The Eternal Revolution: Hardliners and Conservatives in Iran 9781350988613, 9780857727473

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Hamad H. Albloshi is Assistant Professor in the Political Science Department at Kuwait University. He is an expert in Iranian history and politics. He holds a PhD in International Relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University.

‘Hamad Albloshi’s analysis of the political debates between the conservatives and the reformers in Iran is a major step forward in understanding the unique character of the Iranian Revolution: rather than being a version of the modern European national revolution done in a secular fashion, the Iranian state and society that emerged in 1978–9 definitely had a religious framework that separated it from most of the modern state foundations in the twentieth century. Dr Albloshi’s emphasis on the Iranian cultural setting for the development of political power in Iran after 1989 is a much-needed shift away from analyses of the Iranian failure to follow institutional patterns suitable to modern political and economic development in the European sense. Albloshi has made a major contribution.’ Andrew C. Hess, Professor of Diplomacy, Director of the Southwest-Central Asia and Islamic Civilization Programme, Tufts University

‘This is a work that relates theory with history and current politics. Hamad Albloshi has done significant research for this book, which reflects cultural sensitivities and a Middle East perspective. It is timely in light of progress on nuclear negotiations.’ Vali Nasr, Dean and Professor of International Politics, Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University

THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION Hardliners and Conservatives in Iran

HAMAD H. ALBLOSHI

Published in 2016 by I.B.Tauris & Co. Ltd London • New York www.ibtauris.com Copyright q 2016 Hamad H. Albloshi The right of Hamad H. Albloshi to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by the author in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, or any part thereof, may not be reproduced, stored in or introduced into a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior written permission of the publisher. Every attempt has been made to gain permission for the use of the images in this book. Any omissions will be rectified in future editions. References to websites were correct at the time of writing. International Library of Iranian Studies 60 ISBN: 978 1 78453 542 1 eISBN: 978 0 85772 950 7 ePDF: 978 0 85772 747 3 A full CIP record for this book is available from the British Library A full CIP record is available from the Library of Congress Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: available Typeset in Garamond Three by OKS Prepress Services, Chennai, India Printed and bound by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

For: My parents, Hameed and Zuhrih My wife, Elham (Rabo) My daughter, Kawthar

CONTENTS

List of Figures Preface Acknowledgements

viii x xii

Introduction 1. Revolutionary Regimes and Ideological Factionalism 2. From Khomeini to Rafsanjani: The Politics of Factionalism from Radical to Moderate Policies 3. The Reformists and Religious Intellectuals 4. The Hardline Conservatives: Their Roots and Tenure 5. The Hardline Conservatives’ Ideology Conclusion

1 8 17 28 48 66 135

Notes Bibliography Index

142 181 199

LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 4.1 The indirect relationship between Misba¯h Yazdı¯ ˙ ˙ and Isfandya¯r Rahı¯m Masha¯ʾı¯. ˙ Figure 4.2 Comparison between the Reformists and Masha¯ʾı¯ in Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t weekly newspaper.

62

Figure 5.1 A poster designed by the adherents of the supreme leader says, ‘We Are Not the People of Kufa, to Leave Ali Alone’.

72

Figure 5.2 Fakha News website and the supreme leader.

79

Figure 5.3 A comparison between two newspapers’ content on the reformists and religious intellectuals.

81

Figure 5.4 A computer mouse instead of a grenade. Taken from 9 Diy.

95

59

Figure 5.5 Four weekly newspapers and their coverage of the issue of the martyrs in the last or front pages.

111

Figure 5.6 Unemployment rates according to the Central Bank of Iran.

117

Figure 5.7 Subh-i Duku¯hih’s coverage of the issue of the ˙ ˙ Mahdi and the End of the World.

126

Figure 5.8 A picture that was shown in the documentary and depicted Ayatollah Khamenei as Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯.

130

LIST OF FIGURES

ix

Figure 5.9 A photo in Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t referring to the supreme leader as the Khura¯sa¯nı¯.

131

Figure C.1 The relationship between the main issues that appear in the discourse of the hardline conservatives.

139

PREFACE

The idea for this book came in 2011 while watching a documentary with my wife about the reappearance of the Mahdi, the Shiʿi Twelfth Imam. In the documentary, as this book will show, different ideas were discussed and different figures were looked at. However, the most important issue was how the producer tried to link the current Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and the former president, Ahmadinejad, to the reappearance of the Mahdi. Coming from a Shiʿi background, I know how sensitive the issue of the Mahdi is, and how people have been impatiently waiting for him or for any sign telling them of the end of his occultation. Many people in Shiʿi history have appeared and claimed that they have been in contact with him, or that certain events and people can predict his reappearance. The documentary, Ahmadinejad, and many extreme statements made by people within the Iranian regime made me ask and attempt to answer the following questions: Who are these people? Where do they come from? How do they think and what do they want? In order to complete this book, I visited Iran several times. I had the chance to meet ordinary people, but not officials. Even though I was not given permission to do research in the country, I was able to find many books, newspapers and magazines, as well as documentaries and recorded lectures. These visits were also important because I was able to ‘feel’ the existence of the conservatives’ ideology in the Islamic Republic. The group, as this book will reveal, focuses on different issues such as martyrdom, the absolute role of the supreme leader, economic justice, and the relationship to the outside world, in addition to its focus on the

PREFACE

xi

Mahdi. The influence of these issues is seen in the country. For example, when entering various cities in Iran, you can feel the presence of the martyrs through their names and portraits in many places and streets. Pictures of the supreme leader are seen in different locations, staring at people. Slogans against the US and the enemies of the Islamic Republic are repeated in Friday sermons and pro-government demonstrations, and they are also displayed on pictures, banners, and statues around the country. Slogans are everywhere, giving the impression that Iran is a country of slogans. This is not the only picture of Iran. This image is given by the rulers of the country and their supporters but there are certainly other opinions of all the above-mentioned issues, as other factions within the ruling elite have different demands. Therefore, Iran is not only about the hardline conservatives: there are people who are eager for more social freedom; there are people who appreciate arts, music and freedom of expression; and there are Iranians who view Western culture and countries positively. Many of these people are also supporters of the system, but they have a different perspective. However, it is important to analyse the ideological foundations of the hardline conservatives because they have the upper hand within the regime and they dominate many important institutions in the country.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

It is hard to mention all those people who have supported me during the process of writing this book. However, there are certain people who deserve a special note of thanks. Professor Andrew C. Hess, my academic advisor for six years at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, has been a great supporter and a great source of inspiration all those years. I am indebted to him for the energy he put towards the completion of this project as well as my graduate studies at the Fletcher School. I have to thank Vali Nasr, Dean of the John Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and Professor Ali Gheissari of the University of San Diego, for their insight, thoughtful advice, time, effort and generous support for this project from the beginning. Their deep understanding of the topic has shaped this book and deepened my views on Iran, its internal politics and its cultural heritage. As I worked on this book, I benefited from suggestions made by friends and colleagues as well as professors such as Mehran Kamrava of Georgetown University and Kamal al-Deen Saleh of Kuwait University, who read parts of the book and shared their thoughts about it. Maria Marsh, Azmina Siddique and David Campbell of I.B.Tauris were great supporters as well. They all helped improve this work, but I am responsible for any errors. My uncle Abdulredha Albloshi, and my professors and now colleagues at Kuwait University, Ghanim al-Najjar, Falah al-Mdaires and Abdulredha Assiri, have played a major role in the completion of this project because of

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

xiii

their ongoing encouragement. They have supported me since my undergraduate years at Kuwait University, and their help is endless. Finally, I would like to thank my wife, Elham, for her patience. This work would not have been done without her help, support, knowledge and insight. My daughter, Kawthar, also deserves thanks because of her acknowledgement of the importance of writing, and her questions whenever she saw me working on this book and her willingness to help. Thank you all.

INTRODUCTION

More than three decades have passed since the violent establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1979. Despite this lengthy period of time, the death of Imam Khomeini in 1989, and the construction of a framework for a new order, the current rhetoric of hardcore Iranian leaders implies the regime, long after 1978–9, has not left its revolutionary stage. It is therefore important to raise the following question: why do some people within the Iranian system disagree with the ideas of reforming and ending the revolution? This book argues that in order to find answer we need to pay attention to the ideology of one of the main factions within the Iranian system: the hardline conservatives. This group, as this book concludes, does not prefer the institutionalisation of the revolution and believes that it has not fulfilled its main goals. A trend towards stability and internal development seemed well under way when Muhammed Khatami served as president of Iran in the period between 1997 and 2005, and scholars assumed the Iranian revolution had entered a ‘reformist’ era. But in 2005 Ahmadinejad came to power with a message that did not consolidate revolutionary gains; rather, he produced a radical discourse for both external and internal affairs. Ahmadinejad’s discourse, political history and relationship to the hardline conservatives helped him attain power. Therefore, he was the embodiment of the arguments made by extremists in Iran, especially due to his focus on class struggle, aggressive foreign relations, reliance on Shiʿism to justify his actions and the regime’s existence, and his aim to revive the memory of the revolution’s martyrs. Therefore, Ahmadinejad was part of a bigger group, the hardline conservative faction, which has a

2

THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

particular understanding about the revolution and its fate, despite the fact that they disagreed with him on certain points. This faction is one of the main groups within the Iranian political regime. It operates, similar to the reformists and the moderates, within the Iranian system. Each group, however, has its own understanding of the way that the regime should perform both internally and externally. In the scholarly study of modern revolutions, the hardline conservatives’ ideology does not fit the general pattern of institutional development for modern political revolutions. Most political science studies assert that revolutions go through different stages until a new stable structure comes into being. They also argue that at a certain point in revolutionary regimes, radical discourses disappear and more pragmatic rhetoric is used. However, this has not been the case in the Iranian revolution, and radical discourse is still active in the country. Iran is a country which experiences an intense political atmosphere, with heated political, social and cultural debates. Competition among different factions in the country is fierce, and has been so since the establishment of the Islamic regime in 1979. These debates function within a revolutionary system that is not totalitarian, but authoritarian. Scholars of comparative politics distinguish between different kinds of non-democratic regimes. The Iranian regime is among those that tolerate the existence of different factions within their systems. Political debates and disagreements are acceptable in the country as long as they do not threaten the existence of the Islamic Republic. Within this political atmosphere, the reformists and the hardline conservatives operate with different interpretations and understandings of the nature of the Islamic regime and its revolutionary doctrine. These interpretations are related to the political system, economic situation, social conditions, cultural heritage and the country’s foreign relations. Therefore, this debate should be seen within a competitive context that has been established as a result of Iran’s political system. The reformists are the main figures that have introduced new interpretations of the Iranian revolution’s doctrine. They have aimed, through both the former president, Muhammad Khatami, and their intellectuals, at shifting the direction of the revolution and the Islamic Republic towards a more moderate and institutionalised system. This faction is confronted with the hardline conservatives who oppose any reformation of the Islamic regime. This faction has been influential in Iran since the end of

INTRODUCTION

3

the war with Iraq in 1988, which marked the beginning of the emergence of this group and the construction of its ideological framework. The group and its ideology flourished during Khatami’s presidency and was empowered by Ahmadinejad’s reign. This group will continue to influence the political trajectory in the country and will affect the presidency of Hassan Rouhani. Rouhani, a moderate who came to power in August 2013, was soon under attack from the hardline conservatives. He was criticised because of his moderate interpretation of the role of religion in society. In addition, his minister of science, research and technology, Riza¯ Farajı¯-Da¯na¯, was ˙ impeached and dismissed by the parliament because of his alleged cooperation with reformists in the educational sector. More importantly, Rouhani was attacked because of his approach to foreign policy, especially with the West and the US, in addition to the way that he had been handling the nuclear programme. Criticism he received on this issue was intense and led him to counter his opponents by describing them as ‘cowards’.1 This unusual rhetoric from Rouhani is an indication of a heated political atmosphere in the country, and it is a sign of the president’s unstable relationship with the hardline conservatives. Many books and studies have been written on Iran since 1979. Many of them focus on the political developments and the relationship between different factions within the system, but few of them pay attention to the ideological debate in Iran. This book will exclusively focus on the hardline conservatives’ ideology. It will concentrate on its evolution and its main ideas about the nature of the Iranian regime, its position towards other groups within this system, and its understanding of the best way to deal with the revolution and the international community. Therefore, through this study a better understanding can be reached about this group’s position in the country and the ideological roots of major shifts which have occurred in Iran’s internal and external politics since the end of the war with Iraq in 1988. This group’s ideas will remain important in Iran, and many political crises that the current moderate president, Rouhani, might face can be related to this ideology. Ideology, according to Macridis (1992) can be defined as ‘a set of ideas and beliefs that people hold about their political regime and its institutions and about their own position and role in it’.2 With this understanding in mind, this book will deal with the hardline conservatives as a faction within the Iranian regime that has ‘sets of ideas’ regarding the Iranian system and

4

THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

society and has its own interpretations of its philosophy. This book will analyse the conditions and the dynamics that have produced the hardline conservatives’ ideology within the Iranian system since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. In addition, it will focus on this ideology to know ‘how and why it came about [. . .] [and] where it might be headed’.3 There have been many revolutions in many parts of the world and in different eras, but there has been no religious revolutionary system so far, other than Iran. The Iranian system relies on a revolutionary Islamic ideology and uses terms that are unique to Iran as an Islamic religious revolutionary regime, such as fiqh (jurisprudence), vila¯yat-i faqı¯h (the role of the jurist) and the issue of the Mahdi, or the Twelfth Imam, among others. In addition, there has not been a society that has repeated the Iranian revolution, and ‘no Islamic country is likely to duplicate the Iranian experience’.4 In short, the Iranian political system is unique. Therefore, any attempt to understand the Iranian political debate in general, and the ideological foundation of the hardline conservatives in particular, should be done ‘only by locating Iran within its own historical and cultural context’.5 This book will rely on two methods in order to confirm its arguments. The first is based on conducting historical analysis of factionalism within the Iranian system since its establishment in 1979. It will follow political disputes within the regime, from the days of Ayatollah Khomeini’s reign as the supreme leader to the latest dispute between the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei and the former Iranian president, Ahmadinejad. The second method is based on an intense analysis of the hardline conservatives’ ideology. I will qualitatively and quantitatively analyse texts produced by the hardline conservatives. In the qualitative section, I will follow the logic behind this ideology and try to interpret it and connect it to the religious, social, political and economic contexts of the Iranian regime and society. In the quantitative section, I will rely on descriptive statistics in comparing the appearance of certain issues and topics within texts, particularly newspapers.6

Who are the Hardline Conservatives? There is no clear definition of the hardline conservatives in Iran. However, there is an agreement among scholars that this group consists of revolutionaries within the Iranian system who are zealots and loyal to the

INTRODUCTION

5

main principles of the 1979 revolution. For example, Moslem (2002) sees this faction as a loose one ‘made of individuals surrounded by cronies who act like a pressure group within the system. While those associated with this faction use similar rhetoric and support each other’s actions, by and large they act independently’.7 Ehteshami and Zweiri (2007) believe that it emerged because its members were fearful of the reformation era of the former president, Muhammad Khatami. For them ‘this group included those individuals who remained loyal to the ideals of the revolution and the sacrifices made in the long and bloody war with Iraq in the 1980s’.8 Different terms have been used to describe this group; for example, Ehteshami and Zweiri call them neoconservatists in their book Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservative: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution. Before them, following Ahmadinejad’s election in 2005, an article dealing with Ahmadinejad’s group was published by Walter Posch which also describes its adherents as neoconservatives. Posch divides political groups within the system into four major groups: the traditional conservative right (ra¯st-i sunnatı¯ ), the modernist or moderate right (ra¯st-i mudirn), the Islamic Left, and a fourth group, which he gives many names, including the new left, hardline conservatives, and neofundamentalists or new conservatives.9 Posch sees the first group, the traditional conservative right, as the most organised group. It is a result of the coalition between the traditional clergy and the Bazaar. The second group is also known as the technocrats, who are associated with the former president, Hashemi Rafsanjani, and believe in the necessity of opening Iran to the global economy. The third group’s ideology is based on ‘social [revolution] and Islam, but [its members] did manage to liberalize many of their viewpoints’,10 therefore, to form the reformist faction. The last group ‘embrace[s] revolutionary radicalism’11 and is connected to the Revolutionary Guards, the Bası¯j, and some powerful ayatollahs, such as Misba¯h Yazdı¯ and Ahmad Jannatı¯.12 I agree with this classification and will use it through this study. However, I will add to it another group, which is Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h. I will call them hardline ˙ ˙ conservatives, as one of Posch’s terms refers to them. However, the question remains on how to distinguish this group from other factions within the system? One of the main figures within the conservatives, Allah-Karam, asserts that Iranian Hizbulla¯hs and their ˙ associated groups aim at fulfilling goals in three areas: politics, economy,

6

THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

and culture.13 These three issues present the core argument of the hardline conservatives’ ideology that will be analysed. He asserts that politically, the members of Hizbulla¯h defend the absolute authority of ˙ the supreme leader; economically, they focus on justice and struggle with the country’s capitalists; and culturally, they fight against the attempts to secularise the Iranian society.14 In addition, it can be argued that, as the analysis of their ideology will show, the hardline conservatives also support a radical foreign policy. This argument will therefore be the guideline in this book for distinguishing the hardline conservatives from other groups and factions within the Iranian system.

Organisation of the Chapters The book is divided into five chapters. The first attempts to understand the politics in revolutionary regimes. It argues that these regimes establish non-democratic systems but experience factionalism, and there are different interpretations of their main revolutionary doctrines. It also pays attention to the political system in Iran and the fact that the nature of the regime has created factionalism within its political elite, with the emergence of different interpretations of its philosophy. Chapter 2 deals with factionalism in the country in the period between 1979 and 1997, when Iran experienced two phases of factionalism. The first was during Khomeini’s reign and the other began after his death and continued through the presidency of Rafsanjani. Even though the new supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, was allied with the president, disputes emerged as they differed over some policies after the end of the war with Iraq. Chapter 3 focuses on the reformist era in the country. It follows the critical challenges that the reformist president, Muhammad Khatami, faced during his tenure from 1997 to 2005. It also analyses the main arguments made by some of the reformists – mainly the religious intellectuals who appeared from within the system, but with different understandings of its role in the country and a different interpretation of the position of religion in society. The chapter will deal with some of these intellectuals and their main ideas regarding politics and religion in Iran. Chapter 4 is dedicated to following the emergence of the hardline conservatives. It traces their roots and deals with politics of factionalism

INTRODUCTION

7

within the system since the end of the reformist era of Khatami in general, and the dispute within the conservative camp in particular. Finally, Chapter 5 analyses the hardline conservatives’ ideology and is divided into several sections. It demonstrates that their ideology consists of different issues, each of which is related to the other and cannot be understood separately. It will also prove that there is a resistance within the political elite of the country against the normalisation of the revolution, and that the hardline conservatives’ ideology can shape the path the Iranian revolution is taking today. Based on this ideology, it is evident that this group does not encourage the institutionalisation of the position of supreme leader; sees him as being above the law; does not wish to open Iranian society to political, cultural and economic changes; does not support the normalisation of Iran’s foreign policy; and relies heavily on Shiʽi history to justify its actions.

CHAPTER 1 REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES AND IDEOLOGICAL FACTIONALISM

Revolution is defined by Samuel Huntington (1968 [2006]) as ‘a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and policies’.1 Among the various schools that have studied major revolutions,2 the School of Natural History of Revolution examined the aftermath of these kinds of revolutions and asserted that they go through different phases until they settle down and end; the radical revolutionary discourse is eliminated as the revolution moves towards normalisation. According to this school, revolutions have moderate phases, then radical phases and then the return of the moderates and the normalisation of the revolutionary regime. Nevertheless, the process of revolution varies from one case to another. But one thing is observable in mass revolutions; the establishment of authoritarian regimes.3 Edwards (1927 [1970]) asserts that ‘[a] revolution does not diminish the power of a central government in any essential particular; it rather increases it’.4 Brinton (1938 [1965]), Pettee (1938 [1971]), Kamrava (1992) and others agree with Edwards in stressing that authoritarian regimes are established after major revolutions. Post-revolutionary regimes, according to Kamrava, are, in fact, ‘inclusionary at best and totalitarian at worst, supported by political cultures with anti-democratic tendencies’.5 Therefore, tyranny is a system commonly seen in later phases of revolutions.

REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES

AND IDEOLOGICAL

FACTIONALISM

9

Authoritarianism appeared after the French, Russian and Chinese revolutions. Robespierre in France, Stalin in the Soviet Union and Mao in China all established authoritarian systems in their societies. Although the degree of coercion differed from one case to another, they were all undemocratic regimes and were established as a result of revolution. However, factionalism does appear in revolutionary regimes. Kamrava asserts that this happens despite the fact that the ‘selection of leaders has run its course and those surviving have been filtered through rigid doctrinal and practical purges’.6 For him, the emergence of different factions within the ruling elite in a revolutionary regime is due to the growth of the factions’ institutions.7 Each faction has its institution, and the importance of this faction and its influence depends on the viability and importance of the institutions at its disposal [. . .]. The numerical size and political importance of its target audience determines the fate of the other factions and the nature of policies pursued by the revolutionary government.8 In addition, the degree of authoritarianism that is imposed in the revolutionary society can also affect the emergence of different factions. If the regime allows some sort of diversity within the system, different interpretations and discourses can appear. In addition, this factionalism can be strengthened and intensified by the emergence of different ‘doctrinal interpretations within the broader context of the governing ideology’.9 These doctrinal interpretations of the revolutionary regime’s philosophy indicate that these factions ‘adhere to the revolution and its ideals as proclaimed by its current victors’.10 However, they have specific plans and agendas that they seek to pursue ‘within the general contours of the post-revolutionary environment’.11 These plans and interpretations may or may not be supported by the regime’s leaders,12 and can be about the application of specific policies in the country or different perspectives regarding the diplomatic relationship of the regime and its position internationally.13 One interpretation or ideology can be reformist. Kimmel (1990) believes that reforms appear in revolutionary regimes via ‘cooler-headed politicians’,14 who want a

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gradual change in the political direction of their regime. A reform, in general, ‘is a change but not total change’.15 For Huntington, ‘[i]t means a change in the direction of greater social, economic, or political equality, a broadening of participation in society and polity’.16 The reformist camp is usually in conflict with another camp: the conservatives. Conservatism is ‘a political philosophy which aspires to the preservation of what is thought to be the best in established society’.17 The continuation of the revolution is important for some groups within revolutionary regimes, who prefer not to change the situation in the country and reform its political system. In other words, they are conservatives in the sense that they resist changes when they rule their societies, and they oppose any attempts to reform it. Kamrava (1992) argues that ‘[f]or the vast majority of leaders of postrevolutionary states, particularly those who took active part in the revolutionary struggle, the revolution never ends’.18 What is important for these leaders is to legitimise their system and ‘live up to their revolutionary rhetoric’.19 The conservatives’ reaction to reforms or changes in societies varies. Sometimes it has been outright opposition, based on an existing model of society that is considered right for all time. It can take a ‘reactionary’ form, harking back to, and attempting to reconstruct, forms of society which existed in an earlier period.20 Boundaries created among different factions within a system can also be created in relation to the outside world. Leaders in revolutionary regimes have different opinions regarding building relations with other nations. Houman Sadri (1997) divides these revolutionary leaders into two categories: (1) realists and (2) idealists. Realists understand the limits of their capabilities to change the world. They take the reaction of the international community into consideration while understanding the importance of exporting their revolution.21 Therefore, ‘[i]nstead of channeling resources to support national liberation movements, their priority is to build their own country into a model revolutionary state’.22 In contrast, idealists, also called internationalists, focus more on the external relations of their regime.23 They believe in their ability to orchestrate other similar revolutions in other countries.24 Among these idealists, there is a group of radical idealists, who

REVOLUTIONARY REGIMES

AND IDEOLOGICAL

FACTIONALISM

11

have an extreme sense of the mission to export their revolution by any means, even by such interventionist tactics as directly supporting with training and arms the opposition military in other states [. . .] They do not think in terms of official channels of communication or the relations between governments or states, but in terms of relations between people or nations.25 Some of these radicals even believe that they ‘can take on the world’.26 As a result, these regimes may face international pressures to change their attitudes. However, for the radical idealists, ‘the isolation of the country by major powers is unavoidable. In fact, they consider the isolation a blessing’.27

The Iranian Case The Iranian regime is a revolutionary regime established by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979. It was founded around his concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, or the role of jurisprudent. Therefore, the main institution in the Iranian system is the institution of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. The main argument behind this concept is that the issue of governing should be in the hands of clerics during the absence of the Twelfth Imam. The supreme leader in the Islamic regime, for Khomeini, should be a source of emulation,28 even though he later changed his concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. Khomeini’s idea about the role of the clerics was in contrast to the Shiʿa’s traditional belief that did not want clerics to interfere in politics and governance because any government before the establishment of the Twelfth Imam’s regime was seen as illegitimate.29 Therefore, the Shiʿa ‘historically were wary of political power [and] viewed the state as imperfect, corruptible, and a source of persecution’.30 Khomeini criticised the traditional Shiʿi belief by saying, It is now more than one thousand years since the lesser occultation [ghaybat]. What if the Haz˙rat [the Mahdi] sees it fit not to come ˙ for another one hundred thousand years? Should the ruling of Islam remain laid down and not carried out? [. . .] There is a need to implement Islamic laws, and anyone who claims the contrary is against Islam and its eternal nature.31

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THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

Ayatollah Khomeini, however, did not have a clear picture of how the vila¯yat-i faqı¯h regime should be designed. What he clearly wanted after the revolution was to establish an Islamic Republic and purge the monarchy. Therefore, he called for a referendum to vote for the establishment of the Islamic regime. The referendum was organised, and more than 98 per cent of the participants agreed with the creation of an Islamic regime.32 Khomeini did not agree to add the word democratic to the official name of the republic,33 and stated that the name of the country would be ‘the Islamic Republic, not one word less, not one word more’.34 This was the first battle that the Islamists won after the revolution. The second came after the elections of the first Assembly of Experts, which was responsible for writing the constitution in the summer of 1979.35 The Assembly’s members, who did not share the same ideological and political backgrounds, had many debates, especially about the inclusion of the jurisprudent’s role (vila¯yat-i faqı¯h) in the constitution. Some members supported the concept, but others did not agree with its essence and argued for ‘a supervisory role’ for the faqı¯h.36 Eventually, Khomeini and his supporters won their second battle, and the position of the supreme leader was included in the new constitution. The unclear Islamic system imagined by Khomeini came to the surface before his death, when he changed his concept of governance by making the role of the jurisprudent absolute. In addition, he changed one of the main requirements for occupying this position. Khomeini had believed that the supreme leader must be a source of emulation (marjaʿ taqlı¯d),37 but he changed that requirement in the constitutional amendments of 1989. It seems that Iranian officials, as well as the Ayatollah, were convinced that after him they might not find a person who was qualified, both religiously and politically, to occupy his position.38 Therefore, these changes were added to the 1989 constitutional amendments39 in articles 109 and 110. Beside the position of the supreme leader, other important positions were created: the president and the prime minister. After the death of Khomeini the position of the prime minister was abolished,40 and other institutions intervened in the process of decision making, such as the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts and the Council of Expediency, which was founded in 1988. This diversity creates a complex political system of different institutions with overlapping responsibilities.

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AND IDEOLOGICAL

FACTIONALISM 13

The Iranian system for Alamdari (2008) is not hierarchical, and the position of the supreme leader is similar to a tent with different pillars. The supreme leader divides the sources of power between these pillars,41 and this authority to divide the power and responsibilities to rule the country among these institutions means that the supreme leader is the ultimate power in the system. In addition, all of these institutions are, either directly or indirectly, under his authority. There are certain institutions that follow him directly, as it is stated in article 110, such as the military, the media, the judiciary and the mosques. Other institutions do not follow him directly, but nevertheless he has the power to influence their decisions. For example, Iranians vote for institutions such as the position of the president, the parliament and the Assembly of Experts. The latter is responsible for appointing the supreme leader and monitoring his work. According to article 111 of the constitution, the Assembly of Experts has the right to dismiss the supreme leader when he becomes unqualified to carry the responsibility of leadership.42 The candidates of these three institutions are approved by the Guardian Council, which consists of 12 members. Beside its responsibilities to interpret the constitution and review the legislations that are approved by the parliament, 43 the Guardian Council should approve any candidate for these three branches.44 According to article 91 of the constitution, the supreme leader appoints six of its members, and the head of the judiciary appoints the rest. However, the supreme leader appoints the head of the judiciary.45 Therefore, even though the Assembly of Experts has the right to dismiss the supreme leader, its members may not because their candidacy to the council is reviewed and approved by the Guardian Council, whose members are appointed directly or indirectly by the supreme leader. In contrast to the latter, the Iranian president’s responsibilities are limited; he is mainly responsible for managing the economy. The parliament, or the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis-i Shu¯ra¯yi Islami), has 290 members. The Majlis is responsible for legislating and, according to article 87, approving the cabinet.46 In addition, it has the right to observe the government’s functions and management and to impeach the president and his ministers, as stated in article 89. The parliament may disagree with the Guardian Council over some legislation, thus, in 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini established the Council of Expediency to mediate these two branches in the Iranian system.47

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We can see that the constitution encompasses different institutions. Some of them were inherited from the Shah’s regime, such as the parliament and various ministries. Some institutions were completely new; for example the position of the supreme leader, the presidential office, the Guardian Council, the Assembly of Experts and the Council of Expediency.48 The Iranian constitution founded a regime with different institutions to avoid the centralisation of power in the hands of one person. However, the writers of the constitution and founders of the new regime contradicted themselves. On the one hand, they wanted the supreme leader to be the strongest figure within the system, but, on the other hand, they wanted to surround him with different institutions and divide his power, or create a system of checks and balances. At the end, they created a system in which ‘all [its] roads lead to him, but none is straight’.49 The new regime, thus, became a mixture of different regimes and political systems. It features a parliament, but it is not a parliamentary regime, and it has a president, but it is not a presidential regime. The Iranian system is centralised under the authorities of the supreme leader because he is the ultimate power and controls most of its branches. However, the system is also pluralised because it is based on different institutions. It is not a tyranny because, as Francis Fukuyama (2009) says, a ‘real tyranny would never permit elections in the first place’.50 Therefore, the Iranian system can be described as a hybrid of democratic and authoritarian regimes,51 or an ‘electoral authoritarian’ regime. It is similar to those of Venezuela and Russia, which are ruled by a small elite. Thus, ‘Iran is fundamentally an authoritarian regime run by a small circle of clerics and military officials who use elections to legitimate themselves,’52 but the regime ‘never evolved into a pure totalitarian state such as Saddam Hussein’s Iraq’.53 This electoral authoritarian system gives people, to a certain extent, the opportunity to participate in the political process through electing different positions, creating an atmosphere that encourages political debates within the system.54 Even the supreme leader asserts, in one of his speeches, that disagreement exists within the system, describing it as a normal phenomenon.55 Consequently, different political groups and parties have appeared within the system with conflicting agendas and varying political, cultural and religious discourses and interpretations of its revolutionary ideology.

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AND IDEOLOGICAL

FACTIONALISM 15

In addition to the nature of the political system in Iran, differences among the elite have been relatively tolerated by the regime because of the doctrine of Khu¯dı¯ and Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯, which has been adopted by the regime since the revolution. Those who belong to the Khu¯dı¯ are those who come from within the system, and those who are Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯ are the outsiders. In other words, Khu¯dı¯ are those who ‘are adherents to the Islamic regime, faithful to Imam Khomeini, and followers of vila¯yat-i [faqı¯h]. It includes all those who love the Imam, the revolution, and vila¯yat-i [faqı¯h]’.56 Those who do not belong to this circle are ‘the traitors of the Islamic regime, the revolution, and its values’.57 This concept will continue to dominate the political scene in Iran for a long time, as will be discussed later.

Conclusion Revolutionary regimes, as scholars on comparative politics assert, go through different phases until they settle down. They also agree that these regimes do not establish democratic systems but some can experience factionalism because they are authoritarians – but not totalitarians – therefore different interpretations of their revolutionary philosophies emerge. The Iranian regime is one of these revolutionary regimes, with different political factions that have emerged from within the system. Each of these factions has its own interpretations of its philosophy. This chapter has discussed the political system in Iran and its nature. It has dealt with its main institutions and the responsibility of each. It comes to the conclusion that the system allows different factions to operate and compete with each other over different interpretations of the revolution’s doctrine. This system allows the reformists, moderates and hardline conservatives to operate and express themselves as long as they do not threaten the existence of the regime and do not challenge its legitimacy. Therefore the hardline conservative group, which is the subject of this book, exists, competes and expresses itself in the country. Leaders who belong to it give the impression, through their ideology, that the regime, 37 years after the revolution, has not left the revolutionary stage of the 1980s. Chapter 2 will deal with factionalism in Iran in the period between 1979 and 1997, when the reformist era began in the country. It will trace

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THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

disputes among the Iranian revolutionary political elite in that period. It is important to deal with factionalism in the country because without it we cannot understand the background of the hardline conservatives’ rhetoric and ideology, and we cannot understand the nature of the political debate in Iran or its political and ideological context.

CHAPTER 2 FROM KHOMEINI TO RAFSANJANI:THE POLITICS OF FACTIONALISM FROM RADICAL TO MODERATE POLICIES

The First Phase of Factionalism, from 1979 to 1989 The Iranian revolution was not led solely by the Islamists. Different groups and parties cooperated and participated in overthrowing the regime of the Shah, and one ideology was not exclusively responsible for his departure.1 The various parties’ cooperation, however, did not last long; they clashed with each other in the first phases of the revolution, mainly because ‘the revolution in fact meant different things to different people’2 and, therefore, they fought against each other to control the new system until the Islamists were able to dominate the government, just a few years after the establishment of the new regime.3 It is also clear that the revolutionary regime, when taken by the Islamists, followed an aggressive strategy towards its opponents, with violence and mass executions used as tools to oppress them. These executions were conducted by the revolutionary courts which were blessed by Ayatollah Khomeini and acted independent of the provisional government of Mehdi Ba¯zarga¯n. Khomeini asserted that ‘those in detention are not charged but guilty. They must be killed. Nevertheless we provide them with a trial’.4 The regime was implementing this strategy publicly, not ‘behind closed doors’.5 In fact, for several months in 1981, it published the

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THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

names of those it had executed every day.6 According to Coville (2008), the regime killed about 6,000 people from September 1981 to September 1982.7 Other resources say that in the same period the regime killed more than 1,000 Iranians in just six weeks. Those who were executed belonged to political groups and also religious and ethnic minorities.8 Moreover, about 1,000 officials were killed in 1981 alone.9 Furthermore, Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi (2008) says in the period between 1981 and 1984, about 140,000 Iranians were arrested and about 12,000 were executed.10 However, Amnesty International estimated in a report that by the first half of 1986 more than 6,600 Iranians had been executed since the revolution in 1979.11 In any case, these executions were conducted by the new regime to control political life and eliminate any group that could threaten the establishment of the Islamic government. Thus, in the period between 1979 and 1983, the ayatollahs were able to eliminate the following groups: the secular nationalists and liberals, the Muja¯hidı¯n – a Marxist Islamist group – and the Tu¯dih, meaning the mass, which was the Iranian communist party. Other ayatollahs, who did not want the creation of a theocratic government in Iran, especially Ayatollah Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, were also persecuted.12 ‘In sum, since their direct seizure of power in November 1979, the militant ayatollahs have ruthlessly dealt with all its organised political opponents and have by and large succeeded in destroying them’.13 As this internal dispute continued, Iran encountered another major problem. Iraq invaded the country on 22 September 1980, and ‘the longest conventional war’ of the twentieth century started.14 This war lasted for eight years, and Iranians were not prepared for it because of the revolutionary turmoil that they had endured for more than a year. Despite the fact that the Iranian factions put aside their disputes at the beginning of the Iraqi assaults ‘to focus their attention on the invader’,15 disagreements did not disappear completely within the top hierarchy of the Iranian regime. Disputes between the first elected president after the revolution, Abolhassan Banisadr, and the ayatollahs were intensifying and reached a point when Banisadr, who was also the commander in chief, had to leave the country. The war was a source of mobilisation in the country, and the Bası¯j ‘(Bası¯j-i Mustaz˙ʿafı¯n, or mobilisation forces of the oppressed)’16 was the main organisation capable of mobilising fighters to defend the country.

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In fact, ‘the mobilisation of volunteers provided more troops than the Pa¯sda¯ra¯n [the Revolutionary Guards] could arm and fully use for many years’.17 The war’s direct and indirect damages reached about 1,190 billion US dollars for both sides.18 The ‘imposed war’ and isolation of the Iranian regime during the war gave the country’s leaders a sense of uncertainty in their relations with the international community because, for them, the world was against their country and regime. For example, the then-president of Iran, Ali Khamenei, gave a speech to the United Nations General Assembly asserting that his nation stood alone against the Iraqi aggression and that the world, while calling for ceasefire, did not condemn the Iraqi invasion in the first place.19 Iran’s isolation was also associated with economic difficulties. During the first decade of the revolution, the rate of poverty doubled in comparison to the period between 1960 and 1975, when Iran’s gross domestic product (GDP) per capita was similar to that of South Korea and Turkey. In that period, Iran was among the fastest-growing developing countries.20 In addition, around that time, the industrial sector in the country ‘registered an average annual real growth of nearly 14 per cent’.21 In addition, inflation was low and was kept at low rate ‘of 2.5 per cent a year during 1960 – 67, and 3.7 per cent a year between 1968 and 1973’.22 However, after the revolution, ‘price controls and strict rationing of basic consumer goods failed to prevent rampant inflation. Meanwhile, the factional battles over the economy polarised the political environment and eroded what was left of the private sector’.23 As a result of the war, the Iranian economy in the 1980s became ‘a managed war economy rather than a centrally planned command economy of the Eastern European type’.24 The government’s plans and interventions in the economy were based on dealing with immediate problems rather than long-term economic plans.25 In addition, it is important to mention that the population of Iran increased as the economy worsened and the war intensified. In 1976–7, the Iranians numbered about 33.5 million people, but in ten years this grew to 49.4 million.26 As mentioned earlier, the political elite which overthrew the Pahlavi monarchy was divided into different groups and political parties with varying ideological backgrounds and orientations. Some were liberals, others were nationalists, others were communists or Marxists and, of

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THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

course, some were Islamists. These groups had different plans to manage the country’s economy after the Shah,27 not to mention different political agendas. Some groups – especially the Marxists, communists and Muja¯hidı¯n – wanted to follow the Soviet economic path, while the democrats and nationalists wanted to have a ‘Euro-socialist system suffused with nationalistic or Islamic undertones’.28 At the same time, Islamists wanted to have an Islamic economy which would sit between capitalism and Marxism. They believed that Islam had the ability to establish a healthy society by protecting the deprived, while respecting private property.29 The Islamists, among them leftists, had the upper hand among the revolutionaries and were able to eliminate the nationalists and the liberals. Thereafter, they began to apply their views on the economic sector, and many economic changes took place in the first years of the revolution, such as the nationalisation of foreign trade; extension of full public ownership and control over the oil sector; a move toward the establishment of Islamic, interest-free banking; transfer of ownership and management of certain non-financial enterprises to a number of parastatal ‘foundations’ outside the regular government’s structure, regulations, and accountability; and an overall extension of the state’s allocative, distributional, and regulatory role in the economy.30 The difficulties of the regime did not stop there. As soon as the Islamists managed to eliminate their opponents, they found themselves competing with each other and factionalism became evident. However, this time Ayatollah Khomeini tolerated it because the main factions were all in favour of the Islamic revolution. In other words, they were from within, or Khu¯dı¯, not outsiders, or Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯. Generally speaking, the left and the right became the major camps among the Islamists that dominated Iran’s political scene. The first camp involved revolutionaries ‘who advocated state intervention into the economy’.31 This camp was known as ‘the Radical Left faction’.32 In addition, the leftists believed in several other issues, such as (1) the absolute power of the supreme leader, (2) social justice and (3) radical foreign policy.33 The second camp, in contrast, consisted of ‘those who supported private property, opposed the export of the revolution, but

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were socially conservative’.34 This factionalism was a result of the country’s political system. The system had two executive positions: the president and the prime minister. As president of the country, the dispute that Banisadr had with his prime minister, Raja¯ʾı¯, was, to a certain extent, similar to the later dispute between holders of the same positions. In the period between 1981 and 1989, Mı¯r-Hussein Mu¯savı¯ held the post of prime minister, while Ali Khamenei was the president. Khomeini was not able to prevent these factions from competing within the system or ‘splitting due to their different views on economic, socio-cultural, and foreign policy issues’.35 But he managed to prevent ‘an open conflict between them’.36 In other words, the tension between these factions was controlled when the Imam was alive. It did not lead to a crisis of legitimacy because ‘apart from Khomeini’s personal charisma as leader, his style of leadership helped to bridge the gap between the two sides’.37 In addition, he avoided ‘being claimed by any faction’.38 But Ayatollah Khomeini intervened in the dispute between Khamenei and Mu¯savı¯ on different occasions and was supportive of the latter, who was seen as the ‘Imam’s prime minister’.39 Khamenei and Mu¯savı¯ came from two different factions: Khamenei was more conservative and moderate than Mu¯savı¯. Mu¯savı¯ belonged to the left and followed and tried to apply radical politics in the country, as well as being supportive of more aggressive relations with the international community. Khamenei, who did not have power as president, was reluctant from the beginning of his first term to appoint Mu¯savı¯ as his prime minister, but was forced to nominate him to the Majlis because of the support that Mu¯savı¯ received from Ayatollah Khomeini.40 Khamenei disagreed with Mu¯savı¯ over some of his policies, especially on the economy. This dispute escalated, and on several occasions both of them threatened to resign. Khamenei even rejected appointing Mu¯savı¯ as the prime minister for the second time in 1985, and 99 members of parliament supported him. However, in the end, Khomeini was the one who decided, and he decided to support Mu¯savı¯ again.41 This inter-elite dispute was also evident in the elimination of Ayatollah Muntazarı¯, who was supposed to succeed Khomeini, and ˙ meant that different views were operating at the top of the political pyramid; Khomeini forced Muntazarı¯ to resign four months before his ˙ death. Despite the fact that Khomeini tolerated the existence of different Islamic groups and factions within the system, he did not tolerate any

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THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

disagreement with his views and gave the impression that disagreement with him was a disagreement with the orders of God.42 Muntazarı¯ ˙ mainly objected to the mass executions of 1988 when thousands of dissidents where killed by the regime.43 He even sent two letters to Khomeini ‘in which he faulted the Imam for having failed to ‘take note of how your orders, that concern the lives of thousands of people, are carried out’.44 He even wanted the government to ‘correct past mistakes’.45 Moreover, he criticised Khomeini’s fatwa against Salman Rushdie and said, ‘People in the world are getting the idea that our business in Iran is just murdering people.’46 As a result, Khomeini decided to eliminate him and sent a letter to the parliament informing its members of his decision to force Ayatollah Muntazarı¯ to resign.47 ˙ Muntazarı¯ was among other clerics who supported and worked with a ˙ political organisation established in 1977, known as the Society of Militant Clergy (SMC), ‘to distribute and publicize Khomeini’s decrees from Najaf’.48 After the revolution, members of this movement and other politicians worked to create a political party in order to sustain their role in the revolutionary movement. They wanted to translate that role or power ‘into an organisational vehicle within the new state apparatus’. Thus the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) was established.49 IRP consisted of different groups and factions; disagreements were common among them, and the party was dissolved in 1987.50 During Khomeini’s life Iran ‘experienced radical foreign policy mostly towards conservative Arab countries, especially Gulf states, and Western states, especially the [US]’.51 It can be said that Iran, or factions within it, wanted to change the regional structure by exporting its revolution, especially to the Middle Eastern nations. Consequently, Iran’s relationship with all of these countries was negatively affected. The intense relationship with the world during Khomeini’s reign began after the occupation of the American embassy in Iran and continued through its war with Iraq, its interference in Lebanon with the creation of Hizbulla¯h in 1982 and its support for some groups within the Gulf ˙ states to destabilise them. Additionally, before his death, Ayatollah Khomeini worsened Iran’s relation to the world by issuing the fatwa against Salman Rushdie in 1989. Despite this radicalism, it can be argued that, from the beginning of the revolution, the new regime raised the slogan ‘neither East nor West’ as an indication of Iran’s independence from any influence on

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its foreign policies and position in the international community. Muhammad Khatami wrote an article in 1991 and asserted that this slogan was ‘a fundamental principle of the Islamic Revolution and the Islamic Republic’.52

The Second Phase of Factionalism, from 1989 to 1997 Scholars of Iran agree that there have been attempts to normalise the Iranian revolution since the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989.53 Some of them even believe that Iran has established its ‘second republic’ since then.54 One of the main characteristics of the post-Khomeini era has been the relaxation of the brutal policies that were conducted against different political groups in the 1980s. The regime has not committed mass executions since the death of Khomeini, although the record of human rights in the country has not been encouraging since then. The ruling elite was divided between moderate and radical Islamists during Khomeini’s life. This factionalism continued after his death. Each group within the ruling elite has interpreted his ideology and political actions differently. Therefore, ‘[e]ach faction has been able to refer to enough of Khomeini’s views and declarations to justify its own model of an Islamic state’.55 Consequently, three main factions appeared within the system: (1) the radicals, or the left, who evolved and created the reformist camp, (2) the moderate or technocrats, and (3) the conservatives, who are divided between traditional conservatives and hardliners. This factionalism was a continuation of the competition between the main figures in the Iranian revolutionary regime during Khomeini’s life. Factionalism among the children of the Ayatollah was controlled when he existed, but that drastically changed when he died. Some wings were purged and other alliances constructed among the ruling elite. As a result of the dispute between Khamenei and Mu¯savı¯ over the control of executive power in the 1980s, the former was tactically forced to cooperate with Rafsanjani,56 the speaker of the parliament in the 1980s who became president in 1989. Khamenei and Rafsanjani were the main figures in the republic after the death of Khomeini, and they found themselves in a position to cooperate in order to rule the country and eliminate their main opponents, the left. It is important to note that, despite factionalism within the ruling elite, those factions were Islamists and great supporters of Ayatollah

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THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

Khomeini. Therefore, they were Khudı¯. However, Khamenei and Rafsanjani eliminated their opponents from the main institutions within the system in what came to be known as the purge of the radicals. The alliance between Rafsanjani and Khamenei purged radicals from power in different stages. First, the radicals were excluded from running in the Assembly of Experts elections of 1990 because the Guardian Council disqualified most of them.57 The purge continued in the 1992 parliamentary elections when about 1,000 candidates were also disqualified ‘because they lacked the proper ‘Islamic’ credentials’. Among them was Ayatollah Khalkha¯lı¯, who was responsible for the execution of many people after the revolution,58 for which he ‘earned the nickname the “hanging judge”.’59 Bihza¯d Nabavı¯ and other radicals were even accused ‘of undermining the revolution’s Islamic principles’.60 It was hard for them to accept such accusations. For example, Nabavı¯ wrote a letter to Rafsanjani and ‘recounted his stalwart efforts to defend these values [of the revolution] and warned that the “children of the [. . .] revolution” were being purged by the very state that they helped to create’.61 Ayatollah Khalkha¯lı¯ asserted that one reason behind his disqualification from running in the elections was the accusation that he ‘killed many people in the revolution courts’.62 For him, killing people was not an important enough issue or crime to justify his elimination, because Imam Ali did the same things to many people.63 Khalkha¯lı¯, in his memoir, said, ‘All those people who I ordered to be executed were spreading corruption on earth (mufsidı¯n-i filʾarz˙), and based on Qur’an their blood had to be shed’.64 Khalkha¯lı¯ asserted that his court executed more than 75 people and even stated that he regretted that some people were not executed but left the country to conspire against the Islamic Republic.65 Radicals were also excluded from ‘the judiciary and important supervisory bodies such as the Guardian Council’.66 As a result, many of the radical clerics returned to Qom and joined the seminaries to focus more on cultural activities.67 The radical faction disagreed with Rafsanjani over his economic policies, but its leaders did not have ‘a clear set of common priorities’.68 For example, while Mahdi Karru¯bı¯ and Mu¯savı¯ Khu¯ʾı¯nı¯ha¯ ‘sought to promote mass political participation and maintain state control of the economy’,69 other radicals, such as Muhtashamı¯ and Sa¯diq Khalkha¯lı¯, ˙ ˙ focused on foreign policy. They did not want to normalise relations with

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the West.70 Muhtashamı¯, for instance, stated that the main enemies of ˙ the Islamic Republic were the US and the West. For him, they would ‘only be satisfied when Islam and the Islamic Revolution [were] annihilated’.71 Khalkha¯lı¯ even accused the US’s ‘hand’ of trying to eliminate the revolutionary people in the country and asserted ‘[t]hat hand must be cut off [. . .]. We learned the way of struggle from our Imam [Khomeini]’.72 Radicals declared 4 November, the anniversary of the hostage crisis in 1979, to be a ‘National Anti-Imperialism Day’.73 They were also against the normalisation of the relations with ‘lesser Satans’, such as Saudi Arabia.74 They were even against the Gulf War, 1990– 1, and demanded the announcement of jihad against the US and its allies in the region.75 Some of them, such as Karru¯bı¯ and Khalkha¯lı¯ encouraged the Iranian regime to support Iraq.76 Thus, what can be said about this era is that the main issue in the country after the death of Khomeini in 1989 was ‘whether the Islamic Republic would – or even could – move beyond Khomeini-ism’.77 This was an indication of the change in the priorities of the second republic.78 So, while Ayatollah Khomeini wanted to export the revolution, Rafsanjani believed that through rebuilding the country and its economy, the revolution could be exported indirectly.79 In other words, Rafsanjani tried to turn Iran into a model through the economy, not through direct intervention in the affairs of other nations by toppling their regimes. In addition, he believed that ‘factories should be the trenches’ when dealing with the enemies of the revolution.80 However, not all factions of the regime had the same ideas regarding the new era. Even the alliance between Rafsanjani and Khamenei did not help the ruling elite to have one vision for governing the country. The honeymoon between the two main figures of the Islamic Republic was short, and the purge of the radicals did not enable Rafsanjani to apply his reconstruction plan easily, and disputes again emerged as a result of his policies. Rafsanjani’s focus on the economy created a new group that Ali Ansari (2006) calls ‘the Mercantile Bourgeoisie’.81 People believed that his policies created a new class that was no different from the ruling class during the Pahlavi era. Increasing the power of the mercantile bourgeoisie while building a ‘bourgeois republic can be seen as an attempt to reconstitute the bureaucratic– authoritarian political structure of the Pahlavi era with different

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THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

beneficiaries. In many ways, it can be argued that it represented the “normalisation” of revolutionary Iran’.82 As already mentioned, the left was not supportive of Rafsanjani’s economic policies because of ‘its further extension of the bourgeois public sphere’.83 In addition, the conservatives, especially the hardliners, wanted ‘the Islamic Republic [to] remain true to its name’.84 They attacked him and his government in the parliament and forced ‘the removal of all reform-minded ministers – including Muhammad Khatami’ – in the period between 1994 and 1997.85 Rafsanjani asserted that he provided unlimited support to Khatami, ‘who was not able to continue because of the tense atmosphere that was created by the opposite side, [the right]’.86 Many in the conservative circle, despite the alliance between them and Rafsanjani in the aftermath of the death of Khomeini, believed that ‘the revolution had lost its way with [his] election [. . .] in 1989’.87 This happened because the country has been polluted by the ‘corruption of materialism’.88 The hardliners also accused Rafsanjani of not protecting morality in Iranian society. Rafsanjani, in general, was ‘a moderate, encouraging more relaxed attitudes to religious mores’.89 But he defended himself by indicating that his government was not to be blamed because the cabinet was not the only institution responsible for protecting morality. For him, many other institutions could protect society from immoral behaviour, such as the Hawza or the seminaries, ˙ official media, mosques, Friday prayers’ Imams and the organisation of Islamic Propagation, which is under the supreme leader’s authority. In other words, Rafsanjani was referring to the failure of the supreme leader and his organisations to protect Iranian society.90 The competition among ‘the children of the revolution’, which resulted in the purge of the left, led some of them to change their political views. The radicals who played a major role in the violent phases of the revolution started to talk about human rights and democracy and become advocates of the reformation of the system.91 Their views regarding the power of the supreme leader changed as well, and they started to discuss eliminating his responsibilities. On the other hand, the conservatives, who were against the absolute power of the faqı¯h, changed their views and became adherents to his total authority. Disputes among the political elite in Rafsanjani’s reign were also about the moderate foreign policies that his government followed, about

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which the hardliners were concerned. Therefore, while Rafsanjani was following a strategy to reintegrate Iran into the international community after the death of Khomeini in 1989, many events took place that undermined his efforts, such as the assassination of the last Shah’s prime minister, Bakhtya¯r, in Paris in 1991, and the Mykonos Incident in 1992 in which Kurdish–Iranian opposition leaders were killed in Berlin, Germany.92 The Iranian president wanted to increase foreign investments in Iran, and this required the normalisation of Iran’s relations with the world. He was a pragmatic in his policies and followed a moderate discourse in constructing Iran’s relations with the international community. In other words, he tried to overcome the revolutionary ideology in planning for Iran’s foreign relations.93

Conclusion Factionalism in Iran is not a new phenomenon; it began immediately after the revolution in 1979 because the revolution prevailed as a result of the cooperation between different groups and parties. The opposition to the Shah’s regime consisted of Islamists, liberals and nationalists, communists and Marxists. These groups were not able to cooperate for a long time after Khomeini’s return to Iran. The moderates ruled the country for only a short period of time and were eliminated by other groups, especially the Islamists. The Iranian revolutionary radicals took over power and governed, under the protection of Ayatollah Khomeini, until 1989. These radicals were purged by the alliance between Rafsanjani, who became the president, and Ali Khamenei, who was chosen by the Assembly of Experts to become the supreme leader. This alliance, however, did not end factionalism in Iran, as disputes emerged between Rafsanjani and the conservatives over some of his policies. Chapter 3 will deal with another phase of factionalism within the Iranian system, that between the reformists and the conservatives, which emerged after the election of Muhammad Khatami in 1997 and has continued ever since.

