. So far, economic hardships have not resulted in media organizations withdrawing their financial support from the CMM, but the future looks more uncertain.

Media-related journalism by professional media Compared to recent developments in the CMM, the state of media journalism has remained quite stable in recent years. Both analytical views and entertainment-based criticism of news coverage can be found, and their supply has remained relatively constant. However, a look at the producers of media journalism reveals that the scales are tilted towards public service media.YLE hosts an array of regular media-related programmes on television and radio, most of which are long-running and broadcasted in prime time. The weekly critical programmes Pressiklubi (The Press Club), Julkinen sana (The Public Word) and Jälkiviisaat (In Hindsight) are complemented by the entertainment-based weekly shows YleLeaks, Noin viikon uutiset (The News of Last Week or So) and Uutisvuoto (Have I Got News For You). Of these, YleLeaks and Uutisvuoto are regularly among the most watched programmes on TV1. In contrast, the supply of media-related journalism in other media has diminished. On commercial television, the only programme currently running is the weekly entertainment show Hyvät ja huonot uutiset (Good and Bad News, Channel 4). In print media, the supply of media journalism is decreasing.The trade union papers Journalisti (Journalist) and Suomen Lehdistö (The Finnish Press) occasionally provide critical features on the media, while the critical alternative paper Voima (Force) has been struggling financially, and the future of its media journalism is uncertain. In mainstream print outlets, media-related columns have for many years been quite a staple part of many major papers’ repertoires, but they have become less common. In some publications, as in the weekly magazine Suomen Kuvalehti (Finland Illustrated), media-related journalism and criticism have found a place in the blogs on the magazine’s website.5 Other examples of established media journalism are difficult to come by. This suggests that public self-criticism is not an easy feat for journalists, as they prefer not to ‘wash their dirty linen in public’ (von Krogh, 2008a).

Academic media criticism and journalism education Academic criticism of journalism has reduced in recent years. The legal aspects of media accountability practices are still analysed annually in Viestintäoikeuden vuosikirja (The Annals of Communication Law), but the traditional publication for critical reviews of noteworthy media events – Journalismikritiikin vuosikirja (The Yearbook of Journalism Criticism) – was discontinued in 2013, after 16 years of existence. In addition to academics’ publications and their appearances on legacy media, critical academic voices can be heard online in blogs.6 However, these new platforms have not changed the fact that academic media criticism tends to have a rather limited impact on journalists (Heikkilä and Väliverronen, 2013), let alone on public discussion. Journalists regard journalism education as having a great impact on their work. It seems to be particularly important in generating ethical conformity among professionals at a time when journalists’ working conditions are becoming increasingly precarious (Pöyhtäri et al., 2014). 76

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The role of education has been given greater importance within the CMM, too. Since 2011, the CMM has accepted institutions providing journalism education as members. Subsequently, most of the major institutions educating journalists in Finland have joined the CMM, and their student-produced publications and programmes adhere to the GJ.

Innovative instruments of media accountability As noted above, Finnish news organizations are allocating more of their resources to online reporting. As a result, the volume of online coverage has increased and the pace of news updates has accelerated significantly. Media organizations have also aimed at occupying a position on social networking sites and have started learning how to tap into the networks of users’ interpersonal communications. At the same time, the public has also acclimatized themselves to the digital environment. Statistics show that Finns are among the most active Internet users in Europe: 92% of those aged 16 to 74 consider themselves to be regular users (Official Statistics of Finland, 2013). Contrary to what a straightforward cause-and-effect pattern would suggest, the seemingly lively buzz on the Internet has yielded remarkably few initiatives to enhance media accountability. Besides facilitating user comments on news and launching experiments with newsroom blogs and collaborative news production, media organizations have not regarded transparency and responsiveness as their top priority. At the same time, there are also relatively few signs of actors outside the journalistic profession attempting to establish alternative ways of holding journalism accountable. The most notable exception to this are the practices aimed at correcting errors in the news.This objective has been simultaneously addressed by ‘the Empire’ (that is, news organizations and the institutions for self-regulation) and new actors emerging from outside the journalistic establishment. Assuming that the accelerating pace of news production is likely to result in an increasing number of errors, the professional community of journalists agreed that the issue should be addressed in the Guidelines for Journalists. Consequently, an amendment to the GJ was ratified in 2014. The new formulation pertaining to error management decrees that all errors published either offline or online be clearly corrected, both on the same platform on which they were originally published and on the editorial website of the media in question. Moreover, if errors have occurred online, the statute declares that “it is not enough that the incorrect information or article is removed; the public must also be told about the error, as well as how and when the correction was made” (CMM, 2014b, Statute 20). The fact that this practice was rapidly and rather systematically adapted by online news outlets not only shows how well-established and widespread the publication of corrections is in Finnish journalism, but it also demonstrates that media professionals trust in the efficacy of self-regulation. More evidence of the salience of error correction in Finnish journalism can be drawn from the fact that some prominent citizen initiatives are focused on this theme. At the end of 2014, the blog Ei oo totta! (“Can’t be true!”),7 hosted by the media consultant Katleena Kortesuo, was the most-read blog in the field of marketing and communications in Finland. Another recent initiative highlighting error management is the fact-checking site Faktabaari (The Fact Bar).8 This website is modelled on the US-based factcheck.org, and it was instrumental in pointing out the inconsistency in correction practices at legacy media outlets (Vehkoo, 2014). Faktabaari earned its founders the European Public Communication Award 2014 for reporting on the European Parliamentary election coverage.9 The practice of fact checking by independent actors may be loosely associated with the emergence of a new type of journalistic entrepreneurship. The most established benchmark 77

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for this is Long Play,10 which focuses on investigative reporting and long-form narrative journalism. Over a short period of time, Long Play has encouraged a number of followers, who all aim to find their niche in the media market by drawing direct financial support from users.11 While these newcomers to journalism are not directly concerned with accountability issues, they explicitly endorse a non-institutional approach to news production. Therein, the ideas of the greater involvement of the public and increased interaction between journalists and users have a strong strategic value. In a similar way to citizens’ initiatives online, the long-term future of such sites depends on their capacity to find external funding.12 Thus, the impact of such enterprises and initiatives on the long-term development of media accountability practices in Finland is still an open question.

Conclusion Many features from our previous review of media accountability practices in Finland (Heikkilä and Kylmälä, 2011) are still more or less intact. Concerns about journalism ethics and the quality of news are still predominantly addressed within the system of self-regulation – that is, through the interplay of the GJ and the CMM. In fact, their role appears to be even stronger than before as both instruments have been updated to better match the challenges set by the digital environment. Simultaneously, the proactive and expanding role of the CMM raises questions about whether the council will have adequate resources to cope with the changing circumstances and potentially increasing workload. The insecurity about the media economy is experienced at the level of newsrooms and individual journalists even more strongly than within the CMM. The MediaAcT survey conducted in 2011–2012 suggests that journalists’ support for developing media accountability instruments online is stronger in Finland than in any other European country (Mazzoleni and Splendore, 2014, p. 171). However, at the same time, many journalists wish to halt their implementation until economic uncertainties over the future of journalism have disappeared (Heikkilä, 2011). Given that there are no signs of immediate recovery in the media economy, the normative support to transparency and responsiveness among professionals is not easily translated into action. If the pressure from within mainstream media organizations to enhance media accountability does not increase in the future, we may look into the effects of new journalistic entrepreneurs, such as Long Play, Rapport or Faktabaari. Rather than assuming that these newly established organizations will transform journalism in their own right, we think it is more likely that they will contribute to a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2013) where new ideas and practices lend themselves to mutual inspiration and imitation for all parties involved.

Notes   1 This percentage pertains to working-age members of the Union only; student members and those journalists who have retired but maintained their membership are excluded.  2 http://www.jsn.fi/en/guidelines_for_journalists/   3 http://www.jsn.fi/blog/ (only in Finnish)   4 Telephone interview with Ilkka Vänttinen, General Secretary of the CMM, September 9, 2014.   5 See the blog Mediasekaantuja, http://suomenkuvalehti.fi/mediasekaantuja/   6 See e.g. Mediayhteiskunta, http://medykblog.wordpress.com (mainly sociological critique), and Etiikka. fi, http://etiikka.fi (a blog on media ethics).  7 http://eioototta.fi  8 http://faktabaari.fi

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Finland  9 http://faktabaari.fi/in-english 10 http://longplay.fi 11 These include, for instance, Uutistamo (https://www.uutistamo.fi) and Rapport (https://www.rapport.fi). 12 Long Play and Uutistamo have received funding from foundations to help set up their operations, and Faktabaari recently secured foundation funding to cover the Finnish parliamentary election in the spring of 2015.

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11 France Media accountability as an abstract idea? Olivier Baisnée, Ludivine Balland and Sandra Vera Zambrano

Abstract The question of journalistic deontology in France has been widely discussed, but the debate remains topical. For the last few years, many charters, reports and laws to ensure media accountability have been launched, with only some success. This chapter analyses why the attempts to establish an accountable model have not yet found real and general acceptance. This might be explained through three principal elements. First, the journalistic profession depends on actors external to its own professional space (e.g. the state, through unsuitable laws, or economic constraints through increasing job uncertainty) and this can go some way to explaining journalists’ reluctance. Second, contrary to the research and journalists’ discourses, it is mainly the professional space itself that produces the most efficient accountability instruments, leaving aside economic and political constraints. Third, this report discusses the importance of considering the position of the instruments within the journalistic field: most attempts to create effective accountability instruments are established by (and directed to) the most prestigious kinds of journalism, when they only represent a small part of the entire journalistic field.

Introduction The expert assessment presented to the National Assembly by Marie Sirinelli, advisor to the Secretary of State for Culture and Communication in April 2014, stated: “The issue of the creation of a mass-media and press deontological authority – to the image of existing Press Councils in other European Countries – is regularly demanded by the professionals and the representatives of the civil society. I’ve heard this demand once again […] and I completely share the objective to reestablish people’s confidence in media […]” (Sirinelli, 2014).1 Looking for a solution after repeated attempts to establish journalistic deontological authorities in France, the Minister for Culture and Communication demanded a new report on this topic in 2013. As we shall see in the next section, this report helps us to draw a picture of the complexity of the French journalistic field and of its deological debates and authorities. In 2012, there were 37,477 professional journalists in France (Observatoire des métiers de la presse, 2013),2 although this figure underestimates the actual number of journalists as they can only register for a press card if they can prove that they earn more than 50% of the income 80

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from journalistic work. Of the 37,477 registered professional journalists, 66% work for the print media, 14.8% for TV and 9.5% for radio; 28.7% of them work for magazines, 23.6% for the regional press and 19.5% for the specialized press. Only 11.4% of professional journalists work for the national dailies, and yet, debates about ethics are often directed at them. More interestingly, those debates also emanate from the most legitimate fringe of the profession and pretend to apply to all journalists: from the freelance journalist (17.6% of the press card holders) working for any publication to the political editor of Le Monde. As in many countries, French journalism faces a deep crisis. The economic difficulties encountered in most media sectors have accelerated and deepened deontological and ethical issues. On the journalists’ side, the situation of the profession seems delicate. A recent study3 suggests that the results are heavily linked to the increasingly precarious work conditions: intensification of the work, multi-tasking, etc. Sixty-eight percent of respondents said that they feel they have to work quicker than they used to, 55% said that their work was harming their health (physically or psychologically) and 44% stated that they did not feel independent. The main sources of pressure came from the economy: 54% considered their work was threatened by changes in the readership, 42% by the advertisers’ interests and 39% by industrial groups’ interests. Furthermore, state interests came fourth in a list of five possible answers (including “others”), clearly stating, contrary to the scholarly mythology about the French media, that the main constraints on journalistic work emanate from the economic transformations of the media sector and not from political interventionism.4 On the side of the audiences, the 26th yearly barometer on confidence in the media, published in January 2015,5 also shows a degraded perception of the media and journalists. Fiftythree percent of the respondents believe that journalists are not free (indépendents) from the pressures of economic interests, and 58% perceived that journalists are not independent of political pressures. The credibility of the information presented is also at stake. To the question “Do you think that things really happened as [the media] presented it?”, only 10% answered “yes” concerning radio, 9% concerning television and 6% for newspapers and the web. This low level of confidence in the media has been fairly stable and has risen only slowly since 1987. In this context, the latest attempt by the French authorities to initiate a ‘press deontological authority’ is both unsurprising and fairly illusive. Unsurprisingly, given the enormous diversity of interests and practices in the media sector, only the state appears as the sole authority in a position to frame the debate and urge action to solve what is defined as a ‘problem’. Illusory so far, France has been unable to establish such authorities despite various attempts emanating from the state or the profession (or, more accurately, part of the profession). Indeed, the elements of the debate show a very difficult equation to solve: the equilibrium between the freedom of speech and the notion of responsibility. In Sirinelli’s words: “as stated by the resolution 1003 adopted in 1993 by the Parliamentary Assembly from the European Council concerning journalistic ethics, ‘the exercise of journalism has duties and rights, i.e. freedoms and responsibilities’. These responsibilities bring along two levels of restrictions: the first level, ruled by the law, which imposes constraints on the profession; and the level of the deontology, through the definition of principles within the profession.The rules concerning the first level are clearly defined.The rules concerning the second level are not homogeneous and have not yet found a precise structure” (Sirinelli, 2014). In more detail, in the media context, the French juridical system emphasizes freedom of expression. At the constitutional level, Article 11 of the Declaration of 1789 specifies that “the free communication of thoughts and opinions is one of the most precious human rights”. This principle relies on the successive consecrations of the freedom of speech in 1981,6 the freedom of communication in 19827 and the freedom of the press in 19848 by the French Constitutional Council. These constitutional principles are, however, limited by the notion of 81

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responsibility, which translates to the media as ‘the duty of honesty and pluralism in the matter of information’.9 Thus, the equilibrium between the freedom of speech and responsibility finds a day-to-day concrete translation within the juridical status of the journalistic activities, as a principle that protects both the source and the integrity of journalists. Possession of a professional card grants journalists their independence, according to the “Brachard” law of March 29, 1935.

Journalistic culture and media system The media landscape in France10 has its cultural roots in the post-war period, when the state decided to regulate an industry that had lost its credit during the collaborationist Vichy regime of the Second World War. The state maintains a presence in the written press (via the recently renewed system of subsidies), in TV broadcasting (with France Televisions as a major actor and its president almost directly appointed by the state), radio broadcasting (the Radio France group has two stations in the top five in terms of audience), the cinema (with a complex system of subsidies handled by the National Cinematographic Center – CNC) and, more recently, on the Internet (with regulations on cultural products, downloading and property rights known as Hadopi). As in many developed countries, the written press in France is encountering a crisis. Global profits were down 2.3% in 2008 to €10.6 billion, thanks to a drop in advertising revenues (now accounting for 43.8% of industry revenue). Circulation is down as well, with 4.4 billion copies sold (down 1.99%). In 2007, the press industry comprised 2,066 companies (321 fewer than in 2004) employing 83,354 people (4,000 fewer than 2004), most of them working for magazines and the local press. Radio has long been a very popular medium in France, with more than 1,200 stations, thanks to the 1982 law ending the state monopoly. A French household has on average 5.9 radio receivers, an increase from 5.6 in 2002, including digital receivers such as computers, MP3 players and, increasingly, mobile phones. Every weekday, 42 million people listen to the radio; the general content channels are more popular (RTL, France Inter) than stations with music formats (NRJ, Nostalgie). The “PAF,” or French audio-visual landscape, as it is called in France, has been remarkably stable over the past 20 years. But it has been changing a lot since 2005, due to technology improvements and new regulations. According to the literature on journalistic deontology,11 journalists in France tend to associate the profession’s defaults with economic or political pressures more than their day-today activities. But, if we examine the available data on journalists’ principles according to the MediaAcT survey, we find that journalists declare themselves to be less responsible towards politicians or economic partners than to their conscience or to journalistic standards (Baisnée and Vera-Zambrano, 2014). How do external pressures seem so strong when journalists do not seem to care much about them? Some hints come from the analysis of the French media system model by Hallin and Mancini (2004a), which they attribute to the Polarized Pluralist (i.e. Mediterranean) Model, even if the picture is probably not as clear-cut as they draw it. Although a great deal of the ‘Mediterranean’ region applies to the nature of Southern France (the nation is also Atlantic and Britannic),12 contemporary French media is not the best candidate for the Polarized Pluralist Model. First, the historically known intervention of the state on journalism has dramatically decreased; second, political parallelism does not seem to be really important in France;13 and third, the French journalistic field has some exclusive particularities such as the relatively high number of journalists working for the magazines or the high number of journalists that live under precarious conditions. If scholarship has attested well to the historical intervention of the state on journalism and media (Baisnée and Balland, 2011), we shall ask what this intervention looks like. Besides the fact 82

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that the state historically has funded different supports in order to guarantee pluralism (Benson, 2005), it would seem that the role of the state is more related to the role of laws and regulation, even if the main actors claim autonomy of the journalistic occupation. Moreover, recent literature clearly supports self-regulation rather than state-oriented regulation (Sirinelli, 2014). Concerning political parallelism, according to the results we have found from the MediaAcT survey,14 French journalists do not feel any kind of responsibility (or feel any kind of change in their attitude) concerning government or political parties. For example, when journalists were asked if political pressures impacted on their journalistic behaviour, the answer was close to “I do not agree with this statement” (1.91/5), whereas the response rate for economic pressures was significantly higher (3.95/5). Nonetheless, under the government of Nicolas Sarkozy, interferences by the state in media practices frequently occurred. If direct interventions by political powers in media activities have decreased overall due to the development of commercial broadcasting in the 1980s, indirect influences remain, as political and journalistic elites and media owners are largely trained in the same schools and belong to the same ‘social world’.We could suggest that, despite neo-liberal mythologies, the autonomization of the private sector of press and media, structured by powerful multinational companies, does not work as a magic shield against all state and political pressures.15 Finally, concerning the particularities of the French journalistic field, we note the following elements: above all, as previously said, we might point out the enormous difficulty in precisely defining who a journalist is. Once we have stated that the card (license) is a trustworthy element, there are other particularities. The most recent report of the Commission Nationale de la carte de presse16 states that the magazine press employs more than 40% of journalists and that Parisian (national) newspapers have fewer readers than regional newspapers,17 which have less legitimacy within the field. Also, the number of French journalists has doubled in the past 20 years. Their profile is younger, they are more highly educated and the ratio of female journalists has increased. Finally, unstable jobs have also increased and rationalized management of journalistic tasks (targeting of audiences, active searching for maximum readership) has become more prominent (Neveu, 1989; Charon, 1993).

Established instruments of media accountability We might distinguish established instruments of media accountability according to their degree of autonomy towards the journalistic field. French scholarship has highlighted the trend of media accountability to function as a quite autonomous space, providing its own rules but yet permeable to the logic of other fields such as the political, the intellectual or the economic (Champagne, 2000; Baisnée, 2003; Neveu, 2009). In this perspective, we observe that media accountability instruments belonging to the journalistic field (whether or not they are institutionalized) tend to regulate journalistic practices more effectively than those that are external to the journalistic world.

Administrative regulation authorities The most important authority remains the Conseil Supérieur de l’Audiovisuel (CSA – The High Council for Broadcasting), created in 1989, which is in charge of regulating the television and radio sectors. The CSA delivers administrative authorizations (to broadcast), but is primarily a juridical regulation institution, tasked with implementing audiovisual laws, overseeing fair coverage of elections (particularly the airtime granted to each candidate) and ensuring ‘fairness’ and political pluralism in audiovisual media, although it is not permitted to interfere with journalists’ work (ODI, 2014). Moreover, it is only since 1997 that the CSA included deontological rules, 83

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and since 2007 it specifies its activities, nominating one actor responsible for deontological issues among a ‘college of wise men’. Globally, the CSA’s claim of deontology remains contested by professionals because of the selection of its members, nominated by the presidents of the Republic, the Senate and the National Assembly. Another important external authority is the DDMIC (Department of Cultural Industries and Media), which contributes to indirect journalistic regulation. The DDMIC is part of the Ministry of Culture, in charge of media development and pluralism policies and their evaluation, and providing financial support mainly for the print media. In this perspective, it contributes to the elaboration of the legislation and regulation of the press concerning the collection of information in media and audiovisual communication.

Codes of ethics Beyond the punctual juridical translations of media responsibility, the question of deontology in the media occurs principally in moral charters and codes. Three principal texts – negotiated among the professional actors – shape the profession’s activity (Baisnée and Balland, 2011): the Charter of Duty of 1918; the Charter of Munich, which was voted for at the European level by trade unions to complement the Charter of Duty of 1918; and a law passed in 1935 which institutionalized the journalist status by the introduction of a ‘professional card’.18 These texts may resemble other professional codes of ethics (e.g. in law and medicine), but they do not have any constraining power. They are merely declarations of principles mostly considered as the founding moments of professionalism. However, none of these texts has achieved general consensus, even if their contents are founded on similar principles: the respect of the reader and of the peers, and the protection of sources. The intellectual and most legitimate media professionals, claiming ‘seriousness’ and ‘independence’, often propose general texts which try to complete the existent charters and remind us that the issue of deontology remains unsolved.The most recent texts are the “Quality of Information” Charter, written in 2008 during the international Assises du journalisme and the project of a code of deontology for journalists, elaborated after the General Estates of the Written Press in 2008. Besides, we find a diversity of intermediary texts elaborated by legitimate press and media enterprises (France Televisions, Le Monde, 20 minutes, Métro or Challenges, etc.). These internal documents, combining editorial and deontological stakes (Sirinelli, 2014), have different approaches to the issue of deontology, depending on where in the journalistic field they are produced and the main stakes they are dealing with (political, economical, etc.). The topics can vary between the use of hidden cameras, travelling, verification of sources or relationships with politicians. Codes of ethics and deontology are also taught at the main schools of journalism (which provides only 15–20% of new journalists).19 The teaching content of those recognized schools should consider deontological rules in their syllabi besides the technical teaching lessons.20 Moreover, the CNMJ (Journalistic Occupations National Conference), gathering the main training schools and professional associations, has a project of creating a ‘professional passport’, including 100 hours of lessons providing basic knowledge in deontology and professional rules to all journalists.

Trade unions and professional associations Trade unions and associations, the main examples being the Syndicat National des Journalistes (SNJ – Journalists National Trade Union), founded in 1918, and the Association des Journalistes Républicains Français (French Republican Journalists’ Association), founded in 1881, are the main actors in the historical context of regulation practices in French journalism. Indeed, the c­ reation 84

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of these associations, among others, at the end of the 19th and in the early 20th century has allowed the increase in the numbers of journalists as professionals and the autonomization of this professional activity: 2,000 ‘writers in the newspapers’ in 1885, 5,400 in 1895 and 6,000 in 1910. Today, there are around 3,000 journalists affiliated to the SNJ, calling for the creation of a deontological authority.21 This phenomenon cannot be separated from either the process of autonomization of the profession or the political and literary fields and the ‘amateurishness’ of the early ‘intellectual’ authors. The creation of the international Assises du journalisme in 2008 followed on from this tendency, becoming a place of debate and reflection every year for the profession. In 2012, an Observatory of deontology of information (ODI) was created by journalists, editors, associations of civil society and experts for “contributing to the awareness of the importance of deontology” in the media. Their annual report in 2013 pointed out the main failures and ‘good practices’ in matters of deontology, and tried to analyse them (ODI, 2014). Nonetheless, trade unions and professional associations contribute principally to regulating the profession by the production of different ethical charters that have limited constraining power.

L’association de préfiguration d’un conseil de la presse (the Association Anticipating a Press Council) Contrary to many Western European countries, France does not have a press council. Attempts at creating the Cour d’Honneur de la presse (Press Honour Council) in 1946 and the Project of Conseil de presse (Press Council Project) in 1973 did not succeed. In 2006, a group of journalists created the Association de préfiguration d’un conseil de presse (APCP – Association Anticipating a Press Council), based on European examples. Its aim was to create a Press Council, which would mean a strong level of institutionalization and the internalization of the critics.The latest report on self-regulation urged by the Ministry of Culture and Communication pleads for this creation. Nonetheless, according to the huge diversity of interests and practices in journalism, this will remain fairly illusory, even if the state appears to be the sole authority able to frame the debate and urge action.

Ombudsmen Ombudsmen appeared in France in 1994, first in the print media (Le Monde), followed by public broadcast channels France 2 and France 3. Nowadays, the practice of ombudsmen is far from being generalized (there were around 10 ombudsmen in 2015, down from 15 a decade ago) and depends on the will of press institutions to create one (Baisnée and Balland, 2011). Up to the present, we can observe a general tendency marked by the increasing rarity of ombudsmen and the reduction of their visibility, particularly after the suppression in 2008 of the France 2 television programme dedicated to their ombudsmen. Besides their increasing rarity, some changes have occurred in the ombudsman role (ODI, 2014): Created initially by newsroom directors to contribute to media credibility, they tend to act less and less as a ‘mediator’ between the public and the newsroom for embracing the role of ‘educator’ (counselling the newsroom or the hierarchy, or explaining the ‘production of information’ to the public). On the other hand, audiovisual ombudsmen tend to get closer to the CSA (reflection on common projects). Thus, they neither have the same legitimacy nor the same credibility as in other countries (Bernier, 2011).

The role of social networks Social networks (in particular Facebook or Twitter) can also provide the opportunity for transparency, allowing journalists to render their information accessible to their public of 85

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‘followers’. However, it appears that Twitter remains a promoting tool for articles and for journalists among their peers. The concept of collaborative news production is still rare in France, but not non-existent. There are a few opportunities for coproducing news, like Mediapart.fr, which offers the possibility to its subscribers to run their own news production (often in their area of expertise). Le Post.fr, in a larger format, publishes readers’ articles (specifying the status of this information) and Rue.89 allows readers to contribute to a news conference online. Online journalism has a short history, yet Internet-specific practices have evolved rapidly in France. Some practices have disappeared while others have taken on a growing importance. The arena of journalists’ blogs is now rather deserted. While many French journalists had a blog during the early 2000s, they are often inactive now and have been replaced by microblogging through Twitter. As this appears to be peculiar to France, we will particularly stress this aspect. The importance Twitter now has in the daily work of French journalists is even more surprising as the public have not adopted Twitter to the same extent. Twitter also appears as a way to exchange information with readers and their followers (and colleagues), who represent an elite readership for them. In this respect, Twitter appears much more important and effective than comments (on websites) to their articles that are now devalued (because they are often biased, and due to people trolling the forums), except in specific cases. If T   witter is also a way to promote an individual journalist’s production (having a high number of followers is also important for the newsroom who hires the journalist),Twitter would also appear to be a means to control and to cross-check the work of these journalists. In a way, while journalists often do not know whether they are doing a good job (other than those who consider the audience a good way to evaluate the quality of production), social networking on the Internet has made it possible to know almost instantly what others (the audience and colleagues) think of the article just produced. As one journalist put it: “When you misbehave, they kick your ass”. Twitter now ensures this ‘article promotion’ functions by spreading the articles on the social networks; not only promotion but also control of what is published is ensured by readers but also (and foremost) by other journalists. To conclude, Twitter ensures a collective regulation function within the profession and especially among online journalists. Thus, it contributes to the setting of new hierarchies within this journalistic subspace as the recognition from peers and followers provides retributions (within the newsroom and within the profession and, consequently, notoriety) and creates new forms of journalistic excellence within online journalism. The transparency of individual journalists is quite variable across the journalistic (online) space and tends to be related to the media in which they write. Otherwise, it often consists of providing online news with bylines and, more rarely, with a photo of the journalist (mostly writing in their op-ed sections). Journalists’ blogs could also be used as a transparency tool (besides the aspect of personal branding), allowing journalists to develop extra news for a story or to contextualize some data they have provided. These practices of transparency are also highly variable in online journalism, depending mostly on the news organizations and journalists. In general, transparency often consists of providing links to original sources (even if it remains an unsystematic practice) or explanations on the process of producing a story. One interviewee explained the process of production using the ‘Betancourt affair’,22 which required (even in a legal way) collective reflection on the practices of the media and the journalists involved. Indeed, this case is based on thousands of hours of tape recording, which raised the issue of privacy as editors had to select those aspects that were relevant to public interest (fraud, diversion of funds, etc.). 86

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Innovative instruments of media accountability Online journalism, when it comes to accountability and deontology, has created or accentuated two (fairly opposite) tendencies. On the one hand, the automaticity of audience rates (number of page views, etc.) and of news ranking (both by aggregators and by websites themselves) has fuelled the ‘click tyranny’, as journalists are invited to produce news that will attract online viewers. On the other hand, the Internet also proposes new instruments to hold the media accountable. Both the social web (audience commenting news through Twitter and Facebook) and online tools (articles’ comments, correction buttons, sometimes journalists’ contacts) have empowered the part of the audience that is active online (which should not be confused with the entire audience). Besides, responsiveness instruments are quite usual in French online news services. The key aspect is their real effectiveness in the production of news. Indeed, the way media use this interactivity with the audience depends mostly on the media and varies between cases of dialogue with the audience and, on the other hand, an absence of consideration of these feedbacks. In this perspective, forums are widespread in the online comments on news. However, journalists tend generally not to consider them as important in the production of news, because of the people trolling these forums.

The rise of low-cost journalism Some media (e.g. Libération, Télérama) have integrated an online newsroom within (geographically speaking) the traditional ones. Such changes have created tensions, especially in newsrooms very much attached to their professional excellence image. In Le Monde, for example, the arrival of the pre-existing online newsroom (lemonde.fr) in the building of the newspaper created fierce debate and tensions. The rise of online newsrooms and, more generally, of online practices (growing pressure towards convergence) in French journalism is linked to the growing economic constraints and difficulties French media have encountered. The Internet has appeared as a potential new source of income for newspapers facing a dramatic drop in their advertising revenue (and the rise of audiovisual media) and a shrinking readership. Yet the uncertainty about the economic model of online media (and of the online versions of traditional media) has also produced a form of ‘cheap journalism’, practiced by young, underpaid, precarious journalists (Estienne, 2007).

New media, new practices? Online media accountability is related to the way online journalism has emerged, which in France has represented a rather devaluated professional subspace with blurred borders. In this respect, the situation has changed dramatically. Distinctions between a ‘noble’ journalism (traditional print media) and a devaluated one (online journalism) are still used by parts of the profession to stigmatize what remains a repulsive medium for professional journalists (ibid., p. 153). Yet the success of the Internet and the growth of both online media and online journalism has not only increased the visibility of this professional subspace but also contributed to the diversification and organization of practices and of professional representations of the job of ‘online journalist’. Online media accountability, then, is also more varied than online journalism.

Online critique of journalism A few enterprises of external accountability do exist, particularly in the context of the general trend in journalism to not ‘air the dirty laundry in front of the guests’ and to handle 87

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questions of accountability. First, some websites such as acrimed.org or arrêtsurimages.com, dedicated to media, have (since the late 1990s) challenged the journalistic monopoly over media critics and ethics. As a media observatory, these media websites debate journalistic practices and provide some documentation about media accountability. The most well-known institution, known by the acronym of their website, is ACRIMED (Action-Critique-Medias), an Internet association comprising trade unions, individuals, academics, journalists and citizens who pool their documentation on deontology and organize symposiums and meetings. Finally, some new websites have appeared recently, such as journalisme.com, which presents itself as “the website of all journalists”, promoting debates and perspectives about practices in journalism, and gathering information about the profession. In summary, the development of an exogenous criticism of media can be seen as a byproduct of the low degree of institutionalization of media accountability in France. As state intervention is still rather strong but considered to be politically biased, and since endogenous regulation of practices presents a low degree of institutionalization and effectiveness, some actors (scholars, intellectuals, citizens, etc.) have grasped the opportunity of ‘going online’ to express their discontent about the actual state of journalism in France.

Conclusion Constantly proclaimed to be a reality, media accountability in France remains today (merely) an idea that hardly influences journalistic practices. On the one hand, economic and political constraints still shape the context of the profession: Politicians and prestigious journalists ‘work’ together because of their social closeness, while the remainder get increasingly unstable labour conditions. On the other hand, we observe that propositions to hold the media accountable are discussed by the most prestigious fringe of French journalism, meaning the Parisian print media, while they leave behind all the other journalists. Besides the efforts within the profession to regulate its activities, we find many attempts by the state as well, even if its participation in regulation claims to give the journalistic field the greatest possible autonomy. The Sirinelli report reminds us that “any form of additional public regulation appears, in this field, barely possible” (Sirinelli, 2014).The measures proposed are more “encouragement” to auto-regulation, with the creation of a transversal auto-regulation authority (similar to a Press Council) or a reinforcement of the current accountability tools (a better diffusion of deontology information, etc.).

Notes   1 All translations from French are the responsibility of the authors.   2 Information available online: http://www.metiers-presse.org/?uid=7   3 This study was made by Technologia, an independent, private enterprise focused on working conditions and risks. It is available online: http://www.technologia.fr/blog/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/ Technologia-Etude-journalisme-mars-2011.pdf  4 http://www.technologia.fr  5 Baromètre de la confiance dans les medias 2015, TNS SOFRES. Available online: http://www.tns-sofres. com/sites/default/files/2015.01.29-baromedias.pdf   6 Decision of October 30 and 31, 1981.   7 Decision of July 27, 1982.   8 Decision of October 10 and 11, 1984, on Press industries.   9 Decision of January 17, 1989. 10 A longer description of the French media system is available online at: http://ejc.net/media_landscapes/france. The data in the following paragraphs have been collected by Martin Pasquier and Bernard Lamizet for the European Journalism Center.

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France 11 To get the entire panorama of the literature on journalistic deontology, see Hulin (2013). 12 France also includes the overseas territories in the Pacific and Indian Oceans. 13 As an example to illustrate the questioning of high political parallelism, we might point out the final results of the comparative survey on journalistic framing of immigration in the US and in France led by Rodney Benson (2010), where he argues that even if French political parallelism is higher than in America, it is only slightly higher in the sense that the French media emphasizes pluralism, as in the case of the ‘debate ensemble’, where many different points of view are put together. Please note that this comparison relies on two opposing models proposed by Hallin and Mancini (2004a), which allows us to think that if French political parallelism is slightly higher than in the US, its political parallelism is not as significant as supposed earlier. 14 Data from the MediaAcT survey (Baisnée and Vera-Zambrano, 2014). 15 The dominant television channel TF1 belongs to Bouygues, which is one of the biggest building and civil engineering groups in the world. Bouygues’ type of market is strongly dependent on the action of national diplomacy abroad and on the domestic public markets. Most media analysts were struck, in 1994–1995, by TF1’s over-friendly coverage of the presidential campaign of Prime Minister Balladur, who – before the fatal collapse of public support – was enthusiastically depicted as the future president. 16 http://www.ccijp.net 17 Seventy percent of the newspaper copies sold each day in France are regional titles such as Ouest France, the first French newspaper to sell 800,000 copies a day. 18 The ‘Brachard’ law of 1935 has been complemented by the ‘Crassard’ law in 1975, which removed from the previous text the idea of a minimum salary for being a journalist. 19 The balance comes from undergraduate studies in college or from journalism studies taught in less recognized institutions, which marginally include deontology in their syllabus. 20 The official recognition of these schools is, among others, organized by the CPNEJ (National Joint Commission of the Journalistic Employment). This commission was created after 1976 and comprised members from the main trade unions and press agencies having a consultative role to acknowledge journalists’ schools. 21 After the Congress of V   illeurbanne in October 2012, the SNJ called again for the creation of a deontological authority. 22 Interview with a journalist of Mediapart, December 2010.

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12 Germany Disregarded diversity Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler, Mariella Bastian and Janis Brinkmann

Abstract Compared to other European countries, the German media landscape is characterized by a considerable variety of MAIs. Among them, the German Press Council and its code of ethics play a central role, while self-regulatory mechanisms at the newsroom level are slowly gaining ground. Media criticism has a long tradition in German journalism; up until now, however, it has had to cope with the inevitable problems of self-referentiality. A lively German media blogosphere and other innovative accountability instruments on the social web offer new stimuli to media self-regulation, even though they still lack differentiation. Despite the diversity of the German media accountability culture, the basic problem of how to attract the attention of a larger nonjournalistic audience remains an issue for many of the existing MAIs.

Introduction In Germany, a broad range of instruments is serving as a means of holding the media accountable to the public (see also Eberwein, 2011). A press council was established in the 1950s, there are several trade journals and the leading quality media all maintain regular media pages covering journalism and the media business. While the concept of the news ombudsman has not been successfully implemented in German journalism culture until today, many German news outlets have started to experiment with innovative media accountability and transparency instruments online in recent years. In contrast to many other countries in Europe, there is an open and critical debate about the role of the media and journalism in society. This debate does not always strengthen the reputation of the media. In 2014, for example, the Islam-critical PEGIDA movement (Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes) reintroduced the catchword of a ‘lying press’ (Lügenpresse), a politically charged fighting term that was common in former Nazi propaganda, to denunciate the established media, thus bringing a fierce quarrel about the accountability and credibility of journalism into public discourse (Pörksen, 2015). In their daily routines, however, German journalists seem to be less susceptible to the established mechanisms of media self-regulation, as recurrent lamentations about the press council’s lack of sanction potential and its notoriety as a ‘toothless tiger’ exemplify. Compared to other Northern European countries, German journalists are somewhat more sceptical about the concept of 90

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media accountability, and are particularly concerned about a possible state intervention into the field of self-regulation, which might be traced back to experiences with censorship during the Nazi regime and the Communist era in the former German Democratic Republic. At the same time, many German media organizations seem to instrumentalize media reporting to further their own business interests. A review of the scientific literature on media self-regulation and accountability in Germany may help to verify these suspicions and also identify future perspectives for this field of study.

Journalistic culture and media system Germany has a multifaceted media landscape whose basic features were developed in the years after the Second World War, following the specifications of the Allied powers (Wilke, 1999). The essential element for the formation of the German media system is the principle of press freedom as stipulated in the Basic Law (Grundgesetz) of 1949: Every person shall have the right freely to express and disseminate his opinions in speech, writing and pictures, and to inform himself without hindrance from generally accessible sources. Freedom of the press and freedom of reporting by means of broadcasts and films shall be guaranteed. There shall be no censorship. (art. 5, par. 1) The development and status quo of the German media landscape is detailed in several textbooks (e.g. Meyn and Tonnemacher, 2012; Beck, 2012; for a recent overview in English see Schröder, Hasebrink, Dreyer, Loosen and Schröter, 2011) and is only briefly summarized here. The German print market initially appears to be particularly varied. In 2012, there were 130 ‘independent editorial units’ producing 1,532 different daily newspaper editions with aggregated sales of 18.2 million copies (Schütz, 2012). A closer examination, however, proves that a small number of publishers dominate the market for daily newspapers, with the five biggest publishing groups distributing 42.9% of the circulation (Röper, 2014). Bild, a tabloid newspaper published by Axel Springer, has a national circulation of approximately 2.3 million papers and is unrivalled in its market segment. Other than Bild, only a small number of newspapers have a national reach, including the ‘quality newspapers’ with the highest circulations of sold copies, Süddeutsche Zeitung (418,000) and Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (317,000). The majority of the subscription press sells at the regional and local levels. Alongside the daily newspapers, Germany has a buoyant market segment for magazines and weekly papers. Like the daily press, they are sufficiently reliant on sales revenue and advertising to be highly dependent on current market developments. Germany’s audiovisual media are organized in a dual system of public and commercial broadcasting.The public broadcasting corporations are responsible for a basic supply (Grundversorgung) of broadcasting services to the German people. Reflecting Germany’s federal structure, there are currently nine public broadcasting corporations under state law, which form the Federation of Public Broadcasters (ARD – Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik Deutschland). Funded primarily through license fees, each broadcaster contributes to the ‘First programme’ (Das Erste) on German television and offers at least one independent TV channel as well as four or more different radio channels in their region, thus broadcasting an aggregate of about 1,400 hours of radio and 240 hours of TV every day.1 Other main players in the field of public service broadcasting are ZDF (Zweites Deutsches Fernsehen), the nationwide television corporation, which the federal states also co-founded, and the radio corporations Deutsche Welle (DW) and Deutschlandradio. Commercial broadcasters entered the German media 91

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system in the first half of the 1980s and challenged the dominance of public broadcasting.Today, the market of the nationwide private TV broadcasters is highly concentrated, with the RTL Group and ProSiebenSat.1 Media AG in the dominant positions. By contrast, the landscape of the regional and local TV and radio programmes consists of small divisions, which change almost every month.2 The Internet, compared to print and audiovisual media, has the highest expansion rates – both in terms of users and advertising revenue. The leading journalistic online media are the news sites of the established print publishers, particularly bild.de (15.3 million unique users), Focus Online (10.9 m) and Spiegel Online (10.7 m).3 Many other websites also participate in the production and distribution of news, such as the highly visited portals of the Internet service provider T-Online, the e-mail provider Web.de and services like Google News. However, not all of these are maintained by professional newsrooms. Taken together, the German media landscape offers a wide range of possibilities for journalistic activities. There were 72,500 German journalists in 2012, with 43,500 having permanent employment (Kaiser, 2012; see also Weischenberg, Malik and Scholl, 2006). The number of 26,000 freelance journalists can be identified by their membership in the so-called Künstlersozialkasse (the social insurance institution for artists and journalists). In the future, however, many freelance journalists are expected to need a second job to earn their living – and may therefore not be included in statistical representations anymore, as these usually focus on full-time journalists (Kaiser, 2012). Hallin and Mancini (2004a, p. 143) put the German media system among the ‘Democratic Corporatist’ countries, which are characterized by the coexistence of political parallelism with the development of strong mass-circulation commercial media, a tradition of press freedom and strong journalistic professionalization. All of these criteria, with varying degrees of intensity, are typical of Germany’s media landscape, particularly the trends towards the institutionalization of professionalism and self-regulation, as the following sections will demonstrate.

Established instruments of media accountability The German media, as a consequence of journalistic professionalization, have established a wide variety of instruments of media self-regulation and accountability, both in institutionalized and non-institutionalized forms (e.g. Schicha and Brosda, 2010). Among the institutionalized media accountability instruments (MAIs), the German Press Council (Deutscher Presserat)4 is particularly important. Following the British model, it was founded in 1956 by the journalists’ and publishers’ associations in order to thwart the plans of the Federal Ministry of the Interior to install a public authority for press regulation. Up to the present, the Press Council receives sponsorship from the two journalist trade unions, DJV (Deutscher Journalisten-Verband) and dju (Deutsche Journalistinnen- und Journalisten-Union in ver.di) and also the publishers’ organizations BDZV (Bundesverband Deutscher Zeitungsverleger) and VDZ (Verband Deutscher Zeitschriftenverleger). Consequently, it remains free from state influence. As an institutionalized instrument of voluntary self-regulation of the print media, the Press Council pursues two central aims: defending the freedom of the press in Germany and attending to complaints by readers. In order to implement these tasks systematically, the Council developed the German Press Code5 in 1973, which contains ‘Guidelines for journalistic work’, and to which supplements are continuously added. The basic principles of the Press Code are, among other things, respect for the truth and preservation of human dignity, diligent and fair research, a clear distinction between editorial content and advertising and respect for the private life and intimate sphere of individuals. 92

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Focusing on the print media, the Press Code is still the central code of ethics for German journalism. If a journalist violates the Code’s principles, the Press Council can issue a ‘reprimand’ (Rüge), which is supposed to be printed in the publication concerned. In recent years, this has mostly happened in cases of breaches of personal rights, but also in the context of disregard of journalistic due diligence, sensational reporting or discrimination. In 2014, the Press Council dealt with 2,009 complaints. In 20 cases, the complaints committees considered it appropriate to issue a public reprimand and one case received a non-public reprimand. More often there were less severe sanctions, i.e. 78 ‘censures’ (Missbilligung) and 103 ‘editorial notes’ (Hinweis).6 Both the German Press Council and its Code have been the focus of repeated debates, especially after the critical audit by Manfred Rühl and Ulrich Saxer in 1981. The analyses contend that the Guidelines for journalistic work are unsystematic and incoherent (e.g. Bölke, 2000; Wunden, 2003), in some instances even counterproductive, especially when it comes to applying the professional principles of separation (information vs. advertising, information vs. fiction, information vs. opinion) and anti-discrimination (Pöttker, 2002, 2004). The organizational structures of the Council itself are also considered to be dysfunctional. Persistent conflicts between journalists and publishers seem to restrict the effectiveness of the complaint procedures (Eisermann, 1997), which consequently receive little attention within the journalistic profession (Fischer, 2008). A survey carried out by the MediaAcT project found that German journalists perceive the impact of the Council as limited. Only 30% consider the institution to have a “high” or “very high” influence on standards in journalism; however, while media/press law and company codes were regarded as more effective, almost all other MAIs seem to be even less influential (Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014). Similarly problematic is the lack of lay people on the boards of the Council; an increase might contribute to strengthening citizen participation (e.g. Wiedemann, 1996). But while the Council stays bipartite, public interest in its activities remains at a low level – just like its low impact on the quality of journalism. In 2009, the German Press Council expanded its scope to include online newspapers (Eberwein, 2010a), but not audiovisual media.With their Broadcasting Councils (ARD) and the ZDF Television Council, the public broadcasting corporations have established internal regulatory bodies whose members, however, are appointed by state actors. Even if these bodies, to some extent, fulfil tasks similar to those of the Press Council, they are not institutions of media self-regulation in the sense of vocational ethics.The same is true for the State Media Authorities (Landesmedienanstalten), which are responsible for the licensing and supervision of commercial radio and television broadcasting. Other than these institutions, several more organizations of media self-regulation exist (Baum, Langenbucher, Pöttker and Schicha, 2005). Since 1949, for example, the voluntary selfregulation authority of the cinematic industry (FSK – Freiwillige Selbstkontrolle der Filmwirtschaft)7 takes care of the age-rating system for films, video cassettes and DVDs with ex ante tests. A similar system is applied by the USK (Unterhaltungssoftware Selbstkontrolle),8 which focuses on computer games. Since 1972, the German Advertising Standards Council (Deutscher Werberat),9 and since 1987, the German Council for Public Relations (Deutscher Rat für Public Relations)10 deal with ethical self-regulation in advertising and PR. However, these and other institutions of media self-regulation also share the common problem that the public is hardly aware of their activities. Since 2004, this problem has been taken on by the FPS (Verein zur Förderung der publizistischen Selbstkontrolle),11 an association of media professionals and academics who strive to promote media self-regulation by monitoring the performance of the respective institutions and discussing them publicly. This summary of the shortcomings of institutionalized forms of media self-regulation demonstrates that further means are necessary for upholding the social responsibility of the media. 93

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Among the less institutionalized forms, media journalism can take a central role, because it is not only an MAI itself, but may also help other instruments to function properly by providing public attention (Bertrand, 2006). Germany has a rich tradition of media-critical reporting, with authors like Heinrich Heine, Friedrich Nietzsche and Siegfried Kracauer as prominent antecedents of the discipline (Ross, 2005). Today, there is a broad range of media journalism in all types of publications. Most of the quality papers have a daily media page (e.g. the Süddeutsche and the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung), offering coverage of media-related topics to fairly large public audiences, as do the influential news magazine Der Spiegel (circulation 2014: 876,000) and the weekly paper Die Zeit (516,000) with their media sections. However, media reporting is largely restricted to print journalism; only some of the radio channels of the public broadcasting corporations have launched weekly programmes with media coverage (e.g. ‘Markt und Medien’,12 Deutschlandfunk; ‘Texte, Töne, Bilder’,13 WDR5), and with ‘Zapp’14 (N3), there is just one weekly TV broadcast dedicated exclusively to critical media analysis. The predominant readers of the monthly media trade journals (e.g. journalist,15 M,16 medium magazin17) are journalists and media managers. However, traditional trade journals seem to lose their impact on professional debates in Germany, as they are already considered to be less influential than media blogs by German journalists (Fengler et al., 2014). The biweekly and weekly trade services epd medien18 and Funkkorrespondenz,19 both with ecclesiastical backgrounds, have a comparatively small circulation (less than 1,000 printed copies each), but they enjoy a high reputation within the journalistic profession, as well as with media policy-makers. While the diversity of Germany’s media journalism was slightly diminished by the economic crises at the turn of the millennium, media criticism has found new outlets in the established media – for example, in the guise of satire and comedy (Block, 2010). Because of the high potential of media journalism as a means for holding the media accountable, many studies have been conducted on this topic during the last two decades. Most of them come to critical conclusions about media-journalistic performance, particularly the newspapers’ media pages, which frequently focus on previews of the daily TV programmes rather than providing contextual analyses of current media topics (e.g. Krüger and Müller-Sachse, 1998, p. 72; Hillebrand, 2005, p. 48). Peer pressure, in many instances, seems to prevent critical reporting about colleagues (e.g. Kreitling, 1997; Engels, 2005), a problem that becomes even more potent when the interests of the reporter’s employer or affiliated companies are involved (e.g. RussMohl, 2000). It is not uncommon that media proprietors use media coverage to propagate their own business interests (Pointner, 2010; Brinkmann, 2016); for example, newspapers regularly attack the existence of news websites of public service broadcasting (Weiß, 2005). Moreover, the genre has a problem with audience reception: as most newsrooms do not invest in copy-tests and surveys, many media journalists do not know for whom they are actually writing (Malik, 2004, p. 300). Michael Beuthner and Stephan Weichert (2005) term these and other problems as “traps of self-observation”, in which media journalism is inevitably caught. Thus, despite the undisputed potential of this instrument of media accountability, its impact on German journalism is limited, as can also be concluded from the MediaAcT survey (Fengler et al., 2014). In the search for new ways of achieving accountability and transparency, many German media have turned, since the start of the millennium, to additional means at the newsroom level (Meier, 2010): ••

After short-lived experiments with the concept of a news ombudsman in the 1970s (Völkl, 1980), this MAI disappeared from the German media landscape, but is now being revived tentatively. The most notable example is Anton Sahlender, deputy editor-in-chief of the 94

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••

••

•• ••

regional daily Main-Post, who debuted as ‘reader advocate’ (Leseranwalt).20 Sahlender is also the spokesman of the newly founded Association of Media Ombudsmen (Vereinigung der Medien-Ombudsleute), which consists of all ten of the news ombudsmen who exercise this function at the moment in Germany.21 While codes of ethics at the newsroom level are traditionally rather uncommon in Germany, a few media organizations have issued such a document, e.g. Axel Springer22 in 2003 and the Funke Media Group (formerly WAZ Media Group)23 in 2007. The public broadcaster ZDF publishes guidelines and a code that focus primarily on the prevention of conflicting interests and corruption.The online edition of the weekly paper Die Zeit was recently criticized for relying on an internal code of ethics without making it available for the public.24 Axel Springer and the daily newspaper WAZ (Funke Media Group) were also among the first to establish a reader advisory council to provide the newsroom with suggestions about neglected topics. Other current examples are the regional newspapers Braunschweiger Zeitung (also Funke Media Group) and Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung. Even the idea of a correction corner, which German media have disregarded for a long time, seems to have gained ground now, as current examples from the tageszeitung (taz) or the Berliner Zeitung may illustrate. Although most German newsrooms are still not accessible to the general public, there are some notable exceptions: in several instances, the taz openly invited its readers via Facebook to take part in newsroom meetings. ‘Editorial Conference’ (Redaktionskonferenz)25 is even the title of a programme aired by the public service radio station DRadio Wissen, which is broadcast in the evenings from Monday to Thursday. Here, web channel listeners are invited to phone in and discuss the editorial decisions of the day with the relevant journalists.

None of these instruments are innovations in media accountability as they have a long tradition in the United States and in other European countries. In Germany, however, they seem to have great potential for development, in the contexts of both practical journalism and journalism research.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Besides these rather conventional MAIs, the Internet has generated new stimuli for innovations in media self-regulation in recent years. Probably the best-known journalist blog is Bildblog,26 a media watchblog designed initially to examine the coverage of the notorious tabloid Bild, but now also keeping watch on other media. A popular newsroom blog is blog.tagesschau.de.27 Several writers from the newsroom of Tagesschau and Tagesthemen, the main newscasts on Das Erste, use this blog to discuss their editorial strategies with the users. Pottblog28 and Ruhrbarone29 are lively citizen blogs from the Ruhr Area, which, among other posts, comment on media topics on an irregular basis, especially on the performance of the regional newspaper WAZ. The daily Trierischer Volksfreund30 was one of the first newspapers to incorporate audience blogs into its website, thus enabling a counterpoint to the reporting of its own journalists. In recent years, other regional dailies – such as Augsburger Allgemeine31 and Aachener Zeitung/Aachener Nachrichten32 – have been following this example. Obviously, media blogs, as a format of media criticism, experienced a very dynamic development during the last decade – and triggered hopes that they might help media reporting to escape from the “trap of self-observation” (Eberwein, 2008). Initial exploratory examinations of the above-mentioned and similar media-related blogs underscored the potential of this type of media criticism. A content analysis suggested that media watchblogs may even have a higher 95

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journalistic quality than traditional journalism, especially with regard to topicality, variety, comprehensibility, entertainment value, interactivity and hypermediality (Hutter, 2009). Other studies pointed out that media criticism in blogs may be a potent means of monitoring the contents and form of journalistic coverage, especially in the area of tabloid journalism (Schönherr, 2008), and that users of media watchblogs may be motivated to reflect on the criteria for ‘good journalism’ (Mayer et al., 2008). Moreover, journalist and media blogs can apparently serve as a potent means for reflecting editorial decisions and generating user feedback (Wied and Schmidt, 2008; Theis-Berglmair, 2009). However, lessons from the United States exemplify that the German media blogosphere was underdeveloped from the very beginning, particularly with regards to a lack of sustainable business models and possible schemes for self-regulation (Fengler, 2008). This critical assessment is backed by another content analysis (Eberwein, 2010b), which demonstrates that a key feature of many German-language media blogs is a lack of continuity in their reporting. As most watchbloggers in Germany do not have the time or money to cultivate the role of a controlling force of the media, Degen and Spiller (2012) conclude that this instrument of media accountability has long been overrated. Consequently, Germany’s Internet users increasingly activate other channels on the social web for public media criticism. The micro-blogging service Twitter is useful both as a tool for prolonging discussions about topics set by traditional media reporting on other platforms and for pinpointing new issues which need further analysis. For example, it has been thriving as a space that enables recipients to use their mobile media (tablets, smartphones etc.) as a ‘second screen’ while watching television, turning them into a platform for instantaneous TV criticism that is often quicker and more pluralistic than professional film reviews (Hofmeyer, 2014; Buschow and Schneider, 2015). A similar trend is observable in the case of social networks like Facebook – at least since 2010, when 21 people died in a mass panic in the narrow underpass which served as the only entrance to the ‘Love Parade’ techno music festival in the city of Duisburg. The tragic catastrophe triggered an exceedingly large amount of media coverage, not all of which adhered to the standards of professional journalism. Due to the over-sensational portrayal of the mayhem and suffering in the ‘tunnel of death’ by Germany’s leading tabloid newspaper Bild, the German Press Council had to deal with nearly 250 readers’ complaints. Many of them resulted from a heated discussion on various Facebook pages, where angered users had circulated complaint forms that led to an unprecedented run on the institution (Evers and Eberwein, 2011). Other widely debated instances of public media criticism via social networks in Germany include the case of a sports anchor using questionable language,33 and an ‘online petition’ launched against a famous talk show host for treating a leftist politician unfairly.34 Examples like these are instructive since they showcase the potential of social media to mobilize larger groups of media users and make them join forces, in order to generate a novel kind of ‘participatory media regulation’ (Fengler, 2012; Eberwein, Leppik-Bork and Lönnendonker, 2013), which was largely unknown in the pre-Internet era. However, as the MediaAcT study demonstrates, the average German journalist considers the impact of innovative online MAIs (such as user comments, journalist blogs or media criticism via social networks) to be rather low at the moment, while the younger journalistic actors at least seem to pay perceivably more attention to these instruments (Fengler et al., 2014).

Conclusion Compared to the situation in other countries within Europe and beyond, Germany’s journalism culture comprises a broad variety of instruments for maintaining the social responsibility of the 96

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media. Although the concepts of ombudsmanship or newsroom transparency do not have a tradition in Germany, many other MAIs are integral constituents of the country’s media landscape. In that respect, Germany is among the European countries with an advanced infrastructure of media accountability. However, despite the pivotal role of the German Press Council and its code of ethics, its impact on the profession remains slight, not only because of its focus on newspaper and magazine journalism. Although media criticism has a long tradition in national journalism history, it still has to cope with the inevitable problems of self-referentiality, which impedes its bearing on the public quality discourse. Online MAIs may bring new aspects to this discourse, but up to now their public visibility is limited to a few noteworthy controversies. Moreover, the reviewed literature demonstrates that both the established and web-based instruments of self-regulation do have further deficiencies, if looked at from a comparative perspective. The international MediaAcT survey found that their impact on journalistic practices in Germany remains lower than in comparable countries like Switzerland and Finland, where co-regulation models have resulted in a higher acceptance of the different MAIs within the profession in recent years, or where less hierarchical newsroom structures obviously encourage more internal criticism. The comparative view thus makes it reasonable to describe the media accountability culture in Germany as both differentiated and pluralistic, but also largely disregarded and not well thought of by professional actors and the public in general. Finding strategies to minimize this discrepancy will be one of the key tasks for future media policy initiatives – and for applied media accountability research, if it wants to make a difference.

Notes   1 For details see: http://www.ard.de/intern/organisation/  2 For a current overview, see the surveys by the Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Landesmedienanstalten (ALM): http://www.alm.de   3 AGOF/Internet facts 2014-01 (http://www.agof.de)  4 http://www.presserat.de  5 https://www.presserat.de/fileadmin/user_upload/Downloads_Dateien/Pressekodex13english_web.pdf  6 http://www.presserat.de/beschwerde/statistiken/  7 http://www.spio.de  8 http://www.usk.de  9 http://www.werberat.de 10 http://www.drpr-online.de 11 http://www.publizistische-selbstkontrolle.de 12 http://www.dradio.de/dlf/sendungen/marktundmedien/ 13 http://www.wdr5.de/sendungen/toene-texte-bilder.html 14 http://www.ndr.de/zapp/ 15 http://www.journalist.de 16 http://www.verdi.de/mmm/ 17 http://www.mediummagazin.de 18 http://www.epd.de/medien/ 19 http://funkkorrespondenz.kim-info.de 20 http://www.mainpost.de/nachrichten/leseranwalt/ 21 http://www.vdmo.de 22 http://www.axelspringer.de/artikel/Leitlinien-der-journalistischen-Unabhaengigkeit-bei-AxelSpringer_40856.html 23 http://www.initiative-qualitaet.de/fileadmin/IQ/Archiv/Rundmails/iq_rundmail_19_kodex.pdf 24 http://www.stefan-niggemeier.de/blog/17470/im-wortlaut-der-code-of-ethics-von-zeit-online/ 25 http://wissen.dradio.de/index.91.de.html 26 http://www.bildblog.de

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Eberwein, Fengler, Bastian and Brinkmann 27 http://blog.tagesschau.de 28 http://www.pottblog.de 29 http://www.ruhrbarone.de 30 http://blog.volksfreund.de 31 http://www.augsburger-allgemeine.de/community/ 32 http://www.aachener-zeitung.de/blogs/serendipity/index.php?/pages/Ihre-Texte-in-unserenLeserblogs.html 33 See e.g. “Innerer Reichsparteitag für Klose”. Spruch von ZDF-Moderatorin löst Protest aus. Spiegel Online, 14.6.2010: http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/tv/innerer-reichsparteitag-fuer-klose-spruch-vonzdf-moderatorin-loest-protest-aus-a-700458.html 34 See e.g. “Die Wutwelle aufschäumen”, interview with Bernhard Pörksen, Die Zeit, 30.1.2014.

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13 Greece Between systemic inefficiencies and nascent opportunities online Evangelia Psychogiopoulou and Anna Kandyla

Abstract The purpose of this chapter is to examine the status quo of media accountability in Greece by engaging in a study of the available instruments for holding the media to account, with due consideration given to the potential for new technologies and media education and training to promote responsible journalism. The analysis shows that MAIs in Greece appear to be slowly diversifying. This is the case despite the fact that traditional accountability tools are missing or show important shortcomings. However, it is too early to detect any emerging accountability culture online or to point to any systematic media scrutiny activity on behalf of media users.

Introduction Trust in the Greek media among the population is low. A recent Eurobarometer survey (European Commission, 2013) suggests that a clear majority distrusts the press (74%), television (84%) and radio (65%). In another 2013 study, 91% of respondents believed that the media in Greece primarily serve the interests of their owners. In particular, the credibility and objectivity of the news programmes offered by mainstream television operators were severely questioned (Tvxs.gr, 2013). Both studies depict a bleak picture for the Greek media, raising key questions about responsible journalism and media accountability. However, academic research has been limited in the field, focusing for the most part on journalists’ ethical standards and self-regulation more broadly (Anthopoulos, 1999; Deligianni, 2004). The purpose of this chapter is to examine the status quo of media accountability in Greece by engaging in a study of the available instruments for holding the media to account. The analysis starts with a succinct overview of the key characteristics of the Greek media system. It then explores existing accountability instruments, with due account taken of the potential for new technologies and media education and training to promote responsible journalism. The chapter ends with some concluding remarks.

Journalistic culture and media system Drawing from Hallin and Mancini’s seminal work, Comparing Media Systems: Three Models of Media and Politics (2004a), Greece falls under the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model. 99

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Strong state intervention in media development and regulation, high political parallelism and low levels of journalist professionalization define the operation of the Greek media and the processes by which journalists engage in reporting and generally perceive their role. Essential elements of professionalization, such as autonomy, distinct professional norms and a public service orientation in the exercise of journalism, have not received significant attention. This has translated into little respect for journalistic ethics (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, pp. 109–114; Psychogiopoulou, Kandyla and Anagnostou, 2014). Low levels of professionalization are related to political parallelism and the instrumentalization of the media, defined as the control of the media by politicians or economic actors with a view to intervening in politics (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, p. 37). In Greece, the deregulation of the electronic media in the late 1980s was marked by the entry into the media market of business people with substantial investments in other sectors of the economy. Together with the existing publishers, who expanded their activities in broadcasting, these industrialists came to dominate the media market (Papathanassopoulos, 1997, p. 360), a pattern that persists today. A good number of press and broadcasting outlets have never been economically self-sufficient; rather, they operated with losses and were maintained as a means to exert pressure on the government of the day in favour of the non-media-related business interests of their proprietors. This trend is reflected in the excessive number of traditional media outlets available despite the economic crisis. In 2014, the newspaper market featured 35 general interest national newspapers and around 400 local and regional newspapers (Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, 2014; Secretariat General of Information and Communication-Secretariat General of Mass Media, 2014).The large number of titles on offer is disproportionate to the traditionally low (Leandros, 2010, p. 892) and declining levels of circulation: from 155.6 million copies in 2009, the circulation of national newspapers fell to 52.8 million copies in 2014 (Athens Daily Newspaper Publishers Association, 2009, 2014). The Sunday press remains strong in terms of sales with the most popular titles being the tabloid Πρώτο Θέμα (Prwto Thema) (6 million copies in 2014), followed by Το Εθνος της Κυριακής (To Ethnos tis Kyriakis) (4.8 million copies) and Το Βήμα της Κυριακής (To Vima tis Kyriakis) (4 million copies), both published by conglomerates with interests in the broadcast market and other sectors of the economy, as well as Realnews (3.8 million copies), founded by a well-known journalist. The most vocal illustration of media instrumentalization is that for many years private broadcasters have been allowed to function without valid licenses. This has resulted in a densely filled audio-visual media landscape comprising 123 television channels, nine of which are of national range, and around 900 regional radio channels in 2014.1 The national channels, which belong to conglomerates with activities in many sectors of the economy, dominate the television market (Leandros, 2010, p. 891). Mega TV takes the lead with 20.3% of the audience share in 2013, followed by Ant1 (17.1%), Alpha TV (13%) and Star Channel (15.7%).2 Quite importantly, these channels attracted 98.9% of the television advertising expenditure in 2013.3 Besides market control, the failure to adopt, in the analogue era, a sound legal framework for radio and television licensing has had important implications for the power relations that developed between the state and private media operators, nurturing interweaving interests. The transition to digital terrestrial broadcasting has not brought an end to the preferential links established between political elites and audio-visual operators (Psychogiopoulou and Kandyla, 2013). Concurrently, the extent to which the public service operator Νέα Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία, Ίντερνετ και Τηλεόραση (NERIT),4 the successor of Ελληνική Ραδιοφωνία Τηλεόραση (ERT)5 following the latter’s controversial disbandment in 2013 (Psychogiopoulou and Kandyla, 2013), will escape government intervention – breaking with past practices – and contribute to the development of accountable journalism, is debatable (Ekathimerini.com, 2014). 100

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The instrumentalization of the Greek media stands in stark contrast with the prescriptions of the Greek Constitution (Karakostas, 2005). The Constitution safeguards the individual right to freedom of speech, recognizes the freedom of the press and affirms the right of all persons to participate in the information society (arts. 5A and 14(1)-(2)). The constitutional recognition of the freedom of expression and the freedom of the press has been construed as limiting state intervention for the regulation of journalistic activity, paving the way for self-regulation. The Constitution, on the other hand, states that radio and television remain under the “direct control of the state” and determines the values that audio-visual media should serve (art. 15(2)). The regulation of broadcast media content, including in the form of information services, has accordingly rested mainly on state regulation.

Established instruments of media accountability Established instruments of media accountability in Greece stem essentially from the profession itself. They were either devised by journalists or inspired by journalistic discourse on professional standards. The Code of Journalists’ Professional, Ethical and Social Responsibility (the Code) features prominently among these instruments. It was adopted, in May 1998, by Ένωση Συντακτών Ημερησίων Εφημερίδων Αθηνών (ESIEA),6 the trade union of journalists of the daily newspapers of Athens, and was subsequently approved by Πανελλήνια Ομοσπονδία Ενώσεων Συντακτών (POESY)7 (POESY, 1998). It thus applies to all members of the journalists’ unions that are members of the federation, and covers journalistic behaviour in the press, the audiovisual media and, at present, the online media as well. The Code considers the principal duty of journalists to be the revelation of truth. Journalists are under an obligation to provide information that is true, accurate, verified and without prejudice; to abstain from distorting or withholding information; to remedy, without delay, any incorrect information and false claims that affect the honour and reputation of others; and to distinguish between news and opinion.They are also required to treat all citizens equally and without discrimination, to verify and document the information that they collect and to ensure the secrecy of their sources.The Code further proclaims the duty of journalists to defend democracy, to denounce state authoritarianism and abuses on behalf of media owners, to stand up for journalistic independence and to refuse to carry out assignments that contradict journalistic ethics. Financial transparency is seen as a fundamental element of professional credibility and integrity. Journalists must refuse payment from secret government, public or private funds, desist from accepting any benefits that affect their impartiality and avoid conflicts of interest that compromise their autonomy. Poor working conditions are generally deemed to undermine ethical conduct. The Code therefore declares the duty of journalists to support the activities of their trade union and to fight against the downgrading of their labour rights. Professional solidarity is viewed as contributing to the attainment of collective goals and, more widely, to the social image of the profession. Journalists have to respect the personality of their colleagues, refrain from making accusations against them that lack a solid basis and condemn the usurping of others’ work. None of these duties is understood as curtailing free speech and many of them are also formulated as journalistic rights. Greece lacks a press council. The enforcement of the Code rests with the journalists’ trade unions. Presently, there are four regionally organized unions for the journalists employed in the daily press, the broadcast media and news agencies (ESIEA, ESIEMTH,8 ESIEPIN9 and ESIETHSEE10). Another association, ESPIT,11 represents journalists who work for magazines, non-daily newspapers and online news portals. Statistics on the number of journalists working in Greece do not exist and the number of unionized journalists is not disclosed. 101

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The rulebook of the unions states that violating the Code amounts to a disciplinary offence.12 The responsibility for the enforcement of the Code lies with the unions’ disciplinary councils, which are also entrusted with the task of ensuring compliance with the professional and ethical obligations laid down for journalists in the unions’ rulebook. These mirror the content of the Code but also extend to other issues such as the journalists’ relationships with their union. The disciplinary councils, which are exclusively composed of journalists as elected union members, may act ex officio or on the basis of complaints. They only investigate allegations of breach of the Code (and of the unions’ rulebook) by union members. Union membership is not mandatory and is subject to requirements with respect to work experience, among other issues, which means that not everyone in the profession falls within their remit. In the case of breach, the disciplinary councils may impose sanctions, which range from reprimands to membership suspension or expulsion. ESIEA also benefits from a supervisory ethics body, which debates ethics and monitors journalistic behaviour (ESIEA, 2014a) mostly by issuing communications on the basis of majority voting. In ESIEMTH, a council of honour and ethics, composed of member journalists, deals with the application of the Code (but not with members’ disciplinary offences) by hearing cases ex officio or based on complaints.13 Ethical standards for journalism in the audio-visual media are provided or mandated by legislation. Replicating the provisions of the Code, domestic legislation prescribes the requirements that audio-visual media news and other journalistic and political programmes must meet.14 Notably, it also requires television and radio broadcasters to draw up multi-party self-regulatory agreements in order to determine the ethical rules and principles to be respected in their programmes.15 Compliance with these agreements must be scrutinized by special ethics committees, consisting of representatives of the media outlets committed to abiding by their rules. Whether any ethics agreements have been concluded is unclear, but for sure, no special ethics committees have been established. Some internal ethics committees have been created instead but these only pertain to nationwide television operators and are largely inactive (NCRT, 2011, p. 37). The heated debate that ERT’s abrupt closure generated has gone hand in hand with arguments about the need to secure an independent and accountable public service operator. Although the decision to shut down ERT appears to have been driven mainly by financial austerity considerations (Psychogiopoulou and Kandyla, 2013, pp. 144–145), regulatory intervention sought to strengthen the accountability of public service media. An ethics watchdog, in the form of an ombudsman, has been established within NERIT to examine disputes, complaints and requests for the exercise of the right of reply.16 Moreover, NERIT possesses an ethics committee, consisting of NERIT’s ombudsman and two other members.17 The ethics committee is to deliver opinions on ethics in relation to NERIT programmes and services; examine any important ethical issues raised by the ombudsman, the general manager or the members of the supervisory board of NERIT; and also draft an ethics code. During the past few months, NERIT is reported to have been working on its ethics code.This should target the information content of its various services, irrespective of the platform used (television, radio, the Internet), and draw on the ethical standards of the Code and those contained in the legislation. Alongside these instruments, media-critical reporting is also available, mostly through infotainment and satirical programmes on current affairs broadcast by mainstream audio-visual media. Although the purpose of these programmes is not media criticism per se, they often pinpoint ethics breaches. The journalists’ unions also occasionally exercise media criticism. In certain instances, ESIEA, in particular, has taken a harsh stance on alleged disrespect for balanced reporting and impartiality (ESIEA, 2014b). Such activity, however, is not systematic and it has been supplanted by the union’s advocacy activity on journalists’ labour rights and ­working 102

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c­onditions. Other media accountability mechanisms include so-called ‘letters to the editor’, which enable users to comment on reporting and are often published.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Overall, the Greek media were latecomers in terms of going online. Major Greek newspapers started experimenting with their online presence in 2005, while radio and television stations followed later (Spyridou, Matsiota,Veglis, Kalliris and Dimoulas, 2013, p. 82). Initially, the online versions of newspapers did not differ substantially from their print equivalents as they made limited use of interactive features allowing responsiveness (Spyridou and Veglis, 2008). Today responsiveness has increased, with most newspapers offering various interactive applications in their online editions, such as below-the-line comment functions or buttons that enable users to rate articles and share content on social media (Milioni, Vadratsikas and Papa, 2012, pp. 28–30). Additional features that facilitate interaction, such as media blogs written by staff journalists and professional columnists, are incorporated in the online editions of many newspapers, but their number is declining (Doudaki and Spyridou, 2014, p. 10). Lacking a general blogger’s culture, it seems that some journalists stopped blogging after a trial phase, while others went on to create their own blog “away from the medium they work for to express their views freely” (Doudaki and Spyridou, 2014, p. 11).That said, the extent to which existing in-house media blogs are used to comment on media issues and to debate media output and editorial agendas has not been evaluated. No doubt, commenting opportunities and social network share-links do allow for conversations among users and between users and professionals and thus provide platforms for media criticism and scrutiny. Yet, their use by newspapers is prompted mostly by marketing imperatives (Doudaki and Spyridou, 2014, p. 17) rather than by a genuine concern to encourage the development of participative, decentralized and accountable journalistic practices online. Generally speaking, it appears that established news media organizations are still reluctant to explore the opportunities offered by the web in this respect.The websites of newspapers have been found to display a limited degree of openness to readers in the stages of agenda setting and information filtering, which are of most significance for the news production process (Milioni, Vadratsikas and Papa, 2012, p. 28). Newsroom blogs explaining editorial decisions have not been established and online practices that would have allowed users to witness or participate in news production are lacking. A recent study of the manner in which journalists perceive and use the web in their working routines (Spyridou et al., 2013) illustrates that Greek journalists are rather wary of the participatory potential of new technology: they give little consideration to the audience’s opinion and feedback on the content they produce and generally believe that the gatekeeping and agenda-setting functions of their profession are not to be challenged. In recent years, a number of web-only news media owned by publishing enterprises or (groups of) journalists have been established and some have become extremely popular. Compared with the websites of newspapers, these generally provide users with more opportunities to submit their own news stories but, still, do not allow them to get involved in news processing and editing (Milioni, Vadratsikas and Papa, 2012). Tvxs.gr, an online news website built on the notion of ‘independent’ online journalism, initially enabled users to decide, by means of rating various topics, the news agenda of the day. While this practice has been abandoned, Tvxs.gr incorporates several audience blogs, enables subscribed members to submit stories and has created a vibrant user community (Giannakoulopoulos, Varlamis and Kouloglou, 2012, p. 298), which is often critical of journalists’ output and editorial choices. In 2011, for instance, a number of users actively challenged the decision of the website moderators to erase some users’ accounts without justification (Milioni,Vadratsikas and Papa, 2012, p. 41). 103

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Though not devoted to media criticism and journalistic accountability, several online media debate news coverage and, at times, expose media misconduct. Typologies.gr, info-war.gr and thepressproject.gr are indicative of this kind – until 2012, the latter having operated a media watch web page monitoring developments in the media market, media output and its accuracy. Complemented by forums of discussion and commenting, and enabled by social networks, a watchdog function that is rather novel in the Greek context appears to be emerging. To give a humorous, but not trivial, example, the exaggerated and unsupported by evidence manner in which a nationwide television channel reported on the clashes between riot police and protesters that took place in Athens in December 2014 triggered a vast number of satirical articles in news portals and comments on Twitter (In.gr, 2014). Weblogs maintained by journalists outside the media houses for which they work often cover media developments and changes in the media system. Weblogs established and run by scholars, in turn, analyse media issues and publish media-related research findings. Nevertheless, the extent to which both engage in media-critical discussions from the perspective of accountability has not been assessed. Last, but not least, a growing number of citizen blogs (Zafiropoulos, Vrana and Vagianos, 2012, p. 399) expand the arena where news and current affairs are debated. These should not, however, be viewed as media accountability practices online, by definition.

Other media accountability instruments Journalism education, both formal university education and vocational training, has the potential to foster media accountability and responsible journalism (Radu and Popa, 2014). In Greece, university-level education in journalism is relatively recent. University departments of communication and journalism studies were only established in the early 1990s – prompted by changes in the market due to the deregulation of the broadcast media and the ensuing demand for skilled professionals as well as pressures from academics (Skamnakis, 2006, pp. 77, 230). Today, both the Department of Communication and Media Studies of the University of Athens and the Department of Communication, Media and Culture of Panteion University include compulsory modules on media law and journalism ethics in their curricula.The School of Journalism and Communications of the University of Thessaloniki offers a track for students who want to specialize in journalism, combining training in multimedia journalism, media ethics and media law. In addition, a number of private institutions of post-secondary education offer vocational training schemes in journalism. The percentage of graduates from the communication and journalism university departments who eventually pursue a career in journalism is estimated to be rather low (Siomos, 2009, p. 270). In any case, data on the educational backgrounds of professional journalists are not available. Broadly speaking, journalists are not required to follow a formal course of study in order to practice the profession. Journalism has traditionally been – and is still considered to be – a craft best learned on the job (Siomos, 2009, p. 270). Even so, there is a lack of in-house ethics training schemes. The journalists’ associations occasionally offer some training seminars.