CHAPTER 3 THE REFORMISTS AND RELIGIOUS INTELLECTUALS

Khatami’s Reign, 1997 to 2005: Unending Crises The relationship between the former president Muhammad Khatami, a reformist, and his opponents within the Iranian regime can be described as intense. Khatami was not able to apply his reformist agendas in the country because of the conservatives’ pressures on him and his policies. They became an obstacle to his agenda and, as a result, the crises he experienced were many. He even complained about this situation by asserting that his government had many difficulties in ruling the country: ‘On average, this [reformist] government faces a new crisis every nine days’.1 This statement is an indication of the critical condition of Khatami’s government and his relationship with other factions within the Iranian system. Many of Khatami’s crises threatened the stability of the country and the revolutionary government. Writers and observers of Iranian politics, as a result, began to wonder about his fate and even believed that he would be overthrown from power and face the same fate as Banisadr.2 Khatami came to power with a new discourse that paid attention to human rights, democracy and the issue of civil society. His discourse empowered reformist ideas that had been emerging in Rafsanjani’s reign. The hardline conservatives were not happy with his rhetoric, and the supreme leader asked his followers to be cautious because ‘the enemy is striking Islam at home’.3

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Factionalism and competition, as mentioned earlier, had been common within the Iranian revolutionary regime since 1979. However, when President Khatami was elected to lead the executive power in 1997, a new kind of competition appeared in the country and factionalism among the ruling elite in Iran entered a new stage. It became a struggle between those who wanted to reform the revolution and the country’s political system and those who resisted this. Khatami and his supporters took the country to the point of reform. However, for them, protecting the regime was also important and, therefore, they did not benefit from the situation to make serious reforms.4 The reformist faction within the Islamic government in Iran was founded after the purge of the radicals from power by the Khamenei– Rafsanjani alliance. By this time, the radicals paid more attention to the ideas of civil society, accountability and human rights. Muhammad Khatami was not a well-known politician. In fact, he was not the candidate that the reformists had in mind when they were preparing themselves for the presidential elections in 1997. The reformists wanted Mı¯r-Hussein Mu¯savı¯, the former prime minister, to be their candidate. When he refused, Khatami was chosen5 and supported by radicals of the 1980s, such as Bihza¯d Nabavı¯, a minister of the heavy industries; Akbar Ganji, a revolutionary activist in the 1980s; Saʿı¯d Hajja¯rian, part of the Information Ministry; and Mohsen Sazegara, one of ˙ the founders of the Revolutionary Guards. In addition to Mı¯r-Hussein Mu¯savı¯,6 Mahdi Karru¯bı¯ and Khu¯ʾı¯nı¯ha¯, who were active leftist revolutionaries in the first decade of the revolution, cooperated to help elect Muhammad Khatami. The movement of the second Khurda¯d, the date of the Persian calendar in which Khatami was elected, was born. When Khatami came to power, he tried to build on the policies that had been initiated by his predecessor, but he paid more attention to the culture and politics, and less to economic development.7 A member of the parliament even criticised Khatami’s economic policies by asserting that while the president’s government was ‘active in the political and cultural arenas, it was asleep in the economic sector’.8 Changı¯z Pahliva¯n, an Iranian writer, believed that ‘the desire for cultural change [was] deeper than the desire for political change’.9 Khatami opened Iranian society to more political, cultural and intellectual debate, and consequently, the intellectual atmosphere changed because he was ‘an advocate of change’.10 He also brought a new

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discourse to the political establishment and voiced his regret for his country’s extremism after the revolution.11 In response to Huntington’s theory of the Clash of Civilisations, Khatami came up with another term, the Dialogue among Civilisations.12 Moreover, he had a message for the Americans: he showed his respect for them and their culture in an interview with CNN in 1998.13 In addition, he ‘announced Iran’s readiness to gradually normalize ties with the American government’.14 Many newspapers appeared in Iran after Khatami became president. In 1998, there were more than 700 newspapers,15 and in 1999 the total ‘combined circulation of Iranian newspapers and magazines’ was over 2.7 million copies.16 In addition, the minorities’ situation was improved and the pressures on youth reduced.17 Moreover, the regime relaxed its restrictions on Iranian cinema and its film industry. This relaxation began in Rafsanjani’s reign but increased when Khatami came to power. Many directors produced provocative films that criticised the internal situation in the country, such as poverty and social problems. These films pointed at the failure of the revolutionary regime to reach its goals and attain the utopia that it promised. Therefore, the common theme of Iranian cinema indicated ‘a lingering disappointment over the failure of Iran’s revolution to produce a truly egalitarian society’.18 However, this openness of the media sector did not last for long. Authorities shut down many newspapers because they crossed the red lines identified by the regime.19 Nevertheless, what was important about that era was the fact that the intellectual debates initiated by the reformist thinkers started and never ended, even after the departure of Khatami from power in 2005. The reformist government faced many critical problems because the hardline conservatives were active in ending the country’s reform. After a year of Khatami’s rule, four Iranian intellectuals were murdered.20 It was not clear who was behind the attacks, but one man, Saʿı¯d Imamı¯, was detained and later committed suicide in prison.21 Moreover, events and ceremonies that were un-Islamic, based on the conservatives’ understandings, were attacked.22 These attacks were supported by some figures within the system such as Ayatollah Ahmad Jannatı¯.23 In addition, students demonstrated often, protesting issues such as the closure of various reformist newspapers and the tribunals of reformist thinkers and intellectuals. Students demonstrated in 1999 against the closure of the reformist newspaper Sala¯m,24 and again in 2003 mainly

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because of ‘a proposal to privatise Tehran University’.25 The regime was able to contain both events and overcome the crises. The supreme leader and his conservative allies in the regime were dominating the main political institutions. They were able to block Khatami from applying his reformist agendas, and the leaders of these institutions purged many of his supporters. The only institutions in which Khatami was able to increase his adherents were the parliament and some local councils.26 The reformists won the parliamentary elections of 2000 and became the majority in the parliament,27 but this victory did not repeat itself in 2004 because the conservatives were able to dominate and win the elections. The main reason behind that was the exclusion of the reformists from the competition by the Guardian Council. The council banned more than 2,500 reformists from running in the elections,28 among them Muhammad Riz˙a¯ Khatami, the president’s brother. Many of these reformists were members of the 2000 parliament and had been active in political life since the 1980s. The decision of the Guardian Council was challenged by the reformists who decided to respond and protest by organising a sit-in in the parliament. However, ‘such appeals not only failed to impress the ruling authorities but also were largely greeted with popular apathy’.29 Many of Khatami’s ministers or officials and supporters were sent to court because of allegations of corruption, or even blasphemy. The most serious of such tribunals was against Karba¯schı¯, the mayor of Tehran.30 The other major reformer to appear at a tribunal was Abdullah Nu¯rı¯,31 who was seen as ‘the Socrates of Iran’.32 Nu¯rı¯ advocated freedom of expression and supported civil rights for Iranians. In addition, he called ‘for constitutional limitations on the authority of the supreme leader’.33 The trial of Nu¯rı¯ was not only the trial of a former minister, but of the reformist movement.34 Nu¯rı¯ was a member of a class of intellectuals who appeared in the country and demanded the reformation of not only the political system but also religious understanding. This group consisted of Abdolkarim Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar, Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari, Ha¯shim A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯, and others. They were under pressure from the authorities and conservatives to give up their ideas. Kadivar was sentenced to 18 months in prison, while Eshkeveri and A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯ were sentenced to death because of their political views. These trials and attacks on the religious intellectuals were associated with a weak response from the president,

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who was not able to stop the trials or the hardline conservatives from attacking the intellectuals. The only thing he was able to do was to condemn those acts. In general, the reformist movement in Iran failed to reach its goals and open the institutional setup of Iranian society for cultural, social and political change. This failure, according to Thierry Coville (2008), was the result of two main issues: (1) The demands for the creation of civil society and religious democracy were not associated with an effective movement on the ground, and (2) Khatami was preoccupied with the idea of protecting the regime.35 Alamdari (2008) believes that for Khatami, protecting the regime was more important than fulfilling his reformist promises.36 Therefore, he was not willing to put pressure on the regime and the supreme leader to reform the system. For Ayatollah Muntazarı¯, Khatami had the opportunity to pressurise Ayatollah ˙ Khamenei to apply his reformist agenda because he was elected by more than 20 million people and the legitimacy that he had was stronger than that of the supreme leader.37 But Khatami refused to openly challenge the leader’s authority.

The Religious Intellectuals: Main Figures and Main Arguments As mentioned earlier, most reformists had been active participants in the revolution; they were the radicals in the first decade of the revolution, and some of them were also behind the occupation of the American embassy in 1979. The occupation and seizure of the embassy was organised by a student group known as the Muslim Students Followers of the Imam’s Line. The main figures behind the crisis became part of the reformist camp, especially Khu¯ʾı¯nı¯ha¯, who became the publisher of Sala¯m in the 1990s, the same newspaper whose closure resulted in the aforementioned student protests of 1999. Muhammad Khatami’s successful campaign for presidential election in 1997 was based on a discourse that was unpopular among the ruling elite in the Iranian revolutionary regime. He focused, as was mentioned, on human rights and the importance of a civil society. In addition, Khatami challenged, albeit indirectly, the ideological foundation of the Islamic Republic by criticising fundamentalists’ understanding of religion. These understandings, for Khatami, are

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limited to the historical contexts that produced them and, in addition, for him, these understandings may not be accurate interpretations of Islam.38 Khatami criticised these fundamentalists by saying, ‘These people even believe that what they have achieved in interpreting religion is, in fact, the religion itself. They also think that those who endorse these understandings are true believers’39 and those who do not accept them are not. Khatami’s argument, and the ideas of other intellectuals such as Soroush, Kadivar, Shabistarı¯, among others, ‘changed the terms of public discourse from the ideologically closed post-revolutionary worldview [. . .] to an open-ended pragmatic politics. These politics focused on principles of a¯za¯dı¯ (liberty) and ja¯miʿih-yi madanı¯ (civil society)’.40 What is important to note is that most of these intellectuals emerged from within the Islamic Republic. They had a role, either major or minor, before and after the revolution by participating in overthrowing the regime of the Shah or occupying important positions within the revolutionary regime after 1979. This group started to criticise the Islamic regime ‘from within an Islamic framework: They sought a rights-based political order that could open Muslim politics to dissent, tolerance, pluralism, women’s rights, and civil liberties. Their ideas became to be known as “New Religious Thinking”’.41 This group of intellectuals came to be known as the religious intellectuals, or Ruwshanfikra¯n-i Dı¯nı¯. These intellectuals, as Soroush Dabbagh asserts, worked between two camps: modernity and tradition or Sunnat.42 On the one hand, they rejected the total secularisation of Iranian society as it is in the West and, on the other hand, they wanted to have a different reading of tradition and religion. For them, religious intellectualism and secularism had two different foundations.43 It can be said that these intellectuals wanted to combine Islam with modernity. This group criticised the traditional understanding of religion and linked it to the situation in Iran. In other words, because Iran’s regime is theocratic, these intellectuals saw the reformation of the clerical establishment and the understanding of religion as guides to reform the political system in Iran. The reformation of religious thought, according to prominent reformist intellectual Mohsen Kadivar, ‘has been one of the main pillars of the reformist movement in the country, and without the reformation of religious thought, the reformists will not reach their

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aims’.44 In addition, the reformation of the system ‘is the means through which democracy at the end can be achieved’.45 Yasuyuki Matsunaga (2007) divides these intellectuals into two groups. The first group comprises the ‘religious intellectuals’, or those thinkers who do not belong to the clerical establishment and can be seen as the continuation of the pre-revolution ‘religious modernists’, such as Ali Sharı¯ʿatı¯. The second group is called ‘the new thinkers of religion’, and they come from the clerical establishment.46 Abdolkarim Soroush (b. 1945), Ha¯shim A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯ (b. 1957), Akbar Ganji (b. 1960) and others belong to the first group, and Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari (b. 1950), Mujtahid Shabistarı¯ (b. 1936), Abdullah Nu¯rı¯ (b. 1950) and Mohsen Kadivar (b. 1959) and others are part of the second group. In general, these intellectuals appeared in Iran and challenged the traditional understanding not only of Islam but also of Ayatollah Khomeini’s doctrine of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. These intellectuals and thinkers have had different arguments regarding the role of Islam in politics and the way that the Islamic Republic should be reformed. They even had their opinions regarding the reformation of Islam as a religion and Shiʿism as a sect. Their discourse and argument have been influenced by the context of Iranian society, and their opinions have mostly been shaped by the situation in Iran since the revolution of 1979 and are reflections of the intellectual debate within the country. Therefore, the reformist intellectuals raised many questions related to Islam, Shiʿism, ijtiha¯d and the role of the jurisprudent such as [I]s Shiʿism revolutionary and a framework for political liberation, or the underwriting blueprint for orthodoxy, conformity, and austerity? What role does it envision for innovation and, more specifically, for ijtiha¯d, independent reasoning? How and with which tools does or should Shiʿism address such questions of contemporary relevance as democracy and civil rights, globalization and modernity? How is religious knowledge in general and Shiʿa hermeneutics in particular acquired and accumulated? And to what extent does mainstream Shiʿism endorse or jurisprudentially support the notion of the position of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, supreme jurisconsult, which Ayatollah Khomeini elaborated, later occupied, and has enshrined in the 1979 Constitution?47

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Generally speaking, the reformist intellectuals sought to answer these questions, and some of their arguments echoed Ali Sharı¯ʿatı¯ (d. 1977) and his views before the revolution. Sharı¯ʿatı¯ identified a dichotomy between actually existing Shiʿism and ideal or authentic Shiʿism. By referring to actually existing Shiʿism as a historical aberration, he could explain its failures, incapacities, and, most importantly, its historical complicity with the status quo.48 For Sharı¯ʿatı¯, the existing Shiʿism was embodied in the Safavid Shiʿism, and the ideal Shiʿism was the Shiʿism of Ali b. Abi Talib (d. 661), the first Shiʿi Imam. Therefore, Shiʿism is divided between core Shiʿism and the Shiʿism that evolved as a result of the differing perceptions of different clerics, especially those who appeared in the Safavid era. It is true that Sharı¯ʿatı¯ wanted to ideologise Shiʿism and make it a source of mobilisation by this understanding of its history, but the concept itself remains important because, in its core, it argues that the interpretation of Shiʿism and its history can reach different conclusions. In other words, the clerics were not the only class who could interpret that history. Therefore, Sharı¯ʿatı¯ challenged the ʿulamaʾ because he wanted to free religion from the interpretations of the clergy. In other words, Islam for him can be interpreted by the people themselves and without the interference of the clerics. He wanted to ‘separate core Islam from historical Islam’ by offering people access to the Qurʾan.49 Sharı¯ʿatı¯ wanted to open the door of ijtiha¯d for everyone in the Islamic community without the restrictions that had been imposed by the clerical establishment.50 The reformists’ answers to the aforementioned questions were influenced by Sharı¯ʿatı¯’s project, and their views contradict those of the authorities and the hardline conservatives in Iran.51 The first and most controversial religious intellectual of the reformist movement is Abdolkarim Soroush, who has held many important theories on Islam, politics, secularism and the role of religion in societies, in addition to his views regarding the reformation of Shiʿism. He was even seen as the Martin Luther of Islam52 and the intellectual father of the reformists.53 Among the different theories which he has developed and written, several can be seen as central: (1) the Minimal Role of Religion

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and the Maximum Role of Religion (Dı¯n-i Hadd-i Aqalı¯ va Dı¯n-i Hadd-i ˙ ˙ Aksarı¯), (2) the Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Shariʿa (Qabz˙ va Ba¯st-i Shariʿat), and (3) the theory of religious pluralism. ˙˙ In the theory of Dı¯n-i Hadd-i Aqalı¯ va Dı¯n-i Hadd-i Aksarı¯, or the ˙ ˙ minimal role of religion and the maximum role of religion in societies, Soroush contradicts the traditional understandings of both Sunni and Shiʿi religious establishments about the role of religion in everyday life. In this theory, Soroush asserts that religion cannot find the solutions for all of our problems because there is a minimal role (hadd-i aqalı¯) that ˙ religion can have in our daily life. For example, religion does not teach 54 us natural science. In addition, for Soroush, the legal punishments (al-hudu¯d al-sharʿiyya) prescribed by Islam will not be able to solve all ˙ Muslims’ problems. For example, the punishment of chopping off thieves’ hands will not be effective if a given society is suffering from poverty.55 Along with this idea of the minimal role of Islam, Soroush, in another place, asserts that religion – even though it is seen as complete because God says so in the Qurʾan – is not comprehensive and does not cover all aspects of life.56 In another theory, Qabz˙ va Ba¯st-i Shariʿat, Soroush asserts, similar to ˙˙ Sharı¯ʿatı¯, that there is a difference between the religion itself and the religious understanding. In other words, Soroush distinguishes between religion and religious knowledge. ‘The former, the essence of religion, is perceived as beyond human reach, eternal and divine. The latter, religious knowledge, is a sincere and authentic but finite, limited and fallible form of human knowledge’.57 For him, ‘religion is in no need of reconstruction and completion. Religious knowledge and insight that is human and incomplete, however, is in constant need of reconstruction’.58 This interpretation of religious knowledge led him to clash with the religious establishment in Iran because he was, in fact, attacking the understanding of this establishment. In addition, he indirectly attacked the ideological foundation of the Islamic revolution because, if the religious knowledge that led to the revolution and the philosophy of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h was a result of human interpretation of the religious text, not the actual religion and Islam, then it might be limited and therefore an inappropriate understanding of Islam and Shiʿism. Soroush’s theories were the main reasons behind his poor relationship with clerics, who regarded his ideas as ‘a direct challenge to their religious authority’.59

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Generally speaking, Soroush tried to protect and stop the use of religion as a tool for establishing authoritarian regimes. For him, a society in which religion becomes the tool of oppression and humans are crushed and deprived is more sinister than a society without religion, where the oppressor does not commit his criminal acts in the name of God and does not attribute them to religion.60 In addition, Soroush developed another thesis, Religious Pluralism, which propagated the acceptance of other faiths within the realm of truth. For him, there is no one pure religion. All religions, including Islam, have been influenced by people’s understanding and interpretation. Therefore, there is no one ultimate truth of any faith. This plurality of religious understanding and ‘the varieties of religious experiences are consistent with the Divine Will’. Therefore, for him, religions should not be seen as rivals, but as faiths that ultimately have the ‘same goal of human transformation in mutually complementary ways’.61 The religious establishment in Iran did not accept this argument because clerics believed that Soroush was asserting that Shiʿism is not the righteous religion. Even though Soroush raised critical questions about the Shiʿi history and faith, he did not encourage the Shiʿa to give up their beliefs. His goal was to encourage them to accept others’ faiths in their society. In other words, the notion of coexistence was behind his thesis on Religious Pluralism. In addition to Soroush, Mohsen Kadivar is another important reformist intellectual in post-revolutionary Iran, and one who is always proud of not holding any official position within the Iranian revolutionary regime. He was a supporter of the revolution and went to jail during the Shah’s era.62 Similar to Soroush, Kadivar believes that the ʿUlamaʾs understanding of religion and their interpretations of the religious text affected their opinions regarding certain issues. Kadivar keeps this in mind and applies it to the relationship between religion and human rights. For him, there can be a contradiction between the International Declaration of Human Rights, which was issued by the United Nations in 1948, and some Islamic principles, and, therefore, there should be a new interpretation and understanding of peoples’ rights, or Haqq al-Na¯s. ˙

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Kadivar asserts that there is no contradiction between believing in God, following the orders of the Prophet and supporting and defending human rights because ‘it is possible to be a true Muslim and, at the same time, defend human rights’.63 Since religion itself does not have a problem with human rights, the problem comes from what he calls ‘the traditional exegesis of Islam (qira¯ʾat-i sunnatı¯ az Islam) that has treated those religious accounts that came to be seen as conflicting with certain modern norms as “fixed and eternal precepts” of shariʿa’.64 Kadivar believes that human rights norms are ‘one of the most important achievements of humanity as a whole’.65 Therefore, in order to solve this puzzle of the contradiction between Islam and these norms, there is a need to come up with a new jurisprudential approach in dealing with them. The best way to do that is to suggest that jurisprudential interpretations of human rights should be reexamined and even abolished. [The solution that Kadivar] offered critically hinges on the possibility of abrogating certain shariʿa precepts deduced by the traditionalist mujtahids [jurisprudents] from the credible indicants of shariʿa, declared as eternally obligatory, and widely accepted as such by the followers of traditional Islam.66 The idea that Kadivar is advocating is similar to the concept of Na¯sikh wa Mansu¯kh. This concept is an Arabic term and is applied to some verses of the Qurʾan. There are different explanations of this concept. Some believe that there were once verses in the Qurʾan that were later eliminated by the order of God, and therefore, their rules were abolished in addition to their recitation. Another explanation is that some verses remained in the Qurʾan, but they are not obligatory. In other words, their rules are abolished, but they remain in the text and should be recited. In general, this concept came to solve a certain problem within the text: the contradiction between verses. The most common verses are those that are related to the issue of wine. Wine or alcohol is prohibited in Islam; however, there are verses that do not say that. For example, one verse says, ‘Do not go to prayer in a drunken state’. This verse does not prohibit wine but urges Muslims not to pray while they are drunk. However, because another verse prohibits wine, the previous verse

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remained in the Qurʾan but without any effective role. This mechanism was called Na¯sikh wa Mansu¯kh (the abrogating and abrogated).67 Kadivar believes that the divine revelation has been mixed with the ‘custom at the time of its arrival’ (ʿurf-i ʿasr-i nuzu¯l) and all the problems that have entered ˙ into the traditional exegesis of Islam in the modern age relate to this ‘customary part’ (bakhsh-i ʿurfı¯ ) of traditional Islam’.68 Therefore, his solution is based on the idea of repealing principles constructed by ‘the traditionalist mujtahids’.69 For him, if a specific understanding or fatwa existed previously but contradicts ‘a rationally derived precept with a definite indicant’, it means that its maslahat, ˙ ˙ which means good intention, ‘has ceased to exist’ (muntafı¯ shudih ast) and ‘its obligatory status is no longer active’.70 This theory supports others of Kadivar’s arguments. In addition to his efforts to reconcile religion with human rights, Kadivar has another project based on the idea that Islam has a spiritual side, which is static and unchangeable. This side should be in accordance with two principles: justice (ʿda¯lat) and rationality (ʿaql). Therefore, each jurisprudential decree (hukm-i sharʿı¯ ) should support these two issues ˙ and can be seen as a tool to reach them. If these tools do not help society reach justice and are not in accordance with ʿaql, they should be changed71 because their maslahat ‘has ceased to exist’.72 They should be ˙ ˙ seen as temporary decrees, not permanent.73 For Kadivar, affairs in human societies have changed over centuries. What was considered to be just and rational and among the norms of previous centuries may be injust and irrational in this century. Therefore, Kadivar indicates that jurisprudential roles produced to deal with those affairs may also change because they were applied to issues and problems of centuries ago, not to problems related to the current era. Kadivar believes that religion aims to reach three main issues, ‘faith, righteous conduct, and human development (ı¯ma¯n wa ʿamal-i sa¯lih wa ˙ ˙ insa¯n-sa¯zı¯ )’, not to find solutions to all problems of societies.74 Thus, the role of religion, about which both Kadivar and Soroush agree, is limited in societies. Kadivar also focuses on the issue of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. ‘Through his writings, [he] has repeatedly questioned the jurisprudential validity of

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the concept of the vila¯yat, maintaining that there is no viable basis or precedent for it in the Holy Qurʾan or the Sunna of the Prophet’.75 He also criticised Ayatollah Khomeini’s theory of the Absolute Role of the Jurisprudent (vila¯yat-i mutlaqih-yi faqı¯h), which gave the faqı¯h the ˙ permission to issue whatever rules he believes to be in accordance with the interests of the Islamic community and that of the Islamic regime. For Kadivar, the Absolute Role of the Jurisprudent does not regulate the power of the supreme leader. It is based only on personal characteristics of the faqı¯h and his understandings of what is useful for the nation. Therefore, the concept of the absolute rule of the supreme leader is based on his estimation of what is in favour of the Muslim society and the Islamic regime. Thus, the supreme leader and the Islamic regime can suspend certain religious requirements or obligations and change others,76 even if he acts against the norms of religion and its regulations. This right that is given to the supreme leader is not acceptable according to Kadivar. In 1999, as a result of his criticism of the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, Kadivar was sentenced to 18 months in prison. His sentence came from the Special Court for the Clergy,77 which was created to deal with crimes committed by clerics.78 This sentence should not have been surprising because, for the conservatives, vila¯yat-i faqı¯h has been ‘the foundation of their power’,79 and so they regard any attack against this concept as an attack on the Iranian political system and Islam.80 The other cleric who challenged the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic was Hujjat al-Islam Hasan Yousefi Eshkevari. Eshkevari was sentenced to death by the Special Court for the Clergy in 2000, but the sentence was reduced to five years in prison.81 The essence of Eshkevari’s arguments is his insistence that ‘Islam’s social decrees (ahka¯m-i ijtima¯ʿı¯ ) are changeable. They are related to their ˙ contexts [. . .] they are not eternal and were issued for particular contextual and historical conditions’.82 Therefore, there are two different kinds of Islam. The first is called the ‘true Islam’, which appeared by the Prophet, and the other is historical Islam, which is influenced by the religion’s historical development.83 The social decrees of Islam come from this historical evolution of the religious understanding of Islam. These social decrees include the issue of governance. Therefore, he theorises about the establishment of an Islamic Democratic Regime. In this theory, he says that a democratic

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regime is no different to an Islamic regime; they both complement each other. At first glance, his project supports the official arguments and discourse of the Iranian regime. However, what Eshkevari proposes is that within the system about which he is theorising, religion does not dominate every aspect of life, and the regime is not ruled by clerics. For him, the major social role of religion is to provide justice in societies. ‘[T] he justice intended by religion is impossible without established political power, state and executive power. It is here that religion and state meet, and in effect intersect at a crossroads. In other words, justice is the hinge that joins religion to government’.84 At the same time, the most important political regime that brings this justice into societies is the democratic system. There are two major views on the relationship between Islam and politics in the Islamic world. The first believes that Islam should rule by creating Caliphate-style governance, and the second argues for the complete separation of Islam and politics. Eshkevari believes that there is a third way on this issue. The third theory, to which he adheres, is the Islamic Democratic Government because, for him, the ‘Islamic government cannot be undemocratic’.85 Furthermore, for Eshkevari, ‘in today’s world, without following a democratic system, Islamic government is neither possible nor desirable’.86 The logic behind the theory of the Islamic Democratic Government of Eshkevari can be seen below: If we consider the ideal of religion – in social and actual terms – to be justice, and the ideal and essence of democracy to be the establishment of political power and the implementation of truth and justice based on [people’s] will, and [their] conscious and free choice based on pluralism, then without doubt religious justice is not attainable without using democratic methods – or, at least, democracy is the most suitable means for implementing justice. This is because the simplest meaning of justice is giving everybody their rights, putting everybody in their rightful place, preventing discrimination and injustice, and finally establishing a reasonable balance in society; and the most natural, the most human, and the most useful way to create balance in human society is the establishment of a state and the creation of political and governmental power, by people exercising their conscious free

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will, with the maximum participation of all different opinions and ideological persuasions.87 By asserting this, Eshkevari is saying that without people’s freedom of choice, justice cannot be implemented in societies. In other words, justice cannot be found in societies that use force and aggression to implement it.88 Therefore, he refuses the idea of government playing any divine role because in our religious thought and tradition, the sources of power, government and the state are worldly and popular, not divine. This means no one can make an a priori essential claim to be representing God or the Prophet in matters of government and the exercise of political power.89 This is because people should use logic and experience to find the best way to govern their societies – it is difficult to find an answer for the best way to establish a just government from the Qurʾan and religious text.90 Government ‘is a purely human endeavor, cannot possibly have one form and type at all times, and is contextually dependent on the times and the conditions’.91 In this sense, Eshkevari is in agreement with Soroush in his theory on the minimal role of religion because if the Qurʾan cannot provide us with an answer for our question on the creation of a just government, this means that it does not intervene in every aspect of life. Eshkevari believes that the kind of regime that exists in Iran is what he calls ‘the fiqhı¯ government’. He asserts: By fiqhı¯ government I mean one in which all affairs, including decision making in the executive, the legislative and the judicial powers take place within the framework of fiqh [jurisprudence]. When everything is supposed to be done in accordance with fiqh, and when we approach legislation, the judiciary, the executive power and other matters from a fiqh perspective, then the result will be a clerical government.92 For him, one of the negative consequences of this kind of governance is the establishment of a sectarian regime that excludes other kinds of jurisprudences, such as the Sunni fiqh in Iran.93 In addition, this

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government will intervene in the affairs of the Hawza, or the seminaries, ˙ which have been independent of state interventions throughout their 94 history. For Eshkevari, it is hard to separate the clerical government and the Hawza or Marjaʿiyyat. The current government in Iran ‘because ˙ of its religious and clerical composition wants to subordinate the Marjaʿiyyat institution to itself’.95 At the same time, the latter wants to stay independent. The seminaries make the following argument: ‘We want people to choose their marjaʿ in the traditional way; we want each marjaʿ to have his own followers, to receive the Imam’s share [religious tax], issue fatwas, etc. – exactly in the old style’.96 The seminaries’ demands ‘contradict some of the elements, decisions and institutions of [the current Iranian] government’.97 The issue of the relationship between the Hawza and the government ˙ was also raised by Ayatollah Muntazarı¯ (d. 2009), who was forced to ˙ resign as the successor to Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. He was concerned by the efforts of the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, to extend the government’s power over the seminaries. For example, in 1999 he sent his representatives to the seminaries in Qom and asked the Grand Ayatollahs to place the money that they received from their followers under his control, but the Grand Ayatollahs rejected his demands.98 In addition, the influence of the regime is seen in the Hawza, especially the ˙ Fayz˙iyya School. Banners and posters are installed in the school in support of the regime, as well as the Bası¯j. This influence is also seen through the presence of some ayatollahs, such as Maka¯rim Shı¯ra¯zı¯, Misba¯h Yazdı¯ and Ahmed Khatami, who are among the main supporters ˙ ˙ of the Iranian system and the current supreme leader. Ayatollah Muntazarı¯ was absent from the political scene following his ˙ departure from power in 1989. After the emergence of the reformists, he became one of their supporters and attacked the policies of the supreme leader, especially his efforts to extend his power over the seminaries. In 1997 he gave a lecture criticising both the regime and the supreme leader. He made a bold statement against the leader by reminding him that he is not a marjaʿ and did not have the right to intervene in the affairs of the Hawza or even to issue fatwas.99 ˙ Muntazarı¯ was an advocate for the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h and had a ˙ very important role in making it part of the Iranian constitution,100 and so he was a founder of the current political system in the country. However, he criticised the regime’s management of the republic and said

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that there is ‘a great distance between what we have promised and what we have achieved’.101 He did not accept the way that the current Iranian regime was applying the theory on the ground.102 For him, the vila¯yat-i faqı¯h should not lead to absolutism or the creation of an authoritarian regime in which all power is in the hands of one person.103 In addition, the supreme leader should be elected by the nation and accountable in front of them.104 Moreover, he did not want the supreme leader to occupy that position for life. He also wanted the supreme leader to supervise politics instead of intervening in every aspect of governance.105 Other intellectuals also challenged the regime’s legitimacy, demanded more reformation of its institutions and examined the relationship between religion and politics. One of them, Ha¯shim A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯, took the same path as Soroush, Kadivar and even Khatami in criticising the understanding of religion in Iran. For him, every ‘generation has the right to interpret Islam anew; no one should blindly follow religious leaders of the past’.106 In addition, he distinguished between what he called ‘core Islam’ and ‘traditional Islam’, in support of Sharı¯ʿatı¯’s argument. For him, many things ‘were added to Islam’s core, [but] they were not part of the core; they were merely historical additions’.107 Therefore, the way the clerics understood religion is not the religion itself and the way that they ‘interpreted Islam is not Islam. It was their interpretation of Islam’.108 Clerics, for him, did not accept certain things in the beginning of the last century and considered them haram, or forbidden, but they later changed their fatwas and accepted them. Therefore, this is an indication that the understanding of religion and what is halal and haram changes over time.109 Because of that, people also have the right to interpret Islam. ‘We have the same right. Their [the clerics’] interpretation of Islam is not an article of faith for us’.110 A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯ wanted to form an Islamic Protestantism. For him, Muslims need another understanding of Islam that is not dominated by the clerics, and that considers issues of human rights and humanism. People do not need to have someone to mediate between them and God.111 For him, the notion of Islamic Protestantism is a process that evolves, and ‘we are always in need of it, because if our religious thoughts and understandings do not develop then the chance of [our nation] declining is increased’.112 Therefore, he criticised the notion that every Shiʿi must have a cleric to follow. Shiʿa choose one marjaʿ to follow. The position of these sources

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of emulation, or marjaʿ taqlı¯d, is important because ‘most Shiʿa turn to [them] when addressing their religious concerns. Believers ask for opinions and rulings from their ʿUlamaʾ and follow the religion as specified by them’.113 Another important point in this regard is the fact that when Shiʿa choose Grand Ayatollahs as their source of emulation, this means they should pay their religious taxes to them, which is another source of power for these clerics.114 For A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯, people are not monkeys to emulate.115 This understanding of the issue of Marjaʿiyyat was, in fact, a proposition for weakening the power the clerics have had for centuries. Along with his criticism of the clerical establishment, A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯ indirectly criticises the non-democratic regime in Iran. A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯ agrees with Eshkevari that there can be a ‘religious democracy’.116 For him, there are two main issues that need to be addressed in religious democratic regimes. One is the acknowledgement of pluralism in religious beliefs and understandings. The second is the acceptance that democracy is the best governmental method to deal with and govern societies. Therefore, ‘[r]eligious government is one in which individuals govern based on their understanding of religious norms and percepts. [And] for a religious government to be democratic, it must be open to a plurality of religious understandings’.117 Thus, A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯ rejects the notion of one reading of religion. For him, in a religious democratic regime, there should not and cannot be a single reading of religion,118 and therefore, in the case of Iran, there should not be one dominant reading of Islam and Shiʿism. In this understanding of religion’s role, A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯ asserts that the religious government ‘is not the government of God but the government of man, and man is not infallible. Only when a government is guided by the spirit of religion and the logic of democracy will the chances for mistakes and embarking on the wrong path be reduced’.119 This theory is in contrast to the propitiation made by the Iranian government that the regime in Tehran is God’s regime and, as will be discussed later on, the continuation of the Prophet’s and Imam Ali’s governments 14 centuries ago. In addition to these intellectuals and thinkers, there are many other reformists who have emerged from within the system and have challenged the ideological foundations of the regime in Iran. Akbar Ganji held Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei responsible for the chain of murders that took place in Iran in the late 1990s.120 He also promoted

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the retreat of religion ‘from the domain of the state, into the private sphere’.121 In addition, he later denied the existence of one of the Shiʿi Imams, the Twelfth Imam, and asserted that the Qurʾan ‘is not the word of God,’ but was written by human beings.122 Moreover, Shabistarı¯ is a prominent intellectual in Iran who believes that the Prophet is not infallible,123 so challenging the main belief within Shiʿism, which asserts that the Prophet and the Twelve Imams are infallible. He also ‘reads Islamic texts by modern hermeneutics and the methodology of historical analysis’.124 There is also Sa¯diq Zı¯ba¯kala¯m who, along with ˙ other intellectuals, does not see the West as evil125 and criticises the approach of Iranian foreign policies, especially regarding the US.126 In addition, Mohsen Sazegara, Emadeddin Baghi and Mashallah Shamsulva¯ʿizı¯n are some of the other main figures of this camp.127

Conclusion When Khatami came to power in 1997, factionalism intensified in the country. Factionalism was at this time based on ideology as well as politics. Khatami became president and used a discourse that was unique among the revolutionary elite in Iran. He emphasised the importance of human rights, democracy, civil society, elections and ‘dialogue among civilisations.’ All of these ideas and thinkers have challenged the regime’s ideological foundations and have been seen as threats to its legitimacy. Reformists have been threatened and jailed, and some have been physically attacked. Even officials have threatened the reformists. For example, ‘Rahı¯m Safavı¯, commander of the Pasda¯ra¯n (the Revolutionary ˙ ˙ Guards), threatened to “break the pens and cut out the tongues” of those who wrote or spoke against the sanctities of the regime’.128 Clerics were also among those who threatened these intellectuals. The core argument of these thinkers has been reform of the political system in Iran through reforming ‘religious knowledge’. These intellectuals agree that there are two different Islams. The first presents the core Islam, which is static, and the other is the understanding of Islam, which varies based on the interpretations of believers in different historical contexts. In other words, ‘the religious reformation in the West prepared Western societies for freedom, democracy, and liberalism [. . .] and these religious intellectuals believe that society should be

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prepared to enter the era of modernity via a religious reformation’,129 and so they aim to reform the country’s political system, which requires the reformation of religious understanding in society. This argument is a challenge for the ideological foundations of the Islamic Republic of Iran and the current regime, because it indicates that the philosophy of the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯ h is an understanding of Islam, but not Islam itself or the correct interpretation of religion, and, therefore, given the country’s condition, it is not the best political system to follow and apply in Iranian society. Their views are part of an intense debate within the system regarding the nature of the Islamic Republic and the path that it should take. Factionalism has not ended within the ruling elite in Iran. When Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005, this regime also suffered from factionalism. On the one hand, there has been the traditional dispute between the reformists and the conservatives, and on the other hand, a dispute has emerged among the conservatives themselves. Chapter 4 will follow the historical roots of the hardline conservatives and will deal with factionalism within the Iranian political elite in Ahmadinejad’s era.

CHAPTER 4 THE HARDLINE CONSERVATIVES:THEIR ROOTS AND TENURE

The Historical Evolution Two important questions should be raised regarding the hardline conservatives: what is the origin of this group?, and how has it evolved in the country? There is no a straight line for the evolution of hardline conservatives in Iran. However, it is possible to argue that the roots of this group go back to the monarchy era. The extremists’ emergence in Iran was a reaction to modern ideas and policies that had influenced parts of Iranian society at the beginning of the twentieth century. The path towards modernity, and the discourse of modernity, began in Iran during the Qajar monarchy. From the beginning of the nineteenth century, many intellectuals appeared in Persia wanting to reform Iranian society,1 the main figures being Amı¯r Kabı¯r, Sipihsa¯la¯r, Amı¯n al-Duwlih and Jama¯ludı¯n al-Afghani among others.2 The transformation to modernity and the flow of the concepts of human rights, democracy and the participation of people in decision making in Iran were among other variables that led to the eruption of the Constitutional Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century, which transformed the monarchy in Iran into a constitutional monarchy. The discourse among the intellectual strata in the country favoured establishing a parliamentary democracy. Additionally, ‘free trade and economic nationalism were championed, and a general move towards a

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modified and moderate form of Europeanisation became the goal’.3 At the same time, a nationalist discourse was emerging in the country, even before the Constitutional Revolution, among different intellectuals. One of the major aspects of this discourse was the praise of the pre-Islamic era by some Iranian intellectuals. For example, Mı¯rza¯ Fath Ali A¯khu¯ndza¯dih ˙ believed that Iran in the pre-Islamic era was a ‘paradise’. Mı¯rza¯ khan Kirma¯nı¯ also portrayed the Arabs as ‘barbarous’ and claimed that the Arabs’ invasion of Iran initiated Iranian decay.4 The turmoil associated with the Constitutional Revolution and the negative consequences of the World War I forced the Iranians to ally themselves with a dictator, Riz˙a¯ Pahlavi, who became the first Pahlavi king in Persia. An authoritarian regime was established and Riz˙a¯ Shah was able to unify the country again following the emergence of different ethnic groups wanting to establish their own countries. Iran, therefore, ‘remained united [in the twentieth century] because of Riz˙a¯ Shah’s boots,’ as the Iranian professor Sa¯diq Zı¯ba¯kala¯m asserts.5 ˙ Riz˙a¯ Shah was preoccupied with modernity. His desire to follow the path of Atatu¨rk in reforming Persia negatively influenced his relationship with the clerical establishment and religious people, especially on the issue of forcing Iranian women to remove their hija¯bs.6 ˙ In addition, Iran was experiencing the emergence of new elite who were educated abroad, exposed to the outside world and influenced by modern ideas in the West. As a result, scholars emerged within the country, and some of them were in a confrontational position with the country’s clerical establishment. One of the most prominent thinkers of that era was Ahmad Kasravı¯, an anti-cleric who believed that ‘traditional Shiʿism was responsible for many of Iranian society’s ills’.7 Shiʿa for him were ‘the most polluted [corrupted] people’.8 In addition, he criticised the Shiʿi understanding of the first decades of Muslim history and the basic foundations of Shiʿism in his book Shiʿism (1944 [1323]). For Kasravı¯, there are two kinds of Islam: One is the religion that that honourable Arab man brought one thousand three hundred and fifty years ago and was established for centuries. The other is the Islam that there is today and has turned into many colours from Sunnism, Shiʿism, Ismaʿilı¯, Ali-ullahı¯, Shaykhı¯, and Karı¯mkha¯nı¯, and the like. They are both called

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Islam, but they are not one. They are completely different and are opposite to one another [. . .] Nothing is left of that Islam [. . .] This establishment that the mullas are running not only does not have any benefits but it also causes a lot of harm and results in wretchedness.9 Because of these ideas, Kasravı¯ was killed by an extremist group; Hussein and Ali Muhammad Imamı¯, who belonged to Fada¯’iya¯n Islam, assassinated him in the court in 1946.10 The Fada¯’iya¯n Islam was established in the same year by Navva¯b Safavı¯, a young cleric, and the ˙ first statement of the organisation urged Muslims to rise up, described the intellectuals as criminals and threatened them that ‘faithful militants’ were willing to act to silence them.11 In addition, the organisation stated that: We are alive and God, the revengeful, is alert. The blood of the destitute has long been dripping from the fingers of the selfish pleasure seekers, who are hiding, each with a different name and in a different colour, behind the black curtains of oppression, thievery and crime. Once in a while the divine retribution puts them in their place, but the rest of them do not learn a lesson [. . .] Damn you! You traitors, impostors, oppressors! You deceitful hypocrites! We are free, noble and alert. We are knowledgeable, believers in God and fearless.12 After Kasravı¯’s assassination, the group launched its terrorist campaign against many officials. Subsequently, Navva¯b Safavı¯ was arrested, tried, ˙ and executed along with other members of his organisation in 1956.13,14 Before his execution, Navva¯b published a pamphlet stating the programme of his organisation. It was called Barna¯mih-yi Inqila¯bı¯-yi Fada¯’iya¯n-i Islam (The Revolutionary Programme of Fada¯’iya¯n-i Islam). Navva¯b wanted to apply the programme on the ground with two major goals: the ‘Islamisation (de-secularisation) and de-foreignisation15 of the Iranian society’.16 He believed that foreign countries, especially Great Britain and the Soviet Union, were behind the problems in Iran.17At the same time, he was a supporter of Muslims everywhere and promoted the establishment of an entity consisting of Islamic nations.18 He was a supporter of the Palestinian cause and was able to convince 5,000

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Iranians to register their names with his organisation to fight in Palestine after the establishment of Israel. He issued a short statement urging the government to allow those people to travel to Palestine to help their Palestinian brothers.19 Navva¯b’s dream of a unified front for Muslims, support of the Palestinians and efforts to decrease the influence of the foreigners in Iran were associated with his attack on Western societies and culture. For him, ‘human behaviour in Western nations has become similar to animals’ behaviour and lusts [. . .] [Western nations] have lost their human civilisation and turned into wild animals’.20 He attacked Muslims who were influenced by Western culture. For Navva¯b, these people had ‘lost themselves and their independence to the illusive phenomenon [culture] of the Western animals’.21 Therefore, Navva¯b believed that Muslims should initiate two movements in order to become independent from Europe, or the West in general: (1) a movement to establish an Islamic unity and (2) an Islamic scientific movement.22 Along with his propagation of the establishment of an Islamic scientific movement, Navva¯b was critical of the educational sector in the country. He wanted to separate boys from girls in schools and to replace some classes, such as play (theatre), with Islamic courses. Moreover, he did not trust the educational system at the universities. What has happened to Iranian students, who upon their graduation have learned nothing besides idol worship, treachery and waste? [. . .] Yes! The criminal minded statesmen must die and virtuous and knowledgeable teachers of Islamic thought and of Iranian affairs must teach the basic elements of science in a simple way to the children of Islam so that [. . .] [we] will become immune to the political infusion that results in criminal activities, faithlessness, wretchedness and the pursuit of lust instead of science and knowledge.23 Navva¯b’s discourse is, in fact, similar to that of some Islamists in the Middle East. It is possible that he was influenced by their ideas regarding the establishment of an Islamic unity, or the need to protect Islamic culture and heritage from the cultural influence of the West and the outside world. In addition, the discourse of Navva¯b and his organisation

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is reflected in the discourse of some figures within the Iranian ruling elite, especially the hardline conservatives. The supreme leader asserts that he was influenced by him24 and described him as ‘a pioneer of jihad and martyrdom’.25 Even Ayatollah Khomeini used a similar discourse to Navva¯b in his confrontation with Kasravı¯ and other intellectuals who were attacking Shiʿism and criticising Islamic history. One of his main books, Kashf al-Asra¯r, or Reveal the Secrets, was written in response to the discourse of some intellectuals in Iran, as the introduction of its Arabic translation indicates.26 Again, there is no straight line that connects these discourses. Nevertheless the connection may exist, especially as, after the execution of Navva¯b, his organisation allied itself with the supporters of Ayatollah Khomeini in his struggle against the Shah.27 For example, Khomeini established the Coalition of Islamic Associations in the 1960s with an armed wing that largely consisted of former members of Fada¯’iya¯n-i Islam. This armed wing had a long list of officials for assassination. The Shah was included on the list in addition to 13 other figures within his regime.28 After the revolution, members belonging to the ruling elite in the Islamic Republic shared Navva¯b’s aims to Islamise and ‘de-foreignise’ Iranian society. In addition, former members of the organisation became part of the ruling elite and wanted to revive Navva¯b’s organisation.29 Therefore, some of the ideas – and also some aspects of the discourse that Navva¯b was promoting before the revolution – found their way to the ruling elite in the Islamic Republic, either through different organisations and political parties that were created, or through independent figures within the political system. The war with Iraq also played a major role in transforming the religious zeal of the pre-revolutionary era of some groups into the Islamic revolutionary regime. In addition, Fada¯’iya¯n-i Islam was revived30 and other radical groups such as Tha¯r-u Allah (Vengeance of God), Ansa¯r-u Allah (Defenders of God), and Mahdi Hashemi’s group ˙ emerged after the revolution.31 After the war, a new group, known as Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h, or the ˙ ˙ Adherents of Hizbulla¯h, appeared. It is worth mentioning that the term ˙ Hizbulla¯h had been used to describe Islamic revolutionaries after the fall ˙ of the Shah. Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h, however, is more organised and structured. ˙ ˙ They all use similar discourse and rhetoric in dealing with their opponents

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inside and outside the country. Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h’s main leaders were ˙ ˙ Masʿu¯d Dihnamakı¯, a journalist and filmmaker, and Hussein AllahKaram, a veteran, and Ayatollah Ahmad Jannatı¯ was among its main supporters and patrons.32 Allah-Karam believes that the main reason behind the emergence of this group was the era of reconstruction that appeared in the country during Rafsanjani’s reign. He believes that Rafsanjani betrayed the Bası¯jı¯s and the veterans of the war because they were excluded from participating in the country’s reconstruction. For him, Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h in Iran was founded to fulfill goals in three areas: ˙ ˙ politics, economy and culture.33 As mentioned in the introduction, according to Allah-Karam, in politics the members of Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h defend the absolute authority ˙ ˙ of the supreme leader; in the area of economics they focus on justice and struggle with the country’s capitalists; and in the cultural arena they fight against the attempts to secularise Iranian society.34 In addition, they support a radical foreign policy. Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h is part of a broad coalition known as hardline ˙ ˙ conservatives that is ‘made of individuals surrounded by cronies who act like a pressure group within the system. While those associated with this faction use similar rhetoric and support each other’s actions, by and large they act independently.’35 It is true that they act independently, but the aforementioned argument made by Allah-Karam represents the core argument that connect them together. Roy Takeyh (2006) calls these radicals in the Iranian system ‘a new generation of stern conservatives’.36 Takeyh believes that this group reached power on the basis of a return to the roots of the 1978–9 revolution.37 The hardline conservatives are known for their love of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei.38 In his part, the supreme leader has supported them and has ‘not only appreciated their zeal but also shared many of their concerns’.39 It can be argued that mutual interests exist between Khamenei and this group. Khamenei, who did not have a very important position among the clerical establishment, ‘would spend much of his early tenure compensating for his lack of erudition by seeking the approbation of the reactionary clerics who invested much august powers in him’,40 and who, at the same time, wanted his support to increase their influence in the Iranian institutions. The traditional conservatives are also among the supporters and adherents of the supreme leader, but they might try to eliminate his

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power or at least prevent him from controlling all aspects of political life in the country. The relationship that the supreme leader had built with the hardline conservatives, and his role in the formation of a political group within the conservatives, A¯ba¯dgara¯n, mainly concerned the traditional conservatives who had their own political group, the Coalition of Islamic Associations, known as Muʾtalifih. The coalition consisted of senior clerics, such as ayatollahs Mahda¯vı¯-Ka¯nı¯ (d. 2014) and Mishkı¯nı¯, as well as other politicians, such as Habı¯bullah ˙ ʿAskarʾuwla¯dı¯ (d. 2013).41 ˙ The relationship between the supreme leader and this group is one of the main reasons behind a split that appeared between conservatives themselves in the last years of Khatami’s tenure. This split was not serious, but it was, by and large, a competition between the two factions of the conservatives which led some traditional conservatives to support Hashemi Rafsanjani instead of Ahmadinejad in the presidential elections of 2005.42 Takeyh believes that the conservatives, in general, suffer from generational gap, or division. There are ‘young and old’ conservatives in the country, and both groups believe that the Islamic Republic presents ‘God’s will on earth’.43 The conservatives in general: See themselves as a vanguard class that retains loyalty to Khomeini’s revolutionary vision and best understands the intricacies of religious jurisprudence, and for that reason they hold that their authority should neither be infringed upon by representative bodies nor challenged by popular will.44 However, behind this unity in viewing the heritage of Khomeini and their understanding of the role of religion in political life, there is the war generation that is committed to Khomeini’s main goals behind the revolution in 1979. From this segment of society appeared Ahmadinejad and the hardline conservatives,45 and this group is supported by some important members of the clerical establishment and senior conservatives, such as ayatollahs Ahmad Jannatı¯ and MuhammadTaqı¯ Misba¯h Yazdı¯.46 ˙ ˙ But what about Ahmadinejad and his associated group? Before answering this question, it is important to deal with factionalism within the system since Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005.