Conclusion Media accountability instruments in Greece appear to be slowly diversifying. Media criticism opportunities and ethical requirements imposed on journalists mainly through collective selfregulation are gradually being complemented by new instruments enabled by technology and the web, coupled with efforts to guarantee accountable public service media. Online news media, in particular, together with in-house media blogs, web discussion forums and commenting facilitated by social networks and individual weblogs run by journalists denote a change of 104

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trend with nascent online media accountability elements. Notwithstanding, it is too early to detect any emerging accountability culture online. It is also too soon to speak of any sort of systematic accountability activity undertaken from outside the profession, with media users having become key actors of media scrutiny. The relative diversification of media accountability instruments in Greece should not hide the absence or inefficiencies of established media accountability instruments. Greece does not have a press council, and journalists’ trade unions, which are responsible for the enforcement of the journalists’ code of conduct, have been largely unsuccessful in the discharge of their duties. First, their dispersed nature has hampered the development of a common vision on the characteristics that should define accountable journalism. Second, on account of their concurrent union functions, they have prioritized their advocacy activity on journalists’ employment conditions, sidelining their regulatory obligations on journalistic ethics. The disciplinary councils have specifically proved an inappropriate mechanism for the enforcement of ethical standards and accountability. Their exclusive composition of union members has thwarted their ability to act independently when assessing the conduct of their colleagues, and quite importantly, has also obstructed any investigative action of their own volition. The system has also not been able to secure the involvement of media proprietors, since individual journalists are the sole addressees of the Code. At the same time, media users are largely unfamiliar with the process of filing complaints – the unions have taken no action to inform on procedures and thus encourage users to voice concerns. Meanwhile, media operators have not established their own in-house guidelines and bodies to promote responsible editorial policies, whereas audio-visual media legislation requiring the adoption of self-regulatory rules on ethics has remained inapplicable. Against such a background, there are serious doubts as to whether new technologies can deliver mechanisms that are able to ‘correct’ or surpass the shortcomings of existing accountability instruments. Innovative media accountability instruments triggered by technology may serve to isolate individual journalists’ transgressions but they cannot alter journalistic culture. For bolstering accountability in a media system that has long been marked by a strong interconnection between politics, business and the media, and which now faces severe economic pressures due to the economic crisis, consideration must first be given to such matters as media ownership, media instrumentalization, public media independence and media sustainability, thus addressing the structural features of the media system. In such a context, online technologies may offer a helping hand through the provision of platforms for debating journalistic conduct, but challenges to media accountability will only be met through a multi-pronged strategy that combines public regulation and its genuine enforcement with an overhaul of journalists’ self-regulation, strengthened journalism education and continuing training in ethical behaviour.

Notes   1 Data of the National Council for Radio and Television (NCRT) provided upon request, June 14, 2014.   2 Data of AGB Nielsen provided upon request, June 10, 2014. The period covered is September 1, 2012 to August 31, 2013.   3 Data of Media Services SA provided upon request, June 15, 2014. Advertising expenditure refers to sales of advertising space or time by media outlets to advertisers.   4 New Hellenic Radio, Internet and Television.   5 The Hellenic Broadcasting Corporation.   6 The Journalists’ Union of Athens Daily Newspapers.   7 The Pan-Hellenic Federation of Journalists’ Unions.  8 Ένωση Συντακτών Ημερησίων Εφημερίδων Μακεδονίας-Θράκης (Journalists’ Union of the Daily Newspapers of Macedonia-Thrace).

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Psychogiopoulou and Kandyla  9 Ένωση Συντακτών Ημερησίων Εφημερίδων Πελοποννήσου-Ηπείρου-Νήσων (Journalists’ Union of the Daily Newspapers of Peloponnese-Epirus-the Islands). 10 Ένωση Συντακτών Ημερησίων Εφημερίδων Θεσσαλίας, Στ. Ελλάδας, Εύβοιας (Journalists’ Union of the Daily Newspapers of Thessaly, Central Greece, Euboea-ESIETHSEE). 11 Ένωση Συντακτών Περιοδικού και Ηλεκτρονικού Τύπου (Journalists’ Union of the Periodical and Electronic Press). 12 See indicatively art. 7(1), (4) of the ESIEA rulebook, art. 7(1), (4) of the ESIEMTH rulebook, arts. 8 and 23 of the ESIEPIN rulebook and art. 8(1), (4) of the ESPIT rulebook. 13 See art. 22(3) of the ESIEMTH rulebook. 14 Presidential decree 77/2003, FEK A 75/2003. 15 Art. 8 of Law 2863/2000, FEK A 262/2000. 16 Art 12 of Law 4173/2013, FEK A 169/2013. 17 Art. 13 of Law 4173/2013, FEK A 169/2013.

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14 Hungary Difficult legacy, slow transformation Agnes Urban

Abstract This chapter sums up the state of journalism and of media accountability institutions in Hungary 25 years after the regime transition.The overall picture is anything but positive: while previously many considered the democratic transformation and the establishment of the requisite institutional framework as obvious, today it is apparent that the development of an appropriate media system is a considerably more complex process. The professional background and institutional setting that underlies quality journalism is self-evident in many Western European countries but virtually non-existent in Hungary. Self-regulation is still in its infancy, there are no wellfunctioning professional representation organizations and there are no media ombudsmen. The journalistic culture differs considerably from that experienced in Western Europe, media owners are less inclined to focus on responsible behaviour, and the audience, too, has considerably lower expectations regarding media quality. The issue of quality journalism and journalistic credibility is not discussed in public; in fact, it hardly ever manifests itself, even in professional forums.

Introduction The state of media accountability in Hungary gives cause for concern. The institutions that could have contributed to the emergence of credible journalistic practices, which treat professional principles as a priority, have never really become consolidated in Hungary. In the 1990s, there was some hope that, as a result of the process of marketization in the media and the entry of new investors into the media sector, a proper system of institutions and, concomitantly, a typically Western media culture would emerge. Today, we know that this is not what has happened. Since the early 2000s, the Internet has fundamentally transformed the structure of the media industry in Hungary: consumer patterns have changed, and many have come to view media content as self-evidently free. In parallel, traditional media corporations have slid into crisis. Especially in the print media, the past decade has been primarily about survival. The effects of the 2008 financial crisis lasted for a long time in Hungary (Egedy, 2012). Because of continuous cost-cutting measures, there were insufficient resources for raising the quality of journalism, improving the journalistic culture and monitoring editorial practices. The media laws introduced at the end of 2010, which drew substantial international attention, have also suffused the 107

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regulatory framework with uncertainty, and have made media corporations even more vulnerable than they already were. Increasing numbers of foreign investors in the sector are leaving, and the share of Hungarian ownership in the industry continues to rise. However, the new owners are not well-capitalized players, e.g. the commercial television channel TV2 was bought up by the chief executive officer (CEO) and chief financial officer (CFO) of the company (dailynewshungary.com, 2013), but they boast of intense political connections – they are closely connected to the ruling party (Fidesz). The public refers to these actors as oligarchs, and in such a situation there is practically no room for debating the professional issues concerning journalism. A scientific description of the Eastern European media systems is still lacking and we know little about media accountability in the region (Fengler, Eberwein and Leppik-Bork, 2011). The economic, social and political environment has also contributed to the creation of a media system that is particular to the region. It is not simply that Eastern Europe is lagging several decades behind the Western European models; the problem is more complex than that. A detailed review of the Hungarian case will show this and will also illuminate the general issues of the Eastern European media systems.

Journalistic culture and media system The Hungarian media market is small, as the country’s population is only 10 million.1 By comparison, the media selection available in Hungary is rather broad; there is significant competition and many media corporations are increasingly struggling to remain profitable. There are four daily national broadsheets in Hungary (two right-wing and two left-wing papers), as well as two tabloids, two business papers, one sports newspaper and one free newspaper.2 In the rural areas, readers tend to stay informed through regional newspapers, of which there are 18. There are several hundred titles in the market of weekly and monthly magazines, and competition is stiff in all segments. There have been substantial fluctuations in this market in recent years. There has been an obvious trend of declining demand for political content in the market for both daily newspapers and magazines, while tabloid and entertainment newspapers and magazines continue to be popular (Gálik and Urbán, 2014; Tóth, 2012; Mertek Media Monitor, 2013a). The two national commercial channels (RTL Klub and TV2) are the most popular outlets in the broadcasting sector, while the public television channels, five in total (M1, M2, M3, Duna and Duna World), primarily attract elderly viewers. There is also a wide selection of specialized channels, and as a result, a total of 100 channels are available to Hungarians (Mediapiac.com, 2013). In the radio market, only one of the two previously available national commercial stations remains active (Class FM); the frequency of the other (Neo FM) was awarded to a public station. The market of local and regional stations has also changed significantly since 2010. The Media Council’s decisions have systematically benefitted market players close to the governing parties (Mertek Media Monitor, 2013b). Diversity in the radio market has clearly declined, and this is the market sector where the media authority’s interference has had the most obvious impact. The online press is diverse, also thanks to Internet penetration, which stands at 61% (aged 15+). Innumerable news portals and blogs supply news, and since the late 1990s, the two largest players have been index.hu and origo.hu. In contrast to some other countries, in Hungary there are no traditional media (e.g. newspapers or television channels) behind the most popular news sites. Hungarian investors own index.hu, while the telecommunications company, Magyar Telekom (which is a subsidiary of Deutsche Telekom), operates origo.hu (Bodoky, 2005; Tóth, 2012). 108

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Traditional media, primarily the print sector, have been in crisis for some time now, and there have been major changes in consumption patterns since the early 2000s. The economic crisis that began in 2008 hit media enterprises hard, with revenues declining and many companies sliding into the red. The need for consolidation was obvious: The merger of the German Axel Springer Media AG and the Swiss Ringier AG redrew the Hungarian media market, although the Media Council tried to block the merger at the beginning of the negotiations (Gálik and Vogl, 2011; Bayer, Polyák and Urbán, 2012). For quite a while the general anticipation was that the revenues dissipating from the traditional media sector would be balanced by the growing profits of the online content providers. Today, it is apparent that this optimism was misplaced. In Hungary, just as in other countries, Google and Facebook draw the vast majority of revenue from online advertisements, and, as a result, financing Hungarian-language content has proved to be increasingly problematic (Gálik and Urbán, 2014). Journalism is facing countless challenges. Three major publishers used to dominate the print market, all owned by major foreign investors. In addition to Ringier, Axel Springer and the Finnish corporation Sanoma, there were also smaller publishers in the market.The merger of Ringier and Axel Springer in Hungary was difficult to finalize, but the parties finally managed to seal the deal in early 2014 by selling a part of the portfolio to a new market player in Hungary, Vienna Capital Partners (VCP), which includes eight regional newspapers and the largest national broadsheet. The identity of the owners of VCP is still obscure, but the Hungarian media suspect they are investors with ties to government circles (Csuday and Szabó, 2014). The third major publisher, Sanoma, sold off its Hungarian investments in 2014, and they were acquired by a Hungarian venture capital group, Central Fund, which aims to make a profit by selling off the portfolio piece by piece. In other words, there are considerable changes taking place in the print market (and there are also changes among smaller publishers), and journalists have good reason to feel insecure about their situations. Given the state of affairs, there is noticeably no space for the work of professional organizations or for improving journalistic culture. The situation in the online market is similar. Advertising revenues lag behind expectations, and persuading consumers to pay for content appears hopeless. In addition to business pressures, the work of Hungarian editorial offices is also influenced by politics (Mong, Nagy, Polyák, Urbán and Uszkiewicz, 2015).The proximity to politics is readily apparent in the case of all four of the national broadsheets (the party foundation of the Hungarian Socialist Party is a minority owner of the highest circulation political daily). The spring 2014 scandal3 at the second-largest news portal, origo.hu, shows that the importance of online portals has not escaped the attention of politicians. The owners explained the departure of the portal’s editor-in-chief with a new strategic orientation, but it emerged fairly soon afterwards that it was the result of political pressure, in response to the portal’s revelations about a scandal involving a minister. In the days following the removal of the editor-in-chief, almost the entire editorial office left the news portal, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) organized two major demonstrations in defence of press freedom. Many felt that if a company owned by Deutsche Telekom was unable to resist political pressure, then no one could. There is considerable and widely known anecdotal evidence about the political pressure brought to bear on the Hungarian media. While there is no hard governmental control of the media, the instruments through which journalists and editors are subtly signalled about what they ought to write about and what they would best leave alone are considerably more refined. Journalists understand such messages and self-censorship is a widespread phenomenon in Hungary (Mong, 2012). 109

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Established instruments of media accountability The instruments of media accountability are very limited in Hungary. During the decades of communism, the press operated under the strict supervision of the single-party regime. Following the regime transition, foreign owners began to gain ground in the media market and this should have opened up the opportunity for creating professional NGOs and introducing codes of ethics in the media sector. Unfortunately, raising media accountability standards did not figure high on the agenda of journalists whose professional socialization took place under difficult circumstances, nor was it a key consideration for the new foreign owners who were seeking to maximize their profits. By the 2000s, business challenges increasingly pushed professional considerations into the background, and in recent years the political environment has also shifted in an unfavourable direction (Polyák, 2015).

Co-regulation The Hungarian 2010 media law4 set the ground for the creation of a co-regulation system as an alternative to official control. The law authorized media market players to set up self-regulatory bodies with the authority to implement, with exclusive jurisdiction, rules relating to media content.The Media Law allows the Media Council to make administrative agreements with the co-regulation bodies. Based on these agreements, the self-regulation body handles a specified range of cases within the official authority’s jurisdiction and performs other functions relating to media administration and media policy. In this framework, the responsibility of self-regulatory bodies is to decide on complaints concerning the activities of service providers, to arbitrate disputes between media enterprises and to monitor the activities of providers. The law emphasizes that the self-regulation bodies do not proceed with official public authority (Polyák, 2014). Four organizations have sprung up as part of the co-regulation framework since 2011: the Hungarian Publishers’ Association (Magyar Lapkiadók Egyesülete), the Association of Hungarian Content Providers (Magyar Tartalomszolgáltatók Egyesülete), the Association of Hungarian Electronic Broadcasters (Magyar Elektronikus Műsorszolgáltatók Egyesülete) and the Advertising Self-Regulatory Board (Önszabályozó Reklámtestület). The codes of conduct, which are subject to approval by the Media Council and have been created by self-regulatory bodies, are part of the agreement between the authority and these bodies. However, the legal definitions of media law were incorporated into these codes with almost no attempt to adapt them, and with only marginal amendments. Lay dispute resolution forums currently interpret the vague provisions in the law that directly restrict free expression. There is no genuine self-regulation in this system, and this arrangement could be most aptly interpreted as the outsourcing of official responsibilities. The most important benefit of co-regulation for media service providers is that it does not include an option of levying fines – the most severe sanction that may be handed out in this framework is temporary exclusion from the self-regulation scheme. Other sanctions at hand are the determination that legal norms have been violated, to publish the self-regulation bodies’ decisions or to provide moral restitution. Yet the codices do not contain a single provision on the implementation of decisions rendered in the context of co-regulation. Pursuant to the law, the Media Council is obliged to review each and every decision rendered by the co-regulation bodies (Polyák, 2014). The independence of the organizations involved in co-regulation is primarily in doubt because of the way in which the co-regulation scheme is financed. The Media Council distributes financial support to the co-regulation bodies, but without legally established principles or 110

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criteria to guide the allocation – though the amounts are nevertheless published in the official agreement. Thus, the players involved are not only free of potential fines, but also of the costs necessary to operate the entire scheme. Moreover, through the co-regulation framework, market players can track who filed a complaint against them. Nor is co-regulation independent of the market, since market players (big publishers, online content providers, broadcasters) delegate members to the co-regulation bodies that arbitrate complaints. A fairly large proportion of these delegates is employed by, or in extended contractual relations with, market players, which raises the question about whether there is a conflict of interest in their appointments to the aforementioned bodies. Yet conflicts of interest are not regulated in the media law or in the agreements drawn up between co-regulators and the authorities (Lehóczki, 2012). Thus far, the number of complaints has been negligible, in part due to procedural difficulties, but more still to the low public awareness of the co-regulation system. It is undeniable that the co-regulation scheme is a milder restriction of press freedom than the direct control exercised by the authorities. In its current form, however, it lacks any voluntary initiative and is nothing more than an alternative sanctions regime applied by the providers to themselves.

Interest representation organizations The Association of Hungarian Journalists (Magyar Újságírók Országos Szövetsége – MÚOSZ)5 is a non-profit organization that performs professional interest representation, educational and cultural activities. Its predecessor was founded in 1896, and for a long time, it was a major organization with considerable prestige. After the political transition, MÚOSZ became much less significant, and it now lacks any real role in the Hungarian media arena. It was unable to create a professional organization to attract journalists in the new political, economic and technological environment. Its prestige is gone, its membership is aged and typically young journalists do not even join. The Press Trade Union (Sajtószakszervezet)6 was founded in 1989, at the time of the regime transition. Its small, typically older membership has not engaged in any significant activity of late, and it has neither said nor done anything that has reverberated in public opinion. In reality, neither organization can fulfil the role of a genuine interest representation organization. They are both impotent in reducing journalists’ vulnerability and the mass layoffs in the profession, and they cannot counter political or business pressures. Occasionally, MÚOSZ hosts debates and conferences which analyse the state of the Hungarian media, but generally these do not resonate with the public. The activities of both organizations are limited to releasing news about events and offering some benefits to members (e.g. vacation opportunities).

Ombudsman Two broadsheets (Magyar Hírlap and Népszabadság) used to have ombudsmen (public editors) between 2005 and 2008,7 but the age of newspaper ombudsmen came to an end pretty quickly when the two ombudsmen, Zoltán Miklósi and László Majtényi, wrote sharp analyses about the editorial practices of their respective papers. Both authors were university instructors (László Majtényi also served as parliamentary commissioner for data protection and as president of the media authority between 2008 and 2009). They only held their ombudsmen positions for a limited time; it seemed impossible to find a properly prepared ombudsman from the journalistic field who would have been capable of analysing editorial practices independently. At the time of the economic crisis that began in 2008, given the imperative of reducing costs, employing an ombudsman was clearly not a priority for the newspapers any more. 111

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Forum of Editors-in-Chief (Főszerkesztők Fóruma) The Forum of Editors-in-Chief8 is a self-regulation organization founded in 2012 with the participation of 33 editors-in-chief. Today, it has a membership of 53 editors. Attempts to set up such a self-regulation body had begun years earlier, but it soon emerged that, at the level of publishers, the setting up of such a body was impossible because corporate CEOs were not interested. When the body was established, it adopted a code of ethics that had been drawn up in an extensive process. The ethical guidelines describe the external and internal criteria of responsible journalistic work: impartiality, thoroughness, the rules regulating how to gather and handle information, conflict of interest rules and the relationship between editorial content and advertisements (Főszerkesztők Fóruma, 2012). Among the other objectives pursued by the Forum of Editors-in-Chief are strengthening ethics education in the training of journalists, analysing domestic and international cases, drafting the framework for potential self-regulation procedures that could be adopted later and organizing training for journalists. The Forum of Editors-in-Chief is still in the early stages of its existence, and thus far it has only held a few conferences, public debates and discussions on ethics issues, and it has released some statements. Given that it is an entirely voluntary body that has been joined by the editorsin-chief of the largest Hungarian media outlets, it is considered to have more prestige than the four co-regulation bodies referred to above. Press outlets tend to report on the major events organized by the Forum of Editors-in-Chief, and it is likely that public awareness of the body will increase in the future.

Innovative instruments of media accountability As compared to alternative institutional arrangements set up to monitor the media in other countries, in Hungary civil control plays a relatively significant role in this process. Several NGOs and traditional media and social media sites regularly discuss Hungarian media content, and engage in critiques of editorial practices and media freedom. The comment:com blog was launched in 2002 as a blog operated by one of the most popular Hungarian news portals, index.hu. In addition to the important news taken from international media, the blog often features discussions of Hungarian media content which the editors consider as questionable from an ethical or professional viewpoint. The operators of the blog – also relying on the contribution of readers – gather cases from the print and electronic media. They briefly present what has happened and what the problem is with the content in question. These posts typically spread quickly through social media (19,000 likes on Facebook) and are often featured on the main page of the index.hu news portal, whereby they reach many readers. The Tumblr page lastdaysoftenyek.tumblr.com is a social media product. This micro blog collects stories from the evening news of the commercial television channel TV2 (the so-called Tények, ‘Facts’ in English) and shows that this news show, which boasts high viewer ratings, only broadcasts tabloid items to its audience. Though the goal of the micro blog is to poke fun at the news show, it simultaneously points out important professional issues and also sheds light on the tabloidization of television news shows. Some investigative journalists with a particular interest in the goings-on in the media seek to find out what business and political pressures journalists are exposed to, and how they influence editorial content. The articles on the portal kreativ.hu primarily shed light on ownership concentrations and the relationships between the media and politics.The journalists at the nonprofit investigative journalism site atlatszo.hu launched a series on the state of the local media, 112

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highlighting the vulnerable situation that rural journalists find themselves in vis-à-vis municipal governments (atlatszo.hu, 2013). Mertek Media Monitor9 is a media policy think-tank and NGO that was established in 2011. Mertek performs legal analyses, examining the authorities’ application of the law and the impact of the media law on the media system; it also analyses advertising market processes and publishes content analyses. Mertek’s reports (Mertek, 2014) achieve some resonance in the Hungarian media. Some of its blog posts generate quite substantial debates and its research results are also regularly used.10 The Hungarian NGOs Atlatszo.hu, Mertek Media Monitor and TASZ (Hungarian Civil Liberties Union)11 regularly rely on the Hungarian freedom of information act to file public interest data requests with the authorities. They focus on the operations of either the media authority or the public media; in Hungary, these institutions operate in a non-transparent manner. NGOs must make significant efforts to ensure that data and decisions are made available to the public, and in many cases accessing public interest data only becomes possible after taking the authorities to the courts.

Conclusion Even though 25 years have passed since the regime transition, the greatest media policy challenge for Hungary is still to ensure that media companies feel pressure to not only conform to legal provisions but also to operate with a view towards complying with standards of credibility and professionalism. A vicious circle has emerged wherein the awareness of media consumers is low, a significant portion of the audiences does not expect the media to comply with professional principles and many do not even know what fundamental ethical norms journalists ought to pay respect to. Trust in journalists and credibility in the media is low in Hungary (Keller, 2014). In the light of the increasingly difficult economic situation, media owners are not interested in devoting significant attention to professional standards in addition to complying with media regulations that are downright restrictive compared to European regulations. Journalists tend to be more open to such concerns, or, to be precise, one ought to say that a segment of the profession – especially among younger journalists – regards professionalism, media ethics, responsibility and credibility as important ideals to follow. Their notion of quality journalism is not a far cry from Western European standards.12 However, on the one hand, there is pressure for greater efficiency on the part of the owners, and on the other, it is rather difficult to keep the inner motivation going when audiences are so apathetic. A large proportion of journalists, especially in the tabloid media, are less likely to have internalised the importance of improving journalistic culture or a quality-centred outlook. After the regime transition, it appeared that the Hungarian media had started down a road that the media in Western European countries had followed, be it the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model of the media, the North and Central European or Democratic Corporatist Model or the North Atlantic or Liberal Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a). The general expectation was that with democracy and market economics gaining ground, the practices and attitudes that characterize countries with more developed media cultures would come to prevail in Hungary as well. In reality, this process never took off, and it is apparent that even foreign investors have not devoted significant attention to improving the professionalism and ethical practices of editorial offices. The post-transition media systems in Hungary – in fact, in the entire Central and Eastern European region – were characterized by recurring media wars (serious political conflicts about the media system), and this has also decisively shaped the development of democratic media 113

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institutions (Jakubowicz and Sükösd, 2008a). The models that were established in Western Europe over extended periods have failed to take hold in Hungary, and it does not seem likely that they will any time soon, in light of the prevailing technological, economic and social environment. In Hungary, long-term developments in this area are more likely to be shaped by some balance between doctrinaire state regulations and market interests. In this situation, selfregulation, the democratic institutions of the media system or media accountability, as broadly understood, receive less emphasis.

Notes   1 Including ethnic Hungarians outside the borders of Hungary proper, we are talking about a market of about 12 million.   2 The four broadsheets are the left-wing Népszabadság (circulation in January–June 2014 was 45,301), right-wing Magyar Nemzet (37,794), left-wing Népszava (14,883) and right-wing Magyar Hírlap (7,807). The tabloids are Blikk (136,768) and Bors (68,326); the business newspapers are Napi Gazdaság (n.a.) and Világgazdaság (n.a.). The sports newspaper is Nemzeti Sport (49,455) and the free newspaper is Metropol (370,051).   3 The editor-in-chief of the market-leading news portal (origo.hu) was removed from his position after publishing an investigative report which looked into a strikingly expensive official foreign trip taken by a cabinet member (Erdélyi, Magyari and Plankó, 2014).   4 For more about Hungarian media law in English, see Bayer, Polyák and Urbán (2012) as well as Polyák and Nagy (2015).  5 http://muosz.hu  6 http://www.sajtoszakszervezet.hu   7 The idea underlying the creation of this institution is to hold editorial offices to editorial guidelines and to the journalistic norms that the paper wants to meet. The ombudsmen were tasked with reviewing whether, in writing an article, the newspaper had consulted all those involved in the subject matter, and how it ascertained the accuracy of the information it disseminated. The ombudsman had the right to be curious about whether a statement was preceded by and based on sufficient circumspection and an appropriate level of checking of the sources, even if for some reason the source had to remain anonymous. The ombudsman had to make sure that the newspaper respected the privacy rights of the persons it had consulted in the article, and that the dignity of a given person had not been violated (EKINT, 2007).  8 http://foszerkesztokforuma.org  9 http://mertek.eu/en 10 The author is a member of Mertek Media Monitor’s staff. 11 http://tasz.hu/en 12 See Tamás Bodoky’s (editor-in-chief of atlatszo.hu news portal) speech on the Index on Censorship Award 2015 ceremony (http://www.indexoncensorship.org/2015/03/indexawards2015-tamas-bodoky-theindependence-of-journalism-in-hungary-is-under-threat/).

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15 Ireland Moving from courts to institutions of accountability Roderick Flynn

Abstract The development of media accountability institutions came late (mid-1990s to early 21st century) to Ireland because media output was disciplined by other means. The retention of a state monopoly on legal broadcasting until 1988 allowed the state to retain indirect control of broadcast output through ownership. The introduction of censorship in the print media in 1929 was extended by the Emergency Powers Act of 1939–1976, permitting the state extensive control of print content. Only since the 1970s have more transparent mechanisms of media accountability been contemplated. In broadcasting, the remit of the Broadcasting Complaints Commission gradually extended after the 1970s, while in print an industry-organized Press Council was established in 2007. To date, however, such formal mechanisms of accountability have not been substantially augmented by any online culture of citizen-driven monitoring of media output.

Introduction Historically, media accountability in Ireland has relied heavily on recourse to full-blown legal proceedings under the 1961 Defamation Act, a piece of legislation widely seen as favouring plaintiffs in libel actions.The primary sanctions in such legal proceedings have been of a financial nature through the award of damages determined by juries. However, the 21st century has seen much greater emphasis on extra-legal media accountability institutions, such as the revitalized Broadcasting Complaints Commission and the still relatively new Press Council, which offer alternative forms of sanction to the older financial recompense mechanisms. The advent of online media has added a new layer of complexity to questions of media accountability. However, although there are medium-specific mechanisms in place relating to online accountability, these are not characterized by the existence of novel codes specifically applying to online content. For the most part, online accountability institutions concentrate on protecting whole categories of users from unacceptable or inappropriate content, such as pornography or hate speech. When faced with complaints from individuals regarding unfair treatment online, Irish online accountability mechanisms apply or defer to established legal processes, such as defamation law. Nonetheless, there is an acute public awareness of and interest in media accountability debates. Online media have been identified as encouraging anonymous attacks on private and public 115

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figures, and were explicitly cited as a factor in the high-profile suicide by a government minister in 2012 (Sheehan, 2012, p. 3). In a country still transitioning from a conservative (indeed, arguably, theocratic) political culture to one characterized by more liberal perspectives, individuals and groups espousing more ‘traditional’ (i.e. conservative) perspectives have routinely asserted that media coverage of them is unfair, demonstrating a liberal bias. This culminated in the threat of a court action against the national broadcaster in April 2014 when a guest on a popular chat show described individuals associated with a Catholic think tank as “homophobic” (Kealy and Horan, 2014, p. 1). In the event, the broadcaster made a speedy financial settlement before any court proceedings began.Their willingness to do so owes much to the nature of defamation law in Ireland: Although public interest defences have become easier to mount in defamation cases since the 2009 Defamation Act, the cost of losing a libel action in Ireland can be financially crippling for a media organization. In 2009, a PR consultant was awarded €1.87 million in damages after a newspaper story alleged that she had conducted an affair with the then Minister for the Environment (Healy, 2009).Thus, the potentially catastrophic consequences of a libel action clearly give pause to journalistic risk-taking.

Journalistic culture and media system As befits a country with a small population which shares a border with another much larger Anglophone nation, the Irish media market is small, characterized by a high level of media concentration and subject to extensive competition from UK-based media entities. There are five domestically owned national daily newspapers and three domestically owned Sunday papers. One media group, Independent News and Media, dominates the domestic print sector, publishing the Irish Independent, the Herald, the Sunday Independent and the Sunday World and copublishing (with the UK-based Express Group) the Irish Daily Star (see Table 15.1 for domestic newspaper circulation in Ireland in 2015). In addition, there are three UK dailies and four UK Sundays which produce Irish editions, and which, to a greater or lesser extent, produce content exclusively for the Irish market (see Table 15.2). In broadcasting, the state-owned public service broadcaster, Raidió Teilifís Éireann (RTE), operates two channels while a second state-owned broadcaster (TG4) operates one Irish-language channel. There are also two national commercial television channels, both operated by TV3. These face extensive competition from UK-based broadcasters, such as the BBC, Channel 4 and Table 15.1  Domestic newspaper circulation in Ireland in 2015 Dailies

Circulation

Irish Independent Irish Times Irish Daily Star The Herald Irish Examiner

109,524 76,194 57,658 48,133 33,198

Sundays Sunday Independent Sunday World Sunday Business Post

213,549 178,867 32,498

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation.

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Ireland Table 15.2  Irish editions of UK newspapers circulation in 2015 Dailies

Circulation

Irish Mail Irish Sun Irish Mirror

50,037 57,702 43,250

Sundays Irish Mail on Sunday Sunday Times Irish Sun on Sunday Irish Sunday Mirror

90,105 82,748 53,047 30,586

Source: Audit Bureau of Circulation. Table 15.3 Television broadcast group market share in Ireland in 2015 Broadcasting group

Number of channels

Audience market share (%)

RTE TV3 TG4 BBC UTV Channel 4 Sky All other Channels

3 2 1 2 1 3 11

34 13 2 6 3 3 5 34

Source: AGB Nielsen Audience Research. Table 15.4  Radio broadcast group market share in Ireland in 2015 Broadcasting group

Number of channels

Audience market share (%)

RTE Communicorp Local stations

3 2

31 15 40

Source: JNLR/Ipsos MRBI.

Sky Television. Since January 2015, a Northern Ireland-based channel, UTV, has also operated a Republic of Ireland-specific channel, UTV Ireland, which is licensed by the Irish broadcasting regulator and which runs a significant news-gathering operation from Dublin (Table 15.3). RTE also operates four national radio stations that compete nationally with two private radio broadcasters (both owned by Communicorp) and locally with 32 local and regional broadcasters (Table 15.4). The online market in Ireland is dominated by global search engine, social media and retail brands: Google.com and Google.ie are the first- and second-ranked sites in Ireland followed by Facebook, YouTube, LinkedIn, Twitter etc. In terms of local content, legacy media predominate in the online world. Thus, Independent.ie is the top-ranked Irish content production site (ranked 15th in Ireland) followed by The Irish Times (17th) and RTE (21st). Only one ‘digital native’ Irish content production site – Journal.ie – is in the top 50 websites by Irish visitor numbers.1 117

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The Irish branch of the UK-based National Union of Journalists represents 3,500 journalists in the Republic of Ireland, which accounts for 75–80% of all journalists. However, membership levels have declined in recent years due in particular to an increasing incidence of freelancing within the profession. Despite the literal and figurative proximity of Ireland to the UK, the Irish press is characterized by a relatively conservative journalistic culture in the sense that Irish journalists are less likely to assume a critical stance with regard to public and private institutions or to pursue stories for salacious content. As Hallin and Mancini (2004a, p. 206) note, although there is a tabloid market in Ireland, it is mainly dominated by UK imports.The “sharp separation” (ibid., p. 206) that they note in the UK between quality and mass papers does not prevail to the same extent in Ireland. Felle (2013) notes that papers serving the local market (including, for the most part, Irish editions of UK papers) have generally eschewed the “breaches of journalistic ethics, gross invasions of privacy, or the scandalous law-breaking” which led to the establishment of the Leveson Inquiry in the UK. Although there is some anecdotally informed writing on the culture of Irish journalism (Rapple, 1997), there has been relatively little empirically informed research in the area, with the exception of Corcoran (2004). Her research, based on surveys carried out in the late 1990s, suggests that Irish journalists are a homogeneous group, likely to be well educated, middle class and male. That said, the professionalization of Irish journalism came relatively late: only half of those surveyed by Corcoran had received formal journalism training, reflecting the fact that degree level courses in journalism did not emerge in Ireland until the 1980s (French, 2007, p. 43). Now, in the 21st century, however, the leading undergraduate and postgraduate degree level courses in journalism are offered at Dublin City University, Dublin Institute of Technology and the University of Limerick. Other degree level courses are also offered at the National University of Ireland (NUI) Galway, Cork Institute of Technology and private colleges, such as Griffith College Dublin. The wide availability of third-level courses underpins the anecdotal evidence suggesting that the degree of professionalization has significantly increased since the 1990s, as has the gender balance. Politically speaking, Irish journalists perceive their self-identity as (slightly) left of centre and more liberal than both the population as a whole and the news organizations they work for. However, these leanings are not reflected in the overall output of Irish print and broadcast media, which tends to be centrist or lean slightly to the right on economic issues.This reflects both the broad assertion in literature on the sociology of journalism that journalists cannot avoid the influence of the news organizations that they work for, and Hallin and Mancini’s specific assertion with regard to Ireland that – in keeping with other liberal countries – “political neutrality has come to be the typical stance of newspapers” (2004a, pp. 207-208). This conservatism (again understood as a tendency to default towards accepting elite lines on news stories) has come in for criticism in recent years, particularly in light of the failure of the Irish media to sufficiently scrutinize the weak foundations of the remarkable period of economic growth enjoyed by Ireland in the late 1990s and up to 2008. In addition to academic work in this regard (Fahy, O’Brien and Poti, 2010; Mercille, 2014; Silke, 2015), an investigation by the Public Accounts Committee of the Irish Parliament in March 2015 identified media ‘boosterism’ for a propertybased economic growth strategy as one element contributing to the post-2008 financial collapse.

Established instruments of media accountability Although there are several media-specific instruments of media accountability (discussed below), the key instrument is arguably Irish defamation law. The key piece of legislation in this regard is the 2009 Defamation Act, which replaced the relatively archaic 1961 Defamation Act. The stated intention of the 2009 Act was to bring Irish law into step with developments in European 118

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Case Law. This entailed subsuming the previous torts of libel and slander under a single tort of defamation and introducing a number of new defences against the charge of defamation. Key among these was the introduction of a new defence of fair and reasonable publication of a matter of public interest. Thus, in addition to the primary defences against a charge of defamation – namely that a published statement was true or was made under conditions of absolute privilege (e.g. in a parliamentary or legal court setting) – the new act permits media institutions to defend the publication of a defamatory statement on the grounds that the public interest was served by so doing, even if the statement in question subsequently proved to be false. In the event, if a defendant in a defamation cannot demonstrate that the statement was true, made under privilege or made in the public interest, the Act permits the Court to insist upon the publication of a corrective statement of equal prominence to the original defamatory statement and to award damages. Prior to the 2009 Act, the scale of damages was entirely determined by juries, leading to some inconsistency in the scale of awards. Since 2009, however, juries now receive overt guidance from the presiding judge as to the appropriate level of damages, taking into account the gravity of the defamatory statement, how widely it was disseminated and the extent to which the defendant sought to make amends after publication. The Defamation Act applies to statements published via any medium, be it print, broadcast or online. However, in addition to the Act, there are also formal institutional mechanisms of media accountability: the Press Ombudsman (and the related Press Council) as well as the Broadcasting Complaints Commission, which is operated by the broadcast regulator, the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland. Although neither has judicial powers, such as the right to impose financial penalties on those who publish or broadcast unacceptable content, both exercise quasi-judicial functions, assessing the extent to which material brought to their attention meets the respective codes governing print and broadcast content. Despite recent political expressions of disquiet at online content, the same is not true of Irish online accountability mechanisms (see below), which primarily enforce judicial decisions made by other institutions such as the law courts. Moreover, in 2013, for the first time, a ‘digital native’ Irish journal, Journal.ie, signed up to the Press Council’s Code of Practice. The Broadcasting Complaints Commission is the oldest media accountability-specific institution in Ireland, having initially come into existence in 1974 as an interim body called the Broadcasting Complaints Advisory Committee. The designs of subsequent institutions, such as the Press Council, were thus influenced by the prior existence and experience of the Broadcasting Committee. That body’s limited advisory powers were significantly enhanced by the 1976 Broadcasting Authority (Amendment) Act, which reconstituted it as a standalone body overseeing a statutory complaints process. Since RTE was the sole entity legally entitled to engage in broadcasting in Ireland at the time, the Commission initially focused entirely on complaints about RTE’s output. For the most part these complaints related to the extent to which RTE had fulfilled its obligations under the 1960 Broadcasting Act to provide objective and impartial programming content. However, in its early years, the Commission was largely ineffectual. Its annual report was almost never discussed in the Irish parliament and was otherwise unavailable to the public. Although its decisions were published in the broadcast listing journal, the RTE Guide, other media routinely ignored them. This stemmed, in large part, from the fact that the decisions had little impact – although the Commission could find against RTE, it could not require RTE to offer a corrective to the original programme. Despite calls from 1981 onwards to increase the powers of the Commission, little was done through the 1980s. Even when the introduction of commercial broadcasting in 1988 saw a new regulatory body for independent broadcasters, the Independent Radio and Television Commission (IRTC, now the Broadcasting Authority of Ireland, BAI), responsibility for dealing with broadcast119

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ing complaints relating to the new broadcasters was left in the hands of the existing Complaints Commission rather than being handed over to the IRTC. Indeed, it was not until 2009 that the activities of the Complaints Commission were brought under the authority of the BAI. Under the BAI, however, the process has been transformed. The basis upon which a complaint may be made is now much wider and more clearly codified. Broadcasters licensed by the BAI may be censured for a failure to meet programming commitments included in the terms of their license. Furthermore, programme content must conform with a series of codes relating to programme standards, impartiality and fairness in news and current affairs and to the content of broadcasting advertising. In its overall outline of the complaints procedure, the BAI suggests that complaints must relate to a failure of a given broadcast to meet one of the following five requirements (imposed by the codes referred to immediately above): •• •• •• •• ••

objectivity, impartiality and fairness in news and current affairs coverage law and order (i.e. avoidance of content constituting an incitement to crime or undermining the state) harm and offence (see discussion below on Code on Programme Standards) privacy of an individual advertising content (avoidance clashing with the code on broadcast advertising).

The ‘harm and offence’ requirement is derived from the Code on Programme Standards, which offers a further set of criteria that may be used to justify a complaint to the Complaints Commission. That code enunciates seven principles, derived from Section 42 of the 2009 Broadcasting Act. They are (BAI, 2015): •• •• •• •• •• •• ••

respect for community standards (broadcasters must take particular care when scheduling content characterized by sexual, violent or coarse language content) importance of context (content should be carefully scheduled to ensure it reaches appropriate audiences) protection from harm (content relating to rape, suicide, reconstructions of actual events, drugs should be sensitively treated) protection of children (avoid scheduling content that may impair the physical, mental or moral development of children during hours they are likely to be in the audience) respect for persons and groups in society (avoiding prejudicial/discriminatory content) protection of the public interest respect for privacy.

In all complaints, complainants must first seek direct redress from the relevant broadcaster.2 If complainants fail to receive what they consider to be a satisfactory response, they can then bring a formal complaint about the broadcast to the BCC, explicitly identifying which of principles outlined above have been contravened. These complaints are then considered by the BAI’s Executive Complaints Forum, which assesses the complaints in the light of the relevant codes, the 2009 Broadcasting Act and by reference to the Audiovisual Media Services Directive. The Forum may invite comments from the broadcast producer before making a judgment. Having completed an assessment of a complaint, the BAI may uphold it, reject it or resolve it within the Executive Complaints Forum, a process which more often than not suggests that the complaint is not regarded as being based upon the criteria specified within the complaints process (in effect the complaint is rejected as not relevant to the complaints criteria). 120

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For the most part, the sanction for an upheld complaint is effectively limited to public opprobrium: The decisions of the BAI are published on a near-monthly basis and upheld complaints are widely reported upon. However, Section 51 (1) of the 2009 Broadcasting Act permits the BAI to revoke a license if a broadcaster has seriously failed to comply with a term or condition of their contract. Under sections 52–57 of the 2009 Act, the BAI may opt for the lesser sanction of imposing a fine. In the event that a broadcaster breaches a BAI broadcasting code, the BAI’s Compliance Committee may appoint an officer to investigate that breach. Under Section 54 (4), if the officer finds that a breach has occurred, the Compliance Committee writes to the broadcaster to notify it of their intention to apply to the High Court for a determination that there has been a breach and for the imposition of a fine of up to €250,000. The broadcaster may choose to avoid a court case by informing the BAI of their willingness to pay a fine directly to the BAI. In 2012, for example, RTE paid a fine of €200,000 after the BAI found that a current affairs programme had seriously libelled a Catholic priest working in Kenya by effectively accusing him of rape (Stack, 2012). The Press Council of Ireland3 came into existence in 2007 after several decades of political debate relating to the need to update Irish defamation law and the question of press regulation. Although the Law Reform Commission had made a number of recommendations in 1991 reflecting the need to modernize Irish defamation law, a lack of political consensus delayed the introduction of any meaningful changes.This, despite the fact that, prior to the 2009 Defamation Act, Irish legal codes relating to slander and libel were routinely described, not least by the Irish media itself, as ‘draconian’, suggesting that they hugely favoured the plaintiff in libel actions. In 2003, the then government established a Legal Advisory Group on Defamation, which included in its terms a reference to an assessment of the utility of a statutory entity to regulate the press. The Group concluded that it would be possible to create a statutory Press Council while preserving the freedom of the press. As O’Dowd (2009) notes: the Group was particularly impressed by the example of the Broadcasting Complaints Commission (BCC), and the comparatively light statutory framework applied to the broadcast media. (p. 177) In the event, eager to head off the imposition of a statutory body (along with a new privacy law explicitly mooted by the Irish Minister for Justice in 2006), the Irish Press Industry successfully proposed a non-statutory industry body.4 A brief analysis of the statistics relating to the Ombudsman’s activities since 2010 gives some indication of the extent of its activities. Although the number of complaints has increased since 2010 (dramatically in 2012), it is striking that the number subsequently adjudged to demand the direct intervention of the Ombudsman has consistently fallen (Table 15.5). Table 15.5  Complaints to the Irish Press Ombudsman in 2010–2014 Year

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Complaints brought Complaints not formally processed Complaints decided upon by Press Ombudsman Complaints upheld

315 224 53 18

343 266 42 17

575 491 40 18

381 300 29 9

350 261 41 17

Source: Press Council of Ireland and Office of the Press Ombudsman Annual Reports 2010–2014)

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Indeed, that in any given year anything from 66% to 85% of complaints are effectively discarded by the Ombudsman suggests that the bulk of complaints are not regarded as meeting the Ombudsman’s own criteria for valid complaints. This seems likely to discourage at least some complainants, who might otherwise have pursued legal remedies under the Defamation Act, from adopting that course. In practice the Press Council was established in such a way as to remain independent of both the state and the press. Although the Press Council includes five representatives of media owners, plus one journalist, the majority of its 13 members are independent of the industry and act on behalf of the public interest. The main function of the Press Council is to “safeguard and promote professional and ethical standards” across the Irish Print Media. These standards are codified in a Code of Practice, which member organizations (print and digital media) must sign up to. From the perspective of the Irish print media, Press Council membership functions as a demonstration of their commitment to journalistic ethics. Although this does not legally confer a privileged status upon Press Council members, if a given newspaper is seeking to defend a defamation action through the courts using a public interest approach based on the responsibility and accountability of their journalism then, as Fielden (2012, 17) notes “they may use membership of the Press Council to demonstrate that ethical approach”. The Code of Practice5 delineates ten principles which signatory organizations are expected to adhere to. These include commitments to: •• •• •• •• ••

truth and accuracy distinguishing between fact and comment fairness and honesty the right of the individual to their good name and to privacy avoiding expression of prejudice.

These principles also inform the specific complaints procedure associated with the Press Council, which is overseen by the associated Office of the Press Ombudsman.6 Members of the public may refer either published articles or journalistic behaviour to the Ombudsman on the grounds that either the article or behaviour constitutes a possible breach of the Code of Practice. Complainants must first seek direct redress from the editor of the offending publication. If they receive no reply or an unsatisfactory reply, they may then lodge a formal complaint in writing to the Press Ombudsman. This must occur within three months of the publication of the article or the journalistic behaviour. On receiving a complaint and adjudging that it is legitimate, the Ombudsman initially seeks to resolve the conflict through a process of either or both conciliation and mediation, facilitated by a case officer from their office. If this does not resolve the complaint, it is referred to the Ombudsman for a decision. Having considered the complaint, the Ombudsman may uphold it, reject it or conclude that, although the complaint is legitimate, that the publication has offered a satisfactory remedy for the complaint. In rare cases, the Ombudsman may conclude that there is insufficient evidence on which to reach a decision. Both complainants and publications may appeal the Ombudsman’s decision by reference to the Press Council itself. If a complaint is upheld by either the Ombudsman alone or after an appeal to the Press Council, the decision of the Ombudsman and Council must be published in the pages of the offending publication.This is the full extent of the Ombudsman’s and Council’s sanction – essentially subjecting an offending publication to a public criticism that it has failed to meet the standards contained with the Press Council Code of Practice. Although recourse to the BCC and Press Council is intended to constitute an alternative to court actions under the Defamation Act, the latter remains an avenue of recourse for those 122

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individuals or institutions who feel they have been unfairly represented in the media, even if they have utilized either the BCC or Press Council. Indeed, although the creation of the Press Council was explicitly intended to stem the flow of libel actions taken against print media, there is no clear evidence that it has actually done so as yet. It is also worth noting that less formal media accountability mechanisms have been conspicuous by their absence from the Irish public sphere. Thus, for example, there is no Irish media trade journal other than the sporadically published, low-circulation National Union of Journalist’s (NUJ) newsletter, which in any case focuses on defending journalists rather than drawing attention to media-perpetrated misdemeanours. In a similar vein, there is no tradition of media-centric journalism in Ireland. Only one national paper – the Sunday Business Post – includes a regular media column, but this tends to be focused on the PR, advertising and marketing aspects of media businesses, rather than subjecting editorial content to scrutiny. In a similar vein, the Irish Times often includes stories relating to media ownership, but these are generally treated as business stories rather than viewed through a media prism.This reluctance to engage in direct commentary on other media outlets may reflect the limited and Dublin-centric nature of the Irish media: Irish journalists move in similar circles and seem reluctant to publicly engage in critical analysis of themselves and other journalists. Finally, although the Irish Times – uniquely among Irish newspapers – has a publicly available editorial charter,7 no Irish paper has anything remotely equivalent to the New York Times public editor, i.e. an individual who might actively advocate for readers.

Innovative instruments of media accountability The question may reasonably be posed as to whether the advent of new online spaces for expression, whether via blogging or social media, has created new modes for holding media directly accountable to the public. In the case of Ireland, the jury is still out. It is incontrovertibly the case that social media have acted as amplifiers for public outrage over perceived instances of media malfeasance. What is less clear is how effective social media have been in holding media organizations to account in practice. For example, the April 2014 decision of the national broadcaster to make a payout to individuals associated with a Catholic think tank (referred to above) prompted a large-scale response via Twitter and Facebook, which was intensely critical of the broadcaster’s decision. However, given that the broadcaster had already made the payout, the expression of outrage could never have led to a retraction of the decision. What’s more, in subsequent public pronouncements over the controversy (popularly referred to as ‘Pantigate’ in Ireland), the broadcaster has repeatedly defended its decision, arguing that the vagaries of Irish defamation law made any other decision financially risky. In other words, although the response may have had some impact internally and may condition the broadcaster’s response to similar events in the future, there is no definitive evidence that this is or will be the case. In a similar vein, it might be argued that online bloggers writing on Irish media have the opportunity to exercise some influence over media outlets by dint of their reach. The difficulty here is that although there are some – often very acute – critics of media practice in the Irish blogosphere, their influence is limited by their relatively small audiences. One outstanding, though complex, example of effective intervention in the public sphere is the repeated involvement of broadsheet.ie in commenting on, and creating space for wider public comments on, matters which have been subjected to the chilling effect of court actions. In May 2015, businessman Denis O’Brien, the largest media owner in Ireland, secured an injunction against RTE, preventing the latter from running a story about O’Brien’s dealings with a state-owned 123

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bank, Irish Bank Resolution Corporation Ltd (IBRC). A week later, however, Independent Teachta Dála (TD, Member of Parliament) Catherine Murphy used parliamentary privilege to read into the public record an account of O’Brien’s relationship with IBRC, which appears to have included the bulk of the original RTE story. Denis O’Brien then sought to prevent media coverage of Catherine Murphy’s parliamentary statement on the grounds that it was clearly designed to circumvent the original RTE injunction. The significance of this needs to be emphasized: in effect, Denis O’Brien was challenging what most democracies accept as a fundamental principle – the privilege enjoyed by parliamentarians to speak freely. Following the receipt of legal letters from Denis O’Brien’s lawyers, every mainstream media organization removed specific references to the content of the Catherine Murphy speech from their coverage of the story while they awaited the outcome of a further court action as to the legality of Denis O’Brien’s latest demand. In the (relatively brief – three days) interim, only one media outlet – broadsheet.ie – continued to publish the text of Murphy’s speech. In the event, the Irish courts found that O’Brien could not insist on censorship of parliamentary speech: however, for those three days, broadsheet.ie’s example demonstrated the quiescence of mainstream Irish media in the face of the financial and legal muscle of not only Ireland’s most powerful media baron but also the second richest individual in the country. However, although broadsheet.ie probably enjoyed unprecedented visitor numbers during those three days (and continues to host articles critical of Irish mainstream media), it remains relatively obscure for most of the Irish public. Alexa.com ranks it as only the 222nd most visited site in Ireland, well behind the position of legacy media sites. There is also no tradition of media observatory-type organizations in Ireland, like the UK’s Media Lens. Indeed, it can be argued that even within academia, critical content analysisinformed research is relatively underused in Irish media studies. Innovation has thus been limited to developing new approaches to cope with online media where – not least for pragmatic reasons – industry self-regulation prevails. This approach originated in the recommendations of a 1998 report from a working group on ‘The Illegal and Harmful Use of the Internet’, established by the Irish Department of Justice. Starting from the premise that attempts to regulate the Internet via statutory provisions were “not only impossible but also counter-productive” (Working Group on the Illegal and Harmful use of the Internet, 1998, p. 3), the report recommended the establishment of an Internet Advisory Board, which would in turn empower users to protect themselves from either or both illegal and harmful online content. It also proposed encouraging Irish Internet Service Providers (ISPs) to adopt codes of best practice to promote social awareness of safety issues on the Internet. The Board was established in 2000, but was superseded by the Office for Internet Safety (OIS) in 2007, an Executive Office within the Department of Justice and Equality. The OIS primarily adopts a preventative approach to problematic Internet content, rather than acting as a post-hoc regulator of content.Thus, it promotes campaigns relating to Internet safety, with a particular emphasis on the need to combat child pornography. For the most part the OIS operates in tandem with the Internet Service Providers Association of Ireland (ISPAI), which in turn encourages its members to behave as the first bulwark of online accountability. The ISPAI has a two-pronged approach to regulating online content. The first relates to operation of Hotline.ie, an online service operated by the ISPAI since 1999, allowing members of the public to anonymously report instances of manifestly illegal content encountered on the Internet. The scope of Hotline.ie’s activity is notionally demarcated by infractions of the International Association of Internet Hotline Providers (INHOPE) code of practice. In practice, however, Hotline.ie focuses on manifestly illegal content such as child pornography and incitement to hatred. If Hotline.ie staff (who receive training from Interpol) agree that material 124

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drawn to their attention constitutes one of those two categories, they will issue a ‘take down’ request to the relevant ISP. For less serious content, members of the public may complain about content directly to the ISPAI itself. Such complaints are likely to refer to the industry code of practice promulgated by the ISPAI in 2002. The code of practice requires that ISPs devise acceptable use policies which in turn require that customers avoid creating, hosting or transmitting “any unlawful, libellous, abusive, offensive, vulgar or obscene material or any activities deliberately calculated to cause unreasonable offence to others” (ISPAI, 2002, p. 11). This potentially places both ISPs and the ISPAI Complaints Panel in the position of having to adjudicate as to whether a given piece of hosted content legally constitutes libel or defamation. However, Section 2.3 of the Code of Practice also states that although ISPAI members should “remove illegal content when informed by organs of the State or as otherwise required by law”, they should not be responsible for determining “the legality or suitability or to filter or otherwise restrict reception of or access to content material” (ISPAI, 2002, p. 8). In effect then, complaints of, for example, defamation in an online forum are more likely to lead to the removal of online content when the charge of defamation is demonstrated in the course of legal proceedings in a court of law. Irish defamation law is demonstrably effective in this regard: In January 2010, following a successful defamation action against an Irish blogger, the defendant was required to pay damages of €100,000 to a couple he had referred to in his blog some four years earlier (Burns, 2010).

Other media accountability instruments French (2007) identifies six higher education institutions in Ireland as offering courses in professional journalism education, singling out two – Dublin City University (DCU) and Dublin Institute of Technology (DIT) – as the primary centres. Both offer undergraduate and postgraduate degrees, providing a mix of academic and vocational journalism-related training. Both institutions can be described as focusing on the delivery of vocational skills, essential for the dayto-day practice of print, broadcast and online journalism, as opposed to adopting a more reflective, journalism studies approach. Nonetheless, the syllabi of both BA in Journalism courses at DCU and DIT include mandatory first-year modules in Journalistic Ethics, which are informed by abstract conceptions of moral philosophy (Plato, Kant etc.) and which seek to allow tyro journalists to operationalize those principles in the practice of journalism. In addition, although some post-1990 entrants to the Irish media market have not embraced the presence of the main British and Irish journalist trade union, the NUJ, it remains a significant presence in most Irish media organizations. As such, the majority of working journalists within Ireland at least notionally subscribe to the NUJ’s own Code of Conduct. In terms of journalistic accountability, the NUJ code unsurprisingly largely overlaps with the codes advanced by the Press Council and the Broadcasting Authority. It stresses the need to •• •• •• ••

ensure accuracy and fairness, distinguish between fact and opinion, avoid prejudicial content and maintain a distinction between editorial and advertorial content.

However, although the Code also counsels against obtaining information by illegal means and invading privacy, it – unsurprisingly, given that the NUJ primarily exists to defend journalists – does note that exceptions may be made in the public interest. In a similar vein, it also stresses the need for journalists to protect sources who provide information in confidence. 125

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Conclusion Assessing the effectiveness of media accountability instruments in Ireland (or any country) depends on the criteria one uses. It is certainly the case that Irish print media have worked well with the new mechanism, and the industry as a whole regards both the Press Council and the Office of the Press Ombudsman as working well. There is evidence too that the non-statutory nature of its constitution may come to constitute a model for other jurisdictions: when the then Ombudsman, John Horgan (an individual who had – perhaps uniquely – previously enjoyed careers in journalism, politics and academia), was called on to explain the operation of the Irish system of press regulation to the Leveson Inquiry in the UK, his description was warmly received by both the Inquiry and the UK media. Within Ireland, the establishment of the Press Council was in part intended to give individuals who felt that they had been on the receiving end of unfair treatment by the Irish media a means of avoiding the costly and cumbersome procedures of the law courts. Although there is some anecdotal evidence from within Irish newspapers that the option of recourse to the Council has reduced the number of legal cases they face, it is too early to definitively confirm this. A combination of the fact that, until the 2009 Defamation Act, it was possible to bring an action based on content published as much as six years earlier, together with the slow progress of Irish court cases, means that, even in 2015, there are still libel and defamation cases going through the Irish courts which relate to content published before the establishment of the Press Council in 2007. Therefore, it may be some time before anyone can be in a position to make a valid comparison of journalistic behaviour pre- and post- the Council’s establishment. That said, it is apparent that the arrival of the Press Council and the Ombudsman has radically improved internal processes within print media for handling complaints made directly to them. Previously ad hoc systems have been formalized in response to the Press Council requirement that any complaints it receives must first be notified to the offending print institution. With regard to the Broadcasting Complaints Committee, an examination of the nine reports published in 2014 suggests that far fewer complaints are made with regard to broadcast content. The aggregate number of complaints across the 2014 reports was just 89 (some of which referred to broadcasts from 2013). However, a proportionally similar number of complaints are either rejected outright (56) or settled by the Executive Complaints Committee (which, as noted above, essentially means the complaints fell outside the BCC’s own criteria for legitimate complaints). Just 12 of the 89 complaints were upheld or partially upheld. Again, it is difficult to be confident as to how one interprets these figures. On the one hand, the low level of complaints (and the far lower number upheld) suggests that Irish broadcasters are taking their statutory responsibilities seriously. However, there can be a question mark over the manner in which broadcasters respond to upheld complaints. In January 2014, a chat show on RTE Radio 1 discussed the issue of civil partnership for gays and lesbians, during which two representatives of the gay community broadly spoke in favour of the introduction of marriage equality. During the programme, the presenter of the show expressed the hope that marriage equality would be introduced in a forthcoming referendum. This prompted a complaint from a conservative media watchdog to the effect that the programme had failed to offer a counterargument against gay marriage and thus had failed to meet the minimum standards of impartiality and objectivity. The complaint was upheld by the Broadcasting Complaints Commission who argued that the programme had strayed into current affairs territory and thus the role of the presenter should have been to question the stance adopted by his guests (BAI, 2014a). The difficulty in this situation lay not with this decision but with the manner in which Irish broadcasters interpreted and responded to it. In effect, both RTE – to whom the complaint was 126

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addressed – but also other independent broadcasters have interpreted the decision as requiring them to offer a counter-voice whenever an advocate of same-sex marriage appears on radio or television.There is some – albeit necessarily anecdotal – evidence that this has had something of a chilling effect. Faced with the challenge of finding counter-voices whenever a show considers featuring a marriage equality advocate, some broadcasters have opted not to cover the subject at all. Thus, although from an accountability perspective, the BCC has arguably moved to protect against the appearance of broadcaster bias, broadcasters have – again arguably – used the decision as a basis for avoiding dealing with some matters of public controversy at all. In the area of online media accountability, there has certainly been a perception at the political level that the Internet, and social media in particular, constitute a lawless ‘Wild West’ where, to all intents and purposes, there is no regulation of online speech. This peaked in 2012 and 2013 with a spike in public debate around the regulation of online content. In March 2013, a Parliamentary Committee investigated levels of online bullying and new mechanisms for combatting online harassment (Mac Cormaic, 2013). However, submissions to that Committee from groups like Digital Rights Ireland strongly asserted that existing laws offered ample legal remedy for online defamation or harassment. Notwithstanding this, in December 2013 the Minister for Communications established an Internet Content Governance Advisory Group to further explore these issues. However, when the Group reported in April 2014, it also recommended broadly retaining the status quo as regards mechanisms for online accountability. The Group emphasized the education and empowerment of users rather than adopting a punitive approach to service providers (i.e. ISPs), limiting its suggestions for change to a recommendation that the 2007 Communications Regulation Act be updated to add “electronic communications” to the list of messages which might be regarded as criminally “offensive, indecent, obscene or menacing” (O’Neill 2014). If there is an outstanding question relating to online accountability, it relates to the concern that the Defamation Act 2009 does not take sufficient account of the particular relationship between authors and publishers in an online context. Because it is often difficult to identify the author of a contribution to an online discussion, the parties offended by content may seek to sue the host of the bulletin board or the ISP instead. Faced with such legal threats, there have been several instances where the host or ISP has simply shut down all debate on a given topic, an outcome far in excess of what media accountability mechanisms might be expected to achieve (McIntyre, 2010).

Notes  1 Alexa.com   2 All BAI-licensed broadcasters are required to draw up and make public their own codes of practice for handling complaints.  3 http://www.presscouncil.ie   4 The Press Council has a quasi-statutory basis, insofar as Article 44 of the Defamation Act of 2009 offers a definition of how the Council should be constituted and outlines its aims and objectives.  5 http://www.presscouncil.ie/code-of-practice.150.html  6 http://www.presscouncil.ie/office-of-the-press-ombudsman.167.html  7 http://www.irishtimes.com/about-us/the-irish-times-trust

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16 Israel Media in political handcuffs Noam Lemelshtrich Latar

Abstract In Israel, there are no effective MAIs. The complex Israeli media regulation system directly affects the financial strength of the electronic broadcast channels, both public and private, which makes the livelihood of the journalists continuously dependent on the goodwill of the politicians. Powerful owners who maintain ties with politicians control the leading print papers and their journalists wage frequent unethical wars of words against colleagues from competing papers.Within the media itself there are very few journalists, few dedicated TV programmes and few online journals or blogs that are primarily dedicated to media accountability. The Israeli Press Council, a voluntary body, does not enjoy significant public influence, though it has an ethics judicial tribunal. The Israeli courts are the preferred arena for media accountability disputes. A major positive development was the adoption of the Israeli Press Council Ethical Code by the Supreme Court for evaluating journalist accountability. New media and social networks do offer new instruments for public participation in media accountability. The Israeli public, big users of social networks, interact with journalists on accountability issues.

Introduction Israel was established as a democratic country with the proper infrastructure for democratic political processes, including the vision of a free press.The Israeli Press Council (IPC) celebrated its 50th anniversary in 2014 in Tel Aviv, with the participation of more than 35 press councils from Europe. To ensure free expression for journalists, media regulation bodies were created by law, but with seeds of political intervention, as all of the electronic media channels – public and private – were put under the control of government ministries. In theory, Israel should have been an example of Hallin and Mancini’s Liberal Model, characterized by “highly deregulated media markets, little state interference in the media sector, and a highly developed culture of professionalism among journalists” (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, p. 198). However, over the years, Israeli politicians have developed an appetite for political control over the electronic media, and today Israel fits the Polarized Pluralist Model, with “high influence of the political actors on both private and public news organizations, a weak professional culture among journalists and somewhat marginal role of the print media” (ibid., p. 89). The IPC is a voluntary body without teeth, and 128

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it does not play a major role as a media accountability instrument (MAI), although recently the Israeli Supreme Court adopted the IPC’s Ethical Code in a verdict, which was a major achievement. The Israeli courts are the preferred platform to resolve disputes in media matters. Israeli regulation put the electronic media at the mercy of the politicians. This was the result of political appointments to head the regulating bodies, and content regulations that force the public and private electronic media to operate at a loss and to be dependent on the good will of politicians for their survival. The Israeli print media is in decline due to the global process of advertising money shifting to the World Wide Web. The digital age does offer great hope for the creation of new MAIs, including “participatory models of accountability” (Fengler, 2012).This depends on maintaining “net neutrality”. In Israel, there is flourishing journalistic activity on the web, including new MAIs like the Haayin Hashvieet (the Seventh Eye, SE), and many of the leading journalists maintain blogs or Facebook pages on which they receive immediate feedback and corrections from the public. Thus far, there is no content regulation on the Web. However, the Israeli government has been attempting to force stifling electronic regulation on the Web, claiming that “the principle guiding regulation should be based on the product and not the means of distribution and reception; protecting television content without regard to the platform on which the content is being distributed” (Almog, 11.10.2011). The government has appointed a committee to study this matter.

Journalistic culture and media system The Israeli media system can be broadly divided along the lines of ownership structure and technology. Public ownership is limited to broadcast channels including national TV channels and national radio stations. The private sector owns commercial TV channels and regional radio networks as well as print media. New private media players in radio stations and TV channels are beginning to flourish in the Internet sphere due to the low capital entry requirement and the current lack of content regulation. The Israeli print media plays an important role in the political arena.The owners of the print media are considered powerful political players – in most cases, behind the scenes. Until 2007, the major print papers were Yedioth Ahronoth (YA) (Recent News), Maariv (Evening Prayers) and Haaretz (The Country). The three major papers have clear political agendas regarding various issues and political figures. The current Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, does not receive favourable press in any of these three leading papers. In 2007, a new print player, Israel Hayom (IH) (Israel Today), was established, which is distributed free to the public.The owner of IH is the billionaire, Sheldon Adelson, a staunch supporter of Prime Minister Netanyahu. IH has virtually unlimited resources and the introduction of the free paper has changed the print media picture. In 2014, IH became the leading print paper with a distribution of 39.3%, YA is now second with 34.9% and Haaretz is trailing with 5.3%. Maariv has virtually disappeared.This has led to a war of words between YA, which has branded itself as iton hamedina (the paper of the country), and IH. On February 9, 2015, Prime Minster Netanyahu wrote on his Facebook page that Noni Mozes, the owner of YA, was targeting him in YA with the objective of removing him from power undemocratically.The leading journalist of YA, and a recipient of the Israel Prize for journalism, responded that Netanyahu “is a paranoid that should be hospitalized”. YA did not shy away from encouraging legislators supported by the paper to propose a law prohibiting the free distribution of print papers for more than one year. The law is now being fiercely debated in Parliament, but the probability of it being passed is low. Research literature on European countries shows that free papers are not a key factor affecting the decline of the print media (Bakker, 2007). 129

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The Israeli print media is experiencing a decline similar to the global decline, as public attention shifts to the new media platforms and advertising money is transferred to these new platforms. In 2004, when the Israeli print media was the preferred advertising platform, the print papers enjoyed 50% of the advertising money; in 2013, it received only 26% of the advertising money (Baz, 1.5.2014). This is a major decline. A leading creative advertising expert told the SE journalist, “From our point of view, in the advertising world, there is no more print … print is dead” (Baz, 1.5.2014). Public television includes channels 1 and 33, and Educational TV. There are nine public radio stations, including an Israeli Army (IDF) radio station. There are two privately owned TV broadcast channels supported by advertising, 2 and 10, which broadcast entertainment and news. There are also cable and satellite TV channels owned privately, operating on subscription fees, which compete on a national level. A complex regulatory system was created by the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, which put the private TV channels at the mercy of the politicians as the regulations dictate heavy financial investments in contents and royalty payments to the government. The private TV channels have operated at a loss since their inception and the chief executive officers (CEOs) of these channels are constantly begging the politicians to ease the regulations. Three separate regulatory bodies were created by law: the Israel Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the Second Authority for Television and Radio (SATR) and the Council for Cable and Satellite Broadcasting (CCSB). The IBA is responsible for the public TV channels 1 and 33, and for the Voice of Israel national radio stations. The IBA is subject to review by the Israeli State Comptroller (Israel Broadcasting Authority Law, Section 5). The SATR is responsible for maintaining and supervising the commercial regional radio stations and the over-the-air TV broadcast channels 2 and 10. The SATR consists of two entities: the Authority Council and the Authority Management, which is headed by a director general (State Comptroller and Ombudsman Report, 2010, p. 486). The Council for Cable and Satellite Broadcasting is responsible for all the cable and satellite channels. The flow chart in Figure 16.1 demonstrates the political control of all the electronic media in Israel (except the Web) (Lemelshtrich Latar and Karniel, 2013, p. 10). It shows that all of the Israeli broadcasting channels are supervised directly or indirectly by government ministers who appoint the heads of the authorities or councils, and, in many cases, determine the stations’ budgets and content mix.

Figure 16.1  Political control of electronic media in Israel.

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The government and its ministers indirectly control public broadcasting in Israel. A number of public commissions have called attention to the politicization of the IBA (State Comptroller’s Report, 2011, p. 420). Dan Caspi describes the IBA law as tailor-made to fit the government, which created a system of political supervision at various levels (Caspi, 2005, pp. 25–31). The existence and economic survival of public broadcasting are entirely dependent on the state’s political authorities, which appoint its executives and set the fees that are meant to fund it (Negbi, 2011, pp. 215–221). The Authority’s ombudsman, who completed a five-year term of office in 2012, claimed at the end of his tenure that the current situation in the Authority is worse than in the past, and that the Authority aspires to be the mouthpiece of Prime Minister Netanyahu (Barak, 20.8.2012). The viewing figures for the IBA channels (the public channels 1 and 33) compared to the commercial channels (channels 2 and 10) reveal enormous gaps between the public network and the commercial networks: The average rating of the commercial channel 2 during prime time (towards which most investment is directed) reached 19.4% of the population; for channel 10, the average viewership reached 8.2%. In contrast, the average rating of the public channel 1 during prime time declined from 8.8% in 2002 to only 3.5% in 2011 (Toker, 20.2.12). Israeli public TV has suffered over the years from having numerous workers’ unions that refused to adopt new technologies and insisted on employing old and expensive production techniques. The previous Minister of Communications, Gilad Erdan, decided to put a stop to the poor management of the IBA, and set up the Landes Committee to review the IBA’s entire charter. On March 6, 2014, the Landes Committee proposed shutting down the Israel Broadcasting Authority, firing all 2,000 of its employees by March 2015 and, in parallel, creating a new broadcasting authority. The new IBA should broadcast three TV channels: a public channel, a children’s channel and a channel in Arabic. On May 4, 2014, the Israeli government approved the Landes Committee’s recommendations, and Parliament passed it as a law on July 29, 2014. The IBA is now operating under liquidation and the new IBA should start operations in March 2015. The commercial over-the-air TV channels 2 and 10, and the cable and satellite channels, all operate under a license or concession granted to them under the Communications Law and the Second Authority for Television and Radio Law. Two regulatory bodies supervise the commercial channels: the SATR supervises broadcast channels 2 and 10, and the CCSB supervises the cable and satellite channels. Heavy and highly bureaucratic regulation forced the commercial broadcast channels to operate at a financial loss and created a continuing dependence on the support of political legislators (Karniel, 2003, pp. 32–34). The regulations require the broadcasters to invest large sums of money in local content production and to pay royalties to the government regulating bodies. This has forced the broadcasters to operate at a loss over the years and to be constantly dependent on the politicians of the Israeli Parliament to bail them out. The government violation of the freedom of the press reached a record high in 2012, with an affair that became a test case and the most prominent and important example of the dangers inherent in the current regulatory structure for freedom of the press in Israel. This was the ‘channel 10 affair’ and the channel was almost shut down that year due to criticism of the Prime Minister by the leading investigative journalist, Raviv Drucker. The channel was only saved at the very last minute by a special session of Parliament. Mr Drucker later admitted that this episode had put a lot of pressure on him. He launched his own blog to express his views freely, although he is still an employee of channel 10. The current status of channel 10 is uncertain. None of the current owners wish to invest any more money due to the regulations. At the last minute, at the end of 2014, channel 10 received 131

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a six-month extension to find new investors after the employees of channel 10 and their colleagues from the other channels staged many demonstrations in front of the Prime Minister’s office.What made matters even worse was that Prime Minister Netanyahu became the Minister of Communications (in addition to several other offices) after he fired some of his ministers from another coalition party on December 2, 2014. Bureaucracy encumbers the administration of the media market in Israel. Regulation is plagued by variability and inconsistency due to the existence of a multitude of regulation and enforcement bodies which do not operate under a single governmental umbrella (Ezrahi, Goshen and Leshem, 2003). A new and interesting development took place on December 29, 2014, when one of the leading cellular companies, Celcom, started to offer new TV channels on the Web, competing on price with the cable channels. Celcom has made content agreements with Sony, the BBC, NBC and National Geographic, and will also broadcast the free public and private channels 1, 2, 10 and 33, as well as channel 23, the education channel. Another major cellular company, Orange, is planning to launch its own TV channels on the Web. It is important to note that the Web TV channels are not regulated. It is too early to predict the effects of these new cellular TV channels, but they can be expected to be major, with a positive impact on the freedom of the media if they stay unregulated. There is increasing and remarkable activity within innovative online Israeli digital journalism. All of the existing over-the-air and cable broadcasters are putting their content on the Web, which is not subject to regulation and political control. Yet all of the print media also have a significant online presence, with millions of entries per month. There are current attempts by the Israeli government to subject the Web media content to regulation similar to that of other electronic media (Lemelshtrich and Karniel, 2013). Realizing the paradox that Web content is not regulated while other electronic content is, over the past two years the government Ministry of Communications has attempted to subject online media content to the same stifling regulation as the broadcast channels. On October 11, 2011, a government committee presented recommendations to the Ministry of Communications, according to which “the principle guiding regulation should be based on the product and not on the means of distribution and reception … The time has come to switch from regulation based on the means of distribution and reception to regulation based on the product” (Almog, 11.10.2011). This is in sharp contrast to the Western democracies’ policies of ‘Internet neutrality’. The government has appointed the Schechter Committee to study the matter.

Established instruments of media accountability The IPC The IPC is not a statutory body, but acts on a voluntary basis. The General Assembly of the Council consists of journalists (30%), publishers (30%) and representatives of the public (40%). An executive committee elected by the General Assembly manages the Council. The IPC maintains a judicial tribunal and an ombudsman who is responsible for receiving complaints from the public as well as from journalists. The IPC website describes its purpose and vision as follows: The Israeli Press Council was established by representatives of the press (publishers, editors and journalists) and representatives of the public.The Council is responsible for 132

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the maintenance of professional ethics in the free press and determines the ethical code to which the press must subscribe.1 In practice, the most influential members of the Israeli media do not view the Ethical Tribunal of the IPC as a worthy avenue for exploring ethical grievances, and they prefer “hidden arbitration or open legal proceedings” (Mann and Lev-On, 2012, p. 72). A major breakthrough for the IPC was on February 2, 2012, when the Israeli Supreme Court adopted the IPC Ethical Code as a tool for the courts to examine the accountability of journalists and the accountability of their publishers. Supreme Court Justice Fogelman wrote: The ethical or social duty to publicize a matter of significant public interest exists only for publications that are products of careful and responsible work. … The fulfillment of the standard behavior we call responsible journalism will be examined according to the particular circumstances of each case. … A useful tool for the courts can be the code of ethics of the IPC. (Supreme Court Case 751/10 8.2.2012 Ilana Dayan)

A special educational TV programme on media issues: Tik Tikshoret (Media File) For the past 18 years, Educational TV has been producing a weekly programme dedicated to discussing media issues that are highly relevant to media accountability – Tik Tikshoret. A leading journalist hosts the programme and journalists from all media platforms discuss media ethics; the relationships between capital, the media and politicians (a hot topic in the Israeli media); and questions relating to journalists crossing red lines in their publications. The programme is considered highly reliable and has aired some major journalistic scoops over the years. It is a useful MAI, though due to the nature of the television medium, no in-depth discussion or research can take place. Educational TV figures state that the programmes are watched by 7% of the Israeli population.

The Israeli courts Besides the traditional instruments of media accountability, the Israeli courts are the preferred platform for holding the media accountable for harmful publications under the anti-defamation law. Only the courts are able to levy monetary punishments on the media. However, in many court cases, companies and politicians with financial resources sue the media and journalists in order to threaten them against publishing stories – this is known as a ‘media freezing effect’. Many such lawsuits are later withdrawn by the plaintiffs. In 2009, 75 verdicts were given, 50% of which were justified. In 2010, a total of 153 verdicts were given, 48% of which were justified. In 2011, 232 verdicts were given, 36% of which were justified, and in 2012, 218 verdicts were given, 39% of which were justified.2

Academic research on media accountability There are about 15 academic programmes in communications in Israeli universities and colleges that conduct research on media issues, including on MAIs. There are more than 200 133

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communications researchers. Several of the research projects relate to issues of ethics, reporting accuracy in general or specific case studies like the second war in Lebanon or the massive social demonstrations of 2011.

The online journal for media discourse: Ha’ayin Hashvi’it (The Seventh Eye) One of the early entrants to the field of online media accountability discourse is the SE journal, which became the most important player in criticizing the Israeli media on all platforms.‘To guard with seven eyes’ means to guard with extreme care. The SE was founded in 1996 by the Israel Democracy Institute in Jerusalem, a non-profit organization, as a platform for the Israeli media to conduct continuous introspection. It moved from print to an online platform in 2008. It issues a daily bulletin written by leading in-house journalists who held senior positions in the media before joining the SE. It provides in-depth discussions of the Israeli media, including investigative reporting.The SE carries an almost daily comparative analysis of how a media event is covered in the different media platforms, revealing the biases of the journalists.The SE maintains a Facebook page that allows readers to post comments on the media accountability analysis.3 However, it was recently announced that the SE might have to close down due to a lack of resources.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Social networks as platforms for media accountability New media platforms offer great opportunities for the creation of new MAIs, due to the low capital entry requirement, lack of content regulation, individual citizens’ empowerment in the use of social networks and the difficulties of imposing regulations, even if they exist, due to the nature of Internet technologies. Israel as a nation was an early adopter of new media. Out of a population of 8 million, 5.6 million use the Internet, that is, about 70%. Also, 70% of the Internet users use the WhatsApp application and 75% of Israeli homes have a Wi-Fi connection. Fortyfive percent of free time is spent on the Internet (compared to only 12% on watching TV). Israelis have 310 Facebook friends on average, which gives their posts relatively high exposure (Bezeq, 2014).4 In Israel, there is increasing use of the public Internet sphere to hold the media accountable for its publications. Most of the Israeli media platforms and journalists maintain Facebook pages that allow readers to post comments and participate in the discourse on accountability. There are over 72 active online news websites in Israel and more than 10 of them include discussions on media accountability. The Israeli public is one of the most active on social networks in the world: “Israelis ‘like’ Facebook more than any other nation” (Epstein, 13.5.2013).The Israeli Facebook account manager states that Israel has over four million Facebook users (out of a total population of about eight million). The number of ‘likes’ more than doubled in 2013, climbing from 300 million in 2012 to 764 million. This flood of likes demonstrates the affinity that the Israeli public has to respond and interact with the content. There has been an increase in the number of replies to posts, which now stands at 120 million posts per month. Israelis update their status 13 million times per month, and 60% of Israeli Facebook members log into the social network on a daily basis (Epstein, 13.5.2013). This remarkable public interactivity indicates fertile ground for citizen involvement in the discourse on media accountability. 134

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Journalist blogs Due to the economic and political pressures described above regarding the electronic and print media, several leading Israeli journalists have launched personal blogs where they can write more freely and communicate directly with their readers. These journalists admit that they do not as yet have a financial basis for their blogs, so it may be a temporary phenomenon. One prominent example is the Raviv Drucker blog. Mr Drucker is the journalist who published a report on Prime Minister Netanyahu which almost led to the closure of the private TV channel 10. Mr Drucker devotes a special section of his blog to discussing media accountability issues and is open to receiving comments from the public on his posts.5

Participatory models of accountability The digital age does offer great hope for the creation of new MAIs, including “participatory models of accountability” (Fengler, 2012). In Israel, the talkbacks to journalistic articles are quite popular. Many leading journalists admit that their readers correct factual mistakes in their stories and that, after validation, they correct the stories – an easy process with digital media. They also admit that the digital platform enables them to carry on conversations with their readers that often lead to changes and improvements in their articles. No academic research is available on the effectiveness of this MAI in Israel, but it is reasonable to assume that this is a very effective digital MAI, making use of the wisdom of the crowd.The individuals are empowered by their membership of social networks, which gives them a megaphone for their grievances, making the journalists more vulnerable and accountable if they do not respond quickly to readers’ justified remarks. On the other hand, ‘participatory models of accountability’ may have some serious negative effects on journalists’ accountability. Journalists may be sensitive to the number of ‘likes’ they receive for their posts, and it is also known that the return on investment (ROI) of journalists can now be measured based on the ROI of advertisements adjacent to their articles. This phenomenon may be counterproductive to the promotion of accountability: The journalist can test the story … as the story is written. The journalist can adjust the writing to receive the ‘best’ results; a combination of what the journalists, the audience and the advertisers want. … Present pay-per-click business models will create an incentive for news publishers to focus on stories that will match ads. If that happens, it will threaten journalistic freedom. (Lemelshtrich Latar and Nordfors, 2009, p. 44)

Conclusion As demonstrated in this paper, the state of the Israeli media fits the Polarized Pluralist Model of Hallin and Mancini, characterized by “high influence of the political actors on both private and public news organizations”, a “weak professional culture among journalists”, and weakening print media. There is a noticeable transition of MAIs to digital media where, so far, the content is free of political regulation and influences. Several political and government efforts are being made that may result in the media environment changing for the worse. The Schechter Committee appointed by the government is studying the issue of imposing regulation on Web content, and several members of the Israeli parliament are trying to pass a law to prohibit the distribution of free print newspapers. 135

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It is important to understand that, in a country without internationally recognized borders, a country whose very existence is threatened in the view of its population, that political discussions in the media involving leading journalists are quite heated in the attempt to win public support for one policy or another. This environment is not conducive to supporting balanced and ethical journalism. For many journalists, winning these arguments is like a question of ‘state survival’. Despite these complex political conditions, Israel does have MAIs that conduct discourse on journalistic accountability through online journals, academic institutions, the Israeli Press Council, dedicated TV programmes and the courts. A major breakthrough was the Supreme Court’s adoption of the IPC’s Ethical Code for testing journalistic responsibility. Israelis do respect the basic democratic institutions: Parliament, the government and the judicial system. However, the media does not enjoy a high level of public trust. In an annual survey conducted among the Israeli Jewish population by the Israel Democracy Institute in Jerusalem on October 6, 2013, trust in the media was lower than in all the other state institutions, except for the political parties.6 This lack of media popularity could be a reflection of how the public perceives media ethics. It is interesting to note that the Israeli Arab population has a different scale of trust, and that the media is a close second to the Supreme Court in popularity. Since there is unregulated Arabic print and online media in Israel, this high level of trust could be attributed to the Arabic media, and not to the media in Hebrew. New media do offer great promise for improving media accountability due to the ‘participatory models of accountability’ and the wisdom of the crowd. Individuals can monitor the validity of facts that appear in the journalistic stories and can carry on conversations with the journalists. The effects of these participatory accountability instruments on the quality of the media should be researched in academic institutions.

Notes 1 http://www.moaza.co.il/BRPortal/br/P100.jsp 2 http://www.pratiut.com/2013/04/blog-post_17.htm 3 http://www.the7eye.org.il 4 http://www.bezeq.co.il/gallerypress/28_12_2014/ 5 http://drucker10.net 6 http://news.walla.co.il/?w=/9/2683242

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17 Italy Transparency as an inspiration Sergio Splendore

Abstract The chapter examines the lack of accountability and transparency as one of the causes of the low level of freedom of the press assigned to Italy by independent organizations. The difficulties Italian journalism face to be accountable do not depend on the lack of MAIs but on the excessive number of regulations that Italian journalism has adopted without effective sanctions. The result is that in Italy even the most simple quarrels, that could be solved by a system of self-regulation, tend to be regulated by law. Online journalism seems instead to have found a spectrum of practices that do make Italian journalism more accountable.

Introduction According to Freedom House, the independent organization aimed at monitoring freedom (from different points of views) around the world, Italy has since 1993 achieved a ‘partly free’ ranking from the freedom of the press perspective. Looking at the overall 2013 ranking, Italy scores 31/100, where 0 is the best free), while 100 is the worst (unfree).1 Italy (with Guyana) is ranked 68th of 197. Among the countries that Hallin and Mancini (2004a) label as Mediterranean, Greece is the only one that scores worse than Italy. The 2013 Press Freedom Index provided by Reporters Without Borders assigns to Italy a slightly better position: 57th of 197, with a score of 26.11. Whereas Freedom House considers Italy as ‘partly free’, Reporters Without Borders places Italy within the category of countries with ‘noticeable problems’.2 Among the indicators used by Freedom House, the word ‘accountability’ never appears, although ‘transparency’ appears twice. Therefore, if both the indexes can suggest something about the condition of freedom of the press in Italy, they hardly reveal specific features of accountability and transparency within the Italian journalistic field, though both are strictly related to freedom of the press. Nonetheless, if we analyse the levels of media transparency and accountability, which are inextricably entwined, Italy’s freedom of the press is even weaker than either Freedom House or Reporters Without Borders suggest. Since the major reform of broadcasting and the financial crises of the newspaper industry in the mid-1970s, the Italian media system has been characterized by strong political parallelism, media concentration, and a weak accountability culture in public and private businesses. 137

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Claude-Jean Bertrand argues that media accountability systems must be regarded as “any non-State means of making media responsible towards the public” (2000, p. 108). Pursuing the intent of this argument, it is necessary to focus on the level of accountability and transparency in Italy when examining the extent to which journalists and their institutions are able to solve or avoid problems by self-regulation. This issue appears even more important than the basic meaning of transparency referred to in the context of the structure of media ownership, which Russ-Mohl (1993) regards as crucially important and is indeed of utmost significance to the Italian context. Whether the Italian media system has noticeable problems referring to its accountability and transparency depends not only on the high level of political parallelism but also on the legal environment. One of the predominant issues about Italian journalism accountability is therefore the balance between self-regulation and state law.The relation between the two is not necessarily conflictual. Nonetheless, it appears that state law negatively influences self-regulation. The law on defamation, by which some Italian journalists have been convicted during the exercise of their profession, is a prime example. Another was the proposed, but discarded, ‘gag law’ that would have restricted the ability of police and prosecutors to record phone conversations that would have also stopped journalists publishing the resulting transcripts. The ‘gag law’ must be regarded as government’s attempt to monitor and control the news, but also as the failure of journalists’ organizations to autonomously regulate topics that are crucial for the freedom of the press. If, in Italy, defamation is a criminal offense punishable by fines and imprisonment, it is also because Italian journalists and their institutions were unable to foresee the situation and thus make effective any internal regulation to punish those who commit defamation. As the ‘gag law’ proves – in part due also to the proliferation of online news content – the contemporary conditions in which journalism is working make the issues linked to transparency and accountability even more difficult to discuss and enhance (Viali, 2005; Malavenda, Melzi D’Eril and Vigevani, 2012). The economic crisis, combined with the proliferation of media actors that somehow become new, hardened accountability activists, challenged not only the dominance of traditional journalism but also its transparency and accountability. The media actors in this context are both global enterprises such as Google, Facebook and Twitter and small local journalistic activists or bloggers that jeopardize the authoritative roles of traditional media. This chapter will broadly discuss the Italian media system in the digital fashion and will deconstruct (Hanitzsch, 2007) the concept of Italian journalism culture. The chapter will focus on the abundance (and resulting confusion) as opposed to the absence of media accountability instruments and will thus discuss new forms of digital journalism and how they deal with the issues of accountability and transparency in journalism. The conclusion discusses the effectiveness of new and old forms of accountability.

Journalistic culture and media system Two concepts are recurrent when describing the Italian media system. The first is the term ‘anomaly’ and the second is ‘political parallelism’. ‘Anomaly’ was a buzzword identifying the Italian media system, even when conditions seemed to change (Gambaro, 2002; Ortoleva, 2005; Mazzoleni and Vigevani, 2008). Market globalization and digitalization have transformed the system, and today it is possible to track more similarities than differences in comparison to other European media systems. Nonetheless RAI, Italy’s public service broadcaster, the largest in Europe in terms of both digital TV channels provided (15) and audience share (AGCOM, 2014), is still one of the key peculiarities. Another distinctiveness is that Silvio Berlusconi, former prime minister and Italy’s pre-eminent politician 138

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over the past two decades, owns the most important private commercial broadcasting company, Mediaset. Overall, the Italian TV system has faced two major changes: (1) the rise of the satellite pay TV Sky (and its contemporaries entering the free digital market), which is owned by Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation and balances the power of both RAI and Mediaset; and (2) the switch to digital technology that has increased the number of players in the digital TV field.The Italian TV system is no longer a blocked duopoly, but can reasonably be regarded today as an oligopoly based on three major firms and many smaller players which try to survive and make some profit in a highly competitive market. The newspaper market is still suffering a decline in importance in terms of newspapers sold at the kiosks. Nonetheless, the traditional publishers and their historic brands (Corriere della Sera, La Repubblica, La Stampa) are increasing their influence in the online environment. On the other hand, the patterns of Internet use are still contradictory. In comparison to other European countries, they are characterized by the slowest diffusion. Internet penetration is 55%, compared to 79% in France and Germany (AGCOM, 2014). Although the penetration of the Internet is slow, in order to be informed, Italians are increasingly using online news. A recent survey establishes that Italians use the Internet more than newspapers to be informed on local, national and international affairs; the Italian proportion of 40% compares favourably to Americans (46%) and the British (41%) (AGCOM, 2014). Although the media system changes, ‘political parallelism’ is still regarded as one of the principal features of Italian journalism.When Hallin and Mancini (2004a) discuss the Mediterranean Model, they declare it as an unsuitable representation of the Italian media system. The high level of partisanship is common to the party newspapers, and to a certain extent, to a substantial part of the quality press. Partisanship is also visible in television broadcasting, where Berlusconi controls Mediaset and the government owns RAI, the public broadcaster. RAI has suffered since its early days of ‘lottizzazione’ (Mancini, 2009), that is, of the partitioning of the political parties’ grasp on its management, programme production and news channels. Strong political parallelism typifies the Italian journalism culture. Thomas Hanitzsch (2007, p. 371) argues that one of the major driving forces in shaping the journalistic culture is ‘power distance’, meaning journalism’s position in relation to the loci of power in society. If watchdog journalism provides a critique of society and its political institutions, the high level of political parallelism seems to jeopardize even the essential and shared journalistic functions: impartiality and factuality of information. When Seymour-Ure (1974) introduced the concept of ‘partypress parallelism’, he meant the ownership of the mass media by political parties, the editorial choices of the news organizations and the party affiliation of the readers. From this original meaning, political parallelism now is interpreted as the ways media reflect political orientations in their current affairs. High levels of political parallelism affect news content, as well as the quality of pluralism, but they are increasingly important also for determining the level of trust people have in the institutions and in media themselves. Hanitzsch and Berganza (2012) verify that, in general, higher levels of political parallelism determine higher levels of distrust. By contrast, in the Mediterranean Model, the heavier use of public service broadcasting (PSB) and television in general, and confidence in the press, are linked to higher levels of confidence in the institutions, even in a context of economic crisis and general distrust in institutions. One of the reasons appears to be that the ruling class control over the media significantly influences traditional and mainstream media users (Memoli and Splendore, 2014). The important aspect is that the features of the Italian media system as well as the high level of political parallelism in journalism’s culture influence the media’s transparency and accountability. Political power is also responsible for the selection of AGCOM members, which means that those who should be impartial in regulating the media system are politically chosen. Also, 139

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the lack of a law on the conflicts of interest, in particular, for the overall holding of political office and media ownership should be regarded as a lack of transparency due to the close linkage between media and politics.

Established instruments of media accountability The list of what can be considered as instruments dealing with media accountability in Italy is long, detailed and puzzling. Following Puppis’ (2007) definitions of media regulation, Italy is an assortment of state-regulated domain, some self-regulation and a consistent mixture of the two (where public and private sectors jointly operate). In terms of influence on Italian journalists’ practices and behaviour, state law is unequivocally the most significant (Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014). In the field of self-regulation, finding a trace of media accountability instruments as presented by Bertrand (2003) is difficult. The introduction of newspaper ombudsmen has hardly been on the agenda of the domestic media players. Historically, Italian journalism has experienced only two ombudsmen initiatives and neither that of Il Messaggero, one of the most important dailies in the Italian central region, nor of La Repubblica, one of the most influential national newspapers, lasted. The basic problem facing ombudsmen is that they are perceived as an odd institution in the Italian political and cultural context. Indeed, Italian journalists do not even support its institutionalization (Alsius, Rodríguez-Martínez and Mauri de los Rios, 2014, p. 110). Even editorial corrections are a rarity in the printed press, and no media journalism exists. Media criticism is often offered by business competitors, or comedy broadcasts and soft news (Mazzoleni and Splendore, 2011, p. 97). The discourse about the press council and the code of ethics is more complex. The Italian equivalent to a press council is the Ordine dei Giornalisti (OdG), which the Association of Journalists established by law, and to which all journalists must belong in order to see their profession publicly recognized. The OdG can be regarded as a press council, at least in the meaning of an institution established in the defence of press freedom, which is guaranteed by the Constitutional Law and which should monitor the accordance of the content provided by media associates. When media practitioners become members of the OdG, they must, now being professional journalists, sign the OdG’s code of ethics. The OdG has the legal ability to ensure the code is abided by.The journalistic code of ethics is thoroughly articulated (and generally based on co-regulation practices). The OdG’s website provides a current version of the code of ethics.3 Norms that Italian journalists have to follow are contained in 29 different documents.4 The majority are self- or co-regulation codes, which concern different subject matters (privacy, minors, diseases, migrants and refugees and so on). Overall, the four types of the OdG’s sanctions appear to be ineffective and weak: the first is a warning; second, a written objection; third, suspension from practicing for a period of not less than two months and not exceeding one year; and last, expulsion from the OdG. Nonetheless, in practice, the OdG basically regulates access to the profession and appears to be slow and tortuous in making decisions, and ultimately is protective of the associates and members. If the practice of making amendments (corrections) is more frequent, expulsion rarely happens. Mostly, failures to abide by the code of ethics lead to journalists being punished by the first, second or third types of sanctions (Viali, 2005; Partipilo, 2009). The consequence of this complex, as well as weak, quantity of (self- and co-)regulation is threefold. First, Italian journalists have different expectations regarding media accountability in comparison to other colleagues in Europe (Fengler and Eberwein, 2014). Second, Italian jour140

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nalists appear more loyal to their colleagues and company editorial and political guidelines than other instruments (Lauk, Harro-Loit and Väliverronen, 2014). Third, the state law exerts the most influence on journalists’ work (Malavenda et al., 2012). An example of this third aspect is that defamation in Italy is a criminal offense punishable by fines and imprisonment. As recently as June 2012, two local journalists – Orfeo Donatini and Tiziano Marson – were each sentenced to four months in prison and fined €15,000. This event is mentioned in the Freedom House (2013a) annual report. If the criticism of the state law is its influence and intrusiveness on the journalistic profession, there are also criticisms of media law. The government-appointed organ tasked with overseeing the content produced by the media system is the Autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazione (AGCOM), which covers the entire communication sector. AGCOM is accountable to parliament, which appoints its members. Its principal aims are (1) control of quality of media products, (2) mediating disputes between producers and consumers, (3) creating specific rules to safeguard socially vulnerable categories of consumers and (4) fostering political, social and economic diversity in broadcasting. Analyses of AGCOM documents concerning the interventions it makes indicate that the organ deals with transparency and accountability but never refers to journalism. In the context of transparency, AGCOM works often with telecommunications, specifically the transparency of the price in using mobile services. At the same time, when AGCOM does attempt to sanction media actors, it still appears weak and is often criticized for the lack of real power to impose corrections on the media outlets (Verdier-Bonchut, 2003; Casasorsa, 2012; Mazzoleni,Vigevani and Splendore, 2011).

Innovative instruments of media accountability Whereas Freedom House categorizes Italy’s press as ‘partly free’, another index of Freedom House declares Italy’s Internet as ‘free’. This index is based on evaluations of three different categories: ‘obstacles to access’, ‘limits on content’ and ‘violations of user rights’. Italy is relatively weak in the third category, but quite strong in allowing broad freedoms in the second category. Therefore, according to the index, Italian online journalists do not practice self-censorship, the government does not manipulate the information provided and sources of information reflect different points of view. It is reasonable, therefore, to expect online journalism to be more transparent than its traditional counterpart. Italian digital journalism has not generated any well-established accountability instruments, but some autonomous practices can be regarded as a form of accountability (Mazzoleni et al., 2011; Splendore, 2013). References to the phases of news making are typical of the digital environment: (1) the publication of the articles on journalists’ personal Twitter accounts and Facebook pages, (2) recorded discussions about them with readers and (3) readers’ comments received by a website. These everyday practices make Italy one of Europe’s most lively online media-watching environments. In this respect, social media users or bloggers are not the only contributors (Giglietto and Selva, 2014), but journalists also use the online environment for professional self-reflection (Cobianchi, Del Sal and Splendore, 2014). However, while we take for granted the existence of an online sphere full of strong but rarely well-argued media criticism, Italian journalists claim it has a low impact on their ability to produce good quality journalism and they ignore both audience responses and users’ complaints (Dobek-Ostrowska, Głowacki and Kuś, 2014, p. 150). Although they make up a small proportion of the news field, new forms of digital journalism, crowdfunding and data journalism have opened up windows on the issues of transparency and accountability. Within the crowdfunding field, when some media companies ask for funds in order to provide information, they strive to be as transparent as possible to account for the 141

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funds they use and spend. In the case of data journalism, journalists claim that the degree of ­transparency of public administration is mirrored by the transparency they provide in their articles.

Conclusion The Italian journalism culture, characterized by political parallelism and the orientation to comment on politics, is the mirror of the media system that produces it. The press market has always been fragmented and driven by political interests. The degree of professionalization has been evaluated to be as low as the diffusion of newspapers. Television has for decades been anchored to the “blocked duopoly” (Gambaro, 2002) between PSB and Mediaset. Within this landscape, transparency and accountability have not been priorities, because media companies’ interests are apparently given their political preferences. The Italian version of a press council, the OdG, wields some sanctions in the field of transparency, but self-regulation does not appear to be its principal concern and it is usually meant at the ownership level. In the context of accountability, the word itself rarely appears in either the Italian code of ethics or any agreement for maintaining the quality of journalistic content. The ineffectiveness of self-regulation leaves space for the law to govern, even in the context where journalism should intervene autonomously. Today, the media landscape is dramatically changing and the model of traditional Italian journalism is dissipating. The reasons are global and not peculiar to the Italian context. The global economic crisis and the transformation of the media system due to digitization are also affecting Italian journalism, even in its more consolidated features. For instance, the traditional newspaper L’Unità, being a good example of the party-press parallelism that occurs throughout Italy, ceased to operate in the summer of 2014.The economic crisis has eroded the resources that parties designated to the maintenance of their media. The news media have to strive to stay in the market, be innovative, become more popular and increasingly try to cut their bonds with their political references. So do the new digital enterprises. Whereas the journalism of the print press faces a crisis, resulting in the closure of some traditional news media, digitization of the media landscape has increased the number of actors entering the field and trying to survive by innovative forms of news making and business models. The digital way appears to be more concerned (even with a certain degree of unawareness) with issues of transparency.

Notes 1 The index divides the countries according to three different categories:‘Free’,‘Partly free’ and ‘Not free’. 2 Reporters Without Borders divides the countries according to five categories: ‘Good situation’, ‘Satisfactory situation’, ‘Noticeable problems’, ‘Difficult situation’ and ‘Very serious situation’. For a critical review of the consistency of the indexes mentioned here see Banda (2011) and Giannone (2014). 3 http://www.odg.it/content/carta-dei-doveri-del-giornalista 4 On 26 January 2016, the Italian ODG has approved the “Testo unico dei doveri del giornalista”, a unified code of ethics that includes the range of existing charts (Carta dei doveri del giornalista, Carta dei doveri del giornalista degli Uffici stampa, Carta di Firenze, Carta di Milano, etc.). The aim of this new Code is precisely to provide a more consistent and all-encompassing code.

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18 Latvia Different journalistic cultures and different accountability within one media system Ainars Dimants

Abstract At present, three different journalistic cultures compete for domination within the Latvian media system. The state of media accountability is different in each of these cultures. First, there is the traditional Russian journalistic culture, which is characteristic of the minority of the Latvian media, i.e. the part of the media that is produced for the Russian-language minority. Second, from the point of view of an economic theory of journalism, the instrumental and authoritarian (post-Soviet) journalistic culture can be seen. Third, a modern (Western) journalistic culture, orientated towards high journalistic professional standards, editorial autonomy from the publisher and owner and practising Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), is emerging. The professional associations are divided along the lines of the corresponding journalistic cultures. Professional education, media criticism and quality management within editorial staff seem to be measures for broader, nationwide impact. Well-managed public-service media organizations need to be role models in this respect.

Introduction Journalistic infrastructures – the infrastructures outside media organizations for ensuring the quality of the media, such as (1) professional associations of media workers; (2) institutions of professional education; (3) media journalism, i.e. journalism about the media – general interest media reporting about media; (4) the professional press for media practitioners; and (5) media research (Russ-Mohl, 2003, p. 341) – are underdeveloped in Latvia, a small but culturally rich (including from the point of view of journalistic cultures) post-Soviet nation in northeastern Europe. Consequently, it is only possible to see the beginnings of media accountability (Dimants, 2010, pp. 201ff; Rožukalne, 2012, p. 105). At present, three different journalistic cultures compete for domination within one national media system. However, media accountability is different in each of these cultures.

Journalistic culture and media system Paragraph 100 of the Constitution of the Republic of Latvia (Latvijas Republikas Satversme)1 ensures media freedom. The Law on the Press and Other Mass Media (Par presi un citiem masu 143

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informācijas līdzekļiem)2 and Electronic Mass Media Law (Elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu likums)3 do the same. No less important for the successful functioning of media, and a central part of media law, are the Freedom of Information Law (Informācijas atklātības likums)4 and the Advertising Law (Reklāmas likums).5 Paragraph 22 of the Law on the Press and Other Mass Media states that journalists and media outlets have the right to protect and not reveal their information sources. This law also attempts to ensure editorial autonomy and the transparency of media ownership (Rožukalne, 2013), but the concentration of media ownership is hardly regulated. There is no effective regulation of Internet media, which now have a leading role within the Latvian media system. Data from the market research company TNS Latvia show that 68% of the population use the Internet every day and the most popular news portals are Delfi.lv (in Latvian and Russian, 28.8% of all users), Tvnet.lv (in Latvian and Russian, 23.3%) and Apollo.lv (in Latvian, 15.2%).6 All of these portals have Estonian owners (Rožukalne, 2013, etc.). The yellow press style Kasjauns.lv (in Latvian, with 5.7% of all users) is the most popular Latvian-owned portal, and a specific Latvian feature is the success of the national social network Draugiem.lv (26.7%), compared to Facebook.com (28.2%).7 Among the TV companies, there are three big players: Swedish, Russian and Latvianowned TV. The Latvian-owned TV is the public service channels. The national shares in 2014, according to language and ownership, are as follows: TV3 (in Latvian, Swedish Modern Times Group – MTG) – 11.8%; PBK – Pirmais Baltijas Kanāls (First Baltic Channel, in Russian, a private Latvian channel closely connected to the First Russian Channel in Russia, see Rožukalne, 2013, pp. 220ff) – 9.6%; LTV1 – Latvijas Televīzija 1 (Latvian Television 1, public service channel in Latvian) – 9.2%; LNT – Latvijas Neatkarīgā Televīzija (Latvian Independent Television, in Latvian, MTG) – 9.1%; NTV Mir (in Russian, from Russia) – 7.7%; RTR Rossija (in Russian, from Russia) – 5.0%; REN Baltija (in Russian, from Russia) – 4.3%; TV5 (in Russian, MTG) – 4.1%; 3+ (in Russian, MTG) – 4.0%; LTV7 – Latvijas Televīzija 7 (Latvian Television 7, public service channel in Latvian and Russian) – 3.8%; and TV6 (in Latvian, MTG) – 3.0% (data from TNS Latvia).8 A lower level of media concentration is seen between the radio stations, but still 80% of advertising income goes to only six groups: Latvian Radio (public service), Super FM (Latvian private ownership), Radio SWH – Radio Software House (Irish), Radio Skonto (Latvian), Star FM (MTG) and MIX FM (Latvian, only in Russian).9 Data from TNS Latvia show that the biggest stations are Latvian Radio 2 (20.1%), Radio Skonto (11.4%), Latvian Radio 1 (9.5%), Latvian Radio 4 in Russian (6.9%) and Radio SWH (6%).10 The print media are shrinking, both in terms of their independence and their audiences, especially the daily newspapers. However, there are still two nationwide political publications which are independent and profit-making – the biggest daily in 2014 was the national conservative Latvijas Avīze (Latvian Newspaper),11 with 82,000 readers, and the liberal weekly news magazine Ir (It is), with 17,000 printed copies. Many local newspapers and the biggest magazines are also independent. However, the main nationwide Russian language press publications, like the daily Vesti segodnja (News today) and the weekly MK Latvija (Moscow komsomolets Latvija),12 are owned by Russians (Rožukalne, 2013, pp. 180–182, 220f), and they follow the official foreign and security policy lines of Putin’s authoritarian regime. On the other hand, in recent years, journalists from Russia have established two independent news portals in Latvia in Russian, Spektr.delfi.lv and Meduza.io. However, TV remains the most important news medium for more than 75% of Russian speakers in Latvia (data from the Marketing and Public Opinion Research Centre, SKDS).13 Among the theories about media systems, there is the reasonable assumption that a media system consists of the context of norms, including professional standards (Weischenberg, 1992, 144

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pp. 68f). One of the main characteristics of a modern society is the differentiation of the mass media system as a functioning autonomous subsystem of the society with the specific original function to conduct the self-observation of the whole societal system (Luhmann, 1996, p. 173). On other hand, the degree and forms of state involvement in regulation and the self-regulation process, the responsiveness to the audiences, the transparency of the editorial and publishing processes as well as business activities, and the participation of civil society actors shape the corresponding journalistic culture (Lauk and Denton, 2011, p. 218). Moreover, the standards of the commercial media are dominating the global culture of mass media since the end of the 20th century (McQuail, 1994, p. 89). The process of building an independent (autonomous) media system in Latvia is not so linear. The reintegration of the Latvian media into the North/Central European model of media systems, to which the Latvian media system historically belongs, (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, p. 305) is still ongoing. Peculiar to this model is the coexistence of political parallelism, on the one hand, and journalistic professionalism, on the other. Nowadays, in Latvia, the first is highly developed, but the second is not, because a common journalistic culture does not exist (Šulmane, 2011, p. 64). This conclusion comes from the finding that there are three competing journalistic cultures in Latvia.This leads to the hypothesis that, in the process of the homogenization of the journalistic culture of the country, not only will the autonomous media system be differentiated, but also the common national identity of the Latvian people will be strengthened in parallel with this process, because of the importance of the media system for the whole society (approximately 500 journalists belong to professional journalistic associations in Latvia, but there are no precise statistics about the total number of journalists). That possible identity-building results from the homogenization of journalistic culture is determined both by the ethnic composition of the people, including the media makers (e.g. many Russian-speaking journalists are increasingly taking part in Latvian professional journalistic associations), and by, we can assume, the further European integration of the nation. In particular, this means the increasing importance of Latvian and Western investments in the media industry (Dimants, 2008a) and the decreasing importance of such investments from Russia, especially in the Russian-language media segment, which serves approximately a third of the Latvian population. The development of the Latvian public service media also plays a crucial role from this point of view, as a part of the European phenomenon, as it is increasingly financed by taxpayers. Actually, the Latvian public service media take part in the advertising market on a relatively large scale, because they are underfinanced by taxpayers. As already mentioned, three types of journalistic culture can be found in Latvia. First, the traditional Russian journalistic culture which is characteristic for the minority of the Latvian media, that is, the part of the media that is for the Russian-language minority, especially some nationwide and local newspapers, when even part of Russia’s media is going towards the division of news and opinion (Vartanova, 2011, p. 141; Tehnologija novostej, 2011, p. 7). Little differentiation between news and opinion genres in journalism shows not only a lack of modernization, but also makes the manipulation towards an authoritarian Russian cultural and national identity easier. Of course, this does not help in the formation of a common Latvian journalistic culture and a common national and European identity for the Latvian people – on the contrary. Second, from the point of view of the economic theory of journalism (Fengler and RussMohl, 2005; Russ-Mohl and Fengler, 2007; Russ-Mohl, 2009, etc.), the instrumental and authoritarian (post-Soviet) journalistic culture can be seen, with the mostly instrumental and non-independent role of journalism. Such mass media are not independent of the political 145

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and economic subsystems of the society, but are misused for the narrow political or economic goals of the publishers and owners (so-called oligarchs), who are not concerned about the freedom of the media, but with public relations and propaganda. In these cases, the media are not dependent on the public or working for them, but are paid as public relations instruments by a contracting authority. In this journalistic culture, which is widespread in Latvia among both the Russian-language and Latvian-language media, only the minimal professional standards are reached, namely the division of the news and opinions of the author and editorial staff. Third, a modern (Western) journalistic culture can be seen, not only with a division between the news and opinion, but also orientated towards high journalistic professional standards, editorial autonomy from the publisher and owner and practicing corporate social responsibility (Altmeppen, 2011; Dimants, 2008b, etc.).This journalistic culture recognizes that the credibility of the media organization, brand and content is supported by the public who pay for it.This journalistic culture is represented mainly by the leading nationwide and local Latvian-language media and in the Russian-language market segment mainly by the public service media – Latvian Television, Latvian Radio and the common Internet platform of the Latvian public service media Lsm.lv.

Established instruments of media accountability The professional associations are divided according to the corresponding journalistic cultures (Rožukalne, 2012, p. 105). The Latvian Association of Journalists (Latvijas Žurnālistu asociācija) represents the third, modern journalistic culture and has the only press council in the country for its own membership (about 150 members).There is a special commission on ethics that deals with possible violations of the association’s code of ethics.14 A former Soviet organization, the Latvian Union of Journalists (Latvijas Žurnālistu savienība), is an organization only on paper. It is not active, has a code of ethics that is not acted upon and does not have a press council.15 This professional association clearly represents the second, instrumental journalistic culture in Latvia. Because of differences in the journalistic cultures, the organizations of media publishers and owners, like the Latvian Press Publishers Association (Latvijas Preses izdevēju asociācija)16 and the Latvian Broadcasters Association (Latvijas Raidorganizāciju asociācija),17 do not deal with issues of media ethics and other professional and quality standards. As industry representatives, they are only able to lobby for some common economic interests, e.g. taxes.The Latvian Press Publishers Association is not even able to collect data from its own industry about the number of copies sold, because there is no consensus about this. There are codes of ethics in some media organizations, especially the public service media (Latvian TV and Latvian Radio have their own codes of ethics which are used for quality management by the editorial staff), but no nationwide code of journalism or media ethics exists. The National Electronic Mass Media Council of Latvia (NEPLP), as the country’s regulatory authority for audio-visual media services, has adopted guidelines18 for the electronic mass media which are detailed in part four of paragraph 24 of the Latvian Electronic Mass Media Law: “The electronic mass media shall ensure that facts and events are honestly, and objectively reflected in broadcasts, promoting the exchange of opinions, and complying with the generally accepted principles of journalism and ethics. Commentary and opinions shall be separated from news and the name of the author of the opinion or commentary shall be indicated.” According to this law, the regulator monitors electronic mass media and fulfils the duties of media ombudsmen in this regard, for example, regarding news reporting about the war against Ukraine by re-transmitted Russian TV programmes. Trade journals for media practitioners are only emerging on the Internet: first of all, the Latvian website of the European Journalism Observatory19 by the Media Institute and Turiba 146

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University for the transfer of media research results for media practitioners, then the media students portal of the University of Latvia20 and the media criticism section of the think tank Providus.21 The most useful information source of current developments is the national news agency’s (LETA) portal Nozare.lv; it has sections on the media, PR, the printing and publishing industry and advertising.22 In the print media, journalism about the media and media criticism is not organized in the form of thematic pages, regular columns or specialized journalists. However, there are some regular media criticism programmes on the public service media channels of Latvian Radio, like Neērtie jautājumi (Inconvenient questions) on Latvian Radio 5, and Latvian Television, especially regular blogs on Lsm.lv (see more in the next section). Regarding letters to the editor and other established forms of feedback from the public, such as written answers to readers’ questions, telephone calls from readers etc., the outstanding examples of best practice are Latvijas Avīze (Latvian Newspaper) and the successful general interest weekly magazine Sestdiena (Saturday).The latter only includes responses on the Internet: commentaries from its own website and from Twitter. On the other hand, there is no published research on Latvian readers’ responses.

Innovative instruments of media accountability It is also the case that there is no published research on innovative instruments of media accountability in Latvia, with one small exception – a research project by the European Journalism Observatory about media transparency instruments which included results from Latvia.23 However, media criticism in the social media, especially via Twitter, is increasing in importance, especially regarding the exchange of opinions within the professional community of media makers. Online commentaries help to make corrections to online publications. Some researchers’ and journalists’ regular media blogs stand out.The most influential authors are Anda Rožukalne,24 in a public service media portal, and Sandra Veinberga25 and Didzis Melbiksis,26 with their own regular blogs for media criticism. The Providus portal mentioned above includes the best Latvian online documentation of media research, especially on Latvia and other Baltic countries.27

Other media accountability instruments Journalism and media studies are offered by four Latvian universities, three public and one private: (1) the University of Latvia, which is a national research university with a journalism specialization course in communication studies; (2) Riga Stradins University, which has a separate academic study programme on journalism as one of its main communication studies programmes; (3) Vidzeme University of Applied Sciences in Valmiera, outside the Latvian capital Riga, which has a professional, more practice-oriented study programme on journalism and media studies; and (4) Turiba University in Riga, the biggest Latvian private institution of higher education, which also has a professional study programme on journalism and media. So, each university has its own unique study profile. There are also two doctoral study programmes on communication science: at the University of Latvia and at Turiba University. Both universities have the right to award doctoral degrees in communication science. Doctoral studies, apart from the research undertaken within graduate study programmes, are gradually uncovering new knowledge about the Latvian media, and this research partly gives recommendations about best practice and, therefore, impacts on the quality of the national, regional and local media in Latvia.28 147

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Latvia has neither an institution of continuing education for journalists and other media professionals nor a professional journalism school for graduates from other disciplines. Such colleagues receive their professional journalistic education while working in media organizations, especially in the public service organizations, including special occasional courses. Also, there is not enough collaboration and concentration of resources between different media companies regarding professional education matters. Therefore the Baltic Centre for Media Excellence (BCME) was founded in 2015 as an independent, Latvia-registered non-profit organization with foreign financial support.29

Conclusion Legal regulation and the institutionalization of media accountability have had only a limited impact on media accountability in Latvia to date. One positive exception is the Latvian Association of Journalists, which demonstrates the still unused potential of self-organization and self-control. Professional education, media journalism and quality management among editorial staff seem to be developing slowly, but at the same time, they are also the most realistic and productive measures for broader, nationwide impact. Well-managed public-service media organizations need to be role models in this respect, especially as there is a small media market and an ethnically divided country in terms of language. Promotion of a common journalistic culture based on high professional standards could lead to a significant reduction in the possibilities of manipulation of Russian-language media users.

Notes   1 See the official translation on the website of the State Language Centre (VVC): http://www.vvc.gov. lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html;jsessionid=D260C514DFFB47F6B122B1F6250D1 1C8?folder=%2fdocs%2fLRTA%2fLikumi%2f¤tPage=1   2 See the official translation on the website of VVC: http://www.vvc.gov.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=%2fdocs%2fLRTA%2fLikumi%2f¤tPage=14   3 See the translations on the website of the National Electronic Mass Media Council (NEPLP): http:// neplpadome.lv/en/home/electronic-mass-media-law.html   4 See the official translation on the website of VVC: http://www.vvc.gov.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=%2fdocs%2fLRTA%2fLikumi%2f¤tPage=4   5 See the official translation on the website of VVC: http://www.vvc.gov.lv/advantagecms/LV/tulkojumi/dokumenti.html?folder=%2fdocs%2fLRTA%2fLikumi%2f¤tPage=0  6 Regulāri internetu lieto 68% Latvijas iedzīvotāju [68% of Latvian population use the Internet regularly], http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&fullarticle=true&category=showuid&id=4797  7 Regulāri internetu lieto 68% Latvijas iedzīvotāju [68% of Latvian population use the Internet regularly], http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&fullarticle=true&category=showuid&id=4797   8 TV kanālu auditorijas 2014. gadā [Audiences of TV channels in 2014], http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&f ullarticle=true&category=showuid&id=4697  9 Radio apraide Latvijā – ekonomiskā analīze [Radio broadcasting in Latvia – an economic analysis] (2015). Rīga : Baltijas Starptautiskais ekonomikas politikas studiju centrs (BICEPS). URL: http://neplpadome. lv/lv/assets/documents/Petijumi/Radio_apraide_Latvija_2015_Jaunaka_versija.pdf 10 Pavasarī radio vismaz reizi nedēļā klausījušies 78% Latvijas iedzīvotāju [In the spring 78% of the Latvian population listened to the radio at least once a week], http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&fullarticle=true&c ategory=showuid&id=5144 11 Latvijas iedzīvotāji visvairāk lasa nedēļas un mēneša izdevumus [The Latvian population mostly reads weeklies and monthlies], http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&fullarticle=true&category=showuid&id=4693 12 Latvijas iedzīvotāji visvairāk lasa nedēļas un mēneša izdevumus [The Latvian population mostly reads weeklies and monthlies], http://www.tns.lv/?lang=lv&fullarticle=true&category=showuid&id=4693

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Latvia 13 Kā sabiedriskajam medijam sasniegt krievvalodīgo auditoriju? [How to enable the Russian-speaking audience to reach the public service medium?], http://neplpadome.lv/lv/sakums/padome/padomessedes/sedes-sadalas/ka-sabiedriskajam-medijam-sasniegt-krievvalodigo-auditoriju.html 14 See the website of this association: http://www.latvijaszurnalisti.lv 15 See the website of the union: http://www.zurnalistusavieniba.lv 16 See the website of the organization: http://www.lpia.lv 17 See the homepage: http://www.tvradio.lv 18 Vadlīnijas Elektronisko plašsaziņas līdzekļu likuma piemērošanai, veidojot ziņu, informatīvi dokumentālos un diskusiju raidījumus, it īpaši pirmsvēlēšanu laikā [Guidelines for the application of Electronic Mass Media Law in making news, info-doc and discussion programmes, especially before elections], http://neplpadome.lv/lv/sakums/normativie-akti/nozari-regulejosie-neplp-lemumi.html 19 http://www.parzurnalistiku.lv or http://lv.ejo-online.eu 20 http://mansmedijs.lu.lv 21 Mediju kritika [Media criticism], http://providus.lv/?categories=7%2C31%2C8%2C9 22 http://www.nozare.lv 23 http://en.ejo.ch/3118/ethics_quality/transparency-or-bluff-an-ejo-study#more-3118; http://lv.ejoonline.eu/701/etika-un-kvalitate/mediju-caurskatamiba-vai-maldi-eiropas-zurnalistikas-observatorijas-petijums#more-701 24 http://www.lsm.lv/lv/autors/anda-rozhukalne/284/ 25 http://sandraveinberga.lv 26 http://www.journalism.lv 27 http://providus.lv/?categories=7%2C31%2C8%2C9&type=research 28 Aizstāvētie promocijas darbi [Defended thesis], http://www.lu.lv/studentiem/studijas/limeni/doktorantura/darbi/aizstavetie/; Izstrādātie promocijas darbi un kopsavilkumi [Final thesis and summaries], http://www.turiba.lv/lv/bizness-zinatne/doktorantura/promocijas-darbu-temas/izstradatie-promocijas-darbi-un-kopsavilkumi/414/ 29 https://baltic.media

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19 Lithuania The ideology of liberalism and its flaws in the democratic performance of the media Kristina Juraitė, Auksė Balčytienė and Audronė Nugaraitė

Abstract From 1945 to 1990, the Lithuanian mass media served the Soviet totalitarian regime and its propaganda. Fundamental changes were possible after the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania, followed by the abolition of censorship and the introduction of media freedom and pluralism guaranteed by the new media policy and professional standards. The democratization of the media system was launched in the early 1990s, when a liberal legislative framework was introduced along with professional standards following the Western democratic media model, and most similar to the Swedish media regulation framework. Despite the institutional reforms and the new liberal media regulation framework, the media continued to struggle with flaws in the development of a professional culture. Still, changes in media policy, the media landscape in general and demand for media outputs provide new opportunities for constructive dialogue and solidarity in the journalists’ community, as well as citizens’ engagement in media monitoring activities.

Introduction For half a century (from 1945 to 1990), the Lithuanian mass media served the Soviet totalitarian regime and its propaganda. A huge state censorship apparatus was involved in regulating the media and keeping the population under control. More pluralism and freedom of speech were possible after the launch of Gorbachev’s reforms of glasnost and perestroika in 1985. During the period 1989–1991, the main national dailies were privatized and the commercial media era started (Høyer, Lauk and Vihalemm, 1993). The most fundamental changes were possible after March 11, 1990, with the restoration of the independent state of Lithuania, followed by the abolition of censorship and the introduction of media freedom and pluralism guaranteed by the new media policy and professional standards. Hence, the democratization of the media system was launched in the early 1990s.1 Quite a liberal legislative framework was introduced along with professional standards following the Western democratic media model, and most similar to the Swedish media regulation framework (Balčytienė, 2006). In 1996, the major media law on the Provision of Information to the Public was adopted to ensure the ideals of democracy, openness, citizenship, 150

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i­ndependence, national culture and morality, as well as to frame a legislative and safe-regulatory scheme critical for democratic media and civil society. In the new media law, political party ownership of media outlets has been prohibited to minimize the ideological influences from inside and outside the country.

Journalistic culture and media system As a country of fewer than three million inhabitants, Lithuania comprises a rich and pluralist media landscape. Media ownership has undergone an increase in concentration over the past several years (predominantly as a result of economic difficulties related to the global economic crisis), with purchases of outlets by both domestic firms and foreign companies (mainly from Estonia and Scandinavia). Each media sector (print, broadcast or Internet) is extremely competitive and struggles to find a viable economic model. Still, despite the growing significance and importance of web-based media, Lithuanians remain active TV content consumers. In recent years, the rapid decline in advertising revenues has slowed as the country’s economy gradually recovers. Being a positive tendency, when coupled with neo-liberalist policies, such a trend also unveils certain specificities of local media culture. Among the cultural features that most vividly define the political and media traditions in Lithuania are excessive liberalism and commercialization, moderate (but, at the same time, clearly noticeable) political and social polarization and limited media accountability. In Lithuania, as in most of the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries, elites are very polarized and very divided (Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013). This leads to fragile and uncertain democratic legitimacy, manifested as low institutional trust, low party membership and their low funding, and low civic engagement and political participation. All these observations (also found across and within various countries in the CEE region) are outcomes of certain features of multi-party politics, seen in political rivalry and confrontations among different elite groups. The specificity of such a political culture (which also transfers into media performances) grows around the thinking that political winners ‘take all’ to meet political (and quite often also personal) interests, which progressively makes it impossible to find compromises and agree on rules that would lead to arrangements benefitting the competing sides. Why is this so? What do such political conditions suggest about media performance? Does a country (and thus also its media system) featuring a high level of polarization make the process of a democratic emancipation more complex? As argued, social and political polarization is commonly registered in changing environments, where instability may be seen as enthused by the climate of urgent requests for change and hence institutional transformations (Balčytienė, 2015), which are also treated as a natural outcome of changing elite preferences and decisions as to which course of action to take with regard to political decision-making (Eckiert and Ziblatt, 2013; Rupnik and Zielonka, 2013). However, such a climate leads to a number of paradoxes and serious drawbacks. Among the most dramatic developments in the mainstream media in Lithuania (also seen in other young democracies) is the striking loss of public trust (Balčytienė, 2013). Undeniably, this has significant effects on the commercialization and popularization of content, and also on the behaviour of different audience groups. Many of those groups, especially younger audiences, have swapped mainstream media channels for different specialized and niche media products, such as magazines or online portals that target consumers with individualized interests and needs. Alternatively, they remain loyal to certain mainstream media outlets (‘hits’) while supplementing their news diet with a broader spectrum of niche channels, both online and offline (Balčytienė and Vinciūnienė, 2014). 151

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In the broader context of the CEE countries, Lithuania positions itself as a country which has a free and pluralist media, but where political and media culture has not yet grown to be a daily democratic performance or to acknowledge the significance of consensus finding. The consolidation of democracy means that democratic culture is engrained in daily life and professional activities. It also means that people share and accept democratic principles and values which guide their behavioural patterns, perceptions and attitudes. Hence, democratic media performance, first and foremost, should be seen as a cultural change by the media – as the consolidation and realization of professional ideals and values become daily habits. To have a better understanding of such cultural conditions we propose taking the role of the state and the degree of media independence into account in Lithuania. As seen in Table 19.1, which presents the broader picture for all CEE countries, Lithuania is presented as a country where the media indeed enjoys (relative) independence from political and economic interests, yet such a result is not satisfactory as a weak state and a weak civil society do not contribute to fulfilling the expectation of further democratic emancipation in the country. In all cases, our main suggestion is that the role of the state appears to be crucial in media policy design, specifically in the case of furthering the consolidation of media freedom. In general, the state that actively plays a role that is fit for its social purpose (to protect democratic principles and safeguard daily democratic traditions, culture and life) creates legislation and, thus, conditions that ensure the media’s professional and economic viability, while the failure of the state results in the media falling into the hands of whoever has the means to hijack them for their own interests. As argued in other sections of this paper where practical examples of how media policies were shaped in Lithuania are discussed, the potential advantages of free market and neoliberal thinking are indeed seen and enjoyed in the media. Still, as will be shown through media accountability arrangements and media democratic performance assessTable 19.1  Co-dependence between the state and the media in Central and Eastern Europe Degree and type of Degree and type of state power media independence Weak Medium Weak

– (purely market-oriented, commercial media)

Medium

Lithuania (limited but enduring interest from economic elites in the media) Slovenia Estonia (the media is treated mainly (political power is gradually as an economic enterprise; increasing) little interest from politicians)

Strong

Romania, Bulgaria (resulting in economic elites hijacking the media; political elites also function in symbiosis with economic and media elites) Latvia, Czech Republic, Slovakia (gradually and steadily increasing media oligarchy)

Source: Balčytienė, 2016.

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Strong Hungary (resulting in party political colonization and media capture)

Poland

– (responsible, selfrestraining state, and accountable media)

Lithuania

ments, the negative outcomes of such policies and media practice also manifest themselves deeply, for example, through increasing economic power (of various lobby groups and their pressure on media legislation), the growing logic of managerialism and consumerism in the media and through the lack of professional solidarity among journalists within newsrooms and across different media.2

Established instruments of media accountability Immediately after the restoration of independence in 1990 and its international recognition in the following years, the country went through structural and policy changes. The mass media, previously strongly censored by the Soviet authorities, also experienced fundamental transformations. The state-controlled and propaganda-driven media have been replaced by a neoliberal media system. To ensure media freedom and pluralism, as well as to frame a democratic legislative and safe-regulatory scheme, the Law on the Provision of Information to the Public was adopted in 1996. Accordingly, the main instruments to ensure and promote media accountability in Lithuania include the Code of Ethics of Journalists and Publishers, the Ethics Commission of Journalists and Publishers and the Inspector of Journalist Ethics, as well as the Radio and Television Commission and the Press, Radio and Television Support Fund. The core of the media accountability framework is the Code of Ethics of Journalists and Publishers. It covers the main functions, rights, duties and responsibilities of journalists, editors and owners in print, online and broadcast media. The Law on Provision of Information to the Public (1996) stated that the code of ethics was to be developed by the journalists’ and publishers’ organizations.3 Introduced in 1996, the Lithuanian code of ethics is common to both journalists and publishers, although a stronger emphasis is on the professional standards and guiding principles for journalists rather than media owners. The code requires that all media outlets have their own internal codes of conduct; however, this has been ignored by most of the news organizations. The code of ethics is under the supervision of the journalists’ organizations and the Ethics Commission, hence is constantly being updated.4 Press councils and ombudsperson institutions are among the founding organizations of media self-regulation. A two-tier system of self-regulation with a press council and an ombudsperson exists in quite a few European countries (Puppis, Micova and Tambini, 2012), and became the role model for the Lithuanian framework introduced in the newly re-established democratic state. The Law on Provision of Information to the Public (Republic of Lithuania, 1996) outlined the role of the press council to the Ethics Commission of Journalists and Publishers (Ethics Commission), while the Inspector of Journalist Ethics was introduced to correspond with the ombudsperson’s position. Both the Commission and the Inspector supervise the compliance of journalists, editors and publishers with the standards of professional ethics and legislation. Both bodies administer public complaints submitted by readers, viewers and listeners. Until the latest amendment to the law, which came into effect in January 2015, the Commission included 15 members appointed for a three-year term by different non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and professional associations.5 The new Ethics Association of Public Information has been established as a collegial twopartite, self-regulatory body with representatives from the journalists and from media owners.6 Each organization has the right to appoint one representative to the Ethics Commission for a three-year term. Mandated by the recent amendment to the law, the Commission retains responsibility for handling complaints about violations of professional ethics, and it 153

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will also deal with disputes between the media professionals and be involved in media literacy activities.7 It is expected that the new self-regulatory body will be more effective, will improve media quality and will reduce the number of court cases against journalists and publishers. Unfortunately, the new composition of the Commission does not include any members of the public, following the idea that media self-regulation should be performed exclusively by the representatives of the industry, i.e. journalists, editors and owners (see Table 19.2). Following the new architecture of the self-regulatory body, representation of the public interest has been handed over to the media industry and its professionals, which to some extent is limiting media responsiveness and equal dialogue with the public. Hence, whether the media industry is ready for more transparency and accountability remains an open question. Apart from the Ethics Commission, a self-regulatory body, the important role of media ombudsperson in Lithuania is played by the statutory institution, the Office of the Inspector of Journalist Ethics (Ethics Inspector), which is responsible for assessing media quality and indicating any problematic cases in the news media as set in the Law on Provision of Information to the Public. Appointed by the national parliament for a five-year term, the Ethics Inspector, together with expert groups, deals with complaints, mediates between opposing parties, monitors media coverage and provides analytical reports on topical media issues in Lithuania. The Ethics Inspector also supervises the implementation of the Law on Provision of Information to the Public, the Law on the Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effect of Information, and the Law on Protection of Data.8 The Office of the Ethics Inspector is responsible for monitoring pornographic, erotic and violent content in film, video, TV, radio and online media. In addition to the publication of the reprimands of the news organizations, which have been determined as having committed violations, the Inspector may also warn and even fine news organizations if they fail to comply with the Inspector’s decisions.9 Table 19.2  Composition of the Ethics Commission in Lithuania Members of the Commission

Organizations included in the Ethics Commission of Journalists and Publishers (existed up until 2014)

Organizations to be included in the Ethics Association of Public Information (established in 2015)

Journalists and editors

Lithuanian Journalists’ Union, Lithuanian Society of Journalists, Lithuanian Journalism Centre, National Association of Journalists Creators, Lithuanian National Radio and Television Lithuanian Association of Periodical Press Publishers, Lithuanian Radio and Television Association, Lithuanian Cable Television Association, Regional Television Association, National Association of Regional Publishers, Online Media Association, Association of Communication and Advertising Agencies Human Rights Centre of Lithuania, Lithuanian Psychiatrists’ Association, Lithuanian Bishops’ Conference 15 members

Lithuanian Journalists’ Union, Lithuanian Society of Journalists

Media owners

Civil society organizations Total number

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Lithuanian Radio and Television Association, Lithuanian Cable Television Association, Regional Television Association National Association of Regional Publishers, Online Media Association

–

7 members

Lithuania

Apart from the main bodies of media accountability, more specialized institutions with specific self-regulatory functions should be mentioned. For instance, the Radio and Television Commission of Lithuania10 is an independent institution, accountable to the national parliament and dealing with regulation and supervision of audio-visual policy implementation, including licensing and issuing sanctions in cases of violation of legal or ethical standards. Funded by the state budget, the Commission deals with complaints, mediates between opposing parties, monitors TV and radio coverage and provides statistical reports on the changes in the audio-visual media landscape. The Commission is also responsible for reporting on the broadcasters’ compliance with the Law on the Protection of Minors against the Detrimental Effect of Information, and the Law on Protection of Data.11 In 2014–2015, the Commission decided to temporarily suspend the programme parts of the Russian TV stations Ren TV Baltic (Lithuania), RTR Planeta and NTV Mir from being re-broadcast in Lithuania due to misinformation and partial information with regard to the conflict in Ukraine as well as the Soviet aggression against Lithuania in the early 1990s. The Press, Radio and Television Support Fund (Media Support Fund) was established by the Law on Public Information in 1996 to allocate financial support for print, broadcast and online media projects. The Fund is financed by the state budget and is responsible to the national parliament. It is supposed to support the dissemination of cultural and educational information in the following categories: culture and arts media, educational media, regional and local media, radio and television programmes, online media projects and cultural education for children and youngsters.12 If a media outlet is defined as unethical, by violating professional ethics and conduct, it is not eligible for support from the Fund for one year. The media support policy in Lithuania has not been consistent or effective enough because of unstable funding, which is mostly dependent on political will ( Jastramskis, 2013). From 2015, the Media Support Fund has had a new status as an expert institution. In order to assess the way media accountability and transparency measures are implemented in the news media, in 2007 Transparency International’s Lithuanian Office initiated a comparative research study in Lithuania, Latvia and Sweden (Sakadolskis, 2007). Following the research criteria listed in Bertrand’s study on media accountability systems (Bertrand, 2000), the corrections of mistakes, information about media owners, personnel policy and in-house codes of conduct, reporting policy and feedback by readers, listeners and viewers were examined. The study revealed that the Lithuanian media is in the initial stage of media accountability. In only a few cases were errors corrected and letters to editors published, while information about ownership, personnel and reporting policies was most often missing (Sakadolskis, 2007). Even though there is a lack of a systemic and substantial research tradition on media responsibility and accountability issues, it has been addressed in the national and international research focusing on the Lithuanian media system and journalism cultures, media policy, media management and ownership, public service media, media convergence and media literacy. Also, the following academic journals on media, communication and journalism research, including Media Transformations, Journalism Research and Information Sciences, provide recent accounts of media accountability in the context of more general political, economic, cultural and technological changes.

Innovative instruments of media accountability In modern societies, which have been marked by civic apathy, public scepticism, disillusionment with democracy and disengagement from political processes, public interest in blogging, online news, web-based activism and online networking reveal a public that is not disinterested, 155

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but rather tired of the conventions of the mainstream (Papacharissi, 2013). It seems that new communication technologies are creating a new cultural and social environment, where individuals are exposed to new opportunities to observe, experience and engage in society, politics and community life through a more active self-expression and participation in the mediated public sphere. Penetration of online media and diversification of media use have been gaining momentum in Lithuania, too. With the rapid growth of online technologies, there has been a leap in the number of online news portals and traditional media online projects. In 2013, 74% of the Lithuanian population were Internet users. Internet usage has been increasing in all age groups, as well as all geographical areas; the largest growth of online media use was among older people. The younger generation remains the most active online media user group, including on Internet news portals and social networking sites. In 2013, nearly 46% of the national population were social media users (TNS, 2014). The public is more and more active in generating content in the online media, including comments on news stories, writing their own blogs and participating in social networks. Multiple online activities, including networking, learning and expressing oneself, provide new opportunities for decentralized and individualized participation outside traditional power structures (Boberienė, 2013). Rapidly growing online media and their audiences open new possibilities for media accountability. In Lithuania, we can observe a variety of online media forms used for media analysis and criticism, including specialized websites, blogs and social network sites. Research shows that those who are more active online as organizers or content generators are also more empowered offline. They express more confidence in public institutions, have more positive perceptions of government responsiveness and engage in different organizations, community activism and public discourse (ibid.). Indeed, recent technological innovations have created a new public space, facilitated by online and mobile communications. However, whether such a public space can transform public discourse and stimulate a qualitatively new public sphere remains a question for experts and researchers (Papacharissi, 2013).

Other media accountability instruments In this time of media changes and societal transformations, the role of journalism training and a strong professional culture is more important than ever before (Hallin and Mancini, 2012a; Nordenstreng, 2009). Therefore, in this final section, we would like to address the role of journalism training and media literacy in promoting media responsibility practices and public discourses. The professionalization of journalism came onto the agenda in Lithuania nearly 100 years ago, when the first lectures in journalism were introduced at Vytautas Magnus University in Kaunas in 1925–1926 (Balčytienė, Nugaraitė and Juraitė, 2009). However, free and democratic journalism education was suspended until 1990 due to political turmoil. As the political context changed in 1990, the issue of journalism training for the democratic state and civil society came to the foreground. In the light of contemporary media challenges (commercialization and commodification of content, competition, political and business parallelism), only a professional journalism culture could have the power to withstand economic and political pressures and fulfil the role of a critical and independent information provider. Apparently, continuous training and academic reflection on media performance are crucially important for the formation of the professional identity of journalism. Universities mainly provide journalism training in Lithuania.13 There are some exceptions, such as short-term professional training courses organized by the media industry itself, the 156

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Lithuanian Journalists’ Union and some NGOs, such as the Lithuanian Journalism Centre, Transparency International and the National Institute of Social Integration. The professionalization of journalism requires a strong media analysis tradition and critical media literacy. In a small and overcrowded news market where media professionalism is weak (due to the historical development of journalism and weak professional journalism traditions), media literacy becomes of crucial importance in increasing public awareness of critical concepts of journalism (autonomy, accountability, etc.). An informed public has to play a role and help journalists to find the balance between freedom, as enshrined in media regulation, on the one hand, and accountability, on the other. Hence, we believe that critical media literacy is an important way of promoting democratic values, media quality and social responsibility. Media literacy as a part of the compulsory education system is in its initial stage in Lithuania. At present, there is no media education programme implemented at the national level.14 However, in recent years, media education has been acknowledged as one of the priorities for democratic development.15 Liberalization of the media and the transition from state censorship to a market-driven model has made the media very sensitive to market mechanisms. Hence, the media is still considered to be one of the major public institutions in a democratic state. In such a context, media education is particularly important so that the public is able to understand and assess what is behind the so-called free information, i.e. what interests the media, politics or business may have. Increased media literacy, based on the democratic values of participation and critical thinking, is crucial to improve media quality and to promote professional journalism and a democratic culture in the future.

Conclusion Today, Lithuania could be characterized as a country with high media pluralism and freedom, on the one hand, but with particularly strong media power and close contacts between journalists and politicians, on the other. The legitimacy gained during the national liberation movement in the late 1980s, when the media played a particular role, has been retained. However, the Lithuanian media have been affected by global changes, including increasing competitiveness and the concentration of the media market, commercialization and popularization of media content, media convergence and changing media use. Liberal laws, the lack of a professional culture and media autonomy and weak self-regulatory mechanisms, as well as public fatigue and alienation, create favourable conditions for the mass media to set the news agenda according to their own political or business interests. Despite institutional reforms and the liberal media regulation framework introduced in the 1990s, and continued to the present, the media has been struggling with different influences and flaws in the development of a professional culture, as well as with other drawbacks. However, changes in media policy, the landscape and consumption provide new opportunities for a constructive dialogue and solidarity among the journalistic community, as well as for the engagement of citizens in media monitoring activities. To develop the effectiveness of self-regulatory bodies and to promote media quality and a democratic culture, a number of measures are critical. First, a consensus and solidarity in the journalistic community are needed to comply with the professional standards. This requires a professionally trained journalism community, as well as a media literate society. Also, academic research, as well as public discourse on media accountability aims and practices, can boost better understanding and the appreciation of media self-regulation. These measures could become favourable conditions for a public dialogue and journalistic community consensus with regard to media professionalism and emancipation. 157

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Notes   1 The first law of the press and other mass media was introduced by the Presidium of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (SSR) Supreme Soviet in 1990 (Official Gazette, 1990). In the same year, a newly established authority for press control under the Lithuanian Ministry of Internal Affairs, replacing the Soviet media supervisory authority Glavlit, was granted the right of media regulation.The main function delegated to the new body included supervision of the media law and registration of all newly established media, and the Press Control Board also had the right and power to impose sanctions and penalties for the media that violated the law. For instance, after three warnings issued to a publisher or broadcaster due to violations of media law, the media activities could be terminated provisionally or even completely. Until 1996, the Press Control Board cancelled several media activities and issued about 700 warnings, which were mainly related to the ethics of journalism. There was no professional code of ethics at the time.  2 There are two professional organizations of journalists in the country: the Lithuanian Union of Journalists, with 1,017 members (as of November 2014) and the Lithuanian Society of Journalists, with 211 members in 2007. Both were re-established in the early 1990s, after the restoration of independence. They have internal committees of professional ethics and are actively engaged in the media regulatory and self-regulatory bodies.   3 In 1996, the Code of Conduct of Journalists and Publishers was developed and approved by the representatives of journalists’, publishers’ and other organizations, including the Association of Periodicals Publishers of Lithuania, the Association of the Radio and Television of Lithuania, the Association of Cable Television of Lithuania, the Association of Regional Television Broadcasters, the Lithuanian Journalists’ Union, the Lithuanian Society of Journalists, the Lithuanian Journalism Centre, the Lithuanian National Radio and Television and the Lithuanian Branch of the International Advertising Association.  4 The most recent version of the code of ethics is from 2016: http://www.etikoskomisija.lt/teisineinformacija/etikos-kodeksas/item/69-lietuvos-visuomenes-informavimo-etikos-kodeksas   5 From 1996 to 2015, the Ethics Commission was based on the tripartite principle, meaning that journalists, editors, owners and public representatives were delegated from the following professional associations and NGOs: the Human Rights Centre of Lithuania, the Lithuanian Psychiatrists’ Association, the Lithuanian Bishops’ Conference, the Lithuanian Association of Periodical Press Publishers, the Lithuanian Radio and Television Association, the Lithuanian Cable Television Association, the Regional Television Association, and the Lithuanian Journalists’ Union, the Lithuanian Society of Journalists, the Lithuanian Centre of Journalism, Lithuanian National Radio and Television, the National Association of Journalists Creators, the National Association of Regional Publishers, the Online Media Association and the Association of Communication and Advertising Agencies.The Ethics Commission was responsible for examining violations of the code of professional ethics in different media outlets, including print, broadcast and online media. The procedure for dealing with code violations and complaints has been as follows: After receipt of a complaint, it is discussed by the Commission. In the case of the violation of professional ethics, the news organization, where the offence was committed, has to immediately publish the Commission’s decision. If a media outlet is found to be in violation of professional ethics more than five times, it may be labelled as an unethical media organization, losing the right to government support or participation in public tenders the same year. This Commission decision is valid for one year from the date of its adoption. For smaller news media organizations, this has been quite a severe punishment, especially in cases where such funding represented a very important and sometimes substantial revenue source. On the other hand, for larger media organizations, the power of the Commission has been somewhat symbolic and often ineffective. Every year over 100 complaints are considered by the Commission, and the number of violations confirmed by the Commission is tending to increase (for instance, in 2009 the Commission confirmed 12 violations, while there were 24 unethical cases in 2011). Due to the high number of complaints, as well as limited funding, the role of the Commission has been reactive rather than proactive in terms of preserving and protecting professional journalism and media pluralism (Puppis, Micova and Tambini, 2012).  6 A partnership agreement was signed by these organizations: the Lithuanian Journalists’ Union, the Lithuanian Society of Journalists, the Online Media Association, the Lithuanian Radio and Television Association, the Regional Television Association, the Lithuanian Cable Television Association, and the National Association of Regional Publishers.  7 http://www.etikoskomisija.lt

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Lithuania  8 http://www.lrs.lt/intl/zeit.show?theme=662&lang=2   9 When comparing the annual statistics of complaints received by the Ethics Inspector, it seems that the numbers have remained unchanged in recent years. For instance, in 2013, 234 complaints were submitted to the Ethics Inspector, the majority related to violations in the online and print media (112 and 81, respectively). The number of complaints against the online media has been rising in recent years, and complaints against unethical cases on social networks were received for the first time in 2013 (11 cases). On the other hand, violations confirmed by the Ethics Inspector have been decreasing in the past few years (from 286 unethical cases found in 2011 to 141 violations confirmed in 2013) (The Office of the Inspector of Journalist Ethics, 2013). In order to gain more independence from the state and to better protect human rights in the media, the Inspector provided recommendations for the reorganization of the Office of the Inspector of Journalist Ethics to the Office of the Ombudsperson for the Protection of Human Rights in Media (Annual Report by the Inspector of Journalist Ethics, 2013). Although the changes have not yet been adopted, the public debate among the journalistic community and policy makers is continuing with regard to the mission, functions and objectives of the media ombudsperson’s institution in Lithuania. When amendments to the Law on Provision of Information to the Public are made in 2015, the Ethics Commission will be responsible for nominating a candidate for the position of the Ethics Inspector. 10 Eleven members of the Commission are appointed: two by the president, three by the parliament, three by the Lithuanian Association of Artists and the Lithuanian Catholic Church, the Lithuanian Journalists’ Union and the Lithuanian Society of Journalists, each of the latter organizations delegating one member for four years. The Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Commission are appointed by parliament. 11 http://www.rtk.lt/en/the_commission/about_the_commission 12 http://www.srtfondas.lt 13 Formal journalism education is provided at four universities, each with its own profile, which differentiates the logic of training across different schools geographically located in the four largest cities (Vilnius, Kaunas, Klaipėda and Šiauliai). Each programme has its own profile; however, a common feature of the programmes is a strong emphasis on the development of professional standards, including studying the role and functions of media for democracy, and the analysis of political, economic and technological changes at the local and global level. 14 In 2006, the Ministry of Education and Science adopted a national programme of high school education, ‘Teaching about Information Processes and Human Rights’. It emphasized the need to develop and implement a comprehensive policy on information literacy for students and their parents and to promote media ethics and law, as well as to provide knowledge about how to assess information, select trusted sources and be able to use them at school and at home. In 2007, the programme started with training and workshops for selected teachers and newly developed educational material (on the topics of advertising, media, TV, cinema and the Internet). However, due to the economic crisis, financial difficulties, and a lack of political will, the programme of media education was terminated and has not been implemented at the national level so far. 15 Different organizations and associations have been active in the media literacy field so far, including the Lithuanian Journalists Union, the Human Rights Centre,Transparency International Lithuania, the National Institute for Social Integration, the Teacher Professional Development Centre, the Lithuanian Parents’ Forum, Art Hive, etc. The main activities of the mentioned NGOs include workshops for students and teachers, public discussions, training for journalists and teachers, publications and public campaigns.

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20 Luxembourg Low priority in a confined milieu Mario Hirsch

Abstract In Luxembourg, self-regulation is mainly present in two forms: a strong Press Council with broad powers is complemented by a lively protest culture, exercised particularly in the form of letters to the editor. However, media accountability is not an issue of pressing concern in Luxembourg, a small country with a proportionally high number of media outlets and a strong journalistic community in the tradition of media as the ‘fourth power’ – an authority that controls rather than being in need of control.

Introduction Luxembourg traditionally follows a pragmatic approach to regulatory matters regarding the media. Rules, if they exist, tend to be vague and not binding. Regulatory bodies, if they exist, rely on self- or auto-regulation. The surprisingly large number and variety of media outlets in this very small country lead to a very original approach to media accountability.The strong competition between media outlets makes it fairly easy to correct errors or distortions in reporting. There is a system of checks and balances in place for all practical purposes. In the case of more serious damages, the courts can make the media liable. There is also the thriving habit of letters to the editor, used quite often as a very convenient means to redress errors or misgivings created by inaccurate reporting or slander.

Journalistic culture and media system As already indicated, Luxembourg enjoys a very rich media landscape. Six daily newspapers, one freesheet, six weeklies, six radio stations with national coverage and two TV stations make for a very lively media culture which ensures permanent dialogue across the board as well as prompt corrections of distortions when they are needed. Editors see, in these interactive elements, a healthy sign of keeping fairly large audiences for their products and public interest in the media. Editors and journalists tend to consider themselves to be a kind of quatrième pouvoir (fourth estate), and they openly welcome corrections to their considerable influence. 160

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The media outlets in Luxembourg employ some 500 professional journalists, that is, journalists who hold press cards. Press cards are delivered by the Press Council, which is made up of an equal number of representatives from the journalists and the editors. There are no formal educational requirements for professional journalists.The main criterion is the requirement that a would-be journalist has to derive more than 50% of his or her income from journalistic work, and this has to be certified by his or her employer, typically an editor. Ten years ago, the Press Council introduced compulsory education and training courses for journalistic trainees. This was justified by the concern to keep fairly high journalistic standards and by the need to cope with the trend of rising numbers of non-nationals among journalists.

Established instruments of media accountability The Press Council (Conseil de Presse) was created by law on December 20, 1979.1 It is composed of an equal number of representatives from the journalists and from the editors. It plays the role of co-regulator alongside the judicial system. Its approach is clearly inspired by the ambition to act, as far as possible and in as many contentious cases as possible, as the auto-regulator of the media profession. It covers the whole range of media activities (print media, electronic media and online media). Most of the interventions by the judicial system are based on article 1382 of the Civil Code, which stipulates that “every person at the origin of harm to somebody has to repair the damage caused”. Neither journalists nor editors like lawsuits because of the negative publicity to their credibility in cases of condemnation. This was quite frequent before the establishment of the Press Council in 1980, hence the eagerness of both editors and journalists to develop the auto-regulation of the journalistic trade and to develop non-litigious methods of sorting out problems. The right of reply (droit de réponse) and a Complaints Commission (Commission des Plaintes) serve that purpose. These corrective devices are outlined in some detail in the latest version of the law regulating the media (loi du 8 juin 2004 sur la liberté d’expression dans les médias2). Typical of the uncomplicated way of handling these matters, in most cases the right of reply, meaning a formal and precisely chartered way of protesting, is not invoked, but the much more simple letter to the editor (lettre à l’éditeur) serves the purpose of giving satisfaction to whoever feels badly treated or misunderstood by the media. Letters to the editor have become a kind of national sport with Luxembourgers.The dailies have one or more pages devoted to them almost every day, and in the weekend editions they occupy even more space. Editors obviously like this softer corrective approach, but they try, nevertheless, to keep it under control by encouraging their journalistic staff to redress reporting errors as soon as possible by themselves.The rubric for rectifications or corrections has grown in parallel with the rubric of letters to the editor. These developments clearly indicate that in the case of Luxembourg forms of auto-regulation prevail as far as media accountability is concerned. The small size of the country and the abundance of media outlets explain these very special features. The Complaints Commission, which has functioned under the auspices of the Press Council since 2006, deals with any complaint originating from media reporting. Since its creation, it has solved 37 cases. Its decisions are published on the Press Council’s website. It is made up of five members (two representing the editors, two the journalists, plus an independent president with a background in the legal profession, usually a retired judge). Besides the Press Council, which has also developed its own code of ethics, and the letters to the editor, there are hardly any instruments that affect the processes of media accountability in Luxembourg. There is a national ombudsman, but the mission of this institution is to deal 161

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with complaints that concern public administration. Media journalism, as a means of critical self-reflection of the profession, is practically non-existent. To date, there has been no academic research on accountability issues, as there is hardly any academic media research in Luxembourg.

Innovative instruments of media accountability While recent digitization processes have triggered a public discussion about media accountability in many journalism cultures throughout Europe, such a trend has not been visible in Luxembourg. There are basically no web-based instruments of critical media watching, neither in the form of newsroom blogs nor in the form of journalism-external media observatories. The role of a cyber-ombudsman, which might be able to mediate between newsrooms and their online audiences, does not exist. Users increasingly tend to employ the channel of online comments to address journalists, if they are dissatisfied with the quality of their performance; however, this practice does usually not result in a serious dialogue about media accountability issues. A more lively interaction between users and newsrooms seems to be instigated by the various channels of the social web (mainly Twitter and Facebook), but it is still unclear if this development will have a lasting impact on the media accountability culture in Luxembourg.

Conclusion As this brief description suggests, media accountability in Luxembourg rests primarily with the Press Council. Liability suits before the courts play a minor and increasingly marginal role, especially since the Press Council takes care of contentious issues. The creation of the Complaints Commission in 2006 has obviously reinforced the auto-regulatory character of the system. Auto-regulation has also been helped by correctives, such as the right of reply and letters to the editor. Both the journalists and the editors encourage these two approaches in so far as they represent a welcome echo and contribute to enhancing the interactive elements in the functioning of the media. Social media, which indulge in interaction, are a further element of this tendency to strengthen the dialogue between the media and their audiences. Obviously, accountability is not a top priority, with the public or with journalists. Journalists tend to have a high opinion of themselves and their work. It is not uncommon in the media milieu to refer to the media as the ‘fourth power’ in the state.

Notes 1 The website of the Press Council (http://www.press.lu) contains the relevant legal texts as well as useful insights into the functioning of media accountability. 2 The most recent formulation of that law, which has been modified several times, is reprinted in the Code administratif,Volume 5, Luxembourg 2013.

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21 Malta Media accountability as a two-legged ‘tripod’ Joseph Borg and Mary Anne Lauri

Abstract Malta’s media system belongs to the Mediterranean Model expounded by Hallin and Mancini, though it developed its own characteristics, particularly the extensive ownership of media organizations by political parties.This has hindered journalism from developing as an independent profession and consequently, self-regulation accountability structures are particularly weak. Media accountability, on the other hand, is relatively strong in the broadcasting sector. The commercialization of the print media brought along a market-driven concept of journalism in competition with the advocacy model adopted by the political media, but did not enhance the self-regulation structures. Online media are providing new avenues for citizen journalists who help to keep the media accountable. Recent statements by political leaders indicate the possible adoption of a stronger regulatory regime rather than self- or co-regulation structures.