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Factionalism within the Ruling Elite since 2005 Khatami was able to finish his second term of presidency without being overthrown from power, unlike Banisadr. His departure was the end of an era and the beginning of another. Both eras have one thing in common: they have been full of dramatic events and factional politics in addition to an intense debate regarding the fate of the revolution. Ahmadinejad came to power in 2005 after defeating an important figure within the ruling elite: Hashemi Rafsanjani, a former speaker of the parliament and a former president. Ahmadinejad’s departure from the mayor’s office of Tehran to the presidential office was a result of years of crises that the country had experienced because of the competition between reformists and conservatives. The conservatives’ ability to attain power was a reaction to the pragmatic and reformist policies that were followed and applied by former presidents Rafsanjani and Khatami. The conservatives had been attempting to reach power since the late 1990s and dominated the main institutions within the system, benefiting from the role and support of the supreme leader. After the controversial parliamentary elections of 2004, the conservatives became the majority in the Majlis. Other branches in the system had been in the hands of this group, and this might have been the main reason behind the surprising victory of Ahmadinejad in 2005. Allegations were made that the elections were not fair and that the main institutions in the country supported him; Mahdi Karru¯bı¯, another candidate in 2005, complained about fraud in the elections.47 When Ahmadinejad reached power pressures on the regime increased, from both within and from the outside world, as will be discussed later. The conservatives, in general, were united to confront these pressures, and the internal pressures resulted in the intensification of factionalism within the system between the reformists and conservatives. This dichotomy reached its climax in the 2009 presidential election, when the election, and its aftermath, was a serious threat to the stability of the regime. Four politicians were approved by the Guardian Council to run for presidency: Ahmadinejad; Mohsen Riz˙a¯ʾı¯, former head of the Revolutionary Guards; Mahdi Karru¯bı¯, former speaker of the parliament; and Mı¯r-Hussein Mu¯savı¯, former prime minister.

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Ahmadinejad won the election after receiving more than 60 per cent of the votes.48 Some believed that the election was a fraud, and many allegations were made in this regard. For example, Hooman Majd (2010) asserts that about 58 million ballot papers were printed in the country for the 52 million Iranians who were able to vote.49 That might have been seen as an indication that the authorities misused the additional ballot papers. Despite the fact that the authorities printed more ballot papers than needed, some voting centres did not receive enough.50 Mı¯r-Hussein Mu¯savı¯ complained about this in a news conference after the announcement of the results. He also ‘accused the government of shutting down websites, newspapers, and text messaging services throughout the country, crippling the opposition’s ability to communicate during the voting’.51 Mı¯r-Hussein Mu¯savı¯ adopted the colour green for his electoral campaign and so, when it was confirmed that Ahmadinejad won a second term, a new group emerged on the ground and the Green Movement surfaced in the country with Mahdi Karru¯bı¯ its main supporter. Demonstrations were organised, and about 3 million Iranians demonstrated in Tehran streets.52 Many people were either arrested or killed and, as a result, factionalism deepened within the Iranian ruling elite, and the conservatives were able to organise big demonstrations in favour of the president. The crisis, as Ali Ansari (2010) indicates, was not about the elections but about the ‘direction of the Islamic Republic and the future of Iran itself’.53 The supreme leader did not stay neutral in the crisis but supported Ahmadinejad. In his speech in the Friday Prayer at Tehran University, Ali Khamenei denied the ability of the system to give 11 million votes to Ahmadinejad: The legal procedures of the elections in our country do not allow fraudulence. Anyone involved in the elections, and anyone who is familiar with them, will confirm this. [. . .] sometimes, the number of disputed votes is 100,000 or 500,000, or even one million. Then one might say that fraud has occurred, and that [votes] were transferred. But when it is 11million – how can anyone cheat?54 Khamenei asserted that various opinions exist among the ruling elite. He gave an example of his relationship with former president Hashemi

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Rafsanjani. In addition, he talked about the disagreement between Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad and stated clearly, ‘My opinions are closer to those of the president [Ahmadinejad]’ than of Rafsanjani.55 This agreement between the supreme leader and the president did not last long. A dispute appeared again among the ruling elite in 2011. This dispute erupted, as was reported, because of Ahmadinejad’s insistence on firing the Minister of Intelligence, Muslihı¯, who had been the ˙ ˙ representative of the Iranian supreme leader in the Revolutionary Guards before joining Ahmadinejad’s cabinet. Khamenei refused to accept the resignation of Muslihı¯ and wrote him a short letter asking him to stay in ˙ ˙ his position.56 Reports added that this was a result of the role that Muslihı¯ had ˙ ˙ played in forcing one of his deputies to resign from his position in the Ministry of Intelligence. This person was said to be close to Isfandya¯r Rahı¯m Masha¯ʾı¯, a close ally and relative of Ahmadinejad.57 There had ˙ been many attacks on Ahmadinejad from other conservatives who accused him of disobeying the orders of the supreme leader, and the main daily newspapers such as Jaha¯n, Java¯n and Kayhan are among those that criticised and attacked Ahmadinejad and Masha¯ʾı¯. In addition, weekly newspaper Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t also published many articles and news reports against the position of the president in the crisis. He was even accused of being dominated by Masha¯ʾı¯.58 Furthermore, Ahmadinejad was threatened by one of the senior clerics in the country that he would face the same fate as that of the first Iranian president after the revolution, Banisadr.59 What happened was a sign of a split among the conservatives. Some of them even wanted to impeach the president in the parliament – in fact, about 100 members of the parliament signed a request for impeachment.60 Parliament members had to have two-thirds of the votes in order to force Ahmadinejad to resign; according to article 89 of the Iranian constitution, the parliament can force the president to resign if two-thirds of the Majlis vote against him.61 Ahmadinejad was not impeached but was asked to come to the parliament to answer its members’ concerns. The group close to Ahmadinejad is seen as the deviated group (Jarya¯n-i Inhira¯fı¯ ).62 Those who attacked him after his dispute with the supreme ˙ leader had been among his major supporters since 2005. Consequently, after eliminating the reformists from the political scene as a result of the

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dispute over the presidential election results in 2009, the conservatives were divided among themselves. The authorities even arrested some of the members of Ahmadinejad’s circle.63 This division also appeared in the election of the Majlis in 2012. In these elections, Ahmadinejad’s supporters were able to win 25 per cent of the seats, while supporters of the supreme leader gained about 75 per cent.64 It can be argued that the aforementioned argument of Allah-Karam about the reasons behind Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h’s appearance can be seen as ˙ ˙ a triangle that constructs the hardline conservatives’ ideology, with each side presenting one aspect of this ideology, and the hardline conservatives react to any group which challenges one or more of these sides.65 For Allah-Karam, any group within the system that challenges these three issues will be stopped,66 and so, when politicians behind Ahmadinejad deviated from these three major principles, the reaction of the hardline conservatives was critical and strong. This group was accused of being a deviated group, or guru¯h-i Inhira¯fı¯, mainly because of ˙ its behaviour, and Isfandya¯r Rahı¯m Masha¯ʾı¯, as the main figure, was ˙ attacked the most. It is important to mention that a clear dividing line between the two groups does not exist. First, Ahmadinejad was close to the Ansa¯r-i ˙ Hizbulla¯h organisation – a group consisting of youths, former veterans ˙ and fundamentalist clerics – and gave lectures during its meetings.67 At the same time, Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ has been one of the major ˙ ˙ supporters of Ahmadinejad and can be seen as the key person in laying the ideological foundations of the hardline conservatives.68 He also became a major opponent of Ahmadinejad’s associated group, especially Masha¯ʾı¯, and even accused it of being Freemasonic.69 Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ has also supported a clique of politicians ˙ ˙ known as Jibhih-yi Pa¯yda¯rı¯-yi Inqila¯b-i Islami, or the Front for the Islamic Revolution Stability.70 This group was created for the purpose of the parliamentary elections of 2012, and it consists of former members of Ahmadinejad’s cabinet and his circle. They have criticised Ahmadinejad’s government, especially after the dispute between him and the supreme leader. However, this front was accused by some conservatives for having Masha¯ʾı¯ as a major supporter, albeit behind the scenes.71 Moreover, members of this front who participated in the second round of the 2012 parliamentary elections chose to run on a list created by Masha¯ʾı¯. After reviewing a list said to be supported by Masha¯ʾı¯72 and

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comparing it to the first list of Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯,73 it became clear ˙ ˙ that some politicians within the hardline conservatives are still supporting Masha¯ʾı¯ and, therefore, Ahmadinejad. Accordingly, several points should be mentioned. First, before his election to executive power in 2005, Ahmadinejad was close to the Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h group. Second, he was supported by Ayatollah Misba¯h ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Yazdı¯ and other fundamental clerics before and after his elections. Third, after the dispute between the supreme leader and Masha¯ʾı¯, Misba¯h Yazdı¯ ˙ ˙ attacked the close circle of the president. Fourth, former members of Ahmadinejad’s circle formed a political group for the parliamentary elections and were supported by Misba¯h Yazdı¯. And finally, members of ˙ ˙ the new group were among a list of candidates for the second round of elections that Masha¯ʾı¯ supported. Figure 4.1 explains this complex relationship between these members of the hardline conservatives within the Iranian political elite and especially the relationship between Misba¯h ˙ ˙ Yazdı¯ and Masha¯ʾı¯. The front, however, denied any connection to Masha¯ʾı¯ and his list.74 In any case, the relationship between these two camps during the elections shows that a strict dividing line between different factions within the Iranian system may be hard to establish. It also indicates how

Supported this front

Miṣbāḥ Yazdī

Supported this list

Mashā’ ī

A list for the 2nd round elections 2012

Supported

Ahmadinejad and his group

His circle is seen as deviated

Attacks Mashā’ ī and his group

Some of its figures were in this list

Jibhih-yi Pāydārī

A main figure of this group

The deviated group

Figure 4.1 The indirect relationship between Misba¯h Yazdı¯ and Isfandya¯r ˙ ˙ Rahı¯m Masha¯ʾı¯. ˙

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complex the internal politics of the Islamic Republic are that, despite the fact that the republic is governed by an authoritarian regime, it is unable to control or eliminate disputes among its members. However, Masha¯ʾı¯ and some of his close associates are not fundamentalists and do not promote radical Islamic change in Iran in the same way that other hardline conservatives do. Masha¯ʾı¯, unlike other conservatives, particularly the extremists, has a good relationship with artists and filmmakers in the country. Haft-i Subh, which is said to be ˙ ˙ Masha¯ʾı¯’s newspaper,75 focuses on this sector of society. The first page of most of its issues is covered with full-colour pictures of actors and actresses or soccer players. Clerics’ calls for protecting morality in society appear in other pages, and even the statements of the supreme leader are mostly seen in the second page. For example, the first page of Haft-i Subh on 24 May 2012 was ˙ ˙ dedicated to the Istiqla¯l soccer team, while the supreme leader’s statement about the foreign powers, or istikba¯r, was published on the second page with a small picture.76 In contrast, Ettelaat dedicated its first page to the supreme leader and his statement, with a big photo of him greeting a soldier.77 It can be argued that Haft-i Subh is in fact a ˙ ˙ cultural and social newspaper, is not concerned with the supreme leader’s political statements and so does not pay much attention to the political debate within the country. However, it has occasionally published political reports about the region on its front page, such as a news report about an alleged coup in Qatar.78 In addition, another social and cultural newspaper, Jam-e Jam, placed the aforementioned statement of the supreme leader on the first page while publishing his picture on the second page.79 Moreover, on reviewing more than 240 issues of Haft-i Subh, none of them had a picture of the supreme leader ˙ ˙ on the front page.80 It is important to note that even though Masha¯ʾı¯ is very close to Ahmadinejad, he cannot be seen as a hardline conservative. There is no indication in either his discourse or his behaviour that he belongs to this faction. Masha¯ʾı¯, a former member of the Revolutionary Guards, does not mind being seen with actresses or even attending events with women who dance. For instance, during an official trip to Turkey he attended a ceremony organised by the Turkish authorities where some parts of the event were performed by dancing women, and he was attacked by conservatives for this. He has also made statements about Islamic history

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and Iranian nationalism that angered the hardline conservatives. For example, he stated that Iranians should uphold the Iranian maktab (office or culture) to the world instead of the Islamic maktab,81 and on another occasion he also said that the Iranian people are not enemies of the people of Israel.82 This statement contradicts the overall position of the Iranian regime towards Israel and its people since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979. Furthermore, Masha¯ʾı¯’s associated group is against the restrictive understanding of religion; they do not favour using force to implement moral codes in society and they respect art and artists, promote Iranian nationalism and maintain connections to Iranians outside the country. In other words, as Sa¯diq Zı¯ba¯kala¯m, professor of Political Science at ˙ Tehran University, asserts, Masha¯ʾı¯ presents a new faction within the conservatives which Zı¯ba¯kala¯m calls ‘the modern conservatives’, or usu¯lgira¯ya¯n-i mudirn, because Masha¯ʾı¯’s core argument has nothing to do ˙ with the hardline conservatives’ ideology.83 Masha¯ʾı¯’s discourse will therefore not be analysed in this book because he cannot be seen as a member of the hardline conservatives in the country, despite being close to Ahmadinejad. He and his associated group have been attacked in the hardline conservatives’ daily and weekly newspapers and been accused of aiming at the destruction of the Islamic regime in Iran.84 They were attacked by some newspapers even more than the reformists were. For example, the weekly Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, which has intensively attacked the reformists, has criticised the Masha¯ʾı¯ group in different issues. Figure 4.2 shows the numbers of articles and news reports about the group in comparison to the reformists. Thirty-five issues of Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t were analysed for the period between 10 November 2010 (A¯ba¯n 19, 1389) and 3 August 2011 (Murda¯d 12, 1390). In some cases the number of articles and reports against the group exceeded the number of articles and reports that were written against the reformists. It is logical to ask why I chose to analyse Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric as part of the hardline conservatives’ ideology but exclude Masha¯ʾı¯’s. The main reasons behind this decision are (1) Ahmadinejad’s history with the hardline conservatives, and (2) because his rhetoric, as will be discussed, is close to theirs. As mentioned earlier, Ahmadinejad was close to Ansa¯r-i ˙ Hizbulla¯h and gave lectures in their events and ceremonies despite ˙

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Issue numbers that were examined

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Frequency

Figure 4.2 Comparison between the Reformists and Masha¯ʾı¯ in Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t weekly newspaper.

the fact that they relied on violence against their opponents, especially the reformists.85 He believes that Iran is in a cultural war and asserts that [w]e have to direct the minds of our youths toward the basic principles, methods and the values of the Revolution. We have to lay down Islamic guidelines for governance [. . .] Islamic government means a system in which all relations, inside the family, between various people, in trade, and in all places, should take on a true Islamic colour and scent.86 In this quote, he agrees with the hardline conservatives about the importance of protecting the country’s religious cultural heritage in its new war. Martyrs of the revolution have been praised by the hardline conservatives, and Ahmadinejad is among those who praised them and even wanted to bury them in special parts of the city and also at universities. He, as other hardline conservatives, wants to remind the people ‘that they owed their freedom to those young men who went to fight against Saddam Hussein’.87 Moreover, he was a member of the

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Bası¯jı¯ group. Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ asserts that he knew him from the ˙ ˙ beginning of the creation of the organisation of the Bası¯jı¯ professors,88 which began its activities in 1992 (1377) and was officially established three years later.89 According to Yazdı¯, ‘he was one of the Bası¯jı¯ professors at Iran University of Science and Technology, and he used to participate in our meetings’,90 and so his discourse should also be examined. But the question remains about his connection to the deviated group and Rahı¯m Masha¯ʾı¯. There is no single answer to this question, but ˙ assumptions can be made about the reasons behind their relationship. The first speculation is related to family connection. Ahmadinejad’s son is married to Masha¯ʾı¯’s daughter, and so they have personal and social interests in the continuation of this relationship. Second, it might be argued that both figures have a similar background and therefore similarly constructed views on how to manage the country, as both of them are engineers and their educational orientation is different to those who have religious educational backgrounds. Third, since some of figures associated with the deviated group are accused of economic corruption, Ahmadinejad might be part of these scandals – he may be aware that if he were to disassociate himself from them, they might announce his connection to economic corruption in the country. Fourth, even though Ahmadinejad was supported by the hardline conservatives to reach power, he needed the support of close and loyal people for his policies and found that in Masha¯ʾı¯ and his group. Fifth, it is possible to assume that Ahmadinejad wanted to repeat the story of Putin– Medvedev of Russia in Iran by helping Masha¯ʾı¯ to become the president from 2013 to 2017 and return to power after that. In other words, he wanted to be sure that his policies would be followed by his successor before he comes to power again in four years. In fact, Masha¯ʾı¯ wanted to run for the presidential election of 2013, but he was dismissed by the Guardian Council. Finally, it is also possible to argue that Ahmadinejad aimed at creating a group of politicians loyal to him, not to the supreme leader, to increase his power in the main institutions, especially the military sector, to topple the current political elite. It can be seen that there is no one single reason behind the close relationship between these two politicians, but what is clear is that both men are strongly connected to each other even though one, Masha¯ʾı¯, is more moderate than the other.

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Since Ahmadinejad left office in 2013 he has not been active politically and some of his close supporters were convicted of corruption and are serving their terms in prison. However, this does not mean that he is not planning to come back to politics, either through the parliamentary elections or the next presidential election in 2017. The revival of Ahmadinejad’s faction depends on his relationship with the right in general and the supreme leader in particular.

Conclusion The roots of the hardline conservatives go back to the country’s prerevolutionary era when Iranian society experienced the emergence of two discourses and groups at variance with each other. Before the Islamic revolution, different intellectuals appeared with the aim of reforming Iranian society and were confronted by extremists, especially an emerging group known as Fada¯’iya¯n-i Islam under the leadership of Navva¯b Safavı¯ in the 1940s. ˙ This group’s ideology continues to exist in Iran, and different politicians and religious figures use the same arguments used by Navva¯b. However, the current discourse is affected by the context of Iran after the revolution. After the war with Iraq, Bası¯jı¯s founded an organisation known as Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h with the aim of promoting the absolute role of the ˙ ˙ supreme leader, believing in a class struggle and protecting morality in Iranian society. In trying to apply these goals, on some occasions members of Hizbulla¯h resorted to violence. Their main opponents ˙ within the system are the reformists and pragmatists but, since 2009, other politicians were added to this list, comprising Rahı¯m Masha¯ʾı¯’s ˙ group, which has close ties to the former Iranian president. This group was accused of deviating from the path of the revolution and conservatives, and of advocating superstition within the country. In general, Masha¯ʾı¯’s group is different from that of the hardline conservatives because its members are called ‘the modern conservatives’, and so they are excluded from the analysis in this book. However, Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric will be included because of his history with the hardline conservatives and because his overall discourse is close to that of this group. In addition, the hardline conservatives have declared that Ahmadinejad is not similar to Masha¯ʾı¯ even though he is close to him.

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After reviewing the nature of the political regime in Iran, and politics and debates among its elite from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad, Chapter 5 will deal with the hardline conservatives’ ideology to understand in which direction this group wants to take the Iranian revolution and how it can affect the reign of the current president, Hassan Rouhani.

CHAPTER 5 THE HARDLINE CONSERVATIVES' IDEOLOGY

This chapter will discuss the hardline conservatives’ ideology and analyse it by dividing it into six major issues. Even though they are interrelated, these issues are further divided into sections, and each will deal with one aspect of this ideology and its relation to other factions within the system and the international community. Section I deals with the hardline conservatives’ view of the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. Section II is about their perspective towards the reformists and the religious intellectuals. Section III is dedicated to their views on the West and its cultural influences on Iranian society. Section IV looks at Iran’s foreign policies in this ideology, and this is followed by Section V on economy and the gap between the rich and the poor in Iran. Finally, the hardline conservatives’ views on the Twelfth Imam will be discussed in Section VI. These sections are related to the hardline conservatives’ understanding of the political system in the country, its economic situation, its social conditions, its cultural heritage, and the country’s foreign relations. Analysing the hardline conservatives’ ideology in these sections will help us identify its main argument and where they want to lead the revolution, in comparison to the discourse used by the reformists within the system.

I The Absolute Role of the Jurist The first issue that constructs the identity of the hardline conservatives in relation to other factions within the system is their view on the

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concept of the role of the jurist, vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. Their understanding of this concept also informs their relationship with the world, because the system established as a result of this theory is different from other systems in the world. For Rahı¯m-Pu¯r Azghadı¯, this system is: ˙ Neither based on the theory of Western republic, nor on a secular republic and atheistic regime, nor on liberal democracy, nor on the theory of social contract, nor on the theory of public or mass acceptance, nor on the theory of monarchy, nor on dictatorship and absolutism, nor on the Marxist theory [. . .] vila¯yat-i faqı¯h means the government of justice, the government of jurisprudence, which is conditioned to protect the Islamic Shariʿa and its goals, and conditioned to protect the interests of the people.1 As was mentioned in Chapter 1, the Iranian system is based on the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. This concept puts a jurist above the political authorities in the country, and the system constructs the identity of the Iranian regime in relation to not only those aforementioned regimes, but also to other Muslim nations and Islamic regimes. For Ayatollah Misba¯h ˙ ˙ Yazdı¯, the Islamic regime in Iran is the only true Islamic regime in the world, despite the fact that other regimes claim that they are Islamic. For him, ‘the regime that is truly Islamic and closest to Islam exists in Iran’.2 This is because the Islamic regime in Iran is based on the operational role of the jurist, and without it the regime is not Islamic.3 When Ayatollah Khomeini was head of the regime, he had religious and political power because of his position as a source of emulation and also as head of the state. Before his death, Ayatollah Khomeini forced Ayatollah Muntazarı¯ to resign as his successor. He also proposed a new interpretation ˙ of his own idea of the role of the jurist, or vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. Khomeini distinguished between two kinds of jurists. For him, ‘the jurisprudence qualification [. . .] did not legitimize the sovereignty of the Supreme Leader [. . .] Rather, it is the knowledge of and ability to respond to existing problems in all arenas of social life that would justify his rule’.4 In doing that, Khomeini put the interest of the state, maslahat, ahead of the ˙ ˙ knowledge of Islam, fiqa¯hat. Therefore, he gave the supreme leader’s administrative and political abilities priority over his religious capabilities.5 In addition, he made the doctrine of the position of supreme leader an absolute position and called his doctrine vila¯yat-i mu¯tlaqih-yi faqı¯h.6

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In other words, Khomeini and the 1989 constitution separated the position of the marjaʿ from the faqı¯h.7 In the 1979 constitution, article 109, which referred to the position of the supreme leader, asserted that the supreme leader was a man of ‘learning and piety, as required for the functions of [. . .] Marjaʿ’.8 However, the 1989 constitution changed this article to indicate that the leader can be anyone who has the qualification to be a mufti. 9 The article also stated, ‘In the case of a multiplicity of persons fulfilling the above qualifications, the person possessing the better jurisprudential and political perspicacity will be given preference’.10 These two issues paved the way for the new supreme leader to control the country’s social, cultural and political life. As was mentioned earlier, the amendment of the constitution in 1989 increased his authority by eliminating the position of the prime minister and giving him most of the executive responsibilities. Therefore: The supreme leader has the power to declare war, to mobilize the troops and to dismiss many senior position holders in the Islamic Republic of Iran. These senior positions include: the head of the judiciary; the head of the state radio and television; the supreme commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); the supreme commander of the regular military and the security services; as well as the clerical jurists in the [Guardian Council].11 Even though these powers were concentrated in Khamenei’s hands, he lacked one main characteristic: charisma. In addition, Khamenei did not have the religious credentials because he was not a marjaʿ taqlı¯d when he came to power, and many other clerics had more scholarly credentials.12 Therefore, the regime worked to make up for Khameini’s lack of charisma by advocating for his absolute power.13 By 1989, the alliance between the supreme leader and Rafsanjani, in addition to its goal to eliminate the radicals, was based on the desire of both leaders to strengthen the position of the supreme leader and support the concept of the vila¯yat-i mu¯tlaqih-yi faqı¯h . It is also possible to argue that, because of the context of the immediate aftermath of the death of Khomeini, Rafsanjani was among those who supported the absolute power of the supreme leader to purge the radical leftists. Those

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leftists were attacking him without concern because of the absence of a strong and a charismatic supreme leader and the desire to increase their own power. For them, Ali Khamenei was ‘one among equals and lacked the personal charisma to contain this conflict’.14 They even believed that ‘neither Rafsanjani nor the faqı¯h could make policy without considering the view of the Majlis’.15 Thus, it was important for Rafsanjani to manufacture a charismatic supreme leader to back him against the radicals. In order to do that, he worked to strengthen the absolute power of the faqı¯h.16 However, as mentioned before, the relationship between Rafsanjani and the hardline conservatives was later disturbed. The first major step that the conservatives in general and the hardline conservatives in particular took in this regard was to argue that there was no difference between the authorities of the supreme leader and the authorities of God, the Prophet and the Shiʿi Imams. Khomeini himself was making the same argument, but his was a continuation of an assertion made by Shiʿa regarding the position of sources of emulation in their societies. Shiʿa, especially the Usu¯lı¯ clerics,17 who have dominated ˙ the Shiʿi clerical establishment for centuries, believe that the sources of emulation, or marjaʿ taqlı¯d, are representatives of the Shiʿi Imams in general and the Twelfth Imam in particular.18 Therefore, they ‘could substitute for him in performing such tasks as rendering legal judgments, implementing rulings, collecting and distributing alms (zakat and khums), mandating defensive holy war, and leading Friday congregational prayers’.19 Thus, Khomeini’s argument on the representation of the jurist of the Twelve Imams was not strange to Shiʿi thoughts, other than in giving him more political power than he used to have. With the current supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, however, the issue was different because he was not a marjaʿ taqlı¯d. Therefore, the argument that his authority is the continuation of the authorities of the Twelve Imams, and especially the Mahdi, seems to be a strange approach taken by the hardline conservatives because it places someone with few scholarly credentials in the same position as that of the Twelfth Imam. There are many examples that illustrate the conservatives’ emphasis on the continuation of the authorities of the Prophet and the Shiʿi Imams through the position of the supreme leader. For instance, Ayatollah Misba¯h asserted that ‘believing in vila¯yat-i faqı¯h and obeying [the ˙ ˙ supreme leader’s] orders is the same as obeying the Prophet’.20 In

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addition, Na¯tiq Nu¯rı¯, a former speaker of the parliament, believes that ˙ ‘[d]uring the occultation [of the Mahdi] [. . .] the supreme jurist [or valı¯-yi faqı¯h] [. . .] enjoys the same rights and powers as those of the Imams and the Prophet, and his wishes are the commands and duty for all’.21 The concept of the role of the jurist has even been seen as ‘the true path of God, Islam, the Imams,’22 and any deviation from the path of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h is a betrayal of Islam because the righteous way of Islam is through the role of the jurist.23 In addition, other conservatives asserted that the Islamic regime without the position of the supreme leader is not complete, in the same way that Islam, as a religion, is not complete ‘without the vila¯yat’ or the acceptance of the authority of Imam Ali, the first Shiʿi Imam.24 Moreover, it was argued that the concept of the role of the jurist is one of the purist and most valuable concepts of Islam,25 and so there should not be any limitation on the authorities of the supreme leader. Ayatollah Asadullah Bayāt argued that ‘in our era, which is the era of ghaybat [the absence of the Twelfth Imam], the authorities of a just and most knowledgeable faqı¯h [. . .] are legitimate if people accept him’.26 He was attacked by the hardline conservatives, who rejected that argument because, for them, as it appeared in one of their newspapers, the legitimacy of Imam Ali’s role would be under question.27 According to the Shiʿi understanding of the legitimacy of the Imams, this comes from God, not from the people. Therefore, since the authority of the supreme leader is ‘a branch of the authorities of the Prophet and [the Twelve Imams],’ his legitimacy does not come from the people and is not limited by any conditions.28 The criticism of the supreme leader’s legitimacy is also seen as part of a conspiracy that wants to turn the country over to the hands of the liberals and Muja¯hidı¯n-i Khalq.29 Ayatollah Bayāt’s argument and the reformists’ position regarding the supreme leader’s authorities are seen as attempts to decrease his power. In response to those who criticise and question the authorities of the supreme leader, members of Hizbulla¯h threaten to act violently in the ˙ defense of the role of the jurist. For example, in a statement regarding the Quds Day in 1998, Hizbulla¯h asserted that it would stand and ˙ defend the supreme leader ‘until the last drop of blood [of its 30 members]’. What is noticeable in the statement is that Hizbulla¯h saw ˙ its defense of the supreme leader as a defense of an oppressed, Mazlu¯m, ˙ leader. The supreme leader was also described as an oppressed person by

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the navy commander of the Revolutionary Guards, Rahı¯m Safavı¯, who ˙ ˙ later became the commander of the Guards. He said in a speech, ‘I see the supreme leader as an oppressed person, and those shameless persons do anything’ to weaken his authority.31 The attempt to depict Ali Khamenei as an oppressed person in Iran is another effort to link him to the Shiʿi Imams, who are seen in Shiʿi literature as oppressed Imams. Legitimisation of the supreme leader’s authority has another aspect as well, which is linking his authority to the first Shiʿi Imam, Ali. The regime, and especially the conservatives, bring the Shiʿi history to life and use it as a tool to legitimise the role of the current Islamic political system in Iran. The supreme leader is at the centre of this usage of history. He is depicted as Ali on some occasions and Hussein on others. Khamenei’s first name is Ali; this helps connect the two leaders. Thus, many slogans and poems have written about and linked both names, comparing the situation of the supreme leader to the situation of Imam Ali after the death of the Prophet. For example, a short poem in Shalamchih, a weekly newspaper operating in the 1990s, indicated that the experience of Imam Ali should not be repeated in Iran. It asserted, alongside a large photo of the supreme leader, that the Iranians have to be sure not to repeat what happened after the death of the Prophet in Banı¯ Sa¯ʿidih.32 Banı¯ Sa¯ʿidih is the place where the companions of the Prophet gathered and chose Abu Bakr as his successor instead of Imam Ali. In a nutshell, the newspaper was trying to say that since Imam Ali was left alone, according to the Shiʿi understanding of the Islamic history, the Iranians should not leave the second Ali, the supreme leader, alone. In addition, the Bası¯jı¯s and members of Hizbulla¯h always declare, ˙ during any serious crisis in the country, that they will not leave the supreme leader, saying, ‘We are not the people of Kufa to leave Ali alone’.33 In this slogan, they indicate that they will not repeat the mistake of the people of Kufa who were Imam Ali’s adherents but turned against him in his stuggle with Muawiya.34 The hardline conservatives say, ‘We have promised not to turn Iran into Kufa, and it will never be’.35 Therefore, the enemies of the regime should know that ‘even if you make a minaret with our chopped heads, those who will come in the future will not read [anywhere] that Ali Khamenei was left alone’.36,37 Linking the position of the supreme leader to Shiʿi history also appears in the usage of the event of ʿAshuraʾ, when the Shiʿi third

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Figure 5.1 A poster designed by the adherents of the supreme leader says, ‘We Are Not the People of Kufa, to Leave Ali Alone’.

Imam, Hussein, was killed in the battle of Karbala in AD 680, which was the climax of Shiʿi history. Therefore, many issues in the Shiʿi psyche are related to this event, such as martyrdom, oppression, sadness, faithfulness, revolution and revenge, among others. When the hardline conservatives in Iran use the event in support of the regime, the supreme leader becomes the centre of that usage. How? First, the supreme leader should not be oppressed and left alone; thus, he has many adherents who are faithful to their leader and are willing to be killed and become martyrs for his cause. In addition, Ali Khamenei is the one who will be helping the Mahdi to take revenge for the death of Hussein.38 He is also the leader to stand against the pressures on Iran and support the oppressed everywhere. For example, in a meeting with the people of Qom in 2009, a Madda¯h, or panegyrist, read or sang a poem to welcome the supreme ˙ leader to the city and used Shiʿi history heavily in support of Ali Khamenei and his authorities. Karbala and ʿAshuraʾ were included in the poem as well. In addition to relying on the tragedy of Karbala, the Madda¯h raised other issues, such as the war with Iraq; Ayatollah ˙ Khomeini’s residency in Qom, which was in Jamaran; the revolution of 1979; Fa¯timih (the Prophet’s daughter); Imam Ali; and the ˙ reappearance of the Mahdi, and linked them all to the supreme leader and the Iranian regime.

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The poem praised those who were killed in the war with Iraq by stating, ‘You were happy to die so your leader [Khomeini] would not be sad’. Then the panegyrist prayed to God ‘not to reach a day when the leader [Khamenei] sits with the heavy weight of sadness and is alone in Kufa’. In another place, it pledged that the Bası¯jı¯s and members of Hizbulla¯h’s allegiance to the supreme leader would be faithful to their ˙ oath, similar to the allegiance of the martyrs in Karbala who pledged that they would stay with Imam Hussein until their death. ‘Our zealous cry is similar to Karbala [. . .] Until we die, our allegiance is similar to [the one that was made in] ʿAshuraʾ’. Setting aside the issue of Mahdi for the time being, it is important to note that the panegyrist did link Ali Khamenei to the reappearance of the Mahdi by indicating that the supreme leader is ‘the Khura¯sa¯nı¯’. According to some Shiʿi sources, the Mahdi will reappear when the Khura¯sa¯nı¯ prepares the situation for him on the ground.39 The term Khura¯sa¯nı¯ comes from the Khura¯sa¯n region, where Ali Khamenei was born. Therefore, the poet was saying indirectly that Ali Khamenei is in fact the leader who will help the reappearance of the Mahdi, who will come with Imam Ali’s sword, Dhulfiqa¯r (or Zulfiqa¯r).40 Thus, the supreme leader, for the hardline conservatives, is God’s choice to lead the Islamic Republic and should therefore be obeyed and supported. Some even make the argument that the ‘disagreement with the vila¯yat-i faqı¯h is not an easy decision’ because the supreme leader – and in this case Ayatollah Ali Khamenei – may curse the person who does that.41 Other hardline conservatives even believe that the government of the jurist, or vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, revived the Qurʾan around the world, and so people should propagate the regime and the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. Aliriz˙a¯ Pana¯hiya¯n, a hardline conservative cleric close to Hizbulla¯h in Iran, asserts, ‘We talk about everything: Imam Hussein, ˙ martyrdom, and Qurʾan, but when it comes to vila¯yat-i faqı¯h we do not talk about it [. . .] This is cowardice [na¯mardı¯ ] [. . .] Citing the Qurʾan is good, but vila¯yat-i faqı¯h revived it’.42 Even though Islam is the main religion in Iran and the Iranian regime is based on an Islamic system, without the vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, for this camp, Islam cannot be followed. ‘Even if our maktab [school of thought] is Islam, without the understanding of the vila¯yat-i faqı¯h we do not accept it’.43 This endorsement of the concept of role of the jurist, as mentioned previously, comes from the philosophical foundations of Khomeini’s

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theory on vila¯yat-i faqı¯h. Ayatollah Khomeini believed that there is no difference between the authority of the Prophet and the Twelve Imams and that of the jurist, and people must obey him. Therefore, for him, anyone who does not accept the Islamic government based on the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h is supporting ta¯ghu¯t, which means idol. Consequently, if a president is not appointed by the faqı¯h, he is not legitimate, and when he lacks legitimacy, he is a ta¯ghu¯t. Khomeini believed that people should not pay attention to the intellectuals who do not accept the role of the jurist because the jurist’s regime comes from God, therefore people should choose between God and ta¯ghu¯t. He even asserted that: If it [the appointment of the president] is not done in accordance with God’s order, if it is not with the acceptance of the authority of the jurist, it is not legitimate. When it is not legitimate, it is ta¯ghu¯t. Obeying him is an obedience of the ta¯ghu¯t. Being with him is similar to be with ta¯ghu¯t.44 But what happens to people’s decisions in this regime? What if people choose one person and the supreme leader does not agree with their choice? Can he delegitimise the people’s decision? In order to answer this question, it is important to state that the regime in Tehran is an Islamic Republic and, being a republic, it relies on the people. However, for Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ it is not a Western republic – it ˙ ˙ is an Islamic Republic but not a democratic regime. This type of regime, the Islamic Republic, does not mean that it is based on the Western understanding of a republican system, but it is in contrast to monarchical regimes. In other words, it is a republic as opposed to a monarchy, but has nothing to do with democratic republics.45 Misba¯h ˙ ˙ Yazdı¯ explains: Why did the Imam say the ‘Islamic Republic’, and not Islam or the Islamic government? The acceptance of the word republic was to say that we do not accept a monarchical system. A system where a son inherits his father [. . .] This regime in the political literature is called ‘a republic’, but not the ‘republic’ that exists in the West – ‘the democratic republic’ – and not a republic where all of its choices are in the hands of the people and it

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follows them [. . .] Therefore, the goal is to establish Islam in a political system.46 In fact, for him, the thoughts of people who believe that in addition to Islam there is a republic, and that beside the establishment of an Islamic regime, there is a goal to establish a republican regime, represent unbelief (shirk) because there cannot be both Islam and a republic. 47 For him, when the people said during the revolution, ‘Istiqla¯l, A¯za¯dı¯, Jumhu¯rı¯-yi Islami (Independence, Freedom and the Islamic Republic),’ they did not in fact want to have a republic based on Western political systems because they wanted to establish an Islamic regime.48 Moreover, for this faction, the fact that it is named the Islamic Republic means two things: (1) The Iranians have understood Islam and accepted it, and (2) they have accepted the authority of the clerics to govern based on Islam. The people’s role, then, is to accept the clerics’ authority, not to make them their representatives, because representation means that people might have the right to withdraw that authority from the clerics, and this power should not be given to the people.49 Therefore, Misba¯h Yazdı¯ and other hardline conservatives argue that ˙ ˙ the republican system has no foundation in the revolution of 1979. He believes that those who were killed for the sake of the Islamic Republic did not give their souls for the creation of a Western type republic. He asks, ‘Which one of the martyrs was killed for the establishment of [this kind] of republic?’50 Theorising for an Islamic Republic without a democratic system is, in fact, a dilemma. In order to overcome this confusion, it can be argued that the adherents of the Absolute Role of the Jurist believe that there is a limit to the people’s decisions and choices in the Islamic regime. In other words, people’s opinions are important but it is not obligatory for the supreme leader to take action in accordance with their views. For Misba¯h Yazdı¯, people may elect someone to become the ˙ ˙ president, but the supreme leader has the right, according to the interest, or maslahat, to reject or confirm this election. This is because ˙ ˙ the people’s role is consultative. ‘They suggest and say we want this person [to be the president], but they say it is up to you. You should install (nasb) him, but if you do not want to, do not install him’.51 ˙ Therefore, even if 100 per cent of the people chose a person to become the president, if this decision were not approved by the supreme leader,

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then the elected would not be legitimate, but a ta¯ghu¯t.52 Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ asserts that without the supreme leader’s approval, the ˙ ˙ president’s obedience is haram.53 There is arguably a contradiction in the hardline conservatives’ ideology in general, and the discourse of Misba¯h Yazdı¯ in particular, ˙ ˙ regarding the people’s role in the Islamic regime. On the one hand, for them, the regime of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h comes from God, and the supreme leader is free to accept the decisions of the people or not because their role is consultative; on the other hand, the regime pays attention to elections. This contradiction is solved by the hardline conservatives in two ways. First, they argue that in every era there is a legitimate leader and a legitimate Islamic regime; however, sometimes people do not choose the right person to govern them, such as with the case of Imam Ali after the death of the Prophet. But when they choose the legitimate leader, they have to obey him, as was the case when Muslims chose Imam Ali to become the caliph after the death of his predecessor, Othman. The case of the Islamic system in Iran is similar to the case of Imam Ali. When people finally found the right and legitimate system to govern in Iran, they had to obey the supreme leader in all his commands because he is legitimate and supported by God.54 Second, the people’s role is also important during the elections. According to Misba¯h Yazdı¯, people should participate in order to elect ˙ ˙ someone who is religious because, for example, a member of parliament is responsible for legislation, and when un-Islamic legislation is issued by the parliament, the people who elected this parliament are held responsible.55 Freedom exists in the Islamic Republic, according to the hardline conservatives, but the freedom of choice is limited to Shariʿa and Islam.56 In other words, this camp believes that ‘elections are important as long as they prepare the ground for applying Islamic laws and help the functions of the supreme leader’s position; otherwise elections are harmful’.57 Thus, the people are responsible for finding the legitimate Islamic regime and also for protecting its existence by making sure that religious officials are elected to govern and legislate for the country. In addition, their movements and actions should be in accordance with Shariʿa law, otherwise their freedom will be taken from them. There is a famous quote by Khomeini: ‘Mı¯za¯n raʾ-i millat ast (the criterion is the vote of the

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people)’.58 However, according to a lecture by Rahı¯m-Pu¯r Azghadı¯, the ˙ people’s opinion should not be against religion because without Islam there is no value in any referendums or public votes.59 Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯, as mentioned before, pointed out infidelity, ˙ ˙ or shirk, in some people’s attempts to link the Islamic regime based on the concept of the jurist’s role to a democratic republican regime based on Western politics. Another cleric, Nabaviya¯n, also discusses infidelity and believes that, based on Ayatollah Khomeini’s argument, those who do not believe in the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h and want to change it to ‘a ceremonial position’ are apostates.60 In addition, Azghadı¯ believes that opposition to the faqı¯h, who is appointed by God, is haram.61 Therefore, defending the position of the faqı¯h – and especially the current supreme leader – is a religious obligation that people should follow, even if it requires using violence. For example, Aliriz˙a¯ Pana¯hiya¯n, one of the major hardline conservative clerics in Iran, believes that those who do not accept the concept of the jurist’s role are spreading corruption on earth (mufsidı¯n-i filʾarz˙) and ‘execution is their sentence’.62 In addition, for him, those who do not accept the role of the Guardian Council but upbraid the Islamic system should be sentenced to death;63 such a harsh sentence is because of their rejection of the supreme leader and the jurist’s role. This is propagated in Iran because the hardline conservatives claim that they do not want the story of Kufa to be repeated. Again, the issue of Kufa and Ali Khamenei appears in their rhetoric, but this time it is combined with a desire to kill those who oppose him. People who oppose the supreme leader should be terrified, says Pana¯hiya¯n, who asserts, ‘I am willing to chop heads by my hands’.64 This willingness to kill for the sake of the supreme leader is also seen in the way the hardline conservatives use Shiʿi terms in support of him. The Shiʿa recite a prayer for Imam Hussein called Ziya¯rat-i ʿAshuraʾ, in which a verse speaks to Imam Hussein that says, ‘I am in peace with those who are in peace with you, and I am in war with those who fight you’.65 In Jibhih, a weekly newspaper, there is a poster with the same phrase, but which adds Khamenei’s name to it to become ‘[I am] in peace with those who are in peace with you, Khamenei, and [I am] in war with those who fight you, Khamenei’.66 So we can see that those who turn against the supreme leader should be confronted by the hardline conservatives. Additionally, since poetry occupies an important position

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in Iranian tradition and history, people rely on it to express their opinion and state arguments, and so hardline conservatives also use poems to explain their position towards the supreme leader. For example, an issue of Shalamchih published a photo of the supreme leader along with part of a poem: it is short but indicates their view towards him. The poem says: We are waiting for Moharram to come back When the testing day comes back We know the sword and your neck If Ali (Khamenei) is harmed67,68 This promise to kill for the sake of the regime and the supreme leader is associated with the slogans raised by this group about their willingness to die for him, such as ‘Ja¯nam Fada¯-yi Rahbar (my life will be sacrificed for the leader)’.69 Moreover, Fakha News website displays a picture of Khamenei, underneath which is a poem by the famous Persian poet, Ha¯fiz Shı¯ra¯zı¯: ‘I have made a sacred oath [. . .] For as long as I have a ˙ ˙ soul’.70 (See Figure 5.2.) Even though Iran’s supreme leader is officially the main and most powerful political figure in the Islamic Republic, his supporters see his authority as transcending Iranian borders. Many of the hardline conservatives’ publications have called him the ‘Leader of Muslims’, Valı¯ Amr-i Muslimı¯n,71 and other official news agencies call him the ‘Leader of Muslims of the World,’ Valı¯ Amr-i Muslimı¯n-i Jaha¯n.72 The reason behind the usage of this term is not clear, but Muslims should benefit from this concept or be spiritually influenced by it, say the hardline conservatives. There is even a belief that the reason why countries in the region have had many problems for years, despite their people doing their best to reach stability and find solutions, is the absence of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h in these countries: ‘these countries are not blessed by the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, in the same way that Iran is blessed’.73 To sum up, the concept of the jurist’s role among hardline conservatives is related to the authorities of God, the Prophet and the Twelve Imams. Any opposition to the role of the faqı¯h is an opposition to God’s authorities and also to those of the Twelfth Imam. Moreover, without the theory and system there is no Islamic regime, and because the Iranian system is based on vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, it is the only Islamic

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Figure 5.2

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Fakha News website and the supreme leader.

regime in the world – this system makes a regime Islamic so without it, an Islamic regime does not represent Islam. Additionally, the people must defend this system and even be willing to kill and execute others for the sake of the vila¯yat-i faqı¯h and not to repeat the Shiʿi history and tragedy of the Imams in Iran, so many slogans appear in support of this belief.

II The Reformists and Religious Intellectuals As mentioned in Chapter 3, the reformists and religious intellectuals came from within the regime itself. They were Khu¯dı¯ people, or insiders, and argued for the reformation of the political system in the Islamic Republic. Therefore, they were not associated with Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯, the outsider opposition that consisted of the liberals or nationalists of the Freedom Movement of Iran and the outside activists. However, some aspects of the reformists’ and religious intellectuals’ discourse overlapped with the liberals, especially on the issues of human rights, freedom of expression and the role of religion in politics. This group, in contrast with the hardline conservatives who support the absolute role of the jurist, tries to eliminate or at least limit the supreme leader’s authority. For example, Akbar Ganji argued in one of his lectures in Iran in the 1990s that ‘the civil society does not need vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, let alone that absolute role of the jurist’.1 Abdolkarem

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Soroush sees the theory of the role of the jurist as ‘an immoral theory’.2 For him, this theory is equal to ‘religious absolutism. With this theory, it is not possible to find a democratic regime’.3 They also want to separate religion from governance and de-ideologise religion. Soroush, for example, states that ‘Islam as a world religion [is] “richer (farabehtar) than ideology” because it allows for variety of different interpretations’.4 The reaction of hardline conservatives to the religious intellectuals began in Rafsanjani’s reign when those intellectuals began publishing and lecturing about Islam, Shiʿism, the Islamic Republic and other issues related to the political and cultural situation in Iran. Two major magazines were their main tribunes: Ra¯h-i Nuw and Kiya¯n.5 Because of the second magazine, they became known as the Kiya¯n circle, or Halqih˙ yi Kiya¯n.6 Responding to these religious intellectuals begins with the emphasis of the conservatives in general, and the hardline conservatives in particular, on the important role of religion in politics and its role in reshaping and changing societies. Therefore, the first step is to legitimise the jurist’s role and to theorise on the importance of establishing an Islamic regime based on the Shariʿa laws. For them, as with the case of Islamists around the world, religion is not separated from politics; Islam pays attention to people’s spirituality and other aspects of their life, especially politics and governance. Thus, the hardline conservatives do not believe in the separation of religion and politics and see the establishment of an Islamic regime as one of the religious obligations that every Muslim should fulfill, because the Prophet himself governed and implemented Islamic law in the Muslim community 14 centuries ago.7 The Shariʿa laws, for them, ‘embrace a diverse body of laws and regulations, which amounts to a complete social system. In this system of laws, all the needs of human beings have been met’.8 Therefore, Islam covers all aspects of life, and there is no need to borrow and apply other political systems in Muslim countries. Since the Prophet’s government was legitimate, Muslims should follow his path in implementing religion in their societies.9 For Ayatollah Khomeini and his followers, the concept of the jurist’s role is the most representative of the role of the Prophet and the Shiʿi Imams.10 It is possible to argue that the hardline conservatives’ discourse in the last two decades was preoccupied with the intellectual output of the religious intellectuals and the reformist movement. This preoccupation

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can be seen in a comparison between two weekly newspapers of the hardline conservatives: Shalamchih and Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t. After reviewing 35 issues of each, I found that the obsession with the reformists and religious intellectuals is not related to a particular time but has existed in the minds of the hardline conservatives in different periods. For Shalamchih, the starting point was its first issue, which was published in December 1996. The last issue analysed here was the issue of January 1999. For Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, 35 issues were reviewed from November 2010 to August 2011. As Figure 5.3 shows, Shalamchih published about 390 articles, news reports, essays and short comments about the reformists and religious intellectuals. This means that on average they appeared approximately 11 times in each issue. In addition, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t published about 420 articles, news reports, essays and short comments about the reformists and religious intellectuals, giving an average of 12 times in each issue of this weekly publication. Both numbers show the preoccupation of the hardline conservatives with the views and policies of the reformists. It is possible to argue that the overall views of the hardline conservatives regarding this faction have been negative. When the second Khurda¯d Movement emerged in 1997, the aforementioned weekly, Shalamchih, saw

425 420 415

Frequency

410 405 400 395 390 385 380 375

Shalamchih

Newspapers

Yā Lithārāt

Figure 5.3 A comparison between two newspapers’ content on the reformists and religious intellectuals.

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it as a disastrous moment in the country’s history.11 When the era of the reformists ended in 2005, their governance was called the ‘dark [eight] years’ by one of the hardline conservative writers, Fa¯timih Rajabı¯.12 ˙ Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ believes that those religious intellectuals can ˙ ˙ be divided into two groups. The first consists of those who do not have enough knowledge of Islam. He called them gha¯fil, or the unaware persons. The second group, however, consists of those who want to discredit Islam.13 The way that Muslims should deal with each group, therefore, differs. Members of the first group should be given the opportunity to ask and express their opinions, but the members of the second group should be dealt with in a different way. Misba¯h Yazdı¯ does ˙ ˙ not specify how the authorities and the people should do so,14 but by examining the ideology of the hardline conservatives regarding the reformists and religious intellectuals, it can be argued that exclusion is a major tactic used by them. The second group is mostly seen as conspiring against Islam and the Islamic Republic of Iran in cooperation with Western powers. These religious intellectuals are seen as tools in the hands of the arrogant powers. Paya¯m Faz˙lı¯nizha¯d, a former reformist close to Hizbulla¯h and ˙ the Bası¯jı¯s, recently published a book about the reformists and religious intellectuals. The title indicates that the intellectuals in Iran are not independent and that they are part of a bigger agenda against the regime in Tehran. The book is called The Secret Military of the Intellectuals, or Artish-i Sirrı¯-yi Ruwshanfikra¯n. The book has one goal, which is to find the connection between the religious intellectuals and reformists in Iran and the Western powers. Faz˙lı¯nizha¯d claims that ‘the project of the reformists is an ‘English ideology’ and an ‘American dream’ aimed at weakening the Islamic Republic.15 For the author, this project is also associated with the monarchical opposition outside the country which also wants to end the Islamic regime in Tehran.16 Other hardline conservatives made the same argument in the 1990s regarding the religious intellectuals. In 1997, Shalamchih claimed that ‘there are many documents which prove the support that this group of people received from the arrogant powers (Istikba¯r-i Jaha¯nı¯ )’.17 Therefore, the hardline conservatives believe that these religious intellectuals are followers of others in the outside world and receive orders from them.18 The Western powers have supported these intellectuals because they were not able to defeat the regime at the

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beginning of the revolution and so have been working to weaken the Islamic regime from within. According to the hardline conservatives, the religious intellectuals and the reformists are playing a role in this conspiracy.19 For the hardline conservatives, weakening the Islamic Republic from within by the Western powers is a plan that includes five groups inside Iran, despite the fact that they have different orientations. Mujtaba¯ Sha¯kirı¯ believes that these groups include the following: (1) the liberal democrats, (2) the Marxists, (3) the nationalists, (4) the traditionalists, who want to avoid politics, and (5) the hypocrites. Sha¯kirı¯ believes that the religious intellectuals belong to the fifth group in this plan. For him, these intellectuals are hypocrites because they speak the language of religion but are, in reality, secular.20 Because its members speak this language, the last group is the most dangerous, one that ‘we need to be careful about’.21 Sha¯kirı¯’s usage of the term hypocrites, or Muna¯fiqı¯n, to describe the religious intellectuals can be seen as an effort to link this group to Muja¯hidı¯n-i Khalq, an Islamic Marxist group, which was Khu¯dı¯ in the beginning of the revolution, became Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯ afterward, and whose members have been known since as the hypocrites. Because these religious intellectuals follow the West, for Azghadı¯, a thinker close to Hizbulla¯h and the Bası¯jı¯s, they ‘are not creative but ˙ recorders’22 of the intellectual productions of the West. For him, these people bring the ideas of freedom, liberalism, pluralism and civil society from the West without adding anything to them.23 Moreover, the religious intellectualism in the aftermath of the revolution, for Azghadı¯, has moved backwards instead of forwards. He compares the current religious intellectuals with their counterparts, such as Ali Sharı¯ʿatı¯, in the pre-revolutionary era. For Azghadı¯, while Ali Sharı¯ʿatı¯ urged the religious community to participate in the social struggle and wanted to awaken Muslims and revive the concept of political Islam, the current religious intellectuals are arguing against him and oppose the Islamic movement in the world by relying on liberalism and Western systems.24 The supreme leader agrees with Azghadı¯ and believes that, after the war with Iraq, a new kind of intellectualism appeared in Iran in contrast to the intellectuals who were behind the revolution and paid proper focus to religion and Islam. For him, intellectuals after the war retreated to the same arguments that were made at the beginning of the twentieth

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century by intellectuals who were against religion and regarded the West as their model.25 These intellectuals who ‘attack the Islamic rationality, the Islamic knowledge, the definitive Islamic values, the religious governance and law, the religious ideology, the Islamic human rights, [and] the Islamic economy’ are motivated politically to work against the regime, more so than by their cultural and philosophical motivations.26 Moreover, they have also been accused by Khamenei of benefiting from attacking Islam by receiving money from others.27 The religious intellectuals and reformists are seen as tools in propagating Western culture among Iranians. Muhammad Khatami was viewed as a candidate of those who were influenced by the West and those who ‘questioned the pure Islam of [the Prophet] Muhammad’.28 The hardline conservatives have revived and reused Jala¯l a¯l-i Ahmad’s term Westoxification to discredit their opponents, and the intellectuals are also accused of hybridising Islam and the atheist thoughts of the West.29 Moreover, they are seen as protecting and defending the colonial history of the West and ‘see any kind of resistance against centres of capitalliberalism as a “failed struggle”’.30 In a very strange comparison, religious intellectualism is seen by Yu¯suf-Ali Mı¯r-Shakka¯k as ‘an Islamic wine or beer’.31 Beer, as is known, is forbidden in Islam, so the phrase implies that intellectualism within Islam is haram as well. It also implies that Islam and intellectualism are totally different things and thus cannot be combined because, for Mı¯rShakka¯k, ‘the original term [of intellectualism] refers to atheism. How can a person be a religious man and at the same time say that he is an intellectual (ruwshanfikr)?’32 Moreover, religious intellectualism is also seen as ‘the religious irreligious (bı¯dı¯nı¯-yi dı¯nı¯ )’ because intellectuals or ruwshanfikra¯n are accused of relying on the mind (ʿaql) in dealing with social problems more than any other spiritual variables. So, for them, the mind comes first and reliance on anything except mind is, in fact, a reliance on ignorance and legends.33 Therefore, the hardline conservatives believe that because the intellectuals, in general, give the mind more priority than religion, the term religious intellectualism is misleading because the religious intellectuals ‘want to link religion with an irreligious’ way of thinking.34 In addition, some of these intellectuals have been accused of being apostates. For example, Ayatollah Maka¯rim Shı¯razı¯, who is a marjaʿ

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(source of emulation) and close to the Iranian regime, issued a fatwa in 2008 accusing Ganji of being apostate.35 Ayatollah Nu¯rı¯ Hamidanı¯,36 another marjaʿ and supporter of Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h, believes that Soroush ˙ ˙ insulted Islam more than Salman Rushdie did and so ‘Muslims should act in accordance with their obligations’,37 which are, in this case, to kill Soroush. It is worth mentioning that the weekly, Shalamchih, threatened Soroush in the 1990s by saying that in Iran there were many people who wanted to apply Ayatollah Khomeini’s fatwa regarding Rushdie against him.38 In addition, during a meeting with members of Hizbulla¯h in ˙ Mashhad in 2010, Soroush and Kadivar were accused of being atheists, and authorities were warned of their attempts to spread their ideas in the seminaries to divide the public sphere and change Islam.39 Furthermore, as an indication of his negative role and activities in Iran, Ayatollah Muntazarı¯ is seen as the virus of immorality (Jursu¯mih˙ yi fisq) and an irreligious (bı¯dı¯nı¯ ) person.40 The hardline conservatives even claim that Ayatollah Khomeini said, ‘If this immoral [. . .] and corrupted man teaches a student, the student is immoral [too]’.41 The hardline conservatives demanded that the seminaries discredit him and withdraw the title of Ayatollah from him.42 His house was even seen as the ‘arrogant powers’ second nest (la¯nih) of espionage’.43 This description of Muntazarı¯’s house was an indication that he had a ˙ relationship with the American government, because the first nest of spies was the American embassy in Tehran, which was seized by the revolutionaries in 1979. The hardline conservatives believed in the necessity of reacting against those intellectuals, and one of them argued that ‘if today no one reacts against them, they will insult the vila¯yat [. . .] and will propagate secularism’.44 Therefore, in addition to the intellectually based reaction to the religious intellectuals and the reformists, two other types of reactions were common. One of them was to bring those intellectuals and their magazines and newspapers to courts and try them, as with the aforementioned cases of Mohsen Kadivar and Hasan Yousofi Eshkeviri. The other approach was to attack the intellectuals physically, as with the attack against Soroush in Isfahan by members of Hizbulla¯h in ˙ 1995.45 Two years later Ayatollah Muntazarı¯’s house was attacked ˙ following his speech against the supreme leader. After the attack, the Bası¯jı¯s congratulated each other for conquering (fath) Muntazarı¯’s place ˙ ˙ of residency.46

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Hardline conservatives legitimate these acts of violence. They believe that Ayatollah Khomeini approved these kinds of actions. They refer to one of his speeches where he asserted that ‘Advertisements, articles, speeches, books, and magazines [which are] against Islam, public morals, and the interests of the country are haram [. . .]. If the people and youths of Hizbulla¯h noticed those aforementioned issues they should inform the ˙ official institutions, and if these institutions do not do anything, they [members of Hizbulla¯h] are obliged to react’.47 ˙ When the crisis of 2009 erupted as a result of the disputed presidential election, more emphasis was given to the reformist movement and religious intellectuals. As mentioned before, the hardline conservatives have relied heavily on history to approve the absolute role of the jurist and mobilise people around the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. They also use the Shiʿi history to discredit their opponents, especially the reformists. The events after the election and the establishment of the Green Movement were described as fitnih, or dissention. The fitnih of 2009 is even compared to the fitnih in the first decades after the death of the Prophet. Misba¯h Yazdı¯ uses the fitnih in the first years of Islamic history ˙ ˙ to understand the motivation behind the reformists’ actions in 2009. He asserts that ‘after the death of the Prophet, some of his companions changed their behaviour. It is strange for us to see how those people who were Muslims and close to the Prophet were changed after him. The events after the elections were similar to the events in the aftermath of the Prophet’48 because those who challenged the authorities were critical members of the regime following the revolution and were supported by Ayatollah Khomeini. Understanding the causes of the 2009 events is one reason for relying on history; the other is to react to the crisis and deal with the opposition. In other words, the hardline conservatives rely on history to find out how the Prophet or Shiʿi Imams reacted to political crises of their eras. One of the major events mentioned by the hardline conservatives about the best way to deal with dissidents is the event of Nahrawa¯n. The Kharijits had been fighting in Ali’s army when he became the caliph, but they separated themselves from him and eventually were defeated by him in a battle known as the battle of Nahrawa¯n in AD 658.49 The hardline conservatives and Ali Khamenei argued during the crisis that the regime might tolerate the Green Movement, but not for a

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long time. Additionally, they reminded people of the events of Nahrawa¯n and Imam Ali’s position towards the Kharijits. In his speech, several months after the emergence of the Green Movement, Khamenei reminded people that Imam Ali ‘on different occasions and events dealt with his opponents with tolerance for as long as he could, but when there was no option [to solve a crisis] he would seriously confront them and stand against them’.50 Ahmad Khatami, a hardline conservative cleric, made the same argument in one of his speeches by asserting that Imam Ali used to give his opponents, especially the Kharijits, a chance, but when they continued to fight him, he relied on force to stop them. Khatami asserted, ‘This is Ali’s way’.51 This phrase is an indication that the regime will tolerate disagreement in the country, but with limitations, and that it will use force to end any opposition that threatens its existence. Moreover, the pro-government demonstrations usually raise slogans in support of the regime and against its opponents. One of these slogans has been ‘Who is Khamenei? He is [Imam] Ali of this era, death to the Kharijites of Nahrawa¯n, death to the hypocrites’.52 Death to the hypocrites and other opponents of the regime can be fulfilled by relying on violence or executing the adversaries. As was mentioned in the previous section, Pana¯hiya¯n, a cleric close to Hizbulla¯h ˙ in Iran, believes that those who do not accept the concept of the role of the jurist are spreading corruption on earth (mufsidı¯n-i filʾarz˙) and ‘execution [should be] their sentence’.53 This desire to execute the reformists and those who participated in the fitnih is also seen in an issue of the weekly Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t. The newspaper demanded the execution of those who participated in the demonstrations of ʿAshuraʾ in 2010 in support of the Green Movement.54 In addition, Ahmad Khatami accused Mu¯savı¯ and Karru¯bı¯ of being Muha¯rib and demanded their ˙ execution.55 Muha¯rib is a person who relies on violence to spread injustice or ˙ corruption on earth, and the term is associated with another expression, mufsid filʾarz˙. The sentence for both crimes is death, and as the leaders of the Green Movement are seen as Muha¯ribı¯n they should be executed. ˙ Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, the chief editor and representative of the supreme leader in the hardline daily Kayhan, discussed this idea in an article during the crisis. He asserted, ‘The heads of fitnih are the embodiments of the concept of mufsid filʾarz˙. Killing innocent people,

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disturbing the peace, and cooperating with enemies are among their unforgivable crimes’.56 The demands to execute the heads of the Green Movement are seen more and more in the discourse of the hardline conservatives. They appear in different newspapers and in many lectures given by them.57 One of the slogans raised in an anti-Green Movement demonstration was ‘May God Curse Your Enemies oh Hussein [. . .] Karru¯bı¯, Khatami, and Mı¯r-Hussien’. A picture of this slogan was published in Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t,58 and was an indication that the reformists were not only against the regime but also against the Shiʿi Imams. Therefore they should be confronted and even eliminated. Despite the fact that former president Muhammad Khatami has been cautious in his actions during the crisis,59 the hardline conservatives attack him and accuse him of being one of the heads of the fitnih.60 Hamı¯d Rasa¯ʾı¯, a member of the Iranian parliament and a hardline conservative close to Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯, even believes that it is ˙ ˙ shameful that Khatami wears the dress of the clerics and at the same time is supported by Soroush, Ganji and other religious intellectuals. For him, it is also shameful that Khatami is influenced by liberalism and tried to govern based on his Western-influenced ideas.61 As mentioned earlier, the religious intellectuals have been seen as muna¯fiq, or hypocrites, indicating their connection to the Muja¯hidı¯n-i Khalq, and so they are considered traitors. Karru¯bı¯ is also called a muna¯fiq62 and thus is seen as a traitor. As a matter of fact, the whole reformist movement is described in the same way by the hardline conservatives,63 who also believe that the Green Movement was supported by the US and Israel. Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯ calls the events of 2009 the ‘American –Israeli fitnih’.64 A banner was installed in Fayz˙iyya seminary school, Qom, in January 2015, in the anniversary of the events of 2009 –10, accusing the reformists of committing ‘22 sins’. Among them was their relationship with the enemies of the Islamic Republic.65 Moreover, the movement is accused of receiving support from the Saudi government.66 In 2009, the reformists failed to force Ahmadinejad out of power and their movement was unsuccessful in changing the balance of power in the regime in their favour. In 2011, Iranians, and especially the supporters of the Green Movement, were influenced by the so-called Arab Spring, and tried to revive their 2009 movement. They also failed

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and their leaders, Mu¯sa¯vı¯ and Karru¯bı¯, along with their wives, were put under house arrest. However, the hardline conservatives continue to see them as a threat to the stability of the country and the continuation of the Islamic Republic. They have urged the authorities to charge the two leaders and put them on trial.67 When Ahmadinejad’s reign came to an end in 2013, Iran had another presidential election. Only eight people had their candidacy accepted, among them a reformist, Muhammad Riz˙a¯ ʾĀrif. It is true that many reformists did not participate in the election, but the effort made by some of them to nominate a candidate and the Guardian Council’s approval of ʾA¯rif’s candidacy were indications of their existence as part of the regime, or their Khu¯dı¯ position within the system, even though some of their main figures were excluded, arrested or jailed. ʾA¯rif, however, did not continue the presidential race and withdrew in support of the moderate candidate and current president, Rouhani. Despite the fact that Rouhani is not a reformist, his discourse overlaps with that of the reformists, particularly on a moderate relationship with the outside world and his moderate views regarding religion and social problems. This similarity in some aspects of the two factions’ discourses worries the hardliners. He was even accused of reaching power with ‘reformist slogans’ and the help of Muhammad Khatami.68 From the first days of his reaching power, he was criticised by the hardline conservatives because of those he nominated for his cabinet. His nomination for the Ministry of Education, Muhammad Ali Najafı¯, was attacked for his secular-oriented views and his nomination was not approved by the parliament.69 Najafı¯, however, was appointed as a minister of science, research and technology in 2014, succeeding Riz˙a¯ Farajı¯-Da¯na¯, who was dismissed from the cabinet by the parliament because of his alleged relationship to reformists, among other accusations.70 From the beginning, the hardline conservatives urged President Rouhani to avoid appointing reformists in his cabinet, especially those who were part of the Green Movement. The head of Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h in Tabriz asserted that conservatives would not ˙ ˙ allow those who do not support the supreme leader to come back to power. He even warned that if reformists were to be given excutive responsibilities ‘in the name of moderation,’ the country would face a soft coup led by the people of fitnih,71 meaning the reformists. Therefore, it is important to note that Rouhani’s relationship with

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the hardline conservatives depends on his relationship with the reformists; the more he dissociates himself from them, the more stable his cabinet will be. To conclude this section, it is possible to say that the reformists and religious intellectuals have presented a threat to the legitimacy of the regime and hardline conservatives, and so these conservatives have attempted to legitimise the regime’s ideology against the discourse of the reformists. The first step was to propagate the importance of establishing an Islamic regime; the second, to argue for the absolute role of the supreme leader; the third, to attack the reformists and religious intellectuals, either physically or verbally; the fourth, to accuse them of being tools in the hands of the world’s powers to weaken the regime; and the fifth, to assert that these factions are influenced both politically and culturally by the West. One major response to these reformists has been to eliminate them from the political scene and consider them Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯ despite the fact that some of the main leaders in their struggle, such as the former president Khatami, remain part of the system, and so can be considered Khu¯dı¯. The other response has been to prepare the ground to face their challenge in the cultural arena. For the hardline conservatives, the crisis of 2009 was not only about the elections, but also a result of two decades of a war waged by the religious intellectuals and reformists on the values of the regime and of Islam as a religion.72 Therefore, following the war with Iraq, the hardline conservatives have been participating in another war – the cultural war – which will be discussed in the next section.

III The Cultural Confrontation with the Outside World Iran’s hardline conservatives have seen the reformists and religious intellectuals, as discussed in the previous section, as tools in the hands of the Western powers to weaken the Islamic regime in Iran. These groups have been accused of following the West both politically and culturally. The hardline conservatives believe that these reformists and religious intellectuals are, in fact, part of a cultural war that is being waged against the Islamic Republic of Iran by the Western powers, and so they argue that the regime should be prepared for this war. These people are familiar with Joseph Nye’s term soft power, which ‘rests on the ability to shape the

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preferences of others’.1 Nye argues that by using soft power, nations try to overcome difficulties by getting other countries and nations to change their behaviour. Therefore, in contrast to hard power, which ‘can rest on inducements (‘carrots’) or threats (‘sticks’)’,2 soft power can influence decision making in other nations without threatening them militarily or economically.3 Therefore, Nye asserts, ‘If I can get you to want to do what I want, then I do not have to use carrots or sticks to make you do it.’4 The soft powers of any nation, according to Nye, rely on three resources: ‘its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authorities)’.5 The hardline conservatives have used another term related to Nye’s concept of soft power. They believe that the cultural war can be seen as a soft war waged against the Islamic Republic. In this type of war, the West does not use military actions to topple the regime, but rather uses culture to change Iranian society in order to overthrow the Islamic regime in Tehran. Therefore, as will be discussed, steps need to be taken to confront this war. It is not clear when the hardline conservatives began to use the term soft war, but it is important to note that they understood the importance of culture as a tool in their struggle with the world even before the 1979 revolution. The influence of Western culture appeared in Iranian society after the Constitutional Revolution at the beginning of the twentieth century. This influence intensified and deepened in later decades, which consequently produced a cultural backlash. This backlash emerged, as discussed in Chapter 4, in groups that relied on violence, such as Fadāʼiyān-i Islam with its leader Navvāb Safavı¯, or in the intellectuals’ ˙ discourse, such as the case of Jala¯l a¯l-i Ahmad. A¯l-i Ahmad rejected the influence of the West in Iran and believed that ‘Iranians as a Muslim community must begin from the point where they lost their cultural integrity and self-confidence’6 and argued that breaking with Islamic culture in the nineteenth century by the Iranian intellectuals was a serious mistake.7 The clerics after the revolution understood the importance of decreasing the influence of the West on Iranian society. Therefore, from the first decade of the revolution, the regime developed and applied policies to isolate Iranian society from the cultural influences of the outside world. Despite the fact that the revolution of 1978–9 benefited from technology,

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mainly cassettes, to spread Ayatollah Khomeini’s speeches, the regime waged a war against another technological tool: VCRs. In 1983, the regime announced, through the Culture Minister, that video clubs were now illegal in Iran. The decision was made because video clubs are ‘one center and source of corruption and dissemination of immorality’ in Iranian society.8 VCRs were also banned as a way to control the flow of information into Iran before the boom in the information sector. In addition, other steps were taken to change Iranian society and Islamise it. For example, the regime forced Iranian women to wear a headscarf, or the hija¯b, in public, ˙ and many of them lost their jobs because they did not want to obey the 9 new rules. Moreover, Iranian female judges were also forced to give up their positions to their male counterparts.10 Another action in the cultural area was the establishment of the Cultural Revolution Council by a decree of Ayatollah Khomeini in June 1980 to ‘carry out a systematic project to Islamise the universities’.11 Even though the main purpose of the council was the restructuring of the education sector, the council became a factor in an overall reconstruction of Iranian society and culture.12 Its name was later changed to the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution. The council, as it introduces itself, was founded to: Stand against [resist] the political influence of the foreigners and to end any kind of reliance on them, to overcome unwanted atmosphere that is far away from the sublime Islamic and human values that were dominating the society in the era of the Shah, to strengthen the culture of independence and self-sufficiency in accordance to the Islamic standards, to spread Islamic culture and morals, to ensure the mental and spiritual health [of people], to strengthen the foundations of spirituality and faith [in society], to [encourage] the scientific and the intellectual developments, and to gain a self-sufficiency in many social, economic, political, intellectual, and cultural areas as a sign of the independence of the Islamic society.13 This cultural resistance of the regime is embodied in the ideology and behaviour of the hardline conservatives. The soft war and the cultural assault are among the main terms used by these conservatives. In addition, changing the foundations of humanities and social sciences

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to become ‘Islamic humanities’ as will be discussed, is among the issues that concern this group. To the hardline conservatives, the soft war is known as the ‘war between beliefs’.14 On one side is Islam and Islamic thoughts, and the other side consists of those who wage war against it.15 This war and cultural assault are waged by the West to weaken Islamic culture and to ‘end Islam in our country’,16 as Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ asserts. He also ˙ ˙ believes that these assaults are waged because of the attempts to establish a new kind of colonialism, known as ‘a cultural colonialism’ (Istiʿma¯r-i farhangı¯ ).17 In addition to this term, hardline conservatives also use another similar one to describe the current era: informational colonialism. For them, the US is leading this colonialism by its domination of one major source of information: the internet.18 According to a report published by the weekly 9 Diy, which is supported by Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯, the ˙ ˙ US, dominates more than 80 per cent of the internet’s services, and therefore it has the information of more than 80 per cent of the world’s people. As these services are controlled by the US, it uses them as a political tool,19 to weaken other nations. Cultural assaults begin, according to the supreme leader, when a group attacks the cultural foundations of a nation for political purposes.20 The reason behind these assaults, according to Khamenei, is to replace the culture of a nation with another culture.21 These kinds of cultural assaults, for Misba¯h Yazdı¯, are disreputable,22 but he believes that there are other ˙ ˙ types of cultural assaults, which he calls praisable (mamdu¯h) cultural ˙ assaults, which are those that are supported by God and that aim to change 23 and reform societies for the better. Therefore, what the Islamic world in general and Iranian society in particular is facing are disreputable cultural assaults that should be confronted.24 Yazdı¯ believes that cultural assaults take place on three fronts: ‘(1) insights and beliefs, (2) values and orientations and (3) behaviours and actions’.25 But why does the West wage these assaults against Islam in general and Iran in particular? Misba¯h Yazdı¯ has an answer for this question. ˙ ˙ First, he believes that Islamic culture is the only culture that can powerfully resist its enemies, mainly because it does not separate religion from politics. In other words, for Yazdı¯, in Islam there are values related to politics that help Muslims to stand against their enemies. Therefore, the West has been trying since the nineteenth century to

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change this culture and separate religion from politics in Iran, as has happened in the West with Christianity. Thus, spreading and propagating secularism among Muslims is one of the West’s aims behind the cultural assaults.26 Second, for Yazdı¯, cultural assaults lead to cultural hegemony, which leads to an economic hegemony. Western countries have economic interests in many parts of the world and so, according to him, they want to change local cultures to make the people of these cultures buy Western products.27 However, the main aim behind the cultural assaults, for Yazdı¯, is the concept of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h because the existence of Iran is based on it. Yazdı¯ raises different questions to explain his point. He asks, ‘Why does Afghanistan have all these problems? Why do Afghanis kill each other?’28 He then answers these questions by saying, ‘This is because they do not have one obeyed leader.’29 Ayatollah Taba¯tiba¯ʾı¯, the supreme ˙ leader’s representative and the Friday prayer Imam in Isfahan, makes the same argument. For him, ‘Afghanistan suffers because of not having a supreme leader’ like Iran.30 Thus, Iran has been able to stay united, despite having different ethnic groups, because it ‘has a supreme leader and people know their religious duty to obey him,’31 as Ayatollah Yazdı¯ asserts. According to him, ‘the enemy knows this issue and wants to take it [vila¯yat-i faqı¯h] from us [. . .]. [Therefore], if we lose the role of the jurist, we will be a country similar to Afghanistan’.32 The West and the US, according to Kayhan, use different techniques in their cultural assaults against Iran by accusing the Iranian regime of being against freedom and violating human rights, weakening the religious foundations of the youth, encouraging immoral behaviour among them and discrediting the Islamic and revolutionary culture.33 In addition, these assaults are aimed at weakening the Islamic foundations in the hearts of the people.34 Therefore, the geography of the soft war, according to Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, is in people’s hearts and minds, and so the fences of this war exist within people’s minds, and their behaviour expresses their victory or defeat. In this war, people or regimes may unintentionally follow and apply the roles of their enemy in their countries and societies. According to ʿAbba¯sı¯, people either stick to the role of their culture in society or give up these roles and behave in accordance with the roles of other cultures. If people do that, their society is therefore under attack and may lose this war.35

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The hardline conservatives believe that these cultural assaults on Iran have intensified since the end of the war with Iraq36 and that the regime should confront these assaults and fight them because they are more dangerous than the eight years’ war.37 These assaults ‘are the enemy’s last hope to strike the Islamic Revolution and the only religious regime in the Islamic world’.38 Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ believes that ˙ ˙ through these assaults, the enemy ‘wants to destroy this nation’.39 For hardline conservatives, in physical wars or hard wars, people should be trained to know how to fight, and so they should be prepared and trained to fight against cultural assaults as well.40 Consequently, the Iranian regime should prepare people to commit jihad and become Muja¯hidı¯n in the soft war.41 Interestingly, 9 Diy published a picture of a bloody hand holding a computer mouse instead of a grenade, as shown in Figure 5.4. For Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, this war has different aspects, all of which do not harm Iranian society in the same way. Some are more dangerous than others; the danger comes not only from Satan worshippers or Freemasons, but also from the spread of liberalism in Iranian society. Ninety-nine per cent of this danger, according to ʿAbba¯sı¯, comes from

Figure 5.4

A computer mouse instead of a grenade. Taken from 9 Diy.42

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liberalism, and less than one per cent from the Satan worshippers or Freemasons, and one area of the spread of liberalism he is concerned with is society’s reliance on psychologists to solve people’s problems rather than Islamic-based theories about morality. The tragedy in Iran today comes from the fact that, instead of going to clerics – who know some Hadı¯ths from the Prophet and ˙ the Imams, and know verses from the Qurʾan [. . .] – who can help them solve their problems, people go to psychologists who have studied Western theories.43 As well as psychology, the cultural war exists in other fields, especially the social sciences. Professors in these areas, according to him, take theories that were produced in the West and that have nothing to do with Iranian society and try to apply them there. Moreover, he believes that those theories ‘are against Qurʾan’ and Islam.,44 and so the regime should recognise and respond to the education system as being one aspect of the soft war against Iran. The supreme leader pays attention to humanities studies and social sciences. He believes that including these studies, which are based on Western culture, in academia is another aspect of the cultural assaults,45 and he criticises the supporters of these fields, accusing them of turning their theories and books into ‘holy books’.46 Thus, there is seen to be a need to produce ‘a native science’ (ʿilm-i bu¯mı¯ )47 to stand against these cultural assaults on Iranian society and, as a result, the hardline conservatives have been trying to change the curricula of the social sciences in Iranian universities in order to found Islamic social sciences. Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ believes that establishing Islamic social ˙ ˙ sciences, or the Islamisation of the universities, does not mean that more mosques will be built at these universities; instead, he says, the aim is to clarify the ‘right basis of science’ which, for him, is what agrees with Qurʾan.48 In addition, he believes that the Qurʾan is full of the foundations of ʿilm-i Kala¯m and faith, morality, politics, sociology, administration, psychology [. . .]. Therefore, if students of the humanities do not want to be influenced by the Western [foundations of these fields], they

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should study the Qurʾan intensively before looking at any [Western] sources’.49 One of the main responsibilities of the Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, under the leadership of Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯, has ˙ ˙ been to establish Islamic-based humanities and social sciences. It issues journals on different issues such as politics, economy, sociology, psychology, philosophy, law, and the Qurʾan, among other topics.50 In addition, Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ aims at increasing cooperation ˙ ˙ between universities and seminaries.51 Thus, one way to confront and react to cultural assaults is to found Islamic social sciences. In general, for the hardline conservatives, there are two responses to cultural assaults; the first is to prevent these assaults from prevailing in Iranian society, and the second is to remove their influence.52 These responses can have both an intellectual and a behavioural basis. The intellectual foundation of this resistance is based on discrediting Western culture and Iran’s intellectuals, while the behavioural approach is action, either by the authorities or pressure groups, in relation to any deviation in people’s behaviour, and includes the application of the dress codes, or even the issue of having pets. (Buying pets, for example, is seen as an indication of the ‘increase of the Western influence’ in the society and among ‘people who lost themselves’ to the West.)53 In order to protect morality in society and prevent these Western influences, the hardline conservatives have been active in Amr bih Maʿru¯f va Nahy az Munkar, or in Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong. Generally speaking, this concept requires Muslims to be active in preventing sins in their societies.54 In Islamic-based regimes, the government may intervene to promote virtue and prevent vice, as in Saudi Arabia; hardline conservative ideology supports this government intervention to prevent the influence of Western culture in Iranian society. For the hardline conservatives, any failure to pay attention to this concept means the Iranian regime will not stop the cultural assaults.55 If the authorities do not intervene to prevent immoral behaviour, hardliners see themselves as having the right to intervene. For example, a female Bası¯jı¯ group asked the government to intervene in banning magazines from designing and publishing cover pages with pictures of women without hija¯b. The group also threatened the authorities that ˙ its members would intervene against such magazines without the

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government’s permission.56 It is true that the group did not specify how it would react, but it is possible that the main consequence of this reaction could be violence. This statement echoed that of Navvāb Safavı¯’s ˙ organisation, discussed in Chapter 4, when it declared that religious youth would react against immorality in Iran. The result of those threats was the assassination of intellectuals and politicians in the prerevolutionary era. The same experience was repeated in Iran in the late 1990s when politicians and intellectuals were assassinated, and so it can be seen that Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong could result in the use of force. Ahmad Jannatı¯, who was the head of the Council of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in the 1990s and one of the leading hardline conservatives, urged the authorities to support his council with forces to ‘react physically’ against immorality in society.57 In addition, hardline conservatives believe that Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong should be enforced in the media, especially in Iranian films and TV shows; the dress code, for instance, must be respected in films.58 Some conservatives even criticise the actresses because of their personal behaviour outside the media and film industry. Farajullah Salahshu¯r, a hardline conservative director, described Iranian ˙ cinema as a brothel because ‘Iranian actresses post their photos halfnaked on the ‘net’.59 In addition, he believes that Iranian cinema is under the authority of Zionism because some people within the Iranian film industry believe that they are part of the worldwide cinema industry, which, for him, is dominated by Zionism.60 Moreover, these conservatives argue that films and TV shows that propagate Western culture should be banned. For them, producing films should be conducted for the sake of God and for the propagation of Islamic values.61 Many films and programmes have been attacked by the hardline conservatives since the 1990s, and recently, three works have been seen as either promoting Western culture or discrediting Islamic values. Saʿa¯dat A¯ba¯d, directed by Maziar Miri, is accused of propagating Western culture particularly when it comes to relationships between mixed-gender friends,62 and The Separation, directed by Asghar ˙ Farhadi, is accussed of questioning the foundation of Shiʿism and supporting the arguments of the Green Movement of 2009.63 In addition to these two films, a TV show known as The Building of Physicians (Sa¯khtima¯n-i Pizishka¯n) is seen by Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯ as an attempt to spread Freud’s theory in Iranian society and to propagate the

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importance of psychology instead of religion to solve people’s social problems.64 Hardline conservatives think that the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance should prevent the influence of Western culture in Iran. ʿAbba¯sı¯ sees the US as wanting to replace the position of Shiʿi Imams and saints in the hearts and minds of the Iranians with Western actors, actresses and singers, and so the regime should prevent the spread of their products in Iran. He criticises the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance for facilitating the publication of a book by Shakira, the Columbian singer, during the reformists’ era in the country. For him, the ministry is not about Islamic guidance, but rather, it is ‘the ministry of infidelity’.65 In addition to Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong to confront cultural assaults, Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ believes that other steps should ˙ ˙ be taken: (1) organising more religious meetings and gatherings;66 (2) promoting spiritual values in society;67 (3) moving or touching the feelings and the emotions of the Iranians;68 and (4) conducting cultural assaults against the West in the same way that it attacks Islamic values and culture in Iran.69 In other words, Yazdı¯ believes that the Iranian regime should use the same weapon against Western countries to weaken their societies – Iran should confront the West culturally. From the first days of his tenure, President Rouhani was urged to protect morality in the country. ‘Oh mister president,’ says a headline in Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, ‘we expect you to revive values of hija¯b and honour [ʿafa¯f]’70 ˙ in the country. At the same time he was criticised for the reaction of his supporters in the streets after the announcement of his victory. They were described as ‘dancers’, or raqqa¯s, in order to discredit him.71 ˙ Moreover, Rouhani had an indirect debate with hardline conservatives over the cultural responsibilities of the government. He believes that people should not be forced by the government to change their behaviour. ‘Do not intervene in the personal lives of the people [. . .] let them choose the path of heaven by themselves, we cannot use force and the lash [shalla¯q] to guide them to heaven’.72 In response, the Friday prayer Imam of Mashhad asserted that ‘using the lash is easy, we will counter those who prevent people from going to heaven with all our efforts’.73 If it is not fine to force people to go to heaven, Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯ wonders, is it fine to help people commit sins?74 For this reason, there should not be social freedom in the country.

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The above-mentioned statement of Rouhani and his moderate understanding of religion and culture have raised the concern of the hardline conservatives, and they launched a campaign in order to express their concerns, calling it ‘We are Concerned’ or Nigira¯nı¯m. They also organised a demonstration demanding a strict implementation of Islamic dress code in Iran and protesting the government’s policies in this regard.75 To sum up, this section on hardline conservatives ideology has dealt with the ‘other’ in the rhetoric of this group. The ‘other’ here is seen as the outside world, mainly the West, which is seen as leading a war against Iran because of its Islamic regime. This is sometimes known as the soft war, but at other times is referred to as a cultural war or cultural assault. These assaults appear in every part of life in Iranian society, therefore the hardline conservatives believe it is important to confront them by promoting virtue and preventing vice. In addition, they think that promoting Islamic values in society is also important and that these values should be extended to cover the media and education sectors in Iran because the West may try to influence the country’s internal situation via these areas. These cultural assaults are also waged to weaken the regime from within, and, as a result, their danger is no less than that of the war with Iraq.

IV The Political Confrontation with the Outside World For the hardline conservatives, confronting and resisting the West culturally is not enough; there is a need to resist its political pressures as well. Since the disclosure of the Iranian nuclear programme in 2003, the international pressures on the country have increased. The Iranians have held long negotiations over the programme, and they were divided into two main levels: the first level, with France, Germany and Britain – known as the EU-3 – later included other members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), or 5 þ 1; and the second level was with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). These negotiations have sometimes been based on ‘carrots’ and other times on ‘sticks’. Since August 2006, the UNSC has passed different resolutions regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. The level of pressure on Iran has increased after each resolution, but Iran has refused to comply and give

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up its programme. Immediately after the submission of UNSC resolution 1747, for example, the former Iranian President Ahmadinejad announced, ‘Iran will not stop its nuclear activities even for a second [and] the Iranian nation will not forget who supported and who did not support the sanctions’.1 In addition to these resolutions, the United States, the European Union, Canada, the United Kingdom, Japan and France have imposed sanctions against the Iranian regime. These sanctions have varied from banning travel of some Iranian officials to suspending trade and preventing Iran’s Central Bank from trading.2 These sanctions were increased during Ahmadinejad’s reign, mainly because of his radical attitude towards the international community and his radical rhetoric. As discussed in Chapter 1, Houman Sadri (1997) divides revolutionary leaders into two categories: realists and idealists. Both follow different strategies in their foreign policy approach – while the realists understand the importance of the international community and try to take its responses into consideration, the idealists are radical in their relations with the outside world. The hardline conservatives can be seen as the idealists. For them, confrontation with the international community is possible and the position of Iran should be strengthened among the world of nations. They assert that during the Rafsanjani – Khatami era, Iran’s position internationally was weakened because of the approach taken by these two presidents. These conservatives saw Ahmadinejad’s foreign policy as bringing back dignity to Iran internationally3 because of his position towards the West and Israel, as well as his policies regarding Iran’s nuclear programme. For example, they believe that the reformist government of former president Khatami was begging the international community to negotiate with Iran over its nuclear programme, but when Ahmadinejad came to power, the main powers of the international community asked the Iranian government to negotiate. To Nabaviya¯n, a cleric close to Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯, this is a sign of Iran’s power (Iqtida¯r).4 ˙ ˙ So it can be seen that the hardline conservatives disagree with the foreign policy approaches of Rafsanjani and Khatami after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. One of the main characteristics of the 16 years of the Rafsanjani – Khatami era, from 1989 to 2005, was the normalisation of Iran’s foreign relations with the international community. Iran’s ties with the Middle Eastern countries improved, its relationship with

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European countries developed and international pressures on Iran decreased. This normalisation is regarded by the hardline conservatives as a mistake because only resistance works to stand against the pressures of the international community,5 and therefore, the Iranian regime should not tolerate any changes in the foundations and values of the revolution.6 Rafsanjani was attacked because of his policies, which opened the country to the political and economic influences of the West,7 and Khatami because of his moderate rather than radical policies.8 Fa¯timih Rajabı¯ believes that the 16 years of those two ˙ presidents damaged the divine diplomacy of Ayatollah Khomeini.9 The hardline conservatives, on the one hand, defend the dignity of the Iranian nation and the importance of standing against the world powers, and they, as any other nation would, believe in the importance of defending the interests of the Islamic Republic. On the other hand, they focus on the importance of the Islamic nation and do not accept national borders. Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, for example, believes that Islam is not limited to borders and to the constitution of the Islamic Republic.10 The nuclear programme is the embodiment of the important position that is given to Iranian national interests in the hardline conservatives’ ideology. Since the emergence of this issue, Iranian officials, including the hardline conservatives, repeat the same phrase: ‘The nuclear programme is our right’.11 However, the difference is in the strategy that is followed by each group regarding this programme. Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯ believes that the Iranian government should not back down in the negotiations on the programme because Iran does not need the members of the 5 þ 1 group, but they need Iran.12 In general, there is a sense among them that Iran should resist the sanctions and pressures because they do not harm the country, and that Iran’s dignity should be respected even when it comes to negotiating over the removal of the sanctions. There is even a sense among the hardline conservatives that the sanctions are harmless. For the supreme leader, ‘if sanctions are effective, they should have helped the arrogant powers to reach their goals in the first years of the revolution.’13 He even believes that the regime will successfully continue to resist the sanctions.14 Therefore, Iran, in the eyes of Khamenei, is able to overcome their consequences. The head of the Iranian Central Bank in 2011 compared the situation of the Iranian economy, as a result of the sanctions against Tehran, to the

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situation of the Prophet and his companions after the economic boycott that was imposed on them by non-Muslims. That economic boycott forced them to take refuge in a place that belonged to the Prophet’s uncle, Abu¯ Ta¯lib, known as Shuʿab-i Abı¯ Ta¯lib.15 The comparison ˙ ˙ indicated that Iran is in a difficult position. However, the supreme leader rejects that comparison and believes that Iran is in a better situation and that its position towards its enemies is similar to the Prophet’s position after the establishment of his government in Medina, when he was able to defend his government and even to attack non-Muslims. The supreme leader says, ‘Not only is the Islamic regime not in the condition of Shuʿab-i Abı¯ Ta¯lib, but [it is] in the condition of Badr and Khaybar,’16 ˙ two of the battles that the Prophet fought against non-Muslims after creating his state in Medina. In other words, the regime, according to Ayatollah Khamenei, is not under siege but has the power to attack and to defend itself. Another Iranian official discredited the effects of the sanctions on Iran’s economy and asserts that ‘we have a good memory of the sanctions. Sanctions, instead of being a source of limitation, have smoothed the path of development of the country’.17 In addition, Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯ agrees with this argument and believes the sanctions have helped the regime develop in a variety of scientific areas, such as nuclear technology, nanotechnology, space technology, and weapons production.18 In other words, these hardline conservatives see the sanctions and isolation of the Iranian regime as a blessing and conclude that they will not harm the Islamic Republic.19 The hardliners also believe that the West wants Iran to concede and accept another 598 resolution.20 Resolution 598 was issued by the UNSC on 20 July 1987, urging Iran and Iraq to ‘observe an immediate ceasefire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognised boundaries without delay’.21 When Iran accepted that resolution, the war ended. In referring to this resolution, the hardline conservatives indicate that the current regime will not give up as it did during the war with Iraq and will stand against the international pressures and sanctions. Since President Rouhani came to power, he has followed a moderate and pragmatic approach in relation to the international community. Negotiations started between Iran and the 5 þ 1 over its nuclear programme, and a Joint Plan of Action was signed by both parties in

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Geneva on 24 November 2013. Under the terms of the agreement, Iran had to freeze portions of its nuclear programme to reduce the economic sanctions that had been imposed against it. However, within a month, the US Departments of Treasury and State sanctioned individuals and companies, allegedly in relation to the Iranian nuclear programme. Under Secretary of the Treasury for Terrorism and Financial Intelligence, David S. Cohen, asserted that ‘The Joint Plan of Action reached in Geneva does not and will not, interfere with our continued efforts to expose and disrupt those supporting Iran’s nuclear programme or seeking to evade our sanction’.22 Sanctions targeting individuals and companies have continued to be imposed on Iran since then. As a result, hardline conservatives believe that Rouhani’s foreign policy approach is a ‘begging diplomacy’23 that is unable to convince the international community of Iran’s right to develop a nuclear programme. Their position has been the same after the signature of the deal between Iran and the 5 þ 1 regarding its nuclear programme in April 2015. The agreement will remove sanctions that had been imposed on the country because of the programme and will free billions of dollars in oil revenues. Most importantly, it recognised Iran’s nuclear programme. The agreement puts restrictions on Iran because it has to redesign and reduce the number of nuclear facilities. In addition, Iran has agreed to sign the Additional Protocol, which gives the International Atomic Energy Agency the right to inspect Iran’s nuclear facilities. For the hardline conservatives, the agreement was not to the benefit of Iran because it forces the regime to give up its programme without effective measures on the ground. Even though the parliament approved the deal in October 2015, the discussion in Majlis was intense. Java¯d Zarı¯f, Iran’s ˙ foreign minister and Ali Akbar Sa¯lihı¯, the head of the Atomic Energy ˙ ˙ Organization were threatened to be hanged by a hardliner legislator. It follows that, for the hardline conservatives, confrontation is the main policy that the regime should rely on, and one tactic is to use the most effective weapon in the hands of the Iranians: the Strait of Hormuz. The closure of the Strait is seen as an easy step that can be taken by Iran to destabilise the world economy and increase the price of oil. The closure of Hormuz will affect the oil market and harm not only the US, but also other states in the region, especially the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which rely mainly on their exports of oil to manage their economies, of which approximately 90 per cent goes

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through the Strait.24 That 90 per cent represents 75 per cent of the oil market. Consequently, the market will suffer from a shortage in supply which will lead to an increase in the price of oil.25 Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯ believes that the US and its supporters are conspiring against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and that the oil sanctions are part of this conspiracy. For him, Iran can challenge this conspiracy by closing the Strait of Hormuz because the closure is legally based on international law. In addition, he believes that ‘if Iran is not allowed to sell its oil in the international market, then it has the right to prevent others from selling their oil as well’.26 Preventing the GCC countries from exporting their oil production will worsen their relationship with the Iranian regime and may return the region to the same tense atmosphere as in the first decade of the revolution. Iran’s relationship with these countries is poor, but closing the Strait may be seen as an act of war against the GCC countries, especially as oil revenue is their main source of income.27 At the same, it may force the US and its allies to intervene to open the Strait, which could lead to a confrontation between the US and the Iranian regime. Iran’s relationship with the US and the GCC countries has changed dramatically since the Islamic revolution of 1978 –9. Before the revolution, Iran had a very close relationship with these countries, but Khomeini was not in favour of the Shah’s foreign policy, which was very obvious in his radical rhetoric towards them. The US for him was the ‘Great Satan’, or Shayta¯n-i buzurg, and he even wanted to export his ˙ revolution to Southwest Asian countries and attacked the GCC kingdoms frequently because of their relationship to the US.28 Iran’s foreign relations have been unstable with many countries since the Islamic revolution in 1978– 9, swinging from positive to negative at different times. However, its relationship remains unchanged with two countries: Israel and the US. Both countries occupy a consistently negative position in the Iranian regime’s political discourse. For example, 37 years have passed since the revolution in 1979, but even now, those who participate in Friday prayers in many parts of Iran still repeat ‘death to US, death to Israel’. No one can be sure of the feelings of those people who repeat these slogans against the US and Israel, but what is true is that the Iranian regime’s discourse towards these two countries has been negative for more than 30 years and that these prayer ceremonies are organised under the supervision of the regime. Hardline

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conservative clerics such as Ahmad Khatami, Ahmad Jannatı¯ and Muhammad-Taqı¯ Misba¯h Yazdı¯ lead many of these prayers. ˙ ˙ One reason for the steady rhetoric towards the US is indicated in Abbas Milani’s book The Myth of the Great Satan: A New Look at America’s Relations with Iran. He asserts that ‘the clerical regime in Iran has always partially defined itself in terms of its opposition to the United States’.29 However, the regime’s construction of itself towards the US is embodied in the hardline conservatives’ ideology more than that of the reformists and pragmatics. For example, in 2012, former president Hashemi Rafsanjani encouraged the regime in Iran to start negotiating with the US.30 He even criticised the understanding of the ‘neither East nor West’ slogan and believes that it does not mean to cut the diplomatic relations with both sides. For him, the slogan means that Iran should be independent but at the same time deal with the world based on mutual respect and cooperation. He also asserts that he urged Ayatollah Khomeini to end hostility towards the US before his death.31 This pragmatic approach is one of the major reasons behind his disagreement with the hardline conservatives on foreign affairs. Similar to Rafsanjani, the current president, Rouhani, believes in dialogue between Iran and the US, therefore he became the first Iranian president since the revolution to have a direct conversation with an American president, in the famous phone call between them in 2013. This approach has not been supported by the hardline conservatives, and on his return to Iran from New York, President Rouhani was faced with a group of radical students demonstrating against his phone call with the US president. They raised different slogans such as ‘death to America’.32 For the hardline conservatives, the animosity towards the US ‘is not subject to change [. . .] and no one has the right to modify it’.33 At the same time, the hardline conservatives launched a campaign against any rapprochement between Iran and the US.34 Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯ believes that Iran is under threat, and moderate and pragmatic foreign policy is not enough to protect the regime. He criticises Khatami’s concept of ‘dialogue among civilisations’ and sees it as a damaging strategy. Instead, the Iranian regime has to use the same methods that its enemies use. In other words, Iran should retaliate and use power to eliminate those threats and pressures. He stresses that security should be guaranteed to the Iranian regime and threatens the international powers by saying, ‘Either all of us are secured, or none of

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us’.35 He asserts, ‘If our honour, esteem, prestige, and entity are spoiled [by the international powers], we will act within and outside our borders’,36 and then advocates relying on terrorism because the enemies should be scared, and ‘this is called the holy terrorism’.37 For him, the US wants to kill the notion of jihad; thus, the current regime is responsible for reviving it, not for discussing the concept of ‘dialogue among civilisations’.38 This radical discourse towards the US and the West is one of the main challenges that Rouhani will face during his years in office. When dramatic changes happened in the Middle East – such as the eruption of the Arab Spring which toppled four presidents in the Arab world – the hardline conservatives supported them. The Iranian regime has supported these changes and even claimed that these revolutions are natural consequences of the Iranian revolution more than 35 years ago. For example, the supreme leader believes that the demands of the people in the region are similar to the Iranians’ Islamic demands before the 1979 revolution.39 In addition, he asserts that ‘I do not say that the Iranian nation was behind the recent changes in the region, but not seeing the influence of Iran in the Islamic awakening of the region is not logical’.40 Therefore, he calls the Islamic Republic ‘the mother of awakening and of the Islamic movement in the region’.41 Kayhan published an article with a picture of Ayatollah Khomeini, telling him ‘you were right, the Islamic world is awakened’.42 As an indication of the influence of the Iranian revolution on the region, the article asserted that Khomeini was the one who started these changes in the region 40 years ago when he began his movement against the Shah’s regime.43 Following the recent changes in the Middle East, Iran’s relations have worsened with the GCC countries, and the hardline conservatives’ rhetoric towards these countries has been very radical. For instance, the conservatives were harsh in their criticism of Saudi Arabia after the Saudi intervention in Bahrain in 2011 in response to the Shiʿi upraising there. On one occasion, Ahmad Jannatı¯ stated his wish to conquer Bahrain and make its regime an Islamic one.44 The Saudi and Bahraini troops are portrayed in the daily Kayhan as troops who commit genocide against Bahrainis. The newspaper also criticised the former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Akbar Sa¯lihı¯, for going to Saudi ˙ ˙ Arabia to pay his respects to the Saudi monarch following the death of the Crown Prince Sulta¯n.45 ˙

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The relationship between Iran and the GCC countries, especially Saudi Arabia, has worsened after their war in Yemen against the Hu¯thı¯ ˙ rebels, who are an offshoot of Shiʿa. In addition, the Haj stampede, ˙ which resulted in the death of hundreds of Muslims including about 400 Iranians, has negatively affected the relationship between the two countries. Demonstrations were organized in the country, mostly by the hardline conservatives, against the Saudi regime as a result of the incident. The position of the Iranian regime and the hardline conservatives is to support all revolutions in the region, except for that in Syria. The awakening of the Syrians is not seen as a revolution, but as a conspiracy to weaken the resistant front against Israel in the region. Syria is in crisis because it is facing a conspiracy on three fronts: (1) the US, (2) Saudi Arabia and the Arab League, and (3) Israel.46 The situation in Syria is seen as a fitnih, the same term that is used to describe the Green Movement, and not as a revolution. Therefore, they conclude that ‘after the rise of the people in the Arab countries, the opposition to the [Syrian] government tries to benefit and to use phrases such as Arab Spring, or the Arab revolution, to include Syria in the revolutionary movement [of the region]. It also wants to weaken Syria as a front line of the resistance’.47 The conflict in Syria has resulted in the strengthening of Salafi–Jihadi groups in the region. The Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), which was operating in Iraq before the Syrian civil war, captured many cities in Syria and benefited from the instability in Iraq by expanding. ISIS has similar ideological roots to the Nusra Front (an al-Qaeda affiliated group in the region) especially in its view towards the Shiʿa and other minorities, such as Christians and Yazidies. Both groups have been responsible for the destruction of many historical places in Syria and Iraq, and both have attacked churches, Shiʿi mosques and many respected Sunni–Shiʿi shrines. The hardline conservatives have seen Salafi–Jihadi groups as a threat to important Shiʿi shrines in Syria, Najaf, Karbala and Samarrah. Some Shiʿa believe that they are responsible to protect those places, and so Shiʿa – mainly Lebanese, Iranians and Iraqis – have volunteered to fight against the Salafi– Jihadis in Syria as well as Iraq. The hardline conservatives have organised many events in Iran – known as ‘the Defenders of the Shrine’ – and have encouraged Shiʿi youth to participate. These events were associated with lectures and chest-

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beating, or sı¯nih zanı¯ ceremonies. Pana¯hiya¯n, a hardline conservative cleric and one of organisers of and participants in those events, has threatened the West should the Salafis attack those Shiʿi holy places as, to him, the West is behind the Salafis and so it will pay the price. ‘Be sure’, he tells Iranian youth, ‘we will follow the enemy to the White House and destroy him’.48 Pana¯hiya¯n threatens the US because the hardline conservatives believe that ISIS is an American agent in the region and so it is logical to attack it if the Shiʿi shrines are harmed. The animosity towards the US has always been associated with animosity towards Israel, the traditional enemy of Tehran since the revolution in 1979. The destruction of the state of Israel has been demanded by many Iranian officials since Ayatollah Khomeini, who on one occasion said, ‘Israel must be wiped out of the world’,49 and in a message to the pilgrims in 1979, declared that ‘every Muslim has a duty to prepare himself to battle against Israel’,50 and so it can be seen that the position of former President Ahmadinejad was not different from the overall position of Ayatollah Khomeini and the hardline conservatives regarding the problem of Palestine and the existence of the state of Israel. The above-mentioned rhetoric on the conspiracy against Syria echoes the argument that has been made about the Iranian war with Iraq; when dealing with the eight years’ war with Iraq, Iranian officials and the hardline conservatives assert that the war was a conspiracy against the newly established regime in Tehran. This war is another major issue that appears in the discourse of the hardline conservatives, and its continual appearance in their ideology is mainly influenced by the long period of the war as well as by Shiʿism, one aspect of which is the culture of martyrdom.51 Imam Hussein’s name and martyrdom were used by the revolutionaries in their struggle against the Shah, who was, for them, the Yazı¯d of the era before 1979. After the revolution, and as a result of the Iraqi invasion, Imam Hussein’s struggle was reused by the Iranians, but in a different context, and Saddam Hussein became the Yazı¯d of the 1980s,52 and so the war with Iraq was seen as ‘a battle of the righteous against the infidels’.53 The Iranians, in other words, were fighting for Imam Hussein and his cause, and their aim was to liberate Karbala from the Yazı¯d of this era, Saddam Hussein. For them, liberating Karbala meant being able to visit the shrine of Imam Hussein, which the Shiʿa consider to be one of the holiest places in the world. Therefore, it was normal to hear or read an