Introduction An analysis of different authors and reports manifests as a media accountability tripod consisting of regulation, self-regulation and co-regulation (Bertrand, 2000; McQuail, 2005; Hans-BredowInstitut and EMR, 2006). The Maltese media accountability system staggers on just two legs: self-regulation and regulation. A very weak process of self-regulation is managed by a Press Ethics Commission (PEC) set up by the Institute of Maltese Journalists, but the lack of a common professional ethos uniting journalists undermines the work of this Commission. Moreover, media owners do not support the process of self-regulation, further reducing the effectiveness of the process. State regulation enforced through laws and regulations is the only effective means of media accountability, particularly in the broadcasting sector.The Broadcasting Authority, which is a constitutionally established regulator, wields substantial clout regarding content. Its powers include the granting and withholding of broadcasting licenses and the levying of administrative fines. Audiences play a limited role in the process of media accountability, mainly through citizen participation on social networking sites. Blogs and postings on sites run by the mainstream media are on the increase. Some bloggers are becoming popular and powerful, as at times they report information sooner than the mainstream media. 163

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Journalistic culture and media system Hallin and Mancini (2004a) did not include Malta in their discussion of media systems in Europe; however, although Malta’s media ecology does have its own indigenous characteristics, it clearly fits within the Mediterranean Model they propose. One characteristic of the model is low newspaper readership combined with the high usage of electronic media. Just under 12% of the Maltese population of 450,000 read printed newspapers (Media Warehouse, 2014). The most read is The Sunday Times of Malta (78,000 readers), followed by its daily version, which is read by 40,000. The most-read papers published in the Maltese language are It-Torca (The Torch) – 24,000 – and L-Orizzont (The Horizon), read by 17,000. Males (14%) read daily newspapers more than females (9%). For Hallin and Mancini (2004a), this gender-differentiated readership reflects the closeness of the press to the world of politics and the traditional exclusion of women from the latter. It is correct to note that newspaper readership is getting lower everywhere, but low readership in the Mediterranean has been a constant feature as it is a characteristic which can be attributed to the predominance of what Ong (1982) has described as the oral culture. The broadcasting media have a considerably larger audience. Radio is listened to every day by 41% of the Maltese population, while 63.8% watch television (Media Warehouse, 2014). These figures back the findings of Papathanassopoulos (2007), who claims that the only true mass media of Southern Europe are the broadcasting media. Consequently, their importance in the formation of mass public opinion is much greater.This tends to give more status to journalists working within the broadcasting media, particularly television. Internet use is becoming more popular, with the latest statistics showing that 85% use it daily (National Statistics Office, 2014). This is affecting people’s access to news so much so that 27.2% say that they read the news only online, an increase of 11.6% since April 2012 (Media Warehouse, 2014). The popularity of web news sites, social media (Eurobarometer, 2012) and blogs is giving new venues for full-time journalists to search and publish news and giving rise to citizen journalism, thus further influencing journalistic culture. Another characteristic of the Mediterranean Model is the strong presence of the institutions, particularly political parties, in the media landscape. The political and other institutions, e.g. trade unions and the Catholic Church, have been pioneers of print journalism. They considered journalism to be an important part of their arsenal in conflicts, first with the colonial powers and later with other institutions, such as the use by the Church and the political parties to attack each other. This explains the confrontational streak that is still present in the media run by the political parties (Cassola, 2011; Pirotta, 2001; Sacco, 1985; Zammit Dimech, 1987). The presence of these institutions in the Maltese media system is qualitatively different to that of other countries included within the Mediterranean Model since it is the only European country where the two main political parties own not only newspapers but also news websites, radio and TV stations. The influential Catholic Church owns a weekly newspaper (Lehen isSewwa – Voice of Truth), a radio station (RTK Radio), a news website (Newsbook.com.mt), several magazines (e.g. Flimkien – Together) and a small video production company. Malta’s largest trade union also owns newspapers and a news website. The largest presence in the media landscape is that of the state, through the public service broadcaster (Public Broadcasting Services Ltd), which dominates the TV sector and has a strong presence in the radio sector. PBS Ltd was radically restructured in 2005. Editorial independence from government was one of the cornerstones of the National Broadcasting Policy (2005), although a culture of true independence has not yet been achieved. 164

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Malta’s media system in general, and journalistic culture in particular, has been radically changed by three innovations since the 1990s. These were the pluralization of broadcasting, the commercialization of the print media and the popularization of the new media. The institutions’ media presence was even strengthened in 1991 when the government offered the first three radio frequencies in the new, pluralized environment to the two main political parties and the Catholic Church. Commercial organizations soon followed suit. Today there are 13 radio stations broadcasting nationally on FM, several music radio stations broadcasting on the digital platform and nine TV stations. Most stations produce news and current affairs programmes, thus further altering the journalistic scenario. The ownership of broadcasting media by the political and, to a certain extent, the ecclesiastical establishments could be seen as a prima facie strengthening of their hegemony. However, this is not the case, as the process of the secularization of politics pointed out in Hallin and Mancini (2004b) is evident in Malta. One sign is the diminishing audience share of the institution-owned media in contrast to the gains made by commercial organizations. For example, in 2002, the radio stations owned by the institutions had 78% of the audience share (Vassallo, 2002), while by 2011 the figure had gone down to 48% (Axiak, 2012). The only exception is the TV sector, which is a clear example of market failure. Commercial stations have never made an impact on audiences, while the audience of Television Malta (TVM), the main TV station of the public service broadcaster, is larger than that of all the other Maltese stations put together (Axiak, 2015). Journalistic culture was further changed by the commercialization of the print media in the 1990s, driven by the potential attraction of advertising monies resulting from an expanding economy. Today, the commercial sector is publishing more newspapers and magazines than the political parties, the Church and a trade union, and they also dominate the market in terms of sales. Allied Newspapers, Standard Publications and Media Today are the owners of the newspapers not linked to an institution. Media Today publishes the only example of tabloid journalism in Malta. Its relatively poor ratings give credence to the observation of Hallin and Mancini (2004a) that tabloid newspapers have never really developed in the Southern European region. The commercialization of the print media together with the presence of a substantial number of commercial radio stations is a sign of two related developments. First, Malta’s journalistic culture is moving towards the liberal model of media organization, and second, Maltese journalism is moving away from a commentary-oriented or advocacy-type journalism towards a marketdriven ethos (Borg and Lauri, 2012). The strong presence of the institutions has prevented journalism from developing as an autonomous profession. The result is the “weak consensus on journalistic standards and limited development of professional self-regulation” that characterizes the countries appertaining to the Mediterranean Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, p. 113). Most journalists’ sense of belonging is more to the organization that they work for than to the journalistic profession, and this applies to a greater extent to journalists working with politically owned stations who consider themselves as the party flag bearers. Sammut (2007) makes a reference to this dependence but claims that “overall partisan journalists are not entirely subservient” (p. 83). The introduction and popularization of the new digital media provided new opportunities both for the legacy media and for audiences.Today, the news websites operated by the commercially owned print media are far more popular with audiences than those run by the institutions. Timesofmalta.com, like the print editions of The Times, is the website with the greatest following. The websites of The Malta Independent and Malta Today have far fewer followers but are in second and third place (www.alexa.com). The website of the public service broadcaster and of other institutions trail far behind. 165

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The popularization of the Internet gave audiences the possibility of becoming commentators by uploading comments on the news websites, creating discussions on the social media and having their own blogs.Within this context, the boundary line between the professional and the citizen journalist becomes blurred. Moreover, the status of some bloggers is increasing, sometimes even eclipsing that of journalists with the mainstream media.

Established instruments of media accountability The regulatory regime is a more effective means of media accountability than the weak selfregulation mechanism, while co-regulation does not exist. Media accountability is strong in the broadcasting sector due to legislation and measures taken by the broadcasting regulator. This contrasts sharply with the position pushed forward by the European Union for stronger selfregulatory and co-regulatory structures that provide for effective enforcement and can play an important role in delivering a high level of consumer protection (European Commission, 2007). The legal framework does not hold all the media accountable in the same way (Aquilina, 2009). There are laws and legal provisions that regulate all of the media, such as, for example, the human rights and fundamental freedoms provisions that form part of the Constitution of Malta, the European Convention of Human Rights and the Criminal Code. The same can be said for the Press Act and the Copyright Act. There are also laws, for example the Broadcasting Act, which regulate specific media. The Press Act gives journalists an extensive right to protect their sources. It provides for a qualified privilege in that whenever journalists report on what is said by a public person, the liability for what is reported lies with whoever said it. Libel laws are a particularly contentious topic as libel can also be treated as a criminal act. There is a Freedom of Information Act, which journalists frequently resort to, but the government still drags its feet to provide the requested information (Cordina, July 20, 2014, p. 3). The broadcasting sector is the sector most regulated by legislation. The Broadcasting Act radically changed the broadcasting scene in 1991 when pluralism was introduced. Later on, it was amended to take on board the provisions of EU directives. The Broadcasting Authority grants licenses, regulates the content of radio and television in line with the provisions of the Constitution and the Broadcasting Act, among others, and can impose administrative fines on erring stations. The law requires that news and current affairs on broadcasting stations be balanced and impartial in matters of political and industrial controversies and current public policy. The existence of the political stations creates an anomalous situation since they cannot realistically be expected to fulfil this requirement. This problem is bypassed to a large extent as the Authority considers one political station to balance the other. A strong bias is common during the news bulletins and current affairs programmes broadcast on these stations, mainly Net TV and One TV. On the other hand, the content, particularly the news and current affairs content, of the stations owned by the public service broadcaster is more heavily regulated and the Broadcasting Authority expects these programmes to adhere strictly to the provisions of balance and due impartiality. The most lightly regulated is the content on new media and broadcasting on the Internet. The nature of the technology used makes regulation and accountability more difficult as these can bypass monitoring through anonymity and overseas registration. Furthermore, there is no provision for a registered editor for news websites or blogs as there is for the print and the broadcasting media. The print media sector is regulated more than the new media sector but less than the broadcasting sector. For example, the number of advertisements on radio and TV is regulated but this 166

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is not the case for newspapers, where no provision for balance and impartiality applies. One needs a license to operate a radio or TV station but not a newspaper. However, the right of reply applies to both broadcasting and newspapers. Since legislation can only guarantee the minimum of accountability acceptable in a democratic society, self-regulation becomes more important in preventing the print media from becoming centres of power without any responsibility. As noted above, journalism did not develop as an autonomous profession. Attempts to set up the Malta Press Club (now called the Institute of Maltese Journalists) failed several times. While the official website of the Institute blamed the failures on partisan political reasons,1 Sammut (2007) attributes the failure to the collision between two journalistic traditions. There are journalists that “aspire for professional ideology that resembles that of other European nations” and there are others who “draw upon an endemic politicized tradition of journalism that views objectivity as a myth” (p. 71). The founding of the Malta Press Club, which finally took place in 1989, does in fact point towards the weak links of the profession as the initiative was not taken by journalists but by the owner of Malta’s largest advertising and public relations agency. A public relations executive from this company became a member of the executive committee, and ever since, public relations managers have been members of the executive committee of the Institute. Its current chairman is also the managing director of a public relations agency. The press officer of a minister and an employee of a Maltese MEP were also members of the executive committee. This feature is probably another unique characteristic of the journalistic culture of Malta. The Institute of Maltese Journalists set up a PEC which handles complaints dealing with breaches of the Code of Ethics.2 The Code enshrines similar principles to those found in other countries belonging to the Mediterranean Model, which in essence are similar to those belonging to the Democratic Corporatist Model and the Liberal Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a). The Code covers, among other things, respect for confidentiality of sources, accuracy, privacy, coverage of minors and court cases, as well as the need to distinguish between facts and conjecture. The sanctions under the Code are disapproval, censure and grave censure. The decisions of the PEC are not given importance either by audiences or by the industry as the following examples show. In 1996, an editor was found guilty by the PEC of a very grave ethical transgression, namely revealing the name of one of his correspondents who used to write under a pseudonym. Audiences did not think this decision was important, so much so that the editor, who was also a politician, had a big electoral success when he contested the general election. In 2011, a complaint of breach of ethics was made against the editor of a newspaper who was also the Institute’s vice president. The PEC upheld the complaint, imposing the sanction of ‘grave censure’. The executive committee of the Institute believed that, despite being found guilty, the editor did not need to resign his post on the committee.This fact gravely undermined the ‘authority’ of the PEC. The effectiveness of the PEC is further weakened by the fact that the media owners are not committed to its success in any way. An attempt by the Institute to persuade media owners to include the Code of Ethics as part of the contract of work of journalists failed (Sammut, 2007). Media owners in Malta do not support the PEC, and thus it is run in a completely voluntary way with meagre resources. However, media criticism seems quite lively in Malta. The politically owned or affiliated media criticize each other quite extensively. Opinion pieces and news stories in these media frequently criticize the ‘other’ side, unravel mistakes and highlight false accounts. This is done to a lesser extent by the non-political media in their news pages, but more in opinion columns and letters to the editor, which criticize media content. The politically owned media are the most criticized mainly because they are considered to be the bêtes noires of the media system (Sammut, 167

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2007). Several newspaper columns criticize television programmes, including news bulletins and current affairs programmes. A relatively recent development is affecting the local journalistic culture. Two of Malta’s newspapers produce current affairs programmes on the main TV channel of the public service broadcaster while a third newspaper also tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to produce a programme. Such close collaboration between media houses could diminish the possibility of one medium criticizing the other medium and thus holding it more accountable. Media accountability can also be affected through internal structures, such as a press ombudsman; however, in Malta there is no such entity. Public Broadcasting Services Ltd, the state broadcasting body, has a formal structure of internal accountability through an editorial board set up in line with the National Broadcasting Policy (2005). The Policy states that an editorial board, totally independent of the board of directors, should be set up to act as the conscience of the station. It is responsible for ascertaining that news and current affairs programmes, among others, are produced according to the highest ethical and professional criteria and it takes steps when there are failings in this regard.

Innovative instruments of media accountability In Malta, the number of people within and outside the media writing blogs is on the rise, although the system is nowhere near as varied or complex as that outlined by Domingo and Heinonen (2008). Though there is no blog specifically specializing in media criticism, several journalist bloggers regularly discuss the media or particular contributions to the media. By far the most popular blogger in Malta is Daphne Caruana Galizia, who also contributes regularly to The Malta Independent. Her blog is more popular than most websites operated by the established media. Media criticism is quite a frequent subject on her blog. Her main targets are the news portal of the public service broadcaster, The Times of Malta, and the pro-government media. She criticizes both style, such as the type of language used by the media, as well as content, like criticism about important stories that are not published or the way that they are published. At times, she also discusses ethical issues such as quoting without attributing, deceitful reporting and denigration of irregular immigrants. The technological characteristics of new media, particularly the social networks as well as programmes of media literacy, give Maltese audiences the possibility of becoming effective instruments of media accountability. Maltese audiences are using to the full the possibility of posting comments under stories published on websites operated by the mainstream media. Such comments include criticism of the media themselves. Website moderators facilitate the posting of comments. They publish comments written in Maltese even if the website uses the English language while giving very little or no attention to the use of grammar or syntax – two concessions not afforded to writers in the print media. Thus, posting comments is easy, immediate and inexpensive. People also use social networks, particularly Facebook, to air their views. Media reports are shared, liked or criticized, and these reports then develop into news stories in the mainstream media. Producers, editors and commentators ignore feedback given on the social networks at their own peril. Besides these spontaneous comments, audiences can make use of the right of reply afforded by law. This proviso gives a measure of empowerment to audiences who can, to a limited degree, counterbalance the power of the editors and news producers. Audiences can only hold the media accountable if they are media literate and are, therefore, conscious of the relationship between ownership and content, journalistic conventions and media languages. Malta has a long tradition in media literacy programmes (Borg and 168

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Lauri, 2009). Such programmes enable a sector of the audience to critically assess media messages, understand the societal influences on the production of the same messages and be able to produce their own media products. In the digital media landscape, with its vastness, immediacy and omnipresence, the media-literate audience may very well turn out to be the best, if not the only, effective way of holding the media accountable.

Conclusion The current situation of media accountability features strong regulation of broadcasting, a more liberal regulatory regime for the print media and very light regulation of the new media. There is also a very weak system of self-regulation. The latter is concerned with the ethical dimension, which, by its very nature, asks for higher standards than those regulated by law. A weak accountability system of self-regulation implies giving less importance to the ethical dimension. Does the future hold good prospects for a stronger self-regulatory and co-regulatory regime? Not really. During the 2013 electoral campaign, Joseph Muscat, who went on to become prime minister, put forward the possibility that the Broadcasting Authority would also regulate the press. His party’s electoral manifesto proposed the appointment of a Commissioner of Journalistic Ethics within the Office of the Ombudsman, pointing towards a stronger regulatory framework rather than a self-regulatory one. Co-regulatory structures are not part of the public discourse on media accountability. On the other hand, the Institute of Maltese Journalists is hoping to get a wide consensus for a new Code of Ethics, an endeavour that can only succeed if media owners are on board. Thus, good prospects for the future of media accountability in Malta beckon, but it is doubtful whether a balanced tripod of regulation, self-regulation and co-regulation can be achieved in the near future.

Notes 1 http://igm.org.mt/about/ 2 http://www.rjionline.org/MAS-Codes-Malta-Journalist

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22 The Netherlands From awareness to realization Harmen Groenhart and Huub Evers

Abstract In the Netherlands, there is an increasing awareness of media accountability. Both the profession and the public recognize the relevance of transparency and effective self-regulation, and the government strongly calls for more media accountability. However, the present status of media accountability is ambiguous. On the one hand, it is far from being mature and equally integrated into the media landscape. Using, installing or even creating MAIs is not the highest priority, so it remains on the to-do list for many news organizations. On the other hand, some developments in the media landscape suggest a shift towards more openness and responsiveness. Traditional MAIs are being adjusted to new demands and newsrooms increasingly publish information about their policies and processes behind the scene. Moreover, some newsroom innovations pave the way for a more mature and effective state of media accountability. In this era of immediate, unlimited communication and demanding citizens, it seems probable to expect even more awareness of media accountability, resulting in more transparency and useful interaction with the public.

Introduction In the wake of a societal shift towards transparency and accountability, journalism in the Netherlands is confronted with a call for public accountability. Empowerment of citizens, digitization, commercialization and increasing information flows pose new demands on journalistic quality and professional legitimacy. The notion that news media ought to be more transparent and accountable towards the public has gained ground in the profession. Initially this was proclaimed by individual journalists and experts in the field, and gradually permeated into professional organizations like the Raad voor de Journalistiek (Press Council – PC) and Nederlands Genootschap van Hoofdredacteuren (Dutch Association of Editors in chief – AEC). But where some editors-in-chief try to introduce media accountability in the newsroom, journalists remain hesitant (De Haan, 2011), probably due to the fear of losing professional autonomy. A bestselling book on the transparency and fallibility of journalism (Luyendijk, 2006) increased awareness on media accountability among the general public. Two studies on the perception of news users (Groenhart, 2013; Van der Wurff and Schönbach, 2014) indicated that 170

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the public indeed requires journalism to be transparent on professional standards, procedures and errors. They even believe that any journalist who does not abide by the professional standards should be excluded from the profession and the media must be held financially responsible for any harm caused. But although the Dutch public is reasonably informed about aspects of transparency and accountability in journalism, it is not eager to actively engage in calling journalists to account. They expect journalism to have full freedom to do its work and regulate itself vigorously. Not only is the importance of media accountability increasingly articulated, the practice of media accountability indeed seems to have increased in the Netherlands. Media criticism is fuelled by debate and media journalism is available on various platforms. Although ombudspersons have become rare, news organizations are starting to publish policy documents like codes and mission statements and, increasingly, editors publish on the processes behind the screen and ethical issues (Groenhart, 2013). However, this is no warrant for professional quality, as the case of Trouw journalist Perdiep Ramesar illustrated in 2014. Partly due to inadequate internal control, he was able to write numerous articles based on non-existent sources. The paper fired him, published the report of an investigation committee (Myjer and Smit, 2014), sharpened its editorial procedures and announced the appointment of an ombudsman. In the following paragraphs, we will sketch the outlines of the Dutch media system, and the state of both established and innovative forms of media accountability.

Journalistic culture and media system The Dutch media system is categorized as ‘Democratic Corporatist’ (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a). In that respect, it has a free and professional press; a relatively small role of the state, but strong public service media; a competitive and currently somewhat disrupted market; and a traditionally strong relation with society.

A free and professional press The freedom of expression, as set in the Dutch Constitution and backed by the European Treaty of Human Rights, guarantees the professional autonomy of journalists in the Netherlands. Journalists are well aware of their legal rights and become defensive as soon as this freedom seems to be threatened. Freedom of speech has become a topical subject in recent years, marked by the provocative style of the right-wing politician Geert Wilders, the rude and sometimes cheeky journalism like that on GeenStijl.nl, several lawsuits concerning freedom of speech and the backdrop of various international terrorist attacks on journalists. The few formal restrictions of freedom of speech in the Netherlands are penal law concerning defamation, libel, slander, discrimination and hate incitement. Dutch law does not entail a right of reply. In civil law, limits appear in cases concerning unlawful press publications. For journalists, judges use a number of carefulness requirements, e.g. concerning research validity, reliability of sources and the hearing of both sides (Schuijt, 2006). In such cases, Dutch courts generally favour the journalist. During the last decade, journalists have been put under pressure by authorities to reveal their sources in several cases. In those cases, Dutch courts initially favoured the authorities, but the European Court of Human Rights eventually called for the courts to rescind their judgments.1 In 2014, a bill on journalistic privilege (source protection) was introduced. Dutch journalism has a fair level of professionalism. On an institutional level, this is represented by the Nederlandse Vereniging van Journalisten (Dutch Union of Journalists – NVJ), 171

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the PC and the AEC. The NVJ is committed to collective labour agreements between media concerns and employees and freelancers, and on legal advice, trainings and workshops. It contributed, in the 1960s and 1970s, to the rise of editorial statutes in the newspaper industry, which protected editorial independence from the private interests of media companies. The PC’s main task is to assess whether journalistic behaviour has been correct and careful, usually after someone has complained about a publication. Professionalism in Dutch journalism is also reflected in codes of ethics, some defined for the profession as a whole, others by individual news media outlets. Other indicators of professionalism are various academic and vocational education programmes, prizes and awards and frequent debates and conferences.

The small role of the state In line with the constitutional freedom of expression, the role of the state is generally small. Traditionally, the Dutch government has no role in regulating the profession, apart from ­emphasizing the importance of improving media accountability. At the start of the 2000s, the government endorsed an advisory report on media logic suggesting the improvement of selfregulation of the profession by means of more public accountability. Recently the government reemphasized this and requested research on accountability of the media system in general, and specifically of the public broadcasting system.2 Reacting to the reports of The Leveson Inquiry (2012) and the High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism (2013), the government discarded the idea of a regulatory body for the Dutch media.3 Active governmental media policy mainly concerns financing public media service and the stimulation of innovation and research. Due to adverse economic conditions and quarrels in the political arena, the public media service has been under pressure during the past decade. The annual public media service budget was around €1 billion at its peak, and will in the long term be cut by about a third in 2017.4 Since 2010, the Stimuleringsfonds voor de Journalistiek (Journalism Stimulation Fund – JSF)5 has played a stimulating role in the innovation of the media landscape with currently an annual €3.5 million budget for research and innovative projects. Projects vary from complete new start-ups, such as the hyperlocal network Dichtbij.nl, to data journalism experiments of existing news media, such as RTL Facts.6

A strong relation with society? The Dutch media landscape used to clearly reflect societal segmentation, covering a broad range of ideologically diverse newspapers and public broadcasting organizations. Following Hallin and Mancini (2004a, p. 156), in the ‘golden days’ of the societal segmentation, ‘political parallelism’ was a key feature of the Dutch media system. Nowadays, newspapers and broadcasting organizations no longer have formal ties with political parties, but despite decades of individualization and secularization, traits of the so-called segmented pluralist society are still notable in the media landscape, most notably in the ideological orientation and structure of public service broadcasting (Bardoel and Brants, 2003). Organized around ideological associations, public broadcasters represent society by means of citizen membership, the quantity of which determines airtime and the license for each association. In 2014, about 3.5 million members supported one of the public broadcasting associations. One could argue, however, that on the one hand the relation between journalism and society has been declining.The public is more and more volatile.The legitimacy of the traditional newspaper is no longer self-evident and public broadcasters have a hard time keeping their mem172

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berships together. The old loyal generation is slowly dying out, and the new generation is not eager for paid membership or subscriptions. On the other hand, new forms of civic engagement have arisen. Online technology has empowered informed citizens, and offered them platforms for expression. New news media that successfully attract audiences as collocutors increasingly enforce their market position.

A competitive and somewhat disruptive market Traditional newspaper circulation numbers have steadily decreased and lost substantial advertising revenue to online advertising. In a matter of years, the circulation of the main popular newspaper De Telegraaf dropped from 540,000 (2011) to 450,000 (2014),7 and the liberal quality newspaper NRC Handelsblad dropped from 180,000 to 160,000. Local newspapers especially are struggling to survive. Ownership in the news media market has frequently changed, and many criticize the profit maximization strategy of investors and agitation of the market. In 2014, Belgian media companies De Persgroep and Mediahuis enlarged their share in the Dutch newspaper business. Some welcome the journalistic orientation of these investors, while others fear their financial cut-back strategies. The economic decay of the traditional media sector, partly caused by the disruption of online technology, comes together with a lively innovative start-up mentality. Many new news titles entered the online media landscape, experimenting to find viable new business models. De Correspondent,8 an ad-free news platform, entered the stage with a successful membership and crowdfunding campaign. Blendle,9 an online redistribution platform, sells individual articles from most Dutch publishers, and received investment from international media companies Axel Springer and NYT. The broadcasting industry is relatively stable.The three public channels have a rather constant joint market share of around 32%, against RTL Nederland (26%) and SBS (12%).10 Both public and commercial broadcasters invest in on-demand television, although Netflix is dominant in online movie distribution. The most notable signs of market competition among broadcasters concern the bidding on broadcasting rights of soccer matches, such as the acquisition of Fox Sports on live emission. In the journalistic labour market, there is a considerable shift from fixed tenures to freelance assignments. Junior journalists can hardly get a fixed job position and many senior journalists have been sacked.The rights of freelance journalists are contested, which legitimizes new activities of the NVJ and policy-makers. Against the background of these media landscape characteristics, media accountability comes to the fore as an important but not fully developed aspect. In the following sections, we will describe the current state of established and more innovative forms of media accountability.

Established instruments of media accountability At the level of the profession, we will describe the PC and the general codes of ethics. At the level of the news organization, we will describe the role of publishing policy and procedures, internal criticism such as ombudsmen and external criticism such as media journalism.

The PC The PC,11 established by the media sector in 1960, deals with complaints about the professional conduct of journalists. Anyone who feels offended by a press publication can lodge a complaint. 173

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The PC deals with about 80 complaints a year against all journalistic media outlets: newspapers, magazines, radio, television (public and private) and online press. The Council hears both sides and gives its opinion. It does not have powers of legal sanction, such as the imposition of reprimands, fines and suspensions. The standard of judgment is the requirement for journalistic accuracy and professional ethics. Summaries of the opinions, all of which include the names of the journalists involved, are published in the NVJ’s magazine and in full text on the PC’s website. The PC is in a process of rethinking its procedures in order to become less judicial and more journalistic. First of all, a complainer must apply to the editorial staff and try to reach a settlement. If it fails, he can lodge a complaint with the PC. In this way, the PC has become the second stage in the process. Besides, complaints against media that do not want to cooperate are no longer dealt with, unless a further and more principal interest is at stake. Several scholars have studied the PC’s procedures (Mentink, 2006) and its verdicts from various perspectives: media ethics (Evers, 1987), media law (Doomen, 1987) and journalism studies (ten Hoove, 2003). An international comparative empirical research, conducted in 2011 and 2012 by MediaAcT (Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014) shows that verdicts of press councils have little influence on the daily practices of journalists. Nevertheless, a majority does prefer self-regulation. A minority that is just shy of a majority (46%) would have no objection to a council with powers of legal sanction. Almost two out of three interviewed people (61%) in a Dutch research have heard of the PC, but practically nobody has lodged a complaint or read a verdict (Van der Wurff and Schönbach, 2014).

Professional ethics codes In the past, the NVJ conformed to the Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists, drafted by the International Federation of Journalists. The text consists of nine rather generally formulated principles.12 Single newsrooms or newspaper companies used to delineate some guidelines, mostly on privacy protection of suspects and criminals or on how to report on far-right political parties or movements. Besides, there are a lot of unwritten guidelines and standards. Many newsrooms, such as NRC Handelsblad,13 have their own written code of ethics and (social media) code of conduct, which either appears online or is considered as an internal document for staff members only. On a national level, the AEC has drafted its own ethics code.14 In 2007, the PC published the Guidelines,15 a systematic and thematic overview of the standards as applied by the Council. This document enables journalism and the public to easily take note of the general standards of the PC in dealing with complaints. Recently, the PC started a process of updating the guidelines and adapting them to the digital era with the help of the profession and the public.

Publishing on policy and procedures According to the Dutch part of the MediaAcT survey (Groenhart and Evers, 2014), journalists believe that editorial staff should be transparent. Most journalists say media companies should inform the public on ownership and shareholders, and publish mission statements and codes of ethics. Internal editorial guidelines of news organizations seem to have a significant effect on journalists’ activities. External guidelines have less impact. Publishing policy documents is an indicator of media accountability, which appears in great variety among news media. Some news media make an effort in this respect, while others don’t. Most news titles publish mission statements (63%), but statutes (15%), codes (20%) and annual reports (23%) are less common 174

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(Groenhart, 2013).16 Annual reports are mostly published by public broadcasters, as reporting on financial results and editorial policy is mandatory under media law. Although hardly publicly available, most newspapers and broadcasting organizations have an editorial statute, separating editorial and commercial responsibilities. Although advertisers sometimes try to gain influence in the editorial room, improper direct influence of commercial powers of advertisers and owners is not a major problem in the Netherlands. Editorial statues still function as a Chinese wall between editorial and commercial divisions. However, most of the statutes are outdated and risk becoming obsolete. Newsrooms refrain from updating these statutes out of fear of losing professional autonomy in new enterprise constellations (Sanders, 2014). Moreover, the rise of entrepreneurial journalism searching for new business models is recalibrating the traditional demarcation between editorial and commercial activity.

Internal criticism At the beginning of the 1990s, the news ombudsman appeared on the scene in Dutch newspapers, mediating between complainants and the editorial staff or even taking the position of a readers’ advocate. Over the past few years, local newspaper companies have removed the position of ombudsman or reader’s representative for financial reasons. In 2008, twelve ombudsmen and readers’ representatives were active in local and national newspaper offices (Evers, Groenhart and Van Groesen, 2009). At present, two national quality papers (De Volkskrant and NRC Handelsblad) employ an ombudsman with a formally independent status. After experimenting for some years with an ombudsman, the main news organization in public broadcasting, NOS, appointed an ‘ombudscommittee’ of five experts. A minority of news media structurally publishes letters from the editor-in-chief, either regularly in a weekly column (e.g. the national daily Trouw) or irregularly on a weblog (e.g. commercial news broadcast RTL Nieuws). The editor-in-chief of the NOS and other staff members publish between one and seven blog postings each month. As an exception to the other staff, the NOS editor-in-chief also responds online to online comments. However, these online publications come and go and are sometimes hard to find.

External criticism Media journalism distinguishes between two target groups: the general public and (professional) experts. For the general public, the media seem a newsworthy issue, as newspapers and opinion magazines frequently publish on media topics. Both NRC Handelsblad and de Volkskrant even have a daily media section with reviews on (news) media productions and often background features on journalism. However, in most newspapers, the media sections deal with service information on media content and celebrity news. In broadcasting there are a few radio programmes, on both public (e.g. Mediaforum – Lunch!, Radio1) and commercial channels (e.g. Mediazaken – Business News Radio), paying systematic attention to activities in the world of media and journalism. These examples are exceptions to the rule that broadcast media journalism usually has a short life cycle and limited viewing rates. However, the recent start of a third season of the television programme Medialogica (media logic) could indicate that some media journalists have found the right format and tone. For professional journalists, the NVJ publishes a monthly magazine, Villamedia, and a daily blog.17 Villamedia also publishes the PC’s opinions. Online, the main professional platform is De Nieuwe Reporter.18 This magazine frequently publishes critical analyses of media reports.19 Media and journalism are also popular topics for the non-fiction book publishers’ market. 175

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Various authors critically reflect on developments in journalism-related topics: new media, ties between media and politics, foreign reporting, media ownership and how the press sometimes presents filtered, distorted and manipulated stories to the public. For an even smaller target group, s­ pecial interest websites focus on media-related technology, law and media business news (e.g. Webwereld, Mediafacts). Several individual experts such as critical journalists and media scholars20 blog on media developments and reflect on journalism performance. Media-critical blogs have a strongly opinionated character and vary strongly in argumentation quality. As the MediaAcT survey pointed out, external media criticism has a relatively small impact on journalists’ behaviour.Worth mentioning is the project Leugens.nl (2009–2013; ‘leugens’ means ‘lies’), an online platform that aimed at debunking hoaxes and obvious political rhetoric.The project was subsidized by the JSF, but did not seem viable. Its negative, accusing tone did not help in attracting writers and the public to the website.

Innovative instruments of media accountability In an era of social media communication, Twitter and Facebook are important platforms for media criticism, as in other domains. Questionable journalistic behaviour and dubious claims are fiercely debated. In 2014, the news magazine Nieuwe Revu falsely claimed on its website the fall of the sitting government as ‘breaking news’. After one hour of social media criticism, the editor-inchief withdrew the article and apologized.21 Such incidental social media evidence is meaningful, but on a more structural level the modernizing of media accountability has still a long way to go. Traditional news organizations seem to open up to innovative projects, as they aim at improving newsroom practices, journalistic genres, distribution platforms and business models. But innovation hardly aims at improving media accountability. One exception is the online newsroom chat, such as the experiment of NOS discussing audience input with their editorin-chief. Currently, no news organization offers online newsroom chats. It seems more accurate to characterize the evolution of media accountability as ‘traditional instruments going online’. First, news media use the Internet to publish traditional instruments, such as codes and editorial statutes, and increase source transparency in stories and news articles. Second, the lower communication threshold of e-mail and social media has intensified the interaction between journalists and the public.

Traditional instruments go online Policy documents like editorial statutes have become more available by being published on the web. As such, new media are becoming more transparent, a phenomenon supported among Dutch journalists. At least half the respondents in the Dutch MediaAcT survey said that editorial staff should be open about ownership, standards and performance. In 2014, Dutch public service broadcaster KRO-NCRV proposed to publish a list of ancillary revenues of journalists holding a tenure at the organization as well as all non-journalistic clients of its freelancers. By doing so, any potential appearances of conflicts of interest should be countered.22 Such online actor transparency is a dimension for differentiation between news media, as some media make an effort to be transparent. However, the presence of such instruments is variable. When websites are updated or new designs of the online platform implemented, such instruments are often simply forgotten. Not all editors-in-chief are evenly conscious of online actor transparency. Especially in the development of news applications for mobile devices, these documents seem to disappear. Hardly any news app offers such documents. 176

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Where editors-in-chief are gradually overtaking the ombudsman’s role for self-reflection in print or online columns, self-reflection increasingly appears in editorial blogs written by various journalists in the newsroom (e.g. de Volkskrant,23 RTV Oost24 or nu.nl25). However, these blogs are not a common practice in the Dutch media landscape, nor do they have a lot of influence on journalists, as the MediaAcT survey indicates. Online communication technology has also offered a new dimension of source transparency. About half of Dutch journalists think it is desirable to add hyperlinks to source material in reports, a practice that is currently normalizing. Incidentally, newsrooms even publish raw data or interview transcripts online when it is expedient. Especially in data journalism and investigative stories, or when publication leads to controversy, source material underlying the journalistic statement is published. This happened with an interview with the chairman of the national organization of Dutch healthcare insurance companies in the weekly magazine De Groene Amsterdammer. The article ‘The health care costs debacle’ dealt with the power networks and hidden agreements of insurance companies.The chairman, a former minister, refused to authorize the article as he felt he’d been inaccurately quoted. Consequently, the magazine posted the full transcript of the interview on the website to give their readers the opportunity to form their own opinion.26 One traditional instrument that does not seem to appear online is the correction box that usually appears in newspapers. In online context, especially in live blogs, errors are corrected on the fly and remain unnoticeable. NOS is the only news title that has published corrections in a fixed and noticeable place on its website. In the latest redesign of its website, however, the online correction box has been left out.

Getting in touch with the audience Clearly, online communication has increased the interaction between journalism and the audience. By exposing their thoughts and proceedings on social media, especially Twitter, individual journalists evoke audience interaction. Of course, social media are also marketing tools for nourishing a journalist’s profile and highlighting journalistic articles and projects, but authentic audience interaction does occur as well. Although most journalists acknowledge the potential of social media, actual use of social media varies. Newspaper journalists, in particular, seem to be relatively hesitant (Smit, 2013). Also, news organizations vary in the extent to which they stimulate interaction by publishing e-mail addresses for the newsroom and editors-in-chief, or even the personal e-mail addresses of individual journalists. In general, journalists seem rather unsure about opening up to the public. According to the Dutch MediaAcT survey (Groenhart and Evers, 2014), only 41% of journalists think it is desirable to react to user comments, probably fearing an increase in workload on the one hand, and the often rude and aggressive tone of public comments on the other. At present, a discussion is occurring about shaping the conditions for online comments, such as whether editorial staff should moderate reactions and under what conditions. Some media seem to be taking a more critical stance towards online input, by either heavily moderating the input (e.g. the quality newspaper Trouw) or dispensing altogether with the online comments box (e.g. the current affairs programme Nieuwsuur). Otherwise, 44% of journalists want to use the online opportunities for public participation in journalism and 55% are positive about directly getting in touch with the public, e.g. through Twitter and Facebook. A remarkably positive example is the audience-oriented style of journalists working for De Correspondent. The content of this news medium is structured by the news users’ personal preferences for individual journalists. Hence, the interaction between journalists and news users is quite frequent and seems useful for both parties. In comment boxes, users mention errors 177

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or gaps in the journalistic content, which leads to corrections or additions to the article or to follow-up stories. Otherwise, journalists react to user comments in the comment boxes for extra explanation of their prior journalistic statements. Audience interaction being beneficial in this way is probably caused by the niche journalism that evolves due to personalized preferences for individual expert journalists. Another example of audience orientation is the information-gathering approach of De Monitor,27 a public broadcasting investigative journalism programme initially funded by the Journalism Stimulation Fund. The programme purposely publishes on broad, everyday public affairs, such as public health and food quality, to attract a broad audience. On its website, the journalists show the issues they are working on and ask for the input of the audience. Being transparent about the research question sets the wheels in motion. Whenever they get enough useful input, varying from 100 to 600 reactions, they are able to produce the story and publish it. Presumably, such innovations pave the way for a more mature and effective state of media accountability. Most notably is journalistic production that is highly transparent throughout the whole process, from the research question and data-gathering to ongoing publication. Another indication is the tendency to find ways for public interaction. A lower communication threshold in the digital age has already intensified the interaction between journalist and audience. Nowadays, personalized news consumption seems promising as a more mature and beneficial way of audience interaction.

Conclusion The notion that news media and journalism themselves ought to be more transparent and accountable towards the public has gained ground in the profession, as well as in politics and society. As the government principally does not interfere in the profession and the public is not inclined to actively engage in calling journalists to account, media accountability is still basically a matter of professional responsibility. Although media accountability is on the agenda, it is far from being mature and equally integrated. Using, installing or even creating media accountability instruments is not the highest of all priorities, so media accountability often remains on the to-do list for many news organizations. Despite a strong tendency among journalists to foster professional autonomy, some developments in the media landscape suggest a shift towards more openness and responsiveness. Traditional instruments like the PC, ethics codes and newsroom guidelines are of value and are adapting to new demands. The PC has accommodated criticism in new procedures, and ethics codes are adjusted to new circumstances. Although the number of ombudspersons has decreased, the reputation of this instrument is recovering, as three national news titles now have an ombudsman and a fourth intends to install one. Newsrooms increasingly publish policy documents like statutes and mission statements, and editors-in-chief write about the processes behind the screen and ethical issues. Moreover, many news organizations are engaged in innovative projects, and some innovations pave the way for a more mature and effective state of media accountability. In this era of immediate, unlimited communication and demanding citizens, it seems probable to expect that awareness of media accountability will further increase, resulting in more transparency and more useful interaction with the public.

Notes  1 ECHR, 2013, application no. 39315/06 (De Haas/Mos); ECHR, 2010, application no. 38224/03 (Autoweek); ECHR, 2007, application no. 64752/01 (Voskuil).

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The Netherlands  2 Kamerbrief Dekker: Toezeggingen wetgevingsoverleg mediabegroting 2014, maart 21, 2014, Nr. 584980; Kamerbrief Dekker: Plan van aanpak toekomstverkenning publieke mediabestel, juni 20, 2013, Nr. 24060; Kamerbrief Dekker: Pers en journalistiek, november 9, 2013, Nr. 567658.   3 Kamerbrief Dekker: Consultation on the independent report from the High Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism, juli 8, 2013, Nr. 52206.  4 http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/media-en-publieke-omroep/hervorming-publieke-omroep   5 To articulate a broader scope, in 2013 the fund dropped its former name of Press Stimulation Fund.  6 http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/facts  7 http://hoi-online.nl  8 http://decorrespondent.nl  9 http://blendle.com 10 http://kijkonderzoek.nl 11 One of the authors (Huub Evers) is a PC member. 12 http://www.ifj.org/about-ifj/ifj-code-of-principles/ 13 http://apps.nrc.nl/stijlboek/stijlgids/journalistieke-normen-en-waarden 14 http://www.genootschapvanhoofdredacteuren.nl/het-genootschap/code-voor-de-journalistiek/ 15 http://www.rvdj.nl/leidraad 16 Based on the situation in 2012. 17 http://www.villamedia.nl 18 http://www.denieuwereporter.nl 19 http://www.ad.nl/ad/nl/1013/Buitenland/article/detail/3668963/2014/06/08/VermissingszaakKris-en-Lisanne-en-de-neptaxi.dhtml 20 http://dodebomen.nl; http://www.toekomstvandejournalistiek.nl; http://www.leugens.nl 21 http://www.mediaredactie.net/2014/12/19/de-nieuwe-revu-het-kabinet-gevallen/ 22 http://www.villamedia.nl/nieuws/bericht/kro-ncrv-openbaart-schnabbels-journalisten/ 23 http://www.volkskrant.nl/redactieblog-storystream/ 24 http://www.rtvoost.nl/blogs/ 25 http://www.nu.nl/blog 26 De Groene Amsterdammer, Het zorgkostendebacle, juni 4, 2014 (http://www.groene.nl/artikel/is-andrerouvoet-correct-door-ons-geciteerd-lees-het-volledige-transcript). 27 http://demonitor.ncrv.nl

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23 Norway Journalistic power limits media accountability Paul Bjerke

Abstract Norway has a long history of traditional industry-controlled MAIs. A Press Council and a Code of Ethics were set up in the interwar period. They have no statutory or government-controlled elements. The online transition has challenged, but not yet changed, the system. Instead, online media has become a part of the self-regulated system. User-generated content is subordinated to the editor’s responsibility. As yet, the possibilities of new online MAIs are not used in a systematic way. There are no compulsory schemes for newsrooms to present links to original sources, to create newsroom blogs fostering production transparency, to foster collaborative news work or to introduce online correction strategies. The most widespread MAIs are the online discussion forums, where the public is obliged to discuss, criticize and scrutinize the news and reports.

Introduction Hallin and Mancini (2004a) consider a strong self-regulated ethical system to be an important feature of the Democratic Corporatist Model of media systems. In this model, press freedom is highly rated and institutionalized,1 and – following Bourdieu (2005) – the journalistic field is dominated by the “autonomous pole” and relatively independent from the political and economic fields. From this independence follows power for the journalistic profession (Bjerke, 2011). This chapter discusses the relationships between journalistic power and media accountability instruments (MAIs) in Norway.

Journalistic culture and the media system The Norwegian media system is characterized by high media use, a corporatized newspaper field, a strong public broadcasting sector and the rapid growth of online news consumption (Vaage, 2014; Høst, 2014). As in other countries, the digital transition is causing financial problems for the industry. In 2014, the word ‘crisis’ was often used to describe the situation. One thousand (of 12,000) journalist jobs in the print press were in danger2 due to long-lasting decreases in sales and accelerating advertisement losses. The readers are changing from paid, printed newspapers to free online sites and mobile news consumption, and the advertisers prefer 180

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social media and search engines to the traditional print media or their newer online versions (Omdal, 2013; Krumsvik, 2012). Norway used to have a strong partisan press and a state monopoly on radio and television, Norsk Rikskringkasting (Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation, NRK). During the 1970s, the party press lost legitimacy, and in the following decade all newspapers cut their ties to the party system. Most of the smaller newspapers in towns with paper competition closed down, and local press monopolies emerged in all cities and towns except Oslo, Bergen, Stavanger and Skien (Høst, 2014). At the same time, the newspapers attracted interest as investment objects, and Norway got a system of large media-owning corporations, tentatively regulated by a Media Ownership Act. Although press subsidies are decreasing, €45 million is spent annually as direct state subsidies to the press, and the print media are not subject to value added tax (NOU, 2010). The newspapers’ circulation has dropped by 3–4% per year since 1999 (Høst, 2014), but the circulation per capita is still one of the highest in the world.The total in 2013 was 2,230,000 copies per day (430 daily newspapers per 1,000 inhabitants). The most important printed newspapers are the broadsheet Aftenposten (circulation 214,000), the two national boulevard newspapers Verdens Gang (VG) (164,000) and Dagbladet (80,000) and the ‘pink’ business daily Dagens Næringsliv (80,000); all are published in the capital, Oslo.3 The TV industry was liberalized in the 1980s and 1990s, but NRK still holds a strong market position, especially among people over 50 years of age. In 2014, the digitalized TV market was mainly shared between NRKs three fee-financed channels (38%), the Danish-owned TV2’s six channels (30%) and TVNorge, owned by American SBS Discovery (17%).4 Around 80% of all Norwegian print newspapers have some kind of online news distribution and half of them update their sites through the day (Høst, 2014). All the main ‘old’ news organizations (both print and TV) have set up their own 24/7 online news services. The biggest and most influential is VGNett, the online version of the largest circulation boulevard newspaper VG. Fifteen of the 20 most-visited Norwegian online sites are controlled by the traditional media organizations.5 In recent years, two new trends have affected the news market: a strong and rapid growth in the mobile distribution of news and a growth in the use of different video formats on online news sites. Mobile news distribution is also dominated by the ‘old’ media organizations. VG and NRK each have one million unique mobile users per day.6 Seventy of the online sites of the newspapers publish locally produced videos once or more times per week (Høst, 2014). VGNett is also a video pioneer. It transmits a popular live studio show covering big news and sports events.The show includes discussion forums where users are invited to participate. In November 2014, VG launched an ‘ordinary’ TV channel, distributed through cable and satellite.7 This means that in Norway, ‘old media’ still control the ‘new media’. The online news sites have inherited the journalistic culture from the ‘old’ print and television newsrooms. A survey of Norwegian journalists suggests that two main features characterize their culture: journalism has to be responsible and journalists should be independent from all external interests (Bjerke, 2009, 2011). All of the journalistic profession’s organizations in Norway have officially approved the idea of responsible journalism. Unlike other European countries (Heikkilä et al., 2012), there are only minor differences within the journalistic field concerning these matters (Hovden, 2006). Journalistic practice in Norway is legitimated in an ethical way. It is assumed that journalism will contribute to a ‘better society’. Rights and Duties of the Editor,8 a joint document agreed upon by Norsk Redaktørforening (The Association of Norwegian Editors, NR) and Mediebedriftenes Landsforening (The Norwegian Media Businesses’ Association, MBL) ascertains that “The editor 181

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shall promote the freedom of opinion and in accordance with the best of his/her abilities strive for what he/she feels serves society”.9 The first chapter of the Code of Ethics outlines an ethical programme.The press will “defend the freedom of speech, fight for an open society and a transparent government and protect individuals and groups against injustices from those in power”. Last, but not least, journalists also have the “right to publish any kind of information”.10 The main features of these rules were introduced in the 1975 version of the Code as a “declaration of independence” for the journalistic profession. This independence was later formalized in the by-laws of the Norsk Journalistlag (Norwegian Union of Journalists, NJ).11 Only a person that can perform “free choices of sources” may be a member (Bjerke, 2009). For the last couple of decades, Norwegian press ideology has been strongly marked by the growing independence of the press institution. Hovden (2006) finds that 96% of the members of the Norwegian Union of Journalists “strongly agree” or “agree” with the statement that a journalist should consider himself of herself a person who should “criticize injustices in society”, 95% support the view that a journalist should “stimulate new thoughts and values” and 98% of the respondents support the view that a journalist should “study the powers of society”. Using Bourdieu’s concept, one may conclude that the autonomous pole of the Norwegian journalistic field is relatively strong and that the influences of the economic and political fields on the journalistic culture are relatively weak. What effects has the online transition had on this situation? In its first 15 years, online journalism had a low standing (Erdal, 2008; Krumsvik, 2009). The online newsroom staff were young, on temporary contracts and looked down on by print and TV journalists. The online journalists also had to produce more for less (Brurås, 2012). This probably had the effect of weakening the professional power of journalists. The substantial downsizing of print newsroom staff in recent years has also weakened the power of professional journalists, and the economic crisis in the industry has strengthened the heteronomous, economic pole in the media field (Omdal, 2013). The Union of Journalists has not, even with a very high organization density, been able to prevent the downsizing being accompanied by high stock returns to the owners and higher salaries to the managing directors of the media corporations.12 However, the journalistic culture is defended. A total of seven out of ten journalists fear “to a very high degree” that this downsizing will result in a decrease in the quality of journalism. Almost half of the editors are just as concerned.13 Even if there is an ongoing discussion about the quality of the online news sites (Brurås, 2012; Omdal, 2013; Høst, 2014), those in the discussion mostly agree on journalism’s societal obligations, while they disagree on the extent to which online sites meet them.

Established instruments of media accountability Hallin and Mancini (2004a) consider the Scandinavian countries to be “extreme” representatives of the Democratic Corporatist media system. A closer look at these countries’ ethical self-regulating systems shows that Norway has the most unambiguous industry-driven system (Bjerke, 2009).14 Norwegian journalism’s professional ethics has been formalized and governed by the industry itself through Norsk Presseforbund (the Norwegian Press Association, NP), an umbrella body for all organizations in the press (publishers, editors and journalists) (Røssland, 1999). The most important formal organ of journalism’s self-regulation system is the Press Council, which mainly deals with complaints from people who have been exposed to negative press coverage.15 The Norwegian Press Association established the Press Council in 1928. Since 1987, 182

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four of the Press Council’s members represent the press (two editors and two journalists), while there are three lay members. The NP appoints all of the members. A Code of Ethics, established in 1936 (Røssland, 1999) by the board of the Press Association, guides the Press Council’s work. Both the Press Council and the Code of Ethics have high prestige among Norwegian journalists (Brurås, 2006). Furthermore, in 1998, the statutory Kringkastingsnemnda (Broadcast Complaint Commission) shut down, and its operations were transferred to the media industry’s internal Press Council, which today is also responsible for complaints about broadcasting. However, research has problematized the scope of the Council’s practice. Bjerke (2009) finds that the discussions and verdicts in the profession-controlled Press Council are technical and narrow and avoid the more complicated ethical matters in journalism, especially connected to its societal responsibility. Svein Brurås (2009) similarly concludes that the Press Council is an appeals body that “criticizes rule violations, but avoids broader quality questions … The council tries to maintain a distinction between ethics and quality” (p. 133). He finds that the Council criticizes important journalistic stories with minor formal wrongdoings and accepts “most deficient journalism because it does not break any rule” (p. 133) [translation P.B.]. In her master’s thesis, Aanestad (2013) shows that the Press Council tends to “focus on the specifics of each individual case, and to base its ethical conclusions on the Code of Ethics” (p. VI) rather than on ethical discussions: “It can be said that the Press Council in some aspects is imitating legal bodies” (ibid.). Other traditional MAIs are not widespread in Norway. There are no ombudsmen in any newsroom. Bergens Tidende had an ombudsman for six years,16 but the position was abolished in 2011, and no other newsroom has taken up the idea. All print newspapers occasionally cover media affairs, and some (Stavanger Aftenblad, Aftenposten and Dagbladet) have regular media commentators. The pink business paper Dagens Næringsliv has the most comprehensive news coverage of the field, a daily section dedicated to media and culture, mostly their economic affairs.17 Media news and media discussions are relatively rare in television and radio, except for NRK P2, the public service broadcasting’s channel for culture and politics.18 NRK19 and the commercial P4 20 have regular media-satirical shows. There are some trade journals and websites dedicated to media affairs, among them Kampanje, Journalisten and Vox Publica. However, research on the media’s coverage of the media is nonexistent, and there is a steady public discussion about the media’s lack of interest in media criticism, often formulated as the rhetorical question “Who guards the guards?” The chair of the Norwegian Press Association, Kjersti Løken Stavrum, has said that the media’s critical coverage of itself is “not impressive”.21 In the days of the party press, the situation was different. Bastiansen (2009) found that partyaffiliated newspapers strongly criticized each other: In practice, the party newspapers came to reside in the ongoing civil war with each other in their battle over public opinion. Metaphors like war, struggle and strife describe the debates that raged between party newspapers from various parties … Virtually any political statement was strongly criticized of the opponent’s papers and defended by their own reporters. (p. 480) [translation P.B.] However, even today, some of the guards are guarded. The state-owned public broadcasting is edited using NRK Plakaten (The NRK Poster), a governmental charter, and due to the shortage of radio waves, commercial broadcasting is also regulated. The licensed stations have to accept a ‘social mission’ for current news, national culture and programmes for minorities. This mission 183

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is formulated in contracts between the government and the broadcast stations. Medietilsynet (The Norwegian Media Authority),22 a relatively small government body, monitors the contracts and its main task is to ensure that the industry acts in accordance with the Media Ownership Act. In their 2013 report, the authority was mostly satisfied, but the SBS-owned Radio Norge was harshly criticized for “pervasive and prominent violation” of their contract23 and fined. Print newspapers and online sites do not have legal obligations to fulfil any “social mission”. However, to strengthen their legitimacy and meet the criticisms of commercialization, a growing number of newspapers publish a yearly ‘editorial account’, mostly online. In these accounts, the editors summarize their editorial choices in the previous year and discuss successes and failures. The Association of Norwegian Editors publishes a yearly online national ‘editorial account’. In the 2014 report, 65 editors gave brief accounts of the previous year. The report also hyper-linked to 13 more comprehensive editorial accounts, i.e. from the two main media corporations, Schibsted and Amedia. The industry’s interest in these kinds of accounts has been growing in recent years. ‘Letters to the editor’ columns have a long tradition in printed newspapers. Research (Elvestad, 2001) finds that letters are a frequent, popular and important part of Norwegian newspapers.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Online publication technology strengthens the possibilities for two-way communication and media scrutiny. When journalism went online it became much easier to involve readers in news production, evaluation and accountability. The question is whether these communication and accountability possibilities are used. Internet penetration in Norway is 95%; 85% of the population uses the Internet daily, and one of the most popular web activities is reading news. Of the Internet users, 74% read news on the web daily (Vaage, 2014). However, only 12% (total) or 7% (‘last month’) post comments on the commentary fields in the online newspapers (Løvlie et al., 2014). Use of social media is widespread.The most used tools are Facebook, Snapchat, Instagram and Twitter.24 Three million (out of a total of 5 million) Norwegians have a Facebook account. News and comments from the media’s online sites are shared among the users of social media, often with ‘likes’ and written comments, and about 15% of the news media’s online traffic is initiated by social-media sharing (Nedregotten, 2015). The spread of online communication has facilitated the use of other inside-media MAIs. Table 23.1 shows that public information on company ownership and publication of mission statements and codes of ethics are ‘partly applied’ to a medium degree in online news sites. The only widespread innovative MAIs are by-lines and discussion forums. In 2009, 114 of 152 newspapers with an online version had some kind of opportunity for reader participation. Most common was the discussion forum (105 newspapers) (Ihlebæk and Krumsvik, 2014). Other kinds of in-house innovative online MAIs are even more rare. Some news media experiment with journalist blogs that partly deal with media accountability. Aftenposten has established a Facebook group, Bak Forsiden (Behind the Front Page),25 where editors and journalists tell the readers about their work and their reviews. VG has a blog (Innsiden, The Inside) about “how we work in Norway’s largest newspaper? How do we think? What are we doing?”26 Neither Innsiden nor Bak Forsiden have widespread reader participation. For example, VG’s news story about brain research on sudden infant death syndrome was much discussed when it was published in May 2014. Thirty-one news stories were published in the Norwegian printed press in May and June,27 and the Minister of Health had to give an account in the 184

Norway Table 23.1  Innovative online newsroom MAIs in Norway Actor transparency Public information on company ownership Published mission statements Code of ethics published online Profiles of journalists published online

Partly applied (medium degree) Partly applied (medium degree) Partly applied (medium degree) Partly applied (low degree)

Production transparency By-lines to online news Links to original sources Newsrooms blogs/social media use fostering production transparency Collaborative news production

Widespread Partly applied (low degree) Partly applied (low degree) Partly applied (low degree, mostly event news)

Responsiveness Correction buttons Ombudspersons online Online comments in news

None None Widespread

Social media use Social media use by journalists

Partly applied (medium degree)

Norwegian Parliament. However, the discussion thread on VG’s blog had only six participants and twelve ‘likes’. In June 2014, journalists posted 22 Facebook updates on Aftenposten’s Bak Forsiden.The posts received not more than an average of three comments, three ‘shares’ and 40 ‘likes’; this, in the end, looks like one-way information from the newsroom to the readers to explain and defend their choices. These figures contrast with the public optimism of the early World Wide Web days about the democratic possibilities of the web. However, it is important to know that Norwegian journalists did not share this optimism. Former editor, now media researcher, Arne Krumsvik (2009) writes: This lack of enthusiasm for the close contact with the public’s knowledge and opinions have concerned me ever since the online newspapers saw the light … VG-journalists’ skepticism to communicate with the readers represent the rule rather than the exception. (p. 70) Krumsvik found the same scepticism about communicating with the readers and open debate in NRK: “The opportunity for transparency in the journalistic process through the active use of links to external sources, and the possibility of close dialogue with users, were seen as less important characteristics in the description of ‘good online business’” (ibid.). The most important struggle in the field concerned “if the online sites’ discussion forums should be pre-edited or post-moderated” (Bjerke, 2011). The Union of Journalists and central representatives of the profession argued for pre-editing; the industry preferred post-moderating, and the latter view won. Today, almost all online sites have post-moderated chat rooms connected to the news articles. There is much discussion about the quality and character of the commentary space. Some discussants characterize them as “sewage”, “societal pollution” or “echo chambers”, while editors-in-chief and media executives regard the unedited a­udience 185

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participation as “strengthening the editorial content” and “democratizing” (Ihlebæk, 2008). Academic studies find, moreover, that the public’s contribution to websites is of a relatively high standard (Løvlie et al., 2014). All user-generated content is part of the editorial responsibility.The discussion forums are the chief editor’s responsibility, both legally and ethically. Therefore, the editors exert control in two ways: First, editors decide which articles are ‘opened’ for net discussion (and sensitive themes like immigration and feminism are often closed for discussion). Second, the commentary fields are post-moderated, and the moderator may change or delete posts – and prohibit individuals from taking part at all. Ihlebæk and Krumsvik (2014) conclude that “an important point raised in our study is that while the readers are encouraged to participate in online discussion forums, they are not to any noticeable degree invited to take part in the editorial decision-making process” (p. 14). The authors point out the lack of transparency as a problem: This might be a result of limited resources … but it could also be understood as a general skepticism towards the participants and reluctance to give up editorial power. (ibid.) This conclusion is supported by another study that finds that many of the participants in news media discussion forums are dissatisfied with the moderators. Forty-four % of the participants find the discussions “very bad” or “mostly bad”, in contrast to 22% who regard the discussion forums to be “good”. Of the forum participants, 84% have experienced that their posts had been deleted or changed by the moderators in a way that they did not understand (Løvlie et al., 2014). The discussion participants show “strong suspicion and distrust of the moderators, they say they are censored for their opinions, they speak of “PC (political correct)-mafias” that “conspire against people with different opinions”.28 Innovative MAIs outside newsrooms, like media activism, media bloggers and social media networks, are more difficult to map, partly because the field is very broad and fragmented and not institutionalized, and partly because the research on these issues is very limited. For example, there are quite a few websites, blogs and Facebook profiles that are mainly dedicated to media criticism. A few of them are regular and well-known among journalists, like Jan Arild Snoen’s media criticism, published in the conservative online magazine Minerva.29 However, only one (Kilden, The Source) of the 50 sites on the top blog list in June 201430 contains any kind of media criticism or discussion. In general, the whole blogosphere in Norway is diminishing in scope and influence (Bjørkelo, 2013). However, Norway has a long tradition of media criticism and activism from the political right. In the corporation’s first 60 years, all heads of NRK were members of the Labor Party.This led to claims of Labor bias in journalistic reports (Libertas, 1975). Later, the leader of the strong populist right-wing Progress Party, Carl I. Hagen, always named NRK as ARK (Arbeiderpartiets rikskringkasting, The Labor Broadcasting). In the 2000s, this discussion was connected with a rising wave of criticism against ‘political correctness’ in the media, politics and culture, often linked to the fact that 65% of Norwegian journalists vote for left-wing parties.31 Some organizations, like Med Israel For Fred (With Israel For Peace) and the immigration-hostile Human Rights Services (rights.no) and document.no more or less systematically scrutinized and criticized the alleged left-wing bias of the media and journalism, often using online measures. Another innovative online MAI in Norway is social media used as what Kalsnes and others (2014) call a political back channel. The authors consider that televised debates between party leaders have become “an important ritual in election campaigns in democratic countries”. 186

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Previous research has shown that TV debates have considerable importance for agenda-setting during Norwegian election campaigns. Furthermore, TV debates are produced and staged by broadcasters, and political parties are adapting to the journalists’ premises and judgments rather than the opposite. Kalsnes et al. studied all tweets connected to the TV electoral debates in 2013 and found that 50% of them were meta talk, with a high proportion of these addressing critical concerns about the choice of topics and the journalists’ questions. They found a “clear pattern of political fandom and media criticism in the ‘debate about the debate’, indicating that Meta talk in social media can function as a critical public sphere, also in real time” (Kalsnes et al., 2014, p. 313).

Other media accountability instruments There are five state-owned and two private journalism schools in Norway. The state-owned schools are all part of a university or university colleges. In all these institutions, media ethics and accountability systems are a central part of the curriculum. Norwegian students literally have to learn the Code of Ethics by heart. Another way to build professionalism is a yearly conference for investigative journalism, arranged by Stiftelsen for en Kritisk og Undersøkende Presse (SKUP, Association for Critical and Investigative Press), where 600 journalists take part and the SKUP Prize is awarded. Around 50 news stories are submitted for the competition, and the competitors have to write a report32 in which sources, research questions, ethical problems etc. are discussed. In this way, the competition makes journalism more transparent.

Conclusion The findings in this chapter are in line with the findings of the MediaAcT journalist survey: Although new technologies have given rise to serious and broad challenges to ways of doing journalism, the ingrained perception of journalism as an independent occupation, practiced by autonomous individuals, still prevails. The survey indicates that journalists are reluctant to open up to the public about their ‘toolboxes’ and the considerations guiding everyday news production (Lauk, Harro-Loit and Väliverronen, 2014, p. 95). The relative independence of the journalistic field in Norway makes for a strong journalist profession that has given itself the ‘right’ to control the information flow in society. The influential Press Council and the more ambiguous, hesitant and unsystematic use of innovative MAIs appear contradictory, but both tendencies can be seen as results of this strong and powerful journalistic profession. In most theories of professionalization, construction of a professional ethics system is seen as a central part of profession building. A central reason for a strong ethical system is to avoid statuary schemes, like a government ombudsman or state-controlled Press Councils. Odd Raaum (1994) has named the Norwegian system a “thermostat ethics” to run off the external pressure on the press. In the same way, internal innovative online MAIs may be seen as threats to the professional power of journalists. Thus, the profession has been very restrictive about unedited commentary fields, clickable mail addresses, webcasted newsrooms conferences etc. These facts raise some important questions, as Harald Grimen (2006) has pointed out: Collegiate organizations are per se difficult to control from outside; ergo you have to suppose they are able to control themselves if they are given responsibility to m ­ anage knowledge. This is in a way the core in the political dilemma of professionalism. 187

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A society may need craftsmen of a kind whose practice is difficult to control by those who need their services. Society then has to presuppose that they organize themselves in a way that guarantees certain normative standards. A professional morality is such a standard. (p. 3) [translation P.B.] Because journalism in Norway has established itself as a profession based on a strong internal professional self-justice and claims of independence, journalism in Norway has become a typical collegiate organization that is difficult to control from the outside. This profession has been given (or has taken upon itself) the responsibility to manage and control the flow of information through the news institutions on behalf of society. Because the collegiate organization cannot be controlled from the outside, society has to presuppose that it is controlled from the inside, and that the profession is capable of managing power in an acceptable way. The citizens need the services of journalists. They need information and forums for debate. It is also argued that citizens need a ‘fourth branch of government’, and that this is what the profession is supposed to deliver. However, the narrow focus of the institutionalized, traditional press ethics and journalism’s lack of interest in using online MAIs limit society’s possibilities for holding the journalistic profession and the media industry accountable for their choices and practices. Addressing this problem should be a future topic for both the industry and media researchers.

Notes   1 Norway is ranked 3rd in the World Press Freedom Index 2014.  2 http://www.journalisten.no/node/42296  3 Circulation figures for 2013, from Mediebedriftenes Landsforening (Norwegian Media Businesses’ Association, MBL), http://www.mediebedriftene.no/Tall--Fakta1/Opplagstall/Avis-2013/  4 http://www.kampanje.com/medier/juli-2014/Den_nye_tv-krigen/   5 However, also in Norway Facebook, Google and YouTube are the three most visited Internet sites.   6 TNS Gallup.  7 https://kabel.canaldigital.no/Om-Canal-Digital/Pressemeldinger/VGTV-kommer-med-nyhetskanal/  8 http://www.nored.no/Redaktoeransvar/Redaktoerplakaten/Redaktoerplakaten-paa-engelsk  9 http://www.nored.no/Redaktoeransvar/Redaktoerplakaten/Redaktoerplakaten-paa-engelsk 10 Most Norwegian media organizations also have their own, often ‘stronger’, internal ethical codes (Dahlstrøm, 2008). 11 http://www.nj.no/no/Om_NJ/Vedtekter/#DEL%202%20MEDLEMSKAP,%20INNMELDING%20 OG%20OPPH%C3%98R 12 Klassekampen, 8.5.2014. The average income of an NJ member in 2013 was NKr 580,000 (€68,000) (Figures from NJ).The CEOs of the ten biggest media corporations had incomes between NKr 3.6 and 18.4 million (€423,000–€2,160,000) (Dagens Næringsliv, October 17, 2014). 13 http://www.nordiskemediedager.no/nyheter/journalister-og-redaktorer-tror-kvaliteten-faller/ 14 In Denmark, the field is regulated by the Media Liability Act adopted by Folketinget (The Danish Parliament), while Sweden has an ombudsman (Allmänhetens Pressombudman) who considers complaints against the press before they are submitted to the industry-dominated Press Council (Pressens Opinionsnämnd). The ombudsman is appointed by a board where the press’ representatives constitute a minority. 15 In 2013, the Council received 364 complaints; 135 received full treatment and 68 were upheld. 16 http://voxpublica.no/2010/04/slik-lesere-ser-det-fem-rad-om-vesentlig-journalistikk 17 http://www.dn.no/etterBors/ 18 NRK P2 has a weekly media magazine (“Kurer”) and reports extensively on media news in the daily news. 19 NRK’s version of “Have I got news for you” has been the most popular TV show for the last ten years. 20 “Meggene”, a weekly satirical show. 21 Aftenposten, September 9, 2014.

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Norway 22 http://www.medietilsynet.no/English-menu/ 23 http://www.medietilsynet.no/Documents/Allmennkringkasting/MD_AKR_2013_WEB_NY.pdf 24 Kampanje, June 13, 2014. 25 https://www.facebook.com/bakforsiden 26 http://innsiden.vg.no/, see also http://www.journalisten.no/node/41035 27 Retriever search. 28 Løvlie’s oral presentation of the findings in a seminar in January 2014. 29 Minerva shares office with the much influential market-liberal think tank Civita in Oslo. 30 Published by Nettavisen.no, downloaded June 29, 2014. 31 http://www.journalisten.no/node/42100 32 http://skup.no/Konferansen_2014/9549

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24 Poland Accountability in the making Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska, Michał Głowacki and Michał Kuś

Abstract Although the majority of mechanisms and instruments which aim to support media ethics and journalistic professionalization were introduced at an early stage of the political and social transformation in the early 1990s, the system of media accountability in Poland is still in the making. Journalistic communities in the country, which are responsible for the development and safeguarding of self-regulatory mechanisms, are divided based on political ties, and professional unions/associations are not attractive to young representatives of the profession. The Council of Media Ethics does not have any legal basis to apply sanctions after a violation of ethical standards by journalists and new media and technologies have not yet been recognized as mechanisms that could support accountability and transparency. Along with this, the level of press freedom and current discussions on the future of journalism education should be taken into account.

Introduction The transformation from a communist state towards democracy in Poland has had an impact on journalism culture development but it has also created a plethora of problems, which are typical for young democracies. Although several instruments supporting media accountability and transparency were introduced at an early stage of the social, cultural, political and economic transformation in the early 1990s, practice has shown that some of them have been misunderstood or neglected. For some time it has been suggested that the underdevelopment of media accountability institutions is a result of strong media-political relations, the ideological preferences of journalistic communities (left-wing vs. right-wing oriented), problems with journalism education and the lack of effectiveness of established practices. Opportunities to strengthen media accountability and transparency in the online space have not yet been fully recognized by Polish journalists. In fact, the media accountability system in Poland is still in the making. Nowadays it faces additional challenges in relation to the growing importance of the economic aspects of the media, media activism and usergenerated media, as well as global discussions on media ethics and the crisis within the journalism profession. 190

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Journalistic culture and media system The historical context helps to explain the characteristics of journalism culture in Poland. The country lost its independence at the end of the 18th century and recovered its sovereignty in 1918, but only for 21 years. From 1944 to 1989, the country was part of the Soviet Bloc.The two decades of being an independent state (1918–1939) were not sufficient to create effective democratic standards and political culture – in 1926, the country was taken down an authoritarian path under the rule of Józef Piłsudski. Nevertheless, Poles developed a strong tradition of opposition movements and samizdat1 independent press, both when Poland was not an independent state and during the 45 years of Soviet control. All of these conditions have had an impact on the media system and the development of journalism culture. Curry suggests that during the communist period, Polish journalists were both highly politicized and professionalized: Despite an official ideology that regarded the media as instruments of the party, Polish journalists developed a strong professional culture. (Curry, 1990, pp. 23–24) In the early 1990s, at the beginning of the social and political transformation, Poland’s media system was comparable to those of Italy and Spain (Hallin and Mancini, 2012b, p. 279; Jakubowicz, 2008; Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011a, p. 25). The level of journalistic professionalism has been perceived as lower than the Democratic Corporatist or the Liberal traditions, as defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004a), and a high degree of ideological diversity and political conflicts over the media have been observed (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012, p. 49). Despite the introduction of mechanisms fostering media ethics and professionalization at an early stage of the transformation, the tradition of politicized journalism was still observed in the 2000s. The majority of journalists were far from objective, and often got involved in biased political reporting. Paradoxically, journalists were convinced that their civic responsibility demanded their personal involvement in the political course of events. Hadamik (2005) claims that it was a kind of combination of the old and new indicators of journalistic professionalization. She believes that, on the one hand, a lot of values inherited from the past still existed but, on the other hand, journalism culture started to evolve due to global development trends (ibid., p. 222). Nowadays, the majority of journalists still have strong ideological preferences (conservative, liberal, socialist and so on), but only a few media outlets serve as instruments of political parties and propaganda tools. Some of the media firms, such as the left-wing oriented weekly Polityka, often criticized left party governments.There are still several media outlets, including Uważam Rze, Radio Maryja and Nie, which do not hide their close political ties and orientations. The period 2005–2007, when the conservative right-wing oriented Prawo i Sprawiedliwość (Law and Justice) party was in power, was probably the worst for press freedom in Poland. During that time changes in media regulation allowed the appointment of members of public service media to governing and supervisory bodies in accordance with political ties. The period of government of Jarosław Kaczyński and the presidency of Lech Kaczyński was characterized by difficult relations with the media, the polarization of journalistic communities and biased reporting in the public media controlled by people in favour of the government (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011b, pp. 199–202, 2012, pp. 33–36). After the parliamentary election in 2007, Poland improved its position in the World Press Freedom ranking when Platforma Obywatelska (Civic Platform – PO) came to power.The level of press freedom has systematically improved since the presidential elections in 2010 when Bronisław Komorowski from Civic Platform became the president of the Republic of Poland. At that time, the country was regarded as being free (Freedom House, 2015) 191

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and it held the 18th position in the Reporters Without Borders’ world press ranking. In Central and Eastern Europe, this was the fourth position in the ranking, after Estonia, the Czech Republic and Slovakia (Reporters Without Borders, 2015). News disseminators and educators, who keep a significant distance from political actors, appeared to be the most significant roles, as defined by contemporary Polish journalists. The majority of journalists surveyed in ‘The Global Journalist’ study declared that they can select topics for news without any limits or external pressure, and less than 20% referred to examples of censorship in the newsrooms (Stępińska and Ossowski, 2011). Journalists in Poland mostly feel accountable towards journalistic standards, sources of information and their own conscience. Empirical research conducted within the research project ‘Media Accountability and Transparency in Europe’ (MediaAcT) has further proved that political pressure is no longer perceived as the main danger for journalism development. Among the factors that could damage journalistic quality, Polish media professionals indicated economic pressure, inadequate salaries and the tabloidization of news (Stępińska and Głowacki, 2014). The concept of a hybrid model and hybridization are useful when evaluating the current state of journalism culture in Poland (Chadwick, 2013). Poland might not have lost the characteristics of the Polarized Pluralist Model, but it is acquiring features more typical of both the Democratic Corporatist and Liberal countries.These include liberal tendencies and the tabloidization of the media (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2012, p. 49). However, Voltmer (2008) considers that any similarities observed between old and new democracies might be misleading, since only a few of the Western European characteristics of the media and political systems relate to those of Central and Eastern Europe. The media market in Poland is the biggest in Central and Eastern Europe. There are twelve national daily newspapers, with Fakt and Gazeta Wyborcza having the biggest audience shares of 11.30% and 7.98%, respectively (Wirtualne Media, 2015). The readership levels of the dailies, as well as magazines and the local and regional press, have decreased over recent years. The electronic media market is based on a dual model of broadcasting, with a strong public service in TV (Telewizja Polska – TVP) and the domination of privately owned radio stations at the national level (RMF FM and Radio Zet). Internet penetration has increased to 67.15% in 2014 (Internet Live Stats, 2014). Among the most popular websites in the country are Google, Facebook and YouTube (Wirtualne Media, 2014).

Established instruments of media accountability Ethical standards and codes of professional conduct that include respect for the truth, reliability when preparing information, the principle of tolerance and the need for objectivity are mainly defined by the journalistic communities and associations. There are three main associations of journalists in Poland: Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Polskich (SDP, the Association of Polish Journalists, 2,700 members), Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej (SDRP, the Association of Journalists of the Republic of Poland, no data available on the number of members) and Katolickie Stowarzyszenie Dziennikarzy (KSD, the Catholic Association of Journalists, 600 members). Members of these journalistic organizations, as well as the publishers, producers and television broadcasters within the Conference of Polish Mass Media, signed the Charter of Media Ethics in 1995 and the Journalistic Code of Conduct in 2002. In addition, SDP and SDRP have adopted their own codes of professional conduct relevant for members of these associations. In order to uphold the legal validity of the Charter of Media Ethics, the Conference of Polish Mass Media appointed Rada Etyki Mediów (REM, the Council of Media Ethics) to monitor the principles defined in the Charter. REM consists of a maximum of 13 members who can make 192

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statements and issue opinions on journalism performance, but it does not have any legal basis to apply sanctions after a violation of ethical standards by the media. In terms of violation of the Code of Journalistic Conduct of SDP and the Journalistic Code of Conduct of SDRP, the journalistic associations may hold journalists to account through the system of so-called ‘colleague’ courts. For instance, in accordance with the Code of Journalistic Ethics of SDP, journalists’ courts might impose penalties appropriate to the character and scale of the misdemeanour, ranging from admonition through reprimand and the temporary withholding of membership rights in the SDP, to expulsion from the association. However, research conducted within the international project ‘Journalism in Change: Professional Journalistic Cultures in Russia, Poland and Sweden’ indicated that more than 70% of Polish journalists do not belong to any journalistic union or association. In particular, the young people surveyed were not affiliated with any types of organizations; the existing structures of professional unions and associations were widely criticized for being politically oriented (Głowacki, 2015). Moreover, in 2012, as a response to the “widespread ignorance by the media of the idea of the public good” six Catholic, right-wing media professionals (including three former members of the Council of Media Ethics) formed their own ethical commission – the Civic Commission of Media Ethics. Szot (2010) considers that the journalistic community in Poland is weak and does not present a united front. In addition to general codes of journalistic conduct, several media organizations and media groups have adopted their own additional ethical standards. In-house professional codes were designed to put the emphasis on ethical issues in relation to news gathering, privacy protection, a need to separate information from opinions and so on. These principles are among the standards adopted by public service television in the Ethical Principles of Journalists in 2006. The Komisja Etyki (KE, Ethical Commission) safeguards the ethical standards of journalists in TVP. The Commission investigates complaints and criticisms from employees and viewers; it can also undertake investigations on its own initiative. Statements raised by the KE can constitute the basis for a journalist’s superior to pose sanctions or to terminate employment. Criticism and opinions related to content in electronic media by the listeners and viewers can be addressed to the regulatory authority – the Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i Telewizji (KRRiT, the National Broadcasting Council). In addition to all the tasks relating to the administration and control of the electronic media market in Poland, the National Broadcasting Council interprets its role as the viewers’ and listeners’ ombudsman. Any complaint about content or advertising can be submitted by members of the public through the KRRiT website. The majority of TV stations (including Polsat, TVN and TVP) also offer the opportunity to submit criticisms and opinions through their own websites. Overall, 42% of the Polish media professionals surveyed in the MediaAcT study considered journalists to not adhere to professional standards and 47% of them agreed that effective selfregulation should include some form of sanction. At the same time, positive attitudes towards media accountability have been observed, mostly in relation to the obligations of the media.The media accountability instruments that are considered to have the most impact on journalism behaviour are editorial guidelines (80% of journalists), laws regulating the media (56% of journalists) and journalism education (49% of journalists) (Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014). Companies’ editorial guidelines were most important for the youngest representatives of the profession. Letters to the editors are still among the most popular traditional instruments of media accountability in Poland. These mechanisms are found in the majority of newspapers and magazines offering news and current affairs (see for instance Gazeta Wyborcza and the local newspapers Polska Gazeta Wrocławska and Dziennik Zachodni). There are several trade journals 193

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monitoring the development of the Polish media market, often offering discussions on ethical issues (for example, Press). With the exception of KRRiT, which provides some services associated with ombudsman-like institutions, readers’ editors have not yet been created within the structures of media organizations.