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argument that the people were fighting not only to liberate their country or win the war, but also to satisfy their souls by visiting Karbala and the shrine. In a documentary about the war, Iranian Bası¯jı¯s are seen hugging each other and kissing each other’s heads before starting their operations, perhaps because they were not sure if they would meet each other again. The anchor referred to these young soldiers as Karbala’s visitors, indicating that they were aiming to liberate Karbala to visit the shrine of Imam Hussein and pay their respects to him. The images of these young soldiers are accompanied by a sad voice reciting a poem indicating that these soldiers were, in fact, Imam Hussein’s visitors:54 Awaken oh citizen of the city of love, awaken. Get ready for your pilgrimage inspired by love, awaken. Put on your robe and raise your banner, sing aloud. Anyone destined for danger come forward, come forward. Anyone who craves Karbala step forward.55 As the battle of Karbala founded the Master of the Martyrs of Heaven (Sayyid Shuhada¯ʾ Ahl al-Jannah), Imam Hussein, so the war with Iraq founded an Iranian Master of Martyrs, but, on this occasion, of Writers and Thinkers: Sayyid-i Shahı¯da¯n-i Ahl-i Qalam, Sayyid Murtiz˙a¯ A¯vı¯nı¯. A¯vı¯nı¯, the director of the aforementioned documentary, was given the title by the supreme leader because his writings inspired Iranians, as a web page dedicated to him asserts.56 A¯vı¯nı¯ was killed in 1993 after the end of the war, near the Iraqi border, while filming another documentary about the war.57 A¯vı¯nı¯ was a filmmaker and went to the front during the war, mainly to bring the experience of the battlefields into Iranian homes because, as he asserted, ‘We are responsible for telling the story of the war’.58 He wanted to tell the public about the soldiers’ stories and the reason for their participation in the war. He wanted Iranians to know more about these soldiers in order to encourage them to go to the front and fight. The main purpose behind the war, for A¯vı¯nı¯, was faith; his work ‘shows [. . .] how to get closer to God’ and how to keep the war holy59 because ‘he believed that faith could be witnessed and filmed and in turn could encourage the faithless to become believers’.60 Filming the faith of the front fighters could encourage those who did not believe in the war to be

Dukūhih

Jibhih

Yā Lithārāt

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Shalamchih

Martyrdom in four weekly newspapers

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The frequency of martyrdom on the last or front pages of each newspaper

Figure 5.5 Four weekly newspapers and their coverage of the issue of the martyrs on the last or front pages.

convinced about its purpose and fight for its cause. What A¯vı¯nı¯ did could be seen as the embodiment of Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯’s suggestion ˙ ˙ about the importance of touching the feelings and emotions of Iranians. Martyrdom, as Roxanne Varzi (2006) asserts, ‘became state policy’61 in Iran, and ‘the repetition of the memory of glorious death through symbols, especially chants, replaced a coherent language and thought process, bordering on what some might define as mad love or simply madness – majnu¯n’.62 This madness has appeared in many publications and newspapers associated with the hardline conservatives, many of whose members fought in the battlefields and brought their experience back to Iranian society after the war. However, these conservative publications state that the pragmatists and reformists within the system did not appreciate the sacrifices of these veterans and martyrs or disseminate their thoughts among the Iranians. For Dihnamakı¯, a director and founder of the Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h group, ‘instead of guns, they [the authorities] have ˙ ˙ given guitars to our youths’.63 Dihnamakı¯ believes that the authorities under the leadership of the pragmatists and reformists put the culture of martyrdom and the war aside and propagated Western culture. To counter this, the hardline conservatives have discussed these issues in their publications. Some of them deal with the issue of martyrdom

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and the war and are entirely committed to their cause. Shalamchih, Subh-i ˙ ˙ Duku¯hih, Jibhih, Subh, Fakkih and Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t are the main publications ˙ ˙ that have focused on the war, and many of them were named after battlefields, for example Shalamchih, Duku¯hih and Fakkih. A review of four of these publications shows the attention that has been paid to the issue of martyrdom after the war. Twenty-nine issues of each of four weekly newspapers, Shalamchih, Subh-i Duku¯hih, Jibhih and ˙ ˙ Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, were selected.64 The front and last pages of each of these issues were examined to see whether they feature stories or pictures about the martyrs. Most of them, as Figure 5.5 shows, display at least one photo of a martyr, either on the front or last page, or even both. One reason for this repetition of the martyrs’ stories may be the hardline conservatives’ desire to keep the revolution alive in the minds of the people and to keep the faith in the principles of the revolution flourishing in Iran. The war was a great source of mobilisation and zeal; therefore, it is important for the regime to keep that zeal alive, especially after the attempts to normalise the revolution following the death of Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Estimates of the numbers of Iranians killed in the war vary. Some believe that there were about 1 million Iranian deaths as a result of the war,65 and another estimate asserts that there were about 400,000 casualties on both sides.66 However, the most precise and recent estimation of Iranian casualties puts the number of Iranian deaths at 213,255. Among them were 7,054 people under the age of 14 and 65,575 aged between 15 and 19 years old. This means that 72,629 Iranians younger than 20 years old were killed in the war, which represents 34 per cent of Iranian martyrs. Among these martyrs are more than 4,000 foreigners but their nationality is not known.67 It is important, therefore, for the hardline conservatives to tell the story of these people and their struggle to protect the regime as a tool to encourage the Iranian youth to side with the supreme leader and the republic. Moreover, these extremists believe that figures within the system have attempted to erase the martyrs from the memory of the nation so ‘rich people, ladies who ride bicycles, and boys who [drive the newest cars] are not harmed’ by the Bası¯jı¯s.68 Therefore, one of the policies followed by Ahmadinejad when he was the mayor of Tehran was to revive the story of these martyrs and honour them. He ‘announced that the remains of some martyrs of the Iran – Iraq War

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would be buried in 72 city squares, parks and universities dotted around the capital’.69 Pictures of many martyrs still appear in other Iranian cities. Major streets in Tehran, Isfahan and Qom, among others, are decorated with those pictures, and booklets about them are designed and sold at a relatively cheap price. Moreover, the media pays close attention to the war with Iraq and the martyrs, and many TV shows and serials, as well as films, have been produced since the end of the war. Dihnamakı¯, the founder and chief editor of the aforementioned hardline newspapers, has directed various films about the war, including Ikhra¯jı¯ha¯ and Miʿra¯jı¯ha¯. The supreme leader also supports those who fought in the war and has a close relationship with them. They also, as was mentioned earlier, are among his main supporters within the system. One major reason for this is his official position in the first years of the revolution as the Minister of Defense. Khamenei went to the front, spent time with the fighters and knew the difficult conditions of the battlefields.70 These days, the supreme leader meets with those who were injured during the war,71 and has visited martyrs’ families in different cities since the end of the war.72 To conclude, the hardline conservatives believe that Iran should stand against pressure from the international community and confront its attempts to weaken the regime’s position. According to them, Iran should follow an aggressive foreign policy that protects the interests of the Iranian regime and does not give up its rights under any circumstances, especially the right to develop a nuclear programme. Therefore, they believe that moderate and pragmatic foreign policies of Rafsanjani, Khatami and Rouhani are not in the interests of the Iranian nation. These conservatives do not trust the international community because of their experience in the war with Iraq in the 1980s, when Iran fought alone and relied on its people to protect the regime. Hundreds of thousands were killed and the stories of these martyrs are repeated in Iranian publications as a tool to keep the revolutionary zeal alive in hearts and minds.

V The Economy and the Gap Between the Rich and Poor After the war, Hashemi Rafsanjani was elected to be the fourth president of the Islamic Republic since the revolution, and the second republic emerged in the country. Rafsanjani’s agenda for this second republic

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was to reform the country’s economy. He promoted the privatisation of many businesses which had been nationalised after the revolution. He worked to develop infrastructure and wanted to establish free-trade zones and eliminate subsidies and price controls,1 which had been promoted by Mu¯savı¯’s government in the 1980s to decrease the rate of inflation.2 He also wanted to open Iran to foreign investments, which had been prohibited there since the beginning of the revolution.3 All of these issues were part of the reconstruction plan that Rafsanjani announced when he became president.4 The supreme leader embraced the president’s plans for state-building, and Khamenei insisted that providing support for the officials in the country was in the ‘interests of the people’ and that ‘weakening it [was] a religious taboo [haram]’.5 He even urged his followers to support the reconstruction plan because the success of this plan would provide ‘answers for the material and spiritual needs of the nation’ and would also be the greatest blow to be delivered to world arrogance.6 Khamenei wanted to indicate that the government’s policies were not far from the original foundations of the revolution, which were based on confronting imperialism and the West. In other words, he was demonstrating that the battle with the West would be conducted with economics too. This support from the supreme leader can be seen as a result of the alliance that emerged in the first years of Rafsanjani’s reign between these two major figures within the system. But, as was mentioned earlier, the hardline conservatives became Rafsanjani’s strongest opponents. One of Rafsanjani’s mottos for the second republic was ‘everything for development’,7 and his economic plans came as a result of Iran’s devastation after the war. For him: The economy was in a devastated condition [. . .] this condition was one reason behind the decision to end the war [. . .] The country was exporting only 1 million barrels of oil a day, which was not enough [to help the economy] [. . .] refineries were destroyed and we were importing the fuel we needed [. . .] in addition to that, the total revenues of the country was not more than 7 billion dollars [. . .] the private sector was not active and the market was suffering [. . .] unemployment was about 15 per cent [. . .] moreover, four major regions were destroyed because of the war: Khuzestan, Elam, Kermanshah and part of the Western Azerbaijan.8

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As a result, Rafsanjani’s government came up with a five-year plan to overcome these problems and reconstruct Iranian society. His plans were influenced by the state-building plans of the Pahlavi era. ‘Many of the development plans of the Pahlavi period regarding industries development, energy, urban planning, and infrastructure investment were revived and ultimately implemented.’9 In other words, there was a ‘marriage between the old and the new’.10 The new government needed the old academic and business class to implement the plans to rebuild Iran after the war and so it called on those who left Iran after the revolution, urging them to return to participate in the economic reforms.11 This is because Rafsanjani ‘sought to increase the capacity of the state to do more, and to do more with greater efficiency’,12 and so the ‘state would now have to view development as a part of its ideological mandate’.13 New housing projects, shopping malls and private villas appeared in the country. ‘Billboard space that had for years extolled the revolution or condemned the greater and lesser Satans started advertising European appliances and Japanese electronics. Empty lots were converted into public parks. Western plays, from Chekhov’s Uncle Vanya to Arthur Miller’s The Crucible, opened in Tehran theaters’.14 In 1996 Rafsanjani and his pragmatist followers even created a political party that took its name from his goal to reconstruct the country. The party was called the Servants of the Construction (Karguza¯ra¯n-i Sa¯zandigı¯ ).15 It is for this reason that Rafsanjani is seen by Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯ as the founder of a ‘corrupted liberal economy’ in Iran after the revolution.16 For ʿAbba¯sı¯, Rafsanjani’s economic approach, based on liberalism, ‘is one of his crimes’.17 Therefore, when the veterans returned from the war, they found themselves to be strangers in the system and believed that they had been betrayed by the authorities, especially President Hashemi Rafsanjani. In order to rebuild the country after the war, Rafsanjani’s government did not need those who spent many years in the fronts, but instead wanted to recruit technocrats. Therefore, the regime’s slogan of the 1980s, ‘We want the ideologically committed, not specialists’, became ‘We want specialists who are also ideologically committed’ in the 1990s.18 This would have been the first shock to which the veterans were exposed after the war. The second was the outcome of the plan to reconstruct the country. The transformation of Iranian society from the

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revolutionary mode to the reconstructive mode resulted, as was discussed earlier, in a change in the country’s cultural atmosphere and in the relationship between the rich and poor. Reconstructing the country led to the revival of the rich class which had existed in the prerevolutionary era, but the new rich class, however, consisted of revolutionaries; in other words, the pre-revolutionary rich class emerged in Iran in the form of new faces, names and even outfits. Members of the post-revolutionary business class were clerics and religious individuals with good revolutionary records. This was not acceptable to the hardline conservatives. For them, during Rafsanjani’s reign, the values of Iranian society were changed, the ideological foundations of the revolution were damaged and the government was propagating liberalism and recruiting nonrevolutionary managers and officials, as well as ‘following pure capitalist politics’.19 The conservatives rejected this new situation and urged a new kind of reconstruction in Iran. For them, the regime should reconstruct the relationship between the poor section of society and the business class and aim for justice in society and decrease the gap between the Iranian classes. Thus, when Ahmadinejad announced that he would run in the presidential election in 2005, ‘his electoral campaign was focused on the day-to-day social and economic problems that the Iranian people faced, such as unemployment, poverty, inflation and corruption’.20 Ahmadinejad, to put it another way, raised the banner of social justice, which became the main element of his government’s discourse.21 However, the discussion of social justice is not a new issue in Iran because, as Djavad Salehi-Isfahani argues: Thirty years ago, Ayatollah Khomeini proclaimed equity and social justice as the Revolution’s main objective. His successor, Ayatollah Khamene’i, continues to refer to social justice as the Revolution’s defining theme. Similarly, presidents Khatami and Ahmadinejad, though they are from very different political persuasions, placed heavy emphasis on social justice in their political rhetoric. Yet the very fact that 30 years after the Revolution social justice continues to occupy the highest place in Iran’s political discourse implies that this goal of the Revolution remains as elusive as ever.22

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Unemployment percentage

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Fiscal years

Figure 5.6

Unemployment rates according to the Central Bank of Iran.

The hardline conservatives believe that poverty in Iran has increased since the reconstruction and reform of the market during Rafsanjani’s reign. Salehi-Isfahani argues that poverty rates increased for a short time in Rafsanjani’s reign but have dropped since then. ‘[P]overty has declined steadily to an enviable level for middle-income developing countries’.23 Moreover, during Khatami’s administration, poverty rates ‘fell by more than two percentage points each year’.24 However, unemployment rates have been high, regardless of the fact that they differ from one report to another. According to reports of the Central Bank of Iran, for the period between 2000 –1 and 2010– 11, the unemployment rate has been between 10.3 per cent and 14.7 per cent, as Figure 5.6 shows, but other studies indicate that these rates reached 16.2 per cent in 2001–225 or even ‘as high as 35 per cent’.26 Despite the fact that poverty rates decreased in Khatami’s reign, the hardline conservatives were not satisfied with them or with conditions for the poor. Their publications had dealt with this issue since the 1990s, focusing their criticism on what they called the A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha – the children or relatives of wealthy politicians within the system – and connecting the economic corruption in the country to these people and the rich class, as will be discussed later. The hardline conservatives believe that the country is being cut by scissors. On one side of these scissors are the pre-revolutionary capitalists and business class, and on the other side is the new business class of the A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha.27 As previously mentioned, Rafsanjani’s government invited pre-revolutionary capitalists and the business class to invest in Iran. In addition, the government started borrowing money from international organisations. The hardline conservatives

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reject foreign economic intervention in Iran because they believe it opens the door to political intervention. Fa¯timih Rajabı¯ sees this as an ˙ attempt to open the country to the cultural and political influences of the West.28 Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ also believes that by opening the ˙ ˙ country to foreign investments other kinds of connections will be built between Iran and the West, especially the US, and he warns the Iranian government to be aware of this plan.29 In general, hardline conservatives believe that the economic pain of the people should be discussed. This attention to poverty can be regarded as the continuation of Ayatollah Khomeini’s concept of the oppressed or weak. There is a belief among them that officials should not be rich or profit from the benefits that they receive because of their positions. For example, one publication, Subh, praised two legislators for ˙ ˙ selling the cars that they received as members of the parliament and 30 using the money to support citizens. For the hardline conservatives, poverty is related to crime and immorality in society. One of the major works that has dealt with this issue is a documentary directed by Dihnamakı¯ known as Poverty and Prostitution (Faqr va Fahsha¯). The documentary discussed the economic ˙ condition in the country and its role in spreading prostitution. Dihnamakı¯ argues that poverty leads women to this condition; for him, ‘injustice in society leads to poverty, and poverty leads to prostitution’.31 He interviewed several women who asserted that, because of their poverty, they are driven to this business. After reviewing 30 issues of a publication of the hardline conservatives, Subh-i Duku¯hih, it appears that the issue of poverty is ˙ ˙ an important subject for its publishers. One of the sections in this weekly newspaper, called ‘The War between Richness and Poverty,’ is dedicated to this problem. All 30 issues, except three of them, dedicate at least one page to discussing the issue of poverty in Iranian society. In some issues, three pages are about ‘the war between richness and poverty’ and are filled with reports about poverty, economic corruption and the gap between the rich and poor in Iran. In addition, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t has focused on this problem. Thirty issues of this publication were reviewed to see how justice and poverty were covered in the period between November 2010 (A¯ba¯n 1389) and June 2011 (Tı¯r 1390). In 28 issues, justice and poverty are discussed in a page called ‘the smell or the scent of justice (shamı¯m-i ʿda¯lat)’.

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Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t publishes stories about health, poverty, housing and even facilities such as transportation and hospitals of different places in Iran, especially the conditions in villages and remote areas. For example, an article about the transportation in a village known as Ga¯vda¯nih shows pictures of children with cut fingers as a result of their reliance on an old-fashioned tool to cross a river. The article criticises the head of the judiciary, Ayatollah Sa¯diq La¯rı¯ja¯nı¯, who had visited places near the ˙ village. The writer urges him to go there to understand how people suffer. Then he asks him, ‘Has your child been sick [and suffering] in the night [. . .] from a cold, cough, or fever? What do you do [for him/her]? To which hospital will you go? Will you go to a private hospital, or a public one? [Will you choose] a physician with more experience?’ The article adds, ‘A father in Ga¯vda¯nih is also a father. With the conditions in his village, where should he go and with what?’32 Articles of this kind are many in these weekly newspapers and are combined with criticism of the government and the rich class. They believe that the government and rich class should be ashamed because of the country’s poverty. They discuss the story of a woman who sold her kidney to support her husband, the fate of a two-and-a-half-yearold child who died of fever because there was no clinic in her village and the conditions that lead people to commit suicide because of their financial problems,33 and there are many stories such as these in these publications. There is a belief among the hardline conservatives that, in addition to its cultural and political struggles, the country has another struggle, one with A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha. They are seen as the main figures behind the economic corruption in Iran because they benefit from their relatives’ positions within the system. There have been many cases of such people being accused of corruption: sons of Iran’s former Attorney General, a former Minister of Intelligence, a former member of the Guardian Council and the son of Ayatollah Va¯ʿiz Tabası¯,34 who is the head of the ˙ organisation that runs the shrine of the Shiʿi eighth Imam in Mashhad, in the north-east of Iran. Va¯ʿiz Tabası¯ is also known for his alliance with ˙ former president Hashemi Rafsanjani.35 Therefore, Subh-i Duku¯hih ˙ ˙ wonders who is to blame – the fathers, who are the officials, or the 36 sons, who are behind the corruption. On another occasion, an article in Subh-i Duku¯hih asserts that ‘we have not seen any of these A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha ˙ ˙ hanged,’37 as a result of their role in economic corruption.

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These A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha and the rich class are accused of negatively influencing Iranian society and threatening the existence of the Islamic regime. Since they are from within the system, it suggests that their behaviour is like that of all officials in the regime. Given the fact that many people in society have economic difficulties, the hardline conservatives believe that the behaviour of the A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha increases distrust towards the regime.38 In addition, this class is also described as the new nobility in Iranian society.39 It has changed, according to the hardline conservatives, the culture within the country. This class is accused of promoting social and cultural liberalness, and its members are seen as having weak religious beleifs. This weakness in religious beliefs can be spread through society and create un-Islamic culture, so, for the hardline conservatives, the main supporters of the Green Movement were people from the rich class and the northern section of the capital.40 One of the main figures attacked by hardline conservatives is Hashemi Rafsanjani and his family. Because of their power within the system, he and his brother were called ‘the Two Sultans’ by Subh-i Duku¯hih a ˙ ˙ magazine issued by the hardliners.41 His son, Mahdi, and his daughter, Fa¯ʾizih, have been frequently attacked by the hardliners and accused of being behind economic corruption, particularly Mahdi.42 This led to Rafsanjani becoming one of the hardline conservatives’ main opponents within the system. As Khatami was attacked because of his cultural approach to open Iranian society, so Rafsanjani was attacked because of his economic plans and his relatives’ intervention in the economic sector. Thus, when Ahmadinejad competed with Rafsanjani in the 2005 presidential elections, he did so with a history of frequent attacks against the former president and his family, and with negative views of Rafsanjani and the rich class in the discourse of the hardline conservatives. Ahmadinejad’s accusations against the rich class in the system during his debates with the candidates in the 2009 election contained elements of the overall ideology of the hardline conservatives regarding Rafsanjani and the business class within the Islamic Republic.43 It is estimated that Ahmadinejad referred to corruption in the economic sector in 19 of his speeches.44 Ahmadinejad’s focus on poverty did not solve the country’s economy. By the end of his reign, Iran’s economy was in a severe crisis to the extent that Rouhani asserted that such an economic situation had not been experienced for 50 years.45 The country’s inflation rate was nearly

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45 per cent, and its oil exports declined dramatically as a result of the international community’s sanctions.46 Moreover, the economic growth was -6 per cent.47 For the hardline conservatives, sanctions were not responsible for the economic crisis of Iran, but rather Ahmadinejad’s mismanagement and the world economic crisis. Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯ believes that Iran suffered economically not because of the international sanctions, but because of the government’s liberal economic policies. For him, sanctions were not responsible because many countries suffer economically even though they are not under pressures from the international community.48 Moreover, Muhammad Sa¯diq Ku¯shkı¯, a professor of political ˙ science, believes that ‘inflation and high prices will be solved when people obey God’s orders and respect religious roles and values’.49 In this case, for him, the country will be ‘blessed’.50 In other words, sanctions are not responsible, but the irreligious behaviour of the Iranians is. To sum up, when the Iranian revolution entered its ‘second republic’, it tried to normalise its relationship with the outside world and attract investments into the country to reconstruct it after the devastating war with Iraq. However, this did not solve the problems of Iranian society; unemployment was not diminished, but increased, and even though poverty rates were decreasing, it remained an obvious problem in some areas and regions of the country. Therefore, the revolution that came to help the weakest area of society was unable to improve their lives but instead founded a new business and rich class which consisted of revolutionaries and officials from within the system. And so, the hardline conservatives have been supporting the poorest in society, confronting the rich class and accusing its members of benefiting from the regime illegally. Liberalism has been, for this group, one of the main reasons behind the economic crisis of the country, responsible for the absence of social justice that has not been found in Iran since the revolution. The hardline conservatives’ publications have paid attention to this issue and presented the suffering of the poor in different parts of the Islamic Republic. They are in search of social justice and truly believe that it will spread not only in Iran, but all over the world.

VI The Mahdi and the Iranian Regime If the current regime has not been able to fulfill its promise to achieve social justice in society, another regime will definitely be able to do this.

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This regime, according to the Shiʿa is: the government of the Twelfth Imam, or the Qa¯ʾim, the person who rises. For the Shiʿa, this government will be established before the end of the world, and the Shiʿi Imams, before the occultation of the Mahdi, have predicted his emergence and appearance, linking it to justice. Imam Muhammad al-Ba¯qir, the Shiʿi fifth Imam, said, ‘When the Qa¯ʾim from the family of the Prophet will rise, he will distribute equally among the people and will establish justice among his subjects’.1 The birth of the Hidden Imam, whose name is Muhammad bin alHasan al-ʿAskarı¯, is disputed. Some believe that he was born and then forced to hide because the authorities wanted to kill him.2 Others, such as Ahmad al-Ka¯tib,3 Akbar Ganji and Said Arjomand, believe that the Eleventh Imam died without a son to succeed him. Therefore, the Shiʿa, according to them did not have an existing Imam for the first time since the death of the Prophet. To overcome this problem, the Shiʿa started to talk about a Hidden Imam: the Twelfth Imam.4 Whatever the truth is, the fact remains that the Mahdi occupies an important position in the discourse and belief of Shiʿism and the current political elite within the Islamic Republic of Iran. There are certain points that should be clarified regarding the relationship between the current Iranian regime and the issue of the Mahdi, or the Twelfth Imam. First of all, Iran is a Shiʿi country with a Shiʿi Islamic regime, therefore it is normal to see the Mahdi appearing in the regime’s discourse and to see officials advocate for his reappearance. Since the Mahdi is the Shiʿa’s Twelfth Imam, it is obvious that these officials refer to him and pray for his reappearance as do any other Shiʿa. In general, Ahmadinejad, in contrast to other Iranian presidents, intensively focused on the issue of the Mahdi and his reappearance during his reign. He began his speeches by praying for the reemergence of the Mahdi. Furthermore, he spent US$ 30 million to expand the Jamkara¯n mosque and repair the road around it. It is believed that the Mahdi requested the mosque to be built and urged the Shiʿa to visit it.5 In addition, Ahmadinejad saw the policies that he followed and applied, correctly or not, as being helped by the Mahdi because ‘his government [acted] under the management of the Imam of the Age [the Mahdi]’.6 It is important to note that Shiʿa believe that their Imams and saints can bless or help them. Therefore, as there was a reference to the Mahdi

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and his alleged blessing of Ahmadinejad’s government, Fa¯timih, the ˙ Prophet’s daughter, was also seen as a person who blessed the former president and his government. Fa¯timih Rajabı¯ asserts in her book about ˙ Ahmadinejad that his election in 2005 had been supported by Prophet Muhammad’s daughter and the great-grandmother of the Mahdi.7 The Iranian president said the following at the UN in 2005: O mighty Lord, I pray to you to hasten the emergence of your last repository, the promised one, that perfect and pure human being, the one that will fill this world with justice and peace. O Lord, include us among his companions, followers and those who serve his cause.8 This prayer can be seen as an act of every Shiʿi who believes in the end of the world. In other words, Ahmadinejad was not the only person who recited this prayer. Millions of people say the same prayer because they believe in the Twelfth Imam and want to be part of his army when he comes. One way to be prepared to join his army is to be faithful, a true believer and to pray for that. Therefore, the reference to the Mahdi was not unique to Ahmadinejad, as it is also used by ordinary people in their everyday lives or before any steps that they take. For example, it is common to say, among the Shiʿa, that a person is successful in his or her business because the Mahdi blesses him or her. In other words, Ahmadinejad might have been a person who truly believed in the Mahdi, who supports his true believers. There are, therefore, two aspects of the usage of the Mahdi in the former Iranian president’s discourse. One is that he, as any other Shiʿi, was eager for the reappearance of the Mahdi, and two, he believed that because of his faith in the Twelfth Imam, he was blessed by him. Additionally, another important concept within Shiʿism is Tawassul, or ‘resorting to’. Shiʿa believe that they can resort to their Imams to solve their problems and support them, so Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric about the Mahdi can also be seen as being influenced by this. Thus, if the concepts of Barakat (bless) and Tawassul are understood as Shiʿi phenomena, even though some Sunnis rely on them as well, some issues related to the messianic discourse of Ahmadinejad can be understood. However, because Ahmadinejad was a politician, his usage of the Mahdi had political implications, the most effective one being to

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legitimise his policies. It can be argued that the reason behind the reliance on the Mahdi in Ahmadinejad’s discourse was an attempt to tell the Iranians that ‘since he had politically and religiously taken up the banner of the Twelfth Imam, militated for, and was paving the way for his return, the Hidden Imam had in turn directly intervened on his side’.9 In other words, he was blessed by the Twelfth Imam. Therefore, he tried to give the impression to the Iranians that he was a legitimate president and that his policies were somewhat supported by the Mahdi, and a sign of this alleged support appeared in his meeting with a cleric in Qom. During the meeting he claimed that while delivering his speech in 2005 in the UN and after praying for the Mahdi, he had felt that he was surrounded by a holy light.10 The Shiʿa have been waiting for centuries for the Imam to come and have been eager to receive a message from him. Part of this culture of waiting is related to the situation of the Shiʿa throughout Islamic history. The Shiʿa were oppressed for centuries and, for them, the Mahdi is the one to help them end their difficult conditions. Therefore, in different religious ceremonies, the Shiʿa recite prayers for the acceleration of the reappearance of their Imam. In many cases, these prayers are associated with weeping and tears. Clerics tell stories about the miracles that have been performed by the Imam and urge the Shiʿa to expect his reappearance by praying for his return. The Shiʿa have been waiting for an Imam who will come to ‘spread justice on earth, after the spread of injustice’, or Zulm,11 and so it is common for them to pray for _ the Imam, and Iranian officials cannot be separated from this cultural background. At the same time, we cannot look at the actions of these officials outside of the cultural context in Iran. For example, while Ahmadinejad focused on the issue of the Mahdi and prayed for his reappearance in his speeches, the current president, Rouhani, turned one of his cabinet meetings into a mourning ritual for Imam Hussein and he became the preacher or Ruwzih Khu¯n.12 How can the messianic discourse be linked to Ahmadinejad’s negative rhetoric towards Israel? It could be argued that Ahmadinejad believed that justice should be spread in the world and in the Middle East and that this justice cannot be fulfilled unless the Mahdi reappears. So when the former Iranian president used negative rhetoric, he knew that he could not do anything but pray for the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam to achieve this justice. Moreover, if Iran had the power to destroy

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Israel, would the Iranian president be the person in charge of that? Would he make the decision by himself without the supervision of the supreme leader? The answer to this question must be negative given the fact that Ali Khamenei is cautious when it comes to Iran’s relationship with the outside world. Now, suppose that the Iranian revolution of 1979 did not prevail. Would the Shiʿa have used this messianic discourse? In addition, do those Shiʿa who are against the Iranian government propagate for the reappearance of the Mahdi? The answer to both questions is yes, because it is impossible to have a Shiʿi believer who believes in the Twelve Imams but does not wait for the Mahdi or does not believe that he will someday reappear. In addition to the holy light, other rumours emerged about Ahmadinejad’s connection to the Hidden Imam. One of these rumours says that Ahmadinejad or his associated group ‘would lay out an empty plate, spoon and fork and claim that it was reserved for the Twelfth Imam’.13 Java¯nfikr, the former chief editor of The Daily Iran and a close ally of Ahmadinejad and Masha¯ʾı¯, denied this and other stories in an article published in 2009. He described the rumours as being irrational and politically motivated.14 Iran has a long history with the issue of the Mahdi and Millenarianism. Many people have appeared in Iran saying that they had some sort of connection to the Mahdi, the latest such person being Ali Yaʿqu¯bı¯, who is said to be close to Masha¯ʾı¯. The hardline conservatives believe that he spread superstitious beliefs among people by claiming that he is in contact with the Mahdi.15 Some people in other areas of the Middle East have claimed that they have experienced something similar. In Iraq, a man appeared recently and claimed that he is the messenger of the Mahdi. His name is Ahmad al-Hasan al-Yama¯nı¯, and he even asserts that the Mahdi is his grandfather.16 But why is it important to analyse the view of the hardline conservatives regarding the Mahdi? The main reason is to see how these conservatives use messianic discourse to legitimise the existence of the regime among the Iranians. Thus, one of the arguments of this section is that the hardline conservatives rely on messianism and discourse about the Mahdi to gain legitimacy and discredit their opponents. In other words, when this discourse is used for political purposes among the hardline conservatives, it is important to examine it.

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Pages that were dedicated to cover the issue of the Mahdi

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_ .Subh-i . Dukuhih

Figure 5.7 Subh-i Duku¯hih’s coverage of the issue of the Mahdi and the ˙ ˙ End of the World.

The Mahdi had appeared in the hardline conservatives’ rhetoric years before Ahmadinejad’s emergence. This issue is not discussed in the works about the messianic discourse of the former Iranian president. For example, the weekly Subh-i Duku¯hih, in the period between January ˙ ˙ 2002 and July 2003, published many articles and set aside one to three pages in each issue dedicated to the Mahdi and the end of the world. A review of 30 issues of this weekly showed that the subject of the Mahdi was covered in most of them. As Figure 5.7 shows, the issue of the end of the world was given attention in these issues. The title of the pages that covered this subject was called ‘The End of Time’. Five issues of the 30 that I analysed do not discuss the matter of the Mahdi and the problems of the end of the world. Eighteen of them discuss these issues in one page, two of them cover stories about the end of the world in three pages and five of them in two pages. Most of those articles were about religious issues and the history of the Mahdi and how much closer his reappearance was. Some of these articles linked signs of the end of the world to regional events. In an interview with one cleric, the weekly discussed developments in the Middle East and their relation to the phenomenon of the reappearance. One sign of the end of the world was discussed: the Western attacks on Iraq. The cleric says, ‘The destruction of Basra and Baghdad and the arrival of Westerners to Baghdad is one of our certain stories [riva¯yat]’ about the signs of the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam.17 Therefore,

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the emergence of the messianic discourse in Ahmadinejad’s rhetoric was not a new phenomenon, but was related to the cultural context of Shiʿism and Iran, and to the ways in which hardline conservatives have promoted the reappearance of the Mahdi and the end of the world. There can be disagreement among the hardline conservatives about the best way to link the Mahdi to the current regime in the country, or to current events and developments in the Middle East. One major incident showed this difference among them. In 2011, a documentary was produced and distributed in Iran about the reappearance of the Mahdi. The documentary, The Reappearance is Imminent (Zuhu¯r Bisya¯r Nazdı¯k Ast), _ is not only about the Mahdi’s reappearance, but also about telling its audience that those who will prepare the ground for his reappearance will be the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, and the former president, Ahmadinejad. In addition, the Iranian revolution of 1978–9 is seen as a sign of the reappearance of the Mahdi. The documentary uses the Mahdi as a tool in its propaganda to legitimise the regime, especially in light of the internal difficulties and external threats the regime is facing. In the documentary, Ayatollah Khamenei is depicted as the Khura¯sa¯nı¯, a leader who will give the flag to the Mahdi himself, and Ahmadinejad is seen as one of his soldiers who will prepare the ground for his reappearance. Most importantly, the documentary indirectly indicates that Mı¯r-Hussein Mu¯savı¯ wants and is willing to prevent the soldiers of the Mahdi, Khamenei and Ahmadinejad, from accomplishing the divine job to which they have been assigned. Iranian officials and clerics condemned the documentary on the grounds that it propagates superstition in society and is not based on proper information about signs of the end of the world and the reappearance of the Mahdi. Also, ‘there is no need to discuss these issues’, according to Ayatollah Misba¯h ˙ ˙ Yazdı¯.18 However, some of the arguments raised in the documentary are used among the hardline conservatives. Therefore, it can be argued that clerics who criticised the documentary were doing that, first, for political purposes, and second, for religious reasons. Rahı¯m Masha¯ʾı¯, the head of the deviated group within the system, is ˙ accused of producing the documentary. There is a political competition, as was mentioned in Chapter 4, between the hardline conservatives and the deviated group. In addition, clerics rely on the Mahdi in their discourse, but they think they are the legitimate class who have the ability to talk about these issues. Therefore laymen, even though they

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should believe in the Mahdi, do not have the power to be connected to him; this authority is given to the clergy. This belief appears on different occasions. For example, in responding to a question regarding the relationship between Ayatollah Khomeini and Ayatollah Khamenei and the Twelfth Imam and whether they have seen him, the Hawza’s ˙ website says, ‘Throughout the Shiʿa’s history, many people were able to see the Mahdi and to talk to him [. . .]. Therefore, it is possible that [both Khomeini and Khamenei] have had a connection with him despite the fact that they did not announce it’.19 In addition, according to BBC Farsi news, the Iranian media broadcasted a documentary about the revolution in which it was said that when Ayatollah Khomeini wanted the people to demonstrate against the Shah, Ayatollah Ta¯liqa¯nı¯ tried to ˙ convince him to urge the Iranians to stay home. In an indication of his connection to or inspiration by the Twelfth Imam, Khomeini responded to Ayatollah Ta¯liqa¯nı¯ by saying, ‘That was the order of the Master of ˙ Time’, the Mahdi.20 Therefore, connection to the Mahdi is something that the clerics can have, but not other people. A cleric even complained to Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t that some people believe that anyone can be in connection to the Mahdi and that ‘there is no need for sources of emulation and jurisprudence [. . .]. This view is among the most dangerous of ideas’ that should be stopped from spreading in society.21 Another documentary was produced by the same director of the first, Ali Asghar Sı¯ja¯nı¯. This time, other signs of the reappearance of the Mahdi ˙ were added to those that had been discussed in the first documentary, among them the Arab Spring. The documentary declares that Imams asserted that one sign of the reappearance is the moment ‘when Arabs overthrow their leaders [khalaʿat al-Arab Aʾimmataha¯ ]’.22 This documentary avoided two mistakes of the first one: it did not directly say that the supreme leader and Ahmadinejad are among those who will accelerate the reappearance of the Mahdi; and the director interviewed a cleric to explain some issues related to the end of the world.23 The aforementioned quote by Khomeini about the Mahdi’s approval of his decision to order the people to demonstrate against the Shah, in addition to its indication that he had direct relationship with the Twelfth Imam, was also an indication that his actions were legitimate based on the endorsement of the Mahdi. The same argument can be made about the usage by the hardline conservatives, including the supreme leader and the former president, of the Mahdi to legitimise

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their actions and policies. The supreme leader has relied on the Mahdi to gain legitimacy on two occasions. Both of them were during critical moments in the history of the Iranian revolution. The first one was in 1999 during the student demonstrations in Tehran, and the other was ten years later after the eruption of demonstrations as a result of the presidential elections of 2009. In both cases, he spoke directly to the Mahdi. In 1999 he said, ‘Oh our master, certify to God that we stand to the last moment of our life for his sake’.24 In this call, he was suggesting that the Mahdi was in support of the Iranian regime’s policies and therefore would act as a witness in front of God in support of Ayatollah Khamenei’s reaction to the events of 1999. In an emotional speech, the supreme leader said in 2009, Oh our master, we have done what we should do, and we have said what we should say and we will continue to say [. . .]. I have an insignificant life and a weak body [. . .] and I will scarify them for the sake of Islam and this revolution [. . .]. Oh our master, pray for us [. . .] you are our owner, you are the owner of this country, you are the owner of this revolution. You are our supporter and we will continue our path [in defending the regime].25 On both occasions, his words to the Mahdi were associated with weeping and tears from the audience. Thus, in both events, the message was clear: the Mahdi supports the Islamic regime in Iran, and its legitimacy comes from him and his backing. When the documentary The Appearance Is Imminent was produced, it was attacked, as was mentioned, on the grounds that it spread superstition. In the documentary, Ayatollah Khamenei is presented as one who would support the Mahdi and give him the banner to fight and establish his government on earth. In books that appeared among the Shiʿa about the end of the world and the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam, is the name of Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯ who comes from Khura¯sa¯n, a province in Iran, and has a sign on his right hand. He will prepare the ground for Mahdi.26 In the documentary, Ali Khamenei is seen as this Khura¯sa¯nı¯ because he is a Sayyid, a descendant of the Prophet, was born in Khura¯sa¯n and his right hand is paralysed, which means that there is a sign on his hand. The documentary even showed an imagined picture of Khamenei handing the Mahdi a banner (see Figure 5.8 overleaf).

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Figure 5.8 A picture that was shown in the documentary and depicted Ayatollah Khamenei as Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯.

Other events show that the hardline conservatives, although critical of the documentary, use the same claim to legitimise the governance of Ali Khamenei. In Chapter 5, Section I, on the hardline conservatives’ ideology on the absolute role of the supreme leader, a poem was analysed which mixed Shiʿi history with the country’s current events. One verse of the poem referred to Ayatollah Khamenei as Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯.27 Furthermore, an issue of the weekly Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, the tribune of the Hizbulla¯h in Iran, published a photo of the supreme leader with a phrase ˙ stating, ‘We respond to your call, oh Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯, [Labbayk ya¯ Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯ ]’. This photo, as it appears in Figure 5.9, is another indication that there is a belief among the hardline conservatives that the supreme leader is, in fact, the person who prepares the ground for the reappearance of the Mahdi. Under the photo is an article that refers to the end of time by saying, ‘Among us there is a person who will hand a banner to the Mahdi, and we, the Shiʿa of Iran, are proud to obey him’.28 Therefore, they use this as a tool to legitimise the supreme leader’s governance and to give the impression that those who stand against him are in fact resisting the reappearance of the Mahdi and are confronting God’s will.

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Figure 5.9 Khura¯sa¯nı¯.

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A photo in Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t referring to the supreme leader as the

A short audio file was posted on the Internet about the connection between the supreme leader and the Khura¯sa¯nı¯. The audio is a portion of a lecture given by Aliriz˙a¯ Pana¯hiya¯n, the aforementioned cleric close to Hizbulla¯h in Iran. In this lecture he asserts that Ayatollah Ali Khamenei is ˙ the Khura¯sa¯nı¯ and that he will be helping the Hidden Imam. He states, ‘It is hard to deny that Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯ is not the supreme leader’.29 According to the hardline conservatives, people who do not follow the supreme leader are betraying the Hidden Imam. In other words, the legitimacy of the supreme leader is similar to that of the Mahdi.30 In addition, hardline conservatives always focus on the importance of preparing the ground for the reappearance. But how should the regime do this? According to Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯, to accelerate the ˙ ˙ reappearance of the Mahdi, ‘justice, Islamic and religious laws should be propagated so people will be connected to religious values’.31 Another mission that Iranians have in order to prepare the ground for the Mahdi is the creation of a messianic, or Mahdism doctrine to confront other manmade doctrines in the world, particularly the Western doctrine based on liberalism and secularism. In other words, part of the Mahdism doctrine is the cultural confrontation with the West. Hasan ʿAbba¯sı¯ believes that the world has one dominant doctrine, which is Western, and in order to confront it, the Shiʿa have to strengthen and also propagate another doctrine, which is the Mahdism doctrine. For ʿAbba¯sı¯, this doctrine has existed among the Shiʿa for a long time. It is similar to a straight path that began with Imam Ali in

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the beginning of Islam and continues until now through the Islamic regime in Iran. ʿAbba¯sı¯ believes that this path did not end with the occultation of the Twelfth Imam because it went to his representitives among Shiʿa. These representatives have been the sources of emulation, or the Grand Ayatollahs. Therefore, since the Mahdi’s disappearance, ʿAbba¯sı¯ claims that more than 60 sources of emulation have guided the Shiʿi community until the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran.32 The role of these Grand Ayatollahs, for ʿAbba¯sı¯, have been supported by the Twelfth Imam. Therefore, according to him, the Iranian revolution and the establishment of the Islamic regime were also supported by the Hidden Imam because the straight path that began with Imam Ali has one target, which is to establish a divinely guided regime, and the Iranian regime should be seen as part of this path. In other words, ʿAbba¯sı¯ says that this regime has a divine responsibility that is religiously legitimate, and so revolting against it is a revolt against God’s will and the Twelve Imams’ strategy. In addition, since the Twelfth Imam had been behind the establishment of the current regime through his representative, Ayatollah Khomeini, ‘he will protect this regime as well’.33 The sources of emulation are inspired by the Hidden Imam, and what they have done so far is in accordance with his will. In addition, their activities have had one target, which is the acceleration of the Mahdi’s reappearance. Therefore, Ayatollah Khomeini was preparing the ground for that path, and the current Iranian supreme leader is doing the same thing.34 So the existence of the regime, as ʿAbba¯sı¯ indicates, benefits the Shiʿa because it accelerates the reappearance of the Hidden Imam. This regime, consequently, is responsible for preparing the ground culturally for the Mahdi. One of the aspects of this preparation is the cultural confrontation with the West, similar to that discussed in Section III of this chapter. It is not clear how the cultural confrontation with the West will accelerate the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam, but what is clear in Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯’s argument is that the Shiʿa should benefit from globalisation to spread the discourse about the Mahdi. For him, this discourse is based on the idea of guiding people to the ultimate happiness. Therefore, there is a spiritual aspect in Mahdism doctrine that does not exist in Western doctrine.35 Because of the importance of culture in preparing the ground for the Mahdi, the Iranian government has concentrated on spreading the

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doctrine of Mahdism. These efforts have taken different shapes. First, there is an annual conference organised in Iran with the endorsement of the government and under the banner of the Institution of Bright Future (Muʾasasa-yi A¯yandih-yi Ruwshan). The conference discusses the relationship between the doctrine of Mahdism and different issues such as the arts, as in the case of the seventh conference. Another conference was organised under the title ‘The Society and Government which Prepares the Ground for the Re-Appearance of the Imam Mahdi (a.s) ‘Strategies and Approaches’.36 Second, under the supervision of the Institution of Bright Future, which was established in 2004, there are seven magazines and journals that are published and distributed in the country. One of them, Malı¯ka, after the name of Mahdi’s mother, is for children. The other, Intiza¯r-i ˙ Java¯n, is for teenagers. In addition, there is a journal in Arabic known as 37,38 al-Mawʿu¯d, for the promotion of the Mahdi internationally. The main reason for all these efforts is to help Shiʿism and the doctrine of Mahdism stand against the Western beliefs of secularism and liberalism. Therefore, according to ʿAbba¯sı¯, the idea of institutionalisation and the normalisation of the revolution should be put to one side by the heads of the regime, because there is a target, which is the preparation of the world for the Mahdi,39 and the Iranian revolution was a step towards his appearance. Ayatollah Khomeini himself raised this issue as well. For him, ‘the revolution of the Iranian people was the beginning of a bigger revolution of the Islamic nation under the banner of the Twelfth Imam’.40 Therefore, Aliriz˙a¯ Pana¯hiya¯n asserts that by defending the current Iranian regime, Iranians will play a major role in the salvation of the world.41 For this reason, Hujjat al-Islam Thaqafı¯, a ˙ cleric close to Hizbulla¯h in Iran, believes that the revolution should not ˙ be reformed because the mission of Khomeini was to lead Muslims towards the appearance of the Mahdi.42 This mission, for him, is continued through the current supreme leader, Ayatollah Khamenei.43 Thus, any challenge to his authority is a disruption of his mission. The current Iranian society under the leadership of the supreme leader, for Pana¯hiya¯n, is the closest to that which will be established by the Mahdi, therefore it should be defended and its regime should be protected.44 Now, will this preparation and mission require a political confrontation with the outside world? Ayatollah Khomeini encouraged his supporters at the beginning of the revolution to export it to the

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world in order to escalate the reappearance of the Mahdi.45 Pana¯hiya¯n also believes that Iranians ‘should overthrow the unjust governments’ of the world in order to prepare the ground for the Mahdi.46 But how these unjust regimes will be changed is not clear. It seems that this doctrine is more important internally than externally, because it is used to legitimise the regime in Tehran and to continue the revolution without normalising it. To conclude, the justice that has not been found in Iran under the banner of the current regime will be reached with the appearance of the Twelfth Imam. The reliance on messianic discourse should be seen as being related to the cultural background of the Iranian officials, who are Shiʿi. Shiʿa rely on the Mahdi and pray for his reappearance, and the Iranian officials in general, and Ahmadinejad in particular, should not be separated from this reality. In addition to that, these officials and thinkers within the system use the messianic discourse to gain legitimacy, but it is not clear what other political implications it will have. Officials in the regime use messianic discourse and claim that the Mahdi supports their regime in order to silence their opponents. In addition, this usage has cultural goals because the hardline conservatives believe that the doctrine of Mahdism can confront the cultural hegemony of Western civilisation and should be used to prevent any attempts to reform and normalise the revolution and the Islamic Republic, both internally and externally.

CONCLUSION

Findings When Ayatollah Khomeini died in 1989, a new phase of Iran’s history began. In the period between 1979 and 1989 the regime in the Islamic Republic was radical and waging a war in two directions: against parties and political groups that challenged its existence within the country, and also against Iraq. However, the radical regime shifted its focus towards more moderate policies and a process of normalisation began with the election of Hashimi Rafsanjani, who wanted to open the country economically to the international community and to relax the revolutionary zeal after the war with Iraq. This moderate phase continued to exist in Iran through the reformist reign of Muhammad Khatami. However, these moderate and reformist phases were suspended in the period between 2005 and 2013 and the regime was re-radicalised. This re-radicalisation occurred as a result of the hardline conservatives, who reached power through Ahmadinejad. This faction is the product of a coalition of revolutionary zealots that was built after the death of Ayatollah Khomeini. They are against the opening of Iranian society to political, social, cultural and economic changes and, in addition, they are in support of a radical confrontational foreign policy. In each of these phases of the Islamic Republic history, different ideological foundations were propagated. These different views and prespectives within the system have illustrated the difficulty that the system has in institutionalising the position of vila¯yat-i faqı¯h and in

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reforming itself. Institutions, in general, arrange the relationship between the individuals within a country based on rules and regulations, which are seen as ‘patterns of interaction that govern and constrain the relationships of individuals’.1 These rules ‘include formal rules, written laws, formal social conventions, informal norms of behaviour, and shared beliefs about the world, as well as the means of enforcement’.2 These institutions in ‘open access orders’ are able to control violence in their societies. However, in ‘limited-access orders’, or natural states, so named by North, Wallis and Weingast (2009), the absence of effective institutions and organisations can lead to the emergence of violence.3 People who are excluded may find in violence their chance to gain power or at least to be part of or benefit from the existing regime. At the same time, it can be argued that the coalition that is in charge may need to protect its power and will not want to give up its position; therefore, it too might rely on and support violence. In other words, it is true that the excluded group may lean towards violence but, at the same time, those who are in charge may also do so to protect themselves and their power. This is seen in the ideology of the hardline conservatives in Iran, who believe that their leader is a person above the law and that, in order to protect him, violence can be legitimate. Therefore, the context in which the hardline conservatives’ ideology appeared and was constructed has been one created as a result of the competition between factions within the Iranian revolutionary system. These factions or groups want to take the revolution in different directions. The revolution has created an authoritarian regime that relies on democratic institutions, such as a parliament, and has a presidential election that is organised every four years, similar to other democratic regimes, such as the US. However, the regime is not totally democratic because the authorities rely on the leadership of the supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who is not directly elected by the Iranians. Since the revolution in 1979, factionalism has been common among the ruling elite. However, this factionalism is unique to the Iranian context. It is based on the idea that there are two groups within the country: those who belong to the regime, Khu¯dı¯, and those who do not, Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯, and the control of factionalism within the system is based on this. As it is well known, the Iranian revolution was led by different groups and political parties from both the left and right of the political

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spectrum. After the departure of the Shah, these groups confronted each other, and the Islamists were eventually able to control the system and establish an Islamic regime; those parties and groups who did not accept the new regime were eliminated, many of them by violent purges. By the end of the war with Iraq, mass executions were common in the country and took place with Khomeini’s endorsement. However, those factions who accepted the regime were able to operate within the system and even to compete and disagree with each other. Therefore, factionalism among the Islamists was common, and certain aspects of Ayatollah Khomeini’s discourse and behaviour inspired each of them. In addition, he supervised this competition as long as each group accepted the system and the jurist’s authority. Thus, this regime created a competitive atmosphere among its children, and groups with different interpretations of the ideological foundations of the revolution emerged, competed, disagreed with each other and ruled the country after 1989, under the leadership of the new jurist, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. This political context within the system produced the reformists, who did not aim to overthrow the regime but to reform it from within. This faction wanted to transform the Iranian system into a democratic one, based on the role of civil society and on a regime that protects human rights and respects diversity within the country. In addition, within this camp emerged a group of intellectuals, known as the religious intellectuals, who were part of the revolutionary regime, fought against the Shah, or occupied official positions within the system after 1979. These intellectuals aimed at reforming the political system in addition to reforming religious understanding and the role of the clergy in society. They were influenced by the ideas of intellectuals in the pre-revolutionary era, especially the arguments made by Ali Sharı¯ʿatı¯. This reformist discourse has had its opponents within the system, and the hardline conservatives have shaped their ideology in relation to these reformists. These conservatives are different to the traditional conservatives, who advocate for stabilised foreign relations and want to develop the economy under the leadership of the traditional merchants, or the ba¯za¯rı¯. They are, however, conservative when it comes to culture. The hardline conservatives also contrast with the pragmatists who pay less attention to culture within the country and focus more on developing the economy by opening the country to foreign investment.

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After analysing the hardline conservatives’ ideology, it can be said that it is based on different, interrelated topics, and cannot be understood if it is separated from the context of the Iranian situation since 1989, or if each of its topics is analysed separately. In other words, we cannot look at the discourse on the Mahdi without analysing the discourse on the jurist’s absolute role. Similarly, the absolute role of the jurist cannot be understood if the hardline conservatives’ discourse towards the reformists and the religious intellectuals are not examined. Therefore, the logic behind their ideology goes as follows: first, the role of the supreme leader should be absolute because his authority is the continuation of the authority of the Prophet and the Shiʿi Imams; second, the reformists who want to reform the system and Islam are acting against Islam and God’s will, want to liberate Iranian society and reduce the influence of Islam and are seen as tools in the hands of the Western powers who want to destroy the Islamic Republic and overthrow the Iranian regime; third, the West was not able to destroy the regime in a direct confrontation, therefore it wants to defeat the regime from within by waging cultural assaults to change the norms and culture of the Iranian people and make them follow Western culture; fourth, this cultural confrontation also has a political aspect and so the Iranian regime should stand against the pressures of the Western countries, resist their sanctions and rely on aggressive foreign policy – it also needs to remind the people of the sacrifices during the war with Iraq by reviving the memory of the martyrs and those who fought for the existence of the regime; fifth, those who fought for the regime and those who were killed during the war with Iraq were betrayed after the war by the authorities, especially the pragmatists, who followed economic policies that widened the gap between the rich and poor in society and were part of economic corruption; and, sixth and finally, social justice, if not found in Iran after the revolution, will be reached with the reappearance of the Mahdi. The Twelfth Imam, for the hardline conservatives, has supported the current regime since its existence because it is one of the signs and conditions that lead to his rise, and so Iranians should follow the regime in order to accelerate the reappearance of the Hidden Imam. Figure C.1 shows the relationship between these issues in the hardline conservatives’ ideology. In summation, the Iranian revolution created an authoritarian regime, with limited-access orders or limited pluralism that allowed

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Figure C.1 The relationship between the main issues that appear in the discourse of the hardline conservatives.

different factions to appear in society. Each of these factions has a different interpretation of the ideological foundations of the revolution and wants to take the revolution into a different direction. Therefore, the children of the revolution are still in a struggle with each other, debating the best direction that their revolution should take and the best policies it should follow. What is interesting about the Iranian case is that the regime was not able, or did not want, to establish a totalitarian regime that guides society in one direction, but has created an authoritarian regime which allowed limited pluralism and facilitated the appearance of many interpretations of its revolutionary doctrine, with many conflicting plans and directions. Consequently, each group has its ideological foundations which shape its identity in relation to other groups. Some want to reform the system economically, but not politically and culturally, such as the case of Rafsanjani and his associated group of pragmatists. Others focus more on political and cultural reforms, such as the reformist movement and the religious intellectuals. However, another group, the hardline

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conservatives, does not want the revolution to end and prefers to go back to its first years with a radical discourse and policies. The hardline conservatives have acted as a pressure group since the end of the war with Iraq in 1988. They have tried to influence the policies of the Iranian government and succeeded on many occasions. Therefore, their ideology is still relevant in the country and will affect the presidency of Rouhani because they continue to play the role of a pressure group within the system. Many actions were taken by this group to counter Rouhani’s policies since he reached power in summer 2013 – rallies and demonstrations were organised in opposition to his policies, especially those relating to culture and his moderate approach with the international community. In addition to acting as a pressure group, many figures in the regime and members of important institutions, such as the parliament and the Assembly of Experts, are associated with the the hardline conservatives, and so many of the arguments made by the group during the reigns of the former presidents Rafsanjani, Khatami and Ahmadinejad are still relevant in Iran and will continue to exist as long as the group is active. The hardline conservatives, as this book has shown, have their own understanding of many aspects of Iran’s internal and external politics and will try to apply it to the country. In addition, this book concludes that the group neither believes in reforming the revolution nor in institutionalising it. It believes, as the analysis of its ideology has demonstrated, in the continuation of the revolution. Therefore, the group’s ideology remains important in Iran, and the crises that Khatami faced might re-emerge in Rouhani’s presidency, although in a different political context. Rouhani himself acknowledges this, and he has even bluntly attacked and criticised his opponents from the hardline conservative camp. Therefore, it can be seen that this debate within the country will continue as long as the regime allows factionalism to exist among its children, or the Khu¯dı¯. Having said that, it is important to ask the following question; to what extend can the hardline conservatives apply their ideology on the ground, especially when it comes to Iran’s foreign relations? Based on the nature of the Iranian regime, this group can influence internal politics but cannot dictate its foreign policy. In other words, this group can put pressure on the Iranian president to limit social and political freedom in the country, but cannot pressure him on foreign policy without the

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permission of the supreme leader. Ali Khamenei believes in the importance of confronting Iran’s enemies. However, he is a rational politician, and neither entirely supports the policy of confrontation with the international community nor backs an accommodation.4 Therefore, despite his radical rhetoric, the former president, Ahmadinejad, was not able, for example, to go to war with Israel, to intervene in the crisis in Bahrain or to spread chaos in the Middle East to fulfill his messianic ideology, if he ever had one. Those who control Iran’s foreign policy are the supreme leader and the Revolutionary Guards. Both are rational actors, who believe in extending Iran’s power in the region based on a strategy that will protect the existence of the regime as well as the unity of the country. In other words, they will not risk going to war with any regional or global power. The supreme leader may agree with the hardline conservatives’ arguments on culture, and on the absolute role of his authority, but he does not share their zeal when it comes to foreign policy.

NOTES

Introduction 1. Rouhani: Bih Jahannam Kih Buzdilha¯y-i Siya¯sı¯ Az Muza¯kira¯t Mı¯ Larzand,); 11 August 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼NDX9f0VW1yM (Accessed 15 September 2014). 2. Roy C. Macridis, Contemporary Political Ideologies: Movements and Regimes (New York: Harper Collins, 1992), p. 2. 3. Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 1. 4. Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 2000), p. 9. 5. Ali M. Ansari, Iran, Islam, and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (London: Chatham House, 2006), p. 10. 6. This book relies on Persian and Arabic texts and deals with names and phrases in both languages. These phrases have been transliterated based on the transliteration guide of the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). I transliterated titles of Persian and Arabic articles and books that I cited. Names that were not transliterated based on this guide are those of commonly used names, such as Khomeini, Khamenei, Ahmadinejad, Rafsanjani and Ahmad, among others. Other names such as Mousavi became Mu¯savı¯, while Karoubi became Karu¯bı¯ and Montazari became Muntazarı¯. ˙ However, if these names were seen in the title of English books or articles, they are used as they appeared in the endnotes and the bibliography. In the text they are transliterated based on the IJMES guide. It is also worth mentioning that authors’, activists’, intellectuals’, and thinkers’ names have been transliterated unless they have their own websites or accounts on Twitter or Facebook that provide their preferred spelling of their names, such as Mohsen Kadivar and Akbar Ganji. In addition, the names of Iranian and Arab authors who provided English spellings of their names are used as they were provided. Otherwise,

NOTES

7. 8.

9.

10. 11. 12. 13. 14.

TO PAGES

4 –9

143

I transliterated their names. Moreover, Arabic phrases and words that are used in Persian were transliterated in accordance with their Arabic pronunciation and not the Persian. Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), p. 135. Anoushirvan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservative: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution (London: I.B.Tauris, 2007), p. 34. Walter Posch, Islamist Neo-Cons Take Power in Iran (July 2005), available at www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/analy118.pdf (Accessed 20 September 2011). Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Dı¯ru¯z Imru¯z Farda¯ – Dr. Allah-Karam, July 2010, available at vimeo.com/ 14412696 (Accessed 5 June 2012). Ibid.

Chapter 1 Revolutionary Regimes and Ideological Factionalism 1. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2006), p. 264. 2. Different theories have dealt with the phenomenon of revolution. Many of them deal with the causes of revolutions rather that their aftermath. Michael Kimmel distinguishes between four schools of theories on revolutions: ‘One school attempted to chart the natural history of revolutions from their earliest stirrings to the consolidation of the new regime. Another school cast revolutions as the collapse of a social system, normally in equilibrium, that promoted evolutionary change. The final two schools emphasise the psychological factors that lead to revolutions. One stresses the psychological development of individual leaders of revolutions, searching for the origins of their discontent as well as their ability to mobilise others. Finally, a more sociological tradition stresses the aggregate social psychology of mass discontent that leads to revolutionary mobilisation’. Michael S. Kimmel, Revolution: a Sociological Interpretation (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1990), p. 47. 3. Crane Brinton, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York: Vintage Books, 1965), p. 208. 4. Lyford P. Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), p. 205. 5. Mehran Kamrava, Revolutionary Politics (Connecticut and London: Praeger Publishers, 1992), p. 118. 6. Ibid., p. 84.

144 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33. 34.

35. 36. 37. 38.

NOTES TO PAGES 9 –12 Ibid., p. 85. Ibid., p. 86. Ibid., p. 84. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Kimmel, Revolution, p. 51. Huntington, Political Order, p. 345. Ibid., p. 344. Iain McLean and Alistair McMillan, Concise Dictionary of Politics 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 114. Kamrava, Revolutionary Politics, p. 57 – 8. Ibid., p. 59. McLean and McMillan, Dictionary of Politics, p. 114. Houman A. Sadri, Revolutionary States, Leaders, and Foreign Relations: A Comparative Study of China, Cuba, and Iran (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997), p. 14. Ibid. Ibid., p. 12. Ibid. Ibid., p. 13. Ibid. Ibid. Neil Shivlin, ‘Velayat-e Faqih in the constitution of Iran: the implementation of theocracy’, The Journal of Constitutional Law 1, no. 2 (1998): pp. 365– 6. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), pp. 18 – 19. Robin Wright, ‘The challenge of Iran’, in Robin Wright (ed.), The Iranian Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 2. Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), p. 13. Nı¯vı¯n ʿAbd al-Munʿim Musʿad, Sunʻ Al-qara¯r fı¯ Iran wa-al-ʻla¯qa¯t al-ʻArabiyya˙ al-Iı¯ra¯niyya (Beirut: Markaz Dira¯sa¯t al-Wihda al-ʻArabiyya, 2001), p. 67. ˙ Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 5. Riz˙a¯ Sanʿatı¯, Guftima¯n-i Misbah: Guza¯rishı¯ az Zindiga¯nı¯-yi ʻImı¯ va Siya¯si-i ˙ ˙ ˙ Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ (Tehran: Markaz-i Asna¯d-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, 2008), ˙ ˙ p. 615. Musʿad, Sunʻ Al-qara¯r fı¯ Iran, p. 67. ˙ Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, pp. 27 – 8. Ibid., p. 13. Amal Hama¯dih, al-Khibra al-Iı¯ra¯niyya: al-Intiqa¯l min al-Thawra Ila¯ al-Dawla (Beirut: Arab Network For Research and Publishing, 2008), p. 173.

NOTES

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12 –13

145

39. Ayatollah Khomeini wanted to change some articles of the constitution. Therefore, before his death he set up a committee of 25 members to review the constitution. Khomeini appointed 20 of them, and five were selected by the parliament, and the committee was able to complete the work after his death. A referendum was organised to approve the new constitution, and 97.3 per cent of the voters said yes to the changes. Ibid, pp. 171 – 2. 40. Ibid, p. 172. 41. Kazim Alamdari, Chira Isla¯ha¯t Shikast Khu¯rd? Naqdı¯ bar ʿalamkard-i Hasht ˙ Sa¯l-i Islahtalaba¯n dar Iran (1376 –1384) (California: Sayeh Publishing ˙ Corporation, 2008), p. 63. 42. The article states that ‘whenever the Leader becomes incapable of fulfilling his constitutional duties, or loses one of the qualifications mentioned in Articles 5 and 109, or it becomes known that he did not possess some of the qualifications initially, he will be dismissed. The authority of determination in this matter is vested with the experts specified in Article 108’. See the English version of the constitution on: Alavi and Associates, The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran, available at www.alaviandassociates.com/documents/ constitution.pdf (Accessed 12 July 2012). 43. Article 94 states that ‘All legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly must be sent to the Guardian Council. The Guardian Council must review it within a maximum of ten days from its receipt with a view to ensuring its compatibility with the criteria of Islam and the Constitution. If it finds the legislation incompatible, it will return it to the Assembly for review. Otherwise the legislation will be deemed enforceable’. 44. See Article 99, which says, ‘The Guardian Council has the responsibility of supervising the elections of the Assembly of Experts for Leadership, the President of the Republic, the Islamic Consultative Assembly, and the direct recourse to popular opinion and referenda’. 45. Article 91 states that ‘with a view to safeguard the Islamic ordinances and the Constitution, in order to examine the compatibility of the legislation passed by the Islamic Consultative Assembly with Islam, a council to be known as the Guardian Council is to be constituted with the following composition: (1) six religious men, conscious of the present needs and the issues of the day, to be selected by the Leader, and (2) six jurists, specializing in different areas of law, to be elected by the Islamic Consultative Assembly from among the Muslim jurists nominated by the Head of the Judicial Power’. 46. The Article states, ‘The President must obtain, for the Council of Ministers, after being formed and before all other business, a vote of confidence from the Assembly. During his incumbency, he can also seek a vote of confidence for the Council of Ministers from the Assembly on important and controversial issues’. This article and Articles 88 and 89 regulate the relationship between the government and the parliament. Also see: Farideh Farhi, ‘The Parliament’, in Robin Wright (ed.), The Iranian Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 21.

146

NOTES TO PAGES 13 –18

47. Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), p. 61. 48. Hama¯dih, al-Khibra al-Iı¯ra¯niyya, pp. 182– 3. 49. Vali Nasr, Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What it will Mean for our World (New York: Free Press, 2009), p. 59. 50. Francis Fukuyama, ‘Iran, Islam and the rule of law: Islamic political movements have been one form of revolt against arbitrary government’, The Wall Street Journal, July 2009, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/ SB10001424052970203946904574300374086282670.html (Accessed 9 May 2012). 51. Musʿad, Sunʻ Al-qara¯r fı¯ Iran, p. 10. ˙ 52. Fukuyama, ‘Iran, Islam and the rule of law.’ 53. Roy Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 29. 54. Riad Najib El-Rayyes, Masa¯hif wa Siyu¯f: Iran min al-Sha¯h Ila¯ Khatami (Beirut: ˙ Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2000), p. 197. 55. Khamenei az Nisbat Da¯dan-i Ramma¯li bi Raʾı¯s-i Duwlat Intiqa¯d Kard, May 2011, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼uiei3O5-hgQ (Accessed 8 May 2012). 56. Khamenei.ir, Darba¯rih-yi Mafhu¯m-i Khu¯dı¯ va Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯, January, 2009, available at http://farsi.khamenei.ir/others-note?id¼8684 (Accessed 10 May 2012). 57. Ibid.

Chapter 2 From Khomeini to Rafsanjani: The Politics of Factionalism from Radical to Moderate Policies 1. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 80. 2. Ibid. 3. Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 2000), p. 18. 4. Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), p. 25. 5. Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran: Abdolkarim Soroush, Religious Politics and Democratic Reform (London/New York: I.B.Tauris, 2008), p. 4. 6. Ghamari-Tabrizi asserts that the regime published between 100 and 150 names every day during summer and autumn 1981. If we assume that the government executed and published the names of 125 for six months, this means that it executed more than 22,000 people. See Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran, p. 4. 7. Thierry Coville, Iran: al-Thawra al-Khafiyya (Lebanon: Da¯r-Alfa¯ra¯bi, 2008), p. 123.

NOTES

TO PAGES

18 –19

147

8. Ervand Abrahamian, Khomeinism: Essays on the Islamic Republic (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), p. 131. 9. Wright, The Last Great Revolution, p. 16. This brutality did not end in 1983, but it continued through the last years of Ayatollah Khomeini’s life. In 1988, Ayatollah Khomeini gave his permission to execute many prisoners. Said Arjomand (1988) indicates that Khomeini ordered the execution of more than 3,000 members of Muja¯hidı¯n-I Khalq after the war with Iraq. Khomeini issued a decree ‘ordering clerical judges to sentence the “treacherous hypocrites” [Muja¯hidı¯n]’ to death. This group was among other groups that fought the Shah and suffered under his regime. After excluding them from the political scene, and the harsh condition of their followers, the group relied on terror. Its leaders left the country to go to France first, then to Iraq, where it helped the Ba’ath regime in its war against the Iranian government. The Iranian regime calls them Muna¯fiqı¯n or the hypocrites. 10. Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran, p. 126. 11. ‘Death penalty in Iran’, Amnesty International Newsletter, August 1986, p. 1. 12. Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯ was among the Sources of Emulation, or marjaʿ taqlı¯d, in Iran. He did not favour the creation of the Islamic Republic. He was among those Ulama who preferred separation between religion and politics. His followers were able to occupy Tabriz but, after clashing with the regime’s forces, they gave up. Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯ was placed under house arrest until he died. He was even forced to apologise to Ayatollah Khomeini in front of a camera. See Ayatollah Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, September 2008, available at www.youtube.com/watch? v¼Gt79IudNI18 (Accessed 17 April 17 2012). 13. Said Amir Arjomand, The Turban for the Crown: The Islamic Revolution in Iran (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 154. 14. Dilip Hiro, The Longest War: The Iran – Iraq Military Conflict (New York: Routledge, 1991), p. 1. 15. Ali M. Ansari, Iran, Islam, and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (London: Chatham House, 2006), p. 49. 16. Steven R. Ward, Immortal: a Military History of Iran and its Armed Forces (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), pp. 227. 17. Ibid., p. 246. 18. Hiro, The Longest War, p. 1. 19. Iran President Speech, C-Span, 22 September 1987, available at www.youtube. com/watch?v¼hn2djK9Fxno (Accessed 3 December 2014). 20. Parvin Alizadeh, ‘Iran’s quandary: economic reforms and structural traps’, Brown Journal of World Affairs 9 (2) (2003), p. 268. 21. Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran’s Economy under the Islamic Republic (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1993), p. 6. 22. Ibid. 23. Suzanne Maloney, ‘Iran Primer: The Revolutionary Economy’, Frontline, October 2010, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/10/i ran-primer-the-revolutionary-economy.html (Accessed 14 July 2012).

148

NOTES

TO PAGES

19 –22

24. Massoud Karshenas and M. Hashem Pesaran, ‘Economic reform and the reconstruction of the Iranian economy’, Middle East Journal 49 (1) (Winter, 1995), p. 97. 25. Ibid. 26. Amuzegar, Iran’s Economy, p. 61. 27. Ibid., p. 15. 28. Ibid., p. 17. 29. Ibid., p. 18. 30. Ibid., p. 45. 31. Eva Patricia Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran: a Study on the Iranian Political Elite from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2009), p. 50. 32. Ibid., p. 51. 33. Sultan Muhammad al-Naeimi, Al-Fikr al-Siya¯sı¯ al-Iranı¯ (Juthu¯ruh, Rawa¯fiduh A¯tha¯ruh) Dira¯sa Tahlı¯liyya fı¯ Z˙awʾ al-Masa¯dir al-Fa¯risiyya (Abu Dhabi: The ˙ ˙ Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2009), pp. 123–4. 34. Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran, p. 51. 35. Ibid., p. 50. 36. Ibid. 37. Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Richard Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran: Eshkevari and the Quest for Reform (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2006), p. 19. 38. Ibid. 39. Tehran Bureau: who’s in charge? Iran News Now, July 2010, available at www. irannewsnow.com/2010/07/tehran-bureau-whos-in-charge/ (Accessed 1 January 2012). 40. Muhammad Sahimi, ‘The political evolution of Mousavi’, Frontline, February 2010, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/2010/02/ the-political-evolution-of-mousavi.html (Accessed 1 January 2012). 41. Ibid. 42. Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future (New York: Norton, 2006), p. 120. 43. Nikki R. Keddie, Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), p. 260. 44. Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: the Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 172. 45. Wright, The Last Great Revolution, p. 20. 46. Ibid. 47. Asghar Schirazi, The Constitution of Iran: Politics and the State in the Islamic Republic (London: I.B.Tauris, 1997), p. 72. 48. Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran, p. 131. 49. Ibid., p. 135. 50. Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran, p. 50. 51. Ibrahim Mahmoud Yaseen Alnahas, ‘Continuity and change in the revolutionary Iran foreign policy: the role of international and domestic political factors in

NOTES

52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59.

60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77.

TO PAGES

23 –25

149

shaping the Iranian foreign policy, 1979–2006’ (Ph.D. diss., West Virginia University, 2007), pp. 82–3. Sayyid Muhammad Khatami, ‘Imam va Asl-i Na Sharqı¯ Na Gharbı¯’, Pa¯nzdah-i ˙ Khurda¯d 1 (1) (1369) [1991] p. 8. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, p. 103. Anoushervan Ehteshami, After Khomeini: The Iranian Second Republic (London/ New York: Routledge, 1995), p. 27. Moslem, Factional Politics, p. 4. Gheisseri and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, p. 108. Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini, p. 173. Ibid., p. 175. Ibid., p. 177. Shafeeq al-Ghabra, a Kuwaiti – Palestinian professor of political science had a meeting with Ayatollah Khalkha¯lı¯ during his participation in the guerrilla fighting in Southern Lebanon against Israel and other factions allied with it during the Lebanese civil war. He says in his memoir about his years in Lebanon that, after the Iranian revolution, many Iranians visited Southern Lebanon, and one of them was Ayatollah Khalkha¯lı¯. He says that they (fighters) had known that the Ayatollah was responsible for the death of many Iranians who were associated with the monarchy in Iran. During their conversation with Khalkha¯lı¯, he joked with them by saying, ‘If you have any problem that needs to be solved or if there anybody who is bothering you, tell me to apply [my] law’, which was, in this case, execution. See: Shafeeq alGhabra, Ḥaya¯ Ghayr A¯mina: Jı¯l al-Ahla¯m wa-al-Ikhfa¯qa¯t (Beirut: Da¯r al-Sa¯qı¯, ˙ 2012), p. 347. Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini, p. 152. Ibid. Ibid., p. 177. Ibid. Ṣa¯diq Khalkha¯lı¯, Kha¯ṭira¯t-i Ayatollah Khalkha¯lı¯ (Tehran: Nashr-i Sa¯yih, 2000), p. 356. Ibid., pp. 356– 8. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, p. 109. Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran, p. 24. Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini, p. 162. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 155. Ibid., p. 165. Ibid. Ibid., p. 164. Ibid., p. 173. Amal Hama¯dih, al-Khibra al-Iı¯ra¯niyya: al-Intiqa¯l min al-Thawra Ila¯ al-Dawla (Beirut: Arab Network For Research and Publishing, 2008), p. 329. Wright, The Last Great Revolution, p. 21.

150

NOTES

TO PAGES

25 –29

78. Ibid. 79. Ali Ba¯qirı¯ Daulata¯ba¯dı¯ and Muhsin Shafı¯ʿı¯, Az Hashimi Ta¯ Rouhani: Barrisı¯-yi ˙ Siya¯sit-i Kha¯rijı¯-yi Iran Dar Partuv-i Nazariya-yi Sa¯zih Inga¯rı¯ (Tehran: ˙ Intisha¯ra¯t-i Tı¯sa¯, 1393 [2014]), p. 102. 80. Ibid., p. 126. 81. Ansari, Iran, Islam, and Democracy, p. 61. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid., p. 66. 84. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, p. 109. 85. Ibid., p. 111. 86. Muhammad Sa¯diq Husseinı¯, al-Shaykh al-Raʾı¯s: min Qaryat al-Ya¯qu¯t al-Ahmar ˙ Ila¯ ʿArsh al-Zaʿ a¯ma al-Zahabı¯ (Lebanon: Riad El-Rayyes Books S.A.R.I., 2004), p. 125. 87. Ali M. Ansari, Iran under Ahmadinejad: The Politics of Confrontation (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2008), p. 16. 88. Ibid. 89. Ansari, Iran, Islam and Democracy, p. 57. 90. Husseinı¯, al-Shaykh al-Raʾı¯s, p. 124. 91. Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 9. 92. Shahriar Sabet-Saeidi, ‘Iranian-European relations: a strategic partnership?’ in Anoushirvan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri (eds), Iran’s Foreign Policy from Khatami to Ahmadinijad (Reading, UK: Ithaca Press, 2008), p. 58. 93. Hama¯dih, al-Khibra al-Iı¯ra¯niyya, p. 325.

Chapter 3 The Reformists and Religious Intellectuals 1. Muhammad Yası¯n Duzha¯ka¯m and Muhammad Qalʿih-vand, Buhra¯nha¯-yi ˙ Duwlat-i Khatami (Tehran: Barsat, 2001), p. 9. 2. Wilfried Buchta, Who Rules Iran? The Structure of Power in the Islamic Republic (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2002), p. 199. 3. Roy Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 52. 4. Kazim Alamdari, Chira Isla¯ha¯t Shikast Khu¯rd? Naqdı¯ bar ʿalamkard-i Hasht ˙ Sa¯l-i Islahtalaba¯n dar Iran (1376 –1384) (California: Sayeh Publishing ˙ Corporation, 2008), p. 40. 5. Geneive Abdo and Jonathan Lyons, Answering Only to God: Faith and Freedom in Twenty-First-Century Iran (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2003), p. 62. 6. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 131. 7. Ibid., p. 135. 8. Riad Najib El-Rayyes, Masa¯hif wa Siyu¯f: Iran min al-Sha¯h Ila¯ Khatami (Beirut: ˙ Riad El-Rayyes Books, 2000), p. 158.

NOTES

TO PAGES

29 –31

151

9. Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 2000), p. 94. 10. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, p. 132. 11. Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), p. 1. 12. Ghoncheh Tazmini, Khatami’s Iran: The Islamic Republic and the Turbulent Path to Reform (London: I.B.Tauris, 2009), p. 1. 13. Transcript of interview with Iranian president Muhammad Khatami, CNN, January 1998, available at http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/9801/07/iran/interview. html (Accessed May 8, 2012). 14. Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran, p. 1. 15. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, p. 135. 16. Christopher de Bellaigue, The Struggle for Iran (New York: New York Review Books, 2007) p. 6. 17. Sultan Muhammad al-Naeimi, Al-Fikr al-Siya¯sı¯ al-Iranı¯ (Juthu¯ruh, Rawa¯fiduh A¯tha¯ruh) Dira¯sa Tahlı¯liyya fı¯ Z˙awʾ al-Masa¯dir al-Fa¯risiyya ˙ ˙ (Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2009), p. 228. 18. Godfrey Cheshire, ‘Iran’s Cinematic Spring’, Dissent, available at http://dissent magazine.org/article/?article¼4247 (Accessed 7 May 2012). 19. Abdo and Lyons, Answering Only to God, p. 170– 1. 20. Anna Mahjar-Barducci, The Chain Murders of Iran, December 2008, available at www.gatestoneinstitute.org/144/the-chain-murders-of-iran (Accessed 4 May 2012). 21. Tazmini, Khatami’s Iran, p. 107. 22. Wright, The Last Great Revolution, pp. 56, 96, 118. 23. Ibid., p. 93. 24. Michael Rubin, Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), p. 64. 25. Student Protests in Iran: A Long History, PBS, November 2004, available at www.pbs.org/now/politics/iran.html (Accessed 14 July 2012). 26. Alamdari, Chira Isla¯ha¯t Shikast Khu¯rd?, p. 15. ˙ 27. Asef Bayat and Bahman Bakhtiari, ‘Revolutionary Iran and Egypt: exporting inspirations and anxieties’, in Nikki Keddie and Rudi Matthee (eds), Iran and the Surrounding World: Interaction in Culture and Cultural Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), p. 320. 28. Roy Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 229. 29. Ibid. 30. Shaul Bakhash, ‘The six presidents’, in Robin Wright (ed.), The Iran Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 18. 31. The profile of Abdollah Nouri, BBC News, November 1999, available at http:// news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/539470.stm (Accessed 7 May 2012).

152

NOTES

TO PAGES

31 –35

32. El-Rayyes, Masa¯hif wa Siyu¯f, p. 167. Also see: Geneive Abdo, ‘Socrates’ of Iran ˙ awaits his hemlock, Guardian, November 1999, available at www.guardian.co. uk/world/1999/nov/07/islam.iran (Accessed 8 May 2012). 33. Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted (New York: The New Press, 2007), p. 194. 34. El-Rayyes, Masa¯hif wa Siyu¯f, p. 170. ˙ 35. Thierry Coville, Iran: al-Thawra al-Khafiyya (Lebanon: Da¯r-Alfa¯ra¯bi, 2008), p. 224. 36. Alamdari, Chira Isla¯ha¯t Shikast Khu¯rd?, p. 63. ˙ 37. Muhammad Sahimi, ‘Grand Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri: 1922– 2009’, Frontline, December 2009, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ tehranbureau/2009/12/grand-ayatollah-hossein-ali-montazeri-1922-2009. html (Accessed 14 July 2012). 38. Muhammad Khatami, Muta¯laʿa¯t ¯ı al-dı¯n wa-al-Islam wa-al-ʿAsr (Beirut: Dar ˙ ˙ al-Jadı¯d, 1998), p. 30. 39. Ibid. 40. Ali Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (New York: New York University Press, 2010), p. 110. 41. Ziba Mir-Hosseini and Richard Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran: Eshkevari and the Quest for Reform (New York: I.B.Tauris, 2006), p. 2. 42. Guftigu¯-yi Anjuman-i Parva¯z ba¯ Duktur Soroush Dabbagh: Ruwshanfikri-i Dı¯nı¯, January 2012, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼7TXZ_d9DPSM (Accessed 14 July 2012). 43. Ibid. 44. Mohsen Kadivar, ‘Az Islam-i Tarı¯khı¯ ta¯ Islam-i Maʿnavı¯’, in Sunnat va Siku¯la¯rı¯sm: Gufta¯rha¯yı¯ az Abdolkarim Soroush, Muhammad Mujtahid Shabistarı¯, Mustafa Malikiyan, Mohsen Kadivar (Tehran: Sirat, 2002), p. 405. ˙ ˙ 45. Mehran Kamrava, ‘Iranian Shi’ism at the gate of historic change’, in Mehran Kamrava (ed.), Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions (Berkeley/Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2011), p. 63. 46. Matsunaga admits that it is hard to distinguish between these two groups and that ‘the boundaries between religious intellectuals and new thinkers of religion are sometimes murky. It is nevertheless useful to distinguish between the two, if only for heuristic purposes’. Yasuyuki Matsunaga, ‘Mohsen Kadivar, an Advocate of Postrevivalist Islam in Iran’, British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, 34 (2007), pp. 321 – 2. 47. Mehran Kamrava, ‘Iranian Shi’ism at the gate of historic change’, p. 59. 48. Ali Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian: A Political Biography of Ali Shariʿati (London: I.B.Tauris, 1998), p. 299. 49. Pu¯rya¯ Ha¯jı¯za¯dih, and Pardı¯s Ha¯jı¯za¯dih (eds), A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯ (Tehran: Intisha¯ra¯t-i ˙ ˙ Ja¯mihdara¯n, 2003), p. 31. 50. Rahnema, An Islamic Utopian, p. 300. 51. Kamarava, ‘Iranian Shi’ism’, p. 59. 52. Wright, The Last Great Revolution, p. 42.

NOTES

TO PAGES

35 – 40

153

53. Robin Wright, ‘The challenge of Iran’, in Robin Wright (ed.), The Iranian Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 5. 54. Abdolkarim Soroush, Bast al-Tajruba al-Nabawiyya (Beirut: Muʾassat al˙˙ Intisha¯r al-ʿArabı¯, 2009), p. 143. 55. Ibid., p. 129. 56. Ibid., p. 164. 57. Mahmoud Sadri, ‘Sacral defense of secularism: the political theologies of Soroush, Shabestari, and Kadivar’, International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society 15 (2) (2001), p. 259. 58. Mahmoud Sadri and Ahmad Sadri, Reason, Freedom, and Democracy in Islam: Essential Writings of Abdolkarim Soroush (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 31. 59. Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran, p. 27. 60. Ibid., p. 71. 61. Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran: Abdolkarim Soroush, Religious Politics and Democratic Reform (London/ New York; I.B.Tauris, 2008), p. 225. Also see: Abdolkarim Soroush, Al-sira¯ta¯t ˙ ˙ Al-mustaqı¯ma: Qira¯ʾa Jadida li Nazariyya al-Taʿadudiyya Al-diniyya (Beirut: ˙ Muʾassat al-Intisha¯r al-ʿArabı¯, 2009). 62. Geneive Abdo and Jonathan Lyons, Answering Only to God: Faith and Freedom in Twenty-First-Century Iran (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2003), p. 128. 63. Mohsen Kadivar, Haqq al-Na¯s, available at http://kadivar.com/?p¼7319 ˙ (Accessed 7 May 2012). 64. Yasuyuki Matsunaga, ‘Human rights and new jurisprudence in Mohsen Kadivar’s advocacy of “new-thinker” Islam’, Die Welt des Islams, 51 (2011), pp. 364, available at http://en.kadivar.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/ WDI-Matsunaga-Human-Rights-2011.pdf (Accessed 12 March 2011). 65. Ibid. 66. Ibid., p. 376. 67. ‘Naskh’, Oxford Islamic Studies Online, available at http://www.oxfordislamic studies.com/article/opr/t125/e1721 (Accessed October 13 2015). Therefore, Kadivar wants to apply the same concept to jurisprudence by indicating that some rules in fiqh can be abrogated if they contradict with the basic principles of human rights. 68. Matsunaga, ‘Human rights and new jurisprudence’, p. 372. 69. Ibid., p. 376. 70. Ibid., p. 377. 71. Kadivar, Az Islam-i Tarı¯khı¯ ta¯ Islam-i Maʿnavı¯’?, p. 430. 72. Matsunaga, ‘Human rights and new jurisprudence’, p. 377. 73. Kadivar, Az Islam-i Tarı¯khı¯ ta¯ Islam-i Maʿnavı¯’?, p. 430. 74. Matsunaga, ‘Human rights and new jurisprudence’, pp. 371 – 2. 75. Mehran Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 162.

154

NOTES TO PAGES 40 – 44

76. Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran, p. 150. 77. Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, p. 162. 78. The court functions independently of the regular framework and is accountable only to the supreme leader. Its decisions or sentences are ‘final and cannot be appealed’. See: ‘The structure of power in Iran: an overview of the Iranian government and political system’, Frontline, available at www.pbs. org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/tehran/inside/govt.html (Accessed on 29 April 2012). 79. Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran, p. 30. 80. Ibid. 81. Guftigu¯-yi ʿIna¯yat Fa¯nı¯ ba¯ Hassan Yousofi Eshkevari 1, July 2011, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼lOzERU3Gdaw (Accessed 15 May 2012). 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran, p. 83. 85. Ibid., p. 75. 86. Ibid., p. 77. 87. Ibid., p. 85. 88. Ibid., p. 86. 89. Ibid., p. 89. 90. Ibid., p. 92. 91. Mehran Kamrava, ‘Iranian Shi’ism at the gate of historic change’, in Mehran Kamrava (ed.), Innovation in Islam: Traditions and Contributions (Berkeley/Los Angeles, California: University of California Press, 2011), p. 61. 92. Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran, p. 115. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid., p. 117. 95. Ibid., p. 122. 96. Ibid. 97. Ibid. 98. Abdo and Lyons, Answering Only to God, p. 43. 99. Ibid., p.138. 100. De Bellaigue, The Struggle for Iran, p. 32. 101. Ibid., p. 33. 102. Abdo and Lyons, Answering Only to God, p. 143. 103. Ibid., p. 142. 104. Ibid. 105. al-Naeimi, Al-Fikr al-Siya¯sı¯ al-Iranı¯, p. 182. 106. Charles Paul Freund, ‘Liberal martyrdom in Iran’, Reason, 34 (9) (2003) pp. 18–19. 107. The call for Islamic protestantism: Dr. Hashem Aghajari’s speech and subsequent death sentence, MEMRI, December 2002, available at www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/ 0/0/0/0/770.htm#complete (Accessed on April 29, 2012). 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid.

NOTES 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120.

121. 122. 123. 124.

125. 126.

127. 128. 129.

TO PAGES

44 – 49

155

Ibid. Ibid. Ha¯jı¯za¯dih and Ha¯jı¯za¯dih, A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯, p. 45. ˙ ˙ Vali Nasr, The Shia Revival: How Conflicts within Islam will Shape the Future (New York: Norton, 2006), p. 71. Ibid. MEMRI, The call for Islamic protestantism. Kamarava, ‘Iranian Shi’ism’, p. 64. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 65. Anna Mahjar-Barducci, ‘The Chain Murders of Iran’, Gatestone Institute, December 2008, available from http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/144/thechain-murders-of-iran (Accessed 4 May 2012). De Bellaigue, The Struggle for Iran, p. 45. Akbar Ganji: Qurʾan Kala¯m-i Khuda¯ Nı¯st, August 2011, available at www. youtube.com/watch?v¼8RzyO0ktNOs (Accessed 4 May 2012). Matn-i Ka¯mil-i Sukhana¯n-i Janja¯lı¯-yi Shabastarı¯, Tabnak, February 2008, available at www.tabnak.ir/pages/?cid¼38531. (Accessed 4 May 2012). Mehdi Khalaji, ‘Politics and the clergy’, in Robin Wright (ed.), The Iranian Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 29. Kamrava, Iran’s Intellectual Revolution, p. 60. Tehran University political science professor Sadegh Zibakalam slams Iranian regime for its anti-American policies during Iranian TV debate, MEMRI, May 2009, available at www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/2114.htm (Accessed 4 May 2012). Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, p. 118. Mir-Hosseini and Tapper, Islam and Democracy in Iran, p. 33. Guftigu¯-yi ʿIna¯yat Fa¯nı¯ ba¯ Hassan Yousofi Eshkevari 2, July 2011, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼tFX5-pmB8wk (Accessed 15 May 2012).

Chapter 4 The Hardline Conservatives: Their Roots and Tenure 1. See: Lutfullah A¯jda¯nı¯, Ruwshanfikra¯n-i Iran Dar ʿAsr-i Mashru¯tiyyat (Tehran: ˙ ˙ ˙ Akhtara¯n, 1387 [2008–9]), and Fara¯marz Muʿtamid Dizfu¯lı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh-i Andı¯shah-yi Jadı¯d-i Ira¯nı¯: Safarna¯miha¯-yi Ira¯niya¯n Bih Farang – Daftar-i Avval: A¯yinih A¯vira¯n va ʿAsr-i Ru¯ya¯ru¯yı¯ Ba¯ Gharb (Tehran: Shı¯ra¯zih, 1390 ˙ [2011–12]). 2. Ali Gheissari, Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), p. 15. 3. Ibid., p. 14.

156

NOTES

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49 –52

4. Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet, ‘Cultures of Iranianness: the evolving polemic of Iranian nationalism’, in Nikki Keddie and Rudi Matthee (eds), Iran and the Surrounding World: Interaction in Culture and Cultural Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002), pp. 165– 6. 5. Sadiq Zı¯ba¯kala¯m dar Muwrid-i Khadama¯t-i Riz˙a¯ Shah – Qismat-i Avval, March, ˙ 2010, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼JJ0JLNScdjs&feature¼related (Accessed 16 May 2012). 6. Stephen Kinzer, Reset: Iran, Turkey, and America’s Future (New York: Times Books, 2010), p. 78. 7. Michael Rubin, Into the Shadows: Radical Vigilantes in Khatami’s Iran (Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2001), p. 5. 8. Ahmad Kasravı¯, Ha¯jı¯ha¯-yi Anba¯rda¯r Chih Dı¯nı¯ Da¯ra¯nd (Tehran: Payma¯n, 1324 [1945]), p. 3. 9. Sohrab Behdad, ‘Islamic utopia in pre-revolutionary Iran: Navvab Safavi and the Fada’Ian-e Eslam’, Middle Eastern Studies 33 (1) (1997), p. 42. 10. Rubin, Into the Shadows, p. 6. 11. Mujtaba¯ Navva¯b Safavı¯ and Ha¯dı¯ Khusruwsha¯hı¯, Fada¯’iya¯n-i Islam: Ta¯rı¯kh, ˙ ʿAmalkard, Andı¯shih (Tehran: Intisha¯ra¯t-i Ittila¯ʾa¯t, 1996), p. 48. ˙˙ 12. Behdad, ‘Islamic utopia in pre-revolutionary Iran’, p. 45. 13. Rubin, Into the Shadows, pp. 7– 9. 14. This radical discourse and the actions of Navva¯b were supported by some clerics, especially those who helped him to travel to Iran from Iraq, where he was attending the Hawza. Some clerics in Najaf gave him their fatwas to kill ˙ Kasravı¯. In addition, his trip was financed by some other clerics, such as Seyyid Asadullah Madanı¯, who became a member of the Assembly of Experts to draft the constitution of Iran after the revolution, and Ayatollah Abulqa¯sim Mu¯savı¯ Ku¯ʾı¯, who became a major source of emulation for the Shiʿa in the 1970s and 1980s. Behdad, ‘Islamic Utopia in Pre-Revolutionary Iran’, pp. 43 – 4. 15. The desire to deforeignise Iran has its roots in Iran’s history. Throughout its history, Iran has had many disputes and conflicts with many countries. As a result of these conflicts, Iran lost parts of its territory, such as a portion of Azerbaijan and Herat. In the twentieth century, Iran was divided into three zones of influence. The northern part was controlled by Russians, the southern by the British, and the middle by the Iranian government. Foreigners intervened in Iranian affairs for most of the twentieth century. 16. Behdad, ‘Islamic utopia in pre-revolutionary Iran’, p. 53. 17. Ibid. 18. Safavı¯ and Khusruwsha¯hı¯, Fada¯’iya¯n-i Islam, p. 66. ˙ 19. Ibid., p. 70. 20. Ibid., p. 71. 21. Ibid. 22. Ibid., p. 72. 23. Behdad, ‘Islamic utopia in pre-revolutionary Iran’, pp. 56 – 7.

NOTES

TO PAGES

52 –56

157

24. Shaha¯dat-i Navva¯b Safavı¯ va Ya¯ra¯nash, Markaz-i Asna¯d-i Inqila¯b-i Isla¯mı¯, [n.d.] ˙ available at www.irdc.ir/fa/calendar/89/default.aspx (Accessed 20 October 2014). 25. Dast Nivishti-yi Rahbar-I Inqila¯b Dar Tajlı¯l az Shahı¯d Navva¯b Safavı¯, Khamenei.ir, ˙ Diy 1389 [January 2011], available at http://farsi.khamenei.ir/photo-album?id ¼8587#90617 (Accessed 20 October 2014). 26. Imam Khomeini, Kashf al-Asra¯r (Kuwait: Maktabat al-Faqı¯h; Lebanon: Da¯r al-Mahajja al-Bayda¯ʾ, 2000), pp. 9 – 10. ˙ 27. Behdad, ‘Islamic utopia in pre-revolutionary Iran’, p. 60. 28. Rubin, Into the Shadows, p. 11. 29. William (Bill) Abbas Samii, ‘Iran’, in Barry M Rubin (ed.), Guide to Islamist Movements (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), p. 254. 30. Rubin, Into the Shadows, p. 15. 31. Ibid., pp. 31, 44. 32. Ibid., pp. 45. 33. Dı¯ru¯z Imru¯z Farda¯ – Dr. Allah-Karam, July 2010, available at vimeo.com/ 14412696 (Accessed 5 June 2012). 34. Ibid. 35. Mehdi Moslem, Factional Politics in Post-Khomeini Iran (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2002), p. 135. 36. Roy Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 2. 37. Ibid. 38. Hamid Dabashi, Iran: A People Interrupted (New York: The New Press, 2007), p. 233. 39. Roy Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution: Iran and the World in the Age of the Ayatollahs (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 227. 40. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, p. 33. 41. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 149. 42. Ibid. 43. Takeyh, Hidden Iran, p. 22. 44. Ibid., p. 35. 45. Takeyh, Guardians of the Revolution, p. 223. 46. Ibid., p. 226. 47. Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: the Secret History of Iran’s Radical Leader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 73. 48. Ahmadinejad ‘Set for Iran Victory’: Opposition candidate alleges fraud as incumbent president heads to landslide win, Aljazeera.com, June 2009, available at www. aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2009/06/2009612195749149733.html (Accessed 14 May 2012). 49. Hooman Majd, The Ayatollahs’ Democracy: an Iranian Challenge (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2010), p. 4. 50. Ibid., pp. 4 – 5.

158

NOTES

TO PAGES

56 –58

51. Robert F. Worth and Nazila Fathi, ‘Both sides claim victory in presidential election in Iran’, New York Times, June 2009, available at www.nytimes.com/ 2009/06/13/world/middleeast/13iran.html?_r¼1 (Accessed 14 May 2012). 52. Abbas Milani, ‘The Green Movement’, in Robin Wright (ed.), The Iranian Primer: Power, Politics, and U.S. Policy (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2010), p. 41. 53. Ali M. Ansari, Crisis of Authority: Iran’s 2009 Presidential Election (London: Chatham House, 2010), p. 2. 54. Iran’s supreme leader Ali Khamenei in Tehran Friday sermon: those idiots thought they could organize a Velvet Revolution in Iran, like in Georgia, MEMRI TV, June 2009, available at www.memritv.org/clip_transcript/en/ 2151.htm (Accessed 10 May 2012). 55. Khamenei az Nisbat Da¯dan-i Ramma¯li bi Raʾı¯s-i Duwlat Intiqa¯d Kard. May 2011, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼uiei3O5-hgQ (Accessed 8 May 2012). 56. Matn-i Ka¯mil va Ta¯svı¯r-i Na¯mih-yi Rahbar-i Muʿazzam-i Inqila¯b Khita¯b bih Hujja¯tul Islam Muslihı¯, Mehr News, Farvardı¯n 1390 [April 2011], available at ˙ ˙ www.mehrnews.com/fa/newsdetail.aspx?NewsID¼1293692 (Accessed 27 June 2012). 57. Rahbar-i Inqila¯b bih Duwlat Ija¯zih Nadad Muslihı¯ ra Azl Kunad, Kayhan, ˙ ˙ Farvardı¯n, 1390 [April, 2012], available at http://kayhannews.ir/900130/2. htm#other202 (Accessed 27 June 2012). 58. Jida¯l-i Ayatollah Khamenei va Jarya¯n-i Niza¯mı¯ – Amniyyatı¯ Ha¯mi Rahı¯m ˙ Masha¯ʾı¯, RealIran.net, April 2012, available at www.realiran.net/news/pl/ 4637 (Accessed 27 June 2012). 59. Nooshabeh Amiri, ‘Cleric Shojooni tells Rooz: Ahmadinejad to have same fate as Bani-Sadr’, Roozonline, April 2011, available at www.roozonline.com/englis h/news3/newsitem/archive/2011/april/26/article/ahmadinejad-to-have-samefate-as-bani-sadr.html (Accessed 27 June 2012). 60. Ba¯hunar: Tarh-i Suʾa¯l az Ahmadinejad Rasmiyyat Ya¯ft, BBC Persian, October ˙ ˙ 2011, available at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2011/10/111030_l39_bahon ar_question_ahmadinejad.shtml (Accessed 6 November 2011). 61. The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Iran, available at www.iranchamber.com/ government/laws/constitution_ch06.php (Accessed 8 November 2011). 62. Hossein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, ‘Chih kisa¯nı¯ Ba¯yad ʿAzl Shavand?’, Kayhan, Farvardı¯n 1390 [March 2011], available at www.kayhannews.ir/900130/2.htm #other201 (Accessed 5 June 2012). 63. Thomas Erdbrink, ‘Member of Ahmadinejad circle arrested in Iran’, Washington Post, June 2011, available at www.washingtonpost.com/world/ member-of-ahmadinejad-circle-arrested-in-iran/2011/06/23/AG8hBQhH_s tory.html (Accessed 12 July 2012). 64. Parisa Hafezi and Hashem Kalantari, ‘Khamenei allies trounce Ahmadinejad in Iran election’, Reuters, March 2012, available at www.reuters.com/article/ 2012/03/04/us-iran-election-result-idUSTRE82306420120304 (Accessed 12 July 2012).

NOTES 65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

70.

71.

72.

73.

74.

75.

76. 77. 78. 79.

80.

TO PAGES

58 – 61

159

Dr Allah-Karam, Dı¯ru¯z Imru¯z Farda¯, July 2010. Ibid. Naji, Ahmadinejad, p. 46. Ansari, Crisis of Authority, p. 16. ‘Hushda¯r-i Shadı¯d-i Ayatollah Misba¯h Nisbat bih Fitnih-yi Jadı¯d: Harfha¯-yi ˙ ˙ Millı¯ Gira¯yı¯, A¯n Ha¯m Dar Zama¯nı¯ Kih Nihz˙at-i Islami Dar Jaha¯n Dar Ha¯l-i Shikl Gı¯rı¯ Ast, Bara¯-yi Chı¯st?’ Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Farvardı¯n 31, 1390 [April 10 2011], p. 2. Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯: Dalı¯l-i Hima¯yat-i Bandih az Jibhih-yi Pa¯yda¯rı¯ Wuru¯d ˙ ˙ va Qara¯r Giriftan-i Afra¯d-i salihtar dar Raʾas-i Ka¯r bu¯d / Hifa¯zat az Dı¯n va ˙ ˙ ˙ Dastu¯rha¯-yi Inqila¯b Muhimtarı¯n Vazı¯fih-yi Nama¯yandiga¯n-i Muntakhab Ast, The ˙ Front for the Islamic Revolution Stability, Urdı¯bihisht 1391 [May 2012], available at www.jebhepaydari.ir/main/print.php?UID¼889300 (Accessed 13 July 2012). Katu¯zya¯n: Masha¯ʾı¯ Hida¯yatgar-i Pinha¯ni-i Jibhih-iy Pa¯yda¯rı¯ Hast, Entekhab, Murda¯d 1390 [August 2011], available at www.entekhab.ir/fa/print/35313 (Accessed 23 May 2012). Shiba¯hata¯-yi Fihrist-i Ha¯miya¯n-i Masha¯ʾı¯ ba¯ Fihrist-i Pa¯yda¯rı¯, Alef News, Isfand 1390 [February 2012], available at http://alef.ir/prtjvievyuqexvz.fsfu. html (Accessed 12 July 2012). Pu¯stir-i Ka¯ndı¯dha¯-yi Jibhih-yi Pa¯yda¯rı¯-yi Inqila¯b-i Islami, Raja News, Isfand 1390 [February 2012], available at www.rajanews.com/detail.asp?id¼118061 (Accessed 12 July 2012). Aʿz˙a¯-yi Jibhih-yi Pa¯yda¯rı¯ ba¯ Masha¯ʾı¯ Nı¯stand / Pay gı¯rı¯-yi Qaza¯yı¯ Mi kunı¯m, Majlesenohom.ir, Isfand 1390 [February 2012], available at http://majles enohom.ir/1390/12/‫ﺍﻋﻀﺎﯼ‬-‫ﺟﳢﻪ‬-‫ﭘﺎﯾﺪﺍﺭﯼ‬-‫ﺑﺎ‬-‫ﻣﺸﺎﯾﯽ‬-‫ﻧﯿﺴﺘﻨﺪ‬/ (Accessed 12 July 2012). A¯ya¯ ‘Haft-i Subh’ Ma¯l-i ‘Masha¯ʾı¯’ Ast?, Etedaal.ir, April 2011, available at ˙ ˙ www.etedaal.ir/news/2362/default.aspx (Accessed 11 June 2012); see also Ru¯zna¯mih-yi Masha¯ʾı¯: Fisha¯rı¯ Shadı¯dı¯ Bara¯-yi Ba¯zda¯sht-i Masha¯ʾı¯ Va¯rid Shudih Ast, Rahesabz.net, May 2011, available at http://www.rahesabz.net/story/ 37210/ (Accessed 10 June 2012); see also Kava¯kibiya¯n: Mana¯biʿ-i Ma¯lı¯-yi Pu¯lha¯yı¯ kih Masha¯ʾı¯ bih Ru¯zna¯mih-yi Haft-i Subh Midahad Kuja¯st?, Entekhab. ˙ ˙ ir, May 2011, available at www.entekhab.ir/fa/news/25412. (Accessed 10 June 2012). Haft-i Subh, Khurda¯d 4 1391 [24 May 2012], issue 307. ˙ ˙ Ettelaat, Khurda¯d 4 1391 [24 May 2012], available at www.ettelaat.com/ etHomeEdition/thursday/p1.pdf (Accessed 30 May 2012). Haft-i Subh, Shahrı¯var 15 1390 [6 September 2011], issue 108. ˙ ˙ Jam-e Jam, Khurda¯d 4 1391 [24 May 2012], issue 3419, available at http:// jamejamonline.ir/Media/pdfs/1391/03/03/100812763848.pdf (Accessed 30 May 2012). It is important to mention that other issues of the newspaper may have published photos of the supreme leader on the front page, however I was not

160

81.