Innovative instruments of media accountability The Internet has created an opportunity to develop new media accountability instruments and practices in Poland (Lauk and Kuś, 2012, p. 17). All of this has been analyzed in the course of the MediaAcT study and has created a novel perspective for discussions on media developments in the country. However, the contribution of online practices to media accountability and transparency was still regarded as low.This included the lack of development of media blogs, citizens’ and journalists’ websites critically addressing media ethics issues, online documentation of research, podcasts of internal criticism sessions, online ombudsman-like institutions and so on (see for instance Głowacki and Urbaniak, 2011; Kuś, 2011; Heikkilä et al., 2012). Overall, the “potential of innovations, offered by new technologies (especially the Internet) is, at the moment, only partially exploited” (Kuś, 2011, p. 3). Most online media firms publish information about their ownership, but only some of them publish journalists’ profiles (see for instance the websites of the regional branches of Polish Radio). Publications of mission statements or published codes of ethics are still rare (ibid., p. 9). Similarly, publication of the authorship of each story (by-line) and reference to online sources are still not common practice. ‘Portal thinking’ and avoiding publishing external hyperlinks are still widely observed (Heikkilä et al., 2012, p. 52). This phenomenon can explain the relatively slow development of data journalism practices, since data and source transparency are crucial parts of data journalism philosophy. Newsroom blogs are rarely used by Polish media organizations to foster production transparency. Many journalists are active on blogs for their personal use, but they rarely discuss issues related to media accountability and news production (Kuś, 2011, p. 10). Among the most widespread practices are those related to media responsiveness. The most popular forms include social media, which are used to interact with the public (Facebook, the most popular form, Twitter and other microblogs in general). The biggest media organizations, such as Gazeta Wyborcza and public service media, are among the leaders in this respect. Although online media in Poland usually allow comments and frequently moderate them (usually postpublication moderation), they are mostly used for marketing and community-building purposes. Accountability and transparency are a kind of ‘added value’ to community building, not the most important goal in themselves (Kuś, 2011, pp. 11–12). The use of online ombudsmanlike practices and tools for error reporting is not frequent at all (with the exception of Gazeta Wyborcza). This might be explained by financial and organizational limitations; getting involved in the debate on quality in the Polish media might not be regarded as a priority. Generally, when asked for their evaluation of available media accountability instruments, Polish journalists surveyed in the MediaAcT study gave more attention to traditional mechanisms. At the same time, more than 40% of Polish journalists surveyed did not believe that the Internet had increased people’s readiness to call the news media into account. Poland was the only country in the survey where the number of journalists supporting this statement was lower than the number of journalists who did not agree with it (Głowacki, 2013, p. 39). The weakness of online forms of media accountability and transparency seems to be a result of the dominant business model in the Polish media sector, in which media outlets compete in terms of numbers of users rather than quality. This weakness creates important space for initiatives coming from outside the media organizations, such as websites of media accountability 194

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institutions, media journalism websites, academic mediawatch initiatives, civil society groups, media watchblogs and media criticism in social media. However, although one can find some examples of practices generated by citizens (for example, the “Radio Channel 3 listeners movement”, see Kuś, 2011), the number of such initiatives is still much lower than, for example, in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This might be explained by the overall conditions of civil society development and the lack of knowledge about opportunities generated by the online space. Online media accountability, both from the organizational and citizens’ perspective in Poland, is still to be developed.

Other media accountability instruments Education in media and journalism in Poland is not a prerequisite for entering the profession. Journalism courses are taught in 18 public universities; since the social and political transformation of 1989, the educational offer has been extended to private colleges and schools, with courses on journalism and communication within the faculties of either linguistic studies or political and social sciences. The study programmes vary a lot, offering courses on the history of media, the theory of communication, media ethics, public relations, advertising and so on. Several universities offer practical workshops and even the opportunity to get involved in university-based community media, such as students’ radio, magazines and websites (Szot, 2009; Dobek-Ostrowska, 2011a). Journalism education and training are often seen as crucial variables when fostering journalistic professionalization and media accountability (Radu and Popa, 2014, p. 249).The MediaAcT study showed that 62% of Polish journalists surveyed indicated that they had been trained in media ethics during their professional development (Dobek-Ostrowska et al., 2012). At the same time, 54% of them claimed that journalists in the country are inadequately trained. Problems with education were more often observed by professionals at the managerial level (66% of respondents) and journalists from older generations (Głowacki, 2013). Recent studies undertaken within the project “Journalism in Change: Professional Journalistic Cultures in Russia, Poland and Sweden” have shown that, although a significant majority of journalists have a higher education degree (89%), 44% of Polish journalists surveyed did not hold a degree in journalism (Dobek-Ostrowska, Barczyszyn and Michel, 2013; Anikina, Dobek-Ostrowska and Nygren, 2013). Although university courses in journalism might still be attractive to young people, journalism education in Poland faces several difficulties, including a lack of sufficient funding, poor professors’ salaries and outdated study programmes (for other features in Central and Eastern Europe, see Hiebert and Gross, 2003, p. 264). To show the full picture of journalism education in the country would require additional in-depth research, examining the impact of academia and journalism studies on media performance, relations between scholarly institutions and the media industry, and the recruitment requirements of the media enterprises. The salient questions include: Are there any differences between the skills that young people acquire from university training and the professional training given in media outlets? What are the career paths of those who do not find a job in the media after graduating from a school of journalism (Głowacki, 2015)?

Conclusion Analysis of the media accountability and transparency system in Poland cannot be conducted without reference to several pitfalls and limitations. Although a number of traditional offline 195

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instruments and mechanisms supporting the development of journalistic professionalization were introduced 20 years ago, their effectiveness and impact on the quality of journalism in the country might still be regarded as a ‘work in progress’. Journalistic associations in Poland are not popular among representatives of the profession; they are divided in terms of political ideology and do not represent a united front. The diversity of codes of professional conduct and ethical standards could be regarded as a positive feature. However, the variety of mechanisms makes it difficult to indicate which of the codes is the most effective. The Council of Media Ethics, which safeguards principles laid down in the general Charter of Media Ethics, cannot impose sanctions and it has recently been challenged by the activities of the second authority – the Civic Commission of Media Ethics. Although letters to the editor are widespread, no media ombudsman-like institutions have been created by Polish media enterprises. The only available tool in this respect can be found in the activities of the National Broadcasting Council, which give the opportunity for opinions and criticism on the content broadcasted in electronic media. The development of new media and technologies has not yet improved the level of media accountability and transparency. Practices related to media transparency, transparency of news production and media responsiveness online are still being used for marketing and communitybuilding purposes rather than for getting involved in the debate about the quality of journalism in the country. Websites initiated by civil society representatives are rare and many Polish journalists do not believe that the Internet has increased people’s readiness to call news media to account. The overall picture of the media accountability system in Poland is accompanied by the possible limitations in journalism education at the university level. Although the majority of Polish journalists have been trained in media ethics and professionalization, they perceive inadequate training as one of the problems for quality journalism. In common with other European countries, they see economic pressure as the biggest threat to professional development.

Note 1 Independent publications produced and distributed by hand or in other non-professional ways in order to avoid censorship in the Soviet bloc countries.

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25 Portugal Many structures, little accountability Nuno Moutinho, Helena Lima, Suzana Cavaco and Ana Isabel Reis

Abstract The Portuguese media system is shaped by its historical background of nearly 50 years of dictatorship and a dramatic transition period to democracy. Being a small market, there is a tendency to instrumentalization by the elite and a low consumption of news, fitting Hallin and Mancini’s Polarized Pluralist Model. A partisan journalism was put in place during the Revolution of 1974, but by then journalists had also experienced a free press and established an ethical code. The revolutionary period brought considerable instability to newsrooms, media property and news content, but it also brought a press law that granted great powers to journalists. Since then, several accountability instruments have emerged, namely a press council that has evolved to the present regulatory entity of communication. Journalists have witnessed a growing deontological ‘legal regulation’, which is framed by several MAIs. However, the increase in these institutions and codes does not seem to attract great participation from citizens, and journalists’ professional attitudes towards external entities prevail as mistrustful, tending to disregard the opinion of people outside their professional field.

Introduction The Portuguese media system generally fits the Polarized Pluralist Model, defined as a “strong prevalence of partisan media, a tendency to instrumentalization of media by politic and economic elites and their use as tools of bargaining and maneuvering among those elites, frequent state intervention and involvement in the media system, lesser development of journalistic professionalism, lower newspaper circulation and so on” (Hallin and Mancini, 2012b, p. 279). In Portugal, the censorship imposed by the authoritarian regime was the biggest constraint on journalism and media organizations during the 20th century. The Syndicate of Journalists approved the first Deontological Code in 1976, decades after codes of ethics were approved in other European countries (Cavaco, 2012). The number of media accountability instruments (MAIs) increased with democracy. However, if institutions and codes have tended to multiply, there is also a tradition of a lack of records and systemic data. Studies on media accountability in Portugal are scarce and do not take into account the Portuguese media system as such, nor do they consider the recent changes in ownership or the increasing use of the Internet. Recent 197

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studies mainly debate the consequences of these developments on journalism practices, the media organizations response to these changes and the impact on news content (Lima and Reis, 2012; Bastos, Lima and Moutinho, 2012; Bastos, Lima, Moutinho and Reis, 2012).

Journalistic culture and the media system Media models are usually determined by how the political regime interacts with the media system, which depends on whether the regime is democratic or non-democratic. In the Portuguese case, the Revolution of 1974 ended a period of almost 50 years of dictatorship. The revolutionary coup gave way to the so-called On-Going Revolutionary Process (PREC), during which Portugal took the path to socialism. The main financial groups, banks and insurance companies were nationalized, and the media companies that they owned were transferred to state ownership. Most of the newsrooms were controlled by extreme left-wing journalists who turned most of the media into propaganda tools and created new constraints and several forms of censorship. Journalists gained editorial power through the newsroom councils, where they had significant rights, including a veto on the director and hiring and firing new journalists. The struggle for press control was crucial during the PREC, and the occupation by communists of the newspaper República and Renascença, the radio owned by Portugal’s Catholic Church, was the starting point for political change (Lima, 2014c). In the following two decades, the evolution of the media was marked by the historical inheritance of the dictatorship, and also by the particularly turbulent period of the PREC (Lima, 2014b). Between 1976 and 1988, several factors contributed to creating a contradictory environment in terms of the relationship between the media and the political powers, among them the historical background, the media ownership, the illiteracy of the population and the ideology of the journalists. In this period there were two different views on the evolution of journalism corresponding to the private and the public sectors. The latter was dominant and had a dubious relationship with the political powers, since most of the media were supported by the state, which led to forms of political control in newsrooms (Lima, 2014a). The public sector grew tentatively with state support because there was not a tradition of news consumption and thus it was difficult for the press to develop as a business, financed by circulation and advertising. During the 1990s, and with the re-privatization process, news companies and groups emerged, and this period became known as ‘the press decade, for the unfolding of investigative journalism and the real watchdog role assumed by the newspapers. The press law of 1975, which prevailed for a long period, put a focus on the idea of an enlightened citizenship and on the contribution that journalism should make to reporting on political matters.The journalists themselves constructed a self-image of political independence, which was different from the European partisan press and was, and still is, closer to the late 20th century American newspapers that showed no political preferences (Gunthar and Mughan, 2000, p. 11). There are some very particular features of the Portuguese news media that would prohibit its inclusion into the group of the South-Mediterranean countries (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a). Even though it is true that there are many common features relating the history of the Portuguese press to other examples in Southern Europe (Papathanassopoulos, 2007), in recent Portuguese media history, there was a breaking point marked by the revolutionary process with no equal experience in other democratic transitions. Another relevant aspect is the size of the Portuguese nation: with a population of around 10 million, the size of the market and the journalists’ sphere are quite small compared to other Southern European countries. Several media groups own the Portuguese press. Diário de Notícias, launched in 1864, is characterized by a steady audience, thanks to its quality journalism. Its audience is mostly from 198

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Lisbon and the south of Portugal. However, according to the Associação Portuguesa para o Controlo de Tiragem1 (Portuguese Association for Circulation Control – APCT), its circulation has been decreasing and in 2014 was around 20,000.After 1974, it was part of the nationalized media group until the early 1990s, when it was acquired by the Lusomundo Group. Due to a series of acquisitions, it is now part of the Controlinveste Group, one of the larger media groups. Controlinveste is also the owner of the Jornal de Notícias, founded in 1888 in Oporto, which has a strong influence in the north of the country.With a very popular style, during the nationalized period it emerged as the leading daily with a circulation of around 85,000, which had increased to 120,000 by 2005 (Lima, 2012). Since then, its circulation has decreased – in 2014 it was around 85,000, according to the APCT. Apart from newspapers, a sports daily and other specialized and local publications, the group also owns a share of TSF, a news radio station that was launched as a pirate radio station and was eventually legalized, becoming the only news project in this sector. However, the core of Controlinveste is Sport TV, a specialized broadcasting company with four cable channels. Cofina is another of the main media groups and it owns Correio da Manhã, launched in 1979 as the first Portuguese tabloid project, even if it was a soft one. The editorial guidance became more effective and it is now, according to the APCT, the Portuguese daily with the highest circulation (130,000). The group owns other publications, like an economic and a sports newspaper and magazines, and it recently acquired a cable TV network, Correio da Manhã TV (CMTV). Cofina also owns the weekly news magazine Sábado. Público was founded in 1990 and is part of the Sonae Group. It was launched with a clear editorial line of quality journalism. It has a circulation of around 31,000 and its readers are highly educated and aged between 25 and 34 years. Público is mostly read in the urban areas of Lisbon and Oporto. Its online site is the fourth most visited with around nine million visits. The Sonae Group also partly owns Radio Nova, a local station, but notably, this group is not a traditional media owner, but has invested in the sector for financial reasons. Expresso is a weekly newspaper with a circulation of around 95,000, according to the APCT. It had a tradition of taking a political stand against the dictatorship and a long history as a quality paper. Expresso was the original publication that gave way to another media group, Impresa. This group has several specialized publications and a weekly news magazine, Visão, but its core is Sociedade Independente de Comunicação (Independent Communication Company – SIC), the first private TV network, with a main channel, open signal and five cable channels. The other private TV network is Televisão Independente (Independent Television, TVI), with four channels, one an open signal, the others cable. It began broadcasting in 1993 as a Catholic Church channel but was soon sold to Prisa, which owns the Media Capital group. Media Capital is not the largest media group but it is the most diversified in terms of radio,TV, online and print media, though it has never owned a conventional daily paper. It is the largest owner of radio stations, one of which has the highest radio audience. Rádio e Televisão de Portugal (RTP Group), the public service broadcaster (PSB), includes the Radiodifusão Portuguesa (RDP), which includes several radio stations, and the RTP (television network). The RTP Group also owns 50% of Lusa, the Portuguese news agency; private shareholders own the other 50%. Rádio Renascença (RR) is another group in the radio sector.The Portuguese Catholic Church owns the holding r/com, where RR is included and also other radio stations of the group (RFM, Mega Hits, Rádio Sim). Each radio has its own separate web page, linked to the others in the group. On its website, RR distributes a newspaper in pdf format, Página 1, and has a WebTV channel called V+. The Portuguese local and regional press does not have a tradition of keeping accurate records. The Entidade Reguladora de Comunicação (Portuguese Communications Regulatory Authority – 199

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ERC) states that in 2010 there were around 700 newspapers, 18 of them dailies and the great majority monthlies. A 2013 study suggested a significant decrease in the numbers of newspapers, but some have become online projects. However, the ERC does not have precise information on this. The ERC also lacks accurate data on the local and regional radio stations. The last ERC radio report is from 2009, and it states that there were around 300 local stations. In recent years, the media groups have bought many of these small radio stations. For instance, Media Capital alone bought 15 local radio stations.The most important radio group among the local small stations is Luso Canal, which also holds shares in other groups and enterprises, such as TSF.

Established instruments of media accountability Portuguese journalists only established their professional ethics in the last quarter of the 20th century, after the 1974 Revolution, which restored the freedom of the press. However, it was treated as state-induced self-regulation, i.e. as an imposed legal requirement (Camponez, 2011). The 1975 law of the press2 imposed on the informative publications the adoption of the editorial status, which required respect for journalists’ deontology. The law also set a 90-day deadline for the Journalists’ Union to write their own code of ethics. Despite this, the code was only approved in September 1976, even though it repeated much of the code from the 1972 project. In reality, the Journalists’ Deontology Code Project, developed between 1971 and 1972 by a committee appointed by the Journalists’ Union, was in agreement with the supranational codes, but the Union’s general assembly did not vote on this project due to the State censorship regime, which ruled Portugal for nearly half a century (Cavaco, 2013).The current version resulted from the 1993 review. The Statute of Journalists3 converted ethical norms into legal norms in 1999. In the 2007 revision of this statute,4 the legislator further specified deontology and disagreed with the norms regarding professional secrecy established both by journalists in the 1993 Deontology Code and by the business sector (Portuguese Confederation of Mass Media) in the Common Platform for Ethics in Media of 2005. The growing ‘legal regulation’ of deontology and the increasing powers of the co-regulator, the Commission of Certified Professional Journalists (which was established in 1996, with specific functions to sanction the non-compliance of some legal duties) meant “a dilution of powers by the Journalists Union Deontology Council, the main organ of self-regulation of the journalists” (Camponez, 2011, p. 260). In fact, “the Portuguese experience in democracy very often shows some kind of (more or less deliberate) confusion between State regulation and self-regulation, together with some confusion between the legal prescriptions … and ethical concerns” (Fidalgo, 2013, p. 201). A media company with at least five journalists must have a newsroom council, consisting of journalists elected by their peers. The newsroom council may be regarded as a self-regulatory instrument (Fidalgo, 2013), but today most of its activities are merely advisory.This departs from the 1975 law of the press, which established newsroom councils with binding powers, namely the nomination of directors, i.e. the director’s appointment was dependent on a favourable vote from the newsroom council. The Press Council, created by a government initiative in 1975, was tripartite, involving journalists, media owners and external representatives. However, this “independent organ”, funded by the state, had the “unprecedented participation of members of political parties in its composition” (Carvalho, 1986). It was closed down in 1990 following the creation of the High Authority for Mass Media, which was replaced in 2006 by the current ERC – the Regulatory Authority for Mass Media. The ERC’s internal regulatory council has five members, four of 200

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whom are elected by Parliament, and the fifth member (the president) is co-opted by the four elected members. As for the internal codes of conduct in Portuguese media companies, some focus on the journalists’ activities (for example, the daily newspaper Público, the weekly newspaper Expresso and the news magazine Visão), while others are directed at all of the workers in the company (such as the news agency Lusa, the owner of the television station TVI – Prisa and the radio and television public service company RTP).The newspaper Público stands out for making its set of technical and deontological standards “accessible to everyone” in an edition printed in book form. The Público Stylebook, published in 1998 (on the eighth anniversary of the newspaper), intended to “contribute … to the discussion of the future of journalism”, and quickly became a positive reference for Portuguese university courses of journalism and communication. The revised 2005 edition mainly focused on the chapter dedicated to ethical and deontological standards, which resulted from “a broad internal debate” in order to “set even higher standards, stricter behavioural rules, in other words, raise the bar … of excellence” (Público, 2005, p. 9). The ombudsman was introduced in Portugal in the second half of the 1990s. The sports newspaper Record and the daily newspapers Diário de Notícias and Público were pioneers in this regard. The Jornal de Notícias had press ombudsmen between 2001 and 2006. Nowadays, Diário de Notícias, Público and public radio and television have a weekly space for an ombudsman.Their manifestations of dismay are frequent because of the minimal participation of the Portuguese population and the reluctance of newspapers to address their criticisms. The media attention to issues related to mass media has decreased, with the exception of Diário de Notícias and Público, which have four chroniclers besides the ombudsman. Mass media are the target of weekly critics in the popular newspaper Correio da Manhã (Panóptico, since 2011) and at the TV station SIC Notícias (Ponto/Contraponto, since 2009). In 2009, RTP (the public broadcasting corporation) ended its biweekly programme of analysis and debate on journalism, which had been provided free by the Clube dos Jornalistas (Press Club – CJ) since 2004. The CJ has published Jornalismo e Jornalistas ( JJ ), a quarterly magazine about journalism, since 2000.The monthly newsletter Deontology Observatory of Journalism, edited by the Journalists Union Deontology Council, started in 2010 and was discontinued after the seventh issue. On the other hand, scientific production in the field of communication has increased significantly in Portugal in recent years. The first doctoral thesis in communication sciences in Portugal dates back to the early 1990s. Since then, 107 PhD theses have been produced at the New University of Lisbon, 56% of these since 2008. The first journal was launched in 1985 (Revista de Comunicação e Linguagens – the Journal of Communication and Languages) and the second (Comunicação e Sociedade – Communication and Society) in 1999. Of the 16 scientific journals currently published in Portugal (seven in paper format and nine online), more than half appeared after 2004. Nonetheless, the Portuguese journals suffer from “low penetration and international recognition” (Martins, 2012, p. 243). The prestigious Prémios Gazeta de Jornalismo (Gazette Journalism Awards) have been granted annually since 1984 by the CJ.This institution, launched in 1983, has about 800 members. Even though the number of members of the Journalists’ National Union is larger (2,721), the unionization rate has been declining. In 1980 it was over 95% (Correia, 1994), in 2002 it was 62% (Meireles, 2007), and nowadays it is just 45%. We used the MediaAcT field study, designed as a standardized quantitative journalists’ survey, to tackle the question of how journalistic actors perceive the various MAIs and how their interest in this topic might be increased. We applied the same sampling strategy, taking into account media type and journalistic hierarchy, obtaining 147 answers, 3% of the journalists in Portugal 201

Moutinho, Lima, Cavaco and Reis Table 25.1  Respondents of the Portuguese survey of journalistic actors Media

Public news agency (Lusa) Newspapers and magazines Online news media (online-only) Producers Private commercial radio Public service (or state-owned) radio Public service (or state-owned) television Private commercial television Total

Sample

Total

N

%

n

%

8 81 4 2 14 4 15 19 147

5.4 55.1 2.7 1.4 9.5 2.7 10.2 12.9 100.0

274 2,697 125 50 477 120 515 638 4,896

5.6 55.1 2.6 1.0 9.7 2.5 10.5 13.0 100.0

Figure 25.1  Problems concerning journalism in Portugal (in %).

(see Table 25.1). In Portugal, there are 5,685 journalists with a professional card, but only 4,896 give the details of the media organization that they are working for. The results of the questionnaire show that Portuguese journalists think that the most serious problems of the journalistic landscape are “underpaid journalists”, followed by “economic pressures” and “media hypes”. These last two are in line with the countries analysed by MediaAcT, but the first reveals the common perception that wages for journalists in Portugal are the lowest within the EU. Inadequate training and the unethical behaviour of journalists are not considered to be major problems. The perception of a problem (see Figure 25.1) (e.g. “economic pressures” and “media hypes”) is associated with the area within journalism where the journalist usually works. The Mann–Whitney test reveals that journalists in the fields of leisure and economics identify fewer problems with economic pressure, government pressure and media hypes. After performing Kruskal–Wallis tests, the differences between the kinds of media were only statistically significant for the problem of government pressure. Journalists who work in public radio express greater concern about government pressure. 202

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In-house media blog NGOs/Foundations Legal department/media lawyer Print or broadcast satire/comedy about the media Blogs about the media, written by members of the public Viewers’ associations User comments Ombudsman/Readers’ editor Online media criticism by journalist bloggers Regulatory authority Journalism trade journals Media criticism in the news media Academic analysis of journalism Criticism on social media (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) Press council Laws regulating the media Journalism education Professional codes of ethics Company editorial guidelines 0

1

2

3

4

5

Figure 25.2  Impact of MAIs on journalistic behaviour in Portugal.

Another interesting result is that company guidelines, professional codes of ethics and education are viewed to have a strong impact as MAIs, with a mean higher than 3 on the Likert scale (see Figure 25.2). These factors are more normative and show that Portuguese journalists may rationally calculate how much it would personally ‘cost’ them to break the rules of journalism and thus confirm a possible outcome of an economic theory of journalism (Hamilton, 2004; Fengler and Russ-Mohl, 2008). On the other hand, it is interesting to note that company codes have the highest impact. Journalists from Northern and Western European countries involved in the MediaAcT study (the UK, Finland, Germany, Switzerland and Austria) ascribe higher impact to professional codes than to company codes. In contrast, journalists from Southern Europe (France and Italy) and Eastern Europe (Poland and Romania) place much more emphasis on company codes. Spain was an exception, as journalists rate the impact of professional codes higher, maybe as a result of the media self-regulation that has emerged and developed since the Franco regime. In Portugal, the newsroom is the place of excellence to reinforce the rules of journalism.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Accountability instruments in the Portuguese media remain very conservative.The ombudsman figure, in the few cases in which it still exists, certainly has an email address and even a web page, but there is no effective interactivity in terms of the online platform. The online access to these pages is not easy to find, being located at the very bottom of the site or included on the opinion page or the ‘about us’, even on the website of the PSB. Ombudsmen receive the public’s complaints via the web, but they answer using traditional media, either radio, television or print newspapers.The only case where comments on the ombudsman page are allowed is the newspaper Público. There is a particular case, the regional news site Setúbal na Rede, in which the ombudsman is replaced by a group of bloggers. 203

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The media or the political agenda, and not specifically governance matters, are mostly debated by the best-known bloggers. This and the fact that the last journalists’ convention took place in 1998 shows the lack of debate among these professionals. Still, some debates on journalistic issues take place online. The forum Projeto jornalismo e sociedade5 is a platform for professionals and academics to exchange ideas about journalists and it aims to build links between them and with the public. This project was responsible for a series of debates that were held in several cities in Portugal, and it is still active. Other online debate emerged with Facebook. Jornalistas is a closed group, launched by a senior journalist, but involving other journalists as administrators. This group aims to debate journalists’ issues, namely ethics and professional procedures as well as other broader subjects. The lack of online instruments of media governance results from the severe crises that have affected the news media. The newsrooms suffered from layoffs and editorial functions in this matter practically disappeared. Therefore, there is not a friendly policy towards comments, forums or other forms of debate or public participation in editorial content. Most of the news platforms opted to transfer input from the public to the Facebook pages where comments are almost completely ignored (Lima and Reis, 2012). Using the results obtained from the application of the MediaAcT field study to Portugal, we can conclude that traditional accountability instruments still have a much bigger impact than the digital age instruments. Although the majority of Portuguese journalists agreed that the web has increased people’s readiness to call the news media to account (60% of journalists “agreed” or “fully agreed” with this statement, and the overall mean score was 3.95), greater than the MediaAcT countries as a whole (60% and 3.94), the impact attributed to user comments is the lowest of the international sample. Around 5% of Portuguese journalists (none of the MediaAcT countries have less than 10%) said that this instrument has a high or very high impact. Regarding the impact of criticism on social media, this is in line with the mean of the countries considered, around 20%. As expected, the impact attributed to this last issue diminishes with the age and experience of the journalist. The same happens with the impact of ethics codes, as confirmed by the Kruskal–Wallis test. Nevertheless, when asked to consider complaints that had been made against either them or their work, journalists clearly reported that they were being criticized online more than in more traditional ways. The number of journalists who said they were criticized “sometimes”, “frequently” or “often” by the public on social media (52.4%) and on blogs (21.1%) was much What do journalists think about participatory MAIs? “High impact” or “very high impact” ascribed to… (in percent) 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0 Criticism on social media

User comments

Figure 25.3  Impact of participatory MAIs on journalistic behaviour in Portugal.

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higher than that for the ombudsman (11.5%) and the legal department (8.2%) (see Figure 25.3). Furthermore, they reported being “frequently” criticized only on social media. Even though new online and participatory instruments do not yet rival the acceptance of the more traditional instruments, they have already gained relevance as a source of criticism. On the other hand, while 68% of Portuguese journalists were convinced, in theory, that being transparent about journalistic procedures, as well as publishing corrections and apologies, leads to more trust, almost 50% believed that making newsroom processes transparent is not positive. In addition, journalists do not want state intervention. The statement “formal systems of media regulation are open to political abuse” was strongly supported (mean value of 3.49 for Portugal), in line with the MediaAcT mean of 3.62. However, they perceive traditional and online instruments as insufficient as well, since they support the statement “to be effective media self-regulation must include some form of sanctions”. The mean value was 3.41, in line with the mean of 3.36 for all MediaAcT countries.

Other instruments of media accountability At the end of the authoritarian regime, some short journalism courses were available (e.g. one academic year at the Union of Journalists; an academic term at the newspaper Diário Popular) that addressed deontology issues (Cavaco, 2012). The first graduate course in social communication (officially recognized) only appeared in 1979, and the New University of Lisbon sponsored it. In 1985, Portuguese journalists launched the Superior School of Journalism (Oporto), with a plan to combine theoretical knowledge with a practical component.To an extent, the University of Oporto adopted this concept in 2000. A reflection of this is the course’s digital newspaper, JornalismoPortoNet, which is an opportunity for students to develop both theoretical and practical skills. Nowadays, there are 25 courses that confer degrees in this field: communication sciences (14), social communication (7) and journalism (4). However, the media market in Portugal does not absorb the majority of graduates in the professional field of journalism.

Conclusion The status of media accountability in the Portuguese media is strongly shaped by Portugal’s historical background, and also by the way journalists and media companies built codes and normative procedures, particularly after the 1990s, the period of the establishment and development of media groups. The new media companies disregarded the editorial power that journalists previously had (such as newsroom councils) in order to make the media more competitive and bring them under more effective management. In 1974, democracy brought the freedom of the press and released journalists from several constraints. However, democratically elected governments have increasingly enforced regulations, which has also reduced the space for selfregulation. This has often resulted in confusion and ill-defined boundaries (e.g. self-regulation vs. state-imposed regulation). Even though several MAIs have emerged, their general impact is rather modest: relatively few citizens participate and they do not have a great impact on journalists. Exceptions are codes of conduct that are widespread in many media companies, and social networks, as well as the roles of ombudsmen who have ensured the right to an answer for more than two decades. The MediaAcT survey shows that perceptions of Portuguese journalists generally fit the Polarized Pluralist Model of Hallin and Mancini (2004a; 2012a), and the main results are very similar to the Italian case. For example, company codes are perceived as having more impact 205

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than professional codes as MAIs, diverging from the results obtained for Spain. Journalists tend to distrust accountability tools, which may result from confidence in their work as well as the companies’ editorial guidelines. Corporative behaviour, based on the power that journalists used to have and which they built on in the three decades of the democratic period, may also contribute to this explanation. This does not necessarily mean that journalists disregard regulatory procedures, and they also seem to embrace the idea of the new forms of governance allowed by digital media. Nevertheless, there are few emerging forms of accountability, which is due more to the media crises than to journalists’ attitudes. The numbers of staff in newsrooms are much reduced, and they have no means of supporting the digital tools that can deal with complaints from the public, debates or other comments.

Notes 1 http://www.apct.pt/Analise_simples.php 2 Decree-law nr. 85-C/75 February 26th. 3 Law 1/99 of January 13th. 4 Law 64/2007 of November 6th. 5 http://futurojornalismo.org/np4/home.html

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26 Romania Unexpected pressures for accountability Mihai Coman, Daniela-Aurelia Popa and Raluca-Nicoleta Radu

Abstract In 2014, several unexpected social actors made their voices clearly heard, asking for media accountability and transparency in Romania: the justice system, through the National Anticorruption Directorate and the National Agency of Fiscal Administration, and the public, through social networks. Noticeable events started to appear during the summer. These events included judiciary processes related to blackmail money, bribery money, public money, tax money – and jail. All cases are examples of the same problem within the Romanian media: the instrumentalization of newsrooms by politicians and by businesspeople. The process is a continuation of a communist phenomenon: before 1989, each Communist Party in Central and Eastern Europe instrumentalized journalism, using mass media as a propaganda tool. The mechanisms are the same but the ends are slightly different, and they include the creation of private fortunes. Established instruments of media accountability and media-related authorities, like the National Audio-Visual Council, did not challenge this instrumentalization logic in a dramatic manner. Ironically, the National Anticorruption Directorate, the National Agency of Fiscal Administration and the public seem to work better for the Romanian media than the media professionals themselves.

Introduction The interesting news began in March 2014. Dan Diaconescu, the owner and main host of a scandal-based television channel, OTV, was sent to jail for more than five years for blackmailing the mayor of a village. Diaconescu will not be allowed to have contact with the media (as either an owner or TV host) after his time in jail. Before 2014, the National Audio-Visual Council twice withdrew OTV’s license, once for hate speech and the second time for repeated violations of audio-visual law, including using the TV station as a propaganda tool for the People’s Party. Diaconescu used his TV station to make his party come third in the 2012 elections for Parliament. In July 2014, two local media owners were identified as suspects in a number of bribery cases. The National Anticorruption Directorate (DNA) prosecutors showed that Romeo Stavarache, the mayor of Bacău, was using a local TV station and a local newspaper, owned by people close 207

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to him, to receive bribes from businesspeople in the form of advertising contracts (Zuzeac, 2014). The owners of a number of local and central media outlets had used these outlets to sustain one party or another (ActiveWatch, 2014), but this was the first time that news emerged about the media laundering bribe money. Another unexpected piece of news appeared in August 2014.The former owner of the Intact Media Group, Dan Voiculescu, was sent to jail after a trial lasting several years.Voiculescu started as a media owner and businessman and went on to become a politician. As the law does not allow a member of Parliament to be a businessperson, he left the media company in the hands of his daughters.The prosecutors proved that money from transactions to do with state property were used to finance the media company. As a result,Voiculescu was sentenced to ten years in jail and the state started proceedings to recover the money lost in the transactions. For many years, the Intact Media Group served as a currency exchange in negotiations for party coalitions between the Conservative Party of Dan Voiculescu and the main left-wing party, the Social Democrats (Radu, 2011). The end of the trial was the beginning of a complex campaign, run by Antena 3, Intact’s all-news television channel, against the justice system and the politicians who were seen as responsible for the incarceration of Dan Voiculescu. One of the highlights of the campaign was a stroll, as they called it, of the Antena 3 stars, along with a crowd of viewers, around the Presidential Palace in Bucharest. The public reaction to the media campaign was strong. An “Anti-Antena 3” Facebook group, with almost 5,000 members, was formed in January 2015. The pro-Voiculescu campaign was widely discussed and mocked, including a parody with more than 600,000 views on YouTube. The parody, by a group of comedians who host a show on another TV station, was entitled Și eu sunt varan (“I am a varan, too”, referring to the nickname of Dan Voiculescu). Finally, a fourth case involved another media group, formed, among others, by ProTV – a TV station part of Central European Media Enterprises (CME) – and Mediafax, a press agency. For a year, both companies were under intense surveillance by the National Agency of Fiscal Administration (ANAF) and prosecutors. During the authorities’ raids, the former chief executive officer of CME, Adrian Sîrbu, and the prime minister,Victor Ponta, exchanged declarations about negotiations related to media support in elections for fiscal clemency (Ionescu, 2014). It is unclear what really happened between the two. As the year ended, several criminal trials started and Sîrbu was jailed. Just like Voiculescu, Sîrbu was a very powerful figure in the Romanian media. He introduced Western-style television to Romania; built the most important media group, with TV and radio stations, print, online, a press agency and distribution companies, with American financing; and ran, from 2009 to 2014, CME, the most important media group in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), a publicly listed company that included the Time Warner Group among its owners.

Journalistic culture and media system The Romanian media market has undergone radical changes since 2008, mainly due to two factors: first, the economic crisis, which pulled advertising money from the media and resulted in dramatic job cuts, owners’ pressures on newsrooms and, eventually, a sense of journalistic despair; and second, the migration of the public from print and TV to online, for entertainment and, eventually, for news. Newspapers and magazines in Romania have very low audience numbers for a country of about 20 million people.The top seven newspapers have an audience (average number of people reading one issue) of between 93,000, for Ziarul Financiar, an economic daily, and 499,000 for Click, a boulevard newspaper. Since 2008, many newspapers have closed their print editions and moved online. The top seven magazines, of which three are cooking publications and one is a 208

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TV guide, had audiences of between 358,000 and 917,000 per issue in the period November 2013 to May 2015.1 Online audiences are higher. Among the most frequented sites (excluding classified portals and online portals) are the news site of a mainstream television channel, the site of a 24/7 news television channel, the websites of two boulevard newspapers and two websites dedicated to sports.2 They had between 15 and 30 million visits a month in August 2015, that is, between half a million and one million visits a day. In comparison, after the fall of communism at the beginning of the 1990s, the main newspapers had circulation figures of around 1.5 million (Radu, 2011). Actual readership was not researched 25 years ago. The lion’s share of online advertising is probably taken by Facebook, with 8 million accounts in Romania,3 and by Google, with over 95% of the market share of search engines.4 These two statistics validate Cătălin Tolontan (Obae, 2015), who argues that regardless of the small circulation numbers in print, revenues for Internet presences are still only 10% of the aggregate income of a print title. Television stations also have low audience figures. For 2014, the most popular TV station, ProTV, part of CME (which is NASDAQ listed), had an average daily audience of almost 680,000 viewers.5 One of the public TV stations, TVR1, is among the top seven stations, with about 165,000 viewers, representing a market share of 3.8%. Most households own a TV set, but only about 4.5 million people watch TV in Romania daily. The radio stations, with dramatically lower advertising revenues, have a daily audience of 11.5 million, and two stations, one private and one public, reach over 2 million people daily.6 Since 2008, the net market spend has dropped by 42% for the Romanian media, to an estimated €312 million. The Czech Republic, which has half the population of Romania, has an estimated advertising budget that is 4.5 times bigger than Romania’s (Initiative, 2015). TV is considered to be the dominant medium by advertisers, with a 63% share of the national advertising budget, followed by digital (already with a 16% share), print and radio (6% each) and outdoor (9%) (ibid.). If the phenomenon of multiscreen use is added into the discussion, with 30% of people surfing online while watching TV, an increase in the importance of digital media is evident (ibid.). Foreign investors are still present in mass-market TV and online (CME and the Turkish group Dogan), in print and online, for mass-market newspapers and magazines (the Swiss Ringier) and in radio (the French Lagardère). However, there has been a continual withdrawal of foreign investors from the media, leaving the arena to local politicians and business people, and to the religious groups, including the Orthodox Church. Training programmes for journalists and awareness campaigns have also decreased in number, as the international financial supporters of such programmes moved their focus away from the Eastern European region to the emerging democracies in Asia and Africa. Until 1989, journalism was the Communist Party’s political propaganda tool. Now Romania is considered a stable, free-market economy, with laws, norms and values attuned to European and Western democracy models. There are media outlets that are used by their owners as instruments to defend political and economic interests, such as the Voiculescu family’s Intact Group, and several local media companies, owned and controlled by local political and business people (ActiveWatch, 2014). There are media companies that are profit-oriented, such as Pro TV, owned by CME and the Turkish Dogan Media Group. There are also media products that are presented as sustainers of the public interest, as in the case of the public broadcasting media. “Romanian media can be considered following two different patterns: on one hand, the profit-driven pattern, towards which the foreign investors are primarily focused; on the other hand, the influence-driven pattern, towards which most of the local nationwide media players seem primarily being focusing”, says Preoteasa (2011, p. 14). 209

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Under these conditions, several Romanian media owners and media managers with ties to the most prominent media groups (Intact and CME) or with a strong reputation for media scandals (OTV) and corruption (local media groups) have faced criminal charges and have served, or are still serving, time in jail. External institutions involved in media accountability in Romania include civil rights organizations (NGOs), trade unions and employers’ unions. In recent years, the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) (2013, 2014) monitored the associative life of Romanian journalists and concluded that journalists had failed whenever they tried to form a common voice by joining a professional association. Journalists have been reduced to silence by the fear of losing their jobs and the prospect of reduced wages (IREX, 2013, p. 112). The 2014 IREX study (p. 103) states that journalists in Romania are not any better organized this year compared to previous years, and there are no new professional associations to help the community present a common voice. The largest trade union and only organization with a public presence is the Romanian Federation of Journalists MediaSind. The causes of the absence or the non-functioning of a self-regulating media system in Romania (Popa, 2014) are either structural (free access to the profession, the lack of a professional culture, the inactivity of professional organizations) or conjectural (economic factors, informal leaders of editorial boards, employers’ influence). A press council might solve the problem of failing to meet certain standards through individual sanctions, but it would still not solve the systemic problem of the pressure of employers on Romanian newsrooms. Although they are numerous (there are, among others, the Romanian Press Club, the Union of Professional Journalists, the Independent Journalists Association of Romania, a Media Organizations Convention, a Romanian Association of Professionals in the Media and the Romanian Federation of Journalists – MediaSind), Romanian media organizations can be characterized simply by having a low degree of professional representativeness and, as they have achieved little, are almost inactive and invisible in the associative life.The Romanian Press Club is composed, for example, of 24 media companies, one media organization and 20 individual journalists.7 The changes in legislation made the collective work contract inactive in 2014, which included the conscience clause for media workers, one of the biggest achievements of MediaSind.8

Established instruments of media accountability In Romania, we cannot talk about the existence of a press council as a functioning institution. The absence of such an instrument challenges us to bring the reasons for the lack of a press council into the discussion. In a 2013 qualitative study (Popa, 2014), media professionals indicated the lack of people with credibility in the field. Romanian journalists consider that the moral authority, a press council, should be made up of a group of respected journalists alongside members of the public and representatives of various organizations with indisputable reputations, that would always rise in the defence of the field and fix the damage caused to the media landscape in Romania by different external and internal forces. The professionals interviewed thought that such journalists existed in Romania, but that they are not coming together to form a critical mass that would support the implementation of an ethics code. The Romanian Federation of Journalists, MediaSind,9 has its own version of media self-­ regulation, a combination of labour legislation and professional ethics. The system of selfregulation offered by MediaSind consists of a sectorial committee, which is in charge of the 210

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standardization of all occupations in the media domain, and a joint commission, which is in charge of supervising the compliance with the collective labour agreement at the media level and with the code of ethics annexed to the agreement.Throughout its existence, MediaSind has proved to be effective in lobbying the media labour legislation area. The cases brought before MediaSind or ex officio cases are mostly labour litigations related to journalists’ rights of salary and disrespecting of the labour legislation. Since 2014, the collective labour agreement and the attached code of ethics ceased to exist and the federation is working towards negotiating a new collective labour agreement, which would cover media workers and artists. The precondition of operating a press council is the existence of a code of ethics that can be implemented at the national level. The majority of professionals should accept this ethics code, an objective that seems difficult to achieve in Romania. There are two types of ethics codes that we can identify: professional ethics codes issued by journalists’ unions and associations, and organizational codes of practice issued by media outlets. Regarding the first, all initiatives for media self-regulation, coming from professional organizations, have resulted in the development of codes of ethics formally adopted by different organizations, such as the Unique Code of Ethics, adopted in 2009 by the Convention of Media Organizations, the Code of Ethics adopted by the Romanian Press Club, and the Code of Ethics adopted by the Professional Journalists’ Union from Romania, but there have not been any practical results. While there are several codes of ethics for the media in Romania, most do not have implementation mechanisms, and self-regulation is virtually non-existent. Romanian journalists believe that the guidance of a professional activity according to a code of ethics is outdated and it is considered to be a form of editorial censorship (IREX, 2013, p. 105). Regarding the codes of practice issued directly by media outlets, these are applied less, as they are not constantly discussed or referred to in the newsrooms. In public radio, for example, journalists barely know that an internal code exists, let alone how it should be applied (Olaru, 2011). The media ombudsman function has only been tested in the public media, where the law requires it. There is an ombudsman’s office in the public Romanian Television (TVR), subordinated to the Ethics and Arbitrage Commission, composed of representatives of journalists, of the board of directors and of the president – the director general of TVR. The Ethics and Arbitrage Commission is responsible for the implementation of the Journalists’ Status, the internal code of practice in TVR. Journalists consider that private media companies do not hire ombudsmen due to limited financial resources in the newsrooms and the impossibility of finding the right people who will be credible in the job (Popa, 2014). Editors or media managers often fulfil the function, acting as an interface between newsrooms, sources and the general public. Media criticism in Romania is limited to a few media blogs where journalists, especially freelancers, give their opinions on professional issues and about their peers’ performance. The texts on these sites range from journalism about media (paginademedia.ro) to opinions on media developments (comanescu.ro, tolo.ro). These criticism platforms might be a starting point, acting as innovative accountability vehicles, reviving accountability themes and helping with the professionalization process.

Innovative instruments of media accountability In Romania, as in the rest of CEE, international funds for NGOs have supported a plethora of online guides for journalists, legislative compendiums and case studies, ranging from hate speech to work relationships. Two of the most prolific organizations in Romania, in this regard, are ActiveWatch and the Center for Independent Journalism. Using these guides and implement211

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ing the norms and values presented is difficult, and very difficult in some newsrooms, especially after 2008. The financial crisis pressured several good journalists to leave mainstream newsrooms and start entrepreneurial ventures. Some of these ventures are media-critical websites (paginademedia. ro, reportervirtual.ro, radardemedia.ro). Other journalists started ventures on types of journalism: investigative reporting (The Center for Media Investigations, Rise Project), narrative reporting (casajurnalistului.ro, Decât o revistă, totb.ro) and journalistic analyses (dela0.ro, Curs de guvernare). International ventures of this kind have entered the Romanian market – vice.com being an example.These journalistic projects set a new standard for information and opinion production. The journalists support themselves mostly through international and national journalistic grants and awards – and from subscriptions. Superscrieri (Superwritings), a series of highly prestigious national prizes, started a few years ago as an entrepreneurial venture from the public relations area. All of these projects have an online presence, both as sites and on social media, just like mainstream journalism, and they contribute to raising media literacy among the younger generation. The number of followers on Facebook ranges from 500 (for Superscrieri) to 78,000 (for Decât o revistă) – indicating that they do contribute to redefining media understanding and consumption by the public. While the activities of NGOs defending civic rights are more than a decade old and have been researched (see, for example, Dakova et al., 2000; Radu, 2011), the Romanian entrepreneurial phenomenon is novel and has not yet been systematically analysed. Social media (mainly Facebook) and users’ comments on media sites gave a voice to ordinary members of the public – who are, sometimes, specialists interested in a field the media happens to cover – and let them ask journalists and their sources to show public responsibility. An exemplary case was the dispute on vaccines, which emerged as a subject within the larger theme of holistic healing and the refusal of medical support. The anti-vaccine groups have a strong voice online (through websites, blogs and Facebook pages) and charismatic leaders, like the former TV presenter Olivia Steer. The mainstream media, mainly in healthy food and holistic healing articles, covered their anti-vaccine positions. One of the reactions to this online presence and media coverage is a Facebook community called ‘Stop Olivia Steer’, kept alive by medical students, who discuss affirmations on illnesses and healing using medical data. ‘Stop Olivia Steer’ is an example of the pro-vaccines movement that led, in 2015, to the drafting of a law project that imposes a minimal scheme of vaccines for all children who do not have a medical counter-recommendation in this regard. This law project includes the obligation for medical personnel to present only scientifically proven information on vaccines to the media and to parents (Mixich, 2015).

Other media accountability instruments The fall of communism brought forth not only democracy, free markets and a cultural revival, but also a boom in the academic field of journalism. In the beginning, such processes were the result of various campaigns for implementing the educational models of the West. These campaigns were mainly focused on a) creating local branches of the most important foreign institutions, like the BBC school or doctoral programmes sponsored by Agence Universitaire Francophone; b) supporting local faculties via professors or professional trainers to teach various topics (usually for a short period of time) or to counsel the new institutions (the ‘parachute trainer’ syndrome); c) in-service updating training for permanent faculty staff (by means of teaching observation activities, registering for a master’s or doctoral degree programme, or applying for research grants) at Western universities; d) resource transfer such as book and equip212

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ment donations, access to information systems and financial donations; and e) creating and financing inter-university exchange programmes (Tempus, Erasmus and Socrates in Europe, and the United States Information Agency, Fulbright and the Knight Foundations from the USA). These efforts were aimed at bringing academic activities up to Western standards and, thus, at supporting the process of creating a professional, fair and ethical new national journalistic elite (Coman, 2007; Gross, 2002; Hiebert and Gross, 2003). The second trend came about as a result of the defensive reactions of the existing faculty staff.With only a few exceptions, they tried to maintain and legitimize the teaching content and techniques that they were used to in order to maintain and strengthen their academic status, which was threatened by the new professional vocabulary, new curricula, new teaching methods and by the young ‘wolves’ who were penetrating the system. A consequence of this process was academic imposture – dozens of faculty staff from humanistic programmes that were left without students were suddenly turned into journalism professors. There were many cases of staff who, according to the curriculum, appeared to teach journalism courses, but who had not actually changed their profile: they only disguised it by changing its name, offering their old familiar courses of linguistics, style, history of the Romanian language, sociology, history of the literary press, philosophy and information technology, under the label of a journalism course. Most of these structures had some fundamental weaknesses: vocational journalism courses were poorly represented compared to the other complementary disciplines; laboratories were poorly equipped, lacking modern equipment for training in radio, television, layout and photojournalism. The curricula and syllabuses were inadequate both scientifically and pedagogically; there was no specialized bibliography and the libraries lacked the basic foreign books and manuals in the field, and the faculties were unprepared for modern journalistic education. The consequence was that the subject domain became vulnerable to attacks and colonization tendencies from older subject domains such as philology, social, political and economic sciences – not to mention the negative reaction of the profession, always ready to condemn academia for its tendency to promote theoretical courses, not vocational ones. Many of the 20 accredited bachelor programmes in journalism do not provide a strong basis for future journalists. In addition, several of the newsrooms that seem to be adrift, due to economic and political pressures, do not offer the right environment for future careers to blossom. Two recent surveys of journalists shed light on their attitudes and opinions on self-regulation at the professional and newsroom level. Newsroom guidelines seem to be very important to Romanian journalists. In the MediaAcT survey of 14 countries in Europe and the Arab World (Fengler et al., 2014), the Romanian journalists identified company editorial guidelines as the most influential factor in newsrooms (mean 4.19 out of 5), followed, a long way behind, by laws regulating the media (3.17), journalism education (3.09) and professional codes of ethics (2.83). Yet more than half of the Romanian sample had a bachelor’s or master’s degree in journalism, and almost three-quarters were trained in journalism ethics. Another survey, carried out on a sample of 508 respondents in 2009 by IMAS for the Center for Independent Journalism and Active Watch, pointed in the same direction. Romanian journalists did not identify self-regulating mechanisms as an efficient solution for professional issues. Instead, in the IMAS 2009 survey, 70% of journalists agreed that a media law would improve journalistic conduct. In the same survey, journalists said that the most important professional values were correctness (83%), impartiality (69%) and public interest (68%). These values are often quoted for their normative weight. Only a quarter of the respondents quoted reflecting society in its diversity (26%), and less for respecting private life (16%), as journalistic values they cherish – a possible effect of commercialization of the newsrooms. 213

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In the IMAS survey, journalists were asked to identify the norms most difficult to follow. Of the sample of 508, 43% talked about triangulation of sources, 36% about respecting private life, 33% about presenting all relevant parties in an issue, 31% about rectifying errors and only 15% about granting the right to reply. These answers may be linked to the pressures that newsrooms have been under from owners and managers: the triangulation of sources is difficult, if the media product is used as a business or political weapon.Also, respecting private life is difficult in a commercially oriented newsroom. Sensitive to the increased interactivity and to the appetite of the public and of other stakeholders for more information, the great majority of the journalists included in the MediaAcT sample agreed that news outlets should publish a code of practice (mean 4.37 out of 5), disclose ownership and the company’s business or political affiliations (if any) (4.28) and provide a contact for complaints about content (4.10). What is surprising is that journalists would engage in time-consuming, reactive activities, like direct communication with the public, and would accept professional outsiders, like politicians, to regulate their practices and impose sanctions for deviant behaviour. They support punctual, proactive gestures, such as ownership disclosure or the publication of a code of practice, but do not support a proactive transparency process, which involves the representatives of the newsroom, like an ombudsman, explaining the information gathering and presenting processes.

Conclusion The transition period in Romania, as well as in other CEE states, was long and hard to cope with. The economic and financial crises, from 2008 on, have increased the pressures on newsrooms, making the effects of media instrumentalization an everyday reality. A functioning media accountability infrastructure, comprising media organizations, professional codes of ethics, internal codes of practice, press councils and ombudsmen, does not exist. Media criticism is available online, but has little effect. Journalism schools do not seem to have made their mark in the process of media professionalization.The few academic centres offering high-quality journalism degrees, the most prominent of which are at the state universities in Bucharest, IaȘi and Cluj, cannot counteract the more than 15 academic programmes that issue bachelor’s and master’s degrees in journalism for little professional knowledge and skills. In this context, strong pressures for accountability and transparency came from two unexpected sources: the National Anticorruption Directorate and the National Agency of Fiscal Administration on the one hand, and the public on the other. The prosecutors and the fiscal inspectors were not targeting journalists per se, but the media owners and media managers who used newsrooms to defend their political and economic interests. The Internet has allowed the public’s voice to become more articulate and more clearly heard. Confronted with financial difficulties, including insolvency, and seeing their owners or their managers in jail, newsrooms will be forced to temper their campaigns in sustaining political or economic interests and turn to the public in order to survive. It is not clear, at this point, what is happening in the newsrooms and how things will evolve. It is not clear how many newsrooms will survive and how many journalists will remain without turning into journalist-entrepreneurs or leaving the profession altogether.What is clear is that the present state is a good opportunity for researchers in institutional change and in media accountability – an opportunity not to be missed.

Notes 1 According to the Romanian Bureau of Audited Circulation (BRAT). 2 See www.sati.ro, a BRAT branch for auditing traffic on the Internet.

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According to facebrands.ro, a site with measurements of Facebook activities in Romania. According to statsmonkeys.com. Official TV audiences, see www.arma.org.ro, Indici anuali de audiență (Annual audience indices). Official radio audience for April–August 2015, according to http://www.audienta-radio.ro, Rezultatele studiului de audienţă radio.Valul de vară 2015 (The results of the radio audience study, summer 2015). 7 See http://clubulromandepresa.ro/?page_id=16, the official site of the Romanian Press Club. 8 See http://www.mediasind.ro/drepturi-jurnalisti, the official site of MediaSind. 9 MediaSind’s official website: http://www.mediasind.ro

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27 Russia Media accountability to the public or the state? Elena Vartanova and Maria Lukina

Abstract There are many generally accepted mechanisms of mass media accountability to the public in Russia. The Public Board on Complaints About Mass Media (equivalent to media councils in European countries), professional codes of ethics, media criticism in the printed press and through radio channels, a number of professional journals, online instruments encouraging openness and involving the public, the online ombudsmen and a developed network of higher educational institutions training new professionals in the sphere of journalism, as well as other accountability mechanisms, generally comply with worldwide practices. However, the specific characteristics of the Russian media system – described by researchers as a state-and-commercial hybrid – have a strong impact on the infrastructure of media accountability in Russia, resulting in typical features and weaknesses.

Introduction This paper summarizes the state of media accountability instruments in Russia – a country in which the media model differs substantially from Western European models and, in the context of the Hallin-Mancini paradigm, is characterized by “the statist commercialized nature” (Vartanova, 2012, pp. 139–142). The Russian media system and journalistic culture are described here using evaluations of the results of several media studies as well as open source data and statistics published annually by the Ministry of Telecoms and Mass Communications of the Russian Federation. The Russian Constitution and Press Law grant freedom and independence to journalists, and the journalists uphold the main professional values. However, they still feel dependent on the state and owners and these two aspects of journalistic culture feature in media accountability instruments. This chapter aims to portray the actual state of the accountability instruments that are adapted to media reality in Russia.

Journalistic culture and media system Russia’s media model differs from the main models described by Hallin and Mancini (2004a) in a key crucial dimension: a strong relationship between the media, journalists and the state (Vartanova, 2012, p. 141). 216

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In the last 20 years, the Russian media landscape and journalistic culture have radically changed after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The Communist Party press and the broadcasting system that emerged in 1917 was replaced in the mid-1990s by a segmented media market that has introduced substantial changes into media structures, audiences’ demands and patterns of media consumption. One of the core characteristics is the continuing conservation of the strong role of the state in the media system. Quite a lot of media companies are controlled by the state in terms of ownership. Direct and indirect financing by the state also plays an important role, especially at the local and regional level. Several media companies of national importance lead the media market today, including the state broadcaster Vserossiyskaya gosudarstvennaya televizionnaya i radioveshchatelnaya kompaniya (the All-Russia State Television and Radio Broadcasting Company, VGTRK), Gazprom Media, a company with state and private ownership, as well as the purely commercial organizations ProfMedia and the National Media Group (NMG). Apart from VGTRK, the latter three operate in various segments of the media business – press, broadcasting and online (Vartanova and Smirnov, 2010, p. 25). Statistics published annually by the Federal Agency for Press and Mass Communication indicate that in 2014 the Russian media landscape consisted of more than 80,000 registered media outlets, including 58,900 print and 29,570 audio-visual media. As in other parts of the world, the main trends of daily newspapers are declining circulations, reduction of advertising revenues, loss of young readers and, as a result, staff cuts (FAPMC, 2014a, pp. 8–9). It is also generally assessed as a stagnant market with almost permanent national leaders – Argumenty i Facty, Rossijskaya Gazeta, Kommersant, Vedomosti and Izvestia (FAPMC, 2014a, p. 47). Local press markets feel more turbulent, though they are supported by state donations or investments from local businesses that make them politically and economically quite vulnerable as well. The magazine sector is in a better situation: circulations are not falling so rapidly, though advertising revenues for monthly magazines and weeklies are slowly decreasing.The major direction of development in the magazine sector has changed from the boom of lifestyle glossies to a rise in the popularity of cheaper publications containing practical information for everyday life – food, health, gardens, houses, travel, etc. (FAPMC, 2014a, p. 49). Television still plays a key role in the Russian media system – a diverse system of on-air, cable and web broadband, analogue and digital, central and regional, free and paid, general and special interest, mass and niche, state and private channels. In 2013, more than 40 channels were within the reach of an average single urban household (FAPMC, 2014c, p. 55). These channels can be divided into three main groups: national channels of general interest – Pervyj kanal (Channel One), Rossiya 1 (Russia 1) and NTV; the main network channels (STS, TNT, REN TV); and channels focusing on special topics or niches (Kultura, Sport, MTV, Karusel, etc.). Television remains the main source of news for a large audience, regardless of place of residence, social status or level of education. However, its development is associated with transformations to multiscreen, non-linear, interactive media consumption and a shrinking young audience (FAPMC, 2014c, p. 5). Entertainment is the dominant content of Russian television – movies, soap operas, comedy programmes and talk and reality shows dominate the programme structure, with two-thirds of the broadcasting time for the mainstream channels, while news programmes have a market share of only 11% and political programmes even less. Radio broadcasting in Russia is developing with a comparatively positive dynamic. As in other media sectors, ownership of radio stations is either state or private, and the key players are the state-owned channels with news and music content (Radio Rossii, Mayak). Music channels (Russkoje Radio, Dorozhnoe Radio, Avtoradio, Europa+, Retro FM, etc.) are their main competitors, though focused on different audience clusters. Most of them use FM frequencies that limit the 217

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distribution to a single place or a small city (Radio Broadcasting in Russia, 2014, p. 58). A few radio broadcasters offer a talk-radio format; these include the traditionally popular Echo Moskvy and its recent rivals RSN or Komsomolskaya Pravda. TV and radio broadcasting in Russia is undergoing a transition to a digital platform. The penetration of digital TV and radio into local markets and overseas and remote territories, where the concentration of the population is very low, is supported by the Federal Programme ‘Developments of Digital TV and Radio in 2009–2015’. By the end of 2013, the construction of the first digital complex of ten television channels was completed; the second one with the next ten channels is on the way (FAPMC, 2014c, p. 9). Though TV ranks first in terms of news consumption for the great majority of the Russian population, the web and new media already occupy second place, and it seems that social networks are now competing with the print and radio sectors as popular news sources. As with everywhere in the world, the online media, the fastest developing sector, is growing by 20–30% each year (FAPMC, 2014b, p. 83), and in 2012 the Russian online advertising market was the fourth largest in Europe (FAPMC, 2014b, p. 75). Internet-based media can be divided into three main groups – professional publishers, webversions of offline media and social media with user-generated content (UGC). Convergent platforms affect traditional media practices and force them towards integration, convergent solutions, interaction with audiences and alternative agenda settings (Gazeta.ru, Lenta.ru, etc.). There are no exact data on the number of journalists in Russia. In the mid-2000s, the Russian Union of Journalists calculated that about 150,000 journalists were employed in the media industry (Anikina, Dobek-Ostrowska, Hök and Nygren, 2012, p. 21). More detailed characteristics of the post-Soviet journalism community are revealed in several large-scale surveys (Kolesnik, Shiryaeva and Svitich, 1995; Pasti, 2004, 2009; Anikina, Dobek-Ostrowska, Hök and Nygren, 2012; Anikina, 2014;Vartanova and Lukina, 2014). Findings on demographic characteristics show that although journalism was a masculine profession during the Soviet times, nowadays – as in the whole world – there is an increasing number of women working in journalism. Recent research suggests that “the profession is evidently becoming a female one”, with a share of 70% women in the younger groups (Anikina, 2014, p. 238). Journalists in Russia are also generally younger now: about 70% are under 35 years old, 23% are between 35 and 50 and only 7% are over 51 years old. The Worlds of Journalism survey describes Russian journalists as “young professionals”, because, in a significant number of cases, they have less than ten years of professional experience (Anikina, Dobek-Ostrowska, Hök and Nygren, 2012, p. 25). Despite their young age, these “young professionals” are well educated – 95% of them have university or other higher education degrees. Journalism culture in Russia has also gone through major changes.The Russian Constitution and the Press Law adopted in 1991 granted press freedom and guaranteed media independence. However, the Russian media only enjoyed total freedom within the so-called decade-long journalism ‘golden age’ of the 1990s. From the early 2000s, because of the developments of market relations and the strengthening of the state, the media have become increasingly dependent on powerful authorities and businesses. Though journalism practices, in general, have moved from serving a propaganda function to more professional values, the Press Freedom Index ranked Russia at 148 points in 2014 (Reporters Without Borders, 2014). It is interesting to trace the development of the verdicts of the experts on how they perceive the professional characteristics of Russian journalists: in the early 2000s, some researchers saw them through the prism of two types of professional subcultures (Juskevits, 2002, p. 191). The first one consisted of the old generation who entered the profession in the Soviet time, among them ‘propagandists’ and ‘organizers’ emerging from the 218

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close alliance of the media with local authorities, economic or political groups.The second type was the journalist as entertainer – young journalists especially willingly adopted this role (ibid., p. 194). Other researchers affirmed that when ranking professional values, Russian journalists rated freedom and professional independence most highly. The lack of satisfaction of Russian journalists with their jobs can probably be traced back to the pressures coming from the state, press owners and business (Svitich and Shiryaeva, 2006, pp. 285–288). Current research shows that Russian journalists adopted several principles of Western journalistic cultures, and objectivity and impartiality became the main professional standards (Anikina, 2014, p. 244). Autonomy was considered to be one of the main professional features of journalists, and researchers conclude that “Russian journalists feel themselves independent in the main aspects of daily work, such aspects as the selection of stories (69.2% of respondents feel free to define the angle to present the story), the stories’ coverage and managing personal working time” (Anikina, 2014, p. 247). The same survey stated that Russian journalists do not consider themselves to be fully multi-skilled. On average, each journalist works for 1.5 platforms, that is print, TV, radio or an online medium (Anikina, 2014, p. 241).

Established instruments of media accountability Russia has all the classic tools of self-regulation, such as ethical codes, both at the professional and organizational level, and media criticism, as well as the newly created online ombudsman institution. There are also a number of innovative tools relating to the web and social networks, which will be discussed below. The press council is the most important tool for media accountability. It has developed gradually in the post-Soviet era and, during its 20-year history, has changed from having a direct connection to the state court system, through a body belonging to a professional corporation, to a public-collegiate institution, which is in line with the generally accepted idea of what a press council should be. The first predecessor of the press council was the Arbitration Court of Information, created in 1993 by President Boris Yeltsin to provide equal information guarantees to the participants in the 1993 presidential elections. It was the first election campaign in Russia that took place in a context of political pluralism. Researchers note that the experience of the Arbitration Court was unique, and there exists no such body with comparable jurisdiction and power in any country in the world (Rivina, 2013). During the two months of its existence, the Arbitration Court of Information considered 157 complaints and appeals, mainly related to media coverage of the election campaign and the distribution of on-air time to different political parties on TV (ibid.). Following the post-election dissolution of the Arbitration Court, the Chamber of Appeals on Information Disputes was founded in the same year. It is noteworthy that this organization was created by a decree of the president of Russia (at the time, Boris Yeltsin) and was also part of the judicial system of the country. The founder of the Chamber of Appeals, the wellknown law professor A. Vengerov, described its activities as “organized in the framework of the Presidential Administration quasi-judicial board resolving information disputes both according to law and journalistic ethics” (cited in Rivina, 2013). The Chamber, which consisted of seven people, included lawyers, representatives of the academic community and respected journalists. Table 27.1 summarizes the types of appeals as described by the media lawyer Mikhail Fedotov. Due to its activities, the Chamber of Appeals turned out to be an important organ for regulating the activities of the media and journalists from 1993 to 2000. However, it was not a body of media self-regulation in the strict sense of the word. It was subordinated to the president of the country, as, for the media and journalists brought up in the Soviet era, obedience to 219

Elena Vartanova and Maria Lukina Table 27.1  Classification of appeals in the Russian Chamber of Appeals Groups of appeals

Number of appeals

Abuse of media freedom (by media, journalists and private persons) Protection of honour, dignity and business reputation Violation of the right of access to information Conflicts of media institutions with federal and regional authorities Conflicts arising out of violations of election laws

81 48 47 48 76

Source: http://www.presscouncil.ru

a­ uthority was an important deterrent. In general, the Chamber of Appeals was a typical organization of media regulation: it was created by a regulatory legal act, was subordinate to a state institution (the president), regularly reported on its work to the state, was funded by the state and its members were appointed by the president. At the same time, the Chamber of Appeals, although associated with the top officials, functioned without its own staff, premises or administrative support. The Chamber did not have its own enforcement mechanism, but at its suggestion, such mechanisms could be initiated. For example, the Chamber had the right to apply to a court, to send the case to the prosecutor’s office, etc. The decisions of the Chamber of Appeals were openly discussed and published in the government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta. Such a dual position, unsupported by legal status, led to decisions often not being implemented. The Chamber of Appeals on Information Disputes was abolished in 2000 during the formation of the new administration of the president of the Russian Federation,Vladimir Putin. From 1998 to 2005, the Grand Jury, established by the Union of Journalists of Russia and included in its structure, served in a self-regulatory role inside a corporation. It considered conflicts belonging solely to the ethical sphere. However, the Grand Jury did not limit the trial of cases to those involving only members of the Union of Journalists, but required written acceptance of its jurisdiction and authority from both sides of the conflict. Since the Grand Jury was a body of internal corporation control, it was composed of well-known journalists, publishers and representatives of the community, mainly from academia. The Grand Jury included some members of the Chamber of Appeals on Information Disputes after its dissolution, suggesting continuity in the work of these two bodies of media accountability. During its existence, the Grand Jury considered over 45 complaints. In the summer of 2005, it was reorganized with the creation of an overarching media self-regulatory organization, the Public Board on Press Complaints. The Public Board on Press Complaints1 is the Russian version of a press council. It was formed in 2005 through the efforts of members of the Grand Jury. This was a deliberate step towards the creation of a self-regulating organization, recognized throughout the world. The Public Board is formed outside the frames of individual professional associations, and thus is not associated with a particular part of the journalistic community. The board is divided into two chambers – the chamber of the media community and the chamber of the media audience.The first includes journalists, editors, publishers, broadcasters etc.; specialists in advertising and public relations may also be members. The chamber of the media audience is composed of representatives of various organizations operating outside the sphere of the media: political parties, trade unions and religious and other commercial organizations, as well as non-profit organizations, the Public Chamber of the Russian Federation, the Council of Judges of the Russian Federation and other professional bodies (Fedotov, 2009, p. 154). Both chambers include representatives from universities and researchers in the field of the mass media. 220

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The inclusion of political parties in the chamber of the media audience contradicts the established rules of journalistic self-regulation.The same applies to the presence of judges.While judges are members in a few Northern European press councils (e.g. Sweden, Denmark and Estonia), their number is very limited – no more than two, and their activities are administrative. In the Russian case, the judges may have a significant impact on the decision-making board that is unacceptable within journalistic self-regulation. Also, government officials are included in the chamber of the media community, and this largely reflects the situation typical for Russia, where a combination of a journalistic and political career is considered normal and generally accepted by society. The members of the Public Board are nominated by different public organizations that have expressed a desire to participate in the activities of the press council. The Charter of the Public Board specifies the scope of its activities: conflicts in the media of an ethical or moral nature, as well as disputes involving issues of human rights in the media. In its decision-making process, the Public Board often refers to the norms of law. The statistics for 2005–2009 show that it referred to the norms of legislation in its decisions 25 times, while there were 28 references to codes of professional ethics, which is almost half of all the cases tried during this period (Samylkina, 2010). This is an alarming result for a media self-regulation organization, which, by its nature, should work according to the ethical principles of the profession, but not to the norms of law. The Board operates on a continuous basis without any budget and on a voluntary basis, which is unique. Also, it does not have the opportunity to obtain financing from its members, or to apply for grants in order to avoid conflicts of interest. The largest number of cases examined by the Public Board are cases of inaccuracy, errors or incompleteness of information in the media coverage. Second are cases of discrimination on various grounds (national, religious), as well as lack of respect for the honour and dignity of citizens. The number of disputes on violations related to the intrusion of the media in privacy is much lower than in Western European countries. The researchers explain this by a lack of respect for the audience among Russian media as well as a weak civil society, whose representatives are not yet ready to defend their right to privacy (Mamontova, 2012).

Ethical codes of journalists In Russia, the ‘Code of Professional Ethics of the Russian Journalist’ was adopted in 1994, at the Congress of Journalists of Russia. In the same year, Moscow journalists adopted ‘The Moscow Charter of Journalists’. The principles of both documents are based on similar international documents – like the International Declaration of Principles on the Conduct of Journalists (1954) and the International Principles of Professional Ethics of Journalists (1983). The Charter of Broadcasters ‘Against violence and cruelty’, signed by the executives of six national TV channels (2005), is an extra ethical set of rules for radio and television journalists and is also based on generally accepted standards of journalistic ethics. The basic ethical principles that Russian journalists should act in accordance with can be briefly stated in the following points: compliance with the laws of the country and journalistic autonomy; dissemination of reliable, complete and accurate information; rejection of concealment, misrepresentation or dissemination of false information; rejection of remuneration and fees from third parties; separation of facts and opinions; protection of confidential information; respect of people’s honour and dignity; civil rights on any grounds, including sex, race, language, religion, political opinion, social or national origin; presumption of innocence; incompatibility with holding positions in government, and the governing bodies of political parties and other organiza221

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tions of political orientation; refusal to take up arms; not combining journalistic and advertising activities; respect for the rights of colleagues; observance of the laws of fair competition; respect for copyright; rejection of plagiarism; correct citation; the right to refuse an assignment if it is connected with a violation of one of the above-mentioned principles; and the right to defence in court against violence or threats of violence, harassment, moral damages or defamation. Unfortunately, these ethical rules, though matching global standards, are often not implemented in professional journalistic routines and practices in Russia. For example, journalists frequently hold positions in the government, or combine their services with advertising and public relations activities, and media content lacks references to sources and contains unfair citations. Surveys suggest that Russian journalists do not regard ethical standards as the main ‘constraints’ on their work; more often they point to the constraining role of government, authorities, the audience or the specific character of their media outlet (Pasti, 2012, p. 31). However, in recent years, in addition to these codes of ethics, corporate regulations have been developed by individual media organizations for their employees. Such normative documents, i.e. news standards and style guides, were developed in the national news agencies (TASS, Interfax, RBC, etc.), in the major newspapers (Kommersant, Vedomosti, etc.) and in other media. Radio Echo Moskvy in 2014 adopted a special supplement to its statute emphasizing principles for dealing with social media.

Media criticism Media criticism as a tool for accountability is represented in Russia mainly by TV criticism due to the popularity of television. There are many TV critics with well-known names, and there is a ‘Media’ section in almost every serious publication. To name just a few, Rossiyskaya Gazeta (Yuri Bogomolov), Novaya Gazeta (Irina Petrovskaya), Echo of Moscow (Ksenia Larina and Irina Petrovskaya), the independent critic Arina Borodina and others all have columns on a regular basis on media pages or programmes. TV criticism in Russia is considered to be an intellectual activity, and the authors belong to a narrow circle of the journalistic elite. The Novaya Gazeta columnist Irina Petrovskaya considers that “a true television critic follows not the interests of TV personnel, but it represents the interests of society” (Petrovskaya, 2003, p. 44). However, there are only a few critical columns devoted to mainstream media other than TV. The only exceptions are publications related to media business. It should be noted that in Russia satirical journalism, including satirical media criticism, is not a developed segment. Press criticism is sometimes represented in the cartoons, but this is the exception rather than the rule. However, there are several professional magazines devoted to media, communications and journalism.The magazines Journalist, Journalism and Media Market and Novosti SMI, in both paper and electronic form, are important tools of self-control for the professional community.

Innovative instruments of media accountability The development of the web and social media platforms certainly enhanced the accountability of the Russian media and journalism to the public, and influenced the level of media transparency. Following the typology by Domingo and Heikkilä (2012), innovative tools of media accountability in Russia can be found in all major categories: 1

Transparency in mission statements, professional principles and rules of work (e.g. TASS and RIA open source publications in ‘About Us’ and brand pages, RBC chief editor Elizaveta Osetinskaya’s Facebook public post statement,2 etc.). 222

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2

3

4

5

Transparency instruments with regard to the production processes in the newsroom (magazines Russian Reporter and Journalist, radio Silver Rain invites readers for a tour of the office, the TV channel Rain broadcasts its planning meetings live, etc.). Improving the quality of public dialogue with users (profiles of media and journalists on the social networks Facebook,VKontakte and Twitter) and transparency of journalism subjects (e.g. the Facebook account of the special correspondent for Kommersant Andrey Kolesnikov3). Publication of UGC, as an alternative to the mainstream media (comments and audience representatives on the editorial work; individual blogs are used in almost all large and local publications, e.g. blogs on Echo of Moscow4). Creation of additional channels for the professional exchange of information – a popular segment of the blogosphere with an increasing number of independent media experts (Anton Nossik, Vasily Gatov, Andrey Miroshnichenko and others) and specialized websites on the media and new media, for example, MediaToolbox, Media & Journalism and PostJournalism.

It is necessary to separately discuss the processes that have emerged in the field of self-regulation of the web and the media sector as a response to the simplification of access to content and the spread of pirated content and extremist material, as well as the difficulty of legal supervision of this sphere. Self-regulation may be the only solution to promoting the responsibility of the online media, as it implies more flexibility than government regulation of the industry and the establishment of user control, which the government is once again discussing. In particular, the recently opened institution of the Internet ombudsman5 may conduct negotiations with the major players on the Internet and officials responsible for this area and could prove to be an effective mechanism of media accountability.