82.

83.

84. 85. 86. 87.

88.

89. 90.

NOTES

TO PAGES

61 – 67

able to take a look at them. I was able to obtain 245 issues from issue numbers 45 to 308. None had a picture of the supreme leader on the first page. It can be argued that issues from 1 to 44 and some other missing issues might have had a picture of Ali Khamenei on the front page. This is a legitimate argument, but those issues account for 20 per cent of all issues of the newspaper. Therefore, if we argue that they all published a photo of the supreme leader on the front page, they still represent less than a quarter of the issues, which suggests that the overall policy of the newspaper is to not focus on the supreme leader in the same way that other daily conservative newspapers do. Masha¯ʾı¯ Dar Mara¯sim-i Ikhtita¯myyih-yi Hama¯yish-i Iranian-i Mu¯qim-i Kha¯rij az ˙ Kishvar: Hadaf-i ma¯ az ¯ın Pas Muʿarrafı¯-yi ‘Maktab-i Iran’ Ast nih ‘Maktab-i Islam’, Fars News Agency, Murda¯d 1389 [August 2010], available at www.fars news.com/printable.php?nn¼8905130174 (Accessed 12 May 2012). Kourosh Rahimkhani, ‘Esfandiar Rahim Mashaei: Iran’s next president?’, Tehran Bureau, March 2011, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/ tehranbureau/2011/03/esfandiar-rahim-mashaei-irans-next-president.html (Accessed 13 July 2012). Pı¯sh Bı¯nı¯-yi Zı¯ba¯kala¯m, Masha¯ʾı¯ Isla¯h Talaba¯n va ʾUsu¯lgara¯ya¯nra¯ Jalb Miku¯nad / ˙ ˙ ˙ Sala¯hiyyatish ba¯ Hukm-i Huku¯mati Ta’yı¯d Mı¯shavad, Khabar Online, Diy 1389 ˙ ˙ ˙ [January 2011], available at www.khabaronline.ir/detail/124651/ (Accessed 13 July 2012). ‘Jarya¯n-i Inhira¯fı¯ Muwzı¯ Dar Sadad-i Na¯bu¯dı¯-yi Hastih-yi Aslı¯-yi Inqila¯b-i ˙ ˙ ˙ Islami Ast’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Urdı¯bihisht 21 1390 [11 May 2011], p. 4. Naji, Ahmadinejad, p. 46. Ibid., p. 47. Yossi Melman and Meir Javedanfar, The Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran: Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and the State of Iran (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2007), p. 17. Riz˙a¯ Sanʿatı¯, Guftima¯n-i Misbah: Guza¯rishı¯ az Zindiga¯nı¯-yi ʻImı¯ va Siya¯si-i ˙ ˙ ˙ Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ (Tehran: Markaz-i Asna¯d-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, 2008), ˙ ˙ p. 879. Bası¯j Asatı¯d, Ravand-i Shikl Gı¯rı¯-yi Sa¯zma¯n-i Bası¯j Asatı¯d, available at www. basijasatid.ir/?q¼print/903 (Accessed 1 June 2012). Sanʿatı¯, Guftima¯n-i Misbah, p. 879. ˙ ˙ ˙

Chapter 5 The Hardline Conservatives’ Ideology Section I 1. Velayat Faghih Rahimpurazghandi (P1), December 2011, available at www. youtube.com/watch?v¼wWgOa3KnzKw (Accessed 2 June 2012). 2. Muhammad-Taqı¯ Misba¯h Yazdı¯, Maʿna¯ va Mabna¯-yi Vila¯yat-i Faqı¯h, April ˙ ˙ 2010, available at http://mesbahyazdi.com/farsi/?speeches/lectures/velayat_ 1389/23-01-89.htm (Accessed 18 May 2012). 3. Ibid.

NOTES

TO PAGES

67 – 70

161

4. Behrooz Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran: Abdolkarim Soroush, Religious Politics and Democratic Reform (London/ New York; I.B.Tauris, 2008), p. 145. 5. Ibid. 6. Ibid. 7. Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: the Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 147. 8. Ibid., p. 147. 9. Ibid., p. 148. 10. Ibid. 11. Eva Patricia Rakel, Power, Islam, and Political Elite in Iran: a Study on the Iranian Political Elite from Khomeini to Ahmadinejad (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2009), p. 32. 12. Ali M. Ansari, Iran, Islam, and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (London: Chatham House, 2006), p. 56. 13. Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini, p. 154. 14. Ibid. 15. Ibid. 16. Ibid. 17. The other school of jurisprudence within Shiʿism is known as the Ikhba¯rı¯s. They believe that people should follow ‘the Qurʾan and the oral reports of the Prophet and the Imams’. Therefore, these are the main sources of law for them. The Usulis, in contrast, believe that there is a need to add another source, which is the consensus of the jurisprudents. In addition, the Usulis believe that people must follow one of the jurists as sources of law. See: Juan Cole, Sacred Space and Holy War: the Politics, Culture and History of Shi’ite Islam (London: I.B.Tauris, 2005), p. 66. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Vila¯yat-i faqı¯h: Bar Giriftih az Baya¯na¯t-i Haz˙rat-i Imam Khomeini – Quddisa ˙ Sirruh – , Rahbar-i Inqila¯b – Madda Zilluhu Al-ʿa¯lı¯ – va ʿulama¯y-i Aʿla¯m (Iran: _ Kita¯b-i Farda¯, 1391 [2012 – 13]), p. 72. 21. Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 66. 22. Sayyid Mukhta¯r Mu¯savı¯, ‘Khat-i Ası¯l-i Ila¯hı¯ Tabaʿiyya¯t-i Mahz˙ az Vila¯yat’, Ya¯ ˙ ˙ Litha¯ra¯t, Urdı¯bihisht 28 1390 [18 May 2011], p. 10. 23. Ibid. 24. ‘Vila¯yat Asa¯s-i Niza¯mi’, Shalamchih, Isfand 1376 [February/March 1998], ˙ p. 4. 25. ‘Juzʾiyya¯tı¯ az Zindigı¯-yi Maqa¯m-i Vila¯yat’, Shalamchih, Isfand 1376 [February/ March 1998], p. 4. 26. Ahza¯b: Z˙aru¯rat-i Taka¯mul, Hamshahri Online, Diy 1375 [December 1996], ˙ available at www.hamshahrionline.ir/hamnews/1375/751009/maqal7.htm (Accessed 23 May 2012).

162

NOTES

TO PAGES

70 –73

27. ‘Vila¯yat-i Faqı¯h Mashru¯t bih Shart Nı¯st’, Shalamchih, Isfand 1375 [December, ˙ ˙ 1996], p. 2. 28. Ibid. 29. ‘Baya¯niyyih-yi Bası¯j-i Da¯nishju¯-yi Da¯nishga¯h-i A¯za¯d-i Islami Wa¯hid-i Junu¯bi Tehran’, Shalamchih, A¯zar 1376 [November/December 1997], p. 3. 30. ‘Tajammuʿ-i Hizbulla¯h-i Kermanshah’, Shalamchih, Bahman 1376 [January/ ˙ February 1998], p. 3. 31. ‘Sharh-i Ma¯jira¯’, Shalamchih, Urdı¯bihisht 1377 [April/May 1998], p. 9. ˙ 32. ‘Nakunad Makr-i Banı¯ Saʿidih Tikra¯r Shavad kih Ali dar Qafas-i ˙ Kha¯nih Girifta¯r Shavad’, Shalamchih, Urdı¯bihisht 1377 [April/May 1998], pp. 8 – 9. 33. Khutbih-yi 1 Nama¯z Jumʿih-yi Ta¯rı¯khı¯ Khurda¯d 1388 bih Ima¯mat-i Rahbar 1/3 ˙ (1/10), May 2010, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼WMSI9k6KvNg &list¼UUh7yNe8dK37gDLx2_QojWlQ&index¼2&feature¼plcp (Accessed May 15, 2012). 34. Ma¯ Ahl-i Kufa Nı¯stı¯m Ali Tanha¯ Bima¯nat, Hawzah.net, Murda¯d 1388 [July 2009], available at www.hawzah.net/fa/magart.html?MagazineID¼0&Magazi neNumberID¼7005&MagazineArticleID¼84845 (Accessed 17 September 2012). 35. Hussein Qa¯dya¯nı¯, Na¯mih-yı¯ bih Imam Khamenei: A¯qa¯ ra¯ az Har Taraf Bikha¯nı¯ ˙ A¯qa¯st, Khurda¯d 1391 [May 2012], available at www.kayhannews.ir/910311/ 14.htm#other1404 (Accessed 1 June 2012). 36. Furu¯gh Parva¯zih, ‘ʿIshq bih Vila¯yat ʿIshq bih Hamih Khu¯bı¯ Ha¯st’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, A¯zar 10 1389 [1 December 2010], p. 10. 37. Gru¯h-i Pila¯k-i Hasht, Ma¯ Ahl-i Kufa Nı¯stı¯m Ali Tanha¯ Bima¯nat, September 2011, available at http://gpelake8.blogfa.com/1390/07 (Accessed 4 June 2011). 38. Shiʿa believe that before the end of the world, the Mahdi will appear and get revenge for the events in Karbala. Therefore, the idea of revenge has been in the mindset of the Shiʿa for centuries, and their major slogan in this regard is Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t. 39. More will be said about the Khura¯sa¯nı¯, his support for the Mahdi, and the signs before the reappearance of the Twelfth Imam. 40. Ma¯ Ahl-i Kufa Nı¯stı¯m, January 2010, available at www.youtube.com/watch? v¼LcvQ9fhpZh4 (Accessed 23 May 2012). 41. The article is about Ayatollah Nakati’s thoughts, which were organised by the Shalamchih newspaper after his death. For Nakati, it was important to obey the supreme leader, and he gave an example of how disobeying him might affect a person’s life. He says that there was a cleric who disagreed with Ayatollah Mirza Shirazi, who issued the fatwa against smoking. ‘When Shirazi knew that, he cursed him, and his sons did not become clerics’. See Issue: 1st year, 1st half, 13 Murda¯d 1376, pp. 10– 11. 42. Hama¯yish-i Pa¯sda¯sht-i Maqa¯m-i Imam Ha¯dı¯ al-Naqı¯ Hizbulla¯h Cyber, May 2012, ˙ available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼enny8UvIa6Q (Accessed 30 May 2012). 43. Ibid.

NOTES

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74 –78

163

44. Riz˙a¯ Sanʿatı¯, Guftima¯n-i Misbah: Guza¯rishı¯ az Zindiga¯nı¯-yi ʻImı¯ va Siya¯si-i Ayatollah ˙ ˙ ˙ Misba¯h Yazdı¯ (Tehran: Markaz-i Asna¯d-i Inqila¯b-i Islami, 2008), p. 561. ˙ ˙ 45. Ibid., p. 619. 46. Ibid., pp. 619 – 21. 47. Ibid., p. 621. 48. Ibid. 49. Ayatollah Java¯dı¯ A¯mulı¯, ‘ı¯n Harfha¯-yi Za¯hirı¯ va Ru¯sha¯nfikrı¯ Chı¯st?’, ˙ ˙ Shalamchih, A¯zar 1375 [November/December 1996], p. 7. 50. Sanʿatı¯, Guftima¯n-i Misbah, p. 621. ˙ ˙ ˙ 51. Ibid., pp. 549 – 50. 52. Ibid., p. 550. 53. ‘Ma¯nifı¯st-i ʾUsu¯lgara¯ya¯n Bira¯-yi Intikha¯ba¯t-i Majlis dar Dı¯da¯r-i Ayatollah Misba¯h ba Shu¯ra¯-yi Jibhih-yi Markazı¯-yi Pa¯ydarı¯ Matrah Shud’, 9 Diy, Bahman ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 8 1390 [28 January 2012], p. 1. 54. Sanʿatı¯, Guftima¯n-i Misbah, p. 612. ˙ ˙ ˙ 55. Ibid., p. 646. 56. Velayat Faghih Rahimpurazghandi (P2), December 2011, available at www. youtube.com/watch?v¼9CcyOpJWtT4&feature¼channel&list¼UL (Accessed 2 June 2012). 57. Sayyid Muhammad Java¯d Abtahı¯, ‘Bara¯-yi Muba¯rizih ba¯ bı¯ Tafa¯wutı¯ Ba¯yad ˙ ˙ Ru¯hiyyih-yi Tahlı¯l va Muta¯labih Garı¯ az Masʾu¯la¯n Ihya¯ Shavad’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, ˙ ˙ Shahrı¯var 30, 1390 [September 21, 2011], p. 5. 58. Yadullah Shahibzadeh, Posts tagged ‘Mousavi’: The implication of the new election law in Iran, September 2010, available at http://gulfunit.wordpress.com/tag/ mousavi/ (Accessed 3 June 2012). 59. Velayat Faghih Rahimpurazghandi (P2). 60. Kası¯ kih Vila¯yat-i faqı¯h ra¯ Tashrı¯fa¯tı¯ Bida¯nat Murtad Ast, January 2010, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼Y-cZmQ6vtMg&feature¼related (Accessed 30 May 2012). 61. Velayat Faghih Rahimpurazghandi (P2). 62. Shukhana¯n-i A¯qa¯-yi Pana¯hiya¯n Dar Muwrid-i Fitnih 4, December 2010, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼oOAzjCRAgWg&feature¼relmfu (Accessed 30 May 2012). 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid. 65. Sheikh Abbas Qomi, Mafa¯tı¯h Al-Jina¯n (Qom: Shaha¯b al-Dı¯n Publications, ˙ 1382 [2004]), p. 751. 66. ‘Silmun Liman Sa¯lamakum Khamenei . . . Harbun Liman Ha¯rabakum ˙ ˙ Khamenei’, Jibhih, Bahman 23 1378 [12 February 2000], p. 16. 67. Moharram is the month in the Islamic calendar in which Imam Hussein was killed. 68. Shalamchih, Khurda¯d 1376 [May/June 1997], p. 16. 69. It should be mentioned that the office of the supreme leader criticised this slogan and asserted that people should sacrifice their life for Islam and not for

164

70. 71.

72.

73.

NOTES

TO PAGES

78 – 82

one person. See: Intiqa¯d-i Rahbar-i Inqila¯b az Shuʾa¯r-i Ja¯nam Fada¯-yi Rahbar, Alef.ir, April 2010, available at http://alef.ir/vdcg7x9qxak9nq4.rpra.html? 152182 (Accessed 4 June 2012). Fakha News, available at www.fakhanews.com/ (Accessed 30 May 2012). Khutbih-yi Valı¯ Amr-i Muslimı¯n dar Nima¯z-i Eid-i Fitr Sa¯l-i 88, Fakha News, ˙ ˙ available at http://fakhanews.com/index.php/the-community/1298 – 88.html (Accessed 4 June 2012). Valı¯ Amr-i Muslimı¯n-i Jaha¯n: Mutaja¯viz Khu¯dra¯ A¯ma¯dih Darya¯ft-i Sillı¯ha-yi Muhkam va Mushtiha¯-yi Pu¯la¯dı¯n Kunad, Fars News Agency, A¯ba¯n 1390 [November 2011], available at www.farsnews.com/printable.php?nn¼13900 820000165 (Accessed 1 July 2012). Velayat Faghih Rahimpurazghandi (P2).

Section II 1. ‘Iha¯nat bih Imam va Suku¯t-i Mashku¯k’, Shalamchih, A¯ba¯n 1376 [November 1997]. Also: Azı¯z Ghaz˙anfarı¯, ‘Rı¯shih-yi Hurmat Shikanı¯ ha¯-yi Akhı¯r Kuja¯st’, Kayhan, Diy 1388 [January 2011], available at www.kayhannews.ir/881027/ 12.htm (Accessed 15 June 2012). 2. Farza¯nih Pazirpu¯r, ‘Abdolkarim Soroush dar Musahibih ba¯ Ru¯z: ba¯ Rifira¯ndu¯m ˙ Ikhtiya¯ra¯t-i vila¯yat-i faqı¯h Hazf Shavad’, Roozonline, Bahman 1388 [February ˙ 2010], available at www.roozonline.com/persian/interview/interview-item/archi ve/2010/february/16/article/-507aacb774.html (Accessed 15 June 2012). 3. Ibid. 4. Said Amir Arjomand, After Khomeini: Iran under His Successors (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 77. 5. Paya¯m Faz˙lı¯nizha¯d, Artish-i Sirrı¯-yi Ruwshanfikra¯n (2): Kayhan va Niga¯h-i nuw: Arba¯b-i Halqiha¯ [The Secret Army of the Intellectuals (2): Kayhan and the New ˙ Perspective: The Heads of the Circle], January 2012), available at www.elaw.ir/ archives/news/2011/12/001174.php (Accessed 10 June 2012). 6. Ali Mirsepassi, Democracy in Modern Iran: Islam, Culture, and Political Change (New York: New York University Press, 2010), p. 139. 7. Ruhollah Khomeini and Hamid Algar, Islam and Revolution: Writings and Declarations of Imam Khomeini (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1981), p. 40. 8. Ibid., p. 43. 9. Ibid., p. 40. 10. Murtiz˙a¯ Ruwha¯nı¯, Vila¯yat-i Faqı¯h; Zuhu¯r-i Islamı¯-yi Na¯b-i Muhammadı¯, ˙ Khamenei.ir, Bahman 1388 [February 2010], available at http://farsi.kham enei.ir/print-content?id¼8916 (Accessed 15 June 2012). 11. See the front page of Shalamchih, issue 32, Khurda¯d 1377 [May/June 1998]. 12. Fa¯timih Rajabı¯, Ahmadinejad: Muʿjizih-yi Hiza¯r-yi Sivvum (Tehran: Da¯nishʾa¯mu¯z, 2006– 7), p. 16. 13. The first lecture of Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ on the role of religion in society. ˙ ˙ The series were called the ‘Gustirih-i Dı¯n’. 14. Sanʿatı¯, Guftima¯n-i Misbah, pp. 318– 19. ˙ ˙ ˙

NOTES

TO PAGES

82 –85

165

15. Paya¯m Faz˙lı¯nizha¯d, Artish-i Sirrı¯-yi Ruwshanfikra¯n (1): Marg-i Isla¯ha¯t, January ˙ ˙ 2012, available at www.elaw.ir/archives/news/2011/12/001173.php (Accessed 9 June 2012). 16. Faz˙lı¯nizha¯d, Artish-i Sirrı¯-yi Ruwshanfikra¯n (2). 17. ‘Dar Qom Chih Guzasht?’ Shalamchih, A¯zar 1376. [November/December, 1997], p. 5. 18. Ruwshanfikr-i Dı¯nı¯ Z˙aru¯rat-i Mujaddad 3 3/6, July 2010, available at www. youtube.com/watch?v¼ZpFXcJi5NI0&feature¼channel&list¼UL (Accessed 5 June 2012). 19. ‘Dar Qom Chih Guzasht?’ Shalamchih, A¯zar 1376, p. 5. 20. Dı¯ru¯z Imru¯z Farda¯ – Mudil ha¯-yi Dı¯nda¯rı¯, 2010, available at http://vimeo. com/12016862 (Accessed 5 June 2012). 21. Ibid. 22. Ruwshanfikr-i Dı¯nı¯ Z˙aru¯rat-i Mujaddad 1 1/5, January 2010, available at www. youtube.com/watch?v¼QGoalndHyCU&feature¼plcp (Accessed 8 June 2012). 23. Ibid. 24. Ruwshanfikr-i Dı¯nı¯ Z˙aru¯rat-i Mujaddad 1 1/5. 25. Nuktiha¯-yi Na¯b, vol. 4 (Iran: Daftar-i Nashr-i Maʿa¯rif, 2007), p. 49. ˙ 26. Ruwshanfikr-i Dı¯nı¯ Z˙aru¯rat-i Mujaddad 1 2/5, January 2010, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼FKC7lS-qWCE&feature¼channel&list¼UL (Accessed 8 June 2012). 27. Nuktiha¯-yi Na¯b, p. 50. ˙ 28. Rajabı¯, Ahmadinejad p. 59. 29. Amı¯r Hussein Askarı¯, ‘Ada¯-yi Dayn-i Isla¯h Talaba¯n bih Fı¯lsu¯fa¯n-i Libı¯ra¯l’, Ya¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ Litha¯ra¯t, A¯zar 24 1389 [15 December 2010], p. 10. 30. Ibid. 31. Yu¯suf-Ali Mı¯r-Shakka¯k, ‘Ruwshanfikrı¯-yi Islami Misl-i ʿAraq Furu¯shı¯-yi Islami Ast’, Shalamchih, Farvardı¯n 1377 [March 1998], p. 6. 32. Ibid. 33. Mu¯savı¯ Riz˙a¯ʾı¯, ‘Mula¯hiza¯tı¯ dar Ba¯b-i Ruwshanfikrı¯-yi Dı¯nı¯’, Shalamchih, A¯ba¯n ˙ ˙ 1377 [October 1998], p. 12. 34. Ibid. 35. Dar Pa¯sukh bih Istifta¯-yi Shiʿa News: Ayatollah Makarem Shirazi Hukm-i ˙ Irtida¯d-i Akbar Ganji ra¯ sa¯dir Kard, Al-Arabiya.net, October 2008, available ˙ at www.alarabiya.net/articles/2008/10/19/58516.html (Accessed 15 July 2012). 36. Ayatollah Nouri Hamidanı¯ is one of the main supporters of the supreme leader among the clerics in Qom. He is known for his slogans in favor of the supreme leader after the events of the elections in 2009. Ayatollah Hamidanı¯ issued a statement after the crisis of 2009 asserting that protecting the existence of the Islamic regime is an important issue that Iranians from different sectors should work for. He even stated that the protection of the current regime in Tehran is more obligatory than prayers. ‘Hifz-i Niza¯m Muhimtar az Nama¯z Ast’, Ya¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ Litha¯ra¯t, A¯ba¯n 24, 1389 [15 November 2010], p. 1.

166

NOTES

TO PAGES

85 –87

37. Baya¯niyyih-yi Soroush dar Va¯kunish bih Ahka¯m-i Irtida¯d va Tu¯hı¯n bih Muqaddisa¯t, BBC Persian, June 2012, available at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/06/ 120605_l39_soroush_apostasy_najafi.shtml (Accessed 27 June 2012). 38. Ibid. See also Alburz Mahmu¯dı¯, Soroush dar Intiza¯r-i Sarnivisht-i Salman ˙ Rushie?, Isfand 1386 [February/March, 2008], available at www.drsoroush. com/Persian/On_DrSoroush/P-CMO-Soroush-Roshdi.html (Accessed 29 June 2012). 39. ‘Istiqba¯l-i Bı¯nazı¯r-i Mardum-i Qom Natı¯jih-yi Qudrat-i Narm-i Niza¯m va ˙ ˙ Nisha¯nih-i Shikast-i Jang-i Narm-i Dushmana¯n Ast’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, A¯ba¯n 19, 1389 [10 November 2010], p. 5. 40. ‘Baya¯niyyih-yi Shuma¯rih-i 1: Faqtaʿ Da¯bir al-Qawm Allathı¯n Zalamu¯’, ˙ ˙ Shalamchih, A¯zar 1376, [November/December 1997], p. 8. 41. ‘Baya¯niyyih-yi Guru¯hı¯ az Tulla¯b-i Qom dar Khusu¯s-i Muntazarı¯’, Shalamchih, ˙ ˙ Diy 1376 [December 1997/January 1998], p. 3. 42. Ibid. 43. ‘Baya¯niyyih-yi Shuma¯rih-yi 1: Faqtaʿ Da¯bir al-Qawm Allathı¯n Zalamu¯. ˙ ˙ 44. ‘Da¯dga¯h-i Matbu¯ʿa¯tı¯-yi Risı¯digı¯ bih Shika¯yat az Ma¯hna¯mih-yi Du¯nya¯-yi ˙ Sukhan’, Shalamchih, Shahrı¯var 1376 [August/September 1997], p. 5. 45. Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran p. 220. 46. ‘Baya¯niyyih-yi Shuma¯rih-yi 2: wa Makaru¯ wa Makar Allah wa Allah Khayr alMa¯kirı¯n’, Shalamchih, A¯zar 1376 [November/December 1997], p. 8. 47. ‘Na¯mih-yi Guru¯hı¯ az Da¯nishju¯ya¯n-i Hizbulla¯h Khita¯b bih Vazı¯r-i Farhang va ˙ Irsha¯d-i Islami: A¯qa¯-yi Muhajira¯nı¯ Bida¯d-i Qurʾan Birası¯d’, Shalamchih, Shahrı¯var 1376 [September 1997], pp. 8 – 9. 48. ‘Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ dar Guftigu¯-yi Tafsı¯lı¯ Tashrı¯h Kardand Rava¯n˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ shina¯sı¯-yi Sara¯n-i Fitnih’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Diy 8 1389 [December 29 2010], p. 7. 49. Alexander Mikaberidze, Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia, vol. 1 (Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, 2011), p. 478. 50. ‘Rahbar-i Muʿazzam-i Inqila¯b: Siya¯sat-i Niza¯m Nisbat bih Jarya¯nha¯, Jazb-i ˙˙ Haddih-aksarı¯ va Dafʿ-i Haddih-aqallı¯ Ast’, Quds Daily, Shahrı¯var 1388 ˙ ˙ [September 2009], available at www.qudsdaily.com/archive/1388/pdf/6/ 88-06-21/02.pdf (Accessed 14 June 2012). 51. ‘Ahmadinejad: Sarzamı¯nih Amrı¯ka¯ ra Tahvı¯l-i Surkh Pu¯sta¯n Bidahand’, ˙ Farheekhtegan, Shahrı¯var 1388 [September 2009], available at www. farheekhtegan.ir/content/view/3046/1/ (Accessed 30 June 2012). 52. Mustafa¯ Ansa¯rı¯, ‘Khuru¯sh-i ʿAshu¯ra¯yı¯’, Kayhan, Diy 1390 [January 2012], ˙ available at www.kayhannews.ir/901011/12.htm (Accessed 14 June 2012). 53. Shukhana¯n-i A¯qa¯-yi Pana¯hiya¯n Dar Muwrid-i Fitnih 4, December 2010, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼oOAzjCRAgWg&feature¼relmfu (Accessed 30 May 2012). 54. Amı¯r Ha¯mid A¯za¯d, ‘Muha¯riba¯n-i ʿAshuraʾ 1431 ra Dar Sa¯lru¯z-i A¯n Iʿda¯m ˙ Kunı¯d’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, A¯zar 24 1389 [15 December 2010], p. 4. 55. ‘Sara¯n-i Fitnih Misda¯q-i Ba¯riz-i Ba¯ghı¯ va Muha¯riba¯nd’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Bahman ˙ 27 1389 [16 February 2011], p. 1.

NOTES

TO PAGES

88 – 89

167

56. Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, ‘Ghuba¯r-i Fitnih Kih Furu¯ mı¯ Nishı¯nad’, Kayhan, Murdad 1388 [July 2009] available at http://kayhannews.ir/880511/2.htm #other200 (Accessed 7 June 2012). 57. See Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, issue 612, pp. 1, 7 and issue 613, p. 7. 58. See: Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, issue 604, p. 10. 59. In contrast to other reformists, who boycotted the parliamentary elections in 2012, Khatami participated in the elections by voting. He saw his action as an attempt to protect the regime and the Islamic Republic. See: Pa¯sukh-i Khatami bih Muntiqida¯nish: Shirkat dar Intikha¯ba¯t az Muwuz˙iʿi-i Isla¯ha¯t bu¯d, ˙ ˙ BBC Persian, March 2012, available at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2012/ 03/120305_l23_khatami_reax_election_majlis09th_vote.shtml (Accessed 27 June 2012). 60. In a long report published in 9 Diy about Karru¯bı¯, a picture of him with Mu¯savı¯, Khatami and others was published with a comment describing the persons there as ‘the heads of fitnih’. 9 Diy, issue 33, p. 4. 61. Hamı¯d Rasa¯ʾı¯, ‘ʿUzr Kha¯hı¯ az Rauha¯niyyat’, 9 Diy, Shahrı¯var 26 1390 [17 ˙ September 2011], p. 1. 62. ‘Mahku¯miyyat-i Hamka¯ra¯n-i Muna¯fiq Karru¯bı¯’, 9 Diy, Diy 25 1390 [15 ˙ January 2012], p. 2. 63. Saʿı¯d Qa¯simı¯, ‘Rashı¯dı¯-yi Mutliq ha¯-yi ʿAsr-i Khamenei’, 9 Diy, Diy 25, 1390 ˙ ˙ [15 January 2012], p. 1. 64. Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, ‘Qatrih Darya¯st Aghar ba¯ Darya¯st’, Kayhan, Diy 1390 [January 2012], available at www.kayhannews.ir/901026/2.htm (Accessed 17 June 2012). 65. I was able to see it in the seminary in January 2015. A picture of the banner can be seen on the personal website of the supreme leader. See: http://farsi. khamenei.ir/photo-album?id¼24819#197969 66. ‘Kumak-i 18 Milliu¯n Du¯lları¯-yi Saʿu¯dı¯ha¯ bih Shu¯ra¯-yi Fitnih-yi Sabz’, 9 Diy, Bahman 29 1390 [18 February 2012], p. 2. 67. ‘Mardum Dar A¯sta¯nih-yi Chaha¯rumı¯n Sa¯lru¯z-i Hima¯sih-yi 9 Diy Muntizir-i ˙ ˙ Muha¯kimih va Muja¯za¯t-i Mu¯savı¯ va Karu¯bı¯’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Diy 4 1392 [25 ˙ December 2013], p. 7. 68. Ahmed Narı¯ma¯n, ‘Hassa¯siyyat-i ʿubu¯r Az Khat-i Qirmiz Dar ¯ıstga¯h-i ˙ ˙ Baha¯rista¯n’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Mura¯d 14 1392 [5 August 2013], p. 2. 69. Rouhani Najafı¯ ra Raʾı¯s Sa¯zma¯n-i Mı¯ra¯th Farhangı¯ Kard, BBC Persian, 17 August 2013, available at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2013/08/130817_l45_ najafi_tourism.shtml (Accessed 6 December 2014). 70. ‘Guza¯rishı¯ az Iqda¯ma¯t-i Majlis Dar Qiba¯l-i Farajı¯-Da¯na¯: ‘Istı¯z˙a¯h’ ʿA¯qibat-i ˙ Vazı¯rı¯ Kih Az Tanish A¯farı¯nı¯ Dast Barnida¯ sht, Lasarat.com, Murda¯d 24 1393 [15 August 2014], available at http://lasarat.com/vdcfmyd1. w6dy0agiiw.html (Accessed 6 December 2014). See also: Mahmu¯d ˙ Fa¯zilı¯ Bı¯rjandiı¯, Az Mahdi Ba¯zatga¯n ta¯ Hassan Rouhani: Ka¯bı¯niha¯ Dar ˙ Jumhu¯r-i Islam-i Iran (Tehran: Nashr Pa¯ya¯n, 1393 [2014 – 15]), pp. 392, 405 – 6.

168

NOTES

TO PAGES

89 –93

71. ‘Dar Jamiʿi Nı¯ru¯ha¯-yi Hizbulla¯h-yi Tabrı¯z Matrah Shud: Hizbulla¯h Ija¯zih-yi ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Ihya¯y-i Duba¯rih-yi Jarya¯n Nifa¯q ra Nih Mı¯dahad’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Murda¯d 23 ˙ 1392 [14 August 2013], p. 5. 72. Sayyid Muhammad Nabaviya¯n – Jarya¯n-i Isla¯ha¯t – Jang-i Narm – Lı¯bra¯lı¯sm 1, ˙ ˙ February 2012, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼UFVw23oMlF4& feature¼relmfu (Accessed 20 May 2012).

Section III 1. Joseph S. Nye, Soft Power: the Means to Success in World Politics (New York: Public Affairs, 2006), p. 5. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., p. 6. 5. Ibid., p. 11. 6. Ali Gheissari, Iranian Intellectuals in the 20th Century (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1998), p. 89. 7. Ibid. 8. Mehdi Semati, Media, Culture and Society in Iran: Living with Globalization and the Islamic State (London: Routledge, 2008), p. 116. 9. Reza Afshari, Human Rights in Iran: The Abuse of Cultural Relativism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2001), p. 261. 10. Nesta Ramazani, ‘Women in Iran: the revolutionary ebb and flow’, The Middle East Journal 47 (3) (1993), p. 410. 11. Ghamari-Tabrizi, Islam and Dissent in Postrevolutionary Iran, p. 112. 12. Muʿarrifı¯-yi Shu¯ra¯-yi A¯lı¯-yi Inqila¯b-i Farha¯ngı¯, Iranculture.org, available at www.iranculture.org/fa/Default.aspx?current¼viewDoc¤tID¼1338 (Accessed 16 June 2012). 13. Ibid. 14. Sayyid Muhammad Nabaviya¯n – Jarya¯n-i Isla¯ha¯t – Jang-i Narm – Lı¯bra¯lı¯sm 1, ˙ ˙ February 2012, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼UFVw23oMlF4& feature¼relmfu (Accessed 20 May 2012). 15. Ibid. 16. Muhammad-Taqı¯ Misbah Yazdı¯ and ʾAbduljava¯d Ibra¯hı¯mı¯, Taha¯jum-i ˙ ˙ Farhangı¯: Bargiriftih az Sukhanra¯nı¯ha-yi ʾUsta¯d Muhammad Taqı¯ Misbah ˙ ˙ ˙ Yazdı¯ (Qom: Muʾassisih-yi A¯mu¯zishı¯ va Pizhu¯hishı¯-yi Imam Khomeini, 1999), p. 14. 17. Ibid., p. 20. 18. ‘Istiʿma¯r-i Ittila¯ʿa¯tı¯ Dar ʿAsr-i Infija¯r-i Ittila¯ʿa¯tı¯’, 9 Diy, Diy 10 1390 [31 ˙˙ ˙˙ ˙ December 2011], p. 14. 19. Ibid. 20. Nuktiha¯-yi Na¯b, p. 23. ˙ 21. Ibid. 22. Yazdı¯ and Ibra¯hı¯mı¯, Taha¯jum-i Farhangı¯, p. 71. 23. Ibid., p. 73.

NOTES 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

31. 32. 33.

34.

35. 36.

37. 38.

39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

TO PAGES

93 – 97

169

Ibid., p. 66. Ibid., p. 157. Ibid., pp. 92 – 93. Ibid., p. 75. Ibid., p. 126. Ibid. The Office of Ayatollah Taba¯taba¯ʾı¯ Nizha¯d, Khutbiha¯y-i Nama¯z Jumʿi-i 11 Mihr ˙ ˙ Ma¯h 1393 [The sermons of the Friday prayer on 3 October 2014], available at http://em-esf.com/10279.html (Accessed 30 October 2014). Yazdı¯ and Ibra¯hı¯mı¯, Taha¯jum-i Farhangı¯, p. 126. Ibid. Mahmu¯d Ha¯jı¯lu¯, ‘Taba¯dul-i Farha¯ngı¯ ya¯ Taha¯jum-i Farha¯ngı¯’, Kayhan, ˙ Shahrı¯var 1385 [August 2006], available at www.magiran.com/npview.asp? ID¼1183038 (Accessed 19 June 2012). ‘Hamlih bih Bunya¯nha¯ hadaf-i Taha¯jum-i Farha¯ngı¯’, Kayhan, Khurda¯d 1391 ˙ [June 2012], available at http://kayhannews.ir/910320/8.htm#other800 (Accessed 19 June 2012). Duktrı¯n-i Muna¯ziʿih-yi Narm – Bakhsh-i 1 – Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, April 2011 available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼GpMznY6WVcQ (Accessed 1 June 2012). ‘Tajammuʿ-i Hizbulla¯h dar Park-i Lalih Tehran Dar Sa¯lru¯z-i Shaha¯dat-i ˙ Shahı¯d-i Amr bih Maʿru¯f va Nahy az Munkar Shahı¯d Na¯sir ʿAbdam’, ˙ Shalamchih, Mihr 1376 [September/October 1997], p. 2. Yazdı¯ and Ibra¯hı¯mı¯, Taha¯jum-i Farhangı¯, p. 122. ‘Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h Dozfol: Majlis-i Nuhum Naqshih-yi Taha¯jum-i Iqtisa¯dı¯ va ˙ ˙ ˙ Farha¯ngı¯-yi Dushman ra¯ Naqsh bar A¯b Kunad’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Khurda¯d 24 1391 [13 June 2012], p. 5. Muhammad-Taqı¯ Misba¯h Yazdı¯, Alı¯riz˙a¯ Ta¯jı¯k, and Hussein Arjı¯nı¯, Nigahı¯ ˙ ˙ Guzar bih Bası¯j va Bası¯jı¯ (Qom: Muʿassasih-yi A¯mu¯zishı¯ va Pizhu¯hishı¯-yi Imam Khomeini, 2007), p. 61. Yazdı¯ and Ibra¯hı¯mı¯, Taha¯jum-i Farhangı¯, p. 124. Shubayr Fı¯ru¯zya¯n, ‘Muja¯hid-i Jang-i Narm Muqarrabtir az Muja¯hid-i Jang-i Sakht’, 9 Diy, Diy 25 1390 [15 January 2012], p. 4. Shubayr Fı¯ru¯zya¯n, ‘Bası¯rat va Zı¯rakı¯-yi Muja¯hid Makr-i Dushman ra¯ Ba¯til ˙ ˙ Mı¯kunad’, 9 Diy, Bahman 15 1390 [4 February 2012], p. 8. Dr Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯: Istra¯tzhı¯ha¯-yi Jang-i Narm, October 2011, available at www. youtube.com/watch?v¼6yz0pePQEtU&feature¼related (Accessed 15 June 2012). Ibid. Nuktiha¯-yi Na¯b, pp. 20– 1. ˙ Ibid., p. 21. Ibid., p. 28. ‘Taʾammulı¯ bar Islami Kardan-i ʿUlu¯m-i Insa¯nı¯ Khuda¯-yi Jibhiha¯ ba¯ Khuda¯-yi Da¯nishga¯ha¯ Yikkı¯ Ast’, Kayhan, Khurda¯d 9 1391 [29 May 2012], p. 12. Shubayr Fı¯ru¯zya¯n, ‘Tafsı¯r-i Muwz˙u¯ʿı¯-yi ʾUsta¯d Misba¯h va Tuwlı¯d-i ʿUlu¯m-i ˙ ˙ Insa¯nı¯-yi Islami’, 9 Diy, Bahman 29 1390 [18 February 2012], p. 4.

170

NOTES TO PAGES 97 –99

50. See 9 Diy, issue 44, p. 9. 51. Yazdı¯, Ta¯jı¯k, and Arjı¯nı¯, Nigahı¯ Guzar bih Bası¯j va Bası¯jı¯, p. 76. 52. Ha¯jjı¯ Hassan Pu¯r, ‘Az Rafʿ ta Dafʿ-i Taha¯jum-i Farha¯ngı¯’, Kayhan, Urdı¯bihisht 1391 [May 2012], available at http://kayhannews.ir/910231/9.htm #other1104 (Accessed 19 June 2012). 53. ‘Tablı¯gh-i Sag Furu¯shı¯’, Shalamchih, A¯zar 1375 [November 1996], p. 4. 54. For more details about this issue see: Michael Cook, Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong in the Islamic Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). 55. ‘Bı¯ Tavajjuhı¯ bih Amr bih Maʿru¯f va Nahy az Munkar Suqu¯t dar Taha¯jum-i Farhangı¯-yi Dushman Ast’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, A¯zar 3 1389 [24 November 2010], p. 5. 56. ‘Baya¯niyyih-yi Iʿtira¯z-i Da¯nishju¯ya¯n-i Da¯nishga¯h-i ʿUlu¯m-i Pizishkı¯-yi Shiraz Dar Iʿtira¯z bih Ravand-i Ibtiza¯l Dar Matbu¯ʿa¯t’, Shalamchih, Isfand 1376 ˙ [February/March 1998], p. 3. 57. ‘Tana¯quz˙-i ʿA¯shka¯r-i Masʾu¯lı¯n’, Shalamchih, Murda¯d 1376 [August 1997], p. 4. 58. ‘Bad Hija¯bı¯-yi Da¯yim Dar Cı¯nima¯-yi Iran’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Shahrı¯var 23 1390 [14 ˙ September 2011], p.3. 59. Salahshu¯r Cı¯nima¯-yi Iran ra bih ‘Fa¯hishih Kha¯nih’ Tashbı¯h Kard, BBC Persian, ˙ October 2011, available at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/arts/2011/10/111015_ u07_cinema_iran_salahshoor.shtml (Accessed 20 June 2012). 60. Muhammad Nigı¯nı¯, ‘Farajullah Salahshu¯r dar Guftigu¯ ba¯ Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t: Manra¯ ˙ Juzʾ-i Cı¯nima¯-yi Iran bih Hisa¯b Naya¯varı¯d . . . Cı¯nima¯-yi Iran Taht-i Sultih-yi ˙ ˙ ˙ Sihiu¯nı¯st Ast’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Khurda¯d 24 1391 [13 June 2012], p. 8. ˙ 61. Ibid. 62. Muhsin Darya¯ Laʿl, ‘Lajan Za¯r Pur Saʿa¯dat: Riva¯yat-i Mardumı¯ bih Saʿa¯dat’, ˙ 9 Diy, A¯ba¯n 21 1390 [12 November 2011], p. 6. 63. Naqd-i Juda¯yı¯-yi Na¯dir Az Sı¯mı¯n 5, NasrTV, June 2012, available at www. nasrtv.com/modules/video/singlefile.php?cid¼13&lid¼6004 (Accessed 18 June 2012). 64. Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, ‘Sa¯khtima¯n-i Pizishka¯n’ Muravvijih Afka¯r-i Freud’, Raja News, Tı¯r 1390 [July 2012], available at www.rajanews.com/PrintFriendly. asp?id¼96212 (Accessed 18 June 2012). 65. Fı¯lm-i Ka¯mil-i Sukhanra¯nı¯-yi Ja¯lib-i Duktu¯r ʿAbba¯sı¯, Aparat, Shahrı¯var 1390 [September 2011], available at www.aparat.com/v/f752167fca2ecaf38964ffaff 639b8d840967 (Accessed 9 July 2012). 66. Yazdı¯, and Ibra¯hı¯mı¯, Taha¯jum-i Farhangı¯, p. 127. 67. Ibid., p. 145. 68. Ibid., p. 175. 69. Ibid., p. 144. 70. ‘A¯qa¯y-i Raʾı¯s Jumhu¯r! Az Shuma¯ Bira¯y Ihya¯y-i Arzishha¯ Az Jumlih Hija¯b wa ˙ ʿafa¯f Intiza¯r Da¯rı¯m’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Tı¯r 19 1392 [10 July 2013], p. 1. ˙ ¯ 71. ‘Aqa¯y-i Rouhani! Hama¯ntu¯r kih Saughand Ya¯d Kardı¯d Pa¯sda¯r-i Ra¯stı¯n-i ˙ Qa¯nu¯n Ba¯shı¯d’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Khurda¯d 29 1392 [19 June 2013], p. 10.

NOTES

TO PAGES

99 –102

171

72. ‘Raʾı¯s Jumhu¯r Tay-i Sukhana¯nı¯ Qa¯bil-i Taʾammul dar Hama¯yish-i Bı¯mih-i ˙ Sala¯mat Hamigha¯nı¯: Nimı¯twa¯n Ba¯ Zu¯r wa Shalla¯q Mardum ra¯ Bih Bihisht Burd’, Kayhan, Khurda¯d 3 1393 [24 May 2014], available at http://kayhan.ir/ fa/news/13838 (Accessed July 14, 2014). 73. Ba¯ Hamih Qudrat Juluy-i Kasa¯nı¯ Kih Ma¯niʿ-i Bihisht Raftan-i Mardum Shavand Kha¯hı¯m ¯ısta¯d, Mehr News, Khurda¯d 9 1393 [30 May 2014], available at www.karoon.com/o.lasso?o¼/services/calendar/interface. (Accessed 14 July 2014). 74. Ra¯z – Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯ – Buzurktarı¯n Kula¯hbarda¯rı¯-i Ta¯rı¯kh, 18 June 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼LPoTeFov3hA. (Accessed 20 August 2014). 75. ‘Tasa¯vı¯rı¯ Az Tajmmuʿ-i Iʾtira¯z˙ı¯-i Imru¯z Pı¯ra¯mu¯n-i Hija¯b wa ʿafa¯f Dar Tehran’, ˙ Khurdad News, Urdı¯bihisht 17 1393 [7 May 2014], available at http:// khordadnews.ir/news/58092 (Accessed 5 July 2014).

Section IV

1. Iran Tukhaffiz˙ Taʿa¯wunaha¯ Maʿa al-Hayʾa al-Dawliyya li-Tta¯qa al-Dhariyya, ˙˙ BBC Arabic, March 2007, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/arabic/news/ newsid_6494000/6494131.stm (Accessed 25 June 2012). 2. Iranians feel the pain of sanctions: ‘Everything has doubled in price’, MSNBC, May 2012, available at http://worldnews.msnbc.msn.com/_news/2012/05/15/ 11714780-iranians-feel-the-pain-of-sanctions-everything-has-doubled-inprice?lite (Accessed 15 May 2012). 3. Sayyid Muhammad Nabaviya¯n – Jarya¯n-i Isla¯ha¯t – Jang-i Narm – Lı¯bra¯lı¯sm 1, ˙ ˙ February 2012, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼UFVw23oMlF4& feature¼relmfu (Accessed 20 May 2012). 4. Ibid. 5. Hamı¯d Rasa¯ʾı¯, ‘Pa¯yda¯rı¯ Hamı¯shih Java¯b mı¯ Dahad’, 9 Diy, Bahman 29 1390 [18 February 2012], p. 1. 6. Ali Rastghari, ‘Pa¯yda¯r bar ʾUsu¯lgira¯yı¯’, 9 Diy, Bahman 29 1390 [18 February ˙ 2012], p. 3. 7. Rajabı¯, Ahmadinejad, p. 50. 8. Ibid., p. 17. 9. Ibid., p. 107. 10. Fı¯lm-i Ka¯mil-i Sukhanra¯nı¯-yi Ja¯lib-i Duktu¯r ʿAbba¯sı¯, Aparat, Shahrı¯var 1390 [September 2011], available at www.aparat.com/v/f752167fca2ecaf38964ffaff 639b8d840967 (Accessed 9 July 2012). 11. ‘Raʾı¯s Kumisyu¯n-i Amniyat-i Millı¯-yi Majlis: 3 Hiza¯r Milya¯r Dulla¯r bih Taqviyat-i Bunyih-yi Difa¯ʿı¯-yi Kishvar Ikhtisa¯s ya¯ft’, Kayhan, Tı¯r 1391 [July ˙ 2012], available at www.magiran.com/npview.asp?ID¼2539160 (Accessed 15 July 2012). 12. Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, Khargu¯sh-i Moscow, Khurda¯d 1391 [June 2012], available at http://h-shariatmadari.blogfa.com/post-209.aspx (Accessed 17 June 2012).

172

NOTES

TO PAGES

102 –106

13. ‘Agar Tahrı¯mha Muwaffaq Bu¯d [. . .]’, 9 Diy, Diy 3 1390 [24 December 2011], ˙ p. 12. 14. Ibid. 15. ‘Bahmani: Du¯ Sa¯l dar Shuʿab-i Abı¯ Ta¯lib Girifta¯r Kha¯hı¯m Bu¯d’, Raja News, ˙ A¯zar 1390 [December 2011], available at www.rajanews.com/PrintFriendly. asp?id¼109997 (Accessed 25 June 2012). 16. Rahbar: Dar Shara¯yit-i Shuʿab-i Abı¯ Ta¯lib Nı¯stı¯m, Alef News, Diy 1390 ˙ ˙ [January 2012], available at www.alef.ir/vdcaian6a49ne01.k5k4.html? 138768 (Accessed 25 June 2012). 17. ‘Farma¯ndih-yi Nı¯ru¯-yi Zamı¯nı¯ Artish: La¯zim Ba¯shad Tangih-yi Hurmuz ra¯ Mı¯bandı¯m’, Kayhan, June 2012, available at www.kayhannews.ir/910406/14. htm#other1401 (Accessed 25 June 2012). 18. Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, ‘Chih Kasa¯nı¯ Tahrı¯m ra¯ Bazak mı¯ kuna¯nd’, Kayhan, ˙ Bahman 1390 [January 2012], available at www.kayhannews.ir/901105/2. htm (Accessed 17 June 2012). 19. Ibid. 20. ‘Agar Hushya¯r wa Dar Sahnih Niba¯shı¯m Qatʿna¯mih-yi 598 Dı¯garı¯ Imz˙a¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ Kha¯hd Shud’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Mihr 10 1392 [2 October 2013], p. 5. 21. UN Security Council, Resolution 598 (1987), Adopted by the Security Council at its 2750th meeting, 20 July 1987, available at www.unhcr.org/refworld/ docid/3b00f20e64.html (Accessed 27 June 2012). 22. US Department of Treasury, Additional Treasury and State Designations Targeting Networks Linked to Iranian WMD Proliferation and Sanctions, 12 December 2013, available at www.treasury.gov/press-center/press-releases/Pages/jl2241. aspx (Accessed 14 January 2014). 23. ‘Tahrı¯mra¯ Ba¯ Tuwlı¯d Hal Kunı¯m Nah Ba¯ Gida¯yı¯-i Dipluma¯tik’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, ˙ ˙ Murda¯d 30 1392 [21 August 2013], p. 1. 24. Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Closing time: assessing the Iranian threat to the Strait of Hormuz’, International Security 33, no. 1 (2008), p. 82. 25. Ibid. 26. Hussein Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, ‘Tangina¯ ʿUbu¯r az Tangih’ [Crossing the Strait], Kayhan, A¯zar 1390 [December 2011], available at www.kayhannews.ir/ 900922/2.htm (Accessed 17 June 2012). 27. Recently, the UAE was able to open a pipeline that can transport oil to the Gulf of Oman in order to avoid any closure of the Strait. See: Anthony DiPaola, Bloomberg, ‘Abu Dhabi leads Gulf nations with oil pipe to avoid Iran’, July 2012, available at www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-07-12/abudhabi-leads-gulf-oil-producers-with-pipeline-to-avoid-iran.html (Accessed 19 July 2012). 28. Stephen M. Walt, Revolution and War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 243. 29. Abbas Milani, The Myth of the Great Satan: A New Look at America’s Relations with Iran (Stanford, CA: the Hoover Institution Press, 2010) p. 1.