Other media accountability instruments Journalism education in Russia is available within the system of higher education and in media and non-governmental organizations. Most journalism education is within universities. Journalism university programmes combine broad academic education with practical training and are the main suppliers of the country’s press corps. Out of 134 Russian universities where journalists are trained, 105 are state-owned and 29 are private. All of them include courses on journalism ethics and professional standards in their academic programmes. Journalists are also being trained in several media companies providing short-term mid-career or refresher courses for staff and freelancers. Public and non-governmental organizations such as the Russian Union of Journalists, the Guild of Press Publishers, the National Association of Regional Press and the National Association of Broadcasters also play an active role in upgrading professional education and improving the quality of journalism practices, including accountability topics, initiating competitions, round tables and seminars. An additional instrument of media accountability is media research, which is provided by various university departments of journalism. Major parts of the accessible results can be found in scientific periodicals including Vestnik of MSU: Journalism Series, Medi@lmanach and the online Mediascope published by the Faculty of Journalism at Lomonosov Moscow State University. Other educational institutions also publish scientific editions.

Conclusion The actual state of media accountability in Russia, as reviewed in this paper, shows a diverse picture of instruments: a press council, codes of ethics, media criticism and journalism education, 223

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as well as the latest complementary online instruments, which is in line with the set of typical accountability indicators in Europe. However, the hybrid statist-commercialized nature of the Russian media system, as described by Hallin and Mancini (2004a), influences not only authentic journalism culture but accountability practices as well. The Public Board on Complaints about Mass Media – the Russian version of a press council – though announced as a purely public service organization, included politicians and persons from state authorities subordinated to the president. Ethical rules from the Code, the Charter and other adopted self-regulation documents, similar to others in the world, though recognized by the professional community, are not fully implemented in journalism routines. The dual nature has other instruments as well. Corporate codes of ethics initiated during the past decade by a number of media organizations are rarely publicly available, and the organizations are thus not accountable to the wider public. However, the lack of transparency is somewhat compensated by media criticism, journalism education and the innovative accountability instruments that have appeared as a result of the web and its social media platforms.

Notes 1 http://www.presscouncil.ru 2 https://www.facebook.com/elizaveta.osetinskaya/posts/10203000247036430 3 https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=100000620902862&fref=ts 4 http://echo.msk.ru/blog/ 5 http://iombudsman.ru

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28 Slovakia Conditional success of ethical regulation via online instruments Andrej Školkay

Abstract This chapter argues that, among non-state MAIs, the most powerful tools for enforcing media accountability in Slovakia are those instruments outside journalism with a low degree of institutionalization (online tools). However, use of these instruments does not assure any impact. Journalists need to be underpinned by previous experience in journalism or public relations and well-thought out use of new social media. Furthermore, their full independence is rather difficult to sustain financially. In contrast, the MAIs outside journalism with a high degree of institutionalization contribute very little to media accountability in Slovakia.This can be seen as a paradox. The explanation can be found, on the one hand, in the low quality of journalism and media education and research, and on the other hand, in the rapid development of new online technologies that make the impact of an individual in monitoring and checking bigger and more immediate.

Introduction1 The enforceability of and interest in keeping media accountability through non-state means has been problematic since the fall of communism, in 1989, in Slovakia (see for example Školkay, Hong and Kutaš, 2011, pp. 51–57; Šípoš, 2008). Initially, in the early 1990s, many journalists and their major news organizations perceived any discussion or proposal about institutionalized selfregulation (or indeed media legislation suggested by the Cabinet or Parliament) as an attempt to reintroduce censorship. By the late 1990s, media businesses and their representatives added their voices of protest about self-regulation or any other media regulation. Their concern was not press freedom, but that any form of regulation would impede the maximizing of profits. In many cases, there simply was no agreement among the key players about the details of new legislation. Yet the Slovak public at large had by the early 1990s already accepted the watchdog role of journalists (Šrámek, 1994). After 20 years of experiencing free media, the majority of the population still tended to trust the media (digital media: 57%; the press: 59%; television news: 68%; and radio news: 77%) according to a 2010 survey.2 In contrast, a mini survey among 30 respected (probably better described as the best known or most active) journalists in 2005 revealed that only three of them actually knew in detail the code of ethics of the Slovenský syndikát novinárov (Syndicate of Slovak Journalists, SSN) (Poláková, 2010, p. 155). 225

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According to research from 2010 carried out by Transparency International, about 40% of respondents believed that the Slovak media typically had a rather low level of corruption, 27% of respondents put them in the middle of corrupted behaviour and 17% believed that the Slovak media were rather corrupted, while 16.5% did not have an opinion on this issue.3 These survey results suggest that although the media did lose its prestige (i.e. the public’s illusion of being an unbiased watchdog) for the large part of the population, the media kept the trust of a majority of citizens, particularly when compared with other institutions, which inferred that the media had performed the watchdog role in society reasonably well. However, there are some important issues related to the interpretation of the aforementioned surveys.4

Journalistic culture and media system A corpus of regular reports on the situation of the post-communist media in Slovakia has been published. The Inštitút pre verejné otázky (Institute for Public Affairs) produced yearbooks (print and CD) from 1996 to 2010, each of which included a chapter on media; the Mediálny inštitút (Media Institute) produced media-related statistics for the period 1990–2000;5 the Slovak Press Watch produced three media-analytical annual reports for 2006–2008;6 and Transparency International Slovensko has produced and keeps updated a media ownership overview chart with ownership data since 1993.7 In the context of the model of media systems developed by Hallin and Mancini (2004a), the dominant model in Slovakia during the 1990s was the Polarized Pluralist Model. It is now a combination of the Liberal Model and the Polarized Pluralist Model (Školkay, 2008a). Not all the criteria described by Hallin and Mancini are present in Slovakia, or they are not present at a level significant enough to be considered as relevant factors. For example, while media content, especially in public service media (PSM), used to be heavily influenced by the political arena, today commercial pressures (including the important reallocation of advertisements to online media) and domestic media owners’ influence are the dominant factors (combined with the impact of the financial crisis and the related exit of foreign media owners) in the context of self-censorship in the Slovak media sector. A sign of political parallelism in Slovakia used to be the partisanship of media audiences, which is today present by and large in niche media and programmes.8 A small proportion of media staff still tend to be active in political life, and the career paths of some (especially regional) journalists are to a degree still shaped by their political affiliations. Professional mobility between journalism and political public relations remains a common feature. For example, R. Baťo, former editor-in-chief of the economy weekly Trend and later a journalist for the daily Sme, also served as spokesperson for a former prime minister, and he currently serves, together with another former journalist,9 on a presidential team. Furthermore, the former TV journalist P. Petrus was a spokesperson of the president for a few months and has now returned to TV reporting.10 Some journalists still move into the job of spokesperson for a political party. We can illustrate the temporality of categorizing normative-empirical media systems too hastily. Slavko Splichal (1994) concluded, in the mid-1990s, that the Central and Eastern European (CEE) media had been developing along Italian lines, which he called ‘Italianization’.The instability of the political systems in CEE was similar to Italy’s in the 1980s. Although Splichal (2001, note 21) later distanced himself from this label, Wyka (2006) followed this argument and argued that the next stage of Italianization would be ‘Berlusconization’. This means a process by which politicians and businessmen monopolize the ownership of mass media exclusively for their personal, political or business purposes.11 Despite dissimilarities in the socio-political arenas in (Czecho)Slovakia and Italy in the 1980s, ‘Berlusconization’ seemed to be the prevailing situation 226

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in Slovakia at the turn of the century (Školkay, 2008a).12 Again, by 2014, a narrow spectrum of business people had consolidated and concentrated the ownership of major media outlets. It is significant that these consolidated enterprises have substantial investment portfolios.Yet there is no direct involvement of these owners in politics so far, like there was in Italy in the 1990s or in the Czech Republic in 2014–2015. Nevertheless, these developments raise the question of the conflict of interest and independence of journalists. The failure to resolve these issues led to about half of the staff of the daily newspaper Sme establishing a new daily newspaper, N, in early 2015. In general, key factors influencing media system development in Slovakia beyond politics, media policies or the lack thereof, and economic prosperity are the size of the country and the proportion of ethnic minorities, varying to about 20% (ŠÚSR, 2014, p. 78)13 of the population of 5.4 million, although officially the proportion of minorities is counted as approximately 15% (7% did not declare their ethnicity and Roma officially represent some 2%, but it is estimated that there are as many as 8%).14 These demographics clearly restrict job opportunities for journalists, newspaper circulations and audiences for broadcasters,15 as well as limiting advertising revenues (and increasing the impact of occasional economic crises or advertising shifts to online media). Last but not least, it is difficult to exercise peer criticism under such conditions. Nevertheless, there are two newswire agencies (TASR, SITA) and the TV news channel TA3 in Slovakia. The most popular television stations in early 2015 were Markíza, JOJ and the public television channel Jednotka. The less popular were Doma (female-oriented), news television TA3 and Dajto (male-oriented) as well as Plus. The most popular radio channels included Rádio Expres, the public channel Rádio Slovensko, the youth and music radio Fun rádio, music radio Jemné melódie, Rádio Europa 2 and regional public radio Rádio Regina.16 The most important daily newspapers included the tabloids Nový Čas and Plus Jeden Deň; the quality newspapers Pravda and Sme; and the business newspaper Hospodárske noviny. Thus, while the first post-communist decade (1992–2000) was characterized by the strong influence of politics on the media, the current period (since 2000) is characterized by the dominant influence of market forces on the media (Šimečka, 2001; Krútka, 2006; Kollár in Sudor, 2008). This turnabout reflects the high politicization of society and economy during the first decade of transition from a socialist economy and society to a market economy and liberal democracy. Once market forces have been rooted, and the rules of the game in politics and society have been established (this is called de-politicization), the economy becomes the dominant force in a society. In the context of this study, the above-mentioned consolidation and concentration of media ownership can be seen as logical, although a problematic feature of the coexistence of capitalism with a liberal democracy. There are alternative explanations and scenarios. For example, Poláková (2010, p. 3) argues that the turnabout towards a more ethical journalism started in 1997 when the academic journal Otázky žurnalistiky began publishing contributions on ethical issues and journalists gained more experience with new political, media and market systems. Some activities of the SSN were related to ethical-professional journalism in those years. Yet this explanation seems to exaggerate the role of a marginal professional journalist in the development of the discussion on, and the practice of, ethics in journalism. In fact, the situation in journalism ethics has become much worse since then, especially in the case of the larger-circulation tabloid media. Clearly, while 75% of graduates of journalism and archive sciences find qualified jobs, 14% end up in unemployment or with low-paid jobs (Habrman, 2015). This means that there are fewer jobs than graduates (in addition, many graduates from other fields of study enter journalism).17 This, together with the opaque impact of media owners, creates pressure on employees to follow 227

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unwritten media house rules and to compete harder in both the labour market as well as the media market. However, under these socio-political challenges and increasing market dominance, a severe problem is the unethical behaviour of some Slovak journalists, especially among those working in tabloid media. Indeed, according to a non-representative survey (of the selected journalists, only 35% participated) carried out in 2008 among Slovak journalists by the non-governmental organization (NGO) Slovak Press Watch, almost 75% of Slovak journalists claimed to have low professional levels and 56% of respondents noted low ethical levels among their colleagues (Slovak Press Watch et al., 2008). Indeed, transparent correction management is present only in some cases, most successfully in the case of the daily Sme, which publishes an irregular column of its own mistakes. Also, many bloggers publish corrections. As a result of the changing structural conditions, enforcement of media accountability is particularly difficult among many journalists and media. There is an emerging institutional watchdog on ethical behaviour (in the case of online media and social media).18 As a result, the judiciary (Kováčechová, 2011, p. 32) as well as the state authorities in general,19 including the government,20 take the leading role in enforcing professional-ethical rules, but often with dubious impact (Školkay, 2014). The role of journalistic professional organizations has been less important in these developments. There are three professional organizations of journalists in Slovakia. The oldest, with the largest membership, is the SSN, with about 1,200 members. This is a major organization of journalists in Slovakia, although it has very little prestige among the majority of professional journalists.21 Then there is the Slovenská sekcia Európskej asociácie novinárov (Slovak Section of the Association of European Journalists, SS AEJ) with 25 members. Finally, there is the Slovenská asociácia novinárov (Slovak Association of Journalists, SAN). Nothing is known about the SAN’s membership and activities since the organization does not communicate with anyone, and the last information on its website comes from February 2012 (checked in January 2015). Its predecessor used to be a very political organization, close to governmental structures in the mid-1990s. The overall situation of journalistic culture illustrates well the scandal surrounding the major journalistic organization, the SSN. First, it proved incompetent, despite repeated internal audit warnings, to manage its own financial and material affairs, including a huge project of transnational cooperation (see Valková, 2014; Necpalová, 2014; Grosmannová, 2014), which resulted in attempts to avoid default bankruptcy in early 2014.22 In addition, the majority of the members of its presidium publicly accused its chairperson of deliberately neglecting her duties in favour of a loan provider in the spring of 2014.23 The failure of the SSJ to fulfil the overwhelming majority of its objectives in the Programme for 2010–201324 is a paradigm of the problems within the organization.

Established instruments of media accountability Although a code of ethics had been adopted by the SSJ in 1990, a year after the anti-communist (r)evolution, there was no official body that was able to deal with ethical complaints in the print media. Initially, there was either no interest or resistance to the idea to create such a body. However, over the years, there was increasing pressure from politicians, some journalists and some public figures to establish such a body. Therefore, the Press Council (PrC) was established by the Association for Protection of Journalism Ethics in 2002. This association is a legal body created by the SSN and the Združenie vydavateľov periodickej tlače (Union of Publishers of Periodical Press in Slovakia, ZVPT) exclusively for the purpose of ethical self-regulation in the print media. This association gives limited financial support to the operation of the PrC. There 228

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is the Code of Ethics of a Journalist (CoEJ), prepared mainly by the SSJ (passed in 2010), which is the basis of the charter and decision-making of the PrC. The CoEJ is thus indirectly binding for all journalists and publicists in Slovakia. However, the new CoEJ (adopted due to legal, economic and technological changes in society) explicitly states that it is binding only for those (organizations, work groups or individuals) who inform the SSJ in writing that they will abide by the CoEJ. In addition, many media have their own codes of ethics or style books. Some of them are available to the public (PSM, Sme, Trend), but some are only internal guidelines (Pravda, Hospodárske noviny). The PrC has seven members. Membership is an honour, as there is no financial remuneration. There is also a part-time secretary. The professional background of the members (elected by the association) is diverse, which enables the PrC to represent a broad ‘view of the elite’. However, it was also detrimental to the proper functioning of the PrC because the media perspective is missing. In other words, there was initially little understanding of how the media works and perhaps a too strict, literally one-sided, application of the CoEJ, especially by members who are lawyers. Remišová (2010), a former member of the PrC, compared Slovakia’s PrC with press councils in six Western European countries and found differences in two key aspects: First, in the number of founding bodies, which was higher in all the comparative cases; and second, in the professional composition of Slovakia’s PrC. Remišová (2010, pp. 25–26) argues that, ironically, the unique composition of the members of the PrC – respected and honest people from public life – is its ‘Achilles heel’. Remišová concludes that although there are honest professionals present there, they are not professionals in the field of journalism. Therefore, they do not understand how journalism really works. Furthermore, journalists did not accept the PrC as a body of ethical supervision, since they did not participate in its creation and decision-making. The media professionals saw that the PrC, lacking any media representation, did not produce pragmatic solutions. The PrC can issue three different types of sanctions. The organization receives about 20 complaints annually. The PrC convenes ad hoc three to five times a year, and at a minimum – according to its regulations – twice a year. This is a serious deficiency for the proper execution of swift supervision of ethical issues in a rapidly changing media environment. The PrC has declared that it has the right to deal with all ethical issues related to journalists. However, the PrC deals only with ethical issues related to the print media, or those issues related to freedom of the press or access to information for all journalists. It can deal with ethical issues on its own initiative too. In the summer of 2009, the SSJ announced the idea that the PrC should deal also with Internet-based and electronic media.This plan needs further elaboration, and it was indeed still under discussion in the spring of 2015. The PrC still faced problems in the enforcement of its rulings in 2014 (Ludvighová, 2014). Slovakia also has an electronic media regulator, the Rada pre vysielanie a retransmisiu (Board for Broadcasting and Retransmission, RVR). Article 3 of the RVR’s charter clearly defines the RVR, not only as an “independent organ”, but also as a “nation-wide organ of state administration” with the mission to enforce the interests of the public. In other words, the RVR is a sui generis body, which deals with media ethics in television and radio broadcasts as well as in some selected audiovisual services on demand (see more in Hans-Bredow-Institut, 2011, or Jurišta, Kukliš and Školkay, 2015). There is also a Slovak Advertising Standards Council, which has its own code of ethics for advertising practice. This is a sufficiently important body that two major private televisions, Joj and Markíza, as well as the ZVPT, are members. Academic journals pay occasional attention to media and journalistic ethics. For example, Otázky žurnalistiky (Journalism Issues) published a special issue on this topic in its 2011 edition 229

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(issue 3/4). However, only two studies dealt with domestic cases, and this in a rather broad context: ‘Violence as news value in newsreporting of Slovak television’ and ‘Self-promotion as news value’. There is also the journal Communication Today, which occasionally publishes articles that deal with media/journalism ethics, but usually in a very broad social context (i.e. the manipulation of the public by the media).The only study that dealt directly with media/journalism ethics was in 2010 by Poláková. Finally, there appeared a local version of Global Media Journal – Slovak Edition in 2013.

Innovative instruments of media accountability The first Slovak media watchblog, Slovak Press Watch25 (2002–2010), was established by Gabriel Šipoš, an affiliate of the NGO INEKO. This was a popular project among journalists due to the immediate availability of the revelations on the Internet. The blog accumulated 663 posts, the content of which resulted from tips by readers, viewers or media insiders (whistle-blowers) in low-quality journalism.The topics were usually factual mistakes, sometimes plagiarism and even accusations of hidden corruption. Slovak Press Watch was funded by various embassies and private or state-owned companies. The blog was remarkably successful, judging by its popularity, with readership for each article averaging at about 5,857, as well as by its impact on some editorial personnel decisions based on its revelations,26 or reactions from editors.27 Despite its success, it stopped voluntarily in 2010. The second media watchblog, omediach.blog.sme.sk, was established in February 2012. Within three years, average readership of the blog’s 180 articles far exceeded the Slovak Press Watch, at 20,789 per article. Part of the blog’s success is due to its focus on discussing serious but highly selective media issues.28 The ‘sister’ media website, omediach.com, was also established in 2012 with more interesting content for a wider audience, including B2B, and was thus more attractive for advertisers.29 Miroslava Kernová, a former journalist by profession, not by education, established both the blog and the website. Interestingly, the sole sponsorship for the media website was a local company (until late 2014). The reactions of responsible editors30 to the blog and the website are noteworthy. Both blog and website are present on Facebook, whereas omediach.com is also present on Twitter and YouTube since 2013. There are some additional online tools that discuss media accountability, most importantly the special blog section at blog.sme.sk.31 Authors include a newspaper journalist who focuses on new media with a newsroom blog32 and a blogger who became an Internet celebrity.33

Other media accountability instruments There are also media literacy programmes in many primary and secondary schools which are part of the curricula. However, there is no public report available assessing their qualitative level and effectiveness. There has been continuous dissatisfaction with the quality of university education in Slovakia in general and in media and journalism studies in particular. This dissatisfaction occurs despite there being at least five public universities and two private colleges/universities that offer journalistic or mass media studies at the level of departments or at faculty level (Štetka, 2012, p. 16; Školkay, Hong and Kutaš, 2011, pp. 50–52; Ostrovský, 2010, pp. 29-30; Ostrovský, 2013, p. 29). There have been some attempts to improve the quality of journalism training at a university level34 as well as for practitioners. Yet it is also true that there are actually many graduates of nonjournalistic departments and faculties among the corpus of journalists in Slovakia. 230

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It seems that academic research in journalism on ethical-professional issues (Školkay, 1998, 2001, 2002, 2008b; Poláková, 2010; Remišová, 2010) has only a limited, if any, impact on media accountability in Slovakia. In addition to efforts in public or private higher education, there have been many initiatives aimed at improving the overall quality of journalism output, thus, ideally, also contributing towards media accountability. For example, the Open Society Foundation (OSF) in Slovakia has been supporting journalism through an annual competition among journalists, including bloggers, for a decade. In the past, there was controversy about the criteria used for the evaluation of the selected nominees (Školkay, 2007). Still, the assessment of entries seems to be based more on a blurred combination of professional standards and impact factors (social relevance or publicity gained). The state-sponsored Literary Fund annually awards prizes for journalists’ best achievements in a number of categories based on medium type and journalistic genre.35 These criteria are based on assessment proposals, which so far have been accepted without any objections by a jury.36 Some of these assessments also consider (sometimes explicitly, in most cases implicitly) ethical issues. The SSN also supports quality journalism through its annual award Mercurius Veridicus ex Slovakia for excellent achievements of the year in journalism and for life achievements in journalism. In addition, there are some regional competitions for journalists in east Slovakia (the 19th call was in 2014). Clearly, there is a variety of journalistic competitions which contribute to higher specialization, better quality and thus, indirectly at least, to higher media accountability of media reporting in Slovakia (see more in Školkay, Hong and Kutaš, 2011, pp. 40–41). For example, the 2014 initiative by the OSF offered a fully sponsored summer course for bloggers with lectures in journalism focused on reporting on minorities and ethnicity/race-related topics.37 Most recently, Mikeš (2014) and Berthotyová (2015), a judge of the Supreme Court, have suggested creating a new independent body that would protect the free media and public interest. Their idea reflects concerns (see also Kernová, 2014) about the concentration and consolidation of media ownership in the key print media.

Conclusion The Slovakian press council contributes moderately and sometimes controversially to media accountability (and for some print media only), while journalists’ associations (with the previous exception of the role of the SSJ in establishing and supporting the PrC) as well as media/ journalism trade journals contribute very little to media accountability. A professional code of ethics does exist at the country level, as well as internal codes of ethics at media business levels. However, we do not know much about the use of either level of code by journalists in their dayto-day work. It does seem that the national code of ethics is little known and perhaps even less used outside of the major media (of which a majority has anyway their own in-house ethicalprofessional regulations). Although the SSJ has published a mission statement,38 it is of little value considering the low prestige of the organization. Other journalistic organizations – SS of AEJ and SAN – are even less well known and are less active in media accountability among both journalists and the public at large. In the context of media accountability instruments inside journalism outlets with a low degree of institutionalization, the majority of media companies provide either an e-mail address for complaints or addresses for the editor or a journalist. The media traditionally have specified 231

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which news agencies are used as sources, but this has usually been blurred with a statement claiming ‘own’ contribution. Some of the aforementioned media companies make their editorial guidelines public, some make them available on request and some do not make them public at all or do not possess any. A tradition in Slovakian editorial offices is to have an internal critique session. A majority of the media refer to the internal critique when reacting to criticism by media portals on serious issues. The quality media provide a personal e-mail address or allow other ways for readers to contact them. In this sense, one can understand there is (together with some commentaries online underneath an article) a public critique session. Some quality media (the weekly Trend and the daily Sme) used to run media pages, which also covered media (self-)criticism, media accountability issues and media transparency. However, the behaviour of journalists on social media is actually, in many cases, regulated either by a specific code or by labour contracts. In the context of media accountability instruments external to journalism outlets with a high degree of institutionalization, media scholars, NGOs and observatories have published some periodical reports on the media and journalism. However, there is currently no media observatory that would regularly and systematically monitor media accountability. Media education or media literacy programmes in primary and secondary schools do exist, but we do not know if they contribute to media accountability. Similarly, journalism students have to attend courses in media ethics during their education, but we do not know either the intellectual quality of these courses or whether they have any impact on journalism after graduation. This issue should also be put into the context of the highly problematic moral and qualitative level of higher education in Slovakia. The first academic courses on media literacy have also started at some universities for the public at large in recent years. In the case of media accountability external to journalism outlets with a low degree of institutionalization, digital/online instruments like blogs seem to be the most powerful tool for media accountability in Slovakia. Media watch websites/blogs seem to be, under the right conditions (from the author’s own experience with PR), the best tool for increasing media accountability.Yet, in an effort to stay independent, they have ongoing financial problems. A positive role in promoting media accountability is also played by some activists, mostly bloggers. In contrast, blogs written by academics or academic institutions discussing media accountability and transparency on a meta-level are virtually absent from the public discourse. However, sometimes academics write for or appear in radio or television programmes too. In conclusion, in order to assess all aspects of media accountability instruments and their possible causations and correlations, more nuanced and larger studies are needed.

Notes   1 This article has benefited from review by Miroslava Kernová. The research was partially supported by the EC-funded project ‘Anticorruption Politicies Revisited. Global Trends and European Responses to the Challenge of Corruption‘ and the APVV grant DO7RP-0039-11. Furthermore, this is the indirect output of the EC-funded project ‘European Media Policies Revisited:Valuing and Reclaiming Free and Independent Media in Contemporary Democratic Systems’ and the APVV grant DO7RP-022-10.  2 http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/cf/showchart_column.cfm?keyID=2187&nationID=26,&startda te=2010.11&enddate=2013.11   3 http://www.transparency.sk/wp-content/uploads/2010/12/GCB_vysledky.pdf, p. 7.   4 First, it can be more likely assumed that these results are a reflection of the depoliticization of the media and at the same time, the increasing tabloidization of media content in recent years, the point of change being around 2000). Second, the majority of the population does not follow all the media, and a significant part receives most news from two or three major television stations.Therefore, it is actually difficult to base a general assessment of the media performance just on the media selected sample. Third, the

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Slovakia majority of those who follow the media probably do not notice or understand ethical mistakes unless these are pointed out by insiders or experts.  5 http://www.mi.sk/medialna%20rocenka/index.html  6 http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/175975/Slovenske-media-2008-pod-tlakom-vlady-i-vlastnych-biznis-zaujmov. html, http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/125353/Slovenske-media-2007-plusom-nove-technologie-minusompolitizacia.html, http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/80526/Slovenske-media-2006-etika-sa-zlepsila-profesionalitastagnuje.html  7 http://www.trend.sk/weby/vlastnicimedii/   8 While in the past the daily press, particularly, but also TV and radio stations, were politically polarized, as were their audiences, nowadays there is much less political polarization in the major media outlets.  9 http://www.teraz.sk/slovensko/kiska-poradcovia-tim-hovorca-prezident/86182-clanok.html 10 http://www.prezident.sk/?hovorca-prezidenta-republiky; see also http://www.omediach.com/tv/ item/4399-co-hovoril-buduci-hovorca-petrus-o-kiskovi-este-ako-redaktor? 11 According to Wyka (2006), the characteristics of the Italian media system in the 1980s were strong state control, high degree of partisanship, equally high levels of media-politics integration and the overt support of politicians at different levels. i.e. organizational, economic, professional, ideological, etc. In addition, there was an absence of consolidated and shared professional ethics. 12 It should be mentioned here that there are many examples of various (rather simple) models of media development scenarios in post-communist CEE (see some examples in Školkay, 2008a, 32). 13 The number of ethnic Roma is generally seen as underestimated by self-declaration (or lack of it) by about two-thirds (http://romovia.vlada.gov.sk/3548/fakty-o-romoch.php). 14 http://www.narodnostnemensiny.gov.sk/data/files/5126_narodnostne-mensiny-a-etnicke-skupinyzijuce-na-uzemi-slovenskej-republiky.pdf 15 All Slovaks are bilingual – Slovakian and Czech – and almost 10% of the population can follow Hungarian-language media broadcasts from Hungary. 16 http://www.median.sk/pdf/2014/ZS144SR.pdf 17 It is estimated that as many as half of all journalists did not study journalism or media communication. 18 There is a code of ethics for electronic media issued by the Interactive Advertising Bureau Slovakia, but this deals primarily with marketing aspects (http://www.iabslovakia.sk/kodexy/eticky-kodex-elektronickych-medii/). 19 See for example, http://ekonomika.sme.sk/c/6806178/facebook-je-uz-sucastou-zivota-za-urazaniedavaju-urady-pokuty.html#ixzz2TvkEY4Bk 20 The Cabinet has invited foreign experts in 2000 to help increase the ethics of journalism in Slovakia. 21 See Miroslava Kerná, April 11, 2014, Milý syndikát novinárov, socializmus sa dávno skončil (Dear Syndicate of Journalists, socialism has ended a long time ago), http://www.omediach.com/blog/ item/3996-mily-syndikat-novinarov-socializmus-sa-davno-skoncil 22 See Syndikát vypredáva majetok, stojí pred kolapsom (Syndicate is selling its property), November 21, 2013, http://www.omediach.com/tlac/item/2864-syndikat-vypredava-majetok-stoji-pred-kolapsom 23 See Na majetok syndikátu je exekúcia.Valková podáva žalobu na autorov listu členom SSN (There has been issued court order on the property of syndicate. Valková filled file against the authors of a letter to the members of SSN), November 11,2014, http://www.omediach.com/tlacove-spravy/item/3995na-majetok-syndikatu-je-exekucia-vakova-podava-zalobu-na-autorov-listu-clenom-ssn 24 Program Slovenského syndikátu novinárov na roky 2010–2013 (Programme of SSN 2010–2013), http://www.mediahit.sk/?id=139&view_more=4171http://www.mediahit.sk/? (visited 133 times since May 2011). 25 http://spw.blog.sme.sk 26 http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/188964/TA3-by-mala-novinarku-Racovu-Stefkovu-z-vysielania-stiahnut. html 27 See for example, http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/222206/Zahranicno-politicky-preslap-tyzdna-v-Slovenskomrozhlase-Update.html, or http://spw.blog.sme.sk/c/181642/TYDENCZ-prepustil-reporterku-kradlaz-eTRENDsk.html 28 http://omediach.blog.sme.sk/c/316992/Preco-blogujem.html 29 http://www.omediach.com/o-projekte 30 http://omediach.blog.sme.sk/c/299398/Markiza-Rathov-den-vo-vazeni-okopirovala-od-idnescz.html or http://omediach.blog.sme.sk/c/356735/preco-kormuthova-nemohla-ostat-v-rtvs.html or http:// www.omediach.com/tlac/item/4454-clanok-hitler-spasitelom?-presetruje-policia-aj-prokuratura 31 http://blog.sme.sk/t/9/media

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Andrej Školkay 32 http://struharik.blog.sme.sk/ 33 http://holinova.blog.sme.sk/c/354845/Nemame-kauzu-Tak-si-ju-ukradneme.html 34 For example, the Department of Journalism at Comenius University established a cooperation with the English-language weekly The Slovak Spectator under a programme title ‘Get trained and then get ­published’. 35 http://litfond.sk/index.php/ceny/cena_novinarska_tvorba/ 36 E-mail from deputy director Eva Sokolová, 18.3.2014 37 http://www.osf.sk/sk/ako-nepisat-cierno-bielo 38 http://www.ssn.sk/o-nas/

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29 Slovenia The paper tiger of media accountability Igor Vobič, Aleksander Sašo Slaček Brlek and Boris Mance

Abstract The effectiveness of MAIs in Slovenia, like ethics codes, the Journalistic Court of Honour and the ombudsman at the public broadcaster, has been put under question many times by scholars and experts as well as by journalists and editors themselves. Evidence suggests that MAIs have not been able to effectively prevent either political interference or commercial pressures on the media and journalists in their attempts to meaningfully link citizens to societal life, and that the journalistic community itself has been reluctant to push for, or even accept, the establishment of MAIs. While the emergence of new media provides possibilities for empowering audiences, journalists and editors remain reluctant to give up their power as gatekeepers; research indicates that little is being done to utilize online tools and environments for media accountability purposes. Rather, digitization has amplified the trend of the pauperization of journalism, which increases the vulnerability of journalists to both political and commercial pressures.

Introduction When discussing media accountability, we must keep in mind the question of the degree to which media accountability instruments (MAIs) actually reflect the level of development of professional journalism (Splichal, 1988) and the articulations of public good through the media (Poler Kovačič, 2005). In this context, and as discussed in this chapter, the effectiveness of MAIs in Slovenia has been put under question many times by scholars and experts, as well as by the journalists and editors themselves. Evidence suggests (Poler Kovačič, 2014a) that MAIs have not been able to effectively prevent either political interference and commercial pressures on the media and journalists in their attempts to meaningfully link citizens to societal life. The alliance that has formed between some journalists, certain media and the holders of political and economic pow has never been effectively counteracted (Splichal, 1995). At the same time, more and more journalists are being forced to tackle deteriorating working conditions (Vobič, 2013a), while the “identity crisis” (Poler Kovačič, 2004) over the role of Slovenian journalism in the transitional period helped to ultimately subordinate the profession to the newly established relationships of power. These affected, and utterly disarmed, the most notable MAIs, turning Slovenia into what might be regarded as a paper tiger of media accountability. 235

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In the next three parts, we discuss (1) the journalistic culture and media system in Slovenia since the fall of socialism, (2) the origins and normalization of the established MAIs and (3) innovations in media accountability in the digital communication environment. In the concluding part, these discussions are reflected in the context of larger realities of the Slovenian media environment.

Journalistic culture and media system With the end of socialism, the foundations of Slovenian media and journalism shifted, s­ ubstituting the normative framework tied to historical materialism with the modern paradigm of journalism grounded in liberal conceptualizations of participation, property and communication (Vobič, 2013b). Imitative paradigmatic shifts have been coupled with journalism’s empirical transformation during the “capitalist enlightenment” of the early 1990s (Splichal, 1995), which tried to speed up the historical process of political and economic changes in the Slovenian media that had lasted centuries elsewhere ( Jakubowicz, 2007). Shifts continued through the 2000s in what can be labelled as “paternalist commercialism” in the media (Splichal, 2001), where the state has been both a political and an economic actor, subordinating media to the narrow interests of power holders and turning journalists into reproducers of renewed power relations in politics and the capitalist logic in media. In this sense, while the news media and journalists took a significant role in the collapse of socialism, and in the building of Western-type democracy and capitalism in Slovenia, they have not emerged as autonomous and progressive forces, but have rather contributed to the reproduction of clientelistic social dynamics on media-systemic and journalistic-cultural levels (Vobič and Milojević 2014, pp. 127–129). Splichal (1995) considers that the Slovenian “paternal-commercial” media system is ­characterized by tendencies of privatization and commercialization of the media on the one hand, and of either or both maximizing and exercising state power over the media on the other. Similarly, Sandra Bašić Hrvatin and Brankica Petković (2008) claim that the Slovenian media system resembles what Hallin and Mancini (2004a) call the “polarized pluralist system”, with an insufficient introduction of press freedom, a strong presence of political parallelism in the media and political instrumentalization of the media, as the state plays an important role as a media owner, regulator and founder. Namely, powerful networks control the media often through non-transparent ownership and biased subsidies, “savage” media regulation re-establishing their particular political or business interests, and “advertising gatekeeping”, where state-owned companies can “blackmail” print and broadcast media by means of their advertising expenditures, and the appointment of loyal managers and editors (Bašić Hrvatin and Petković, 2008). These problems are reflected in occasional conflicts between journalists and the political power holders. For instance, in 2007, 571 journalists signed the Petition against Censorship and Political Pressures on Journalists in Slovenia, which has not been publicly discussed in any depth. Namely, “[t]he politicians and the politically controlled media endeavoured to eliminate this issue from the public agenda. This was further proof that the disclosure of political clientelism was closely related to enabling (or disabling) the professionalization of journalism” (Bašić Hrvatin and Petković, 2008, p. 199). In addition, in 2005 and 2006, threats of the interference of political elites in the functioning of the media were intensified with the passing of a new Radio and Television Corporation of Slovenia Act (ZRTVS-1) and significant amendments to the Mass Media Act (ZMed-UPB1). ZRTVS-1 particularly drew heavy criticism from Slovene and international experts and professional associations, mainly because it gave the parliamentary coalition the power to determine the majorities in both governing bodies of the public broadcaster (Splichal and Hvala, 236

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2005). ZMed-UPB1 was criticized particularly for the way it broadened the scope of political ­influence on the media through public financing of media content (Petković, Rovšek and BašićHrvatin, 2006). In recent years, working conditions and the autonomy of journalists have been steadily declining, especially since the onset of the Great Recession. The transition to online has been especially difficult for Slovenian media organizations, as, in recent years, advertisers have been moving away from the Internet and focusing more on traditional media, especially television (Tsmedia, 2013). Without a viable business model to monetize audiences online (Vobič, 2012, 2013a), media organizations have been shifting the financial burden onto news workers through layoffs, standardization of news work and the introduction of precarious labour relations, resulting in the “pauperization of journalism” (Splichal, 2005). These trends are also a cause for concern from the perspective of media accountability, since precarious working arrangements increase the vulnerability of journalists to political and commercial pressures, while the drive towards reducing costs also broadens the possibilities for the political and economic elite to influence the reporting of media through information subsidies. In this context, some journalists and editors are pointing out that financial constraints and the focus of media organizations on cutting costs are among the main barriers to quality journalism (Slaček Brlek, 2014). Since the fall of socialism, the development of Slovenian journalistic culture has been characterized by an “identity crisis” with respect to its normative self-proclamations (Poler Kovačič, 2004) and also through negotiations of their societal roles in the news (Vobič, 2009). While the normative role of journalism in socialism was about teaching, education and advocacy, with the establishment of the new Slovenian state, the prevailing normative service of journalists has become the impartial mediation of reality (Luthar, 2004, p. 665). However, Splichal (1999, p. 300), states that endeavours aimed at “objective” journalism have not abolished the ideological nature of the press, but have rather helped replace one ideology with another. In addition, as a consequence of the application of the principle of objectivity, “artificially arranged events intended exclusively for the expression of opinion (for example, press conferences, election campaigns and party conventions) became ‘facts’ and reporting them ‘news’, whereas a journalist’s or citizen’s direct statement remained ‘opinion’” (Splichal, 1999). Despite stressing the concept of objectivity as a feature of the “high-modern” or “classical” paradigm (Dahlgren, 2009), and the corresponding notion of the balancing of claim and counterclaim in their conquest for the public good, research on Slovenian journalism raises doubts about the fulfilment of the normatively grounded and codified conduct and roles of Slovenian journalists (Poler Kovačič, 2004). Namely, within market-driven societal dynamics, Slovenian journalists have turned from working for the good of the citizens to providing a service for the good of the consumers, which reflects the political, economic and cultural subordination of journalism to the established power relations (Vobič, 2009), manifested in phenomena such as “semi-investigative journalism” in the mass media (Poler Kovačič, 2009).

Established instruments of media accountability Journalistic codes of ethics The fall of socialism has importantly shaped codified journalism ethics and accountability in Slovenia. In the late 1980s, evident signs of the reconceptualization of the media and journalism accountability in Slovenia emerged, resulting in a recodification of journalism ethics (Košir, 1988; Splichal, 1988). If the 1988 Code of Yugoslav Journalists offered “only slight, non-essential changes” in defining the role of journalists in society, the 1991 Code of Journalists of Slovenia, 237

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prepared by the Association of Slovenian Journalists (ASJ), represented “an immense change” (Poler Kovačič, 1996, p. 109): “A journalist’s fundamental obligation is true and genuine informing of the public” (ASJ, 1991). Poler Kovačič (1996, p. 109) considers that the code established journalists as decision-makers who were not accountable to act on behalf of their homeland, nation and working class, as they did during socialist self-management, but to perform on behalf of the public, implying what Igor Vobič (2013a) considers as a paradigmatic shift in Slovenian journalism toward high-modernism.1 In this conceptual context, the code of the largest journalistic organization has been revised twice – in 2002 and 2010. In both cases, as Poler Kovačič, van Putten and Vobič (2012, p. 82) claim, the process of drafting codes was brief, limited to a small group of people, and was not based on systematic research. Codes from other countries were consulted in the process of drafting (that is, the International Federation of Journalists Declaration and the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics in 2002, and the Dutch Journalism Guidelines in 2010), but not copied – rather, they were adapted to the national specifics from the practice of the Journalistic Court of Honour (Poler Kovačič et al., 2012, p. 83). Although previous research indicates that the code’s “strength has been diminishing” (Bervar, 2002, p. 73), Poler Kovačič et al. (2012, p. 84) claim the new code has been seen as a solution to ethical problems recognized in practice, which at least to some degree indicates journalistic codes are considered as a contribution to better journalism.2

Journalists’ ethics commission Društvo novinarjev Slovenije (Association of Slovenian Journalists – ASJ), joined by Sindikat novinarjev Slovenije (Union of Slovenian Journalists – USJ) in 1996, runs Novinarsko častno razsodišče (the Journalistic Court of Honour – JCH). This self-regulatory commission has eleven members: nine elected journalists and editors, and two representatives of the public (ASJ and USJ, 2010, Article 4). A case in front of the JCH can be initiated by anyone and needs “to contain detailed references to words, messages or actions that allegedly infringe provisions of the Code of Slovenian Journalists” (ASJ and USJ, 2010, Article 11). If planned, intentional or repetitious breaches are identified by the JCH, the commission can suggest to the JCH and USJ to exclude a journalist from both or one of the organizations. The JCH is also tasked with educating journalists and the public through symposiums, round tables and public debates as well as recommending changes to the code of ethics (Poler Kovačič, 2011, p. 79).3 During the profound societal changes in the 1980s, this journalists’ ethic commission gained substantial “moral capital” by autonomously basing its decisions on professional rights and duties set in the code, and not on intense political pressures (Poler Kovačič, 2011). However, in the 1990s, the conduct and reputation of the commission changed: “While in the 1980s journalists expected from it protection in the face of political pressures, they now saw it as a fortress of the profession that was to provide a refuge regardless of how they behaved” (Bervar, 2002, p. 59). Such collective sentiment prevailed during the 2000s, when some journalists left the association to avoid having to respect the commission’s decisions, while the media rarely published its rulings (Poler Kovačič, 2011). Thereafter, since 2010, most of the cases have involved journalists who are not members of the association or who have not responded to the claims in JCH’s cases (JCH, 2011, p. 1). Although the JCH indicates an increase in complaints, particularly those coming from the political sphere and the corporate sector, their rulings rarely enter the public debate. “Rulings and positions of the JCH are still only published on our website. In the media that are recognized as violators of the code they are not published in many cases, indicating a lack of awareness about the importance of self-regulation” (JCH, 2011, p. 2). 238

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Furthermore, the JCH has been criticized for its lack of power (Bervar, 2002); its rulings are not binding for other players in the media sphere, and publishers do not feel obliged to publish JCH’s adjunctions. These debates were closely linked with an initiative to establish a press or media council in 2001, started by the non-government organization (NGO) Mirovni inštitut (the Peace Institute) (Bervar, 2001). Although the journalistic community initially supported the idea, ASJ later distanced itself from it, because it would supposedly “open up the gates of different interests and lobbies”, and negatively affect media and journalism accountability (Poler Kovačič, 2011, p. 78).

Media ombudsmen The instrument of a media ombudsman was also an integral part of the initiative for a press or media council (Bervar, 2002). During discussions within the journalistic community, the Swedish model had received a lot of attention and was regarded by some as an “ideal solution” for the Slovenian context (ibid., p. 55). It was suggested that issues of media accountability would be addressed by a collective body, that is, a press or media council, as a higher complaints authority, where journalists, publishers and the public would all be represented. “That body could act as a supreme complaint authority, and in addition, thanks to the fact that the majority of operative tasks would be carried out by the ombudsman’s office, it would be able to devote itself to difficult and controversial cases with all due meticulousness and professional breadth” (ibid.). However, in the early 2000s, the media ombudsman instrument and the press or media council were taken off the self-regulatory agenda (Poler Kovačič, 2011, p. 78). Nevertheless, on the basis of the Radio and Television Corporation of Slovenia Act, in 2008 the public broadcaster appointed its first ombudsman, the Guardian of Viewers’ and Listeners’ Rights. The ombudsman’s work is based on the “principles of autonomy, impartiality, confidentiality and credibility” (RTV Slovenia, 2007, Article 6). The ombudsman collects complaints through the website and other communication channels, through which the public can report violations of their rights, based on the law of RTV Slovenia and the internal Professional Standards and the Principles of Journalistic Ethics (RTV Slovenia, 2000, Article 7). However, during the first five-year mandate, the prominent television presenter who acted as ombudsman stated in an interview that the Council of RTV Slovenia accused her first annual report of being “tendentious” and “politically biased” (Molk, cited in Mladina, 2009): “The public has been critical for years. I have been following their suggestions, comments and complaints. Those who criticize my report do not understand the function of the ombudsman. The debate was banal and it turned personal – non-productive in any sense” (ibid.). In the last annual report, the acting ombudsman, a prominent television journalist, editor and presenter, claimed that he felt as if he was “alone in a no-man’s land”. “While the public expects and demands moves to improve the quality and overcome repeating mistakes, editors and journalists see in the ombudsman their own guardian. This means conflict … [O]ur media house is not prepared to have an ombudsman” (Ambrožič, 2014).

Media news and analysis As stated above, traditional media institutions rarely publish the rulings of the ethics commission (Bervar, 2002), also reflecting the otherwise scarce contributions of media news and analysis in Slovenia – only a few media outlets have special sections devoted to media journalism, and they only occasionally concentrate on analysing matters of media accountability. 239

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For example, RTV Slovenia provides occasional call-in television or radio programmes where the Guardian of Viewers’ and Listeners’ Rights takes and responds to audience members’ questions and complaints. Moreover, in the last year of the first mandate, the acting ombudsman prepared a special monthly television programme ‘Je res?’ (‘Is it true?’), educating viewers about the role of the Guardian and analysing more difficult or repeat cases (Ambrožič, 2014). The current ombudsman considers that these shows popularized this instrument of media accountability: “The audience interest in the ombudsman’s work has been above average when the show started” (ibid.); in 2013, the number of complaints doubled in comparison to 2012 – from 483 to 988. Yet, in the last five years, among the established media, only the daily Dnevnik (Daily) and the political weekly Mladina (Youth) have had special satirical sections on media and journalism matters, while others have only occasionally devoted attention to media accountability. In this context, community media, such as the LGBT magazine Narobe (Wrong), the student monthly Tribuna (Tribune) and Radio Študent (Radio Student), play an important role as watchdogs of the mainstream media and in introducing participatory practices with respect to media accountability (Carpentier, Dahlgren and Pasquali, 2013). In addition, between 1998 and 2013, an important space for ‘critical self-reflection’ was provided by the journal Medijska preža (MediaWatch), financed by the Open Society Foundation (Škrinjar, 2014). The journal provided a forum where journalists, media experts and scholars could reflect on the challenges and problems of media accountability in Slovenia. In 2013, Medijska preža stopped its operations “due to financial problems”, because of a decrease in funds from the Open Society Foundation and a lack of other means of finance (Petković cited in Škrinjar, 2014).

Joint initiatives In the last five years, there have been several initiatives aimed at promoting and contributing to media and journalism accountability, bringing together different actors such as NGOs, universities and media institutions. In 2010, the National Institute for Public Health (NIPH) brought together a public university, several NGOs and journalists from different media outlets to jointly prepare professional guidelines for reporting on suicide, Spregovorimo o samomoru (‘Let’s talk about suicide’) (Roškar,Tančič Grum and Poštuvan, 2010).The guidelines provide key technical knowledge about suicide and its health, social and psychological-media aspects, while offering recommendations for decision-making on the real dilemmas facing journalists. In addition, in 2014, a consortium of the largest journalistic association, the human rights ombudsman, the NGO Zveza prijateljev mladine Slovenije (Friends of Youth Association of Slovenia) and several media outlets prepared the document Smernice za poročanje o otrocih (‘Guidelines for reporting on children’), which aimed at helping journalists to overcome central dilemmas when journalistic work is concerned with children (Ivelja et al., 2014).

Innovative instruments of media accountability Through the societal consolidation of the Internet as a relevant communication environment, the MAIs based on journalist-audience relationships have been substantially transformed in the past decade. In Slovenia, scholars distinguish different modes of audience engagement in media accountability (e.g.Vobič and Poler Kovačič, 2014;Vobič, 2014). These studies identify a power struggle within journalist-audience relationships, but find that these interactive modes have only minor relevance for the processes of media accountability. 240

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For example, research (e.g. Vobič, 2014) shows that Slovenian journalists and editors have been primarily focused on remaining as the central providers of information and interpretation in public life and on the media market, doing little to use online tools and environments, such as comment sections, blogs and social media, for media accountability purposes. At the same time, there are only a few examples of citizens using digital media for media accountability purposes. There are a few exceptions, like In media res,4 a blog by philosophy professor Boris Vezjak, which is dedicated to critically analysing media, and the L files,5 a blog by former journalist Domen Savič, recently exemplifying companies that advertise in ethically questionable media outlets. In this context, it appears that these interactive socio-communicative relationships between journalists and audiences are usually manifested within the corporate environments where the communication rights of citizens, journalists and audience members remain subordinated to the property rights of media owners (Splichal, 1999). Only on rare occasions do journalists use their relationships with audience members in the context of nurturing responsible conduct (Vobič, 2014). Nonetheless, there are some notable exceptions. In 2010, eight leading Slovenian online media (Delo.si, Dnevnik.si, MMC, Siol.net, Vecer.com, Zurnal24.si, 24ur.com and Slovenskenovice.si) signed the Code for Regulation of Hate Speech in Slovenian Web Portals (Safe.si, 2013). The code, which has been prepared by the Safer Internet Centre and its anti-hate speech Internet portal Spletno oko (‘the Web Eye’), brings together the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Ljubljana, the public research institute Arnes, the NGO Friends of Youth Association of Slovenia and the Mladinsko informativno svetovalno središče Slovenije (Youth Information and Counselling Centre of Slovenia). It obliges the signatories to introduce the registration of commentators as well as a system of content moderation (Vobič and Poler Kovačič, 2014). Web portals should include a warning that hate speech is against the law, and a button to report hate speech comments, which has been established as one of the mechanisms to keep hate speech out of the media (ibid.). The dilemmas that the Internet has brought about, for instance, the accuracy of information versus transparency and traceability of corrigendum, and public journalism versus credibility of information (Poler Kovačič, 2014b), have, for some time, shaped the debate on changing the Slovenian Journalist Code of Ethics to better suit the new media environment. Due to a lack of consensus among journalists on whether the existing code is applicable to the particularities of the ‘new’ media technologies, further amendment of it in this regard seems to be uncertain (ibid.). The Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Ljubljana, and its undergraduate, graduate and doctoral programmes of journalism are a relevant environment for furthering discussions on innovations in media accountability. For five decades, scholars from the Department of Journalism have been involved in public debates, in implementing MAIs and in educating journalists through journalism and media ethics courses (Poler Kovačič, 2014a). In the past decade, the curricula have been adapted, particularly for the courses Media Ethics, Journalism Ethics and Journalism, Ethics and Professionalism, in order to respond to the increasing dilemmas of the contemporary digital media environment where the boundaries of the mass media world become blurred (ibid.).

Conclusion The overall effectiveness of the MAIs discussed in Slovenia remains rather low. The Journalistic Court of Honour does not have the power to effectively enforce the code of ethics (Bervar, 2002) because of the lack of sanctions at its disposal and the fact that its activities receive very little publicity in the media. Furthermore, only a few media outlets have special sections devoted 241

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to media journalism and they only occasionally concentrate on analysing the problems of media accountability. The relatively strong community and alternative media that act as watchdogs of the mainstream media provide an important counterbalance. Nonetheless, alternative and community media lack the range and impact that the coverage of media accountability issues in the mainstream media could provide. The effectiveness of the Guardian of Viewers’ and Listeners’ Rights at RTV Slovenia is hampered by a lack of commitment from within the public broadcaster. Office holders of the Guardian of Viewers’ and Listeners’ Rights at RTV Slovenia have complained about both the politically motivated attacks on their work and the lack of support from RTV Slovenia (Molk cited in Mladina, 2009; Ambrožič, 2014). While the emergence of new media provides possibilities for empowering audiences, journalists and editors remain reluctant to give up their power as gatekeepers. Research indicates that little is being done to utilize online tools and environments for media accountability purposes (Vobič, 2014). Media organizations in Slovenia have generally not been proactive in the changing media environment, focusing more on cutting costs rather than on introducing innovative practices and business models, while political actors are reluctant to relinquish their influence on the media by strengthening the mechanisms of media accountability. The trend towards pauperization of journalists is of special concern as it threatens to further undermine the autonomy needed for effective self-regulation of the media and to increase the vulnerability of journalists to both political and commercial pressures.

Notes 1 Unlike in other countries, where the journalistic community is “fragmented into a number of ideologically and professionally divided smaller journalistic associations” (Bervar, 2002, p. 73), this is not the case in Slovenia, where until recently there was only one organization and one code. In 2007, the Association of Journalists and Publicists (AJP) was established “because of some journalists’ discontent with the Association of Slovenian Journalists” (Poler Kovačič et al., 2012, p. 75). However, the new association has not drafted its own code. It only published a translation of the Society of Professional Journalists Code of Ethics and Munich Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Journalists on its website as its accountability guidelines. 2 However, Poler Kovačič et al. (2012, p. 75) also acknowledge that the practice of adopting internal codes of ethics within media institutions “has not been rife in Slovenia” – there are only a few institutional codes, such as those of the public RTV Slovenia (2000) and the financial daily Finance (2005). 3 In 2010, AJP started its own ‘court of honour, but only small parts of its activities are made public. 4 http://vezjak.wordpress.com 5 http://www.dsavic.net

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30 Spain New formats and old crises Salvador Alsius, Ruth Rodriguez-Martinez and Marcel Mauri de los Rios

Abstract Tools of media accountability in Spain are experiencing an evolution similar to that observed in other European countries. Until just a few years ago, Spain employed most of the classic mechanisms of professional self-regulation, albeit unevenly.These included codes of ethics, press councils, groups protecting readers’ rights, editing statutes, professional committees, etc. In recent years, while not claiming that these means have disappeared, their importance and recognition have diminished in favour of instruments from the digital world. Currently, media are held to account primarily through blogs run by people, or by individuals, or, most importantly, through social networks.

Introduction In order to understand the current media system in Spain, certain contextual factors should be taken into account. The first of these is historic. Many aspects of life in Spain are still marked by the 40-year dictatorship of General Franco. While other countries in Western Europe recovered rapidly from the wounds of the Second World War, Spain was under the shadow of a dictatorship, which, as well as impeding normal political development, had a devastating effect on cultural development. Today, although four decades have passed since the death of the dictator in 1975, Spanish democracy is still hindered by remnants of the Franco era lingering on in the fabric of society. A second key aspect is that Spain cannot in any way be regarded as a single political and cultural unit.Various stereotypes, which bear fleeting resemblances to reality, are applied to Spain as they are to many other countries. Bullfighting is just one example of these clichés. On posters aimed at tourists, on symbolic maps and across the board in advertising, the typical Spaniard appears dressed as a toreador. It should be pointed out that the popularity of bullfighting has declined dramatically in recent years and that in some regions, bullfighting is actually banned. It should also be emphasized that, culturally, Spain is far from homogenous and that in some areas, other languages are spoken alongside Spanish, such as Catalan, Galician and Basque.

Journalistic culture and media system Spain has been described as belonging to the model that Hallin and Mancini (2004a, p. 89) define as the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model. However, the country’s cultural and 243

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linguistic diversity make the panorama much more complex. Taking the country as a whole, more than a hundred general newspapers are published, although the majority of these are local and have relatively low circulations. Among the most important are those published in Madrid – El País, El Mundo, ABC and La Razón – which aim to reach the whole country. Some newspapers published in Catalonia also figure among those with the highest circulation, notably La Vanguardia and El Periódico de Catalunya, both of which have a dual edition, one in Spanish and the other in Catalan. Regarding the audiovisual sector, both radio and television maintain a double public-private provision. Under Franco, the only channels were public, so although under the control of a dictator, the development of television in Spain did in fact take place according to the general European model, based on public service.The radio on offer was somewhat more commercial even in the last years of the dictatorship. Only after the death of Franco did television provision begin to diversify, first with the appearance of public channels in the regions that were very different culturally and linguistically (the Basque Country and Catalonia), and later, at the end of the 1980s, with the breakthrough of the private providers.1 Spanish media are now in crisis. It is no coincidence that in 2014 the directors of three of the country’s most important newspapers were replaced (El País and El Mundo, published in Madrid, and La Vanguardia, published in Barcelona). Obviously, two factors have contributed to a shake-up in the substructure of these well-established newspapers: economic performance and political pressures imposed by government. The newspaper El País, which belongs to the PRISA group, is a case in point. Just four years ago, El País enjoyed the largest circulation of a general-interest daily with daily sales averaging 383,000 (specialist sports newspapers are counted separately). Today, although El País still maintains first place, its average circulation is 292,000, a 23.7% drop. Almost all newspapers are experiencing a decline of this type.2 This reinforces historical data pointing to the generally low level of press readership, which has always been manifest in Spain. The most recent data on readership have been provided by the study ‘Values and Worldviews’ by the Fundación BBVA (BBVA Foundation), according to which Spain is situated below the European average for readership of the daily press.The European average stands at 31.9%. A significant sector of the Spanish population also admits to almost never reading a daily newspaper (34.2%).3 Spain has also experienced a concentration of power into the hands of a few large business conglomerations, which control the majority of the media market. The ownership structure of these groups is complex and in flux. The ideology of media is no longer the only incentive for investors because now the economic interests are also important. This gives rise to paradoxical situations in which a major shareholder may have interests in media whose political stance opposes their own view. In addition, a large number of media companies now form part of large corporations, which operate globally and begin to have interests in other business conglomerations controlling, for example, telecommunications. This phenomenon has been called “vertical concentration” (Pérez Gómez, 2002). As indicated by Álvaro Gutiérrez, the interconnections between groups are constant, as are the buying and selling of share packages with the aim of pushing interests to a wide public.4 The media sector is suffering the effects of a double crisis. On the one hand is the general economic crisis, which began affecting Spain in 2008 and brought the country to the brink of a bailout. On the other hand is a crisis specific to the media, which can be put down to a decrease in advertising revenues, poor management by the groups of the transition from analogue to digital and a sharp increase in certain overheads. The salaries of high-level directors within media groups should be highlighted among these increased overheads. This phenomenon has been observed in various countries, but in Spain has reached levels prompting a real feeling of public unease (Almirón, 2013). 244

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It has become almost a cliché, in referring to newspapers, that the analogue world is l­anguishing without actually dying, while the digital world has been born but not yet taken hold. In Spain, this cliché continues to hold true. It is proving very difficult for new digital media to find a sustainable business model. The online versions of the print press are in competition with digital newspapers created on the Internet, and for Internet consumption. The perennial debate is whether to offer information for free or to charge for it. In some cases, an intermediate, premium version has been tried. In the case of newspapers that are disseminated exclusively online, the apparent phenomenon of the resurgence in ideological polarization should be noted. According to a recent study (Pineda and Almirón, 2013), there is a clear, though not always explicit, predominance of right-wing viewpoints. Journalism is facing many serious problems for survival, as demonstrated by a recent survey carried out by the press association of Madrid.5 Between mid-2008 and October 2013, 11,151 press positions in Spain were axed, 4,434 of these (40% of the total) in 2013 alone. This loss of employment was not confined to journalists but extended to workers in the media in general. Equally worrying, since mid-2008, 284 media organizations (print and broadcasting media) have closed down, 73 of them in 2013. At the same time, quite a number of news websites have been created, managed by their own journalists. Consistent with this climate of serious crisis, the journalists surveyed stated that the main problems in the profession were, in this order, an increase in unemployment and job instability, the lack of political and economic independence in the media and the poor remuneration received by workers in journalism.

Established instruments of media accountability Codes and other exhortative documents Spain’s two main benchmark codes are the code of the Col·legi de Periodistes de Catalunya (Catalan College of Journalists), created in 1992, and the code of the Federación de Asociaciones de la Prensa Española (Federation of Press Associations of Spain, FAPE), created in 1993. The code of the Col·legi de Periodistes de Catalunya resulted from an effort to democratize a profession that had been controlled and repressed during the dictatorship of General Franco. The original text is made up of twelve central criteria, in which the basic activity of the journalist is summarized, plus an introduction, a final declaration and appendices. In 2001, specific recommendations were added, relating to how personal tragedies and news related to immigration should be treated. The publication of the FAPE code served to overcome the reticence which the profession had traditionally demonstrated towards this body. This code was a key element in promoting self-regulation and prompted Spanish journalism to adopt models of journalism common in the rest of Europe. Despite the importance of this body for the self-regulation of the journalistic profession, the number of Spanish media which actually adhere to general internal codes, including ethical directives and internal codes, is minimal. The situation is similar when observing the adherence of Spanish communication media to general external codes. This trend coincides with the results of the survey carried out by MediaAcT showing that Spanish journalists place less importance on ethical codes than the European average – an average of 3.12 out of 5 in Spain, as opposed to a European average of 3.44, where a value of 1 indicates little impact and 5 signifies high impact. To understand the scepticism of Spanish journalists regarding this instrument, it is worth taking into account that professionals in the media have little knowledge of the ethical codes (Real, 2010, p. 281). 245

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Press councils Spain is in a unique position concerning press councils, given that there is no such council at state level. The results of the MediaAcT survey demonstrate that in countries where there is no state-level council, the level of acceptance by journalists is lower. Although there is no body of this type for the Spanish state as a whole, the existence and importance of regional press councils should be noted. The Consell de la Informació de Catalunya (the Catalan Information Council, CIC), approved in 1992 and created in 1996, is a case in point. In 2004, the FAPE created its own ethical council, which is today known as the arbitration commission for complaints and ethics and is similar to the Catalan body. Regarding its structure, the CIC follows a model of participation in which three distinct groups are represented: media professionals, media owners and the public.The number of public representatives is greater than those representing professionals. Although the owners have only a weak and inconstant direct representation in the council, it is they who decide whether or not to accept the moral authority of the council. They contribute to defray the running costs through an annual fee, which is proportional to their size and audience. When examining in more detail the activity carried out by this type of organization, the CIC has investigated a total of 575 complaints (counting those that did not end in a ruling as well as those that did) received between 1997 and 2012. The system introduced by FAPE’s arbitration commission for complaints and ethics saw less activity, and was reformulated in July 2012.

Audiovisual authorities Spain is unique in having two regional audiovisual councils which act within the European context: the Consell Audiovisual de Catalunya (Audiovisual Council of Catalonia, CAC) and the Consejo Audiovisual de Andalucía (Audiovisual Council of Andalucía, CAA). Some autonomous parliaments, such as in the Canary Islands or the Balearic Islands, are developing laws for creating similar audiovisual councils. The CAC is an independent organization created by the Catalan parliament in the style of the French or Portuguese supreme audiovisual councils. Its main mission is to see that the regulations applicable to audiovisual communication service providers are complied with, be they public or private. The CAC’s members, six in total since 2013, consist of five councillors chosen by the Parlament de Catalunya (Catalan Parliament), plus its president, nominated by the regional government. The CAC’s decision-making process requires a consensus of two-thirds (4 of 6). Similar to the CAC, the CAA regulates audiovisual communication service providers in its own region. The CAA’s principal commitment is to ensure that the audiovisual media comply with the rights and liberties recognized in this field in Andalucia’s regional autonomy statute, as well as complying with other relevant laws pertaining to broadcasting and advertising. The CAA also provides an office for the defence of the rights of the viewer to process the complaints, suggestions and requests made by viewers or listeners, in cases where the public consider that certain rights or laws relating to audiovisual content, programming or advertising, have been infringed. The absence of an audiovisual council at state level means that the powers of these two existing councils are limited, as they are unable to intervene in media that provide national coverage. Recently, Spain’s government has drafted the creation of the Consejo Estatal de Medios Audiovisuales (National Audiovisual Media Council, CEMA), although the political consensus needed to ascertain its powers and composition has not yet been achieved. 246

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Ombudspersons Several Spanish media have a readers’ ombudsman, and journalists rate this instrument more highly than the European average (2.80% as against 2.32%). To understand this result, it should be remembered that readers’ ombudsmen have traditionally been used by prestigious newspapers, such as El País, La Vanguardia, La Voz de Galicia, El Correo Gallego and El Punt (now El Punt/Avui). The ombudsmen generally have a weekly column where they comment on any complaints received from readers and include the responses offered by the journalists involved. In the audiovisual sector, the concept of the ombudsman has also been introduced, in particular in the Radio y Televisión de Andalucía (Radio Television of Andalucía, RTVA), Radio Televisión Española (RTVE Radio Television of Spain) and la Corporació Catalana de Mitjans Audiovisuals (Catalan Corporation of Audiovisual media, CCMA).

Media journalism Although there is no systematic tradition of media-critical reporting in Spain, a significant number of the newspapers printed in Spain have a section dedicated to issues of communication. Newspapers that incorporate this type of section include El País, El Mundo and La Vanguardia. A large number of printed newspapers, however, publish news about journalistic media on a more superficial level and include sections with titles such as ‘television’ or ‘leisure’. Digital newspapers like El Plural,6 La Voz Libre7 or El Semanal Digital8 are the media that publish more general media-critical reporting and it is here that information on this issue is published consistently. Audiovisual media include programmes where media criticism takes place (Telemonegal, 2003–2013), although this often assumes an ironic or superficial tone (El intermedio9). In addition, there is a range of journalism magazines which are dedicated exclusively to publishing news about the profession. Examples of this include the free RedAcción, a bi-monthly magazine edited by the journalists’ union of Andalucia.The magazine Luz y Taquígrafos has a similar stance, edited by a journalists’ union in Madrid. Another significant example is the magazine Capçalera, which has been edited by the Col·legi de Periodistes de Catalunya since 1989, and which aims to analyse the journalistic profession from the stance of constructive criticism.

Audience associations Spain does not have a long tradition of newspaper readers’ clubs, but the audiovisual sector has changed this trend. In recent years, the number of associations for television audiences has increased. As highlighted by Aznar (1999) and Herrera (2005), the appearance and development of these movements have resulted in a certain degree of progressive maturity of audiences. In most cases, these associations also enjoy a growing legal support for the development of their activities and the most mature and well-established of these institutions is the Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación10 (Association of Communication Users, AUC). This association defines itself as a non-profit, independent organization, devoted to defending the rights of citizens as users of the different mass media.The association provides a complaint and right-to-reply service, whereby users can send their comments and suggestions. The Telespectadors Associats de Catalunya11 (Associated Viewers of Catalonia,TAC) are also quite well established in the Catalonia region. Another example of this instrument is the platform called iCmedia,12 portrayed on its website as a Federación de Asociaciones de Consumidores y Usuarios de los Medios (Federation of Media Consumers’ Associations). This Federation makes decisions and takes action to improve the quality of media content, particularly related to youth and children, and it contributes to 247

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the creation of a freer, fairer and more supportive society, bearing in mind the new multiscreen reality. Another fundamental objective is to act as a benchmark of support for families in guaranteeing the protection of young viewers. The Federation offers a self-regulatory code for content aimed at children, and ensures that material comes with information on its content. The members of the associations that make up the Federation choose members of the steering committee of iCmedia at their annual general assembly. The Federation has an advisory council formed of professionals and academics from the audiovisual sector. The Federation states that it makes complaint forms available to its users and organizes forum meetings, activities and prizes. Currently, 17 associations make up the Federation, representing 100,000 members from almost all the autonomous communities in Spain (although this claim is unsubstantiated by academic research).

Innovative instruments of media accountability Spanish journalists are within the European average (3.61 out of 5, the European average being 3.60) when asked to consider that the Internet has increased the ability of the public to call the media to account about its work. This, however, has not brought about a clear commitment to new models of accountability on the part of traditional media beyond opening these participative windows to its users. Spanish media has adapted rapidly to digital platforms and social networks; however, this process did not imply the significant appearance of new instruments of online self-regulation.Traditional media has been limited to fostering user participation through social networks, principally Facebook and Twitter (Alsius, Mauri and Rodríguez, 2011, p. 165). It is clear that journalists gradually “are becoming more engaged on social media and taking more interest in what people are saying about their work” (Powell and Jempson, 2014, p. 126). In this way, among Spanish professionals, criticism on social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) is one of the new self-regulatory instruments, to which most impact is attributed (3.11 out of 5, 1 being no impact and 5 the most impact). This is very much above the average perception among European journalists (2.61), according to the survey carried out by the MediaAcT project. Beyond this attention to social networking, however, there is little observable willingness on the part of traditional media to exploit the potential offered by the Internet as a means to develop innovative initiatives in the sphere of self-regulation and accountability to its audience. It is in the new online media where these innovative models of transparency and accountability can be found. There, the digital transformation “has also created a favorable atmosphere for the rise of new media where the role played by the audience is decisive” (Alsius, Mauri and Rodríguez, 2011, p. 165). These new online media are the fruitful outcome of an evolving economic and journalistic context of the economic crisis, the bigger presence of digital natives13 among journalists and readers and new ways to consume news content through mobile platforms such as tablets or smartphones. Faced with this situation, but also that caused by the recent drop in credibility affecting journalists and the media,14 digital media has responded differently in its creation, adaptation and reinvention of certain self-regulatory and transparency models as a necessary opportunity to recover the trust of the public. A good example is Eldiario.es,15 a media organization that was founded in 2012 as the brainchild of a group of journalists who had worked on the newspaper Público (which had folded several months previously). The intention of Eldiario.es is to provide more transparent information with a clear desire to explain its proceedings to its readership.This news website has its own online ombudsman as well as its own in-house media blog for its editorial staff. This and other digital news publications, such as Vilaweb.cat16 (founded in 1996, and a pioneer in fostering participation among its readership community) or Ara.cat17 (established in 2011 as a double, paper248

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online newspaper), share common features. They prioritize public participation and introduce various tools, such as online chats or participation in editorial advice, as a means of fostering such participation wherever possible. With the aim of encouraging the active participation of readers, certain online media (such as lainformacion.com18) have designed systems for the detection and correction of errors, enabling users to feel they are taking an active part in the process of news production. One means of creating a link with the public also includes encouraging the economic involvement of readers by means of crowdfunding. There are already various new media that have taken up these innovative formulas to launch projects. One of the more recent examples is Sentit Crític,19 a media initiative that emerged in 2014 and seeks, via economic commitment from the public, a greater co-responsibility and transparency between the media platforms and the public. Its aim is to bring about a much more committed and active participation from their readership. Outside the main online media institutions, we find other innovative accountability instruments. One of these is fixmedia.com,20 an error-correction service which can be applied to existing media. In this interactive medium, registered users flag up errors and can suggest corrections to what has been published by any media organization. In this area outside the mainstream media, we also find instruments such as online services offering criticism by journalist bloggers. Of particular note in this sector are certain consolidated projects such as Media.cat, a monitoring initiative developed by the Ramon Barnils journalists’ association, which casts a critical eye over the media. In addition, once a year and by means of crowdfunding, this group produces some 15 investigative reports on subjects on which the mainstream media have been silent. Then there is the blog Periodistas21,21 a vital web resource from the journalist Juan Varela, who offers a critical survey of the whole panorama of Spanish journalism. Spanish journalists consider that this type of blog has a relative impact (2.75 out of 5), although this is somewhat above the European average (2.48). Examples of audience blogs are Malaprensa (that tracks down all types of errors committed across the Spanish media) or the web page run by the Federación de Asociaciones de Consumidores y Usuarios de los Medios22 that sets out to give a voice to the readership and to promote initiatives to improve media quality. It is also worth singling out other monitoring, or media-critical blogs, in the academic sphere. One such example is infotendencias.com, financed by the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte (Ministry for Education, Culture and Sports), in which various researchers from Spanish universities analyse the quality of convergent media. There is also the specialist website Portal de la Comunicació,23 produced by Barcelona’s Universitat Autònoma. This portal was created in 2001 with the goal of analysing the ethical conduct of the media. Another website is the Observatorio de la Producción Audiovisual24 of the city’s Universitat Pompeu Fabra, dedicated to the objective monitoring of audiovisual media. Clearly, in recent years, academic research in Spain into media transparency and accountability has grown apace. Some research projects, such as ‘Ética y Excelencia Informativa’ (Excellence and Media Ethics), financed by the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte (2006–2009) and coproduced by a number of Spanish universities, or the ongoing project ‘Transparencia y Rendición de Cuentas en la Información Periodística’ (Transparency and Accountability in Journalism), also financed by the Ministerio de Educación, Cultura y Deporte, are good examples of this change.

Conclusion Spain enjoys a varied outlook on media accountability instruments developed in the past 20 years after the consolidation of democracy. However, problems such as unemployment, the lack of political and economic independence in the media or the drop in credibility suffered by 249

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journalists and the media in recent years make the development and consolidation of media accountability instruments uncertain. Considering traditional instruments of media accountability, Spanish journalists give less importance to press councils or ethical codes than the European average, but this perception changes and is above the European average when Spanish journalists value the audiovisual authorities or the ombudsperson. Regarding innovative instruments, Spanish journalists are within the European average when asked to consider that the Internet has increased the ability of the public to call the media to account over its work. For instance, criticism on social networks (e.g. Facebook, Twitter, etc.) is one of the new self-regulatory instruments to which most impact is attributed, very much above the average perception among European journalists. Regarding new innovative instruments, it cannot be denied that the development of media accountability instruments on the Internet has enhanced their variety in this field. Digital media websites not only offer interesting critical overviews of the whole panorama of Spanish journalism, but also prioritize and promote public participation. Thus, in the current circumstances, despite old problems and crises, focused research on ethics is necessary in Spain to monitor changes in media accountability instruments, self-regulation and transparency.

Notes   1 For a more detailed description see Alsius et al. (2011).   2 Up-to-date data on press circulation can be found at http://www.introl.es/medios-controlados/  3 ‘Values and Worldviews’ is an international study from the Fundación BBVA which examines the range of perceptions, attitudes and values of citizens in ten European countries dealing with both the public and private spheres. The data were obtained following the completion of 15,000 questionnaires between November 2012 and January 2013 in Germany, Denmark, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, the UK, the Czech Republic and Sweden (http://www.fbbva.es/TLFU/dat/ Presentacionvalueswordwidel.pdf).   4 For an up-to-date description of the fabric of media groups in Spain, see the article by Álvaro Gutiérrez ‘Quién manda en los medios de comunicación españoles?’ (Who runs the Spanish communication media?) in Tribuna Interpretativa (http://tribunainterpretativa.com/quien-manda-los-medios-comunicacion-espanoles/).   5 The study was carried out in 2013 and presented in December of the same year. See http://www.apmadrid.es/noticias/generales/informe-de-la-profesion-periodistica-2013-11151-empleos-perdidos-y284-medios-cerrados-desde-2008  6 http://www.elplural.com  7 http://www.lavozlibre.com  8 http://www.elsemanaldigital.com  9 http://www.lasexta.com/programas/el-intermedio/ 10 http://www.auc.es 11 http://taconline.net 12 http://www.icmedianet.org/ 13 http://henryjenkins.org/2007/12/reconsidering_digital_immigran.html 14 According to the February 2014 barometer from Spain’s Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (Centre for Sociological Investigation), journalists are the least-rated professionals, just ahead of judges. 15 http://www.eldiario.es 16 http://vilaweb.cat 17 http://www.ara.cat 18 http://www.lainformacion.com 19 http://www.elcritic.cat 20 http://www.fixmedia.org 21 http://www.periodistas21.com 22 http://www.icmedianet.org 23 http://www.portalcomunicacion.com 24 http://www.upf.edu/depeca/opa

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31 Sweden A long history of media accountability adaption Torbjörn von Krogh

Abstract Sweden has a long history of media accountability adaption, with institutionalized media criticism in the 19th century, the beginning of a code of ethics for the press in 1900, a press council in 1916 and a national press ombudsman for the public in 1969. Due to recent changes in the consumption and the economy of traditional news media, the accountability instruments are once again adapting to new conditions, where media convergence is an important factor. Examples of new online MAIs include a weekly podcast with a discussion on media development and media ethics between the chief editors of the two leading national tabloids Aftonbladet and Expressen. The roles of their news organizations have changed with their online versions, where they gather the largest audiences in the country, with more resources for information than in the sensational tabloids. This change is manifested in the podcast that interacts with its audience via Twitter. Innovations, more than institutions, are important features in this ongoing media accountability adaptation.

Introduction Sweden has a long history of pioneering media accountability with early examples of institutionalized media criticism1 and a press council in place in 1916. After political pressure, the selfregulatory system was successfully upgraded in the 1960s with Allmänhetens pressombudsman (the national news ombudsman for the public – PO2) together with lay members of the council and an obligation for newspapers to pay a fee when criticized by the Press Council. This historical ability to adjust media self-regulation to the evolution of media and society and to gradually reform the voluntary institutions of media accountability is now somewhat in doubt; small signs of crisis are slowly emerging. Some influential newspapers have temporarily left the Press Council, which together with the diminishing profits of traditional media companies has led to anxiety regarding the funding of the Press Council in the future. However, in parallel with this development, media journalism and various less-formal accountability initiatives are gaining ground within the media sphere and among the public. Sweden no doubt belongs to the group of “most advanced countries” in MediaAcT’s categorization of media accountability development (Fengler and Eberwein, 2014, p. 44). 251

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Journalistic culture and media system Sweden fits well into the description of countries typical of the Democratic Corporatist Model (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a). The country has a history of a partisan press combined with a strong mass-circulation press; an evolving high level of journalistic professionalization, including very early introductions of codes of ethics and a press council; strong organizations for publishers and journalists; and protection of press freedom, combined with state interventions in the media sphere plus a substantial public service sector (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a; Weibull, 2007). The Freedom of Information Act is the world’s oldest of its kind, and was included in the 1766 Constitution. Sweden also has a very robust public service broadcasting sector. The main character of the news journalism performed there has been studied over time and given different overarching labels: journalists behaved like educators 1925–1945, mirrors 1945–1965, watchdogs 1965–1985 and interpreters 1985–2005 (Djerf-Pierre and Weibull, 2013). The watchdog ideal still tops the list when Swedish journalists are surveyed individually (Wiik, 2012), but the watchdog function is not perceived by journalists to be the focus for the development of journalism. Half of them find that journalistic/professional and ideological/political motives have become weaker, while some 80% find that economic/market/technical motives have grown stronger (Andersson and Wiik, 2012, p. 62). The strong adherence to the watchdog function may, in part, be seen as a reaction to a growing commercialization of the media. An international survey in 2012 showed that, to a large extent, Swedes have faith in the government, and more so than in many other countries. Only 14% envisioned widespread corruption in the government, compared to e.g. 30% in Finland, 43% in the UK, 58% in Germany, 67% in Austria and 86% in Italy (Gallup, 2013). This high trust in the government also illuminates the relationship between the state and the media in Sweden. On the one hand, it is not forbidden for the government to intervene in media matters: parliament pushed hard and successfully to sharpen the more or less voluntarily accountability instruments in the late 1960s. A system for state subsidies to ensure the continued publication of financially weak newspapers started in the 1970s and is still in place. Over time, the government has added content obligations for the public broadcasters. On the other hand, the statutory transparency of public administration since 1766, and the media’s ability to utilize the right to see public documents in a watchdog manner and to disseminate results to a large audience, is believed to hinder corruption and to promote trust in the government – and the media (Weibull and Börjesson, 1995; von Krogh, 2013; Färdigh, 2013). For many years, newspaper readership in Sweden involved about 80–85% of the population. Since 2005, newspapers have been losing ground, especially among younger people. Readership in 2013 was about 60% of the population. Falling circulations and advertising revenues have led to the consolidation of ownership and downsizing of newsrooms in local, regional and metropolitan news organizations. The two nationwide single copy tabloids, Aftonbladet and Expressen, have lost half of their circulation since 2005, but to a large extent, they have managed to convert their operations (and revenues) to the Internet. Aftonbladet is the leading news portal, with approximately 5 million unique visitors per week – Sweden has a population of 9.6 million. Trust in the media varies with regard to the specific media’s mixture of news reporting (higher level of trust) and entertainment (lower level of trust).

Established instruments of media accountability Due to the wide freedom of the printed press since the Constitution of 1766 – by law only one registered person, usually the editor-in-chief, is responsible for the content – the voluntary 252

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system of handling complaints is quite complex. Pressens opinionsnämnd (The Press Council – PC) only deals with complaints regarding newspaper content published in print or online; the journalists’ union deals with complaints concerning journalistic methods (e.g. interviews under false pretences); and the government agency Granskningsnämnden (The Swedish Broadcasting Commission – SBC3) deals with complaints on what is broadcast by companies based in Sweden. There are holes in the net, and it is sometimes difficult for a claimant to know how and where to complain, especially as all of the media organizations are active on a growing number of platforms. The main financial backer of the PC, the Newspaper Publishers’ Association (NPA), has been weakened by the loss of print circulation and print revenue among its members; it is trying to broaden the financial base for the Council – and to make it more up to date – by transforming the PC to a Media Council, dealing with complaints for all kinds of platforms and for content as well as journalistic methods. NPA bylaws state that news organizations that are criticized by the PC must pay a fee (it is not called a fine) to the Council, and in total, these fees cover about 15% of the Council’s costs. The sums are fixed: €1,200 for small papers (with circulations of up to 10,000 copies) and €3,000 for papers with larger circulations. Still, the self-regulatory system works fairly well. The PC criticizes the editors-in-chief for about 10–15% of the 400–500 complaints each year that are delivered to and handled by the PO. The Council and the Ombudsman are both known and, most of the time, respected by the public and the media. The Ombudsman holds newsroom seminars, writes columns and participates in public debates. The SBC receives about 1,300–1,400 complaints a year, and about 5% of the cases lead to criticism by the SBC. However, the complaints system regarding journalistic methods is neither well known by the public nor especially respected by the media. It received 26 complaints from 2008 to 2012, and criticized one journalist (Wigorts Yngvesson, 2012). The Code of Ethics started expanding into new areas in the late 19th century. Ethical guidelines are formalized and adopted by Pressens Samarbetsnämnd, a committee made up of the Union of Journalists, the NPA, the Magazine Publishers’ Association and Publicistklubben (The National Press Club).This committee is also the mandator for the PC. Today, the strengths and weaknesses of the Code of Ethics reflect the system described above.The paragraphs dealing with published newspaper content (in print and online) are referred to, debated and sometimes changed, as a result of the criticism. The paragraphs dealing with journalistic methods and with advertorials gain less attention. In a small survey carried out in 2013, representatives of the media said that media ethics in Sweden had improved since 1990, whereas representatives of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), labour market organizations and industry said that it had deteriorated (Bergling, 2013). However, all parties were in favour of a new Media Council replacing the PC (ibid.).The Media Council is slowly getting under way, but the process will take some years due to the legal changes needed for the public broadcasters. There is an ongoing input of views and facts on media behaviour from different NGOs and two specific private media institutes. Timbro Medieinstitut is assigned by industry and commerce to study media mistakes and argue for increased transparency and accountability (Olin, 2012). Institutet för mediestudier, is a media institute financed by labour unions, NGOs, the church and industry in order to deepen the media debate based on media research4 (von Krogh, 2012a). There is also media scrutiny going on in newspapers, trade journals, radio, television, books, films and theatre – and, of course, on the Internet. The most important arena for independent, continuous media journalism bordering on media criticism is the weekly public service radio show Medierna (the Media).The public radio company Sveriges Radio has shown its commitment to media journalism with a regular programme since 1970 (Brunnberg, 2012). Medierna is an agenda-setting show with an investigative edge, important for discussion of both the traditional and social media (Truedson, 2012). 253

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One landmark example of effective media journalism took place in 2004 within the public service broadcaster Swedish Television (SVT) (von Krogh, 2012a). The hard-hitting weekly investigative SVT show Uppdrag Granskning (Mission: Investigation) was feared among powerholders for its exposures, but also criticized for too much drama at the expense of facts. These criticisms seldom resulted in more than rather arrogant responses from Mission: Investigation. At the time, SVT had a programme covering media matters called Mediemagasinet (The Media Magazine) that decided to check the content of Mission: Investigation. The Media Magazine focused on three episodes of the investigative programme and found quite a few blatant errors concerning the handling of facts, sources, statistics and conclusions. The well-documented exposé resulted in profound changes in how the investigative show was researched, fact-checked and produced. External criticism was crucial to the process of qualitative change to speed up within the organization, despite internal resistance (Hanson, 2012). The number of reprimands from SBC fell from 1 per 36 shows to 1 per 204 shows (Edström, 2012).

Current research on established instruments Building on earlier works on the Swedish self-regulatory system (Weibull and Börjesson, 1994), field studies focusing on the conflict for journalists between media ethics in theory and in practice (Ekström and Nohrstedt, 1996) and the friction between corporatist codes of ethics and individual morality (Wigorts Yngvesson, 2006), a renewed interest in media accountability research has evolved in the 2010s.This new wave of research deals with a theoretical elaboration of aspects of media criticism (Stiernstedt, 2014; Svensson, 2015); an inventory of media criticism in politics, industry, research, media and civil society in Sweden from 1988 to 2012 (von Krogh, 2012a); and the analysis of interrelations between media criticism, media accountability and media governance in Sweden from 1940 to 2010 (von Krogh, 2012b).

Innovative instruments of media accountability Some online examples worth noting focus on media responsiveness and media scrutiny, performed by media heavyweights as well as outsiders. As noted in the historic resume, the competition for news between the two leading Swedish tabloids Aftonbladet and Expressen has led to ethical mistakes and harsh media criticism in the past – at times so harsh that the whole system of self-regulation was affected and reformed. Aftonbladet and Expressen still compete for the news, but they also cooperate in spreading media literacy online and discussing the media criticism of the day. Since April 2013, the editors-inchief of these two single-copy papers have produced a weekly 1.5-hour podcast where the two of them elaborate on media evolution and media events, both worldwide and in Sweden. Both papers have gone from being printed newspapers to becoming news brands on the Internet; Aftonbladet is one of the few papers that make a profit online. The two top editors, Thomas Mattsson and Jan Helin, receive (often critical) questions from the public and the profession via Twitter and respond with quite detailed answers.5 They also deal in depth with complicated issues. For example, one podcast was wholly devoted to a discussion of recent rulings by the PC. Another podcast analysed, in detail, the pros and cons of the journalistic coverage of the M/S Estonia, which sank in the Baltic in 1994 with the loss of 852 passengers. Ethical issues of reporting on catastrophes are discussed. About 30,000 users download the podcast every week. The television programme Mission: Investigation often broadcasts stories concerning industrial or political corruption. The producers have become used to heavy criticism from people in power, which in turn has led to a number of transparency instruments on the programme’s 254

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website, e.g. policy documents, a manual with aspects concerning fairness and ethics to be examined twice by a ‘devil’s advocate’ in the reporting process, a manual for fact-checking and a primer on investigative journalism and the methods used. The latest instrument on the site is called UG-referens. It consists of the manuscript for each major story, with hyperlinks to the sources for the facts that are mentioned, and is made available on the programme’s site as soon as the story has been broadcast. One example of UG-referens has been translated into English.6 It deals with the Snowden documents about the National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance activities and contains NSA documents, full interviews with key people, correspondence with government agencies and editorial statements from the producers explaining why these documents are published. In March 2014, the freesheet Metro began to examine stories in social media that had gone viral and had begun to be regarded as matters of fact in professional media channels – but mostly without journalistic checking.They called the project Viralgranskaren (The Viral Eye)7 and found lots and lots of false stories, some of which were fabricated for xenophobic reasons. The Viral Eye did not immediately go viral itself, but has been widely shared both in social and traditional media. The project has also produced a guide for fact-checking in social media and a list of unreliable sources on the Internet for stories that often go viral.8 The fourth example is called Rättviseräknaren (in English approximately the Fairness Calculator) that has developed from the practice of the non-profit NGO Rättviseförmedlingen (The Equalisters).9 The Equalisters were born in 2010 out of a frustration with the massive domination of white middle-aged males used as experts, interviewees and commentators in the mainstream media and in other parts of society. The NGO has 60,000 followers on Facebook and uses crowdsourcing to suggest alternatives to the established experts in the media and elsewhere. ‘Equal’ stands for equality and ‘listers’ for all the people who contribute to creating the alternative lists.The next step in this development was the Fairness Calculator that aims to show solid statistics online in a simple way, for example, gender representation in the media.Vinnova, the Swedish Governmental Agency for Innovation Systems, which funds this €500,000 project, believes that accurate and up-to-date statistics in this field will facilitate change.

Innovation versus institution All of the examples above are fairly new, and we do not know how long they will last. Sweden has seen a number of online accountability initiatives that have started, flourished for some time, made some impact and then declined or died. Is this a problem when it comes to finding ways of improving media accountability? Yes, if you find the institutionalization of criticism or monitoring a necessary prerequisite for influencing media actors in an effective manner over time (see e.g. Heikkilä et al., 2012, p. 68). The PC is a visible example of this kind of institution. The answer, however, will be no, if you make analogies with short-term popular campaigns in the past concerning specific media malfunctions. There are, of course, all kinds of interactions and dependencies between institutions and initiatives and campaigns, but the amorphous character of online and social media activities might favour a variety of intense, yet limited, initiatives. They are active in a media ecosystem that already has a readiness for media criticism and a demand for media accountability. The quest for gender equality in the media may illuminate this process. Activists, teachers and media researchers in the city of Gothenburg founded the media-watch organization Allt är Möjligt (Everything is Possible – EIP)10 in 1992 in order to influence the media and its users concerning gender representation and equality. Their slogan is “Don’t let the media change you – change the media instead!” Staff from this NGO lecture in schools and newsrooms, take part in 255

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worldwide statistical surveys (Who makes the news?)11 and inform and debate on traditional and social media. EIP has produced a strategy book on media criticism, and a starter kit for media activists (including a coding grid for checking media content). Some progress has been noted, but media stereotypes and structures are still quite resistant. The accountability activities of EIP have changed over time, but the organization remains. One short-lived project emanating from Gothenburg concerned making yearly editorial balance sheets in co-operation with newspapers, radio stations and television companies. Some items, inspired by EIP, dealt with gender representation in, and behind, the news. The project only lasted for a few years, but the accountability instrument of continuous gender surveys (and surveys for other aspects) is still in use in numerous newsrooms. A new daily newspaper, Dagens ETC, publishes an account of how many women and how many men are interviewed and written about in the paper every day. Twitterstorms and online petitions regarding the portrayal and defamation of women in social media are accompanied by in-depth television investigations on the same subject. A number of newsrooms have called on the resources of The Equalisters to change their routines for finding experts to quote and cases to describe. Several of the newsrooms belong to the public broadcaster Sveriges Television, which has an elaborate corporate policy of plurality concerning both staff and programmes, with plurality checklists before and monitoring after broadcasts. The Equalisters have received a number of awards for their achievements. The Fairness Calculator is the latest accountability instrument that The Equalisters have announced. Nobody knows for how long the Calculator or the organization will prevail, but this is the context in which they and many others12 act – a mixture of established organizations and vital initiatives with short lifespans (see e.g. the MediaAcT report on Germany for a similar discussion: Evers and Eberwein, 2011). Some research has been undertaken on public participation in news gathering online, although the focus is more on the democratic potential than on media accountability issues (e.g. Bergström, 2011; Jönsson and Örnebring, 2011). The attitudes of chief editors and other media leaders towards media criticism and media accountability on- and offline have been found to be a mixture of public relations, control and quality considerations (von Krogh, 2008b; von Krogh and Nord, 2010; von Krogh, 2014). The Open Newsroom, a pioneering project that took place from 2007 to 2009 in the Swedish Television newsroom Aktuellt and involved a high degree of production transparency, has been analysed in terms of reflection and reflexivity, and boundaries for transparency are discussed (Graf, 2009). The effects of ‘source transparency’ and ‘message transparency’ on readers’ trust in the news was found to be minimal in an experimental setting concerning a very local news item that was tested with different degrees of transparency attached to it (Karlsson, Clerwall and Nord, 2014). The most positive effect was obtained by using links to original sources, a method that is highly rated by European journalists in the MediaAcT survey (Groenhart and Evers, 2014, p. 134).

Other media accountability instruments Two areas are relevant here: further education and public debates.

Further education The main form of education for Swedish journalism students is two- or three-year university programmes. In addition, Sweden has two systems of free further education for practising journalists. One is financed by the state, and participants are selected based on prior (lack of ) 256

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education and on their written motivations. The other is a private system for further education financed by a gift from the industrialist Marcus Wallenberg, who in the late 1960s was annoyed with what he felt was a lack of journalistic knowledge in financial matters. Both systems include media ethics in their courses on contemporary issues. Grävande journalister (Digging journalists) is an association of journalists with 800–900 members, which holds a three-day seminar each year on experiences, methods and ethical problems in investigative journalism. A number of newsrooms have yearly seminars with the national Press Ombudsman about rulings from the PC, and some have also met with victims of press abuse in order to comprehend and discuss individual consequences. Some NGOs, e.g. from the Swedish Disability Federation, have conducted workshops and seminars within media organizations on representation issues (von Krogh, 2010).

Debates Media issues are continuously debated on media talk shows. However, there are plenty of other opportunities to go deeper into problems of media accountability. Journalism schools, private media research institutes, trade unions, the National Press Club in Stockholm (plus their five regional press clubs) and educational organizations like ABF (the Workers’ Educational Association) regularly invite professionals and the public to debates on contemporary controversial media issues. There are also special events – a full week of politics and societal matters in July, a four-day book fair in September, and a three-day media fair in March – with thousands of seminars and debates, where media accountability topics (among other issues) are debated with panels of media representatives, media researchers, NGOs, politicians and media users.

Conclusion The overriding problem concerning media accountability in Sweden is how to transform the existing press-centric self-regulatory system into a media-centric system, and to achieve this in a media landscape where audiences and economic factors shift at great speed. This speed, however, is also beneficial for deciding and implementing new accountability instruments. One significant benchmark example in Sweden is the previously mentioned weekly podcast created by the editors-in-chief of two of the most successful traditional media operations converting to digital publishing – and also the two papers most frequently criticized by the PC. They dwelled at length on ethical issues – albeit on their own terms. They did, however, admit mistakes, perform self-reflection and make apologies. Another benchmark example is Viralgranskaren, The Viral Eye, which is adapted to the new, more fluent, media situation. To what extent are the different media accountability instruments effective? We know that fierce political criticism combined with threats of legislation was instrumental in the 1960s in shaping the new PC (von Krogh, 2009), and that thorough media journalism raised the quality of investigations in Mission: Investigation.We also know that media responses to media criticism most often include a combination of paradigm repair, potential public relations effects and some quality concerns (von Krogh, 2014). Taking the question to another level: How do you measure media accountability effectiveness? Are media accountability instruments effective when complete media satisfaction among stakeholders is obtained? Some friction between media and society is most likely a necessary indicator of the media fulfilling its societal task (Plaisance, 2000). Maybe it would be possible to separate criticism due to factual and contextual sloppiness in the media (negative friction) from criticism fuelled by crucial societal media revelations (positive friction). This would be an 257

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interesting field for further study, especially in a continuously changing media landscape, when differentiating between short- and long-term effects, between views on media conduct and content among the public, among powerful stakeholders and within the media.

Notes   1 E.g. magazines devoted to press criticism, such as Granskaren (The Examiner) in 1865 and Dementin (The Retraction) in 1923.  2 http://www.po.se/english  3 http://www.radioochtv.se/en/content-regulation/   4 The author of this chapter acted as director for the Institute 2009–2014.  5 http://www.mattssonhelin.libsyn.com  6 http://www.svt.se/ug/read-all-articles-in-english  7 http://www.metro.se/om-metro/the-viral-eye-let-us-check-before-you-share/EVHnet!DXpm3 ED1Co3IM/  8 http://www.metro.se/nyheter/dear-journalist-colleagues-this-is-why-we-shouldn-t-publish-storiesbased-on-anonymous-web-comments/EVHncz!ocSDCqqGyrUvg/  9 http://rattviseformedlingen.se/equalisters 10 http://www.alltarmojligt.se/index.php/in-english 11 http://whomakesthenews.org 12 E.g. Genews that has provided newsrooms with tools for measuring gender representation quicker than the Fairness Calculator; http://genews.io/se

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32 Switzerland A role model with glitches Colin Porlezza

Abstract Switzerland is a small country with a well-developed system of MAIs compared to other European countries – with some exceptions. Traditional MAIs such as the Swiss Press Council, ombudspersons, trade magazines and different associations are particularly well established and respected among journalists. With regard to innovative MAIs, however, the situation is less than perfect: while the number of media blogs may increase, continuity is often difficult to achieve. Social media like Twitter have some self-regulating potential in terms of critique and feedback to the media and journalists, in particular, but a wider audience is still missing. On top of that, journalists still ascribe a very low impact to such practices. Generally, the traditional self-regulation system in Switzerland works quite well, while innovative MAIs, in particular, still have a long way to go to achieve a comparable status and effectiveness.

Introduction In November 2012, the Swiss government established a new Eidgenössische Medienkommission (Federal Media Commission – FMEC), which advises the Federal Council as a non-parliamentary administrative committee with regard to matters of media financing as well as media regulation.1 The FMEC “is responsible for monitoring and analysing the Swiss media landscape and delivering recommendations on selected issues. In addition to its advisory function, the Commission also addresses topics on its own initiative. The FMEC communicates its recommendations and the results of its investigations to the public in an appropriate form.The FMEC promotes public discourse about media-related issues throughout Switzerland”.2 On this basis, the Commission published its first report on the state of the Swiss media in August 2014.3 The members of the commission concluded that the Swiss media landscape had suffered rapid and massive transformations and therefore suggested different forms of (public) financing. However, the Swiss Federal Council had already decided in June 20114 that despite the big economic, technological and social changes the media were undergoing, there was no need to further enhance the statutory regulation.5 On the contrary, in a report entitled ‘Protection of press plurality’ (‘Pressevielfalt sichern’), the government explicitly emphasized, based on the findings of different research projects, that the media industry in Switzerland had to rely more 259

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strongly on self-regulation and “that it is up to the industry to keep pace with constant structural change”.6 This position was further reinforced by a report of the Federal Council published in December 2014 on the political and democratic function of the media, in which the government reiterated that the responsibility and self-regulatory ability of the media had to be the primary answer to the disrupted media ecosystem – even if a contemporary financial support strategy might be able to mitigate the consequences of structural change. Hence, for the time being, no specific actions are being taken. It is nevertheless encouraging that the concepts of accountability, self-regulation and responsibility are not limited to academic discussion in Switzerland, but are part of a wider dialogue about media policy between policy-makers, media professionals, civil society and academics.The examples mentioned above, together with an ongoing debate7 about the partial revision of the law concerning radio and TV broadcasting (which came into effect in 2007), show that issues of self-regulation and responsibility are repeatedly discussed in Switzerland. Taking into account all these initiatives and, in addition, the recommendations of the Swiss Association of Communication and Media Research (2002), a clear trend towards less statutory rule and more self-regulation can be observed. In exchange for an increase in entrepreneurial and journalistic freedom, media organizations should behave more responsibly towards their audiences and, through self-regulation, be held accountable for what they do. This general tendency has, over the last two decades, enabled several institutions and practices to emerge both within and outside the media organizations that help to hold the media accountable and to secure quality in journalism. Consequently, Switzerland is among the countries in Europe with highly developed infrastructures when it comes to media self-regulation and quality management. Furthermore, new and innovative media accountability instruments (MAIs), which are mostly online-based, have been added recently, also fostering more direct participation by audiences and civil society. However, some MAIs such as media journalism (in traditional media) are also facing increasing pressure, mainly due to the grim economic situation of certain publishers, but also as a consequence of editorial decision-making to restrain media criticism. Nevertheless, MAIs are widespread in Switzerland compared to most other European countries, and they essentially enjoy a good reputation among journalists. However, traditional MAIs are still seen as having a higher impact than new and innovative MAIs like media criticism through social media and audiences, or when it comes to the continuous monitoring of the media quality by researchers. Overall, the Swiss model of media self-regulation works fairly well, even if there are some glitches.

Journalistic culture and media system The Swiss media landscape is characterized by three features (Künzler, 2009, 2012): first, the Swiss media market is rather small – and to be precise, there is not a single media market, but three or even four smaller media markets, one for each language region. Out of the three main media markets, the German-speaking market, with its 4.7 million inhabitants, is the biggest one in terms of potential audiences, followed by the French-speaking part with 1.5 million and the Italian-speaking region with roughly 300,000 inhabitants.8 Moreover, every regional market has a huge neighbour, which speaks the same language, but has a far bigger media market: Germany, France and Italy. These “next-door giants” (Meier and Schanne, 1983) exert a huge impact, particularly in the TV sector, and also as a result of spill-over effects.9 Foreign television channels have more than 60% of the Swiss TV broadcast market, among the largest share in Europe (Puppis, 2009a). This is one of the reasons why Swiss advertisers have begun to buy 260

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advertising slots on foreign TV channels in so-called ‘Swiss windows’, which can be seen only in Switzerland. Second, the Swiss media market is characterized by strong decentralization. Most newspapers are regional. Only a few titles have a national area of influence and are mostly quality newspapers such as the Neue Zürcher Zeitung or Le Temps, the tabloid Blick and certain news magazines such as Die Weltwoche. One newspaper, the free newspaper 20 Minuten, is, uniquely, distributed throughout all three language markets. The print media industry still dominates the Swiss media advertising market. In 2013, the net advertising expenditures in the print press equated to approximately CHF 1.6 billion, which corresponds to 38% of the overall media advertising market. Advertising revenue for the press has declined by CHF 800 million since 2008 and there is no evidence that the negative trend is likely to change. Nevertheless, advertising expenditures are still higher than in the television sector (18%, CHF 749 million) and radio sector (4%, CHF 157 million) combined. Similar to the print press, audio-visual broadcasters are also strongly regionalized. Radio stations and private TV channels are regionally or locally oriented in terms of distribution and thematic selection. However, private broadcasting stations only have marginal market shares. In the TV sector, Swiss private channels have a share of less than 10%. This is due to the dominant position of the public broadcasting company SRG SSR Idée Suisse (SRG), which is financed by a license fee (to about 75%, with the remainder from other sources like advertising and sponsoring).The SRG consists of several different organizational units serving the four language regions with with overall seven TV channels, 17 radio stations and five websites. With a market share of over 30%, it leads the national electronic media market.10 A third characteristic of the Swiss media landscape is the high media concentration, particularly in the newspaper market. In the German-speaking part, each of the three oligopolists holds a market share between 19% and 36%, whereas in the French-speaking part, one of the big three, Tamedia, even has a market share of 68% (fög, 2013).11 Local or regional newspapers are often split editions of newspapers based in larger cities. Many of these newspapers have either very large market shares or even a monopoly in their local markets (Künzler, 2005). Many larger media organizations also engage in cross-ownership of both newspapers and local broadcasting stations, in an attempt to integrate a variety of types of media and thus become multimedia companies (Künzler, 2009). The high media concentration also arises from the small size of the overall media market, resulting in fewer resources and a smaller chance to attain a reduction in fixed costs compared to larger countries.12 The growing media concentration in the Swiss media landscape has not changed with the emergence of the online market. On the contrary – in the online market, there is also an increasing trend towards concentration on information-based journalism, on the basis that the main outlets belong to the larger and mainly print-based media conglomerates. However, the peculiarities of the Swiss media system are not only due to the small size of the country’s population and its media market – the interactions between the political and media system have to be taken into account as well. In Hallin and Mancini’s typology (2004a) of media and politics, Switzerland is located within the Democratic Corporatist Model. This classification seems to fit, as the press is still a leading media type (compared to other countries like Italy, where television is by far the dominant medium), the public broadcasting company has an overly dominant position and the professionalization of journalism, as well as its autonomy in terms of political independence, are mostly guaranteed (see Bonfadelli, Keel, Marr and Wyss, 2011). However, it cannot be denied that there is no political parallelism at all. During the past two decades, conservative politicians and their allies have repeatedly invested in financially fragile media outlets, rehabilitating them economically and reorienting them with regard to their political allegiances. 261

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Established instruments of media accountability With regard to the press, media regulation in Switzerland is not very strong, and the legal framework is thus very similar to that of other European countries. However, when it comes to the broadcasting sector, media regulation is more complex and the rigidity depends very much on the area under scrutiny. While certain areas such as licensing are more strongly regulated, others like the protection of minors do not present that many laws compared to other European countries (Schweizer, Puppis, Künzler and Studer, 2014). Although laws may not directly deal with potential issues such as sensationalism, drowning quality (fög, 2013) or partisanship, it is important to understand the legal and thus also the political framework in Switzerland to comprehend the well-developed system of media self-regulation and its informal norms based on journalistic professionalism. Several studies show that media concentration in the Swiss media market is constantly increasing (e.g. fög, 2013). Nevertheless, there is no regulation controlling strong media concentration, even if regional interests (due to language or different Cantons) typically play an important role. In 2004, politicians acknowledged that there was an increasing media concentration in Switzerland, particularly among the press. However, this tendency was mainly interpreted from a positive perspective. Many politicians thought that stronger media organizations would be in a better position to preserve and guarantee quality and diversity than financially weaker outlets. In this respect, lower turnover threshold limits for mergers were abolished (Künzler, 2009).With the introduction of the new law on radio and television in 2006, the limits of cross-ownership were abolished, allowing private media organizations – particularly the bigger publishers – to become multimedia companies by acquiring regional TV and radio stations. The reason behind this political decision was the idea that it would further strengthen big media organizations and thus allow them to maintain operations in the face of financial pressures.13 The lack of any specific press law is another proof of weak regulation. On the other hand, the Swiss press industry was a pioneer of media accountability and self-regulation. The long history of autonomy from any regulation enabled professional rules, norms and standards to develop over time. One of the first attempts at self-regulation occurred in 1977, when the Swiss Association of Journalists established the Swiss Press Council (Schweizer Presserat – SPC). The purpose of the SPC is to serve as an appeals institution for any kind of ethical issue raised by the public or journalists and to stimulate discussion about media ethics within newsrooms (Schweizer Presserat, 2011).The SPC, upon request, observes and controls ethical standards within the media and whether there is any misconduct with regard to the “Declaration of the Duties and Rights of a Journalist”, which consists of a set of ethical guidelines for journalistic news production and summarizes the judgments of the SPC since its foundation.These professional norms are among the most respected instruments of media accountability by all kinds of Swiss journalists (Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014), though they are more strongly grounded in the German part of the country than in the other two main language regions (Keel, 2011). It is important to note that the SPC is not only responsible for the print media, but handles complaints about questions of “professional ethics with regard to all public media, periodic or current” (Schweizer Presserat, 2011), and thus also “online journalism of Swiss provenance” (Schweizer Presserat, 2000). However, the SPC has only limited possibilities to enforce its decisions, i.e. there are no fines. The SPC’s decisions cannot be enforced by court order, and media organizations cannot be forced to publish its decisions: it has therefore to rely entirely on the voluntary commitment of the respective media outlet. However, the public broadcasting company SRG and the publishers’ association have agreed to publish at least a short summary of every decision (Puppis, 2009b). 262

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For more than 30 years, the publishers were not members of the SPC, because the journalists’ unions who founded it feared that the Declaration of the Duties and Rights would be watered down, particularly with regard to the autonomy of journalists. In order to put the decisions of the SPC on a wider and sounder basis and to take up the publishers on their dedication to qualityoriented content, publishers were admitted as new members and sponsors of the SPC in 2008. With regard to electronic and audio-visual media, the situation for law enforcement is different. The “Independent Complaints Authority for Radio and Television” (Unabhängige Beschwerdeinstanz – UBI) is the federal authority in charge of assessing complaints about radio and television programmes (Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2010). The UBI determines whether certain programmes have violated either national or international law, “or whether there has been an unlawful refusal of the right to appear on a program” (UBI, 2014). However, before being allowed to file a complaint with the UBI, the proceedings have to be brought before the office of the ombudsman, which acts as an arbitrator and an intermediary. Both individuals and organizations can appeal against the UBI’s decisions to the Federal Supreme Court. In the same spirit of the SPC, the Swiss public broadcaster SRG for instance has institutionalized a readers’ council.14 This is deemed to be a sparring partner for the newsroom, particularly in order to stimulate discussions about news selection and production as well as to provide the perspective of media consumers/lay persons. Therefore, the composition of a readers’ council should reflect the structure of the audience or the readership to assure that the comments on the layout, contents and language meet the expectations of the public. The St. Galler Tagblatt appointed a ‘merker’, or observer, who acts as an individual counterpart to the newsroom. However, those news outlets which institutionalized this role even further employ an ombudsperson. The role of an ombudsperson is to act not only as a kind of conscience for the newsroom, but primarily as a contact person for complaints originating from the audience. While ombudspersons are mandatory for electronic media in Switzerland, only the Neue Luzerner Zeitung in Lucerne makes use of such a role. Other media organizations do employ an ombudsperson as well, but rather than acting as a contact person for one particular media outlet, the ombudsperson’s responsibility covers the whole media conglomerate, as in the case of Tamedia or AZ Medien AG. However, they are hardly visible in the media they represent.Therefore, Blum (2000, p. 344) points out that the ombudsmen rather complement the actions of the SPC in terms of dealing with ethical issues. While in the U.S. many ombudspersons have their own columns and regularly write about actual dilemmas in news reporting, in Switzerland ombudsmen rarely engage in media journalism. When it comes to an overall evaluation of media journalism in the Swiss media landscape, there are two different qualities. On the one hand, there are surprisingly many more trade magazines and websites that deal with journalism for such a small country. On the other hand, media journalism has been struggling in traditional print media for the past 15 years. In the 1990s, media journalism was booming, with a lot of newspapers and news magazines appointing media journalists and creating new spaces with news on the media industry (Straub and Schönhagen, 2007). However, the grim economic times and the consequential massive decrease of advertising income after 2000 led a lot of news organizations to shut down their media journalism sections and to lay off media journalists. Moreover, media journalism is cumbersome, as media journalists have to write about colleagues, competitors or employers – which is risky in a small media system like the one in Switzerland. Only very few media outlets such as the Neue Zürcher Zeitung still have a media section, even though it has shrunk to mainly one page. In spite of this, there are at least four print magazines engaged in media journalism.15 Several associations of citizens complete the net of infrastructures with regard to journalistic self-regulation. Associations such as the “Verein Qualität im Journalismus” (Association for 263

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quality in journalism) or the “Verein Medienkritik” (Association media critique) aim to promote and safeguard the quality of journalism in the media. The members are mainly journalists, researchers, journalism educators, publishers or citizens interested in the quality of the media. Then there are also associations such as the “Aktion Medienfreiheit” (Association for press freedom) where the members, who ask for more diversity and press freedom, less state intervention and more self-regulation and responsibility in the media, are primarily politicians from centre and right-wing parties.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Because media journalism has nearly disappeared from traditional news media such as newspapers, new opportunities for media criticism have arisen online. However, compared to other countries such as the United States or even Germany, digital initatives evolved rather slowly. Still, Trappel and Uhrmann (2006) conclude that the blogosphere with regard to politics and political communication is neither differentiated nor developed, yet Wyss, Schanne and Stoffel (2012) observe that online media criticism has been blossoming over the past couple of years. However, the initial euphoria has turned slowly into a more sceptical attitude, particularly with regard to the continuity and sustainability of these new platforms. This is emphasized by the emergence of many media watchblogs, some of which disappeared again shortly afterwards. Due to their weak institutionalization, media and watchblogs are still in no position to replace media criticism in traditional mass media. This is also because media blogs serve a different audience. While traditional mass media address a wider public with a general interest, media blogs have a more specialized audience, also due to the narrower thematic spectrum (Künzler, 2012). Besides, only if journalism is supported by an organization with the relevant resources can it actually perform on a continuous basis and therefore guarantee continuous coverage ( Jarren, 2008). In many cases, these organizational structures are missing when it comes to blogs, with the result that communication occurs unsteadily and to a limited public of highly interested followers. Many media blogs such as medienspiegel.ch,16 Nur eine Frage,17 infamy,18 or O-Ton Mediennews19 are either one-man shows or very small groups of people interested in the media. Online media criticism can thus be seen as a complement to the media journalism published in newspapers or broadcasted programmes, but not as a substitute (Eberwein, 2010b). Bloggers themselves acknowledge that they have not reached sufficient authority to act as a watchdog of democracy. “The model of self-proclaimed (and often anonymous) media watchdogs could not be established in Switzerland” (Lüthi cit. in Wyss, Schanne and Stoffel, 2012, p. 370, transl. C.P.). On social media like Twitter the situation seems to be no different: the potential lies in comments and feedback on spelling errors, the lack of research and admonishments of ethically dubious behaviour, but also in praise and compliments (Lüthi, 2012). Overall, a wider audience and particularly the continuity of communication are missing. Wyss, Schanne and Stoffel (2012) state therefore that Twitter’s potential for media criticism is rather questionable. However, even if it is still not an alternative to media journalism published in traditional news media, online media criticism grows steadily and thus acquires relevance by setting its own agenda (Lilienthal, 2014).20 Other innovative self-regulation instruments combine the positive aspects of the Internet, such as its ubiquity and rapidity in being able to publish new content, with the differently clocked realm of media and communications research. In Switzerland, there are two such institutions: one is the European Journalism Observatory (EJO), based at the University of Lugano, which offers together with its partners a web page21 in 14 different languages. Its mission as a non-profit institution is to forge “connections between journalism cultures across Europe and 264

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the U.S. It promotes dialogue between media researchers and practitioners. It brings the results of media research to the people who deal with and work in the media. It aims to improve the quality of journalism, contribute to a richer understanding of media, and to foster press freedom and media accountability” (EJO, 2014). Therefore, the EJO publishes either original articles written by staff members on new findings in the area of journalism studies, or the authors of the studies write a guest column to present their research. Another digital media magazine called Medienwoche (Mediaweek) takes a similar approach by following international trends that are relevant to the Swiss media landscape and by inviting experts such as media and communication researchers to present their findings to a wider audience. The other institution, called Medienkritik Schweiz (Media Critique Switzerland), has already been mentioned in the previous section on established instruments. The aspect that makes its contribution innovative is that it has a website that the association runs in partnership with the Institute of Applied Media Studies from the Zurich University of Applied Sciences. Most of the contributions originate from their students and thus self-regulation in terms of media observation is combined with journalism education. Other innovative self-regulation instruments such as online comments are widespread across both traditional and news organizations and blogs. However, the potential of online comments as a means of constructive feedback is rather low in the journalists’ perspective (Fengler et al., 2014, 61).Yet 61% of the surveyed Swiss journalists think that it would be important to respond to the comments and suggestions of the users, and still about half are open to the idea of offering the respondent possibilities for direct communication with journalists, for instance through social media channels like Facebook or Twitter. But when it comes to direct contributions in the newsroom, journalists tend to be very reluctant with more than 60% strongly rejecting the idea of letting lay journalists or citizens participate in the editorial production.This might be one reason why both the transparency and the means to contribute to the editorial production in Switzerland are still rather limited – it is still seen as a domain exclusive to professional journalists. The MediaAcT project showed that Swiss journalists are the most critical media professionals across the analysed sample with regard to collaborative models (Porlezza, 2014).This can also be interpreted in a positive way since Swiss journalists understand themselves as professionals, defending their status quo – even if the result might well be determined by concerns such as losing the gatekeeper function. There are only a handful of established news organizations that apply innovative or web-based accountability instruments. This might be due to the circumstance whereby journalists ascribe a rather low impact to these practices (Fengler et al., 2014). In-house media blogs, journalist’s blogs, feedback through online comments or on Twitter or Facebook – all these practices attain very low scores when it comes to the impact they have on the quality of journalism (ibid.). It is therefore less surprising that established MAIs such as journalism education (the highest impact), media law and editorial guidelines – or even the press council (Wyss, Tschopp and Wüthrich, 2007) – are above the average when it comes to their impact on the news production process. However, with regard to journalism education, it is striking that in Switzerland still more than a third of the respondents of the MediaAcT study think that they, as journalists, are not adequately trained. This could be one of the reasons why new ways of journalistic production in Switzerland are more difficult to implement or have been introduced only after a delay (Porlezza, 2014).

Conclusion Switzerland is a small country in the heart of Europe, but it shows a well-developed network of MAIs, both external and internal to the newsrooms, compared to other European media 265

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systems. Established instruments such as journalism education and the Swiss Press Council and its Declaration of the Duties and Rights of a Journalist are seen by journalists themselves to have the highest beneficial impact on the editorial news production process (Fengler et al., 2014). Nevertheless, innovative online practices such as blogs and activities in social media, providing various new possibilities of feedback such as online comments, are slowly increasing in number and importance. However, a well-developed network of MAIs should not hide the fact that there is still room for improvement, particularly in the press: local or regional newspapers often lack documented and institutionalized codes of conduct or ethical codes that hold journalists accountable for their work. In the field of electronic media, the government tried to overcome this situation through tighter co-regulation, introducing – after the revision of the new law on radio and television in 2006 – a new licensing process that focused on editorial quality management systems as well. The Federal Department of the Environment, Transport, Energy and Communications obliges the licensed broadcasters to implement certain quality criteria, but does not tell them what kind of instruments they have to select or how they have to put them into practice. Besides, the quality management instruments are not directly controlled by the Federal Office, but by four external firms, among which the news organizations can freely choose (BAKOM, 2008). Even if the system of MAIs is widely established, it needed the initiative of a member of the National Council to finally launch a broad discussion on the condition of the Swiss media landscape and about the future of the press. In its response to the initiative, the Swiss Federal Council argued basically for the status quo. For the time being, there will be no new directives with regard to media policy. Even if this may seem an easy way out (Meier, 2012), at least the Federal Council, together with the Federal Media Commission, continues to observe the media landscape and the disruptive effects on journalism. In the turmoil journalism is experiencing, instruments of media accountability can help maintain certain quality standards in the editorial news production and maybe even bring back some of the vanished trust and credibility among the audience. But these practices have to be discussed and clarified on a broader basis, not only on a political level, but also – and particularly – on the organizational level of media outlets.

Notes  1 The Federal Media Commission is headed by the media researcher Prof. Otfried Jarren from the University of Zurich. The other 13 members of the Commission originate from different media segments and media affine professional groups such as journalists, journalism education, communication and media research, professional associations and unions, publishers, the public broadcasting company and communication infrastructures as well as information technology.  2 http://www.emek.admin.ch/en/the-commission/index.html  3 http://www.emek.admin.ch/de/themen/medienfoerderung/index.html (the report is available in German, French or Italian only).   4 In 2009, a member of the National Council, Hans-Jürg Fehr, together with the Political Institutions Committee, submitted a postulate in reference to the future of the media in Switzerland – and of the press in particular – to the Swiss Federal Council. Following the postulate, the Swiss Government commissioned six studies via the Federal Office of Communications, which analysed different aspects of the Swiss media landscape. The final report of the Federal Council is available here: http://www. bakom.admin.ch/themen/radio_tv/00509/01188/03754/index.html?lang=de (in German, French and Italian).   5 Press release of the Swiss Federal Council on June 29, 2011 with regard to the report on the future of the press in Switzerland: http://www.bakom.admin.ch/dokumentation/medieninformationen/00471/ index.html?lang=en&msg-id=39886 (for further information see Meier, 2012).  6 http://www.news.admin.ch/NSBSubscriber/message/attachments/23504.pdf

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Switzerland  7 http://www.bakom.admin.ch/dokumentation/gesetzgebung/00512/03026/04299/index.html?lang=de   8 Numbers are based on a structural survey in 2012. With Romansch, there would be a potential fourth regional market. However, as only 22,000 people live in this region, it is not considered to be an autonomous market.   9 Spill-over effects occur when TV and radio signals from larger countries irradiate into smaller countries and can be received or decoded by the population. Small countries often experience this kind of impact given that larger cities are not very distant from the border. 10 http://www.bfs.admin.ch/bfs/portal/de/index/themen/16/03/key/ind16.indicator.16010306. 160105.html 11 The main findings or the “Yearbook 2013 – The Quality of the Media’ can be accessed online at http://www.foeg.uzh.ch/jahrbuch/Broschur_QdM_engl_2013_ohne_Sperrvermerk_150dpi.pdf 12 However, the limited resources do not apply to the number of journalists. There are roughly 10,500 professional journalists working in Switzerland, which is, in relation to the overall population, more than twice as much as Germany (Keel, 2011). 13 However, in recent years, this decision has led to an even more concentrated media market, given that many multimedia companies started to enter different language regions or to build up not only local but large regional monopolies (fög, 2013). 14 Certain newspapers such as Der Bund have abolished their readers’ councils due to financial reasons, but also because the publishers were afraid of public criticism about the paper (Hartmann, 2012). 15 Edito, Schweizer Journalist, Persönlich, Werbewoche. 16 http://www.medienspiegel.ch 17 http://nureinefrage.blogspot.ch/ 18 http://infam.antville.org 19 http://www.o-ton.ch 20 The fact that established media organizations set up new journalism blogs on their online pages might well be an indicator that the blogosphere’s importance is increasing. See, for instance, deadline (http://blog.tagesanzeiger.ch/deadline/), a blog on various issues with regard to news making, or Interna (http://www.suedostschweiz.ch/community/blogs/interna), a blog of the regional newspaper Südostschweiz that explains delicate editorial decisions to its readers. 21 http://www.ejo.ch

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33 Turkey Sacrificing credibility for economic expediency and partisanship Ceren Sözeri

Abstract From the outset, political engagement was significant for media owners and journalist-state ­relationships in Turkey. After the third coup-d’état in 1980, new investors who came from other sectors carried the ‘corporate mentality’ into their media operations, while ‘clientelist’ relationships between media patrons and the state became increasingly established.Today, irrational market conditions and patronage relationships result in a climate of self-censorship, a lack of quality in journalism and inconvenient working conditions in the media. At the same time, journalists are proving to be unable to take the initiative to improve their professional standards due to a lack of horizontal solidarity. There is not an organization regulating the media in Turkey in a transparent or accountable way.

Introduction Media accountability mechanisms in Turkey have been inefficient for a long time because of the ideological polarizations and political divisions within and among various media and journalists’ associations. While Turkey has been described as a ‘no-man’s land’, located somewhere between South-Eastern Europe and the Middle East (Christensen, 2007, p. 180), the political ties of media owners and journalists reinforce the political polarization in society and, consequently, self-censorship in the media as described by Hallin and Mancini’s (2004a, p. 98) Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model. The shifting ownership structure in the 1980s, characterized by new investors in the media from other sectors like automotive, construction, banking etc., increased the ‘clientelist’ relationship between media patrons and the state. Although it does not appear to be a profitable market due to insufficient and unbalanced advertising and circulation revenues, their growing investments in other sectors and their public procurement performances show their obedience to the government. The irrational market conditions and patronage relationship resulted in a climate of self-censorship, with content not subject to quality criteria and inconvenient working conditions. Journalists are in a very weak position in comparison to those with political power and the media owners. Accordingly, political polarization and the lack of unionization of journalists prevent horizontal solidarity for their professional rights and standards. 268

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At present, almost all established media accountability mechanisms in Turkey are inefficient. The historical backgrounds and current situations of the Press Council, the codes of ethics of professional organizations and ombudsmanship will be discussed in this chapter. The online media are still exempt from self-control mechanisms. However, the small, independent media initiatives which are monitoring the media while non-governmental organizations (NGOs) monitor media literacy education and social media are seen as important in raising social awareness about media accountability.

Journalistic culture and media system Turkey’s media structure is similar to that of the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model of Hallin and Mancini (2004a), even though it is not a part of their research. As in many other Mediterranean countries, the media in Turkey developed as a political institution rather than a market institution, and various actors have used it as a tool to intervene in the political arena (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a, pp. 90–113). Since the establishment of the press in the late Ottoman era in 1831, journalism has been seen as a mission for the modernization of society rather than a profession. As a result, journalists were excluded from the scope of the first Labor Law (no. 3008) for many years. Journalists were part of the elite in society and were assigned to educate people and to support the Kemalist reforms throughout the foundation of the Republic. Due to their close relationships with politicians, journalists were sometimes rewarded with membership of parliament, or punished by the government by being exiled to small cities or foreign countries as civil servants. Between 1920 and 1957, 75 journalists sat in parliament (Gürkan, 1998, pp. 79–83). Hence, journalists have been potential targets of government repression. In the early years of the Turkish Republic, their approaches to the political regime resulted in a distinction being made between ‘opponent’ (Istanbul) and ‘proponent’ (Ankara) presses, and later on, some dissident journalists were prosecuted by İstiklâl Mahkemeleri (the Independence Courts) (Elmas and Kurban, 2011, p. 18). Journalists obtained a number of social rights through the first specific law regulating the profession of journalism (no. 5953), which was adopted after the transition to a multiparty regime in 1950; however, shortly after, the government resorted to press censorship policies. Although the first coup d’état in 1960 introduced a liberal amendment to Law no. 5953, known as ‘the 212’, in favour of journalists and against the protests of press owners, military regimes instituted after the coups of 1960, 1971 and 1980 reduced these limited rights (Sözeri and Kurban, 2014, p. 192). Turkey’s journalistic culture shifted remarkably after the third coup d’état in 1980. New actors who already had investments in other sectors of the economy replaced traditional family-owned companies. These new owners gradually carried their ‘corporate mentality’ into their media operations (ibid.). Combined with the politically authoritarian post-coup d’état climate, the commercialization of the media resulted in an increase in the sensationalization and tabloidization of the press (Bek, 2004, p. 376). In the 1990s, after the termination of the state monopoly over broadcasting, a few conglomerates, which had increased their economic power through vertical and horizontal mergers, came to dominate the whole of the media sector and ‘clientelist’ relationships between media patrons and the state were increasingly established. While media owners competed with each other financially, by and large they shared the common mindset of protecting the ‘state interest’ in their coverage (Sözeri and Kurban, 2014, p. 192) During the 2001 financial crisis, some media groups that had investments in the financial and banking sectors were completely wiped out while Tasarruf Mevduatı Sigorta Fonu (the 269

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Savings Deposit Insurance Fund), established by the government, seized others. From 2002, these changes were used as a tool for the reconfiguration of the mainstream media in accordance with the ideology of the ruling party. Big media owners supported Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (The Justice and Development Party – JDP) in its first years, due to its implementation of new reforms to achieve economic stability after the 2001 crisis. After its second electoral victory in the municipal elections of 2004, the mainstream media, on the grounds of the violation of secularism, heavily criticized some social reforms, such as the constitutional amendment adopted by parliament to legalize the headscarf at universities. Hürriyet, the biggest Turkish daily, supported mass demonstrations against the government, which were later found to be co-organized by groups involving retired high-ranking military leaders.The JDP government adopted a dual strategy to eliminate the media opposition. It forced the biggest media group, Doğan Group, to downsize its media investments by means of heavy tax fines and it reconfigured the mainstream media by mergers and acquisitions. Thus, the power shifted from the ‘opponent’ mainstream media companies to the ‘reconfigured’ or ‘proponent’ media companies (Kurban and Sözeri, 2012, p. 50). In recent years, many journalists and columnists have lost their jobs due to their critical comments on government policies. Moreover, the prime minister has targeted some columnists and pleaded with media owners to keep their columnists under control or dismiss them for their negative coverage of the government’s policies (Söylemez, 2012). In the Freedom House special report, ‘Democracy in Crisis: Corruption, Media, and Power in Turkey’, it is said that editors and journalists in the mainstream media receive regular phone calls from the prime minister’s office asking them to change stories, downplay coverage, or fire reporters or columnists. The government also uses the courts to go after offending journalists (Corke et al., 2014, p. 9). As the Reporters Without Borders correspondent in Turkey, Önderoğlu (Akgül, 2014a) notes that the consolidation of power at the hands of President Erdoğan became the violation parameter, i.e. one of the most significant concerns of freedom of expression and freedom of press in Turkey, so much so that he targeted a caricaturist, a reporter, a columnist and a media owner at the same time in a way that was not even witnessed during the military tutelage. Journalists constantly struggle with state censorship and legal pressures. Twenty-four journalists are still in jail, according to the Platform for Solidarity with Imprisoned Journalists (TGDP); most of them (about 60%) are Kurdish or work for the Kurdish media. For a long time, owning a media company has meant much more than having an interest in the media sector. Many media outlets cannot generate sufficient advertising revenues and therefore operate in the red. Some media owners noted in their statements to the Parliamentary Coup and Memorandum Investigation Commission1 that they felt obliged to enter the media sector at the request of, or because of pressure from, some politicians, and they had to expand through cross-ownership, like buying TV stations, in order to reduce their deficits in the 1990s.2 By looking at the frequent changes in the ownership of some media outlets by business groups close to the governing party, it could be argued that the same kind of demands are still in place today. Due to a lack of transparency, there are no reliable data about newspapers’ circulation figures or advertising revenue and the newspapers’ share of the advertising revenue in the media market. However, the anti-trust regulations seek to prevent a media organization from getting more than 30% of all commercial communication revenues in the market (Law no. 6112, Article 19). It is also claimed that a large share of official press advertisements distributed by Basın İlan Kurumu (The Directorate General of Press Advertisements – BİK) goes to the pro-government media (Turkish News website, T24, 2014). As a result, the local media, minority media and dissident media have had unequal access to official press advertisements. In recent years, efforts have been 270

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made to strengthen the local media through increasing their share of official advertisements (Kurban and Sözeri, 2013, pp. 3–4). Today, the four big media groups dominating the sector (Doğan Group, Doğuş Group, Ciner Group and Kalyon Group) have also invested in other sectors, such as energy, mining, finance and construction. For example, the biggest group, Doğan Group, is involved in oil and gas exploration in the Kurdish Autonomy in Iraq. Ciner Group has focused on the mining sector. Doğuş Group won the public tender for the Galataport project,3 undertook some parts of the metro project in Istanbul and has been involved in constructing some highways. Kalyon Group is involved in the third airport project in Istanbul. It can be seen that the media owners are increasingly winning important public tenders relative to their sizes, and the role of their media operations in their success cannot be underestimated. Although the media does not appear to be a profitable market, the significant role that media ownership plays in the relationship with government can be seen from the public tenders that they have secured. Although, as one of the big media owners pointed out, the huge amount that the state invests in the economy obliges businessmen to collaborate with the state; whether or not they take part in public tenders (T24, 2012), their investment performances point in the opposite direction (Sözeri, 2013). This explains why the media owners are eager to please the government on every possible occasion and why self-censorship is so widespread in the media. For instance, during the Gezi protests,4 CNNTürk broadcast a documentary on penguins, which became an ironic symbol of media coverage on protests, while CNN International showed live coverage of the streets in Turkey. The initial failure of the mainstream media to cover Gezi entirely unveiled the reflexive compliance of the media owners (Corke et al., 2014, p. 8).

Established instruments of media accountability The ideological polarizations and political divisions within and among various media and journalists’ associations destroyed the credibility of media accountability and self-control mechanisms for the press, broadcast and online media in Turkey. Furthermore, the suppression of the journalists’ union severely limited not only the social and professional rights of journalists, but also their editorial independence and collaborative efforts to raise professional standards. Topuz (2012) contends that an editor who chooses to maintain editorial independence has to face up to becoming unemployed. The Media Monitoring Report by the Bağımsız İletişim Ağı (Independent Communication Network, BİA) states that 186 journalists were forced to resign between April and June 2014. The Press Council currently operates with the support and cooperation of only a few newspapers and only two online news outlets. The 1998 Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities developed by Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (the Journalists Association of Turkey) is still the source of journalistic ethics most commonly referred to. Besides this, a few small journalists’ associations and media groups have their own ethics codes, but mostly these are not used. A very few media outlets (Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and Sabah) also have active ombudsmen. The Directorate General of Press Advertisements (BİK) functions as a public body which has sanctioning powers to prohibit advertisements in any publication that it considers to have violated media ethics. This is considered to have had a censorship effect on the print media.

Press Council Some media owners also support the Press Council, which was established by a group of journalists in 1988. It developed its own charter, which was most recently amended in 2003. 271

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Currently, only seven national newspapers, eight national TV channels, 278 local and regional newspapers (about 10% of the local and regional total) and two online news outlets are associated with the Press Council.Thus, it is not an effective body for monitoring ethical issues in the traditional and online media. Members of the profession have contested the independence of this body from the state and from official ideology from the outset (Kurban and Sözeri, 2012, p. 53). Oktay Ekşi led the Press Council for 23 years, since its foundation in 1988. A number of key representatives, including those from TRT (Turkish Radio Television Corporation) and the Anatolian News Agency (the official news agency of Turkey), withdrew from the Council following a vote of confidence in November 2011 in keeping Oktay Ekşi as its chairman. What made Ekşi’s endorsement controversial was that he had recently resigned as chairman to run in the general elections as a parliamentary candidate (ibid.).

Code of ethics The 1998 Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities developed by Türkiye Gazeteciler Cemiyeti (the Journalists Association of Turkey) was settled after a long discussion process involving a wide range of journalists, NGOs and unions. It was signed by more than 4,000 journalists and is the source of journalistic ethics most commonly referred to. However, as Baydar (2009) contends, it was not enough to declare commitment by signing – the rights and responsibilities also needed to be followed and acted upon, although ethics have never been a priority in the media in Turkey. In 2010, a group of pro-government journalists who had parted ways with the Press Council established Medya Derneği (the Media Association) to support and raise the standards of the media. In 2011, the association announced a new code of ethics for journalists, which was developed during a three-day Media Ethics Workshop held in January of the same year. However, the editor-in-chief of the newspaper Zaman and the vice-president of the Media Association, Ekrem Dumanlı (Dumanlı, 2014) recently declared that they were withdrawing from the Association following a clash between the ruling Justice and Development Party (JDP) and the Fethullah Gülen Movement.5 Therefore, the Media Association involves only pro-government media and it is mentioned only for its professional training for young journalists.

Ombudsmen In 1999, the daily Milliyet introduced the concept of print news ombudsmanship to the press in Turkey. However, this ended in conflict during the summer of 2004 in a ‘car crash’, according to the ombudsman Yavuz Baydar. He was dismissed following his refusal to bow down to pressure from management to refrain from publishing a critical piece about the fabrication of facts in the newspaper (Baydar, 2011, p. 96). Currently, four Turkish newspapers (Hürriyet, Cumhuriyet, Milliyet and Sabah) have active ombudsmen who self-monitor the compliance of their paper with codes of journalistic ethics. Recently, the ombudsman’s page in the daily Sabah was suspended because of the ombudsman’s critical coverage of the Gezi protests. The chief editor of the daily Sabah responded to ombudsman Baydar’s critics in the reader’s comments section, noting the readers’ support for the paper’s editorial preferences. Then, Baydar stated his argument in the New York Times and was subsequently fired on the grounds of criticizing the Turkish media (Baydar, 2013). While ombudsmanship is seen as a potentially important monitoring force for the media, many doubt its effectiveness in a culture where criticism is not tolerated. Hence, ombudsmanship only lasted for a short time in several newspapers (Akgül, 2014b). As the ombudsman of the 272

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daily Milliyet, Akçura claims that ombudsmanship is underestimated and that in media outlets its role is reduced to that of a reader representative (Akgül, 2014c). In September 2006, Radyo ve Televizyon Üst Kurulu (the Radio and Television Supreme Council, RTÜK) introduced a voluntary audience representative mechanism for broadcasters. Currently, 34 national and local television channels have representatives whose contact information is listed on RTÜK’s website (Kurban and Sözeri, 2012, p. 53).

Media journalism Media journalism became more popular in the independent and online media in Turkey after the Gezi protests. During the protests, the mainstream media preferred not to cover the events on the street. Instead, for instance, CNN Türk, owned by the Doğan Group, broadcast a documentary about penguins, which became an iconic symbol of self-censorship. In recent years, a few books published on media criticism written by dismissed veteran journalists,like 5 N 1 Kim (5 What 1 Who) by Mustafa Alp Dağıstanlı (2014), Abluka (Blockade) by Mustafa Hoş (2014) and Batsın Boyle Gazetecilik (Damn journalism like that) by Derya Sazak (2014) told of their experiences of how journalists struggle with political pressure and subsequently self-censorship in Turkey’s major newsrooms.

Innovative instruments of media accountability As mentioned above, there are only two online news outlets associated with the Press Council, thus it is not able to function effectively as a monitor of ethical issues in the online media.Tercan Ali Baştürk, the representative of the Medialog Platform (2013), notes that it seems that the online media in Turkey is exempt from self-control mechanisms due to financial constraints and online journalists’ deprivation of journalistic rights, and because the rules of establishment and working for online journalism are open to manipulation and inadequacies in human resources. The new technologies provide opportunities for alternative sources of media monitoring. One of the most significant examples of such sources is the Independent Communication Network, BİA, which was established in 1997 for monitoring and covering media freedom and promoting independent journalism in Turkey. Journalists who were dismissed or resigned from mainstream media created some small and independent alternative media sites to cover areas that the mainstream media ignored or distorted, including media criticism. Recently, a new fact-checking site, Doğrulat.com (2014), began to reveal the media’s bias, which was inspired by the Politifact website in the USA.The website rates news articles and the claims that they make as ‘false’, ’slightly true’, ‘true’ or ‘mostly true’, using 15 volunteers, who include academics, lawyers and economists. There are also small initiatives that monitor both online and offline media, like the Medya Etiği Platformu (Media Ethics Platform), which aims to become a reference source for ethical journalism, and the Platform for Independent Journalism (P24). P24 often provides funds for investigative journalism and organizes training for young professionals to promote best journalistic practice and, more specifically, to encourage the transition to web-based journalism. However, these initiatives are still limited to the efforts of a few journalists. Alternatif Bilişim Derneği (The Alternative Informatics Association) recently published a report on ‘the Situation of the Internet in Turkey in 2013’, including the political and legal pressures preventing online freedom of expression and hate speech in the online media in Turkey. They also suggest some policies to create a freer, democratic and peaceful new media environment. The regulations regarding the Internet are highly controversial in Turkey. Telekomünikasyon İletişim Başkanlığı (the Telecommunications Communication Presidency, TİB) has blocked tens 273

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of thousands of websites. Twitter and YouTube were blocked before the local elections that were held on March 20, 2014. After individual petitions were submitted to the Constitutional Court, it ruled that the bans violated the freedom of expression of all users and the blocking orders were subsequently withdrawn (Freedom House, 2014). At the end of 2012, the European Court of Human Rights also delivered a very important judgment in the case of AhmetYıldırım vs.Turkey on the blocking of Google Sites in Turkey, to the effect that it violated the right to freedom of expression, i.e. Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights (HRW, 2012). Despite this, parliament passed amendments to Internet Law no. 5651 that strengthened the powers of the TİB.

Other media accountability instruments In 2003, a group of Members of Parliament established a platform supported by the Radyo Televizyon Üst Kurulu (the Radio and Television Supreme Council, RTUK) to increase social awareness on the prevention of violence in society, family and the mass media (Türkoğlu and Ayyıldız, 2014, p. 3). During the First Media Literacy Conference in 2005, the regulatory authority and academics extensively debated RTÜK’s project for media literacy education in primary schools. In 2006, elective media literacy courses started to be taught to children in the 6th, 7th and 8th grades with the cooperation of RTÜK and the Ministry of National Education. A guideline for teachers was prepared in collaboration with Talim Terbiye Kurulu (the Board of Education and Discipline) and academics from various communication faculties in Turkey. The first research conducted on the effects of the media literacy courses on teachers and students welcomed the initiative “which will have several positive effects on children”, but warned of the “possibility of the project’s failure since the classes are taught by social science teachers and not by specialists of communication” (Kurban and Sözeri, 2012, p. 59). In recent years, there has also been a growing awareness of the need for social monitoring of the media.Various NGOs and activist groups started media-watch initiatives in order to expand the culture of diversity and to reduce discrimination, racism and hate speech. For example, MEDİZ (the Women’s Media Watch Group) has been monitoring sexism in the media since 2006. A lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) association, KAOS GL, regularly looks for sexism and discrimination in the media against LGBTI individuals and has published monthly reports for the past five years. They have recently published a guideline for journalists to combat homophobic speech in media products (LGBTI News, 2014). After the assassination of the Armenian journalist and human rights defender Hrant Dink in 2007, hate crimes and hate speech in the media became a much more pressing issue for civil society. Sosyal Değişim Derneği (The Association for Social Change) prepared a report entitled ‘Hate Crimes in the National Press: 10 years, 10 examples’ and recently launched a campaign for the adoption of Turkey’s first law against hate speech. Similarly, the Hrant Dink Foundation combats racism and discrimination based on ethnic and religious grounds through media monitoring and discloses it through four-monthly reports (Kurban and Sözeri, 2012, p. 60). BİA also provides training for journalists, communication students and NGOs; publishes handbooks on peace journalism; broadcasts radio programmes for the local media; and organizes conferences, forums and international exchange programmes as part of its target to strengthen the independent media in Turkey.

Conclusion Journalism and journalists have always been caught between political and legal pressures and structural problems in Turkey. From the outset, political engagement was significant for media 274

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owners and journalist-state relationships. After the third coup-d’état in 1980, new investors, who had already invested in other sectors like energy, mining, finance and construction, replaced the traditional family-owned press.With the termination of the state monopoly over broadcasting in the 1990s, a few conglomerates increased their economic power through vertical and horizontal mergers and still dominate whole sectors of the media. The media, especially the newspapers, have operated under huge financial difficulties and most of them operate in the red (Kurban and Sözeri, 2012, p. 28). Hence, for instance, the newspapers’ owners had to own at least one TV channel to support the newspapers and to make a profit. It can be said that the media owners have used their media organizations to maximize their profits in other sectors of the economy. Accordingly, the power of the state in the economy, and moreover the consolidation of power at the hands of President Erdoğan obliged media owners to please the government to acquire public tenders or to elude punishment by tax fines, for instance. These irrational market conditions and patronage relationships resulted in a climate of selfcensorship, content not subject to quality criteria and inconvenient working conditions in the journalistic profession. Some research shows that a very high percentage of journalists claim that they are faced with both censorship and self-censorship in the media. They fear being taken to court and feel intimidated by government and by patronage pressure (EJN, 2014; Corke et al., 2014, p. 2; CPJ, 2012, p. 8; Arsan, 2011, p. 69). On the other hand, there is an unwillingness among media executives, columnists and editors to risk their careers and high incomes to combat self-censorship. Besides, the very low average wages and the high informal employment rate prevent labour peace in the media. The vulnerable position of journalists vis-à-vis the media owners’ self-censorship practices and political pressure is also the result of competition, unionization practices and the lack of horizontal solidarity in the profession. The political polarization and lack of unionization are the most significant reasons for enhancing media accountability mechanisms.There is no transparent and accountable self-regulatory organization in the media. The Press Council deals inefficiently with ethical issues in the traditional and online media. The 1998 Declaration of Rights and Responsibilities has not been fully adopted by the media outlets, although it is still the most reliable source for journalistic ethics. Only four Turkish newspapers have active ombudsmen who self-monitor the compliance of their paper with codes of journalistic ethics, but the website editions are exempt from the ombudsmen’s mandates. Above all, ethical issues are not a priority in the media in Turkey. It is clear that effective self-regulation is the best way of promoting high professional standards in the media, and this should be a priority in all matters of regulation (Kurban and Sözeri, 2013, p. 6). However, it can only be implemented if the journalists are willing to engage in collective action against both the state and the media owners, and if the readers support them.

Notes 1 The Parliamentary Coup and Memorandum Investigation Commission was established in 2011 to investigate past military coups, particularly the ‘post-modern military coup’ of February 28, 1997. Among others, the Commission listened to the testimonies of politicians, media owners and journalists who closely witnessed undemocratic attempts against the government. 2 A large proportion of advertising revenues are still shared by the broadcasting companies on the grounds that television has a strong influence on public opinion in Turkey, due to high ratings and the low costs of advertising. 3 The Galataport project involves the privatization of Karaköy Port to convert the shorefront into a port area complete with hotels, cafés, retail shops and space for cruise ships to dock in İstanbul. It is one of Europe’s ten largest ports.

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Ceren Sözeri 4 The Taksim Gezi Park protests, which started on May 28, 2013 against the government’s urban ­development plan for Istanbul’s Taksim Gezi Park, were spread across Turkey and touched a wide range of concerns. 5 The Gülen movement is a tightly networked group following the teachings of the Islamic preacher Fethullah Gülen. The movement also has a network of hundreds of schools and colleges in Turkey and abroad, and extensive business interests inside and outside the country. The daily Zaman, the English daily Today’s Zaman, the daily Bugün and Kanaltürk TV are owned by the Gülen-affiliated media groups (Corke et al., 2014, p. 7).

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34 United Kingdom Post-Leveson, media accountability is all over the place Mike Jempson, Wayne Powell and Sally Reardon

Abstract In recent years, the media in the UK have been under greater scrutiny than ever before, across all platforms. Journalists have been the subject of protracted criminal investigations and trials. The Leveson Inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the press, conducted in public, exposed press malpractice and offered proposals for reform. Yet far from creating a fresh, independent and accountable regulatory system to replace the discredited Press Complaints Commission, the outcome has brought more confusion than clarity, and concern has been raised internationally about threats to press freedom in the UK. Meanwhile, the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), the world’s best-known public service broadcaster, has been riven by scandals, has suffered a reduction in its operating capabilities and is under pressure from the government to undergo a major restructuring.

Introduction Over the past few years, media accountability has been the focus of more political and public debate in the UK than ever before. A year-long forensic investigation into the culture, practices and ethics of the press conducted in public by Lord Justice Leveson exposed arrogance and malpractice by editors and journalists, and revealed the torment of those on the receiving end of intrusive and unwarranted coverage and illegal activities by journalists and their associates. It resulted in a comprehensive set of proposals for the reform of press self-regulation (Leveson Inquiry, 2012) which were instantly criticized by the majority of Britain’s mainstream press, misrepresenting them as an attempt to place the press under state control (Ramsay, 2013; Gilligan, 2013). A lengthy trial of newspaper executives accused of condoning criminal acts in the gathering of sensational stories led to the jailing of Andy Coulson, former editor of the UK’s biggest selling newspaper and communications director for the UK’s prime minister. Meanwhile, top public relations ‘guru’ Max Clifford, who made millions by supplying the tabloids with often-concocted ‘celebrity stories’, was jailed for sexual misconduct carried out over many years (BBC, 2014).

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A series of police investigations (BBC, 2013) into allegations of criminal activity among other journalists and their contacts – police and prison officers, and health services staff – resulted in more than 200 arrests. The trials of most journalists fell apart, but some public servants were convicted and jailed.The chilling effect has soured the public sphere, (Turvil, 2014; Reidy, 2014) and increased distrust between the press and police. At the same time, the government required The Guardian newspaper to physically destroy a hard drive containing data supplied by US whistleblower Edward Snowden, in the presence of security officials (Harding, 2014), and evidence emerged that the police were accessing journalists’ confidential sources without recourse to the courts.1 These incidents led the World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers to send a delegation to investigate (WAN-IFRA, 2014). Meanwhile, the BBC, long regarded as the doyen of public service broadcasting, has been reeling from a series of scandals. Public confidence in the corporation was shaken by its failure to identify and expose the paedophile behaviour of the late Jimmy Savile, a disk jockey, children’s TV host and charity worker, who abused many children while working at the BBC and elsewhere over a 50-year period.Two other popular BBC presenters, Rolf Harris and Stuart Hall, have been jailed for sexual misconduct, often with young people, and police investigations and celebrity trials continue (Ward and O’Mahony, 2013). Scandals over the size of executives’ wages and pay-offs and the fees paid to its freelance ‘talents’ have strengthened criticism of the BBC’s use of the license fee (Turvill, 2015). All point to the need for an overhaul of Britain’s long-established and elaborate system of media accountability. However, far from creating a reformed system – open, independent and accountable – on which the public can rely, the outcome of this extraordinary period has been a plethora of complaints-handling procedures more likely to confuse than to enlighten the public. The main national and local newspaper groups have given their names to and funded the Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), which is generally regarded as a thinly disguised reincarnation of the discredited Press Complaints Commission (PCC) (Toynbee, 2015). IPSO wields the right to impose tough sanctions on those who breach the Editors’ Code of Practice, but only deals with complaints which have not been first resolved by the offending newspaper. Several prestigious national paper groups have opted to continue with Readers’ Editor schemes (in-house ombudsmen). An alternative regulator, the Independent Monitor for the Press (IMPRESS), aims to comply fully with the Leveson reform proposals, and has been approved by the Press Recognition Panel set up under a Royal Charter to keep it from political control. IMPRESS has found favour with small publications, including those produced by ‘community journalists’, but has come under sustained criticism from mainstream papers.

Journalistic culture and media system Hallin and Mancini (2004a) categorized UK journalistic culture as part of the North Atlantic or Liberal model – a long-established, pluralist and professionalized, market-led tradition. All the main national newspapers are privately owned and all but one are commercially driven. Although circulations continue to fall, national newspapers retain considerable influence over public opinion and help set the news agenda for broadcast media, but it is the online presence of both print and broadcast media and the instantaneous breaking of news via Twitter that literally determines the news of the moment. Following pressure from journalists and a Royal Commission after World War 2, the newspaper industry developed its own system of self-regulation, which has taken various shapes, all of which have been the subject of criticism for lack of independence for the last 70 years (for a fuller history, see Jempson and Powell, 2011). 278

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The broadcast media have always operated under statuary regulation, requiring a license to broadcast and compliance with quality, impartiality and decency standards. They have operated under a ‘lighter touch’ system of regulation since the establishment of the Office of Communications (Ofcom)2 in 2003 to deal with all forms of telecommunications. Ofcom issues licenses to radio and TV broadcasters as well as handling complaints. It has a staff of 790 and budget of £117 million (Ofcom Annual Report, 2013–2014), coming partly from license fees and partly from state subsidies. Commercial terrestrial television channels funded by advertising share public service broadcasting commitments with the BBC, which is funded from the public purse via a license fee paid by every household with a TV, or where TV services are watched ‘as live’ on any form of receiver. In the years since the formation of Ofcom, British household online media consumption has rapidly increased. In 2003, Britons watched an average of 3.75 hours of television per day; those few with access to broadband then used the Internet daily for less than 30 minutes.Television viewing has remained fairly static, with people consuming 3.66 hours a day in 2015. However, broadband now reaches 80% of households and on average people spend more than 31 hours a week online (Ofcom, 2015a). In addition, more than two in every three people in the UK now own a smartphone, and increasingly these are used to access news and information (Ofcom, 2015b). A large majority of those accessing news online do so via ‘traditional’ media sites such as the BBC (Ofcom, 2012). Research has shown that people access TV and online news in a ‘complementary way’ (Newman, 2012, p. 12), often from the same provider. Meanwhile, newspaper circulations have continued to plummet (Taylor, 2014), with more and more people relying on the Internet for news.

Established instruments of media accountability The success of the citizen-led ‘Hacked Off ’ campaign3 in generating both outrage and concern about the apparent impunity with which some journalism outlets were flouting the law placed media ethics and accountability at the top of the political agenda in 2012. This in turn led Prime Minister David Cameron, supported by his Liberal Democratic coalition partners and the Opposition Labour Party, to set up an independent public inquiry into the culture, practices and ethics of the British press, chaired by Lord Justice Brian Leveson.4 For the best part of a year, he received copious written evidence of press misbehaviour and cross-examined complainants, journalists, editors and owners, and non-governmental organizations, in public and streamed live online. His findings ran to some 2,000 pages and included 47 recommendations for improvements in the system of press regulation. They immediately became the subject of controversy within the press industry. Those most heavily criticized represented his proposals as an attempt to bring the press under state control, even though he had ruled this out most explicitly. All three main political parties, the ruling Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition and the opposition Labour Party, in consultation with the ‘Hacked Off ’ pressure group, proposed that a non-partisan Royal Charter be drafted to ensure that any system of self-regulation devised by the industry was fit for purpose. The Press Recognition Panel5 established under the Charter must be satisfied that any new regulatory body is sufficiently independent of those publications it regulates. Once signed up to a recognized regulator, publications would be relieved of the risk of punitive damages and costs in any court action brought against them by a complainant. The main national and local newspaper groups6 rejected this scheme and have funded IPSO, which is regarded as a reincarnation of the discredited PCC (Toynbee, 2015). IPSO wields the 279

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right to impose tougher sanctions on those who breach the Editors’ Code of Practice, but only deals with complaints which have not been resolved by the offending newspaper. IPSO began operating in the autumn of 2014. It requires its members to establish their own in-house complaints procedures, to which it expects complainants to make their initial approaches, signalling a return to the notion of in-house ombudsmen, which was briefly a feature of the industry. Publications found to have breached the Editors’ Code of Practice could face fines of up to £1 million if complaints are referred to IPSO. In the past, the industry has rejected any notion of fines. The new regulator is able to request the publication of either or both corrections and apologies, but has demonstrated a willingness to insist on greater prominence than its predecessor. Members are required to submit an annual statement to IPSO about complaints received,7 but there is no requirement to publish them on their websites. According to a detailed analysis of its structure and governance by the Media Standards Trust (2013),8 IPSO satisfies only 12 of the 36 Leveson recommendations to ensure the independence of an effective regulator. IPSO claimed to have had a very effective first year in operation, having dealt with 463 complaints, 198 of which were resolved between complainant and publisher, another 48 through mediation by IPSO and 48 upheld by IPSO.9 Its critics remain vocal, however, releasing a video showing a victim’s unhappiness with the new system.10 Three national newspaper groups that have not signed up to IPSO – the Guardian Media Group (The Guardian and The Observer), Independent Print Ltd. (The Independent, i and Independent on Sunday) and the Financial Times – have retained their established Readers’ Editors who deal with complaints and write about journalism ethics. Meanwhile, an initially crowdfunded alternative regulator for publications that do not wish or cannot afford to belong to IPSO applied to the Press Recognition Panel. Once acknowledged as meeting the criteria set out by Leveson, members of the Independent Monitor for the Press (IMPRESS)11, might have expected exemption from paying claimants’ costs in libel or privacy actions and from paying exemplary damages under the Crime and Courts Act 2013 (CCA). However the relevant clauses of the CCA have yet to be implemented following pressure from the mainstream media. IMPRESS won backing from some leading journalists, writers and intellectuals, however, it has been criticised by some for accepting funding, indirectly, from Max Mosley, former President of the International Automobile Federation, who campaigned for privacy laws following a notorious breach of his own privacy by the now defunct Murdochowned News of the World. IMPRESS also requires complainants to approach editors first, but offers an arbitration service, an idea that has been taken up by IPSO. For the public, and those wishing to make complaints, the new press regulatory landscape is more complex and confusing than before. They must first discover which regulatory system the offending publication has signed up to, and follow the procedures used by that publication. Meanwhile, in broadcasting, Ofcom has stringent powers to fine and even remove the right to broadcast if the terms of its licenses are broken. The terms cover technical quality but also include a Broadcasting Code relating to matters of content, which each broadcaster is expected to supplement with their own in-house editorial guidelines. The expectation is that complaints about programmes are made online, via the Ofcom website. This can be a somewhat cumbersome process. Nonetheless, there were 12,774 complaints about broadcasting standards or license conditions in 2013–2014, a reduction of more than 21% from the previous year. However, there was an increase of almost 32% in the number of complaints about either or both unfairness and unwarranted infringements of privacy.When there are complaints about a programme or service, they tend to come in batches. Of the 251 cases consid280

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ered worthy of investigation in the first category, 124 were found to be in breach of Ofcom codes or license conditions and a further 29 cases were resolved. Only 72 fairness or privacy cases were adjudicated upon, with 22 upheld and seven resolved satisfactorily. Altogether, fines ranging from £10,000 to £85,000 were levied against offending broadcasters, but none faced the fate of the Iranian broadcaster PressTV, which was fined £100,000 and taken off air by Ofcom in 2012.12 Given the rapidly changing media environment, especially in terms of delivery, Ofcom is reviewing its approach to content regulation. Its declared aim is to reduce regulation, except where there is a specific need to protect the interests of citizens and consumers. The regulator has embarked upon a review of public service broadcasting requirements as they apply to terrestrial channels such as the BBC, ITV, Channel 4 and Channel 5 and their related ‘catch-up’ services, as well as considering how other TV services contribute to the public service remit. The BBC retains its own in-house complaints system,[13] but under its renewed Royal Charter the statutory regulator Ofcom is now responsible for holding the BBC to account.