NOTES

TO PAGES

106 –109

173

30. Rafsanjani: Qatʿi Ra¯bitih ba¯ Amrı¯ka Qa¯bil Tada¯vu¯m Nı¯st, DW Persian, April ˙ ˙ 2012, available at www.dw.de/dw/article/0,15856540,00.html (Accessed 15 July 2012). 31. Ibid. 32. Arash Karami, ‘Rouhani greeted, attacked upon homecoming from UN’, Iran Pulse, 28 September 2013, available at http://iranpulse.al-monitor.com/index. php/2013/09/2902/rouhani-greeted-attacked-upon-homecoming-from-un/ (Accessed 22 April 2014). 33. ‘Tahdı¯dha¯y-i Pı¯sh-i Ru¯y-i Zarif wa Rouhani Dar New York’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Mihr 3 1392 [25 September 2013], p. 4. 34. ‘Nasb-i Gustardih-yi Tasa¯wı¯rı¯ Dar Mukha¯lifat Ba¯ Muza¯kirih-yi Iran wa ˙ ˙ A¯mrı¯ca¯ Dar Khiya¯ba¯nha¯y-i Tehran: Mukha¯lifa¯n-i Diplu¯ma¯sı¯-yi Duwlat-i Rouhani Ba¯ Bilbu¯rd Bih Sahnih A¯midand’, Zamaneh Tribune, A¯ba¯n 15 1392 [6 ˙ ˙ November 2013], available at www.tribunezamaneh.com/archives/34929? tztc¼1 (Accessed 12 December 2013). 35. Fı¯lm-i Ka¯mil-i Sukhanra¯nı¯-yi Ja¯lib-i Duktu¯r ʿAbba¯sı¯, Aparat, Shahrı¯var 1390 [September 2011], available at www.aparat.com/v/f752167fca2ecaf38964ffaff 639b8d840967 (Accessed 9 July 2012). 36. Ibid. 37. Ibid. 38. Ibid. 39. ‘Zilzilih-yi Siya¯sı¯ dar Nama¯z Jumʿih-yi Tehran’, 9 Diy, Bahman 23 1390 [12 February 2012], p. 11. 40. ‘Jumhu¯rı¯-yi Islami Ma¯dir-i Bı¯darı¯-yi Islami dar Mantaqih / Huz˙u¯r-i Gustardih ˙ ˙ dar 22 Bahman Nisha¯nih-yi Istimra¯r-i Harikat-i Mardumı¯-yi Inqila¯b Ast’, ˙ Raja News, Bahman 1390 [February 2012], available at http://rajanews.com/ Detail.asp?id¼116220 (Accessed 27 June 2012). 41. Ibid. 42. ‘Az Dil Niraftaʾī Agar az Dı¯dih Raftaʾī . . . Waʾdih-yi tu¯ Ra¯st Bu¯d: Jaha¯n-i Islam Bı¯da¯r Shud’, Kayhan, Khurda¯d 1391 [May 2012], available at www. kayhannews.ir/910311/14.htm#other1400 (Accessed 1 June 2012). 43. Ibid. 44. Imam Jumʾih-yi Tehran Kha¯ha¯n-i Fath-i Bahrain Shud, July 2011, available at ˙ www.youtube.com/watch?v¼42I3XIvLDO0 (Accessed 18 July 2011). 45. ‘Kha¯ksipa¯rı¯ (Guft va Shanavad)’, Kayhan, A¯ba¯n 1390 [October 2011], available at www.kayhannews.ir/900804/2.htm#other201 (Accessed 15 July 2012). 46. ‘Bı¯da¯rı¯-yi Islami Yiksa¯lih Shu¯d’, 9 Diy, A¯zar 26 1390 [17 December 2011], pp. 8 – 9. 47. Hamzih Bahmanpu¯r, ‘Sina¯riu¯ bira¯yi Tazʾīf-i Jibhih-yi Muqa¯vamat’, 9 Diy, ˙ A¯ba¯n 28 1390 [19 November 2011], p. 13. 48. Hujjatul Islam Pana¯hiya¯n – Bisya¯r Shu¯rangı¯z - Muda¯fiʿa¯n-i Haram, Aparat, Tı¯r ˙ ˙ 20 1392 [11 July 2013], available at www.aparat.com/v/SaoRy (Accessed 1 August 2013).

174

NOTES

TO PAGES

109 –112

49. ‘Imam Khomeini Sa¯bit va ʾUstiva¯r az A¯gha¯z ta¯ Pa¯ya¯n ‘Israel Ba¯yad az Safhih-yi ˙ ˙ ˙ Ru¯ziga¯r Mahv Shavad’, Pasda¯r-i Islam, no. 287 (2005), p. 2. ˙ 50. Khomeini and Algar, Islam and Revolution, p. 276. 51. Roxanne Varzi, Warring Souls: Youth, Media, and Martyrdom in Post-Revolution Iran (Durham: Duke University Press, 2006), p. 51. 52. Ibid., p. 55. 53. Ibid., p. 54. 54. Rava¯yat-i Fath – Majmu¯ʿih-yi Avval – Qismat-i Chaha¯rum, May 2012, available ˙ at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼b2yGp3_mg-c (Accessed 27 June 2012). 55. This translation was taken from Varzi, Warring Souls, p. 91. 56. Chira¯ A¯vı¯nı¯ Sayyid-i Shahı¯da¯n-i Ahl-i Qalam Shud?, available at www.aviny. com/Occasion/Enghelab_Jang/Aviny/89/Chera.aspx?&mode¼print (Accessed 30 June 2012). 57. The Collections of Religious and Cultural Production of the Martyr Murtiz˙a¯ A¯vı¯nı¯, Zindigı¯na¯mih-yi Shahı¯d Sayyid Murtiz˙a¯ A¯vı¯nı¯, available at www.aviny. com/aviny/Biography.aspx (Accessed 28 June 2012). 58. Rava¯yat-i Fath – Majmu¯ʿih-yi Avval – Qismat-i Chaha¯rum, May 2012, available ˙ at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼b2yGp3_mg-c (Accessed 27 June 2012). 59. Varzi, Warring Souls, pp. 77– 8. 60. Ibid., p. 79. 61. Ibid., p. 47. 62. Ibid. 63. ‘Bija¯-yi Musalsal Dast-i Java¯na¯n-i Ma¯ Guitar Da¯dand’, Subh-i Duku¯hih, ˙ Bahman 1381 [January/February 2003], pp. 6 – 7. 64. The dates of three, Shalamchih, Subh-i Duku¯hih and Jibhih, range from ˙ December 1996 to December 2002. For the fourth weekly, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, I chose the last 29 issues from the day of writing this section of the book, covering issues from December 2011 to June 2012. 65. Ian Black, ‘Iran and Iraq remember war that cost more than a million lives: Thirty years ago this week Saddam Hussein launched a ’whirlwind war’ that lasted eight years’, Guardian, September 2010, available at www.guardian.co. uk/world/2010/sep/23/iran-iraq-war-anniversary (Accessed 28 June 2012). 66. Lawrence G. Potter and Gary Sick, Iran, Iraq, and the Legacies of War (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), p. 2. 67. 155,081 were killed in direct confrontations with Iraqi forces. 155,259 were single and 55,886 were married. 7,054 were 14 years old and younger, 65,575 were between 15 and 19 years old, 87,106 were between 20 and 23 years old, 22,703 were between 24 and 29 years old, and 30,817 were 30 years and older. See: Jadval-i A¯ma¯r-i Kullı¯-yi Shuhada¯-yi Jang-i Tahmı¯lı¯, Fatehan.ir, A¯zar 1390 ˙ [December 2011], available at www.fatehan.ir/page.aspx?pid¼33&post id¼313. (Accessed 28 June 2012). See also ʿadam-i Vuju¯d-i A¯ma¯r-i Daqı¯q az Tiʿda¯d Shuhada¯ Dar Kishvar, enghelabe-eslami.com, Khurda¯d 9 1393 [30 May 2014] available at www.enghelabe-eslami.com/component/content/article/13khabar/siasi/9022-2014-05-30-13-57-48.html (Accessed 13 January 2015).

NOTES

TO PAGES

112 –115

175

68. ‘Shuhada¯ Khu¯band Agar Faqat Shahı¯d Ba¯shand’, Shalamchih, Murda¯d 1376 ˙ [August 1997], p. 5. 69. Kasra Naji, Ahmadinejad: the Secret History of Iran’s Radical Leader (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), p. 50. 70. Khat va Nisha¯n-i Rahbar, BBC Persian, September 2011, available at www. ˙ bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2011/09/110916_l72_lf_ayatollah_ways_online.shtm l (Accessed 12 July 2012). 71. Dı¯da¯r-i Ja¯nba¯za¯n-i Qatʿe-i Nukha¯ʿı¯, Khamenei.ir, Mihr 1390 [September ˙ 2011], available at http://farsi.khamenei.ir/photo-album?id¼17369#138311 (Accessed 15 July 2012). 72. Mı¯zba¯nı¯ Az Bihisht: Riwa¯yat-i Huzu¯r-i Maqa¯m-i Muʿazam-i Rahbarı¯ Dar ˙ ˙ Mana¯zil-i Shuhada¯ (Iran: Muʾasisi-yi Jiha¯dı¯, 1393 [2014]).

Section V 1. Suzanne Maloney, ‘Iran primer: the revolutionary economy’, Frontline, October 2010, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/ 2010/10/iran-primer-the-revolutionary-economy.html (Accessed 14 July 2012). 2. Jahangir Amuzegar, Iran’s Economy under the Islamic Republic (London and New York: I.B.Tauris, 1993), p. 78. 3. Robin Wright, The Last Great Revolution: Turmoil and Transformation in Iran (New York: Alfred A. Knof, 2000), pp. 21– 2. 4. Ali M. Ansari, Iran, Islam, and Democracy: The Politics of Managing Change (London: Chatham House, 2006), p. 52. 5. Daniel Brumberg, Reinventing Khomeini: The Struggle for Reform in Iran (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2001), p. 160. 6. Ibid., p. 161. 7. Muhammad Sa¯diq Husseinı¯, al-Shaykh al-Raʾı¯s: min Qaryat al-Ya¯qu¯t al-Ahmar ˙ Ila¯ ʿArsh al-Zaʿ a¯ma al-Zahabı¯ (Lebanon: Riad El-Rayyes Books S.A.R.I., 2004), p. 116. 8. Ibid, p. 117. 9. Ali Gheissari and Vali Nasr, Democracy in Iran: History and the Quest for Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), p. 106. 10. Ibid., p. 115. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid., p. 105. 13. Ibid. 14. Wright, The Last Great Revolution, p. 22. 15. Roy Takeyh, Hidden Iran: Paradox and Power in the Islamic Republic (New York: Times Books, 2006), p. 40. 16. Intiqa¯d-i Duktur Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯ Az Khat-i Fikrı¯-yi Hassan Rouhani, Aparat, A¯ba¯n 29 1392 [20 November 2013] available at www.aparat.com/v/fa9dn (Accessed 14 May 2014). 17. Ibid.

176

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TO PAGES

115 –120

18. Gheissari and Nasr, Democracy in Iran, p. 114. 19. Rajabı¯, Ahmadinejad, p. 50. 20. Anoushirvan Ehteshami and Mahjoob Zweiri, Iran and the Rise of its Neoconservative: The Politics of Tehran’s Silent Revolution, London: I.B.Tauris, 2007, p. 60. 21. Shahra¯d Isna¯ ʿAsharı¯, Az Duwlat-i Isla¯ha¯t ta¯ Duwlat-i Islamı¯ (Tehran: ˙ ˙ Intisha¯ra¯t-i ʿAta¯ʾı¯, 2007), p. 19. ˙ 22. Djavad Salehi-Isfahani, Iran: Poverty and Inequality Since the Revolution, Brookings Institute, January 2009, available at www.brookings.edu/research/ opinions/2009/01/29-iran-salehi-isfahani (Accessed 4 July 2012). 23. Ibid. 24. Ibid. 25. Parvin Alizadeh, ‘Iran’s quandary: economic reforms and structural traps’, Brown Journal of World Affairs 9 (2) (2003), p. 270. 26. Vali Nasr, Forces of Fortune: The Rise of the New Muslim Middle Class and What it will Mean for our World (New York: Free Press, 2009), p. 78. 27. ‘Ka¯kh-ha¯ Biru¯-yi Khu¯ni-ha¯ va Ku¯kh-ha¯’, Shalamchih, Shahrı¯var 1376 [August/September 1997], p. 14. 28. Rajabı¯, Ahmadinejad, p. 54. 29. Yazdı¯, Ta¯jı¯k, and Arjı¯nı¯, Nigahı¯ Guzar bih Bası¯j va Bası¯jı¯, p. 83. 30. ‘Masʾu¯lı¯n Va¯qiʿı¯-yi Mardum Peugeohay Khudra¯ Pas Mı¯dahand’, Subh, Isfand 20 ˙ 1379 [10 March 2001], p. 3. 31. ‘Naqd-i Faqr va Fahsha¯ dar Ku¯-yi Dadinshga¯h’, Subh-i Duku¯hih, Shahrı¯var 1 ˙ ˙ 1384 [23 August 2005], p. 24. 32. Muhsin Mahdiya¯n, ‘Ayatollah La¯rı¯ja¯nı¯ ba¯ Chih Vası¯lih-yi bih ¯ın Ru¯sta¯ Safarmı¯ku¯nad?’ Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, A¯ba¯n 26 1389 [17 November 2010], p. 9. 33. ‘Khuda¯ Nakardih Masʾu¯la¯n Khija¯lat Nakishand’, Subh-i Duku¯hih, Bahman ˙ 1380 [January/February 2002], p. 9. 34. Hossein Bastani, ‘The hidden half of Jazaeri’s case’, Roozonline, Isfand 1385 [March 2007], available at www.roozonline.com/persian/news/newsitem/arti cle/the-hidden-half-of-jazaeris-case.html (Accessed 17 September 2012). 35. Muhammad Sahimi, ‘The man in the shadow: Mojtaba Khamenei’, Frontline, July 2009, available at www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/tehranbureau/ 2009/07/the-man-in-the-shadow-mojtaba-khamenei.html (Accessed 17 September 2012). 36. ‘A¯qa¯ha¯ Muqassirand ya¯ A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha?’, Subh-i Duku¯hih, Bahman 1380 ˙ ˙˙ [January/February 2002], p. 10. 37. ‘ Ba Guzasht-i du Sa¯l Hanu¯z Hı¯ch A¯qa¯za¯dih-ye Iʿda¯m Nashudih ast’, Subh-i ˙ Duku¯hih, Urdı¯bihisht 1382 [April 2003], p. 3. ¯ 38. ‘Tehran va Masʾalih-yi Aqa¯za¯dih-ha Julu¯-yi Jashm’, 9 Diy, Urdı¯bihisht 30 1391 [19 May 2012], p. 8. 39. Ibid. 40. ‘Shuma¯l-i Shahr Nishı¯nı¯ va Hizhimu¯nı¯-yi Farhangı¯’, 9 Diy, Urdı¯bihisht 30 1391 [19 May 2012], p. 8.

NOTES

TO PAGES

120 –122

177

41. ‘Sarnivisht-i du Sulta¯n’, Subh-i Duku¯hih, A¯zar 1 1384 [22 September 2010], ˙ pp. 2, 10. 42. ‘Hika¯yat-i 2 Sa¯l Fara¯rı¯ Da¯dan-i Mehdi Hashemi az ʿAda¯lat’, 9 Diy, Diy 25 1390 [15 January 2012], p. 3. 43. It is important to mention that Rafsanjani was also attacked because of his position on the crisis of 2009, when he did not condemn the reformists and their leaders’ approach. 44. Ali Ba¯qirı¯ Daulata¯ba¯dı¯ and Muhsin Shafı¯ʿı¯, Az Hashimi Ta¯ Rouhani: Barrisı¯-yi ˙ Siya¯sit-i Kha¯rijı¯-yi Iran Dar Partuv-i Nazariya-yi Sa¯zih Inga¯rı¯ (Tehran: ˙ Intisha¯ra¯t-i Tı¯sa¯, 1393 [2014]), pp. 247– 9. 45. Mashru¯h Musa¯hibih-yi Rouhani Ba¯ ʿunva¯n-i Guza¯rish-i 100 Ru¯zih Bih Ma¯rdum, ˙ ˙ ˙ 29 November 2013, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼z68EZr5XIms (Accessed 2 December 2013). 46. Joby Warrick and Jason Rezaian, ‘Iran’s economic crisis deepens as Rouhani prepares to take office’, Washington Post, 2 August 2013, available at www.was hingtonpost.com/world/national-security/irans-economic-crisis-deepens-asrouhani-prepares-to-take-office/2013/08/02/530ba704-fba7-11e2-a369d1954abcb7e3_story.html (Accessed 3 December 2013). 47. Amir Paivar, Iran: Rouhani’s first 100 days, BBC Persian, 12 November 2013, available at www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-24908733 (Accessed 15 December 2013). 48. Ra¯z – Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯ – Buzurktarı¯n Kula¯hbarda¯rı¯-i Ta¯rı¯kh, 18 June 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼LPoTeFov3hA. (Accessed 20 August 2014). 49. Muhammad Sa¯diq Ku¯shkı¯, ‘Au¯luviyyatha¯y-i Fara¯mu¯sh Shudih’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, ˙ Khurda¯d 8 1392 [29 May 2013], p. 1. 50. Ibid.

Section VI 1. Sais Amir Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam: Religion, Political Order, and Societal Change in Shi’Ite Iran from the Beginning to 1890 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), p. 39. 2. Ka¯mil Sulayma¯n, Yawm al-Khala¯s fı¯ Zil al-Qa¯ʾim al-Mahdi ʿAlayh Assala¯m ˙ _ (Lebanon: Da¯r al-Kita¯b al-Lubna¯nı¯), p. 113. 3. Ahmad al-Kateb, Tatawwur al-Fikr al-Siya¯sı¯ al- Shiʿi min al-Shu¯ra¯ Ila¯ ˙ Wila¯yat al-Faqı¯h, 3rd ed (Lebanon: Arab Scientific Publishers, 2005), p. 248. 4. Arjomand, The Shadow of God and the Hidden Imam, p. 40. 5. The mosque is located near the holy city of Qom. According to Abbas Amanat, the mosque is unique because it is seen as a stepping ground (qadamga¯h) of the Hidden Imam, in addition to the hole that is known as the ‘“well of the Lord of the Age”, [which] is believed to serve as a channel of communication with the Hidden Imam’. Therefore, it is common to find people writing their wishes on pieces of paper and throwing them in the hole in the hope that they will reach

178

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14.

15. 16.

17. 18.

19.

20.

21. 22. 23. 24.

25. 26. 27.

NOTES

TO PAGES

122 –130

the Mahdi, who will read them and fulfill their requests. Abbas Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism (London: I.B.Tauris, 2009), p. 228. Ibid., p. 244. Rajabı¯, Ahmadinejad, p. 18. Ali Rahnema, Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics: Majlesi to Ahmadinejad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), p. 35. Ibid., p. 43. Ibid., p. 38. Sulayma¯n, Yawm al-Khala¯s fı¯ Zil al-Qa¯ʾim al-Mahdi ʿAlayh Assala¯m, p. 9. ˙ _ Ruwzih Kha¯nı¯-yi Hassan Rouhani Dar Jalasih-yi Hayʾat-i Duwlat, November 3, 2014, available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼YQyoCVTbMeQ (Accessed 13 January 2015). Rahnema, Superstition as Ideology in Iranian Politics, pp. 81 – 2. Ali Akbar Java¯nfikr, Gardgı¯rı¯ az Ya¯dda¯shha¯-yi Vibla¯g, Mihr 1388 [October 2009], available at http://javanfekr.ir/1388/page/4 (Accessed 27 May 2012). Muhammad Ha¯dı¯ Jama¯lı¯, ‘Maba¯nı¯-yi Nazarı¯-yi Jarya¯na¯t-i Siya¯sı¯-yi Da¯khilı¯ ˙ (Bakhsh-i A¯khar)’, 9 Diy, A¯zar 5 1390 [26 November 2011], p. 4. He claims that his full name is Ahmad bin Ismaiel bin Saleh bin Hussein bin Salman bin Muhammad bin al-Hassan al-Askarı¯. See: Nasab al-Imam Ahmad al-Hassan, available at http://almahdyoon.org/nassab (Accessed 12 July 2012). ‘A¯ya¯ Zuhu¯r Nazdı¯k Ast?’, Subh-i Duku¯hih, Khurda¯d 17 1382 [7 June 2003], ˙ ˙ pp. 13 – 15. ‘Nazar-i Ayatollah Misba¯h Darmuwrid-i Mustanad-i Janja¯lı¯’, Raja News, ˙ ˙ ˙ Farvardı¯n 1390 [April 2011], available at http://rajanews.com/PrintFriendly. asp?id¼84764 (Accessed 12 July 2012). Pursish va Pa¯sukh: Imka¯n-i Irtiba¯t ba¯ Imam-i Zama¯n, Hawzeh.net, Diy 1385 ˙ [January 2007], available at www.hawzah.net/fa/QuestionView.html?Questi onID¼11762&SubjectID¼78622 (Accessed 9 July 2012). Muddaʿiya¯n-i Irtiba¯t ba¯ Imam-i Zama¯n va Daura¯n-i Ahmadinejad, BBC Persian, ˙ July 2008, available at www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/story/2008/07/080706_ ba-npn-ahmadinejad.shtml (Accessed 9 July 2012). ‘Ba¯yad az Isha¯ʿih-yi Afka¯r-i Khata¯rna¯k dar Ja¯miʿih Julu¯gı¯rı¯ Kard’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, ˙ Shahrı¯var 30 1390 [21 September 2011], p. 5. Ali Asghar Sı¯ja¯nı¯, Lahzih-yi Dı¯da¯r (Iran: 2012), part 1. ˙˙ ˙ Ibid. Khat va Nisha¯n-i Rahbar, BBC Persian, September 2011, available at www. ˙ bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2011/09/110916_l72_lf_ayatollah_ways_online.shtm l (Accessed 12 July 2012). Ibid. Ali al-Ku¯ranı¯ al-ʿAmilı¯, ʿAsr al- Zuhu¯r, 17 th ed. (1427 [2006]), [No Location], _ p. 187. Ma¯ Ahl-i Kufa Nı¯stı¯m, January 2010, available at www.youtube.com/watch? v¼LcvQ9fhpZh4 (Accessed 23 May 2012).

NOTES

TO PAGES

130 –133

179

28. Sayyid Mukhta¯r Mu¯savı¯, ‘Labbayk ya¯ Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Isfand 18 1389 [9 March 2011], p. 10. 29. Pana¯hiya¯n: Sayyid Khura¯sa¯nı¯ ¼ Imam Khamenie, Aparat, 6 Tı¯r, 1392 [June 27, 2013], available at http://www.aparat.com/v/40nK9/%D9%BE%D9%86% D8%A7%D9%87%DB%8C%D8%A7%D9%86%3A_%D8%B3%DB% 8C%D8%AF_%D8%AE%D8%B1%D8%A7%D8%B3%D8%A7%D9% 86%DB%8C_%3D%D8%A7%D9%85%D8%A7%D9%85_%D8%AE% D8%A7%D9%85%D9%86%D9%87_%D8%A7%DB%8C (Accessed June 7, 2015). 30. Ibid. 31. ‘Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ dar Ikhtita¯miyyih-yi Hama¯yish-i Duktrı¯n-i Mahda˙ ˙ viyyat: Muba¯rizih ba¯ Zulm va Tala¯sh bara¯-yi Istiqra¯r-i ʿAda¯lat Zamı¯nih Saz-i Zuhu¯r-i Imam-i ʿAsr Ast’, Kayhan, Shahrı¯var 1385 [September 2006], available ˙ ˙ at www.magiran.com/npview.asp?ID¼1200711 (Accessed 9 July 2012). Even though Ayatollah Misba¯h Yazdı¯ is accused of having connections to the ˙ ˙ Hujjatiyyih Society (William (Bill) Abbas Samii, ‘Iran’, in Barry M Rubin ˙ (ed.), Guide to Islamist Movements (Armonk, N.Y: M.E. Sharpe, 2010), p. 260), which was founded in 1953, his views contrast with those of its members regarding the Twelfth Imam. The Hujjatiyyih Society did not believe in the ˙ importance of establishing an Islamic government. For them, ‘true Islamic government must await the return of the Mahdi’. Ibid., p. 256. 32. Dr Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, Duktrı¯n-i Mahdaviyyat va Intiza¯r (5), October 2008, ˙ available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼5fJFziPOV10&feature¼channel& list¼UL (Accessed 10 July 2012). 33. Dr Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, Duktrı¯n-i Mahdaviyyat va Intiza¯r (8), October 2008, ˙ available at www.youtube.com/watch?v¼D3fd2n3L4YE&feature¼channel& list¼UL (Accessed 10 July 2012). 34. Ibid. 35. Dr Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, Duktrı¯n-i Mahdaviyyat va Intiza¯r (7), October 2008, www. ˙ youtube.com/watch?v¼kVEckOmiFmU&feature¼channel&list¼UL (Accessed 10 July 2012). 36. Details about these conferences can be found at: www.mahdaviat-conference. com/fa/ 37. Mahdaviat, Darba¯rih-yi Ma¯, available at www.mahdaviat-conference.com/vsda %5Eln1lkt47,1.k5hk4.html (Accessed 15 July 2012). 38. This last journal is different from another journal, with the same name, that was discussed in Abbas Amanat’s book, which was published in 1996 in Persian. Amanat, Apocalyptic Islam and Iranian Shi’ism, p. 236. 39. Dr Hassan ʿAbba¯sı¯, Duktrı¯n-i Mahdaviyyat va Intiza¯r (6), October 2008, www. ˙ youtube.com/watch?v¼RKNNYEWbP6Y&feature¼channel&list¼UL (Accessed 10 July 2012). 40. Aliriz˙a¯ Pana¯hiya¯n, Intiza¯r-i ʿA¯miya¯nih, Intiza¯r-i ʿA¯lima¯nih, Intiza¯r-i ʿA¯rifa¯nih ˙ ˙ ˙ (Tehran: Baya¯n-i Maʿnawı¯, 1391 [2012 – 13]), p. 110. 41. Ibid., p. 215.

180

NOTES

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133 –141

42. ‘Hujjatul Islam va al-Muslimı¯n Thaqafı¯, Muhaqqiq va Pizhu¯hishgar Dar ˙ ˙ Jalasih-yi Haftigi-yi Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h: Ta¯ Islamra¯ Ha¯kim Nih Kunı¯m va ˙ ˙ ˙ Ta¯ma¯mı¯-yi Abʿa¯d-i Huku¯matra¯ Islamı¯ Nih Kunı¯m, Nihz˙at-i Imam Ida¯mih ˙ Da¯rad’, Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, Khurda¯d 15 1392 [5 June 2013], p. 5. 43. Ibid. 44. Pana¯hiya¯n, Intiza¯r-i ʿA¯miya¯nih, Intiza¯r-i ʿA¯lima¯nih, Intiza¯r-i ʿA¯rifa¯nih, p. 118. ˙ ˙ ˙ 45. Ibid., p. 216. 46. Ibid., p. 213– 14.

Conclusion 1. Douglass Cecil North, John Joseph Wallis, and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders: a Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 15. 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid., p. 35. 4. Karim Sadjadpour, Reading Khamenei: the World View of Iran’s Most Powerful Leader (Washington D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2008), p. 3.

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INDEX

5 þ 1, 100, 102, 103, 104 9 Diy, newspaper, 93, 95 A¯ba¯dgara¯n, 54 ʿAbba¯sı¯, Hassan, 94, 95, 98, 99, 102, 106, 115, 121, 131, 132, 133 Abu¯ Ta¯lib, 103 ˙ Additional Protocol, 104 al-Afghani, Jama¯ludı¯n, 48 Afghanis, 94 Afghanistan, 94 A¯gha¯ja¯rı¯, Ha¯shim, 31, 34, 45 Ahmadinejad, Mahmoud, 3, 65, 88, 135, 140 accelerating the reappearance of the Mahdi, 128 close to Ansa¯r-i Hizbulla¯h, 58, 59 ˙ ˙ coming to power, 1, 47 conservative attacks, 57 dispute with Khamenei, 4 focused on the issue of the Mahdi, 122 holy light, 124, 125 and martyrs, 62, 112 messianic discourse, 123, 126 mismanagement of the economy, 121 and nuclear programme, 101 position regarding Palestine, 109 preparing the ground for the Mahdi, 127

presidential elections of 2005, 5, 54, 59, 120 presidential elections of 2009, 55, 56, 58, 86, 120 presidential election of 2017, 64 reign, 89 relationship to Masha¯ʾı¯, 60, 63 in the UN, 123 A¯khu¯ndza¯dih, Mı¯rza¯ Fath Ali, 49 ˙ al-Qaeda, 108 Alamdari, 13, 32 Ali, Imam, 24, 45, 70, 71, 72, 73, 76, 86, 87, 131, 132 A¯l-i Ahmad, Jala¯l, 84, 91 Westoxification, 84 Allah-Karam, Hussein, 6, 53 American embassy, 22, 32, 85 hostage crisis, 25 Amnesty International, 18 Ansari, Ali, 25, 56 Ansa¯r-u Allah, 52 ˙ A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha, 117, 119, 120 Arab League, 108 Arab Spring, 88, 107, 108, 128 ʾA¯rif, Muhammad Riz˙a¯, 89 Arjomand, Said, 122 ʿAshuraʾ, 71, 72, 73 ʿAshuraʾ 2010, 87 Ziya¯rat-i, 77

200

THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

ʿAskarʾuwla¯dı¯, Habı¯bullah, 54 ˙ ˙ Assembly of Experts, 12, 13, 14, 27, 140 1990 elections, 24 Atatu¨rk, 49 Atomic Energy Organization, 104 A¯vı¯nı¯, Murtiz˙a¯, 110, 111 Azghadı¯, Rahı¯m-Pu¯r, 67, 77, 83 ˙ Badr, 103 Baghdad, 126 Baghi, Emadeddin, 46 Bahrain, 107, 141 Bakhtyar, 27 Banı¯ Sa¯ʿidih, 71 Banisadr, Abolhassan, 18, 21, 28, 55, 57 al-Ba¯qir, Imam Muhammad, 122 Bası¯j, 43, 53, 64, 71, 73, 83, 85, 97, 110, 112 organization, 5, 18 professors, 63 Basra, 126 Baya¯t, Ayatollah Asadullah, 70 Bazargan, 17 Berlin, 27 Brinton, Crane, 8 Britain, see United Kingdom Canada, 101 Central Bank, Iran, 101, 102, 117 Chekhov, 115 Uncle Vanya, 115 China, 9 cinema, Iranian, 30, 98 civil society, 29, 32, 33, 46, 79, 83, 137 Coalition of Islamic Association (Muʾtalifih), 52, 54 Cohen, David S., 104 colonialism cultural, 93 informational, 93 Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 97, 98, 99

communists, 19, 20, 27 Tudeh (Tu¯dih), 18 conservative camp, 7, 26 conservatives, 27, 40, 47, 55, 57, 60, 64, 69, 70, 80, 89, 90, 98, 116, 137 as allies to the supreme leaders, 31 demonstrating in favour of Ahmadinejad, 56 division, 58 lack of trust of the international community, 113 pressure on Khatami, 28 supporting Ahmadinejad, 101 traditional, 23, 53, 54, 137 use of messianic discourse, 125 Council of Commanding Right and Forbidding Wrong, 98 Council of Expediency, 12, 13, 14 Coville, Thierry, 18, 32 cultural assaults, 92 and academia, 96 confrontation, 99 fight against, 95 praisable, 93 responses to, 97 as waged to weaken the regime, 100, 138 Cultural Revolutionary Council, 92 Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution, 92 cultural war, 90, 91, 100 Dabbagh, Soroush, 33 Defenders of the Shrine, 108 deviated group, 57, 58, 63, 127 Dihnamakı¯, Masʿu¯d, 53, 111 Faqr va Fahsha¯, 118 ˙ Ikhra¯jı¯ha¯, 113 Miʿra¯jı¯ha¯, 113 al-Duwlih, Amı¯n, 48 Edwards, Lyford, P., 8 Ehteshami, Anoushirvan, 5 Elam, 114 Ettelaat, newspaper, 60

INDEX Europe, 51 EU-3, 100 European Union, 101 Fada¯’iya¯n-i Islam, 50, 52, 64, 91 Fakha News, 78 Fakkih, 112 faqı¯h, 40, 68, 69, 70, 74, 77, 78 absolute role of the jurist, 20, 75, 79 absolute role of the faqı¯h, 26, vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, 4, 11, 12, 15, 34, 36, 39, 40, 43, 44, 47, 66, 67, 69, 70, 73, 74, 76, 77, 78, 79, 94, 135 vila¯yat-i mutlaqih-yi faqı¯h, 40, 67, 68, ˙ Farajı¯-Da¯na¯, Riz˙a¯, 3, 89 Farhadi, Asghar, 98 ˙ The Separation, 98 Fa¯timih, the Prophet’s daughter, 72, ˙ 123 Faz˙lı¯nizha¯d, Paya¯m, 82 fitnih, 86, 87, 88, 89, 108 France, 9, 100, 101 Freemasons, 95, 96 Freud, 98 Front for the Islamic Revolution Stability (Jibhih-yi Pa¯yda¯rı¯-yi Inqila¯b-i Islami), 58 Fukuyama, Francis, 14 fundamentalists, 32, 33, 60 Ganji, Akbar, 29, 34, 45, 79, 85, 88, 122 Geneva, 104 Germany, 27, 100 Ghamari-Tabrizi, 18 Green Movement, 56, 86, 87, 88, 89, 98, 108, 120 Guardian Council, 12, 13, 14, 68, 77, 119 the approval of ʾA¯rif, 89 the approval of candidates for the presidential elections of 2019, 55 the Assembly of Experts elections of 1990, 24 dismissing Masha¯ʾı¯, 63

201

exclusion of reformists from the parliamentary elections of 2000, 31 Gulf states, 22 Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), 104, 105, 107, 108 Gulf War 1990– 1, 25 Haft-i Subh, 60 ˙ ˙ Haj stampede, 108 ˙ Hajja¯rian, Saʿı¯d, 29 ˙ Hamidanı¯, Ayatollah Nu¯rı¯, 85 hardline conservatives, 1, 2, 15, 32, 35, 48, 52, 60, 70, 71, 72, 77, 83, 111, 116, 125, 130, 131 Arab Spring, 107 attacking Khatami, 88, 120 attacking Muntazari, 85 attacking Rouhani, 3, 120 belief that Iran should stand against pressure, 113 belief that sanctions were not responsible for the economic crisis, 121 broad coalition, 53 continuing to see Mu¯savı¯ and Karru¯bı¯ as a threat, 89 cultural confrontation with the outside world, 90 – 100 demonstrations against the Saudi regime, 108 desire to keep the revolution alive, 112 discourse, 80, 138 doctrine of Mahdism, 134 the economic pain of the people, 118 ending the country’s reform, 30 historical roots, 47 idealists, 101 ideology, 3, 4, 6, 7, 16, 58, 61, 65, 66, 76, 106, 109, 120, 136, 137, 138, 140 legitimate violence, 86 linking the Mahdi to the current regime, 127

202

THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

newspapers, 81 normalisation, 102 position toward the supreme leader, 78 protecting the country’s cultural heritage, 62 Rafsanjani’s strongest opponents, 114 relationship to Rafsanjani, 69 relationship to the supreme leader, 54 republican system, 75 rejecting foreign economic intervention, 117 re-radicalisation, 135 rhetoric before Ahmadinejad, 126 Rouhani’s foreign policy approach, 104 struggle with the A¯qa¯za¯dih-ha, 119 supreme leader as God’s choice, 73 support of the absolute role of the jurist, 79 supporting Ahmadinejad, 63 the usage of the Mahdi, 128 views on Khatami’s rhetoric, 28 hardliners, 23, 26, 27, 89, 97, 103 Hashemi, Mahdi, 52 Hawza, 26, 43, 128 ˙ Fayz˙iyya School, 43, 88 hegemony cultural, 94 economic, 94 hija¯b, 49, 92, 97, 99 Hizbulla¯h, 6, 22, 70, 71, 73, 82, 83, ˙ 85, 87, 130, 131, 133 Hizbulla¯h, Ansa¯r, 5, 52, 53, 58, 59, ˙ ˙ 61, 64, 85, 89, 111 human rights, 23, 26, 28, 29, 32, 37, 38, 39, 44, 48, 79, 94, 137 International Declaration of Human Rights, 37 Islamic, 84 Huntington, Samuel, 8, 10 Clash of Civilizations, 30 Hussein, Imam, 71, 72, 73, 77, 88, 109, 110

Hussein, Saddam, 14, 62, 109 Hu¯thı¯, Rebels, 108 ˙ ijtiha¯d, 35 Imam Khomeini Education and Research Institute, 97 Imamı¯, Hussein and Ali Muhammad, 50 Imamı¯, Saʿı¯d, 30 Imams, 70, 79, 128 Shiʿi, 69, 71, 86, 88, 99, 122, 138 Twelve, 69, 70, 74, 78, 80, 125 imperialism, 114 inflation, 19, 116, 120, 121 Institution of Bright Future, 133 International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 100, 104 Intiza¯r-i Java¯n, magazine, 133 ˙ Iran University of Science and Technology, 63 Iraq, 14, 25, 125, 126 Iran– Iraq war, 3, 5, 6, 18, 22, 64, 72, 73, 83, 90, 100, 103, 109, 110, 112, 113, 114, 115, 121, 135, 137, 138, 140 damages, 19 imposed war, 19 Isfahan, 85, 94, 113 Islamic democratic regime, 40, 41 Islamic Republic Party (IRP), 22 Islamic State of Iraq and Sham (ISIS), 108, 109 Islamists, 12, 17, 20, 23, 27, 51, 80, 137 Israel, 51, 61, 88, 101, 105, 108, 109, 124, 125, 141 Jaha¯n, newspaper, 57 Jamaran, 72 Jam-e Jam, newspaper, 60 Jamkara¯n, 122 Jannatı¯, Ayatollah Ahmad, 5, 30, 53, 54, 98, 106, 107 Japan, 101 Java¯n, newspaper, 57

INDEX Java¯nfikr, 125 Jibhih, newspaper, 77, 112 jihad, 95, 107 Joint Plan of Action, 103, 104 Kabı¯r, Amı¯r, 48 Kadivar, Mohsen, 31, 33, 34, 37, 38, 39, 40, 44, 85 Kamrava, Mehran, 8, 9, 10 Karbala, 72, 73, 108, 109, 110 Karba¯schı¯, 31 Karru¯bı¯, Mahdi, 24, 25, 29, 55, 56, 87 house arrest, 89 muna¯fiq, 88 Kasravı¯, Ahmad, 49, 50, 52 al-Ka¯tib, Ahmad, 122 Kayhan, newspaper, 57, 87, 94, 107 Kermanshah, 114 Khalkha¯lı¯, Sa¯diq, 24, 25 ˙ Khamenei, Ayatollah Ali, 4, 6, 26, 45, 77, 93, 103, 116, 128, 130, 131, 133, 137, 140 absolute power, 68 accusing the intellectuals of benefiting from attacking Islam, 84 alliance with Rafsanjani, 23, 24, 25, 29 caution regarding Iran’s relationship with the outside world, 125 chosen by the Assembly of Experts, 27 dispute with Muntazari, 32, 43 as president, 19, 21 reaction to the events of 1999, 129 sanctions, 102 speech, 56, 87 supporting the reconstruction plan, 114 time spent with fighters, 113 Kharijits, 86, 87 Khatami, Ahmad, 43, 87, 106 Khatami, Muhammad, 1, 26, 31, 89, 101, 102, 113, 116, 140 1997 presidential elections, 27, 29, 32

203

accession to power, 46 administration, 117 attacked by hardline conservatives, 120 caution during the crisis of 2009, 88 criticisms of fundamentalists, 33 criticisms of the understanding of religion in Iran, 44 departure from power, 30 dialogue among civilizations, 30, 46, 106, 107 interview with CNN, 30 ‘neither East nor West’, 22 – 23 presidency, 3 reformation era of, 5, 7 reformist reign of, 135 relationship with his opponents, 28 tenure, 6, 54 Khatami, Muhammad Riz˙a¯, 31 Khaybar, 103 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 15, 23, 24, 43, 65, 73, 77, 80 the 1989 constitution, 68 approved acts of violence, 86 Arab Spring, 107 blessing of the revolutionary courts, 17 clear picture of the regime, 12 concept of the oppressed and weak, 118 Council of Expediency, 13 criticisms of the traditional Shiʿi belief, 11 Cultural Revolution Council, 92 death of, 1, 4, 23, 25, 26, 27, 101, 112, 135 divine diplomacy, 102 doctrine of vila¯yat-i Faqı¯h, 34 and factionalism, 20 – 2 fatwa, 85 head of the regime, 67 hostility towards the US, 106 Israel, 109 Mahdi, 128, 132, 133

204

THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

mass executions, 137 reign, 6 on the representation of the jurist of the Twelve Imams, 69 residency in Qom, 72 revolutionary vision, 54 and the Shah’s foreign policy, 105 theory of the absolute role of the jurisprudent, 40 Khu¯dı¯, 15, 20, 24, 79, 83, 89, 90, 136, 140 Ghayr-i Khu¯dı¯, 15, 20, 79, 83, 90, 136 Khurda¯d Movement, second, 29, 81 Khu¯ʾı¯nı¯ha¯, 24, 29, 32 Khura¯sa¯n, 73, 129 Khura¯sa¯nı¯, 73, 127, 129, 130, 131 Khuzestan, 114 Kimmel, Michael S., 9 Kirma¯nı¯, Mı¯rza¯ khan, 49 Kiya¯n, 80 Halqih, 80 ˙ Kufa, 71, 73, 77 Ku¯shkı¯, Muhammad Sa¯diq, 121 ˙ La¯rı¯ja¯nı¯, Ayatollah Sadiq, 119 ˙ Lebanon, 22 leftists, 20, 23, 26, 68, 69 liberalism, 88, 95, 96, 115, 116, 121, 131, 133 liberal democrats, 83 liberals, 18, 19, 27, 70, 79 local councils, 31 Madda¯h (panegyrist), 72 ˙ Mahda¯vı¯-Ka¯nı¯, Ayatollah, 54 Mahdi, 4, 11, 70, 72, 73, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 138 Hidden Imam, 122, 124, 125, 131, 132, 138 Imam of the Age, 122 Mahdism doctrine, 131, 132, 133, 134

Master of Time, 128 Muhammad bin al-Hasan al-ʿAskarı¯, 122 Qa¯ʾim, 122 Twelfth Imam, 66, 69, 78, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 132, 133, 134, 138 Majd, Hooman, 56 Majlis, 3, 13, 14, 21, 22, 23, 26, 31, 55, 57, 58, 69, 76, 89, 104, 118, 136, 140 elections of 1992, 24 elections of 2000, 31 elections of 2004, 55 elections of 2012, 58, 59 Malı¯ka, magazine, 133 Mao Zedong, 9 Marjaʿ Taqlı¯d, 12, 45, 68, 69, 84, 85, 132 Marxists, 19, 20, 27, 83 Marxism, 20 Masha¯ʾı¯, Isfandya¯r Rahı¯m, 57, 58, 59, ˙ 60, 61, 64, 127 presidential election of 2013, 63 Mashhad, 99, 119 Matsunaga, Yasuyuki, 34 al-Mawʿu¯d, journal, 133 Medina, 103 Medvedev, Dmitry, 63 messianism, 125 discourse, 125, 126, 134 doctrine, 131 ideology, 141 Middle East, 51, 107, 124, 125, 126, 127, 141 Milani, Abbas, 106 millenarianism, 125 Miller, Arthur, 115 The Crucible, 115 Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance, 99 minorities, 30 Miri, Maziar, 98 Saʿa¯dat A¯ba¯d, 98 Mı¯r-Shakka¯k, Yu¯suf-Ali, 84

INDEX Misba¯h Yazdı¯, Muhammad Taqı¯, 5, 43, ˙ ˙ 54, 58, 59, 63, 67, 69, 74 – 7, 82, 86, 88, 93 – 7, 101, 106, 111, 118, 127, 131 Mishkı¯nı¯, Ayatollah, 54 moderates, 2, 15, 26 Islamists, 23 right, 5 Moslem, Mehdi, 5 Muawiya, 71 Mufsidı¯n-i filʾarz˙, 77, 87 Muha¯rib, 87 Muhtashamı¯, 24, 25 ˙ Muja¯hidı¯n-i Khalq, 18, 20, 70, 83, 88 Muntazari, Ayatollah, 21 attacking the supreme leader, 43 house attacked, 85 objection to the mass executions of 1988, 22 resignation, 67 urging Khatami to put pressure on the regime, 32 Mu¯savı¯, Mı¯r-Hussein, 87, 88 2009 presidential election, 55, 56 dispute with Khamenei, 23 government in the 1980s, 114 house arrest, 89 as prime minister, 21 supporting Muhammad Khatami, 29 Muslihı¯, 57 ˙ ˙ Muslim Students Followers of the Imam’s Line, 32 Mykonos Incident, 27 Nabavı¯, Bihza¯d, 24, 29 Nabaviya¯n, Sayyid Muhammad, 77, 101 Nahrawa¯n, 86, 87 Najaf, 22, 108 Najafı¯, Muhammad Ali, 89 Na¯sikh wa Mansu¯kh, 38, 39 nationalists, 18, 19, 27, 79, 83 ‘neither East nor West’, 22, 106 New York, 106

205

Nigira¯nı¯m (We are Concerned), 100 nuclear programme, 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 113 Nu¯rı¯, Abdullah, 31, 34 Nu¯rı¯, Na¯tiq, 70 ˙ Nusra Front, 108 Nye, Joseph, 90, 91 Othman, 76 Pahlavi, era, 25, 115 monarchy, 19 Pahlavi Riz˙a¯, 49 Pahliva¯n, Changı¯z, 29 Palestine, 51, 109 Pana¯hiya¯n, Aliriz˙a¯, 73, 77, 87, 109, 131, 133, 134 Paris, 27 parliament, see Majlis Pettee, 8 Posch, Walter, 5 poverty, 19, 30, 36, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121 pragmatists, 64, 106, 111, 137, 138, 139 followers of Rafsanjani, 115 Prophet Muhammad, 38, 40, 42, 45, 69, 70, 71, 74, 78, 80, 84, 86, 96, 103, 122, 129, 138 Putin, Vladimir, 63 Qajar, 48 Qatar monarchy, 60 Qom, 24, 43, 72, 88, 113, 124 Quds Day, 70 radicals, 26, 27, 32, 68 purge of, 24, 25, 29 Rafsanjani, Fa¯ʾizih, 120 Rafsanjani, Hashemi, 5, 6, 26, 57, 69, 101, 113, 119, 139, 140 alliance with Khamenei (supreme leader), 23, 24, 25, 29, 68

206

THE ETERNAL REVOLUTION

attacked by hardline conservatives, 102, 120 era of reconstruction, 53 and opening up the economy, 135 presidential elections of 2005, 54 reconstruction plan, 25, 114 reign, 28, 30, 53, 80, 117 Servants of the Reconstruction, 115 as speaker of the parliament, 55 Rafsanjani, Mahdi, 120 Ra¯h-i Nuw, 80 Raja¯ʾı¯, 21 Rajabı¯, Fa¯timih, 82, 102, 118, 123 ˙ Rasa¯ʾı¯, Hamı¯d, 88 reformist camp, 23 faction, 5 intellectuals, 34, 35 movement, 31, 32, 33, 35, 80, 86, 88, 139 thinkers, 30 reformists, 2, 3, 15, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 43, 45, 47, 55, 57, 61, 62, 64, 66, 70, 79, 81 – 7, 89, 90, 99, 106, 137, 138 religious intellectuals, 31, 33, 34, 46, 66, 79 – 84, 86, 88, 90, 137, 138, 139 Revolution of 1978– 9, 5, 34, 53, 54, 72, 75, 105, 107, 109, 125, 127, 91, 136 Revolution, Constitutional, 48, 49, 91 Revolutionary Guards, 5, 19, 29, 46, 57, 60, 71, 141 Riz˙a¯ʾı¯, Mohsen, 55 Robespierre, Maximilien, 9 Rouhani, Hassan, 3, 65, 89, 99, 100, 103, 104, 107, 113, 120 phone call with American president, 106 Rushdie, Salman, 22, 85 Russia, 14 Sadri, Houman, 10, 101 Safavı¯, Navva¯b, 50, 51, 52, 64, 91, 98 ˙

Safavı¯, Rahı¯m, 46, 71 ˙ ˙ Salafis, 109 Salafi-Jihadi groups, 108 Salahshu¯r, Farajullah, 98 ˙ Sala¯m, newspaper, 30, 32 Salehi-Isfahani, Djavad, 116, 117 Sa¯lihı¯, Ali Akbar, 104, 107 ˙ ˙ Samarrah, 108 Satan worshippers, 95, 96 Saudi Arabia, 25, 107, 108 Sazegara, Mohsen, 29, 46 School of Natural History of Revolution, 8 secularism, 33, 35, 85, 94, 131, 133 Shabistarı¯, Mujtahid, 33, 34, 46 Shah, 14, 17, 20, 27, 33, 37, 52, 92, 105, 107, 109, 128, 137 Sha¯kirı¯, Mujtaba¯, 83 Shalamchih, 71, 78, 81, 82, 85, 112 Shamsulva¯ʿizı¯n, Mashallah, 46 Sharı¯ʿatı¯, Ali, 34, 35, 83, 137 Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, Ayatollah, 18 Sharı¯ʿatmada¯rı¯, Hussein, 87, 88, 102, 103 Shiʿa, 11, 34, 44, 45, 49, 69, 108, 109, 122– 5, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134 Shiʿism, 34 –7, 45, 46, 49, 80, 122, 123, 127, 133 Safavid Shiʿism, 35 Shı¯ra¯zı¯, Ayatollah Maka¯rim, 43, 84 Shı¯ra¯zı¯, Ha¯fiz, 78 ˙ ˙ Shuʿab-i Abı¯ Ta¯lib, 103 ˙ Sı¯ja¯nı¯, Ali Asghar, 128 ˙ Zuhu¯r Bisya¯r Nazdı¯k Ast, 127, 129 ˙ Sipihsa¯la¯r, 48 social justice, 20, 116, 121, 138 social sciences, 92, 96 ilm-i bu¯mı¯ (native science), 96 Islamic Social Sciences, 96, 97 Society of Militant Clergy (SMC), 22 soft power, 90, 91 soft war, 91, 92, 93, 96, 100 geography of, 94 Muja¯hidı¯n, 95

INDEX Soroush, Abdolkarim, 31, 33, 42, 44, 80, 85, 88 Minimal Role of Religion and Maximum Role of Religion, 35 religious absolutism, 80 Theoretical Contraction and Expansion of Shariʿa, 36 theory of religious pluralism, 36, 37 South Korea, 19 Soviet Union, 9, 50 Special Court for the Clergy, 40 Stalin, Josef, 9 Strait of Hormuz, 104, 105 Subh, 112, 118 ˙ ˙ Subh-i Duku¯hih, 112, 118, ˙ ˙ 119, 126 Sulta¯n, former Saudi Crown Prince, 107 ˙ Syria, 108, 109 Taba¯tiba¯ı¯, Ayatollah, 94 ˙ Tabriz, 89 ta¯ghu¯t (idol), 74, 76 Takeyh, Roy, 53 Ta¯liqa¯nı¯, Ayatollah, 128 ˙ Tehran, 45, 55, 56, 74, 82, 85, 91, 102, 109, 112, 113, 129, 134 Tehran University, 31, 56, 61 Thaqafı¯, Hujjat al-Islam, 133 ˙ Tha¯r-u Allah, 52 Turkey, 19 unemployment, 114, 116, 117, 121 United Kingdom, 50, 100, 101 United Nations (UN), 124 General Assembly, 19 Security Council (UNSC), 100 United States of America (USA), 25, 88, 93, 94, 99, 101, 106, 107, 109, 118, 136 Department of Treasury and State, 104 ‘Great Satan’, 105

207

UNSC Resolutions 598, 103 1747, 101 Usu¯lı¯, 69 Va¯iz Tabası¯, Ayatollah, 119 ˙ Vali Faqı¯h, vila¯yat-i faqı¯h, vila¯yat-i mutlaqih-yi faqı¯h, see faqı¯h ˙ Varzi, Roxanne, 111 VCRs, 92 Venezuela, 14 West, 33, 46, 74, 84, 94, 100 confronting the West, 114 cultural assaults against, 99 cultural confrontation, 132, 131 cultural and political influences, 118 enemies of the Islamic Republic, 25 factions influenced by, 90 hardline conservatives’ views on, 66 independence from, 51 influence of, 91 modern ideas in, 49 political and economic influences, 102 radical discourse towards, 107 theories produced in, 96 Western Azerbaijan, 114 White House, 109 World War I, 49 Ya¯ Litha¯ra¯t, 57, 61, 81, 87, 88, 99, 112, 118, 128, 130 al-Yama¯nı¯, Ahmad al-Hasan, 125 Yaʿqu¯bı¯, Ali, 125 Yazı¯d, 109 Yazidies, 108 Yemen, 108 Yousefi-Eshkevari, Hasan, 31, 34, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 85 Zarı¯f, Muhammad Java¯d, 104 ˙ Zı¯ba¯kala¯m, Sa¯diq, 46, 49, 61 ˙ Zionism, 98 Zweiri, Mahjoob, 5