Innovative instruments of media accountability Ofcom research14 suggests that the digital era has brought with it new forms of multi-level communication, from watching different content on different devices at the same time to ‘media meshing’ (talking on the phone, texting or tweeting about programmes, or even communicating directly with the programmes while watching TV) and ‘media stacking’ (using smartphones or tablets to surf the net, network with friends or shop online while watching TV). It could be said that each of these forms of multi-tasking represents an attitude towards media accountability as schedulers, commissioning editors and producers need to be aware of and respond to this new audience climate. Shaun Austin, director of media research at the polling agency YouGov, in a study using their social media analysis tool (SoMA),15 found that the majority of people on Twitter follow some form of news account – be it a news brand, breaking news account or journalist. A large number of them follow all three. Of these three types of accounts, journalists are the most popular, suggesting that people appreciate the opportunity to get closer to those who make and comment on the news. The Reuters Institute Digital News Report 201416 revealed that 12% of UK Twitter users now treat it as a news source, clicking on stories flagged up in tweets, unlike Facebook users. Tracking actual usage across a representative sample of users,YouGov estimates that 2.6 million people (48% of those accessing news on Twitter) follow at least one specific journalist, 2.2 million (40%) follow a breaking news account and 1.9 million (35%) follow at least one general news brand. “68% of people in our data have interacted with a journalist or media organisation that they don’t follow, through either a reply, favourite, or retweet”, explains Austin. As a result, the influence of journalists and news organizations is more significant than the numbers around followers suggest. There has been a noticeable change in the number of citizen-run blogs highlighting the errors and agendas of national newspapers in particular. From 2009–2010, there were around 20 blogs doing this. Over the last five years, this number has slowly dwindled. Two remain particularly active: The Media Blog17 has more than 70,000 followers on Twitter,18 and Zelo Street19 has more than 6,000 followers on Twitter20 and posts several blogs every day. Tabloid Watch had 17,000 Twitter followers when it stopped blogging and tweeting in May 2013. It was regularly updated for four years, and lawyers at the Leveson Inquiry used some of its exposés to question editors. Some of the early ‘media watchbloggers’ took up journalism jobs, fearing that continued blogging on media errors could adversely affect their careers.21 281

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Arguably, the impact of the phone-hacking scandal and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry may also have played a part. Before 2011, media criticism was a niche interest. Generally, the media does not report on problems in other media except in exceptional circumstances (or, for example, for ideological reasons, such as attacks from the right-wing Mail, Sun and Telegraph on the BBC).22 The revelation of the hacking of Milly Dowler’s phone and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry made this issue mainstream. Daily news reports from the inquiry and live streaming of the interrogation of key witnesses on 24-hour news channels meant media misbehaviour became interesting to the wider public. ‘Hacked Off ’ has expanded its web presence to include IPSO Watch23, to monitor the effectiveness of the new press regulator. The Media Standards Trust24 continues its research and watchdog role and is now focusing on the online media giants of the digital age – Facebook, Google, Twitter,Yahoo and YouTube. There are plentiful special interest groups keeping an eye on the media too, from Tell Mama,25 which highlights Islamophobia, to MediaWatch,26 focusing on ‘family values’. Organizations representing Roma, Gypsies and Travellers have become more active in their responses to unfair print and broadcast coverage,27 as have those representing the transsexual and intersex communities.28 It is now not uncommon for individuals to tweet about media issues amid all of their other concerns. Increasingly, Twitter is being used to highlight outrageous or incorrect stories. These ‘Twitterstorms’ and the campaigns they generate may become news in themselves, attracting many thousands of supporters. Examples have included demands for corrections of serious errors,29 the removal of ‘lads’ mags’ from supermarket shelves,30 ending the sexualization of children in the press31 and even the firing of controversial columnists. A call for the removal of Page 3 topless models from The Sun32 garnered 200,000 signatories to an online petition, numerous YouTube contributions, support from trades unions, universities and politicians and earned acres of media commentary. Academics from the Media Reform Coalition33 blog and tweet about policy issues, and similar material can be found on the blog of the International Forum for Responsible Media.34 There remains a distinct reluctance on the part of the media to respond to such organized campaigns. Even commentators in the media who favour greater public accountability are sceptical about the efficacy of ‘crowd-sourced corrections’. “It is not the answer”, says journalism professor Brian Cathcart, founder of ‘Hacked Off ’.“We need clarity and rigour. We would not consider ‘crowd-sourced’ verdicts in criminal cases”.35 Will Gore, a former PCC complaints officer and now managing editor at the Independent newspaper group, believes public accountability via social media is “interesting but it is likely to deal with only major issues – and be focussed on campaigning-type subjects. It cannot really remove the need for formal in-house or external regulation”.36 The Guardian37 Readers’ Editor Chris Elliot sees the two working together, writing:“Intuitively I think they will complement rather than supplant a more formal in-house process”.38

Other media accountability instruments Nowadays it is increasingly the case that journalists enter the trade with a degree qualification, though not always in journalism. However, more than 60 universities and higher education institutions offer courses in all forms of print, broadcast and online journalism at undergraduate and postgraduate level.39 They attract international and domestic students, and some mid-career journalists undertake postgraduate courses to change direction in their career or develop particular interests. 282

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More and more of the staff delivering these courses are mid-career journalists who bring extensive industry experience to the classroom. Media law, ethics and regulation have become key elements in all courses accredited by one or other of the industry bodies – the National Council for the Training of Journalism,40 the Broadcast Journalism Training Council41 and Creative Skillset.42 Basic journalism qualifications can also be gained at further education institutions, and there are many private providers, including distance learning and online courses.The main journalists’ union, the National Union of Journalists (NUJ), also offers skills development short courses to its members. Short courses and summer schools in investigative journalism, for example, have become popular, especially among those developing an interest in alternative or community journalism.43

Conclusion The system of media accountability in the UK remains in a state of transition, if not of turmoil. At present, few of the stakeholders would consider the outcome of the ‘hacking scandal’, the Leveson Inquiry or the management failures at the BBC as either settled or satisfactory. The reputation of British journalism and media organizations has been tarnished, perhaps not irreparably, but it will take some time for public confidence to return. A recent YouGov poll44 revealed that the British users of Wikipedia trust its contributors more than they now trust journalists. It has been a long-standing tradition to distrust journalists, but levels of trust seem to be dropping even further. Journalists’ standing in popularity polls is repeatedly found to be languishing near the bottom of the tables. An Ipsos Mori poll in 2006 found that journalists were the least trusted among 16 professional classes. Their ranking had slightly improved by 2011, not because the level of trust had risen, journalists being resolutely seen as liars by 72% of those polled. Rather, another profession had fallen even further, with politicians being generally distrusted by 82% of people (Ipsos Mori, 2011). Other research has shown that there had been a steady decline in trust in journalists over a period of years (Barnett, 2008). However, not all journalists are the same in the public’s eye. Trust in British television journalism remains significantly higher than for other media. While the Ipsos Mori poll rated ‘journalists’ as thoroughly untrustworthy, ‘television news readers’ were trusted by over two-thirds of respondents (Ipsos Mori, 2011). This confirms the trend for partisan UK print media to be treated with scepticism while television news organizations and journalists are more trusted sources (Ofcom, 2012; Gunter, 2005; Cushion, 2009). Debate about the renewal of the BBC’s Charter in 2016 focused on Government proposals to radically alter the structure, funding and regulation of the corporation (Plunkett, 2015) and public service broadcasting obligations in general, and resulted in the dissolution of its governing body, the BBC Trust. It may take longer to assess the effectiveness of the various new press regulatory systems. Never has the expression ‘Watch this space’ been a more appropriate conclusion.

Notes  1 http://www.pressgazette.co.uk/save-our-sources-press-gazette-campaign-stop-uk-public-authoritiessecretly-obtaining-journalists  2 http://www.ofcom.org.uk  3 http://hackinginquiry.org  4 http://www.levesoninquiry.org.uk

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Jempson, Powell and Reardon  5 http://pressrecognitionpanel.org.uk   6 News UK (part of Rupert Murdoch’s News Corporation), which owns The Sun, The Times and The Sunday Times; the Telegraph Media Group, which owns The Daily and Sunday Telegraph; Associated Newspapers, owners of the Daily and Sunday Mail and the Metro; and Northern and Shell Media Publications, which owns the daily and Sunday editions of the Express and the Star.   7 See Annex A at http://www.ipso.co.uk/pdf/regulations.pdf  8 http://mediastandardstrust.org/mst-news/ipso-an-assessment-by-the-media-standards-trust/  9 https://www.ipso.co.uk/IPSO/news/press-releases-statements.html 10 http://hackinginquiry.org/comment/ipso-year-one-no-regulation-no-arbitration-no-investigationsno-independent-auditing-weak-excuses-from-the-chief-executive/http://hackinginquiry.org/pccipso/public-gives-damning-verdict-on-ipso-after-first-year/http://hackinginquiry.org/video-posts/ ipso-one-year-of-failure/ 11 http://impressproject.org 12 Ofcom Annual Report, 2013–2014. 13 http://www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/contact_us/making_a_complaint.html 14 http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/market-data-research/market-data/communications-marketreports/cmr13/ 15 http://www.digitalnewsreport.org/essays/2014/how-news-and-stories-are-followed-on-twitter/ 16 http://www.digitalnewsreport.org 17 http://themediablog.typepad.com 18 @themediatweets 19 http://zelo-street.blogspot.com 20 @zelo_street 21 Maintaining regular blogs about a fast-changing media can be taxing for bloggers working alone, especially when career, family and other commitments reduce the time available to analyse media output. 22 See http://www.themediablog.co.uk/the-media-blog/2014/04/bbc-bashed-for-lavish-lambing-luxuries. html and http://tabloid-watch.blogspot.co.uk/2010/12/mail-attacks-bbc-over-burning-of-blue.html 23 https://ipsowatch.com 24 http://mediastandardstrust.org 25 http://tellmamauk.org 26 http://www.mediawatchuk.com 27 http://www.travellermovement.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/A-Bigger-Fatter-PublicDebate-Gypsies-Travellers-and-Roma-in-the-media.pdf 28 http://www.transmediawatch.org 29 Examples include @Jon_Danzig (http://jondanzig.blogspot.co.uk) and @NoMorePage3 (https:// www.change.org/p/david-dinsmore-take-the-bare-boobs-out-of-the-sun-nomorepage3) 30 http://www.mumsnet.com/campaigns/lads-mags 31 https://www.change.org/p/daily-mail-mailonline-stop-the-daily-mail-sexualising-children 32 http://www.change.org/en-GB/petitions/david-dinsmore-take-the-bare-boobs-out-of-the-sunnomorepage3 33 http://www.mediareform.org.uk 34 https://inforrm.wordpress.com 35 interview with Mike Jempson, July 2014. 36 interview with Mike Jempson, July 2014. 37 http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/22/readers-editor-guardian-deals-complaints 38 Interview with Mike Jempson, July 2014. 39 http://www.theguardian.com/education/ng-interactive/2014/jun/03/university-guide2015-league-table-for-journalism-publishing-and-public-relations 40 http://www.nctj.com 41 http://www.bjtc.org.uk 42 http://creativeskillset.org 43 For example http://www.tcij.org and https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com 44 http://yougov.co.uk/news/2014/08/09/more-british-people-trust-wikipedia-trust-news/

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35 Summary

Measuring media accountability in Europe – and beyond Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler, Katja Kaufmann, Janis Brinkmann and Matthias Karmasin

Abstract This summary chapter examines and compares structures of media self-regulation and media accountability in all parts of Europe – and beyond. Emphasizing the relevance of responsible media in democratic countries granting press freedom, the summary analyses the development of established instruments of media self-regulation – such as press councils and ethics codes – as well as more recent online instruments – e.g. media blogs, online ombudsmen and participatory processes of media accountability. In order to do so, the authors summarize the key results of the first comparative analysis of media self-regulation and accountability structures in all EU member states (plus selected neighbouring countries), provided by a team of mass communication and journalism scholars from 33 different research institutions. In addition to the qualitative data, the summary presents a pilot index to measure the state of media accountability across countries, and – similar to the Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders – stimulate a wider media policy debate about self-regulation beyond academic circles.

Media accountability – a trending topic for journalists and policy-makers While news outlets all over the world are struggling to cope with the technological and economic challenges that are putting their journalistic function to the test, media accountability has become a trending topic – both for journalists and for media policy-makers. Over the past few years, the effectiveness of the traditional system of media self-regulation has been a cause for heated debates within the media industry, particularly after Lord Justice Leveson recommended a fundamental reform of the Press Complaints Commission in the United Kingdom in late 2012, as a consequence of the News of the World scandal (Leveson Inquiry, 2012). Clearly, the British self-regulation system – which had been a role model for Western European journalism cultures since the 1950s – was not able to prevent or control the unethical and unlawful methods of the Murdoch-owned tabloid. Instead, Leveson suggested a new system of self-regulation, underpinned by statute – a strategy that prompted an outcry among British news outlets. Many of them considered such a form of state intervention to be the end of press freedom. 285

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A similarly fierce response came from industry representatives and lobbyists across Europe to the 2013 report of the EU High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism (­Vike-Freiberga, Däubler-Gmelin, Hammersley and Maduro, 2013). The committee was set up by EU Commissioner Neelie Kroes in 2011. At that time, the European Parliament was concerned about a tightening of the media law in Hungary under the Orbán government. Among other recommendations, the High-Level Group suggested drastically expanding the sanctioning potential of existing press councils.They also demanded mandatory media councils in EU states which still do not have press councils, such as France and Romania (Eberwein, Fengler, Lauk and Leppik-Bork, 2011; Fengler, Eberwein, Mazzoleni, Porlezza and Russ-Mohl, 2014). Despite interventions like these, the overarching question is still unanswered: How can we ensure a free and responsible press across Europe? Apparently, a universally applicable strategy seems to be hardly realistic, since the European media market is far from being a homogeneous entity. Due to the recent processes of political transformation, the context factors of media production in the new democracies of Eastern Europe considerably differ from those in Western Europe (Jakubowicz and Sukosd, 2008a). Even in Western Europe, the development of journalistic professionalism and, consequently, the approaches to media accountability and selfregulation vary widely (Hallin and Mancini, 2004a). Moreover, the new challenges imposed by the ongoing digital transformation of the international media landscape are doing their share to complicate the necessary reformation of the existing models of media regulation even further (Ess, 2014; Friend and Singer, 2007). Finding sound and sustainable strategies to accompany and monitor this reformation must be considered as one of the key tasks of current media and communication research, if it wants to have a socially relevant impact. But how can this type of scientific monitoring of international media accountability processes be realized? How, and under which circumstances, can media accountability be a potent means to support responsible journalism at all? Which factors – not only from the context of media systems and journalism cultures, but also political and economic factors – enable or disable the functionality of media accountability processes? And what are the possible practical implications, particularly for (European) media policy-makers? Finding answers to questions like these requires a systematic comparative analysis – and our European Handbook of Media Accountability offers a sound empirical basis for such an endeavour. This chapter presents the results of a comparative evaluation of the 33 country reports that have been compiled for this volume. The qualitative analysis is supplemented by a European Index of Media Accountability, created to measure and monitor the status quo of media accountability in Europe based on the judgments of national experts in the fields of media self-regulation and communication research. Taken together, these assessments constitute the first comprehensive pan-European inventory of the prevalence of media accountability instruments (MAIs) offline and online – and their practical relevance.

A qualitative comparison For our European Handbook of Media Accountability, a team of mass communication and journalism researchers in 33 European countries has conducted desk studies in their respective countries, in order to create a qualitative perspective on the state of media accountability across Europe. These studies included (a) a brief description of the countries’ journalism culture and media system; (b) a description and discussion of established instruments of media accountability like press councils, ethics codes, ombudsmen, media journalism in trade journals, media criticism in the mass media, letters to the editor etc.; (c) a description and discussion of innovative instruments of media accountability emerging online in the digital age – such as media blogs, citizens’ 286

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and ­journalists’ websites critically addressing media issues, online documentation of research, podcasts of internal critique sessions, online ombudsmen etc.; (d) a description and discussion of other MAIs like journalism education and training, if they did not fit into the aforementioned categories; and (e) a conclusion that discusses the effectiveness of the various MAIs, problems and benchmark projects in the analysed countries. Altogether, this procedure helped to create a collection of 33 comprehensive country reports, evaluating the state of media accountability across Europe – and beyond – on the basis of the available scientific literature as well as additional documents (journalistic articles about MAIs, internal documents by institutions of media accountability, etc.). The following paragraphs summarize some of the Handbook’s findings from a comparative perspective, with a focus on •• •• ••

instruments of media accountability on the professional level instruments of media accountability on the organizational level online instruments of media accountability.

The particular situation in Turkey, Russia and Israel, all of three being neighbours of the core region of the European Union, is discussed in a separate section.

Professional instruments of media accountability On the professional level, MAIs like press councils and codes of ethics are crucial. The history of their creation as well as their current reputation in the media systems and journalism cultures of Europe differ considerably. The idea of a press or media council as a voluntary institution to monitor journalistic coverage has its roots in Northern and Western Europe, with the oldest example coming from Sweden. Here, the Pressens opinionsnämnd was founded as early as 1916, being complemented by a national news ombudsman for the public since the 1960s. According to Torbjörn von Krogh, this particular combination “works fairly well”1 – just as its counterpart in Norway, where the Press Council (PC) has been in place since 1928. Unlike the Swedish example, the Norwegian PC is now also responsible for complaints on broadcasting. Both institutions were able to revert to formalized ethical codes from early on, and they seem to “have high prestige” among members of the profession.The same is true for the third country on the Scandinavian Peninsula, Finland. Being active only since 1968, the Finnish Council of Mass Media may be considerably younger than either of the aforementioned institutions, but its central role in the national media system is undisputed.The Council bases its judgments on the Journalistin ohjeet (Guidelines for Journalists), which were originally published in 1957 – and have ever since been adapted to ongoing media transformations. Today, Jari Väliverronen and Heikki Heikkilä observe that “[t]he strong support for nationwide rules has rendered other ethical codes, such as in-house guidelines, unnecessary or complementary at best”. The history of professional self-regulatory organizations in other Western European countries has, in most of the cases, been more erratic. In the United Kingdom, a General Council of the Press was established in 1953 to avoid statutory regulation, but proved ineffectual, even when reconstituted as the Press Council in 1963. After new threats of statutory control, the industry reacted by creating the Press Complaints Commission (PCC) in 1991, this time excluding journalists’ organizations which had been represented in the older Press Council. The PCC, however, was disbanded in 2014 as a consequence of the News of the World scandal – and replaced by the new Independent Press Standards Organisation (IPSO), which still has to prove whether it is more effective than its predecessors. The German Presserat was founded in 1956, initially 287

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c­opying the structures of the British model. It took almost 20 years, however, to develop a German Press Code, which was then supplemented on a case-by-case basis. It is now often criticized because of its incoherence and its lack of adaptability to the realities of the digital media world – similar to the Declaration of the Duties and Rights of a Journalist by the Swiss Press Council (founded in 1977). The first Austrian Press Council was established in 1961, but had to discontinue its activities between 2002 and 2010 because of a dispute with the major tabloid newspaper Kronen-Zeitung. The Dutch Press Council has been active since 1960, but its adjudications seem to have “little influence on the daily practices of journalists”, as Harmen Groenhart and Huub Evers assert. The Conseil de Presse in Luxembourg was created by law in 1979. Given that it is the only traditional instrument of media accountability in this little country, it has done much to “reinforce the auto-regulatory character” of journalistic quality management there. Among the countries in Northern and Western Europe, the press councils in Denmark, Belgium and Ireland must be considered as atypical latecomers. The Danish Press Council was established by political intervention in 1992, after “internal disputes within both the press organizations and specific media, as well as between the media industry and the government, [had] complicated the development of broadly accepted official rules and sanctions” for many years. In Belgium, there are two press councils which reflect the dominant language communities within the country: the Raad voor de Journalistiek, formed in 2002 in Flanders; and the Conseil de Déontologie Journalistique, created in 2009 in Wallonia. The quasi-statutory Press Council of Ireland came into existence as late as 2007 after several decades of political debate relating to the need to update Irish defamation law and the question of press regulation. It is a special case because Ireland’s Office of the Press Ombudsman pre-mediates every complaint about unethical journalistic actions, thus reducing the burden on the members of the Council. The situation is strikingly different in Southern Europe and the countries belonging to Hallin and Mancini’s Mediterranean Model, where MAIs on the professional level are far less dominant, and institutionalized forms of media self-regulation sometimes do not exist at all. In France, for example, there is still no press council, since attempts at creating the Cour d’Honneur de la presse (Press Honour Council) in 1946 and the Projet de Conseil de presse (Press Council Project) in 1973 did not succeed. On the other hand, trade unions and associations, such as the Syndicat National des Journalistes and the Association des Journalistes Républicains Français, played a historically important role in shaping the identity of the profession, for example by developing the first French code of ethics in 1918. Neither does Greece have a press council. The enforcement of the Code of Journalists’ Professional, Ethical and Social Responsibility rests with the journalists’ trade unions and their disciplinary councils. Even the Italian Ordine dei Giornalisti (OdG) is no real equivalent to the press and media councils in Northern and Western Europe, as it was established by law and operates rather as an institution that regulates access to the journalistic profession. If media practitioners, after passing a highly selective requirement process based on years of paid work and a final examination, are recognized as members of the OdG, they have to sign a set of rules – and are sanctioned if they infringe them. Although technically these rules cannot be considered a code of ethics, they include some aspects related to social responsibility to the public and to the protection of the professional integrity of journalists. However, other countries in Southern Europe differ from the aforementioned examples: Spain, for instance, does not have a national press council either, but regional organizations like the Consell de la Informació de Catalunya (Catalan Information Council), approved in 1992 and created in 1996, or the ethical council by the Federation of Press Associations of Spain (FAPE), created in 2004, partly make up for this absence. Accordingly, the ethical rules of the Collegi de Periodistes de Catalunya (Catalan College of Journalists) and the FAPE code may be 288

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considered as “Spain’s two main benchmark codes”, although there are many other documents containing ethical guidelines in Spain. Portugal’s first deontological code originated in the 1970s – as did the Portuguese Press Council, which was created by a government initiative in 1975, but then was closed down in 1990 following the creation of the High Authority for Mass Media, which was replaced in 2006 by the current Regulatory Authority for Mass Media (ERC). The Press Ethics Commission (PEC) in Malta was established in 1999, but according to Joseph Borg and Mary Anne Lauri, “[t]he decisions of the PEC are not given importance either by audiences or by the industry”. Its Cypriot counterpart, the Cyprus Media Complaints Commission, has been active since 1997, after two institutional precursors “never operated properly”. In the media systems of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), organizations like press or media councils only came into existence in the period after the fall of communism – if at all. In many cases, their foundation was accompanied by the formulation of new codes of ethics, following the ideals of Western media systems. Often, however, it proved difficult to gain acceptance for them among industry members. The earliest example of a press council among the CEE countries, the Avaliku Sõna Nõukogu, founded in 1991 in Estonia, illustrates this problem quite well. The base model was Finland’s Council of Mass Media and operated for a while as the only critical institution for the media in Estonia. However, as interventions by the Press Council became more and more disliked among media leaders, resistance emerged, and eventually, as a result of a conceptual conflict, the Estonian Newspaper Association withdrew its membership, with the broadcasters (both private and public) following suit, to found their own Press Council in 2002. As a consequence, two national press councils are now competing for supremacy in Estonia. Due to the enduring tensions between the two councils, the Code of Ethics for the Estonian Press has not been amended since 1997. A direct diffusion of Western European models can also be observed in other CEE countries. In Lithuania, for example, a two-tier system of self-regulation with a press council and an ombudsperson, similar to the Swedish case, was introduced in 1996. Other press councils, for example in Slovakia (since 2002), Bulgaria (since 2005) and Croatia (since 2011), mirror the conventional one-tier system that dominates most Western European media systems. According to the authors of this book, their activities are hardly visible in public – and therefore do not leave much of an impact on practical journalism. As in the other journalism cultures, there are also some special cases in Central and Eastern Europe: Hungary has a Media Council that is part of the co-regulation system, which was set up in accordance with the media law of 2010. This law “allows the Media Council to make administrative agreements with the co-regulation bodies. Based on these agreements, the self-regulation body handles a specified range of cases within the official authority’s jurisdiction and performs other functions relating to media administration and media policy. In this framework, the responsibility of self-regulatory bodies is to decide on complaints concerning the activities of service providers, to arbitrate disputes between media enterprises and to monitor the activities of providers”. In Poland, the Press Act of 1984 defined a Press Council as a consultative body for the prime minister, but this Council does not yet exist. In recent years, media scholars have proposed to change the old legislation and transform new ideas into media law in order to introduce such an institution in Poland. In Romania, neither a press council nor a similar institution exist at all. However, Romanian media actors are organized in one of the oldest professional associations of journalists in Eastern Europe which is functional even today: the Union of Professional Journalists, created in 1919, with its own Code of Ethics. 289

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Organizational instruments of media accountability Similar to MAIs on the professional level, infrastructures of media accountability on the organizational level display distinct features in the different media cultures and journalism systems of Europe. Taking into account the rather mature development of the profession, and the wide acceptance of professional codes of ethics, in the majority of the Northern and Western European countries, organizational codes and newsroom statutes play a much less important role in the infrastructure of media accountability. Denmark seems to be an exception, as “in the late 1980s and in the 1990s, the three largest national dailies developed ethical guidelines, and in the last five to seven years more and more news media have followed”. Considering that pioneering US newspapers in the 1960s borrowed the ombudsman concept from Scandinavia, this MAI is surprisingly underdeveloped in the Northern states. In Denmark, a few newspapers had ombudsmen for a short while, but today only Politiken maintains such a function (since 2001). There is currently no ombudsman in Norway. In Germany, the ombudsman concept was never successfully introduced, even though some small local papers have, in recent years, been trying to revive the idea. In the Netherlands, the number of ombudsmen has dwindled, mainly for financial reasons, from twelve in 2008 to two in 2016. Several newspapers maintain an ombudsman (or ombudsman-like) function in Switzerland, even though “they are hardly visible in the media they represent”. There is one ombudsman in Austria and also in Belgium. As the industry in the United Kingdom is split about the re-establishment of a press council after the Leveson Inquiry, those media groups not joining the new IPSO stress that their readers’ editors should hold a watching brief over ethical matters. In Norway, the Association of Norwegian Editors publishes a yearly online “editorial account”. Media journalism in the mass media is a frequent phenomenon in quality media, both print and broadcasting, of the Northern and Western European countries, and all countries report at least one and in many cases several trade journal(s) and website(s). Denmark has a regular TV and radio programme focusing on media matters, as do several Danish newspapers. In Sweden, media is a frequent topic for all media, with a public service radio programme being the opinion leader; even a freesheet engages in media accountability. In Norway, all newspapers run a media beat or cover media affairs, as does the public broadcaster. In Finland, while “[i]n print media, the supply of media journalism is decreasing”, several radio and TV programmes by the public service broadcaster YLE report on the media, as does a weekly satire on private TV. In Germany and the Netherlands, newspapers and opinion magazines tackle media matters, while media criticism in broadcasting media is much less frequent. Also in Switzerland, many media beats in the mass media have been abolished for economic reasons. In Austria, only two of the leading newspapers run small media sections. The United Kingdom is notable once more, due to the News of the World scandal, as Mike Jempson,Wayne Powell and Sally Reardon summarize: “Before 2011, media criticism was a niche interest. Generally, the media does not report on problems in other media except in exceptional circumstances (or, for example, for ideological reasons, such as attacks from the right-wing Mail, Sun and Telegraph on the BBC). The revelation of the hacking of Milly Dowler’s phone and the subsequent Leveson Inquiry made this issue mainstream. Daily news reports from the inquiry and live streaming of the interrogation of key witnesses on 24-hour news channels meant media misbehaviour became interesting to the wider public”. Broadcasting law requires public broadcasters to employ an ombudsman in Switzerland and in Denmark. In Switzerland, in addition, a “federal authority” is “in charge of assessing complaints about radio and television programmes”. Ofcom acts as a strong and visible media 290

Summary

regulator for broadcasting in the United Kingdom. In the Netherlands, NOS has installed an “ombuds-committee”. In Sweden, the Swedish Broadcasting Commission “deals with complaints on what is broadcast by companies based in Sweden”. In Germany, with the Broadcasting Councils (ARD) and the ZDF Television Council, the public broadcasting corporations have established “internal regulatory bodies whose members, however, are appointed by state actors”. In Ireland, the long-established Complaints Commission for public broadcasting has become part of the BAI. Austria is notable, as “institutional self-regulation of the audio-visual sector does not exist”, while the public broadcaster ORF has a rather visible editors’ council, as is the case in Belgium, where “[t]he public broadcaster VRT developed its newsroom statute in 1998 and it has been modified several times since then”. Political parallelism, along with a weak professionalism, probably has been the key factor in the implementation of several specific MAIs on the organizational level in many Southern European countries, including France and the French-speaking part of Belgium. In Portugal, as well as France, several quality media have organizational codes of conduct for journalists. In contrast, Salvador Alsius, Ruth Rodriguez and Marcel Mauri describe the number of Spanish media “which actually adhere to general internal codes, including ethical directives and internal codes”, as “minimal”. Specific to Southern European countries seems to be the newsroom council (sociétés de rédacteurs or sociétés de journalistes), established as a means to protect the newsroom from the political pressure of the media owner. Such councils can be found in France, Portugal and in the Frenchspeaking part of Belgium. However, our authors evaluate them as rather powerless in today’s converging and ever-competitive media landscape. Also, ombudsmen are a more frequent phenomenon in the countries of Southern Europe, with the exception of Italy (where two initiatives by Il Messaggero and La Repubblica failed). In France, Spain and Portugal, leading print and broadcast media all have introduced ombudsmen since the mid-1990s, and maintained at least several of them until now. Given the ongoing influence of the state on news outlets, broadcasting regulators are considered to be a core element of the accountability process in Southern Europe, besides their function as a distributor of licenses, and monitor of compliance. Italy, France, Portugal and Wallonia report influential broadcasting regulators, which are dependent on government and parliament. In Spain, there is no media council/regulator at the national level, while two regional audiovisual councils exist. After the abolishment of the state broadcaster ERT in Greece, the newly founded public broadcaster NERIT maintains an ombudsman and an ethics committee. Similar to the CEE countries, media law in Greece (in the case of NERIT), Malta and Cyprus requires an ombudsman, which at least in the case of Cyprus is still non-existent. While Italy lacks any form of media criticism (with the exception of media business reporting and satire/comedy), quality papers in Portugal do have media reporters. Media reporting in Spanish legacy media also appears to be quite developed. In Greece, infotainment and satirical programmes on TV “often pinpoint ethics breaches”. Media criticism is described as being “quite lively” in Malta, as “[t]he politically owned or affiliated media criticize each other quite extensively”. Even in Cyprus, “three outlets have regular media pages”. Trade journals exist in Portugal, France and Spain. With regard to Central and Eastern Europe, the observation by the Estonian authors Urmas Loit, Epp Lauk and Halliki Harro-Loit reflects well the inner professional barriers to the establishment of sounder media accountability infrastructures in the other countries which belonged to the Soviet Empire before 1990: “While the media in Estonia take the right to criticize everything and everybody, they remain opaque and inaccessible for criticism directed at themselves, and any question of the responsible use of this right is carefully avoided. Critical voices from 291

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outside the media that point to violations of ethical principles of reporting, power abuse by the media or simply bad journalism are often accused of attempting to restrict the freedom of the press or even to establish censorship. This argument easily finds public support and understanding. The memories of past censorship and the all-penetrating control by the authorities are still fresh and painful among both journalists and the public”. After the deregulation of the media markets, the new media entrepreneurs in the CEE countries have exerted a strong influence on the development of the profession, and obviously hindered the development of sound infrastructures of media self-regulation in numerous cases. The situation seems most severe in Romania and Bulgaria, both latecomers to the European Union, where only in 2004, and after severe interference, did media owners in Bulgaria adopt a code of ethics, but owners’ interference almost a decade later disrupted the work of the Council for Media Ethics in 2012/2013. At that time, the NBMG media group established its own ethical standards and formed a separate body, the Bulgarian Media Union (BMU). In Romania, “all initiatives for media self-regulation, coming from professional organizations, have resulted in the development of codes of ethics formally adopted … but there have not been any practical results”. Also, the small Baltic states – bearing the handicap of tiny media markets, with less competition, as well – can serve as an example of how a low degree of professionalism, along with rather blunt political pressure, distorts attempts to create functioning media accountability systems. In Estonia, newspaper owners and broadcasters started to boycott the professional Press Council established in 1991, and founded a separate Press Council in 2002. While some news outlets have adopted ethical codes, Latvia still lacks a nation-wide journalism code of ethics, due to a lack of consensus between the Latvian- and the Russian-speaking media. In Lithuania, the professional code of ethics “requires that all media outlets have their own internal codes of conduct; however, this has been ignored by most of the news organizations”. In comparison, the larger CEE countries Poland, Czech Republic and Slovakia stand out in terms of media accountability, at least with regard to the most basic organizational MAIs. Several leading news outlets, like Gazeta Wyborcza, Týden, Mladá fronta Dnes, Pravda and Hospodárske noviny, have adopted and in some cases also published internal codes of ethics during the late 1990s. In reaction to the tight media law and forced co-regulation introduced in Hungary, a group of leading media representatives founded the Forum of Editors-in-Chief in 2012. However, only a few active ‘ombudsmen’ are – again with a high degree of skepticism – reported for CEE countries. Media journalism is not practiced by the mainstream media, but remains a domain of alternative, community and niche media, which are less dependent on market mechanisms. Often, it takes on the form of media satire (Slovenia), or, if existent at all, is restricted to public broadcasting (Latvia). Similarly, only Poland and the Czech Republic report several regularly published trade journals, while initiatives to introduce platforms for professional exchanges, both offline and online, have failed in the smaller countries. While private media enterprises have been reluctant to establish instruments of media accountability, legislators have obliged public broadcasting stations to implement such measures in the political transformation period after 1990. Media law requires public broadcasters to provide an ombudsman or an ethics committee in almost all CEE countries. However, CEE public broadcasting stations are less independent from politics, and political actors have a grip on MAIs in several cases. While the ombudsman of RTV Slovenia is described as an excellent example of an accessible and active ombudsman, national observers are more skeptical about the impact of these public broadcasting ombudsmen in other CEE countries. There are several media-related NGOs in Sweden and Switzerland, among them the Institutet för mediestudier, Sim(o), “a media institute financed by labour unions, NGOs, the church and industry, in order to deepen the media debate based on media research”, and the Verein Qualität 292

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im Journalismus. Besides some voluntary self-regulation authorities of media-related industries, Tobias Eberwein, Susanne Fengler, Mariella Bastian and Janis Brinkmann highlight the FPS (Verein zur Förderung der publizistischen Selbstkontrolle) as an association of media professionals and academics “who strive to promote media self-regulation by monitoring the performance of the respective institutions and discussing them publicly”. Unique to Spain is the rather large array of audience-run initiatives. There are several associations of television viewers, like the Asociación de Usuarios de la Comunicación, the Telespectadors Associats de Catalunya and the Federación de Asociaciones de Consumidores y Usuarios de los Medios, resulting “in a certain degree of progressive maturity of audiences”.

Online instruments of media accountability Compared to the United States, online MAIs appear to be less developed in Northern and Western Europe. A statement by Jari Väliverronen and Heikki Heikkilä summarizes the observation for several countries in Hallin and Mancini’s Democratic Corporatist Model, where “the seemingly lively buzz on the Internet has yielded remarkably few initiatives to enhance media accountability. Besides facilitating user comments on news and launching experiments with newsroom blogs and collaborative news production, media organizations have not regarded transparency and responsiveness as their top priority. At the same time, there are also relatively few signs of actors outside the journalistic profession attempting to establish alternative ways of holding journalism accountable”. In the Scandinavian countries, Germany and the Netherlands, there are some, although not a plethora of, blogs and websites focusing on the media. In Norway, the Netherlands and Germany, we find examples where editors-in-chief take on a quasi-ombudsman role, reflecting on media ethics in public. Smaller countries do not seem to support substantial media accountability online. In Switzerland, many media blogs “are either one-man shows or very small groups of people interested in the media”, and the potential of social media for media accountability is not exploited yet. With the exception of Kobuk, no media blog lasted in Austria, where “[t]he most popular instrument for media criticism in the social media is Twitter, where a lot of journalists interact with and scrutinize each other”. But the high number of citizen media blogs in the United Kingdom has also diminished in recent years, and “[s]ome of the early ‘media watchbloggers’ took up journalism jobs, fearing that continued blogging on media errors could adversely affect their careers. […] Increasingly,Twitter is being used to highlight outrageous or incorrect stories. These Twitterstorms and the campaigns they generate may become news in themselves, attracting many thousands of supporters”. In Italy, in contrast to the almost total lack of traditional MAIs, observers report a lively debate about media accountability in social media, involving journalists and the public alike, and a much larger willingness to demonstrate transparency among online news outlets. Similarly, social media seem to have emerged as an important platform for debates on media accountability in Spain, and innovative news outlets emerging online pay substantial attention to accountability and transparency issues, while “there is little observable willingness on the part of traditional media to exploit the potential offered by the Internet as a means to develop innovative initiatives in the sphere of self-regulation and accountability to its audience”, which is also observed in Greece. In France,Twitter now plays an important role as a channel of communication between journalists and their (elite) publics, replacing journalists’ blogs criticizing the media, which have flourished for some years since the late 1990s. There are also some activities in social media in Portugal, even though Nuno Moutinho, Helena Lima, Suzana Cavaco and Ana Isabel Reis criticize a lack of awareness among Portuguese journalists of discussing professional matters, even more so in public, and “[t]he lack of online instruments of media governance results from 293

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the severe crises that have affected the news media. The newsrooms suffered from layoffs and editorial functions in this matter practically disappeared. Therefore, there is not a friendly policy towards comments, forums or other forms of debate or public participation in editorial content”.The Greek news website Tvxs.gr has a very active user community, “which is often critical of journalists’ output and editorial choices”. Though not mainly concerned with media criticism and journalistic accountability, a number of online news media debate news coverage and seek to expose media misconduct in Greece. In Malta, several journalist bloggers tackle media issues, and in 2013, an innovative effort began in Cyprus with the creation of the participatory journalism platform We Report Cyprus. Like the Spanish authors, Sergio Splendore stresses the potential of crowdfunded journalism in Italy to promote transparency in journalism. While most news outlets in Central and Eastern Europe offer comment functions online, few make active use of the variety of innovative MAIs used in Western Europe. Marketing imperatives dominate most initiatives to ‘open up’ to the public, and the authors of our Handbook agree that economic hardship also severely restricts online activities in the field of media accountability. Some market leaders, like Gazeta Wyborcza in Poland and index.hu in Hungary, also run media-critical blogs, but neither Twitter nor Facebook yet play a major role as MAIs, and the development of online media accountability in CEE is clearly still in its infancy. “This weakness creates important space for initiatives coming from outside the media organizations, such as websites of media accountability institutions, media journalism websites, academic mediawatch initiatives, civil society groups, media watchblogs and media criticism in social media”, state Bogusława Dobek-Ostrowska, Michał Głowacki and Michał Kuś, albeit their observation seems to be true for most CEE countries. Furthermore, as the statement continues, “the number of such initiatives is still much lower than in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This might be explained by the overall conditions of civil society development and the lack of knowledge about opportunities generated by the online space”. However, there are several web-based media-critical NGOs in Hungary, Poland, Slovenia, Latvia, Slovakia and the Czech Republic; also, university-run online MAIs play a role in the CEE countries, in contrast to Western and Northern Europe. In Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary, business and political pressure on and corruption of journalists is a central concern. Therefore, in Romania, the National Anticorruption Directorate as well as the National Agency of Fiscal Administration also investigate media owners and media managers and have thus initiated a public debate about media accountability. For Bulgaria, Bissera Zankova and Michał Głowacki report some citizen-activist blogs criticizing corruption in media, which they see as indicators for “a new active participatory culture”.The Hungarian websites kreativ.hu and atlatszo.hu investigate cases of corruption in national and local journalism.

Media accountability under pressure: the situation in Israel, Turkey and Russia The European Handbook of Media Accountability also contains chapters analysing media accountability infrastructures in Israel, Turkey and Russia – three countries with high political and economic relevance for the EU. Journalists and news outlets in these countries are faced with different context conditions: with regard to the ongoing political conflict in the Middle East, the Israeli military keeps exercising media censorship, and even though the public sphere and the public debate in social media are described as vibrant, the government has a strong grip on the broadcasting sector. In contrast, governments in Turkey and Russia control large parts of the media and thus hamper the development of effective instruments of media self-regulation. Consequently, only a minority of the Turkish media supports the Turkish Press Council founded 294

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in 1988. In 1998, the Journalists’ Association of Turkey passed an ethics code, but the association is under political pressure as well, and in 2010, pro-government journalists created a separate association, along with their own codes. Obviously, there are severe limits to media accountability activities on the professional level, but given the political instrumentalization of many media outlets in Turkey, media accountability on the organizational level is fragile as well. Four leading newspapers maintain ombudsmen, but they cannot act independently, which might also be assumed for the public’s representatives installed in broadcasting stations. Media criticism is restricted to social media and the few independent news organizations. In recent years, many NGOs critical of the mainstream media have monitored and analysed the influence of politics and business on journalists in Turkey. Somewhat similar, a Public Board on Press Complaints has been created in Russia in 2005, but one of its chambers is composed of party members and other political representatives, government officials and judges, and thus “contradicts the established rules of journalistic self-regulation”. Various ethical codes have been adopted by major journalists’ associations since 1994, but are considered ineffective. Several media with high national visibility have passed their own organizational codes in recent years, and experiment with instruments of media transparency. As in Turkey, media criticism is not common in the Russian mainstream media, and critical issues regarding media are largely restrained to social media. Even though Israeli journalists operate within the framework of a democracy, infrastructures of media accountability are weak and display many resemblances to the status quo of media accountability in Southern and Eastern European countries. The tri-partite Press Council in Israel is considered to be a rather weak instrument, and many disputes about media accountability are taken to court.Therefore, it is considered as a “breakthrough” by Noam Lemelshtrich Latar that “the Israeli Supreme Court adopted the IPC Ethical Code as a tool for the courts to examine the accountability of journalists and the accountability of their publishers”. Also, a critical debate about the quality of Israeli media does take place – be it on a respected TV programme focusing on media, journalists’ blogs, online comments or on websites maintained by NGOs.

Towards a European Media Accountability Index As a consequence of the qualitative analysis, the authors of this summary chapter argue that a broader European media policy debate is needed in order to promote a public discussion about the quality of media accountability in Europe. Also, more cross-border attention needs to be given to best practice cases in the field of media accountability, as well as to political, economic and professional context factors enabling or discouraging the development of sound media accountability infrastructures. With this goal in mind, we conceptualized a prototype of a European Media Accountability Index, which intends to highlight and even visualize the striking differences in the field of media accountability across Europe.2 Thus, drawing on the theoretical concept of media accountability as presented in this volume, a questionnaire for evaluating the state of media accountability was developed, following a typology of MAIs that accounts for their degree of institutionalization within the profession or in news organizations (high versus low) and for their position as internal (self-regulatory) or external (participative) tools in journalism. The questionnaire consists of six categories with questions about the impact of practices and instruments of media accountability in the analysed countries. It works on a Likert scale, ranging from 0 to 5.3 Besides the three resp. four complementary questions regarding the general media system and the online/offline interactions, the third and fourth categories concentrate on MAIs within the journalistic profession and a high 295

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degree of institutionalization (e.g. ombudsmen, regulatory authorities, press councils, professional and internal codes of ethics) or a low degree of institutionalization (e.g. fixed complaint procedures, company editorial guidelines made public, internal and public critique sessions), while the fifth and sixth categories focus on highly institutionalized (e.g. advisory councils consisting of users, media-related NGO or foundations, or media observatories) or less institutionalized MAIs outside media organizations (e.g. media satire shows or activist’s and academic media watchblogs). With 40 questions altogether, the Index questionnaire foresees a minimum score of 0 (total absence of any MAI) and a maximum score of 200 (presence of all kinds of MAIs and highest level of efficacy). An evaluation of the completed questionnaires allows for differentiation between •• •• •• •• ••

countries with a maximally developed media accountability infrastructure (200–160 points in the Index), countries with a highly developed media accountability infrastructure (159–120), countries with a developed media accountability infrastructure (119–80), countries with a partly developed media accountability infrastructure (79–40), and countries with an underdeveloped media accountability infrastructure (39–0).

Following a methodological approach of collecting expert opinions, similar to the Delphi ­technique (Rowe and Wright, 2001), between three and seven experts from each participating country (designated researchers or practitioners in the field of media accountability were selected and contacted by the national authors) were needed to complete the questionnaire.4 Thus, the data collection for our Media Accountability Index was organized in a way similar to the Press Freedom Ranking provided by Reporters Without Borders, and the Freedom House Press Freedom Index.The authors of this summary chapter do share methodological concerns regarding the empirical procedures connected to these indices – as summarized by the MediaAcT consortium (2013). However, even with the clear limitations of a non-representative approach, such indices can help to stimulate public awareness and an ensuing policy debate. Moreover, our Index data are balanced and supplemented by the qualitative comparison of 33 comprehensive country reports.

The European Media Accountability Index – a prototype Table 35.1 provides an overview of the results of our experts’ survey. The evaluation shows that no country falls into the first or the last category, which suggests that there is neither a perfect nor a completely failing media accountability culture in Europe. Besides that evaluation, and keeping in mind the different media landscapes and journalistic cultures, the Index actually shows remarkable results and allows for a reasonable grouping of countries with a similar status quo of media accountability to point out important differences in Europe, which are described below. The top flight includes only representatives of the expectedly well-developed media systems of Northern and Western Europe – with Norway followed at some distance by Finland, Sweden, Austria and Germany, which are placed relatively close together. In this grouping, the Scandinavian bloc clearly dominates in terms of media accountability. After this small group, we find a broader field of countries with different journalism cultures, which can all be rated as ‘developed’ in terms of media accountability. This includes Northern or Western European countries such as Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark, which could also be expected to fall into the first group due to striking similarities with the leading countries. However, 296

Summary Table 35.1 The European Media Accountability Index – a prototype Ranking

Country

Score

1. 2. 3. 4. 4.

Norway Finland Sweden Austria Germany

153 129 128 122 122

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 18. 18.

United Kingdom Switzerland Estonia Poland Netherlands Czech Republic Denmark Spain France Slovenia Slovakia Portugal Romania Hungary Belgium

115 113 113 109 106 103 101 99 98 97 90 86 82 82 82

21. 21. 23. 24. 25. 25. 27. 28. 29. 30.

Lithuania Italy Latvia Croatia Ireland Greece Bulgaria Malta Luxembourg Cyprus

79 79 77 74 70 70 69 66 64 53

the media markets in these countries are mostly smaller, which has implications for the quality of media accountability infrastructures, as laid out in more detail later on. These countries are followed by the United Kingdom, a representative of the North Atlantic or Liberal Model according to Hallin and Mancini (2004a), but with severe problems in the field of media selfregulation, as well as Estonia, Poland and the Czech Republic, as representatives of a new “hybrid liberal model” (Dobek-Ostrowska, 2015, 26). All of them rank higher than other countries from Central and Eastern Europe, such as Slovenia, Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, which display considerable limitations in their media accountability structures, as previously explained in the qualitative analysis. Similarly, Spain, France and – with a small backlog – Portugal, all representing the Mediterranean or Polarized Pluralist Model, as well as Belgium, can be classified as countries with an at least ‘developed’ media accountability culture.The third and last group consists of the Baltic states of Lithuania and Latvia, plus Italy (which lags behind other Mediterranean countries), Greece, Malta and Cyprus.To these partly developed media accountability systems belong Croatia and Bulgaria as well as – partly unexpected – the assumedly developed media systems 297

Eberwein, Fengler, Kaufmann, Brinkmann and Karmasin

of Ireland and Luxembourg, which are ranked lower than theoretically comparable countries as they provide only a few MAIs, as explained in the qualitative analysis. These results – even though the data have been gathered in a way that deliberately accepted its stark empirical limitations – do in fact support the results from our qualitative evaluation and can thus be considered as a useful extension of our research, reaching out to a wider public sphere. To explain the Index findings, we need to look deeper into the empirical data.The similarities between the leading highly developed countries – in terms of media accountability structures – attract attention at first: these countries hold the highest results in almost every category. For example, Norway, Sweden, Finland, Germany and Austria display, in comparison to the other European countries, the most MAIs inside the journalistic profession (institutionalized or not) as well as the most journalism-external instruments (with a high level of institutionalization). Switzerland, the Netherlands and Denmark are somewhat lagging behind them, especially in the context of the non-institutionalized MAIs like social media, journalists’ blogs and participative MAIs, which might at least be partially explained by the smaller size of these media markets, with less competition among media outlets, and a smaller journalistic workforce eager to discuss professional issues. The United Kingdom has a remarkable quantity of highly institutionalized MAIs outside journalism, highlighting the prominent role of citizen initiatives in the public life of Anglo-Saxon countries, but also the weakness of traditional MAIs in this country undergoing a severe media crisis. Poland and Estonia receive the highest rankings among CEE states, which in the Polish case probably reflects the positive impact of a more successfully deregulated media market. By contrast, Estonia’s high ranking reflects the positive influence of culture. Estonia, even during the Soviet period, has maintained strong ties with Finland, particularly in the field of journalism, and managed to withstand Soviet influence more than any other CEE country. Romania, Hungary, Lithuania and Latvia show remarkable deficits in the case of internal instruments, e.g. with institutionalized MAIs like press councils. Focusing on the Mediterranean countries, Spain, France and Portugal are characterized by stable results with MAIs inside journalism, and a rather strong position with regard to instruments and practices outside journalism, while Italy is lagging behind in every category. Greece, Malta and especially Cyprus show inferior positions with regard to institutionalized MAIs (inside and outside journalism). Croatia and Bulgaria, while classified by our Index as the least developed media accountability cultures in Eastern Europe, almost completely lack internal institutionalized MAIs, but still have some external instruments (like media-critical NGOs). Ireland shows unexpected deficits in every category, reaching barely two-thirds of the ratings of the United Kingdom. The case of Luxembourg seems similarly startling: scoring points under the average with journalism-internal MAIs, Luxembourg ranks just above the minimum in the context of instruments outside the journalistic profession, which might be due to a large extent to the very tiny media market, narrowed even more by the issue of language.

Implications for European media policy Both the qualitative analysis and the prototype of our Index of Media Accountability demonstrate that the distribution of media accountability infrastructures varies substantially in the media systems and journalism cultures within Europe. Particularly in some countries of Northern and Western Europe, these infrastructures constitute a fairly effective basis for safeguarding responsible journalism, while many other European countries display serious deficits in this regard. In the light of such insights, it seems obvious to ask for possible reasons for the highlighted discrepancies – and to look for strategies for how the impact of media accountability infrastructures can be increased throughout Europe in the long run. 298

Summary

Indeed, a comparative evaluation of the empirical studies presented in this volume discloses that there are various context factors which seem to enable or disable the efficacy of media accountability initiatives. Among the factors that enable media accountability are a high degree of press freedom and media pluralism, including the largest possible autonomy from either or both political and economic influences; a high degree of journalistic professionalism, including a well-functioning system of professional education; a responsible self-conception of journalistic actors; high solidarity among journalistic actors; a long history of media self-regulation, including a well-established press or media council, and of institutionalized media criticism; and a tradition of media criticism by actors outside of journalism, such as NGOs or academia. Among the factors that disable media accountability are a low degree of press freedom and media pluralism, accompanied by strong political and/or economic constraints; a low degree of journalistic professionalism, accompanied by insufficient standards of professional education; an absence of solidarity among journalistic actors; a missing or disrupted tradition of media self-regulation and media criticism; a general reluctance in the journalistic community towards media accountability; and low trust in the media, accompanied by a lack of public discourse about journalistic quality and credibility. Of course, context factors like these are culturally shaped and cannot be levelled out completely. A sustainable European media policy, however, would be able to contribute significantly to the long-term development of a coherent culture of media accountability. Based on the findings of our empirical research, we suggest three central recommendations for (European) media policy-makers that could run alongside the aforementioned propositions of the EU High-Level Group on Media Freedom and Pluralism: 1

2

3

Incentive models for media accountability: If media companies have incentives to support media accountability, they are more likely to accelerate the establishment of different MAIs. In the sense of a co-regulated media self-regulation, such incentives could be defined by a European media policy, for example by distributing public subsidies and advertising funds only to those media companies that encourage media accountability in one way or the other. Media accountability in transition: Particularly in those countries which are in the middle of a transformation process, the concept of media accountability would be able to underpin the attempt to support media pluralism and responsibility. For this end, a European media policy can offer support as well – for instance through workshops and education programmes etc., not only in EU member states, but also beyond. Monitoring media accountability: In order to keep track of current developments and highlight the need for further development, continuous measures to monitor media accountability initiatives are necessary. An annual update of our Media Accountability Index could be a first step in this direction – and would also help to stimulate public awareness of the topic.

Recommendations like these will not synchronize the state of media accountability throughout Europe, as culturally determined context factors inevitably remain different. However, if taken seriously, our suggestions can surely contribute to a general increase in the international level of media responsibility. In this sense, our research project may also be regarded as an MAI in its own right, by not only intending to describe the various cultures of media accountability in Europe, but also striving to make them more effective.

Notes 1 All direct quotations that are not attributed to any particular author are taken from the country reports in the European Handbook of Media Accountability.

299

Eberwein, Fengler, Kaufmann, Brinkmann and Karmasin 2 In our qualitative analysis of media accountability, we tried to broaden the ‘European’ perspective by including countries which, under a media governance approach to European media systems, would not initially have been included (e.g. Turkey, Russia and Israel). We are convinced that these countries add interesting and sometimes challenging insights to the traditional European approach, apart from being politically influential players in the mediated debate on global politics. For the construction of our Media Accountability Index, on the other hand, we want to focus on countries under the direct or indirect regulatory impact of the European Union. This does not limit the scope to member states, but at least narrows the discussion down to countries observing similar rules and regimes of press freedom, media pluralism, freedom of speech and opinion, and the imperative of regulated self-regulation (or co-regulation) with no direct influence by the political elite on media corporations. 3 0 means that the instrument does not exist or does not apply to the country, 1 means it is not effective in terms of media accountability, 2 stands for a low impact, 3 for a moderate impact, 4 for a high impact, and 5 means that the MAI has a major efficacy and impact. 4 Three countries deviated from the standard procedure: In Belgium, the sample includes two completed questionnaires from Flemish experts, three from Wallonian experts and one compiled by both Flemish and Wallonian experts. The research teams in Luxembourg and the Czech Republic only found two appropriate experts, which led to two completed questionnaires.

300

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INDEX

accuracy 1, 10, 21, 27, 44, 104, 114n7, 122, 125, 134, 167, 174, 221, 241 activist 18, 27, 138, 232, 255–6, 274, 294, 296 advocacy 95, 102, 105, 123, 127, 163, 165, 175, 237, 255 agenda-setting 103, 187, 253 Andalucía 246–7 answerability 20, 59, 147, 203, 205, 254 Arab World 3–4, 72n18, 131, 136, 213 Austria 4–5, 7–13, 16, 48, 72n18, 203, 252, 288, 290–1, 293, 296–8 award 22, 62n3, 77, 114n12, 172, 187, 201, 212, 231, 256 balance 32, 51, 69, 102, 136, 157, 160, 166–7, 256, 268 bankruptcy 33, 228 Basque country 243, 244 Belgium 14–23, 72, 173, 288, 290–1, 297, 300n4 bias 43–4, 48, 51–3, 66–8, 86, 88, 116, 127, 134, 166, 186, 191, 226, 236, 239, 273 blackmail 207, 236 Bulgaria 24–30, 152, 289, 292, 294, 297–8 capitalism 25, 108, 227, 236 Catalonia 244, 246–7 censorship 17, 24, 28, 30n1, 33, 44, 50, 63, 70, 72, 91, 109, 114n12, 115, 124, 141, 150, 157, 192, 196–8, 200, 211, 225–6, 236, 268–9, 270–1, 273, 275, 292, 294 chat 23, 126, 176, 185, 249 chief editor 8–9, 14–15, 18, 20–1, 23, 33, 35, 67, 69–70, 94, 109, 112, 114n3, 170, 175–8, 185–6, 222, 226, 251–2, 253–4, 256–7, 272, 292–3 church 159n8, 164–5, 198–9, 209, 253, 292 cinema 82, 93, 159n13

co-regulation 5, 13, 17–19, 97, 110–12, 140, 161, 163, 166, 169, 200, 266, 289, 292, 299, 300n2 code of ethics 2–3, 7, 9–10, 13, 18–21, 34, 36, 41–3, 45, 47, 58–9, 64–6, 68–9, 72–5, 84, 90, 93, 95, 97, 102, 105, 110, 112, 125, 133, 140, 142, 146, 153, 155, 158n1, 158n3–4, 161, 167, 169, 172–4, 178, 180, 182–5, 187, 192–4, 197, 200–1, 203–5, 210–11, 213–14, 216, 222–5, 228–9, 231, 233n18, 235, 237–8, 241–3, 251–4, 266, 269, 271–2, 285–92, 295–6 comedy 94, 140, 203, 208, 217, 291 commercialization 14–15, 63, 69, 71, 151, 156–7, 163, 165, 170, 184, 213, 216, 224, 236, 252, 269 communism 24, 31–4, 36, 40, 48–9, 63, 65–6, 91, 110, 190–1, 198, 207, 209, 212, 217, 225–8, 233n12, 289 competition 25–6, 50, 55–6, 60, 63, 66, 73–4, 108, 116, 139–40, 151, 156–7, 160, 163, 171, 173, 181, 187, 205, 217, 222–3, 231, 245, 254, 263, 275, 291–2, 298 concentration 1, 8, 13–16, 18, 23, 40, 42, 46, 64, 92, 112, 115–16, 137, 144, 148, 151, 157, 227, 231, 244, 261–2, 267n13 conscience 82, 168, 192, 210, 263 convergence 17, 87, 155, 157, 218, 249, 251, 291 copyright 7, 37, 166, 222 corporate social responsibility (CSR) 143, 146 correction 11, 20, 27, 35, 44, 75, 77, 87, 95, 129, 140–1, 147, 155, 160–1, 177–8, 180, 185, 205, 228, 249, 280, 282 corruption 29, 75, 95, 207, 210, 214, 226, 230, 232n1, 252, 254, 270, 294 credibility 1, 35, 55, 59, 61, 67, 81, 85, 90, 99, 101, 107, 113, 146, 161, 210–11, 239, 241, 248–9, 266, 268, 271, 299 Croatia 31–8, 289, 297–8

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Index crowdfunding 141, 173, 249, 280, 294 Cyprus 3, 39–46, 289, 291, 294, 297–8 Czech Republic 47–53, 152, 192, 209, 226–7, 233n15, 250n3, 292, 294, 297, 300n4 data journalism 141–2, 172, 177, 194 defamation 17, 33, 115–16, 118–19, 121–3, 125–7, 133, 138, 141, 171, 222, 256, 288 democratic corporatist model 4, 7–9, 13, 16, 49, 54–6, 60–1, 65, 73, 92, 113, 167, 171, 180, 182, 191–2, 252, 261, 293 Denmark 16, 54–62, 181, 188n14, 221, 250n3, 288, 290, 296–8 deregulation 3, 8, 16, 41, 49, 100, 104, 292 dialogue 14–15, 24, 45, 66, 70, 87, 150, 154, 157, 160, 162, 185, 223, 260, 265 dictatorship 197–9, 243–5 discrimination 27, 43, 45, 51, 93, 101, 120, 171, 221, 274 diversity 16–17, 23, 26, 51, 81, 84–5, 90, 94, 108, 141, 172, 191, 196, 213, 223, 244, 262, 264, 274 editor-in-chief see chief editor election 29, 48, 50, 77, 79n14, 83, 167, 186–7, 191, 207–8, 219–20, 237, 270, 272, 274 entertainment 28, 30, 33, 51, 76, 96, 108, 130, 208, 217, 219, 252 equality 45, 57, 64, 101, 119, 124, 126–7, 154, 161, 219, 255–6, 270 error 11–12, 20, 35, 59, 60, 75, 77, 135, 155, 160–1, 167, 171, 177, 194, 214, 221, 228, 230, 233n4, 239, 249, 253–4, 257, 264, 281–2, 293 Estonia 5, 63–72, 144, 151–2, 192, 221, 289, 291–2, 297–8 European Union (EU) 2–4, 6n8, 26, 29, 31–3, 37, 49, 166, 202, 285–7, 294, 299, 300n2 Facebook 5, 12, 38, 44–5, 52, 60, 70, 75, 85, 87, 95–6, 109, 112, 117, 123, 129, 134, 138, 141, 144, 162, 168, 176–7, 184–6, 188n5, 192, 194, 203–4, 208–9, 212, 222–3, 230, 248, 250, 255, 265, 281–2, 294 fact-checking 49, 51, 77, 86, 114n7, 225, 254–6, 273 fairness 43, 75, 83, 92, 119–20, 122, 125, 213, 222, 255–6, 280 feedback 21, 70, 96, 103, 129, 147, 155, 168, 259, 264–6 film 11, 34, 52, 91, 93, 96, 154, 253 Finland 63, 66–8, 72–9, 97, 109, 203, 252, 287, 290, 296–8 Flanders 15–20, 23, 288 fourth estate 17, 61, 160 France 1, 4, 15–20, 22–3, 80–9, 139, 203, 209, 246, 250n3, 260–1, 286, 288, 291, 293, 297–8 freelancer 33, 65, 81, 92, 118, 172–3, 176, 211, 223, 278 freesheet 160, 255, 290

gatekeeping 103, 235–6, 242, 265 gender 118, 164, 240, 255–6, 274 general interest 100, 143, 147, 217, 244, 264 Germany 3–4, 8, 10, 12, 16, 19, 33, 36, 48, 54, 57, 72n18, 90–8, 109, 139, 203, 250n3, 252, 256, 260–2, 264, 267n12, 287–8, 290–1, 293, 296–8 globalization 49, 138 Google 92, 109, 117, 138, 188n5, 192, 209, 274, 282 governance 40, 127, 204, 206, 254, 280, 293, 300n2 Greece 1, 42, 44, 99–106, 137, 288, 291, 293–4, 297–8 harassment 127, 222 hate speech 17, 22, 31, 34, 37, 115, 171, 207, 211, 241, 273–4 hierarchy 45, 85, 97, 201 human rights 35, 37, 43, 81, 154, 158n5, 159n8, 159n13–14, 166, 171, 186, 221, 240, 274 Hungary 1, 107–14, 233n15, 152, 286, 289, 292, 294, 297–8 ideology 6n4, 12, 14, 16–18, 20, 23, 40, 43, 55–6, 63, 65, 68, 150–1, 167, 172, 182, 190–1, 196, 198, 233n11, 237, 242n1, 244–5, 252, 268, 270, 271–2, 282, 290 impartiality 1, 22, 32, 42, 51–2, 66–7, 101–2, 112, 119–20, 126, 139, 166–7, 213, 219, 237, 239, 279 infotainment 44, 69, 102, 291 integration 44, 49, 71, 87, 145, 157, 159n14, 170, 178, 218, 233n11, 261 interactivity 28–9, 87, 96, 103, 134, 160, 162, 203, 214, 217, 233n18, 240–1, 249 investigative journalism 18, 22, 35, 40, 44–5, 71, 78, 112, 114n3, 131, 134, 177–8, 187, 198, 212, 237, 249, 253–7, 273, 283 Iraq 271 Ireland 25, 115–27, 144, 288, 291, 297–8 Israel 4–5, 128–36, 186, 287, 294–5, 300n2 Italy 4, 10, 49, 72n18, 137–42, 191, 203, 205, 226–7, 233n11, 250n3, 252, 260–1, 288, 291, 293–4, 297–8 Jordan 72n18 Kenya 121 Latvia 143–9, 152, 155, 292, 294, 297–8 layout 74, 213, 263 Lebanon 134 letter to the editor 11, 14–15, 21, 28, 43, 59, 103, 147, 155, 160–2, 167, 175, 184, 193, 196, 286 Leveson Inquiry 118, 126, 172, 277–83, 285, 290 liability 54, 56–7, 59, 162, 166, 188n14 libel 17, 33, 115–16, 119, 121, 123, 125–6, 166, 171, 280

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Index liberal model 4–5, 49, 65, 113, 128, 165, 167, 226, 278, 297 Lithuania 150–9, 289, 292, 297–8 lobbying 14, 146, 153, 211, 286 Luxembourg 3, 72n1, 160–2, 288, 297–8, 300n4

203, 205, 211, 214, 216, 219, 223, 235, 239–40, 247–8, 250–1, 253, 257, 259, 263, 269, 271–3, 275, 278, 280, 285–93, 295–6

Malta 3, 163–9, 289, 291, 294, 297–8 manipulation 28, 31–2, 34, 141, 145, 148, 176, 230, 273 marketing 22, 77, 103, 123, 144, 177, 194, 196, 233n18, 294 media journalism 3, 11, 23, 50, 69, 76, 94, 104, 140, 143, 147–8, 162, 171, 173, 175, 195, 239, 242, 247, 251, 253–4, 257, 260, 263–4, 273, 286, 290, 292, 294 media literacy 26, 45, 71, 154–7, 159n14, 168, 212, 230, 232, 254, 269, 274 media logic 172, 175 media organization 20, 25, 42–3, 57, 59–60, 116, 124, 146, 155, 158n5, 165, 202, 210, 248–9, 270 media policy 2, 5, 11, 13, 17, 20, 97, 110, 113, 150, 152, 155, 157, 172, 260, 266, 285–6, 289, 295, 298–9 migration 41, 45, 89n13, 140, 168, 186, 208, 245 minority 45, 64, 109, 143, 145, 174–5, 183, 188n14, 227, 231, 270, 294 mission statement 22, 42, 171, 174, 178, 184–5, 194, 222, 231 mistake see error monitoring 18, 22, 36, 41, 43–4, 46, 93, 96, 104, 107, 115, 137, 150, 154, 157, 166, 194, 225, 249, 255–6, 259–60, 269, 271–4, 286, 293, 299 monopoly 8, 16, 50, 82, 88, 115, 181, 226, 261, 267n13, 269, 275 Netherlands 4–5, 15–17, 19, 23, 54, 72n1, 72n18, 170–9, 238, 250n3, 288, 290–1, 293, 296, 297–8 neutrality 40, 52, 69, 118, 129, 132 news agency 37, 40, 43, 78n2, 147, 199, 201–2, 272 newsletter 22, 123, 201 non-governmental organization (NGO) 5, 42, 45, 109, 113, 153, 223, 228, 230, 239–41, 253, 255, 269, 279, 296 norm 3, 6n3, 48, 55, 58, 65, 71, 73, 78, 100, 110, 113–14, 140, 144, 188, 200, 203, 205, 209, 212–14, 221–2, 226, 236–7, 262 Northern Ireland 117 Norway 4, 16, 54, 56, 72n2, 180–9, 287, 290, 293, 296–8 objectivity 29, 52, 99, 119–20, 126, 146, 167, 191–2, 219, 237, 249 ombudsman 3–4, 7, 11, 14, 20–1, 28, 31, 34–5, 43–4, 50, 58, 63–4, 69, 85, 90, 94–5, 97, 102, 107, 111, 114n7, 119, 121–2, 126, 131–2, 140, 146, 153–4, 159n8, 161–2, 168–9, 171, 173, 175, 177–8, 183, 185, 187–8, 193–4, 196, 201,

photo 15, 86, 213 plagiarism 35, 37, 222, 230 pluralism 2, 5–6, 12, 22, 26, 42, 45, 51, 82–4, 89n13, 96–7, 139, 150–3, 157–8, 166, 172, 219, 278, 286, 299, 300n2 podcast 194, 251, 254, 257, 287 Poland 1, 66, 72n18, 152, 190–6, 203, 250n3, 289, 292, 294, 297–8 polarized pluralist model 4–5, 7, 9–10, 12–13, 32, 39, 41, 65, 82, 99, 113, 128, 135, 137, 139, 163–5, 167, 192, 197, 205, 226, 236, 243, 268–9, 288, 297 pornography 115, 124, 154 Portugal 197–206, 246, 289, 291, 293, 297–8 press council 3–4, 7–10, 12–13, 18–19, 23, 31, 34–5, 38, 41, 45–6, 54, 56–9, 61, 63–4, 66–74, 80, 85, 88, 90, 92–3, 96–7, 101, 105, 115, 119, 121–3, 125–9, 132–3, 136, 140, 142, 146, 153, 160–2, 170, 173–5, 178, 180, 182–3, 187–8, 197, 200, 203, 210–11, 214, 219–21, 223–4, 228–9, 231, 243, 246, 250–5, 257, 259, 262–3, 265–6, 269, 271–3, 275, 285–90, 292, 294–6, 298 privacy 18, 27, 31, 34–5, 51, 86, 114n7, 118, 120–2, 125, 140, 167, 174, 193, 221, 280–1 propaganda 44, 67, 90, 146, 150, 153, 191, 198, 207, 209, 218 public relations (PR) 38, 47, 50, 56, 93, 116, 123, 146–7, 167, 195, 212, 220, 222, 225–6, 232, 256–7, 277 racism 17, 42–3, 45, 51, 274 religion 51, 209, 220–1, 274 responsibility 1, 3, 6n3, 14, 52, 68, 70, 81–4, 93, 96, 101–2, 110, 113, 119, 122, 136, 146, 153, 155–7, 167, 178, 180, 183, 186–8, 191, 212, 223, 249, 260, 264–, 288–9, 299 responsiveness 28–9, 59–60, 77–8, 87, 103, 145, 154, 156, 170, 178, 185, 194, 196, 254, 293 Romania 5, 66, 72n18, 152, 203, 207–15, 286, 289, 292, 294, 297–8 Russia 1, 4–5, 64, 143–6, 148, 155, 193, 195, 216–24, 287, 292, 294–5, 300n2 sanction 2, 9, 42, 54, 57, 90, 93, 102, 110–11, 115, 121–2, 137, 140–2, 155, 158n1, 167, 174, 190, 193, 196, 200, 205, 210, 214, 229, 241, 271, 278, 280, 286, 288 satire 11, 94, 102, 104, 183, 188n20, 203, 222, 240, 290–2, 296 Scandinavia 4, 151, 182, 287, 290, 293, 296 Second World War 16, 48, 61, 82, 91, 243, 278 self-regulation 2, 4–7, 10–11, 13, 17–19, 22, 25–7, 38–9, 41, 46–7, 51–2, 56, 61, 63–8, 70–3, 75,

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Index 77–8, 83, 85, 90–3, 95–7, 99, 101–2, 105, 107, 110, 112, 124, 137–8, 140, 142, 145, 153–5, 157–8, 160, 163, 165, 167, 169–70, 174, 180, 182, 190, 200, 203, 205, 210–11, 213, 219–21, 223–5, 228, 238–9, 242–3, 245, 248, 250–1, 253–4, 257, 259–60, 262–5, 275, 277–9, 285–9, 291–5, 299–300 sensational reporting 15, 18, 31–2, 34, 38, 43, 93, 96, 251, 262, 269, 277 sexism 51, 274 Slovakia 47–8, 152, 192, 225–34, 289, 292, 294, 297 Slovenia 152, 235–42, 292, 294, 297 smartphone 48, 96, 248, 279, 281 social network 26, 28, 37–8, 44, 70, 85–6, 96, 103–4, 128, 134–5, 144, 156, 159n8, 163, 168, 205, 207, 218–19, 223, 243, 248, 250 socialism 15, 28, 47–9, 51, 109, 158n1, 191, 198, 227, 236–8 Soviet Union 1, 31–2, 34, 47–9, 63, 71, 143, 145–6, 150, 153, 155, 158n1, 191, 196n1, 217–19, 291, 298 Spain 4, 10, 72n18, 191, 203, 206, 243–50, 288–9, 291, 293–4, 297–8 special interest 9, 176, 217, 282 sponsoring 92, 205, 212, 230–1, 261, 263 stakeholder 17, 22, 24, 73, 214, 257–8, 283 start-up 172, 173 stereotype 243, 256 subsidies 8, 10, 14, 17, 23, 56, 70, 82, 176, 181, 236–7, 252, 279, 299 suicide 10, 116, 120, 240 surveillance 208, 255 Sweden 16, 54, 56, 144, 150, 155, 188n14, 193, 195, 221, 239, 250–8, 287, 289–92, 296–8 Switzerland 4, 10, 15–16, 48–9, 66, 72n1, 72n18, 97, 109, 203, 209, 259–67, 288, 290, 292–329, 296–8 tabloid 7–10, 12–13, 15, 18, 25, 33, 47–9, 55–6, 64, 91, 95–6, 100, 108, 112–13, 114n2, 118, 165, 192, 199, 227–8, 232n4, 251–2, 254, 261, 269, 277, 281, 285, 288 talk show 35, 51, 96, 257

terrorist 1, 171 trade journal 3, 11, 36, 50, 90, 94, 123, 146, 183, 193, 203, 231, 253, 286, 290–2 trade union 51, 76, 84–5, 88–9, 92, 101, 105, 111, 125, 164–5, 210, 220, 257, 288 transformation 1–2, 5, 24, 28, 47–9, 74, 81, 107, 142, 151, 153, 155–6, 190–1, 195, 217, 236, 248, 259, 286–7, 292, 299 trust 1, 3, 8, 25, 37, 41, 51, 56, 73–5, 77, 83, 99, 102, 113, 136, 139, 151, 159n13, 186, 197, 205–6, 225–6, 248, 252, 256, 266, 270, 278, 283, 299 truth 1, 10, 19, 33, 38, 42, 68, 92, 101, 122, 164, 192 Tunisia 72 Turkey 4–6, 40, 42, 209, 268–76, 287, 294–5, 300n2 Twitter 5, 10, 12, 45, 52, 60, 70, 85–7, 96, 104, 117, 123, 138, 141, 147, 162, 176–7, 184, 194, 203, 223, 230, 248, 250–1, 254, 256, 259, 264–5, 274, 278, 281–2, 293–4 Ukraine 146, 155 United Kingdom 3–5, 39, 58, 61, 92, 125, 139, 277–83, 285, 287–8, 290–1, 293, 297–8 United States 4, 36, 58, 73, 77, 89n13, 95–6, 139, 198, 208, 213, 263–5, 273, 278, 290, 293 user comment 77, 96, 177–8, 203–4, 293 user-generated content (UGC) 44–5, 180, 186, 218, 223 value 1, 11, 15, 20, 24, 30, 42, 52, 61, 63, 66, 71, 78, 86, 96, 101, 152, 157, 182, 191, 194, 209, 212–13, 216, 218–19, 230–1, 244, 250, 282 Wallonia 15, 17, 288, 291, 300n4 war 16, 25, 36, 48–9, 57, 61, 82, 91, 104, 129, 134, 146, 183, 243, 278 whistleblowing 230, 278 xenophobia 17, 43, 51, 255 YouTube 44, 117, 188n5, 192, 208, 230, 274, 282 Yugoslavia 32, 34, 237

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